

PRONUNCIATIONS

In Pali the vowels are pronounced as follows :

The short *a* as *a* in *at*

The long *ā* as *a* in *father*

The short *i* as *i* in *pin*

The long *ī* as *ee* in *been*

The short *u* as *u* in *put*

The long *ū* as *oo* in *tool*

The long *ē* as *a* in *table* (always long)

The long *ō* as *o* in *bone* (always long).

The consonants are mostly as in English ; but *g* is always hard, and *c* is always *ch* as in *church*. The consonants *t*, *th*, *ḍ*, *ḍh*, *ṇ*, *l*, are linguals and are formed by bringing the upturned tip of the tongue in contact with the back of the palate.

LIFE OF THE BUDDHA

Reduce to meekness the wild motions of the will, and make it thy care to tame the cruel beast. Thou art bound to the will ; strive to unfasten the bond that cannot be broken. The will is thy Eve.

St Bonaventura, *De conversione*.

THE STORY OF THE BUDDHA'S LIFE IS WELL KNOWN AND need be only briefly summarized ; its span of eighty years covers the greater part of the fifth century B.C., but the exact dates of his birth and death are uncertain. Prince Siddhattha, the only son of king Suddhodana of the Sākiya clan and of his queen Mahā Māyā, was born at Kapilavatthu, the capital city of Kosala, a district extending from southern Nepal to the Ganges. In saying "king" (*rājā*) it must not be overlooked that most of the "kingdoms" of the Ganges Valley at this time were really republics over which the "kings" presided ; the procedure followed in the Buddhist monastic convocations corresponded to that of the republican assemblies and to that of the trade guilds and village councils.

Until the Great Awakening Siddhattha is still a Bodhisatta, although this is the last of the countless births in which he had already developed those supreme virtues and insights that lead to perfection. As a Buddha, the "Wake" is sometimes referred to by his family name of Gotama or Gautama, and this serves to distinguish him from the seven (or twenty-four) previous Buddhas of whom he was more truly the lineal descendant. Many of the Buddha's epithets connect him with the Sun or Fire, and imply his divinity : he is, for example, "the Eye in the World," his name is "Truth," and amongst the most characteristic synonyms of *Buddha* (the "Wake") are the expressions "Brahma-become" and "Dhamma-become." Many of the details of his life are direct reflections of older myths. These considerations raise the question, whether the "life" of the "Conqueror of Death" and "Teacher of Gods and men," who says that he was born and bred in the Brahma-world and who descended from heaven to take birth in Mahā Māyā's womb, can be regarded as historical or simply as a

myth in which the nature and acts of the Vedic deities Agni and Indra have been more or less plausibly euhemerized. There are no contemporary records, but it is certain that in the third century B.C. it was believed that the Buddha had lived as a man amongst men. It is not proposed to discuss the problem here, and, although the writer is inclined to the mythical interpretation, references will be made to the Buddha as if to a historical person.

Prince Siddhattha was brought up in luxury at the court in Kapilavasthu and kept in total ignorance of the old age, sickness and death to which all mundane beings are naturally subject. He was married to his cousin Yasodā, and had by her an only son, Rāhula. Soon after Rāhula's birth it was realized by the Gods that the time had come for Siddhattha to "go forth" and take up the mission for which he had prepared himself in many previous births that he had for the present forgotten. Orders had been given that whenever he rode out through the city from the palace to the pleasure park, none sick or aged and no funeral procession might appear in public. So man proposed, but the Gods, assuming the forms of a sick man, an old man, a corpse, and a religious Mendicant (*bhikkhu*), appeared. When Siddhattha saw these, to him strange sights, and learnt from his charioteer, Channa, that all men are liable to sickness, old age and death, and that only the religious Mendicant rises superior to the distress which suffering and death occasion in others, he was deeply moved. Straightway he resolved to seek and find a remedy for the mortality that is inherent in all composite things, in all that has had a beginning and must therefore come to an end. He resolved, in other words, to discover the secret of immortality, and to make it known to the world.

Returning home, he informed his father of this determination. When he could not be dissuaded, the king set guards at all the palace gates, and endeavoured to keep his son and heir at home by force. But at night, after taking a last look at his sleeping wife and child, he summoned his charioteer and, mounting his stallion Kanthaka, came to the gates, which were silently opened for him by the Gods, and so rode away. This was the "Great Going Forth."

In the deep forests the prince cut off his royal turban and long hair, unsuitable to a religious Mendicant, and dismissed his

charioteer. He met with Brahman hermits, under whose guidance he led the life of a contemplative. Then, leaving them, he devoted himself alone to the "Great Effort"; at the same time a company of five Mendicants became his disciples, and served him, in the expectation that he would become a Buddha. To this end he now practised far more severe mortifications, and brought himself to the very verge of death by starvation. Realizing, however, that the consequent weakening of his bodily and mental powers would not lead to the Awakening (*bodhi*) for the sake of which he had abandoned the worldly life, he again took up his bowl and begged his food in villages and towns like other Mendicants. At this, the five disciples abandoned him. But the time for his Awakening had come, and from his dreams the Bodhisatta drew the conclusion, "This very day I shall become a Buddha." He ate food into which the Gods had infused ambrosia, and rested during the day. When evening came, he approached the Bodhi tree, and there, at Earth's centre, with his face to the East, he took his seat, where every former Buddha had been seated at the time of his Enlightenment; immovable, he determined so to remain until he had realized his purpose.

Then Māra (Death)—the old Vedic Ahi-Vṛtra-Namuci, "Holdfast," overcome in the past by Agni-Bṛhaspati and Indra, but never really slain—perceiving that "the Bodhisatta wants to liberate himself from my dominion," would not let him go, and led his armies against him. The Gods were terrified and fled in alarm; the Bodhisatta sat there alone, with only his own transcendent virtues for bodyguard. Māra's assault with weapons of thunder and lightning, darkness, flood, and fire, and all the temptations presented by Māra's three beautiful daughters, left the Bodhisatta literally unaffected and unmoved. Māra, unable to recover the throne to which he had laid claim, could only retire. The Gods returned, and celebrated the prince's victory; and so night fell.

Entering into ever deeper states of contemplation the Bodhisatta obtained successively the Knowledge of Former Births, Divine Insight, the Understanding of Causal Origination, and finally, at dawn, the Full Enlightenment or "Awakening" (*sammā-sambodhi*) that he had been seeking, and so, ceasing to be a Bodhisatta, became a Buddha, the "Wake." A Buddha is no longer in a category, but innumerable; no longer "this

man So-and-so," no longer anyone, but one whose proper name it would be in vain to ask, and to whom are appropriate only such epithets as *Arahant* ("Worthy"), *Tathāgata* ("True-come"), *Bhagavā* ("Dispenser"), *Mahāpurisa* ("Great Citizen"), *Saccanāma* ("He whose Name is Truth"), and *Anoma* ("Unfathomable"), none of which is the designation of an individual. The explicit synonyms "Dhamma-become" and "Brahma-become" are particularly noteworthy; for the Buddha expressly identifies himself with the Eternal Law (*dhamma*) that he embodies, and the expression "Brahma-become" must be taken to imply an absolute theosis, if only because the Buddha had been a *Brahmā* and *Mahā Brahmā* already in previous births and because in any case the gnosis of a *Brahmā* is inferior to that of a Buddha. Here and now in the world the Buddha had attained that Liberty (*vimutti*), Despiration (*nibbāna = nirvāṇa*), and Immortality (*amatam*), the Way to which he would henceforth proclaim to all men.

But now he hesitated, knowing that the Eternal Law of which he had become the bearer, and with which he identified himself, would be hard indeed for other-minded and worldly men to understand; he was tempted to remain a Solitary Buddha, enjoying by himself the hard-earned fruits of an age-long quest of which the goal had been reached at last. If we are to form any conception of the Buddhist *Nibbāna* it will be almost indispensable for us to understand the quality of this "enjoyment"; it was "the supreme beatitude of one who had rejected the notion 'I am'"; of one who had utterly "denied himself," and so "laid down his burden." This was *Māra*'s last and subtlest temptation: that it would be folly to abandon this hard-won felicity and to return to ordinary life in order to preach a Way to men who would neither hear nor understand. But at the Buddha's hesitation the Gods despaired; and their highest, *Brahmā Sahampati*, appeared before him, lamenting that "The world is lost!" and pleading that there were in the world at least some people of comparatively clear vision who would hear and understand his teaching. For their sake the Buddha consented, announcing that "the Doors of Immortality are open." Accordingly, he set out to spend the remaining forty-five years of his natural life in "Turning the Wheel of the Law," that is to say, in the preaching of the liberating Truth and of the Way that must be followed if

the ultimate purpose and meaning of life ("man's last end") is to be attained.

The Buddha went first to the Deer Park in Benares, to the five who had been his first followers. He preached to them the doctrine of the Middle Way between the two extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification: that of the liability to suffering that is in all born beings, the cause of which—appetitive desire (based on ignorance of the true nature of all desirable things)—must be eradicated if the symptom is to be cured; and that of the "Walk with Brahma" which leads to the end of sorrow. Finally he taught them the doctrine of the liberation resulting from full comprehension and experience of the proposition that of one and all of the constituents of the mutable psycho-physical individuality that men call *I* or *myself* it must be said, "that is not my Self" (*na me so attā*)—a proposition that has very often, despite the logic of the words, been mistaken to mean that "there is no Self." The five Mendicants obtained Enlightenment, and there were now six *Arahants* in the world. When the number of *Arahants*, "freed from all bonds, human and divine," had risen to sixty-one, the Buddha sent them forth to preach the Eternal Law and the Walk with Brahma, and empowered them to receive and ordain others; so there came into being the Buddhist congregation (*saṅgha*) or order of Mendicants, composed of men who had abandoned¹ the household life and "taken refuge in the Buddha, the Eternal Law, and the Community."

On his way from Benares to Uruvelā the Buddha fell in with a party of young men picnicking with their wives. One of them, being unmarried, had brought with him his mistress; but she had run off with some of the young men's belongings. They were all looking for her, and asked the Buddha if he had seen her. The Buddha replied: "What think ye? Were it not better ye sought the Self (*attānaṃ gaveseyyātha*), rather than the woman?" (*Vin.* i. 23, cf. *Vis.* 393). This answer, accepted by the young men, who subsequently become the master's disciples, is of the utmost significance for our understanding of the Buddhist doctrine of self-denial. We find the very

¹ This abandonment is literally a going into exile (*pabbajjā*): the Buddhist view being like Meister Eckhart's, that those poor souls who settle down at home and serve God there are in error "and will never have the power to strive for or to win what those others do who follow Christ in poverty and exile."

