

UPPER CLASS WOMEN AND MEN IN THE UNITED STATES:  
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE SIGNIFICANCE  
OF GENDER AND CLASS

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## ABSTRACT

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This study concerns itself with the influence of two key determinants of stratification in the United States--class and gender--on the roles, activities, and attitudes of its sample upper class members, giving particular attention to responding upper class women. Spheres of investigation include demographics, domestic division of labor, paid and volunteer work, and relationship to wealth. It was this study's purpose not only to provide a description of sample members' class- and gender-related roles, activities, and attitudes in these spheres, but also, based on these findings, to suggest their possible bases and implications. Beyond these principal aims, a further purpose of the study was to investigate, in relation to the interview sample, the relevance of certain existing sex-role theories and portrayals of upper class women.

The principal conclusion drawn from this research is that, despite sample upper class women's and men's overall parity in wealth-based power potential, the women, nevertheless, appeared to remain in a male-subordinate position within their class. This was reflected in findings that, relative to the men, responding women were characterized by a greater domestic identification, a weaker connection to the

productive domain, more restricted access to top positions in the corporate and non-profit or charitable sectors, and less active management of their wealth. The theoretical framework suggested as best equipped to explain this apparent status inconsistency among sample upper class women is that which utilizes a class-based analysis.

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I dedicate this work to my family and to Mark, whose never-flagging patience, confidence in me, and love enabled and motivated me to stay the course and bring this project to completion.

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## INTRODUCTION

As a means of combating and eradicating inequality and discrimination in the United States, understanding the bases and implications of social stratification<sup>1</sup> is undoubtedly of utmost importance. In recognition of this, much research attention has been given the topic of stratification both by social science, in general, and by anthropology, in particular. In the social sciences, a commonly held view of the American structure of stratification is that it is multi-dimensionally based (Barber, 1968; Bottomore, 1966; Lipset, 1968; Lipset & Zetterberg, 1966; Otto, 1975; Rodman, 1968; Rose, 1967; Weber, 1966). And, while this conceptualization undeniably has some validity and analytic utility, it, nevertheless, obscures the fact that certain of these dimensions appear to be more powerful than others as predictors of the differential access to, and control over, society's critical resources which underlies not only individuals' distinct positions within the stratification structure, but also the roles, attitudes, and functions associated with these positions. Two such key stratification determinants are economic class<sup>2</sup> and gender, and it was this

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<sup>1</sup>Social stratification is here defined as the hierarchical ordering of individuals according to their differential "control over access to basic resources, control over productive processes, and control over social energy" (Harris, 1975, p. 407).

<sup>2</sup>Economic class is here defined as a category of people "who possess similar forms of control (or lack of control) over basic resources, the tools and techniques of production, and the flow of socially available energy" (Harris, 1975, p. 396).

study's purpose to examine the interrelationship of these factors, as well as the nature of their operation and the implications of their operation at the upper class<sup>1</sup> level, with special attention given to upper class women.

The choice of the upper class, and its female members, as this study's units of analysis derives from two premises. One is that adequate theory can only grow from complete consideration of a sociocultural phenomenon (Domhoff, 1970; Nader, 1969). And, the other is that, in constructing theories regarding the conditions affecting, the implications of, and the interrelationship between class and gender hierarchies, social science investigations have generally neglected the upper class, and particularly upper class women. Taken together, these two premises suggest not only that existing class- and gender-related stratification theories are characterized by both a "downward" (i.e., lower-classes-oriented) and a male bias, but also that they are of uncertain status, and should be only tentatively accepted until further research eliminates such biases. It was in light of the need for such research that the two units of analysis were selected and the present investigation undertaken.

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<sup>1</sup>Upper class refers to individuals who monopolize control over basic resources, the tools and techniques of production, and the flow of socially available energy. For the purposes of the present study, the upper class was taken to be characterized by "hereditary propertied . . . wealthholders, . . . who descend from the fortune builders of past generations, who belong to financially prominent families, and whose individual wealth derives from and forms part of a much greater generic, family-based fortune" (Lundberg, 1968, pp. 24, 163). Justification for such a definition derives from the assumption that (1) control over vast wealth signifies, under capitalism, disproportionate access to and control over society's critical resources and (2) social prominence (legitimation) facilitates such access and control.

Since existing scientifically-based literature dealing with the upper class and upper class women in the United States is extremely limited, the first aim of the present research was to collect descriptive data in relation to which analyses could be formulated and prior theories checked. To this end, data were generated regarding sample members' domestic, extra-domestic, and wealth-related activities, roles, and attitudes. These descriptive data then served as the basis for the study's second aim: to examine the differential operation of class and gender as determinants of access to, and exercise of, power<sup>1</sup> at the sample upper class level. It is hoped that the data and findings presented will provide preliminary insights into these areas of investigation and, at the same time, help counteract the male bias inherent in current upper class theory and the downward bias inherent in existing stratification theory.

This dissertation comprises 7 chapters. In Chapter I, theoretical and methodological considerations are reviewed. Chapter II presents and examines sample demographic data. And, Chapters III through VI, respectively, cover information pertaining to the domestic, paid work, volunteer work, and money-related spheres characterizing the research sample. The dissertation concludes with Chapter VII in which a summation of the investigation's principal findings is provided.

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<sup>1</sup>Power, in this study, refers to an individual's disproportionately great access to, and influence on, society's critical resources. Power can be inferred from several indicators, one of which is great wealth. Others include (1) authority over major corporations, foundations, and private universities and (2) participation in, and influence on, pivotal government bodies and decision-making groups (Domhoff, 1970, pp. 105-106; Harris, 1975).

## Chapter I

### THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Two bodies of theory underlie this study's examination of the interrelationship between class and gender hierarchies. These are sex-role theory and stratification theory. And, because this investigation examines factors specifically associated with the relationship between the American upper class and its women members, this section will discuss those theoretical aspects which support the use of class as the unit of analysis and which describe the bases of women's status under conditions of class stratification.

To begin, within stratification theory--as it applies to the contemporary United States--two prevailing and competing theoretical perspectives exist. The first of these is labeled the "status continuum model" of stratification and the second, the "ruling class model." While the historical roots of stratification theory, in general, go back to Marx, Weber, and Functionalism, it is the influence of the latter two which predominates in the status continuum view of U.S. stratification. Following Weber, this view holds that class, although a dimension of stratification, is only one of its dimensions (along with prestige--or status--and party), and not its organizing principle. Central to this theory is the contention that stratification by prestige interposes a range of status groups between the two major classes described by Marx. In Marx's view, stratification was based on a division between classes determined by the relationship to the

means of production. However, in the Weberian characterization, wherein classes are viewed as separated by a range of status groups, stratification appears to be based on a continuum of status positions (Bottomore, 1966, p. 25).

Two major drawbacks inherent in this status-focused theory render its conclusions regarding the nature of social stratification untenable. First, the theory itself is founded almost entirely on investigations carried out among members of the lower classes (Domhoff, 1970, pp. 5-7). It is not surprising, therefore, that the theory derived from these investigations not only supposes the absence of objective class distinctions in the United States, but also overlooks the possibly important influence of the upper class with regard to maintaining or changing the structure of stratification. As Domhoff (1970) points out, when one begins by investigating the upper class, the apparent stratification continuum "hardens into a social class with more or less definite boundaries and class consciousness" (p. 174).

The second problem in status-oriented stratification theory has to do with the measurement strategies on which it is based. Standard measurement strategies, such as informer ratings, self-identification, sociometrics, and life-style indicator ratings must rely on the awareness of people within the community studied of the existing structure of stratification. Each of these strategies has come under criticism for being improperly based on subjective perceptual factors, which at best result in no more than a very rough approximation of perceived class structure. Another measurement strategy, the multi-dimensional approach, is meant to circumvent this difficulty. This

approach uses allegedly objective indicators, such as occupation, income, education, and ethnic background to measure social class. The purpose of using the multidimensional approach, according to its proponents, is to uncover increasingly precise statements about how these dimensions are related to one another, thereby achieving a clearer picture of the nature of the stratification system (Barber, 1968, p. 292). However, again, because application of this measurement strategy has largely excluded the upper class, the indicators show only loose correlation and the stratification system appears based on continua rather than on discrete classes.

By focusing exclusively on status, the Functionalist school has further contributed to the notion that stratification in the United States is primarily based on status continua. In the Functionalist formulation, stratification is a necessary societal mechanism which, through status rewards, encourages people to seek the diverse positions critical to the smooth working of any complex social system (Lipset, 1968, p. 305). A corollary to this is that differences in status (or class) really rest on individual differences in aptitude and talent. The hierarchical system is seen as open, where class barriers are always surmountable, depending on individual qualifications for filling a position (Schumpeter, 1966, p. 45).

Despite Functionalist claims to the contrary, the validity of the above propositions cannot be accepted. For instance, the notion that stratification is necessary for the stability and functioning of complex societies (thereby justifying the existence of structural inequality) loses credibility when one considers that the persistence

of the stratification structure may largely be due to the fact that a privileged class maintains and benefits from it. However, there is little substantiation for the argument that systems of differential reward operate to ensure a correspondence between natural ability and rank. On the contrary, it has been shown that inequalities in income--an important feature of differential reward--are largely dependent upon unequal distribution of property through inheritance, rather than on differences in earned income (Bottomore, 1966, p. 11).

Due to its inherent limitations, the status continuum model of stratification is an inappropriate theoretical framework for addressing the types of research questions integral to the proposed study. Thus, an alternative theoretical construct is needed, which can more satisfactorily and accurately account for the nature and structure of stratification in the United States. Ruling class theory seems to provide such a construct and, at the same time, supports the use of upper class women as the unit of analysis for the present study.

In support of the ruling class model, evidence from a number of studies shows the United States' stratification system to be fundamentally class-defined (in terms of this study's economic class definition), with decisionmaking power both consolidated in, and exercised by and to the advantage of, the upper class (Baltzell, 1953, 1958; Bottomore, 1966; Coles, 1977; Domhoff, 1970; Harris, 1975; Lundberg, 1968; Ostrander, n.d. (a,b,c,d), 1980; Thompson, 1981).<sup>1</sup> Since, under

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<sup>1</sup>To justify the use of a class (rather than a status) analytic approach to this research, it is necessary to demonstrate that stratification in the U.S. is class-based. This is not to say, however, that, in doing so, the significance or operation of status factors is denied. Rather, it is to say that, for the purposes of this study, the concept of economic class constitutes the more useful analytic tool.

capitalism, wealth, class, and power are closely interrelated, perhaps the most unequivocal of this evidence comes from statistical data on wealth distribution and corporate stockholding in the U.S. Coles (1977), Chesler and Goodman (1976), Harris (1975), Lundberg (1968), Osman (1977), Smith, Franklin, and Wion (1975), and Thompson (1981) have all documented the extraordinary concentration of wealth and power that appears to obtain. To cite just a few of the statistics:

The top  $\frac{1}{2}$  of 1% of U.S. consumer units owned 22% of all personal wealth; the top 2.5% of wealth-owning consumer units owned 43% of all personal wealth; and, the net worth of the bottom 10% of all U.S. consumer units was negative. (Osman, 1977, p. 397)

Trust fund assets are highly concentrated: in 1968, the total value of funds held in personal trusts was approximately \$138 billion; in 1969, the top  $\frac{1}{2}$  of 1% of U.S. wealthholders owned 85% of the value of all trust assets, and the top 1% owned 92%. (Osman, 1977, pp. 401-402)

The "super-rich" in the U.S. comprised those adults with greater than \$60,000 net worth: this was only 4.4% of the adult population, but held 35.6% of the nation's personally owned net worth; people with \$500,000 or more comprised only .3% of the adult population, but owned 12.6% of the net worth of all people; people with \$1,000,000 or more comprised .1% of the adult population, but held 8.1% of all personal net worth; by contrast, 53% of all adults in 1969 would have had a net worth of no more than \$3000, had they sold all their possessions and paid off their debts. (Smith et al., 1975, p. 9)

Only 1.3% of the adult population owned stock worth \$60,000 or more, and this constituted 53.3% of all privately held stock. The top 1% of all shareowners (about .2% of the total adult population) owned almost 1/3 of all privately held stock. (Smith et al., 1975, pp. 17-18)

The most affluent 1% of U.S. families and individuals accounted for 47% of dividend income received and 51% of the market value of stock owned by all families, while 10% of the wealthiest Americans accounted for 71% of dividend income and 71% of market value. (Chesler & Goodman, 1976, p. 53)

With regard to shareowning, Smith et al. (1975) note that ownership of a small fraction of a company's outstanding stock, in many cases, gives control over all its assets and, therefore, ownership of corporate stock may confer power over assets of much greater value than the stock itself. From their estimate that a "super-rich" 4.4% of the adult population owns 60% of the value of all privately held stock, these researchers conclude that this fraction of the population--for all practical purposes--controlled all corporate assets (p. 20).

Concentration of wealth, of stockholding, of control over entire corporate assets, and of power in the corporate world itself are the critical keys to class-based stratification and to the disproportionate power of the upper class in the United States. As Smith et al. (1975) state, "wealth and power are not the same thing. Yet, wealth is a fertile source of power, even if power is not always born of wealth" (p. 20). And, as put even more strongly by Harris (1975), class stratification is founded on differential

control over access to basic resources, control over productive processes, and control over social energy. Control over corporate business activity is control over all three of these dimensions of stratification. . . . it is clear that the daily routines of U.S. culture must to a large extent be controlled by those who control the corporations. (p. 407)

If it is assumed that much control converges in the hands of the privileged few, then it is possible to speak of a distinct upper class. This class, as several investigators have stressed (Baltzell, 1953, 1958; Bottomore, 1966; Domhoff, 1970; Harris, 1975; Lundberg, 1968; Osman, 1977), has had a high degree of integrity over time, due to inheritance of wealth and to endogamy. And, while enormous wealth is

perhaps the most fundamental characteristic defining the upper class (Baltzell, 1953; Domhoff, 1970, p. 32), it has been proposed that this class can also be defined operationally by its several indicators (Baltzell, 1953; Domhoff, 1970; Kavalier, 1960; Ostrander, n.d. (c)). These indicators, which include being listed in certain social registers or blue books, having attended certain private schools, and being a member of certain exclusive clubs (Domhoff, 1970, pp. 21-29) appear, to an unfortunate degree, to be male-biased. They are, nevertheless, useful as an indirect--albeit imperfect--approach to identifying upper class members.

Having argued and given evidence for the existence of a class system and a distinct upper class in the United States, it is relevant to go further and learn in what ways the upper class might also be a "ruling" class--a class characterized by fundamental consensus regarding the political and economic objectives that underlie its actions and which possesses and uses determinative political influence. In The Higher Circles, Domhoff (1970) demonstrated that the channels used by upper class individuals (mostly male) to influence political decisions are their foundations, associations, committees, and institutes. According to Domhoff, the purpose of these organizations is to "maintain and manage a socioeconomic system which is organized in such a way that it yields an amazing proportion of its wealth to a miniscule upper class of big businessmen and their descendents" (p. 107). And, although the upper class may not exhibit consensus on how to handle each political and economic problem, Domhoff maintains that, with regard to this fundamental goal, it stands essentially united.

Thus far, evidence has been presented arguing the validity of using a class-based approach for the current research. What has not been discussed is sex-role theory, its relationship to class theory, and its application to upper class women. As mentioned earlier, generally speaking, within the social sciences, while research on the upper class has been relatively scarce, investigation of women within this class has been virtually nonexistent. And, although it is true that in the last two decades great strides have been made in the field of women's studies, contributing much to the re-emphasis and review of women's relationships to society and culture, these efforts, for the most part, have not been directed towards an analysis of women in the upper class. Mostly, such social science research has sought the origin of women's subjugation, by examining evidence from biology, primatology, and pre-state societies, or it has focused on role and status determinants of women of the lower classes in state societies.

While some of the most recent research pertaining to sex-gender systems suggests not only that gender hierarchy may not be a universal phenomenon, but also that the formation of gender constructs may be mediated by such factors as kinship system, marriage patterns, political systems, situation, context, and meaning (Atkinson, 1982), nevertheless, in general, over the last two decades, most such research has fallen into one of the two main theoretical camps.

On the one side there are those who perceive women's inferior position relative to men to be primarily rooted in a combination of biological and ideological factors (Chesler & Goodman, 1976; Chodorow, 1974; Epstein, 1970; Gough, 1975; Knudsen, 1969; Morris, 1968; Ortner,

1974; Poloma & Garland, 1971; Rosaldo, 1974; Sanday, 1973, 1974; Suelze, 1970; Tiger, 1969; Tiger & Fox, 1971). On the other side, however, are those who reject this thesis (although not necessarily denying that these factors may have some relevance) and who assert, instead, that women's subjugation evolved, and persists, primarily as a result of historical and material conditions (Boserup, 1970; Bossen, 1975; Coulson, Magas, & Wainright, 1975; Dalla Costa & James, 1972; Dobbins, 1977; Draper, 1975; Ehrenreich & English, 1975; Engels, 1972; Frankford & Snitow, 1972; Friedl, 1975; Grabiner & Cooper, 1973; Hartmann, 1976; Kolko, 1979; Leacock, 1972, 1975, 1978; Mullings, 1976; Oakley, 1974; Rapp, 1979; Reiter, 1975, 1976, 1977; Rubin, 1975; Sacks, 1975, 1976; Schlegel, 1977; Secombe, 1974; Szymanski, 1974; Van Allen, 1972, 1976; Zaretsky, 1973). Each of these perspectives, of course, signifies somewhat different solutions to the problem of gender inequality.

According to the first group of theorists, women's devaluation and circumscription result from their childbearing and rearing roles, as well as from the ideologies surrounding these roles. Based on data from pre-state societies, this argument holds that, since women, by nature (rather than men), have primary responsibility for child- and homecare, their access to the public (more power-related) domain and, therefore, their status, is restricted. An extension of this perspective, to apply to present-day America, is that women still assume primary responsibility for parenting, and that, while motherhood is to some degree idealized, at the same time, it becomes a stigma with regard to paid labor (an area through which, it is held, women might attain equal footing with men). In other words, because women

are identified with childbearing and -rearing functions, this identification becomes the justification for denying women equal access to positions within the wage labor force (Chesler & Goodman, 1976; Epstein, 1970; Knudsen, 1969; Oakley, 1974; Suelze, 1970). Moreover, the problem is said to be compounded, because girls are socialized to expect economic dependence on men and their future work to be as wives and mothers. This, in turn, results in women themselves feeling ambivalent about competing (especially against men) for top positions in the job market (Chesler & Goodman, 1976; Epstein, 1970; Knudsen, 1969; Oakley, 1974; Paloma & Garland, 1971; Suelze, 1970), a factor used to explain the high incidence of women in the volunteer labor force (Chesler & Goodman, 1976, p. 191).

What all this adds up to is that, due to biological and ideological factors, women in the U.S. tend to work for comparatively little or no money. And, as Chesler and Goodman point out (1976, p. 13), in a money culture such as America's (where, it is asserted, money buys and controls all other powers), to not work for money is to be non-existent. Thus, according to this view, it seems that, since, at the present time, the biology of childbearing cannot be altered, the means of improving women's status would require ideological changes: resocialization of children to expect a division of labor unrelated to gender, where women's principal activities are not restricted to the home (Oakley, 1974). This should then lead to a situation in which women could, without obstruction, more equally participate and compete in the wage labor sphere and money culture, seen here as the bases for power in the U.S.

In contrast to the above views are those propounded by theorists who place primary emphasis on the historical and material conditions underlying women's characteristic roles and status. From their perspective, while biology and ideology may to some degree influence, they do not fundamentally determine women's male-subordinate position. Instead, many of these theorists contend (taking their cue from Engels) that, historically, it was the advent of male-owned private property that initially undercut women's status relative to men. With this historical development, it is argued, women were denied equal access to the sphere of production, were excluded from social labor, and became economically dependent on--and subordinate to--men. In order to remedy this imbalance and to gain equal access to, and control over, critical resources, it is proposed that women must renew their participation in social production (Engels, 1972; Friedl, 1975; Leacock, 1972, 1975, 1978; Sacks, 1975, 1976; Sanday, 1973, 1974; Schlegel, 1977).

Following from, and building upon, the above view is another which maintains that systematic gender hierarchy became firmly entrenched, and women's status sunk more deeply, with the development and establishment of capitalism (Dalla Costa & James, 1972; Engels, 1972; Friedl, 1975; Grabiner & Cooper, 1973; Hartmann, 1976; Leacock, 1972, 1975, 1978; Mullings, 1976; Oakley, 1974; Rapp, 1979; Sacks, 1975, 1976; Sanday, 1973, 1974; Schlegel, 1977; Secombe, 1974; Zaretsky, 1973). According to this perspective, with the rise of capitalism, paid labor (primarily male) moved outside the home, leaving women

behind responsible for privatized domestic labor.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, it is held that, since, under capitalism status is determined by an individual's relationship to the means of production, and since women's work in the home has no such direct relationship, women by necessity become the economic dependents of men.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, because housework is unpaid and invisible, women and their work are further devalued.

A further interesting aspect of this perspective is that which demonstrates the way in which gender stratification, in general, and women's unpaid privatized domestic labor, in particular, are actually functional to, and, therefore, integral to the maintenance of, capitalism. In the first instance, some theorists hold that the perpetuation of sexism helps to sustain capitalism in two significant ways. First, sexism is said to divide the working class, thereby hindering the development of class consciousness and cohesion (seen as the bases for class action). And, second, by allowing lower pay

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<sup>1</sup>As Hartmann (1976) points out, however, men have not been passive participants in this process. According to her research, patriarchy ("the system of male oppression of women" (p. 138)), which predates capitalism, has much to do with the form capitalism takes. It is her contention that, because they stand to benefit from sexually stratified labor, "male workers have played, and continue to play, a crucial role in maintaining sexual divisions in the labor process" (p. 139).

<sup>2</sup>Because the housewife is isolated in the home (where her work is out of public view), and because her work is unpaid, the role of domestic labor in the economy is largely unrecognized. Moreover, the dissociation of the housewife from both the means of production and the means of exchange (the wage) means that she can only buy through her husband (Chesler, 1976, p. 100). In this way, the housewife becomes her husband's dependent, exchanging her unpaid housework services for a share in his wage. The completely private nature of this exchange, whereby the housewife has no contract to protect her, leaves her in an exceptionally vulnerable economic position.

for women, sexism provides a format for capitalism's and the capitalist class's realization of super-profits (Grabiner & Cooper, 1973; Szymanski, 1974).

And, with regard to the second instance, at least two distinct suggestive arguments have been formulated to show the utility of women's domestic work to capitalism. One of these maintains that the existence of any social system depends on the reproduction of the conditions of its own existence--which include the means of production, the forces of production, and the relations of production--and that, under capitalism, women's domestic labor serves to ensure the reproduction of the last two conditions. That is, not only does women's household work reproduce labor power for capitalism, both on a daily and generational basis, but it also reproduces the capitalist relations of production.<sup>1</sup> The former is said to be its economic foundation, and the latter, its ideological function (Secombe, 1974, p. 14). Moreover, according to Secombe (1974) and Dalla Costa and James (1972, p. 33), were it not for the unpaid services provided by women's housework, men would not be "free" to produce the surplus value so critical to the

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<sup>1</sup>In this view, reproducing labor power means reproducing the capacity for work. In order to be able to work, the laborer needs at least physical maintenance, psychological maintenance, and skills (Secombe, 1974, p. 14). The housewife is responsible for the welfare of each of these domains, and she carries out her duties in tasks such as housework, childcare, providing affection, and child socialization. With regard to reproducing the relations of production, Secombe states that it is the mother, more than any other person, who prepares children for acquiescent participation in the social system. This, he says, is due to the fact that the child's early socialization is primarily the mother's task and to the fact that, during this early socialization period, a character is formed which is particularly suited to the requirements of capitalist relations (p. 15).

capitalist. Therefore, these authors conclude women's unpaid domestic labor to be integral to the maintenance of capitalism itself.<sup>1</sup>

The second argument, which differs from but fundamentally endorses, the first, bases its internal logic on women's ostensible relationship to the wage labor force. According to this position, the socialization of women to be first-and-foremost wives and mothers serves capitalism by ensuring a cheap reserve labor pool for times of economic stagnation, when cheap labor is needed to (a) fuel the economy, (b) hold down labor's real income, and (c) raise consumer demand, in order that the system be maintained (Chesler & Goodman, 1976; Dobbins, 1977; Grabiner & Cooper, 1973; Kolko, 1979; Rubin, 1975).

The views expressed above, which are based on a materialist<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The housewife and her domestic labor are seen as closely connected to the (male) laborer's wage. Before the wage can be converted into a means of subsistence, the commodities it buys require additional labor. Housework is the additional labor which transforms the wage into commodities and commodities into modified consumption items. As a result of the transformations accomplished through domestic labor, labor power is renewed. Thus, although the worker believes the wage pays for work done, this is a deception. In actuality, according to this view, the wage pays for the work involved in reproducing the labor power of the whole family. In other words, wages are not a measure of the value of the work carried out at the work location, but, rather, they are a payment which ensures the family's subsistence. And, while the wage pays for the past labor which reproduces labor power, the industrial worker's present labor becomes surplus value for the capitalist.

<sup>2</sup>Heilbroner (1980) characterizes the "materialist approach to history" as a perspective "that highlights the central role played in history by the productive activities of mankind, and that therefore locates a principal motive for historical change in the struggle among social classes over their respective shares in the fruits of production" (p. 21).

This characterization is corroborated by Pickvance (1976), who briefly describes historical materialism as "the theoretical corpus based on Marx's fundamental theses that the material economic base of society determines the superstructure of social, legal, and political

approach to the understanding of women's status, propose that the perpetuation of women's inferior status in the United States is largely the consequence of the capitalist system and of the sexual division of labor which it exploits and which confines women primarily to the domestic sphere. Following from this perspective, at least two courses of action are open to women to break their oppression. The first is to discontinue their role as unpaid domestic laborers and to enter the paid labor force. And, the second, is, once in the labor force, to challenge (through strikes and protests) both the hierarchical sexual division of labor and the capitalist system, which encourages it.<sup>1</sup>

As with solutions to gender discrimination offered earlier in this paper, this one calls for the return of women to the sphere of social labor (which gives them an arena for political action). However, unlike these earlier solutions, this one additionally proposes that, in order for women, on the one hand, to be freed from imposed housewifery, and, on the other, to gain equal access to, and control over, society's critical resources, capitalism, itself, must be overturned.

The connection between (1) responsibility for the domestic sphere and (2) a restricted relationship to society's critical resources is the common thread that runs through each of the preceding theories

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institutions, rather than vice versa, and that each historical society is characterized by struggles between the opposing social classes arising from the particular processes of production within it" (p. 1). In other words, "historical materialism, by definition, emphasizes the material basis of human society and its ultimate role in determining the development of society" (p. 31).

<sup>1</sup>While it is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the probability of these actions being taken, it should be noted that the matter remains in question.

on women's status. However, because, in the main, these theories have not been tested at the upper class level, the significance they hold for, and the extent of their applicability to, upper class women remains to be seen. For instance, to what extent can it be said that upper class women's domestic roles, and the circumstances conditioning them, resemble those of women of other classes? Also, at the upper class level, is it relevant to speak of women's unequal relationship to society's valued resources, when upper class women, like upper class men, are the top wealthholders in a society where wealth is, perhaps, the most valued resource? Furthermore, if gender stratification does operate at the upper class level, to what extent can the foregoing, and/or other, theories account for this? It is questions such as these that the present study intends to address.

From the foregoing, it should not be thought that social science literature is completely lacking in depictions of the upper class, and of upper class women, in the U.S. While rare, these studies do exist, and, to a large extent, served as a point of departure for the current research. In light of this, and the data to be presented later, a brief review of the literature, and the theoretical questions that arise from it, is in order.

The most common portrayal of upper class women depicts them in their family roles as wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters--with greatest stress falling on the wife-mother functions. As such, the descriptions are not unlike those given for women of other classes. Basically, upper class women are said to be generally subordinate to and supportive of their husbands, caretakers of household tasks, and

primary parent to their children. Their families are said to be male-dominated economic units (Baltzell, 1953, pp. 125-126, 174; Birmingham, 1958, p. 12), in which the social position of the male household head determines the social position of the entire family. And, further, it is reported that the upper class world--perhaps to a greater extent than that of other classes--is rigidly sex-segregated (Baltzell, 1953, p. 113; Domhoff, 1970; Ostrander, n.d. (c, d); Rapp, 1978; Warner & Abegglen, 1956).

With regard to upper class women who are single, the available information pertains only to young women of high school and college ages. This information describes the exceptional education received by most of these women and the very exclusive social events in which they participate. However, data on the unmarried adult upper class woman, on the upper class woman who heads her own household, on the one who has a paid job, or on the one who maintains control over her own financial interests is wholly missing. Virtually the only information on upper class women to go beyond their family functions is that which describes their involvement in charity work, in organizing "society" events, and in various forms of art--occupations, as Baltzell points out, that can be combined with the wife-mother role (1953; 1958).

Among those social scientists who have investigated upper class women, a few have formulated class-specific explanations for what are said to be these women's principal roles: that is, those of the housewife, social guardian, and volunteer. These investigators propose that, through these roles, upper class women act to support not only

the extant stratification structure, but also, their own class interests. One suggested aspect of this is that upper class women are guardians of the social institutions that keep their class endogamous (such as the debut, club membership, and exclusive private schools) (Domhoff, 1970, p. 34). Another is that the volunteer work these women do, as board members of major cultural institutions, social service agencies, and academic institutions, both helps reduce hostility directed towards the upper class from other sectors of the population (Domhoff, 1970) and helps maintain upper class control over public concerns (Ostrander, n.d. (c), p. 8). And, added to these, is the proposal that, by appearing to the public as unemployed housewives, upper class women may serve as models of ideal behavior to women of other classes, thereby bolstering gender hierarchy (Chesler & Goodman, 1976; Domhoff, 1970; Rapp, 1978). Each of these propositions will be examined more fully in this dissertation's subsequent chapters.

Investigation into the literature relating to upper class women stimulates a number of questions. For instance, within stratification theory, it has been proposed that status inconsistency (wherein the different dimensions of an individual's status show low correlation in their rankings) has specific behavioral consequences (Barber, 1968, pp. 294-295; Lipset, 1968, p. 313; Lipset & Zetterberg, 1966, pp. 572-573). If one accepts that upper class women are in an ambiguous position in terms of their status--being, at the same time, members of the dominant class and of a subordinate category (women)--then, following the status inconsistency proposition, the behavior and

attitudes of these women should differ in a predictable way from those found among individuals with greater status consistency (for instance, upper class men). In fact, it has been suggested that status inconsistency among the wealthy tends to produce attitudes favoring change in the existing power structure (Lipset, 1968, p. 313). If this is so, one should find these attitudes among upper class women. However, thus far, it appears that the small amount of data bearing on this proposition tend to contradict it (Baltzell, 1953; Domhoff, 1970; Ostrander, n.d. (c, d); Rapp, 1978). Nevertheless, the issue is far from decided, and deserves looking into, as it bears on the question of potential for structural change within the stratification system.

Another little-explored area of upper class studies is that regarding within-class diversity. Although Marx recognized that each class would have some internal differentiation (Lipset, 1968, p. 298), he did not analyze what effects sex, age, religion, or other variables might have on class behavior (Barber, 1968, p. 288). And, while certain upper class investigations have attacked the question of within-class gender differentiation, almost none have concerned themselves with the possible significance of other important classificatory variables. With regard to the present study, it was of interest to examine how some of these variables appeared to influence the roles and activities of sample members.

Still another matter for consideration is how existing social and environmental conditions may affect upper class women's roles, attitudes, and behaviors. For instance, it was recently held to be

true that, due to economic and technological developments, overall, women were bearing fewer children and are marrying later (Harris, 1977, pp. 186-187). As the cost of living rose, as their household and family responsibilities lightened, and as the rate of population growth decreased, women were increasingly re-entering the workforce, an arena through which some theorists believe--as previously mentioned--they might achieve greater social power.<sup>1</sup> However, while this trend has been shown to apply to women in other classes, it is unknown to what extent it might also pertain to upper class women. Research tells us that these women have had neither careers of their own nor access to the power positions held by their fathers, brothers, husbands, and sons (as Chesler and Goodman state [1976, p. 3], "great ladies" are also always one man away from the top). If this no longer holds, it might have significance not only for upper class women, but also for the stratification system itself, and the whole of society.

The point of having reviewed the preceding theories and descriptions pertaining to women's status and roles under capitalism is to set a framework for this dissertation's subsequent presentation of data collected over the course of a year's research among members of the upper class in the United States. It was the purpose of this fieldwork to discover to what degree, and in what ways, the sample interviewed confirmed, contradicted, or supplemented existing theories and portrayals regarding the roles and status both of women in general

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<sup>1</sup>However, if women are re-entering the labor force only as a reserve labor pool, then their potential for access to greater social power is undoubtedly undermined.

and of upper class women in particular. To this end, the descriptive data generated serves as a basis for analyzing the extent to which interviewed upper class women's activities and opportunities were gender- and/or class-defined. And, as a result, this analysis will provide a means of checking the comprehensiveness of existing sex-role and stratification theories, as they pertain to women in the United States.

### Site

The research for the present study was carried out principally in New York City between August 1980 and August 1981. Because, in the 20th century, the American upper class is national in scope (Baltzell, 1958, p. 16; Domhoff, 1970, p. 28), any number of other locations might have been chosen as the site for fieldwork. New York City was selected, however, due to its particular suitability regarding the research purpose and population.

The special features commending New York as a particularly appropriate site for upper class studies have to do with demography, history, and economics. According to Baltzell (1958):

In any complex civilization, social and economic power tends to gravitate toward the large metropolis; and centralization is especially characteristic of modern American society. (p. 16)

Following from this, an investigation of the upper class in the United States can be most fruitfully realized if undertaken in a major city. New York satisfies this requirement not only in population (over 7 million [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982]), but also, perhaps, as the "center of pomp and power" for the United States in the 20th

century (Baltzell, 1958, p. 15). Beyond this, according to recent (1972) statistical information, New York State is home to a greater number (1,581,700) of top wealthholders than any other state. (Except for California, others fall far behind; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1981, p. 445.) And, if Baltzell (1958) is correct in stating that, in the 20th century, the upper class has tended to converge in large cities (p. 16), it seems likely that a large proportion of these top wealthholders would be found in New York City.

Two other features unique to New York enhance its desirability as the research site. First, it is not only one of the cities covered by the Social Register, but it is the original such city (the Social Register was first published in New York in 1888). This fact confirms New York City both as a socially established upper class center and as one which has continuously functioned as such since the last century. Second, the greatest number of upper class clubs (as listed in Domhoff, 1970, pp. 23-26) are located in New York. And, these clubs may serve as further indicators of the upper class population residing in New York. An additional benefit gained from New York's connection to the Social Register and upper class clubs is that, in the research itself, the actual association between these indicators and upper class members interviewed could be checked.

Finally, the selection of New York City as the location for the current investigation was, in part, a purely practical matter. As a Manhattan resident, the investigator had pre-existing upper class contacts, who could serve as entrées to other upper class members in the city. As the upper class is characteristically highly

exclusive and private, this existing basis for access to its New York members was considered a factor favoring the choice of that city as the fieldwork site.

### Population and Sample

Although the primary concern of this investigation centered on the roles and functions of upper class women in the United States, the population and sample for the study included both upper class women and men. This was the case, because the study deals, in part, with gender-based differential activities at the upper class level and because, had men not been included in the sample, there would have been no basis for gender comparison. Thus, the sample was drawn from both upper class men and women, most of whom resided in New York City. The criteria for inclusion in the sample were either (1) that the subjects must have been, or expected to be, inheritors of great wealth,<sup>1</sup> that this wealth was part of a wider, and generically much greater, family fortune, and that the family fortune must have been amassed and established at least two generations in the past; or (2) that, if great wealth was achieved through marriage, the individual should have had access to this wealth for at least two generations.

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<sup>1</sup>For the purposes of this study the most recent known information available, adjusted for inflation, was utilized to define "great wealth." Thus, because, according to Osman (1977), in 1969, individuals with personal wealth worth \$200,000 or more comprised the top 1% of U.S. wealthholders (p. 412), in the present study (conducted in 1980), based on Consumer Price Index information for 1969 and 1980 (Industry Week, 1983, p. 91), this figure was adjusted up to approximately \$450,000.

In the absence of direct information on personal worth,<sup>1</sup> approximate indicators of upper class status were used as criteria. These included association of oneself or one's family members with the private schools, exclusive clubs, and social registers listed in Domhoff (1970, pp. 21-27).

### Sampling Procedures

In the beginning, contact was established with individuals having access to upper class members (some of whom were upper class members themselves). These contacts provided the initial referrals to potential sample members. Thereafter, each sample member was requested to refer the investigator to other potential interviewees of similar socioeconomic status (the "snowball" method; Babbie, 1979, pp. 214, 229; Coleman, 1958-1959, p. 29; Ostrander, n.d. (c)). These individuals were then sent letters explaining the research, naming the person providing the referral, and requesting participation in the study through the interview. A follow-up call served to establish a person's willingness to participate in the investigation and to set up appointments with those who agreed to involve themselves. As a result of this process, 49 interviews were realized. And, of the total number of individuals contacted (69), approximately 28.9% (20) either refused or were unable to participate.

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<sup>1</sup>Among individuals interviewed for this study, three (two men, one woman) neither indicated their levels of wealth, nor conformed to Domhoff's other criteria. These individuals were, nevertheless, included in the sample due to the interviewer's personal knowledge regarding their general financial circumstances.

Although it is likely to result in a biased sample, the snowball--rather than random--method of sampling was used, because it provided a means of access to the focus population. It was felt that, without personal introductions, such access could not have been achieved. The problem of potential sample bias promoted by the use of the snowball method was further exacerbated, however, because, in an attempt to strengthen gender and class as independent variables, an effort was made to develop a sample that varied along such dimensions as age, religion, and political affiliation. As a consequence, in these regards, the present study's sample deviated considerably from the population norm, which is generally characterized as older (evidenced by advanced careers or parenthood), Christian, and Republican.<sup>1</sup> And, while Lundberg (1968) and Domhoff (1972) reject the significance of differential political affiliations at the upper class level, and further, although Domhoff submits that, among the members of this class, "similarities in economic interests . . . far outweigh their personal, religious, and philosophical idiosyncracies" (p. 48), in the pages that follow, attention will be paid to the possible relationship between certain of these factors and principal research findings. In particular, gender-associated findings will be further examined to determine the possible influence of differentials in age (comparing

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<sup>1</sup>In fact, concerning differential political affiliations, Domhoff (1972) suggests that as many as 80-90% of non-Southern upper class members might be registered Republicans (p. 18). Moreover, since the estimated proportion of Jews in the national population is only about 2.5%--and, in New York, 10.6% (Himmelfarb, 1983)--it can also be safely assumed, based on population statistics alone, that Jewish-identified individuals comprise a small proportion of the upper class in the United States.

those under 40 years old to those at least this age), religion (comparing Jewish- to Christian-identified sample members), and, in certain instances, level of wealth (comparing those reporting less than \$1,000,000 to those reporting at least this amount).<sup>1</sup>

### Hypothesis Testing

Neither hypothesis formulation, nor hypothesis testing, was a component of the present research paper. Instead, due to the paucity of information pertaining to upper class women, the primary concerns of this study were to collect and present descriptive data regarding sample upper class members' gender- and class-defined roles, activities, attitudes, and functions and to discover the degree to which this descriptive data supported, contradicted, or supplemented some of the existing theories and portrayals relevant to upper class women. Because the sampling method used in this study cannot be said to have produced a representative sample of upper class members, this research does not claim to generate findings that are either projectable or of statistical significance. Therefore, conclusions reached, based on data collected, should be viewed only as points of departure for additional research, ideally at a more comprehensive and representative level.

