The Political Economy of Global Remittances

Gender, governmentality and neoliberalism

Rahel Kunz

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ROUTLEDGE

The Political Economy of Global Remittances

Over the last decade, a new trend of Global Remittances (GRT) has emerged within the international development community. Government and private sector actors have become interested in migration and remittances and their potential for poverty reduction and development, and have started to devise institutions and policies to harness this potential.

This book employs a gender-sensitive governmentality analysis to trace the emergence of this new phenomenon, to map its conceptual and institutional elements, and to analyse its broader implications in terms of reproducing neoliberal governmentality. With an in-depth case study on Mexico, and by locating the migration–development nexus within its wider development context, Kunz demonstrates that the GRT is instrumental in spreading and deepening neoliberal governmentality in a deeply gendered way.

This innovative book will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, international relations, sociology, development studies, economics, gender studies and Latin American studies.

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Abbreviations

CONAPO	Consejo Nacional de Población
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
EMIF	Encuesta de Migración a la Frontera Norte de México
FDI	foreign direct investment
FPPC	Fundación para la Productividad en el Campo, A.C.
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GMG	Global Migration Group
GRT	Global Remittance Trend
HTA	Hometown Association
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IAF	Inter-American Foundation
IFI	international financial institution
ILO	International Labour Organization
IME	Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMM	Instituto Michoacáno de la Mujer
IMP	International Migration Policy Programme
INEGI	Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Geografía y Informática
INSTRAW	United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
IO	international organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IR	international relations (discipline)
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean Region
LDC	less developed country
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIF	Multilateral Investment Fund (of the Inter-American Development Bank)
NAFIN	Nacional Financiera
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO	non-governmental organisation
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance

OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFAO	Oficinas Estatales de Atención a Oriundos
OFATE	Oficina de Atención a Tlaxcaltecas en el Exterior
PCME	Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Extranjero
PPIAF	Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SEDESOL	Segretaría de Desarrollo Social (Mexican Development Agency)
SFU	Social Finance Unit (of the ILO)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHLD	United Nations High-Level Dialogue
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

1 Introduction

> Remittances are beautiful.
>
> (Maimbo 2005)

On 9–10 October 2003, over 100 representatives of international financial institutions (IFIs), international organisations, government officials, banks and non-bank financial institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and consultants from 42 countries gathered in London for the first international conference focusing entirely on remittances:[1] the *International Conference on Migrant Remittances: Development Impact, Opportunities for the Financial Sector and Future Prospects*. The conference was organised jointly by the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and the World Bank, in collaboration with the International Migration Policy Programme (IMP). Its objectives were to bring together concerned stakeholders to share experiences on remittances; to identify best practices based on regional, country and agency initiatives; and to identify and establish collaborative strategies to strengthen the developmental impact of remittances.[2] In his opening statement, Cesare Calari, vice president of the Financial Sector at the World Bank, announced:

> We are gathered here today because of the shared belief that there is a huge potential for scaling up the impact of remittances on poverty reduction efforts in developing countries.
>
> (Department for International Development and World Bank 2003: 39)

This book is about this 'shared belief': how it was born and progressively turned into a full-grown global trend; how it is constituted through particular discourses and practices; and how it plays out in gender-specific ways in various localities. This book is about the emergence of a phenomenon that I call the Global Remittance Trend (GRT).

Migration and remittances are not new phenomena. Migration has existed since the beginning of humankind and migrants have been sending and investing their money in various ways. Over the last decade, however, a new trend has emerged within the international community, whereby government

institutions, international (financial) organisations, NGOs and private sector actors have become interested in migration and remittances and their potential for poverty reduction and development, and have started to create institutions and devise policies to harness this potential. What is new about the GRT is the way in which remittances have become a global object of knowledge, and migration and development have become linked in theoretical and practical ways; the number and variety of institutions that have become involved in activities linking migration and remittances to development; and the ways in which new institutions and policies have been created at the international, national and local levels aimed at harnessing remittances for development. Moreover, the novelty of this phenomenon lies in the extent to which migration and remittances have gained popularity as an instrument to finance development and poverty reduction.

The GRT emerged against the backdrop of a number of ongoing global transformations, such as the increase in international migration and remittances over the last decade, the crisis in development financing to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and processes of global restructuring. With increasing international migration came a growing awareness of migratory processes. The UN estimates that approximately 214 million people lived and worked outside the country of their birth in 2010, up from around 155 million in 1990, and 75 million in 1960 (Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 2008). This global increase in international migration has been accompanied by a growing sum of remittances. According to World Bank statistics, remittance flows to developing countries are estimated to have reached 161 billion US dollars in 2004, 239 billion US dollars in 2007, and 316 billion US dollars in 2009 (World Bank 2008; World Bank 2010: 1).[3]

These vast sums[4] have warmed the hearts of members of the international community, particularly given the notorious crisis in development financing. So much so that it prompted World Bank Senior Financial Sector Specialist Samuel Munzele Maimbo to exclaim in an interview that 'remittances are beautiful' (Maimbo 2005). Although the international community has agreed on a common framework for development, namely the MDGs, there is a constant lack of resources to finance the achievement of these goals. This has been exacerbated by the current financial crisis. In this context, the UN launched the Financing for Development Process and organised the International Conference on Financing for Development in March 2002, which adopted the Monterrey Consensus.[5] The conference report states: 'We note with concern current estimates of dramatic shortfalls in resources required to achieve the internationally agreed development goals' (United Nations 2002: §2). Indeed, multilateral development aid has decreased during the last decade. Meanwhile, worldwide remittance flows exceed total development aid and have become the second largest – and for some countries even the largest – financial flow to developing countries after foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet, as a result of the increasing securitisation of migration, such as in the Mexico–US

context, but also due to the recent financial crisis, remittance flows to certain countries have slowed down. For instance, the year 2007 saw a stagnation and 2009 a decline in remittance flows to Mexico and to other Latin American countries (World Bank 2010: 4). However, this does not (yet) seem to have halted the advance of the GRT.

The GRT has proliferated both in the international realm as well as in national contexts. Among the countries that have received most attention, both in the academic and non-academic literature, is the case of Mexico. The third largest recipient of remittances (after India and China and before the Philippines), Mexico is often cited as an example of best practice, i.e. a country that has successfully managed to harness migration and remittances for development (World Bank 2010: 2). Indeed, some Mexican-born diaspora policies, such as the Programa 3×1^{6} have gained international prominence and are being replicated around the world. Mexican government, financial and non-governmental institutions have played a pioneering role in actively promoting initiatives harnessing remittances for development and 'courting' Mexican migrants.

There is a burgeoning academic and institutional literature on the links between migration, remittances and development, both in general (e.g. Brown 2006; Hammar et al. 1997; Kapur 2005; Martin 2004; Massey and Taylor 2004; Orozco 2003; Skeldon 1997; Sørensen 2005; Taylor 2004), and regarding the Mexican context (such as Alarcón 1995, 2004; Canales 2004; De la Garza and Lowell 2002; Durand 1988; García Zamora 2003, 2005; Goldring 1992, 2004; Merz 2005; Moctezuma Longoria 2006; Wise and Knerr 2005). So far, the main focus in the existing literature has been on whether, in what ways, and under which conditions, migration and remittances contribute to development and poverty reduction. Thereby, optimism regarding the development potential of migration and remittances has generally prevailed. Thus, for example, the Global Commission on International Migration asserts that remittances 'play an important part in alleviating poverty in countries of origin, and can also support the development process if the governments of those countries provide a conducive environment for economic growth' (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 23). Based on such claims, a number of international and national initiatives have been launched to improve harnessing this development potential of remittances.

The narrow economic focus and 'problem-solving approach' in the existing literature tends to ignore the background of the current interest in remittances, and the broader implications of the migration–remittances–development nexus. This book seeks to move beyond this narrow focus in two steps: first, by problematising the GRT, through an analysis of the process whereby migration, remittances and development have become linked in the GRT and have turned the migration–remittances–development nexus into an object of knowledge and intervention. Second, by shifting our attention towards the broader implications – or what Ferguson has called 'instrument-effects' (Ferguson 1994: 256) – of the GRT. This means moving beyond the analysis of the

intended effects of development and poverty reduction, in order to take into account the unintended, but nonetheless very real, outcomes and side-effects of the GRT. Moreover, this implies broadening the debate about the migration–remittances–development nexus and situating it within ongoing transformations, such as global restructuring and the shift towards neoliberalism. Finally, such an analysis also includes exploring the gender dimensions of the GRT and its implications. As feminist researchers have revealed time and again, seemingly gender-neutral development and macroeconomic initiatives are often underpinned by gendered assumptions and have gender-specific implications. As will become clear throughout this book, taking gender dimensions into account is crucial to understand the functioning of the GRT. Hence, this book explores the following questions: How did the GRT emerge? How does it manifest itself in the international realm and in the context of Mexico? What are the broader (gender-specific) implications of the GRT? In what ways, if at all, is the GRT involved in the current spreading and deepening of neoliberalism?

To seek answers to these questions, I build a theoretical framework based on Foucault's governmentality approach, combined with insights from post-colonial and post-structural feminist theories, outlined in more detail in Chapter 2. Drawing on this framework, the GRT is conceptualised as a 'regime of practices', which is defined as the ways we think about and act upon a particular topic, at any given time and place (Dean 1999: 21). Analysing the GRT as a regime of practices means tracing the emergence of the GRT; exploring the forms of (gendered) knowledge this regime gives rise to and depends upon; mapping the conceptual and institutional elements that constitute it; and examining the diverse (gendered) power dimensions and implications. Thereby, the focus is directed to the assemblage of discourses, institutions, governing mechanisms and power technologies involved in generating knowledge about, and acting upon, the migration–remittances–development nexus. I discuss the added value of this theoretical framework in the next section.

Put succinctly, the argument of this book goes as follows: the GRT has emerged as a regime of practices constituted of a conceptual and institutional apparatus at the international, national and local level, with concrete implications that stretch from the international realm to individual subjects. I argue that the GRT is an expression of and reinforces specific forms of gendered neoliberal governmentality. Concretely, in the context of Mexico, I demonstrate how the GRT contributes to entrench a neoliberal welfare model; to increase civil society participation in the implementation of welfare and development programmes and to redefine civil society as both object and subject of governing; to govern populations and individuals to behave according to market norms; to create gendered neoliberal subjectivities; and to reinforce the dual nature of neoliberalism, namely the coexistence of increased normativity and new possibilities for resistance and empowerment. I offer a more detailed account of how my argument unfolds throughout the book in the last section of this chapter. Before doing so, the next section reviews existing studies upon which I draw, before outlining my methodological approach.

Situating the research

Addressing the narrow focus and largely 'problem-solving' approach in the mainstream literature, a number of studies have started to reconceptualise the debate on the migration–remittances–development nexus. Thereby, two main strategies have been adopted: broadening the debate and shifting the focus. The first strategy involves broadening the analysis to include elements that have been left out. This includes ethnographic research that documents the effects of migration and remittances for home communities and the experiences of the non-migrant population (e.g. Barrera Bassols and Oehmichen Bazán 2000; Cornelius 1978; Dinerman 1974; Massey et al. 1990; Mummert 1999; Reichert 1979; and Suárez and Zapata 2004). Such studies have made important contributions, broadening the narrow perception of remittances and revealing the gendered social realities within which remittances are embedded. Yet, regrettably, all too often, rich ethnographic analyses are marginalised within the literature that focuses on the macro level.

Research on transnationalism has also contributed to broaden the focus of analysis to include the social and political processes that accompany the phenomenon of remittances (for example Levitt 1996, 2001; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Ramirez et al. 2005; Sørensen 2005).[7] In their pioneering work, Basch et al. define transnationalism as 'the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement' (1994: 7). Redefining remittances from a 'sum of money' to a 'transnational activity', this literature situates remittances within transnationalism more broadly, thus rendering visible the underlying realities within which remittances are embedded. These realities include, among others, the context within which the decision to migrate is taken; the human, social, cultural, political and economic consequences for migrants and non-migrants; the networks which enable migration and remittances; the legal and socio-economic status of migrants; and the gendered power structures which affect processes of migration and remittances.

A second strategy that has been adopted in order to reconceptualise the migration–remittances–development debate involves shifting the focus beyond the question of whether this nexus works or not, to explore its broader (unintended) consequences, or 'instrument-effects' (Ferguson 1994: 256). In this vein, feminist research investigates the implications of migration and remittances on women and gender relations (Barrera Bassols and Oehmichen 2000; Carling 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; INSTRAW 2007d; Kanaiaupuni 2000; Mummert 1999, 2003; Pessar 1999; Suárez and Zapata 2004; Vega Briones 2003). The key question in these writings is whether, and in what ways, migration and remittances contribute to empower women and reduce gender inequalities. For a long time, the focus has been mostly on migrant women,[8] and relatively little was written about the experiences of non-migrant women and children who are the other side of the coin of migration as it were.[9] Yet, the more recent literature has started to address this gap (e.g. Barrara Bassols and Oehmichen

2000; Carling 2005; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Mummert 2003; Pauli 2008; Suárez and Zapata 2004). In the case of Mexico, certain authors suggest that transformations due to migration and remittances affect gender relations in a positive way (Vega Briones 2003: 330) and can increase women's self-esteem, satisfaction and general well-being (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994: 64–65; Pessar 1999). Others, however, paint a rather bleak picture of the gender implications of migration. Thus, for example, in her study of the state of Guanajuato, Sinquin Feuillye reports: '*En nuestra región, la mayoría está demasiado agotada por la sobrecarga de trabajo, trastornada por la soledad y las pesadillas, agobiada por la crianza e hijos rebeldes idealizando al padre ausente, para aprovechar esta oportunidad*'[10] (2004: 446). In sum, this body of work shows the complex ways in which gender relations are transformed due to migration and remittances, and how these transformations do not necessarily or automatically translate into women's empowerment in the household and the community. These studies have made an important contribution to challenging the gender-blindness of narrow, economic ways of framing remittances. Yet, so far relatively little has been written on the broader gender implications of the migration–remittances–development nexus, which is the gap that this book seeks to address. This means directing our attention to gendered forms of representation and stereotypes within the GRT, which shape policy-making and have gendered power implications.

In the Mexican context, a number of studies have analysed the broader implications of the migration–remittances–development nexus regarding reforms of Mexican development policy, transformations of local governance, regional integration and subjectivity formation (Bakker 2007; Binford 2004; de Haas 2005; Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias 2007; Kapur 2005; Simmons 2008). These critical analyses challenge the underlying assumptions of this nexus and its simplistic conception of migration and remittances as 'good for development'. For example, back in 1979, Reichert warned of the culture of dependency resulting from what he called the 'migration syndrome' (1979). Papademetriou argued more recently that remittances perpetuate and deepen the 'backwardness' of migrants' hometowns by creating a destructive dependency that discourages local and regional development initiatives (quoted in Delgado Wise and Rodríguez Ramírez 2001: 12). Delgado Wise and Rodríguez Ramírez argue that remittances do not deliver on their promises to bring development:

> [R]emittances, while relatively significant in aggregate terms, tend to be small at the individual level. They do little to help local and regional economies, where they are used to meet basic family needs and, in the best-case scenario, to set up a small-scale business.
>
> (Delgado Wise and Rodríguez Ramírez 2001: 12)

Binford (2004) warns of the 'remittances trap', arguing that the Mexican state has moved 'toward a deliberate policy to expel migrants from rural areas and

to sustain contacts with them in the United States to ensure a reverse flow of remittances' (Binford 2004: 3–4). And Burgess (2005) critically examines the consequences of the influx of remittances regarding democratic forms of local governance in Mexican communities.

Within this literature, a number of authors have devised new terminology that comes close to my understanding of the GRT, albeit focusing at the national level. Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias (2007) identify a 'remittance-based development model' in Mexico, and analyse it from the perspective of the political economy of development. Bakker (2007) explores the emergence of what he calls the 'remittances-to-development discourse' and analyses how this discourse impacts on the relationship between the Mexican state and Mexican migrant organisations, and the construction of the subject of the 'collective migrant'. Simmons (2008) undertakes a critical analysis of what he calls the 'remittances and development discourse', examining why international banks have become interested in remittances and arguing that despite widespread evidence to the contrary, 'large international banks and [development] agencies are drawn by ideology and self-interest to believe that remittances can be channelled to bring about development' (ibid.: 61).

Analysing the broader implications of this new 'remittance-based development model' in Mexico, all of these authors demonstrate that this model contributes in a number of ways to spread and entrench neoliberalism. Binford warns that 'the growing focus on remittances by academics, nongovernmental agencies and others risks trapping us within a discourse and practice that is uncritical, if not practically supportive, of Mexican state neoliberal economic policy' (2004: 3–4). Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias highlight how this model deepens the process of asymmetric regional economic integration, intensifies the neoliberal export-led development model of Mexico, and contributes to 'presenting a "human face" to negate the climate of social un-sustainability, labour precarisation, and productive disarticulation that prevails' (2007: 102). Bakker uncovers the construction of the subjectivity of the 'collective migrant' through this model, and argues that it is consistent with neoliberalism: 'This remittances-to-development discourse, consistent with neoliberal premises, situates the potential for migration-led development in the individual migrant entrepreneur and the market' (2007: 42). Simmons refers to neoliberalism more indirectly:

> In a world in which the dominant discourse of economic growth emphasises the role of the private sector and ways to reduce state budgets and international development assistance, the 'remittances and development' discourse by banks and agencies […] provides an excellent opportunity for these banks and agencies to present themselves as doing a great deal that is positive, even when what they accomplish may be much less than they claim.
>
> (Simmons 2008: 75)

In sum, these authors all reveal the emergence of a new phenomenon, and they demonstrate a number of broader unintended consequences of this phenomenon – among which is the spreading and deepening of neoliberalism. This book builds upon these analyses, seeking to explore whether, and in what ways, the GRT reproduces specific forms of neoliberalism. Yet, it aims to move beyond existing research in at least three ways. First, with the exception of Simmons (2008), existing analyses have mainly focused on the national level and have not offered an integrated analysis that links national and international elements of this new phenomenon, which is the purpose of this volume. Second, my analysis seeks to move beyond the gender-blindness that characterises most existing literature apart from the feminist research mentioned above. A gender-sensitive lens is capable of analysing the multiple ways in which gender is crucial to the functioning of the GRT and to explore the gender-specific implications of the GRT. Third, I adopt a new theoretical approach to study this phenomenon, that of a gendered governmentality. This approach allows me to identify the specific sites where the GRT is reproduced and the different institutions involved in the GRT, and to study the relationships between these different sites, which enables a more holistic approach. Most crucially, a gendered governmentality approach is capable of moving beyond the question of whether or not the GRT is successful in bringing about development, to shift the focus towards the broader unintended consequences of the GRT and its performative power. This approach conceptualises the GRT not as a strategy that conceals or diverts attention, as in Simmons (2008) who argues that the remittances and development model serves as a legitimising tool for international institutions, and as a strategy to divert attention from the fact that these institutions are not fulfilling their promises in terms of migration-linked development achievements. Thus, while Simmons' focus is on how this model is being used to cover the failures of international institutions, a governmentality approach looks beyond the intended outcomes, in a move from focusing what is *not* happening, to what *is* actually happening and what the consequences are. Thus, the concern of this book is not with what institutions within the GRT have promised and failed to do, but with what has actually been accomplished (intentionally or unintentionally) through the GRT. A governmentality analysis also allows me to trace the gendered implications of the GRT from the 'macro' to the 'micro' level, revealing how it produces specific policies and institutions at the international, national and local level, as well as gendered subjectivities and forms of resistance and empowerment. Moreover, such an approach is also capable of exploring whether, and in what ways, the GRT reproduces neoliberal governmentality.

Taking a novel perspective on the implications of the migration–remittances–development nexus, and situating it within the move towards neoliberal governmentality, this book seeks to make three contributions: first, an empirical contribution to the literature on the links between migration, remittances and development, by providing a detailed analysis of the gender-specific dimensions of the GRT both globally and in the context of Mexico. A second

contribution relates to the theoretical approach that combines a Foucaultian governmentality approach with feminist concepts. This analytical framework seems promising to bridge the macro–micro/global–local divides that plague much social science enquiry today. The third contribution lies in the multi-method approach used in this analysis, which also contributes to overcoming these divides.

Methodological approach

To comprehensively trace the GRT, from its 'macro' to its 'micro' dimensions, from its conceptual to its institutional elements, within the international realm and in the Mexican context, I use a multi-method approach that combines textual and policy analysis with expert-interviews and ethnographic fieldwork. Using such a multi-method approach proved necessary to investigate all the different dimensions, sites and implications of the GRT: Expert-interviews allowed me to gather additional insights and background to the findings resulting from the textual and policy analysis, and showed that solely focusing on documents would have been insufficient to trace the manifold dimensions of the GRT. Fieldwork research proved essential to understand the multiple ways in which the GRT plays out in specific localities, the transformations and contradictions it brings about, but also the forms of resistances it generates. In addition, this multi-method approach also allowed me to demonstrate that certain phenomena that are not commonly associated with the migration–remittances–development nexus in the literature, such as the targeting of Mexican women remittance receivers with productive projects, are an integral part of the GRT. More generally, I suggest that such a methodological approach is well adapted to carry out governmentality analyses that are interested in tracing governing and power technologies and their implications. It might also prove fruitful for researchers in the field of IR and IPE more generally to further explore such a multi-method approach.

In a first step, I carried out textual analysis of key documents by the main actors involved in the GRT – governments, international (financial) institutions, private financial institutions and NGOs – including institutional literature, speeches and official documents, websites, etc. Second, I analysed key policies, programmes and activities by the main institutions within the GRT.[11] In the case of Mexico, I selected a number of the most prominent migration-linked development programmes, such as the Programa 3×1, Mi Comunidad, and Invierte en México (see Chapters 4 and 5). The data for this analysis consisted of websites, expert-interviews with representatives from the institutions that are implementing these programmes (e.g. the Mexican development agency SEDESOL, NAFIN, etc.), and secondary literature on migration-linked development programmes and policies.

This textual and policy analysis was complemented, third, with a number of expert interviews with officials from relevant institutions. In this context, I also attended various key events, such as the 'Regional Hearing for the

Americas' of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (16–17 May 2005, Mexico City), and the 'UK Launch Event' of the GCIM Report (December 2005, London), the presentation of the BRIDGE Cutting Edge Pack at a DfID 'Workshop on Migration and Gender' in London (2005). I also participated in two major conferences on International Migration and Development organised by the Mexican research network Migracion y Desarrollo, which brought together academics, representatives from international and non-governmental organisations, and policy-makers. This allowed me to collect information about the main issues at stake, to explore the different discourses, and to engage in informal discussions with experts and present preliminary findings of my own research. For the coding of the documents and interview transcripts I used the qualitative research software tool ATLAS.ti.

Finally, data on the 'local' dimensions of the GRT were collected during recurrent periods of ethnographic fieldwork research in two rural Mexican communities between 2005 and 2008. The data-collection methods applied during my fieldwork research include semi-structured in-depth interviews and participant observation, complemented with secondary data where necessary.[12] My fieldwork consisted of a number of short visits to several rural communities – such as in Michoacán, Oaxaca, Puebla and Tlaxcala – combined with more in-depth fieldwork in two rural communities: San Lorenzo (Michoacán) and Los Pilares (Tlaxcala) (see Chapter 4). This combination allowed me to gather in-depth insights into two communities in order to understand the specific dynamics of the GRT in particular contexts, while at the same time providing me with a broader picture of the ways in which the GRT plays out in rural Mexico. While the analysis in this book draws mainly on information gathered in these two communities, my visits to other rural Mexican communities confirm that many findings hold true across rural Mexico.

Prior to starting research in the two communities, I conducted several pilot studies in other rural Mexican communities, accompanying Mexican researchers, which provided me with important insights into conducting research in such communities. Based on these pilot studies, I opted for qualitative in-depth interviews and participant observation, which proved vital to overcome the initial distrust of people, to capture the variety and complexity of the realities, and to access information about the implications of the GRT in terms of its gendered regulatory and disciplinary power and its forms of resistance and empowerment.[13] Recurrent stays in the two communities gave me the possibility to assess transformations and to confirm interpretations of my fieldwork. Participant observation allowed me to verify or complete information collected through interviews, to make sense of interview statements and to understand the broader context.

An initial step of fieldwork research involves getting access to the communities under study. In the case of Los Pilares, I participated in a local research project,[14] which allowed me to attend a number of events bringing together key actors involved in the GRT in the state of Tlaxcala, such as the Oficina

de Atención a Tlaxcaltecas en el Exterior (OFATE), priests, and the local media. Through this project, I was introduced to the local priest who is trusted by the community and provided me with access to the community. In San Lorenzo, I contacted Mario López Espinosa, a consultant for the International Labour Organization (ILO) who had designed the methodology for a migration-linked development project in the community, and who introduced me to a few members of the community as well as to a women's project (see Chapter 4). I also worked with one key informant in each community, who provided me with valuable background information and helpful comments on early interpretations of my research.

The choice of interviewees was carried out through a combination of snowballing and random selection. Interviews with people who were recommended to me ensured a certain level of trust and opened many doors. These interviews were complemented with people I randomly selected in order to diversify my sources and to include people who were not necessarily part of the snowballing networks. In order to verify the accuracy of certain information and avoid one-sidedness, I used participatory observation and cross-checking, which involved asking different informants about the same issue or asking the same question several times in different ways.

Being a non-Mexican and non-native speaker had both advantages and disadvantages for my research. On the one hand, it was more difficult to gain access to the communities, to earn the trust of informants, and it demanded additional efforts to understand the context of my informants. Often my respondents initially thought I was a *gringa*,[15] which sometimes facilitated the beginning of conversations, or even prompted people to come and talk to me, but in other cases made it more difficult to establish trust. On the other hand, as a foreigner, I could often ask questions regarding background or context that a native (speaker) could not have asked, and thereby gather valuable information.[16] Given the gender focus of my research, being a woman was an advantage for conducting fieldwork research, given that most women I have interviewed would not so readily have talked to male researchers, and even less given information about gender-specific issues.

Plan of the book

The key aim of this book is to trace how the GRT emerged, map the key elements that constitute it as a regime of practices, and explore its broader implications. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework, which combines insights from Foucault with post-colonial and post-structural feminist theories. The framework consists of two main elements: a genealogical method to analyse the emergence of the GRT, and a gender-sensitive governmentality approach to analyse what constitutes the GRT and how it works. The governmentality approach adopted in this book includes five dimensions: conceptual and institutional apparatus, power technologies, subjectivity creation, and forms of resistance and empowerment. Chapter 2 also provides an overview of

neoliberal governmentality, as a basis for examining whether, and to what extent, the GRT might contribute to spreading neoliberal governing techniques.

Drawing on a genealogical method, Chapters 3 and 4 trace the emergence of the GRT and map the conceptual and institutional apparatuses in the international realm and in the Mexican context respectively, demonstrating how the GRT was constituted as a regime of practices. These two chapters dissect the various elements of the GRT from the 'macro' to the 'micro' level and prepare the grounds for analysing the functioning and implications of the GRT in Chapters 5 and 6.

Chapter 3 maps the discontinuities, contradictions and struggles that marked the emergence of the GRT within the international realm, and the activities of the various institutions involved in the GRT that contributed to its consolidation. The chapter also undertakes a gender analysis in order to explore the gendered dimensions of the conceptual and institutional apparatus. The analysis identifies two main discourses exemplified by different institutions: the money-based approach and the rights-based approach, which compete over the framing of the issues of migration, remittances and development at the international level. The institutional apparatus is constituted of various practices by different international institutions, a tight network of activities between these institutions, and new institutions and programmes that have been established for the purpose of harnessing migration and remittances for development. Key activities within the institutional apparatus include monitoring remittances, research on remittance processes, conferences on the migration–remittances–development nexus, coalition-building and concrete projects to harness remittances for development.

Chapter 4 first maps the backdrop against which the GRT in Mexico emerged, namely the restructuring of the Mexican political economy since the 1980s, including two generations of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), regional integration, the modernisation of Mexican agriculture, the move towards an export-oriented development strategy, and a neoliberal welfare model. In a second step, the chapter introduces the two rural Mexican communities where the fieldwork for this book was conducted, before examining the conceptual and institutional apparatus of the GRT in Mexico. The conceptual apparatus is characterised by five elements: the representation of migration as an opportunity, remittances as an object of knowledge, migrants as heroes and development agents, and the Mexican nation as stretching beyond the Mexican territory. The institutional apparatus consists of various state and non-state actors involved in three main activities: monitoring remittances, promoting the institutionalisation of migrant groups, and courting migrants.

Having established the elements of the GRT within the international realm and in the case of Mexico, Chapters 5 and 6 are dedicated to showing how the GRT works in detail and what its broader implications are. Analysing the ways in which the GRT serves to govern populations and individuals, Chapter 5 focuses on the disciplinary and regulatory power of the GRT, and the subjectivity creation within the GRT. Divided in three parts, this chapter

addresses the questions of how the GRT acts as regulatory and disciplinary power in the context of Mexico, and what its gender dimensions are. The first part finds that regulation within the GRT operates through a number of mechanisms: first, it acts to create two main population groups: the (male) migrant remittance-senders and the (female) non-migrant remittance receivers; second, it works through the collection of information about these groups, turning them into an object of knowledge and governing; and finally, it leads to the design of policies targeting these population groups in order to render them 'useful' for the development of Mexico. Regulation through the GRT is deeply gendered. Whereas migrant men as a group are regulated through 'courting' strategies and through the promotion of collective remittances projects, non-migrant women are regulated through the 'migrant bias' that acts to marginalise women and gender issues, and through the 'make women productive' strategy that aims to integrate women into productive work, while promoting the productive investment of remittances. The second part of the chapter shifts the focus towards the disciplining of individuals within the GRT in the case of Mexico, which works to increase the 'usefulness' and 'docility' of individuals in gender-specific ways. The chapter reveals that (male) migrants are disciplined into sending individual and collective remittances, using formal channels to transfer them, and investing them productively. In parallel, non-migrant (women remittance receivers) are disciplined into investing remittances in a productive way, rather than using them for consumption, and to generate counterpart income to remittances. The third part of this chapter analyses how the disciplinary power of the GRT not only influences individuals' ways of thinking, but also their ways of being, i.e. it contributes to the production of the neoliberal subject of the responsible entrepreneurial citizen. In the context of Mexico, this subjectivity formation has a gendered face: while migrant men are turned into entrepreneurial heroes, non-migrant women are turned into market producers. The analysis highlights that using a gender analysis is crucial to understand the functioning, scope and implications of the regulatory and disciplinary power of the GRT in the Mexican context.

Yet, while the GRT does act to discipline individuals, regulate populations, and create new subjectivities, it has not established a complete system of domination. Analysed through a gender-sensitive Foucaultian perspective that stipulates that wherever there is power there is also resistance, moments of resistance and space for empowerment within the GRT can be identified. Chapter 6 explores the different forms of collective and individual resistance adopted by migrants and non-migrants, both collectively and individually. The two main forms of resistance include non-compliance and subversion. The analysis also reveals how the GRT opens spaces for the empowerment of non-migrant women, for instance, in the following areas: self-esteem and fulfilment; mobility; skills; getting a voice; and conquering spaces.

Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, synthesises the key theoretical and empirical arguments of this book. It pulls together the various elements of neoliberal governmentality that are spread and deepened through the GRT,

including the neoliberal welfare model; the involvement of civil society groups, such as migrants, in welfare provision; the production of gendered neoliberal subjectivities and their responsibilisation for their own welfare; the redefinition of civil society as both object and subject of governing; and the dual character of neoliberalism. The chapter highlights that even if the GRT might not be sustainable and does not necessarily produce the promised outcomes of poverty reduction and development, the conceptual and institutional apparatus and power technologies of the GRT still work to deepen specific forms of neoliberal governmentality. For this reason, it seems important to move beyond existing analyses that focus on whether the GRT works or not.

2 A gender-sensitive governmentality approach

> To analyse regimes of practices means to analyse programmes of conduct which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done […], and codifying effects regarding what is to be known.
>
> (Foucault 1991b: 75)

Introduction

This chapter presents the theoretical framework and key concepts used to examine the Global Remittances Trend (GRT), i.e. the process whereby various state and non-state actors have become interested in migration and remittances and their potential for poverty reduction and development, and have started to create institutions and devise policies to harness this potential. This framework is geared towards tracing how the GRT emerged, mapping the key elements that constitute it as a 'regime of practices', and exploring its broader implications. My theoretical approach is informed by the writings of Foucault and post-colonial and post-structural feminist thinkers, such as Mohanty (1988) and Spivak (1988), as well as by the applications of their respective insights to the field of development (e.g. Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Hirshman 1995; Marchand and Parpart 1995). It also draws upon the emerging field of governmentality studies and its engagement with issues of welfare and development policy (for example Dean 1999; Lairap 2004; Larner 2000; Lemke 2001; Luccisano 2002; and Rose 1993).

Feminist reactions to Foucault have been mixed. Some authors have argued that there are areas of convergence between Foucault and feminism, such as in the analysis of the power/knowledge nexus, the focus on the body as a locus of disciplinary power, or the emphasis on everyday practices and resistances (see for example Diamond and Quinby 1988; Mohanty 1988; McNay 1992; Sawicki 1998). Other feminist thinkers have heavily criticised Foucault, arguing that there is no space for resistance in Foucault's analysis of power and criticising the lack of a normative framework in his work (Deveaux 1994; Fraser 1989; Hartsock 1990). I differ with this critique, suggesting that resistance is part and parcel of a Foucauldian analysis (see below). Agreeing that the gender-blindness of Foucault's concepts needs to be challenged, I sympathise with the

efforts to find areas of convergence between Foucauldian insights and feminist theory. Hence, the theoretical framework of this book employs a number of Foucault's concepts, but builds on post-colonial and post-structural feminist insights to further develop Foucault's analysis by including a gender focus.

Foucauldian insights, post-colonial and post-structural feminist theory and governmentality studies share compatible epistemological and ontological foundations, their core assumption being that language and discourses are not innocent abstractions, but are constitutive of reality. As Dean affirms: '[L]anguage shapes what are taken to be problem areas of social and political life and how they might be addressed' (Dean 1999: 64). Yet, this does not mean that 'language should be accorded a causal priority in analysis', it is simply to 'hold that we should not underestimate the role of language in constructing worlds, problems and persons as governable entities' (ibid.). Thus, ideas and discourses construct reality through institutions and within particular power constellations.

This chapter proceeds as follows: the second and third sections present the Foucauldian concepts of genealogy and governmentality, and the fourth the insights from feminist theory used in the theoretical framework of this book. The fifth section provides an outline of neoliberal governmentality, before concluding with summary of the theoretical framework.

Genealogy

During his long and prolific activity as a researcher, Michel Foucault went through a number of shifts in focus and arguably there is not a single Foucault (Couzens Hoy 1986: 2). Analysts of Foucault often divide his work into different periods in terms of his methodological approach: his earlier work was characterised by archaeology, which focuses on discursive systems in themselves, whereas in his later writings he used a genealogical approach, which has a wider scope and aims to examine social practices and power relations as a whole, not focussing exclusively on the discursive.[1]

Foucault's understanding of the genealogical approach is based on the rejection of a notion of history as teleological and progressing on a linear path (Foucault 1977b: 140, 146). Genealogy 'rejects the meta-historical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies [and] it opposes itself to the search for "origins"' (Foucault 1977b: 140). Thus, the aim is not to uncover the 'essence' of things, i.e. to look for their origin (*Ursprung*), but to examine the emergence (*Entstehung*) of things, i.e. to reconstruct the way in which they emerged throughout time. Thereby, the focus is on the shifts, contradictions and struggles involved in the emergence of a specific phenomenon or object of knowledge. The genealogical approach allows for the analysis of the historical construction and transformation of phenomena that are usually taken for granted. 'Writ[ing] the history of the present',[2] Foucault dissects seemingly immutable objects of knowledge or truths – such as feelings, sexuality or the body – in order to reveal how they emerged through historical processes and struggles (Foucault 1977b: 153).

While power was always an implicit concern in Foucault's work, it is with the genealogical approach that it becomes the explicit focus of analysis (Edkins 1999: 41). The focus is thus on the power/knowledge nexus, i.e. the power relations involved in the formation of truths (Davidson 1986: 224). Hence, the objective of the genealogical analysis is not to verify the origin or truthfulness of statements, but rather to situate them in their discursive context in order to examine how they emerged, and to trace the power relations involved in their emergence. For example, in his analysis of the emergence of the nineteenth-century prison system (the carceral) in *Discipline and Punish* (1977a), Foucault examines the relations between the emergence of the institutions of the prison system, a specific understanding of punishment, and specific forms of power.

Apart from considering the resistances and struggles in the emergence of things, the genealogical approach also pays attention to the silences and power relations that are involved in determining what becomes an event and what remains a non-event (Foucault 1977b: 140). Within the genealogical framework it is essential to evaluate phenomena not only based on the intended consequences, but also on their unintended outcomes, or what Ferguson has called 'instrument-effects' (Ferguson 1994: 256). Thus, sometimes, the supposed failure of a particular strategy can be a success in itself. As Foucault argues in *Discipline and Punish*, the failure of the new penal system was central to its success: it succeeded in producing a specific type of delinquency, and in producing the delinquent as a pathologised subject (Foucault 1977a: 277). Hence, the prison as a correctional institution does not succeed in rehabilitating the people who have failed to respect the norms; on the contrary, it produces delinquent individuals as part of a technique to exert social control. Similarly, in his analysis of the impacts of development interventions in Lesotho, Ferguson reveals the 'instrument-effects' of these interventions, i.e. the unplanned, un-orchestrated outcomes of state activities that nonetheless are very real (Ferguson 1994: 19). In his case, he demonstrates how the development apparatus established in Lesotho led to the expansion of bureaucratic state power and a depoliticisation of poverty and the state through the establishment of an 'anti-politics machine' (Ferguson 1994: 256). Much like Ferguson, this book uses the genealogical method to trace the emergence of the GRT in terms of the power/knowledge nexus and to explore its unintended consequences.

Governmentality

As indicated by the composition of the word, governmentality focuses on the links between governining (*gouverner*) and modes of thought (*mentalité*) (Lemke 2001: 2). Due to his early death, Foucault never published a major work on governmentality.[3] Even though Foucault's governmentality concept is therefore somewhat diffuse and has been interpreted in a number of ways, we can distinguish three broad meanings (Dean 1999: 20). The first denotes a

generic term referring to a way of governing or the 'conduct of conduct' – also called 'governmental rationality'. Thus, for example, we can refer to liberal governmentality, neo-conservative governmentality, neoliberal governmentality. The second meaning is a historically specific version of the first – i.e. a particular governmental rationality or form of governing or government – which emerged in eighteenth-century Europe. This form has been described as:

> [T]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its primary target the population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.
>
> (Foucault 1991a: 102)

Thereby, governmentality is associated with the emergence of 'societies of security', the spread of bureaucracy and statistics, and the creation of new groups of population. Foucault schematically contrasts this meaning with other forms of governing: 'sovereignty' (understood as monarchical rule over a given territory and its subjects, which takes law and violence as its instruments), and 'discipline' (which works over and through the body, and is associated with the expansion of regimes of discipline in the seventeenth and eighteenth century in schools, prisons, hospitals, armies, factories, etc.).[4]

The third meaning of governmentality refers to an analytical tool for examining ways of governing, what Dean calls 'an analytics of government' (Dean 1999: 20). Foucault devised this analytical framework to examine different forms of governing and their underlying rationalities, and to undertake a genealogy of the modern state – ranging from Ancient Greece through to neoliberalism – aiming to show how the emergence of the modern sovereign state was closely linked to the formation of the modern autonomous individual (Lemke 2001: 191).

According to Dean, an analytics of government 'is concerned with thought as it becomes linked to and is embedded in technical means for the shaping and reshaping of conduct and in practices and institutions' (Dean 1999: 18). Hence, an analytics of government examines the conditions under which regimes of practices emerge, are maintained and transformed. Regimes of practices are 'places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect' (Foucault 1991b: 75). In this book, I examine the GRT as a regime of practices, defined as the more or less organised ways in which remittances have been turned into an object of knowledge, the various practices put in place to influence the activity of remitting, and the various technologies involved in harnessing remittances for development. In other words, I use an 'analytics of government' – i.e. the third meaning of governmentality – to examine the GRT. As elaborated by Dean, an analysis of a particular regime of practices

> seeks to identify the emergence of that regime, examine the multiple sources of the elements that constitute it, and follow the diverse processes and relations by which these elements are assembled into relatively stable forms of organization and institutional practice. It examines how such a regime gives rise to and depends upon particular forms of knowledge and how, as a consequence of this, it becomes the target of various programmes of reform and change. It […] analyses the characteristic techniques, instrumentalities and mechanisms through which such practices operate, by which they attempt to realize their goals, and through which they have a range of effects.
>
> (Dean 1999: 21)

Analysing the GRT through this perspective has a number of advantages. A governmentality analysis is based on a broad understanding of government, defined as 'the conduct of conduct' in different sites of society. Thus, government includes both the control and management by the state or the administration – i.e. the way the term is used nowadays in its 'political' sense – and the management or governing of the family, of children, the household, and of oneself. In this understanding, government includes both governing oneself and governing others (Lemke 2001: 191). A governmentality approach is also capable of linking the conceptual with the institutional components of a regime of practices, as well as analysing how it plays out in different interrelated localities (Merlingen 2006: 189). This enables bridging the global/local, or macro/micro divide, which is essential to understand the GRT as a regime of practices, as Lemke observes:

> The analysis of governmentality not only focuses on the integral link between micro- and macro-political levels (e.g. globalisation or competition for 'attractive' sites for companies and personal imperatives as regards beauty or a regimented diet), it also highlights the intimate relationship between 'ideological' and 'political-economic' agencies (e.g. the semantics of flexibility and the introduction of new structures of production).
>
> (Lemke 2001: 203)

Thereby, the terminology of 'levels' serves a purely analytical purpose, these different levels are part of one totality. Analysing these links through a governmentality perspective avoids a simplistic and disempowering conceptualisation of the global as determining the local:

> No 'local centre', no 'pattern of transformation' could function if, through a series of sequences, it did not eventually enter into an over-all strategy. And inversely, no strategy could achieve comprehensive effects if it did not gain support form precise and tenuous relations serving, not as its point of application or final outcome, but as its prop and anchor point. There is no discontinuity between them, as if one were dealing with two

> different levels (one microscopic and the other macroscopic); but neither is there homogeneity (as if the one were only the enlarged projection or the miniaturisation of the other); *rather, one must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work*.
>
> (Foucault 1991a: 99–100, my emphasis)

Thus, a governmentality analysis of the GRT allows us to trace its elements within the conceptual and institutional realms and from the micro to the macro level. Furthermore, the concept of governmentality is able to consider different forms of power technologies. Drawing on Dean (1999: 20ff) and Lemke (2001: 36), I employ a governmentality analysis composed of five dimensions: the conceptual apparatus,[5] the institutional apparatus, power technologies, subjectivity creation, and resistance and empowerment. These five dimensions constitute the regime of practices of the GRT, and they presuppose each another, but are not reducible to one another (Dean 1999: 33).

Conceptual and institutional apparatus

The conceptual apparatus of a regime of practices refers to the ways of rendering visible, problematising, thinking and speaking of, a particular issue, and the specific ways of producing knowledge and truth. This apparatus includes competing discourses regarding the GRT, i.e. networks of statements that present the migration–remittances–development nexus in a specific way and define new objects of knowledge.

The institutional apparatus refers to what Dean calls the domain of 'techne' (Dean 1999: 31). This includes the instruments, mechanisms, techniques and institutional activities within the GRT. In other words, it refers to the ways in which an issue is dealt with, the types of actors involved and the types of institutions established. Thereby, institutions are not conceived as pre-existing, but understood as emerging through regimes of power, as the 'end-product' of power relations.

I borrow the use of these two concepts from Ferguson (1994). In his analysis of development interventions in Lesotho, Ferguson examines how these interventions established a particular conceptual and institutional apparatus, with far-reaching implications:

> [T]he *conceptual apparatus* systematically translated all the ills and ailments of the country into simple, technical problems and thus constituted a suitable object for the apolitical, technical, 'development' intervention which 'development' agencies are in the business of making. […] First, technical problems such as isolation, lack of markets, lack of credit, unfamiliarity with a cash economy, lack of education, lack of fertiliser, lack of tractors, lack of purebred livestock, lack of farmers' associations and cooperatives, and lack of appropriate energy technology are exaggerated

> or invented to take the place of things like unemployment, low wages, influx control, political subjugation by South Africa, and entrenched bureaucratic elites; then an *institutional apparatus* is unleashed to combat these largely illusory technical problems.
>
> (Ferguson 1994: 87–88, my emphasis)

Ferguson demonstrates how the way in which an issue is framed (conceptual apparatus) is intimately linked to the way in which the issue is dealt with (institutional apparatus). Similarly, this book analyses the emergence of a conceptual and institutional apparatus that constitutes the GRT as a regime of practices, both within the international realm and in the context of Mexico.

Power technologies

The third dimension regards power technologies. It has been argued that Foucault provides us not so much with a new theory of power as a new approach to study the problems of power in modern societies (Davidson 1986: 225), as outlined in two of his key books: *Discipline and Punish* (1977a) and *The History of Sexuality* (1978). Foucault's own thinking about the relations between different ways in which he analysed power is far from consistent (Rose 1999: 23). However, we can identify three core characteristics of power that distinguish Foucault's approach. First, power is not a characteristic that can be possessed, it is not something that one can acquire or hold; it is neither 'a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state', nor 'a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body' (Foucault 1978: 92). In that respect, Foucault distances himself both from liberal and Marxist understandings of power. Instead, he conceptualises power as decentred, dispersed, and exercised from many sites and in many ways. Thus, power is not found in one specific site, it is 'everywhere', embedded in social relations. This does not mean, however, that it is all-encompassing: 'Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere' (ibid.: 93).

Second, Foucault emphasises the productive or performative aspects of power relations. Thereby, power is not merely seen in its capacity to prohibit and repress, but its capacity to produce particular social forms is also taken into account; it is 'a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression' (Foucault 1980: 119). This characteristic allows power to function effectively.

In *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault rejects the focus of mainstream analyses on the negative functions of power on sexuality, i.e. the repression and prohibition of sexuality. He calls for a new approach focusing on the productive aspects of power to uncover how specific power relations served to establish 'sexuality' as an object of knowledge and produce specific ways of experiencing sexuality. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault examines how power

relations within the new prison system produce 'docile bodies' through new forms of punishment practices. Third, and linked to the second point, Foucault pushes us to analyse the various sites and locations where power is exerted and produces effects.

In his research on power, Foucault distinguishes between different mechanisms of exercise of power throughout history. In *The History of Sexuality*, he argues that starting in the seventeenth century, two poles of power emerged: disciplinary power[6] and bio-politics (Foucault 1978: 139).

Disciplinary power, or the *anatomo-politics of the human body*, functions at the level of the body. It works to optimise the capabilities of the body, to increase its usefulness and docility and to integrate it into 'systems of efficient and economic controls' (ibid.). Through disciplinary power individuals become subject to management:

> [D]iscipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, 'docile' bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 'aptitude', a 'capacity', which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.
>
> (Foucault 1977a: 138)

Over time, disciplinary power has become one of the core mechanisms of power within modern society and has come to permeate more and more spheres of social life (ibid.: 137). It operates through modifying our understanding and use of space and time. Thus, on the one hand, 'discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space' (ibid.: 141). An example of this is the enclosure of individuals into factories, prisons or schools, linked to the emergence of specific forms of architecture, such as huge enclosed factories or the panopticon (ibid.: 195). On the other hand, disciplinary power also leads to a transformation of the understanding of time, breaking it down into fragments to make it manageable and productive: 'it is a question of extracting, from time, ever more available moments and, from each moment, ever more useful forces' (ibid.: 154). New techniques of taking charge of time introduced the need for individuals to conform to a certain rhythm of time, to be punctual and have a time schedule. This happened through the enclosure of individuals into factories, for example, where they had to change their ways of dealing with time which previously had often been based on natural cycles.

There are three main instruments of disciplinary power, as exemplified in *Discipline and Punish*. The first, hierarchical observation (surveillance), serves to observe people and render visible any incidence of non-compliance to norms (ibid.: 170–71). Sites of such observation are prisons, hospitals, the military or schools. Observation (or surveillance) serves to render individuals visible by collecting information about them and making it available (ibid.). This

information is then used to control and influence the behaviour of the individuals: Through hierarchical observation people are made to think that they are constantly being watched. The awareness of this surveillance results in self-disciplining whereby individuals interiorise the norms of behaviour they are expected to conform to, and they police themselves. There is often a fine line between disciplining and self-disciplining.

Second, disciplinary power works through normalisation or normalising judgement (ibid.: 177). This acts to define norms that are the standard against which individuals' behaviour is to be judged, establishing limits of accepted behaviour. Those who comply with the norms are rewarded, non-compliance is punished and marginalised. The result is to impose a certain homogeneity of behaviour and to induce competition among people to conform and be rewarded. Foucault identifies five elements through which normalisation operates to transform the behaviour of individuals to conform to the norms: comparison, differentiation, hierarchisation, homogenisation and exclusion (ibid.: 182–83).

In a system of 'gratification–punishment' those who comply with the norms are rewarded, non-compliance is punished and marginalised. Thereby, the use of punishment is to be avoided as far as possible, as rewards are more effective than punishment: 'the lazy being more encouraged by the desire to be rewarded in the same way as the diligent than by the fear of punishment' (ibid.: 180). The result is to impose a certain homogeneity of behaviour and to induce competition among people who aim to conform and be rewarded.

The third instrument of disciplinary power is examination, which 'combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement' (ibid.: 184). Examination works through the minute observation and documentation of individual's behaviour and the measuring of their behaviour against the norm, thus making 'each individual a case' (ibid.: 191). Examination enables the acquiring of knowledge about individuals through observation, and links it to the exercise of power to control them through a normalising effect. Thus, the overall objective is to 'transform the economy of visibility into the exercise of power' (ibid.: 187). Sites of examination include the school where exams function as an exchange of knowledge between the pupil and the teacher, ensuring the learning process of the pupil, but simultaneously passing knowledge to the teacher, which becomes the basis for controlling and normalising the behaviour of the pupil. While observation and normalisation focus on techniques of power, examination focuses on the sites or moments where the first two techniques are combined and enacted. To sum up, disciplinary power functions as an efficient means for producing useful individuals and controlling them.

The second pole or mechanism of power, bio-politics or regulatory power, works at the level of the population. Regulation as understood through a Foucauldian approach, aims to exert control over groups of populations and link them to the requirements of capitalist development.[7] Thereby, populations become resources that can be made use of in the process of production. In Foucault's words, the second pole

> focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and *regulatory controls*: a *bio-politics of the population*.
>
> (Foucault 1978: 139)

A series of instruments and interventions were designed in order to gather information about all aspects of populations: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, health situation, patterns of diet and habitation (ibid.: 25). Thereby, 'population' became a field over which control was exerted through the collection of data. In the field of sexuality, for example, bio-politics aimed at regulating and controlling the population through collecting information about its sexual behaviour.

Regulation works through a number of mechanisms, such as defining and classifying populations into different groups, and gathering information about these groups, which turns them into an object of knowledge and allows control to be exerted over them. This then leads to the design of policies targeting these population groups. Thereby, those population groups that are deemed economically or politically useful are included, whereas other groups not fulfilling these criteria are excluded.

As Foucault observes, these two poles of power are linked and interact in a number of ways (ibid.: 146). While the two poles were still relatively separate in the eighteenth century, they combined in the nineteenth century, to mark 'the beginning of an era of "bio-power"' (ibid.: 140). Although not sufficient in itself, bio-power was 'an indispensable element in the development of capitalism', as capitalism 'would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes' (ibid.: 140–41). For analytical purposes, they will be distinguished in this book in order to analyse the disciplinary and regulatory power exerted through the conceptual and institutional apparatuses of the GRT in the international realm and in the context of Mexico of the GRT (Chapter 5).

Subjectivity creation

The fourth dimension of the analytical framework refers to ways of being and 'identification' (Dean 1999: 32): the creation of new forms of subjectivity within a regime of practices. Foucault rejects the idea of a universal, sovereign, transcendental subject that is the foundation of power or knowledge. Instead, he conceptualises subjectivity as created through the power–knowledge relation, whereby the production of new subjectivities happens both through disciplining – which acts to transform the thinking, acting and being of individuals through normalisation and punish–reward systems – and through self-disciplining,

whereby individuals train themselves and adjust their thinking and behaviour to conform to norms (Foucault 1980: 39). Hence, subjects are not essential and born into a pre-existing world, but the two are constitutive. Disciplinary practices act to transform the individual's thinking and behaviour and thereby (re-)produce subjectivity:

> But in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives.
>
> (Foucault 1980: 39)

Hence, the focus of analysis is to 'account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework' (ibid.: 117). In other words, it is to account for the ways in which regimes of practices promote and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents (Dean 1999: 32). This book thus analyses the forms of subjectivities created within the GRT.

Resistance

Foucault's understanding of power could easily give the impression that all resistance is futile, that power is pervasive and irresistible, and that society is completely normalised (Couzens Hoy 1986: 13). Indeed, Foucault has often been criticised in this respect, and it is fair to say that resistance is rather under-theorised in his writings. Moreover, many studies using a governmentality approach focus mainly on investigating how governing works, rather than on how it is resisted (Merlingen 2006: 190). Yet, the close link between the exercise of power and forms of resistance is a key characteristic of Foucault's conception of power. As Merlingen rightly states, 'inscribed in governmentality theory is an ontology that emphasises the likelihood of resistance and the reversibility of power relations' (2006: 190). Power produces resistance, which means that resistance can be found in many sites, and is not only, or necessarily, related to one social group. It is worth quoting Foucault at some length here:

> Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power […] These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: […] by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations. But this does not mean that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to the basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat.
>
> (Foucault 1978: 95–96)

This opens up a vast space for the location of resistances and emphasises the need for context-specific analyses in order to identify resistance strategies located in different sites. Hence, power is never complete; disciplining and regulation can never be total; and there is no situation of absolute subjugation. The docility of individuals is fragile and needs to be reproduced constantly. However, sites of resistance also shift and are not necessarily stable, which poses challenges for the analysis (ibid.: 101). In turn, resistance may also produce counter-resistance or lead to backlashes (see Chapter 6). Hence, forms of resistance are an integral part of the analysis in this book, based on the claim that the GRT as a regime of practices goes hand in hand with specific forms of resistance.