Master in whom the work of self-naughting has been accomplished recommending others to seek for the Self—an apparent contradiction that can only be resolved if we clearly distinguish between the “selves” referred to—one to be naughted, one to be cultivated.

At Uruvelā the Buddha resided for some time at the hermitage of a school of Brahmanical fire-worshippers, and performed two notable miracles : in the first he overcame and tamed the furious Serpent (*ahi-nāga*) that lived in their fire-temple ; and in the second, when the Brahmans could neither split their wood nor light their fires, he did these things by his supernatural powers (*iddhi*). The final outcome was that the Brahman master Kassapa and all of his five hundred followers decided to “Walk with Brahma” under the Buddha, and were received by him into the Order.

The Buddha then proceeded to Gayāsīsa, accompanied by all those, to the number of a thousand, who had by now become his disciples. There he preached the famous “Sermon on Fire.” All sensation, all sensibilia (for example, the tongue and its tastes, the mind and its thoughts), are on fire—the fire of appetite, resentment, and delusion (*rāgo, doṣo, moho*), birth, ageing, death, and sorrow. This sermon is of particular importance for the understanding of Nibbāna (“Despiration”) in its primary sense : the “going out” of these fires which—with the empirical “individuality” (*atta-sambhava*) of which they are the “becoming” (*bhava*)—cease to “draw” when their fuel is withheld. It is also of special interest because of its very close correspondence to James iii. 6 where “the tongue is a fire . . . and setteth on fire the wheel of becoming” (ὁ τροχὸς τῆς γενέσεως) just as in the Buddhist context “the tongue is afire” (*jivhā ādittā*) and “life” is the “wheel of becoming” (*bhava-cakka*). In the New Testament context the formulae are more likely to be of Orphic than of Buddhist origin, but there may be older common sources underlying both formulations.

The Buddha went next to Rājagaha where he preached to King Bimbisāra of Magadha and an assembly of Brahmans and Householders, calling first upon Uruvelā Kassapa to explain why he had abandoned his ritual fires. Kassapa having borne witness, the Buddha preached, and the whole company obtained the “Eye for the Eternal Law,” that is, they understood that “Whatever has had a beginning must also come to an end.”

It must never be forgotten that this apparently simple formula, more familiar in the form,

Of whatever originates causally, the Truth-finder hath told the cause,
And of all these things the Great Ascetic hath likewise explained the cessation.
(*Vin.* i. 41, etc.)

is actually a valid epitome of the Buddha’s doctrine and a sufficient means (if one is prepared to act up to all that it implies) to the attainment of Immortality and the ending of all sorrow. Its primary application is, of course, to the understanding and eradication of the causes of the “becoming” of all the mortal ills that the passible “individuality” is heir to : the passing away of appetite, resentment and delusion and consequent arrest of “becoming,” are one and the same thing as Despiration and Immortality, ultimate Felicity (S. ii. 117, iv. 251, v. 8 ; Sn. 1095).

In the course of his wanderings, the Buddha returned to Kapilavatthu, his birthplace ; and accompanied by a host of Mendicant Arahants begged his food in the streets, where he was seen from the palace windows by Rāhula’s mother. To his father’s protests the Buddha replied that this had been the rule of all past Buddhas. Siddhodana became a lay disciple, and on his deathbed became an Arahant, without ever having abandoned the household life. In the meantime the Buddha, accompanied by his two chief disciples, Sāriputta and Moggallāna, and giving his begging bowl to the king to carry, visited Rāhula’s mother. She came to him and clasped his ankles and laid her head on his feet ; and the king told him that when she had heard that her husband had taken the yellow robes, she also put on the yellow robes, and ate only once a day and followed all the rules of the Buddha’s life. Rāhula’s mother sent her son to his father, telling him to ask for his inheritance, he being now the heir to the throne. But the Buddha, turning to Sāriputta, said “Give him the monastic ordination,” and Sāriputta did so. So Rāhula received a spiritual inheritance. But Siddhodana was deeply hurt, and said to the Buddha, “When thou didst abandon the worldly life, it was a bitter pain, and so is it now that Rāhula has done the same. The love of a son cuts into one’s skin and to the very marrow. Pray grant that in future a child may not be ordained without his father’s and mother’s consent.” To that the Buddha agreed.

In the meantime, the merchant prince Anātha Piṇḍika had become a lay disciple, and, having purchased at great price the Jetavana Park at Sāvātthi and built there a magnificent monastery, invited the Buddha to take up his residence there, and he did so, making this his headquarters for the rest of his life. The Jetavana, indeed, is a "place never abandoned by any of the Buddhas" (DA. 424; *BdvA.* 298); and naturally the "Fragrant Pavilion" (*gandha-kuṭi*) in which he resided there became the archetype of the later Buddhist temples in which he is represented by an icon. The Buddha was not always in actual residence; this was simply his permanent home, and it is in this connection that the question of an iconography first arises. For the question is asked (in the *Kālingabodhi Jātaka*), by what kind of a symbol or shrine (*cetiya*) may the Buddha be properly represented, so that offerings can be made to him in his absence. His answer is that he can only be properly represented during his lifetime by a Great Wisdom Tree (*mahā-bodhi-rukka*), and after his death by bodily relics; he deprecates the use of "indicative," i.e. anthropomorphic, icons, calling them groundless and imaginative. It is, in fact, the case that in "early" Buddhist art the Buddha is represented only "aniconically" by his evident "traces" (*dhātu*), viz. either by a Bodhi-tree, by a "Fragrant Pavilion," by a "Wheel of the Law" (*dhamma-cakka*), by Footprints (*pada-valaṅga*), or by a reliquary Cairn (*thūpa*), and never by a "likeness" (*paṭimā*). When, on the other hand, probably to begin with in the first century A.D., the Buddha was represented in human form it is significant that in its most typical aspect the image is not really the likeness of a man, but reflects the old concept of the "Great Citizen" (*mahā-purisa*) or Person or Cosmic Man, and more directly repeats the established type of the image of a Yakkha—Agathos, Daimon or Tutelary Genius. This accords with the fact that the Buddha is himself "the Yakkha to whom sacrifice is due," with the doctrine of the "Yakkha's Purity," and with the whole background of the pre-Buddhist Sākya, Licchavi and Vajjian cult of Yakkhas, whose customary service the Buddha himself had earnestly advised the Vajjians never to neglect. As a Bodhisatta he had once been mistaken for the spirit of the tree under which he was sitting; and just as the Buddha was represented at the Jetavana and in early Buddhist art by a tree-shrine (*rukka-cetiya*) so were the Yakkhas, at whose "temples" the Buddha

was so fond of staying when on tour. All these considerations are only fully significant when we bear in mind that *the Yaksas* (Yakkha) of the Vedas and Upanishads had been originally a designation at once of Brahma as the principle of life in the Tree of Life and of the immortal Self that inhabits this human "city of Brahma" (*brahma-pura*) from which the Man as "citizen" takes his name of Purusa; and that epithets "Wake" (*buddho*) and "Brahma-become" (*brahma-bhūto*) are recognized synonyms of Him who is also called the "Great Citizen" (*mahā-purisa*), and is at least once explicitly and often implicitly equated with the universal Self (D. iii. 84, *et passim*).

By this time the number of the disciples had grown enormously, and had come to consist of various bodies of Mendicants (*Bhikkhu*) or Exiles (*Pabbajita*), no longer always "wandering," but often resident in monasteries that had been presented to the community by wealthy lay adherents. Already in the Buddha's lifetime questions of discipline had arisen, and the Buddha's decisions on these points are the basis of the Rule (*vinaya*)—as regards residence, clothing, food, conduct, deportment, induction and expulsion—under which the Mendicants lived. In the community (*saṅgha*) as a whole were to be found a relatively small number of graduate (*asekko*) masters and a much larger number of undergraduate (*sekko*) disciples. This distinction is especially noteworthy in the case of the great disciple Ānanda, the Buddha's own first cousin, who became a mendicant at Kapilavatthu in the second year of the Buddha's predication and after twenty years was chosen to be the Buddha's personal attendant and confidant, messenger and representative and yet was unable to "graduate" until some time after the Master's decease.

Ānanda was responsible for the admission of women to the Mendicant Order. We are told that Mahā Pajāpatī, Suddhodana's second wife, and the Bodhisatta's foster-mother after Mahā Māyā's early dormition, begged for admission to the Order, but to her great sorrow was refused. She cut off her hair, assumed the orange robes of a Mendicant, and together with a following of other Sākya women again sought the Buddha; all these women, wayworn and covered with dust, stood and waited at the door of his residence in Veṣālī. Ānanda was deeply touched, and presented their case to the Master, who thrice repeated his refusal. Then Ānanda took up the problem

from another angle ; he asked, " Are women, if they abandon the household life and live according to the doctrine and discipline taught by the Truth-finder, capable of realizing the fruits of ' entering the stream,' becoming a ' once-returner,' or a ' non-returner,' or the state of being Arahant ? " The Buddha could not deny it ; and agreed that there should be an Order of Bhikkhunis, side by side with that of the Bhikkhus. But he added that if women had not been admitted to the Order and the practice of the Walk with Brahma, the True Law (*saddhamma*) would have stood for a thousand years, whereas now it would stand fast for only five hundred.

In his eightieth year the Buddha fell sick, and though he recovered temporarily he knew that his end was near. He said to Ānanda, " I am now old, my journey is near its end, I am turning eighty years of age ; and just as a worn-out cart, Ānanda, can be kept going only with the help of thongs, so, methinks, the body of the Truth-finder can be kept going only by medicaments." Ānanda wanted to know what instructions the Buddha left to the Mendicants ; the Buddha replied that if anyone thought that the community depended on him, it was for *him* to give instructions,— " Why should I leave any instructions regarding the community ? " The Truth-finder had preached the Law in full, withholding nothing, and all that was needed was to practise, contemplate and propagate the Truth, in pity for the world and for the welfare of men and Gods. The Mendicants were not to rely upon any external support, but to make " the Self (*attā*) their refuge, the Eternal Law their refuge "—and so, " I leave you, I depart, having made the Self my refuge " (*D. ii. 120*).

