

II BUDDHISM

Early Buddhism, both in the Canon and as interpreted by Buddhaghosa, emphasizes the inconstancy and the extreme brevity of life under any conditions, in a word, its mortality in the sense that "all change is a dying" (Plato, *Euthydemus* 284 D, Eckhart, Evans ed. I. 384); and asserts unequivocally the unreality of "beings" (*satta*)¹ and of the "self" (*attā*)², although

¹ S. 1. 135 *evam khandesu santesu hoti satto ti, sammuti... nayidha satt' ūpalabbhati*; Mil. 72 *n'atthi koci satto yo imañhā kāyā aññāṃ kāyaṃ saṅkamati*; 268 *na paramatthena satt' ūpaladdhi*. D. 3. 211 *sabbe sattā saṅkhāratt'hikā*; S. 1. 97 *sabbe sattā marissanti*,—cf. Aristotle, *De an.* 3. 6 *τὸ γὰρ ψῆδος ἐστὶ οὐδέστι οὐδ' ἐστὶ*. Just as much as the modern positivist, the Buddhist regards "individuality" as nothing but a transitory association of sensuous data, mere name and phenomenon, and "the very mother of illusions"; but at the same time denies absolutely that all that "is my Self". It should be needless to say that the postulated "self" (*attā*) or Ego (*aham*) is other than the Self to which the Buddha "resorts" (S. 3. 143, D. 2. 120), other than the "plenary, great 'I'" (*pūrṇam aham mahah, Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 240), other than the "I" that is "proper to none but God in his sameness" (Meister Eckhart). On the two "I's" cf. *JAOS* 67, 1947, pp. 69, 70.

² Nothing that can be named or sensed is a real "Self". When the Freedman realises that in the postulated "self" there is no

both are permissible terms when postulated merely for practical, everyday purposes³.

"Brief is the life of human beings... none to whom death cometh not" (S. 1. 108, cf. A. 4. 136). Even of a Brahmā, whose day is of a thousand years, is said that "his life is little, not for long" (S. 1. 143). "Life is like a dewdrop... a bubble on the water" (A. 4. 137, cf. D. 2. 246 f.),—"like a dewdrop on the tip of a blade of grass when the sun rises, such is the lifetime of men. Mother! do not hinder me" (Vism. 231), i.e. do not hold me back from the Path. "In the last analysis, the moment of the life (*jivita-khaṇo*) of beings is just as over-brief (*atiparitto*)⁴ as the turning of a single thought; like the turning of a chariot-wheel, which turns by means of just one place on its rim, and stands still by means of only one, so is the life of beings that of a single moment of thought, and when this ends the being is said to have ended. As it has been said, 'In the past thought-moment one lived... in the future thought-

veritable Selfhood, and no longer sees Self in what is not-Self, then he "no longer worries about what is unreal" (*asatā na paritassati*, M. 1. 135).

³ The pragmatic validity and real invalidity of the postulates corresponds to the distinction of relative, transactional (*vo-hārīka*) and conventional (*sammuti* = *sammata*, or perhaps = *saṃvṛti*, "contingent") from absolute (*paramatthika*) truth. The affirmative language of postulation applies literally only to the world of accidents (D. 2. 63) and can only be employed analogically or negatively to ultimate reality.

⁴ Cf. A. 1. 249 where the little self (of which the "life" is referred to above) is *paritto*, the Great Self *aparitto*. On *√ric* see my "*Unātiriktaṃ and Atyaricyata*", *NIA*. 6. 52-56.

moment one will live ... in the present thought-moment one is alive',

'Life, the self-ish nature (*atta-bhāva*), pleasure and pain, all⁵

Are conjunct (*samāyutta*) in a single thought, and its moment passes lightly'⁶...

Such is the 'Recollection of Death' in terms of the 'Brevity of the Moment'" (Vism. 238).

"Connatural are life and its theft⁷ ... Beings are born bearing in themselves inveteration and death. For indeed their recurrent thinking is infected with inveteration coincidentally with its origination; like a stone that falls from a mountain top, it breaks up together with the aggregates of which it is composite, so that instant death (*khaṇika-maraṇam*)⁸ is connatural with advent" (Vism. 1. 230). In other words, birth and death are not unique events of any contingent existence, but of the very stuff (*evam-dhammo*) of "life"; and this liability, of which a particular birth and death are only special cases, is precisely that "reincarnation" (*puna-bbhava, āgamana*) from which a final escape is sought; immortality (*amata*) and life or becoming (*bhava*) are

⁵ "All", i.e. the passible five-fold composite "that is not my Self" (*na me so attā*), *passim*.

⁶ *Eka-citta ... vattate (vṛt) khaṇo* implying that *citta-vṛtti*, "turning, or inconstancy, of thought" that the Yogi seeks to suppress. The mind is always on the move, and hence often compared to a monkey.

⁷ "Theft", i.e. by the "robber", or "waylayer", or "hunter", Death.

⁸ Not "sudden death" at the end of one's life, but "instant death" all through it.

not compossibles, but incompatible; "the cessation of becoming is Nibbāna" (S. 2.117). "As between one thought and the next (*citt'antaro*), such is a mortal" (A. 5. 300): "Could a man be called 'quick' who could so run as to catch in the air arrows loosed at the same time by four master-archers? Quicker than that is the wearing out of the composite-factors of life" (S. 2. 266); "All that is born, whatever is become, is corruptible" (*palokadhammam*, S. 5.163). It is in this sense that "the Buddha looks upon the world in momentary (*khaṇe khaṇe*) dissolution" (Dpvs. 1.16)⁹.

"Four and eighty thousand aeons the Maruts abide, and yet abide not even for so long as for the sequence of two thoughts ... In the present lives the world, and with the break-up of a thought it dies (*paccuppanena jīvati citta-bhaṅga mato loke*)¹⁰ ... From the unseen come forth born beings, and broken-up pass into the unseen; like a flash of lightning in the ether they arise and pass away" (Vism. 625, 626).

Time (*samaya*, "co-ition") is past (*atīta*, "over-gone"), future (*anāgata*, "un-come"), or present (*paccuppanna*, "up-come"). The present has three senses; that of the moment (*khaṇa-*) in which there meet forthcoming, stasis and break-down (*uppāda-tṭhiti-bhaṅga-*

⁹ Buddhaghosa derives *loka* from *laj, palaj*, to decay, be dissolved (Vism. 427).

¹⁰ Similarly in MU. 6. 17 and 6. 34. 43 "this world, measured by a thought ... the conflux, just a thought" (*idam citta-mātram ... citta-m-eva saṁsāram*), i.e. lasts only for so long as a thought, though it may also be meant that it is "of the stuff of thought", conceptual.

pattam); that of the continuation (*santati-*), i.e. "now" in the extended and usual meaning of the word; and that of road (*addhā-*)¹¹ in the sense of span of life, whether long or short; and of these three presents, the first is included in the second, and the second in the third. The becoming of the five-fold aggregates, i.e. of "beings", or "selves", takes place in the course of all these "times" (*Vism.* 431, 473).

