Felicity Colman

Deleuze & Cinema
THE FILM CONCEPTS

DELEUZE
AND CINEMA

For Xhrise.

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Contents

Abbreviations

C1 Deleuze, G. [1983] 1986. *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (trans.). London: Athlone.

C2 Deleuze, G. [1985] 1989. *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta (trans.). London: Athlone.

Acknowledgments

Introduction: Deleuze's Cinematographic Consciousness

Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) was the first philosopher to write a two-volume account of cinema. Deleuze creates a very specific open system of thinking about how and what the screen medium does. This book, Deleuze and Cinema: The Film Concepts, *examines Deleuze's cinema system and presents his approach as a methodology that is useful for all types of practices concerning the history, theory and production of screen media forms and philosophy.*

Deleuze argues that the virtual worlds created by screen forms intervene in all aspects of things in the worlds on screen and the bodies in the worlds external to that screen. Investigating how cinema is able to produce new concepts that change how we perceive and interact with the world, Deleuze describes cinematographic consciousness as a new type of philosophy. Deleuze's stated aim of the cinema books is to generate a taxonomy of the various cinematographic concepts. However, through that process of collating the various aspects of film forms and screen-generated concepts, Deleuze's taxonomy extends to an account of cinema as productive of an autonomous cinematic consciousness, thus creating a new theory for screen-based forms.

Deleuze's cinema books engage, reject and extend the European canonical histories of classical and modern philosophy, and twentieth-century film theory. Deleuze connects the complexities of the perceptual philosophy of images, perception and political concepts as named by Aristotle, Plato, Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel and Martin Heidegger, amongst others, and those once renegade but now acceptable philosophers of people, power and politics: Baruch Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson. Deleuze's investigation into the cinema is undertaken as a philosopher involved in an ontological enquiry, not as a technician of historical or production knowledge about cinema. The observations of film writers such as André Bazin, Jean Epstein, Lotte Eisner, Jean Mitry, Jean-Louis Schefer, Christian Metz, Noël Burch and Pier Paolo Pasolini, and directors including F.W. Murnau, Sergei Eisenstein, Dziga Vertov, D.W. Griffiths, René Clair, Alain Resnais, Glauba Rocha, Orson Welles, Wim Wenders and Jean Vigo, in particular play a decisive role in Deleuze's pursuit of an account of cinematic ontology. Alongside the influence of the work of his immediate peers, Félix Guattari and Michel Foucault, is a range of auteurist directors whose films lead Deleuze's engagement with the philosophy of film, including Luis Buñuel, Alfred Hitchcock, Fritz Lang, Jean-Luc Godard, Robert Bresson, Resnais, Wenders, Werner Herzog, and some of the canonic actors, including Charlie Chaplin, Ava Gardner, Welles, Maria Falconetti, Greta Garbo, Stanley Baker, Alain Delon, Klaus Kinski, Chantal Akerman and Jerry Lewis.

Deleuze points out:

> A theory of cinema is not 'about' cinema, but about concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices, the practice of concepts in general having no privilege over others, any more than one object has over others. It is at the level of the interference of many practices that things happen, beings, images, concepts, all the kinds of events. The theory of cinema does not bear on the cinema but on the concepts of the cinema, which are no less practical, effective or existent than cinema itself. The great cinema authors are like the great painters or the great musicians: it is they who talk best about what they do. But, in talking, they become something else, they become philosophers or theoreticians – even [Howard] Hawks who wanted no theories, even [Jean-Luc] Godard when he pretends to distrust them. (C2: 280)

Combining primary empirical observation with a mix of philosophical methodologies, Deleuze engages with the polemics of film technical and historical theory to describe concepts that cinema creates. For example, in a sequence describing how 'cinematographic perception works continuously', Deleuze invokes scenes from King Vidor's film *The Crowd* (1928), F.W. Murnau's *Der Letzte Mann* (*The Last Laugh*, 1924), Wenders's *Im Lauf der Zeit* (known as *Kings of the Road*, 1976) and *Alice in den Städten* (*Alice in the Cities*, 1974), and Jean Renoir's *Le Crime de Monsieur Lange* (1935) (C1: 22–24). In addition to these scenes, put as evidence for the argument Deleuze makes for the notion of cinematographic perception as a continuous whole which changes, he draws on the process of duration (from Henri Bergson), the modulation of temporal forms (from philosopher Gilbert Simondon), insight into the temporality of the shot (Epstein), and the investigation into film forms by Bazin (C1: 22–24; 220–221, notes 18–24). Overlaying this particular discussion, we can also see the influence of the classification of epistemic regimes (Foucault), the perception of a societal whole and the political centring of knowledge (Spinoza), and the critique of the moulding of subjectivity by societal institutions (Guattari) with which to address the composition of the cinematic image, and the experiments of Hitchcock on sequence-shots. Above all, Deleuze is drawn to the treatment of film form, the theatricality of the cinematic, the dramatization of situations and journeys, and the treatment of events in film.

Embedded in Deleuze's cinema books is an historical account of one of the pivotal directions of film philosophy of the period of 1970s–80s, a period that proved to be catalytic for the directions of the respective disciplines of philosophy and film studies. Three key contextualizing factors situate Deleuze writing his cinema books in Paris at the end of the one of the most influential of all periods of film, prior to the advent of the internet, and prior to digital filmmaking techniques. First, the Parisian *cinephilic* culture cultivated through the work of Henri Langlois at the Cinémathèque Française, provided access to the classical and modern cinema forms of the twentieth century (Roud 1983). Early cinematic forms were shown alongside the latest productions which in turn led to comparative debates about issues of aesthetics and

politics as played out in French film journal *Cahiers du Cinéma* and French post-Hollywood films of the 1960s and 1970s.[1] Underwriting Deleuze's philosophical methods in the cinema books are the attitudes and opinions of the *Cahiers*' writers, alongside those of philosophers, directors, mathematicians and literary authors. While Deleuze is not always in accord with *Cahiers*' writers, their ideas provide impetus and orientation for many of his arguments on the nature of the cinema. The influence of cahiers upon Deleuze is extensive, to the point where Deleuze frequently utilizes exactly the same scene analysis as those film theorists he references. In this sense, Deleuze's approach to the cinema can be considered, as film theorist D.N. Rodowick commented, to be in the 'mainstream' of these debates (1997: xii).[2] In particular the editorial opinions of the *Cahiers*' writers who comprised the November 1972 editorial team are reflected in Deleuze's topic choices in his cinema books. They were Jacques Aumont, Pierre Baudry, Pascal Bonitzer, Jean-Louis Comolli, Serge Daney, Pascal Kané, Jean Narboni, Jean-Pierre Oudart, Phillipe Pakradouni, Sylvie Pierre and Serge Toubiana (cf. Reynaud 2000). This generation saw *la politique des auteurs* as taking a radical approach to film, although now both the term and the form of this radicalism has passed into the stylistic historical avant-garde. Deleuze's cinema books arrive at what is arguably the end of the era of the dominance of the *Cahiers* critical line of thinking and the advent of *le cinéma du look* – that is, an era in the early 1980s of film-making that attended to a certain stylistic production, characterized in the work of Jean-Jacques Beineix, Luc Besson and Leos Carax. Second, Deleuze's contemporary philosophical milieu was one where French philosophy was culturally important enough to be accorded recognition through media forms, including regular television programmes about philosophy (cf. Reynaud 2000: 17; Chaplin 2007: 5ff). Third, is the shift in pedagogic focus by Deleuze, when his university lectures began to engage cinema from 1981 (Dosse 2010: 397–405). The two-volume works are the result of Deleuze's lecture series on cinema, as a very specific media that engages in a political commentary and determination of culture as a political aesthetic (see Deleuze's interview in *Cahiers du Cinéma* from 1976 in Deleuze 1995: 37–45).

Form and Content: How to Read this Book – Biases and Expectation

In this book, I describe the key concepts and themes of the two cinema books (C1 and C2) in approximately the order that Deleuze presents them. For economy I have selected the core topics for understanding the Deleuzian ciné-methodology and provide thematic chapters on key aspects of Delueze's system, including his transsemiotic method, vectors, topology and politics. Each chapter begins with a brief summary of what the reader will encounter in that chapter and the terms of the Deleuzian ciné-concept. These issues provide resources for screen analysis, or philosophy, but the terms of this practice must be first understood through praxis. 'A theory has to be used,' Deleuze (2004: 208) notes; 'it has to work.' After presenting a case study or focussed discussion on the significance of the relevant chapter concept or theme, each chapter then takes the reader through three ways of approaching the concept:

1. what x concept is (in broader as well as Deleuzian terms);
2. how Deleuze uses x concept;
3. the function of x concept.

For each chapter, I suggest a way of accessing the more difficult aspects of Deleuze's ciné-philosophy is for the reader to watch the key film/s discussed and then consider the Deleuzian concepts presented. Like Deleuze, I discuss a wide range of films, and while the big screen and sound of the cinema theatre is the best place for viewing, most are available online.

Through this method of exegesis, I also present my own taxonomy of Gilles Deleuze's cinema books as a system for engaging with screen-based forms. I do this from the position of being a student, teacher and producer of screen media forms – films, games, mobile media screens, television and theory. My focus engages with the filmic medium as I follow Deleuze closely in the following chapters. However, the reader will note that my terminological preference

is for 'screen media', rather than 'film' or 'cinema', where I give an example that would be successfully engaged by any number of screen media (films of all levels of production – commercial, amateur, artistic, experimental – made on all types of media recording formats, analogue and digital – mobile, dv, 35 mm, video, etc; computer games of all levels of production – mobile, flash, platform-based, commercial experimental, similarly for television, and internet news media products, etc.). While Deleuze writes specifically about cinema, and the rise of a cinematographic consciousness through the types of cinema made in the twentieth century, his discussion focus is on the philosophical concepts generated by the time-based form of the moving screen image. The Deleuzian ciné-system is thus applicable to any screen media that has the capacity for image, sound and movement.

In this book I engage with Deleuze's work in terms of a feminist position that I have previously described his work as enabling. This takes the approach of never thinking that you have found, or even can find, an end-point or limit to some type of knowledge form (Colman 2005b: 100–102). Deleuze's method provides a positioning theoretical springboard for all types of enquiry, and reader's biases toward certain styles or genres of screen materials are easily accommodated by Deleuze's generative approach to film theory and film history.

Deleuze's cinema books are complex and skilful, yet in parts they seem obvious, and in others elliptical, and the promise of the new logic required for the 'becoming' time-image that is argued for at the end of *Cinema 2* not entirely evident (C2: 275). This call for a new logic continues Deleuze's thinking in *Difference and Repetition* where he states, 'The search for a new means of philosophical expression was begun by Nietzsche and must be pursued today in relation to the renewal of certain other arts, such as the theatre or the cinema' (Deleuze 1994: xxi). Deleuze's philosophical oeuvre has become part of the philosophical canon, but within that discipline, his cinema books remain only scantly accounted for, and are absent from many philosophy and film theoretical works. The main (English language) exponents of Deleuze's system for film work include the respective works of Steven Shaviro (1993), D.N. Rodowick (1997), Barbara Kennedy (2000), Patricia Pisters (2003), Ronald

Bogue (2003), Anna Powell (2005; 2007) and David Martin-Jones (2006). For the purposes of this book, a discussion of the Deleuzian components of the ciné-system is the focus, providing a pathway into the various nuances of the above authors. Bogue's work in particular provides the point of reference for the technicalities and neologisms that Deleuze employs, while Pisters's work provides examples of applied Deleuzian ciné-theory.

Deleuze concludes his two volumes on cinema with the reminder that 'philosophical theory is itself a practice, just as much as its object' (C2: 280). It is with this coda in mind that this book, *Deleuze and Cinema: The Film Concepts*, combines a detailed account of Deleuze's ciné-system, and engages in the practice of the philosophically based film theory advocated by the cinema volumes.

I

Ciné-system

Deleuze's two volumes on cinema provide a model of ciné-philosophy. Deleuze sets himself the task of compiling a taxonomy of the cinema and ends up with a processual ciné-system. This is a model of ciné-philosophy that can be used as a methodology for analysis of all types of screen-based media. This chapter examines that model as a ciné-system, open, infinite, and critically questioning how screen media can possibly prefigure, produce or presuppose the subject of its discourse.

> By which system can a little egg be cooked in a huge pot?
>
> C1: 176; see *The Navigator* (1924)

Screen-based work and film is a dynamic medium. Through the duration of the delivery of its content, no matter how limited or formulaic, the media form changes by accommodating incoming information and reconfiguring the forms already in play. It is through specific activities on screen that cinematic forms can be productive of ideas that in turn give rise to new forms or consolidate pre-existent ones. As Deleuze argues, film is a creative practice that uses a processual system.

No matter what the content, the type of interface and/or gesture required to access and operate it, screen forms are moving sound-images on time-based platforms. Educational models would describe the screen thus: by engaging visual, audio and sensory methods, cognitive data and ideas are communicated, affective domains are enabled (political and cultural attitudes and value systems), and psychomotor skills are tested (through interactive media forms and ideas about these forms) (cf. Anderson and Krathwohl 2001; Bloom and Krathwohl 1956; Krathwohl *et al.* 1964). Deleuze engages a similar group of elements, but does not limit discussion of the screen form to only reading the psychological, affective or cognitive capacity of the medium. In addition to addressing these significant issues are the philosophically and cinematographically framed questions of the forms that contribute to and determine such elements.

When producing or analysing screen-based work, the significance of film form and the relationship between form and style is foremost, even in theories coming from quite different traditions (cf. Andrew 1976; Beller 2006; Bellow 2000; Bresson 1977; Bordwell and Thompson 2003; Eisenstein 1949; Eisner 1973; Gledhill and Williams 2000; Godard and Ishaghpour 2005). The relationships produced by such different approaches in turn create fundamental questions for film philosophy and film theory concerning the political implications of aesthetic forms such as cinema and screen-based images (for discussion of the relationship between film, theory and philosophy compare essays in Colman 2009c and Wartenberg and Curran 2005). The work of film theorists such as David Bordwell (1985), Raúl Ruiz (1995) and Kaja Silverman (1988) are exemplary in explicating the significance of film form, and for discussions engaging the relationship between

form and style, see the respective works of Jean-Luc Nancy (2001), Linda Williams (2008) and Jacques Rancière (2004; 2006). Deleuze will cautiously frame an answer to this question through his examination of the constitution of the world through screen forms; at various points in the cinema books using the term 'englobing'; describing the sense of the nature of the cinematographic to encompass perception, thinking, and politics.

The discussion of form provides a platform for many of the ideas Deleuze sets forth in his system. In this, Deleuze's project is furthering the implications of Henri Bergson's comments where he refers to the cinema as a model for human perceptual processes: 'The mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind' (Bergson 1983: 323). Although we can see the influences of other philosopher's logics on the development of the method Deleuze employs in his cinema books, including the work of Foucault, Guattari and Gottfried Leibniz, Deleuze attributes his primary cinematographic thinking on movement and duration to Bergson (see Mullarkey 2009a; 2009b: 88). Deleuze draws this discussion through the work of philosophers including Plato, Kant and Spinoza, but also from diverse authors including Arnold J. Toynbee, and theories by a range of film directors including Godard, Glauba Rocha, Hitchcock, Yasujirô Ozu and Pier Paolo Pasolini. Deleuze concludes his study by pronouncing: 'Cinema itself is a new practice of images and signs, whose theory philosophy must produce as conceptual practice' (C2: 280).

What is the Deleuzian Ciné-system?

Deleuze uses the term 'system' to describe cinema in terms of his approach: 'The image itself is the system of the relationships between its elements, that is, a set of relationships of time from which the variable present only flows' (C2: xii). Deleuze creates a classification system that describes what these 'elements' of cinema are in order to discuss how they systemically work to produce a film, and how those elements are then capable of becoming autonomous producers of other systems (cf. the various body-becomings charted in MacCormack 2008: 113; or in *The Wizard of Oz* (dir. Fleming, 1939)).

Deleuze carefully looks at language systems, such as semiotics, for the means with which to express what is happening on screen and in the perceptive body of the addressee. It is a dynamic system that is anti-structural. Deleuze will however privilege his vitalist, pedagogic vision for addressing the forms and concepts created in the practice of film.

Within the system are sets of images. Deleuze divides them into two parts – movement and time, but these two are part of the same set. Of his approach to these types of cinematic images, there are three main questions that Deleuze circles in his system:

1. How does a screen form produce content?
2. How do screen-based forms become autonomous?
3. How does cinema produce philosophical concepts?

These three points are questions that Deleuze has in mind in every chapter of his cinema volumes. No matter what the content focus, the composition of the screen form is concerned with the organization of information, including abstract informational forms such as time and space. In reference to the first point, Deleuze describes the screen form as the set – the *ensemble* of things (including the *mise-en-scène* or *milieu*). In Deleuze's terminology the term image 'set' is not to be confused with 'set-theory', although elements of that approach are definitely present. Rather, the type of 'set' that Deleuze invokes, as Arkady Plotnitsky argues, is a conceptual set that does not always involve spatial figures. Rather, the set provides a more extensive meaning, closer to a 'topos theory' that looks at points in space: 'A *set* is composed of *elements* capable of having certain *properties* and certain *relations* among themselves or with elements of other sets' (Cartier, cited by Plotnitsky 2006: 188 original emphasis; see chapter 12 Topology). The key words are italicized: *elements, properties, relations* – these are the components that Deleuze describes.

Thus, Deleuze's approach here is neither ethnological nor linguistic in terms of its classification of material. Rather, to answer the second question, Deleuze draws up a philosophical semiology for screen analysis, combining the systemic meaning. As he states at the beginning of the preface to the

French edition of *Cinema 1*, his study is 'a taxonomy, an attempt at the classification of images and signs' (C1: xiv). While Deleuze gives credit to the American theorist C.S. Peirce's study of images and signs as being one of 'the most complete and the most varied', Deleuze uses Peirce's descriptions of signs just for taxonomic purposes, not for semiotic analysis (C1: xiv; C1: 69). Throughout the cinema books, Deleuze situates Peirce within a certain sphere of classification, combined with insights from linguist Louis Hjelmslev, film maker Pasolini, philosopher Bergson, and consolidated over work with Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* wherein any systematic analysis of signs must be understood as having political consequences by virtue of the ways in which the image can produce mental images – this is the third question that Deleuze's system encircles (C1: 198–200, C2: 30–34; Hjelmslev 1961; Pasolini 2005; Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 43–45). Drawing on Bergson and Guattari's work, Deleuze distinguishes between the terms of mechanistic and machinic, which might be invoked when thinking of a system that describes concepts and forms based on a technological platform. Deleuze makes it clear that when he engages the sense of a 'system', and the use of terms such as 'components', it is in a machinic sense and not in a mechanistic sense, and this is why his theory is applicable to all kinds of screen media – analogue, digital, mobile, fixed, text, image or sound based.[1] The definition of the elements that might comprise a film or screen form – what is cinematography, what is acting, what comprises a shot, sound, lighting, dialogic style etc. – is the subject of numerous side discussions Deleuze undertakes throughout his volumes. An example of this technique: in looking at how cinema presents a world of images that contain multiple layers of time within them, Deleuze questions how French director Jean Renoir is able to present a multi-dimensional image, one that is not flat or just 'double-faced' (C2: 84). He writes: 'It is a depth of field, for example in *La Règle du jeu*, which ensures a nesting of frames, a waterfall of mirrors, a system of rhymes between masters and valets, living beings and automata, theatre and reality, actual and virtual. It is depth of field which substitutes the scene for the shot' (C2: 84–85; Renoir 1939).

In addition to describing the elements of the image, Deleuze offers two basic propositions for critical screen analysis: the movement-image and the

time-image. Both movement and time are technical and abstract concepts that screen-based works dramatize. Movement images and time images engage processes that activate further models and forms on screen and in thought. Deleuze notes the points at which cinema invents a new logic for addressing movement and time.

First, in Deleuze's terms, the movement image produces its own world, its own universe in fact, a process of what philosopher Henri Bergson termed a 'metacinema' (C1: 59). Matter is 'a set of movement-images' (C1: 61). Deleuze will prove that this 'set' is in fact an 'infinite set' wherein each set is extensive and forms what Deleuze terms a 'Whole' or 'Open' as it 'relates back to time or even to spirit rather than to content and to space' (C1: 59; C1: 16–17; see chapter 2 Movement). The movement-image, as Deleuze names it, thus has its own generative process of 'cinematographic consciousness'; it is a living thing.

Second, Deleuze expands his ciné-semiotic language to describe the time-image. Deleuze's discussion of the time-image is oriented by philosophical focus on the perception of forms, the description of reality, and the undertaking to account for the methodology of filmmaking techniques and practices. Influential for his entire philosophical oeuvre, Deleuze wrote monographs on philosophers especially concerned with issues of difference and time: Kant (Deleuze [1963] 1984), Spinoza (Deleuze [1968] 1990a; [1970] 1988a), Nietzsche (Deleuze [1962] 1983a), Bergson (Deleuze [1966] 1991), and books on Foucault (Deleuze [1986] 1988b) and Leibniz (Deleuze [1988] 1993), the latter two published in France directly after the two cinema books. To take analysis of Deleuze's construction of the time-image taxonomy, in addition to further consideration of Bergson's work in *Matter and Memory* (1896) and *Creative Evolution* (1907), some background on Leibniz, Foucault and Nietzsche's philosophy is useful for reading the frequently dense passages in *Cinema 2*. The work that Deleuze engages from each thinker's oeuvre provides distinctive paradigms for the taxonomy that Deleuze constructs of the time-image.

Deleuze engages Bergson's focus on duration for the task, taking into account and building upon the different forms of habitual time such as

'recognition', 'representation' and 'perception', also discussed in *Difference and Repetition* (1994: 133–142). Considering these issues up in relation to the screen medium, Deleuze's discussion is wide-ranging in scope, for example, accounting for the creation of recognizable forms of movement and time, such as the perception-image; the dramatization of time by the cinematographic image; addressing classical temporal difference created between forces of the world characterized by figures of the Apollonian and the Dionysian; Nietzsche's concept of the eternal return, and Bergson's vitalist concept of duration. Deleuze develops Peirce's semiology to provide new words for an account of the range of time-signs. Deleuze applies and develops some of Bergson's temporal schemas from *Matter and Memory* (Bergson [1896] 1994). Bergson's theories on issues of duration, recognition and memory are engaged by Deleuze as temporal laws that account for the different ontologies of time that the cinema produces. Deleuze's discussion of time addresses the body, the brain, politics, the event, the philosophical question of the true and the false, variations of temporal concepts such as dreams, memory, amnesia, déjà-vu, death and their operation in film. In parts of *Cinema 2*, Deleuze's discussion of time within his open-system seems impossibly dense. However, the determining logic to this system is the discussion of the components' creation of 'cinematographic autonomy' that cinema creates (C2: 243) through the nature of its open-system.

Foucault's work highlights concepts of temporal processes upon subjectivity, and the different registers of affective exchanges that power can hold over people – as Deleuze develops in his book on Foucault (1988b). Foucault pointed out that the corporeal control of activity through the monastic inheritance of the timetable that continues to govern the epistemic direction of everyday human life: 'for centuries, the religious orders had been masters of discipline; they were specialists of time, the great technicians of rhythm and regular activities' (Foucault [1975] 1977: 149–150). Foucault's work on how such historical control over human events has helped determine the chronological regimes of thinking and action that tacitly control human impulses, and applications of knowledge. Extending the Foucauldian critique of such passive and unquestioning behaviour that Deleuze undertakes with Guattari

in *A Thousand Plateaus* (where they develop the concept of rhizomatic think-ing), the cinema books offer an absolute critique of modern philosophy's posi-tions on structuralism, the representational theory of mind and the notion of 'Truth'. Rather than focus on how a certain type of narrative 'reality' is 'cap-tured' on screen, Deleuze directs us to see how the nature of the 'becomings' of each character (C2: 145; 150) determines the type of time-images produced. The points of potentiality for thinking of the new logic of the time-image include references to new dimensions, and the crystalline state as a seeding of these dimensions. At the beginning of the *Movement-Image*, Cinema 1, Deleuze refers to time as the 'fourth dimension' revealed through those im-ages able to 'open' themselves, as in Carl Dreyer's 'ascetic method' (C1: 17). As we discuss in the chapters in this book, Deleuze introduces many terms to discuss the range of the variations in modes of time on screen and the type of philosophy that is generated by time-images.

Deleuze argues that the cinematic image is not singular, but is comprised of an 'infinite set' (C1: 58). Cinephiles know this already: a screen-based or filmic idea is never complete; there may be another version, there may be alterna-tive scenes or endings in circulation; there may be alternative formats; there may be an extended discussion and revision of a screen form. The image is always in the process of determining its ensemble; a set of images which form signaletic material (as explained in the movement-image, and the perception-image) (Deleuze 1995: 65). This set is not the same as 'set-theory', rather (as we discuss in the chapter on topology), this is a conceptual field or phase of elements that enable Deleuze to build the complex dimensions of screen space. Through his work Deleuze draws on various branches of conceptual mathematics, such as in *Difference and Repetition*. The work done in the cinema books enables a specific type of philosophical direction to be taken in Deleuze's subsequent books, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1993), *Foucault* (1988b) and *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life* (2001b) which, with Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) and *What is Philosophy?* (1994), becomes a model of topological political philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari's development of the concepts of smooth and striated political spaces draw on Bernhard Riemann's conceptual mathematics in order to describe the

movements and conceptual sites of territory and the processes of de- and re-territorialization (1987: 142–145). In the cinema books, this mathematically informed conceptual approach is evident throughout, in particular the political consequences of the forms that such divisive territorial movements take on screen are made clear through Deleuze's method in addressing genre films and political cinemas. The set of images that Deleuze uses to define what comprises the screen set is the subject of this book: Deleuze's ciné-system.

How Deleuze Uses the Ciné-system

Deleuze 'does philosophy' on cinema to the extent that he demonstrates that film is a medium that shows us the immanent constitution of things (images, content, ideas), as opposed to being transcendent (mysterious, opaque, sublime). There are different kinds of concepts that Deleuze engages throughout, and other philosophical problems that he has worked on previously – in *Difference and Repetition* and in *The Logic of Sense* (Deleuze [1969] 1990b) – where the issues of 'the 4th dimension' and Plato's concepts of Forms of 'the Real' are addressed. In philosophy, Forms are framed and identified by the question, '*what is x*' (McMahon 2005: 43; Salanskis 2006: 50). Identified throughout the cinema books with a capital F to indicate that Deleuze's sense is in reference to Plato's theory of ideas, Forms are the named properties or essences of things. In conjunction with neo-Platonic screen Forms (and the philosophical debate over the immanent or transcendent nature of things), Deleuze also engages Bergson's two forms of perceptual recognition: 'automatic or habitual recognition' (C2: 44), the range of narrative forms that cinema engages and the forms that the creation of different types of 'whole' image set that the screen produces (cf. C2: 161).

Deleuze's method for discussing the time-image is predominantly influenced by Bergson, whose work on the internalization of time appears to be similar to Kant. However, as Deleuze points out, the process of the actualization of this Idea, and the realization that 'we are internal to time' and are thus a component part of that interiority – that is, 'we inhabit time' – this is Bergsonian,

not Kantian (C2: 82). As Deleuze discusses the time-image, he also engages in philosophical debates with thinkers including St Augustine, Peirce, Kant, Leibniz, Bergson, Nietzsche and film makers including Hitchcock, Pasolini, Resnais, Welles. Each aspect of the various time-images has a specific function within the Deleuzian ciné-system, and to invoke one calls upon a depth of possible configurations and nuances for the particular time-image under discussion.

In the first cinema book, Deleuze takes the time to detail a crucial aspect of his cinema system. This, as I argue in chapter two of this book, is Deleuze's thesis on *the notion of the cinematic body as a social, living system* (C1: 59; my emphasis). The system is an open-ended system – as more things enter it, or as it comes into contact with other systems, then there are an infinite number of possible outcomes. Even the actualization of something within a screen system – another film on war, or another film on family life, or another film on human or animal comedy, drama, tragedy, science-fiction, fantasy, and so on – does not mean that the possibilities are exhausted with that making. On the contrary, Deleuze's cinema methodology shows how an open system does work, or could work, but he also describes how there are many films that succumb to being closed-systems, making clichéd and static images. Deleuze also tries to demonstrate how open-systems can be co-opted for all kinds of political purposes, and how we can be attentive to the aesthetic dimensions of the system.

Deleuze's investigation into the concepts that cinema is able to produce continues his work in his 1969 book, *The Logic of Sense*, on ancient Stoic ontology. This is a process-oriented philosophical exploration of creation of 'becoming' (cf. Braidotti 1994; Bonta and Protevi 2004; Roffe 2007: 43–47; Burchill 2010; Colman 2010). This ontological process is a perpetual process – as clearly demonstrated by the cinematographic consciousness that must be distinguished from other art forms. Screen-based audio-images are time-based in different ways to literature or painting, or even performance works. Screen-based images are subject to technical restrictions and advancements, just as other arts are (writing developments in technologies of printing and design, for example), but cinema uses a different kind of method. While its

closest medium allies may be found in music and photography, the cinema is a moving surface of intersecting components – things and ideas – that create images that dominate all other modes of communication. These images produce forces (which Deleuze describes as 'affects'), complex notions about time and space, the organization of things in the world, the politics of thought as it is produced by the cinema. In short, Deleuze questions how the cinema can affect the organization of the world, by altering perception of that operation. Thus Deleuze introduces terms such as 'worldization' (*mondialization*) and the 'world-image' in order to describe moments where films produce constructed sound/images (C2: 59).

Deleuze is in pursuit of a methodology that will enable him to adequately describe the breadth of types of images that cinema produces. So he comes up with his own type of screen-sign method, but it is useful to think of it in the terms as set up by Deleuze in *Proust and Signs* (Deleuze [1964] 2000), *The Logic of Sense* (Deleuze, [1969] 1990b) and by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* ([1977] 1983) and in A *Thousand Plateaus* ([1980] 1987).

First, the pragmatics of signs holds a key function in Deleuze's philosophy. Through consideration of the Proustian method for engaging with previously unknown objects and coming to recognize that meaning can be discerned through attention to the taxonomic relations of objects, things, and people and their repetition under different conditions and over time, through to the diagrammatic flow of differentiating 'belief or desire' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 141; 219), a significant philosophy of the sign emerges in the cinema books. This philosophy forms a *transsemiotic* of the screen image, which indicates the rhizomic, or multiple ways that signs (including those produced by sound images) produce a 'mixed semiotics', comprised of four components: generative, transformational, diagrammatic, and machinic (*ibid.*: 145–146). Each of these elements combined create different types of screen analysis, and we see this rich method applied in academic and practical work (whether consciously Deleuzian or otherwise). For example, the development of the generative (and transformational) terms of a 'minor cinema' (see Genosko 2009a) or the possibilities of 'schizoanalytic' screen analysis (see Buchanan

and MacCormack 2008), a diagrammatic method being engaged in many filmmakers works, such as Lars von Trier's film *Dogville* (2003) or Terence Davies' *Distant Voices, Still Lives* (1988) and the work of Bruno (2002) and Conley (2006).

Another significant part of the system is provided by an exploration of movement and contrast. Deleuze engages a dialectic method in order to describe the composition of screen Forms. According to the screen situation, elements of a set engage in differentiating forms of dialectical movements. This is a dialectic that is certainly comparable to other thinkers, and Deleuze draws from Burch's dialectic as much as a Nietzschian comparative ethics. Deleuze's dialectic of difference is entirely critical of a Hegelian dialectic. Hegel uses a comparative and oppositional dialectic to describe the creation of things. He uses the notion of a universal Being which assumes certain pre-existing unities. The Hegelian-based notion of a dialectic of difference is thus based on figuring models of representative thought based on dominant models of being (see Malabou 2004). Deleuze emphatically rejects the notion of a universal subject, and the notion of the representation of that subject. Rather, in the cinema books, Deleuze adopts the method he laid out in *Difference and Repetition* in order to speak of the thinking of difference as 'the state in which one can speak of determination *as such*' (Deleuze 1994: 28, original emphasis; see also Williams 2003: 57–58). The cinema books continue Deleuze's Kantian critique against the determining values espoused in the Cartesian cognitive and *perceptual implications* that support the determination of 'I think' and the assumption of being (able to think, able to conceptualize, able to judge, able to imagine, able to remember, and able to perceive). As Deleuze says in *Difference and Repetition*, '"I think" is the most general principle of representation' (1994: 85; 138). This point is useful for wresting epistemological representational analogies, judgments, conceived identities, imagined likenesses and differences away from images (*ibid*.: 138).

The Deleuzian ciné-dialectic is used as a method for *differentiating*, for the purposes of describing and comparing the same entity, in order to find out differences in kind. In the cinema books, Deleuze continually reminds us of the relations between structures of thinking and of images; of the determination

and indetermination of the structures of situations, and the behaviour of characters. As he describes with the *perception-image*, the *a priori* relations that we have with *things* in the world tend to lend shape to the ideas we have from film images, and indeed, determine *how* images are formed. The poles Deleuze names in the Cinema books include: the classical and the modern, natural and realist, the objective and subjective (of the *perception image*; of *montage*; C1: 71), empiricism and metaphysics, darkness and light, vertical and horizontal, psychological and analytical temporal expressivity, the organic and the crystalline forms of duration, degrees of zero and infinite spatial modalities, the *a priori* structure and the 'undifferentiated abyss' (Deleuze 1994: 28). These poles do not pose 'problems and solutions' for the cinema, rather Deleuze uses the dialectic as a *diaphora*: a transport, or passage of movement for intensive fields, aleatory encounters of unconnected parts, 'anomalies of movement' – that form relations 'as external to their terms' (C1: ix, x). The cinema's organization functions through the creation of such fragments, such poles of thought, by the affective intervals created between movement and within time, dialectic movements productive of mutations of form. Deleuze's theory of the cinema directs us to pay attention to the openings that fragment, empty or crack forms; where pure situations of rhythmic bliss or chaotic or controlled violence or intensive potentiality alter the screen set, reconfiguring the very imperceptible site of consciousness and its 'pure possibility' (Sitney, quoted by Deleuze C1: 233–234n 24). So, in the consideration of screen-based forms, Deleuze's cinema dialectic is neither Hegelian nor Socratic, nor is it geared toward achieving antimonies, rather Deleuze engages the dialectic for its binomial mechanism: its devise of thrust and reversal, the way that a dialectic argues from different modes or poles of energy. In this movement, the action of the cinema engenders different styles and forms of film: the movement engenders the differentiation of form.

In terms of the form of the two-volume system, the Second World War is a marker that is often invoked to describe the distinction between Deleuze's two cinema books, but again, the terms of this separation lie within the components of the elements of the war invoked. We can observe that these books are separated by extensive vectors, one concerned with movement,

the second concerned with time. This break is often described historically (in terms of key 'moments' in cinematic history, such as the advent of Italian neo-realism), but actually it is less an epistemic separation than an expression of the aesthetic (and stylistic) poles of the same event. As we shall further explore, Deleuze invokes the notion of a pole frequently in the cinema books, and uses it as a signal for *movement*: a *caesura-reversal* that enables critical perception of 'caesura points' and ensures that there are no distinctive limits for the image to be thought (C1: 34).

The Function of the Deleuzian Ciné-system

When we see or hear images or sounds as they move across a screen, they interact with our body of already determined knowledge, perception and experiences – this is what we can call the aesthetic domain of screen participation. What we think we already know, or what we imagine can be confirmed or shifted, augmented or reduced by what we see and hear. Deleuze's system argues for an awareness of the processes and forces of an internally regulating entity that operates as an organism that relies upon certain systems to keep it functioning. Deleuze describes his system in a number of ways. Discussing the intensive forms that different films' content will focus upon (which he describes in terms of the large form and collective knowledge and the small form and vectorial points), Deleuze likens the body of the cinema to both mathematical planes of calculated movements and organic paradigms of life. Overall, the cinema books depict a cine-system that functions rather as a human body functions, in that it requires a respiratory system, a circulatory system, and a nervous system – each part of which contributes to the cine-system in singular and collective screen circumstances. As Deleuze described in an interview published in *Libération* in 1980, 'A system is a set of concepts. And it's an open system when the concepts relate to circumstances rather than essences' (Deleuze 1995: 32). So this cine-system is not THE system, rather it is a processual system – an open-ended practice of making concepts.

The Deleuzian system is designed to be to be used, abused, extended or reconfigured. It offers a number of discipline-specific pedagogic and intellectual avenues – for fields of film, media and communications studies, philosophy, education, sociology, political theory. The existing literature on Deleuze's cinema books demonstrates this breadth of possible applications and extensions. Specific authors have picked out parts of the system that are relevant to the work that they are interested to make or engage with. In the English language, Steven Shaviro published *The Cinematic Body* in 1993, providing an account of the implications of some of the genetic terms of cinematic thinking provided in the Deleuzian system – such as the terms of 'molecular sexuality'; D.N. Rodowick focussed on the arguments of the time-image to describe the terms and possibilities of Deleuze's 'time-machine' (1997); Barbara Kennedy provides a close reading of the terms of the affection-image, looking at Deleuze's affect-image in relation to a set of specific case studies (2000); Ronald Bogue in *Deleuze on Cinema* (2003) looks at the core arguments of Deleuze's Bergsonian-influenced taxonomy of cinematic signs; David Martin-Jones wrote a book based on this system that focuses on the concept of 'national identity' (2006); Anna Powell has used the system to look at horror films and 'altered states of consciousness' achieved through experimental cinemas (2005; 2007).

What the Deleuzian approach to cinema provides is a platform that enables and encourages a more considered and holistic approach for analysis of the moving sound-image. Instead of privileging a cognitive, analytic, sociological, or historical method, Deleuze's system draws us to attend to first the forms of production and then the affective forces at work that contribute to the types of forms, and thus content, that are created or re-presented on screen. Within the Deleuzian system, notions such as 'history', 'knowledge', 'gender', 'subjectivity' or 'nation' are rejected as being constructed determinations that are often as inadequate in their ability to articulate ideas on screen as they are static. Such notions are of course not without value, but it is in their application to the moving sound-image that Deleuze's cinema books frame.

Rosi Braidotti noted that Deleuze's emphasis on the 'activity of thinking differently' throughout his work, together with his 'emphasis on processes,

dynamic interaction, and fluid boundaries' is an approach that is entirely suited to understanding the methods, limitations, and potential of our contemporary culture (Braidotti 1994: 111).

2

Movement: the *Movement-image*

Deleuze begins his investigation into the cinema in terms of its movements in two arenas: the philosophical and the technical. Deleuze argues that movement informs our understanding of the formation of worlds in terms of the types of information it selects and generates as new forms. The cinema creates many different types of movement-images and Deleuze describes six key types: the perception-image, the affection-image, the impulse-image, the action-image, the reflection-image and the relation-image. Drawing on the concepts of philosopher Henri Bergson and film theorists André Bazin, Noël Burch and Jean Mitry, the point that Deleuze argues is that the screen image is a relational whole which changes, either through movement or through temporally mediated events that have altered the situation of the moving-image. From this perspective, he argues that the image equals

> *movement; a metaphysical whole is formed through its immanent movement. The system of the movement-image is a dual process of the differentiation and specification of objects, but, as Deleuze contends, it is not to be understood as a language of moving objects, but a process that creates a whole screen world.*

Director Jim Jarmusch tells the story about how the first part of his second film, 'The New World' in *Stranger Than Paradise* (1984), began life shooting with off-cut lengths of 16mm film from the production of Wenders's *Der Stand der Dinge* (*The State of Things*) in 1982. In addition to this, Jarmusch has a gifted roll of black negative film from the legendary filmmaker Jean-Marie Straub. Working with these materials, Jarmusch constructs a style that he repeats with variation in his later films, where the insertion of the frames of black negative film in between 16mm frames creates a '*true black*' space between scenes, enabling each film to draw itself into the whole of life through the framing of the details of life (Andrew and Jarmusch 1999).

Stranger Than Paradise makes itself through the process of the mix of discarded film stock, just as any remake, remix, reference, or sampling of ideas, techniques, materials, affords a new insight into the whole. A scene opens, the camera (cinematography by Tom DiCillo) follows the movement, and then abruptly it seems a black shutter comes down as the 16mm film is literally cut and the black film length inserted, before the next scene opens up again, plays itself out, and again is cut by the black interval. Edited by Jarmusch and Melody London, the film has a matter-of-fact style echoing the prosaic nature of the scenery. This process is repeated throughout the film in varying lengths and longer cuts, particularly in the second two of the three parts of the film, with the first section's timing being around the following ratios: scene = x minutes, black interval = x minutes. Motion is considered and slow in these individual scenes, grinding down movement to its most basic operation through a staging of snapshots of everyday matter making daily time irrelevant. Yet on the other hand, when we consider *Stranger Than Paradise* in its entirety, or in relation to other of Jarmusch's films that use

this technique – *Night on Earth* (1991), *Dead Man* (1995), or even the inter-titles of *Ghost Dog* (1999) – the temporal modes of the characters as they undergo movement become clearer. As they move around their worlds and as they encounter other people, things, or ways *of being* (attitudes, cultures, music, politics), the movement-image engages a 'pedagogy of the image' (C1: 13) – just as Deleuze describes the images of Roberto Rossellini (1946; 1952) and Godard (1963) – and a *'pedagogy of perception'* (just as Daney described Straub and Godard (Deleuze 1995: 70, original emphasis)). This is what we see in *Stranger Than Paradise,* where the movement (which incorporates sound) of the true black images, created by the narrative structure, cinema-tography, sound design and editing create images of the absolute relations between objects, people and ideas in scene. And, as these images begin to coalesce over the duration of the film, they provide a lesson on interactivity (a pedagogy of perception and of consciousness). 'The movement image has two sides,' Deleuze explains of this apparent paradox, 'one in relation to objects whose relative position it varies, the other in relation to a whole – of which it expresses an absolute change' (C2: 34). This 'cinematographic whole' is given through camera movements, cessations and ruptures (C1: 27). But it is a false sense of unity given by the movement-image, as Deleuze argues that any cinematic 'whole' is always 'open' (C1: 28). Any 'truth' of an image, as we shall see, is created within the modulations of the image-set, one side in a 'process of *differentiation*', one side engaged in a 'process of *specification*' (C2: 29 original emphasis; see chapter 10 Time). The movement-image, says Deleuze, is 'the thing itself caught in movement as continuous function' (C2: 27): It is an interactive encounter that engenders further movement and perception of other dimensions of life.

What is Movement?

In philosophy, movement has always occupied a central position, where the contrasting physics of something flowing is opposed to something being slowed down, diverted, striated or broken (as in thought, or life itself).[1] Movement

in the cinema is different from the kind of movement produced by any of the other arts. In general, if we think of movement and the cinema, we think of the term *cinematography*, which in technical terms is a consideration of the camera's ability to record kinetic activity. However, all things that produce images contain and produce movement – of a physical and or mental kind. Of course, the cinema is not the first art to produce movement, and throughout the cinema books Deleuze acknowledges this with references to critical considerations of movement in numerous art forms: early cine-photography (Étienne-Jules Marey (C1: 6)), painting (movement through planar juxtapositions of depth of field in painting between the sixteenth and seventeenth century (C1: 26)), music, dance (ballet and mime (C1: 6–7)), and literature (such as Kafka C1: 21). However, Deleuze's taxonomic approach focuses the task of defining movement in the cinema through continual reference to the argument concerning movement inherent in contemporary philosophy, as inherited from ancient philosophy, namely the 'opposition between the Platonists and the Stoics' (C1: 13). To prove his argument, Deleuze takes the type of new forms that the cinematic medium is able to create, and describes their formation and significance.

When it comes to consideration of screen forms, the possibilities for movement are only bound by the degrees of creativity in relation to equipment and technical ability. The camera itself contains many mechanisms that move (whether digital or analogue): the lens focus must move and adjust itself; the camera may follow movement of things around; a fixed camera may record movement between things; a camera may follow action very slowly or very rapidly; the camera's movements and effects can engage mental movement with very slight effort, creating sensorial, cognitive, intellectually, psychologically triggered neurological and physical movements – this is a 'properly cinematographic *Cogito*' (C1: 74; see chapter 5 Perception). Sound is a component of the movement-image, unless otherwise specified. It is all of these complex functions of the cinema that interest Deleuze: how can this mechanical and technical thing produce such a body of thought; of images; of knowledge; of actual ontology? These issues provide Deleuze with a good alibi of the properly philosophical to make his inquiry into the nature of the

differential as a movement that produces thought and creates the world realities that we subscribe to, and that operate to configure us, through duration. 'Antiquity came up against these aberrations of movement,' he writes, 'which even affected astronomy, and which became more and more pronounced when one entered the sub-lunar world of men (Aristotle)' (C2: 36).[2] In other words, human perception is formed, guided and affected by movement, and different types of movement determine different types of action, perception, affections, impulses, reflections, relations. Deleuze takes the auterist position for the production of images: 'Certain great movements are like a director's signature' (C1: 21).[3]

In addition to the human perception of movement that he studies in relation to the cinema, Deleuze, and Deleuze with Guattari, explore non-human perception and construction of movement; the movement in worlds of biomorphic diversity; plants, animals, minerals; the geomorphic structures of the world (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 233–309; cf. Bonta and Protevi 2004). Through all of his work Deleuze considers movement as a necessary life-process (the philosophy of vitalism), and in the cinema books, he further defines the terms of the Bergsonian propositions for movement.

How Deleuze Uses Movement

Cinema 1 begins with two sides to the argument: the philosophical and filmic consideration of movement. Henri Bergson's 'discovery of a movement-image' is comparatively addressed with correlative filmmakers (C1: xiv). First up is German director Wim Wenders, whose film *Falsche Bewegung* (trans. false movement, commonly known as *Wrong Move,* 1975) is inferred in the prefaces to the English editions of both cinema books by the term *false movement*. And this notion of *false movement* forms the crux of Deleuze's discussion of Bergson: 'Instead of an indirect representation of time which derives from movement, it is the direct time-image which commands the *false movement*' (C1: ix, original emphasis). What Deleuze reasons in this proposition (which he proves in his discussion of the time-image) is that movement is a dynamic

continuum that should not be thought of in false (e.g., constructions of spatial) terms, but in terms of the different functions of duration of the *'immanent material elements'* that are within an image (C2: xi-xiii; see chapter 10 Time; C1: 4, original emphasis). As we shall discuss with the framing, shooting and cutting of an image, and through the consideration of time, these functions extend to consideration of multiple modifications to duration made through movement, for example, the rhythm of duration (C1: 17). While drawing on Bergson, Deleuze also takes him to philosophical task for his own engagement with false movement, asking if Bergson had 'forgotten' his own discovery of the movement image (C1: 2; cf. Olkowski 2009). Although apparently serving us a philosophical elephant in the room instead of a commentary on the cinema, as is revealed by Chapter Four of *Cinema 1* (in his 'second commentary on Bergson'), this line of enquiry will galvanize Deleuze's position and advancement of Bergson's own *dual system* of approaching the concepts that living images create (for further critical discussion of this point see Bogue 2003: 11–39, 12–13). The concept of the power of the false (and false movement in the cinema) is a philosophical and political point that Deleuze engages through all of his work, and work with Guattari. The false is a way that Deleuze will use to mark or register the form of either movement or time, a power of 'falsification' that marks the system of 'truth' created. 'This idea of truth', Deleuze commented in a conversation from 1985, is something that 'has to be created in every domain' (Deleuze 1995: 126). Any 'truth' of an image, as we shall see, is created within a specific image-set (see also the time-image).

Deleuze sets forth three theses on movement in *Cinema 1* through two commentaries on Bergson: chapter one's 'Theses on movement' (three ways of regarding the organization of movement), and chapter four's 'The movement-image and its three varieties' (on the image and image-movement (the infinite set), with modifications of previous statements after his address of the issues of the closed set (the frame and shot) and montage). Each of these three theses on movement spin off into correlative propositions, and it is worth reading the original Bergson texts alongside Deleuze's references to his texts in these early chapters to get a sense of how and why Deleuze gleans

Bergson's language for expression of these ideas. Location of the threads of each distinctive proposition for movement can be made by following through each of their differential positions:

1. movement and the instant;
2. the properties (quality) of the instant;
3. movement and change.

The three theses follow Bergson's discussion of movement in *Matter and Memory*, *Creative Evolution* and *Duration and Simultaneity: With Reference to Einstein's Theory* (1922). Deleuze outlines Bergson's discussions, and then counters with his own proposition on the thesis in question.

