




US Policy toward Chile in the 1970s

Frustrated Ambitions

Morris Morley *and* Chris McGillion



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**Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing**



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This book first published 2019

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

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ISBN (10): 1-5275-3969-5

ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-3969-3

For Adriane: together

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The research for this study was partly funded by a grant from the Australian Research Council.

INTRODUCTION

It is now reasonably common to find scholarly works analyzing US foreign policy making from the perspective of bureaucratic politics. As a discipline, however, this kind of approach is still in its infancy and continues to ignore important actors in the policy making—and policy implementing—process. In his seminal 1971 study of the Cuban missile crisis, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Graham Allison explained the need to shift the focus of analysis away from key individuals and notions of the “unitary state” when trying to understand foreign policy decisions and look instead at organizational behavior. The reason, he argued, is that “the ‘decision-maker’ of national policy is obviously not one calculating individual but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors.”¹ Just how extensive the “conglomerate” engaged in handling any particular foreign policy issue may be can remain uncertain for years until documents are declassified and made publicly available. Even then, the array of political actors involved in policy discussion and determination may appear so unwieldy that scholars choose to concentrate on high-ranking officials and peak bodies such as departments in the interests of comprehensibility. Writing almost 50 years after Allison’s ground breaking study Gvosdev, Blankshain and Cooper argue—in *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy*—that mainstream foreign policy analysis remains focused at the level of senior bureaucratic maneuvering and pays far too little attention to the “less visible bureaucratic activities that take place at lower echelons within the national security apparatus.”²

Those who occupy these “lower echelons” often help to produce—or at the very least circulate and thus promote—the language in which issues are framed and policy options are discussed. Any particular approach can come to be generally viewed in the minds of more senior officials as “positive” or “negative,” “moderate” or “radical,” according to the prevalence of the labels attached to them in departmental “Talking Points”, “Options Papers” and memos. The repetition of terms such as “chaos,” “hostile,” “threat,” “hardline” as distinct from “responsible,” “credible,” “orderly,” and “measured” can help shape the way perceptions are formed or confirmed and the beliefs associated with those perceptions take shape. In this way, the language in which bureaucratic debate is conducted can

play a crucial role in generating images in the minds of senior decision makers and influencing the set of policy preferences associated with those images. Language, in other words, matters.

More directly, lower level officials of the foreign policy bureaucracy can support and faithfully carry out decisions made by their superiors but they can just as easily manipulate, undermine, or oppose instructions. Different agencies can interpret the wording of a policy decision in vastly different ways and proceed to “enact” the policy accordingly: individuals, down to and including section officers in an embassy, can choose to emphasize aspects of a policy with which they agree and ignore or drag their feet in acting on those with which they disagree. A president’s interest in an issue may be broad and time-bound: departmental secretaries translate that interest into policy directives. But the vast network of political appointees and career service officers below the level of secretary are tasked with lending coherence to directives by engaging with the details of policy over time. This provides considerable opportunity to contest what has been decided and to influence directly how decisions are implemented. Lower level officials can also act surreptitiously as back-channel conduits of information to members of Congress—who have a vital role to play in foreign policy making—and to non-government organizations which campaign for congressional action in particular issue areas.

This book is the first detailed study of the “less visible bureaucratic activities” involved in US policy making in respect of Chile in the 1970s and how these related to the “visible” or more obvious policy statements and activities at senior levels. In the first part of the 1970s US policy toward Chile came to be seen as emblematic of the *realpolitik* approach pursued by President Richard Nixon and his chief foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger. Subsequently Chile policy was viewed as a test case of Jimmy Carter’s alternative human rights approach. This study thus fills a gap in our understanding of an important bilateral relationship at a crucial time in US foreign policy. But it has wider implications than simply throwing light on policy toward one country during one particular period. In significant respects the goals pursued in respect of Chile by each administration during this decade—that of Nixon, Ford and Carter—were largely unrealized. This was primarily due to the single-minded purposes of Chileans themselves and the limited influence the US had (and chose) to wield upon them. As a result, these frustrated ambitions heightened the debate among US officials at every level over what policies to pursue and how to pursue them. The contest of ideas and the competition between different interests and agendas throughout the foreign policy bureaucracy

were thus thrown into stark relief, permitting a deeper reading of their operation and impact on policy outcomes. The fact that the period under study saw two quite different approaches to the management of foreign policy also allows the identification of those features which were common to both approaches and are thus inherent characteristics of the bureaucratic politics of decision making.

Nixon, Kissinger and foreign policy making

By the late 1960s, the United States confronted a number of interrelated global developments that weakened its position as the world's dominant power: the war in Vietnam, increased economic competition from powerful capitalist allies in Europe and Japan, the emergence of the Soviet Union to military superpower status, the rise of China, and resurgent nationalism in various parts of the developing world. A serious question also had arisen as to whether the American electorate and Congress would continue to support military intervention in the Third World to protect US interests. There must be global recognition, Richard Nixon had written in a 1967 essay, "that the role of the United States as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future."³ He concluded that if the US was to maintain its status as *the* global power in a stable international order, an alternative, more cost effective means of "containing Communism" must replace the kind of direct confrontation that had hitherto characterized Washington's Cold War competition with the Soviet Union.

To achieve this Nixon sought to run a foreign policy unconstrained by public opinion, Congress, or even his own bureaucracy. The result was a greater emphasis on secrecy in decision-making in Washington and an increased resort to covert intervention in the Third World. A man of firm convictions and considerable ego, Nixon had always intended to conduct foreign policy out of the White House. This meant strengthening the position of the National Security Council (NSC) and downgrading the role of the State Department. It also meant that the President's choice of an NSC Adviser was a crucial one. Not only would the appointee have to share a similar worldview but also be able to rise above the maul of competing departmental interests and pressures typically involved in policy formulation.

With these qualities in mind, Nixon turned to the director of Harvard University's International Seminar and its Defense Studies Program, Dr Henry Kissinger. Although Kissinger had declined to serve on Nixon's foreign policy committee during the presidential campaign, he had established himself by the end of 1968 as the Republican Party's pre-

eminent foreign policy expert. He was also well known for his hard line anti-communist credentials and was sympathetic to Nixon's views on how best to pursue the Cold War policy of containment. The two met for only the second time following Nixon's election victory in November, 1968, and quickly established a rapport.⁴ Kissinger accepted the offer to head the NSC, recommending that he "structure a national security apparatus within the White House that, in addition to coordinating foreign and defense policy, could also develop policy options for [the President] to consider before making decisions."⁵ Foreign policy making essentially would become a joint affair with little role for intermediaries. The State Department's John Bushnell, who was seconded to the NSC staff from 1971 to 1974, recalled that Kissinger "felt the bureaucracies did not share his global view of what he and the President were trying to do and that the cabinet secretaries were in the pockets of the bureaucracies."⁶

In one of his first acts as President, Nixon issued National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 2 which ended State Department oversight of the NSC and thereby effectively promoted the Council to the key role in the formulation of policies on major international issues—and the NSC Adviser to the role as his most influential foreign policy consultant. Nixon deemed these organizational changes necessary to create a more centralized policy process, particularly after the NSC had been sidelined during the Kennedy-Johnson years. This shift in influence would have a profound effect on recommendations by both senior officials in Washington and US ambassadors around the world and how their advice was viewed by Kissinger.

As for the State Department, Nixon dismissed it as a little more than what he termed a "recalcitrant bureaucracy."⁷ In *The White House Years*, Kissinger was even more forthcoming. Nixon, he wrote, was convinced that State personnel had no loyalty toward him, having "disdained" him as Vice President and "ignored him the moment he was out of office." Nixon's animus extended to the CIA which he was determined to bring under greater control because he regarded it as "staffed by Ivy League liberals who behind the façade of analytical objectivity were usually pushing their own preferences [and] had always opposed him politically."⁸

In hindsight at least, Kissinger was acutely aware of the implications of this restructuring. It created a situation likely to intensify the normal frictions between the NSC Adviser and the Secretary of State, and diminish the role of the latter. Reinforcing these institutional changes was a deep-seated personality clash between Kissinger and Nixon's first Secretary of State, William Rogers. A close confidant of the President's since the late 1940s, Rogers had limited foreign policy experience prior to

his appointment. A lawyer by profession, who had served as Attorney-General in the Eisenhower administration, Rogers “was trained to deal with issues as they arose on their merits,” in Kissinger’s opinion, which was less than adequate preparation for his new position. This “tactical” approach to foreign policy was in stark contrast to what the NSC Adviser described as his own “strategic and geopolitical” approach. Kissinger also viewed Rogers as overly concerned with congressional reactions to policy decisions (which Nixon would make little effort to court⁹) and the press (toward which the President adopted a “bunker mentality”¹⁰), and as basically “an insensitive neophyte who threatened the careful design of our foreign policy”¹¹ because he balked at tough decisions.

By September 1970, and after months of endless bickering between Kissinger and Rogers, Nixon’s Chief of Staff Harry “Bob” Haldeman would write in his diary that Kissinger felt sure Nixon “can’t take Rogers seriously on foreign policy.”¹² Kissinger himself recalled that by the summer of that year, Rogers was already being excluded from all key foreign policy decisions or else “brought in so late that his role was that of a ratifier rather than a policy formulator.”¹³ The responsibilities of cabinet government, in other words, were essentially taken over by NSC staff so that Nixon and Kissinger could “keep control of the agenda and the bureaucracy.”¹⁴

In the Nixon administration interdepartmental advisory committees were no longer to be chaired by State: the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) that formulated policy options and reports under State’s leadership was replaced by a Senior Review Group (SRG) chaired by Kissinger and tasked with coordinating all policy papers from Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) which prepared NSC directives. Kissinger also chaired meetings of the 40 Committee (responsible for covert operations), the Defense Program Review Committee (responsible for defense policy and budgets), the Intelligence Committee, the Under-Secretaries Committee (which considered issues referred to it by the SRG that did not require a presidential decision), the Inter-Agency Regional Groups (which likewise considered regional issues that could be dealt with at the assistant secretary level), and the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) which was responsible for managing crises involving US interests abroad. Eventually, the interagency WSAG would grow in importance relative to all other groups and committees, meeting on an almost weekly basis from July 1969 until November 1973. From his position as chair of these forums, Kissinger was able to control what information and policy alternatives were presented to the President, and deluge the foreign policy bureaucracy with requests for studies and options papers—which he often

ignored.¹⁵ The net result was that policy advice in cases such as Chile was often based less on specialist knowledge than on the application of general theories and assumptions (Kissinger's) and policy decisions were often the product of little more than prejudice and gut-feeling (Nixon's).

With these organizational and personnel changes "the focus of major foreign policy and military decisions became the daily meetings between Nixon and Kissinger."¹⁶ Unsurprisingly, morale within State plummeted as the White House "circumvented [the Department] in a hundred different ways" and deliberately sidelined Secretary Rogers from any substantive policymaking role.¹⁷ On almost all major foreign policy initiatives, State was either kept out of the loop (Nixon's "opening" to China), marginalized (Vietnam policy), or trumped by the White House and the NSC in interagency deliberations (Washington's "tilt" toward Pakistan in its 1971 war with India). Another consequence was that foreign governments became confused about who spoke for the administration and/or imagined that they could play one senior US official against another.¹⁸

In September 1973, Nixon announced that Kissinger (while still retaining his NSC position) would replace Rogers as Secretary of State. Many of Kissinger's most trusted NSC staff moved to State with him, assuming key positions and creating an inner circle of favored advisers. "The locus of power moved with Kissinger to State," observed Barry Rubin, "but the authority remained personal rather than institutional."¹⁹ More than that, Kissinger's new appointment placed him in a "particularly propitious position to design, manage, and make foreign policy almost single-handedly."²⁰ According to one State Department official at the time, reports and memos were often written with an eye to purely internal departmental disputes and many simply vanished into a "black hole" of bureaucratic filing cabinets.²¹

The transition from Nixon to Gerald Ford in August 1974 had little impact on Kissinger's influence. Ford entered the White House "without a sure grasp of either the substance or the processes of foreign policy" and was eager for Kissinger—along with most of Nixon's other key foreign policy advisers—to stay in place.²² As Ford recalled later, he "didn't want to make any changes that might be misunderstood overseas."²³ Moreover, Ford had pressing domestic issues to contend with—the political aftermath of Nixon's downfall, an increasingly belligerent Congress, an economy in difficult straits—and was amenable to giving Kissinger considerable latitude in his dual roles as Secretary of State and NSC Adviser.

Ford would implement no major changes in the structure of foreign policymaking. Among the transition team recommendations he rejected was one that Kissinger be relieved of one of his two portfolios,²⁴ a

decision ensuring that there would be few, if any, shifts in the fundamental direction of US foreign policy. Not only did the existing conceptual framework of fighting the Cold War by whatever means possible remain intact but, under Ford, Kissinger pursued a managerial approach that differed little from the Nixon period—which continued to generate unease, if not hostility, at the middle and lower levels of the State Department. Through most of 1975 and 1976, Kissinger remained the dominant figure in American foreign policy, gaining his way in intra-departmental conflicts (for example, approval for a major covert program in Angola over the strong opposition of State's bureaucracy) and interagency disagreements (winning the argument with Defense over how much force should be used to rescue the US merchant ship *S.S. Mayaguez* captured for allegedly entering Cambodian territorial waters).²⁵

As he gained confidence in the conduct of foreign affairs, however, Ford would start to listen to advice other than Kissinger's while maintaining the basic thrust of his predecessor's foreign policy. What differences did emerge between Ford and Kissinger resulted from congressional initiatives (for instance, on human rights), the growing chorus of opposition (in Congress and elsewhere) to superpower détente with the Soviet Union, and a vague notion entertained by some of Ford's senior advisers that it was time to infuse moral values into the conduct of America's dealings with the rest of the world.

Foreign policy under Carter

Jimmy Carter's criticism of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger era was not that its leading architects had been less than vigorous in promoting US interests but that at times they had misconstrued what these interests were, deceived the American people about how they were pursuing them, and acted in ways that undermined confidence in the US commitment to the values it claimed to champion. Carter was determined to break with the *realpolitik* of those years and to substitute for secret diplomacy, covert politics and automatic support for authoritarian anticommunist regimes a moral approach based on the pursuit of human rights.²⁶

Carter later explained that his commitment to a new approach stemmed from a belief that "moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American power and influence."²⁷ But Carter's confidantes also allowed a substantial role in his motivations to "political acumen." His senior campaign foreign policy adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, observed that not only did Carter sense there was a "pressing need to reinvigorate the moral content of American foreign policy:" he also

perceived the electoral appeal of human rights “for it drew a sharp contrast between himself and the policies of Nixon and Kissinger.”²⁸ The human rights issue, recalled campaign aides, was the one issue around which a divided Democratic Party could unite: it “appealed to [those] on the right” in the sense that it applied to the Soviet Union and its treatment of Jews, and “to the liberals in terms of Korea and Chile.”²⁹

Even as a strongly *articulated* component of Carter’s foreign policy, however, the commitment to human rights retained a key instrumental role in the administration’s thinking. State Department officials were reminded of the need to establish “credibility” with Congress as to the depth of their commitment to enable the Executive Branch “to regain [the] initiative in this field and to have more flexibility on [the] use of levers such as aid and arms policies, public reporting on human rights conditions, and voting in international financial institutions, all of which are now mandated by the Congress.”³⁰ More generally, Carter viewed a commitment to human rights as a way of helping to strengthen American influence among Third World nations which were yet to choose “future friends and trading partners.”³¹ Similarly, Brzezinski—who Carter appointed NSC Advisor—felt strongly that the approach would advance US global interests by offering these countries a counter to the liberationist rhetoric of the Soviet Union.³² For him, however, “power was the goal and morality was an instrument to be used when appropriate, abandoned when not.”³³ “Without credible American power,” he wrote, “we would simply not be able either to protect our interests or to advance more humane goals.”³⁴

In countries where vital strategic, political and/or economic interests were paramount, human rights concerns would always take a back seat to a pragmatic maintenance of friendly relations. In dealing with repressive Third World allies, the Carter administration made “ample use” of the “extraordinary circumstances” clauses written into human rights legislation to minimize or circumvent aid cutbacks.³⁵ The Carter White House commitment to human rights, in other words, was never as “absolute” or principled as the President insisted it would be in his inaugural address. Exploiting “loophole” provisions would not only compromise the policy but was bound to create frictions with Congress where the White House could initially expect a sympathetic hearing but not necessarily a trouble-free ride.

The influx of a significant number of newly elected, independently-minded Democrats to Congress in 1976 meant, in the words of Carter’s Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan that “we...had no unifying Democratic consensus, no program, no set of principles on which a majority of Democrats agreed.”³⁶ The President’s own attitude, reflected in the “the

anti-Washington thrust of the 1976 campaign,” only promised to make matters worse. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance described Carter as having “almost a contempt for the Congress” which both sides of politics were acutely aware of and made dealing with legislators on foreign policy issues “more difficult than they should have been.”³⁷ This, in turn, severely limited his ability to establish a solid support base willing to do him “favors” or push programs that required congressional assent.³⁸ In early 1978, Carter wrote in his diary of feeling particularly uncomfortable in meetings with those legislators who, ironically, were the strongest supporters of his human rights policy: “I feel more at home with conservative Democratic and Republican members of Congress than I do the others, although the liberals vote with me more often.”³⁹ Only months later, a White House legislative official reported that Carter had no “natural constituency” on the Hill.⁴⁰

Testifying before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee in the first weeks of the new administration, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher insisted that human rights “will be woven, we are determined, into the fabric of American foreign policy.”⁴¹ In a speech at the University of Georgia in April, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance provided a slightly more detailed exposition of the policy, which concentrated on three areas: the “integrity of the person,” the enjoyment of civil and political liberties, and basic economic rights. In other words, the focus would be on specific techniques of governing, not on questions of regime origins or legitimacy. Brutal or autocratic rulers would never be opposed on the grounds of their essential nature. Vance underlined the importance of pursuing human rights in a “realistic” and calculating fashion based on each particular case, the possibilities for taking effective action and its impact on national security interests.⁴² This, he later wrote, could best be achieved through “quiet diplomacy”—a view fully shared by Christopher.⁴³ Nonetheless, Vance’s speech “offered remarkably little insight into how the administration would promote human rights, unless it was to foreshadow how full of qualifications and hesitations it would be,” concluded Barbara Keys.⁴⁴

Upon taking office, Carter moved quickly to differentiate his management style and structures from those of his immediate predecessors. He downgraded the role played by the NSC in foreign and defense policy decisions under Nixon and Ford with the objective of broadening the range of opinions and options for his consideration. To this end, he issued Presidential Directive 2 on January 20, 1977 that retained the NSC as “the principal forum for international security issues requiring Presidential consideration” but reduced its overall staff numbers and its leadership role

within the interagency committees by cutting the latter from seven to two, only one of which—the Special Coordination Committee (SCC)—would be routinely chaired by the NSC Adviser and attended by other senior foreign policy officials as appropriate. The meetings of the Policy Review Committee (PRC) would be run by the Cabinet officer (or Director of Central Intelligence) most directly responsible for the issue under discussion. Those NSC Interdepartmental Groups tasked with considering specific issues at the behest of the President also operated under the direction of the PRC.

The PRC had the most extensive charter with responsibility for issues that fell primarily within the province of a particular department but where the subject also had important implications for other departments and agencies. These ranged from major foreign policy issues with significant military aspects, to defense policy issues with international impacts, to the preparation of national intelligence budgets and resource allocations to intelligence activities. Also included were economic issues relevant to US foreign policy and security. The SCC (which replaced the Nixon-Kissinger Washington Special Action Group) dealt with issues that cut across agencies and required coordination in the development of policy options and their implementation. Though narrower in focus than the PRC, the SCC would eventually become the key clearing house for foreign policy matters due to the growing importance of crisis management and the increasing influence of Brzezinski.⁴⁵

Vance inherited from Kissinger a State Department whose institutional problems had not been addressed and whose resources had not been adequately exploited. He would later describe the Department as “suffering one of its perennial crises of morale” as a result. Determined that something had to be done to “prevent a steady erosion of the sense of identity and purpose” within the foreign-service, he proposed a re-organization that would “assign greater responsibility and authority to senior subordinates and to ambassadors in the field [and] draw regularly on the career service for advice on major foreign policy matters as well as for the conduct of routine business.” This gave the careerists greater muscle with which to pursue their particular agendas but it also ensured that intra-agency disputes over human rights would require close and careful management. Vance, however, delegated responsibility for this and a number of other issues, including Chile policy, to his Deputy, Warren Christopher, whom he described as “truly” his “alter ego,” concentrating much of his own time and energy on East-West issues and arms control rather than the day-to-day conflicts embroiling State officials.⁴⁶

Since the effort to incorporate human rights criteria into decisions about US bilateral (and multilateral) aid policy had originated in Congress, it was perhaps natural that the search to lend coherence to Carter's ambitions in this area drew at first on the language of the 1976 Harkin Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) restricting multilateral development bank loans and assistance, and US arms exports and security assistance, to any country whose government engaged in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." The State Department's February 1977 *Guidelines on US Foreign Policy for Human Rights* agreed with Congress that the prime point of reference for determining internationally recognized human rights was the UN's *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, principally those sections dealing with crimes against the person which should constitute the "main focus for purposes of both field reporting and Department decision-making." The *Guidelines* were open-ended in defining what constituted a "consistent pattern of gross violations" since "no mathematical formula is appropriate to the wide variety of existing cases." Rather, the emphasis should be on searching for both "regular recurrences" (for instance, with respect to class, race or political persuasion) that indicated patterns of behavior, and "the extent of violations over time." In effect, rather than producing clarity, this focus encouraged interminable inter-agency disputes about trends.⁴⁷ "Consistency has always been the core problem for the [human rights] policy," said a White House official midway into Carter's term. "And the infighting gets roughest when different government agencies see their interests threatened."⁴⁸

This study reconstructs the internal debates in Washington regarding Chile policy during the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations, and assesses the extent to which the different approaches of each administration influenced decision-making in Santiago, particularly under the Pinochet dictatorship. The study is based on original interviews which no other scholarly publication has exploited with former US government officials, congressional staffers, human rights activists, and leading Chilean opposition political figures, as well as primary/archival research (in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom) the scope of which exceeds that of any currently published work on this topic. The study demonstrates that neither the sympathetic embrace of the Chilean junta by the Nixon and Ford administrations nor the more critical approach exercised toward it under Carter went unchallenged within the US foreign policy making bureaucracy. In fact, the often intense competition over policy decisions at a departmental, agency and even embassy level often spoiled attempts to implement a consistent approach to Chile and

weakened what pressure the US could bring to bear in pursuit of its own preferred outcomes. This challenges the prevailing view in much of the published literature that the US had substantially much more influence over the dictatorship than it was prepared to wield and raises findings with wider implications for scholars of US relations with Chile and Latin America, and for approaching US foreign policy more broadly.

CHAPTER 1

CONFRONTING ALLENDE

*“Chile could end up being the worst failure in our administration—
‘our Cuba’ by 1972.”*

*Henry Kissinger, speaking to President Richard Nixon’s appointments
secretary, Dwight Chapin, November, 1970.*

As Chile’s major political parties began mobilizing for the 1970 presidential election, Washington policymakers confronted the very real possibility of a leftist coalition, *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity or UP), gaining national political power through the ballot box. The UP’s candidate, Salvador Allende—a member of the Socialist Party who had strong connections to the Communist Party—had run for the presidency in 1952, 1958 and 1964, each time significantly increasing his share of the vote. In 1964, the United States had mounted a major covert action program to forestall his victory and six years later the idea of a government led by him had no more appeal. There was, however, a greater reluctance, especially in the State Department, to replicate the massive electoral intervention that had helped bring to office the incumbent Christian Democratic Party’s (PDC) Eduardo Frei, even though senior officials in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) were willing to lend support to low-level anti-Allende covert political initiatives.

In March 1970, a memo from Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Crimmins requested that the interagency 40 Committee—a secretive group chaired by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and responsible for approving funding of CIA covert operations—endorse such a proposal as long as it simply targeted the UP and could not be interpreted as providing support to the right-wing National Party candidate, former President Jorge Alessandri. ARA was above all concerned about the regional consequences of a UP victory, that it would bolster “extremist groups in other countries—most immediately, Bolivia and Peru.”¹ The CIA also advocated covert intervention but in more traditional Cold War terms: an Allende presidency would *ipso facto* be a win for the Soviet Union and therefore a

“major strategic setback” for the United States. To prevent this outcome, the CIA contended, would send a clear message to Moscow as to “our determination [to] rebuff any Soviet attempt [to] establish another beachhead in the Western Hemisphere.”²

By mid-year, the White House had designated Chile a “high priority” issue—a status the CIA seemed only too willing to justify. At the end of July, for instance, the Agency produced a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Chile detailing the challenges Washington was likely to confront depending on the outcome of the election. Although bilateral relations would not be trouble-free if either the rightist Alessandri or the left-leaning Christian Democrat’s (PDC) candidate, Radimiro Tomic, became president, both “appear persuaded of the value of good relations with the US.” By contrast, an Allende government dominated by the Socialist and Communist parties would produce “much greater” problems. Apart from the threat to US economic interests in Chile, such a government would likely pose a direct challenge to the US in Latin America and globally which would be “extremely difficult” to manage. The problems foreseen ranged from such a government normalizing relations with Cuba and increasing ties with the socialist bloc to adopting an “openly hostile” stance on key issues involving “East-West confrontation” at the UN and in “world affairs generally.”³

That same month, however, President Richard Nixon requested an urgent interagency review (titled National Security Study Memorandum 97 or NSSM 97) of how the US should respond to an Allende presidency.⁴ Its major conclusions treated a leftist government in Chile as a threat to US interests but in more measured terms than had the CIA report. NSSM 97 stated that a leftist government would not pose a direct threat to “vital” US national interests within Chile, nor would it “significantly alter” the global military balance of power. Such a result, however, would raise the likelihood of “tangible economic losses” for the US and significant “political and psychological costs.”⁵ The Interdepartmental Group (IG) subsequently approved NSSM 97—effectively trumping the CIA assessment. Crimmins, who chaired the IG meetings, recalled a consensus that “the world was not going to come to an end” if Allende won and the White House “should sort of live with that situation.” Even though Crimmins had drafted the earlier memo to the 40 Committee proposing a limited covert campaign to keep the UP out of power, Chile’s democratic political culture, he reasoned, would ensure that “there was another election down the line.”⁶ A similar sentiment prevailed within the State Department according to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William D. Rogers (who was no relation to Secretary of

State William Rogers) who was appointed in 1974. “We didn’t regard the left in Chile as a contribution to the distortion of the balance of power with the Soviet Union,” he recalled. “I mean it was laughable: [Chile] was a microscopic country.”⁷

Still, Washington’s least favored outcome was confirmed on September 7 when Allende and the UP coalition won a narrow victory over Alessandri by a mere 39,000 votes, with the PDC candidate lagging well behind in third place. From Santiago, US Ambassador Edward Korry, effectively rejecting the NSSM 97 assessment of the likely impact of this outcome, cabled Secretary of State Rogers that US interests had “suffered a grievous defeat” which would have “the most profound effect on Latin America and beyond.” For its part, the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence produced a same day assessment which also challenged the consensus of the IG on NSSM 97 and followed it up with a paper for discussion at a 40 Committee meeting to assess the possibilities for reversing the election result. A military coup option was ruled out on the grounds that the Chilean armed forces are “incapable and unwilling to seize power.” The Agency was almost as pessimistic about a political strategy to forestall Allende forming a government on the basis of his narrow win, as this would require the support of outgoing president Eduardo Frei to secure sufficient PDC and Radical Party votes in Congress to elect Alessandri. Nevertheless, the CIA argued that the US might still have a “crucial” role to play in preventing Allende from taking office, although it cautioned that any such actions must be confined to “backstopping a Chilean effort.”⁸

Whether the US should become involved or not was “the crux of the issue,” NSC staffer Viron Vaky wrote in a memo to Kissinger. Vaky suggested that the “risks” of an Allende government outweighed the possible unanticipated consequences that might flow from US intervention to countermand the election vote. Still, while conceding that Allende was “a serious problem that would cost us a great deal,” Vaky nevertheless argued that the UP leader did not pose any kind of “mortal threat to the US” and nor was his victory likely to trigger “dominos falling” across the region. The impact of a Marxist state for the rest of Latin America, the NSC staffer suggested, “is containable.”⁹

This was not an assessment that either Nixon or Kissinger wanted to hear. Crimmins recalled a White House that “had gone ape about this—ape. They were frantic, just besides themselves.”¹⁰ Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers, however, adopted a coolly calculating posture on what should happen next as their telephone conversation on the early afternoon of September 14 makes clear:

Rogers: I talked with the President at length about [Allende's victory]. My feeling and I think it coincides with the President's is that we ought to encourage a different result...but should do so discreetly so that it doesn't backfire.

Kissinger: The only question is how one defines "backfire."

Rogers: Getting caught doing something. After all we've talked about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the US tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.

Kissinger: The President's view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Allende [sic] takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.

Although the findings of NSSM 97, along with Vaky's NSC assessment of the consequences of an Allende victory for the US, had now been quickly overtaken by events—or, perhaps more correctly, by the mood in the White House—both senior officials expressed concern about the more extreme assessments coming out of the Santiago Embassy. Ambassador Korry, after all, had been a newspaper man with only limited diplomatic experience (as Ambassador to Ethiopia) before being appointed to Santiago by the Johnson administration: he now found himself at the centre of what the White House believed to be a major fault line in the Cold War conflict and the tone of his reports apparently suggested to Rogers more the breathless urgency of a correspondent's dispatches than the sober assessments of an ambassador.

Rogers: I have been disturbed by Korry's telegrams. They sound frenetic and somewhat irrational. I know that he's under pressure but we ought to be careful of him. He's got tender nerve ends. I don't know if you saw his telegrams.

Kissinger: Yes, I did.

Rogers: And I think we've got to be sure he acts with discretion. He's a high-strung fellow.

Kissinger: I think what we have to do is make a cold-blooded assessment, get a course of action this week some time and then get it done.¹¹

According to Kissinger's later account in *The White House Years*, during a September 14 meeting with the conservative Chilean businessman and publisher Augustin Edwards and the President of the Pepsi Cola Company, Donald Kendall, Nixon was "triggered into action" over Allende's victory.¹² The following day, the President denounced Allende's victory at a meeting with CIA Director Richard Helms and Kissinger. Terming the result "unacceptable to the United States," the President instructed the head of the covert agency "to prevent Allende from coming

to power or to unseat him by whatever means possible.” The White House, according to Helms’ handwritten notes of the conversation, was determined to “save Chile!” irrespective of the “risks involved,” and in order to achieve this objective it was necessary to “make the economy scream.”¹³ Helms attempted to tell Nixon that no Agency official believed it was possible to mount a program to prevent Allende’s inauguration as President in early November, but said it “was like talking into a gale.”¹⁴

If Nixon, in Kissinger’s words, “was beside himself” over the election outcome, and took out his frustration on Helms, a similarly apoplectic NSC Adviser directed his wrath at the relevant foreign policy agencies whom he accused of engaging in “a complicated three cornered minuet that kept the problem from high level attention.” Kissinger singled out the State Department’s Latin American Bureau for not “put[ting] the chips on anybody” in the lead up to the election and dismissing the possibility of an Allende victory.¹⁵ He conjured up the specter of dramatic global and regional consequences for the United States if the vote was allowed to stand. Internationally, Kissinger insisted, the result would have major implications for the future success of communist parties in Western Europe. An NSC aide recalled that Kissinger was especially preoccupied with the growing political support for the Italian Communist Party and the negative message communist participation in Chile’s democratic electoral process, and Washington’s acceptance of the result, would send to the Italian voter ahead of the 1972 elections.¹⁶ Beyond warnings about the threat of “falling dominoes” in southern Europe, Kissinger further conflated the dire consequences of Allende’s election (and the importance of a “tough” US response) by situating it “against the backdrop of the [pro-Moscow] Syrian [government’s] invasion of Jordan and our efforts to force the Soviet Union to dismantle its installation for servicing nuclear submarines in the Caribbean.”¹⁷ Closer to home, he declared, Chile’s location in the mainland of South America, and the democratic origins of a Socialist-Communist-dominated coalition election victory, posed an even greater threat to US regional interests than had the Cuban Revolution during the 1960s. For Kissinger, what happened in Chile had the potential to “undermine our position in the entire Western Hemisphere.”¹⁸

The day after Helms was told to somehow rescue Chile from the left, Kissinger held a White House briefing in which he again spelled out the broader strategic implications of the election result. Implicitly treating Allende’s victory as akin to the Soviet Union forcibly establishing a client regime in Eastern Europe, he issued an ominous warning: “I don’t think we should delude ourselves that an Allende takeover in Chile would not present massive problems for us, and for democratic forces and for pro-US

forces in Latin America, and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere.” In the current circumstances, however, the reality was that Washington’s dilemma could not easily be resolved in a manner favorable to US policy objectives. Realistically, Kissinger acknowledged, the situation was “not one in which our capacity for influence is very great at this particular moment now that matters have reached this particular point.”¹⁹

That said, and having failed to prevent the UP’s victory, the White House was determined to overturn the result if at all possible. According to Kissinger, Nixon “did not put forward a concrete scheme, only a passionate desire, unfocused and born of frustration to do ‘something’.”²⁰ Before long, however, that “something” coalesced into a two-track policy: Track 1, approved by the 40 Committee and, according to Kissinger, “closely paralleling” the instructions Nixon had given Helms, consisted of instructions to the Embassy to enlist whatever political, economic, and propaganda tools it could to induce the opposition forces to block a formal transfer of power to Allende.²¹ Track 2 concentrated on efforts to foment a military coup.²² In a telegram to Santiago on September 28, the head of a special CIA task force on Chile, “instructed his team that ‘every plot, however bizarre’ must be explored to prod the military into action.”²³ Kissinger was skeptical about a successful covert operation, terming it a “long shot” made worse by “bureaucratic resistance” especially from a “timid and unsympathetic” State Department.²⁴ He did, however, direct Ambassador Korry to inform the Chilean military leadership that “we do not want them to be deterred by what they may feel is any ambiguity with respect to our attitude toward the election of Allende” and that if they did block his inauguration the reward would be increased military aid.²⁵

That was about as much as State Department officials knew of Track 2 programs.²⁶ Even Korry was kept in the dark about what the Embassy’s CIA station and US Army attaché had been instructed to get up to. The Ambassador, according to his successor, Nathaniel Davis, was “blind-sided and short-circuited in his responsibility to represent the President.”²⁷ This extraordinary secrecy, recalled Kissinger, “was an expression of Nixon’s profound distrust of State Department machinery, which he suspected would foil consideration of his wishes.”²⁸ But it marked the beginning of a policy response suffused with internal contradictions and inconsistencies.

The Chilean military culture

Kissinger’s instincts about, along with the CIA’s assessment of, the prospects of the military moving to block Allende’s assumption of power

were correct. But the reasons why the armed forces refused to act had little to do with their capabilities (a key factor singled out in the CIA's September 7 assessment), the timidity of the State Department in egging them on (cited by Kissinger in his September 17 memo to Nixon), or any consideration of inducements (the offer made by Kissinger through Korry on October 7). Rather the Chilean military had a well-developed respect for constitutionalism, an acute sense of the dangers involved in trying to umpire Chilean politics, and sufficiently mixed feelings about the prospects of an Allende government to want to stay its hand.

Historically, the Chilean military saw itself as the country's pre-eminent institution and the very repository of national values, interests, and goals.²⁹ Its battlefield successes dated from colonial times and included the war of independence from Spain, the fierce frontier wars fought against the Mapuche Indians, and the two victorious nineteenth century wars against its neighbors, Peru and Bolivia. During the twentieth century, all three services played a key role in laying the economic and political foundations of the modern state, including the adoption of the 1925 Constitution. By the late 1960s, the Chilean military was arguably the most professional armed forces in all of Latin America.

Beginning in the 1920s, the twin ideas of the state playing a key role in industrial and economic development, and the importance of social justice in order to avoid instability and the political radicalization of the lower classes, began to permeate the thinking of the army's officer corp. So also did a nationalist outlook reflected in a strand of thinking opposed to foreign economic domination and in favor of domestic control over strategic resource sectors. None of this, however, inclined the armed forces to jettison a virulent anti-communism combined with a more generalized distrust of mass movements and the potential dangers of popular democracy. While the former had a long pedigree, dating back to the early days of the Russian Revolution, it grew in intensity during the Cold War. Like other Latin armed forces, the Chilean officer corps saw themselves locked in a mortal conflict to preserve not only their national integrity but Western civilization, which they saw as hardly the exclusive preserve of European and North American countries. Indeed, many Chilean officers expressed their irritation over what they perceived as Washington's paternalistic attitude and failure to treat them as vital, equal partners in this worldwide conflict—particularly with respect to sophisticated weapons transfers—and viewed with concern what they perceived as the West's flagging commitment to waging the moral battle against the forces of global communism.³⁰

The formative anti-communist experience of the generation of military officers who came to power in the 1970s, including Augusto Pinochet, was their direct participation in the effort of the Gonzalez Videla's Radical Party government to crush nationwide industrial strikes in the mines during 1947, declaring them part of a political effort by the Communist Party to topple the regime from power.³¹ As well, the teaching of geopolitics in Chile's war academies during the 1950 and 1960s—by Pinochet and Jose Merino, among others—served to reinforce the military's nationalist and statist but also anti-communist sentiments. Geopolitical thinking was based, in Pinochet's words, on “the idea of the state as a living organism engaged in a constant struggle for survival” against the forces of economic decline and political and moral decay.³² In this worldview, Marxist notions of internationalism and class conflict were seen as threats that weakened the nation by destroying its social cohesion.³³ Chilean military studies of insurrectionist movements from Algeria to Vietnam also reinforced the idea that civil society was a battlefield in which, left unchecked, Marxists infiltrated intellectual circles, labor unions, the media and even the Church to promote lawlessness and moral disorder to their own advantage.³⁴ This thinking reinforced the military's commitment to economic development—poverty only empowered revolutionaries—but also constituted a further reason to suspect democracy's excesses and politicians who are tempted to exploit these for the own short-sighted ends.

At the same time, the Chilean military had a vivid institutional memory of the disastrous consequences that befell it following the collapse of the Ibanez dictatorship during the Great Depression of the early 1930s. Then, as the Army and Carabineros struggled to restore order on the streets of Santiago, elements within the Navy mutinied leading the newly created Air Force to bomb the fleet at anchor in the port city of Coquimbo. The combined effect of a civilian backlash against the military and the breakdown in its own institutional discipline and unity eventually persuaded senior officers to disavow any further *direct* role in politics. After 1932 the armed forces confined themselves to purely professional duties and “began to develop a social and cultural life that was completely separate from civilian society.”³⁵

In the civilian domain, meanwhile, an attitude bordering on neglect developed toward the military and its concerns. Between 1958 and 1968, the Alessandri and Frei governments presided over a contraction of the defense budget from 25 percent to 13 percent of total public spending,³⁶ and dismissed warnings from senior officers about Chile's military capabilities lagging dangerously behind those of Peru and Argentina—

both seen as potential future threats. In 1968, eighty officers signed letters of resignation in protest at their poor salaries and working conditions; the following year retired General Roberto Viaux took control of a barracks on the Peruvian border, declaring a “strike” to secure a pay rise in the Army and the resignation of the Defense Minister.³⁷

In these circumstances Allende’s election victory was a cause of both concern and celebration within the military. On the one hand he was a Marxist who employed the language of class conflict, mass mobilization politics, and internationalism. On the other, he promised structural reforms that would strengthen the economy and hence the nation’s security. Furthermore, Allende—unlike his predecessor—went out of his way to accommodate the armed forces’ concerns. He praised their contribution to the country, promised (and eventually delivered) pay increases, gave guarantees to modernize their equipment and assurances that he would not change Chile’s defense arrangements with the US or interfere in the military’s affairs.³⁸ Moreover he had come to power in an election contest that constitutionalist military leaders had pledged to respect, and committed himself to govern within the bounds of legality. There was, in other words, no immediate impetus for the armed forces to stand in the way of his forming a government.

Korry flew to Washington for a meeting with Kissinger on October 13 at which he basically outlined the same conclusion, arguing that any attempt at a military coup supported by the US might backfire as badly as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. The Ambassador was then taken to meet with Nixon whose first words of greeting were, “That sonofabith, that sonofabitch! Not you, Mr Ambassador, you always tell it like it is. It’s that bastard Allende.” Nixon invited Korry to address a meeting of the 40 Committee where the latter again expressed his strong opposition to any US contact with conspirators—especially retired General Viaux who, along with other potential plotters, was being actively encouraged by the CIA behind Korry’s back. The Ambassador left the meeting and flew back to Santiago believing there was a consensus behind a decision to accept the inevitability of an Allende government and to pursue a policy of cordial if distant relations with it.³⁹ According to Kissinger’s subsequent account, mounting advice that a coup was unlikely to succeed caused him to terminate Track II programs—with Nixon’s approval—on October 15. (Track I, he claimed, was also abandoned by the 40 Committee at the “same point” and the administration then resigned itself to the prospect of an Allende presidency.)⁴⁰

The following day, however, the CIA station in Santiago received a cable from headquarters advising it remained a “firm and continuing

policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup” and that while it would be “much preferable” to have this transpire before October 24 “efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date.”⁴¹ Three days later, rightwing conspirators (including retired General Viaux) mounted a plot to force a coup by kidnapping Army Commander-in-Chief General Rene Schneider and sheet the blame home to leftist radicals. Although the CIA had urged Viaux against taking “precipitate action” until he could be assured of more widespread support for a coup, the Agency had supplied him with gas masks and gas canisters on October 16.⁴² In any event, the kidnapping attempt failed: Schneider was shot resisting his assailants, died some days later and the nature of the plot was exposed leading to Viaux’s arrest and imprisonment. At this point, the Chilean military rallied even more resolutely to the causes of both institutional unity and law and order—rather than to Washington’s hoped-for pre-emptive coup strategy. The whole farce was the first of many miscalculations by US policymakers when it came to understanding the culture and intentions of Chile’s officer corps.

Chile “Gone”: The Allende transition

With Allende seemingly assured of victory in the congressional vote on October 24 as a result of post-election guarantees negotiated with the PDC, and in the absence of any sign of military intervention to block his subsequent inauguration, formulating a strategy for dealing with the UP in government now became imperative. In fact, Kissinger had already begun chairing interagency meetings to devise a longer-term program of economic sanctions in the event that Allende’s election was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. “The whole purpose of the meetings,” an administration source recalled, “was to ensure that the various aid agencies and lending agencies were re-jiggered to make sure that [Allende] wasn’t to get a penny.”⁴³

A number of key assumptions aggregating, but by now also exaggerating, earlier assessments of the impact of an Allende government informed this new policy debate. A memo from Vaky to Kissinger in early October provides a case in point. A little over a month after suggesting that the impact of a Marxist government in Chile was “containable”, the NSC staffer assembled a more alarming list of consequences. First, and given Allende’s “profound anti-American bias,” his governing coalition was “likely to lead opposition to US influence in the hemisphere, to promote policies counter to ours and to seek the adoption of a neutralist Third World stance by Latin America.” Second, the new government would

almost certainly deepen relations with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the socialist bloc, thereby creating an “entry point” for these countries to expand their influence in the hemisphere. Third, US investments in Chile will “almost certainly” be expropriated in due course, possibly without compensation. Fourth, the simple reality of a government of the UP’s persuasion in Chile “is likely to encourage elements opposed to us in other Latin American countries.”⁴⁴ The State Department began expressing particular concern over a possible Chilean “turn” to the Soviet Union for military and economic aid—even though the CIA offered the opinion that closer relations with Moscow would not lead Allende “to make Chile a Soviet vassal...or submit to Soviet domination.”⁴⁵ The Agency’s assessment would prove more accurate: as President, Allende did not ask US military advisers to leave the country; US military aid increased from \$800,000 in 1970 to \$5.7 million in 1971 to \$10.9 million in 1972; and, in 1973, Chile took part in the UNITAS sea exercises with US and other Latin navies for the first time in four years.⁴⁶

At the end of October, Kissinger received an “Options Paper on Chile” prepared by the State Department officials in consultation with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the CIA for consideration by the NSC. This document exhibited still greater alarm than earlier memos about policymakers’ assumptions regarding an Allende government’s regional and global policies. In addition to its “profound anti-American bias”—now a mantra among US officials—that would translate into efforts to “extirpate” the US presence in Chile and challenge its influence in the rest of the hemisphere, a UP government was likely to exploit the Organization of American States (OAS) “as a forum for advancing its interests principally at the expense of the United States,” to encourage other countries in the region to replicate the Chilean experience, and would certainly re-establish diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba. Further afield, while keen “to avoid dependence” on Moscow, Chile might develop military relationships with the communist bloc that would pose a serious threat to the Western Hemisphere if Santiago adopted an “actively hostile” stance toward inter-American organizations. Finally, Allende’s Chile was likely to become “a haven for Latin American subversives.”⁴⁷

Against this backdrop of real and imagined concerns, the Nixon White House redoubled its efforts to make certain that a government it viewed as a profoundly antagonistic to US interests did not complete its six-year term of office. Nixon’s antagonism toward Allende had been set in stone before the new Chilean President had any opportunity to enact policies impacting on the US in anyway: his professed ambition to transform Chile into a democratic socialist society pursuing its own independent foreign

policy was all that was needed. Moreover, although Allende harbored ambitions to restrict the capacity of US capital to expand in Chile, the nationalization of American property interests, wrote Kissinger, “was not the [primary] issue.” He told a group of US corporate executives who supported Treasury Secretary John Connally’s proposal to negotiate a quiet government bailout of the corporations and an “expropriation peace” with Allende that the administration had “the national interest to think about.”⁴⁸

When officials in State’s ARA and Policy Planning Bureaus received copies of the October “Options Paper” they responded coolly to its more provocative policy implications. In a briefing memo to Secretary Rogers, on the day of Allende’s inauguration (November 3) and preparatory to an NSC meeting on Chile that afternoon, several of these officials agreed that the election result was “clearly a setback for the US” but counseled that Washington should think carefully about how it treated a democratically-elected government in a region where nationalism was on the rise, fuelled in large part by a perception of “US domination.” An approach based on “overt” hostility, the memo argued, risked the possibility of “even more serious losses for us in the hemisphere and elsewhere in the world.” Moreover, Washington’s ability to influence developments in Chile by any means short of direct military intervention over the next several months was “marginal at best and could be seriously counterproductive.”⁴⁹

The risks were obvious. For a start, US meddling might unite rather than divide the various political factions and power brokers in Chile. And it could produce a wider anti-American backlash in Latin America, particularly in the absence of anything Washington could point to as a clear provocation or imminent—as distinct from imagined—threat. Moscow’s immediate response to Allende’s confirmation as President, for instance, was firmly anchored in the spheres of influence politics practiced by the world’s two superpowers at the time and requiring each to respect the other’s areas of obvious interest. State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (BI&R) had already reported that the Soviet Union seemed determined not to “unduly provoke” Washington by avoiding any commitment that might be interpreted as helping the UP to consolidate its hold on political power. Rather, it had adopted a conservative approach to developing ties with the regime based on “friendly but not effusive public” support. BI&R attributed this posture not only to the commitments under global détente but also to Moscow’s own domestic economic problems, its existing major financial commitments to Third World allies, and its concern over the survival prospects of the Allende government, especially given the vehemence of US hostility.⁵⁰

But Kissinger was projecting a much darker scenario. A secret November 5 memo to the President prior to a second NSC meeting on Chile in almost as many days spelled out the dimensions of “one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere.” Describing Allende now as “a tough dedicated Marxist...with a profound anti-US bias,” Kissinger hyperventilated that his “consolidation in power” would lead to the establishment of “a socialist, Marxist state in Chile,” the total loss of US influence throughout the region, and a deepening of ties between Santiago and the socialist bloc. The consequences of regime consolidation would be bilateral, regional and global: the billion dollar US investment stake would be immediately threatened together with the prospect of a default on the approximately \$1.5 billion in debt owed to the US government and US private banks. As well, “Chile would probably become a leader of opposition to us in the inter-American system...and a focal point for subversion in the rest of Latin America,” while the global impact of a successful democratically elected Marxist government—“especially in Italy”—could have a multiplier effect “significant[ly] affect[ing] the world balance and our own position in it.” Thus, Kissinger cautioned against taking a “benign or optimistic view of an Allende regime over the long term” or seeking some kind of accommodation on the grounds that, within Chile itself, such an approach “plays into his game plan” and, worse still, a socialist Chile linked to Moscow and Havana could somehow “be even more dangerous for our long-term interests than a very radical regime.” Kissinger’s recommendation was predictable: “oppose Allende as strongly as we can and do all we can to keep him from consolidating power.”⁵¹

The next day, Nixon and his senior foreign policy officials gathered in the Cabinet Room to discuss what was now being viewed as little short of a crisis facing US policymakers. It quickly became clear that the President himself was preoccupied with the potential regional and global consequences of a consolidated left-wing government in Santiago and, as such, gave short shrift to those in State and the CIA who contemplated some kind of accommodation with the democratically-elected Allende government. In Nixon’s mind an even worse scenario than Allende’s election would be his ability to lead a successful government and project a positive global image of Chilean socialism.

Determined to prevent this happening, Nixon settled on a strategy of maintaining a formal public relationship with Allende but privately sending the message that Washington opposed his government, and also letting other Latin American leaders or potential leaders know they were asking for “trouble” if they thought “they can move like Chile and have it

both ways.” Chile is “gone,” the President declared, because Allende “isn’t going to mellow.” The US must try to “hurt him” in any way possible. “I want [other Latin leaders] to know our policy is negative,” Nixon said. If the UP government “is able to get away with” its socialist strategy, it would embolden other Latin governments who are “sitting on the fence,” he insisted.⁵²

The White House now prepared to mobilize all the resources at its command to destabilize and topple the elected UP government from power. On November 9, Nixon issued National Security Decision Memorandum 93 (NSDM 93) dictating a public policy toward Allende of accepting his government and keeping lines of communication open in a “correct but cool” fashion; and a private—that is, secret—policy of hostility designed to “maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to US and hemisphere interests.” Included in the measures to be followed were a mandated end to all US credits, sharp reductions in economic assistance, a denial of new guarantees for private US investment in Chile, and putting pressure on the international financial institutions to limit credit and other financial assistance to Chile.⁵³ According to Nathaniel Davis—who formally succeeded Korry as US Ambassador to Chile in October 1971—it soon became evident “that the difficulty with these inconsistent and somewhat contradictory secret and public policies was that they were hard to keep straight, hard to keep secret, and hard to make fully understood—even within the inner counsels of the US government.”⁵⁴ None of that concerned Nixon who also informed his senior policy officials that the public-private tracks would be accompanied by ongoing attempts to coordinate anti-Chile regional actions.

Destabilizing Allende: The “outsider” strategy

The Chilean economy’s vulnerability to US pressures provided a natural target for the Nixon administration as it set about implementing a multi-track destabilization policy. Washington’s ability to make the economy “scream” was immensely facilitated by two key factors: a copper industry accounting for approximately 90 percent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings, and largely controlled by American corporations until it was nationalized toward the end of 1971; and Chile’s extensive dependence on funds from US public and private sources, as well as US-influenced multilateral development banks (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank) and international financial institutions (International

Monetary Fund), both for day to day operations and long-term development projects.

Following Allende's inauguration, the US government systematically went for the economic jugular. First, it terminated all bilateral economic (but not military) aid to an economy that, on a per capita basis, had been the largest recipient of Alliance for Progress funds during the 1960s. Second, it imposed a spare parts embargo that was particularly devastating for a country whose agro-industrial infrastructure was overwhelmingly dependent on purchases of these materials from American firms. This cutoff had a profoundly negative impact on the pivotal copper industry's production levels and thus foreign exchange earnings. Third, between 1970 and 1972, Nixon policy resulted in a precipitous decline in short term US commercial credits which further affected the Allende government's ability to purchase replacement parts and machinery for the most critical economic sectors--copper, steel, petroleum, electricity and transportation. Fourth, the White House sought to limit Chile's access to capitalist bloc export markets, most notably in its partially successful effort to place an embargo on Chilean copper sales to Western Europe. Fifth, Washington successfully mobilized support within the global and regional banking institutions for a virtual cutoff of all loans from these sources for the whole period of UP rule. "Our job," recalled Kenneth Guenther, US Alternate Executive Director in the Inter-American Development Bank, "was to make sure that not one shekel left the bank for Allende and for Chile."⁵⁵

Washington also lobbied Chile's foreign creditors to participate in its global credit squeeze on the basis of Chile's "lack of creditworthiness," highlighting domestic economic problems that, in large part, could be attributed to US sanctions. Moreover, at the same time as the White House was denying Chile access to traditional sources of external funding, it instituted its own debt squeeze, demanding that interest payments on that part of the debt owed to US government agencies (accumulated prior to 1970) be made exactly on schedule as compared with the extremely flexible arrangements that operated during the 1960s. Around half of Chile estimated \$3.83 billion foreign debt as of December 1970 was owed to US government agencies and US private lenders.⁵⁶

Unlike the credit, financial and trade squeeze which denied new economic resources to the government, the intended debt squeeze sought to extract financial resources from Chile. By demanding most payments on schedule, US policymakers had a no loss strategy in mind: if Chile paid up it would have to divert scarce funds from popular programs and development projects; if Chile did not pay, its international credit rating

would fall, new loans from non-US sources would not be forthcoming, and the loss of funds to finance imports would cause an economic decline generating political discontent.⁵⁷ Initially, to meet increased debt obligations, the government was forced to draw on the country's foreign exchange reserves just to keep many of its development and social programs operating. Before long, it declared a moratorium on debt repayments. Eventually, over US opposition, Chile negotiated an agreement with most of its creditors granting it a 70 percent stay on payments due in 1972 but no such agreement was made between Chile and the US.⁵⁸ Even so, the dramatic action Chile had taken hardly endeared the Allende government to potential creditors.

In a porous, dependent society like Chile, these mutually reinforcing US economic sanctions were a formidable instrument in heightening opposition to the UP government. But the UP's own economic mismanagement quickly began to alienate large sections of Chilean society. Keen to broaden its base of electoral support, the UP set about an economic stimulus in 1971 which included raising workers' salaries and using public spending to create jobs. At first, this policy seemed to reap rewards with industrial production rising, unemployment falling, GDP up, and inflation down in Allende's first year in office. By 1972, however, the economy was not producing sufficient goods to meet demand. Production levels fell, the government began printing money, and the scarcity of goods soon produced rationing, a black market and bread lines.⁵⁹

Allende had no luck finding alternative sources of funds and new trading partners. The Soviet Union's political—and limited financial—support did not translate into significant levels of economic aid. As a result, Allende could not at one and the same time honor past external obligations, meet current economic pressures, and develop the economy which, in turn, severely affected his government's ability to budget, plan programs, and pursue a coherent economic and social policy.

Regionally, the administration took up Nixon's call to work with other Latin regimes to isolate Chile diplomatically. US policymakers increasingly viewed the Brazilian generals and their repressive capitalist economic development strategy as a counterweight to the Chilean socialist experiment, and sought their assistance in contesting the forces of political and economic nationalism on the continent. Testifying before Congress in mid-1971, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer characterized Brazil's development record as "transcendental."⁶⁰ Some months later, during a White House meeting with Brazil's President Emilio Medici, one of the agenda items was a discussion about how best to coordinate anti-Chile interventionist actions. Medici informed Nixon that

Brazil “was exchanging many officers with the Chileans” with a view to encouraging the latter to overthrow Allende. Nixon responded with enthusiasm and an offer of whatever support might facilitate Brazil’s efforts. As reported by Kissinger:

It is very important that Brazil and the United States work closely in this field. We could not take direction but if the Brazilians felt that there was something we could do to be helpful in this area, he would like President Medici to let him know. If money were required or other discreet aid, we might be able to make it available. This should be held in the greatest confidence. But we must try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to reverse these trends.⁶¹

Complementing these actions was a public diplomacy campaign that sought to portray Allende in the worst possible light. In a remarkable echo of the language the Chilean military would eventually use to justify its overthrow of the UP government, senior administration officials were drawn to medical metaphors in describing the interrelated issues of communism and the “problem of Chile” in Latin America. To Nixon and Kissinger, the September 1970 election result had produced a “cancer” or “poison” that had to be eliminated lest it spread uncontrollably through the whole regional “body politic.”⁶²

Destabilizing Chile: The “insider” strategy

The efforts to deepen economic dislocation in Chile were paralleled by growing ties between the United States and critical sectors of the Chilean state and civil society. The objective was to weaken the capacity of the new government to realize a nationalist development project, and to enlist these forces in support of US policy goals. The interagency 40 Committee approved funds for a covert program that included political action to divide the UP coalition, expanding contacts with the armed forces, and providing support to non-Marxist opposition groups and parties as well as anti-Allende media outlets, including Augustin Edwards’ influential *El Mercurio* newspaper.⁶³ The administration’s decision not to rupture diplomatic ties with Allende made it possible to collect sensitive information on his government and its supporters, lend assistance to the political opposition, and facilitate the flow of financial resources to those internal forces sympathetic to its ultimate strategy of turning the Chilean military against the government.

The circumstances of Allende’s accession to the presidency promised to create formidable institutional obstacles to the new government’s efforts

to implement a wide-ranging program of social and economic change in Chile. The UP achieved office in a context of fractured political power. Control over the Executive Branch did not extend to most other key state and political institutions. Congress remained under opposition control, and time and again was responsible for blocking key legislation proposed by the executive (for example, bills to introduce a progressive income tax). The judiciary remained an opposition stronghold throughout the Allende presidency. In return for PDC votes to confirm the September 1970 election outcome, Allende guaranteed that those officials who staffed the state bureaucracy in previous governments would retain their positions—which effectively meant that the opposition had allies inside the civil service who were in a position to slowdown or sabotage the implementation of UP programs. The pre-election guarantee also extended to the mass media where the political opposition had a decisive advantage in terms of ownership and control that would not be fundamentally challenged during Allende's tenure.

By the latter half of 1971 the internal opposition was beginning to recover from the disarray of the post-election period. The PDC and the National Party had begun to mend their fractured relationship, while the initial “panic and paralysis”⁶⁴ that characterized the industrialist class was being replaced by a focus on developing a strategy to contest the government and its economic program. At the same time the UP coalition began bickering over the tactics, strategy and timing for achieving its ultimate goal. The “moderates” led by the Allende wing of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party clashed with the “radicals” coalesced around the more hardline Socialist Party faction over a range of issues. These included relations with the middle class sectors and the PDC, ties to the extra-parliamentary *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Movement of the Revolutionary Left or MIR), support for mass mobilization politics, attitudes toward Moscow, agrarian reform strategies, unauthorized factory and land occupations and, more broadly, the pace and scope of socioeconomic change.⁶⁵ These divergent positions were not easily reconciled, delaying the submission of critical legislation to take over parts of the economy and creating other obstacles that hampered government efforts to pursue a coherent policy program. Not surprisingly, such intra-coalition disagreements did little to strengthen the government's ability to withstand attacks by a more united opposition and played into the hands of those who argued that the country was becoming ungovernable.

The issue of pressure from sections of the working class and marginalized Chileans for an accelerated transfer of political, economic and class power, for instance, surfaced as early as April 1971. In

municipal elections that month, the UP increased its share of the vote to just under 50 percent but major tensions were beginning to emerge within the coalition—not to mention the country more generally. In the urban centers industrial workers began taking over factories and plants on their own initiative, forcing a reluctant Allende—fearful of the ripple effect of such independent actions—to accede to demands that they become part of the state sector. By doing so, the government increased the concerns of factory owners and investors, many of whom simply refused to risk capital in expanding productive capacity that might unexpectedly become subject to legal or illegal expropriation. In the countryside, pressures to legitimate farm expropriations were equally strong: by mid-1972, peasant supporters had illegally occupied around 1700 properties presenting Allende with another largely unwanted source of opposition from disaffected landowners and a more generalized fear about the direction in which the country was heading.⁶⁶ Fidel Castro's near month-long visit to Chile toward in November 1971—his first state visit since a trip to the Soviet Union seven years earlier—had also intensified both middle class and military anxieties that Allende was intent on opening the country up to Soviet-Cuban influence and igniting class conflict.

Before long, the external sanctions regime was beginning to feed into an array of interrelated problems confronting the UP: rising import costs, shortages of goods, declining private domestic and foreign investment, dwindling foreign currency reserves, the growth of a black market, and wage increases considerably in excess of original projections. Particularly concerning was the failure of domestic production to meet the upward demand for basic foodstuffs occasioned by the rise in workers' wage levels which, in turn, fuelled inflation and forced the government to divert more of its financial resources to pay for imports. Substantial falls in the price and production of copper—resulting in tax collections falling far short of projected totals—merely added to the emerging fiscal crisis. Within little more than a year, a \$100 million balance of payments surplus (1970) had turned into a \$299m deficit (1971).⁶⁷

By early 1972, the most prominent anti-government forces in civil society had regrouped and begun to develop a focused and organized counter-response to the UP government. Ranged against the UP and its lower class base (workers, urban poor and sectors of the rural population) was the bulk of the upper and middle classes including large landowners and industrialists, the propertied lower middle class who abhorred the instability and viewed the government's nationalization policy as a threat to private enterprise, retail and wholesale merchants who opposed the government's efforts to assume direct control over the distribution of

goods in order to pre-empt the black market, those peasants who wanted their own private plots of land rather than work on collective or state farms, and the major political parties of the center-right who were putting their ideological and political differences aside in order to jointly oppose Allende's rule.

Holding a decisive advantage in seats in both houses of Congress, the opposition political parties signaled their intent to use their legislative power to challenge the constitutionality of the government's program—to vote against individual proposals, to devise means to limit the executive's traditional power of veto, to censure cabinet ministers and, more generally, displayed an intent to play fast and loose with traditional conventions in implementing measures to obstruct the UP coalition's objectives.

The UP's resort to existing legislation and laws to implement its structural changes further antagonized sectors of the political opposition who cited an earlier government commitment to submit new legislation to Congress to achieve these objectives. In October 1971, the PDC announced a fundamental challenge to the gradualist transition to socialism by submitting a constitutional amendment to the Senate to deprive the Chilean President of "the regulatory powers on which the government's nationalization policy was based" and make illegal any further takeover of private firms using state funds to become a majority shareholder—which had been the strategy employed in the financial sector.⁶⁸ Allende's government countered with its own legislation to substantially expand the nationalized sector as part of a broader attempt to increase the power of the Executive Branch, setting the stage for a major constitutional confrontation. Four months later, following the collapse of negotiations, Congress voted to approve the opposition amendment which the UP government predictably vetoed. Further negotiations failed to break the deadlock due to a combination of policy differences within the coalition and the PDC's refusal to modify its original stance.⁶⁹ As this constitutional conflict unfolded, it did so against the background of an emerging electoral collaboration between the PDC and the National Party (in late 1972, both parties formally organized themselves into the opposition Democratic Confederation or CODE), and the appearance of a more coordinated challenge to the government by center-right political parties and their allies.

The PDC received considerable support from the Chilean legal profession. The Comptroller-General, responsible for "implementing the law through governmental decrees," deliberately slowed down the processing of decrees and actively participated in the constitutional debate through efforts to obstruct the government's nationalization program by,

for instance, consistently ruling that decrees requisitioning privately-owned enterprises for the state sector were unlawful.⁷⁰ Taking its lead from this “new approach to legal interpretation,” the Supreme Court also repeatedly contested the constitutional basis of government actions.⁷¹

Despite selective nationalizations in the industrial and commercial sectors of the economy, both remained largely under private control and it was precisely in these sectors that the UP confronted its most serious internal economic problems. Industrialists stopped investing and cut back on production, used state credits for speculative or political purposes, and transferred capital into foreign bank accounts. The commercial sector resorted to hoarding goods and capital, and selling goods on the black market to circumvent price controls.

The political opposition sought to give their efforts a disciplined and focused thrust through specific organizational structures with close ties to the center and right wing political parties. These employer and professional associations (*gremios*) included confederations of the big landowners and industrialists, small property owners (truck owners, bus owners, taxi owners, small retail merchants and industrialists), and the salaried professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.). Because all felt threatened by the government’s policies, the large property owners were able to promote a sense of identity and common purpose by playing on the theme of conflict between those who owned property and those (essentially working class Chileans) who didn’t—a strategy which effectively blunted the traditional differences and disagreements between big and small property owners. Efforts to organize the latter to oppose the government were greatly facilitated by the growing working class pressure on Allende to accelerate the process of change. This merely served to heighten middle class and professional groups’ sense of being embattled in a hostile and chaotic world.

In Washington, the Nixon administration was carefully monitoring these developments as it began to devote more and more time, effort and resources to “the problem of Chile.” To complement and reinforce the internal opposition, and to take advantage of the multiple internal and external pressures that were now beginning to create major dislocations in the Chilean economy, the White House authorized a significant expansion of CIA covert activities.

Covert US support for the centrist and right-wing political parties was a feature of virtually “every major election in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973,” enabling the major opposition political parties “to maintain an anti-government campaign throughout the Allende years.”⁷² The PDC was particularly dependent on the Agency for its growth and

influence in the decade prior to Allende's election, extending its presence into strategic areas of Chile's social as well as political life (the Catholic Church, unions, education and the civil service)—which Washington fully exploited after 1970 in its effort to destabilize and terminate UP rule. CIA expertise and financial support also facilitated a sustained propaganda assault against the government in the newspapers (especially *El Mercurio*), radio stations and on television. The mass media played a key role in influencing popular perceptions by framing its coverage of the various problems besetting Allende's government in terms of UP incompetence, the breakdown of law and order, and an undisciplined labor force.

Supported by the traditional elites, the CIA moved to mobilize and finance those social forces most adversely affected by the deteriorating economic conditions and direct their political energies against the UP government. A principal target was the property-owning lower middle class which was not only numerous but also concentrated in the capital of Santiago, the nerve center of both the economy and public administration. Members of the lower middle class exhibited a contradictory attitude toward the state: while opposed to wage and price controls, they sought tariff protection, lines of credit and public infrastructure investments. Initially, many of these individuals had been attracted to the UP policies from which they directly benefited through increased access to state credits and rising sales due to wage increases for workers. But as economic pressures began to bite, the lines of credit also dried up, spare parts became harder to obtain, and Allende's working class supporters became more militant in demanding a quickened pace of socioeconomic transformation, organizing street rallies on an almost daily basis. To property owners large and small who abhorred instability and disorder, the country was becoming an increasingly hostile and threatening place, sentiments that led the least privileged among them to abandon the support they may have originally lent to the government. This constituency, in turn, became exceedingly receptive to traditional rightist appeals on the need to restore order, defend the sanctity of private property, the family and religion, and to reverse a perceived trend toward economic anarchy—making its members amenable to mobilization by the traditional elites who proceeded to help organize and channel their resentments in a political direction.

The right-wing political parties and the *gremios* began developing a coordinated strategy in March 1972 centered round a series of strikes that they hoped would weaken and eventually oust the UP government from power—either by forcing Allende to resign or the armed forces to intervene into the political arena. That October, the truck owners'

confederation went on strike, ostensibly over specific economic grievances. Within 48 hours, the truckers' action had ballooned into the first general strike of the property owning classes as a whole. The entire *gremialista* movement joined the protest, the big industrialists called on their members to lock workers out of their factories, retail shopkeepers closed their doors, private transport firms locked up their vehicles, and doctors, lawyers and other professionals closed their practices. A newly formed *Gremialista Front* performed a coordinating role. Endorsed by the National Party and the PDC, what began as a strike by a single *gremio* triggered an effort to paralyze the economy and was then rapidly transformed into a political strike. Economic losses resulting from the strike ran into the hundreds of millions of dollars. The truckers' strike culminated in violent demonstrations against the government which, momentarily at least, convinced many in the military to unite more determinedly behind the government for "disorder was on the right, and legality on the left."⁷³ At the same time, independent action by factory workers in Santiago's industrial belts to seize—and thus prevent lockouts in—dozens of enterprises raised the long-term stakes by effectively forcing the government to issue decrees legitimizing the takeover of more than 50 factories in order to avoid a major confrontation between labor and capital.

At this point, and egged on by opposition political leaders, Allende invited three senior constitutionalist generals, including army commander General Carlos Prats, to join the cabinet. In so doing, Prats' idea was to maintain a truce between the competing forces until congressional elections would reveal the extent of the government's popular support. But this first civil-military cabinet risked polarizing the armed forces (given the qualms many of its members had about Allende) and, significantly, breached the strict division between affairs of the military and affairs of government.

In the congressional elections of March, 1973, the UP increased its share of the vote to 44 percent of the electorate and the combined vote for the opposition parties accounted for 56 percent. While this was the first time in Chilean electoral history that a government had increased its popularity during its term in office, the result, Frederick Nunn noted, "merely perpetuated and exacerbated executive-legislative conflict (always a point of departure for military-political activists in Chilean history) and it gave both UP and CODE reason to believe that each represented the will of Chileans."⁷⁴ Chileans, in other words, were almost equally divided. Having concluded that the only solution to this political standoff was a coup, the strongest military proponents, the Navy and Air Force,

confronted a dilemma: how to penetrate the army's rigid top-down structure of authority and convince its officer corps to withdraw their allegiance from a constitutionalist commander (Prats), who was esteemed by his troops, without fracturing the most powerful branch of the armed forces and igniting a civil war.⁷⁵

According to a later account of this period by Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, the purpose of US financial assistance to the opposition groups after 1970 was "to keep the democratic non-Marxist forces in Chile afloat, not to destabilize and sink the Allende government partway through its term." Official US policy on that score, he insisted, "was unvarying throughout my time in Chile, even in the most privileged and confidential policy documents."⁷⁶ Davis also notes that both Nixon and Kissinger contemplated far more radical measures to oust Allende but these were resisted and never turned into policy. One example he gives is a proposal to lend financial support to the striking truckers, which both he and Assistant Secretary of State Jack Kubisch successfully opposed.⁷⁷ The claim that Washington was only trying to maintain a level playing field in Chile, however, sits oddly with Davis' acknowledgement of NSDM 93's secret directive to bring maximum pressure to bare on Allende's government. Davis also admits that while he made every effort to ensure that US military attachés stationed in the Santiago Embassy "stopped short of political involvement of any kind", it did become necessary "to send a few US military officials home, in order to ensure compliance with my directives and enforce our policy of strict political self-restraint."⁷⁸ Why anyone in the Embassy would still be working toward a military coup without directives to that effect from more senior officials back in Washington remains unclear in his account. The only explanation Davis offers is that the "inherent dissembling in the secret and public US policies toward Chile caused problems."⁷⁹ At the very least, these "problems" may have provided a good deal of latitude for some agencies and individuals to interpret for themselves the intent, and limits, of US intervention in Chile at this time.

Beginning in 1973, for instance, the CIA subsidized a series of devastating strikes against the government in the agro-industrial and mining sectors that served as a basis for tens of millions of dollars in production and foreign exchange losses. Notable among these was the April-May strike of thousands of *El Teniente* copper miners—the "labor aristocracy" of blue collar workers—organized by the industry *gremio* and supported by the PDC, the National Party, and the extreme right-wing *Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Liberty Nationalist Front) over demands for a 41 percent salary increase; the June strike by

the medical *gremios* (doctors, chemists, nurses, dentists) who combined specific grievances with a more generalized attack on the government's economic model; and a ruinous strike in late July, coordinated by a *Gremialista Front*, which resulted in tens of millions of dollars in damage to production.⁸⁰ Given that more than 1000 *gremios* were actively opposing the government, it is little wonder that the CIA increasingly pursued its objective through those it regarded as "the holders of real power" in Chile⁸¹—conveniently ignoring those who still retained legitimate power.

Inside the military, events in Chile since October 1972 were being viewed with increasing alarm and the initial support Allende's policies had generated—his attempts to address military grievances over pay, conditions and budgets; his efforts to secure Chilean sovereignty over key national resources such as the copper industry; and even his enthusiasm for breaking Chile's dependence on the US—was beginning to wane. The unfolding economic crisis further intensified military concerns about social cohesion; so also did the growing number of marches, rallies and street clashes that raised the specter of increasingly radicalized popular sectors making more and more demands on the government to accelerate the class struggle and the socioeconomic revolution. The MIR was not just creating difficulties for the government but was also becoming a source of major concern among the armed forces as well. In the countryside, for instance, the MIR encouraged remnants of the indigenous population to seize farmland and timber stands, and to declare no-go areas for the security forces.⁸²

Meanwhile, US efforts at economic destabilization and covert subversion had been paralleled by deepening ties between the United States and the Chilean armed forces. At the time of Allende's inauguration, the CIA had only two paid agents in the Chilean military;⁸³ by January 1972, the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973* concluded that the CIA Station "had successfully penetrated" the most likely pro-coup sectors of the armed forces. Agency officials, by their own admission, now had "assets" "drawn from every branch of the Chilean armed forces. As the level of class conflict intensified, and preparations for the military coup quickened, the Santiago Station moved to give potential plotters support and direction by starting to collect "operational intelligence" vital to any successful coup such as "arrest lists [and] key government installations that needed to be taken over and government contingency plans."⁸⁴

Toward the end of 1972, the *New York Times* reported discussions among senior Chilean armed forces officials about the possibility of a

military coup against Allende and their increased contacts with the *gremio* leaders and prominent capitalist supporters of the October 1972 anti-government general strike.⁸⁵ On the political right, the National Party, the *gremialista* movement and non-party nationalists were all espousing “the need for an authoritarian political order.”⁸⁶ US intelligence sources also reported that the American Embassy in Santiago was becoming a meeting place for extreme right-wing individuals “who were essentially dedicating their lives to the overthrow of Allende—it was like a holy war.”⁸⁷ As the opposition to Allende grew more strident, the persistence of internal differences within the UP government undermined efforts to resolve the economic crises and limit new demands from radicalized workers and peasants. Violence from both extreme left and rightwing groups grew apace and the former began to talk of a forthcoming class war and, of critical concern to military commanders, to infiltrate the armed forces to recruit supporters.⁸⁸

In February 1973, the UP government announced plans to assume government control of the school curriculum and use it to promote a socialist system. The *Escuela Nacional Unificada* (National Unified School or ENU) generated sufficiently huge protest marches to force Allende to delay implementing the scheme. But the motivations behind the ENU particularly concerned more conservative members of the armed forces and began to erode service rivalry between them.⁸⁹ Two months later, with CODE still in the majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, the confrontation between Congress and the President over the anti-nationalization constitutional amendment flared up again. The Chamber of Deputies rejected the government’s veto, and the opposition argued that the President was required to promulgate the text within 60 days. Subsequently, the Chamber declared Allende’s policies “unconstitutional and illegal” and voted overwhelmingly for the armed forces to “defend the constitution.”⁹⁰

In June, Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Souper led a column of tanks toward the presidential palace in an effort to topple Allende. When informed of the threat, Allende broadcast a call to the nation urging workers to assemble in central locations in Santiago to defend the government. Subsequently, he called on workers to take over factories and enterprises, and for a more general popular show of support in the capitol. Few Chileans responded to the call—something that could hardly have escaped the attention of future coup plotters. General Prats himself, supported by his Santiago area commander, General Augusto Pinochet, faced down Souper’s tanks with a minimal loss of life. In the aftermath of the abortive coup, however, army unity and discipline began to weaken as

a number of senior officers independently began to make common cause with Navy and Air Force colleagues who favored a coup. Complementing these institutional moves, elements of the civilian opposition continued to engage in strikes and bombings and began openly to urge the armed forces to seize power.

● On August 23, yielding to pressures from within the officer ranks and also to maintain army unity, Prats resigned and was replaced as commander-in-chief by Pinochet. The military then began a purge of officers deemed loyal to the government and vigorously enforced arms control laws but in a way that betrayed its essential leanings: factories and shanty towns were searched but far less attention was focused on right-wing vigilante groups.⁹¹ Less than three weeks later, the September 1973 coup occurred—shattering Chile's democratic transition and setting the stage for an ambitious rightist counterrevolution based on repression and terror.

Complex forces both internal and external meshed to create the conditions leading to the September 1973 coup. While the UP government failed to develop a coherent socialist transition strategy or to carry a majority of Chileans with it, the political-economic errors and bureaucratic incompetence that attached to Allende's experiment cannot be disassociated from the internal class conflict or US attempts to sabotage the UP government. The ties between Washington, the PDC and right-wing civilian and military forces inside Chile laid the basis for the continuous destabilization of Allende. Extensive US funding and penetration of anti-Allende groups had a profound influence on the degree and extent of economic dislocation, and deepening social polarization. The Nixon administration was willing to provoke a general societal crisis, a coup, and a military government—to support a transition from democracy to dictatorship—if that was the only means of restoring the optimal conditions for private capital accumulation in Chile and crushing the possibilities of a regional economic and political challenge to continued imperial state hegemony. The ultimate goal, as one scholar in another, early Cold War, context aptly described, was a “closed hemisphere in an open world.”⁹²

The coup gave the impression that the US had played a leading role in the ouster of Allende. While that is extremely doubtful, the idea led to a proprietary sense of the outcome as far as Nixon and even more so Kissinger were concerned. That, in turn, would continue to condition Nixon-Kissinger policy toward the military Junta and further minimize the attention each was prepared to give to advice from Latin American specialists in the State Department and elsewhere. The consequences of

this mindset for Chile and the pursuit of US interests in the country would soon become apparent.

CHAPTER 2

CONSOLIDATING PINOCHET

“I prefer them to Allende—old fashioned as it may be.”
Henry Kissinger on the Chilean military Junta, July 18, 1974.

Although the September 11 coup came as no great surprise to Washington, those who led it were largely an unknown quantity to US officials—even in the Pentagon. Three of the governing Junta—General Augusto Pinochet (Army), General Gustavo Leigh (Air Force), and Admiral Jose Merino (Navy)—had only assumed the top position in their respective services less than a month prior to the coup and had not figured prominently in US dispatches. The remaining member, General Cesar Mendoza, joined the plotters the day before the coup on the understanding that he would become general director of the *Carabineros* (Chilean national police force) after the military took power.¹ Beyond the initial unfamiliarity of Chile’s new military leaders, the quite extraordinary ability of the Junta to keep its subsequent deliberations secret, especially to the US Embassy and intelligence services, kept outsiders guessing. Over time, the military’s sense of cohesion and purpose also “increased the regime’s capacity for surprise and unpredictability and forced domestic and international actors [including the US] to elaborate their responses on the basis of only minimal information about positions and evolving correlations within the government.”²

This was evident from the beginning of military rule. If, in their initial appearances and statements, the Junta leaders talked tough, they were also at pains to justify their actions to both domestic and international audiences and, initially, restrained in the ambitions they set for themselves. In two documents released on September 11—Edict 5 and Decree Law 1—Chile’s new rulers explained that the military had a “moral duty” to oust a government that had fallen into “flagrant illegitimacy” and had “destroyed national unity.” The new military regime, its leaders insisted, was assuming power out of a sense of patriotic duty, without any radical agenda of its own and for only as long “as circumstances so require.”³ What was clear, however, was that while the

military held the ousted government and its supporters responsible for the crisis into which Chile had descended, it ultimately blamed the political system for allowing Allende's rise to power and failing to curb what it regarded as his excesses.

The armed forces leadership consolidated its rule in the early period with considerable ruthlessness that could be explained partly by a strongly held belief that "a rapid imposition of military rule characterized by shock and awe would pre-empt protracted resistance."⁴ The core targets of this offensive were the leftist political parties and trade unions and their supporters, who constituted the political-social base of the Allende government. These groups had to be systematically demobilized and denuded of any power to represent their (urban and rural) constituencies. Factories and shanty-towns became early targets.⁵ The disappearances, killings, incarcerations, and torture, Chile's 2004 National [Valech] Commission concluded, were intended "to instil fear, to force people to submit...to the military regime."⁶ Among US officials both in Santiago and in the State Department in Washington, recalled William Lowenthal, there was a sense of disbelief that the Chilean military "could be that cruel."⁷ Arnold Isaacs, who had been placed on the Chile desk in State in July 1973, agreed that no-one had expected the brutality that the military unleashed. "The Prussian part of their makeup came to the fore," he says.⁸ The coup leaders were sending a message not only to those who might choose to resist but also to Chile's political class generally that the country had broken with its past and the days of political compromise were over. The systematic campaign of terror and bloodshed was intended to achieve unchallenged control over the nation's political life in order to transform, in turn, Chile's politics, economy and society.

Chile "saved"

Despite the bloodshed, President Nixon and his National Security Council (NSC) advisor Henry Kissinger were privately euphoric over Allende's demise and decried liberal Americans' lack of appreciation for their contribution to this Cold War victory:

Kissinger: The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course newspapers are bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown.

Nixon: Isn't that something? Isn't that something?

Kissinger: I mean instead of celebrating in the Eisenhower period we would be heroes.⁹

One State Department official likened the response in the White House to the sensation of a sporting victory: “You know, kind of like it wasn’t the Super Bowl, but at least it was a playoff game, and our team had won.”¹⁰ The administration’s haste to embrace the Junta indicated that the issue of a genuine and convincing justification for the overthrow of a democratically-elected government was not a high priority in this White House. On the contrary, Nixon and Kissinger essentially turned a blind eye to the Junta’s repressive consolidation strategy. What mattered above all was that Chile had been rescued from “an anti-American government” and “totalitarianism,” and the Southern Cone “from collapse into radicalism.”¹¹

In public, however, the White House never wavered from its stance of neutrality when discussing events in Chile. During confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 17, Kissinger, now Secretary of State-designate, insisted that the administration “took the decision that we would not say anything that indicated either support or opposition—that we would avoid what we had done in Brazil in 1963 [sic] where we rushed out by recognizing the [military] government.”¹² Four days later, and three days before Washington officially recognized the new government, Ambassador Davis received a cable from State requesting him to meet with the new Foreign Minister, Admiral Ismael Huerta, to convey the message that the US government wanted “our relationships with the new GOC to be as positive and constructive as friends can make them” and promising to assist the new government in “all appropriate ways.”¹³

This instruction echoed a message Kissinger had sent to the Santiago Embassy two days after the coup instructing Davis to inform Chile’s generals that the US government wished “to make clear its desire to cooperate with the military Junta.”¹⁴ In a memo to Kissinger, NSC staffers Richard Kennedy and William Jordan reported telling Pinochet of “our favorable disposition and our readiness to work with the new government and be helpful to it.” They suggested that Washington “will need to have our ducks in line to respond quickly and effectively to specific requests and proposals.”¹⁵ Pinochet had already met with a US Military Group (MILGP) officer and conveyed “a fundamental desire to strengthen” bilateral relations and reach a “mutually acceptable solution” regarding compensation for US-owned copper companies expropriated by the Allende government. He also announced that Chile would sever diplomatic ties with Cuba, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and North Korea.¹⁶

Complicating the desire to help the Junta, however, was the failure of Pinochet and his colleagues to deal with the level of repression. This

constituted a powerful constraint on the amount of assistance that could be provided, not least due to the anti-regime mood in Congress. Prior to a mid-October meeting with Chile's Foreign Minister Huerta, Kissinger received a briefing from Assistant Secretary of State Jack Kubisch that while it was in the US interest to help the Chilean Junta consolidate power, its actions in the human rights field had rendered the task more difficult. Kissinger subsequently told Huerta that "it would be easier for us" if his government purchased "riot control and police-type equipment" from other countries. At the same time he stressed that on those occasions when US domestic politics made it difficult to respond to particular requests from Chile "this would not affect the basic position; it would simply be a matter of tactics."¹⁷

Two weeks earlier, the State Department had already concluded that as the Junta would be "extremely sensitive" to any demarche (a formal protest delivered through diplomatic channels) on human rights. It should be postponed until diplomatic ties had been formalized, raised as part of a package of bilateral issues, and should emphasize "positive steps GOC [Government of Chile] has already taken in human rights matters."¹⁸ Nevertheless, the need to attend to the military rulers' image abroad was a high priority in both Washington and Santiago. From the very earliest meetings of the Junta, getting international legitimacy ranked with the desire for access to US economic and military aid. Within days of the coup, Admiral Huerta was instructed "to prepare a list of distinguished Chileans" to tour the US and Europe to remedy "the distorted image of Chile abroad," in the process making the case for the coup and the necessity for a period of military rule.¹⁹

The abuses perpetrated against civilians by the armed forces were not about to derail Nixon-Kissinger efforts to normalize US relations with Chile. If such abuses were somehow tolerable—from the perspective of more important US interests—Kissinger wrote, "we will seek to work out what we can with the country involved in order to increase our influence."²⁰ The new ruling generals in Santiago fell into this category. Whatever the precise civilian death toll, their requests for non-lethal military aid found a strong advocate in the US Ambassador. When the Chilean Air Force requested flares "for illumination purposes in military operations against extremist groups," Davis cabled Washington in support of the request and hoped it could be undertaken "discreetly if possible." The regime was "operating under great strains, and is counting [on] friends in this moment," he wrote.²¹ In a follow-up request, the Ambassador lobbied his superiors to send tents, blankets and other supplies for use in detention centers being set up around the country. Once again, Davis was

keen to ensure that such material assistance did not shine the spotlight on the regime's human rights record, and suggested that it "need not be publicly and specifically earmarked for prisoners."²²

The initial Chilean request for 2000 flares for what the senior Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) official Jack Kubisch called "intimidation,"²³ together with 1,000 steel helmets and liners, was treated with some skepticism in State where these items were not seen as critical to the military's consolidation of power. The Embassy, however, argued that the flares were critical to the Air Force's ability to undertake what it euphemistically termed "nighttime operations." If the Junta could not find alternative sources for the purchase of this equipment, State was willing to "reconsider the request 'on an urgent basis.'" Whatever decision was taken, NSC staffer William Jorden informed Kissinger, State had expressed a concern that "public identification" with Junta military needs "might influence thinking on the Hill." But Jorden emphasized how important it was "to set a pattern of cooperation and trust" with the new regime and that meeting this essentially "modest military request" fitted such an approach.²⁴ Ultimately, State sold the flares after the Junta was unable to obtain them from any other country.

The provision of actual weaponry to the Junta was a more contentious issue, especially given the mounting evidence of widespread repression. NSC staffers advised Kissinger that the Chilean armed forces would almost certainly submit orders for expensive M-60 tanks and F-5E aircraft to counter a military buildup in neighboring Peru but that such requests would require careful handling. "We do not need to face this issue now but we believe we may have to slow the Chileans down on these high cost purchases" until a stabilization program and the economic rehabilitation plans are in place. "This will have to be a carefully tooled action on our part."²⁵ In a telegram to the Santiago Embassy in late October Kissinger's office wrote that given the extent of congressional and public hostility toward the Junta, any move to provide it with lethal weaponry was out of the question and could only undermine "our future ability to assist and cooperate with the GOC."²⁶

Chile: "Creditworthy" again

Although Kissinger cabled the Embassy in late September that the biggest obstacle to a rapid normalization of relations was congressional anger over the brutal nature of the coup,²⁷ for now the most pressing issue was how to satisfy the military regime's economic requirements. The Junta was in desperate need of US financial assistance to help halt, then reverse, the

country's economic and financial crisis. Under the combined weight of interrelated domestic and external pressures—economic mismanagement, US sanctions, declining copper production and exports, and falling agricultural and industrial production—Chile's growth rate (real Gross Domestic Product or GDP) had plummeted to -5.6 percent by the end of 1973, the government deficit had reached almost a quarter of the country's GDP, the long and medium-term foreign debt hovered at close to \$3.3 billion, and the inflation rate exceeded 500 percent.²⁸

In preparation for a September 20 WSAG (inter-agency crisis management committee) meeting on Chile, Kissinger received a briefing from aides on a proposed strategy to reinvigorate the Chilean economy over the next six months. Given the Junta's firm promise to compensate expropriated US property owners and its determination to recreate an attractive environment for foreign investment, they told him he would "want to set the tone for our cooperation...to be sure there is no foot-dragging or timidity in our responses to Chile's needs."²⁹ To help identify these needs more precisely, it was proposed that a group of Agency for International Development (AID), Treasury, Agriculture and Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) officials visit Chile. In addition, subtle pressures should be applied on the Junta to request International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans but the US should avoid flexing its own power within the Fund "lest we appear to be the GOC's patron." Large-scale US aid should be considered down the track as a complement to support provided by the IMF and other global financial institutions.³⁰ The rush to support the generals was not a consensus view within the State Department, however. Some officials expressed misgivings about "taking a leading role in assisting the new government to straighten out its economy" without waiting for the dust to settle. Otherwise, wrote ARA's Richard Bloomfield, "we [could be] putting our foot on a slippery slope."³¹

On September 25, Chile's representative to IMF and the World Bank (IBRD), Orlando Saenz, conferred in Nairobi with US Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Hennessy and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sidney Weintraub. To meet its debt obligations and import costs, Saenz estimated that the Chile would need \$500 million in balance of payments support over the next three months. Without giving any specific commitment, the American officials responded that the administration would "be as helpful as possible." Hennessy added that "to establish Chile's financial bona fides" a quick resumption of debt rescheduling negotiations with its creditors would greatly facilitate substantive action by Washington.³²

A Kissinger-chaired WSAG meeting meanwhile agreed that Ambassador Davis should inform the Junta about when it could expect delivery of emergency supplies and also discuss with the generals "Chile's middle and long-term economic needs."³³ In short order, the Department of Agriculture extended \$52 million in two commodity credits for the purchase of wheat (\$24 million) and feed corn (\$28 million) to meet food shortages. When the latter request was discussed at an October 29 WSAG meeting, the likelihood of congressional criticism and complaints from Third World governments denied commodity credits was weighed against the need "to maintain the credibility of our commitments to the GOC to meet their urgent economic needs."³⁴ The *Journal of Commerce* termed the wheat credit "extraordinary" in view of Chile's supposed lack of creditworthiness over the previous three years.³⁵ Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) observed that it was "eight times the total commodity credit" provided to the Allende government.³⁶

There was also a sudden renewed interest in Chile by the multilateral lending institutions which had previously followed the US lead in implementing a virtual complete cutoff of aid to the Allende government. The IMF sent a mission to Santiago in early November 1973 to discuss the possibility of new standby loans, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was poised to dispatch a team to open negotiations on two loans totaling \$129 million to finance hydroelectric and petrochemical plants, and World Bank officials were planning a visit to review the institution's uncreditworthy rating for Chile.³⁷

The Junta had equal success in convincing the US private banks to reopen their loan books. Hanover Bank of New York was the first to act with a \$24 million credit to the Banco de Chile, the nation's most influential private bank. Another eight to ten American banks and two Canadian banks reportedly offered a combined \$150 million in commercial loans.³⁸ Surveying these developments, *Business Latin America* observed that the major economic justification for the international financial community's "three years of total ostracism" of Chile during the Allende government years still existed but had conveniently been forgotten.³⁹

Chile's foreign debt, likewise, was a subject of discussion only blocks away in the Nixon White House. Treasury officials argued strongly that it was in America's interest to continue to work through the Paris Club—an informal grouping of creditor nations which operated on the principle that decisions required the assent of all its members. The major advantage of a multinational debt relief strategy was that it would enable the US to "keep a low profile." The officials cautioned, however, that the likelihood of a

successful debt relief outcome would be significantly reduced in the absence of an “effective [IMF] stabilization program.”⁴⁰

In early October, Paris Club co-chairman and Assistant Treasury Director in the French Finance Ministry Guy Nebot told a visiting Chilean delegation that debt talks could not resume until the Junta government was able to work out such a program. He also told US officials that an agreement with Chile at the next Paris Club meeting was “imperative” because failure to act, against the background of growing international hostility toward the military regime, would be interpreted as a “political sanction.” Hence, no meeting date should be announced “until it is clear that economic and technical conditions warranting rescheduling were in prospect.”⁴¹

The military regime made clear from the outset that, despite its pressing financial circumstances, it would honor Chile’s multibillion dollar external debt, re-privatize almost all of the foreign and domestic companies expropriated by the Allende government, and resume compensation negotiations with the affected US copper companies—which, significantly, the regime had no intention of denationalizing because it regarded state control of this sector to be in the interests of national security. These commitments were rewarded when officials of both governments signed a memorandum of understanding to reschedule Chile’s November 1971 to December 1972 external debt payments to the 1974-77 period.⁴²

Still, by the end of 1973, the Nixon administration had achieved only mixed success in supporting Chile’s access to international financial assistance. In the World Bank (IBRD), the US had informed President Robert McNamara that it favored proceeding rapidly on three postponed loans totaling \$13 million so long as he was confident of favorable outcomes when the Executive Directors voted on each loan. Soon-after, though, McNamara “received negative signals” from several European countries and decided that it would serve Chile’s interests best if there was a temporary delay in submitting the loans to a vote. Santiago was especially disappointed because the regime had already started making debt payments to the IBRD on a signal that its President would get the loan process well underway by then. Although no less unhappy with McNamara’s tactics, Washington counseled the Chileans against taking any rash action to express their displeasure, such as withholding future debt payments.⁴³

Junta negotiations with the IMF had a more successful outcome. Although a Fund Mission to Chile concluded that the country’s Finance Minister and Central Bank President “do not grasp the details of economic

and financial policy,” it was satisfied that they could still “effectively” implement the proposed program.⁴⁴ At the end of December, the Fund’s management approved a financial plan submitted by the Mission, and recommended passage by the Executive Directors. In January 1974, the Board approved a \$95 million standby arrangement. Over the next twelve months, Chile also gained access to other sources of IMF support to offset short term export shortfalls and the dramatic rise in oil import costs.⁴⁵ The IMF loan would play a key role in the successful renegotiation of more than \$900 million of Chile’s foreign debt at the March 1974 meeting of the Paris Club creditor nations.⁴⁶

Taking stock

In late November, 1973, Kissinger requested his top Latin American adviser, Jack Kubisch, to prepare an analysis of the post-coup repression in Chile, including the widespread practice of summary executions carried out during the early weeks after the military takeover. Kubisch’s memo explained that the “purpose of the executions [was partly] to discourage by example those who seek to organize armed opposition to the Junta.” The expectation of large-scale resistance, or more specifically, the “fear of civil war” was instrumental “in their decision to employ a heavy hand from the outset.” But equally important was a “puritanical, crusading spirit—a determination to cleanse and rejuvenate Chile.”⁴⁷

The Junta’s application of extreme force, Kubisch perceptively noted, was consistent with well-established thinking inside Chile’s military academies—reinforced by their close observation of the Vietnam conflict—about the nature of popular insurgencies, the need to tackle them early with overwhelming force, and the military imperative to view civil society as itself a battlefield in which the armed forces had to set about, in the words of Chile’s Colonel Manuel Contreras, “killing guerillas, destroying their hideouts, and submitting the civilian population to the strictest of surveillance.”⁴⁸ The conviction among Chile’s military leaders that security matters (however exaggerated) took precedence over other considerations such as human rights, dialogue and compromise would continue to undermine US attempts to moderate the Junta’s behavior, and so remain an obstacle to Washington’s ability to deliver on economic and military aid proposals.