Observe that the Stasis is only momentary, not in the continuing present, except in the sense that the moments are surrounded by the continuum; "as it might be a mountain torrent flowing swiftly from afar and carrying everything along with it, and there is no moment, pause, or minute (*khaṇo, layo, mul.utto*) in which it comes to rest¹²,... even so is the life of men

¹¹ In its most extended sense the Road (*addhā*) as distinct from the Way (*magga*) ... much, indeed, as "byway" from "highway"... is that whole extent of the past habitations (*pubba-nivāsa*) that were "not my Self", but in which, already, more tears have been shed than would fill the sea. "It is through not understanding, failing to penetrate, the Four Ariyan Truths (of Ill, its origin and its eradication, and the Way) that we have run and wandered on this long road,... both you and I... How is a Monk a 'Wayman? In that he is moving fast on this long road to where he has not yet been, there where there is a cessation of all composites, a relinquishing of all conditions, a waning out of thirst, an absence of gust, an arrest of becoming, ... Nibbāna... There is no surcease of Ill until World's End has been reached" (*D.* 2. 60, *A.* 3. 164 and 2. 49).

¹² Cf. Plutarch, *Mor.* 432 A, B (on the stream of Time). In my *Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought*, 1946, p. 159, n. 10 (on *kṣaṇika-nairātmaḍī*) I erred in speaking of existence as "not a continuity but a succession of unique instants

brief and light (*parittam lahukam*)... or like the mark made by a stick on water... For the born there is no 'not dying'"¹³ (*A.* 4. 137). Buddhaghosa's three momentary accidents (*uppāda, thiti, bhāṅga*)¹⁴ are the same as the "forthcoming, maturity, and alteration or dying (*uppāda, vayo, aññathatta*)¹⁵ of things while

of consciousness". The Buddhist doctrine is one of "continuity without identity", and it is because of *both* that the question, Is it the same man or another that reaps what has been sown, cannot be answered by a simple Yes or No.

¹³ Aristotle's *τοῦ αὐτοῦ ... καὶ γένοισ καὶ φθορά*, *Met.* 11. 12. 8.

¹⁴ *Vism.* 404—405; where it is asked whether in the case of one who visits the Brahma-world in an invisible, mental body, he does this "in the moment of the forthcoming or moment of stability or moment of break-up of the resolute thought" of going there, and answered that he goes "in all three moments"; which is as much as to say that they are not three consecutive moments, but one. It has been previously explained that if he goes in a visible body the journey takes some time, "for the body moves slowly".

¹⁵ Aristotle's *ἀφθίσις, ἀκμή, and φθίσις*, dependent on food, *De an.* 3. 12; *AA.* 2. 1. 2 *annena hīmāni sarvāṇi bhūtāni samananti*; *Taitt. Up.* 2. 2 *annād vai prajā prajāyante*; *D.* 3. 211 *sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhikā*; *S.* 1. 97 *sabbe sattā marissantī*. "All change is a desistance from a nature", Aristotle *Phys.* 4. 13, 222 B, cf. 4. 12, 221 B: "All change is a dying", Plato, *Euthydemus* 283 D, 285 B, and Meister Eckhart (Evans ed. 1. 384); "Alteratio est via ad generationem et corruptionem", St. Thomas Aquinas, *De mixt. elementorum*, ed. Parma 16. 353, cf. *Sum. Theol.* I. 105. 2 and I-II. 113. 7 ad 1.

It can hardly be overlooked, also, that the three phases of existence, *saṅgī, sthiti* and *laya*, that are resumed in every instant, are the respective functions of the Trinity of Brahmā, Vishnu and Śiva in so far as they are logically distinguished from "the unity of the Person".

they last" (*thitānam*) predicated in S. 3.137, the same, too, as the "procession, stasis and recession" (*gati, sthiti, nivṛtti*) that are synthesised in Time, ŚĀ. 7. 20, and as the "efflux, maturity, and Heimgang" (*srava, vṛddhi, astam gamana*) of which the Time without time, Brahma to wit, is the inexhaustible font (MU. 6. 14); and these three are characteristic of whatever is composite (*saṅkhatam*) but not of what is incomposite (*asaṅkhatam*, A. 1. 152)¹⁶,—and emphatically *not* of the Buddha's "incomposite Eternal-Law" (*asaṅkhatam dhammam*, A. 4. 359), *not* of Nibbāna (*asaṅkhatam*, Mil. 270), *not* of that home (*āyatanam*) "where there is neither coming nor going nor stopping, nor falling nor uprising, no this world and that world, no support, no motion, no inception" nor of that "unborn, unbecome, uncreated, incomposite that *is*, and were it *not*, there would be no way of escape from the born, become, created and composite" (Ud. 80)¹⁷.

¹⁶ Incomposite, i.e. "simple": "intellectus noster... in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non potest, nisi per remotionem compositionis... aeternitas non varietur per praesens, praeteritum et futurum" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I. 10. 1 and 2, cf. *Sum. contra gentiles* I. 15); "igitur vita eius non habet successionem, sed est tota simul. Est igitur sempiterna" (*Sum. contra gentiles* I. 99). I would add, nisi simul, quomodo omnisciens?

¹⁷ It will not be overlooked that all these negative terms, having *nibbāna* and *dhamma* as their reference, are equally such as are applied to God *secundam viam remotionis* in Christianity; cf., for example, *Sum. contra gentiles* I, cc. 14, 15, 18, 23, 89, ... God is immutable, incomposite, without accidents, impassible, etc.

Πάντα ῥεῖ: Heracleitus, fr. XLI, "You cannot dip your feet twice into the same rivers; for other waters are ever flowing in": *sabbe dhammā aniccā* (S. 3.132). That all things—note the plural—are in flux is no more a denial of the real stability of that which is not a "thing" than is the Buddha's destructive analysis of the composite "self", always followed by the words, "that is not my Self", a denial of the Self. As Aristotle (*Met.* 4. 5. 7 and 15f.) points out, there can be "also another kind of essence of things that are, wholly devoid of destruction and generation". It cannot be shown that Heracleitus ever explicitly or implicitly denied this; "all things" flow, no doubt, but there is a one and only Wisdom is distinct from "all things" (fr. XVIII),—not one of them; and if, as Ritter and Preller say, the "Ever-living Fire" is such that *unde manat omnis motus*, this does not mean that itself is moved. Aristotle had absolutely no grounds for accusing "these men" of the belief that "sensibilia are the only realities". In Buddhism the reality of an unmoved, incomposite nature is explicitly asserted over against the evanescence of the composite transients; and when Aristotle goes on to say "it is only the realm of sense around us which continues subject to destruction and generation, but this is a practically negligible part of the whole" (*ib.* 22), this might just as well have been said by the Buddha himself!