The first thesis of movement looks at 'movement and the instant' (C1: 1). This is what Bergson terms 'cinematographic illusion' and Deleuze will counter with 'sections which are mobile' and begin to foreground the importance of Bergson's notion of duration (C1: 1–2; see chapter 10 Time). Let us think this thesis through with a filmic example that *appears* to perform this cinematographic illusion, Gus Van Sant's film *Elephant* (2003). Van Sant's film looks at the events surrounding a fictional school shooting in the United States, based in part on the 1999 Columbine High School Massacre. In style, *Elephant* references English director Alan Clarke's short film also titled *Elephant* (1989), set in Belfast, Northern Ireland during the Troubles (c.1963–85). Clarke's *Elephant* (1989) chronicles the actions of a gunman tracking victims and shooting them, with the camera recording the trajectories of gun finding victim, shooting and killing, then starting the movement toward the next victim. Adopting Clarke's spare style, although executed at a slower pace, Van Sant's plot tells a story by drawing up detailed images of victims (perception and affection images) and the creation of other victims (action-images) through movement.

In Van Sant's *Elephant* we have a series of images that are brought together to depict instants in time, some of which overlap in their simultaneity of occurrence (the cinematographer is Harris Savides, the editor is Van Sant). The camera frames one of the male characters who will take part in the shooting,

Alex (actor Alex Frost) future gunboy, in class. He is being physically abused by a number of other students who throw things at him while the teacher explains the behaviour of atomic orbitals (a mathematical function of an electron in an atom), apparently oblivious to the action behind his back at the blackboard. The camera records the gunboy Alex in the school bathroom, silently cleaning the muck that was thrown at him in class out of his hair and clothes. Cut to a scene of Alex in the school cafeteria, where the camera is tracking him, almost going past him, but then holding him in central focus for the scene, steadicam (the stabilizing device for the camera) keeping the image frame in close to Alex's body and face as he looks around the cavernous room at its configuration, its fixtures, the ceiling, and jots down some notes. Alex is silent, aside from a singular, pivotal exchange with a girl as they come to stop in the same floor space. 'What are you writing?' she asks, to which calmly he responds, 'Oh this?' 'Yeah.' 'It's my plan, you'll see.' He walks forward and looks around some more, is brushed past by another student to which he shakes his head and writes again in his notebook. Then the camera pulls back away from him slightly, allowing a view of some more of his surroundings. The noise of full-service school lunch in the cafeteria is amplified, and again the gunboy puts his hands to his head, as though the sounds of the other students pain him. The camera no longer acts as a protective cloak against his environment.

   In each of these scenes, the camera holds an autonomous quality: it feels like it is choosing who to track, follow and frame as it encounters different characters in each scene, and often abruptly alters course and begins to track someone different, going the opposite direction. This camera movement indicates the privilege of the moving body that cinema has become, but also signals a moment of technical expertise – the production of the events. The breadth of extension of this movement is played out in a number of films similar to *Elephant* in their use of an extended camera movement so that, in tracking characters, a registration of behaviour is given; the camera does not judge. Compare, for example, the camera movement in Abbas Kiarostami's *Ten* (2002), Tsai Ming-liang's *He liu* (*The River*, 1997), Béla Tarr's *Kárhozat* (*Damnation*, 1989), *4* (dir. Ilya Khrzhanovsky, 2005), the work of

cinematographer Oleg Mutu in *4 Months, 3 Weeks and 2 Days* (dir. Cristian Mungiu, 2007), *Wandâfuru raifu* (*After Life*, 1998) by Hirokazu Koreeda, or in *Into the Wild* (dir. Sean Penn, 2007).

Elephant loops back on itself several times, with each main character trajectory sometimes crossing over other pathways. The film shows instants in time that had first been recorded in front of a character, which are later shown as the same situation, but from another point of view. Is it the same section of time, and the same situation, that the movement of the camera traverses? Deleuze says that this thesis of cinematographic illusion; 'real movement → concrete duration', and 'immobile sections + abstract time' is an 'incorrect formula' (C1: 1). According to Deleuze, Bergson's first thesis is that 'movement is distinct from the space covered' (C1: 1). However, it must be remembered that Bergson is writing during cinema's early stages; in its analogue pre-digital state where filmic movement was literally regulated according to the projector speed and film, where recorded frames of celluloid film are projected on average at twenty-four or eighteen frames per second, with the eye perceiving these frames as a continuous movement. The analogue filmic strip in its literal plastic form is comprised of still images, thus Bergson will say in his book *Creative Evolution* that 'the cinematographic method' gives itself 'the illusion of mobility' (1983: 324; see chapter 5 Perception). But as Deleuze points out, Bergson is quick to offer that 'the cinematographical method therefore leads to a perpetual recommencement' as 'you will never reconstitute movement', as it 'slips through the interval, because every attempt to reconstitute change out of states implies the absurd proposition, that movement is made of immobilities' (*ibid.*: 324–325). This later proposition is ancient philosophy's conception of movement, where actual movement is deemed to be impossible and things only appear to move through their reconstitution in sections with their 'instants in time' – this is what Deleuze presents as Bergson's first thesis for the cinema. Bergson discusses Zeno's paradox of the flying arrow (one of four of Zeno's paradoxes listed in Aristotle's *Physics*) – that motion is impossible. Picturing an arrow in flight, Zeno divided each component point of its flight path into singular moments in time and saw the arrow as stationary at each instant, and therefore, not moving (*ibid.*: 325–328). Deleuze does

not agree with Bergson's appeal to Zeno's paradoxes in *Creative Evolution* as a way of discussing the cinema as merely 'the reproduction of a constant, universal illusion' (C1: 2). Rather, Deleuze looks to Bergson's earlier work, *Matter and Memory*, which he reads as a crucial work of critical theory for the cinema, with its discovery of the movement-image (C1: 2).

The Function of Movement

How the cinema works is through 'false movement', says Deleuze; movement may have 'instants in time' but they are never immobile. The cinema 'immediately gives us a movement-image', observes Deleuze (C1: 2), because the cinema has filmed movement – however imperceptible – it has filmed a duration. To think of an analogue state of projection is to miss the point of the movement image, as it reduces the cinema to its merely mechanical function, and ignores the release of images of time, no longer dependent upon a chronometric movement (see chapter 10 Time). D.N. Rodowick discusses this aspect of Deleuze's film-philosophy in relation to Chris Marker's 1962 *ciné-roman La Jetée* (1997: 4). Thus, for Deleuze, the cinema 'does not give us an image to which movement is added', rather: 'It does give us a section, but a section which is mobile, not an immobile section + abstract movement' (C1: 2), and this is what we see in the sections of movement in Van Sant's *Elephant*. We can call these mobile sections little plots of time, but what is clear is that these movements are but sections of the whole movement. This does constitute a set, as Bergson discusses in *Creative Evolution*, a closed system and a finite set, but, as Deleuze in his second commentary on Bergson clarifies, this is '*an infinite set*' (C1: 59, emphasis added). Explaining his point further Deleuze notes, 'despite some terminological ambiguities in Bergson, it is not an immobile or instantaneous section, it is a mobile section, a temporal section or perspective' (C1: 59; see chapter 5 Perception).

After we have seen the whole film of *Elephant*, we can appreciate the senses of infinite that Deleuze employs here in two distinct ways. First, there is the terrible social sense of the boundless repercussions of events as depicted in

Elephant (and similarly with films that address specific events[4] in tumultuous public social histories: *La Bataille D'Alger* (*The Battle of Algiers*; dir. Gillo Pontocorvo, 1966); *11'09"01– September 11* (Prod. Alain Brigand, 2002); for critical commentary on cinematic affects of violence and war, see Shapiro 2009). The events of such films describe how singular incidents actualize the existence of things, drawing in both the new and a pre-existing assemblage of things, and then how that assemblage becomes transformed anew through that singularity (Stagoll 2005: 87). Second, with this statement (the infinite set) Deleuze challenges the false problem of the operations of a movement-image as a closed set by mathematically based philosophy. (Hence his flag concerning *false movement*.) Under Deleuzian image (atomistic) theory, Aristotelian-based theorems of cinematic movement, space and time pose problems that are often false problems because they are incorrectly framing known physical laws of the universe. There may be issues of narrative equilibrium to be achieved that 'motivate' movements of cause and effect within a certain style of film, but when dealing with events in the world, resolution of any kind is a decision enforced by the closed sets of factors such as genre or production. Extending Deleuze's diagramatization of the event, we can observe that the infinite set in film constitutes an actual real 'event' that can be 'a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples such as an audible wave … [f]or time and space are not limits but abstract coordinates of all series …' (Deleuze 2001a: 77).

The 'vibration' of an event – an instant in time – and the infinite ripple affect causes the type of movement that is the subject of the second and third of Bergson's theses on movement, and Deleuze's on the movement-image (and this movement is to be further understood in Deleuze's discussions on *relations* and *perception*). As the boy in *Elephant* bumps into Alex the gunboy in the cafeteria, the gunboy is annoyed enough to write down the other boy's name in his record of who to kill. This instant in the film (second thesis) creates a movement-image of change (which is the third of the Bergson theses). The instant is one formed in a response to an environment, 'a transition of one form to another' (C1: 4), such as we see the dance movements in films where performers respond to their environment and incorporate it in their

movements (Deleuze references the action movements of actors Fred Astaire and Charlie Chaplin (C1: 7)). This *relation within* is the second thesis on movement – what Deleuze terms the 'privileged instants and any-instant-whatevers' (C1: 3). This thesis on movement is critical for film analysis, as the cinema shows us that properties of the instant that are made through the *qualitative* (relating to inherent, distinguishing properties) as opposed to quantitative (relating to measurable properties) types of movement. This 'instant' in *Elephant* is both poles of movement: privileged and any-instant-whatevers, not unique, but an instant of movement within the continuous movement of the film. Deleuze gives us the example of Russian director Sergei Eisenstein, whose focus is always directed toward such instants as pivotal moments of a film. The moment in *Bronenosets Potyomkin* (*Battleship Potemkin*, 1925), for example, when a mother is shot standing at the top of a staircase and her baby in its pram teeters at the top of the Odessa steps, is a chilling image of war. This is undoubtedly a climactic moment in the film's narrative, but in describing the movement of this moment of the image, says Deleuze, we should not confuse this as a moment of an 'actualisation of a transcendent form' (C1: 6; see chapter 4 Montage). Although Eisenstein's cinematic subjects are marked by 'moments of crisis' – the 'pathetic' points of scenes – such 'remarkable instants' are 'still any-instants-whatevers' and these can be 'regular *or* singular, ordinary *or* remarkable' (C1: 5–6, original emphasis).

Again Deleuze enters into a philosophical debate with his peers on this point, providing a primary lesson on the 'modern scientific revolution' (C1: 4–5). Alongside the developments of modern astronomy, modern physics, modern geometry, and the differential and integral calculus (after Newton and Leibniz), where does the advent of cinema sit with its own relational engagement with time and movement? Initially regarded as an 'industrial art', '[cinema] was neither an art nor a science' (C1: 4; 6). What the cinema does, says Deleuze, following Bergson's cue, is provide us with new questions about 'reality' (C1: 8). Ancient philosophy regarded those false instants of time as immobile and productive of the 'eternal'. Cinematic mobile instants produce 'the new' (C1: 7). And Deleuze underscores what, for him, is the essence

of cinema: its production of a new ontology, he continues, 'that is, of the remarkable and the singular, at any one of these moments: this is a complete conversion of philosophy' (C1: 7; for critical work on the Deleuzian 'production of the new', see O'Sullivan and Zepke 2008).

The term 'conversion' is precisely the basis of Bergson's third thesis on movement: 'Movement always relates to a change, migration to a seasonal variation' (C1: 8). Through the introduction of new matter to a situation, an insertion of a new section into a whole, then the whole has changed, altering its configuration forever, and enabling us to see the notion of an infinite whole (C1: 10).[5] This movement and change, as Deleuze goes on to explore through his cinema books, is defined through relation, perception, affection, time, space, sound, action, direction, speed, and thought itself. Consider the divergent images of movement through change in *Drugstore Cowboy* (dir. Van Sant, 1989), or in *Lola rennt* (*Run Lola Run*; dir. Tom Tykwer, 1998). When Deleuze considers thought and the movement-image in *Cinema 2*, he demonstrates that change does not have to be translational, as in a variation of a set of things through physical movement, but may constitute a conversion of thinking by non-translational movements, moving transversally, or ceasing movement altogether. When cinematic movement enters into the world, movement has an even more pervasive force upon perception and thus philosophical practice. Following Bergson, Deleuze describes the assemblage of executed and moving images as a mechanism of the universe – a 'metacinema' (C1: 59). Deleuze stresses how we can consider every single image that we can imagine – and those we cannot – as made by movement, movements of 'interatomic influences', atoms, molecules, our bodies, brains, eyes, as all pervasive, and which shape 'an infinite set' (C1: 58–59). In other words, the image is a dynamic entity, as he shouts at us in 1983, 'IMAGE = MOVEMENT' (C1: 58, original caps).

Deleuze says a film may be comprised of multiple kinds of images, but has one type of image as its dominant one: active, perceptive or affective. Then the relations produced through each of these types of image form the impulse-image, and as we shall see, the limits of the action-image in its crisis of movement (C1: 68; 70). Deleuze brokers a discussion on how to 'extinguish'

these types of images as part of his logic of differentiation (C1: 66). The dual aspects of movement – the relations between objects within sections, and the change in the whole – mean that the objects of cinema 'are united in duration' (C1: 11). Bergson's third thesis has opened the levels of framing of the movement of this duration, which Deleuze addresses further in his address of the technicalities and concepts of 'frame, shot and cut'.

3

Frame, Shot and Cut

What film theory generally discusses as film style, cinematography and the mise-en-scène *(costumes, props, set, lighting, editing, sound, acting method), the rhythm of the moving shots, Deleuze prefers to discuss in terms of the framing of* the movement-image. *This chapter is key to Deleuze's cinema system of the apparatus of film. The technical aspects of the framing, type of shot and cut performs a crucial function for a film's qualities creating what Deleuze calls* a set of values *or* a relatively closed system. *The framed image set/system changes according to temporal modifications (montaged sequences, the pace and rhythm of cutting and framing) and through the selective inclusion or exclusion of (qualitative and quantitative) information. In examining the construction of the movement of this image through its shot, framing and cutting, Deleuze takes each image/sound back into its protean*

world of creation – and thus locates its unlimited potential to reshape itself into future (variable) images.

Consider the portrait like the framing of a character against a background: for example, the character of Wilhelm (actor Rüdiger Vogler) in the film *Falsche Bewegung* (Wenders, 1975). In the opening scenes of the film the images are of Wilhelm framed against a bedroom window in his mother's apartment. Cinematographer Robert Müller directs the camera to hold a steady, *medium shot* of him standing near the window, which frames his mid torso and head against the window, and then *close-up shots* of his head and hands – the camera imperceptibly following his actions. There must be a camera placed inside the bedroom with him, looking towards him, and then another, outside, in a *crane shot*, looking in at him looking out from the first-floor apartment. Inside and outside shots are spliced together – *cut together* – so as to form one continuous film-time scene. The action of the film will follow this portrait of him, the camera relentlessly framing him. Later, another scene begins with a long shot of a beach and then cut to a close-up shot of Wilhelm's face framed against a window – is he back in the first-floor apartment room reminiscing? The answer is no, for as the camera pulls back, the expanded frame reveals that he is now in a different room, one overlooking that beach. In yet another scene, the camera frames his portrait, intercut with shots of what he is looking at: a woman on a parallel train, her face framed as in a portrait by the train window in a moving shot as she travels away. Here the image is in movement, literally. But as the film multiplies Wilhelm and others' portraits, the mobility that is generated from the concrete aspects of movement derails the physically determining meanings of the individual shots. As Deleuze will argue, movement becomes 'fractured' (C1: 128), 'decentred', and thus discontinuous, generating a 'false movement' (C2: 143). This movement creates a new modality of time that will change the 'status of narration' (C2: 131).

Wenders's film describes how the camera's framing of a person's life offers a translation of the movement of instants of time: those *any-instant-whatevers* that Deleuze described as Bergson's second thesis on movement (C1: 3).

These are the 'mobile section' of instants which Wenders's films play out, as we see in *Falsche Bewegung*, where units of mobility (shots) comprise the singularity that is Wilhelm at any given framed set, yet this singularity changes as more sets are harvested into the whole film. This is what Deleuze refers to as 'the dual point of view' of the shot: 'the translation of the parts of a set which spreads out in space [Wilhelm], the change of a whole which is transformed in duration [gathered in the layered portraits of a young man; the whole of the film *Falsche Bewegung*]' (C1: 20). Deleuze notes that Wenders makes 'a particularly concrete reflection on the cinema' in the two films that frame the 1975 *Falsche Bewegung* in Wenders's trilogy of portraits of time and movement: *Alice in den Städten* (*Alice in the Cities*, 1974), and *Im Lauf der Zeit* (*In the Course of Time*, commonly known as *Kings of the Road*, 1976) (C1: 22–23). What Wenders's and Müller's framing of the *concrete movement* of the cinema emphasizes is the dual nature of cinematographic perception. On one hand, the camera leads us to a pragmatic consideration of movement – following a tracking shot, the way that the frame draws attention to certain features in a room, the direction of the rhythm of shots through intercutting (of shots). Now in this, says Deleuze, 'the mobile camera is like a *general equivalent* of all the means of locomotion that it shows or that it makes use of – aeroplane, car, boat, bicycle, foot, metro …' (C1: 22, original emphasis and ellipses). Deleuze makes use of this relative projection of the ingenious nature of Wenders as a filmmaker throughout the *Movement Image*, at one point comparing Wenders to a Kafka parable to stress his argument on the perception of an image, and its affective qualities as movement goes 'beyond the states of things' (C1: 100–101). Deleuze develops his discussion of the implications of dual movement of the camera from close-up to long-shot and back again in the *perception-image* and in his address of the large form (see chapter 5 Perception). What is out-of-frame or out-of-field in the shot counts toward the processes of 'differentiation' between images that create thought (C2: 179; chapter 13 Thought).

Expanding the view of film theorists (through this section Deleuze works with the ideas of Burch, Bonitzer and Mitry) who account for the *pragmatic movement* of where and how the camera locates itself (and we can include

in this pragmatism any special effects of post production), Deleuze argues that the polar of such *quantitative data* is the *qualitative* data made through movement. Both aspects have implications for processes of creating meaning. The physical mobility of the camera – its 'primitive' capacity for moving, is the false movement that Deleuze investigates – arguing that while the image that is movement, but the 'shot' the camera creates 'is the movement-image'; a 'mobile section of a duration' (C1: 22). This is an important point for analysis of all information generated by technologies of all types, not just screen media, and here indicative of how the arguments concerning temporal shapes that Deleuze explores in his cinema books can be extended to other and future considerations of all media. It is not 'sufficient', notes Deleuze, to merely distinguish 'concrete' or 'imaginary' properties of something, dependent upon whether it is within the spatial frame of the shot, or out of the shot (C1: 17). Rather, the frame carries within it the possibilities of a far more complex set of processes which function: 'As Bergson says, although he had not seen its application to cinema, *things are never defined by their primitive state, but by the tendency concealed in this state*' (C1: 25, emphasis added). Film theory that analyses its material by determining whether or not something is 'in or out of shot' can often overlook this inherent tendency or nature of something, as equally as it can neglect the technical aspects that might be generative of types of image properties.

Developed for screen by writer Peter Handke, the story of *Falsche Bewegung* is based on Johann Wolfgang Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (Goethe [1795–96] 1917). Goethe's novel is a narrative of the process of apprenticeship, where the travel topology canvassed is a pedagogy of life experience: change through movement. The relationship between travel, movement and perception is a philosophical theme that Deleuze repeatedly returns to in the cinema books (see chapter 5 Perception). Yet Wenders's film takes not only the pedagogic nature of 'the passage of life' as its plot, but also examines the passage itself – as physical and as metaphysical (relating to the constitution of being) movement-frames. This is a common trajectory in Wenders's films: how movement comes to constitute and consolidate the tracing of pathways of existence, the desire to experience things, and how histories are created

– not just by humans, but by things and places and events, as in *Der Himmel über Berlin* (*Wings of Desire*, 1987). The themes of apprenticeship and pedagogy no doubt appeal to Deleuze, who had already made a lengthy study of the notion of apprenticeship through the search for love, carried out in his book *Proust and Signs* (2000).[1] To access any new system (language, love, culture), specific semiologies must be learnt (signs and their meanings) – this is the nature of an apprenticeship of any new arena or paradigm. Yet certain axiomatic ethics of pedagogy are involved in any apprenticeship, therefore, as once one part of the system is learnt, then others are engendered, and this has consequences for the system – in terms of knowledge, perception and aesthetics. One can only see what one is trained to see: even the most 'objective' of framing is affected by the style and manner of an apprenticeship (however Deleuze will describe how the cinematographic *cogito* alters this fixed perception in his account of the *perception-image*). The 'relatively closed system' (C1: 12) of the cinema, thus provides a 'material universe' (C1: 59) of a contained system of apprenticeship, enabling a 'becoming' (C2: 145) of situations, conditions, characters or things. This closed system is open to change (and this is not to be considered a paradox) – as a process articulated by what Deleuze terms Bergson's 'infinite set' (C1: 59). In the context of its cinematographic use, the closed system to which Deleuze refers is in fact the detailing of how a film takes shape. In this technical process, regulated by what Deleuze and Guattari called the *'machinic processes'* of social formations, a self-affective transformative 'metacinema' arises from the cinematographic shot, cuts and framed composition (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 435, original emphasis; C1: 59). Deleuze's thesis is this: it is the inherent nature of this socially coded technical process – the cinematographic layout itself – from which the whole of the movement-image arises. This is the machinic nature of the cultural assemblage of a film: machinic not in the sense of the mechanist dimensions of the cinematic, but in the sense of the cinematic body as a social, living system (*l'agencement machinique des images-mouvement*) (C1: 59; Deleuze 1983b: 88). This is a position of defining film as formed through process; a *'machinic assemblage'* (*ibid.* original emphasis).

What are the Frame, Shot and Cut?

Any discussion of the frame and shot, framing and cutting, plunges into the technical aspects of filmmaking which determine the creation of an image, the construction of scenes: a film. Framing seems simple, but is not: decide what object to film, and point a camera at an object. Do you zoom in to fill your frame with the texture of its surface, its materiality? Or do you frame the object sitting in situ, providing context through information about the scale, physicality, relativity of the object to its surroundings, but lose important details? There are important issues of choice that are raised by this complex activity of framing and shooting. Films are often remembered through the recollection of a particular framed scene – an arrangement of things, a colour, sound, or dialogue, a close-up of some thing or person – which may be intense, absurd, revelatory or excessive. These technically created facets of the cinema generally operate within already existing paradigms – those axiomatic systems of knowledge that are instantly 'recognizable' – as regulated by cultural conventions and economic controls.

Shooting and cutting will affect the way that the framed object appears. Holding the camera on the object for one continuous shot (a *long take*) (X number of minutes of chronometric time mapped with screen-time) will convey a different perspective of time and place, for instance, than a sequence comprised of two or more shots cut together at certain time intervals, with or without sound information either transitioning across or interacting with or matching the image in or out of frame. The action of splicing (*collure*) involves the literal splicing together of celluloid sound and images. While a literal physical cut was used for film stock such as 16mm or 35mm (common stock in the twentieth century), digital editing of shots employs a similar process of using units of image and sound in post-production editing. Cutting individual shots and sounds together that were filmed or made in different space-time axes so that they present a continuous sequence (a whole) is a technique commonly referred to as *montage*. Sound can operate at various levels of montage against or with the image (see chapter 4 Montage).

The pace and rhythm of intercutting shots, either with aspects of the same scene or with discontinuous spatial scenes, affects the image in a number of ways. Established connections, the sense of continuity, and the idea of chronometric time are transformed by the length and pace of shots, thereby altering the breadth and quality of information conveyed by the frame (see chapter 4 Montage). Even if an image is the result of an immobile camera (a fixed shot), the shot provides a temporal perspective on continuous information (C1: 24), provided by other connections in movement, such as sound, preceding frames, the character or topology of the scenery, and so on. For example, consider the opening shot of the landscape with its frenetic alien sounds in *There Will be Blood* (dir. Paul Thomas Anderson; dop. Robert Elswit, 2007). This shot is held for a determining length of time before it is cut to a contrasting shot below ground, an industrious silent frame of misanthropic activities as yet buried under the petroleum sediment hills. Contrary to such marked cuts of time are the shots of Wilhelm in *Falsche Bewegung* held as long as the tedium of life shows itself in the framed image. In each movement-image, created by the cut shots, conceptual and economic choices have been made about aesthetic and generic formations. As Deleuze will describe, the length of the shot and the decisions about the lengths of movement between cuts results a movement-image that shapes dimensions into multiplicities.[2] Rather than situating his analysis of the shot and cut just at the cardinal level of counting frames and lengths of shots (which results in the naming of something already resolved), Deleuze will focus on the kinds of translations in the on-screen circumstance-generated conditions.

In the French language the camera 'shot' *plan* implies a number of different meanings, including the sense of a geometric plane, something which Deleuze will play off in his discussion of the image as an *ensemble*. In philosophical terms, Deleuze describes the plan in terms of its affective organizational (and political) terms of the planes of immanence and transcendence (Deleuze 1988a: 128). Although the Spinozist sense of the hidden dimensions of social power or what Deleuze terms as the 'theological plan' (*ibid*.) are completely underplayed in the cinema books, the word *plan(e)* provides a rich vector for

film philosophy and for screen analysis. In cinematic terms, Deleuze draws upon Burch's discussion of the geometry of the French etymology of plan, but with qualifications (Burch 1980). The geometrical organization of the plan is used in the measurement of distances between the camera and its framing of an object or body for the name of the shot – a *plan américain*, for example, a term used to describe a group shot of characters from their knees up (a 3/4 length shot). A shot can also be named after its lens type – a zoom (lens) shot, a wide-angle (creating distortion, for example scenes in *Pierrot le fou* (Godard, 1965), the deep-lens shots constructed by Gregg Toland for Orson Welles for *Citizen Kane* (1941), and then developed in the *The Magnificent Ambersons* by Welles and Stanley Cortez (1942). Bogue details Deleuze's use of the *plan* and *plans* as encompassing all possible senses and techniques of the shot – whether close-up (*gros-plan*), long shot (*plan d'ensemble*), or a tracking shot, and so on – in terms of Deleuze's address of a 'unity of movement' (C1: 27) which 'brings together a multiplicity of elements' (Bogue 2003: 45). In terms of framing and cutting the shot (*cadrage et decoupage*), Deleuze also mines the etymology of this word for his discussion. *Cadrage* is the framing in ciné-terminology, but to speak of the *cadre* is to address the framework of something and to speak of the environment. The activity of cutting – *découpage* (*découper* = to cut into pieces) – is not the same as in the English adoption of this word meaning an act of cutting and reassemblage, but in the French film industry, *découpage technique* refers to the process of the construction of time-space blocks of film, the act of shooting script, of editing length to film duration and spatial qualities to the limits of the frame, of throwing things into relief through cutting, interweaving images (Burch 1980: 3–16). The English-speaking film industry has no single word that encompasses this sense of *découpage*). This point should be considered when drawing from Deleuze's descriptions of montage and the action image as a result of instances of *découpage* and affective framing of particular conditions and qualities.

How Deleuze Uses the Frame, Shot and Cut

Considering the effects of the framing and movement of shots in images is a method of topological philosophy. As used by Deleuze in the Cinema books, it continues the type of critical epistemology Deleuze presents with Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*, where their study of geometric *physicality* enables a framing of qualitative material (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 361–364). Here, Deleuze and Guattari use this method of 'descriptive geometry' – such as Deleuze will employ to describe camera shots and movements across a frame – as 'a minor science' and a 'mathegraphy' (*ibid.* 364). This approach provides a methodology for the taxonomy of film concepts as Deleuze's interest in the frame, shot and cut/edit of the film is not for technical reasons – although he takes time to explain some of them – rather he is interested in what concepts and forms these types of activities might enable.[3]

In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze says Jean Epstein comes the 'closest' to the concept of the shot as a 'mobile section, that is, a *temporal perspective or a modulation*' (C1: 24). Deleuze cites Epstein's description of 'the nature of the shot as pure movement', a 'descriptive geometry' (C1: 23, translation has modified Epstein's citation slightly). In his discussions of specific films, Deleuze argues for attention to the product of the shot construction and its form of modulation. Deleuze constantly draws his taxonomy back to the notion of *the false*, which he will address in *Cinema 2* as a 'power' (C2: 126). The false power can transform cinematographic elements. Over the chapters that engage elements of the shot, montage and narrative in cinema, Deleuze describes how different sequences of images 'enter into relative continuities' (through sequence shots where different images are rejoined to the whole), or are formed through 'false continuities' (where what is outside of the frame, which Deleuze refers to as 'the Open', draws into the image) (C1: 27–28).

Cinematic consciousness is produced by the different types of *framing of the image*, and the ways in which that image has been constructed by what Deleuze explains in terms of kinetic and chronic regimes, where a movement of duality also produces false and true continuities (C2: 126–128). Thus the shot construction and its form of modulation work to form the 'two poles of

existence, the connections that determine a continuity *and* discontinuous appearances to consciousness' (C2: 302 n1). Deleuze charts examples (in the films of Hitchcock, Godard, Ozu, Syberberg, Mankiewicz) where attention to the framing of the image, and the dis/continuity of parts within a shot work to construct different screen arrangements, but also new images (C1: 12–13; C2: 126–127). The unity of the image, or what Deleuze sometimes refers to as its whole (*tout*), is created through the movements of different sets (*ensembles*). We see the closed system of framing an image as in the transformation of Wenders's characters of Alice or Wilhelm, or in Dutch director Marleen Gorris's 1997 film *Mrs Dalloway*, or Stephen Daldry's 2002 film *The Hours*, where the interconnections and changes brought about through the system enabled by 'Mrs Dalloway' reveal the process of subjectivity to be about the levels of becomings, changes through movement.[4]

In all senses of the shot, Deleuze says, the shot holds a dual unity, a 'dual requirement' (C2: 27). This in no way refers to the 'shot-reverse-shot' of classical Hollywood cinema, although this is a type of shot that, when employed, contributes to the type of unity to which Deleuze refers. The unity is one achieved through movement, for example where a shot engages a singular moment through its framing, and its correlation to other shots, either sequenced before or after it, with which it may enter into multiple relations. It may produce an open or closed system.

The various ways in which a movement-image is framed, shot and cut together has the effect of fusing all possible narratives in a film, resulting in the 'coalescence' of multiple images (such as in images in Wenders's films) (C2: 127; see chapter 10 Time). The assessment of the meaning of the film is thus *not* made in terms of the links between narrative and stylistic continuity, as is the case with much formalist film theory. Deleuze's ciné-system focuses on how and what variations of images produce: 'As in mathematics, cuts no longer indicate continuity solutions but variable distributions between the points of a continuum' (C2: 121). Deleuze develops the *incompossible* in terms of a 'crystalline' temporal mode and 'false' narration of movement (see chapter 12 Topology). Such complex domains are inferred when he simply states: 'The shot is the movement-image' (C1: 22). But, as Deleuze addresses

with his notion of the movement-image, there are two aspects of movement to first consider: sets (closed) and wholes (open). The shot is 'the intermediary' between the set and the whole (C1: 19).

What is a set? Within individual films the type of narratives, the range of information given, the places, time and people created are contingent and controlled by the type and style of frame, shot and editing (cutting technique, speed, rhythm). These technical considerations are what distinguish the qualities and functions of things and bodies in film. Deleuze addresses the production of a film through this technical formation of a set of things: *'every-thing which is present in the image* – sets [*décors*; scenery], characters and props – *framing*' (C1: 12, original emphasis). Each of these parts that comprise the set of a frame are the 'elements, which themselves form sub-sets' (C1: 18). Each *set* (notably, the word Deleuze uses in the French is *ensemble*, which is a mathematical set, but also invokes the notion of an *assemblage*) produces a finite set of things – a closed system – determined in space and by abstract conceptions of time, by their framing.

Sets are thus different to the *wholes* of duration (Bergson's third thesis; see chapter 4 Montage) but both comprise the movement-image. Extending Bergson's thesis, Deleuze takes 'three levels' of this framing to consider the technicalities of how it is possible that the discreet parts of the (closed) sets in a scene/film (individual objects, people, sounds, etc.) operate to create a whole that forms an *infinite system*, where that assemblage of images keeps on producing more and more variation of meanings (the influence of Spinozan thought on Deleuze here is worth further consideration (cf. Negri 1991; Gatens and Lloyd 1999). The three levels he names are:

1. sets;
2. the 'movement of translation' and 'modification' of the objects within sets;
3. the duration or whole which changes 'according to its own relations' (C1: 11).

Describing the first level – a set that frames things – Deleuze directs us to consider how the technical stresses of the cinema produce paradigms for

forms (and herein lies the influence of philosopher Henri Bergson, but equally that of film theorist Noël Burch). Identifying the process of camera framing as 'limitation' (C1: 13), Deleuze states: 'Framing is the art of choosing the parts of all kinds which become part of a set. Within this set, there may be sub-sets which provide further degrees of information. The main set is a closed system, *relatively* and artificially closed' (C1: 18, emphasis added). Useful for film (and all moving media) analysis are the five characteristics that Deleuze describes as comprising the 'first level' of this closed system (or closed sets) of the framed image. In each film, choices concerning elemental details for shooting and cutting provide: (1) *information*, which is relational to (2) the *limits* of the frame, (3) the *topology* of that framing, (4) the *point-of-view* of the shot, and the inference or interference of (5) any *out-of-frame* (*hors-champ*) material (C1: 14–15).[5]

The second level describes the shot and movement formed by shot and cutting techniques which cause a translation of movement and modification 'of their respective positions' (C1: 11). In films each shot works to construct a specific *cinematographic consciousness* through particular types of move-ments: creating the mobility of the cinema's duration, creating the type of topological dimension for the image. This dimension can be thought of as the spatial orientation of the image, but the physical movement of the cam-era, explains Deleuze, is what offers situational points for analysis of shifts in perception, mutations, changes; variations and image-becomings, where change or endurance is apparent by the modifications of the situation shown through movement (C1: 23). Deleuze discusses this conscious change of the shot through its movement in relation to Hitchcock's film *The Birds* (1963). *The Birds* is often referred to in film studies for its cross-cutting editing tech-nique of increasing speed between edited shots of bird attacks, their victims and the onlookers, where the editing rhythm creates a pace for the action (cf. Bordwell and Thompson 2003: 224–225) However, Deleuze is following film theorist Noël Burch in looking at *The Birds* to see how 'shot transitions' (Burch's terms) 'can give rise to patterns of mutual interference' (Burch (1969) 1981: 12). This approach directs film analysis to look at the arithmeti-cal affect in addition to its pace. Deleuze discusses how this technique of the

movement of the elements of the scene can be analysed in terms of: (1) the resonance of the 'relative movement' of a director's screen signature, (2) the dynamism and geometry of specific movements, and (3) the 'distributions between elements' (C1: 20–21). The first two points are elements that Burch would come to dismiss as pointless formalism (Burch 1980: vi). However, it is the third point that distinguishes Deleuze's cinema system, in its articulation of the variation of elements – of the contradictory and complex elements of a situation – as they coalesce over time. Each of these divisions of the elements that make up the whole of the set of a shot offers insight into both the construction and the division of the elements which makes up the scene. This is the 'dividual' of what avant-garde artist Jean Epstein referred to as the '*perspective of the inside*' of an image (Epstein cited by Deleuze C1: 23, original emphasis; C1: 221 n20). Whatever kind of shot, says Deleuze, it 'always has these two aspects: it presents modifications of a relative position in a set or some sets. It expresses absolute changes in a whole or in the whole' (C1: 19).

The 'third level' of Deleuze's Bergsonian inspired thesis of movement is the determination of the whole and the expression of duration (C1: 20; C1: 29; see chapter 4 Montage, chapter 10 Time, chapter 12 Topology). With regard to this level, Deleuze describes how the topology of cinematographic consciousness is never static – it is one of movement and change (Bergson's third thesis), even in a set of 'vacant interiors' (C1: 12). When he writes: 'the whole is the Open, and relates back to time or even to spirit rather than to content and to space' (C1: 17), Deleuze is describing how the whole (sets of images) are shaped in image (in film), through the internal relational movements (such as modes of montage) of sets. The framing of an image (key for Deleuze's cinema system) provides the paradigmatic framework where difference – *the dividual* – causes change, through introduced elements of time: 'This is Ozu's thinking: life is simple, and man never stops complicating it by "disturbing still water"' (C2: 15). Taking Japanese director Yasujiro Ozu's implication of this image of life – as one of perpetual movement – this image records the event of a disturbance to water, whether it is in the view of the camera and explicitly recorded, inferred through off screen sound, or noise dialogue. The shot is what provides a map of an image's movement, a particular filmmaker/

cinematographer/director's 'signature' style of filmmaking (C1: 21) – such as the beautiful and tragic consciousness that Ozu's style conveys through human interaction with the elemental worlds and vice versa (see Ozu's film *Akibiyori* (*Late Autumn*, 1960)). In the Deleuzian sense, the term 'shot' refers to the camera as a dominant consciousness: a cinematographic consciousness that will determine the forms of filmic universes that are framed, a provider and selector of levels of participation to information.

The Function of the Frame, Shot and Cut

Deleuze's discussion on the frame and shot orients itself through the mediation of specific directors whose work excelled in showing the limits of the camera and of human ability for perception and action within a system of their own devising, or their reaction to an elemental system beyond their control. The choice of what is framed determines how something is perceived (see also perception-image). To frame, a physical or abstract 'centre' is invoked. To find a centre, or even an asymmetrical 'acentre' of an image for the purposes of framing and shooting, x number of elements, objects and functions come into interaction. This is the aspect of differentiation (and dedifferentiation – the loss of specialization in form or function) that Deleuze addresses with numerous examples from the cinema to show what happens.

The centre is *physical* in images where a specific actor's style – Deleuze mentions Gene Kelly, Fred Astaire, Jerry Lewis and Alain Masson – effect a 'degree zero' (C2: 61). Behaviour and gesture have generated the situation, modified the genre, and created a new or different image. We can also note that the framing of the image (its arrangement within the set), its shot and cut (spatial and temporal), is also a result of decisions on the production and arrangement of the elements within the image (including the actors body), how they are cut together in a shot. However, as Deleuze argues, it is the movement of the cinematic world that affects the mobility of characters, to the point where an infinite mobility is engendered by its very limitation by the frame (C2: 59).

Deleuze constructs the technical terms of the screen's topology to focus on the *information* that a framed set – or shot will offer. Analysing the complexities of information provided in film and in media spaces is a theme that runs throughout the books (cf. C2: 268–269), and Deleuze chastises us for not assessing the image properly in its framing, 'because we do not know how to read it properly; we evaluate its rarefaction as badly as its saturation' (C1: 12–13). Saturation has been one of the dominate features of Contemporary Hollywood cinema particularly since the advent of 'MTV' culture (1981) and digital editing styles where 'rarefaction' of the image is the tendency of the movement-image toward the simplification of the image, through a stress on a dense singularity. In Jarmusch's *Stranger than Paradise* (1984), a singular sound, such as the repeated refrain of the song 'I Put a Spell on You' performed by Screamin' Jay Hawkins, or a singular frame when the image is cut to a black frame in between scenes, acts as a decrease in information of the frame. But at the same time this rarefaction invokes its polar – as a density of the frame, a saturation of black references, Hawkins' expansion of the genres of blues and rock, and Jarmusch's use of 'I Put a Spell on You' as a sound-image. Deleuze engages with this aspect of the extreme 'affective framing' in terms of the temporal and spatial implications (compression or dilation, rarefaction and saturation), and close-up of an expression or event in a later chapter on 'the affection-image' (C1: 102, see chapter 6 Affect). The sound ('I Put a Spell on You') and the image (black frame) change the whole scene when heard or seen. These frames re-shape the meaning of the (whole) image through an 'accent' on a 'single object' (the example Deleuze gives is the famous glass of milk shot in Hitchcock's 1945 film *Spellbound*, where the entire frame becomes filled with the white density of the milk). Deleuze references Burch on this point of a black or white screen frame, saying this type of change in the framing of an image constitutes a change in the 'structural value', rather than just serving as 'punctuation' (C1: 13; 219 n2). Whether tending toward a saturated image as in Hitchcock, or when the set itself becomes emptied, as in one of Ozu's 'vacant interiors' or Michaelangelo Antonioni's 'deserted landscapes', the meaning of the image is formed through its framing (see for example *L'Eclisse* (*Eclipse*) 1962; C1: 13). 'Saturation' is to be considered

in terms of 'the multiplication of independent data', in terms of a collapse of spatial organization (Deleuze's example is director William Wyler – think *Roman Holiday*, 1953 or *Ben-Hur*, 1959) and the hierarchical arrangement of information (Deleuze's example is Robert Altman – see his films *MASH*, 1970, *Short Cuts*, 1993 or *Gosford Park*, 2001. All of Altman's extras have as much part to play as 'the stars', and equally there is little differentiation between focal and background objects) (C1: 12). What the camera does, says Deleuze, is frame, shoot and cut together, or montage events in such a way that the internal situation of the event is revealed.

Using examples of a specific shots from films enables Deleuze to quickly make a distinction between the modes of time, the qualities of space, and thus importantly, the political conditions that the camera movement fixes under action-images, or will invoke as thought portals as a time-image. Does the movement of the camera in a film track you across a physical space, or does it plunge the action into the depths of time? These are the criteria Deleuze will use when addressing the technical *stresses* that are in play by the operations of filmmaking, which he continues further in his investigation of the type of movement generated by the activity of *montage*.

4

Montage

Deleuze looks at four schools of montage – American, French, German and Soviet – and divergent directions taken during the first era of cinema. This chapter will address each of those directions and how Deleuze situates montage in relation to the movement of time. In the Deleuzian system, montage is the 'determination of the whole' of the image, achieved through the techniques of cutting (editing) and creating continuities. Montaged images create sets of images – it is the whole of the political and aesthetic spectrum of the production of thought, of commodities, of modes of address. Montage creates movement which in turn produces specific modes of time that are not fixed, but situational events that are contextually reproduced over the passage of chronometric time, as different people interact, intervene, and encounter things in divergent ways.

American director Todd Haynes made a film about folk singer Bob Dylan en-titled *I'm Not There* (2006) in which six disparate actors of different shapes and body types 'perform' six different episodes descriptive of a component of phases in Dylan's life. In Deleuzian terms each of these images come to-gether to make a whole life that depicts a life of multiple facets, whose final form is in perpetual movement. In a conversation on how the production of ideas occurs, Deleuze refers to the poetry of Bob Dylan as exemplary of the 'long preparation' required to produce work (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2002: 6–7). Deleuze describes how things are made after an 'encounter' with other things, people, but also after encounters with 'movements, other ideas, events, entities' (*ibid.*). Dylan's lyrics on this nature of the processual forma-tion of thought – in 'a-parallel evolution' are repeated in Deleuze's position on the function of montage in the cinema: montage is a producer of forming consciousness (*ibid.*; C1: 20). Film is comprised of a number of different kinds of images, and Deleuze calls this image-assemblage montage. Through connections as yet un-thought, un-named, but intuited through things al-ready 'manifested' in forms and the performance of those intuited senses, montage makes possibilities take new forms. What might represent life most of all is not a mimicry of life, but a practice that shows how life shapes itself by chance and through contrived connections. Through this movement, and through these circumstances, events, fissures and forces, and political and thus aesthetic positions are formed. Similar in its aesthetic ideals to the anti-hero journey movies of *L'Avventura* (*The Adventure*; dir. Antonioni, 1960), *Little Dieter Needs to Fly (*dir. Werner Herzog, 1997), *Stranger Than Paradise* (dir. Jarmusch, 1984), *Im Lauf der Zeit* (*In the Course of Time*, commonly known as *Kings of the Road*; dir. Wenders, 1976), *Into the Wild* (dir. Sean Penn, 2007), or *Scott Pilgrim vs. The World* (dir. Edgar Wright, 2010), *I'm Not There* demonstrates how different encounters generate mul-tiple images and perspectives that modulate the whole (the components of the image) into a specific consciousness of something. As Deleuze will argue, the image is a product of 'the sensory-motor schema', located in the 'hodological space' of the screen (C2: 127). To understand the composition of the image, Deleuze looks first at descriptions of things, then the forms

of 'continuity' that the type of film sets up (logical, continuity shots or sur-
realistic connections).

To recap the *movement image*, the three levels of Bergson's thesis on
movement that Deleuze ascribes are: (1) the creation of a closed system (by a
screen situation), (2) the movement that occurs between each component in
the system (a scene/character/situation/film's internal relations), and (3) the
changing whole (the mode of montage) engages in *kinetic migration*; as ideas
and things circulate, their movements 'enables each to contain or prefigure
the others' (see chapter 2 Movement; C1: 29).

Operating as the third level of Bergsonism comprising the *movement im-
age*, montage types engage images in and out of the frame in different ways.
Dependent upon the type of montage, there are a range of political and aes-
thetic implications for the images produced. Montage will create certain forms
of the movement-image, and this is the reason why Deleuze pinpoints this
technique as fundamentally one of epistemology, where the screen engages
in a pedagogy of perceptual formations. Scene by scene in turn, images give
rise to signs (as we shall read with regard to the Peircian semiotics Deleuze
draws upon in chapter 8 Transsemiotics) of meanings of all types, including
the signs of the process of creative formation itself: this is montage.

What is Montage?

Considered within the domain of twentieth-century modernist art move-
ments, montage was a radical practice that caused a reassessment of vision
in cognitive and perceptual terms. Montage refers to a technique of putting
together different things, and has various specific names for that technique,
according to the media platform being used: photomontage for photographic
images; collage or montage for the plastic arts of sculpture, painting, draw-
ing, or sound; montage for screen work. Modernist painters such as Natalya
Goncharova (for example her painting *Linen*, 1913) and Juan Gris (*Still Life
with Open Window, Rue Ravignan*, 1915) made famous their vernacular tech-
nique with their practice of the collection, collation and collage of disparate

images and things from their everyday situation. James Joyce's novel *Ulysses* (1918–22) exemplifies the work of the modernist artists' who were trying to visualize the dynamism of everyday life, the processes of change, and the scale and terms of movement, the dimensions of speed and slowness. Their method engaged the principle of self-reflexivity where the hook-up of process and examination of the object becomes a part of the final work. Visualization in whatever medium is recognized to be concerned with investigating the types of relationships generated from forms (abstract and representational), sound, colours and movement-images. Through this epistemological investigation of vision, the question of representation of life is in itself critiqued. This era, says Deleuze, 'was the search for a kinetics as a properly visual art', which was to be seen in the silent cinema of the era, as well as the plastic arts and music (C1: 43).

In relation to screen forms, montage generally refers to the joining of cinema shots (with sound being a component part of any shot). Montage can serve either or both of the primary movement-image functions, either to perform a cliché or metaphor of sound-imagery, or to engage in creative or destructive aesthetic-political ends. Montage thus serves to disrupt *or* standardize the schemata of standard sensory-motor perception and provides a different/ normative vision of the world. In this sense the critical consideration and analysis of montage is an encounter with the specific *pathologies of movement* that a particular director, producer, actor, financier, chooses to engage.[1]

As a process, the activity of montage creates an image of time and determines the particular mode of time of a film. Montage is movement, whether mechanical activity (mobility of the camera (C1: 24–28) or in the edit suite) or movement within perceptual processes, and this movement is what will create a cinematic whole: the film itself. Technically speaking, there are many different types of montage that a director/cinematographer/editor/sound engineer-producer may intuitively, deliberately and/or accidentally choose to use for the purposes of filming.

Deleuze names a number of different types of montage, via their function in terms of the creation of forms, through their dialectic of difference (see the discussion on how Deleuze uses the ciné-system to engage a screen-dialectic

of form). The editing together of disparate and like things, whether as music enfolding a single shot, or whether as two or more places cut together, produces a range of effects and affects. Deleuze concludes at the end of *Cinema 2* that montage is one of the most significant components of image production and the cinema. Ultimately, the non-extensive, internal (or immanent) 'perpetual exchange' of actual and virtual image is what Deleuze will define: the production of the autonomous image (C2: 273). Deleuze describes this further in relation to the time-image, but for now we must continue with the taxonomy of technical details.

In his system, Deleuze notes three forms of montage:

1. 'the alternation of differentiated parts';
2. montage of 'relative dimensions';
3. montage of 'convergent actions' (C1: 31).

The technique of montage enables the relational variation of the movement-image to express multiple positions in space and show how these may vary, or depict how images might change in what we understand as historical, cultural, geo-physical or chronometric time. Through montage, divergent aspects of an image are brought into proximity, are linked together, through direct and indirect cinematographic techniques (of which matters of perceptual capacity are just as important to consider as formal techniques). The result of which is the 'whole' that Deleuze speaks of – meaning the specific type and form of relational *consistency* of the whole of a filmic world.