The Kubisch memo also touched upon the essential nature of the coup leaders’ justification—that, as guardians of the nation and its social values, they had both a moral and historical mandate to defend a certain kind of societal order, albeit one within which radicalized workers and peasants, in

the military's imagination, constituted the primary threat. Over time, this justification partly explained the Junta's prolonged resistance to outside calls to reduce or eliminate its repressive policies and accelerate the return of electoral politics.

The "crusading spirit" of the Junta also explained why Pinochet publicly rejected the option of the military acting as a "caretaker government for a year or so" and then returning to civilian rule as the "worst [possible] solution." His Junta colleague, Admiral José Merino, was similarly disparaging about any rapid handover of power to "the political gentlemen," while Defense Minister Patricio Carvajal told *El Mercurio* that there was "no desire to return to a corrupt (*viciada*) democracy."⁴⁹ The Junta's March 1974 *Declaración de principios del gobierno de Chile* (Declaration of Principles of the Government of Chile) gave official imprimatur to these statements, formally abandoning any post-coup intention to retain power only as long as circumstances warranted in favor of boldly asserting that the armed forces "have set no time limit on their stay in government [as] the task of morally, institutionally, and materially rebuilding the country requires a prolonged and profound effort." Significantly, the Declaration distinguished between the type of society the military sought to foster and those in Europe and the United States which had descended into "a materialism which has enslaved man's spirit" and where consumerism seems to "control man himself, leaving an inner feeling of emptiness and dissatisfaction." The Junta's Chile would not seek to replicate other Western countries but instead be a "technocratic society with true social participation" and one that gave expression to an "organic, social" democracy. In practical terms, this translated into a depoliticized populace, a permanent change towards a more authoritarian style of government fostering the values of "Christian western civilization," and the promotion of a new capitalist development model.⁵⁰

By early 1974, the generals had extended the seizure of power into a more comprehensive, and more permanent, ambition to implant a long-term military rule—a situation US policy seemed willing to accommodate. But while political priorities were being transformed in Chile, political fortunes were undergoing dramatic changes in Washington as well. The Watergate scandal and its subsequent investigation was now carving a path directly to the Oval Office, and before the end of the 1973 Congress was debating whether to impeach the President. Increasingly consumed by the threat to his political survival, Nixon was allowing more and more discretion to Kissinger in the conduct of foreign policy so that the latter quickly became the "de facto director" of most aspects of US relations abroad.⁵¹

Deserting old friends

Assessing bilateral ties at the beginning of 1974, the US Embassy in Santiago characterized them as basically “close and constructive [despite] some irritants on both sides.” Notable among the “irritants” was the status of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) to which US policymakers looked for allies to lend a veneer of legitimacy to the military regime. With their hopes of a relatively swift handover of government now dashed, the party felt “ignored, frustrated, demoralized and generally impotent.”⁵² To make matters worse, the PDC was essentially bankrupt. As part of its early propaganda efforts to boost the image of the Junta abroad, the CIA had financed a tour of European and Latin capitals by leading Christian Democrats in October 1973 to explain the background to the coup, and why they had supported the regime change. Mindful of the PDC’s dire financial situation, the CIA also urged continuing direct, covert support to enable the Party to recover a political role in the post-coup environment. Agency officials lobbied to adjust the Fiscal Year (FY) 1974 budget for the PDC political action program to almost \$700,000 and requested \$160,000 in immediate support for the period December 1973 to April 1974. The request sparked a heated and revealing debate between two of Kissinger’s most senior advisers. To Jack Kubisch, the survival of the PDC was not critical to the “success” of the pro-US Junta and, therefore, financial support was no longer warranted. But allowing the PDC to wither on the vine, countered Harry Shlaudeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and former Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) at the Santiago Embassy (1969-1973), might reflect badly on the administration because “it would look as if we had been interested simply in knocking off Allende [and] had no problems with a right-wing dictatorship [or any] interest in the survival of democracy [in Chile].”⁵³

Responding to a direct appeal by ex-President and former PDC leader Eduardo Frei, the newly-appointed US Ambassador to Chile, David Popper (a career diplomat who replaced Nathaniel Davis in February 1974), proposed a limited funding commitment “that would keep our options open.” Popper did not question the importance of “avoiding at all costs an open break” with the military government. If the PDC-Junta relationship ever became “openly antagonistic” over issues of human rights, economic policy, trade unions, or any other major issue, argued the Ambassador, “we would not want to be linked to the PDC.”⁵⁴ Keeping the military on side, in other words, was the priority. Eventually a compromise was reached between State and the CIA: the agency was authorized to make a final \$50,000 clandestine payment to the party to cover pre-coup

commitments made between July 1 and September 10, 1973 but financial support for all other political parties was terminated. Before long, the CIA's role in Chile was also reconfigured from covert operations to more open relations with the regime's security services.

Keeping Chile afloat

Santiago was still in pursuit of an accord with its foreign creditors on its multi-billion dollar debt—around half of which was held by US public and private institutions. Success in rescheduling debt payments hinged on satisfying the members of the Paris Club. Deliberations over Chile promised to be something of a litmus test of international reaction to the Junta, to the extent that political (that is, human rights) as well as strictly financial considerations played a role in decisions taken. US efforts to support the Junta soon revealed how attuned or out of step Washington was with its European allies and the lengths to which it was prepared to go to wrest a favorable outcome for Chile from its international creditors.

Kissinger cabled the Santiago Embassy at the end of January 1974, that the Junta looked to the US for “strong support for generous...terms” at the upcoming Paris Club meeting.⁵⁵ If the Nixon administration was keen to develop a consensus on a rescheduling procedure in advance of the meeting, Chile's European creditors were not all of one mind. The senior West German government debt negotiator told American diplomats that he had to “tread very carefully” in devising an approach because Chile “was a sensitive political issue” in the Federal Republic. The French firmly believed that Chile's commercial debts “should be rescheduled on commercial terms.”⁵⁶ According to State Department officials, the Canadians and the Spaniards would advocate “generous [rescheduling] terms,” and Japan was expected to take a “positive” approach while arguing for a rescheduling limit of 85 to 90 percent of the outstanding debt.⁵⁷ After a London meeting between US Treasury officials and the head of the British delegation to the Paris Club, the American Ambassador cabled Kissinger that, with a national election on the horizon, the conservative British government “for political reasons” favored a rapid settlement as long as it was based on purely economic criteria.⁵⁸ Other delegations (the Dutch, Swedish, Danish and Belgian) were cautious about rescheduling, at least on generous terms. It took considerable effort on the part of the US to produce a basic understanding on rescheduling, subject to formal agreement at a second Paris Club meeting in March.⁵⁹

The terms of the draft to be discussed at the follow-up Club meeting were not as generous as Washington desired but were sufficiently

acceptable to receive its unqualified support. Chile and its international creditors eventually reconvened in Paris and signed a multilateral debt rescheduling arrangement requiring the former to repay 20 percent of its 1973-74 debts, with the remaining 80 percent being rescheduled. The Dutch government's attempt to condition renegotiation on an improvement in human rights failed to elicit any broad support.⁶⁰ France and West Germany signed a memorandum of understanding to reschedule Chile's external debt payments for the two year period 1973-74 less than three months after the Paris Club meeting. By mid-year, to Washington's considerable relief, Chile's major creditors had either concluded (US), or shortly expected to negotiate (United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Japan), bilateral rescheduling agreements with Santiago. The US was not yet entirely out of step with other Western governments in its approach to Chile's Junta but differences were appearing.

Business Latin America called the result "surprisingly generous," while the *Latin America Economic Report* termed it "an important psychological step in clearing the way for new credits to Chile."⁶¹ This forecast was no rash prediction. Soon-after the March Paris creditors' meeting, a \$22 million IADB agricultural recovery loan was "rammed through" by the US in around four weeks instead of the normal six months, bypassing the required technical review of such applications—and over the objections of a number of member governments—but in time for the Bank's annual meeting in Santiago in April.⁶² Later that month, IADB Directors approved their largest ever loan to Chile, a \$75 million credit for the construction of a hydroelectric complex. "The bank's administration which used to delay all loan requests from [Allende's] Chile," a knowledgeable insider observed, "now brings them to the directors with impressive speed."⁶³

At the same time, a number of European IADB representatives continued to express concerns about the Junta's repressive policies. The West German government, for instance, temporarily held up an IADB operation in Chile due to the internal political situation. But it was aspects of the Junta's economic program that was more likely to act as a brake on these financial institutions coming to the aid of the military dictatorship. Following a World Bank Mission to Chile during February and March 1974, US Ambassador Popper reported that the Mission was suitably "impressed" with the general economic policy approach but critical of the "disorganized government apparatus charged with [implementing] decisions [and was] appalled at [the] failure of [the] GOC thus far to set clear development priorities."⁶⁴ If anything, Popper understated the damning nature of the Mission's assessment. According to Paul Meo, a

World Bank economist who accompanied the mission, the group concluded that the Chileans had “no serious program” and that their anti-inflationary measures lacked “credibility.”⁶⁵

US officials were less than pleased by the Bank’s attitude while conceding that the military’s economic performance was mixed. But government mismanagement and human rights considerations took a back seat to the needs of political stability, internal security, and the requirements of foreign investors. As far as Washington was concerned, the global financial institutions had an important role to play in promoting these interrelated objectives in Chile and the provision of large-scale infrastructure assistance was a prerequisite to creating the conditions for future growth and development. Although the Nixon administration may have desired the World Bank to follow the lead of the IADB which had shown itself willing, under considerable US pressure, to circumvent basic assessment criteria in making loans to the Junta, Meo recalled that “we didn’t get any pressure from the Americans” in this early period.⁶⁶ The real problem wasn’t a lack of sympathy for Chile’s economic needs within the Bank’s hierarchy. As President McNamara told Chile’s newly appointed Minister for Economic Coordination Raúl Sáez, while the Bank management was “very eager to move forward” on loan proposals, there were “problems” in mobilizing favorable votes among Executive Board members.⁶⁷

In the IMF, unease over further lending to the Chile stemmed primarily from its actual performance under the standby negotiated in late 1973. A May 1974 Fund Mission reported that efforts to implement “a cohesive financial policy” was made more difficult by the ability of interest groups to delay or reverse decisions made by the regime’s economic team. It singled out “a competing group of civilian advisors” as the main culprits. While the regime’s external performance—its depreciation of the exchange rate to a level now more aligned with domestic price and cost increases, trade liberalization measures, and a balance of payments surplus generated by higher than expected world copper prices—was viewed in a more positive light, the Mission still assessed the overall performance as “disappointing.”⁶⁸ This conclusion had little or no effect on Washington’s determination to do all it could to support the regime.

Since the September 1973 coup, there had been no dearth of statements by the Chilean regime affirming the need to reach satisfactory agreements, as rapidly as possible, with foreign and especially U.S.-owned companies expropriated without compensation by the Allende government. In April 1974, Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz told Pinochet that the US considered the actions taken to date “to be very significant” and lauded the

dictator for his understanding of the key role private foreign capital played in economic development.⁶⁹ Eventually, the Chilean government agreed to pay \$253 million in compensation to the Anaconda Company (less than the company's requested \$341 million) and \$68 million to the Kennecott Copper Corporation.⁷⁰ Compensation payouts to these and other US firms accounted for over half of the increase in Chile's external public debt which topped \$3.73 billion at the end of 1974.⁷¹

The eventual successful conclusion to these compensation negotiations only strengthened Washington's desire to support the governing Junta. A mid-year State Department "Talking Points" paper could not have stated US policy toward the Junta more clearly: "our objective is to try and contribute to the Junta's sense of confidence in its ability to govern and to meet the country's economic problems and defense requirements. Undue pressure on [human rights] would work the other way. Quiet but steady US support for the Junta is the indicated strategy."⁷²

Accommodating the Generals

Once the Nixon administration had extended official recognition to the new Chilean government—on September 24—the Junta accelerated efforts to systematically eliminate all real and perceived opponents through a campaign of terror and bloodshed intended to achieve unchallenged control in order "to facilitate the long-term transformation of Chile's socioeconomic and political systems."⁷³ The key institution for implementing the post-coup repression was the *Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia* (Directorate of National Intelligence or DINA), a secret police organization established in mid-1974. DINA's thousands of members were drawn from all branches of the armed forces, the police, the extreme right wing group *Patria y Libertad*, and "an extensive network of informants and collaborators."⁷⁴ DINA functioned with broad powers under the authority of now General Manuel Contreras—one of the principal architects of the Chilean military's theories about how to wage counter-insurgency warfare—who was answerable only to Pinochet.⁷⁵ At a July Army generals' meeting, Pinochet dismissed criticism that DINA's "lack of accountability violated the chain of command" in a few terse words that underscored his steady consolidation of personal power: "I am DINA gentlemen." In practice the establishment of DINA signaled the victory of the Army over other military branches whose officers were allocated purely administrative responsibilities within the organization. This arrangement would become a source of on-going tension between the

services. "I pulled my people [out]," said Air Force General Gustavo Leigh, "when I realized that I had no power over DINA."⁷⁶

The CIA played an active role in building up DINA through training and support provided to its members, rationalized by Agency officials on the grounds that they were contributing to the fight against "external subversion" and that none of their activities related to "internal political repression." Privately, however, these officials understood that this was a sham and illusory distinction. Furthermore, since his arrival in Santiago in 1974, the CIA's Chief of Station Stuart Burton had developed a strong camaraderie with Contreras, extending to joint family Sunday picnics. Embassy political officer John Tipton recalled that the tight relations between the two "permeated the whole CIA Station." According to the Chile Desk officer in State, Contreras also considered himself "a bosom buddy" of the CIA's Deputy Director General and Pinochet confidante, General Vernon Walters.⁷⁷

Over time, with the opposition decimated, the intensity and scope of the repression ebbed and became more selective: increasingly, "disappearing" opponents became the favored means of minimizing the publicity attached to other forms of violence against civilians. But abuses of human rights were still abuses. Despite the problems and tensions that such repression might produce in US relations with Chile, from the outset Kissinger had no intention of allowing it to influence the administration's basic policy approach. Following the coup, he had told his subordinates: "We should understand our policy—that however unpleasant they act this government is better for us than Allende was."⁷⁸

The US Embassy was under strict instructions not to provide assistance of any kind to Chilean nationals seeking to enter its grounds to escape arrest or worse. "We are under orders," wrote Labor Attaché Art Nixon to the Inter-American representative of the AFL-CIO, Andrew McLellan "not to officially intervene with the [Chilean] Government in cases which involve Chilean citizens, unless we have a request from someone in the States (i.e., from the US government)."⁷⁹ One exception was a decision by Ambassador Davis, immediately after the coup, to send Embassy officers "deliberately and in broad daylight in cars with Embassy license plates and an American flag," to visit the families of detained persons, including former Allende cabinet ministers. Recalled the Embassy Political Officer, Robert Steven: "The point was to be seen in the hope that this would send a message to the government 'Don't mess with these people, they are people that we are concerned about.'" At the very least, "we did put the Chilean military on notice very quickly that we didn't want to see these people summarily executed."⁸⁰ Art Nixon also worked tirelessly to protect

Chilean trade unionists. “Who knows how many Chileans [trade unionists] are alive because Art Nixon happened to be in Chile?” remembered an American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) official. Aware that “he would do anything he possibly could to protect them,” union officials provided Nixon with lists and he “was up day and night tracing the names on those lists.” Among other things, he “served notice on the people from DINA... that there was a diplomat in the US Embassy who was on their tail and holding them accountable for the fate of these people who had disappeared.”⁸¹

Still, in stark contrast to the Europeans who opened their embassy gates to all asylum seekers, the US Embassy denied access even to American citizens seeking refuge or asylum. Although it was standard operating procedure to refuse foreign nationals such entry, American citizens did not fall into this category. Yet, on the day of the coup, Robert Steven witnessed this procedure being applied to his own country’s nationals: “Some Americans came to the Embassy and asked to be allowed to come in for refuge because there was shooting in the streets but [they] were refused entry. They were told, ‘No, just go home. They’re not going to bother any Americans. As soon as things quiet down, you’ll be alright.’”⁸² This was not a consensus view among the Country Team, some of whom chafed under the constraints imposed on them in a situation where human rights were being abused indiscriminately. Steven believed the Ambassador was responsible for this decision, as did his colleague John Tipton who described Davis as “the real culprit [who] refused suggestions by the Consular Section to help US citizens here.”⁸³ From the very beginning, in other words, a few American diplomats were clearly unhappy about what they were being asked to do or not do irrespective of instructions from Washington.

Similarly, Embassy officials who were assigned to cover some of the military trials described the procedures as “a travesty” where defense lawyers had practically no authority, and confessions were extracted through the use of torture. “We reported these things regularly,” said Robert Steven, who was assigned to cover the trials of some of Allende’s air force supporters, “but the attitude in Washington always was, ‘These are unfortunate developments but the country’s not communist, it’s improving economically and American business will benefit from this, the country’s now ‘stable.’ The *hope* that the repression would gradually decline was essentially it.”⁸⁴

The Peruvian “problem”

If ensuring Chile's continued access to international sources of loans and credits was a priority for the Junta, maintaining the armed forces' capabilities ranked close behind. When it came to military aid, the Junta had no stronger advocate than Kissinger but even he had to factor a number of considerations into any decisions he might make. One was the contentious nature of such assistance—especially given the likely response from Congress. Another was Chile's request for an array of sophisticated, high cost weapons based on the Junta's deeply held belief that Peru's nationalist military government headed by General Juan Velasco would launch an attack on Chile in the near future. This fear was exacerbated by Lima's decision to purchase advanced T55 tanks and other weaponry from the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Huerta told US Embassy officials in late January 1974, that the Junta was “seriously concerned” about Peru as a potential military threat to Chile, and stated that Lima's new arms purchases from Moscow had created a dangerous regional arms imbalance.⁸⁵

The Chileans had already signaled a desire to purchase 18 F-5E aircraft at an estimated cost of \$60 million and to acquire 15 M-60 medium tanks that had been requested under a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit arrangement prior to the September 1973 coup. Although sympathetic to Chile's needs in this area, any US response had to take into account more than the Peruvian situation. The Junta's intention, ARA's Jack Kubisch told a State Department staff meeting, with Secretary Kissinger in attendance, was to borrow the funds to purchase the aircraft at commercial interest rates. ARA, he continued, would probably recommend that the Chileans be permitted to go ahead and purchase the aircraft with their own funds but only after Washington had assessed “the implications of that on economic assistance programs.” The core problem, said Kubisch, was the likely response of the World Bank and other international lending agencies if Chile prioritized military spending. Vigorous lobbying by left-wing European governments in these institutions, still angry over the toppling of Allende, to defer lending to Chile until things settled down, could cost the Junta hundreds of millions of dollars in loans and credits. As far as Kissinger was concerned, there was an even bigger geopolitical issue at stake: the growing Soviet and European arms sales to Latin America at the expense of US manufacturers which, if allowed to continue, will “create a group of Nasser-like colonels in these countries.”⁸⁶

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Bowdler and the Acting Head of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) Seymour Weiss cautioned Kissinger that any effort to fulfill Chile's arms request would

undoubtedly “provoke strong opposition in the Congress and could affect the prospects for foreign assistance legislation in general.” To address this concern, the Department’s Legal Adviser (L), ARA, and the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) recommended that the administration fulfil its previous commitment to sell Chile F-5E fighter planes and medium tanks, and consider any additional requests on a case-by-case basis. EB endorsed the limited sale in the absence of any real alternative, while L and PM “reluctantly” supported tank sales on the grounds that they would counterbalance Lima’s acquisition of similar items from Moscow and hopefully allow the US to “have a restraining influence on the possible use of the tanks.”⁸⁷

In late March, the Director of State’s Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Winston Lord, again took up the issue with Kissinger, reporting that the Chileans’ pressure for new weapons purchases was unrelenting; they remained convinced that Peru was a serious threat due to its superiority in tanks and fighter aircraft, and the message from Santiago was that if the US refused to accommodate Chile’s perceived “minimal needs,” the generals would “make every effort to meet them elsewhere.” A failure to support the Chilean request, Lord wrote, could have “unpredictable long-term consequences” for the Junta. Kissinger approved the final recommendation by ARA, PM and S/P to authorize the sale of previously committed F-5E aircraft and M-60 tanks, and to indicate that the US was prepared to sell mines and the LAW (Light Anti-Tank Weapon) system and consider other arms requests on a case-by-case basis.⁸⁸

In mid-April, US Ambassador Popper informed the Junta’s Admiral Merino and Defense Minister Carvajal that Chile had been allocated a \$15 million Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit. Although only meeting a small part of the Junta’s request, Merino called the decision “wonderful news” and Popper expressed confidence that the credit “will help to maintain our leverage” with the regime.⁸⁹ But he quickly discovered that Pinochet himself was far less ebullient about the amount of funding than his colleagues. During a meeting with the Junta leader and the head of US Southern Command, General William Rosson, Pinochet pressed for more arms transfers on the grounds that Chile had gotten rid of a “Marxist government” and continued to oppose the “communists.” It was precisely this deeply imbedded sense of “self-righteousness,” Popper commented, that makes the generals “largely insensitive” to international concerns over human rights issues.⁹⁰ In Washington, though, Pinochet had in Kissinger an individual who shared his dismissive attitude toward human rights when they interfered with larger strategic objectives. Less than 72 hours after this meeting, Popper received a telegram from Kissinger instructing

him to advise the Chilean government of his decision to proceed with limited weapons sales despite a certain hostile response from Congress and influential sectors of American public opinion.⁹¹

Over the following months, the US Embassy kept up the drumbeat in support of military aid to Chile. In an August cable to Kissinger, for instance, the Ambassador, speaking for the entire Country Team, spelled out the case for modernizing Chile's armed forces. Soviet tank sales to Peru had placed the Chilean military in a state of "massive inferiority" and the armed forces leadership maintained there was "a threat of local leftist terrorism, supported by international Marxist forces." Providing Chile with the latest weaponry to repeal such threats was perfectly understandable, the Ambassador argued, and not doing so would force the Junta to "make irrational purchases of inferior equipment at exorbitant prices" from other sources. This would weaken the armed forces' morale, contribute to internal instability, and lead to the emergence of "a highly xenophobic, harshly dictatorial regime." From the point of view of US interests, a refusal to cooperate would "drastically lower our influence with the Chilean Junta." To avoid this outcome demanded a substantial increase in US military training assistance which also served an important political purpose: as a transmission belt for propagating American values and beliefs, and cementing professional ties between the officer corps of both countries.⁹² These arguments cut little ice with Congress: that August, Senator Kennedy submitted an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) that would terminate all US military aid to Chile.

Institutionalizing repression

"A hostile regime," began the Embassy's 1975-76 CASP for Chile (released in March 1974), "has been replaced by one which is avowedly friendly and which shares many of our own conceptions." Globally, regionally, and economically the US stood "to gain substantially from a policy of sympathy and support for the present government [of Chile]." The paper dismissed the case for non-cooperation because of human rights abuses and the absence of democratic politics, maintaining—in what would become a constant Embassy refrain—that direct pressure to force the Junta to ease its political grip was "much more likely to provoke an adverse reaction" contrary to US interests. The CASP took at face value the Junta's public statements that it would return Chile to civilian rule "in due course" and viewed Pinochet as justified in waging an internal war until the threat of the Marxist "cancer" was eliminated. What did concern Popper was the need "to save these well-meaning but somewhat narrow

and unimaginative military leaders...from the consequences of their own acts." American policy, therefore should operate within a broader consensus that sought to assist "in maintaining and strengthening" the present regime, while encouraging it to develop a "viable democratic political process as quickly as possible." Strengthening military ties, it was suggested, could help achieve these objectives.⁹³

A CIA memo issued the same month described the Chilean armed forces as "more determined than ever to permanently restructure the nation's political, economic and social systems before allowing a return to civilian rule." Personality, inter-branch and policy conflicts had been contained "within manageable proportions" so as not to affect the stability of the government. To ensure his authority went unchallenged, Pinochet was "determined to prevent the emergence within the military of potential rivals for power" through forced retirements, relocation to positions far from the center of power, and promotion of supporters to high level positions.⁹⁴ Within six months of the coup, he had already retired 15 of the 25 army generals (including the four most senior) and replaced them with officers "known for strict adherence to institutional discipline."⁹⁵ In doing so, Pinochet had "essentially freed the army of *constitucionalistas*."⁹⁶

Compared to the Embassy CASP, and even the CIA's views, a much less clinical assessment of the situation inside Chile at the end of the first six month of military rule was provided by Canada's Ambassador to Santiago, A.D. Ross, who reported to Ottawa that the "'purification' [that is, physical elimination of the left] has been accomplished mainly by fear—fear caused by the harsh brutality of the Junta's post-coup methods [which included] torture, threats, arbitrary arrest, detention without specific charges and under inhumane conditions, suspicious shootings of prisoners 'while trying to escape,' and other clear violations of basic human rights [which] have occurred on a considerable scale."⁹⁷ Not surprisingly, the moderate domestic opposition—notably from Christian Democrats and the Catholic Church—was becoming slightly more public in response to the generals' repressive rule, their now clearly articulated intention to remain in power over the long term, and their determination to carry out an ambitious program of domestic reforms irrespective of the social costs. PDC leaders could be in no doubt that, in view of the military's intentions as outlined in the Declaration of Principles, there was little or no chance they could implement their own programs through the Junta or convince it to hand over the reins of power in the medium term. It was the Church, however, that began to emerge as the leading institutional opponent of the regime—even though it continued to tread a delicate line between criticizing the Junta and not to precipitating a complete break

with the ruling generals. Efforts to influence government policy were generally confined to what the Canadian Ambassador described as "private gentle persuasion rather than public exhortation."⁹⁸

In contrast to these domestic critics, Washington's concerns over the military's repression were largely confined to the negative image it projected to the rest of the world. The regime's already strained relations with a number of European and Latin American governments seemed to be going from bad to worse during the first half of 1974. Sweden, France, Italy, Belgium, West Germany, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico were embroiled in serious disputes with Santiago over their embassies extending asylum to Chileans fleeing arrest, imprisonment or worse. Paris and Bonn linked bilateral aid programs to the release of specific individuals jailed for political reasons. The Dutch, Norwegian, and Italian governments not only substantially reduced levels of economic assistance but also voted "No" on Chilean loan requests to the World Bank. Relations with Britain deteriorated further when Harold Wilson's new Labor government announced termination of arms sales and suspended its economic aid program in response to the Junta's human rights record. Although the amounts involved were not large, the most significant impact was political: reinforcing the Junta's international pariah status. In a tit-for-tat, Chile reciprocated by halting copper sales to the United Kingdom (UK). The tension between the two countries increased when Whitehall recalled its Ambassador over the arrest and torture by Chilean security forces of one of its citizens, Dr Sheila Cassidy, who had travelled to Chile to practice medicine during the Allende years.⁹⁹ Before year's end, Mexico would sever diplomatic ties with the Chilean regime while other Latin governments significantly downgraded political ties.

With mounting evidence that the generals were embarking on a program to purge Chile not just of "terrorists" and "Marxists" but of all those who might conceivably oppose its vision to "rejuvenate" the nation, and systematically employing torture and disappearances as tactics to this end, Kissinger could not ignore completely the Junta's ham-fisted behavior. In March, thwarted by Pinochet's reluctance to allow any international monitoring of the human rights situation, he voiced his support for an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) delegation visit. Circling the wagons against any evaluation by an outside body, Kissinger explained in a memo to the Santiago Embassy, was counter to the regime's "own best interests" and did nothing to "improve the prospects for international cooperation."¹⁰⁰

Testifying before a House Subcommittee in June about Washington's cozy relationship with the Junta, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

Inter-American Affairs Harry Shlaudeman dismissed any notion that the generals had transformed Chile into a “totalitarian state.” Questioned by an incredulous chairman Donald Fraser (D-MN), the senior Latin American diplomat held firm to this position:

Fraser: You are saying it is not now a totalitarian state?

Shlaudeman: I should say not.

Fraser: The Government that is in control of the instruments of power in Chile derives its legitimacy from what source?

Shlaudeman: ...I believe, as a matter of fact, there is a considerable degree of personal freedom still in Chile...My definition of a totalitarian government would be one with an exclusive monopoly on power which is not the case in Chile.

Fraser: With whom does the existing government share power?

Shlaudeman: I think you would find a wide variety of groups, of activities. Chile is not a monolithic state.

This brought a withering response from an exasperated Fraser: “Political parties suspended, congress in recess, no elections, summary trials, suspension of the right of habeas corpus. Mr Secretary, you are a great apologist for an authoritarian regime.”¹⁰¹

“Authoritarian” or “totalitarian,” Chile’s internal situation at this time was certainly closer to Fraser’s depiction than to Shlaudeman’s, a conclusion given added weight only days later when the military declared all executive powers resided in the Junta President—that is, Pinochet. The military also legalized the separation of state powers in such a way as to give the President special prerogatives. Under the *Estatuto de la Junta del Gobierno* (Statute of the Governing Junta) promulgating these changes, Pinochet effectively became Chile’s leader in perpetuity: the order of precedence could be changed only if the Commander-in-Chief of the Army ceased to be a member of the Junta due to “death, resignation, or any kind of total disability.” He was formally appointed “Supreme Chief of the Nation” but under the Statute was required only to “collaborate” with other Junta members “in the exercise of [his] executive functions.”¹⁰² In reality, the Statute legitimated a process that had been operating de facto since the coup. The perception of a collective decision-making process belied Pinochet’s paramount role within the Junta.¹⁰³

The June 1974 decree appointing Pinochet as Junta President, however, certainly did not give him unlimited authority. His early efforts to concentrate absolute power in the Army under his leadership were vigorously and successfully rebuffed by the Navy (Admiral Jose Merino) and Air Force (General Gustavo Leigh) commanders, forcing the adoption of rules specifying and separating “executive and legislative powers,” and

requiring consensus decisions to enact decrees, pass laws or change the Constitution. Pinochet, writes Robert Barros, retained control over legislation, and areas such as budgets, taxes and wages but “could not unilaterally legislate nor mold the Junta at his whim.”¹⁰⁴ Technically, he was required to exercise his specific powers with the “cooperation,” “accord,” or “advice” of the Junta, and adhere to the unanimity rule. These institutional arrangements also ensured that each branch of the armed forces retained its autonomy when it came to promotions and retirements.

If his power and authority was “never absolute,”¹⁰⁵ it was not for want of trying. The notion of a collective leadership did not sit well with Pinochet’s ambition to establish outright dominance over his colleagues. By the time he formally assumed the position of President of the Republic in December 1974, Pinochet had garnered a formidable support base within the state and civil society. First, he had the unqualified backing of the Army leadership and of DINA which was effectively his own secret police. Second, his power to make appointments to national, municipal and local government posts reinforced his authority nationwide. Third, he could depend on a powerful civilian movement which contributed to, and supported, his political and economic views. Eventually, having seen off the objections of Junta colleague General Leigh in the course of some particularly acrimonious discussions about the dangers of concentrating power in a single individual, Pinochet’s year-end formal appointment as Head-of-State would be the beginning of his attempt to assume total power.¹⁰⁶

The civilian advisers to the Junta consisted of two distinct groups with clashing views over Chile’s political future. *Gremialista* leader Jaime Guzman and other hardline conservatives were dismissive of the political parties and aggressive proponents of long-term authoritarian rule in contrast to a small group of prominent senior economic advisers who exhibited a more eclectic mix of political outlooks. In the final analysis, however, neither group exercised more than a limited influence on regime policy. The “hardliners” could always be overruled by a military leadership composed largely of conservative, authoritarian pragmatists while those with the administrative skills and reputations as experts within the global financial community found their ability to shape Junta thinking almost exclusively limited to economic issues. The latter, Ambassador Popper would report in 1975, “enjoyed only second-class status and could not adequately control other ministers, much less members of the Junta.”¹⁰⁷

In this situation where the incumbent regime was tightly connected to the state, and especially where the dictator had built up strong political loyalties in the dominant—and largely impenetrable—branch of the armed

forces, American policymakers were always going to face an uphill task influencing regime behavior, identifying and/or exploiting cleavages among its members, bolstering moderates, or exercising any significant impact on political developments or Junta decisions. While civilians appointed to serve the regime in executive or advisory roles provided a more likely conduit through which Washington could exercise some leverage, their highly circumscribed roles compounded the problem. "We had close relations from the outset with the regime's economic team and offered what we could to their efforts," recalled Harry Shlaudeman. "As for other 'moderate' elements, or divisions in the Junta and the like, Pinochet was simply not open to challenge as long as he had the support of the Army, which he had virtually to the end."¹⁰⁸ This would prove to be an on-going source of frustration for US officials and make it virtually impossible to determine the relative effectiveness of quiet diplomacy versus a tougher approach. In circumstances where neither the civilian opposition nor external actors were in a strong position to influence regime policy, restraints on policy practice would largely originate within the Junta itself.

Resisting the Congressional challenge

In the US, meanwhile, Congress was beginning to flex its muscles over the control of foreign policy and, to that end, Chile was becoming something of a test case. Those legislators concerned with human rights abuses had largely been forced to rely on media reports of the situation in Chile through the latter months of 1973. By 1974, however, credible reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) detailing the extent of human rights violations not only confirmed the worst fears of Kennedy, Fraser and others about the situation in Chile but also provided a sharp contrast to the assessments and assurances provided by administration officials. The US Catholic Church, which had probably its strongest regional presence in Chile at the time of the coup, was, by 1974, also becoming more active in lobbying legislators to do what they could to defend human rights there. No member of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) dissented from the hierarchy's line in defense of human rights, presenting sympathetic congressmen with a powerful ally in pressing the administration on behalf of the victims of repression. In time, the USCCB also began working with Chilean Church organizations. Among the tasks performed by the USCCB, one particularly stood out: its willingness to submit documented evidence of human rights abuses collected by these local religious bodies to the Organization of American

States (●AS) and United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in its own name to avoid the very real danger of the Junta's retribution if the actual authors of this evidence were revealed.

The Nixon-Kissinger White House was exceedingly dismissive of, even antagonistic toward, Congress playing any substantive role in foreign policymaking. The legislature was viewed in purely negative terms, as an institution only capable of obstructing, constraining, and complicating Executive Branch efforts to pursue America's relations with the rest of the world. In the minds of the President and his senior foreign policy adviser, the Congress should confine its foreign policy actions primarily to rubber stamping administration decisions. Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers (henceforth referred to as William Rogers or simply Rogers) offered a concise explanation for Kissinger's antipathy toward the nation's elected representatives: "They were constantly legislating instructions about how we were to manage the tools of our foreign policy, military assistance and economic assistance, the findings we had to make, the reports we had to make, and essentially extracting as much as they could of the management of the instruments of foreign policy."¹⁰

Although reluctant to allow domestic constituencies to influence foreign policymaking, political factors now dictated that Kissinger could not simply ignore the growing demand on Capitol Hill for a stronger US response to the violence being perpetrated by autocratic Third World allies—especially those who were recipients of US aid. His proposed solution to congressional activism had been to establish an ●office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs. Its responsibilities, however, would not be allowed to intrude on the turf of State's geographic and functional bureaus even though human rights officers were subsequently assigned to each of the geographic bureaus. Likewise Kissinger resisted recommendations to appoint human rights officers to US Embassies around the world, a decision, wrote the first Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator James Wilson, which would not have displeased US ambassadors in those countries later targeted as major rights abusers. They generally opposed any shift away from quiet diplomacy, believing that "public flagellation of offenders" would in most cases fundamentally weaken bilateral ties "and reduce our future ability to persuade them to mend their ways."¹¹ Indeed, Wilson would soon discover the essentially cosmetic nature of his position as time and again the Secretary summarily and emphatically dismissed his proposals related to human rights issues.¹¹

●n Capitol Hill, there was a diversity of opinions about Chile policy—opponents and supporters of the Pinochet regime as well as those who "simply avoided the issue."¹¹² Broadly speaking, however, Congress was

always more critical of the Chilean dictatorship per se than the Executive Branch. It was more inclined to view the Junta as the problem, and not merely particular aspects of its behaviour, which partly explained the persistent disagreements between the two branches over the amount of pressure that should be applied on the dictatorship. Consequently, while Kissinger could browbeat and bully his subordinates over how to approach the Junta, Congress was not so easy to deal with.

At the end of September 1973, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) had opened Judiciary Subcommittee hearings on human rights in Chile with a direct challenge to Nixon-Kissinger willingness to sacrifice democratic rule in favor of military dictatorship. First, he wanted “some public assurance of active concern over the bloodshed and violation of human rights in Chile.” Second, excluding emergency humanitarian assistance, he recommended that there should be no rush to provide economic aid to generals who had violently seized political power “especially after years of denying such assistance to a democratically-elected government.” Testifying before the Subcommittee, Assistant Secretary of State Jack Kubisch was grilled over human rights in Chile and US policy on economic aid to the regime. Kennedy’s ire was raised when Kubisch stated that the administration and the international financial institutions (IFIs: also referred to as multilateral development banks or MDBs) “would certainly consider all kinds of possible assistance to Chile if the new government adopts sensible programs that can be supported from abroad.” Why, then, the Senator demanded to know, was “the same rule of thumb” not applied to the Allende government? To that question State’s senior Latin American diplomat had no satisfactory answer.¹¹³

To emphasize his concerns and intentions, Kennedy subsequently introduced a non-binding “Sense of the Congress” resolution (Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act) calling on the President to withhold non-humanitarian economic and military aid to Chile until he was convinced that the new regime was protecting basic human rights as defined in the relevant international declarations. This was a “minimum” initiative to demonstrate the Hill’s opposition to the generals’ human rights abuses and “our deep concern... over the continued silence by the administration” over what was taking place in Chile.¹¹⁴

As the documented evidence of widespread human rights abuses began to mount, congressional voices grew louder and more strident, and the issue of military aid to the Junta emerged as a major target of opposition. If Congress was reluctant to provide significant amounts of economic assistance to the Chilean generals, it was doubly hostile to the idea of more lethal aid commitments to a regime that had overthrown a democratically-

elected government and appeared to be carrying out repression on a wide scale. The need to address this issue was not lost on some Nixon officials. One paper written for a September 1973 WSAG meeting had recommended that the Junta be told prospects for future weapons assistance would hinge substantially on its ability to project "a reasonably good international image with respect to human rights."¹¹⁵ A December memo to the Acting Secretary of State from ARA's Kubisch and the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) Seymour Weiss termed this "the heart of the problem," making it incumbent on the administration to "continue to be sensitive to the attitude of Congress on this subject." At least temporarily, they cautioned against authorizing the sale of tear gas, riot shotguns, police-style armored vehicles and other items that could be used for population control. Based on informal discussions with key legislative staff members, the memo continued, trying to make a case for commercial or Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash sales offered the best prospects as these were likely to generate fewer attacks than would be the case if FMS credits were involved.¹¹⁶

That same month, following a series of hearings on human rights and foreign policy before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations chaired by Donald Fraser which highlighted serious human rights violations in Chile, Congress took the first hesitant step in applying pressure on the Executive Branch to contest the generals' brutal method of rule. It passed the Kennedy-authored Section 32 on a voice vote. Kennedy also managed to secure Senate approval of a Chile-specific reference to the foreign assistance authorization bill (Section 35) urging the President to lobby the Chilean government to protect human rights, allow international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Red Cross to aid political prisoners and refugees, and permit the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to launch an immediate investigation into the events following the coup. Although Kennedy's original amendment also included a sense of the Congress statement that all military and economic aid to Chile should be reduced, this statement was absent from the House version of the bill and did not survive the Joint Conference Committee meeting called to reconcile the two versions.¹¹⁷ Kennedy-Fraser efforts to mobilize support for the upgrading the human rights Coordinator's office in the State Department to Bureau status also failed, as they were unable to muster the necessary numbers in either the House or the Senate.

Further to his efforts to get Congress off his back over the human rights issue, Kissinger agreed to informal discussions on the subject with interested legislators. Most dismissed the Secretary's utterances as largely

“window dressing,” according to John Salzberg, the staff aide to Representative Donald Fraser. What came through loud and clear was that human rights was of no great concern to the White House if the targeted regimes “were our allies and served our interests.”¹¹⁸ By adopting a disdainful attitude toward the Hill’s desire to promote greater respect for human rights, Fraser told the co-founder of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Joseph Eldridge, that Kissinger was his own worst enemy. “If he had been a little less arrogant the human rights legislation would have been defeated, it just wouldn’t have gone forward. But there was such resentment at his haughty kind of arrogant dismissive treatment of the US Congress that they said ‘To hell with it, we’re going to adopt this legislation to try and rein in his embrace of these despotic governments.’”¹¹⁹

Kissinger’s palpable frustration with interfering legislators and his determination to circumvent or keep them in the dark about the Department’s objectives and intentions in Chile dominated a mid-July, 1974, telephone conversation between the Secretary and his deputy:

Kissinger: Let’s see what we can do on military equipment for them. What is the obstacle?

Kubisch: We face an imminent [problem in Congress. They] will not give us discretion on military assistance. We are trying to walk the line to avoid having this amendment. There was a resolution on this last fall. We wanted to make military assistance....

Kissinger: We don’t have to take it into account.

Kubisch: We don’t want to flaunt it in such a way they remove our discretion to do that and that they make it mandatory.

Kissinger: What are you telling me? In practice, how do we take this into account?

Kubisch: We tell them we will make certain things available tanks, aircraft. They have a long lead time. We will not publicize the fact that we have informed them of this. We have informed the Chileans. They know it.¹²⁰

Congress, however, was not easily dismissed or sidelined. In late July, Senator Kennedy presided over a second series of hearings on refugee and humanitarian problems in Chile. On this occasion, he questioned the administration’s determination to provide as much financial support for the Chilean Junta as possible, including commodity credits and loans totaling \$52 million, a proposal to renew development loans for the first time in almost a decade, an increase in military aid to \$20.5 million (plus an additional \$800,000 for the training of Chilean military officers) in FY 1975, and strong pressure by US officials to accelerate the bureaucratic

process and support Junta loan requests to the IADB. Kennedy was prepared to concede that the “humanitarian rationale” constantly invoked by administration officials justified some of these decisions, but he failed to comprehend why this rationale was not equally relevant in respect of Allende’s rule, when similar programs were denied to Chile. Beyond highlighting this fundamental contradiction in White House policy, the Senator termed efforts to apply the humanitarian justification to military assistance an “inexcusable policy” which ignored “the virtually unanimous reports” by the international human rights community of ongoing torture and repression. Given this, he was at a loss to understand what possible reason there was for the concurrent visit to Santiago by Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway “to hobnob with Chilean military officials.”¹²¹

Kennedy’s most severe criticism was reserved for the Acting Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman. Questioned about reports that the Chilean military were engaged in the practice of systematic torture, Shlaudeman simply denied this to be the case, based on enquiries Ambassador Popper had made with Chilean officials. “What do you think they are going to tell [Popper] though?” Kennedy asked. “Do you think Chilean officials are going to tell him they are torturing as a systematic means of interrogation or are they not?” Shlaudeman could only repeat his initial answer but then he inadvertently undermined his own justification by stating that, in any event, “one way to help correct the situation would be to bring these facts to their attention.” Having listened to enough of this evasiveness, Kennedy exploded: “And what are they going to do? I mean I would like to know the extent of [Popper’s] review of this” given that myriad groups and individuals visiting Chile “have found the same thing.” For the Ambassador and the State Department, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, to rely uncritically on statements by members of the Chilean government “who say that [torture] is not a systematic thing” was nothing more than a “head-in-the-sand attitude.”¹²²

Concerned that repeated efforts to press Congress on large-scale Chile funding in the current anti-Pinochet atmosphere might imperil the entire Agency for International Development (AID) program, Agency Administrator Daniel Parker made fruitless attempts to get State to jettison its overly supportive approach toward the Junta. Instead, Department officials now concentrated their efforts on lobbying chairs of the House and Senate committees responsible for aid legislation to the effect that dollar flows were one of the few ways to gain influence with the Junta. Some months later, ARA brokered a decision to put any increase in aid on hold until a comprehensive investigation of the military government’s foreign aid bureaucracy had been carried out. It was in this context of

efforts to break down congressional resistance that Kissinger appointed Special Assistants on Human Rights officials directly responsible to the Assistant Secretaries in the various regional bureaus.¹²³ In no sense, however, did this reflect any significant shift in Kissinger's view of the role of human rights in foreign policymaking.

Such minor, and largely cynical, initiatives could not disguise Kissinger's unqualified and active support for providing military aid to the Junta, and there now seemed little doubt that the White House and Congress were on a collision course. Previously, the case for military aid had been based on Washington's obligation to honor outstanding commitments dating from the Allende era. But the rationale for a proposed \$20 million package in FY 1975 was given a Cold War twist: it was deemed necessary to counterbalance Soviet weaponry recently acquired by the government of Peru. To bolster the argument, Kissinger warned a Senate Foreign Assistance Appropriations subcommittee that "our influence in Chile and the need of continuing the relationship" could be jeopardized if the US failed to accommodate at least some of the Junta's requests.¹²⁴

To Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Chief of Staff Pat Holt, the hostile Nixon-Kissinger response to these congressional initiatives came as no surprise. Especially among SFRC members, he recalled a "cynicism [of] cosmic proportions [regarding] almost anything coming out of the White House." The post-coup repression in Chile merely served to widen this "credibility gap" and played a major role in the passage of legislation linking aid to human rights performance. When Kissinger met with the Committee and made "an impassioned plea...not to tie his hands, that progress in human rights was best promoted through 'quiet diplomacy,'" he received a sympathetic hearing. But the problem, said Holt, was "that nobody believed there had been any 'quiet diplomacy.'"¹²⁵

As Nixon began his fateful last months in office, the key dynamics of Chile policy were beginning to emerge: a brutal and ambitious military regime; a divided and increasingly polarized Chilean populace; and an influential minority of legislators ready to contest an Executive Branch determined to lend whatever support it could to Chile's new rulers. In August 1974, one step ahead of possible impeachment, Nixon resigned his office, to be replaced by his Vice-President Gerald Ford, a foreign policy novice, who would leave Kissinger's pre-eminent influence on foreign policy essentially intact over the next two years. Predictably, during the 1976 presidential election campaign, the Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter, exploited this issue by charging that "as far as foreign policy goes, Mr Kissinger [not Gerald Ford] has been the President of this country."¹²⁶

Even members of the Secretary's Department concurred with this judgment. "Ford was so beholden to Kissinger," recalled the Director of the Office of Bolivia-Chile (BC) Affairs, Rudy Fimbres. "He was so proud when he said Kissinger was going to be his Secretary of State. I thought 'Who's nominating who here?'"¹²⁷

Presidential transition, policy continuity

Some weeks after the August 1974 transition from Nixon to Ford, the Director of the Latin American section of State's Policy Planning Staff (S/P) commented to a British Embassy official that the incoming President "knew little about foreign affairs and had to be educated. This took time—and Latin America would be low on the list."¹²⁸ Western Hemisphere developments also ranked low on the scale of Ford's global policy concerns for another reason. With the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile, recalled Kissinger's National Security Council (NSC) deputy Brent Scowcroft, "a lot of the anxiety over the leftist trend in Latin America went out" of administration calculations.¹²⁹ The region reverted, in the words of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William Rogers, to a place of "zero consequence."¹³⁰ Certainly the Nixon White House had exhibited little or no interest in actively promoting a strategic shift away from a hemisphere dominated by military regimes to one where democracies flourished. The US was involved in a global conflict with the Soviet Union, Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "and the Cold War reality impelled us to maintain a constructive relationship with authoritarian [and anticommunist] regimes of South America." As far as developing lines of communication with the political opposition in countries governed by dictatorial rulers, Nixon-Kissinger policy was to establish contacts "without antagonizing the government."¹³¹ Promoting democracy was not a priority, observed Deputy NSC Adviser Brent Scowcroft because "we didn't want to stir things up in Latin America."¹³²

Gerald Ford had barely moved into the Oval Office when the subject of Chile arose in a top secret State Department briefing paper on "Latin American and Human Rights" detailing the policy approach and its rationale. Aid to the Junta, the paper began, confronted two major obstacles. Internationally, Chile was subject to more opprobrium than any other hemisphere nation and, domestically, US efforts to lend support "were seriously hampered by hostile congressional attitudes." Yet, the case for supporting the regime had not lessened: if anything it had been strengthened by the regime's "friendly and cooperative" attitude in

contrast to the government it replaced. The Junta had moved toward a satisfactory resolution of compensation demands by US companies expropriated during the Allende years, played a “constructive role” in regional affairs, and aligned with the US on most key international issues. Thus, it was “clearly” in America’s interests to maintain a positive relationship, especially taking into account the lack of any viable alternative to rule by the generals. “Undue pressure” over human rights would be counterproductive whereas “quiet but steady US support” was likely to be more effective in coaxing improvements. The prime goal should be to implement measures that bolster the Junta’s “sense of confidence in its ability to govern and meet the country’s economic problems and defense requirements.”¹³³

This was little more than a summary of the policy approach inherited from his predecessor and indicated that Ford was unlikely to alter it. On Capitol Hill, by contrast, support for imposing new restrictions on arms transfers to Latin America was growing. In preparation for an August 19 NSC meeting to formulate a counter-strategy, State circulated a briefing paper noting the administration’s modest success in opposing limits on its ability to satisfy weapons requests from Latin American governments—increasing the ceiling on military assistance from \$100 million in 1972 to \$150 million in 1974—and stating that Kissinger was preparing a recommendation to Congress that the ceiling be eliminated altogether.¹³⁴ In another memo prepared for the meeting, the Director for National Security, Richard Kennedy, argued that Kissinger’s tactic of playing up the “regional threat” was the best way to neutralize or eliminate “objectionable” amendments to legislation. This will be especially important, he wrote, in making the case for Chile aid which would get little traction if based “on the nature of the Junta.” Emphasizing the importance of offsetting “Soviet penetration into Peru” was much more likely to achieve the desired result.¹³⁵

Given that momentum in the House and Senate was moving in favor of those legislators opposed to economic and military aid to Chile, the best that senior State officials could propose was a new *démarche* to the Junta on the need to improve the nation’s legal procedures and comply with international obligations regarding human rights.¹³⁶ This was intended to build on an earlier visit to Santiago by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake that, according to Ambassador Popper, had “helped alleviate [a] feeling of isolation among GOC officials by showing continuing US interest and desire to maintain cooperative relations,”¹³⁷ without making any impact on the regime’s human rights practices. Not surprisingly, among those legislators most critical of the administration’s Chile policy,

invoking the Soviet “threat” to justify aid was wearing thin while the promise of yet another Embassy meeting with regime officials to discuss US concerns made little, if any, impression. Four days after this new—and extremely limited—diplomatic effort was proposed, the SFRC took the first major step toward curtailing US assistance by setting a \$65 million cap on economic aid, and a \$10 million military aid ceiling on the regime over its “disregard for human rights.”¹³⁸

Following this SFRC initiative, the Santiago Embassy was requested to make sure the Junta clearly understood the growing “impatience” on the part of Congress and the international community over the lack of adequate progress in ameliorating state-authored abuses.¹³⁹ Popper responded that for any demarche to have an impact would depend on his being allowed to determine the most propitious circumstances for, and timing of, its delivery.¹⁴⁰ Two days later, on the first anniversary of the coup, he offered a mixed and somewhat pessimistic assessment of the political dynamics in Chile vis-à-vis US interests and objectives. Although “frequently heavy-handed and fumbling,” the military was still “firmly ensconced in power,” had not allowed inter-branch rivalries to affect the consensus on broader policy issues, and confronted “no effective threat and no alternative” to its continued rule.¹⁴¹ Curiously, Popper made no reference to the plight of the PDC and nor did he note the deliberate absence of the Chilean bishops from the official anniversary celebrations.

State Department officials were clearly annoyed and disappointed over both congressional resistance to their plans for Chile and the Junta’s reluctance to make progress on human rights. Together, these attitudes lent themselves to a worst-case scenario whereby the Junta’s failure to take measures that complied with human rights requests would ultimately influence Capitol Hill to cut further, or terminate completely, US economic and military aid to Chile.¹⁴² In mid-September, Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Ingersoll informed Kissinger of a “general consensus that if the Department did not place itself ahead of the curve on this issue, Congress would take the matter out of the Department’s hands.”¹⁴³

CHAPTER 3

DISCORDANT VOICES

“To continue our present support for the [Government of Chile]... is to squander Executive Branch capital and credibility with Congress over a relatively unimportant issue when much more important ones are at stake.”

Dissent report by five US Embassy officials to the 1976-77 Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) for Chile, May 18, 1975

Echoing Henry Kissinger’s well-established mantra, a State Department briefing paper for incoming President Gerald Ford unsurprisingly had restated the case for maintaining the Nixon-Kissinger approach toward the Pinochet regime: “In Chile, whatever the circumstances, the replacement of the Allende regime by a friendly and cooperative government favored US interests.” Quiet diplomacy should remain Washington’s preferred strategy and “undue pressure” on the human rights front—especially through legislative restrictions on aid—should be discouraged.¹ For his part, Kissinger, now both Secretary of State and NSC Adviser, continued to resist all efforts to criticize, let alone chastise, the Junta for its widespread human rights abuses.

By early 1975, however, the Ford White House was forced to acknowledge that a reluctance to censure or find serious fault with the Junta’s method of rule was not producing the desired results, above all congressional approval for adequate assistance to the Chilean economy and an end to the country’s international pariah status. With the political left now decimated, physically and organizationally, the Christian Democrats disoriented, and the regime’s hold on power uncontested, Kissinger—whose own reputation, especially in Congress, had been sullied by the public revelations of his role in destabilizing the Allende government—decided that the most immediate and pressing task was to improve the credibility of the administration’s policy. This led to a mild tactical shift from uncritical support of the military regime to selective statements of disapproval about specific abuses perpetrated by the Chilean security forces, especially those that generated negative publicity abroad. But these pronouncements were not reinforced by the threat that, should

they be ignored, serious repercussions would follow. Indeed, as far as Kissinger was concerned, the primary objective of the shift was to make it easier for the White House to assist the Junta by fending off critics of Washington's supportive approach, both domestically and globally.

Prodding the Junta

But there was little sign that the ruling generals had any interest in cooperating with their friends in Washington by improving their image, much less their behavior—and thus strengthening the administration's stance vis-à-vis Capitol Hill. Kissinger viewed an early February 1975 meeting between Popper and Interior Minister General Cesar Benavides as an opportunity to enlighten a senior regime official on the importance of “procedural safeguards and use of normal legal processes [including] restoring the rule of law and basic human rights protection,” and how Chile's credibility internationally depended on visible achievements in these areas. The Secretary instructed Popper to make these points in a “low key” way, all the time stressing “our desire to be helpful.”² Despite this benign attempt to elicit some positive action on human rights, Benavides was totally unmoved. He insisted that steps already taken to release detainees had “substantially eased [Chile's] image problem” and that as more and more detainees were freed this would eventually lead the rest of the world to “tire of baiting Chile” and focus its attention elsewhere. Frustrated by the encounter, the US Ambassador concluded that someone other than Benavides would have to be approached if there was to be any serious discussion on human rights.³

In Washington, attention had turned to finding a way to evade the spirit of congressional aid restrictions. In a memo to Kissinger, Rogers and two other Department officials eventually noted an “ambiguity” inherent in Section 25 of the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) prohibiting military assistance to Chile in FY1975 that might be exploited by the administration—specifically whether the statute excluded FMS cash sales.⁴ The Legal Adviser (L), Monroe Leigh, decided that the statute permitted such sales as long as no US funds or guaranteed loans were involved. At the same time, he opposed any policy decision that circumvented the intent of Congress and argued “in the strongest terms” for prior consultation with key legislators. If this was not done, Leigh warned, a “permissive” interpretation of the law in the absence of a major improvement in Chile's human rights environment would be “exceedingly difficult to defend” and could result in new and harsher congressional aid restrictions. One possible option would be to defer any decision on cash

sales until after the expiration of Section 25 of the FAA on June 30, 1975, thereby minimizing this risk.⁵ Yet, Rogers and his colleagues still recommended approving the sale and delivery of F-5E aircraft and naval spare parts provided in existing contracts, and other spare parts contracted before Section 25 became law “without congressional sanction or consultation” as well as the preparation but not yet actual delivery of all other pre-Section 25 FMS cash sales.⁶ The debate was further complicated when Leigh learned that senior legal officials in Defense would insist on an opinion by the Attorney General before approving FMS cash sales under the President’s authority.⁷

Kissinger sought to break the impasse in mid-March by requesting the Pentagon to implement “without further delay” the procedures necessary for cash sales and delivery of add-ons to be included in a 1974 contract negotiated prior to the enactment of Section 25, and to offer the Junta the option of canceling or availing but delaying delivery of the rest of the pre-Section 25 FMS cash sales.⁸ Defense, presumably protecting its wider interests in military transfers from any congressional flow-on effects arising out of the Chile case, refused to shift from its initial stance that Section 25 did not permit these sales.⁹

Resistance to the Secretary’s gung-ho policy was not confined to the Pentagon. Tensions within the State Department, especially among ARA officials, had been building up since early 1975. The Deputy Director of the Office of Bolivia-Chile Affairs (BC), William Lowenthal, remembered “a lot of disagreement between those who wanted to support Pinochet and those who wanted to abstain from having anything to do with him. Both sides were constantly at logger-heads.” While the major bone of contention was the Junta’s human rights abuses, a number of officials were also critical of “Milton Friedman’s economic policies” enthusiastically supported by some key civilian advisers to the Junta if not quite yet by the generals themselves. According to Lowenthal, there was a particularly acute cleavage in his own Office between the staff and its Director, John Karkashian, who was considered by virtually all his colleagues to be a “holy terror” to work with and someone “who was much too supportive of Pinochet.”¹⁰

The dilemma confronting those who desired a stronger commitment to human rights in Chile, said Lowenthal, was that “there was nothing we could do about it because of the position of the Secretary of State.” As far as Kissinger was concerned “it was terrible what happened down there but we should be accommodating. What’s happened has happened, and in a way if it was good for our fight against world communism, then let it be.”¹¹ Lowenthal’s colleague, Rudy Fimbres, made much the same point:

“With Kissinger there was an aura, an air that you couldn’t speak frankly and if you had views that were negative to the Seventh Floor, tread carefully. As a result, the anti-Pinochetistas kept a low profile.”¹² Given his excellent contacts with Junta officials in Washington and Santiago, Fimbres was baffled, to say the least, by the Secretary’s stance: “To get them to change their minds was impossible. With Kissinger, and the CIA and Treasury in their corner why in the world would they care what officials in State or congressmen said about them?”¹³ This did not exclude subtle forms of resistance, however. When Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Harry Shlaudeman conveyed Kissinger’s instructions on Chile to the relevant bureaus, said Lowenthal, he had “a very hard time getting everybody underneath him to follow what he told them to do.”¹⁴

Criticism of the Kissinger’s line expressed itself in other ways among a number of middle-level officials. Some of these, according to the director of the Washington Office on Latin America, Joseph Eldridge, “were very clearly chafing under the whip of Henry Kissinger” and were uncomfortable with Kissinger’s dismissive attitude toward incorporating a human rights element into US foreign policy. These officials privately sought outside views and assessments in formulating their position. Eldridge, among others, was regularly called in by the Office of Bolivia-Chile Affairs’ Rudy Fimbres, who Eldridge described as “a quiet, discrete ally,” to brief Department officials. “He would bring together a group of officials and they just asked me for my impressions of Chile, what are you hearing from Chile, my reports from Chile,” Eldridge recalled. “William Rogers would also have conversations with us.”¹⁵ Thomas Quigley, the Latin American adviser to the USCCB, developed similar, informal ties with some in State: “We had a fair amount of contact with George Lister who played a major role in eventually getting the human rights office established [in State],” and also “showed up at all the Chilean concerts and protests.”¹⁶ Even at the height of his powers to shape Chile policy, in other words, Kissinger’s approach was never a consensus view within State.

As well as his policy preferences, Kissinger’s managerial approach put offside many of his State Department colleagues, including some of his senior advisers. John Bushnell, who worked closely with him during the Ford years, considered his personal style the cause of most departmental unhappiness:

Henry was an awful person to work for, just awful. At meetings, everyone would sit around a table more or less in order of seniority, and beginning with the deputy secretary, he would begin by insulting each one of us, what a terrible job we we’re doing. He was always playing games with us

and we never thought that he disclosed anything, hardly anything he was thinking about. Henry thought of foreign policy as a private matter between him and the president, he didn't want anybody getting in the way anybody.¹⁷

More generally concerns about the Junta's behavior began to feature in Embassy communications that reported no likelihood of any modification in the basic pattern of restrictive human rights practices as long as the ruling generals gave priority to internal security issues. Left unchecked, the ongoing abuses "could eventually contribute to a violent outburst likely to result in an even more repressive regime...probably unfriendly to the US."¹⁸ In a briefing memo for Assistant Secretary Rogers ahead of his scheduled trip to Santiago in March 1975, Popper noted how difficult and exasperating a task it was to get the regime leaders to understand the implication of their "authoritarian practices [which] remains the touchstone for US-Chilean relations," and take appropriate action that could bolster aid prospects: "We have tried to educate the Chileans, but few who run the government understand the root of the problem, or why it is so serious."¹⁹

In these circumstances, and with Chile still governed under a state of siege, Representative Donald Fraser had expressed "serious reservations" about Kissinger's stated intention to visit Chile himself. The Junta and international opinion, said Fraser, would undoubtedly interpret the trip as a sign of US "approval of the arbitrary and brutal methods" the government was using to repress dissent and punish Allende supporters. Absent a lifting of the state of siege and an end to torture, unreasonable arrest and other depredations against civilians, Fraser bluntly told the Secretary that "a trip to Chile by you at this time is inappropriate."²⁰ From Santiago, however, Ambassador Popper had enthusiastically supported a Kissinger visit for precisely the reason Fraser opposed it: it would give Junta the "kind of psychological boost it needs to help steady it as it confronts its difficulties."²¹

One pressing difficulty, from Santiago's perspective at least, remained the threat posed by Peru's arms buildup. Back in January, 1974, Chile's Foreign Minister Admiral Ismael Huerta had told US Embassy officials that the Junta was "seriously concerned" about Peru as a potential military threat to Chile, and stated that Lima's new arms purchases from Moscow of T55 tanks and other modern equipment had created a dangerous regional arms imbalance.²² Not long after Huerta had raised his government's concerns, ARA's Jack Kubisch visited Santiago where he delivered a mixed message to the governing generals: Washington was closely monitoring developments Peru and was "very concerned" about

the Soviet tank sale. At the same time, this had to be balanced against the Nixon White House desire to improve bilateral ties with the government in Lima to ensure that it “does not fall in with powers outside this hemisphere.” To take new measures that amounted to “tum[ing] our backs on Peru,” the American diplomat said, would “make the situation worse.”²³ For the moment it could only have struck the Chileans as odd, especially given the former Johnson administration’s strong opposition to Peru’s purchase of Mirage 5 jet fighters from France in the late 1960s.²⁴

Embracing Neo-Liberalism

The Chilean regime also had its own domestic economic problems that required immediate attention. For reasons of security and stability as much as anything else, Chile’s senior military leaders were eager to sort out the economic chaos of the last two years of the Allende government as quickly as possible, reduce the country’s vulnerability to outside financial pressure, and institute a national development program that would both integrate all regions of Chile into a new nation-building project and set the economy on a course for rapid growth. But the generals were not economists, and their initial thinking was as naive as it was heterogeneous. If there was one word that summed up a consensus position during the first twelve months of the dictatorship it was “corporatism”—a view that the nation was composed of various functional groups which must all act together under the direction of the state in the interests of the common good. Corporatist notions were clearly spelled out in the Junta’s March 1974 *Declaración de principios del gobierno de Chile* (Declaration of Principles of the Chilean Government)—reflecting the belief that a nation was (or at least should be) an organic whole in which none of its constituent parts were more important than the sum of the total.

The difficulties inherent in confronting the most highly regulated economy in Latin America outside of Cuba, and one marked by slow growth and high inflation, however, eventually reinforced the generals’ belief that free market solutions and new inducements to foreign investment offered the best and quickest path to achieving their security and national development goals. Initially, the Junta hedged its bets, satisfying a desire to “recess” or terminate all political parties and so silence their criticism of specific economic policies with support for a gradualist approach to overall reform. This included a relatively traditional austerity stabilization program proposed by the regime’s two most senior economic officials Fernando Léniz and Raúl Saez who argued that tackling the inflation and balance of payments crises should take priority.

At the same time, the Junta was determined to begin an immediate and profound restructuring of property relations, and a re-concentration of wealth to benefit some of the country's largest economic conglomerates. During the first year of military rule, 350 firms expropriated or in some way made subject to state intervention under the Allende government were privatized,²⁵ nationalized properties were returned to the former owners, trade was deregulated via liberalized import controls, price constraints were eased, the exchange rate was devalued, state expenditures cut, capital controls eliminated, and foreigners offered new inducements to invest in Chile.

By early 1975, however, it was becoming evident that this stabilization approach was not working: it had neither revived the economy as a whole nor raised the living standards of a majority of the population. With the economy in free fall, Pinochet decided to act, appointing Jorge Cauas, a former World Bank official and vice president of Chile's Central Bank, as Minister of Finance and Sergio de Castro, who had studied at the University of Chicago, as Economy Minister. Both were committed neo-liberals. In April, Milton Friedman—the most high profile of the University of Chicago's free market advocates—visited Chile and held a private meeting with the Pinochet. Following this meeting, the Junta leader conferred extraordinary powers on Cauas to reverse the country's economic decline.²⁶ Pinochet's ability to make such a dramatic move and appoint cabinet ministers without approval from his Junta colleagues was a power he received on becoming President of the Republic in December 1974. That an increasing number of subsequent ministerial and advisory appointments were graduates of the University of Chicago also reflected the fact that, in Pinochet's eyes, they were regarded as "technocrats" who had no connections to the political parties. To Pinochet, these "Chicago Boys"—as they came to be known—were untainted by traditional political practices and ambitions, and so did not pose a threat to his rule. For all the praise the US government subsequently heaped on the Chilean "economic miracle," these kinds of pragmatic political considerations behind Pinochet's embrace of the free market and neo-liberal policies—as well as the more general military ambivalence toward them (evidenced most dramatically when the Chicago Boys were dumped from cabinet positions during the 1982 fiscal crises)—never rated a mention in Washington's bureaucratic deliberations.

Cauas and de Castro wasted no time in introducing further drastic cuts to state spending, deregulating the financial sector, slashing tariffs and import duties, pushing through additional privatizations, and withdrawing price controls on thousands of new items in an effort to halt spiraling

inflation. By the end of 1975, this “shock treatment” had managed to reduce inflation (although it remained a hefty 375 percent at the end of 1975, falling to 212 percent in 1976) but elsewhere the economic landscape still looked bleak. National industrial production fell by almost one quarter following the elimination of protectionist barriers which exposed local producers to foreign competition, the Gross National Product (GNP) dropped 16.6 percent in 1975, and unemployment rose to 14.5 percent (up from less than 5 percent before the coup), and real wages and salaries stood at 60 percent of 1973 levels. Developments in the world economy exacerbated Chile’s problems: the copper sector’s contribution to export earnings declined precipitously from \$1.6 billion in 1974 to \$868 million in 1975, and was instrumental in a blow out in the balance of payments deficit from \$45 million to \$275 million during the same two-year period and oil import costs rose significantly.²⁷ Failing a turnaround in the world copper price, a 1975 State Department memo cautioned, it might become necessary to increase efforts to help cover Chile’s foreign exchange needs by providing new Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds, additional Eximbank financing, or by supporting the Junta’s efforts to increase borrowings from US private banks—without, however, cutting back on PL480 wheat exports, the AID and housing guarantee programs, or vigorous lobbying on Chile’s behalf in the international financial institutions. These proposed new supports could be justified on humanitarian as well as policy grounds, the memo argued, and there should be no hesitation in pursuing them as “the only means open to Chile to avoid a permanent, totalitarian dictatorship.”²⁸

The second debt rescheduling

By early 1975, Chile also faced the prospect of technical insolvency, making a successful renegotiation of the country’s external debt as critical as ever. Although this provided leverage to Washington to insist on improvements in the regime’s behavior, Kissinger instead advised the Santiago Embassy that the administration intended “to support Chile’s request for rescheduling on the most generous terms possible” without preconditions.²⁹ Getting Chile’s other creditors to play ball, however, would not be easy. Kissinger suggested “selective bilateral agreements” if a significant number of creditors refused to attend the March meeting of the Paris Club on political grounds.³⁰

Initially, the British government adopted a very pragmatic stance on Chile’s situation. Foreign Secretary James Callaghan advised Prime Minister Harold Wilson in early February to reject any Chilean request for

a Paris Club debt rescheduling meeting if it imposes “real and irresistible pressure” on the Pinochet regime but not “if our refusal is a gesture which costs us debt repayment but does not harm Chile.”³¹ West Germany signaled that it would attend the March meeting, noting that the Junta’s decision to release from prison Socialist Party leader Clodomiro Almeyda had eased tensions in the bilateral relationship. Having earlier stated that it was not possible to delink human rights completely from the debt settlement question, Bonn’s Economics Minister now expressed confidence that the release would pave the way for overcoming any other “political objections” to a rescheduling of Chile’s debt.³² The French were more circumspect, leading US officials to conclude that German participation was crucial and therefore Bonn should be the target of “strong representations.”³³

The State Department could not have taken much comfort from its embassies’ reporting on the deliberations of other European governments. The US Deputy Chief of Mission in The Hague came away from a meeting with a senior Dutch foreign policy official convinced there was no reason to believe that government “would overcome its political objections” to sending a delegation to Paris. Washington could only take some encouragement from the Spanish government which objected to the “politicization” of debt rescheduling and was prepared to support negotiating the same arrangements as 1974.³⁴ But even Madrid’s position depended on the views of other creditor nations.

Kissinger kept unrelenting pressure on Whitehall, instructing US Ambassador Elliot Richardson to telephone Foreign Secretary Callaghan and reiterate the administration’s opposition to any attempt to politicize Chile’s debt rescheduling. While politely sympathetic, Callaghan explained that on this issue domestic politics trumped all else. The Chile debt problem, he said, had become “a focus for deep seated feelings” about Chile particularly within the Labour Party.³⁵ As more creditor nations indicated their reluctance to participate, there seemed little point in going ahead with the March meeting. The final straw was France’s decision that the number of absentees (Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the UK) was more important than the fact that these governments accounted for less than 20 percent of Chile’s debt.

The debt impasse had consequences for Chile’s loan requests to the World Bank which was itself already under attack by American officials for its apparent reluctance to lend to the military regime. USAID Director Stuart H. Van Dyke, for instance, accused the multilateral lending institution of “dragging its feet” on Chile lending for what he deemed purely political reasons.³⁶ Senior World Bank officials later insisted that

this was not a problem at the staff or management levels but conceded that it “could not be avoided at the Board level.”³⁷ Bank President McNamara himself was particularly concerned about Chilean loan requests polarizing the Board because of the negative impact he feared they could have on the Bank’s “capital increase and IDA [International Development Association] replenishment initiatives.”³⁸

After considerable encouragement from US officials, representatives of 11 creditor countries arrived in Paris to attend an informal meeting on the Chilean debt in May. The end result did not disappoint Washington: only the UK and Italy failed to attend and seven creditors accounting for 80 percent of the due debt (US, France, West Germany, Japan, Spain, Canada, and Switzerland) agreed to reschedule 90 percent of Chile’s 1975 renegotiable payments. As well, four countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden) decided to postpone rescheduling until a later date. Raúl Saez accepted the terms even though they were “somewhat harder” than the 1974 rescheduling. Nonetheless, these terms were more attractive than those offered the Allende government in 1972. This outcome did not, however, assuage the US Secretary of State’s anger over what he believed was the Paris Club’s failure to treat Chile favorably and France’s insistence that politics must be part of the discussions. With typical hyperbole, Kissinger assailed the actions of these European allies as putting the future of the Club “very much in doubt.”³⁹

Washington’s success in mobilizing support for Chile in the IMF was more straightforward. The Fund was especially cooperative in helping the country deal with internal economic and foreign debt problems. While underlining the importance of further austerity measures to radically cut the inflation rate, and concerned that “the slippages between policy formulation and implementation” that occurred in 1974 were not repeated,⁴⁰ the Fund signed a second \$79 million standby agreement in March 1975 and allowed Santiago to make additional drawings to offset persistent export shortfalls and the rising cost of petroleum imports. During FY1975 and FY1976, the Fund loaned the Junta \$231.8 million from its oil facility which enabled Chile to continue importing 70 percent of the nation’s domestic requirements. Between September 1973 and December 1975, the Fund provided just under \$450 million in standby agreements which was critical in enabling the regime to subsequently have “ready access to private capital markets,” thus eliminating its dependence on other, more difficult to obtain, sources of credit.⁴¹

Kissinger's policy challenged

Writing to President Ford at the end of April 1975, Kissinger had described bilateral relations with Chile as “good.” the regime had settled expropriation disputes with American companies and aligned with the US on most international issues. On those grounds alone, he complained, the legislative constraints on US economic and military assistance were unacceptable.⁴² It was, therefore, not surprising that Kissinger should be more concerned about reassuring Pinochet and his colleagues of Washington's favorable intentions than in dealing with the implications of global hostility toward the generals' method of rule. In mid-May, the draft of a statement prepared for delivery by Assistant Secretary Rogers at a meeting of the NSASGA in Santiago affirmed that “no issue is more fundamental to the business of the hemisphere, than...the sustenance of human freedom and individual dignity.”⁴³ The same week, Kissinger privately conveyed a very different message at a breakfast meeting in Washington with Chile's Foreign Minister Admiral Patricio Carvajal where he restated a long-held personal view that a country's domestic problems should not be the final arbiter of US decision-making. The US would probably need to make a statement on human rights at the NSASGA but did “not intend to harass” Chile on the matter.⁴⁴

What particularly incensed Kissinger was Congress's refusal to allow generous military aid—a position that left US administration officials uncertain about their room for maneuver—and the Pentagon's refusal “to deliver on contracts made [to Chile] before the [congressionally mandated] cutoff.”⁴⁵ This conflict between the State and Defense Departments didn't improve Kissinger's mood. State continued to interpret the Kennedy Amendment to the 1974 FAA as allowing FMS cash sales; Defense argued for withholding any new sales until the expiration of the amendment on June 30. Kissinger took the matter up with the President, requesting support for his Department's stance because it was legally defensible and “in the national interest.”⁴⁶

Pinochet's response to Congress's successful efforts to block the possibility of substantial military aid to Chile mirrored that of Kissinger's. Requesting a meeting on short notice with Ambassador Popper, and accompanied by his Defense Minister Herman Brady, the Junta leader got straight to the point. In Popper's account of the meeting what particularly displeased Pinochet was the inability of the Chilean Mission in Washington to even get a satisfactory answer as to whether the 1971-74 FMS credits for Chile would be released. Inquiries to the Pentagon, he said, had been “repeatedly rebuffed.” Brady then “weighed in strongly on

the subject of increasing Chilean fears regarding Peru's growing military superiority."⁴⁷

Less than two weeks after Kissinger's communiqué on the matter to Ford, the NSC's Stephen Low informed the Secretary that the administration was only authorized to deliver \$1.5 million of a total \$50 million in arms sales Chile had requested before July 1. Under Secretary of State Carlyle Maw was proposing that no sales should occur until after that date, and then only if the new provision in the continuing resolution (which temporarily funded a program until a new appropriations bill was passed) "permits us to do so." Further complicating the issue, explained Low, was a letter from 100 congressional supporters of Chile arms sales (on security grounds) which had the unintended consequence of focusing renewed attention on these sales by the opponents of any transfers "and particularly on the legal question of whether or not authority exists for such sales." As well, achieving US objectives was not helped by highly critical press accounts of torture in Chile and the growing impression that the Chileans had not taken promised measures to improve human rights. Unless this commitment was fulfilled it threatened the passage of a "new and stiffer provision" banning all military aid to the regime. Thus, to deliver even a small part of the Chilean request before July 1 ran the risk of being perceived in a very negative light on Capitol Hill, posing a threat not only to US military assistance to Chile but also to other allies around the world. The recommendation to Kissinger was that the administration would be "on sounder grounds to proceed later" if Congress failed to change the Chile arms provision in the new continuing resolution "after having had the interpretation that it permits sales brought to its attention." But even the transfer of a very limited quantity of arms would almost certainly exacerbate already difficult relations with the Congress. Better to wait until July 1 and proceed then "if the flexibility we now have remains in the Continuing Resolution." Kissinger approved the recommendation.⁴⁸

The intra-agency battle over Chile policy flared up in more dramatic fashion when the Embassy prepared to submit the 1976-77 CASP, bringing into the open sharp internal divisions within the Country Team. In his overview to the document, Popper referred to several members of his staff who believe that the US should "apply its power and influence a good deal more vigorously than it has," to improve the Junta's human rights practices. He was not among them, adding that as emotionally satisfying as strong pressure this might be, he "would not consider a major change of this character... to be justified in the present circumstances." While the regime should be encouraged to improve its behavior and broaden its political support base, there should be no diminution in

Washington's level of support for what was "after all a highly friendly government." In any event, a resort to direct pressure would only have a counterproductive outcome: instead of eliminating abuses and bolstering the Junta's political opponents, they "would undercut the moderates in Chile, force the Junta to react in paranoid fashion, and create a siege mentality which could only be breached by violence."⁴⁹ US goals would best be served by the application of "balanced judgments reached in the context of a comparison of Chile's behavior with that of other authoritarian regimes," by maintaining the current level of economic and financial aid, by actively supporting Chilean loan requests to the IFIs, by providing "generous" debt rescheduling terms, and by continuing efforts to expand the military assistance program.⁵⁰ Most of Popper's colleagues believed that exerting too much pressure on Pinochet could risk him adopting a reactive, nationalistic posture. "We were trying to dance along a very fine line here," recalled DCM Thomas Boyatt.⁵¹ State's Deputy Director of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, William Lowenthal, had a more cynical interpretation of the Ambassador's stance, attributing it primarily to his "fear of getting himself into trouble with Kissinger" and being subjected to one the Secretary's outbursts: "I think he was trying to find a way that he could live with Mr Kissinger's views and not get himself fired. He was for putting more pressure on Pinochet but he had to follow his orders."⁵²

The alternative, "dissenting," view had been prepared and signed by five Embassy political officers, and supported by several of their colleagues "who personally approved it but felt they couldn't sign it."⁵³ Appended to the CASP report, it argued that quiet diplomacy and "friendly persuasion" had comprehensively failed to achieve any major improvement in the Junta's human rights performance. Despite overwhelming evidence that the generals remained impervious to external pressures, and that Chile's pariah status internationally showed no signs of easing, the main report simply restated the 1975-76 CASP recommendation, thereby ignoring "both the past failure of our efforts [and] the new situation." Once again, the most striking absence in these now standard recommendations was any reference to "specific tools and concrete actions." Instead of clinging to a status quo policy that had not served America's best interests globally, these diplomats wanted the Junta told, in strongly worded language if necessary, that "we will take no new initiatives to assist Chile...unless and until its human rights practices have reached an acceptable standard." This approach had distinct advantages: first, it was more measured than the CASP position and allowed the regime time to react without halting pipeline aid and other US assistance,

thus avoiding the possibility of the generals “withdrawing into an unproductive siege mentality”; second, it offered “the most effective incentive” to the Government of Chile to improve its human rights behavior and move toward a return to democracy; and, third, it made no sense to waste “capital and credibility” with Congress and major allies by maintaining what was perceived to be a “close embrace” with one of the most repressive Third World regimes that was not even an important US strategic ally.⁵⁴ Political Officer Robert Steven characterized the split in the Embassy as one between those diplomats who were “very strongly conservative” and supported official policy “to the hilt to keep the communists out” and those who strongly disagreed with “the unqualified support that we appeared to be giving [the Pinochet regime].”⁵⁵

This “dissenting” assessment was not only sharply at variance with the Ambassador and the majority of the Embassy staff but also with Kissinger’s own thinking on the subject. As one senior State official at the time recalled, the dissenters’ report bucked the “party line” in the Department that the US needed to support Pinochet to hold back communism in Latin America.⁵⁶

The CASP dissidents had the unintended consequence of weakening Kissinger’s effort to make sure his subordinates were of one accord on Chile because they emboldened officials inside the Department who were similarly critical of the existing policy approach to begin to speak out. In the Latin American Bureau (ARA) the general reaction was “those guys are pretty ballsy down there.”⁵⁷ State’s Director of the Office of Policy Planning (S/P), Richard Bloomfield, characterized “diplomatic persuasion” as a failed policy that was becoming increasingly costly over time. It had only succeeded in eroding support for “our [broader] foreign policy [objectives]” both on Capitol Hill and among the electorate at large.⁵⁸ Kissinger sought to allay any concern the Ambassador may have had about widespread intra-agency unease over the basic thrust of the CASP: “No, repeat no, pre-IG [Inspector General’s Office] participant [at June 5 review] endorsed [the] premise that human rights interest *per se* outweighed other US interests and objectives in Chile.” At the same time, all in State agreed that the regime’s human rights record constituted a major obstacle to the achievement of these “interests and objectives.”⁵⁹

Kissinger was now fighting for his policy preferences on three fronts: against congressional opponents intent on limiting US economic and military support to an abusive regime; against officials in other parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy who articulated a more black letter interpretation of the restrictive legislation than did he; and against members of his own Department critical of a policy which appeared

incapable of getting the Junta to tone down the violent nature of its governance.

Chile's economic crisis, Washington's policy dilemma

Despite Chile's successful renegotiation of its external debt, and the generous support provided by the IMF, a mid-1975 memo to Deputy NSC Adviser Scowcroft, aptly titled "Disarray in Chile Policy," concentrated much of its attention on the still serious economic situation confronting the military regime. Written by staff official Stephen Low, it drew heavily on a recently prepared CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) warning of the potential politically destabilizing consequences of a failure to reverse the country's "gloomy" economic outlook. The NIE put most of the blame on falling copper prices that contributed to a major blowout in Chile's balance of payments deficit. In these circumstances, any signal that the US was cutting back on its economic support could be calamitous: a retrenchment of aid programs might "dry up sources of external capital and precipitate an economic crisis" thereby forcing the generals "into economic alignments potentially at odds with US interests."⁶¹

The Low memo began on an upbeat note, praising Washington's commitment to support Chilean government attempts to "get its economy under control and defend itself against the possibility of Peruvian aggression," the administration's "major, successful effort" to get the Paris Club to approve rescheduling of the country's foreign debt, the provision of PL480 food aid, pressure on the World Bank to lend to the Junta, and a commitment to sell military spare parts "as soon as possible." On the downside, the NSC staffer noted "strong criticism" by congressional opponents of Junta aid, as well as by a number of State Department officials and American diplomats in Santiago who supported a ban on all forms of aid to Chile until the human rights situation improved. While Low's analysis indicated the difficulties in arriving at a consensus over how best to deal with the regime, the Embassy dissidents and like-minded ARA officials were still a distinct minority: within the foreign policy bureaucracy, the Ambassador's CASP analysis had received overwhelming support.