It was at Kusinārā, in the Sāla-grove of the Mallas, that the Buddha lay down to die, assuming the " lion's repose." A great host of laymen, mendicants and gods of all ranks surrounded the couch, over which Ānanda kept watch. The Buddha gave him instructions regarding the cremation of the body and the erection of a cairn (*thūpa*, *dhātu-gabbha*) to contain the bones and ashes. At the sight of such cairns, erected for Buddhas, other Arahants, or a King of kings, many people would be made calm and happy, and that would lead to their resurrection in a heaven hereafter. Ānanda wept at the thought of not yet being a graduate. The Buddha assured him that he had done well and would soon be " free from the fluxes," that is, become

an Arahant ; and he commended Ānanda to the company of the Mendicants, comparing him to a King of kings.

" Corruptible are all things composite ; in sobriety work out your goal " ; these were the Truth-finder's last words. Entering at will into each of the four higher contemplative " states," he emerged from the fourth, and was forthwith wholly despirated.¹ The Truth-finder's death was announced by Brahmā, who realized that the death of all beings whatsoever, even that of the Great Teacher, is inevitable. The well-known lines were repeated by Indra :

Transient are all things composite ; theirs to originate and age,
And having originated, to be again destroyed ; to have stilled them is beatitude.

Anuruddha, an Arahant, pronounced a brief eulogy in which he pointed out that " there was no panting struggle for that steadfast heart, when the Sage, the immovable, found peace." Ānanda was profoundly moved ; only the younger Mendicants wept and rolled on the ground in their grief, crying out that " Too soon has the Eye in the World gone in." For this they were blamed by the elder Mendicants, who reminded them that

Corruptible are all composite things, how else ?

The body was cremated, and the relics, having been divided into eight parts, were distributed to the clansmen, who erected eight monuments to contain them.

Thus the Buddha, who for so long as he was visible to human eyes had possessed but could not be identified with all or any of the five factors of personality (*S. iii. 112*), " burst the vestment of selfhood " (*A. iv. 312* ; cf. *Vin. i. 6*). He had long since been an Immortal (*M. i. 172* ; *Vin. i. 9* ; *It. 46, 62*), unborn, unageing, undying (*KhA. 180* ; *DhA. i. 228*). " The body ages, but the True Law does not age " (*S. i. 71*). " The body dies, the Name survives " (*S. i. 43*, cf. *RV. vi. 18, 7* ; *BU. iii. 2, 12*). " His Name is Truth " (*A. iii. 346*, *iv. 289*). " Truth is the Eternal Law " (*S. i. 169*) ; and even now it can be said that " he who sees the Law sees Him (*S. iii. 120* ; *Mil. 73*) by whom the Doors of Immortality were opened " (*M. i. 167* ; *Vin. i. 7*).

Let us now ask what was that Law and Truth with which he identified his essence.

¹ *Parinibbāyati* ; here in the sense " died," although not often used in this physical context.

THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE

Then only will you see it, when you cannot speak of it: for the knowledge of it is deep silence, and suppression of all the senses.

Hermes Trismegistus, *Lib. X.* 5

TO CONVEY AN ADEQUATE IDEA OF THE CONTENT OF EARLY Buddhist doctrine presents almost insuperable difficulties. The Buddha already describes the Eternal Law (*dhamma sanantana, akālika*)—which he had by no means excogitated by a process of ratiocination, but with which he identifies himself, and which had been taught by his predecessors in ages past as it would be taught by his successors in ages to come—as a matter profound and difficult of comprehension by otherwise-trained and other-minded hearers; it is a doctrine for those whose wants are few, not for those whose wants are many. In his own lifetime the Buddha repeatedly found it necessary to correct the misinterpretations of his teaching—to explain, for example, in what precise sense his was and was not a doctrine of “excision”: *was*, in the sense of “cutting out” self-love and evil or sorrow; and *was not*, in the sense of the annihilation of any reality. His was, indeed, a doctrine of self-naughting,—whoever would be free must have literally *denied* himself; for what remains, the terms of logic—either-or—are inadequate; but it would be altogether inappropriate to say of the despirated Arahant, liberated by his super-gnosis, that “he neither knows nor sees” (*D.* ii. 68).

If misunderstanding was possible in the Buddha's own time when, as he says, the Ancient Way that he reopens had been long neglected and a false doctrine had arisen, how much more is misinterpretation inevitable in our day of progress, self-expression and the endless pursuits of higher material standards of living? It has been almost completely forgotten, except by professional theologians, that an ultimate reality can be correctly described only by a series of negations of all that it is not. In any case, as Miss Horner remarked as recently as 1938, “the study of early Buddhism is admittedly still in its infancy” (*Bk. of the Discipline*, I, vi). If the reader thinks of Buddhism,

quite rightly, as a way of “escape,” he has still to ask himself from what, of what, and to what “there is in the world a way of escape” (*S.* i. 128).

The difficulties have been intensified by the misinterpretations of Buddhism that are still to be found even in the works of scholars. For example, one of the most notable scholars fails completely to distinguish the “becoming” of which the cessation coincides with the realization of immortality from the “making become” of our immortal part. Actually, “becoming” corresponds to what is now called “progress,” regardless of the fact that change may be for better or for worse; and we are reminded that now, as then, “there are Gods and men who delight in becoming, and when they hear of putting a stop to becoming, their minds do not respond” (*Vism.* 594). Another great scholar asserts that early Buddhism “denied a God, denied a Soul, denied Eternity,” and it is almost universally claimed that the Buddha taught that there is no Self,—thus ignoring that what is actually denied is the reality of the mutable Ego or psycho-physical “individuality,” and that what is said of the Self and of the Truth-finder (or Thus-come) and Perfect Man after death, is that none of the terms “becomes” or “does not become,” “becomes and does not become,” or “neither becomes nor does not become,” apply to it or to Him (*S.* iv. 384 f., 401-402; *Ud.* 67, etc.). Again, it is still often asserted that Buddhism is a “pessimistic” doctrine, notwithstanding that its goal of freedom from all the mental suffering that man is heir to is one attainable here and now: in any case, overlooking that a doctrine can be judged only in terms of its truth or falsity, and not by whether we like it or not!

The Buddha is primarily concerned with the problem of evil as suffering or pain (*dukkha*); the problem, that is to say, of the corruptibility of all things born, composite and mutable, their liability to suffering, disease, inveteration, and death. That this liability is a fact,¹ that it has a cause, that its cause can be suppressed, and that there is a Way or Walk or Faring by which this cause can be suppressed—these are the “Four Ariyan Truths” that are the beginning of wisdom. “Both now and

¹ “The whole human race is so miserable and above all so blind that it is not conscious of its own miseries” (Comenius, *Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of the Heart*, C. XXVIII). It was precisely because of this blindness that the Buddha hesitated to preach the Dhamma to men whose eyes are filled with dust.

heretofore I teach just this, ill and the end of ill"¹ (*M. i. 140*). Accordingly, Buddhism can be and often is reduced to the simple formulae of "causal origination" (*paṭicca samuppāda*): "this being so, that becomes; this not being so, that does not become." From the beginningless operation of mediate causes there is no escaping any of their composite effects; escape is possible only from the field in which the causal efficacy of past actions (*kamma*) operates, and only for that which was never an integral part of the field.

Buddhist doctrine is reducible to a statement of the law of causality because of the pertinence of this law to the problem of mutability and corruptibility; if the cause of misery can be suppressed there will be no further need to bother with its symptoms. In the cycle or vortex of becoming (*bhava-cakka*, *samsāra*) the instability, inveteration, and death of whatever has had a beginning is inevitable; life or becoming is a function of sensibility, sensibility of wanting (*taṅhā*, thirst), and wanting a function of ignorance (*avijjā* = *moha*, delusion). Ignorance, the ultimate origin of all suffering and bondage, all pathological states of subjection to pleasure and pain,² is of the true nature of things "as become" (*yathā-bhūtam*), and in particular of their inconstancy (*aniccam*). Everything becomes, everything flows like a river; there is nothing of which it can be said that it is (*sabbe saṃkhārā aniccā*). All that becomes is mortal; to have put a stop to becoming, no longer to be moved, is to be immortal. This intimately concerns ourselves; the most dangerous aspect of ignorance—the "original sin"—is that which leads us to believe that we "ourselves" are this or that and that we can survive from moment to moment, day to day or life to life as an identity.

Buddhism, then, knows of no "reincarnation" in the popular and animistic sense of the word: though many are "still under the delusion that Buddhism teaches the transmigration of souls" (*SBE. xxxvi. 142; Dialogues, ii. 43*). Just as for Plato, St Augustine, and Meister Eckhart, so here, all change is a sequence of death and rebirth in continuity without identity, and there is no constant entity (*satto*) that can be thought of as passing over from one embodiment to another (*Mil. 72*) as a

¹ Taught as early as in the First Utterance.

² "Ignorance" is subjection to pleasure and pain . . . "yielding to oneself". (Plato, *Protagoras*, 356, 357).

man might leave one house or village and enter another (*Pv. iv. 3*). Indeed, like that of "self," the very notion of an "entity" as applied to anything existent is merely conventional (*S. i. 135*), and there is nothing of the sort to be found in the world (*Mil. 268*). That which perishes and again arises "not without otherness" is an individuality (*nāma-rūpa*) (*Mil. 98*) or discriminating consciousness (*viññāya*) that inherits the former's "works" (*M. i. 390; A. iii. 73*). If the Buddha says that there are, assuredly, personal agents (*A. iii. 337-338*), this does *not*, as Mrs Rhys Davids supposed, "wipe out the doctrine of *anatta* altogether" (*GS. iii. xiii*). The Buddhist point of view is exactly the same as the Brahmanical: "I am not the doer of anything, it is the senses that move amongst their objects," such is the view of the bridled man, a knower of the Suchness" (*BG. v. 8-9, xviii. 16-17*). The individual is, indeed, responsible for and will inherit the consequences of his actions for so long as he thinks of "himself" as the agent; and no one is more reprehensible than the man who says "I am not the doer" while he is still actually involved in activity (*Ud. 45; Dh. 306; Sn. 661*), and argues that it does not matter what he does, be it good or evil (*D. i. 53*). But to think that I *am* or another *is* the doer, or that I or another will reap as I have sown is to miss the point (*Ud. 70*): there is no "I" that acts or inherits (*S. ii. 252*); or to speak more strictly, the question of the real existence of a personal agent is one that cannot be answered by a simple "Yes" or "No," but only according to the Middle Way, in terms of causal origination (*S. ii. 19-20*). But all these composite "entities" that originate causally are the very things that are repeatedly analysed and found to be "not my Self"; in this ultimate sense (*paramatthikena*) a man is not the agent. It is *only* when this has been realized and verified that a man can dare deny that his actions are his own; until then there are things *he* ought and things *he* ought not to do (*Vin. i. 233; A. i. 62; D. i. 115*).