In filmmaking terms the key names for montage techniques of the early twentieth century are the Russian film makers Lev Kuleshov, Dziga Vertov and Vsevolod Pudovkin. To construct his argument, Deleuze draws on the filmmakers who use and discuss montage – Eisenstein, Vertov, Pasolini, Jean Epstein (C2: 36). Deleuze also looks at the work of directors whose films rely on the perfection of certain types of montage – Luchino Visconti, Welles, Hitchcock, Resnais, Rouch, Perrault, Godard – and the film theorists who discuss it – Bazin, Jean-Louis Schefer – and the philosophers who attended to the kinds of forms that were produced by modes of dialectical movement that montage produces – Aristotle, Kant, Hegel.[2]

How Deleuze Uses Montage

For Deleuze, montage is a form and technique that is the primary way that the movement-image and its varieties are composed. Deleuze is speaking of analogue methods of montage, so techniques are different for digitally compressed images, but the morphological process of montage remains the same for all types of screen image. In *Cinema 2* Deleuze poses the following chicken-and-egg question: 'Which is first, montage or movement-image? The whole is produced by the parts but also the opposite: there is a dialectical circle or spiral, "monism" (which Eisenstein contrasts with Griffith-style dualism)' (C2: 159). Deleuze has already answered this question in *Cinema 1*, in his third chapter on montage, where he describes montage in the Bergsonian terms of duration: the movement-image is expanded from within as more montaged images dilate the whole. This durational whole, says Deleuze, is expressive of 'the indirect image of time' (C1: 29). In this Bergsonian sense, Deleuze radically alters and extends how we can approach the techniques of montage.

The discussion of montage lends itself to a number of core concerns for the Deleuzian ciné-system. Screen montage is the cinematic equivalent of philosophical problem-framing. The image identifies the issue and then contrasts it within its world, or with other elements that either challenge or complement it. Deleuze always has his philosophical problem of difference in mind, arguing that the forms that Eisenstein creates make him 'a cinematographic Hegel' (C2: 210). Devoting a large chapter to the subject of montage enables Deleuze to flesh out some of the problems of the differential method he employs to articulate the movement-image. Philosophical debates concerning the 'singular' and 'the infinite' are engaged in his discussion of the 'any-instant-whatevers', for example, as part of his address to Plato's question on the composition of the transcendent moment (or sublime) and relational ontology in Forms. In describing how the 'alternation of differentiated parts' (instead of an image composed by dialectical opposition) (C1: 31; 45) leads to different types of montage wholes, Deleuze also gives examples of what he terms the 'relation-image' (cf. C1: x; C1: 215). Deleuze notes that 'the

techniques of the image always refer to a metaphysics of the imagination: it is like two ways of imagining the passage from one image to the other' (C2: 58). In this sense, a *dialectic of movement* (which we can see as a component of the montage) is where time can be defined in relation to movement (C1: 31–32). Time can be considered as a whole, as an interval, or indirectly produced through montage (C1: 32). Over the duration of the film, *I'm Not There*, for example, the lived eras of Dylan as subject become simultaneous images through the montaged alternation of the differentiated parts of each image. Other kinds of relation-images arise when time is not produced by movement and mental images that arise through relations: (1) natural relations and the mark, (2) abstract relations and the symbol, (3) free indirect relations and the opsign and sonsign (see chapter 13 Thought).

Montage is an essential component for the indirect time-image to occur, the result of a motor-sensory movement (see chapter 10 Time and chapter 12 Topology). The physics of movement on screen are the montage-event that Deleuze addressed from the first chapter of *Cinema 1*: 'the cinema is the system which reproduces movement as a function of any-instant-whatever, that is, as a function of equidistant instants, selected so as to create an impression of continuity' (C1: 5). In calling attention to the ways in which films dramatize their internal and external organization, Deleuze draws our attention to the kinetic processes of the screen – how ideas are played out, but also how characters or situations take form, or are engaged in what Deleuze calls the process of becoming (see chapter 11 Politics).

Deleuze divides the variations of montage into what he views as the 'four main trends' that can be distinguished by their culturally specific concerns – however different their technique or style (C1: 30). Thus he names four 'schools' of filmmaking of the early twentieth century that engage distinctive practices of montage: American, Soviet, German Expressionist and Pre-war French (C1: 30). Deleuze will qualify this grouping of 'national' productive characteristics of cinematic groupings, making the observation that as with any group, in terms of shared communal 'themes, problems and preoccupations', they provide 'an ideal community … to found concepts of schools or trends' (C1: 30). When referring to Deleuze's concept of a 'national' cinema,

it is a definition that is not guided by a determining territory, or geographical site, but is marked by its mode of dramatization of the circulating ideas and the forms they may manifest in various states of transition and motion that are produced in specific countries' conditions (see chapter 11 Politics for ways that Deleuze engages different nationally produced cinemas).

Deleuze characterizes the style of montage from each named national cinema in the terms of this sense of community, testing out some of his claims in other parts of his argument. Although this might seem like a simplifying rule for classification, Deleuze argues that the only 'generality' about montage is its function means that it places 'the cinematographic image into a relationship with the whole; that is, with time conceived as the Open' (C1: 55). By this, Deleuze refers to his overarching conception of the movement-image as duration in the Bergsonian, vitalist sense; as an ever expanding living thing.

Deleuze names, after Kant, two main modes of movement created by montage as two kinds of the sublime: the mathematical and the dynamic (C1: 53). Each have different functions. These are movement-images of the mathematical – as in the work of Abel Gance, and his film *Napoléon* (1927) (C1: 46), and the movement-images of dynamic composition (via montage), such as we see in F.W. Murnau's silent film *Sunrise: A Song of Two Humans* (1927) and *Nosferatu* (dir. Murnau, 1922) (C1: 46–53). Deleuze will invoke the sublime when describing indirect time-images, that have gone 'beyond' the movement-image, yet which require movement to figure their composition (C1: 53; C2: 238; chapter 13 Thought).

The Function of Montage?

Montage reveals that the formation of an image is through the movement of the coalescence of the two sides of the actual perception of the virtual object (C2: 68). The dialectic of the virtual actual is the premise of the law of this paradigm. Godard offers Deleuze access to one of the technical methods that a film maker uses to convey the wholeness of time, for example in his specific montage techniques in works such as his *Histoire(s) du Cinéma* (*Histories of*

Cinema, 2007), or *Notre Musique* (*Our Music*, 2004), or in direct dialogue, such as from *Nouvelle Vague* (*New Wave*, 1990): 'The past and the present that they felt above them were waves of one and the same ocean.'

The type of fragmentation to a continuum, caused through cutting different shots together, creates what Deleuze calls (in relation to the fragmentation employed in French director Resnais's films, cf. Resnais 1948; 1950; 1955; 1968) 'a technical stress which is essential in the cinema' (C2: 120). In other words the type of montage engaged determines, through intensive means, the form of reality or thought-image created by a screen image. Further, Deleuze stresses that this technique of fragmentation, which produces a continuum of fragmentations, is 'inseparable from the topology, that is from the transformation of a continuum' (C2: 120). New and different forms of 'reality' are created through transformations of forms. Montage is a technique for change: a form of self-producing machine, particularly visible on screen where situations and events work to reconfigure individuals and communities. For example, consider the range of intensive forms of community created in scenes in the following films: *4* (dir. Ilya Khzhanovsky, 2005)*, Code 46* (dir. Michael Winterbottom, 2003)*, 2046* (dir. Wong Kar-Wai, 2004)*, Er shi si cheng ji* (*24 city*; dir. Zhang Ke-Jia, 2008).

What montage does, according to Deleuze, is achieve the 'determination of the Whole' (*la détermination du Tout*) (C1: 29). This is different to the *realization* of the Whole, which is, according to Deleuze, a process that only *thought* can achieve, evidenced through actions (see chapter 13 Thought). Different forms of montage draw up the internal, external (non-localizable), and peculiar variations of movements of life. For example, Deleuze describes hacked montage (*montage haché*) as a process where fragmentation alters the topology of the image (C2: 120). Deleuze also discusses Bazin's idea of the 'law of the "forbidden montage"' (C1: 153). This is a useful concept to keep in mind for screen analysis. When there is a scene with simultaneous terms to be held as an 'irreducible simultaneity', where montage or shot-reverse-shot are not appropriate, then the filmmaker engages this mode of composition. Deleuze refers to this as the 'third law' of 'organic composition', made common in American genre cinema (C1: 151–152). Van Sant's film *Last Days*

(2005) – a sound meditation on the final forty-eight hours of rock star Kurt Cobain's life – has many examples of this forbidden montage. Like *Elephant*, single shots are held in a fixed frame – no cuts – and either pull back or track forwards at an infinitesimal pace to enlarge or reduce the information in the frame, degree by degree, so that the situation is highlighted and drenched in a continuous, simultaneous sound. The subject must be enclosed with its surrounds and no cut-way, no *hors-champs* (out of frame) can be allowed.

In *Cinema 1* Deleuze says montage is 'the determination of the whole (the third Bergsonian level) by means of continuities, cutting and false continuities' (C1: 29). In *Cinema 2* Deleuze states that montage is 'the principle act of cinema' (C2: 34). In regarding the act of cinema as its 'determination of the whole', Deleuze extends the standard discussion of the construction of the plane of composition of a screen scene in terms of *continuity or discontinuity* (Godard's infamous jump-cuts, against the rules of classical Hollywood's 180-degree line of composition, for example). What Deleuze is stressing is against analytic cinematic theory which takes analysis of the moving image back to its shot by shot analysis, removing the movement of the living image, and often applying a critical methodology that is better suited to a (still) photographic image. Screen-based images move and change. Thus, in stressing the 'whole' that is created, and continually created out of *variations* of shots, it is important to recall that Deleuze considers those component parts as living entities. In this, Deleuze is drawing on Bergson's vitalist philosophy for the creation of new things, and on Nietzsche's affective theory where 'forces' are substituted for the old philosophies of 'judgement' (C2: 141; chapter 6 Affect).

Deleuze argues that the type of articulation of movement-images is the fundamental act of the cinematographic – which marks its difference from the photographic still, for example, and that which enables the formation of all kinds of distinctive types of films and movement images. Deleuze argues that montage is 'primary' to the shaping of both the cinematic whole and its component images (C1: 29, 55).

5

Perception

Perception is one of the ways in which the screen-image engages atten-tion. Exactly what or whose perception is being framed? Film theory often invokes the notion of a 'spectator' or 'participant'. Philosophy discusses the 'phenomenology' of the activity of perceiving something. Both approaches often neutralize or make assumptions about the ra-cialized, gendered, sexualized and thus political position and physical body of that perceptual activity. In the Deleuzian ciné-system, percep-tion is an element of a movement-image. The perception is a form that presents images of a framed perception of things, and the perception in things.

'*Esse est percipi*, to be is to be perceived' (C1: 66). This idea is one that Deleuze reiterates throughout the cinema books. The act and activity *of being* is a perception and a perspective. Film dramatizes this perception, making images that demonstrate and perform things, and thus creating new aesthetics and new perspectives. Deleuze points out that existence is empirically contingent upon the subject that is doing the perceiving. Significantly, this subject is not a human subject, rather it is the perceptual capacity of the subject of matter produced through technological platforms that enable perception (for example, within a *mise-en-scène*). For the film theorist, the difficulty of this idea rests with the description of *esse est percipi*: the actual articulation of the technical and philosophical production of this notion, which Deleuze describes as the perception-image. Deleuze draws his example from Samuel Beckett's silent film, *Film* (dir. Alan Schneider, 1964), where actor Buster Keaton embodies the perception-image; he creates images that are the subject and the object, and the cinematic perception, showing consciousness to be a matter of being (*ibid.*).

Taking the famous film by the Lumière brothers of *L'Arrivée d'un train à La Ciotat* (*Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat*, 1896), we see that the perception of movement is done by the camera, recording in one shot a steam train arriving at a train station with people milling about. The camera notes details about the materials and forms of the time of filming (Gunning 1995). *L'Arrivée d'un train à La Ciotat* is a silent film, and any subsequent overlaid sound-track has the effect of re-framing and dramatizing the moment. This is a perception-image produced by and in the camera, and functions as any technological platform functions: as a recording device of images.

However, Deleuze's argument is that in addition to cinematic perception, there are two further fields of perception to be accounted for: those created by the subject or object of the camera, and then how the whole of cinematographic perception is productive as an autonomous form. The whole is comprised of different types of perception image, which are formed through different types of movement. The second type of perception is easily figured through subjects that are framed by or which acknowledge the presence of the camera. A train travels towards a camera; an actor performs in front of

a camera; an actor might even directly address a camera; an animal may run towards or away from a camera. An example of this subject/object perception is to be found in Leslie Harris's film *Just Another Girl on the I.R.T.* (dop. Richard Connors, 1992). In the opening sequence of the film, the main character Chantel (played by actor Ariyan Johnson) stops her journey, turns, shaking her head at the camera trailing her, and in direct address to camera she talks into it and to the audience – just as she has had to engage with the various perceptions and perspectives of others who have engaged her on her journey (Jerry the model who picks her up at the train station, an older man who gives her a 'don't enter my space look' and moves away from her reading over his shoulder in the train, a boy in the street who engages her private trajectory, and who calls out to her as she walks past). Chantel tells her cinematic stalker: 'I'm a Brooklyn girl […] I don't let nobody mess with me. I do what I want, when I want'. The dialogue is in contradistinction to the elements of the plot that subsequently unfold, and Chantel's 'control' over her own subjectivity is seen to be a false notion that she holds, as constituted within her world. Chantel's direct address to the camera works by providing another perception-image to the set of previous montages of movement-images. Rather than explain these types of perception-image in terms of the 'mediation' of the technology, Deleuze argues for a philosophy of difference here, an interjection to examine how something has changed between images. This offers a way of considering how differentiation of perception occurs by and in the image. While 'natural perception' engages 'fixed points or separated points of view' (the phenomenological position of Chantel at that moment), Deleuze describes how the function of 'cinematographic perception' is something that 'works continuously' to form the movement-image (C1: 22).

As we saw in the last chapter, what is in the image is a useful term to approach the shot and frame. What is in image is the camera's perception-image; all of the component parts that will comprise the image – 'sets, characters, props – *framing*' (C1: 12, original emphasis). However, when the image is 'reflected by a living image' it becomes what Deleuze says and 'is precisely what will be called perception' (C1: 62). This creates the third field of the perception-image that Deleuze discusses – the creation of a whole.

For example, in *Der Himmel über Berlin* (*The Sky over Berlin* also known as *Wings of Desire*; dir. Wenders, 1987, dop. Henri Alekan[1]), the shots after the title frame are connected by point-of-view of the camera, modified by the rhythmic axis of the movements it sees: the sun is shrouded by clouds shining thinly over the 1980s cityscape of Berlin, graphically matched with a full screen eye of an angel, an aerial shot of the view that that sun-eye sees above the city of Berlin, shots of children who see this sun-angel looking at them, back to what is above – a bird, the angel, a plane, the angel on a plane looking at a child looking back – until the camera's frame is pulled by another consciousness and it picks up Peter Falk's character, until his thoughts, audible for the complete film image but not for the film world, and his musings continue until he mentions the name Berlin, at which point the camera frames the outside of the plane again, those same clouds swirling above the city as the plane descends towards the ground. Languorously controlling the pace of the music that has lent continuity to this entire opening sequence, the mobile camera's framing through the plane-window point of view is distracted by the sounds of radio transmissions from a radio tower emitting the signals of multiple stations from Berlin. The sound is a murmur that swells and ebbs throughout the entire film – that of thousands of voices, of thoughts controlling, directing, perceiving, observing, as the humans and angels continue in their existence. The camera leaves the plane and pursues these sounds of life, and the duration of the life-sound watchers – the angels, whose framed perception of the material history of the city provide the film story. The film oscillates between the two perception-images of the framed perception and the perception within. These are the key elements of Deleuze's perception-image: observing a passage between subjective and objective, and seeing the perception-image change its modes as it constitutes a different set of images.

Wenders' film-thinking about the perception of a specific thing leads us to the heart of Deleuze's discussion of the perception-image, and the limits and possibilities of perception-images.[2] For on the ground in Berlin we have numerous, in fact multiple, other perceptions of that same city's history; how to account for these is a question cleverly framed in *Królik po berlinsku* (also known as *Rabbit à la Berlin*; dir. Konopka, 2009), where the perception-image

reveals a pocket of human interval in land control – rabbits who were able to freely breed and live in some of the pockets of the no-man's-land space between the Berlin wall of eastern and western Berlin. This perception-image is contingent upon the duration of the living land and of its perception.

What is the Perception-image?

Screen images and sounds give form to thoughts and ideas. Screen images and sounds create worlds. In order to make sense of images, we place things into known categories of genres and style conventions, as determined by political and aesthetic cultural practices. Screen-based media materializes *perception* of these conventions and their complex, transitional and variable connections and relations, through movement which renders temporal conditions visible and audible to certain audiences, and obscures, censors, excludes and complicates situations for others. Perception of the moving time-based image is a function of the cognitive and intellectual abilities of the perceiver of that image, and of the perception-image, but, with the Deleuzian perception-image there is a second aspect where perception is to be understood as formed by a '*double system, of a double regime of reference of images*' (C1: 62, original emphasis).

Perception as a double regime of reference of images refers to a 'complementary' movement that takes place in the movement-image (C1: 62). 'The image [image 1] reflected by a living image [image 2] is precisely what will be called perception', notes Deleuze, and further, these two aspects result in the 'perception-image' (C1: 62). For example, using the film scenes discussed above, our perception of the moment on the train station is in relation to the start of the Lumières' film and its durational movement of images until the end. Within that short space (approximately forty seconds), the image of the train (image 1) has come together through movement-images of the train (+ image 2, the living image); we recognize an action-image, it produces a certain affect where the arrival of the train causes the passengers to move, which in turn gives rise to a perception-image. Or, if we take the example of the

rabbits of *Królik po berlinsku* living in the site between walls in Berlin (image 1, situation), from their perception, an action (existence) was affectively enabled by the non-threatened environment (image 2, life/affect), providing a perception-image of Berlin's historical site. Chantal (image 1, situation) in *Just Another Girl on the I.R.T.* perceives herself (image 2) as being in control, her actions and statements leading to a perception-image. In each of these examples (and there are many more that could be engaged to demonstrate the procedures of perception[3]) the perception-image is something that is formed by an arrangement of the elements in the screen image; it is an 'image reflected by a living image' (C1: 62). As Deleuze describes it, there is a doubled system of images at work here, where we have an image (train/rabbit/Chantal) referencing its own lived/living image through the site of the screen. Deleuze describes the form of this 'living image' as 'the centre of indetermination or black screen' – as we shall discuss, this refers to the movement of the perception-image (*ibid.*).

The transformation of forms by the images produced by the camera provides Deleuze's focus. To engage the arguments of the creation of philosophical Forms (as we discussed in the chapter on the movement-image) and further look at the elements of the set of movement-images, Deleuze divides the perception-image into three phases of perception forms:

1. the two poles [of perception], objective and subjective;
2. liquid perception;
3. gaseous perception.

First, the subtractive phase of the perception image is produced by polarized movements of objective and subjective (i.e., *we perceive the thing minus that which does not interest us*). Deleuze takes what he calls a 'nominal, negative and provisional' definition of perception, noting that the image as comprised of a set can be seen by someone who is either internal or external to that set (C1: 71). Deleuze notes that there are 'sensory', 'active' and 'affective' factors that will be contributed to the image (set) by the perceiver (either internal – a character, animal, or situation within the screen – or external to

the screen). The perceiver's either subjective or objective perception of the image this contributes towards its formation.

In order to describe this 'difficulty' of relating how a cinematographic perception and external subjectivity or 'cogito' is formed and informed through the movement of the camera, Deleuze develops the notion of the '"being-with" of the camera' that French film-theorist Jean Mitry engaged in his book *The Psychology of the Cinema* ([1963] 2000). Deleuze notes that Mitry points out that a shot-reverse shot scene on screen has the effect of throwing into doubt the position of the perception of the image as subjective or objective. Deleuze does not take the same route as Mitry in solving this form, although Mitry's discussion certainly has left an imprint on how Deleuze continues his argument on perception, including the following points: Mitry describes the difficulty for the film theorist, in engaging with the description of things through language; Mitry compares filmmaking to other art forms, describing the limitations that each media's structural properties hold for expression; Mitry notes that film signification is 'organised in terms of images'; and finally Mitry describes the 'active' 'unity of identification being-with its object' ([1963] 2000: 54; 83). Reproaching Mitry for his 'partisanship' in condemning Vertov's montage forms, Deleuze rejects the phenomenological position of 'knowing' that Mitry ultimately takes, and instead argues that the activity of the doubled system of perception as a 'being-with' the camera is productive of a 'cinematographic *Mitsein*' (C1: 72; 81).[4] Modifying Mitry's invocation of the largesse of a *Mitsein* to a Bergsonian position of a non-unified consciousness – a multiplicity – Deleuze invokes his mantra of perception that he repeats throughout his work: 'We perceive the thing, minus that which does not interest us as a function of our needs' (C1: 63). This holds as a useful proposition to consider and test against all screen works. Deleuze describes this tendency toward a subtractive perception as 'the first material moment of subjectivity' (C1: 63). The next two material aspects, as 'avatars' of the movement-image, relate to the action-image and the affection-image (C1: 65).

The problem that Deleuze identifies is how to extend the discussion of 'perception' beyond the poles of objective and subjective? Experiencing the 'cinematographic perception-image', notes Deleuze, has always engaged a

'specific, diffuse, supple' degree of perception that must be thought of in terms of the type of mobility it engages (C1: 72). Where is the camera in relation to the characters that it is filming, for example – is it waiting in anticipation, is it following them, is it tracking them in shots, does it offer itself as a cinemato-graphic point of view? In these terms, we can use the cinematically produced perception-image as a subtractive phase for both analysis and production of images.

Reminding us of associated problems with the linguistic interpretation of images, Deleuze engages Italian film maker and theorist Pasolini's and Mikhail Bakhtin's respective theories of 'free indirect discourse' in order to describe the aesthetic consciousness of the perception-image, as engaged by certain schools of style (Pasolini 2005; Bakhtin in Voloshinov 1973). Deleuze notes that the camera in fact engages 'an assemblage of enunciation', that produces 'two inseparable acts of subjectivation simultaneously ... there is no mixture or average of two subjects, each belonging to a system, but a differentiation of two correlative subjects in a system which is itself heterogeneous' (C1: 73). Taking the terms of Pasolini's account of the aestheticization of style that a film director imposes on an image, Deleuze considers how the two poles of subjective and objective are useful for describing how the movements in perception images are not just doubling, but engaged as in a duel. By impos-ing other images and actions upon characters, images are transformed – this is Pasolini's notion of 'free indirect subjective', created by the 'free indirect discourse' that the camera produces (C1: 74–76). In this, Deleuze directs our attention to thinking past the subjective or objective to look to the 'pure Form which sets itself up as an autonomous vision of the content' (C1: 74). Extending his critique of *Difference and Repetition* that refuted the way that ideas are compared from external differences, Deleuze then questions the differential forms that the perception-image takes within the heterogeneous elements of screen worlds (cf. Deleuze 1994: 39).

The second phase of perception-image Deleuze describes is 'liquid per-ception'. Deleuze enlists examples from French directors from the early part of the twentieth century: Jean Epstein, Marcel L'Herbier, Abel Gance, Jean Grémillon and Jean Vigo. Deleuze addresses Epstein's 1923 film titled *Cœur*

fidèle (*Faithful Heart*). This silent film montages together fixed-camera shots of a couple in a centrifugal carnival ride and flashback scenes, providing 'an amplified movement' of the lovers' moment (C1: 77). Fixed points disappear with graphic cinematography and post-production editing, but Deleuze then turns to contrast the earthiness of the Vichy-led, German-occupied French nation (1940–44) to describing a common motif of this era of French cinema, water, and the ways in which aquatic movement has the effect of displacing any sense of a central point. Deleuze's film examples include Grémillon's *Remorques* (*Stormy Waters*, 1941) and Vigo's surrealistically styled *L'Atalante* (1934). The 'liquid element', says Deleuze, is one that holds the possibility of a 'grace' of movement that does not occur on the land (C1: 79; see chapter 11 Politics).[5]

The subject of the screen image rarely holds its own agency, and discussion of a perception-image in Deleuze's terms must consider the 'material universe' of the entire production of the screen situation and the multiple dialectical levels this creates (C1: 40). Underwater, we see Jean (played by actor Jean Dasté) in *L'Atalante*, or on top of the body of water we see Juliette (actor Dita Parol) trying to walk across the boat in *L'Atalante*. Each actor's body offers contrasting perceptions and affections by their milieu; through movements each create different shapes on screen (forms) and different action-images. The specific location of the bio-technical body (camera, spectator, participant in screen culture) already has an individual culture that provides agency for the action and form of the perception-image.

Third, Deleuze provides an account for non-material perception-images in the gaseous phase. Beyond the solid and the liquid is to reach 'another' perception, which is also 'the genetic element of all perception' (C1: 85). Deleuze looks at examples of where motor-sensory perceptions are replaced by images of 'pure auditory and optical perceptions' that make perceptible the 'molecular intervals' (*ibid.*). The molecularity Deleuze invokes here is in relation to the 'microperceptions' of the processes of things changing over duration – the terms of 'becoming' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 248–249, 292–294). Difference is not just difference in form, as Deleuze points out with the perception image, but difference at levels of molecularity. Molecular

perception is something that is 'peculiar to a "ciné-eye"', but is also specific to cognitive, hallucinatory, sensory functions of the body' (C1: 79–80). The 'ciné-eye' to which Deleuze refers here is the 'kino-eye' of Vertov's *Chelovek s kino-apparatom* (*Man with a Movie Camera*, 1929) (C1: 82). Deleuze notes that Vertov's dialectic is 'in matter and of matter' (C1: 83). Deleuze considers the marine perception to hold even a 'clairvoyant function', but for the most extensive aspect of perception, a fluid perception, then in considering 'the genetic element of perception' Deleuze notes that there is a change in 'camera-consciousness' (C1: 85). Deleuze contrasts the movement-image of 'aquatic lyricism' of the French Impressionist cinema of the 1920s with the 1960s and 1970s American experimental school's gaseous perception. Of the latter, Deleuze mentions Michael Snow's film *La Région Centrale* (1971), Stan Brakhage, Jordan Belson, Ken Jacobs and Owen Land's *Bardo Follies* (1967). Although a very brief discussion is given, Deleuze's method of looking at differences of perceptual phases provide for a useful method for discerning difference beyond technological or mechanical points. Deleuze takes Snow's description of the convergence of camera and machine as productive of a 'Nirvanic zero' (Snow, cited by Legge 2009: 74), enabling a 'gaseous state of perception' where the image is defined by its 'molecular parameters' (C1: 84–85).

How Deleuze Uses the Perception-image

Deleuze discusses perception in the *movement-image* in relation to the types of variation that the movement of perception forms. Extending and testing the thesis he expounded in his book, *Bergsonism*, Deleuze takes the 'problem' of perception and solves it in terms of time, rather than space ([1966] 1991: 31). Through movement, certain new forms are created, and the perception-image is where the material of the cinema changes into a 'new dimension', and moves into a 'degree zero' – where the image is expressive of the 'relation between movement and the interval of movement' (C1: 35; C2: 31). Where the affection-image is something that happens in that interval, perception-images

are produced in the time-based relations and the movement between the two. Deleuze looks at the type of aesthetic values generated by the movement of the cinematographic medium, in its differentiation of the 'signaletic material' of the movement-image – that Deleuze defines as modulation of the image through sensory means, 'kinetic, affective, rhythmic, tonal, and even verbal' – and duration as a method which reveals the qualities inherent in things (C2: 29).

The question of 'perception' is one that Deleuze focuses on through his system's objectives, asking how is cinematographic consciousness created? As we have seen, Deleuze engages the arguments of the creation of philosophical Forms, the significance of film form, and the question of the technological platform of cinema itself. In addition, the political ramifications of the creation or mutation of forms, perceptual construction, their address and their affective capacity as produced in cinematographic consciousness is also an issue Deleuze considers (see chapter 11 Politics). The context in which Deleuze qualifies the cinematographic *cogito* differs from that of his peers. For example, Foucault describes the modern *cogito* (self) as an historically bound self, limited by its contemporaneous modes of surveillance and control (Foucault [1966] 1977: 309ff). Deleuze discusses how 'moi [me] = moi' (translated as 'ego = ego'), but the connotations of ego/me are different from the Foucaultian self (C2: 153, 199). Deleuze's cinematographic self is not the brain, as he notes, the 'brain is certainly not a centre of images from which one could begin, but itself constitutes one special image among the others' (C1: 62).[6] Deleuze rejects the idea that consciousness or perception is *of something* (C1: 56–61). Instead of describing a generalized account of 'the perception' of 'the viewer' or 'a character' in the cinema books, Deleuze addresses subjectivity as a component of all potential elements that come to constitute that self or subject by and in cinematographically generated consciousness. Subjectivity is an element of the image (see also chapter 11 Politics). Deleuze argues that 'the sole cinematographic consciousness is not us, the spectator, nor the hero; it is the camera – sometimes human, sometimes inhuman or superhuman' (C1: 20). Cinema is not an illustration of 'something'. Films do not 'do' philosophy, they 'make'; they generate images

and concepts and react upon those made images. Things are 'luminous by themselves' (C1: 60), different to the phenomenological sense of 'sensing' or the illumination of something (this is the argument of intentionality).[7]

He writes:

> An atom is an image which extends to the point to which its actions and reactions extend. My body is an image, hence a set of actions and reactions. My eye, my brain, are images, parts of my body. How could my brain contain images since it is one image among others? External images act on me, transmit movement to me, and I return movement: how could images be in my consciousness since I am myself image, that is, movement? And can I even, at this level, speak of 'ego', of eye, of brain and of body? Only for simple convenience; for nothing can yet be identified in this way. It is rather a gaseous state. (C1: 58)

In his chapter titled, 'Second commentary on Bergson – the movement-image and its three varieties', Deleuze begins by stating: 'The historical crisis of psychology coincided with the moment at which it was no longer possible to hold a certain position. This position involved placing images in consciousness and movements in space' (C1: 56). Deleuze refers to the historical crisis that philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty found themselves in in relation to the topic of phenomenology.[8] Merleau-Ponty advocated the need for extending the cognitive reconstruction of experienced visual fields by incorporating sensorial awareness (1964: 48–50). As we have discussed, rather than follow the phenomenological position (such as Merleau-Ponty's or Husserl's notion) that consciousness is of something, Deleuze follows Bergson's position, which is radically opposite to phenomenology, and describes 'me' as being an element of the image (C1: 58–61). Deleuze explains creative expression and his philosophical rejection of the 'transcendental subject' by the philosophical terms of Bergson's 'living image' (C1: 62) and Spinoza's 'planes of composition' (Deleuze 1988a: 128–9). The 'plane of immanence or the plane of matter' is the place where the doubled system of the perception-image exists (C1: 61). While encouraging attention to the material constitution of all bodies (not just human ones, but bodies of water, molecules, the earth, animals, etc.), Deleuze opposes the phenomenological 'natural' point of view, as he argues that perception of the materiality of the image is contingent upon a set of elements, and is not always determined by

movement. Of the latter point Deleuze notes, 'in the adult world, the child is affected by a certain motor helplessness, but one which makes him all the more capable of seeing and hearing' (C2: 3).

The Function of the Perception-image

Deleuze describes how differentiated images, subjects and ideas, and other activities of consciousness (the perception of layers of recollection, memory and sound, for example) are able to create a perception-image as an aspect or sign of a movement-image (C1: 68).

Watching, or participating in screen works, the form appeals or repels the participant on a number of levels. One important aspect of screen cognition is the position of consciousness, how and where it is situated, manipulated or stimulated by the screen-based activity. Commercially oriented films are careful to frame and thus direct the consciousness of the viewer through the screen event, ensuring that a certain degree of conscious 'satisfaction' is achieved, in relation to the market value of the experience.

Experimental films, on the other hand, often tend to push the perceptual boundaries of an image, forcing the viewer to question a number of different planes (and thus forms) of existence: for example *Meshes of the Afternoon* (dirs Maya Deren and Alexander Hammid, 1943); *Free Radicals* (dir. Len Lye, 1958–79); *Window Water Baby Moving* (dir. Stan Brakhage, 1962), *Spiral Jetty* (dir. Robert Smithson, 1970); *Je tu il elle* (*I you he she*; dir. Akerman, 1974), *Chunguag Zhaxie* (*Happy Together*; dir. Wong Kar-Wei, 1997), *Inland Empire* (dir. David Lynch, 2006). There are points in these films where perception becomes a time-image, not just a motor-image of the material world.

The critique of the possible perception of something and the recognition of something are central for Deleuze's argument for how the movement-image is different to the time-image. Through movement we come to find the indeterminate centre of the image, and this varies according to the type of movement-image (a centre is a conceptual point in Deleuze's system). In terms of the polar coordinates of every movement image, the centre might be thought

of as a mobile point of reference within the trajectory of a movement. If we think of a literal camera movement, as Deleuze does, following Bazin's discussion of the camera in the film *M* (dir. Lang, 1931), the protagonist is posited as the centre of the image, which we only realize when the camera ceases to follow his movements within the closed set of the screen frame, and instead 'arcs off'. But the centre may also be the interval (Jarmusch's black attitude), a rupture or break that conceals the middle, or the essence of things and people, such as the driver at the centre of Kiarostami's camera in *Ten* (2002). 'The essence of a thing never appears at the outset', writes Deleuze, 'but in the middle, in the course of its development, when its strength is assured' (C1: 3). In his discussions of the cinema, Deleuze will always focus on how movement is made in relation to an acentre of the image (the 'signaletic material' (C2: 29)). This 'middle' to which he refers is a quality that arises from the forms and actions of a particular kind of (directorial/cinematographic) movement. 'The image reflected by a living image is precisely what will be called perception' (C1: 62). In defining the perception-image, Deleuze draws upon a number of strands of philosophical debate, as he begins to qualify the terms of his taxonomy further and develop the different aspects of cinematic modulation between movement and time, and make comments about the philosophical understanding of the creation of Forms.

6

Affect

The affection-image is one of the three core varieties of the movement-image in the Deleuzian ciné-system. Deleuze situates affect as a potential force that holds consequences for not only the composition and expression of movement, but directs, controls, and situates the metaphysical movement of the creation of difference through the virtual to form a whole, a complex entity that is open, in infinite movement.

In Charles Laughton's 1955 intense expressionist film, *The Night of the Hunter*, a most poignant scene arrives. Two little children, who have been orphaned and terrorized, have run away from their current situation. Pursued by an enraged man, the Preacher Powell (played by actor Robert Mitchum), they spend the night in an open row-boat, moved down the river by its current

of black and silver water. The film maps the movement of these children as they negotiate a short, but intensive period of their lives, and the affects of the movement of other bodies that they encounter upon their own directed-becoming. Tracking them, the Preacher rides his horse alongside the river, humming a sinister word alongside the musical score of darkness and folly (music by Walter Schumann). There are several shots that comprise this scene, where camera frames and situates the children alongside and from the point of view of the animals they pass in the night: a gleaming spider's web, under which their boat passes, a bullfrog puffing up as if to sing. The camera shots present the animals in close-up, providing intervals to the shots of the man on the horse, his shadow, and the children in the boat (dop. Stanley Cortez). The girl's sweet voice reigns over the scene: 'One night these two pretty children flew away/Flew away/Into the sky/Into the moon'. In following scenes we see more animal life: the dilated eyes of an owl on the prowl, an awkward and ancient tortoise, a pair of quivering rabbits, some bleating sheep. These shots of animals are affection-images, they serve as images that bring into focus the actions of the human-nature of adults: the hunter's agitation of hatred of youth, a world-weary woman feeding a gathering of children and treating them as useless livestock to be half-tolerated. Repeated shots of the boat and the water's surface shows it to be an image produced through an 'intensive series' of affection-images, and to also be an image of a face (as the clock face): 'a receptive immobile surface, [a] receptive plate of inscription ...' (C1: 87). The boat is but their hapless shelter from the nightmare of life as it must pass through these affection-images of their world – these are images that present what Deleuze will term the 'genetic' and the 'differential' signs of life (C1: 110; C2: 33). In this we see that the affection-image is what Deleuze terms an extensive '*movement of world*' (C2: 59, original emphasis). Referring to *The Night of the Hunter*, Deleuze will note that this film shows the movement of the world: 'The frightened child faced with danger cannot run away, but the world sets about running away for him and takes him with it, as if on a conveyer belt' (C2: 59).

In this way Deleuze discusses the affective nature of the expressionist film as extensive to movement, noting that the abstraction of space of the scenes

of this type of film has the affect of 'potentializing' space, 'making it something unlimited' (C1: 111). An affection-image is thus a sign that expresses a specific aesthetic that will situate an image, event, body or thing outside of 'actualized' spatial paradigms, yet within time, even as it performs crucial movements; as Deleuze describes, an affect is an 'entity' in itself (C1: 95–101; C2: 32–33).

We see this actualization of the virtual nature of the affect-image in many different situations, often best utilized in horror, suspense or mystery genres. For example, in *Gwoemul* (*Monster*, also known as *The Host*; dir. Bong Joon-ho, 2006), an affective intensity is generated through the screen-time's lengthy search for a missing child (actor Ah-sung Ko), who is in mortal peril. In *Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari* (*The Cabinet of Dr Caligari*; dir. Robert Wiene, 1920) the missing Cesare (actor Conrad Veidt) generates an anxiety-affect for the other characters. In *Shock Corridor* (dir. Samuel Fuller, 1963), another type of anxiety-affect pervades the simple *mise-en-scène*, affecting a change in all bodies present. A reverse plot of another narrative of social affects upon bodies occurs in a film from French director Agnés Varda, such as her *Sans toit ni loi* (*Without Roof or Rule*, also known as *Vagabond*, 1985). Rather than approach analysis of these disparate forms of narrative suspense as engendered through emotive manipulation of the screen story, as a universal plot technique of a countdown to life or death, Deleuze's device of the affection-image enables us a more extensive analysis of the discreet screen images. In charting the kinds of critical points and pathways that affective-images create, the type of screen analysis Deleuze's system now engages focuses on content created structures and the styles of their critical construction. Further, through the development of the affection-image, Deleuze provides the criteria by which we might comparatively evaluate the effectiveness of the political and perceptual communication by one particular screen image over another.

What is Affect?

The affection-image is the image that will provide the requisite force to move the perception-image into the state of being an action-image. As a reactive

facet of the cinematographic movement-image, the affection-image is a 'power-quality' that plays and 'anticipatory role' for screen events (C1: 102). Deleuze's discussion of the affection-image and screen affect sets about explaining this apparent paradox of an image that is pre-image or an anticipatory image.

In these terms of the affect-image, the camera is as much a body of interactivity as an actor's body, or the body of a landscape, or the body of a director's work, or as we say, the body of a film genre. Affect is what will cause the movement from one state to another. The movement and subsequent mixing between any animate or inanimate bodies produces affects: on screen it could be an entity like rain, or the sound of an animal, a computer-generated monster or a particular space or colour. The affect is an intensity that will produce a dynamic expression in a body causing it to alter its composition and its potential trajectories. This is different to a screen effect, which concerns the technicalities (stylistic and technical) of how to render that affect. Technicalities in themselves can produce further affects. Deleuze discusses these in the larger sense of the complexity of the singularities that will connect or disconnect on screen, thus contributing to the range of possible qualities and powers that the affect offers.

Deleuze will describe the sensations and ideas generated through these filmic bodies as movements of forms of screen intensity. Deleuze will argue that intensity, or sensation, is the product of the potential power of an affection-image, or often a series of action-images. A movement (or action) occurs, giving rise to an affect, in turn generating a reaction and perception of both the affect and the action. Although montaged images might be involved, Deleuze is describing something different from the narrative or stylistic manipulation of the shot, such as the intensity garnered through a shot reverse shot countdown to some kind of incident (C1: chapters 5–8).

A screen situation's potential intensity is converted from moment of anticipation to realization through many methods. For example, a rush of sound or movement may occur, or a wave of emotion or expression may be realized in a body or across a face on-screen, or a morphological shift might occur between disparate objects or sentiments to produce a compounded or synergesic affective power, and thus affection-image. Deleuze begins his discussion

of the affection-image by inviting us to consider the proposition that the '*affection-image is the close-up and the close-up is the face*' (C1: 87, original emphasis). Continuing his engagement of Bergson's discussion of the nature of movement, Deleuze will explain this curious statement over two chapters of *Cinema 1*. Another clue is given from Eisenstein, who understood that an iconic image of something (for example, a religious symbol, a revolutionary colour, a scream of terror) could provide an 'affective reading of the whole film' (C1: 87). An affection-image thus engages the two components of movement and intervals: if we imagine the image of an (analogue) clock, for example, we have hands that take 'micro-movements' with 'intervals', with the movement forming part of an '*intensive series*' (C1: 87, original emphasis). This intensive series of movement, continues Deleuze, 'marks' and 'prepares' the way to 'a critical instant', a 'paroxysm', a 'momentary independence' (C1: 87, 89). As always in Deleuze's system, this image is of 'two poles' (C1: 87); to analyse an image, one must consider both sides of which it presents. What possible variations in affective outcome can an image engender? Off screen, in the minds of viewers, the affective outcomes of screen-based media are infinite. On screen, the affect of movement contributes to the whole affection-image; it is a '*reflecting and a reflected unity*' (C1: 87, original emphasis), while the affect of critical forces generate an infinite processual quality for the film. Deleuze points out that this 'quality' is 'common to several different things' – object/body/idea – this is a point of argument that he continues in looking at the construction of a cinema of thought and the thought-image in *Cinema 2* (C1: 90; chapter 13 Thought). New things may be incorporated at further viewings of a text, for instance, events that had not yet happened when the film was made, but subsequently impact upon the way it can be viewed. There may be a momentary autonomy of intensity, but affect is never independent (cf. Massumi 2002a).

Deleuze's affection-image is drawn from Spinoza's theory of potential – the potential some thing or body has in its movement and mix with other bodies or things (Deleuze 1988a: 122–130). How the prince can become a frog and can become a prince again, and to what effect, on screen, is the concern of Deleuze's attention to the concept of affect. It is to this internal, inherent

quality of the screen image that Deleuze refers, when he says: 'Affect as immanent evaluation, instead of judgement as transcendent value: "I love or I hate" instead of "I judge"' (C2: 141). In *Cinema 2* he provides further discussion of this conception of how we can critique a film by tracing the affective conditions – the phrase 'affect as immanent evaluation' leading us to evaluate affect diagrammatically. Deleuze gives examples of this, discussing the difference between 'affective fusion' and 'affective composition' created by Eisenstein's montaged images (C2: 160–161).

How Deleuze Uses Affect

As Deleuze will describe it, the affection-image of the screen is not a representational image, such as the action of an impact upon a body, or the reflection of an emotion upon an actor's face – such images are action-images. Affect is the *intensive power* that propels extensive actions. In Deleuze's philosophy this intensive power is what gives the cinematographic its ethical agency. In his chapters on affect, Deleuze looks at how images hold a certain 'quality of a possible sensation, feeling or idea' (C1: 98). By this he means that the image holds within it a certain value that can be deployed in a number of ways. This occurs through:

1. propositional affects (the expression of states);
2. actualized affects (expressed relational affects, for example, sound, or different types and forms of montage). (C1: 97–99)

The difference between an active series of movements and an affective series of images is that movement has to 'go beyond the state of things' (C1: 101). Deleuze's reference is to Wenders's 1982 film *Der Stand der Dinge* (*The State of Things*) (see chapter 2 Movement). On screen we are often shown situations where a body is trapped, immobilized and at the mercy of its environment. The screen situation requires that perception of this situation be registered through action, but to get to that movement, some form of impetus

must be provided. The affection-image registers a process of interval that occurs in between perception and action; the juncture where *something happens*. Deleuze often refers to this point of change as the site of an *encounter* – one encounters something and things change – I meet you on the street and we decide to go and do something together. If I did not encounter you on my journey, I will have undertaken a different course (cf. C2:1, 157). In terms of the screen, Deleuze describes how watching a film takes the viewer into 'the domain of the perception of affection' (C1: 67). This place, this domain, this juncture, this encounter, are all sites where the affection-image creates a change – this may be chemical, sensorial, structural, durational, intellectual, cognitive, perceptual – a relational affect. Following Bergson, Deleuze will refer to the affection-image as genetic and differential – unlimited. Any screen image that has provided an encounter with something that then opens a new domain provides explication of the affection-image: 'We are in the domain of the perception of affection, the most terrifying, that which still survives when all the others have been destroyed: it is the perception of self by self, the *affection-image*' (C1: 67–68, original emphasis). This is the domain of the topological affect. Affect is what causes perception to move into action, and as such, an affect is a potential power, an energy, a force. It may be actualized anywhere in the range from sad affects (grief, pain, destruction, loss, death) to joyful affects (happiness, pleasure, life).

Deleuze's use of affect in the cinema books extends his discussion of Spinoza's concept of affect (*affectus*) as a mode of thought (Deleuze 1978; 1988a; 1990a). Spinozist affect refers to the types of knowledge one can infer through the movement of bodies and how through that movement, interactivity and encounters occur that alter the dimensions of each body. Using this Spinozist sense of affect as movement, knowledge and the intervention into the modes of perceptual power that knowledge brings, means that Deleuze will engage the terms of a cinematic image in a different way to standard cognitive or psychologically based screen theory (although there are some aspects of 1970s standard film theory that we see Deleuze employ in his cinema books).

When translated into the cinematographic, Spinozist affect and affection-image convey the 'quality' of a possible 'state of things' (C1: 98). Deleuze

stresses this aspect of potentiality; the affection-image '*is not* a sensation, a feeling, an idea, but *the quality of a possible* sensation, feeling or idea' (C1: 98, emphasis added). Such qualities have no concrete forms in themselves, but in culturally produced and politically controlled forms such as art (film, music, literature, fine arts), qualities are actualized, signalled, signposted through symbolic means, such as the device of culturally specific fetish objects or religious iconography. In a larger sense, then, affective images register at the level of forces, such as we see in the different social forces that impact upon the duration of life in *The Host* or in *Vagabond*, or in the series of *Iron Man* films (dir. Jon Favreau, 2008; 2010) or narratives concerning the affects of all types of conflict upon communities such as *Aguirre, der Zorn Gottes* (dir. Herzog, 1972), *Au Revoir, les Enfants* (dir. Louis Malle, 1987); *Sometimes in April* (dir. Raoul Peck, 2005), or *The Bridge to Terabithia* (dir. Gabor Csupo, 2007). As Deleuze will discuss, a singular affect as an expressed entity in a specific cultural and spatial temporally controlled domain thus becomes a particular type of complex 'proposition' (C1: 105). Deleuze gives the example of the change in community attitude from proposition to actualized affect as registered in the face of Joan of Arc in conjunction with her surroundings in *La passion de Jeanne d'Arc* (*The Passion of Joan of Arc*; dir. Dreyer, 1928) (C1: 70).

In these terms, affect can be understood in Deleuze's consideration of the Foucauldian terms of power relations (Deleuze 1988b: 70; cf. Foucault 1977). There is an 'internal' power-play being enacted in the image, and this must be understood as different from the action-image where 'real relation(s)' between components is maintained by the camera (C1: 106–107). Deleuze also invokes writer Charles Péguy (influential for Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*) and Maurice Blanchot in these pages to underscore the affective politics at work in these types of images, understood as exercises 'in power' that are expressed in the image as an affective quality, thereby evoking connections that can be made through the intersections of things (Deleuze 1988b: 71; C1: 106; cf. Blanchot 1992; cf. 'Clio' in Péguy 1958).

For this kinetic idea of the affection-image and its description, Deleuze draws on C.S. Peirce's definitions of sign-images and then extends these for

the cinema. The affection-image draws from the Peircian notion of 'firstness', as Deleuze says, 'something that only refers to itself, quality or power, pure possibility' (C2: 30; cf. Deledalle 2000). The affect is not immediately 'knowable' to the elements within the set that it affects. Deleuze gives an example from Peirce that further exemplifies this 'quality' of an affection-image: 'You have not put on your red dress', where the colour red provides the quality, the affect of the image (C2: 30). In films, colours are frequently used to indicate affective qualities, wherein the affection-image provides the cumulative perceptual push over into an action. For example, consider the activity incited by the colours of Mao's revolution in Godard's *La Chinoise* (1967), or the time-image of the grief of loss and embrace of life in Krzysztof Kieslowski's *Trois couleurs: Bleu* (*Three Colours: Blue*, 1993), or the political affect invoked in Lars von Trier's *Zentropa* (1991), where the poles of both movement and time are forced through the colour washes of red stain make the images pass through all modes of movement.