The perception of a policy in "disarray," wrote Low, was heavily influenced by a particularly acrimonious debate between State and Treasury over a \$55 million Housing Guarantee loan to Chile approved by the Inter-Agency Chile Coordinating Committee and Development Loan Committee (with no objections from Congress). "At the last minute," ARA decided to reduce the loan to \$30 million without consulting other

participating government agencies. Treasury officials, in particular, were “annoyed” by this arbitrary decision which they considered “a departure from agreed policy” that could negatively impact on the Chilean economy. Treasury was fielding questions from New York bankers on a \$200 million commercial loan to Chile that was being floated and on how to handle pressure to urge the World Bank to process more loan requests to the authoritarian regime. Against the background of a fall in world copper prices, the financial communities in Washington and New York were in agreement with the NIE that any indication the US was withdrawing its economic support for Chile could have major negative flow-on effects.⁶¹

That possibility seemed all the more likely after the World Bank concluded, in a December 1975 report, that nine months into the economic shock treatment under the tutelage of the Chicago Boys, Chile was experiencing its “worst depression” in over four decades:

The Junta’s free market economic policies led to the transfer [re-concentration] of income to the upper class, heightened the exploitation of the working class, impoverished the middle class, and led to a greater concentration and consolidation of power in the hands of big foreign and national capitalists, bankers and financiers, generals and admirals while exacerbating the problem of inflation and depressing industrial production.⁶²

The Chicago Boys took this damning assessment in their stride. They were perfectly happy to assume responsibility for this outcome in the belief that a recession was the only way to get rid of inefficient enterprises that depended on state supports to function. The policies they had implemented would shift “both capital and labor...into new, export oriented and globally competitive areas of the economy.” In the words of Marcus Taylor, they looked upon their program as one of “creative destruction.”⁶³

Further debate on military aid

The other problem highlighted in Low’s memo to Scowcroft was the ongoing saga of military assistance and the postponement of a decision on FMS cash sales until the Kennedy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) expired on June 30. While lawyers in State and Defense agreed that restrictions on this category of sales lapsed after that date, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance Carlyle Maw disagreed, insisting that he had an understanding with the Pentagon that it would not authorize any sales without his concurrence. Low disputed Maw’s veto power, informing Scowcroft that as far as he was concerned the \$5 million

in sales already approved by Kissinger and the President could certainly proceed without anyone's concurrence. "ARA wants a hold put on everything, including the \$5 million, until the matter can be reconsidered," Low reported. Scowcroft wrote in the margin the word "No" three times, in capital letters and underlined each word.⁶⁴ In Santiago, Pinochet had again protested to Ambassador Popper about "the run-around" Chilean officials in Washington were getting about arms sales at a time when Peru had installed its Soviet tanks and other military equipment within 150 miles of the border between the two countries.⁶⁵ Chile's military leaders remained "convinced that Peru plans to 'avenge' the War in the Pacific defeat, with the prodding of Cuba and the Soviet Union, before the year is out."⁶⁶

Chilean preoccupation with Peru, however, had begun to receive less and less credence among US and other Western diplomats after the appointment of General Francisco Morales-Bermúdez as Peru's Prime Minister in February 1975. In August, he replaced Velasco entirely. Commenting on the transition, Brent Scowcroft advised the White House that the new President was "likely to follow a more moderate line than his predecessor."⁶⁷

Still, in mid-July, Low returned to the arms sales issue after Pinochet had discussed with Popper an \$11 million in FMS credits left over from FY1971 to FY1974. The Chileans had been repeatedly told that these funds could not be used to purchase FMS items. But anxious Pentagon officials, convinced that Senator Kennedy would introduce a new sanction on military aid, wanted the White House to authorize Chilean access to the \$11 million, as well as a further \$52 million of signed and valid obligations the release of which awaited some progress on the human rights front. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was being aggressively lobbied by his subordinates to request an interagency Senior Review Group (SRG) meeting on the subject to get Kissinger personally involved "because they are not convinced that lower levels of State are reflecting his views in this matter."⁶⁸

At the State Department, William Rogers supported the resumption of military aid. After noting that Congress was not united on this issue, he requested Kissinger's approval to inform the leading critics of Chile in the House and Senate that the administration planned to move ahead now with FMS cash sales to Chile on a "modest level."⁶⁹ This suggestion received a lukewarm response from the Bureaus most closely involved with Chile policy. The Legal Adviser (L), Monroe Leigh, together with the Human Rights Coordinator's Office argued that such a course of action would be perceived by many in Congress as a "reward for conduct inconsistent with

US human rights policies,” notably Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), and would pose a “genuine risk of legislative action to preclude even delivery of items proposed to be sold to Chile.”⁷⁰ The primary objective had to be to prevent any “counterproductive” legislation and convince the regime to take some positive human rights initiatives that would allow the administration to defend limited cash sales to Chile. ARA was not opposed to a postponement of military sales; nor was Ambassador Popper unduly concerned that his position would be “utterly compromised” if there were no sales just yet.⁷¹

In the midst of this debate Pinochet did himself no favors with his abrupt mid-year decision to cancel a United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) Working Group visit to study the human rights situation in Chile. Always ambivalent about the visit in the absence of similar study missions to Cuba and the Soviet Union, he was convinced that the United Nations had become a tool of Moscow and its allies, with a history of applying disproportionate pressure on selected member countries over their human rights abuses and none on others. It was only after prodding from his closest advisers that Pinochet was persuaded to change his mind in the first place and authorize a Working Group visit. The clinching argument by senior civilian officials was that the government had negotiated “reasonable guarantees” ensuring the proposed delegation would be fair and objective. As the months passed, however, Pinochet’s anger over global criticism of the military’s rule intensified. Attacks on Chile at the International Labor Organization meeting in Geneva, and at a UN-sponsored International Women’s Conference in Mexico City, reinforced his underlying skepticism about the proposed visit. The last straw was the Working Group’s decision to interview Chilean exiles prior to its arrival in Santiago, together with Pinochet’s accusation that some its members “had made prejudicial statements indicating they were biased.” During a July 4 speech, without consulting his Junta colleagues, Pinochet announced cancellation of the visit because “by communist design [the] cards are stacked against Chile in international organizations.”⁷² Pinochet’s unilateral decision provoked criticism among senior civilian and military officials that he was being overly influenced by “a small group of extremely conservative advisers,” especially Jaime Guzman—who General Leigh among others believed was instrumental in persuading the President to cancel the visit.⁷³

From Capitol Hill, and in the State Department, the responses to this decision were immediate and condemnatory. Donald Fraser, the chair of the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, termed Pinochet’s action “deeply deplorable and regressive,” and one that required a blunt,

uncompromising US government response.⁷⁴ State's Robert Ingersoll called in Chilean Ambassador Manuel Trucco (appointed April 1975) and Deputy Foreign Minister Colonel Enriquez Valdés, and "read them the riot act."⁷⁵ A CIA intelligence report presumed the decision would "damage [Chile's] efforts to obtain badly needed credits and new foreign investment," and create additional problems in future foreign debt negotiations.⁷⁶

What rankled senior State officials, particularly those who had been able to exploit the Working Group's scheduled trip to Chile's advantage in multiple arenas, was a feeling of the rug being pulled out from under them. This was another of Pinochet's decisions that came as a complete surprise to US officials in Washington and Santiago. By using this upcoming visit, Assistant Secretary Rogers wrote, Chile was able—"with our support"—to keep consideration of an Inter-American Human Rights Committee (IAHRC) report highly critical of the Junta's human rights abuses off the agenda of the previous ASGA meeting. Without the promise of that visit, Rogers also thought it unlikely that a US delegation statement about progress in human rights in Chile would have been acceptable to the regime's critics on Capitol Hill. Last, but not least, American officials had been able to use the trip "to mute Chile's critics" during the May Paris Club negotiations on debt rescheduling. Rogers concluded on a despairing note: in the absence of a major policy shift, Pinochet had "at a stroke practically eliminated" Chile's chances of buying significant quantities of military hardware from American sources and had made "financing of their economic recovery program problematic at best."⁷⁷

Just prior to Pinochet's announcement, Popper had transmitted a long memo to Washington assessing the current situation in Chile in preparation for an interagency meeting in State on July 18 at which he would be present. His central argument was that the US should not retreat from its policy of supporting the Pinochet regime for interrelated, if somewhat unconvincing, political and economic reasons: to maintain US leverage in the human rights field which the Embassy dissidents observed had not achieved much, if anything, to date; and to keep the regime technically solvent and help it "establish a viable market economy." Popper concluded that the national interest demanded that US policy should be directed "primarily at preventing the re-emergence of a Chilean government essentially hostile to us" and only secondarily to ameliorating state-authored repression.⁷⁸ With the regime's authority unchallenged, however, there was little possibility of an alternative government emerging in the near future and so this was, in effect, a non-issue.

In a frank memo to William Rogers and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hewson Ryan, Policy Planning's Richard Bloomfield attacked what

he viewed as another example of a head-in-the-sand approach. The fall-out from the UNHRC Working Party cancellation was bad enough but his more trenchant comments focused on the striking disparity between Executive Branch rhetoric and its actual policy practice: “We...deploy our diplomacy to promote debt rescheduling; we use our influence in the IFIs to assure that Chilean loans are not held up; we vote against or abstain on resolutions in international organizations that condemn the GOC’s human rights record; we assure the GOC that we want to sell it arms and that we regret Congressional restrictions.” Turning to Popper’s policy analysis, Bloomfield savaged the Ambassador’s contention that harsh criticism of the human rights situation had little or no effect. This, Bloomfield wrote, was little more than an attempt to rationalize the provision of aid to the Junta when most of the international community considered the Pinochet regime a bunch of “fascists and torturers.” Human rights were the touchstone of US-Chilean relations, he concluded, “and we will not achieve them without turning the screws harder and taking the risks that entails.”⁹

When Popper was recalled for consultations in mid-July, what he encountered was a Secretary of State prepared to vent his frustrations in all directions. Kissinger opened a meeting with his senior aides by complaining about State’s apparent decision to almost halve the promised multimillion dollar housing guarantee loan to Chile only to have Rogers interpose that these funds had merely been set aside for the next twelve months because “we did not want to appear too generous” this fiscal year. Kissinger then proceeded to lecture his subordinates that they should be in “no doubt about my policy [which was] to strengthen Chile.” The international community was his next target. “Why,” he asked, “does Chile have to be the only country that must receive a human rights investigating body?” Next in line for a tongue-lashing were members of his own Department whom he accused, in effect, of giving tacit support to the anti-Pinochet forces on Capitol Hill: “There is a great deal of foot dragging all over this building. [It’s] just enough so that nothing happens and it is difficult to pin responsibility on anyone.” Warning to the task, the Secretary again invoked the specter of “a Portuguese-type government” taking over in Chile, at which point he told the gathering “you will sit around and wring your hands.” Congress was also included in the tirade: he had “no intention of having Chile [economic aid] cut” and any attempt to terminate it would be rejected out of hand. Yet, Kissinger was clearly disappointed at the Junta’s unpredictable behavior and reluctance to take Washington’s advice. When asked if he would include Chile in his itinerary for a contemplated trip to Latin America, his

response conveyed a sense of exasperation: "Well, if those madmen do something on human rights."⁸⁰

Pinochet's cancellation of the UNHRC visit increased the likelihood that Congress would further extend or tighten legal restrictions on all forms of aid to the regime. William Rogers described the mood on Capitol Hill as one in which new restraints on military aid to Chile during 1975-76 were inevitable in the absence of some "measurable" decline in regime abuses.⁸¹ As the administration readied its FY1976 foreign assistance package for submission to Congress, State's BC Affairs official Rudy Fimbres issued a similar warning about the sentiment within Congress. "Indications are that Chile and South Korea will be singled out as villains," he wrote. The prohibition on Chile arms sales would "most likely" continue, the economic aid program could well "be in trouble," and debt rescheduling "may receive closer scrutiny."⁸²

As if these problems were not enough, the last thing the White House needed was a proposed visit by Pinochet to the United Nations in New York, followed by a meeting with President Ford at the White House—in all probability the real intention of any trip north. The Chileans had initially floated the possibility with US Embassy officials in August. On transmitting the request to Washington, Popper was instructed to "discourage it by saying that the President's schedule was already full for this period." Both State's William Rogers and the NSC's Stephen Low expressed the view that if Pinochet was the first Latin American head of state received by Ford in the Oval Office, it "would stimulate criticism domestically in the US and from Latin America."⁸³ To make sure the Chilean dictator got the message loud and clear—as he was not immediately dissuaded—Deputy Director of the CIA Vernon Walters was requested to raise the issue with the head of DINA, Manuel Contreras, later that month along the lines of a State Department determination that "we should play it very cautiously, and do nothing to encourage such a visit."⁸⁴

Pinochet was eventually persuaded to drop the idea but he showed little flexibility beyond that. On the second anniversary of the coup, he announced a partial lifting of Chile's state of siege in a speech that was otherwise uncompromising about the Junta's open-ended hold on political power and its domestic policy agenda. Marxist parties remained banned, other political parties were indefinitely suspended, leftists had been purged from the public service, the universities and labor posts, left-wing led unions were forbidden to strike, and leftist publications were prohibited while others remained under strict controls. Church sources around this

time put the number of Chileans who had undergone at least temporary detention at 1 in 100 compared with the government figure of 1 in 250.⁸⁵

To Pinochet and his military supporters this was all part of the “anti-subversive” war. Not even senior Pentagon military officials could convince them otherwise. Meeting with the Chilean President in late September, the head of the US Southern Command, General Dennis McAuliffe, once again emphasized the importance of the Junta taking some measures “to help their US friends in Washington to help them.” The response was a flat denial that there was any longer a human rights problem in Chile.⁸⁶

Chilean workers under siege

Within the US Embassy, those officials unhappy about rigidly implementing Washington’s policy of accommodation and its reluctance to vigorously criticize human rights abuses sought as best they could to ameliorate the regime’s violence against civil society. Supporting the moderate trade unions, as well as the center-right political leadership, was one example of Embassy officials taking the initiative in the absence of any encouragement or initiative from their superiors in Washington. To do so, they enlisted the help of the peak organization of the American labor movement. “The AFL-CIO representatives were down to see us all the time,” said then DCM Thomas Boyatt, “which started even before my arrival in Santiago in December 1975. We met once a week with the labor union leaders and the Christian Democrats and some of the politicians on the right.”⁸⁷

Organized labor’s plight had become increasingly more desperate through 1975, and especially with the adoption of a strategy of economic recovery through a radical structural adjustment to make Chile competitive in the global marketplace. Back in early April, the US Embassy’s Labor Attaché Art Nixon had painted a bleak picture of the state of the union movement in a note to the AFL-CIO’s Inter-American representative Andrew McLellan: “The situation here becomes more depressing each day. Although the movement is structurally intact, it becomes less effective as time passes.” The one respite for Chilean union leaders was a series of seminars organized by the American Institute of Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Although “pretty bland” they enabled the union leadership to meet in relative safety and, perhaps more importantly, created “the feeling that we care about the Chilean movement. We’re about the only shoulder they have to cry on.”⁸⁸ Stuart Van Dyke, Director of the AID Mission in Chile, and Ambassador Popper also described the

AFLD program as giving “moral support” to a movement fighting to survive under relentless government pressure.⁸⁹ The unions’ continuing resistance had most recently been demonstrated when as few as 1,000 workers attended a May Day meeting organized by pro-regime supporters at which Pinochet was scheduled to speak—in a theater with an 8,000 seat capacity. The small turnout, resulting in his non-appearance, was due to the union movement’s decision to support a labor Mass held by Cardinal Raúl Silva at more or less the same time. “The cathedral was full and virtually all the labor leaders were there,” Nixon reported. The Minister of Labor was “furious” and that afternoon called a meeting of the four principal labor spokesmen who comprised an advisory committee to the government “and bawled [them] out...threatening to have them arrested.”⁹⁰ Soon after, Nixon was cabling Washington to the effect that the Junta was cracking down even more ruthlessly on what it deemed political activities by the labor movement, singling out copper workers who had been arrested in June and some of whose members were still detained—and possibly subject to torture—three months later.⁹¹ This hostile operational environment and the refusal to restore basic trade union freedoms, the AFL-CIO’s Andrew McLellan informed Nixon, put in “serious doubt” a proposed visit to Chile by members of his organization.⁹²

The AFL-CIO itself was unable to accommodate Chilean union requests for desperately needed financial assistance due to a fiscal crisis of its own at this time. A low level trade union delegation that did visit Chile unsuccessfully proposed a budget to their AFL-CIO and AFLD colleagues that would permit them to travel and maintain regular contact with rank and file leaders throughout the country.⁹³ By then, the CIA was reporting that the union movement was struggling to stay afloat and a working class which had been depoliticized by its preoccupation with economic survival and was “intimidated by the fear of the armed forces.”⁹⁴ In a letter to McLellan, Nixon highlighted the dire situation, commenting that the Chile labor movement was “going to need help if [it is] to survive,” and appealed to the AFL-CIO to come to its aid, rather than AFLD which had a precarious relationship with the military regime. Joe Campos, the AFLD Chile representative, was “walking on eggs, trying to conduct an effective program, without being booted out of Chile,” Nixon wrote. Given AFLD’s problems with the regime, and the debate over aid to the union movement, Nixon encouraged McLellan himself to consider a visit: someone “with the clear authority to speak for the AFL-CIO might be able to clear up some of the doubts which some in this government have on labor.”⁹⁵

For its part, the Catholic Church under the leadership of Cardinal Silva employed a carefully balanced strategy that avoided any action with the potential to rupture its access to the regime. It publicly criticized the harsh impact of the austerity measures on workers and peasants but continued to resort to “quiet diplomacy” in responding to human rights abuses so as to keep open the lines of communication with the generals. A State Department official said of Cardinal Silva that “his barbs are velveted in theology.”⁹⁶ Occasionally, the Church publicly criticized the security forces for their habit of “ignoring existing legal safeguards against arbitrary detention and torture.”⁹⁷ In late October 1975, based on Embassy discussions with two prominent Church spokesmen, Ambassador Popper reported to Washington his belief that strained relations would not lead to “an open and permanent split between Church and GOC.”⁹⁸ US intelligence communiqués reached a similar conclusion about Pinochet’s stance: “[He] has been careful to keep Church-State differences within manageable limits and to at least leave the door open for cooperation.”⁹⁹

Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill during the latter months of 1975, pressure to amend the FAA to halt all economic aid to any country engaged in a persistent pattern of gross human rights violations was gathering strength. Drafted by human rights activists Joseph Eldridge (Washington Office on Latin America) and Edward Snyder (Friends Committee on National Legislation), a proposed amendment to this effect was championed in the House by liberal Democrat Tom Harkin (IA). Perhaps of greater concern to the White House, it was also embraced by a number of Harkin’s conservative colleagues hostile to US foreign aid “giveaways.” In September, the Harkin amendment passed the House by a vote of 238 to 164, and thereafter in the Senate on a voice vote. This comfortable majority in favour of the amendment testified to the Hill’s growing determination to force the Executive Branch to be less dismissive of its wishes and recognize that foreign policy-making was a shared responsibility. In this case, the President was now mandated to suspend aid to human rights violators except in cases where he concluded that a waiver was in the interests of US national security. The other loophole in the amendment was a “basic human needs” (BHN) provision which allowed for economic aid if it could be justified as benefiting the neediest sections of the population. Determining when aid met this condition would soon become yet another source of disagreement between the Ford White House and Congress.¹⁰⁰

Kissinger loathed the thought of elevating human rights concerns above the demands of *realpolitik* in the conduct of US diplomacy. In the case of Chile, the Santiago Embassy’s DCM Thomas Boyatt recalled that

Kissinger “didn’t want to hear” reports on human rights abuses or suggestions that “we ought to try to do something about [them].”¹⁰¹ When he didn’t oppose or ignore congressional restrictions on aid to repressive governments he invariably “produce[d] a State Department lawyer with legalese exempting the programs he wished to continue.”¹⁰² But in an effort to mute congressional criticism, the State Department requested Embassy reports on the status of human rights in over 80 prospective aid recipients. After examining the results, senior officials agreed that the level of violations in at least seven countries, including Chile, “were clearly going to cause trouble.” Some bureaus advocated aid cutbacks for selected countries while others, notably the geographic bureaus, maintained that security interests dictated no changes to the initial country allocations. Among the former was the Human Rights Office which recommended to Kissinger that State produce a series of individual country reports. In the words of Human Rights Coordinator James Wilson, a “great quiet” then descended on the Seventh Floor before Kissinger eventually came back with a question: “Why do we have to do all this? Can’t we just tell Congress in an executive session what the story is?”¹⁰³

In September, Wilson had managed to convince Robert Ingersoll and Carlyle Maw to endorse a recommendation that unclassified reports—or at least reports that could be largely declassified—be sent to Congress. Kissinger turned the proposal down, preferring instead generalized reports that concentrated on the “processes” undertaken. He suggested highlighting the difficulties involved in settling on specific criteria for designating governments as major human rights abusers, and was only prepared to discuss the subject with Congress in executive session.¹⁰⁴ Kissinger’s idea of accommodating Congress, in other words, meant withholding country-specific reports, classifying them, and substituting a humdrum summary of the findings which, instead of providing the requested information, would attack the 1974 “Sense of Congress” policy enunciated in Section 502B of the FAA that linked military or security assistance to human rights performance. Wilson described the reaction in Congress as “sulphurous.” Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) characterized the summary document as “about as bland as swallowing a bucket of sawdust” while his colleague Alan Cranston (D-CA) said it displayed “malign indifference.”¹⁰⁵ When Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance Carlyle Maw appeared before the House Committee on International Relations in November, his testimony further exacerbated tensions between the two branches of government: no military aid or arms sales, Maw told his questioners, had been denied to any country on human rights grounds. As many in the Department had feared, this was another clear signal to the Congress that

the administration would continue to oppose 502B. This attitude so angered legislators that they moved to strengthen the amendment by making it binding on the President to include human rights considerations in determining economic and security assistance to recipient countries, to insist that reports must be submitted on a country by country basis, and to ask for a detailed statement of violations occurring in any particular country where they were not satisfied with the reports.

Rethinking US policy

In a detailed analysis of US policy toward the Chilean military dictatorship during its first two years in power, the State Department's Rudy Fimbres argued that the decision "to maintain and strengthen" the regime stemmed largely from a belief "that on a worst-case basis a likely ultimate alternative to the Junta would be a leftist dictatorship." Hence, the Nixon and Ford administrations had taken a number of economic stabilization measures, from aggressively encouraging private investment and multilateral capital flows to "spearheading" Chile's foreign debt negotiations with the Paris Club. Yet, the central message of Pinochet's September 11, 1975 anniversary speech was unmistakable: his government did "not welcome suggestions regarding its internal affairs." One could only conclude, Fimbres wrote, that US policy "has not worked." Pinochet's persistent refusal to take any meaningful actions to improve the human rights situation, and no indication that he was prepared to do so in the future, suggested it was time for the US to apply "more energetically its power and influence" to induce a change in the Junta's outlook. If the status quo in Chile persisted and there was no change in Washington's approach, Fimbres predicted that the failure to take a sufficiently tough stance over human rights violations would further erode domestic support for White House policy.

The problem in deciding how to proceed had to balance two different realities. On the one hand, American interests in Chile were "not significant [and] the strategic argument is overdrawn;" on the other, the governing Junta had settled outstanding disputes with US firms and pursued policies "highly friendly" to the US. Fimbres cautioned that taking some kind of forceful action would be interpreted by Pinochet as a clear "sign of shifting US policy." A response of this kind needed to be weighed against Pinochet's extreme sensitivity to even a "nudge" which he could easily inflate into a "push," leading him to conclude that Washington had "abandoned" Chile the better to pursue broader US interests. In these circumstances, he might resort to behavior that was

“paranoiac and unpredictable.” Fimbres recommended that Kissinger raise the issue in a low key manner with Foreign Minister Carvajal during a forthcoming United Nations meeting, explain to him the US desire for faster progress on human rights, and make him doubly aware that growing domestic opposition to the Chilean government will only increase “if the American public cannot see demonstrable progress in the elimination of abuses.” On a more positive note, Fimbres suggested to Kissinger that he might inform his Chilean counterpart that despite the failure to gain congressional support for FMS credits, the White House would try to restore access to FMS and commercial military sales, support a small-scale mapping training program to the tune of \$0.9 million, and continue its bilateral and multilateral economic assistance during FY1976.¹⁰⁶

Fimbres’ memo, the author later recalled, demonstrated further the policy rift in State Department ranks over the administration’s strategy. His reference to the limited significance of US interests in Chile was his way of “throwing a barb at Kissinger” and the exaggerated importance the Secretary placed on supporting the regime.¹⁰⁷ Outside of the State Department, however, policy disquiet tended in the opposite direction. The most vigorous bureaucratic opponents of establishing a link between support for Chilean loan requests to the MFIs and human rights improvements were Treasury officials greatly impressed by the regime’s willingness to take a number of “hard decisions” that had revitalized the economy in their view. This was not the moment “to undermine the Chilean effort.”¹⁰⁸ They criticized “the increasingly political orientation” of the World Bank and “went out of their way to express disenchantment with, and indeed resentment toward, [President Robert] McNamara.”¹⁰⁹ Kissinger’s arrogant dismissal of a briefing paper prepared for his September 29 meeting with Carvajal as full of “nothing but human rights” indicated that he couldn’t have agreed more with these sentiments. Dripping sarcasm, he spoke of being surrounded by “people who have a vocation for the ministry [but because] there were not enough churches for them they went into the Department of State.” His critics were “hypocrit[es],” Kissinger told Carvajal, who singled out Chile and ignored violations committed in numerous other countries. This was a welcome sentiment to the Foreign Minister who dismissed allegations about rights abuses as “absolutely false.”

Nonetheless, even Kissinger went on to acknowledge that there remained a “practical” problem to be resolved: while the administration was keen to assist Chile “it was hard for us to help” because of the constraints imposed by Congress. Some highly visible human rights initiative would be “enormously helpful.” Otherwise, said the Secretary,

“Congress will place restriction upon restriction” to dramatize its opposition to further US aid. Turning to the cancellation of the UNHRC Working Group visit, Kissinger opined that the offer should not have been made in the first place as it only raised expectations that were dashed when the trip was called off. Carvajal then raised the issue of a \$500,000 credit limit imposed on Chile by the Eximbank. When the Secretary asked William Rogers to intervene with the Bank, his deputy replied that officials already were “leaning hard on the [Eximbank] bureaucracy.” In all, the tenor of the meeting was reassuring rather than remonstrative. “We understand the problem,” a solicitous Kissinger assured his Chilean counterpart, once again invoking the specter of the April 1974 revolution in Portugal where left-nationalist military officers toppled the Salazar dictatorship. “It is not in the interest of the US to turn Chile into another Portugal,” he concluded.¹¹⁰

Scarcely a week after Kissinger’s meeting with Carvajal, a senior PDC leader Bernardo Leighton, at the time exiled in Rome, was severely wounded in an assassination attempt carried out by Italian operatives working for DINA. The previous November, Pinochet had taken the lead in formally concluding a secret agreement with the military regimes in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and Bolivia—codenamed “Operation Condor”—to cooperate in tracking down and eliminating “subversives” in each other’s countries. Within twelve months, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay would move to globalize their efforts and Santiago quickly emerged as a major state sponsor of international terrorism, unleashing DINA against high-profile exiled Chilean opponents of the dictatorship in Europe and Latin America. Those targeted for assassination included Christian Democrats as well as Socialist and Communist Party members.¹¹¹ Curiously, American officials at first drew no connection between these actions and the September 1974 murder of retired constitutionalist General Carlos Prats in Buenos Aires, also by individuals contracted by DINA. Despite the close working relationship between DINA and the CIA, and compelling circumstantial evidence that the former had carried out the Prats’ assassination on Pinochet’s orders to eliminate a potential threat to his power, US Embassy officials in Santiago had displayed a total lack of intelligence or insight when they dismissed a Soviet claim of DINA’s involvement as making “no sense to us.”¹¹² After the attack on Leighton, US officials again drew no decisive conclusion.

On Capitol Hill, meanwhile, Assistant Secretary Rogers was raked over the coals when he testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearing in early October on Chile’s humanitarian and refugee problems. Chairperson Edward Kennedy drew attention to the apparent “political

criteria” for allocating 85 percent of Latin America’s total PL480 food aid allocation to the military dictatorship instead of distributing it regionally on the basis of humanitarian needs. When asked to explain this anomaly, Rogers defined basic needs as incorporating efforts to help a country such as Chile that was in the grip of a worsening balance of payments crisis brought about by increased wheat imports due to a fall in domestic production “at the very time when the bottom fell out of the copper market.” Applying this logic more generally, Kennedy found it difficult to restrain his anger at the administration’s double standard when it came to Chile: “Are we going to say that Haiti has had a low standard of living and therefore we do not have to give food to them—we can give them just a little—but Chile had had a high standard of living, so we will give them a good deal more?”¹¹³

The following day, Rogers could at least report that discussions between officials from State, Defense and the NSC on arms transfers to Chile had reached agreement—with Kissinger seemingly going along under duress—on a strategy for dealing with Congress. He informed a weekly ARA/CIA meeting that Chile would receive no military grants or loans during FY1976. Although this would likely cause much “writhing and flailing” on the part of the Chileans it would avoid a head-on clash with Congress.¹¹⁴ The State Department agreed, however, to begin limited sales “as promptly as possible” but according to NSC staffer Stephen Low, both State and Defense insisted on consultations with key legislators before the understanding was implemented. The ultimate goal was to get FMS sales contracted before Capitol Hill imposed restrictions on them (that is, before the end of 1975) released to the Chileans, together with “a few new items,” the total value of which could be as much as \$100 million.¹¹⁵

Kissinger could not contain his unhappiness over this decision to exclude Chile from FMS eligibility simply on the grounds that “it would be knocked off” by Congress. “Now I think we should put Chile back on,” he told President Ford and NSC Adviser Brent Scowcroft during a White House meeting, “and let Congress knock it off. I don’t think we should link FMS with human rights.” Ford agreed that to do so would establish “a very bad precedent.”¹¹⁶

At a staff meeting to discuss the Chile arms sales issue Kissinger could only bemoan his Department’s “failure” to aggressively challenge Congress by putting the military aid ball in the legislators’ court instead of meekly capitulating to their demands. Rogers again bore the brunt of the Secretary’s discontent. When he relayed the Pentagon’s desire to “get cracking” on the arms sales program after consultations with Congress, the

reaction was, at once, skeptical and accusatory. Kissinger implied that his policy was being white-anted by officials intent on pursuing an agenda that had more in common with the legislative opponents of Chile aid. "Why do I have the uneasy feeling that you guys are euchring me step by step into an arms embargo on Chile [and] that Chile is being thrown to the wolves?" Nor was the Defense Department exempted from his criticism on the grounds that it had failed to consult with Congress much earlier. To this charge Rogers replied that "the bureaucratic decision of getting the foot-dragging settled" had been achieved and that it involved nothing untoward. "It's part of the problem," he said, "of getting that whole [aid] package through."

This comment further enraged Kissinger who protested that it had only taken State and Defense "two seconds" to decide Chile would receive no FMS credits. Once military credits are determined by criteria other than security concerns, the Secretary insisted, "We're licked." Rogers countered that the issue was basically one of "straight, raw politics," namely that foregoing FMS credits increased the possibility "of keeping the [cash] sales program alive." Kissinger grudgingly conceded the point but when Rogers said that the Chile sales issue was going up to Congress in the next day or so, the Secretary shot back that "it's not going up with my approval [and] there should be absolutely no misapprehension about it." To make sure those present got the message, Kissinger then issued a pointed threat: "And I am perfectly capable of sitting on it for six weeks." Under Secretary of State Carlyle Maw intervened that to do so would have broader global ramifications because the lack of a decision on FMS sales to Chile was "hold[ing] up the Mideast [arms sales package] and everything." Rogers kept trying, with little success, to convince his boss that "nobody was trying to do anything behind your back." But Kissinger was obsessed with the perfidy of bureaus in his own Department, convinced that the only reason they didn't come up with a proposal weeks earlier was "because all they do is weep around with each other so that they can finally make a compromise." Eventually, an exasperated Rogers summarized the two available options: either the administration proposed \$20 million in FMS credits for Chile and "clos[es] the door with respect to possibilities" or it proposed no credits to accompany the cash sales proposal. If it opted for the latter "we have a fighting chance of getting it through [Congress]."¹¹⁷

But the first crack in the administration's wall of resistance to holding Chile fully accountable for its human rights practices came in October 1975 when the UNGA's Social, Cultural and Humanitarian Affairs Third Committee prepared to consider the issue once again. Nervous Chilean

officials alerted Washington to the possible passage of a resolution more critical of regime violations than in the past. The response was surprisingly cool and blunt: "Chile must help her friends help her" and the Junta had done itself no favors by refusing entry to the UNHRC Working Group. In the absence of improvements, even Kissinger was forced to concede that the White House could no longer adhere to the fence-sitting positions it adopted at previous UNGA and UNHRC meetings. "We must be prepared," he telegraphed the USUN Mission in New York, "to accept language in resolutions reflecting widespread concern over [the] Chilean attitude and impatience at [the] refusal of Chile to cooperate in establishing facts."¹¹⁸

Opinion among American diplomats about the resolution most likely to emerge from the Third Committee was restrained in comparison with earlier proposals. The Santiago Embassy characterized it as "generally moderate," non-condemnatory, and "largely free of verbal overkill." Ambassador Popper thought the US should abstain if the final wording was mild to "lend strength to the more moderate elements in GOC" and only vote against the resolution if its language was toughened.¹¹⁹ UN Ambassador Moynihan told Kissinger the final text was the result of a "fragile truce" between the hardliners and the moderates on the Committee and judged it an improvement over some earlier draft resolutions, principally because it avoided a "direct condemnation" of Chile.¹²⁰ The mildly worded resolution expressed "profound distress" at the violations of human rights, called on the Chilean authorities to take all necessary measures to restore and safeguard basic individual rights "without delay," and deplored the refusal to allow the Working Group visit to take place.¹²¹ The USUN delegation recommended a favorable vote for three reasons: to signal US displeasure over the cancellation of the Working Group visit; to send a message to the Chileans that they must improve their human rights performance; and because abstaining would considerably limit the administration's ability "to accomplish anything in the human rights area at this GA [General Assembly]."¹²² But a "Yes" vote should be accompanied by an explanation that included criticism of the UN's tendency "to show only a selective concern about the protection of human rights in member states."¹²³

Following a telephone conversation with Moynihan on the eve of the final vote, Kissinger indicated that he would support the resolution even though "I don't like it," and ended the conversation with his now familiar, and increasingly fanciful, refrain about the dangers of a Portuguese-style government achieving power in Chile.¹²⁴ For the first time the US voted against Chile in a major international body. The reaction in Santiago was

more one of resignation than great anger. Pinochet expressed “disappointment and surprise,” while Foreign Minister Carvajal claimed it would strengthen Junta hard-liners and the “moderate voices will be correspondingly weakened”—an interpretation that US Ambassador David Popper echoed.¹²⁵ To ensure that the regime’s leaders were laboring under no illusions about US support for the wording of the resolution, Deputy Assistant Secretary Hewson Ryan informed Chile’s Permanent UN Representative Huerta that it “represented the consensus of all elements of the USG.”¹²⁶ The full General Assembly had also passed the resolution by an impressive margin: 88 to 11 with 20 abstentions.

In early November, Ford had decided to relieve a notably reluctant Kissinger of his NSC post and appoint his deputy, General Brent Scowcroft. Regarded as a loyal acolyte, Scowcroft described this change at the top of the NSC as “seamless.”¹²⁷ While the decision stripped Kissinger of his White House office and staff he continued to dominate NSC proceedings due both to his perceived pre-eminence in foreign policy matters and through his position as Secretary of State. Kissinger’s shift was also part of a broader cabinet reshuffle engineered by White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld who moved to the Pentagon to become Secretary of Defense, replacing James Schlesinger. Although Rumsfeld was successful in eliminating one of Kissinger’s two positions, he failed in an attempt to place his preferred candidate, Arthur Hartman, as the new NSC adviser rather than Scowcroft whose foreign policy outlook closely approximated that of his predecessor. This ensured the NSC remained more or less within Kissinger’s orbit.¹²⁸

Kissinger was still considering his options in respect of visiting Santiago when the UN Security Council voted by a margin of 17 to 2 with 5 abstentions to hold its 1976 General Assembly meeting in the Chilean capital. The US decision to abstain from voting was primarily influenced by the Junta’s refusal to admit the UN Human Rights Commission Working Group.¹²⁹ This latest instance of so-called public distancing from Chile was part of what the NSC’s Latin American Director Stephen Low termed the administration’s “increasingly hard-nosed” policy approach toward Pinochet’s regime.¹³⁰ For the moment, officially, the White House continued to link its attendance at the UN Security Council meeting to Chilean government cooperation with an international investigation of the domestic human rights environment.¹³¹

CHAPTER 4

A COOLER EMBRACE

“My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going Communist.”

Henry Kissinger to General Augusto Pinochet, June 1976.

As the Ford presidency prepared to enter its last year, interagency and intelligence reports described a “diminishing commonality of interest” between the United States and Latin America. The increase in regional “bitterness” was largely the result of a perception that Washington had “unilaterally changed the rules of hemispheric (economic) interaction,” ranging from increased protectionism and declining levels of aid, “punitive legislation [and] threats of retaliation for disagreement on international issues,” to a lack of reciprocity for concessions by Latin governments. In the case of Chile, Washington’s failure to appreciate the elimination of “a Marxist cancer” had led to “warming relationship” between Santiago and, ironically, Communist China.¹

Toward the end of 1975, the pressure in Washington for some kind of change in its approach to Chile was palpable. A number of State Department officials had become increasingly irritated by the military Junta’s stubborn refusal to ease its repressive practices and had begun calling for the adoption of tougher measures to drive the message home. Meanwhile, the White House was locked in an unresolved dispute with Congress over the provision of economic and military assistance to the regime while the international opprobrium directed at the Junta only served to further isolate the US defense of the Chilean dictatorship from positions taken in Europe and elsewhere around the world.

Chile’s human rights performance was scheduled to be a major agenda item at the next UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) meeting in Geneva in early 1976. Kissinger instructed Ambassador Popper to meet with government officials and suggest that they take account of international concern and at least indicate “a desire to correct the abuses that have occurred.” Allowing the UNHRC Working Group to visit would

be a good start. Popper was advised to stress that without some “gesture of cooperation” it would be difficult to offset the negative impression created by the earlier cancellation, and almost certainly result in the UNHRC and other UN forums taking “stronger condemnatory measures” in the future.² Like similar past requests, this overture had no impact where it most counted. Pinochet, Chile’s Director General of the Foreign Office explained, had ruled out a UNHRC visit as “absolutely foreclosed [and] would not reverse [this decision].”³ Weeks later, Air Force General Leigh told a visiting US congressional staffer that, while he was “concerned with Chile’s poor international image,” he would not be taking any action to change Pinochet’s mind. Differences of opinion on specific issues remained compatible with a Junta consensus over basic objectives.⁴ The CIA had long since arrived at the same conclusion. Irrespective of differing personal, professional and political outlooks, the ruling generals remained sensitive to the need to “compromise where necessary to preserve the unity of the Junta.”⁵ In late June, to take one example, Popper had two separate conversations with senior Air Force officers close to General Leigh, both of whom stressed that the entire higher Chilean Air Force command thought Pinochet “had let power go to his head.” They complained about his refusal to terminate the state of siege and his preoccupation with getting inflation under control at the expense of attacking unemployment and raising living standards. Leigh’s fellow generals attributed the latter to “the ‘Milton Friedman nonsense’ preached by Chilean civilian economic ministers.” That said, they emphatically denied that their branch of the armed forces would “abandon Pinochet or the Junta.”⁶

What Washington should do about Pinochet’s refusal to heed its advice was a matter of some contention among the Country Team—as the 1977-78 CASP revealed. In his overview of the situation, Popper described a regime that was “firmly in control” and posed no current threat to US economic or strategic interests but its “deep-seated desire” for close bilateral ties was unlikely so long as a concern with the absence of basic human rights “dominate[d] our approach to Chile.” Popper, and a majority of Embassy officials, believed the provision of military and economic aid could be utilized as a lever to force the generals to gradually bring their human rights practices up to “acceptable standards” so long as it was done in a gradual way. Any resort to a “meat-axe approach” would be counterproductive and most likely “force the Junta into a much tighter repressive and xenophobic posture.” For the second year in a row, a dissenting paper was attached to the CASP outlining the views of two political officers and five other Embassy officials. Their analysis was

premised on the assumption that “absent strong pressures to the contrary,” the regime’s abusive behavior was unlikely to change and that this could only be to the detriment of US interests in Chile and to America’s global reputation. The “dissenters” were at one with their colleagues on the need to avoid an excessively “rapid” application of pressure because it might lead to increased state-authored repression. But, in the absence of some “tangible” action the White House would not achieve its objectives because diplomatic actions and UN votes failed to send Pinochet and his Junta colleagues “a sufficiently strong message.” The dissenters proposed that all economic and financial aid, and access to military hardware and training, be terminated after FY1976.⁷

For the moment, the Ford administration confined its leverage to symbolic pressures—and even these actions were not always applied in a consistent fashion. In February, the US voted for a Chile resolution in the UNHRC expressing “profound distress at the constant, flagrant violations of human rights, including the institutionalized practice of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest, detention and exile.” That same month, however, Kissinger handed the Junta a public relations coup by announcing that he would, after all, head the US delegation to the June OAS meeting in Santiago.⁸ Not surprisingly, an Embassy political officer about to be reassigned after a three year posting in Santiago, told ARA’s George Lister that the Junta was not receiving consistently “clear signals on USG’s Chile policy” which are “essential” if Washington desires to influence Pinochet.⁹

An economic lifeline

Back in November 1975, the administration presented to Congress a FY1976 economic aid package for Chile exceeding \$100 million—double that of any other country in the region and 20 percent of total US assistance to the Western Hemisphere proposed for that year. Senator Edward Kennedy’s reaction to this request was unsympathetic. Still smarting from what had happened twelve months previously when he sponsored an amendment to limit economic aid to Chile to \$25 million in FY1975 only for the actual figure to end up topping \$100 million despite “continuing repression, the continuing use of torture and the continuing violations of human rights,” he served notice of a new amendment to the 1975 International Development and Food Assistance Act that would substantially cut this latest request.¹⁰

Administration policy, however, was not reducible simply to matters of “political interest,” as Kennedy had asserted.¹¹ Falling global demand for

copper and the devastating social and economic costs of the April 1975 austerity measures had significantly increased the number of Chileans living in extreme poverty, and bankrupted, slashed the incomes, or eliminated the jobs of tens of thousands of small property owners and public sector workers. The result was growing discontent among a range of societal groups, including some who had been strong supporters of the 1973 coup and an important social base of the dictatorship. Only the armed forces budget, which jumped from \$332 million in 1973 to \$653 million in 1974 (falling to \$455 million in 1975, but still a substantial increase over 1973), was relatively exempt from the effects of the new economic program.¹²

These developments accounted for a strong concern among US officials that Chile might fail to meet its 1976 foreign debt repayments, projected at around \$700 million or 38 per cent of its entire export earnings which, in turn, could trigger a default chain reaction among other Latin American debtors and fuel debt moratorium sentiments in other parts of the Third World—all of which had the potential to impact severely on the US as the world's largest creditor nation.¹³ With the difficulties surrounding the 1975 debt renegotiations fresh in his mind, and convinced that the 1976 discussions would be even more politically complicated, Chile's Finance Minister Jorge Cauas raised the possibility that renegotiation this time around might be more trouble than it was worth. World Bank and IMF officials dismissed such thinking as "wholly impractical" and dangerous for a government grappling with a severe economic crisis.¹⁴

In contrast to the more demanding and rigorous conditions that normally attached to IMF loans or balance of payments support, the private foreign banking community's lending requirements were far less onerous. In the case of Chile, they provided a veritable economic lifeline to the regime. These financial institutions, flush with funds as a result of the quadrupling of global oil prices in 1973-74 were, in the words of a Business International executive, "falling all over each other" to fill the coffers of the military dictatorship—at high interest rates but with far fewer strings than the conditions attached to IMF or MDB loans. And, if asked, Washington was only too willing to "provide a positive assessment of Chile's economic policies and creditworthiness."¹⁵ As a result, the country's dependence on these private bank funds more than doubled from 25 percent of total foreign borrowings in 1975 to 59 percent in 1976 (skyrocketing to around 80 percent in 1977).¹⁶

If the largesse of the foreign private banks was enthusiastically supported by the Ford administration as a means of circumventing

congressional restraints on US aid and the difficulties experienced in dealing with the IFIs, this did not mean a lessened effort to gain Chile access to funds from these global institutions. In mid-January 1976, the State Department's Office of Bolivia-Chile (BC) Affairs proposed a slew of new initiatives to ease Chile's economic problems and to avoid any possibility of a debt default that singled out the importance of supporting IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loans to the Pinochet government.¹⁷ Weeks later, strong American lobbying in the World Bank paid off when the Executive Directors approved a \$33 million copper development loan to Chile—more than the Bank's total aid provided in the previous two years—despite abstentions or no votes by 9 of the 20 member countries (including virtually all of the West Europeans) representing over 40 percent of the bank's voting power. The White House senior economic adviser, William Seidman, insisted the US voted in favor of the loan "solely on its economic merits"¹⁸—a puzzling explanation given that Chile was supposedly mired in the worst recession since the 1930s and their European allies had profound doubts about its creditworthiness.

This paradox did not escape congressional critics of the lenient treatment afforded Pinochet's Chile. In a letter to Bank President Robert McNamara, the influential chair of the House Banking and Currency Committee, Henry Reuss (D-WI), charged that the institution's own internal documents did not validate McNamara's claim at the time of the vote that the "Yes" case was based on "purely economic grounds."¹⁹ In Reuss' opinion, it was dictated by the Bank's "favorable assessment" of the regime's neo-liberal economic model. What else, he asked, could explain deeming an economy "creditworthy" that was in "incomparably worse" shape compared with 1971 when the Bank deemed the Allende government "uncreditworthy" and suspended assistance to Chile? In voting for the \$33 million loan, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that the Bank had "gone all-out to justify an essentially unjustifiable loan," knuckling under to political pressure from American officials "to shore up an inhuman right-wing dictatorship tottering on the edge of bankruptcy."²⁰

In a March cable to London, a British Embassy official recounted a discussion with State's Deputy Director of BC Affairs William Lowenthal about Chile's debt servicing problem. The White House bind, he reported, was that no amount of lobbying would convince Congress to support a bilateral, rather than a multilateral rescheduling, and, absent an improved human rights environment, a new rescheduling process was unlikely to begin.²¹ For the first time in three years, the Americans chose not to press ahead with efforts to convene a Paris Club meeting. The subsequent failure

to renegotiate its debt servicing arrangements with European creditors left the Chilean government saddled with more than triple the debt service and interest on loans it had expected to repay in 1976.²²

Despite Washington's reticence to force the issue in the Paris Club, it was eager to provide what bilateral assistance it could. On his arrival in Santiago in early May, Secretary of the Treasury William Simon indicated that the US was prepared to support loan submissions to the IFIs, encourage new inflows of US private investment by restarting the Overseas Private Investment Corporation's (OPIC) insurance program, and implement an agreement to avoid double taxation, contingent on "a framework of a system ensuring personal and political freedoms."²³ At a round table conversation with senior Chilean economic and foreign policy officials, Simon called the human rights issue a serious obstacle to improved bilateral ties and to increased US and multilateral aid flows:

We fought in the World Bank for you. I urged debt rescheduling for Chile.... But there will be trouble in the IBRD and I[A]DB. Congressman Reuss' letter is an indication. Unless we break down this obvious impediment, the situation will get worse. We were disappointed when the UNHRC trip was cancelled. The dangers are clear if the situation is not reversed.²⁴

The Chileans promised to take some measures to improve the country's image abroad, including a commitment to work with the UNHRC, but most of what they said rested on vague assurances of Junta actions at some indefinite time. Particularly revealing were those issues the Chileans refused to discuss: terminating the state of siege, disbanding the secret police (DINA), putting a stop to arbitrary arrests and disappearances, and addressing the lack of political rights. What modest concessions Simon extracted—a speeding up of the "parole" program and agreement to discuss a possible UNHRC visit—came from civilian officials he knew personally, notably Finance Minister Jorge Cauas, who had next to no influence with Pinochet when it came to political matters.²⁵ Nonetheless, Simon had already delivered a huge boost to Chile's reputation for creditworthiness by his very presence in Santiago and his statements of continued US support.²⁶

In a detailed briefing to representatives of the European Economic Community missions in Santiago, the Embassy's DCM Thomas Boyatt insisted that the Simon visit "should not be seen as marking any change in US policy."²⁷ This seemed borne out following the Treasury Secretary's return when the *Washington Post* reported that the State Department had pressured OPIC to quietly begin insuring companies that invested in Chile,

that State and Treasury had encouraged a consortium US and Canadian banks to lend Santiago between \$100 and \$125 million to pay short-term obligations to other countries, and that the administration had used its influence to get the IADB to lend Chile up to \$125 million, with the first \$20 million already approved.²⁸

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) in executive session, Simon pressed the case for maintaining the US economic aid program—and avoiding any contemplated cuts in the 1976-77 security assistance legislation relating to Chile—on the thin reed of assurances given by Pinochet that the human rights situation would be improved. Such a guarantee did not impress Simon's skeptical questioners. What angered Hubert Humphrey and Edward Kennedy was the perception of an autocratic regime receiving overly generous treatment from the administration, including the great bulk of PL-480 aid allocated for Latin America.²⁹

Congress keeps the pressure on

If the White House efforts to support Chile economically produced a heated response on Capitol Hill, attempts to rescind legislative constraints on military aid to the Junta generated even more anger. Michigan congressman Donald Riegle Jr (D) expressed a widely held view during a hearing on the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (ISAAECA): "I don't understand why [Chile] over and above others in South America deserves greater help." There was, Riegle told a senior Defense Department official testifying against a total arms embargo, no justification for giving a nation ruled by a repressive regime such special treatment.³⁰ His colleague, Donald Fraser, accused the Executive Branch of paying lip service to human rights problem while simultaneously acting in ways "to make clear to Chile that we have a special relationship." For some "wholly obscure [reason], we feel a need to give them preferred treatment." In his view, the contrast between this molycoddling of the authoritarian generals and a disinterest in the civilian targets of their violence could not have been greater.³¹

Michael Harrington (D-MA) proposed a complete prohibition on all forms of military assistance to Chile in an amendment to the House version of the FAA. This was simply too much for Alabama's Republican congressman John Buchanan Jr. who countered with an alternative amendment to avoid a blanket ban. His proposal would permit FMS cash sales after September 30, even in the absence of a presidential determination that a visible improvement in human rights had occurred,

and it would avoid any blockage of commercial sales and delivery of military items in the pipeline.³² In the Senate, Kennedy introduced an amendment to a version of the ISAAECA to embargo the sale of all American-made weapons to Chile. When the bill reached the floor of the Chamber it was supported by a margin of 48 to 39. Hubert Humphrey spoke for many of the bill's supporters, describing the dictatorial regime as "a handful of thugs [who] had shot their way into power."³³ The Chilean response was predictably hostile. In a speech alluding to the Senate's action, Pinochet referred to "demagogues from countries who have traditionally been friends of ours, [who] embroider their electoral campaigns with a cheap form of leftism.... They are the puppets [of] Soviet imperialism." Even so, the US Embassy described the government reaction as "less than might have been expected."³⁴ Reporting on a conversation with Pinochet, DCM Boyatt wrote that the Junta head was more worried about the "symbolical impact" than the "practical effects" of the Senate vote.³⁵

State Department officials were most upset by the provision in the Kennedy amendment that would eliminate \$122 million worth of equipment, including 18 F-5E and 18 A-37 aircraft already in the pipeline, which Santiago had agreed to pay in cash upon delivery.³⁶ Despite indications of a tough battle ahead with the Congress, a staff aide to NSC Adviser Brent Scowcroft thought there was a reasonable chance of defeating a total ban on military assistance and sales on the floor of the House, thereby shifting the issue to a House-Senate Conference Committee. This would provide an opportunity to lobby for an outcome "as close to the Buchanan amendment as possible," he wrote. "If necessary to defeat the Kennedy amendment, we would be willing to sacrifice some or all of the new FMS sales or commercial sales." The highest priority was the \$122 million in pipeline funds.³⁷ Kissinger instructed his subordinates "to make an all-out effort [to] defeat" Harrington's House version.³⁸ At the Pentagon, officials were optimistic about retaining the Buchanan amendment language or "at least some compromise short of a total embargo" if the Conference Committee was called upon to reconcile the two conflicting pieces of legislation.³⁹

In mid-March, prior to the House vote, Thomas Harkin (D-IA), George Miller (D-CA) and Tony Moffett (D-CT) visited Chile. Their primary purpose was to investigate "the real effect of US foreign aid dollars" but it was the appalling political situation they encountered that had the greatest impact: "During our stay, it became increasingly clear that the Junta... rules... by terror. We found a silent and pervasive fear in all segments of Chilean society."⁴⁰ They antagonized the regime by meeting with Cardinal

Raúl Silva and former PDC President Eduardo Frei while failing to keep scheduled appointments with the Interior Minister and the President of the Supreme Court. Embarrassed US diplomats went out of their way to stress that they “did not arrange any meetings or interviews for the visitors, other than those with members of the Government.”⁴¹ On their return, the three legislators announced that they would lobby for a total cut-off of military aid, including pipeline funds. “As long as US aid keeps flowing through the pipeline,” they told a press conference, “there is no deterrent to the military Junta’s repressive human rights policies.”⁴² In a jointly prepared statement to the House International Relations Committee (HRC), Harkin decried the absence of a “concrete message” from the administration that would “in any way act as a deterrent or moderating influence on the Junta.” Moffett added that he became quite perturbed when senior Embassy officials “boasted proudly of the wonderful job that the new Chilean government had done on internal security” and lauded the Junta leaders as “our kind of people.”⁴³ These comments had little impact on House legislators who voted overwhelming against terminating all aid to Chile which automatically propelled the competing amendments to the Foreign Assistance Bill to a joint Conference Committee for a final decision.

Over relentless administration objections, however, Congress did land a potential blow to the Pinochet regime when it voted in May to extend the 1975 Harkin amendment authorizing termination of aid to major human rights abusers unless it directly benefited those most in need to cover loan applications to the IADB and the African Development Fund (ADF). President Ford criticized this decision as “well intended but misguided [and] an awkward and ineffective device” for promoting internationally recognized human rights.⁴⁴

On May 7, despite relentless pressure from the “formidable ‘Israeli lobby’” who opposed any holdup in the provision of military aid to Washington’s most important political and strategic ally in the Middle East, President Ford vetoed the Foreign Assistance Bill citing the mandatory nature of 502B as his reason—and singled out for criticism the legislators’ decision to terminate “the modest program of military assistance to Chile.” This justification did not impress the majority of legislators who “considered aid for Israel much more important than human rights in Chile.”⁴⁵ Eventually, the White House and Congress reached a compromise on the wording of the bill that allowed the President to provide assistance to abusive regimes if extraordinary circumstances pertained. The revised language of the bill also conditioned aid sanctions on a provision that required the President’s signature, thereby giving the

Executive Branch increased control over aid flows. A now satisfied Ford signed the bill into law, including its “watered down version” of the Senate’s 502B provision, at the end of June.⁴⁶ With the ink barely dry on the document, the State and Treasury Departments turned their attention to developing guidelines that would enable the administration to take the “greatest advantage possible” of the basic needs loophole.⁴⁷ This sleight of hand tactic would only fuel the growing militancy among those legislators critical of US aid to Third World governments deemed to be human rights abusers.

The compromise bill also delayed the requirement that formal country reports be submitted until FY1978, although Congress did ask for “sample” reports on 13 designated countries. Kissinger turned that request down as well but in the House Donald Fraser then invoked a request for “statements” on six countries (including Chile)—with which State was forced to comply.⁴⁸ James Wilson recalled that State Department officials were almost “unanimous” in requesting that Chile at least should be dumped as a recipient of military assistance or the White House risked so “infuriating Congress that they would enact even stricter legislation.” Kissinger’s response was to refer privately to his staff as “theologians” and “bleeding hearts.”⁴⁹

Kissinger’s side-show in Santiago

Kissinger’s decision to attend the OAS gathering in Santiago exemplified his tendency to blunder or miscalculate when dealing with issues or areas of the world where his expertise was limited. “It does his ego good,” a State Department official explained to the *Miami Herald*. “They kick him around in Europe, he’s lost his magic in the Middle East and he’s a political issue here at home. Latin America is one of the few places left where he still gets the kind of reception he likes.”⁵⁰ The prevailing sentiment in State’s Latin American bureau, of course, had been that going to Chile should be dependent on prior human rights concessions from Pinochet’s regime.⁵¹

In a cable to the Secretary soon-after he confirmed the visit would take place, Ambassador Popper described the regime’s human rights progress over the previous twelve months as “generally disappointing.”⁵² Perhaps conscious of Kissinger’s tendency to dismiss such reports when they challenged his preferred course of action, ARA and the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs agreed that human rights should at least be on the agenda of any Kissinger-Pinochet meeting: it would counter likely Chilean efforts to otherwise draw a “more benign” picture

of the situation, and it would offset a Department concern that Kissinger would legitimize the military regime by his presence in Chile.⁵³

As someone who probably had better personal relations with Pinochet than any of his colleagues,⁵⁴ Embassy DCM Thomas Boyatt also worried about how Kissinger should handle a discussion with the Chilean head-of-state and offered some timely advice: "Pinochet is shrewd and hardheaded, but finds it difficult to deal with contrasting viewpoints. He is so narrow-minded and convinced of his righteousness that it takes sledgehammer blows to call his attention to some unpleasant facts of life. The meeting should be small...and the message direct. If we speak platitudes, Pinochet will never understand what bothers us."⁵⁵ Boyatt recommended that the Secretary emphasize as strongly as possible that the failure to take "specific steps to improve human rights practices," would make it impossible for the US government to "justify the domestic cost of defending his regime against its critics at home and abroad."⁵⁶ On another issue, the Department and Embassy were in complete agreement: rescinding the ban on a UNHRC Working Group visit would undeniably improve Chile's global image.⁵⁷

On May 26, Rogers transmitted a memo to Kissinger outlining in detail what should be the objectives of his trip and the Department's view over how best to achieve them. While the administration had given no thought to promoting a regime change, Roger's message was clear:

Even our present level of relations is at hazard if [the regime] continues practices that offend sincere public opinion around the world. The most important US objectives in Chile, thus, are to improve human rights practices and to make it publicly clear that we do not approve of what is going on. A passive policy would not be an attractive option. Our critics would consider silence an acquiescence. At the same time, since we want real change, we have to leave the Junta a chance to reform without losing face. Aggressive confrontation... would make it difficult for Pinochet to back down.⁵⁸

From Santiago, Popper concurred that any kind of drastic punitive measure such as withholding the delivery of promised F-5E aircraft (until October), could only bolster the authority of regime "hardliners" who desired the government to pursue its own agenda "whatever the cost."⁵⁹

Rogers highlighted another issue that Kissinger needed to address. The Chilean regime must be disabused of the perception that congressional hostility was only confined to "an ineffective minority" and, that being the case, "cosmetic changes would get them by." The generals and their civilian cabinet ministers had to understand "the rudimentary facts of life": that only an improved human rights performance could halt efforts to

further limit US aid and avoid an unnecessary obstacle to international bank loans. The Secretary's primary task would be "to convince" the Chileans of this reality.⁶⁰

Reluctant to apply any significant pressure on the Junta, and convinced that he was being undermined by members of his own Department and elsewhere within the foreign policy bureaucracy, Kissinger did not wholly embrace the Rogers' advice. During their telephone conversation on the eve of the OAS conference, he literally accused his colleagues of wanting to see Pinochet toppled from power: "I am not on the same wave length with you guys on this business. I just am not eager to overthrow these guys.... I think we are systematically undermining them."⁶¹

For Pinochet, the OAS conference was an opportunity to showcase the new Chile. In the lead-up period, he ordered the release of more than 300 political prisoners, decreed medical checks for others still in detention, and issued safe passes out of the country to a number of leftists who had taken refuge in foreign embassies. If these limited, and calculated, gestures had any positive influence on international opinion, it was nullified almost immediately by the blanket findings of the latest IAHRC report on Chile (covering the period August 1974 to January 1976). Quantitative reductions in some categories of human rights abuses notwithstanding, the report accused the military regime of arbitrary imprisonments, persecutions and torture, and a general lack of cooperation in providing access and information to investigators. The continuing restrictions on political party activity, freedom of expression and assembly, and flaws in the legal system were just as "contrary to the full restoration of human rights."⁶² Even a US OAS delegation position paper conceded that Chile exhibited the basic features of "a classic police state."⁶³ None of this could have been welcome news to Kissinger as he prepared to leave for Santiago. At the very least, in his meeting with Pinochet, he would have to navigate his way around these charges. This he would do in a rather duplicitous—and eventually somewhat pointless—fashion.

On June 4, Pinochet opened the regional gathering, denouncing "communist tyranny" as a threat to the Western Hemisphere and attacking "those who adopt peaceful coexistence [global détente] or neutralism in the face of it."⁶⁴ This was not merely Pinochet striking a defensive posture. The previous August, the US and its NATO allies had signed the Helsinki Final Act with the Soviet Union, essentially recognizing Soviet territorial gains in Eastern Europe arising from the Second World War. To the Chilean military this was a serious abrogation of the US' moral responsibility to wage the Cold War. The wider significance of this viewpoint—particularly for US-Chilean relations—seemed entirely lost on

Kissinger and his staff, who at no time seemed alert to what Pinochet was implying, namely that the anti-communist forces in Latin America were on their own in defending their treasured societal values.

Before addressing the conference, Kissinger held his much anticipated meeting with Pinochet. Topping his list of priorities was a desire to allay any fears the dictator might harbor that Chile would be subjected to a major dressing down over the Junta's human rights record. Kissinger told his host that none of the critical remarks in his speech should be taken to heart, that they were nothing more than a sop to American domestic opponents of the regime and did not reflect his views or those of the Ford administration: "In my statement... I will say that the human rights issue has impaired relations between the US and Chile [but] the speech is not aimed at Chile. I wanted to tell you about this. My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going Communist. *But we have a practical problem we have to take into account.*" It was this "practical problem" that stood in the way of deeper economic and military ties between the two nations. Pinochet had to understand that Congress "is in a mood of destructiveness," so much so that Kissinger's instructions to administration officials "to make an all-out effort" to defeat the Kennedy amendment banning military transfers to Chile had no possibility of success in the absence of convincing evidence that the human rights situation was improving. "We must be able to point to events here in Chile or we will be defeated." Kissinger then suggested that the prisoner release program would have a greater "psychological impact" if Pinochet combined the releases instead of staggering them at 20 a week.⁶⁵

But it did not take long for Pinochet to move the discussion to the one issue that preoccupied the Junta above all else: the Peruvian military buildup. Twelve months earlier, an NIE had provided a precise summary of the Junta's preoccupation with the threat of a Peruvian military attack. This was "its principal foreign problem" and influenced its efforts "to improve its international position and its bilateral relations" far more than any other factor.⁶⁶

Despite this NIE and periodic Embassy cable traffic referring to Chilean anxiety about Peruvian intentions, on this issue Kissinger appeared to have been caught totally unawares. Under Pinochet's direct questioning, he sidestepped straightforward answers:

Pinochet: How does the US see the problem between Chile and Peru?

Kissinger: [after a pause] We would not like to see a conflict. Much depends on who begins it.... If Peru attacked, this would be a serious

matter for a country armed with Soviet equipment. It would be serious. Clearly we would oppose it diplomatically. But it all depends, beyond that. It is not easy to generate support for US military action these days....

Pinochet: Assume the worst, that is to say, that Chile is the aggressor. Peru defends itself and then attacks us. What happens?

Kissinger: It's not that easy....

Pinochet: I am concerned very much by the Peruvian situation....you have a punitive system for your friends.

Kissinger: There is merit in what you say. It is a curious time in the US.⁶⁷

What this exchange revealed was that President Ford's senior foreign policy adviser had clearly misread Pinochet's priorities and was unprepared to address the dictator's foremost concern. Assurances regarding public criticism of the regime's human rights record, although welcome, paled in significance to Chile's desire for a US commitment to prevent a military attack by Peru or, failing that, to assist the country in the event of war with its neighbor. Kissinger's uncertain and decidedly non-committal response—that it would depend on the circumstances at the time in some vague sense—had an impact on the course of bilateral relations that could not be underestimated. In light of conclusions that Chilean military analysts had already drawn from their observations of the Pakistan-India wars of 1965 and 1971 and the Israeli-Arab wars of 1967 and 1973—that small countries could not depend on superpower allies to come to their aid in regional conflicts⁶⁸—Kissinger's responses further persuaded Pinochet that the US was an unreliable ally that could not be trusted to provide support when it was most needed.

All of this seemed to escape the Secretary of State who was reasonably upbeat over the reception accorded his speech to the closed session of the ●AS where he repeated part of what he had told Pinochet—that human rights abuses had “impaired” the US relationship with Chile and would “continue to do so.”⁶⁹ As expected, the US voted in favor of the conference resolution on Chile which authorized the IAHRC to continue monitoring and documenting abuses. Washington had now supported resolutions critical of Chile in the UNGA, the UNHRC, and the IAHRC. Although some scholars have argued that Kissinger's message to the ●AS carried weight,⁷⁰ the reality was otherwise. The statement was essentially meaningless, completely undermined by the Secretary's behind-the-scenes assurances to Pinochet regarding human rights. But, more importantly, what Pinochet had sought from Kissinger were guarantees over Peru—not suggestions about how he might assist the administration to do more to aid Chile generally. And, most importantly, his disappointment at Kissinger's response gave him even less reason to curry favor with Washington by

complying with White House or congressional strictures about human rights.

Kissinger's subsequent extraordinary outburst over the comments made by the US representative on the IAHRC, Robert White, continued his generally aggressive—if by now more ineffective—defense of the Chilean regime. The Secretary had already returned to Washington by the time the IAHRC was ready to consider its latest report on Chile. When the Junta government rejected the report, White accused it of “refusing to see itself as others see it.”⁷¹ A furious Kissinger complained to Rogers that not only had the American diplomat made a “passionate defense” of the report, he then had the temerity to set about “humiliating” the Chileans. This, to Kissinger, was nothing short of a “bloody outrage.”⁷²

Congress and aid issues

Less than two months after the Santiago Embassy submitted its 1977-78 CASP report, Ambassador David Popper offered his own analysis of Washington's decision to “perceptibly” change its approach to dealing with Chile's human rights problem. Since July 1975, Popper wrote, US policy had shifted from an emphasis on “quiet diplomatic suasion” to one based on a “more forceful series of policy decisions,” including support for UN resolutions condemning human rights practices in Chile (November 1975, February 1976), an abstention vote on Chile hosting the June 1976 OAS General Assembly meeting, deleting Chile from the US military assistance program for FY1976 and FY1977, and a refusal to support Junta efforts to convene a 1976 Paris Club meeting.⁷³ Nonetheless, Popper considered these actions as less a principled objection to the Junta's systematic and sustained repression than to symptomatic factors—above all, Pinochet's indefinite postponement of the UNHRC Working Group visit.

Popper's interpretation, however, overstated the extent of the policy shift insofar as senior US officials continued to offer mixed signals in regard to human rights, downplayed the seriousness of abuses inside Chile and, where urging restraint or reform, did so with a view to appeasing critics of the Junta who the administration generally regarded with disdain. Moreover, no effort was spared to support Chile in the MFIs, to encourage US private bank lending and new investments, and to disburse what economic aid Washington could provide. Finally, to circumvent any congressional ban on military aid, Ford officials continued to explore avenues for transferring certain kinds of weaponry to the Junta. If it was possible to discern any shift in Chile policy it was primarily driven by a

desire to counter growing domestic and international opposition to Kissinger's efforts to blunt criticism of the Junta. Necessarily, those efforts now required that greater lip-service at least be paid to human rights in Chile.

Doing so was never going to be easy as sentiment on Capitol Hill hardened in opposition to Executive Branch maneuvers designed to keep aid flowing to Chile. Writing to the President in mid-May 1976, NSC Adviser Brent Scowcroft summarized the status of the security assistance legislation as it related to Chile. The Kennedy amendment to the Senate bill imposed a comprehensive embargo on all military assistance and sales (including spare parts) after October 1976 with the sole exception of sales in the pipeline waiting to be released. The State Department-supported House version, incorporating the Buchanan amendment, would permit FMS cash sales and a continuing flow of spare parts for US-origin equipment. While Scowcroft and his staffers also preferred the House version, they did not believe the Senate version in itself would be grounds for veto of an "otherwise acceptable bill."⁷⁴

At the beginning of June, the House passed an amendment to the legislation authored by the chair of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Donald Fraser, placing a ceiling of \$25 million on economic aid to Chile in FY1977 compared with the administration request for \$68 million. What motivated this amendment was an analysis of the US economic aid program to Latin America that revealed the Pinochet regime had received "preferential treatment" during FY1975 and FY1976: the bulk of Public Law 480 Title 1 food aid loans to the region, tens of millions of dollars in housing loan guarantees, a debt rescheduling agreement, Eximbank loans and financial guarantees whose exposure in Chile now totaled \$141 million, and favorable treatment from the international banks. Fraser accused the White House of consciously seeking "to evade the spirit if not the letter of the congressional aid ceilings on Chile." During testimony before his subcommittee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hewson Ryan taxed Fraser's patience by repeatedly attempting to minimize the importance of bilateral ties. At one point Ryan's obfuscations provoked a cutting response from the chair:

The Title 1, Public Law 480 program will enable them to buy arms from us, aid from the Export-Import Bank, the housing guarantees, our votes on the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank for new loans. We are the principle defenders of Chile. We are their friend; they are our client. Why?⁷⁵

An NSC staff aide, Les Janka, informed Scowcroft that if developments in the House were not bad enough, Kennedy intended to replicate Fraser's initiative by introducing a floor amendment incorporating a ceiling provision into the Senate bill. The administration would "strongly oppose" it while attempting to get the House amendment deleted in Conference, although "our prospects for achieving this result are not bright." Pinochet's reluctance to modify his repressive political rule only partly explained Janka's pessimism: the limited nature of the aid programs themselves meant that neither the domestic agricultural sector nor the arms industry had any good reason to actively lobby on Chile's behalf.⁷⁶

The White House eventually gained a small victory when the House-Senate Conference Committee agreed to allow pipeline deliveries (amounting to \$115 million in equipment already contracted and paid for) and military training activities currently in progress. But a more significant indicator of congressional sentiment—a decision to prohibit commercial and future arms spare parts sales—did not bode well for increases in Chile aid. The committee rejected administration efforts to allow private commercial sales because it wanted "the narrowest possible" interpretation placed on the relevant provision.⁷⁷ At the Defense Department (DOD), the priority was to ensure the flow of additional spare parts and other items not in the pipeline that were critical to the optimal functioning of American-origin equipment about to be delivered to, or already in, Chile. It proposed negotiating a new agreement with the Chileans before the current legislation was enacted into law to provide up to \$18 million worth of spare parts, air safety equipment and technical manuals. In State there were qualms about how this idea would be received on the Hill even though the Pentagon intended "to do this openly in full consultation with the Congress." State officials could not shake the feeling that this would generate considerable "flak" thereby undermining the gains achieved over the past twelve months in "reestablishing trust" between the two branches of government.⁷⁸

Commenting on the House-Senate Conference decision, Rogers let Kissinger know that the State Department, together with DOD and AID, had gone "all out on the legislation" and had achieved some important victories in efforts "to soften the provisions on Chile." Apart from getting language inserted in the bill to permit delivery of the weaponry paid for in the pipeline (defeating Kennedy's effort to prevent this transaction), they were able to exempt the non-concessional activities of the Eximbank, OPIC and the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) from the ceiling on bilateral economic aid.⁷⁹ Other senior colleagues assured Kissinger that the results of the Conference Committee decision

were “considerably better than we had anticipated,” particularly in permitting the sale of F-5Es and other Chile materiel in the pipeline.⁸⁰ Unconvinced, the Secretary stubbornly clung to the belief that an American ally was being punished out of all proportion to its internal shortcomings. He instructed the Santiago Embassy to deliver a letter to Foreign Minister Carvajal expressing his “disappoint[ment]” at the outcome, stressing that the US government had resolutely opposed measures to limit or terminate economic and military aid, and conveying the hope that continuing efforts to repeal the legislation would ultimately succeed.⁸¹

A few days later, Stephen Low reported to Scowcroft that Kissinger was apparently still making up his mind before approving one of three alternatives presented to him by his subordinates regarding a proposed \$15 million spare parts agreement with Chile. Concerned that the process was “moving very slowly,” Low recommended that Scowcroft tell the Secretary time was running out and unless the Department of Defense received State’s authorization to proceed “within the next day or so,” there was almost no possibility of getting the parts package approved.⁸² After conferring with Scowcroft, Kissinger decided to give the “go ahead” to the Pentagon. Relations with Congress took a subsequent turn for the worse when Senators Hubert Humphrey and Edward Kennedy accused the State Department of “rushing through” a new \$9.2 million package of spare parts for the Chilean Air Force “in a last-ditch effort to beat a congressional ban on further weapons aid for Chile.” Kennedy called it “outrageous [and] a clear total violation of the spirit” of the provision banning military aid.⁸³

In the course of his grilling of Hewson Ryan, Fraser had focused attention on the crucial role of the MFIs in putting their stamp of approval on the Junta’s economic program with the strong support of the US government. This issue was subsequently addressed head on by the chair of the House Banking and Currency Committee, Henry Reuss, who launched a powerful attack on the World Bank, the IADB and the US private banking community over their hard currency commitments to an economy in the midst of a severe recession and close to bankruptcy, a situation brought about in part by the regime’s own free market austerity policies.⁸⁴ Reuss’s specific target was a recent \$125 million loan from 16 American and Canadian banks signed in January 1976 which, he contended, violated the banks’ own letter of commitment, because it stipulated that any such loan was predicated on Chile negotiating an IMF standby agreement to guarantee effective international supervision of the country’s economic policies. In a letter to the US Comptroller of the

Currency, Reuss warned that the loan carried “a substantial risk” for the participating banks given the “shambles” into which the Chilean economy had fallen and the refusal to provide relief by major European creditors holding the largest share of the post-1976 debt. Aware that the Fund and Santiago could not agree on the terms of a standby, thereby casting doubt on Chile’s ability to pay back the loan without incurring another multi-million debt, the bank syndicate nonetheless proceeded with the line of credit amid allegations that both the State and Treasury Departments had encouraged the consortium to do so despite the excessive risk. Under questioning by Reuss, the Comptroller lamely responded that he had no knowledge of these allegations.⁸⁵

During his visit to Santiago, Kissinger had held discussions with Foreign Minister Carvajal and Finance Minister Cauas to lay to rest any concerns they harbored about US support for a \$21 million IADB loan to the Chilean private sector. Cauas had opened the meeting by telling an apparently unaware Secretary of State that twenty four hours earlier the IADB’s Chilean Executive Director was told the US desired to postpone a scheduled vote on the loan for a week “so as to comply with informing Congress because of the Harkin Amendment.” Although there was no criticism of the technical aspects of the loan, the Chileans had learnt that Treasury Secretary William Simon discussed the vote with congressional officials a second time. An incensed Kissinger assured the two Cabinet ministers that this was nothing more than “harassment” of an ally and he “would get this situation under control” on his return to Washington. “I will not have my statements on human rights here used to injure Chile.” This was another case of individuals wanting to get into the “human rights business,” he claimed. Shifting into full sarcastic mode, he declared that his “prime function this year is to take the blame. Let them say that Henry Kissinger with his well-known fondness for dictatorship has ordered this.” William Rogers, who was at the meeting, responded that a week’s delay “would set a fatal precedent” in both the IADB and the World Bank for upcoming loan submissions by the military regimes in Argentina and Brazil. Worse than that, Kissinger exploded, “it would ruin our foreign policy.” And as far as the IADB loan was concerned “my position is for the loan and against consulting with Congress on it.”⁸⁶ On the same day (June 10), back in Washington, State’s HA Coordinator received an inquiry regarding a pending IADB loan to Chile from the Treasury Department to confirm its understanding that a favorable vote would require a determination as to whether or not a consistent pattern of widespread human rights abuses existed in Chile and, if so, whether the pending loan met the “basic human needs” (BHN) test. HA responded that

Chile clearly fitted the “consistent pattern” criteria and supported an analysis as to whether this loan project should be given the green light.⁸⁷

“Bureaucratically the loan was a big problem,” recalled a State Department official. “This was a hot potato that nobody wanted to touch. We struggled with it down to literally the last minute.”⁸⁸ Be that as it may, the Treasury-chaired National Advisory Council (NAC)—responsible for coordinating US actions in the MFIs—maintained that under the Harkin Amendment responsibility for assessing a country’s human rights performance rested with State. Initially, none of the economic agencies raised any objections to the Chile loan submission and routine preparations proceeded on the assumption of a favorable Board outcome. To avoid any congressional criticism, a Treasury lawyer advised Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary John Bushnell to notify State before giving NAC approval, even though the State was represented at the NAC meetings that reviewed the loan. On so doing, he discovered that the issue had already been referred to Kissinger for a decision. Bushnell made it clear that he would follow standard operating procedure in these cases: in the absence of objections from State the loan would go ahead. Kissinger eventually bowed to the advice from his Legal Adviser that the Harkin Amendment meant the US Executive Director could not legally support the loan.

The day before the IADB Board vote, Bushnell was notified of the decision to oppose the loan unaccompanied by any reason for doing so. To say the least, he was perplexed at this outcome: “We seldom vote ‘No’ on a loan, and we always explain why.” Unable to arrange a last minute NAC committee meeting to consider the matter, he demanded a memo from State explicitly directing the US Executive Director John Porges to cast a negative vote. The memo arrived on the morning of the Board meeting only to confront one last hurdle. Porges declared he would not vote as instructed because he personally opposed the Harkin amendment and, in any event, accused State of misinterpreting its meaning. This response cut no ice with the Bushnell: “You don’t have any choice. It’s the law of the land and the NAC procedures have been followed.”⁸⁹

At an early July meeting of the IADB Executive Directors, the US grudgingly opposed the loan but refused to charge the regime with engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violations as required by the Harkin amendment. Congressional staffers monitoring the debate ascribed this precedent-setting vote to a calculation that, even without American support, there were enough votes on the Board to ensure the loan passed. If this was a true reading of the administration’s view, it likely accounted for the absence of any US lobbying in support of a “No” vote.⁹⁰

Kissinger's singular determination not to "injure" the Junta fueled his anxiety over the latest proposed congressional restrictions on arms transfers. During a telephone conversation with Senators Hubert Humphrey and Jacob Javits (R-NY), the Secretary insisted that the Chileans "are moving in the right direction now and [we] don't want to kick them in the teeth." Humphrey replied that Capitol Hill was bending over backwards in an effort to meet his requests. The House compromise amendment (cash sales but no aid) should be welcomed by the White House, Humphrey said. His tone then shifted, verging on uncharacteristic anger: "You have the Import-Export Bank, you have PL-480. You have economic assistance if they make progress which you and the President certify. You have damn near everything you asked for."⁹¹ The White House did indeed have much of what it asked for—except the required progress on human rights from the Chilean side.

The Junta clearly had other priorities. In the months following the CAS conference, the perceived Peruvian military threat dominated Junta thinking but was no closer to convincing Kissinger or Scowcroft of the need to give any undertakings of support if there was an outbreak of hostilities—reinforcing the belief in Santiago that the US could not be depended upon in a crisis. During his meeting with Scowcroft in mid-July, Admiral Merino again highlighted the Peruvian military threat "with Soviet and Cuban support," and complained that Chile was even being forced to purchase naval spare parts from non-US sources at greater cost while Peruvian and Argentine fleets continued to have access to American-built spares. Scowcroft was singularly unresponsive to Merino's pleading. "We have done the best we could for Chile," he told his visitor, "and in fact had come out better than we had expected earlier in the year would be possible. We were able to get the pipeline approved."⁹²

As for Kissinger, he was never particularly alarmed about any Peruvian threat to Chile *per se*—especially after General Francisco Morales-Bermúdez became President in August 1975 and signaled Peru's shift to a more conservative, pro-Western foreign policy. During his June 8 conversation with Pinochet, Kissinger had expressed mild concern over the regional implications of Peru's expanded military ties with the Soviet Union.⁹³ Otherwise, while conceding there was a "distinct possibility" Peru's acquisition of Soviet military aircraft and missiles could only have a destabilizing impact on countries in the Southern Cone, he continued to dismiss the likelihood of "a deliberate armed attack" on Chile in the near future. Given the "almost nonexistent" possibilities of restoring the balance of military power by persuading Congress to increase US aid to Chile, Kissinger advised the White House that the application of economic

pressures on Peru offered the best prospects of defusing the inevitable rise in tensions as the anniversary of the start of the War of the Pacific (1879-84) approached. The Morales-Bermudez government had inherited an economy in “desperate financial” shape due primarily to major foreign exchange shortages and a rising foreign debt, and was currently negotiating with a number of American and other foreign commercial banks for a \$400 million loan package to meet its external payments for the rest of 1976. “We intend to use [this] leverage,” Kissinger told the President, “to try to persuade the Peruvian Government that a continued buildup threatens its credit worthiness and jeopardizes its developmental objectives.”⁹⁴

At the end of 1975, the prospect of Peruvian military action had not rescinded in the eyes of the Chilean military. Nevertheless, the Junta announced that it would begin negotiations with Bolivia to restore to that landlocked nation a corridor to the sea via Peruvian territory lost to Chile during the nineteenth century conflict. Lima had always insisted “that it has a treaty right to veto any change of sovereignty in the territory it lost to Chile,” Kissinger informed the White House. Recent reports, however, indicate that Chile “may nevertheless unilaterally cede the corridor to the Bolivians” which would undoubtedly anger the Peruvians “and could provide the flashpoint for hostilities.” An attempt to deter “unilateral action” by the Chileans, Kissinger suggested, may well explain the Peruvian buildup.⁹⁵

The interrelated issues of Chile-Peru tensions, US military aid policy toward both nations, and Soviet arms sales to Lima dominated a State Department meeting chaired by Kissinger in early September. A decision was required before the end of the month on whether to proceed with a \$20 million FMS purchase of A-4 Skyhawk jets to Peru that had been under consideration for the past twelve months. Describing the Chileans as “in a state of near panic about this whole business,” Rogers proposed that the administration adopt a “get tough” approach and cancel the deal. Kissinger seemed not averse to that outcome, describing the FMS weaponry as “beyond the usual parade-ground stuff” and part of a Peruvian military buildup that, contradicting his earlier statement, is “bound” to lead to war in the Western Hemisphere because Lima is determined “to build up tension [and] take back the part [of their territory] they lost [during the War in the Pacific].” Turning to the Lima-Moscow military relationship, Under Secretary of State Carl Maw observed that the terms on offer were so “attractive” that the Peruvian Air Force “feels they can’t afford to turn it down.” But it was the offensive nature of the weapons that was most disturbing. Harry Shlaudeman suggested that the

previous US refusal to sell Peru F-5s was “a critical mistake” because they were now buying more advanced aircraft from alternative sources. There was no consensus over how to proceed. For his part, Maw was reluctant to cancel the \$20 million FMS, arguing that the new government in Lima desired to establish “more friendly” ties with the White House and this was an opportune time “to try to win them back.” The Secretary responded with customary bluntness: “buying the planes is not an act of friendliness because they can’t get them anyplace else.” He then reminded the meeting that “the strategic problem with Chile” was still unresolved and suggested a possible solution might be to satisfy Peru’s requests for A-4s under the FMS and to submit an arms package request for Chile to the Congress. Unable to restrain himself, the Secretary then launched into a tirade over Soviet military exports to the region in general: “If we don’t oppose the purchase of the Soviet arms, they’re going to have arms all over the goddam place and they’re going to turn Latin America into as much of a tension place as they can get away with.” Major Soviet arms purchases by Latin governments must be avoided “and if we have to use muscle to do it, we ought to do it because we’re going to pay for it down the road.”⁹⁶

For the rest of 1976, Washington maintained a cautious, low-level concern about Peruvian military objectives. Despite increased tensions between Peru and Chile, both governments were still on speaking terms and the prevailing view in the Secretary’s office was that fears of a war were exaggerated. To embark on military action would not only contradict Morales-Bermudez’s plans to improve ties with his Andean neighbors but also exacerbate Peru’s now severe domestic political and economic problems. “On the other hand, crazies exist in the Peruvian military,” the Secretary’s office reported.⁹⁷ At the end of December, the State requested NSC comments on a proposal to inform Congress that the administration intended to sell 140 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to Peru valued at almost \$16 million. Given the volatile nature of Peru’s relations with both Ecuador and Chile, Council staffers questioned the timing of the sale. They suggested that because it would transmit “a particularly unfortunate signal to all parties in the region” any decision should be postponed for 90 days by which time “the situation should have clarified sufficiently... to allow a final decision on whether the APC sale proposal should be approved.”⁹⁸

Assassination in Washington

In July, 1976, a UN diplomat Carmelo Soria disappeared in Santiago and was found murdered—an act subsequently attributed to DINA as part of

its “Operation Condor” activities.” A report to Kissinger on “Operation Condor” prepared by Shlaudeman three weeks later explored in considerable detail the joint efforts by the Southern Cone military dictatorships to coordinate intelligence operations and wage war against “subversives” and terrorist exponents of “International Marxism” who threatened “Christian civilization” at home and abroad. Imbued with a “siege mentality shading into paranoia,” Shlaudeman wrote, these regimes and their security forces were also targeting “non-violent dissent from the left and center left.” Of the three dictatorships Chile’s was the most dramatic example. Pinochet had “smashed the left almost as thoroughly as the Brazilians,” but the Chilean Junta’s repressive apparatus was “much more unrestrained” compared to Brazil whose President, General Ernesto Geisel, “even seems to wish to moderate human rights abuses.”

What most worried Shlaudeman were the potentially “disturbing” regional and global implications of a resort to “bloody counter-terrorism” by these dictatorial regimes. In the Western Hemisphere it threatened to create “deep ideological divisions;” if “Operation Condor” started operating in European capitals, its targets might respond in a way that would turn the industrial democracies into a “battlefield.” Unless Washington took some action, its reputation around the world might suffer because “internationally, the Latin generals look like our guys. We are especially identified with Chile [which] cannot do us any good.”¹⁰⁰

Despite an absence of real urgency, once Kissinger became aware of “Operation Condor” expansion plans he instructed US ambassadors in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay to approach “the highest appropriate official, preferably the chief of state” and issue a *demarche* stating that while the US considered the exchange of intelligence information and the coordination of activities in tracking down subversives “useful,” it drew the line at counter-terrorist actions that extended to targeted assassinations—whether of subversives, politicians or other high-profile figures—which could only bring further international opprobrium on these Latin allies.¹⁰¹ As the implications of Shlaudeman’s report were being debated in State, evidence surfaced of a possible “Operation Condor” mission to the United States in the form of an August 5 cable from the US Ambassador to Paraguay, George Landau, detailing efforts by two Chilean secret police to travel to Washington, via Asunción, on false passports.¹⁰²

From Santiago, David Popper rejected the idea of approaching Pinochet directly regarding “Operation Condor” on the grounds that his well-established “sensitivity regarding pressures by the USG” might lead him to “take as an insult any inference that he was connected with such assassination plots.”¹⁰³ Instead, Popper endorsed the idea of sending the

head of the CIA Station in Santiago to discuss the matter with his DINA counterpart, Manuel Contreras. Shlaudeman agreed that there was no question of “making a representation to Pinochet as it would be futile to do so.”¹⁰⁴ Whether this proposed CIA-DINA meeting took place is unclear. For the next several weeks, there were no new initiatives by either government. Then, on September 20, at Shlaudeman’s directive, US ambassadors in the Southern Cone countries were instructed “to take no further action [because] there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme.”¹⁰⁵ In less than twenty four hours the error in this advice became apparent in the most public and violent fashion: one of the most high profile international critics of the Pinochet regime, former Allende Foreign Minister, Orlando Letelier, and his American colleague Ronni Moffitt, were killed by a remote-controlled car-bomb in downtown Washington, D.C., not far from the White House. The impact of this terrorist act on bilateral ties, and especially on Kissinger’s “practical problem” in getting maximum flexibility to assist Chile could not be exaggerated. In the words of one State Department official involved with Chile policy, “it made everything utterly sour.”¹⁰⁶

Kissinger’s endgame

In the aftermath of the Letelier/Moffitt murders, State’s Chile Desk Officer Robert Driscoll described bilateral ties as “poisonous,” observed that Washington’s linkage strategy—improved relations and increased aid in return for declining levels of state-authored violence—“does not appear to have brought real results,” and was convinced that the arms cutoff had made the Chileans “even less disposed than previously to listen to American ‘moralizing.’”¹⁰⁷ Even so, Kissinger and other senior Department officials met with a Chilean delegation in early October headed by Foreign Minister Carvajal for a wide-ranging discussion on human rights, US policy, and how to deal with another likely UNGA condemnation of Chile. The ensuing conversation revealed the depth of frustration Kissinger shared with his visitors over the forces arrayed against them. He understood perfectly Santiago’s need to purchase military hardware for cash on an ongoing basis, castigated recent congressional decisions, and promised that if President Ford was re-elected in November “we will attempt to undo [them].” He gave fair warning, however, that if the Democratic Party candidate Jimmy Carter was victorious, “there is no possibility” of any change. When Carvajal repeated an earlier suggestion by Finance Minister Jorge Cauas that Chile

might be better off to refuse the current limited amount of US economic aid because of the negative publicity it created both at home and abroad, Kissinger responded with a mixture of anger and sympathy: “The whole thing is a goddam disgrace. You may be right.”¹⁰⁸

At this point, Chile’s UN Ambassador Ismael Huerta brought the discussion around to a resolution currently before the UN’s Third Committee proposing economic sanctions against Chile. Kissinger was indignant at Chile being singled out: “It’s totally inappropriate.... I can tell you 30 states with human rights problems worse than Chile’s. We will oppose it.”¹⁰⁹ In a cable to the Santiago Embassy the day after the UN panel charged Pinochet’s regime with “systematically extending its suppression of human rights,” the Secretary emphatically declared that the US would not support any proposal in the UNGA “calling for mandatory economic sanctions.”¹¹⁰ The most it was willing to do was abstain on the UNGA vote condemning the Junta government’s human rights abuses which passed for the third consecutive year.

The perennial question of how to overcome Chile’s negative global image was taken up with Ambassador Popper when Carvajal returned to Santiago. Popper’s message was simple: if the regime was serious about avoiding further isolation, and reversing its pariah status, it could “with no appreciable risk begin an evolutionary process of restoring individual rights.” The response was a “vigorous ‘No.’” Carvajal’s “hard-rock resistance” to any gradual easing of restrictions reflected the basic outlook of Pinochet, his right-wing civilian advisers and the hardline generals in the armed forces: that to do so would only provide new opportunities for the spread of communist influence.¹¹¹ As well, by now Pinochet and his supporters were convinced that the US Congress had little appreciation of the realities of the Chilean situation—or Latin American issues generally—and was unlikely to be swayed from an essentially paternalistic attitude toward the region. On October 20, the government formally notified Washington that it would no longer accept any US economic assistance—a decision that surprised few given the poor state of bilateral relations.¹¹²

But, for the moment, the President and his Secretary of State were focused on a far more pressing domestic concern: Gerald Ford’s 1976 re-election campaign. The White House incumbent confronted a formidable challenge in the person of the Democrat candidate Jimmy Carter who Kissinger described as “a vicious, mean little man—the worst one ever to stand for the President.” In discussing the upcoming debates, he warned Ford that Carter would “take on Chile again [and] if he doesn’t I would” and link it to the importance of being able to provide military assistance to

Third World allies. During a recent speech at Harvard University “I said if we can’t be the policeman of the world and can’t sell arms, how do we defend the free world?”¹¹³ The implication of these comments was unmistakable: If Carter won the White House, Kissinger believed US global interests would no longer be advanced or defended.

Much to the outgoing Secretary of State’s dismay, however, Carter won a narrow election victory. Writing to the Foreign Office, a British Embassy official characterized the Chilean government reaction as “somewhat despondent.” Apart from a general nervousness about the new president’s foreign policy outlook, what particularly worried the Junta was that the contacts developed with the Ford administration (reflected in the Simon and Kissinger visits) would “lose their value” although “in practical terms.... it is by no means clear what more the new Administration could do to demonstrate disapproval of the Junta.” The termination of US military aid, the congressional embargo on weapons sales, and Pinochet’s decision to refuse future US economic aid, had reduced bilateral ties to a point where they “were already devoid of major content.”¹¹⁴

With the Ford presidency entering its final days, a vote on two World Bank development loans totaling \$60 million scheduled for mid-December triggered one last confrontation between Congress and the administration. Henry Reuss and eight House Democratic colleagues wrote to Treasury Secretary William Simon that despite the absence of any legal prohibition on US approval of World Bank loans to Chile, “it is the clear intent of Congress that we not support such repressive regimes through any economic assistance channel.”¹¹⁵ Staff aides to Senators Kennedy and Lawton Chiles [D-FI], and the House’s Donald Fraser, contacted Treasury officials to indicate that favorable votes, especially during a recess period, would be widely resented on Capitol Hill. In response, Assistant Treasury Secretary Gerald Parsky merely restated the traditional Department view that World Bank loans “should not be decided for political reasons, but on economic merit alone.”¹¹⁶

In a memo to the Acting Secretary of State, Philip Habib, Harry Shlaudeman and the Economic and Business Bureau’s Julius Katz advocated a “Yes” vote on the grounds that both loans qualified under the Harkin Amendment’s BHN exemption loophole, and that supporting them “should encourage the Chilean Government to continue to move in the right direction on human rights.” Postponing the vote would only delay the decision momentarily and be perceived as vacillating on the US commitment to oppose “injecting political factors” into Bank decision-making. That said, Shlaudeman and Katz acknowledged that a favorable vote could increase congressional demands for new restrictions on aid

recipients with poor human rights records.¹¹⁷ At the request of the Scandinavian member nations for more time to analyze the loan documents, the Bank's Board of Directors decided to temporarily delay the vote. After a short interregnum, both loans were approved by substantial margins. They were economically "sound," said US Executive Director Hal Reynolds, and that was all that mattered.¹¹⁸

Pondering bilateral relations over the previous twelve months, Ambassador Popper characterized them as "difficult, formal, and largely static." He painted the picture of a Junta with a firm and unchallenged grip on political power, governing a country in which political activities were banned and individual rights "sharply curtailed." At the top of the political pyramid sat Pinochet who "shows no inclination to relinquish [personal] power." While the repression may have diminished in intensity, DINA continued to operate with relative impunity, leftist and trade union opponents of the government regularly disappeared, and the population lived under the emergency provisions of a state of siege, "which in effect suspends due process of law for real or imagined dissidents."¹¹⁹

Nevertheless, as Ford prepared to leave office support for the regime on State's Seventh Floor remained as strong as ever. Rudy Fimbres recalled a Department still on tenterhooks about Chile policy in case some opinion was expressed that might displease Kissinger: "Everybody was on guard. Everybody was very reserved on what they said. There wasn't the normal communication about Chile you would have had under more normal circumstances without Kissinger there."¹²⁰ From the Secretary's office, there were no concessions to the expressed mood of the incoming Carter White House, none to the US Congress, and no sign that emerging suspicions of the Chilean Junta's complicity in the Letelier/Moffitt murders had substantially shaken his confidence that US interests were best served by a continued embrace of the authoritarian regime. By now, though, such uncritical support was largely confined to Kissinger and a few of his closest acolytes. In Santiago, if there was "apprehension at what might come" in American policy after January 20, 1977,¹²¹ it was unlikely that Pinochet himself any longer expected much at all from his so-called friends or was losing any sleep about what Carter's election might portend for future relations with the United States, much less what impact it might have on the situation inside Chile.