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<sup>1</sup>Because of the close association between age and level of wealth (of the 7 sample members reporting ownership of under \$1,000,000, 71.4%--5--were under 40 years old, and, of the 37 sample members reporting at least \$1,000,000, 78.4%--29--were over 40 years old), the influence of level of wealth on research findings could not be assumed.

### Research Procedures

The instrument through which most of the information for this study was attained was a formal interview schedule administered to each interviewee (23 men and 26 women). The interview itself was divided into five main spheres of inquiry which, respectively, examined issues related to family background, the domestic domain, paid work, volunteer work, and money. Topics covered included, among others, household and family composition, roles in the domestic sphere, paid and volunteer employment history, extent of participation in wealth management, and comprehension and training regarding personal financial affairs.

Because the interview technique tends to provide subjective information (that is, based solely on informants' perceptions), a second research procedure was used, conjointly, to bring a greater measure of objectivity to the study. This was the "activities record," a form on which was recorded the interviewees' activities and involvements over the course of any two weekdays (excluding weekends).<sup>1</sup> These written chronicles were used to check respondents' comparable verbal statements regarding their activities, thus providing a more objective basis for evaluating the structure and content of their daily affairs (Sanjek, 1978).

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<sup>1</sup>While it is unknown the extent to which this method may have resulted in accurate data, the choice of examining only two weekdays' activities was based not only on the time constraints inherent in the interview situation, but also on the precedent set by Sanjek, wherein, in examining the work week, he also settled on a two-day recording of activities (see Sanjek, 1978).

Due to the extraordinary privacy and exclusivity characteristic of the upper class, participant observation, a cornerstone of most anthropological fieldwork, played an extremely limited role in the present study. Observation, of course, took place in the context of the interviews, most of which were conducted in the respondents' homes (although a few took place at individuals' places of extra-domestic work). However, participant observation was possibly only on those few occasions when the researcher was invited to participate in upper class social situations. These included a number of cocktail gatherings, a weekend at a summer home, several fund-raising benefits, a wedding, and an excursion with members of a prominent museum board.<sup>1</sup> Although these occasions were not many, they did serve to illuminate and confirm certain features of upper class lifestyle and social networks.

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<sup>1</sup>It should perhaps be noted that these invitations resulted, in some cases, from social relationships that developed as a consequence of acquaintances made during the course of interviews, and, in others, from pre-existing contacts with upper class members.

## Chapter II

### DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

The body of data collected for this study derives from extensive (from 2 to 4 hours in length) interviews conducted with 26 upper class women and 23 upper class men. And, while what follows in this chapter is a description of certain sample characteristics drawn from this data, it should be reiterated and stressed that, due to the particular manner in which the interview sample was attained, the characteristics found to be associated with this sample should not be taken as projectable to the wider universe of upper class individuals in the United States. Moreover, because so little research has been done on the upper class (and particularly on upper class women) and because that which has been done may be analytically incompatible with the present investigation (due to such factors as difference in historic period or in upper class definition used), it is difficult to determine not only what characteristics of the upper class universe might be, but, furthermore, to what extent the characteristics found to describe the present sample might deviate from those representative of the universe as a whole. Thus, in reading the sample description that follows, the probability of sampling bias should be kept in mind.

Regarding the ages of those participating in this research, all interviewees were between 20 and 89 years old and were fairly evenly distributed between these ages. These distributions are shown in Table 1.

Table 1  
Age Distribution of Sample<sup>a,b</sup>

	< 40 years	40-59 years	60-89 years
Women	23.1% (6)	38.4% (10)	38.4% (10)
Men	34.8% (8)	39.1% (9)	26.1% (6)

<sup>a</sup>In this and all subsequent tables, the numbers shown in parentheses correspond to the adjacent percentages.

<sup>b</sup>In this and subsequent tables, percentages that do not total 100% may be attributed to rounding error.

Table 2  
Frequencies of Reported Multiple Residences  
by Age, Religion, and Wealth Level

		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	16.7% (1)	62.5% (5)
	≥ 40	94.4% (17)	86.7% (13)
Religion:	Jewish	84.6% (11)	76.9% (10)
	Christian	63.6% (7)	80.0% (8)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	60.0% (3)	--
	≥ \$1MM	76.5% (13)	88.9% (16)

With regard to residence, the majority of those interviewed (89.8%, or 44 individuals) reported their primary residence to be New York City. And, of the 47 individuals providing information on their number of residences overall, 76.6% (36) stated they had 2 or more homes. Broken down by gender, this constituted 75% (18) of the 24 responding women and 78.2% (18) of the sample men. Number of residences reported by interviewees was found to be somewhat associated with gender, age, religion, and level of wealth, as is shown in Table 2 (see p. 33).<sup>1</sup>

As can be seen from Table 2, although multiple residences were more frequently associated with older, than with younger, age for both men and women, this differential association was a great deal stronger among the women. That is, whereas, among the women, those under 40 years old were much more likely than not to have just one residence, this was not true for the men, among whom multiple residences were characteristic of both age categories. Because, as later evidence will show, these young age-related gender distinctions cannot be attributed to findings that young sample men, relative to sample women, had a greater facility, or were more participatory, with regard to their financial affairs (which might have led to their greater ease in disposing of their incomes in such investments as property), they

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<sup>1</sup>The reader should bear in mind that, due both to this study's small sample base and to the nature of the particular comparisons made in this and similar tables to follow, individual cell numbers are extremely small and not projectable. Furthermore, it should be stressed that, because occasionally information was either missing for, or not relevant to, some interviewees, percentages shown in this paper's tables may reflect adjusted, rather than absolute, frequencies.

are probably best explained by the fact that a higher proportion of the women (50%, or 3) under 40 years old, than of the men (25%, or 2) in the same age category, reported wealth of less than \$1,000,000.

Looking at the data on the association of distinct religious affiliations to number of residences, overall it appears that, regardless of religion, sample members tended to report having multiple residences. Despite this, however, the table makes clear that, while the frequencies with which Jewish- and Christian-identified men reported such residences were very similar, substantial differences in frequencies characterized Jewish- and Christian-identified women, as well as Christian-identified men and women. With regard to the women respondents, frequency discrepancy may possibly be explained by the facts that a higher proportion of Jewish sample women, than of Christian sample women, were over 40 years old and that older age was found to be highly associated with incidence of multiple residences. An additional possible explanation, however, might be that the higher frequency of multiple residences found among Jewish sample women may reflect a manner of status enhancement perhaps more relevant to these women, who are members of both a lower status religion and gender, than to Christian-identified women, whose status is relatively higher and more secure, by virtue of their association with a dominant religious faith. Regarding the frequencies of reported multiple residences among Christian sample members, the basis for the displayed gender-differentiation is unclear. Nevertheless, it is possible to speculate that this differentiation may result from the somewhat differential wealthholding characterizing Christian-identified sample

men and women: in the case of the former, just 10% (1) reported wealth of less than \$1,000,000, while, in the case of the latter, this level of wealthholding characterized 30% (3) of those providing relevant information. Based on this information regarding gender-associated differential wealthholding among Christian-identified sample members, it seems reasonable to conclude that the women's higher frequency of lower wealth may have accounted for their lower frequency of reporting multiple residences.

Finally, on considering the relationship of wealth level to number of residences, it seems quite clear that, overall, more money is associated with more residences. This seems to have been the case for sample members generally, even though, among the women with less than \$1,000,000, multiple residences were more common than not. Despite this, the women in this wealth category were still almost twice as likely as those with greater wealth to report only one residence.

An examination of the marital statuses of the interviewed sample shows that, while the great majority of both men and women had, at some point, been married (84.6%--22--of the women and 78.2%--18--of the men), nevertheless, their overall backgrounds with regard to marriage were both quite varied and, in some instances, apparently gender-related. For example, an examination of the reported currently existing marriages of sample members shows that the men, to a greater extent than the women, tended to be presently married. That is, in contrast to 78.2% (18) of the interviewed men, only 50% (13) of the women reported being currently married.

Additionally, not only did responding men have a greater tendency to be currently married, but they were also twice as likely as the women to be currently living in couple situations. That is, while just 46.1% (12) of the women were living with mates (married or not), 91.3% (21) of the men lived in this way. Contrastingly, the reported incidence of both overall and existing divorces was higher for responding women than it was for responding men. Of the 22 women who had ever been married, 45.5% (10) stated that they had been divorced and 27.3% (6) indicated that they were presently so. [These statistics on divorce rates dispute the findings of Baltzell (1958), whose 1940 data showed low divorce rates (p. 161). Again, this disparity might be due to any number of factors, including difference in sampling procedure, time frame, and/or others.] Among the 18 ever-married men, however, only 27.8% (5) reported having been divorced, and none claimed to be currently so. And, connected to this, compared to sample women, sample men demonstrated a higher frequency of remarriage following divorce. Among those who had ever been divorced, subsequent remarriage was reported by 100% (5) of the men, compared to 50% (5) of the women. Finally, while none of the interviewed men reported themselves to be current widowers, 11.5% (3) of the sample women--all over 80 years old--stated themselves to be widows.

Tables 3, 4, and 5 reflect the apparent association of age, religion, and level of wealth to certain features characterizing sample members' marriage patterns. As can be seen from these tables, in practically every instance, greater age is associated with higher

Table 3  
Marriage Patterns I

		% Ever Married	
		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	50.0% (3)	37.5% (3)
	<u>≥</u> 40	95.0% (19)	100.0% (15)
Religion:	Jewish	93.3% (14)	84.6% (11)
	Christian	72.7% (8)	70.0% (7)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	40.0% (2)	—
	<u>≥</u> \$1MM	94.7% (18)	88.9% (16)

Table 4  
Marriage Patterns II

		% Currently Married	
		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	50.0% (3)	37.5% (3)
	<u>≥</u> 40	50.0% (10)	100.0% (15)
Religion:	Jewish	40.0% (6)	84.6% (11)
	Christian	63.6% (7)	70.0% (7)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	20.0% (1)	--
	<u>≥</u> \$1MM	52.6% (10)	88.9% (16)

Table 5  
Marriage Patterns III

		% Ever Divorced	
		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	--	--
	<u>≥</u> 40	100.0% (10)	100.0% (15)
Religion:	Jewish	46.7% (7)	23.1% (3)
	Christian	27.3% (3)	20.0% (2)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	20.0% (1)	--
	<u>≥</u> \$1MM	42.1% (8)	27.8% (5)

frequencies of both marriage and divorce--a not surprising association. What is surprising, and difficult to understand, are the differential associations which appear in the case of distinct religious affiliations and the various marriage pattern categories. For instance, it seems unusual not only that Jewish identified sample members (both the men and the women) should demonstrate a higher frequency of ever having been married than those who were Christian identified, but further that the difference in the incidence of current marriages for men versus women was so much greater among Jewish respondents (men having a much higher frequency than the women for such marriages) than among Christian respondents. And, while, with regard to this latter finding, no logical explanation is apparent, with regard to the former, it is possible to suggest that the greater frequency of ever having been married found in association with Jewish sample members may have been the result of the fact that, compared to their Christian counterparts, these research participants comprised a higher proportion who were at least 40 years old. As for the possible bearing of wealth level on sample marriage patterns, although the charts show that, in each case, greater wealth and higher frequencies of marriage and divorce are associated, this finding should probably be attributed to the close association between distinct age and wealth categories (i.e., older age associated with greater wealth), rather than to any that might exist between marriage patterns and wealth levels per se.

Before leaving the subject of marriage patterns found among this investigation's upper class sample, something can be said regarding apparent tendencies towards class exogamy or endogamy. Concerning

this, research data show that, for both sample men and women, marrying outside their class was more characteristic than marrying in. This is demonstrated in Table 6. What the figures in Table 6 show is that the commonly held notion that the upper class is firmly rooted in class endogamy (Birmingham, 1958, p. 114; Domhoff, 1970, p. 33; Lundberg, 1968, p. 26), to which its "definite boundaries" (Domhoff, 1970, p. 74) and maintenance are partly attributable cannot be said to apply to this study's upper class sample. To the contrary, the table shows that, for the most part, both interviewed upper class women and men married outside their class (as here defined) at least 50% of the time. What is not evident in the table, however, is the extent to which the sample tendency towards class endogamy or exogamy may have been associated to the age, religion, and wealth variables. Since it has already been established that the incidence of divorce for the current sample was associated entirely with older age, and that younger age and less wealth were very highly correlated, examination of the possible relationships between the nature of past marriages and distinctions in age or wealth level for research participants is not feasible. Despite this limitation, however, Tables 7 and 8 which follow display the associations found between the nature of past marriages and religious affiliations, as well as those found to exist between the nature of existing marriages and age, religion, and wealth level.

From the chart depicting past marriages in association with religious affiliation (Table 7), it is evident that, while, overall, exogamy was prevalent among both Jewish and Christian respondents,

Table 6  
Class Endogamy and Exogamy

	Women	Men
Past marriage(s):		
endogamous only	16.7% (2)	40.0% (2)
exogamous only	75.0% (9)	40.0% (2)
both	8.3% (1)	20.0% (1)
Present marriage: <sup>a</sup>		
endogamous	50.0% (6)	33.3% (6)
exogamous	50.0% (6)	66.7% (12)

<sup>a</sup> Among sample women, actually 13 were currently married. However, only 12 of these provided information on class exogamy and endogamy.

Table 7

Past Marriages: Frequency of Class Endogamy  
and Exogamy by Religion

	Women			Men		
	Endogamous	Exogamous	Both	Endogamous	Exogamous	Both
Jewish	22.2%(2)	66.7%(6)	1.1%(1)	33.3%(1)	66.7%(2)	--
Christian	--	100.0%(3)	--	50.0%(1)	--	50.0%(1)

Table 8

Present Marriages: Frequency of Class Exogamy  
by Age, Religion, and Level of Wealth

		% Exogamous Marriages	
		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	66.7% (2)	66.7% (2)
	≥ 40	44.4% (4)	66.7% (10)
Religion:	Jewish	33.3% (2)	63.6% (7)
	Christian	66.7% (4)	71.4% (5)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	NA	NA
	≥ \$1MM	60.0% (6)	75.0% (12)

certain differences appear, when examining women and men separately. That is, although Christian women demonstrated a higher degree of exogamous past marriages than did Jewish women, among the men the opposite was the case: Jewish men more frequently reported exogamous past marriages than did the Christian men. In the case of the men, the interpretation of this is not at all clear, since inspection of the chart showing present marriages (Table 8) indicates that, in these cases the religion-associated frequency of exogamous marriages is reversed. Perhaps what might be generally concluded regarding the men is that religious affiliation seemingly bore little relationship to frequency of class exogamy. Among the women, however, the situation is more consistent. With regard to both past and present marriages, Christian-identified women respondents reported more frequently than did Jewish-identified women respondents exogamous marriages. As an explanation for this finding one might speculate that, for Jewish-identified women, being members of both a lower status religion as well as a lower status gender (in contrast to Christian-identified women, whose status is more secure, due to their religious affiliation), marrying outside their class might constitute a greater risk in terms of a possible loss of status than it would for Christian-identified women.

Turning to an examination of the association of age to present class exogamy or endogamy among sample members, Table 8 shows that it was only among the women that age seemed to make a difference. That is, whereas, exogamy was characteristic of all other age categories of sample members, among the women who were at least 40

years old, endogamy appears to have been most prevalent. Again, this finding is not quite interpretable, since what is in question here are current marriages. In other words, the fact that younger women currently had a higher frequency of class exogamous marriages than did older women does not disclose anything regarding what the future nature of their marriages--or those of older women--might be.

Finally, briefly looking at the percentages of exogamous marriages associated with differential levels of wealth, it should be mentioned that, due to the great overlap between younger age and less wealth and to the association between younger age and never having been married, all but one of the sample members in this wealth category were currently single. As a consequence of this, no comparison can be made regarding the effects of different levels of financial worth on frequencies of class endogamy or exogamy.

As mentioned previously, literature pertaining to upper class households mostly assumes a model comprising husband, wife, and young children. However, as can be seen from the foregoing data, this model has only limited application to this investigation's sample, where 14 women (53.9%) and 6 men (26.1%) were currently either unmarried or not living with a spouse (1 man and 1 woman in this category were separated from their spouses). Of all the interviewed women, 5 (19.2%), ages 37-81, lived completely alone; 7 (26.9%), all over 50 years old, lived with live-in help only; and 2 (7.7%), in their 20s, lived with family members and other roommates. With regard to sample men, 2 (8.7%), in their 30s, lived completely alone; 1 (4.3%), in his 30s, lived with his mate and other roommates; and 3 (13%), in their 20s, lived (unmarried) with mates only.

And, even among those sample members who were currently married and living with their spouses (12 women, 17 men), the nuclear family household only narrowly applied. In the case of all interviewed women, although 19 (73.1%) were mothers, only 5 (19.2%), ages 30 to 50, currently lived according to the model. And, in the case of all interviewed men, although 14 (60.9%) were fathers, only 6 (26.1%), ages 29 to 66, did so. (It should be noted that the age spans associated with this nuclear model are those which generally correspond with childrearing years.)

In total, then, the figures from this study relating to marital status and household composition indicate that the majority of both men and women respondents (72.9%--17--and 80.8%--21--respectively) did not, at the time of the research, live according to the normative nuclear family household model. And, just how the household composition of sample interviewees may have been related to age, religion, and level of wealth is presented in Table 9.

As can be seen from the table, in relation to the categories of age and religion, the differential frequencies with which sample women reported not living in nuclear households were just the reverse of those associated with the sample men. With regard to the frequencies exhibited according to age distinctions, it may be suggested that, by comparison with the younger women respondents, the higher association of non-nuclear households found among those who were older could have been connected to the fact that older age, in this study, was more highly associated with having been divorced. Moreover, the finding that a larger proportion of younger sample men than of younger

Table 9

Percentage of Respondents Not Living in Nuclear  
Households by Age, Religion, and Wealth

		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	66.7% (4)	87.5% (7)
	<u>≥</u> 40	85.0% (17)	66.7% (10)
Religion:	Jewish	86.7% (13)	61.5% (8)
	Christian	72.7% (8)	80.0% (8)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	80.0% (4)	100.0% (2)
	<u>≥</u> \$1MM	78.9% (15)	66.7% (12)

sample women reported living in non-nuclear households is undoubtedly related to the fact that a higher proportion of the latter than the former were currently married. And, the association exhibited, among the men, between older age and lower frequency of non-nuclear household composition may be attributed to the further research finding that older, rather than younger, age, for the men, was more highly associated with being currently married. Finally, with regard to age-associated discrepancies in the frequencies of reporting non-nuclear household composition, it may be said that the higher frequency with which older sample women, as opposed to older sample men, reported such household composition probably reflects the fact that these women also had a lower frequency than did the men of currently existing marriages. And, it should perhaps be noted that the overall gender-differentiated trend displayed in the table, according to age distinctions, is that, whereas, among sample women, nuclear household arrangements apparently decreased with age, among the men, they increased with age.

Turning to the data concerning distinctions in religious affiliations, the table indicates that Jewish-identified women and Christian-identified men had the highest frequencies of non-nuclear households. Jewish sample women, proportionally, were more associated with such households than were either Christian-identified women or Jewish-identified men. And, Christian-identified men were proportionally more associated with these kinds of households than were Jewish-identified men or Christian-identified women. In neither of these instances does it seem possible to attribute the found

discrepancies to anything having to do with the religions themselves. Rather, it seems more likely that these discrepancies are partly age-related. That is, among the women, while frequency of current marriage was not differentially associated according to age distinctions, ever having been divorced was much more highly associated with older than with younger age. And, because in this investigation a higher proportion of the Jewish, than of the Christian, sample members were at least 40 years old, this association between older age and higher incidence of divorce may account for the fact that Jewish-identified interviewed women were more highly associated with non-nuclear household than were the Christian-identified interviewed women. Conversely, in the case of interviewed men, incidence of current marriages did appear to be age associated. Younger men were less associated with their older counterparts with existing marriages. Thus, based on this finding, as well as on the greater association between Christian sample members and young age, it is possible to at least partly account for the association displayed in Table 9 between these sample members and a greater frequency of living in non-nuclear households. While age discrepancies may account for some of the religion-related findings in the table, they cannot, however, account for those connected to gender. The fact that Jewish-identified men tended to be more associated than Jewish-identified women with nuclear households may be attributed to the fact that, overall, men had a much higher frequency than did women of current marriages. Nevertheless, although this seems a reasonable interpretation, it is obviously inapplicable to the differential associations characterizing

Christian-identified sample men and women. In this latter case, the greater association seen between the men and non-nuclear households remains a puzzle.

Lastly, in the category of wealth levels, the table shows that, among the men, but not the women, sample members with less wealth were more likely to be living in non-nuclear households. Since this finding is unlikely to be related to an inability on the part of these less wealthy interviewees to afford the cost of raising children, it probably should be attributed, instead, to the fact that both of the men with under \$1,000,000 were also under 30 years old and unmarried.

Overall, what the foregoing data on household composition of sample members suggest is that, in general, the living arrangements of these individuals did not follow a nuclear model, but, rather, tended to vary within a non-nuclear context according to such factors as stage in life cycle, gender, age, personal preferences, or a combination of such factors. Furthermore, contrary to literature depictions, the data suggest that a large proportion of sample women (53.9%--those not living with spouses) were heads of their own households and determiners of their own social positions. And, moreover, given the high incidence of class exogamy characterizing this sample, even among those women who had been formerly, or were currently, married, the model of the male-dominated household cannot necessarily be assumed to apply. Thus, it seems that the earlier-described view which characterizes upper class women as living in nuclear households and as being their husbands' subordinates, may be insufficiently comprehensive both in its depiction and as a basis for

generating relevant theory. The importance of recognizing this, and of working towards developing the most inclusive portrayals possible, is that, in so doing, one may discover the ways in which variations in household and family compositions impinge upon the daily activities, options, and choices of their constituent members.

As can be seen from the foregoing, the lines along which the research sample appeared to vary included age, marital status, family and household composition, and class endogamy versus exogamy. These dimensions, however, form only part of those examined in the course of the field project. Others, to be discussed below, include religion, political party affiliation, education, occupation, and background to, and level of, wealth.

Looking at religion first, 55.1% (27) of those interviewed stated that they had been born into, and remained in, the Jewish faith,<sup>1</sup> while 40.8% (20) of those interviewed said they had been raised as, and remained, Christians. In addition to these, 4.1% (2) of those interviewed chose religious identifications which were not the natural

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<sup>1</sup> Although a high proportion of this study's respondents identified themselves as Jewish, the reader should be aware that this proportion contrasts sharply not only with that which Jews actually comprise in the American population, in general (Himmelfarb & Singer, 1983, pp. 130-131), but, more specifically, also with that which they are said to comprise in relation to the upper class population. With regard to the United States upper class, Jews are said to be in the vast minority (Baltzell, 1958, p. 236; Domhoff, 1970, p. 297; Lundberg, 1966, pp. 358-360). And, while the ratio of Jewish- to Christian-identified research respondents signifies that this study's sample was not a representative one, it nevertheless reflects the attempt to diversify the sample as much as possible, in order that gender and economic class might be strengthened as independent variables. Where appropriate, within the body of this thesis, the association between differential religious affiliation and principal findings has been examined.

outgrowth of their upbringings. One, a woman, reported that, although she had been raised in the Jewish faith, she had, as an adult, converted to Christianity. And, the other, also a woman, said that, while her father was Jewish and mother, Christian, she had chosen to identify herself as Jewish. The breakdown, by gender, of the research sample's reported religious affiliations is shown in Table 10.

Table 10  
Religious Affiliations by Gender

	Women	Men
Judaism	57.7% (15)	56.5% (13)
Christianity	42.3% (11)	43.5% (10)

With regard to political party affiliation, despite efforts to obtain a balanced sample of Republicans and Democrats, the sample interviewed was heavily weighted with Democrats.<sup>1</sup> Of the 46 interviewees responding to the question of political affiliation, 67.4% (31

<sup>1</sup>Because the research sample was obtained by the "snowball" method, that the sample was weighted with Democrats may imply something regarding the tendency of respondents to socialize with individuals holding similar political views. Furthermore, it should be noted that the distribution of Democrats and Republicans in this investigation reverses that usually held to be characteristic of the American upper class (Birmingham, 1958; Domhoff, 1972). In fact, as mentioned previously, according to Domhoff, Republicans possibly comprise 80-90% of the non-Southern members of the upper class (1972, p. 18). And, while Domhoff's claim is tentative, it, nevertheless, points up the potentially biased nature of this study's sample with regard to political party affiliation. With regard to this, however, it should be recalled that, according to Domhoff himself, similarities in the financial circumstances of the upper class override in significance the potential impact of the differential political--or other--affiliations which may characterize its members (p. 48).

individuals) reported themselves to be Democrats, 19.6% (9 individuals), to be Republicans, and 6.5% (3 individuals), to be Independents. Of the 3 (6.5%) remaining interviewees, one claimed membership in the Citizen's Party, one didn't know her affiliation, and the third said she belonged to no party. The breakdown of political party affiliations by gender, age, religion, and level of wealth for the 20 men and 24 women who clearly specified such affiliations may be seen in Tables 11 and 12.

What Table 12 shows is that, regardless of age, sample members were, according to their own reports, preponderantly registered as Democrats. Furthermore, however, it also shows that being disassociated with either major party was much more common among those who were under 40 years old than it was among those who were at least 40 years old, a finding which may reflect a greater tendency among the young to buck the establishment. Regarding the association of religious and political affiliations, although the table demonstrates a weighting towards the Democratic Party for both Jewish- and Christian-identified sample members, the heaviest weighting is associated with the former sample members, a finding which bears out Domhoff's claim that wealthy American Jewry is much more closely aligned with the Democratic Party than are wealthy American gentiles, a circumstance, which Domhoff (1972) suggests may be attributable to a combination of historical, economic, and cultural conditions and realities (pp. 55-63). Lastly, examining level of wealth, it is clear that, in this case as well, whether sample members had more or less wealth, they still were mainly affiliated with the Democratic Party.

Table 11  
Political Party Affiliation by Gender

	Women	Men
Democratic	75.0% (18)	65.0% (13)
Republican	20.8% (5)	20.0% (4)
Independent	4.2% (1)	10.0% (2)
Citizen's Party	--	5.0% (1)

Table 12  
Political Party Affiliation by Age, Religion, and Wealth

	Women			Men		
	Dem.	Rep.	Other	Dem.	Rep.	Other
<u>Age:</u>						
< 40	60.0% (3)	--	40.0% (2)	60.0% (3)	--	40.0% (2)
≥ 40	75.0% (15)	25.0% (5)	--	66.7% (10)	26.7% (4)	6.7% (1)
<u>Religion:</u>						
J	86.7% (13)	13.3% (2)	--	75.0% (9)	25.0% (3)	--
C	50.0% (5)	30.0% (3)	20.0% (2)	50.0% (4)	12.5% (1)	37.5% (3)
<u>Wealth Level:</u>						
< \$1MM	75.0% (3)	--	25.0% (1)	100.0% (1)	--	--
≥ \$1MM	78.9% (15)	15.8% (3)	5.3% (1)	62.5% (10)	18.7% (3)	18.7% (3)

The only instance in which there appears to have been some distinction according to wealth, in fact, is among the men, where 100% of those with less than \$1,000,000, in contrast to 62.5% of those with at least \$1,000,000, were registered Democrats. This apparent differentiation, however, cannot justifiably be interpreted to have any particular meaning, since the total number of men in the cell comprising less than \$1,000,000 is only 2 individuals.

Before leaving the subject of interviewees' political party affiliations, it should be said that the degree to which, or way in which, the Democratic bias characterizing this investigation's sample may have influenced the research findings is unknown and must await further analysis. However, if Domhoff (1972) and Lundberg (1968) are correct in asserting that the two-party system is an illusion and should more accurately be called a one-party system with two branches, wherein the one party is a "property party" comprised of both Democratic and Republican "fat cats," then, perhaps, it might be suggested that party affiliation should not be a significant factor influencing features which characterize upper class members. However, as stated above, as this has not been checked in the current, or in other, research, it must be viewed as a very tentative proposition.

Turning now to an examination of the educational backgrounds of this study's sample, it may be said that, on the whole, the sample upper class members interviewed for this investigation were very well educated. Only 4 (15.4%) of the sample women, all of whom were over age 65, had not achieved degrees beyond the high school level. These findings stand in contrast to those of Baltzell in his 1953 study, in

which he found that upper class women tended to have little formal education (p. 126). Among the men, only 3 (13%) had not gone farther than high school, and these individuals were each over 57 years old. Thus, in all, only 14.3% (7) of the total sample interviewed had not achieved more than a high school diploma.

As far as college and graduate education are concerned, 48.9% of the sample (22 respondents) had not gone beyond the former, and 40.8% (20 respondents) had continued on into the latter (among these last individuals, one man, with an MA in music, and one woman, concentrating in law, were still in the process of earning their degrees). And, in each of these cases, the proportions of men and women characterized by these educational-levels were very similar: 46.2% (12) of the women, compared to 43.5% (10) of the men, had obtained college degrees only; and 38.5% (10) of the women, compared to 43.5% (10) of the men, had received graduate education. Tables 13, 14, and 15 (1) summarize the preceding statistics comparing sample men's and women's educational attainments, (2) present and compare the types of graduate degrees earned by these men and women, and (3) display the associations to be found between highest degree attained and distinct ages, religions, and levels of wealth.

With regard to Table 13, what seems to stand out is that, overall, the men appeared to concentrate in the areas of law/politics and finance/economics (the PhD was in Economics), while the women, on the other hand, seemed hardly to concentrate in any particular fields at all. And, it is perhaps worth suggesting that those spheres of study most heavily represented by interviewed men are also those commonly

Table 13  
Highest Education Level by Gender

	Women	Men
High school education only	15.4% (4)	13.0% (3)
College education only	46.2% (12)	43.5% (10)
Graduate education	38.5% (10)	43.5% (10)

Table 14  
Graduate Degrees Earned by Gender

	MBA	LLD	MSW	MD	MLA <sup>a</sup>	PhD	MPA <sup>b</sup>	MA	Unspeci- fied
Women	2	1	1	2	1	-	-	-	2
Men	2	4	-	-	-	1	1	1	1

<sup>a</sup>Masters of Landscape Architecture

<sup>b</sup>Masters of Political Affairs

Table 15

## Highest Degree by Age, Religion, and Wealth

	Women			Men		
	H.S. only	College only	Graduate degree	H.S. only	College only	Graduate degree
<u>Age: Age:</u>						
< 40	--	50.0% (3)	50.0% (3)	--	75.0% (6)	25.0% (2)
≥ 40	20.0% (4)	50.0% (10)	30.0% (6)	20.0% (3)	33.3% (5)	46.7% (7)
<u>Religion:</u>						
Jewish	26.7% (4)	40.0% (6)	33.3% (5)	7.7% (1)	38.5% (5)	53.8% (7)
Christian	--	63.6% (7)	36.4% (4)	20.0% (2)	60.0% (6)	20.0% (2)
<u>Wealth Level:</u>						
< \$1MM	--	100.0% (5)	--	--	100.0% (2)	--
≥ \$1MM	15.8% (3)	36.8% (7)	47.4% (9)	16.7% (3)	50.0% (9)	33.3% (6)

both restricted to men and associated with power.<sup>1</sup>

With regard to Table 15, analysis reveals not only that gender, but also age and religion, may have been relevant factors affecting educational levels attained by interviewees (wealth is not considered here due to its correlation to age). For instance, looking at the percentages related to age, it is apparent that all of the sample members under 40 years old had at least college degrees, a circumstance that probably reflects the greater societal stress placed on continuing education in recent decades. Of further interest in these numbers are the findings that, among the women, those who were younger were much more likely than those who were older to have earned graduate degrees and that, of interviewees under 40 years old, the women were twice as likely as the men to have earned such degrees. The within-gender difference found among the women is perhaps explainable by the aforementioned increased present-day stress placed on higher education. And, the apparent discrepancy existing between younger men and women sample members is perhaps attributable not only to women's subordinate status, but also to the current historic period in which a great deal of pressure exists--at least among the highly educated and high-income social sectors--for women to pursue careers. It may be that, as a result of their gender-based lower status, these women can only improve

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<sup>1</sup>That attitudes regarding the acceptability of women entering these arenas could possibly be changing is perhaps indicated by the fact that, of the 4 women under age 35 with, or in the process of getting, graduate degrees, 3 had chosen the fields of law or business. This compares with the 6 additional women with graduate degrees, who were over 40 years old, among whom none had specialized in a finance-related area, and only one in the area of law.

their competitive position in the marketplace by enhancing their status via such means as obtaining graduate degrees. Such a recourse, of course, would be of less relevance and concern to sample men. What remains puzzling, however, is what might account for the fact that the proportion of men at least 40 years old who reported graduate degrees was almost double that of those under 40. One possible explanation for this difference might be that, among the younger men, there were graduate degrees still to be earned.

On examination of the association between religious affiliation and highest educational degree earned, it seems that, among the women, religious affiliation cannot be said to have been an influencing factor. That is, although more Christian- than Jewish-identified women held at least college degrees, the facts that (1) there appears to have been a relationship between older age and high school education only and (2) those sample women who were over 65 years old all identified themselves as Jewish indicate that age was probably a more significant factor with regard to level of education among women than was religion. Concerning the men, however, one might speculate that religious affiliation could have been related to differential education levels achieved by Jewish- and Christian-identified respondents. That is, it is possible that the fact that Jewish men reported a much higher frequency of earned graduate degrees than did Christian men may again reflect the reaction of a subordinate status category of individuals acting to enhance their status through available means.

Turning to a comparison of sample members' gender differentiated primary occupations (those at which respondents had worked the greatest

number of years), Tables 16 and 17 should be of help. As will be seen, the tables show, not only the total numbers of men and women who had been primarily volunteer, as opposed to paid, workers, but also the general breakdown of types of paid occupations held, and the association of paid versus volunteer primary occupations to age, religion, and wealth level.

What stands out on reviewing Table 16 is that, in line with the literature portrayal of upper class women, a relatively large proportion (53.8%) of women respondents had done volunteer work as their primary occupation. Save one, all these women were over 40 years old. However, what additionally stands out, contrary to literature depictions, is that a large proportion (42.2%) had also been primarily paid workers. Of the paid occupations, those most heavily represented by women interviewees were in the fields of health and business. And, while those women in the field of health (2 M.D.s, 1 MSW, and 1 R.N.) ranged in age from their 20s to 80s, all those in business, except one (in her 70s), were under 40 years old,<sup>1</sup> a finding which may reflect a present-day increasing trend among younger women, generally, to break into traditionally non-female occupational spheres such as the business sphere. Aside from women specified in the table, none of the others had occupations related to the business domain.

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<sup>1</sup>Of the women whose primary occupations were in business, although one (in her 70s) declined her salary, she was nevertheless included in the paid work category, as the position she held was a salaried one.

Table 16  
Primary Occupation by Gender

	Women	Men
Volunteer	53.8% (14)	21.7% (5)
Paid	42.2% (12)	73.4% (17)
Health	15.4% (4)	--
Arts <sup>a</sup>	3.8% (1)	13.0% (3)
Law	3.8% (1)	13.0% (3)
Business <sup>b</sup>	15.4% (4)	26.1% (6)
Education	3.8% (1)	4.3% (1)
Not-for-profit	--	13.0% (3)
Government/politics	--	4.3% (1)
Other <sup>c</sup>	3.8% (1)	4.3% (1)

<sup>a</sup>Includes authors, musicians, museum staff, etc.

<sup>b</sup>Includes publishing, finance, real estate, electronic communications, etc.

<sup>c</sup>Includes a student (female) and an unpaid musician (male).

Table 17

Paid vs. Volunteer Primary Occupations  
by Age, Religion, and Wealth

	Women		Men	
	Paid	Volunteer	Paid	Volunteer
<u>Age:</u>				
< 40	66.7% (4)	16.7% (1)	50.0% (4)	37.5% (3)
≥ 40	35.0% (7)	65.0% (13)	86.7% (13)	13.3% (2)
<u>Religion:</u>				
Jewish	40.0% (6)	60.0% (9)	84.6% (11)	7.7% (1)
Christian	45.5% (5)	45.5% (5)	60.0% (6)	40.0% (4)
<u>Wealth Level:</u>				
< \$1MM	60.0% (3)	20.0% (1)	100.0% (2)	--
≥ \$1MM	42.1% (8)	57.9% (11)	72.2% (13)	22.2% (4)

Comparing the occupational statistics for women with those for men, it can be seen that the men had a higher frequency not only for paid work (73.4%), in general, but also for work in the business sphere (26.1%), in particular. Moreover, if one considers that 3 additional men (one volunteer and two lawyers) not included in the table's calculations for business occupation, actually dedicated much of their daily work to the investment world, then the proportion of interviewed men who could be counted as primarily involved in business rises to 39.1%. The age range for this group of men was 43-73, which indicates that, for sample men, as opposed to sample women, older, rather than younger, age was associated with business occupations--a finding that lends additional support to the above-proposed association between young age and involvement in "non-traditional" endeavors. And, just as a greater proportion of interviewed men than women were represented in the paid work sphere, a smaller proportion of the men (21.7%) did volunteer work as their primary occupation. Among this latter group, ages ranged from 30s to 60s.

An interesting aspect of the comparison between men's and women's primary occupations, that is not evident from Table 16, is that a greater number of responding men than appear in the table were actually currently employed in the paid not-for-profit sector. That is, in addition to the 3 indicated men, one of the lawyers and 2 of the respondents whose primary occupations had been as volunteers were also presently employed in paid non-profit work, bringing the total number of men in this sphere to 6. And, if these 6 are taken together with the remaining 3 volunteers, then the percentage of sample men

who were currently working principally in the nonprofit sector rises to 39.1%. What seems interesting about these data is that, although a respectable proportion of responding men were currently working, and a majority (53.8%) of responding women had worked, in the not-for-profit sector, a tendency to be paid for this kind of work appeared only in relation to the men. That is, remuneration for their time and effort applied to 66.7% (6) of the men currently principally employed in the non-profit sector, but to none of the women so employed.

Table 17 shows the associations of age, religion, and level of wealth to paid and volunteer primary occupations. In this table, younger age for women and older age for men appear to be particularly associated with primary occupations in the paid domain, while younger age for men appears somewhat more associated with volunteer work. As an explanation for these associations, it might be argued, again, that the younger women's relatively greater participation, compared to the older women, in paid occupations might reflect the contemporary trend in which women, in general, are increasingly entering the labor force. Furthermore, the fact that volunteer occupations were more associated with young responding men than with either young responding women or with older responding men, might traditionally bear out the view that youth is more often associated with nontraditional behaviors and attitudes.

What the statistics in Table 17 show regarding the association between religion and nature of primary occupation is that although the frequencies for primary occupations in the paid sphere were similar

for both Jewish- and Christian-identified women, the Jewish women reported a higher incidence of primary occupations in the volunteer sector, while the primary occupations of Christian women were equally divided between the two domains. Moreover, the table shows that, while paid primary occupations were the rule for men of both faiths, nevertheless, Jewish men reported a higher frequency of this kind of occupation, and Christian men reported a higher incidence of volunteer occupations. The possible bases for these associations between religious affiliation and nature of primary occupation--if any--are not apparent, but, again, may be related to the facts that a higher proportion of Jewish-identified, than of Christian-identified, sample members were at least 40 years old and that older age is more often associated with "traditional" behaviors.