The affective-image thus arises from style, situation, object and movement and time-images of all forms (including action, perception, thought, reflection, relation, etc.). Deleuze gives examples of the range of affective treatments by directors; 'Hitchcock's suspense, Eisenstein's shock and Gance's sublimity' (C2: 164) to 'quantative mediocrity' or 'blood-red abritrariness' (C2: 164) or the 'hallucinatory' visual style of Ozu or Antonioni (C2: 129, 204–205), and the eidetic cinema of Viking Eggeling (1924), Norman McLaren (1948; 1949; 1955) or George Landow (C2: 214–215).

The Function of Affect

Deleuze's discussion of screen affect provides a further discussion of an aspect of the movement-image and an extension on Bergsonian form. Deleuze uses affection to develop an answer to the problems of the phenomenological tendency toward sensorial answers, arguing: 'Affection is what occupies the interval, what occupies it without filling it in or filling it up. It surges in the centre of indetermination, that is to say in the subject, between perception

which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action' (C: 65; see chapter 5 Perception). The affection-image describes an account of the variability and how it occurs on screen, drawing on the richness of life itself as 'a quality or a power' (C2: 32). The affection-image comes prior to an action, it is the intensive 'Power' by which a body can express a 'more radical reflection' of a particular 'Quality' (C1: 90). In the Spinozist sense that Deleuze uses the term, power is indicative of an essence of something, not always realized (Deleuze 1990a: 93). For example, in his short film, *Sans Titre* (*Untitled*) commissioned as a postcard/teaser film for the Cannes Film Festival's fiftieth anniversary in 1997 and his preparatory work on his 1999 film, *Pola X*, French director Leos Carax inserted *The Night of the Hunter* riverboat scene, amid a montage of films where children are under threat, being or have been killed. It is a montage technique of homage, where the debt to other cinema is acknowledged. While some film theory discusses this form of inter-textual referencing as 'postmodern' or 'remediation', we can also recognize this as the *cogito* of the cinematographic at work, actualizing the qualities of a specific screen affect for various stylistic and historical ends.

This scene and sound from *The Night of the Hunter* through its combined action-perception-montage *moves us* as an affection-image. In this sense our consideration of an affective film is in terms of the movement-image, the question of mobility: the tortoise and the hare. When King Kong draws the tiny body of his captive female close to his face and we wonder what the next move will be (*King Kong*; dirs Merian C. Cooper, Ernest B. Schoedsack, 1933; *King Kong*; dir. Peter Jackson, 2005). In extension to the perception and the trajectories of the never completed, yet made real through the thought of possible outcomes, we might recall something about the essence of a film in terms of a completed action, a gesture, a glance: the final kiss, the last twitch of a dying body, the song that hangs over the closing credits of a film – these are actions whose affects become immanent to those action-sound-images. The affect is the dynamic force produced from an action which in turn becomes embedded in that image of activity. The association between action and affect can easily be shifted, manipulated, augmented or reduced through the tricks and techniques of screen media. And therein lies the pleasure and the terror of the screen, holding the capacity to alter and create.

7

Action

The action-film has a universal currency and is one of the most popular at the box-office. Deleuze notes three main forms for the action-image – the small, the large and the trans-morphological. In the ciné-system the action-image is a key figure in the philosophical argument concerning Plato's philosophy of Ideas and Forms. Deleuze will argue that film can engage and produce the ideas that give rise to forms, just as it can reproduce harmless or inept copies of ideas. Although Deleuze describes the action-image in terms of actors and imbues the action-image forms with a vitalist, respiratory movement, he contrasts the action-image against a 'cinema of the body' – a body that will create thought.

Action films: *The Navigator* (dirs Donald Crisp and Buster Keaton, 1924); *Scarface* (dir. Howard Hawks, 1932); *Ladri di biciclette* (*Bicycle Thief*; dir. Vittorio de Sica, 1948); *Shichinin no samurai* (*Seven Samurai*, dir. Akira Kurosawa, 1954); *Cléo de 5 à 7* (*Cléo from 5 to 7*; dir. Varda, 1962); *Jaws* (dir. Steven Spielberg, 1975); *Mad Max* (dir. George Miller, 1979); *The Terminator* (dir. James Cameron, 1984); *Tetsuo* (dir. Shinya Tsukamoto, 1989); *Point Break* (dir. Katherine Bigelow, 1991); *God, Construction and Destruction* (dir. Samira Makhmalbaf, 2002); *Children of Men* (dir. Alfonso Cuarón, 2006). Action is a movement that exists in every film. Examine the various types of action-images created in the above list of films of the past 100 years, from territorial wars to a school lesson. Through the arrangement of things on screen we see; we hear; we sense; we imagine the state of things, the situation and its affective impact. In combination of elements, through their interactivity, they embody an affective connection which, in turn, produces a dynamic image, an action in movement. The resultant image is the set of the movement-image – the action shows the modified situation, but embedded in that situation is the process of modification, the process of that dynamic transference of energies. Deleuze's action-image looks at the type of forms that action takes, describing the method of this movement, the reactions of the elements of the action-image and what these things produce in image.

Action-image: Canadian director Bruce LaBruce and Rick Castro's 1996 film *Hustler White* follows the cruising scene of boys on the Santa Monica Boulevard in Los Angeles. The physical action of the film tracks all ways up and down this specific territory, the strip acting as a topological figure of reference that holds a range of orienting qualities for all of the elements of the film. If we consider these qualities as elements produced by the action-image, we can determine that the figure of the strip is not only a geographical locale, but a sign of possible transformation of any form that engages with it. LaBruce and Castro's film offers story arcs that appear to have certain narrative resolutions but in fact work to create unresolved forms that are generative of a certain perspective, with no absolutes offered. It is a formula LaBruce repeats in all of his films: take as a central aspect the life of a character in a specific situation, submit that character to certain activities and then reexamine that character

through an on-screen *re-casting* of the staging of the elements of that charac-
ter by its social, historical and geographical actualization. Or, as Deleuze says
of the types of reworking that Howard Hawks brings to bear upon the action
genres of Noir and Western cinema, the knowledgeable director is engaged
in 'deformations, transformations or transmutations' of forms (C1: 178). The
kinds of matter-of-fact action around the tracked scene in *Hustler White*, and
LaBruce's later film *The Raspberry Reich* (2004), are the action-images of the
film, sourcing documentary genres and forming new types of social realism
and comedy. LaBruce shows us things – people, ideas, objects – and then
carefully traces and repeats the movement around those things for us to see
how they come to be constituted through on-screen trajectories that modify
them. His method is to make action-images that are a physical comedy of
errors, chances and expectations, as the film acts out the perception and
consequences of the *idea* of action-images. *Hustler White* directly references
the action images of Hollywood fame, where these films' journeys are also
psychological as well as physical in the determination of their staged paths:
in Hollywood stories such as *The Wizard of Oz* (dir. Victor Fleming, 1939),
Sunset Boulevard (dir. Billy Wilder, 1950), *Easy Rider* (dir. Dennis Hopper,
1969), or *Taxi Driver* (dir. Martin Scorsese, 1976) (C1: 242 n14). LaBruce
channels the prescient direction of Luis Buñuel's biting social commentary in
L'Âge d'or (*Age of Gold*, 1930) or Kenneth Anger's attitude in *Scorpio Rising*
(1964) or *Kustom Kar Kommandos* (1965). LaBruce's territorial commen-
tary can also be compared with the social irony and social environmental
activity presented in Park Chan-wook's 2006 film *Saibogujiman kwenchana*
(*I'm a Cyborg, But That's Ok*), or *Black Sheep* (dir. Jonathon King, 2006) or
the telling of historical becomings in Mikhail Romm's *9 dney odnogo goda*
(*Nine Days of One Year,* 1962), *Aguirre, der Zorn Gottes* (*Aguirre, Wrath of
God*; dir. Werner Herzog, 1972) or *Die Bleierne Zeit* (*The Leaden Time*; dir.
Margarethe Von Trotta, 1981).

Through a disparate range of scenario producing realities, these types of
narratives share a film form constructed through the action-image. They are
films that provide us with examples of the action-image, which 'do not merely
designate forms of action, but conceptions, way of conceiving and seeing "a

subject", a story or script' (C1: 178). Describing the action-image, Deleuze will indicate the theme or genre (the song style or the journey) of the film at this point in his taxonomy, but considers how content is produced by the creation of forms by certain kinds of images. In other words his system is charting not so much what the films are about, but how cinema produces different kinds of 'aesthetic and creative evaluations' by its different forms (C1: 178). As he has argued from the beginning of *Cinema 1*, the action-image has a certain kind of 'functional reality' (C2: 4). However, it is in examining the types of function that movement plays (or the differential relations engaged) to produce the form of the action-image, that Deleuze will, by the end of *Cinema 1*, distinguish between the forms of movement-image of the habitual nature of the action-image (sets of clichés, the established terms of 'reality') and the action-image created through the mental image, that produce, often by virtual means, new forms for thinking, such as we see in a film like *Rope* (dir. Hitchcock, 1948) (C1: 200; chapter 10 Time).

What is the Action-image?

The action-image forms part of the movement-image system. The action-image is always part of movement, a reactive motion around a perception: action comes after perception (perception is produced by affection). One of the infamous scenes from Buñuel's 1930 film *L'Âge d'or* (*The Golden Age*): the Man (played by Gaston Modot) sees a certain type of dog. It embodying all he abhors, and the affective qualities of that perception (he feels annoyed/frustrated) engender an action and he kicks the dog. Perception and action are locked into a duelling catalytic movement on screen. The action-image feeds the vortex of energies, initiating further images. The Man's body is already imbued with affects and impulses and they are actualized by the actions he takes. 'Qualities and powers' writes Deleuze, 'are no longer displayed in any-space-whatevers, no longer inhabit originary worlds, but are actualized directly in determinate, geographical, historical and social space-times' (C1: 141). In other words, the action-image is a movement-image that shows us the

immanent constitution of an image: after perception, we fill, or the perceptive conjunction is filled by, a constitutive affect, which propels perception into activity. On screen this translates as the action-image: something happens and an action actualizes a response, creating a change in the screen situation. Hours of screen-time are produced using this formula.

Different qualities of the action-image describe issues that the action-image raises in consideration of the larger system of the movement-image. Using C.S. Peirce's classification of signs – but with qualification – Deleuze considers the conditions of how the action-image works to modify the situation on screen (see chapter 8 Transsemiotics). The idea of 'secondness' (a term from Peirce) applies to the action-image to describe the way that the action-image is produced in conjunction with another type of movement-image, as a 'duel of forces' (C1: 98, 142). As Deleuze discusses, this is not a simple 'mirroring' of images, but a movement of images, two very distinct things. The action-image shows how the cinema reveals the movement of all things to be an inevitable component of the path of universal variation. 'What is called action, strictly speaking, is the delayed reaction of the centre of indetermination' (C1: 64). The centre of indetermination is the 'living matter' with 'receptive organs' as framed (relationally, physically or as cognitively inferred) although compromised, affected by various speeds of encounter or perception of the action (C1: 65–66).

Deleuze divides the action-image into three main forms: small, large and trans-morphological. He discusses them with interlocking, but distinctive terminology. Deleuze comes up with conceptual formulas that can be applied to any screen situation in order to describe the type of action-image:

1. large form: the screen situation or film will have a *mise-en-scène* that displays a situation (S), an action (A), then a modified situation (S') = (SAS') (C1: 143–147);
2. small form: will have a *mise-en-scène* that displays an action (A), a situation (S), then a modified action (A') = (ASA') (C1: 160–164);
3. trans-morphological forms: 'deformations, transformations or transmutations' (C1: 178).

In the dialectic logic of the movement-image, the action-image *shows how* the operative properties that contribute to the creation of stories and the pre-existing structures of culture and socio-political states (actual and imaginary) from which they draw, can solidify, change, or create new states, things, or people: new forms of movement-images. This dialectic produces a different type of image, form and idea to that of images produced by a logic of relations – which is the time-image. Deleuze further distinguishes between different domains where the small and large forms manifest on screen. With the small form, the movement from action *to* situation is facilitated by a vector, which Deleuze says is exemplified in film forms that express 'the physico-biological domain which corresponds to the *notion of milieu*' (C1: 186, original emphasis; see chapter 9 Signs (Vector)). With the large form, the movement is from situation *to* action, which Deleuze relates to 'the mathematical domain which corresponds to the *notion of space*' (C1: 186, original emphasis; see chapter 12 Topology).

To test out these ideas and look at the variables of this logic, consider any film that might be termed an action genre; perhaps a monster action film such as *Alien* (dir. Ridley Scott, 1979) or *Pulgasari* (dirs Chong Gon-Jo and Shin Sang-Ok, 1985), or a war film such as *Battle of Algiers* (dir. Gillo Pontecorvo, 1966) or *The Hurt Locker* (dir. Katherine Bigelow, 2008). Like the western, the war or monster film as a genre has always been invested in the action-image. Even when the sights and sounds of war or monster film are unseen and unheard, and indeed unimaginable, the action-image engages a specific event – activity – that of the duel. A power struggle, a power relay where sides switch, and the terms of life and death are rapidly interchangeable. The duel encompasses all the literal torsions of power movements. Pause for a moment and think of what a duel on screen might encompass – gun slinging, Clint Eastwood, words, romance, family, institutional relations, power struggles? Herein lies the essence of Deleuze's action-image in every sense of the word 'duel' – the struggle, the fight, combat, contestation, the challenge – 'action in itself is a duel of forces …' (C1: 142). As Deleuze describes, through this actualization: 'The action-image inspires a cinema of behaviour (behaviourism) since behaviour is an action which passes from one situation to another,

which responds to a situation in order to try modify it or to set up a new situation' (C1: 155). Deleuze describes the 'incurving of the universe', the sense of how 'a character' can actualize themselves in an image and modify the situation they find themselves in (C1: 65; 141). In the case of the action-image, this is done through sets of images that contain certain qualities and forces, or powers, being determined and actualized by the movement around a centre.

Describing the range of complex behaviours of the actor's body and its ability to demonstrate the 'condition of the development of the action-image', Deleuze begins to account for how the actor's body succeeds when it engages the conditions of the construction of the image it infers – in a self-conscious way (C1: 158). This argument is further fleshed out when Deleuze discusses the *thought-image* at the end of *Cinema 2*. Deleuze demonstrates how interested he is in the concept of 'subjectivity' by his fascination with actor's bodies, their modes of playing characters and the types of qualities they bring to the screen. The discussion on the action-image also extends to account for directors such as Luchino Visconti, whose work focuses on the 'autonomous, material reality' of things – which have a way of modifying the action-image and the characters within the scene (C1: 4; cf. Visconti 1960).

In his discussion of the action-image Deleuze will give as his examples directors from the German expressionist period – Fritz Lang and Georg Wilhelm Pabst – Swedish director Victor Sjöstrôm's *The Wind* (1928), and early Hollywood classics: *Scarface* (1932), King Vidor's films *The Crowd* (1928), *A Street Scene* (1931), *Our Daily Bread* (1934), *An American Romance* (1944). Deleuze will name a significant number of actors of the twentieth century whose work demonstrates this *condition of the development* of the image, as a part of the action of behaviourism that engages (in various ways) with other bodies, things and situations. These actors include Orson Welles, Maria Falconetti, Greta Garbo, Stanley Baker, Alain Delon, Klaus Kinski, Charlie Chaplin, Jerry Lewis, and Chantal Akerman.

Similarly, this logic of cinematographic behaviourism extends to all action-images where a force of nature and/or manufacture interferes and interacts with the daily actions of people or cultures: *The Wizard of Oz* where Dorothy (Judy Garland) suffers a psychosomatic response-action to the elemental

centres of her world, as did the character of Letty (Lillian Gish) in *The Wind*. There is a storm that similarly blows into and ends the picnic and changes the communal interactions of the women in *Daughters of the Dust* (Julie Dash, 1991). The action may be caused through biological or genetic or pathological elemental shifts: the change of blood in vampire genres causing a deformation to the action-form: *Bakjwi* (*Thirst*; dir. Chan-wook Park, 2009); the change in genetic circumstance provoking movement: *Solyaris* (*Solaris*; dir. Andrei Tarkovsky, 1972); *Children of Men* (dir. Alfonso Cuarón, 2006); changes in political determination: *Gojira* (*Godzilla*; dir. Ishirô Honda, 1954); *Little Dieter Needs to Fly* (dir. Herzog, 1997); *Import/Export* (dir. Ulrich Seidi, 2007). In the case of a movement-image, action is relational, interactive, as typically played out for suspense in Hollywood-style action-genres of environmental or manufactured disaster films: *The China Syndrome* (dir. James Bridges, 1979), *Twister* (dir. Jan de Bont, 1996), *The Day After Tomorrow* (dir. Roland Emmerich, 2004).

Deleuze investigates the action-image further with a number of possible axes for analysis, dividing the action into different screen forms (C1: 143–147):

1. documentary ((*Nanook of the North*; dir. Robert J. Flaherty, 1922); 'reality genre' screen media);
2. 'psycho-social film' (the films of King Vidor);
3. noir and gangster genre (*Scarface*);
4. western genres (the films of John Ford).

With the screen's ability to actualize virtual relations, to engender reality, also comes the question of ethics for the producers and creators of screen worlds. Deleuze examines how the techniques and the formal style of the action-image develop through different film genres and across different national productions due to localized inflections of culture, and socio-political schema of history and vernacular necessity. Further, Deleuze says the action-image is the model of filmmaking that has 'produced the universal triumph of the American cinema, to the point of acting as a passport for foreign directors who contributed to its formation' (C1: 141).

How Deleuze Uses the Action-image

The action-image forms the vitalist component of Deleuze's system of move-ment-images; it is a form that arises from living matter and the actualizations of things through any type of place that the screen can evoke: 'determinate, geographical, historical and social space-times,' notes Deleuze at the start of the first of four chapters on the action-image and its forms (C1: 141). Deleuze is also interested in the metaphysical account of images (C1: 185). Deleuze explains that the 'point' of accounting for the different types of action-images (even at the level of discerning between the large and the small form) is not just to name action forms, but to designate 'conceptions, ways of conceiving and seeing a "subject", a story or a script' (C1: 178).

Deleuze devotes nearly five chapters of *Cinema 1* to discussing the forms of the action-image, describing various 'laws' by which to define them. At the start of the chapter titled 'Figures, or the transformation of forms', Deleuze notes that he uses the sense of the large and small form of the action-image 'in Plato's sense' (C1: 178). Like Plato, Deleuze has already committed to an answer for 'what is X?' when compiling his taxonomy of cinema. As he and Guattari argue in *What is Philosophy?* 'on the Platonic plane, truth is posed as a presupposition, as already there' (1994: 29; cf. Plato).[1] With images, cinema reconfirms existing classificatory systems, the standard shapes, genres and forms at the service of commercial screen forms. The problem that Deleuze identifies with the action-image, and this is his conclusion of *Cinema 1*, is that its construction comes about through 'sets of *clichés*, and nothing else' (C1: 208). Screen forms are already indexed to the predetermined meanings of their world. It is at this point in his thesis that Deleuze echoes Artaud in his condemnation of the failures of the cinema to be adequate to responding to situations of the world (C2: 166–167).

Finally, the action-image identifies characteristics of what Deleuze terms 'the crisis of the action-image and the American Dream' (C1: 210). According to his argument, the 'crisis' of the action-image provokes new forms of cin-ema, which Deleuze describes variously in terms of changes to forms of the action-image. Deleuze notes five characteristics of this change of film form

as: '*the dispersive situation, the deliberately weak links, the voyage form, the consciousness of cliché, the condemnation of the plot*' (C1: 210, original emphasis). These changes came about in cinema in various ways, and Deleuze's discussions relate to specific national cinemas throughout the cinema books (see chapter 11 Politics). Ultimately, German national cinemas play a large role in Deleuze's overall thesis. In his discussion of the action-image, Deleuze focuses on the situation and forms of American, Italian and French comparative works. In these, Deleuze positions the action-image as a 're-examination of the sensory-motor schema' (C1: 210), through the tactics of 'parody' (Altman; C1: 211); 'mutation' and 'breaks with tradition' (French new wave cinema; C1: 211, 213); Italian style's 'dispersive and lacunary reality' (Rossellini, DeSica, Fellini; C1: 211–212). It is only in these transmorpological forms that Deleuze sees any potential for the multiple pathways of 'hodological space' to offer ways out of 'concrete space' by the processes of differentiation (C2: 128–129; see chapter 12 Topology; C2: 28–9). Deleuze describes this (differentiation) as the determination of the 'virtual content of the Idea [form]' in terms of 'the consequences for the cinema' (Deleuze 1994: 209; C1: 178). Deleuze needed to produce a philosophical model that would describe the movement of cinema as a model that charts the shifts in the history of things and people. Literally, this larger sense of what film encompasses emerges not by its 'representation' of history, but through the discussion of the different determining qualities of situations and forms – productive of Ideas – of various times (Deleuze details this process in *Difference and Repetition* 1994: 209). Buster Keaton's 'burlesque', for instance, has the effect of changing the forms of the action-image from within his 'trajectory gag' and 'machine gag' in films such as *Our Hospitality* (dirs John G. Blystone and Buster Keaton, 1923) and *The Navigator* (dirs Donald Crisp and Keaton, 1924), which are inflected with certain characteristics that are action-images with a 'minoring function' (C1: 173–176; chapter 11 Politics).

The perceptual and behavioral capacities of a body (including molecular bodies, the elemental bodies, the body of the character and the cinematographic body) are in turn productive of a particular kind of affective response determined by those limitations, productive of a reaction. For the actor on

screen, for example, there are some things that their body or mind cannot or will not do, and others that the law will not allow, as in the case of child actors (cf. *Lolita*; dir. Adrian Lyne, 1997). Similarly with non-human bodies or with animals, there are some physical and logistical impossibilities for bodies: dogs cannot fly and mountains do not move. Actions on screen are a realization of perception and affection. Deleuze's approach is to take the central and the peripheral body in action.

The Function of the Action-image

Deleuze says the action-image is situated in the actual place and time of a history and society, as a product of the relation between the 'mileux which actualize [the screen environment] and modes of behaviour which embody [the realism of this environment]' (C1: 141). Thus, the action-image is the moderator of the form that screen-produced 'reality' will take. This raises a point central for film-philosophy, which is an examination of the relationship between ideas and forms. With the capacity of film to create things, and to use the principle of continuous creative growth of concepts, the question of what ethical paradigms engage the Platonic index of the question of judgment is one of the underlying narratives of the cinema books. The question of form, and how and what type of structure arises, becomes the content – the story on screen.

The action-image is unthinking in Deleuzian terms, however it *is* an image that charts the behavioural reaction to 'living matter' (C1: 64). In following Bergson here, Deleuze flaunts a philosophical 'behaviourism' that can be considered to be a category mistake in philosophy. It is an image that provides the sensory motor situation that might then lead to a body encountering and interacting with other bodies. Deleuze describes the action-image as a respiratory act, literally imagining how life forces are breathed into an image through the various forms of action. Deleuze's description of the action-image and its forms of transformation offers film analysis a distinctive way of articulating historical consciousness of an image, thereby addressing Plato's position on

the creation of the universe, and Marx's position on the production of capital by the framing of the activities and objects of capital as the 'reality' (cf. Beller 2006: 106; chapter 13 Thought).

Deleuze's concept of the action-image raises a number of issues for film-philosophy: (1) the movement from situation to action, (2) the relations between screen produced Ideas and Forms, (3) the trans-morphology of situations to produce new images of thought, and finally, (4) action-images are productive of specific forms of time. The action-image often seen as a 'psychological duration', a phrase which Deleuze takes from the film psychology of Jean Mitry, wherein the on-screen time reveals the durational changes that a character or situation will undergo, as 'evolution or ontogenesis', or even 'entropy, a degradation' (C1: 126). Deleuze describes the action-image in terms of the forms of 'behaviorism' of the differentiating processes that the action-image creates, providing a model that is useful to all forms of analysis of moving images and screen-based activity, inclusive of text, images and sounds.

8

Transsemiotics

In his assemblage of the signs and images of cinema, Deleuze creates an apparently simple set of concepts: movement-image and time-image. These two forms work as open-assembly points for other images, enabling the production of a limitless set. The result is a screen taxonomy that can create multiple terms to drop into the classification of images and signs. However, Deleuze's project is firmly situated as the practice of a political philosophy, and the film theory he produces demonstrates this. The naming of things is the most fundamental of political acts, and Deleuze is careful to attend to the nuances of the implications of this when naming multiple types of cinematic signs. The semiology Deleuze employs in both cinema books continues the work he does in Proust and Signs (1972), and engages the 'transsemiotic' – a diagrammatic method set up by Guattari and explored by Deleuze

and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus – a combination of the ideas of a range of thinkers of language systems: Hjelmslev, Kafka, Proust, Beckett, Godard, Pasolini, Herzog. In the Cinema books, Deleuze diverges from the linguistic philosophy of de Saussure's approach to the sign as a substitutive system for classification (as was commonly used in film theory of Deleuze's time of writing), and instead utilizes C. S. Peirce's non-linguistic approach, combining this theory with insights from a range of thinkers, including Barthes and Pasolini, to make apparent that the range of sound-image relations on screen are produced through non-representational expression.

In fact, [Godard] made a science fiction film with the Rolling Stones [*One Plus One*]. He had his camera track slowly through the Olympic Sound Studio in Barnes, as Kubrick tracked a camera through space. The head of Brian Jones moves quietly across the screen like only one other thing in your memory: the space ship in *2001* that appeared at one side of the screen and, in a galactic silence, drifted across the field of vision.

Wenders [1986] 1989

After our participation in a screen-event, we ask 'what is that?' as Wenders does after viewing Godard's film *One Plus One* (*Sympathy for the Devil*, 1968) at the Electric cinema, London.[1] In joining together apparently disparate worlds – the head of musician Brian Jones (of The Rolling Stones) and images of the Black Panther movement – Godard changes the expression and content of both. It is a highly problematic film in many ways, derided by critics at the time of its release, for taking images out of their context of everyday production and abstracting them to a degree where their generative political and cultural contexts are masked (cf. Debord 1969).[2] Yet this abstraction reflects the processes of music creation; where the impulses behind a seemingly 'radical' song are swallowed in the production and consumption of the form. What do we see and hear in *One Plus One*? The possibilities of the organization of a black syntax, minor forms of political activism (graffiti, student protests, critique of popular culture), the creative process behind a famous song, an historically famous recording studio, gender suppression and control (simplified images

of the roles of black women in the Black Panther movement; white 'virginal' sacrificial tokens; disturbing on-screen games with Godard's wife of the time, Anna Wiazemsky, playing the character 'Eve Democracy'; a woman controlled), all mapped by an hypnotic cinematography (by Anthony B. Richmond). The tracking camera creates a new continuum of a clear-cut montage through the conjunction of *and*, and one plus one equals x?[3] In fact Godard's films from the 1960s – such as *Les Carabiniers* (1963), *La Chinoise* (1967), *Week End* (1967), and *One Plus One* (1968) – present an index of images on the topic of each film's themes, speculating not only on the nature of cinema itself (as in *Bande à part,* 1964), the themes that cinema takes on (as in *Le mépris* (*Contempt*, 1963)), but also the alignment of images with politics, and a questioning of how this sound-politics and image-politics – produced by the image – can be articulated. The conditions of conjunction prove to be a pressing question arising from the critique that Deleuze takes up in the cinema books, against the linguistic basis of semiology, instead advocating an image-based method.[4]

Deleuze looks to the components of the sound-images that are generative of meanings informing our aesthetic processes. Film theorists call this type of analysis film semiology or film semiotics (Barthes 1967: 9; Metz 1974a; Stam *et al*. 1992; cf. Buckland 2000). What Deleuze does in the cinema books is devise his own semiology, comprised of components of an image (including sound). Deleuze creates an open-category semiotics, produced through his method of 'a taxonomy, an attempt at the classification of images and signs' (C1: xiv). For the main terms of his analysis, Deleuze engages the work of C.S. Peirce, whom he champions as a semiotician (C1: 69; cf. Deledalle 2000; Ehrat 2005: 13–14.), but engages only as far as his nomenclature of signs. In addition to C.S. Peirce (C1: 198), Deleuze takes up film maker Pier Paolo Pasolini's call for a study of the conditions of the principles of reality that cinema engages (Deleuze references Pasolini's book, *Heretical Empiricism* (1972) 2005; C2: 286 n.8), together with Henri Bergson's reminder of the 'modulation' of the object through its movement (C2: 27).

Throughout his entire oeuvre, Deleuze is critical of the restrictions of semiotic analysis, which he argues against because of its structuralist methodology (cf. Deleuze 2004: 170–192; Surin 2005: 24). Deleuze engages, but

differentiates his work from that of theorists including Edgar Morin, Christian Metz, Roland Barthes and Umberto Eco in the cinema books to construct his political polemic against linguistic-based theory from analysis of the image. Earlier in works such as *A Thousand Plateaus* with Guattari, a critique of Bertrand Russell and Noam Chomsky is engaged and the type of accounts of the limits of language and thought's ability to express a singular position are discussed (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 148). In his book on *Foucault* ([1986] 1988b; usefully read as a supplement to the cinema books), Deleuze continues to offer ways in which the notion of subjectivity can be conceived – not in any sense of a structuralist semiotic construction, but in the terms that Foucault indicated – as an historical archive of folded layers of selves, of cracks and fissures of time that are multiple and 'co-extensive' (1988b: 118; see also chapter 5 Perception).

Deleuze describes how a taxonomic approach – that we refer to here as the transsemiotic method[5] of the ciné-system – can assist in our apprehension of film's conceptual practice. Deleuze seeks to account for the image not through 'codifications' or 'resemblances' (as many semiotic theories do), but through the image-in-process. Deleuze's account describes the political constitution of an image, the ontology of an image, and how, through repeated viewing of an image, the participant notices that it is never the same. We can thus characterize Deleuze's transsemiotics as an account of a *becoming-image*: that is an account of the image as always in process, as always being reconfigured. We see this, for example, through different types of cinematography, and post-production editing and stylization (for example think of different types of animation, the forms of which inform the content). These differentiating factors and the ways in which the image reveals or envelops the modulation of these factors, as Deleuze writes, 'nourishes' the relation between object and images through its own terms of modulation – whether an indirect and direct image (C2: 27–28; C2: 266 n5; Barthes 1968: 51–54). With all of these elements, Deleuze negotiates the complex field of film theory in the early 1980s, and develops a non-linguistic semiotic that attempts to account for how every time we watch a film we see another thing, and in the most basic of epistemological terms, one plus one does not equal two.

What is Transsemiotics?

Semiotics is one of the most powerful tools for analysis of all kinds of texts. Semiotics is the study of signs: things that stand in for something else. The ways and means that different semiologies are used for the critique and discussion of screen-based works have figured some of the most highly charged political positions for screen-based theory and philosophy. One of the most famous film semioticians was Christian Metz, who produced an analytic method that would examine the components of the story to see how they worked. Metz drew from an earlier theorist, Ferdinand de Saussure (Rushton 2009: 266). De Saussure's system argues that a sign has value by virtue of its place in a system, and that the substitution of elements within that system means that it can still function. This type of semiotics focuses upon images and symbols or signs, which are termed the semiotic expressions. These are the language and words that we apply in order to describe any given thing produced by a complex system such as screen image (which are a result of teams of people producing creative and technical work. See Barthes 1967: 30).

In film analysis semiotic systems have been developed for use by film theory and film philosophy to deconstruct and describe the constituent functions of objects and the relations and actions of and between characters and things on screen (cf. Lotman 1976; Johnston [1973] 1977; Metz 1974a; Monaco 1977; De Lauretis 1984; Buckland 2000). Articulating the ways that cinema can be 'read' or 'worked through' uses a particular theoretical framework to articulate a certain type of 'reality'. Film semiologies developed from the work of Metz, Barthes, Lacan, or de Saussure are reworked and expanded after the period of 1960s and 1970s when theoretical investigations based on postcolonial, feminist, and economic live world developments revised many of the ways in which film histories record the polyphony of images. Cinema and film theory incorporated elements of these debates into theories that seek to account for the technicalities of film signification, as well as the other processes at work, for example, through investigations into cognition (cf. Bordwell 1985), emotion (cf. Tan 1995), the systematization of genre theory (cf. Williams 2007),

gesture (cf. Bellour 2000), music (cf. Rose 1994); the politics of language (cf. Shohat and Stam 1985), race (cf. Minh-ha 1989), reception theory (cf. hooks 1996; Jenkins 2000:165–182), or sexuality (cf. Rich 1998: 368–380; Williams 2008) (this is by no means a definitive list). Feminist philosophy has been at the forefront of revisions of epistemology of the subject, later engaged by film theory; Butler 1999; Hendricks and Oliver 1999).

In Deleuzian terms, semiotic methods are inadequate as a tool for analysis. Primarily, as Deleuze and Guattari noted, 'language is a political affair before it is an affair for linguistics', and thus no 'general semiology' (1987: 140) can be applicable in theory (see also the arguments in Pearce 1997). The main problem with semiotic approaches (such as a pure structuralist, historical, cognitive or psychoanalytic methodology) is that they rely on what Deleuze and Guattari describe as 'pre-signifying regimes', where one 'signifier' takes control over an expression (for example, of people: imposing gender role demands; of places: imposing territorial nationalist controls; of cultures: music, dance, rituals; of politics: the assumption of previous economic directions, etc.), thereby abstracting local inflections and ignoring the content of the local expression in favour of a power-label for 'analysis' (1987: 137).

In addition to the study of the basic elements of language signs are other political and cultural indicators that predetermine with what the system of signification is comprised. For example, language systems are generally quite arbitrary, and the words and sounds of words are often unrelated to the thing that they stand for. How does the word 'film', for example, relate to a film we see? It does in the sense that 'film' used to consist of a strip of celluloid coated with a 'film' of chemicals, but that word does not describe anything of the nature of film, although it does indicate the historical origins of its photographic process of production. For the most part, language is arbitrary – the word 'girl' in English totally different to the word for 'girl' in French, or in the Japanese language. How the word 'girl' is linked to an actual girl is through other elements. What semiotics attempts to do is *describe that linkage*. Feminist critiques have demonstrated how such paradigmatic systems maintain gender biased values even in exchange systems (cf. Irigaray [1978] 1985: 170–191). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari's critique of semiotic systems is

that descriptions can merely re-ascribe or transfer interpretation to another place, not really changing anything (1987: 138). The de Saussurian model has limited application in cinema, because while the screen produces images that may invoke signs of, or 'be representative of' something, all kinds of films engage different modalities of signification that are indicative of certain things – and all images have a political as well as aesthetic position that they signify.[6]

Instead of the structural linguistics of the semiotic methods, Deleuze and Guattari propose a 'pragmatics' of a 'transsemiotic' (1987: 145, 136), a method that Deleuze continues to investigate in the cinema books in terms of its 'generative' and 'transformational' application (*ibid.*: 139). This method builds upon the semiotic approaches of Peirce and Louis Hjelmslev by using Guattari's transversal technique and Deleuze's schematic use of mathematic philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 43; Hjelmslev 1961). The transsemiotic method that Deleuzian film philosophy brings is the ability to undertake a differentiating expressive model, enabling discussion that performs not only a critique of the conditions of expression, but, as feminist critique has also arrived at (following a not dissimilar pathway), the possibility of cracking apart regimes of control that suppress expression (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 140; Braidotti 1994; Mohanty 2003).

How Deleuze Uses Transsemiotics

How do we articulate and write about different screen conditions? We must use a constructed language, but one that it is not at all equivalent to the cinematic 'language system of reality', which, as Deleuze points out, 'is not at all a language' (C2: 28). Engaging the Deleuzian system for screen analysis, we might observe that *One Plus One* appears to depict the form of dual point of view Deleuze describes in the large form of the action-image (SAS'), where we see situations (S) altered (S') after an action (A) occurs. By the end of the film, we can observe that a situated image enters into a 'perpetual exchange' with itself, and the restricted action of the camera and the events being

recorded are contained within the circuit of the cinematography. In this way, the film transforms this movement into a time-image through the system of different signs that comprise the conditions of the film. In his description between the differences of the components of the signs and images of movement and time image, Deleuze takes a clear position on the semiotics of images and signs, and addresses the problem of the 'relations between cinema and language' (C2: 25). At first we might assume that he is addressing the problem of describing one medium (the moving sound-image) with another (written or spoken language). However, the 'problem' for Deleuze is the methodology of linguistic philosophy, semiology or the science of signs, as it is applied to film analysis. Screen semiology is a contentious and disparate method at the time of Deleuze's Cinema books in the early 1980s (cf. Hawks 1977: 123–150). In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze challenges the prevailing linguistic philosophy (such as Rorty 1967) by presenting cases for the limits and the creative powers of language through the work of Raymond Roussel and Charles Péguy, which leads Deleuze to a discussion of the heterogeneity of signs and the ways in which movement and pedagogy can alter that sameness (Deleuze [1968] 1994: 22–24). In *Proust and Signs* ([1972] 2000), Deleuze sets out the concept of literary machines where signs are never singular but multiple. In turn these concepts are extended in *A Thousand Plateaus*, where Deleuze and Guattari set out a scathing argument against semiotics as the 'scientific' study of language, invoking an extensive range of supportive evidence, including Foucault's critique of the historicity of described structures, and devoting two plateaus (chapters) to the 'postulates of linguistics' ([1980] 1987: 75–148) and the 'regime of signs' (*ibid.*: 111–148). One of the main propositions running through *A Thousand Plateaus* describes the workings of the war machine as an organizational force that corrals its subjects into obeying through the order-words of signifying regimes, including language. Deleuze and Guattari contend: 'A rule of grammar is a power marker before it is a syntactical marker' (1987: 76).

The Deleuzian transsemiotics focuses on the image. Just as Deleuze approaches the description of the categorical structures that a screen-based perception-image creates with qualifications, when describing the signs of the

image, Deleuze is careful not to be prescriptive about the types of realities, or the 'cognition' of the different worlds that screen-based experience creates. Instead, he comes to describe how certain types or genres of films tend to create, reconfigure and occupy certain categories of meaning through the type of cinematic sign they employ.[7] Signs can signal or switch, envelop or open different forms of screen ontology. In the cinema books Deleuze describes two main signs – one for movement, and one for time. This is how he sees cinema as organizing itself, and he disagrees with theorists who discuss film and ignore either of those two aspects (and he argues why). Deleuze names the main three movement signs: the perception-image, the affection-image, the action-image. He then invokes several other movement-signs, including the impulse-image, the reflection-image, the relation-image. These movement-signs are then qualified, and can be given further forms and content through description of the range of signs that organize them. Further, Deleuze describes different temporal signs including (but not limited to): opsigns, sonsigns, tacitsigns, mnemosigns, onirosigns, hyalosigns, chronosigns, noosigns, lectosigns, qualisigns, crystals, seeds. These names are indicative signs for when types of forms change and alter things on screen. Each of these signs can be qualified by further signs, and Deleuze's system (as an open and 'trans' (across) system) can be technically difficult to follow. Some of the terms drawn from Peirce can become confusing, as Deleuze engages them for different ends to Peirce's project (C2: 30–34). For example, if we look at a division of the signs of movement-image, into affection-image, into icon-image, into describing a close-up shot of a face on screen, and its emotive reaction to a range of affects, Deleuze describes this face as a 'set of the expressed and the expression' (C1: 97). This set becomes an 'icon' – a 'sign of the bi-polar composition of the affection-image' (*ibid.*). The icon sign can be further divided into other signs that articulate the type of icon sign it is; this is the process of *differentiating* that Deleuze speaks about through the books – not a comparison, but a qualification of the types of transformations or translations that the form has taken, thus generating new kinds of signs. The movement-image and its 'modulation' of 'an object' (a reality) come *before* the sign that we use to label it (C1: 27). Bogue has usefully mapped out the main signs of the

Deleuzian system (2003: 70–71). Although complex, Deleuze's method gives us licence to invent our own names for signs, as Deleuze clearly demonstrates an open-system, and signs are useful for detailing and qualifying the meanings and contents of different screen forms. For example, Kara Keeling describes the signs of an 'image of common sense' in her discussion of some of the cinematic epistemologies and ontologies of race on screen (2007), engaging a Deleuzian method to examine some of the overlooked issues of the image. Developing some of the implications of an anti-semiotic (and thus anti-psychiatric) approach, Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack have argued for a 'schizoananalytic' method for screen studies interested in Deleuze and Guattari's anti-semiological work (2008). Deleuze's open-system method thus is valuable for extending film studies and qualifying significant changes to film practice; for example, just as 'genre' theory qualified 'auteurist' theory (cf. Gledhill and Williams 2000: 222), so can a Deleuzian transsemiotics qualify practices of cognitive semiotic film theory and film philosophy. This is by no means a 'master theory', but a philosophical approach that Deleuze takes, engaging a rhizomatic method (some would term 'post-structural') in order to engage with the ontology of film and the embedded epistemologies screen images create.

As Deleuze is classifying images not according to the terms of 'so-called classical narration' (C2: 26; cf. Bordwell 1985), any sense of narrative that we ascribe to the 'what is it?' question is derived from different forms of movement-images and the compositions and different types of time-images. So when Deleuze begins to summarize his approach to the relationships generated by screen sound-images (in chapter 2 of *Cinema 2*) he begins with some qualifications about the use of the semiotic classifications. In work previous to his cinema books, Deleuze had already critiqued the political outcomes and philosophical limitations of structuralist work (Deleuze [1967] 2004: 170–192; Deleuze [1969] 1990: 50; cf. Lecercle 2002). In Cinema 1, Deleuze engages Peirce's classifications of the image as relational stages. Deleuze uses Peirce's system for the classification of signs and images, using Peirce's numerical values through which certain qualities can indicate differences in kind, and the image can be classified as relational stages (cf. Bogue 2003: 67–69). To

this he adds a measure of Bergson, in order to figure in the registration of the different states of the movement-image. Specific examples of films also qualify Deleuze's meanings. In Deleuze's system, they are the states of: (1) 'zeroness' (perception-image), (2) 'firstness' (affection-image), (3) 'secondness' (action-image) and (4) 'thirdness' (relation-image) (C1: 98; C2: 30). Deleuze also engages Pasolini's notion of 'free indirect discourse', which is a form that describes the cinematic image in similar terms to Peirce's triadic system (C1: 72–73; see glossary, the *perception-image*). However, where Peirce's theory of the sign is the sign as an image that stands for another image (its object) through the relation of a third image (interpretant), this three-way movement ultimately returns to its linguistic measurable sign. Pasolini's system of free indirect discourse 'testifies to a system which is always heterogeneous, far from equilibrium' (C2: 73). In his text and in the dense footnotes of the cinema books, Deleuze invokes a number of theorists of semiotics, including Mikhail Bakhtin, Barthes, Umberto Eco, Julia Kristeva (C2: 26; Kristeva 1980). In particular, Deleuze engages works of three of the most famous French film semioticians of his era – Metz (with particular reference to his work *Essais sur la signification au cinéma* (1964–68), translated as *Film Language* (1974a)), Raymond Bellour's *The Analysis of Film* (2000), and Morin's work *The Cinema or the Imaginary Man* (2005). However, Deleuze reads the work of these film theorists not as film theory but as film philosophy. Deleuze argues why Metz 'and his followers' 'remain Kantians' (C2: 286 n8), and why their theories are less appropriate for his system than the type of Bergsonian approach to the image that he has thus far taken.

The question of 'reality' plays a fundamental part in Deleuze's approach throughout his entire oeuvre. The construction of a particular epistemology of truth, and the 'pedagogy of perception' that film theory creates, provide impetus for Deleuze as a philosopher to address the details of the structures producing and shaping this reality. Following his summation of 'signs and images in the cinema' (C2: chapter 2), we can see that Deleuze rejects film theory that presents the terms of a prescribed narrational framework, where the questions and answers already have a phenomenologically prescribed content.

The Function of Transsemiotics

Aspects of life come in all kinds of screen-forms. Image and sound editing is often approached as the screen's semiotic system, as it can control and manipulate narrative/emotions of the spectator/participant. The rhythm and pace of editing techniques directs attention of the participant, cognitive film theory tells us, and editing is primarily concerned with the relationship of one shot to another (cf. Eisenstein 1998: 82–92 and Deleuze's critique of Eisenstein C2: 287 n14; Bordwell and Thompson 2003: ch. 6). However, with a Deleuzian transsemiotic approach the otherwise prescriptive technicalities of cognitivist structuring can be critically engaged, so as to examine the hierarchies and forces implied in those relationships and image-orders. Like Pasolini, Deleuze's critical approach poses the questions, what is the relationship between cinema and reality? And how can the prefigured conditions of realities external to viewing describe images that work to reconfigure and communicate those worlds (cf. Johnston 1977: 408; Pasolini 2005: 167ff)?

To explore Deleuze's screen transsemiotic we might consider the films that foreground the question of language as a sign. This is the genre of films that examine the scriptwriting process, or play with questions of reality through language or semiotic premises. The pragmatics of translations and transformations are 'formalized' through words, which lead to all manner of confusion and mistakes, incorrect actions and misdeeds, tragic-comic modes of life, such as created in a range of films, for example; *Je tu il elle* (*I you he she*; dir. Akerman, 1974); *Sweet Movie* (dir. Makavejev, 1974), *Barton Fink* (dir. Coen, 1991), *Vayna on 42nd Street* (dir. Malle, 1992), *Fah talai jone* (*Tears of the Black Tiger*; dir. Sasanatieng, 2000), *Adaptation* (dir. Jonze, 2002), *Ten* (dir. Kiarostami, 2002), *Ten Canoes* (dir. de Heer and Djigirr, 2006). Deleuze examines the way in which Ozu constructs his images as 'information systems', not language ones (C1: 12) – although Deleuze will later qualify this. Deleuze writes of Ozu's films *Ochazuke no aji* (*The Flavour of Green Tea over Rice*, 1952):

American ordinariness helps break down what is ordinary about Japan, a clash of two everyday realities which is even expressed in colour, when Coca-cola red or plastic yellow violently interrupts the series of washed out, unemphatic tones of Japanese life. And, as the character says in *The Flavour of Green Tea over Rice*: what if the opposite had occurred, if saki, samisen and geisha wigs had suddenly been introduced into the everyday banality of Americans …? (C2: 15)

Objects and spaces of a certain hue and materiality are framed by the cinematography (by Yuuharu Atsuta) in certain ways that convey an array of information. The information is presented by way of the modes of encounter through the camera, which Deleuze describes in the terms of the transsemiotic crack: *break down*; *clash*; *violently interrupts*; *suddenly*. The subjective and objective quality of the images is given weight through their situating placement in chronometric time, communicative of a sense of ethnic place, but not one of space. Information about things is given in terms of epidermis, wigged, sedated by rice wine, a physical presence through their singular and combined sets of shots. To take the analysis further, we can look at each of these signs individually, as vectorial points, where the movement between object and image ceases and enters into a degree of a time-image. Deleuze's approach to the image-sign, whatever sort it may be, is vitalistic: for example, what he looks for in the image are indicators of this philosophy: 'It is clear that the image gives rise to signs' (C1: 69). He continues, 'For our part, a sign appears to be a particular image which represents a type of image, sometimes from the point of view of its composition, sometimes from the point of view of its genesis of formation (or even its extinction)' (C2: 69). As we have noted above, one of the problems with semiological models is that they can rely upon linguistic structural platforms for their methodology, and Deleuze strongly rejected structuralism for its deterministic reliance upon some form of 'transcendental' signifying position (Deleuze 2004; Stivale 1998: 253). Instead, Deleuze develops a semiology that places the image as its central sign, and signifier of not just meaning, but of ontology – of life itself. 'Language is not life; it gives life orders' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 76).

Deleuze's screen semiotic is the crucial aspect of both cinema books. It is the blood supply for the skeleton and neural network. It provides us with

the means to interpret unwieldy and obvious screen texts (cf. Kennedy 2000; Powell 2007). Commercialism aside, screen-based forms do have the potential to perform as a creative art. However, as Deleuze describes, the transformative powers of syntactical and semiotic rearrangement remain firmly grounded in pre-existing power arrangements that even the screen medium may not overcome. What can alter is our thinking about the ways in which we record, articulate and analyse the perception-image; as Deleuze notes, 'Godard says that *to describe* is to observe mutations' (C2: 19, original emphasis).

9

Signs (Vector)

In the Deleuze's taxonomy, over twenty different signs generated by the movement-image and over a dozen from the time-image are charted. The way that the ciné-system works, by infinite generation, means that there is no limit to the number of signs that cinema can produce. A taxonomy is reliant upon signs for the terms of its classification process. In semiotics, signs are things that stand in for something else; in Deleuzian transsemiotics, signs are topological figures that affect change.