CHAPTER 5

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CHILE POLICY

“Human rights is now at the high-stakes table. In the past, it was too often at the penny ante table.”

Mark Schneider, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, April 21, 1977

Throughout his run for the White House, Jimmy Carter appeared to single out Chile for special attention in his critique of US foreign policy during the Nixon-Ford era. In the second campaign debate, he repeated his charge that US policy toward Chile during the first half of the 1970s—its role in the “destruction” of a democratic government and “strong support” of a military dictatorship—had failed to reflect American values.¹ While these comments were essentially directed at past policy, they raised expectations of a major change in Washington’s relations with the Pinochet regime. Ironically, the absence of any overriding strategic or economic threat to US interests meant that Chile posed a fairly low risk target of Carter’s commitment to human rights. “They were not going to give Lebanon or Pakistan to the human rights lobby,” explained the State Department’s Robert Blake, “but they could give them something that was very high on their priority list—which was Chile—where there was no comparable priority in terms of US interests. So Chile was something where they could side largely with the human rights community, where they couldn’t for other reasons in the vast majority of cases.”² On Capitol Hill, expectations of a shift in Chile policy among those legislators concerned with reviving America’s damaged international reputation following the Nixon-Kissinger era were high.³ The Santiago Embassy’s DCM, Thomas Boyatt, recalled that after January 21, 1977 “we were getting more pressure from the Congress now that they had an Executive to work with.”⁴

The domestic human rights community most active in the political struggle over relations with Chile hailed Carter’s election victory as a watershed event. To the US Conference of Catholic Bishops Latin American adviser Thomas Quigley, it was as though “a new day had dawned.”⁵ The Director of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Joseph Eldridge, was just as elated. The presidential transition,

he said, had ushered in “a completely different ballgame...particularly with regard to Chile.”⁶ Chilean opposition leaders, likewise, embraced Carter’s promised approach on human rights as a welcome change from the policies of Nixon and Ford. The Socialist Party’s Enrique Correa lauded Carter for providing opportunities for anti-regime forces to engage with Washington in ways that were not possible under his predecessors: “Carter not only represented a political or diplomatic change but a real surgical break to an almost romantic relationship between the US and the Pinochet government and the intelligence services of both countries.”⁷ Other prominent Socialist Party officials were similarly impressed by what Ricardo Nuñez called “significant changes” in US policy toward Chile and the region as a whole. To Heraldo Muñoz, Carter’s willingness to criticize America’s failure to support democracy and human rights in the past, and to raise Chile in this context, was a “tremendous signal” about what lay ahead.⁸ By contrast, in both the US and Chile, members and supporters of the ruling Junta regarded Washington’s new-found attention to human rights as outdated, exaggerated, or simply unfair. US Ambassador David Popper described the Junta’s “burning resentment” over the failure of the international community to react positively to the country’s human rights improvements.⁹

At the outset of his presidency, the election rhetoric notwithstanding, problems in US-Chilean relations ranked far from the top of Carter’s list of hemisphere concerns. It “was really pretty low on the priority list,” observed NSC official David Aaron. “We weren’t going to try to overthrow Pinochet. As far as the Carter White House was concerned, it would be a policy of diplomatic unfriendliness and just let them stew in their own juice.”¹⁰ Robert Blake attributed Chile’s relative lack of importance to a mix of ideological and material factors: “after the coup, the country was not going to go communist and US economic interests weren’t threatened.”¹¹ Even then, Carter officials with a specific interest in Chile had a limited notion of what the administration might achieve and certainly downplayed any White House commitment to promoting political change in Chile. “The focus was on human rights abuses,” said Aaron. “There was only a strategy of hammering the regime over human rights. There were no plans of how you get to democracy.”¹² A senior State Department Latin American specialist agreed: “The focus was on the right to life kind of human rights—the right against torture and so on. There was not much focus on political rights.”¹³ Carter’s request for a Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) on Chile early in his administration was accompanied by a directive that in considering “policy options.... none can take precedence over our human rights concerns.”¹⁴

While that appeared to be a clear, if limited, change in approach the practice would prove less decisive.

Chile: Opportunities and constraints

A diplomat in the British Embassy in Santiago described the Junta as “somewhat despondent” about the election of Jimmy Carter, “clearly apprehensive” regarding his views on human rights, and “worried” that the myriad ties cultivated with previous administrations “will now lose their value.” How far this assessment was true of General Augusto Pinochet himself, as distinct from those around him, is debatable. Like his US counterparts, this British official judged that such a high level of anxiety was, for all practical purposes, unnecessary given that the bilateral relationship was “devoid of major content” prior to Carter’s victory and what more the new President could do to demonstrate disapproval of Pinochet and his colleagues was far from clear.¹⁵

Within a month of Carter’s victory, however, Pinochet approved the release of more than 300 political prisoners and the closure of two notorious detention centers. This was interpreted by some as a good-will gesture toward the new White House and by others as a decision taken for purely internal reasons (to demonstrate the Junta’s confidence in its unchallenged authority). Irrespective of any change in strategy or tactics, hundreds of political prisoners still languished in Chilean prisons. Indeed, soon-after the November election, the US Embassy’s DCM had cabled Washington that “the security forces are displaying greater sophistication in circumventing legal safeguards [and] more discreet arrests and effective isolation of those destined to continue ‘missing’ contrast with earlier, sloppier procedures.”¹⁶ The prisoner release decision was further compromised by a new crackdown on the Communist Party, including the arrest of 13 of its leaders.

US Embassy cables were guarded and not particularly encouraging as to what Pinochet’s actions signified. “While the repression may be said to be more moderate,” wrote Ambassador Popper, “the Junta has not fundamentally altered its system of control.”¹⁷ Citing the release of political prisoners and fewer reports of disappearances and torture as evidence that human rights practices had “improved appreciably during 1976,” the Embassy’s Thomas Boyatt added that this had not been accompanied by any easing of the Junta’s “authoritarian grip” on political power.¹⁸ There was nothing in these reports to indicate Pinochet was sufficiently concerned by Carter’s election to substantially moderate his

behavior in order to pursue better relations with the new US administration—and certainly not on Washington's terms.

In a detailed “overview” of Junta rule in Chile prepared for the incoming Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, however, Popper was in no doubt that the Carter focus on human rights had created a “a very serious problem” not only for Pinochet but also, paradoxically, for the US’ ability to reverse the country’s international pariah status. The emphasis on repression would hamper foreign investment, leave Chile vulnerable to economic sanctions, and limit its efforts to acquire advanced military weaponry that could better enable the armed forces to respond to “Peruvian preparations for a revanchist border war.” Certainly an improved human rights performance could facilitate an upgrading of bilateral security ties, ensure support for Chile in international forums, encourage new American investments in the minerals sector, maintain the country’s support for responsible copper and other global commodity agreements, and “through a more cooperative relationship, avoid replacement of the present regime by one still less desirable.”¹⁹ But the current situation of tightened restrictions on economic aid, and congressional termination of military assistance and sales, meant that encouraging the Junta to modify its behavior would be no easy task.

State did not have to be reminded of this reality. In preparation for Secretary Vance’s meeting with Chile’s Ambassador-designate to the US Jorge Cauas, ARA’s William Luers forwarded a “Talking Points” memo to Vance noting that the Cauas appointment “coincides with a low point” in bilateral relations for which Santiago must take the blame. “We have explained again and again to the GOC [Government of Chile] the realities of the situation [that] although we support the foes of communism, it is difficult for us to defend any government which uses repression as an instrument of policy.” In the absence of a “significant improvement” in human rights the possibilities for renewed military aid were bleak.²⁰ So concerned was Luers about the Junta’s stance that he suggested Vance invite Chile’s Foreign Minister, Patricio Carvajal, at the time visiting Europe, to stop by the Department on his way back to Santiago to let the Chileans know early on in the new Administration that it was serious about human rights. “Coming from you the Chileans would not be able to blame ‘middle and lower level officials’ for meddling in internal affairs.” External pressures were responsible for the gains that had occurred during the past year, Luers argued, but such pressure “must be *direct* and it must be *clearly stated*. Subtlety is lost on the Chilean military mind.” Chile’s global pariah status, he continued, remained unchanged precisely because what its government called improvements were “more cosmetic than

substantive” and did not involve any weakening of the state’s repressive institutions.²¹

Aside from the constraints imposed by Congress, there were other obstacles confounding Chile policymakers. “First of all,” said the NSC’s Robert Pastor, “we didn’t really know a lot about what was going on in Chile within the military.”²² The beleaguered status and reputation of the CIA at the time partly explained this failure. The Agency was reeling from the Church Committee investigations into illegal domestic intelligence gathering activities and revelations about its involvement in attempts to assassinate foreign heads-of-state.²³ In 1976, President Ford and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence had established an independent Oversight Board to monitor the Agency much more closely than had been the case in the past. Once in the White House, Carter quickly signaled his intention to keep the CIA on a tight leash by ordering a thorough review of all its activities.²⁴ Whatever the result of more effective oversight and/or the depletion of its “assets” inside Chile might have been, CIA influence over Chile policy had ebbed significantly. The NSC’s David Aaron, among others, was surprised to discover that American intelligence on Chile “was not very good” at all.²⁵

The paucity of intelligence information was also affected by legislative restrictions on aid imposed during the Ford administration which inevitably weakened ties between the Pentagon and Chile’s military leadership, as well as by the Junta’s extraordinary capacity for keeping its affairs under extremely tight wraps. What was known about the military’s thinking was more often provided to Embassy officials by civilians close to the regime. To that extent, it was often too general to be of much use in directing policy. “Abstractly,” the influential Pinochet adviser and *gremialista* leader Jaime Guzman told Ambassador Popper in early 1977, the majority of the armed forces leadership favored a move toward democracy at some future, unspecified date, yet constantly “shrank back” whenever an “immediate decision” was required. To Guzman, this indicated that any relaxation of political constraints “would be a slow business.”²⁶ This kind of intelligence was of limited value to Washington.

Clearly, having eliminated or intimidated into submission virtually all serious opposition, the military were under few internal pressures to speed up progress in the area of human rights (or a return to democratic politics). Appreciating this much at least, the possibility of any serious left wing political revival was dismissed out of hand by Carter officials in State and the NSC. The prevailing assumption was that the left was pretty much decimated and that “they were never going to come back.”²⁷ US officials were aware that among substantial numbers of middle and upper class

Chileans, Pinochet remained personally popular for having removed Allende from office and, in their eyes, rescuing the country from “chaos” and a possible civil war. While the Chilean economy remained in the grip of recession, the appointment of Sergio de Castro as Finance Minister at the end of 1976 heralded the beginning of a sustained period of neo-liberal reforms presided over by neoliberals in the Milton Friedman school of thought. Economic restructuring and privatization hit working class Chileans hard in the form of massive cuts in government spending and job losses but inflation was brought under control and growth rates would climb over the next five year period.²⁸ These achievements ensured that Chile was progressively less vulnerable to outside economic pressure; as well, they bolstered the regime’s confidence in its own management abilities and reinforced support for Pinochet in the eyes of many of his supporters.

The consolidation of Pinochet’s position limited what influence Washington could exercise over the regime. The bureaucratic debate over how forcefully to interpret and implement the human rights policy was another limiting factor. In contrast to Argentina or Uruguay, the most egregious human rights abuses in Chile had been perpetrated by the regime prior to Carter’s election in November 1976. As a result, it was already tainted in the eyes of an influential segment of the US Congress, American public opinion and even some Carter officials, for past offenses rather than its more recent behavior. This added fuel to arguments over what constituted “progress” in measuring Chile’s human rights performance. “The timing of the [human rights] policy was wrong,” said one senior State Department official, “because we were doing all these things when in fact, the Chilean military had stopped torturing people and so forth, and except for responding to violence against [armed forces personnel] they were not doing very much of anything.” Other US diplomats contested this interpretation, advocating instead a policy that effectively sought punishment for the most brutal years of military rule—thus sending a strong signal to potential abusers—rather than a policy aimed at ameliorating current abuses.²⁹ Further complicating the picture were the obligations a number of Carter political appointees felt they owed to the domestic human rights lobby and its members’ raised hopes that the administration would take the gloves off in its dealings with Pinochet.

Institutional interests and priorities constantly hindered inter- and intra-agency cooperation on Chile. The human rights issue was the source of innumerable disagreements, especially within the State Department. “Whatever the Chileans did,” observed the NSC’s Robert Pastor, “parts of the Human Rights Bureau would say ‘This is ridiculous, this is symbolic,

this isn't serious' and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs would say 'This is brilliant, this shows they're coming around'—whatever it was."³⁰ Roberta Cohen who worked in HA's Southern Cone office shared Pastor's view of ARA: that it always sought to put the best possible gloss on, and express maximum optimism about, the most limited of Junta actions or signals. "ARA would have liked to improve relations with Chile, little by little. So it was always poised to say 'Well, let's try to take some positive steps, either in public statements or in the UN.'" Cohen singled out the increasingly toxic relationship between HA and the ARA Chile Desk: "There were so many fights over Chile that it got to the point where I couldn't deal with them."³¹

The two bureaus could be equally obstructionist when the circumstances permitted. ARA Chile Desk officer Robert Steven (1977-1979) described a proposal to bring two Chilean officers to the US for counter narcotics training. "I argued in a meeting that to reject the proposal would not make sense because counter narcotics was a basically politically neutral issue." That the idea had widespread Departmental support did not impress HA which flexed its muscles and "just flatly vetoed it."³² That Secretary Vance remained "completely uninvolved" in Chile policy didn't help matters.³³

Bureaucratic conflicts resonated all the way down to diplomats in the Santiago Embassy. "It was incredible," said DCM Boyatt discussing the transition from Ford to Carter. "As far as Henry Kissinger was concerned, we were a bunch of starry eyed lib-symp pinkos. Two days later, when the Carterites got in, we were savage right-wing supporters of a vicious dictatorship." Career foreign service officers based in the Western Hemisphere were constantly placed in that kind of situation, Boyatt claimed, "because for some reason the American body politic takes Latin American affairs personally. You know they can live with some African dictator storing the eyes of his opponents in his deep freeze but they can't live with repressive regimes in Latin America."³⁴ Charles Grover, who replaced Boyatt as DCM in 1978, was surprised by the resistance and cynicism among Embassy officials to Carter's human rights focus. The prevailing attitude was "we're up to our arse in alligators, and now they want us to tell the Chileans how to run their country."³⁵ In practice, this failure to achieve closer bureaucratic coordination of Chile policy allowed individual agencies a degree of latitude that encouraged Pinochet to believe he could weather any serious challenge from Washington to his manner of rule.

These Executive Branch disagreements over Chile were mirrored on Capitol Hill. ● On the one hand, the White House was forced to deal with a powerful and vocal set of legislators who were highly critical of the

Chilean Junta *per se* and continually pushed for a more aggressive application of the human rights policy and punitive sanctions in the absence of substantive improvements. On the other, there was a smaller group of conservatives in both political parties acting in concert with allies in the Executive Branch, who regretted the regime's abusive rule but opposed a more forceful anti-Pinochet policy on ideological and economic grounds. To them Pinochet had rescued Chile from a Marxist regime and the clutches of international communism, presided over an economic transformation based on a neo-liberal model, and reestablished a secure, attractive environment for foreign investment. HA's Mark Schneider thought the Executive had underestimated a broadly-based concern on both sides of the political divide that the human rights policy shouldn't jeopardize economic interests unnecessarily: "The assumption was that we were going to have congressional support, and that we didn't have much to worry about and we were somewhat surprised, and probably a little naïve, in not recognizing that when we did touch the economic levers there was going to be some reaction."³⁶

This was the conundrum facing Carter foreign policy officials: how to pursue a human rights policy toward Chile within self-imposed constraints (the principle of non-intervention in another country's internal affairs), legislation mandated by Congress (restrictions on aid preventing its use as an incentive to moderate behavior), Pinochet's political dominance and what a State Department official described as a "hard audience" for a human rights message among those who governed in Chile³⁷—all the while acting in ways that did not backfire or jeopardize other more important or more permanent US interests.

Initial policy cleavages

In late January 1977, the high-level Policy Review Committee (PRC), chaired by Secretary Vance and responsible for foreign policy, defense and international economic issues, met to begin preparation of the PRM Carter had earlier requested but now focused broadly on US policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean with particular attention to four "special country problems"—Cuba, Brazil, Mexico, and Central America. Carter's campaign rhetoric had singled out Chile but it was conspicuously absent from the list.³⁸ Robert Pastor attempted to have Chile included in a draft of the memorandum which was leaked to the media "in a way that made it sound as if I was trying to foster intervention in Chile, and trying to do my own thing." He accused ARA of responsibility for this "very sensitive and very well-crafted" disclosure, playing on NSC Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's

disinclination to review a multitude of specific country policies because the administration's agenda was already full to overflowing. This experience of bureaucratic politics, said Pastor, made him "much more vulnerable. So I couldn't really press this issue at all. So that's why we had to retreat a bit."³⁹

Following this back step, HA and ARA locked horns in a way that revealed how human rights issues could confound other foreign policy objectives. In February, administration officials received a joint offer from Chile and Peru to participate in the annual UNITAS naval exercises scheduled for September. Previously, the US had always engaged in separate exercises with each country. Assistant Secretary Terence Todman and the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) Director Leslie Gelb supported the idea of a trilateral exercise as a way of defusing regional political tensions and improving US defense relationships with Latin America. They argued that the Pinochet regime had recently taken a number of measures the US welcomed as a "positive development." Due to the "tentative and fragile" nature of the bilateral relationship ARA and PM agreed that "we should not burden it by making further Chilean action on human rights a condition of our participation."⁴⁰

The background to this issue was the simmering conflict between Chile and Peru, and the latter's emergence as one of the region's biggest purchasers of military hardware from the Soviet Union. The CIA estimated that Lima had acquired or made commitments to buy approximately \$500 million worth of Soviet weaponry during the Nixon-Ford years,⁴¹ a buying spree that showed no signs of slowing down. "It is expecting delivery of 36 advanced Soviet fighter-bombers...and is seeking bids on radar systems," Brzezinski informed the White House in early February.⁴² Although this undoubtedly "increase[d] the pressure for an arms build-up throughout the region," Brzezinski saw no evidence to suggest that Moscow could expand arms sales to other Latin markets, and was equally skeptical about its ability to acquire any lasting influence with Peru's government unless it could develop other bilateral links or, in the less likely event of a radicalization of the so-called Peruvian revolution. As far as Brzezinski was concerned, the US should take a low-key approach to what was essentially a case of one country taking advantage of access to an independent source of advanced weaponry that could be delivered speedily and on relatively generous financial terms.⁴³

Along with the NSC Adviser, the intelligence community could find no indication that Peru's military leaders were "bent on aggression" but cautioned that there was a "hawkish element within the military and a widespread conviction that war with Chile is inevitable."⁴⁴ Despite this

caveat, the CIA agreed with State and Defense that if anything, Peru had grown “more cautious” as a result of a near-war with Ecuador in December 1976, and assessed the possibility of a conflict with Chile during 1977 as “slight.”⁴⁵ As for Moscow’s eagerness to deepen ties with Lima, this was no more than an effort to overcome its lack of influence in the region as a whole: “it is their only toehold in South America,” the CIA opined.⁴⁶

In May, the Agency updated its analysis of Soviet-Peruvian relations, highlighting Moscow’s lack of success in expanding economic links with the Peru which had raised questions about the future of the relationship. Much to the frustration of Soviet officials, Lima had deliberately attempted “to keep them at [economic] arms-length,” had been tardy in using Soviet credits, and had “kept its options open” with regard to other foreign aid and trade. Additionally, the presidential transition from Juan Velasco to Morales-Bermúdez in August 1975 was accompanied by a greater emphasis on private investment to deal with domestic economic problems and the replacement of “leftist and pro-Soviet individual[s]” in the upper reaches of the government and the armed forces by “more moderate and pragmatic [ones].” Moreover, US acceptance of Peru’s 200-mile offshore fishing boundary and Lima’s settlement of outstanding compensation claims by affected American companies had resolved many of the tensions that plagued US-Peruvian relations during the Velasco era. The intelligence study also reminded US policymakers that a major reason Velasco’s government initially turned to the Soviet Union was a refusal by the Nixon-Ford White House to sell it arms “at a time when Peru felt itself strategically weaker than its traditional antagonist, Chile.” But the acquisition of requested weaponry from Moscow together with the US embargo on arms sales to Chile had “recast the military balance in the Andes and [eliminated] a point of friction in US-Peruvian relations.”⁴⁷

In Santiago, however, Chile’s ruling generals continued to exhibit a more alarmist perception of Peru’s intentions. What mattered to them was a perception that Morales-Bermúdez had downgraded diplomacy and proceeded to articulate a new get-tough military policy toward Chile ever since the 1976 collapse of negotiations aimed at giving landlocked Bolivia a route to the coast. There remained a strong suspicion that Lima would embark on military action before the 100th anniversary of the 1879 War of the Pacific.⁴⁸ Further contributing to regional anxieties about Peru’s military buildup was “the absolute certainty” that the US, would not get involved even if the Peruvians launched a preemptive strike.⁴⁹

The Todman-Gelb assertion that trilateral naval exercises were in each party’s best interests was challenged by HA. The bureau was reluctant to

countenance any “highly visible USG identification” with the Chilean Junta on the grounds that it ran counter to the legislative ban on security assistance to Santiago and would generate “grave doubts in Congress as to the credibility of the administration’s declared emphasis on human rights in the conduct of foreign policy.” Todman and Gelb responded that support for Chile’s participation “does not imply satisfaction with the present state of human rights observance,” and the absence of continued progress in this sphere “could require us to withdraw” at a later date. For the moment, however, there were practical benefits that flowed from the naval exercises and these were more compelling than any advantage to be gained by sending symbolic signals. Under pressure to make an immediate decision, HA withdrew its opposition to Chile’s participation in the joint maneuvers in return for an understanding that the US reserved the right to pull out if the human rights situation worsened.⁵⁰ Eventually Carter approved US participation but ordered American naval vessels to bypass Chilean ports on their way to the exercises.⁵¹ The lines of arguments leading up to this decision typified the different approaches adopted by the two bureaus when it came to Chile: HA emphasized the importance of symbolic actions, particularly with reference to Congress; ARA was preoccupied with the impact of any decisions on substantive US interests.

This difference of opinion was soon overshadowed by another clash, this time involving the Embassy and Secretary Vance. The bone of contention was how the US should vote on the Chile human rights resolution at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in Geneva. Before the Commission was a draft resolution condemning the Pinochet regime over its “constant and flagrant” violations of human rights and its “institutionalized practice of torture.” In a flurry of cable traffic between Popper and State, the Ambassador (who remained in the post until May 1977) noted that the US had abstained on a similar, though milder, resolution critical of Chile at the UNGA in 1976 when the situation for most Chileans was much worse. There was no recognition in the current draft resolution, he complained, “of the appreciable progress we have reported during the past year.” The decision to co-sponsor this latest resolution at the urging of the USUN delegation, based on the proposition that this would ensure a “moderate” final wording, was ill-advised, Popper maintained, because it would only “strengthen the tendency which already exists here to demonstrate Chile’s solidarity with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay in defying the US on human rights issues.”⁵² This was not an argument that Vance found persuasive. Co-sponsorship, he responded, would improve the prospects for heading off a “harsher” Cuban draft.⁵³ Following the US vote in favor of the

resolution, which passed by 26 to 1 with 5 abstentions, Vance again cabled a sharply worded message to the Embassy: There would be no easing of public diplomatic pressure on Santiago until the government made “major sustained progress” in the human rights area.⁵⁴

In an interview with the German newspaper *Die Welt*, Pinochet alleged that Washington had succumbed to “anti-Chilean” propaganda originating from two sources: the Soviet Union and those Chilean exiles “who play the game of Marxism without being Marxists themselves.”⁵⁵ Three days after the UNHRC vote, the Chilean Foreign Ministry gave concrete vent to its anger by withdrawing its delegation and observers from the Commission, accusing it of subjecting Chile to “a constant and unfounded campaign of slander.”⁵⁶ A sympathetic David Popper could not hide his displeasure at the negative UNHRC vote, claiming that “it helped stimulate the tough measures to still domestic dissent,” among them the Junta’s March 12 decision to ban all political parties including the PDC.

This was a case of misreading the calculations going on in the minds of Junta members—not least that of Pinochet himself. Although the activities of the non-Marxist political parties had been suspended by government decree in January 1974, the PDC managed initially to operate fairly openly. But as more and more party members who had supported the 1973 coup began to publicly oppose the dictatorship and its policies, the regime responded by gradually curtailing the party’s media outlets, removing its members from senior positions in the civil service, public enterprises and universities, and harassing, imprisoning, exiling and even killing some party officials. The decision to include the PDC in the ban on political parties seemed more a function of Pinochet’s growing amoyance with the activities of party members than payback for a toughening of Washington’s position in the UNHRC. Moreover, in banning all parties the Junta was attempting to shore up the juridical grounds for clamping down on violators of the original decree declaring parties of the center and right to be in recess: under that decree, successful convictions of anyone violating the recess required proof that the accused was acting as an agent of a political party together with evidence that a “political” act had been committed—which was almost impossible to obtain.⁵⁷ While a number of Christian Democrats among Pinochet’s civilian advisers resigned in protest at the ban, no immediate action was taken against the party under the terms of the decree law and within days Pinochet had sought to allay fears among government supporters that he was moving in a totalitarian direction by promising that, in time, a legislative chamber would be re-established. What Pinochet actually had in mind for political parties within

a future new institutional structure, however, was a role that limited their activities to “mere currents of opinion.”⁵⁸

Their disagreements notwithstanding, the other Junta members would have been in complete agreement with Pinochet on this latter point. During Popper’s farewell call on Air Force General Leigh, the Ambassador learned of a major difference brewing within the armed forces leadership over whether and when to return the country to political normality. On one side was Pinochet who insisted on retaining power indefinitely; on the other was the Air Force and Navy which advocated a return to civilian rule based on “a strong central source of authority” and where the role of the traditional political parties would be limited. Despite even this difference, however, Popper wrote that Leigh’s comments did not reflect a breach of armed forces unity “under any circumstances.”⁵⁹

Pinochet’s bluster that he would adopt a “harder line” in dealing with Washington and pursue closer ties with neighboring regimes the better to resist US pressure over human rights was also dismissed as bluff by Popper. Despite indications that Chile was intent on deepening its ties with the other Southern Cone neighbors, all that had occurred to date was “a little smoke but no fire,” the Ambassador reported. Popper correctly surmised that whatever action Pinochet might take to distance himself from Washington was more likely to harm Chile than the United States: domestically, it could lead to a weakening of the Junta’s political support because there was no consensus among regime supporters behind a new “get tough” anti-US policy; globally, it could have a negative impact on Chilean access to foreign markets, foreign investment and loans, and risk a cut-off of possible US military assistance programs in the event of war with Peru. There was no need for Washington to take “precautionary steps,” Popper concluded, because it is the Embassy’s considered view that “Chile can do little to harm us, and on reflection the GOC may decide not even to try.”⁶⁰ Six months later, a State Department study concluded that the other Southern Cone military regimes were still reluctant to participate in regional or anti-US actions with Chile except on an ad hoc and intermittent basis due primarily to global perceptions of Pinochet’s dictatorship.⁶¹

The head of the US Southern Command, General Dennis McAuliffe, was just as unperturbed as Popper by the prospect of any dramatic shift in Junta policy. In correspondence with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General George Brown, he wrote that “Chile is not likely to move any more against the US than it already has” even taking into account the deterioration in bilateral ties since Congress suspended military aid in July 1975.⁶² That Pinochet indeed failed to translate his

bolder threats against the US into action was, in all likelihood, because aside from embarrassing Chile at the UNHRC, Washington was hardly acting recklessly in applying its new human rights policy. Tough talk for domestic consumption did not necessarily reflect a similar intensity in the practical application of the policy.

In early March, William Luers and State's Policy Planning staffer (S/P) Anthony Lake transmitted to Vance an options paper responding to the review of Latin American policy (PRM/NSC-17). The paper highlighted a number of weaknesses in Washington's approach including "clientism and conscious or unconscious identification with friendly regimes." It outlined a number of identifiable minimal policy objectives to eliminate human rights abuses and provide "encouragement and (where we can) concrete support" for governments that have good human-rights records while "simultaneously" advancing other US foreign policy interests. The paper then asked whether the US should have a single standard for measuring human rights violations or whether "[w]e must expect something more from Pinochet than Idi Amin—or Brezhnev—if only because we have more responsibility for the Chilean situation, and more leverage to change it." The authors of the paper answered the latter question in the affirmative on the grounds that it was "far more feasible in practice" and would allow the US to make judgments on a range of issues and values. The paper also posed the question whether the priority concern should be "basic human rights" or these together with "civil" rights—leaning toward the former as this reflected both congressional and domestic public concerns and because basic rights "transcend national sovereignty." Finally, the document laid out examples of specific policies that could be pursued in defense of basic human rights, noting that "stronger steps would have an impact on other US interests" and therefore actual decisions "will inevitably be taken on a case-by-case basis." While noting that multilateral efforts to pursue human rights offered a "lower cost" to the US, the review concluded that "for the foreseeable future, the greatest opportunities for bringing about change lie in bilateral relations" as these were "quicker, can be more private, are much less cumbersome, and can be used far more frequently."⁶³

Later the same month, at a PRC meeting in the White House, Warren Christopher proposed an extremely mild shift in Washington's dealings with Latin military regimes. Adopting verbatim the phrase NSC official Robert Pastor had earlier coined in a memo to an approving Brzezinski, Christopher urged that the US pursue "warm relations with civilian and democratic governments, normal relations with non-repressive military regimes, and cool but correct relations with repressive governments." This

formulation was well received by other committee members, including the Pentagon's Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's General Brown.⁶⁴

But what, exactly, did "cool but correct relations" mean? One message was not hard to decipher: the administration would continue to deal with human rights abusers on a government-to-government level. A few weeks after the PRC meeting, ARA requested a decision from Christopher as to whether Chile's new Ambassador to Washington, Jorge Cauas, should be called into State for a "frank discussion" about the human rights issue in Chile. As the regime's repressive policies had forced bilateral ties to "a standstill," the only alternatives were to make an effort to break the impasse or do nothing and let relations "continue to stagnate." In view of Cauas' status as Chile's "Super Ambassador" who reported directly to the President, ARA surmised that he could be used to allay Pinochet's "paranoid" fear that the US was "trying to overthrow the Junta." For this tactic to succeed, however, progress on human rights must receive "suitable recognition" which had "not been done in the past." In the margin of one of the memos (from Terence Todman), a testy Christopher scribbled: "What do you count as progress?" ARA's William Luers offered a quick response: "Since the beginning of the year, we have not heard any believable stories of disappearances, torture or detention without charge." Despite continuing repression, the suspension of political parties, and government intervention in the labor unions and universities, Luers argued that these "positive" developments suggested it might now be time for Washington "to take the initiative" in seeking to improve the human rights situation and bilateral relations. This approach appeared consistent with Carter's own thinking, the President having "strongly suggested" to Cauas when he presented his credentials on March 23 that a renewed effort should be made to improve bilateral ties.⁶⁵

Luers' account of improvements inside Chile, provoked an angry response from Robert Pastor. "After three months of relative good behavior, Chilean security services increased the pace of activity starting about a month ago," the NSC staffer wrote to Brzezinski. "Most of the victims appear to be socialists, but some are communists and Christian Democrats. Pinochet made it clear that he will repress drastically and move harshly against anyone who threatens his government."⁶⁶

Congress and the MDBs: The "flexibility" debate

Dealing now with a White House ostensibly committed to a human rights-based foreign policy, congressional impatience for rapid, decisive and

sustained initiatives—bilateral and multilateral—was bound to create tensions over how actively to pursue the approach. Having elevated human rights to prominence during the Ford presidency, its proponents on Capitol Hill had high expectations of the new administration. In late 1975, over the opposition of the Ford White House, Congress had passed the Harkin Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) directing US Executive Directors in the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the African Development Fund (ADF) to vote against loans to major human rights abusers unless those loans could be justified on “basic human needs” (BHN) grounds. Among those departments and agencies most involved with foreign policymaking—State, Treasury and the NSC—there was a considerable reluctance to support any further legislation that might limit Executive Branch discretion or flexibility. Senior Treasury officials were just as opposed—if not more so—as State to the very idea that a nation’s internal policies should determine how US Executive Directors voted on loan submissions to the MDBs or IFIs. Assistant Secretary Fred Bergsten argued that to “inject political factors” into the process would set a precedent, thus undermining the primacy of “sound development criteria” and that voting against loans on human rights grounds would achieve little since the majority of member countries in these institutions were opposed to politicizing the process.⁶⁷

NSC staff strongly concurred with Treasury and, in a memo to Brzezinski, several of them outlined their concerns in some detail. Legislating to force US Executive Directors to vote on the basis of specific criteria eliminated the administration’s “flexibility” and was more likely to antagonize American allies in these institutions “whose support we want [and so] undermine the promotion of human rights objectives.” Introducing political factors would be “highly counterproductive [and a] highly interventionist approach,” thereby contradicting the fundamental US principle governing MDB loan decisions which was “to insulate” economic development from politics. The memo pointed out that Deputy Secretary Christopher was scheduled to testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance where he was likely to be closely questioned about US military aid to autocratic governments in South Korea and the Philippines. The powerful chair of the House Banking and Currency Committee Henry Reuss was also preparing to hold hearings on multilateral assistance where he would be certain to demand a commitment to use US influence in the IADB, the IBRD and even the IMF “to shut down economic development assistance to human rights violators.” Fearful that the whole issue might get out of control, Brzezinski’s aides recommended that he counsel Christopher to be “non-

committal” in his remarks before the subcommittee and remind the Secretaries of State and the Treasury that this remains the administration’s position “until a more specific guidance is developed.”⁶⁸

The NSC’s Latin American specialist Robert Pastor also intervened in the debate, also stressing the importance of Executive Branch “flexibility” in the course of launching a scathing attack on State’s ARA Bureau over its authorship of PRM/NSC-17—a review of US policy toward the hemisphere—which he characterized as an “unwieldy” document replete with “issues slated for decision [that] are posed poorly.” This was further proof that “if you want new policy directions toward Latin America, the last place to turn to for advice is ARA.” Discussing the section on the IFIs and MDBs, he argued that while human rights should be an integral part of US decision-making in these institutions, it was important to avoid being bound by “any automatic or fixed formulas.” The administration should seek “some flexibility” with respect to the original Harkin amendment as applied to the IADB and oppose moves gaining ground in the Congress to extend it to all other global financial institutions.⁶⁹ Another NSC staffer in the Council’s Office of Global Issues (the responsibilities of which included human rights) referred to the administration’s growing anger over what it considered the failure of Congress to sufficiently appreciate that times had changed. Absent continued “pushing and forcing,” the human rights advocates on Capitol Hill still appeared to believe that the Carter White House, like its predecessors, would “do nothing.” But this overlooked one fundamental difference: this Executive Branch was actively committed to the promotion of human rights and therefore “you don’t have to force us and lock us in with these amendments.”⁷⁰

Although the State Department was relatively more disposed to work through multilateral channels and, to that extent, supported a sharper break with the Nixon-Ford approach, Christopher advised Secretary Vance that congressional enthusiasm for applying specific human rights criteria to each and every loan submission presented a “difficult tradeoff.” The administration, of course, should comply with legislation and work with the Congress but only as long as these efforts on behalf of human rights did not become “a point of useless political contention within the IFIs.” He urged a good faith effort to fulfill the spirit and letter of the Harkin amendment while lobbying Congress to give US Executive Directors in the IFIs “more flexibility” in applying human rights criteria to loan submissions. In return, Christopher suggested that “[we] should put increased effort into working with other nations and using multilateral mechanisms to further human rights” because this had the advantages of reducing the image of the US as “the moralistic mother-in-law of the

world” while simultaneously mobilizing global support for the human rights cause.⁷¹

NSC Adviser Brzezinski preferred a more combative approach, warning the President that a rigid policy on human rights in the MDBs would have dire consequences for US relations with the Third World and also “severely compromise” the US position in the multilateral financial institutions. He accused “overzealous” legislators of threatening to make virtually all US international economic relationships hostage to a country’s human rights performance.⁷² Carter was sufficiently concerned that he had communicated directly with Reuss about the need to avoid “an overly rigid approach.”⁷³ Soon-after, the President went public on the matter declaring that formal mandatory requirements were self-defeating because they “simply remove my ability to bargain with a foreign leader” who might be willing to make human rights improvements but when faced with a requirement that is “frozen into law” this absence of “flexibility” eliminates any reason for that individual to comply.⁷⁴

During the first half of 1977, the administration’s “flexibility” problem with Congress took a turn for the worse. While Reuss in the House and Humphrey in the Senate sponsored amendments to Harkin that would allow the White House greater discretionary power in applying human rights criteria to MDB or IFI loan requests, in April, the House passed, on a voice vote, an amendment to the IFIs authorization bill submitted by Herman Badillo (D-NY) to extend the mandatory provision of Harkin to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. NSC officials Jessica Tuchman and Jane Pisano feared that the Senate could follow suite unless the administration mounted an aggressive lobbying effort: “We face a real dilemma: while we do not like any of the amendments, we must voice support for the more flexible [Humphrey or Reuss] amendments.”⁷⁵

A meeting of NSC, State, AID, Treasury and Eximbank officials to devise a strategy “to improve our increasingly weak and defensive posture on the Hill” attributed the defeat of the Reuss language and the adoption of the Badillo amendment to the administration’s failure to present a “strong clear position during the debate.”⁷⁶ Treasury was the harshest critic of the Badillo-Harkin language, insisting that an automatic “No” vote in the IFIs undermined Washington’s ability to promote human rights objectives by destroying any “negotiating flexibility” on its part. In any event, most of these targeted loans would still go ahead, thus rendering the policy “sterile [and] ineffective.” By contrast, the Humphrey amendment would enable the US “to significantly advance” the human rights cause because it would provide “considerable negotiating leverage.”⁷⁷ In more measured language, Vance backed up Treasury’s interpretation, describing the Humphrey

wording as “permit[ting] us to maximize our influence for human rights within the banks” whereas the Badillo language “represents too wooden an approach to the problems it addresses” and should be opposed.⁷⁸ At Vance’s suggestion, State drafted a letter that represented a coordinated interagency policy statement, to be signed by Carter, and transmitted to Humphrey, praising his version of the Reuss amendment.⁷⁹

Amid this chorus of support for a more moderate amendment, one senior Carter official, White House counsel Robert Lipshutz, questioned whether the administration’s opposition to the substance of the amendment might not “undermine much of our credibility in our espousal of human rights as a fundamental cornerstone of our foreign policy.” Writing to the President, he pointed out that the vehicles for implementing this policy were essentially limited to public advocacy and private diplomacy (which were being actively pursued) while “overt physical actions” and financial pressures (principally restraints on US private bank lending) were firmly rejected. The message Lipshutz took from the NSC staff memo pouring cold water on all of the amendments “was that we should give only lip service and diplomatic efforts to the goal of human rights.” As far as he was concerned, there was no contradiction between the mandatory action required by the Badillo or Harkin language and “a clear definition of what constitutes a consistent pattern [of human rights abuses]; an established and fair procedure for ascertaining facts; [and] adequate flexibility to protect our national interests and further our foreign policy goals.” The amendment would retain the basic human needs exception and bilateral agreements would still be available.⁸⁰

In a separate memo to Brzezinski and Carter, Lipshutz insisted that if the White House was serious about human rights being the “cornerstone” of US foreign policy “then we must make that clear by our actions in the financial field as well as by our rhetoric [and] must utilize whatever other peaceful means we have.” Granting or withholding economic aid, he argued, was “the most effective such means we have available.”⁸¹ Vance ignored Lipshutz’s advice and urged Carter to support the Humphrey amendment to the IFI Authorization Bill because its more flexible language represented a “positive approach which permits us to maximize our influence for human rights within the banks and with recipient governments.”⁸² The eventual outcome was not dissimilar to that which confronted President Ford over the original Harkin amendment: following votes in the full Senate and a Conference Committee in favor of the Humphrey amendment, the House rejected the Committee report and voted so decisively in favor of the Badillo-Harkin language that the Senate capitulated and a reluctant President Carter signed it into law in October.⁸³

Nonetheless, Treasury officials kept up a barrage of criticism about the difficulty of implementing the human rights policy in the IFIs. In early 1978, Fred Bergsten would complain to Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal that State's policy regarding the IFIs was as "seriously deficient" as ever and yet it continually rebuffed suggested changes. First, there was no explicit definition of "gross violators" or clarity about the objectives being sought. Second, State had not developed country assessments and strategies that could provide a basis for systematic action over time. Third, there had been no attempt to link IFI policy to bilateral economic and military assistance policies.⁸⁴ "Christopher and his people," Under Secretary Anthony Solomon and Bergsten wrote to Blumenthal on another occasion, appear "unable to pull together country strategies which integrate the IFIs with other policy instruments."⁸⁵ While this debate had limited direct relevance to Chile policy—because Executive Branch discretion on matters of aid to Santiago was already tightly constrained by specific legislation—it was an indication of a growing gulf in expectations between the White House and Capitol Hill over how far the human rights policy should extend and, more importantly, how this issue was opening up fault lines between those officials wanting to pursue the toughest possible approach and those more concerned with a traditional interest in maintaining Executive prerogatives.

Christopher had already transmitted a status report on the human rights policy to Secretary Vance that drew on earlier guidelines, once again stressing how important it was that the Department had as much flexibility as possible in regard to the decision-making process. To ensure that the policy was implemented in a "coherent" manner, he proposed that State should assume primary responsibility and, as chair of the Department's Human Rights Coordinating Group, suggested that he might be "best placed to help in that capacity."⁸⁶

An Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, (otherwise known as the Christopher Committee after its chairman) was subsequently created and tasked with assessing the human rights performance of governments submitting loan requests and making "how to vote" recommendations to the Treasury. Normally, an applicant's record would be assessed by HA and then distributed to the other Committee members. At first there were no lists of violators or country studies to go on and only the vaguest guidelines to act upon. As a result, decisions would often come down to a balance of opinion rather than a genuine consensus.⁸⁷ At its first meeting on May 6, 1978 these omissions left one NSC participant apprehensive: until proper guidelines were developed, the NSC's Jane Pisano wrote to a colleague implicitly criticizing Christopher's

desire for flexibility, the Committee's decision would be made on an ad hoc basis "which may set precedents for further decisions."⁸⁸

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sally Shelton-Colby remembered Christopher Committee meetings being "very contentious," with HA "always arguing for the toughest policy position, and [ARA] usually wanting the weakest policy position."⁸⁹ HA and the geographic bureaus were determined to relentlessly defend their positions, so much so that the meetings usually "degenerated into a sterile tennis match." The animosity reached a peak on those occasions when HA sought to get a Committee decision overturned by going directly to the Secretary's office instead of utilizing the traditional bureaucratic process.⁹⁰ ARA's Terrence Todman was so hostile to the entire concept of the Committee—on the grounds that opposing loans would not produce human rights gains—that he simply refused to attend its meetings. Instead, he delegated Robert Blake, and later Deputy Assistant Secretary John Bushnell, to go in his place.⁹¹ Of all the Executive Branch Departments, the Pentagon exhibited the most anxiety about inserting human rights criteria into decision-making in the IFIs, especially where it involved Latin America because to do so could only impinge on professional and personal ties with regional armed forces and thus weaken efforts to resist "communist subversion" throughout the region.⁹²

More of a problem was the fierce resistance mounted by some Departments and bureaus to Christopher Committee oversight of their programs. Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance Lucy Benson, for example, successfully opposed all attempts by the Committee to review military aid programs. As she told a House Appropriations subcommittee in early 1977: "I believe we must use security assistance in a flexible and pragmatic way to improve human rights practices; extreme or ill-considered action could disrupt relationships of importance to us while having no effect on abuses of human rights. An absolute termination of assistance would result only in losing whatever influence we may have had to change human rights practices for the better."⁹³ Benson's victory was the beginning of the Committee's conversion "from a forum reviewing all aid decisions to one primarily reviewing US positions on MDB proposals."⁹⁴ The Department of Agriculture was granted a similar exemption when it refused to relinquish control over food aid programs, of which Chile was a major beneficiary, and the Agency for International Development (AID) successfully argued that its programs benefited the poor and therefore should be exempt as well.⁹⁵ Reflecting this gradual erosion of responsibilities, 13 full Committee meetings held in 1977 had been whittled down to two by 1980.⁹⁶

During Carter's tenure US Executive Directors in the World Bank and the IADB abstained on a combined 46 loan submissions and voted "No" on 14 others from Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Uruguay and Paraguay on human rights grounds.⁹⁷ On only one occasion—a World Bank loan to Chile—was there "enough support to have a loan withdrawn." This abysmal success rate was no surprise to senior State Department officials who concluded that member governments were simply reluctant to weaken "the apolitical and developmental integrity of the MDBs."⁹⁸

Reaching out to the Opposition

The issue of how hard to push on Chile again became apparent in early May, 1977, when two prominent Chilean opposition figures—former Christian Democratic Party (PDC) president Eduardo Frei and the exiled Socialist Party leader Clodomiro Almeyda—requested meetings with senior administration officials, including President Carter, during stopovers in the US. The requests were made independently and while both men were united in opposing dictatorial rule in Chile, the experiences of the parties they represented were quite different. Despite the regime's ban on all political parties in March, the PDC continued to enjoy a degree of latitude denied other opposition parties. Most of its leaders remained in Chile, had access to the media, and could hold some low-key party meetings so long as their activities posed no serious threat to the regime.⁹⁹ The Socialist Party, on the other hand, struggled merely to survive. It was paralyzed as a political force by the repression its members had suffered after September 1973 and by its own internal factionalism, stemming from personality conflicts and disagreements over strategy.

Although none of the Chilean parties had any illusions about the Pinochet regime or its determination to remain in power for as long as it chose, they remained divided over how best to respond to this reality: the Communist Party urged a broad front approach that would unite all regime opponents under the one umbrella; the Socialists, though many of its members had misgivings about the Communist Party's motives, were not prepared to rule out that option whereas the Christian Democrats categorically rejected it.¹⁰⁰ These differences meant that the Carter administration's response to Frei and Almeyda would reveal what kinds of ties with which opposition leaders Washington was prepared to entertain in the current circumstances, the extent to which it was willing to antagonize Pinochet by meeting with his opponents (and at what level of seniority), and what US officials regarded as the most appropriate ways of

reaching out to anti-regime political leaders in a context where none of them were in any position to seriously contest the Junta's hold on power.

In mid-May, the NSC's Robert Pastor, addressed Frei's request for a top level meeting in a memo to Brzezinski. Arguing that there were "obvious and serious implications" for US-Chilean relations of a meeting between President Carter and Frei both in the short and the long-term, he spelled out two possible scenarios. One was to declare Chile a "pariah" state, aggressively lobby worldwide support for this stance, vote against Chilean loan requests to the IFIs, and meet opposition leaders in the expectation that "an alternative to Pinochet would emerge." The other approach would be simply "to try and bargain" with the Chilean dictator to shift to a less repressive style of governance. Pastor recommended caution in making a final decision because "Pinochet is reported to be paranoid and dangerous." Brzezinski and Pastor agreed, however, that the NSC Advisor at least should meet with Frei.¹⁰¹

Most of the subsequent inter-agency discussion focused on the political implications of agreeing to a Carter-Frei conversation. At the NSC there was little doubt that Pinochet would view such a meeting as "interference" in the internal affairs of Chile and even accuse Washington of seeking to overthrow his government. Concern that this might put at risk human rights gains generated a discussion over how effective US pressure had been in terms of the results achieved to date and whether the administration "has anything to lose and perhaps something to gain by alienating the Pinochet government and declaring it a pariah." Furthermore, if a White House meeting received the thumbs down, might this be tantamount to the US conferring legitimacy on the military Junta? Whatever the decision, it was imperative that it not provoke a major rupture in bilateral relations. This was more or less assured when it was finally agreed that Frei would not meet with Carter due to "scheduling difficulties" but instead would be received by Brzezinski for a "more or less casual discussion." Vance would confer with Ambassador Casas to "carefully negate any harmful impact" that might flow from the Frei-Brzezinski meeting, and the Socialist Party's Almeyda would meet with a lower ranking official—ARA's Assistant Secretary Todman.¹⁰²

The State Department concurred with the decision to void a Frei visit to the Oval Office but was prepared to recommend that he meet with a more senior administration figure than Brzezinski, namely Vice President Walter Mondale or, if he was unavailable, Warren Christopher (who had assumed the role of Acting Secretary of State while Vance was abroad). State also thought that Christopher should meet with Almeyda and preferred that the Chilean Ambassador simply be "informed of our

plans.”¹⁰³ HA opposed Frei meeting with Carter on the grounds that it would antagonize the generals and reinforce perceptions that the PDC was an instrument of US policy. This, the bureau argued, would undermine efforts to encourage human rights improvements. In allowing Frei to meet with Mondale and Brzezinski, Carter had to override further disquiet in State, reportedly due to a similar concern that it might provoke further retaliation against the Christian Democrats¹⁰⁴ because any decision to upgrade the status of Frei’s reception would not have been lost on the generals in Santiago who considered him *persona non grata*. Those Department officials included Terence Todman who was “strongly opposed” to any meeting between the Vice President and the former Chilean president.¹⁰⁵

Pastor informed Brzezinski that he had “worked hard on State” to get its agreement with the NSC recommendations. The importance of presenting a “consensus strategy” to the President could not be overstated: “The decisions we make in the next few months will not only have a great impact on what happens in Chile, but will have important implications for our policy on human rights and our policy to Latin America.” This made it all the more important, Pastor argued, that ARA’s “ad hoc” approach to decision making not be allowed to “sum up US policy to Chile.” The bureau’s handling of the Frei-Almeyda issue was a case in point. Initially, ARA recommended that Frei meet with Todman, that Almeyda not meet with any US official, and that Chilean Ambassador Cauas be invited to confer with the William Luers. “Such a strategy would have made the President’s statements on human rights look foolish,” Pastor concluded. The NSC staffer’s patience was sorely tested when Luers initially “refused to come or allow anyone else from [ARA] to attend [the informal interagency meeting] on the grounds that such a meeting should be held in State or nowhere.”¹⁰⁶ Once ARA was on board, Brzezinski forwarded the consensus proposals to Carter, asking if he would care to meet with Frei. The President declined, responding that the Vice President should perform that duty.¹⁰⁷

The Frei visit posed a difficult decision once word of it was leaked to the press. Brzezinski communicated his concern to Mondale: on the one hand, “If we refuse to meet with him Pinochet would see it as an endorsement of his regime;” on the other hand, a meeting with Frei could be interpreted by Pinochet “as a sign that the US is crowning his opposition, and the Junta leader may accelerate the current wave of repression.” No doubt, the former Chilean President was “probably looking for some support in an effort to crack the solidarity of the Junta” at a time when a number of State Department officials were expressing

doubts as to whether Pinochet could survive if the US withdrew all support for him.¹⁰⁸

Before scheduling any meetings, State went to great lengths to reassure the Chileans that there was no major policy shift underway. Luers explained to Ambassador Cauas, that his government should not interpret Frei's visit in "any negative way" and, irrespective of the human rights issue, the administration had "no intention whatsoever" of attempting to destabilize the military regime. To avoid public misperceptions about the significance of a Frei meeting, the Department was seeking "low-key press coverage" and would issue no official statements related to the visit. The decision to receive Almeyda, Luers told Cauas, simply reflected the White House policy of establishing lines of communication with "leaders of other political currents" apart from Frei and the PDC, and "does not in any sense constitute an effort on our part to encourage a 'coalition' of [opposition] political leaders or parties in Chile."¹⁰⁹

Todman and ARA had one overriding concern: that human rights not take center stage in discussions with Frei and Almeyda. Rather, the message should be that the administration's sole objective was to deepen its knowledge of the "broad spectrum" of political opinion in Chile. This limitation was championed even though Todman and other US officials most sympathetic to the Junta's arguments about its record and performance conceded that the Chilean regime remained a gross violator of basic human rights, that the security forces still operated with "impunity," and that Santiago must understand improved ties were dependent on "a substantial improvement" in the area of human rights. "Nothing escapes its influence," Todman acknowledged.¹¹⁰

Whether or not State was optimistic about convincing Cauas of the administration's good intentions, Embassy officials in Santiago doubted that the message could be gotten through to Pinochet for whom any Washington dalliance with opposition leaders was unacceptable. Chargé d'Affaires Thomas Boyatt, (who had assumed that position in the seven month interim between the departure of Popper and the arrival of his replacement, George Landau) cabled the Department that the reception of Frei, Almeyda, and also Cardinal Silva in quick succession by senior US officials would cause "unrestrained fury here." All three "are enemies—more than opponents" of the regime. It was therefore all the more urgent that Cauas take back to the Junta a "clear and direct" message about the US stance on human rights in Chile. "This [series of meetings] is strong medicine which the Junta will find very difficult to swallow," Boyatt continued, "[but] it is important to be direct and specific with the military

men with whom we are dealing here. Subtlety and innuendo will be lost on them.”¹¹¹

In the event, it was more a case of Boyatt’s advise being lost on officials back in Washington who, having committed to meetings with Frei and Almeyda, now sought to publicly play down their significance. An official dealing with Latin America told the *New York Times* they were nothing more than “an attempt to reverse symbolisms”—to send a global message that the era of “strongly supporting” the Pinochet regime was over. Nonetheless, he was careful to differentiate between jettisoning a “close embrace” policy and the Carter White House embarking on an anti-Junta policy. “The United States has not taken sides,” this official stressed. “We talk to the Chilean Government but we also talk to men of stature in the opposition, such as Frei.... But we aren’t endorsing Frei over anyone else and the Almeyda visit proves it.”¹¹² Welcoming these opposition leaders was all about sending diplomatic signals and “not trying to tell anything to anybody”¹¹³—although that seemed to beg the question then of what the meetings were intended to achieve in the first place.

The NSC’s David Aaron interpreted Washington’s decision as “a symbolic way at least of being able to express some of our regret that Chile had gone the route of military dictatorship after all those years of democracy.”¹¹⁴ Robert Pastor added that while sympathy at their predicament was the key factor, the meetings were also arranged “deliberately to send the message that we viewed the opposition to Pinochet as legitimate.” There was no doubt in Pastor’s mind that the message did indeed get through to the Junta generals:

I mean they were shocked. And they were so shocked by the meeting with Almeyda. I mean a meeting with Frei and the Vice President and Brzezinski would have been enough but the Almeyda thing really turned it over. One could recognize the legitimacy of Frei. After all, he was the last elected President and there is no doubt in my mind, nor in Brzezinski’s, nor in Mondale’s, that that was appropriate, that was easy, that was a slam dunk. That was very easy to pull off in the White House. It was hard to do in the State Department. But Almeyda was a slightly different thing.¹¹⁵

Neither meeting produced an explicit commitment from US officials that a restoration of democracy was high on the White House agenda—as distinct from the less confrontational notion of “moderation” of the regime’s repressive policies. Nor was there evidence that Washington was interested in devising a strategy for working with the opposition on a future political transition. Frei and Almeyda were not encouraged to bury their differences and/or review their policies in order to present a viable governing alternative and both came away with no substantive offers of

assistance in their respective efforts to persuade the military to return to barracks. Not that any specific commitments were actually requested by the Chileans. In his discussion with the Mondale and Brzezinski, Frei spoke in very general terms of what he hoped the US might do to influence events in Chile in a way that avoided any form of direct intervention. He preferred that the administration confine its actions to "creat[ing] conditions—by words, policies, and meetings—that will have a great influence on the developments in Chile." Were democracy to be "imposed" on Chile, it would be a "failure." Brzezinski, responded that the White House only sought to create "a moral framework, [not to] determine internal conditions." Mondale agreed that this defined the current policy "quite well," recalling that when he had served on the 1975 Senate Church Committee investigating US intelligence activities he was "ashamed to learn of our behavior in Chile" between 1964-1973 which "imposes on us a special responsibility to deal with the situation in Chile with good sense and respect for our own values as well as Chile's."¹¹⁶ That said, no firm guarantees were offered by Washington.

Still, in another sense, the decision to meet openly with Frei and Allende could be seen as something of a watershed decision in the US approach to Chile. While European governments had been dialoguing with Chilean opposition leaders since the early months of Pinochet's rule, the Socialist Party's Enrique Correa observed that it was only with the advent of Carter that they gained access to Department of State officials: "For the first time, Carter began building relations with the opposition to Pinochet."¹¹⁷ In developing these lines of communication, said Robert Service, Embassy political officer from July 1977 until August 1980, the Carter White House was building on prior, and continuing, Country Team outreach. "[The regime] knew we met with them, we listened to them, we had them to our houses, we reported on what was going on."¹¹⁸ DCM Thomas Boyatt concurred: he and his colleagues met with Christian Democrats "all the time" but less so with the Socialists whose members "were either in jail or out of the country."¹¹⁹ Robert Service also attributed the limited contact with the Socialists to the fact that their party was operating largely clandestinely and most of the leaders were in exile.¹²⁰ Boyatt's successor Charles Grover (1978-80) did remember increased contacts with the Socialists as they began to return from exile in substantial numbers toward the end of the decade.¹²¹

Beyond the political parties, the Embassy maintained close contact with the Catholic Church's Vicariate of Solidarity which it considered "the main source of information on the human rights situation," while Labor Attaché, Ed Archer, who succeeded Art Nixon, "spent most of his time."

dealing with the “democratic” labor unions.¹²² Such contacts were primarily intended to keep abreast of developments and convey a sense of vigilance over the fate of the center-right opponents of military rule. By showing the Embassy license plates in the company of regime critics (a tactic employed in the aftermath of the 1973 coup), the objective was to make it more of an embarrassment for the regime to crack down on them. At no time was this outreach initiative linked to any concerted campaign of democracy promotion. “We wanted, first, an end to human rights abuses, which you could stop very quickly, and a return to democracy once Pinochet stepped down,” said Robert Service. “But forcing him to step down we felt was more up to the Chileans and not for us to tell him to.”¹²³

Mixed signals

During his Washington visit, Eduardo Frei’s major objective was to seek a “consistent and coherent” articulation of US policy, echoing Thomas Boyatt’s observation that the regime took comfort from what they perceived as the mixed signals coming from Carter officials. In conversation with Mondale and Brzezinski, Frei noted the comment by Junta member and Air Force commander General Gustavo Leigh during his recent visit to Argentina that “it did not matter what the White House thought; all that was important was the Pentagon, and he felt that the Pentagon was strongly supportive of the Chilean Junta.” To this, Mondale simply commented: “Well said.”¹²⁴ As if to underline the point, only a week later a senior Department of Defense (DOD) official offered some reassuring comments to Ambassador Cauas during a May 31 luncheon attended by military and civilian members of both governments. When Cauas asked about prospects for “the lifting of sanctions and the normalization of bilateral relations,” the Director of the Inter-American Region (ISA), Major General Richard Cavazos, responded that the biggest sticking point was the failure to convince Chilean military leaders “of the broad-based support” in the US for human rights and get them to understand that Congress would not lift sanctions in the absence of “significant positive steps to improve conditions.” Cavazos recalled the 1976 meeting between Merino and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at which time Rumsfeld instructed his staff that “we were to assist Chile to the extent permitted under the law.” The US attendees reported that Cauas was “visibly elated” that his military attachés had received a similar message from DOD officials, as indeed had Cauas himself on an earlier occasion from Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher. “Slapping his open

palms on his thighs, [Cauas] replied: *'Basta. Punto clave. Lo voy a reportar'* ['That is enough. Key point. I'll report.']. The memo of the conversation concluded that the Ambassador's purposes "seem to have been served."¹²⁵

Cavazos' interpretation brought a sharp retort from State's HA Bureau. Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Schneider was furious at the Major General's "thoroughly incorrect" statement pertaining to current US policy on human rights in general and Chile in particular. "We are no longer in any sense directed to assist Chile 'to the extent permitted under the law,'" he complained to Patricia Derian, "until there is definite and decisive improvement in human rights conditions." Attending to the "three priority problem areas" (state of siege, intelligence organizations, lack of due process) would not alone justify lifting the ban on arms transfers: "Only genuinely convincing and patent long term changes in the behavior of the Government of Chile could trigger fundamental changes in our present posture."¹²⁶

The Inter-American Commission on Human rights (IACHR) provided strong evidence that this condition certainly was not being met. Its third report, focusing on the period March 1976 to February 1977, accused the regime of continuing to engage in murder, torture, the denial of due process, and arbitrary arrests, as well as maintaining severe restrictions on political and civil liberties. Furthermore, the Chilean authorities consistently ignored new human rights decrees proclaimed by the Junta such that they have no "actual or practical meaning," and continually failed to cooperate with the reporting process by providing adequate data on violations of physical liberties. In general, the Commission found the political rights environment was "essentially" unchanged since its first report in 1975.¹²⁷ Irrespective of these findings, and credible reports of a new wave of DINA-orchestrated disappearances, tortures and illegal detentions around this time, Chilean officials predictably dismissed these charges as referring to individuals who "held multiple identities, sneaked abroad or died during the coup." Nor did the visible evidence of an upsurge in regime abuses dissuade senior Embassy officials from continuing to recommend that US pressure on human rights be confined to private remonstrations and that any public statements of concern be couched in "general, world-wide terms."¹²⁸

The IACHR report, which was to be tabled at the June OAS General Assembly meeting of foreign ministers in Grenada, was powerful ammunition if Washington decided to take a tough line on Chile at the regional gathering. A position paper cleared by ARA recommended that the US delegation strongly endorse the conclusions of the report.¹²⁹ A

separate ARA briefing memo provided more reinforcement for the IACHR conclusions. It advised that the entrenched disregard for human rights among the Southern Cone states dictated a twofold regional strategy: close cooperation with other democracies and regimes that did not perceive themselves to be targets of the policy; and distinguishing between serious abusers who at least were engaged in some effort to bring torture “under control” (Brazil), those who were “implanting police states on the cold ashes of past difficulties” (Chile, Uruguay), and those that confronted “a serious terrorist threat” (Argentina). On that basis, Chile was seen to compare unfavorably even with the Argentine military dictatorship currently waging a “dirty war” ultimately responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians.¹³⁰

In preparation for his attendance at the OAS meeting, Vance received briefing papers for a scheduled private meeting with the Chilean Foreign Minister, Admiral Patricio Carvajal, which anticipated that Carvajal would almost certainly wish to discuss the Frei and Almeyda visits. If so, it was suggested the Secretary should simply repeat earlier reassurances that they were merely a “reflection of our interest in understanding the positions held by a broad spectrum of political interests” and categorically deny that they implied “a lessening [of] our interest in improving relations with the Pinochet regime, assuming there is human rights improvement; [and] least of all...any US involvement in a plan to overthrow the military government.” He should further emphasize that a decision not to receive either opposition leader “would have caused more criticism than receiving them”—presumably a reference to likely US congressional and public disapproval.¹³¹ Paradoxically, this was precisely the kind of mixed signal that former President Frei and Santiago Embassy DCM Boyatt had warned could encourage the Junta to believe it had little to fear from Washington. The briefing papers also emphasised that, despite a modicum of improvement over the past year, Chile remained “a gross violator of human rights,” and DINA continued to perpetrate abuses with impunity under the continuing state of siege.¹³²

Speaking before the OAS General Assembly, Vance put the case for human rights in general terms only, declaring that a “state’s efforts to protect itself and secure its society cannot be exercised by denying the dignity of its individual citizens or by suppressing political dissent.”¹³³ At a subsequent press conference, he would not discuss the specifics of any one-on-one meetings with his Latin counterparts, merely stating that promises had been made to take steps to improve the rights situation in various countries. Refusing to identify the governments that had issued such assurances, Vance stated that as far as the US was concerned, “we

shall have to wait and see what happens.”¹³⁴ In his discussion with Carvajal, the Secretary of State conveyed his primary message in more precise language: Chile’s rulers had to demonstrate progress on human rights and a good place to begin was a lifting of the state of siege, reform of the intelligence organizations, the abolition of DINA, and an acceptance of due process. Vance could not have been encouraged by Carvajal’s response that the state of siege and the nation’s intelligence organizations would remain in effect “as long as the Government of Chile deemed it necessary to protect [citizens from being] killed by terrorists.”¹³⁵

The actual terrorist threat was miniscule at best. The “Rettig” Commission’s investigation of human rights violations committed by private citizens for political purposes between January 1974 and August 1977 uncovered a mere six cases of such actions and concluded that violent activity was “on a lesser scale” during this three and a half year period. The Commission’s report was also damning of the authoritarian regime for its refusal to discriminate between legitimate protest and terrorism.¹³⁶

Imbedded in these kinds of comments was the key reason as to why it was so difficult to get any reaction on human rights from the Chilean regime. State’s Chile Desk officer Robert Steven put it concisely: “They believed in what they were doing and we didn’t have an awful lot of ways to influence them.”¹³⁷ The armed forces’ conviction stemmed partly from its doctrine of national security which constituted a central part of the framework within which Chilean foreign policy was devised and pursued. Robert Pastor was one of the few senior American officials who comprehended the doctrine’s all-embracing nature and why human rights didn’t fit into the military’s worldview: “They had convinced themselves they were doing God’s work and we didn’t understand it. They felt that they were defending Western civilization from the Communists and previous administrations in the US agreed with them. And all of a sudden you get these [Carter] people coming out of nowhere, telling them they weren’t Christian and they weren’t doing the right thing.”¹³⁸ If the Chilean military thought it was saving Western civilization, observed HA’s Mark Schneider, there was only one conclusion it could, and did, continue to draw: “You can do just about anything. And they felt that they could.”¹³⁹ At the OAS meeting in Grenada, this worldview was on display for all to see. Chilean representatives made strenuous attempts “to achieve international acceptance for the institutional linkage of ‘terrorism’ (read ‘subversion’) with the suspension of civil liberties, all in the name of an authoritarian defense against international Marxism.”¹⁴⁰

Eduardo Frei's concern about Washington's confused signals on Chile policy came to the fore again in mid-1977 when the White House was forced to deny a press report that the NSC had requested a CIA study of "alternatives" to Chile's military Junta, accusing two State Department officials of engaging in "a direct effort to smear [NSC staff specialist on Latin America] Bob Pastor."¹⁴¹ Having been "caught in a crossfire and almost shot," Pastor speculated that this was an attempt to get rid of him for allegedly advocating an "unjustifiable policy of intervention and by making it appear as if I were acting on my own against [Brzezinski's] instructions; to try to put a stop to the NSC Staff's 'interference' in the State Department's conduct of foreign policy; [and] to keep US policy to Chile solely the prerogative of ARA."

Pastor acknowledged that his relationship with ARA had always been difficult, partly due to personality conflicts and policy issues but primarily for "institutional reasons." Unburdening his frustrations on Brzezinski, he then launched into a withering attack on what he considered the bureau's determined efforts to freeze the NSC out of Latin American policymaking altogether. "They act as if life does not exist outside ARA except perhaps on the Seventh Floor. They have tried to exclude me and have kept me uninformed on what they have been doing. Hardly any information or recommendations bearing on future policy are forwarded to the NSC unless I ask for it first." As to current Chile policy, he damned it as "a series of uncoordinated ad hoc decisions" for which ARA must take much of the blame. The bureau wanted to initiate a dialogue with the regime, dangling the carrot of economic aid or positive statements by Vance or the US Embassy "for even the slightest indication of diminishing repression." This strategy could end up associating the President, either directly or indirectly, with the region's most brutal government for "a pittance." A competing approach, suggested by HA's Mark Schneider was "to immediately and totally disassociate the US from the present regime." While these two different views may have given the appearance of "bureaucratic pushing and pulling" to arrive at a policy outcome, Pastor argued that, in reality, both options were being pursued "simultaneously." Occasionally, Schneider "inserts himself in the process," bringing it to the attention of Christopher or Vance. At other times, ARA will directly communicate with the Chileans. It is hard not to conclude, wrote Pastor, "that our policy to Chile has been inconsistent and ad hoc without a sense of goals or strategies."¹⁴²

Some weeks later, Pastor repeated his concern about the "mess" that was US policy toward Chile. He complained to a British Embassy official that State Department "radicals" led by HA's Patricia Derian wanted to get

tough with Chile and force its leaders to adopt better human rights practices while ARA remained firmly wedded to the “quiet diplomacy” strategy. For its part, the NSC subscribed to a “middle course” whereby the US “would distance itself from Chile but avoid politicizing economic institutions (e.g., Eximbank) by introducing the human rights argument.”¹⁴³

Meanwhile, in Washington, an Inter-agency Human Rights Working Group report on Chile provided ammunition for those Carter officials opposed to the authorization of two AID loan applications for Chile totaling between \$10 and \$11 million respectively, part of a \$27.5 million economic package supported by ARA, the Defense Department and senior AID officials, and approved by Congress for FY1977. When HA and AID’s Latin American bureau successfully argued in the Working Group that, absent an improvement in the human rights situation, new AID loans to Chile should be withheld, and persuaded the Christopher Committee to this view, an outraged Terence Todman refused to let the matter rest. He personally lobbied Christopher directly to have the Committee overturn the decision. In the first place, he complained, the loans met the statutory “basic human needs” requirements or could be justified on humanitarian and development grounds because they were intended for farmers. More importantly, the situation in Chile today was “no worse and is somewhat better” than when the congressional ceiling on aid was imposed in the first place. The Deputy Secretary, wrote Todman, must see how “illogical” it would be to cut back further the original ceiling figure. The Working Group’s activities not only flew in the face of some human rights gains that had actually occurred but it also undermined President Carter’s professed desire to initiate a dialogue with Santiago. The US was more likely to achieve its objectives in Chile, Todman concluded, if its policy is “not perceived as punitive in nature.”¹⁴⁴

HA’s Mark Schneider vigorously contested Todman’s views in his own memo to Christopher, accusing State’s senior Latin American diplomat of conflating the so-called improvements and ignoring the recent disappearances and beatings, and the ransacking of the homes of PDC leaders. Dialogue and the provision of economic aid in the absence of any reciprocity on Chile’s part—for instance, taking some action to accommodate US concerns about DINA, the state of siege, due process and the like—was unacceptable. Schneider insisted there was a need to distinguish between loans for transmission directly to the regime (for example, the AID loans) and those intended for non-governmental organizations and state bodies at some distance removed from the government such as the Central Bank or the Agriculture Ministry.¹⁴⁵ Once again the Deputy Secretary was forced to arbitrate the disagreement.

On July 1, Christopher announced a minor concession to ARA that underlined the inconsistent nature of Chile policymaking: final action on the two AID loans would be postponed for 30 to 60 days “to see what changes might develop” in the human rights area.¹⁴⁶ That same day the Chilean government formally rejected the entire \$27.5 million aid package when news of the delay became public.¹⁴⁷ Pinochet declared that Chile would not allow foreign credits to be linked to human rights criteria: “Chile is not a country of beggars and those who intend to use credits as a political pressure will fail.”¹⁴⁸ Undoubtedly, this sudden act of defiance was not disassociated from Chile’s remarkable success in attracting loans from private US, West European, and Canadian banks exceeding \$800 million by 1977 (of which American banks accounted for more than \$500 million of this amount).¹⁴⁹ The military regime’s access to large-scale private sources of funding had a number of significant consequences: it further weakened US economic leverage, undermined the intent of Congress in restricting aid, and rendered other administration initiatives of more symbolic, than practical, value. Clearly conditional factors impacting on US policy were changing for reasons beyond the control of Carter officials. And as far the Chilean regime was concerned, the human right approach already appeared to be nothing that should unduly concern them.

CHAPTER 6

MUDDYING THE WATERS

*"The leading human rights advocates on the Hill are still not convinced that the Administration is serious about human rights."
Brzezinski to Carter, January 1978*

If Pinochet could turn a deaf ear to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) and its February 1977 assessment of the situation in Chile he could not so easily dismiss the steady erosion of what legitimacy the military regime retained inside the country itself, and the tensions this was generating within the Junta and among its closest supporters. There were also new rumblings of disenchantment among the Catholic hierarchy that could not be treated in the same cavalier fashion as condemnatory reports by outside human rights bodies. Chilean workers posed another problem, both in terms of potential industrial action over traditional concerns like wages and conditions, and as a possible source of recruits for political mobilization against the regime. Not even the opposition political parties could be entirely dismissed. Several of their prominent leaders had connections abroad and some were campaigning through these contacts, especially in the US, for harsher action against the regime. If only as an irritation, they constituted a challenge Pinochet could not ignore and how he chose to deal with it would be part of the calculus of how the US would deal with him.

Rising discontent in Chile

During 1977, the Chilean bishops became more forthright in their denunciations of the regime over its economic policies, the expansion of DINA's operations, crackdowns on labor unions, and attacks on non-violent critics of military rule including high-profile individuals within or close to the Church. When the regime banned all political parties in March 1977 in order to strike at the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the full Episcopal Conference responded with its strongest challenge to the dictatorship's legitimacy since the 1973 coup. In a declaration entitled

Nuestra Convivencia Nacional (Our Life as a Nation), the bishops criticized the regime's inherent weaknesses, demanded an end to bans on all political parties and the termination of the state of emergency, requested more accurate information on the disappeared, attacked the growing gap between rich and poor, and called for the revival of democratic politics.¹ The declaration revealed a widening gulf between the Church and the regime and it threatened to undermine what moral basis the military had been able to draw from the earlier support with which most bishops had greeted the overthrow of Allende. Pinochet declined to respond to the bishop's document, apparently not wanting to pour more fuel on the fire.

In his annual May Day homily that same year, Cardinal Raúl Silva launched a strong defense of the Chilean working class and the absence of respect for the rights of labor but, as in the past, was reluctant to take any action that might permanently damage the Church's traditional prerogatives.² At a luncheon speech four days later, he again focused on the unsatisfactory nature of military rule without, in Ambassador Popper's words, showing any inclination to "embark on an anti-government crusade."³

The ruling Junta was just as concerned to avoid any kind of precipitous break with the Church most strikingly illustrated in the events leading up to the resignation of the Minister of Justice, Renato Damilano, on April 20 after only six weeks in office. In an address at University of Chile earlier that month, Damilano accused the Church hierarchy of "perpetrating inappropriate political and hypocritical attacks against the Government" inspired by Marxist ideology. In a subsequent interview, he arrogantly declared that he "neither repented nor withdrew" his remarks and, to make matters worse, dismissed the bishops as "*polvos*" (insignificant dust). This was the last straw for the Junta leaders. Having ignored warnings to lower the decibel level of his attacks on the Church, Damilano was abruptly dismissed from his ministerial post.⁴

The labor movement presented its own problems. When Carter took office, Chile's workers were on a new collision course with the regime after the Group of Ten (G10) moderate unions broke with the government, angered by its blunt rejection of complaints that member organizations were being "paralyzed" under the pretext of national security. The continuing prohibition on strikes and bargaining over wages, together with other infringements on workers' rights, soon triggered more wide-ranging criticism of regime policies by the G10.⁵ At the end of April, 126 labor organizations issued a document that accused the Junta of not fulfilling promises made in the areas of workers' rights or social justice, and

charged that the free market economic policy was “dramatically injurious to workers’ interests.”⁶

Combined with a more active US effort to isolate Chile within global forums, these rising internal challenges convinced many of the Junta’s key civilian advisers that the time had come to start planning a transition away from military rule—a view that did not lack support among some of Pinochet’s Junta colleagues. ●f perhaps greater significance, there had developed a growing restlessness among a majority of Army generals over the spike in DINA illegal detentions, grounded in a belief that, as the CIA reported it, “the subversive situation is well under control, [the] state of siege should be lifted, [and] that DINA’s arrest powers should be terminated.” Even so, none of the generals were willing to argue the case with Pinochet because, again as the CIA saw it, they did not want to give the impression of capitulating to US pressures.⁷

These developments notwithstanding, the US Embassy still considered the likelihood of Junta tensions and disagreements leading to a fracturing or breakup of the leadership as remote. There were no “ambitious potential heirs within the army,” and other service chiefs were aware that “serious schisms would harm them all.” Pinochet’s strong support among upper and middle class sectors of Chilean society was also a check on challenges to his power.⁸ The behavior of Pinochet’s most outspoken Junta critics, Air Force General Gustavo Leigh and, to a lesser extent, Navy Admiral José Merino, added weight to this assessment.

Leigh had long opposed Pinochet’s relentless drive to accumulate personal power through his control of DINA and by inflating his own standing—as President of the Republic—inside the Junta. Having originally assumed responsibility for overseeing the social ministries (education, health and housing), Leigh became a vocal critic of the regime’s harsh economic reforms and was not averse to expounding on these views in public. ●ne notable performance occurred at a mid-1977 luncheon of European Economic Community Ambassadors in Santiago where he was the guest of honor: “Leigh put on an astounding show,” according to the American Embassy’s DCM Thomas Boyatt, “composed of roughly equal parts of criticism of Pinochet and pressure for political and human rights progress.”⁹ While arguing that Pinochet “cannot afford to ignore his colleagues,” Leigh, nonetheless, repeatedly emphasized the importance of Junta solidarity and armed forces unity.¹⁰ Admiral Merino preferred to confine his criticisms of Pinochet to close-door Junta meetings but joined with Leigh in contesting any sign that Pinochet was moving toward permanent military rule. He also voiced increasing alarm over the nation’s international reputation and the consequences of antagonizing

world opinion.¹¹ As heads of services highly dependent on access to advanced weaponry and spare-parts from abroad, both Junta members were acutely conscious of not unnecessarily alienating potential sources of supply and assistance.¹²

Pinochet's riposte

US officials in Washington and Santiago did their best to monitor these internal Junta dynamics. “[The] Pinochet situation is deteriorating,” Secretary of State Vance scribbled on notepaper during a June meeting in the White House. “If economic help should decrease [it] could have [a] positive effect.”¹³ Days earlier, Ambassador Popper had left Chile to become special representative to the Secretary of State in the Panama Canal negotiations, leaving Boyatt as the most senior official in the Embassy. ● On July 1, 1977, Boyatt cabled Vance that “for the first time we have a pattern of evidence that a number of senior military officials are sufficiently distressed by Chile’s image regarding human rights abuses to begin gnawing away at DINA’s omnipotence.”¹⁴ Tensions among the ruling generals were not interpreted as tantamount to a groundswell of opposition to Pinochet himself. Rather, they were confined to particular policies and/or policy directions. Moreover, US officials were sensitive to the fact that attempting to exploit these fault lines to achieve limited outcomes was fraught with risk. “The obvious problem was if you tried to bolster somebody, you might get his head taken off,” remembered State’s Chile Desk ● officer Robert Steven. “The fact that the US might be seen officially supporting a general who might not be one hundred percent following Pinochet’s line wasn’t doing that fellow any favors.”¹⁵ In any event, what awareness US officials did have of the Junta’s internal divisions had no policy consequences in the White House or the State Department. They were not viewed as an opportunity to rethink or revise the existing approach. Instead, as he had done on previous occasions, it was the Chilean President who seized the initiative.

● On July 10, Pinochet announced *El Acto de Chacarillas* (The Act of Chacarillas), in a speech at the same location authored by *gremialista* leader Jaime Guzmán. This was a plan to establish a constitutional framework that would “institutionalize the regime and legalize its permanence in power.” The creation of what Pinochet termed a “new democracy” was now a realistic goal, due to “the evident success of the economic plan, the progress of the social measures, and the [achievement of] order and tranquility.” Implying a seamless thread between the events of September 11, 1973 and his plan to shape a “new democracy,” Pinochet

defined the latter as “an authoritarian, protected, integrating, technological system with real social participation” that would fulfill the military’s original intention in overthrowing “an illegitimate and ruinous government” and terminating “a political-institutional regime already bankrupt.”¹⁶ The CIA interpreted the timing of Pinochet’s decision as essentially tactical, dictated by internal and external pressures. Among these were growing demands from within the Army high command for a shift in policy to improve ties with Washington, and urgings from Pinochet’s Junta colleagues to “establish a timetable for transition to civilian rule.”¹⁷ But whatever his motives, Pinochet’s unilateral decision did not sit well with his Junta colleagues. Air Force General Leigh was angry at not being consulted prior to the *Chacarillas* speech and vented his spleen with some “blunt remarks.” He and the Navy’s Admiral Merino had been “pressing for a more rapid transition from military rule” than anything Pinochet seemed to be proposing.¹⁸

The timetable for the introduction of a “new democracy” was to be staggered. The first stage, a period of “recovery,” would last until December 1980. Political power would remain concentrated in the hands of the armed forces leadership which would proceed to write a new constitution that would be submitted for approval through a national plebiscite. This would be followed by a four or five year “transition” phase to allow for the passage of legislative “reforms” in the areas of labor, social welfare, education and public administration. Meanwhile, there would be a gradual reduction in the military’s legislative—though not executive—powers paralleling the establishment of a civilian legislative chamber whose members would be selected by the Junta. The final “normalcy or consolidation” stage, to be completed by 1990, would feature the election of two-thirds of the members of the new Congress who, in turn, would elect a president.¹⁹

Almost immediately the regime’s political “reform” agenda came under attack from labor unions which rejected the dictator’s vision of a “protected and authoritarian democracy,” protested his timetable for a return to civilian rule, and insisted that the formation of any new political institutions must be based on genuine consultation with all sectors of Chilean society.²⁰ Given the lack of specificity, and its vague and drawn-out timetable that ensured the military would remain in charge at every step, it is not surprising that Chile’s opposition leaders, likewise, rejected the plan describing it variously as a “cosmetic formula,” a “farce,” a “mockery of democracy,” and a ruse to mask the continuation of Junta rule.²¹ The initial US response was more welcoming. (Pinochet apparently sent Assistant Secretary of State Terence Todman an advance copy of the

speech believing him to be among those Carter diplomats most sympathetic toward the regime.²²) Secretary of State Vance labeled the transition plan a “positive step” and one with which “in principle we are pleased.”²³ ARA’s Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank McNeil was somewhat more reserved, describing the plan as “a limited and still rather exotic” way of returning Chile to some form of institutional legality.²⁴ In Santiago, Boyatt reportedly visited Chilean Foreign Minister Patricio Carvajal to convey Washington’s enthusiasm for the plan. His remarks triggered an angry response from opposition leaders forcing a State Department spokesman to issue a clarifying statement that the US remained as concerned as ever about human rights in Chile and that President Carter’s preference was for an earlier return to democracy. Other Department officials were relaxed about Boyatt’s comments on the grounds that “we don’t want always to appear critical.”²⁵

The NSC’s Robert Pastor noted the absence in Pinochet’s speech of any reference to the state of siege, any guarantee of due process or the future of DINA, and discerned a consensus among US officials that the timetable was “not serious.” The main significance of the *Chacarillas* speech appeared to be Pinochet’s seeming acknowledgment that a permanent military dictatorship was not a viable option for Chile—which Pastor, like Vance, considered a “positive step.”²⁶ That said, few officials in Washington followed the regime’s constitutional proposals with sufficiently close interest or attention to incorporate Pinochet’s brazen ambition into their overall assessment of the regime’s intentions. “I don’t think that anyone thought the detail of the constitutional debate was vital,” said State’s Robert Steven. The prevailing view was that the “military were going to do what they wanted to do and how they chose to phrase it was not of itself vital.”²⁷ This was unsurprising insofar as the key objective of US policy remained “the enhancement of basic human rights,” not efforts to “change governments or remake societies.”²⁸

Based on such reasoning, Carter officials concentrated on exploiting Pinochet’s transition proposal to extract further concessions on human rights rather than democratic political reform. In mid-July, for instance, a special Chilean emissary arrived in Washington for a meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll to explain the decision to cancel a scheduled UNHRC Working Group visit. He carried a message from Pinochet complaining about an anti-Chile campaign being “orchestrated in UN forums.” Applying mild pressure in the hope of reversing the decision, Ingersoll replied that cancellation of the Working Group’s visit would only reinforce congressional opposition to economic and military aid programs for his nation.²⁹ If there was any more comprehensive message the State

Department wished to deliver the Junta in the aftermath of *Chacarillas*, it would await the visit to Chile by Assistant Secretary Terence Todman—the highest ranking US official to make the trip since Carter took office.

The State Department's policy under fire

As Todman's arrival in Santiago neared, the cable traffic and Department conversations offered insights into the differences of opinion opening up among Carter officials over how best to deal with Chile. In Washington, Warren Christopher cautioned his Assistant Secretary that most of the countries he would visit in his tour through Latin America were governed by "strongly anti-communist military leaders... nurtured on Cold War rhetoric" which would inevitably "color" discussions on a number of topics. He would also likely find that recent US policy shifts, specifically a marked decline in US military relations with these countries, had produced "considerable bitterness" and a growing perception that the US was "at best, an unreliable partner."³⁰ From the Embassy, more pointedly, Thomas Boyatt recommended that, in his meetings with Chilean officials, Todman should encourage the government's planned human rights measures, promise a positive response once they were implemented, and indicate the US was "favorably impressed" with the decision to make public proposed dates and steps for the transition from emergency rule.³¹

Ambassador Popper, now back in Washington and apparently less concerned than previously about pushing Pinochet into some kind of anti-American corner, challenged Boyatt's recommendations, messaging Todman that the Embassy had "veered off the mark." The Assistant Secretary should not be "less forthright" than Vance and Christopher in prodding the Junta to get on with the task of restoring a "greater degree of normality" in their country. Todman might also press for the resumption of visits by international bodies such as the UNHRC Working Group, and an accelerated timetable for the military's return to barracks.³² Popper's recommendations received short shrift during an inter-departmental meeting attended by Todman: "Commenting on the political atmosphere in Chile [deleted] said that the situation is improving. Apparently the GOC does intend to get rid of DINA. There is a new flexibility and a new responsiveness to our pressures. The question now is how much and when to push for reforms."³³

At the NSC, Robert Pastor could not see how these "two quite different Chile policies" in State—one to get tougher with Pinochet; the other to ease up—contributed to any push for reform. "Rather than coalescing," he wrote to Brzezinski, "these two approaches seem to be moving further

apart.”³⁴ There could be no disputing that the major intra-agency protagonists were interpreting “cool but correct” relations with Chile according to their own agendas. To ARA, this framework was not incompatible with working through the Junta to achieve policy objectives; to HA, it signified no backsliding on demands for an end to the state of siege, reorganization or termination of the intelligence agencies, a more satisfactory response on the subject of disappeared persons, and a move toward the “reassertion of traditional Chilean civil liberties.”³⁵

Pastor displayed increasing annoyance with State’s contradictory and inconsistent messages on Chile, fearing that unless something was done, they would become “a significant embarrassment to the President.” On the eve of Todman’s departure, the NSC staffer kept up his scarcely veiled criticism of Vance and insisted that the Assistant Secretary take with him a very clear message to Chile and the other Southern Cone regimes about the nature of US policy. What they must be made to understand was that Washington sharply distinguished between “an announcement of intention and the implementation” of a policy, and between real and cosmetic changes. Otherwise, his hosts “won’t have much trouble” dismissing administration policy as “grossly inconsistent.”³⁶

Prior to his scheduled meeting with the American envoy, Pinochet announced that DINA would be dissolved and replaced with a new intelligence service, the *Centro Nacional de Informaciones* (National Information Center or CNI). Most observers downplayed any notion that this decision to restructure the major instrument of repression was a response to US pressure, emphasizing instead the role of interrelated domestic factors in Pinochet’s calculations: increased armed forces support for the appointment of civilians to government positions and the institutionalization of the regime’s legitimacy; concern about the need to break down Chile’s global isolation; and Pinochet’s apparent confidence that the internal security threat had eased to the point where “subversives... can no longer challenge the authority of the government.”³⁷ In Washington, Pinochet’s move was interpreted as a concession to his Junta colleagues and their simmering hostility toward the security organization to the point where it had assumed the “role of the Gestapo,” monitoring not only civilian opponents of the regime but military officers as well.³⁸

The question that divided US officials was how much significance to attach to DINA’s dissolution. Its termination also saw the closure of a number of notorious torture centers but the CNI inherited most of DINA’s estimated 4000 agents and continued many of the earlier security organization’s functions.³⁹ Unlike its predecessor, though, the CNI’s authority and jurisdiction would be formally established under the Interior

Ministry and without the powers to arrest or detain individuals—those powers were now transferred to the President. Still, the US Embassy worried that “a loophole in the new law” gave CNI “certain detention powers and does not establish clearly enough that it will be merely an intelligence collection agency.”⁴⁰ Nevertheless, Todman dismissed suggestions that the replacement of DINA with the CNI was little more than a sleight of hand, terming it a “very positive” development.⁴¹ Such an overly optimistic view was not shared by State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) which offered a much more cautious assessment, namely that it was premature to conclude whether the establishment of the CNI represented “a real or merely a cosmetic change in policy.”⁴²

Todman’s more favorable assessment of DINA’s disbandment was not the only contentious statement the Assistant Secretary made during his visit. Meeting with senior Chilean foreign policy officials, Todman sympathized with the need “for a positive espousal of democratic values to counter the Soviet menace” in Latin America and, invoking a Cold War-era security agreement, told his audience that the US “would not abandon friends, particularly in this hemisphere.”⁴³ At the end of his stay, which included a 90 minute discussion with Pinochet, Todman applauded the regime’s human rights progress, and attributed its negative international image “to a lack of information” and assessments largely based on “conditions that existed before but which do not correspond to the present situation.”⁴⁴ Union officials who conferred with a visiting US congressional delegation only days after Todman left Chile offered a far more pessimistic slant on the abolition of DINA: it was only a “superficial” gesture and “the political and trade union situation would not improve” as a result.⁴⁵ In a candid briefing to the EEC and Commonwealth Ambassadors, the US Embassy’s Thomas Boyatt admitted that the discussions between Chilean officials and Todman, and with the congressional delegation, achieved little. They were similar to the Carvajal/Vance meeting at the June 1977 OAS gathering where there was “no meeting of minds whatsoever.”⁴⁶

At the State Department, spokesman Hodding Carter appeared to endorse Todman’s stance, telling reporters that Chile’s global image “is somewhat distorted and somewhat out of date.”⁴⁷ Pinochet himself did this interpretation no favors when he soon added a qualification to his promise of elections, telling a *New York Times* reporter that the date Chileans would go to the polls had been stretched from eight to ten years and then only if the country continued to show “positive signs.”⁴⁸ This statement would have come as no surprise to NSC officials who had earlier registered skepticism about his original drawn-out plans for a return to

civilian rule. A CIA study similarly concluded that the reform measures promised by the regime were “still cloaked in ambiguity.” The one indisputable fact was that Pinochet “intends to keep the process tightly in hand and prevent it from unraveling too fast.”⁴⁹

Human rights sidelined: Pinochet vsits Washington

Foreign policy options papers on Latin America prepared for Carter following his election victory stressed that the renewal of negotiations over the Panama Canal treaty, suspended during the campaign, would be viewed by the region as “a critical test” of the new administration’s policies.⁵⁰ Anything less than a satisfactory outcome “could lead to bloody confrontations in the Canal Zone and doom any prospect for cooperative relations with [the hemisphere].”⁵¹ Within days of entering the White House, the President requested his senior foreign policy advisers to prepare a memorandum on Panama as part of a “broader review” of regional policy.⁵²

Following intense negotiations, American and Panamanian delegations finally reached agreement on treaties governing the future of the Canal: one would return sovereignty over the Canal Zone territory to Panama and establish joint operational control of the Canal itself; the other, would withdraw US forces from the area while granting the latter a permanent right to return to defend the Canal from an external threat. Carter and Panama’s General Omar Torrijos signed the requisite documents on September 7 (approved by a national vote in Panama and, after a prolonged debate, ratified by two-thirds of the US Senate). To celebrate the signing of the treaties, President Carter invited all his Latin American counterparts (with the exception of Cuba’s Fidel Castro) to Washington. This would represent a public relations coup for Pinochet, as would a promised White House meeting with Carter. Pinochet’s invitation would also be significant as his first journey as President outside of Latin America except to attend the funeral of Spain’s General Francisco Franco.