There is nothing in the doctrine of causality (*hetuvāda*) or in that of the causal effect of actions (*kamma*) that in any way necessarily implies a "reincarnation" of souls. The doctrine of causality is common to Buddhism and Christianity, and in both is effectively the statement of a belief in the orderly sequence of events. The "reincarnation" that the Buddhist would dispense with permanently is not a matter of any one eventful

death and rebirth to be expected hereafter, but the whole vertiginous process of repeatedly dying and being born again that is equally the definition of temporal existence here as a "man" and of aeviternal existence there as a "God" (one amongst others). The accomplished Arahant knows better than to ask, "What was I in the past? What am I now? What shall I be hereafter?" (S. ii. 26-27). He can say "I" for everyday practical purposes without in any way intending what the notion of I or myself implies to an animist (D. i. 202; S. i. 14-15). Time implies motion, and motion change of place; in other words duration involves mutation, or becoming. Hence it is not an immortality in time or any where, but apart from time and place, that the Buddhist envisages. Stated in the pragmatic terms of everyday discourse, of which the application is only to things that have a beginning, development and end (D. ii. 63), it can be said of the Ego, "Once it was and then was not, once was not and then it was," but in terms of truth, "It was not, will not be, nor can it now be found; it neither is nor shall be 'mine'" (Ud. 66; Th. i. 180). The Buddhist vortex or wheel of becoming is nothing but St James' ὁ τροχὸς τῆς γενέσεως; the Ego is an unreality for the Buddhist, just as it had been for Plato and Plutarch, by the very fact of its mutability. The squirrel cage revolves, but "that's not me," and there is a way of escape from the round.

The evil for which the Buddha sought a remedy is that of the wretchedness involved in the corruptibility of all things born, composite and inconstant. Misery, mutability, un-Self-isness¹ (*dukkha, anicca, anatta*) are the characteristics of all composite things, all that is not-my-Self; and of all these things the Ego, I, self (*aham, attā*) is the pertinent species, since it is with man's last end that we are concerned. It is axiomatic that all existences² (S. ii. 101, etc.) are maintained by food, solid and mental, as fire is fed by fuel; and in this sense the world is on

¹ In all traditional philosophies, in which it is axiomatic that "there are two in us," it is unavoidable to distinguish "Self" from "self" or Ego, *le moi* from *le soi*, the savant from the connoisseur. In the present context Selflessness coincides with self-isness; to have said "unselfishness" would have been to say the opposite of what is meant,—it is only of the Self that an ontological un-self-isness, and therefore an ethical un-selfishness can be predicated. For the present we are discussing only the Ego, or self; the problem of the Self in Buddhism will be dealt with later.

² "Existence," as distinguished from "being," *esse* from *essentia*, *γένεαις* from *οὐσία*.

fire and we are on fire. The fires of the Ego-consciousness, or self-isness, are those of appetite (*rāga = kāma, taṇhā, lobha*), resentment or irascibility (*dosa = kodha*), and delusion or ignorance (*moha = avijjā*). These fires can only be quenched by their opposites (A. iv. 445; Dh. 5, 223), by the practice of corresponding virtues and the acquisition of knowledge (*vijjā*), or, in other words, only cease to "draw," and so go out, or rather *in*, when their fuel is withheld. It is this "going out" that is called a "despiration" (*nibbāna*, Skr. *nirvāṇa*), and is naturally linked with the notion of a "cooling off" (compare the vernacular, Why so hot, my little man?). Nirvana—to use the word in its more familiar form—is a Buddhist key-word, than which, perhaps, no other has been so much misunderstood.¹ Nirvana is a death, a being *finished* (both in the meaning of "ended" and of "perfected"). In its passive senses it has all the connotations of Greek *τελέω, ἀποσβέννυμι*, and those of *φύχω*. Nirvana is neither a place nor an effect, nor in time, nor attainable by any means; but it is and it can be "seen." The "means" that are actually resorted to are not in themselves means to Nirvana, but means to the removal of all that obscures the "vision" of Nirvana: as when a lamp is brought into a dark room one sees what is already there.

We can now understand why the self (*attā*) must be tamed, conquered, curbed, rejected, and given its quietus. The Arahant or Perfect Man is one whose self has been tamed (*atta-danto*), whose self has been cast off (*atta-jaho*); his burden has been laid down (*ohita-bhāro*), what there was to be done has been done (*katam-karaṇīyam*). All of the epithets that are applied to the Buddha himself, who has no longer a personal name,² are applicable to him; he is "released" (*vimutto*), he is "despirated" (*nibbuto*), there is no more becoming for him, he has earned his rest-from-labour (*yoga-k-khemam*), he is awake (*buddho*, an epithet applicable to any Arahant, not only to the Buddha), he is immovable (*anejo*), he is an "Ariyan," no longer a disciple (*sekho*) but a Master (*asekho*).

Selfishness (*mamattam*, "possessiveness"; *maccheram*, "bad

¹ "Extinction" (as of a fire) is not illegitimate; but "annihilation" is misleading. In India, the "going out" of a fire is always thought of as a "going home".

² Even "Gotama" is not a personal, but only a family name; Ānanda, too is a Gotamid.

behaviour," "law of the sharks") is a moral evil, and therefore the taming of the self requires a moral discipline. But selfishness is supported by "Self-iness" (*asmi-māna*, *anattani attā ditṭhi*), and mere commandments will hardly suffice unless and until the erroneous view that "this is me" has been shattered. For the self is always self-assertive, and it is only when the true nature of the inconstant self has been realized that a man will set out in earnest to overcome his own worst enemy and make him a servant and ally. The first step is to acknowledge the predicament, the second to unmask the self whose sole liability it is, the third to act accordingly; but this is not easy, and a man is not very willing to mortify himself until he has known these appetitive congeries for what they are, and until he has learnt to distinguish his Self and its true interest from the Ego, his self and its interests. The primary evil is ignorance; and it is, in fact, by the truth that the self must be tamed (S. i. 169). Only "The truth shall make you free!" The remedy for self-love (*atta-kāma*) is Self-love (*atta-kāma*) and it is precisely in this sense, in the words of St Thomas Aquinas, that "a man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than any other person, more than his neighbour (*Sum. Theol.* II.-ii. 26.4). In Buddhist terms "let no man worsen welfare of himself for other's weal however great; if well he knows the Self's true interest, let him pursue that end" (*Dh.* 166). In other words, man's first duty is to work out his own salvation,—from himself.

The procedure, in often-repeated expositions of the "un-Self-iness" (*anattā*) of all phenomena, is analytical. The repudiation is of what would nowadays be described as "animism": the psycho-physical, behaving mechanism is not a "Self," and is devoid (*suñña*) of any Self-like property. The Ego or self-consciousness or self-existence (*atta-sambhāva*) is a composite of five associated grounds (*dhātu*) or stems (*khandha*), viz. the visible body (*rūpa*, *kāya*), and invisible sensation (*vedana*, pleasant, unpleasant or neutral), recognition, or awareness (*saññā*), constructions or character (*samkhārā*)¹

¹ *Samkhārā* (σύνκριτοι, σύνθετοι) here with reference to mental images, phantasms, notions, postulates, complexes, opinions, prejudices, convictions, ideologies, etc. In a more general sense *samkhārā* defines all things that can be referred to by name or sensibly perceived, all *nāma-rūpa*, all "things," ourselves included.

and discrimination, discretion, judgment, or valuation (*viññāṇa*),¹ in short, a composite of body and discriminating consciousness (*sa-viññāṇa-kāya*), the psycho-physical existent. The causal origination, variability, and mortality of all these factors is demonstrated; they are not "ours," because we cannot say "let them, or let me, be thus or thus" (S. iii. 66-67): on the contrary, "we" are what they "become,"—"a biological entity, impelled by inherited impulses."² The demonstration always concludes with the words: "That's not mine, I'm not that, that's not my Self." To have done with them for good and all, to have put away the notions "I am So-and-so," "I am the agent," "I am," will prove to be "for your advantage and your happiness" (S. iii. 34). The Buddha, or any Arahant, is a "Nobody"; one cannot properly ask his name.

Otherwise stated, any thing or individuality is characterized by "name and shape" (*nāma-rūpa* = ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ μορφή, Aristotle, *Met.* viii. 1.6); "name" referring to all the invisible, and "shape" or "body" (*rūpa* being interchangeable with *kāya*) to all the visible and sensible constituents of individuality. This is as much as to say that "time and space" are the primary forms of our understanding of things that become; for while the shape or body of anything is evanescent, its name survives, and by its name we still hold on to it. It is by his "names," those of the "Law" and "Truth," that the Wake survives in the world, although, like the rivers when they reach the Sea, his liberation is from name and shape, and whoever has "gone home" is no longer in any category, no longer this or that, or here or there (*Sn.* 1074).

All this is nothing peculiarly Buddhist, but the burden of a world-wide philosophy, for which salvation is essentially from oneself. *Denegat seipsum! Si quis . . . non odit animam suam, non potest meus discipulus esse!*

"The soul is the greatest of your enemies."³ "Were it not for the shackle, who would say 'I am I'?"⁴ "Self is the root, the tree, and branches of all the evils of our fallen state"⁵;

¹ The five *khandhas* are nearly the same as the five "powers of the soul" as defined by Aristotle (*De an.* II, III) and St Th. Aquinas (*Sum. Theol.* i. 78. 1), viz. the vegetative (nutritive), sensitive, appetitive, motive, intellectual (diagnostic, critical).

² L. Paul, *The Annihilation of Man*, 1945, p. 156.

³ Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Risālat al-Laduniyya*, Ch. II.

⁴ Rūmī, *Mathnawī* i. 2449.

⁵ W. Law, *Hobhouse* p. 219.