Rather than present a cursory account of each of the named signs in the Deleuzian ciné-system, and speculate on the myriad of possible growth signs, this chapter focuses on just one sign in order to demonstrate the richness behind each and every taxonomic classificatory term that Deleuze produces. Ronald Bogue's table of images and their

corresponding signs provides a useful reference tool for seeing how images are composed through their corresponding signs of composition and genesis (Bogue 2003: 70). This chapter looks at the 'vector' which, in Deleuze's system, is a sign of genesis. This means that when it appears, it signals and can enact creation or destruction. As Bogue reminds us, Deleuze's taxonomic system is more Bergsonian than Peircian, and thus Deleuze's focus on the notion of genesis should not be too surprising (Bogue 2003: 67).

   A vector is a geometric modelling tool that we are using to describe the capacity of screen space. In the Deleuzian ciné-system vectorial points create, map and modify intensive moments and the behavioural conditions of screen spaces. Understanding the vector as a sign, and its difference from an edit or montage, is crucial for the development of interpretive practices for film studies. Quite distinct from an allegorical reading of film, the vectorial defines the internal relations of a film and how their connections impact upon the film's style and form. The vector creates a skeleton-space, a screen space composed through broken and indirect connections made up of heterogeneous parts.

Consider the *extent* of Deleuze's description of the following scene from one the key vampire films of the twentieth century,

> It is the hour when it is no longer possible to distinguish between sunrise and sunset, air and water, water and earth, in the great mixture of a marsh or a tempest. Here, it is by degrees of mixing that the parts become distinct or confused in a continual transformation of values. (C1: 14)

Deleuze refers to German director F.W. Murnau's film, *Nosferatu, eine Symphonie des Grauens* (*Nosferatu, A Symphony of Horror*, 1922). Like all films of the vampire genre, it contains its fair share of overtly theatrical spooky scenes, but *Nosferatu* remains unsettling even through its melodramatic staging. Deleuze describes *Nosferatu*'s cinematic composition in terms of sensory reaction and atmospheric movement. His literary tone echoes that

of one of the foundational European film theorists, Béla Balázs, who similarly noted that the emotive atmospheric disturbances of *Nosferatu* resonated with 'the glacial draughts of air from the beyond' (Balázs cited by Eisner 1973: 97). Both Balázs's and Deleuze's descriptions focus on the *dynamic conditions* of the film. Both address the film in terms of the energy and movement of the screen. Both undertake to translate into words this movement on screen, as shifts in emotive space registered by cinematic bodies. Deleuze's description, however, takes us into the very *formula* of atmosphere in *Nosferatu*. Deleuze tells us *how* those types of dynamic fluctuations create specific forms of the action-image through points of physical change on screen. Deleuze's words do not just describe a film style, but convey how the film world's (diegetic) fluctuations – here called marshes or tempests – alter the film form through a specific switching of meaning. This modification causes movement in terms of on-screen time, space and subject meaning. In turn, this movement creates change on screen – in terms of the technical dimensions of the film, the visceral sensate forms produced by these physical connections, and the modification of thought of the sound-image. The term Deleuze uses to describe this transformation of form in cinema is 'vector'.

As one of the earliest vampire films, *Nosferatu*'s power lies in its unsettling characterization of a bone-chilling fear of change and fear of otherness. *Nosferatu*'s disturbing narrative encompasses the plague, infected blood and soil, sexual chemistries, genetic reordering, strange personality traits, organic transmutations, journeys, strange weather patterns, social mores, fears and nightmares. These often unrelated elements are united by what Deleuze describes as vectors, by providing links in the screen circumstances. These *vector-links* are often disjointed – their connections made on screen by zigzag, tacit or irrational means. The vectors transform the scene disturbances into a series of joined incidents that operate in discrete temporal and spatial realities. Re-combined they create screen situations of incredible intensity such as we see in *Nosferatu*. Deleuze describes this type of action-image as the 'small form' and a 'cinema of behaviour (behaviourism)' – evident in the vampire film, the military, or western film, historical films, noir-style melodramas and thrillers – where filmic 'reality' and meaning resides in the creation of

closed and intense worlds such as those by directors like Hitchcock, Anthony Minghella or Sofia Coppola. It is *the structure and style of filmic behaviour* that film theory (and to a lesser extent, film criticism) seeks to describe in its writing. This behaviour is inspired by the on-screen action and 'engendered' by screen situations (for example brought about by acting styles, or socially imposed gender rules), says Deleuze, 'since behaviour is an action that passes from one situation to another, which responds to a situation in order to try to modify it or set up a new situation' (C1: 155).

What Is the Vector?

The vector is a term used to indicate the concept of agency, a sequence, or used to represent spatial coordinates, direction and magnitude of a quantity. The vector is a model employed across a range of disciplines – medical, biological, aeronautical, computational and mathematical – used to describe real and abstract qualities. In film vectors actively reconfigure the quantitative dimensions of a scene – affecting the whole of the film's final form. The vector is the point at which things change on screen.

First expounded in his pursuit of 'the image of thought' through critique of the notion of 'representation' in his 1968 thesis, *Difference and Repetition*, the vector and vector field are terms Deleuze uses to indicate *how things move and are thus transformed* according to the physics of the forces that determine the situations of forms and their trajectories. In 1980 in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari use the term vector as a way of differentiating between the forms and conditions of what they term an 'abstract machine' or 'machinic assemblage' – forms and conditions of which we can see demonstrated by cinema (1987: 145). In an assemblage there are two vectors, say Deleuze and Guattari: one vector is concerned with distribution and organization of things and territories (stratification) and the other vector works to re-orient the form and content of an assemblage to deterritorialize its stability (smooth space) (*ibid*.: 144–145, 474–500). In *A Thousand Plateaus* the types of movement that occur within an assemblage from

stability to dynamic form and back again are discussed in relation to speed vectors (drawing on Paul Virilio), but it is not until the Cinema books that the differentiations of vectorial movements are further explored and applied (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 396). In both *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2* Deleuze draws on the mathematical utility of the vector in order to express how the physical cinematic system is able to convey fluctuations of relations of all kinds, and retain the *conditions of spaces* (curved, three-dimensional, flat, surface or virtual) through the transformation of things (such as we recognize in *Nosferatu*).

Deleuze draws our attention to the *structure of behaviour* of cinematic form, in part from Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the relation between cinema and psychology (Merleau-Ponty 1964). The structure of cinematic behaviour is created in films like *Nosferatu* through vector points that act as connectors that Deleuze describes, after Bergson, as the 'sensory-motor' links (Bergson 1994: 42–43, 231; Merleau-Ponty 1996: 10, 91, 159). These links create a cinematic performativity that marks out *Nosferatu* as one of the formative vampire films through the iconic situations of *über*-vampirism that are affectively enacted by all on-screen elements in the film (such as the weather, people, horse and carriage, or ethical shifts). Through sensory-motor disturbances in the screen situation, the *vector points* of the action-image transform and alter the fabric of the communities that they contact (both on and off screen). For example, in the passage quoted at the start of this chapter (from *Cinema 1*), Deleuze's description of the emotional and ethical changes in *Nosferatu*'s filmic world is styled by the words *marsh* and *tempest*. This choice of words connotes not only the sense of a connection of the elements through a disturbance (tempest) or congestion (marsh) of air and water, but also invokes the emotional conditions on screen created by those mixtures. In his use of the word *tempest* Deleuze writes his own vector – as a *quality of measure* – into his description of the on-screen vectors communicating the sensory-motor screen properties. Like Balázs Deleuze conveys how we might translate our screen experience into a manner of language that will have some resonance with the moving medium. Be aware of that hour of *mixing*, Deleuze writes, for it is here that vampiric vectors work their dark magic.

In Deleuze's cinema system vectors are simply the 'signs' of the variable dimensions of forces that operate to bring a screen situation to life. The 'tempest' is such a force: a sign of the vector. As we have seen with the movement-images, all images are immanent in the larger forms directing them as they convey a meaning beyond material existence. For example, an index might constitute the generic elements of a particular screen world. The eccentric movements, cloaks and long fingernails of actor Max Schreck's performance as Count Orlock in *Nosferatu* set a standard index for generic discussion of all somnambulists and vampires-in-disguise. Equally the décor and cinematographic framing of *Nostferatu* marks an indexical territory as a (spooky) screen form that continues to be strategically utilized by the genre (cf. Powell 2005). The use of the term 'index' thus enables Deleuze to signal (and simplify) the complexity of the cinematic operation comprised of multiple signs, including the vector. It is important to note that, as the vector indicates the variation in the whole, it is what Deleuze describes as 'an index of lack': that is, where there is a gap in the narrative the vector makes the connection (either elucidating or mystifying the situation in the example of a noir film) (C1: 160). Vectors are the sign that a *modification* has occurred on screen.

Focus on the vectors in film analysis requires us to pay attention to any number of singular elements, which may form the evaluative relationship between modelled forms (all aspects of the *mise-en-scène*, sound and cinematography) in the screen space. In addition to considering the conditions that come to constitute an image, Deleuze asks that film analysis acknowledge the concrete terms of the screen through the laws of physics. Vectorial elements produce meaning through the creation of new connections between things. In between those connections made by the visual, sonic or haptic vectors of the image are further spaces – vector-induced moments of 'vertigo' between edits (C2: 180; see chapter 12 Topology). Always attentive to the physicality of language, Deleuze invokes a signpost phrase from novelist Dashiell Hammett (author of the book, *The Maltese Falcon* (1930)) to describe the physicality of the vector sound-image as something that puts 'a spanner in the works' (C1: 164). Noted examples of this *spanner-vector* (as disruptive or constructive heavy-handed shifts in situation) are obvious in classical Hollywood films

such as *The Big Sleep* (dir. Hawks, 1946) and *The Maltese Falcon* (dir. John Huston, 1941). This style is continued in contemporary noir, such as Frank Miller's *Sin City* (dirs Frank Miller and Robert Rodriguez, 2005). As noir-thrillers the divisive plot twists and turns of these films rely on vectorially produced atmosphere, revelations and concealment of physical and emotive images. As we have already observed – thinking of *Nosferatu* – the screen vector is what styles the *transforming* of a scene's action *and* the vector provides the imaginary or theoretical nuances of a script, *and* the physical and intellectual situation of the *mise-en-scène* (C1: 178–179). In other words the vectorial point can generate both physical and conceptual movement. In Deleuze's film theory analysis of the type of vector contributes to the critique of cinematic practices, knowledge that will enable our better apprehension of the kinds of *living relations* the cinematographic creates through its perception of the world.[1]

On screen the vector marks an incidence of change. Thinking with vectors cues us to the *organization of sensory stimulation* on screen through systemic shifts in the direction and quality of things in the cinematographically constructed world. A vector can occur with the introduction of a certain sound or the use of a physical motif to indicate a shift in temporal or spatial dimensions. As we have discussed, the vector signals where a difference in the conditions of the screen *transform*. This transformation is not to be confused with moments of a switch in a situation of a scene in terms of a sonic or graphic match between sound and imagery: for example, the matching of the infamous bone cut to same shape spaceship in Stanley Kubrick's film *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968), or the fluid formal correlation between ejaculation cut to ultrasound gel squirt in Catherine Breillat's film *Romance* (1999). These are instances where contrast or comparison is injected in the film situation through editing methods and are what Deleuze refers to as Eisensteinian montages (C1: 36; chapter 4 Montage).[2]

Rather than just think about the graphic cut between sound-images, Deleuze insists we pay attention to the type of form of transformation that takes place – the type of vector. In addition to any allegorical correlations to be made in analysis of a film, first explore the internal structure of motor-sensory links

on screen. How, and with what, is the film's internal structure composed? What are the film world's limits in physical terms? What types of internal focuses or gathering points are created by those boundaries? What are the vector points? The vectorial form is to be considered and expressed through the following five interrelated aspects of screen composition. These are implicit and intentional aspects of scene construction:

1. the constitution of the sound-image through the physical organization of the screen (or what Deleuze terms 'gestural' and 'motor' structures);
2. the sensory qualities/behaviour of a change in screen situation;
3. what type of impact these variations have on localized situations;
4. the overall form of the film (in this case, small);
5. how this form creates a particular type of space (skeletal) by the temporal distances between vectors.

The *vectorial points of change* within a screen's continuum can be both *abstract* (for example, the range of elements and concepts conveyed by the 'vampire') and/or *physical* (the designated narrative, stylistic attributes and sensorial qualities of the film/scene). The vectorial moments are such moments of intensity on screen and the vector is the *carrier* of those forces and sensations.[3]

How Deleuze Uses the Screen-vector

The vector provides Deleuze with a physical term to describe the *relational changes* between two or more specific screen elements, such as cinematography, acting modes, lighting, editing, sound, post-production film effects, and any other technological situations where forms are altered, through human and elemental means. In altering technical aspects of the film, such as lighting, or in scene edits, the vector is a micro 'vertigo' space, a 'between' that engenders micro worlds, and a macro space for thought.

As a practical component of the calculus, Deleuze uses the vector for the description of the representation of all manner of what he called 'local' (meaning particular) screen situations and actions. However, he will also account for the sensory terms of the sound-image's specific conditions of construction. This sense of the *local-vector* is seen in documentary, historical films, noir genres, comedy, costume dramas, the neo-western genre, in the films of Godard, and in television. All contain instances of where a *local condition* situates the sound-image. As we have already discussed, the *spanner-vector* of the transformation of situations is representative of an obvious vector situation. However, one of the pleasures of cinema (whether mainstream or 'arthouse') are those nuances of change in situation that can be slight and so subtle that they are not realized until some time after viewing. For example, consider the films of Chinese director Zhang Yimou or American director Orson Welles. Both create films that focus on the conditions created in restricted environments – *local-vectors*. For example, in Yimou's films such as *Raise the Red Lantern* (*Da hong deng long gao gao gua*, 1991), and the blockbuster *Hero* (*Ying Xiong*, 2002), or in Welles's *Citizen Kane* (1941) or *The Magnificent Ambersons* (1942), the films' conditions create controlled settings. These settings describe specific historical conditions that provide core *censorial, gendered, and racial vectors* for accessing knowledge of the respective politics of Chinese or American cultural policies. Yimou describes the tight controls of Chinese social behaviour, generating screen ethics made by intense colour and sound treatment. Welles does the same. Recognition of this vectorial form can be used for analysis more or less universally across films where a certain form of *militarism* rules that filmic world.

Other examples of screen situations that create instances of localized 'realities' reference the very relation between the screen and its construction. The dramatized link between the sensory and the motor perception of cinema reveals the medium to us as one that is a 'world which becomes its own image' – as Deleuze comments in his remarks on 'the identity of the image and the movement' (C1: 57). Such moments of cinematic construction, which we can term *method vectors*, are to be found in a wide range of film styles. Contemporary mainstream films often acknowledge the world of their

film's production through extra-diegetic (external to the film world) devices: for example, the use of a contemporary soundtrack in period films such as Ang Lee's film *Brokeback Mountain* (2005) or in Sofia Coppola's film *Marie Antoinette* (2006). *Brokeback Mountain* and *Marie Antoinette*'s respective *mise-en-scènes* are set in their historical pasts (Wyoming, 1963, and Paris, 1780s), and like the many variations in productions of vampiric-vectorial forms reveal much about the era of their production through their subject focus which creates a small form cinema.

Like the political films of Godard or Lars von Trier, the films of Yimou, Lee and Coppola operate as political allegories. Just as Pasolini's film *Salò o le 120 giornate di Sodoma* (1975) engaged localized situations to attend to the transformation of forms created by larger (global) forces, each of the above examples enact their vectorial form through local levels. Broadly speaking we could also characterize this sense of a local situation as an appeal to a cinema of 'allusion', as Noël Carroll once described (not to be confused with the 'post-modern') (Carroll 1981). However, to speak only to the 'allusions' these forms of cinema raise would miss one of the momentous specificities of the physics of cinematographic perception: *the detailing of close range*. What a vector enables us to articulate is *how* a moving image can convey situational aware-ness and change. A screen will produce a sound-image of a form of localized knowledge. Changing that sound-image by combining it with other images, sounds, movements, colours and bodies will alter the dimensions of that first image, thereby changing what we grasp to be the *situation* of the image. The vector thus causes an associative function to occur by embedding a thought (through various means) or by enacting a change in screen elements.

Put simply, attending to the vector points on screen enables Deleuze to follow changes within the moving image – the very processes of modelling the dynamics of the multiple dimensions of the screen. Deleuze plays on this no-tion of 'the small form' of the image (as opposed to the large form, discussed in chapter 12 Topology), where the tiniest of physical movements that might enable an abyss-sized trajectory of thought is preyed upon by cinema. The small form can be created by any component of the screen. Consider the figure of *Nosferatu* himself, as rendered by Herzog's 1979 version of Murnau's

film, where actor Klaus Kinski's body is 'caught in uterine regression', according to Deleuze's description of this film's visual geometry of scale as 'a foetus reduced' (C1: 185). Deleuze's allusion to the metaphysical womb asks us to question the physiological style of the screen situation, rather than analyse the psychoanalytical constitution of the actor/character's mind.

Thus the vector might take the form of the tone, accent or pace of delivery of an actor's dialogue, it might be the colour of the actor's skin or eyes or hair texture, it might be the type of camera movement used between images (hand-held, tracking, swing ellipses), or a close-up, or it might be an object used in a situation to segue the realism of the screen situation. To conceptualize the power that such 'small forms' hold, Deleuze also refers to the small form of cinema as the *skeleton-space* of the screen situation. As a skeleton-space, a whole space (of the film) is composed through broken and indirect connections made up 'with missing intermediaries, heterogeneous elements which jump from one another' (C1: 168). This has implications for further thinking through the 'temporal distances' that are created in such a space (for example, between material and organic objects or historical concepts, etc) (*ibid*., see chapter 10 Time). In this sense of shaping the screen's totality vectors provide the quantitative links required for recognition to occur between the infinite ranges of physics of the moving image worlds on screen. The skeletal space of the vector provides an 'empty' site for *chi* (Chinese for *the breath*); it is an encompassing space.[4]

Vectors are thus those rhetorical or geometric ellipses on screen, the individual points that enable an action on screen (A) to 'disclose' a situation (S), catalytic for a new action on screen (A') (where A' equals a modified action) (C1: 160). According to Deleuze this form – ASA' – has multiple possible configurations of movement dependent on the type of screen sound-image and style of action. The ASA' is modification of a situation through movement. Deleuze describes this form using the Riemannian sense of elliptic space, with his discussion playing on both senses of the word as the geometric field and the rhetorical 'gap': ellipse and ellipsis. Generic descriptions are rhetorical indices for Deleuze – they are formed through what he terms 'a reasoning-image' such as 'the famous image of the train, whose arrival we only see from

the lights which pass across the woman's face, or the erotic images which we can only infer from the spectators' (C1: 161). The rhetorical sense of such a screen ellipsis has enabled a cinematic perception of events and objects, beyond everyday perception, as the logic of objects (and their temporal and spatial impression) are disclosed, modified and trigger off a further action.

In the second geometrical sense of the ellipse, the vector enables Deleuze to delineate the descriptive movements of the screen components. The screen vector is a form that will effectively provide access to a screen situation in thinking of apparently discontinuous entities, by asking the screen participant to consider two positions by way of a third form (the vectorial point or space) that holds a differential quality or singular difference (C1: 187, 239; Duffy 2006c). Deleuze wrote of the vector form: 'It is as if an action, a mode of behaviour, concealed a slight difference, which was nevertheless sufficient to relate it simultaneously to two quite distinct situations, situations which are worlds apart.' (C1: 161). The vector does not denote a type of seamless exchange or transportation of information. Rather it is a specific function that articulates the magnitude and 'change in direction' of 'an obstacle' or 'the power of a new impulse', creating a specific screen form, as Deleuze says, 'in short, the subordination of the extensive to intensity' (C1: 51).

The Function of a Vector

Employed by Deleuze as a formal term, a 'vector' is a practical concept for the consideration of the physical and sensory dimensions of screen spaces and situations created through those narrative, stylistic and technical processes of filmmaking that involve the *transformation of forms*. In *Nosferatu* a vector space is the point where the relationships of elements begin to transform, as Deleuze writes, so that by *degrees of mixing* (quantities of assimilation) *the parts become distinct or confused*. Of course *Nostferatu* engages in expression of a certain type of dramatic mood that such films never fail to impress upon their viewers, and in this sense provides an easy illustration of a vector. However, the vector is not just a category of the expressionist film (cf.

The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari; dir. Robert Wiene, 1920), just as it is not to be confused as a term that describes the *mise-en-scène*. As Deleuze explored, the vector is a physical arrangement (*agencement*) that provides a necessary facilitation for the abstract machinery of filmmaking to cohere. That ensemble is created through associational means, through what Deleuze calls the vector, or 'line of the universe' – the 'broken line which brings together singular points or remarkable moments at the peak of their intensity' (C1: 218).

Vector-fusions form the series of incidents that create the intensities of *Nosferatu*. Deleuze gives another example – the *vector-pause*, seen in Vertov's use of the intertitle – as a restoration of 'intervals to matter' (C1: 81). This screen interval is not so much a gap between sound-images; rather it creates a hiatus that provides a 'correlation' of images, a 'properly cinematographic enunciation' (C1: 82). Just as we can teach children the rudiments of geometry by differentiating between the scales, dimensions and proportions of space, by measuring things with a length of string that can be knotted and stretched, the vector also provides us with a tool to access and survey the properties of screen space. In fact Deleuze likens the vector situation to a length of knotted rope, as indicated by the economics of directors Sam Peckinpah, Anthony Mann and Delmer Daves, whose western genre films depict a plurality of 'Wests', totalities that are composed of 'the broken stroke', 'genetic signs', 'heterogeneous critical instants' that create a totality that is 'like a knotted rope, twisting itself at each take, at each action, at each event' (C1: 168). The screen vector does perform this role of connecting 'both spaces and actions', as Bogue noted, and to this sense of thinking through connections Deleuze complicates the whole by asking us to consider the temporal mode (or style) of the film in question (Bogue 2003: 89–92). Creating a film that covers the dimensions of its world through the creation of a skeletal space often involves a fracturing of chronological time. We see this in Quentin Tarintino's *Kill Bill* films (2003–2004), or in Kenji Mizoguchi's *Zangiku Monogatari* (*The Story of the Late Chrysanthemums*, 1939), the latter's sequencing of different spaces referred to by Deleuze as creating a 'parallelism of vectors', giving rise to our comprehension of the function of the small form in the conception of space.

As Deleuze notes of the small form, 'it is "small" by its process, but its immensity derives from the connexion of the fragments which compose it, from the placing in parallel of different vectors (which retain their differences), from the homogeneity which is only formed progressively' (C1: 194). Both Mizoguchi and Tarantino employ extremely formal cinematic techniques to deploy their gradual construction of space to encompass the infinite range of cinema through small form.

Deleuze utilizes the mathematical sense of the vector to denote those instances on screen where there is a physical movement. These movements create links and variations in the screen situation. A vector will create a dynamic screen situation – through a particular screen action, sound or behaviour. This moment is not constituted through binary structures (say the difference between the calm air and the storm). Rather, the screen-vector is created through differences that are self-affecting in their constant variation and movement (see chapter 6 Affect). In *Nosferatu* the blood of the vampire is the vectorial point; it is regulatory of its own dimensions of being, *and* full of creative possibilities – like an egg. By increasing its community of vampires, Nosferatu's own status and power is altered. Such is the self-affecting nature of the screen, and any analysis of the medium must account for how much of that moving dimension has played itself out (such is the difficulty we experience in analysis of current events still in process). Event-based narratives all carry this potential for future affection. We see this in a diverse range of films that deal with the migration of viruses, as viral or blood-vectors, including the spread of HIV in *Kids* (dir. Larry Clark, 1995), or in the political allegory of *28 Days* (dir. Danny Boyle, 2003), where another 'blood' infection called Rage, decimates the British population. The vector appears in films that communicate other political paradigms, for example in *Shadows* (dir. John Cassavetes, 1959), where the politics of race-gender relations explode through a reaction to skin colour.

The vectorial point or space in Deleuze's cinema system describes specific screen situation's expressive movements. These movements are measured quantitatively and dynamically: the spatial change in a room at the point when the light is closed; when you hear a classical musical score, rhythmically

accompanying a montage of death on screen; when you count the number of gunshots in a western; what you think of when you read the word *Hiroshima* on screen; the moment when you realize a character has now become a vampire. These are vectorial screen situations – movement (and as we shall describe in later chapters, temporal dynamics) effected by light, sound, narrative information and characterization. The vector is functional for thinking through and articulating the conditions that generate these situational points on screen. The vector is also useful for the recognition of constituent genre elements, the diversity of historical screen information, and for analysing screen sound, image, affects, actions and situations.

10

Time

Deleuze provides an extensive array of different types and forms of time-images that screen images produce and express. Deleuze's description of the time-image provides a philosophical and mathematical explanation for different aspects of the time-image, organizing them in philosophical terms, as 'commentaries on Bergson' (C2: contents). In Cinema 2 Deleuze devotes four core chapters to the topic, continuing with his ciné-thesis on Bergson from Cinema 1: Chapter 3, 'From recollection to dreams: third commentary on Bergson' (on recognition, the opsign and sonsign); Chapter 4, 'The crystals of time'; Chapter 5, 'Peaks of present and sheets of past: fourth commentary on Bergson' (on time and memory); and then the chapter which deals with the 'becoming as the third time-image', Chapter 6, 'The powers of the false'.

Deleuze addresses how diverse and similar screen conditions produce and destroy new time-based forms through processes of differentiation (C2: 28–9; C2: 40; C2: 80–81).

One of the promotional taglines for the 2001 film *Donnie Darko* (dir. Richard Kelly) was the use of an eternal term: Dark. Just as light creates and destroys forms, so does the dark.[1] Dark becomes darker, darkest and then darko, a play with forms of 'reality' created by forms of 'knowledge', such that vision, perception, imagination and intellect is impaired or modified in some way. *Donnie Darko*'s narrative follows the events of dissymmetrical pathways of time and the moments when they split, thereby destroying certain trajectories and creating other forms by their detours and intersections. As if to emphasize the interplay of light and dark, Donnie's psychiatrist (played by actor Katharine Ross) tells his parents that Donnie (played by actor Jake Gyllenhaal) is experiencing a 'daylight hallucination'. Donnie's 'hallucination' is stylized on screen through the actors' bodies' reactions to extra light and spaces in their world – light flares, connective and shimmering surfaces, viscous mirrors. Meanwhile in the 'real world' darkness is indeed falling, with strange dark clouds gathering and those once flickering surfaces now bruised, decaying and darkened, until the end does indeed fall on the characters to the soundtrack song of 'Mad World' by Andrews and Jules.

In *Donnie Darko* temporal stages of darkness affect the characters with the darkening of the trajectory of time becoming the accepted way of being, until 'the end' when the narrative realizes all stages of the 'darkness' as an event wherein time-images are simultaneous and coextensive. A book titled 'the philosophy of time-travel' provides some narrative lucidity to draw the storylines into its promised themes, but time as a state of becoming through encounters and subsequent change provides one of the main story arcs, performed through various images in the film. The 'darkness' colours perception by mapping that perception's movement through durational screen time that in turn creates boundaries as it simultaneously rips open new places, creating paths that allow you to see the 'channel into the future' (Darko).

Donnie Darko offers an example of Deleuzian direct and indirect time-images. We have a filmic whole made up of a range of temporal modes, examples that Deleuze has argued from the outset in the cinema books. Movement is a 'translation in space' (C1: 8), however, when we 'are confronted with a duration, or in a duration' – Deleuze writes, 'we may conclude that there exists somewhere a whole which is changing, and which is open somewhere' (C1: 9). As Deleuze describes it, the time-image occurs as an image 'beyond movement', recognizable through differential processes as 'duration-images, change-images, relation-images, volume-images' (C1: 11). These type of images are indirect time-images. Deleuze says the time-image 'cannot do without the movement-images which express it, and yet it goes beyond all relative movements forcing us to think an absolute of the movement of bodies, an infinity of the movement of light, a backgroundless [*sans fond*] of the movement of souls; the sublime' (C2: 238; for Deleuze's discussion of the sublime, see chapter 4 Montage and chapter 13 Thought).[2]

In time-images durational movement creates topological openings rather than translations of form – as we see with the various time-images in *Donnie Darko*.[3] Instead of having multiple selves within the different story arcs of the film, Donnie's character has a mutant reflection-image provided by multiple versions of Frank, a rabbit-headed character. The paradox of the hare and the tortoise, drawn from Zeno's story of Achilles's footrace with the tortoise, is played out with the rabbit-headed Frank and the often slow-registering Donnie, each character a mirror of the other with differences, on different trajectories; although bound through some dimensional cross-overs, each of their pathways remains distinctive. One of the Franks provides the pragmatic account of the design of a world, at one point noting: 'Twenty-eight days … six hours … forty-two minutes … twelve seconds. That … is when the world … will end' (*Donnie Darko*). American director Richard Kelly follows through time-signing of 'the end' – as a pathway offering both limitations and possibilities – created by temporal activities that *Donnie Darko* prophetically raised (made in 2001, the film is set in 1988, USA) and which Kelly's post-televisual film, *Southland Tales* (2007), continues. In *Southland Tales* the particular apocalyptic situation of *Donnie Darko* becomes more generalized through its

repetition, with a narrator (Justin Timberlake) providing not just a narrative description but temporal method – directions for the development of the film. 'This is the way, the world ends,' he intones (in *Southland Tales*). The space and concept of 'film' is extended by Kelly with 'more temporal structures', as Deleuze predicted, wherein the cinematographic image 'has been able to grasp and reveal [those structures], and which can echo the teachings of science' (C2: xii; Kelly 2003; 2004).

As well as 'indirect' images of time, which Deleuze discusses in terms of the aesthetics of political ideas (C2: 243), Deleuze describes 'direct' images of time, including 'crystal' moments: 'seeds of time' where that 'beyond' 'without ground' is created through various functions of time such as memory, recollections, events (C2: 98). Through his discussion of the time-image, Deleuze engages this method of polar concepts of the indirect image of time. Taken in part from Nietzsche's use of a dyadic aesthetic, Deleuze's methodological approach to time draws up from the movement-image, an indirect image of time coming from affective fields of cognition, perception and events, to the direct image of time (cf. C2: 43). The direct image of time can be taken as a Deleuzian definition of the affective dimensions and topology of subjectivity. Deleuze describes his method of accounting for time by citing Federico Fellini: 'We are constructed in memory; we are *simultaneously* childhood, adolescence, old age and maturity' (C2: 99, original emphasis). In this approach we can see that the movement-image is an immanent embedded component of the time-image. Deleuze's Bergsonist mode of vitalist philosophy – wherein the past is present as a living force (habitual, mythical or becoming) – also figures largely in this polar methodology, just as the Nietzschian account of Apollonian destruction and Dionysian creation injects a certain philosophy of the new (C2: 239–240). With his account of the time-image, Deleuze's system describes the virtual nature (or ontology) of the cinema. Understanding this enables us to map the logic of the various structures at work within any given image.[4]

What is Time and the Deleuzian Time-image?

Deleuze approaches time in the terms he sets up through the movement-image, and then takes a 'detour' in order to reveal the 'essence' of time and cinema as a time-based medium (C2: 43). Deleuze will mark the appearance of time in the image not as past, present, future, but as direct and indirect time. The question that Fellini raised, as I discussed above, concerning subjectivity or being, is at the heart of Deleuze's proposal for a philosophy of difference rather than a philosophy of representation (C2: 99), where cinema is engaging a process of actualizing various conceptions of 'time'. Rather than oppose 'the real' and its illusory various cognitive states (perceptions or beliefs), Deleuze describes things in terms of the 'virtual' and 'actual' state of things (1994: 208). In discussing how film actualizes virtual states (such as thought and dreams), *Cinema 2* takes his earlier work on the philosophy of ideas (as an alternate proposition to the philosophy of representation) and extends his Bergsonian schema of creation through cinema's products and his discussion of cinema by thinkers like Artaud, and film makers including Welles, Resnais and Fellini. The actual or 'actualization' of things (for example, the actualization of Donnie's dreams or the theories of time from the pages of a textbook in *Donnie Darko*), in Deleuzian terms, is an act or process of 'genuine creation' (1994: 212).

Deleuze proposes Bergson's descriptions of the multi-planar dimensions of time as the method for discerning the various ways in which this actualization might occur, although he will describe how once certain 'crystalline images' or 'seeds of time' are created on screen, then the types of time-image enabled are in fact infinite (the theory behind this is Deleuze's Leibniz, see chapter 12 Topology). One of the key signaletic terms for the time-image, the crystalline image of time, is variously referred to in the cinema books as 'the time crystal', 'the crystal-image', 'seeds of time', 'mirrors of time' and the 'hyalosign', and appear where the expression of time coalesces, and the image both expresses and produces a composite (time-image) of different types of layers of time, and different signs of time, or crystalline circuits of

time (see C2: Chapter 4, 'The Crystals of Time'). Each of these signs can then be discussed further in terms of the philosophical matter with which they are composed, and will create, and in terms of their relation with other sign-images. Deleuze also uses Bergson's tabulation of the different types of possible memory states: dreams, amnesia, déjà-vu, and conceptions of fantasy, hallucination and death; dream images (Deleuze calls these oniro-signs), memory-images (mnemosigns), thought-images (noosigns), order or relation-images (chronosigns), truth-images (genesigns), and sound-images (lectosigns). The *crystalline image of time* comes to describe its situation, as Deleuze explains the image is not one of a substitute sign (this sound-image standing in for that object), rather it has become the entire composition of time: 'Rosebud' (Welles 1941), or the ghost ship of *Les Trois couronnes du matelot* (*Three crowns of the sailor*; dir. Ruiz, 1982; cf. Goddard 2011) or the figure of Frank (Kelly 2001) (C2: 126). As such, the time-images will come to affect the values of the open-system of images, which Deleuze describes in terms of the 'powers of the false', in relation to description, narrative, and questions of 'truth' (see chapter 12 Topology and chapter 11 Politics). First, the terms of the Deleuzian time-image must be clarified.

Continuing the discussion of the movement-image, frame and shot, and montage of *Cinema 1*, Deleuze will discuss the way that montage can produce an 'image of time' through its activity of producing a whole (C2: 34–35). This is a stable form of time, where montage 'selects and co-ordinates' moments of time (images and sounds of events and icons that might be inserted into another image). Deleuze notes that this indirect image of time is contradicted when there appears to be no affective linkage of perception and action images; when there is a break in the 'sensory-motor schema' of the movement-image, and where time-images appear as direct images; 'pure optical and sound situ-ations' (op-signs and son-signs) (C2: 40–41). These are instances of crystals of time appearing as an expression of a 'mutual image' (C2: 69): a crystal image, where an image enters into a relation with its own screen image (C2: 69). Through this exchange of actual and virtual images, the image becomes autonomous and independent of movement, and is a seed of time to be found in all types of environments and expressed in all kinds of screen conditions.

Through his discussion of the crystal-image, Deleuze references Bergson's diagrams for four different types of temporal schemas from *Matter and Memory* (each are reproduced in Deleuze's notes in *Cinema 2*):

1. The circuit (or the internal limit);
2. The inverse cone;
3. The dissymmetrical jets;
4. The event.

Each of these four diagrams influences the direction of Deleuze's discussion on particular aspects of the time-image (C2: 289, 294, 295, 297). In what follows I look at each of these in terms of Deleuze's methodological approach to the different aspects of the time-image.

The first diagram illustrates Bergson's first schema of time as the circuit of the internal limit (diagram illustration C2: 289). Deleuze discusses the 'circuit' of the actual and the virtual in terms of Bergsons's description of how 'memory [is] immediately consecutive to perception' (C2: 289). Deleuze variously describes this function on the time-image as a psychological issue of perception, or 'recognition' or 'reflection', a 'zone of recollections, dreams or thoughts', describing the doubling movement of 'creation and erasure', or creation and destruction of forms (C2: 44–46; C2: 126–147; Bogue 2003:112–133). This circuit describes a crystal of time (which Deleuze also refers to as hyalosigns); the beyond of the movement-image is created through op-signs and son-signs – these are points or vectors of direct-time. This is a circuit, such as Fellini describes, and which Donnie Darko experiences, where the past is present, but is in fact altered by its present state. The actualization of the past is the circuit. Deleuze discusses this, giving examples of various temporal/recollective states, including 'paramnesia' (the sense of *déja-vu*), memories and dreams (often technically constructed in film as 'flashbacks' or 'flash forwards', and outlines Bergson's 'major theses on time' as Kantian (C2: 79; 79–82; cf. Deleuze 1984). Deleuze gives three examples that express this circuit of 'being in time', of the 'internal' situation of time, of the definition of time as 'the affection of self by self': Dovzhenko's *Zvenigora* (1928, about life

in the Ukraine, part of a three part trilogy (see Liber 2002), Deleuze also mentions Dovzhenko's *Zemlya* (*Earth*, 1930)), Hitchcock's *Vertigo* (1958), and Resnais's *Je t'aime, je t'aime* (1968) (C2: 82–3). Furthermore, different types of interconnections are made on screen with opsigns and sonsigns through other types of time-images, and thus are descriptive of Bergson's relational circuit of 'constant creation or reconstruction' (Bergson 1994: 103; C2: 34; cf. Bogue 2003: 108; cf. Colman 2005a). The circuit of 'exchange' between actual image and virtual image creates new time-images and different types of narrative strategies (C2: 68; 71). In *Donnie Darko* the image of Frank the rabbit functions to signal variations in time for Donnie. The instructions for the ending of the world in *Southland Tales*, like the predictions given in *Donnie Darko*, coalesce into the actual images of the film through an exchange of temporal perception. This is made possible, says Deleuze, through a correspondence between the 'two sides' of an image: 'actual and virtual' (C2: 68, original emphasis). This is the crystal of time, as Deleuze describes it, or the very being of cinema's time-process, its ontological process of the material expression and the assemblage of ideas of time.

The second diagram is Bergson's inverted cone from *Matter and Memory*, which Deleuze describes in *Difference and Repetition* as 'a gigantic memory' (1994: 212; diagram illustration C2: 294). The cone illustrates what is created through the circuit of the virtual image; between present and past through recollection-images, this is the 'little crystalline seed' (C2: 81). Deleuze performs a topological movement here, asking us to engage with the various circuits of the virtual actual and imagine them expanding outwards from the seed. The cone illustrates the second aspect of the crystal-image, says Deleuze, the first was the circuit, which defines its 'internal limit', the second, the cone, illustrates its 'outer-most, variable and reshapable envelope [. . .] the vast crystallisable universe' (81).

The third of Bergson's temporal schemas is the split into dissymmetrical jets (diagram illustration C2: 295). This diagram illustrates the operations of the time-image as a topology with two types of operational functions – algebraic and quantum. The spilt, tearing or opening of time into new pathways, is one of the fundamental (and most commented upon aspects) of time

consistency. This is the moment where time splits 'at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself', writes Deleuze; further, this split 'is time, that we *see in the crystal*' (C2: 81, original emphasis). How this fracture is depicted on screen provides much scope for film analysis.

The fourth diagram illustrates the event. This is Bergson's 'fourth schema of time', where the event is given value through a graphical method of memory intersecting with history. History is illustrated as longitudinal: something that 'passes along the event', intersecting with memory, as vertical region (diagram illustration C2: 297). Deleuze discusses this in his 'fourth commentary on Bergson', chapter 5 of *Cinema 2*, discussing Fellini's comment concerning a direct time-image, where the process of memory can be thought of in various ways – as a 'Being-memory' (for example Donnie Darko's character), or as a 'world-memory' (a character's composition through the larger world they inhabit and the relations and institutional laws that direct their disposition) (C2: 98). History is constituted through the organization of language and ideas, in which time has become the event. Deleuze explains this in terms of St Augustine's definition of time: a logic of a 'threefold present' that contains the present of present things, the present of past things, and the present of future things (C2: 99–10; St. Augustine 1962: 251–277). The time-image that contains this type of simultaneity 'gives narration a new value', says Deleuze, 'because it abstracts it from all successive action, as far as it replaces the movement-image with a genuine time-image' (C2: 101) (Deleuze gives the example of Robbe-Grillet's work, and engages a point of difference between Robbe-Grillet and Resnais (C2: 104), but we might equally consider Richard Kelly, David Lynch, Chantal Akerman or Sofia Coppola's respective films on this point). Thus, for Deleuzian film theory or for film philosophy to describe the temporal situation, analysis must first qualify its terms (or conditional regional values, correlations, etc.) as a specific point on the circuit. For an example of this specificity, consider Deleuze's taxonomic analysis of the variations of temporal repetition in Buñuel's work: a 'forgetfulness' in *Susana* (also known as *The Devil and the Flesh*, 1951), an 'exact repetition' in *El Ángel exterminador* (*The Exterminating Angel*, 1962), or a 'deepening' of the circuit in *Belle de Jour* (1967), and so on (C2: 102). On screen time can be organized

to achieve the depiction of all manner of temporal degrees of past present and future. A 'present' may be depicted using a number of stylistic devices and narrative methods; for example, the vernacular of daily life in *Donnie Darko*'s world appears in different guises in other film and screen treatments.[5] However, Deleuze has argued through the above points of Bergson's temporal schema set out in *Matter and Memory* that the notion of 'the present' is a limited one, noting: 'It is a mistake to think of the cinematographic image as being by nature in the present' (C2: 105). Instead, the fourth schema of time – as event rather than as 'a present' – enables a critique of the value of the event and how it has been created on screen.

These four schemas provide Deleuze with ample scope to develop his taxonomy of the direct-images of time. He discusses various other forms of the time-image which describe topological conditions of time-images, including the 'mirror-image'. Further, the Bergsonian circuit of the actual-virtual will describe what Deleuze terms the 'point of indiscernibility', or 'principle of indeterminability' (C2: 4–7; 68–71; see chapter 12 Topology). Indiscernibility enables Deleuze to argue why a simple distinction between 'the subjective and the objective' provides a limited critical method for analysis of the autonomous nature of the image of time (C2: 4–7). Instead, using the figure of the crystal image, Deleuze charts a topology of crystalline time. As he will remark in the context of a dense discussion of Fellini's films (including *8 1/2*, *Fellini's Roma* (1972), *La città delle donne* (*City of Women*, 1980), *The Clowns* (1970), *Satyricon* (1969)), the 'organization of the crystal is bipolar, or rather two-sided' (C2: 90). What he means by this is that one cannot consider one side of the image without the other, and for Deleuze it tends to be one judgemental side or ethical side.

How Deleuze Uses Time

Continuing his transsemiotic approach, Deleuze names the situations and conditions of time as images comprised of matter made up of signs, which Deleuze describes as 'signaletic material' (C2: 33). Deleuze gives each of

these a place and a function in the system according to the type of value they generate in creating or destroying images. In this Deleuze follows Bergson's thesis in *Matter and Memory*, continually stressing the Bergsonian aspects of understanding the signs of matter and the many temporal structures in cinema (C1: 11; C2: 33, 109). Deleuze also continues work on his thesis from his book *Difference and Repetition*, discussing how change occurs and describing how: 'Actual terms never resemble the singularities they incarnate' (1994: 212). Components of the screen change through repetition. Deleuze argues that the conditions for the present time – the lived present of now – are formed through habit; by a synthesis of past times, repeated past actions and perceptions which will in turn guide our present and future (1994: 70–81). Applying this method in his cinema books, Deleuze will repeat what he has discovered: repetition is in no way predictable, but habit limits change. Repetition cannot repeat what has already occurred before; repetition may set up a series or sequence of events, but through repetition a change occurs, no matter how slight – what Deleuze will term a 'becoming' (C2: 275).[6] Even from a synthesis of things, asymmetrical anomalies occur: the character of *Donnie Darko* steps out of the black hole of time on the screen and his actions address his audience. We may have seen the actor playing Donnie (Gyllenhaal) speak, move and gesture in a previous film, for example, *October Sky* (dir. Joe Johnston, 1999). *October Sky*'s narrative repeats the habitual sentiments of the 'American Dream' which constitute a process of change, but are always fixed by a linear track towards an end 'goal'. Deleuze offers a critique of these different forms of narration with his distinction of 'organic' and 'non-organic' time, where narratives determined by 'pure descriptions' are compared with narratives and images that offer what he sees as opening new futures (C2: 126ff). To seek an 'end point' of a narrative is the opposite of Deleuze's notion of the difference created in repetition and the notion of the creation of the new that different screen media forms are capable of producing. On screen the actualization of things creates new forms every time, no matter how many times an idea has been realized, although Deleuze does point out the shortcomings of cinema despite this logic of difference through repetition: 'Cinema is dying then, from its quantitative mediocrity' (C2: 164; see chapter 13 Thought).

The elements of *Donnie Darko*, like a number of films of this period, shift the actor's role and shift the possible trajectories of the film. Darko is 'capable of seeing and showing rather than acting' – he is, in Deleuze's words, 'A new type of character for a new cinema' (C2: 19). Thus in his conclusions to the *Time-Image* (cinematic mediocrity notwithstanding), Deleuze writes: 'The before and after are then no longer successive determinations of the course of time, but the two sides of the power, or the passage of the power to a higher power' (C2: 275). We might consider 'the before and after' of Donnie in this sense, where 'the order of time' (C2: 274) is not presented as successive, but shifts and jumps all over the place, expressive of the different types of time zones as creative and destructive of different powers. Time as a power is presented as capable of manipulating events and characters, and is multiple, simultaneous and continuous. Through the composition of the transformative potential of becoming through the sequences of time that film constructs, the virtual ontology of the screen is shown as being able to shift and change the actual (of the actor's capacity; of audience cognition; of the falsity of continuity; of the perceptual change in the utility of landscapes, etc.), by affecting itself with its own products, its own elemental nature. The screen builds and destroys time as it progresses (this is Bergson's law). On screen time is a potential becoming enabled by the filmic sequence, which may be extended or reduced *ad infinitum* as we understand through the processes of editing and production. (In the case of Donnie, see for example, the director Kelly's comments on the DVD.)

The main point that arises from the taxonomy of time-images is that they all 'shatter the empirical continuation of time, the chronological succession, the separation of the before and the after' (C2: 155). Time-images, according to Deleuze, appear in three distinctive ways. The first two concern *the order of time*: (1) the image relations beyond of translation of movement-image, and (2) the transformation of time through internal elements of the image; the third is *the series of time*: (3) 'the before and the after in a becoming' of the image (C2: 155).

In *Cinema 2* Deleuze continues his discussion of false movement begun in his consideration of Bergson's three theses on movement, in particular the

frame and shot of the image (C1: 12–28). The senses of the passing of time, as well as the actual depiction of the passage of time, offer a technical quest for all filmmakers. The various clichéd devices of time do not offer much in the way of philosophical knowledge, Deleuze argues; this is false movement. Rather, his discussion is drawn to examples where cinema materializes or destabilizes perceptual and epistemic knowledge – such as the framing of something, relations created by new things or encounters, events caused through situations of political or natural change. Everyday and extraordinary moments and events encountered, such as geomorphic change, poverty or beauty, civil unrest and events of militarism, produce different screen responses, create new forms, and address different people. Deleuze discusses these changes through examples from the cinemas of neorealism, new wave movements of various countries (and we have discussed examples from French, German, South Korean, Thai, but there are many more). Activities of all types produce a 'consistency' of the whole that we name as *time* (C2: 35), but in achieving this form, as we shall discuss with the *thought-image*, other cinematographic and philosophical problems arise.

As Deleuze argues, the actualization of time is the subject of cinema. Fellini proposes that our idea of being is the simultaneous and coextensive layers of the past, recollections, memories, all in the 'present' tense/situation. Virtual time, in contrast to actual time, is all of which can be 'present' (C2: 78–80). The time-image can only be produced when an 'actual image' enters 'into relation with its *own* virtual image', thereby constituting an image that is 'double-sided, mutual, both actual and virtual' (C2: 273, original emphasis; Deleuze also discusses the doubled constitution of objects in *Difference and Repetition*: 209; see also Deleuze 2006: 112–115). Time reveals itself at the materialist level in a number of ways on screen. Deleuze describes how states of change (individual or community based; activities of militarism) produce 'the crystal-image': a direct presentation of time, an event of the here and now, even if it is one of a 'hallucinatory' landscape (1989: 128–129). Focusing on narrative cinema, Deleuze looks at the activities of actors that populate those landscapes. Deleuze's principle of the time-image becomes apparent with a figure such as Donnie Darko's various Franks – they are the 'actor-mediums'

who actualize or portray a 'fact-image' (C2: 19–20). Through his mapping of the components and signs and variations of the movement-image and of the time-image, one of Deleuze's key narrativization of cinematic philosophy is the question of the false and the true as a 'pair of terms' described in philosophical terms that enable the distinction of philosophical categorizations and concepts (Deleuze 1995: 65–66). Frank might be the intemperate figure of the outside 'real' world of militarism that is driving the impending apocalypse of Donnie's world and, then again, Frank is a temporal prophet, a Dionysian *Dr Who* in rabbit guise (C2: 152). Like other narrators who stage the very epistemological falsity of their position, Frank is 'free' (to some extent) from systems of judgement (such as the governmental, psychiatric, familial and educational labels placed upon various situations) that Deleuze labels as false movement. Frank is precisely the figure of time that Deleuze describes – Frank is the event and crystalline image of time engaging in 'political acts of storytelling', etc.; his character is a 'coalescence' of the temporal conditions of perception (C2: 243–245).