That there is "no moment in which the river rests" shows clearly that time is not to be thought of as "made of" a succession of stops, but as a continuum (*samtāna*); the indivisible moment is immanent in time,

but not a part of time; just as for Aristotle "time is not composite of atomic nows, any more than any other magnitude is made up of atoms" (*Phys.* 6. 9. 230 B, cf. 8. 8, 262 A).

Inasmuch as all change is a dying, it is from the inconstancy (*anicca*) of life and thought that the Wayfarer seeks to be emancipated,—“seeking for stability” (*aññhitam nissāya*, A. 3. 219). As we have seen above, Stasis is predicated only in the moment (*khaṇa*) or in the Time (*kāla*) without time that is Brahma—that Brahma and Dhamma that the Freedman, *dhamma-bhūto, brahma-bhūto*, D. 3. 84, S. 3. 93) “has become”; but we have not yet drawn the obvious conclusion that these two are one and the same, though be it noted that in one the past and future meet, and from the other flow, and that both are without duration. What are we, then, to understand by such expressions as “one whose thought is stable” (*thita-citto* D. 2. 157, S. 5. 74) “one whose self is stable” (*thit’attā*, D. 1. 57, S. 3. 55, and notably Sn. 359 *parinibbutam thit’attam*) and “stable, motionless” (*thito anejo*, Th. 1. 372), “as in the ocean’s midmost depth no wave is born, but all is still, so for the Monk, who’s still and does not move (*thito anejo*), nor should he swell at all”¹⁸ (Sn. 920); or by statements such as that “having crossed, and reached the Farther Shore (*Nibbāna*), and stands’ (*tiṭṭhati*), ‘an Arahant’ is meant” (S. 4. 175, cf. Sn. 946), or that

¹⁸ “Dū solt sin stēte unde veste, daz ist: dū solt gelich stān liebes und leides, gelūkes und ungelūkes” (Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer p. 71).

“having overpast inveteration and death, they ‘stand’” (*thassanti*, S. 2. 46)¹⁹.

¹⁹ “Stability is the peculiar property of eternity” (Marsilio Ficino, *Commentary on Plato’s Symposium* IV. 16). “Men saw these two things [body and soul, i.e. *saviññāna-kāya*], pondered them, investigated both of them, and found that each is mutable in man. The body is mutable in its various ages, in its corruption, its ailments, its reflections and its defections, its life, its death. They passed to the soul, which they certainly comprehended as being the better, and also wondered at as being invisible. But they found it too to be mutable, now willing something, now not willing; now knowing, again not knowing; now remembering, again forgetting; now fearing, again daring; now advancing in wisdom, again relapsing into folly. They saw that it was mutable, they left it too, and went in search of something that should be immutable. And thus they arrived at a cognition of God the Creator by means of the things which He created... Examine the mutations of things and thou wilt everywhere find ‘has been’ and ‘shall be’. Think on God and thou wilt find ‘is’ where ‘has been’ and ‘will be’ cannot be” (St. Augustine, *Sermo* CCXLI. 3. 3 + *In Joan. Evang.* XXXVIII. 10, versions by Erich Przywara, S. J.); further, “clarum est eam [animam] esse mutabilem” (*De ver. rel.* XXX. 54), “non quidem localiter, sed tamen temporaliter” (ib. X. 18); “anima vero jam ipsa crearetur” (*De Gen. ad litt.* VII. 24. 35) and “omnia quae fecit, quia ex nihilo fecit, mutabilia sunt” (*De nat. boni*, I. 1). But “Quod autem incipit aut desinit vivere, vel in vivendo successionem patitur, mutabile est” (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. contra gentiles*, I. 99), and more generally, “whatever has had a beginning must have an end” (Aristotle, *Phys.* 3. 4, 203 B; *Samyutta Nikāya* 4. 46). How, then, can “the” soul be or become “immortal”? Only if, with St. Thomas, Plato, Philo and the Upanisads, we recognize that “duo sunt in homine”, respectively mortal and immortal by nature,—a created “soul” subject to accidents, and an uncreated “Soul of the soul” above them. St. Augustine asks, in fact, “how

The answer in terms of time is that the Buddha, identified with the Dhamma, must be, like the Dhamma, "simple" (*asamkhata*, A. 4. 359) and by the same token "timeless" (*akāliko*, A. 4. 406). The Freedman, in fact, "transcends the aeons"²⁰ (*kappāṭīto . . . vipamutto*, Sn.

is it that reason (*ratio = λόγος*) is immortal, and that I am defined as something both rational and mortal at the same time?" and reflects, "if reason is immortal, and if I who analyze and synthesize all these [temporal] things, am reason, then that by which I am called mortal is not 'mine' . . . and we ought to fly from the mortal to the immortal" (*De ordine* II. 50).

If we bear in mind that "Dhamma" (*δικαιοσύνη*, *Justitia*, *Lex Aeterna*) is one of the Divine Names (*dhamma* and *brahma* being interchangeable terms in the Upaniṣads and the Pali Canon), it will be seen that Augustine's words might as well have been those of the Buddha himself; both were "intensely sensitive to the pathos of mutability". St. Augustine's "then that by which I am called mortal is not mine" corresponds exactly to the Pali *taṃ n'ētam mama, n'eso'ham asmī, na me so attā*.

²⁰ On the incalculable length of the aeons (*kappa*), in their sequences of hundreds and thousand for which no earliest point can be recognized, see S. 2. 178-193, ending with the words, "Impermanent are all composites the nature of which is to originate and age, and having arisen, then to perish; to have done with them is bliss"

An aeon (*kalpa*) qua *saeculum*, is properly speaking a "day of Brahma" consisting of a thousand yugas or 4320 million human years; in his days and nights successive worlds are manifested and dissolved. The life-span of a Brahmā is a hundred years made up of such days. It is from even this "brief" life that the Buddha teaches a "further escape". But it should be noted that *kappa* ($\sqrt{k/p}$, related to *kr*) is also "concept" or "multiple arrangement", *κόσμος* (cf. RV. 10. 90. 11 *katidhā vi akalpayan?* and conversely MU. 6. 30 *nihsantikālo*

373), "not a man of the aeons" (*akkapiyo*, Sn. 860); "they call him 'awake' (*buddha*) who discerns the

nirabhimānas tiṣṭhet), i.e. *prapañca*, and that just as a Wake is *nippapañca* "unelaborate", so *akappiyo* (Sn. 914 etc.) is not only *ex tempore* but also "other than whatever is conceivable *seriatim*", transcendent not only with respect to "times" but also with respect to temporalia.

The "former habitations" and past aeons are all immediately present to a Buddha who can pounce upon them like a lion or reach them like an arrow its mark; others need to look backward through the ages, one or myriad according to their ability, but a Buddha or Arahant envisages past or future aeons directly (*Vism.* 411). It as if they formed a circle (beginningless and endless cycle) of which he is the centre, no farther from one than from any other point on the circumference; while others, less adept, must work their way backward along the circumference if they are to see any past time.