"it is impossible to lay hold twice of the essence of anything mortal . . . at one and the same moment it arrives and is dissolved"¹—such citations could be multiplied indefinitely. It is less often realized that many modern naturalists and psychologists have reached the same conclusions. "The naturalist . . . maintains that the states and events called mental exist only when certain organizations of physical things also occur . . . [and] are not exhibited by those things unless they are so organized. . . . The structured object is simply manifesting the behaviour of its constituents . . . [it] is not an additional thing which . . . controls . . . the behaviour of its organized parts." The naturalist's and the Buddhist interpretation of the behaviour of the "structured object" are so far identical: but whereas the former identifies himself with the behaving object,² the Buddhist insists that there is *no object* that can properly be called "my Self." The psychologists, on the other hand, prescind from the Ego, still, like the Buddhist, leave room for something other than the Ego and that can experience an "infinite happiness." "When we see that all is fluid . . . it will appear that individuality and falsity are one and the same,"—the direct implication being, as in the *anatta* doctrine, that "we" are other than our individuality. "In the traditionally [*sc.* customarily] emphasized individuality of each one of us, 'myself' . . . we have *the very mother of illusions* . . . [and] the tragedy of this delusion of individuality is that it leads to isolation, fear, paranoid suspicion, and wholly unnecessary hatreds;" "any person would be *infinitely happier* if he could accept the loss of his 'individual self',"—as the Buddha puts it, he does not worry about what is unreal. "In the epoch of scientific rationalism, what was the psyche? It had become *synonymous with consciousness* . . . there was no psyche outside the ego. . . . When the fate of Europe carried it into a four-years' war of stupendous horror . . . no one realized that European man was *possessed by something that robbed him of his free choice*;" but over and above this Ego

¹ *Timaeus* 28 A, cf. *Cratylus* 440; Plutarch, *Moralia* 392 B. For the Buddhist doctrine of the "moment" (*khana*) in which things originate, mature, and cease, cf. *Vis.* i. 239, and the fuller development in the *Mahāvāna*.

² Such an identification reverts to the animistic proposition, "I think, therefore I am," and involves the unintelligible concept of a single agent that can will opposite things at one and the same time. The logical positivist ought to deny the possibility of any "self-control,"—perhaps he does.

there is a Self "around which it revolves, very much as the earth rotates about the sun," although "in this relation there is nothing knowable in the intellectual sense, because *we can say nothing of the contents of the Self.*"¹

What has Buddhism to say of the Self? "That's not my Self" (*na me so attā*); this, and the term "non-Self-ness" (*anattā*) predicated of the world and all "things" (*sabbe dhammā anattā*)² have formed the basis of the mistaken view that Buddhism "denies [not merely the self but also] the Self." But a moment's consideration of the logic of the words will show that they assume the reality of a Self that is not any one or all of the "things" that are denied of it. As St Thomas Aquinas says, "primary and simple things are defined by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as that which has no parts;" and Dante remarks that there are "certain things which our intellect cannot behold . . . we cannot understand what they are except by denying things of them." This was the position of the older Indian philosophy in which Buddhism originated: whatever can be said of the Self is "Not so." To acknowledge that "nothing true can be said of God" is certainly not to deny his essence!

When the question is pressed, Is there a Self, the Buddha refuses to answer "Yes" or "No"; to say "Yes" would involve the "eternalist" error, to say "No" the "annihilationist" error (*S.* iv. 400-401). And similarly, when the post-mortem destiny of a Buddha, Arahant, or Very Man arises, he says that none of the terms "becomes" (*hoti*) or "does not become" or "neither becomes nor does not become" or "both becomes and does not become" apply. Any one of these propositions would involve an identification of the Buddha with some or all of the five factors of personality; all becoming implies modality, but a Buddha is not in any mode. It should be emphasized that the question is always asked in terms of becoming, not in terms of being. The logic

¹ The naturalists and psychologists cited are Dewey, Hook and Nagel, Charles Peirce, H. S. Sullivan, E. E. Hadley, and C. G. Jung. It will be seen that the latter, who speaks of the "absolute necessity of a step beyond science," is a metaphysician in spite of himself. The citations are not made by way of proving the truth of the Buddhist analysis, but to help the reader to understand it; the *proof* of the pudding will be in the eating. (The italics are mine).

² Identical with the Brahmanical "of those who are mortal, there is no Self", (*anāmā hi martyah*, *ŚB.* ii. 2. 2. 3).

of language only applies to phenomenal things (D. ii. 63), and the Arahant is uncontaminated by any of these "things": there are no word-ways for one whose self is no more; one "gone home" is no longer in any category (Sn. 1074, 1076). Nevertheless it is also said that the Buddha "is" (*atthi*), though he cannot be seen "here or there," and denied that an Arahant "is not" after death. If, indeed, absolutely nothing remains when the self is no more, we could not but ask, Of what is an immortality predicated? Any reduction of a reality to the nothingness of "the son of a barren woman" would be meaningless and unintelligible; and, in fact, the Buddha in repudiating the "annihilationist" doctrines that were attributed to him by some contemporary heretics expressly denies that he ever taught the destruction of anything real (*sato sattassa = ὄντως ὄν*) (M. i. 137, 140). There is, he says, "an unborn, un-become, unmade (*akataṃ*),¹ incomposite (*asaṃkheṭaṃ*),² and were there not, there would be no escape from the born, the become, the made and the composite (world)" (Ud. 80): "knower of what was never made (*akataññū*) art thou, O Brahman, having known the waning away of all composite things."

The Buddha expressly "holds nothing back," making no distinction of a within from a without, his is "not a closed fist" (D. ii. 100); but the Eternal Law, and Nirvana, are "incomposite," and for this transcendent Worth (*param'attha*) all words are inadequate—all *alta fantasia qui manco possa* (*Paradiso xxxiii. 142*)—in which the disciple must have Faith (*saddhā*) until he can experience it, until Faith is replaced by Knowledge; "he whose mind has been fired by the desire of the Untold (*anakkhāta*), he is one freed from all loves, a swimmer against the current" (Dh. 218),—"the Buddhas do but tell the Way" (Dh. 276). If there is a salvation by faith (Sn. 1146), it is because "Faith is most conducive to knowledge" (S. iv. 298): *Crede ut intelligas*. Faith implies authority; and the Buddha's authority (*mahāpadesa*), which rests upon his own immediate experience, is that of his words as spoken or as reported by competent Mendicants; in the latter case not merely rightly

¹ The "unmade world" (Brahmaloka) of the Upanishads.

² "Incomposite," i.e. without origination, growth or mutation, A. i. 152; Nirvana, Mil. 270; Dhamma, S. iv. 359. On the other hand, even the highest Contemplative "states" are composite, and it is even from these exalted conditions that there is a "final escape".

grasped, but checked for their consistency with the texts of the Canon and the Rule. In this initial dependence in what has not yet been "seen" there is nothing uniquely Buddhist or credulous. The Buddha's doctrine is always about what he claims to have personally seen and verified, and what he tells his disciples can be seen and verified by them if they will follow him in Brahma-faring. "The Buddhas do but tell the Way, it is for *you* to swelter at the task" (Dh. 276); the "End remains untold" (Sn. 1074); it has no sign (S. i. 188, Sn. 342), and is a gnosis that cannot be communicated (A. iii. 444); and those whose reliance is only on what can be told are still under the yoke of death (S. i. 11).

In the discussion of Faith it is too often overlooked that the greater part of our knowledge of "things," even of those by which our worldly actions are regulated, is "authoritative"; most, indeed, even of our daily activities would come to an end if we did not believe the words of those who have seen what we have not yet seen, but might see if we would do what they have done, or go where they have been; in the same way those of the Buddhist neophyte would come to an end if he did not "believe" in a goal not yet attained. Actually, he believes that the Buddha is telling him the truth, and acts accordingly (D. ii. 93). Only the Perfect Man is "faithless," in the sense that in his case knowledge of the Unmade has taken the place of Faith (Dh. 97), for which there is no more need.

For the Buddhist, Dhamma, the Lex Aeterna,¹ synonymous with the Truth (S. i. 169), is the ultimate authority and "King of kings" (A. i. 109, iii. 149). It is with this ultimate, timeless and temporal, transcendent and immanent authority that the Buddha identifies himself, that Self in which he has taken refuge: "he who sees the Dhamma sees me, and he who sees me sees the Dhamma" (S. iii. 120; It. 91; Mil. 73). One of the most impressive of the Buddhist books is called the *Dhammapada*, "Footprints of the Law"; it is a chart and guide-book for those who "walk in the Way of the Law" (*dhammacariyaṃ caranti*), which is also the "Way of Brahma" or "Brahma-faring" (*brahmacariyaṃ*), and "that old road that was followed by the formerly All-awakened." The Buddhist words for

¹ "A Law above our minds, which is called the Truth," St Augustine, *De ver. relig.* xxx. Cf. St Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* ii-1. 91. 2.

"Way" (*magga*) and for "seeking" (*gavesana*),¹ with the Self as object (*Vin.* i. 23; *Vis.* 393), both imply the following of tracks or footprints.² But these tracks end when the shore of the Great Sea is reached; until then the Mendicant is a disciple (*sekho*), thereafter an expert (*asekho*),—"no longer under a pedagogue" (*Gal.* iii. 25). The Way prescribed is one of self-naughting, virtue and contemplation, walking alone with Brahma; but when the end of the "long road" has been reached, whether here or hereafter, there remains only the "plunge" into the Immortal, into Nirvana (*amat'ogadham, nibbān'ogadham*), into that fathomless Ocean that is an image at once of Nirvana, Dhamma, and the Buddha himself (*M.* i. 488, ; *S.* iv. 179, 180, 376, v. 47; *Mil.* 319, 346). This is an old simile, common to the Upanishads and Buddhism: when the rivers reach the Sea, their name and shape is lost, and one only speaks of "the Sea." This last end is already prefigured in the adoption of the monastic vocation; like the rivers when they reach the Sea, so men of whatever caste becoming Mendicants are no longer called by their former names or lineage, but are simply of the lineage of those who have sought and found the Truth (*Vin.* ii. 239; *A.* iv. 202; *Ud.* 55).

"The dewdrop slips into the shining sea." Yes, but this is not an exclusively Buddhist formula; we find it in Rūmī,³ (Nicholson, *Diwān*, xii. xv; Mathnawī, *passim*), in Dante (*sua voluntate . . . è quel mare tutto si move* [*Paradiso* iii. 84]), in Meister Eckhart (*also sich wandelte der tropfe in daz mer—the sea of God's unfathomable nature . . . plunge in, this is the drowning*), Angelus Silesius (*Wenn du das Tröpflein wist im grossen Meere nennen, Den wist du meine Seel' im grossen Gott erkennen* [*Cher. Wandersmann* ii. 25]), and in China, where the Tao is the ocean to which all things return (*Tao te Ching* xxxii). Of all those who reach it it can only be said that their life is hidden, enigmatic. The Buddha visibly present in the flesh is even now "unattainable" (*anupalabhyamāno*) and "past

¹ Cf. the story of Gavesin, p. 41.

² As in Plato, *ἵκεύω*, *passim*. Meister Eckhart's "soul following the spoor of her quarry, Christ".