Gendering governmentality

Generally, the term 'gender' has two broad meanings. First, it refers to a dynamic that structures social life, a historically and culturally specific social construction which operates through various mechanisms – such as representations, social structures and institutions, etc. – and which has concrete implications in determining how women and men think, act and live. Second, gender refers to a tool for analysis, a lens through which to make sense of the world. As defined by Peterson and Runyan, a gender-sensitive lens enables 'to "see" how the world is shaped by gendered concepts, practices, and institutions' (1993: 1). This book uses gender as an analytical tool, in order to examine the GRT through a gender-sensitive lens, which means to analyse the gender dimensions of the conceptual and institutional apparatus, the disciplinary and regulatory power, the subjectivity creation, and forms of resistance and empowerment.

A first step in examining the GRT through a gender lens involves highlighting the silences, gendered blind spots and gendered representations within the conceptual apparatus. As feminist scholars have shown, representations are rarely gender-neutral. Thus, for example, post-colonial feminists analyse the gendered representation of the non-Western world and non-Western women in Western discourses (Hirshman 1995; Mohanty 1988; Ong 1988; Spivak 1988).[8] They argue that on the one hand, Western representations of non-Western countries and people are gender-biased, portraying the colonised as the feminine, vulnerable and powerless 'other' – an aspect often also ignored by post-colonial writers.[9] On the other hand, they reveal how Western feminist discourses represent non-Western women[10] as the subordinate other who has not yet reached maturity and modernity (Mohanty 1988: 65). Thus, for example, Marchand and Parpart (1995) highlight the tendency to represent non-Western women in terms of their role as mothers, ignoring other aspects of their lives. Moreover, feminist analyses also emphasise the productive and constitutive power of representations and stereotypes, whereby specific groups of women are targeted with particular interventions – such as fertility control – based on gendered representations. Thus, for example, micro-credit initiatives often specifically target women, based on gendered stereotypes claiming that women are better

credit-takers than men (Lairap 2004; Weber 2002). Feminists have also emphasised the gendered character of dichotomies, whereby dichotomies are commonly associated with gendered characteristics and divided along gender fault lines, and positively valued masculine characteristics are often opposed to negatively valued feminine characteristics, such as in culture–nature. Thus, the gender analysis of the conceptual apparatus of the GRT focuses on gendered representations and their implications.

A second step involves the analysis of the institutional apparatus of the GRT through a gender lens. Feminist literature has highlighted the gendered implications of institutions and practices. As illustrated in the field of development, for example, there is a rich literature on the gender implications of structural adjustment policies (Elson 1989; Sparr 1994), micro-credit initiatives (Lairap 2004; Mayoux 1998; Weber 2002), or Conditional Cash Transfer programmes (Luccisano 2002; Molyneux 2006). Thus, a gender analysis of the institutional apparatus of the GRT involves analysing the gender-specific design, implementation and implications of programmes, instruments and institutions.

This is tightly linked to the third step: analysing the disciplinary and regulatory power of the GRT through a gender lens. Thereby, I draw on existing feminist analyses that challenge the gender-blind Foucaultian conceptualisation of disciplinary and regulatory power and examine the specifically gendered elements of these two forms of power in various areas. In her research on micro-credit programmes in Cameroon, Lairap reveals how micro-credit works as gendered regulatory power to select and target sections of the population with credit; functions as gendered disciplinary power by exerting constant pressure on women borrowers to conform to the norms of the market economy; while at the same time serving as a tool for resistance in some situations (Lairap 2004: 9). Luccisano (2002) analyses the gendered disciplinary and regulatory power in the context of Mexican anti-poverty programmes. Lind (2010) analyses the making of sexual subjectivities in narratives and institutional practices of the global development industry.

The fourth step explores the gendered creation of subjectivities within the GRT. Analysing the link between representations and gendered subjectivities, post-colonial and post-structural feminists have revealed how gendered representations and dichotomies contribute to shape subjectivities (Mohanty 1988; Ong 1988). More concretely, they have analysed how representations of non-Western women contribute to shaping the subjectivities of Western and non-Western women.[11] Lairap (2004) analyses how within micro-credit programmes in Cameroon, new gendered subjectivities are formed and Luccisano (2002) examines the gendered subjectivities that are produced through new Mexican anti-poverty programmes.

Finally, a gender analysis also involves exploring the gendered dimensions of forms of resistance and empowerment within the GRT. Feminists have long emphasised the gender-specific nature of resistance and criticised approaches that neglect more localised and everyday practices of resistance (Marchand

and Runyan 2000; Parpart et al. 2002; Townsend et al. 1999). Instead, they propose a reconceptualisation of resistance, in order to take into account 'multiple forms of resistances and sites of intervention' (Marchand and Runyan 2000: 19), and to consider their contextual and gender-specific nature. Thus, a feminist conceptualisation also considers 'less spectacular' forms of resistance and 'coping strategies' (Marchand 2002: 154). These range from women giving testimony as a strategy of opposition to Latin American dictatorships in the 1980s and 1990s; to the renegotiation of boundaries, such as between private and public, or state and market (ibid.). This feminist reconceptualisation can be combined with a Foucauldian understanding of resistance in order to focus on the small-scale forms of resistance and subtle subversion strategies to the GRT, both collective and individual. As Chapter 6 illustrates, resistance to the GRT occurs in different sites and takes various gender-specific forms.

In feminist theorising, analyses of resistance often include the notion of 'empowerment'. Resistance and empowerment are frequently linked, and yet they are not the same. Within the GRT, resistance can sometimes be experienced as empowering, and some forms of empowerment involve resistance. Yet, other forms of empowerment do not entail resistance and acts of resistance are not always experienced as empowering. Hence, in order to capture this difference, and in order to provide a holistic analysis of the GRT, we need two separate analytical concepts: resistance and empowerment.

At first sight, including the element of 'empowerment' might seem an incongruous assertion from within a Foucauldian approach. Foucault himself is slightly inconsistent in his statements regarding forms of 'empowerment' or 'emancipation' and has been interpreted in multiple ways (Dean 1999: 35). Yet, I suggest that Foucault's governmentality approach can be combined usefully with feminist theory in order to analyse forms of empowerment. Examining how regimes of practices operate, a governmentality analysis denaturalises these regimes and raises awareness of how we have come to conduct ourselves and others, and thereby also brings to light possibilities of thinking and behaving in different ways. In addition, analysing instances where power technologies meet with resistance reveals new openings for doing things differently. Some of these possibilities and openings are considered as instances of empowerment. Yet, Foucault does not provide us with a detailed vocabulary for analysing empowerment. Thus, it is helpful to turn to the extensive feminist literature on this concept.

There are many conflicting definitions of 'empowerment' (Afshar 1998; Afshar and Alikhan 1997; Kabeer 1994; Mayoux 1998; Moser 1989; Parpart et al. 2002; Townsend and Zapata 1999). It goes beyond the scope of this book to undertake a detailed review of this literature. Instead, I provide a brief outline indicating how the concept emerged and is used here to analyse the different forms of empowerment within the GRT. The concept of empowerment was popularised by feminist writers in development studies, such as Sen and Grown (1987) and Moser (1989). Initially, it was perceived as a feminist approach to development that emphasised the agency, self-reliance and bottom-up organisation of

Third World women (ibid.: 1815). Due to its focus on the transformation of power relations, the empowerment concept was perceived as potentially radical and as a challenge to dominant development approaches, and initially did not receive much support from governments or development agencies (ibid.: 1808). Yet, widespread use of this concept since the 1990s has transformed its meaning, and turned it into a 'popular, largely unquestioned "good"', adopted by governments, mainstream development agencies and NGOs alike (Parpart et al. 2002: 3). As Townsend and Zapata note: 'its meaning has become devalued; it can mean whatever the user wants it to mean, not what the audience understands by it' (1999: 2). In the context of neoliberalism, empowerment has often come to be limited to its economic dimension and understood in terms of choice, or as something that the state can do to individuals. Hence, as used by the mainstream, the concept of empowerment has been largely stripped of its potentially radical elements. Yet, rather than risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater, I suggest that the empowerment concept can still be a useful analytical tool. However, there is a need for redefining the concept if it is to be useful for the analysis in this book.

As understood in this analysis, empowerment is necessarily always context-specific. Informed by Parpart et al. (2002) and Townsend and Zapata (1999), the concept is used in the following way: First, empowerment is understood as both subjective and relative. Its meaning varies according to time and space, and is culturally and socially co-determined. This is in line with Townsend and Zapata, who highlight the need to shift the definition of the content of empowerment towards the 'audience', the people who are supposed to be 'empowered'. Thus, instead of working with pre-formulated criteria for empowerment, the analysis here focuses on the sites and experiences that the informants define themselves as empowering. Second, empowerment is understood both as a process and an outcome (Parpart et al. 2002: 4). Third, empowerment does not occur in a vacuum, it does not stand outside but within existing power relations, and forms of empowerment can only be understood within specific contexts (Parpart et al. 2002: 4). Fourth, empowerment has many dimensions, such as political, social and economic, and can be both individual and collective. Finally, empowerment is something that people do themselves; it is not something that can be done to people: empowerment comes from within; it is self-empowerment (Townsend et al. 1999: 24), although external conditions can influence and facilitate empowerment, as Sinquin Feuillye notes:

> *El empoderamiento se construye con avances y retrocesos. En la medida que es eminentemente personal, sus características varían y no son cuantificables. Tampoco surge a partir de condiciones externas, comunque éstas lo puedan facilitar.*[12]
>
> (Sinquin Feuillye 2004: 427)

Hence, the concept of empowerment is used to analyse the experiences of the individuals and groups targeted by the disciplinary and regulatory power of the GRT.

We have now gathered all the required ingredients for a gender-sensitive governmentality analysis of the GRT. Yet, before embarking on such an analysis, it is necessary to shortly outline the broader overall context within which, I argue, the GRT is situated: the shift towards neoliberal governmentality.

Neoliberal governmentality

Using the first meaning of governmentality (see above) allows me to explore whether, and in which ways, the GRT as a regime of practices extends and intensifies a particular form of governing: neoliberal governmentality. Indeed, Foucault himself used a governmentality perspective to analyse the genealogy of the modern state, including neoliberalism. But what is distinctive about neoliberal governmentality? Although Dean warns us that there is more than one type of neoliberalism (1999: 58), I suggest that while neoliberalism manifests itself in many forms, we can identify a number of key elements of neoliberal governmentality relevant to this book. The central features of neoliberalism, understood as 'a novel set of notions about the art of government' (Gordon 1991: 6), are the following: first, the 'marketisation' of the state, whereby the state itself becomes subjected to market principles, such as competition, reward of entrepreneurial behaviour, and laws of supply and demand (Olssen 2003). Furthermore, over time, market rationality is extended to areas that are neither exclusively, nor even primarily, concerned with economics, such as the family, birth rate, delinquency and crime (Dean 1999: 57). Thereby, market laws come to govern society and social relations become increasingly represented as relations of exchange (Olssen 2003). As Larner (2000: 12) states: neoliberalism 'involves forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market'. For Foucault, this extension of market rationality to new areas of social life is not simply a form of repression, but produces new forms of social life and relations, based on an understanding of power as a productive force. Moreover, it also produces new forms of resistance and empowerment (see below).

Second, neoliberal governmentality involves new models of welfare and development. These are characterised by a shift from universal social welfare programmes towards individually targeted poverty reduction and welfare provision initiatives, in an attempt to do more with fewer resources.[13] This leads to the creation of new target groups, such as the 'deserving poor'. A third element is the increasing participation of civil society actors in the implementation of welfare and development programmes, which has triggered a proliferation of actors involved in governing within neoliberalism.

Fourth, these new models result in the growing responsibilisation of citizens for welfare and development. This means that individual subjects and collectives – such as families, associations, or communities – are rendered responsible through 'shifting the responsibility for social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc., and for life in society into the domain for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of "self-care"' (Lemke 2001:

201). Thereby, the state becomes a facilitating state that enables the poor to become responsible for managing their own needs. Responsibilisation is based on the redefinition of civil society as both subject and object of governing (Sending and Neumann 2006: 652) and a redrawing of private–public boundaries. This tendency is illustrated by notions of 'entrepreneurial culture' and 'active society' (Dean 1999: 33), which express the tendency to responsibilise citizens for their own well-being. Yet, responsibilisation also opens new space for resistance and empowerment for individuals and collectives that are being responsibilised (see below). Luccisano (2002) demonstrates the expansion of neoliberal governmentality through Mexican anti-poverty programmes and shows how these are instrumental in creating 'responsible poor citizens'.

Linked to this is a fifth element of neoliberal governmentality: the creation of neoliberal subjectivities through regulation and disciplining. Neoliberal subjectivities can take a number of forms, such as the 'responsible poor citizen' (Luccisano 2002); the 'entrepreneurial poor woman' (Lairap 2004); or the 'informed consumer' (Dean 1999). Thereby, the neoliberal subject is portrayed as 'an entrepreneur of herself or himself', and the individual is normalised into investing in 'human capital to obtain both monetary earnings and psychic and cultural satisfactions' (ibid.: 57). Analysing transformations with neoliberalism, Lemke (2001: 202) argues that there is a shift of 'the regulatory competence of the state onto "responsible" and "rational" individuals' (Lemke 2001: 202).

A sixth element of neoliberal governmentality, linked to the responsibilisation of individuals and the creation of responsible subjectivities, is the redefinition of civil society 'from a passive object of government to be acted upon into an entity that is both an object and a subject of government' (Sending and Neumann 2006: 652). Thereby, civil society is both being governed, and brought into the task of governing, through 'contractual implication':

> This involves 'offering' individuals and collectivities active involvement in action to resolve the kind of issues hitherto held to be the responsibility of authorized governmental agencies. However, the price of this involvement is that they must assume active responsibility for these activities, both for carrying them out and, of course, for their outcomes, and in so doing they are required to conduct themselves in accordance with the appropriate (or approved) model of action. This might be described as a new form of 'responsibilization' corresponding to the new forms in which the governed are encouraged, freely and rationally, to conduct themselves.
>
> (Burchell 1993: 276)

This implication of civil society actors in governing results in a seventh characteristic of neoliberal governmentality, which is its 'dual nature': 'There is thus a dual nature […] typical of advanced liberal government: [it] at the same time enables and opens up new possibilities for its subjects, and restrains these subjects as they are made subjects of a certain calculative and disciplinary

regime' (Haahr 2004: 209). Hence, through their involvement in governing, civil society actors are both disciplined, but can also become empowered and conquer new spaces for action. This contradictory and paradoxical nature of neoliberalism has also been noted by other scholars (e.g. Goldring 2002; Marchand 2002). Lind explores this fundamental paradox in relation to queer studies and activism:

> [N]eoliberalism, a set of policies that emphasize market-led development, including economic liberalization, privatization, state retrenchment, and the general insertion of national economies into the global 'free market', have contributed to heightened forms of gender, sexual, cultural and economic normativity within and among cultures and nations undergoing neoliberal reforms and related initiatives […] Yet specific neoliberal ideologies and policy processes have opened new terrain for queer activism and political subjectivities as well: as sexual rights NGOs have played increasing roles in the new neoliberal public-private partnerships and to the extent that sexual rights activists, like feminist activists, agree to pick up where the state left off, they have acquired some visibility in national development and political processes.
>
> (Lind 2010: 18)

This book explores whether, and in what ways, the GRT is based upon, and reproduces, these elements of neoliberal governmentality. We will come back to this in the final chapter.

Conclusion

The concepts laid out in this chapter are employed in the following way throughout the book: The genealogical method informs the analysis of the emergence of the GRT as a regime of practices in the international realm (Chapter 3) and the context of Mexico (Chapter 4). Thereby, the aim is not to undertake a complete genealogy of the GRT, which would be too big an endeavour for one book. Rather, I use the genealogical method as a guideline for the analysis in terms of the types of questions to ask and the things to look for: How have migration, remittances and development become discursively linked and widely discussed? What is being said about them and who says what and from which perspective? What are the effects of power generated by what is being said? What knowledge was formed about this linkage? I use the genealogical procedure in combination with the concepts of institutional and conceptual apparatus. The aim is to demonstrate how a conceptual and institutional apparatus emerged around the migration–remittances–development nexus and was turned into an object of knowledge and intervention that constitutes the GRT. A gender lens will be applied to explore the gender dimensions of the conceptual and the institutional apparatuses of the GRT. In a further step, the power technologies of the conceptual and

institutional apparatuses are analysed in Chapter 5, focusing on the regulatory and disciplinary power through a gender-sensitive lens. Chapter 5 also analyses how the GRT works to create gendered forms of subjectivities. Focusing on the link between power and resistance recognises the capacity of the GRT to produce particular forms of resistance and empowerment, which is the objective of Chapter 6. The aim is to explore the variety of strategies that groups and individuals have devised in gender-specific ways to resist and subvert the disciplinary and regulatory power of the GRT, and to get empowered. The Conclusion, Chapter 7, comes back to the question of whether, and in what ways, the GRT as a regime of practices contributes to the spreading of gendered forms of neoliberal governmentality.

3 The GRT in the international realm

> Remittances – a powerful tool to reduce poverty if effectively harnessed.
> (World Bank 2005)

Introduction

In the international realm, a great variety of institutions has become interested in the development potential of remittances, and has devised strategies to harness this potential. Thereby remittances have become conceptualised as an instrument to finance development and poverty reduction. Using a genealogical method, this chapter examines the emergence of the GRT in the international realm. The aim is to reveal how the GRT emerged, how it is constituted by a conceptual and institutional apparatus, and what its gender dimensions are. This prepares the grounds for analysing the regulatory and disciplinary power in Chapter 5. The choice of starting the analysis with the international realm is purely analytical and does not imply a top-down approach assuming that the GRT works from the international to the national to the local level. As set out in the previous chapter, the genealogical method is used in this book to analyse the emergence of the conceptual and institutional apparatus of the GRT as a regime of practices. The chapter is divided into six main sections: the next section traces the emergence of the GRT within the international realm through a few milestones, the third and fourth sections dissect the institutional and conceptual apparatuses of the GRT, followed by a gender analysis in the fifth section and a conclusion.

The birth of the GRT

At the heart of the GRT lies a major shift in thinking about migration and development. Traditionally, there was a tendency to perceive migration as either a completely distinct area of concern from development, or the outcome of lacking or failed development. Within this view, poverty is seen as the root cause of migration and it is believed that through aid and development migration can be prevented or at least mitigated.[1] For a long time, this conventional

view was the mainstream approach within the international community, adopted by states and international institutions alike.[2]

In the 1990s a new paradigm emerges, whereby the two areas of migration and development become linked in the so-called 'migration-development nexus' (Sørensen et al. 2002). Migration is no longer seen as a *problem*, but as a *tool* for development. Within this approach, migration is taken as a fact and the aim is to manage migration and harness remittances in such a way as to increase their impact on development in the countries of origin. Thus, the linkages between migration and development are perceived mainly in a positive way. This shift was emphasised by the International Conference on Migrant Remittances in 2003 which concluded that:

> [Migration] is no longer simply seen as a failure of development but increasingly as an integral part of the whole process of development with a potentially important role to play in the alleviation of poverty.
> (Department for International Development and World Bank 2003: 11)

It is important to note that the emergence of the migration–development nexus has not meant a complete paradigm shift, as some have it, or the eradication of the conventional paradigm. Rather, different institutions adopt the two paradigms to different extents and in different ways, as we shall see below. In some cases there is a combination of the two approaches, which may result in the co-existence of inconsistent policies. Thus, for example, there is typically a disagreement between internal affairs departments and development departments of destination countries. Internal affairs departments have to deal with the implications of migration for the receiving country and the often negative attitudes of the population towards immigrants, which tends to produce more restrictive approaches to migration, whereas development departments, given their field of concern, are often in favour of relative openness towards migration. The UK Home Office, for example, tends to adopt a more conventional approach aimed at preventing migration, whereas the Department for International Development (DfID) is among the frontrunners of the GRT. Within the EU there is also a certain policy incoherence and there are a number of obstacles to achieving policy coordination.[3]

This shift in thinking about the links between migration and development resulted in efforts by the international community to find out more about the nature of these links, and how they could be influenced in order to increase the positive impacts of migration and remittances on development. Thereby, remittances have become the centre of attention, which led to the emergence of the GRT.[4] The emergence of the GRT is situated against this shift towards the migration–development nexus. In what follows, a number of milestones shall be identified.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) was among the first international institutions to point to the importance of migrant remittances. As early as 1949, the ILO Convention on Migration for Employment (no. 97) refers to

the 'earning and savings of the migrant' and urges countries to allow migrants to transfer remittances (International Labour Organization 1949: Article 9). The ILO focus was right from the start on migrants' rights, among which the 'right to remit'. Yet, at this stage, the ILO did not yet make an explicit link between migration, remittances and development. However, this demonstrates how the ILO has considered, albeit in a different context, the issue of remittances long before the term was used and long before the recent interest in remittances emerged towards the turn of the millennium.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is somewhat a pioneer of the new migration–development paradigm. According to its mission statement, the IOM is 'committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society' and acts to encourage social and economic development through migration.[5] Thus, linking migration and development and focusing on its positive linkages have been part of IOM's mission right from the start. In 1964, well before the broad emergence of the migration–development nexus, the IOM (then called ICEM) launched the Migration for Development programmes aimed at recruiting and placing highly qualified migrants to developing countries in Latin America, and in 1974, the Return of Talent Programme for Latin Americans Residing Abroad.[6] Within the broader international community, these were rather isolated efforts to link migration to development and are certainly to be understood in the raison d'être of the institution itself. In addition, the IOM focus was not explicitly on the development potential of migrant remittances.

One of the first milestones in the emergence of the GRT is the Cairo Programme of Action, which noted in 1994 that migration has potential benefits for both the country of origin which receives remittances, and for the country of destination which obtains needed human resources.[7] The Programme also urged source countries to implement policies to facilitate the transfer of remittances and to channel them towards productive investment.

In November 2000, the ILO organised a conference on 'Making the Best of Globalisation: Migrant Worker Remittances and Micro-Finance' in order to 'assess possibilities and constraints for channelling remittances through microfinance institutions towards productive investments' (International Labour Organization 2000: 2).

The issue of remittances was also addressed in the Monterrey Consensus. This Consensus is part of the Report adopted at the International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD summit) which was held in 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico. The aim of this conference was to consider new sources to finance development and efforts to achieve the MDGs. It was the first United Nations-hosted conference to address financial and development issues and provides 'the new global approach to financing development' (FfD website). The issue of remittances is addressed within the area of domestic financial resources. The Consensus states: 'It is also important to reduce the transfer costs of migrant workers' remittances and create opportunities for development-oriented investments, including housing' (United Nations 2002: §18).

In response to growing awareness of the implications of international migration, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) was established in 2003, on the encouragement of the UN secretary-general.[8] Its main mandate was to 'anayls[e] gaps in current policy approaches to migration and examin[e] inter-linkages with other issue-areas' such as development, trade, security and human rights.[9] GCIM activities mainly focused on preparing and promoting its final report, but it also organised a series of regional hearings and expert meetings, bringing together a number of actors involved in migration and development issues. For instance, the Regional Hearing for the Americas was held on 16–17 May 2005 in Mexico City and included participants from governments, regional bodies and experts, and civil society.[10]

Before 2003, the World Bank was a relatively minor player in the GRT. This changed rapidly with the publication of the Global Development Finance Annual Report in 2003, entitled *Worker's Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance*. In this report, the World Bank took for the first time formal notice of remittances as a source of development finance, raising global awareness of the development potential of migration and remittances. Chapter 7 on 'Worker's Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance', suggests that remittances have become an important source of development financing, and discusses measures to increase remittances and thereby their positive impact on development (Ratha 2003: 157). Thereby, remittances are referred to as 'an increasingly prominent source of external funding for many developing countries' (ibid.). This publication illustrates the approach of the World Bank to the issue, i.e. with the main focus on the financial aspects of the issue and on the transfer of remittances. It was followed by a number of World Bank empirical studies within its Research Program on International Migration. What is interesting to note is that the World Bank does not explicitly mention earlier efforts and activities by other institutions, such as the ILO for example, to address the issue of remittances. As shall be analysed below, with the entry of the World Bank onto the GRT stage, the discourse shifted towards a more financial framing of the issues of migration, remittances and development.

Later in 2003, the first international meeting focusing entirely on migrant remittances, entitled 'International Conference on Migrant Remittances: Development Impact, Opportunities for the Financial Sector and Future Prospects', took place in London, organised jointly by DfID and the World Bank in collaboration with the International Migration Policy Programme (IMP) (see Introduction). The conference report makes reference to the Monterrey Consensus, quoting the above-mentioned sentence on migrant worker remittances (Department for International Development and World Bank 2003: 3). In 2006, the second International Conference on Migration Remittances was organised again by the World Bank and DfID.[11]

At the Sea Island Summit in 2004, the G8 adopted the Action Plan, 'Applying the Power of Entrepreneurship to the Eradication of Poverty'. This Action Plan recognises the key role remittances can play in private-sector development

efforts, and commits to reduce the transfer costs for remittances and to increase financial options for the recipients of remittances in order to maximise their developmental impacts.[12]

In 2005, the first International Forum on Remittances took place at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) headquarters in Washington DC, organised by the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF). For the first time, this included a session on gender and remittances, which was co-organised by INSTRAW (United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW). Prompted by the increase in remittances in LAC region, the MIF started to get involved in the GRT at the beginning of the new millennium and has become one of the major players in the field of remittances, focusing on activities such as research, the organisation of conferences, and concrete migration-linked development projects. In May 2001, the IDB/MIF organised the first ever Latin American conference on remittances entitled 'Remittances as a Development Tool: A Regional Conference'.[13]

In March 2006, the Conference on Migration and Development took place in Brussels, jointly organised by the Belgium government, the IOM, the World Bank and the European Commission.[14] The purpose of the conference was to discuss:

> how migration and related policies can contribute to economic development in countries of origin or transit, and how development policies in turn can address root causes of migration such as poverty and lack of socio-economic prospects, and ease the pressures on people to emigrate unwillingly.[15]

The Brussels conference also aimed at preparing an input for the United Nations High Level Dialogue Meeting on International Migration and Development. Launched in December 2003 through General Assembly resolution 58/208, the first High-Level Dialogue took place in New York in September 2006 and brought together a broad range of institutions. The Dialogue aimed:

> to discuss the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development in order to identify appropriate ways and means to maximise its development benefits and minimise its negative impacts. Additionally, the high-level dialogue should have a strong focus on policy issues, including the challenge of achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals.
>
> (United Nations 2006)

As a result of the High-Level Dialogue, many states expressed their interest in continuing the dialogue by means of an informal, voluntary and state-led forum, which led to the establishment of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). The first meeting of the GFMD took place in Brussels in July 2007, to mark the start of a new global process designed to enhance the positive impact of migration on development (and vice versa) by

adopting a more consistent policy approach, identifying new instruments and best practices, exchanging experience about innovative tactics and methods, and establishing cooperation between the various actors involved.[16] The second Global Forum on Migration and Development was held in Manila in October 2008, the third was hosted by Athens in 2009, and the fourth in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, in November 2010.

Another important forum that has recently received renewed importance in the GRT is the Global Migration Group (GMG). It grew out of an existing inter-agency group, the Geneva Migration Group, which was established in April 2003 by the heads of ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UNCTAD, UNHCR and UNODC. In early 2006 membership in the Geneva Migration Group was expanded to include DESA, UNDP, UNFPA and the World Bank, and in 2007 the Regional Commissions, UNESCO, UNICEF and UNITAR joined. The GMG meets at regular intervals at the level of heads of agencies, and aims to promote the application of relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration, and the provision of more coherent and stronger leadership to improve the overall effectiveness of the United Nations and the international community's policy and operational response to the opportunities and challenges presented by international migration.[17]

Later in 2007, the second International Forum on Remittances took place in Washington DC, organised by the MIF in cooperation with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The aim of this conference was 'to shed light on the rural dimension of [remittance] flows, estimated at 40 per cent of total flows, [to] explore the links between remittances and banking, technology and microfinance, and discuss ways to integrate development agencies' agendas on remittances'.[18] The conference emphasised the potential of remittances to empower women:

> Women represent almost half of the estimated 200 million economic migrants in the world, and they are also often the heads of households that receive remittances. Remittances can enhance the economic status of women and change traditional gender roles and ideologies. However, very little research has been conducted on the gender dimension of remittances. The development potential of remittances can be increased by looking at remittances from a gender perspective.[19]

An institution that has recently become involved in the GRT is the OECD, with publications and participation in events. A study published by the OECD Development Centre concludes that international migration contributes to economic growth and poverty reduction in the migrant-sending country through the three channels of labour supply, changes in productivity and remittances (OECD 2007: 12). The main recommendation is that OECD countries 'look at their migration policies through a development lens', whereas developing countries should 'look at their development policies through a migration lens' (ibid.: 16).

In January 2008, the Center for Migration Studies (CMS) and the IOM held a conference on 'International Migration and Development: Continuing the Dialogue: – Legal and Policy Perspective', aimed at assessing where the dialogue on international migration and development is headed.[20]

This outline of the key milestones in the emergence of the GRT in the international realm reveals a number of characteristics of the institutional and conceptual apparatus of the GRT. First, there is a broad variety of institutional practices involved in the GRT, creating a dense network of activities in the field and constituting an institutional apparatus. Second, these institutions focus on different aspects of the GRT and adopt different ways of framing the links between migration, remittances and development, which has generated competing discourses within the conceptual apparatus of the GRT. These discourses coexist, struggle and shift over time. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between two competing discourses within the GRT: the narrow economic, money-based approach (adopted mainly by international financial institutions) versus the rights-based, people-centred approach based on a broad understanding of the linkages between migration and development (adopted by the ILO and the IOM for example).

Over the last few years, there has been a shift within the international community from the broader, more 'rights-based' approach towards the narrower 'money-based' discourse. Thereby, the focus moved from the more general linkages between migration and development towards monetary aspects of the development impact of remittances. This shift is linked to the changing influence of different international institutions in the framing of the issue at the international level. For a long time, it was mainly the ILO and the IOM that dealt with issues linked to migration and development. Their focus was on protecting migrant's rights in terms of decent working conditions and the right to remit, and on harnessing the potential development impact of their return to the country of origin. These institutions adopted a rather cautious view regarding the consequences of migration, taking into account the potentially negative effects of migration and remittances. When the issue was taken up by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF and regional development banks, it was reframed in a more narrow way, whereby the focus moved towards the financial aspects of migration – remittances – and their potential to reduce poverty and finance development. According to this discourse, remittances are the most visible feature of international migration and they are seen as being endowed with many positive characteristics and the potential to contribute to development and poverty reduction in the sending countries of origin. Within this discourse, optimism about the development potential of remittances predominates, and the challenges of migration and remittances are seen to be outweighed by their positive impacts.

However, this shift does not mean that the rights-based discourse no longer exists. On the contrary, there is a continued debate over the framing of the issue, both between institutions and within institutions. These struggles over the framing of the issue take place on different platforms, such as the UN High-level

Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the GFMD, but also at NGO events, through publications and lobbying activities, etc. It remains to be seen whether this debate will contribute to a re-framing of the issue, which could broaden the agenda and give more importance to non-financial aspects of the nexus between migration and development. Before turning to a more detailed examination of these two discourses and how they have shifted over time, the next section provides an analysis of the institutional apparatus of the GRT in the international realm.

Institutional apparatus of the GRT in the international realm

Today, there are many different institutions involved in the GRT, including international organisations (e.g. ILO, IOM); international financial institutions (e.g. World Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank); national development agencies of migrant-receiving countries (e.g. DFID, USAID); NGOs (e.g. Inter-American Dialogue, Women's World Banking); and government institutions of major migrant-sending countries like Mexico and the Philippines. Over time, more and more members of the international community have become involved in the GRT in one form or another.

All these institutions and their activities make up what I call the institutional apparatus of the GRT. This apparatus serves to distribute norms and build consensus around the GRT, but it is also a site for struggle and contestation over different discourses and policies. It goes beyond the scope of this book to undertake a detailed analysis of all the institutions and activities within the institutional apparatus of the GRT. The aim of this section is more modest; it concentrates on a few key institutions of the GRT most relevant to this book: the World Bank, the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank, the Global Commission on International Migration, the International Labour Organization, and UN-INSTRAW. As mentioned above, these are not the only relevant institutions to the GRT, but they are good illustrations of the two main discourses. In what follows, the involvement of each institution in the GRT and the reason why it was selected will be briefly presented, before we focus on the institutional practices within the GRT.

The World Bank

As mentioned above, the World Bank officially joined the GRT in 2003 (Ratha 2003). It has since become one of the leading and most influential institutions of the GRT and migration, remittances and development have gained importance in the work of the World Bank, as stated on its website: 'international migration and development is now a key area for World Bank research, including work on the brain drain, temporary mobility, the links with foreign direct investment, and the role of remittances'.[21] This is the case not only in its research, but also in its operational work: 'The importance of migration is increasing in our analytical and operational work'.[22] In the future, the Bank is planning 'to

integrate remittance issues into its country work, to help countries address impediments and strengthen their domestic environments to attract and better use remittances' (Maimbo 2005).

In 2003, the World Bank website contained few references to migration, remittances and development, and these were scattered. Since then, the issues of migration and remittances have to some extent been mainstreamed throughout World Bank units and activities. Numerous sections within the World Bank system are now involved in the GRT: The Poverty Reduction Group,[23] the World Bank's Development Prospects Group,[24] the Social Protection Unit,[25] the Development Research Group,[26] and different regional sections. In order to facilitate communication within the World Bank on its analytical and operational activities in the field of migration, the Migration and Development Thematic Group was established.[27] The overall justification of the Bank's involvement in the GRT is based on the wish to 'promote better coherence and coordination of international organisations working to enhance remittance services and heighten the developmental impact of remittance receipts' (Maimbo 2005). The experts within the World Bank who are working on migration and development are mainly economists or financial sector specialists.[28] This is not only due to the general tendency of the Bank to hire mostly economists, but is an explicit strategy.[29]

The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Within the IDB Group, it is the MIF that deals with the issue of remittances. The MIF was established in 1993 to encourage the growing role of the private sector in the LAC region and aims to increase access to financial services, especially for micro and small entrepreneurs.[30] The MIF plays a pioneering role in the GRT and is a key influence in the discourse and policies adopted in the LAC region, and particularly in Mexico. The MIF's rationale for joining the GRT are the profound implications of remittances flows for the economic integration of the hemisphere and 'the future course of economic development in receiving countries' (Multilateral Investment Fund 2002: 4).

The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)

In response to growing awareness of the implications of international migration, the GCIM was established in 2003, on the encouragement of the UN secretary-general in order to 'anayls[e] gaps in current policy approaches to migration and examin[e] inter-linkages with other issue-areas', such as development, trade, security and human rights.[31] Its mandate was accomplished with the publication of its final report (Global Commission on International Migration 2005).[32] The GCIM has had considerable influence on the framing of the GRT in the international realm and its report is a key document that also served as input for the UN High-Level Dialogue in 2006.

The International Labour Organization (ILO)

Based on its mission – the promotion of social justice and internationally recognised human and labour rights – the International Labour Organization (ILO) has a long history of engagement in the protection of migrant worker rights and the promotion of 'decent work' and labour rights to reduce poverty. The ILO estimates that due to its tripartite structure it has a unique role to play in migration and development issues. The ILO was among the first institutions to get involved in the GRT with the publication of a working paper in 1999 (International Labour Organization 1999b), which engendered a lot of interest in the topic and led to the 2000 ILO conference in Geneva (Bernd Balkenhol, ILO, Geneva, personal interview, March 2007). With its more rights-based approach, the ILO is an important actor in the GRT and challenges many elements of the discourse and policies of the World Bank and the MIF, for example. However, over time, the ILO somewhat lost momentum and therewith its leading role in the field, which led to the World Bank and other institutions taking over. According to Bernd Balkenhol, director of the Social Finance Programme of the ILO, this was partly due to the organisational and funding structures of the ILO and the lack of will of ILO member states to follow up the issue (ibid.). In the last few years, the ILO had to re-orient itself to find its role within the GRT, and has regained momentum with the UN High-level Dialogue.

Within the ILO there are two sections working on issues linked to migration: the MIGRANT programme and the Social Finance Unit. MIGRANT is part of the Social Protection sector and focuses on the protection of migrants' rights and their integration in countries of origin and destination; the forging of an international consensus on managing migration; and research on international migration. The Social Finance Unit (SFU) belongs to the Employment sector and is based on the idea that sustainable finance and improved access to financial services can be used to promote decent work and poverty reduction.[33] Thus, the SFU deals mainly with the financial aspects of migration, i.e. remittances, and their investment in microfinance, but also with the costs and risks related to migration. Given their different emphasis within the GRT, the two ILO sections sometimes adopt different discourses (see below).

UN-INSTRAW

INSTRAW, an autonomous UN research and training institute dedicated to the advancement of women and gender equality worldwide, was created by the ECOSOC in 1976, following the recommendation of the first United Nations World Conference on Women held in Mexico City in 1975. INSTRAW's main activities are research and the diffusion of knowledge through training seminars (INSTRAW 2004: 3). The field of remittances is one of three main areas of INSTRAW's activities. INSTRAW is among the pioneers in highlighting the gender dimensions of migration and remittances and it is thus a key

institution to be considered when analysing the gender dimensions of migration, remittances and development.

Institutional practices

Analysing the activities within the institutional apparatus of the GRT we can identify five key areas: monitoring, research, conferences, coalition-building and concrete projects. Table 3.1 visualises the institutional apparatus within the international realm, as examined in this chapter.

In cooperation with national banks and money transfer companies, the World Bank and the MIF focus on monitoring and forecasting remittance and migration flows; and creating reliable and comparative indicators and statistical data on migration and remittances.[34] The last eight years or so have seen an enormous amount of research on the impacts of remittances on development, and on the challenges involved in harnessing remittances for development. The World Bank, for example, publishes the *Migration and Development Briefs*,[35] the *Migration and Remittance Factbook* that compiles data to present a global overview of migration and remittances,[36] and it has introduced the issue of remittances into its annual flagship publications, the *Global Economic Prospects* and the *Global Development Finance Report*, which brought remittances to the attention of the international community. Within the Bank, this information and analysis is used by senior and executive management for planning, investment and policy-advice purposes.[37] The MIF has pioneered remittance research in the LAC region and has commissioned over 100 publications.[38] MIF studies have contributed to draw international attention to the surge in remittances in the LAC region (De Haas 2006: 13). A recent compilation of remittance-linked data of LAC countries was published on the MIF website in the form of an interactive map, including country snapshots with information on the amount of remittances received and the percentage of GDP they constitute; where the remittances come from; used transfer mechanisms; a profile of remittance senders and receivers; mechanism, cost, frequency and amount of remittance transfers; and use of remittances.[39] Apart from the Final Report, the GCIM has also published a series of papers on a wide variety of issues linked to migration in its online research paper series, *Global Migration*

Table 3.1 Institutional apparatus of the GRT within the international realm (selected institutions)

Institutions	*Activities*				
	Monitoring	*Research*	*Conferences*	*Coalition-building*	*Projects*
World Bank	X	X	X	X	
MIF	X	X	X	X	X
GCIM		X	X		
ILO		X	X	X	X
UN-INSTRAW		X	X	X	

Perspectives.[40] The ILO is also involved in research on migration and remittances, for example in its attempt to build 'a global knowledge base on labour migration through research, information and an online international labour migration (ILM) database' where one of its focal point is the productive use of remittances (International Labour Organization 2006a: 77). To this end, it has published a number of working papers on migration and development issues (International Labour Organization 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2004a, 2004b), a special edition of *Labour Education Online* on migrant workers (International Labour Organization 2002) and has also commissioned case studies on remittances.[41] In 2003, INSTRAW started the research area Gender, Remittances and Development, developing a conceptual framework on gender and remittances and publishing case studies in cooperation with other institutions (such as UNFPA and UNDP).[42]

This proliferation of research has been accompanied by an explosion of events on remittances, as shown above. In addition, new platforms have been established at the international level, including conference cycles and fora, such as the International Forum on Remittances, and the GFMD. The large number of publications by various institutions and their distribution through numerous conferences and workshops contributes to raise awareness of the existence and alleged development potential of remittances. They also contribute to spread a specific discourse within the international realm (see below). Furthermore, as shall be analysed in Chapter 5, research establishing detailed portraits of remittance senders and receivers serve to create new groups of population, such as the remittance senders and receivers, and to render them visible, in an attempt to regulate them.

Another important activity within the GRT is the building of coalitions and new forms of cooperation between the different institutions. Thus, for example, the World Bank has been involved in the creation of a number of working groups and new institutional frameworks, such as the inter-agency Task Force on Remittances.[43] The ILO has also established cooperation with a number of institutions (such as the IOM, UNFPA, UNITAR and the World Bank), plays an active role in the Berne initiative, and has received support from the European Commission for the Plan of Action (International Labour Organization 2006a: 78). These forms of cooperation also serve as platforms for creating and distributing knowledge on remittances and development.

Finally, a number of institutions are also involved in concrete projects linking migration and remittances to development. To date, the MIF supports more than forty projects linked to remittances, of which some have a regional and others a country-specific focus.[44] Most MIF remittance project funding goes to financial institutions to set up new technologies to improve and reduce costs of remittance transfer mechanisms through loans and technical assistance to financial institutions. Some funding goes to entrepreneurial migrants with remittances, based on the MIF framing portraying migrants as entrepreneurs (see below) (Multilateral Investment Fund 2004: 26ff.). In 2004, the ILO embarked upon a project entitled Labour Migration for Integration and

Development in Africa.[45] The ILO was also involved in establishing a pilot project in Mexico – Mujeres y Desarrollo de San Lorenzo: Proyecto Productivo Binacional – that will be analysed in more detail in the following chapters.

Conceptual apparatus of the GRT in the international realm

The conceptual apparatus of the GRT is made up of two main aspects: two core assumptions shared by most institutions within the GRT, and two main competing discourses: the 'money-based' and the 'rights-based' discourse. Linked to institutional and power constellations, these discourses shift over time and there is a constant struggle over competing discourses within the GRT. I now first outline the core common assumptions within the conceptual apparatus and then examine with more detail the two competing discourses within the GRT.

There are two core assumptions that most institutions involved in the GRT have come to share. These represent a shift from earlier assumptions about the links between migration, remittances and development. First, in the shift towards the migration–development nexus, migration is generally perceived as a positive process or as a *fait accompli*, and its development potential is emphasised. The objective is to manage migration in order to maximise its positive impacts on development and poverty reduction. Second, the focus is generally on the positive characteristics of remittances: remittances are being compared to other sources of external finance (such as FDI and aid) and in comparison to these sources, remittances are said to be relatively stable; counter-cyclical (i.e. they increase in times of economic downturn); evenly distributed among development countries; and received by low-income countries and even by so-called 'failed states'. The following quotes illustrate these shared assumptions:

> International migration has the potential to play a very positive role in the process of human development, bringing benefits to people in poorer and more prosperous countries alike. The Global Commission on International Migration underlines the need for the international community to maximise these benefits and to capitalise on the resourcefulness of people who seek to improve their lives by moving from one country to another … Significantly, remittances tend to be more predictable and stable than FDI or ODA … Remittances help to lift recipients out of poverty, increase and diversify household incomes, provide an insurance against risk, enable family members to benefit from educational and training opportunities and provide a source of capital for the establishment of small businesses.
>
> (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 5, 26)

> Remittances are also more stable than private capital flows, which often move pro-cyclically, thus raising incomes during booms and depressing them during downturns. By contrast, remittances are less volatile – and may even rise – in response to economic cycles in the recipient country.
>
> (Ratha 2003: 157 [World Bank])

> Remittances are agile transactions that respond to neither market fluctuations, as the exportation of primary goods does, nor to the volatility of foreign investment. On the contrary, remittances are stable and can be counter-cyclical in times of economic recession.
>
> (Ramirez et al. 2005: 15 [INSTRAW])

> In the long run, international migration is beneficial, helping to distribute opportunities and resources more efficiently and offering advantages to sending and receiving countries and the migrants themselves. In the short term, however, unregulated migration can be disruptive and may have unnecessary and unacceptable social consequences, on the one hand leading to the exploitation of clandestine workers, and on the other encouraging attitudes and behaviour that can be politically dangerous.
>
> (International Labour Organization 1999a)

While most institutions in the GRT share these assumptions, they differ on other issues. In addition to competing discourses *between* different international institutions, there is also a competition of discourses *within* institutions, between different departments, of both international organisations and states, for example within the ILO or the World Bank. The multitude of units within the Bank working on migration, remittances and development issues creates a certain diversity of discourses. Thus, for example, the Social Protection and Labor Sector focuses on issues linked to labour migration, such as the benefits from increased international labour mobility, skill transfers across borders, remittances, and migration as a 'social risk management tool' for households.[46] Meanwhile, the Poverty Reduction Group focuses more on the effects of international migration on social and economic development, including issues such as the health and education impacts of remittances, and the consequences of brain drain.[47] However, as we shall see below, it is still possible to identify a general World Bank framing of the GRT.

Figure 3.1 shows how the different institutions can be situated in a diagram of the two main discourses within the international realm. While the money-



Figure 3.1 Main discourses within the conceptual apparatus of the GRT in the international realm (selected institutions)

based discourse is adopted mainly by international financial institutions, it is increasingly also taken up by other institutions. In this book, the money-based discourse is illustrated with the World Bank and the MIF. The GCIM and INSTRAW also take on a number of elements of this discourse, but challenge other elements, which is why they are situated between the money-based and the rights-based discourse. The rights-based discourse is illustrated by the ILO. This diagram is only an approximate classification of the different institutions reflecting their general tendency. The two discourses are analysed according to the following criteria: (a) key issues and actors, (b) representation of remittances, (c) representation of migrants, (d) policy focus.

The money-based discourse

As outlined above, the economic, money-based discourse of the GRT has become prominent over time within the changing constellation of institutional involvement in the GRT, and can be characterised as follows. The main focus of the money-based discourse is on remittances. Thereby, remittances are portrayed as the most important and visible feature of international migration, as exemplified by the following World Bank quote: 'Money remitted home is one of the most visible – and beneficial – outcomes of global migration' (World Bank 2005). Despite being critical of many elements of the money-based discourse, as shall be analysed below, INSTRAW's earlier writings also adopted this focus on remittances (Ramirez et al. 2005: 1).

According to this discourse, remittances are seen as being endowed with many positive characteristics and the potential to contribute to development and poverty reduction in the sending countries of origin. Thus, optimism about the development potential of remittances predominates, and the challenges of migration and remittances are seen to be outweighed by their positive impacts. The emphasis on remittances implies that other issues linked to international migration are of less importance and has led to their marginalisation.

Another important focus within the money-based discourse is on the multiplier effect of remittances. The underlying idea of the notion of the multiplier effect is that when remittances are spent on the purchase of food, clothing or other consumer items, they can create a series of positive effects by circulating through local, regional and national economies, producing economic growth. The multiplier effect results from increased demand and the creation of employment (Binford 2004: 7). Thus, for example, the 2003 *Global Development Finance Report* states: 'If remittances are invested, they contribute to output growth, and if they are consumed, then also they generate positive multiplier effects' (Ratha 2003: 164). Similarly to the World Bank, the MIF also uses the notion of the multiplier effect to emphasise the developmental potential of remittances and to justify the optimism within the MIF framing (Multilateral Investment Fund 2004: 10). The multiplier effect is a key discursive strategy in arguing for the positive implications of remittances on development in developing countries. However, many studies have since

challenged the potential benefits of the multiplier effect for development,[48] and the term has lost some of its importance. This is an interesting development and illustrates, first, that the money-based discourse has changed over time and adopted a slightly more cautious tone; and second, that critical studies in the area of remittances and development have to some extent managed to challenge the general optimism and enthusiasm within the money-based discourse. Thus, for example in more recent documents by the World Bank, we can observe a broadening of the discourse to include concerns about the negative implications of migration and remittances. However, the World Bank continues to emphasise the positive implications of migration and its benefits for development and poverty reduction.

The main actors that are deemed relevant to the GRT by the money-based discourse are assumed to be the country of origin, the country of destination and the migrants, as the following quote by senior World Bank economist François Bourguignon illustrates:

> [I]nternational migration will likely entail various costs for these actors. For origin countries, these costs include the loss of skilled migrants' positive impact on society and the resources used to educate them. Migrants are likely to suffer from the separation from family, friends, and culture, and from the lack of effective legal protection. Costs for destination countries include the perceived threat to cultural identity and the effect of migrants' competition for the same jobs as natives.
>
> (Bourguignon 2006a: ix)

We can observe that the non-migrant population – or 'those left behind' as the World Bank tends to call them (World Bank 2006a: 63) – is absent from this picture. This strategy, which I call 'the migrant bias', acts to silence the voices of the non-migrant population, both as agents within the GRT, and as individuals concerned by the impacts of the GRT, with important gender implications (see Chapter 5).

At the centre of attention in the money-based discourse, remittances are generally defined as a sum of money with mainly positive characteristics and a strong potential for alleviating poverty. This definition is based upon a narrow financial notion of remittances as a source for development funding, and an abstract and macroeconomic perspective, focusing mainly on the (positive) implications of remittances. As illustrated in the 2003 *Global Development Finance Report*, remittances are defined as 'money sent home by immigrant workers abroad' and as an aspect of development finance, i.e. 'an increasingly prominent source of external funding for many developing countries' (Ratha 2003: 157). This has become the mainstream definition of remittances within the GRT.

The financial definition is enacted through de-personalisation and abstraction of the migration and remittance process, which leaves us with a sum of money or the image of 'missing billions' to be discovered, accounted for, channelled and harnessed for development, as portrayed on the MIF website:

> Call it the case of the missing billions. For generations, millions of migrant workers have been sending billions of dollars back to their home countries to support their families. But these flows of both money and people have been hidden in plain sight for decades. Why? Because the money is sent regularly in small amounts, usually outside the formal financial system; and the workers typically live on the margins of society. All of this is now changing. Remittances are widely recognised as critical to the survival of millions of individual families, and the health of many national economies throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.[49]

This image suggests that because traditionally remittances were sent in small amounts and through informal channels – i.e. not accounted for and controlled by the formal financial system and financial statistics – they were 'missing', i.e. they did not exist. The way the issue is presented suggests that the fact that remittances have been 'hidden' is a problem and that with increasing awareness within the international community 'things will get better' through channelling and harnessing remittances for development. This contributes to turn remittances into an object of knowledge which is part of the regulatory power of the GRT (see Chapter 5). This discursive strategy serves to legitimise efforts by the MIF and other financial institutions to formalise remittance transfers. Note also the extreme arrogance expressed in this quote, affirming that 'all of this is now changing', but merely referring to the increasing accounting for remittances, while completely ignoring the conditions of the workers who 'typically live on the margins of society'. This illustrates the marginalisation of certain issues that results from the disproportionate attention given to remittances within this discourse. This narrow financial understanding of remittances within the money-based discourse is problematic, because it evades delving into the complex and varied human, social, political and economic realities, within which remittances are embedded, and which are an integral part of the phenomenon and make them possible in the first place. Moreover, portraying remittances as a powerful force to solve the problems of poverty and development of countries of origin draws our attention away from the negative impacts of remittances, obscuring the problematic realities which underlie the remittance issue, such as the human and social costs of migration for the migrants themselves and for their non-migrant relatives and home communities. Thus, there is a need to broaden the perception of remittances and situate them within their underlying context. This has been done to some extent by the rights-based discourse that will be analysed in the next section.

Alongside its narrow financial approach, the money-based discourse is also characterised by its positive portrayal of remittances. Going beyond the core assumptions within the conceptual apparatus of the GRT, the money-based discourse creates an image of remittances as a 'good' and powerful force that will help to get over bad times and to solve the problems of development and poverty. This is achieved through the use of positively connoted adjectives, such as 'powerful', 'vital' or 'beautiful', as the following World Bank headlines illustrate:

> Remittances: An Economic Force in South Asia
>
> (World Bank 2005c)

> When Money Really Matters – Remittances Vital to South Asia
>
> (World Bank 2005b)

> Remittances – A Powerful Tool to Reduce Poverty if Effectively Harnessed
>
> (World Bank 2005a)

These headlines contribute to the imaginary of remittances as an enormous sum of money to be tapped for development. The alleged power of this force is further accentuated by emphasising the enormity of global remittances flows, and nurturing the mystery about the exact sum, given the alleged huge sum of informal remittances:

> Remittances through informal channels could add at least 50 percent to the official estimate, making remittances the largest source of external capital in many developing countries.
>
> (World Bank 2006a: xiii)

In its earlier publications, INSTRAW joined the World Bank and other institutions in emphasising the importance of remittances for developing countries and praising their positive effects:

> Remittances are agile transactions that respond to neither market fluctuations, as the exportation of primary goods does, nor to the volatility of foreign investment. On the contrary, remittances are stable and can be counter-cyclical in times of economic recession … Migrant women and men have come to represent the largest and most stable source of foreign assistance for their countries of origin.
>
> (Ramirez et al. 2005: 15)

On the basis of this assumption about the inherent positive characteristics of remittances, the money-based discourse emphasises their development potential in terms of poverty alleviation and increase in well-being; economic growth; private sector reconstruction; micro-finance; debt repayment; and creditworthiness. Thereby, remittances are alleged to have positive impacts both at the macroeconomic as well as at the community and household level:

> Remittances augment the recipients' incomes and increase their country's foreign exchange reserves. If remittances are invested, they contribute to output growth; if they are consumed, they generate positive multiplier effects.
>
> (Maimbo and Ratha 2005: 32)

While the MIF generally adopts the money-based discourse, the analysis of the MIF approach reveals that it adds an important element that is not present in

the World Bank discourse, for example. To its generally abstract financial definition of remittances the MIF adds a non-economic aspect of remittances:

> Remittances are the expression of profound emotional bonds between relatives separated by geography and borders, and they are the manifestation of the constant interaction among these relatives regardless of the distances between them.
>
> (Multilateral Investment Fund 2004: 9)

Adding a human or emotional element through the use of words such as 'loved ones', 'human connection' and 'maintain the bonds' is generally a welcome move in order to break through the abstraction of the money-based discourse. However, in this context, the emotional move has two implications: On the one hand, portraying these bonds in such a positive idealised way risks romanticising transnational family life. This presents a highly distorted picture which evacuates the negative consequences and social and human costs of migration. On the other hand, emphasising the human connection serves to reinforce the social obligations resulting from these bonds. It thus reproduces the social expectations and pressure that rests on migrants to send remittances. In some cases, this social pressure is so strong that it prevents migrants from going back and even prompts them to sever ties with their home community. This contributes to the regulation and disciplining of migrants, and the creation of responsible citizens, as we shall see in Chapter 5.

To be fair, even though optimism predominates within the money-based discourse, there is some awareness of the potentially negative consequences of migration and particularly the challenges related to harnessing remittances for development. Thereby, it is mentioned that remittances are private money, and therefore do not have the same characteristics as other financial flows. The main problems mentioned are the brain drain associated with migration; mixed evidence about the impact of remittances on income inequality; the risk of currency appreciation; the loss of export competitiveness due to a great volume of remittances; and fears of a culture of dependency and 'de-development'.[50] Yet, these potentially negative implications of migration and remittances are framed in terms of challenges and risks seen to be outweighed by the positive impacts of migration and remittances on development. In general, when considering the negative implications of migration, the main focus is at the macro level, based on the rather abstract framing of the money-based discourse, to which we shall come back in the gender analysis.

In the money-based discourse, migrants are mainly represented in terms of resources that can be tapped for development and poverty alleviation and other related issues, such as business development and the expansion of banking access. Migrants are represented in a number of ways that all add up to portray them as resources: as remittance senders and bearers of non-financial resources, as development agents, and as bank clients and entrepreneurs that contribute to economic development.

Migrants are represented first and foremost as remittance senders, emphasising their role of sending remittances, which acts to turn them into financial resources. This illustrates the abstract and money-focused character of the money-based discourse and serves to legitimise the instrumentalisation of migrants and remittances. But migrants are also portrayed as bearers of non-financial resources, possessing valuable skills, networks, knowledge and political capital. The 2008 World Bank brief on International Migration and Technological Progress, for example, portrays international migrants as important channels for the transfer of technology and knowledge and refers to 'the diaspora as a brain bank' (World Bank 2008).

Based on their resources, migrants are then represented as (potential) agents for development. This can be illustrated with the GCIM report that portrays migrants as agents for economic development in both countries of origin and destination, and 'underlines the need for the international community … to capitalise on the resourcefulness' of migrants (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 5): 'The role that migrants play in promoting development and poverty reduction in countries of origin, as well as the contribution they make towards the prosperity of destination countries, should be recognised and reinforced' (ibid.: 23).

The MIF also refers to migrants as agents for development, as stated by the IDB president Enrique Iglesias on the occasion of a remittances conference:

> *Con esta conferencia el BID quiere extender su mano a un nuevo e importante* socio en el desarrollo *de la Región: la comunidad latinoamericana y caribeña en el exterior.*[51]
>
> (Iglesias 2001: 1, my emphasis)

This serves to legitimise the instrumentalisation of migrants for development, reinforced by the call for integrating migration into growth and development strategies. Thereby, the responsibility for development is at least partly delegated to non-state actors, in this case the migrants (see Chapter 5).

Further, migrants are also turned into new clients for banks. Their remittances are seen as a welcome entry point in the wider campaign by international financial institutions to 'bank the unbanked' and 'serve the underserved', aiming to increase the number of people included in the formal banking system. Hence, in this 'banking the unbanked through remittances' strategy, migrants are encouraged to open bank accounts, take advantage of financial services and new financial technologies, and are offered 'financial literacy training' (Multilateral Investment Fund 2002: 17). This is a form of normalising and disciplining migrants (see Chapter 5).

Finally, migrants are also portrayed as entrepreneurs, as potentially rational economic actors with entrepreneurial skills and choices to make about the investment of their remittances. This representation is based on the deep-seated assumption within the money-based discourse of the GRT that in order to undertake the adventure of migration you need a special entrepreneurial

drive, which is supposed to be the same that you need to establish a (successful) business. It is assumed that this drive is inherent in all migrants. This purportedly enables them, among other things, to make informed choices about the transfer channels and investment of their remittances. In case they are not capable of making such an informed choice, i.e. in case their behaviour runs against the logic of financial institutions, they are disciplined through training and awareness raising.

This assumption has been challenged by some authors and officials. They argue that there is no reason to assume a priori that migrants are born as entrepreneurs. As Bernd Balkenhol (ILO) states:

> Migrants are not born as entrepreneurs! Why should we assume that migrants are entrepreneurs by nature? Some argue that they are more 'entrepreneurial', as they migrated and showed initiative, but then that doesn't turn them into entrepreneurs. Just like some of us are not entrepreneurs either!
>
> (Bernd Balkenhol, ILO, Geneva, personal interview, March 2007)

Yet, although this representation of migrants as natural entrepreneurs does not stand the reality test, it nevertheless has important implications in terms of regulation and disciplining of migrants: this representation acts to construct new groups of populations as a first step towards regulating these groups, linked to the regulatory power of the GRT (see Chapter 5).

The objective of the GRT, as presented within the money-based discourse, is to manage migration and remittances in order to maximise their positive impacts on development and poverty reduction. As expressed by World Bank President Wolfensohn, 'more needs to be done to maximise the development impact and potential that remittances offer' (Wolfensohn 2005: ix). This was reiterated in the World Bank publication (World Bank 2006b) entitled *The International Migration Agenda and the World Bank: Managing Risks, Enhancing Benefits.*

Within the money-based discourse, the belief is that the potential challenges of migration and remittances can be addressed successfully to create 'win-win-win' solutions for developing and developed countries and for migrants. The following quote from François Bourguignon, chief World Bank economist, illustrates this approach:

> In order to expand our knowledge on migration and to identify policies and reforms that will lead to superior development outcomes and to 'win-win-win' results for both sets of countries and for the migrants, the Development Economics Research Group of the World Bank initiated the International Migration and Development Research Program.
>
> (Bourguignon 2006a: ix)

The Social Protection and Labour Sector of the Bank adopts this terminology as well, aiming at: 'identifying win-win situations for the developing and the developed world, so both can benefit from increased international labour

mobility, skill transfers across borders, and remittances'.[52] While the notion of 'win-win-win' strategies was initially brought up by the World Bank, it was subsequently adopted by other institutions within the GRT, such as the ILO for example in its contributions to the High-Level Dialogue. We can observe the selection of relevant stakeholders chosen to become shareholders, i.e. who is included in the 'winning team': the country of origin, the country of destination and the migrants, whereby the non-migrant population is excluded (see below).

Within the money-based discourse, a number of different strategies are suggested to take advantage of remittances flows and create win-win-win outcomes, based on linking remittances to finance. A first strategy is the promotion of the formalisation of remittances, i.e. channelling them through formal financial institutions, as illustrated by the following MIF quote: 'MIF pioneered many of the ongoing initiatives to promote the use of formal financial institutions to unleash the development potential of remittances'.[53] The MIF encourages the use of formal financial institutions through its projects, offering a range of financial services to remittance senders and receivers, such as mortgages for the purchase of housing, and thereby contributes to the regulation and disciplining of migrants within the GRT, normalising them into sending their remittances via formal channels (see Chapter 5).

The World Bank is also a strong promoter of formalising remittances and reducing transfer costs: 'Lowering the costs of remittances is an important step to enhancing their development impact. Costs could be cut by strengthening competition and avoiding overregulation' (Bourguignon 2006b). This strategy is based on a discursive move that conflates two issue: the cost of transfers and the status of transfers. The first issue regards the high cost of formal remittance transfers as a serious problem, whereby migrants, often remitting small sums, lose a high percentage of their money. In the US-Mexico context, for example, migrants sending US$100 pay 16 percent in service fees, those sending US$500 pay 5 percent (World Bank 2006b: 13). Within the money-based discourse, this problem is to be addressed through increased competition between financial institutions offering remittance services. Yet, whether this will solve the problem is a question that has not been answered. As regards the second issue, i.e. the status of transfers, it cannot be assumed that informal transfers are a priori more expensive just because there is no or less competition. Indeed, migrants often choose informal mechanisms because they are cheaper, quicker and more reliable than formal channels, although there is contradictory evidence on this. The reasons for the Bank's strong efforts to formalise remittances seem to lie elsewhere:

> First, a lack of competition results in high transaction costs and erodes the income of migrants and remittance recipients; second, developing countries do not benefit from the *financial deepening effects* associated with formal remittance channels; and, third, *it is difficult to track money used for illegal purposes*, such as money laundering or terrorist financing.
>
> (World Bank 2006b: 13, my emphasis)

Through conflating the formalisation of remittances with the reduction of transfer costs, the concerns of the migrants (i.e. lower transfer costs) are linked to the specific concerns of the World Bank and those of financial institutions (i.e. financial deepening and tracking of financial flows). This is an effective discursive mechanism that serves to legitimise World Bank involvement and interests in the GRT, i.e. by presenting them in the same vein as the migrant concerns, which have more legitimacy within this area. The idea that until now the development potential of remittances has lain dormant and can be awaken through the involvement of financial institutions also contributes to legitimise the involvement of these institutions and their formalisation strategy, by suggesting that using formal financial institutions will help to increase the development potential of remittances.

A second strategy within the money-based discourse is the linking of remittances to risk management. Thereby, migration and remittances are portrayed as risk management strategies, as illustrated in this World Bank quote: 'Remittances help poor families increase their savings, keep their children in school, and deal with negative economic shocks.'[54] Thus, the strategy identifies ways in which the risk management potential of migration and remittances can be increased to contribute to poverty alleviation for the non-migrant population:

> [M]igration as a Social Risk Management tool for households has been explored. Finally, the access to social protection for migrant workers in host countries and the transferability of social security benefits back to the migrant's home country have been assessed.[55]

The GCIM also adheres to this idea of using remittances as a form of risk management when it states: 'Remittances … increase and diversify household incomes, provide an insurance against risk, enable family members to benefit from educational and training opportunities and provide a source of capital for the establishment of small businesses' (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 26). It is interesting to note that the SFU of the ILO has also bought into this linking of remittances to risk management, suggesting that remittances can 'help the poor cope with risk'.[56] The underlying idea is that remittances can be an entry point for reinforcing social protection and social security, when invested in health, pension funds or education (Bernd Balkenhol, ILO, Geneva, personal interview, March 2007).

Third, as mentioned above, remittances are seen as an instrument, as an entry point, in the campaign to 'bank the unbanked'. As World Bank economist Samuel Maimbo states: 'remittances are considered as part of the wider financial sector agenda of increasing access to financial services' (email correspondence with Samuel Munzele Maimbo, 2005). Among other institutions, both the World Bank and the MIF are involved in this campaign:

> Despite fuelling the international support system driven by remittances, millions of migrants and their families have been left out of the financial

> mainstream. MIF projects seek to leverage the development impact of these flows to the region by making money transfers cheaper and safer and putting formal banking services within reach of those sending and receiving remittances. This is especially important in underserved rural areas that receive the bulk of remittances.[57]

Put simply, the idea is to use remittances as an instrument to draw remittance senders and receivers into the formal banking system. This idea of banking remittance senders and receivers was brought up by the Monterrey Consensus and the G8 Action Plan in 2004. However, the World Bank goes one step further, inviting banks to 'take advantage of remittance flows'.[58]

The issue of 'banking the unbanked' is framed in terms of financial inclusion, deploring the financial exclusion of many migrants and their families. Thereby, informal financial systems are presented in terms of exclusion and negatively connoted. This is problematic on two accounts: the financialisation campaign is not of an inclusive character, but specifically targets population groups: remittance receivers and senders. This is potentially discriminatory towards people who do not migrate or do not have migrants in the family, and leads to increase inequalities within communities of origin. Furthermore, the formal financial system may not necessarily be the best model for local communities and does not automatically lead to development.

In this context, many financial institutions also advocate the linking of remittances to microfinance instruments, as proposed by the World Bank: 'Partnerships between microfinance institutions and remittance service providers offer a promising means of expanding coverage among the poor' (World Bank 2006b: 24). Linking remittances to microfinance has become a powerful strategy within the GRT, with both regulatory and disciplinary implications (see Chapter 5).

Over time, there has been a certain shift in the strategies proposed by the money-based discourse: initially, it emphasised the intrinsic benefits of migration and remittances for development, and now, it acknowledges that the potential of remittances and migration for development can only be achieved under certain conditions. Thus, in order to maximise the benefits of remittances, there is now a need to strengthen financial institutions, improve the investment climate in countries of origin. This can be illustrated with a comparison of two World Bank quotes: Whereas in the first, the 'rural areas of the developing world are quietly being transformed', in the second, there is a whole list of preconditions for remittances to fulfil their mission:

> Unlike other capital flows, remittances are stable and directly benefit the poor. Moreover, as migrants repatriate their savings, *the rural areas of the developing world*, from where much of the world's transnational labour is drawn, *are quietly being transformed*.
>
> (World Bank 2005a, my emphasis)

> *In order to maximize the benefits*, policy makers need to step up efforts to improve the business environment, include migrants and their families in the banking system, and deal with possible reductions in labour supply and real exchange rate overvaluations.
>
> (World Bank 2006c, my emphasis)

This shift could be a reaction to the fact that the promised 'quiet transformation' through remittances has not happened as predicted. Instead of questioning existing framings and policies, the Bank seems to blame the countries themselves for the modest impact of remittances on development, calling for institutional and financial reforms to allow countries to 'benefit from remittances'.

Looking at the money-based discourse as a whole we can identify one main underlying tenet, which I call the 'migrant bias'. This refers to the privileging of the voice of migrants over that of non-migrants in a number of ways. First, migrants are considered relevant actors of the GRT alongside the country of origin and destination, whereas the non-migrant population is excluded, as shown above. The discursive choice of actors considered relevant and worthy of benefiting from the GRT acts as a mechanism of exclusion, as revealed in concrete policies such as the Programa 3×1 for example (see Chapter 5). Second, the situation and perspective of the migrants are privileged over that of non-migrant people. This means a number of things: the focus is on migrants – portrayed as heroes, entrepreneurs, and active agents and shareholders in development – while less ink is spent on the situation of non-migrants, one of the main stakeholders of the migration–remittances–development nexus. Migrants' vision is also privileged when it comes to the decision how to spend remittances. This has important regulatory and disciplinary implications (see Chapter 5). Finally, migrants are also trusted with decisions about the needs of their home community, assumed to know best how to invest collective remittances back home. This means that the voices of the non-migrant population are often ignored, not only when describing the problems that their community faces, but also when it comes to policy-making. The migrant bias can be observed to various extents in all institutions within the GRT.

The rights-based discourse

There is no such thing as one single alternative discourse. Rather, within the conceptual apparatus of the GRT, there are many different institutions involved in challenging the money-based discourse. Yet, for the purpose of this book, we can identify one key alternative discourse that has been crucial in challenging the money-based discourse and that is exemplified with the ILO, and to some extent also the GCIM and INSTRAW: the rights-based discourse. This section outlines the ways in which the rights-based discourse challenges the money-based discourse and the alternatives it suggests. The analysis also reveals areas in which the institutions or institutional sections that generally adhere to a rights-based approach adopt elements of the money-based discourse.

The rights-based discourse focuses mainly on the issue of migrant workers and their rights, thus, migrants are the key actors. This is illustrated by the ILO,[59] whose mission is to set up a framework for the protection of migrant worker rights, as expressed in the Plan of Action for migrant workers adopted at the 2004 ILO conference: 'a fair deal for all migrant workers requires a rights-based approach' (International Labour Organization 2004a: §20), and in the ILO's *Multilateral Framework on Migration: Non-binding Principles and Guidelines for a Rights-Based Approach to Labour Migration* (International Labour Organization 2006b). This approach contributes to challenging the narrow focus of the money-based discourse on remittances as the most visible aspect of international migration and the migration–development nexus. The GCIM and INSTRAW also contribute to broadening the issue and to moving beyond a narrow focus on remittances. Thus, in its Final Report, the GCIM mentions a number of ways in which migration can contribute to development, such as the return of migrants, diaspora activities, brain circulation and remittances (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 23ff.). While in earlier writings INSTRAW adopted a narrow focus on remittances of the money-based discourse, more recent INSTRAW publications are more critical and explicitly challenge the mainstream discourse on the migration–development nexus. These critiques include the narrow framing that reduces the links between migration and development to remittances; the economistic definition of development as economic growth; and the lack of a gender perspective (INSTRAW 2007c: 2). INSTRAW now adopts a rights-based approach, arguing that failing to do so results in the instrumentalisation of migrants: 'Disregarding migrants' rights seriously risks instrumentalizing them – i.e. acknowledging their agency only as "global development pawns" and not as development beneficiaries' (ibid.: 5).

The focus of the rights-based discourse on migrants and their rights does not mean that it does not consider remittances as part of the migration–development nexus. However, it focuses on the 'right to remit', rather than on remittances as a tool for development, as seen within the money-based discourse. Thus, for example, the 1949 ILO Convention states:

> Each Member for which this Convention is in force undertakes to permit, taking into account the limits allowed by national laws and regulations concerning export and import of currency, the transfer of such part of the earnings and savings of the migrant for employment as the migrant may desire.
>
> (International Labour Organization 1949)

The rights-based discourse pushes for a broader understanding of remittances. Thus, INSTRAW asserts that '[r]emittances are much more than flows of money', challenging the narrow definition of remittances within the money-based discourse (Ramirez et al. 2005). Thereby, INSTRAW contributes to a reconceptualisation of remittances to take into account their human and

social consequences. This approach is reflected in INSTRAW's case studies, which show the social implications of migration and remittances, such as increasing income disparities between recipient and non-recipient households, inflationary pressure on the cost of housing, agricultural land, building material and other goods and services in the communities of origin, etc. (INSTRAW 2007a: 4).

In the ILO, remittances are conceptualised as 'migrant workers' earnings sent back from the country of employment to the country of origin',[60] as illustrated also in the ILO Convention no. 97 (International Labour Organization 1949).[61] Hence, remittances are presented not just as an abstract sum of money, but as earnings. This definition takes into account the type of money that remittances are and where they come from, highlighting the fact that remittances are earnings and thus cannot be appropriated freely by governments or development and financial institutions. Emphasising that sending remittances is a *right*, and not a *duty*, this discourse also challenges the implied expectations and social pressure on migrants to send money home.

The rights-based discourse also adopts a more cautious approach when it comes to the development potential of remittances. It challenges the optimism in this respect, highlighting that contrary to what is commonly believed, evidence on the positive correlation between remittances and economic performance of the country of origin is rather shaky, as illustrated by the following ILO report:

> Migration may clearly have a number of positive and negative effects in the country of origin. Most policy-makers in developing countries conclude that any losses in human capital are more than offset by the gains through remittances and other linkages. Is this the case? At present, there is not much positive evidence that countries receiving large quantities of remittances have better economic performance. Of the top 20 developing country recipients of workers' remittances, seven have managed an annual per capita income growth of at least 2 per cent over the past 25 years (notably China, India, and Thailand); however, seven have done very poorly (notably Ecuador, the Philippines and Yemen).
>
> (International Labour Organization 2004b: 28)

And the ILO warned again in 2006: 'It is probably true that remittances can play a large role in the development process, but there are countries receiving large volumes of remittances year after year which are yet to achieve sustained growth' (International Labour Organization 2006a: 74).

INSTRAW joins this critique in its more recent work, warning that 'the empirical evidence linking migration and development is weak, and the development impacts of remittances are often difficult to assess' (INSTRAW 2007d: 1).

Another note of caution is added by the ILO, highlighting one of the big blind spots of the money-based discourse that keeps emphasising the positive characteristic of remittances to 'increase in times of economic hardship', but never ponders the reasons underlying this peculiarity of remittance flows:

> In fact remittances tend to increase in times of economic hardship because families depend on them as a principal income source, and because more people are likely to emigrate for work during such times. Better-off migrants who invest in their home countries are also less likely to be discouraged by adverse economic conditions than foreign investors.
>
> (International Labour Organization 2004: 23)

Thus, it becomes clear that the relative stability of remittance flows during times of economic hardship comes at a heavy social and human cost.

The GCIM has also contributed to challenging the overly optimistic approach of the money-based discourse, cautioning that 'remittances are private money and should not be appropriated by states' (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 26). In order to realise their developmental impact and contribution to sustainable growth, remittances need a 'conducive environment', including 'sound financial systems, stable currencies, a favourable investment climate, and an honest administration' (ibid.: 28). It also warns that:

> Development must begin at home. Migrant remittances and diaspora trade and investment can make an important contribution to growth, but should not become a substitute for an economic policy that develops and draws upon the talents of people who have remained in their country of origin.
>
> (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 30–31)

However, it has to be noted that these notes of caution do not receive much emphasis in the 88-page GCIM report and are not retained in the final recommendations. Situated in the context of the totality of the report that paints a rather optimistic picture emphasising the contributions of migrants and the importance of capitalising on their potential, this paragraph could be judged contradictory, or explained in terms of expressing a compromise stemming from internal debates within the GCIM. All in all, it seems like the small print on a package.

The GCIM has also contributed to highlight problematic issues surrounding the use of remittances as a development tool. Thus, for example, the GCIM report expresses concerns related to the potential competition between different institutions involved in the GRT:

> [T]he World Bank, as well as IOM, ILO and UNDP, are all concerned with migrant remittances and their impact on development. While such overlaps are not necessarily negative, and may not be entirely avoidable, the Commission has concluded that they often give rise to competition between the agencies concerned and that they do not represent the most efficient use of the limited resources available.
>
> (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 74)

This concern was also voiced in my interviews with officials of institutions involved in the GRT. Thus, for example, there was some fear that the IFIs might take control not only over the framing of the GRT, but also over policy-making and available funding (ILO representative, Geneva, personal interview, February 2005). This is an expression of the ongoing struggles within the GRT.

Hence, we can see how the rights-based discourse challenges the representation of remittances as merely a sum of money endowed with the potential of a 'force for good', through broadening the notion of remittances and highlighting the negative and problematic issues linked to remittance processes.

While the money-based discourse represents migrants as remittance senders emphasising their financial (and non-financial) resources and their obligation to send remittances, the rights-based discourse generally uses the term migrant and migrant worker in order to refer to individuals as bearers of rights rather than of money. This approach is expressed for example in the way migrants are conceptualised within the ILO: as a person and as a worker with rights, including the right to protection, decent work, and the right to remit (International Labour Organization 2004a, 2004b, 2006c). INSTRAW's contribution in this respect has been to recognise that migrants are gendered human beings who experience migration in gender-specific ways. Hence, this discourse challenges the representation of migrants as resources and instead portrays them as gendered human beings and workers.

Given its framing of the issues of migration, remittances and development, the rights-based discourse also identifies new policy priorities. While within the money-based discourse, the emphasis is strongly on promoting the developmental potential of migration and remittances, the rights-based discourse advocates more management of migration mainly in order to assure more protection of migrants' rights, and to improve the distribution of the benefits of migration. This distributional element is a particular feature of the ILO discourse: 'While fostering mobility may benefit all countries, *it is important to ensure more equitable distribution of benefits*' (International Labour Organization 2006a: 73, my emphasis).

The rights-based discourse also highlights the need to improve the situation in the countries of origin, such as to generate employment, so that migration can become a choice and is not a necessity:

> An important concern for the ILO is that migration should be undertaken 'by choice, and not by necessity'. Therefore, a major emphasis must be placed on generating full and productive employment and decent work for all, especially in countries of origin.
>
> (International Labour Organization 2006c: 4)

Calling for policies to regulate certain aspects of migration, the rights-based discourse leaves room for state intervention and migration management, emphasising that it cannot be left to market forces alone, adopting a slightly

more interventionist approach than the World Bank or the MIF for example. In order to achieve this goal, the ILO emphasises the need for a multilateral framework for the governance on international migration (International Labour Organization 2006a: 75).

Over time, the ILO has slightly modified its approach and adopted the notions of 'maximising positive effects' and 'win-win solution', which are part of the money-based discourse. While it still has a more cautious approach to the benefits of migration and remittances – emphasising their trade-offs and negative consequences and calling for a more equitable distribution of their benefits – the ILO now also seems to adhere to the general optimism within the money-based discourse. Indeed, in its contributions to the High-Level Dialogue, it quotes World Bank studies a number of times (International Labour Organization 2006c):

> There is now increasing global recognition of positive contributions of migration though remittance flows, transfer of investments, technology and critical skills, and transnational communities. Some perceive migration to be part of livelihood strategies for the poor. Nonetheless migration policy involves some trade-offs for source and host countries as well as for migrants themselves since it has both positive and negative consequences. The challenge is how to manage migration in such a way that the positive effects are maximised, making it a win-win phenomenon for all.
>
> (International Labour Organization 2006a: 73)

Looking at the rights-based discourse and the different institutions that adopt it, we note that they also adopt the migrant bias to some extent. In some ways, the migrant bias is inherent in the ILO mission to protect migrant worker rights. However, in its win-win strategies, for example, the families and home communities are included as shareholders. The INSTRAW discourse also contains the migrant bias to a lesser extent, given its concern with both migrant and non-migrant women. In the context of Mexico, the migrant bias is reproduced in a slightly different form (see Chapter 4). To sum up, Table 3.2 provides an overview of the key characteristics of the two discourses within the international realm of the GRT.

Gender dimensions of the GRT in the international realm

This section undertakes a gender analysis of the GRT in the international realm. On the one hand, it examines the gender dimensions of the core assumptions, the mainstream money-based discourse, as well as elements of the rights-based discourse, which are largely gender-blind. In addition, it analyses the gendered representations and gendered stereotypes underpinning the GRT and explores their gender-specific implications.

Women and gender issues have come to the international GRT agenda only relatively recently, notably with INSTRAW getting involved in 2003 and with

Table 3.2 Key characteristics of the two main discourses within the international realm of the GRT

	Money-based discourse	*Rights-based discourse*
Key issues	• Remittances as development tool • Multiplier effect	• Migrant worker rights • Labour issues
Key actors	• Country of origin • Country of destination • Migrants	• Migrants
Notion of remittances	• Sum of money • Force for good	• Worker's earnings • Process embedded in underlying social context
Notion of migrants	• Resources • Development agents • Entrepreneurs • Customers	• Human beings • Workers with rights
Policies, objectives	• Focus on increasing development potential • Link remittances to finance: formalisation, bank remittance senders and receivers, remittances as risk management tool and as microfinance instrument • Win-win-win outcomes	• Focus on equal distribution of benefits • Focus on creating decent work in countries or origin • More 'interventionist' approach • Migration as a choice, not a necessity

the first official session on gender at the First International Forum on Remittances in 2005. Thus, most documents of the institutions involved in the GRT analysed above do not include references to women or gender issues.

At first sight then, the GRT discourse seems to be gender-neutral. However, despite the appearance, I argue that the GRT conceptual apparatus is not gender-neutral but gender-blind, i.e. it contains three key elements that make it appear gender-neutral: the narrow financial *definition* of remittances as a sum of money, the level of *abstraction* at which the GRT is generally framed, and the exclusive choice of *actors* deemed relevant and legitimate within the GRT.

As seen in the money-based discourse, remittances are generally defined as a sum of money with mainly positive characteristics and a strong potential for alleviating poverty. This definition is based upon a narrow, financial notion of remittances as a source for development funding, and an abstract and macroeconomic perspective, focusing mainly on the (positive) implications of remittances. From a gender perspective, this is problematic because it silences the complex and gendered human, social, political and economic realities, within which remittances are embedded, and which are an integral part of the phenomenon. Thus, there is a need to broaden the perception of remittances and situate them within their underlying gendered contexts.

As illustrated above, the rights-based discourse has a broader definition of remittances, which includes their origin as 'migrant worker earnings'. Including the underlying context of remittances to some extent, this definition opens up a space to consider the gendered social realities that underpin these earnings. Yet, the ILO has not seized the opportunity that this space provides in order to insert the gender dimensions of remittance processes into the debate, whereas INSTRAW has done so both in its publications and activities (see above).

The broadening of the definition of remittances goes hand in hand with breaking through the levels of abstraction of the GRT, and directing attention beyond the macro aspects of remittances. The money-based and to some extent also the rights-based discourse privilege the macro over the micro level, focusing on the macroeconomic implications of remittances, a second mechanism to make it appear gender-neutral. Consequences of migration and remittances, and of initiatives to link them to development, at the community, household and individual level are often left out of the picture. A gender analysis allows us to render visible the social dynamics at the micro level and how they are embedded in gender, class and ethnicity dynamics, and to link them back to the macro level. Moreover, such an analysis is crucial to understand the functioning of the GRT.

Finally, the choice of actors considered relevant within the GRT also acts as a mechanism to make it appear gender-neutral. As analysed above, the money-based discourse identifies three main actors as relevant to the GRT: the country of origin, the country of destination and the migrants. This is a manifestation of the 'migrant bias' (see above) within the GRT that acts to privilege the voice of the migrants over those of non-migrants and to marginalise the non-migrant population. Combined with the stereotype in the international realm that women are the main remittance receivers (see below), this has gender-specific implications. In the context of Mexico the migrant bias also has gender-specific effects: given that traditionally in Mexico, and particularly in rural areas, the majority of international migrants were men, this means that the inherent gender bias acts to marginalise the voice of non-migrant women (see Chapter 5). Yet, even now that women represent at least half of international migrants from Mexico, the implications of this gender bias still hold firm, although this might change in the future.

These three mechanisms act in combination to make the GRT appear gender-neutral and to exclude a number of actors and issues from the picture, notably the non-migrant population and the implications of migration and remittances at the local level, in the areas of socio-economic, cultural and political transformations, which are all deeply gendered.

However, whilst being largely gender-blind, the GRT does include some gendered representations and stereotypes. Examining the GCIM Report, for example, we find two references to gender and women in connection with remittances:

> It is also noteworthy that migrant women and lower-paid migrants at times transfer a higher proportion of their income than others.
>
> (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 26)

> Households and communities in countries of origin should be assisted to make effective use of remittance receipts through the provision of appropriate training and access to *microcredit facilities. Some studies indicate that women make the most effective use of remittances, therefore special efforts should be made to target women in such initiatives.* An additional option is to *enable migrants to exercise greater control over the use of the money they remit*, by offering them opportunities to purchase goods or services directly, rather than leaving such transactions in the hands of household members.
> (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 28, my emphasis)

These two quotes illustrate how women's specific roles in the remittance process are represented through (implicit) gender stereotypes. Remittance receiving households are portrayed in a patronising way as incapable of making the 'right' decisions about the use of remittances, they are deemed incompetent and ignorant about what is good for them and in need of assistance to instruct them how to make 'effective use of remittances'. Based on the stereotype that women remittance receivers make the most effective use of remittances, it is then suggested that they be targeted with micro-credit initiatives. This ties into a broader global discourse that has recently become prominent: the 'make women productive' discourse, linked to large-scale development initiatives targeting women with micro-credit and productive projects. This highlights the ways in which the GRT in the international realm is based on gender stereotypes and how these stereotypes have profound gender-specific implications. In the context of rural Mexico, this discourse manifests itself in the ways in which women remittance receivers are portrayed as in need of assistance to make effective use of remittances, and it underlies the various initiatives to target non-migrant women with micro-credit programmes, with powerful regulatory and disciplinary implications (see Chapter 5).

The GCIM report does not indicate where the evidence for these statements about women's specific behaviour in remittance activities comes from, and what 'some studies' (cf. quote above) refers to. When I asked a member of the Commission at the UK Launch Event of the Report (December 2005) where the information for these types of statements had come from, the answer was that these statements were based on information from the World Bank and World Bank informants. Given that the World Bank has little to say about the gender dimensions of migration and remittances and uses a largely gender-blind discourse, it seems crucial to critically evaluate such statements.

Another key publication in the field, the BRIDGE Cutting edge pack, *Gender and Migration* (2005), contains the same stereotype about women remitters: 'It is generally believed that women send home a greater share of their earnings in remittances' (BRIDGE 2005: 26). This statement is based on a quote from an article by Ninna Nyberg-Sørensen which reads:

> Despite female migrants' lower incomes, it is generally assumed that women by and large send back home a greater share of their earnings in remittances than men and also tend to be better savers. In addition to being the largest receivers of remittances, women – when in control of remittances – are also believed to channel overseas financial transfers into better health, nutrition and education for their entire family, hereby supporting the development of stronger and more productive communities.
>
> (Sørensen 2005: 3)

Finally, in the 2006 issue of *id21 insights*, an article by Sarah Mahler on the gender dimensions of remittances asks:

> Do financial institutions, or indeed the women themselves, know that migrant women dedicate a higher percentage of remittances than men to capital and asset-building? This finding could empower women to demand more access to finance – such as loans and insurance – and shows that incorporating gender is one of the most promising routes to improving policy.
>
> (Mahler 2006: 8)

These examples highlight a number of things. First, gender-related statements within the GRT are mostly limited to focusing on women's behaviour in the remittance process, reducing gender to women. Second, these statements about women's behaviour are largely based upon secondary data sources, assumptions or stereotypes that often emerge through generalisations of one concrete case study. Alternatively, they are based upon gendered assumptions or expectations about the social roles of women and men, such as the 'women = mothers' bias. Hence, within the GRT, the most commonly used stereotypes include the following:[62]

- 'Men are mainly remittance senders and women are mainly remittance receivers.'
- 'When women are remittance senders, they tend to send more remittances than men.'
- 'Women make better use of remittances than men.'

Empirical research into the gender dimensions of remittance processes provides contradictory and complex findings. The stereotype of women as mainly remittance receivers has been somewhat overhauled by the evidence that women now represent half of migrants worldwide and the majority in certain countries, such as the Philippines (UNFPA 2006: 1). Moreover, even in cases where women form the majority of non-migrants, this does not mean that women necessarily receive the remittances. As has been shown, in some cases migrants send their money to male and/or elderly members of the family, highlighting the context-specific nature of remittance processes. However, this stereotype is still very much present, for example in the Mexican case. Interestingly, the stereotype is often interpreted in terms of women being *only*

remittance-receivers, i.e. as not doing anything 'productive' themselves, which has profound regulatory and disciplinary implications (see Chapter 5).

The second stereotype, i.e. of women tending to remit more than men, has been challenged by a variety of ethnographic studies. Evidence from a study on Filipina and Filipino migrant workers by Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2005) reveals that men send more money than women, and that therefore households with male migrants have a higher income level than households with female migrants. Another study by Zontini on Filippina and Moroccan migrants in Barcelona shows how for Moroccan women the obligation to send remittances is not as strong as for Filipinas, revealing the cultural specificity of remittance practices (Zontini 2004). She also notes that Moroccan women migrants often do not send remittances at all, as they migrate in order to escape rigid gender roles within their society of origin (ibid.: 1123). These studies challenge the stereotypical idea that women *a priori* send more remittances than men, and illustrate the importance of context. Indeed, the issue needs broadening, and a number of factors would need to be taken into account when analysing the remittance behaviour of different groups, such the percentage of remittances of a migrant's income, but also cultural, generational or educational factors.

Third, though scarce, some empirical studies into the gendered use of remittances reveal the variety of ways in which gender influences remittance behaviour (e.g. Rahman 2007; Zontini 2004). Some studies indicate that women spend money differently from men in certain circumstances. However, a number of issues would need to be considered: What does 'better' or 'more effective' use of remittances mean? Who determines the criteria for a more or less effective use of remittances? What is the context within which remittances are spent and which are the options? My own fieldwork shows that the spending of remittances involves complex processes of decision-making and negotiating among the members of a household, based on gendered power relations. In many cases, women are advised how to spend remittances by migrant men or some male family member; in other cases the women defy these orders and decide for themselves.

These empirical studies help to unsettle and challenge gendered representations and stereotypes, suggesting that generalisations about the gender dimensions of remittances are problematic and that context-specific factors need to be taken into account. In sum, neither the largely gender-blind discourse, nor the gendered underpinnings of the GRT, take gender seriously within the GRT. They cannot do justice to the complex and contradictory ways in which gender is crucial in the functioning of the GRT, as will be shown in the following chapters. Yet, regardless of their shaky empirical foundation, these gendered representations and stereotypes have very real effects.

Conclusion

This chapter has revealed a number of key discursive and institutional transformations that paved the way for the emergence of the GRT within the

international realm, and has examined the institutional and conceptual apparatuses of the GRT. Within the conceptual apparatus of the international realm, we have identified two core assumptions: the perception of migration as a positive process with a development potential, and the focus on the positive characteristics of remittances in comparison to other sources of finance. The two main discourses, the money-based approach and the rights-based approach, agree on these assumptions, but disagree regarding the definition of remittances, the relevant issues and actors, the understanding of migrants, and the policies that should be adopted. Various institutions are engaged in an ongoing struggle over the framing of the migration–remittances–development nexus.

The institutional apparatus of the GRT within the international realm is constituted of various practices by different international institutions, the tight network of activities between these institutions, and new institutions and programmes that have been established for the purpose of harnessing migration and remittances for development. The key activities identified within the institutional apparatus of the GRT are monitoring remittances, research on remittance processes, conferences on the migration–remittances–development nexus, coalition-building, and concrete projects to harness remittances for development.

This chapter has also demonstrated how the GRT within the international realm is deeply gender-blind and gender-biased. As the following chapter shows, many of these gender-biased elements are reproduced within the Mexican discourse, albeit in slightly different ways. The policy implications of these gendered elements of the GRT in the international realm are explored in Chapter 5.

4 The GRT in Mexico

Las remesas desempeñan un papel fundamental en la economía Mexicana. […]
El gobierno Mexicano ha realizado un gran número de acciones para garantizar el flujo de remesas y lograr aprovecharlas de manera más eficiente.
(Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior 2004: 1)[1]

Introduction

This chapter maps the institutional and conceptual apparatus of the GRT in Mexico, using a genealogical method to trace the shifts that led to the emergence of the GRT.[2] The specific implications and functioning of the conceptual and institutional apparatus as a regulatory and disciplinary power will be analysed in Chapter 5. Before embarking on this analysis, the next section of this chapter provides the background against which the emergence of the GRT in the context of Mexico developed: the restructuring of the Mexican political economy since the 1980s within the neoliberal turn. This restructuring has manifold consequences, both at the country and at the community and household level – such as agricultural crisis, growing pressure on labour and increasing internal and international migration, wide-ranging transformations of the social sector and decreasing social welfare provisions by the state, growing inequality between and within communities, and changing demography, family arrangements and social reproduction conditions.[3] The third section introduces the local fieldwork context, providing a short profile of the two communities under study. This prepares the grounds to analyse the ways in which the regulatory and disciplinary power of the GRT plays out, and how resistance and empowerment strategies take shape in these communities. The fourth section is dedicated to the analysis of the conceptual, and the fifth section to the institutional apparatus of the GRT in the case of Mexico. The continuities and discontinuities between the Mexican and the international realm are explored in the conclusion.

Gendered neoliberal restructuring of the Mexican political economy

Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the US.
(Popular Mexican saying)

A number of developments since the 1980s prompted a fundamental reorganisation of the Mexican state and economy: the debt crisis starting in 1982; the ensuing two generations of structural adjustment policies (SAP) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; the intensified regional integration through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); and the peso crisis in 1994/95. Reforms prescribed within SAPs included devaluation of the peso against the dollar, lifting import and export restrictions, removal of price controls and state subsidies associated with export-led economic development policies, and the privatisation of public services (Luccisano 2002: 36ff.; Morton 2003). This also meant curbing of social spending and resulted in growth stagnation, lower incomes, reduced state budgets and increased poverty. In order to address this situation, a second generation of SAPs was implemented within a post-Washington Consensus perspective, where more attention was paid to the role of the state. Thus, state institutions were reformed to become more efficient, transparent and accountable to citizens in order to reduce poverty. The role of the state was no longer to design and implement policies for state-led development, but rather to facilitate development, which would be achieved by the poor themselves, and enable the poor to get themselves out of poverty. This second generation of SAPs included fiscal deficit and public expenditure reduction, lower taxes, market driven interest rates, floating exchange rates, trade liberalisation, privatisation of public services and agencies, and deregulation of business (Luccisano 2002: 39). The restructuring of the Mexican economy also involved a complete transformation of agriculture and production oriented towards export, the reduction in government spending on agricultural development, and the opening of markets through NAFTA. In addition, agrarian legislation regulating land ownership was reformed, which effectively eliminated state-protected communal land rights and opened the way for the commercialisation of agricultural land (Bartra 2005; Calva 2004; Hellman 1997).[4] Thereby, Mexico became firmly integrated into the global capitalist market.

Reforms were intended to encourage private investment in agriculture, increase efficiency and further develop agricultural production. However, according to some studies, the outcome of this 'neoliberal experiment' was quite different. Using government statistics, Calva (2004) demonstrates how the per capita GDP related to farming and forestry shows a decline of 14.3 per cent from 1981 to 2001, and how the production of the eight main grains decreased by 21.8 per cent and the production of meat fell by 28.8 per cent in the same period (ibid.). At the same time, food imports increased from US$1,790 million in 1982 to US$7,274.4 million in 1994, and US$11,077.4 million in 2001 (ibid.).

The rural population has been hit particularly hard by these restructuring processes and the rural crisis extended to the cities through rural–urban migration, but also resulted in increasing international migration (Bartra 2005: 23).[5] Approximately one quarter of the Mexican population lives and works in rural areas and the majority of Mexican peasants are smallholders producing mainly for subsistence (Bartra 2005: 18). In the last twenty years there has

been an increase in rural poverty in Mexico and more broadly in Latin America. According to World Bank estimates of 2004, 28 per cent of Mexican rural dwellers were extremely poor and 57 per cent moderately poor (World Bank 2004: 171). Although only about one quarter of Mexico's population lives in rural areas, they are host to 60.7 per cent of the country's extreme poor and 46.1 per cent of the moderately poor (ibid.). The counterpart to this is the agro-industrial sector in Mexico, which has become very competitive.

In short, neoliberal restructuring has meant less protection for peasants, which in turn has led to an increase in landless peasants, a drop in prices of agricultural goods and an increasing dependency on food imports, an increase in rural–urban and international migration, and a general undermining of traditional ways of living for the rural population (Bartra 2005: 23).

The neoliberal Mexican state and its welfare model

A key aspect of the restructuring of the Mexican political economy was the reform of the state and the welfare model. This is situated within the broader context of the restructuring of Latin American states since the post-war period, and became accentuated in the 1980s (CLAD 1998: 45). In Mexico, this phase is associated with the policy of New Federalism. One of the defining features of the Mexican political system throughout most of the twentieth century was the strong central government headed by a powerful president (Shirk 1999: 1). Since the debt crisis in the 1980s, a number of initiatives have been launched to increase decentralisation in Mexico and other Latin American countries, among them New Federalism promoted by President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000). This policy aimed at 'shifting the balance of power in the Mexican political system to the state and local level', and thereby transferring administrative and fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government: states and municipalities (ibid.).

New Federalism can be understood as part of a broader agenda of shifting administrative responsibility to the subnational level to reduce the national state sector (Goldring 2002: 83). However, the pressure for greater autonomy for the Mexican states also played an important role (Shirk 1999: 3). New Federalism had mixed results: while the autonomy of the subnational units and local control was increased to some extent, for example through cost-sharing programmes, decentralisation was also used, paradoxically, as a strategy to reaffirm the centre's control (Goldring 2002: 83; Shirk 1999: 2). The Programa 3×1 within the GRT is an example of such a cost-sharing programme, and its decentralised character, the strong involvement of civil society, and the transfer of costs to participants are expressions of the decentralisation efforts launched by New Federalism (Goldring 2002: 83).

In this context, New Public Management theories became prominent, advocating a reduced and transformed role of the state (CLAD 1998). The managerial model of the state is inspired by organisational changes in the private sector, the underlying assumption being that 'the government may not be an

enterprise, but it can become more enterprising' (ibid.: 48). The objective of managerial reform was to 'increase efficiency, effectiveness and democratisation of public power' (ibid.: 56). The key ingredients of the state, according to this model, are decentralisation, the involvement of private actors and civil society, targeted social programmes, and creating an enabling environment for private sector development. Thereby, a relation of co-responsibility is established between the state and citizens:

> Citizens are called upon to assume an active role in organising collective action and, more specifically, in dealing with those problems that affect their daily life and that of their families – such as security in their neighbourhood, management of their children's schools, etc.
>
> (CLAD 1998: 56)

Thus, the role of the state was now described in market terms, as a facilitating state that enables development and empowers the poor to become responsible for managing their own needs. Reforming the state was aimed at increasing transparency and accountability, buzz words of this paradigm. This also involved a transformation of state–civil society relations, whereby non-state actors became redefined as 'active intermediaries that participate to ensure accountability and transparency of state policy functions', which is supposed to result in the empowerment of civil society (Luccisano 2002: 38). Thus, certain tasks and responsibilities are outsourced to civil society, which, in some cases, empowers the civil society organisations involved (Piester 1997: 482).

Influenced by these theories, the restructuring of the Mexican state engendered a reform of welfare and poverty reduction policies. Alongside many other Latin American countries, Mexico does not feature a welfare state with universal entitlement and coverage (Molyneux 2006: 426). Mexico's welfare system is based on formal employment and covers only around 55 per cent of the population, excluding self-employed and informal-sector workers (Laurell 2003: 324). Thus, around half the economically active population depends on the informal sector for its income and has access to few social benefits (Molyneux 2006: 433). Given the size of the informal sector, Mexico collects only 11 per cent of GDP in tax, which is below the 18 per cent average for Latin America (ibid.).

Broadly speaking, the reform of the welfare sector involved a shift from broad social welfare programmes towards individually targeted risk-reducing and poverty reduction initiatives (Hellman 1997; Luccisano 2002). Various factors account for this shift in Mexican welfare policy. The debt crisis and the ensuing SAPs led to a reduction in the government budget and drastic cuts in social spending.[6] At the same time, however, the population was suffering the implications of the crisis and the austerity programmes, which in some cases translated into popular protests voicing increasing social demands. The answer was targeted social spending in order to compensate for the sufferings of the population and to reduce the likelihood of mass mobilisation (Piester 1997). Hence, the Mexican government was faced with the necessity 'to do more

with less' (ibid.: 469). In this context, targeted social assistance, strongly advocated by the World Bank and the IMF, became seen as the most effective instrument (Escobar Latapí and González de la Rocha 1991: 12; Piester 1997: 471).

It has been argued that the new model amounted to a 'welfare revolution' (BBC News 1999), characterised by a shift 'from a compensatory social welfare state to a social investment state concerned with active social policies that focus on giving opportunities through education, training, and paid employment' (Luccisano 2006: 56). Thus, the aim of social welfare is no longer to protect people from the market, but to integrate them with increased capabilities into the market. Thereby, social protection, which was seen to have been welfare-oriented, a luxury for the poor and very costly for the state, was replaced by a social risk management strategy: investing in human capital aimed at assisting the poor in better managing risks.

The new welfare model in Mexico began to emerge under the de la Madrid presidency (1982–88), in the form of targeting experiments focusing primarily on urban poor neighbourhoods – where unrest had emerged – and aimed at building links with independent popular organisations to encourage their participation in the implementation of social programmes (Piester 1997: 473). During the subsequent presidencies, poverty alleviation through targeted programmes and community participation became an integral part of Mexican social policy (ibid.: 481). The overarching aims were to overcome a system fraught with paternalism and clientelism, whereby the allocation of welfare was in theory given 'unconditionally' by a paternalistic state, though in reality often determined by political allegiance to the dominant Mexican party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) (ibid.: 472). The new model was based on co-responsibility to get the poor involved, as president Salinas declared:

> *El bienestar social en el Estado moderno no se identifica con el paternalismo, que suplanta esfuerzos e inhibe el carácter. Hoy la elevación del nivel de vida sólo podrá ser producto de la acción responsable y mutuamente compartida de Estado con la sociedad.*[7]
>
> (quoted in Piester 1997: 481)

In this context, subsidies for many products were eliminated or became selective. In 1986, the government began to distribute *tortibonos* coupons for subsidised tortillas (Piester 1997: 479). In a similar vein, the 1990s saw a reduction and closure of many para-state welfare institutions and the privatisation of the Mexican old age pension system in 1997 (Luccisano 2006: 62). Instead, within the new welfare model, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have become prominent, such as the OPORTUNIDADES programme, the 'flagship anti-poverty programme' in Mexico, which has been widely adopted beyond Mexico (Molyneux 2006: 425).

In sum, this neoliberal welfare model had a number of implications for development and poverty reduction: First, as mentioned above, there was a move towards targeting specific groups judged particularly vulnerable or excluded.

Second, based on the principle of co-responsibility, receiving welfare became conditional, and there was an increased involvement of the poor and popular organisations in development programmes. This leads to a reconfiguring of state–civil society relations and has in some cases increased popular representation in the social policy arena (Piester 1997: 470). However, at the same time, it also serves as a tool to discipline poor citizens and make them responsible for their own poverty alleviation. This implies a shifting of responsibility for development from the state towards the individual and civil society actors. Rights and entitlements of citizenship have become social responsibilities, which are deeply gendered, as we shall see below. Third, the investment in human capital, aimed at producing an active and productive citizen, contributes to the formation of a new subjectivity: that of the responsible risk-taking poor citizen (Luccisano 2006: 62). Thus, the individual is disciplined into a new behaviour and mind-set. These implications can be illustrated with the example of Mexico's most prominent welfare and social development programme – OPORTUNIDADES.

The OPORTUNIDADES programme

OPORTUNIDADES, formerly called PROGRESA,[8] was initiated in 1997, building on the social fund model that was pioneered and supported by the Inter-American Development Bank in the late 1980s in order to mitigate the negative social impacts of SAPs, and to facilitate the transition to market economies (Luccisano 2006: 60). Funding for the programme stems from the Mexican government, supplemented by international loans, such as from the Inter-American Development Bank (ibid.: 55). OPORTUNIDADES is a targeted anti-poverty programme that provides government cash transfers to poor Mexican households. The money is handed to the women in the households, to cover some of the families' nutritional, educational and health needs, conditional on women's participation in monthly health workshops, regular health checks for mothers and their children, and children's regular school attendance. In addition, women beneficiaries are often required to participate in cleaning and maintenance activities in the community's health facilities (ibid.: 63). Aiming to move beyond paternalistic approaches, one of the key characteristics of the programme is 'co-responsibility', as stated on its website: '*La corresponsabilidad es un factor importante en este programa, porque las familias son parte activa de su propio desarrollo, superando el asistencialismo y el paternalismo*'.[9] However, it has been argued that this actually sustains the paternalistic practices of previous poverty alleviation programmes (Luccisano 2006; Molyneux 2006). The women beneficiaries are required to collect their money in person at a designated time and location. Banks are in charge of administering the programme funds, aiming at inserting beneficiaries into the banking system, through providing them with a bank account, assisting them in withdrawing money from an ATM machine, or encouraging them to save parts of their monthly cash transfers (Luccisano 2006: 64–65).

OPORTUNIDADES has been hailed as one of the most successful anti-poverty programmes. However, evaluations have come to contradicting conclusions (Luccisano 2006; Molyneux 2006; Skoufias and McClafferty 2001).[10] Some studies suggest that the programme has contributed to increased school enrolment, attendance levels, and years of schooling. Other studies show that while cash incentives are given to the poor, investment in material and pedagogical infrastructure has been neglected, effectively resulting in more students using a worsening educational system, with negative implications for school performance and staff working conditions (Luccisano 2006: 71–73). Furthermore, given the high unemployment rate in Mexico, the question of where all these newly educated poor people are going to find jobs remains largely unanswered. Migration is part of the answer.

The programme also has contradictory gender implications, as highlighted by Luccisano (2006) and Molyneux (2006), and confirmed in my own interviews. The idea behind the programme is to give women cash – based on the assumption that women spend money more efficiently and for the benefit of the household – so that they can lift themselves and their household out of poverty. Thus, the double objective is to reduce poverty and to empower women by giving them the money. Thereby, financial empowerment is seen as *the* form of empowerment that will trigger other forms of empowerment, which is a problematic assumption. Moreover, women's reactions to the programme have been mixed. Some of my interviewees thought that this programme brought relief, as Señora Maria from Los Pilares told me: '*este programa nos ha ayudado mucho*' (Señora Maria, Los Pilares, personal interview, April 2005). Yet, other women beneficiaries complained that the conditions they were required to fulfil – i.e. participate in health workshops, make sure their children attend medical appointments and school, participate in 'volunteer' community maintenance activities, etc. – were not worth the money they received and represented an increased workload for them: '*Hay muchos, muchos requisitos, tienes que llevar muchos papeles y es mucho perdido de tiempo, a mi no me gusta*'[11] (Señora Olga, Los Pilares, personal interview, April 2006). Still others reported feeling stressed by the programme. Some women who had failed to fulfil the conditions did not receive their monthly payment or were even removed from the programme, losing an important economic support. This seems to at least challenge the idea that financial cash transfers necessarily increase women's well-being and trigger women's empowerment.

Analysing the regulatory and disciplinary implications of this programme, Luccisano argues that it serves to regulate poor women as a group of population: they are targeted in their function as mothers, effectively making them responsible for the poverty alleviation of their families, empowering them to manage their own risks (Luccisano 2006: 55). This represents an outsourcing of responsibility: The programme 'has shifted the responsibility for social security from the state to the non-state sector, namely to mothers and families, banks and markets' (ibid.). Luccisano further argues that this programme

'attempts to insert mothers into the market as creditworthy consumers, yet has inserted them into the economy and into political discourse not as citizens with rights, but as mothers with increased social responsibilities' (ibid.). The programme also acts to discipline individuals to change their behaviour. Reinforcing notions of motherhood and women's responsibilities in the family by reproducing gender stereotypes, women's behaviour is normalised. Thus, poor women are disciplined into social reproduction behaviour and responsibilised for the development of their children. Women are also encouraged to adopt the habit of saving and to learn how to manage risk better; the programme acts to create an enterpreneurial culture (ibid.: 57).

Finally, OPORTUNIDADES also acts to devalue social reproduction work by reinforcing the idea that such work is not worth remuneration. Thereby, it echoes the idea that not earning income means that one's activities do not contribute to production; that social reproduction work is 'not real work' because it is unpaid in most cases, and therefore not productive. This reopens old feminist debates about the definition of 'productive', and the significance of social reproduction work to the functioning of the (global) economy.[12] A programme functionary is reported to have said to the women beneficiaries:

> Señoras, you must remember that the money you receive from the government is not a *pagos* [payment], these transfers are *apoyos* [supports] given to you by the government. These monies are not *pagos* because you do not work.
> (Quoted in Luccisano 2006: 77)

Thus, the OPORTUNIDADES programme illustrates the new welfare and social development approach of the Mexican government, and its regulatory and disciplinary functions. This book argues that the GRT in Mexico is also embedded in, and simultaneously reproduces this neoliberal welfare approach and involves similar patterns of regulation and disciplining as identified for the OPORTUNIDADES programme, which will be analysed in the following chapter. Yet, before turning to this analysis, the next section provides a short profile of the two fieldwork communities.

Fieldwork context

The choice of the two main fieldwork communities was based on their similarity in terms of size and marginalisation, which allows for comparison and a certain consistency, as well as on the differences between the two communities, which allows me to explore the various ways in which the GRT in Mexico plays out in different localities. Los Pilares and San Lorenzo are rural Mexican communities of similar size, with a relatively high rate of poverty, a high degree of analphabetism, and a general lack of basic infrastructure and services. Both communities have a high rate of emigration to the USA, of mainly male and undocumented character, as is generally still the case for rural Mexico, although this is changing. This means that there is a considerable number of households

that live on remittances, either as a complementary or single source of income. Yet, the two communities also differ in important aspects; for example, they are situated in different Mexican states with different migration traditions, and they feature different types of efforts to establish migration-linked development projects.

Los Pilares

The community of Los Pilares is located in the state of Tlaxcala, the smallest state of Mexico with only 1,068,207 inhabitants (INEGI 2005). Tlaxcala ranks 16 in the Mexican marginalisation index, with a medium degree of marginalisation (CONAPO 2005: annex A). Its geographical location in the centre of the country, close to Puebla and Mexico City, has allowed for relatively well developed communication and transport facilities and growing industry. Most *Tlaxcaltecas* work either in agriculture or in manufacturing in the industrial zones of the state (Binford et al. 2004: 22–23). In the pre-Revolution era (until 1910), Tlaxcala experienced a long period of economic growth, mainly characterised by a vibrant textile industry. This has prompted historians to speak of a 'pre-revolutionary golden age' (ibid.: 22). In the aftermath of the Revolution, Tlaxcala experienced a slow decline of economic growth and industrial activity. Much of the textile industry fell victim to new and more efficient technologies and lost competitiveness on the national market. While the old factories were closing down, a new phase of industrialisation occurred from the 1950s onwards (ibid.: 26). Given the problems with agriculture and unemployment, the state relaunched an explicit policy of encouraging industrial development by creating so-called industrial corridors, making use of the favourable geographical location and the relatively well-developed infrastructure facilities and availability of labour (Rendón Garcini 1996: ch. V).

The state of Tlaxcala has a long history of internal and regional migration to Mexico City and Puebla, which can be divided into different phases. The first originated in the nineteenth century when farmers who lost access to communal land due to the privatisation of farm land migrated towards the big *haciendas* situated in the centre and south of the state, to work as day or seasonal workers (ibid.: ch. III). For fifty years, these *haciendas* were the main sources of employment in the state, providing work and income for hundreds of agricultural workers (Marchand et al. 2006: 6). Thus, migration was of mainly temporary and agricultural character. A new phase was initiated around 1900, with the construction of the railway within the state of Tlaxcala, which facilitated transport and increased internal migration (Rendón Garcini 1996: ch. III). Simultaneously, the strong textile industry in Tlaxcala diversified economic activities within the state and attracted workers (Marchand et al. 2006: 7).

The economic decline in the post-Revolution period, the land redistribution policy of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40), whereby most *haciendas* were expropriated and converted into *ejidos,* and the loss of employment due to the

closure of textile factories, engendered another phase of migration (Binford et al. 2004: 26). Yet, the renewed industrial development in the 1960s led to migration towards the industrial corridors and reduced emigration from Tlaxcala to other states. Thus, by 1990 Tlaxcala was attracting more people than it was losing (ibid.: 6). This changed rapidly with the crisis in the 1990s, when *Tlaxcaltecas* started to join the international migration flows northwards. Tlaxcala is part of the central region of Mexico in terms of its recent integration into international migration. There are some precedents of international migration: some *Tlaxcaltecas* participated in the *Bracero* programme, and Tlaxcala was a major participant in the *Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas Mexicanos de Temporada*, signed between Mexico and Canada in 1971 (ibid.: 2, 26). However, it is only in the 1990s that *Tlaxcaltecas* started emigrating to the US and Canada in bigger numbers, mainly due to land infertility and scarcity, and a decrease in industrial employment. INEGI estimates that between 1995 and 2000, around 136,500 *Tlaxcaltecas* were living outside Mexico, which represents 3 per cent of total Mexican migration (INEGI 2000).

Los Pilares is a small rural mestizo[13] community with around 1,170 inhabitants, located in the municipality of Huamantla (INEGI 2005). Situated at 2,250 metres above sea level, at the foot of the La Malinche volcano, Los Pilares is around 8 kilometres from the town of Huamantla (Godoy Hernandez 2006: 8–10). The community lacks many basic services, such as a sewage system, but there is a water system using pipes to bring water from the volcano down to the community, adding chlorine on the way. However, due to poor administration, deforestation and disputes with a neighbouring community, water provision is irregular. Los Pilares has only two telephone lines, which makes it difficult for inhabitants of the community to keep in touch with their migrant relatives abroad. Recently, some households have acquired mobile phones. Most households have electricity, apart from the remote houses further up the hill. For cooking, most families collect wood in the nearby forests or use gas if they can afford it. Los Pilares has its own kindergarten, primary and secondary school; however, there is a general lack of resources in education facilities, leading to poor performance among students and a relatively low education level (ibid.: 43). There is a gender disparity in education, whereby girls often drop out of school earlier than boys. People generally marry early (starting at around 13 years old) and young women often do not finish their secondary school, given the general tradition that deems it unnecessary for women to get educated once they are married. However, with the increase in international migration, boys and young men also often drop out of school because they decide to migrate to the US (Marchand et al. 2006). The community features a health centre, providing basic health care services. However, the centre has a serious lack of resources, which makes it difficult to perform its function (Godoy Hernandez 2006: 33). The health diagnostic of the community identifies serious problems with malnutrition (mainly children below the age of 5), and the most frequent health problems are respiratory and digestive diseases (ibid.: 15, 32).

The main occupation in the community is agriculture and animal breeding, and around 78 per cent of the population indicates being active in agriculture (ibid.: 38). Corn is the main produce for subsistence and for generating income. There is also a tradition of producing cheese and selling it at the market in Huamantla. The traditional gender division of labour in the community can be described as follows: women work mainly in the home, cleaning, washing, making tortillas, sewing, looking after the children, etc., but they also engage in the production of cheese and sometimes go to sell their produce at the market. Men perform tasks linked to cultivation, livestock and administration, such as paying electricity bills, and many of them have jobs that require short-term migration to nearby cities. As in many Mexican rural communities, women's mobility is generally quite restricted and there is a high incidence of gender discrimination.

As in most rural Mexican communities, many farmers in Los Pilares benefit from the government programme PROCAMPO.[14] This programme was established in 1993 and replaced the large-scale subsidies and price guarantees for Mexican farmers with targeted assistance to small producers to help them compete, based on the neoliberal logic mentioned above.[15] As the price of corn has diminished and the price of fertiliser increased, for many families it has become impossible to make ends meet with agriculture and livestock, which has given rise to growing internal and international migration. There is internal migration from Los Pilares to the nearby town of Huamantla, to the factories situated outside Huamantla, and also to the capital Tlaxcala and other big cities of surrounding states, such as Puebla or Mexico City. The majority of men migrating internally get hired for road construction all over Mexico, often opting for seasonal migration in order to be back for the harvesting period, thus combining seasonal migration with agricultural activity (Godoy Hernandez 2006: 39). Women have been involved in internal migration since the early 1970s, mostly in order to sell food in Mexico City or San Martin Texmelucan (a large regional market located at the border between Puebla and Tlaxcala) or to work as domestic workers in Mexico City. There are no official statistics on the number of internal migrants from Los Pilares, but according to my interviews, the percentage is considerable.

Since the late 1990s, Los Pilares has featured a growing rate of international migration to the US. Interviews with inhabitants from the community indicate that there are around 100–300 people from Los Pilares in the US (Local President, Los Pilares, personal interview, April 2006; Revilla López 2005: 71). International migration from Los Pilares (and rural Tlaxcala more generally) is mainly young, undocumented and male; only a few women have migrated abroad. Based on interviews in the context of our research in Tlaxcala, *Tlaxcaltecas* are spread over many different US states, but there is a high concentration in California, Texas, New York and Georgia (Marchand et al. 2006: 14–15). Judging from the general literature on the Mexican diaspora in the US, one gets the impression that all Mexican migrants are well organised. Yet, this is not the case: in certain Mexican states such as Tlaxcala, emigrant

organising is either non-existent or of more informal character. In his study on Tlaxcaltecan migrants in the US, Ulises Revilla López found that from the eleven registered Tlaxcaltecan migrant organisations in the US, most did either not exist, had disappeared or could not be contacted (Revilla López 2005: 92ff.). The SEDESOL delegation in the state of Tlaxcala reveals that only two migrant organisations have so far become active within the Programa 3×1 (Marchand et al. 2006: 68). The main reason is that some migrant organisations only form to implement a specific project and disappear afterwards. In addition, the enormous distrust of government authorities and even academics and researchers prevents many *Tlaxcaltacas* from providing information about migrant activities (Revilla López 2005: 94).

In contrast to other communities, there is no tradition in Los Pilares for migrants to organise and send collective remittances for community projects. Interviews also revealed that knowledge about the possibility to get co-funding, for example through the 3x1 programme, is rather limited both within the community and among emigrants.

San Lorenzo

San Lorenzo is situated close to Uruápan, in the state of Michoacán, a large state situated on the Pacific coast in the centre-west of the country. It forms part of the Meseta Purhépecha that spans the central and northern regions of the state and extends over an area of 6,000 square kilometres (CDI 2008). Michoacán figures rank it at 10 on the Mexican marginalisation index, with a high degree of marginalisation and a lower degree of development than the state of Tlaxcala (CONAPO 2005: annex A). The state has a long-standing history of migration and is part of what Durand and Massey (2003: 71) call the 'Región Histórica' (see below).

Industrial development in the state of Michoacán is modest and the activities in the Meseta Purhépecha consist mainly of agriculture and forestry, including the manufacturing of wood products. However, years of extensive use of forests, the expansion of avocado crops, and illegal logging have led to an alarming rate of deforestation. Michoacán ranks as the third state in the nation with regard to deforestation rates, and according to one study, 50 per cent of the forest in the Meseta Purhépecha vanished between the years of 1951 and 1986 (Ayala and Mines 2002: 9). The Purhépecha region attracts tourists interested in the volcanoes and the monarch butterfly sanctuary, but also the colourful textiles and Purhépecha's culinary specialities (Segretaría de Turismo de Michoacán, no date). Despite the far-reaching transformations of indigenous culture and traditions due to colonisation, the region still maintains many indigenous customs. The inhabitants speak mainly the indigenous language P'urhé, and there is a general reluctance to speak Spanish, even though most people, particularly the younger generation, understand and speak Spanish.

San Lorenzo is a small rural community of indigenous Purépechas with 3,639 inhabitants (INEGI 2005).[16] The community has a relatively high rate

of poverty, a high degree of analphabetism and a general lack in basic infrastructure and services. San Lorenzo is known for its ancient church and chapel dating from the sixteenth century, the colourful *artesanías*, and its numerous fiestas featuring bright, colourful regional costumes and traditional music of the Meseta Purhépecha (Segretaría de Turismo de Michoacán, no date). The women of San Lorenzo are famous for their beautiful craftwork.

As in many indigenous communities in Mexico, systems of traditional community organisation, so-called cargo systems, play a key role in the organisation of San Lorenzo and determine its cultural activities (CDI 2008). They are usually divided into a religious and a non-religious part, and community members are required to participate in specific tasks. Women's participation is often limited to support roles and tasks lower down the hierarchy, such as cleaning and preparing the church for religious celebrations. Increasing migration and trends towards religious diversification in Mexico often endanger the continuity of these systems of community service, with profound implications for community life.

Throughout the Purhépecha region there is a relatively well-developed transport infrastructure (CDI 2008). However, other infrastructure and services are of a generally low standard and there is a high degree of marginalisation, partly based on the longstanding neglect of indigenous communities in Mexico (CONAPO 2008: 29). San Lorenzo features two kindergartens, two primary and two secondary schools. However, there is a high rate of drop-out: according to one interviewee, almost half of the population over 15 has not concluded its secondary education (Señora Andrea, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005). The provision of drinking water is a serious problem in San Lorenzo and generally in the Purhépecha region (Ayala and Mines 2002: 9). Some inhabitants have wells, while others have to purchase their water in bottles. During summer, most wells are dry and water is brought in to the community by trucks. There are a number of public telephone lines in San Lorenzo.

The traditional gender division of labour in the community can be described as follows: women work mainly in the home, cleaning, washing, making tortillas, sewing, looking after the children, etc. In addition to social reproduction and community work, women in San Lorenzo have a tradition of manufacturing *artesanías*. Men perform tasks linked to livestock cultivation or timber, or are employed in one of the carpentry workshops in San Lorenzo, and are in charge of administrative tasks, such as paying electricity bills. My interviews revealed that compared to Los Pilares, the gendered division of labour in San Lorenzo is stricter and the control of women's mobility and fertility is particularly pronounced. Thus, for example, young and married women hardly leave their houses, as Señora Leonor, who went to school and trained as a hairdresser, told me: '*Yo ahora casi no salgo. Antes salía mucho, casarme me cambio la vida, antes tuve amigas, hace falta el tiempo ahora, y aquí no hay costumbres de salir*'[17] (Señora Leonor, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005).

It is estimated that approximately 2–2.3 million *Michoacanos* live in the US, sending an estimated 1,000 million dollars worth of remittances per year, which represents 11 per cent of the total sum of remittances received by Mexico.[18] Since the 1940s, there has been an increase in migration from the Meseta Purhépecha to the US, which in some communities represents up to 35 per cent of the population (CDI 2008). Agricultural restructuring and shrinking timber reserves have led to the out-migration of a growing number of men, but increasingly also young women joining their husbands or escaping the strict gender roles in the community. San Lorenzo also has a high rate of emigration to the US of mainly undocumented character.

In general, *Michoacanos* in the US are well organised and have established many migrant organisations, so-called Hometown Associations (HTAs) (Burgess 2005: 118). The first Michoacán federation formed in 1997 when HTAs in Chicago united in the Federacion de Clubes Michocacanos (FEDECMI) in order to gain more leverage in negotiating with the state government (ibid.).[19] The Michoacán state government has been very active in encouraging migrant participation in local development (ibid.). As the Plan Estatal de Desarrollo Michoacán 2003–2008 demonstrates, migrants have become an integral part of the state's development strategy and make significant contributions to the development of their home communities (Gobierno de Michoacán, no date; CDI 2008). Michoacán obtains a considerable amount of projects funded through the 3x1 programme: in 2002 and 2003 it had sixty-four projects, which is 7 per cent of the total (Burgess 2005: 119). Migrants from San Lorenzo have also organised and contributed in a number of ways to establishing projects in their community. For example, they have organised to send money for the church renovation and to build a basketball court.[20] In addition to these infrastructure and community projects, there is also a women-only productive project: Mujeres y Desarrollo de San Lorenzo: Proyecto Productivo Binacional.

This productive project emerged out of an initiative by the International Labour Organization (ILO), which, as Chapter 3 shows, is a major player within the GRT. In 2000, the ILO started an initiative on remittances and development in Mexico that went through four phases. The first phase consisted of carrying out research on remittance transfers from the US to Mexico and their use. The ILO commissioned a study on *Migrant Worker Remittances and Micro-Finance in Mexico*, undertaken by Mario López Espinosa (López Espinosa 2002). His study highlighted that only a small portion of remittances was being used to promote local economic development initiatives, established a methodology for a binational productive project, and recommended launching a pilot project in Mexico to establish productive projects linking migration to development (ibid.: 27ff.). In a second phase, the ILO organised a number of workshops in different Mexican states to promote this methodology.[21] In a third phase, such workshops were organised for migrant organisations in the US, in order to raise awareness about the development potential of remittances and the role of productive projects in reducing emigration, and to encourage migrants to participate in pilot projects. The final

phase, starting in 2004, saw the emergence of such a pilot project, albeit in a different way than planned by the ILO. The initial plan to implement four pilot projects based on the methodological framework that had been elaborated by López Espinosa failed.[22]

However, Mario López Espinosa managed to find other institutions that were willing to support a project based on his methodology. Thereby, the main driving force was the Instituto Michoacáno de la Mujer (IMM) of the state of Michoacán that adopted the project and managed to convince other institutions from the state of Michoacán to get involved (Laura Flores, IMM, Morelia, personal interview, June 2005). This led to the pilot project in the community of San Lorenzo. The choice of San Lorenzo was based on a number of criteria: the pilot community needed to rank high on the marginalisation index, to have high emigration rates, but also an existing tradition of producing *artesanías*, which is characteristic of many indigenous communities in the region. The final choice of the community was made by a delegation who visited four potential communities to present the project. San Lorenzo was chosen because the women from the community appeared in a high number (around 500) and showed most interest in the project (Mario López Espinosa, ILO consultant, former NAFIN economist, Mexico City, personal interview, June 2005).

The objective of this project was to promote development and women's empowerment through their participation in the economic development of the community (Instituto Michoacáno de la Mujer, no date: 3). The project aimed at getting women involved in production for the market and to extend the marketing of their *artesanías* to the national and international market. The way the project planned to achieve this was by establishing a strategic alliance between women from San Lorenzo and (women) migrants in the US, based on the idea that migrant women in the US would participate through the promotion and commercialisation of the *artesanías* in order to provide an income for the women in San Lorenzo, and also for themselves.

The project, as designed by López Espinosa, builds on a number of pillars. The Comunidad del Proyecto is composed of all the women participating in the project. The Empresa de Servicio (EDS) is the administration body of the project and includes the Consejo de Administración (an administrative council of seven elected representatives of the women producers) and a number of administration experts (López Espinosa 2002: 48). The decision-making power rests with the seven women; the other members have a consultative status only. The EDS acts as an intermediary between the Comunidad del Proyecto and public and private sector credit institutions and buyers. It offers services to the project participants such as technical assistance, and is in charge of the marketing and commercialisation strategy, fundraising and credits management, acquisition of material and machinery, and administration of the project fund (ibid.: 50). The members of the EDS receive a percentage of the additional benefits created through selling *artesanías* of the project participants, thus, if they do not sell more than before, there will be no income for EDS members. Migrant women can participate in the project in a number of

ways: first, they can help the EDS to commercialise and market *artesanías*, whereby they will receive a percentage of the newly created income by the producers as all members of the EDS; second, they can work as independent promotion agents, collecting orders for *artesanías*, for which they receive a commission; and finally, they can make financial contributions to support the productive activities of the women in San Lorenzo (Instituto Michoacáno de la Mujer, no date: 14–15). There is also a project fund: women are encouraged to contribute 10 per cent of their earnings through the project to a community fund, which has two functions: half of the money of this fund is to be used for expenses that increase the productivity of the project community (such as technical assistance, workshops, machines and material, marketing costs, etc.), and the other half is dedicated to social welfare expenses and investments of the participants and their family members, such as health care, education, housing and pensions. Finally, a Comité de Respaldo (support committee) includes a number of institutions – such as the IMM, the state development agency (SEDESOL Michoacán), and the Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo – that support the project, but do not have decision-making power.

Initially, the project was planned based on the methodology described above. The women organised in groups and participated in the workshops on dressmaking and embroidery offered by the IMM, where they learnt new techniques and improved their skills. Workshops included training on how to calculate the price of an *artesanía*, how to market their products, and additional workshops on topics such as women's rights and self-esteem and empowerment (Laura Flores, Morelia, personal interview, June 2005). At the beginning, the women were given material sponsored by the IMM, based on the assumption that with the income of their first product they would be able to buy their own material.

However, over time, a number of serious problems emerged, some aspects of the project were never implemented, and the structure and 'ownership' of the project changed considerably. The EDS was never established and therefore no real marketing strategy existed and no project fund was opened. Many women kept producing *artesanías,* but did not sell a single product, the promised catalogue to sell the *artesanías* never materialised, the administrative steps to export the *artesanías* were never taken, and there was no real cooperation between the women in San Lorenzo and the migrant women in the US. After approximately one year the consultant Mario López Espinosa left the project due to disagreements. According to him and another voluntary consultant, the main problem was that the IMM had appropriated and politicised the project and was more interested in 'showing off' the women from San Lorenzo at *ferias*, rather than in marketing their products to generate income and improvements for the women producers (ILO consultant, former NAFIN economist, López Espinosa, Mexico City, personal interview, April 2006). Indeed, when I returned to San Lorenzo the following year, the women told me that the IMM seemed to have lost interest and did not reply to their calls and their visits had become less frequent. The women also told me that

they felt they had to participate in many *ferias* to present Purhépecha culture in order for the IMM to keep supporting their efforts (Señora Andrea, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006). Furthermore, the project had been transformed from an all-inclusive to a small project of individual women entrepreneurs: from the initial 300 women only a dozen or so were left. Women who wanted to participate now had to pay an entry fee, which meant that poorer women were no longer able to participate (ibid.).

The women themselves also identified a number of problems. On the one hand, they had encountered a number of obstacles to participating and continuing with the project, such as the traditionally restricted mobility of women in the community that made it difficult for them to participate in *ferias* or meetings outside the community, and the lack of childcare provision within the project. On the other hand, the project had not yielded the promised income for them, so there was no improvement of their economic situation. Indeed, after the women had learnt how to calculate the real price for their *artesanías* they were often told that their *artesanías* were too expensive. Moreover, many women had spent considerable amounts of money to buy material to produce *artesanías* and to travel to *ferias*, etc., and had actually lost money through the project. However, despite all these obstacles and problems, the women had managed to keep the project alive; they carried on producing *artesanías* and opened a small shop on the main street where they took turns to try to sell their products.

This project cannot be labelled successful when judged according to its own criteria, i.e. it has not managed to generate income for the women participants and development for the community as a whole. Yet, community members told me that this project had transformed their lives in a number of ways (see Chapter 6). However, the purpose of this book is to analyse the implications of the effort to establish a migration-linked development project, regardless of whether or not it was successful. This project provides an interesting case study, because it is a productive project linking migration and remittances to development that has an explicit gender focus in that it aims to harness migration and remittances not only for development, but also for women's empowerment. In addition, the project was initiated by an international organisation, which highlights the links between the international and the local realms.

As mentioned above, as a result of migration and remittances, the communities of origin in Mexico have undergone a number of social, cultural, economic and political transformations, which have been widely documented in the literature (e.g. Barrera Bassols and Oehmichen Bazán 2000; Dinerman 1982; Marchand et al. 2006; Marroni 2000; Massey et al. 1990; Mummert 1999, 2003; Suárez and Zapata 2004). The two communities studied in this book underwent similar transformations. Elsewhere, I provide a more detailed analysis of these transformations at the community, family and individual levels (Kunz 2010a, 2010b). For the purpose of this book, it is sufficient to provide a brief overview of these transformations in order to set the stage for the following chapters.

At the level of the community we can identify three main areas of transformations: changes in the demographic composition of migrant-sending communities, in the access to resources linked to increasing inequalities, and changing social dynamics. Given that rural migration is still predominantly male, though this is changing, the demographic composition of rural communities has been affected by migration. In both communities researched in this book, among the population living in the communities of origin there has been a general increase in the percentage of women, children and elderly people, which is common to most (rural) Mexican communities with a high emigration rate (Massey et al. 1990). Migration and remittances have also transformed access in the home communities to resources, such as water, land, housing, motor vehicles, nutrition, and clothing, which has led to increased inequalities *between* and *within* Mexican communities, depending on their geographical and socio-cultural characteristics.[23] This has implications for the growth and development of communities and regions.[24] This growing inequality between communities and households also results in transformations of social and cultural dynamics, new forms of social hierarchies, and conflicts in the communities of origin. The restructuring of the Mexican political economy and emigration have also led to a fundamental transformation of family arrangements and the conditions of social reproduction (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Marchand et al. 2006; Mummert 1999, 2003; Nabor 2004; Vega Briones 2003).[25] New patterns of family structures both disrupt and co-exist with traditional patterns. Thus, for example, male emigration – from several months to several years – creates a situation of (temporary) break-up of the family. Thereby, women and children have been 'abandoned' or left in the care of other family members, and/or men have started leading 'double lives'.[26] This is often described in terms of the 'disintegration of the family', understood as the dominant patriarchal heterosexual family, which is replaced by other family arrangements, such as female-headed households or increasing reliance on the extended family. This (temporary) disintegration can be experienced as both disempowering and empowering: Some women and children from the two communities under study reported feeling lonely, angry, or depressed, whereas other respondents emphasised the benefits of remittances, and saw this situation as an opportunity for their personal development, increased responsibility, and liberty (see Chapter 6).

It is well documented in the literature, and it was confirmed in my fieldwork research, that, as a result of the emigration of male family members, increasingly women, children, and the elderly take on the double burden of both productive and reproductive work (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Marchand et al. 2006; Mummert 1999, 2003; Oehmichen Bazán 2000; Vega Briones 2003). Thus, women and children take on tasks traditionally performed by men, such as administering resources, performing administrative work, and work associated with livestock and agriculture, as Señora Cecilia states: '*Cuando se van ellos, se queda uno a cargo de todo: del campo, de la casa, de los niños, de los animales, de todo, de las juntas de la escuela*'[27] (Señora Cecilia, Los Pilares, personal interview, June 2005).

Given that in many cases migration does not yield the promised/expected remittances, women and children are often left in economic hardship. In this context, women have devised a number of income-earning activities in order to assure their own and their children's survival. Although during the absence of migrant men, more work and responsibility fall on women's and children's shoulders, upon their return some migrant men reportedly take on a larger share of the social reproduction work. However, in many cases things go back to normal when migrants return, and sometimes traditional gender roles are even reinforced.

In sum, neoliberal restructuring and migration processes have a number of gendered implications, at the macro level as well as at the community, family and individual levels. It is within this profound restructuring of the Mexican political economy that the emergence of the GRT in Mexico is embedded. We now turn to map its conceptual and institutional apparatus.

Conceptual apparatus of the GRT in Mexico

The conceptual apparatus of the GRT in the context of Mexico involves a number of key discursive shifts. In some cases, these shifts take forms similar to those in the international realm, such as portraying migration as an opportunity and turning remittances into an object of knowledge. Other elements that were essential for the emergence of the GRT in the context of Mexico are context-specific, such as the shift of the representation of migrants from traitors to heroes and the redefining of the Mexican nation beyond the Mexican border. In order to understand these shifts and elements of the conceptual apparatus of the GRT in Mexico, is it necessary to provide a short overview of the characteristics of Mexican–US migration and migration policy.

As described by Durand and Massey (2003: 45), Mexican emigration to the US is characterised by the following aspects: *historicidad* (historicity), *vecindad* (neighbourhood), *unidireccionalidad* (one-directionality) and *massividad* (immensity). Mexican-US migration has a history spanning more than a century, and is one of the biggest migration flows of contemporary times. Ever since the recruitment of Mexicans to work in US railroad construction and agriculture in the mid-1880s, and the inauguration of the railway connecting the two countries in 1884, there has been a continuous flow of Mexican workers across the border (Cornelius 1981: 2). Mexican–US migration is characterised by a long and hard-to-control border, an economic asymmetry between the two neighbours, ever increasing demand for cheap labour in the US, the rural crisis in Mexico, and a certain migration culture that has emerged in Mexico, sustained by strengthening migrant networks. For most of the twentieth century, despite a few brief periods of bilateral cooperation, the two countries practised what has been called a 'policy of no policy' (Domínguez and Fernandez de Castro 2001: 12).

The migration phenomenon in Mexico takes a variety of forms and different Mexican regions have different emigration patterns. Mexico is commonly

divided into four migration regions: historical, frontier, central and southeast (Durand and Massey 2003: 71). The historical region features a high population density, is listed at a medium level in the Mexican Marginalisation Index, and has a history of emigration of more than 100 years. This is also the region where the *enganche* system started in the early twentieth century, and where many *braceros* were recruited (see below). In this region, migration has become a part of life, migrant networks are strong and much research has been conducted on the development impacts of migration and remittances, particularly in Zacatecas. The frontier region, with its low population density, a generally higher living standard than other Mexican states and an important zone of economic activity (*maquilas*) is a site of strong population movements. It has long been the (temporary) destination of internal migration, acting as a trampoline for potential migrants to the US (ibid.: 79). The central region rotates around Mexico City, a strong attraction for internal migration. This region has made a considerable contribution of *braceros*, and during the 1980s and 1990s has become fully incorporated into the migration flows, most notably with the indigenous populations starting to join the migration process, such as those from Oaxaca (ibid.: 85). The last region, the southeast, had a marginal participation in the migration phenomenon until the 1990s. The *enganche* system in this region had an internal focus, and the region participated only to a small extent in the *bracero* programme. At the turn of the millennium, however, some states from this region started to experience an explosion of migration flows, such as Veracruz (ibid.: 89). Each of these regions has experienced various shifts in migration flows and in the representation of migration and migrants.

Migrants: from traitors to heroes

One of the key conceptual shifts that gave rise to the emergence of the GRT in Mexico regards the reconceptualisation of migrants from traitors to heroes during the 1980s and 1990s. During the twentieth century, migration flows between Mexico and the US and the representation of the migration phenomenon in Mexico have gone through five phases (Durand and Massey 2003; Durand 2005). The first phase (1880s–1920), known as *el enganche* ('the hooking'), was characterised by the private recruitment of Mexican labourers. Thereby, recruiters on behalf of US employers, or agencies contracted Mexicans, advancing the transport fees which would be deducted from the worker's wage once in the US. Based on private recruiters and debt bondage, this system created slavery-like conditions for migrant workers and resembles today's trafficking systems. During the Mexican Revolution in 1910, a wave of refugees joined the migration flows. With the entry of the US into the First World War, the demand for Mexican workers increased. Yet, the second phase (1921–42) saw mass deportations of Mexicans during the Great Depression. During these first two phases, Mexican migrants were portrayed as traitors to the homeland, lacking patriotism because they were working for, and thus

contributing to, the development and enrichment of the neighbouring enemy. Migration was seen as a sin or illness, as pointed out by a contemporary author: '[*los emigrantes estan*] *enfermos del pecado de la emigración*'[28] (Alfonso Fabila 1932, quoted in Durand 2005: 18). Returning migrants were viewed with suspicion, marginalised and treated as outsiders. They were called *pochos*, a derogatory word referring to the fact that they had acquired a new accent and were using Anglicisms (Gómez Arnau and Trigueros, no date: 287). At the time, arguing that the country needed its workers to exploit its resources and move ahead, the Mexican state chose a policy of dissuasion and negative propaganda to retain its workers (Durand 2005: 16). Relations between the two countries had been difficult since the Mexican–American War that ended with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, in which Mexico lost more than half of its territory to the US. Mexican resentment over this is still present in the national consciousness and sometimes means that Mexicans going north do not consider themselves as illegals.

Not long after the last mass expulsions of the 1920s and 1930s, the US entry into World War II created an acute labour shortage, leading to the third phase: the *bracero* programme (1942–64). For the first time, Mexico and the US negotiated a bilateral agreement to implement an agricultural temporary migrant worker programme, explicitly acknowledging that migration was an issue and that there was a binational North American labour market. The *bracero* programme was administered by the two governments in order to avoid the failures of the *enganche* system, and restricted to male agricultural workers, who were provided with temporary work contracts guaranteeing a minimum wage, transport and social security (Durand 2005: 19). During its existence, 4.5 million *braceros* were recruited, mostly young men from rural areas (ibid.: 19). While this programme seems to have worked out for some people, it was also heavily criticised for the corruption at the recruitment centres; the exploitation of migrant workers due to their fixed contract and the minimum employment of four months; the amount of paperwork and recruitment costs; and the creation of a parallel flow of undocumented migrants (ibid.: 20–21).

The end of the *bracero* programme resulted in the fourth phase of the indocumentados (1965–86). During this phase, the profile of migrants began to change. Traditionally, Mexican migrants came from rural areas and engaged in seasonal and circular migration to work in US agriculture. Yet, due to the increasing mechanisation of US agriculture, the need for such workers declined, whereas the demand for migrant workers increased in the industrial and service sectors. At the same time, the debt crisis started to cause an increase in the migration flows. This led to a feminisation and urbanisation of migration flows, whereby women and urban Mexicans joined the flows in greater numbers and women started migrating increasingly as independents (Durand 2005: 22). This undocumented migration resulted in the strengthening of migrant networks, but also reinforced the border mafia and the *coyotes* system[29] (ibid.: 23).

The last phase was initiated in 1986 with the passing of the US Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This law included an amnesty for

undocumented migrants who could demonstrate that they had been in the country since 1982, and a special amnesty for agricultural workers, which led to a total of 2.3 million Mexicans legalising their status in the US. IRCA also made it illegal for US farmers and companies to employ undocumented migrants. At the same time, the law provided increased funding for border control to keep migrants out, which led to the implementation of Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego area, and Hold the Line in the El Paso region, and resulted in the militarisation of the US–Mexican border, increasing the costs for illegal border crossings and deaths at the border (ibid.: 24). However, rather than stopping undocumented migration, these operations increased the trend towards more permanent migration and contributed to the establishment of an increasingly professionalised 'migration industry' (Castles and Miller 1998).

During this last phase, the representation of migrants experienced a major shift. As the Mexican state started to recognise the economic and political importance of Mexican migrants, their representation shifted from traitors to heroes. This culminated during the *sexenio* of Vicente Fox, who put migration high on his agenda. In his speech on the occasion of the constitution of the Asociación de Prestadores de Servicios de las Remesas Familiares, he addressed Mexican migrant workers as the '*23 millones de héroes, de queridos paisanos y paisanas, 23 millones de mexicanos que viven y trabajan en los Estados Unidos*'[30] (Fox 2001). President Fox thanked the migrants for their remittances and encouraged them to continue remitting:

> *Es verdaderamente significativo ver éste esfuerzo* heroico *que hacen nuestras paisanas y nuestros paisanos, allá en los Estados Unidos … A nombre de todas las paisanas y paisanos, a nombre de todo México, a nombre mío en lo personal, les agradezco – de veras – el esfuerzo que se está haciendo y los invito a que continuemos avanzando en este sentido puesto que se está haciendo una gran tarea … Con su perseverancia, iniciativa y probada capacidad, nuestros paisanos* contribuyen al desarrollo económico *de México, y sobre todo contribuyen al desarrollo económico de los Estados Unidos.*[31]
>
> (Fox 2001, my emphasis)

In December 2000, President Fox went on a two-day tour to reach out to migrants heading home on their traditional Christmas trip, attributing public recognition to migrants' contributions to the development of Mexico (*New York Times* 2000).

His successor, President Felipe Calderón, continues this policy, albeit in a less accentuated way. In a speech in Zacatecas, in February 2007, he affirmed that '*estoy comprometido a ser un Presidente que sirva y esté atento a los Mexicanos en Estados Unidos*'[32] (Calderón 2007). President Calderón also expresses his admiration for migrants, although he stops short of calling them heroes, using terms such as 'brave'. Instead, Calderón's discourse emphasises more strongly the negative human and social implications of migration and the need to create jobs in Mexico.

However, after 9/11 and with the increasing securitisation of migration, another representation of migrants has gained popularity: migrants as terrorists. While the Mexican government continues to portray migrants as heroes, the US and other receiving governments have started to perceive migrants as potentially linked to global terrorism.

The migrants-as-heroes framing aims to prevent migrants from losing touch with their country and communities of origin and maintain strong ties, a precondition for the flow of remittances. This framing was also a step towards portraying migrants as agents for development, which has also become prominent in the international realm of the GRT (see Chapter 3). The conceptualisation of migrants as heroes and development agents paved the way for the creation of migrants as a population group. This shift in the representation of migrants is linked to another conceptual shift: the redefinition of the Mexican nation.

Redefining the Mexican nation

At the heart of the emergence of the GRT lies a redefinition of the Mexican nation. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Mexican state embarked on a political and economic project to 'redefine and reincorporate Mexicans living abroad as members of the nation' (Goldring 2002: 56). Thereby, the notion of the nation was broadened to transcend territorial confines, and to include Mexicans living abroad. This redefinition was a key conceptual precondition for the passing of the law allowing for dual citizenship, the law allowing Mexicans abroad to vote, and new laws extending property rights of nationals to Mexicans living abroad (see below). In return, this new legislation simultaneously reinforced the broadened understanding of the nation. It has been argued that this was a strategy of the Mexican government that aimed at encouraging investment and remittances flows (ibid.: 69). This notion of the nation was affirmed by President Calderón:

> *Para mí, México no termina en la frontera con Estados Unidos, no termina ni en el Río Bravo, ni en la barda. Para mí, donde quiera que haya un mexicano o una mexicana ahí está México.*
>
> (Calderón 2007)

Another expression of this broader understanding of the nation can be found in the slogan of the Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME) (see below): '*Aunque estés lejos, estamos contigo*'.[33] This highlights IME's mission to give Mexican migrants confidence that the government is there to support them, even when they are outside Mexico, and in sometimes difficult situations. The phrase also conveys a picture of the nation as one big family, and of the government as a partner or a parent. Given the widespread distrust and suspicion of Mexican government authorities, this is a necessary first step towards winning migrants' trust and attracting remittances.

Combined with the representation of migrants as heroes and development agents, this redefinition of the Mexican nation is an important conceptual shift that enabled the GRT in Mexico. Both serve to justify government investment in setting up an institutional apparatus to provide services to migrants in the US. Yet, an additional conceptual ingredient for the emergence of the GRT in Mexico was necessary: the reconceptualisation of migration.

Migration: from problem to opportunity

Breaking with the traditional way of representing migration as a problem, within the GRT migration is reconceptualised as a mainly positive phenomenon and its development potential is emphasised. This is in accord with the conceptual apparatus of the international realm. In most of President Fox's speeches migration is seen as a positive phenomenon and as an opportunity for development. On the occasion of the constitution of the Asociación de Prestadores de Servicios de las Remesas Familiares, he states: '*la migración no es un problema, es una oportunidad para ambos países, para poner el futuro a nuestro favor*'[34] (Fox 2001).

In line with the 'migration as opportunity' framing, remittances are generally represented as a 'force for good' or a 'motor for development', and their positive characteristics are emphasised. Again, this corresponds to the dominant discourse within the international realm of the GRT. The following statement by President Fox shows that he is very optimistic about their development potential:

> *Estos recursos no son sólo sostén de millones de familias, millones de familias pobres y marginadas, sino también son el motor que mueve la microeconomía de muchas rancherías, comunidades y regiones en el país; son fondos que juegan un papel estratégico, porque llegan justamente a las personas y a los lugares que más lo necesitan. Pero que son fondos que no sólo van con un destino de consumo, sino buena parte de ellos hoy ya se invierten en pequeños proyectos productivos, en changarros, que aquí se convierten en un patrimonio para toda la vida de esas familias. Por eso tienen un enorme significado económico.*[35]
>
> (Fox 2001)

This emphasis on the economic potential of remittances leads President Fox to focus on the 'protection' of remittances:

> *Es mucho y muy grande el esfuerzo que realizan los trabajadores migrantes para poder apoyar a sus familias. Lo es porque generalmente desempeñan labores mal remuneradas y porque el elevado costo de vida les impide ahorrar lo suficiente. Por estas razones, consideramos un fin de justicia* proteger esos envíos de dinero para que sufran la menor merma posible*, para que no se hagan perdidizos, para que los destinatarios puedan sacarle el máximo provecho.*[36]
>
> (Fox 2001, my emphasis)

One would expect the Mexican president to worry about the protection of migrants' rights and the improvement of their status in the US. But this is obviously not President Fox's priority. While he does mention the underlying realities of remittances and their origin and socio-economic context, these are then quickly forgotten when it comes to harnessing remittances for development. The IME shares this optimistic view of the links between migration and development (see the above epigraph to this chapter).

The current president, Felipe Calderón, continues in a similar vein, emphasising the potential of migration, but has a slightly less enthusiastic approach. Thus, for example, in one of his speeches he states that '*a mí me duele la migración*',[37] and comparing migration to an open wound for Mexico, he also highlights the negative social consequences of migration: separated families, fragmented and deserted communities, brain drain, and migrants risking their lives in search of a better life: '*La migración fragmenta nuestras familias, obliga a dejar a los hijos, a los padres, a la esposa, al marido*'[38] (Calderón 2007). He states that even though Mexico does receive remittances, this does not mean that Mexico is necessarily better off, though he does not further specify: '*Se van y dejan aquí a sus familias. México se divide, sí, sí recibimos remesas, nuestra gente es solidaria con su familia y con los nuestros, pero eso no significa que México esté mejor*'[39] (Calderón 2007). Hence, we can see how the discourse has slightly shifted during his administration towards a less optimistic approach to the migration–development nexus.

Remittances as an object of knowledge

Another important conceptual element of the GRT in Mexico is the creation of remittances as an object of knowledge. This is intimately linked to efforts of measuring and monitoring remittances, both internationally and in Mexico (see below). During the Fox administration, remittances were portrayed as an important motor for development, alongside petroleum oil and tourism (Lozano Ascencio 2005: 44). Thus, for example, in a government radio programme in 2003, President Fox emphasised his pride in the increasing amount of remittances:

> *En el año 2002, México registró ingresos – por turistas internacionales – por 8 mil 858 millones de dólares. Nunca antes en la historia de nuestro país habíamos recibido tantos ingresos por turistas. El turismo va bien, tenemos buenas noticias. Y además,* tenemos otros récords*: En el año 2002 fue el año en el que produjimos más petróleo, en el que generamos más energía eléctrica, en el que se incrementaron las reservas internacionales y en el que* tuvimos más remesas familiares de los paisanos, de nuestros conciudadanos que viven en los Estados Unidos. Tenemos muchos récords, muchas cosas de qué enorgullecernos.[40]
>
> (Fox Contigo 2003, my emphasis)

We note that President Fox emphasises that he is proud of the high levels of remittances being sent, implying that these were an achievement of his administration (Lozano Ascencio 2005: 46). We may wonder whether there is reason to be proud of the fact that so many people leave the country in search of a better life. This serves to silence the social realities underlying migration and remittances.

Listing remittances alongside the performance of the other elements of the Mexican economy turns remittances into a sector of the Mexican economy. This is an important discursive shift that serves to legitimise Mexican government activities in the field of remittances, such as establishing laws on reporting remittances, and negotiating with transfer institutions, etc. Thereby, remittances are constituted as an object of knowledge to turn them into an area of intervention. The government gains a certain control over remittances, even though it continues to affirm that these flows are private money.

Linked to the construction of remittances as an object of knowledge and intervention, and as a 'force for good', there is a focus within the conceptual apparatus of the GRT on the productive investment of remittances. Thus, for example, President Fox emphasises that when invested instead of being used for consumption, remittances can provide a lifelong improvement of families' lives: '*son fondos que no sólo van con un destino de consumo, sino buena parte de ellos hoy ya se invierten en pequeños proyectos productivos, en changarros, que aquí se convierten en un patrimonio para toda la vida de esas familias*'[41] (Fox 2001). Indeed, as we shall see below, the Fox administration made it one of its key objectives to turn remittances into benefits for Mexico.

All these conceptual elements constitute the conceptual apparatus of the GRT in Mexico, and have a number of regulatory and disciplinary implications, and help to create particular forms of subjectivities (see Chapter 5). Linked to this conceptual apparatus, a complex institutional apparatus has been established in the context of Mexico, in order to harness migration and remittances for development.

Institutional apparatus of the GRT in Mexico

As in the international realm, the Mexican institutional apparatus also involves numerous activities by various institutions, and the creation of new institutions and programmes. The institutions involved in the Mexican context include Mexican government agencies at the federal, state, municipal and community level; Mexican financial institutions (e.g. NAFIN or Banco de México); Mexican and US NGOs and philanthropic organisations (e.g. the Fundación para la Productividad en el Campo, A.C., the Inter-American Foundation, or the Rockefeller and Ford foundations); Mexican media; Mexican priests; but also USAID, US banks and Western Union, and certain regional and international organisations such as the MIF and the ILO.

Activities identified within the GRT in the international realm are also present in the Mexican institutional apparatus. Thus, various Mexican institutions are

also involved in monitoring remittances, conducting research, organising conferences, building coalitions and launching concrete projects. In addition, in the Mexican context, the activities within the institutional apparatus include a whole machinery for 'courting migrants' and promoting migrant activities. This is in line with the conceptual apparatus that constructs migrants as development actors. The institutional apparatus of the GRT in Mexico consists of three main elements: the mechanisms established to account for remittances; the programmes to promote increased institutionalisation of Mexican migrants in the US; and the 'courting migrants' strategy.

Accounting for remittances

An important milestone in the emergence of the GRT in Mexico is the moment when systematic efforts to measure remittances were established in Mexico. The first study aimed at measuring remittances was reportedly undertaken by Manuel Gamio as early as in the 1930s.[42] However, at the time, this was a rather isolated attempt and interestingly enough did not raise much interest. Until the beginning of the 1990s, there was no consensus about the amount of remittances flowing to Mexico annually, and existing statistics varied widely, from 2,000 million US$ estimated by the Bank of Mexico in 1991, to 6,000 million US$ as calculated by Telecomm-Sepomex in 1990 (Lozano Ascencio 2005: 47). Starting in 1994, the Banco de México revised its methodology and started to systematise its statistics on remittances, which nearly doubled the estimated amount (ibid.: 48). By the mid-1990s there was already a much more consolidated method for the accounting of remittances that gave a clearer idea of the amount of money being transferred. In parallel, starting from the 1990s, the estimated sum of remittances was increasing and by 2001 it was estimated that remittances surpassed the income from tourism (ibid.: 49). This steady growth of remittance numbers has been attributed to a number of factors: the increase in migration and remittances, the improvement in the methodologies accounting for remittance transfers, the decrease of transfer costs and the formalisation of remittances (ibid.: 57–58).

The Banco de México and international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, play an important role in accounting for remittances, as seen in Chapter 3. A number of other institutions are also involved in collecting information about remittance flows, including the CONAPO, the INEGI, the Mexican Migration Project,[43] the Encuesta de Migración a la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF),[44] the National Survey of Latinos by the Pew Hispanic Centre,[45] and the MIF (ibid.: 50). The monitoring of remittances in Mexico was reinforced in 2002, with the new regulations issued by the Banco de México, in order to improve its capacity to measure remittances. Thereby, all institutions involved in transferring money were instructed to register with the Bank of México and to establish monthly reports with detailed information about the amount and destination of remittances transferred.[46]

The machinery established to measure and account for remittances is an important element of the institutional apparatus of the GRT in Mexico and serves as a regulatory mechanism: monitoring remittances is a way to make them manageable and to regulate them (see Chapter 5).

Promoting the institutionalisation of migrant groups

Associations of Mexicans abroad and Mexican migrant philanthropy have existed for a long time: the first expressions of migrant organising date back to the nineteenth-century associations of mutual support, established to assist paying for funerals and repatriation of the dead, or for building and renovating churches (Goldring 2002: 62; Gómez Arnau and Trigueros, no date: 273). The oldest formal Mexican organisation in Los Angeles was reportedly established in 1930 to assist Mexicans affected by Depression-era deportations (González Gutiérrez 1995). What is new with the GRT is the ways in which Mexican migrant organising has been promoted, institutionalised and instrumentalised by the state and non-state actors since the late 1980s.

Starting in the 1970s, migrant organising entered a new stage, with the proliferation of various forms of organisations, including a diverse social and ethnic membership, with different levels of political awareness and activity (Gómez Arnau and Trigueros, no date: 273). These organisations fulfil various missions: some gather collective remittances destined to support development projects in their home community;[47] others aim to maintain and promote Mexican tradition and culture or create support mechanisms for their members (in case of illness, other difficulties, or death); and still others are sports or religious clubs, or political lobby groups. Oftentimes, these different activities are combined in the same migrant association. Establishing and maintaining such migrant organisations is a difficult task and requires considerable financial and time commitment, which is not something most migrants have in excess, and which explains the more transient nature of some organisations (ibid.).

Nevertheless, in the last thirty years, Mexican migrant organisations have multiplied and become more formalised and institutionalised.[48] There are different levels of institutionalisation of migrant associations: (a) informal associations, (b) formal hometown associations (HTAs), and (c) federations joining all the HTAs from one specific Mexican state (Alarcón 2004: 162–63). Usually, HTAs are set up by an aggregate of families, and consist of a president, treasurer, secretary, and auditors. The selection process of the president depends on the formality of the association, but elections for president are usually held once or twice a year (Orozco 2003: 7). Migrants from Mexican states with a long migration tradition, such as Zacatecas, Michoacán or Guanajuato, have set up many HTAs. As researchers have reported, authority within the HTA is usually distributed among various members and the decision-making process involves significant debate (ibid.). However, there is sometimes a danger in idealising such associations: major power struggles and processes of exclusions have been reported, such as those based on gender.[49]

Mexican consulates in the US also play an important role in fostering ties between the migrants and the state, and in promoting the formation of new, and the institutionalisation of existing, migrant associations. The consulate in Los Angeles assumed a pioneering role: it launched an HTA registration process, and was actively involved in arranging meetings between HTAs and prominent politicians and officials, and convening events to form new HTAs (Burgess 2005: 112). This registration process serves as an instrument to collect information about migrants and thereby contributes to their regulation (see Chapter 5).

Another important actor that helps encourage migrants to get organised and institutionalised are Mexican priests. Their activities involve organising the communities of origin, organising the migrants, building trust between the two groups, and promoting collective remittances. Their involvement with the migrants takes the form of dialogue or visits to the US. Given that priests are often more mobile and can obtain travel permits relatively easily, they can act as intermediaries and connect the community with the migrants. Thus, they visit the migrants in the US and celebrate mass with them, providing religious services to the diaspora. Priests also act as go-betweens to keep up the ties between the migrants and their non-migrant family members. Local priests transmit news, photos, letters, and money between relatives on both sides of the border. In our research in Tlaxcala, for example, we have documented how the local priest managed to bring the community and the migrants closer through his visits to the US (Marchand et al. 2006: 75). Given the widespread distrust in government institutions, local priests often represent an alternative authority to be trusted. They fill a gap that has been created by widespread corruption and mismanagement of government institutions.

Finally, the (local) media also encourage migrants to get organised. As we have documented elsewhere, in the case of Tlaxcala, for example, the magazine *El Norte* and the radio programme *En punto* play an important role in the GRT (Marchand et al. 2006: 74; Pérez Martínez 2006: 104; Revilla López 2005: 97ff.). Both media have a binational presence, aimed at opening and maintaining communication channels between the migrants in the US and their home communities in Mexico. Their activities contribute to reinforcing the feeling of collective identity among *Tlaxcaltecas* in the US, and to promote migrant organising (Marchand et al. 2006: 74).

As a consequence of the active promotion of HTAs since the 1990s, the number of HTAs increased dramatically and HTAs have become increasingly federated (Burgess 2005: 113; Goldring 2002: 63). This promotional activity acts to create migrants as a population group and target them with regulatory policies (see Chapter 5). The increased organisation and institutionalisation of Mexican migrants in the US was an important element in the emergence of the GRT.

Courting migrants

Within the GRT, a number of initiatives were established to 'court migrants'. In the literature this strategy is also referred to as 'diaspora policies', 'transnationalism

from above', or 'state-led transnationalism' (Goldring 2002; Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Hamilton 2003; Lozano Ascencio 2005). As defined by Goldring, state-led transnationalism 'describes national policies that foster or maintain transnational social spaces' (2002: 64). In this analysis, the term 'courting migrants' is used, because it allows me to go beyond state-led initiatives in order to include the activities of a variety of non-state actors that are involved in courting Mexican migrants.

As seen in the last section, the conceptual basis for the courting strategy was established through portraying migrants as heroes and agents for development, praising them in official statements for their courage and loyalty, and emphasising their importance for the development of Mexico and thus giving them public recognition. This section maps the institutional elements of the courting strategy, which includes establishing institutions and programmes to offer services for migrants; passing legislation regarding double nationality, property rights and the vote from abroad; promoting cultural and educational exchange programmes for migrants and home-country tourism; facilitating remittance transfers; encouraging development projects funded by collective remittances; and creating incentives for migrant investment.

This strategy of courting migrants originated at the level of different Mexican states. The first major initiative started in 1986, when, during a visit to Los Angeles, the newly elected governor of Zacatecas, Genaro Borrego, announced the Programa para los Zacatecanos Ausente*s* (Programme for Zacatecans Abroad), in which the state government matched every peso that the Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of Southern California (FCZSC) invested in local projects (Burgess 2005: 112). Zacatecan migrants had long been active in organising and collecting money for projects destined to improve life in their home communities. However, this was the first major step by a Zacatecas governor to formalise such initiatives and actively get in touch with the migrant community in the US. This Zacatecan programme later became the model for the federal Programa 3×1 (see Chapter 5).

At the federal level, the courting strategy started under the Salinas administration (1988–1994) and culminated during the Fox presidency (2000–2006). Under Salinas, a set of policies and programmes were established to promote closer social, cultural and economic ties with Mexicans abroad and to offer services to migrants (Goldring 2002: 66). In 1989, Salinas created the Programa Paisano that aimed to improve the treatment of returning Mexicans at the hands of customs and police agents (ibid.). To this aim, the *semáforo fiscal* was introduced at border crossings – a traffic light that randomly selects who will be subjected to a detailed luggage control – which helped to regulate luggage control, and reduced waiting times and corruption (ibid.). The Programa Paisano also informs migrants about their rights and obligations upon their return to Mexico. In the area of security, the protection unit Grupo Beta was founded in 1990 with the mission to defend migrants in the border zone between Mexico and the US against assaults and police corruption, leading to a 90 per cent reduction of violence and an improvement of the security in the former 'no man's land' (Durand 2005: 26).

In 1990, the Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior (PCME) was established, aimed at redefining the relationship with Mexicans abroad (Gómez Arnau and Trigueros, no date: 283). The PCME operated under the Foreign Ministry and included a network of forty-two consulates and twenty-four institutes and cultural centres. The PCME was divided into different thematic areas, such as education, culture, sports, business, health, communication and communities (Goldring 2002: 66). Its objectives were to promote Mexican history, traditions, and culture; to improve the Mexican reputation in the US; and to spread information about migrant activities and struggles in the US and to reach out to existing and facilitate the formation of new HTAs (Burgess 2005: 112; Goldring 2002: 66; Gómez Arnau and Trigueros, no date: 283).

While some commentators have argued that this programme was created for purely political reasons to improve the reputation of the Salinas government among the Mexican diaspora, the programme did provide a range of useful services to migrants in a number of areas (Durand 2005: 27). In the area of education, the PCME established the Programa Binacional de Educación Migrante México-Estados Unidos, Programa de Intercambio de Maestros, free distribution of text books to Mexican children living in the US, and legislation to facilitate the validation of the school years spent in the US (Gómez Arnau and Trigueros, no date: 284). Services in the area of health included the publication of a list of US health institutes offering services in Spanish, the organisation of prevention campaigns, and facilitating an exchange programme for health personnel between the two countries (ibid.). Thus, the PCME contributed not only to intensifying contacts between the Mexican government and the migrants, but also to strengthening relations among migrants. Furthermore, the PCME also promoted the social and economic links between migrants and their home communities, encouraging local development initiatives in their hometowns (ibid.).

Encouraged by the PCME, the 1990s saw the emergence of numerous Oficinas Estatales de Atención a Oriundos (OFAOs), state-level centres dedicated to (potential) migrants (ibid.). The OFAOs have multiple objectives: to distribute information about available services to (potential) migrants from their state; encourage and coordinate the participation of state-level institutions in courting initiatives; promote the formation and consolidation of HTAs and their involvement in local development initiatives; improve the reputation of migrants in their home communities; support the consulates' activities in protecting migrants; organise visits by prominent migrants and assist migrants with their (temporary) return; encourage and channel investment projects of migrants; and establish possibilities for legal labour migration (José Portillo, OFATE official, Tlaxcala, personal interview, May 2005). There is considerable diversity in the working and activities of OFAOs. Some have been particularly active and have established various initiatives, as is the case for the OFAO of Guanajuato, for example. Created in 1994, it initiated a number of projects, among which the Casas Guanajuato and Mi Comunidad, a project for the

productive investment of remittances in *maquiladoras* (see Chapter 5). Other Mexican states have also established such centres as a counterpart to the OFAOs in the US, such as Casa Michoacán or Casa Puebla,[50] sometimes with funding from private actors. These serve to provide information and as a meeting point for migrants and representatives from the Mexican states. Thus, parallel to the federal-level efforts, state governments also actively participate in the courting strategy. In Zacatecas, for example, this involved a binational health programme of the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, which allowed migrants to pay for health insurance for their family members living in the home community (Alarcón 2004: 166). The Casa del Migrante Tlaxcalteca in Houston, Texas was established in 2005, with the objective of providing a point of contact for *Tlaxcaltecas* abroad in the case of emergencies, and to serve as intermediary between the migrants and their communities of origin. An association of *Tlaxcaltecas* sponsored the rent and the administrative costs (Avendaño 2005; Marchand et al. 2006: 69). Thus, the Casa was not provided by the state as a service for the migrants, but it is the migrants themselves that are paying for this service. In connection with the inauguration of the first Casa del Migrante Tlaxcalteca, a newspaper report quoting a government official from Tlaxcala illustrated the main objective behind this initiative, from the side of the Mexican government:

> *Además, adelantó que una vez levantado el padrón de tlaxcaltecas en ese país, su administración los invitará a cooperar en la realización de obras en sus respectivas comunidades, o bien invertir sus ahorros en la entidad una vez que regresen. 'Lo más importante en este momento es que sigan inyectando divisas a la economía nacional', enfatizó.*[51]
>
> (Avendaño 2005)

While during the Zedillo administration (1994–2000), the courting strategy continued, for example with the passing of the law allowing double nationality for Mexicans, it was under the Fox administration that the strategy changed gear. Renewing the Mexican government's commitment to working with the diaspora, President Fox created the Oficina Presidencial para la Atención de Migrantes en el Extranjero (Presidential Office for Attention to Mexican Communities Abroad), which was turned into a new major institution in 2002: the Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME), as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs (Burgess 2005: 114; Lozano Ascencio 2005: 43). IME's mission was to '*fortalecer la capacidad institucional del Gobierno de México para desarrollar políticas de acercamiento con esta población*', i.e. to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Mexican courting strategy.[52] Thereby, the IME functions as a communication channel between migrant organisations and the Mexican government, as expressed by Luis Enrique Vértiz Avelar, director of IME: '*El IME es como un puente, lo que hace es interconectar a los migrantes que estan en E.E.U.U. con la SEDESOL, con la NAFIN, con la Fundacion para la Producividad en el campo, etc.*'[53] (Luis Enrique Vértiz Avelar, IME,

Mexico City, personal interview, May 2005). Further, the IME also aims to revalorise the migration phenomenon and promote the humane treatment of Mexicans living abroad through developing instruments for defending the human rights of Mexican migrants.[54] Through its activities, the IME creates community and communication spaces for migrants, coordinates courting activities, and promotes migration-linked development projects.[55] The IME offers services in different areas, such as health, education, sport, culture, housing, community organisation, financial education, and development.[56] Through the regularly organised Jornadas Informativas for influential leaders of Mexican migrant communities in the US and Canada, the IME distributes information about its services and encourages migrants to get involved in development initiatives.[57]

One of IME's most innovative features is the Consejo Consultivo, an advisory council that consists of 152 members, including migrant representatives, representatives from Latino organisations in the US, special advisors and representatives from Mexico's state governments.[58] This council helps to identify and analyse problems, challenges and opportunities regarding the improvement of the lives of Mexicans abroad, and assists the IME in the promotion of its programmes.[59] In this council, migrants' voices are represented, although there is a question of the adequacy of representation.[60]

During the Fox administration, a number of initiatives to court migrants and win their trust were established and promoted on a big scale. Thus, Fox resurrected and considerably extended the Programa 3×1 (see Chapter 5). A further aspect of the courting strategy is the law allowing Mexicans abroad to vote, first introduced in the 2006 presidential election. The courting strategy also works below the federal level, whereby Mexican state governors play an important role in trying to shore up political and economic support from Mexican migrants, visiting migrants in the US, and promoting the Programa 3×1. In return, migrants get the honour of a visit by the state governors who listen to their concerns, and they get a seat at the table when it comes to negotiating migration-linked development initiatives. The authorities at the municipal level have also been active in the GRT in Mexico. They generally face a dilemma: Given their relatively modest finances, they have often come to rely on remittances to carry out development projects in their municipality, however, at the same time, they worry about the potential competition from migrants for political capital in the communities, given that traditionally, development projects were often assigned based on political support, in an environment of *asistencialismo* (Burgess 2005: 115). Thus, the increased interaction between migrants and the municipal authorities has been problematic in many ways (ibid.). Some local level authorities have also been active in the GRT, whereas others are more sceptical towards linking migration to development, as in the case of Los Pilares in Tlaxcala (see Chapter 6).

The Mexican consulates in the US play an important role in the migrant courting strategy. They promote IME's services and encourage migrants to channel collective remittances through Mexican government programmes. To this aim, Mobile Consulates have been created that attend to the consular

needs of Mexican migrants living far from the major consulates in the US.[61] Mexican and US philanthropic organisations and NGOs have also been involved in courting migrants and seeking ways to increase the alleged benefits of remittances. NGOs such as the Fundación Solidaridad Mexicano-Americana A.C.[62] and the Fundación para la Productividad en el Campo A.C. (FPPC) have both collaborated with migrant organisations in the US to promote development in their home communities.[63] The Inter-American Foundation (IAF), an independent agency funded by the US government, provides grants to non-governmental and community-based organisations in the LAC region for innovative, sustainable and self-help programmes.[64] It has initiated a series of dialogues with immigrant groups in the US and their counterparts overseas, in order to increase productive investment of remittances, and it has co-supported development projects financed by Mexican migrants (Merz and Chen 2005: 222). A number of US foundations, such as Ford, Hewlett, Rockefeller, and MacArthur, provide support for HTAs and facilitate diaspora giving. Thus, for example, with its support to the Zacatecan Federation based in Los Angeles in 2003, Rockefeller became the first private foundation to make a grant to an HTA (ibid.: 223).

Further, the US development agency USAID is also to some extent involved in the courting strategy, for instance through its public–private Diaspora Networks Alliance (DNA) that was launched in the Global Development Alliance. The objective of the DNA is to 'leverage the vast resources of Diaspora communities', and 'to intensify the flow of knowledge and resources of Diaspora to their home countries to promote economic and social growth'.[65] Furthermore, as part of a broader strategy of banking the unbanked through remittances, many US banks and companies are involved in programmes to increase the formalisation of remittances and the use of banking services for remittance transfers. More recently, they have also started to contribute to remittance-linked development projects, such as in the case of Western Union's participation in the Programa 3×1 in 2005 (see Chapter 5).

Regional and international institutions are also highly present in courting Mexican migrants, as illustrated in Chapter 3. Thus, for example, the ILO commissioned a study on remittances in Mexico in 2002 (López Espinosa 2002), and launched a binational pilot initiative for the purpose of linking migration to development in Mexico. Another example is the MIF (IDB) which, since 2007, has become involved in a productive variant of the matching-fund Programa 3×1 and the Invierte en México programme (see Chapter 5).

This is linked to the broader aim within the GRT in Mexico of investing remittances 'productively'. As seen above, the productive investment of remittances is one of the elements of the conceptual apparatus in Mexico. The institutional apparatus includes various strategies seeking to attract migrant investment. Indeed, the Fox administration made one of its key objectives that of turning remittances into benefits for Mexico. As the IME affirms:

> *El gobierno mexicano ha realizado un gran número de acciones para garantizar el flujo de remesas y lograr aprovecharlas de manera más eficiente. Con*

> *base en estos objetivos se han promovido mecanismos para reducir el costo de envío de las transferencias de dinero y proyectos que brinden oportunidades financieras para nuestros conacionales.*[66]
>
> (Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior 2004: 1)

For example, in an attempt to provide investment opportunities to migrants, the BANSEFI was created:

> *Las remesas que envían los mexicanos que viven en Estados Unidos, y que representan la tercera fuente de ingresos de nuestro país, constituyen recursos que* deben ser invertidos en proyectos productivos *dentro de sus comunidades de origen, a fin de propiciar el crecimiento económico y el desarrollo social. Para coadyuvar al eficiente empleo de estos recursos y fomentar el desarrollo de estas comunidades, la* [*Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público*] *SHCP transforma el Patronato del Ahorro Nacional en el Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros* [*BANSEFI*] *con el objetivo de ofrecer productos y servicios financieros que promuevan el ahorro y la inversión entre la población.*[67]
>
> (My emphasis)

This statement amounts to an obligation to invest remittances in productive ways, and puts the SHCP in charge of promoting the efficient investment of remittances in order to trigger development in the home communities. This acts to normalise migrants to invest remittances in productive ways (see Chapter 5).

Finally, Mexican priests also play a role in the courting strategy. Oftentimes, priests have a unique access to the trust of communities and migrants. Many priests use their position of authority to organise the community in order to formulate demands on the migrants to obtain collective remittances. In parallel, they encourage migrants to organise and to keep in touch with the needs of their home communities, in order to establish remittance-linked development projects. A number of priests I have interviewed have become involved in the GRT. In some cases, they obtained collective remittances for church projects, such as renovation, celebrations or new infrastructure material. Indeed, church renovations are one of the most popular projects funded through collective remittances in Mexico. Thus, for example, during our interview, Padre Roberto from San Lorenzo proudly showed me the brand new computer and printer that he had obtained from migrant remittances during his last visit to the US (Padre Roberto, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2006). Hence, priests have often gained influence over how collective remittances are spent, which contributes to the regulatory power of the GRT, as will be analysed in the following chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter has mapped the conceptual and institutional apparatus of the GRT in the case of Mexico. In short, the conceptual apparatus is characterised by

five elements: the representation of migration as an opportunity, remittances as an object of knowledge, migrants as heroes and development agents, and the Mexican nation as stretching beyond the Mexican territory. The institutional apparatus consists of various state and non-state actors involved in three main activities: monitoring remittances, promoting the institutionalisation of migrant groups, and courting migrants. Thus, the regime of practices of the GRT in Mexico is geared towards formalising remittance transfers and reducing transfer costs, encouraging migrants to get organised and to send both individual and collective remittances, and promoting migrant investment, in order to harness remittances for development. This analysis has allowed us to show how seemingly disparate discursive elements and practices form part of the regime of practices of the GRT.

The main focus has been on the discourse of the GRT during the Fox administration. While not offering a full-scale comparison between the approaches adopted by President Fox and by President Calderón, I have also illustrated some areas where Calderón's approach departs from his predecessor's. While the general tenet has remained the same, the discourse has undergone slight changes with the advent of the Calderón administration. Generally, what differentiates the Calderón administration discourse is the stronger emphasis given to the negative human and social implications of migration and a stronger focus on the need to create jobs in Mexico. While Fox courted migrants more overtly and emphasised the issue of remittances and their economic potential and development impact, Calderón adopted a slightly more cautious approach to the links between migration and development. Factors influencing this shift in emphasis include the fact that Calderón is less in need to justify the establishment of new institutions to provide services to migrants; this political battle was fought by his predecessor. Moreover, his framing is also influenced by the increasing securitisation of migration and his own political agenda of emphasising the need for job creation within Mexico.

Comparing the conceptual apparatus in the Mexican context with the apparatus in the international realm, we can identify a number of continuities and discontinuities. As mentioned above, it has to be emphasised that there is not one homogeneous Mexican discourse, and different institutions within the Mexican government and different administrations have adopted slightly different approaches. In addition, the discourse also shifts with the context, e.g. the language used to address migrants directly is different from the language used to address government officials or development experts. But it goes beyond the purpose of this book to go into the details of these different discourses. The aim here is more modest, namely to compare the general tendencies in the Mexican context with the two discourses identified within the international realm: the money-based and the rights-based approach.

To start with, it was demonstrated that the Mexican discourse shares the two core assumptions within the international apparatus: the conceptualisation of migration as a mainly positive phenomenon, and the focus on the positive characteristics of remittances. Generally speaking, we can observe how in the

Mexican context, many elements of the money-based approach are adopted, but combined with some elements from the rights-based approach and some new elements particular to the Mexican context.

In terms of the key issues and actors, the Mexican discourse adopts the money-based focus on remittances as the most visible element of international migration and as a tool for development. Similar to the international level, remittances have become an object of knowledge and regulation. Yet, in terms of actors considered relevant, it puts stronger emphasis on the migrants as key agents for the development of Mexico; migrants have more weight in the Mexican discourse. This is the necessary basis for justifying the investment in offering services to migrants. In the Mexican context, there is also a stronger sign of the awareness of the problematic conditions in which migrants live compared to the international discourse. These conditions are often mentioned in official speeches addressing migrants, in order to acknowledge their situation and establish a dialogue.

Within the Mexican context, both the narrow financial definition of remittances and the positive portrayal of remittances have been adopted. As demonstrated, President Fox is very optimistic about the potential of remittances for the economic development of Mexico, and remittances are represented as a 'motor for development', for example. In the Mexican context, the 'emotional element' of remittances found in the MIF discourse is also present, namely the emphasis on the emotional bonds between migrants and their families that serves to reinforce the social pressure on migrants to send remittances.

In the Mexican discourse, migrants are portrayed as resources that can be tapped for development. As will be shown in the following chapter, the Mexican discourse also adopts the migrant bias that contributes to marginalise the voice of non-migrants, with important gender implications. Yet, the policy focus within the Mexican context is slightly different from the focus within the international realm: while the formalisation and regulation of remittance flows and the reduction of transfer costs are also major concerns in the Mexican context, there is a strong emphasis on the productive investment of remittances to generate employment and economic growth for the communities of origin and the country as a whole. This mirrors the policy focus of the ILO.

The analysis has revealed that the institutional apparatus in Mexico features similar activities as in the international realm. This demonstrates how the GRT links various localities and spans from the micro to the macro level. Yet, this is not to argue that the GRT is a one-way, top-down phenomenon that started at the international level and was imposed on Mexico. The GRT emerged concurrently in different places, albeit in different forms. Indeed, the foundation stones of the GRT in the case of Mexico were laid prior to the emergence of the GRT in the international realm, as illustrated with the courting strategy or the Programa 3×1, which emerged as a grassroots initiative at the end of the 1980s and was institutionalised by the Mexican federal government in 2002. However, the GRT only fully manifested itself starting with the Fox administration (2000–2006), which is

roughly the same time as the GRT became prominent in the international realm.

As shown in this and the previous chapter, there is a multitude of state and non-state actors involved in the GRT. One particularity of the Mexican case is the fact that priests have become a key actor in the GRT. The roles and the implications of their involvement will be analysed in more detail in the next chapter.

This chapter has also provided background information on the emergence of the GRT in Mexico. Neoliberal restructuring and migration processes in Mexico have a number of gendered implications, at the macro level as well as at the community, family and individual levels. This information is crucial to understanding the mechanisms of regulation and disciplining, and the forms of resistance and empowerment within the GRT. In addition, it is the starting point for assessing whether and in what ways the GRT might be based on, and reproduce, neoliberal governmentality.

A number of key neoliberal elements of the restructured Mexican welfare model have been identified. First, the general shift from universal social welfare programmes towards individually targeted risk-reducing and poverty reduction initiatives. This involved, second, the creation of new target groups, such as the 'responsible and deserving poor'. Third, this shift was accompanied by the increasing involvement of civil society actors in the provision of welfare and poverty alleviation. Further, based on the principle of co-responsibility, receiving welfare has become conditional and there is increased responsibilisation of individuals for managing their risks and lifting themselves out of poverty, as illustrated with the OPORTUNIDADES programme. Fifth, neoliberal subjectivities have been created within this new welfare model, such as the 'responsible poor citizen'. Finally, the dual nature of neoliberalism, as identified in Chapter 2, manifests itself in the Mexican case, as illustrated by the disciplining and empowerment of civil society groups involved in the provision of welfare. I argue that the GRT is based on and contributes to reproducing these elements of the neoliberal welfare model in Mexico, and thereby reinforces neoliberal governmentality. This is the point at which the next chapter begins in order to further substantiate this argument.

5 The power technologies and subjectivities of the GRT in Mexico

> [*H*]*ay una comunidad aquí que no tiene agua y sufren mucho, es urgente, … ahora proponen de hacer un pozo pero cuesta 2,000,000 pesos y no tienen muchos migrantes, entonces yo voy a tentar de localizar los migrantes en California para ver si ellos pueden hacer una colecta de dinero para pagar una parte del pozo.*[1]
>
> (Padre José Luís, San Pablo, personal interview, June 2005)

> *Nos tenemos que someter a lo que quiere el mercado. El mercado manda.*[2]
>
> (Señora Andrea, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006)

Introduction

Having traced the backdrop against which the GRT emerged and mapped its conceptual and institutional apparatus within the international realm and in the context of Mexico in the previous chapters, this chapter now turns to the third and fourth dimension of the governmentality analysis: the gendered power technologies and subjectivities of the GRT. Thereby, the focus is mainly on Mexico, but relevant international elements are also factored in. As set out in Chapter 2, the analytical framework of this book focuses on two forms of power and how they operate in specifically gendered ways: regulation and disciplining. These two poles are linked and interact in a number of ways, but can be distinguished for analytical purposes: regulation operates at the level of population groups, whereas disciplinary power works at the level of the individual body, in order to increase the docility and utility of individuals. These power technologies contribute to the creation of new, gendered ways of being and identifying; new forms of subjectivities. The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section analyses the regulatory power, the third section focuses on the disciplinary power, and the fourth section examines the subjectivities dimension, followed by a concluding section.

The regulatory power of the GRT

The regulatory power of the GRT is exerted both through conceptual mechanisms, such as the representations of women's and men's roles through the

remittance sender–receiver dichotomy, as well as institutional mechanisms, such as policies, legislation, and the establishment of new institutions and programmes. We can identify three elements of the regulatory power of the GRT: the creation of new population groups, the collection of information about these population groups, and the targeting of these groups with specific policies.

Creating population groups

The regulatory power of the GRT creates two key groups of populations relevant for this book: the (remittance-sending) migrants and the (remittance-receiving) non-migrants. At first sight, the two groups appear to be a neutral classification of people who are part of the migration and remittance phenomena. However, as feminist scholars have argued for some time, dichotomies are rarely gender-neutral. Thus, a gender analysis of this dichotomy in the context of Mexico reveals that it opposes the active male migrant hero sending remittances to the dependent, unproductive non-migrant woman remittance receiver waiting passively at home. The gendered character of the dichotomy is expressed through different value attributions, whereby what is associated with the masculine is generally given greater value (i.e. migrant men sending remittances) than what is associated with the feminine (i.e. non-migrant women receiving remittances). These gender attributes are context-specific. In the Mexican context, for a long time, men have outnumbered women in international migration by far. In the meantime, the percentage of women emigrants has increased. For example, in 2008, it was estimated that Mexican men amounted to 55.8 per cent of the total immigrant population in the US, while 44.2 per cent were women (Terrazas 2010).[3]

The emergence of the remittance sender–receiver dichotomy is situated in the context of the conceptual and institutional apparatus of the Mexican GRT, particularly the shift towards representing migrants as heroes and development agents and the courting migrants machinery. Thereby, in the official discourse, the main focus is on the migrant hero. The non-migrant remittance receiver receives much less attention in official discourses, and the courting strategy is almost exclusively targeted at (male) migrants. Yet, as this chapter shows, the (women) non-migrant remittance receivers are also an integral component of the GRT in the case of Mexico. Indeed, they have also become the target of regulatory and disciplinary power. They are the (hidden) side of the coin of the courting machinery, but they are necessary for the functioning of the GRT. Only a gender-sensitive lens can detect and analyse this side of the coin.

As seen in Chapter 4, the remittance-sending migrant hero has received much attention, as expressed in official statements and government policies in Mexico. The Fox and Calderón administrations played a key role in (re)producing this discourse, as the following extract from a speech illustrates:

> [L]o*s admiramos,* los *admiramos por el coraje y la gallardía que han tenido para arriesgarlo todo, para irse a una tierra que no es la suya.* [*L*]*es*

> *estamos infinitamente agradecidos, agradecidos porque las familias más pobres de México, que son las familias de donde ustedes salieron y emigraron, sólo han podido sobrevivir a crisis financieras, a errores económicos, a corrupción, a desorden, a tantas tragedias que han ocurrido en nuestro país, sólo han podido sobrevivir gracias al envío de las remesas, del* hijo *que se acuerda de la madre y del* esposo *que se acuerda de sus hijos. También vengo a decirles que* los *extrañamos,* los *extrañamos mucho* […].[4]
>
> (Calderón 2008, my emphasis)

We can observe how the gender dichotomy is reproduced in this speech: the migrant remittance senders are assumed to be male, whereas the receivers are women and children; the son sends to his mother, the husband sends to his wife or children.

This discourse results in the creation of migrants and non-migrants as population groups. In the case of the migrants, they become regulated to become useful for the development of Mexico, as illustrated in an interview with an IME official:

> *Los migrantes estan jugando un rol de los más importantes para el desarrollo de Mexico, economicamente, y ya están cambiando mucho: envian las remesas por canales formales y por esto ya se consideran de los primeros ingresos que hay en Mexico.*[5]
>
> (IME representative, Mexico City, personal interview, May 2005)

While much has been written about the 'masculine' side of the dichotomy – i.e. the 'remittance-sending migrant hero' – the other side of the dichotomy – i.e. the 'unproductive passive woman remittance receiver' – has received much less attention. This side of the dichotomy is composed of two mutually reinforcing constructs: first, women are portrayed as passive remittance receivers (who do not do anything 'productive' while waiting at home for the money to arrive);[6] second, women are portrayed as being in need of the promotion of their involvement in productive work. Both assume that women generally do not perform 'productive' work and that social reproduction work is not 'productive'. Getting involved in 'productive projects', it is argued, will allow women to generate income, escape poverty and bring development to their families and communities, and get empowered. Thus, there has been a move towards a general discourse and strategy to 'make women productive', i.e. to integrate them into income-generating activities.

The 'unproductive woman' stereotype has been reinforced not only implicitly through the remittance receiver stereotype, but also explicitly in official statements and government policies. The representation of women as unproductive and the assumption that social reproduction activities do not count as work are not new. As seen in Chapter 4, the representation of women as unproductive is reproduced for instance through the main Mexican anti-poverty programme OPORTUNIDADES. With the GRT, this representation of women

as unproductive is grafted onto the remittance sender–receiver dichotomy. Thereby, we can observe how both aspects identified above are present, i.e. the unproductive women, and the 'make women productive' dimension. Statements like the following extract from a speech by President Calderón addressing Mexican migrants illustrate and serve to reinforce the dichotomy:

> *Vemos también cómo se nos convierten los pueblos, las ciudades, en comunidades donde* sólo hay mujeres, sólo hay ancianos y hay algunos niños. *Esto me lleva a ver con tristeza que* la migración se lleva lo mejor de nosotros. *Sé que ustedes, que han hecho todo al cruzar el río, el desierto; ustedes o sus padres, realmente se encuentran entre* los *más valientes,* los *más audaces, entre* los *más arrojados, gente joven, gente fuerte, gente que México necesita*.[7]
>
> (Calderón 2008, my emphasis)

Referring to migrant men as 'lo mejor de nosotros', i.e. the best part of Mexico, reproduces the stereotype of the migrant hero and the two gendered population groups. This reinforces the normative basis of the dichotomy that attributes greater value to men migrants than women non-migrants, thereby forgetting the efforts and hardship of the non-migrant population who ensure the reproduction of life and the survival of families and home communities. The gendered dichotomy and the representation of women as unproductive remittance receivers were also reflected in my own interviews with Mexican government officials:

> *Yo creo que el rol de la mujer es muy importante, porque, ahora esta dentro del sector productivo, no, o sea, no es lo mismo que tu, si vivieras aquí en México y tuvieras un esposo que se fuera a EEUU, te esta mandando dinero, digamos 500 dollares al mes, pero tu no hagas nada, no, ósea, nada mas recibes el dinero, y ya, no? … bueno si comes y te vistes y llevas a los niños a la escuela, pero* no estas haciendo nada de productivo, nada mas estas recibiendo el dinero*, no, entonces yo creo que esto [estos proyectos productivos] es el complemento que ellas realizan,* que a parte que reciben el dinero de sus esposos como remesas, tu también estas produciendo … *hay una complemetaridad entre mujeres y hombres*.[8]
>
> (Mexican government official, personal interview, April 2005, my emphasis)

This statement reflects the underlying dichotomy between migrant men as remittance senders and non-migrant women as passively waiting at home for remittances to arrive, not doing anything productive. It also underscores the assumption that women should get involved in productive activities. Importantly, women's involvement in income-generating activities is portrayed as their duty, as their 'counterpart' to the remittances that their migrant spouses send. As we shall see below, this duty of the individual woman remittance

receiver is then extended to the women in the community more generally, who are supposed to earn counterpart income as well.

The remittance sender–receiver dichotomy observed in the Mexican context is embedded in the framing that is currently prominent within the international community: the 'make women productive' discourse. This refers to the representation of women's role in development in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, portraying women as a motor for growth and as a safe investment (Eyben 2008). A look at the history of the representation of women in development discourse shows how it changed over time. Traditionally, women were ignored in development discourse and left out of development policies. This changed with the pioneering book by Ester Boserup, *Women's Role in Economic Development*, published in 1970, that gave rise to the first feminist theory of development, the Women in Development (WID) approach.[9] Based on Boserup's documentation of how women had been left out of development projects and how certain projects had proven harmful for women, WID advocates called for the integration of women into development initiatives (Visvanathan 1997: 17–20). These early welfare approaches portrayed women mainly in their reproductive role, as beneficiaries of development and as a population group with specific needs (Kabeer 1994: 5–6). In the late 1980s, the discourse changed. Based on the idea that 'women were productive agents whose potential had been underutilised under welfare-oriented approaches' (ibid.: 8), the argument was that the inclusion of women in development projects would lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness. Women were given recognition as the 'nimble fingers' and the 'micro-entrepreneurs' (ibid.). Thus, for example, in 1989, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) report entitled *Women, Development and the British Aid Programme* portrayed women both as agents and beneficiaries of development: 'If they themselves are healthy and knowledgeable, if they have greater access to knowledge, skills and credit, they will be more economically productive' (Overseas Development Administration 1989: 6). As a direct consequence of policies aimed at integrating women into productive work, in the 1990s the dominant way of portraying women was the concept of the triple burden, i.e. reproductive work, productive work and community work (Eyben 2006: 73). With the advent of the new millennium, the familiar 'make women productive' discourse has re-emerged within the international community (ibid.). This is illustrated in a number of publications and speeches. Thus, for example, in April 2006, the *Economist* wrote: 'Forget China, India and the internet: economic growth is driven by women', adding that:

> Governments, too, should embrace the potential of women. Women complain (rightly) of centuries of exploitation. Yet, to an economist, women are not exploited enough: they are the world's most under-utilised resource; getting more of them into work is part of the solution to many economic woes, including shrinking populations and poverty.
>
> (*Economist* 2006)

Later that year, the World Bank published its Gender Action Plan for 2007–10 entitled 'Gender Equality as Smart Economics' (World Bank 2006b). The same tenet was reiterated by World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick at the 2008 conference on 'Ways to Bridge Gender Gaps':

> The empowerment of women is smart economics … Studies show that investments in women yield large economic and social returns.
> (Robert B. Zoellick, World Bank Group president, April 2008)

The global 'make women productive' discourse and the specific form it takes in the Mexican context, anchored in the gendered remittance receiver versus remittance sender dichotomy, are based upon a number of underlying assumptions. First, women's empowerment is conceived of mainly in economic terms. Thereby, 'making markets work for women' and 'empowering women to compete in markets' become the key policy objectives (World Bank 2006b: 4). Thus, women are expected to increase a country's GNP, while development actors largely ignore the fundamental gender inequalities associated with the unpaid work of household maintenance and care, on which the market economy depends (Eyben 2008). Economic empowerment, it is argued, gives women greater bargaining power to negotiate transformations of traditional household roles and decision-making dynamics. This completely ignores the issues of the triple burden for women, whereby they take on reproductive, productive and community work, and the new forms of gender discrimination emerging through women's integration in productive work or financial markets, for example through micro-credit. Second, women are responsiblised for lifting themselves, their families and their communities out of poverty. This is located within the neoliberal assumption that individuals are responsible for their own poverty. As a result, women's empowerment is no longer an end in itself, but becomes a means to the end of economic growth (Eyben 2008).

The remittance sender–receiver dichotomy within the GRT has a number of implications. It contributes to the persistence of the representation of Mexican migrant men as main breadwinners and thus to the model of the patriarchal, heterosexual nuclear family. Thereby, it ignores that many women have always been engaged in productive work, either because they wanted to or because they needed to in order to guarantee their own survival and the survival of their household. It also renders invisible women's social reproduction work, including biological reproduction and social provisioning in the household and the community, tasks that are usually shouldered mainly by women and to some extent also by children and elderly. This reproductive work is essential to create the conditions that allow migration and to keep the households and communities of origin alive. At the same time, the dichotomy renders invisible the involvement of men in social reproduction work. The dichotomy also serves to maintain the regulatory power of the GRT on migrant men, emphasising the emotional ties between the migrants and their families and thereby reproducing the pressure to remit. This is a gendered form of regulation,

keeping up the pressure on (mainly) migrant men as a group to keep sending remittances. Finally, the dichotomy serves to legitimise 'make women productive' strategies by the Mexican government, as we shall see below.

Confronting the stereotype of the 'unproductive and passive woman remittance receiver' to the lived realities in rural Mexican communities reveals a striking discrepancy: most non-migrant Mexican women are neither passive nor remittance receivers. There is often a considerable time lag before remittances arrive, and sometimes they never do, or dry up after a while. In addition, the out-migration of a family member is usually linked to considerable expenses which have to be reimbursed. Furthermore, rural women do not 'just eat and dress and bring the kids to school', as the above official wants us to believe. Women shoulder the totality of biological and social reproduction tasks while also engaging in income-generating activities and community activities. In addition, they also face increasing social pressure within the community and the extended family, making it harder to perform their multiple tasks. Its shaky empirical foundation notwithstanding, this gendered dichotomy and the gendered representations analysed in this section (as well as in Chapter 3) have very real implications for policy-making through the regulatory power of the GRT. The creation of the two population groups turns them into objects of knowledge and enables control to be exerted over them. An important ingredient of this regulatory power is the collection of information about these population groups, which in return also contributes to their formation.

Collecting information about population groups

The creation of population groups was co-constitutive of the project of collecting and distributing information about migrants and non-migrants. Traditionally, given their reputation as traitors to the Mexican nation, migrants did not have much visibility, and not much was known about their lives and activities. As illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4, the GRT triggered a wealth of studies, surveys and statistics regarding migrants' lives, their ways of crossing borders and their remitting activities. This information is distributed through national and international conferences, publications, and expert meetings. The collected information also serves as a basis for designing policies aimed at linking remittances and migration to development in Mexico, and for targeting specific population groups (see next section).

A number of actors are involved in this information collection and distribution exercise: international institutions and government officials conducting surveys with remittance receivers and prospective and returning migrants, fieldwork activities and data collection by Mexican universities, Mexican and US banks, local priests, and NGOs such as the Inter-American Foundation. Thus, for example, the MIF commissioned a survey that was conducted by Bendixon and Associates to collect information about the remittance behaviour of Latino immigrants in the US (Multilateral Investment Fund 2002). The results of this survey were published on the MIF website and included

information about remittance senders and receivers.[10] Based on this survey, profiles for Latin American countries were established, such as for Mexico (see Box 5.1).

Box 5.1 Profiles of Mexican remittance senders and receivers

Country snapshot

- Mexico is the largest remittance-receiving country in the region, with over $23 billion in 2006.
- An estimated 11 million Mexican-born people live in the US, where hundreds of Mexican hometown associations are also active.
- Remittances are equal to 2.8 per cent of its GDP, and to 10 per cent of its annual exports.
- Such inflows are increasing steadily, while other external financial sources grow much more slowly, such as tourism, or fluctuate significantly, such as foreign direct investment (FDI).
- Remittances are still below the level of Mexican oil exports, but do exceed both tourism revenue and agricultural exports.
- In Mexico, there are at least 100 money transfer businesses.

What are the profiles of remittance recipients in Mexico?

- Remittance recipients in Mexico tend to be overwhelmingly female (2 to 1), have moderate annual household incomes and are not very well educated – nearly 60 per cent have a high school diploma or less.
- Remittance recipients tend to have larger households, with 29 per cent saying they live with six people or more.
- Highest concentrations of recipients are in the regions of Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas.
- The main factor driving emigration seems to be Mexico's economic problems, with 75 per cent of recipients saying this played an important role in the decision to leave.
- Only 37 per cent say there was an agreement beforehand between the sender and recipient to send money.

Where are remittances to Mexico coming from?

- Almost all Mexican remittance recipients receive money from family in the United States.

How much do Mexicans receive in remittances?

- Eighteen per cent of Mexican adults receive remittances regularly, about seven times a year at an average of $190 each time.

How are remittances sent and received and at what cost?

- On the receiving end, we see a strong preference for the use of banks or credit unions, which 45 per cent of recipients report using, while informal means of transferring money, such as mail, courier, or a person travelling, account for 29 per cent.
- International money transfer companies are still prominent, with over one-quarter of remittance recipients using their services.
- The average cost to send $200 is 6.0 per cent.

How are remittances used?

- A large majority of families (78 per cent) spend the money on basic needs, such as rent, food, medicine or utilities.

How do recipients relate to financial services?

- One-third of remittance recipients have a bank account and over two-thirds know how to use an ATM machine.

Source: Adapted from Bendixen and Associates (2003).

Another institution that significantly contributes to the information collection within the GRT is the IME. Thus, for example, it has established a database where all Mexican migrant organisations worldwide are registered, including information about their location, organisational structure, founding history and areas of activity.[11] The IME also distributes research on remittance transfers and collects profiles of remittance senders and receivers.[12] Through its registration system for Mexican HTAs, the IME collects information about the different organisations and their remittance activities. Mexican consulates also play an important role in the collection of information about migrants. The increasing institutionalisation of migrant organisations and the registration procedure established by the Mexican government through its consulates have made it easier to collect information about migrants. This allows migrant organisations to get known, but it also facilitates the extraction of information about migrants and their activities and serves a means to specifically target them with information, policies or financial requests.

Through the collection, publication and diffusion of data about migrants and migrant organisations, they are rendered visible, which creates competition

among the different organisations, for example to organise the biggest fundraising party and collect most money. It also generates moral pressure on migrants to get organised and to collect money for projects.

The collection of information about non-migrants (remittance receivers) is more challenging. In Mexico, and particularly in migrant-sending communities, there is great mistrust of government authorities and data collection staff in general. Information collection about non-migrants is also more time- and resource-intensive, given that the information sometimes has to be collected in locations that are distant and difficult to access. However, in recent years there have been a number of initiatives in Mexico to collect information about remittance receivers and non-migrants in general, both by NGOs and academic institutions, but also by the different levels of government. The data focus on the transformations of communities of origin, the transfer and use of remittances, and their implications for development and poverty reduction in these communities. The data collected through these initiatives have been distributed, discussed and analysed in various conferences, workshops, and publications, both in Mexico and internationally. A prominent example is the 'Migracion y Desarrollo' network that was established in October 2003 and has organised numerous conferences on the issue of migration, remittances and development.[13]

Overall, we can see how within the GRT in Mexico, a complex machinery for the collection of data about the two main population groups has been established, which has rendered these two groups more visible and serves as a basis for designing specific policies targeting these groups.

Targeting population groups

There are a number of policies targeting migrants and non-migrants, which aim at rendering them useful for the development of Mexico. These are deeply gendered, as this section will show. Policies targeted at each population group shall be analysed in turn.

Targeting migrants

As shown in Chapter 4, there are a number of institutions within the GRT in Mexico that specifically target migrants through the extensive 'courting strategy'. There are various initiatives targeting migrants. The *Jornadas Informativas* organised by the IME are a case in point: during these *Jornadas*, migrant leaders are informed about the various services provided by the IME and the options it offers for migrants wishing to donate or invest money in Mexico. The IME reaches out to migrants through the Mexican consulates in the USA and Canada. For this purpose, in each consulate there is a representative of the IME to guarantee cooperation. The consulates are in direct contact with migrants and identify the leaders to be invited to the *Jornadas* (IME representative, Mexico City, personal interview, May 2005). These *Jornadas*

serve to collect information about migrant activities, and are a means to regulate migrants, for example in terms of promoting the use of banking channels for their remittance transfers, or to get migrants engaged in sending collective remittances for development projects.

The *Consejo Consultivo* of the IME (see Chapter 4) also serves as a regulatory mechanism. It is an instrument for the government to collect information about migrants. Further, it also serves to draw on migrant resources, including knowledge about their home community, social networks, human and financial resources. Thus, it reinforces the 'migrants as development agents' discourse.

These examples illustrate three key ways in which such targeting policies regulate migrants as a group: to formalise remittances, to send remittances, and to invest remittances productively. In what follows, these elements of regulatory power are analysed in more detail in two major initiatives within the GRT in Mexico: the Programa 3×1 and Mi Comunidad. These programmes are prominent examples of the targeted policies in the Mexican GRT, focusing on infrastructure and productive projects.

Programa 3×1

The 'Programa 3×1 para Migrantes' aims to harness migration and remittances for development projects. The programme works as a matching-funds system, whereby Mexican migrant organisations (HTAs) in the US donate money and apply for additional funding from the three levels of the Mexican government to finance a development project in their community of origin. Thus, the financing scheme includes the migrant contribution (25 per cent), matched by contributions from the three levels of the Mexican government (25 per cent municipal, 25 per cent state and 25 per cent federal). The programme is administered through the Mexican development agency SEDESOL (Segretaría de Desarrollo Social) and its state-level delegations.[14]

This programme originally derived from migrant grassroots initiatives and was institutionalised by the Mexican federal government in 2002 (Fernández de Castro et al. 2006: 6, Delgado Wise et al. 2004: 175). Its institutionalisation was a long and complex process and there are several versions of the history of the Programa 3×1. What is certain is that the state of Zacatecas and Zacatecan migrants in the US set important precedents for the emergence of this programme. Zacatecas has a long migration tradition and Zacatecan migrants in the US have always been well organised. They reportedly formed their first federation, the Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California in 1965 (Alarcón 2004: 166). Zacatecas state governors have for a long time actively sought contact with Zacatecan migrants, have listened to their concerns and supported their philanthropic efforts. In 1986, the Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California signed a contract with the Zacatecas state government to set up the Programa 2×1, establishing co-funding projects to be financed by equal parts from the Federation and the Zacatecas

government (Alarcón 2004:166; Burgess 2005: 112). This was the model for the establishment of the Federal Programme 2×1 under the Salinas presidency in 1993, which was administered through the SEDESOL and extended to other Mexican states (Alarcón 2004: 166). Even though the programme was abolished at the federal level under the Zedillo administration, it nevertheless continued at the state level in Zacatecas and in other Mexican states (Burgess 2005: 113).

As the Rules of Operation state, the objective of the Programa 3×1 is the following:

> [*A*]*poyar las iniciativas de migrantes radicados en el extranjero que promuevan el desarrollo social de sus localidades de origen u otras localidades en condiciones de marginación, rezago o alta concentración de pobreza*.[15]
> (SEDESOL 2007: 3)

The underlying rationale is to target poor communities in need of basic infrastructure. According to the Rules of Operation, the initiative for establishing a 3×1 project is taken by the migrants. The submitted project proposals are evaluated by a committee established by the state delegation of the SEDESOL, and accepted projects are managed by a *comité de obra,* comprising representatives from the migrant organisation or participating citizens, the state office of SEDESOL, the state government and the municipal government (SEDESOL 2008: 6).

The Rules of Operation have undergone changes since the establishment of the programme. Since 2004, for example, only SEDESOL-registered migrant organisations are allowed to participate in the programme, due to problems linked to applications by non-existing migrant organisations (Burgess 2005: 116). As stated in its 2007 Rules of Operation, SEDESOL now has the right to verify the existence of the migrant organisation (SEDESOL 2007: 6). In some states, such as Zacatecas, the Federation negotiated with the state that only HTAs that are registered with the Federation are allowed to apply for the 3×1 co-funding programme, preventing non-organised, non-registered migrant organisations from accessing such funds (Burgess 2005: 116). This serves as a regulation mechanism, determining which migrant groups are 'worthy' of receiving government funds, and excluding the 'unworthy' groups. By extension, this has serious implications for the socio-economic development of communities of origin and acts to exclude communities without organised migrants. Thus, for instance, in the case of Los Pilares, there are no organised migrants and the community is therefore excluded from access to 3×1 funding.

Three types of projects can be funded through the 3×1 programme: infrastructure projects, such as church renovation and the construction of roads, wells or schools; socio-cultural projects including the funding of community fiestas, community centres or scholarships; and so-called *proyectos productivos*, i.e. economic development projects that aim at establishing small to medium enterprises and generating employment. These include for example animal breeding and feedlot facilities, greenhouses for the production of flowers and

vegetables, or water bottling and fruit-canning facilities (García Zamora 2003). The move to include *proyectos productivos* into the 3×1 programme is fairly recent and has triggered a number of controversies, notably regarding the definition of such *proyectos productivos* and the evaluation criteria for their success.[16]

The programme experienced exponential growth (see Table 5.1): at the beginning of its implementation in 2002, only twenty HTAs participated in the programme; by the end of 2007, the number had grown to 857 HTAs. But not only the HTAs, but also the number of projects funded by the programme and the sums of collective remittances channelled through the programme have increased.

Growing from the initial Programa 1×1 practiced in Zacatecas to the currently institutionalised 3×1, more recently, the programme experienced another modification: the 4×1 and 5×1 that involve private partners, forming public-private partnerships (SEDESOL 2008: 5). A pioneer project was launched on 12 October 2005, involving First Data Corporation and its subsidiary Western Union as the first corporate entity to collaborate in the matching-fund programme with a contribution of 1.25 million US$, of which $250,000 is earmarked for projects in Zacatecas.[17] For the 2008 period, SEDESOL also established a pilot project in cooperation with the BID: the 'Projecto Piloto 3×1 BID'.[18] This project aims to support *proyectos productivos*, and social and productive infrastructure, and is implemented in five states (Jalisco, Michoacán, Oaxaca, Yucatán and Zacatecas).

The Programa 3×1 has been hailed as an example of best practice and has been promoted and imitated beyond Mexico, such as in El Salvador (Fernández de Castro et al. 2006: 5). However, some commentators have warned about unwanted effects of such programmes, and voice doubts regarding their replicability in other places (Bourguignon 2006b; Bernd Balkenhol, ILO, Geneva, personal interview, March 2007). Indeed, evaluations of the programme have revealed a mixed picture. It goes beyond the scope of this book to go into a detailed evaluation of the 3×1 programme, suffice it to mention the principal challenges relevant for our purpose. First, there is evidence of huge disparities in the implementation and success of the programme. There is an inherent tension between the objectives stated in the rules of procedure –

Table 5.1 Evolution of the Programa 3×1

	2002	*2007*
Federal entities	20	27
Number of projects	942	1,613
Number of municipalities that received support	247	443
Number of participating migrant groups	20	857
Number of state of residence in the US	8	37
Sums invested (in million pesos)		
Federal	113.7	257.7
State, municipal and migrants	266.5	690.8

Source: Adapted from SEDESOL (2008).

i.e. to reach those regions and communities that rank highest on the marginalisation index – and the fact that the migrants choose where to establish their projects. Levels of marginalisation and rates of out-migration do not always correspond (Burgess 2005: 117). Thus, not all communities can obtain funding, and communities without organised migrants are less likely to attract such projects, which leads to local and regional disparities, as one IME official stated: '*hay unos migrantes que son más activos que otros, los que son más activos son los que más proyectos tienen*'[19] (IME representative, Mexico City, personal interview, May 2005). In states where HTAs are less prevalent, small groups of migrants or family members receiving remittances have applied for 3×1 project funding (Burgess 2005: 116; Frías et al. 2006: 179). This can lead to the failure of projects or the exclusion of a part of the community from the benefits of the project, and has involved the community contributing the migrant share of financing. As mentioned above, since 2004, the rules regulating migrant participation have become stricter, but this is still an issue, particularly in states that have only recently joined the emigration trend, such as Tlaxcala.

There is contradictory evidence as to whether 3×1 funding goes to the poorest communities. In a study on 3×1 projects in Jalisco, Michoacán, and Zacatecas, Burgess finds that municipalities with a project are, on average, more populous, wealthier, and less rural than those without projects (Burgess 2005: 119). However, examining the distribution of projects within municipalities she reveals that the 3×1 programme has a relatively high share of projects located outside the *cabecera municipal* (municipal capital). Traditionally, those communities tend to be small, rural and sometimes indigenous, and receive very little government spending, or have chosen not to participate in the 3×1, as we shall see in Chapter 6 (ibid.: 118).

Second, implementation and management of 3×1 projects have been hindered by a lack of funding and municipal administrative capacity, a precondition of 3×1 programme applications. This has led to the mismanagement or cancellation of projects; some municipalities contributing in kind instead of financial resources; and sometimes state government funds have been used to cover the municipal contribution to the programme, deflecting money from other development projects (Burgess 2005: 115–16; Frías et al. 2006).

Third, the community, a key party in these projects, has generally been left out of decision-making. This has also been criticised in an evaluation of the programme that regrets the 'lack of formal inclusion of citizen groups within benefited communities into the decision-making processes', and states that 'the biggest challenge of the 3×1 programme remains to involve citizens/organisations within the local communities where the development projects are being carried out much more fully and explicitly' (Rocha Menocal, no date: 6, 13). Despite being absent from decision-making, the community often has to contribute to the development projects established through the 3×1, either in the form of labour, voluntary community work, or through financial contributions, which might be paid through individual remittances of community members (Frías et al. 2006).

One peculiarity of the GRT in Mexico is the involvement of priests, as mentioned in Chapter 4. Thus, priests sometimes facilitate collective remittances projects. In many cases, this has resulted in remittances being invested in the church. Hence, it seems that the use of collective remittances depends to a large extent on the authority involved in addressing demands to the migrants, as a SEDESOL official confirmed:

> *En el 3×1 se pone mucho dinero en las iglesias. … Porque a muchas veces, los curas, … son los que tienen comunicacion con los de alla, y dicen: oye, hijo, hay una fiesta, necesitamos renovar la iglesia, etc. El cura tiene mucho que ver, hay muchas curas que intervienen, van a pedir los recursos para la renovacion de la iglesia. … El 3×1 dipende mucho de la persona que lo pide, … si es el cura, son proyectos para las fiestas, para la iglesia, si es el presidente municipal, es mas para infraestructura*.[20]
>
> (SEDESOL representative, Mexico City, personal interview, June 2005)

However, there have also been cases where priests have used their role as go-between in order to promote development projects for their communities through the Programa 3×1. Padre José Luís from San Pablo, for instance, explained to me that he intends to get migrants to finance a part of the well project under way in one of the communities:

> *A Tlaxco tienen 3 proyectos de 3×1, Lazaro Cardenas, Santa Ana Chiautempan también tienen un 3×1 … Pero hay una comunidad aquí que no tiene agua y sufren mucho, es urgente, y muchos presidentes pasados prometieron agua, ahora proponen de hacer un pozo pero cuesta 2,000,000 pesos y no tienen muchos migrantes (solo 20 personas de los 500). No pueden pagar la mitad de este pozo, entonces yo voy a tentar de localizar los migrantes en California para ver si ellos pueden hacer una colecta de dinero para pagar una parte del pozo*.[21]
>
> (Padre José Luís, San Pablo, personal interview, June 2005)

This quote shows that there has been a shift in thinking, whereby people in communities now turn to migrants instead of state authorities to get funding for development projects.

The most prominent example of a catholic priest involved in promoting migration-linked development initiatives is Padre Marco Linares in the community of Atacheo (Michoacán). Atacheo is a small and relatively 'poor' rural community in the state of Michoacán, with a population of less than 2,000 inhabitants and an economic activity based mainly on agriculture and livestock (Hernández-Coss 2005: 88; Shannon 2006: 88). The community has a high rate of emigration: *La Jornada* reports an 80 per cent emigration rate for Atacheo, with more than 4,000 community members living in the US (*La Jornada Michoacán* 2006). Padre Linares, a 43 year old priest, came to Atacheo in 1999. His first step was to organise the community, to convince the

inhabitants to cooperate instead of working individually. He also encouraged the community to use the remittances that they received from family members in the US in such a way as to improve the future of the community instead of using it for their own consumption (*Cambio de Michoacán* 2007). Atacheo was the first community to apply for funding through the Programa 3×1 when it was institutionalised in 2002 in Michoacán (*La Jornada Michoacán* 2006). Between 1999 and 2005, migrants and community members invested 150,000 US$ in various projects in Atacheo (Hernández-Coss 2005: 89). In a first step, they implemented infrastructure projects, such as road paving, water provision, a waste water system, telephone connections, street lighting, and improvements to the local church, health clinic and school (*La Jornada Michoacán* 2006). The second step consisted in establishing 'productive' projects to create employment, in order to offer alternatives for the people in the community and reduce emigration. Those projects include a turkey and goat breeding facility, greenhouses to grow vegetables and flowers for export, a factory for loudspeakers and baffles, and a bull-fighting ring (Hernández-Coss 2005: 89).

The example of Atacheo has been presented as 'a model for social communitarian organisation' in a World Bank working paper (Hernández-Coss 2005), and Padre Linares has been hailed as a hero for organising the community and the migrants for the purpose of migration-linked development projects. During a visit to the region in 2003, President Fox praised Atacheo as an example to be followed (*La Jornada* 2005). However, local researchers following the developments in Atacheo have raised doubts about the sustainability of the development projects. In addition, Amy Shannon from Enlaces América reports that the projects have encountered serious financial difficulties and 'appear to have serious technical flaws' (Shannon 2005: 2). Indeed, President Fox had reportedly promised to support the productive projects in Atacheo in need of investments amounting to 10 million pesos, according to Padre Linares.[22]

It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to evaluate the projects of Atacheo. Instead, the aim of this short illustration is to highlight the activism of local priests in organising the community and establishing migration-linked development projects, such as through the 3×1 programme.[23] Thus, local priests can play an active role in regulating migrants and non-migrants: they encourage the community and the migrants to get organised, promote migration-linked development projects, and redirect the demands to meet community needs towards migrants (instead of towards the government) and thereby contribute to responsibilise migrants for development. It is important to note, though, that there are regional disparities. Whereas in traditional migration regions, such as Michoacán, priests are generally very active, in more recent migration regions, such as Tlaxcala, my fieldwork has shown that priests have only recently got involved in migration-linked development initiatives. Moreover, given their personal interests in channelling remittances for church projects, priests might also to some extent undermine the regulatory power of the GRT that aims to turn migrants into economically useful population groups for the development of Mexico.

In sum, the 3×1 programme acts as an instrument of regulation within the GRT in a number of ways: first, by reinforcing the representation of migrants as development actors and the notion of the co-responsibility of migrants for development. Second, it encourages migrants to send collective remittances and invest them in development initiatives. Third, this programme also creates competition among different migrant organisations and serves as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion, determining which groups of migrants get access to government services. Thereby, given the limited funding and strict access rules of the Programa 3×1, migrant organisations compete for funding and only (well-)organised migrants can participate. More broadly, although this programme may offer new opportunities for participation to civil society actors – i.e. mainly migrants – strong regulatory power is exerted through the terms of access and the rules of operation of this programme. Finally, this programme also has a number of gender implications, which are analysed below.

Mi Comunidad

In the Mexican context, a number of programmes promote productive projects funded through collective remittances. The most well-known programmes are the Fideicomismo Fideraza in Jalisco, the Fondo de Atención a Zacatecanos Ausentes, and the programme Mi Comunidad in Guanajuato. The latter is most developed and has been hailed as a successful development project (Moctezuma Longoria 2006: 99; PPIAF and World Bank 2002: 31).

Since the 1990s, the state government of Guanajuato has been particularly active in promoting collective remittances and their investment in productive activities. The Mi Comunidad programme was established in order to attract migrant remittances into investment in textile *maquilas* (Alarcón 2004: 171). The aim was to create employment in the poorest municipalities to reduce emigration (ibid.: 172). Through the establishment of *Casas Guanajuato* in the US, migrants were approached and encouraged to organise and invest in their home communities (PPIAF and World Bank 2002: 18). With a minimum investment of US$60,000, HTA members along with local investors, became shareholders of the *maquilas* (Moctezuma Longoria 2006: 102). Indications on the numbers of *maquilas* established and the number of jobs created vary widely between different studies. Optimistic numbers provided by the Dirección General de Atención a Comunidades Guanajuatenses en el Exterior estimate that by June 2000, a total of twelve *maquilas* were in operation and another nine in course of implementation, benefiting nine municipalities and creating a total of 925 jobs (quoted in PPIAF and World Bank 2002: 48). Based on these figures, the programme was hailed as an example of a successful development initiative, and the PPIAF/World Bank Report recommended:

> [A] sound step is to consolidate and improve the programs '3×1' and 'Mi Comunidad'. In spite of their shortcomings, these programs can be considered a good model to be followed by other states that have not been

> able to set up meaningful mechanisms for attracting collective remittances and migrants' investments.
>
> (PPIAF and World Bank 2002: 31)

Other studies suggest more moderate outcomes: Moctezuma Longoria states that by 2000, fifteen *maquilas* were established, creating 339 jobs (2006: 102). What is undisputed, however, is that the programme encountered serious problems and obstacles, and by now, '*ha dejado prácticamente de existir*', i.e. it has practically stopped to exist (ibid.). This is in stark contradiction to the PPIAF/World Bank report's statement that the difficulties faced in the programme were overcome 'with promptitude and efficiency' (PPIAF and World Bank 2002: 23).

The main problem encountered was that the original joint venture scheme proposed by the government of Guanajuato, promising 50 per cent of the capital for the establishment of each *maquila*, never materialised. Instead, the state offered loans, which were considered too expensive in most cases, hence migrants ended up shouldering the total costs (ibid.). The technical assistance offered by the state was inadequate, limited to visiting the *maquilas* (Moctezuma Longoria 2006: 102; PPIAF and World Bank 2002: 23). In addition, some *maquilas* faced problems with the acquisition of machinery and equipment, involving corruption charges (Moctezuma Longoria 2006: 102). Another important problem was that no real market study was carried out and the commercialisation plan was not finished on time (ibid.). There were also some difficulties regarding the recruitment of able managers for the *maquilas*. Finally, the Dirección de Atención a Comunidades Guanajuatenses en el Extranjero did not honour its promise to monitor, support, and evaluate the programme, which left migrants alone with the problems (ibid.).

A fact rarely mentioned is that these *maquilas* employed mainly women (Rionda y Romero cited in Alarcón 2004: 172), which raises all sorts of questions, as we shall see below. To my knowledge, there has been no official evaluation of the programme, and given that most *maquilas* are no longer in operation, such an evaluation is unlikely to happen. This is a lost opportunity to find out about the implications of such projects, which could serve as a lesson learnt for the many productive projects that are currently discussed or implemented, such as the 3×1 BID, and the Invierte en México project.

Regardless of its failure, Mi Comunidad acts to regulate migrants by attracting migrant money and by encouraging them to invest remittances in productive ways in their home communities through a government-led initiative. There have been a number of other initiatives to promote such productive investment of collective remittances. Thereby, NGOs have also been involved, such as the Fundacion Para La Productividad En El Campo, A.C. (FPPC). Established in 1996, the FPPC has collaborated with HTAs and the IME to promote sustainable rural development in migrant-sending regions in Mexico. The foundation works to improve the livelihoods of agricultural producers and their families in rural communities in Mexico and offers a wide range of

services including access to sources of financing, technical and marketing assistance, and training courses. The IDB provided a grant to the FPPC to create a matching investment programme for Mexican migrant workers. For each dollar raised by migrants, the IDB committed itself to match an additional dollar that can be used as cash collateral to obtain short term loans for working capital. As this example shows, NGOs are also involved in the regulation of migrants through influencing their use of remittances, in an attempt to attract remittances into development initiatives.

Targeting non-migrants

(Women) non-migrants, the second population group created within the GRT, are also subjected to regulation. As illustrated in the GCIM Report (see Chapter 3), non-migrant women are explicitly targeted with specific initiatives, based on gendered stereotypes:

> Households and communities in countries of origin should be assisted to make effective use of remittance receipts through the provision of appropriate training and access to *microcredit facilities. Some studies indicate that women make the most effective use of remittances, therefore special efforts should be made to target women in such initiatives.* An additional option is to *enable migrants to exercise greater control over the use of the money they remit*, by offering them opportunities to purchase goods or services directly, rather than leaving such transactions in the hands of household members.
> (Global Commission on International Migration 2005: 28, my emphasis)

Thereby, we can identify two key regulatory mechanisms: the 'migrant bias' and 'make women productive' strategy. The first mechanism regulates non-migrant women indirectly, whereas the second explicitly targets non-migrant women. This section analyses each strategy in turn, providing illustrations from prominent programmes within the GRT in Mexico.

The migrant bias

The migrant bias, as outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, refers to the representation of migrants as important actors for development and the privileging of the migrant voice and participation over that of non-migrants. In the case of Mexico, it is based on the gendered dichotomy that opposes the two population groups created within the GRT and attributes a greater value to migrants. The migrant bias acts to marginalise women and gender issues in two main ways: first, by regulating the use of remittances, and second, through migration-linked development initiatives.

As seen above, one of the regulatory purposes of the GRT in Mexico is to promote the spending of remittances, and particularly larger sums, in productive ways. This is enacted in two ways: by targeting migrant (men) with investment

opportunities (as seen in the previous section), and by targeting non-migrant (women) with micro-credit and productive project initiatives. The various investment options for migrants aim to retain control over the use of remittances in the hands of the migrants. This is based on the assumption that migrants are among the most entrepreneurial of the population and thus most likely to invest remittances in productive ways. The remittance receivers, however, are not trusted to invest remittances productively, as expressed by an IME official:

> [*H*]*ay mucha gente en EE.UU. que ahorra dinero, pero se lo envían a su familia, por ejemplo ahorran 5,000 dólares y dicen, aquí tienen ustedes este dinero, pero la persona que recibe el dinero realmente no sabe como invertir el dinero, no, entonces al final, este dinero si tu no sabes invertirlo, se pierde. Entonces, aquí lo que importa al programa* Invierte en México*, es la asesoría que NAFIN te da, para que pongas un negocio y que este negocio efectivamente funciona, que produzca, que te deje dinero …* [*E*]*s una asesoría completa, tu dinero esta prácticamente asegurado.*[24]
>
> (IME representative, Mexico City, personal interview, May 2005)

This portrays non-migrants in a patronising way and is in line with the general marginalisation of home communities in decision-making regarding the use of remittances, as seen above. Combined with the gendered dichotomy of the male remittance-sending hero versus the non-migrant remittance-receiving woman, this implies that the control over remittances should stay in the hand of migrant men and suggests that women remittance receivers cannot be trusted of making the most effective use of remittances. This can act to decrease the participation of women remittance receivers in the decision-making regarding the use of remittances. Thereby, the often mentioned empowerment effect that links receiving remittances to increased decision-making and negotiation power for women is undermined. Moreover, as I show below, women who fall out of line of the productive investment imperative and use remittances for consumption are disciplined. Finally, it seems that whereas women are trusted with spending small sums of money for the benefit of their families, such as within the OPORTUNIDADES programme, when it comes to investing larger sums of money, they are marginalised.

Hence, the migrant bias acts to privilege the migrants' vision when it comes to deciding how to spend remittances. The bias also acts in migration-linked development projects. Thereby, migrants are trusted with decisions about the needs of their home community, assumed to know best how to invest collective remittances back home. This serves to marginalise the non-migrant community in such projects, as illustrated with the Programa 3×1.

Programa 3×1

The Programa 3×1 is underpinned by gender-blindness. This was strongly visible in my interviews with Mexican government officials and development

personnel. When asked whether gender issues were relevant to the 3×1 Programme or whether the Programme had gender-specific implications or particular effects on women, government officials would react in a slightly puzzled way, and most responded that this was a gender-neutral programme. They often backed this view by saying that the projects implemented through the 3×1 were mainly infrastructure projects which benefit everybody, independent of their sex.[25]

An examination of the official SEDESOL websites presenting this programme largely reflects this gender-blindness. The main website describing the programme does not make any reference to gender, and gender aspects are also absent from the external evaluations of the programme.[26] However, there are some exceptions. The *Reglas de Operacion 2005* mention that the objective of the programme is:

> *Apoyar las iniciativas de migrantes radicados en el extranjero, para concretar proyectos mediante la concurrencia de recursos de la Federación, estados, municipios y de los migrantes señalados*, promoviendo la equidad y enfoque de género en los beneficios del programa.[27]
>
> (quoted in Soto Priante and Velásquez Holguín 2006: 13, my emphasis)

Still, there is no indication as to what this might imply and how it might be achieved. Moreover, in the updated Rules of Operation for 2008, the gender focus has disappeared (SEDESOL 2007). Some state-level SEDESOL offices have kept the gender aspect in the descriptions of the 3×1 on their websites. Thus, Michoacán[28] or Chihuahua,[29] for example, have adopted the above-quoted sentence from the Rules of Operation 2005.[30] However, when following the link for more information, there is no further mention of gender, and there is no indication as to what such a gender focus might imply and how it is/will be implemented. Finally, in the IDB project description for the new Projecto Piloto 3×1 BID, the gender focus is explicitly mentioned: '*El Programa promueve la equidad y el enfoque de género en la distribución de los beneficios*'.[31] However, again, there are no implemention details, and on the SEDESOL page of this programme there is no reference to gender whatsoever.

Hence, it seems more like paying lip service to gender than a serious commitment to include a gender focus into the 3×1. This is surprising, given that the Mexican government has adopted a gender mainstreaming strategy for its public policy-making, as expressed in its National Programme for Social Development 2001–6:

> *Las diferencias por género marcan todos los ámbitos de la vida y de las políticas públicas. Por otro lado, los obstáculos que limitan el avance de la mujer y propician la inequidad de género se extienden a muchos ámbitos de la vida y, en lo social, se ven expresados en particular en los espacios educativos, de salud y del trabajo.* Es por ello que toda estrategia y norma de las políticas públicas y en especial la política social, debe ser examinado

> desde una perspectiva de género, *para garantizar que en cada una de las acciones se refleje y promueva la prioridad de reducir las brechas que existen entre hombres y mujeres,* brindándoles a ellas la oportunidad de participar plenamente en los frutos del desarrollo.[32]
>
> (SEDESOL 2001: 84, my emphasis)

However, the IDB evaluation from March 2002 of the progress of mainstreaming gender into the country strategy in Mexico (2002–5) attributes the label 'partial' for Mexico, meaning that 'gender issues identified in the diagnostic/development challenges, and specific actions/interventions proposed in at least one strategic focus area' (Inter-American Development Bank 2007: annex 4). The evaluation states that gender mainstreaming has been implemented in certain programmes in Mexico, such as OPORTUNIDADES, but that much remains to be done (ibid.: 6, 20). It seems that migration-linked development initiatives, such as the 3×1, which are assumed to be gender-neutral, are rather resistant to the gender mainstreaming strategy. This could pose a serious obstacle to mainstreaming gender throughout the Mexican national development agenda and development policy-making.

Given the almost complete lack of gender awareness within the Programa 3×1, the possibility that women and men have gender-specific needs, even in terms of infrastructure projects, or that projects implemented through this programme might have gendered implications, is neglected. Furthermore, this gender-blindness can act to marginalise women's voices and participation in a number of ways. Given that within the 3×1, the migrants are generally in charge of the projects, there is a danger that (women) non-migrant voices and needs are marginalised in the stage of the discussion about the needs of the community prior to the emergence of a project.

This can be illustrated with the example of an initiative to apply for funding for a well through the Programa 3×1 in Los Pilares. In the discussions preceding the project, the marginalisation of non-migrants and particularly non-migrant women was striking. I interviewed a number of community members in order to find out what they thought about this project and what their opinions on the needs of the community were, and a number of issues emerged. Most women I interviewed did not identify lack of water provision as the main problem in the community. Instead, in their view, the most urgent need of the community was to create employment possibilities so that the male members of the community would not (have to) migrate. However, in the discussions about choosing a migration-linked project, these views were not taken into account.

In addition, many of my respondents did not agree with the well project. They often mentioned the case of a neighbouring community where a well project had been implemented through 3×1 funding. In that case, the community had to make regular financial contributions to keep the well functioning, which in some cases met with resistance. When the electrical device operating the well broke, the community was asked to pay for its repair. However, the community

refused, which led to disputes. In the end, the well was out of order for several months and it was not certain who was going to pay for the repair (Padre Elpidio, Huamantla, personal interview, May 2005). Having learnt about this example of a failed well project, many of my interviewees were concerned to avoid this. Instead, there was an alternative proposition: many women in the community suggested they would prefer transforming a natural *barranca*[33] into a basin to collect water, which would be cheaper and require less maintenance, as Señora Liliana told me:

> *Nosotros no queremos un pozo. A Zaragoza tienen problemas con el pozo: se rompio la bombilla y es caro para reparala, y ahora no hay agua! Seria mejor usar las barrancas y poner unos prensas … Y el agua de la Malinche es muy sabrosa, si hacemos un pozo perdemos este agua sabrosa!*[34]
>
> (Señora Liliana, Los Pilares, personal interview, April 2006)

Thus, the women knew about the potential problems, yet during preparations for the project, their voices were not heard.

Women are also marginalised through the migrant bias that pervades 3×1 project committees. Thereby, it is often male migrants, such as HTA leaders, who represent the migrants, based on the widespread marginalisation of women within HTAs (Goldring 2002). The community is often hardly present in the project committees, given that it is assumed to be the migrants' project. Indirectly, this leads to the exclusion of women's voices, given that they often represent the majority in the community. This is problematic from the point of view of equal representation, but also in terms of gender relations and women's specific needs. To be sure, this is not an exclusive characteristic of migration-linked development projects, but builds on the strong patriarchal ideology and machismo within certain communities of origin and in Mexico more generally, which act to marginalise women in public life. However, in this case, they are reproduced through migration-linked projects.

Yet, when it comes to the implementation of migration-linked development projects, the picture looks entirely different. Even though the community is left out of decision-making, it is often required to contribute to the implementation of development projects established through the 3×1, either in the form of unpaid labour or financial contributions. Even though collective remittances are a formal requirement to obtain funding through the Programa 3×1, the reality often looks different and community members end up paying part of the money that should have come from the migrants (Frías et al. 2006). These financial contributions might sometimes be paid through the individual remittances that the community members receive (Señora Olga, Los Pilares, personal interview, April 2006). Where voluntary work is required from households whose male family members are abroad, non-migrants often have to make financial contributions in compensation. Furthermore, maintenance work and costs for the project are generally shouldered by the community members, and thereby often indirectly by non-migrant women. These can be substantial

and can lead to the failure of the project in the long term, as was the case with the well project described above. It is all the more surprising that the community members who have to contribute to the financing and maintenance of such projects are not given a voice in planning and implementation decisions.

Hence, the migrant bias acts to privilege the migrants' vision when it comes to spending remittances. Migrants are also trusted with decisions about the needs of their home community, assumed to know best how to invest collective remittances back home. Thereby, the migrant bias acts to exclude the community from decision-making when it comes to initiating, planning and implementing migration-linked development projects, for example through the 3×1. Given that in rural Mexico the majority of migrants are (still) men, there is an inherent gender bias, whereby the voices of non-migrant women are marginalised, not only in identifying community needs, but also when it comes to addressing those needs through policy-making. In addition, 3×1 projects rarely take into account gender-specific needs of the community. Yet, while non-migrant women are often excluded from decision-making in migration-linked development projects within the 3×1, they have become the target of specific initiatives aimed at getting them involved in productive work.

The 'make women productive' strategy

As outlined above, the 'make women productive' discourse, anchored in the gendered remittance receiver versus remittance sender dichotomy, aims to make women work for development. Within the GRT, this has resulted in a number of initiatives targeting non-migrant women (remittance receivers) with projects to get them inserted in productive work and to use their remittances productively. These initiatives both work to regulate non-migrant women as a population group to become useful for the development of the country, as well as to discipline individual women into the 'be productive' mentality. We can distinguish between two types of initiatives that actively promote the integration of women into productive work within the GRT: micro-finance and migration-linked productive projects.

The first type of initiative promotes the establishment of micro-businesses for women. The aim is to get women to take a credit in order to set up a small business. Since the first global Microcredit Summit in 1997, micro-credit programmes have become the most prominent tool for global poverty reduction. Based upon the model of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the objective is to provide poor people, and particularly women, with small sums of money on credit for investment in income-generating projects. Micro-credit is provided in the absence of conventional forms of collateral, based upon 'group (mutual) guarantee mechanisms' (Weber 2002: 540). Thereby, micro-credit is hailed not only as *the* anti-poverty strategy but also as *the* empowerment strategy for women: 'We recognise that microcredit programs are a key strategy towards achieving … eradication of poverty and empowerment of women' (Microcredit Summit Report 1997: 46). There is a rich literature on gender

dimensions of micro-credit initiatives and many authors have warned about the problematic implications of micro-credit, such as debt cycles, increased violence, social pressure on women credit-takers, etc. (Lairap 2004; Mallick 2002; Mayoux 1998; Rahman 1999; Weber 2002). The focus here is on the ways in which micro-credit works as a regulatory and disciplinary mechanism within the GRT.

Within the GRT, the credits are often provided based on the remittances that women receive, or are expected to receive in the near future, encouraging the 'productive' investment of remittances. This can be illustrated with the example of FOMTLAX, a public credit institution that was established in 1998 by the government of Tlaxcala and provides credit for productive projects in order to foster rural development. FOMTLAX offers a range of credits from small to bigger sums for various purposes, such as greenhouses, agricultural infrastructure, livestock or small shops (FOMTLAX representative, Tlaxcala, personal interview, April 2006). Based on the widespread belief that women are better creditors, FOMTLAX favours women as credit takers and explicitly targets women in certain programmes:[35]

> *La distinción que se hace es que la mujer es más pagadora que el hombre. Nunca vas a encontrar a una mujer tomando cerveza en una tienda, ¿verdad? Pero los hombres si. La mujer es más responsable, nunca va a hacer esto, porque tiene hijos, y los hombres no pensamos en esta forma*.[36]
>
> (FOMTLAX representative, Tlaxcala, personal interview, April 2006)

As the same official states: '*Más que nada, los proyectos exitosos son los de las mujeres*'[37] (ibid.). Thus, 48 per cent of all credit applications stem from women. Women are represented as the ideal targets for credit and women remittance receivers are particularly welcome credit takers, as their remittances can be used as collateral to obtain credit (ibid.). This demonstrates how such micro-credit initiatives within the GRT serve to regulate non-migrant women (remittance receivers) as a group to become involved in productive work, and to invest their remittances 'productively'.

The second type of 'make women productive' initiatives within the GRT are so-called *proyectos productivos*. Both the Mexican government and NGOs promote such initiatives. The Fundacion para la Productividad en el Campo for example supports productive projects in rural areas. A Mexican government official explains:

> *La Fundación para la Productividad en el Campo sirve para tener proyectos productivos para zonas marginadas en el área rural. Estos proyectos productivos intentan a hacer que las, por ejemplo,* las esposas de los que se fueron a EE.UU. *participen en proyectos productivos, por ejemplo, recuerdo un proyecto productivo en Oaxaca, que exportan estos productos a EE.UU. por ejemplo chocolate, mole oaxaqueño, nopales en conservas, alimentos oaxaqueños, este tipo de proyectos productivos donde se ven*

> *beneficiados las personas que viven acá* [*en México*] *donde salieron los migrantes … Yo creo que estos proyectos* son importantes porque son también un complemento de la inversión que en algún momento los esposos que están en EE.UU. están haciendo a su localidad, *por ejemplo este grupo de personas que están a EE.UU. y están cooperando para poner la energía eléctrica en su población, entonces las personas que están acá* [*en México*]*, están en una forma* complementando la inversión que sus esposos están haciendo *para poder introducir la energía eléctrica en su poblado.*[38]
>
> (IME representative, Mexico City, personal interview, May 2005, my emphasis)

This statement demonstrates the reproduction of the gendered remittance sender versus remittance receiver dichotomy as the basis for targeting women with productive projects. Thereby, as mentioned above, women's integration into productive activities is presented as women's duty, as their counterpart to their husband's remittances. We can also observe how this duty is extended from the individual woman remittance receiver to non-migrant women in rural communities in general. As another official told me:

> *Muchos dicen: porque beneficien más las mujeres de los proyectos? No es que la beneficiamos más, entendemos una realidad en nuestros municipios: en muchos estados de la republica* los hombres se van, aquí se deja la mujer que en este momento es jefe de familia, *se convierte en mama y papa*, y tiene que ponerse a trabajar*, entonces nosotros las soportamos para que su pago sea mayor, porque muchas sí tienen toda la iniciativa del mundo, pero también no tenemos que desconocer que* muchas si se va el marido, ellas no saben hacer nada, *entonces, … yo creo que en este momento guardo una tristeza, veo mi realidad, veo mi pequeña casa, veo mis hijos … , de estas hay muchas, y que sé hacer? nada, nada, sí, cuidar a los niño, sí, lavar, sí planchar, sí cocinar,* pero trabajar no sé*, porque antes mi vida no era así, ahora sí, entonces, empiezan a moverse, y olvídate, porque ellas son increíbles, se organizan, sí son organizadas, son las mejores para impulsar proyectos, son las que detonan un proyecto productivo,* aquí los mejores proyectos que tenemos son de mujeres, y son mucho mejores que el hombre.[39]
>
> (SEDESOL representative, Mexico City, personal interview, June 2005, my emphasis)

We can observe how women are represented as helpless victims who 'don't know how to do anything', left behind by migrant husbands and in need of assistance. Again, we find the assumption that before their husbands migrated, these women were not 'working'. Thereby, social reproduction work, such as childcare, cooking, etc. is explicitly excluded from the category of work. Yet, women are also represented as the ideal clients or targets for setting up productive projects. Women's capacity to get organised and take initiatives is

hailed. This results in a combination of negative stereotyping and positive discrimination.

A concrete example of the targeting of non-migrant women is the project 'Mujeres y Desarrollo de San Lorenzo: Proyecto Productivo Binacional' (see Chapter 4). This project is a site of regulatory power to get women involved in productive work and to use a part of their remittances for productive purposes. A more detailed analysis of this project is provided below in the section on disciplining.

Another example of a productive project within the GRT in Mexico is Mi Comunidad, discussed above. In this project, both the gender-blindness of migration-linked development projects and the 'make women productive' imperative are manifested. The *maquilas* established through the Mi Comunidad project employed mainly women (Rionda y Romero cited in Alarcón 2004: 172).[40] This shows how non-migrant women in communities of origin are targeted with productive work. Yet, in the information available about the project there is no sign that it was based upon a gender-aware design: no thought seems to have been given to gender-specific implications of this project, nor to gender-specific needs of female workers. Thus, for example, the working conditions of the jobs created through the programme and the gendered social implications would need investigating. Research on the working conditions within *maquilas* in the Mexican border zone with the US reports widespread exploitation and abuse of the mainly female workforce, with implications in terms of women's health and violence and discrimination in the workplace and beyond (Afshar 1985; Bayes and Mae Kelly 2001; Fernández-Kelly 1983). Even though the context and motivation for setting up *maquilas* within Mi Comunidad are entirely different, the issue of the working conditions would need exploring. Other gender implications of the increased involvement of women in *maquila* work, such as gender relations in the workplace, but also the transformation of gendered power relations within the households of the women workers would also need to be examined. To my knowledge, there are no gender-sensitive evaluations of this project, nor have I found interviews with (female) employees. Yet, what is clear is that this project, seemingly gender-neutral, acted to get women involved in productive work, albeit temporarily. To be sure, I am not arguing that it is necessarily 'bad' to promote the integration of women into 'productive work'. However, it is important to challenge the assumption that social reproduction work is not productive, and to realise that the integration into productive work does not necessarily and automatically contribute to empowering women, but can produce new forms of gender discrimination.

The full implications of the regulatory power of the GRT can only be understood in its interaction with disciplinary power.

The disciplinary power of the GRT

The last section analysed how through the GRT two main groups of populations are created and regulated: the (male) migrant remittance senders and the

non-migrant (woman) remittance receivers. This section shifts the focus from population groups towards individuals, to analyse the disciplinary power of the GRT in the case of Mexico. As outlined in Chapter 2, disciplinary power works through three mechanisms: observation that serves to survey people and render visible any incidence of non-compliance to norms, leading to self-surveillance; normalisation, which serves to define norms that become the standard against which individuals' behaviour is to be judged, establishing limits of accepted behaviour; and examination, which combines the techniques of observation and normalisation in specific sites (Foucault 1977a: 170–91). These three mechanisms are intimately linked, but can be distinguished for analytical purposes.

As will be shown in this section, the GRT in Mexico acts to discipline individuals in a number of ways. It disciplines (male) migrants to honour their moral obligation to send remittances to their families, to use formal transfer channels to send their remittances, to get organised to send collective remittances for development projects, and to invest remittances productively. (Women) non-migrants are disciplined into using the remittances they receive in productive ways, and to get involved in productive activities to produce their counterpart to remittances. Hence, migrants and non-migrants are disciplined into useful and docile individuals, in gender-specific ways.

Disciplining migrants

As analysed above, the emergence of the GRT triggered an impressive machinery aimed at collecting information about migrants' lives, their living conditions in the US, their remitting activities, etc. This machinery turns remittances into an object of knowledge and serves to regulate migrants as a population group. In addition, it also acts to discipline individual migrants through observation.

One particular instrument for the observation of migrants within the GRT is the *Matrícula Consular*, an identity card for Mexican migrants living in the US. The *Matrícula* is a useful instrument for migrants to identify themselves, independent of their legal status, and to obtain all sorts of services, open bank accounts and make remittance transfers.[41] Yet, the *Matrícula* also serves to collect information about individual migrants. It makes them visible and allows the authorities to keep track of them. Moreover, this ID card has been widely promoted by US banks in search of new clients, within the broader 'banking the unbanked through remittances' strategy (see below). Thereby, the card contributes to discipline migrants to use formal remittance transfers.

Migrant organisations themselves are also involved in the collection of information about their members. Thereby, each individual migrant becomes visible: their border-crossing activities, remittance behaviour, participation in HTA activities, fundraising performance, etc. In addition, the moment of (temporary) return is also a site for the observation of migrants both among themselves and by community members. Observation acts to create competition among migrants to bring back most presents, to build the biggest house and to invest most money. Thus, there is a strong social pressure on migrants to return rich.

Yet, at the same time, returning migrants also face prejudice and anger from non-migrant community members. Thus, for example, there is strong resentment against migrants in both Los Pilares and San Lorenzo. As one informant put it: '*Todo es por culpa de los Norteños*'[42] (Señor Luciano, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005). Another respondent reported that return migrants or family members of migrants are perceived as behaving arrogantly, 'showing off' their possessions and their *migradólares*: '*La gente cambia en el hecho de que ya no es humilde como antes, ahora ya se siente grande, ya se siente que tienen dinero, ya se sienten los mejores del pueblo*'[43] (Señora Eva, Los Pilares, personal interview, May 2005). Hence, the disciplining within the GRT includes not only top-down observation such as by government officials, but also mutual observation and self-surveillance, such as within HTAs or communities.

Disciplinary power also works through normalisation, which defines norms that are the standard against which individuals' behaviour is to be judged and establishes the limits of accepted behaviour. The normalisation of Mexican migrants has a number of elements. One element is the emphasis on the emotional ties between migrants and their families in the conceptual apparatus of the GRT, both within the international and Mexican context (see Chapters 3 and 4). Thereby, remittances are defined as an expression of these emotional ties, as illustrated in the following IME statement: '*Más allá de su contribución económica, las remesas representan una expresión más de los profundos lazos que unen a nuestras comunidades en ambos lados de la frontera*'[44] (Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior 2004: 1).

As demonstrated for the international discourse, this emphasis on the emotional links serves to create a moral pressure to send remittances, reinforcing the social obligations resulting from these bonds. This acts to keep remittances flowing and to instrumentalise migration and migrants for the development of Mexico.[45] It also serves to discipline migrants into responsible citizens, and contributes to create neoliberal subjectivities.

Another element of normalisation is the strategy of 'banking the unbanked through remittances', adopted both within the international realm as well as in the Mexican context (see Chapters 3 and 4). This strategy encourages both remittance senders and receivers to open bank accounts to be used for saving and for transferring/receiving remittances. Thus, the aim is to extend access to banking facilities to these population groups. The strategy is based on the assumption that the access to financial services will lead to an improvement in living conditions:[46] '*Queremos que los migrantes y sus familias utilicen los servicios bancarios en ambos lados de la frontera y accedan a través de su ingreso y remesa a una mejor calidad de vida*'[47] (Calderón 2007).

The 'banking the unbanked through remittances' strategy is strongly present in the Mexican GRT. Thereby, two objectives are achieved: remittances are used to facilitate the inclusion of new sections of the population into the banking system, and through this inclusion, remittances are more likely to be sent via formal channels and by extension invested or saved, rather than spent on consumption. In this context, a number of initiatives have been implemented.

Thus, for example, representatives from (US) banks are invited to the Mexican consulates to distribute information about their remittances services, and they are also invited to speak at the *Jornadas Informativas* for migrant leaders.

A final normalisation element regards the productive investment of remittances. As seen in Chapter 4 and in the analysis above, this is a strong emphasis within the conceptual and institutional apparatus of the GRT in Mexico. Thus, for example, promoting the productive use of remittances is also one of the aims of the OFAOs, as an OFATE (Oficina de Atención a Tlaxcaltecas en el Exterior*)* representative told me: '*nuestro objetivo es promover la inversion productiva de las remesas … y una cultura empresarial*'[48] (OFATE representative, Tlaxcala, personal interview, May 2005). To this end, a number of investment initiatives have been established to attract remittances. Thus for example, a number of Mexican institutions offer mortgages or construction and renovation services, such as Cemex-Construmex, Mi Casita Hipotecaria, Conficasa, and Hipotecaria Nacional (Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior 2004: 3).[49] Thereby, migrants have the opportunity to buy a house in Mexico on credit in the US or to pay for renovation or construction through remittances. Such programmes allow migrants to control the spending of remittances, maintaining the decision-making over remittances in the hands of the migrants. This is based on the gender-biased mistrust in the decision-making of (women) remittance receivers. Overall, these programmes contribute to discipline migrants to conform to the norm of investing remittances productively.

Invierte en México

Apart from attracting migrant remittances into housing, there are also a number of initiatives that promote the investment of remittances into small businesses in Mexico, such as the Invierte en México programme. This programme was launched in 2003 by Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) in cooperation with the MIF of the IDB, and piloted in three Mexican states (Jalisco, Hidalgo and Zacatecas). The programme's slogan is: '*No estás solo*',[50] and it aims to contribute to development of the communities of origin by creating employment and economic growth, as stated by a NAFIN official: '*el programa surge con la inquietud de atraer remesas para poner proyectos productivos*'[51] (NAFIN representative, personal interview, June 2005). It was the first programme to attract individual migrant remittances to be invested in small businesses (ibid.).

The conditions for participating in the project are to be a migrant of Mexican origin and to own the capital for establishing a business, as NAFIN does not provide credits. The programme includes only migrants with capital. This programme contributes to (re)producing the subjectivity of the entrepreneurial migrant (see below). Each project proposal is evaluated by a committee consisting of a group of entrepreneurs within the respective Mexican state. If the project is accepted, NAFIN contributes by financing up to 70 per cent of the business plan and the market study, and providing a consultant who

accompanies the establishment of the business (Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior 2004).

The programme differentiates itself from other migration-linked development initiatives in that it does not involve considerations about community infrastructure or social aspects, but it is based on purely economical grounds: '*nosotros no apoyamos proyectos que tienen que ver con infraestructura comunitaria o proyectos sociales, nosotros tenemos que tener proyectos rentables, y que sean negocios*'[52] (NAFIN representative, personal interview, June 2005). However, there seems to be a slight tension here, given that from the perspective of the migrants these businesses are not established merely on rational economic grounds, but mostly linked to the wish by migrants to invest in their home community. Thus, migrants invest in a business in their home community based on social and emotional bonds and not on purely economic grounds opting for the most lucrative business type and location. This is acknowledged by NAFIN:

> *Estas empresas* crean empleos en lugares en donde difícilmente alguien invertiría … *Yo creo que el proyecto es una opción muy importante, más pensando en que ciertas comunidades vale la pena, porque esta gente esta invirtiendo en lugares en donde un inversionista con una racionalidad únicamente económica no escogería como prioridad, seguramente,* estas invirtiendo en lugares en que difícilmente alguien hacen inversiones *y dan empleos, y en alguna manera esto frenara, sin duda, el fenómeno migratorio y genera opciones de desarrollo para estas comunidades.*[53]
>
> (NAFIN representative, personal interview, June 2005, my emphasis)

In some ways, migrants are expected to invest in conditions where 'normal' investors would not necessarily invest, due to lack of infrastructure, for example. Yet, when asked about this tension, my interviewee chose not to reply. In case of failure, the blame falls entirely on the migrant. This obscures the fact that a lack in business infrastructure in many Mexican communities is a crucial factor in the failure of many businesses.

Another intriguing aspect of Invierte en México is that some migrant investors have set up *maquilas* through this programme:

> *Muchos de estos empresarios ya tienen su negocio en EE.UU. y solo están maquilando ahí, se pueden maquilar en Tijuana o en Aguascalientes, o en su pueblo, y si le sale igual que a su pueblo, entonces van a ir a su pueblo.*[54]
>
> (NAFIN representative, personal interview, June 2005)

As mentioned above in the context of Mi Comunidad, one would have to investigate what kind of jobs are created through this programme and what type of work environment they feature. Judging from the evaluation of this programme, it encountered serious problems, such as the distrust of migrants in government authorities, inadequate support and follow-up of projects, the

establishment of businesses that were not sustainable, etc.[55] This challenges the statement by the IME official that within this project 'your money is very secure': '*Lo que importa al programa es la asesoría que NAFIN te da, para que pongas un negocio y que este negocio efectivamente funciona,* […] *es una asesoría completa, tu dinero esta prácticamente asegurado*'[56] (IME representative, Mexico City, personal interview, May 2005). It is through such programmes that migrants are normalised into saving remittances and investing them in productive ways.

In sum, we can identify a number of ways in which migrants are disciplined through normalisation within the GRT in Mexico. Normalisation works through comparison and differentiation between individuals: the remitting behaviour of migrants becomes visible and comparisons between migrants from different Mexican states and contexts are made possible. Thereby, for instance, the Zacatecan migrant has become the example of best practice and the norm which migrants from other states are supposed to live up to. Numerous studies emphasise the high sums of individual and collective remittances sent by Zacatecan migrants, point to the well-organised character of Zacatecan migrants, and highlight the success of these projects funded by remittances, both infrastructural and productive (see García Zamora 2003, 2005). This serves to differentiate individuals, and the Zacatecan migrant becomes an optimum towards which other migrants should move. Simultaneously, it also serves to establish hierarchies and create competition, both between migrants and between migrant groups to get organised, collect remittances, invest them productively, etc. Within HTAs, there is competition among migrants to become leaders and thereby be conferred a certain authority.

Importantly, normalisation also works through a reward and punishment system. Thus, for example, through sending remittances, senders acquire recognition and increased social status. Productive investment of individual remittances is encouraged and rewarded through investment and credit opportunities, such as through Invierte en México. Migrants who organise and collect remittances are rewarded by the Programa 3×1, which co-funds their collective remittance projects. This, in turn, gives migrants increased recognition and negotiating power with the government and political influence in their home communities. Successful HTAs receive visits by Mexican governors or the Mexican president. The more organised they are, and the more remittances sent, the higher the rewards. Thus, for example, the Projecto Piloto 3×1 BID is being implemented in five Mexican states that are seen as successful in implementing migration-linked development projects.

However, normalisation also works though exclusion and punishment for non-conformity. Those migrants who are not willing to organise, pay membership fees to HTAs, participate in collecting remittances, etc. are often excluded from migrant organisations and thereby from important social networks and services. Migrant groups who are not organised and institutionalised are excluded from the Programa 3×1 and have no access to co-funding, given that only registered migrant organisations are allowed to participate in the programme.

Moreover, in some states, such as Zacatecas, only HTAs that are members of the Federation are entitled to participate, preventing non-organised, non-registered migrant organisations from accessing such funds. This acts to punish not only the migrants by preventing them from earning financial and status rewards, but also their home communities that as a result cannot get 3×1 projects. Thereby, migrants are disciplined into getting organised in order to 'get a project', and to have a project becomes a question of status and recognition. Yet, many migrants are not interested in sending collective remittances and funding development projects, and actively resist disciplining, as we shall see in Chapter 6.

The third instrument of disciplinary power, examination, links observation to normalisation. As illustrated in this section, there are at least three sites of examination that link the collection of knowledge about migrants to normalising practices: migrant organisations, the *Jornadas Informativas*, and the Consejo Consultivo. First, migrant organisations are a site for knowledge exchange whereby the (remitting) behaviour of each individual migrant becomes visible and is assessed by the HTA community, which in turn serves as a basis for controlling the individual migrant's behaviour, and putting pressure on them to behave according to the norms. The pressure includes both peer pressure and hierarchical pressure exercised by the leadership of the HTA. The growing institutionalisation of migrants and new registration procedures for HTAs facilitates gathering information about migrants and their activities, and renders them increasingly visible.

A second site of examination are the *Jornadas Informativas* organised by the IME. These serve as a site for the exchange of information: the migrant leaders receive information about the different services of the IME and the different options for migrants wishing to donate or invest money in Mexico, and in return the Mexican government collects information about migrant activities. As mentioned above, representatives from (US) banks are invited to speak at these *Jornadas*, in order to try to convince migrants to use formal (bank) channels for transferring their remittances. The participants then spread the information among the migrant community (IME representative, Mexico City, personal interview, May 2005). Through these *Jornadas*, Mexican migrants are disciplined to open bank accounts, save and invest, to adopt formal channels to send remittances, and to send collective remittances for development projects.

A third site of examination is the IME's advisory council, the Consejo Consultivo, composed of migrant representatives, representatives from Latino organisations in the US, special advisors and representatives from Mexico's state governments. This council is a site for the representation of migrant voices and needs, but acts in parallel as an instrument to collect information about migrants, and contributes to the disciplining of migrants.

Disciplining non-migrants

The GRT also acts to discipline non-migrants in a number of ways. In particular, (women) remittance receivers are expected to conform to the norms of

using remittances productively and producing a counterpart income. The information collection machinery established within the GRT disciplines individual non-migrants through observation. Thus, for example, the various studies and statistics on remittance receivers' profiles act to make visible non-migrants and serve to normalise them. This is particularly the case for non-migrant women.

With migration the surveillance of non-migrant women tends to increase. Based on the assumption that women cannot live without male protection, the absence of the husband typically leaves women under the surveillance of the extended family and the community, and they are expected to behave according to strict social norms (Alarcón 1992: 313; Fagetti 2000; Marroni 2000). In my fieldwork this form of social pressure has been evident in many forms. Señora Benedicta from Los Pilares, 22 years old and married to a migrant, expressed how she experienced this social pressure:

> *Debe uno que ver como sale uno porque: ¡mírala! Y ya dicen quien sabe que, quien sabe cuando y ya hay chismes.* […] *Si más o menos la ven cambiada, es porque va a ver a otro y no es así, solo es porque quiere uno andar limpio!*[57]
>
> (Señora Benedicta, Los Pilares, personal interview, May 2005)

Hence, non-migrant women are often exposed to the social gaze of the community and other family members. Observation within the GRT is grafted upon this social gaze within the communities of origin. Thus, the remittance-receiving behaviour of each woman with migrant family members is made visible: Does she receive remittances? How much and how often? What does she use the money for? And so on. This acts to discipline remittance-receiving women into certain forms of behaviour. Moreover, it even influences the behaviour of women who do not receive remittances, as Señora Paulina from San Lorenzo reported:

> *Aquí hay mujeres que tienen esposo en EE.UU. pero no reciben remesas. Cuando ellas van a comprar zapatos o vestidos lindos la gente habla mal de ellas, les critica porque piensan que han ido con otro hombre para obtener dinero*.[58]
>
> (Señora Paulina, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006)

This observation opens the way for the normalisation of women remittance receivers, i.e. disciplining them into behaving according to the norms within the GRT. There are a number of normalisation mechanisms at work. One key element is the 'make women productive' strategy. This strategy acts as a norm, through which it has become socially unacceptable to 'just receive remittances'. Instead, women remittance receivers are expected to invest their remittances productively, rather than just using them for consumption and the daily needs of the household. Furthermore, women remittance receivers are expected to 'become productive' and generate income themselves, in order to fulfil their 'duty' of providing a counterpart to remittances. Indeed, many of my interviews

show that there is a strongly felt pressure among women in the two communities not to use the remittances for consumption and to 'become productive' themselves. Women who 'just receive remittances' and use the money for consumption without generating income do not conform to the norm and are labelled as unproductive in the official discourse. Within the community, they are stigmatised as 'lazy' (*flojas*). Señora Eva, for example, told me with disdain:

> *Las mujeres que tienen su esposo en EE.UU. se vuelven más flojas! Porque cuando esta el marido, tienen que trabajar, pero después ya no se preocupen porque el marido les manda y ya no hacen nada*.[59]
>
> (Señora Eva, Los Pilares, personal interview, May 2005)

This acts to discipline non-migrant women and also leads to self-disciplining. Thus, women are pushed into becoming productive or at least keeping busy to show that they are not 'lazy'. Thus, for example, Señora Maria, who lives in a big house built with remittances, kept busy all day cleaning all the rooms, although she did not use them.

The self-disciplining has gone so far that some women decide not to use the remittances they receive or to use only a small part, and instead start generating themselves the income necessary for the survival of the household. In Los Pilares and San Lorenzo, many women generate income through agricultural products, such as selling cheese or tortillas at the local market. Other women have bought livestock to sell the meat, or started selling sweets, beauty products or nutritional products in the community. Still others have set up small shops in the entrances of their houses by investing their remittances, such as *abarrotes*,[60] but also *tortillerías*, *papelerías*, hairdressers or games stores. Thus, for example, after her husband left for the US, Señora Adriana started producing cheese from the milk of her cows and selling them at the market. During the six years that her husband worked in the US, she only used a small part of the remittances he sent her and survived with three children living off the revenue from her cheese and the subsistence produce from their farm:

> *Los seis años que él estaba allá me giraba dinero, pero este dinero, yo no lo tocaba yo, aunque me lo metió al banco … Vivimos nada más con el producto de los quesos*.[61]
>
> (Señora Adriana, Los Pilares, personal interview, June 2005)

This demonstrates the self-disciplining within the GRT, whereby non-migrant women change their behaviour to conform to the new norm of not spending remittances on consumption and becoming productive to contribute their counterpart income.

Normalisation also contributes to push women to get involved in productive work through productive project initiatives. Within the GRT, there are two types of initiatives: micro-finance initiatives and specific migration-linked productive projects.

Micro-finance seeks to reach the economically active poor with financial services in order to enable them to establish enterprises (Lairap 2004: 118). As illustrated above with the example of FOMTLAX, within the GRT, micro-credit initiatives often specifically target women remittance receivers, based on the gendered stereotype that women are better credit-takers than men, and the rationale within the GRT in Mexico that promotes the productive investment of remittances.

In her analysis of the disciplinary power of micro-credit in the case of Cameroon, Lairap highlights a number of ways in which micro-finance initiatives act to normalise individual women borrowers into market behaviour and mentality (2004: 117). Within the GRT, these disciplinary mechanisms of micro-finance act similarly to normalise the productive investment of remittances and to discipline women into productive work. Hence, the nexus between migration, remittances and development provides a further entry point for the promotion of micro-credit initiatives, and also additional legitimacy for the strategy as a major international poverty-reduction tool. Yet, there is one particularity within the GRT: micro-credits are often attributed on the basis of future remittances, i.e. money that women are expected to receive in the future. However, sometimes remittances fail to arrive regularly and the sums may vary, which represents an additional factor of uncertainty in the establishment of a micro-credit project based on remittances. This may tie women into a vicious cycle of debt. Yet, it goes beyond this book to evaluate the outcomes of such micro-finance projects within the GRT.[62] What is relevant here is that through such micro-finance initiatives non-migrant women are disciplined into productive work and integrated into financial markets.

Mujeres y Desarrollo de San Lorenzo: Proyecto Productivo Binacional

Productive projects established within the GRT in Mexico are also a site of observation and normalisation. These projects render the individual participants visible. They also actively promote the productive investment of remittances by remittance receivers and the integration of non-migrant women into productive work. This section focuses on one particular example of such a *proyecto productivo* in San Lorenzo.

As described in Chapter 4, the woman-only productive project established in San Lorenzo aims at getting women involved in production for the market and to extend the marketing of their *artesanías* to the national and international market (Instituto Michoacáno de la Mujer, no date: 3). As mentioned above, the project can be considered a failure when judged by its own promises and objectives. Yet, the aim here is to examine how this project is a site for disciplining non-migrant women within the GRT. The disciplinary implications of this project are expressed in a number of ways. First, the underlying principles of the project reinforce the 'unproductive passive remittance receiver' stereotype and the 'make women productive' imperative. As stated in the project description, the project starts from the recognition that women's

productive work is a form of social capital that has so far been under-utilised for development:

> *En México, y por supuesto también en Michoacán, no sólo se ha desaprovechado este importante capital social, sino que las mujeres continúan enfrentando limitaciones y obstáculos estructurales que dificultan su participación en la actividad empresarial.*[63]
>
> (Instituto Michoacáno de la Mujer, no date: 4)

Given that women's productive capacity has allegedly been under-utilised, the aim is to get them into productive work through such projects, which contributes to normalise non-migrant women to become productive. The gendered stereotypes within the GRT discourse are also mirrored in statements from IMM representatives, as the following statement illustrates:

> *San Lorenzo es la típica comunidad de* mujeres que esperan a que los esposos les manden sus recursos, … *y entonces, con este proyecto creemos que,* […] *va a crear recursos, ingresos, porque realmente, las mujeres bordaban para autoconsumo, rara vez vendían, entonces esto va a ser un cambio fuerte, porque* va crear la conciencia a las mujeres que ellas pueden hacer algo productivo.[64]
>
> (Laura Flores, IMM, Morelia, June 2005, my emphasis)

Second, through this project, women's productive activities are rendered visible – the amount of *artesanías* they produce, the quality of their products, etc. – and it becomes possible to differentiate between the women. There is a constant comparison and evaluation of their products and the best ones are taken to be exhibited at *ferias*. Thus, for example, the project coordinator took some particularly nice *artesanías* to an international *feria* in Rome in an attempt to establish business ties with potential buyers (Mario López Espinosa, ILO consultant, former NAFIN economist, Morelia, personal interview, June 2005). This acts to increase competition between the women in the project and produces inclusion and exclusion processes. Thereby, women who stop producing or produce less than others are marginalised, or even excluded, judged as traitors to the project. The competitive approach of the project is stated in the project leaflet:

> *¿Cuanto puede ganar una mujer artesana? Depende de cuánto tiempo trabaja y de cuál es la calidad de su trabajo. Si su producto está mejor hecho podrá venderse a mejor precio y tendrá mayores ingresos. La que trabaja más y mejor, gana más.*[65]
>
> (Instituto Michoacáno de la Mujer et al., no date)

However, the project also has a collective dimension. While each woman is an individual producer and thereby competes with the products of other women

in the project, there are also a number of collective activities, such as cooperation in the workshops or collective selling strategies. This combination of collective effort and individual work and competition among the women creates a certain tension.

A third way in which disciplinary power operates through this project is by modifying women's use of time. According to Foucault, disciplinary power modifies our understanding and use of space and time, such as by introducing new techniques of taking charge of time (Foucault 1977a: 151–52). Foucault uses the example of the enclosing of individuals into factories, whereby they had to change their ways of dealing with time. Similar processes also occur with their insertion into other forms of productive activity, such as *proyectos productivos*. Women participating in the project in San Lorenzo reported that since they had got involved in productive work they had to change their daily schedule in order juggle productive with reproductive and community work. Thus, women are disciplined into managing their time more efficiently. Some women found it difficult to manage the increased workload and to resolve the tension between social reproduction and productive activities. For example, Señora Maria Luz noted that:

> *Antes tenía yo más tiempo. Ahora, si quiero ir al taller me tengo que levantar temprano en la mañana y me tengo que apurar para terminar todo, llevar los niños a la escuela, hacer a comer, limpiar, todo … Me cansa mucho.*[66]
>
> (Señora Maria Luz, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005)

Fourth, the project aims to integrate women into international markets and export their *artesanías*. Thereby, the women adopt the language and logic of the market and are disciplined into market behaviour. This was reinforced through the workshops on marketing *artesanías*, for example. Participants reported feeling this discipline of the market, as Señora Andrea observes:

> *Nos tenemos que someter a lo que quiere el mercado. El mercado manda. Apenas empezamos el camino, más adelante nos va a decir el mercado lo que quiere, cuáles colores, cuáles formas, … es una lastima porque así se pierden las tradiciones, pero así es.*[67]
>
> (Señora Andrea, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006)

This illustrates how the women started orienting their choices and behaviour towards the demands of the market. The market is perceived of in terms of an all-powerful force, like Adam Smith's 'invisible hand'. Furthermore, the women perceive a tension between their traditions and 'what the market wants', whereby the market prevails. Thus, disciplining not only works to change people's behaviour, but also transforms their ways of thinking and feeling, and their beliefs and desires.

The adoption of the market logic is also expressed in the following reply by Señora Clara when asked what transformations the project had brought for her:

> *Para mi, esta todo, económico y derechos, que* todos tenemos el derecho de vender*, no solamente los que tienen puestos, que nosotros también tenemos derecho, que tenemos a donde vender, …* que tenemos el derecho de ir a otras partes, no nada más aquí en México, también en otras países, y que nos den el derecho de participar a vender a otros países.[68]
> (Señora Clara, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005, my emphasis)

Interestingly, Señora Clara emphasises economic rights, without mentioning political or social rights, reproducing the discourse of the project that is based on a notion of empowerment that is largely limited to its economic dimension. Her statement mirrors the ways in which the women within this project – and within the 'make women productive' discourse more generally – are represented, i.e. as citizens with market rights, with the right to produce and sell. Political and social rights are marginalised or expected to flow automatically from economic rights (see below).

Finally, through this project, women are responsibilised for their own and the development of the community, as explicitly set out in the project objectives. The project attempts to move beyond a paternalistic approach, i.e. to provide people with the means and skills that would allow them to pull themselves out of poverty. This is in line with the neoliberal welfare state model that aims to responsibilise individuals and communities for their own development:

> [*Este proyecto*] *pretende contribuir a mejorar las condiciones de vida tanto de las mujeres que habitan en San Lorenzo, como de aquellas otras mujeres michoacanas que radican en el exterior, en particular en los EE.UU., promoviendo entre ambas la concertación de una alianza estratégica para* impulsar conjuntamente su desarrollo personal y comunitario … *En este proyecto se eliminan de la acción de fomento los criterios y enfoques de carácter asistencialista que alientan invariablemente la inacción, estimulan la dependencia e inhiben la iniciativa emprendedora. Se promueve … en cambio, que* las mujeres artesanas en San Lorenzo y las michoacanas en el exterior asuman la responsabilidad plena de diseñar e instrumentar su propia estrategia de desarrollo productivo.[69]
> (Instituto Michoacáno de la Mujer, no date: 3–5, my emphasis)

Mario López Espinosa confirmed the 'make women work for development' strategy of the project:

> *El objetivo es que las mujeres tengan dinero para sus familias para comer, vestir, etc. … Queremos impulsar la emancipación de la mujer a través el trabajo, y también educación, toma de decisiones, etc. que las mujeres aprenden con el proyecto. Las mujeres pueden estimular el desarrollo a través un ingreso económico.*[70]
> (Mario López Espinosa, ILO consultant, former NAFIN economist, Morelia, personal interview, June 2005)

There is an inherent tension in this strategy that expects women's productive work to reduce their poverty and bring development to their families and communities: On the one hand, women are normalised to learn market behaviour and behave like 'rational economic actors' in order to successfully generate income and become entrepreneurs of themselves. On the other hand, however, when it comes to the use of the money generated through their productive work they are supposed to behave in altruistic ways.[71] There, women are supposed to spend the money earned through their productive work to improve the well-being of their family and community. Thus, while this project disciplines women into 'rational economic actors', at the same time, it also acts to reinforce traditional notions of motherhood and women's responsibilities in the family. This also reinforces the economic notion of empowerment, whereby women's empowerment is reduced to its economic aspect, which is seen as the catalyst for other aspects of empowerment. Thus, the economic independence that the women in the project are expected to achieve through selling their *artesanías* is supposed to be the basis upon which the women can acquire greater decision-making power and participation in the family and the community.

Overall, we can identify three sites of examination that discipline non-migrant women within the GRT in Mexico to become involved in productive activities and invest their remittances productively: the community, micro-credit programmes and productive projects. Within the community, the social gaze and mutual observation act to render visible women remittance receivers, and disciplining and self-disciplining pushes them to 'not just receive remittances', but produce a counterpart income. Micro-credit programmes act as sites of examination through the collection of information about the individual women clients and have the effect of disciplining women to adopt market thinking and behaviour. In the context of productive projects, the making visibile of the activities and productivity of each participant acts to discipline members of the project to compete for more productivity, better quality, cheaper products, etc. and conform to market norms. Hence, the GRT in Mexico acts not only to discipline women to get productive and use remittances productively, but also to conform to certain gender-specific forms of behaviour.

Analysing the disciplinary power of the GRT in the case of Mexico, there are a number of ways in which migrants and non-migrants are being responsibilised for their own and the well-being of their families and communities. This is based on the neoliberal understanding of welfare, as outlined in Chapter 4. Further, it also contributes to the creation of new subjectivities.

The production of subjectivities

The disciplinary power of the GRT not only works to change people's behaviour, but also transforms people's ways of thinking, feeling, and identification, i.e. their subjectivities. According to Foucault, the production of subjectivities happens both through disciplining – which acts to transform the thinking, acting and being of individuals through normalisation and punish–reward

systems – as well as through self-disciplining – whereby individuals train themselves and adjust their thinking and behaviour to conform to norms. Yet, as post-colonial feminists have demonstrated, processes of subjectivity creation are deeply gendered (Hirshman 1995; Parpart and Marchand 1995). Using a gender lens to analyse the subjectivity creation in the GRT in Mexico, we can identify at least three subjectivities. First, the subjectivity of the 'male migrant development agent' and the 'entrepreneurial migrant man' saves money, sends individual and collective remittances and invests productively, in order to provide well-being for his non-migrant family and development for the community. Second, the 'productive non-migrant woman (remittance receiver)' invests the remittances she receives productively and produces a counterpart income. Third, the 'active priest' helps to organise the community and the migrants, to build trust between the two groups and to promote migration-linked development projects.

The creation of subjectivities happens through various mechanisms. Thus, the praising of migrants as heroes and agents for development combined with the extensive courting machinery create the 'migrant development agent' and the 'entrepreneurial migrant'. In parallel, the discursive construction of the 'unproductive remittance receiver woman' and the targeting of non-migrant women with micro-credit and productive projects produce the 'productive non-migrant woman (remittance receiver)'. The underlying gendered dichotomy between the remittance sender and remittance receiver and the emphasis within the conceptual apparatus on the emotional bonds between migrants and their families also play a key role in creating subjectivities. The incentives for co-funding to establish migration-linked projects contribute to produce 'active priests'.

These gendered forms of subjectivities created through the GRT are based on a neoliberal logic and contribute to neoliberal governmentality. As outlined in Chapter 2, neoliberal subjects take a number of forms, but share a common characteristic: they are responsible individuals. Thus, neoliberal subjects are no longer citizens with claims directed towards the state, but self-enterprising citizen-subjects, each 'an entrepreneur of his or her self' (Rose 1999: 142). This active individual conducts 'his or her life, and that of his or her family, as a kind of enterprise, seeking to enhance and capitalise on existence itself though calculated acts and investments' (ibid.: 164). This new subject manages her/his own needs, is empowered to make self-interested choices, and becomes responsible for advancing her/his well-being through these choices. The GRT contributes to producing gendered neoliberal subjects in the form of the 'migrant development agent', the 'entrepreneurial migrant' and the 'productive non-migrant woman (remittance receiver)'. These subjectivities are based on, and simultaneously reinforce, a neoliberal understanding of welfare. Thereby, migrants send individual remittances that allow their families to pay for consumption as well as welfare services – such as education and health care – while collective remittances serve to fund development projects. This is completed by the reproductive work of non-migrant women and children, and their productive work to complement remittances. Both forms of subjects are

responsibilised for their own needs as well as for the development of their families and communities, which serves the overall objective of the GRT. The 'active priest' is also a responsible subject. He helps to organise the community and the migrants, to build trust between the two groups and to promote migration-linked development projects. Thereby, he also becomes responsibilised for development to a certain extent.

Yet, there is an important gender difference between the two main subjectivities. Migrant development agents and entrepreneurial migrants earn certain benefits and political rights in return for sending individual and collective remittances. Thus, they have the right to dual citizenship, the opportunity to voice their concerns in meetings with Mexican government representatives, and they receive recognition and political capital for sending collective remittances or investing in home communities. However, the subjectivity of the productive non-migrant woman is purely economic. Thereby, the rights of the subject are conceptualised in market terms: the emphasis is on the right to have access to markets and consumer rights, and political rights are marginalised. Thus, women's inclusion into productive work focuses mainly on the economic aspects of empowerment, leaving out their political rights. Luccisano (2002) confirms this in her analysis of the implications of Mexican anti-poverty programmes, which contribute to 'the construction of the neoliberal subject – the making of the rational and empowered market citizens' (Luccisano 2002: 62). It is important to note that this also acts as an exclusionary mechanism, whereby migrants who do not send individual and collective remittances and invest in their home communities become marginalised. To be sure, I am not suggesting that the GRT has been successful in grafting these subjectivities onto all rural Mexicans. As the next chapter shows, there are various forms of resistance.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the gendered regulatory and disciplinary power and the gendered subjectivities produced within the GRT in Mexico. The regulatory framework of the GRT serves through a number of mechanisms to render population groups politically and economically useful and link them to the development of Mexico. Based on the gendered dichotomy between the migrant man (remittance sender) and the non-migrant woman (remittance receiver), it creates two population groups, turns them into objects of knowledge through information collection and distribution, and targets them with regulatory initiatives. Migrants as a group are regulated through strategies that promote collective remittances projects and productive investment, as illustrated with the Programa 3×1, Mi Comunidad, and Invierte en México. Non-migrants are regulated indirectly through the 'migrant bias' that acts to marginalise non-migrants and in particular women and gender issues, as well as directly through the 'make women productive' strategy that aims to integrate women into productive work through micro-credit or *proyectos productivos*, as illustrated in the case of San Lorenzo, while promoting the productive investment of

remittances. The disciplinary framework acts through observation, normalisation and examination to increase the docility and utility of individuals. Thus, the GRT in Mexico disciplines (male) migrants into sending individual remittances, using formal transfer channels, getting organised to send collective remittances, and investing productively. Non-migrant (women) remittance receivers are disciplined into investing remittances in a productive way and producing a counterpart income. The disciplinary power of the GRT also contributes to producing new subjectivities: the 'male migrant development agent' and the 'entrepreneurial migrant man', the 'productive non-migrant woman (remittance receiver)', and the 'active priest'.

The analysis in this chapter highlights that using a gender analysis is essential to understanding the functioning, scope and implications of the regulatory and disciplinary power of the GRT in the Mexican context. Indeed, the targeting of women remittance receivers with productive projects in order to get them involved in productive work can only be understood as a part of the GRT if we adopt a gender-sensitive lens. The 'migrant bias' that pervades most of the GRT, and assessments of it, prevents us from seeing this connection. Thus, only a gender analysis can reveal the real extent of the GRT and the links between seemingly unrelated policies of 'courting migrants' and 'make women productive'.

The gendered character of the regulatory and disciplinary power of the GRT in Mexico has a number of elements. The main gendered dichotomy between the remittance sender and remittance receiver leads to the creation of gendered population groups and to gender-specific targeting. Migrant men are turned into agents for development and receive a certain recognition for their contribution to the development of Mexico, such as public acknowledgment in presidential speeches and visits from state governors. They are also targeted with special services offered by the IME, which brings them a number of benefits. In contrast, women's gender-specific needs and gender issues are silenced and non-migrant women are marginalised when it comes to decision-making on the use of remittances and migration-linked development projects. Yet, non-migrant women are also regulated through the 'make women productive' imperative to get involved in productive work in order to produce their counterpart to remittances to contribute to the development of their families and communities. However, non-migrant women receive less public recognition and participation in return for their productive work.

This chapter has revealed a number of ways in which the GRT is based on and reproduces neoliberal governmentality, an issue to which we shall return in the Conclusion. While this and the previous chapter have analysed how different mechanisms and sites of the GRT act to regulate and discipline migrants and non-migrants, it is important to note that the GRT also creates space for resistance and empowerment, which is the task of the next chapter.

6 Resistance and empowerment within the GRT in Mexico

Nosotros también tenemos derechos![1]
(Señora Clara, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006)

[T]here is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial.
(Foucault 1978: 95–96)

Introduction

The GRT poses an interesting paradox: on the one hand, it acts to discipline individuals and regulate populations, and to create new subjectivities, as analysed in the previous chapter. In many cases this has meant restrictions and normative pressure on people's behaviour. Yet, on the other hand, GRT policies and discourses have also opened new terrain for collective and individual resistance and empowerment. Hence, the analysis of the regulatory and disciplinary power of the GRT should not be understood as implying that the GRT has established a complete or all-encompassing system of domination without resistance. To the contrary, the power technologies of the GRT have their limits. A Foucauldian perspective that stipulates that 'wherever there is power there is resistance', enables us to reveal moments of resistance and spaces for empowerment. Thus, the populations and individuals targeted by this regulatory and disciplinary power of the GRT, i.e. the migrants and non-migrants, are not 'passive victims'. Quite to the contrary, they have devised a variety of strategies to resist and subvert the disciplinary and regulatory power of the GRT, and to make use of the new spaces to get empowered.

This chapter explores different forms of collective and individual resistance and empowerment within the GRT in Mexico, illustrated with concrete examples from the literature and my fieldwork research. Given the temporary and context-specific nature of resistance and empowerment, this does not claim to be exhaustive. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the analysis in this book uses the concept of resistance as referring to instances and activities that challenge, subvert or disrupt the functioning or effects of the power technologies of the

GRT. In contrast, the concept of empowerment is used to analyse the subjective 'emancipatory' experience of the individuals and groups targeted by these power technologies. Yet, resistance and empowerment are often intimately linked, although they are not synonymous.

Resistance within the GRT

Within the IR and IPE disciplines, the question of resistance has not received due attention and remains rather under-theorised. Furthermore, existing approaches to resistance have been rather narrow, focusing mainly on large-scale, organised movements and activities. When approached through an understanding of resistance as collective, organised political activity, it might seem that there is no resistance to the power technologies deployed within the GRT. Thus, we need to use a reconceptualised understanding of resistance, as outlined in Chapter 2, based on a combination of Foucauldian with feminist insights, in order to identify the multiple sites and forms of resistance within the GRT.

Both feminists and Foucault emphasise that there are individual and collective forms of resistance: '[T]he points … of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilising groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behaviour' (Foucault 1978: 95–96).

Various actors are involved in resistance in the context of Mexico, including NGOs, academic networks, migrants and non-migrants. One example of collective resistance by civil society are the many NGOs (in Mexico and the USA) fighting for migrants' rights. They challenge the money-based approach dominant within the GRT that portrays remittances as sums of money and migrants as resources (see Chapters 3 and 4). Further, they aim to shift the emphasis from remittances to people in order to bring back the silenced dimensions, such as political rights, and the social costs and gender dimensions of migration. Academic networks challenging the dominant discourse, formulating counter-discourses and undertaking political activities to transform the conceptual apparatus of the GRT, are another example of collective resistance. A case in point is the Red Internacional de Migracion y Dessarrollo that issues regular declarations, signed by Mexican and international scholars and politicians. Thus, for example, in the context of an international conference in Cuernavaca in 2005, the Red designed a statement that challenges the representation of remittances as a sector of the economy and the instrumentalisation of migrants as a resource for development within the Mexican government discourse (see Chapter 4):

> *Los migrantes y sus remesas no deben ser vistos como un recurso nacional estratégico a ser administrado por el gobierno de su país de origen para promover el desarrollo en el largo plazo, como si se tratara del petróleo o de cualquier otro recurso natural.*[2]
>
> (Red Internacional de Migración y Desarrollo 2005)

The remainder of this section focuses on forms of resistance exercised by migrants and non-migrants, the main protagonists of this book. For the purpose of this analysis, two main forms of resistance can be identified: non-compliance and subversion. Non-compliance refers to behaviour that defies the norms of the GRT. Hence, population groups or individuals resist by refusing to adjust their behaviour to the norms established through the GRT, and thereby challenge and disrupt the disciplinary and regulatory power of the GRT. Some forms of non-compliance are more radical than others; some undermine the fundamental basis of the GRT, whereas others merely scratch the surface. In contrast, subversion refers to a conscious effort to defeat, harm or undermine an endeavour and is synonymous with sabotage or challenging of existing power structures. The notion of subversion is used by feminists as referring to acts of undermining gender regimes and challenging gendered power structures (Butler 1999). Subversion within the GRT means that people resist by undermining the functioning and purpose of disciplining and regulation. This can happen in many ways: through overt actions or through (seemingly) conforming to the norms, but then subverting their functioning. In what follows, I use a three-dimensional analytical grid to analyse the form, scope and actor of resistance, distinguishing between non-compliance and subversion, collective and individual, migrants and non-migrants (see Table 6.1 for a summary).

Non-compliance

There are a number of ways in which migrants and non-migrants choose not to comply with the norms of the GRT. Migrants may resist GRT norms collectively by not sending remittances, limiting their remittances to the family only, refusing to get organised, or refusing to cooperate in collective remittances projects, such as the Programa 3×1. Thus for example, migrants from Los Pilares, and from the state of Tlaxcala more generally, resist the pressure to get organised and send collective remittances. Indeed, as reported in our interviews, there are very few Tlaxcaltecan migrant organisations and the existing ones are hardly institutionalised (Marchand et al. 2006: 69; Revilla López 2005: 72). Partly, the general lack of migrant organisations from Tlaxcala is a result of the dispersal of migrants all over the US and their mainly undocumented migration status (see Chapter 4). Yet, it is also an explicit refusal to trust government authorities and cooperate with them. Migrants are reluctant to send collective remittances and to participate in migration-linked development initiatives such as the Programa 3×1. Some migrants from Los Pilares I have interviewed simply did not show any interest in getting organised or sending collective remittances to improve life in their home community. As Señor Alejandro, a young migrant from Los Pilares, told me: '*No, aquí no se dan estas cosas colectivas, aquí cada uno, cada quien su vida*'[3] (Señor Alejandro, Los Pilares, personal interview, April 2006). Other migrants indicated that they did not trust the authorities, as a return migrant from Los Pilares told me: '*Aquí no tenemos confianza, es que ya había mucha gente que nos vino a engañar*'[4]

Table 6.1 Examples of forms, scope and actors of resistance to the GRT in the case of Mexico

	Migrants		*Non-migrants*	
	Collective	*Individual*	*Collective*	*Individual*
Non-compliance	• Resist pressure to get organised • Refuse to send collective remittances • Not trust the government	• Refuse to send collective remittances • Refuse to participate in HTA	• Refuse 3x1 project • Refuse migration-linked development projects	• Resist 'make women productive' norm
Subversion	• Organise, but focus on other issues than remittances and development (e.g. migrant's and indigenous people's rights) • Use the migrant organisation to gain political power and stronger footing in negotiations with government and make demands	• Obtain services and rights, without becoming agents for development • Gain political power as migrant leader	• Trick the 3x1 • Participate in productive project, but make demands, voice needs	• Subvert the project purpose • Subvert the use of money • Voice demands • Appropriate the project and the 'make women productive' discourse

(Señor Pedro, Los Pilares, personal interview, May 2006). This was confirmed by the local priest: '*hay mucha desconfianza con la gente, entonces no van a querer el 3×1*'[5] (Padre José Luis, San Pablo, personal interview, June 2005). It has to be noted that in the state of Tlaxcala, the general distrust in authorities has traditionally been more pronounced than in other Mexican states. It seems that within the GRT this has become accentuated and is seen as a 'problem' by government authorities trying to earn migrants' trust in order to get them to send collective remittances and invest.

On one occasion where migrants from one extended family in Los Pilares decided to get together to collect remittances for the renovation of the church, they decided not to cooperate with the government, because they found that they could trust themselves, but not the government (Señora Gloria, Los Pilares, personal interview, April 2006). This is an example of a group of migrants that has organised for a specific purpose without constituting a formal migrant organisation, and has sent collective remittances to the community without cooperating with government authorities. This refusal to organise and to cooperate with the authorities is a form of non-compliance.

Migrant groups from the state of Puebla are another case in point. They have openly blamed political authorities and the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) as partly responsible for creating a situation that drove them to emigrate to find a better life. Therefore, they had little interest in cooperating with state authorities. Thus, they chose not to participate in the 3×1 programme and to channel their remittances in other ways. Research has shown that the general politicisation of this programme has prompted resistance by a number of migrant groups who oppose corruption and the fact that local politicians have sometimes claimed credit for getting the migrants to send collective remittances (Rocha Menocal, no date: 5–6). The case of the migrants from Puebla shows how migrants can use their strengthened voice within the GRT to express their discontent with the political situation in their home state. More broadly, this example also shows how migrants' actions contribute to undermining the money-based approach that dominates the framing of the link between migration and development within the GRT, and to shifting the focus towards the root causes and social implications of migration in the country of origin.

Migrants also resist the disciplining within the GRT individually. First, some migrants decide not to comply with the norm of sending remittances to their families and communities. Thus, for example, in both communities under study, there were cases of migrant men who did not send remittances or stopped sending after a while. Many argued that life in the US was too expensive for them to be able to save money, and some reported that they had no interest in sending money, given that their life was now in the US, as Señor Juan said: '*es que hay muchos que ya tienen su vida en los E.E.U.U. y no les interesa regresar o hacer algo para la comunidad*'[6] (Señor Juan, Los Pilares, personal interview, May 2005). Some migrants also reported not wanting to undertake regular visits, because they felt obliged to bring presents which made them spend a lot of money, thereby resisting the normative pressure based on the emotional bonds in transnational families.

Another way in which migrants resist is by refusing to cooperate with the authorities and to become agents for development. Thus, for example, Señor Alfonso, a migrant on a visit to Los Pilares, reported: '*a mi no me interesa cooperar, porque las autoridades hacen muchas promesas pero no cumplen, es pura mentira*'[7] (Señor Alfonso, Los Pilares, personal interview, May 2005). Señor Hector, another migrant from Los Pilares, told me that he was not interested given that the others were not participating either:

> *Es que no quieren cooperar todos, hay unas personas que quieren hacer algo, y preguntan a otros migrantes, pero ellos no quieren participar. Si todos se reunen lo hacemos, pero si no hay todos no quiero.*[8]
>
> (Señor Hector, Los Pilares, personal interview, 26 May 2005)

The state and municipal authorities of the government of Tlaxcala have reacted to this resistance by migrants by increasing their efforts to court migrants and developing new policies to target them. For example, in Los Pilares, a big wall-poster was put up in 2006 to encourage migrants to ask for assistance in setting up development projects in their home community (see Cover Photo). The OFATE has also established a number of programmes aimed at keeping in touch with Tlaxcaltecan migrants, but many migrants do not trust the OFATE (Marchand et al. 2006: 69; Revilla López 2005: 73).

Within the communities of origin, there are also various forms of non-compliance. Thus, for example, certain communities resist the pressure to establish migration-linked projects. As an IME official told me, certain Mexican states have opposed the establishment of a 3×1 project initiated by the migrants, because they thought that the proposed project did not meet the needs of the community of origin:

> *Hay estados que no quieren este tipo de proyectos, por diferencias, por ejemplo, hay estados que dicen, realmente esta obra que ustedes quieren hacer en esta localidad no es prioritaria, nosotros queremos hacer esto y esto, entonces no entran al programa y no participa su estado.*[9]
>
> (IME representative, Mexico City, personal interview, May 2005)

The refusal of a proposed project undermines the logic of the Programa 3×1 that conveys the authority to decide on the needs of the community to the migrants, marginalising the community of origin in the decision-making process. It is thus a form of resistance to the migrant bias within the GRT (see Chapters 4 and 5). In my fieldwork, I have come across a number of cases in which communities of origin have started to voice their needs and demand a seat at the decision-making table.

Non-migrants also resist the power technologies of the GRT individually. For example, in one case, several community members refused to pay the repair works on a well that was funded by remittances through a 3×1 project. They argued that the provision of water should be the responsibility of the state and

municipal authorities and demanded that the state pay for repair and maintenance of the well. This challenges the 3×1 logic and the 'outsourcing' of state responsibilities to migrants. In another example of non-compliance, non-migrant women refused to become integrated in productive activities or quit after a while. Thus, for example, in the case of San Lorenzo, several women told me they refused to enter the project, some arguing that it was a waste of time: '*es que no tengo tiempo, me parece que se pierde el tiempo con este proyecto*'[10] (Señora Amalia, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005).

Subversion

Subversion refers to activities that disrupt or undermine the functioning or effects of the disciplinary and regulatory power of the GRT. Thereby, actors often play the game to a certain extent, seemingly complying with the norms of the GRT, yet undermining the purpose of the disciplinary and regulatory power. This is a subtle form of resistance that can nevertheless challenge the core of the GRT.

Collective acts of subversion by migrants include cases where a group of migrants decides to get organised, but uses the new authority and leverage gained from organising for purposes other than those intended by the GRT, namely to send collective remittances and initiate development projects. Thus, migrants subvert the purpose of the organisation norm. This can happen in a number of ways: for example, by choosing to focus on alternative issues than the ones predominantly emphasised in the GRT, such as migrant's rights or indigenous people's rights. The Frente Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales (FIOB) is an interesting case in point. The FIOB is a community-based organisation and a coalition of indigenous organisations, communities and individuals living in Oaxaca, Baja California and the US state of California. It was founded on 5 October 1991 in Los Angeles, in the context of the opposition by indigenous peoples to the official celebrations of 500 years of the 'Discovery of America' by Christopher Columbus (Revilla López 2005: 82). Its mission is to 'contribute to the development and self-determination of the migrant and non-migrants indigenous communities, as well as struggle for the defense of human rights with justice and gender equity at the binational level'.[11]

The FIOB is an innovative transnational organisation that brings together indigenous people living on both sides of the border, both migrants and non-migrants. The focus of FIOB activities is on migrants' and indigenous people's rights. This contributes to undermine the dominant focus on remittances in the money-based framing of the GRT. It also acts to subvert the regulatory and disciplinary power of the GRT that pushes migrants to get organised as agents for development. Instead, they become transnational advocates for migrants' and indigenous people's rights.

Migrant organisations have also used their increased visibility gained through the GRT in order to voice their concerns and start making demands. For instance, they take advantage of their attributed authority as agents for development in

negotiations with Mexican government institutions, in order to push through their specific needs. In the case of the Programa 3×1, Burgess (2005) reports how migrant organisations have resisted attempts by the Mexican municipal or state governments to outsource their responsibility in terms of infrastructure development to migrant development actors, and how they have started to demand transparency, accountability and the fighting of corruption (Burgess 2005: 116, 122). In her study of migrant organisations from Zacatecas, Jalisco and Michoacán she observes that:

> [H]TA members have expressed concerns over the new role given to municipal governments. First, they are wary of absolving local authorities of the responsibility for providing basic services. Second, they resist efforts to shift control of project resources and implementation to the municipality … Some HTAs also protested the frequent, ad hoc, use of state government funds to cover shortfalls in the municipalities' contributions to the program.
> (Burgess 2005: 116)

Some HTAs have managed to shape policy-making at state level in Mexico. In the case of Zacatecas, for example, the Federation of migrants managed to renegotiate the rules of the 2×1 programme (see Chapter 4). In her analysis of the negotiation processes, Goldring states:

> The negotiations that took place during the intersection of the Dos por Uno program and the New Federalism suggest that a strong transmigrant umbrella organization can give transmigrants and local committee members an opportunity to negotiate with municipal and state authorities and thus participate in civic life in ways probably not possible without the presence of such organizations. Although transmigrants and their organizations did not always participate directly in the local planning process, they had a voice in the discussions and negotiations that led up to making specific project proposals and in the actual implementation of the projects.
> (Goldring 2002: 88)

This illustrates how migrants have collectively started to take advantage of their new status conveyed through the GRT in order to voice their own concerns. Hence, in some sense, instead of becoming docile and useful agents for development, they have started to make demands. They have also gained increasing awareness of their rights and strengthened their political voice.

Migrants also employ individual resistance strategies. For example, some migrants join an HTA and participate, but merely in order to obtain services and rights, and to benefit from the increased social and political capital that the participation in HTAs brings, without becoming agents for development. A number of migrants from Los Pilares told me that they would be interested in forming an association, but merely to strengthen the ties among migrants and not to donate collective remittances. A number of migrants who have

become migrant leaders have used their position mainly for voicing demands and for lobbying, both in Mexico and in the US. This acts to undermine the normalisation pressure on migrants to get organised for the purpose of funding development projects, subverting the effect of the disciplinary power of the GRT.

Non-migrants also engage in numerous acts of subversion. Thus, for example, they collectively attempt to 'trick' the 3×1 programme, by applying for funding without having a migrant contribution or without a registered migrant organisation, as has been documented by Frías et al. (2006: 178ff.). This is a way to resist the migrant bias inherent in the GRT that gives priority to migrants to obtain development funding. It is also a subversion of the conditionality of the 3×1 programme, whereby existence of a migrant organisation is a precondition to obtain funding. However, it has to be noted that this form of resistance can have adverse impacts for the communities, such as in cases where the community had to pay for the part of the project that was supposed to be funded by migrants.

In the two communities under study, most subversion activities by non-migrants are of individual rather than collective character. Individuals use a number of techniques to resist the disciplining of the GRT. For example, some women who obtained micro-credit based on the remittances, decided to use the credit for other purposes than planned, such as for emigration. Hence, they did not get involved in productive work and subverted the purpose of the credit.

Within the productive project in San Lorenzo, participants also used a number of subversion techniques. Women subverted the purpose of the money which was supposed to be invested 'productively'. Some women participated in the project only at the beginning in order to benefit from the workshops, where they received money for their participation. As soon as the workshops finished and the women were expected to work by themselves, these women left the project. Señora Teresa, for example, whose husband migrated to the US and had stopped sending her remittances, used the money from the workshop to buy food and clothes for her baby. She was then excluded from the project, but the money had helped her bridge a difficult moment. Señora Vanessa decided to use the money that she earned by assisting the initial workshop in order to pay for the expenses related to her emigration. With the money that was supposed to be invested in material for *artesanías*, she managed to emigrate with her daughter in order to join her husband in the US. This subverts the project rationale which aims to get women to produce a counterpart to remittances and to invest the money they earn for the well-being of their family and the development of the community. It also undermines the purpose of the project, which is to provide women with an alternative to migration. Finally, it challenges the broader rationale of the GRT which normalises non-migrant women to become productive and invest remittances.

Finally, a number of non-migrant women have used the efficiency argument underlying the 'make women productive' discourse to convince their husbands and extended family of the usefulness of their productive work, in order to negotiate more mobility and decision-making participation in the household.

In the context of the productive project in San Lorenzo, women have used the argument to convince their husbands and families that if they are allowed to participate in the project they will generate income for the household. In some cases, the women in the project never actually managed to generate income by selling their products, yet they still managed to use the project to empower themselves (see next section). Thus, for example, a number of women took advantage of the opportunity to increase their mobility and to travel. Señora Anna, for example, used the project activities to visit her daughters who were studying in Morelia: '*A mi el proyecto me sirve mucho, me da la posibilidad de ir a ver mis hijas en Morelia*'[12] (Señora Anna, San Lorenzo, personal interview, May 2006). Appropriating the project for their own purposes, the women subvert the 'make women productive' strategy.

As this section has illustrated, within the GRT, there is a variety of different forms of resistance with different scopes, undertaken by various actors. Some of these resistance activities have become a source of women's empowerment, which is the focus of the next section.

Women's empowerment within the GRT

Given the focus in this book on the ways in which the GRT plays out in gender-specific ways in rural Mexico, the analysis concentrates on the empowerment of non-migrant women. This is not to say that migrant women and men do not get empowered through the GRT or are less important. Indeed, the previous section mentioned some instances of migrants' empowerment, for instance in cases where they use the new authority and leverage gained from organising for purposes other than those intended by the GRT, such as for making demands, voicing critiques or fighting for migrants' rights. Yet, the particular purpose of the analysis here is to examine whether and how non-migrant women experience empowerment within the GRT in the context of rural Mexico and more particularly the two communities under study.

The key tenet in the literature on the migration–development nexus is that non-migrant women get empowered through receiving remittances, and through getting involved in income-generating activities, linked to the 'make women productive' strategy. Thus, for example, in the context of the biannual International Forum on Remittances (2007 and 2009) it has repeatedly been claimed that 'remittances can enhance the economic status of women and change traditional gender roles and ideologies'.[13] This is based on the assumption that either directly through the reception of remittances or indirectly through the integration into productive work, women will automatically be empowered and will be able to reverse traditional gender discrimination and negotiate increased mobility and decision-making power in the household and community. This understanding reduces empowerment to its economic/financial dimension, and follows a sort of 'trickle-down logic' that claims that empowerment in other areas will automatically follow. Such an understanding of empowerment is also at the heart of the project in San Lorenzo, as López Espinosa states: '*El*

objetivo es de impulsar la emancipacion de la mujer a traves el trabajo'[14] (López Espinosa, ILO consultant, Morelia, personal interview, June 2005). Yet, as the previous chapter has shown, remittances and remittance-linked productive activities do not necessarily always result in the empowerment of non-migrant women. However, this is not to say that the GRT holds no space for women's empowerment. As illustrated in this section, there are a number of areas where non-migrant women have become empowered within the GRT.

Hence, this book takes a different approach that does not assume a priori that remittances and the involvement in productive activity empowers non-migrant women, and that does not conceptualise empowerment as limited to its economic dimensions, but as including all areas of women's lives. Instead, as outlined in Chapter 2, the analysis here understands empowerment as subjectively defined, as context-specific, as both a process and an outcome, and as something that people do themselves. Thus, the analysis in this chapter takes as its starting point the areas and forms of empowerment identified by the non-migrant women themselves. My respondents have identified five key areas of empowerment:[15] self-esteem and fulfilment; mobility; skills; getting a voice; and conquering spaces. While these areas can be distinguished for analytical purposes, they are often interlinked: increased mobility for instance enables the acquiring of new skills. We can distinguish between the empowerment of non-migrant women as a result of the emigration of male members of their households, and the empowering effects of the transformations due to the GRT. The general focus of this book is on the latter, i.e. the spaces for empowerment opened through the GRT, going beyond the empowering effects of emigration itself. This means that the focus is on the empowering effects of the discursive and institutional apparatus established within the GRT in the case of Mexico. Yet, in practice, these two sources of empowerment are often tightly linked and it is not always possible to separate them.

Sentirse realisada

The first area of empowerment identified by my respondents is a feeling of increased self-esteem and fulfilment as a result of the opportunities opened through the absence of their migrant husbands and women's involvement in productive work. This is linked to a contradictory situation in which many women with migrant family members find themselves. While the emigration of their husband or other male family members makes them feel lost and sad, this absence also creates new opportunities. Thus, for example, Señora Maria told me she has got used to living alone with her children since the emigration of her husband 10 years ago and reports that while the absence of her husband makes her feel sad, she also sees this as an opportunity for her personal development and empowerment and enjoys discovering new activities:

> *Si, es triste, pero no se me hace tan difícil vivir sola. Es importante valer si mismo. Me gusta ser activa, no perder el tiempo, me pongo a leer, a cocer,*

> *y doy clases de catecismo a los niños en la iglesia. Ahora sé lo que puedo hacer, me siento útil, mi esposo me apoya, y me siento bien.*[16]
>
> (Señora Maria, Los Pilares, personal interview, May 2005)

The involvement in productive work has been experienced by some women as empowering in terms of feeling proud of themselves and feeling fulfilled. This has also been the case in the project in San Lorenzo. Project participants told me that this project was making them realise what they were capable of, and that they enjoyed feeling 'useful'. Señora Clara for example stated: '*Con este proyecto, me siento más realisada*'[17] (Señora Clara, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005). Señora Flor said that she felt that this project had helped her 'grow' and improve communication with her husband and resulted in weakening 'machismo':

> [*Y*]*o ahora me siento con más conocimientos, … este proyecto a mi me ayuda a crecer, y sobre todo con la familia, ya hay más comunicación, siempre había comunicación, pero a veces no me entendieron, y ahora ya no, mi esposo también ahora me anima, y me acompaña a los lugares que tengo que ir, el me llevo hasta Uruapan, y ya es como hay más comunicación entre nosotros, el machismo ya no hay tanto.*[18]
>
> (Señora Flor, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006)

Further, Señora Flor reported that her husband was initially against her participating and she decided to participate without telling him. When he returned from abroad, he was impressed with the *artesanías* she was producing; he supported her and sometimes helped her with household chores. Hence, while such productive projects have disciplinary implications, as shown in Chapter 5, they can also contribute to women's self-esteem and fulfilment and to transforming gender relations. This illustrates that through the GRT spaces for women's empowerment have been opened in terms of feeling more self-assured, confident and fulfilled.

Salir

Increased mobility was one of the most frequently mentioned areas of empowerment within both communities under study. This has to be understood against a backdrop in which restricted mobility was highlighted as a key area of gender discrimination in both communities (see Chapter 4). There is a strong tradition of women staying inside the house, and women often only leave their houses in male company, or to go to local shops, the market, or to collect the monthly cash transfer from the OPORTUNIDADES programme in the nearby city. Thus, for example, Señora Isabel from San Lorenzo told me: '*Aquí los hombres dicen que las mujeres no pueden salir, porque va a ir con otro, aquí ésta es la mentalidad de la gente, la gente dice: ella va andando por allá, quien sabe que esta haciendo por allá*'[19] (Señora Isabel, San Lorenzo, personal

interview, April 2006). Similarly, Señora Luz from Los Pilares confirmed: '*Aquí la gente luego dice: ay no, la mujer no tiene que salir, la mujer nada más en la casa, la mujer nada más para atender a los hijos, a los esposos, aquí la mujer no sale mucho*'[20] (Señora Luz, Los Pilares, personal interview, June 2005).

Restricted mobility is a key obstacle for women wanting to get involved in 'productive' work, given that many forms of income-generating work require a certain mobility. Whereas this is less the case for women who open a small shop in the entrance of their houses, other forms of productive work require more mobility, e.g. selling products on the market or participating in *ferias* as part of the project in San Lorenzo. Thus, some women told me that they could not go to the market to sell their products. Others were prevented by their husbands or the extended family from participating in productive projects, because it would have required them to spend more time outside their house. In the context of the productive project in San Lorenzo, Señora Gregoria, a project participant told me: '*El problema es que no me dejaron ir a Morelia, tuve que atender a mi esposo y no podía dejar mi niña con él*'[21] (Señora Gregoria, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006).

To be able to leave the house without being accompanied by a male member of the family or by children, or to start driving a car, was experienced as empowering by my respondents. Increased mobility for non-migrant women can be a result of the emigration of the male family members, which means that women have to go out more often, for example to take care of administrative tasks such as paying bills. Sometimes, migrants bring back cars from the US, which has led to some women learning to drive. In Los Pilares, for example, there are two women in the community who have started to drive a car. Yet, women with migrant husbands are often under the 'protection' of the family-in-law that takes over their administrative tasks and watches them. In addition, women with migrant husbands are subjected to a strong social gaze that controls their mobility and life in general (see Chapter 5). Thus, for example, Señora Maria from Los Pilares told me:

> *Mi suegro me trajo una coche y ahora ya lo se usar. Pero aquí no hay muchas mujeres que manejan. Me gusta manejar, pero a veces no me siento bien porque la gente me mira, habla de mí y me hacen chismes en el pueblo.*[22]
>
> (Señora Maria, Los Pilares, personal interview, May 2005)

Some women used their involvement in productive work to negotiate increased mobility. As mentioned above, this is an instrument of subversion that provides women with an empowerment space. The women use the efficiency argument underlying the 'make women productive' discourse to convince their husbands and extended family of the usefulness of their productive work, and to obtain increased mobility as a requirement for generating income and decision-making participation in the household. In the context of the productive project in San Lorenzo, women have used the argument to convince their husbands that if

they were allowed to participate in the project they would generate income for the household. Even if they did not generate income, they still gained increased mobility. Thus, for example, the participants were required to leave their houses more often and for longer periods to attend meetings and workshops and were encouraged to travel to *ferias* and promote and sell their *artesanías* outside the community. This is a totally new experience that many women found empowering. Señora Angela, who had rarely left the community before, has taken this opportunity to travel with great enthusiasm: '*Me gusta mucho viajar, y el proyecto me da la posibilidad de salir de la comunidad*'[23] (Señora Angela, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006). This was also the case with Señora Anna, who used the project trips to visit her daughters (see above). She has been able to benefit from this increased mobility to go and visit her daughters who are studying in the capital, Morelia. Finally, Señora Mirna (San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006) also used the efficiency argument to get involved in the project, in order to increase her mobility and to transform her patio into a workshop for the women in the project to work together. After one year in the project, she had not generated income through her products, but she told me she felt empowered through her new activities, the newly gained mobility and space, and the new skills she had learnt.

Conocimientos

The acquisition of new skills was another area of empowerment identified by my informants. As a result of migration, non-migrant women learnt new tasks previously performed by their husbands, such as driving a car, agricultural tasks, administrative tasks such as paying phone bills, or taking care of the formalities and documentation required by the PROCAMPO programme (see Chapter 4). While this represented an increase in their workload, women also felt that they enjoyed acquiring new *conocimientos*. Through their involvement in productive activities, women may also obtain new skills. Thus, for example, Señora Martina from San Lorenzo told me that one of the great achievements of this project was that the women could acquire new skills: '*Antes no sabíamos nada, nada más en el quehacer, mirando la tele, ahora ya sabemos la costura y tenemos nuestro propio dinero*'[24] (Señora Martina, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006).

It is obviously not the case that women did not 'know' anything before participating in the project: the project actually built on the existing stitching and sewing skills of the women in San Lorenzo. Rather, this statement seems to be an illustration of the reproduction of the dominant discourse within the 'make women productive' strategy, which emphasises that non-migrant women are unproductive and 'don't know how to do anything' (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the statement illustrates women's enthusiasm about learning new skills.

This is also expressed in the case of Señora Andrea, who emphasised the empowering effect of learning new skills through the project. She has opened

a small shop in the entrance of her house and found that some of skills she acquired within the project are also useful for keeping her shop, such as knowledge of legal issues and accounting skills. We can observe how for her to have more skills and knowledge is linked to feeling more fulfilled:

> [*C*]*on este proyecto yo me siento más realizada, con más conocimientos, es como algo nuevo que nos ayuda también a mi, a entender las cosas, … me ayuda también conmigo mismo, como, yo antes no conocía muchas cosas, como cuestiones legales, y ahora ya los conozco, y también me ayuda para mi tienda que tengo aquí, porque antes no sabía bien como hacer, ahora ya estoy calculando la ganancia, a ver lo que se vende más, como hacer un balance para tener las cuentas bien, entonces ya me va mejor, antes compraba todas las cosas, pero no sabía lo que me vende lo más, y se perdieron las cosas.*[25]
>
> (Señora Andrea, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005)

The acquiring of new skills is also linked to the newly acquired mobility within the project in San Lorenzo. Thus, for example, Señora Clara reports how increased mobility allowed the women to learn not just marketing and selling skills, but also 'social skills' which made them feel more comfortable in public:

> *En este proyecto tenemos que salir para aprender a vender y a tratar con otra gente … Vamos todos allá, y así aprendemos a salir, porque la primera salida que hicimos, y aquí la gente estamos muy tímidas porque no salimos, no sabemos, este, con otra ciudad, con otras gentes, así somos, cuando vamos a otro lugar con otra gente, nada más llegamos y nos sentamos, no platicamos, porque esperamos, somos penosos, todavía no estamos muy acostumbrados a la civilización, pero algunas ya empiezan a aprender como comportarse con la gente, como participar.*[26]
>
> (Señora Clara, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005)

Señora Clara also found that increased interaction with other people helped her to feel more comfortable in public and to increase her self-esteem. This socially imposed timidity described by Señora Clara is a real obstacle to Mexican women's participation in public life, and is comparatively stronger in indigenous communities, such as San Lorenzo. Discrimination against indigenous people is still very much alive.

A voice of one's own

With increasing mobility, non-migrant women have become more visible inside and outside the community and have started voicing their needs and concerns and conquering new spaces, previously reserved for men. The literature reports some testimonies of women's empowerment strategies. Morales López (2004) for example, documents the experiences of a group of indigenous women from

San Juan Mixtepec in Oaxaca, a community with an extremely high rate of emigration. A group of seven women invested their remittances in cars to set up a taxi company. Their motivation was to invest productively and to prevent their husbands from always migrating to the US (Morales López 2004: 437). Despite considerable opposition and critique from the authorities, from the community members, and to some extent from their husbands, these women managed to establish their own business. In the process of doing this, they not only secured an income for themselves and their families, they also acquired new skills and increased their mobility (ibid.: 414). Thus, the women learnt to drive a car, to organise, to deal with the authorities in order to obtain the necessary transportation permits, to establish a business, etc. Beyond their claiming of the 'public' space through their work as taxi drivers, they also started to make their voices heard in the political arena (ibid.: 451). This case illustrates how a group of women has benefited from the GRT logic in order to improve their situation and get themselves heard.

In my own fieldwork, my respondents mentioned similar forms of empowerment. Within the project in San Lorenzo, for example, over time, there has been a gradual increase in women who voice their concerns at project meetings and who take on specific tasks in the administration of the project. Most women were not used to speaking in public, but slowly started to get used to it: '[*H*]*ay poquitas que hablan en las reuniones, sí saben hablar, sí entienden, pero no todos quieren hablar, aquí somos tímidas, pero ahora ya empiezan a hablar en las reuniones*'[27] (Señora Andrea, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005).

Some non-migrant women have used their involvement in productive activity for the purpose of organising, voicing their demands and conquering public space. In the case of the productive project in San Lorenzo, for example, the women used the interaction space opened up within this project in order to start voicing a collective demand. Realising that they could no longer resolve the tension between their multiple tasks of social reproduction and production, they demanded the provision of childcare facilities within the project, so that they could spend more time producing *artesanías*. Even though their demands have not (yet) been met, this illustrates that the project has prompted women to voice a collective demand and to raise awareness regarding alternative ways of providing childcare among the participants, challenging the idea that childcare is women's private business. This is an expression of an emerging resistance against the triple burden experienced by the women participants. Thereby, they challenge the implicit assumption of 'infinite elasticity'[28] within the 'make women productive' strategy that aims to get women involved in income generation on top of their reproductive work, without rethinking the gender division of labour within the household. Ultimately, this also acts to challenge the GRT, for which the 'make women productive' strategy is a key pillar.

Furthermore, over time, the project participants became more self-assured and appropriated the project for themselves. When the Instituto Michoacáno de la Mujer (IMM) failed to comply with its promises, the women decided to

ask questions and hold the IMM accountable. Whereas previously the women would just wait until the IMM called them, they now started to take the initiative and to call the IMM. This shows how the women resisted the tendency of this project to become a casualty of political power games.[29]

A space of one's own

Through their integration into productive work, women obtain 'a space of their own', a site for social interaction among women. Thus, for example, women who got involved in producing and selling their products on the market have more opportunity to meet other women (and men) and spend time with other women while selling products. Women who have established their own shop also have more opportunity to talk and meet other people. Indeed, some women have told me that their shop serves more as a site for social interaction and distraction, rather than for income generation (Señora Evelina, Los Pilares, personal interview, May 2006).

Productive projects also create such spaces, as in the case of San Lorenzo. The new spaces include opportunities to spend time with other women and be part of a collective effort, to communicate and speak in front of other people. This new experience has been mentioned as empowering by many project participants. They meet up regularly for meetings to discuss the functioning of the project, but also to work in small groups. After a year, the women established a small shop on the main road, which became their meeting point. These various meetings provide women with an opportunity to voice their opinions and concerns and exchange ideas. In smaller groups, women felt less shy about talking.

The project also creates a space for 'distraction'. Participants told me that they liked participating in the project, because it allowed them to spend time together with other women and to forget about the problems of everyday life for a while, as Señora Esperanza states: '[*E*]*ste proyecto ha servido para la distracción, siempre hay problemas en la casa, y bordando se olvide un poco las problemas, pero también se puede hablar de los problemas, hay más comunicación*'[30] (Señora Esperanza, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005).

Yet, the project not only serves to help forget one's problems, but also as an opportunity to discuss problems with other women. Communication topics include family and community problems, violence in the family and the community, children, etc. (ibid.). During these meetings women also discuss personal problems and give each other advice, as Señora Andrea confirms: '*Yo a veces doy consejo a las mujeres para decirles como hablar con los hombres si tienen problemas*'[31] (Señora Andrea, San Lorenzo, personal interview, June 2005). One example is the story of Señora Isabel, who shared her problem with the other women and got useful advice how to deal with it. Her daughter had recently got married, and since then Señora Antonia had not seen her, because the parents-in-law did not allow her to leave the house: '*No la dejan salir, la muchacha, tampoco para fiestas, ¡no sale! Y la mama no puede hacer*

nada, si la madre dice algo, la hija va a tener problemas y se puede separar la pareja y esto es terrible'[32] (Señora Antonia, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006). When she discussed her grief with the other women in the group, they came up with the idea that Señora Antonia could take some fruit or vegetables to her daughter's house, in order to get a chance to see her and speak to her, a strategy that seemed to work.

Finally, as Señora Mirna told me, the project also serves as a space to reintegrate widows living in the community, who are often marginalised (Señora Mirna, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006). Indeed, a number of widows actively participate in the project.

Conquering new spaces and creating their own spaces within the GRT has made women more visible in the community and the household, and has led to an increasing awareness of their rights. The most vivid expression of this growing awareness is the story of Señora Clara, who decided to attend a community council for the first time and voice her demands for the establishment of access to water. She was met with fierce resistance from the male community members attending the council, but is determined to continue her struggle.

Yet, the conquering of new spaces and the creation of women's own spaces has also provoked backlashes. My respondents from San Lorenzo mentioned a number of cases where patterns of gender subordination have been reinforced or even aggravated. For example, Señora Veronica's participation in the project has created a number of problems in the household. Her husband found it difficult to deal with the fact that she was leaving the house more frequently and meeting other women, and he turned violent. At one point he beat her so badly that she almost lost her baby (Señora Veronica, San Lorenzo, personal interview, April 2006). In other cases it was the mother-in-law who prevented women from leaving the house and participating.

The testimonies from Los Pilares and San Lorenzo show that non-migrant women are not passive victims of the disciplinary and regulatory power of the GRT, but actively negotiate and resist the transformations they are confronted with. Yet this does not always, nor automatically, contribute to empowerment. In some cases, the newly acquired self-esteem, skills, and spaces have created new possibilities and power-sharing arrangements within some households, whereas in others, old patterns of gender subordination have been reinforced or even aggravated. The examples from the two communities expose the complex combination of empowerment, increased gender subordination and moments of backlash within the GRT.

Conclusion

This chapter has revealed the different ways in which migrants and non-migrants have resisted the disciplinary and regulatory power of the GRT in the case of Mexico. Two main forms of resistance have been identified: non-compliance and subversion, which are exercised both individually and

collectively, by migrants and non-migrants. In addition, the analysis shows how the GRT has opened up spaces for the empowerment of non-migrant women in the following areas: self-esteem and fulfilment; mobility; skills; getting a voice; and conquering spaces. These findings challenge the narrow economistic notion of empowerment upon which the GRT and the 'make women productive' strategies are based, and underline the importance of reconceptualising the notion of empowerment.

As the analysis shows, the relationship between resistance and empowerment is complex. It is mainly forms of resistance involving subversion that are experienced as empowering. This is the case, for example, for migrants who use the new authority and leverage gained from organising for purposes other than those intended by the GRT, such as for making demands, voicing criticisms or fighting for migrants' rights. Another example are non-migrants who subvert the 'make women productive' rationale or productive projects for their own purposes, such as obtaining increased mobility or financing their emigration.

Yet, not all forms of empowerment entail resistance. Thus, for example, non-migrant women's feeling of increased self-esteem and fulfilment, and the enthusiasm for acquiring new skills as a result of the opportunities opened through the absence of their migrant husbands and their involvement in productive work, does not necessarily challenge the GRT. Quite to the contrary, these forms of empowerment can be firmly entrenched in the logic of the GRT. This illustrates that in order to capture this difference and provide a holistic picture of the GRT, it is crucial to include the two concepts of resistance and empowerment in the analytical framework.

The analysis in this chapter illustrates the continuous struggle between the power technologies of the GRT and the varied forms of resistance, and highlights the fragility of these power technologies. Moreover, the analysis also brings to the fore one of the defining characteristics of neoliberalism: its dual nature and paradoxical implications, as we shall see in the concluding chapter.

7 Conclusion

> Neoliberalism … involves forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market.
>
> (Larner 2000: 12)

The Global Remittance Trend is more than a 'shared belief'. It is a regime of practices, constituted of a conceptual and institutional apparatus, which acts to regulate and discipline migrants and non-migrants, creates gendered forms of subjectivities, generates various types of resistance and opens up space for empowerment. Thus, the GRT is a complex phenomenon with concrete implications that stretch from the international realm to individual subjects.

Mapping the emergence of the GRT has highlighted a number of key discursive and institutional transformations that paved the way for the GRT. The analysis revealed a tight network of discourses, institutions and activities geared towards harnessing migration and remittances for development, both internationally and in the context of Mexico. This illustrates the ways in which the GRT is anchored in different localities stretching from the 'local' to the 'global' level. Throughout, the conceptual apparatus is based on two core assumptions: the conceptualisation of migration as a mainly positive phenomenon, and the focus on the positive characteristics of remittances. In addition, in the international realm I have identified two main competing discourses: the money-based and the rights-based discourse. In the Mexican context, five elements make up the conceptual apparatus: the representation of migration as an opportunity, remittances as an object of knowledge, migrants as heroes and development agents, and the Mexican nation as stretching beyond the Mexican territory. The institutional apparatus consists of various practices of different international institutions, including monitoring remittances, research on remittance processes, conferences on the migration–remittances–development nexus, coalition-building, and concrete projects to harness remittances for development. In the Mexican context, the institutional apparatus includes three additional activities: monitoring remittances, promoting the institutionalisation of migrant groups, and courting migrants. As the analysis has demonstrated, the conceptual and institutional apparatuses of the GRT are gender-blind and gender-biased.

Examining the GRT in the case of Mexico revealed that the GRT acts as a gendered regulatory and disciplinary power. The regulatory framework of the GRT serves to render groups of populations politically and economically useful and link them to the development of Mexico. Based on the gendered dichotomy between the migrant man (remittance sender) and the non-migrant woman (remittance receiver), it creates two groups of population, turns them into objects of knowledge through information collection and distribution, and targets them with regulatory initiatives. Thereby, migrants as a group are regulated through strategies that promote collective remittances projects and productive investment, as illustrated with the initiatives Programa 3×1, Mi Comunidad or Inviérte en Mexico. Non-migrants are regulated indirectly through the 'migrant bias' that acts to marginalise non-migrants, and particularly women, and gender issues; and directly through the 'make women productive' strategy that aims to integrate women into 'productive' work, while promoting the investment of remittances, as illustrated by micro-credit initiatives or *proyectos productivos*. The disciplinary framework acts through observation, normalisation and examination to increase the docility and utility of individuals. Thus, the GRT in Mexico disciplines (male) migrants into sending individual remittances, using formal remittance transfer channels, getting organised to send collective remittances, and investing productively. Non-migrant (women) remittance receivers are disciplined into investing remittances in a productive way and producing counterpart income. The GRT also contributes to producing gendered subjectivities: the 'male migrant development agent' and the 'entrepreneurial migrant man', the 'productive non-migrant woman (remittance receiver)', and the 'active priest'.

Moreover, the analysis has demonstrated how the GRT generates a number of individual and collective resistance strategies, including non-compliance and subversion. Examples of non-compliance include the refusal by migrants to get organised and send collective remittances, and the refusal by non-migrant women to become productive. Subversion refers to cases where migrants appropriate migrant organisations for empowerment or for fighting for migrants' and indigenous people's rights, and instances where non-migrant women appropriate productive projects for purposes other than those suggested by the GRT norm, such as for increasing their mobility or for emigrating. In addition, the GRT opens spaces for manifold forms of empowerment for non-migrant women, including feelings of heightened self-esteem and fulfilment, increased mobility, the acquiring of new skills and the conquering of new spaces.

The GRT and gendered neoliberal governmentality

Throughout the book, I have explored the broader unintended implications of the GRT and assessed whether and in what ways the GRT contributes to reinforcing neoliberal governmentality. As the analysis has demonstrated, in the context of Mexico the GRT is based upon, and contributes to, the spreading and deepening of neoliberal forms of governing in gender-specific ways. We

can identify at least five elements of neoliberalism that are being reproduced through the GRT.

A first element is the new model of welfare and development situated in the overall 'marketisation' of the state. This model is based on a shift from universal social welfare programmes towards targeted poverty reduction and welfare provision initiatives, and involves the creation of new target groups and the introduction of the provision of welfare on a conditional basis. As demonstrated, the GRT in Mexico is firmly entrenched in the logic of this neoliberal welfare model. Thereby, gendered groups of population are created, i.e. migrants and non-migrants, and targeted with specific policies. Thus, (male) migrants are targeted with the 'courting' strategy, whereas (women) non-migrants become the target of the 'make women productive' strategy. Moreover, government cost-sharing and matching-funds initiatives, such as the Programa 3×1, are offered on a competitive basis and made available only to 'deserving' migrants and communities. Thereby, the receipt of government funding becomes conditional.

This is linked to the second element of neoliberal governmentality that is reinforced through the GRT: the proliferation of actors involved in governing and the increasing participation of civil society actors in the implementation of welfare and development programmes. The GRT reinforces the tendency to involve a multiplicity of non-state actors: migrant organisations, international (financial) institutions, business actors, NGOs, the media, and priests. This goes hand in hand with the growing responsibilisation of citizens for their welfare and development, reinforced through the GRT. Both migrants and non-migrants are increasingly made responsible for managing their own needs, and the welfare of their families and communities, in gender-specific ways. (Men) migrants are responsibilised for providing individual remittances to support their households, for sending collective remittances and initiating development projects in their home communities, and for investing a part of their remittances in productive ways in order to build a 'life project' and ensure future well-being. (Women) non-migrants are made responsible for investing the remittances they receive in productive ways, and for generating a counterpart income. Thereby, non-migrant women are responsibilised for lifting themselves, their families and even their communities out of poverty. For instance, the Programa 3×1 is an example of a GRT initiative based on the co-responsibility for welfare by the state and citizens, both migrants and non-migrants. The responsibilisation of citizens for their own welfare within neoliberal governmentality is accompanied by a certain de-responsibilisation of the state in terms of welfare provision. Thereby, there is a tendency to delegate the responsibility for the consequences of neoliberal restructuring – such as privatisation, cuts in social spending, and export-oriented development – to civil society actors and the individual citizen.

A third feature of neoliberal governmentality that is being reinforced through the GRT is the creation of responsible, self-entrepreneurial subjects. In the case of the GRT in Mexico, these include the 'male migrant development agent' and the 'entrepreneurial migrant man', the 'productive non-migrant woman (remittance receiver)', and the 'active priest'. The 'male migrant development

agent' and the 'entrepreneurial migrant man' save money, send individual and collective remittances and invest productively, in order to provide well-being for his non-migrant family and development for the community. The 'productive non-migrant woman (remittance receiver)' invests the remittances she receives productively and produces a counterpart income. The 'active priest' helps to organise the community and the migrants, to build trust between the two groups and to promote migration-linked development projects. GRT initiatives that offer co-funding and investment opportunities for migrants and micro-credit and productive projects targeted at non-migrant women, discipline individuals to adopt market behaviour and contribute to subjectivity creation. These subjectivities share a number of characteristics: the individual is composed of, and responsible for, skills expressing her/his human capital; the individual is responsible for managing her/his own needs and well-being; and s/he is active and enterprising through economic participation. Through these forms of neoliberal subjectivity the productivity and docility of individuals is reinforced.

Yet, as the analysis demonstrates, this creation of neoliberal subjectivities within the GRT is a deeply gendered process. On top of economic opportunities, migrant men earn certain benefits and political rights in return for becoming development agents and entrepreneurial migrants, such as the right to dual citizenship, a seat at the table in meetings with Mexican government representatives, and recognition and political capital for sending collective remittances or investing in home communities. However, the subjectivity of the productive non-migrant woman is based on a purely economic grounding. As such, the rights of the subject are conceptualised in market terms: the emphasis is on consumer rights and the right to have access to markets, whereas political rights are marginalised. Thus, women's inclusion into productive work focuses mainly on the economic aspects of empowerment. Moreover, these gendered subjectivities have important implications for political participation. Given that the 'courting migrants' and 'make women productive' strategies are also implemented in other countries (see Ragazzi 2009), these gender implications of neoliberal subjectivities might well be relevant beyond the Mexican context. Further research would be needed to substantiate such a claim.

The proliferation of actors involved in governing and the creation of new responsible subjects within the GRT is linked to the fourth element of neoliberal governmentality: the redefinition of civil society as both object and subject of governing (Sending and Neumann 2006: 652). Within the GRT, migrants are the 'objects' of governing in the context of the courting strategy, while simultaneously becoming involved as 'subjects' of governing, for example as agents for development. This involves offering migrants 'active involvement in action to resolve the kind of issues hitherto held to be the responsibility of authorized governmental agencies' (Burchell 1993: 276). Through the GRT, migrants and migrant organisations are offered active involvement in providing infrastructure, which was traditionally the responsibility of the Mexican government. This involvement supplies them with a certain participatory and

decision-making power. This can be illustrated with the example of the Consejo Consultivo of the IME, an advisory council that consists of migrant representatives, representatives from Latino organisations in the US, special advisors and representatives from Mexico's state governments (see Chapter 4). The mission of this council is to identify and analyse problems, challenges and opportunities regarding the improvement of the lives of Mexicans abroad, and assist the IME in the promotion of its programmes. The Consejo is an instrument for the government to collect information about migrants; it turns migrants into an object of knowledge, and serves to draw on migrant resources, including knowledge about their home community, social networks, and human and financial resources. Thus, it governs migrants as 'objects'. Yet, at the same time, it also reinforces the 'migrants as development agents' subjectivity. Within this Consejo, migrants become 'subjects' of governing: they participate in identifying problems deemed worthy of intervention and highlighting the needs of home communities. Furthermore, migrants participate in promoting IME's programmes, such as the 3×1. Thereby, they contribute to spreading GRT norms, for instance related to sending collective remittances. This involvement of migrants in governing has a 'price-tag' (Lemke 2001: 202): the migrants have to assume responsibility for their activities and become co-responsible for development in Mexico. This can be seen, for example, in the fact that community members in Mexico have started to turn towards migrants from the community for help, instead of addressing their demands to the Mexican government.

In the case of Mexico, priests have also become involved in governing within the GRT. Through their activities, they encourage the community and the migrants to organise, promote migration-linked development projects, and redirect the demands to meet community needs towards migrants, contributing to the responsibilisation of migrants for development. Yet, their personal interests in channelling remittances into church projects might also to some extent undermine the logic of the GRT that aims to channel remittances into public infrastructure and productive projects and to turn migrants and non-migrants into economically useful population groups for the development of Mexico.

Finally, the GRT is also based on, and reinforces, the dual nature that characterises neoliberalism. On the one hand, within the GRT in Mexico there is increased normativity, whereby migrants and non-migrants are regulated and disciplined into specific forms of behaviour and thinking. On the other hand, new possibilities for resistance and empowerment are created. The GRT has opened up new terrain for migrant activism, and migrants as a civil society group have gained increasing visibility and weight in political processes through their new role as agents of development. For non-migrants, the GRT has also opened spaces for resistance and empowerment, albeit often in a more individualised form, such as increased mobility and a space for communication for non-migrant women. Hence, the GRT is an illustration of how neoliberal governmentality can contribute to further entrench gender discrimination and

gendered power relations, while at the same time opening up new terrain for resistance and empowerment. These new spaces opened up through the GRT can be used to challenge neoliberal normativity more broadly. This happens, for example, when migrants refuse to send collective remittances or when they use migrant organisations for the purpose of fighting for migrant and indigenous people's rights or for critiquing the Mexican government; when home communities refuse a migration-linked development project arguing that the state should pay for basic infrastructure; or when non-migrant women subvert the 'make women productive' logic to get empowered without becoming market producers. Even though these instances of resistance might not be framed as such, they challenge not only the GRT, but also neoliberal governing rationality more broadly.

Employing a gender-sensitive governmentality approach to analyse the GRT has allowed me to examine the various interrelated sites where the GRT is reproduced, and to trace the gendered implications of the GRT from the 'macro' to the 'micro' level. Most crucially, this approach enabled me to move beyond the existing literature that mainly focuses on the question of whether or not the GRT is successful in bringing about development, to shift the focus towards the broader, gendered implications of the GRT. Thereby, the GRT is conceptualised not as an ideology or as a strategy to conceal or divert attention – as for example in Simmons (2008) – but as a regime of practices with performative power. The findings highlight that using a gender lens is essential to understand the functioning, scope and consequences of the GRT. Thus, for example, in the Mexican context, the targeting of women remittance receivers with projects in order to get them involved in productive work can only be understood as a part of the GRT through a gender analysis. The migrant bias that pervades the GRT – and most gender-blind assessments of it – prevents us from seeing this connection between the seemingly unrelated policies of 'courting migrants' and 'making women productive'.

The role of the researcher

In closing, I would like to add a reflection on the role of researchers like myself in the GRT. As demonstrated in this book, in Mexico countless research projects are carried out collecting information about migration, remittances and the lives of migrants and non-migrants, involving many universities and independent researchers. So, are we researchers also involved in the regulatory and disciplinary power of the GRT, for example through rendering visible the activities of the people surveyed and interviewed, and thus contributing to normalisation? Binford raises this concern in the context of Mexico, when he states: '[T]he growing focus on remittances by academics, nongovernmental agencies and others risks trapping us within a discourse and practice that is uncritical, if not practically supportive, of Mexican state neoliberal economic policy' (Binford 2004: 3–4). A statement by the local priest in Los Pilares seemed to confirm this concern. During an interview, he said that he was

happy that we[1] had come to do interviews with the people in Los Pilares, because he felt it had 'woken up' the inhabitants of Los Pilares and incited them to start becoming more active and thinking of establishing migration-linked development projects: '[*E*]*ste estudio ha ayudado a consientisar a la gente, se ve que cambia la gente ahora! Y esto es gracias a su investigación, sirvió para motivarlos y despertarlos*'[2] (Padre Elpidio, Los Pilares, personal interview, April 2006). This statement has to be understood in the context of cooperation with Padre Elpidio, who helped us in gaining access to the community, and in the context of his personal objective of organising the people in Los Pilares in order to initiate development projects with the help of migrants. Could it be that through our research we are contributing to spreading the norms within the GRT, for example by asking questions about the existence of collective remittances in a community where they are absent? Or could it be that we researchers are instrumentalised within the GRT, for example by initiating dialogue and raising expectations to attract migrant remittances? It seems what is needed is more reflexive research, as feminist theorists have argued for some time.

Outlook and further research

While undertaking this study, a number of topics for future research emerged that fall outside the scope of this book. There is a need to closely monitor the struggle over the framing of the GRT within the international realm, in order to seize the windows of opportunity to critique the gendered aspects of the GRT and to emphasise migrant rights concerns. Another possible area for further research would be to conduct additional case studies in order to compare how the GRT plays out in different countries with high emigration rates. It would be particularly interesting to compare Mexico with the Philippines, given that the two countries have similar emigration experiences, but deal with migration in very different ways and have quite different emigration patterns; for example, the majority of emigrants from the Philippines are women. Indeed, it would be interesting to examine the implications of the current feminisation of migration for the GRT in the international realm. As demonstrated throughout this book, gender stereotypes related to migration and remittances are relatively resistant and might persist despite changing migration patterns. More research is also needed on the various forms of resistance and empowerment in contexts other than the one analysed here, which would contribute to a better understanding of the GRT and how it is being contested. Finally, future studies might examine how the GRT and its power technologies are being transformed by the increasing securitisation of migration and the global financial crisis. The decrease in remittances to Mexico (World Bank 2010: 4), the reverse flow of remittances from Mexico to the US, and the return of many migrant workers raises doubts about the sustainability of harnessing migration and remittances as a development strategy in Mexico. Yet, does this mean that the GRT itself is unravelling? Only time will tell.

Notes

Introduction

1 Remittances are commonly defined as the money that migrants send back to their families or communities of origin. We can distinguish between individual remittances (sent to the family) and collective remittances (sent by a group of migrants to the community of origin as a whole).
2 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPCONF3/Resources/1588024–1152543209834/REPORT_AND_CONCLUSIONS_INTERNATIONAL_CONFERENCE_ON_MIGRANT_REMITTANCES.doc (accessed July 2010).
3 Official numbers do not include informal remittances which are thought to be substantial. Yet, a note of caution is necessary: The increase in official remittances figures is probably also influenced by the increased capacity for registering such flows and not merely an expression of their increase in real terms.
4 It has to be noted that the big sum of aggregated remittances consists of many small sums of mainly individual remittance transfers: estimates indicate that only around 1 per cent of total remittances are sent collectively (Vargas-Lundius 2004: 10).
5 See www.un.org/esa/ffd/index.htm (accessed July 2010).
6 The Mexican 'Programa 3×1' works as a matching-funds system, whereby migrant organisations in the US can donate money and apply for additional funding from the three levels of the Mexican government to finance a development project in their community of origin.
7 For more references see Massey et al. (1990: 216).
8 This can be understood as a reaction to the fact that the migration literature has traditionally been largely gender-blind, sex-disaggregated data on migration was long unavailable, and women were mostly conceptualised as accompanying dependents of male migrants, or women's experiences were assumed to be mirroring those of men migrants (Carling 2005: 4). Thereby, the particular ways in which women experience migration, and the ways in which gender influences migration and vice versa were ignored. In the mid-1970s, migration studies started to take up gender issues and to document women's experience with migration (Chant 1992; Pessar 1999).
9 An exception is Hondagneu-Sotelo's early study of Mexican immigration to the US (1994); she devotes one section of her book to 'the lives of women who stay behind' (1994: 62–67). However, her interest in the transformations of non-migrant women's lives is mainly instrumental to better understand why some of these women eventually decide to migrate themselves.
10 'In our region, the majority [of women] is too exhausted by their workload, haunted by loneliness and nightmares, worn out by childcare and rebellious sons who idealise their absent father, in order to benefit from this opportunity […]'
11 The timeframe for the selection of relevant textual data starts in the 1990s.

12 I conducted interviews with more than 120 respondents, mainly women, but also men and children. To guarantee anonymity for the respondents, their real names will not be mentioned and pseudonyms will be used throughout the book. The translations from the Spanish provided throughout this book are my own.
13 I was involved in a quantitative survey of migrant sending communities carried out by local researchers, where it became apparent that short, structured surveys with community members did not result in an accurate portrait of the situation within these communities. Although we had an official permission to conduct the survey and presented identification documents, the surveyed families did not trust us, and either refused to answer or provided obviously incorrect information. By contrast, in a similar study using recurrent in-depth interviews as a research method, we obtained more accurate and insightful information.
14 The research project intitled 'Apizaco y Huamantla: Un estudio comparativo de comunidades expulsoras de migrantes. Modelo de análisis de las causas e implicaciones de los flujos migratorios para solucionar la falta de desarrollo sustentable en la region' was coordinated by Professor Marianne Marchand, and funded by the state government of Tlaxcala, the Consejo Nacional de Sciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT) and the Universidad de las Américas in Puebla (UDLA). Findings of this project have been published in Marchand et al. (2006).
15 A disparaging term referring to US citizens.
16 In the indigenous community of San Lorenzo many inhabitants did not feel comfortable speaking Spanish, which meant that I asked someone to translate from Purhépecha. Yet, given that I am not a native Spanish speaker often created a sense of complicity and some informants started talking Spanish to me after a while.

2 A gender-sensitive governmentality approach

1 Most analysts argue that the shift from the archaeological to the genealogical approach occurred with *Discipline and Punish* (1977a), see for example Davidson (1986) or Rabinow (1984).
2 By this Foucault means to 'dissect' today's reality. His studies of madness, medicine, the prison and sexuality are part of his 'history of the present'.
3 He presented his research on this topic mainly in the form of a series of lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 and 1979.
4 However, he argues that these are not to be understood as subsequent historical epochs, but rather as a triangle of sovereignty–discipline–government (Foucault 1991a: 102). Dean interprets this as follows: 'Rather than replacing discipline or sovereignty, the modern art of government recasts them within this concern for the population and its optimization (in terms of wealth, health, happiness, prosperity, efficiency), and the forms of knowledge and technical means appropriate to it' (Dean 1999: 20). This tension has given rise to various diverging interpretations of this triangle.
5 Foucault uses the term 'apparatus' in a number of ways. A detailed discussion of his use of this term goes beyond the scope of this book.
6 Thereby, I use the concept of discipline not as in the sovereignty–discipline–government triangle mentioned above, but as used by Foucault in the *History of Sexuality* and *Discipline and Punish*, i.e. a form of power that works in combination with regulatory power.
7 The Foucauldian meaning of regulation goes beyond the general understanding of the term as referring to legislation or rules.
8 For a discussion of post-colonial feminist theory see Kothari (2001).
9 This is not to argue that all post-colonial writers ignore gender issues. In *Orientalism*, for example, there is a reference to gender issues, discussing Flaubert's representation of an Egyptian courtesan (Said 1978: 6).

10 Given the emphasis on contextuality by post-colonial and post-structural feminist thinkers, the term 'non-Western women' has to be used carefully in order not to homogenise.
11 However, this formation is actively negotiated by the subject her/himself, as Parpart and Marchand (1995: 18) suggest: 'women actively construct their own identities within the material and discursive constraints of their lives'.
12 'Empowerment happens through advances and setbacks. Given that it is something very personal, its characteristics vary and are not quantifiable. Empowerment does not emerge through external conditions, but the latter can facilitate it.'
13 For the case of Mexico, this has been documented for example by Luccisano (2002); Molyneux (2006) and Piester (1997).

3 The GRT in the international realm

1 The Council of the European Union, for example, still adopted this approach when it declared in its concluding remarks to the conference in Seville:

> The European Council considers that combating illegal immigration requires a greater effort on the part of the European Union and a targeted approach to the problem, with the use of all appropriate instruments in the context of the European Union's external relations. To that end, in accordance with the Tampere European Council conclusions, an integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackling the root causes of illegal immigration must remain the European Union's constant long-term objective. With this in mind, the European Council points out that closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention are all means of promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reducing the underlying causes of migration flows.
>
> (Council of the European Union 2002)

2 It is interesting to recall that in Europe and in the USA, for example, previous decades saw a more 'liberal' approach to migration, whereby migration was not primarily perceived as a problem. However, what is new with the migration–development nexus are the explicit and positive links between migration and development.
3 For an analysis of the EU context see Lavenex and Kunz (2008).
4 Since 9/11, the migration–development nexus has become challenged and in some contexts replaced by the migration–security nexus.
5 See www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-iom/mission/lang/en (accessed July 2010).
6 See www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-iom/history/lang/en (accessed July 2010).
7 See www.iisd.ca/Cairo/program/p00000.html (accessed July 2010).
8 See www.gcim.org (accessed July 2010).
9 See www.gcim.org/en/a_mandate.html (accessed July 2010).
10 See the *Report of the Regional Hearing for the Americas*: www.gcim.org/mm/File/Mexico%20Hearing%20Report.pdf (accessed July 2010).
11 See http://go.worldbank.org/4N49KYF2F0 (accessed July 2010).
12 Sea Island Summit (2004), G8 Action Plan: www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2004seaisland/poverty.html (accessed July 2010).
13 For more information about the conference see www.iadb.org/mif/events.cfm?language=English& parid = 9 (accessed July 2010).
14 See www.migrationdevelopment.org/index.php?id=11 (accessed July 2010).
15 See the Conclusions of the conference: www.migrationdevelopment.org/index.php?id=11 (accessed July 2010).
16 See www.gfmd-fmmd.org/en/public/global-forum-migration-and-development-0 (accessed July 2010).

17 See www.un.int/iom/GMG.html (accessed July 2010).
18 See www.iadb.org/mif/events.cfm?language=English& parid=9&topic=&subtopic=REMS (accessed July 2010).
19 See www.ifad.org/events/remittances/index.htm (accessed July).
20 See www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/eventAM/cache/offonce?entryId=15225 (accessed July 2010).
21 See http://go.worldbank.org/KDRVMI0RQ1 (accessed July 2010).
22 See http://go.worldbank.org/KD51V21IF0 (accessed July 2010).
23 See http://go.worldbank.org/TH1AWRCBT0 (accessed July 2010).
24 See http://go.worldbank.org/1JAUQGCYL0 (accessed July 2010).
25 See http://go.worldbank.org/ET5UILQKR0 (accessed July 2010).
26 See http://go.worldbank.org/KMNU73ELM0 (accessed July 2010).
27 See http://go.worldbank.org/KD51V21IF0 (accessed July 2010).
28 The main specialists include: Richard H. Adams Jr (consultant in the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit); Samuel Munzele Maimbo (senior financial sector specialist on the South Asia Region); John Page (chief economist for the Africa Region); Dilip Ratha (senior economist in the Development Prospects Group); and Maurice Schiff (lead economist in the International Trade Unit, Development Research group).
29 'Because of political sensitivities and lack of reliable statistics, migration has been under-researched by economists. The Bank, through its own work on economic migration and in partnership with other institutions, is now creating knowledge in this overlooked area to guide policy choices' (World Bank September 2005).
30 See www.iadb.org/mif/We_fund.cfm?language=English& parid=2 (accessed July 2010).
31 See www.gcim.org/en/a_mandate.html (accessed July 2010).
32 The GCIM Report was elaborated over a two-year period and is divided into six chapters representing the key thematic areas of the Commission's focus: migrants and the labour market; migration and development; irregular migration; integration of migrants; migration and human rights; and the governance of international migration. Supporting information is drawn from commissioned studies, existing literature, and expert and regional consultation meetings.
33 See www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/finance/ (accessed July 2010).
34 See http://go.worldbank.org/SSW3DDNLQ0 (accessed July 2010).
35 These are informal notes for Bank staff on the implications of migration and remittances that highlight emerging trends and topical issues. See http://go.worldbank.org/R88ONI2MQ0 (accessed July 2010).
36 See http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,contentMDK:21352016~isCURL:Y~menuPK:3145470~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html (accessed July 2010).
37 See http://go.worldbank.org/1JAUQGCYL0 (accessed July 2010).
38 Among the first publications of the IDB on the issue of remittances was the map outlining remittance flows to a selected number of Latin American and Caribbean countries. See http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=548861 (accessed July 2010).
39 See www.iadb.org/mif/remesas_map.cfm?language=EN&parid=4&item1id=2 (accessed July 2010).
40 See www.gcim.org/en/ir_gmp.html (accessed July 2010).
41 Such as on Lesotho (1996), Bangladesh (2001), Mexico (2002b) and South Africa (2003).
42 INSTRAW has also developed a qualitative research methodology to evaluate the development potential of remittances from a gender perspective (INSTRAW 2006), and published a number of working papers on remittances and gender. See www.un-instraw.org/migration/programme-page/ (accessed July 2010).
43 Other cooperation fora include the G8 Action Plan; the 'interagency, intergovernmental technical group to improve remittance statistics' (WB, IMF, UN); the

'special task force on international retail payment systems to improve transparency in remittance transactions' (Bank for International Settlements and WB); and projects by regional banks, bilateral aid agencies and other international agencies (Maimbo and Ratha 2005: 2).

44 For a list of MIF projects see www.iadb.org/mif/projects.cfm?lang=en (accessed July 2010).

45 The project, which receives financial support of the European Union, seeks 'to enhance government and social partner capacities for managing labour migration as an instrument for development and regional integration in countries of the Maghreb, West Africa and East Africa'. The project activities include national research, capacity-building seminars, technical cooperation and support to strengthen the social dialogue mechanisms, and the promotion of international labour standards. See http://migration-africa.itcilo.org/ (accessed August 2006).

46 See http://go.worldbank.org/ET5UILQKR0 (accessed July 2010).

47 See http://go.worldbank.org/TH1AWRCBT0 (accessed July 2010).

48 See for example Binford (2004) or Delgado Wise and Rodríguez Ramírez (2001: 12), who argue:

> Much speculation as been offered about the multiplying effect generated, in macroeconomic terms, by the remittances that flood into Mexico … The fact is that beyond their importance as a net source of foreign exchange, they have failed to fuel stronger economic performance in the high-emigration areas, much less offset the country's foreign trade deficit.

49 See www.iadb.org/mif/home/index.cfm (accessed October 2005).

50 See Maimbo and Ratha (2005: 6); Özden and Schiff (2006); Ratha (2003: 32); World Bank (2005a).

51 'With this conference, the BID wants to extend its hand to a new and important development partner in the region: the Latin-American and Caribbean community living abroad.'

52 See http://go.worldbank.org/ET5UILQKR0 (accessed July 2010).

53 See www.iadb.org/mif/lessons/lesson.cfm?lang=en&lesson=2 (accessed July 2010).

54 See http://go.worldbank.org/OFJHFPCYT0 (accessed July 2010).

55 See http://go.worldbank.org/ET5UILQKR0 (accessed July 2010).

56 See www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/finance/index.htm (accessed July 2010).

57 See www.iadb.org/mif/subtopic.cfm?language=English&parid=5&SUBTOPIC=REMS&TOPIC= (accessed July 2010).

58 See http://go.worldbank.org/OFJHFPCYT0 (accessed July 2010).

59 Even though the ILO as a whole generally adopts a rights-based approach focusing on migrant worker rights, there are slight disparities between the different sections *within* the ILO: the MIGRANT department focuses more on migrant protection, migration management and social justice, whereas the Social Finance Unit focuses more on remittances and tends to be more optimistic about the beneficial impacts of migration on development than the MIGRANT department, sometimes adopting elements of the money-based discourse.

60 See www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/finance/vulnerab/remitt.htm (accessed July 2010).

61 Again, there are differences between the ILO sections; the Social Finance Unit defines remittances in a more financial way than the MIGRANT department.

62 These stereotypes are not all that new. The stereotypical idea that women make 'better' use of money than men and spend money in ways which benefit the family rather than just themselves has been used since the emergence of Women in Development (WID) discourses and has served to legitimise specific development practice, for instance in the case of poverty reduction programmes based on

handing out sums of money to women in poor households (such as the Mexican poverty programme OPORTUNIDADES).

4 The GRT in Mexico

1 'Remittances play a fundamental role in the Mexican economy. […] The Mexican government has implemented many initiatives to guarantee the flow of remittances and to harness them in the most efficient way.'
2 Note on terminology: I use 'the GRT in Mexico' to mean 'the GRT in the case of Mexico', which is not to say that this only refers to a national phenomenon occurring 'inside' Mexico.
3 Social reproduction refers to all activities necessary to reproduce and maintain social human beings, including biological reproduction and social provisioning involving subsistence work, care, and education, as well as emotional and affective services and activities to reproduce culture (Bakker and Gill 2003: 4, 32; Hoskyns and Rai 2007: 298).
4 Under the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994), Article 27 of the Mexican constitution – which established the right of the Mexican nation to its land and natural resources, and restored communally held land property (*ejidos*) to peasants who had been dispossessed before the revolution – was reformed to liberalise and privatise *ejidos*. This development occurred against the backdrop of regional integration, whereby Mexico was under pressure to liberalise *ejidos* to allow for their commodification in preparation for NAFTA negotiations (Hellman 1994: 53). The *ejido* reform meant that 3 million *campesino* families lost their protection from labour markets and access to open land (Luccisano 2002: 77).
5 The debt crisis in the 1980s further worsened the situation in already neglected rural areas, and a major blow was dealt by NAFTA and the US Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, which increased US agricultural subsidies, making it difficult for the Mexican agricultural sector to compete (Calva 2004: 23).
6 Even before the debt crisis, equity and social welfare ranked low in policy-making priority and the marginalisation of the Mexican government's welfare policies produced a highly unequal distribution of welfare and high rates of poverty (Escobar Latapí and González de la Rocha 1991: 3; Tello 1991: 57–58). However, during the crisis years, government social spending declined from 17.2 per cent of total spending in 1981 to 9.2 per cent in 1987 (Carrasco and Provencio quoted in Piester 1997: 474). This further impoverished the population and resulted in the slowed rate of improvement in mortality rates, worsening nutrition, less access to health services for the poor, declining school enrolment growth rates, and an increase in informal sector employment and migration (Escobar Latapí and González de la Rocha 1991; Tello 1991).
7 'Social well-being within the modern state is no longer achieved through paternalism that replaces efforts and inhibits character. Today, the increase in well-being can only be the product of the responsible activities shared between the state and the society.'
8 PROGRESA stands for Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación. For more information see www.ifpri.org/themes/progresa.htm and www.oportunidades.gob.mx (accessed July 2010).
9 'Co-responsibility is an important factor in this program, because the families now play an active part in their own development, overcoming philanthropy and paternalism.' See www.oportunidades.gob.mx/Portal/wb/web/quienes_somos1 (accessed July 2010).
10 For an evaluation by the BID, see http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1485604 (accessed July 2010).
11 'There are many, many requirements, it's a lot of paperwork and a waste of time, I don't like it.'

12 Feminists have long challenged the mainstream definition of the term 'productive' and the gendered distinction between productive and social reproduction work, and there is an ongoing debate about this term, starting with the domestic labour debate in the 1970s. See for example Bakker and Gill (2003); Folbre (2001); Hoskyns and Rai (2007).
13 *Mestizo* is a Spanish term that was used during the Spanish Empire to refer to people of mixed European and indigenous origin in Latin America. The term continues to be used today to refer to the majority of the population of Latin America.
14 For more information about the Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo (PROCAMPO) see www.procampo.gob.mx/ (accessed July 2010).
15 For a critical evaluation see Arzate Salgado and Vizcarra Bordi (2007: 99).
16 It is difficult to determine the population with exactitude. Official census results indicate a population of 6,000, whereas a survey by the local health clinic indicates a total number of around 3,000. As has been noted by other authors, due to migration the population of a community varies greatly according to the time of the year when the census is carried out and the level of distrust held by communities (Morales López 2004: 419).
17 'I hardly ever go out. Before, I used to go out more, getting married has changed my life, before I used to have female friends, but now there is no time, and here it's not usual for [women] to leave the house.'
18 See www.michoacan.gob.mx/gobierno/migrantes/sabias.php (accessed July 2010).
19 See www.fedecmiusa.com/ (accessed July 2010).
20 The fact that they opted for a basketball court – a popular sport in the US – rather than for a football field, the most popular sport in Mexico, is indicative of the strong cultural transformations that San Lorenzo is undergoing as a result of migration, which have also been called 'social remittances' (Levitt 1996, 2001).
21 Participants included ILO officials, Mexican government officials, the private sector, development banks and civil society representatives.
22 A number of reasons were mentioned: According to ILO officials, it was difficult to find HTAs willing to donate the necessary money for the pilot projects, due to a lack of confidence and unwillingness to give money to a big international organisation such as the ILO, and due to the high administrative costs of the ILO. Another obstacle mentioned in my interviews was the competition among institutions to 'capture' remittances. Disagreements between ILO headquarters in Geneva and its regional office in Mexico represented a further obstacle.
23 Communities situated in traditional migration states, such as Michoacán, are likely to have a higher percentage of emigrants and, thus, the influx of remittances is more significant. Households with emigrant members are more likely to receive remittances and, therefore, often have a higher income than non-migrant households.
24 This is not to argue that previously there was no inequality in Mexico, but rather that restructuring processes and the migration phenomenon have significantly increased and created new forms of inequalities.
25 Concepts such as 'family' or 'household' have been the object of considerable academic debate. I use the concept of the household not as a homogeneous, unproblematic 'black box', but as a dynamic 'entity' involving conflict and unequal power structures.
26 This refers to situations where migrant men maintain two families, one in the home community and another in the US.
27 'When they go, we become responsible for everything: the land, the house, the children, the animals, everything, the school reunions.'
28 'Migrants are ill with the sin of emigration.'
29 The term *coyote* refers to a person paid to smuggle undocumented migrants across the border.
30 '23 million heroes, beloved Mexican men and women, 23 million Mexicans who live and work in the US.'

31 'It is significant to see this heroic effort that our fellow women and men compatriots are making in the US … On behalf of all our compatriots, and on behalf of Mexico, I personally want to thank them for the effort that they are making and I encourage them that we continue progressing on this path, which has become a great task. Thanks to their perseverance, initiative and proven ability, our compatriots contribute to the economic development of Mexico, and most of all, contribute to the economic development of the US.'
32 'I am committed to being a president that serves and remains attentive to the Mexicans living in the US.'
33 See www.ime.gob.mx/# (accessed July 2010).
34 'Migration is not a problem, it's an opportunity for both countries, in order to turn the future in our favour'.
35 'These resources not only support millions of families, millions of poor and marginalised families, but they are also the motor that moves the micro-economy of many communities and regions in this country; they are funds that play a strategic role, because they flow to exactly those people and places that need them most. However, these funds are not only destined for consumption, but a large part of them is already being invested in small productive projects, in small businesses, that transform themselves into an asset for the whole life of these families. This is why they are of extreme economic importance.'
36 'Migrant workers make many great efforts to be able to support their families. Their efforts are even more admirable, considering the fact that the migrants generally have badly paid jobs and that high living costs prevent them from saving enough. For this reason, we think that it's a matter of justice to protect these money transfers to ensure that they suffer the least possible harm and that they don't get lost, so that they benefit the receivers to a maximum.'
37 'Migration makes me sad.'
38 'Migration fragments our families and forces us to abandon sons, fathers, wives and husbands.'
39 'When our citizens cross the border to go north, our country loses the talent and creativity of its women and men. Many times it is the best, the strongest, the youngest and the most courageous who leave. They go and leave behind their families. Mexico is divided, yes, yes, we receive remittances, our people show solidarity with their families and with us, but this does not mean that Mexico is better off.'
40 'In 2002, Mexico registered an income of 8,858 million dollars from international tourism. Never before in history did tourism generate that much income for our country. This is good news, tourism goes well. And in addition, we have other records: 2002 was the year in which we produced most crude oil, we generated most electricity, international reserves have grown, and it is the year in which we had most family remittances from our compatriots living in the US. We have many records, many things to be proud of.'
41 'These funds are not only destined for consumption, but today, a big part of these funds are already being invested in small productive projects, in small businesses, and in this way they become an asset for the whole life of these families.'
42 See www.letraslibres.com/index.php?art=7844 (accessed July 2010).
43 See http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/ (accessed July 2010).
44 See www.conapo.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=94&Itemid=252 (accessed July 2010).
45 See http://pewhispanic.org/ (accessed July 2010).
46 See www.banxico.org.mx/documents/%7BA5443598-2DF0–815D-4077-A416D3429AA9%7D.pdf (accessed July 2010)
47 Migrant organisations collect money destined for their home communities in a number of ways, such as through organising raffles, dances, beauty contests, lotteries, and rodeos, or through private donations and membership payments (Alarcón 2004: 162).

48 An example of the increasing organisation, institutionalisation and political consciousness of migrants is the first migrant summit – the Primera Cumbre de Comunidades Migrantes Latino Americanas – that took place on 10 May 2007 in Morelia (Mexico) and brought together more than 1,000 participants to exchange experiences and issue a declaration. See www.cumbredemigrantes.org/ (accessed July 2010).
49 Research on the gender dimensions of HTAs shows that contrary to common beliefs, HTAs are deeply gendered and implicated in reproducing gendered social roles and power relations. While they can be a site for progressive change and empowerment of women, this is not necessarily always the case, see Goldring (2001) and Burgess (2005).
50 Casa Puebla was initially established by business leaders.
51 'Moreover, he stated that once information about the migration patterns of *Tlaxcaltecas* in the US was collected, his administration would invite migrants to implement projects in their home communities, or to invest their savings upon their return. He emphasised: "The most important thing, in this moment is that they keep injecting money into the national economy"'.
52 See www.ime.gob.mx/ime/antecedentes.htm (accessed July 2010).
53 'The IME is like a bridge, what it does is connect the migrants in the US with SEDESOL, NAFIN, the Fundacion para la Producividad en el Campo, etc.'
54 See www.ime.gob.mx/ime/objetivos.htm (accessed July 2010).
55 See www.ime.gob.mx/ime/objetivos.htm (accessed July 2010).
56 Another instrument for courting migrants is the internet portal E-Migrantes, set up by the Mexican government. It serves to distribute information and maintain communication among migrants. See www.e-migrantes.gob.mx/ (accessed July 2010).
57 See www.ime.gob.mx/jornadas/jornadas.htm (accessed July 2010).
58 See www.ime.gob.mx/ccime/ccime.htm (accessed July 2010).
59 See www.ime.gob.mx/ccime/ccime.htm (accessed July 2010).
60 A detailed analysis of this council goes beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to note that it does not contain representatives from all Mexican states and most representatives seem to form part of an elite of migrants. For more information see www.ime.gob.mx/ccime/perfiles_ccime06.pdf (accessed July 2010).
61 See www.presidencia.gob.mx/programas/?contenido=35231 and www.ime.gob.mx/investigaciones/bibliografias/cgg2.pdf (pp.23–26) (accessed July 2010).
62 The Fundación Solidaridad Mexicano-Americana A.C., created in 1994, is a binational non-profit organisation that works to promote cultural, social, educational and entrepreneurial exchange between the two countries. It works to build new leaders among the migrants with a view to encouraging them to invest in their home country.
63 Another important project, Enlaces América, a centre for advice and support of transnational Latino and Caribbean migrant organisations committed to building healthy communities both in the United States and in their countries of origin, was launched in 2002, but closed down in 2008.
64 See www.iaf.gov/ (accessed July 2010).
65 See www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/gda/remittances.html (accessed July 2010).
66 'The Mexican government has implemented many initiatives to guarantee the flow of remittances and to harness them in the most efficient way. In order to realise these objectives, mechanisms to reduce the cost of remittance transfers and projects that offer financial opportunities for our co-nationals are being promoted.'
67 'The remittances sent by Mexicans living in the US, which represent the third most important source of income for our country, are resources that have to be invested in productive projects within the communities of origin in order to stimulate economic growth and social development. To promote the efficient use of these resources and development of these communities, the [Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público] SHCP transforms the Patronato del Ahorro Nacional into the Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros [BANSEFI] in order to offer financial

products and services that promote saving and investment among the population' (See: www.ime.gob.mx/consejo_nacional/secretarias.htm (accessed July 2010).

5 The power technologies and subjectivities of the GRT in Mexico

1 'There is a community here that has no water and suffers a lot, it's urgent, […] now they suggest to build a well, but it costs 2,000,000 pesos and they don't have many migrants, so I will try to find migrants in California to see if they can collect money to pay a part of the well'.
2 'We need to submit to what the market wants. The market commands.'
3 An analysis of the Philippines, for example might look different, but goes beyond the scope of this book.
4 'We admire you; we admire your courage and the grandeur that you show in risking everything in order to go to a land that is not yours. We are infinitely grateful, grateful because the poorest families in Mexico, which are the families where you came from and emigrated, they could only survive financial crises, mistaken economic policies, corruption, disorder, so many tragedies that have occurred in our country, they could only survive thanks to remittances, sent by the son who remembers his mother and by the husband who remembers his children. I have also come to tell you that we miss you, we miss you a lot!'
5 'Migrants play a pivotal role in the development of Mexico, economically, and they are transforming everything: they send remittances via formal channels and so these remittances have become the most important source of income for Mexico.'
6 See Chapter 4.
7 'We see how our communities and cities are being transformed; there are communities with only women, only elderly and some children. This makes me realise with sadness that migration takes the best away from us. I know that you, who have risked everything to cross the river, the desert; you or your fathers, are really among the most valuable, the most courageous, the most audacious, young people, strong people, people that Mexico needs.'
8 'I think women's role is very important because now they are doing productive work, it's not the same … imagine, if you lived in Mexico and your husband went to the US and sent you remittances, let's say $500 a month, but you wouldn't do anything, you just receive the money and that's it, no? Well, OK, you eat, you dress and you bring the kids to school, but you don't do anything productive, you just receive the money, yes? So, I think that these productive projects are women's contribution as a counterpart to remittances, so that apart from receiving remittances from their husbands, they also produce.'
9 For discussions of the WID theory and its different sub-orientations, see Kabeer (1994: 5) or Visvanathan (1997: 20).
10 See www.iadb.org/mif/remesas_map.cfm?language=English (accessed July 2010).
11 See www.ime.gob.mx/DirectorioOrganizaciones/principal.aspx (accessed July 2010).
12 See www.ime.gob.mx/investigaciones/2006/estudios/economia/remesas_familiares.pdf (accessed July 2010).
13 See www.migracionydesarrollo.org (accessed July 2010).
14 See www.microrregiones.gob.mx/p3x1.php?func=0 (accessed July 2010).
15 'To support initiatives by migrants living abroad in order to promote social development in their communities of origin or other communities that are marginalised, disadvantaged or have a high concentration of poverty.'
16 For a detailed analysis see García Zamora (2003).
17 See www.federacionzacatecana.org/index.php?sectionName=home&subSection=news&story_id=292 (accessed July 2010).
18 See www.iadb.org/projects/project.cfm?project=me-l1012&language=spanish (accessed July 2010).

19 'Some migrants are more active than others; those who are more active get more projects.'
20 'In the 3×1, a lot of money is spent on the church. […] Because many times, the priests […] are the ones who are in communication with those in the US, and they say: 'listen, son, there is a celebration, we need to renovate the church, etc.'. The priests have a lot of influence. There are many priests who get involved, go to ask migrants for money for the renovation of the church. The 3×1 depends a lot on the person who initiates the project, […] if it's the priest, it's often for a project for the church, if it's the municipal president, it's generally for infrastructure'.
21 'In Tlaxco, they have three projects funded through the 3×1, and Lazaro Cardenas, Santa Ana Chiautempan also have a 3×1. […] But there is a community here that has no water and suffers a lot, it's urgent, and many of the previous local presidents have promised water, now they suggest to build a well, but it costs 2,000,000 pesos and they don't have many migrants (only 20 people out of 500 community members), they cannot pay themselves half of this *pozo*, so I will try to find the migrants in California to see if they can collect money to pay a part of the well'.
22 See www.mimorelia.com/imprime.php?id=2324 (accessed July 2010).
23 It goes beyond the scope of this book to investigate the gender implications of this increased priestly involvement, and how this might lead to a reinforcing of gendered catholic values and practices within the communities of origin.
24 'There are many people in the US who save money, but they send it to their families, for example, they save 5,000 dollars and say to their family: 'here, take this money', but the person who receives the money does not actually know how to invest the money, so in the end, this money, if you don't know how to invest it, is lost. So, what is important to us in the Invierte en México programme is the technical assistance provided by NAFIN for you to establish a business and that this business will effectively work and produce and generate money for you. It's a complete assistance and your money is very secure.'
25 I carried out most interviews between 2005 and 2008. It would be interesting to repeat these interviews to discern whether there has been a change in the discourse towards more gender awareness.
26 See www.sedesol.gob.mx/archivos/301401250702/File/0%20Datos_Generales_3×1.pdf (accessed September 2008).
27 'To support initiatives by migrants living abroad, in order to implement projects bringing together resources from the federal level, the states, the municipalities and the migrants, while promoting equality and a gender focus related to the benefits of the programme.'
28 See http://migrantes.michoacan.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=92&Itemid=139 (accessed July 2010).
29 See www.sedesol.gob.mx/index/index.php?sec=60060512&len=1 (accessed July 2008).
30 To compare the different descriptions of the 3×1 programme on each individual state office website of SEDESOL, see www.sedesol.gob.mx/index/index.php?sec=60&len=1 (accessed July 2008).
31 'The programme promotes equity and a gender focus in the distribution of the benefits.' See www.iadb.org/projects/project.cfm?project=me-l1012&language=spanish (accessed July 2010).
32 'Gender differences influence all areas of life and public policy. At the same time, the obstacles that limit women's empowerment and reproduce gender inequality are manifest in many areas of life, such as in the areas of education, health and work. For this reason, each strategy and norm that are part of public policy and especially social policy, needs to be subjected to a gender assessment, in order to guarantee that each activity reflects and promotes the priority to reduce the gaps between women and men, and to provide the opportunity for women to participate fully in the advances through development.'

33 A sort of dam built using natural valleys that would collect water to be channelled through tubes.
34 'We don't want a well. In Zaragoza they have problems with their well: the pump broke and it's expensive to repair it and now they don't have water! It would be better to use the natural valley and some tubes [for the water provision] … And the water from the Malinche [volcano] is very tasty, if we build a well we lose this tasty water.'
35 This belief is based on a gendered stereotype that has been challenged by feminist writers (Lairap 2004).
36 'The difference is that women are better debtors. You will never see a woman drinking beer in public, right? But you will see men drinking beer. The woman is more responsible, she will never do that, because she has children, but we, the men, we don't think like that.'
37 'Most of the successful projects are women's projects.'
38 'The Fundación para la Productividad en el Campo serves to establish productive projects in marginalised rural areas. These projects have the objective that the women, for example, the wives of those who have emigrated to the US, participate in productive projects, for example, there was such a project in Oaxaca, where they export products to the US, for example, chocolate, mole oaxaqueño, nopal conserves, typical food from Oaxaca, these productive projects aim to benefit the people who live here in Mexico from where the migrants left … I think that they are important, because they are also a counterpart to the investment that the husbands in the US make for their home community, for example, there is this group in the US and they collect remittances to finance the establishing of electricity lines for their community, so with these projects, the people who are here in Mexico are in some ways complementing this investment of their husbands.'
39 'Many say: "why do you favour women in these projects?" But it's not that we favour women, it's just that we understand a reality in our municipalities, which is that in many states of the republic, the men go, and the women are left here, and in this moment, they become head of the household, they take on the roles of the mother and the father, they have to start working, so we support them in order for them to generate more income, because many have all the initiative and will in the world, but we shouldn't forget that many women, when their husband leaves, they don't know how to do anything, … so I think in this moment there is sadness, the women see their reality, their little house, their children, … there are many women who face such a situation, and what do they know how to do? Nothing, nothing, yes, they know how to look after their children, iron clothes, cook, but they don't know how to work, because before, their life was different, so then, they start moving, and once they start, forget it, they are incredible! They get organised, yes, they are very organised, they are the best to initiate projects, they are the ones who initiate productive projects, here, the best projects we have are women's projects, they are much better than men!'
40 There seems to be a contradiction between the stated aim of the project, i.e. to create employment in order to reduce migration, and the fact that mainly women were employed, given that at the time, it was still mainly men who emigrated. This is not to say, of course, that women should not be offered jobs, but merely to question the efficacy to achieve the stated aim.
41 See www.ime.gob.mx/agenda_migratoria/matricula.htm (accessed July 2010).
42 'It's all the fault of the migrants.'
43 'People change in the way that they are no longer modest like they used to be, they feel great, they show off their money, they pretend they are the best of the community.'
44 'Beyond their economic contribution, remittances reaffirm the profound bonds that unite our communities on both sides of the border.'
45 It also risks romanticising transnational family life, downplaying the hardship such family life can bring.

46 I challenged this problematic conflation in Chapter 3.
47 'We would like migrants and their families to use bank services on both sides of the border, so that through their incomes and remittances, they can access a better quality of life.'
48 'Our objective is to promote productive investment of remittances' and 'an entrepreneurial culture'.
49 See www.cemexmexico.com/se/se_co.html; www.univision.com/content/content.jhtml?cid=932160 (accessed July 2010).
50 See www.nafin.com/portalnf/?action=content&sectionID=5&catID=349&subcatID=350 (accessed July 2010).
51 'The programme emerged in order to attract remittances to be invested in establishing productive projects.'
52 'We do not support community infrastructure or social projects, we need profitable projects, real businesses.'
53 'These businesses create employment in places where it is difficult to get anyone to invest … I think that this project is a very important initiative, also because in certain communities it's worth it, because these people invest in places where an investor adopting a strict economic rationality would not choose as a priority to invest, so they are investing in places where it is difficult to get anyone to invest, and they create employment, and in some way this will certainly help to stop the migration phenomenon and generate development options for those communities.'
54 'Many of those entrepreneurs already have their own business in the US and only use their business here as a *maquila*, they can establish *maquilas* in Tijuana or in Aguascalientes, or in their own home community, and if it's the same price, they will choose their own community.'
55 See www.iadb.org/projects/Project.cfm?language=English&PROJECT=TC0106003 (accessed July 2010).
56 'What is important to us in the programme is the technical assistance provided by NAFIN for you to establish a business … it's a complete assistance and your money is very secure.'
57 'You have to watch out how you go out, because they say: 'look at her', and they say who knows what, who knows when, and that's how gossip emerges … If they see that she has changed, it's because she's going out with another, but it's not true! It's just that we want to be clean when we go out!'
58 'There are women here who have a husband in the US, but who don't receive remittances. When they go to buy shoes and nice clothes, people talk badly about them, people criticise them because they think that the women are seeing another man to get money.'
59 'The women who have their husband in the US become lazier! Because when their husband is here, they have to work, but after he leaves they don't care because their husband sends them money and they just don't do anything anymore.'
60 Small shops that sell many different products.
61 'During the six years that he was in the US he sent me money, but I didn't touch this money! Even though he put the money on a bank account for me … We just lived on the income from the cheese that I produced.'
62 A little anectote might illustrate the difficulties surrounding micro-businesses. In one FOMTLAX micro-credit project I visited during my fieldwork, a woman had obtained credit based on remittances to buy four milk cows. Yet, after several months, she still did not make any profits, as she spent all the money she obtained by selling the milk on the high veterinary costs and to feed the cows. In the meantime, her husband kept injecting remittances to keep the project going. Furthermore, there was no real market in the community for the milk that her cows were producing, and given that there is no paved road to the community, no milk tanker could come to take the milk to a cheese factory. When we visited the project, the woman

proudly showed us the cows, but told us that she was worried about not being able to repay her debt. This case shows, among other things, the importance of market studies before setting up micro-businesses. It also reveals that a basic infrastructure is crucial for the functioning of such projects. Finally, it raises doubts as to whether such micro-businesses can be sustainable (development) initiatives.

63 'In Mexico, and of course also in Michoacán, not only has [women's] important social capital been underused, but women also continue to confront limitations and structural obstacles that make it difficult for them to participate in economic activities.'

64 'San Lorenzo is a typical community where women are waiting for their husbands to send remittances … so with this project we aim to generate resources and income, … because so far, the women have only done *artesanías* for their own consumption and rarely sold their products, so this will create a big change, it will make women aware that they can do something productive.'

65 'How much can an artisan woman earn? It depends on how much time she spends working and on the quality of her work. If her product is of better quality, she can sell it for a higher price and will have more income. The more a woman works, the more she earns.'

66 'Before, I had more time. Now, if I want to go to the workshop, I need to get up early in the morning and hurry up in order to finish everything, take the kids to school, prepare food, clean, everything … It is very tiring.'

67 'We need to submit to what the market wants. The market commands. We have just started on our path, but further on, the market will tell us what it wants, which colours, which forms, … it's a shame, because this is how traditions get lost, but it's just the way it is.'

68 'In my view, [in this project] there is everything, both economic and rights, that we all have the right to sell, not only those who have market stalls, that we also have the right to sell and a place where to sell, that we have the right to go to other places, not only here in Mexico, but also to other countries, that they give us the right to sell in other countries.'

69 'This project aims to contribute to improve the living conditions of the women who live in San Lorenzo, and the *Michoacánas* living abroad, particularly in the US, promoting a strategic alliance between the two groups of women in order to advance their personal development and the development of their community … This project aims to eliminate the assistentialist characteristics of previous development projects, which lead invariably to inactivity, promote dependency, and inhibit entrepreneurial initiatives. Instead, this project encourages the women artisans from San Lorenzo and the *Michoacánas* abroad to take full responsibility for designing and implementing their own strategy for their own productive development.'

70 'The aim is that women have money for their families, to eat, to buy clothes, etc. … We want to promote the emancipation of women through work, and also through education and decision-making, etc., things that women learn through the project. Women can stimulate development through economic income.'

71 The gendered implications of this tension between altruism and rationalism have been discussed in the literature on social reproduction, see Cook et al. (2000) or Ferber and Nelson (1993, 2003).

6 Resistance and empowerment within the GRT in Mexico

1 'We have rights too!'

2 'Migrants and their remittances should not be seen as a strategic national resource to be administered by the government of their home country in order to promote development in the long term, as if we were talking about oil or any other natural resource.'

3 'No, here we don't do these collective things, here each person for themselves, each person has their own life.'

4 'Here, we don't trust, there were many people who came to cheat on us.'
5 'There is a lot of distrust among the people, so they will not want the 3×1.'
6 'Many people already have their life in the US and they are not interested in returning or doing something for the community.'
7 'I'm not interested in cooperating, because the authorities make many promises, but don't fulfil them, it's all lies.'
8 'It's because not everybody wants to cooperate, there are people who want to do something, and they ask other migrants, but they don't want to participate. If everybody unites we can do it, but if not everybody participates, I don't want to either.'
9 'There are states that don't want this type of project, because they have arguments, for example, there are states that say that "this project that you want to do in this location is not really a priority, we want to do this and this instead", so they don't enter the programme and the state doesn't participate.'
10 'I don't have time, I think I'm losing my time with this project.'
11 See http://fiob.org/ (accessed July 2010).
12 'This project is very useful for me; it gives me the opportunity to go to see my daughters in Morelia.'
13 See www.ifad.org/remittances/events/forum07.htm; and www.migrationanddevelopment.net/conferences-events/ifad-international-forum-on-remittances (accessed July 2010).
14 'The objective is to promote the emancipation of women through work.'
15 These coincide with other analyses such as Morales López (2004) or Sinquin Feuillye (2004).
16 'Yes, it's sad, but I don't find it that difficult to live alone. It's important to value oneself. I like being active, not losing my time, I read, I cook, I teach religion classes to children in the church. Now I know what I'm capable of, I feel useful, my husband supports me, and I feel good.'
17 'With this project, I feel more fulfilled.'
18 'I feel I have more knowledge, … this project has helped me to grow, and mostly in the family, there is more communication now, we always communicated, but sometimes they didn't understand me, but now my husband also encourages me, and he accompanies me to the places I have to go, he takes me to Uruapan, and it's like there's more communication between us, and there's less machismo.'
19 'The men here say that a woman cannot go out, because she will go with another man, this is the mentality of the people here, they say: "ah, she's going over there, who knows what she's doing there!"'
20 'Here, the people sometimes say: "no, a woman doesn't go out, women have to stay in the house, the woman is there to look after the children and the husband", women here don't go out a lot.'
21 'The problem is that they don't let me go to Morelia, I had to serve my husband and couldn't leave my daughter with him.'
22 'My father-in-law brought me a car and now I already know how to drive it. But here, there are not many women who drive. I like driving, but sometimes I don't feel well, because people are watching me, they talk about me and they spread rumours in the community.'
23 'I like travelling, and the project gives me the opportunity to leave the community.'
24 'Before, we didn't know how to do anything, we only worked in the household, watched TV, now we know how to do sewing and we have our own money.'
25 'With this project I feel more fulfilled, with more skills and knowledge, it's like something new that helps us and it helps me to better understand things, … it also helps me with myself, before, I didn't know many things, like legal issues, and now I know them, and it also helps me for my shop that I have here, because before I didn't really know how to do it, now I know how to calculate the gains, to check what sells most, to do a balance of payments in order to keep the accounts, so the

shop is going better, before, I used to buy everything, but I didn't really know what I was selling and so things went off.'

26 'In this project, we have to go out in order to learn how to sell and how to deal with other people … This is how we learn to go out, because the first time we went – we are very shy because we don't often go out, we don't know how to go to other cities, deal with other people, that's how we are, when we go to another place with other people, we just get there and sit down, we don't talk, because we wait, we are difficult, we are not very used to civilisation, but now, some women are already starting to learn how to behave with other people, how to participate.'

27 'Not many women speak during the project meetings, they know how to speak, they understand, but many don't want to talk, we are shy, but now, they are starting to speak out in the meetings.'

28 According to Elson, 'women's unpaid labour is not infinitely elastic – a breaking point may be reached, and women's capacity to reproduce and maintain human resources may collapse' (Elson 1989: 58).

29 With the change of government administration the commitment of the IMM weakened. This could mean that rather than being based on a genuine commitment to the women from San Lorenzo on behalf of the IMM, the project was used for political purposes.

30 'This project has served as a distraction, there are always problems at home, and while stitching you forget those problems for a while, but we also have the chance to talk about those problems and there is more communication.'

31 'Sometimes I give the women advice on how to talk to their men when they have problems.'

32 'They don't let her go out, the girl, not even for fiestas, she doesn't go out! And the mother cannot do anything, if the mother complains, the daughter will have problems and sometimes the couple even breaks up and that's terrible.'

7 Conclusion

1 Referring to our research team of the project *Apizaco y Huamantla: Un Estudio Comparativo de Comunidades Expulsoras de Migrantes. Modelo de análisis de las cuasas y implicaciones de los flujos migratorios para solucionar la falta de desarrollo sustentable en la region*.

2 'This study has contributed to raising awareness among the people … You can see how they have changed. And this is thanks to your investigation, it helped to motivate them and wake them up.'

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