When just above (*Vism.* 410) Buddhaghosa speaks of the remembering of "how I was then, So-and-so, of such and such a family, etc.", and of the past conditions as being those "in one's own continuum" (*attano saṃtāne*)—or better, perhaps, "one's own lineage"—this is said "conventionally" (*samuccā*), not in very truth (*paramatthena*); for any well taught Buddhist monk knows better than to ask, What was I in a former life, or What am I now, or What shall I be in the future? For he sees things "as become", i.e. strictly in terms of causal process and only speaks of an "I" for practical convenience in everyday life (S. 2. 26, D. 1. 202). Similarly in D. 1. 81 the analogy of *cuti* and *upapatti* to the case of a man who goes to another village and again returns to his own (the "villages" being this and yonder worlds, as in CU. 8. 6. 2) would be a heresy if taken literally, as is explicit in Pv. 4. 3. 31. The three modalities of personality (*atta-bhāva*), past, present, and future, are mere conventional terms of every speech, not ultimate realities (D. 1. 202). In just the same way for the *Yoga Sūtra* (2. 39 and 4. 35), the contemplation of one's

aeons, the flux of things in which they fall and rise . . . , one for whom birth (*jāti* = *bhava*, *γένεσις*) is at an end" (Sn. 517). For such as these, explicitly, "there is neither past nor future" (*na tassa paccha na purattham atthi*, S. 1. 141); a Buddha's "recollection" does not operate by a following up of the sequences of births and deaths in time, but siezes immediately and

former personalities (*ātma-bhāva*) may be a profitable exercise in the earlier stages of a Yogins' development, but one who no longer confuses *sattva* with Self will never propound such questions as "Who was I?", etc. Reincarnation, in other words, is a façon de parler, not really a matter of persistent individualities.

It should be observed that the Buddhist "double truth" (*sammati*-, *loka-vohāra*-, *loka-niruttiyo*-, etc. and on the other hand *paramattha-saccam*; corresponding to the Vedantic *avidyā* and *vidyā*, *vikāra*- and *paramārthika-satyam*), one relative and conventional, the other absolute and certain, correspond to the distinction of metaphysics from "philosophy" (in the narrow sense of the word), and to Plato's distinction of "such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one ore another of the things that wo nowadays call realities" from "the knowledge that abides in that which is absolutely real" (*Phaedrus* 247 E), and distinction of "true opinion" from "truth", parallel to that of becoming from being (*Timaeus* 27 D, 28 A). The *prob*-ability of the relative truths can be established by repeated observation, and such are the statistical "laws of nature" discovered by science; but behind the experience of order "there is a further cause of that which is 'always so'"; it is because of *eternity* that "there never was or will be any *time* when movement was not or will not be"; but such a first cause, being itself uncaused, is not *prob*-able but axiomatic (Aristotle, *Phys.* VIII. 1. 252 B),—i.e. "self-revealing", *sva-prakāśa*, "self-evident".

instantly upon whatever situation in whatever time the Buddha chooses to perceive (Vism. 411); that is to say, all times are present to a Buddha's instant glance.

"Where there is neither past no future" must and can be only *Now*²¹. It is true that for beings in time the momentary now (*khāṇa*) is ever present. But the word, in the sense of "right time" means also *opportunity*, i.e. *gateway* and although as such this interval²² is continually opened and closed again as time passes²³, what if the instant opportunity is never seized? From this point of view the Buddha counsels: "Get ye across this sticky-mire, let not the Moment pass (*khāṇo ve mā upaccagā*), for they shall mourn

²¹ "Ubi futurum et praeteritum coincidunt cum praesenti", Nicolas of Cusa, *De visione Dei*, c. X.

²² *Inter-vallum*: the "needle's eye" and "strait gate" in the wall of Paradise, "locum . . . cinctum contradictorium coincidentia, et iste est murus Paradisi, in quo [tu Domine] habitas, cuius portam, custodit spiritus altissimus rationis, qui nisi vincatur, non patebit ingressus" (Nicolas of Cusa, *De visione Dei*, c. IX).

²³ Past and future being, in fact, the Symplegades or Clash-ing Rocks, and separated only by the now-without-duration through which the Hero (*mahāvira*) finds his way; in other words, the jams of the "Doorway of Immortality" (*amatassa dvārā*, M. 1. 226, cf. Vin. 1. 7) that the Buddha (Brahma-become and the Giver of Immortality, A. 4. 226, S. 4. 94) threw open to his followers; and of the Sundoor, of which it is asked, "Who is able (*arhātī*, cf. RV. 10. 60. 40 *arhanā*) to pass through it",—i.e. is able to take the way of the "unobstructed Sāman, or otherwise, the Lightning" (ib. 1. 30. 2, 4), which "Sāman", as explained above, is to be thought of as the "Harmony" of the past and future forms, *sā* and *ama*.

whose Moment's past" ²⁴ (*khanātītā hi socanti*, Sn. 333, cf. Dh. 315, Thā. 403, 653, 1005, Thī. 5, 459); and that he congratulates those of the Monks "whose Moment has been caught" (*khaṇo vo paṭiladdho*) and commiserates those "whose Moment has past" (*khanātītā*, S. 4, 126) ²⁵. Cf. *Anth. Pal.* 16. 275 on the passing Moment.

The moment of release is sudden (*sub-it-aneus*, "going stealthily"): comparable, in fact, to that of an arrow loosed without further effort from the bow to pierce all obstacles and penetrate its mark, being already "that-become" (*tad-bhūta*, i.e. *brahma-bhūta*), when the archer's stance, grip and draw are correct,—the arrow corresponding to the Self and the target to Brahma (Mil. 418 + Muṇḍ. Up. 2. 1. 1—4): and the adequacy of this trope (*upamā*) is so far precise that it extends to the use of the same verbs whether the archer be in fact a bowman or a "target-piercing" (*akkhaṇa-vedhin*) ²⁶ Monk,—viz. *samdhā*, "synthesis" applied to the setting up of the bow and the placing (*yoga*) of the arrow, which can

²⁴ Almost exactly as William Blake's:

... he who kisses the joy as it flies
Lives in eternity's sunrise...
But, if once you let the ripe moment go,
You can never wipe off the tears of woe".

²⁵ It must not be overlooked, of course, that *khaṇa* has also the meaning of "opportunity" present during a relatively short period of time; as in Thī. 459 where Sumedhā says, "This is an age of the Buddhas; gone is the absence of opportunity, the moment's seized!" (*virajjito akkhaṇo, khaṇo laddho*).

²⁶ *Akkhaṇa* = Skr. *ākhaṇa*, "target", in JUB. 1. 60. 7, 8 and CU. I. 2. 7, 8; and is not to be connected etymologically with *khaṇa*, "moment".

therefore be thought of as "in *samādhi*" ²⁷, *mac*, "loose", with reference to the liberation of the arrow or the Self, and *vyadh*, "penetrate" (in some forms identical with *vid*, "know" or "find") with reference to the attainment of the archer's "aim" ²⁷.

In the case of the Buddha and some other Arahants (cf. Thā. 173, Thī. 627) the Awakening takes place at dawn, that is to say at a junction of times (*samdhī*), or twilight, when it is neither night (the prior form) nor day (the posterior form); and in this connection it is not insignificant that a synonym for *samdhī* is *brahma-bhūti*, "becoming Brahma". Even at any point of time, the event takes place at a conjunction of times past and future, and it is not without interest that the word *yoga* in its astronomical sense can be substituted for the "moment" of Awakening (Thī. 4). The suddenness of the Awakening contrasts with the length of the Way, the aeonic time that is *now* and once for all escaped (much as the sudden release of the arrow contrasts with the archer's long training); and this is especially emphasized in the Mahāyāna, notably in Vasubandhu's *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, where when the end of the long road has been reached, the Great Awakening (*abhisambodhī*) is "single-instantaneous" (*eka-kṣaṇa*) ²⁸.

²⁷ See further my "Symbolism of Archery" in *Ars Islamica* 10, 1943.

²⁸ E. Obermiller, "The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā as exposed in the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* of Maitreya", *Acta Orientalia* 11, 1933, pp. 81, 82. *Abhi-samaya*, "full attainment", may be more literally something like "super-coincidence", as of "time" considered absolutely; cf. also *samayūtam* (co-ire), to "pass through" (the midst of the Sun), JUB. I. 6. 1, suggesting an

The notion of "instantaneous [i.e. timeless] awakening" (*ekakṣanābhisambodhi*) persists also in Tantrik Buddhism, where it is given, quite logically, a double signifi- cance, comparable to that of a point on the circum- ference of a circle, such a point being at one and the same time its beginning and end, alpha and omega. As beginning, the awakening is the instantaneous quicken- ing²⁹ from which the development of the embryo pro- ceeds to the conscious perception of the "net of con- tingency" (*māyājāla*) in the dimensioned (*nirmāna*-) body. On the other hand, as already explained above, the instant or timeless Wakefulness from which gener- ation (the descent of spirit into matter) proceeds is not only the first but also the last moment of the temp- oral cycle (*kāla-cakra*) of existence (*samsāra*), when consciousness returns to its source; evolution (*utpatti- krama* = *pravṛtti*) and involution (*utpannakrama* =

equation of *abhisamaya* with *parāyana*. I substitute "single- instantaneous" for Obermiller's "momentary" because the latter word could be understood to mean "ephemeral" or "transient", which is not intended; "momentary" would be right for *khane khane*, but not for *eka-kṣane*. *Eka-kṣane* cor- responds to Śāṅkara's *sadya* in *sadyo-mukti*, BrSBh. 1. 1. 11; *sadya*, "this day", like *sakrt*, "forthwith", "no sooner than", etc., cf. St. Augustine, *De lib. arb.* III. 25. 77 *Millia dierum in temporis mutabilitate intelligantur; unus autem diei nomine in- commutabilitas aeternitatis vocatur.*

²⁹ Cf. Manu 1. 56 "When [the Great Self] becoming atomic (*aṇumātriko bhūtvā*) and with a view to existence and motion inhabits the seed with which it is associated, then it assumes an actual-form (*mūrtim vimuñcati*)". The Tantra asserts the intemporal, Manu the undimensioned quality of the animating principle.

nivṛtti) representing the two halves of the cycle of existence, whether cosmic or individual. So in yoga practise, of which the purpose is involutory, we find a contemplation on time, directed towards the imme- diate realisation of ever greater and greater durations and pursued until the whole of time can be experienced *now*. Inspiration and expiration³⁰ are correlated suc- cessively with day and night, fortnights, months, and so on, the procedure culminating in "a complete re- solution of microcosmic time by the disciple who, having successively fixed his mind on ever greater periods of time and successively rid himself of them in the course of his breathing, comes at length to the great universal aevum; including all creation from its beginning to its reabsorption",—or rather, regener- ation (*palingenesis*), for "this is the yogic rebirth, briefly and clearly described in the following quotation from *Kālacakra*tantra: 'The birthplace of the Royal Conquerors is in one constant moment (*ekasmin- ṣamaye'kṣare*)"³¹; when the 'heart' is established in the

³⁰ In Yoga practise, the in- and out-breaths are equated or identified, each being sacrificed in the other (BG. 4. 29, 5.27); and that is, in the last analysis a realisation of the Supreme Identity of Mitrāvaruṇau, who are both the in-and-out-breaths (ŚB. 1. 8. 3. 12) and day and night (TS. 2. 1. 74), and of the Unity of the Gale (Vāyu) "who blows as one, but in man becomes these two, the in-and out-breathing" (ŚB. 1. 8. 3. 12), "who bestows these breaths" (TS. 2. 1. 1. 3) and is in fact the "other whereby men live" (KU. 5. 5).

³¹ *Ak;ara*, "still", "not fluent", from a Hindu point of view, a designation of Brahma, and of the syllable OM by which he is represented in verbal iconography.

Great Breath, and actual breathing has ceased, when the physical sense-powers are relinquished and the divine have arisen, when the natural planes have been left and the planes divine are seen, then I see All, Great King, then there is naught that is not always seen'. Having thus realised his own-nature or intrinsic being (*svabhāva*), become what he is, the Yogi "without any subjective-objective relation... knows all because it [his essence] comprehends all in a geometric point (*bindu*) and in one instant (*eka-kṣaṇa*)... Time is drowned in eternity"⁵².

Such a "control of the moments and their sequence" (*Yoga Sūtra* 3. 52) as this is the contemplative equivalent of the Vedic seasonal sacrifices by which Prajāpati, the Year (Time) having been, by the act of creation, unstrung and dismembered into the parts of the year (time), i.e. days and nights, etc., of which the conjunctions are his broken "joints", is made whole and complete again⁵³, at the same time that the Sacrificer himself is reintegrated (*Śatapatha Br.* 1. 6. 3. 35 and *passim*). "For because the year is a counterpart

⁵² Mario E. Carelli, *Sekoddeśatikā*, Baroda, 1941, Introduction pp. 16, 17 and Skr. text p. 7 (but the version of the *Kālacakratānta* passage is my own).

⁵³ These "joints" (*parvāni*) are (in a surgical sense) "re-set", or literally "put together" or "syn-thesised", cf. AĀ. 7. 20, where Time unites (*sāmdadhāti*) past, present and future times. Things thus put together (*sāmhita*) are in *samādhi*, in wholeness or health; and this completes the cycle that began with their division and sickness (*vyādhi*). The separative act of creation is necessarily followed by the unitive (re-collective) process of involution; complication by simplification.

(image) of Prajāpati, they call him the Year" (*ibid.* 11. 1. 6. 13); "the Year is everything, and that is what 'Imperishable' means" (*ibid.* 11. 1. 2. 12). "How many days are there in the year?" That depends upon the way it is divided, but "really, only one; the Year is just that day after day"; and the Comprehensor of this doctrine of the Year himself becomes the Year" (*ibid.* 12. 2. 2. 23).

Except for the last references, the doctrine of the "Now that stands" has been dealt with so far only on the basis of the Hinayāna. Many other scholars, notably Jacobi, Keith⁵⁴, De la Vallée Poussin, and Stcherbatsky, have studied it only from the Mahāyāna sources, in which it is expanded, but certainly did not originate. All schools, of course, retain the doctrine of the causal efficacy of the past operative in the present. Keith, indeed, always assuming that the Buddha denied the reality of the Self—which he never did, but rather counselled men to "seek for" and "take refuge" in it (*Vin.* 1. 23, *Vism.* 393, *D. H.* 120, *S.* 3. 143)—goes so far as to say that the Vaibhāsika doctrine "interpolates the moment of existence (*sthitī*), which, it asserts, was suppressed by the Buddha be-

⁵⁴ Although Keith himself asks respecting the Buddha's "unfathomable" nature predicated in *S.* 4. 374, etc., whether this "is not to argue that the Tathāgata apart from the mortal constituents is something real but ineffable?" and calls it "unwise to insist on seeing negativism in passages where another explanation is not merely possible, but probably more in accordance with the ideas of the teachers of the early Canon" (*Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, 1923, p. 26).

cause of the danger which it involved to the doctrine of impermanence”⁵⁵; implausible, because the notion of a “permanent” Self and “impermanent” self involves no antinomy, and in any case the word *thiti*, even in combination with *attā*, is by no means avoided in the Canon, where also the verbs *tiṭṭhanti* and *thassanti* (as cited above) are used of Arahants; nor can there be any question but that the Dhamma, with which the Buddha identified himself is an “eternal substance” (*akālika dhātu*). For the Sautrāntikas, whose very name implies their orthodoxy, “the true doctrine is that there is no distinction between the entity, the efficiency, and the time of its appearance; entities appear from non-existence”⁵⁶; they exist for a moment; then they cease to exist. Their existence, activity, and action are

⁵⁵ A. B. Keith, *ibid.* p. 167.

⁵⁶ “Which temporal things before they are, are not; and when they are, pass away; and when they are passed away, will not be. And so, when they are future, they are not yet; and when past, no longer are” (St. Augustine, *De lib. arb.* 3. 7. 21).

In RV. 10. 72, 2 *asataḥ sad ajāyata*, “the existent springs from non-existence”, cf. CU. 3. 19. 1, Taitt. Up. 2. 7, where “non-existent” means “not yet existing”, “being in potentiality”, *prāgabhāva*. On the other hand, in the contrary formulae of TS. 4. 6. 1. 2, CU. 6. 2. 1, 2 and BrSBh. 2. 1. 17, 18, where being arises only from being, “not from the non-existent”, the reference is to the fourth, *atyanta*, absolute, kind of non-existence, that of things that could never be, e.g. “the son of a barren woman”. In Aristotelian terms, “appearance from non-existence (*prāgabhāva*)” would be “reduction from potentiality to act”, and this is the sense in the beautiful prayer of BU. 1. 3. 28, *asato mā sad gamaya*, “Lead me from non-existence unto existence”. Cf. also JAOS. 66. 154, n. 30.

all one . . . Past and future are mere names”⁵⁷. All this involves, of course, the old doctrine of the Void (*sūnyatā*)⁵⁸ which Keith discusses in connection with the

⁵⁷ A. B. Keith, *ibid.* p. 166. Rūmī, *Mathnawī* 1. 2201, “Past and future are to thee a curtain from God”.

⁵⁸ Just as in the case of “destruction” (*khaya*) it must be asked, if the “Annihilationist Heresy” (*ucchedavāda*) is to be avoided, just what can and should be destroyed (Vism. 508), and as in the case of “escape” (*nissaraṇam*) it must be asked, From what, and To what, if we are to know what is meant, so in the case of the “void” (*suññam*) it must be asked, Of what? As Hermes Trismegistos says, “you must not call anything ‘void’, without saying what the thing in question is void of” (Ascl. III. 33 C); cf. Aristotle, who points out that “to determine whether the ‘void’ (τὸ κενόν) ‘is’ or ‘is not’ we must know what those who use the word really mean by it. The current answer is, ‘a place in which there is nothing’. But that is the explanation given by those who hold that nothing ‘is’ but ‘matter’ (σῶμα), that which is ‘tangible’ (ἄπυρόν) . . . and yet no one supposes that they are thinking of the ‘point’ (ἡ σιγῆς), to which the definition really applies” (*Phys.* 4. 7, 213 B-213 A). It is only because such questions are not asked that so many a modern recoils from what he calls the “negativity” of Buddhist formulae; in reality, this *via negativa* implies a “transvaluation” of values, and not their destruction, and what the modern empiricist and “optimist” really resents is precisely the sacrifice that any transvaluation of values demands.

The Buddhist “Void” is empty of things that become and to which the language of affirmative empiricism really applies (D. 2. 63). “Freedom”, though a good, is always a freedom from limitations, or “de-void” of them.

On various senses of the term *suññatā* see Vism. 512. Note also that “Void” and “Plenum” are never unrelated, but rather coincide, cf. Aristotle *Met.* 1. 4. 9, 4. 5. 5, and references in my

Mādhyamikas, or Middle-Waymen, whose name again asserts their orthodoxy. For them "the doctrine of causation must be taken as referring only to the world of ignorance", i.e. opinion. This I take not only to mean that things only *happen* in time and space but also that cause and effect are not only transcendently but actually always simultaneous; we think of cause and effect as precedent and sequent because all logical formulation applies, in so far as language (the language of postulation) is employed affirmatively only to events (D. 1. 202). So we find it uneasy to understand just how a cause can operate at a distance³⁹; how, if things exist only for a moment, can they work on one another? How can their order be explained? In fact, if we presume that acts are causes, then the orderly sequence of events will have to be explained by a "pre-established harmony", arbitrarily established; and this was the false position, into which the Islamic Mutakallemin

"Kha and other words denoting Zero...", *BSOS*, 7, 1934, pp. 487—497. This coincidence is implied by the Mahāyāna aphorism, *yas saṃsāras taṃ nirvāṇam*, and the words of the *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī*, 1. 193, *yac cid viśeṣatvam tad sadā-śivatattvam* are only saying the same in other words.

³⁹ For example, when a plant, transferred from its original environment to another and different set of conditions, continues to flower in "its own" time regardless of the new conditions, this represents in it the working of a kind of memory that, as such, is "imperceptible" (*adr̥ṣṭa*) to human beings, who can investigate the distant causes in the plant's original environment, but cannot "see" them as they still actually exist in the plant, in which cause and effect coincide at every "moment" of its growth.

were forced by the logic of their own kind of atomism. The answer to all these difficulties is that causes never operate at a distance, but *are present* when and where their effects are seen⁴⁰. Nothing of an act outlasts the act itself; but the action leaves its trace in the environment, which will for ever afterwards be other than it would have been if the event had not taken place; the act and its causal efficacy are two different things, of which one (which is perceptible) and the other (which can only be inferred) persists. It stands to the high credit of Indian logic to have distinguished acts (*karma*) from causes (*kāraṇa*), and to have given the significant names of "unseen" (*adr̥ṣṭa*) and "not-past" (*apūrva*) to "causality"; the latter term, in particular, at the same time implying that the efficacy of an act (unlike the act itself) is really *present-when* the effect appears; the consequences of past actions always remaining latent until the conditions under which they can operate arise. From this point of view there remains no inconsistency in a combination of the concept of instant actuality with the operation of mediate causes in time.

On the other hand, it would be obviously impossible to apply the causal formula, that the efficacy of the

⁴⁰ So it is that, as St. Thomas Aquinas says, "fate lies in the created causes themselves?" (*Sum. Theol.* 1. 116. 2). The deduction will naturally follow that, to escape from fate, to be free, which is to fulfil one's destiny (reach one's destination, man's last end), one must have "denied himself" (*denegat seipsum*, *Math.* 16. 24) and passed over from becoming to being.

cause is really *present-when* the effect appears, the consequences of past actions always remaining latent until the conditions under which they can operate are established; whereas, the causal act and its effects are never simultaneous, however soon the latter may be realised.

On the other hand, it would be obviously impossible to apply the causal formula, "this being so, that follows", to that other world in which there is no becoming and no triad of origination, existence, and decay to be accounted for. Keith continues: "Absolute reality, Čāntideva points out, does not fall within the domain of the intellect (*buddhi*), for that moves in the realm of relativity and error. Nāgārjuna denies consistently that he has any thesis of his own, for to uphold one would be wholly erroneous; the truth is silence, which is neither affirmation nor negation"⁴¹. All of these are positions already established in the Hīnāyāna Canon⁴².

⁴¹ A. B. Keith, *ibid.* pp. 235-239.

⁴² Just as for Śāṅkara "this Brahma is silence" (BrSBh. 3. 2. 17): "Whom only silence can declare" (Hermes Trismegistos, I. 31, cf. X. 5): "Nothing true can be said of God" (Meister Eckhart in Evans, 1. 87, citing St. Augustine, cf. Kena Up. I and II). Silence is the "Middle Way" between affirmation and negation; and corresponds to that "untold" (*anakkhātam*, Dh. 218, *avyākatam*, S. 4. 374f.) which the Buddha, for all that he "holds nothing back", cannot reveal for lack of any "speechway" (*vādapatha*). Silence is a "Middle Way" between affirmation and negation; and what is probably the oldest text on Silence in this sense is to be found in the verses quoted in AĀ. 2. 3. 8, v. 3:

De la Vallée Poussin⁴³ discusses *kṣāṇa* (1) as a measure of time and (2) as the limiting minimum of

"Of speech, that which is 'yes' and which is 'no' ...
Discarding, the prophets (*kavayah*) found their quest;
[Erst] bound by names, [now] they delighted in audition
(*śrutī*).

The Buddha characteristically "discards the yes and no" when he so often says that the condition of a Freedman, Arahant, post mortem, cannot be described by such expressions as "is" or "is not" or by any copulative or disjunctive combination of these expressions,—just as, for the Upanisads, the Self is *neti, neti*. The Buddha, moreover, likewise denies that he has any "views" (Sn. 837, cf. 152 and 878f., 914).

One further reservation must be made: the Buddhist doctrine of Causality (*hetuvāda*, literally "etio-logy") refers only to the operation of natural or mediate causes, or in other words to necessity; the same applies to the Western doctrine of causality as formulated by Leukippos (Aetios, I. 25. 4): for Plato, *Timaeus* 28 a, "everything becomes from some cause, of necessity"; and so on, to the scholastic doctrine that "nothing happens by chance" (St. Augustine *QQ LXXXIII*, q. 24) and the modern scientist's "faith" in order. Past events determine the character of any entity at any given moment, and in this sense "fate lies in the created causes themselves" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I. 116. 2). But this no more in Buddhism (or Islam) than in Christianity excludes the entity's responsibility for what, out of the bundle of possibilities that it inherits, it *elects* to do. Otherwise, all the Buddha's exhortations to do this (*kiriyavāda*) and not to do that (*akiriyavāda*), to eradicate this and to make that become, and the whole concept of "self-control" (the conquest, control or management, and impulsion of self by Self, Dh. 104, 160, 379 *attanā codāy'attānam*, 390 and *passim*) would be meaningless. It is true that all the reactions of the self or Ego are fated and determined by past causes, but all that "is not my Self" (*na me so attā*, *passim*), and whoever does not identify himself with it is in a position

time, analogous to the atom (*paramāṇu*) considered as an indivisible minimum of "matter"; he barely mentions Hīnayāna sources, and ignores their background altogether, though he quotes Vasubandhu on S. 2. 265. He cites various definitions of the moment in which a thing (*dhamma*)⁴⁴ exists, all amounting to this, that the moment has no real duration; it is just as incalculably short as the sum of the aeons would be incalculably long; a moment is simply the indivisible present in which the three phases of any existence take place,—“on ne peut douter que... le *kṣaṇa*, durée du Dharma [chose] soit une grandeur de temps se rapprochant de zéro à l'infinité”. At the same time it does not seem to me correct to say that “le temps est discontinu et fait de *kṣaṇas*, comme le corps étendu est fait d'atomes”, because the interval between two *kṣaṇas* is no more than the *kṣaṇa* itself a period, and in the same way the space between two atoms is no larger than the measure of an atom, which is nil⁴⁵. Time flows

to make it behave as *ne* will. This is not an interference with the operation of causality; it is simply that with “repentance”, i.e. “change of mind”, previously inoperative causes are brought into play, with new results.

⁴⁴ “Notes sur le ‘moment’ ou *kṣaṇa* des bouddhistes”, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, 8, 1931, 1-13, in which he quotes from his own version of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* and from other sources.

⁴⁵ Dhamma as “thing”, a very common meaning also in the Pali sources, must not be confused with Dhamma as “Eternal Law” and (in *sa-dhamma*) “Natural Law”.

⁴⁶ Aristotle deals with the problem in much the same way (Phys. IV. 13. 222 a, b): time is “always beginning” (*ἀει γὰρ ἐ*

in the same way that a river flows, continuously, and never rests (*να ραμᾶτι*). Poussin cites also some Jaina sources⁴⁶ in which *samaya* as point of time corresponds to the Buddhist *kṣaṇa*: “a moment (*samaya*) is the minimum time (*kāla*) required by an atom (*paramāṇu*) to move its own length”, and “a moment is the time required by an atom to pass through the interval between two atoms” (*aṅvantaram*)⁴⁷.

Stcherbatsky's treatment of the Moment, in *Buddhist Logic*⁴⁸ is fuller, and he does recognize that “the origin of the theory of Instantaneous Being is probably pre-Buddhistic”⁴⁹. He observes that for the Buddhist “existence and non-existence are not different appearances of a thing, they are the thing itself”, quoting

dezi): it is by means of the indivisible now (*ἄτομος νῦν*) that “time is continuous”; in one sense the nows are different from one another, but in their function of holding time together they are “always the same” (*ἀει τὸ αἰῶν*).

“Moments” are like “points” determining a line; two contiguous points will not make a line, but only three, because a line is not a line unless it has a beginning, middle and end; and so with all other series.

⁴⁶ *Tattvārthādhigama*, treated by H. Jacobi in ZDMG. 40; and *Gaṇitasārasaṅgraha*, edited by M. Rangacharya, Madras, 1912

⁴⁷ *Aṅvantara*, cf. *citt'antara* cited above, and *buddh'antara*, “interval between two successive advents”, is neither Rangacharya's “un autre atome” nor Poussin's “l'intervalle, l'étendu d'une atome”.

⁴⁸ *Bibliographica Buddhica* XXVI, 2 vols, Leningrad, 1930, 1932.

⁴⁹ Stcherbatsky does not go very far back. In a footnote he says: “The Sāṅkhya-Yoga in this point, as in many others, comes very near to the Buddhist view, cp. Vyāsa on III. 52—*kālo vāsta-sāṅhya-buddhi-nirmāṇaḥ sarva-jñāna-anupālī, kṣaṇas-*

Śantaraksita, "the nature of anything is its own momentary stasis and destruction" (*yo hi bhāvaḥ kṣaṇa-sthāyī vināśa iti gīyate, Tattvasaṅgraha* p. 137. 26). Such a destruction is not, of course, the empirical event that takes place when the jar is shattered by a blow and is then no longer a jar, but as much intrinsic to the thing as is its very existence (pp. 94, 95).

Tscherbatsky is right in saying that, in Vasubandhu's words, "because of immediate destruction, there is no (real) motion" (*na gatir nāśāt, Abhidharmakośa* 4.1)⁵⁰ and would have been right in emphasizing that motion itself, and therewith time, is only a pragmatic postulate—just as for Buddhists the Ego, individuality, is only a pragmatic postulate—and as a concept, not an external reality but something constructed by ourselves, whose manner of knowing is in terms of time and space,—Kant's "forms of our intellect". But he is not right in deducing from this that "motion is discontinuous"; for, on the one hand, motion is, experientially, continuous, and as we have seen, "the river never stops"; while on the other, there is no motion really; and neither of these propositions, respectively relative and absolute, involves a discontinuity such as would be involved if we relapsed into the fallacy of thinking of a line as "made up of" points. Vasubandhu illustrates his position (as Rūmī did) by the example of a moving light, which produces the appearance of a line

tu vastu patitah", which I take to mean that time is a baseless mental construction, and a derivative of the moment.

⁵⁰ See in L. de la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, 5 vols., Paris 1923-1931.

of light, and "moves" in the same sense that we speak of a man as "walking". But Tscherbatsky⁵¹ is wrong in saying (p. 99) that the so-called "motion consists of a series of immobilities". What Vasubandhu actually says is that "the arising of instants is untinter-

⁵¹ Tscherbatsky goes on to discuss "some European parallels", chiefly in Bergson. He cites "the world that the mathematician deals with is a world that dies and is reborn every instant, the world which Descartes was thinking of when he spoke of continuous creation" (*Creative Evolution*, pp. 23, 24) and "the Ego has no reality... It is an endless flow" (*ib.* pp. 3, 4), and "the proposition that movement is made out of immobilities is absurd" (*ib.* p. 326). But when he (Tscherbatsky) sums up (p. 118) by saying "for the Buddhists there are no stops at all other than in imagination, the universal motion never stops... for Bergson, on the contrary, real is duration, the moments are artificial cuts in it", I am unable to understand in what respect there is a contradiction.

For Leibniz there may be consulted F. S. C. Northrop, "Leibniz's Theory of Space" in *JHI*, 7, 1946. Leibniz denies "the void in space, atoms, and even particles not actually divided. And, further, he distinguished two levels of truth, that of "the primary truths of fact" (amongst which are propositions relating to the self) and "the truths of reason" (axiomatic propositions, e.g. that "every spirit... is durable and absolute"),—all of which "has the consequence of making matter as known by any scientific knower or observer purely phenomenal". There is a certain irony, on the other hand, in the fact that for a typical modern nominalist such as A. B. Keith, "such knowledge as is not empirical is meaningless, and ought not to be described as knowledge" (*Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, 1909, p. 42); this last position has been destructively analysed by Wilbur M. Urban, who concludes that "the metaphysical idiom of the Great Tradition is the only language that is really intelligible" (*The Intelligible World*, 1929, p. 471)!

rupted" (*nirantara-kṣaṇa-utpāda*); and the word that Tscherbatsky renders by "series" is actually *samtāna*⁶², which is literally and etymologically a "continuum", and what he says is that "'lamp' is the name conventionally given to a continuum of lights so as to make a sort of unity", and that it is just in the same way that "this man, So-and-so's" name is conventionally given to what is really a continuing process, not a substantial "self". And herein there is no departure from early Buddhist doctrine in which *punar utpadāna* is already explained in terms of the lighting of one lamp from another, and there is no essence (*sattā*) that moves on. In any case, any division of the continuity of time into a series of immobile instants would be just as artificial as a division of time into a discontinuous series of hours or days, or as the division of a line into a series of points; one might as well think of time as a thing *created* by the jerky motion of the hands of a clock!

⁶² It is precisely this continuity (*samtāna*, which Dasgupta also misrenders by "series") that enables Cakrapāṇi to say that although the existence of the body is momentary (*kṣaṇika*), the connection of the Supreme Self with the body is not intermittent but constant (Comment on *Caraka-saṃhitā* 1. 1. 41). It is significant here, also, that Cakrapāṇi so well observes that "the constancy (or eternity) of the Self is a matter of its concurrence with its own past and future hypostatic experiences" (*nityatvam cātmanah pūrvāparāvasthānabhūtartha-pratīsamdhanāt*, Comment on 1. 1. 55), i.e. inasmuch as It is the one and only transmigrant. Thus what is for one a proof of the pseudo-identity of the transient self is for the other a proof of the real identity of the constant Self; and these are complementary, and by no means contradictory, propositions.

III GREECE

In discussing Time and Eternity in Greek contexts I shall refrain from entering into any long account of Greek "atomism" as a whole; since it appears that a distinction must be made between the physical atoms of which bodies may be a composite, and the atomic time that divides and unites periods of time from and to one another, just as the point divides or unites parts of a line from or to one another. Physical atoms must have some dimension, however small, if anything is to be "made of" them; but the time-atom is a zero, and explicitly "not a part of time". It would be truer (though not exact) to say that past and future are parts of the time-atom than it would be to describe a period of time as "made up of" time-atoms; just as the point is the principle and sine qua non of extension, but points, having no extension, cannot be added up to make a length, and we cannot say that extended things are "made up of" points. And so, with perfect logic, Plato does not speak of the elements as "atomic", but only as existing in particles "so very small as to be invisible", and only forming visible masses when these particles are assembled in sufficient numbers (*Timaeus* 56 C).