³ *Attham-gato* is a good example of the numerous etymological ambiguities that are met with in Pali. Where *attham*=Skr. *astam*, the sense is that of "gone home," but where *attham*=*artham*, that of "having attained one's purpose, or goal." Such an ambiguity is far from inconvenient, since the "return home" and the "attainment of the end" have a common reference.

finding out" (*ananivejjo*); no one thus "gone home" can be referred to any category (*sankham na upeti* [*Sn.* 1074]). For "no one who sees me in any shape sees me"; "name and aspect are none of mine"; he only who sees the Eternal Law sees the Buddha, and that as effectively to-day as when he still wore the personality (*persona*, "mask," "disguise") that at death "he burst like a coat of mail" (*A.* iv. 312).

The equation between Dante's *mare* with the Buddhist "Sea," implied above, may seem to import a theistic sense into the supposedly "atheistic" Buddhist doctrines; but it need only be pointed out that no real distinction can be drawn between the immutable Will of God and the Lex Aeterna, his Justice of Wisdom, that Nature which is also his Essence and to act against which would be to deny himself. The Law, Dhamma, had always been a *nomen Dei*, and is still in Buddhism synonymous with Brahma. If the Buddha identifies himself with the Eternal Law, this means that he cannot sin; he is no longer "under the Law," but being himself the Law can only act accordingly, and we find amongst the interpretations of the epithet "Thuscome" or "Truth-finder" that "as he says, so he does." But for those who are still Wayfarers and learners, sin (*adhamma*) is precisely an offence against that Natural Law which represents the share of the Eternal Law that determines the individual's responsibilities and functions. In other words, the Eternal Law has its immanent correlative in every man's "own law" (*sa-dhamma* [*Sn.* 1020]), by which his natural inclinations and proper functions (*attano kamma*=*τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν*) are determined; and it is only greed or ambition that leads to the disparagement of the nativity by which a man is normally "protected" (*Sn.* 314, 315). I mention this only because of currency of the erroneous opinion that the Buddha "attacked" the caste system. What he actually did was to distinguish the Brahman by mere birth from the true Brahman by gnosis, and to point out that the religious vocation is open to a man of any birth (*A.* iii. 214; *S.* i. 167): there was nothing new in that. Caste is a *social* institution, and the Buddha was speaking mainly for those whose preoccupations are no longer social; for the householder it is observed that his entelechy consists in the perfection of his work (*A.* iii. 363), and only those occupations that injure others are condemned. The duties of a Ruler are often enumerated. The Buddha himself was a

Royalty inasmuch as he laid down a Law, and was a Brahman by character (*Mil.* 225-227). Brahmans are only disparaged in so far as they do not live up to their ancient norm. In many contexts "Brahman" is synonymous with "Arahant."

It has been asserted that Buddhism knows only of the personal God Brahmā and nothing of the Godhead Brahma: this would have been strange indeed in India of the fifth century B.C., in one who had studied under Brahman masters, and in scriptural contexts that are so often reminiscent of the Brāhmanas and Upanishads. Actually, there can be no doubt that in the grammatically ambiguous expression *brahma-bhūto* which describes the condition of those who are wholly liberated, it is Brahma and not Brahmā that must be read; it is Brahma that one who is "wholly awake" has "become." For (1) the comparatively limited knowledge of a Brahmā is repeatedly emphasized, (2) Brahmās are, accordingly, the Buddha's pupils, not he theirs (*S.* i. 141-145; *Mil.* 75-76), (3) the Buddha had already been, in previous births, a Brahmā and Mahā Brahmā (*A.* iv. 88-90), hence it would be meaningless, in the equation *brahma-bhūto = buddho* (*A.* v. 226; *D.* iii. 84; *It.* 57, etc.), to assume that *brahma* = Brahmā, and (4) the Buddha is explicitly "much more than a Mahā Brahmā" (*DhA.* ii. 60). It is true that the Buddha is often addressed by Brahmans as Brahmā (*Sn.* 293, 479, 508), but here Brahmā is not the name of the God, but (as in *Skr.*) the designation of a true and learned Brahman,¹ and tantamount to Arahant (*Sn.* 518, 519). As for the "Gods" (*deva*), e.g. Indras, Brahmās and many other and lesser divinities or angels, not only are these at least as real as men, not only do the Buddha himself and other Arahants visit their worlds and converse with them, and not only is the Buddha the "teacher of Gods and men" (*S.* iii. 86), but in response to questions he explicitly ridicules the notion that "there is no other world" (as maintained by the "Nothing-morists," whom we should now call Positivists [*M.* i. 403]) and the preposterous view that "there are no Gods" (*M.* ii. 212). Finally, inasmuch as the same things are said of the Self and of the Buddha, e.g. that definitions of either in terms of either or are invalid, not

¹ In Vedic ritual, the Brahmā is the most learned of the four Brahman officiants, and their standard in all matters of doubt; hence Brahmā, as from one Brahman to another, is the most respectful possible form of address.

only is "Buddha" explained as "one whose Self is awake"¹ (*Vis.* 209; cf. *BU.* iv. 4.13), but there can hardly be any doubt that the Commentator is right in asserting that in such contexts the Truth-finder or Thus-come "is the Self" (*Ud.* 67 with *UdA.* 340). That the Buddha is not only a transcendent principle—Eternal Law and Truth—but also universally immanent as the "Man in this man" is implied by the epithet "All-within" (*Vessantara* = *Viśvāntara* [*M.* i. 386; *It.* 32] applied to him, and by the words, "Whoever would nurse me, let him nurse the sick" (*Vin.* i. 302),—this last a striking parallel to Christ's "inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren ye have done it unto me."

In the whole of the Buddhist canonical literature it is nowhere stated that "there is no Self," no reality distinguishable from the empirical self that is repeatedly subjected to destructive analysis. On the contrary, the Self is both explicitly and implicitly asserted; notably in the recurrent phrase according to which this, that or the other "is not my Self." We cannot ignore the axiom, *Nil agit in seipsum*: Plato's "when there are two opposite impulses in a man at the same time about the same thing, we say that there must be two in him" (*Rep.* 604 B). This will apply, for example, when the conditions are described in which Self is the friend or the foe of self (*S.* i. 57, 71-72 as in *B.G.* vi. 5-7), and whenever a relation between two selves is asserted. The Buddhist is expected to "honour what is more than self" (*A.* i. 126), and this "more" can only be the "Self that's Lord of self, and the goal of self" (*Dh.* 380). It is of the Self and certainly not of himself that the Buddha is speaking when he says, "I have taken refuge in the Self" (*D.* ii. 120), and similarly when he asks others to "seek for the Self" (*Vin.* i. 23; *Vis.* 393), and to "make the Self your refuge and your lamp" (*D.* ii. 100, *S.* v. 163; cf. *S.* iii. 143). Distinction is also made of the "Great Self" (*mah'attā*, "Mahātmā," "the magnanimous") from the "little self" (*app'ātumo*, "the pusillanimous"), and of the "Fair Self" from the "Foul self," the former blaming the latter when wrong is done (*A.* i. 57, 149, v. 88). In short, it is quite certain that the Buddha neither "denied a God, denied a Soul, [nor] denied Eternity."

¹ *Buddh'attā buddho*, *Vis.* 209, cf. *BU.* iv. 4. 13 *pratibuddho ātmā*. The "awakened Self" will be the "Self made-become" (*bhāvit'attā, passim*), i.e. the "unborn Self (*ajāta'attā*) that neither ages nor dies," *DhA.* i. 228, cf. *B.G.* ii. 20.

In numerous contexts, the Buddha and other Arahants or Perfect Men are described as "having made the Self become" (*bhāvit'atto*); "made become," i.e. "as a mother fosters her only son," for this causative form of the verb "become" (the want of which in English is a serious inconvenience) means to "foster," "care for," "cultivate," "serve" or "provide for,"—like *θεραπεύω*. This "making become" of the Self is an indispensable part of the Buddhist pilgrim's progress, and certainly no less so than is the corresponding negative task of putting a stop to all "becoming." To have completed either task is to have completed the other, and to have reached the goal: and "so," as Wordsworth says, "build we up the being that we are." But the modern scholar must be careful to distinguish the "becoming" that is a mere metabolism, an undirected process of automatic growth or "progress," from the "making become" that is a *selective* cultivation. It is only the empirical self, composite of body and consciousness (*viññāna*) that "becomes." Apart from the bodily constitution, consciousness cannot arise; our "former habitations," i.e. past lives, are composites of this sort, but "not mine," "not my Self" (S. iii. 86); and of the Mendicant in whom the conditions that lead to the renewed becoming of a consciousness have been suppressed it is said that he is one whose Self is liberated, existent, altogether content, and that he knows that for him there is no more birth, no more becoming (S. iii. 55).

Merely to have reached the Brahma-worlds or to have become a Brahmā there is not the last end; to have become a Brahmā, or even the Mahā Brahma of the aeon, is indeed a tremendous achievement, but it is not the same as to have become Brahma, or totally despirated Buddha and Arahant. The distinction of Brahmā from Brahma, expressed in Christian terms, is that of God from Godhead, and it will help to make the matter clearer in the Buddhist contexts if I quote analogous statements from two of the greatest and most intellectual of the Christian "mystics":

"You must," says Meister Eckhart, "learn what God and Godhead are. God works, the Godhead does no work. God becomes and unbecomes (*wirt und entwirt*), and is an image of all becoming (*werdenne*); but the Father's nature does not become (*unwerdentlich ist*), and the Son is one with Him in this unbecoming (*entwerdenne*). The temporal becoming ends in the

eternal un-becoming" (Pfeiffer, 516 and 497). So "it is more necessary that the soul lose God than that she lose creatures" (Evans, i. 274), if she is to reach that state in which we shall be "as free as when we were not, free as the Godhead in its non-existence." "Why do they not speak about the Godhead? Because all that is there is one and the same, and there is nothing to be said. . . . When I go back into the ground, into the depths, into the well-spring of the Godhead, no one will ask me whence I came or whither I went" (Pfeiffer, 180-181). "Our essence is not annihilated there, for although we shall have there neither cognizance, nor love, nor beatitude, but there it becomes like unto a desert in which God alone reigns." ¹ Accordingly, the unknown author of *The Book of Privy Counselling* and *The Cloud of Unknowing* makes a difference between those who are called to salvation and those who are called to perfection, and citing Mary's choice of "that best part, the which shall not be taken away from her" (*Book of Privy Counselling*, f. 105 a), remarks of the contemplative life that "if it begin here, it shall last without end," adding that in that other life "there shall be no need to use works of mercy, nor to weep for our wretchedness" (*Cloud of Unknowing*, Ch. 21).