The decision to include Pinochet on the list of invitees was not universally applauded within the foreign policy bureaucracy. HA led the opposition, describing it as a “bad idea” principally because he “was the only head of state who carried out an assassination in the streets of Washington”⁵³—a reference to the murders of Orlando Letelier and his aide Ronni Moffitt in 1976. The NSC advised against sending invitations to any authoritarian or dictatorial head of state. Neither argument, however, persuaded Carter who refused to withdraw the invitation to

Pinochet because he had a bigger picture in mind. Robert Pastor elaborated:

Carter called us all in Brzezinski, me and Mondale and the political types to talk about the signing ceremony for the Canal Treaties. I had convinced Zbigniew Brzezinski that we didn't want to own the dictators, so we should invite just the democratic presidents and the foreign ministers of the dictatorships. So Brzezinski goes in the room and he makes that case. Carter just dismissed him totally. He said 'You don't understand; you think the American people know the difference between Pinochet and [the military dictator of Paraguay General Alfredo] Stroessner, and these others. What we need to do is show the American people that all of Latin America backs the Canal Treaties. And to do that you have got to bring them all up here.' So Carter was focused first and foremost on his first objective the Canal Treaties.

Having lost the argument, the NSC had no option but to go along with the Carter strategy and let the President "work over directly" those dictators who attended the ceremony.⁵⁴ On Capitol Hill, much of the legislators' ire at inviting Pinochet was targeted at the scheduled White House meeting between the Chilean leader and Carter. In a letter to the President, Senator James Abourezk (D-SD) attacked the decision to entertain in the Oval Office a head-of-state who presided over a still "deplorable" human rights environment in his own country. It would, Abourezk wrote, only "give him the additional power to continue the deprivation of human rights of a great many of his citizens."⁵⁵

Carter rejected the recommendation of Robert Pastor to allow Pat Derian to sit in on the President's meetings with the leaders of Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina. Although it would have established "a difficult precedent," Pastor argued that it would have clearly signaled the importance the President attached to human rights and defuse criticism from the human rights community which had "been attacking us for inviting these guys to the White House in the first place."⁵⁶ In any event, as expected, much of the hour long meeting between Carter and Pinochet focused on what the US President described as the "only major bilateral problem"—human rights. While Carter "laid it on the line," according to Pastor, his tone was "conciliatory" rather than aggressive or hostile.⁵⁷ The President softened his remarks by acknowledging the "great progress" of recent months with the release of prisoners, improved trial procedures, and the announcement of a future return to democratic government. Nonetheless, "in the eyes of the world Chile still had a human rights problem." To Pinochet, talk of this kind was simply part of "a vast and successful Marxist propaganda campaign" to discredit his regime. "All of

his problems,” Carter later wrote in his diary, “were derived from Cuba and Russia, according to him.” Pinochet denied there were any political prisoners in Chilean jails or any serious violations, explained away restrictions on personal freedoms to the danger posed by Marxists who would again wreak havoc if allowed to regain power. Carter was somewhat more successful in getting Pinochet to reconsider his decision to ban a UNHRC delegation from visiting Chile to investigate alleged widespread human rights abuses. But in return, Carter agreed to Pinochet’s demands that the delegation would consist of two people only (officially visiting as individuals rather than members of a commission or working group of any kind), that there would be no advance publicity of the visit, that the study would be conducted in an “impartial” manner, and that the Chilean government would be allowed to comment on the report prior to publication. Pinochet was confident that the UN would not accept these conditions—which indeed turned out to be the case.⁵⁸

Carter and Pinochet also discussed several other bilateral issues including the Peruvian military buildup. Carter attempted to allay Chilean fears of a Peruvian threat, telling Pinochet that Peru’s President Morales-Bermúdez had assured him during their bilateral that his government’s security needs had been satisfied and it did not intend to purchase additional military weaponry except for operational and maintenance materials.⁵⁹ These assurances, however, gave Pinochet no comfort.

The two heads of state then discussed the vexed, and seemingly intractable, issue of Bolivia’s demand for a corridor to the sea—an issue that would eventually deflate any hopes Pinochet might have had that he could trust Carter and work with his administration to improve bilateral ties. Pinochet suggested that Washington lobby the Peruvians to grant a corridor to Bolivia while at the same time putting the onus on the landlocked country to convince Lima to accept a Chilean proposal regarding a tripartite zone. This offer, made in secret to La Paz in 1975 and largely reflecting an attempt to enlist it in an alliance against Peru, would have involved providing Bolivia with a narrow strip of land with access to the sea in exchange for some water rights and an equivalent amount of Bolivian territory. But this last demand was rejected by La Paz which insisted that the corridor had to include the port of Arica and refused to surrender any of its territory in return. There was also a further obstacle what would not be easy to surmount. Under a 1929 Treaty, Chile was legally forbidden from disposing of territory formerly owned by Peru without the latter’s consent which Lima refused to give unless Chile provided a strip of land within a joint Peruvian-Chilean-Bolivian condominium zone at the Pacific end of the corridor as well as a tri-

national port authority in Arica—a proposal the Pinochet regime rejected out of hand. On the eve of Carter's meetings with the heads-of-state of Peru, Bolivia and Chile, Brzezinski advised him that Peru was "the key" to any settlement even though it probably still harbored thoughts of regaining territory lost in the War of the Pacific. But while Lima supported Bolivia's claim, "its proposal was so unrealistic that one can infer that it is not eager to settle."⁶⁰

Brzezinski did raise with Carter the possibility of applying pressure on Morales-Bermúdez during their meeting. Quite fortuitously, the Peruvians were negotiating a standby loan with the IMF at the time and hoped for Washington's strong support, which put the US in a position to "exercise considerable influence" on Lima. Even though the country's economic program was reasonably "sound" and Morales-Bermúdez would "probably" obtain the loan without US help, Brzezinski suggested to Carter that "you might want to subtly link the IMF issues to our concern over the corridor."⁶¹ It seems unlikely that Carter took that advice because, when he finally met with Bolivian President Hugo Banzer, he told him that the "burden" of negotiating a corridor to the sea rested largely on his shoulders. Two formidable obstacles lay in the way of a solution, said Carter: Peru's refusal to support an agreement negotiated between Bolivia and Chile alone, and Chile's rejection of a Peruvian proposal for an international zone at Arica.⁶² Presumably both were somehow Banzer's problem to solve. The entire impasse over Bolivia's access to the sea, in other words, remained unchanged.

Overall, Chile Desk officer Robert Steven, who wrote briefing papers in preparation for the Carter-Pinochet meeting, expressed disappointment with the results of the encounter, especially from a human rights perspective. He surmised that Carter may well have felt that this "wasn't the time or place" to more forcefully press Pinochet on human rights because this might have "opened up problems with all the other governments."⁶³ Embassy DCM Thomas Boyatt was also disappointed over what he considered the President's lack of specificity in spelling out the administration's human rights policy, observing that "general statements on human rights are lost on Pinochet."⁶⁴

Whatever Carter's intentions, the effect of avoiding a showdown considerably buoyed Pinochet. Embassy cables leading up to the visit had described him as having "mixed feelings" over how he would be received in Washington, hopeful that the visit would provide some much needed legitimacy for his rule while "fear[ing] a high-level confrontation" over the Junta's human rights record. Instead, he came away feeling a sense of "relief," surprised that he had been treated so well. The meeting with

Carter was amicable, his positions on outstanding problems received a better than expected hearing, and there were no requests for the Junta to take specific internal measures. The meeting even raised expectations among some regime supporters that, finally, the White House was beginning to appreciate “the ‘Chilean reality.’”⁶⁵ On his return to Santiago, Pinochet felt no compelling reason to lift the state of siege or take any other initiative that would have exposed him “to charges that he was submitting to US pressure.”⁶⁶ There was little sign that Carter’s “working over” of Pinochet had achieved much at all on any front.

The same was true of pressure on the Junta by its key domestic critics. During October, the Embassy and the CIA both commented on improved ties between religious and military leaders. “See-saw Church-State relations appear to be on the mend,” DCM Boyatt cabled State, “with both sides avoiding confrontation on socio-economic and political issues.”⁶⁷ Intelligence reports reached a similar conclusion: the Church had adopted a “more conciliatory attitude,” singling out the key role of Cardinal Silva in “urging church leaders to be cautious in applying pressure on the government, since he judges that such tactics would be counterproductive.”⁶⁸ By the end of November, however, the Embassy reported that “the carefully nurtured *modus vivendi*” was beginning to show signs of “strain,” exacerbated by Pinochet’s hostile remarks during a speech to labor leaders where he complained about the Vicariate of Solidarity for “developing and providing information used by Chile’s critics abroad” and accused it of engaging in political activity by working closely with the G10 labor leaders.⁶⁹ Relations with such trade union leaders remained more difficult to predict. Although a threatened confrontation was defused, at least temporarily, when Pinochet agreed not to proceed with a plan to force a number of them from their positions, his animosity showed no signs of easing, fueled by a conviction that these individuals were being used by the Christian Democrats and “engaging in political activity to embarrass the government.”⁷⁰

Enter George Landau

After considerable delay in nominating a new US Ambassador to Chile following the departure of David Popper, the White House submitted the name of George Landau who had previously served as Washington’s Ambassador to Paraguay. If the Carter meeting with Pinochet had augured well for a “softer” US approach to Chile, the Landau appointment would certainly have sent a different message: it promised a marked contrast to Popper and signaled that bilateral relations were about to enter a new and

far less amicable phrase. At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)—only two weeks after the Carter-Pinochet meeting—Landau was peppered with questions about human rights in Chile by legislators who challenged the “symbolic effect” of upgrading US Embassy representation (no ambassador had been appointed for six months) at a time when there were no perceived “great changes” in the conduct of the regime regarding human rights. The Ambassador-designate gave no hint that any shift to a more moderate policy was being contemplated by the administration. Responding to a question from Committee chair, Frank Church (D-ID), Landau spelled out the basis for the approach he intended to take: “I have been dealing with human rights questions now for the last five years. I speak from the viewpoint of trial and error, from experience. It is one of the most difficult problems [and] we have to use all the methods at our disposal.” Landau emphasized that his primary objective was to make the Embassy a veritable “focal point” for the promotion of human rights in Chile.⁷¹

As Landau prepared to take up his post in mid-November, senior Carter policymakers moved to ensure that the regime was made fully aware the new Ambassador would come armed with a more forceful mandate to distance Washington from the ruling Junta than his predecessor had or desired to possess. Due to the “extraordinary importance of Chile as a symbol of human rights abuse,” State’s Peter Tarnoff suggested to Brzezinski that Landau meet with Carter before his departure for Santiago on November 4, thereby demonstrating the new Ambassador clearly “speaks with the authority of the White House.”⁷² Brzezinski enthusiastically supported this idea. In a memo to Carter he stressed that the Chilean regime must be in no doubt “that [Landau] is our representative and you have confidence in him. Otherwise, he and our human rights policy may suffer an unnecessary setback in terms of credibility.”⁷³ With the media deliberately informed of the meeting in advance, Landau was granted ten minutes with the President in the Oval Office. Before his departure, Carter wrote a letter to Pinochet to underscore the point further, stating that the new Ambassador had his “complete confidence.”⁷⁴ Recalling the circumstances some three decades later, Landau observed that when he left for Chile he carried with him “very clear instructions, and they were to keep a distance from Pinochet...and to do what I did in Paraguay: get things done.”⁷⁵

On arriving in Santiago, Landau found Pinochet “very, very worried about the Carter administration: he thought they were out to get him.”⁷⁶ The Ambassador exempted the White House from this accusation but empathized with the Junta leadership’s frustration over what it

perceived as a lack of reciprocity on Washington's part for concessions made, and was critical of the President's failure to realize that some of his officials, among them Robert Pastor and Mark Schneider, were indeed "out to get Pinochet."⁷⁷ If that was the case, there is no evidence that these sentiments predominated in such a way as to have any major policy consequences. True, the US was using its position in international forums (●AS, UN) to publicly criticize the regime's foot-dragging on human rights as were other governments around the world—but Chile was hardly the sole target of Carter's moralistic approach.

Still, Pinochet's anxiety about Carter policy could only have been reinforced by a series of developments during Landau's first months in Santiago. In November, the interagency Christopher Committee determined that the US should oppose four new Chilean loan requests to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) totaling \$53.5 million, notwithstanding the dissolution of DINA, the cordial meeting between Carter and Pinochet, and the latter's conditional agreement to allow UN human rights inspectors into Chile. In the course of the Committee's discussion, ARA put forth its standard position that "basic human needs" (BHN) loans should be supported to avoid punishing the populace "for the sins of their government." The bureau's Frank McNeil downplayed the scope of the Junta's repression by comparing it favorably with more egregious abusers, contending that the number of political prisoners in Chile was only in the hundreds and that while "many have been killed [it is] certainly less than in Indonesia." ●nce again, this view failed to attract much, if any, sympathy from other Committee members. Christopher himself categorically opposed any aid ties or financial assistance to the Junta until he saw some "believable and sustained" progress on human rights. Nor was it simply a case that, in supporting the loan applications, the US would be helping the least well off in Chilean society. What ARA failed to understand, said the NSC's Robert Pastor, was that all assistance of this kind, including BHN loans, was "channeled" through a government and, therefore, is imbued with "overtones of signs and symbols legitimizing that government." HA's Mark Schneider challenged McNeil's attempt to put a favorable gloss on the human rights environment, noting that the Department continued to receive reports of arbitrary arrests, detention, disappearances and torture. Christopher brought the discussion to an end, announcing that the US would oppose all four loans if they came up to the IADB Board for a vote.⁷⁸ This decision reaffirmed the thrust of Secretary Vance's prior cable to the Santiago Embassy that there had been no "fundamental change in the human rights situation in Chile

which would permit us to alter our position” on such matters as World Bank votes.⁷⁹

Although it temporarily withdrew a \$14 million soft loan request to the IADB for health facilities in early December to avoid the embarrassment of an almost certain American veto, Chile did not lack support within the MDBs.⁸⁰ The \$24.5 million infrastructure loan request received approval from IADB Executive Directors despite the negative vote cast by the US representative. While the US position on this loan was no doubt galling to Santiago, the fact remained that the loan got through. Equally significant, as in other cases where the US opposed a loan on human rights grounds, Washington did not put pressure on other member countries to follow its lead.⁸¹ Another example of the contradictory nature of White House policy was that while it consistently opposed Chilean MDB loan requests, it did not terminate US bilateral economic assistance which in 1977 totaled \$33.2 million in loans and grants.⁸²

Still, Chilean officials were by now being constantly badgered over human rights by Carter administration civilian *and* military officials. In early December, the Head of the US Southern Command, General Dennis McAuliffe, held discussions in Santiago with Pinochet, Defense Minister General Herman Brady, and other senior Army officials. McAuliffe’s central message was that if the Chileans wanted to improve bilateral relations, “the ball is in their court.” Discrete improvements were well and good but “much more needs to be done and a good track record maintained over a sustained period.”⁸³ These sentiments likely generated more discomfort coming from a fellow officer—who presumably better understood the Chilean military’s calculations—than those coming from senior American diplomats.

Some military supplies were getting through, including those in the pipeline before Congress terminated direct military aid. Although the ban extended to private arms transfers, during 1975-76 the Junta purchased US-origin vision equipment, revolvers, ammunition, trucks, aircraft and aircraft engines, and chemicals used in riot control. When Congress voted to extend the prohibition on arms deliveries in 1976, it was presumed Chile would remain completely off limits to US military aid and commercial arms sales. But, in January 1978, Pastor informed Brzezinski that Defense contractors had transferred \$43 million worth of arms to Chile in the first nine months of 1977 and an additional \$39 million worth of arms were supposed to be in the pipeline for the following year. This situation, argued Pastor, “raises two very fundamental questions: First, should we stop the pipeline? I really think we have no choice but to do that [and] secondly is there not a better monitoring device for keeping us

informed about such arms sales?”⁸⁴ The following month Pastor drew the NSC Adviser’s attention to the fact that at the end FY1977, there was \$77.9 million worth of FMS undelivered orders. As they had already been contracted and paid for, he expressed “serious reservations” about stopping delivery at this time.⁸⁵

Back in mid-1977, an administration decision to delay the sale of police weapons was described by a State Department official as more of a cautious “stall [than a] firm decision” to halt the transfer of these types of items permanently.⁸⁶ That same year the Chilean air force took delivery of the earlier purchased 36 F-5E and A-37 fighter planes.⁸⁷ In November, the *Los Angeles Times* reported that the State and Defense Departments had approved sales of engines and electronic equipment to the Brazilian aircraft firm Embraer in the full knowledge that the parts were used in patrol planes on-sold to the Chilean navy.⁸⁸ All told, Chile received tens of millions of dollars’ worth of US military material during the first twelve months of the Carter presidency which DOD justified on the grounds they had been ordered before June 30, 1976 or else involved dual purpose equipment, such as the Embraer sales, which, technically, had civilian as well as military applications.⁸⁹

Whither the human rights policy

Discussing the possibilities for exploiting tensions within the ruling Junta triggered by Pinochet’s assumption of “a greater political role” at the end of 1977, an ARA draft memo titled *Chile—A Tactical Plan* warned that “it would be a grave mistake to overestimate the amount of potential leverage which the current situation entails.” Of course, regime change was not on Washington’s agenda. “It is not and should not be our policy,” the memo stated, “to weaken General Pinochet nor to be instrumental in inducing a change of government.” Maintaining a “cool” relationship and keeping cooperation “to a minimum” remained the preferred policy option. ARA thus advised limiting participation in activities with opposition groups over the next three to six months and instead focusing on funding specific small-scale projects in the private sector. But the regime should be under no misapprehension that cooperation came at a price: it could and would occur only if the Junta “takes serious steps to terminate arbitrary arrests and torture, and makes substantive moves toward democratization.” The objective should be to put the Chileans “on the defensive.” Once this general political framework was approved it should be implemented in consultation with key members of Congress and Washington’s principal European allies who had an interest in Chile.⁹⁰ Not long after, however,

Warren Christopher restated State's commitment to maintain "correct, cool relations" with the military government.⁹¹

While Chile might remain a special case in terms of the human rights policy, the trend in White House thinking as early as the second half of 1977 was nonetheless toward lowering expectations as to what the policy could achieve. In June, State Department officials had described the OAS, not the United States, as the "principal instrument" for pursuing regional improvements in human rights and backed up that statement by successfully sponsoring a resolution at the annual OAS meeting to delegate more of the responsibility for policing abuses to such bodies as the IACHR.⁹² Concurrently, US officials openly spoke of the need for greater "even handedness" in dealing with repressive regimes. "We don't want the human rights policy to be, or appear to be, purely punitive," remarked one ARA official. "We don't want improvements to go unnoticed."⁹³ To increasing numbers of individuals inside and outside the administration this apparent shift seemed to denote a major backpedaling from the tough human rights rhetoric of the 1976 presidential campaign. Carter's chief of staff, Hamilton Jordan, at one point felt so exasperated by the President's apparent lack of commitment to the policy that he had asked the NSC Adviser, "What's the matter with him? I don't recognize him. He wasn't like this in Georgia."⁹⁴ Responding to comments such as these, Brzezinski felt compelled to warn Carter of a growing public perception that his foreign policy was "soft" and advised him to strongly "reassert" his commitment to promoting human rights.⁹⁵

At year's end, Carter received a memo from Jordan, supporting a call for the President to re-engage forcefully with the issue. "We need to be more visible and active," Jordan wrote, because this was the one foreign policy initiative "that has a broad base of support among the American people and is not considered 'liberal.'"⁹⁶ The domestic political cost of appearing to abandon human rights was not all that worried Carter's senior advisers. "[The] leading human rights advocates on the Hill," reported Brzezinski, "are still not convinced that the Administration is serious about human rights."⁹⁷ In State, there was pressure on Vance to urge the White House "to clarify to the bureaucracy how the President views the policy, its application, and the range of instruments being used."⁹⁸ Most observers were interpreting his positions on aid legislation as reflecting little more than a desire for "damage limiting," wrote Policy Planning's Anthony Lake, and the Executive seems only willing to take measures to deny economic or military assistance to major abusers if "ordered" to do so by Congress.⁹⁹ Brzezinski lent support to this critique and suggested to Carter that the lack of a Presidential Directive (PD) on human rights was

causing “a certain degree of confusion” over the guidelines of US policy, and allowed those who opposed it to argue that the policy “does not even really exist.”¹⁰⁰ When a PD finally appeared in February 1978 it did little to clear up the confusion. Apart from a new emphasis on the use of “positive inducements and incentives acknowledging improvements in human rights whenever appropriate,” the document essentially repeated what earlier policy drafts had said on the subject.¹⁰¹ To some in the administration, the PD threatened to only further water down the US government’s commitment; to others, it singularly failed to address the bureaucratic differences which remained as wide as ever.

Senior Treasury Department officials were equally unhappy with what they considered the State Department’s failure to address major flaws in the “implementation” of the MFIs which they ascribed partly to a failure “to define clearly its human rights goals.”¹⁰² In a memo to Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal, two senior subordinates complained that, despite having worked “closely” with Warren Christopher and his staff, they could not get a precise definition of “gross violators” or what objectives the human rights policy were intended to achieve. Unless State was able to “pull together country strategies which integrate the MFIs with other policy instruments,” the two Treasury officials warned, the result could have the effect of seriously complicating future congressional MFI appropriations.¹⁰³

The appearance of a human rights policy suffused with contradictions and inconsistencies did not go unnoticed among America’s allies, particularly those in Western Europe who had “mixed feelings about what we are doing,” wrote Anthony Lake in an assessment of the first year of the program. Lake identified a number of features that had the potential to create “serious problems” in inter-Alliance relations: first, the provision of bilateral aid to a country like Chile while simultaneously opposing multilateral development bank loans to the same country; second, applying more rigorous human rights criteria to economic assistance directed at those people most in need while simultaneously adopting more flexible criteria regarding military aid or sales programs to selected authoritarian allies; third, actually funding abusive governments despite a professed commitment to provide aid only to those regimes attempting to improve their methods of rule; and, finally, a perception that the harshest aid cut-offs targeted governments violating the “integrity of the person” (torture, arbitrary arrest, etc.) with less importance given to the issues of political and civil liberties, levels of economic development, and regimes making serious efforts to close the inequality gap. Lake proposed a greater effort to “multilateralize” lending policy in order to ease “suspicions of a holier-

than-thou attitude or an ideological crusade against selected states.”¹⁰⁴ This would prove a forlorn ambition.

Pinochet’s “popular mandate”

Amid this unfolding policy debate in Washington, Pinochet’s autocratic rule was coming under sustained attack in the United Nations. Toward the end of 1977, the UNHRC Working Group on Chile issued a highly critical report and proposed the establishment of a fund to distribute humanitarian and financial aid to political prisoners and their families. Despite some marginal improvements, rights abuses remained “systemic and institutionalized.”¹⁰⁵ The report brought an angry response from the Chilean Foreign Ministry which accused the Working Group of “openly violating the principal of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states regarding matters which are totally outside its jurisdiction.”¹⁰⁶ In a letter to Carter on November 9, Pinochet denounced the report as a “veritable prosecution” of Chile and charged the Working Group with exercising a “double-standard” for its “disregard” of numerous other countries with far worse human rights records.¹⁰⁷ Some weeks later, he again wrote to the White House what State’s Peter Tamoff described as an “icy” letter attacking the United Nations and the United States “over what he sees as [their] failure to understand Chile’s position and our interference in Chilean internal affairs.”¹⁰⁸

These and similar blustering statements made no impression on the USUN delegation: in mid-November, it provoked uproar in both Santiago and Washington over its leading role in drafting the annual Chile human rights resolution for submission to the UNGA. Brady Tyson, who had played a prominent role in drafting the condemnatory March 1977 resolution, was once again involved in drafting an equally harsh resolution and, on this occasion, was working “closely” with the Cuban delegation to do so. Santiago Embassy officials were incensed about this collaboration and its outcome: a document that was “more condemnatory” of Chile than alternative drafts submitted by the European Community (EC) and Sweden.¹⁰⁹ When Ambassador Landau presented copies of his credentials at the Foreign Ministry days later, he was subjected to a “long and impassioned exposition” by Foreign Minister Carvajal that included an attack on “the collusion” between Tyson and Cuba in preparing the resolution.¹¹⁰

NSC staffer Thomas Thornton wrote to Brzezinski that the “US-Cuban draft... makes no concession to the fact that there have been improvements in Chile.” It went far beyond the “less objectionable”

language offered by the Europeans, owed “some of the toughest language (unnecessarily tough in my view)” to Brady and not to the Cubans,¹¹¹ and merely confirmed that “the Embassy is right!! USUN is out of control.”¹¹² Tensions between New York and Washington worsened when State signaled a desire to withdraw co-sponsorship of the resolution. The USUN delegation responded “that to do so would undercut our human rights credibility,” especially as the great majority of member states, including the United Kingdom, were prepared to support this draft. State’s Bureau of International Organizations (IO), was more concerned that this sort of problem would not go away “as long as Tyson is there.”¹¹³

Pinochet and his senior military officials were bewildered by the US decision to accept the USUN position and not oppose Tyson’s actions. To them, in the words of a CIA report, it was nothing short of “absurd and totally incomprehensible politically.” Once the American delegation received the go-ahead to co-sponsor this resolution, the Chilean rulers concluded that it was a “waste of time to continue worrying about the present feelings of the US.” They had lost all trust and confidence in Washington and, as the CIA report continued, “do not foresee any possible improvement of relations between the US and Chile as long as the current US President is in office.” The US role in co-sponsoring the UN resolution, together with Carter’s letter to Pinochet critical of Chile’s human rights performance around the same time, seemed to the Junta leader totally inconsistent with the tenor of their September 1977 White House meeting—so much so that Pinochet requested the Foreign Ministry assess the impact of Chile withdrawing from the UN. These Chilean declarations most likely represented the “feelings of the moment,” a CIA report suggested, and would not necessarily “guide GOC policy beyond the near term” in light of Pinochet’s “well-known propensity to take extreme positions when angry.”¹¹⁴

The UN the resolution went before the General Assembly on December 7, 1977, producing the most scathing condemnation to date of the dictatorship’s governance. Passed by a vote of 98 to 12 with 28 abstentions, the resolution “deeply deplor[ed] the destruction of the democratic institutions and constitutional safeguards formerly enjoyed by the Chilean people” and concluded that “constant and flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms continue to take place.”¹¹⁵ Pinochet’s response was not long in coming. On December 18, he announced that Chileans would have a chance to express their own opinion on his rule in a national referendum—scheduled for January 4, 1978—that, if successful, would reinforce his mandate internally and provide useful ammunition with which to challenge his critics worldwide.

Pinochet used the UN vote to play on national pride in campaigning for a successful outcome to the plebiscite: the question put to Chileans was simply whether or not they supported his “defense of the dignity of Chile” and the nation’s “sovereignty [against] international aggression.”¹¹⁶

The Santiago Embassy offered another motive for the decision to call the plebiscite: “to strengthen [Pinochet’s] position within the Junta.”¹¹⁷ This was consistent with the trajectory of a number of decisions Pinochet had taken since 1973 to consolidate his authority at the top of the Army hierarchy (by manipulating promotions, assignments and the budgets of senior officers), within the Junta (by cultivating a base of support among conservative forces outside the military and appointing cabinets answerable to him rather than the collective leadership), and over the state repressive apparatus (through his control of DINA and its successor the CNI).¹¹⁸ On this occasion, his Junta colleagues were initially cool in their responses to Pinochet’s ploy. General Leigh, again incensed over the lack of any prior discussion, opposed the whole idea of a plebiscite, maintaining that the result would not be taken seriously in the court of international opinion and would only enhance Pinochet’s personal standing.¹¹⁹ The Navy’s Admiral José Merino had similar qualms and, like Leigh, was indignant at Pinochet’s failure to consult before making his announcement. A major rupture was avoided only when both were persuaded to publicly support the plebiscite once it had been announced.¹²⁰

Although, in theory perhaps, the outcome could not be guaranteed, the plebiscite was in reality not quite the gamble it seemed. Pinochet loaded the dice in his favor by carrying it out under a state of siege, giving the political opposition no time to mount an effective campaign, and threatening to arrest anyone handing out leaflets advocating a “No” vote. The timing allowed for a mere eight day electioneering period (which included Christmas and the New Year holidays). While Pinochet may have been in the box seat, opposition to his proposal, especially from an increasingly active (although formally banned) PDC¹²¹ and the Catholic Church hierarchy (which withheld endorsement of the plebiscite on the grounds that the wording of the question was too vague and the public ill-prepared to make an informed choice) ensured that he did not have everything his own way.¹²²

For all that, Pinochet’s confidence proved warranted. The final vote count was an overwhelming 75 percent “Yes” to 20 percent “No”, with the rest of the votes null. The plebiscite’s author called it a great moral victory and told Chile’s politicians that, as a result of the vote, they were “finished.”¹²³ The ballot boxes would be put in cold storage for the next decade, he said, and there would be “no more elections and [no more]

voting for 10 years.”¹²⁴ In Washington, the State Department offered a cautious appraisal of the result and what it might mean for Chile’s future. Spokesman Thomas Reston was mildly critical, observing that “we believe as a matter of principle that any election held should offer all parties sufficient guarantees to present their case.”¹²⁵ The Embassy was inclined to take the result at face value or, in the words of Political Officer Robert Service, “as an accurate reflection of how Chileans felt at that time.”¹²⁶ Not surprisingly, however, the political opposition branded the entire exercise a fraud.¹²⁷

Privately, US officials exhibited more realism about the impact of Pinochet’s success on the prospects for a return to civilian rule. A CIA brief concluded that it would “consolidate” his support within the military, particularly the Army, where “doubt about his judgment and leadership was beginning to spread,” and would reaffirm his “preeminent” status in the ruling Junta.¹²⁸ That analysis was shared by State’s INR Bureau: the victory had increased Pinochet’s “personal power” which, in turn, seemed likely to “stall any moves toward internal liberalization,” and would probably solidify the regime’s defiance of international pressures for human rights progress.¹²⁹ Pinochet interpreted the referendum outcome, above all, as a personal triumph: “There are no divisions with the military Junta because we remain united,” he told a Brazilian interviewer. “But now I lead the way and the other three follow.”¹³⁰ Suitably emboldened, one of his first acts was to arrest 12 PDC political and labor leaders and banish them to internal exile which Policy Planning’s Anthony Lake wrote in a briefing memo to Vance, signaled that he “will not yet tolerate opposition political activity.”¹³¹

The Letelier/Moffitt dilemma

On relocating from the Santiago Embassy to Washington, D.C. to take up his new appointment as Chile Desk Officer in August, 1977, Robert Steven discovered that most ARA officials from the Assistant Secretary level down “wanted, if possible, to separate themselves and their reputations” from the Letelier/Moffitt investigation. The prevailing sentiment was that the murders were “all very unfortunate” but should not be allowed to affect bilateral ties or “harm” the Pinochet regime. “The word that I very quickly got on the desk,” recollected Steven, “was to be quiet and do what was necessary but don’t raise any problems.” One issue that arose was deciding what documents related to the case should be provided to the Justice Department which wanted to send officials to Chile to research the case, and conduct interviews with key individuals. Much to his dismay,

Steven discovered that the files related to the case were in a “mess... literally cabinets stuffed full of documents, with no order.” Once he began the arduous task of sorting out the chaos, he came across documents “that clearly should have been” provided to Justice. He initiated contact with Eugene Propper and Larry Barcella, the two Assistant US attorneys in charge of case, who were desperate for “real evidence” to back up their “suspicions.” Propper had repeatedly complained about the “lackadaisical response” of Steven’s predecessor, Robert Driscoll, to requests for documents pertinent to the case.¹³² When Steven handed over the now organized files to Propper, the Assistant Attorney “found very quickly the information that was there, recognized its importance, [and] was outraged”—so much so that he raised the possibility of prosecuting some State Department officials for “obstruction of justice,” which Steven advised against. He later told Steven that these files were “an important turning point in handling the case, because this gave them leads then into the assassins who had come here.”¹³³

Propper’s change of fortune in the State Department was not, however, matched by any significant progress on the Chilean side. In August 1977, Propper confided his frustration to the NSC’s Robert Pastor. At their most recent meeting with Chilean Embassy officials, he reported, the Justice attorneys stressed the high probability that regime officials were involved in the assassinations and “suggested to them that they ‘cut their losses’ by helping us root out the guilty parties.” Despite the Ambassador’s promise of “full cooperation” and Pinochet’s apparent agreement, “the information we received was superficial, incomplete, and failed to answer any of the important questions we asked.”¹³⁴

As the White House prepared to welcome regional political leaders to the Panama Canal Treaty signings in September 1977, the FBI already suspected the DINA of responsibility for the Letelier/Moffitt killings. On that occasion, Carter chose not to raise the issue because he did “not want anything to stand in the way of traditional US-Chilean friendship”¹³⁵ and equally to avoid any note of discord that might divert regional and world attention from his Canal Treaty success. After all, as Carter later wrote in *Keeping Faith*, his idea of inviting heads-of-state to the signing ceremony was an attempt to “seize the initiative” from anti-treaty forces inside and outside the US Congress, and to stage a “vivid demonstration of the international significance of the treaties.”¹³⁶ Symbolism, in other words, was allowed to trump national security.

However, by early 1978, the revelations of Chilean government involvement in this extraterritorial crime were beginning to create difficult problems for Pinochet, at home as well as abroad. In February, FBI and

Justice Department officials identified two Chilean military officers—Michael Townley (an American citizen and DINA operative) and Armando Fernández Larios (also a member of DINA)—they wanted to interrogate about the murder. In preparation for a meeting with Chile’s Ambassador Cauas, ARA briefed Deputy Secretary of State Christopher that it was critically important to impress on Cauas the “gravity” with which the administration viewed the case, and “our determination to solve it.” In other words, “we must insist upon the fullest cooperation.”¹³⁷ State’s Director of the Office of Andean Affairs, Malcolm Barnebey, told a British Embassy official that if it was firmly established that DINA had ordered the Letelier/Moffitt killings and if the regime was “‘caught with a smoking gun in its hand’ all hell would break loose in this country.”¹³⁸

Around this time, Christopher made what some State officials viewed as a fateful decision to pursue the investigation (and extradition requests) through legal, rather than political and diplomatic, channels. On taking up his position in HA, near the top of Mark Schneider’s immediate objectives was “to go after Pinochet and to use the foreign policy instruments of the US government to do that.” One new and formidable obstacle to achieving this outcome, in Schneider’s view, was precisely Christopher’s decision which effectively forfeited Pinochet’s vulnerability on the issue. Had the administration been willing to adopt the position that this was an “act of state, not a criminal matter,” it could then have taken the case to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the OAS on the grounds that it was a clear violation of treaty obligations “and we could have pressed really hard for their isolation and brought sanctions against them.” According to State’s HA bureau this would have made it possible “to get serious sanctions against individuals unless Contreras and Espinoza were extradited and made available. And then you could go after Pinochet.”¹³⁹ For a change, Todman sided with Christopher in not wanting to see an alternative (political) approach “pushed” aggressively. ARA’s Chile Desk officer Robert Steven, a supporter of the HA approach, was instructed to “‘let Justice take the lead in this.’ The signal was very, very clear: lay off.”¹⁴⁰

As well as denying US investigators the full strength of political and diplomatic leverage, pursuing the case through legal channels meant both trusting in—and respecting—the authority of the Chilean Supreme Court which dealt with all extradition requests. This was always going to be a questionable approach. Although Chile’s opposition political parties had consistently accused the Court of working with the Junta, the reality was certainly more complex. From the beginning, the military had pledged to respect the independent functioning of the judiciary: officially the Junta’s

responsibility was to deal with an emergency situation that existed beyond Chile's constitutional and legal framework while the Supreme Court retained its duties within the parameters of that framework. Politically, the Junta sought legitimacy in part by adhering to the principle of legality in ways that allowed the Court to exercise formal limits on the prerogatives enjoyed by the ruling generals.¹⁴¹ But DCM Thomas Boyatt's assertion that it "was never Pinochet's court"¹⁴² certainly overstated its independence. In the absence of any legitimate arena of political debate, contests over the constitutionality or legality of the Junta's actions had more and more been channeled into the courts in ways that risked a potential confrontation between the executive and judicial branches of government—in which ultimate power resided with the former. In practice, then, the Supreme Court's latitude for action was severely constrained. Christopher's decision to wait on the court's determination in the Letelier case, said Schneider, attested to his lawyer's instinct and was based on "a false assumption" that the Chileans were treating the US extradition request "straight" instead of factoring in political considerations.¹⁴³

Chile's half-hearted efforts to locate and arrest Michael Townley dominated a late March meeting in Santiago between Landau, Propper, Boyatt, and a number of Chilean officials, including Foreign Minister Carvajal. Part way through what Landau considered Propper's excessively diplomatic presentation to the group, the US Ambassador interrupted and bluntly accused the Chileans of not "trying very hard" and warned that, in the absence of a more serious effort, Propper would inform the White House that the Chilean government had been uncooperative and less than truthful about its efforts to locate Townley. Although essentially a bluff, DCM Boyatt was sufficiently impressed, describing Landau's performance as a case of really "sticking the knife in [and then] twisting it." The gambit appeared to work when the Chileans promised to hand over Townley. But when Propper arrived at CNI headquarters on April 3 in the belief that Townley's departure formalities would be finalized that night, he was told that the expulsion would be delayed for up to two weeks. To Landau, there was only one explanation for this postponement: Contreras was maneuvering to block Townley's repatriation to the US. The Ambassador went directly to the Foreign Ministry and resorted to "some very firm table pounding," making it clear that "the investigation could not be contained within legal channels" for another two weeks and that the State Department "would be obliged to fight back with dramatic diplomatic actions." The Chileans finally relented and a "tentative" agreement was reached that same night on transferring Townley into

American custody. Neither the Chileans nor the Americans, however, “seemed to be sure what would happen next.”¹⁴⁴

In the meantime, Pinochet could not simply ignore progress in the investigation and, to the surprise of a number of US officials, he went to some lengths to appease Washington. On March 21, for instance, the former head of DINA Manuel Contreras was dumped by Pinochet who formally “accepted” his resignation from the Army retaining the rank of General. Of greater consequence, two weeks later, Michael Townley was expelled from Chile to the United States in what an Embassy political officer characterized as a semi-legal operation “because they essentially took him to the airport and gave him to us.”¹⁴⁵ Despite Washington’s energetic efforts to get Townley, this was a perplexing decision on Pinochet’s part because it constituted the breakthrough the Carter administration was seeking in the investigation. Townley was eventually found to have planted the bomb in Letelier’s car: his handover established beyond doubt DINA’s involvement in the assassination and ensured that the case would henceforth dominate relations between the US and Chile. “The degree of cooperation we got from the [Chilean] military in hanging themselves was really quite remarkable,” Robert Steven explained. “The fact that they went along with us as far as they did, turning the man over to us when he could have been ‘disappeared,’ and effectively admitting guilt by firing Contreras, was to their credit.”¹⁴⁶

Why Pinochet decided to surrender Townley is unknown but it ensured that for virtually the duration of the Carter presidency, the Letelier/Moffitt murders would cast a wide shadow across Chile policy. Steven “could not emphasize enough how much Letelier dominated everything. If I went to a meeting of any sort in the Department and tried to argue for any consideration on another Chile issue, I was shot down.”¹⁴⁷ George Landau, likewise, recalled the case as “totally dominating” Chile policy: he “was never called back to Washington for consultations over any other issue. Letelier was it.”¹⁴⁸

Pinochet insulates the regime

With Townley in American hands, and US investigators probing deeper into the circumstances of the Letelier/Moffitt murders, the Chilean government’s civilian cabinet ministers now began to actively lobby Pinochet on the importance of resolving the broader legitimacy problem of the regime for the foreseeable future. The suggestions ranged from the adoption of a new constitution to the gradual withdrawal of the military from politics. These efforts were encouraged by Pinochet’s chief

constitutional adviser— Jaime Guzman—and by members of his own general staff, who were equally concerned about the need to progress Chile's institutional and juridical 'normalization' to separate the government from its armed forces—at least in a formal sense.¹⁴⁹ The driving force behind the Cabinet push was Sergio Fernández, a regime "hardliner," with strong links to the *gremio* movement.

The first indication that Pinochet might be responsive to this pressure was an announcement that the state of siege, operating since September 1973, would not be renewed when it expired on March 11. Simultaneously, though, he announced that the state of emergency—that allowed Pinochet to retain arrest powers but limited incarceration to ten days in the absence of a specific charge—would be extended throughout the country for another six months.¹⁵⁰ In April, Pinochet reorganized his cabinet, appointing three more civilian ministers so that civilians now outnumbered military officers. The transfer of Sergio Fernández to head the Interior Ministry was particularly significant because for the first time the security services would, at least formally, be under the control of a civilian. Pinochet also decided that, subject to approval by a future plebiscite, the Junta would enact a new constitution containing provisions regulating a phased transition to a "protected" democracy. Responsibility for overseeing this transition was delegated to Fernández.¹⁵¹ Last, Pinochet pardoned a number of individuals convicted by military tribunals for offenses against national security, commuted the sentences of others to banishment from Chile, and promulgated a decree-law giving members of the armed forces complete amnesty for any criminal act that had taken place between September 11, 1973, and March 10, 1978—except, in another apparent concession to Washington, for crimes committed in connection with the Letelier/Moffitt murders.¹⁵² Chile's Foreign Minister told the State's Frank McNeil that these new human rights initiatives were a "result of both Chilean jitters caused by the Letelier investigation and of growing pressure for changes within Chile." He compared the process of incremental reform with that which took place in Spain after Franco's demise. The difference, he told McNeil, was that Pinochet "was not dead and showed no inclination of dying."¹⁵³

The CIA ascribed Pinochet's decision to advance the transition timetable and improve the country's international image primarily to the role played by "key Army generals concerned about questions of legitimacy and improved relations with the United States."¹⁵⁴ Even so, the only circumstance which could conceivably pose a serious problem for Pinochet, according to the agency, would be the discovery of "enough incriminating evidence" of his own involvement in the Letelier/Moffitt

murders. As long as the military are satisfied that his “hands are clean” there was little chance of his being unseated.¹⁵⁵

Publicly at least, the State Department welcomed Pinochet’s package of measures as a “positive contribution” to the human rights situation in Chile.¹⁵⁶ Inside the Department, however, this was not a consensus view. HA expressed strong misgivings about Pinochet’s seeming sleight of hand in a report that not even ARA disputed: “The Chilean Government continues to maintain a repressive system of control over all political activity. There are no effective legal guarantees against Government abuse of human rights. A state of emergency which gives the Government extraordinary powers remains in effect.”¹⁵⁷ INR interpreted Pinochet’s actions as being driven solely by pragmatic politics, specifically a desire to moderate another resolution on Chile which was currently being drafted by the UNHRC.¹⁵⁸

At the end of January 1978, two NSC staffers met with the US Ambassador to the UNHRC, Edward Mezvinsky, to discuss the upcoming Commission meeting. Mezvinsky “promise[d] to keep Brady Tyson in check on Chile” and ensure that any public statements on the “sensitive subject” of human rights would be made by him alone.¹⁵⁹ Weeks later, the question of whether or not the US should co-sponsor the principal Chile resolution at the UNHRC had flared into a major disagreement between George Landau and HA. In a cable to the Department, the Ambassador opposed co-sponsorship of the resolution “as it presently stands” because a key US goal “is to remove [the] taint of double standard from [the] activities of that body.” Withholding sponsorship was “the principal leverage that the US has for pressing for broader and nondiscriminatory attention to human rights violations” and would enhance “US human rights credibility and our effectiveness in international fora.”¹⁶⁰ The day after this cable arrived, Mark Schneider received supportive phone calls from the British and Swedish Embassies. Buoyed by these messages, he delivered HA’s response that a failure to co-sponsor the amended resolution would “cause problems with our Western allies and ... significantly damage” the prospects of achieving other US objectives in the UNHRC. In Latin America, he added, it would be interpreted as the US “backing off” on Chile. To make matters worse, Schneider concluded, the Congress would also likely see it as backtracking or “retrenchment” on the human rights policy in general.¹⁶¹

●n Capitol Hill, Pinochet’s “concessions” of the previous year were subjected to a withering critique by Senator Edward Kennedy who described them as all smoke and mirrors: The general amnesty made “no mention of the ‘disappeared’ political prisoners who remain unaccounted

for [or] the thousands who are in political exile;" the state of siege had been replaced by a new state of emergency; and the plebiscite initiative was "not inconsistent" in the Junta's thinking with making no changes to existing proscriptions on political party and trade union rights. These cosmetic changes simply reinforced the case for maintaining and tightening the aid sanctions—bilaterally and globally. Kennedy singled out the need to halt the continuing "back-door" economic funds from US private banks and the transfer of US military equipment to Chile "under spurious civilian labels or through third countries."¹⁶²

Another example of what Kennedy considered "back-door" aid was a recent Christopher Committee decision to approve \$38 million in commercial export credits to Chile through the aegis of the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The US Embassy saw no reason to deny CCC credits to Chile on human rights grounds, nor did it think a decision to either withhold or grant CCC credits to Chile should be "used as a form of leverage affecting GOC behavior" because the nation's foreign exchange reserves and global credit rating were "in good shape." The lack of sufficient Chilean cooperation over the Letelier case, however, was another matter altogether. In a mid-June cable, the Country Team questioned the propriety of extending any further credits to Chile or Chileans until extradition requests were met. "Doing otherwise," Ambassador Landau cautioned, "might signal to the GOC [a] lack of seriousness on our part by doing 'business as usual.'"¹⁶³

Among State Department officials, the most determined and consistent opponent of HA's interpretation of the human rights situation in Chile was Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman, who made no effort to conceal his lack of sympathy for the whole thrust of Carter's human rights policy. Following his visit to the Southern Cone nations in August 1977, Todman had been widely criticized by the human rights community for not being tough enough on government abuses in the countries he had visited.¹⁶⁴ In early 1978, displaying his long held reluctance to insert political criteria into loan policy decisions, Todman clashed with Deputy Secretary Christopher in an ultimately failed attempt to get the administration to support a \$14 million health loan request resubmitted by the Chilean regime to the IADB. In conversation with a senior British Embassy official, Todman decried the US policy of "disassociation," terming it a "failure" that Pinochet had exploited to his own advantage in the 1978 referendum campaign and its outcome. Only quiet diplomacy, he insisted, could have any chance of "getting the Chileans to mend their ways."¹⁶⁵

HA, on the other hand, refused to allow Todman's assertions to go uncontested. "There have been changes you could define as positive in terms of decline in numbers of political prisoners," Mark Schneider testified before a House congressional subcommittee in opposing IABD loans to Chile, yet "there still remain serious abuses and violations."¹⁶⁶

There was no disputing that the Junta had a case to answer over the absence of progress on political and civil rights; where US officials diverged was over the stance the administration should take in voting against loans to Chile that fell within the "basic human needs" category. Todman argued that the regime had become "much more selective and restrained in its use of the more flagrant human rights abuses" since mid-1976, a number of other Third World countries had far worse records than Chile, and the regime's "highly creditworthy" status in the eyes of the foreign (especially US) private banking community was providing a level of financial support which more than substituted for cutbacks in bilateral and multilateral aid flows, and ensured that whichever way the US voted would have a minimal impact at best.¹⁶⁷

Although Todman lost the argument he maintained his track record of resisting every sanction suggested by the Christopher Committee and HA targeting Chile or other Third World nations on the grounds that doing so somehow furthered the cause of human rights. His barely grudging support of Carter's Latin American policy finally exhausted Christopher's patience to the point where he decided to relieve Todman of much of his responsibilities. The Assistant Secretary's fall from grace was hastened by a speech he gave to New York's Center for Inter-American Relations where he launched a thinly veiled attack on the administration's human rights policy. It would be a "tactical mistake" to blame an entire government for an intolerable act by one of its officials, he told his audience, adding that this approach embodied a "selective morality." Continuing in this vein, he said in dealing with any Western Hemisphere nation, "we do not have to believe that only the opposition is telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth concerning the conditions prevailing in that country."¹⁶⁸ Todman's speech was widely circulated in Chile and became the subject of a favorable editorial comment in the highest circulation daily paper *El Mercurio* which labeled it "particularly true with regard to Chile in the present circumstances."¹⁶⁹ In Washington, his remarks were interpreted as beyond the pale and Christopher finally persuaded Carter to reassign Todman by nominating him as US Ambassador to Spain after he formally stepped down as Assistant Secretary in late June.¹⁷⁰

Landau versus Washington

Todman was not the only US official at odds with State Department policy. In a mid-March 1978 cable to Secretary Vance discussing the future direction of US policy toward Chile, Ambassador Landau had reached the conclusion that the lack of gains achieved by a policy of trying to coax Pinochet showed the approach had failed and a new one was required: "I rejected as politically impractical a strategy of working through the Pinochet regime to achieve human rights improvement."¹⁷¹ As one of his Embassy political officers put it: "Those people who really thought you could nudge Pinochet, you know persuade him he didn't have to be such a tough guy, it was just sort of embarrassing. It was a carrot and stick sort of approach" and Landau doubted its effectiveness.¹⁷²

By now, having developed a quite sophisticated understanding of the Chilean political scene, Landau, in effect, was challenging a fundamental assumption on which Carter policy was based—that Pinochet was not so much part of the problem (only some of his behavior was problematic) as part of the solution. While acknowledging that the US had limited leverage in seeking to influence a difficult ally, the Ambassador desired a more active effort to develop lines of communication with center/right and acceptable center/left politicians, as well as the Junta and other generals more sympathetic to political changes. Furthermore, there was no disputing that Pinochet retained substantial popular support and, echoing an argument often made by his predecessor, Landau warned that external pressures to moderate regime behavior carried the risk of a nationalistic backlash (the old Embassy fallback position). Adopting a policy of "cool disdain," Landau argued, was most likely to strengthen the longer-term objective of a "more rapid, but peaceful transition...to civilian democratic rule [and in] essence, we need to structure our approach for a longer haul."¹⁷³ The key to achieving US objectives, he suggested to Vance, remained "the application of pressures modulated so as to avoid [any] backlash."¹⁷⁴

For all his efforts to counsel Washington on the best course of action to achieve a consensus outcome, Landau was becoming increasingly frustrated over the contradictory responses of his political masters to Embassy analyses and proposals, and their refusal to reciprocate Pinochet's concessions to US policy demands. "I simply made it very clear that you can't have it both ways," he later explained. "You can't give me instructions to go in and get this done and that done if at the same time you don't show any recognition for the things they have done unilaterally to please us."¹⁷⁵ His criticism of a lack of reciprocity on the part of the White

House and State Department intensified following the decision in late March 1978 to replace the “hardline” Foreign Minister Patricio Carvajal with a relative moderate, Hernán Cubillos—a change that signaled to Landau a shift to a more “flexible” foreign policy approach.¹⁷⁶

Cubillos’ immediate task, as Landau saw it, was to convince Pinochet that he had to improve his relations with the US. The proof of his success was the restoration of the lines of communication between the Junta leader and the US Embassy. With Cubillos’ help, “everything I asked for was done,” said Landau who linked this development to Pinochet’s new outreach strategy that included turning Michael Townley over to American authorities, lifting the ban on the UN Special Rapporteur visiting Chile, and agreeing to meet for the first time with senior representatives of the US labor movement (AFL-CIO). “I reported this and said these are positive things and if we continued on this line we would be able to make real strides in the human rights field to get people released. The answer from Washington was to be harsher than ever.”¹⁷⁷ Pinochet took great offense: “He now realized that regardless of what he did he would get only the fist in the face.” Washington continued “to send [me] instructions to do a great number of things but of course I was rebuffed.” Landau attributed the failure of his assessments to be taken seriously in State to the excessive influence wielded by HA, singling out Assistant Secretary Patricia Derian and Mark Schneider who, he insisted, “continued their attacks” on Pinochet.¹⁷⁸

To Landau, his task had become even more difficult following Jimmy Carter’s remarks at the opening session of the Eighth OAS General Assembly meeting in Washington, D.C. in June, 1978. Pinochet was already fuming over the White House failure to respond to his earlier “concessions”; Carter’s speech made matters worse because it included a call to find a solution to Bolivia’s lack of access to the sea. In a surprise move some four months earlier, La Paz had severed relations with Santiago over the failure to resolve this issue. During his meetings with Latin heads of state following the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977, Carter had attempted to mediate the dispute: now he was publicly siding with Bolivia less than twelve months before the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of hostilities between Peru, Bolivia and Chile in the War of the Pacific. This marked a departure from the more neutral stance adopted by the Ford administration. Landau was uncertain as to whether responsibility for Carter’s comments lay with HA in its desire “to keep the pot stirred” or Robert Pastor “because he knew about the Bolivian thing.” Whatever the reason, the Chilean leader was furious: “It was totally uncalled for because no-one had asked [the administration for such

a statement]. The Bolivians hadn't asked them, it was a total surprise. To Pinochet that was a dagger to the heart," wrote Landau, "and he started realizing that things are not going to work, regardless of how many favors he does for me."¹⁷⁹

Despite Todman's departure the following month—and his replacement as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs by Viron Vaky—bureaucratic disagreements over the implementation of the human rights policy continued unabated. "We are engaging in an evangelical phase to advertise our moral concerns to the rest of the world," complained one US official. "Yet the inconsistent way we apply our policy means we look hypercritical and moralistic, not moral." HA's Assistant Secretary Patricia Derian's rejoinder sent a clear message that the human rights advocates were not about to accommodate the entreaties of their ARA (or any other) colleagues, or retreat into silence: "We aren't the tooth-fairy handing out sugar plums to kids who put their teeth under the pillow," she told reporters asking about the policy differences.¹⁸⁰ For all the disarray in pursuing human rights policy, in other words, the strongest advocates of this approach were not about to back off or compromise in any fashion.

CHAPTER 7

ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK

*"The policy to Chile was simple: he's a dictator, he's bad news. What can we do? And the answer is we can't do anything."
George Landau, Ambassador to Chile, 1977-1982*

In April 1978, a report prepared for the Christopher Committee acknowledged new tensions had emerged with Congress during the first fifteen months of the Carter White House over implementation of the human rights policy. One was a perceived lack of consistency: Washington was seen to be applying harsh treatment to soft targets—nations where the US had no vital interests—but “a different standard to those countries which are important to us.” Another was a concern that the policy was putting at risk more important US interests. Finally, there were questions raised as to whether sanctions, including opposition to IFI loans, were a more effective tactic in achieving human rights improvements than “moral suasion and arousal of world opinion.”¹ This last assessment was dubious in the case of Chile. Four months on, the Director of State’s Policy Planning (S/P) staff, Anthony Lake, argued that “Chile could be the hardest test of the policy we are advocating. Violations of the person have virtually ended, in part as a result of our pressure. There is a good chance that continued pressure from us could contribute to further progress toward restoration of political freedoms.” Lake saw the US role in recent Chilean history as making it “impossible for us to be neutral: to begin now to support IFI loans to [Chile], or to open up Exim credits, would be seen (in Chile and abroad) as prematurely rewarding” the military dictatorship. The administration must also take into account congressional demands to increase pressures on the Junta to return Chile to democracy. In other words, “the arguments for keeping the heat on are strong.”²

Nonetheless State’s Policy Planning (S/P) office raised the ire of HA’s Patricia Derian when it argued that the administration should adopt a general policy against taking human rights into account on IFI votes, once violations of the person had ended. “The problems inherent in S/P’s broad-brush approach are exemplified by the [case] of Chile,” she wrote to

Christopher. “Aside from the political outcry, voting for IFI loans for Chile would create a serious moral dilemma.” Violations of rights of the person, she continued, “have fallen off because sufficient numbers of political opponents have been killed, terrorized or driven into exile. It would be ironic if our logic led us automatically to respond favorably to such ‘success’ by supplying export credits and voting for IFI loans.”³ No resolution of this difference of opinion was in sight.

The Letelier investigation stalls

While such differences of opinion continued in Washington, by mid-1978 Pinochet had noticeably altered his approach toward the Letelier investigation. The CIA described the shift from an initial strategy of “grudging cooperation” to one of “hardline stonewalling tactics” in an effort to prevent the US government from building a case against Manuel Contreras and others involved in carrying out the murders.

The State Department chose to show its disapproval at Chile's foot-dragging by blocking a shipment of bomb parts Santiago had ordered before the congressional ban on arms transfers took effect. In June, Landau was also recalled to Washington following the Junta's rejection of numerous US requests to interrogate Chilean military officers identified by the FBI as persons of interest.⁴ These initiatives seemed out of tune with Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher's commitment to the legal route but he decided to use the occasion of Landau's recall to review the human rights situation in Chile—a decision the Department of Justice called the latest demonstration of the extent to which all aspects of US policy were now entangled in the Letelier case.⁵ Justice officials were distinctly unimpressed, indeed angered, according to ARA's John Bushnell, by State's very public announcement linking the general and specific issues on the grounds that this “would strengthen Pinochet in his efforts to gain domestic support for his hidden policy of non-cooperation in the case.” It undermined efforts by Justice officials to steer clear of internal Chilean politics and focus purely on getting hold of those security officials accused of responsibility for the murders for trial in an American court.⁶ Christopher's decision to pursue the Letelier investigation primarily through legal channels was proving impracticable. Not surprisingly, the Chile Desk officer Robert Stevens would later claim that “Chile relations in general [were] Warren Christopher's headache.”⁷

In his memo, Bushnell had reminded Christopher that the US still retained one source of leverage—“our principal non-symbolic weapon”—in the effort to force Pinochet to extradite or prosecute those implicated in

the assassination: the approximately \$25 million remaining in the FMS military supply pipeline for delivery to Chile. Terminating the funds on human rights grounds, however, was not justified on an objective evaluation of the situation inside Chile since “in both absolute and relative terms” abuses had declined since 1976 and any resort to new sanctions would almost certainly prove “counterproductive.” Bushnell, however, recommended keeping the funds in reserve as “one of our most useful instruments of pressure” to gain Chile’s cooperation. Given his initial directive, it would not have been surprising had Christopher rejected outright any proposed non-judicial approach to dealing with the Letelier matter. Instead, he ticked his agreement in the margin.⁸

In mid-June, with Chilean cooperation in the Letelier investigation at a standstill, Pinochet’s recently appointed Ambassador to the US, José Miguel Barros, was called to the State Department where officials impressed on him the importance the White House attached to a concerted effort on Chile’s part to bring the investigation to a satisfactory conclusion.⁹ The Chilean response was more stonewalling. To State, it was increasingly clear that extradition of the former DINA officials for trial in the US was “not on the cards.” If that was the case, US officials believed there was little chance of their prosecution in Chile. Moreover, lacking any clear evidence of Pinochet’s knowledge of the assassination his position as head of state was reasonably secure. For now, Pinochet and his closest advisors had adopted the position “that they have more to gain by stonewalling than by further cooperation.”¹⁰

In response to the regime’s foot-dragging when it came to resolving the Letelier/Moffitt case, a State Department options paper addressed the question of what possible measures could be used to apply pressure on the regime. They ranged from the cancellation of Carter’s ambassador-at-large and Special Representative to the UN Law of the Sea Convention Elliot Richardson’s scheduled visit to Santiago, to the withdrawal of Chile’s invitation to participate in UNITAS naval maneuvers later in the year, to the withdrawal of the Military Group (MILGP) and the US Ambassador. “Some or all of these steps in combination,” the paper concluded, “will have secondary effects, including the tightening up by private international banks on their Chilean lending.”¹¹

Richardson’s proposed trip to Chile for a Law of the Sea conference caused disquiet among US officials because, in the wake of progress in the Letelier investigation, his high rank “might send the wrong signal—American indifference to the assassination.” Richardson’s executive assistant was called to the Old Executive Office Building on the eve of his departure and told by an NSC official he should not visit Chile. Landau

had supported Richardson's attendance "on the grounds that Chile was a leader at the conference, and on the merits it was appropriate to consult its [Law of the Sea] officials."¹² Ultimately, Richardson postponed the trip.

When Landau returned to Santiago after consultations in Washington, the State Department publicly declared that "mutual cooperation had been re-established" between the US and Chile.¹³ Yet, among those officials charged with responsibility for monitoring bilateral ties, this was not a consensus view. Nor was it the view within the Embassy where the Ambassador himself was particularly skeptical of a return to normal relations and considered the most likely outcome of various pressures on Pinochet in the medium term would be an internal military coup. "[W]e are approaching the end of the road in US-Chilean relations and it is only a matter of time before the Army leadership realizes that the only way Chile will improve its relations with the rest of the world is by replacing Pinochet. [Letelier] is the catalyst which will finally galvanize the Chilean Generals to take the inevitable step." With a long-standing dispute over the Beagle Islands dispute "heating up" again and Carter's failure to mention it during his OAS speech, concern over possible Argentine military action, anxiety over the UNHCR Working Group visit and the "political pressures" that were likely to follow it, the regime "feels besieged," concluded Landau.¹⁴

State now considered dangling the carrot of US support to help resolve both the Beagle Channel dispute and the Bolivian corridor issue. Recent discussions between State officials and Ambassador Landau, Secretary Vance informed the White House, left no doubt that the "GOC's greatest fear at present is that Argentina will take advantage of Chile's international isolation to seize islands south of the Beagle Channel." The quid pro quo for Chilean cooperation on the Letelier case might be US assurances to Pinochet about finding a means "to dissuade Argentina from military action." The US could likewise assure Chile of Washington's active support for direct negotiations with Bolivia over the corridor issue, thereby avoiding any possibility of it ending up in some international forum.¹⁵

A resolution of the continuing debate in State over BHN loans to Chile soon became more pressing when, in July, a \$20 million agricultural development loan application by the Chilean government came up for discussion in the Christopher Committee. The loan did not meet the BHN test but ARA believed it could easily be restructured to meet the criteria. Rather than force a quick decision the Committee members agreed to hold off for the time being. Non-BHN loans were a different matter altogether: the all-embracing shadow that the Letelier issue cast over Chile policy was

such that even ARA conceded that to approve these requests would be “misinterpreted” not only by the military leadership in Santiago but also by “important, Administration, Congressional, and public currents of opinion here.”¹⁶

Pinochet ousts Leigh

Landau’s prediction that Pinochet might be deposed also proved incorrect when he actually consolidated his position in late July by removing General Leigh from the Junta, less than a week after the Air Force chief had called for a transition to “institutional normalcy” within five years.¹⁷ Leigh had certainly long harbored suspicions about Pinochet’s ambitions. Their relationship first took a serious turn for the worse as far back as early 1976 when the Air Force General proposed the dissolution of DINA and a speedy return to civilian rule.¹⁸ Months later, Leigh exercised his veto power in the Junta to halt Pinochet’s efforts to privatize education and mining property. In 1977, he blocked Pinochet’s attempt to assume broad legislative authority to deal with anomalies arising out of the January 1974 decree declaring non-Marxist political parties in recess.¹⁹ While publicly insisting that he saw eye-to-eye with Pinochet on the form Chile’s new institutional order should take, it was clear that Leigh preferred a quicker—if not more comprehensive—transition from military rule than Pinochet was willing to contemplate.²⁰ However it was the looming Supreme Court decision on Letelier that “apparently motivated Pinochet to press for Leigh’s ouster.”²¹

Under the terms of the June 24 Statute of the Junta, chiefs of staff held their posts until “death, resignation or a total impairment of the person.” While Pinochet could appoint and retire chiefs of staff of the Army, he needed the support of the other Junta members to remove Leigh.²² To neutralize any potential opposition to this move from Leigh’s own service, Pinochet had Army units surround Air Force bases prior to the announcement.²³ The other Junta members “who disapproved of Leigh’s constant challenges to Pinochet as damaging to the unity of the armed forces” supported his ouster.²⁴ Leigh’s removal was accompanied by a “massive purge” of air force generals.²⁵ Seventeen of the Air Force’s 19 most senior officers resigned in protest and its 10th ranking officer, General Fernando Matthei, was promoted in Leigh’s place.²⁶ Once again Pinochet had asserted his authority over his Junta colleagues who, from now on, would be much more cautious about opposing his decisions.

Not long after Leigh’s ouster, a Federal Grand Jury in Washington, D.C. handed down its decision that eight Chileans had participated in the

Letelier assassination plot. Of those indicted, Assistant US Attorney Eugene Propper disclosed that the Carter administration would request the arrest and extradition of former DINA head General Manuel Contreras, his second-in-command Colonel Pedro Espinoza Bravo, and DINA operative Captain Fernández Larios. The next day, the House of Representatives, threatening to undermine Bushnell's success in persuading Christopher to keep the powder dry, voted against all US arms shipments in the pipeline until the three officials had surrendered to authorities. Justice Department officials were furious: labelling the action "premature and inappropriate," they warned that the legislators' action could "seriously impede" efforts to bring the three Chileans to trial if the Junta interpreted it as interference in Chile's internal affairs, and that it was little more than a political tactic aimed at toppling the regime. The House accepted this argument and swiftly reversed its original vote.²⁷

When Santiago had not responded to Propper's request by October, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank McNeil laid out a phased strategy to "break the Chilean stonewall" and, if that failed, to punish the regime. First, Landau should be instructed to warn the Chileans to "abandon the cover-up" or the US would take "appropriate action." Second, they should be told that a failure to act might result in another recall of the Ambassador for consultations and the application of a new set of already decided-upon punitive measures. Third, Washington could go public with a threat it had learned about to "blackmail" Pinochet and thereby force him to continue to protect Contreras. In that event, the administration would be forced to conclude that the "continued cover up confirms GOC responsibility (read Pinochet) for the murders [and that] we were prepared to take certain concrete measures to severely affect" the bilateral relationship. Fourth, the White House might make good on that threat by taking "certain steps all at once for maximum effect."²⁸ For the moment, these suggested actions—vague as they were—stayed at the level of general recommendations.

US capital embraces Chile

Through 1977 there had been no great influx of new foreign capital in Chile due largely to the country's economic recession, its stagnant domestic market, hyperinflation, and a perception that the labor force had not been sufficiently brought to heel or lasting political stability achieved. Nonetheless, American investors in Chile were "quite vocal" in their opposition to Carter's human rights policy.²⁹ A generalized hostility surfaced within weeks of the presidential transition because, compared to

the Allende years “they were now in a situation where they could operate, which is all they cared about,” remembered the Embassy’s Thomas Boyatt.³⁰ But this new White House obsession with human rights “put their investments at stake and if Chile had decided to retaliate in some way, they were hanging out there,” said a State Department official. “We had meetings with American businessmen and the atmosphere tended to be very chilly.”³¹

In an effort to improve the conditions for capital accumulation, the Pinochet regime introduced new foreign investment regulations in early 1977 that offered greater incentives and protections to overseas investors. These regulations were part of a broader strategy to enhance the profit-making environment by using the full force of the state’s repressive apparatus to create a more docile workforce, and by eliminating the activities of political parties that might pose any long-term threat to property rights or to the security of overseas capital. The regime promoted its economic model in the American media, taking out press advertisements boasting that Chile had “tranquility and stability in all sectors of the labor force [and] internal conditions of social calm and peaceful coexistence, with a complete absence of any kind of radical violence.”³² For the time being at least, and under the ever-constant vigilance of the regime, these were not empty claims, even if they contradicted the Junta’s insistence to be still dealing with a major “terrorist” threat inside the country. Chile, observed George Landau, “was a good place to invest.”³³

In January 1978, the Exxon Corporation announced that it was purchasing a government-owned copper mine for \$107 million—the largest US investment since the military coup. When asked whether the regime’s human rights performance was considered prior to the decision, an Exxon spokesman merely responded that the shift to a stable political order had transformed Chile into an attractive option.³⁴ While the Exxon decision appeared to herald the beginnings of a surge in new US investments, caution remained the byword: only about 12 percent of the \$4.1 billion in foreign investments approved by the Chilean government between mid-1974 and mid-1979 actually entered the country, channeled almost exclusively into the mining sector of the economy, and profit levels during that period remained below the regional average.³⁵

Equally, if not more, critical to a turn-around in Chile’s economic fortunes, and the Junta’s ability to sustain the upswing, was continued access to large amounts of capital from foreign private banks. Between 1973 and 1978, the Chilean government borrowed an estimated \$1.5 billion from these institutions, of which \$927 million was provided by US

banks alone. In 1978, these financial institutions accounted for over 80 percent of Chile's total borrowings abroad, profoundly weakening the dictatorship's vulnerability to outside economic and financial, let alone political, pressure over its human rights record.³⁶ The most generous American benefactors included some of the nation's highest profile institutions: Bankers Trust (\$180 million), Morgan Guaranty Trust (\$150 million), Chemical Bank (\$125 million), Wells Fargo National Bank (\$125 million), Citicorp (\$82 million), and First National Bank of Chicago (\$75 million).³⁷

This dramatic shift in the source of funds did not go unnoticed on Capitol Hill. In April 1978, House Banking Committee chairman Henry Reuss had reminded those participating US banks that lending to Chile was "not helpful" to the human rights policy and requested a "full public explanation." A First National Bank of Chicago executive gave an unsurprising defense: the lending was perfectly legal, the opportunities for profit making were "attractive," and the bank considered Chile to be a creditworthy country.³⁸ A mid-year report prepared by the US Embassy bemoaned the extent to which the banks' behavior had effectively "dissipated the impact of USG actions linking economic assistance to human rights-constitutional government improvements." That said, as long as non-US private banks were eager to lend, any decision by American banks to reduce or terminate their ties with Chile for whatever reason would have only a limited impact because European, Japanese and Canadian competitor banks could be expected to fill the vacuum. Nonetheless, the report allowed for the possibility that, "given the leadership role of US banks," any move to contract their lending could have a domino effect. "Just as US banks led the way in," the Embassy suggested to Vance, "so they can lead the way out."³⁹

The White House, however, showed no inclination to press American banks to take the initiative. The dominant view was that the administration could not and should not try to interfere except where government subsidies were part of the calculation. "There was never any consideration," said Robert Pastor, "of an embargo on either trade or on financial services of any kind."⁴⁰ This refusal to block private capital flows to Chile was in keeping with a stance enunciated by Carter at the beginning of his presidency that he would not attempt to harness private sector investment and trade to the ends of his human rights policy—most recently repeated on the occasion of his visit to Brazil in March, 1978. Asked by journalists how he would respond if the US Congress sought to link commercial banking loans to Brazil's human rights policy, Carter's reply was unequivocal: "It would be inconceivable to me that any act of

Congress would try to restrict the lending of money by American private banks to Brazil under any circumstances... and if such an act was passed by Congress, I would not approve it.”⁴¹ During later congressional testimony, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher reaffirmed that “as a general rule, we have sought to implement the human rights policy without interfering with private commercial operations abroad.”⁴²

The same principle applied to Chile: while the US government was prepared to take a hard line on Chilean loan requests in the multilateral development banks, private bank lending did not elicit a similar response. At hearings on US-Chilean relations in late July, Senator Kennedy and Representative Thomas Harkin ignored Carter’s tough talk about vetoing any legislation that attempted to restrict private bank lending and announced they would introduce an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) in the hope of at least generating public pressure on these institutions to stop funding Chile and other major human rights violators by requiring the banks to document their financial support of these regimes. The likelihood of the amendment passing was slight, but what upset Carter officials was that the private sector lending atmosphere “will have been chilled.”⁴³ NSC Adviser Brzezinski attacked this initiative as part of a trend toward an overly assertive regional human rights policy that was “in danger of becoming one-sidedly anti-rightist.” But he laid the blame at the feet of the State Department, not the Congress: “I said that we are running the risk of having bad relations simultaneously with Brazil, Chile and Argentina because of the way State was implementing our human rights policy.”⁴⁴

But Pinochet had little to fear on the economic front. Through 1978, and due precisely to the massive inflow of private foreign bank capital, the Chilean economy was reviving in spectacular fashion. Average annual growth rates were approaching seven percent, the shock treatment administered by the Chicago Boys had forced inflation down from triple to single digits, the export sector posted rapid growth figures and rising prices (accompanied by a significant fall in the balance of payments deficit), and real wage levels were beginning to climb (although they only returned to their 1970 level in 1980). Much of this new dynamism was made possible by deregulation of the financial sector, rising foreign investment, and the massive increase in funds from private foreign financial institutions. On the negative side, unemployment remained between 15 and 20 percent, public spending on health and education declined, increased consumption was concentrated in the top 20 percent of income earners, and the medium and long-term external debt rose sharply—from \$4.3 billion in 1973 to \$9.4 billion in 1980.⁴⁵

The White House had no reason to upset Chile's economic reform program unduly. An announcement that the US Executive Director would vote "No" on a Chile structural adjustment loan (SAL) request at a World Bank Board meeting scheduled for late November—based on "legislative criteria" centered on human rights concerns—was accompanied by policymakers' dismissal of any suggestion that this decision had broader implications. Carter officials wanted it clearly understood that no action would be taken to otherwise pressure Chile because the administration "strongly" supported the Junta's economic policies and considered its market-orientation and record of responsible management a "model for others."⁴⁶

The boycott threat

As part of its determination to crush the political base of the Allende government and recreate a malleable labor force for its neo-liberal economic program, the organized working class had been singled out by the military regime and subjected to the full force of the state's repressive apparatus. Summing up Junta policy toward the labor movement after five years of military rule, Ambassador Landau was brief and to the point: it was based on "a big stick and not much carrot."⁴⁷

During the Nixon-Ford years, the fate of Chile's unions had not been a high priority in Washington. To the extent that there was some interest in, and concern over, Pinochet's treatment of Chilean workers it was largely confined to the Santiago Embassy (principally Labor Attaché Art Nixon) whose role DCM Thomas Boyatt characterized as that of "keeping the opposition union leadership alive" with the help of the AFL-CIO whose officials "were down to see us all the time."⁴⁸ Very occasionally in the Ford years, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William Rogers, would meet with AFL-CIO President George Meany to discuss the labor situation in Chile, although few if any policy consequences resulted.⁴⁹

Expectations that the Carter administration would take a greater interest in the plight of Chile's trade union movement were strong in view of the White House's professed commitment to a human rights-based foreign policy which at least acknowledged that there were social and economic rights even if these took a lower priority to political and civil rights. These hopes failed to eventuate: what efforts occurred to support workers' rights were half-hearted at best, reflecting a general reluctance to antagonize the Junta over issues that might impact negatively on the satisfactory resolution of more important problems—notably the Letelier

case. Despite the devastating reversal in labor's fortunes, union activism was never completely extinguished. In late 1977 and throughout much of 1978, evidence of a revived challenge to the dictatorship was not hard to find. Labor disputes spread from the all-important copper miners to textile, minerals and ports and were accompanied by the establishment of the *Coordinadora Nacional Sindical* (National Trade Union Coordinator or CNS), an organization of Socialist, Communist and Christian Democratic union activists.⁵⁰ Rising worker militancy was a sufficient risk to Chile's export and investment drive that even the pro-government newspaper *El Mercurio* began to raise subtle concerns about the regime's ability to manage labor relations effectively.⁵¹ Even the country's neo-liberal reformers themselves began calling for new labor laws to replace emergency decrees and to give investors a degree of certainty in dealings with their workforces.

Potentially more threatening to the economic program was the growing success of exiled Chilean labor leaders in mobilizing international support for the plight of their domestic constituencies.⁵² In December 1977, an AFL-CIO convention passed a resolution describing the Pinochet regime as a "military fascist dictatorship" that had abolished all trade union rights and it requested the US government to "sever all relationships" with the Junta.⁵³ The following May, the powerful American longshoremen's union, with the concurrence of the AFL-CIO, took matters into its own hands, refusing to unload two Chilean ships docked in US ports in retaliation for the reported arrest of six Chilean maritime workers. Weeks later, a high-level AFL-CIO delegation visited Chile at the invitation of the anti-communist Group of Ten (G10).

In a two-hour meeting with General Pinochet, the delegation's leader, Thomas Gleason (an AFL-CIO vice-president and head of the International Longshoremen Association), said he was "very disappointed with the lack of respect for trade union freedoms and would leave Chile less favourably inclined than when he arrived." The delegation called for the lifting of restrictions on workers' rights to assemble without prior authorisation, to elect officials, to bargain collectively, and to take strike action. It was equally concerned about what passed for the government's attempt to train labor leaders, and stressed the importance of establishing a timetable for the election of labor representatives without delay to avoid driving democratic unionists into the arms of the communists or right-wing extremists. When Pinochet accused the G10 of being "manipulated if not controlled" by the communists on the basis that both participated in a May Day demonstration, the delegation responded that this was a good example of why normalization of trade union activity was "an urgent priority" to

avoid polarizing the labor movement. In their private discussions with local union leaders, the American visitors also conveyed a blunt message: any actual cooperation between “democratic” and “communist” unions could create difficulties in regard to future AFL-CIO support.⁵⁴

The delegation left Chile with little more than vague promises from Pinochet to attend to labor reforms at some time in the future.⁵⁵ AFL-CIO President George Meany, however, was not prepared to wait indefinitely for some sign that measures were being implemented. After listening to a report by Vice Presidents Gleason and Sol Chaikin on their Chile discussions, Meany wrote directly to President Carter that the AFL-CIO Executive Council had decided the military regime “must face grave international consequences” if it failed to significantly improve its human rights observance. In the absence of a “satisfactory response” from Pinochet by November 26, when the Executive Council of the *Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores* (Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers or ORIT) met in Lima, the AFL-CIO would “cooperate fully” with hemisphere trade unions in organizing “an effective international action against the Chilean government’s continued repression of its workers.”⁵⁶ To apply pressure on the White House, Meany ensured that his letter was distributed inside Chile as well. Union leaders told Landau that the dictatorship could not take the risk that an American labor-supported boycott would “snowball” into a worldwide boycott of Chilean products and transportation.⁵⁷

Throughout this period, the US Embassy maintained “very close contact” with AFLD officials and supported the organization’s request for increased US government funding.⁵⁸ Landau acknowledged that an expanded AFLD program in Chile involved some political risks simply because it received the bulk of its funding from Washington. AFLD’s other sponsor, the AFL-CIO, could also complicate the Institute’s operations in Chile if the shipping boycott went ahead, conceivably endangering continuation of the entire program. On balance, though, Landau concluded that the proposed budget increases and the use of the additional funds to expand ongoing programs “do not dangerously increase our political exposure in Chile.” Furthermore, these measures would enable the G10 and the pro-government *Sindicato de Trabajadores de Chile* (Union of Chilean Workers or UNTRACH), which had already established a working relationship “to compete more effectively” with the leftist CNS and its labor allies, to operate in ways that would benefit long-term US interests in Chile.⁵⁹

The regime met another wave of industrial unrest in August-September with new and harsher repressive decrees, including the power to dismiss

public employees without due process. Following a late October meeting of the Junta, the Cabinet and the military high command, seven leftist national labor federations (representing 529 local unions with a total membership of more than 300,000 workers) were dissolved, and their property confiscated. The government then called snap elections (on October 31) for all private sector unions as part of an effort to head off any international trade boycott threat. Campaigning was banned as were printed ballots. Any candidate who was a union office holder or had been formally affiliated with a political party during the past decade was ineligible to run for office. As well, the Ministry of Labor had the authority to annul any election if the successful delegates were judged to be "political." The aim was to cull the ranks of existing officials and to replace them with a more compliant union leadership.⁶⁰ But these efforts backfired when the majority of newly elected union officials were regime critics eager for advice from all political persuasions on how best to confront the regime.⁶¹

Still, in the absence of a more generally satisfactory movement on the labor front, the ORIT meeting in November unanimously adopted a motion proposed by the AFL-CIO to boycott trade with Chile. No effective date was set to take action: a top level meeting of AFL-CIO officials decided to hold off until the following January any decision on whether to proceed with the boycott in the hope that it could be avoided. But the relentless crackdown on workers' rights finally exhausted the patience of ORIT (and its principle member, the AFL-CIO). A proposal was put to the ORIT Executive Council to boycott all goods shipped into or out of Chile. As one foreign diplomat told the *New York Times*, Pinochet and ORIT were now "on a collision course."⁶²

Landau advised Washington not to get "overly involved" in the dispute which could only "lend fuel" to those within Chile who sought to depict the boycott "as yet another instance of USG intervention." In his meetings with government officials, Landau emphasized the absence of US involvement in any threatened boycott action, worried that if the regime settled on a "foreign devils" interpretation the consequences would be harmful to US interests. To encourage the regime to negotiate, informal approaches appeared to offer the best prospect although Landau was not particularly optimistic that the Junta would act constructively given the generals' bedrock conviction that "politicized" labor unions bore a major responsibility for the "debacle" of the Allende years.⁶³ The next day, Landau cabled an even more downbeat assessment of the Junta's willingness to address the problem: "We have seen no clear indication as

yet that the GOC is looking for a negotiated escape from the boycott threat.”⁶⁴

The Junta faced an uphill battle to mobilize public support for its tough anti-boycott stance. When ORIT first authorized a boycott, the Junta invoked the specter of an “external threat,” accusing the political opposition of channeling “false and misleading” information to international labor organizations. To gain more traction for this campaign, Pinochet and his colleagues encouraged mass demonstrations in Santiago and other population centers—with disappointing results. In the capital, the US Embassy reported “relatively small and not wildly enthusiastic” turnouts despite a large-scale public relations effort and the early closure of government departments to allow their employees to attend. One such rally on December 6 drew a crowd estimated at a modest 15,000 but the relatively low key nature of the presentations indicated that the regime had not yet formulated a well thought-out anti-boycott strategy.⁶⁵

The boycott option complicated the Embassy’s relationship with the military regime in another respect. Although Landau insisted that the Embassy had “consistently taken the position that a possible AFL-CIO sponsored boycott of Chile was entirely a matter between that organization and the government of Chile,”⁶⁶ some Pinochet officials were not so sure that Labor Attaché Ed Archer shared this view. In November, Foreign Minister Hernán Cubillos raised the issue of alleged negative cables on labor developments in Chile with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.⁶⁷ Not for the first time had Chilean officials criticized the activities of Archer, and his predecessor Art Nixon, who both frequently appeared in public with “democratic” trade unionists, making them “special targets” of regime amoyance.⁶⁸ Cubillos publicly accused Archer and AFLD’s Andrew McLellan of providing the AFL-CIO executive with information that resulted in the boycott threat. Landau thought there was “some danger” the regime would attempt to have Archer removed from his position.⁶⁹ Subsequently, the Ambassador and visiting Chile Desk Officer Robert Steven were told by Cubillos that he had resisted considerable pressure to declare Archer *persona non grata* immediately following the ORIT boycott vote. The US diplomats responded that the regime should think carefully about taking such a decision in the future because the most likely consequence would be “a further hardening” of the AFL-CIO position, which at present was “sufficiently flexible to make a settlement possible.” After all, the boycott was proposed as a last resort only after all other attempts to negotiate the restoration of labor rights had failed.⁷⁰

Landau’s own role was also somewhat more hands-on than he at times allowed. He not only played a key role in arranging the May meeting

between the AFL-CIO delegation and Pinochet,⁷¹ but had repeatedly gone out of his way to impress on Chilean officials the need to take seriously a boycott outcome and “deal constructively with the democratically oriented elements of the Chilean labor movement.”⁷²

In early December, with the AFL-CIO’s backing, the President of AFLD’s Board of Directors, Peter Grace, arrived in Santiago for a meeting with Pinochet, Interior Minister Sergio Fernández and Labor Minister Vasco Costa in an effort to mediate the boycott conflict. Landau reported that Grace avoided any contact with US Embassy officials but that he encountered a government line of “not being willing to negotiate under a threat.”⁷³ This proved not to be the entirely true.

The Grace-Pinochet meeting had not long concluded when Finance Minister Sergio de Castro, on his own initiative, flew to Washington on December 20 for urgent talks with George Meany, who bluntly told him that the AFL-CIO leadership would no longer “waste time” talking with Labor Minister Vasco Costa who it considered rigid and inflexible.⁷⁴ The importance of at least accommodating Meany on this point was not lost on Pinochet who dumped Costa from the cabinet almost immediately. Within the diplomatic community in Santiago, his replacement, another of the Chicago Boys José Piñera, was considered an astute choice.⁷⁵ Whether this one concession would have much of an impact appeared doubtful given that the AFL-CIO had made it clear that any decision to postpone the boycott would depend on how the government’s actions were assessed by Chilean workers’ representatives, in particular the G10 trade union leaders.⁷⁶

Piñera requested a confidential meeting with Landau to discuss Washington’s request that the Chilean government consult with G10 leaders prior to the January 8 ORIT boycott committee meeting. Landau told the new Labor Minister that talking with the democratic labor leaders was a necessity, unaware that Piñera had been instructed by Pinochet that he was prohibited from “doing anything,” especially negotiating with the G10, before the scheduled ORIT meeting to avoid the perception that the regime “was acting under threat or out of weakness.” When the Ambassador warned the Labor Minister that if something was not done a boycott was inevitable, the response seemed to evince little if any concern. A detailed economic analysis of the likely effectiveness and cost to Chile of a boycott authored by Piñera prior to his cabinet appointment had concluded that the economy would be “inconvenienced but not seriously damaged.” This had convinced Pinochet that the AFL-CIO “was not acting from a position of great strength.”⁷⁷ Nevertheless, avoiding a confrontation was preferable to testing this assumption with the possibility of dire consequences for the Chilean economy.

To offset the boycott threat and growing labor discontent, Piñera announced, at the beginning of January 1979, the first of the government's so-called "seven modernizations"—the new *Plan Laboral* (Labor Plan) under which trade unions would be granted the right to hold membership meetings without prior authorization, accorded greater autonomy in terms of the right to strike in certain situations and to bargain collectively, and would be allowed to again collect membership dues by the time the new law came into effect. The G10 and like-minded labor leaders complained that this was nothing more than "a statement of intention not facts" hedged with various restrictions. "They got nothing concrete," wrote Landau, "but a waiver of the prohibition against their right to meet." To the American Ambassador, *Plan Laboral* essentially reflected the regime's continuing determination to maintain a depoliticized and controlled labor movement—and was probably destined to fail. His biggest concern was that efforts to keep the trade union movement "compartmentalized and weak" might accelerate the revival of "partisan politics as the only way to achieve bread and butter goals."⁷⁸ Two days later, to allow time to analyze the plan, the AFL-CIO decided to extend the deadline for a final boycott decision by seven days to the "almost euphoric" relief of the military dictatorship.⁷⁹ Subsequently, the Embassy credited Peter Grace with convincing the government to introduce two reforms in February—allowing unions to hold meetings without prior approval and permitting them to collect union dues.⁸⁰

Whatever explained its back down, the AFL-CIO Executive Council ultimately took the entire boycott threat off the table, calling instead on President Carter to "exercise the diplomatic, legal, economic and political sanctions" at his disposal if the regime continued to suppress human rights and free trade unionism in Chile⁸¹—a request that was largely ignored. Meany himself later explained that concessions had been wrested from Piñera that would "create circumstances permitting the Chilean Group of Ten trade unions to handle the situation with their own strength and means [which] would be a better solution than bringing the country to its...knees."⁸² The evidence for this was limited if not necessarily unconvincing. The G10 leaders themselves, while publicly rejecting the regime's plans to re-establish union "freedoms," indicated that the problem could be resolved without outside assistance. "What the gringos believe is their problem," said Tucape Jiméñez, representing the government employees' union. "We have to solve our union problems the Chilean way."⁸³

In return for the decision to put the boycott threat on hold, the AFL-CIO had presumed that the regime and the G10 would enter into a

constructive dialogue to resolve outstanding workers' rights issues. As weeks passed with no negotiations in sight, AFL-CIO Director of International Affairs Department Ernest Lee wrote an acerbic letter to Secretary of State Vance accusing the regime of acting as if nothing had changed: "rather it appears that trade unionists are called to listen, but not to be listened to, nor have their views been taken into consideration and acted upon."⁸⁴ AFLD's Executive Director William Doherty made essentially the same criticism during a meeting with Chilean union leaders and senior State Department officials. The military rulers had reneged on earlier promises to get the boycott suspended, and the labor reforms implemented to date were being seen to be "useless." At this point, the AFL-CIO and OIRIT were not prepared to reconsider further action at least until the regime's self-imposed June 30 deadline for implementing the reforms at which time the situation would be reassessed and new measures taken if required.⁸⁵

More fudging on human rights

Throughout 1978 the Catholic Church also ratcheted up pressure on the government over human rights abuses and labor restrictions.⁸⁶ Stressing the need for the Church to remain active in combating abuses against civilian non-combatants, Cardinal Silva inaugurated 1979 as the Year of Human Rights that would involve a series of nationwide meetings sponsored by the Vicariate of Solidarity, culminating in a major symposium to be held in late November. As the date for the symposium neared, the Vicariate announced it had compelling evidence of more than 600 proven cases of disappearances of alleged regime opponents.⁸⁷ Despite strong regime pressures to call off the symposium, the gathering took place, attracting an estimated one thousand participants representing organized labor, the professions, youth organizations, intellectuals, Christian Democrats, and foreign human rights groups.

This was a watershed moment in establishing the legitimacy of the human rights movement inside Chile—demonstrating the extent of its popular support—and marked a significant broadening of agitation on behalf of the victims of abuse beyond the Church and its agencies. Thereafter, the Chilean Commission of Human Rights and other secular organizations took an ever more prominent role in calling the government to account over its abusive treatment of civilians and, in the process, became increasingly more active in helping to mobilize political opposition to military rule in general.⁸⁸

By contrast, efforts to achieve a bureaucratic consensus on the human rights situation in Chile continued to elude the Carter administration as it approached the end of its second year in office. Ambassador Landau put a relatively positive gloss on the Junta's record and urged Washington to vote against any UN resolution to renew the mandate of the Working Group, claiming it was part of a Socialist bloc campaign to topple Pinochet from power because "nothing less than his departure will satisfy them."⁸⁹ In fact, Pinochet eventually agreed to the visit—which Carter had pressed upon him at their meeting the previous September—only after extracting from Washington an agreement to wind up the operations of the Working Group at the end of the year and, in the interim, to replace its head, Pakistan's Alli Allana, who had overseen highly critical reports on Chile in the past.⁹⁰

Landau's assessment of the Junta's record was vigorously contested in the State Department. ARA's Thomas Enders advised Vance that any move to certify that Chile had made "significant progress" would be "difficult to defend" at home and abroad and could "cost us support on Central American policy, in Congress, and from the Europeans." He cautioned that the impact on Capitol Hill of certifying a country that "has made no significant human rights progress during the past two years" would be particularly negative, further weakening support for White House policy on the Hill.⁹¹ The recently completed annual report of the UN Ad Hoc Working Group on Chile damned the current situation with faint praise. While the end of "flagrant and massive" abuses constituted a marginal improvement, torture was still a routine accompaniment to the interrogation of prisoners, the security forces continued to arrest individuals on an arbitrary basis and often for political reasons, and the regime had presided over a "drastic" abrogation of trade union rights with the passage of the new labor legislation.⁹²

HA's Mark Schneider could not have agreed more. He described Chile as a country where "the abuses of the integrity of the person continue [and] the institutions of an authoritarian and repressive regime remain unchanged." This demanded no easing of pressure on the Junta and Pinochet, and no deviation from the current arms-length treatment of the Chilean regime.⁹³ But just how far was "arms-length" in the bilateral relationship? By now human rights concerns had been effectively quarantined from other aspects of the relationship. A confidential Department analysis of the period 1974 to 1978 found no "significant spill-over" between diplomatic negotiations or bilateral agreements—ranging from debt rescheduling, to double taxation relief, to setting up a cooperative meteorological observation program—and the dictatorship's

violent governing style. Nor was there any explicit attempt by either side to pursue a direct linkage strategy in talks on multilateral issues such as a common fund for commodities and dollar limits on Generalized Scheme of Preferences benefits.⁹⁴

Beagle Channel tensions

The possibility of war between Chile and Argentina in late 1978 provided the most striking instance of Washington's preparedness to subordinate human rights to what it considered more urgent and important US strategic interests. The trigger was a dispute over possession of three islands in the Beagle Channel which marked each country's southern border. The outcome would also determine congruent maritime territorial extensions totaling 30,000 square miles rich in fish stocks and mineral deposits (including oil), and possible rights in Antarctica. The conflict threatened to destabilize the entire Southern Cone and embolden an Argentine military Junta whose human rights record was of even greater concern in Washington than that of Chile's.

In 1971, Chile and Argentina had agreed to submit the territorial dispute over the islands to binding arbitration under the auspices of the British Crown. Six years later, the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) awarded Chile sovereignty over the islands, the ruling to take effect within nine months of the decision. Argentina's generals attacked the ruling and in January 1978 the negotiating process collapsed altogether when Buenos Aires announced its formal repudiation of the ICA decision, leading to an inevitable rise in tensions with Chile. In Washington, the NSC's Robert Pastor argued that Argentina should pay a price for its decision to abruptly terminate negotiations by countermanning the proposed sale of \$29 million worth of tanker aircraft. To go ahead with the sale would reinforce the military Junta's belief that, in dealing with a globally "isolated and discredited" Chile, it could "dictate terms" for resolving the conflict.⁹⁵

Over the next 10 months, Argentina began a military build-up at its Ushuaia Bay naval base in Tierra del Fuego, climaxing in the dispatch of a naval squadron in mid-December. "I can remember the nationalistic emotion [in Buenos Aires at the time]," said the British Embassy Chargé d'Affaires. "The Argentine nationalists were boiling with indignation while the military were boasting that they 'would be pissing in the Pacific by January.'"⁹⁶ The diplomatic situation rapidly deteriorated and the armed forces of both countries were placed on full alert. A last minute effort by the region's foreign ministers to seek a mediated solution

founded over Argentina's demand that it receive formal recognition of some territorial claim in the islands south of Tierra del Fuego beforehand.

The Chileans had made it clear to Landau upon his arrival in Santiago in late 1977 that they were extremely concerned about Argentina's intentions regarding the Beagle Channel islands and very keen to get assurances that the US would support Chile, or at least take a neutral stance, in the event of a military conflict. Recalling the episode years later, Landau maintained that he was able to convince Washington that Chile was the aggrieved party but his efforts didn't end there: "With Washington's knowledge, I gave the Chileans information about Argentine troop movements" and corresponded regularly about the dispute with Robert Pastor who contacted the US Ambassador to the Vatican to urge the Holy See's intervention.⁹⁷

On October 25, Secretary of State Vance reported to Carter that "we are receiving disturbing reports of Argentine military preparations" which might be little more than "sabre-rattling" but there was always the possibility that "the momentum of military preparations may become self-fulfilling."⁹⁸ Forty eight hours later, Vance informed the President that the crisis "may be cooling off" following a reported discussion between Chilean and Argentine officials.⁹⁹ This intelligence proved accurate with the subsequent announcement that the foreign ministers, Chile's Hernán Cubillos and Argentina's Carlos Pastor, would meet to discuss the selection of a mediator. Encouraged by this initiative, and reports that Argentina's Navy had been "ordered back to port," Vance expressed cautious optimism that tensions would subside. His measured response seemed justified when the Argentine foreign ministry's legal adviser told Washington in mid-November that his government was concerned over a "hardening impasse" due to Chile's refusal to continue bilateral talks which had "proved fruitless" to this point. He warned that if the Chileans failed to respond positively to its latest demarche, the Argentine government would be forced to take "other steps."¹⁰⁰

Although October passed without an agreement, and talks were adjourned, Pinochet and his Argentine counterpart General Jorge Rafael Videla continued to exchange messages. The Argentines would agree to a Chilean proposal to bring in a mediator but only on condition that there was prior discussion of the boundary questions. The Argentines wanted exclusive maritime claims in the Atlantic, and the three islands in the Beagle Channel under Chilean jurisdiction threatened these claims. The Chileans resisted any idea of setting such conditions for mediation.

President Videla was under pressure from military hardliners pushing for "a show of force" and a leader of this group warned Landau that failure

to resolve the dispute by mid-December would trigger war. The admiral in command of Argentina's Coast Guard reinforced this threat, telling an American Embassy officer in Buenos Aires that his country would occupy the disputed territory and sever diplomatic and trade relations with Chile if there was no resumption of negotiations by the first week of December. US efforts to maintain a dialogue with both sides were proving difficult. "Trying to mediate between the Argentines and the Chileans," the NSC's Robert Pastor wrote to Brzezinski, "would make Camp David look easy, and we just don't have the same kind of stake in the Beagle Channel."¹⁰¹

Both governments later confirmed that Cubillos and Pastor would confer in Buenos Aires on December 12 to discuss selection of a mediator for the delimitation of their boundaries in the South Atlantic. The Argentines had already sounded out with Rome the possibility of the Pope taking on this task and there were signals that the Chileans might find him acceptable. Meanwhile, troop buildups by both countries continued apace and there was no letup in Argentine threats to attack its neighbor if the Cubillos-Pastor meeting failed to resolve the impasse.¹⁰² The word from the Papal Nuncio in Buenos Aires was that the Pope would be willing to mediate the conflict "only if he became convinced that war was imminent."¹⁰³ The day before the Cubillos-Pastor meeting, with US intelligence reports warning that the Argentines were poised to invade and take control of the three islands "in order to strengthen their bargaining position," Warren Christopher decided to meet with the ambassadors of both countries "to urge restraint in strong terms."¹⁰⁴

On December 19, US intelligence sources informed Landau that Argentina was preparing for an imminent invasion and occupation of the islands, and a simultaneous full-scale military assault on Chile itself. Representing the White House, Pastor sent the Argentine Junta a blunt warning that "if you take even one rock [of Chilean territory] as small as it may seem the government of the United States and their NATO allies will consider you the aggressor."¹⁰⁵ In Santiago, Admiral Merino ordered the Chilean navy to the area to block any invasion attempt while Chilean army troops were deployed along the border with Argentina. As the situation rapidly deteriorated, both Landau and Chilean Foreign Minister Cubillos were in contact with the Vatican urging immediate Papal mediation.¹⁰⁶ The Vatican was now more than willing to intervene but Buenos Aires initially rejected the idea because its military planning was so far advanced. To overcome Argentine objections, Pope John Paul II offered to send an emissary immediately to both capitals.¹⁰⁷ This proposal, together with the US warning to Buenos Aires, broke the deadlock and only hours before the Papal envoy's arrival in the Argentine capital the invasion was called

off. Two weeks later, with a Vatican envoy present, Argentine and Chilean officials signed an agreement to seek a peaceful solution and both renounced the use of force. This episode considerably improved Landau's standing with his host government: "I was able to get a lot of brownie points with the Chileans because they knew I was on their side and was helping them," he later recalled.¹⁰⁸

Despite this outcome, very little of this cordiality would spill over into the broader bilateral relationship between Santiago and Washington during the last two years of the Carter administration. In a presidential address to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 6, 1978, Carter singled out Chile as a country whose government practised repression.¹⁰⁹ Although this sounded like a return to the tough language of his presidential campaign, the trajectory of the policy debate was replete with contradictory statements. At the beginning of February, 1979, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance cabled the Santiago Embassy that the final draft of the year's "Goals and Objectives" for Chile would acknowledge "improvement in the regime's observance of individual human rights" and indicate Washington's desire "to begin the slow and deliberate transition from cool to more normal relations"—so long as the Letelier investigation was "resolved satisfactorily" and there was no "backsliding" on human rights.¹¹⁰ If anything, the outlook for US-Chilean relations from State's Seventh Floor was looking decidedly more promising than Carter's public criticism of the Pinochet regime might have suggested.

A matter of days later, two inter-departmental memos on Chile prepared for Deputy Secretary Christopher exposed continuing differences in perceptions and approach among US officials over the interrelated issues of aid and human rights. One memo addressed the question of whether the President should continue to limit Eximbank credits on human rights grounds (they had been capped at \$750,000 per foreign buyer some years earlier). The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA), Economic and Business Affairs (EB), Policy Planning Staff (S/P), and the Legal Adviser (L) argued that the limit should lapse because improvements in the human rights situation in Chile are now "generally recognized" and other punitive measures were available to demonstrate US dissatisfaction with continuing abuses without prejudicing American exporters. HA vehemently disagreed, contending that it was primarily the imposition of economic and military sanctions that had forced Pinochet to "end or reduce some basic abuses [and] we risk halting the trend if we ease up now."¹¹¹ On April 20, Christopher chaired another interagency meeting to discuss whether the \$750,000 ceiling on Eximbank project loans to Chile

should be lifted by a Presidential determination in compliance with the Chafee amendment to the 1978 Export-Import Bank Act (which prevented applications for support from being denied on nonfinancial or non-commercial grounds unless the President specifically determined that to do so was in the national interest or contributing to the promotion of policy objectives in areas such as international terrorism and human rights) before an April 22 deadline on an application lodged by Chile with the Bank. The other complicating factor was the impending Chilean Supreme Court decision on the US request for the extradition of the three DINA officials involved in the Letelier/Moffitt murders. To avoid transmitting a “potentially misleading signal” to the regime, Secretary Vance recommended that the Bank take no action for the time being on the Chilean request for an increase in the \$750,000 limit.¹¹²

The second memo, written jointly by ARA's Viron Vaky and HA's Patricia Derian, sketched in broad strokes the core disagreement between the two bureaus: ARA's desire to concentrate on Chile's medium term human rights performance (in this case the past 14 months) versus HA's preference for a longer-view that included the entire post-coup years and the possibility of “backsliding” in the future. ARA's stance was based on three factors: first, despite the suspension of most normal political and civil rights there was limited evidence of recent killings or disappearances by the Chilean security forces; second, in practice, the regime was tolerating a substantial amount of informal political activity and criticism; and, third, economic and social rights did not constitute “an area which should weigh heavily in our human rights formulation.” HA agreed that the incidence of violations had “declined significantly” but insisted that the instrumentalities of human rights abuses remained “largely unchanged.” Countering the regional bureau's dismissive attitude toward the question of economic and social rights, HA presented the findings of the most recent UN Working Group report on Chile which was highly critical of the Junta's failure to deal with the serious unemployment problem while simultaneously cutting back on public health facilities and presiding over a significant rise in malnutrition among the nation's poor.¹¹³

Subsequent comments by senior officials of both countries seemed to indicate that the ARA position was winning the bureaucratic debate. Pinochet's Ambassador in Washington, José Miguel Barros, told reporters in March that US-Chilean relations were “normal,” although they experienced periodic “ups and downs.”¹¹⁴ Only weeks later, Landau made a similar point before a meeting sponsored by the Council of the Americas in New York: he expected problems in the bilateral relationship to be

resolved before too long.¹¹⁵ In the meantime, an ARA-chaired inter-agency group had approved a modest plan for the Country Team to “continue to monitor closely actual human rights practices, promptly note progress or recidivism, and express our concern over human rights violations.”¹¹⁶ Of more significance in terms of US policy, however, was Christopher’s testimony before a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee in May when he signaled an administration shift to a more “balanced” approach on human rights. Decisions often needed to be based on trends rather than particular existing situations, he said, and the most effective strategy for obtaining improvements was one that combined “the full range of diplomatic approaches” rather than relying primarily on punitive actions.¹¹⁷

Another Letelier bombshell

On May 13, bilateral ties took a dramatic turn for the worse. The Chief Justice of the Chilean Supreme Court, Israel Borquez, rejected Washington’s request for the extradition of the three DINA officers implicated in the Letelier/Moffitt murders—Contreras, Espinosa, and Larios. The NSC’s Robert Pastor termed the decision “much worse than any one of us had anticipated.”¹¹⁸ HA was always convinced that it was a “false assumption” to ever imagine the Chileans would play the extradition case “straight.”¹¹⁹ Secretary of State Vance again recalled Ambassador Landau for a “thorough review of all facets of our relations” with the Chilean regime.¹²⁰ In a letter to President Carter, Senators Edward Kennedy and Frank Church (D-ID) demanded a “review of our entire relationship” with the country, as well as a series of economic and military sanctions if the regime was unwilling to rescind the decision.¹²¹

Consideration of what kind of sanctions to implement triggered a heated discussion within the Executive Branch, pitting the Department of Justice and State’s HA bureau, both of which argued for the toughest of responses, against the more restrained approach advocated by State’s ARA, and the Commerce, Treasury and Defense Departments. Christopher chaired two interdepartmental meetings to discuss this latest setback which were dominated by a sharp disagreement between Assistant US Attorney Eugene Propper and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom over what instructions Landau should take back with him to Santiago. In a reversal of roles, Propper now described as totally inadequate the Department’s reluctance to adopt a tough approach and demanded that the Chileans be told as bluntly as possible “that we will not back down and we will not accept such conduct from them.” When Newsom countered that any response had to take into account “the entire

range of our bilateral relations,” Propper exploded: “The Letelier case *is* our relations with Chile!”¹²² At the NSC, Pastor informed Brzezinski that State wanted “to deliver a very, very firm *démarche* in order to make clear to the Chileans that our relations will be seriously and adversely affected,” if they did not take the appeal seriously.¹²³ What that meant was debatable given State was reluctant to implement sanctions in the hope that the full Court would overrule Borquez or, failing this, that the three officers would be tried in Chile. The question was how much pressure could or would Washington exert, if not to reverse the decision then at the very least to express its outrage.

On Capitol Hill, as the Kennedy-Church response foreshadowed, the extradition outcome caused uproar. Angry legislators in both the House and Senate demanded that the White House suspend all forms of bilateral economic aid and, to the extent possible, multilateral loans, impose trade sanctions, immediately recall the Ambassador and all US military personnel in Santiago, prohibit US visas to Chilean military and intelligence officials, and review the entire relationship with Chile if the regime held to its refusal to extradite the former DINA officials. The legislators also singled out the need to “scrutinize more closely, US private bank loans and investments—‘backdoor aid,’ which ha[d] provided the most critical economic lifeline to this international pariah regime.”¹²⁴ The House Banking and Currency chair Henry Reuss wrote to Vance that the Supreme Court decision had created “an intolerable situation” and renewed his call for the administration to tackle the vexed issue of US private banks lending to Chile. He urged “a thorough analysis” of the impact of loans from these institutions on the Chilean economy, their role in enabling the regime to finance its international payments and service its foreign debt, and requested that serious consideration be given to directing the participating banks to halt new loans until the regime complies with the extradition request.¹²⁵ The Borquez announcement also threatened to erode congressional support for a most favored trading nation draft agreement between the United States and Chile. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs John Bushnell received a memo from a Department colleague that the Letelier case had “charged the atmosphere on the Hill to such an extent that we must lean against consummating this agreement [because] the political stakes for the President and our Chile policy are high.”¹²⁶

Certainly, following the Court decision, Landau received much firmer directives than previously in dealing with the regime over this issue. On June 1, Christopher instructed him to meet with Pinochet and Foreign Minister Cubillos, and leave them in no doubt that bilateral relations were

“approaching a crossroads” as a result of the regime’s absolute failure to conduct a serious investigation of the murders. He was also to stress that future ties would depend “very heavily” on the outcome of the US appeal against the ruling. Pinochet should be left under no illusion that if the appeal to have Borquez’s “completely unacceptable” ruling overturned was unsuccessful, Chile could expect a stern response to what would then be seen as a case of “unpunished terrorism.” Among the possible specific steps that might be taken, Christopher listed a denial of Eximbank credits and pressure on private American banks about their lending to the military dictatorship.¹²⁷ In a letter to Carter, six House members had called on the President to impose all of the “diplomatic, legal, economic and political sanctions at our disposal,” including the prohibition on continued private bank lending to Chile, if the regime refused to extradite the three “henchmen” charged with the Letelier/Moffitt murders.¹²⁸ Chile also risked almost certain exclusion from the annual UNITAS naval manoeuvres in the absence of a satisfactory outcome to the extradition request.¹²⁹ For the moment, however, the White House would respect due process and await the result of the Supreme Court deliberations.

Meanwhile, Congress continued to lobby the White House over the role of the American banks in helping the Chilean economy stay afloat. Representative Thomas Harkin and 34 other members petitioned Carter to impress on the Junta that a failure to extradite the military officials would trigger a series of retaliatory measures including the termination of US commercial loans to Chile—a precedent-setting action against a country with which the US had full diplomatic ties.¹³⁰ The banks themselves had not allowed the Letelier issue to interrupt business as usual: over the preceding three weeks, Riggs National Bank agreed to extend \$38 million worth of credits to Chilean military missions and the Bank of America announced that it would loan \$45 million to Chile’s *Compañía de las Cervecerías Unidas*, a major beverage company.¹³¹

In mid-year, another internal State Department dispute surfaced over the question of whether to issue Commerce Department validated licenses for the export of some non-munitions to the Chilean armed forces. The EB Bureau had requested a Seventh Floor decision on whether to recommend that licenses be issued or maintain the existing ban pending the outcome of the US appeal to overturn the original Supreme Court decision in the Letelier case. Expressing scepticism that the current policy approach would accelerate a movement toward democracy or improve the regime’s human rights performance, EB and ARA supported the sale of these items. They were more concerned about the harm a failure to do so would have on the US’ reputation in Chile and elsewhere as a “reliable supplier,

thereby damaging our long-term export position.” HA remained adamantly opposed to any loosening of constraints on military sales or aid on the grounds that approving the licenses would “send a clear signal to Chile that, despite the persistence of serious human rights abuses, we are still prepared to continue business as usual.” After weighing the alternatives, Deputy Secretary Christopher decided to postpone a final decision until the conclusion of Chilean judicial proceedings on the Letelier case.¹³²

As the final decision neared, Landau was confidentially informed by Borquez that the jurists were working on a ruling to deny extradition and instead send the accused DINA officers for trial in a Chilean military court.¹³³ While not ideal, Assistant Secretary Vaky communicated to Christopher that such an outcome might be enough to satisfy even HA and avoid the need for a strong US response. HA reacted angrily to this suggestion, accusing ARA of having suddenly shifted its position away from the consensus instructions previously transmitted to Landau. HA and Policy Planning (S/P) argued that Washington should remain absolutely resolute in demanding that the three officers be extradited or face genuine Chilean justice; anything less “effectively entails allowing terrorists to go unpunished.” The Embassy’s worst fear was that the administration’s evidence would be “insufficient” to reverse Borquez’s original decision and eventually result in the defendants being exonerated. For precisely this reason the State Department had earlier determined that the Chilean regime’s failure to comply with its extradition request would warrant application of all the other discussed punitive measures as well as “jawboning” key executive officers of the US major banks in Chile—an action proposed by HA in the event it was not possible to pass legislation placing limits on these financial institutions lending to Chile. Depending on the outcome, Vaky advised Christopher that the White House had a range of options at its disposal. If the Borquez decision was upheld and a military trial of the defendants rejected, the US should issue the toughest possible statement “deploring” the outcome, recall the Ambassador and reduce the Embassy staff, terminate Eximbank lending, suspend the FMS pipeline, withdraw the MILGP, cancel UNITAS naval exercises with Chile, and lobby against Chilean loan requests to the MDBs except those meeting the BHN criteria.¹³⁴

While none of these options should be taken off the table, Vaky counselled the importance of striking the “right balance of tolerable and productive pressure” in order both to avoid Pinochet’s resort to a populist “defensive nationalism” and to prevent simply doing further harm to US interests in Chile. If the original Supreme Court decision was reaffirmed or there was to be no internal military trial of the accused, Vaky, in advising

Christopher not to act precipitously, referred specifically to calls for constraints on private bank lending. Any such measures, he argued, would not only set a dangerous precedent but also prove ineffectual because in all probability non-US private foreign banks, which already accounted for approximately forty percent of all commercial lending to Chile, would meet any shortfall, and “create significant losses for US banks in Chile which the US might find itself obligated to compensate.” Within 72 hours, Christopher had changed his mind on recalling Landau for an indefinite period, deciding that it would have “no positive effect on the Letelier case.”¹³⁵

Whether other agencies or individuals felt otherwise or concurred with Vaky’s analysis, there was little time to debate the issue. On October 1, the Court upheld Borquez’s original ruling barring any trial of the three intelligence officers who were subsequently released. Landau was convinced that responsibility for the decision rested with Pinochet who was unhappy over the general deterioration in US-Chilean relations. Only weeks after the Court’s announcement, the US compounded the “offence” to Chile when it voted in favor of a resolution before the OAS General Assembly supporting Bolivia’s case for an outlet to the sea. Landau was convinced that Washington’s stance on this issue over the previous 15 months had “influenced the Letelier case” above all others, angering Pinochet to the extent that he ultimately ordered the Court to hand down the ruling that it did.¹³⁶

The extradition decision and the sanctions debate

When the verdict not to extradite the ex-DINA officials or prosecute them in a Chilean court was announced, State’s Director of Andean Affairs Malcolm Barnebey, called it a “slap in the face for the US.”¹³⁷ What particularly angered Washington was the lengths the Court judgment went to “discredit” not just Michael Townley’s testimony but “every other piece of evidence” presented by the US government.¹³⁸ Yet, the White House response was a cautious one. When Christopher informed the President that the Department had issued a powerful statement criticizing the decision, Carter wrote in the margin of the memo: “I do not wish to break relations.”¹³⁹ Some weeks later, a confident Pinochet issued a press statement that the Letelier case was now definitively over and there was “no possibility” of new evidence that would force it to be reopened.¹⁴⁰

Predictably, there was considerable disagreement between ARA and HA over precisely what measures the administration should take. HA supported the indefinite recall of the Ambassador, action to at least restrict

US private banks from lending, the cancellation of military and economic aid commitments still in the pipeline, using the United Nations to highlight Chilean support for international terrorist acts, a US labor union boycott, removing the American Peace Corps from Chile, and a reduction of the US Embassy staff as part of a broader effort to ensure that bilateral relations reverted to “minimal contact.” The career officials in ARA, not surprisingly, were decidedly unenthusiastic about pursuing any such “hardline” approach.¹⁴¹

Among the rest of the foreign policy bureaucracy there was limited support at best for retaliatory measures. EB’s international section strongly opposed any move to cancel Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) programs, fearful that the Junta might rescind its agreement to settle \$378.4 million in expropriation claims payable to the government’s development finance institution.¹⁴² It rejected ARA’s proposal to sharply restrict, if not terminate completely, Eximbank credits to Chile since this would be nothing but a symbolic gesture given the willingness of European and Japanese banks to lend to the Pinochet regime and to do so would thus hurt American exporters.¹⁴³ Over the longer term, if the US imposed export controls “with no expectation of an impact on Chile,” America’s reputation as a reliable supplier of commercial goods would be “further tamish[ed].” and the White House would have to confront a “substantial negative reaction” from Capitol Hill.¹⁴⁴ Those Departments most closely linked to America’s overseas traders and investors—Treasury and Commerce—joined EB in opposing any attempt to suspend or terminate Eximbank credits for much the same reason—the harm it would do to US exporters operating in the Chilean market, and the benefits that would accrue, as a result, to US competitors.¹⁴⁵

Involved departments were each seeking to protect their own interests. The Department of Defense (DOD) was a clear case in point. Preoccupied with major crises in Central America and instability in the Caribbean, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown lobbied Vance that this was “scarcely an opportune time to signal a further disengagement from the Hemisphere by precipitately cutting our military representation in Chile.” Acknowledging that the extradition denial was “lamentable,” proposed countermeasures were nonetheless likely to “erode further our ability to influence political developments in the Southern Cone area.” It was critically important, wrote Brown “to keep our attaches and MILGP in Chile to support our intelligence requirements and maintain some communication with their military services,” or risk presenting the Soviet Union with “new opportunities” in this area.¹⁴⁶ The Director of the Inter-American Region in DOD singled out two specific proposals under

consideration by State that his Department could not abide. First, any move to cancel pipeline items for Chile's armed forces would be self-defeating, not only making the country more vulnerable to foreign military intervention but forcing it to look elsewhere, primarily Europe, to purchase the most sophisticated jet fighter planes and "would cast the US in the role of unreliable source of supply." Second, was his agreement with Secretary Brown that to withdraw the MILGP and exclude Chile from UNITAS would not only weaken the Pentagon's ability to maintain influence and contacts with the Chilean armed forces but also send a very clear signal that the US was disengaging from the region.¹⁴⁷

State's ARA and Politico-Military Affairs (PM) bureaus lined up behind the Pentagon's Cold War viewpoint and provided another reason for maintaining the five-person MILGP in Santiago—to monitor the foreign military sales (FMS) pipeline as long as it was operative. HA was predictably underwhelmed by these arguments: "business as usual on the military side will contradict, both in Chile and here, our strong anti-terrorist stance."¹⁴⁸

When the NSC's Robert Pastor read Brown's memo, the suggestion that reducing the US military presence in Chile would weaken intelligence capabilities and even "lose" the Southern Cone to Moscow elicited a cutting retort: "[This] is absolute nonsense.... The foundation of these governments is anti-Communism. They have nowhere to go, but us." What principally concerned Pastor, however, was that no "credible case" for taking any retaliatory measures had yet been made and couldn't in the absence of answers to some fundamental questions: What justified US anger over a decision made by the legal system of a sovereign country? By what authority did the State Department have the right to judge a foreign government's laws and court system? What were the US objectives in the Letelier case, bilateral relations "and overall?" The lack of clarity about the precise nature of US policy when it came to answering these questions was what most disturbed Pastor. He urged Brzezinski to ignore Brown's concerns which were little more than "bureaucratically self-serving" concerns.¹⁴⁹

On October 15, Christopher chaired an inter-departmental meeting with the objective of reaching some sort of consensus on retaliatory measures that could be transmitted to the White House. Each department representative outlined their interests in Chile and how these would be affected by the various proposed sanctions. Justice rejected outright any suggestion that the Chilean Court had not erred in fact. ARA's Vaky was more interested in moving the discussion away from bureaucratic turf contests to a focus on the importance of balancing an act of government-

orchestrated state terror “against all other American interests in Chile.” Following the meeting, a Justice official who had attended telephoned Eugene Propper that support for soft sanctions was growing or, as he put it, “the marshallow is getting bigger.” The decision by the US Ambassador to Chile to support Vaky particularly rankled: “I’m telling you, it was a different George Landau in there today [from the person who applied considerable pressure to force the Chileans to extradite Townley in March 1978].”¹⁵⁰

In a memo to Carter four days later, Secretary Vance spelled out the key factor that had to be taken into account when determining the White House response to the military regime’s complicity in the murders of Letelier and Moffitt, its subsequent failure to seriously “investigate or prosecute these crimes on its own,” and the Chilean judicial system’s refusal to extradite the accused DINA security officials or conduct a satisfactory local prosecution. “By its actions—and its inaction—the GOC [Government of Chile] has, in effect, condoned this act of international terrorism within the US,” Vance wrote, and it was essential that Washington signaled to Santiago and to the rest of the world “that such actions cannot be tolerated.”

It was unmistakably strong language if lacking in a correspondingly firm commitment to translate words into practice. Vance rejected the application of “extreme measures” such as legislation to limit private bank lending or a break in diplomatic ties on the grounds that they “would not serve our interests in Chile or elsewhere.” Instead, his specific recommendations to the President included further diplomatic *démarches* conveying US “displeasure” over Chile’s failure to prosecute those involved in an act of international terrorism, a reduction in the size of the US mission in Santiago, a gradual termination of remaining FMS pipeline funds, the withdrawal of the MILGP, the suspension of Eximbank financing under the Chafee amendment, the denial of licenses for exports to the Chilean armed forces, and a halt to approval of any new OPIC guarantees for US investors in Chile.¹⁵¹ These proposed retaliatory measures failed to satisfy either Justice or HA both of which considered them not tough enough or ARA which thought them unlikely to achieve their objective while possibly creating new frictions in US-Latin American relations.¹⁵²

By his own account, Pastor had “never been comfortable” with the way State dealt with the Letelier case,¹⁵³ due partly to a belief that the Department had conspired with Justice to limit his own access to key documents related to the investigation. For someone who was “quite insistent on playing a role,” Pastor was clearly angered by what he

complained was federal prosecutor Eugene Propper's conscious effort to exclude the NSC from involvement in these deliberations. The latter had pulled no punches in rejecting Pastor's desire to participate in the process. Chile Desk officer Robert Steven explained:

When I mentioned this to the Justice Department officials, Propper said, 'Tell them to go to hell. We don't want people involved who are going to be leaking stuff out of this investigation.' So the Justice Department's view was 'Don't share things with the National Security Council people; if they need briefings, they can come to Justice for it; it is not a State Department matter. It's a Department of Justice matter'. So it got to the point that when Bob Pastor called me one day and simply told me that from now on all messages going out from the Department on or about Chile had to be cleared with him, I said that I didn't have the authority to send stuff to him.¹⁵⁴

It was Vance's October 19 memo to the White House that pushed Pastor to boiling point. "I am appalled at [the memo's] failure to come to grips with any of the important questions or issues which are suggested by the Letelier case," he complained to Brzezinski. The Secretary of State had not provided the necessary political case for any punitive action the US might take in response to a legal determination by another country's judicial system—certainly not to the satisfaction of the NSC.

The need for a "clear justification" to apply retaliatory measures against Santiago was more imperative than ever, Pastor noted, "in light of the unfolding crisis in Iran" following the Islamic Revolution and Washington's refusal to accommodate a request from the new government in Tehran to hand over the ousted Shah who, at the time, was receiving medical treatment in the United States.¹⁵⁵ "There is no question," he subsequently wrote "that if we choose to announce harsh, punitive sanctions against Chile for their failure to extradite Contreras, the Iranians...will link our action to theirs." Brzezinski's handwritten note in the margin agreed that "this is a good point" and asked his Latin American staffer to draft a memo that could be forwarded to Vance.¹⁵⁶ Senior ARA officials also expressed concern that the Shah's presence in the United States undermined the stance of those within the administration advocating tough sanctions against Chile. "The Iranians are upset with us because we won't extradite the Shah," the newly appointed Chile Desk Officer, Peter Whitney observed. "And now we are complaining about the Chileans because they won't extradite Contreras."¹⁵⁷

Before the White House made a final decision on retaliatory action, the congressional liaison officials reported in late October that while the "liberals" on Capitol Hill unsurprisingly demanded strong sanctions, there

was “support across the Congress for firm action.” What measures were chosen would be seen as a litmus test of the President’s commitment to human rights, especially by the more outspoken critics of the Pinochet regime. Stressing how important this decision was, they advised that the tough sanctions would be in the President’s “best political interest on the Hill.”¹⁵⁸

In passing on Pastor’s concerns to the Secretary of State, meanwhile, Brzezinski emphasized how important it was that “we clarify and clearly identify our concerns with the Chilean decision, the objectives which our actions are designed to achieve, and the public justification for the proposed actions.” This was the very point of the questions raised earlier by Pastor which, as far as the NSC was concerned, still demanded answers. Curiously, Brzezinski made no reference to the Iran issue, focusing instead on the legitimacy of passing judgment on a Chilean Supreme Court decision: “Unless we decide that our concern is based on the [GOC] failure to investigate the crime, then we will need to be able to respond to the question whether we are impugning the integrity of the Chilean court system.” To avoid the latter, he argued, “I think we ought to be considering sanctions which are much less harsh than what you have recommended.”¹⁵⁹ Ultimately, Brzezinski agreed with Vance’s proposed actions, singling out for approval the Secretary’s decision to reject “the more extreme measures” such as severing diplomatic ties or terminating private bank lending to Chile that were entirely “disproportionate to their likely benefits to US interests.”¹⁶⁰

Yet another obstacle stood in the way of swift action over Chile’s Supreme Court decision, said newly-installed Chile Desk Officer Peter Whitney. “We couldn’t get a quick response from the White House about what sanctions had been approved.”¹⁶¹ After considerable delay, and under mounting pressure, in late November the President decided to adopt most of Vance’s original recommendations. There would be a phased reduction in the size of the US military and diplomatic mission in Santiago, an orderly cancellation of military sales in the FMS pipeline, an end to disbursements of already approved military aid programs, the termination of US government guaranteed loans, the suspension of Eximbank guarantees, insurance and extensions of credit, and a freeze on additional OPIC coverage in Chile.¹⁶² The administration would more closely examine Chilean loan requests to the MDBs (although no detailed consideration or instructions would be given on voting for or against Chile loans) and requests to purchase US strategic materials and advanced technological products. These were the most punitive measures the Carter administration had taken against the Pinochet regime in three years. How

they would impact inside Chile, and what they would mean for the future US-Chilean bilateral relationship, remained to be seen.

CHAPTER 8

POLICY ADRIFT

“If we don’t sort things out better, we will be inviting the next administration to throw the baby out with the bathwater.”
Thomas Thornton, NSC Staff official, assessing Chile policy,
November 1980.

On all sides initial reactions to the sanctions package were that Chile got off very lightly. Regime officials registered their indignation but seemed to recognize that they had dodged a bullet. The US business community in Chile was, likewise, “generally relieved that the measures were not harsher.”¹ On Capitol Hill, Representative Tom Harkin lambasted the administration’s “despicably weak response” and its failure to take the one initiative—for which the President had clear legal authority—that would have the most immediate impact: the suspension of all US private bank lending to Chile. “The uninterrupted flow of private bank loans in the face of Chile’s international terrorism is instead an effective endorsement of these activities.”² A more sarcastic response to the “minimal” economic impact of the sanctions came from the Canadian Ambassador in a despatch to Ottawa: “So thanks in part to [the Iranian] Ayatollah’s contribution to preoccupying the White House...the Letelier axe that has been hanging over Pinochet for nearly two years seems to have been lowered ever so carefully alongside the neck, and with only enough force to stand upright there. It will not be difficult to pull it out of the chopping block when wanted.”³

Ironically, the Chilean regime seems to have risked more in the bilateral relationship than Carter was evidently prepared to do. The US President had resisted strong pressures from the Congress for harsher sanctions, up to and including a break in diplomatic relations, which he regarded as having the potential to only minimally advance American interests in Chile and quite possibly severely damage them elsewhere. “The measures we are taking constitute the best and the right response,” commented one administration official. “If we restricted private bank lending to Chile we feel it would hamper the proper functioning of the

whole international banking system.”⁴ Still, not everyone appreciated this apparent gloved fist. To Chile’s Foreign Minister, Hernán Cubillos, the sanctions signaled a “return to the old practice of old methods of US imperialism in Latin America.”⁵

Not surprisingly, the President’s announcement produced a mixed response within the foreign policy bureaucracy. In State, HA had hoped that Ambassador Landau would be recalled for an indefinite period (instead of only two months) and expressed disappointment at what it considered as insufficient a proposed 20 percent reduction in the number of Embassy personnel if both initiatives were “to have their full intended impact.”⁶ The NSC supported the actions to be taken and was pleased with the decision to exclude “the more extreme measures” although Brzezinski did express some concern that the proposed suspension of Eximbank funding on the basis of the Chafee amendment “could lead to business complaints against the use of export financing as a tool of foreign policy.”⁷

From Santiago, the US Embassy personnel cuts generated strong, if silent, criticism. Landau thought them “a joke.” The sole impact of the reductions would fall on the Country Team he told Washington, not the Chileans who “wouldn’t know and wouldn’t care” or on Pinochet himself “who couldn’t have cared less.”⁸ DCM Charles Grover who assumed responsibility for running the pared down Embassy agreed: “If Washington saw this as punishing Chile...Pinochet didn’t notice.” Given Carter’s professed commitment to human rights, he observed how ironic it was that among those positions eliminated from the Political Section was that of the human rights reporting officer. This meant that there would now be even less time and resources to spend monitoring the regime’s governance.⁹

ARA gave Landau’s complaints fairly short shrift. The three person Political Sections in the Lima and Bogota Embassies were functioning perfectly well, it argued, and with reporting on the Letelier case “virtually ended” there was no compelling reason for rescinding this decision. The bureau was prepared to concede that a case could be made for not subjecting the Economic/Commercial Section to the same cutback given the value of US exports to Chile had reached \$1billion annually and the prospects for increased US investments were promising. However, “since there is not necessarily any direct correlation between US exports/investments and an Embassy’s staffing, one less Economic/Commercial position is unlikely to affect the operation of that Section.”¹⁰

Executives of US corporations with investments in Chile (unlike their trade counterparts) were surprised at the “strength” of the measures; a senior official of the American Chamber of Commerce in Santiago warned

that they “may harm” US business in Chile.¹¹ On Capitol Hill, prominent anti-Pinochet legislators criticized the package of measures for precisely the opposite reason. Senator Edward Kennedy termed them “minimum appropriate steps [that] fell far short of a tough and vigorous action against terrorism.”¹² In Chile, the moderate opposition parties were equally unimpressed, dismissing the announced measures as feeble. The number of US military personnel had already been reduced to three attachés and their aides and, during 1978, the Junta had purchased most of its \$750 million of new military hardware from alternative arms suppliers in France, West Germany, Brazil and Israel—all, paradoxically, important US political, strategic and/or economic allies.¹³ This was further evidence of a White House reluctance to translate its tough human rights rhetoric into practice on a regional scale. The administration, a senior State Department human rights official acknowledged, “didn’t press other governments about supplying arms to Chile.”¹⁴

Pinochet’s position seemed unassailable. The regime’s major “success story” in 1979 was its turning around of Chile’s economic “near-collapse” according to the Canadian Embassy’s annual report. The country had ended the year with most major economic indicators pointing in a “healthy direction.” That said, Chile still “looked like a dictatorship and felt like a dictatorship to the opposition within and outside the country.”¹⁵ A British Embassy cable to London in early December had been even more acerbic, noting that Pinochet by year’s end had made virtually no attempt to pretend that it was the Junta rather than him who ran country. Perhaps the most “disturbing factor” was a perception that the Chilean leader was becoming “distanced from everybody”, and it was now “no-one’s job to tap him on the shoulder and tell him he is mortal.”¹⁶ As if to prove that assessment correct, on the night before Landau was scheduled to return to Washington for another round of consultations, Pinochet hosted a dinner for the Santiago diplomatic corps. During the course of the evening, Landau informed the Junta leader of his departure date, only to be met with what the Ambassador described as an arrogant and dismissive response: “Well so what? Stay away as long as you want, I don’t need the US’ and he pointed to the Chinese ambassador who was standing there.” The inference was unmistakable: Pinochet had other friends who could fill the gap created by US sanctions, minor or major.¹⁷

Pinochet’s response to Landau at the diplomatic corps dinner would not have been a complete surprise to the Ambassador. On the mere four of five occasions when he met privately with the Chilean leader, they were “usually disagreeable” encounters. His DCM Charles Grover (1978-1980) remembered a similar experience: “I had to see Pinochet on only one

occasion and he was a very gruff kind of person who would kill arguments with a single statement. He didn't trust anybody who was a foreigner."¹⁸

Counting the costs

Following closely on the November 1979 sanctions decision, the US again voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution critical of Chile's human rights record. In the context of the Supreme Court's disappointing decision in the Letelier extradition case, it was not hard for the USUN Mission to persuade Secretary of State Vance to approve another "Yes" vote rather than abstain in recognition of "improvements." An abstention would not only have been "difficult to explain" to the world at large, the Mission argued; it would have alienated the moderate anti-Pinochet opposition groups whom the administration purported to sympathize with if not actually support. The flaws in the resolution could be outlined in an "explanatory statement" accompanying the vote.¹⁹ Vance agreed, but he instructed the American delegation to challenge the "accuracy" of those parts of the resolution implying that "several categories of human rights practice" had worsened over the previous twelve months and to emphasize that improvements "should be recognized."²⁰ On December 6, the resolution was adopted with 93 governments voting in favour, six against, and 28 abstentions. There was no disguising the fact that, in view of the Letelier decision and the resulting US sanctions, the UN vote capped the lowest point in bilateral ties since the 1973 coup.

The deterioration in relations, however, was not irreversible—or even necessarily as dramatic as it seemed. The lines of diplomatic communication remained intact, the White House had rejected the harsher sanctions proposed by administration human rights advocates and influential members of Congress and, on closer inspection, a number of the measures Carter announced on November 30 began to look less punitive—and certainly far less effective—than they had at first appeared. Entering 1980, not one Embassy staff member targeted for repatriation had yet left Santiago and a majority of those who were due to go had already been earmarked for eventual relocation before the sanctions were announced. As for the withdrawal of US MILGP personnel, this only affected a handful of officials whose major responsibility was to supervise a pipeline on military assistance that had been closed off to new grants in 1976. Once orders still in the pipeline had been delivered, it was always intended that the group would return home. Privately US Embassy officials and opposition political party leaders in Santiago described the sanctions adopted as "a slap on the wrist" at best and never believed that the White

House would carry through on its more dire threats over Letelier. "All right, we bluffed," one high-ranking American diplomat in Santiago told the *Washington Post* barely a month after sanctions were announced. "They called our bluff and we lost."²¹

This assessment delivered a very clear message to both sides of politics in Chile: to Pinochet supporters, that the US was weak and indecisive; to opponents of the regime, that Carter was unwilling to risk a complete break with the dictatorship.

Pinochet's consistent alignment with American foreign policy objectives, of course, added to Washington's reluctance to contemplate actions that might provoke a serious fracture in bilateral ties. At a mid-January 1980 meeting with Foreign Minister Hernán Cubillos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Samuel Eaton expressed America's gratitude for Chile's support in its conflict with Iran's new Islamic government, its opposition to increasing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, and its efforts on behalf of Colombia in the latter's competition with Cuba for a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). "The fact that the US had decided to keep its Ambassador in Chile," Eaton told the Foreign Minister, "symbolized our belief that we could and should work together on matters of mutual interest, while recognizing that there were serious problems in our relationship." At the top of the list of problems was still the regime's failure to satisfactorily resolve the Letelier case. In his discussion with the visiting American diplomat, Cubillos displayed little or no interest in confronting this issue, preferring to focus on the "continuing US threats and pressure complicat[ing] the task of the [regime] moderates" in their efforts to maintain good ties with Washington and lobby the Junta for a more rapid transition to democracy.²² These "threats," he said, only served to "strengthen the hardliners around Pinochet."²³ Landau wrote to Vance that Eaton came away from his discussion with no indication the Chilean government "plans to take the steps that might allow us to put the [Letelier] matter behind."²⁴

Ambassador Landau agreed that the Letelier decision had "dropped [relations] to a new low," and warned against taking measures that could bolster the regime hardliners, although for very different reasons. No action should be taken that might undermine the benefits accruing to the American multinational business community in Chile, the country was an important trading partner and the stake of the US private business and financial community was "at an all-time high," and having implemented "all practical punitive measures available" it was unlikely that any further sanctions would strengthen government moderates over hardliners. That being the case, Landau proposed that US private commercial and financial

interests in Chile be treated independently of the formal diplomatic relationship. He drew a comparison with the importance of the regime's alignment with American foreign policy: Santiago "frequently takes positions on global issues compatible with US interests," particularly those related to East-West relations, the Middle East and Africa, and generates few, if any, security concerns in Washington. In these circumstances it made perfect sense, Landau concluded, for the administration to "maintain cool official relations for an indefinite period [until the Letelier issue was resolved] while still seeking and exploiting areas of congruent interest." What the Ambassador could not abide was the refusal of HA officials to acknowledge any positive initiatives taken by the military regime such as the abolition of DINA, the extradition of Michael Townley, or Pinochet's decision to rescind the bans on visits to Chile by UN Special Rapporteurs and American labor leaders.²⁵ "They could not care less what Pinochet did. They were out to get him [and] hit [him] over the head whenever they could." In light of this attitude, it was not surprising, Landau added, that "I was rebuffed" by Chilean authorities on numerous occasions in attempting to implement Department instructions.²⁶

Corporate America's Chilean affair

For all their hand wringing over the impact of the Letelier dispute on US-Chilean relations, members of the US investment and banking community continued to laud the Junta's economic strategy and its enforced political stability that had created an optimal profit-making environment. Not even bilateral disagreements that periodically triggered the recall of the US Ambassador for consultations interrupted the increased flow of American capital to Chile. Anaconda Copper (now owned by Atlantic Richfield) signed a contract to invest up to \$1.5 billion in a new mine. "We have come back to Chile not only because of the mining prospects, but because this Government has created a climate of confidence for investment," said company president Ralph Cox. The head of Dow Chemical operations in Chile termed business conditions "excellent" as did Jack Carter, the manager of Goodyear's \$34 million tyre, battery, and rubber products plants in Chile. In contrast to other Third World countries "there is stability, a large and growing middle class and pent up demand after a long period of recession," he explained. St Joe Minerals Corporation was another prominent investor in Chile with estimates that its stake could eventually total as much as \$500 million. US corporate executives and bankers openly acknowledged that human rights considerations exercised no influence over their decisions. "I don't think we spent five minutes

talking about human rights when the board made the decision to invest in Chile,” observed Goodyear’s Jack Carter, praising the economic road taken by the military regime.²⁷

By early 1980, at least five US copper companies were investing heavily in exploration and development, taking advantage of Chile’s foreign investment laws which the *Wall Street Journal* described as “among the world’s most attractive,” and their ability to access copper ore that contained 50 percent more metal on average than domestic (US) ore.²⁸ Paralleling the upsurge in foreign investment was a continuing influx of foreign private bank loans. “Hardly a week passes,” reported the *New York Times* in July, “that some important foreign banker is not pictured with [Pinochet], announcing the opening of a new branch or a big loan.”²⁹ American finance capital remained a steady and critical source of support. At the time of the Borquez extradition decision, for instance, the Chase Manhattan Bank opened its first branch in the country, and during the last five months of 1980 at least four multimillion dollar syndicated loans to Chile were being managed by leading American multinational banks.³⁰ Ultimately, these developments further undercut the already feeble Carter administration efforts to apply economic pressures on the Chilean regime.

There were, in any event, new calculations to factor into US relations with Chile and Latin America more generally. During the last 18 months of the Carter presidency, foreign policy decision-making was complicated by the deteriorating relationship between Brzezinski and Vance, and the President’s uncertain response to their conflicting views. Whereas Vance generally remained committed to superpower détente and targeting abusive Third World governments, Brzezinski was by then urging an increasingly harder-line approach toward the Soviet Union in view of its “adventurism” in the Horn and Southern Africa, together with a renewed US military build-up, and an aggressive pursuit of human rights especially where this would strengthen dissident efforts to undermine Moscow’s influence in Eastern Europe. According to Carter’s Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner, the President allowed himself to be caught in the middle. The result was that he “vacillated between Brzezinski and Vance, and they often cancelled each other out.”³¹ After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter sided firmly with the Brzezinski and backpedaled on the centrality of human rights in determining administration policy toward the Third World.³²

MDB lending: The final debate

Carter administration efforts to block or force the withdrawal of Chile loan requests to the MDBs, according to one calculation, probably resulted in decisions not to submit additional loan proposals totalling an estimated \$500 million in order to avoid the humiliation or embarrassment of a negative vote.³³ But the situation was more complex—and less flattering to the effectiveness of US policy—than it appeared.

Carter had only just begun his fourth year in office when the issue of Chilean loan applications before the World Bank resurfaced. The US Executive Director's office alerted State and Treasury officials to three loans (for roads, water supply and agriculture) totalling \$116 million which were coming up for determination, and requested "informal" Department positions on each application prior to discussions with Bank management and other directors. Two of the loans, a \$42 million highway construction project and a \$38 million water supply project, had been held in abeyance at Chile's request after being processed through the Loan Committee stage in March 1979. The World Bank's Acting Regional Vice President, Eugenio Lari, thought this decision understandable at the time as most of Chile's financial requirements were being met by private foreign banks on increasingly generous terms and the regime did not want to jeopardize access to these credits "by pressing multinational agencies for loans at the risk of provoking bitter Executive Board debates."³⁴

State's Economic and Business Affairs (EB) bureau felt there was no good reason to support the loans, especially as the Bank had continued to define Chile as "uncreditworthy" since it last approved a loan to the Pinochet regime in December 1978—albeit with the "controversy surrounding the political and human rights situation in Chile [constituting a] major unofficial factor" in the Bank's calculations. Bureau staff communicated to EB's Assistant Secretary Deane Hinton their "strong preference" for convincing Bank management not to bring forward the loans which, they added for maximum impact, was Treasury's favored option as well. This, the bureau argued, was "consistent with the President's recent policy decisions on Chile"—presumably alluding to the previous November's package of sanctions.³⁵

Hinton and ARA's Assistant Secretary William Bowdler (who succeeded Viron Vaky in January 1980) referred the question of what should be the Department's position on these upcoming Chile loan requests to Warren Christopher. The Assistant Secretaries were troubled by the timing of the loan submissions which coincided with congressional deliberations on the broader issue of the US subscription to the World

Bank's Selective Capital Increase (linked to a change in the voting powers of Bank members) because of a key difference that had emerged between the House and Senate versions of the FY1980 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). Their fear was that any MDB loan to Chile "could put the Bill's passage further in doubt" and, if defeated, US contributions to all the MDBs, as well as bilateral aid programs, would be seriously affected. To avoid that possibility, Hinton and Bowdler joined forces to advise that if the Bank's management disregarded Washington's first preference, then the US should aggressively lobby to mobilize a consensus among the Executive Directors to oppose the loans and, failing that, instruct the US representatives to just oppose any loans that were brought forward and leave other member governments to vote as they wished.³⁶ In the event, the US Executive Director was able to temporarily delay World Bank consideration of the Chile loans. But ARA's Chile Desk officer Peter Whitney made the general point of reminding his colleagues that voting against Chile loans in the MDBs was not among the Letelier sanctions announced by Vance despite the fact that HA having "specifically" requested that it be included.³⁷

In early March, Bowdler transmitted a memo to Christopher spelling out in detail ARA's position on whether loans to Chile in the World Bank and IADB should be based on the Letelier case or treated separately from human rights issues. The document highlighted a striking inconsistency between the "significant progress" in human rights achieved by the military regime during the past twelve months and a policy of opposing MDB loans on these self-same grounds. Bowdler wanted the Deputy Secretary to disentangle the two issues: "To prevent confusion arising over our response to an improvement in human rights conditions—particularly in countries where human rights are an issue in our relationships—we must keep these issues separate, and a signal should be sent which clearly recognizes Chile's improved human rights situation." ARA, therefore, supported a "Yes" vote on the BHN loans which would be consistent with the policy covering the Agency for International Development's (AID) Chile program in view of the Department's public statement at the time of the November 1979 sanctions that these activities would not be cut for humanitarian reasons.

When the Christopher Committee had discussed the three World Bank loans in February, Bowdler continued, there was unanimous agreement that the water supply loan met the BHN criteria but a sharp division of opinion over whether Chile's improved human rights record was a sufficient reason for changing a policy "based on the arguments that the Letelier case is in fact a case of human rights." ARA lawyers, rejected any

connection between the terrorist act and human rights legislation, and argued that improvements in the latter should be duly acknowledged. At the same time, the bureau's view was that voting decisions in the MDBs must take into account the Letelier case even though the November sanctions included no instruction to that effect. ARA was willing to support a "No" vote on non-BHN loans as "the appropriate expression of our concern" while holding firm to the position that approval of BHN loans to Chile accorded with recent US policy decisions and statements.³⁸ The Santiago Embassy gave unqualified support to ARA's stance, insisting that "an act of international terrorism" should not be confused "with improvements in the internal human rights performance of this regime."³⁹

Another communiqué to Christopher jointly signed by Bowdler, Hinton, and HA's Assistant Secretary Patricia Derian again highlighted the lack of a Departmental consensus on what stance the US should take on the Chile loans: bilateral ties were "clouded by the Letelier case which HA believes should be considered as a serious human rights violation and ARA believes should be treated as a separate issue." Derian refused to budge from HA's deeply held belief that the Letelier case was, first and foremost, a major human rights abuse and therefore the US should resolutely oppose all aid to Chile. The regional and global implications of adopting the ARA-Embassy position—that Chile be placed in the same category as Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, abstaining on non-BHN loans and approving BHN loans—also needed to be taken into account. When the US changed its voting patterns in the MDBs this was generally acknowledged as a message carrying "considerable political significance"—another reason for HA's opposition to any policy shift related to Chile loan submissions. "We should not," Derian argued, "send a signal to the Pinochet Government under present circumstances, even on a basic human needs loan." To change policy now would undermine the active and successful US role in mobilizing growing international opposition to MDB loans to Chile over the past two years: "We would find it very difficult if not impossible to justify our shift in position in the light of recent bilateral actions with regard to Chile." Bowdler restated ARA's position that Washington should only support BHN loans due to Chile's "failure to investigate and prosecute" those responsible for the Letelier/Moffitt murders. Whereas previously a large number of donor nations had opposed MDB loans to Chile, he reasoned, this situation no longer held and most Executive Directors could now be expected to cast favourable votes when the circumstance arose.

Presented with these two sharply opposed recommendations, Christopher decided to retain the existing policy of voting against all Chile loan requests primarily out a concern to avoid any perceptions among the public or Congress of a weakened commitment to human rights.⁴⁰ Although the Embassy and ARA continued to press the case for a policy shift, at least when it came to BHN loans, Vance and his Deputy stood firm in support of HA's position. Following Christopher's April 9 decision to maintain the Chile "No" vote policy, Department and Embassy critics were quick to fault it as "unfortunate and inconsistent" and based on a flawed rationale about the state of human rights in Chile which had improved over the past three years.⁴¹ Assistant Treasury Secretary C. Fred Bergsten initially concurred with the Vance-Christopher position before requesting a slight delay to "think about the decision over the weekend." ARA balked at clearing any cable until Treasury had made up its mind. On April 15, the log-jam was cleared when the Department announced its agreement.⁴² Two days later, at a World Bank Board meeting, the US Executive Director carried instructions from Treasury Secretary George William Miller to vote "No" on all three loan submissions.

Vance explained the decision to oppose the water supply and agricultural BHN loans on the grounds of Washington's twin concerns with the human rights situation in Chile generally and, more importantly, the regime's "failure to fully investigate...the Letelier matter" or to prosecute those responsible.⁴³ Landau pleaded unsuccessfully for a reconsideration of the policy given the decline in state-authored abuses, adding that opposing the loans further weakened his own ability to press for concessions from the Junta. "The Carter administration really ruined all the possibilities to make progress on human rights," Landau reflected, and Vance had to accept most of the blame for being "completely uninvolved" in Chile policy which allowed HA to wield excessive influence.⁴⁴

World Bank decisions to postpone consideration of the agricultural credit loan (to September) and the highways loan (to November) gave proponents of a policy shift some breathing space to regroup and prepare for the next round of debate, confident that developments in the bilateral relationship and in internal Chilean politics could always be guaranteed to impact on arguments for and against Christopher's decision to oppose all loans. Meanwhile, US efforts to bring other Executive Directors on board made little headway. Washington's "No" votes in the MDBs were effectively little more than symbolic gestures that enabled the administration to maintain a principled posture while avoiding any attempt to effect the outcome of Board decisions. A senior World Bank economist with Latin American responsibilities sketched a devastating picture of a

White House that lacked the courage of its convictions when it came to pursuing human rights objectives in that institution:

The Americans had twenty percent of the vote and when the Americans would vote 'No' on something like that, they would essentially ask the Executive Director to read out a little script giving some form of pseudo economic or social justification and, with regret, vote 'No'. Period. But they didn't lobby. They didn't make an effort to get other Executive Directors' support until later. So we really didn't care, that much. They wouldn't harass us. In general in those years it was clear that an overwhelming majority were going to approve Chile loan requests. And the Americans didn't really make threats. When they really get tough, you know it. They were not tough. We were never worried about the Carter 'No' votes on World Bank loans.⁴⁵

The administration's lack of success should have come as no surprise, given it was already aware of the refusal of American allies worldwide to support its Chile policy. On one occasion, the White House did send a high level delegation to Europe and Japan to lobby governments to oppose Chilean loan requests only to discover that "all of them thought we are absolutely crazy" to vote against them on human rights grounds.⁴⁶ The cable traffic from European Embassies in particular revealed almost total agreement that host governments intended to vote purely on the "economic merits [or] economic viability" of each Chilean proposal.⁴⁷

Military tensions

At an early 1979 Christopher Committee meeting, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Bushnell described as "absurd" a situation in which the US voted against "sound" Chile loan requests to the MDBs while simultaneously retaining a number of military links with the authoritarian regime (joint naval exercises, technical assistance programs, etc.). These were precisely the wrong "signals" to be sending, he said. The Pentagon had other ideas and was "strongly opposed" to eliminating even the most minor programs such as the long-established Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) which provided financial and technical aid for the production of aerial maps of Chile. When Bushnell proposed terminating that project to avoid any perceived inconsistency with the human rights policy, the idea was fiercely contested by the Pentagon. DoD officials on secondment to ARA reported that their phones were "ringing off the hook with senior officers trying to figure out how to maintain the program." So concerned was the Department that it arranged for a delegation to meet with Bushnell and explain the supposed critical importance of this

program to US national security. At the scheduled time, a large number of senior military officers from the DMA program, the Navy, and other Pentagon staffers filed into the Deputy Assistant Secretary's office. One of those present at the meeting "counted the number of stars in the room, stars as in rank, and he said there were more than 40. The delegation was headed by a four-star general with several three-stars, and the bag carriers were one or two stars." Their pleading about the necessity for up-to-date maps for any operations in Chile was summarily rejected by Bushnell as lacking substance and anachronistic in the age of satellite monitoring.⁴⁸ Having lost the argument in State, DOD then protested the decision all the way up to the President—with the same outcome at each step.⁴⁹

A far more significant issue for US-Chilean military relations surfaced in February 1980 when NSC staffer Thomas Thornton alerted Brzezinski to a pending decision on whether the US should invite Chile and Argentina to participate in the annual UNITAS naval exercises with other Latin American allies. Whereas Defense "wants to go ahead," he reported, State would assuredly contend "that we should not let the Chileans participate this year as one more punishment for the Letelier affair." Thornton proposed inviting Argentina and excluding Chile, the latter decision "keyed specifically to the Letelier case." But he coupled this advice with a belief that, after three years, the time had arrived to seriously address the question of whether this Letelier-related "punishment" should finally come to an end. "Do we want this to be a time-limited action," Thornton asked, "or is it supposed to remain a semi-permanent factor in US-Chilean relations?" His answer was unequivocal: this UNITAS decision should be "our last one." In future, issues that had the potential to complicate bilateral relations should be assessed "on the basis of their merits and overall Chilean behavior."⁵⁰

Twenty four hours later, Thornton informed Brzezinski of an apparent stalemate between State and DOD over whether or not to invite Chile, and of Under Secretary of State David Newsom's request that the NSC "take a position and, presumably, decide the issue." Brzezinski ticked "Yes" on the memo beside his staffer's recommendation that Chile not be invited to participate.⁵¹ Robert Pastor now weighed into the debate. "I would pose Tom's question differently," he told Brzezinski. "How much staying power does the USG have? I think it would be a terrible embarrassment to the President if we proceeded with 'business as usual,' alluding to the UNITAS exercise, four months after he announces a strong and firm policy" on the Letelier case. A second reason for avoiding "business as usual" had to do with domestic politics, specifically Mark Schneider's resignation from HA to run Senator Edward Kennedy's campaign against

Carter for the 1980 Democratic Party presidential nomination. "You can be absolutely certain that a decision to put the 'Letelier phase' in the past and proceed with UNITAS would be noticed," Pastor wrote, if for no other reason than that Kennedy was "hungry for issues." That aside, "there is no good reason for us to go ahead with UNITAS; we are hardly in danger of losing Chile to anyone but the militarists."⁵²

As the bureaucratic debate over Chile's participation in UNITAS intensified—and the larger question Thornton had raised awaited a response—Secretary Vance became embroiled in another pressing Junta-related matter in the United Nations: whether or not to co-sponsor a "sound, moderate" draft resolution in the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) offered by the Netherlands that was critical of Chile while resisting more radical proposals that might be introduced. HA lobbied for co-sponsorship, but in view of the time constraint, was agreeable to putting American support behind the Dutch draft "to help forestall growth of support for an expected radical—and unacceptable—Cuban resolution." Vance authorized the US Mission in Geneva to support, not co-sponsor, the Dutch resolution, rejecting an ARA proposal to abstain on the vote. To do the latter, he decided, would constitute a policy shift which the administration was not prepared to make. Deputy Assistant Secretary Roberta Cohen had to "fight off a real effort" by ARA to change the US vote to abstention and to make a positive statement. Partly to mollify ARA, and encouraged by State's Bureau of International Organizations (IO), Vance instructed the delegation to call attention to a limited number of flaws in the resolution at the time of the vote.⁵³

While Vance was busy dealing with the UNHRC problem, President Carter was pondering a final decision on the UNITAS issue. In the past, no question of being selective about who to invite had ever arisen because Latin American military regimes came and went in the region and the long planning times needed for some exercises—usually two years in the case of UNITAS—meant that these sorts of manoeuvres essentially remained independent of political considerations. When Carter accepted the NSC recommendation to exclude Chile it marked the first time in 21 years that a regional ally had not been invited to participate in UNITAS on political grounds.

At the NSC, Thornton applauded the decision and hoped the White House would "stand firm and not back down now in the face of Chilean pressure." Thornton also wanted Brzezinski to put pressure on Vance to address the larger question he had raised earlier: whether it was not time to "draw the line" under the Letelier case which had become State's "automatic reason for opposing anything." Thornton wrote that "inflicting

punishment indefinitely is poor policy and I don't see much virtue in proving our 'staying power' indefinitely." An added bonus if State could be persuaded to shift away from its "hardline" stance was that it would "probably also make DOD somewhat happier."⁵⁴

Conservative legislators could hardly control their anger over Chile's exclusion. One of the first challenges for Edmund Muskie—who would take over as Secretary of State on April 29 following Vance's resignation over his opposition to Carter's ill-fated military mission to rescue Americans held hostage in Tehran—was to face down protests by a sizable bipartisan group of House members (15 Republicans and 9 Democrats) who aligned themselves with the Defense Department in opposing Vance's refusal to change his mind over UNITAS. In a letter to the President, they warned that the decision would establish a "dangerous precedent" by politicizing regional military cooperation.⁵⁵ In a personal letter to Muskie, Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Richard Lugar (R-IND) argued that excluding Chile would not contribute to regional security and was most likely to weaken the hemisphere's ability to contain the spread of Soviet influence.⁵⁶ On July 1, at a meeting with the President, conservative House members, Charles Wilson (D-TX) and Henry Hyde (R-ILL) termed the UNITAS decision "ridiculous" and accused Deputy Secretary of State Christopher of politicizing a security operation which they considered "personally insulting and 'absolutely infuriating.'"⁵⁷

Carter went out of his way to assuage the wrath of those legislators hostile to Chile's exclusion by explaining that the decision had "a momentum of its own and that by the time he got involved with it, it was too late" and that he had already informed State that Chile's participation "could be done next year". But now it was imperative to send "a very clear and significant message" that the US was profoundly dissatisfied with the regime's response to the Letelier/Moffitt investigation. This failed to mollify his visitors. Wilson countered that the US response was a case of overkill while Hyde argued that the trial of the three DINA officials was equivalent to the US government "putting J. Edgar Hoover on trial." Carter conceded that it was possible that "we could have over made our point to Chile."⁵⁸

In Santiago, the UNITAS announcement had a profound impact on the armed forces, especially the Navy. "Chile was already a pariah at the UN and that bothered them," said Roberta Cohen. "The US votes and statements at the UN were a point of pressure; the State Department human rights reports bothered them too. But the ban on participation in naval exercises really hit them," because it effectively meant that the

military relationship was being “put on ice.”⁵⁹ Embassy DCM Charles Grover was similarly emphatic that “the things that bothered the military more than anything else were related to purely military matters” and the UNITAS decision literally “stunned” the Chilean Navy because this was a regular, important, and much anticipated part of their scheduled activities each year.⁶⁰

The formal Chilean government response was one of “grave disappointment.” In conversation with the US Ambassador, Foreign Minister Cubillos went so far as to assert that it “would upset the stability in the Southern Cone” and embolden Argentina and Peru to take “a more threatening stance” in regard to the Beagle Channel islands and possible military intervention respectively. Cubillos accused Washington of applying a “double standard of morality” by treating Chile far more harshly in comparison with Argentina the human rights record of which was far worse and which “had not cooperated with the US against the Soviets or in the nuclear field.” He also suggested that the time had arrived to call a halt to defining American policy almost exclusively in terms of the Letelier issue. Without responding directly to the Foreign Minister’s statement, Landau firmly reminded him that the Junta had repeatedly offered its full cooperation in the Letelier investigation only to stonewall any action over the past two years; and that the November measures “were not taken on human rights grounds [and therefore] it was not a question of applying a double standard.” The Ambassador dryly added that no Argentinian government personnel had been “accused of murdering two persons in the streets of Washington.”⁶¹

Pinochet gave his own response in a keynote address to foreign Ambassadors in Santiago. Emphasizing that Chileans “fight against Marxist imperialism, a tenacious and powerful, but not invincible enemy,” he exhorted those present “to defend Chile against the Soviet-inspired propaganda campaign.” Pinochet also told his audience that those “who believe in western Christian civilization observe with fear that the country we had considered as the leader is not in fact; it seems unable to take any decisive action.” There was no disguising his allusion to the US, Landau commented, adding that for the Chilean President “the Cold War never ended.”⁶² But nor was there any disguising what by now was the contempt Pinochet held for the Carter administration.

Despite continuing Embassy pleas to rescind the UNITAS decision, the administration remained firmly committed to Chile’s “ostracism” from the 1980 naval exercise barring some particularly significant development that indicated a policy review might be in order.⁶³ When the Embassy transmitted a Junta request that Washington review its position in April,

Deputy Secretary Christopher (for the Secretary) cabled that a short and unequivocal message be conveyed to the regime: “[The request] has been reviewed at a high level on [an] interagency basis” and it was agreed that inviting Chile to UNITAS “would be inconsistent with other USG decisions in connection with [the] Letelier case.”⁶⁴

Soon after Pinochet’s Cold War speech to foreign ambassadors in Santiago, a development with consequences for both governments was unfolding in mid-March over the skies of the Pacific Ocean. *En route* to the Philippines in mid-March, at the invitation of President Ferdinand Marcos, and accompanied by Foreign Minister Cubillos, Pinochet received word from his host that the state visit had been abruptly cancelled on the grounds that Marcos suddenly had “urgent” business outside of Manila. Some days later, Marcos explained that security concerns—the discovery of an alleged plot by “foreign terrorists” to assassinate both leaders—had caused him to cancel the visit.⁶⁵ True or not, Pinochet was embarrassed and humiliated, all the more so given that he had viewed the trip as demonstrating the regime’s enhanced international image.⁶⁶ He blamed Cubillos for the debacle, accusing him of failing to anticipate the cancellation and, more generally, of consistently urging him to make concessions to Landau and the US government in the absence of any reciprocity on their part.⁶⁷ “See what your friends the Americans are doing to me,” he reportedly exploded, before firing his Foreign Minister on the plane as it returned to Santiago.⁶⁸ Landau long harbored a suspicion that “there must have been something we did” that explained the Marcos decision.⁶⁹ The PDC’s Edgardo Boeninger, however, suggested that the decision to remove Cubillos reflected Pinochet’s suspicion that he was “a potential successor...as a transitional civilian president and [Pinochet] had marked him down as a force to be removed at the first available opportunity.”⁷⁰ Whatever the reason for Cubillos’ fall from grace, Pinochet promptly replaced him with a career diplomat, the then Chilean Ambassador to Spain, René Rojas.

The US Embassy interpreted Cubillos’ sacking as a sign that Pinochet was preparing to become much more directly involved in the day-to-day conduct of Chilean foreign policy at the expense of Foreign Ministry moderates.⁷¹ Canadian diplomats in Santiago attributed Cubillos’ downfall to pressure applied by the “*duros*’ (hard-liners) in the government and circles influential with the President.” Although convinced that “that there is no way that Rojas can have the influence that Cubillos did” there was an upside to Rojas’ appointment: Pinochet’s selection of a civilian meant that the hardliners “had not enjoyed a complete triumph in ousting Cubillos,”⁷² even if it was hard to discern much in the way of a policy shift following

Rojas' selection. Chile's refusal to support the US bid for a seat on the UNHRC—despite an active, and successful, lobbying effort by the USUN delegation against passage of any General Assembly resolution highly critical of the regime's human rights performance—appeared to substantiate Pinochet's reported move to assert greater personal control over foreign policy and to distance Chile from the US in the process. Ambassador Landau called the decision "the first clear case of retaliation for USG decisions flowing from the Letelier/Moffitt case."⁷³ The Cubillos sacking was a major setback for Landau who "lost [his] interlocutor to Pinochet." Thereafter, the Junta head refused to give him "the time of day." If the US Ambassador wished to appeal a prisoner's release or request that a particular human rights abuse be investigated, he could now only get a hearing from Interior Ministry officials: "By the end of the Carter regime I was kind of the larn duck."⁷⁴

In mid-June, Navy Commander Admiral José Merino re-ignited the debate over Chile's first-time exclusion from UNITAS, accusing the State Department of reaching this decision on the basis of a "banal political issue."⁷⁵ He boasted that Chile's absence would in no way affect the Navy's preparedness; instead it would only damage "the hemispheric defense against communism."⁷⁶ This statement found a receptive audience in the Pentagon where efforts were underway to encourage greater Chilean participation in Southern Cone security affairs. In the NSC, on the other hand, it drew the ire of Robert Pastor who was already armoyed at DOD's aggressive effort to get the White House to sanction a visit to a number of countries in the region, including Argentina and Chile, by Secretary of the Navy Edward Hidalgo. Pastor attacked the DOD lobbying as "symptomatic of their continued efforts to undermine the President's human rights and security objectives in Latin America." He wanted Brzezinski to oppose the trip which could only send "mixed signals" to the hemisphere regarding the human rights policy, and divert the Pentagon's focus from "real security problems in the Caribbean" as well as improving ties with the armed forces of the region's democratic countries.⁷⁷ Pastor's colleague, Thomas Thornton, also opposed the trip partly on the grounds that it would almost certainly be perceived as "a gesture to make up for the UNITAS decisions."⁷⁸ In a memo to Carter, Secretary of State Muskie also supported excluding Chile (and Argentina) from Hidalgo's itinerary because of the Junta's failure to take satisfactory action on the Letelier case. Surprisingly, the President wrote in the margin that he was "inclined to let him go" but would hold off making a final decision until Muskie had conferred with Defense Secretary Harold Brown. In the end, after Brown

had also consulted with Brzezinski, it was agreed that Hidalgo would go to Argentina but not Chile.⁷⁹

Warren Christopher gave no credence to Merino's warning that Chile's exclusion from the UNITAS exercises increased the region's vulnerability to communism. Responding to a White House request for an assessment of Soviet relations with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay, Christopher wrote that "the strongly anti-Communist orientation of most current South American leaders and the significantly stronger position of the United States and many European nations have limited the growth of Soviet influence" in the hemisphere. In the case of Chile, which had no diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, Moscow was not engaged in any activities "which seriously trouble the Pinochet regime domestically."⁸⁰

Nevertheless, on June 21, Brzezinski received a copy of Muskie's "Morning Summary" which described the official Chilean response to the UNITAS ban as "predictably negative and nationalistic." Well aware of the absence of an administration consensus, the Pinochet government appeared "resigned to taking its lumps this year in the hope that next year will be business as usual."⁸¹ By "next year," the regime almost certainly had in mind a more sympathetic Republican White House following the 1980 presidential election. Nonetheless, the cancellation "hit them very hard" and to symbolically express his anger Pinochet "gave the order personally" that none of his cabinet ministers or senior military officials would attend the July 4th Independence Day reception at the US Embassy. Although Landau himself considered the UNITAS decision an "empty gesture," insofar as it had a limited impact on Chilean military capabilities, what "really bothered them" was the broader message it sent: that relations across the board were never likely to improve under Carter.⁸²

As it turned out, the impact of the UNITAS decision on bilateral military ties was far less than its critics feared. In September, John Bushnell asked ARA's Robert Service for a report on whether administration policy, in light of the disappointing Letelier outcome, should be confined to the November 30 measures or expanded to "an almost total prohibition of the military-to-military relationship." In a telling memo, Service wrote that, to his knowledge, there had never been a decision requiring across-the-board curtailment of armed forces' interactions under the Letelier sanctions policy and even the November announcement did not itself specify termination of the Embassy's MILGP, merely a review of its function. In addition, while decisions were taken to discourage visits by military officials of both countries there was no move to prevent members of the US armed forces from attending multilateral conferences with their Chilean counterparts as recent meetings of senior regional air force

officials in Santiago and of hemisphere naval chiefs in Quito, Ecuador attested. The question remained, wrote Service, whether US interests “benefit or suffer” from a decision to terminate most military ties with the Chileans. While it “reinforces our position that the GOC must take action against Contreras, et al...the sanctions hurt us at least as much as the Chileans [and] at some point we are going to start removing or modifying them.” In Santiago, this ratcheting up of pressure over Letelier fed into an existing “strong suspicion” within the Junta that the US objective is “not justice but political change at the highest level” which Pinochet could exploit to his own advantage.⁸³

Pinochet’s Constitution

The deterioration in Washington-Santiago relations since mid-1979 soon collided with more pressing internal problems that required the Junta’s attention. Worker discontent had begun to surge again, fuelled largely by the failure of Piñera’s Labor Plan to address unionists’ concerns and the decline in real wage levels. Simultaneously, Cardinal Raúl Silva’s efforts to mollify Pinochet and ease the regime’s pressure on the Church to stay out of politics actually revived tensions between these two powerful institutions. On the occasion of Silva’s homily at the traditional Independence Day memorial mass on September 19, 1979, the Cardinal bowed to threats from the Chilean leader and excluded “pointed criticisms of the government” in the version of the text he read from the pulpit after Pinochet told him “he would walk out” of the Cathedral if he did not.⁸⁴ This antagonized a large number of the Catholic clergy, two hundred of whom had petitioned Silva not to even appear at the service in protest at the regime’s refusal to honor an agreement to return the Lonquen bodies (uncovered the previous year) to the families of the victims—instead secretly burying them in a mass grave. When the complete version of the speech was released, Ambassador Landau cabled Washington: “the generally activist Chilean clergy [were] dismayed that the Cardinal capitulated in the face of President Pinochet’s bluff to walk out of the mass.” In airport statements *en route* to Europe for the Chilean bishops *ad limina* (or obligatory regular) meeting with the Pope, Silva “reacted defensively when asked about his handling of the situation, stating that he ‘didn’t want to step on anyone’s toes.’” To Landau, Silva’s behavior seemed part of an effort to avoid pushing church/state relations to “breaking point” at a time of particularly strained ties over a range of issues, including Pinochet’s harsh criticism of the Episcopal Bishops’ Council’s study of the government’s agrarian policy and “an ongoing

dispute over control of [Santiago's] Catholic University."⁸⁵ Relations failed to improve as the state continued its crackdown on anti-regime protests and Silva canceled the traditional (1980) May Day mass.⁸⁶ Landau, who was on "great terms" with the Cardinal and the Vicariate, said senior Church officials often "came and cried on my shoulder but there was so little I could do."⁸⁷

Finding ways to quell the resurgence of opposition to military rule was not the only challenge confronting Pinochet and his generals. Their civilian *gremialista* supporters were constantly pressing to begin the process of implementing measures to consolidate the regime and its economic strategy over the long term. Finally, Pinochet announced that a plebiscite would be held on September 11, 1980 to approve a new Constitution that had two key objectives: to provide the framework for a transition from direct military rule to a "protected democracy," in the process relegating the political left to the margins of this proposed new political system; and to halt, then reverse, the nation's growing worldwide isolation that was seen as a potential threat to regime stability.⁸⁸ The new Constitution was the outcome of conflicts and disagreements over a range of issues that had been a feature of Junta discussions since the beginning of the Carter presidency. As a compromise, it reflected the continuing strength of the Junta's unanimity rule and testified to the limits on Pinochet's ability to act completely independently of his colleagues' views. As was always the case, writes Robert Barros, "no member of the Junta unilaterally imposed their preferred institutional framework, timetable, or transition."⁸⁹ The decision to include political parties in future arrangements was a case in point. Only months earlier, Pinochet had restated his view that "under no circumstances can we accept the return to professional politicians and political parties...because the parties would allow the Marxists to penetrate and return again to power."⁹⁰ However, his Junta colleagues, and a number of senior military and civilian officials, envisaged the participation of political parties in a "protected democracy" and "in the end Pinochet was a realist"⁹¹—meaning he knew that ultimately he would have to give way on this issue because these sentiments could not be ignored.

The Constitution Chileans would vote to accept or reject set an eight-year "transitional period" before a second plebiscite (in 1989) when Chileans would either endorse a regime-nominated candidate for president or, if this person was rejected, set the country on a path to competitive elections. To accept this long and circuitous route back to "democracy" required voters to approve a new Constitution that would institutionalize the outcome of the 1973 coup—including a leading role for the armed

forces in Chile's political life and entrenchment of the Junta's neo-liberal economic strategy. That Pinochet wanted this outcome was clear from the conditions under which the plebiscite would be held: without voter registration lists or party-appointed poll watchers, and with the opposition subject to incarceration or internal exile if any of its members attempted to mobilize politically.⁹² Not surprisingly, the anti-regime leaders—excluded from any role in drafting the Constitution—called for a “No” vote, interpreting the document as “merely a device to prolong military rule.”⁹³ From Washington, Senator Edward Kennedy denounced the whole exercise as a “fraud” and called on the US government to “dissociate itself both publicly and privately” from the regime; in the House, Thomas Harkin and 39 other members signed a letter to Pinochet describing the plebiscite as “transparently fraudulent.”⁹⁴ Ambassador Landau added his voice to these concerns, accusing the regime of “pulling all the levers to insure favourable results” while simultaneously cracking down on the efforts to campaign for the “No” vote.⁹⁵

In late August, the Church entered the debate when the Episcopal Conference of Bishops issued a carefully worded statement expressing “strong sympathy” for those critical of the consultative process and the limited amount of time provided to address a range of questions that would give the plebiscite requisite moral authority. The statement singled out for criticism restrictions on access to the media, together with a lack of security about the procedures regulating polling.⁹⁶ In a dispatch to Ottawa, the Canadian Embassy resorted to much blunter language:

Amount of [information] from gov[ernmen]t about plebiscite and new constitution, not/not to say propaganda, is overwhelming. TV is flooded with pro-Pinochet sentiment, while opposition expressions get minimal attention in news. Radio is about 90/90 percent pro gov[ernmen]t [and] press is predominantly pro-gov[ernmen]t, with heavy advertising, and most editorial comment focusing on danger represented by any backsliding from government's policies and on opposition's weaknesses.⁹⁷

The steadily increasing opposition culminated in the largest anti-regime protest since the 1973 coup as tens of thousands took to the streets to vent their anger only two weeks prior to the September 11 vote. While Pinochet did not anticipate the speed with which the opposition forces coalesced into a unified challenge to the plebiscite, any decision to cancel the vote was considered slim at best because Pinochet's “personal prestige is committed to it.”⁹⁸

As the vote neared, the Carter administration publicly adopted a wait-and-see attitude although a number of senior officials had already made up their minds about the worth of Pinochet's Constitution. “We didn't take it

seriously,” said the NSC’s Robert Pastor.” In State there were “mixed views” as to whether it was a step forward for Chile, basically summed up in the attitude that “it’s better than nothing but it’s got some things in there which can perpetuate fairly rigid control of the system by the more conservative elements in the country.”¹⁰⁰ ARA officials described the Constitution gambit as “a gimmick in order to protect the military from persecution” but acknowledged that the armed forces were unlikely to ever return to the barracks if some protection of this kind was not on offer. Even if true, this assessment cut no ice with HA officials who dismissed the whole process as an “unacceptable route to non-punishment.”¹⁰¹ According to Deputy Secretary Bushnell this was one more case where the Seventh Floor “split the difference” between HA’s stance that this was Pinochet’s strategy for holding onto power and his own view that, however flawed, the document indicated a promise to return the country to democracy. In other words, “we said nothing before the vote, neither approving the process nor condemning it.”¹⁰²

In contrast to Washington’s lack of policy coherence, Pinochet appeared single-minded and resolute. On the eve of the September plebiscite vote, Landau cabled State downplaying the possibility of “significant fraud” but suggesting that the plebiscite would “sharpen the fundamental dilemma which poses Pinochet’s need to retain power indefinitely against the broad-based popular interest in returning to civilian, elected government. The heart of the issue is that Pinochet believes he cannot dismount from the tiger and thus will not voluntarily leave office.”¹⁰³ Certainly the overall result was never really in doubt: over two-thirds of voters (67 percent or 4.2 million) cast their ballots in favour of the new Constitution. Despite reports of widespread fraud,¹⁰⁴ Pinochet and his senior military and civilian advisers hailed the outcome as a complete success: it gave the regime the political legitimacy it desired, affirmed the electorate’s support of continued armed forces rule, and reinforced Pinochet’s ideas about Chile’s “democratic” future. Asked at a press conference what message he would like to send to the US government, Pinochet answered in effect that the Junta had given up trying to accommodate the Carter White House:

It did not cost the United States one dollar, one bullet or a war to kick the communists out of Chile. When we needed something, instead of helping us, they hit out at us. So the only thing we ask of you is to leave us in peace to work, because we are doing a lot of things in accordance with our idiosyncrasy, believing that we are doing it well.¹⁰⁵

Passage of the new Constitution attested to Pinochet's skill as a political manipulator. The extraordinarily open-ended Article 8, for example, incorporated the most provocative constraint on the political left and mass mobilization politics: "[it] banned any person or group which contradicted the essential values of the 'Chilean spirit' from engaging in political activity, but was primarily a mechanism to exclude Marxists from the political system." The document, wrote Marcelo Pollack, also paid homage to the Chicago Boys and their success "in consecrating a... social and economic model organized according to the laws of the market."¹⁰⁶

Although the Constitution did not grant Pinochet unbridled discretionary powers it ensured his almost absolute control "over the management of repression and eliminate[d] any surviving elements of legal protection."¹⁰⁷ Not for nothing did Washington refuse to "applaud" either the vote or the outcome.¹⁰⁸ As late as it came, the State Department expressed disappointment at the long transition process, and issued a statement critical of the way the vote had been conducted, pointing out that the plebiscite neither "in its substance or process gave meaningful choices to the voters." Because it failed to advance the transition to democracy—at least anytime soon—there would be no change in US policy.¹⁰⁹ What additionally concerned the Carter administration was Pinochet's apparent post-plebiscite distancing from the *gremialista* movement which had been among the strongest advocates of a transition to a new political order. Having played an active role in the campaign for a "Yes" vote, Pinochet interpreted the result "as a personal victory that had reinforced his authority" and immediately began to increase contacts with those of his supporters "who insisted on the importance of keeping a very military orientation for the regime and warned him about the *Gremialista* ambitions."¹¹⁰

Even in the lead-up to the plebiscite, US-Chilean ties were falling to a new low. As the World Bank finally began preparations to consider Chile's request for the \$43.5 million agricultural credit loan—which had been held over from earlier in the year—Treasury officials renewed their campaign for a reconsideration of the blanket decision in April to oppose all Chilean loan requests rather than abstain. HA officials were in no mood to see any change in the policy status quo, insisting that the human rights situation in Chile had "taken a turn for the worse" in the three months since the US voted against the BHN water supply loan: "Torture continues, arbitrary detention continues, and persons so detained in 1980, unlike in 1979, are being punished by internal banishment." A second reason was the nature of Pinochet's new Constitution and his transition timetable which HA was convinced would "set back considerably" the

return of an elected civilian government.¹¹¹ From Santiago, Ambassador Landau accused HA of introducing “an entirely new consideration” into the debate on the loan applications, “namely our belief that the transition to free elections as provided for in the constitutional plebiscite is too lengthy.” The previous understanding and agreement was that the regime’s failure to act on the Letelier investigation “was the central and determining reason” for negative US votes on all Chilean loans requests. Now, Landau maintained, “political considerations” were being advanced to justify the policy.¹¹² Secretary Muskie responded that State’s decision to abide by the April agreement to oppose all loans (reaffirmed at an August 28 meeting) was based on “both Letelier/Moffitt and human rights considerations.”¹¹³ In the end, the US voted “No” on the agricultural credits loan in September, and “No” on the highway loan in November.¹¹⁴ In the process, the substance of Landau’s complaint—that an entirely new rationale had been introduced into the policy debate—was never addressed.

Only weeks after Chile’s plebiscite, an NSC staff official wrote that the eleven months since the imposition of the Letelier sanctions have witnessed “some ugly trends in Chilean human rights behaviour.”¹¹⁵ Although the worst of the state-authorized terror had passed, Amnesty International reports for 1979 and 1980 continued to express concern about political killings and imprisonment, torture, arbitrary detentions, and harassment of regime opponents including trade unionists, Church organizations, human rights activists, and the working class and urban poor in general.¹¹⁶ During the first half of 1980, the Chilean Human Rights Commission reported an increase in abuses that were now being carried out more discretely in order to minimize international opprobrium. Discussing the persistent use of torture, a member of the Santiago Archdiocese’s legal aid service characterized the tactics employed by the security forces as “more sophisticated now, they don’t leave marks and people don’t disappear as they did before.”¹¹⁷

The UN Special Rapporteur’s end-November 1980 report to the General Assembly on the human rights situation in Chile added further weight to these conclusions. The Rapporteur described increased restrictions on individual freedoms and civil rights, more “individual and collective arrests” compared with previous years, often resulting in torture, unexplained death and/or disappearance perpetrated by the security agencies and their rightist allies and “the almost total absence of protection against arbitrary action by officials [which] has created a climate of terror.” Commenting on the regime’s Labor Plan, the report concluded that approximately 80 percent of all workers had received no benefits from it whatsoever.¹¹⁸ By now, however, the military Junta was “resigned” to

being a target of “politically-directed” criticism from abroad. And as for United Nations and Organisation of American States’ resolutions, these were summarily dismissed as “annual rituals” which Chile’s diplomats should no longer be “defensive” about in justifying and promoting the nation’s policies.”¹¹⁹

As the Carter presidency entered its final months, the NSC’s Thomas Thornton posed the question, in a memo to Brzezinski, of whether or not to undertake a final review of Chile policy “or simply leave matters for the next administration to deal with.” He was not pleased by what he believed was a decision by Warren Christopher to actually terminate a State Department study that had already begun. The case for doing nothing was fairly straightforward: there were no “pressing issues” that needed to be addressed in the short term; the Chilean regime remained “fairly odious” and had enacted a transition timetable “perpetuating the rule of Pinochet” that was “a mockery of the democratic process;” and by leaving changes to the next White House “we give them some cards to play.” The counter, and more persuasive, argument was twofold: the Letelier sanctions had been ineffectual and were now “counterproductive” to US interests; and the “get tough” policy was being applied far more rigorously to Chile than to Argentina, whose generals were conducting a war of much greater brutality against their population. The result of the sanctions were said to discredit the administration’s human rights policy and, unless Carter administration officials “sort things out better, we will be inviting the next administration to throw the baby out with the bathwater.” Thornton concluded that it was in the White House interest to undertake a review.¹²⁰

What Thornton failed to make explicitly clear were the confused rationales invoked to justify current policy toward Pinochet. One involved the broad human rights issue with all the contested views about it which had plagued the administration from the beginning (and were further complicated by disagreements over whether the Chilean regime should be held accountable only for post-1977 abuses or also for those committed prior to Carter entering office). Another was the Letelier case, which Warren Christopher had put firmly on a legal track to resolution although Chile’s eventual obstructionism was bound to require the adoption of diplomatic responses from Washington. Finally, dealing with Pinochet now involved questions of promoting genuine democratic reform—not just human rights outcomes—as part of any plan to return the military to barracks. These various rationales allowed different agencies and individuals to advance different arguments for their preferred courses of action. And this complex situation virtually ensured the absence of a consistent US approach and made it extremely difficult for the Chileans to

calculate with any certainty what concessions might produce what rewards from Washington.

In contrast to the disarray in US policy, Chile's ruling Junta and its armed forces leadership maintained their essential internal cohesion and resisted any tendencies toward institutional fracturing.¹²¹ Pinochet had made sure that Washington would find it difficult to cultivate senior military figures opposed to his rule by promoting supporters to key command positions and allowing others to retain their high-level posts beyond the normal age of retirement. Cutbacks in US military assistance and Embassy personnel further weakened efforts to monitor developments inside the Chilean state's coercive institutions.

Paradoxically, while shoring up his military support base, Pinochet was also engaged in formally distancing himself from the armed forces: his new Constitution had been convincingly "approved" in the September plebiscite the outcome of which could be interpreted as a sign of his own popular appeal. He faced no coherent political opposition, no serious challenge from the streets, and had battered an historically unified and activist trade union movement into submission. And he had opened the way to the eventual institutionalization of an authoritarian state in the guise of a "protected democracy." As well as being firmly in charge of Chile's political destiny at the end of 1980, in the economic sphere Pinochet had overseen a major structural readjustment and immeasurably enhanced the country's attractiveness to foreign private and investment capital.¹²²

In the Department of State, assessments of US-Chilean relations during the latter half of the Carter presidency were pessimistic to say the least. When Robert Steven left the Chile Desk in mid-1979 he described bilateral ties as "static and unable to improve a great deal because of Letelier."¹²³ His successor, Peter Whitney who served out the remaining 18 months of Carter's term on the desk, characterized the relationship at the end of his tenure as "tense."¹²⁴ An Embassy political officer seemed rather sanguine about what the future held as "we were resigned" to having the Chilean military in power "for a while."¹²⁵ During 1979-80, however, except for Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, Cuba, the Western Hemisphere had been relegated to a "back burner" foreign policy concern as the administration shifted its attention to Iran, Afghanistan and other Third World trouble spots.¹²⁶ The ability of HA and its few bureaucratic allies to counter the influence of anti-Communist hardliners such as NSC Adviser Brzezinski was further weakened by bureau personnel changes: Assistant Secretary Patricia Derian had resigned for health reasons, Mark Schneider had signed onto Senator Edward Kennedy's presidential

campaign team, and a number of staff positions remained vacant as foreign service officers reasoned that applying for HA positions might not be in their best long-term career interests given the very real possibility of a Republican Party victory in the November 1980 presidential election.

Pinochet and his supporters had long since abandoned hopes of better ties with the Carter White House. The UNITAS exclusion was the final straw. Relations between Washington and Santiago were now, in George Landau's words, "almost non-existent." The Chilean Junta "had a total distrust of United States and after UNITAS they were just hoping and praying that Reagan would win the November presidential election."¹²⁷ As things transpired, Robert Pastor observed, "Pinochet was very pleased with the electoral outcome."¹²⁸ But even before then, and after four years of Carter and his break with the policies of the Nixon-Ford era, Pinochet was in as strong a position as ever to confront whatever the next administration had in mind for Chile.

CONCLUSION

The Reagan administration would shift from, in its first term, reaching out again to the Pinochet regime with all the support it could give within legislative constraints, and, in its second term, viewing Pinochet as a threat to long-term US interests in Chile and actively encouraging him to return the country to civilian rule. But Pinochet would go at a time of his own choosing—as laid out in his 1980 Constitution—and without bothering much at all about what Washington was urging him to do. His longevity among Latin American military dictators of the period was a testament to his own tenacity and also to the limited influence the US could wield over independently-minded rulers south of the border.

Certainly US policy toward Chile in the 1970s failed to make a significant impact on events inside the country. The Nixon Administration could not prevent the election of Salvador Allende's leftist *Unidad Popular* (UP) coalition in September 1970 and had no more success in its efforts to thwart Allende's assumption of power two months later. By exerting external pressure on the Chilean economy, Washington was able to make life extremely difficult for the UP government and it conspired with its opponents—including in the Chilean military—to oust Allende and his coalition from office. The coup of September 1973, however, was far less a response to US machinations than a decision taken by senior Chilean military commanders in what they considered to be the national interest. Moreover, the coup leaders were largely unknown to US officials and, overtime, were distinctly unresponsive to Washington's advice on how they should govern and largely unmoved by the carrots the Nixon and Ford administrations extended or the sticks the Carter Administration eventually brandished over them.

The overthrow of Allende basically returned Chile to its place among countries of relatively minor strategic, political and economic interest to the US. This meant there was no compelling need for the various actors involved in US foreign policy making to unite behind a cogent approach toward the country and its political fortunes. In the Cold War context of the period Henry Kissinger, like Richard Nixon, certainly wanted to prevent further experiments in using democratic means to arrive at communist revolutions and supporting those who had ousted the UP was one way they thought they could do that. But once Allende was overthrown

and the left decimated in Chile this cause lost its urgency for other officials in the administration and began to be seen by some as increasingly counterproductive to broader US interests. The Carter Administration appeared to single out Chile as a test case for its new human rights policy. But, once in office, this was a lesser priority for the President than demonstrating his new, less interventionist approach to Latin America as a whole. As a low priority issue, Chile presented an opportunity for different departments, agencies and individuals to more assertively contest the policy line because little of consequence was at stake. And as a source of frustration at how little influence the US was having on events inside the country, Chile generated a near constant source of evaluations, re-evaluations, disagreements, and conflicts.

It was Kissinger's practice to deal with this challenge by ignoring those around him and making policy himself or else in direct negotiation with the President. In 1975, as Secretary of State, he did run into opposition to his attempts to deliver military equipment to Chile from the Department of Defense which was concerned about a wider issue, namely, inciting further congressional restrictions on arms transfers generally. The following year he clashed with Treasury over US support for an Inter-American Development Bank loan to Chile for much the same reason—Treasury's fear that the wrong move would produce a congressional backlash with wider implications than just for Chile. For the most part, however, inter-departmental disagreements about Chile policy were rare, although inside the State Department they were less so. The Office of Bolivia-Chile Affairs was bitterly divided over Washington's embrace of the Pinochet dictatorship; the Human Rights Coordinator's Office took issue with various aspects of the policy; and, after a group of embassy officials questioned the whole approach in 1975, the Director of the Office of Policy Planning characterized the policy as a failure in a direct challenge to the Secretary's approach.

As well, as Kissinger eventually began to suspect, these unresolved tensions among his subordinates regarding Chile policy spilled over into subtle forms of collusion between a small number of Department officials and those legislators most active in seeking to moderate the White House stance. These officials included Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William Rogers who, having failed to temper Kissinger's uncompromising embrace of Pinochet, began to open lines of communication with human rights advocates and sympathetic members of Congress. Lower level State officials, including the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs's George Lister, were even more directly involved with particular legislators and human rights groups. Differences of opinion

within State that might have been dealt with through compromise by someone other than Kissinger instead helped shift the issue to a dispute between the Executive and Legislative branches of government and inadvertently lent encouragement to the passage of human rights legislation designed to constrain administration efforts to provide economic and military aid to Chile and other repressive Third World regimes.

Whereas Nixon and Ford had turned a blind eye to the Chilean armed forces' brutal consolidation of their rule, the Carter administration focused its concerns on the Junta's institutions of repression. It did not, however, challenge the regime as such, thereby isolating a commitment to human rights from a concern about the nature of the regime violating those rights. The idea was to defend basic US interests in Chile and avoid a complete rupture in relations while working to alleviate abuses. From its inception, however, this focus on human rights was always more of an idea than a thought-out policy program, best illustrated by Carter's belief that only some of the regime's behavior was problematic. Not even holding the Junta accountable for an act of terrorism on the streets of Washington—the Letelier/Moffitt murders by DINA operatives acting on the orders of Augusto Pinochet¹—could shake Carter's belief that US interests were best served by maintaining ties with the Junta and that concessions were best extracted by working through the regime. This approach was given expression by Assistant Secretary of State Warren Christopher as "cool but correct" relations toward the dictatorship—a term that invited those critical of the Chilean Junta to emphasize the word "cool" and those more sympathetic in their approach to emphasize the word "correct". The result was that decisions were often split down the middle rather than made on their merits.

During Carter's first 15 months in office—the time most likely to produce a significant change in Chile policy—there developed no well-conceived sense of how to deal with a government the White House refused to challenge head-on but whose behavior it sought to modify. The one potentially vulnerable economic pressure point to which the Junta was exposed—access to foreign aid and loans—had well and truly closed once American and other private foreign banks had stepped in and proceeded to lend billions of dollars to the regime. By early 1978, the ruling generals' firm hold on political power and their ability to resist external efforts to force changes in their style of governance had triggered a sharp difference of opinion among American officials over how to proceed.

The "hardliners" among these officials desired to maintain lines of communication with the Junta, provide economic and military aid to the

extent possible, and acknowledge positive changes when they occurred. Tougher action, they argued, would be counter-productive: ratcheting up the pressure on Pinochet to implement desired reforms would simply provide him with further justification to become more repressive, paranoid, intransigent, or non-cooperative. Other Carter officials agreed with Ambassador George Landau's memo to the State Department in March of that year, dismissing the idea that human rights could be improved by working with Pinochet. This strategy had failed to achieve its objective, Landau wrote, and was "politically impractical." He suggested that a longer-term strategy based on consistently cool disdain was more likely to bring about the end of military rule.²

This division over the application of Chile policy highlighted a key feature of the broader policy debate: a formidable bureaucratic resistance to White House efforts to prioritize human rights relative to other competing interests in dealing with repressive Third World allies. This situation was not helped by consistently ambiguous public statements by the President and his senior foreign policy advisers as to where human rights fitted into the overall scheme of things. Designated exceptions or exemptions were an integral part of the policy from the very beginning. Whenever the pursuit of human rights conflicted with key US strategic, geopolitical or economic interests in a particular country, those interests always took precedence.

This loophole generated inter-departmental and intra-agency disputes over specific applications often leading to policy outcomes on the basis of trade-offs and compromises rather than leadership; at other times sheer policy immobility was the result. Beyond this, no sharply defined or comprehensive guidelines on how and when human rights concerns should be taken into account in framing and pursuing US policy decisions were ever developed. The result was that individual officials, agencies and departments retained considerable latitude to interpret the policy and/or contest the interpretations of others—a problem which was magnified in the State Department as a result of efforts by Cyrus Vance to reverse the heavy-handed management style of Henry Kissinger. In the more devolved environment that resulted, the administration was unable to build a strong institutional base committed to the idea that human rights should play a key role in its foreign policy.

The reorganization and streamlining of the foreign policy bureaucracy under Secretary of State Vance was intended to elevate the roles played by the State and the Defense Departments in crucial policy decision-making. In practice, however, this devolution of authority also raised the tenor of competing departmental interests, especially over the new emphasis on

human rights. If the core Carter White House message was that the US would no longer turn a blind eye to human rights abuses in its relations with other governments, the idea lacked strong administration supporters outside of the Bureau of Human Rights (HA), a handful of senior officials on State's Seventh Floor, and the NSC's Latin American specialist Robert Pastor. Inside the Pentagon, civilian and military officials were perhaps the most hostile to the human rights "innovation" because it threatened weapons transfers to Third World allies which could, in turn, reduce "access to and leverage over" the military as a key state institution, especially in Latin America.³ Treasury adhered to the policy but did so only grudgingly whenever it was involved in determining Washington's position on individual multilateral development bank loan requests. It too was primarily concerned with wider issues: generous replenishment of US contributions to those banks and ensuring a positive environment for US investors. Commerce resisted any attempts to link human rights and trade in ways that might threaten US access to export markets. Much the same reasons shaped the negative response of the US intelligence agencies to the idea of human rights playing a key role in foreign policy. Discussing the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, one prominent HA official spoke of having experienced more problems with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the CIA than with the Pentagon: both DIA and the CIA had built up extensive liaisons with their Chilean opposite numbers which they did not want to risk.⁴

At the middle and lower rungs of the foreign policy bureaucracy there was a good deal of disagreement about the interpretation and application of the policy, especially in State where one official described an ongoing "guerrilla warfare battle"⁵ between the career foreign service officers in the geographic bureaus and the mainly political appointees located in the newly created Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA), a number of whom were recruited from Congress where they had worked on legislation restricting economic and military aid to countries with poor human rights records.⁶ The various agencies in dispute over policy continued to use what means they could to advance their own agendas and frustrate those of others. Because HA had no direct access to cable traffic between the Embassies and State's desk officers, it relied on the good will of the latter to forward information relevant to human rights issues. This could always be delayed or withheld in attempts to keep HA in the dark or make its concerns seem groundless.⁷ One HA official remarked that the bureau had to "kick, scream and claw" its way into the policymaking process.⁸ Other bureaus were also particularly irritated by having to deal with more red tape in the form of a requirement that HA sign off on all

arms transfers and security assistance.”⁹ Looking back to those turf battles, then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Security Assistance Steven Cohen described an essentially beleaguered HA Bureau, viewed by the rest of State—especially the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs or ARA—as a “hostile implant.”¹⁰

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Bushnell characterized the 1977-80 years as a period “unpleasant” confrontations between ARA and HA over the preparation of policy papers on human rights and “tremendous struggles” over the drafting of the annual Human Rights report to Congress. One side would want to praise relative improvements and the other side would demand condemnation and punishment. This situation was made all the worse by the failure of senior State Department officials, particularly Vance and Christopher, to seriously grapple with the problem. Instead, decisions tended to be made which merely “split the difference” between competing agencies.¹¹ On taking up his appointment as Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs in 1978, David Newsom immediately found himself in the midst of this conflict: “When I came into the Department...some fifty cases of disagreement simmered within and between bureaus over the implementation of legislation requiring attention to human rights.”¹² The establishment of an interagency committee chaired by Warren Christopher, responsible for assessing the human rights situation in countries seeking loans from the major international lending agencies proved no more effective: it quickly became a battleground for competing departmental priorities that Christopher could rarely resolve and which often worked against consensus decisions, gradually reducing the committee to an occasional player in loan decisions.

What particularly angered the geographic bureaus was not human rights advocacy *per se* as much as what they perceived as HA’s tendency to exclusively focus on this one factor to the exclusion of all else.¹³ “We were putting every single foreign policy operation through one single lens, which was human rights,” explained ARA’s Deputy Assistant Secretary William Stedman. “As important as human rights is, it’s not the only optic through which to view conditions and developments in foreign countries. The exclusivity of this one approach only was becoming overbearing. As a consequence, the career service and its point of view was getting short shrift.”¹⁴ Throughout her tenure as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Sally Shelton-Colby was called upon, time and again, to mediate the constant “distrust” between ARA and HA officials, not only over matters of policy but also over seemingly clear-cut issues such as the actual human rights situation in particular countries: “You couldn’t even

get a consensus on what the facts were, much less on policy."¹⁵ Both points are amply demonstrated in the two bureaus' battles over Chile policy.

From her vantage point in State's Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Roberta Cohen also witnessed endless inter-agency disputes over implementing human rights policy in general and "big fights" over inter-American affairs in particular. Like others, she traced the problem to the failure to develop a thought-out conceptual framework within which the human rights policy could be applied and how to go about applying it in practice: "I think that most people at State didn't really know what human rights were. How you apply it wasn't really something that was discussed or set out anywhere."¹⁶ Perhaps no one attempting to reconcile differences between ARA and HA was more frustrated than the NSC's Pastor who described his own failed effort to have the problem resolved: "When [HA and ARA] became more extreme in their positions, I thought that if we brought it up to the Christopher/Brzezinski level, which wouldn't have us dance back and forth depending on who grabbed the policy first in the State Department, we could really do something. But we didn't get very far."¹⁷

Scholars have observed that divisions, disagreements and disputes of this kind in the foreign policy making process can produce creative responses to challenging situations.¹⁸ But they can also produce inertia with respect to changes in policies if not paralysis with respect to action of any kind. Where crucial US interests are not subject to immediate threat, the result of competing agendas is conducive to a stability of approach at a practical level so that little of significance changes from one administration to another. Certainly the rhetoric around Chile policy changed substantially from the Nixon-Kissinger period to the Carter period. Clearly also the intentions of each administration's policy were quite different. The Carter White House took a much more critical approach to Pinochet than had its predecessors, designating his regime as a major abuser of human rights, scaling back military relations, terminating economic aid programs, and opposing Chilean loan requests to the multilateral development banks. Simultaneously, Carter officials embarked on an offensive to embarrass the Pinochet regime over its style of governance. Judged by the administration's own stated goals—a policy designed to align U.S. actions with the cause of human rights narrowly defined ("integrity of the person")—the aim was laudable and a number of positive results were achieved. Inside Chile, the impact of Carter policy was certainly suggested by the number of lives saved, the periodic easing of repression (release of prisoners, return of exiles, lifting states of

emergency), and the reconfiguration of the more appalling instruments of repression (closing down detention/torture centers, replacing DINA with the slightly less sinister CNI). Of course, how much of this would have been done in any event as a response to opportunities and challenges inside Chile is a matter of debate. The administration also had clearer, though limited, success in pursuing the Letelier investigation and the DINA operatives who carried out the terrorist act.

What is less certain is whether Carter's approach facilitated the growth of the political opposition by encouraging the dictatorship to engage in pseudo-democratic reforms. Pinochet's two major political initiatives, the 1977 *Chacarillas Plan* and the 1980 plebiscite on a new military-authored Constitution, were less a response to US pressure than part of a broader effort to translate the regime's brute force into some kind of legitimacy to govern.

That said, Pinochet found little difference in the reliability he sought, or the reciprocity he expected, from any of the administrations he dealt with in the 1970s. One senior State Department official involved in Chile policy in the decade considered here, thought little of any real substance had changed. In practical terms Carter Administration policy of public gesturing over human rights abuses, he said, seemed to produce as much response in Chile as the Kissinger approach, "to wit, you're much better off if you are quiet on the subject and put pressure on behind the scenes."¹⁹ More generally, one study has observed that given the patterns of exceptions and compromises in implementing policy, it is not surprising that there was "no significant relationship between human rights violations and US assistance at any time during the Nixon, Ford, or Carter years."²⁰ What this study has shown is the extent to which the bureaucratic contest over US foreign policy making at all levels can contribute to a levelling of differences in approach and outcomes across administrations irrespective of their ambitions and management styles.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN ENDNOTES

AD	Agency for International Development
AmEmb	American Embassy
AP	Associated Press
ARA	Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
BD●HP	British Diplomatic ● Oral History Program
BG	Boston Globe
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research
BLA	Business Latin America
BNA	British National Archives
BW	Business Week
CFPF	Central Foreign Policy Files
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CAN	Canadian National Archives
CSM	Christian Science Monitor
CT	Chicago Times
DDRS	Declassified Documents Reference System
DJ	Dow Jones
DMN	Dallas Morning News
DNSA	Declassified National Security Archive
D●D/F●IAe, IIUS	Department of State Collections, Chile Declassification Project, Electronic, Department of Defense
D●S/●H	Department of State/● Office of the Historian
D●SB	Department of State Bulletin
D●T	Department of the Treasury
D●S/F●IAe, IUS	Department of State Collections, Chile Declassification Project, Electronic, State Chile, Tranche I
D●S/F●IAe, IIUS	Department of State Collections, Chile Declassification Project, Electronic, State Chile, Tranche II
D●S/F●IAe, IIIUS	Department of State Collections, Chile Declassification Project, Electronic, State Chile, Tranche III
CIA/F●IAe, IIIUS	Department of State Collections, Chile Declassification Project, Electronic, CIA Creation Documents
D●S/F●IAe, Argentina	
ET	Electronic Telegrams, NARA, RG59, Central Foreign

	Policy Files, 1/1/73-12/31/73; 1/1/74-1/12-31; 1/1/75-1/12/75; 1/1/76-1/1/31
FBIS: DR: LA	Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report: Latin America
FAOHC	Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection,
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GRFPL	Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
GMMA	George Meany Memorial Archives
HA	Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs\
IABD	Inter-American Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMFA	International Monetary Fund Archives
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research
JC	Journal of Commerce
JCPL	Jimmy Carter Presidential Library
LAWR	Latin America Weekly Report
LA	Latin America
LAER	Latin America Economic Report
LAPR	Latin America Political Report
LAT	Los Angeles Times
MH	Miami Herald
NA	National Archives, United States
NARA/FOIAe, IU.S.	U.S. Department of State Collections, Chile Declassification Project, Electronic
NCR	National Catholic Reporter
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NPMS	Nixon Presidential Materials Staff
NSC	National Security Council
NSC/FOIA, III	US Department of State Collections, Chile Declassification Project, Electronic, National Security Council.
NYT	New York Times
●AS	●rganization of American States
PDC	<i>Partido Democrática Cristiana</i> (Christian Democratic Party)
RG59	Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State
RNS	Reuters News Service
Telcon	Telephone Conversation
TGM	Toronto Globe & Mail
WASG	Washington Special Action Group (serious crisis)

WHCF	White House Central Files
WSJ	Wall Street Journal
WP	Washington Post
WBGA	World Bank Group Archives

ENDNOTES

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⁵⁵ Interview with Kenneth Guenther, FAOHC. Catherine Gwin, "U.S. Relations with the WB, 1945-1992," in Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, Richard Webb, eds., *The World Bank, Volume 2: Perspectives* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp.195-274.

⁵⁶ Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review of Chile, Annual Supplement, 1973*, p.15.

⁵⁷ For a comprehensive analysis of the Nixon administration debt strategy, see Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Historical Office, *United States Policy Toward Chile*, November 1971-September 1973, Research Project No.1047-A, May 1976, 43pp. (Declassified Freedom of Information Act).

⁵⁸ Joseph L. Nogee and John W. Sloan, "Allende's Chile and the Soviet Union," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Vol.21, No.3, August 1979, p.347.

⁵⁹ Lois Hecht Oppenheim, *Politics in Chile* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 65-66.

⁶⁰ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, *New Directions for the 1970s—Part 2: Development Assistance Options for Latin America*, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., February 18, July 12, 19, 26, 27 and August 4, 1971, p.265.

⁶¹ Memo, WH, from HAK to The President's File, Dec 9, 1971. DNSA.

⁶² Transcript of Conversation between President Nixon, Mexican President Luis Echeverria Alvarez and Alexander Haig Jr, June 15, 1972, Conservation No.735-1, Cassette Nos 2246-2248, Oval Office, White House, *The Nixon Tapes*, DNSA, Washington, DC.

⁶³ Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, November 25, 1970, DNSA.

- ⁶⁴ Barbara Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), p.137.
- ⁶⁵ See, for example, Jonathan Haslam, *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile* (London: Verso, 2005), pp.91, 118-119.
- ⁶⁶ Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, 2001), p.250.
- ⁶⁷ Julio Faundez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp.205, 208.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.217.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.225-226.
- ⁷⁰ Edy Kaufman, *Crisis in Allende's Chile* (New York: Praeger 1988), p.181.
- ⁷¹ Faundez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile*, pp.232-233.
- ⁷² U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973*, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., December 18, 1975, pp.9, 29.
- ⁷³ Rouquie, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, p.241.
- ⁷⁴ Frederick M. Nunn, "New Thoughts on Military Intervention in Latin American Politics: The Chilean Case," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol.7, No.2, November 1975, p.279.
- ⁷⁵ Allende also appointed military officers to senior positions in mining enterprises, steel companies, the Chilean Development Corporation (CORFO), nuclear research facilities, engineering projects and shipping firms. Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History*, pp.277-278.
- ⁷⁶ Davis, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*, p.127.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.128-29.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.119.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.* Davis cites as one example the encouragement Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, chief of US naval operations, gave to Allende to invite the US aircraft carrier Enterprise to visit Valparaiso in early 1971: When Kissinger learnt of the invitation he rebuffed Allende and took Zumwalt to task for having suggested it. See pp.118-19.
- ⁸⁰ Kaufman, *Crisis in Allende's Chile*, pp.78-79.
- ⁸¹ Thomas F. O'Brien, *Making the Americas* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), p.248.
- ⁸² See Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History*, p.275.
- ⁸³ Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, p.15.
- ⁸⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973*, pp.36, 38, 39.
- ⁸⁵ Jonathan Kandell, "Chilean Officers Tell How They Began to Plan the Takeover Last November," *NYT*, September 27, 1973, p.3.
- ⁸⁶ Pollak, *The New Right in Chile 1973-1989*, 1999, pp.28, 37, 41.
- ⁸⁷ Quoted in Haslam, *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile*, p.130.
- ⁸⁸ Bawden, *The Pinochet Generation*, p.127.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.117.
- ⁹⁰ Alan Angell, "Chile Since 1958," in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Chile Since Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.168.

⁹¹ Immediately prior to the September coup, the director general and five generals of the Carabineros, together with three army generals, two admirals and fifty junior officers were purged. See Rouquie, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, p. 258. On the weapons searches, see Mary Helen Spooner, *Soldiers in a Narrow Land* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp.34-35.

⁹² See David Green, *The Containment of Latin America* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971).

Notes to Chapter 2

¹ At the time of the coup, Mendoza was the six-ranking general in the *Carabineros*. His defection was critical because it denied the government the support of a well-armed, 35,000 man paramilitary force. See Spooner, *Soldiers in a Narrow Land*, pp.83-84.

² Robert Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.5. US Embassy officials interviewed for this study conceded that they knew very little about what transpired in Junta deliberations apart from what individual officers were prepared to tell them.

³ Quoted in Arriagada, *Pinochet: The Politics of Power*, pp.4, 5.

⁴ Bawden, *The Pinochet Generation*, pp.136-37.

⁵ Mark Ensalco, *Chile Under Pinochet* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), p.28.

⁶ Quoted in Peter Kornbluh, "Letter from Chile," *The Nation*, January 31, 2005, p.23.

⁷ Author interview with William Lowenthal.

⁸ Author interview with Arnold Isaacs.

⁹ Telephone Conversation between Kissinger and Nixon, September 16, 1973. DNS4.

¹⁰ Samuel F. Hart interview, *FAOHC*.

¹¹ Telcon, Nixon/Kissinger, September 16, 1973, DNS4; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.753.

¹² Quoted in Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, p.201.

¹³ Telegram, Department of State to Embassy in Chile, September 21, 1973. DOS/OH.

¹⁴ Telegram, Kissinger (Rush) to AmEmb Santiago, September 13, 1973, NARA, RG59 CFPF, ET.

¹⁵ Memo, Kennedy and Jordan to Kissinger, "WASAG Meeting-Chile, September 14," September 13, 1973, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Meeting Files (1969-74), Folder: WSAG Meeting Chile 9/14/73, Box H-094, NPMS.

¹⁶ "Briefing Paper on Chile, 9/13/73," attached to NSC, Memo for the Record, From William J. Jordan, Subject: "Chile, Sept 15, 1974," NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Meeting Files (1969-74), Folder: WSAG Meeting Chile 9/14/73, Box H-094, *Ibid.*

¹⁷ The Secretary's Meeting with the Foreign Minister of Chile, October 11, *Documents on South America, 1973-1976* (hereafter, FRUS, South America, 1973-1976), Doc.145. pp.396-398.

¹⁸ Telegram, (Rush) to AmEmb Santiago (Davis), September 24, 1973, *DOS/OH; Ibid.*, Doc.140, pp.386-389.

¹⁹ Quoted in Darren G Hawkins, *International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p.58.

²⁰ US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger, Part I*, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., September 7, 10, 11, and 14, 1973, p.241.

²¹ Quotes in Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, p.211.

²² Telegram, Davis to Kissinger, "Chilean Request....," September 28, 1973, DOS released, June 30, 1999, *DNSA*.

²³ Quoted in "Minutes of a Meeting of the WSAG," September 20, 1973, *FRUS, Chile, 1969-1973*, Doc.363, p.935.

²⁴ Memo NSC, Jordan to Kissinger, September 17, 1973, *ibid.*, Doc.358, pp.925, 926. Also see Telegram, Rush to Davis, September 21, 1973, *ibid.*, Doc.363, p.940.

²⁵ Talking Points, attached to Memo, Kennedy and Jordan to Kissinger, "WSAG Meeting-Chile, September 20," September 19, 1973, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Meeting Files (1969-74), Folder: WSAG Meeting, Chile, 9/20/73, Box H-094, *NPMS*.

²⁶ Telegram, Kissinger (Rush) to Santiago Embassy, October 27, 1973, *FRUS, South America, 1973-1976*, Doc.150, pp.404-405.

²⁷ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, September 24, 1970, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.

²⁸ Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*, p.281, Table 10-3.

²⁹ Memo, Kennedy and Jordan to Kissinger, September 19, 1973, *NPMS*; Memo, Kennedy and Jordan to Kissinger, September 13, 1973 (for WSAG Group Meeting), Folder: WSAG Meeting Chile 9/14/73, *ibid.*

³⁰ Memo, Kennedy and Jordan to Kissinger, September 19, 1973; Attachments Economic: Short-Term (next two to four weeks) and Chile Economic Assistance The Next 1-6 Months, , NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Meeting Files (1969-74), Folder: WSAG Meeting, Chile, 9/20/73, Box H-094, *NPMS*; Memo, Kennedy and Jordan to Kissinger, September 13, 1973 (for WSAG Group Meeting, 9/14/73), *Ibid.*

³¹ Memo, Bloomfield to Kubisch, September 13, 1973, *DNSA*.

³² Telegram, Rush to USUN Mission, New York, September 25, 1973, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.

³³ "Minutes of a Meeting of the WSAG," September 20, 1973, *FRUS, Chile, 1969-1973*, Doc.361, p.930.

³⁴ Agenda for WSAG Meeting, October 29, Chile, Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile 1973, Vol.2, Folder 3, Box 1, *NA*.

³⁵ Richard Lawrence, "Steps Taken to Resume Aid to Chile," *JC*, October 17, 1973, p.1.

³⁶ Quoted in Terri Shaw, "Chile Gets US Loan for Wheat," *WP*, October 6, 1973, p.1. Also see Robert Gruenberg, "New Chile Regime Gets \$52 Million in US Grain Aid," *MH*, November 26, 1973, p. 3B.

³⁷ See *Latin American Index*, October 28, 1973.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, November 1-15, 1973; Jonathan Kandell, "Private US Loans In Chile Up Sharply," *NYT*, November 12, 1973, p.53.

³⁹ "Foreign Banks Come to Chile's Rescue," *BLA*, December 12, 1973, p.400.

⁴⁰ Attachments to Memo for the Record, From Jordan, September 15, 1973, Subject: Chile, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Meeting files (1969-74) Folder: WSAG Meeting Chile 9/14/73, Box H-094, NA.

⁴¹ Telegram, AmEmb Paris (Irwin) to Kissinger for Hennessy, October 3, 1973, NARA, RG59, CFPP, ET.

⁴² See Terrie Shaw, "Chileans, US Agree on Debts," *WP*, December 23, 1973, p.A3.

⁴³ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, November 2, 1973, NARA, RG59, CFPP, ET.

⁴⁴ Office Memorandum, IMF, Carlos Sanson to Acting Managing Director, "Mission to Chile," November 7-December 6, 1973, *IMFA*.

⁴⁵ See James M. Boughton, *Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund, 1979-1989* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2001), p.346; International copper prices had regained their value and were now near record levels but Chile was still importing 70 percent of its petroleum requirements and the price of oil had risen at faster rate. The annual cost of petroleum-related imports was projected to jump from around \$120 million before the October 1973 Middle East war to an estimated \$400 million in 1974. Lewis H. Diuguid, "Chile Requests IMF Loan, Seeks US Aid," *WP*, January 30, 1974, p.A19.

⁴⁶ "Chile's Backing by IMF Will Help in Securing Credits," *BLA*, February 13, 1974, p.53.

⁴⁷ Briefing Memo, Kubisch to Kissinger, "Chilean Executions," November 27, 1973, in Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, Doc.1, p.182.

⁴⁸ Quoted in Bawden, *The Pinochet Generation*, p.87.

⁴⁹ All quotes in Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, February 11, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPP, ET. Also see *FBIS: DR: LA*, February 19, 1974, p.E1.

⁵⁰ Junta de Gobierno, *Declaración de principios del gobierno de Chile*. Santiago, March 1974.

⁵¹ Reichley, *Conservatives in an Age of Change*, p.124. In 1977, Carter's NSC staff specialist on Latin America, Robert Pastor was told by an informed academic that when Kissinger took up his appointment in 1973 "he effectively castrated all the regional NSC staff by either making regional policy himself or going directly to the President." As a result, "the Latin American people in NSC, Defense, and Treasury hardly did anything....." Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, "The Gedda Story and US Policy to Chile," June 27, 1977, *DNSA*.

⁵² Airgram, AmEmb Santiago (Thompson) to DOS, "The Junta after Four Months," January 22, 1974, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.4, Folder 2, Box 2, NA.

⁵³ Figures from Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, p.209; Kubisch and Shlaudeman quoted in John Dinges, *The Condor Years* (New York: The New Press, 2004), pp.61-62.

⁵⁴ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, February 27, 1974, *DOS/FOIAe*, III.

⁵⁵ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, January 30, 1974, NARA, RG59 CFPP, *ET*.

⁵⁶ Telegram, AmEmb Bonn (Hillenbrand) to Kissinger, February 15, 1974, *Ibid*.

⁵⁷ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Bonn et al, February 15, 1974, *Ibid*.

⁵⁸ Telegram, AmEmb London (Annenberg) to Kissinger, February 19, 1974, *Ibid*.

⁵⁹ Despatch, London, LAD, FC (Fullerton) to British Emb, Santiago (McQuillan), March 13, 1974, Folder: FC7/2611, Renegotiation of Foreign Debt of Chile (Paris Club), 1974, *BN4*.

⁶⁰ Memo to UK Secretary of State, "Chilean Debt," June 13, 1974, Folder: FC7/2611, Renegotiation of Foreign Debt of Chile (Paris Club), *BN4*; Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Brussels, et al, March 7, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPP, *ET*.

⁶¹ "Chile's Foreign Creditors Okay Debt Renegotiation," *BLA*, April 10, 1974, p.115; "Chilean Debt Renegotiated," *LAER*, May 10, 1974, p.72.

⁶² Quoted in "Latin America: Loans for the Good Guys," *Latin America*, April 5, 1974, p.105. Also see Terri Shaw, "Chile Gets Disputed Loan from Inter-American Bank," *WP*, April 2, 1974, p.A16. According to the US Alternate Executive Director (1973-74), "the US government pressured the Board so that the annual meeting was transferred to Chile." Kenneth A Guenther interview, *FAOHC*.

⁶³ Quoted in Terri Shaw, "Chile Gets Loan After 3-Year Ban," *WP*, April 26, 1974, p.A23.

⁶⁴ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, March 12, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPP, *ET*.

⁶⁵ Author Interview with Paul Meo.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*.

⁶⁷ Memo for the Record, from Gerald Alter, July 30, 1974, File Unit: Contacts Chile (1972-1979), Box 4, A1993-012, *WBG4*.

⁶⁸ Office Memorandum, IMF, Carlos Sanson to Acting Managing Director, May 29, 1974, Central Files, C/Chile/810, Mission Sanson and Staff, May 1974, *IMFA*.

⁶⁹ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, April 3, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPP, *ET*.

⁷⁰ See "Chile: A Wobbly Economy Needs Foreign Help," *BW*, August 13, 1974, p.30; George F.W. Telfer, "Chile Begins Payment of International Debts," *JC*, July 26, 1974, pp.1, 17.

⁷¹ Attachment to Inter-Office Memo, DOT, Maresca to Furst, January 21, 1977, Series IIIB, Subject File (Secretary), Drawer 18, Folder 18: 52, Chile 1976, Box 18, *William E. Simon Papers*.

⁷² Talking Paper, "Latin America and Human Rights," August 1, 1974, *DOS/FOIAe*, III.

⁷³ Mark Ensalco, *Chile Under Pinochet* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), p.34.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*., p.57.

⁷⁵ Report, DIA, April 10, 1975, *DNS4*.

⁷⁶ Quotes in Genaro Arriagada, *Pinochet: The Politics of Power*, p.18.

⁷⁷ All quotes in Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, pp.213-14.

⁷⁸ The Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, October 1, 1973, *DNSA*

⁷⁹ Letter, Nixon to McLellan, April 26, 1976, RG18-010 International Affairs Department, Country Files, 1969-1981, Folder: 5/18 Chile 1975, Box 5, *GMM4*.

⁸⁰ Author interview with Robert S. Steven; Robert S. Steven interview, *FAOHC*.

⁸¹ Jesse A. Friedman interview, *Ibid.*

⁸² Robert S. Steven interview, *FAOHC*.

⁸³ *Ibid.*; Interview with John Tipton, Embassy Political Officer, August 12, 1974, *Robert Alexander Papers*.

⁸⁴ Robert S. Steven interview, *FAOHC*.

⁸⁵ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Thompson) to Kissinger, January 28, 1974, NARA, 157, RG 59, CFPF, *ET*.

⁸⁶ State Department Staff Meeting, January 21, 1974, *DNSA*; Transcript of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, January 31, 1974, *FRUS, South America, 1973-1976*, Doc.157, pp.421-424. The US Embassy in Peru advised against exaggerating the significance of Soviet arms purchases by the Velasco government. In August 1974, Ambassador Robert Dean reported that the Peruvians "appeared not to be purchasing further Soviet arms because of the unfavorable terms imposed." Quoted in Walton, *Peru and the United States, 1960-1975*, p.287.

⁸⁷ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Thompson) to Kissinger, January 28, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPF, 1/1/74-12/31/74, *ET*; Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, February 13, 1974, *Ibid.*; Memo, Bowler, Weiss to Kissinger, March 14, 1974, *DOS/FOIAe, II*.

⁸⁸ Action Memo, Lord to Kissinger, March 22, 1974, *FRUS, South America, 1973-1976*, Doc.162, pp.436-440.

⁸⁹ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, April 18, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.

⁹⁰ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, April 18, 1974, *FRUS, South America, 1973-1976*, Doc.165, pp.448-449; Telegram, Popper to Kissinger for Kubisch, April 22, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.

⁹¹ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb, Santiago, April 25, 1974, *Ibid.*

⁹² Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, August 2, 1974, *Ibid.*

⁹³ Airgram, Popper to DOS, March 13, 1974, *DOS/FOIAe, I*; Letter, Popper to Shlaudeman, March 16, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.

⁹⁴ Memo, Defense Intelligence Agency, March 21, 1974, File: DIA, 1973-78, Chile Human Rights Docs, Box 1, *NA*.

⁹⁵ Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), p.56. Between 1973 and 1986, 52 of the 118 agency heads, almost half army and all provincial governors were military officials (of which two-thirds were army officers), *Ibid.*, p.84.

⁹⁶ Craig L. Arceneaux, *Bounded Missions* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2001), p.74.

⁹⁷ Despatch, Canadian Emb, Santiago (Ross) to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, April 23, 1974, RG25 Interim Container 121, File: 20-Chile-1-4, Part 9. *CM4*.

⁹⁸ Despatch, Canadian Emb, Santiago (Ross) to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, April 26, 1974, *ibid.*

⁹⁹ On the Cassidy torture, see NCR, January 16, 1976, pp.1-2.

¹⁰⁰ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, March 18, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPF, ET.

¹⁰¹ US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Inter-American Affairs and International Organizations and Movements, *Human Rights in Chile*, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., December 7, 1973; May 7, 23; June 11, 12 and 18, 1974, pp.133-134.

¹⁰² Quoted in Arriagada, *Pinochet: The Politics of Power*, pp.15-16.

¹⁰³ Hawkins, *International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile*, p.52.

¹⁰⁴ Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship*, pp.37, 38.

¹⁰⁵ Carlos Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007), p.77.

¹⁰⁶ Leigh initially refused to sign the December presidential decree but was virtually intimidated by Pinochet into doing so and not exercising his veto. *ibid.*, pp.188-189. Also see Hugh Shaughnessey, *Pinochet: The Politics of Torture* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), p.79.

¹⁰⁷ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, April 10, 1975, NARA, RG59, CFPF, ET.

¹⁰⁸ Author Correspondence with Harry Shlaudeman.

¹⁰⁹ Author interview with William D. Rogers. For a perceptive analysis of the conflict between Kissinger and Congress over human rights policy, see Barbara Keys, "Congress, Kissinger and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History*, Vol.34, No.5, November 2010, pp.823-851.

¹¹⁰ James M. Wilson, Jr., *Diplomatic Theology—An Early Chronicle of Human Rights at State*, August 1977, Folder: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Wilson Memoir, Box 1, *James M. Wilson Jr. Papers*.

¹¹¹ See Jeffrey D. Merritt "Unilateral Human Rights Intercession: American Practice Under Nixon, Ford, and Carter," in David D. Newsom (ed.), *The Diplomacy of Human Rights* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986), p.58.

¹¹² Author correspondence with Harry Shlaudeman.

¹¹³ US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, *Refugee and Humanitarian Problems in Chile*, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., September 28, 1973, pp.35, 36.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.47.

¹¹⁵ Briefing Paper on Chile from Jordan, September 13, 1973, attached to Memo, Kennedy and Jordan to Kissinger, September 15, 1973, NPMS, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Meeting Files (1969-74), Folder: WSAG Meeting Chile, September 14, 1973, Box H-094, NA.

¹¹⁶ Memo, Kubisch and Weiss to Acting Secretary of State, December 5, 1973, DOS/FOIAe, I.

¹¹⁷ See Lars Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p.198.

¹¹⁸ Author interview with John Salzberg.

¹¹⁹ Author interview with Joseph Eldridge.

¹²⁰ Telcon, Kissinger/Kubisch, July 18, 1974, DNSA

¹²¹ US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, *Refugees and Humanitarian Problems in Chile, Part II*, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., July 23, 1974, pp.2-3. On Callaway's visit, see Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, July 23, 1974, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.
¹²² US Congress, Senate, *Refugees and Humanitarian Problems in Chile, Part II*, pp.52-55, 58, 62.

¹²³ Robert A. Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy, 1929-1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp.306-307.

¹²⁴ US Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Foreign Assistance and Relations Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975*, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., July 24, 1974, p.1350.

¹²⁵ Pat M. Holt, Chief of Staff, SFRC, 1974-77, *Interview #8: The End of the Fulbright Years*, December 4, 1980, pp.254.

¹²⁶ Presidential Campaign Debate, San Francisco, October 6, 1976, *The American Presidency Project*.

¹²⁷ Author telephone interview with Rudy Fimbres.

¹²⁸ Despatch, British Emb, Washington, D.C. (Walker) to LAD, FCO, London (Collins), December 19, 1974, Folder: FC07/2556, Latin American Relations with United States of America, *BNA*.

¹²⁹ Author interview with Brent Scowcroft.

¹³⁰ Author interview with William D. Rogers.

¹³¹ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.754; Author interview with Stephen Low.

¹³² Author interview with Brent Scowcroft

¹³³ Briefing Paper, DOS, "Latin America and Human Rights," August 17, 1974, attached to Memo, Davis to Kennedy et al, August 19, 1974, NSA, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff: Files, 1974-1977; Folder: President Ford-Briefings, August-September 1974, Box 11, *GRFL*.

¹³⁴ Briefing Paper, DOS, "Military Assistance in the Hemisphere," August 17, 1974, *Ibid*.

¹³⁵ Memo, NSC, Kennedy to Timmons, "LIG Meeting," August 19, 1975, Folder: Legislative Interdepartmental Group Meetings, William E. Timmons File, Box 4, *GRFL*.

¹³⁶ Memo, Bowler, Feldman to Sisco, September 3, 1974, *DOS/FOIAe, II*.

¹³⁷ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, August 31, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPE, *ET*.

¹³⁸ Quoted in "Senate Unit Asks Military Aid Cut for South Korea," *NYT*, September 7, 1974, p.5.

¹³⁹ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, September 7, 1974, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

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¹⁴³ Quoted in Patrick Breslin, "Human Rights: Rhetoric or Action?" *WP*, February 27, 1977, p.C4.

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- ² Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, February 1, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.
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- ⁴ Memo, Rogers, Vest, McClosky to Kissinger, March 4, 1975, *Ibid.*; Leigh to Maw, March 4, 1975, Kissinger/Scowcroft Parallel File, Folder: Chile (2), 4/1/75-6/30/76, Box A1, *GRFPL*.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*
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- ⁷ Memo, Leigh to Maw, March 4, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.
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- ¹⁰ Author interview with William Lowenthal.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
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- ¹⁵ Author interview with Joseph Eldridge.
- ¹⁶ Author correspondence with Thomas Quigley.
- ¹⁷ Author interview with John Bushnell.
- ¹⁸ See Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Thompson) to Kissinger, January 6, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*, Statement, AmEmb Santiago to DOS, "Issue Analysis," February 19, 1975, *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ Memo, Popper to Rogers, March 10, 1975, *Ibid.*
- ²⁰ Letter, Fraser to Kissinger, March 5, 1975, 149 G 9 7 B. *Donald M. Fraser Papers*. At year's end, an angry Fraser wrote to the Secretary that only 29 Chileans out of 13,023 who had left Chile had been accepted for entry into the United States and demanded an explanation "for this appalling figure." Letter, Fraser to Kissinger, December 23, 1975, 149 G 9 7 B, *Ibid.*
- ²¹ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger for Rogers, December 22, 1974, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.
- ²² Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Thompson) to Kissinger, January 28, 1974, NARA, 157, RG 59, CFPF, *ET*.
- ²³ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, February 13, 1974, NARA, RG59 CFPF, *ET*.
- ²⁴ See Francois Le Roy, "Mirages Over the Andes: Peru, France, the United States, and Military Jet Procurement in the 1960s," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 71, No. 2, 2002, pp. 269-300.
- ²⁵ William F. Maloney, "Chile," in Laura Randall, (ed.), *The Political Economy of Latin America in the Postwar Period* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), p.50.

²⁶ Economy Minister Fernando Léniz, along with other moderate civilian advisers, had virtually guaranteed their demise by attributing the lack of access to foreign funds to the negative global impact of the regime's human rights abuses. See Huneus, *The Pinochet Regime*, pp.278-79. On Friedman's visit Chile, see Milton & Rose D. Friedman, *Two Lucky People: Memoirs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp.399-400; Herald Muñoz, *The Dictator's Shadow* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp.70-71.

²⁷ Lois Hecht Oppenheim, *Politics in Chile* (Boulder: Westview, 2nd Edition, 1999), p.121; Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-2002* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd Edition, 2004), pp.365-367; Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, 2001), pp.268-269, 281; James Petras and Fernando Ignacio Leiva, *Democracy and Poverty in Chile* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p.23-26; Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Debt, Development & Democrac.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp.153-155; Pollack, *The New Right in Chile 1973-1997*, pp.56-57; Spooner, *Soldiers in a Narrow Land*, pp.105-106, Juan de Onis, "Chile's Austerity Curbs Inflation," *NYT*, October 30, 1975, p.5. To encourage foreign investment, average import duties were initially cut from 92 to 22 percent by 1975, then to 10 percent by 1977. Juan Gabriel Valdés, *Pinochet's Economists* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.21-22. Between September 1973 and September 1975, however, less than \$2 million in new foreign investment flowed into economy. Jonathan Kandell, "Chilean Junta Resisting Critics," *NYT*, September 21, 1975, p.30.

²⁸ Report, AmEmb Santiago to DOS, "The Situation in Chile....," July 1, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

²⁹ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, January 30, 1975, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.

³⁰ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, January 30, 1975, *Ibid.*; Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Paris, February 27, 1975, *Ibid.*

³¹ Memo, Callaghan, FC to Prime Minister, February 11, 1975, Folder: FC07/2800, Rescheduling of Foreign Debt of Chile (Paris Club), *BNA*.

³² Telegram, AmEmb Bonn (Hillenbrand) to Kissinger, January 23, 1975, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *Ibid.*

³³ Telegram, AmEmb Paris (Rush) to Kissinger, February 28, 1975, *Ibid.*

³⁴ Telegram, AmEmb The Hague (Gould) to Kissinger, March 4, 1975, *Ibid.*; Telegram, AmEmb Madrid (Eaton) to Kissinger, March 4, 1975, *Ibid.*

³⁵ Memo, Dales to Carless, LAD, FC, March 14, 1975, FC07/2801 Rescheduling of Foreign Debt of Chile (Paris Club), *BNA*.

³⁶ Memo, AID, Van Dyke to Stout, April 1, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

³⁷ Memo of Conversation, "Amb Popper's call on IBRD," July 18, 1975, *Ibid.* A senior World Bank economist dealing with the Andean Group countries confirmed Krieger-Vasena's statement and added that the Bank's initial reluctance to lend to Chile was because "the 'economic team' such as it was did not impress them as being credible." Author Interview with Paul M. Meo. Loans to the Junta from the World Bank and the IADB at the end of 1976 would total a modest \$244 million.

USAID, *US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance From International Organizations, 1945-September 30, 1976*, pp.41, 183.

³⁸ See Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, Richard Webb, *The World Bank, Volume 1: History* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), p.301. If the Bank was reluctant to lend to Chile, at the same time there was virtually no support among senior officials for a July 1976 proposal by anti-poverty expert and Director for Policy Planning, Mahbub ul Haq, that Chile lending be put on hold due to the "prohibitive" cost of the stabilization program "for the poorer classes" which had further skewed income distribution. Regional Vice President Adalbert Krieger aggressively defended the Bank's lending to Chile, in effect sanctioning the Junta's policies. *Ibid.* The Bank's International Development Association (IDA) has been, and remains, the largest source of concessional lending to the poorest Third World countries. It is funded by the richest donor countries who meet every three to four years to "replenish" the IDA's fund. Being far and away the largest contributor to the IDA, this institution has always been vulnerable to US pressure from both the Executive Branch and the Congress to align its lending with Washington's preferences.

³⁹ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, et al, May 15, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ IMF, Secretary to Members of Executive Board, "Chile-Staff Report," March 3, 1975, p.9, Milwaukee Manuscript Collection 112, Wisconsin Historical Society, Folder 24: Chile, 1974-1976, Box 78, *Henry S. Reuss Papers*.

⁴¹ William Goodfellow, *Chile's Chronic Economic Crisis: 1976 and Beyond* (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, September 1976), p.11; Boughton, *Silent Revolution*, p.346.

⁴² White House, From Kissinger, Presentation of Diplomatic Credentials Ceremony, April 29, 1975, WHCF, Subject File, Folder: C● Chile, 8/9/74-9/30/75 Executive, Box 12, *GRFPL*.

⁴³ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, May 17, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*. See also "US Supports ●AS In Chile Investigation," *WP*, May 17, 1975, p.A4.

⁴⁴ Telegram, Kissinger (Ingersoll) to AmEmb Santiago for Popper from Rogers, May 13, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁴⁵ NSA, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 9, 1975, Box 11, *GRFPL*.

⁴⁶ Memo, Kissinger to Ford, May 26, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger for Rogers, June 30, 1975, RG54, Office of the Secretary, Subject Files of Ambassador David H. Popper, Folder: Chron Cables (Amb) May/July 1975, Box 3, *N4*.

⁴⁸ Memo, Low to Kissinger, "Chile Arms Sales," June 6, 1975, NSA, Presidential Country Files on Latin America, Folder: Chile (2), Box 3, *GRFPL*; Letter, US Congress (House) to Kissinger, May 15, 1975, Henry A. Kissinger/Brent Scowcroft Parallel File, Folder: Chile (2), 4/1/75-6/30/76, Box A1, *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Airgram, Popper to DOS, May 18, 1975, "FY 1976-77 CASP for Chile," *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Author interview with Thomas Boyatt.

⁵² Author interview with William Lowenthal.

⁵³ Robert S. Steven interview, *FAOHC*.

⁵⁴ Appendix to Airgram, Popper to DOS, May 18, 1975; "FY1976-77 CASP for Chile," *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁵⁵ Robert S. Steven interview, *FAOHC*. He co-authored the dissenting attached opinions attached to the two CASP papers sent to with another Embassy political officer, John Tipton. *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Author interview with Rudy Fimbres.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Memo, Bloomfield to Karkashian, June 4, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, II*.

⁵⁹ Telegram, Kissinger to Popper, Chile CASP, 1975, June 20, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁶⁰ CIA, NIE, "Prospects for Chile," June 6, 1975, Kissinger/Scowcroft Parallel File, Presidential Country File for Latin America, Folder: Chile-Political, Military, General (1), 6/30/75-10/17/75, Box A4, *GRFPL*; Memo, Low to Kissinger, June 30, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Memo, Low to Scowcroft, "Disarray in Chile Policy," July 1, 1975, Kissinger/Scowcroft Parallel Files, Country File-Latin America, Folder: Chile 4/1/75-6/30/76, Box A2, *Ibid.*

⁶² See World Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, *Economic Memorandum on Chile*, December 24, 1975, Report No.966-CH, p.ii.

⁶³ Marcus Taylor, *From Pinochet to the 'Third Way'* (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p.56.

⁶⁴ Memo, NSC, Low to Scowcroft, "Disarray in Chile Policy," July 1, 1975, *DNSA*.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ CIA, NIE, "Prospects for Chile," June 6, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Memorandum for the Pres, From Brent Scowcroft, Subject: Coup in Peru, August 29, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, File: Panama (1), Folder: Peru (1), Box 6, *GRFPL*.

⁶⁸ Memo, Low to Scowcroft, July 16, 1975, NSA, Presidential Country File for Latin America, Folder: Chile (2), Box 3, *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Memo, Rogers to Kissinger, July 21, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁷⁰ Memo, Rogers to Kissinger, August 5, 1975, *Ibid.* Also see Memo, Leigh to Rogers, July 21, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁷¹: Memo, Rogers to Kissinger, "FMS Sales to Chile," August 5, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*. For his part, Kissinger considered 502B "a basically outrageous and phony approach" that had been "imposed" on him. See "The Secretary's 8:00am Staff Meeting," November 5, 1975, *DNSA*.

⁷² Telegram, Kissinger (Ingersoll) to USDEL, July 11, 1975, Project File on Pinochet/Chile, Folder: 7/9-12/75 Europe, to SEC (5), Kissinger Briefing Books and Cables, *GRFPL*; Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, July 8, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*. One of Pinochet's senior ministers at the time, Raúl Saez, when asked by Ambassador Popper who might have influenced the General's change of heart, pointedly recalled that DINA head Manuel Contreras "had been very opposed to

the visit." Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, July 7, 1975, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.10, Folder 2, Box 7, N4.

⁷³ CIA, Western Hemisphere Brief, August 29, 1975, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: CIA-Directorate of Intelligence, Mori Docs Nos.55-83, Box 1, *Ibid.* Also see Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Appraisal, "Chile: Two Years After Allende (U)," November 13, 1975, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Folder: Latin America-General (2), GRFPL.

⁷⁴ Quoted in "Rep. Fraser Ties Move By Chile to US Aid," *WP*, July 8, 1975, p.A10. Also see Letter, Donald M. Fraser to Henry Kissinger, July 14, 1975, 149 G 9 7 B, *Donald M. Fraser Papers*.

⁷⁵ A Chilean diplomat quoted in David Binder, "US Aide Rebukes Chile For Barring U.N. Inquiry," *NYT*, July 12, 1975, p.7. Also see Memo of Conversation, "Under Secretary of State Luncheon....," July 11, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁷⁶ CIA, Weekly Review, July 11, 1975, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: CIA-Directorate of Intelligence MORI Docs, Nos. 55-83, Box 1, N4.

⁷⁷ Briefing Memo, Rogers to Sisco, July 17, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*; Memo, Rogers to Acting Secretary, July 9, 1975, *Ibid.* United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1975, Volume 29* (New York: Office of Public Information 1978), p.622.

⁷⁸ Report, AmEmb Santiago to DOS, "The Situation in Chile....," July 1, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Memo, Bloomfield to Rogers and Ryan, July 11, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Memo of Conversation, Popper, Kissinger, Rogers, July 18, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Letter, From Kissinger, for Carvajal, "FMS Cash Sales," August 5, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁸² Memo, Fimbres to Rogers, September 3, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*. By the end of 1975, Chile's total outstanding debt to the US government stood at \$1.16 billion, of which \$578 million was owed to AID, \$304 million to Eximbank, and \$172 million to the Department of Agriculture. Attachment to Inter-Office Memo, DOT, Maresca to Furst, January 21, 1977, Series III B, Subject File (Secretary), Drawer 18, Folders 18: 52, Chile: 1976, Box 18, *William E. Simon Papers*.

⁸³ Memo, Low to Scowcroft, August 8, 1975, Kissinger/Scowcroft Parallel Files, Country Files, Folder: Chile 4/1/75-6/30/75, Box A2, GRFPL.

⁸⁴ Memo, ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting, August 26, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, III*. This was Contreras' third trip to Washington, DC to meet with Walters since March 1974. See Muñoz, *The Dictator's Shadow*, p.97.

⁸⁵ Jonathan Kandell, "Chilean Junta Resisting Critics," *NYT*, September 21, 1975, p.30.

⁸⁶ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, September 25, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Author interview with Thomas Boyatt.

⁸⁸ Note, AmEmb Santiago (Nixon) to Inter-American Representative, AFL-CIO (McLellan), April 11, 1975, RG18-010, Latin American Affairs Department, Latin America and the Caribbean, Series 4, Folder 5/18, Chile, *GAMMA*.

⁸⁹ Interview with Stuart Van Dyke, Director AID Mission in Chile, July 25, 1975, *Robert Alexander Papers*; Interview with David Popper, July 25, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Interview with Arthur Nixon, July 25, 1975, *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Letter, McLellan to Jose Campos, AIFLD, August 4, 1975, RG18-010, International Affairs Department, Country Files, 1969-1981, Folder 5/18, Chile 1975, Box 5, *GMMA*.

⁹² Letter, McLellan to Nixon, August 26, 1975, *Ibid*.

⁹³ Letter, McLellan to Nixon, October 29, 1975, *Ibid*.

⁹⁴ CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, "Chile after Two Years of Military Rule," October 21, 1975. Chile, human Rights documents, File: CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Mori Docs, Nos 55-83, Box 1.

⁹⁵ Letter, Nixon to McClellan, November 24, 1975, RG18-010. International Affairs Department, Country Files, 1969-1981, Folder 5/18, Chile 1975, Box 5, *GMMA*.

⁹⁶ Memo, Fimbres to Rogers, "Your Meeting with Silva," November 18, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁹⁷ CIA, Staff Notes, Latin America Trends, September 10, 1975, Chile Human Rights Docs, File: CIA-Directorate of Intelligence MORI Docs Nos. 55-83, Box 1, *NA*.

⁹⁸ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, October 31, 1975, NARA, RG59, CFPE, *ET*.

⁹⁹ CIA, Weekly Review, December 5, 1975, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: CIA-Directorate of Intelligence, MORI Docs Nos. 84-115, Box 1, *NA*.

¹⁰⁰ See Schultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, pp.195-198.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Thomas Boyatt, *FAOHC*.

¹⁰² David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988), p.102.

¹⁰³ Interview with James M. Wilson Jr, *FAOHC*.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in Wilson Jr, *Diplomatic Theology—An Early Chronicle of Human Rights at State*. Cranston quoted in Sandy Vogelgesang, *American Nightmare, Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of US Human Rights Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980), p.130.

¹⁰⁶ Memo, Fimbres to Rogers, "US Policy toward Chile," September 15, 1975, *DOS/FOIAe, I*. Some senior Ford officials were not unduly concerned about a resurgence of the Chilean left "because Pinochet seemed to have things under control" [Author interviews with Brent Scowcroft and William D. Rogers] but others maintained that "it was not unreasonable in those early years to think that the failure of the regime would bring the communist-socialist coalition back to power." Author Correspondence with Harry Shlaudeman.

¹⁰⁷ Author telephone Interview with Rudy Fimbres.

¹⁰⁸ Memo, Low to Kissinger, September 22, 1975, Kissinger/Scowcroft, NSC Convenience File-Latin America, Folder: Chile-Political, Military, General (1)-(3), Box A5, *GRFPL*.

¹⁰⁹ Note, Bank of London Executive to LAD, FC0 (Binns), December 10, 1975, Folder: FC07/2803, Rescheduling of Foreign Debt of Chile, *BVA*.

¹¹⁰ Memo of Conversation, "Kissinger and Carvajal," September 29, 1975; *DOS/FOIAe, I*; Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, October 3, 1975,

NARA, RG59, CFP, *ET*. By 1974, the Portuguese armed forces had grown weary of fighting in Africa and supported rapid independence for the country's remaining colonies. In April, a military coup toppled the authoritarian Caetano regime from power, which "came as an unpleasant surprise to Washington," and announced its intention to end what was left of the country's colonial empire. The White House was particularly concerned about possible Soviet involvement in the decolonization process and importance of "preventing the creation of a neutralist Portugal that could split NATO and work as a magnet for other Europeans who were dissatisfied with Washington's policies." Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.220.

111 For excellent discussions of "Operation Condor," see Dinges, *The Condor Years*; J. Patrice McSherry, *Predatory States* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Kombluh, *The Pinochet File*, pp.331-363.

112 Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, October 24, 1974, *DOS/FOLae, I*.

113 US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, *Refugee and Humanitarian Problems in Chile, Part III*, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., October 2, 1975, p.50.

114 Memo for the Record, ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting, October 3, 1975, *DOS/FOLae, III*.

115 Memo, Low to Scowcroft, October 8, 1975, NSA, Presidential Country File for Latin America, 1974-1977, Folder: Chile (2), Box 3, *GRFPL*.

116 Memo of Conversation, Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft, October 6, 1975, *NARA/FOLae, I*.

117 The Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, October 8, 1975, The Kissinger Transcripts, *DNS.4*.

118 Telegram, Kissinger to USUN Mission, October 29, 1975. *ET*.

119 Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, November 10, 1975, *DOS/FOLae, I*.

120 Telegram, USUN Mission (Moynihan) to Kissinger, November 3, 1975, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*; Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, November 10, 1975, *DOS/FOLae, I*; Telegram, USUN Mission (Moynihan) to Kissinger, November 10, 1975, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.

121 Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its Thirtieth Session, 3448 (XXX), "Protection of Human Rights in Chile," *United Nations General Assembly website*.

122 Telegram, USUN Mission (Moynihan) to Kissinger, November 10, 1975, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.

123 Telegram, USUN Mission (Moynihan) to Kissinger, November 3, 1975, *Ibid*.

124 Telcon, Moynihan Kissinger, November 11, 1975, *DNS.4*.

125 Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, November 13, 1975; *DOS/FOLae*, Pinochet quoted in Binder, "US-Chilean Ties Called Strained," p.5.

126 Telegram, Moynihan to Kissinger, November 17, 1975, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.

127 Author interview with Brent Scowcroft. In his memoir, Ford denied that any "conflict of significance" had arisen in his relations with Kissinger. Ford, *A Time to Heal*, p.355. Encouraged by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other

administration officials, Ford "began to accept less and less of Kissinger's advice and went his own way" John Robert Greene, *The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995), p.120.

¹²⁵ Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp.670-671.

¹²⁹ Telegram, Kissinger (Ingersoll) to AmEmb Santiago, December 17, 1975, NARA, RG59, CFPE, ET.

¹³⁰ Memo, Low to Scowcroft, November 18, 1975, WHCF, Subject File, Folder: C-33 Chile 10/1/75-1/20/77, Box 12, GRFPL.

¹³¹ David Binder, "US Prods Chile on Human Rights," *NYT*, October 13, 1975, p.9. The majority of OAS members voted for Santiago "in the absence of an alternative." Memo, Scowcroft to Ford, June 5, 1976, NSA, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, Folder: June 6-13, 1976 Latin America, General, Box 25, GRFPL.

Notes to Chapter 4

¹ CIA, Intelligence Memo, "Latin America's Changing Foreign Relations," December 29, 1975, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Folder: Latin America-General (2), Box 2, GRFPL; Interagency Intelligence Memo, "Latin American Perceptions of the United States," April 26, 1976, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Folder: Latin America-General (3), Box 2, *Ibid.*

² Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb, Santiago, January 28, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe I*.

³ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, January 29, 1976, *Ibid.*

⁴ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, February 18, 1976, *Ibid.* From the British Foreign Office, an official in the Latin America Department wrote that Pinochet's refusal to admit the UN Working Group had "effectively spiked the guns of those countries who have tried to maintain a distinction between a moderately and constructively critical approach towards Chile and the all out political attack of the Soviet Union and its allies." LAD, FC, London (Collins) to BritishEmb Santiago (Haskell), March 3, 1976, Folder: FC07/3071, Annual Review for Chile 1976, *BNA*.

⁵ CIA Intelligence Memo, October 21, 1975, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: CIA-Directorate of Intelligence, MORI, Nos.55-83, Box 1, *NA*.

⁶ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, June 28, 1976, RG59, Office of the Secretary, Subject Files of Amb David H. Popper, 68-79, Folder: Chrons, Outgoing Telegrams, May-August 1976, Box 3, *Ibid.*

⁷ Airgram, Popper to DOS, "FY1977-78 CASP for Chile," February 3, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe I*.

⁸ See Juan De Onis, "Latin America is Offered US Plan on Cooperation," *NYT*, February 18, 1976, p.7. In late April, a State Department draft human rights report on Chile covering the previous 12 months concluded that "there was no improvement" in the overall human rights situation. Memo, Fimbres to Rogers, April 22, 1976, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS Human Rights in Chile, Vol.15, Folder 3, Box 10, *NA*.

⁹ Memo, Lister to Rogers, April 15, 1976, *DNSA*.

¹⁰ *Congressional Record-Senate*, 94th Cong., 1st Session, Vol.121, Part 27, November 3, 1975, p.34760.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² IBRD, From Deputy Secretary, "World Bank Report on Proposed Copper Loan to Chile," January 7, 1976, Milwaukee Manuscript Collection 112, Folder 25: Chile 1974-1976, 3/3, Box 78, *Henry S. Reuss Papers*; "Chile: the end of the road," *LAER*, January 30, 1976, p.18; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969-1978*, December 1980, Table 1, p.44.

¹³ Jonathan Kandell, "Chile's Debts Worry Washington," *NYT*, March 15, 1976, pp.1, 4; Charles N. Stabler, "US, Canada Banks Near Pact on Loan to Chile, Creating Difficult Problems," *WSJ*, April 27, 1976, p.5. Later figures put debt service payments at \$785 million, or 41 percent of export earnings. See "Simon Tells Chile US Aid Depends on Rights," *WP*, May 8, 1976, p.A10.

¹⁴ Note, Bank of England (MacGillivray) to LAD, FC0, London (Binns), December 10, 1975, Folder: FC07/2803, Rescheduling of Foreign Debt of Chile, *BNA*.

¹⁵ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, March 29, 1975, NARA, RG59, CFPE, ET.

¹⁶ Figures and quote in Ann Crittenden, "Loans From Abroad Flow To Chile's Rightist Junta," *NYT*, February 20, 1976, pp.1, 47; Isabel Letelier and Michael Moffitt, *Human Rights, Economic Aid and Private Banks: The Case of Chile* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1978), pp.9-10.

¹⁷ Memo, Fimbres to Rogers, Ryan, Fishlow, Klein, January 14, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹⁸ Letter, Seidman to Senator Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.), March 15, 1976, WHCF, Subject Files, Folder: C033 Chile 10/1/75-1/20/77, Box 12, *GRFPL*.

¹⁹ Quoted in Hobart Rowen, "The World Bank in Chile," *WP*, February 12, 1976, p.A12.

²⁰ Letter, Henry Reuss to Robert McNamara, March 19, 1976, Milwaukee Manuscript Collection 112, Folder 25: Chile 1974-1976, 3/3, Box 78, *Henry S. Reuss Papers*. Also see Hobart Rowen, "Political Loan to Chile Laid to World Bank," *WP*, March 24, 1976, p.A8.

²¹ Despatch, BritishEmb Washington, D.C.(Millington) to LAD, FC0 (Binns), March 23, 1976, Folder: FC07/3081, "Relations Between Chile and the USA," 1976, *BNA*. One indicator of US domestic opposition, Lowenthal told the British diplomat, was that the State Department continued to receive such "a tremendous amount of mail protesting about human violations in Chile that an ARA official [was] employed full-time dealing with such correspondence." At the same time, he stressed that Washington took a "more sorrow than in anger" attitude." *Ibid.*

²² See Jonathan Kandell, "Chile, Image Building, Still Harsh," *NYT*, December 12, 1976, p.22.

²³ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Boyatt) to Kissinger, May 8, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

²⁴ Memo of Conversation, Silva, Simon, Parsky, et al., "Human Rights in Chile," May 7, 1976, *Ibid.*

²⁵ Despatch, BritishEmb Washington, D.C. (Millington) to LAD, FC0 (Davies), May 20, 1976, Folder: FC07/3081, Relations Between Chile and the USA, 1976, BNA; Telegram, BritishEmb Santiago (Haskell) to LAD, FC0 (Davies), May 12, 1976, *Ibid.*

²⁶ "Simon Tells Chile US Aid Depends on Rights," *WP*, May 8, 1976; p.A10; Telegram, AmbEmb Santiago (Bell) to Kissinger, May 8, 1976, *DOS/FOLae, I, El Mercurio* editorialized that Simon's visit was "a success for the military government because it constitutes a show of support of its economic policy." "Press Lauds US Treasury Secretary's Visit," *FBIS: DR: L4*, May 10, 1976, p.E1.

²⁷ Despatch, BritishEmb Santiago (Haskell) to LAD, FC0, London (Davies), May 12, 1976, *BNA*.

²⁸ Jack Anderson & Les Whitten, "Hidden Funds in Chile," *WP*, May 8, 1976, p.E41.

²⁹ See "Simon Says He'll Ask US Not to Cut Aid to Chile," *NYT*, May 17, 1976, p.15; Memo, Grunwald to Rogers and Shaudeman, May 28, 1976, *DOS/FOLae, I*; Briefing Memo, Rogers to Kissinger, "Simon, Chile and the SFRC," May 30, 1976, *Ibid.*; Memo, DOT, Simon to Ford, June 2, 1976, Presidential Handwriting File, Folder: Foreign Affairs-Foreign Aid (8), Box 22, *GRFPL*.

³⁰ US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *International Security Assistance Act of 1976*, 94th Cong, 2nd Sess., February 4, 1976, p.697

³¹ Letter, Fraser to Kissinger, December 23, 1975, 149 G 9 7 B, *Donald M. Fraser Papers*.

³² US Congress, House, *International Security Assistance Act of 1976*, pp.694, 697, 182.

³³ Quoted in BritishEmb Washington, D.C. (Millington) to LAD, FC0 (Binns), March 2, 1976, Folder: FC07/3081, Relations Between Chile and the USA, 1976, *BNA*.

³⁴ Pinochet quote and US Embassy response in Telegram, BritishEmb Santiago (Haskell) to LAD, FC0 (Collins) February 27, 1976, FC07/3081, Folder: "Relations Between the Chile and the USA," 1976, *Ibid.*

³⁵ Memo of Conversation, Pinochet and Boyatt, February 13, 1976, *DOS/FOLA, III*.

³⁶ Richard D. Lyons, "Senate Votes Overhaul of Military Aid," *NYT*, February 19, 1976, pp.1, 4; "US Aide Fear Impact of Vote on Chile, Arms," *NYT*, February 20, 1976, p.2.

³⁷ Memo, NSC, Low to Scowcroft, February 25, 1976, Kissinger/Scowcroft Parallel Files, Country File-Latin America, Folder: Chile 4/1/75-6/30/76, Box A2, *GRFPL*.

³⁸ Memo of Conversation, DOS, Pinochet, Caravajal, Kissinger, Rogers, et al., June 8, 1976, Kissinger/Scowcroft Parallel Files, President's Country File-Latin America, Folder: Chile (3), 7/1/76-1/11/77, Box A1, *Ibid.*

³⁹ Memo, DOD, Assistant Secretary to Deputy Secretary Clements, February 22, 1976, *DOS/FOLae, II*.

⁴⁰ Quotes in Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, March 17, 1976, *Public Library of US Diplomacy (Wikileaks)*.

⁴¹ Letter, BritishEmb., Santiago (Langmead) to LAD, FCO (Binns), March 18, 1976, FCO/7/3081, Folder: Relations Between Chile and the USA 1976, BNA.

⁴² Quoted in "3 in House Seeking Halt in Aid to Chile," *NYT*, March 18, 1976, p.30.

⁴³ US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976*, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 31, 1976, pp.177,195.

⁴⁴ Office of the White House Press Secretary, Statement by President Gerald R Ford to Senate, May 7, 1976.

⁴⁵ Gerald Ford, "Veto of the Foreign Assistance Bill," May 7, 1976, *The American Presidency Project*; Telegram, BritishEmb, Washington, D.C. (Millington) to LAD, FCO, May 11, 1976, Folder: FCO/7/3081, Relations Between Chile and the USA, 1976, BNA.

⁴⁶ Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.229.

⁴⁷ Quoted in Breslin, "Human Rights: Rhetoric or Action," *ibid.*, p.C4.

⁴⁸ Interview with James M. Wilson Jr, *FAOHC*.

⁴⁹ All quotes in Wilson Jr, *Diplomatic Theology—An Early Chronicle of Human Rights at State*. Wilson was appointed as the State Department's first Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in May, 1976.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Phil Gailey, "Latin Trip, Attack on Chile Being Studied by Kissinger," *MH*, April 22, 1976, p.30A.

⁵¹ Memo, NSC, Low to Scowcroft, February 25, 1976, *GRFPL*. According to Human Rights Coordinator James Wilson, Kissinger decided to attend the conference "against the advice of most of his staff." Wilson, Jr., *Diplomatic Theology—An Early Chronicle of Human Rights at State*.

⁵² Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, March 23, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁵³ Draft Action Memo, Fimbres, approved Rogers, April 26, 1976, *ibid.*

⁵⁴ Boyatt had known Pinochet since 1960 when he was posted to Antofagasta in northern Chile as Vice Consul at a time when Augusto Pinochet was also stationed there with the Chilean Army. On his departure for Santiago to become Embassy DCM, he was informally briefed by William Rogers "along the lines of 'keep the communication channels open as best you can, it's a delicate situation, they are pro-Western, this is the Kissinger era after all, let's not forget that.'" Putting such advice into practice, Boyatt reminisced, was "difficult but not impossible," although it did create some tension with Ambassador David Popper, who invariably rejected his DCM's requests to accept informal lunch invitations from Pinochet. "No dammit, I'm the Ambassador," Popper would respond when Boyatt received an invitation. But when the DCM would then contact Washington about the dictator's overtures "invariably they'd come back and say 'Go ahead and go.'" Author interview with Thomas Boyatt.

⁵⁵ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Boyatt) to Kissinger, for Rogers, April 21, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, I*. On Boyatt's assessment of Pinochet's character, see Briefing Paper, "Chile: Augusto Pinochet Urgarte," prepared for Kissinger's 1976 OAS meeting in Santiago June 1976, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Box 57, *JCPL*.

56 Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Boyatt) to Kissinger, April 24, 1976, NARA, RG59, CFPF, ET.

57 See, for instance, Telegram, Kissinger (Robinson) to USUN Mission, York, May 21, 1976, DOS/FOIAe, I.

58 Memo, Rogers to Kissinger, May 26, 1976, *Ibid.*

59 Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, May 29, 1976, *Ibid.*

60 Memo, Rogers to Kissinger, May 26, 1976, *Ibid.*

61 Telcon, Kissinger/Rogers, June 3, 1976, DNSA.

62 Quoted in Juan de Onis, "Chile Study Says Torture Goes On," *NYT*, June 8, 1976, p.1; OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, *Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile*, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.37, June 28, 1976, p.191.

63 Position Paper, AmEmb Santiago to DOS, for June OASGA session, June 1, 1976, DOS/FOIAe, I.

64 Quoted in Joanne Omang, "OAS to Debate Human Rights in Santiago," *WP*, June 5, 1976, p.A12.

65 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger, Pinochet, Carvajal, Rogers, et. al, Santiago, June 8, 1976, Presidential Country File for Latin America, Folder: Chile (3), Box 3, GRFPL. During their meeting, Pinochet also denounced the criticism he received from Christian Democrats, bemoaned their influence on Capitol Hill singling out Orlando Letelier's for particular attention. Kissinger was equally disparaging of the PDC, emphasizing that he had "not seen a Christian Democrat for years." *Ibid.* For Kissinger's June 8 address to the OASGA, see DOSB, July 5, 1976, pp.1-5.

66 NIE, "Prospects for Chile," June 6, 1975, NSA, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff: Files, Folder: Chile Political, Military (1), Box 1, GRFPL.

67 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger, Pinochet, Carvajal, Rogers et al, Santiago, June 8, 1976.

68 See Bawden, *The Pinochet Generation*, pp.82-83.

69 Statement by Henry Kissinger on human rights at Sixth OASGA meeting, reprinted in US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, *Human Rights at the Sixth Regular Session of the OASGA*, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 8, 1976, p.20. In his memoirs, Kissinger conveniently fails to mention that his OAS speech was primarily for public consumption. See Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.758.

70 See, for example, Schultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America*, p.131.

71 Quoted in Joanne Omang, "Debate on Human Rights Dominated OAS Conference," *WP*, June 20, 1976, p.B7.

72 Telcon, Rogers/Kissinger, June 16, 1976, Collection: Kissinger Transcripts, DOS/FOIA Electronic Reading Room.

73 Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, March 23, 1976, DOS/FOIAe, I.

74 Memo, Scowcroft to Ford, May 18, 1976, NSC Press and Congressional Liaison Staff, Folder: Security Assistance Legislation, May 1976, Box 8, GRFPL.

75 US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, *Chile: The Status of Human Rights and Its Relationship*

to *US Economic Assistance Programs*, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., April 29, 1976, pp.2, 36; Goodfellow, *Chile's Chronic Economic Crisis*, p.5; W. Frick Curry, *Subsidizing Pinochet* (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, September 1985), p.5.

⁷⁶ Memo, Janka to Scowcroft, June 8, 1976, WHCF Subject File, C 33 10/1/75-1/20/77, Box 12, *GRFPL*.

⁷⁷ Memo, Low to Scowcroft, June 18, 1976, NSA, Presidential Country File for Latin America, Folder: Chile (2), Box 3, *ibid*.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*.; Memo, Low, Janka, Granger to Scowcroft, June 17, 1976, Kissinger/Scowcroft Parallel Files, Country File-Latin America, Folder: Chile 4/1/75-6/30/76, Box A2, *Ibid*.

⁷⁹ Action Memo, Rogers to Kissinger, June 18, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁸⁰ Action Memo, McCloskey, Ryan to Kissinger, June 18, 1976, *ibid*.

⁸¹ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, June 19, 1976, *ibid*.

⁸² Memo, Low to Scowcroft, June 21, 1976, NSA, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff: Files, Folder: Chile-Political, Military (2), Box 1, *GRFPL*.

⁸³ Quoted in Spencer Rich, "Chile Arms Pledge Called 'Shoddy Deal,'" *WP*, June 25, 1976, p. A17.

⁸⁴ See "Summary and Conclusions to the World Bank Economic Memorandum on Chile," December 24, 1975, Attachment to Letter, Charles A. Cooper, US Executive Director, *IBRD*, to David R. Obey, House of Representatives, reprinted in US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, *Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations For 1977, Part 1*, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1976, p.303.

⁸⁵ Draft Letter, Reuss to James E. Smith, Comptroller of the Currency, undated (March 1976), Milwaukee Manuscript Collection 113, Folder 25: Chile, 1974-1976, 3/3, Box 78, *Herry S. Reuss Papers*; Reuss quoted in Ann Crittenden, "Chile Loan Held Risky For Banks," *NYT*, June 14, 1976, p.51.

⁸⁶ Memo of Conversation, Kissinger, Rogers, Popper, Carvajal, Cauas, et al, Santiago, June 10, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁸⁷ Memo, Wilson to Robinson, June 10, 1976, Folder: 1/76-8/76, Box 6, *James M. Wilson, Jr. Papers*.

⁸⁸ Author telephone interview with Robert O. Blake.

⁸⁹ John R. Bushnell interview, *FAOHC*.

⁹⁰ See Lewis H. Diuguid, "US Vote on Chile Loan," *WP*, July 9, 1976, p.A2; W. Frick Curry and Joanne Royce, *Enforcing Human Rights: Congress and the Multilateral Banks* (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, February 1985), p.3.

⁹¹ Telcon, Humphrey/Kissinger, June 15, 1976, *DNSA*.

⁹² Memo of Conversation, Scowcroft, Merino et al, July 12, 1976, NSA, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, Box 20, *JCPL*.

⁹³ Memo of Conversation, Pinochet, Kissinger, Carvajal, Rogers, et al, Santiago, June 8, 1976, *ibid*.

⁹⁴ Memo, Kissinger to Ford, August 2, 1976, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Folder: Peru (3), Box 6, *ibid*. During the latter half of 1976, US

intelligence reported improved ties between Lima and Santiago, CIA Weekly Summary, October 8, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, II*.

⁹⁵ Memo, Kissinger to Ford, August, 2, 1976, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Folder: Peru (2), Box 6, *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Transcript, Memo of Conversation, DOS, Sept 8, 1976, *DNSA*.

⁹⁷ Telegram, Kissinger (Robinson) to USDEL Secretary, December 28, 1976, NARA, RG59, CFPF, *ET*.

⁹⁸ Memo, Plowden to Scowcroft, "Foreign Military Sales to Peru," December 30, 1976, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Folder: Peru (2), Box 6, *GRFPL*.

⁹⁹ Carmelo Soria, a Spanish-Chilean and a former adviser to the UP government, had used his diplomatic immunity to assist opponents of the Pinochet regime find asylum in various foreign embassies in Santiago.

¹⁰⁰ Memo, Shlaudeman to Kissinger, ARA Monthly Report (July), August 3, 1976, *DNSA*.

¹⁰¹ Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Buenos Aires, et al, August 23, 1976, *Ibid.* Also see Dinges, *The Condor Years*, pp.6-7.

¹⁰² See George Landau interview, *FAOHC*.

¹⁰³ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, August 24, 1976, *DNSA*.

¹⁰⁴ Memo for the Record, ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting of August 27, August 30, 1976, *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ ARA-Luers from Schlaudeman, Subject: Operation Condor, 20 Sep. 1976. Four days earlier Kissinger, who was travelling in Zambia, had cabled Schlaudeman to take no further action in respect of warning Latin military leaders. See USDEL Sec. in Lusaka to S/S Washington, 16 Sep. 1976. Both documents *DNSA*.

¹⁰⁶ Author Interview with Malcolm Barnebey. The State Department's John Karkasian, who had served in Chile for number of years, dismissed the possibility of the Junta's involvement in an act this "crude." The generals might be "ruthless and Prussian in their suppression of internal dissent," he told US Attorney Eugene Propper, "but not stupid". Most of his colleagues, he asserted, believed that the assassination had been carried out by members of the Chilean left to damage Pinochet's reputation. Branch, Taylor, and Eugene M. Propper, *Labyrinth* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), pp.83-84. The Santiago Embassy also jumped to the regime's defense on the grounds that "we have never had any indication that DINA was any way operational in US territory, and it is difficult for us to believe that even its rather fanatical leaders would expose themselves to the consequences of being implicated in a terrorist act in Washington." Telegram, AmbEmb, Santiago (Popper) to DOS, September 21, 1976, *FRUS, South America, 1973-1976, Doc.247*, pp.664-665.

¹⁰⁷ Letter, BritishEmb, Washington, D.C. (Millington) to LAD, FCO (Davies), September 30, 1976, Folder: FC07/3081, "Relations Between Chile and the USA," 1976, *BNA*.

¹⁰⁸ Memo of Conversation, Kissinger, Habib, Shlaudeman, Carvajal, Trucco et al., October 7, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Kathleen Teltsch, "U.N. Unit Says Chile Abuses Widens," *NYT*, October 15, 1976, p.6; Telegram, Kissinger to AmEmb Santiago, October 16, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹¹¹ Airgram, Popper to DOS, October 19, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹¹² "Chile Acts to Reject Assistance," *NYT*, October 21, 1976, p.6.

¹¹³ Memo of Conversation, October 18, 1976, NSA, 1973-1977, Box 21, *GRFPL*.

¹¹⁴ Telegram, BritishEmb Washington, D.C. (Webb) to LAD, FC0, London (Davies), November 5, 1976, Folder: FC07/3081, "Relations Between Chile and the USA," 1976, *BNA*.

¹¹⁵ Letter, Reuss et al. to Simon, November 23, 1976, *DOS/FOIA*. Also see Daniel Southerland, "Congress Eyes Indirect Aid to Chile," *CSM*, December 1, 1976, p.42.

¹¹⁶ Quoted in Edwin L. Dale Jr., "US to Back Chileans on World Bank Aid," *NYT*, December 12, 1976, p.23.

¹¹⁷ Briefing Memo, Shlaudeman, Katz to Acting Secretary, December 16, 1976, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹¹⁸ Quoted in Edwin L. Dale, Jr., "World Bank Votes Loans to Chile of \$60 Million, with US in Favor," *NYT*, December 22, 1976, p.3.

¹¹⁹ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, January 28, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*; Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, January 18, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.20, Folder 1, Box 12, *NA*.

¹²⁰ Author telephone interview with Rudy Fimbres.

¹²¹ Despatch, BritishEmb, Santiago (Webb) to LAD, FC0, London (Davies), December 14, 1976, Folder: FC07/3081, "Relations Between Chile and the USA," 1976, *BNA*.

Notes to Chapter 5

¹ Transcript, "The Second [Presidential] Debate, San Francisco, October 6, 1976, in Sidney Kraus, ed., *The Great Debates* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p.480. "We stumbled into the quagmires of Cambodia and Vietnam," Carter proclaimed in an earlier speech (on September 8), "and carried out heavy handed efforts to destroy an elected government in Chile." Jimmy Carter, *The Presidential Campaign, Volume One, Part Two* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1978), p.710.

² Author interview with Robert O. Blake.

³ Author interview with Mark Schneider. Prior to his appointment to HA, Schneider was a congressional aide to Senator Edward Kennedy where he worked on Latin American affairs and international human rights issues. During his time in the Carter administration, he was generally suspected by State Department colleagues of leaking information to sympathetic legislators to influence the outcome of policy debates. See Rossiter, *Human Rights: The Carter Record, the Reagan Reaction*, p.5.

⁴ Author interview with Thomas Boyatt.

⁵ Author email correspondence with Thomas Quigley.

⁶ Author interview with Joseph Eldridge.

⁷ Author interview with Enrique Correa.

⁸ Author interviews with Ricardo Nuñez and Hernando Muñoz.

⁹ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, March 30, 1977, RG59, Office of the Secretary, Subject Files of Amb David H. Popper, Folder: Chrons, Out-going Telegrams, 1977, Box 1, NA.

¹⁰ Author Interview with David L Aaron.

¹¹ Author interview with Robert O. Blake.

¹² Author interview with David L. Aaron.

¹³ Author interview with George F. Jones.

¹⁴ Policy Review on Chile, Staff Offices, National Security Affairs-Brzezinski Material (undated), Country File, Folder: Chile 1/77-1/81, Box 7, JCPL.

¹⁵ Telegram, BritishEmb, Santiago (Webb) to LAD, FC (Davies), November 5, 1976, Folder: FC 7/3081, Relations between Chile and the USA, BNA.

¹⁶ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Boyatt) to Kissinger, October 27, 1976, DOS/FOIAe, I.

¹⁷ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, January 28, 1977, *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Telegram, AmEmb (Boyatt) to Kissinger, February 14, 1977, *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, January 28, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, I.

²⁰ Briefing Memo, Luers to Vance, "Credentials presentation by Ambassador-designate Cauas," February 23, 1977, *Ibid.*

²¹ Memo, Luers to Vance, "Proposed invitation for Chilean Foreign Minister, Admiral Patricio Carvajal," February 23, 1977, *Ibid.*

²² Author Interview with Robert Pastor.

²³ On the latter, see US Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Report. 94-465, November 20, 1975.

²⁴ "The President's News Conference of February 23, 1977," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter 1977*. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1977, p.218.

²⁵ Author interview with David L. Aaron. Washington's failure to adequately comprehend the nature of the Chilean government's internal politics after September 1973 partly reflected a deterioration in the quality of CIA intelligence across the hemisphere that was not unrelated to the resurgent congressional effort to impose restrictions and much greater oversight on the agency's global activities. Executive branch and legislative investigations of the CIA's role in Watergate, the toppling the democratic government of Chile and efforts to assassinate foreign leaders, led to the passage of new constraints on covert operations abroad, and expanded scrutiny of the Agency by newly established House and Senate Intelligence oversight committees. This had a devastating impact on the organization's morale and effectiveness, accompanied by a major administrative overhaul during 1973 that led to the retirement of more than 2,000 officers John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), p.583. William D. Rogers, the Assistant Secretary of State during the Nixon-Ford administrations, formed the impression that the CIA "was a mess

during that period in Latin America: it was a very weak and unreliable source of information.” Author interview with William D. Rogers.

²⁶ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, April 11, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

²⁷ Author interviews with Mark Schneider and Robert Pastor.

²⁸ Paul E. Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p.120.

²⁹ Author interview with Robert O. Blake.

³⁰ Author interview with Robert Pastor.

³¹ Author Interview with Roberta Cohen.

³² Author interview with Robert S. Steven.

³³ Author interview with George Landau.

³⁴ Author interview with Thomas Boyatt.

³⁵ Author interview with Charles Grover.

³⁶ Author interview with Mark Schneider.

³⁷ Author interview with Robert Service.

³⁸ Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-17 “Review of US Policy Toward Latin America,” NSC, Brzezinski to Vice President, et al., January 26, 1977, *Declassified NA*.

³⁹ Author interview with Robert Pastor.

⁴⁰ Memo, Gelb and Todman to Habib, February 14, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁴¹ Intelligence Memo, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, February 23, 1977, *DOS/FOIA*.

⁴² Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, February 18, 1977, *Ibid*.

⁴³ Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, “Information Items,” February 7, 1977, *DOS/FOIA*.

⁴⁴ Intelligence Memo, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, February 23, 1977, *Ibid*.

⁴⁵ Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, March 5, 1977, *Ibid*.; CIA “The Arms Race in the Andes and Regional Tensions,” *Ibid*.

⁴⁶ Intelligence Memo, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, February 23, 1977, *Ibid*.

⁴⁷ CIA, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, “The USSR: Regional and Political Analysis,” May 12, 1977, *DNSA*.

⁴⁸ Interview with US army officer just returned from service in Chile, April 15, 1978, in Daniel M. Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p.265. During 1978, the Chilean and Peruvian foreign ministries worked assiduously, and with considerable success, to improve bilateral ties, only to have much of their diplomatic efforts undone following a visit by Peru’s foreign minister to Santiago in November. “In an incredible display of uncoordinated ineptitude,” some members of Chile’s naval intelligence and other navy personnel attached to the Lima Embassy “got involved in activities which Peru’s government chose to regard as espionage [and] a threat to the nation’s sovereignty.” Telegram, CanadianEmb, Santiago, Ambassador to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, March 26, 1979, Ottawa, RG25, Interim Container 121, File: 20-Chile-1-4, Part 14, *CNA*.

⁴⁹ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, “INR Report on the Andes,” May 5, 1977, NSC, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 29, *JCPL*.

⁵⁰ Memo, Gelb and Todman to Habib, February 14, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁵¹ Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p.182, footnote 49.

⁵² Telegram, Popper to Vance, March 7, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁵³ Telegram, Vance to AmEmb Santiago, March 8, 1977, *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Telegram, Vance to AmEmb, Santiago, March 15, 1977, *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Quoted in "Pinochet Discusses Relations with Bolivia, Peru, US," *FBIS: DR: L4*, March 9, 1977, p.E1.

⁵⁶ Quoted in "Chile Breaks All ties With UN Human Rights Commission," *Ibid.*, March 14, 1977, p.E1. The session was also memorable for the public remarks made by Brady Tyson, deputy leader of the US delegation to the UNHRC, on the role played by the US in the coup that overthrew Salvador Allende. "In discussing Chile we would be less than candid," Tyson said, "and untrue to ourselves and to our people, if the delegation from the United States did not in any discussion of the situation in Chile express its profoundest regrets for the role that some US government officials, agencies and private groups played in the subversion of the previous, democratically-elected, Chilean government." Quoted in Telegram, Vance to Emb Santiago, et al., March 9, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*. Tyson's remarks were immediately disavowed by the State Department. Carter himself described the remarks as "inappropriate" and Tyson was recalled for further instructions. "Transcript of Carter News Conference," *NYT*, March 10, 1977, p.26. Also see "US Official Expresses 'Regrets' for Role in Chile but is Disavowed," *NYT*, March 9, 1977, pp.1, 4. This episode cast doubt on how widespread was the distaste for past US policy toward Chile in the Carter White House and throughout the foreign policy bureaucracy.

⁵⁷ Admiral José Merino and General Gustavo Leigh had previously blocked Pinochet's efforts to assume broad personal authority to deal with this anomaly by insisting on legislation that denied the President absolute power. See Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship*, pp.54-61.

⁵⁸ "Pinochet address to the Nation, March 19," *FBIS: DR: L4*, March 21, 1977, p. E3.

⁵⁹ Telegram, Popper to Kissinger, May 10, 1977, RG59, Office of the Secretary, Subject Files of Amb. David H. Popper, Folder: Chrons, Out-Going Telegrams 1977, Box 1, NA.

⁶⁰ Airgram, Popper to DOS, April 12, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁶¹ Report, DOS, INR, "South America's Southern Cone Bloc in Formation?," October 6, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe*, Argentina; Briefing Memo, Lake, to Vance, "Progress on Latin American Issues," June 13, 1977, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Box 61, JCPL.

⁶² Memo, McAuliffe to Brown, March 22, 1977, Folder: Latin America, Country and Regional Matters, Notes, Messages, Traffic, Reports of Trips to Various Countries, Articles, Box 1975-1979, *Dennis P. McAuliffe Papers*.

⁶³ Memo, Luers, Lake to Vance, "Transmission of PRM NSC-17," March 8, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, II*.

⁶⁴ See Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, March 14, 1977, Donated Historical Materials, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Meetings PRC 8: 3/24/77, Box 24, JCPL; Policy Review Committee Meeting, White House, "Latin America," March 24, 1977, *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Memo, Tolman to Christopher, May 2, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, I; Memo, Luers to Acting Secretary (Christopher), May 9, 1977, *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Memo, North/South (Pastor) to Brzezinski, "Evening Report," May 23, 1977, NSC, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Box 105, JCPL.

⁶⁷ US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, *Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1978, Part 1*, 95th Cong., 1st Sess, March 7, 1977, p.206.

⁶⁸ Memo, Hormats, Tuchman, and Kimmitt to Brzezinski, March 4, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, Subject File, Human Rights 2-4/77, Box 10-32, JCPL.

⁶⁹ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, "PRC Meeting on LA," March 14, 1977, Donated Historical Materials, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Meetings PRC 8: 3/24/77, Box 24, JCPL.

⁷⁰ Quoted in Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade* (Lanham: Hamilton Press, 1986), p.173.

⁷¹ "US Foreign Policy on Human Rights: A Status Report," attachment to Memo, Christopher to Vance, April 6, 1977, DOS/FOIA.

⁷² Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, April 9, 1977, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Folder: Weekly Reports [to the President], 1-15 [2/77-6/77], Box 41, *Ibid.*

⁷³ Quoted in "Carter Rebuffed by House on Rights," *NYT*, April 7, 1977, p.12.

⁷⁴ "The President's News Conference of April 15, 1977," Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter 1977, p.636.

⁷⁵ Memo, Tuchman, Pisano to Brzezinski, "Proposed Admin Position on H Amendments to IFI Legislation," April 13, 1977 and attached "Administration Position on Human Rights Amendments," Staff Offices, Counsel-Lipshutz, Human Rights (re IFI Legislation), 4-8/77 [CF, O/A 120], Box 19, JCPL.

⁷⁶ Memo, Tuchman and Pisano to Brzezinski, April 13, 1977, Folder: Human Rights (re IFI legislation), 4-8/77, Box 19, *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Treasury paper, attached to *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Memo, Vance to Carter, April 15, 1977, Staff Offices, Counsel-Lipshutz, File: Human Rights (re IFI Legislation), 4-8/77, Box 19, *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Memo, Pisano to Brzezinski, Moore, April 15, 1977, WHCF, Subject File (Human Rights, Executive, Folder: HU 4/1/77-4/30/77, Box HU-1, JCPL.

⁸⁰ Memo, Lipshutz to Carter, April 17, 1977, Staff Offices, Counsel-Lipshutz, File: Human Rights (IFI Legislation), 4-8/77, Box 19, *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Long hand notes, White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz, April 29, 1977, *Ibid.*

⁸² Memo, Vance to Carter, April 15, 1977, *Ibid.* By including the "flexibility" provision, noted one official, it enabled the US "to support aid to repressive regimes." Quoted in Dumbrell, *The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation*, p.119.

⁸³ "House Votes to Tie Aid, Rights," *WP*, September 17, 1977, p.7. Also see Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Linking Aid Plans to Human Rights," *NYT*, June 19, 1977, p. F5.

⁸⁴ Memo, Bergsten to Blumenthal for Vance, January 16, 1977, Anthony M. Solomon Collection, Chron File, Folder: 1/16/78-1/31/78, Box 3, JCPL. Treasury led a successful administration effort to undermine an attempt by Harkin and other congressional human rights advocates to extend the legislation to the IMF. Rossiter, *Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction*, p.10.

⁸⁵ Memo, Solomon, Bergsten to Blumenthal, "Items for your 8.30 AM meeting," March 2, 1978, Anthony M. Solomon Collection, Chron File, Folder: 3/78, Box 4, JCPL.

⁸⁶ Report, Christopher to Vance, "US Foreign Policy on Human Rights: A Status Report," April 6, 1977.

⁸⁷ See US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1980, Part 2*, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979, pp.176-178.

⁸⁸ Memo, Pisano to Aaron, May 6, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, Subject File, Human Rights 5/77-11/78, Box 10-32, JCPL.

⁸⁹ Sally Shelton-Colby interview, FAOHC.

⁹⁰ Christopher Committee Group member, quoted in Rossiter, *Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction*, p.20.

⁹¹ Author interview with Robert O. Blake; John R. Bushnell interview, FAOHC.

⁹² See Jo Marie Griesgraber, *Implementation by the Carter Administration of Human Rights Legislation Affecting Latin America* (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 1983), pp.129-30,148,150.

⁹³ US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, *Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1978, Part 1*, 95th Cong., Sess. 1, March 24, 1977, p.761.

⁹⁴ Rossiter, *Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction*, p.8.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* pp.8-9, on the Defense and Agriculture exemptions, also see Scott Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp.30-31.

⁹⁶ Memo, DOS, Michael Bache and David Pierce to Members of Working Groups on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, Subject: "Historical Reports," February 3, 1981, DOS/FOIA.

⁹⁷ Rossiter, *Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction*, pp. 14-17. Also see Forsythe, *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy*, p.62, Table 3.1.

⁹⁸ Memo, Derian, Hormats to Christopher, "Human Rights and Multilateral Development Banks," January 24, 1979, DOS/FOIA.

⁹⁹ Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Party Opposition under the Chilean Authoritarian Regime", in Valenzuela and Valenzuela, (eds.), *Military Rule in Chile*, p.209.

¹⁰⁰ See Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Incomplete Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), p.122.

¹⁰¹ Memo, Paster to Brzezinski, May 13, 1977, WHCF Subject Files, General C028 thru Executive C0341, Folder: C033 1/20/77-1/20/81, Box C0-15, JCPL.

Notwithstanding denials by White House, CIA and NSC officials, two administration sources were emphatic that Robert Pastor had requested CIA analysis of “possible alternatives” to the Pinochet-led Junta around the time of the Almeida and Frei visits. “I’ve seen the papers,” said one. Quoted in George Gedda, “CIA Study of Alternatives to Chile Junta is Denied,” *MH*, June 25, 1977, p.19A.

¹⁰² Memo for File, Pastor, Feinberg et al, May 16, 1977, NSA Staff Materials, North/South, Chile 2-8/77, Box 3-9, *JCPL*.

¹⁰³ Memo, Tarnoff to Brzezinski, May 18, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Folder: Chile, 1/77-1/81, Box 7, *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁴ See Terri Shaw, “Mondale and Brzezinski Confer With Chile’s Frei,” *WP*, May 26, 1977, p.A31; Graham Hovey, “Carter’s Chilean Policy,” *NYT*, May 30, 1977, p.4.

¹⁰⁵ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, “The Gedda Story and US Policy to Chile,” June 27, 1977, *DNSA*.

¹⁰⁶ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, May 19, 1977, NSA, Staff Materials, North/South, Chile 2-8/77, Box 3-9, *JCPL*.

¹⁰⁷ Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, “Request for President or VP to meet with Frei,” undated, *Ibid*; Memo, Trevorton to Pastor, May 21, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Folder: Chile 1/77-1/81, Box 7, *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁸ Memo, Brzezinski to Mondale, “Your Meeting with Frei,” May 24, 1977, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Chile 2-8/77, Box 3-9, *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁹ Memo of Conversation, Cauas, Luers, Barnebey, May 24, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹¹⁰ Briefing Memo, Todman to Christopher, May 25, 1977, *Ibid*.

¹¹¹ Telegram, AmEmb (Boyatt) to Vance, for Christopher and Luers, May 25, 1977, *Ibid*. Cardinal Silva had been invited to the US to receive an award from Georgetown University.

¹¹² Quoted in Graham Hovey, “Carter’s Chilean Policy,” *NYT*, May 30, 1977, p.4.

¹¹³ Quoted in James Nelson Goodsell, “Chilean Opposition Leaders Welcomed in Washington,” *CSM*, June 6, 1977, p.13.

¹¹⁴ Author interview with David L. Aaron.

¹¹⁵ Author interview with Robert Pastor.

¹¹⁶ Memo of Conversation, Mondale, Brzezinski, Frei, Clift, Pastor, May 26, 1977, WHCF, Subject Files, General C028 through Executive C0341, Folder: C033, 1/20/77-1/20/81, Box C0-15, *JCPL*.

¹¹⁷ Author interview with Enrique Correa.

¹¹⁸ Author interview with Robert Service.

¹¹⁹ Author interview with Thomas Boyatt.

¹²⁰ Author interview with Robert Service.

¹²¹ Author interview with Charles Grover.

¹²² Author interview with Robert Service.

¹²³ *Ibid*.

¹²⁴ Memo of Conversation, Mondale, Brzezinski, Frei, Clift, Pastor, May 25, 1977, WHCF, Subject Files, General C028 through Executive C0341, Folder: C033 1/20/77-1/20/78, *JCPL*.

¹²⁵ Memo of Conversation, DOD, Office of Assistant Secretary, June 1, 1977, *DOD/FOIAe, III*; Briefing Memo, Devine to Christopher, "Conversations with Cauas," *DOS/FOIAe, I*. Also see Telegram, Vance to AmEmb Santiago, May 28, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.21, Folder 3, Box 13, NA.

¹²⁶ Memo, Scheider to Derian, June 17, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.22, Folder 2, Box 13, *ibid*.

¹²⁷ OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, *Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile*, Chapter XI, Conclusions, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc 10, February 11, 1977; Seventh Regular Session of OAS General Assembly, *Position Paper*, June 1, 1977. USOAS, cleared ARA and sections, *DOS/FOIAe, I*. Also see Graham Hovey, "Chile Still Violating Rights, O.A.S. Group Charges," *NYT*, May 23, 1977, p.7.

¹²⁸ Telegram, AmEmb (Boyatt) to Vance, June 3, 1977 *DOS/FOIAe, I*. The Embassy also reported that DINA was "taking the lead in [a] new wave of repression which features illegal detentions, torture and several cases of 'disappearance.'" Telegram, Popper to Vance, May 18, 1977, *ibid*.

¹²⁹ Position Paper, DOS, Seventh Regular Session of OAS General Assembly, *Position Paper*, June 1, 1977, *ibid*.

¹³⁰ Briefing Memo, Luers to Vance, "Scope Paper," June 7, 1977 Your Trip to the Caribbean for VII OAS General Assembly Meeting, *DOS/FOIA*.

¹³¹ Briefing Paper, "Bilateral Talks during OASGA: Chile Foreign Minister Carvajal [with Vance and Todman]," June 15, 1977, *ibid*.

¹³² Briefing Paper, DOS, "Bilateral Talks during OASGA: Chile Foreign Minister Carvajal," June 14-17, *DOS/FOIA*.

¹³³ "Text of Secretary Vance speech to Seventh Regular General Assembly of the OAS," St George's, Grenada, June 14, 1977, *DOSB*, July 18, 1977, p.70.

¹³⁴ Secretary Vance Attends OAS General Assembly at Grenada, "Text of News Conference," June 16, *ibid*., July 18, 1977, p.74; Memo of Conversation, Vance, Carvajal, et al., OAS meeting, Grenada, June 15, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹³⁵ *ibid*.

¹³⁶ *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (" Rettig Report")*, Volume 2, pp.620, 621-628.

¹³⁷ Author interview with Robert S. Steven.

¹³⁸ Author interview with Robert Pastor.

¹³⁹ Author interview with Mark Schneider. Armed forces representatives held more than half of all ambassadorships and the power of the Foreign Ministry had been significantly eroded as key foreign policy issues were increasingly being adjudicated by special presidential task forces or Pinochet's office.

¹⁴⁰ Telegram, CanadianEmb, Santiago to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, "Basis of Chilean Foreign Policy 1977," June 20, 1977, RG25, Interim Container 121, File: 20-Chile-1-4, Part 7, *CNA*.

¹⁴¹ Memo, White House, Press/Congressional to ZB, "Evening Report" June 24, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports File, Box 3, *JCPL*.

¹⁴² Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, "The Gedda Story and US Policy to Chile," June 27, 1977, DNSA.

¹⁴³ Letter, BritishEmb Washington, D.C. (Millington) to SAD, FC (Sindall), August 8, 1977, Folder: FC07/3302, "Political Relations Between Chile and the USA," 1977, BNA.

¹⁴⁴ Memo, Tolman to Acting Secretary, June 22, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, I. Also see Graham Hovey, "US Officials Divided Over Loans to Chile," *NYT*, June 24, 1977, p.5; "US Defers Two Loans to Chile, Citing Human Rights Situation," *NYT*, June 29, 1977, p.3.

¹⁴⁵ Memo, Schneider to Christopher, June 26, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, I.

¹⁴⁶ Quoted in "US Defers Two Loans to Chile Citing Human Rights Situation," *NYT*, June 29, 1977, p.3; Dan Morgan, "Issues of Human Rights Complicates Relations with Dozens of Nations," *WP*, July 17, 1977, p.A17.

¹⁴⁷ Reported in attachment to agenda for meeting of the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, from Stephen Oxman, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State, September 10, 1977, DNSA.

¹⁴⁸ Quoted in "Pinochet Announces Rejection of US Aid," *FBIS: DR: LA*, July 1, 1977, p.E1. Also see John M. Goshko, "Chile Rejects US Aid in Human Rights Dispute," *WP*, July 1, 1977, p. A1, A13.

¹⁴⁹ See Letelier and Moffitt, *Human Rights, Economic Aid and Private Banks: The Case of Chile*, pp.9-10.

Notes to Chapter 6

¹ Report, INR, "The Catholic Church and Human Rights in Latin America," October 25, 1977, DNSA. See also Fleet, *The Catholic Church and Democracy in Chile and Peru*, pp. 63-64 and for an account of Cardinal Silva's relations with the Junta in the 1970s, Mario I. Aguilar, "Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, the Catholic Church, and the Pinochet Regime, 1973-1980: Public Responses to a National Security state," *Catholic Historical Review*, 89 (4), 2003, pp. 712-731.

² Lowden, *Moral Opposition to Authoritarian Rule in Chile*, p.60.

³ Telegram, Popper to Vance, May 7, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, I.

⁴ According to Popper, Cardinal Silva had told him that when the Vatican was informed of Damilano's remarks it sent a "rocket" to the Papal Nuncio instructing him to tell the Junta that they were completely unacceptable and suggested that the regime was about to break ties with the Church. "The Nuncio spoke to the right people, and Damilano was fired summarily." Telegram, Popper to Vance, May 7, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, I.

⁵ Manuel Barrera and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "The Development of Labor Movement Opposition to the Military Regime," in Valenzuela and Valenzuela (eds.), *Military Rule in Chile*, pp 243-48.

⁶ Quoted in "Workers Demand Pinochet Rectify Social-Economic Policy," *FBIS: DR: LA*, May 3, 1977, p.E1.

⁷ CIA Intelligence Document, June 6, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: Directorate of Intelligence, No.193-219, Box 5, NA.

- ⁸ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Boyatt) to Vance, July 22, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.
- ⁹ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Boyatt) to Vance, July 21, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, Box 1, File 1, *NA*.
- ¹⁰ CIA, Latin America: Regional and Political Analysis, March 31, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: CIA-Directorate of Intelligence, MORI, Nos. 116-146, Box 12, *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship*, p.190.
- ¹² The highly negative impact of the US spare parts embargo on Chile's navy and air force is discussed in John R. Bawden, "Cutting Off the Dictator: The United States Arms Embargo of the Pinochet Regime, 1974-1988," *Journal of Latin American Studies* (UK), Vol.45, Issue 3, August 2013, pp.513-543.
- ¹³ Folder: "Notes: governmental and international meetings, daily priorities, and official matters," 4 of 4, 1977-1980, Series No 11, Box 10, *Cyrus Vance Papers*.
- ¹⁴ Telegram, AmEmb (Boyatt) to Vance, "Evaluation Report: Human Rights in Chile," July 1, 1977, *DOS/FOIA*.
- ¹⁵ Author interview with Robert S. Steven.
- ¹⁶ "Text of Pinochet Speech Announcing Political Reforms," *FBIS: DR: LA*, July 18, 1977, pp.E1-E5.
- ¹⁷ CIA, Latin America: Regional and Political Analysis, July 21, 1977, *CIA/FOIAe, II*.
- ¹⁸ CIA, Latin America: Regional and Political Analysis, July 28, 1977, *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ "Text of Pinochet Speech Announcing Political Reforms."
- ²⁰ Quoted in Barrera and Valenzuela, "The Development of Labor Movement Opposition to the Military Regime," p.245.
- ²¹ Quoted in "Opponents of Chilean Junta Fear US Warming to Pinochet," *WP*, July 29, 1977, p. A12.
- ²² See "Chile: Fancy Wrapper," *LAPR*, August 17, 1977, p.254.
- ²³ Telegram, Vance, To All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, July 11, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.
- ²⁴ Statement to US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, *Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy: A Review of the Administration's Record*, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Oct 25, 1977, p.21.
- ²⁵ Quoted in "Opponents of Chilean Junta Fear US Warming to Pinochet," p.A12. Further evidence of a diplomatic thaw was the attendance of Carvajal and three other cabinet ministers at the Embassy's July 4 Independence Day reception. Chile's leaders had boycotted the last major Embassy gathering to farewell the departing Ambassador Popper. See *Ibid.*
- ²⁶ Author interview with Robert Pastor; Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, "Recent Developments: Chile," undated, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, Country Files (Tab 6), Box 7, Chile, 1/77-1/81, *JCL*; Memo, Vance to Carter, July 11, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 67, *Ibid.*
- ²⁷ Author interview with Robert S. Steven.

- ²⁸ Revised draft of PRM NSC-28: Human Rights, attached to Memo, DOS, Christopher to SCC members, July 8, 1977, Human Rights, PRM 7/77 [CF, O/A 716], Staff Offices, Counsel, Lipshutz, Box 19, JCPL.
- ²⁹ Memo, Becker to Enders, July 16, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, I.
- ³⁰ Christopher, "Scope Paper for Todman Trip," August 11, 1977, DNSA.
- ³¹ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Boyatt) to Vance, July 22, 1977, *Ibid.*
- ³² Memo, Popper to Todman, July 26, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, Box 1, File 1, NA.
- ³³ Mark Schneider Memo for the Record, ARA/INR/CIA Weekly Meeting, August 8, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, III.
- ³⁴ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, August 5, 1977, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Chile 1-12/77, Box 3-9, JCPL.
- ³⁵ Memo, Schneider to Acting Secretary, May 10, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, I.
- ³⁶ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, August 5, 1977; Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, August 9, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski File, Country File, Folder: Chile, 1-77-1/81, Box 7, JCPL.
- ³⁷ Memo, CIA, Latin America: Regional and Political Analysis, August 18, 1977, CIA/FOIAe, II. Also see Hawkins, *International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile*, pp. 101, 105.
- ³⁸ Author interview with Robert S. Steven.
- ³⁹ Ensalaco, *Chile Under Pinochet*, p.57.
- ⁴⁰ Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, "Information Items," August 22, 1977, DNSA.
- ⁴¹ Quoted in De Onis, "US Rights Drive Asks Aid of Latin Military," p.7. Also see "A US Official Praises Chile's Action on Police," *NYT*, August 14, 1977, p.46. Sheer opportunism was another interpretation of Pinochet's decision: "By mid-1977, the regime had abducted, murdered, and 'disappeared' about as many of its enemies as was feasible." Ensalaco, *Chile Under Pinochet*, p.127.
- ⁴² INR, Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights, No. 18, August 16, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, II.
- ⁴³ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Boyatt) to Vance, August 13, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, I.
- ⁴⁴ Quoted in De Onis, "US Rights Drive Asks Aid of Latin Military," p.7; "USA: Hard to Please All," *LAPR*, September 9, 1977, p.274; John Dinges, "Visiting US Official Praises Progress on Human Rights in Chile," *WP*, August 14, 1977, p.C4.
- ⁴⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *United States in the Western Hemisphere*, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., Committee Print, February 21, 1978, pp.20-21.
- ⁴⁶ Letter, BritishEmb, Santiago (Haskell) to SAD, FCO, London (Davies), August 24, 1977, Folder: FC07/3302, Political Relations Between Chile and the USA., 1977, BNA.
- ⁴⁷ Quoted in James Nelson Goodsell, "Chile Improves Its Stance on Human Rights," *CSM*, August 30, 1977, p.6.
- ⁴⁸ Quoted in Juan de Onis, "Head of Chilean Junta Hints He Intends to be in Power a Long Time," *NYT*, August 25, 1977, p.2.

⁴⁹ CIA, Latin America: Regional and Political Analysis, September, *CIA/FOIAe, II*. Also see Memo for the Record, ARA/INR/CIA Weekly Meeting, August 8, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁵⁰ See, for example, Draft, "The US and Latin America," State and Defense Options Papers. Volume Two, Plains File, Subject File, Folder: Transition: State and Defense Options Papers [3], 11/76, Box 41, *JCPL*.

⁵¹ Memo to the President-Elect, Foreign Policy Priorities November 3, 1976-May 1, 1977, Plains Files, Subject File, Folder: Transition: Foreign Policy Priorities, 11/76, Box 41, *JCPL*.

⁵² Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-17 "Review of US Policy Toward Latin America," NSC, Brzezinski to Vice President, et al., January 26, 1977, *NA*.

⁵³ Author interview with Mark Schneider.

⁵⁴ Author interview with Robert Pastor.

⁵⁵ Letter, Abourezk to Carter, August 29, 1977, *DNSA*.

⁵⁶ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, "Overview Paper for the President," September 5, 1977, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Box 40, *JCPL*.

⁵⁷ Letter, BritishEmb Wash DC (Millington) to SAD, London (Sindall), October 6, 1977, Folder: FC07/3302, Political Relations Between Chile and the USA., 1977, *BNA*.

⁵⁸ Memo of Conversation, "Carter/Pinochet Bilateral," September 6, 1977, NSA, Staff Materials, North/South, Chile 9-12/77, Box 3-9, *JCPL*; Carter, *White House Diary*, p.91; Memo, Vance to Carter, September 24, 1977, *DNSA*.

⁵⁹ Meeting, Carter and Morales-Bermúdez, "Checklist and Follow-up Items," September 6, 1977, NSA, Staff Material, Staff Secretary, Box 6, *Ibid*; Carter, *White House Diary*, p.90.

⁶⁰ Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, "Nineteen Bilaterals," September 5, 1977, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Box 40, *JCPL*.

⁶¹ *Ibid*; Meeting, Carter and Morales-Bermúdez, "Checklist and Follow-up Items," White House, September 6, 1977, NSA, Staff Material, Staff Secretary, Box 6, *Ibid*.

⁶² Memo of Conversation, "Carter/Banzer Bilateral," September 8, 1977, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Box 62, *Ibid*.

⁶³ Author interview with Robert S. Steven.

⁶⁴ Memo, NSC, North/South (Pastor) to Brzezinski "Evening Report," Sept 2, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports File, Box 5, *JCPL*.

⁶⁵ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Boyatt) to Vance, September 23, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*; Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, "Information Items," September 15, 1977, *DOS/FOIA*.

⁶⁶ Memo, Situation Room to Brzezinski, September 16, 1977, *DNSA*. Also see CIA, Telegram, September 14, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: Director of Intelligence, Docs Nos. 248-274, CIA, Box 5, *NA*.

⁶⁷ Telegram, AmEmb Santiago (Boyatt) to Vance, October 5, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.23, Folder 1, Box 14, *Ibid*.

⁶⁸ CIA, Latin America Weekly Review, October 13, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: CIA-Directorate of Intelligence, MORI, Nos.147-172, Box 2, *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Telegram, Landau to Vance, November 28, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.24, Folder 2, Box 14, *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ CIA, Latin America Weekly Review, October 13, 1977.

⁷¹ US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Transcript*, Landau Hearing to be Ambassador to Chile, September 20, 1977, pp.72, 76.

⁷² Memo, Tarnoff to Brzezinski, October 21, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Folder: Chile, 1/77-1/81, Box 7, *JCPL*.

⁷³ Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, October 21, 1977, *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Letter, Carter to Pinochet, October 31, 1977, *DNSA*.

⁷⁵ George Landau interview, *FAOHC*.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Author interview with Robert S. Steven. The same opinion was expressed by Ambassador Landau. Author interview with George Landau.

⁷⁸ Minutes of November 4 Meeting of Christopher Group on Human Rights and Foreign Economic Assistance, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁷⁹ Memo, Vance to AmEmb Santiago, October 15, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁸⁰ The Chilean government signaled its intention to resubmit the loan request under the Bank's Ordinary Capital category. It did so in early 1978 only to have it rejected by the IADB Executive Board.

⁸¹ Forsythe, *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy*, p.61.

⁸² See Frick Curry, *Subsidizing Pinochet*, p.8, Table 3.

⁸³ To General Brown (chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) December 77: cc to Landau and Pezzullo, "Report on visit to Chile and Uruguay," Folder: Latin America, Country and Regional Matters, Notes, Messages, Traffic, Reports of Trips to Various Countries, Articles, 1976-1979, *Dennis P. McAuliffe Papers*.

⁸⁴ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, January 28, 1978, Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, National Security Affairs-Staff Material, North/South; Pastor, Country, Chile, 1-12/78, Box 9, *JCPL*.

⁸⁵ Memo, Pastor to Schneider, February 9, 1978, WHCF, Subject File, Confidential File, Folder: C-33 1/20/77-1/21/78, Box C-15, *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ State Department official, Michelle Bova, quoted in "Police-Gear Sales to Latins Held Up," *NYT*, July 18, 1977, p.3.

⁸⁷ Shirley Christian, "US Curbs on Arms Send Latin Nations Shopping Elsewhere," *MH*, September 9, 1977, p.10A.

⁸⁸ Michael Klare and Cynthia Amson, "Chile Still Gets US Military Equipment," *LAT*, Part II, November 25, 1977, p.11.

⁸⁹ Cynthia Amson and Michael Klare, "Law or No Law, The Arms Flow," *The Nation*, April 29, 1978, p.503.

⁹⁰ Memo, prepared by DOS/ARA, "Chile - A Tactical Plan," November 15, 1977, *NARA/FOIAe, I*.

⁹¹ Telegram, Vance (Christopher) to AmEmb Santiago, "US Goals and Objectives in Chile," December 10, 1977, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.24, Folder 2, Box 14, NA.

⁹² William R. Long, "US Shifts Tactics on Rights Stand to Woo Latin Nations," *MH*, August 4, 1977, p.19A.

⁹³ Quoted in *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Madeleine Albright, Leslie G. Dened, William Odum, in Miller Center, *The Carter Presidency Project*.

⁹⁵ Brzezinski to Carter, "NSC Weekly Report No 37," November 18, 1977, reprinted in Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p.560.

⁹⁶ Quoted in Dumbrell, *The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation*, p. 118.

⁹⁷ Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, "NSC Report for 1977," January 12, 1978, WHCF, Subject File-Confidential, Folder: HU, 1/20/77-1/20/81, Box 1, JCPL.

⁹⁸ Briefing Memo, Lake to Vance: "The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment," January 20, 1978, attached to Memo, Tarnoff to Brzezinski, January 30, 1978, WHCF, Subject File-Confidential, Folder: HU, 1/20/77-1/20/78, Box HU-1, *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, "NSC Report for 1977," January 12, 1978, WHCF, Subject File-Confidential, Folder: HU, 1/20/77-1/20/81, Box 1, *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Memo, Carter to Mondale, Vance, Brown, et al., Presidential Directive/NSC-30, "Human Rights," February 17, 1978, Presidential Campaign 1980, 7/80-9/80, Folder: Presidential Directives, No Box Number, *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Memo, Bergsten to Blumenthal, January 16, 1978, Anthony M. Solomon Collection, Chron File, Folder: 1/16/78-1/31/78, Box 3, *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Memo, Solomon, Bergsten to Blumenthal, March 2, 1978, Anthony M. Solomon Collection, Chron File, Folder 3/78, Box 4, *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Briefing Memo, Lake to Vance, "The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment," January 20, 1978. *DOS/OH*

¹⁰⁵ United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1977, Volume 31* (New York: Department of Public Information, 1980), p.715.

¹⁰⁶ "Government Accuses UN Rights Panel of Meddling," *FBIS: DR: LA*, November 26, 1977, p. E1.

¹⁰⁷ Letter, Pinochet to Carter, November 9, 1977, *DNS4*.

¹⁰⁸ Memo, DOS, Tamoff to Brzezinski, March 3, 1978, *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Telegram, AmEmb (Boyatt) to Vance, November 15, 1977, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹¹⁰ Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, "Information Items," November 19, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily Report File, Box 4, *JCPL*.

¹¹¹ Memo, NSC, Thornton to Brzezinski, November 25, 1977, *NARA/FOIAe, I*.

¹¹² Thornton quoted in Memo, Dodson to Brzezinski, November 17, 1977, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Chile 9-12/77, Box 3-9, *JCPL*.

¹¹³ Memo, Thornton to Brzezinski, November 25, 1977, *NARA/FOIAe, I*. Tyson remained on the staff of the USUN mission until the end of the Carter presidency.

¹¹⁴ CIA, Intelligence Report, November 30, 1977, NARA, Chile Human Rights Documents, Folder: CIA Directorate of Operations, Nos. 248-274, Box 5, NA. Also see Memo, Situation Room to Brzezinski, December 14, 1977, DNS4.

¹¹⁵ United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, Volume 31*, pp.715-716.

¹¹⁶ Quoted in Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*, p.275. Planning for a plebiscite had actually begun in early 1977 with the appointment of Sergio Fernández to the position of *Contraloría General de la República* (Comptroller) with responsibility for organizing just such a “National Consultation.”

¹¹⁷ Telegram, Landau to Vance, December 31, 1977, DOS/FOIAe, I.

¹¹⁸ See Remmer, *Military Rule in Latin America*, pp.135-139.

¹¹⁹ See Hawkins, *International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile*, p.127.

¹²⁰ See “Added Remarks by Merino,” *FBIS: DR: LA*, January 5, 1978, p.E3; “General Leigh’s Remarks,” *Ibid.* Pinochet’s Junta colleagues were informed just twenty four hours before his speech was broadcast on December 20. “In a stormy meeting next day, [Merino and Leigh] argued vigorously against the exercise, and thought that they had reached agreement not to go ahead.” “Chile: Costly Exercise,” *LAPR*, January 6, 1978, p.1.

¹²¹ “Chile: Winning Hearts and Minds,” *LAPR*, January 13, 1978, p.13.

¹²² See Lowden, *Moral Opposition to Authoritarian Rule in Chile*, p.64.

¹²³ Quoted in Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*, p.275.

¹²⁴ Quoted in Lewis H. Diuguid, “US Denounces Chile Vote as ‘Unfair,’” *WP*, January 6, 1978, p. A12.

¹²⁵ Quotes in Juan de Onis, “Chilean Chief’s Rule Reinforced by Vote,” *NYT*, January 6, 1978, p.20.

¹²⁶ Author interview with Robert Service.

¹²⁷ A study by Chilean sociologist Eduardo Hamuy of just over 1,000 polling sites in greater Santiago raised serious questions about the validity of the plebiscite vote. Hamuy concluded that “gross fraud” had occurred at almost 40 percent of the sites. Spooner, *Soldiers in a Narrow Land*, p.154.

¹²⁸ Area Brief, CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, January 11, 1978, *DDRS 2005-0016*.

¹²⁹ *INR Weekly Highlights*, January 12, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, II*.

¹³⁰ Interview with *Jornal do Brasil* quoted in “Pinochet Says Vote Enhances Role,” *NYT*, January 9, 1978, p.2.

¹³¹ Briefing Memo, Lake to Vance, “Country Priorities in Latin America,” February 26, 1978, *DNS4*.

¹³² Robert S. Steven interview, *FAOHC*. On the chaotic nature of the Letelier case files and criticism of Driscoll, see John Dinges and Saul Landau, *Assassination on Embassy Row* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), p.303; Taylor Branch and Eugene M. Propper, *Labyrinth* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), pp.348, 353.

¹³³ Robert S. Steven interview, *FAOHC*.

¹³⁴ The Justice Department already suspected that, given Contreras’ power was based on his close personal ties with Pinochet, “it is difficult to conceive of DINA

carrying out an operation of this magnitude, with its obvious political ramifications, without Pinochet's knowledge and approval." Memo, Propper to Pastor, August 31, 1977, National Security Affairs-Staff Material, North/South, Folder: Pastor, Country, Chile, 2-8/77, Box 9, JCPL.

¹³⁵ Quoted in Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, p.404.

¹³⁶ Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p.161.

¹³⁷ Briefing Memo, Bushnell to Christopher, February 17, 1978, *DOA/FOIAe, III*. Within a matter of days of the actual killings on September 21, 1976, the FBI suspected DINA's involvement and CIA informants were already sheeting ultimate responsibility back to Pinochet. See Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, p.404. Townley was initially identified as a person of interest in the Letelier case by George Landau, then US Ambassador to Paraguay, after he received an application (using an alias) from the DINA operative for a visa to travel to the United States.

¹³⁸ Letter, BritishEmb, Washington D.C. (Millington), to SADB, FCO, London (Davies) March 27, 1978, Folder: FC07/3487, Political Relations Between Chile and the USA, 1978, *BNA*.

¹³⁹ Author interview with Mark Schneider.

¹⁴⁰ Author interview with Robert S. Steven.

¹⁴¹ See Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship*, pp.85-87.

¹⁴² Author interview with Thomas Boyatt.

¹⁴³ Author interview with Mark Schneider.

¹⁴⁴ Branch and Propper, *Labyrinth*, pp.466-467, 473, 475; Briefing Memo, ARA Todman to Christopher, April 6, 1978, "Chile the Letelier/Moffitt Assassination," April 6, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

¹⁴⁵ Author interview with Robert Service.

¹⁴⁶ Author interview with Robert S. Steven.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ Author interview with George Landau.

¹⁴⁹ See Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship*, pp.211-212.

¹⁵⁰ See Pastor, "Significant Intelligence," March 13, 1978, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Box 75, JCPL. Under a state of siege, the government places restrictions on the movement of people in or out of cities, and gives the coercive institutions usually the police the authority to arrest individuals without charges or warrants. This differs from a state of emergency whereby the government suspends normal constitutional (executive, legislative, and judicial) procedures that can, in turn, be used to justify the suspension of individual rights and freedoms in order to regain control of a particular situation it deems a threat to its authority.

¹⁵¹ Hawkins, *International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile*, p.129.

¹⁵² Quoted in Lowden, *Moral Opposition to Authoritarian Rule in Chile*, p.65.

¹⁵³ Letter, BritishEmb, Washington, D.C. (Millington) to SADB, FCO, London (Davies), April 18, 1978, Folder: FC07/3487, Political Relations Between Chile and the USA, 1978, *BNA*.

¹⁵⁴ CIA, LA Weekly Review, April 13, 1978, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: CIA-Directorate of Intelligence, MORI, Nos.187-202, Box 2, *NA*.

¹⁵⁵ CIA, Intelligence Memo, National Foreign Assessment Center, May 1978, *CIA/FOIAe, II*.

¹⁵⁶ Thomas Reston, quoted in "US Applauds Amnesty by Chile," *NYT*, April 21, 1978, p.8.

¹⁵⁷ Report, DOS, "Human Rights: Chile," Drafted HR HA, cleared ARA, April 7, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹⁵⁸ INR, Weekly Highlights of Developments, No.48, March 15, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, II*.

¹⁵⁹ Memo, NSC, Global Issues, to Brzezinski, "Evening Report," January 30, 1978, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports File, Box 8, *JCPL*.

¹⁶⁰ Telegram, Landau to Vance, February 23, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹⁶¹ Briefing Memo, Schneider to Christopher, February 27, 1978, *Ibid*.

¹⁶² *Congressional Record-Senate*, Volume 24, Part 10, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 4, 1978, p.12713.

¹⁶³ Telegram, Landau to Vance, June 14, 1978, *DDRS: 2006-1975*. In October, Landau repeated his warning that until the extradition proceedings reached a satisfactory conclusion, Santiago would interpret agricultural export assistance "as evidence that our relations are better than they are" and conclude that the interests of US exporters are a higher priority than exerting "maximum pressure in connection with the Letelier case." Telegram, Landau to Vance, October 6, 1978, Chile, Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.26, Folder 1, Box 15, *NA*.

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, "USA: hard to please all," p.274.

¹⁶⁵ Cover Memo, BritishEmb, Washington, D.C. (Millington) to SADM FC, London (Sindall), February 14, 1978, and attached Minute, Squire to Robinson, February 13, 1978, Folder: FC7/3487, Political Relations Between Chile and the USA, 1978, *BNA*.

¹⁶⁶ US Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance, *US Participation in Multilateral Development Institutions*, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 28, March 14 and 15, April 5, and May 18, 1978, p.306.

¹⁶⁷ Memo, DOS, Todman to Christopher, February 24, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹⁶⁸ Quotes in Lars Schoultz, "The Carter Administration and Human Rights in Latin America," in Margaret E. Crahan (ed.), *Human Rights and Basic Needs in the Americas* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1982), p.311; Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade*, pp.37, 38. For a more sympathetic account of Todman's position with respect to Carter's human rights policy see William Michael Schmidli, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy toward Argentina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 139ff.

¹⁶⁹ "El Mercurio Backs Todman Criticism on US Rights Policy," *FBIS: DR LA*, March 2, 1978, p.E1.

¹⁷⁰ Rossiter, *Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction*, p.21.

¹⁷¹ Telegram, Landau to Vance, March 17, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹⁷² Confidential interview. This was a consensus view in the Embassy. *Ibid*.

¹⁷³ Telegram, Landau to Vance, March 17, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

¹⁷⁴ Telegram, Landau to Vance, "Survivability of Pinochet," April 20, 1978, Chile Human Rights Documents, Box 1, File 1, NA.

¹⁷⁵ George Landau interview, FAOHC.

¹⁷⁶ Telegram, CanadianEmb, Ambassador (Buick) to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, March 26, 1979 Ottawa, RG25, Interim Container 212, File: 20-Chile-1-4, Part 14, CNA.

¹⁷⁷ Author interview with George Landau.

¹⁷⁸ George Landau interview, FAOHC; Author interview with George Landau.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* For transcript of the speech, see Jimmy Carter, "Organization of American States Remarks at the Opening Session of the eighth General Assembly," June 21, 1978, *The American Presidency Project*.

¹⁸⁰ Quotes in Karen Elliot House, "US Officials Worry Over Inconsistencies in Human Rights Plan," *WSJ*, May 11, 1978, p.17.

Notes to Chapter 7

¹ "Report Prepared by Interagency Group on Foreign Assistance," April 30, 1978, *FRUS, HR/HA, 1977-1980*, Doc. 139.

² Memo, Lake to Christopher, "Human Rights Sanctions," August 10, 1978, *Ibid.*, Doc. 157.

³ Briefing Memo, Derian to Christopher, "Human Rights Sanctions," Memo of S/P, undated, *Ibid.* Doc 158.

⁴ Landau told Pastor that the hearings in Santiago on the extradition request would be "extremely dirty," as Contreras had hired Miranda Carrington, "a Nazi [who had offered to defend Goering in the Nuremberg trials], as his lawyer." Memo, North South (Pastor) to Brzezinski, "Evening Report," August 23, 1978, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports File, Box 14, *JCPL*.

⁵ Quoted in John M. Goshko, "Envoy to Chile Recalled over Letelier Probe," *WP*, June 24, 1978, pp. A1, A11.

⁶ Briefing Memo, Bushnell to Christopher, June 27, 1978, *DOS/FOLae, III*.

⁷ Robert S. Steven interview, FAOHC.

⁸ Briefing Memo, Bushnell to Christopher, June 27, 1978, *DOS/FOLae, III*.

⁹ Briefing Paper, Bushnell to Acting Secretary, "Chile: The Letelier/Moffitt Assassination Investigation," June 15, 1978, *DNSA*.

¹⁰ Memo, DOS "LM Case Next step Options," June 23, 1978, *ibid.* The CIA reported that Pinochet's "hardline, stonewalling tactics has... calmed down the army which is, after all his key support base." CIA, Intelligence Report, June 23, 1978, *DNSA*.

¹¹ Memo, DOS, "Letelier/Moffitt Case Next Step Options," June 23, 1978, *DNSA*.

¹² Alan G. James interview, FAOHC.

¹³ Quoted in "US Envoy Returns to Chile," *WP*, July 4, 1978

¹⁴ "All of the Generals are very much aware that if we have sufficient evidence on Contreras, there is no way that he would have done it without informing Pinochet, with whom he had breakfast almost every single day." Memo, Pastor to

Brzezinski, Aaron, "Conversation with Landau," June 28, 1978, NSA, Brzezinski Materials, Chile 1/77-1/81, C0, Box 7, JCPL.

¹⁵ Memo, Vance to Carter, June 30, 1978, DNSA.

¹⁶ Memo, Steven to Bushnell, July 5, 1978, DOS/FOIAe, III.

¹⁷ Memo, Christopher to Carter, July 26, 1978, DNSA.

¹⁸ See Hawkins, *International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile*, p.127.

¹⁹ See Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship*, pp.186n, 196.

²⁰ Quoted in "Karen DeYoung, "Critic of Pinochet Rule Ousted by Chilean Junta," *WP*, July 25, 1978, p.A8. Also see "Leigh Claims Agreement," *FBIS: DR: LA*, March 31, 1978, p.E2.

²¹ Memo, Situation Room to Brzezinski, "Noon Notes," July 24, 1978, DNSA.

²² Genaro Arriagada Herrera, "The Legal and Institutional Framework of the Armed Force in Chile," in Valenzuela and Valenzuela (eds.), *Military Rule in Chile*, p.133.

²³ See Remmer, *Military Rule in Latin America*, p.128.

²⁴ Huneus, *The Pinochet Regime*, p.77.

²⁵ Memo, Christopher to Carter, July 26, 1978, DNSA.

²⁶ Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship*, p.213.

²⁷ Quoted in John M. Goshko, "Halt in Arms for Chile Is Passed and Reversed," *WP*, August 3, 1978, pp. A1, A15. See also *Congressional Record-House*, August 2, 1978, p.23921.

²⁸ Memo, McNeil to Vaky October 30, 1978, DOS/FOIAe, III. According to Chile Desk officer Robert Steven, both he and McNeil were eventually forced out of the Bureau, principally due to having "press[ed] too hard" on the Letelier case. Ironically, McNeil was reassigned after being awarded a Superior Honor Award for his work on the Letelier case. He was "literally fired" after being called into Vaky's office over something he had said or written "and told to clear his desk and be out of there this afternoon, just go." Steven suffered essentially the same fate. After McNeil received his award from Vaky, Steven was recommended to receive the same award which was duly approved. "Mr Vaky read the citation and then turned and, with grinning teeth and the most forced smile you can ever conceive of, shook my hand for my good work and sort of handed me the award. As I say, I never worked in the Bureau again." Author interview with Robert S. Steven; Robert S. Steven interview, *FAOHC*.

²⁹ Author interview with George Landau.

³⁰ Author interview with Thomas Boyatt.

³¹ Author interview with George F. Jones.

³² See for example, advertisement, "Chile: Safety Zone for Foreign Investors," *WSJ*, June 8, 1977, p.16.

³³ Author interview with George Landau.

³⁴ Lewis H. Diuguid, "Exxon buys Mines in Chile," *WP*, January 25, 1978, p.A16.

³⁵ "Chile Looks Abroad for Funds to Bridge Oil Gap," *LAER*, August 17, 1979, p.253. Also see "Chile Returns to Favour with Foreign Bankers," *Ibid.* July 1,

1977, p.98; “Big Exxon Investment Boosts Chile Regime,” *Ibid.* February 10, 1978, p.45.

³⁶ See Letelier and Moffitt, *Human Rights, Economic Aid and Private Banks*, pp.9-10.

³⁷ John M.Goshko, “Several Banks Accused of Undercutting Policy on Chile,” *WP*, April 12, 1978, p. A9.

³⁸ Both quotes in “1st National Loans Hit,” *CT*, April 13, 1978, Sect.4, p.10.

³⁹ Report, AmEmb Santiago (Doughy) to Vance, July 25, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁴⁰ Author interview with Robert Pastor.

⁴¹ Transcript, “President’s News Conference, Brazil visit,” March 30, 1978. *The American Presidency Project*. Also see Report, Santiago Emb to Vance, “USG policy on private sector lending to Chile,” July 25, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁴² US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy*, 96th Cong., 1st, May 2 and 10, June 21, August 2, 1979, p.333.

⁴³ Memo, Doughy to Flower, July 25, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁴⁴ Talk with Carter, August 7, 1978, in Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p.128.

⁴⁵ See Collier and Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-2002*, pp.370-373; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, *Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 1982, Volume II* (Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 1984), p.296, (Table 22); Spooner, *Soldiers in a Narrow Land*, pp.144-145; Report, INR, “Chile: From Theory to Practice More Flexibility in Economic Policies,” January 11, 1983, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁴⁶ Talking Points, DOS, November 20, 1978, *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Telegram Landau to Vance, “The Govt of Chile and Organized Labor after Five Years,” August 30, 1978, Chile Human Rights documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.25, Folder 3, Box 15, NA.

⁴⁸ Author interview with Thomas Boyatt.

⁴⁹ Correspondence, McLellan to Nixon, January 22, 1976, RG18-010, International Affairs Department, Country File 1969-1981, Box 5, Folder: 5/18 Chile 1975, *GMM*.

⁵⁰ Thomas Miller Klubock, “Class, Community and Neoliberalism in Chile,” in Peter Winn (ed.), *Victims of the Chilean Miracle* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), p.223. On the formation of the CNS, also see Telegram, Landau to Vance, June 5, 1978, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.25, Folder 1, Box 15, NA.

⁵¹ Barrera and Valenzuela, “The Development of Labor Movement Opposition to the Military Regime,” p.249.

⁵² See Peter Winn, “The Pinochet Era,” in Winn (ed.), *Victims of the Chilean Miracle*, p.31.

⁵³ *Proceedings of the Twelfth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO*, Daily Proceedings and Executive Council Reports, Resolution No. 52, Los Angeles, California, December 8-13, 1977, p.429.

⁵⁴ Telegram, Landau to Vance, “AFL-CIO Solidarity Visit,” June 5, 1978, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.25, Volume 1,

Box 15, NA. According to a member of the American delegation, AFL-IO head William Doherty Jr, Pinochet began the meeting by asking Gleason "if he was the one who had boycotted Chilean ships in US ports. When Gleason said that he was, Pinochet asked why he had done so, and Gleason asked Pinochet to look at the window in his office, and said that if George Meany asked him to jump out of that window he would do so, and when Meany asked him to boycott Chilean ships, he did so. This all intrigued Pinochet. As a result of that, instead of giving them only half an hour, he spent two hours with them. Clearly, Pinochet thought that at the end of this time he had won over the US labor leaders, but that was clearly not the case." William Doherty Jr, April 18, 1988, *Robert Alexander Papers*.

⁵⁵ "AFL-CIO Members Ask Pinochet to Ease Labor Restrictions," *FBIS: DR: LA*, May 26, 1978, p. E3.

⁵⁶ Correspondence, Meany to Carter, August 10, 1978, RG1-038, Office of the President, Folder: 68/27, Chile 1978-1979, Box 68, GMMA; Juan de Onis, "Citing Repressive Policies in Chile, AFL-CIO May Join in Boycott," *NYT*, November 20, 1978, p.10.

⁵⁷ Telegram, Landau to Vance, September 1, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁵⁸ Confidential interview.

⁵⁹ Telegram, Landau to Vance, September 14, 1978, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.26, Folder 1, NA.

⁶⁰ Quoted in Juan de Onis, "Supplementary Material," *NYT*, October 30, 1978. Also see "Chile: A Finger in the Dyke," *LAPR*, October 27, 1978, p.329. Also see Telegram, Landau to Vance, "Trade Union Rights...", October 30, 1978, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.26, Folder 2, Box 15, NA.

⁶¹ Constable and Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies*, p.228.

⁶² Juan de Onis, "Citing Repressive Policies in Chile, A.F.L.-C.I.O. May Join in Boycott," *NYT*, November 20, 1978, p.10.

⁶³ Telegram, Landau to Vance for Vaky, November 30, 1978, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.26, Folder 3, Box 15, *Ibid*.

⁶⁴ Telegram, Landau to Vance, December 1, 1978, *Ibid*.

⁶⁵ Telegram, CanadianEmb, Santiago (Buick) to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, "Labor in Chile," January 15, 1979, R25, Interim Container 121, File: 20-Chile-1-4, Part 14, CNA. Also see Telegram, Landau to Vance, December 7, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

⁶⁶ Telegram, Landau to Vance, November 29, 1978, *Chile Human Rights Documents*, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.26, Folder 2, Box 15, NA.

⁶⁷ Telegram, Landau to Vance, November 16, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁶⁸ Telegram, Landau to Vance for Vaky, November 30, 1978, *Ibid*.

⁶⁹ Telegram, Landau to Vance, December 2, 1978, *Chile, Human Rights Documents*, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.26, Folder 3, Box 15, NA.

⁷⁰ Telegram, Landau to Vance, December 6, 1978, *Ibid*.

⁷¹ Author interview with George Landau.

⁷² Telegram, Landau to Vance for Vaky, November 30, 1978, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.26, Folder 3, Box 15, NA.

⁷³ Telegram, Landau to Vance, December 11, 1978, *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Quoted in "Chile: New Cabinet," *LAPR*, January 5, 1979, p.1.

⁷⁵ Telegram, CanadianEmb, Santiago (Buick) to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, "Labor in Chile," January 15, 1979, RG25, Interim Container 121, File: 20-Chile-1-4, Part 14, *CNA*.

⁷⁶ Memo, AFL-CIO, Lee to Meany, December 27, 1978, RG1-038, Office of the President, Folder: 68/27, Chile 1978-1979, Box 68, *GMMMA*.

⁷⁷ Telegram, Landau to Vance, December 29, 1978, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol.26, Folder 3, Box 15, *NA*.

⁷⁸ Telegram, Landau to Vance, January 12, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*. The other "modernizations" comprised pensions, education, health, agriculture, justice and decentralization.

⁷⁹ Telegram, CanadianEmb, Santiago (Buick) to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, "Labor in Chile," January 15, 1979, RG25, Interim Container 121, File: 20-Chile-1-4, Part 14, *CNA*.

⁸⁰ "Restrictions on Unions Relaxed; Favorable Reaction Noted," *FBIS: DR: LA*, February 12, 1979, p. E3.

⁸¹ Resolution No 196, *Proceedings of the Thirteenth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, Volume II*, Report of the Executive Council, Washington D.C., November, 1979

⁸² Letter, Meany to Mahaffey, January 22, 1979, RG1-038, Office of the President, Folder: (IFTCU): Inter-American Regional Organization (ORIT), 1978-1979, Box 62, *GMMMA*.

⁸³ Quoted in "Group of 10 Rejects Union Freedom Plan," *FBIS: DR: LA*, January 8, 1979, p. E4.

⁸⁴ Telegram, Vance to AmEmb Santiago, "AFL-CIO Letter to Chilean Minister of Labor," March 26, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁸⁵ Telegram, Vance to AmEmb Santiago, April 5, 1979, *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ See Juan de Onis, "Chile Under Mounting pressure From Church on Human Rights," *NYT*, November 16, 1978, p.4.

⁸⁷ Attempts by the regime to minimize its record of repression would be severely damaged in November 1979 when the remains of 15 decomposed bodies were discovered in Longuén, an abandoned mining area in Central Chile, providing the first potentially tangible evidence that any of the "disappeared" had been killed by the security forces. After weeks sifting through the evidence, the investigating magistrate provided the necessary confirmation. *Ibid.* pp.81-82. Even so, the Junta's General Matthei continued to insist that these were victims of terrorists rather than the security forces. "Matthei Discusses Democracy; Lonquen Bodies," *FBIS: DR: LA*, March 21, 1979, p.E1. The handling of the victims' remains added to the image of a brutal and uncaring dictatorship. When ordered by the courts to return the bones to their families for burial, instead, the military secretly interred them in a communal grave. Despatch, Ambassador (Buick), Santiago Embassy to Under S/S for External Affairs (GSL), Ottawa, "Chile: 1979 Overview," January 14, 1980, *CNA*.

⁸⁸ Lowden, *Moral Opposition to Authoritarian Rule in Chile*, pp. 65-68, 84-86.

⁸⁹ Telegram, Landau to Vance, "Chile Resolution in Third Committee," December 1, 1978, Chile Human Rights Documents, File: DOS, Human Rights in Chile, Vol. 26, Folder 3, Box 15, NA.

⁹⁰ See "Chile: Ungracious Favour," *LAPR*, June 16, 1978, pp.180-181.

⁹¹ Memo, Enders to Vance, November 20, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁹² Quoted in "Chile: Still Under Fire," *LAPR*, November 24, 1978, p.366.

⁹³ Memo, Schneider to Vaky, December 2, 1978. Amnesty International reports during this period concurred with HA's conclusion that disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture still remained a visible feature of the Chilean political scene. See *Amnesty Reports of Chile Human Rights*, July 1977-June 1978 and; May 1978-April 1979.

⁹⁴ Talking Points/Briefing Paper, From N.S. Kane, December 21, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁹⁵ Memo, NSC, Pastor to Denend, January 11, 1978, NSA, Staff Material, FOI Legal, Box 14, *JCPL*.

⁹⁶ Interview with Hugh Michael Carless, Charge d'Affaires, BritishEmb, Buenos Aires, 1977-80, *BDOHP*.

⁹⁷ Author interview with George Landau.

⁹⁸ Memo, Vance to Carter, October 25, 1978, *DNS4*.

⁹⁹ Memo, Vance to Carter, October 27, 1978, *ibid*.

¹⁰⁰ Memo, Vance to Carter, November 10, 1978, *ibid*; Memo, Vance to Carter, November 17, 1978, *ibid*.

¹⁰¹ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, November 27, 1978, *ibid*.

¹⁰² Memo, Vance to Carter, December 2, 1978, *ibid*.

¹⁰³ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, December 6, 1978, *ibid*.

¹⁰⁴ Memo, Christopher to Carter, December 11, 1978, *ibid*.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in "Conflicto con Chile: la Guerra que no fue," *La Nacion* (Argentina), December 21, 2003.

¹⁰⁶ Mark Laudy, "The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building," in Melanie C. Greenburg, et al. (eds.), *Words Over War* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, undated), p.308.

¹⁰⁷ Telegram, CanadianEmb Santiago (Buick) to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, March 26, 1979, RG25, Interim Container 121, File: 20-Chile-1-4, Part 14, *CNA*.

¹⁰⁸ Author interview with George Landau. The negotiations were finally concluded in 1984 when Pinochet and Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

¹⁰⁹ "Universal Declaration of Human Rights Remarks at a White House Meeting Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Declaration's Signing," December 6, 1978, *The American Presidency Project*.

¹¹⁰ Telegram, Vance to AmEmb Santiago, January 26, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

¹¹¹ Memo, Vaky, Derian, Katz to Christopher, February 1, 1979, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: 1-12/79, Box 3-9, *JCPL*.

¹¹² Memo, Vance to Carter, April 20, 1979, *DNS4*.

¹¹³ Briefing Memo, Vaky, Derian to Christopher, February 28, 1979, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: 1-12/79, Box 3-9, *JCPL*. The Embassy considered data collected by the Santiago Archdiocese's Vicariate of Solidarity to be the most reputable even "slightly conservative because [it] wanted to retain credibility across the board in Chile." Author interview with Charles Grover. ARA's Chile Desk Officer remembered having to arbitrate between HA which also relied on Vicariate figures as well as Amnesty International reports and statistics provided by the Chilean Human Rights Commission and Politico-Military Affairs (PM) which contended that the situation was "not as bad" as these sources were suggesting. Usually the Embassy's figures prevailed in Washington "because they had the facts." Author interview with Peter Whitney.

¹¹⁴ Quoted in "Ambassador to US at Meeting; Comments on Relations," *FBIS: DR: LA*, March 19, 1979, p. E1.

¹¹⁵ See Wendy Cooper and A Kauffman O'Reilly, "Business Reassured on Chilean Ties," *JC*, May 3, 1979, p.1.

¹¹⁶ Telegram, Vance (Christopher) to AmEmb Santiago, April 17, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

¹¹⁷ Quoted in Graham Hovey, "US Lists Guidelines for Linking Rights Concern to Foreign Policy," *NYT*, May 3, 1979, p.2.

¹¹⁸ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, May 25, 1979, Vertical File, Chile-Human Rights, Folder: Chile-Human Rights (3), 6/30/79, *JCPL*.

¹¹⁹ Author interview with Mark Schneider.

¹²⁰ Quoted in "US Recalling Envoy Over Chile's Refusal to Extradite 3," *NYT*, May 16, 1979, p.8.

¹²¹ Telegram, Vance to AmEmb, Santiago, "Text of Letter," May 16, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*. Also see Letter, Chairman SFRC Church to President, May 8, 1979, MSS56, Series 2.2, Folder 4, Box 46, *Frank Church Papers*.

¹²² Quotes in Branch and Propper, *Labyrinth*, p. 594 (authors' emphasis).

¹²³ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, May 25, 1979, Vertical File, Chile-Human Rights, Folder: Chile-Human Rights (3), 6/30/79, *JCPL*.

¹²⁴ Letter, US Senate, Kennedy and Church, to Carter, May 14, 1979, *DNSA*; Statement by Harkin, House of Representatives, on Chilean Supreme Court decision, May 14, 1979, *Ibid.*; Statement by Kennedy on Chile, May 15, 1979, *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Letter, Reuss to Vance, May 17, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

¹²⁶ Memo, Atwood to Bushnell, May 13, 1979, *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Telegram, Vance (Christopher) to Landau, "Instructions re US Reaction to outcome of Letelier Case," June 1, 1979, Vertical File, Chile-Human Rights, Folder: Chile-Human Rights (3), 6/30/79, *JCPL*.

¹²⁸ Letter, Congress, House of Representatives, to Carter, August 1, 1979, *DNSA*.

¹²⁹ Memo, White House, David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for NSA to Rear Admiral Thor Hanson, USN, Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense, June 1, 1979, National Security Affairs-Staff Material, North/South; Pastor, Country, Chile, 1-12/79, Box 9, *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Diuguid, "Congressmen Ask Carter to Move on Chile Extraditions," p.A16.

¹³¹ Christopher Dickey, "Human Rights Groups Start Boycott of Riggs Bank Over Loan Policies," *WP*, June 16, 1979, p.C2; "Chilean Company to Get a Loan Totalling \$45 Million," *WSJ*, August 2, 1979, p.23.

¹³² Memo, Katz to Christopher, "Commerce List Export to Chile," July 26, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

¹³³ Author interview with George Landau.

¹³⁴ Memo, Vaky to Christopher, September 19, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*; Talking Points/Briefing Paper, September 19, 1979, *Ibid*. Also see Briefing Memo, Derian to Christopher, September 21, 1979, *Ibid*.

¹³⁵ Memo, Vaky to Christopher, September 22, 1979, *Ibid*.

¹³⁶ Author interview with George Landau.

¹³⁷ Telegram, BritishEmb Washington, D.C. (Henderson) to FC, London, October 2, 1979; Folder: FC7/3613, UK Policy Towards Chile, 1979, *BNA*.

¹³⁸ Despatch, CanadianEmb, Santiago to External Affairs, Ottawa, GSL, October 8, 1979, Folder Title: "Political Affairs-Policy and Background-Internal Policy Trends-CHILE," File No Dossier: 20-Chile-1-4, Volume 15/16, 79-08-01 to 82-06-30, *CNA*.

¹³⁹ Memo, Christopher to Carter, October 2, 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, *JCPL*.

¹⁴⁰ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, "Evening Report," November 16, 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports File, Box 25, *Ibid*.

¹⁴¹ Draft memo, Vaky through Christopher to Vance, October 5, 1979, National Security Affairs-Staff Material, North/South; Pastor, Country, Chile, 1-12/79, Box 9, *JCPL*.

¹⁴² Memo, Constable to Knepper, October 5, 1979, *Ibid*.

¹⁴³ Memo, Ely to Bushnell, October 9, 1979, *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁴ Memo, Calingaert to ARA, October 12, 1979, *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁵ Draft memo, Vaky through Christopher to Vance, October 5, 1979. *DOS/OH*.

¹⁴⁶ Letter, Brown to Vance, October 9, 1979, Vertical File, Chile-Human Rights, Folder: Chile-Human Rights (3), 6/30/79, *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁷ Memo, Office of Assist Sec of Defense (G.J. Schuller, Director, Inter-American Region) to Bamebey, Director, Andean Affairs, ARA, October 11, 1979, *Declassified NSC/Chile*.

¹⁴⁸ Paper, DOS, "Residual Military Relationship with Chile," October 12, 1979, *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁹ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, October 11, 1979, Vertical File, Chile-Human Rights, Folder: Chile-Human Rights (3), 6/30/79, *JCPL*.

¹⁵⁰ Quotes in Branch and Propper, *Labyrinth*, p.599.

¹⁵¹ Memo, Vance to Carter, October 19, 1979, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: Chile 1-12/79, Box 9, *JCPL*. Senator Edward Kennedy was singled out as "play[ing] a particularly active role in convincing Vance that it was necessary to adopt a get-tough stance." Quoted in John M. Goshko and Timothy S. Robinson, "US Eying Cutback in Aid to Chile," *WP*, October 18, 1979, p. A8.

¹⁵² See Goshko and Robinson, "US Eying Cutback in Aid to Chile," pp. A1, A8.

¹⁵³ Memo, NSC, Pastor to Brzezinski, October 11, 1979, Vertical File, Chile-Human Rights, Folder: Chile Human Rights (3), 6/30/79, *JCPL*.

¹⁵⁴ Robert S. Steven interview, *FAOHC*.

¹⁵⁵ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, October 25, 1979, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: Chile-1-12/79, Box 9, *JCPL*.

¹⁵⁶ Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, November 19, 1979, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: 1-12/79, Box 3-9, *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Quoted in Branch and Proper, *Labyrinth*, p.600.

¹⁵⁸ Memo, Frank Moore and Bob Beckel, "Chile Sanctions," October 24, 1979, Office of Box 219, *JCPL*.

¹⁵⁹ Memo, Brzezinski to Vance, "Letelier/Moffitt Case," Undated 1979, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: Chile: 1-12/79, Box 9, *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ Memo, Brzezinski, Owen to Carter, "Proposed Sanctions against Chile," [undated, probably early February 1980], NSA, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Folder: Chile, 1/77-1/81, Box 7, *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Author interview with Peter Whitney.

¹⁶² Memo, Brzezinski to Vance, November 27, 1979, Vertical File, Chile-Human Rights, Folder: Chile-Human Rights (3), 6/30/79, *JCPL*; Telegram, Vance to AmEmb Santiago, November 30, 1979, Vertical File, Chile-Human Rights, Folder: Chile-Human rights (3) 6/30/79, *Ibid.*

Notes to Chapter 8

¹ Memo, NSC, LA/Caribbean (Pastor) to Brzezinski, December 3, 1979, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports File, Box 25, *JCPL*; Letter, "Chile: Letelier Case," Harding to Fearn, SAD, FCO, London, December 7, 1979, Folder: FC07/3614, UK Policy Toward Chile, 1979, *BNA*.

² News from Congressman Tom Harkin, "Harkin Blasts 'Despicably Weak' Carter Response to Chile," November 30, 1979, *DNS4*.

³ Despatch, CanadianEmb, Santiago (Buick) to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (GSL), Ottawa, "Chile: 1979 Overview," January 14, 1980, Folder: Political Affairs-Policy and Background-Internal Policy Trends-CHILE, File No Dossier: 20-Chile-1-4, Volume 15/16, 79-08-01 to 82-06-30, *CNA*.

⁴ Quoted in Graham Hovey, "Carter Said to Plan Cutbacks in Chile Over Letelier Case," *NYT*, November 30, 1979, p.6.

⁵ Quoted in "Cubillos Assails US Decision," *FBIS: DR: LA*, December 3, 1979, p.E1; "Chile Says US Cutbacks Revive 'Imperialism,'" *NYT*, December 1, 1979, p.8.

⁶ Memo, Derian to Bowdler, January 3, 1980, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁷ Memo, Brzezinski, Owen to Carter, undated, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Folder: Chile: 1/77-1/81, Box 7, *JCPL*.

⁸ Author interview with George Landau.

⁹ Author interview with Charles Grover.

¹⁰ Memo, Barnebey to Eaton, December 19, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

¹¹ Quoted in "US Cuts Nearly all Ties with Chile, Accuses the Regime of Condoning Terrorism," *LAT*, December 1, 1979, p.2.

¹² Quoted in Edward C. Burks, "Kennedy Assails Carter's Actions on Chile as Weak," *NYT*, December 1, 1979, p.39.

¹³ Juan de Onis, "US Envoy Resumes His Duties in Chile," *NYT*, December 6, 1979, p.13. Following the Carter administration decision to suspend all US military aid to Chile in 1977, Israel stepped into the breach and became an important arms supplier to the Pinochet regime, negotiating agreements to provide a range of weaponry including patrol boats, an electronic radar system, air-to-air missiles, and large quantities of spare parts, light arms, ammunition, uniforms, and helmets. See Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israeli Connection* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), p.99. On Israeli arms sales to Chile between 1973 and 1983, also see Aaron S. Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach* (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1985), pp.136-138; Leslie H. Gelb, "Israelis Said to Step Up Role as Arms Suppliers to Latins," *NYT*, December 17, 1982, pp.1,11; "A New Jerusalem Built on Trade," *LAWR*, September 5, 1980, pp.7-8; Penny Lernoux, "Who's Who of Dictators Obtain Arms from Israel," *NCR*, December 25, 1981, pp.3, 23.

¹⁴ Author Interview with Roberta Cohen. In July 1980, the British Ambassador to Chile informed George Landau that Whitehall had decided to lift its seven-year arms embargo of Chile. To Landau this latest breach in the wall was significant not just in terms of the Chileans gaining a possible new weapons supplier but also for the "considerable psychological lift" it would give Pinochet "both internally and externally." Telegram, Landau to Vance, July 22, 1980, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

¹⁵ Despatch, CanadianEmb, Santiago (Buick) to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (GSL), Ottawa, "Chile: 1979 Overview," January 14, 1980. *CNA*.

¹⁶ Annual Review, BritishEmb Santiago (Amy) to London (Lord Carrington), December 27, 1979, Folder: FC07/3749, Chile: Annual Review for 1979, *BNA*.

¹⁷ Author interview with George Landau.

¹⁸ Author interview with George Landau; George Landau interview, *FAOHC*; Author interview with Charles Grover.

¹⁹ Telegram, USUN Mission, New York (McHenry) to Vance, December 4, 1979, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

²⁰ Telegram, Vance to USUN Mission, New York, December 5, 1979, *Ibid*.

²¹ Quoted in Charles A. Krause, "US Bluff in Letelier Case Bolsters Pinochet in Chile," *WP*, January 2, 1980, p.A1. An NSC official dismissed the idea that anyone in the administration thought the sanctions "were going to bring down the Pinochet regime." Unlike the Cuba sanctions, they did not have international (or extraterritorial) jurisdiction and most administration officials considered the Cuba sanctions a failure and "so we didn't want to go down that road again." Author interview with David L. Aaron.

²² Telegram, Landau to Vance, January 18, 1980, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

²³ Telegram, Landau to Vance, January 23, 1980, *Ibid*.

²⁴ Telegram, Landau to Vance, January 18, 1980, *Ibid*.

²⁵ Telegram, Landau to Vance, February 4, 1980, *Ibid*.

²⁶ George Landau interview, *FAOHC*.

²⁷ All quotes in Juan de Onis, "Chile Attracts US Business," *NYT*, October 4, 1979, p.7.

²⁸ Roger Lowenstein, "Chile Again Lures Investments in Copper Despite Takeover of Mines in Early 1970s," *WSJ*, January 28, 1980, p.24.

²⁹ Quoted in Juan de Onis, "New Crackdown in Chile Greets Appeals for Changes," *NYT*, July 10, 1980, p.2. Over \$3 billion in foreign loans enabled Chile to pay off \$2 billion in debts that fell due in 1979 and to cushion a trade deficit. *Ibid.*

³⁰ The banks were Bank of America, Chase Merchant Banking Group, and Wells Fargo Bank NA. See *DJ*, August 14, 1980; "Chilean Banks Sign for Credit Facility," *TGM*, August 29, 1980, p.B2; *DJ*, Sept 26, 1980; "Banks Lend \$50 million," *TGM*, December 11, 1980, p. B24.

³¹ Stansfield Turner, *Terrorism and Democracy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p.58. For a concise summary of the different approaches to international relations taken by Vance and Brzezinski, see Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006* (New York: McGraw Hill, 10th edition, 2008), pp.302-304.

³² On Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the US response, see Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, pp.1125-1146; Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, *Superpower Détente: A Reappraisal* (London: Sage Publications, 1988), pp.234-253.

³³ See Frick Curry, *Subsidizing Pinochet*, p.8.

³⁴ Memo for the Record, World Bank, Eugenio Lari to Robert McNamara, "Chile-Meeting with Finance Minister de Castro," November 28, 1979, File Unit: Contacts Chile (1972-1979), Box 4, A1993-012, *WBG.A*. Between 1974 and 1979, this global financial institution lent Chile a meagre \$127 million. Kapur, et, al, *The WorldBank*, p.301.

³⁵ Memo, Ely to Hinton, January 15, 1980, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

³⁶ Memo, Bowdler, Hinton to Christopher, January 21, 1980, *Ibid.*

³⁷ Memo, Whitney to Eaton, Barnebey, Knepper, "MDB Loans to Chile," February 5, 1980, *Ibid.*

³⁸ Memo, Bowdler to Christopher, March 6, 1980, *Ibid.*

³⁹ Cable, Landau to Vance, April 16, 1980, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: 1-10/80, Box 3-9, *JCPL*.

⁴⁰ Memo, Derian, Bowdler, Hinton to Christopher, April 3, 1980, *DOS/FOIAe, III*. In November, the US also voted "No" on a \$19.9 million rural drinking water loan request by Chile to the IADB.

⁴¹ Memo, Whitney to Eaton, April 11, 1980, *Ibid.*

⁴² Briefing Memo, Derian to Christopher, April 17, 1980, *Ibid.*

⁴³ Telegram, Vance to AmEmb, Ottawa et al, April 15, 1980, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: 1-10/80, Box 3-9, *JCPL*.

⁴⁴ Author interview with George Landau.

⁴⁵ Author interview with Paul M. McO.

⁴⁶ Author interview with Robert Pastor.

⁴⁷ See for instance Telegram, AmEmb Paris (Hartman) to Vance, April 17, 1980, *DOS/FOLAe, III*; Telegram, AmEmb London (Streator) to Vance, April 17, 1980, *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ John R. Bushnell interview, *FAOHC*.

⁴⁹ Author interview with Robert Blake.

⁵⁰ Memo, Thornton to Brzezinski, February 13, 1980, Donated Brzezinski, Subject File, Meetings Vance, Brown, Brzezinski: 3/80-9/80, Box 34, *JCPL*.

⁵¹ Memo, Thornton to Brzezinski, February 19, 1980, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Folder: Meetings-Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski: 5/80-6/80, Box 23, *Ibid.*

⁵² Memo, Pastor to Brzezinski, February 20, 1980, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: 1-10/80, Box 3-9, *Ibid.*

⁵³ Memo, Flood to Derian, February 18, 1980, *Declassified DOS/FOLA*; Telegram, Vance to US Mission Geneva, February 23, 1980, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: 1-10/80, Box 3-9, *JCPL*; Author interview with Roberta Cohen.

⁵⁴ Memo, Thornton to Brzezinski, March 28, 1980, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Folder: Meetings-Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski: 5/80-6/80, Box 23, *JCPL*.

⁵⁵ Letter to President, May 6, 1980, attached to Memo, Albright to Brzezinski, May 28, 1980, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File: Folder: Meetings Muskie/Brown, Brzezinski, 5/80-6/80, Box 23, *JCPL*.

⁵⁶ Quoted in "US Bars Chile From Naval Exercise as a Reprisal for Letelier-Case Action," *MH*, June 19, 1980, p.A23.

⁵⁷ Memo of Conversation, "Summary of the President's Meeting....," July 1, 1980, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Box 88, *JCPL*.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Author interview with Roberta Cohen.

⁶⁰ Author interview with Charles Grover.

⁶¹ Telegram, Landau to Vance, March 18, 1980, NSA, Staff material, North-South, Folder: 1-10/80, Box 3-9, *JCPL*.

⁶² Telegram Landau to DDD (Joint Chiefs of Staff), March 4, 1980, *DNSA*.

⁶³ Memo, Brzezinski to Aaron, Denend, Dodson, April 1, 1980, Subject File, Donated Historical Material Brzezinski Collection, Folder: Meetings-Muskie, Brown, Brzezinski, Box 23, *JCPL*.

⁶⁴ Telegram, Christopher to AmEmb Santiago, "Naval Exercise UNITAS XXI," April 11, 1980, NSA, Staff Material, North/South, Folder: 1-10/80, Box 3-9, *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Quoted in *AP*, March 18, 1980.

⁶⁶ Quoted in Charles A. Krause, "Filipino Rebuff Humiliates Pinochet; Chileans Fear End of Liberalization," *WP*, April 2, 1980, p.A22.

⁶⁷ See Huneus, *The Pinochet Regime*, p.198.

⁶⁸ Author interview with George Landau; *AP*, April 2, 1980.

⁶⁹ Author interview with George Landau.

⁷⁰ Despatch, GSL/Charles Court, Desk Officer, Latin American Division, External Affairs, to FILE (Via Mr.Gilbert), "Conversation with Edgardo Boeninger," May

6, 1980, Folder Title: Political Affairs-Policy and Background-Internal Policy Trends-CHILE, File No Dossier: 20-Chile-1-4, Volume 15/16, 79-08-01 to 82-06-30, *CNA*.

⁷¹ Telegram, Landau to Vance, "US/Bilateral Relations," April 24, 1980, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁷² Despatch, CanadianEmb (Buick), to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, (GSL) Ottawa, "Chile in 1980," Feb 9, 1981, Folder: Political Affairs-Policy and Background-Internal Policy Trends-CHILE, File No Dossier: 20-Chile-1-4, Volume 15/16, 79-08-01 to 82-06-30, *CNA*.

⁷³ Telegram, Landau to Vance, "US/Bilateral Relations," April 24, 1980.

⁷⁴ George Landau interview, *FAOHC*; Author Interview with George Landau.

⁷⁵ Quoted in "Merino Downplays Exclusion from Unitas-21 Exercise," *FBI: DR: LA*, June 18, 1980, p.E1.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Telegram, The Situation Room, To Denend for Brzezinski, "Secretary's Morning Summary," June 21, 1980, *Declassified DOS/FOIA*.

⁷⁷ Memo, Paster to Brzezinski, June 10, 1980, Donated Historical File, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Folder: Meetings-Muskie/Brown Brzezinski: 5/80-6/80, Box 23, *JCPL*.

⁷⁸ Memo, Thornton to Brzezinski, June 10, 1980, Donated Historical Materials, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection, Subject file, Folder: meetings Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski: 5/80-6/80, Box 23, *Ibid*.

⁷⁹ Memo, Muskie to Carter, June 6, 1980, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 76, *Ibid*. Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, "NSC Weekly Report #145," June 13, 1980, NSA, Plains File, Box 10, *Ibid*.

⁸⁰ Memo, Christopher to Carter, June 19, 1980, NSA, Staff Materials, North/South, Folder: Latin America 1-12/80, Box 10-43, *Ibid*.

⁸¹ Telegram, Situation Room, to Denend for Brzezinski, "Secretary's Morning Summary," June 21, 1980.

⁸² Author interview with George Landau.

⁸³ Memo, Service to Bushnell, September 26, 1980, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁸⁴ Annual Review, BritishEmb Santiago (Amy) to London (Lord Carrington), December 27, 1979, Folder: FC07/3749, Chile: Annual Review for 1979, *BNA*.

⁸⁵ Telegram, Landau to Vance, September 28, 1979.

⁸⁶ "Government Cracks Down on Protest," *LAWR*, May 9, 1980, p.5.

⁸⁷ Author interview with George Landau.

⁸⁸ See Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship*, pp.180-181.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*. p.168.

⁹⁰ Quoted in de Onis, "New Crackdown in Chile Greeted Appeals for Changes," p.2.

⁹¹ Chilean military official quoted in Hawkins, *International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile*, p.131.

⁹² Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime*, p.88.

⁹³ Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship*, p.173.

⁹⁴ Quotes in "Kennedy, 40 Congressmen Call Chile's Vote a Fraud," *WP*, September 11, 1980, p.A26.

⁹⁵ Telegram, Landau to Muskie, August 20, 1980, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

⁹⁶ Telegram, CanadianEmb, Santiago to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa (GSL) "Plebiscite in Chile: Statement by the Conference of Bishops," August 25, 1980, Folder: Political Affairs-Policy and Background-Internal Policy Trends-CHILE, File No Dossier: 20-Chile-1-4, Volume 15/16, 79-08-01 to 82-06-30, *CNA*.

⁹⁷ Despatch, CanadianEmb Santiago to External Affairs, Ottawa GSL, September 10, 1980, *Ibid*.

⁹⁸ National Intelligence Daily Cable, "Chile: Opposition to Plebiscite," August 29, 1980, Folder: Political Affairs-Policy and Background-Internal Policy Trends-CHILE, File No Dossier: 20-Chile-1-4, Volume 15/16, 79-08-01 to 82-06-30, *Ibid*.

⁹⁹ Author interview with Robert Pastor.

¹⁰⁰ Author interview with Robert Service.

¹⁰¹ Author interview with Robert Blake.

¹⁰² John R. Bushnell interview, *FAOHC*.

¹⁰³ Telegram, Landau to Muskie, September 10, 1980, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

¹⁰⁴ A study of approximately one tenth of the 10,552 voting tables in greater Santiago by Chilean sociologist Eduardo Hamuy "discovered gross fraud at almost 40 percent of the polling sites studied." Spooner, *Soldiers in a Narrow Land*, p.154.

¹⁰⁵ "Pinochet Press Conference," *FBIS: DR: L4*, September 15, 1980, p.E2.

¹⁰⁶ Pollack, *The New Right in Chile, 1973-97*, pp.79, 73.

¹⁰⁷ Manuel Antonio Garretón, "The Political Evolution of the Chilean Military Regime and Problems in the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, et al (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p.110.

¹⁰⁸ Author interview with Mark Schneider.

¹⁰⁹ Talking Paper, DOS, "Department statement on Chile constitutional plebiscite," September 18, 1980 [from Roberta Cohen].

¹¹⁰ Huneus, *The Pinochet Regime*, pp. 358, 360.

¹¹¹ Memo, "Christopher Group Meeting," August 27, 1980 [from Roberta Cohen].

¹¹² Telegram, Landau to Muskie, September 8, 1980, *DOS/FOIAe, III*.

¹¹³ Telegram, Muskie to AmEmb, Santiago, September 12, 1980, *Ibid*.

¹¹⁴ For a record of Carter administration votes in the MDDBs, see Rossiter, *Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction*, p.15.

¹¹⁵ Memo, NSC, Dodson to Clift, October 23, 1980, WHCF, Subject File-Confidential, Folder: C0 33, 1/29/77-1/20/81, Box C0-15, *JCPL*.

¹¹⁶ *Amnesty Reports on Chile Human Rights*, May 1979-April 1980; May 1980-April 1981.

¹¹⁷ Quoted in de Onis, "New Crackdown in Chile Greets Appeals for Changes," p.2.

¹¹⁸ United Nations Press Release HR/981, "Human Rights Special Rapporteur Sees Aggravation of State of Emergency in Chile," November 14, 1980. Also see United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1981, Volume 35* (New York: Department of Public Information, 1985), p.051.

¹¹⁹ Annual Review, Britis Emb, Santiago (Heath) to the Secretary of State, FC0, London, January 9, 1981, Folder: FC07/3893, Chile: Annual Review for 1980, BNA.

¹²⁰ See Memo, Thornton to Brzezinski, November 18, 1980, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Folder: Meetings-Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski, Box 24, JCPL.

¹²¹ One striking instance of the Junta's determination to show a solid front to the outside world even where there were sharp cleavages among its members involved an effort by Admiral Merino and Navy officials in late 1979 to preserve a key feature of 1974 legislation that had benefited Chile's merchant marine and demonstrated the conditional nature of the regime's embrace of neoliberal economic reforms by providing "reciprocal tariffs and subsidies for the purchase of new vessels." The proposal generated a vociferous debate which pitted the Navy against Pinochet and other Junta members Mendoza (Carabineros) and Matthei (Air Force) who "saw no compelling reason to maintain the [existing] law." The Junta's decision to end the subsidies outraged the Navy high command which, unsuccessfully, attempted to have the ruling overturned. Yet, despite the Navy's deep unhappiness over the outcome, it did not weaken the Junta's unity. See Bawden, *The Pinochet Generation*, pp.176-178.

¹²² Between July and December 1980, three US banks (Bank of America, Wells Fargo Bank, Chase Merchant Banking Group) arranged four separate syndicated loans to Chile totalling \$152 million.

¹²³ Author interview with Robert S. Steven.

¹²⁴ Author interview with Peter Whitney.

¹²⁵ Confidential interview.

¹²⁶ Author interview with David L. Aaron.

¹²⁷ Author interview with George Landau.

¹²⁸ Author interview with Robert Pastor.

Notes to Conclusion

¹ In a memo in 1987 President Reagan's Secretary of State Georg Shultz informed the White House of a recent CIA report analyzing the Letelier-Moffitt assassinations. It concluded that there was "convincing evidence that President Pinochet personally ordered his intelligence chief [DINA head] Manuel Contreras to carry out the murders [and that] Pinochet decided to stonewall on the US investigation to hide his involvement." The report also confirmed that Pinochet had even contemplated "the elimination of his former intelligence chief" Contreras, who was sentenced to seven years imprisonment in Chile in 1995 for the murders of Letelier and Moffitt. The Agency, wrote Shultz, "had never before drawn and presented its conclusion that such strong evidence exists of [Pinochet's] role in this act of terrorism. It is not clear whether we can or would want to consider indicting Pinochet.... Nevertheless, this is a blatant example of a chief of state's direct involvement in an act of state terrorism...." Memo, Shultz to Reagan, October 6, 1987, DNS4.

² Telegram, Landau to Vance, March 17, 1978, *DOS/FOIAe, I*.

³ See Richard Feinberg, *US Human Rights Policy: Latin America* (Washington D.C.: Center for International Policy, October 1980), p.3.

⁴ Author interview with Mark Schneider.

⁵ Author interview with Robert O. Blake.

⁶ On the conflict between HA and the geographic bureaus, see Clinton Rossiter, *Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction* (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, September, 1984), 27pp

⁷ David Earl Morrison, *Human Rights Foreign Policy Decision making in the US State Department and Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs: Process and Perception* (PHD Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1988), pp.80-81.

⁸ Quoted in Edwin S. Maynard, "The Bureaucracy and Implementation of US Human Rights Policy," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol.11, No.12, May 1989, p.186.

⁹ Morrison, *Human Rights Foreign Policy Decision-Making*, p.87.

¹⁰ Author interview with Stephen Cohen.

¹¹ Author interview with John R. Bushnell; John R. Bushnell interview, *FAOHC*.

¹² David D. Newsom, *Witness To A Changing World* (Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 2008), p.306.

¹³ Author interview with Mark Schneider.

¹⁴ William Stedman interview, *FAOHC*.

¹⁵ Author interview with Sally Shelton-Colby.

¹⁶ Author interview with Roberta Cohen.

¹⁷ Author interview with Robert Pastor.

¹⁸ See for instance Steven W. Hook, *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power* (Washington: CQ Press, 2010).

¹⁹ Author Interview with James M. Wilson, Jr.

²⁰ Barbara Hinckley, *Less Than Meets the Eye* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p.141.

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Confidential Interview, Hilton Head, S.C., April 19, 2007: DOS, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Santiago, 1976-early 1981.

David L. Aaron, Santa Monica, CA, September 5, 2007: NSC, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1977-1981.

Malcolm Bamebey, Plano, Texas, September 7, 2007: DOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Director, Office of Policy Planning, Public and Congressional Affairs, 1976-1977; Staff Director, NSC Interagency Groups 1977; Director, Office of Andean Affairs, 1979-1980.

Robert O. Blake, Washington, D.C., September 26, 2006: DOS, (Deputy and) Assist Secretary for International Organizations, 1974-1975; Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 1978-1980.

Thomas Boyatt, McLean, VA, September 18, 2006: DOS, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Santiago, 1975-1978.

John R. Bushnell, Falls Church, VA, September 22, 2006: DOT, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs (Developing Nations), 1974-1976; DOS, Acting/Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 1977-1980.

Roberta Cohen, Washington, D.C., October 5, 2006: DOS, Bureau of Human Rights, Office of Southern Cone, 1978; Human Rights Officer for International Organizations and Non-Government Organizations, and senior adviser to U.S. delegations to UNHRC and UNGA during Carter administration; Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, 1980.

Steven Cohen, Washington, D.C., September 13, 2006: DOS, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights/Security Assistance, 1979-1980.

Enrique R. Correa, Santiago, Chile, July 17, 2008: President of the Christian Democracy Party during the 1960s; joined *Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria* (MAPU) in 1969; joined *Unidad Popular* (UP) government 1970-73 and switched membership from MAPU to the Socialist Party.

Joseph Eldridge, Washington, D.C., September 21, 2007: Co-Founder Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Director, 1974-early 1980s.

Rudy Fimbres, Chesapeake Beach, MD, September 6, 2007: DOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary ARA/BC; Director Bolivia-Chile Affairs, 1974-1975; Office Director ARA, 1974-1976.

Charles W. Grover, Bethesda, MD, September 15, 2006: DOS, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Santiago, 1978-1982.

Arnold Isaacs, Falls Church, VA, October 3, 2006: DOS, Chile Desk Officer, 1974-1975.

George F. Jones, Fairfax, VA, September 17, 2007: DOS, Deputy Director, Office of Regional Political Programs, 1978-1982; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Santiago, 1985-1989.

George W. Landau, Peacham, VT, September 10, 2007: DOS, Ambassador to Chile, 1977-1982.

Stephen Low, Washington, D.C., September 27, 2007: NSC, Staff Member, Latin American Affairs, 1974-1976.

William Lowenthal, East Falls Church, VA., April 17, 2007: DOS, U.S. Embassy, Santiago, September 1973-February 1974; Deputy Director, Bolivia-Chile Affairs, ARA, 1974-1975.

Paul M. Meo, Bethesda, MD, September 19, 2007: Senior World Bank economist with primary responsibility for the Andean Group countries, 1976-1987.

Heraldo Muñoz, New York City, September 25, 2008. Member of the Chilean Socialist Party; spent most of the 1970s in exile in Europe and the United States; returned to Chile in September 1978 and participant in Socialist Party efforts to develop a strategy for confronting the Pinochet dictatorship

David Newsom, Email Correspondence, September 9, 2006: DOS, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 1979-1980.

Ricardo Núñez, Santiago, Chile, July 9, 2008. Member of the Chilean Socialist Party; after the 1973 coup lived in exile in East Berlin; returned to Chile in the late 1970s and participated in Socialist Party efforts to

develop a strategy for confronting the Pinochet dictatorship; a founding member of the Socialist Convergence in 1980.

Robert Pastor, Washington, D.C., September 18, 2006: NSC Staff, Latin American North/South Cluster, 1977-1981.

Thomas Quigley, Washington, D.C., November 28, 2007: Policy Adviser on Latin America and the Caribbean, US National Conference of Catholic Bishops during the 1970s and 1980s.

William D. Rogers, Washington, D.C., October 3, 2006: DOS, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 1974-1976; Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, 1976.

John Salzberg, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2006: Staff Consultant on International Human Rights, House Subcommittee on International Organizations, 1973-1978; DOS, Regional Affairs Officer, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979-1981.

Robert E. Service, Washington, D.C., September 16, 2007: DOS, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, 1980-1982.

Mark L. Schneider, Washington, D.C., October 19, 2007: Staff Aide to Senator Edward Kennedy, 1970-1977. DOS, Deputy Coordinator/Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1977-1979.

Brent Scowcroft, Washington, D.C., October 2, 2006: Deputy NSC Adviser 1973-1975; NSC Adviser 1975-1976.

Harry Shlaudeman, Email Correspondence, September 25, 2007: DOS, Ambassador to Venezuela, 1975-1976; Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 1976-1977, Ambassador to Peru, 1977-1980.

Robert Steven, Arlington, VA., April 16, 2007: DOS, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Santiago, 1973-1976; Chile Desk Officer, 1977-1979.

Peter Whitney, Washington, D.C., April 24, 2007: DOS, Chile Desk Officer 1979-1981.

James M. Wilson, Jr. Washington, D.C. September 15, 2006: DOS, Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, 1975; Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976-1978.

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