Lastly, an examination of level of wealth in relation to primary occupation discloses that less wealth was associated, for both men and women, with a greater frequency of paid primary occupations. And, while in previous discussions regarding the possible influence of level of wealth on various findings it has been proposed that young age might have been more relevant as the influential factor, in this instance, it is also reasonable to assume that individuals with a lesser amount of wealth would be more likely to pursue paid work as their primary occupation.

Finally, with regard to the subject of wealthholding, the level of wealth reportedly owned by, and, thus, the upper economic class status of, this study's sample can be easily shown. Taking the sample as a whole, of the 44 individuals who reported their levels of wealth,

40 (90.9%) claimed wealth (principally unearned) in excess of \$500,000. And, for the 4 individuals who reported wealth between \$200,000 and \$500,000, each was not only under 30 years old, but, in addition, was due a future inheritance that would place him or her over the \$500,000 level. Thus, projecting from Osman's statistics (1977, p. 412), if it can be said that people with at least \$500,000 comprise the top 1% of U.S. wealthholders, then, clearly, those individuals interviewed for this study, who reported their level of wealthholding, can be said to belong to the topmost economic class (and, it should be recalled, in the case of the 5 individuals who did not indicate their personal wealth, upper class membership was ascertained based on these respondents' conformity to Domhoff's upper class indicators and/or on the researcher's personal knowledge regarding their general financial circumstances).

Of the 24 women and 20 men who indicated their level of wealth and reported it currently to be \$200,000 or more the breakdown of ranges of wealth, according to gender, is shown in Table 18. And, while no pronounced relationship was found between religious affiliation and level of wealth for the interview sample (a somewhat higher proportion of the Christian-identified women reported less than \$1,000,000), as mentioned earlier, there did appear to be a strong association between level of wealth and age. This is best seen in Table 19.

As Table 19 shows, the majority (71.4%) of individuals with less than \$1,000,000 were under 40 years old, while the majority (78.4%) of individuals with at least \$1,000,000 were 40 years old or more.

Table 18  
Wealthholding by Gender

	Women	Men
\$200,000 - \$499,000	7.7% (2)	8.7% (2)
\$500,000 - \$999,999	11.5% (3)	--
\$1,000,000 - \$4,999,999	30.8% (8)	34.8% (8)
\$5,000,000 - \$9,999,999	11.5% (3)	21.7% (5)
\$10,000,000 or more	30.8% (8)	21.7% (5)
Not indicated	7.7% (2)	13.0% (3)

Table 19  
Level of Wealth by Age

	< 40	≥ 40
< \$1MM	71.4% (5)	28.6% (2)
≥ \$1MM	21.6% (8)	78.4% (29)

This finding is not at all surprising, when it is considered that 80% (4) of those who were under 40 and reported under \$1,000,000 in wealth also stated that they had not yet received their full inheritances. In other words, it might be concluded that, because inheritances are frequently received in allotments, over time, among the upper economic class, younger age may be associated with less wealth.

Concerning the derivation of sample members' fortunes, a major portion of the wealth held by all but 3 of the interviewees could be traced back at least two generations to an original fortune-builder and could be attributed to the intergenerational transfer of wealth. The exceptions to this rule were all over 65 years old and had been living with great wealth for at least two generations. One of these individuals claimed that 90% of his wealth was self-made, but that he had been given a head start in fortune-building by inheriting both a successful business and some money from his father. Another interviewee was born into a family of some means, but had married wealth much greater than her own. The third interviewee claimed to come from a background of modest wealth, and she too had "married up," inheriting her husband's estate at his death.

Earlier in this paper the approximate indicators of upper class status identified by Domhoff (1970) were noted. It was the intent of the present research, in part, to investigate the extent to which these indicators characterized sample upper class members interviewed. One of Domhoff's several possible indicators is being listed in the Social Register (or comparable blue book, for cities not covered by the Social Register). Among respondents for this study, research

determined that at least 38.8% (19 individuals) were presently, or had been in the past, listed in the Register (all interviewees were from covered cities). Comparing men and women, 46.2% (12) of the women and 30.4% (7) of the men had such a listing, reflecting, perhaps, again, a greater concern with status enhancement among sample upper class women than among sample upper class men. And, while little association was found to obtain between differential age categories and frequency of listing in the Social Register (save that older women had a somewhat greater incidence of such listings than did younger men), interesting associations did appear to obtain between the incidence of these listings and differential religious affiliations or levels of wealth. These associations can be found in Table 20.

As would be expected, based on the historic policy of the Social Register of excluding Jews from its listing, in this study Jewish sample members--both women and men--were much less frequently associated with this register than were Christian-identified sample members, a finding which may account for the probably lower than expected overall association between sample members and this upper class social indicator. Perhaps unexpectedly, however, with regard to the association of levels of wealth to inclusion in the Register, those interviewees who reported less wealth appear to have been "registered" more frequently than those with greater wealth. This is a surprising association primarily because of the preponderance of younger sample members in the under \$1,000,000 category, a circumstance that might be expected to indicate that these respondents would have been less likely to be associated with the Register than would have

Table 20

## Social Register Listing by Religion and Wealth

		Women	Men
Religion:	Jewish	26.7% (4)	7.7% (1)
	Christian	72.7% (8)	60.0% (6)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	60.0% (3)	50.0% (1)
	≥ \$1MM	42.1% (8)	33.3% (6)

been their wealthier, and older, counterparts, among whom greater concern might have been anticipated regarding the maintenance of ties to such a long-lived upper class directory. However, not too much should be read into this association of lesser wealth and younger age to higher frequency of listings in the Social Register, due to the fact that it is not uncommon for young upper class members to be listed in the Register as a consequence of their parents' prior listing in the directory.

Another indicator is membership of oneself or certain of one's family members in any of the clubs Domhoff lists. Information regarding this dimension was collected for 47 sample members (25 women and 22 men). Among these respondents, 48.9% (23) could claim such a club association. These 23 respondents comprised 56% (14) of the responding women and 40.9% (9) of the responding men.

If one looks at club membership from a slightly different angle, narrowing the focus to include only the interviewees themselves, some interesting additional features become apparent. Forty-five interviewees (22 men and 23 women) provided information on their own club affiliations, and, of these, only 33.3% (15) were themselves members of the clubs listed by Domhoff. Broken down by gender, 27.3% (6) of the men and 39.7% (9) of the women reported such club affiliations. All these individuals were over 40 years old, suggesting perhaps that membership in prestige clubs is partly age-associated.

That club membership may be associated with increased age is further indicated by evidence related to the overall club membership of sample members. Again, of those 45 interviewees who provided

information on their own club memberships, 68.9% (31) reported belonging to some social club, and, of these 83.9% (26) were over 40 years old. Conversely of those respondents who reported no club memberships (14 individuals, or 31.1%), 78.6% (11) were under 50 years old and 50% (7) were under 40 years old.

Regarding gender differences in overall club memberships, sample men had a slightly greater tendency than did sample women to be club joiners: 72.2% (16) of the former, as contrasted with 65.2% (15) of the latter, reported current affiliation with some club. Thus, while only about a third of the interview respondents reported membership in one of Domhoff's prestige clubs, it appears that, for both genders over 40 years of age, social club membership, in general, was common.

Before leaving the subject of club membership, it is worth examining the potential influence of level of wealth and of religious background on the frequency of research participants' exclusive club affiliations. Apropos of this, although no relationship was found to exist between differential level of wealth and frequency of exclusive club participation, research data did indicate some variation in the incidence of such club membership according to religion. That is, in the case of the Christian-identified respondents, 33.3% (3) of the men and 44.4% (4) of the 9 women who reported their club affiliations stated that they belonged to one or more of the clubs noted by Domhoff (1970). And, in the case of Jewish-identified respondents, 23.1% (3) of the 13 men and 35.7% (5) of the 14 women who provided club information reported such memberships. Thus, overall, both sample men and women who identified themselves as Christians appeared to

have a somewhat greater likelihood than did those identifying themselves as Jewish of membership in America's most prestigious clubs (as specified by Domhoff). And, while this finding is basically in line with other research that claims the practice of discrimination against Jews by prestige clubs (Baltzell, 1958; Domhoff, 1970; Zweigenhaft, 1980), nevertheless, the disparity it reflects is perhaps less than might be expected in light of such other research.

Regarding yet a further of Domhoff's indicators, high school alma mater, 50% (24) of the interviewees for whom information was attained (48 participants) reported their own and/or a family member's attendance at one of those schools identified by Domhoff as signifying upper class standing. Of the 25 women for whom information was obtained, 52% (13) had attended one of the Domhoff-specified schools. And, of the 23 sample men, 47.8% (11) reported attending these schools.

In Table 21 can be seen how, in this investigation, age, religion, and wealth level were associated with interviewees' frequency of attendance at the schools listed by Domhoff. With regard to this table, while the explanation for the higher association of younger women with exclusive high school attendance--compared to sample members in all other age categories--is not readily apparent, the fact that these women were the same ones reporting both less than \$1,000,000 and attendance at such schools (for whom the frequency of association was also highest) might indicate that affiliation with prestige schools was considered to be particularly important for upper class women whose relative wealth was not great. Because prestige high schools are claimed to provide the basis for a student's later, and life-time,

Table 21  
 Exclusive High School Attendance<sup>a</sup> by Age,  
 Religion, and Wealth

		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	80.0% (4)	37.5% (3)
	≥ 40	45.0% (9)	53.3% (8)
Religion:	Jewish	33.3% (5)	30.8% (4)
	Christian	80.0% (8)	70.0% (7)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	80.0% (4)	50.0% (1)
	≥ \$1MM	50.0% (9)	50.0% (9)

<sup>a</sup>High schools as listed in Domhoff (1970, pp. 22-26).

social relations, perhaps, for these women, affiliation with such schools was viewed as a means of fostering the security of their future class position.

On consideration of the possible relationship of religion to exclusive high school attendance, the table shows that, overall, Jewish research participants were much less frequently associated with these schools than were the Christian-identified participants. In order to account for this differential association, it might be proposed that the lower incidence of prestige school affiliation found among Jewish sample members reflects the historical discriminatory treatment of members of this faith. And, as in the case of the Social Register, research participants' relatively weak association with this indicator, as well, may also be attributable to the sample bias characterizing the investigation.

Domhoff's final indicator of upper class membership is as follows:

A person is considered to be a member of the upper class if his or her father was a millionaire entrepreneur or a \$100,000-a-year corporation executive or corporation lawyer, and (a) he or she attended one of the 130 private schools listed in the back of Kavalier's The Private World of High Society or (b) he or she belongs to any one of the exclusive clubs mentioned by Baltzell or Kavalier. (1970, p. 26)

In the research sample for this study, this indicator applied to 64.3% of the individuals from whom relevant information was collected (23 women, 19 men). The breakdown for women and men, respectively, was 69.6% (16 women) and 57.9% (11 men). And, although neither differential, age nor wealth level, appeared to be particularly associated with the incidence of this indicator among sample men and women (however,

younger women, unexplainably, demonstrated a somewhat greater identification with this indicator than did others in the sample), differential religious background, on the other hand, did expose such an association. That is, while Domhoff's 5th indicator applied to 100% (9) of the responding Christian women and 85.7% (6) of the responding (7) Christian men, it applied to only 50% (7) of the responding (14) Jewish women and 50% (6) of the responding (12) Jewish men. That this lesser frequency of association, on the part of Jewish sample members, with Domhoff's 5th upper class indicator may have appeared in the current study should, however, come as no surprise, since it has previously been shown that the Jewish individuals participating in this investigation were less often associated with prestige schools and clubs than were the Christian-identified participants. Again, had the present research sample not been biased with an over-weighting of Jewish sample members, a stronger association may have been seen between Domhoff's 5th indicator and sample members.

Looking over all of Domhoff's possible dimensions, qualifying one for upper class standing, it appears that 33 sample individuals (67.3%) could definitely claim at least one such trait. Based on these dimensions, sample women and men met Domhoff's minimum requirements for upper class status to a similar degree: 69.2% (18) of the women and 65.2% (15) of the men were associated with at least one indicator.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the research sample for this investigation largely

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<sup>1</sup>And, as stated previously, these percentages probably would have been higher had the research sample for this study been a representative one. Apropos of this, however, the percentages do increase somewhat, if the frequencies are adjusted, by discounting from the

supports Domhoff's findings regarding characteristics associated with membership in the American upper class.

Having just affirmed the relevance of Domhoff's upper class indicators, based on findings from the present study, it should be stated that this affirmation derives partly from an interpretation of Domhoff's work which ignores its male bias. Intentionally or not, in four of his five indicators, by exclusively using the male pronoun, Domhoff implies that only men can be members of the upper class. A representative example of this is Domhoff's fourth indicator:

A person is considered to be a member of the upper class if his sister, wife, mother, or mother-in-law attended one of the following schools or belongs to one of the following clubs. (1970, p. 24; stress added)

Does Domhoff really mean that a woman whose sister, mother, or mother-in-law attended these same schools or belonged to these same clubs would not be an upper class member? For the purposes of this study, it was assumed that he did not intend to exclude women in this way, and, therefore, where possible, each of his indicators was interpreted to apply to women as well as men.

A related mistake seems to have been made in Domhoff's fifth indicator. Here he states that an individual whose father was a wealthy entrepreneur, corporate executive, or corporate lawyer would qualify as an upper class member (1970, p. 26). Granted that women have been, and still are, a miniscule minority in the realms of fortune building and corporate leadership; nevertheless, Domhoff

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calculations the two women and two men for whom information on indicators was not clear. In this instance, the relative frequencies for sample women and men become 75% and 71.4% respectively.

should have been explicit in stating whether a child born to such a woman could equally qualify for upper class standing. Without this kind of clarification, Domhoff's indicators can be read as predominantly male-oriented, and, therefore, not necessarily relevant or useful in the study of upper class women.

As a last word of indicators, it is worth mentioning an institutional association that emerged as a common upper class characteristic in this study. This was the association of upper class members and foundations of their own or a family member's, creation. In the present study it was found that 65.4% (17) of the women and 60.9% (14) of the men were linked to foundations which they had created and primarily funded themselves or which had been so-created and funded by one or more family members. And, although neither sample members' differential ages nor, therefore, the differences in their current personal financial worth could be claimed to be related to the likelihood of their being connected to a family foundation, nevertheless research data show that, in this study, an association existed between differential religious identifications and incidence of reported family foundations. With regard to Jewish-identified sample members, 73.3% (11) of the women and 76.9% (10) of the men reported the existence of family foundations, while, among Christian-identified sample members, this was true of only 54.5% (6) of the women and 40% (4) of the men. To what this religion-associated difference in tendency towards family foundations may be due is unknown. However, it is possible to suggest at least two factors which may have contributed to the finding of these differential associations. One of these factors is discussed by

Domhoff who states that, according to some theorists, Jewish "cultural traditions" include "social justice and charity," while those of Protestants stress "that people get what they deserve" (1972, p. 56). And, if this is, indeed, the case, then "cultural" differences obtaining between sample members (and sample members' families) of different religious affiliations might explain the greater frequency with which Jewish respondents were found to be associated with family foundations. Another possible explanation for this finding, however, is that, because, relative to members of most Christian denominations, members of the Jewish faith belong to a lower status category, which is generally associated with less access to power, the greater frequency with which Jewish sample members in this study were associated with family foundations may reflect actions taken by these individuals, or by other of their family members, to improve not only their social standing, but also their social influence (i.e., power). Finally, while it was not the goal of this research to discover and then determine the general applicability of new upper class indicators the large proportion of sample members who had family charitable foundation connections suggests that such an association might also apply to the wider U.S. upper class population.

### Chapter III

#### DOMESTIC DIVISION OF LABOR

Because many theories concerning women's secondary status in the United States revolve around their restriction to the domestic sphere and--some say consequent--alienation from the productive sphere and society's critical resources, the significance of these theories for the upper class can only be checked by examining the actual extent and nature of upper class women's participation in these spheres. To this end, in the present study, these spheres were investigated, and, in this section, findings regarding sample members' reported domestic division of labor shall be presented and discussed. Topics to be covered include the role of household help and, for those sample members who at some point lived with mates or spouses, the perceived division of household management, childcare, economic support, and financial management. Evidence bearing on each of these topics was drawn from interviewees' open-ended statements regarding perceived past and present roles and responsibilities in the domestic domain and from data provided by completed Activities Records (completed by 24 women and 18 men), which show, at least in part, interviewees' actual activities over a recent non-weekend two day period. The central question to be addressed by an examination of this collective evidence is, to what extent can the generally held view of American women as predominantly home-bound domestic workers, who are, consequently, men's economic dependents and subordinates be said to apply to the upper class women participating

in this study? What follows in this chapter is an attempt to answer this question and, in so doing, to investigate, with regard to the present upper class sample, the relevance and comprehensiveness of the theories underlying this view.

Looking first at sample members' reported division of labor regarding household management, it should be noted that interviewed men and women were in complete agreement that in no case were men primarily responsible for running households. And, while some discrepancy did appear to exist in the degree to which men and women perceived household labor to be shared (38.1%--8--of the 21 responding men, versus 14.3%--3--of the 21 responding women reported such sharing), the greater proportion of men claiming to share in housework seemed principally a function of younger age (neither religious affiliation, nor level of wealth appeared to be factors here). That is, of the 8 men who reported sharing in housework 75% (6) were under 40 years old (contrasting with the women, among the 3 of whom 33.3%--1--was under this age), a finding which may reflect the present-day partially changed consciousness among the young, concerning what should rightly constitute men's household responsibilities. However, the fact that a greater proportion of men than women (young or not) reported sharing in household labor may indicate that, although sample men may have developed a new awareness regarding what their household roles should comprise, this new awareness may not have translated into new behavior--at least from the women's perspectives. Unfortunately, with regard to the present study, due to the fact that, generally, sample members were not married to one another, the likely validity of this suggestion cannot be ascertained. Despite

this, however, the main point to be made regarding the division of household labor characterizing this investigation's respondents is that the large majority of both the men and the women regarded women as primary household administrators. And, this view is further supported by examining the nature of household tasks reportedly assumed by responding men and women and their mates/spouses.

Apropos of this, one--perhaps generalizable--distinction made by interviewees regarding gender-differentiated spheres of housework duties was that, whereas women were responsible for most tasks related to the inside of the home, men took responsibility for those associated with the outside of the house: these last might include some kind of heavy work, managing country property (second homes), and outside or structural aspects of home maintenance and repairs. Other tasks listed by both men and women as the primary spheres of responsibility for men included arranging vacations and weekends, participating in athletics with children, and mechanical repairs and heavier work inside the house. The three chores most commonly reported (and moreso by the male interviewees) as somewhat shared by both men and women were those of meal preparation, dishwashing, and child guidance. It should be noted that all these male-associated chores, in all likelihood, can be accomplished without disrupting a full-time extra-domestic work schedule.

By comparison to the male interviewees' listing of their own domestic responsibilities, their listing for their mates'/spouses', and the listing provided by the women interviewees themselves, is both longer and more detailed, perhaps reflecting the fact that these upper class women did indeed have primary responsibility for managing the domestic

domain. Some of the housework tasks mentioned as commonly undertaken by women include childcare, entertaining and planning social events, administering household help, food shopping, occasional laundry, meal planning and occasional meal preparation, bookkeeping, and home decoration. Of the many items specified by all responding interviewees as the principal province of women, only overall childcare, home decoration and entertaining and planning social events were mentioned as exclusively women's tasks. Nevertheless, it is clear from both sample men's and sample women's statements about gender-based division of domestic labor that, while men may have occasionally lent a hand with routine domestic chores, it was largely the women who were the household managers. In the course of interview discussions, 85.7% (18) of the responding women and 61.9% (13) of the responding men stated this to be the case. Thus, by and large, sample members' own views regarding their relative roles in household management corroborated those generally held as applicable to members of other classes, wherein women, rather than men, are said to have principal responsibility for overseeing and carrying out household tasks.

Notwithstanding the probability that sample upper class women may have resembled women of other classes in bearing disproportionate responsibility for management of the domestic sphere, it, nevertheless, should not be assumed that the nature of the housework carried out by different classes of women is necessarily either equally exacting or constraining. In fact as the foregoing descriptions of sample members' characteristic household chores indicates, and as data on the role of household help and Activities Records' evidence further suggest, much

unlike what is supposed for women of other classes, sample upper class women appear to have been relatively little burdened or restricted by their housework obligations.

For instance, by looking at interview information on sample members' reliance on household help to carry out the bulk of domestic chores, it is apparent that 96% (24) of the 25 responding women and 72.7% (16) of the 22 responding men currently employed such help to do most of the actual work entailed in housework. This hired domestic labor was either on a come-in or live-in basis, and sometimes on both. With regard to this, 44% (11) of the responding women and 36.8% (8) of the responding men reported utilizing some live-in help, while 52% (13) of the women and 36.4% (8) of the men specified employing come-in help exclusively. And, it may be that this gender-differentiated employment of household help is a reflection of the fact that women are more often associated than are men with the execution of housework so that, whereas, in some cases, sample upper class men may have relied exclusively on their wives to carry out household chores, sample upper class women were less likely to be able to rely on their husbands to assume this type of responsibility, and, therefore, may have been more likely than the men to hire outside help. Moreover, by comparing the 7 interviewees (1 woman, 6 men) who did not indicate the current employment of hired help to those who did (40 individuals), it appears that exploitation of such service may have been partly a function of age and/or household composition (in contrast, neither religious affiliation nor wealth level appeared to be of significance in this matter). That is, while in the latter group 95% (38 interviewees) were either over 35 years old or had

children at home, in the former, 85.7% (6) were both under 35 and childless (and, in the case of the seventh individual--a 42 year old father--being without hired help was a relatively recent development.) Thus, it would perhaps be expectable that, as interviewees either advanced in age or became parents, the likelihood of their making use of hired household help would also increase. Regardless of this proposition, however, interview data make clear that, overall, by their employment of domestic household help, sample upper class women and the spouses/mates of sample upper class men were, in the main, relieved of many domestic work obligations.

In accordance with the above data on the role of household help, a review of the completed Activities Records shows that, although a majority (62.5%--15--) of the responding women--as opposed to a minority (27.8%--5--) of the responding men--attended to household affairs (including childcare) as part of their daily routine, it also indicates that the amount of time devoted to this part--by either group--was quite modest. In the case of women, for example, only 25% (6) reported occupying themselves with household matters during more than one period of the day (i.e., morning, afternoon, or evening hours), their specified tasks including meal preparation, instructing household help, childcare, grocery shopping, and cleaning--with greatest emphasis on the first three chores. And, in the case of the men, whose listed chores were similar to the women's (subtracting cleaning and help instruction, but adding dishwashing), this was true of only 11.1% (2). Thus, these data indicate that it was not only for sample upper class men, but for the women as well, that a substantial proportion of the day remained free

from household duties. In light of this evidence, as well as in that bearing on household help, it seems apparent that the commonly held views of the nature and bases of American women's domestic roles cannot be said to thoroughly apply to this study's participating upper class women. For, whereas women in the United States are seen, for the most part, as predominantly housewives (that is, domestic workers) who, perforce, are both bound to the daily demands of housework and childcare and, therefore, dependent on their husbands for economic support, this image, as present research data show, bears little relationship to the actual circumstances or conditions characterizing sample upper class women's lives and domestic obligations. For, although the data indicate that responding women were primarily responsible for the smooth running of their households, they also show that, in most instances, housework for these women was relatively discretionary and, for the most part, meant supervising the labor of domestic employees.

Despite the above, however, it is perhaps of significance to note that the Activities Records do reflect among sample members a gender-differentiated allocation of parts of the day to housework, which may have had consequences for their additional participation in further activities. That is, among the women, the greatest proportion (41.7%--10--) attended to at least part of their domestic duties in the morning hours, with a lesser proportion active in the afternoons and evenings (29.2%--7--and 25%--6--respectively). In contrast, not only did the great majority of men apparently fail to participate in any domestic labor, but, additionally, when they did participate, their efforts were concentrated in the evening hours. In regard to this, of the men who

completed Activities Records, 27.8 % (5) indicated that they attended to housework in the evenings, while only 5.5% (1) in each case reported doing additional such work in the mornings or afternoons. The implication of this differential apportionment of time by responding upper class men and women is, of course, that, whereas the men set aside the daylight hours for extra-domestic affairs, the women generally utilized part of these hours for attending to household management, thereby reducing their available time for any other activity. And, it is in this limited sense that the generally posited connection between women's primary domestic responsibility and their restricted access to the productive sphere may be said to apply to this investigation's participating upper class women.

Although the foregoing discussion has covered in a general manner the reported division of household labor among upper class sample members and its apparently incomplete conformity to the standard view of gender-based domestic division of labor, there remains a specific aspect of this subject matter which deserves closer inspection. This is the topic of childcare, which is particularly important to examine in that it is central to certain theories purporting to explain women's persistence in the private (home), and alienation from the public (productive), domain. For instance, as earlier outlined, many investigators have attributed the endurance of women's domesticity to biological, ideological, and/or structural factors. Those emphasizing the role of biology stress the particular constraints imposed on women by pregnancy, childbirth, lactation, and infant helplessness (Friedl, 1975, p. 2). Others, who give priority to ideological forces, claim that women's

continued enactment of, and restriction to, primarily domestic functions lies in their generationally repeated socialization to expect an adult role centered on child bearing and rearing. This, it is said, has the additional consequence of contributing to employers' biases against women competing with men in the marketplace, as well as to women's own ambivalence about doing so. Lastly, those who underline the importance of structural factors propose that women's disproportionate responsibility for child raising is societally promoted due to its supposed contribution to system maintenance. It is in the interest of theoretical advancement that each of these formulations should be examined for their application at the upper class level.

Before proceeding with such an examination, however, a prior and fundamental question regarding the present study must be addressed: To what extent did sample women resemble women of other classes by assuming principal responsibility in childcare? In response to this question it can be said that evidence based on interviewees' own reports suggests that sample women and the spouses of sample men did, in fact, predominate in childcare. Of this study's 19 mothers, 100% stated that attending to their children, particularly in the early years, was not only their principal responsibility and concern, but also more theirs than their husbands'. This viewpoint was generally corroborated by the 14 sample fathers, among whom 78.6% (11) felt that, more than they themselves, their wives had been present and available during their children's early years (the 3 remaining fathers--21.4%--felt they had shared early childcare responsibilities with their wives).

Having, thus, established sample upper class women's apparent disproportionate role in early childcare, the factors suggested as influencing such a gender-linked division of labor may be more informedly discussed. In this regard, from the outset it should be noted that the biological arguments for women's domestic identification seem, of themselves, irrelevant to the case of upper class women. That this is so is due to the fact that, for upper class women, if not for others, financial privilege and the extreme affordability of hired infant care can bring to a minimum the constraints associated with infant helplessness. And, with regard to the constraints associated with pregnancy and childbirth, as cross-cultural research has shown, these cannot even be held as innately induced (Oakley, 1975, pp. 168-169). Consequently, it seems safe to assume that it was not due to biological factors that sample upper class women took principal responsibility for the domestic sphere.

Having rejected the proposition that biological factors necessitated responding upper class women's greater home orientation, the relevance of the proposition which focuses on ideological factors may be examined. In relation to this, data from the current investigation bear out the view that, as a result of their socialization--which encourages their feelings of obligation to their young children and to the domestic domain in general--women may feel ambivalent about seeking and undertaking activities which might interfere with their felt home duties. Of the 22 sample women who were mothers and/or wives, 81.8% (18) reported that they had either discounted, delayed, or somehow adjusted careers in order to accommodate those of their husbands or to

simply fulfill what they saw as the domestic obligations of a wife/mother. The following excerpts taken from some of the interviews with these women are representative of the attitudes expressed by most of them regarding the domestic/extra-domestic work conflicts they reportedly had experienced.

I'm not considering [paid work] while the children are very small. I mean I certainly wouldn't consider even full-time part-time work until they're both in school . . . I think in the future, when the children aren't so small and don't need us . . . so much that there wouldn't be any problem. . . . I don't think my husband would like the idea . . . Something that took up too much of my time away from the children and him wouldn't be good.

I was married at 19. I had my first child at 20, so that married life, to me, I think, meant a household and children . . . And, during that time, I didn't take any interest in community affairs. . . . I loved bringing up the children. That's the best job I ever had.

While [my son] was young, I was [mostly oriented towards the home]. I did community things, but they didn't loom as large. They weren't as time consuming. I wouldn't let them be.

I really would have liked to have been a businessman, but I had children, and I liked bringing them up, and then I got involved in philanthropic causes, and interested in them, and here I am now.

We got this mixed message of, on the one hand, when I graduate from Vassar, . . . go on with a career, . . . [but, on the other hand], it was really more important to have an engagement ring on your finger when you graduated. . . . When I first met my husband, I was sure he was going to be the greatest [doctor] ever, and I would help him raise a wonderful family. It was very much his career I thought of, not my own. And, mine would fit into it.

I started working, had a job, and then got pregnant immediately. I have absolutely no question that something in me--an old thing of mine--was you've got to give it all to your children. . . . So, I absolutely submerged myself [in my children]. I went back part-time. There was never any feeling that I should get a more major job. . . . There was a feeling that, if I raised the kids and made my career second, [my husband] would be somebody important.

I thought it was great fun to play a wife. I thought running the household was number one . . . But, it never occurred to me to have a real job job, in those early years, because I was busy with the babies, the house, and it all sort of happened at once. . . . I was very busy with all of that, which was wonderful for about the first eight years.

I had this thing about wanting to work . . . I was very unserious. I just did whatever came to hand. I had no sense of career as career. I figured I was going to work at a job for a few years, and get married. . . . I thought, "wouldn't it be fun, tra-la!"

I could have made a career . . . I started to take a graduate degree at Columbia . . . , but I really didn't have the time, with the children--the ages they were--to spend all that time in the library, get the thesis out, and so forth. . . . I suppose, if you were really going to [have a career], you wouldn't have four children.

As can be seen from the foregoing citations, sample women, for the most part, tended to believe that they shouldn't or couldn't take on extra-domestic work--and especially full-time work--or activities, due to the perceived constraints imposed on them by wifely and/or motherly obligations. And, it is in this sense that it might be said that their feelings and behaviors in this regard were probably strongly influenced by their gender-specific socialization. However, while the ideological socialization component underlying responding upper class women's relationships to the domestic and extra-domestic spheres should not be ignored or denied, at the same time, it should be recognized that, since this component must itself be accounted for, it cannot constitute a sufficient explanation for sample women's alienation from the extra-domestic domain. That is, it remains to be explained why, at this level of the upper economic class, where neither factors of biology nor of domestic economic need seem to invite or require it, socialization for a division of labor by sex (wherein women predominate in the domestic

sphere and men, in the productive sphere), nevertheless, persists. Some theorists, of course, might argue that today's system-wide socialization for gender-based division of labor is simply a reflection and outgrowth of dramatically different conditions which prevailed through most of human history and which are thought to have been conducive to the development of both a structure and ideology of sexually differentiated organization of labor as an adaptive strategy. However, even if it could be demonstrated that historic conditions did, in the past, dictate such a structure and ideology, this would still not be a sufficient explanation for their persistence today. Consequently, an alternative explanatory framework, relevant to all segments of contemporary U.S. society, must be sought. With this in mind, the chapter which follows will consider the possible relevance of structural factors in promoting responding upper class women's domestic orientation and productive sphere alienation.

Turning now to a different aspect of women's stated domestic role-related subordinate status, it is of interest to investigate the degree to which women interviewed for this study bore out the assertion that, on the whole, households are characteristically male-dominated economic units in which the status of the entire family hinges on that of the male household head. In this regard, this investigation examined both the division of economic support and of household-related financial management as they pertained to the interviewed sample. This examination of the financial sphere was considered of particular importance in that not only did it help clarify the extent to which the above characterization might be applicable to research participants, but, further,

because people's attitudes and behaviors regarding money may reveal significant aspects of their relationships to power. This topic will be taken up in greater detail in a subsequent section of this paper, but it should be noted here that, in the domestic sphere alone, comparing sample men's and women's reported financial responsibilities illuminated both a key characteristic of the sample upper class gender hierarchy and, at the same time, a certain inconsistency in responding women's relationship to power.

For example, in both the women's and men's groups, the majority of interviewees declared themselves to be either the main, or an equal, source of financial support for their households (that is, they used their own monetary resources to cover household and family-related expenses; these resources might have been kept in either joint or separate accounts). This was true of 85.7% (18) of the 21 responding women and of 100% of the 21 responding men. Despite this similarity of economic function, however, the women's and men's feelings about, and actual participation in, the financial management associated with their households appeared to be quite distinct. For instance, a full 40% (8) of 20 responding women stated that, by and large, they left overall financial management (defined as supervising the payment of the largest domestic bills) to their spouses/mates. Another 10% (2) said they left such financial matters in the hands of hired outside accountants. And, even among the women who claimed to take some, or primary, responsibility for overall financial management in the domestic sphere (10 women, or 50%), several expressed the sentiment that, ideally, a mate/spouse would oversee these affairs. The following excerpts taken

from interviews with responding women reflect not only these women's sentiments, which overall were shared by at least 55% of the responding women, but also the commonly reported division of labor surrounding financial management in the domestic sphere.

I'm a dodo [about financial matters]. As far as the domestic money is concerned, I was always given an allowance--by my husband. . . . I paid all the bills. Well, he paid certain bills--certain large bills . . . , like the rent, insurance, etcetera. But, day-to-day household bills, I always . . . [paid].

I think that he mostly took care of the financial end, and I took care of the household as best I could. I always hated arithmetic, and anything financial I ran away from. . . . [In my second marriage], I was the one with the money. I gave him an allowance. . . . He paid the bills with my money.

[My husband] really manages the money. . . . We have a joint account, and he does all of the work on that. . . . I pay for the children's clothes, the household help, the food. He does all of the other [bills] in the office.

I have nothing to do with the money. He'll tell me what he's doing, but he does it. . . . I figure that's his department. . . . [My husband] is the banker, and, just as buying the food and hiring the maid was my department, managing the finances was his--and is his.

What the above comments seem to show is that, although a large majority of sample women were, in fact, providing substantial financial support for their households, many felt reluctant about and/or incapable of directing pertinent salient financial matters. These data point to the above-mentioned inconsistency in sample upper class women's relationship to power: although these women, by virtue of their possession of great wealth, had the potential for economic dominance (power), or at least equality, in the domestic domain, they reportedly instead often accepted or chose a more retiring, less visible, and more subordinate position relative to their spouses/mates with regard to the financial

sphere, thereby relinquishing the dominant or equal position that might have been theirs.

These women's stated sentiments about, and actual participation in, domestic financial affairs stand in sharp contrast to what was found to pertain among responding sample men (16), 75% (12) of whom reported having primary responsibility for overall domestic financial management, none of whom stated that their spouses/mates had this responsibility, 12.5% (2) of whom said they shared financial management with their spouses/mates, and another 12.5% (2) who reported delegating the management to outside accountants. And, as Table 22 shows, in this study, not only was gender associated with differential participation in overall domestic financial management, but, additionally, associations also appeared between this kind of financial management and differences in age, religious affiliation and level of wealth.

With reference to the table, it is perhaps possible to understand the noted associations of both younger age and less wealth (in the case of the women) with greater participation in overall domestic financial management by supposing that the young and less wealthy might hold in common a relatively exaggerated desire to feel control (i.e., power) over their wealth. However, beyond referring to the relatively greater association between Christian-identification and young age for this study's sample, the possible explanation for the association found between these Christian-identified sample members and greater financial participation remains a mystery.

With regard to the attitudes of interviewed men concerning their taking responsibility for the management of major household financial

Table 22

Frequency of Participation in Overall Domestic Financial  
Management by Age, Religion, and Wealth Level

		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	66.7% (2)	100.0% (3)
	≥ 40	47.1% (8)	84.6% (11)
Religion:	Jewish	23.1% (3)	83.3% (10)
	Christian	100.0% (7)	100.0% (4)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	100.0% (2)	NA
	≥ \$1MM	50.0% (8)	92.3% (12)

transactions, unlike interviewed women, none of those who claimed such responsibility seemed to doubt the propriety of assuming this role. In fact, the most commonly reported (by both sample men and women) accepted division of financial responsibility was an arrangement in which women primarily managed the smaller, daily household bills (including paying household help, purchasing food, buying children's clothes, etc.), and men took care of the less frequent, but more sizeable, domestic financial concerns. The following excerpts from interviews with sample men reflect this division of domestic financial management and closely resemble the previously-listed women's statements.

I'm not sure that any relationship could thrive on her book-keeping, in the larger sense. She can handle the checkbook. . . . I don't think she could manage the larger aspects of a financial situation. She could manage with help, certainly. . . . [S]he has a general idea of financial matters that pertain to us, [but] she has no real involvement, and I think no real interest in its management.

She balances her checkbook, and often with my assistance. . . . She takes care of the ordinary running of the household --the maids and ordering the food and the laundry. I put money into an account so that she can take care of it. . . . I take care of the major items, such as taxes and the maintenance on the apartment, the expenses on our [two other homes]--the things that are not ordinary household things.

Thus, the evidence from this research appears to corroborate, for this investigation's interview sample, a view held by other investigators: that, in an economic sense, households tend to be male-dominated. However, that this may have been the case for sample members does not imply acceptance of another portion of this view, which holds that the social position of the male household head determines the social position of the entire family. In fact, quite the opposite was probably true, at least for those women who married exogamously (in the present study

68.1%--15--of those who had ever married--22 women--had, at some point "married down") and whose husbands' wealth and status never approached their own. In these cases, it was the woman's wealth and position which, in all likelihood, raised the status of her husband and determined that of the whole family.

In sum, the preceding discussion has suggested that, although existing portrayals and theories regarding American women's present-day domestic roles and status, by and large, may be said to have applied to this investigation's upper class sample women, nevertheless, it has also suggested that there were significant ways in which these women's relationships to the domestic sphere departed from commonly held views. On the side of similarities between responding upper class women and portrayals of women of other classes, it appeared that, like the latter, the former were primarily responsible for household management and child-care, that they had been socialized to assume these functions, and that, in so doing, their available time and their inclination to participate in extra-domestic activities were diminished. And, it is in regard to this last feature that, as has been proposed regarding women of other classes, sample upper class women's potential for power (via participation in the productive sphere), and thus their status relative to men, may have been reduced. In addition to the foregoing, a further parallel found between interviewed upper class women's and other women's depicted domestic positions was that, as for the latter, the domestic financial affairs of the former appear to have been characteristically male-dominated. That is, although on a material (financial) level interviewed women probably held a much more powerful domestic position than that of

most other women relative to their husbands, nevertheless, for apparently subjective reasons, they remained, like other women, in economically male-dominated households.

In pointing out the apparent similarities between this study's sample women and women of other classes regarding relationships to the domestic domain, the main distinction between these sets of women--one which has theoretical implications--has already been suggested. That is, that unlike what is often held to be true for other women, due to their financial privilege, sample upper class women not only contributed substantially to the status of their families, but, furthermore, were, of necessity, neither restricted to the domestic sphere nor from participation in other activities. Thus, in relation to this last point, the question remains as to why these women, whose financial position should liberate them from the dictates of the gender-based domestic/extra-domestic division of labor, nevertheless resemble women of other classes in being socialized for, and accepting primary identification with, domestic functions. As has already been stated, neither biological nor ideological explanations provide an adequate answer to this question. And, in the next chapter, the applicability of structural explanations will be considered.

## Chapter IV

## PAID WORK

In his 1940 study of the Philadelphia upper class, Baltzell concluded:

The occupational patterns of the upper-class woman . . . suggest the paucity of real career women among the fashionable group. The upper-class women were almost all authors, artists, or civic leaders, achievements which can be combined with the role of mother and wife. (1958, p. 162)

He also stated that "on the whole, career women do not add to the stability of the home" (p. 161) and that "in contrast to men, it is probably true that women are not rewarded socially, at least in the upper classes, by business and professional achievement" (p. 161). While Baltzell does not define what he means by "real career women" or what might constitute being "rewarded socially," his main points in the above statements are that, due to the possible adverse consequences of a woman's extra-domestic employment for domestic stability, upper class women generally choose to have no career or one that will not interfere with the domestic duties they might have. Webster's New World Dictionary (1960, p. 221) defines "career" as "one's advancement or achievement in a particular vocation; hence, a . . . profession; occupation," and "career woman"--a colloquial usage--as "a woman who follows a professional or business career, often to the exclusion of marriage."<sup>1</sup> If one accepts this latter, colloquial

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<sup>1</sup>Although neither Baltzell nor Webster's specifies pay as a

meaning of "career woman," then the findings from the current research support Baltzell's initial contention (among responding women, only 2--7.7%--had paid careers, were over 30 years old, and had never married). And, as was seen in the preceding section, Baltzell's corollary proposition--that it is upper class woman's domestic obligations which impede them from having professional or business careers--is at least supported by sample women's own reports of career adjustments felt to have been made due to perceived domestic duties (81.8%--18--women reported such accommodations).

However, if one takes Webster's first definition of career, then the evidence from this study provides a picture of upper class women's paid occupational backgrounds quite distinct from that portrayed by Baltzell. For instance, among the 26 women interviewees, 19 (73.1%) had at some point (almost all beginning in their 20s) undertaken paid employment of a year's or more duration. And, of these, at least 14 (53.8% of all) had worked continuously 5 or more years and could be said to have advanced or achieved in their particular vocations.<sup>1</sup> (This percentage rises to 61.5%, if one includes the two women who were currently under 35 years old and embarking on what they viewed to be long-term careers.) Moreover, unlike Baltzell's findings regarding characteristic occupations of upper class women, in this study the women with past or present paid

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characteristic feature of careers, for Baltzell's work, as well as for the present study, I have assumed it to be an understood aspect of the career concept.

<sup>1</sup>For the purposes of this paper, "career" will be defined as paid work of at least 5 years' duration.

careers were not concentrated in, or confined to, the fields of arts, writing, or civic work.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, while it may be true that married upper class women's paid work backgrounds are partly modified due to the precedence these women give perceived domestic duties, recognition of this likelihood does not take the analysis of the subject far enough. In order to advance our understanding of the relationship between upper class women and paid work, it is important to consider not only the relationship between these women's domestic roles and their employment, but also such matters as the nature of their occupations, the duration of their careers, the relationship of occupation to such factors as differential age, education, religious affiliation, wealth, and expressed motivations for, and attitudes about, paid work. Closer examination of such aspects of sample upper class women's paid work histories should provide both a more accurate picture of the nature of, and factors related to, their paid work backgrounds, as well as insights into the relationship between their career ideologies and practices.

With regard to this last point, while it is already known that a large majority of responding women felt their career options were limited by their domestic responsibilities, only by examining the actual choices made by those women who had careers, can the practice of this ideology be checked. The evidence provided by these women's work histories shows which women had uninterrupted career paths, and

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<sup>1</sup>However, as will be seen in a subsequent section, civic work is characteristic of responding women's volunteer activities.

at what points the others stopped or started paid work. This information, in turn, provides a grounded picture of the existing interaction between sample upper class women's domestic and career activities. The picture formulated is one which demonstrates a marked difference in career continuity (for the 14 sample women who had worked at least 5 years continuously) between those who were parents (9 women, ranging fairly evenly in age from their 30s to their 80s) and those who were not (5 women, with a similar age spread). While none of this latter group reported interruptions in their work for anything more urgent than a desired vacation, among the former group 88.8% (8 women) reported links between career inhibition and motherhood. For instance, of these 8 women, 4 had given up work at marriage and resumed it again only after their children were somewhat independent of them, by which time the respondents were in their late 30s or their 40s. Two other sample women postponed beginning careers until they felt their motherhood responsibilities had substantially diminished; each of these women was in her 40s on taking her first paid job. Yet another interviewee had worked continuously for 15 years, but gave up her career, never to resume it again, at pregnancy. Finally, the eighth respondent of this group, while not giving up her career due to motherhood, did switch from a full-time to a part-time position in her company in order to accommodate childcare. In each of these cases, then, sample upper class women's careers were to some degree hindered by their attitudes both about the sexual division of childcare and about their responsibilities as mothers. And, even the ninth sample mother--who had worked full-time for over 50 years,

making no major career concessions for childraising--had to make certain occupational adjustments. This woman admitted that child-raising in combination with full-time work was exhausting, and required her to be innovative and flexible in choosing positions and constructing work schedules.<sup>1</sup>

In sum, the work history data of this study's 14 "career women" suggest that each of these women's career backgrounds was in some way conditioned or affected by her domestic situation: specifically, whether or not she was a parent. Those career women who were not parents, even if they were married (3 women fell into this category), seemed unimpeded in their pursuit of career development, while, as was just discussed above, motherhood seemed a definite career conflict for those with children. From this it can be concluded that the ideology expressed by many of this study's upper class women--wherein career and domestic life are seen as closely, but somewhat inversely, related--both reflects, and is reflected in, specific actions taken by these women regarding their extra-domestic work (partly corroborating Baltzell's position): The more demanding their felt or actual home obligations (i.e., having pre-school children in the home), the less likely sample women were to be employed.

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<sup>1</sup>It is undoubtedly worth noting here that, unlike these upper class women, women of other classes do not have the same latitude in choosing whether or not, or when, to work. As studies have shown, most women work due to economic need and "the number of working mothers has increased more than tenfold since the period immediately preceding World War II (1940)." According to research statistics, 59% of all mothers with children under 18 years old, and 50% of mothers with pre-school children, were in the labor force in March, 1982 (Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, 1982).

Be this as it may, saying that responding upper class women's felt domestic identification might have interfered with their career development is not the same as asserting that these upper class women, for the most part, had no careers. As has been seen, more than half of the women participating in this research project reportedly had had continuous paid employment experience spanning at least 5 years' time. Additionally, of these women, 3 had worked between 10 and 20 years and 5 had worked 20 years or more. Thus, 30.8% (8) of the total sample of women had worked continuously a minimum of 10 years (of the 6 of these who were presently working, only one was under 50 years old). Furthermore, it should be noted that, according to respondents' interview statements (which, by and large, were upheld by the Activities Records), at the time of this investigation, 12 (46.1%) of the 26 women participants were either currently employed or had worked through retirement. Five of these (including the one retiree) were employed full-time (with ages spread evenly between their 30s and 80s), six had shifted from full-time to part-time work (4 of these were under 40 years old and 2, over 60 years old), and one (in her 50s) had always worked part-time.

On consideration of these data, therefore, it seems safe to suggest that upper class women in the United States may not be stereotypically careerless. Rather, the evidence from this investigation indicates that a more accurate characterization of the relationship between upper class women and paid work might emphasize that, although many upper class women do undertake paid employment, a very small percentage of those who are mothers will also have had

uninterrupted, undelayed, full-time, lifelong careers (of the 19 mothers in this study, only 1--5.3%--had such a career). Instead, these women's careers are more likely to be part-time, discontinuous, and/or of limited duration, where many give up (temporarily or permanently), postpone, or modify paid careers ostensibly due to the woman-associated domestic obligations perceived to inhere in marriage and motherhood (this was true of 11--57.9%--of the 19 sample women who had been employed one or more years; of the 8 remaining women, to whom it did not pertain, 7 were not mothers).

Going beyond this apparent relationship between career activity for interviewed upper class women and their domestic lives, there are other aspects of these women's paid work backgrounds worthy of examination, including the earlier-mentioned possible relationship between paid employment and age, education, religion, or wealth level; the types of jobs held by these women; and the degree to which responding women tended to have part-time versus full-time positions (about which something has already been said). Although, with regard to interviewed women, in this investigation, data did not bring to light any associations between either differential religious affiliations or wealth levels and the likelihood of having had careers or being currently employed, nevertheless, in the cases of differential age and educational achievement, interesting associations to such employment did appear.

Looking first at the possible relationship between age and paid employment experience, the data both on the 11 currently employed responding women and on the 14 who had 5 or more years of paid work

experience suggest that age was probably not a factor which could predict the likelihood of paid employment among sample upper class women. For instance, in the presently-employed group, 5 (45.5%) of the women were under, and 6 (54.5%) over, 40 years old. And, in the group with at least 5 years' experience, 6 women (42.9%) had work backgrounds that spanned several decades, taking them from their 20s to beyond 50, 3 other women (21.4%) had worked primarily in their late 30s and 40s, while the remaining 5 (35.7%) had worked in their 20s and 30s (and, since 3 of these were currently working, the association between their ages and paid work should not be seen as limited to these ages). Moreover, even when one compares those with at least 5 years' experience to those without it, no age relationship appears. The age range of those who had little or no paid employment in their backgrounds was about as evenly spread as for those who had at least 5 years. This is demonstrated in Table 23.

In fact, in investigating the potential relationship between age and upper class women's paid work status, the only positive correlations to appear occur either when one looks at the ages of the presently-working women who had worked more than 10 years (where 5 of 6 were over 50 years old) or when one compares the various age ranges of sample women for the proportion of women presently employed in each. In this latter case, such a comparison shows that, across age ranges, younger women (under 40 years old) had a higher relative number currently employed (5 out of 6: 83.3%) than did the women between 40 and 59 years old (2 out of 10: 20%) or the women over 60 years old (4 out of 10: 40%). What this might indicate is that, although many

Table 23  
Employed 5 Years or More

	Yes	No
< 40 years old	3	3
40-49 years old	3	2
50-59 years old	2	3
60-69 years old	2	1
70-79 years old	2	1
80-89 years old	2	2

Table 24  
Frequency of Careers and Present Paid Work  
Among Women by Academic Degree Level

	High school only	College only	Graduate degree
With careers	50.0% (2)	38.5% (5)	55.5% (5)
With present paid work	25.0% (1)	30.8% (4)	66.6% (6)

participating upper class women may have embarked on careers in their 20s and 30s (as was noted previously, almost all of the 19 sample women who had ever worked took their first jobs in their 20s), a good number of them probably tended to abandon these careers (temporarily or permanently) before reaching 40 years old. This seemingly age-related change in employment status corresponds as well, of course, to the period during which these women were most likely to have gotten married and to have begun raising children.

Looking next at the association between education level and paid work for responding upper class women, the information from this study suggests, as can be seen in Table 24 (see p. 108), that the sample women holding graduate degrees were more likely than the others both to be currently employed and to have had longer-running paid work experience. Of the 9 sample women with graduate degrees, 5 (55.5%) had had "careers" (and 3 of these had worked over 20 years), 6 (66.6%) were currently employed, and one (in her 80s) was retired. This compares with the 13 women who held college degrees, only 5 (38.5%) of whom worked 5 or more years (none having worked 20 or more years), and 4 (30.8%) of whom were currently employed. Lastly, among those 4 women who held high school diplomas, 2 (50%) had worked more than 5 years, and only one of these (25%) was both currently working and had paid work experience spanning more than 20 years. These figures, then, taken together, indicate that, although a preponderance of responding upper class women may have been highly educated (84.6%--22-- of this sample had at least college degrees), completion of a college education was not necessarily correlated with the pursuit of a paid

career, Rather, if a correlation could be said to have existed between sample women's education levels and careers, the data from this study suggest it would probably be found at the level of graduate education.

As the subject of part-time versus full-time paid work for upper class women was already alluded to in a foregoing discussion, it will be taken up again only briefly here. In the earlier section it was stated that part-time work to some degree seems to have characterized sample upper class women's employment backgrounds. This statement is further supported by figures from the present research which show that, of those formerly employed for at least 1 year (19 women), 36.8% (7 women) had worked exclusively full-time, while the remainder worked either exclusively part-time or a combination of full-time and part-time. The statistics for the currently employed (11 women) are very similar: 36.4% (4 women) were working only full-time, while the remainder worked exclusively part-time. And, as was pointed out earlier, the apparent tendency among sample upper class women to undertake some part-time work was often attributed by these women to conflicting demands of domestic versus extra-domestic commitments.

On considering the types of occupations (paid and unpaid) prevalent among upper class women in the U.S., it might well be true, as Baltzell (1958) and others (Domhoff, 1970, pp. 41-42; Ostrander, n.d. (c, d); Warner & Abegglen, 1956, p. 65) have claimed, that civic work, arts, and authorship are characteristic. Certainly, in the current investigation it has already been shown that the primary occupations of 53.8% of sample women were in the volunteer (or "civic

work") sector, while another 3.8% were in "the arts" (in this case, authorship), bringing the total number of women so-occupied to 57.6%. However, while it is true that this study's occupational data lend some support to the stereotypes regarding upper class women's characteristic occupations, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that over 40% of the sample (11 women--or 42.3%; not a trivial number) were otherwise engaged, their primary occupations spanning the fields of mental and physical health, law, business, and education.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, when one takes a diachronic and more comprehensive view of these women's occupations, one discovers both that some women had hidden former careers and that women's occupations were not necessarily static, but rather may have changed over time. It is by taking this longer view that it can be said that 50% of the sample of women participating in this research were at some point committed to paid careers, none of which were in the fields specified by Baltzell.<sup>2</sup> Table 25 shows the wide range of occupations in which these 13 women had been principally engaged,<sup>3</sup> the number of women engaged in each,

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<sup>1</sup>These findings are supported to some degree by Domhoff's own research (1970, pp. 41-42), in which a "small number" of both business people and physicians (or other health-related occupations) were uncovered among female respondents.

<sup>2</sup>Differences found between this and earlier studies dealing with upper class women's occupations may reflect not only bias in the present research sample, but also an overall change in women's career patterns in the last several decades.

<sup>3</sup>In order not to mislead the reader, it should be noted that the careers of 4 of these women were abbreviated, in the sense that neither had they worked extensively (at least 20 years), nor were they presently employed in their former occupational fields. Rather, overall, their primary occupational orientation had been in the volunteer sector.

Table 25  
Women's Careers

	5-10 years		10 - 20 years		20 years or more	
	No. of Women	No. at Upper Level	No. of Women	No. at Upper Level	No. of Women	No. at Upper Level
Physical and Mental Health	-	-	-	-	3	2
Law	-	-	-	-	1	1
Publishing	1	-	-	-	1	1
Electronic Communications	-	-	1	1	-	-
Press Agent/Editor	-	-	1	-	-	-
Government/Politics	-	-	1	1	-	-
Banking/Finance	1	1	-	-	-	-
Real-Estate/Construction	1	1	-	-	-	-
Architecture	1	-	-	-	-	-
Education	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	5	2	3	2	5	4

the approximate duration of their paid employment (not all the years of employment indicated were necessarily spent in the primary occupational field), and the number who had reached upper level positions.

As can be seen from the table, there is a great deal of diversity among the types of occupations held by these women. And, while only in the specific fields of health and publishing can any weighting be found, it should be mentioned that 5 of these career women should be regarded as having been business women (2 in publishing, and 1 each in communications, banking, and real-estate)--a point worth making, since upper class women's participation in the business realm has rarely been noted. Further, with regard to the incidence of sample women in business careers, it is of relevance to add that, although--as was stated earlier--younger age appears to have been associated with a higher frequency of such careers among these women, associations did not seem to exist between these kinds of careers and either religious affiliation or level of wealth. Moreover, of additional interest in examining these paid employment backgrounds is the fact that, while only one of the women could be said to have been a one-time corporate executive, a larger number (8) had attained upper-level or managerial positions in their chosen professions, a fact that seems to reflect a certain amount of career ambition and dedication among these women.

Apropos of such matters as sample upper class women's career "dedication" or "ambition," there is a final topic concerning upper class women and paid work that is yet to be discussed. This is the topic of the responding women's attitudes about both the realm of

paid work and its relationship to them. Information gathered regarding this topic during the course of research interviews touched on the motivations or stimuli which might have influenced women interviewees to obtain paid positions, the degree to which these women considered themselves to have been career-oriented, and the degree of satisfaction they expressed regarding not only their actual paid work experienced, but also regarding the perceived adequacy of opportunities to realize existing career aspirations.

As might be expected of individuals whose desire for paid work is not rooted in basic economic need, one of the least frequently mentioned motivations for seeking paid work was the pecuniary motive. Among the (16) women who were either presently employed or who had at least 5 years' paid work experience, only 3 mentioned this as a career motivation. Of these 3, 1 wanted to earn money partly because she felt she did not receive enough income on her inheritance (of over half a million dollars) to support her standard of living and partly because she was "always fascinated with the idea of making a lot of money"; another wanted to support herself because she sought independence from her family, and did not come into her inheritance until well into adulthood; and, a third felt, on principal, that she ought to support herself, rather than rely on her inheritance for this purpose. Other of sample women's less frequently mentioned motives for taking on paid employment included having a general and inherent urge to do wage work (without specifically alluding to the importance of earning the wage) and feeling that wage work was related to the life cycle events of marriage and motherhood. In this latter group,

for instance, one woman had thought of her first jobs as a way to meet her future husband and as a means of marking time until that occurred. And, another woman, as her children reached adolescence, became worried about what she would do once they were no longer dependent on her, and this anxiety moved her to prepare herself for an ongoing career. Beyond these foregoing explanations, however, the reasons most frequently given by women research respondents for their having undertaken careers were (1) felt family or societal expectations that they should do so and, of course, (2) inherent interest in a particular field. The former of these reasons deserves, perhaps, some additional note, as it points out that not all upper class women are necessarily socialized exclusively towards volunteer activities. Over a third of the women interviewed for this study (and over half of the 16 women who were either presently working or who had at least 5 years' paid work experience) felt their families had, to some degree, influenced them to pursue paid work. However, as can be seen from the following interview excerpts, in some cases parental (or family) career expectations regarding daughters were neither very explicit nor even particularly emphatic, a circumstance which may have contributed to some of these women's own ambivalent feelings about having careers:

Later on, in college, . . . I would say, "Well, what if I never get married?" And, [my mother] would say, "That's fine. Then you'll do something [else]. As long as you have something that interests you . . . ." And, in fact, she would try to suggest to me . . . what she thought I could do. . . . She said she thought it was important for a man or a woman to have something to fall back on professionally should times get bad.

In fact, [my parents] were quite similar in the way they tried to direct us. Mother was more concerned

about our academic performance and how each step would follow one from the other: that doing well in school would mean getting into a good college, that getting into a good college would be important to getting a good job. . . . [My mother] encouraged us when it was what we wanted to do. She did want us to do something meaningful, and encouraged us in that, and helped us. For example, the first job that I had--a summer job--she helped me get it.

I think I really had the feeling that I should do something that was professionally useful. That was partly due to this identification with my mother. . . . I was good with people. That was the message that I was given: that I was the one who was good with people, so that teaching or social work were really the things that I . . . thought about. Once my mother said to me, "You know, you should be a journalist," because she thought I'd meet more interesting men.

I think there was some double message, . . . that, on the one hand, we were tracked into an expectation of being the good wife, with the kids and the house in the country, and, on the other hand, being the first [woman] President of the United States. . . . There was a real ambivalent message. My father I don't think ever took any of [his daughters] all that seriously professionally. . . . My mother is a very difficult person to understand and read. . . . I'm sure they would have me be in a much more powerful and prestigious position [than I am]. . . . My mother wants me to be higher up. My father will say, "I don't care what you do as long as you're happy." In that sense, I don't find him taking my work seriously. . . . And, my mother, I think, is really pushing me to develop my career, because she doesn't see me pushing to develop the marriage and family.

Both my parents felt that they had had potential careers, but they had not been allowed to follow them for one reason or another. So I think . . . this wasn't maybe so much verbalized, but it was sensed that career is very important, whether you're a girl or a boy.

My grandfather [had a] tremendous influence [on me]. . . . I mean the idea that he came to this country with nothing, and he made money here, and . . . I have been given this privileged existence and, therefore, owed something to society. . . . There was never any question, but that I was going to work. I mean, I never grew up with the idea that I was going to get married and have children, stay home and take care of a family. It was my grandfather's influence.

A final point to be brought out regarding the influence of sample upper class women's families on their paid work is that, among the previously-mentioned 16 women, a good number (7, or 43.8%) had obtained at least one of their jobs through family connections. In most cases, these were first jobs for the women in question. However, despite the occasional link between a respondent's family and her work, none of the women interviewed could be said to have had a full-time, long-term career in a family-associated business or profession (what is meant here by family-associated or family business is one which is dominated or significantly influenced by an individual's consanguineal or affinal relations).

In discussing personal goals with this study's participants, one of the topics covered was the degree to which these individuals considered themselves to have been career-oriented, that is, with fairly clear ideas of career directions they wanted to pursue. Of the 26 women participants, about 60% (16 women, ranging in age from their 20s to their 80s) characterized themselves as not being career-minded, in any specific sense, in the past, while about a third (8 women, with a similar age range) felt the reverse. And, as Table 26 demonstrates, the frequency with which interviewed women recalled having had specific career aims appears to have been most highly associated with older age and Christian-identification (whereas, the apparent association with greater wealth can probably be more reasonably explained by the relationship of greater wealth with older age). With regard to this, while it might be speculated that the association between older age and more frequent reports of past career goals could

Table 26

Frequency of Career Orientation Among Women  
by Age, Religion, and Wealth Level

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Age:	< 40	20.0% (1)
	<u>≥</u> 40	36.8% (7)
Religion:	Jewish	26.7% (4)
	Christian	44.4% (4)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	--
	<u>≥</u> \$1MM	38.9% (7)

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be attributed to the facts that women, generally, are not as strenuously socialized to formulate career goals and that the younger women would have had less time to formulate such goals, the factor(s) that might account for the association between religious affiliation and frequency of such reports remains a puzzle. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, as far as career outcomes are concerned, these outcomes did not necessarily correspond to responding women's reported early feelings about having careers: while more than half (62.5%--10) of the women in the former group were either currently working or had undertaken jobs of at least 5 years' duration, the opposite pertained for about a third (3) of those in the latter group. What can account for these discrepancies, at least in part, are two different factors: on the one hand, many of the women who had felt little career directedness earlier in life had still felt the desire to have some kind of paid work, and, therefore, took paid positions despite their lack of commitment to the particular field; and, on the other hand, some of those women who had had clear work goals in mind as young women, found that they were unable to achieve these goals due to previously-discussed obstacles.

With regard to career obstacles, although only 3 women (11.5%) out of the total of 26 stated that they felt the opportunities available to them to pursue careers were inadequate, over two-thirds of this sample (18 women; 69.2%) listed obstacles which they felt had impeded or prevented them from such an endeavor. Again, reports of career obstacles among the interviewed women appeared to be age-associated (although not religion- or wealth-associated). That is,

whereas 65% (13) of the women who were at least 40 years old specified such obstacles, this contrasted with 83.3% (5) of the women under 40 years old. A possible explanation for this finding is that, due to their probably greater exposure both to the most recent feminist movement and to feminist perspectives, younger sample women may have been more sensitized, not only to present-day pressures regarding expectations of career success for women, but also to impediments that may have prevented them from attaining this.

With regard to career obstacles reported by sample women, those most frequently mentioned--aside from the earlier-discussed felt domestic obligations--were (1) gender discrimination, where women stated that, due to their gender, they had been denied jobs, restricted within their professions, and/or socialized to think undertaking paid work was wrong; (2) their own lack of career focus or directedness; and (3) a lack of ambition (this was sometimes attributed to the effects of wealth). Each of these was specified by between approximately 25-30% of the women respondents. Other listed obstacles included guilt with regard to one's wealth or privilege inhibiting one from taking a paid position or using one's connections; lack of self-confidence or poor self-image; lack of training or of skills; and family objections.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The career obstacles reported by women participating in this study contrast with those found by Ostrander (n.d. (c), p. 25), which included: (1) perceived attitude of husband, (2) lack of perceived gain compared to current lifestyle, (3) unwillingness to change lifestyle and relationship to men in order to meet demands of paid occupations, and (4) being less motivated to seek extra-domestic employment due to the drudgery of housework.

Having now reviewed several different aspects of sample upper class women's paid work backgrounds--including the apparent relationship between paid work and domestic obligations, the extent to which these women have had "careers," the nature of jobs they have held, and certain of their attitudes about the paid work sphere as it pertains to them--it is relevant to discuss the degree to which these interviewees felt satisfied with their relationships to the paid work sphere. Were women who had not had "careers" any more or less satisfied about this than those who had? While interview data show that sample women were almost equally divided between those who had regrets regarding their employment backgrounds (14 women, or 53.8%) and those who had none (12 women, or 46.2%), these same data suggest that those women who were basically satisfied with their work backgrounds were more likely to be those who had had at least 5 years' paid work experience. Among those who expressed no regrets with their work experiences, 75% (9 out of 12) had had "careers." This compares with the other group, in which almost two-thirds of those expressing dissatisfaction with their work backgrounds (9 of 14, or 64.3%) were women who had done primarily volunteer work or under 5 years of paid work. The regrets most commonly voiced by this second group of women were either that they had never developed a clear sense of career direction, that they had experienced too little or no paid work, or that the work they had undertaken was not important enough or not what they had really wanted.

The preceding discussion of paid work as it pertains to the upper class women participating in this study has shown, contrary to

the commonly held view of upper class women in the United States, not only that many of these women (14, or 53.8%) had had past "careers," but also that many (11, or 42.3%) were presently employed--and not in the "arts" or "civic work." The point of stressing these findings is not to refute the validity of the upper-class-woman-as-volunteer conception (which, as shall be seen hereafter, is fundamentally upheld by the present research), but to broaden this conception so that it might become more comprehensive and representative. What the final section of the discussion has brought out is that over 50% of the women interviewed for this study expressed some degree of dissatisfaction with regard to their employment experiences, and most of these women were those with minimal or no paid work experience. Regardless of the amount of their paid work experience, however, what all these dissatisfied women felt in common was that, despite their backgrounds of great privilege and opportunity, a combination of both internal (i.e., lack of self-confidence, low ambition, ingrained values regarding the "proper roles" for upper class women) and external (i.e., gender--and even class--discrimination) impediments had restricted their options for participation and achievement in the sphere of productive paid labor. Thus it seems that, to some degree and within the context of their own class level, these women of the dominant class may have shared with women of all classes their gender's subordinate status relative to men, along with the limitations that this secondary status implies.

Thus far, the examination of the relationship between sample upper class women and paid work has not taken into account how this

relationship resembles or differs from that which characterized the sample men. Such a comparison is relevant, not only because it may illuminate the differential operation of class and gender for the upper class sample with regard to the paid work sphere, but also because it establishes a grounded, albeit preliminary, portrayal of pertinent features of sample upper class men's paid work histories. To these ends, then, the following discussion will concern itself with how the paid work experience of the men participating in this study compared with those of the women. The ground covered will be the same as that for the women. That is, it will include an examination of the relationship between the men's domestic obligations and their work, the extent and duration of their past and present paid employment, the relationship of age, education, religion and wealth level to paid work experience, types of jobs held, and attitudes towards the paid work sphere.

To dispense first with the topic of possible domestic interference in responding men's careers, it is no surprise to learn that in no case did a male respondent report making an occupational adjustment to accommodate domestic duties. This simply conforms to and reflects both the male role expectations and the accepted, normative, and hierarchical gender-based division of labor inherent in the U.S. social system. Among sample men, in almost every case where marriage (or living together) and/or children were involved, wives (or mates) were relied upon to take principal responsibility for managing home and family care. And, even among those men who felt they shared domestic management with their wives/mates, none had made

any apparent career concessions in order to carry out their share in these domestic duties. By and large, this arrangement, wherein men were less home-identified (and more career-identified) than women, seemed to be generally taken for granted and accepted by all sample men. Only rarely (in 3 cases) was a felt life constraint associated with this sexual division of labor. This constraint, which is really the reverse of the constraints reportedly experienced by sample women, was that the demands of career development did not permit enough time for family involvement. In one case, a respondent attributed the breakup of his marriage to his over-attention to work, and, in two others, respondents felt the demands of their jobs resulted in an undesired degree of isolation from their wives and children. Despite this felt constraint, however, these men had not modified their work schedules. And, generally speaking, it seems that domestic situation had little or no bearing on these upper class men's pursuit of career.

In fact, relative to the career disruptions reported by this study's sample women, those reported by the men were insignificant. Of the 17 men (73.9%) who stated that they had worked at least 5 years, 7 (41.2%) reported interruptions in their careers. However, as these interruptions consisted mainly of military service and graduate school (in both of which relevant professional experience may be acquired) and because they were confined to the respondents' early adult years (their 20s), they cannot be viewed as problematic or career-inhibiting activities. Rather, in most cases, the graduate work and military service later served to enhance these men's careers. Thus, in contrast to the experience of responding career women, that of the career men

suggests that these men's potential for career continuity and development was minimally obstructed by felt or actual extraneous commitments.

This is further borne out by the fact that a substantially larger proportion of responding men than women reportedly had maintained continuous lifetime careers (at least 20 years); this was true of 52.2% (12) of the men, as opposed to 19.2% (5) of the women. Additional discrepancies between participating men's and women's past and present work situations uncovered by the present research are presented in Tables 27 and 28.

As can be seen, the men in the sample reportedly not only had a much higher incidence of ongoing paid work (of over 1, 5, 10, and 20 years' duration) than did the women, but they also had a greater frequency both of individuals who were either currently employed (and whose employed statuses were corroborated in the Activities Records) or had worked through retirement, and of those who were simply currently employed. As with the sample career women, the men who had worked at least 5 years continuously ranged in age from their 30s to their 80s. But, unlike sample working women, among the 12 currently working men who had worked 10 years or more, a much higher proportion were under 50 years old (6, or 50%, as opposed to 1 of 6 women, or 16.7%). The different may, in part, reflect the fact that a somewhat greater proportion of men (14, or 60.8%) than women (11, or 42.3%) in the sample were under 50 years old, but it may also indicate that, unlike the sample women, sample men did not feel the need to abandon their paid jobs mid-career due to domestic obligations.

Table 27  
Duration of Paid Work

	Women	Men
At least 1 year	73.1% (19)	95.7% (22)
At least 5 years	53.8% (14)	69.6% (16)
At least 10 years	30.8% (8)	65.2% (15)
At least 20 years	19.2% (5)	52.2% (12)

Table 28  
Presently Employed or Worked Through Retirement

	Women	Men
Employed	42.3% (11)	78.3% (18)
Retired	3.8% (1)	8.7% (2)
Total	46.1% (20)	87.0% (20)

Other age-related differences revealed by the present investigation regarding participating men's and women's paid work patterns were that (1) whereas the women, no matter what their age category, were as likely as not to have worked at least 5 years, practically all the men over 40 (14 of 15, or 93.3%) had worked this number of years. It was only among the men who were under 40 years old that a high proportion (6 of 8, or 75%) had worked for a shorter duration. And, (2) whereas among responding women, those who were under 40 years old comprised a higher proportion who were presently employed than did the women between 40 and 59 or those who were 60 years old or more, among the men, those under 40 and those between 40 and 59 demonstrated an equally great tendency to be currently employed: in the first case 87.5% (7 of 8), and in the second 88.9% (8 of 9), were so-employed. It was only among the men who were over 60 years old that the percentage employed diminished. In this case only 50% of those 60 years old or more (3 of 6) were presently working. What this data seems to imply is that, overall, upper class men in this study were not only more likely than the women to be currently employed, but that they were more likely to be currently employed regardless of age. Moreover, among those respondents who were 40 years old or more, the men were characterized by a substantially higher frequency (93.3%) than were the women (55%, or 11 of 20) of careers spanning at least 5 years' time. Thus, although it has been previously shown that the women in this investigation to a large extent did have histories of ongoing paid work experience, the degree to which they were employed (whether in the past or present) and the duration of their employment

was substantially below that demonstrated by the study's male participants.

When the relationship between the level of women interviewees' education and their paid work experience was previously examined, it was suggested both that those women with graduate degrees were more likely than others to have had careers and that college education apparently was not an indicator of subsequent career involvement. For sample men, the relationship between educational and paid work backgrounds is somewhat different. Unlike for their women counterparts, highest education level for the men did not seem to correspond to a greater likelihood either of long-term paid work or of present employment. This is demonstrated in Table 29. As can be seen from the table, the men in this study who demonstrated the highest incidence of career activity were those with high school diplomas only (100%), followed next by those with graduate degrees (77.8%), and then by these with college degrees (54.5%). And, this sequence changes on looking at the figures for men currently employed. In this case, the college educated-only interviewees had the highest proportion employed (90.9%), followed by the graduates (77.8%), and the high school-only (33.3%). What this data, taken together with the data on age, seem to suggest is that, while education level (distinguishing between graduate and below graduate levels) might have been a more likely predictor than age of whether or not sample upper class women had had careers, for the men, the opposite seems to be the case. That is, the data on sample upper class men suggest that paid work of at least 5 years' duration was standard for those men who were 40 years old or

Table 29

Frequency of Careers and Present Paid Work  
Among Men by Academic Degree Level

	High school only	College only	Graduate degree
With careers	100.0% (3)	54.5% (6)	77.8% (7)
With present paid work	33.3% (1)	90.9% (10)	77.8% (7)

Table 30

Frequency of Careers and Present Paid Work  
Among Men by Religion and Wealth Level

		Careers	Present Paid Work
Religion:	Jewish	76.9% (10)	84.6% (11)
	Christian	60.0% (6)	70.0% (7)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	--	100.0% (2)
	≥ \$1MM	77.8% (14)	78.9% (15)

more (no matter what their education level), but not for those who were younger.

Considering, next, the possible associations of either religion or level of wealth with the incidence among sample men of having had careers or present paid work, it should be recalled that, in the case of sample women, no such associations were found. This finding for the women, however, contrasts with that regarding sample men. Table 30 (p. 129) exhibits how differential religious affiliation and wealth appeared to be associated with paid work backgrounds for this study's responding men. As can be seen, among the men, in the case of differential religious identification, Jewish sample members more frequently reported both careers and present paid work. And, while it might be speculated that this finding reflects a greater achievement orientation that could be characteristic of a partially subordinate category of individuals, it is probably more likely, at least in the case of career differences, that the discrepancy found between Jewish- and Christian-identified sample men resulted from the somewhat higher proportion of younger men found among the latter group of respondents.

With regard to paid work backgrounds and the apparent differences, depicted in the table, between those sample men reporting less than \$1,000,000 and those reporting at least \$1,000,000 in wealth, it need only be pointed out that, because only two interviewed men fell into the former category, it is undoubtedly fruitless to suggest any--even tentative--explanations for the evident associations. However, with this disclaimer in mind, it may be proposed that, in the case of career frequency, the fact that neither individual with less than

\$1,000,000 reported a career probably had more to do with these individuals' young age (each was under 30 years old) than with their level of wealth. On the other hand, it isn't at all unlikely that the fact that both interviewees reported present paid work may have been related to their lesser level of wealth (although, in this instance, age may also have played a role: that is, the higher proportion of men over 60 years of age in the \$1,000,000+ group might partly explain the lower frequency of present paid work among these respondents).

In continuing the comparison between sample upper class women's and men's paid work backgrounds, the degree to which the latter held part-time versus full-time positions, the nature of their principal occupations, and their attitudes towards the paid work/career sphere are yet to be discussed. To address the first topic first, it is perhaps surprising to learn that the reports of responding men, who in the past had worked at paid jobs for at least a year (21 men), indicate that these men closely resembled sample women in the degree to which they had worked exclusively full-time, as opposed to a combination of full- and part-time, or exclusively part-time. In other words, compared to the previously-noted 36.8% of the women, 33.3% (7) of the men reported having worked exclusively full-time in the past, with the remaining men falling into the other categories. However, while in a general sense this similarity can be said to hold, it is to a certain extent misleading. This is not only because the similarity dissolves on comparing the work arrangements of currently employed men and women--wherein, in contrast to the 36.4% of the presently employed women, 61.1% (11) of the so-employed (18) men were

employed exclusively full-time--but also because the relative preponderance of full-time work, for those men who reported a combination of part-time and full-time past paid work was substantially greater than it was for the women characterized by both these kinds of work schedules. That is, while about 57% (12) of the men who worked at paid jobs for at least a year reported having had both part-time and full-time positions, for most of these men (8, or 75%), their work was primarily full-time. This contrasts with the approximately 42% (8) of the women who reported having done both kinds of work, among whom a smaller proportion (4, or 50%) might be said to have been primarily involved with full-time jobs. These contrasts aside, there is one further significant gender distinction to be made regarding sample members' full-time paid work experiences. This is that, not only did the men have a higher incidence than the women of full-time paid work, but also that a higher proportion of the men had what would be regarded as extensive, lifetime careers (of 20 or more years' duration). One way of seeing this is to consider that, of all sample men and women who were at least 40 years old and who had worked at least 1 year full-time (15 men and 11 women), a much higher percentage of the men (73.3%; 11 men) than women (36.4%; 4 women) had full-time work backgrounds that spanned 20 years or more.

Turning to an examination of responding men's career types, in contrast to the women, because only one of the men had a hidden past career that differed from his principal occupation (his hidden career was in real estate, while his primary work was as a volunteer), Table 31, showing the specific occupational breakdown for the men who had

Table 31  
Careers by Gender

	No. of Men	No. in Upper Positions	No. of Women	No. in Upper Positions
Physical and Mental Health	-	-	3	2
Law	3	2	1	1
Publishing	-	-	2	1
Electronic Communications	1	1	1	1
Press Agent/Editor	-	-	1	-
Government/Politics	1	1	1	1
Banking/Finance	4	4	1	1
Real Estate/Construction	2	2	1	1
Architecture	-	-	1	-
Education	1	-	1	-
Arts	3	-	1	-
Foundation Management	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	16	11	14	8

worked at least 5 years, will not look particularly different from this paper's initial table which depicted the general occupational breakdowns for both sample men and women. The purpose of presenting this table, however, is both to provide a more precise characterization of participating men's careers and to point out the proportion of the "career men" who had achieved upper level or managerial positions in their fields. This information, together with that already provided regarding the women (which, for comparative purposes, will be summarized alongside Table 31), may then be used to check possible associations between gender and sample members' particular career choices and career advancement.

What stands out on examining Table 31 is that, in line with research by Baltzell (1958, p. 35), Domhoff (1970, p. 18), and Lundberg (1968, pp. 806, 813), the career choices of this study's sample men centered primarily in the realms of law and business. As can be seen, 62.5% (10) of the men included in the table held careers in these areas. Furthermore, considering only the business sphere, it is apparent that the men were more likely than the women to have had careers in this domain: in the case of the men, the careers of 56.3% (9) had been in business (2 in law, 1 in communications, 2 in real estate, and 4 in banking/finance), while, in the case of the women, this applied to 35.7% (5) (2 in publishing, 1 in communications, 1 in real estate, and 1 in banking).

Additionally, although earlier in this paper the association between older age and higher frequency of business careers among sample men was indicated, nothing was said concerning other possible

associations. Regarding this, while an association between differential levels of wealth and frequency of business careers could not be discerned, an association did appear between differential religious affiliation and such frequencies. In the present investigation, 53.8% (7) of the Jewish-identified male interviewees, in contrast to 20% (2) of the Christian-identified male interviewees, reported business careers. However, since occupations in the business realm are generally thought to be characteristic of upper class men, this differential association to business careers, according to religion, is most likely accidental.

On further examination of Table 31, what also stands out, in a comparison of the figures for career men and women, is that there does not seem to have been a great difference between the relative proportions of these men and women to have reached upper-level positions in their fields: 68.8% (11) of the men, as opposed to 57.1% (8) of the women, could claim such career success. However, while this may reflect well on responding upper class women (whose corresponding larger population is rarely associated with professional achievement; see Baltzell, 1958, p. 162; Chesler & Goodman, 1976, p. 68; Domhoff, 1970, p. 41-42; Lundberg, 1968, p. 24; Ostrander, n.d. (d), p. 13; Warner & Abegglen, 1956, p. 65), it does mask the fact that--as was mentioned earlier--only 1 (7.1%) of the sample upper class career women, compared to 9 (56.3%) of the corresponding men, had actually attained a topmost position in the business sphere. Those women, who, according to the tables, had achieved high positions in law, communications, real estate, and banking, were, in the first case, not in

business law, and, in the latter cases, in middle rather than top, executive positions. This contrasts with the men who held high positions in these same spheres, all of whom were senior partners in, and/or heads of, their business firms. These findings generally correspond to those of Chesler and Goodman, who state that, "At the top corporate levels, men outnumber women 600 to 1" (1976, p. 67).

With regard to the subject of corporate leadership among sample members, it should be further remarked that one of the principal dimensions of power attributed to the American upper class is their indirect or direct control over the corporate sphere. And, while all sample members, by virtue of their disproportionate stockholding could, perhaps, be said to have borne out the view of indirect corporate control, as has just been discussed, it was mainly the men rather than the women who held the kinds of corporate positions associated with providing active and direct control within this domain. Thus, in this very important regard, relative to that of interviewed upper class men, the access to, and exercise of, power by interviewed upper class women appeared to be inferior.

Perhaps there is one other point worth mentioning in connection to the foregoing career tables. This is that, whereas just one of this investigation's women interviewees had a career in "the arts," the careers of three of the men interviewed were in this sphere. And, while in each case the percentage involved in the arts was small (7.1% and 18.8%, respectively), due to the common literature portrayal of gender-based characteristic occupations of upper class individuals (wherein women are associated with the arts, rather than men), one

might have expected this study's gender-associated percentages to have been reversed.

Finally, taking up the matter of interviewed men's own views of their paid work backgrounds, including perceived associated motivations, stimuli, and problems, it becomes apparent that, to a large degree, these men's reported experiences of the paid work sphere were different from those reported by the women. For instance, although in general men's and women's expressed motivations for seeking paid work were similar, in one significant case they were not, and in other cases the relative significance of the expressed motivations or stimuli varied. What is referred to in the first instance is that, in contrast to the women, in no case did the men report that they perceived having a job as somehow contingent on domestic considerations. And, in the second instance, whereas both the participating men and women cited family expectations and family connections as career stimuli, for the men these two impetuses seemed to play more central roles. For example, while it was previously stated that about one-third of responding women felt that family expectations had something to do with their pursuit of paid jobs, but that these expectations were not always unequivocal, over three-quarters of the responding men stated that they were brought up with the firm expectation that they would undertake paid careers (with no ambiguity about the importance of this undertaking), and over half the men felt they had been urged by one or more family members towards particular jobs or fields. These sentiments are reflected in the interviewees' own statements, some of which are cited below.

I was the boy in a two-child family. . . . There was always an assumption that I would be successful as a primary objective. . . . My parents, when I was 14, helped arrange a summer job for me on Wall Street as a clerk (which I got through family contacts in a brokerage firm). I continued for the next 3 years, so that was 4 summers altogether, with their encouragement. . . . [Later] I was working without a salary. That was . . . breaking . . . family rules. So, despite the fact that I was working very hard, . . . because it was volunteer work, it was . . . interpreted as breaking that family rule. . . . I think the difference [between my parents' expectations for my sister and me] was that they had lined up for me a pretty specific job. They wanted me to be the family stockbroker, because if I got all the commissions from all the family trading, I'd . . . instantly have the big income they expected.

I'm not sure if I can really say it was my mother versus my father, but I remember somebody saying, "You're going to have to work the rest of your life. . . ." My dad says, "It's your life. You do with it what you want to do with it. Do good work. . . . I hope you earn a dollar. For Christ sake stop volunteering. Get paid."

I said to [my mother] that, "Basically, what you really wanted to create were poetic lawyers and bankers. That's really what would have made you comfortable." And, she agreed. . . . The money was there as a cushion; it wasn't there to be used. It was there to pass on to your children, and you were to add to it.

My parents didn't push too much, [although] I was always expected, I think, to come onto Wall Street.

I . . . began to take it for granted, with [my parents'] encouragement as I left college, that I would go into some field of public affairs or government. Dad . . . was determined that I wanted to get into the foreign service, which I didn't. He did. . . . Dad did a lot of civic work in the course of his life. . . ., so there was an atmosphere of that. . . . It's so inconceivable to me that I would have done nothing. I've been such a compulsive worker all my life. . . . My mother sort of whipsawed her children, I think, with regard to work.

I think the only thing father was pretty set about was that I wasn't going to work in his business. He wanted us to work for strangers. . . . I think there were different expectations for the sons than the daughters. They didn't expect them to be career girls.

I was in my mid-twenties . . . . I was really floundering around. I didn't know what I wanted to do. I had enough money so that I could support myself, without having to make a specific commitment to anything, and I wandered around, which I really was not upset about, but my mother was fit to be tied. She once said to me, "Why can't you get a job?! Why can't you sell shoes?! At least you could sell shoes."

I suppose [my parents] did have influence, but it was not dominant. . . . [My father] arranged for us to go down to do this work at the bank, this apprenticeship. . . . I'm sure they would have liked us to continue in a financial field. . . . I have to say I suppose we were kind of pointed towards the way they wanted [us] to act.

As should be clear from a reading of these excerpts, in the eyes of most male respondents, having careers as adults was not only an understood given for them, but also a matter of primary importance from the point of view of their parents. In several of the above cases it can be seen that the idea of doing volunteer work only, or not having a paid job, was recalled as having been unacceptable to at least one, if not both, of the respondents' parents. And, in over half the examples, these men felt that they had been specifically routed in a particular career direction (mainly towards the sphere of finance). If these recollections, as well as the parallel ones of women interviewees cited earlier, are largely accurate representations of these individuals' within-family work-related socialization, they point up one of the factors that is probably responsible for encouraging gender-differentiated paid work patterns among sample members. This is that, whereas for the men the family-based implicit and explicit pressures to pursue careers (and specifically to earn money) seemed both quite prevalent and pronounced, for the women these pressures seemed to occur with less frequency, with less insistence, and with less clarity.

A job obtained through a family connection was the other family-associated career stimulus which both sample men and women noted with some frequency, but in relation to which their experiences differed. It was stated previously that at least one of the jobs of 43.8% of the sample women who had had careers or who were presently working in paid positions had been attributable to a family contact. Furthermore, it was said that, despite this, none of these women reported having had long-term paid work in a family-owned or associated organization. It is with regard to this second feature, rather than the first, that participating men and women differed (of those men who had had careers or who were presently working, the percentage who reported obtaining at least one job through a family connection was almost the same as that for the women: 42.9%, or 9 of the 21 men). For, in relation to working for a family-associated concern, in contrast to the women, among the 21 men with corresponding work experience (that is, having had careers or being currently employed), the careers of 28.1% (6 men) were family-linked. Interestingly, in every case but one, these men had worked for the family-connected or -dominated business for at least 20 years, and all were over 40 years old (which means that 40%--6 of 15--of the sample men who were at least 40 years old had such careers). Among the younger men, there was no indication that family-related careers would be a likelihood. And, aside from the probability of these men's own divergent career interests, this may be explained in part, by the possible predetermination on the part of the men that family-connected careers would be unfeasible due to both the transgenerationally widening dissociation

between any one descendant and a company's original key executive or shareholder and the similarly expanding pool of descendants who might potentially compete for fast-track positions. Moreover, in contrast to the past, as Thompson points out, because "today the 'family business' is probably publicly owned and run by professional managers" and "succession to the presidency is no longer automatic" (1981, p. 76), young upper class members may not view family-associated careers as particularly attractive or promising propositions.

Turning now to a discussion of sample men's perspectives on the degree to which they had been career-focused, on whether or not their career opportunities had been adequate, on what, if any, kinds of obstacles might have significantly obstructed their career progress, and on their relative satisfaction with their paid work backgrounds, it will again be seen that, in several instances, their recalled experiences with regard to these matters substantially differ from those of the women respondents. On one matter, however, both the men and the women were in strong agreement; almost 90% of responding women and 100% of responding men felt their career opportunities to have been perfectly adequate, and often more than adequate. It is in relation to specific career-directedness, felt career obstacles, and paid work satisfaction that participating men and women differed most. For instance, whereas over half of the women did not perceive themselves as having had a definite career focus in the past, less than a quarter of the men characterized themselves in this manner. Conversely, only about one-third of the sample women, as opposed to almost two-thirds of sample men, did recall having clearly defined notions of what

careers they might have wanted to pursue. Moreover, as Table 32 indicates, the associations of such factors as age, religion, and wealth level to career orientation were different for the interviewed men than they were for the women.

As can be seen, unlike women respondents, among the men there was little discrepancy associated with age in frequency of reported career orientation. And, the fact that, compared to the younger women, younger sample men reported a much higher incidence of specific career aims may indicate that these men had been exposed to much earlier and more forceful socialization regarding the importance of having careers. Furthermore, on considering the association found between the difference in responding men's religious affiliations and their frequency of reporting having been career-oriented, Table 32 also shows that the data concerning the men both resemble and contrast with that regarding the women. The resemblance stems from the fact that, in both cases, an association appears. The contrast lies in the fact that, whereas, in the case of the women, Christianity appeared to be more highly associated with career orientation, among the men, it was Judaism which displayed this kind of association. And, while no basis could be conjectured to explain this evident association among women sample members, among the men, the greater association between Jewish-identification and reports of having had specific career aims may have been a reflection of the earlier-hypothesized more intense achievement orientation which possibly characterized the Jewish-identified, as opposed to the Christian-identified, sample upper class men. Lastly, with regard to the association of differential wealth

Table 32

Frequency of Career Orientation Among Men  
by Age, Religion, and Wealth Level

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Age:	<u>&lt;</u> 40	71.4% (5)
	<u>≥</u> 40	63.6% (7)
Religion:	Jewish	77.8% (7)
	Christian	55.6% (5)
Wealth Level:	<u>&lt;</u> \$1MM	100.0% (2)
	<u>≥</u> \$1MM	60.0% (9)

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to frequency of reporting career orientation, although data indicate that, among the men, less wealth was more highly correlated with reports of such orientations, there appears to be no logical basis for this correlation, which, therefore, is probably best attributed to the problems inherent in small and non-representative samples, such as that characterizing the present study.

Turning to an examination of the relevance of early-developed specific career goals to later career development, to an even greater extent than was evident among responding women, for sample men, the absence of an early development of career definition seemed to have little bearing on whether or not an individual eventually had a career: of the 5 sample men who felt they had "floundered" with regard to career in their early years, all were either currently employed or had had paid work of over 5 years' duration. In fact, since over 90% (21) of the interviewed men could claim to have worked at least 5 years or to be currently employed (as compared to about 60%--16--of the women), it would seem that this study's responding upper class men were, in a general sense, more career-oriented than were the women, and that they encountered fewer obstacles than did the women in their pursuit of careers.

Apropos of career obstacles, while about half the sample men (56.5%, or 13 men) described difficulties that they felt had had a certain bearing on their professional development, over half of those describing such difficulties felt the impediments they mentioned to have been quite minor. In fact, overall only about a quarter of the interviewed men (26.1%, or 6 men) stated that they had encountered

what they considered to be serious obstacles to advancement in their chosen fields. This, of course, is very different from what was reported by participating women, among whom more than two-thirds felt they had been subject to career obstacles of considerable significance. And, although on examining the possible influence of differential wealth levels, religions, and ages on the frequency with which the men reported career impediments, the first factor appeared to be associated (relative to 33.3%--6--of those with at least \$1,000,000, neither of the 2 individuals with less than \$1,000,000 reported serious career obstacles), this apparent interconnection is probably attributable only to the fallibility of an internal sample comparison based on such extremely small cell numbers. With regard to the other two factors--religion and age--no such associations were evident. And, at least in the case of differential age, this finding contrasts with the data on women respondents, among whom younger age was more closely associated with reported obstacles.

An additional discrepancy found concerning the career obstacles specified by sample men and women is that those noted by the men were both somewhat different in nature and less widely applicable to fellow sample members than were those mentioned by the women. For instance, three of the women's most frequently reported career impediments--domestic obligations, gender discrimination, and lack of ambition--were not to be found among the hindrances listed by the men. Moreover, while these three impediments--depending on which is in question--were mentioned by between approximately 30 and 100% of the 18 women reporting obstacles, among the men, this kind of intra-group

corroboration of perceived obstacles is not as much in evidence. In the case of the sample men who reported perceived career difficulties, the most frequently noted hindrances--inadequate training or education and lack of self-confidence--were specified by less than a quarter of the individuals (23.1%, or 3 of 13). Beyond these, most of the other obstacles mentioned by the men were in some way related to their privileged backgrounds, and included (1) problems associated with working in a family-linked firm, (2) resentment from less-advantaged co-workers, (3) career-goal ambiguity or super-elevation, resulting from the absence of economic need, which usually would make the wage itself a central career goal, and (4) guilt regarding whether or not one deserved to have a paid job. (As will be remembered, several of these obstacles specified by responding men were also among those listed by sample women.)

What remains to be stressed in this comparison of participating men's and women's reported career obstacles are two key points. One, which has already been presented, is that interviewed upper class women were more than twice as likely as their male counterparts to feel that significant obstacles had hampered their career development. The second, which, although consistently implied in the foregoing discussion, has not been sufficiently emphasized, is that all these reported career obstacles are reflections of each sample member's own perceptions and recollections, and should not, therefore, be viewed as scientifically valid explanations for the apparent gender-differentiation (documented in this section) that seems to characterize

the relationship of sample upper class members to paid work. To reiterate, the most pronounced distinctions between responding men's and women's paid work backgrounds were that, on the whole, the women were both more likely than the men to have had interrupted, delayed, part-time, and/or short-term paid work experiences and less likely to have attained topmost executive positions, regardless of whether in business or non-business fields. And, while the relevance of the respondents' specified--or other, here-unspecified--career impediments must await further research, it should be noted that only a few of the listed hindrances would qualify as objective, rather than subjective, conditions. This may reflect the likelihood that, for the upper economic class as a whole, significant objective impediments to career development are less numerous and less critical than for individuals from less advantaged circumstances. Moreover, additional research into the objective conditions affecting upper class women's and men's access to, and participation in, the productive sphere may bear out what has been suggested in this paper and in the research of others: that the access of upper class men to the productive sphere and to top-level positions within it is subject to no generalizable objective restrictions, while similar access for upper class women has been characteristically constrained, not just by the existing gender hierarchy which discriminates against women, but possibly as well by the prevailing capitalist class system which may encourage the operation of such a hierarchy.

Coming finally to the topic of career satisfaction, it will be seen that this is yet another area in which the men's and women's

perspectives differed. To begin, while the proportion of women respondents who expressed regrets regarding their paid work backgrounds was about the same as for those who did not, among the men the proportions were about 30% (7 men) and 70% (16 men), respectively, indicating, it seems, that men, in general, felt more satisfied regarding their work (or lack of work) experience than did women. Furthermore, if one examines the relationship between expressed work satisfaction and existence of "careers" for the men, unlike for the women, among whom there seemed to be a connection between having careers and feeling satisfied, among the men, no such relationship emerged. For example, even though, of those interviewed men who expressed contentment with their work backgrounds, almost two-thirds (62.5%, or 10 of 16) had had careers, it is equally true that, of those who related paid work disappointments, an even larger percentage (85.7%, or 6 of 7) had also had careers. The apparent difference in relevance of career to felt work satisfaction for sample men versus sample women, can probably be attributed to the objective differences in their career histories. Women were both less likely than the men to have had careers and reportedly more likely to have experienced obstacles to achieving career ends. Thus, their most frequent source of paid work dissatisfaction was the inadequacy of the paid work itself. Conversely, since careers were quite characteristic of interviewed upper class men and because their access to the paid work sphere seemed virtually unrestricted, the men's disappointments did not center on any insufficiency of paid work itself, but rather more on insufficiencies they perceived either in the nature of the paid work

they had undertaken or in themselves. Accordingly, in contrast to the women's most frequently mentioned disappointments, those of the men included (1) delay in discovering one's preferred occupation, (2) inadequate professional preparation, (3) choosing work for which one wasn't well-suited, and (4) working for a family enterprise.

On looking back over this discussion of the relationship of this study's participants to the paid work sphere, one general point should be quite obvious. This is that the operation of gender hierarchy and gender discrimination within this sphere appears to have been, in its own way, as much applicable to these members of the upper class as it has been shown to be for members of other classes. This is borne out by the data from the present research, which show that, although a substantial proportion of interviewed upper class women had undeniably had careers (as here-defined), despite this, their relationship to the paid work sphere was both of a much more limited and a much more problematic nature than it was for the interviewed upper class men. Based on the statements made by both sample men and women, it appears that, relative to participating upper class men, women respondents generally had shorter-term careers, a lower incidence of past and present paid work, less experience with full-time employment, inferior access to topmost positions in the business sphere, more irresolute socialization with regard to their expected relationship to the paid work sphere, and a greater number of both subjective and objective obstacles that seemed to significantly constrain their participation in this sphere.

In regard to this, and to earlier-discussed propositions, it appears that sample upper class women may have been less thoroughly isolated from the paid work sphere than their corresponding larger population has commonly been described to be (Baltzell, 1958, p. 162; Birmingham, 1967, 1982; Domhoff, 1970, pp. 44-54; Mosley, 1980; Swanberg, 1980; Wharton, 1981), suggesting, perhaps, as has been proposed for other American women today, that, relative to the past, upper class women may have also increased their paid work participation. However--and in accordance with other propositions--even if this were shown to be characteristic of today's population of upper class women in the United States, unless such participation were also shown to be of much greater magnitude than found among this investigation's upper class women, it is unlikely that it would have any unprecedented sociological impact. That is, even if American upper class women participate today with greater frequency in the paid labor sphere, if such participation resembles that of this study's sample women--operating mainly on a part-time or short-term basis--then both the general relationship to power, and public image, of these women would be, fundamentally, what they have always been: their power, relative to upper class men, would continue to be restricted, and their image would remain that of the unemployed housewife. Furthermore, if, as has been suggested, these women do serve as models of ideal behavior for other women, their message to these women would remain unchanged: women should not seriously compete against men in the marketplace, but should, instead, devote primary attention to home life and volunteer activities. Thus, in such a case, upper class

women's increased productive sphere participation should be imagined to constitute, not a challenge or threat to, but rather an ongoing endorsement of, the established ideology and structure of male-dominant gender stratification.

That upper class women may maintain a relationship to the domestic and productive spheres that essentially upholds and reinforces extant gender-based division of labor and stratification brings this discussion back to an earlier, and as yet unaddressed, issue. That is, if biological and ideological factors cannot adequately account for sample upper class women's participation (or lack thereof) in these spheres, to what extent might structural conditions be held accountable? In response to this question it might be argued that, with regard to responding women's paid work participation, there remains at least one ideology-based explanation that has not, thus far, been considered. This is that--unlike for women of other classes--these women's apparently relatively weak relationship to paid work might be more logically attributed to a wage's irrelevance to them, rather than to any specific constraints which may have limited their participation. Stated differently, this argument would hold that, given a choice, most people would prefer, and would choose, not to work, and that, from this perspective sample upper class women's paid work abstention is understandable. As plausible as this view may seem, however, it is, nevertheless, refuted by the fact of sample upper class men's continued active productive sphere participation. And, these men's participation in the productive sphere is itself easily understood, if it is accepted that a critical measure of power

and status in the U.S. stratification system is an individual's relationship to the means of production and to society's critical resources: by remaining actively involved in the productive domain, sample upper class men are able to safeguard and maintain, not only their class, but also their gender dominance. Thus, the question remains as to why a sexual division of labor--wherein, relative to men, women have more responsibility for the domestic domain and, at the same time, generally less participation in, and control over, the productive sphere (and, specifically, its key positions)--seemingly characterized this study's sample upper class individuals, who, given their dominant class position and their great wealth, might have been expected to be largely unconstrained in their selection of roles and activities.

With regard to this puzzle, while previously-discussed structural explanations do not provide solutions to the genesis of gender-based and gender-stratified division of labor, they, nevertheless, seem to provide insights into why such a division of labor may be sustained at the upper class level. However, as not all such explanations appear to be of equal applicability to the upper class, it is important to distinguish between those that seem relevant and those that do not. And, among those that do not seem relevant can be counted at least two, each of which resembles the other in faulting the structure of capitalism with conditioning and furthering present-day gender hierarchy, but differs from the other in the functional arguments stressed to explain capitalism's culpability. In the first view, women's primary identification with, and responsibility for, the

domestic sphere are seen as critical, not only for "liberating" men for extra-domestic wage labor, but also for reproducing, on a daily basis, the forces and relations of production, while, in the second view, women's domesticity is seen as the key to their exploitability as a necessary cheap reserve labor pool. In relation to these views, issue is taken neither with the likelihood of their applicability to other classes, nor with that of capitalism's exploitation of gender hierarchy as a means of self-maintenance, but rather with the relevance of the above-specified functional ends in either accounting for or promoting upper class gender-based and -stratified division of labor. For instance, in the first case, clearly, at the economic level of the upper class, the first two ends could largely be accomplished through the services provided by hired domestic help, and the third could probably be achieved equally competently--without their perpetual presence in the home--by either or both parents (and possibly by a number of other individuals, as well). And, in the second case, because upper class women constitute only a miniscule proportion of the adult female population in the United States, it seems that the vitality of the reserve labor pool would be little threatened by their absence from it. Following from these points, it seems clear that, if structural conditions are to be held accountable for promoting America's gender-linked division of labor and stratification, it cannot be assumed that their operation has universally identical significance. And, in relation to this, until the relevance of these conditions can be demonstrated for each class--or other meaningful--level, their status as explanatory tools can be only tentatively accepted.

On considering why structural conditions--and, specifically, the structure of capitalism--may encourage gender hierarchy at the upper class level, it is useful to consider together both Marx's proposition that "the ruling ideas in any society are the ideas of the ruling class" (Bottomore, 1966, p. 94) and the earlier-outlined propositions delineating the critical functions served by gender stratification in relation to maintenance of the capitalism system. By doing this, it becomes possible to see that same upper class women's apparent acceptance of a gender-based and -stratified division of labor, which seems to result in their inferior status and power, relative to men of their class, may, in fact, serve to maintain not only the capitalist class system, but also their dominant class position within it. For example, if upper class women's putative domestic identification and inferior position represent to women of other classes an ideal to be emulated, then, in as far as such emulation occurs, it may both facilitate men's availability for wage labor and women's for cheap reserve (or volunteer) labor, as well as inhibit the development of cross-gender working class unity--each of which functions is said to be essential to capitalism's vitality. The obverse of this, of course, would be that, if upper class women were to challenge gender stratification at their class level, this might constitute a signal stimulating other women similarly to seek gender equality. And, if it is true that capitalism depends substantially on women's continued subordination, then the success of such a movement among women would constitute a serious destabilizing force with regard to the capitalist structure. Further, since the capitalist (upper)

class (including its women members) benefits from the maintenance of the existing class system, a threat to the latter would certainly constitute a threat to the former. It is in these senses, then, that the apparently subordinate position of upper class women (and the dominant position of upper class men), which seemingly benefit both the prevailing stratification system and their own class interests, may be said to be structurally promoted. Thus, through their acceptance of an inferior position relative to the men of their class, and through their domestic and volunteer orientations, sample upper class women may have served a system-maintaining function, which, though appearing to be ideological in nature on the surface, would have been fundamentally economic in its impact. And, as will be seen in the next chapter, a similar system- and class-maintaining analysis, with both its ideological and economic components, may be productively applied to the sphere of volunteer activities, in which both sample upper class women and men participated.

## Chapter V

## VOLUNTEER WORK

In surveying some of the literature on upper class volunteer work, one finds not only that this sphere is generally perceived to be strongly gender(woman)-associated (Baltzell, 1958, p. 162; Birmingham, 1982, pp. 67, 282; Chesler, 1976, p. 187; Domhoff, 1970, pp. 34-35; Ostrander, n.d. (c), pp. 5-10), where upper class women are said to concentrate their efforts on behalf of cultural organizations, social service agencies, academic institutions, and science and medicine (Birmingham, 1982, pp. 280-281; Daniels, 1978, p. 33; Ostrander, n.d. (c), pp. 5-6), but also that differences of opinion exist regarding the relative significance of the upper class role in volunteer work today and regarding the fundamental purpose of this volunteer work. In this section these perspectives on upper class volunteer work will be examined in light of this study's research findings.

To begin, contrary to the widely held view that upper class volunteer work is a characteristically female undertaking, the research carried out for this investigation shows that sample upper class men were nearly as likely as sample upper class women to have participated in this kind of work. In the current study, 95.7% (22) of the men, compared to 100% (26) of the women, reported some volunteer participation as adults. These figures suggest that active philanthropic involvement may have been equally characteristic of sample men and

women. This suggestion is further supported by data collected on the recalled within-family socialization regarding the importance of volunteer work, on age relationship to earliest volunteer experience, and on duration of volunteer activities.

For instance, with regard to the first-mentioned dimension, 100% of both the 21 women and 22 men providing relevant information mentioned some way in which their within-family socialization had encouraged them to view volunteer work as part of one's life responsibilities. This socialization appeared to take at least one of three frequently-reported forms, the most common of which was the example set by one or both of sample members' parents. This particular factor was indicated by 100% of the above-specified responding women and by 95.5% (21) of the specified men. In addition to this somewhat tacit form of socialization, however, there appeared to exist two further, and more explicit, forms. These consisted of conspicuous and specific emphasized family values concerning the importance of volunteer activity and of a specific stress placed on the somewhat more nebulous concept of "social responsibility." According to their own reports, the first of these forms of socialization applied to at least 81% (17) of the women, and at least 54.5% (12) of the men, here-considered, while the second form--the expressly instilled value of "social responsibility"--applied to at least 71.4% (15) of the former, and 72.7% (16) of the latter, respondents.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The reason for stating that these aspects of socialization applied to "at least" a certain number of individuals is that the fact that they were not mentioned by some respondents cannot be construed to mean that they were necessarily inoperative for these same respondents.

In Table 33 can be seen the extent to which differences in age, religious affiliation, and levels of wealth appeared to influence the frequencies with which sample members reported having been exposed to one or the other means of volunteer work socialization. What stands out in the table is that, with regard to age categories, the only particularly notable differential association is that appearing in the frequencies with which men reported being exposed to a specific emphasis placed on participating in volunteer work. In this instance, a much lower proportion of the younger men than of the older stated having experienced such exposure. And, while this association might be interpreted as an indication that, with regard to this sample, socialization of upper class men to volunteer participation was on the decline, due to the absence of known conditions to which this finding might be attributed, such an interpretation seems unwarranted, or at best premature.

An examination of the association of differential religious affiliation to frequency of reported volunteer work socialization--whether in the case of stress on volunteer work or on social responsibility--exposes several interesting and consistent findings. One is that, in each instance, a higher frequency appeared for Jewish-identified men than for Jewish-identified women. Another is that the second highest incidence of reported volunteer work socialization consistently appeared among Christian-identified sample women (leading the Jewish-identified women in this regard). And, the last is that Christian-identified men lagged behind all other categories of sample members in recalling exposure to volunteer work socialization. Based

Table 33

Frequency of Volunteer Work Socialization  
by Age, Religion, and Wealth Level

	Stress on Volunteer Activities		Stress on Social Responsibility	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<u>Age:</u>				
< 40	66.7% (4)	12.5% (1)	66.7% (4)	62.5% (5)
≥ 40	65.0% (13)	73.3% (11)	55.0% (11)	73.3% (11)
<u>Religion:</u>				
Jewish	60.0% (9)	69.2% (9)	53.3% (8)	84.6% (11)
Christian	72.7% (8)	30.0% (3)	63.6% (7)	50.0% (5)
<u>Wealth Level:</u>				
< \$1MM	80.0% (4)	--	80.0% (4)	50.0% (1)
≥ \$1MM	63.2% (12)	55.6% (10)	57.9% (11)	66.7% (12)

on the present study, whether or not these findings might be of any significance cannot be known. However, if sample members' reports were a reflection of the actual extent to which they had been instilled with the value of volunteer work participation (a conclusion which should not be drawn), then it might be possible to speculate that, whereas, among Jewish sample members, the men were somewhat more likely to be socialized to assume responsibility within the volunteer sector, among Christian sample members, the emphasis on such socialization was placed on the women. In other words, while each of these religious affiliations appeared to demonstrate gender-differentiated socialization to volunteer responsibility, they did so in contrasting ways. (It should be pointed out at this juncture, however, that the speculated relationship between upper class Judaism and greater socialization of males with regard to volunteer responsibility is not supported by this study's findings concerning gender-associated frequencies with which Jewish sample members reported actual current participation in volunteer work--a subject to be considered shortly.) As a final point, it is perhaps worth noting that, relative to Christian-identified sample members, the overall greater association of those who were Jewish-identified with stated volunteer work socialization supports the previously-mentioned theory that Jewish, more than Protestant, "cultural traditions" stress "social justice and charity" (Domhoff, 1972, p. 56).

On considering the associations between levels of wealth and frequency of reported volunteer activity socialization, not only are such associations evident, but they are also apparently gender-related.

That is, less wealthy women consistently show higher frequencies of reporting volunteer activity socialization, while less wealthy men consistently show lower such frequencies. However, since less wealth is highly associated with young age and since present levels of wealth among these younger sample members is by no means indicative of either their families' wealth or of their potential future wealth, the demonstrated associations between wealth levels and frequencies of reporting volunteer socialization should not be interpreted as having any particular meaning. If anything, it would be more relevant to see the associations as based on age differentials, in which case the puzzling earlier finding of an association between younger age among men and less frequently reported volunteer socialization would be repeated. Moreover, continuing with this line of analysis, the data also show younger women (i.e., those with less wealth) to be more highly associated with reports of volunteer socialization than the older (i.e., wealthier) women. Although such an association was somewhat reflected in the specifically age-related data, it is much more pronounced in the data on differential wealth levels. Despite this association, however, the conclusion that younger sample upper class women may have been subject to more intense socialization regarding volunteer responsibility than had been the older sample women seems groundless and should not be drawn. As in the case of sample men, in this case as well, the age associations evidenced by the data are most likely the chance result of the smallness, and biased nature, of this study's research sample.

Some of the statements made by interviewees, which seem to reflect, and be representative of, their recollections regarding the above-specified two aspects of their within-family socialization are cited below. And, as will be seen, at times, both of the aspects appear together in respondents' statements, a circumstance that may mirror the fact that, for most sample members, socialization to volunteer work probably occurred on several levels. With regard to their families' quite firm and pronounced emphasis on volunteer work per se, women commented:

My mother . . . was on the boards . . . of major colleges . . . [and] did a hell of a lot for the public schools. . . . So that was a very positive model for me. . . . Helping others . . . was a very important thing. And, I think that also came from my family and Jewish heritage.

My mother worked in the community across the tracks. It was a bad ghetto area. She would work on the community board of their settlement house over there. I used to go there with her. . . . There was a lot of reward for doing good things for other people. . . . I feel that [the profession I chose] comes from a lot of what they instilled in me: a lot of the self-sacrifice, a lot of serving the people who are least advantaged.

Philanthropy had always been a part of life with my family, and you were expected to grow up . . . and take part in philanthropy. . . . My parents expected us to do community work. . . . I think my mother . . . suggested that I go down to a settlement house and work there while I was still in high school.

And, similarly, men stated:

[Volunteer work] is very much in the tradition of my family, and something that my parents instilled in all of their children. . . . I think it has always been very important in my parents' lives, . . . that a very large role be played in voluntary efforts.

I think [my parents'] philosophy was--and certainly was mine--that doing good work was sort of religious in scope. . . . If you were doing something for the community, . . . it was very important.

The values which were established by my parents, and particularly by my mother, were that, if you were lucky enough not to be hard put, you had a public responsibility. . . . We were always urged to take on some responsibility--public. Right from the beginning, after I got out of school, I got involved in various charitable activities.

And, with regard to the more general value of "social responsibility" absorbed from their families, women remarked:

I think there were a lot of messages. On the behavioral end of it, consideration for others, a sense of responsibility towards society, regarding our position in relationship to the money as one of stewardship rather than as one of ownership.

My father was one of the civic leaders of Chicago [and] had an enormous sense of responsibility to the community. . . . My father talked about money a lot and responsibility.

[My mother] had a very strong feeling of ethical responsibility in the world. I think she was the greater influence in way of life. . . . I was always aware that I would have a lot of money, and given the impression that this was a social responsibility.

These statements regarding family values of social responsibility are again matched by the men's observations.

I come from a family that's had a tradition of public involvement and service. . . . That's just one of those things you kind of absorb, and kind of assume that [you'd] probably end up doing something like that. . . . The idea of there being certain responsibilities and so forth was clear [from my parents].

I think that there was a very clear expectation on my father's side of the family that one would engage in some socially useful activity, public service primarily. I think that came through on my mother's side too--that the fact of being born to wealth deposited one with a sense of responsibility, or imposed a sense of responsibility to prove useful as a result of that.

Dad did a lot of civic work in the course of his life. . . . So, there was an atmosphere of that. . . . I think there was that tradition that you kind of owed something back to society.

Thus, taken together, the just-presented statistical and verbal data seem to support the proposition that sample upper class men and women may have been quite similar in their volunteer work orientations.

Another indication of the plausibility of this proposition, and, more specifically, of the proposition that upper class volunteer work may be at least as much a man's as a woman's province, is that sample men were nearly as likely as sample women to have started their philanthropic work involvements as teens or young adults. According to the reports of the 21 women and 17 men providing information regarding their earliest volunteer work experiences, 100% of the women, and 88.2% (15) of the men, had begun this kind of work at under 30 years of age, a practice which might connote the success, in each case, of the aforementioned within-family socialization. Moreover, and in the same vein, participating men and women, overall, resembled one another closely when duration of, and present involvement in, philanthropic activity were investigated. For the men's part, 82.6% (19) reported current involvement as volunteers, and 73.9% (17) reported having been active as volunteers for 10 years or more. For the women's part, 88.5% (23) stated themselves to be currently active in volunteer work, while 79.2% (19) of those providing information on duration of volunteer participation (24 women) claimed at least 10 years' involvement.

However, going beyond these broad generalizations, Tables 34 and 35 display the extent to which the frequencies of sample members' reported longstanding, or current, volunteer participation may have been affected by their differential ages, religious affiliations, or

Table 34

Reported Duration of Volunteer Work by  
Age, Religion, and Wealth Level

	Women		Men	
	> 10 Years	5-10 Years	> 10 Years	5-10 Years
<u>Age:</u>				
< 40	20.0% (1)	40.0% (2)	25.0% (2)	50.0% (4)
≥ 40	94.7% (18)	--	100.0% (15)	--
<u>Religion:</u>				
Jewish	86.7% (13)	6.7% (1)	76.9% (10)	15.4% (2)
Christian	66.7% (6)	11.1% (1)	60.0% (6)	30.0% (3)
<u>Wealth Level:</u>				
< \$1MM	60.0% (3)	--	--	50.0% (1)
≥ \$1MM	82.4% (14)	11.8% (2)	77.8% (14)	16.7% (3)

levels of wealth. In Table 34, depicting frequencies of reported duration of volunteer work, it is clear that these frequencies were associated with the factors of age, religion, and wealth level. In the first instance, compared to younger age, for both men and women, older age is much more--and virtually equally--highly associated with longer term volunteer involvement. This, of course, makes sense, since older sample members would have had more years than would have younger sample members in which to undertake volunteer activities. In the second instance--that of differential religious affiliations--the table shows that, for both men and women, Judaism was more highly associated than was Christianity with reports of over 10 years' volunteer experience, although the reverse seems to hold (especially with regard to the men) in the category of reported volunteer work of 5 to 10 years' duration. These findings may be attributable to the fact that, compared to the Christian-identified sample men and women participating in this investigation, a relatively higher proportion of those who were Jewish-identified were at least 40 years old and a relatively lower proportion were under 40 years old. However, it is also possible, in line with an earlier-outlined theory, that the higher incidence of reported longterm (over 10 years) volunteer activity found among this study's Jewish sample members may reflect an aspect of Jewish cultural heritage that is not as characteristic of the Christian --or at least Protestant--tradition (Domhoff, 1972, p. 56).

Lastly, in the instance of differential levels of wealth the table shows not only that, overall, greater wealth and longer term volunteer participation were highly associated, but also that the

degree of the association was approximately equal for responding men and women. As an explanation for this association, it may be appropriate to claim that wealthier individuals, being relatively more liberated from the concerns of earning a livelihood, would have more time available to give to volunteer activities. And, while this explanation may have some validity, it is also possible that the association seen in the chart is partly attributable to the overlap between older age and greater wealth. This suggestion is partly borne out by the fact that, among those with less than \$1,000,000, a higher proportion of the women than the men were over 40 years old. And, as the table shows, the women with less than \$1,000,000 were more highly associated with longterm volunteer participation than were the men in their wealth category.

On examination of Table 35--that displaying the frequencies of the sample members' reported current volunteer activity--still further discrepancies can be noted based on differences in age, religion, and wealth. First, although among the men and women who were at least 40 years old, the frequencies of reported current volunteer participation were similarly high, and substantially higher than those reported by the younger sample members, in this latter group, the reported frequency for this kind of activity was relatively higher among the women than among the men. Although the basis for this differentiation among the younger group is not clear, it is possible that it results from a gender-distinct socialization of these individuals, whereby the women may have been encouraged to initiate their participation in volunteer activities at an earlier

Table 35

Frequency of Present Volunteer Work by  
Age, Religion, and Wealth Level

		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	66.7% (4)	50.0% (4)
	<u>≥</u> 40	95.0% (19)	100.0% (15)
Religion:	Jewish	93.3% (14)	92.3% (12)
	Christian	81.8% (9)	70.0% (7)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	60.0% (4)	50.0% (1)
	<u>≥</u> \$1MM	94.7% (18)	83.3% (15)

age than had been the men, while the men may have been taught that volunteer activity should be developed subsequent to the establishment of a career. This model would certainly fit the earlier-presented data on sample members' gender-associated socialization to paid work, wherein the frequency with which the men reported such socialization was much greater than it was in the case of the women. Moreover, if such a model could be generally applied, it could account for the fact that, among the older sample men, the frequency of volunteer work was on a par with that of the women.

In the case of the differences reflected in the frequencies with which distinct religious affiliations are associated with reported current volunteer participation, the table shows that, overall, Jewish-identified sample members are more highly associated, than are Christian-identified sample members, with such reports. Again, this discrepancy in the frequencies is perhaps attributable to some "cultural" differences between the two religious camps (Domhoff, 1972, p. 56), or it may be a consequence of the fact that a higher proportion of the Jewish sample members (both men and women), relative to the Christian sample members, were at least 40 years old and that greater age appears to have been associated with higher incidence of reported current volunteer activity. Finally, with regard to this study's data on the association of religion to current volunteer work, it should be noted that the incidence of reports of such work was higher among Christian-identified sample women than it was among their male counterparts. While the reasons for this gender difference are unknown, it is worth pointing out that it conforms to

the findings on volunteer work socialization, wherein, within the category of Christian identification, the sample women reported such socialization with greater frequency than did the men.

Lastly, concerning differential levels of wealth, while the women in both wealth categories demonstrated a greater association to reported present volunteer participation than did the men, nevertheless, the gender-based differences are not very great. Of more interest is the finding that in the case of both genders, greater wealth is much more highly associated with reports of present volunteer work than is lesser wealth. As was proposed in relation to the association found between greater wealth and longer term volunteer work, here, as well, it may be suggested that the demonstrated association is linked to the probability that wealthier sample members would be more likely to feel unconstrained (by the need to earn their living) in the allocation of their work time, and, therefore, would be more likely to make time for volunteer participation.

Having just looked into two aspects of upper class volunteer work--current participation and duration of participation--and having found, irrespective of the differential associations based on age, religion, and wealth, that, contrary to what has been implied by some of the existing research on the subject, in this study, very little overall gender-differentiation could be demonstrated in these regards, it is of interest to investigate how participating upper class men and women compared on other volunteer work dimensions, such as nature of work undertaken, positions held, motivations for--or stimuli to--philanthropic participation, and functions as volunteers.

As was stated above, the major categories of upper class volunteer work are usually described as those of "culture", health, education, and welfare. And, while the findings of this study generally corroborate this depiction, they also both generated a greater number of categorical distinctions and provided information on differential participation in these spheres by sample men and women.

With regard to spheres of voluntary endeavor, those listed by this study's interviewees were wide-ranging, including work related to children, health, religion, family foundations, "alternative" foundations, community foundations, education, environmental concerns, women's rights and status, "culture", politics or good government, foreign or international affairs, "society", domestic inter-ethnic affairs, urban problems, and legal and civil rights. And, while it is true that these areas are both diverse and numerous, it should be noted that sample men and women appeared to concentrate in only a few of them (by concentration is meant that at least a third of the men and women mentioned participation in an area) and that many of the areas overlapped one another. Those areas of volunteer work in which sample men and women were most concentrated, albeit not necessarily equally so, were the areas of childcare (or welfare), women's rights and status, health, family foundations, education, "culture", and religion. Based on respondents' own reports of organizations for which they had volunteered, it appears that, of those men and women who had ever done this kind of work, at least 50% in each case had actively participated in family foundations

and in educational organizations, and about 40% in religion-related<sup>1</sup> organizations or projects. With regard to the spheres of "culture", health, and children, however, a relatively greater proportion of women than men respondents reported participation: over 50% of the women, compared to just over a third of men, mentioned working in these areas. And, of all the areas in which sample members showed some concentration, the only one in which men and women were not both represented was that of women's rights and status. In this area, approximately a third of the women, but only about 4.5% (1) of the men, reported volunteer activity.

Another angle from which sample members' philanthropic activity may be viewed is one which reveals the extension of this activity both within particular spheres (a different kind of concentration) and across diverse spheres. In the first instance, if one examines the number of organizations reportedly served by sample members in any one area relative to the number of those same interviewees, one finds that, in almost every sphere, the number of organizations specified surpasses the number of individuals, which means, of course, that at least some interviewees had participated in more than one

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<sup>1</sup>The activities or functions of these "religion-related" organizations--and consequently respondents' volunteer efforts on their behalf--were more often secular than directly religious in nature. For instance, a church might sponsor a project, the purpose of which was feeding the poor, and, from among its membership, form a committee to carry out this project. Or, organizations, the main purposes of which were in providing medical care, education or employment counseling, because of their affiliation with and funding from a religion-related agency (such as the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies), might attract or seek out board members whose religious affiliations were applicable.

organization in the same field (and, in the present study, one individual specified as many as 8 organizations served in one area). In the second instance--the extension of respondents' volunteer activity across diverse areas--by examining the reported spheres of active involvement for each of this study's participants, one sees that, in every case, among those individuals who had done some philanthropic work, no fewer than 2 distinct volunteer work spheres had been served per individual (and, serving in only 2 areas may have been in part, age-related, since, in this study, all but one of those who participated in such a limited number of spheres were under 35 years old). Moreover, on the average, according to their interview statements, each woman respondent had been active as a volunteer in about 5 distinct philanthropic areas, and, each man, in about 4. And, again, as was just discussed above, these distinct spheres in which respondents reportedly participated usually comprised a far greater number of organizations (for example, two individuals in this study listed as many as 30 organizations for which they had worked). From the foregoing, then, it can perhaps be concluded that, while not always applicable to the same areas of endeavor, nevertheless, intensive and extensive participation was characteristic of the volunteer work done by both sample women and sample men. It should be noted, however, that, despite the apparent general applicability of these two features in characterizing sample members' volunteer activity--regardless of gender--the degree of intensity of such activity--as measured by number of organizations reportedly served--did appear to be somewhat greater for women than for men participants. In the former

case, an average of at least 8.3 organizations per respondent had been served, whereas, in the latter, the average per individual was 6.5.<sup>1</sup>

Thusfar, evidence from this investigation has shown that, in various respects, sample men and women resembled one another in their voluntary activity. Yet, there remains another key feature concerning the nature of their volunteer work which must be examined, before it can be concluded that the eleemosynary activities of interviewed men and women were essentially similar. This key feature is that of positions held within the volunteer sphere, about which Daniels (1978) has written:

men predominate among those who become the leaders of volunteer activities: the directors and board members of philanthropic foundations and important community welfare fund drives. Men are disproportionately found on the "big" boards of cultural, medical, city improvement associations--the boards that direct policy and future planning, review and make investments for the association, plan the budget... .

Whatever the counter tendency, it is still true that women are a disproportionate number of the "foot soldiers" who ring door bells, address and stamp envelopes, collect and sell tickets, arrange flowers. They predominate in the business of providing altruistic service. (p. 3)

In contrast to Daniel's statements, in this study, overall, the extent to which men and women reportedly held philanthropic organizational board positions was virtually identical. On the one hand 21 men (91.3%), and on the other 24 women (92.3%) stated that they had served as volunteer board members (and here, again, it is perhaps

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<sup>1</sup>This statement regarding the relative intensity with which men and women respondents did philanthropic work should not be seen as conclusive in any way, since the number of organizations left unspecified by both groups of interviewees cannot be known or estimated.

interesting to point out that each of those women and men who did not report serving boards was under age 30). However, the fact that this similarity existed does not necessarily contradict Daniels' general concept: that gender-based power differentials, wherein men dominate, may even operate in the volunteer sector, which, as is known, is generally considered a quintessentially female sphere.

In order to discover the applicability of Daniels' concept for this investigation's upper class individuals, differential volunteer positions assumed by sample members (according to their own reports) were examined in two different domains: that of the family (including personal) organization and that of the non-family organization. With regard to the first domain, earlier in this section it was pointed out that one of the ways in which responding men and women resembled one another in their voluntary activities was that, among those who had ever done this kind of work, a minimum of 50% in each group reported participation in this domain. However, by making this point, existing distinctions between sample men's and women's degree and type of participation in family philanthropic organizations were simultaneously disregarded. These distinctions now become relevant and must be considered. For instance, of those who reported the existence of family (or personal) foundations, 78.6% (11) of the men, compared to 94.1% (16) of the women, mentioned active involvement. And, the frequencies with which such involvement was reported by these sample members did not appear to be differentially associated, according to either distinct age categories, religious affiliations, or levels of wealth. However, as Tables 36 and 37 show, position levels reportedly

Table 36

## Reported Positions Held in Family Foundations by Gender

	Women	Men
President or Chairperson	62.5% (10)	54.5% (6)
Other Executive Officer	12.5% (2)	--
Director of Trustee	25.0% (4)	36.4% (4)
NI	--	9.1% (1)

Table 37

Reported Executive-Level Positions Held in  
Family Foundations by Age

	Women	Men
< 40	50.0% (1)	--
≥ 40	78.6% (11)	75.0% (6)

held within family foundations did appear to vary, in association with both differences in gender and in age (they did not vary, however, with differences in religion, and it was not possible to arrive at such a determination regarding variations based on differential wealth levels, not only because of the close association between age and financial worth, but also because none of the women with less than \$1,000,000 reported the existence of family foundations).

From Table 36 it can be seen that, compared to interviewed men, responding women had a higher frequency of executive-level positions within their family foundations. Whereas 75% (12) of the women stated that they occupied some executive-level position in these foundations, only 54.5% (6) of the men claimed this level of participation. And although it is clear from Table 37 that the older age is associated with both the responding men's and women's frequencies of reported executive positions held, this association does nothing to contradict the finding that, in contrast to what has been submitted by Daniels, with regard to family philanthropic organizations, participating upper class women, rather than upper class men, demonstrated the edge in both serving on, and heading, the boards of this type of philanthropic entity.

This apparent edge, however, is not sustained by participating women in the second volunteer work domain--that of board participation for non-family organizations. In this domain, as is shown in Tables 38 and 39, the general degree of reported board participation on the parts of sample men and women appears to have been very similar, and, furthermore, data indicate that variations in these

Table 38

Frequency Reported Non-Family Organization Board  
Participation by Gender

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Women	80.8% (21)
Men	86.9% (20)

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Table 39

Frequency Reported Non-Family Organization Board  
Participation by Age and Wealth Level

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		Women	Age
Age:	< 40	60.0% (3)	62.5% (5)
	<u>&gt;</u> 40	90.0% (18)	100.0% (15)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	60.0% (3)	50.0% (1)
	<u>&gt;</u> \$1MM	88.9% (16)	88.9% (16)

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frequencies are associated with differences in age and levels of wealth (although not with differences in religious affiliations).

As far as age is concerned, the shown association between older age and higher incidence of participation on the boards of organizations that were not family-linked stands in contrast to the lack of such an association in the case of family-connected organizations. What probably accounts for this discrepancy, with regard to the two types of organizations, is that, in the latter case, selection of board members is frequently largely a matter of an individual's family relatedness, while, in the former case, this is irrelevant, and selection depends more on qualifications such as an individual's skills, experience, networks, and clout--qualities that are likely to be associated with older, as opposed to younger, age. And, this explanation, which, in this instance, refers only to the differences found in the associations of distinct age categories to board participation (according to type of organization concerned), can be equally profitably applied to the case of the discrepancies found in the associations between different wealth levels and such participation. That is, while no association was found between level of wealth and frequency of reported board participation in relation to family-linked organizations, an association between greater wealth and greater frequency of reported participation is apparent in the case of non-family organizations. And, this wealth-related contrast in findings is probably attributable to the facts that, while, in family-connected organizations, a prospective board member's level of wealth is likely to be of less concern than his or her blood or

marriage ties to other board members, in non-family organizations, the relative importance of these concerns is likely to be reversed. In the latter organizations, whereas the nature of an individual's ties to presiding board members is probably perceived as of relatively little functional value, this person's level of wealth would probably be viewed as of great significance in determining his or her relative clout and networking capabilities.

Having now indicated the degree to which sample men and women resembled one another in their frequency of reported participation as board members in non-family organizations, and, further, having shown how these frequencies may have been influenced by differences in age and levels of wealth, it is important to return to the subject of the disparity found between sample men's and women's participation in this sphere--a disparity which was reflected in the relative frequencies with which each reportedly served in executive-level positions on the boards of non-family organizations. As Tables 40 and 41 exhibit, data indicate that these frequencies varied according to differences not only in gender, but also in age and religion as well. This kind of determination could not be made with regard to differential levels of wealth, however, due to the fact that, among the men with under \$1,000,000, neither reported board participation (a circumstance that could reasonably be attributed to the additional fact that each of these interviewees was under 30 years old). Nevertheless, judging from Table 41's data on women interviewees with less than \$1,000,000, it does not appear that differential financial worth was particularly associated with differential frequencies in reports of executive positions held on non-family boards.

Table 40

Reported Executive Positions Held by Board Participators  
in Non-Family Organizations by Gender

	Women	Men
President or Chairperson	47.6% (10)	70.0% (14)
Other Executive Officer	23.8% (5)	25.0% (5)
Total at Executive Level <sup>a</sup>	57.1% (12)	70.0% (14)

<sup>a</sup>The sums in each column do not equal the indicated totals, because certain respondents served at more than one executive level.

Table 41

Reported Executive Positions Held by Board Participators  
in Non-Family Organizations by Age,  
Religion, and Wealth Level

		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	25.0% (1)	60.0% (3)
	≥ 40	57.9% (11)	73.3% (11)
Religion:	Jewish	64.3% (9)	72.7% (8)
	Christian	33.3% (3)	66.7% (6)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	66.7% (2)	NA
	≥ \$1MM	55.6% (10)	76.5% (13)

On further examination of Table 41, it is clear that, for both sample men and women, an association exists between older age and higher frequency of reported executive-level positions held in non-family organizations. This finding is not a surprising one, when --as previously noted--it is considered that older age is also generally associated with advanced personal and professional experience, knowledge, ability, and reliability--qualities that would be valued in a candidate for executive-level board functions. In contrast to this association, however, the analysis of those appearing between distinct religious affiliations and frequency of reported executive-level board positions held in non-family organizations remains a puzzle. As Table 41 shows, there is little differentiation to be found in the frequencies with which Christian-identified sample men and Jewish-identified sample women and men reported having served in the capacity of executives on the boards of such organizations. However, in the case of Christian-identified sample women the frequency is much lower. Why this discrepancy appears is unclear, but should probably be attributed to the peculiarities inhering in the research sample as a result of the sampling method. Moreover, clarification regarding the degree of bias--or extent of projectability--reflected in these frequencies must await further research.

Turning to a consideration of Table 40, it can be seen that, despite the just-reviewed variations in frequencies, based on differential age and religious affiliations, overall sample men, relative to sample women, reportedly held a disproportionate number of executive-level positions on the boards of non-family

organizations.<sup>1</sup> As the data show, responding men appear to have substantially exceeded responding women, not only in the proportion listing some executive board position served, but also in the proportion specifying top board position served. From this, then, and from the preceding it appears that, while this investigation's respondents demonstrated little gender disparity regarding their overall board participation, such disparity did arise within specific areas of their board work. On the one hand, as has already been discussed in this section, despite the fact that, as board members, women, on the average, appeared to cover a wider range of fields and represent a greater number of public, non-family-linked organizations than did men, men, nevertheless, seemed to predominate as leaders of these types of concerns. And, it is in regard to this area of volunteer activity that the current research seems to corroborate Daniels' proposal that, even in the volunteer work arena, as in the rest of American society, the normative, male-dominant gender hierarchy may obtain.

However, it is in relation to another area of the volunteer sphere--that of the private family-associated foundation--that data from the present investigation suggest the possible reversal of this normative gender hierarchy. For, at least with regard to this study's sample upper class members, it was in this area that women appeared to prevail as board members and as board executives. Thus, even though,

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<sup>1</sup>Here, again, these numbers should be only tentatively accepted, as they may reflect some under-reporting on the men's and/or women's parts.

in the domain of public organizations, sample upper class women's overall direct influence via their volunteer roles may have been relatively less than that of sample upper class men, nevertheless, due to their apparent extensive board participation in these organizations, and leadership positions in private family foundations, these women's potential for, and actual, influence regarding public affairs probably remained great. For, in their capacities as general trustees, and, more directly, as chief officers, of philanthropic boards, these women may have shaped and determined policies, which, ultimately, were of public concern.

Before leaving the subject of the nature of upper class research participants' volunteer activities, a word should be added about the possible connection between certain aspects of this work and status inconsistency theory. As will be recalled, this theory, applied to the upper class, hypothesizes that those individuals who demonstrate low correlation in the rankings of their various status dimensions will be those who are most likely to challenge the extant power structure (Lipset, 1968, p. 313). In terms of the present investigation, there are at least three areas of sample members' volunteer activities for which this theory may have relevance. One of these is the area of "alternative" foundations, another that of women's rights and status, and a third that of religion-related activities.

An "alternative" foundation (so-called by many of those who participate in them, Teltsch, 1983), as characterized by annual reports from two such charitable organizations, promotes "progressive and fundamental change in . . . society," and helps, through

financial grants, "those who have been denied power and justice" to recognize their "common interest and come together to defend it" (North Star Fund, "Annual Report 1981-82," p. 3) and "supports grassroots social change organizing projects working toward the redistribution of wealth and power" (Vanguard Public Foundation, July 1, 1979 to June 30, 1980, p. 11). In other words, these foundations, and those who participate in them, purport to challenge basic inequities inherent in the established social system. In this study, 7 sample members (5 men and 2 women, comprising 14.3% of the total sample) reported active association with one or more of this kind of funding organization. And, it is because 6 of these (comprising 50% of all in their age category) were comparatively young (under 35 years old) and because young age is often associated with lower status, that one might conclude that these individuals' "alternative" volunteer activities could be related to the conflict inherent in their status composition, wherein low status, associated with young age, and high status, linked to wealth and family position, exist side by side.

In the area of women's rights and status, although the organizations and projects for which interviewees had volunteered may have been diverse in nature (spanning such fields as education, family planning, finance, politics, and paid labor, as well as others), all had in common the aim of helping advance and protect women's positions in society. In other words, these organizations and projects were concerned, either directly or indirectly, with the minimization or eradication of power differentials inherent in the existing gender

hierarchy. And, in the current investigation, volunteer participation in this area was reported by 10 individuals, ranging in age from their 30s to their 80s. Of these respondents, 9 were women, comprising 34.6% of all women sample members. As with the above-discussed young interviewees, who were active in "alternative" volunteer efforts, this study's women respondents, who were active in the area of women's rights and status, might also be said to have participated in this kind of system-challenging work partly as a result of their dissatisfaction with their own specific condition of status inconsistency, wherein the relatively low status associated with being female clashes with the dominant status of being upper class.

Finally, based on the data available for the present research, it appears that status inconsistency theory may also have had some bearing on the fact that one set of interviewees demonstrate a relatively greater degree of participation in religion-related philanthropic work than did another. The first set of these interviewees were those who identified themselves as Jewish, a religion against the members of which discrimination has historically and widely been practiced. And, the second were those who identified themselves as Christians, an identification which, at least in the present-day United States, suffers no comparable denigration. In this study, among the 28 reportedly Jewish sample members, 53.5% (15) mentioned participation in organizations, the principal work of which was aiding the Jewish community, whether on a local, national, or international level. In doing this kind of volunteer work, these individuals were not only attempting to help other Jews, but, by

association, themselves as well, since improvements in the condition and status of the former must reflect back on that of the latter. By comparison to the frequency with which this study's Jewish-identified sample members reportedly undertook religion-related philanthropic work, the frequency of this kind of work among those who identified themselves as Christians appeared to be substantially lower: of the 21 Christian-identified interviewees, 5 (23.8%) specified participating in such work. Thus, here, again, a case can be made for the argument that status inconsistency may result in activities that combat the status quo. For, in this instance, to a greater extent than was true for this study's upper class Christian respondents, those who were Jewish--among whom status contradiction is more readily apparent--undertook activities the aim of which, at base, was countering adverse conditions and attitudes affecting their coreligionists and themselves.

Turning, now, to a discussion of the stimuli or motivations underlying respondents' participation as volunteers, it should be pointed out that some of these have already been revealed. For instance, at the beginning of the section, within-family socialization was demonstrated to be a particularly strong motivational factor in the eyes of both the men and the women interviewees. And, additionally, later, both inherent interest in particular fields and the existence of family foundations were shown to induce volunteer participation on the part of interviewed sample members (94.1%--16--of the women, and 78.6%--11--of the men, who reported the existence of family foundations, were themselves board members). Lastly, as

has just been discussed, the operation of status inconsistency, which in this investigation appeared most applicable to the women, the young, and the Jewish respondents, may have been--consciously or unconsciously--a basis for sample members involving themselves in certain of their chosen voluntary endeavors.

Going beyond these previously-examined possible motivational factors, however, there are others which should also be introduced. These additional stimuli to volunteer participation may be divided conceptually between those connected to respondents' other principal work and those connected to their economic class position and their networks. About the first conceptual area, Daniels (1976) has said:

Volunteer careers require special motivation. . . .  
For men, philanthropic activities can be closely tied to their professional or business advancement. . . . [V]olunteerism can be . . . good for business.

But . . . women . . . are thinking about personal growth and their own identities in their participation. [Respondents] speak of needing something to enlarge their existence beyond the home, yet within the traditional scope of expectations for the wife and mother. . . .

Implicit in these [explanations of] the impetus toward a volunteer career is the potential emptiness of [these women's] affluent lives. (pp. 43, 45)

With regard to these comments, evidence from the current research provides only partial corroboration. For, whereas Daniels implies that volunteering women and men do not share common motivations for their philanthropic work--men's participation stemming from professional interests and women's from potential domestic boredom--in the present investigation, this is not completely borne out. For among those men and women who were either presently employed or who had had "careers" (21 and 16 individuals, respectively), virtually equal proportions--50% (8) of the women and 52.4% (11) of the men--

reported volunteer involvements bearing some relationship to their paid professions. Thus, while it may be true that sample upper class women were less likely than sample upper class men to have had paid employment, nevertheless, among those who had such employment, voluntary participation in organizations related to that employment was no less common than it was among the men.

Having made this point, however, it should be added that, in a more general sense, the evidence from this investigation does seem compatible with Daniels' finding that women's motivation for volunteer work usually stems from their concern about possible stagnation in the domestic sphere. This is because, compared to participating men, relatively few of the women maintained longterm careers (for instance, as was shown earlier, 30.8%--8--of the women, compared to 65.2%--15--of the men, reported careers spanning 10 or more years), most of them, instead, over the long run, choosing to substitute career responsibility with responsibility for the domestic and volunteer spheres. And, while few of these women respondents expressed as explicitly as has Daniels that the threat of inadequate stimulation motivated their extra-domestic volunteer participation, nevertheless, this explanation seems quite plausible in light of their relatively restricted access to the productive sphere and disproportionate responsibility within the domestic sphere.<sup>1</sup>

In contrast to the work-related stimuli influencing volunteer activity, those that were related to sample members' class standing

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<sup>1</sup>However, one could argue that such a motivation--the attempt to compensate for potentially empty lives--could apply equally to sample men, among whom volunteer work was also characteristic.

and networking potentials seemed more generally applicable, regardless of gender. As a stimulus to sample members' volunteer work, networks appeared to have at least two aspects. One is based on the perspective of fundraising organizations, which encouraged sample members' volunteer participation at least in part due to the networks they represented. In relation to this, it should be readily apparent that invitations to serve on the boards of organizations are more frequently offered to upper class individuals--both male and female--than to individuals of other classes, because, in so doing, the personal donations of the former are ensured, and, at the same time, the organizations gain access, through the upper class board member, to a much wider network of potential contributors, among whom the board member is often expected to fundraise. And, to the extent that gender might affect the relative desirability of upper class individuals as board members, this would probably be attributable to the fact of upper class men's more extensive connections to the business sphere, which, with regard to the present study, might account for the greater frequency with which sample men--as opposed to sample women--occupied executive-level board positions in non-family organizations. The significance to organizations of having as board members individuals with access to such networks was aptly expressed by one of the men interviewed for this investigation.

It would be very hard to separate out business from philanthropy. . . . If you're not active in business, you're not going to be as good in philanthropy. You know where the money is.

For instance, if you're a financial advisor to somebody, you advise them on the sale of \$42 million worth of their stock, and you say, "You know, I think you ought to give

some of that to charity--at least \$5 million." . . .  
Then you advise them where to give it.

Thus, while it is probably true that, because they each possessed wealth and networking capabilities, both interviewed men and women were eagerly sought by non-family organizations to fill board positions, nevertheless, it is likely that the men may have been more avidly courted, and offered more high-level board positions than were the women, because, in general, the networks they represented (encompassing the business community), compared to those represented by women, were potentially both more lucrative and powerful.

The other aspect of the network stimulus to sample members' volunteer participation is based on the perspective of the interviewees themselves, among whom a not uncommon motivation for volunteer involvement was felt connection to a particular organization. And, while this felt connection could be due to a friend's relationship to the organization, more frequently it was based on the prior participation in that organization by one or more family members. Perhaps the most common example of this, in the present investigation, was the frequency with which sample members served on the boards of schools in which they and/or other family members had been enrolled. Of the women and men who reported serving on boards, 41.7% (10) of the former and 52.4% (11) of the latter listed family-connected school boards among those for which they had worked. Another, less specific, example is that, on occasion, a family might have built up a kind of tradition of participation in

an organization, wherein, over years or even generations, some family member had served on the organization's board. Sample members for whom such a case applied (according to their own reports, 25%--6--of the women and 47.6%--10--of the men, who had ever served on boards) looked upon the continuance of this tradition as a kind of family heritage that should be sustained.

The foregoing discussion brings to light characteristics relating to sample upper class members' volunteer work, which are not in complete accord with depictions of this kind of work found in some of the existing literature. For instance, although valuable insights have been gained from the work of those researchers who have particularly associated upper class volunteer work with upper class women (Baltzell, 1958; Birmingham, 1982; Domhoff, 1970; Ostrander n.d. (a-d), 1980), in contrast to this view the current study showed--at least with regard to its upper class participants--that men, as well as women, played important--although not necessarily identical--roles in the volunteer sphere. The roles of these interviewees appeared to be alike in that similarly large proportions of each group reportedly had had some past volunteer experience, were presently active as volunteers, had served as volunteers for at least 10 years, and had been volunteer board members. Their roles seemed markedly different, however, in that, based on interview information, although the volume of sample women's volunteer activities was generally higher than that of the men and although a relatively greater proportion of these women held high-level family foundation board positions, nevertheless, a

disproportionately large number of the interviewed men served as board leaders for non-family-associated organizations. In light of these data, it should be clear that, recognition and examination of both the similarities in, and differences between, sample upper class men's and women's volunteer roles is critical in order to more accurately assess not only the nature of the volunteer sphere in which they worked, but also the differential functions of class and gender within this sphere. Moreover, it might tentatively be proposed that, in neglecting to examine the roles and functions of upper class men in the volunteer sphere, much of the literature on the subject may have contributed to a distorted picture both of gender-differentiated activities and functions at the upper class level and of the upper class volunteer domain itself.

Another characterization of the volunteer work sphere which is seemingly contradicted by this and other research is that proposed by Birmingham, who suggests that the grande dames about whom he writes--and whom he defines by the "exuberance," "daring," "extravagance," "scale," and "supremely high-handed self-confidence" with which they "grasped the burden of philanthropy and culture"--are a "vanishing breed" (1982, pp. 280-282). And, as the following citation shows, Birmingham attributes the alleged deterioration of the significance of these women's roles in philanthropic service to two factors: the encroachment of government into the sphere of public welfare and present-day tax laws which supposedly encourage wealthy individuals to relinquish direct control of their wealth for the sake of preserving it to the fullest extent.

It is certainly true that, in the years since the beginning of the Roosevelt era, the federal government has slowly and steadily usurped the territory that once belonged to a few public spirited philanthropists, and caring for the needy, . . . has become a public rather than a private responsibility.

Indirectly, too, through the strictures imposed by the Internal Revenue Service, the United States Government has discouraged grande dameship. To prevent their estates from being ravaged by taxes, the rich, . . . have been forced to funnel their wealth into foundations, where decisions are no longer made by an individual legatee but by a board of trustees--grand committee substituted for the grande dame. (pp. 279-280)

While it was not within the scope of this research (and perhaps would not be particularly relevant) to determine which adjectives best described the manner in which sample upper class women engaged in their philanthropic work, nevertheless, contrary to what might well be concluded from reading Birmingham, these "great ladies" seemed far from the brink of extinction. It is, of course, possible that Birmingham is correct in contending that upper class women today, generally, are not as "grand" as were those about whom he writes, but this emphasis seems misplaced and should not be interpreted to mean that the roles of upper class women in the philanthropic arena are any less vital today than they were several generations ago. With regard to the present study, as has been seen, not only did volunteer work appear to be characteristic of the entire sample of women, but also, for many, it appeared to be the primary occupation. That this was the case, and that sample upper class men also participated extensively in volunteer activities, seems antithetical to Birmingham's proposal that the upper class role in the philanthropic sphere has been undermined by the more recent and larger role played

by the federal government. For, while it is undoubtedly true that many public organizations rely heavily on federal funding, it is just as true (and perhaps moreso in the current Reagan administration) that many, nevertheless, require substantial financial support from the private sector. As a result, large donations are commonly solicited from wealthy individuals and their corporations, and these individuals, as has been seen, seem to end up occupying and directing the organizations' boards. Furthermore, based on her own research, Ostrander has concluded that, the volunteer roles of upper class women, rather than being diminished by the encroachment of the government or anyone else, serve to protect "the traditional position of the old wealthy families in the community institutions established by them," provide "a locus for screening persons not accepted by the inner circle in moving toward that acceptance," and provide "an economic base for maintaining private control over public concerns, thus . . . serving as a holding action against the extension of government involvement" (n.d. (c), p. 8). These findings of Ostrander's, taken in conjunction with those issuing from the present research, at the very least call into question the assertion of Birmingham's that infringement by the government has seriously undercut or incapacitated upper class influence in the philanthropic sphere.

A second point to be made with regard to Birmingham is that the findings of this study contradicted his view that the wealthy must relinquish control of the estate-preserving foundations they create. On the contrary, and as was seemingly the case for many of this

investigation's interviewees, an individual may give or leave money to launch a foundation which, thereafter, may be run by a board of his or her descendants. This point has been emphasized by other researchers. For instance, Lundberg (1968) not only cites the 1956 Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis publication Charitable Foundations, which states:

"Since the charitable foundation may remain under the direction of the creator either directly or indirectly, its assets may be used to complement the general financial activities of the creator while still achieving specific desirable charitable ends." (p. 974)

but also remarks that:

The Fords, like their peers, were chosen before birth for their roles, which are (oddly in a democratic, republican or merely parliamentary context) purely hereditary. They are hereditary oligarchic philanthropists!

It is, then, by hereditary right that all these concededly beneficent expenditures are made. (p. 514)

And, in his research on "Founding Families," Sease (1979) quotes a tax attorney as saying: "If you equate control of wealth with power, then a bequest to a family charity leaves the family with a hell of a lot of power" (p. 1). Thus, it seems that, in forming foundations, the wealthy have the double advantage of preserving both their estates and their control over the entire family fortune.

As a final topic in this section on sample upper class members' volunteer activities, a review should be made of the proposals of other investigators of the upper class concerning the fundamental functions and effects of this kind of work. Basically, there appear to be two distinct views on this matter. On the one hand, there are those, such as Birmingham (1982), who see the function of upper class

volunteer work to be nothing more than what it purports to be: that is, doing good for humankind. On the other hand, however, there are those, such as Chesler and Goodman (1976), Daniels (1978), Domhoff (1970), Lundberg (1968), Ostrander (n.d. (c), 1980), and Thompson (1981), who perceive in this work ulterior class- and self-benefiting functions which overshadow and outweigh the significance of true altruism. And, as these latter functions are not as easily discerned as the former, they deserve some additional discussion.

To begin, Domhoff (1970, p. 35), Chesler and Goodman (1976, p. 192), Lundberg (1968, p. 468), Ostrander (n.d. (c), p. 6; 1980, p. 76), and Thompson (1981, p. 260) each argues that upper class volunteer work is, at a general level, system maintaining. And, while various aspects of this argument exist, one of the principal ones, suggested by all the above researchers, save Chesler and Goodman, is that, by engaging in charitable work, upper class members create for themselves a sympathetic public image, thereby helping to deflect attention from, and to obscure, their probably less attractive and clearly profit-motivated dealings, which, if entirely exposed and recognized, might result in disruptive class conflict and—even worse—in the redistribution of power. In addition to this aspect of the argument that volunteer work is system maintaining are others suggested by Chesler and Goodman and by Thompson. Chesler and Goodman, for instance, propose that volunteer labor "allows private and public wealth to remain out of the hands of those who need it most, the majority of people in the country" (1976, p. 195). And, Thompson makes the point that, if, through their philanthropic efforts, wealthy individuals

improve conditions for the lower classes, then members of these classes will "constitute a better workforce, providing more profit" (1981, p. 260).

In addition to this general system-maintaining function, Domhoff (1970), Lundberg (1968), and Ostrander (n.d. (c), 1980) also find that upper class volunteer work serves the more specific function of extending the power of the upper class, as a whole, over public institutions. Ostrander (with whom Domhoff, 1970, p. 34, concurs) has previously been quoted in this regard, asserting that, by virtue of their disproportionate representation on institutional boards, upper class women extend and protect the influence of their class over essentially public concerns (n.d. (c), p. 8; 1980, p. 76). To her comments can only be added three further points made by Lundberg. These are that (1) the upper class further extends its influence in the cultural arena by virtue of its members exclusively making financial grants to applicants deemed ideologically acceptable, (2) the formation and use of foundations saves upper class members a great deal in taxes, without their forfeiting control over the disposition of their money, and (3) upper class foundations, which can be used as receptacles for large blocks of corporate stock, provide a means for upper class individuals to extend and sustain their corporate control (1968, pp. 468-469). (The topic of upper class charitable financial contributions, with which these last three points are really more precisely concerned, will be taken up again in the subsequent section on money.)

A third ulterior function of upper class philanthropic activity, according to Daniels (1978) and Ostrander (n.d. (c), 1980), is that it is self-benefiting for the women who participate in it. Daniels makes the point that women's paid careers may be aided by their volunteer work, because the latter affords them both contacts and high visibility (1978, p. 46). And, taking a somewhat different view, Ostrander maintains not only that volunteer work enhances upper class women's structural position by providing them "with opportunities to get higher positions than they would otherwise [have been able to achieve] if their opportunities were based solely on their qualifications and training" (n.d. (c), p. 7), but also that it "provides a path for upper class women to achieve positions of power and prestige in the community in their own right" (p. 8). From this perspective, it appears that volunteer participation may be a significant factor underlying the power differential between upper class women and women of other classes.<sup>1</sup>

A final point regarding suggested latent functions of upper class volunteer work derives from Domhoff's (1970) research. As is demonstrated by the following citation, it is that investigator's contention that, in their volunteer roles, upper class women serve as representatives not just for their class, but, more specifically, for upper class men.

What are some of the major ways in which the activities of upper-class women are useful in ways that would not

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<sup>1</sup>This may be the case, because, although women of other classes participate as volunteers, it is upper class women who appear to predominate as organizational board members.

immediately strike the eye? Most generally, their presence in a wide variety of institutions increases the participation of members of the upper class in all aspects of American culture. . . . This in itself is an important function when it is considered that there are only a few hundred thousand males in the country who are members of the upper class. In short, a distinctive point of view is brought to areas in which men of the upper class do not have the time or the inclination to participate. (p. 34)

While not wanting to deny the theoretical validity of Domhoff's remarks, it is important to note that the data from the current study cast some doubt on the actual extent to which sample upper class women could be said to have represented their male counterparts in the volunteer sphere. This doubt results from research evidence showing that sample upper class men were also widely involved as volunteers and, more significantly, that, where non-family-linked organizations were concerned, they filled a disproportionate number of executive-level board positions. This suggests that, although sample women may have stood to some degree as representatives for the men of their class, this function was not wholly given over to them. And, that this was the case, when responding women were generally more available for volunteer work than were responding men, requires some explanation. Certainly, as has previously been discussed, sample men's volunteer participation might partially be explained by a combination of stimuli and motivations, such as their early socialization, the potential for professional advancement related to their volunteer activities, and the demand for their volunteer board participation due to their wealth and their networking capabilities. Or, it might be explained from a functional perspective, as serving

similar functions as those associated with upper class women's volunteer work: that is, "doing good," while, at the same time, both bolstering the extant social system and extending the overall influence of their class. However, while any or all of these explanations may be relevant, there is at least one other that should be considered. This is that upper class men's participation as volunteers, and acceptance of leadership positions on organizational boards, may, in part, function to guard against excessive influence of upper class women either on these organizations, or, via these organizations, on the public domain. And, although this proposition, to some extent, contradicts Domhoff's analysis, nevertheless, it is consistent with the reality of the existing gender-based power hierarchy and with status inconsistency theory, which, as has been previously stated, suggests that status inconsistency among the wealthy--of which upper class women provide an example--produces attitudes favoring structural change. Thus, it may be that, in their volunteer roles, upper class men function to safeguard both the reality and ideology of male dominance, which could potentially be threatened by unmitigated and unmonitored volunteer activity on the part of upper class women.

Having now examined a number of different characteristics of upper class interview participants' volunteer activities, both from the perspective of the current research findings and from that of prior investigations, a review of the conclusions reached is undoubtedly in order. First, data from the present study seemed to show, contrary to what would commonly be believed, that volunteer work was characteristic of both sample upper class women and men. Moreover, it

appeared, based on respondents' reports, that both the men and the women were socialized to participate as volunteers, that they resembled one another closely in the fields most commonly chosen for participation, that both, in their volunteer work, represented not only multiple organizations, but also multiple fields, and that, with regard to boards, the women served as members as frequently as did the men.

Second, in contrast to these gender similarities, the data from this research also showed (1) that the women, overall, tended to be more active volunteers than the men, and, further, that a larger proportion of the women than the men held executive positions in family foundations, and (2) that the men, more often than the women, were recruited for top-level volunteer positions on the boards of non-family-associated organizations. What these gender-based differences might signify with regard to sample men's and women's differential power is that, while, by serving as board members and heads of family foundations, the women may have had access to, and may have exercised, substantial power with consequences for the public sphere, nevertheless, when it came to society's larger, wealthier, and more influential institutions, the men, by and large, maintained control.

Third, in addition to examining sample members' gender-differentiated positions within the volunteer sphere, the present study also investigated some of the probable stimuli underlying respondents' participation in this sphere. Several, such as within-family socialization, inherent interest, and the existence of a family foundation, seemed equally applicable to the men and the women. However, others, such as status inconsistency, relationship to other

work, and networking capabilities, appeared variable, depending to some degree on gender.

Finally, in the last segment of this section, possible functions--both manifest and latent--of upper class volunteer work were discussed. And, while the potential validity of such a function as serving humankind could not be precluded, strong arguments presented by a number of investigators suggest that this work's latent functions may be the more significant. Thus, as was proposed in this paper's commentary on the possible functions of sample upper class women's relationship to the domestic and paid work spheres, in the volunteer sphere their roles, and those of sample upper class men as well, may serve the dual purpose of maintaining both the ideological and economic status quo. This latter perspective, which stresses the significance of the hidden functions of upper class volunteer work over that of the acknowledged functions, is, perhaps, most aptly expressed by Lundberg (1968), who states that:

In every case of a surviving foundation family group . . . the foundation has benefited its sponsors more than it has benefited the world. Whatever benefit it has wrought for the world it has wrought, too, for the family group. (p. 525)

And, further, Lundberg states that, while some may think of upper class volunteer and foundation activities as playing a "special role" in easing society's problems, instead, "they only serve at best to lubricate existing machinery" (p. 499).

## CHAPTER VI

## MONEY

As has been emphasized throughout, this dissertation has had a twofold purpose, one aspect of which has been to describe how class and gender may have been related to roles and activities at the upper class level of its sample members, and the other of which has been to suggest possible implications of these gender- and class-related roles and activities on a structural level. Thusfar, evidence drawn from an examination of the domestic, paid work, and volunteer spheres has led to two general tentative conclusions. One of these is that, although responding upper class women's roles and activities may have restricted them to an overall subordinate status and to an inferior power position, relative to responding upper class men (thereby aligning them, at least with regard to the gender hierarchy, with all women), avenues existed through which these women may, nevertheless, have exercised considerable influence, with consequences both for the public sphere, as well as for the maintenance of their own dominant class position (a circumstance which sets them quite apart from women of other classes). The second conclusion, however, is that, ironically, upper class women's continuation as members of the dominant class, may partially depend on their continued subordination relative to the men of their class.

In the following section, the foregoing descriptive and analytic components comprising this study's main purpose will be extended, and

its tentative conclusions reviewed, by examining one further arena of particular relevance. This is the arena of money, which, thusfar, has been little discussed, and which, as a key determinant of status and power under capitalism, requires closer inspection. It has already been established, of course, that all individuals interviewed for this research, largely due to their great wealth, were members of America's most prestigious and powerful class. And, while this, in itself, is an important recognition, it neither addresses nor illuminates sample members' gender-specific relationships to the sphere of wealth (and, thus, power). For this reason, it is not an adequate level of analysis for the purpose of this paper. Therefore, in this section, in order to clarify, and investigate the implications of, any such gender-based relationships, sample men's and women's differential abilities to control and manipulate their wealth will be explored. This exploration will cover the following 4 areas: terms of inheritance, financial preparation and comprehension, degree of financial participation, and wealth-related attitudes.

Of the above-listed areas, perhaps the one that is most basic to sample upper class members' abilities to control and manipulate their wealth is that of the legal terms of their inheritances. The reasons for this should be clear. First, for all sample members, inheritance reportedly constituted either a critical portion of, or the entirety of, their wealth. And, second, without legal ownership of or access to this wealth, sample members were unlikely to have much control over it. Given this, what must be determined here is whether or not gender bias, resulting in differential control over wealth,

characterized the relative terms of sample men's and women's inheritances. That such a situation obtains in American society at large has been proposed by other researchers, who claim: "It appears that sexually distinctive patterns of asset acquisition are generated from childhood on. Gifts to children tend to differ along sex lines" (Chesler & Goodman, 1976, p. 59).

In order to check the preceding proposal's relevance with regard to this study, three separate groups were examined: sample members themselves, sample members and their siblings, and sample members' children. And, for each of these groups, gender bias in asset allocation was sought in its two principal forms: differential amounts given and differential methods of transfer. In the latter instance, it should be noted, 3 main methods of transfer exist: (1) trust funds, the various forms of which may have significantly different impacts, (2) direct inheritance, and (3) periodic lifetime gifts (Osman, 1977, p. 400). Of these three main methods of transfer, direct inheritance probably gives an individual the most, and trust funds the least, immediate and direct control over assets.

Having checked Chesler's and Goodman's proposal regarding gender bias in asset acquisition against the evidence of interviewees' own statements, it appears that, on the whole, this proposal had only restricted relevance. For instance, among sample members themselves, virtually no gender differentiation was reflected in the frequencies with which sample men and women reported asset acquisition through one or the other of the above-mentioned three principal methods of inheritance transfer (and, it is, perhaps, of interest to note that,

in most cases, respondents reported receiving their inheritances according to a combination of methods). Moreover, only a small number of respondents reported the operation of intentional gender discrimination in relation to either their siblings' or their children's inheritances. Perhaps significantly, however, when, in these cases, evidence of such discrimination did appear, it always indicated a bias towards the male heir.

For example, of the 19 women with brothers, 2 (sisters) stated that the original terms of their inheritances (which they, later, persuaded their father to change) provided that the duration of their trust funds would be much longer than that of their brother, who was to receive a direct inheritance at 21 years old. And, an additional 2 women maintained that, compared to their own inheritances, those received by their brothers were substantially larger. Among the 15 men with sisters, these reports of gender discrimination were matched by two respondents who said that, although they and their sisters had received inheritances of equal value, theirs had been transferred to them directly, while their sisters' had been held in trust.

Looking at gender distinctions in the inheritance provisions of sample members' children, the reported small number of cases revealing such distinctions also appear to be male biased. These cases were each reported by responding men, among whom 11 had children of both genders. Two of these respondents admitted that the legacies left their sons would exceed those left their daughters, and one stated that his sons would acquire their inheritances at an earlier age than would his daughters.

While the above-described instances may indicate that, in this study, where gender bias regarding inheritance terms operated, it seemed to favor the heirs rather than the heiresses, nevertheless, these instances are not numerous enough to suggest a normative pattern of gender discrimination.<sup>1</sup> In fact, more general support for such a suggestion was found in only one specific arena related to sample members' inheritances. This was the arena of trust funds per se, in which differences in types of trust arrangements often signify differences in relationships to wealth. Apropos of this, the two most commonly specified trust instruments applying to sample members were those which distributed assets and those which distributed income only. Between these two trust types, the former, to a much greater extent than the latter, gives the beneficiary direct access to, and control over, trust assets. With this in mind, and by looking at Tables 42 and 43, it is evident that, relative to those affecting the men, the trust arrangements affecting women respondents tended to be more restrictive. This is reflected not only in Table 42, which displays an overall comparison of interviewed men's and women's statements regarding the nature of their trusts and shows that exclusively income-distributing trusts were more characteristic of the women, but also in Table 43, wherein, in every category, save those of interviewees under 40 years old or with less than \$1,000,000, responding women are shown to have had a higher

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<sup>1</sup>Lundberg suggests, however, that men's greater representation among heirs, compared to women, may be due to their more developed financial capabilities and their greater "staying power", as adults (1968, p. 25).

Table 42

Frequency Reported Exclusively Income-Distributing  
Trusts (by Sample Members with Trusts) by Gender

Women	43.5% (10)
Men	28.6% (6)

Table 43

Frequency Reported Exclusively Income-Distributing  
Trusts (by Sample Members with Trusts) by  
Age, Religion, and Wealth Level

		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	20.0% (1)	42.9% (3)
	≥ 40	50.0% (9)	21.4% (3)
Religion:	Jewish	38.5% (5)	25.0% (3)
	Christian	50.0% (5)	33.3% (3)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	--	--
	≥ \$1MM	50.0% (9)	35.3% (6)

frequency of reported income-distributing-only trusts than are responding men. And, it should be remarked, if exclusively income-distributing trusts were generally more characteristic of sample women, then the two exceptional cases would not seem to have any logical basis. Rather, they should probably be attributed to the problems of sampling bias. Although, in the case of the equally low association--for both men and women--between less wealth and lower incidence of income-distributing-only trusts, a probable explanation can be formulated. That is that, for those sample members in this wealth category, who did not expect future additional inheritances, the resource base was perhaps considered not large enough either to provide adequate income or to warrant safeguarding for future generations, and, therefore was allowed distribution. Such a perspective should stand in contrast to that pertaining to the sample members whose wealth was (or would become) greater.

In other words, if wealth were very great, then the trust-creator might want to protect it all (by using an income-only instrument) for future generations, or, on the other hand, he or she might feel safe in allowing distribution of some, or all, of the assets, assuming that there would still be enough wealth remaining to pass along to the future generations. Thus, while, for wealthier upper class members, type of trust arrangements may not be predictable, for those who are not so wealthy asset-distributing trusts may be more characteristic.

Before leaving the examination of Table 43, comment is due on the apparent association between religious affiliation and frequency

od reported exclusively income-distributing trusts. As the table shows, while the frequencies of such reports appear to be quite similar for the Jewish- and Christian-identified men, among the women, those who were Christian-identified appear to be somewhat more highly associated with trusts distributing income only. With regard to this finding, it does not seem likely that the differential association can be attributed to differences in religious affiliation. To what it may be attributed, however, remains unclear.

Although none of the foregoing specified cases regarding gender-based differential terms of inheritance for sample members, their siblings, or their children, is sufficient to demonstrate an existing norm of gender discrimination characterizing these individuals, the last-described of these cases (concerning sample men's and women's differential frequencies of exclusively income-distributing trusts) may indicate that a tendency towards this type of discrimination may have obtained. Allowing this, it is of interest to examine both the explicit and implicit motivations for such male-preferential treatment. In the first instance, interviewees' own rationale for differential allocation of assets according to gender contained two premises. One of these was that, since women are presumably less capable than men of handling money responsibly, longterm trust funds comprise necessary means of protecting their assets from possible mismanagement or unethical practices. The

other stated premise was that, since women will presumably marry and be financially supported by their husbands, they will not need, and, therefore, do not deserve, inheritances the values of which are equivalent to that of their male siblings, who will, presumably, have to support families of their own. Neither of these premises, of course, stands completely to reason. For, while men may have more exposure to financial matters (a topic to be readdressed, later), women are certainly not inherently less intelligent than men, and, therefore are no less capable, by nature, of responsibly overseeing their financial affairs. And, furthermore, although the majority of upper class women may marry and marry "well" (i.e., marry men who can support them in a style to which they have been accustomed), as the current research has shown, many may also marry exogamously, not marry at all, or be divorced from their husbands, and, therefore, these women, for their financial well-being, cannot necessarily depend on the supposed prosperity of their presumed spouses.

If, then, this expressed rationale, purporting to explain gender-differentiated inheritance terms, is really more of a rationalization, what might constitute a more valid--albeit not necessarily conscious--motivation? One possible answer to this question is implicit in the consequences of this gender differentiation. That is, by restricting upper class women's access to their families' fortunes, or, furthermore, by persuading both upper class women and men that men are more financially astute and deserving, the sphere of money and money-related power is maintained as a predominantly male sphere.

That access to and control over family wealth may be most fundamentally determined by terms of inheritance does not diminish the significance of the remaining specified factors in this regard. For instance in the absence of some learning, and consequent comprehension, regarding the financial sphere, no individual is likely to be equipped either to directly manage his/her own affairs, or to supervise their management by others, with any great success (barring luck). Thus, another important basis underlying any individual's ability to control and manipulate financial resources is likely to be his/her financial preparation and knowledge.

In order to see how participating men and women compared in this area, two investigative tactics were employed. First, the relative extent of financial preparation was judged based on respondents' descriptions of the degree and nature of their inside- and outside-family learning. Within the arena of family, financial training was considered to constitute any one or more of the following conditions: open and frequent discussion of family and/or general financial matters; encouragement towards financial awareness; specific instruction regarding one's own and/or general financial affairs. Outside the family, financial training resulted primarily from specific school instruction, from on-the-job exposure and experience, and/or from independent self-teaching. Second, the relative extent of interviewees' financial knowledge was judged based both on their self-characterizations in this regard, as well as on the degree to which their statements, throughout the interviews, demonstrated their clear understanding of such factors as the backgrounds to, the bases of, the stipulations

regarding, and the management philosophies and practices affecting their assets.

Concerning the question of financial preparation, existing literature on the subject reflects several somewhat disparate viewpoints. For instance, as the following citation shows, Chesler and Goodman maintain that financial instruction at the upper class level is gender-linked.

The daughters of wealth . . . may receive presents and trust funds, but are not groomed to inherit, manage, and control the family's wealth. That is their brothers' province. As a daughter and then as a wife, the "wealthy" woman . . . probably knew nothing, and was taught nothing of the business, [sic] assets, or how to manage them. (1976, p. 52)

However, in contrast to this, Thompson (1981) asserts that, regardless of gender, to assume that instruction about money is an integral part of any upper class individual's education is a fallacy (p. 61). In fact, she claims that, regarding the subject of money, people with old wealth "consider secrecy the duty of their class" (p. 240).<sup>1</sup> Added to these points of view is that of Fenichel's who, like Thompson, does not make gender distinctions, but who claims that, in class society, the subject of money is, generally, considered improper and that financial ignorance is perpetuated throughout--particularly by a school system that teaches very little about financial matters, relative to their importance in capitalist society (1954, pp. 93-94).

With regard to each of these points of view, evidence from the current investigation falls somewhere in between. On the one side,

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<sup>1</sup> Apropos of this emphasis on secrecy regarding money among the rich, Thompson gives as reasons the possibility of an IRS audit, reaction from irate stockholders, annoying solicitations, thefts and insurance problems, extortion attempts, kidnapping, sabotage, and murder attempts. (1981, pp. 299-318).

respondents' statements regarding their within-family preparation seem to partially corroborate the position of Thompson and Fenichel that neglect of financial education affects both genders: that is, even though the frequency of reported absence of within-family financial preparation was higher among responding women than men, nevertheless a large majority of both groups of interviewees gave such reports. Women, for example, commented:

My father didn't believe in having nasty little rich children. We were given 10¢ a week and then he would very goodly go shopping with us at Christmas time. It took a long time to get a dollar. . . . Money was a dirty word. You didn't talk about it. You didn't mention anything about it. You know, vulgar people asked you how much something cost.

We always got the feeling that money was a bad thing. You could talk to my father. He was very interested in Freud. . . . I mean, I didn't necessarily talk to him about sex, but that was more permissible than talking about money. Money was absolutely forbidden.

[My father] hated being a businessman, and he hated money. He really saw that the interesting people were intellectuals, and making money was an embarrassment.

We didn't get any training.

I had almost no financial training at all, and almost no preparation at all.

[After I was 21,] I was sent down to the office several times to have things explained to me. . . . The people were so technical that I really didn't understand much of what they were talking about. . . . I was always aware that I would have a lot of money, and given the impression that this was a social responsibility; never that it was a financial responsibility.

We were utterly kept in the dark about money. Utterly. I always felt that my family was on the brink of financial disaster. Disaster!

And, as can be seen by the following excerpts, men's comments were very much the same:

The one thing my mother did was to give us some sense that we had a responsibility and that we were very

fortunate. She did inculcate that, but nothing of a pragmatic nature about how to deal with [wealth]. She herself . . . was mostly at the mercy of her professional advisors and later my stepfather [and] had very little power herself over her wealth.

The whole secrecy dynamic and the maybe discomfort dynamic between my mother and father about the money led to never discussing this kind of thing openly. I mean it was almost a little bit like how you learned about sex and who told you about that. It was sort of like sitting you down and there's this nervous moment and, "Well, do you know about this and that?" I would have preferred, if there could have been more kind of casual discussion about things.

I was still on an allowance until about age 23 or 24, until I realized there were pre-existing trust funds that were providing an income flow and that I didn't have to sort of go knocking on the door all the time for hand-outs.

I had to account for every penny of my allowance, and I had to work up a monthly budget. This is up to about age 18 or so. And, there was none of this coaching and preparation for a lot of money. . . . And, finally, I got impatient and annoyed and said, "I want to see every document that relates to me in this office." And, it was like pulling teeth to get it. . . . [I was] 26 or 27.

I was told nothing until I was 21. And, I was so stupid that I didn't realize that one had money. I thought everybody lived in a house with 12 in staff and so forth.

My mother was the primarily dominant force in my life, and finances made her nervous, and she didn't like to talk about it. She thought it was in bad taste anyway, and she certainly made me feel it was in bad taste, and to talk about money was really inexcusable. Unpardonable to discuss money.

In all, reports similar to those cited above were made by 87.5% (21) of the (24) responding sample women and 69.6% of the sample men. However, while it can be concluded from these percentages that lack of within-family financial preparation was characteristic-- albeit somewhat differentially--of both the men and the women, it should be noted that differences in age and levels of wealth

(although not in religions) did seem to affect the frequencies associated with reports of such preparation. These differential associations, according to age and wealth level, may be examined in Table 44. As can be seen from the table, in this study, for both men and women, younger age and less wealth (which were themselves highly correlated) were more highly associated with within-family financial preparation than were older age and greater wealth. And, while there appears to be no clear explanation for the association found between younger age and more preparation (unless it reflects either the effect of the overlap between young age and less wealth or some recent shift in attitudes concerning money as a topic of conversation), it is possible to formulate an explanation for the association between less wealth and greater preparation. In this case, it seems quite plausible that the higher frequency of financial preparation is a reflection of the greater concern among the less wealthy regarding methods of wealth maintenance.

To return to the main point, however, what the data on within-family financial preparation indicate is that, although interviewed men reported a somewhat greater degree of such preparation than did interviewed women, nevertheless, a majority of both the men and the women repeated what the preceding citations reveal: that by the time they were 18 years old, these respondents had been provided with absolutely, or virtually, no information from their families regarding financial matters; and, for those for whom this lack of preparation was not absolute, financial exposure often took the form of simply receiving an allowance or being taught family values concerning

Table 44

Frequency Reported Within-Family Financial  
Preparation by Age and Wealth Level

		Women	Age
Age:	< 40	33.3% (2)	50.0% (4)
	≥ 40	5.6% (1)	20.0% (3)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	40.0% (2)	100.0% (2)
	≥ \$1MM	5.9% (1)	16.7% (3)

philanthropic responsibilities--hardly adequate procedures to equip an individual for clear comprehension of, and active participation in, his or her financial affairs.

Thus, to a certain extent, this study's findings corroborate the above-mentioned views of Thompson and Fenichel, who content that the absence of financial preparation is prevalent regardless of gender. On the other side, however, are data from the present investigation that appear to support Chesler's and Goodman's perspective that upper class financial preparation is gender-linked. Not only has this just been seen, to a degree, in the data on within-family preparation, wherein a somewhat greater proportion of sample men than women seemed to receive this kind of financial preparation, but, further, it can be seen in data based on respondents' reports of their outside-family financial learning. As Table 45 demonstrates, it is in this arena that the men's experience seemed to greatly exceed that of the women. What the table shows is that, compared to the 38.1% (8) of the responding (21) women, 90% (18) of the responding men stated that they had received outside-family financial training as adults. This training was the result either of their own initiatives, formal education, and/or related occupational experiences. Thus, while, as minors, both sample men and women may have been generally limited in their exposure to financial concepts, after reaching adulthood, gender differences regarding this kind of exposure appeared to increase, where, relative to the women, the men disproportionately acquired training that could enable them to knowledgeably oversee the management of their finances.

Table 45

Frequency Reported Outside-Family Financial  
Preparation by Gender

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Women	38.1% (8)
Men	90.0% (18)

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Table 46

Frequency Reported Outside-Family Financial Preparation  
by Age, Religion, and Wealth Level

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		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	66.7% (4)	80.0% (4)
	≥ 40	26.7% (4)	93.3% (14)
Religion:	Jewish	25.0% (3)	100.0% (11)
	Christian	55.6% (5)	77.8% (7)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	50.0% (2)	NI
	≥ \$1MM	40.0% (6)	88.9% (16)

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Carrying the analysis of the possible bases of sample members' differential financial preparation a bit farther, although gender seems to have been a critical factor, it is of interest to examine other possible factors as well. With regard to this, Table 46 (p. 220) displays the way in which differences in age, religion, and level of wealth may have differentially affected the frequencies with which sample members reported exposure to outside-family financial preparation.

In looking at the percentages associated with distinct age categories, what most stands out is that a larger proportion of the younger, than of the older, women reported receiving outside-family financial preparation and that this age-associated differentiation is the reverse of that found among the men. While this gender contrast in age-associated frequencies may at first seem incongruous, it should be pointed out that, to the contrary, it is consistent with the earlier-noted finding that business occupations were more highly associated with younger age among interviewed women and older age among interviewed men (a finding which, it was suggested, may have been linked to current social trends as well as to the greater likelihood of tradition-breaking behaviors and activities among the young). Moreover, an awareness regarding these findings makes more comprehensible those that are reflected in the data on the association between differential religious affiliations and frequency of reported outside-family financial preparation. From these data, it can be seen that the frequency of such reports was higher among Christian-identified women than among Jewish-identified women, and among

Jewish-identified men than among Christian-identified men. It is unlikely, however, that these differential associations can be attributed to distinctions inhering between the religious affiliations themselves. Rather, the more likely explanation of these somewhat contradictory frequencies is that they are a result of the fact that Christian-identified sample men and women were characterized by a relatively higher proportion of individuals under 40 years old than were Jewish-identified sample men and women. This, then, would account for the finding that Christian-identified women had a relatively higher, and Christian-identified men a relatively lower, frequency of reported exposure to outside-family financial preparation.

Turning, briefly, to an examination of level of wealth as a factor possibly related to differential frequencies of reported outside-family financial training, the table shows that, in the case of interviewed men, insufficient data were available on which to base a judgement. However, in the case of the women, an association--although not great--does appear between less wealth and higher frequency of such reports. And, while it might be proposed that this association could result from a greater concern among the less wealthy to know enough about their finances to be able to safeguard against loss, this proposition would seem equally applicable to those who are wealthier (and, furthermore, it should be recalled that some of those among the less wealthy sample members expected to receive additional future inheritances). Thus, a more likely interpretation of the exhibited association is, again, that it follows from the previously-noted association between young age (which is, itself,

associated with less wealth) and exposure to the business sphere, among sample women.

Before leaving this topic of financial preparation, two questions should be addressed. First, considering the central importance of wealth in sample members' lives, what might account for the reported within-family inhibitions regarding open discussion of money?<sup>1</sup> And, second, why, as adults, did sample women seem to fall behind sample men in learning about the sphere of money? To this second question a probable answer is not difficult to formulate. Given that the business and financial spheres have long been male-dominated and female-restricted, it is not surprising that participating upper class women infrequently pursued learning about them: not only had they been taught, but they had observed and experienced, that women are not welcome as active participants in the financial arena. The reverse, of course, was the case for participating upper class men. To the first question, however, an answer is not so readily apparent, and should, perhaps, be sought in both psychological and systemic factors. On the psychological side, it may have been, as most respondents pointed out, that the guilt associated with inherited wealth served as an inhibiting factor, making the discussion of one's unearned fortune--in light of widespread economic hardship for others--an embarrassment. On the other side, however, the psychological impediments to straightforward treatment of the topic of money could

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<sup>1</sup>Those claiming that the topic of money, per se, was never, or very rarely, discussed at home included 95.7% (22) of the 23 responding women, and 75% (15) of the 20 responding men.

be connected to systemic conditions. This point has been made by Fenichel, who contends that

The general characterization of money matters as "indelicate" must fulfill a special function in the social ideology. This function must be a negative one: ignorance about financial matters and the effort to repress them . . . lead to illusion about the true state of affairs in this field . . ., and thus belongs to those . . . expedients for maintaining the present-day class relationships. (1954, p. 94)

And, while Fenichel may not have had the upper class in mind when he made his comments, they, nevertheless, are not irrelevant at this class level. After all, from an ethical standpoint, how much less troublesome it must be for many upper class members themselves, if they can avoid clear recognition of harsh realities inherent in the capitalist economic system, to the maintenance of which they may contribute and from which they may disproportionately benefit.

Furthermore, Fenichel's comments might equally apply to the maintenance of present-day gender relationships at the upper class level. In particular, the less aware upper class women are about the sphere of money, the less likely it is that they will challenge the men, who usually end up managing their financial affairs.

Turning, now to the subject of interviewees' comprehension with regard to the sphere of money, it should follow that those having had broader financial preparation and experience would be those reporting and demonstrating greater knowledge about this area. And, in fact, in the present study, this appears to have been the case. Based on respondents' ability to provide clear factual information regarding their financial affairs, as well as on their own estimation

of their financial aptitude, research data show that, compared to 42.3% (11) of the responding women, 91.3% (21) of the responding men felt they had--and appeared to have had--a confident and solid understanding of this area, enabling them to advisedly monitor and direct their personal financial affairs. And, while the frequencies with which men and women indicated having an understanding of the financial sphere did not appear to vary according to distinctions in religious affiliations, as Table 47 shows, among the women, these frequencies were more highly associated with younger age, and, among the men, they were more highly associated with greater wealth. With regard to the latter case, however, because among the men, only two individuals constituted the under \$1,000,000 category, the fact that this category was less associated with financial comprehension should probably be interpreted as nothing more than a consequence of small cell size. This is particularly true, considering that, with regard to the women, data show different levels of wealth not to have been particularly differentially associated with indicated financial comprehension. In fact, if any interpretation of the exhibited association could be considered plausible, it would be one that attributed less wealthy sample men's lower frequency of indicated financial comprehension to the fact that the two men in this category were each under 30 years old and, therefore, had probably had relatively less exposure to the financial sphere, and to financial concepts, than had their older counterparts. However, this interpretation is itself contradicted by the additional data in the table, which show that, among the men, age is not (or is hardly) associated

Table 47

Frequency Reported Comprehension Regarding  
Financial Matters by Age and Wealth Level

		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	83.3% (5)	87.5% (7)
	<u>≥</u> 40	30.0% (6)	93.3% (14)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	40.0% (2)	50.0% (1)
	<u>≥</u> \$1MM	47.4% (9)	94.4% (17)

with differential frequencies of indicated financial comprehension, while, among the women, such frequencies are more highly associated with younger age. And, apropos of this last-mentioned finding, by way of explanation it need only be reiterated that it was among the younger, as opposed to the older, sample women that a relatively high proportion had pursued occupations in the business domain.

Complementing the above-presented data on gender-differentiated frequencies characterizing sample members' indicated financial comprehension is further research evidence regarding the differential degree to which these men and women displayed minimal or no understanding of money-related matters. With regard to interviewed women, evidence indicates that 26.9% (7) seemed to have virtually no grasp of the circumstances affecting their finances, while 30.8% (8) had some general, but hazy or confused, conceptualization. By contrast, in the case of interviewed men, the proportion in each instance was only 4.3% (1 individual). What this evidence, and that on financial preparation, suggest is that, even if sample men and women could be said to have had identical legal access to their inherited assets, because of their gender-associated differential abilities to comprehend the financial sphere (based on differential access to financial learning) the women would still lag well behind the men in their ability to take charge of, and to successfully guide, their own wealth-related affairs.

Apropos of this, it is of interest to examine a third dimension relevant to interviewees' differential control over wealth: that of their active participation in the management of their financial affairs.

For the purposes of this investigation, such participation was considered to include the following activities: selecting advisors; buy and sell decisionmaking regarding investments; meeting several times per year with financial advisors to review one's financial status and investment portfolio; establishing investment guidelines or targets; reading carefully key reports related to one's financial affairs. It was presumed that interviewees' active participation in any of these activities was an indication of their actual or potential ability to handle and guide their own wealth-related affairs. And, the greater number of these activities in which sample members' were involved, the greater their ability was judged to be. Conversely, in this investigation, the sample members who appeared least capable of directing their financial affairs were those who rarely met with advisors, made no investment decisions themselves, had their money managers chosen by others, and never, or rarely, read their financial reports.

Although information collected on sample members' reading of their important financial documents was inadequate, that collected on the other several dimensions was sufficient to lend support to Domhoff's claim that "the American upper class is based upon large corporate wealth that is looked after by male members of the . . . families that are its basis" (1970, p. 56), as well as to Chesler's and Goodman's further assertions that

What women own is generally in name only. They do not control the money. Women do not make the decisions regarding the buying, selling, or trading of stocks and bonds. . . . At best, they are corporate "dummies." . . . Money managers are not women. . . . Men . . . make the decisions, sales, purchases, and the money. (1976, p. 51)

and that

Male lawyers, male accountants, male stockbrokers, male money managers decide how to put "her" money into various corporations, funds, bonds, mortgages-- also controlled by men. (p. 52)

The researchers' points in the above comments are that, as opposed to men, upon whom they must rely, women do not demonstrate control over their own financial resources. The present research upholds these views in part, by revealing that, relative to the men, women participants appeared less active in handling and supervising their financial affairs (that this was so was usually a matter of choice and may have been a reflection of the women's lesser confidence and ease regarding the financial domain, due to their inferior experience in, and comprehension of, this field). This is documented in Table 48.

As can be seen from the table, in none of the specified areas did women's reported participation reach 50%. In fact, in all but "selection of financial advisors," it was substantially lower, with no respondents reporting involvement in "buy/sell investment decisions". This contrasts quite sharply with the case of the responding men, where, in every area but that of "buy/sell decisionmaking," over 50% reported active involvement. And, while just 40% of the responding men claimed to be directly involved in personal investment decisions, this, on the one hand, is not such a small proportion, and, on the other, is a substantially larger proportion than that demonstrated by the women.

In all, participation in at least one of the above-listed areas of financial management was indicated by 50% (13) of the interviewed women and 78.3% (18) of the interviewed men. And, on examination of

Table 48

## Frequency Participation in Financial Management by Gender

	Women	Men
Selects own financial advisors	42.9% (9)	78.9% (15)
Several meetings/year with advisors	23.8% (5)	57.9% (11)
Sets own investment guidelines	18.2% (4)	72.2% (13)
Makes buy/sell decisions	--	40.0% (8)

Table 49

Frequency Indicated Participation in Financial Management  
by Age, Religion, and Wealth Level

		Women	Men
Age:	< 40	83.3% (5)	50.0% (4)
	≥ 40	40.0% (8)	93.3% (14)
Religion:	Jewish	46.7% (7)	84.6% (11)
	Christian	54.5% (6)	70.0% (7)
Wealth Level:	< \$1MM	60.0% (3)	50.0% (1)
	≥ \$1MM	52.6% (10)	83.3% (15)

the degree to which the frequencies of indicated participation may have varied, according to such factors as differential age, religion, and level of wealth, it is evident not only that such variations occur, but also that those associated with the men are diametrically opposite those associated with the women. This is demonstrated in Table 49 (p. 231).

As can be seen in the table, younger age for the women, but older age for the men, is more highly associated with indicated participation in financial management. With regard to this, while it might reasonably be assumed that, due to its frequent connection to greater experience, older age should be more highly associated with such participation, in this type of instance and in the case of the women, such an assumption cannot be said to apply. This is because--as noted in several previous instances--in the present investigation, younger, rather than older, upper class women exhibited a higher frequency of exposure (through their occupations) to the realm of business, a finding that was both connected to a recent labor force re-entry trend among women and tentatively attributed--at least in part--to the tendency towards "nontraditional" actions on the part of the young. Moreover, as has been suggested in the preceding discussion, it is likely that this kind of disproportionate exposure to the business world provided younger sample women with a relatively greater understanding of financial matters, which, in turn, would have better enabled them to take part in the management of their own financial affairs. This, then, may explain why, among responding women, young age appears in association with greater frequency of indicated participation in financial management. In the case of men, however, because reported occupation-related

exposure to the business world was associated more with older, rather than younger, age, the findings regarding the frequencies with which interviewed men indicated financial management participation run counter to those characterizing interviewed women. That is, whereas, among the women 50% (3) of those who were under 40 years old, and 5% (1) of those who were at least 40 years old, reported primary occupations in the field of business, among the men, none of those in the younger age category, and 60% (9) of those in the older, reported such primary occupations. Thus, these contrasting experiences may largely account for the discrepancies exhibited in the frequencies with which sample men and women, in identical age categories, indicated financial management participation.

Furthermore, these same age-associated discrepancies may also provide the key to understanding the differential frequencies appearing in association with distinct religious affiliations and levels of wealth. In the first case, the fact that a slightly higher proportion of Christian-identified, than Jewish-identified, women were associated with indicated participation in financial management is probably attributable to the higher proportion of young sample women found among those who were Christian-identified. Conversely, compared to that characterizing Christian-identified men, the greater association exhibited between Jewish-identified men and indicated participation in financial management can probably be largely attributed to the fact that a higher proportion of the latter than of the former interviewees belonged to the older age category. In the second case--that of differential frequencies based on distinct levels of wealth--it can

be seen that the influence of age is consistent with that shown in the above instances. Again, among the women, the wealth category most associated with younger age (i.e., under \$1,000,000) is shown to be more highly associated with indicated participation in financial management than is the category associated with older age (i.e., at least \$1,000,000). And, in the case of the men, the opposite continues to obtain: as the table shows, the frequency of indicated participation in financial management is higher for the wealthier—and relatively older—sample men than it is for those who were less wealthy and relatively younger. Thus, it appears that, although Table 49 exhibits frequencies of indicated participation in financial management which vary according to distinctions in age, religion, and level of wealth, it is, nevertheless, probable that it is only the first of these factors which is of significance in accounting for the differential frequencies displayed.

Having now considered the possible influence of other factors on the frequency with which sample members indicated participation in financial management, it should be reiterated that the main point emerging from the above data is that, by and large, by virtue of their overall greater degree of active involvement in money management, sample men were likely to have practiced a corresponding greater degree of personal financial control than were sample women. What has not yet been brought out, however, and what should be at least briefly discussed here, in light of Chesler and Goodman's comments, is the degree to which "male accountants, male stockbrokers, [and] male money managers" figured more prominently in the oversight of sample women's

affairs than they did in those of sample men. For, what seems implicit in the writing of these authors is that dependence on the (male) money manager is a female, not male, characteristic, and one which can partly explain women's powerlessness in the sphere of money. With regard to this position, it should be pointed out that there was not one individual interviewed for this study—including those who were themselves investment managers—who did not rely on some amount and kind of financial counsel for the running of their affairs. That this counsel was almost entirely male—as Chesler and Goodman would maintain—cannot be disputed. However, what should be added to their comments, at least in the case of this study, is that not only wealthy women, but wealthy men as well, depended heavily on more expert (male) others for the management of "their" wealth. This dependence, for most interviewees, existed, despite their successes in keeping informed about or actively supervising their accounts. Thus, regarding this, in the current study, the question of control over finances did not seem one of whether or not an individual looked to male advisors for guidance, but rather a matter of an individual's maintaining an informed and active position in relation to these advisors. And, in the absence of such a position, it is likely that the individual wealthholder would relinquish much of his/her power potential to the decisionmaking personnel in charge of his/her affairs.<sup>1</sup> This case was well-put by one of the interviewed women,

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<sup>1</sup>How the absence of such a position may affect women particularly was stated in an article by Lewin (1982), who maintains that "many . . . women are entirely dependent upon their money managers' advice--and entirely vulnerable if that advice is bad" (p. D4).

who stated:

My father's cousin . . . took care of my affairs. . . . Even after all the trusts were over, he continued to manage my affairs. By that, I mean he was the one who looked over my account and decided whether it was doing all right and made investments for me. . . . In return, I think he liked it because it gave him power. . . . After he died or toward the end of his life, when I felt that I had to become more active, I discovered what he did was . . . just what I'm doing now. He went to an expert and the expert decided [where to invest]. Then he'd approve it. Now, as I look back, I can see that I could have done that, maybe not as well as he, but well enough, and [I could have] learned that way. It's too bad that I didn't take the initiative myself or ask someone how I could have managed my own affairs without having to do every single thing myself.

Where responding men and women differed, then, in terms of their financial control, was not so much in the extent to which they relied on the technical advice of others, but in the degree to which they actively monitored and directed these advisors. And, as the data have shown, among research participants, such active involvement seemed far more characteristic of the men than of the women.

There is, perhaps, one further aspect of financial participation that should be considered, before leaving the subject. This is the previously alluded to area of financial contributions, an area in which sample members' active participation indicated not only a degree of manipulation and control over their money, but also a disproportionate influence on public institutions and affairs. Regarding this latter derivative of financial contributions, some research support has already been presented. However, to this earlier research corroboration, further claims can be added. For example, Thompson's research led her to state that a "soft heart is not the

prime impulse driving your average philanthropist to give millions away to charitable causes." Rather, she found that a primary motivation underlying such contributions was the "desire to take maximum advantage of tax laws," which, at the time of her writing, allowed one to deduct up to 50% of one's income for charitable contributions and up to 30% of one's gross adjusted income for "in-kind" gifts (stocks, art, etc.). And, as Thompson correctly notes, the benefit of these kinds of tax laws is that the philanthropist can use his/her money to influence particular causes, rather than giving the government this option (1981, p. 259). Joining Thompson in the view that upper class financial donations have systemic effects is Lundberg (1968, pp. 466, 468), who makes two claims in this regard. First, he states that, because upper class philanthropic contributions give the impression that these individuals are relinquishing their fortunes, the "unsophisticated population" does not perceive that the wealthy constitute "a serious factor of power in the social system," and, hence, is unlikely to direct an attack against that factor in an effort to promote systemic structural change. Second, Lundberg, as the following citation shows, asserts that upper class contributions serve to keep the have-nots submissive and tractable.

By making serial gifts each year . . . the donor can keep prospective worthy recipients sitting around forever. . . . In such an arrangement, prospective institutional recipients are not likely to voice unwelcome socio-economic ideas. . . . The general foundations, then, with their serial gifts, function pretty much as a carrot, rewarding those who are cooperative and constructive, and passing over the unworthy, the carping, the critical. (p. 519)

Returning, however, to the subject of interviewees' financial control and manipulation, it is interesting to note that, unlike the other aspects of participation in financial affairs, and unlike the areas of differential inheritance terms and differential financial preparation and knowledge, the sphere of monetary contributions was the one examined money-related area in this investigation in which participating men's and women's activity appeared fundamentally on a par. That is, where charitable donations were concerned, 100% of the women and 95.7% (22) of the men stated that they made yearly gifts (and, the one interviewee who did not report this, was in his early 20s and had just begun to make charitable donations the previous year). Moreover, among the 25 women and 20 men who indicated the level of their donations, 60% in each case (15 and 12, respectively) indicated that these donations were always at least at the maximum tax deductible level (and sometimes higher). In contrast to these individuals, the remaining interviewees reported gifts either below the maximum allowable or of varying amounts from year to year. The point of mentioning these findings regarding sample members' philanthropy is not to show or extol their apparent great generosity and altruism (characteristics in regard to which doubts have already been raised), but rather to stress that, at least with regard to this one money-related area, responding women equalled responding men, not only in their level of participation, but also, by implication, in their potential to impact on the public domain.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The validity of this statement, of course, depends largely on an assumption that these men and women had roughly equal amounts of money at their disposal.

Having thus far reviewed the apparent effects of inheritance terms, financial preparation and comprehension, and degree of financial participation on sample members' ability to control and manipulate their wealth, the relevance of the fourth area--wealth-related attitudes--shall be examined. Before proceeding with this discussion, however, a caveat is in order: that is, unlike the three preceding areas, because this fourth exclusively concerns interviewees' emotions related to their wealth, conclusions as to the impact of such emotions is merely speculative. Nevertheless, in this study, to the extent that research participants reported having personally experienced emotional problems associated with their affluence, it was assumed that such problems constituted psychological impediments which partially limited those participants' full awareness about, and oversight regarding, their financial affairs. Furthermore, the reverse was also assumed: that those individuals not reporting personal problems regarding their money, were more likely to actively participate in, and direct the management of, their affairs.

While the following discussion will focus only on interviewees' expressed wealth-related emotional difficulties, it should be noted at the outset that all sample members, including those reporting problems, recognized their financial privilege to be an enormous life advantage--at least from the economic standpoint. Nevertheless, given this recognition, by their statements most interviewees also indicated that, on a psychological level, inheriting great wealth can promote a number of emotional problems having significant unproductive behavioral

consequences.<sup>1</sup> That this was felt to be the case was asserted by 60.9% (14) of the sample men and 92.3% (24) of the sample women. However, in terms of reporting personally experienced affective problems regarding wealth, although the proportions of both sample men and women remained high, and that of the women remained unchanged, the proportion of sample men decreased somewhat to 47.8% (11 men). An explanation for this apparently gender-associated wide gap in sample members' reporting of felt psychological problems due to their inherited wealth may be found in the differential relationships of men and women to power under capitalism. Because under capitalism not only are wealth and power equated, but also--due to gender hierarchy--women, relative to men, have, and are expected to have, inferior relationships to power, rich women, as mentioned earlier, find themselves in an awkward and conflictive position. Because of their money, their potential for power exceeds that of most men and resembles that of rich men, placing them, because of their gender, in a situation of status incongruity. This predicament, then, could be the basis for, and lead to, the kind of gender-differentiated incidence in experienced wealth-related emotional problems which this study has

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<sup>1</sup>This view is upheld by Thompson's (1981) research findings. Thompson distinguishes between the "self-made" wealthy and those who are heirs and heiresses. Among the former, she found attitudes regarding money to be enthusiastic. But, among the latter, money was seen "as a symbol of inferiority, a gnawing reminder that daddy or granddaddy was the dynamo" (p. 15). Thompson concluded that, among the wealthy, the "second generation often feels totally inadequate" (p. 75). And, while the present research supports this view, it should be reiterated that the extent is unknown to which such money-related emotional difficulties may, or may not, be representative of the universe of upper class Americans.

found and which seems to indicate that, relative to interviewed men, interviewed women had more difficulty feeling comfortable about, and taking charge of, their financial resources.

Moreover, this proposition--that the higher frequency of interviewed women's reported wealth-related problems may have been an outgrowth of the relatively greater conflict existing between certain dimensions of their status (i.e., gender and wealth)--is lent additional support from further research data which show that, among the men (but not the women), the frequencies with which problems regarding wealth were reported varied according to differences in age categories (it should be noted, however, that such variations did not obtain with regard to either the men or the women according to distinctions in religious affiliations or wealth levels). That is, as Table 50 indicates, among responding men, while 100% (8) of those

Table 50

Frequency of Reported Wealth-Related Problems  
Among Men by Age

< 40	100.0% (8)
≥ 40	81.8% (9)

who were under 40 years old reported experiencing problems associated with being wealthy, this was true of just 81.8% (9) of those (11) who provided information and were at least 40 years old. What this finding indicates is that, as for the women generally, for the younger sample men as well, felt discomfort regarding financial privilege was

probably conditioned by their relatively greater degree of status inconsistency. That is, as was proposed earlier, because young age is often associated with inferior status and power, the status dimensions characterizing young sample upper class men were likely to demonstrate more internal conflict than were those characterizing older sample upper class men. And, as a result--and, as data concerning the present research sample indicate--this greater degree of conflict may have conditioned and promoted an age-related differential degree of experienced wealth-associated problems among these men. However, unlike for sample upper class women, among whom gender-related status inconsistency and its associated problems are probably permanent lifelong features, for sample upper class men, such inconsistency and problems probably decrease, over time, with age.

Turning to the nature of the affluence-related problems specified by this investigation's participants, a survey of such problems reveals the existence of a minimum of 12 different categories, at least 5 of which appear to be symptomatic of these individuals' underlying feelings of guilt and unworthiness due to their disproportionate financial privilege and 7 of which seem based on an assumption that inherited wealth is an inherently negative life force.<sup>1</sup> Of these latter, 1 category was mentioned by women respondents only, and, therefore, may have been more associated with the women than with the

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<sup>1</sup>It should be noted that guilt, itself, is a special case of inherited wealth's potential negative consequences. Moreover, although 12 problem categories were formulated from sample members' statements, it should also be emphasized that these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

men. Listed below, and divided among their three classificatory areas (i.e., "money and guilt," "money as negative," and "money and women"), is each of the problem categories indicated by interview respondents, as well as examples of the comments that reflected these felt problems.

### Money and Guilt

#### General Guilt and Feeling Undeserving

I grew up in a very political household, but also very much conscious of our status in the world and our money. My father was very involved with . . . people who really believed in human rights and didn't just talk about it. So, I got to see and experience and talk with my parents about a lot of the real deprivation that existed, and it really impacted on me. So . . ., I spent a lot of time . . . feeling very guilty about our situation. . . . And, I kind of have seen myself as being somewhat displaced in our society.

Being wealthy has been a real burden for me. I mean, throughout my life, there's been a real guilt hanging over my head. . . . It's very difficult to feel like you deserve anything in the world, when you've been given everything in the world. So, there's just a certain amount of alientation.

I . . . had taken some economics courses and was about to inherit a lot of money and was flipping out over that and feeling very confused about it. And, I had somewhat of an analysis about capitalism and imperialism and where the wealth in this country came from and how it was used. . . . I began to feel guilty and felt I had an obligation to do something about it. . . . I'm undeserving. That's been there so often and so much of the time--that I don't deserve anything for me, because I already had it all.

#### Anti-Upper Class, -Business, or -Money Attitudes

I think it's really awful that we have so much wealth.

In grade school . . . , the only time my parents . . . took me anywhere was to meet people . . . at the local country club. And, dancing class. . . . And they were all rich jerks.

I don't like rich people very much. . . . The other night [my parents] had a cocktail party. They have moved . . . to . . . [a] very different economic location. It's big money. . . . These people--I mean, I have never been so repulsed in all my life. I mean, they are just the most disgusting group of people I have ever seen.

I haven't done anything about learning about [my money]. I have a horror of it. I don't like to deal with it.

I hate the business world, in a nutshell.

A lot of values . . . that have been passed down from one affluent generation to another and trust fund mentality, I've rejected. . . . [I] think, "Please preserve me from ever having raised a bunch of kids with Park Avenue mentality." They just can't have this mentality.

I respect the arts and . . . pursuits of the mind, more than I do crass commercialism.

### Guilt About Spending Money

I really have the idea that my father worked in a bank all of his life just to pass on as many pennies as he could to his children, which, of course, gave me a great deal of guilt about spending money.

I love living here. That was something that took me a while to do--to be able to spend money on myself without being mortified about it. It took a long time. I remember my college roommate . . . , when he walked in this apartment, his first reaction was, "Well, thank God. You finally stopped living in the dumps."

I would spend the money in ways that didn't show easily. If I was dating, I would go out to dinner and theater, which a lot of people couldn't afford to do, but I would still live in a relatively small apartment. It was a major thing for me, when I moved out of three rooms into five rooms into which the sun occasionally shone.

One day I wanted a coat, and I thought I'd get a fur coat. I tried on a mink coat, and it was absolutely

delicious. By this time I was 39 years old. And, I said, "Oh, it's just beautiful, but I can't have it. . . . I can't go around in a mink coat. . . . I do all this work for the community. I go to visit hospitals. How can I do that in a mink coat?" . . . Well, I didn't buy it. I just couldn't buy it. This is a hang-up. This is what I call a hang-up.

I am interested in writing. I'm interested in photography a lot. Both of these are areas where I feel . . . were certain things to resolve in my life, that I might be able to spend a lot more time doing that. . . . I don't feel that I have a creative outlet in my life right now, and that's been kind of frustrating for awhile. But, again, it's tied up to photography being an extravagance and writing being something that is very self-centered. . . . So this still is an incredible . . . weight . . . : what I should do, and what I'm allowed to do, and what I allow myself to do.

I don't think I even buy groceries without thinking about the amount of money I'm spending and whether I should or shouldn't spend it. What I have on is about the extent of my wardrobe. I mean, I really have a hard time spending money.

### Investment Ethics

I would like to begin to find investments in which my money can help towards building the kind of society that I want to live in. And, of the companies that I'm invested in right now, they're doing all kinds of wonderful things [such as] polluting the environment. [laughter] . . . I say [to my advisors], "Look, you can have this much for the kinds of investment that you want to make, which is rape the earth, and I want an equivalent amount that you must find investments for which will not rape the earth, but return to the earth resources."

### Disentitlement

One of the biggest problems . . . is that it's all been like magic. It's like somebody . . . is sitting up there. When I wanted \$10,000, I'd call the office, and \$10,000 appeared. It's totally unreal, and that is a terrible way to handle money.

[Receiving my inheritance] pushed me to . . . lay out for my parents how I felt about the money, . . . saying

that I didn't really believe that it was mine, that I didn't feel I could use it to my own advantage. . . . I tried to fit it all into a nice little package that said, "This is what I can't do and this is what I can do, and this is what I have to do, because I am from this background." And, "I can't go on fancy vacations with you. I can't have certain kinds of extravagances. I can't take advantage of my background in any way, or else I'm contradicting myself, because I really believe that society should be different." . . . It was very troublesome.

I assumed that the money should, would, go back to the family . . . , because it was from the family, and I didn't think I had . . . right[s].

It . . . began to seem sort of stupid that [my money] was being managed, and I did not feel that it was mine. . . . I sort of felt like I had to call up when I needed money for something. I would feel as if I were borrowing it from them.

### Money as Negative

#### Money as Generally Burdensome or Problematic

I think we would like [our children] . . . to know that there are some problems of having [money]. While it's obviously an advantage, in many ways it's also a burden. . . . It's something that we struggle with.

Among students in the particular college that I teach at . . . the number . . . that I run into that are really messed up from coming from wealthy backgrounds is incredible. I find it hard to believe that people from other classes could be messed up in as great a ratio, compared to the . . . people from wealthy backgrounds. It's just incredible the proportions of people. The likelihood of coming from unstable family life and . . . neurotic . . . types of situations seems to be higher if you happen to be born into wealth and, therefore, makes the achievement of your goals also more difficult.

My father has written his will, dispersing everything. Other than what we have at the moment, we will get nothing more, which just is "what a relief!"

I would prefer not to pass money on at all. It's been such a burden and so horrific a thing.

Money is a very serious, and sometimes a very sad situation.

### Money as a Basis for Social Rejection

I always . . . used to worry about . . . my money--the effect it would have on other people and being scared of people who were coming on because of my money . . . or who hated me because of my money. . . . I learned to be nervous about my money because people didn't like me . . . my mother died when I was in boarding school and . . . the local sheriff had to come serve me with a . . . warrant, saying how much I was getting. . . . This was at the tender age of 15. And, so, I went around . . . the school [to] . . . my friends, [saying], "Oh gee, I'm getting \$400,000." And, they said, "Well, f--- you." And, so, that was the first time I really learned that I was not to talk about it.

I'd say it's much harder to come out about your money than it is about your sexuality. . . . Money is even more scary to people than sex. . . . I think, in many cases, it's . . . easier to spring the fact of being gay upon people than of having a lot of money.

I didn't want to look rich . . . . And, I can remember one of the most embarrassing incidents for me was going to college my first time . . . and the chauffeur driving me up, and my saying to him, "Listen, . . . you pretend like you're my father," because I couldn't stand the embarrassment.

When I was in 10th grade . . . we would be driven to school in a Lincoln car with chauffeur, complete with hat. And, we were in the back . . . and that was an absolute misery. . . . Most of [my classmates] were . . . poor kids and professional families' kids. . . . And, if they weren't poor, they damn well tried to be. I mean so did we. We wore our baggiest jeans, but there we were stuck with driving in this damn car. So, we insisted on getting out at the top of the hill . . . and walking to school--the rest [of the students] were out of sight. And, I remember dying, when my mother came to school one day in a fur coat, and that was agony.

Everybody in the school had jobs, . . . and I was doing the clean-up one day after lunch, and I guess I . . . [did] a sort of sloppy clean-up job, and one of these smart-ass young leftist kids . . . came over and

sneered at me and said, "Rich kid!" And, that really threw me for quite a loop.

### Money Undercuts Motivation and Sense of Purpose

Knowing that security blanket . . . was there has perhaps been negative as far as cultivating that kind of competitive, fighting, ambitious spirit in me. . . . I [wish] I had had more professional experience under my belt before stopping [work]. [If I weren't wealthy] . . . I would have gotten it, because I would have felt pressured, monetarily speaking. That pressure isn't particularly pleasant, but the reward is that you end up getting the benefits of doing work that you had to do to support yourself.

I feel very sorry for my grandsons . . . and for my son, too. They're having such a terrible time finding themselves, and finding their niche in the world. I think money is a big handicap there.

I do think that having money makes life easier and pleasanter in many ways. What it does to one's motivation, that's another question. . . . I think that it may be difficult to give people the same push or motivation, if they feel secure.

I think the money that was given to me was definitely a double-edged sword. I think I would never, never, never say that I wasn't very very fortunate to have that, and I would love to be able to have my children have it, but, on the other hand, it's a buffer that I think sometimes keeps you from moving ahead. . . . I might have developed more personal ambition, if I hadn't been given so much.

My experience . . . is that inheritance of large amounts of money is a disaster, that there's much more harm than good, . . . because it makes it unnecessary for you to devote yourself to anything. It gives you, when you are too young, too much feeling of choice. It leaves you in a position where you're not compelled to become an expert in anything, and that kind of person usually ends up as a pretty useless kind of individual. . . . The more you leave, and the further down the line these trusts go on-- these are things that create disasters. . . . When you get to a point where [a person] doesn't have to earn a living, there are very few cases where that has worked out so that it doesn't do him harm.

### Money Prompts Creation of Exalted Self-Standards

I think by and large I've been a compulsive worker, and that I have spent a lot less time doing leisure things than I could have according to my income, because I felt guilty about it . . . . I didn't do a lot of things that I could have. I thought I should be out there grinding away.

I think that wealth can really screw people up and also be disastrous. . . . It might be good to conclude by saying that wealth in some ways makes it easier to achieve your goals, but in some ways makes it difficult, because having wealth eliminates a certain range of goals that most normal people have--out of necessity--for themselves. Eliminating that range of goals . . . forces you to have a more exalted type of goal, which, in many ways, is more difficult to achieve. To be able to find something that is intrinsically rewarding is an extremely difficult thing.

A beef I have with the ruling class is that sometimes expectations are so high it drives people crazy. My two closest friends growing up, one ended up killing himself, and one ended up--still is--in a mental institution.

I have this attitude that . . . you have to lean over backwards to work harder than the other guy, because you've got the money.

### Money Undermines Self-Confidence

I think one of the problems that people with inherited wealth [have]--one of the problems I've had--is the eternal question that everybody faces: Am I really being appreciated for myself or my dough? . . . And, so, I have . . . a real terrible fear of being a dilettante. A terrible fear of being a dilettante. And, it is disproportionately important for me to be paid for what I do. Then I know I've hacked it and met the standard.

I think the books are by far the most satisfying thing I've done, and I'm glad I did those, in the sense that there is no question that the success of those books had to do with me, personally, and not a goddamn thing to do with my money.

### Money Promotes Dependence and Helplessness

There was one unfortunate aspect [for which] I blame a lawyer . . . who used to tell me, "You boys won't have anything to worry about. You're going to inherit some money, when you're 21, and you'll do fine. Don't worry about a thing." And, that's a hell of a thing to say to a young person. That must have set me back 15 years, as far as seriousness and recognizing the need for survival and developing skills . . . .

I felt that I had been so overprotected in some ways. I think, in other ways, I had been brought up in a remarkable and wonderful way, but that, in terms of understanding the processes of daily living, . . . I was a complete incompetent. I didn't know how to run a house, I didn't know how to do the laundry, I didn't know how to cook, etc., etc., etc. . . . I had spent all my life having authorities and experts who knew how to do everything, so that I never had a chance to learn the art of living, much less earning my living. And, I wanted to learn those things.

I think it is a matter of privilege. . . . that my mother never taught us anything about housekeeping. I never knew how to wash a kitchen floor. I knew you did it. But, do you get down on your hands and knees for a real scrub? How do you use a mop? Does it replace the scrub brush? So, then you get the water and the detergent on the floor, how do you get it up? . . . Do you let it dry? It will soak into the apartment downstairs, so you don't want that to happen. So, I used to spend hordes of money on paper towels to pick the water up. . . . I didn't know how to cook. . . . I remember the first time I used Clorox in the wash. My God, nothing was grey any more!

You must realize that being brought up the way I was, . . . I was taken to school by a chauffeur, and never went on the bus with the other girls. And, this place in the country was big enough so that there was no way of other people being around except my own cousins. So that I was terribly shy by the time I grew up. . . . I must say, I don't think it's the greatest way to bring somebody up to deal with the world as it is.

## Money and Women

### Money Causes Problems in Love Relationships

I am really envious of a lot of people who didn't come from the kind of background that I came from, and I feel it all the time. And, I wish I didn't feel it. And, I think I feel it more because a lot of my friends who didn't come from that kind of background can have good relationships with people, and I would really like to have good relationships with people. . . . I think it has to do with the money. . . . [When I say relationships] I mean with men--or women--a love relationship.

In my first two marriages, I was clearly the prominent one, and it made for real problems.

The preceding interview evidence should be sufficient to confirm that, at least in terms of an individual's emotional life, inheriting substantial wealth can be a mixed blessing. And, in this study, emotional complications, while certainly not unique to the women, nevertheless seemed particularly characteristic of them. Compared to the men, not only did the women--as stated previously--demonstrate an overall higher frequency of reporting money-related emotional difficulties, but, in addition, they also demonstrated higher such frequencies along every dimension listed and described above. Again, a probable explanation for this gender differentiation is that, unlike sample upper class men, on top of all the other doubts they experienced in relation to their fortunes, sample women had to confront the additional tensions created by their possessing great power potential in a social system, and particularly in a sphere (i.e., the money sphere), where women are expected to be relatively powerless.

Returning to the assumption that interviewees' reported negative attitudes and feelings about money might interfere with their ability to manage and take charge of their financial affairs, it need only be said that it seems likely that, for those individuals reporting them, all these difficulties, to one degree or another, created inhibitions regarding the full exploitation of, awareness about, and management of owned financial resources. And, in some cases, these inhibitions even appeared to result in an almost complete immobilization and passivity on the part of certain respondents in relation to their wealth. In such instances, as well as in the less extreme cases, wealth-related power potential probably could not be fully realized. Because, in this investigation, women respondents, with much greater frequency than responding men, reported personally experiencing wealth-related emotional difficulties, it is possible to at least tentatively conclude that, due to this, relative to the men, these women were less capable of controlling and manipulating their money and, therefore, were also less able to exercise their full potential for power.

The foregoing discussion has served principally to fulfill this study's descriptive purpose. That is, it has shown the ways in which sample members' differential relationships to the money sphere may have been influenced by gender. On a more analytic level, however, the discussion has also shown some of the implications of this gender differentiation: mainly that, even if sample men's and women's levels of wealth were identical, on the whole the men would, nevertheless, realize a greater degree of wealth-based power than would the women.

This conclusion is based on research evidence which revealed that interviewed men were generally better prepared, more knowledgeable, more participatory, and less troubled than interviewed women with regard to their money--all of which should indicate that they were also more able to exploit their financial resources for their chosen ends.

How do these findings relate to the two general conclusions noted at this section's outset? They are very closely related. First, as with this paper's previous sections, evidence from the money sphere also indicates--as has just been stated--that, in this sphere, sample upper class women appeared to maintain a subordinate status and inferior power position relative to sample upper class men. At the same time, however, the very fact of their wealth and their active participation in philanthropy placed them in positions of influence well beyond those of most men and women of other classes. And, second, with regard to the structural impact of sample upper class women's inferior status in the money sphere, it is likely that, as in other spheres, here their subordinate positions contributed to maintaining the status quo and, thus, their own class standing.

## CONCLUSION

In concluding this report, it is helpful to return to its beginning. At this paper's outset, a number of goals were established. The principal of these were to discover, through generated data, some of participating upper class members' class- and gender-associated roles, activities, and attitudes and, based on these determinations, to suggest their possible bases and/or implications. Beyond these principal aims, however, a further purpose of this research was to investigate, in relation to this study's sample, the relevance of certain existing sex-role theories and portrayals of upper class women. In light of these aims, it will be the task of this concluding statement both to summarize the main and general research findings as related to gender and class--bearing in mind, however, that a number of these findings exhibited differential associations, according to distinctions in such secondary factors as age, religion, and level of wealth (with age appearing to have been the most relevant)--and to discuss the extent to which these findings seem consistent with established theories explaining women's secondary status under capitalism and with portrayals of upper class women in the United States.

To begin, from this dissertation's sections on sample demography and on domestic roles, activities, and attitudes, it could be seen that, in certain respects, traits characterizing sample women did not conform to some of the common portrayals of women of their class

(or, for that matter, of women in general) in the United States. For example, contrary to earlier-outlined depictions, the women in this study's sample appeared to represent a variety of marital statuses and backgrounds, household compositions, and work histories, all of which, rather than being static categories, usually changed over time, principally according to such factors as personal preferences and life cycle stages. Moreover, and also in contrast to these depictions, generated data showed that both sample women and men often married outside their class, that the women were frequently household heads, and that they (the women) commonly contributed to both the status and the financial support of their families. And, with reference to this latter, it was clear that these women, perhaps unlike most women of other classes, were in no financial sense, economic dependents of their husbands or of anyone else. Despite this, however, literature portrayals of women as generally financially dependent on husbands may not be completely irrelevant to the case of responding upper class women. This is because, as evidence from the domestic sphere indicated, as opposed to interviewed men, most women participating in this investigation appeared to be-- probably as a result of socialization-related ideological and subjective factors--psychologically the financial dependents of their spouses or of their male financial assistants. Also in line with standard views of all women's roles in the United States were data from the domestic sphere which showed women respondents, relative to the men, to have been more home- and family-oriented, taking greater-- and primary--responsibility for the running of their households.

Nevertheless, and as was pointed out, that sample women may have shared with women of other classes a domestic identification, does not mean that the significance and nature of this identification were also equally shared. In the case of sample women, for example, time invested in domestic-related duties did not appear great. Moreover, due to the practice of hiring domestic help, the actual work performed by these women was, as a rule, neither manual in nature, nor particularly onerous. Rather, responding women's main task associated with the domestic domain appeared to be to act as household managers and administrators. What seemed particularly curious about the general domestic orientations of interviewed women was that, although their financial privilege should have freed them to reject--and, in the men's case, to accept--domestic responsibilities, most of those who had been either married or parents, nevertheless, felt obligated to give this sphere precedence over potentially competing other spheres of activity, and, in particular, that of full-time longterm paid employment. Implications of the above material include that (1) while, in the domestic sphere, most sample upper class women were probably not the male-subordinate home-bound individuals some portrayals would have them be, nevertheless, (2) neither did their capacity for liberation within and from their homes appear to translate into an exploitation of this liberation in order to pursue fully-realized roles in the productive sphere (an arena through which they may have enhanced their power potential). Additionally, (3) neither biological nor financial constraints, as proposed by some theorists, appear

adequate in explaining the abdication of this pursuit by most of these women.

With regard to the sphere of paid work, this investigation's research suggested that literature views of upper class women's employment did not sufficiently correspond to the reported experiences of the women members of this study's sample. For example, while paid work backgrounds are rarely mentioned in connection with upper class women, in this study it appeared that almost 75% of the interviewed women had paid work histories, over 50% had worked more than 5 years, and almost 50% were either presently employed at paying jobs or had worked through retirement.<sup>1</sup> Despite this indicated extent of participation in the productive sphere, collected data did, nevertheless, support the widely held view that upper class women's connection to the paid work domain is substantially weaker than that of upper class men. Regarding this, data revealed that interviewed upper class men led interviewed upper class women along a variety of paid work-related dimensions--including duration, frequency, and continuity of employment; upper- and top-level positions held; extent of current employment; and assertiveness of socialization to paid work. Moreover, with regard to the question of experienced career impediments, those most commonly specified by responding women were not only distinct from those mentioned by the men, but, additionally, corresponded closely to the gender-associated career obstacles

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<sup>1</sup>The lack of correspondence between these and other studies' findings, it should be recalled, may be due to a number of factors, including those related to methodology (for instance, whether or not investigative attention focuses on women's lives over time), historic period, and/or sampling bias.

proposed by some sex-role theorists as applicable to women in general. That is, of those women reporting such obstacles, the most frequently noted ones were felt domestic obligations, gender discrimination, and lack of ambition. Interestingly, although responding men also listed felt obstacles to their careers, in contrast to the women, who generally viewed specified obstacles as of critical significance, these men mostly viewed their experienced impediments as insignificant and surmountable. Taking together the above information from the paid work sphere and that from the domestic sphere, it appears that, at a general level, for this investigation's upper class respondents, as for the population at large, these spheres were gender-associated. That is, domestic orientations and activities appeared relatively more characteristic of responding women than men, and, conversely, extra-domestic paid (productive) work appeared more characteristic of--and more accessible to--responding men than women. And, because in the United States, relationship to the productive (paid) sphere is one of the principal sources of adult validation and valuation (as well as, according to some theorists, of power), this conclusion suggests not only, as has been proposed by Chesler and Goodman (1976, p. 287), that gender hierarchy crosscuts all American classes, but also, specifically, that it applied to this study's sample. Thus, it may have been that participating upper class women's apparently relatively weak connection to the paid work sphere--and particularly to the corporate sector--correspondingly weakened their status and power relative to participating upper class men.

While the above comments point to a broad sexual division of labor among research participants, data from the volunteer sector show that this kind of segregation should not necessarily have been assumed to apply equally to all "work" domains. For, interviewees' reports indicated that, in the volunteer domain, men's and women's roles and extensive activity overlapped to a far greater degree not only than in either of those previously discussed, but also than usually supposed. And, this information serves to underline not only the rarely-stressed role of upper class men as volunteers, but also sample women's previously-noted freedom from the dictates of housework. Beyond this, examination of sample members' participation as volunteers revealed two further general, and seemingly characteristic, tendencies. The first, which accords with the literature portrayal of upper class women as volunteer workers, was that for over half (53.8%) the responding women, but for only about a quarter (26.1%) of the responding men, volunteer rather than paid work constituted the primary sphere of endeavor. The second--a tendency unmentioned in other literature on the subject--was that, while both responding men and women frequently held volunteer board leadership positions, these positions apparently tended to concentrate in separate arenas, according to gender. Thus, although, relative to members of other classes, their positions may have afforded both sample men and women disproportionate power with regard to the public domain and to system maintenance, nevertheless, the reportedly larger role played by the men in leading large nonfamily institutions implies that in the volunteer sector, as well, a hierarchical gender-based

division of labor operated. That is, with regard to top power positions in this sphere, women's access, relative to men's, appeared to be restricted.

Lastly, by examining various aspects of research participants' relationships to the sphere of money, it seemed evident that this sphere, as others have claimed, in essence, was male-identified, dominated, and directed. This appeared to be the case even though research indicated gender parity to be, by and large, characteristic of sample members' actual wealthholding. Due to this inconsistency, an explanation was sought for the ostensible relative subjection, impotence, and passivity of most sample upper class women in connection with money-related matters. And, based on interview information, the explanation to emerge was that, despite these women's class status and great money-related power potential, their ability to actualize this potential was undercut, at least in part, by the pre-existing, thoroughly entrenched, and capitalism-compatible gender hierarchy, which, working at ideological and psychological levels, seemed to interfere to a greater extent with sample women's financial preparation, knowledge, participation, and self-acceptance, than it did with sample men's. As a result, it is likely that, overall, sample women were rendered to some degree--and more so than sample men--dependent, helpless, and vulnerable with regard to the financial sphere. The implications of this, as Chesler and Goodman have contended are that "Without an understanding of money and power and institutions, women can never be prepared for capitalism or its successor" (1976, p. 288). Tentative acceptance of these propositions, however, should not obscure another of equal importance:

that is the likelihood that, because of their great wealth--and particularly because of the potentially wide-ranging impacts of their financial contributions--related to most individuals (and especially to most women) in other classes, sample upper class women possessed a far greater capacity for influence on the public domain.

In light of the foregoing, what remains to be reviewed here is the degree to which earlier-described theories seem relevant in accounting for the relatively inferior power position of sample upper class women within their class, which this study's data appear to reflect. And, more importantly, which, if any of these theories, seem to disclose the conditions most fundamentally responsible for encouraging this evident gender stratification among sample upper class members? As will be recalled, existing theories offer a number of competing explanations with regard to the conditions promoting gender hierarchy under capitalism. And, while those outlined at this paper's outset all seem to agree that women's restricted access to, participation in, and control over the productive sphere is determinative, each claims different factors to be responsible for this restriction. As has already been discussed, theories that propose either biology or exigencies of childbearing and rearing as the basic causal factors are simply not borne out by this study's data. Further, while undoubtedly relevant, as a mediating factor, to women's experiences regarding the productive sphere (as well as others), the suggestion that their restriction within this sphere is ultimately attributable to adverse ideologies seems an inadequately developed proposition.<sup>1</sup> That this is the case

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<sup>1</sup>And, this is particularly true for women outside the upper class, for many of whom participation in the productive sphere is

is due to the fact that such a suggestion either takes as its starting point a presumed gender hierarchy, or rests its arguments on a combination of presumed biological determinism and socialized guilt. The problem in the latter instance is that, at least at the level of state society, biology can probably be ruled out as the key factor underlying sexual division of labor and gender rankings (Gough, 1975; Money & Erhardt, 1972; Oakley, 1975; Schlegel, 1977). And in the former instance, the problem is that the analysis is tautological and does not go far enough. Both the roots of, and conditions affecting, gender hierarchy must themselves be accounted for, if gender discrimination is to be fully understood and successfully combatted and eradicated.

Regarding both this, and its application to the current research, of those theories reviewed in this paper, that which appears best equipped to clarify the bases of gender stratification is that which uses a materialist approach to elucidate not only its genesis, but also the way in which it may have become crystallized, consolidated, and functional under the structure of capitalism (Boserup, 1970; Bossen, 1976; Gough, 1975; Mullings, 1976; Rapp, 1976, 1977; Rubin, 1975).<sup>1</sup>

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not a matter of choice, but rather of necessity. In this specific regard, ideology probably plays a larger role for upper class women, who, because of their financial security, have the option of foregoing paid work.

<sup>1</sup>It is extremely important to recognize, however, that while abolishing capitalism may be a prerequisite for opening up the structure of opportunity to women, it would not necessarily--or probably--constitute a sufficient alteration to ensure gender equality. That this is the case is indicated by evidence from Communist and Socialist systems, wherein women's access to, and participation in, the productive sphere--although apparently less restricted relative to that of women in the

Further, and as this paper has tried to demonstrate, it is by using such an approach that the observable differences in women's roles--and the significance and functions of these roles--at analytically distinct levels become understandable. As was earlier stressed, and as Rapp (n.d.) has clearly and convincingly argued, although the nature of capitalism may constitute the fundamental condition fostering present day subordination of women in all classes, its impact on these women's roles and functions is likely to vary according to resource base. Thus, a model which portrays American women as primarily housewives, exchanging their labor for access to their husbands' wages, while born out by working class research (Komarovsky, 1967 & Pilcher, 1972), cannot be extended to include women of other classes. This has been demonstrated by research on women under conditions of poverty (Stack, 1974a, 1974b) and suggested by the current work. In both

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United States--are generally inferior to that of men's (Davín, 1975; Diamond, 1975, Epstein, 1970; Sidel, 1972). And, as Hartmann has maintained:

Because both sexual division of labor and male domination are so long standing, it will be very difficult to eradicate them and impossible to eradicate the latter without the former. The two are now so inextricably intertwined that it is necessary to eradicate the sexual division of labor itself in order to end male domination. (1976, p. 168)

In light of this statement, it has been the perspective of this paper that, because capitalism seemingly thrives on, and therefore maintains, a hierarchical sexual division of labor, its abrogation could well be a necessary first step to building a system of gender parity. However, as Hartmann correctly emphasizes, because gender hierarchy based on a sexual division of labor predates capitalism and because it has become a widely and deeply internalized life perspective, its eradication will undoubtedly require both an attack on several fronts and a very long time. (Hartmann, 1976, pp. 168-169)

cases, and for obviously extremely different reasons, the women in question neither depended on their husbands' earnings nor were they stereotypical housewives. And, with regard to the upper class women participating in this study, the meaning of their proposed gender-associated roles and functions is clearly different than it is for women of other classes. At the upper class level, due to their access to and control over enormous wealth, these women--who, indeed, seemed quite powerful in their own right--should have a greater opportunity than most other women to attain gender parity. However, despite this opportunity, that these women still appeared to submit to a male-subordinate position within their class seems largely a function of their specific, and incongruous, relationship to the capitalist structure of stratification. That is, for women of no other class is it likely that a successful challenge to gender hierarchy--a mainstay of capitalism--would simultaneously constitute a net deterioration in status. Yet, for upper class women, as argued earlier, this may be a distinct possibility: if gender hierarchy goes, the capitalist class structure, and, thus, the capitalist class itself, might be endangered.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, and ironically, it may be that in order to sustain their dominant class position, upper class women must accept a subordinate

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<sup>1</sup>It will be recalled that this argument was based on the assumptions that (1) capitalism, to a large extent, depends for its maintenance on the continuation of female-subordinate gender relations and (2) an effort on the part of upper class women to combat male-dominant gender stratification at their class level might promote such a struggle on the part of women of other classes. Given these conditions, it is possible to see that, if a women's wide-ranging challenge to male dominance were successful, the stability of the capitalist structure might suffer as a consequence. Furthermore, by implication, if the capitalist structure were so threatened, the uppermost position of the capitalist (upper) class, including its women members, would be endangered as well.

gender position. From this perspective, then, sample upper class women's overall acquiescent behavior in the face of the male-dominant gender hierarchy can be understood.

Having now reviewed both the descriptive and theoretical conclusions drawn from this study's data, a final word should be said regarding the wider significance of investigation of the upper class in general, and of upper class women in particular. On a theoretical level, the significance of studying upper class women is double-faceted. On the one hand, it may provide additional insights regarding the forces that affect upper class women both as women and as members of the upper class. And, on the other, by introducing women into the theoretical picture, it helps eliminate the gender-bias inherent both in most current upper class theory and in stratification theory as a whole. Consequently, this should lead to better stratification theory and to an improved conceptualization of the upper class.

Beyond these theoretical considerations, however, upper class research also has practical significance. This is because theory forms the basis of real actions and decisions, and because the results of not studying the upper class could be not only inadequate stratification theory (Nader, 1969), but also inadequate policies based on that theory. This point has been well argued by Ostrander (1980), who, in her own research on upper class women, discovered "the reality of class," and who maintains that "academic theorizing" about class has been inadequate and may have profound systemic consequences.

Fundamental to American popular ideology is the belief that social class is not of much importance in everyday life. . . . [A]cademic studies . . . conclude that Americans are not particularly "class conscious" and do not consistently behave or define their lives in class-related ways. . . . This ideology and its scientific supports contribute to a lack of interest among policy-makers and the general populace in the issue of class inequality. Since classes are not perceived as important or real, strategies to bring about an equalitarian class structure and eliminate class privilege are seen as unnecessary. (p. 73)

In the same vein, because gender and class stratification seem so closely intertwined, until research investigating their interrelationship also includes investigations of the upper class and of upper class women, it is unlikely that adequate theories--and, therefore, policies--can be developed regarding the advancement of women in the United States. Because study of women of the lower classes, alone, may prevent attainment of comprehensive knowledge concerning those variables which condition women's access to, and utilization of, power and resources, it may also, ultimately, lead to the limited effectiveness and impact of any policies intended to advance the position of women within the stratification structure.

As a final statement, it should be emphasized that an objective in science is to understand and change the world with regard to objective existing conditions. Given this, it is clear, then, that the scientific approach to studying stratification, and women's place within it, must be to study "up" as well as "down." Only by constructing competent and inclusive theories regarding both women and stratification can actions related to these areas be made optimally effective.

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APPENDIX  
INTERVIEW GUIDE

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

CONFIDENTIALITY OF ALL RESPONSES IS GUARANTEED

Name:

Birthdate:

Birthplace:

Marital Status:

Address(es):

Education (schools attended, dates of attendance, degrees and dates received):

Occupation(s):

Memberships:

Approximate value of total wealth and property (please check one):

Under \$60,000

\$60,000 - \$99,000

\$100,000 - \$199,000

\$200,000 - \$499,000

\$500,000 - \$999,000

\$1,000,000 - \$4,999,999

\$5,000,000 - \$9,999,999

\$10,000,000 or more

Unknown

Father's name:

Spouse's maiden name:

Mother's maiden name:

Siblings' names:

Children's names:

## INTERVIEW GUIDE

I FAMILY

A Tell me about your family: who is in it, what they do, and where they are. Who are household members, other than you?

B Your growing up and your relationship to your parents:

1 What kinds of expectations were held of you (i.e., in education, personal relationships, attitudes, work, . . .)? What activities were you encouraged to pursue?

2 To what extent do you feel that you conformed to these expectations?

3 Were different or similar expectations held of your sisters/brothers?

C If married (or "living with"):

1 What do you see as your main responsibilities in the relationship? Your spouse's?

2 How are tasks and responsibilities actually divided between you?

household management  
child care  
economic support  
other

3 Are there things that you and your spouse (mate) regularly do apart? Together?

4 Who manages the overall financial affairs? Household finances?

5 Is there anything you would change about either the division of responsibilities or activities in the relationship?

6 Are there ways in which either of you has influenced the other's career or work?

D If a parent:

1 What are/were your expectations of your sons/daughters (i.e., in personal relationships, education, work, attitudes . . .)? What about your aspirations for your sons/daughters?

- 2 What kinds of activities or interests have you encouraged your sons/daughters to pursue? Why these?
- 3 What do you see as your main responsibilities as a parent? Your spouse's?
- 4 In your eyes, what would constitute success for your sons/daughters? What would constitute a failure or disappointment?

E If living alone:

- 1 Do you live alone by choice? What are your reasons for choosing to live by yourself?
- 2 What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of living alone?

II ACTIVITIES

A Work:

- 1 Have you, in the past, or do you now, work in either a paid or volunteer capacity?
- 2 Discuss: the jobs you have held and/or hold now (i.e., your specific tasks or responsibilities, full- or part-time, . . . )

what motivated you to choose these involvements?  
(personal interest, social significance,  
political impact, other)

would you change anything about your current  
(or past) work? (are you satisfied?)

have there been either any particular setbacks  
or favorable advances regarding your work?  
what has accounted for these?

B Other Activities:

What other activities are you involved in that are important to you?

- 1 social
- 2 leisure
- 3 family
- 4 political
- 5 religious
- 6 cultural
- 7 philanthropic
- 8 other

9 How would you rank the relative importance of your various activities?

C Family comparison:

How do the activities in which you are involved compare to those of other family members?

D In personal terms, what, for you, constitutes success?

III WEALTH

A Background:

- 1 What is the origin of your family wealth? Is this still the principal basis of the family fortune? Your own fortune?
- 2 Is your own money the consequence of inheritance? If so, what were (are) the terms of this inheritance? If not, how did you come into your money?
- 3 As far as you know, were (are) the terms characterizing your inheritance the same as those for your sisters/ brother(s)?
- 4 Do you have a will? Are the terms of your will identical for all your children? What other provisions have you made?
- 5 (a) Which, if either, of your parents was more prominent in determining the position of your family, either in the community or nationally? (b) If married, which of you do you consider more prominent in this regard?

B Participation:

- 1 (a) How are your financial affairs managed, and who is principally responsible for supervising this management? (b) What is your own role in this management? (c) Is there anything you would like to change about the management of your finances or about your own role?
- 2 (a) Has there been anything in particular that has prepared you to take a role in your financial affairs? (b) Would you change anything about this approach? (c) Have you taken steps to prepare your children to participate in the management of their financial affairs? (What have you tried to teach them about money?)

- 3 (a) Is there any way in which you participate in a family business or in any other business in which you hold stock? (b) Would you like to change anything about the extent of your participation?
- 4 Compare your experience with regard to (a) participation in financial management, (b) preparation for managing finances, and (c) involvement in a family (or other) business to other family members.

C Contributions:

- 1 (a) What are your priorities regarding the use of your money? (b) Do charitable and (c) political contributions form part of your yearly expenditures? (d) Is there a set percentage of your income that you give to each yearly? (e) What is that percentage?
- 2 With regard to contributions, what kinds of organizations and individuals appeal to you?
- 3 How do you go about deciding (a) to whom or what to give and (b) how much you should give? (Do you get advice?)
- 4 Do you participate in the organizations to which you give money in other than financial ways?

IV ATTITUDES (misc.)

- A Are there particular ways in which you feel yourself to be an influential person? How do you feel about this? What do you think it takes for someone to have influence on an institutional level or in public matters?
- B Do you feel you've had adequate opportunities to achieve personal goals? What, if any, have been obstacles for you?