Parallels such as these are sometimes even more conducive to an understanding of the content of Buddhism than are the direct citations from the Buddhist canon; for they enable the reader to proceed from a known to a lesser-known phraseology. It need hardly be said that for a European reader or scholar who proposes to study any Oriental religion seriously a considerable knowledge of Christian doctrine and thinking, and of its Greek background, is almost indispensable.

The two selves are in dramatic contrast whenever one reproaches the other. "Self upbraids the self (*attā pi attānam upavadati*) when what should not be done is done (A. i. 57-58): for example, when the Bodhisatta begs his food for the first time, he cannot stomach the unappetising scraps he receives, but "he blames himself," and he does not allow himself to weaken (J. i. 66). The Self knows what is truth and what is falsity, and

¹ Meister Eckhart's "non-existence," "well-spring," "desert" correspond to the Buddhist Sea (as discussed above) in which all differentiation is lost (cf. Nicolas of Cusa's definition of theosis as *ablatio omnis alteritatis et diversitatis*) and to Rūmī's "Sea" of Love or Non-existence,—the lover becoming there the Beloved (*Mathnawī* i. 504, 1109, ii. 688-690, 1103, iii. 4723, vi. 2771 et passim, with Nicholson's notes).

the Foul self cannot hide its evil deed from the Fair (A. i. 149). The Self is, then, our conscience, inwit and synteresis; the Socratic Daimon "who cares for nothing but the Truth" and "always holds me back from what I want to do." It is a matter of universal experience that, as Plato says, "there is a something in the soul that bids men drink, and a something that forbids, that hungers and thirsts, and another one that keeps account," and it is for us to decide "which shall rule, the better or the worse." Self is the Agathos Daimon, whom it is for "me" to obey.

This leads us to consider the doctrine of the "Daimon's purity" (*yakkhassa suddhi*). Ignoring that there can be a multiplicity of Genii, just as in other traditions there can be a multiplicity of "spirits other than the Spirit," it must be premised that the Daimon (*yakṣa*) had been originally and was still for the Upanishads, Brahma—that Brahma, who is at once transcendent and, as the "Self of the self," immanent. The Sakyas themselves had been worshippers of a Yakkha Sakyavardhana, who can probably be equated with this "ever-productive" Nature. In Buddhism, the Buddha, who is so often described as "Brahma-become" (*brahma-bhūta*), is also called a Yakkha, the Daimon whose "purity" was mentioned above. The Buddha is "uncontaminated" (*anūpalitto*), wholly despirated, goal-attained (*attha-gata*, as predicted by his given name of Siddhartha), pure (*suddho*), immovable (*anejo*), and undesirous (*Sn. 478, cf. M. i. 386, buddhassa . . . āhuneyyassa yakkhassa*): "such is the Daimon's purity, he the Truth-finder has a right to the oblation," he is the *āhuneyya* Daimon, "to whom the sacrificial offering should be made" (*S. i. 141; M. i. 386; Sn. 478*). Whereas all existences are maintained by and delight in "food" (physical or mental) (*D. iii. 211*), the question is asked, "What is that Daimon's name, who takes no pleasure in food?" (*S. i. 32; cf. Sn. 508*). How vividly this recalls the question, "Won't you tell me who he is?" and Socrates' reply, "You would not know him if I told you his name!" and the fact that in the Indian and some other traditions, "Who?" is the most appropriate name of the god who is "the Self of all existences," but has neither come from anywhere or ever become anyone. This "Self of all beings" is the Sun—not "the sun that all men see, but the Sun whom few know with the mind" and whom the Vedas describe as "uncontaminated" (*arepasa, i.e. anupalitto*).

This is only one of the many reasons for identifying the *brahma-bhūta* Buddha, who is also called "the Eye in the World" and "whose name is Truth," with this "Light of lights" and "Sun of men."

Our immediate concern is with the word "uncontaminated." Whether explicitly or implicitly, and equally in Buddhist and pre-Buddhist contexts (where also the Sun is "the one lotus of the sky") the analogical reference is to the purity of the lotus, which is "not wetted by the water" on which it floats. In the same way, the Buddha is "uncontaminated by human affairs" (*Sn. 456; cf. S. iv. 180*): uncontaminated by the world (*A. iii. 347*) and all things in it (*A. iv. 71*). What this implies will throw some light for us upon the nature of the goal that the Buddha and other Perfect Men had pursued and reached. It is too often assumed that the notion of a goal "beyond good and evil" is of modern origin. It appears, however, not only in Indian but also in Islamic and Christian contexts, and is intrinsic to the normal differentiation of the active from the contemplative life, virtue being *essential* to the former and only *dispositive* to the latter, of which the perfection is man's ultimate goal—that of the beatific contemplation of Truth. The notion recurs again and again in Buddhist contexts: that by which the Perfect Man is uncontaminated is not merely evil or vice, but also good or virtue. This is stated explicitly in many contexts, e.g.: "uncontaminated whether by virtue or by vice, self cast away, for such there's no more action needed here" (*Sn. 790*); "one who hath here escaped attachment whether to virtue or vice, one sorrowless, to whom no dust adheres, one pure, him I call a very Brahman" (*Dh. 412*), i.e. Arahant. But even more notably in the parable of the raft: "abandon right and a fortiori wrong; one who has reached the farther shore has no more need of rafts" (*M. i. 135*), for which there are exact parallels in St Augustine's "let him no longer use the Law as a means of arrival when he has arrived" (*De spir. et lit. 16*) and Meister Eckhart's "having gotten to the other side I do not want a ship"; and as the latter also says, "Behold the Soul divorced from every aught . . . leaving no trace of either vice or virtue."

"Purity" is not attainable by belief, audition, knowledge, morals or works, nor without them (*Sn. 839*); in other words, moral training is absolutely indispensable, but does not by itself involve perfection. Rules of conduct are laid down for house-

holders and for Mendicants; those for the latter are naturally more stringent, but in no way extreme; self-torture is strongly deprecated. Those of the Mendicants who offended (and it is admitted that there were some who joined the order for quite unworthy reasons) could be cited and censured in public monastic assembly, or, in case of serious offences, unfrocked. On the other hand Mendicants were not, and are not nowadays, bound by any irrevocable vows, and are free to return to the household life if they wish; this is regarded simply as a failure or weakness and an occasion of reproach.

The practice of moral virtues whether by a householder or Mendicant disciple leads to rebirth in a lower or higher heaven, as the case may be. The former earns merit by moral conduct and above all by generosity; in this connection it may be noted that the Buddha instructs a householder, who has been converted and has become a lay-adherent, not to abandon his former practice of supporting the members of a rival order of Mendicants, although from the Buddhist standpoint these were heretics. The Mendicant, who had no possessions apart from his robes, begging bowl, jug, and staff, could not in the same way be generous with his goods, but might be a teacher of others, and there is no gift more worthy than that of the Eternal Law; he no longer recognized family ties, as bonds implying duties, nor might he concern himself with politics or participate in the pleasures, trials, or affairs of men living in the world, but he was not only expected to return love for hate if anyone abused him verbally or physically, and also to practise the Brahma-bidings or Divine "States" (*brahma-vihāra*) of Love, Pity, Tenderness, and Impartiality (*mettā, karuṇā, muditā, upekkhā*). The first of these consists in the deliberate radiation of well-wishing Love towards all living things whatever,—“with heart of Love he abides irradiating one, a second, third, and fourth quarter; and so the whole wide world, above, below, athwart, and everywhere, he continues to irradiate with heart of Love abounding, measureless, guileless,” and thinking, “May all be happy” (*Sn. 143 f*). Here the reference of “all” is by no means only to human beings, but absolutely universal. Impartiality, on the other hand, is a subjective state of patience or detachment, as of one who looks upon whatever pleasant or unpleasant things befall himself as one might look on at a play, present at but not involved in the hero’s predicaments. The “heart’s liberation” thus brought about

tends to an ultimate rebirth in the Brahma-worlds and to companionship and coincidence with Brahmā; inasmuch as the disposition of the Mendicant who develops these friendly and unacquisitive states of mind is the same as that of Brahmā. It will not be overlooked that the procedure so far is strictly ethical, and that it presupposes the virtue of Innocence (*ahimsā*, *M. i. 44*; *S. i. 163*; *Sn. 309, 368, 515, etc.*), a term that has become again very familiar in modern times as the principle of “non-violence” advocated by Gandhi as a rule of conduct under all circumstances,—“put up thy sword.” The training of the will is logically prior to the training of the intellect.

But these ethical procedures, in which the notion of oneself and others is still involved, are only a part of the Mendicant’s “Walking with God” (*brahma-cariyam = θεῶν συνομαδεῖν*) or “Walking with the Law” (*dhamma-cariyam*), and not the end of the road; there is “still more to be done.” We are told that, like Mendicants who are not yet “absolutely freed” but flatter themselves that their work is done (*A. v. 336*; *cf. M. i. 477*), the Gods are often subject to the mistaken impression that their condition is unchangeable and everlasting, and that for them there is nothing more to be achieved (*A. iv. 336, 355, 378*; *S. i. 142*). Even a Brahmā, the highest of the Gods, imagines that there is no “further escape” (*uttarim nissaranam*) from the glorious state that is already theirs (*M. i. 326*; *A. iv. 76*; *S. i. 142*). We find, accordingly, the Buddha reproaching Sāriputta for having instructed a Brahman questioner in no more than the way “to the lower Brahma-worlds where there is still more to be achieved” (*M. ii. 195-196*). It is always assumed that those who have not effected their Total Despiration (Parinirvana) here, if they have gone so far as to be “non-returners,” can attain to their perfection and make their final escape from whatever may be their position in yonder world; it is for that that the Buddha is the teacher not only of men but also of the Gods.

What, then, is the remaining task to be accomplished by some Mendicants and those who have attained to an aeviternal life in the Empyrean heavens but are not yet Arahants “whose work is done”? There is no further question of a higher status to be acquired by good works,—the fruit of works has already been earned; it is a matter now entirely of the life of Contemplation (*jhāna*). *Jhāna* (Skr. *dhyāna*, Chinese *ch’an*, Japanese *zen*) corresponds almost exactly to the second term of the series “Con-

sideration, Contemplation, and Rapture" in Western practice; *samādhi*, literally "composure," or "synthesis," as of radii at the centre of their circle,¹ corresponding to "Rapture" and implying the consummation of *Jhāna* at any stage. *Jhāna* implies the active and intentional realisation of states of being other than that in which the contemplative is normally existent at the time; and its force is entirely betrayed by those scholars who have called it "musing," or, still more ineptly, "reverie." Contemplation is a strenuous mental discipline, demanding a long training, and not a kind of day-dreaming; "there is no suggestion of trance, but rather of enhanced vitality" (PTS. *Pali Dictionary*, s.v. *jhāna*). The expert can pass from one to another of the hierarchy of "states" at will, and back again (D. ii. 71, 156); and this positive command and control of contemplative "states" sharply distinguishes the Indian Yoga from all merely passive and adventitious "mystic" experience. The contemplative "states" are a kind of ladder by which one can ascend from lower to higher states of being or levels of reference; but the final goal of Liberation lies beyond them all. The first four *Jhānas* are sometimes practised by laymen as well as by Mendicants.