Frank becomes 'the character of the cinema' (a crystal-image; a noosign or a *thought-image*); in Deleuze's terms, he is 'the forger' who operates 'to the detriment of all action' (C2: 132). Frank redirects the movement-image into time-images. We see these characteristics or image-behaviour in genre films that engage a central character to be the vectorial body of narrative and temporal manipulation, such as in the films of Hitchcock, Ozu, Deren, Orzon, Nolan, Kim (2003a and 2003b), Wong (2004), Park (1998).

The Function of Time + the Time-image

There are a number of different ways to approach time on screen. To account for the differences in temporal perspectives and modulations, Deleuze divides time into the organic and the non-organic or crystalline (1995: 67; C2: 45). With these categories Deleuze's system takes two distinctive focuses for film theory, film philosophy and philosophy – the topological processes of film work and the value systems engaged by the medium.

Time is a processual thing, argues Deleuze, not a synthesis – not a habit, but something which may yet appear. And in this process of 'becoming' (as Deleuze describes it), time is a 'potentialization' (C2: 275; cf. dir. Kim 2003b). The time-image presents a 'series of powers' (*ibid.*) which can be thought of in both positive and negative senses of the types of social/political/cultural diachronic and synchronic constructed places that may yet appear on screen. Yet the ways in which Deleuze approaches discussion of such an abstract concept as 'time' enable other possible critical trajectories for film as a material product 'of its time' to emerge. By enacting a type of visionary quest Deleuze acknowledges that his discussion of the limit of an image is also bound by the Kantian limit of his apperception of the 'transcendental' presentation of time (C2: 271). This transcendental (or 'sublime') is something that cannot yet be shown: something perhaps 'too powerful or too unjust', but sometimes 'too beautiful' (*ibid.*). Deleuze gives the example of the 'unbearable' 'beauty' of a girl militant in one of Godard's 'pre-enlightenment' films, *Les carbiniers* (*The soldiers*, 1963) (C2: 18). The time-images created on screen give rise to new forms of expression, new types of compositions, and provide ethologies of filmic style as 'truth' and as 'false narration'. These are the subjects that Deleuze takes up through the whole of the second of the cinema books, *The Time-image*, and his conclusion will be a call for a new way to address time as the time-image expresses it. He writes: 'A new logic has to be invented, just as earlier a new psychology had to be' (C2: 275). Although he hints at what this 'new logic' might be, Deleuze stays with his main taxononomic project, although, as I discuss in following chapters, this compilation takes on an increasingly purposeful political agenda as *Cinema 2* draws to an end.

Time provides access to thinking, to the very nature of being itself, and the forms it takes and can take, through expression on screen. How to articulate the range of images and forms of time that cinema creates? Different theorists discussing cinema have made use of the Deleuzian time-image in a variety of ways, through address of quite divergent topics. For just three examples see Anna Powell in her discussion of 'horror time' (Powell 2005: 154ff); Colin Gardner in his elucidation of types of class and sexual time in director Joseph Losey's work (2004: 137); or the question of temporality as

Patricia Pisters describes it, as a function of the brain that is shaped by film (2003: 39; 2011).

The time-image as a 'crystalline' image has also produced a number of interpretations. Rodowick sees it as 'multifaceted' (1997: 92). Rodowick will carefully qualify that, for Deleuze, the physical and mental description of something is mixed through the Bergsonian circuits of movement that the object and its mental image must go through (*ibid.*: 92–3). Bogue reminds us of the possibilities of surface facets of the crystal; as being both transparent and opaque simultaneously, and as an image that holds both the actual image (the thing) and its virtual (thought or non-physicality) (2003: 122–3). Deleuze provides a critical appraisal of two aspects of life as a virtual and mirrored existence (C2: 79), directing us to attend to the 'two orders of problems' that arise from consideration of this relationship of the exchange between 'mutual images' (C2: 69). This mutuality causes issues of the virtual and the actual or the real to be evoked in discussions of temporality, and the doubling of the image that occurs on screen.

To account for the range of new components of the image that this seeding opens up, Deleuze discusses the topological functions and modes of the image. The 'essential' point of the image is revealed not by a judgement of the 'true' or 'false' nature of the image (C2: 128). Rather the image can never be known, only expressed though a temporal 'fracture' or dislocation of space – points where narration becomes false movement (C2: 136).

II

Politics

Under the terms of a philosophy of difference, Deleuze's approach to film teaches us that every screen text is political. In the logic of this system, movement-images reveal the falsity of narrative 'truth' and time-images hold the 'potential' for different types of 'becoming' to happen. The Deleuzian ciné-system directs us to recognize the terms of perceptual activity that different activities of the screen enable as different choices, contingent upon and enabling political beliefs.

Politics is the practice and the theory of the organization and control of things. In the implementation of political authority, strategies and tactics will vary according to activity and beliefs. While many filmmakers, theorists and philosophers will deny that their work is 'political', the fact remains that a

work – screen work or philosophy – is composed through a particular aesthetic territory and situated by a specific political culture that marks the production of even the most abstracted of ideas. As an entity funded through a variety of different sources, the types of political persuasions that influence the outcomes of philosophy and screen-based media production are as many as the work itself is able to generate.

What Deleuze's theory of the cinema shows us is that image-based media are able to actualize things through their relational circuit of images and produce new autonomous things by this circuit. It is not a matter of the 'representation' of time as 'real' or 'imaginary' or 'virtual' or 'psychological' in film that concerns Deleuze's discussion of time on screen (C2: 109). Instead, Deleuze continues his philosophical exegesis of the actualization of worlds created and events of belief and of bodies charted in cinema. Deleuze extends his Bergsonian approach to the movement of time with Nietzschian perspective on the components of the topologies of time that cinema is able to produce, as the 'actual present' (C2: 109). As Patricia Pisters contends, the time-image is thus fundamentally an image of a political cinema where a 'change in the relation between image and life' means that 'the time-image can no longer be judged in opposition to life' (Pisters 2003: 77). Hence, the potential of this medium lies in its ability to provide, facilitate and develop political expression. It is what philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy referred to in relation to Iranian director Abbas Kiarostami's work as 'the affirmation of cinema by cinema' (Nancy 2001: 10; cf. Kiarostami 2002). But in Deleuzian terms, the cinematic extends beyond an affirmation to create a doubled production that mutates and creates and causes specific differences to affected images and objects. In discussing his open-system as one where 'appearances' are clearly demonstrated to be linked to systems of judgement (C2: 138), where the 'conditions' of the image need to be accounted for not in terms of the aesthetics of 'the real and the imaginary' or in the political terms of 'the true and the false' (C2: 274), but in terms of thought and events (C2: 272), then it is clear that Deleuze's project with cinema has all along been to engage it as *the* political media of the twentieth century. Deleuze's argument is one that is developed extensively in the work of diverse authors: for example, Steven Shaviro with attention to the types

of cinematic bodies that cinema produces (Shaviro 1993); Kara Keeling with regard to black women on screen (Keeling 2007); Alison Butler in relation to 'women's cinema' and the 'minor' (Butler 2002); and Jonathon Beller with regard to the modes of production that the different type of organizations that film taps into is able to mediate (Beller 2006).

What is Political Cinema?

Exactly what constitutes a 'political' cinema will vary according to cultural specificity. For example, the implicit type of workers and health and safety jokes of the Disney Pixar production of *Ratatouille* (dirs. Brad Bird and Jan Pikava, 2007) will not translate to audiences whose notion of the cultural politics of cooking are not invested in a Disneyfied French culture. Other films with scenes of the dimensions of the preparation of food engage entirely different sets of cultural economies. Compare the breadth of political differences between films such as *Tampopo* (dir. Juzo Itami, 1985), *Babettes gæstebud* (*Babette's feast*; dir. Gabriel Axel, 1987); *Politiki Kouzina* (*Political kitchen*; dir. Tassos Boulmetis, 2003) and *Bakjwi* (*Thirst*; dir. Chan-wook Park, 2009). The theme of sustenance, while a universal human activity, does not convey a universal political condition.

Different industry expectations and culturally specific values impact upon forms of cinema. The terms of nationally specific censorship laws and the markets of global distribution impose further limitations on screen products. Genre films may mask national controls, for example, as in the neo-western *Fah talai jone* (*Tears of the black tiger*; dir. Wisit Sasanatieng, 2000: the first film from Thailand to be selected for competition at the Cannes Film Festival). *Fah talai jone*'s style demonstrates the colonial tensions and breakup between peoples using a non-explicit aesthetic. In *Sud Sanaeha* (*Blissfully yours*; dir. Apichatpong Weerasethakul, 2002), the tensions between Thailand and its ex-colonial neighbour, The Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma), are carefully wrapped in the humidity of the landscape and characters, and the political activity of medical care of another. Films like these tacitly engage

the political turmoil of the region through a stylized deterritorialization of characters shown to be under duress by their environment. In his film *Sud Pralad* (*Tropical malady*, 2004), Weerasethakul plays with the cultural conventions of representations of homosexuality, for example, just as French filmmaker Leos Carax plays with the cultural conventions of heterosexuality in his film *Les Amants du Pont-Neuf* (*Lovers on the ninth bridge*, 1991). In these films the valorization of nationally specific gendered cultures is messed up, opening up new ways of being and acting. Through movements away from and within existing configurations, these images generate possibilities for different political organizations. The internal elements of the set of images are what contribute to the political content of the film, so that we can see the themes of gender culture in entirely different ways through their organization.

A comparative screen aesthetic to Weerasethakul is the film work of Marguerite Duras. Deleuze notes that Duras's various treatments of water ('the tropical Indian humidity', the 'dampness of Normandy') create a 'marine perception that is deeper than that of things' (C2: 258–259).[1] This 'liquid perception' draws in all classes of people, Deleuze reasons (C2: 259). The effect is that the time-image switches from the classical cinema's image of time as indirect, to a modern cinema where time is direct and productive of thought-images (*ibid.*: 260–21).

Discussion of the role that movement plays in the construction of perception of images, through the modes of recognition of those images, leads Deleuze to conclude that the perception of a thing is a habitually guided movement only in relation and reaction to our interests and our needs. And thus, he notes, this is 'a way of defining the first material moment of subjectivity; it is subtractive. It subtracts from the thing whatever does not interest it. But, conversely, the thing itself *must* then be presented in itself as complete, immediate, diffuse perception' (C1: 63, original emphasis; see chapter 5 Perception). Cinema becomes political when it swings from this pole of movement – the sensory-motor function where we apprehend the clichés we can perceive – to the movement of the interval or break that will produce a political thought-image: 'a pure optical-sound image, the whole image without metaphor, [the break] brings out the thing in itself, literally, in its excess

of horror or beauty, in its radical or unjustifiable character, because it no longer has to be "justified", for better or for worse . . .' (C2: 20). At that point, recognition shifts from a perceptual mode into a neurological movement, one that may not necessarily be controlled or pre-determined.

The political is to be found in screen media that depict this modal shift or break, moments where the ethics of choice are presented. This is the subtractive movement that determines aesthetic form and the political organization of things.[2] This shift is demonstrated in a range of pivotal screen moments, regardless of their stylistic aesthetics, where the political can be understood as a perspective on the position of something and its situation within the collective set of images. The dimensions of the political organization of individuals, peoples, groups, economies of all kinds in terms of this modal shift, can be seen for example in films where specific moments of epistemic and stylistic breaks occur, such as in *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (dir. Rouben Mamoulian, 1931) (the transformation of the self); *The Boy with Green Hair* (dir. Losey, 1948) (political difference through colour); *La Bataille D'Alger* (*The Battle of Algiers*; dir. Pontocorvo, 1966) (the planting of the bombs on both sides); *Bad Timing* (dir. Nicolas Roeg, 1980) (the crossing of the border); *Chunguag Zhaxie* (*Happy Together*; dir. Wong Kar-Wai, 1997) (the change of states of love); *Jackie Brown* (dir. Quentin Tarantino, 1997) (the switched redundancy of middle-aged women with men); *Lola rennt* (*Run Lola Run*; dir. Tom Tykwer, 1998) (the switching of possible trajectories for plot outcomes); *Sånger från andra våningen* (*Songs from the second floor*; dir. Roy Andersson, 2000) (the harvest of the potatoes); *À ma soeur!* (For my sister; dir. Catherine Breillat, 2001) (the violent deaths of the sister and the mother); *Saibogujiman kwenchana* (*I'm a cyborg, but that's OK*; dir. Chan-wook Park, 2006) (on the organization of schizophrenia by breaks in 'sane' functioning).

How Deleuze Uses Political Cinema

Deleuze sees cinema not as something that turns towards politics, rather it is cinema itself that politicizes events, things or the narration (communication)

of the *value* of things. Cinema politicizes images according to the social mores of the culture that produced that image. Specific aesthetic interests and histories, for example, may be highlighted in an image: where a particular theologically driven moral turn, the removal of an image due to censorship laws, or the ramping up of an historical period through a contemporary colour or sound palette flavours the image. Cinematographic consciousness turns its eye to places and events at certain times in history and is able to 'observe mutations', as Godard noted (C2: 19). On screen mutations to standard narratives provide endless genres, histories, gender and sex role reconfigurations of an image.

Deleuze describes the difficulty of separating an image from its underlying determining codes of meaning as the problem of 'the assimilation of the cinematographic image to an utterance' (C2: 27). The 'utterance' is the terms or mode of narration that is employed to create and determine the image; however, once the image is expressed then the movement of that image becomes a 'modulation of the object itself' (C2: 27). As Deleuze argues, this modulation can be understood as a dual process of the specification and the differentiation of the object of the image (C2: 28–29; see glossary, *movement-image*). This is the false movement created by systems that narrate dimensions of their political 'truth' or 'reality' that on-screen present as clichéd images. As Deleuze says, we 'normally only perceive clichés' because 'we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather what it is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic interests, ideological beliefs and psychological demands' (C2: 20). Many films narrate this process of limited, clichéd perception, for example, in the narratives of *The Wizard of Oz* (dir. Victor Fleming, 1939); *Cleo de 5 à 7* (*Cleo from 5 to 7*; dir. Varda, 1962); *Gimme Shelter* (dirs. Albert Maysles and David Maysles, 1970); *The Man Who Fell to Earth* (dir. Nicolas Roeg, 1976); *The Thin Red Line* (dir. Terrence Malik, 1998); *Mulholland Dr. (*dir. David Lynch, 2001); *Mean Girls* (dir. Mark Waters, 2004).

However, Deleuze argues, if there is a 'jam or break' in our sensory-motor schemata of discerning the perception of things, then we might be able to 'see the thing in itself, literally, in its excess of horror or beauty, in its radical or

unjustifiable character, because it no longer has to be "justified", for better or for worse …' (C2: 20). So we might observe that in *Wizard*, Dorothy has an epiphanic moment at the end of the film when the narrative presents her with the means to choose between the fantasy world she is in (Oz) and her hometown (Kansas); in *Cleo*, the protagonist finally comes to perceive the value of her life only after the specific news validating it comes through; in *Gimme Shelter* the camera and the band keep on rolling even after a man dies in front of them; in *The Man Who Fell*, the unhappiness of difference and the sadness of migration presents itself to characters other than the main protagonist through their perception of behavioural strangeness; in *The Thin Red Line* the economies of killing become too much for the main character; in *Mulholland Dr.* acting techniques shift the dimensions of the image in every scene; and in *Heathers* (dir. Michael Lehmann, 1989) and *Mean Girls* (dir. Mark Waters, 2004), the protagonists are forced to make a choice about which type of identity group they must identify with, but realize that the only way to survive is to play the teen cliché. In all the image, once uttered or expressed, has the affect of altering the dimensions of that image. Deleuze discusses this aspect of narration, noting that it 'is never an evident [*apparent*] given of images, or the effect of a structure which underlies them; it is a consequence of the visible [*apparent*] images themselves, of the perceptible images in themselves, as they are initially defined for themselves' (C2: 27).

In addressing the construction, the perception and signification of cinema forms, Deleuze argues for the consideration of the political implications of cinema through both volumes. However, it is not until towards the end of *Cinema 2* that Deleuze provides a framework for considering cinema and politics:

1. consideration of the position of 'minority' film makers or film makers from the 'Third world' (C2: 215–217);
2. a 'critique of the myth' engaging the story-telling function of cinema and the production of 'collective utterances' (C2: 219–224);
3. modern political cinema is created from fragmentation and the production of the state of impossibility and the intolerable (C2: 220).

Taking the first point, the minority and 'minoritarian' are states that Deleuze has previously described in two co-authored books with Guattari; *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* ([1975] 1986) and *A Thousand Plateaus* ([1980] 1987). In the cinema books Deleuze qualifies his example of the minority in cinema by discussing the people of cinema. Dividing the cinema into nation-state products, and then into classical and modern cinemas, Deleuze charts the politics of each by their differences not in terms of audience reception (as is common in film theory audience studies (see Staiger 2000)), but by the differences in *the people* as determined by the film of a particular nation. This is the difference between presupposing an audience (the colonialist move prevalent in classical cinemas) and inventing an audience (the attempts of a minority to form a group, or 'becoming consciousness', as depicted in modern cinemas) (C2: 217–218).

Consciousness of the possible (and thus political) production of a national-consciousness is the object of many filmmakers who might address minoritarian states from without a majority position, and also from within – for example, see the various narratives and aesthetic trajectories in Mikhail Kalatozov's *Soy Cuba* (*I am Cuba*, 1964), Derek Jarman's *Jubilee* (1978) or Warwick Thornton's *Samson and Delilah* (2009). Deleuze argues his point by contrasting the classical period of Soviet cinema and 'the people' to whom Eisenstein addressed his political cinema, with the westerns and social dramas of American cinema (Deleuze gives the example of Hollywood-based directors King Vidor, Frank Capra, John Ford) that address a people by 'testifying' to the hardships of their existence (C2: 216). 'For in classical cinema,' Deleuze notes, 'the people are there, even though they are oppressed, tricked, subject, even though blind or unconscious'. In modern cinema, Deleuze considers that there are equally oppressed nations. Giving the example of Alain Resnais's *La Guerre est finie* (*The war is over*, 1966), Deleuze notes that the film depicts 'a Spain that will not be seen' (C2: 216).

The second point that Deleuze makes with regard to political cinema is that consideration of the function of myths and the production of 'collective utterances' is where cinema achieves an audience more readily. For example, using a very different filmic method than Resnais's in *La Guerre est finie*, is

a film by Guillermo del Toro, *El laberinto del fauno* (*Pan's labyrinth*, 2006). This film achieved global acclaim for a cinema that highlights the horrors of Franco's 1944 Fascist Spain. Del Toro's film was successful because it engaged the screen tropes and dramatization techniques that mainstream audiences of the 2000s recognize, a style that enables the more sinister aspects of fascism palatable through the use of a magic realism. (However, we might ask, where are the people of its action?) Variations on this style would include a folk magic realism where the political control of life brought about by oppressive organizations is depicted through surreal or exaggerated aesthetics, such as we see on Summerisle in *The Wicker Man* (dir. Robin Hardy, 1973) or in the outskirts of Moscow in *4* (dir. Ilya Khzhanovsky, 2005), or *Underground* (dir. Emir Kurstirica, 2005), or *Jisatsu sâkuru* (*Suicide Club*; dir. Shion Sono, 2001).

Deleuze's point is that the 'political art' of cinema has to find its way through the 'impasse' of addressing people who are the oppressed, marginalized, poor, or in the throes of the action that is being depicted. To make this standpoint, Deleuze depicts the differences between classical and modern cinema not in terms of their differences in style aesthetics, but differences in address, according to the 'majority' regulatory economic system of capitalism in which cinema is circulated (C2: 216–217). Deleuze argues that although cinema is an industrial product – an art 'of the masses' – its revolutionary and democratic potential has been compromised by a number of factors. He names these as Hitler's use of the medium, which 'gave cinema as its object not the masses become subject but the masses subjected', 'Stalinism, which replaced the unanimism of peoples with the tyrannical unity of a party', and 'the break-up of the American people' (C2: 216). Against this compromised mass art, Deleuze says that 'if there were a modern political cinema, it would be on this basis: the people no longer exist, or not yet ... *the people are missing*' (C2: 216, original emphasis).

When Deleuze writes 'the people are missing', he is referring to minority groups, the missing collective consciousness (of unanimism) of an audience group, and literally the dead (or censored) subjects and objects of films such as *Nuit et brouillard* (*Night and fog*, 1955), *La Guerre est finie* and *Hiroshima*

Mon Amour (*Hiroshima, my love*, 1959). Deleuze also refers to the audience that must be invented: the invisible audiences of majority economies, such as women, children, ethnic and sexual minorities, *and* to the colonized or oppressed peoples of third world states. Giving examples from South American directors and 'black American cinema', Deleuze defines 'the third world' as the state of 'oppressed and exploited nations' that remain in a state of 'perpetual' minority with a 'collective identity crisis' (C2: 217; 220). The forms that minor cinema takes in its 'address' to 'the people' who are 'missing' may be problematic, as Deleuze contends, the 'minority film-maker finds himself in the impasse described by Kafka', for example, 'the impossibility of not "writing", the impossibility of not writing in the dominant language, the impossibility of writing differently … the impossibility of not speaking, the impossibility of speaking other than in English, the impossibility of settling in France in order to speak French …' (C2: 217; 219).

In their book *Kafka* the conditions of this minor state of literature are discussed (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 18). Relevant for Deleuze's discussion of cinema, the minor is here figured as a mode of communication where a writer is making work in their non-native language, thus forcing a strangeness, or a reconfiguration of language. Deleuze and Guattari refer to this as a state of the 'deterritorialisation' of language, but the same state applies to writers, directors, producers and actors of screen works who work in the majority language of the media form (*ibid.*; see also Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 306; C2: 218). To perform in a language and culture that is not your own makes you attentive to the second and third points that Deleuze and Guattari note in Kafka: 'the connection of an individual to political immediacy and the collective assemblage of enunciation' (*ibid.*). How well a 'connection' is made is entirely dependent upon a breadth of politically conceived issues – those that are fixed to do with pre-existent hierarchies of culture (laws concerning gender, race, migration, status). Deleuze points out that the 'collective conditions' are brought together in the cinema, in the same way that Kafka suggested that literature brought together the collective conditions for literature (C2: 222).

The Kafkaesque difference Deleuze uses to distinguish between the form of the political image produced in major and minor cinema is how the minor can

engage their own colonized mythology and redeploy or destroy it, and instead produce 'collective utterances' (C2: 222). Deleuze describes the 'impasse' that the colonized person confronts – 'the impossibility of living' within or without a minor group, and 'the intolerable' aspects of life as a minority (C2: 217–218). Giving the examples of *Deus e o diabo na terra do sol* (*Black god, white devil*, 1964) and *Terra em transe* (*Land in Anguish*, also known as *Entranced Earth*, 1967) by Brazilian director Glauber Rocha, Deleuze argues that Rocha's work is a minor cinema that presents a different conception of myth, where 'the myths of the people, prophetism and banditism, are the archaic obverse of capitalist violence' (C2: 218). In contrast to classical cinema that marks a passage of movement of political forces, modern cinema is the lived actualization of the political – coming to constitute, as Deleuze writes, 'the new object of political cinema' (C2: 218–219). Deleuze's contrasting examples are between the classical of Russian and American directors – Eisenstein, Vertov and Vsevolod Pudovkin and the 'unanimism' of Hollywood directors Vidor, Capra and Ford (*The Grapes of Wrath*, 1940), and the modern political cinemas of Glauba Rocha, Filipino film director Lino Brocka, Quebecois documentary film director Pierre Perrault, Egyptian film director Youssef Chahine, Ethiopian film director Haile Gerima, and Palestinian film director Michel Khleifi (C2: 216; 221).

Consider the moment of awareness (movement-image, passage) by the mother (private) of her son's motivation (political) in Pudovkin's film *Mat* (*Mother*, 1926) (*ibid.*).[3] In contrast Deleuze sees Rocha's work as doing away with that boundary between private and political, and not using myth in the structural sense of finding an identity today through the myths of the past, but by 'connecting archaic myth to the state of the drives in an absolute contemporary society, hunger, thirst, sexuality, power, death, worship' (C2: 219). While Rocha completely rejects the notion of a collective 'people' as a myth of the bourgeoisie, Deleuze's position argues that the collective is the way toward producing new minority forms (Phillips 2008: 93). Deleuze gives the example of African cinemas that use cinema as a medium for storytelling, acknowledging the dimensions of myth through the awareness of the politics of the speech act (C2: 222). Deleuze compares the situation of

minority identity and colonial activities in various films, including Ousmane Sembene's film *Ceddo* (*Outsiders*, 1977) with Pierre Perrault's *Un pays sans bon sens!* (*A country with no common sense!* 1970) and *Le pays de la terre sans arbre ou Le mouchouânipi* (*Land without trees or The Mouchouânipi*, 1980), and Jean Rouch's *Les Maîtres fous* (*The Mad Masters*, 1955) and *Moi un noir* (*I, a Negro*, 1958) (C2: 223). We might also consider the griot method of storytelling in Julie Dash's film *Daughters of the Dust* (1991), and Rolf de Heer and Peter Djigirr's emphasis on the authority of the storyteller in *Ten Canoes* (2006).

By means of a focus on the type of movement of the screen-system, a non-representational analysis of screen type is enabled by Deleuze, where the political forms of cinema are determined by an aesthetic of ethical engagement. This ciné-ethics remains central to Deleuze's philosophical agenda, even in his discussion of the cine-techniques, for example his analysis of the content as providing evidence of a 'psychomechanics' at work in the films of German film maker Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, director of *Hitler: ein Film aus Deutschland* (*Our Hitler*, 1978) (C2: 264). This is of critical appeal for cinema theory, for example in the engagement with films made at specific junctures of social and or political change, but which do not directly address or mask those conditions. While it is possible to make allegorizing claims for films (for example, linking the events in *Donnie Darko* and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, or the Vietnam War and Robert Altman's film about the Korean War, *MASH* (1970), or films such as *Children of Men* (dir. Cuarón, 2006) or *The Constant Gardener* (dir. Fernando Meirelles, 2005) on the conflated issues of their contemporaneous fields of politics, market controls and ecology), how cinematographic autonomy is determined remains unanswered. Becoming political is not a matter of just becoming conscious of the condition of minority, but of acknowledging the 'third difference': how the social dialectic of the gap between minor and major, or the break or fragmentation between public and private or between naiveté and realization, is exposed in minor cinema as a cinema that rejects capitalist violence by inventing new forms of storytelling and avoiding 'fiction and ethology' (C2: 222).

The Function of Political Cinema

What is cinema able to achieve according to Deleuze? It can entrap and inte-
riorize political knowledge. Cinema provides form for political positions, such
as the desperation, poverty and hunger of the colonized peoples of Rocha's
Brazil, or in the forms of fascism displayed in Mussolini's Italy, as staged in
Pasolini's *Salò o le 120 giornate di Sodoma* (1975) (C2: 175). 'Salo is a pure,
dead theorum, a theorum of death …' (C2: 175). In his two books on the
cinema, and in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*,
Deleuze reminds us of the nature of the *technologically expanded relation-
ship* between image and thought that is at once immanent and productive of
a range of spiritual automata. Technology, as in the example of the cinematic
screen that Deleuze refers to, made obvious to twentieth-century viewers that
a sensory-motor function does not, despite its apparent logic, provide a motor
extension or extensiveness to that sensory-motor nature. Rather, what tends
to happen through the complexities of the construction of the moving image
is the production of a range of situations that figure humanity, that give rise to
the conditions of automatism: psychological detachment, emotive insensitiv-
ity, inaction in the face of violence. In the cinematic consciousness created
by technologies of the twentieth century we can see this automaton aesthetic
of a ritualized metaphysics of zombie-being, from Frankenstein to the clichéd
characters played by Hollywood actor Tom Cruise. Deleuze described the
structures of this aesthetic as a type of 'world-memory' (C2: 117) that comes
into being through collective disappearances of fixed points or centres via the
shock to the imagination, and categorized this notion into different types of
sublime structures (C2: 157; chapter 13 Thought).[4] Referring to Paul Virlio's
book *War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception* ([1984] 1989), Deleuze
says, 'the situation is still worse if we accept Virilio's thesis: there has been no
diversion or alienation in an art of the masses initially founded by the move-
ment-image; on the contrary the movement-image was from the beginning
linked to the organization of war, state propaganda, ordinary fascism, histori-
cally and essentially' (C2: 165). The paradoxical logic of the metaphysics of
such images that Deleuze alludes to in the cinema books is one that negates

the future of a collective humanity, and *in* whose aesthetics we participate through everyday acts of consumption (I argue this in Colman 2009b). The transformations to this *world-memory* cause a change in the topology of the world, and this occurs, as Deleuze marks it, through instances of the time-image. 'One leaves the theatre to get to life', he writes in *Cinema 2*, 'but one leaves imperceptibly, on the thread of the stream, that is, of time' (C2: 88). Then the political function question: 'where does life begin?' (*ibid.*) And the answer concerns the future, not a political consciousness that is always being determined by the past, and is thus irreparably fixed (Deleuze gives the example here of Sartre's criticism of the temporally doomed *Citizen Kane* (dir. Welles, 1941). 'It is by leaving it that time gives itself a future' (C2: 88). This is the function of political cinema Deleuzian style – to create a political consciousness of 'how to get into' 'the stream [of time]' (*ibid.*). The 'seed' of this future time appears in the film image, as Deluze discusses, just as they appear in other political situations and philosophies (for example, Deleuze writes of Foucault's life interest in the seeding of certain kinds of 'subjectification' (Deleuze 1995: 106)). Deleuze commented in an interview in 1985: 'Any creative activity has a political aspect and significance' (Deleuze 1995: 60). What cinema does that Deleuze's system allows us to visualize and express is the seeding of images as precisely a political activity, enabling access to knowledge that one day may be able to be utilized.

In the time-images produced by screen-based work, time produces things that should not be considered as merely abstract attachments, products of film as an art or industrial form, or just narrative devices extrinsic to a cinematographic product. Time-images are indicative of certain forms that are as much a part of the world as the temporal assignations we provide to give form to the movement of biological and geological forms. The time-image is expressive of the constitution of the contemporary world as it proposes and exposes modes of 'truth' and produces new modes of thinking about the world (C2: 125). When Deleuze argues: '"Time is out of joint"', he is defining a post-cinematic time, recalibrated by 'behaviour in the world, but also by movements of world' (C2: 41). If we think of the polar meanings of the term 'behaviour' in relation to a time-image, then Deleuze's method of approaching

the anti-metaphysical sense of time on screen raises the question of behaviour in terms of the set of images: the movement of becoming, as framed in the intervals of movement (C2: 271). In turn we can relate the behaviour of the set of various time-images in terms of their behaviour as in the ethology of the image-set as world (in Spinozist terms). Further, this approach to time on screen enables Deleuze to construct a post-Kantian transcendental sense of time, the direct and indirect representations of time. Deleuze's system enables screen theorists and philosophers to attend to the different temporal practices that film produces as metaphysical forms that are creative of specific screen ethics.

Thus, using Deleuze's method, we can analyse the political conditions of any film. In looking for 'the evolution of a situation' (C1: 147), that is, the temporal stages of a screen text, Deleuze describes the political qualities of a situation. Under this rubric all films are political, but there are different types of politics. Where and whether or not we overtly see politics on screen depends on how a film and film maker deals with the material elements in the film, and the conditions under which those elements may circulate, and further the techniques and methods that are employed. Different social organizations as directed under different historical time frames can come together under the cinema in its ability to compress and expand things, events and places, so that a new form of 'world-memory' (C2: 117) creates a shared political *socius* on screen. When Holly Golightly's character (actor Audrey Hepburn) exclaims that she is 'crazy about Tiffany's', her dialogue and her method of delivery perform a political position that reconfirms Truman Capote's story adapted for the screen; that the nature of her gender as a commodity in the US market that can be bought and sold as easily as a diamond (*Breakfast at Tiffany's*; dir. Blake Edwards, 1961). As much as films that show the overt political manoeuvring of the diamond industries, such *Blood Diamond* (dir. Zwick, 2006), or the manipulation of gender roles, as in *The Portrait of a Lady* (dir. Jane Campion, 1996) or *Sex is Comedy* (dir. Catherine Breillat, 2002), *Breakfast at Tiffany's* is a 'social drama' of the sort Deleuze classifies as 'classical' political cinema, where 'the people' are already there, performing, engaging, showing cinema to be a highly compromised 'art of the masses' (C2: 216).

12

Topology

The topology of screen-space is the mind-map of the creators of the image: writers, concept artists, directors, sound engineers, editors, cinematographers, as fitted together under the production budget and design. Technically a mathematical term, topology can be the study of any specific place and is concerned with the properties of that place. Deleuze uses topology as a concept, as an adjective, and as a way of accounting for the complex spaces that cinema creates. Topology in the Deleuzian ciné-system engages with the notions of non-chronological time, of the distinctions in the concept of memory as it is played out on screen as a recollection, a revival, fragment, singular and multiple, a transformation, or a mirroring, and for ways of distinguishing the various time-images that history creates. Deleuze builds a vocabulary

of screen topologies as he addresses the forms of worlds made by cin-
ematographic space, time, sound and memory.

In the *Struktura krysztalu* (*The Structure of Crystals*; dir. Zanussi, 1969),
the opening scenes present the message of the overall images, signs of life
and human choices. The *mise-en-scène* of a remote wintery meterological
station provides much information about the film, but it is the situation of
the characters and their modes of performance that sharpen the overall to-
pology of the film. Rather like Goethe's Wilhelm, this film appears to be the
narrative about a quest for knowledge, a questioning of choice and existence
(see chapter 3 Frame, Shot and Cut). It is all that, but it also is a film about
memory – about how memories take time and require durational space to be
lived. The central character explains this activity of being to his concerned
friend, stating: 'You see pausing for breath might be a way of life' (Jan, played
by actor Jan Myslowicz in *Struktura krysztalu*).

    As consciousness cinema performs a way of life, a world. For that world
to take form, we require 'respiration', as Deleuze describes the living-image
produced by the cinema. Deleuze discusses topology throughout the two vol-
umes, arguing that the cinema 'does not just present images, it surrounds them
with a world' (C2: 68). Continuing his thesis from *Difference and Repetition*,
Deleuze argues, 'The originary world has no existence independent of the
geographical and historical milieu which serve as its medium' (C1: 124).
By originary world Deleuze means any zone or matter 'recognizable by its
formless character' (C1: 123). Cinematographic consciousness respires form.
'Cinematographic consciousness is not us, the spectator,' Deleuze writes, 'nor
the hero; [rather] it is the camera – sometimes human, sometimes inhuman
or superhuman' (C1 20). Consciousness is also drawn up – inhaled – through
the skeletal forms of the screen in a dialectic of movement that responds to
and modifies different situations, different bodies, different screen behaviours
(C1: 155). Deleuze refers to the large form of the action-image as the respira-
tion space, where 'the principle quality of the image is breath, respiration'
(C1: 145–146). The respiratory dialectic is what he describes when he writes

that the 'first form' of the action-image is an ensemble; a set of 'the organic representation, which seems to be endowed with breath or respiration. For it expands towards the milieu and contracts with the action' (C1: 142). In other words the action-image is constituted by the movement of this figure of a respiratory dialectic that Deleuze invokes in both an allegorical (Deleuze suffered from a pulmonary disease) and philosophical (Bergsonian) sense. However, the living system that engages in this movement is not human – Deleuze has already argued that the body, the eye, the brain are all images ('hence a set of actions and reactions') (C1: 58). The living system Deleuze develops – and this is the extension of his argument begun in *Difference and Repetition* – is 'the *machine assemblage* [*agencement machinique*] *of move-ment-images*' (C1: 59, original emphasis). In putting together an account of the Platonic system of images, where meanings are bound to predetermined ways of life, then the respiratory affective forces of the processes of breathing in and breathing out enable Deleuze to envisage how living system is made by that movement. It is not the singularities of body, brain and conscious-ness, but an arrangement of these things in whatever determination they have (Deleuze 1994: 28). Taking this position Deleuze critiques those values espoused in the Cartesian cognitive and perceptual assumptions of the image of thought (Deleuze 1994: 146–147; chapter 13 Thought). However, before we can examine the image of thought, this chapter pauses to look at the condi-tions for thinking that Deleuze finds on screen, through a screen topology that is in part informed by the quality of the image of respiration, but also other spatial images.

To explain the spaces that cinematographic consciousness creates – both virtual and actual – Deleuze needs to account for the topological built en-vironment of screen movement and time-images. He provides a wealth of signs, figures, concepts and connective markers that cinema creates – *the empty space whatevers*, the disconnected spaces, the egg, the crystal, the various forms of the *action image*, the *vector*, the skeleton, the folded and nested narrative spaces, sound passages, the plane of immanence, the plane of composition, the earth, desert, sky, oceans, the smooth and striated, no-madic and sedentary, deterritorialized and reterritorialized territories, and

Bergson's diagrams for *time-images* of the circuit of reflective perception, divisive threshold of temporalities such as memory, dreams, the imagination.[1] The absolute and the contingent, heterotopic and entropic, actual and virtual image, all contribute to the a relational circuit of 'constant creation or recon-struction' of the image (Bergson 1994: 103). Deleuze addresses the abstract concept of space as it is determined by cinema by making us think about *how* the elements that comprise a filmic situation are functioning. These elements include the array of objects and settings that might comprise a scene, differ-ent types of topologies – city, country – and their architectural components, colouration, sound, and the editing of each element. Underpinning Deleuze's exploration of the function of each element as it comes to contribute to the constitution of a specific form and type of spatial situation is the mitigating factor of the political and thus aesthetic content of the film.

Spatial arrangement in the cinema is discussed by Deleuze in relation to the processes of *differentiation* of the type of *movement* that produces a new topos, *and* in terms of the question of the consistency of *time*. In the movement-image, the processes of differentiation are found in the exchange between perception-image to action-image (C2: 28–29, 40). Deleuze describes the action-image with the figure of 'two inverse spirals' (C1: 142). Imagine an hour-glass, two inverted containers joined by a narrow passage with a body of fine sand held on one side. Tip it over and the sand will rush toward the other side, 'in a descending spiral: SAS" (C1: 144). Time can be measured by the movement of the body of sand from one side to another. The set of images on screen is like this body of sand in movement, one narrowing towards action and the other expanding towards a new situation (C1: 142). The movement-image is a thus a procedure which builds a relational space between things which we can call the topological site of the screen. For the time-image the process of differentiation is applied by Deleuze in his development of the different types and forms of the crystal image: for example, the difference between a time image that has been produced through either a seeding of time or a mirrored process of time. Deleuze looks at the Russian cinema of Tarkovsky (C2: 42) and Dovzhenko, comparing it with the Eastern European cinema of Zanussi, whose cinema he will contrast with Tod Browning (C2:

71–72; cf. *Freaks*; dir. Browning, 1932). In this dense and often elliptical fashion Deleuze builds a topology of film themes, describing them as a 'brain section' or 'a crystal barely dislodged from the earth' (C2: 70–71).

In his fourth commentary on Bergson Deleuze extends his discussion of the time-image to further account for the variations of forms of temporal modes and time structures on screen. Drawing further on the four structures Bergson sets up in *Matter and Memory* (see chapter 10 Time), Deleuze describes the significance of the time-image through its topological form. Deleuze concludes this chapter's commentary in *Cinema 2* by stating: 'The image no longer has space and movement as its primary characteristics but topology and time' (C2: 125). Deleuze arrives at this position through further consideration of the figure of the crystal which he says 'reveals or makes visible the hidden ground of time' (C2: 98).

What is Topology?

Topology refers to the place (from the Greek *topos*) and the discourse (*logos*) of the spatial properties (geometry) of an object. Developed from the study of geometry and set theory, topological concepts are used in the fields of anatomy, architecture, systems networks (such as computing), and through Deleuze the cinema and thus screen images. Topology explores transformational and spatial issues concerning how the properties of an object, place, or thing remain as properties of that thing, even when moved around, reconfigured, bent, stretched, folded, squashed or built upon. Topological studies look at the sets of points (such as the vectorial points of the small form of the action-image) through study of the transformation of the properties of things through different kinds of interconnections – which we can name in the Deleuzian system as affective connections, perceptual semiotics, opsigns and sonsigns, chronosigns, hylosigns, onirosigns, lectosigns, noosigns, mnemosigns.[2] Theorizations about the ways in which the dimensions of space and places are determined draw on topological figures – through the movements and intersections of informational communication (McLuhan's medium is the message/massage), or networked

ecologies, or heterotopic spaces where deposits of time (libraries, cemeteries, cinema) intersect with other place configurations (Foucault [1967] 1984).

In order to account for some of the more complex structures of the cinematic image in its virtual and actual forms, Deleuze extends the register of forms of movement and forms of time through a topological framework. Arkady Plotnitsky describes Deleuze's approach as a 'topo-philosophy' (2006: 190).[3] Thinking of time as duration, and duration as a topological process, is the way to approach the idea of space in Deleuze's ciné-system. As we have discussed, to frame makes an event out of differentiated objects – this is a fundamental point in the movement-image axis of horizontal and vertical movements. Deleuze then considers 'spatial determinations' – component parts, distances, measurements, scales (C1: 25) in order to figure out the contributing factors for *how* the shot is constitutive of a specific type of space, and further how the mobile framing of the shot creates the sense of a whole (a *mise-en-scenic* whole, but also a cinematographic consciousness of an open whole), through the establishment of a set of components (C1: 18). Space is required for the movement-image in all of its forms – montage, perception, affection, action, impulse – and the time-image forms of the crystal, the relation-image, the opsign and sonsign. Deleuze argues a cut, an interval, a space between images is what enables us precisely to frame and thus experience an image as a set of images. The movement-image is what enacts and creates space in its motor and material capacity to populate or empty the screen with image-signs of empirical life (cf. C2: 47). Once a time-image such as the relation-image begins to engage with the circuit of images then 'non-localizable relations' and false movements within time begin to fracture the smooth space of the movement image and create hodological spaces (C1: 200–201; C2: 128–129). Deleuze's system of registration of the process of the movement-image and the time-image says that it is 'not sufficient' to follow the lead of a theory such as Burch's (who follows Bazin) in distinguishing a 'concrete space' with an 'imaginary space' (C1: 17). Instead, Deleuze will direct the thinking of the notion of the hodological to the discreet and relational aspects of the 'Open' as a coextensive 'thread' that enjoins and enfolds all the determining and indeterminate parts of the movement-image (C1: 16–17).

Using Leibniz's work on the calculus (invented by Leibniz and Newton in the seventeenth century in response to problems of calculating space, time, motion and the differential relations of movements) Deleuze builds on his taxonomy of cinema, including the time-image's difference to empirical time and the calculation of the limits and series of these things.[4] In doing so Deleuze thus proposes a problematization of the philosophy of mathematics, as Smith argues (2006: 146). Deleuze engages Leibniz in the cinema books for his argument on time and the image of thought – specifically how time on screen creates new topologies. The discussion of the differences that cinema produces through the convergence of series, through 'the continuity of the universe', creates various spatial figures that Deleuze uses in the cinema books (Deleuze 1994: 253; C2: 14–15). So when Deleuze makes a comment such as: 'it is Nietzsche, who, under the name of "will to power", substitutes the power of the false for the form of the true, and resolves the crisis of truth, wanting to settle it once and for all, but, in opposition to Leibniz, in favour of the false and its artistic, creative power …' (C2: 131), he is using a comparative method to think about the different approaches by 'philosophers of difference' to think about difference created by movement, and time created through repetition.[5] Leibniz provides concepts for thinking about 'contingent futures' (C2: 303 n5), while Nietzsche is engaged as a checkpoint for screen values (cf. C2: 8, 113, 137).

How Deleuze Uses Topology

In considering the different forms of cinema Deleuze engages a 'duel of forces' (C1: 142). Technically, Deleuze takes as his starting point Burch's description of forms of action, where cinematic movement causes a change in the situation of a scene, a *mise-en-scenic* shift in things (*ibid.*). Conceptually, this idea is where Deleuze seems to return to one of philosophy's perennial problems: how to create form out of chaos. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze speculates on how artists create forms and ideas out of nothing. He considers Goya's line work – in particular, the infamous series of eighty-two prints that

Goya does in 'The Disasters of War' (1810 and 1820). The chiaroscuro line is part of how Deleuze thinks through his notion of vector forms, linking points of heterogeneous elements in what he calls the skeleton-space, theoretically developed through a combination of French art historian François Cheng's theory of empty and full space in Chinese landscape painting (1979) and French philosopher Henri Maldiney's notions of affect and space (1973).

Throughout his discussion of the time-image Deleuze frequently makes topological allusions, continuing his discussion of Plato's theory of Forms (cf. Cooper 1997; Fine 1995). These include references to the common idea of 'space', but include more nuanced and complex accounts of spatial forms. Deleuze develops the notion of 'strata', previously discussed in *A Thousand Plateaus,* as a geological allusion to the philosophical ground upon which he draws in order to construct his philosophy of difference (cf. Protevi and Bonta 2004). Further, there are two parts to this hidden ground that Deleuze develops through topological thinking: (1) 'presents which pass', and (2) 'pasts which are preserved' (C2: 98). These are the terms of memory and the terms of recollection. Deleuze divides these two into further categories. Memory has a number of different states (as we previously discussed with the time-image) in terms of the topology of time. Deleuze is interested to qualify the chronosign, or the ordering and relation-image of time. He defines two types of chronosigns topologically:

1. *'aspects'* (regions and layers of time);
2. *'accents'* (points of view) (C2: 101).

This topology of time sets up two divergent paths for Deleuze. On the one hand he discusses the 'stubborn geometry' of the visual image in reference to the life-long work of Cézanne who created an exhaustive series of paintings and drawings of Mont Sainte-Victoire in Aix-en-Provence, France. On the counter side, to further investigate topological aspects and accents, Deleuze gives even more figures of thinking stemming from the action-image and the time-image: the dialectic of respiration and the crystal seed. Russian cinema gives this form: 'With Dovzhenko, the large form – SAS'– receives from the

dialectic a "respiration", an oneiric and symphonic power overflowing the boundaries of the organic' (C1: 180).

The topology of movement appears in the montage image where Deleuze notes that a development of different types of perception occurred – at the molecular and the molar levels (C1: 80). Deleuze describes 'liquid' and 'solid' perception (*ibid.*). As Tom Conley has explained, the molecular is what 'enables Deleuze to move from a philosophy of relation (or difference and repetition) to chemistries of being, and then on to delicate issues of perception in cinema, music, literature and painting' (Conley 2005: 173–174). Similarly, the molar is a conception of the elemental and chemical constitution of things. In Deleuze and Guattari's conception the molar provides the eternal dimensions (as in Whitehead's conception of eternal objects) of things and aesthetics – at both an organic and at a machinic level (cf. Guattari 1995; Robinson 2008). In his cinema books Deleuze will engage the natural and manufactured elemental range of earth, fire, air and water as paradigmatic provisos of material and virtual values for articulating eternal aspects of aesthetic and political cinemas. Again, as Conley points out, the important effect of this unique methodological approach to cinema 'tends to jettison the psychological inflections' for an elemental approach to demonstrating and discussing the cinematographic (Conley 2005: 171–172). The appearance of molar elements in the cinema books can be realized as a signal for the switching of poles, and the registration of micro or macro events. The event is the screen event itself, but also the events of the screen itself – actioning agency for new or mutated forms and meanings to be consolidated or actualized.

Topologies are formed, says Deleuze, by the redistributed, coexistent, transformed and fragmented forms (C2: 119–120). Cinematic conditions continually produce topologies through these shifts and constant layers of images. The various forms of action-image, for example, open out multiple modes for the trans-morphological situation of an action to a new or mutated form (as both molar and molecular forms). Consideration of the topological dimensions of this built image enable Deleuze to consider the dynamic qualities and potential capacity of the screen (C1: 13). This enables Deleuze to argue how the functional 'reality' of objects and settings that appear in

an action-image film are determined by their situations. This multiplicity is substantive, which may be contradictory, limiting or even 'impossible' – such as the temporal domains inferred in films like *Un Chien Andalou* (dirs. Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dali, 1928) or *Ritual in Transfigured Time* (dir. Maya Deren, 1946), *La Jetée* (dir. Chris Marker, 1962), *Dark City* (dir. Alex Proyas, 1998), *Donnie Darko*, *The Hours* (dir. Stephen Daldry, 2002), *Dolls* (dir. Takeshi Kitano, 2002)*,* whose spaces Deleuze explains, after Leibniz, as the 'incompossible worlds' of complex narratives (C2: 131: 303 n5).[6] Or we might consider the layered images of histories and memories which Deleuze will discuss in terms of 'de-actualized peaks of the present' and 'virtual sheets of the past' (C2: 130). For example, consider the topological forms created through the inferences and images of the present and past in films such as *Yeogo goedam* (*Whispering corridors*; dir. Park Ki-hyung, 1998), a ghost story that is embedded with various histories of Korea, or *Marie Antoinette* (dir. Coppola, 2006), where the siting of a historical narrative is mutated and multiplied through the various sound-images that re-situate the story (converse sneakers and 'Hong Kong Garden' (Siouxsie and the Banshees, 1978) in Versaille, France).

What such images do, says Deleuze, is create the 'incompossible' worlds that Leibniz describes, but also create a 'new co-ordinate of the image', namely the power to 'falsify' (C2: 132). The 'form of the true' is something that Deleuze has addressed throughout the cinema volumes, used as a test against 'false movement', and he marks a philosophical shift in thinking about the differences between these two powers (as staged, variously, by figures such as Leibniz, Nietzsche, Melville, Borges) to the cinematographic power that replaced the false and the true with the 'powers of life' (C2: 133–135).

Deleuze also conceptualizes cinematic changes through the 'topological and cartological limits' that historical shifts and types of images and their corresponding signs create (C2: 118). The 'break' is something that 'reveals' what exists 'before or after speech, before or after man' – this is the 'strata' of the visual-image, which Deleuze says is now (after 'the break') *'archaeological, stratigraphic, tectonic'* (C2: 243, original emphasis). The break in the Deleuzian, neo-Platonic sense as created by screen-based forms shows itself

to be the space that Blanchot identified: where a 'vertigo of spacing' generates not only new places (in both horrific and awesome forms) but also engages the circuit of subjectivity (C2: 180; cf. Blanchot 1992). This is the image of thought that is created through a body acting as a 'topological, cerebral space' (C2: 147). There are five physical laws Deleuze associates with the large form – including different types of narrational strategies useful for genre analysis and description – 'nested' structures, gaps and passages between action, and other structural devices. Deleuze addresses the large form through classical cinema genres – the western, noir and classical documentary film. It is also useful to think of large form in terms of the screen genres it engages, of war on screen, science-fiction screen forms, and serial formats, such as dramas and comedies. Conceptually the large form describes collectives, which are at the opposite spectrum of screen situations to vectors (the small forms described in *Vector*). A collective structure is readily explored through a community – and what better place to see a community in inter/action than in a western (cf. Colman 2009a; dir. Jarmusch 1995).

The 'crystalline seed' is the process Deleuze describes as introducing potential time sites with which to bring about a whole crystal of time. The crystalline seed is 'a component element' of the 'infinite' state of a time crystal. This seeding is different to creating vectorial moments in the cinema, although similar in terms of the spatial creation of a screen field, the crystalline seed has 'a capacity for indefinite growth' and the vector situates a specific point in space (C2: 89). Deleuze gives the example of Resnais's filmmaking, where the vectorial point, 'the centre or fixed point', disappears from the film altogether (C2: 116). The vector is replaced with the seed and the difference is neuronic – the seed will make us think, will invoke memory conditions, introduce other topologies of time, and is not concerned with narrative continuity or creating breaks that would later be filled.

Deleuze further breaks down this organization of space on screen by the crystal into main types (C2: 82–90):

1. ritornello (sound territory (C2: 92));
2. memory (multiple and simultaneous (C2: 99));

3. historical and social (the 'too-late' of history (C2: 92));
4. archaeological (entropic (C2: 93));
5. kinaesthetic (where Deleuze points to the mirror crystal, not movement).

Deleuze describes a number of different situations where these different types of crystal-image occur. The ritornello is a concept defined through thinking about sound territories such as a bird that sings at sunrise, marking the new day (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 299, 308). A ritornello is Guattari's Italian word for the refrain, a recognizable song (C2: 92, 296 n34). On screen sound is used as a sign for images as well as being a stand-alone image. Deleuze describes how sound in cinema is able to create a 'passage' from 'one world to another' and this power holds a profoundly political as well as stylistic topological agency (C2: 63). Characters in narrative film, for example, engage the refrain/ritornello as a way of marking out as well as testing territorial boundaries: for example, see the actions of Tony Manero (actor John Travolta) in *Saturday Night Fever* (dir. John Badham, 1977), or the (nameless) man (actor Kang-sheng Lee) and the woman (actor Kun-huei Lin) in *Dong* (*The Hole*; dir. Tsai Ming-liang, 1998), or Tracy Turnblad (actor Nicki Blonsky) in *Hairspray* (dir. Adam Shankman, 2007). Territorial affects are also created through sound topologies, as in *Jaws* (dir. Steven Spielberg, 1975) or *Dead Man* (dir. Jarmusch, 1995). Deleuze also comments on how musicals can create topologies through their 'dreamlike power', how 'reality' is restaged by the musical's staging of passages between worlds, 'breaking in and exploring' (C2: 61–67). Deleuze describes the affective behaviour of comic figures Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy, Buster Keaton, and Jerry Lewis, and gives examples from classic Hollywood genre films, including director Stanley Donen's films *Singin' in the Rain* (1952) and *The Pyjama Game* (1957), Vincente Minnelli's films *An American in Paris* (1951), *The Band Wagon* (1953), *Brigadoon* (1954) and Jacques Tati's films *Les Vacances de Monsieur Hulot* (*Monsieur Hulot's Holiday*, 1953), *Play Time* (1967), *Trafic* (1971), noting that with Lewis and Tati, the 'set' replaces the 'situation' of the image (C2: 67).

Another key example Deleuze discusses is how the event of war produces 'the crystal-image' as a direct presentation of time, an event of the here and

now, even if it is one of an 'hallucinatory' landscape (C2: 128–9). Deleuze will discuss how Fellini develops his method of accessing different modes of time through the figure of the 'crystal' and the 'crystalline seed', which he describes in topological terms. Rather like the vector, the crystal in Fellini's work, says Deleuze, is an 'entrance', infinite and multiple (C2: 88–89). 'The crystal image was not time, but we see time in the crystal' (C2: 81). In addition to post-war film styles Deleuze marks other points of change with various events in the cinema books – the 'new wave' of cinemas (he mentions examples from French, Italian, Japanese, German but these occur globally at different times), other activities of militarism, or surveillance society, national incidents, stylistic shifts, and the philosophical epistemic break caused by the cinematographic depiction of time putting 'the notion of truth into crisis' (C2: 130).

Deleuze also notes that change does not always imply quantitative movement. Rather change can occur in-place, that is to say, in specific sites and bodies such as in memory or consciousness and in what we term the temporal dimension. Change can also be qualitative, enabling perception in the sometimes dark, complex places created by virtual and actual data that coagulate as quantum energies. These become vectorial points for further movement or provide reference points: signs and indices. The images in *Struktura krysztalu* (Zanussi), *4* (Khzhanovsky), *M* (Lang)*, Donnie Darko* (Kelly)*,* or *The Virgin Suicides* (Coppola, 1999), *Stranger than Fiction* (dir. Marc Forster, 2006), or *Angus, Thongs and Perfect Snogging* (dir. Gurinder Chadha, 2008) provide cinematographic consciousness of this data-change, creating forms of time-images that measure, organize and express the course of perception, duration, thought, becoming, time. Movement becomes stilled as different types of time-images – what Deleuze describes as the 'crystal-image' acts as vectors, forms and layers of time (C2: 68). Deleuze's approach shows that even within a singular there is an 'open list of logical conjunctions ("or", "therefore", "if", "because", "actually", "although …")', plus *'and'* itself (C2: 23; 214). Such conjunctions may be added to indicate a result, however, as we can see within any vectorial field of the screen an infinite array of the different types and modes of cinema arise. When a 'break' occurs,

movement may be reduced to zero thus affecting the type of image produced (C2: 128).

The event of war causes cinema to reappraise its functions and produce divergent types of images. Movement and its progressive connections become disjointed. Deleuze argues that after the Second World War people no longer know how to react, so that the notion of action-reaction necessarily changes in cinematic bodies (Deleuze 1995: 123). The time of activities/action experienced by the on-screen participant becomes subject to the site of 'any-space-whatevers', a space that has left its 'metric relations' and become a purely tactile space. This is found in the shadows of German expressionist cinema, the lyricism of Bresson, or the colour absorption and affective nature of images produced by directors such as Varda or Antonioni. The characteristics of these three approaches to spatial transformation describe affective topologies that characterize new aspects of cinematographic evolution and the new regime of the image that Deleuze discusses in relation to the topology and time of cinema (C2: 17, 135, 43).

Like the movement-image after we watch the whole of the film, we realize that while component parts provide sets and series of (time-)images that provide time through the movement-image (film showing time through 'empirical form' (C2: 271)), these are but intervals or totalities of movement providing an image of time. Rather Deleuze will argue that in addition to this 'ready-made idea' of time, there are further aspects for the consideration of time: 'the direct time-image' that depicts a 'new regime of the image', 'the subtle and the sublime' (C2: 134; 271). In addition to these cultural and philosophical dimensions, Deleuze provides a complex, political and aesthetic chart of time that draws upon Bergson but also develops further some of the Spinozist concepts that underpin much of his philosophy (cf. Deleuze 1988a; 1990a). In cinematographical consciousness time is a plane of expression within which various planes of temporal composition operate according to screen factors of style, production, aesthetic considerations and above all political affects (see also Protevi 2009; Shapiro 2009).

The Function of Topology

Deleuze first concerns himself with a technical cartography of the situation of time in cinema before studying its political – what he will term ethical – relations. He not only considers the topological structures of the screen's time-image, but also the constitution of that topology through its movement – where the time-image comes first, then is generative of a movement-image. Time is the interplay with the contracted actual image and the world surrounding the small circuit's virtual reflection, in turn actualizing and enlarging this reflection; giving it a global application '(mondialization)' (C2: 59). In his chapter prior to the crystals of time, 'From Recollection to Dreams' (*Du Souvenir aux Rêves*), Deleuze gives an extended discussion of the kinetic speeds of this search for the smallest circuit from slow motion to the 'mad race'. The political dimensions of this moderation of topological consistency and potential for actualization are played out in films such as Visconti's *La Terra Trema*; *Mama Roma* (dir. Pasolini, 1962); DiCillo's tracking camera in *Stranger than Paradise* (dir. Jarmusch); *Love is the Devil* (dir. John Maybury, 1998).

Deleuze describes sound and visual image in terms of their topological function in framing, dislocating, building and burying; the sound image 'will bury the event under stratigraphic layers' (C2: 279). Sound can also take on the small form of the action-image when it acts as a vector to enact or inject movement into a scene. The sound-vectors that Buñuel repeatedly uses, for example the cow-bell clanking in *L'Âge d'or* (*Age of Gold*, 1930), provides the action of an impression-image where an internal link between the physiological responses of the woman in one scene and the action of the man in another scene are transversally connected. In *Belle de Jour* (dir. Buñuel, 1967) the tinkling bells of the horse carriage act as indexical links to signal ellipses in the action-images (see chapter 9 Sign).

Deleuze argues that the fixed camera shot is 'a uniquely spatial determination' (C1: 24) wherein images are placed in relation to others by montages (of other images, sounds, colours, etc.). This creates movement-images of certain

types (perception, action, affection). Each of these types of movement-image in turn creates a certain form. Deleuze discusses the *shape* of the world created by the perception-image, describing how the 'doubled system' of perception-images references both an image through a living image which causes the latter to create 'centres of indetermination' and axes of 'an acentred universe, a left and a right, a high and a low' (C1: 62–63). The fragmentation of images 'are inseparable from the topology', notes Deleuze, looking at the spatial serial construction in different films, 'that is', he continues, 'from the transformation of a continuum' (C2: 120). In Ozu Deleuze notes that 'the space is not constituted by vision but by progression, the unit of progression being the area or the fragment' (C1: 193). 'The French New Wave also broke shots open, obliterated their distinct spatial determinations in favour of a non-totalisable space: for example Godard's unfinished apartments permitted discordances and variations, like all the ways of passing through a door with a missing panel, which takes on an almost musical value and serves as accompaniment to the affect (*Le Mépris*)' (C1: 121).

Deleuze describes the constitution of space in cinema as a crucial element for the realization of the political time. Different spatial situations, as framed by the camera and as created by the *mise-en-scène*, indicate the circumstances of the events of the time-period being filmed or depicted. The unbearable, unnamable thing Deleuze will develop in relation to his discussion of time-image is seeded with mention of Blanchot's empty spaces. This is a spatial figure that resonates with the political intensity of the generations of Europeans in particular, who lived through the Second World War and Nazi occupation and destruction of many people and things. Deleuze draws up this history, through his references, through his choice of films and directors, to tell the story of this kind of cinematographic space. He provides some terms that are useful, word interventions that will assist us in delineating other spaces, fraught and happy, of creative and destructive, and of hopeful and sad affects. 'Sometimes a man's shadow is more in the room than he is' (*Love is the Devil*; dir. John Maybury, 1998).

13

Thought

What causes us to think? Deleuze tells us thought is created by the moving image and argues that cinema issues a call for an 'ethics' and 'belief' in the world. Deleuze describes the thought-image as a product of a new cinema of the body and of the brain.

The static shot is of a woman sitting alone at a table in front of a kitchen sink peeling potatoes. There is no extra-diegetic sound, no overlaid soundtrack, and the camera does not move. There is a big paper bag of potatoes on the table with her and a shallow bucket filled with water. She keeps peeling, rinsing off the dirt of the peeled potato in her bucket, and then reaching into the paper bag for another. She completes her task and looks into the middle

distance of the room. Time passes and her expression changes imperceptibly. The scene is from Chantal Akerman's 1975 film *Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles* and is famed for its portrait of the banal time of the housewife (Margulies 1996). For 201 minutes of time the camera follows Jeanne Dielman in her daily tasks: cleaning, preparing, making up the house. Naked in one scene, she sits in the bath and scrubs the sides and taps, and then cleans herself. She is practical, organized and efficient, and the camera conveys her silent pauses at the end of certain tasks. The film gives us a secret about her daily timetable, but treats everything with the same aesthetic economy. She is a thought-image (a 'noosign' in Deleuzian taxonomy of time-images), one that reconfigures the other images in her world, however radically or slightly, an image that plunges us into the circuit of images she inhabits; this is her history. The elements of the image that Deleuze details as thought-images enable us to access the structure of this image further.

With his discussion of the time-image Deleuze argues that cinema reveals how time is a *process of becoming* which affords a temporal perspective of images that problematizes classical philosophy's categorizations of 'truth' and the 'reality' of the world. 'If we take the history of thought,' Deleuze argues, 'we see that time has always put the notion of truth into crisis' (C2: 130). In discussing the forms of time that enable him to come to this conclusion, he comparatively engages the types of topological time created in the works of Leibniz, Foucault and Nietzsche (C2: 130–7; chapter 12 Topology).

Reaching the end of Deleuze's ciné-system we come to realize that the theory of something often begins at the wrong end by looking at the realized product. In order to figure how the image of thought come about, the Deleuzian system teaches us to look at the process of the image itself. Through the cinema volumes Deleuze has described how an image is something that comes to be composed of a circuit of layered and sometimes fragmented movement-images and time-images that result in a topological screen site. Sometimes this site might provoke thinking by the different types of time-images altering the order or series of time. Akerman's *Jeanne Dielman* engages a dialectical sublime with which it can generate a form of thinking about the condition of the housewife. As we see with Akerman's screen processual activity, thought

can be produced in durational screen space or it might require a stylistic break or crack with the 'narrative truth', 'in favour of the false and its artistic, creative power' (C2: 131).

When discussing how changes in social, political and everyday life bring about changes in screen form, Deleuze notes, after Godard, it is not just a matter of collating the type of montage or 'cataloguing procedure', but becomes a 'method of constitution of series, each marked by a category' (C2: 185). If we describe the image of *Jeanne Dielman* (a housewife goes about her daily tasks of maintaining her household inclusive of all kinds of labour transactions), we might initially only see sensory-motor images which are clichés (C2: 20). Is it a question of perception, how to see past the cliché, and is it possible for film to show anything other than formulaic models? Because, Deleuze notes, 'we never perceive everything that is in the image, because it is made for that purpose ...' (C2: 21). Deleuze looks to the work of a range of directors for the answers, and a few will provide the basis for the argument for the *thought-images* that he unfolds through *Cinema 2*. The respective works of Resnais (1950; 1955; 1959) and Hitchcock (1954; 1963) provide pivotal points for his argument, but so do other directors like Chantal Akerman (C2: 196), Marguerite Duras (C2: 256), Andy Warhol and Paul Morrissey (C2: 191–192) and John Cassavetes (C2: 192) in orienting evidence for his discussion, which draws to its conclusion arguing for new images that are located in the body and its gestures (C2: 193–194). Examples of films that attest to the 'theatricalization of the everyday' are what Deleuze focuses on, ones that attest to cinema that produces a body of images that address the 'historical and political gest of a minority community', that is not told but revealed (C2: 196–197; cf. dir. Hou *Qian xi man po* (*Millenium mambo*) 2001; Haynes's *Superstar* 1987). Of Akerman's work Deleuze notes that she shows that 'the chain of states of female body is not closed', but reveals states of its everyday situation (C2: 196; cf. dir. Akerman 1984).

What is Thought/the Thought-image?

How, when you watch and listen to films, do they make you think? Is there time within the filmic construction to allow you to reflect upon what is unfolding, or drawing you in, or making you emotively react? Or is the screen work so tightly constructed that there are no gaps outside of its world, or is it edited together so fast that there are no pauses for your thoughts to enter the sound-images that your brain is processing, and it is not until afterwards that the ideas of the image start to take form?

Thought is a process that cinema equally stimulates and stifles. Thought is something that is produced or directed by images. Critical consideration of thought in and as produced by the screen is still in its infancy, as developments in realms of new forms of media and new understanding of the neurological and physiological processes of the human body continue to expand our understanding of the capacity of the thinking being (cf. Ione 2005; Frampton 2006; Pisters 2011). Deleuze argues that a new image of attitudes of the body eventualize: 'The body is sound as well as visible, all the components of the image come together on the body' (C2: 193).

Deleuze begins his chapter on 'Thought and Cinema' with a series of propositions about cinema as a very specific art form and the cerebral medium of thought (C2: 156). The points he makes in the opening pages of this chapter revisit and develop the opening pages of his first 'Thesis on movement' on 'movement and instant' in *Cinema 1* (C1: 1–3). Deleuze begins by reminding us that the technical nature of producing the cinematographic image means that images automatically have movement. In that, they differ from static art forms or performative forms already attached to a moving body. Most images in the cinema are of an intellectual kind which we recognize through cognitive processes. Deleuze contends that when movement 'becomes automatic' then the 'artistic essence' of an image is realized and the image changes (C2: 156). If cognition is disturbed, shocked or interrupted, then our intellectual thoughts move from an automatic intellectual movement to a state of 'spiritual' automatism (*ibid.*). The terms Deleuze uses to describe these different types of thought-images are 'automatic movement' (from art historian Eli

Faure) and 'spiritual automaton' (from Spinoza) (C2: 308 n1, n3; C2: 310 n 19; Bogue 2003: 165–166). In his notes Deleuze cites Faure who argues that between materialist and spiritual images 'there is a constant reversibility between technical and affective nature' (C2: 308 n1). Deleuze engages this reversibility through his method of duelling and various movement-image forms, asking if images can instigate a kind of cerebral massage, a vibration to the nervous system, that 'shocks' the viewer into thinking, or if images merely reinforce already determined worlds and patterns of thought (C2: 156–157; cf. Massumi 2002b).

As Deleuze calls it, the utopic promise of cinema as an art form that would alter the thoughts of men was never realized: 'this pretension of the cinema, at least among the greatest pioneers, raises a smile today' (C2: 157). Deleuze is of course referring to the *sublime* ideas of early cinema, such as the 'mathematical' of Gance, the 'dynamic' of F.W. Murnau, and the 'dialectical' of Eisenstein (C2: 157). Instead, as Deleuze notes of Virilio's thesis, 'the system of war mobilizes perception' to the extent that 'the whole of civil life' 'passes into the mode of the mise-en-scène' (C2: 309 n16). In his two books on the cinema and in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze reminds us of the nature of the *technologically expanded relationship* between image and thought that is at once immanent and productive of a range of spiritual automaton. 'Cinema is dying, then, from its quantitive mediocrity', he writes in the second part of 'Cinema and thought' (C2: 164). In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze also explored the question of thinking, noting that 'Artaud said that the problem (for him) was not to orient his thought, or to perfect the expression of what he thought, or to acquire application and method or to perfect his poems, but simply to manage to think something' (1994: 147). Deleuze opens his chapter on 'Thought and Cinema' with a comparative consideration of thinking itself, citing German philosopher Martin Heidegger: 'Man can think in the sense that he posses the possibility to do so. This possibility alone, however, is no guarantee to us that we are capable of thinking' (C2: 156). Heidegger's question of the as-yet untapped capacity for humans to think provides a catalytic point for Deleuze's focus on 'Thought and Cinema' (C2: 156). Heidegger also viewed the product of creative work

as holding some form of spiritual resonance, and his work thus provides an interesting comparative juncture for thinking Deleuze and cinematographic consciousness (cf. Bolt 2004: 100). Like Heidegger's historical investigation of the question of 'being', Deleuze sketches out a historicization of the question of thinking as it is determined by the nature of cinema (cf. Lampert 2006). In this framework Bergson's thesis of cinematographic consciousness still holds true, and Deleuze refocuses his taxonomy of thought-images on the site of that consciousness – the body.

The states of the body must be considered in terms of their everydayness and their theatricalization. Plato's cave of political prisoners and masters provides a useful model here (cf. Sinnerbrink 2009: 29). The Spinozist affective topology Deleuze discusses in the affection-image and in the creation of a political cinema leads him to reverse the 'philosophical formula' of body before thought; instead Deleuze places the 'unthinking body' first (C2: 189). 'Life will no longer be made to appear before the categories of thought; thought will be thrown into the categories of life' (*ibid.*). Instead, Spinoza's request 'give me a body then', he writes, 'is to first mount the camera on an everyday body' (C2: 189). It is by doing this, or the conceptualization of this, that the 'everyday body' can become the 'ceremonial body', thereby freeing the individualized body from its rigid series of meaning, and opening up the potential of becoming something else, of joining another temporal pathway or finding another 'attitude of the body' (C2: 190–191).

How Deleuze Uses Thought

Deleuze credits director Hitchcock for making obvious the mental relations cinema produces as the thought-image. 'Hitchcock's premonition will come true,' he writes at the start of *Cinema 2*: 'a camera-consciousness which would no longer be defined by the movements it is able to follow or make, but by the mental connections it is able to enter into' (C2: 23). It is Hitchcock, Deleuze confirms at the end of *Cinema 2*, who 'introduces the mental image into the cinema' (C2: 203). The cinema is able to create new kinds of spaces

through the 'architecture of vision', but more specifically, as Deleuze points out, through the architectural relations created by bodies in space. The 'attitudes and postures of the body', create a 'scenery' (C2: 193; cf. Hitchcock 1945; 1954). Hitchcock's is an intellectual cinema, a cinema that offers obvious cognitive functionality, as he had first included the viewer in the film, notes Deleuze, and then inverts this identification so that 'the character has become some kind of viewer' (C2: 3; cf. Hitchcock's films *Rope*, 1948; *Rear Window*, 1954; *Vertigo*, 1958).

Deleuze argues that mental reflection, the thought-image, is 'a cinema of bodies which mobilizes the whole of thought' (C2: 206). He arrives at this point by making a series of thematic conjunctions charting the evolution of cinematic forms of the movement and time-images of the twentieth century. He distinguishes two forms of cinema – intellectual and physical – giving the example of Antonioni as being a director whose style encompasses both camps (C2: 204). The themes of the everyday – such as we see in Akerman, Warhol (*Empire*, 1964, *Eat*, 1963, *Kiss*, 1963), or Abbas Kiarostami (*Ten*, 2002; *Ta'm e guilass* (*A Taste of Cherry*), 2005) – develop under the lens to extremes of stylization and exaggeration of themes, acting, narratives and abstract associations. In this way the screen turns the 'physics of the body' into the 'everyday or the ceremonial', or the 'formal and informal "eidetics" of the spirit' – a division that roughly follows the technical and affective nature that Faure sketched out (C2: 204).

If we look at the first division Deleuze makes here, we can see the physics of the body determining screen forms. For example, the vernacular burlesque of Charlie Chaplin *The Immigrant* (1917) informs the standing characters of everyday life. This interest begins to realize itself through cinema that focuses increasingly upon actors' gestures and bodies in ordinary situations, such as we see in *Jeanne Dielman* or the encounter with a young girl's pregnant belly in *Umberto D* (C2: 1–2) (De Sica 1952), or in scenes of the 'volcanic island of poor fisherman' (C2: 20) in Visconti's *La Terra Trema* (*The earth trembles*, 1948) – but there is a shift in the perceptual ability of the types of characters on screen and in the viewer's perceptual ability. Deleuze argues this comes about through the actions of neorealist cinema, where the 'eye takes up a

clairvoyant function' (Deleuze recalling the clairvoyant of *Ladri di biciclette* (*Bicycle Thief*; dir. De Sica, 1948) (C2: 22). Deleuze charts this perceptual shift through twentieth-century cinematic styles, from the Italian neorealist era, addressing specific scenes, characters and themes from films by Rossellini (1945; 1946; 1948; 1952), De Sica (1948; 1952), Visconti (1948; 1960) to the Italian New Wave era of Antonioni (1960) and Fellini, and French New Wave of Godard (C2: 170). Artaud's writing on the cinema provides much of the impetus for Deleuze's understanding that the 'new cinema' (of neo-realism, of new waves of the 1960s, and other new waves) functions *organically*, as opposed to the movement of sensorially oriented action-images. Artaud's 1933 essay, 'The Premature Old Age of the Cinema', provides some catalyzing and clarifying points for Deleuze's orientation in his own chapter on thought. Here Artaud lays out a foundation for thinking about the 'organic functioning' of the 'study' of the cinema (Artaud 1976: 311).[1]

The second division – Deleuze constantly searches and expresses the linguistic constraints of expressing the *eidetic function* of the sound-image through both cinema volumes. That is, the cinematic mode of production of sound-images is a medium that is exceptionally vivid in its perception of the world: a form that gives shape to the affective movement of thought. This is the cinema of the brain which 'reveals the creativity of the world' (C2: 205; Deleuze discusses Kubrick's films; *2001: A Space Odyssey*, 1968; *A Clockwork Orange*, 1971; *The Shining*, 1980; and Resnais's *Van Gogh*, 1948; *Je t'aime, je t'aime*, 1968; *Mon oncle d'Amérique* (*My American Uncle*), 1980). The cinematic image works by 'affective composition' where, as Deleuze argues, even the different types of the use of metaphor can be seen not as a 'technique' but as a 'fusion' (C2: 160–161). For example, psychological memory can be expressed in film as a flashback (often signalled by a visual or sound motif) to create what Deleuze described as 'dream-images' (C2: 273). 'Even when the European cinema restricts itself to dream, fantasy, or day-dreaming, its ambition is to bring the *unconscious mechanisms of thought* to consciousness' (C2 160, emphasis in original). Deleuze notes that dream-images 'affect the whole', as they 'project the sensory-motor situation to infinity, sometimes by ensuring the constant metamorphosis of the situation, sometimes by

replacing the action of the characters with a movement of the world' (C2: 273). We see these images in a range of films, *La coquille et la clergyman* (dir. Germain Dulac, 1928); *I Was a Teenage Werewolf* (dir. Gene Fowler Jr, 1957); Hitchcock's *Spellbound*; *Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban* (dir. Cuarón, 2004). Resnais provides a focal point for much of Deleuze's address of the thought-image. 'Resnais conceives of cinema not as an instrument for representing reality but as the best way of approaching the way the mind functions.' (C2: 121).

Deleuze provides three points for orienting his address of the new cinema of the body and the brain:

1. the point-cut;
2. relinkage;
3. the black or white screen.

The point-cut is the quality of something (as Deleuze discusses with the affection-image). 'The brain has lost its Euclidean co-ordinates, and now emits other signs' (C2: 278). Relinkage is the image of thought – the noosign 'an image which goes beyond itself towards something which can only be thought' (C2 Glossary). Relinkage is the concept of the intellectual or elastic mind in its serial mutation. The black and white screen is the 'inpower of thought' that Blanchot describes as what 'forces us to think' (C2: 168): the space for thinking – Jarmusch's black screen, Derek Jarman's blue screen or the Straub's political cinema, or the camera-less cinema of Len Lye (C2: 215; cf. dir. Jarman's *Blue*, 1993; Macarow 2003; dir. Lye 1958–1979).

Deleuze rejects previous philosophical positions on the metaphysics of concepts of 'the self', 'God' and 'world'. Instead he offers a method of how virtual relations create new conditions for life through an infinite passage of 'becoming' in which previously framed questions of 'true and false', 'belief' and 'reality', are replaced by questions of ethics and the forms of political topology. Becoming is a central concept in his final work, *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life* (Deleuze 2001b). Developed through work on Nietzsche (1983), the cinema, with Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987: 232–309),

and finally in *Pure Immanence,* 'becoming' as a different/ciated passage cri-
tiques and dismantles previous conceptions of objective and finite positions
(Deleuze 1994: 168ff; see chapter 13 Thought). As determined though the
political framework of screen-based topologies (media forms of all kinds), *be-
coming* within the type of rhetorical cultures of perceptual militarization and
infantalization that screen-based media configure is a concept that Deleuze
explores and the mediatized movement of becoming is a question that his
peers Foucault, Guattari and Virilio were also asking in their respective works
(Guattari 1995; Virilio 1989; Deleuze 309 n16).

The Function of Thought

As Deleuze constructs them, *thought-images* operate through rhizomic
means – as multiple networks that coalesce at points to form plateaus, planes
of immanence, platforms of communication and new concepts (cf. Deleuze
and Guattari 1987: 10). The cinema books lead us closer to identifying the
types and modalities of thought that are produced by a particular film. This
has political and ethical implications; Deleuze describes film as a method that
makes us slaves bound to the chain of images. Philosophers will recognize the
famous allusion here – it is the story that Plato told to describe cognition of
the practice of institutional epistemology that makes people believe in their
own slavery as the reality of the world (C2: 209).

Above all, thought has a political function for Deleuze – this is where the
cinema screen has overtaken philosophy proper as the producer of thought.
Deleuze gives many examples of this process through both cinema books.
To take just one theme here, the nationalist structure of films concerning
wars is addressed by Deleuze in terms of a Foucauldian biopolitics that per-
forms its mutable genre of political differentiation (see chapter 11 Politics).
The films that do this best, under the Deleuzian aesthetic criteria of exactly
that 'operation' (C2: 179), are the films that perform 'the psychomechanics'
of their cinematic perception. In this Deleuze cites Pasolini's 'insight about
modern cinema' – the freedom to be gained through 'a free indirect discourse'

(C2: 183) where there is a 'demonstration' of the thought of the self-affecting 'cinema-form' (C2: 178). Godard's 'reflexive genres' are exemplars, argues Deleuze, of a series of genre *movements* where the 'determination of thought [and] choice' of this cinema-form is to be found in the intersticial. This is what Deleuze describes as the old associative agit-prop one might find in the dialectic sublimes of Eisenstein's montages (e.g., in *Oktyabr* (*October*), 1928, of monumental and the vernacular icons of a city, of objects of worship and fetish) – variously described by Deleuze as 'the point-cut' (C2: 213/215); 'a slip [lapsus]' (C2: 212); 'the relinkage of independent images' (C2 214; 215); and the screen itself as 'abstract or eidetic', 'black or white' (C2: 215) – each process creating an image where a sign or an axis of thought can occur. It is at these junctures, intensive moments, interstices and vectors, Deleuze says, where the 'cerebral process' occurs: 'A flickering brain, which relinks or creates loops – this is cinema' (C2: 215).

As we have already noted, the 'image' in the Deleuzian system is an element of the set (as in ensemble) of movement-images, of which the *perception-image* is a part. This set (comprised of movement-images of all types – including noise, soundtrack, dialogue and images) contributes to the *immanent nature of the image*, where any perceptual consciousness is 'in' something (rather than being as observed 'of' something). In Deleuze's philosophy *immanence* is the opposite of the type of transcendent position that phenomenology proposes (as a privileged mode of 'experience' of something, whether an economic, spiritual or gendered state). Deleuze takes Spinoza's position on immanence, regarding experience as being something created within a particular state or situation (Deleuze 1992: 169–172). Thus immanent states, such as perception, are to be understood in the Deleuzian sense as expressions created within the conditions of the image, not against or outside of them; they are an 'image of thought' (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37; Lawlor 2003: 81). 'With the cinema, it is the world which becomes its own image', Deleuze argues, 'and not an image which becomes world' (C1: 57). We see this thesis produced by the disparate worlds of the skater in *Dogtown and Z Boys* (dir. Stacy Peralta 2001), the school children in Van Sant's *Elephant*, and in the communities in *Encounters at the End of the World* (dir. Herzog 2007).

Concerned with the technical at the level of the methods by which one can elaborate upon the material that the cinema provides, Deleuze will come up with his own technical language to express the cinematographic consciousness that the screen creates. How can we articulate the cinema's incredible ability to capture the sense of a moment in time, an impression of something or someone, a texture, a taste, a rendering of temporal modes such as memory and thought itself! Beyond the wonder of the technological feats of the cinematic lies the wonder of the neurological and sensorial affects of the image. How is it that we can watch something on screen and imagine a state of a future that could affect our conception of a past and how we then might interact with other things that we engage with in this world, with this virtual knowledge? In the spirit of thinking through the dimensions of the *reciprocity* required for the world to function humanely, Deleuze's ciné-philosophy engages these terms. 'When one relates movement to any-moment-whatevers, one must be capable of thinking the production of the new, that is, of the re-markable and the singular, at any one of these moments: this is the complete conversion of philosophy' (C1: 7).

The function of thought is political. *With our thoughts we make the world!*

14

Conclusion: Cinematographic Ethics

> Classifying signs is an endless business, not least because there are an endless number of different classifications. What interests me is a rather special discipline, taxonomy, a classification of classifications, which, unlike linguistics, can't do without the notion of a sign.
>
> Deleuze, *Negotiations: 1972–1990*

The breadth of the Deleuzian ciné-system enables Deleuze to consider the smallest of gestures that we might see on film in relation to the largest thing we can imagine. As Deleuze reminds us, it is the remarked upon smell from a bag of oranges from southern Italy that is able to present a sound-image that instantly sums up the dynamic temporal histories at play in Visconti's 1960 film *Rocco e i suoi fratelli* (*Rocco and His Brothers*) (C2: 4, 95). Deleuze is drawn to Visconti's work, as he charts in films like *Rocco* the 'inventory' of its setting, while in *Ludwig* (dir. Visconti 1973) 'little history is seen', but history

nevertheless 'growls at the door' (*ibid.*). Such images are alive because they make their worlds believable.

Through both the movement-image and the time-image Deleuze engages philosophical principles, particularly from the philosophy of mathematics. As we have discussed in earlier chapters, this is because Deleuze's philosophy is one engaged in the discovery and address of the philosophy of difference. The two key principles to note that are mentioned through both books are *the principle of indiscernibility* and *the principle of differentiation*. In the cinema books Deleuze engages these principles as a 'process' that is generative of new forms (C2: 40). Cinematographic consciousness determines the forms that difference takes. Deleuze argues this consciousness is where the principle of differentiation is in fact a vitalist one, where life is 'bursting forth' (C2: 91).

Two issues of and for philosophy stand out in the cinema books: the critique of philosophies of representation, and the critique of language as a semiological system engaged in order to articulate issues of 'representation' of 'Realism'. Deleuze describes a logic of time-images that alongside the movement-image theorizes ways in which the autonomy of screen images can be seen as an open-system, where difference is expressed and composed as forms of 'truth' (political, moral, historical). The creation of a collective image by the ciné-system means the creation of an infinite whole. Infinity, and our consciousness of it, is embedded with and formed by specific spaces, which in turn are generative of many temporal structures and modes of thinking. Deleuze writes of this processual activity of cinema, but also of the need to validate that process by framing activity: 'History is inseparable from the earth [*terre*], struggle is underground [*sous terre*], and, if we want to grasp an event, we must not show it, we must not pass along the event, but plunge into it, go through all the geological layers that are its internal history (and not simply a more or less distant past)' (C2: 254–255). In terms of critically examining the aesthetics of the selections made for his taxonomy, we can take the two philosophical positions Deleuze argues for: an open system and the negation of the philosophies of 'the eternal' in favour of the cinematographic evolution, that is, the genetic conditions under which

something new is produced (heterogenesis) (Deleuze 1992; cf. O'Sullivan and Zepke 2008).

The Deleuzian ciné-system delivers lessons in the grammar of articulating the politics of images. In spite of his device of an analytic topology and taxonomy Deleuze takes a vitalist's approach to cinematic ideas, one which Deleuze acknowledges, where the activity of seeking out 'the unbearable, the empire of poverty' assumes a 'visionary' mantle (C2: 18). Deleuze's ciné-system then, has quite specific aesthetic boundaries. However, as a Deleuzian system it provides a useful convergence between thinking about film theory and philosophy that explains how cinematographic autonomy is achieved. In doing this Deleuze makes a number of theoretically innovative suggestions that are useful for all types of practical application for all aspects of screen-based work and for the practice of film-philosophy and philosophy. The significance of the cinema volumes for cinema, film and other screen media forms is the medium's capacity for formal innovation and expansion of cinematographic consciousness. Limitations and exploitations of this practice are imposed by aspects of economy, commerce, censorship, reactive governmental regulations that control cultural, racial and gendered roles in specific societies, and access to the technology, yet the possibilities for cinematographic evolution and entropy are infinite. The cinematographic forces temporal modalities into all forms of life. Alternative and mainstream media forms are as yet in their infancy in terms of accessing the potential powers of this medium with the basic laws of capitalism ensuring that surveillance activities, actions of militarism and crude communicative methods are at the forefront of technological development and application, while the entertainment industries of pornography and the basic laws of heterosexual propaganda follow closely behind, while any alternate or experimental forms are milked for their creative potential. Deleuze describes 'the old curse which undermines the cinema: time is money' (C2: 77). The limitations of the filmic are not through any exhaustion of ideas, as Deleuze discusses, but through the economic demands capital places upon time, space and creativity (C2: 76–78).

Like many philosophers and creative thinkers, such as film directors, Deleuze's central concepts lie in the very structure of his work. His two cinema

books thus state their concept and their structure in their physicality: as two they combine to provide a definitive statement on the cinema as something that presents, on the one hand, a closed product – a film – while, on the other, the product is capable of opening and altering previously known worlds and ideas. The two conspire to change the world. The books operate as twinned parts, and Deleuze provides multiple ways to conceptualize these parts: the spider and the web, the relay of the virtual and the actual, the forces of the true and the false, the specific and the general. Ultimately, each book explores aspects of the two concepts that the cinema is: time and movement. There can be no separation of the two, as both are implicit with-*in* the other, or 'immanent', in philosophical terms, meaning their ontological logic (their very constitution of being) is inherent in their construction (cf. Williams 2005: 125–127). The Deleuzian system begins with analytic or formalist methods – it articulates how different screen worlds are formed, and reminds us that the 'reality' of those worlds is created through the components of the images of that world. 'Reality' thus cannot be a criteria for analysis of the image, so criteria for discussion of that world must be made from the images themselves – the elements that inform their movements and the ground that their time images draw up. In the processes of the screen circuit of the materialization of exchange of relations between bodies, new properties are created and existing properties are modified, thereby producing new, autonomous images, things and worlds. In his 1968 work, *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze has already made an argument for the philosophical understanding of how things are created, and how philosophical approaches can critique the terms of what we understand difference to be. However, as Deleuze notes, the main aims of finding 'the powers of difference and repetition could only be reached by putting into question the traditional image of thought' (1994: xvi). The question of the image of thought is cinema's extraordinary power to actualize the properties of things: forces, emotions, behaviour, powers, ideas. Deleuze states: 'This is Realism' (C1: 141). This realism, it should be stressed, extends to any type of actualized – created – world, and is a cinematographic realism.

What Deleuze demonstrates with his 'taxonomy' of the cinema is the dynamism of the cinematographic technique whose diverse system is not at

all linear or predictable, but the result of duelling forces creating generative movement into the infinite. Each notion, each object, each technique of the screen, is enfolded into another – slightly or widely different, often opposing position or material entity – and as Deleuze argues, cinematographic consciousness engenders both open and closed systems of thinking (C1: 20). Deleuze weaves a dynamic structure for the system that retrospectively alters the previous components; for example, the essential method and philosophical paradoxes of *Cinema 1* chapter 2, 'Frame and Shot, framing and cutting', are taken up in *Cinema 2*, chapter 6 in 'The Powers of the False'. The final chapters of *Cinema 2* return to the questions posed in the first pages of *Cinema 1*.

Thus, the different types of images produced by the movement-images and time-images do not add up to make a 'whole' image, as Deleuze continually stresses in all of his work – there is no 'open totality' to be found as the elements are in continuum (Deleuze 1995: 64). Rather, as Deleuze describes of the movement-image, there are a number of different image forms and signs that come to comprise the whole of a movement-image (action-image, perception-image, affection-image, which are only limited by modes of creativity and identification). Similarly there are an infinite number of different forms and signs (direct and indirect) of the time-image (Deleuze charts the main ones as the crystal-image, recollection-images, hyalosigns, chronosigns, noosigns, and lectosigns). Yet together these do not create just one model of cinema. For example, the time-image and the affection-image may co-join to form the whole and the open infinite system of certain types of images. Deleuze demonstrates this idea through one of the most fundamental parts of the cinema: the shot. 'The shot is the movement-image. In so far as it relates movement to a whole which changes, it is the mobile section of a duration' (C1: 22). Deleuze describes at length how 'crystalline potentialities', or what he also refers to as the 'seeds' of time or the 'crystalline form of the universe', are able to depict the 'beyond' of movement – the time-image (C2: 75). Deleuze's approach to the film screen as a topological space enables a film analysis that considers the ground from which movement-images are formed; time is given form, defined and directed. To summarize, the Deleuzian ciné-system does three main tasks:

1. Deleuze's ciné-system determines the components of the moving sound image;
2. the system generates a language with which to express the nature of these cinematic elements;
3. it charts a ciné-philosophy that provides a new theory of forms and concepts, based on cinematographic consciousness.

As I demonstrate in this book, Deleuze's taxonomic approach is productive of many different methods for screen analysis, and these are not limited to pre-existing categories of analysis for screen-based works. For reasons of economy there are many components of the sound-image that Deleuze describes that I could not touch upon here. However, the reader should see that understood in the terms that I outline above, Deleuze's system offers a pragmatic taxonomy of cinema and a model of a dynamic film-philosophy, not a meta-philosophy. It composes and applies the discipline of taxonomy against the cinema's organic (movement-images) and crystalline (time-images) systems. The function of that taxonomy of the cinema is the production of a new philosophy from the cinematographic and this offers all kinds of extensions for and from film work (C2: 280; see also Mullarky's summation of Deleuze's cinema work in Mullarky 2009; and for examples in extensions of the Deleuzian film thinking, see Alliez 1996; 2004; Powell 2005; 2007; Zepke 2005; Keeling 2007; del Rio 2008; Rodowick 2010).

What are Cinematographic Ethics?

The philosophical significance of the cinema volumes is that they make explicit key aspects of the advent of Deleuze's mature philosophical thinking. They provide a conceptual bridge from the ancient theory of Forms through to an engagement with his peers Virilio, Foucault and Guattari's respective works on the politics of aesthetics and media forms, through to the writing of *Immanence, A Life* (Deleuze 2001b). In this way, these volumes register and provide a new theory of forms and concepts, based on cinematographic consciousness.

In the Deleuzian sense ethics have nothing to do with the sense of 'moral-ity' that is associated with making a judgement on whether or not something is 'right' or 'wrong'.

Through his work Deleuze engages Spinoza's conception of ethics. This is a non-hierarchical method of considering the movement of bodies, which Deleuze develops in the context of the forms of movement-images produced and recorded by screen media and film. But with his discussion of the time-image Deleuze engages more of a Nietzschian approach to addressing the 'problem of judgement' that philosophers have always set for themselves. This problem, and its naming raised in relation to film, enables Deleuze to take a fresh look at a problem as addressed by *the* medium of the twentieth century. As I have discussed through this book, one of the fundamental themes running through both cinema books is Deleuze's continual address of the questions of 'the false and the true' and the 'question of truth'. In cinema Deleuze finds some technical stresses and perspectives embodied and engaged. 'Truth' may be what some directors (and their critics or theorists) articulate as 'style', but this is not what Deleuze is after in his cinema books. It becomes clear that he is continuing his work in *Difference and Repetition*, in which he insisted that for philosophy to continue as a relevant discipline then it must learn the art of dramatization, of narrativization, and the practice and craft involved in the telling of stories (in the same way that we see cinema as a practice) (Deleuze 1994: 206–213). What Deleuze engages in the cinema books, then, is not an account about the different types of filmic genres that 'tell stories', but how the conditions created by screen time enable a range of modes of narrativisa-tion, evidenced in movement-images and time-images which create different forms of what he describes as 'functionalism' (C2: 121).

In many ways in the cinema books Deleuze finesses and simplifies many of the concepts he raised in *Difference and Repetition*. The core issues for both books are the same: the philosophical episteme of the true and false, and how the very act of the posing of a 'problem' has the effect of determining what kind of 'solution' will be arrived at. Instead of this approach Deleuze advocates the process of differentiation as a way of understanding notions of the variable event as a way to consider the complexities of life (Deleuze

1994: 186). This is the Deleuzian screen ethics – a consideration of difference through forms.

Composed in the 1980s the cinema books continue an argument started by Socrates in the *Republic*, one contentiously engaged by Plato concerning the value of art. The audio-visual nature of certain cinema, says Deleuze, achieves 'a victory' over this hierarchization of modes and concepts of art (C2: 253). This is also a victory in philosophical terms for art as a political form that contributes something to the world. Deleuze argues for the validity and necessity of film as an art form that is central to philosophy. Deleuze continually points out that notions of 'truth' are indeed false, created by different hegemonic systems for different purposes of control of the mental functioning of people (C2: 121). In their combined works, Deleuze and Guattari describe and question how people desire of their enslavement and their desire to be subordinated, chastized and disciplined by institutions and regimes of power (1983: xiii). The vitalist processes of the cinema provide the means with which to both continue this enslavement *and* to be able to see the bondage of life under fascist domination, of a life led in subservience (C2: 121–125).

Cinematographic consciousness is about the terms of the control and direction of thought; the production of reality; the investigation into ideas and forms; the limits and the fissures in processes of becoming; the production of difference; the construction of worlds; the composition of sets of elements that can be seen as either local or global; those processes of composition; the processes of expression; process itself; the creative and destructive dialectic at play between forms and ideas. Rodowick has argued that Deleuze's engagement with the Platonic concept of the image through consideration of good and bad copies is of interest for Deleuze in as much as this idea presents a paradox that 'provoke[s] thought to its proper activity: an unthought in thought that resists or even challenges those forces that freeze or curtail thought in the form of universal consensus' (1997: 123).

In the cinema books Deleuze singles out a number of film makers who engage what we can call a distinctly Spinozist ethical approach. Pasolini's film *Salò* offers such an example, but in its viewing this is a screen ethics that may not agree with every viewer (Pasolini 1975). *Salò* depicts the imposition

of fascist ideals upon a group of children as an intensive indoctrination of ideals. The film offers a model of education that simultaneously mocks the sinister motives of the Nazi party and related fascist political movements in the twentieth century by using the sexual as a metaphor for the aesthetic boredom of the bourgeoisie, the porn industry's homogeneous productions, and pedagogic models for teenagers. *Salò* is as anti-porn as it is anti-fascist, and it demonstrates a screen ethic that depicts difference through forms by a focus on the affects of hierarchical actions upon bodies (C2: 174–175). In this way Deleuze demonstrates how the semiotic analysis of the film image, and thus the signs generated by screen-based works, are fundamental organizers of differences in kind and are thus indicative of a range of (aesthetic and political) conditions. Deleuze's transsemiotic method differs from most semiologists with his philosophical emphasis oriented toward producing concepts that can be engaged for a range of methods for analysis – ontological, historical, comparative, technical, and above all political – which are not generative of a (closed) categorical system, but of an open-system for thinking through and analysing any form of screen-generated images.

The representation of time, as Deleuze describes it, is above all a consideration of an image-ethic. Time conveys a 'temporal perspective', Deleuze argues, which not only frames a thing (as in a 'relief'), but gives an epistemological perspective through the mode of time-image created on screen. Deleuze's own perspective here can be seen as indicative of the philosophical issues that he worked with, some of the concepts precisely thrown into relief by Bergson, Nietzsche, Foucault, Guattari, and by film makers including Epstein and Eisenstein, Antonioni, Resnais, Godard, Cassavetes and Shirley Clarke, Pierre Perrault, Jean Rouch. Thus, in the Deleuzian system, a time-image can be many things, but in the cinema books the focus is on specific aspects of Deleuze's political philosophy – it could be memory as a specific 'age' of the world (C2: 119), and it could be the way that time 'has always put the notion of truth into crisis' (C2: 130) by challenging fiction and transforming the ways in which cinema goes 'beyond description and narration' (C2: 147) to create a third time-image – a product we already see emerging from the processes of the digital age.

The best way to approach a Deleuzian critique of any film would thus be to not become bound up in the technicalities of whether or not a story or a set of images is properly working, based on some industry or economic standard requirements. The proper way to begin screen image analysis is 'of knowing', as Deleuze says, the answer to the 'constitution' of *Comment ça va* – how are things (C2: 183)? In describing we observe mutations (Godard in C2: 19); we observe changes; we observe how things function and what it is they are trying to determine or name as 'truth'.

Initially there can be no straightforward answer to the question of 'what is cinema?' as posed by Bazin. Deleuze answers the call to attend to the ontology of cinema, taking the writing of cinema into the modernist modes that boldly reshaped the critical function of cinema: Beckett, Pasolini, Godard, Wenders. Channelling his inner Bergson, the philosopher who advocated the vitalist methodology (choose life!), Deleuze writes as though he were a film of life itself, playing out scenes and sounds, dramas, high points, quiet moments, tears, laughter, sadness, joy, impulsive excesses, low points, dark places, death, renewal, hope, sadness, and the thought of the future. The words flicker and repeat and gradually build into a screen language whose codes we begin to access, although many private jokes and obscure and closed cultural references remain, and the English translation denies some of the true ciné-sexiness of the original French language, however despite all of these obstacles, Deleuze provides a text that is one of the turning points in the field of screen studies. 'We will start with very simple definitions,' Deleuze writes with a tongue-in-French-cheek assurance at the beginning, 'even though they may have to be corrected later' (C1: 12). Ultimately he provides no less than a systematic account of cinema as one of the most powerful mediums in the world – cinema as social modifier, neurological manipulator, material mutator, a radical and the most conservative of pedagogic apparatuses. Deleuze provides instructions for future cinematographic evolution: 'The cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link' (C2: 172).

Notes

Introduction: Deleuze's Cinematographic Consciousness

1. *Cahiers du Cinéma* was founded in 1951 by André Bazin, Jacques Doniol-Valcroze and Joseph-Marie Lo Duca (http://www.cahiersducinema.com/). For further discussion and opinion on this background, see the respective works of Hillier 1985; 1986; Bowne 1990; Wilson 2000; Martin-Jones 2006: 42; Vaughan 2009.
2. Some errors of fact occur in Deleuze's cinema books with regard to English translations of film titles and narrative sequencing, as film critic Jonathon Rosenbaum details (2003: 180). I note some errors in the sequence of endnotes to which the reader of these editions should be alert.

Chapter 1: Ciné-system

1. Further address of the 'machinic' dimensions of life and subjectivity are to be found in Guattari's book *Chaosmosis* (1995).

Chapter 2: Movement: the *Movement-image*

1. The term striation is from the word 'stria', a term referencing grooves or tracks left through geomorphic changes, such as glacial movements, erosion, grooves cut by mechanical methods, phonograph grooves, etc. Deleuze and Guattari compare striation with 'smooth' spaces, following the mathematician Bernhard Riemann (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 474–485; see chapter 12 Topology).
2. It is significant that Deleuze references Aristotle's observer pedagogy here. Aristotle divided the world into either sublunar or trans-lunar forms. Aristotle's sub-lunar world was made up of four elements in varying states of generation or decay, composed of the elements of earth, air, fire and water. The minerals, plants, animals and humans of the earth comprise the form and matter of the sub-lunar. The trans-lunar world was made up of 'ether' – the 'fifth element' - an unchanging substance. The heavens and celestial bodies were formed of ether and were thus incorruptible whereas man was formed from an infinitely corruptible body (cf. Aristotle *Physics*).
3. For a summary of auterist theory, see Bazin 2008; Fournier Lanzoni 2002: 17; Hayward 2000: 30–33.
4. I use 'event' in the Deleuzian sense here, see his chapter 'What is an Event?' (Deleuze 2001: 76–82).
5. The infinite is different to a philosophy of transcendence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 47; see chapter 5 Perception).

Chapter 3: Frame, Shot and Cut

1. Drawing from Proust's *A Recherche du Temps Perdu* (*In Search of Lost Time*) Deleuze explores how Proust is able to make meaning through his fragmentary narrative style.
2. Multiplicity is a major theme in Deleuze's work, where he engages with the philosophy of Husserl and Bergson, see chapter 10 Time. Deleuze uses the word multiplicity in a number of ways in the cinema books to investigate the properties of space and duration, extending his discussion of the multiple from *Difference and Repetition* and his investigation of the continuous production of ideas through multiplicity (Deleuze 1994: 182–186). For critical appraisal of this work see Hughes 2009 and Williams 2003.

3. See also Jacques Rancière discussion of the terms of Deleuze's engagement with Bresson (Rancière: 2006: 120).
4. Virginia Woolf's character of *Mrs Dalloway* (1925) provides an important reference for understanding Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'becoming' through rhizomatic actions (see Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 276–280).
5. For further discussion of the critical aspect of the perspective presented in a Deleuzian sense of the frame, see Pascal Bonitzer's essay 'Décadrages' (Deframings) (*Cahiers du Cinéma* 284, January 1978) – Bonitzer refers to the 'Deleuzian terms' in the 'art of deframing' (reproduced in Wilson 2000: 197–203; 200).

Chapter 4: Montage

1. These are the terms of aesthetics that film makers, producers, directors, writers, cinematographers, and critics, audiences, theorists and philosophers choose (cf. Rancière 2006; Levitin *et al.* 2003; Godard 2004).
2. Deleuze references some formative twentieth-century texts on screen montage throughout his cinema books, notably many of Eisenstein's essays from *Film Form*, including 'Methods of Montage' (Eisenstein 1949; C1: 44; 223, n17) Narboni, Sylie Pierre and Rivette's 1969 essay on 'Montage' from *Cahiers du Cinema* (Deleuze references this twice: C1: 28, 222 n29 and C2: 41, 288 n22), and Russian director Andrei Tarkovsky's essay discussing the shot and montage, ' On the cinematographic figure', which Deleuze notes has 'important implications' for examining the 'pressure of time in the shot' (C2: 42).

Chapter 5: Perception

1. Alekan was also the cinematographer on *La Belle et la Bête* (*Beauty and the Beast*) dir. Jean Cocteau, 1946), *Roman Holiday* (dir. William Wyler 1953), and *Topkapi* (dir. Jules Dassin 1964).
2. Although we could easily substitute any other number of scenes for this discussion – the lighthouse scene in *Happy Together* 1997; the point of view of the dual characters of Nikki Grace and Susan Blue (played by Laura Dern) in *Inland Empire* (dir. Lynch, 2006); the dream sequence in *Persepolis* (dirs. Paronnaud and Satrapi

2007), the paths of Lola in *Lola rennt* (*Run Lola Run*; (dir.) Tykwer, 1998) or the lawlessness of *Dogville* (dir. Von Trier, 2003). David Martin-Jones provides a good discussion of the perception-image and its movement into the recollection-image, playing out in a scene in Hitchcock's 1958 film *Vertigo* (Martin-Jones 2006: 55–57).

3. For example see *Meshes of the Afternoon* (dir. Deren and Hammid 1943), *Window Water Baby Moving* (dir. Brakhage 1962); *Je tu il elle* (dir. Akerman, 1974), *Just Another Girl on the IRT* (dir. Harris, 1992); *Cliffhanger* (dir. Harlin, 1993), *Lola Rennt* (*Run Lola run*); dir. Twyker, 1998); *Romance* (dir. Breillat, 1999); *Le scaphandre et le papillon* ((*The diving bell and the butterfly*); dir. Schnabel, 2007); *Fantastic Mr Fox* (dir. Anderson, 2009).

4. The reference to a '*Mitsein*' (English translation of the German is 'being-with') by Deleuze follows Mitry, who has argued within the pages Deleuze cites that the ambiguities presented by the perception of a film may be summarized by Heidegger's phrase 'the experience of unity in diffusion' (Mitry 2000: 55). *Mitsein* is Heidegger's thesis on the 'being-with' shared cultural and historical worlds that we inhabit (cf. Inwood 1999: 31; Carel 2006: 148).

5. Garin Dowd has described the significance of the maritime space for post-war thinkers such as Serge Daney, Paul Virilio and Deleuze (Dowd 2009: 130–131).

6. There has been some significant work done around this concept of the brain, affect, and as William Connolly terms it, neuropolitics (cf. essays in Flaxman 2000; Connolly 2002 and Pisters 2011).

7. Deleuze discusses these issues concerning image perception, in the historical context of the work of Bergson, Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Deleuze notes that Husserl does not mention cinema in his work (C1: 56; in particular we might note Husserl's work on transcendental phenomenology in the early twentieth century, which explores different perceptual situations including hallucination but ignores the moving-image cf. Husserl 1970). Deleuze further notes that Sartre's *The Imaginary* ([1940] 2004 incorrectly translated in the English cinema books as 'The Imagination') 'does not cite the cinematographic image' (C1: 57) – even though Sartre critiques Husserl's thesis of phenomenological intentionality and describes perception in terms of images in the world, a phrasing that Deleuze will qualify in his own terms throughout the cinema books.

8. Phenomenology is a method of study of the experiences of the structures of consciousness, as determined through the first-person perspective or point of view. Phenomenology engages degrees of 'intentionality', in that they direct their study toward a thing or an experience which in Deleuzian terms has the effect of

constructing the reality of that thing or experience. Deleuze rejects the phenom-
enological position of Merleau-Ponty because it entails drawing from a pre-existing
framework of clichéd opinions, experiences and knowledge, precisely the type of
deterministic methodology Deleuze opposes in his ciné-philosophy (Deleuze and
Guattari 1994: 149–150); see also Helen A. Fielding's discussion of Merleau-Ponty,
film and perception (Fielding 2009: 81–90).

Chapter 7: Action

1. Some of the terminology and ideas behind the action-image can be further engaged
   by looking at Deleuze's other work on the philosophical problems he discusses in
   Difference and Repetition, where the philosophical debate on Plato and forms that
   underpins most of the cinema books is made more explicit. Deleuze also discusses
   Platonism as a 'selective doctrine' where transcendence (Plato's theory of ideas/
   Forms) is situated within immanence, which is productive of different temporal
   modes – Chronos and Aion (cf. Deleuze 1994: 164–168; 1997: 136–137).

Chapter 8: Transsemiotics

1. Stones sequence recorded at Olympic Sound Studios, Barnet, West London (stu-
   dios closed in 2009) in June 1968. For background and review of *One Plus One/
   Sympathy for the Devil* see Glynn (2007).
2. Godard's work has a significant influence on Deleuze's thinking about the image
   and the situations it produces (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 98; Deleuze [1976]
   1995: 37–45; C1: 213–214; C2: 194–196). It is beyond the remit of this chapter,
   but Godard's work may have easily been replaced in this discussion with any of the
   films of, for example, Abbas Kiarostami, Claire Denis, Julie Dash, Marlene Gorris,
   Quentin Tarantino, Zhang Yimou, each of whom, we may observe, engages types
   of images that may readily be interpreted as signs for certain types of cultural
   attitudes, but which may also be interpreted as abstractions from their everyday
   situations. See Deleuze's comments on the 'judgement' of 'codes' (C2: 285 n4).
3. See Godard's notes for 'My Approach in Four Movements' – for his film *Deux ou tr-
   ois choses que je sais d'elle* (*Two or three things that I know about her*, 1967) – but

which also apply here (Godard 1986: 241–242); Deleuze also describes Godard's technique of *and*, which he describes in terms of a pedagogy of thought (Deleuze 1995: 37–45; C2: 22–23).

4. This is a key topic of the era that enabled major shifts in epistemological practices (cf. Jameson 1984; Wollen 1993; Braidotti 1994: 173–190). Deleuze's cinema books come at the cumulation of many of the critical debates, providing him with an advantageous position. For example, see Jacques Derrida *Of Grammatology* (1967), Michel Foucault *The Archaeology of Knowledge* ([1969] 1972) and *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Pierre Bourdieu *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* ([1979] 1984) and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980). For an overview of Godard's film philosophy see Baross (2009) and on Godard's semiotics, see Rancière (2006: 143–153).

5. It almost goes without saying, but following Deleuze and Guattari's method, this approach is not advocating another master narrative; rather a 'transsemiotic' is an approach that engages an open rhizomic method in order to debate and articulate a specific expression (1987: 136). The 'trans' for Deleuzian thinking should accommodate Guattari's notion of 'transversality', as Janell Watson has argued, 'transversality' is a term that engages the notions of 'transference and language, the "twin pillars" of psychoanalytic treatment' (Watson 2009: 23), and thus offers a critique for semiotic structuring activity (see also Genosko 2009b: 48–68). For screen applications, cf. Marciniak *et al*. (2007). For a discussion of the issues of the 'master narrative' in relation to film theory, and a good overview of what 'theorization' attempts to achieve, see Nichols (2000), Mohanty (2003). For a definition of the rhizomic in Deleuze's work, see Colman (2005c: 231–233).

6. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari invoke a number of film makers/films to support their thesis, in the context of signification, notably: Godard (1987: 98); Pasolini (2005: 106), Herzog (1987: 110). There is insufficient space to extend this discussion here, but Deleuze and Guattari are not alone in this position – for example, see the arguments of Butler 2002; Collins and Davis 2004; Derrida and Stiegler 2002; Pines and Willemen 1989; Porton 1999; Rancière 2004; Shapiro 2008.

7. In this sense, Deleuze is engaging a philosophical dialogue with Aristotle in terms of categorization of the world into recognizable things, ultimately productive of modes of realism (cf. Ackrill 1963; Aristotle 1953; 1963), and Kant on the question of the possible judgement of categories of things (Kant 1958). Kant comes to figure in terms of the category of the sublime (C1: 53) and how immaterial qualities come to figure within sign-images (C1: 182).

Chapter 9: Signs (Vector)

1. The term 'living relation' is Merleau-Ponty's, who in his book *Phenomenology of Perception* discusses the creation of perceptual conditions for the anchoring of a subject through certain spatial settings (C1: 57; see chapter 5 Perception*).
2. Cf. Sergei Eisenstein, 'The Montage of Film Attractions' (1924) (Eisenstein 1998: 35–52).
3. In its etymological sense the vector is constructed from the Latin meaning 'carrier' (OED).
4. Deleuze develops his concept of small form (skeleton-space) and large form (respiration-space) from François Cheng's discussion of Chinese painting as 'philosophy in action' and the 'empty and full' spaces of Chinese painting (cf. Cheng 1994; chapter 12 Topology; C1: 168, 186–187, 239).

Chapter 10: Time

1. In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze discusses light in the pre-war French school through filmmakers like Grémillon and Rivette as an 'alternation' from the darkness in German Expressionist film forms (C1: 45, 49–50).
2. Indirect time-images are also created by some sound-images, for example listen to the opening scene of Donnie Darko with the soundtrack overlaid with the post-punk pop song, 'The Killing Moon' (Echo and the Bunnymen, 1984), producing a transformative temporal space.
3. Ronald Bogue provides a detailed discussion of the different parts of Bergson's *Creative Evolution* and *Matter and Memory* that Deleuze draws on for the distinction between 'translation' in movement and 'transformation'; through duration (Bogue 2003: 22).
4. I do not have the space in this chapter to develop this discussion on the content in Kelly's films, but Deleuze's purpose with making the time-image stand as an explicitly political empirical marker are developed in the chapter on 'political cinema'. Deleuze chooses the films of Resnais, for example *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (Resnais 1959) and *Nuit et brouillard* (Resnais 1955) to discuss the time-image, both films charting the political events of their respective eras. Anna Powell provides a further Deleuzian theoretical reading of *Donnie Darko* (Powell 2007: 156; 160–161).

5. *Donnie Darko*'s script is set in Midlothian, Virgina (Kelly 2003), but shot in Long Beach, California, and despite the intentions of the director, the film's cinematography produces a perspective for that temporal place as a specific ethical condition. We could compare, for example, many other iconic films shot/set in California, and the types of temporal characters that film created there have produced. Many Californian road trip films lend themselves to specific forms of chronosigned characters, for example Marion Crane (played by actor Janet Leigh) in her fateful trip from Phoenix towards Fairvale, California in Hitchock's *Psycho* (1960). In Todd Haynes's film *SAFE* (1995), 'Twentieth-Century Disease' is the symptom of living in the San Fernando Valley, California in the late 1980s, as evidenced in the character Carol White (played by Julianne Moore).

6. Deleuze and Guattari have previously discussed becomings in terms of a process of infinite metamorphosis (see Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 277).

Chapter 11: Politics

1. Deleuze mentions a number of Duras's films, including *India Song* (1975), *Le Camion* (*The lorry*, 1977), *L'homme atlantique* (1981), *Agatha et les lectures illimitées* (1981).

2. Theorist Hamid Naficy refers to this moment as productive of an 'accented' cinema (Naficy 2001: 10–39).

3. From a feminist perspective, we must note that Deleuze's analysis is limited here as the private is in fact also a political sphere, and it would be better to contrast private and public. The terms of this discussion for screen analysis can be usefully extended by looking at the argument set forth by Michèle Mattelart (2000: 25–26, 31–32), where she looks at the values ascribed and the implicit hierarchization of the private and invisible sphere of women's labour.

4. Following Kant, Deleuze names these three sublimes dynamic, dialectic and mathematical, and addresses in terms of specific cinematic forms.

Chapter 12: Topology

1. For discussion on the spatial figures across Deleuze's oeuvre, cf. Buchanan and Lambert 2005.

2. In addition to mathematical studies of topology, there is a wide range of applications of topological studies in the humanities, which look at the ecologies and ethologies of things -to co-opt examples from Guattari's Eco-aesthetic paradigm (1995); and Deleuze's discussion of ethology through Spinoza's geometrical method of proving philosophical concepts in Expressionism in Philosophy (Deleuze 1992: 21–22; 134–5). See for example, Rosi Braidotti's discussion of Deleuze's Nietzschean 'topology of forces' and a feminist topology of positions on subjectivity (1994: 113; 167), Busbea on space (2007), and Yi-Fu Tuan on topophilia (1974); Massumi on how to think the virtual topologically (2002: 134).

3. Plotnitsky has demonstrated why the most influential figure for Deleuze's philosophical use of mathematical concepts is Bernhard Riemann (Plotnitsky 2006). Riemann's influence on Deleuze and Guattari is seen especially in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987: 482–483). Plotnitsky argues that Riemann's type of conceptual mathematics 'may be contrasted to set-theoretical mathematics' – but not opposed (Plotnitsky 2006: 187–188).

4. Deleuze notes that 'Leibniz's calculus is adequate to psychic mechanics where Newton's is operative for physical mechanics' (Deleuze 1993: 98). Deleuze refers to Höené Wronski's interpretation of the differential idea and the conceptual development of the calculus (cf. Boyer 1949: 262; Duffy 2006a: 75).

5. See Deleuze's annotated bibliography at the end of *Difference and Repetition* on authors whose work 'revolves around the themes of difference and repetition' (1994: 334–343).

6. Deleuze discusses the incompossible further in Leibniz (1993). A comparative study of the topologies invoked in the cinema books and the Deleuzian Baroque is beyond the economy of this book, however see Lambert 2004; Ndalianis 2005. The Baroque is a conceptual tool currently utilized in the arts that we have come to understand in particular from a theoretical and philosophical point of view through the work of Deleuze in a book that came after the two cinema volumes: *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque,* on the philosophical work of Gottfried Leibniz (Deleuze 1993). For historians, any historical period can be collected and united under similar stylistic texts. But because the 'historical' Baroque is stretched over a period from 1600–1800s, and encompassed work from numerous diverse geographical locations, it is a period that has inspired theorists to look at other ways of thematizing the 'style'. Deleuze refers to Wölfflin's discussion of the stylistic similarities in terms of a grouping of 'material traits' (Deleuze 1993: 4). It is the descriptions of the *allusion* of movement of the physical works that appear to have caught

Deleuze's attention; palpability is recast as information carried by fluid matter, and that in turn is cast into a continuum of divisibility and reconfiguration of form and perception (1993: 4–5).

Chapter 13: Thought

1. I discuss Artaud further in Colman 2009b; see also Anna Powell's discussion of Artaud in Powell 2009.

Glossary of Deleuze's Key Cinematographic Terms

8mm	type of analogue film stock
16mm	type of analogue film stock
35mm	type of analogue film stock
180 degree rule	rule of cinematography where the camera must stay on one side of the action to ensure stable spatial relations between objects on screen
action-image	a reactive motion around a centre
affect	power or quality that propels actions
affection-image	is genetic and differential
analogue	technical type of film (for example, 16mm, 35mm)
any-instant-whatevers	expressions of snapshots of time – diagrams, photos, cinema
any-space-whatevers	a space determined by its use; see also smooth and striated and topology
auteur	the mark of the author of a creative concept on screen, recognizable across works

becoming	movement over duration
chronosign	an image where time appears for itself (refer to topology), and not as a subordinate product of movement. Deleuze refers to chronosigns as points (vectors) and as sheets that may be folded (topologies, large form).
cinematographic	image created from the camera
cinematographic consciousness	the image set
cinematography	the image in camera and post-production
ciné-system	open set
classical cinema	logical film space formed through sensory-motor schema
classical Hollywood	studio-controlled film making system in Hollywood from sound era to late 1940s
close-up shot	an object is framed by the camera in such a way that it alters the scale of the object, making it appear larger, for example a close-up shot of a human head which fills the screen
continuity editing	a technique of classical cinema to edit together sequences that unfold in logical order according to the narrative
crane shot	shot constructed when camera is mounted on a crane
cut	break in scene
crosscutting	editing together of two or more shots that may occur in different places simultaneously
crystal	temporal figure that seeds the exchange between virtual and actual
decoupage	construction of the total shot pre- and post-production

depth of field	comparative measurement of distance between things in shot to determine focus and focal points
diegesis/diegetic	everything contained within the screen world. Extra diegetic – things that the screen world refers to but are not overtly included within that world, for example, the use of an actor, prop, or sound whose body has appeared in other screen/non-screen worlds bring an extra-diegetic reference to the situation.
difference	the internal (not comparative) particularity of things
differentiation	the actualization of the virtual
digital	data technology for recording uses non-continuous data harvesting of sequences and coded languages (as opposed to continuous storage of analogue types of film)
dir.	director
dissolve	fade of one shot into another
dop.	director of photography/main cinematographer/camera person
duration	consciousness of changes in lived states
edit	selection of shots
ellipsis	missing duration where parts are cut
figure	sign which can be reflect, invert or be discursive of its own or related object
fixed camera	non-moving cinematic camera
form	the components of the ciné-system
frame	an image set
icon	Peircean sign that refers to a set of designated characteristics for an object. Deleuze

	uses to designate the affect expressed by a facial image (face or equivalent)
image	an infinite set
incompossible	divergent series that depend on singularities
iris	a moving circular masking of the image that opens or closes to provide focal points
hodological	space determined by sensory-motor schema
large form	situation (S), an action (A), then a modified situation (S') = SAS'
line of the universe	vector; a line that is marked by moments of intensity and singular points
long-exposure	holding the camera aperture open for an extended period of time, usually with a still camera, *pose* (C1, 5)
milieu or mileux	a French word etymologically inferring a 'middle place', and in the context that Deleuze uses the term in the cinema books, it infers the environment, either social environment, cultural climate, or generally a place from which meanings change and are influenced
mise-en-scène	the design and style of a shot – everything you can see and hear within a shot, including the mode of performance and the action
modern cinema	determined by non sensory-motor schemas; fragmentation; the production of the intolerable
money	order of time
montage	a process of shot editing using Eisenstein's rule that the relation between two shots

	produces a third meaning, exterior to the *mise-en-scène*. Meanings of the montaged shots are also controlled by the rhythm and the duration of the intercut shots.
movement-image	set of variable elements that act on and react to each other
narration	spoken guide either within or outside of the *mise-en-scène*
narrative	story
opsign	visual sign
pace	rhythm of a film
pan	movement of camera from left to right or right to left around an imaginary vertical axis of which the camera is the centre. Panning is different to a tracking shot.
perception-image	subtractive image composed from a set
plan	French for (camera) shot
plan-américain	a shot framing of a body (animate or inanimate) that alters the scale of the object. Also known as a medium long shot when a human figure is not in scene. With a human figure the shot is generally from the shins to the head of the body.
plan-séquence	a long take; a single-shot scene
plot	how the story is told
point-of-view shot (pov.)	a shot which shows the scene from the point of view of a character, thing, or object, for example, compare the pov of the shark in *Jaws* with a character looking at that shark
pull-back shot	a zoom or tracking shot that moves back from its initial subjects to reveal the larger context of a scene

qualitative	inherent, distinguishing properties
quantitative	measurable properties
ritornello	a territory defined by noise, sound or music
rhythm	pace shots are edited together, productive of graphic relations
set (ensemble)	the components of the image
small form	action (A), a situation (S), then a modified action (A') = (ASA')
shot	pure movement/descriptive geometry/*plan*
shot reverse shot	two or more shots edited together in alternating sequence whose rhythm contributes to the final set
sign	a type of image either bipolar or genetic
story	the content produced by the arrangement of the componenets of the image and the sequencing of events
time-image	process of differentiation
transsemiotic	the rhizomic or multiple ways that signs (including those produced by sound images) produce a 'mixed semiotics' comprised of four components: generative, transformational, diagrammatic and machinic
topology	the transformation and or coexistence of different times in the one screen space, and the relational space between things. Also known as the Boulanger transformation.
topological	space determined by non-sensory-motor schemas
track/tracking shot	a smooth continuous shot where the camera is fixed on a form of tracking (like railway lines)

trans-morphological forms	deformations, transformations or transmutations
vector	sign of minute intensive perceptions
virtual	recollection-image which may or may not be actualized into form

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Jisatsu sâkuru (*Suicide Club*). S. Sono (dir.) (Omega Project/Biggubito/For Peace Co. Ltd/Fyûzo, 2001).

Jubilee. D. Jarman (dir.) (Megalovision/Whaley-Malin Productions, 1978).

Just Another Girl on the I.R.T. L. Harris (dir.) (Miramax Films/Truth 24 F.P.S, 1992).

Kárhozat (*Damnation*). B. Tarr (dir.) (Hungarian Film Institute/Hungarian Television/Mokép, 1989).

Kids. L. Clark (dir.) (Guys Upstairs/Independent Pictures/Kids NY Ld/Miramax Films/Shining Excalibur Films, 1995).

Kill Bill: Vol 1. Q. Tarantino (dir.) (Miramax/A Band Apart/Super Cool ManChu, 2003).

Kill Bill: Vol 2. Q. Tarantino (dir.) (Miramax/A Band Apart/Super Cool ManChu, 2004).

King Kong. M.C. Cooper and E.B. Schoedsack (dirs) (RKO Radio Pictures, 1933).

King Kong. P. Jackson (dir.) (Bif Primate Pictures/Universal Pictures/WingNut Films/MFPV Film, 2005).

Kiss. A. Warhol (dir.) (Andy Warhol, 1963).

Królik po berlinsku (Rabbit à la Berlin). B. Konopka (dir.) (MS Films/Ma.Ja. De Filmproduktion/Telewizja Polska/Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (MDR)/Lichtpunt/Vrijzinnig Protestantse Radio Omroep (VPRO)/Polish Film Institute/Media/Andrzej Wajda Master School of Film Directing, 2009).

Kustom Kar Kommandos. K. Anger (dir.) (Puck Film Productions, 1965)

Laberinto del fauno, El (Pan's labyrinth). G. Del Toro (dir.) (Estudios Picasso/Tequila Gang/Esperanto Filmoj/Sententia Entertainment/Telecino/OMM, 2006).

Ladri di biciclette (*Bicycle Thief*). V. De Sica (dir.) (Produzioni De Sica, 1948).

Lady Vanishes, The. A. Hitchcock (dir.) (Gainsborough Pictures, 1938).

Last Days. G. Van Sant (dir.) (HBO Films/Meno Film Company/Picturehouse entertainment/Pie Films Inc, 2005).

Letzte Mann, Der (*The Last Laugh*). F.W. Murnau (dir.) (UFA, 1924).

Little Dieter Needs to Fly. W. Herzog (dir.) (Werner Herzog

Filmproduktion/Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen/ZDF Enterprises/BBC/Arte/Media Ventures, 1997).

Lola rennt (*Run Lola Run*). T. Tykwer (dir.) (X-Filme Creative/Pool/Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR)/Arte, 1998).

Lolita. A. Lyne (dir.) (Guild/Lolita Productions/Pathé, 1997).

Love is the Devil: Study for a Portrait of Francis Bacon. J. Maybury (dir). (BBC, 1998).

M. F. Lang (dir.) (Nero-Film AG, 1931).

Mad Max. G. Miller (dir.) (Kennedy Miller Productions/Crossroads/Mad Max Films, 1979).

Magnificent Ambersons, The. O. Welles and S. Cortez (dirs) (Mercury Productions/RKO Radio, 1942).

Maîtres fous, Les (*The Mad Masters*). J. Rouch (dir.) (Les Films de la Pléiade, 1955).

Maltese Falcon, The. J. Huston (dir.) (Warner Bros. Pictures, 1941).

Mama Roma. P.P. Pasolini (dir.) (Arco Film, 1962).

Man Who Fell to Earth, The. N. Roeg (dir). (British Lion Film Corporation/Cinema 5, 1976).

MASH. R. Altman (dir.) (Aspen Productions/Ingo Preminger Productions/Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 1970).

Marie Antoinette. S. Coppola (dir.) (Columbia Pictures/American Zoetrope/I Want Candy/Price!/Tohokushinsha Film, 2006).

Mean Girls. M. Waters (dir.) (Paramount/M.G.Films/Broadway Video, 2004).

Mépris, Le (*Contempt*). J.-L. Godard (dir.) (Les Films Concordia/Rome Paris Films/Compagnia Cinematographica Champion, 1963).

Meshes of the Afternoon. M. Deren and A. Hammid (dirs) (Maya Deren, 1943).

Moi un noir (*I, a Negro*). J. Rouch (dir.) (Les Films de la Pléiade, 1958).

Mon oncle d'Amérique (*My American Uncle*). A. Resnais (dir.) (Philippe Dussart/Andrea Films/TF1, 1980).

Mr & Mrs Smith. A. Hitchcock (dir.) (RKO Radio Pictures, 1941).

Mrs Dalloway. M. Gorris (dir.) (First Look International/Bayly/Pare Productions/Bergen Film & TV/Newmarket Capital Group/BBC Films/European Co-production Fund/Nederlandse Programma Stichting/Dutch Co-Production Fund/Nederlands Fonds voor de Film, 1997).

Mulholland Dr. D. Lynch (dir.) (Les Films Alain Sarde/Assymetrical Productions/Babbo Inc./Canal +/The Picture Factory, 2001).

Mystery Train. J. Jarmusch (dir.) (JVC Entertainment Networks/Mystery Train, 1989).

Nanook of the North. R. Flaherty (dir.) (Les Freres Revillon/Pathé Exchange, 1922).

Napoléon. A. Gance (dir.) (Abel Gance/ Société génerale des films, 1927).

Navigator, *The.* Crisp, D. and Keaton, B. (dirs) (Buster Keaton Productions, 1924).

Night of the Hunter, The. C. Laughton (dir.) (Paul Gregory Productions, 1955).

Night on Earth. J. Jarmusch (dir.) (Victor Company of Japan/Victor Musical Industries/Pyramide Productions/Canal+/Pandora Cinema/ Pandora Filmproduktion/Channel Four Films/JVC Entertainment Networks/Locus Solus Entertainment, 1991).

North by Northwest. A. Hitchcock (dir.) (MGM, 1959).

Nosferatu, eine Symphonie des Grauens (*Nosferatu, A Symphony of Horror*). F.W. Murnau (dir.) (Jofa-Atelier Berlin-Johannisthal/Prana-Film GmbH, 1922).

Notorious. A. Hitchcock (dir.) (Vanguard Films/RKO Radio Pictures, 1946).

Notre Musique (*Our Music*). J.-L. Godard (dir.) (Avventura Films/Les Films Alain Sarde/Périphéria/France 3 Cinéma/ Canal+/Télévision Suisse-Romande (TSR)/Vega Film, 2004).

Notte, La. M. Antonioni (dir.) (Nepi Film/ Silver Films/Sofitedip, 1961).

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Nuit et brouillard (*Night and fog*). A. Resnais (dir.) (Argos films, 1955).

Ochazuke no aji (*The Flavour of Green Tea over Rice*). Y. Ozu (dir.) (Shôchiku Eiga, 1952).

October Sky. J. Johnston (dir.) Universal Pictures, 1999).

Oktyabr (*October*). S. Eisenstein (dir.) (Sovkino, 1928).

Oldboy. C.-w. Park (dir.) (Egg Films/ Show East, 2003).

One Plus One/Sympathy for the Devil. J.-L. Godard (dir.) (Cupid Productions, 1968).

Our Daily Bread. K. Vidor (dir.) (King W. Vidor Productions, 1934).

Our Hospitality. J.G. Blystone and B. Keaton (dirs) (Joseph M. Schenck Productions, 1923).

Passion de Jeanne d'Arc, La (*The Passion of Joan of Arc*). C. Dreyer (dir.) (Société generale des films, 1928).

Pays de la terre sans arbre ou Le mouchouânipi, Le (*Land Without Trees, or The Mouchouânipi*). P. Perrault (dir.) (National Film Board of Canada, 1980).

Pays sans bon sens!, Un. (*A country with no common sense!*) P. Perrault

(dir.) (National Film Board of Canada, 1970).

Persepolis. V. Paronnaud and M. Satrapi (dirs) (2.4.7 Films/France 3 Cinéma/ The Kennedy/Marshall Company/ French Connection Animations/ Diaphana Films, 2007).

Pierrot le fou. J.-L. Godard (dir.) (Films Georges de Beauregard/Rome Paris Films/Société Nouvelle de Cinématographie/Dino de Laurentiis Cinematogafica, 1965).

Play Time. J. Tati (dir.) (Jolly Film/ Specta Film, 1967).

Point Break. K. Bigelow (dir.) (JVC Entertainment Networks Largo Entertainment, 1991).

Poison. T. Haynes (dir.) (Bronze Eye Productions/Poison L.P., 1991).

Pola X. L. Carax (dir.) (Arena Films/ Canal+/Degeto Film/Euro Space/ France 2 Cinéma/La Sept-Arte/ Pandora Filmproduktion/Pola Production/Thoe Films/Télévision Suisse-Romande/Vega Film, 1999).

Politiki kouzina (*Political kitchen*, also known as *A Touch of Spice*). T. Boulmetis (dir.) (Village Roadshow/ Greek Film Centre *et al*., 2003)

Portrait of a Lady, The. J. Campion (dir.) (Polygram Filmed Entertainment/ Propaganda Films, 1996).

Professione: reporter (*The passenger*). M. Antonioni (dir.) (Compagnia Cinematografica S.A./Les Films Concordia, 1975).

Psycho. A. Hitchcock (dir.) (Universal Pictures/Alfred J. Hitchcock Productions, 1960).

Pulgasari (also known as *Bulgasari*). G.-J. Chong and S.-O. Shin (dirs) (Chong Gon-jo and Shin Sang-ok, 1985).

Pyjama Game, *The*. S. Donen (dir.) (Warner Bros. Pictures, 1957).

Qian xi man po (*Millenium mambo*). H.-H. Hou (dir.) (3H Productions/ Orly Films/Paradis Films/Sinemovie, 2001).

Raspberry Reich, The. B. LaBruce (dir.) (Jürgen Brüning Filmproduktion, 2004).

Ratatouille. B. Bird and J. Pikava (dirs) (Pixar Animation Studios/Walt Disney Pictures, 2007).

Rear Window. A. Hitchcock (dir.) (Paramount Pictures/Patron Inc., 1954).

Règle du jeu, La (*The rules of the game*). J. Renoir (dir.) (Nouvelles Éditions de Films (NEF), 1935).

Remorques (*Stormy Waters*). J. Grémillon (dir.) (Maîtrise Artisanale de l'Industrie Cinematographique/ Sedis, 1941).

Ritual in Transfigured Time. M. Deren (dir.) (Maya Deren, 1946).

Rocco e I suoi fratelli (*Rocco and His Brothers*). L. Visconti (dir.) (Titanus/ Les Films Marceau, 1960).

Romance. C. Breillat (dir.) (Flach Film/ CB Films/arte France Cinéma Centre

National de la Cinématographie (CNC)/Procirep/Canal+, 1999).

Roman Holiday. W. Wyler (dir.) (Paramount Pictures, 1953).

Rope. A. Hitchcock (dir.) (Transatlantic Pictures/Warner Bros. Pictures, 1948).

SAFE. T. Haynes (dir.) (American Playhouse Theatrical Films/Chemical Films/Good Machine/Kardana Productions/Channel Four Films/ Arnold Semler/American Playhouse/ Kardana Films, 1995).

Saibogujiman kwenchana (*I'm a cyborg, but that's OK*). C.-W. Park (dir.) (Moho Films, 2006).

Salò o le 120 giornate di Sodoma (*Salò, or the 120 Days of Sodom*). P.P. Pasolini (dir.) (Produzioni Europee Associati/Les Productions Artists Associés, 1975).

Samson and Delilah. W. Thornton (dir.) (CAAMA Productions/Scarlett Pictures, 2009).

Sånger från andra våningen (*Songs from the second floor*). R. Andersson (dir.) (Danmarks Radio/Easy Film/ Nordisk Film- & TV-Fond/Norsk Rikskringkasting (NRK)/Roy Andersson Filmproduktion/SVT Drama/Svenska Filminstitutet (SFI), 2000).

Sang sattawat (*Syndromes and a Century*). A. Weerasethakul (dir.) (Anna Sanders Films/Backup Films/ CNC/[…], 2006).

Sans toit ni loi (*Without roof nor rule* also known as *Vagabond*). A. Varda (dir). (Ciné Tamaris/Films A2/ Ministere de la Culture, 1985).

Satyricon. F. Fellini (dir.) (Produzioni Europee Associati, 1969).

Scaphandre et le papillon, Le (*The Diving Bell and the Butterfly*). J. Schnabel (dir.) (Pathé Renn Productions/France 3 Cinéma (co-production)/Kennedy/Marshall Company, C.R.R.A.V. Nord Pas de Calais/Région Nord-Pas-de-Calais/ Canal+/CinéCinéma/Banque Populaire Images 7., 2007).

Scarface. H. Hawks (dir.) (The Caddo Company, 1932).

Scorpio Rising. K. Anger (dir.) (Puck Film Productions, 1964).

Scott Pilgrim vs. The World. E. Wright (dir.) (Universal Pictures/Marc Platt Productions/Big Talk Productions/ Closed on Mondays Entertainment/ Goldcrest Post Production London/ Relativity Media/Scott Pilgrim Productions, 2010).

Sex is Comedy. C. Breillat (dir.) (CB Films/Canal+/Centre National de la Cinématographie/Flach Film/France Télévision Images 2/Studio Images 2/ arte France Cinéma, 2002).

Shadows. J. Cassavetes (dir.) (Lion International, 1959).

Shichinin no samurai (*Seven Samurai*). A. Kurosawa (dir.) (Toho Company, 1954).

Shining, The. S. Kubrick (dir.) (Warner Bros. Pictures/Hawk Film/Peregrine/Producers Circle, 1980).

Shock Corridor. S. Fuller (dir.) (Leon Fromkess-Sam Firks Productions, 1963).

Short Cuts. R. Altman (dir.) (Fine Line Features/Spelling Films International/Avenue Picture Productions, 1993).

Signora senza camelie, La (*The Lady Without Camelias*) M. Antonioni (dir.) (Produzioni Domenico Forges Davanzati/Ente Nazionale Industrie Cineatographafiche, 1953).

Singin' in the Rain. S. Donen (dir.) (Loew's, 1952).

Société du Spectacle, La (*Society of the Spectacle*). G. Debord (dir.) (Simar Films, 1973).

Solyaris (Solaris). A. Tarkovsky (dir.) (Creative Unit of Writers & Cinema Workers/Mosfilm/Unit Four, 1972).

Sometimes in April. R. Peck (dir.) (CINEFACTO/HBO Films/Velvet Film/thinkfilm, 2005).

Southland Tales. R. Kelly (dir.) (Universal Pictures/Cherry Road Films/Darko Entertainment/MHF Zweite Academy Film/Eden Roc Productions/Persistent Entertainment/Academy Film/Destination Films/Inferno Distribution/Wild Bunch, 2007).

Soy Cuba (*I am Cuba*). M. Kalatozov (dir.) (ICAIC/Mosfilm, 1964).

Spellbound. A. Hitchcock (dir.) (Vanguard Films/Selznick International Pictures, 1945). *Spiral Jetty.* R Smithson (dir.) (Robert Smithson 1970).

Stand der Dinge, Der (*The State of Things*). W. Wenders (dir.) (Gray City/Pro-ject Filmproduktion/Road Movies Filmproduktion/V.O.Filmes/Wim Wenders Produktion/Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, 1982).

Stranger than Fiction. M. Forster (dir.) (Columbia Pictures/Mandate Pictures/Three Strange Angels/Crick Pictures/Ebeling Group, 2006).

Stranger Than Paradise. J. Jarmusch (dir.) (Cinesthesia Productions/Grokenberger Film Produktion/Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, 1984).

Street Scene, A. K. Vidor (dir.) (The Samuel Goldwyn Company/Feature Productions, 1931).

Struktura krysztalu (*The Structure of Crystals*). K. Zanussi (dir.) (Polish corporation for Film Production Zespoly Filmowe, 1969).

Sud pralad (Tropical Malady). A. Weerasethakul (dir.) (Backup Films/Anna Sanders Films/Downtown Pictures/[…], 2004).

Sud Sanaeha (*Blissfully yours*). A. Weerasethakul (dir.) Anna Sanders Films/Kick the Machine/La-ong Dao/[…], 2002).

Sunrise: A Song of Two Humans. F.W. Murnau (dir.) (Fox Films, 1927).

Sunset Boulevard. B. Wilder (dir.) (Paramount Pictures, 1950).

Susana (also known as *The Devil and the Flesh*). L. Buñuel (dir.) (International Cinematográfica, 1951).

Superstar: The Karen Carpenter Story. T. Haynes (dir.) (Iced Tea Productions, 1987).

Sweet Movie. D. Makavejev (dir.) (Maran Film/Mojack Film Ltée/V.M. Productions, 1974).

Symphonie diagonale (*Diagonal symphony*). V. Eggeling (dir.) (Eggeling, 1924).

Ta'm e guilass (*A Taste of Cherry*). A. Kiarostami (dir.) (Abbas Kiarostami Productions/CiBy 2000/Kanoon, 1997).

Tampopo. J. Itami (dir.) (Itami Productions/New Century Productions, 1986).

Taxi Driver. M. Scorsese (dir.) (Columbia Pictures/Bill/hillips/Italo/Judeo Productions, 1976),

Ten. A. Kiarostami (dir.) (Abbas Kiarostami Productions/Key Lime Productions/MK2 Productions, 2002).

Ten Canoes. R. De Heer and P. Djigirr (dirs) (Adelaide Film Festival/Fandango Australia/SBS/Vertigo Productions Pty. Ltd, 2006).

Terminator, The. J. Cameron (dir.) (Hemdale Film/Cinema 84/Euro Film Funding/Pacific Western, 1984).

Terra em transe (*Land in Anguish* also known as *Entranced Earth*). G. Rocha (dir.) **(**Mapa Filmes, 1967).

Terra Trema: *Episodio del mare, La* (*The earth trembles*). L. Visconti (dir.) (Universalia Film, 1948).

Tetsuo. S. Tsukamoto (dir.) (Japan Home Video/K2 Spirit/Kaijyu Thatre/SEN, 1989).

There Will be Blood. P.T. Anderson (dir.) (Paramount Vantage/Miramax Films/Ghoulardi Film Company, 2007).

Thin Red Line, The. T. Malik (dir.) (Fox 2000 Pictures/Geisler Roberdeau/Phoenix Pictures, 1998).

This is England. S. Meadows (dir.) (Big Arty Productions/EM Media/Film4/Optimum Releasing/Screen Yorkshire/UK Film Council/Warp Films, 2006).

Tokyo-Ga. W. Wenders (dir.) Chris Sievernich Filmproduktion, Gray City, Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), 1985).

Topkapi. J. Dassin (dir.) (Filmways Pictures, 1964).

Trafic. J. Tati (dir.) (Les Films Corona/Les Films Gibé/Selenia Cinematográfica, 1971).

Trois couronnes du matelot, Les (*Three crowns of the sailor*). R. Ruiz (dir.) (Films A2/Institut National de l'Audiovisuel (INA), 1982).

Trois couleurs: Bleu (*Three Colours: Blue*). K. Kieslowski (dir.) (MK2 Productions/CED Productions/France 3 Cinéma/CAB Productions/Zespol

Filmowy 'Tor'/Canal+/Centre National de la Cinématographie/Fonds Eurimages du Conseil de l'Europe, 1993).

Twister. J. De Bont (dir.) (Warner Bros. Pictures/Universal Pictures/Amblin Entertainment/Constant c Productions, 1996).

Umberto D. V. De Sica (dir.) (Amato Film, Astoria Films, De Sica, Rizzoli Film, 1952).

Underground. E. Kustirica (dir.) (Barandov Studios/CiBy 2000/Komuna/Pandora, 1995).

Vacances de Monsieur Hulot, *Les* (*Monsieur Hulot's Holiday*) J. Tati (dir.) (Discina Film/Cady Film/Specta Film, 1953).

Van Gogh. A. Resnais (dir.) (Canton-Weiner, 1948).

Vayna on 42ⁿᵈ Street. L. Malle (dir.) (Channel Four Films/Mayfair Entertainment/The Vanya Company, 1992).

Velvet Goldmine. T. Haynes (dir.) (Channel Four Films/Goldwyn Films/Killer Films/Miramax Films/Newmarket Capital Group/Single Cell Pictures/Zenith Entertainment, 1998).

Vertigo. A. Hitchcock (dir.) (Alfred J. Hitchcock Productions/Paramount Pictures, 1958).

Virgin Suicides, The. S. Coppola (dir.) (American Zoetrope/Eternity Pictures/Muse Productions/Virgin Suicides LLC, 1999).

Wandâfuru raifu (*After Life*). H. Koreeda (dir.) (Engine Film/Sputnik Productions/TV Man Union, 1998).

Wavelength. M. Snow (dir.) (Michael Snow, 1967.)

Week End. J.-L. Godard (dir.) (Comacico/Films Copernic/Lira Films/Cinecidi, 1967).

Wicker Man, The. R. Hardy (dir.) (British Lion Film Corporation, 1973).

Wind, The. V. Sjöström (dir.) (MGM, 1928)

Window Water Baby Moving. S. Brakhage (dir.) (Stan Brakhage, 1962).

Wizard of Oz, The. V. Fleming (dir.) (MGM/Loews, 1939).

Workshop Experiment in Animated Sound. N. McLaren (dir.) (Ottawa: National Film Board of Canada, 1948).

Yeogo goedam (*Whispering corridors*). K.-H. Park (dir.) (Lee Choon-yeon, 1998).

Zangiku Monogatari (*The Story of the Late Chrysanthemums*). K. Mizoguchi (dir.) (Shôchiku Eiga, 1939).

Zemlya (*Earth*). A. Dovzhenko (dir.) (VUFKU, 1930).

Zentropa (also known as *Europa*). L. von Trier (dir.) (Alicéléo […], 1991).

Zvenigora. A. Dovzhenko (dir.) (VUFKU, 1928).

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