The *Jhānas* are typically four (available to laymen as well as to Mendicants), or if taken together with the four *Āruppa-Jhānas* (formless or altogether immaterial states) a set of eight stages of liberation (*vimokkha* [D. ii. 69-71, 112, 156, et passim]). In the first, making the mind "one-pointed," attention is directed to some specific support of contemplation naturally suited to the pupil's disposition and constitution, and often chosen for him by the Master whose disciple he is. In the second *Jhāna* the practitioner still sees the external form, but is unaware of his own; the experience is ecstatic. In the third, the ecstasy passes, and there remains only awareness of the endlessness of the power of discrimination (*viññāṇa*). In the sixth the sense that "there is nothing" (*n'atthi kiñci*) prevails. In the seventh there is no further discrimination, and the condition is one neither with nor without consciousness (*saññā*). In the eighth there is an arrest of

¹ In the architectural symbolism often employed the concentration of the powers of the soul at their source effected in *samādhi* is illustrated by the synthesis of the radiating rafters in the roofplate of a domed building; and this (perforated) roofplate itself is the "sundoor" by which one escapes from whatever conditioned world is represented by the interior space or cavity (the Platonic "cave") of the building itself.

all consciousness and sensation (D. ii. 69-71, 112, 156). And once a Mendicant has mastered these eight degrees of liberation in sequence, in reverse sequence, and in both sequences successively, so that he can submerge himself in or emerge from any of them at will and for as long as he will; and when also by the eradication of the fluxions he enters into that Freedom of the Will (*ceto-vimutti*) and into that Intellectual Freedom (*paññā-vimutti*) which he of himself has come to know and realize here and now, then such a Mendicant is said to be "Free in both ways"; nor is there any other or higher Freedom in both ways than this (D. ii. 71; cf. Sn. 734, 753).

It must, however, be very clearly understood that the attainment of such a complete command of the hierarchy of the states of existence, or successive heavens, is not an end in itself, but a means to final Liberation from all "states"; all are contingent, all originate and pass away, and no one who knows their true nature, who understands their pleasures and pains, and who knows the way of escape (*nissaraṇam*) from them, would delight in them or wish to remain permanently in any of them, even the highest (D. ii. 79). Whatever one's position in the hierarchy of the worlds may be, there is always a still farther shore to be reached, and it is only for one completely liberated that there is nothing more to be done; from the point of view of the *summum bonum* it is little better to have reached a heaven than to be still on earth; the great work is still unaccomplished. To make this clear the Buddha propounds the great doctrine of the Middle Way,—*majjhena tathāgato dhammam deseti*.

This very important doctrine, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Scholastic as much as it is Brahmanical and Buddhist, has as many applications as there are alternatives, of which the choice between this and some other world, thought of as contrasted "shores," is only one case; the true "world-ender" (*lok'anta-gū*) is not attached to existence in this or any other world, however exalted; for all beings (*sattā*), men and Gods alike, are in Death's bonds (S. i. 97, 105). There are always two extremes (*antā*), and it is as against the extremist (*anta-g-gahika*) who attaches an absolute value to either that the Buddha propounds his Mean; the true "Walking with God" (*brahmacariya*) is a Middle Way. Already as a Bodhisatta, having been reared in luxury, and thereafter having mortified his flesh to the very point of death, the Buddha had discovered that neither of these extremes would lead him to

the knowledge that he sought, and that he attained to by following the Middle Way (*Vin.* i. 10). In the same way, Purity cannot be attained by virtue,—nor without it (*Sn.* 839); purity is not only from vice but also from virtue. In the same way as regards all “theories” (*ditṭhi*), affirmations and denials: “is” (the Eternalist error) and “is not” (the Annihilationist error) are neither of them true descriptions of an ultimate reality (*S.* ii. 19–20, 117),—just as for Boethius, faith is a “mean between contrary heresies.” This does not mean that the Middle Way has any dimension; in terms of space, the goal is neither here nor beyond nor in-between (*Ud.* 8), and it is “not by paces” but within you that World’s End must be reached (*S.* i. 61–62; *A.* ii. 48–49; *S.* iv. 94). In the same way—and this is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the atomic principle—as regards time. The existence—origin and dissolution—of all things is momentary (*khaṇika* [*Vis.* i. 230, 239; *Dpv.* i. 16]); as it had been for Heraclitus (*cf.* Plutarch, *Moralia*, 392 B.C.). This *in-stant* (*khaṇa*), in which things arise, exist, and cease to be simultaneously, is the now without duration that separates past from future and gives to both their meaning; time, in which change supervenes, is nothing but the unbroken succession of flow of such moments, each of which—timeless in itself¹—is our Middle Way (*A.* iv. 137). Life, as we know it empirically, is the field of transient action, and it is precisely such actions that have heritable consequences. Immanent activities, on the other hand, remaining in the agent, do not involve the agent in external events and, for the same reason, are inaccessible to observation. Several Buddhist expressions (*e.g.* *thit’atto* [*S.* iii. 55; *Sn.* 519, *cf.* 920]), to be contrasted with the transience, *aniccam*, of all that is not-Self imply the immobility of the liberated Self. What this means is that the transcendent, supra-logical Life of the liberated Self is Self-contained. The moments themselves are one; their apparent succession is conventional.

The “moment” without duration is, then, our great opportunity,—“now the day of salvation,”—and we find the Buddha praising those of the Mendicants who have “seized their

¹ It is true that “men feel that what cannot be put in terms of time is meaningless,” but “the notion of a static, immutable being ought to be understood rather as signifying a process so intensely vivacious . . . as to comprise beginning and end at one stroke” (W. H. Sheldon in the *Modern Schoolman* xxi. 133). “Plus la vie du moi s’identifie avec la vie du non-moi [i.e. le soi], plus on vit intensément”. (Abdul Hādī in *Le Voile d’Isis*, Jan. 1934).

moment,” and blaming those who have let it pass them by (*S.* iv. 126; *Sn.* 333). The moments, indeed, pass us by; but whoever seizes one of them escapes from their succession; for the despirated Arahant time is no more. In every case the Buddha teaches the Mean by the principle of causality; and whatever the two extremes may be, it is “appetite” or, literally, “thirst” (*taṇhā*) that “sews” one to renewed becoming, and it is only as a mentor of the Mean that one is uncontaminated by either extreme (*A.* iii. 399–401; *Sn.* 1042),—just as for Plato it is only by holding on to the golden thread of the Common Law that the human puppet can avoid the contrary and unregulated pulls that drag us to and fro to good or evil actions determined by our appetites (*Laws*, 644).

It is not without good reason that the Mendicant is called a Workman (*samaṇa*, literally “toiler,” and exact semantic equivalent of “ascetic”); he can know no rest until he is one “who has done what there was to be done” (*katakarāṇīyo*). He must be one who is the master of his will or thought, not one who is at their mercy; and the man whom the Buddha commends as an “illuminer” of the forest in which he lives alone, is the Mendicant who, when he returns from his round for alms, assumes his contemplative seat determined never to rise again until he has freed himself from the fluxes. For the winning of what has not yet been won, the reaching of what has not yet been reached, the verification of what has not yet been verified, the Mendicant who has left the world in faith and is still a disciple must exercise manhood or heroism (*viriyam* = *ἀνδρεία*, *virtus*), resolving, like the Bodhisatta himself: “Rather let skin, sinews, and bones alone remain, while flesh and blood dry up, than let there be any rest from the exercise of manhood until I shall have won what can be won by human endurance, manhood, and persistent advance” (*S.* ii. 28; *M.* i. 481; *A.* i. 50; *J.* i. 71). These are his intentions: “I shall become not of the stuff that any world is made of, I shall eradicate the notion of ‘I’ and ‘mine,’ I shall become fully-possesst of the gnosis that cannot be imparted, I shall see clearly the cause and the causal origination of all things.”

We have seen that the Bodhisatta’s original and primary purpose (*attha*) was to effect the conquest of death, and that in fact he conquered Death on the night of the Great Awakening, and thereafter by his teaching of the Eternal Law “opened the gates

of immortality" for others. It will be, then, a kind of test and proof of the efficacy of the Mendicant's Walking with Brahma in accordance with his teaching if we ask ourselves how the graduate Arahant looks on at the death of others, or looks forward to his own. As for the death of others, it is a part of his discipline, to be "mindful of death," and this mindfulness of death includes the reflection that all beings whatever, up to and including the Gods of the Brahma-world, are ultimately mortal; and bearing this in mind, the graduate Mendicant remains unmoved even by the Buddha's own decease, for he is aware that decay and dissolution are inherent in all component things, and it is only the novices and the inferior deities who weep and wail when "the Eye in the world" is withdrawn. It had been an old story in India that immortality in the body is impossible; the Arahant, then, is well aware that his own time will come. The untaught, average man, when the end is at hand, "mourns, pines, weeps and wails"; but not so the Ariyan disciple in whom the fires of selfhood have been quenched—he knows that death is the inevitable end of all born beings, and taking this for granted, only considers, "How shall I best apply my strength to what's at hand?" (*A.* iii. 56) until he dies. Having already died to whatever can die, he awaits the dissolution of the temporal vehicle with perfect composure and can say: "I hanker not for life, and am not impatient for death. I await the hour, like a servant expecting his wages; I shall lay down this body of mine at last, foreknowing, recollected" (*Th.* i. 606, 1002). Or even if the Ariyan disciple, whether a Mendicant or still a householder, has not yet "done all that there was to be done," he is assured that having come into being elsewhere according to his deserts, it will still be possible for him to work out his perfection there. The words, "O grave, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting?" might well have been the Buddha's or those of any true Buddhist. For him, there will be no more becoming, no more sorrow; or if there is, it will not be for long, for he has already gone far on that long road that leads to Nirvana, "and, indeed, he will soon have reached the goal."

EXTRACTS
FROM
THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE