ARISTOTLE'S

ETHICS

WRITINGS FROM THE COMPLETE WORKS

Revised, edited, and with an introduction by
JONATHAN BARNES
and
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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Princeton and Oxford

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should be sent to Permissions, Princeton University Press.
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William
Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6
Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW

press.princeton.edu

Jacket design by Jason Alejandro

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Aristotle.
[Works. Selections. English. 2014]
Aristotle's ethics : the complete writings / edited by
Jonathan Barnes and Anthony Kenny.
pages cm
Includes indexes.
ISBN 978-0-691-15846-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Ethics—Early works to
1800. I. Barnes, Jonathan, 1942–editor of compilation. II. Kenny,
Anthony, 1931–editor of compilation. III. Title.

B407.B37 2014
171'.3—dc23 2013030226

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available

This book has been composed in MVB Verdigris
Pro, Lydian MT, and Syntax LT Std.

Printed on acid-free paper.

Printed in the United States of America

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

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And so it is with the contemplative faculty; for god is not a ruler who commands: rather, he is that for the sake of which wisdom commands (that for the sake of which has two forms, and has been distinguished elsewhere); for god needs nothing. What choice, then, or possession of the natural goods—whether bodily goods, wealth, friends, or other things—will most produce the contemplation of god, that is best, and this is the noblest standard. Any choice that through lack or excess hinders one from serving and contemplating god is base. This a man possesses in his soul, and this is the best standard for the soul—to perceive the irrational part of the soul, as such, as little as possible.

So much, then, for the standard of gentlemanliness and the aim of things good in the abstract.

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

FIRST OXFORD TRANSLATION:
W. D. Ross

GREEK TEXT:
I. Bywater, OCT

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INTRODUCTION

EVERY CRAFT AND EVERY INQUIRY, AND SIMILARLY ACtions and choices, are thought to aim at some good; that is why the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends: some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, crafts, and sciences, their ends also are many: the end of medicine is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of generalship victory, that of economics riches. But where crafts fall under a single capacity—as bridle-making and the other crafts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under horse-riding, and this and every military action under generalship, and in the same way other crafts under yet others—in all of these the ends of the master-crafts are more desirable than all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned. 1094a

If, then, there is some end in matters of action which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for in this way the process goes on to infinity, so that the desire is empty and vain), plainly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what we should? If so, we must try to determine, in outline at least, what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the business. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative craft and that which is most truly the master craft. Politics appears to be of this nature. For it is this that ordains 1094b which of the sciences should be studied in a State, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this—for instance generalship, economics, rhetoric. Since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the human good. For even if the end is the same for an individual and for a State, that of the State seems at all events something greater and more complete both to attain and to preserve; for though we should be content to attain the end for a single individual, it is more noble and more divine to attain it for a nation or for States. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry, being a sort of political science, aims.

Our discussion will be adequate if it is as illuminating as the subject-matter allows; for precision is not to be looked for alike in all discussions, any more than in the products of the crafts. Now noble and just actions, which political science investigates, exhibit much variety and fluctuation, so that they are thought to exist only by convention and not by nature. And goods also exhibit a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people: before now men have been undone by their riches, and others by their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking about such things and setting out from such things to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which hold only for the most part and setting out from such things to reach conclusions of that kind. In the same spirit, therefore, should each of our statements be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits: it is evidently similar to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand demonstrations from a rhetorician.

Each man assesses rightly the things he knows, and of these he is a good assessor. And so the man who has been 1095a educated in a subject is a good assessor of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good assessor *tout court*. That is why a young man is not an appropriate student of political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his emotions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character: the deficiency does not depend on time, but on his living and pursuing things as his emotions direct. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with reason knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.

These remarks about the student, the way in which our statements should be received, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

I

HAPPINESS AND THE HUMAN GOOD

LET US TAKE UP OUR INQUIRY AND STATE, IN VIEW OF THE fact that all knowledge and choice aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods among matters of action. Verbally, pretty well everyone agrees; for both the general run of people and the refined say that it is happiness, and assume that living well and faring well are the same thing as being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the general run do not give the same account as men of understanding do. For the former think it is some clear and evident thing, like pleasure or riches or honour—some one thing and some another, and often the same man identifies it with different things (with health when he is ill, with riches when he is poor). But, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who talk about some great thing that is above their heads. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is good in itself and which causes the goodness of all these.

To examine all the beliefs that have been held would no doubt be somewhat fruitless: it is enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to have some reason in their favour.

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from the originating principles and those to the principles. For Plato was right in raising this problem and inquiring: 'Are we on the way from the principles or to the principles?'—as if in a race-course, from the judges' stand to the end of the track or *vice versa*. For, while

we must begin with what is familiar, things are so in two ways—some to us, some in the abstract. Perhaps, then, we must begin with things familiar to us. That is why any adequate student of what is noble and just and generally about political matters must have been brought up in good habits. For the facts are principles, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he will not need the reason why as well; and someone who has been well brought up possesses or can easily grasp the principles. And as for him who neither posseses nor can grasp them, let him hear the words of Hesiod:[1]

> Far best is he who knows all things himself;
> Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
> but he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
> another's wisdom, is a useless wight.

LET US RESUME OUR DISCUSSION AT THE POINT AT WHICH we digressed. To judge from their lives, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, assume (not without reason) that the good and happiness are pleasure—that is why they cherish the life of the voluptuary. For there are three prominent types of life: the one just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life.

Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, choosing a life suitable to cattle; but they get some reason for their view from the fact that many of those in positions of power share the tastes of Sardanapallus.

Those who are refined and active identify happiness with honour; for this is pretty much the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, whereas the good we divine to be something of one's own and not easily taken away. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be convinced of their own goodness—at least, it is by men of wisdom that they look to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue. Plainly, then, according to them at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even assume this rather than honour to be the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems compatible with being asleep or inactive throughout one's life and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes. But a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were defending a thesis. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated in our popular discussions.

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[1] *Works and Days* 293–297.

Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later.

The life of money-making is one undertaken perforce, and riches are plainly not the good we are looking for; for they are useful and for the sake of something else. That is why one might rather assume that the aforenamed objects are ends; for they are cherished for themselves. But evidently not even these are ends—although many arguments have been thrown down in support of them. Let us then dismiss them.

WE HAD PERHAPS BETTER CONSIDER THE UNIVERSAL good and consider the problem of what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of ours. Yet it might perhaps be thought that it is better, and we ought for the sake of the truth to destroy even what is our own, especially as we are philosophers; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honour truth above our friends.

Those who introduced this belief did not posit Ideas of things within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why they did not set up an Idea of the numbers). But things are called good both in quiddity[2] and in relation, and that which is *per se* and substance is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an offshoot and accident of what is); so that there will not be an Idea common to all these goods. Further, since things are said to be good in as many ways as they are said to be (for things are called good both in quiddity, as god and intelligence, and in quality, as the virtues, and in quantity, as that which is the appropriate amount, and in relation, as the useful, and in time, as the right opportunity, and in place, as habitat, and so on), plainly the good cannot be something universal, common and single; for then it would not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only. Further, since of the things answering to one Idea there is one science, there would have been one science of all the goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall under one category—for instance opportunity (for opportunity in war is studied by generalship and in disease by medicine), and the appropriate amount in food is studied by medicine and in exertion by gymnastics. And one might raise the problem of what in the world they mean by 'a thing itself', if in man himself and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are men, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will there be a difference in so far as they are good. Again it will not be any the more good for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day. (The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible account of the good, when they place the one in the column of goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed. But let us discuss these matters elsewhere.)

An objection to what we have said may be discerned in the fact that they have not been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and cherished for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form, while those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a different manner. Plainly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things beneficial, and consider whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea. What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? For even if we pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea good in itself? In that case the Form will be pointless. But if the things we have named are also good in themselves, the description of the good will have to appear as something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But the description of the goodness of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, differs from case to case. The good, therefore, is not something common answering to one Idea.

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[2] Deleting, with Spengel, καὶ ἐν τῷ πόσῳ ('and in quantity').

But then in what way are things called good? They are not like the things that only chance to have the same name. Then is it by being derived from one thing or by all contributing to one thing? Or rather by analogy? For as sight is in the body, so is intelligence in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And similarly with regard to the Idea: even if there is some one good which is predicated in common of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, plainly it could not be a matter of human action or acquisition; but we are now looking for something of that sort. Perhaps, however, someone might think it worthwhile to have knowledge of it with a view to the goods that *are* matters of action and acquisition; for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them shall attain them. This argument has some plausibility, but it seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these, though they aim at some good and look to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one side the knowledge of it. Yet that all craftsmen should be ignorant of, and should not even look for so great an aid is not

reasonable. It is problematic, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this goodness itself, or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general. For a doctor seems not even to consider health in this way, but the health of man—or perhaps rather of a particular man; for it is individuals that he is healing. But enough of these topics.

Let us again return to the good we are looking for and ask what it can be. It is evidently different in different actions and crafts: it is different in medicine, in generalship, and in the other crafts likewise. What then is the good of each of them? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in generalship victory, in building a house, elsewhere something else, and in every action and choice the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good in matters of action, and if there are more than one, these will be the goods.

So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we must try to state this more illuminatingly. Since there are evidently several ends, and we choose some of them (for instance riches, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, plainly not all ends are complete ends; but the chief good is evidently something complete. Therefore, if there is only one complete end, this will be what we are looking for, and if there are several, the most complete of them. Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more complete than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and we call complete *tout court* that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, whereas honour, pleasure, intelligence, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, assuming that through them we shall be happy. But happiness no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result evidently follows; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself living a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is political by nature. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend it to parents of parents[3] and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be. Further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others—if so counted it is plainly more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added yields a superiority in goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something complete and self-sufficient, and is the end in matters of action.

Perhaps, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first grasp what a man's task is. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any craftsman, and, in general, for anyone who has a task and an action, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the task, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a task. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain tasks and actions, and man none? Is man naturally idle? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently have a

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[3] Adding τῶν γονεῶν (Rassow).

task, may one lay it down that man similarly has a task apart from all these? What then can this be? Life is evidently common even to plants, but we are looking for what is proper to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of sense-perception, but it also is evidently common to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has reason. (Of this element, one part has reason as being obedient to it, the other as possessing it and exercising thought.) Since this too can be taken in two ways, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the stricter use of the term. Now if the task of man is an activity of soul in accordance with reason, or not without reason, and if we say a so-and-so and a virtuous so-and-so have a task which is the same in kind (for instance, a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so generally in all cases), superiority in respect of virtue being added to the task (for the task of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case,[4] the human good turns out to be activity of soul in conformity with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete.

But we must add 'in a complete life'. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.

Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that anyone is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or collaborator in such matters. That is how the advances of the crafts have been made; for anyone can add what is lacking.

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[4] At this point the manuscripts have the following passage, which Bywater deletes as a repetition:

> . . . and if we state that the task of man is a certain kind of life, and that this is an activity of soul or actions involving reason, and that the task of a good man is the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate virtue: if this is the case . . .

We must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer look for right angles in different ways: the former does so in so far as it is useful for his task, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in other matters as well, so that our task may not be subordinated to side-tasks. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike: it is enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the case of the originating principles—the fact is primary and a principle. Now of principles we consider some by induction, some by sense-perception, some by a certain habituation, and others in other ways. We must try to investigate each sort in the natural way, and we must take pains to determine them aright, since they have a great influence on what follows. For the origin is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.

We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our premisses, but also of what is said about it; for with a true view all the facts harmonize, but with a false one they[5] soon clash. Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; and we call those that relate to soul most especially and strictly goods. But we are considering actions and activities relating to soul.[6] Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to this belief, which is an old one and agreed on by the philosophers. It is correct

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[5] Deleting τἀληθές (Rassow). The received text reads: 'The true soon clashes with the false'.

[6] Deleting ψυχικάς (Goebel). The received text reads: 'But we consider that actions and activities of the soul are concerned with the soul'.

also in that we identify the end with certain actions and activity; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods.

It also harmonizes with our account that the happy man lives well and fares well; for we have more or less defined happiness as a sort of living well and faring well. Also, the characteristics that are looked for in happiness all evidently hold of what we have said. For some people identify happiness with virtue, some with wisdom, others with a kind of understanding, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few reputable men; and it is not reasonable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for virtue is expressed in the activity of virtue. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we assume that the chief good lies in possession or in use, in state or in activity. For the state may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way inactive, but the activity cannot; for it will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And just as in the Olympic Games it is not the most handsome and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act correctly win the noble and good things in life.

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant—for instance a horse to a lover of horses, and a spectacle to a lover of shows—and in the same way just things are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous things to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because they are not by nature pleasant. But the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant both for such men and also *per se*. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm: it has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who does not delight in noble actions is not even good: no one would call a man just who did not delight in acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the virtuous man assesses them well and he assesses in the way we have described.

Happiness, then, is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos—

> Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
> But pleasantest is it to win what we love.

For all these attributes belong to the best activities; and these, or one—the best—of these, we identify with happiness.

Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to perform noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from blessedness, such as good birth, satisfactory children, beauty—for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is hardly happy, and perhaps a man would be still less so if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune.[7]

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[7] Deleting, with Giphanius, the clause which follows in the received text: '. . . though others identify it with virtue'.

For this reason also the problem is raised, whether happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or comes from some divine providence or again by fortune. Now if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, and the most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry: happiness, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, is evidently among the most divine things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the chief good and something divine and blessed.

It will also be widely shared; for all who are not disabled as regards virtue may win it by a certain kind of learning and care. If it is better to be happy thus than by fortune, it is reasonable that things should be so, since everything that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and similarly everything that depends on craftsmanship or any cause, and especially if it depends on the best of all causes. To entrust to fortune what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement.

The answer to the question is evident also from the definition; for it has been said to be a certain kind of activity of soul.[8] Of the remaining goods, some are necessary and others are naturally collaborative and useful as instruments. And this will be found to agree with what we said at the outset; for we stated the end of political science to be the best end, and political science spends most of its care on making the citizens to be of a certain character, namely good and capable of noble acts.

It is reasonable, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such activity. For this reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are called happy are being felicitated by reason of the hopes we have for them. For there is required, as we said, not only complete virtue but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and all manner of fortunes, and the most prosperous may encounter great disasters in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such fortunes and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy.

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[8] Deleting κατ᾽ ἀρετήν. The received text gives: '. . . a certain kind of activity of soul in accordance with virtue'.

MUST NO ONE AT ALL, THEN, BE CALLED HAPPY WHILE HE lives? Must we, as Solon says, see the end? And if we are to lay this down, is it also the case that a man is happy when he is dead? Or is not this quite absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is an activity? But if we do not call the dead happy, and if Solon means not this but that one can then safely call a man blessed as being at last beyond evils and misfortunes, this also affords matter for discussion; for both evil and good are thought to exist for a dead man, as much as for one who is alive but does not perceive them—for instance honours and dishonours and the successes and misfortunes of children and in general of descendants. This also presents a problem; for though a man has lived blessedly up to old age and has had a death that befits his life, many reverses may befall his descendants—some of them may be good and attain a life they are worthy of, while with others the contrary may be the case; and plainly too the degrees of relationship between them and their ancestors may vary indefinitely. It would be absurd, then, if the dead man were to share in these changes and become at one time happy, at another wretched; while it would also be absurd if the fortunes of the descendants did not for some time have some effect on their ancestors.

But we must return to our first problem; for perhaps the present question might be considered from that point of view. Now if we must see the end and only then call a man

blessed, not as being blessed but as having been so before, surely it is absurd that when he is happy what holds of him will not be true of him because we do not want to call living 1100b men happy, on account of the changes that may befall them, and because we have supposed happiness to be something lasting and by no means easily changed, while one and the same man may suffer many turns of fortune's wheel. For plainly if we were to follow his fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and again wretched, making the happy man out to be a chameleon and insecurely based. Or is following his fortunes in this way quite incorrect? Doing well or badly does not depend on these, but human life, as we said, needs these as well, while virtuous activities or their contrary control happiness or the contrary.

The problem we have now discussed testifies in favour of our definition. For no human task has as much firmness as virtuous activities do (they are thought to be more lasting even than knowledge), and of these themselves the most valuable are more lasting because those who are blessed spend their life most readily and most continuously in them; for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. The attribute in question, then, will belong to the happy man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or in preference to everything else, he will do and contemplate what is virtuous, and he will bear the fortunes of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is truly good and foursquare beyond blame.

Now many things happen by fortune, things differing in importance: small pieces of good fortune or of its opposite plainly do not weigh down the scales of life one way or the other, but a multitude of great ones if they turn out well will make life more blessed (for not only are they themselves such as to add adornment to life, but the way a man deals with them may be noble and virtuous), while if they turn out ill they crush and maim blessedness (for they both bring pain with them and hinder many activities). Yet even in these nobility shines through, when a man bears gracefully many great misfortunes, not through insensitivity but through breeding and pride.

If, as we said, it is activities that control life, no blessed man can become wretched; for he will never perform actions that are hateful and base. For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the fortunes of life becomingly and always acts as nobly as the circumstances allow, just as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his command and a shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case, the happy man can never become wretched—though he will not be blessed if he meets with fortunes like those of Priam.

Nor, again, is he many-coloured and changeable; for he will not be moved from his happy state easily or by any ordinary misadventures but only by many great ones—and in that case he will not recover his happiness in a short time but (if at all) only in a long and complete one in which he has attained great and noble successes.

What then prevents our saying that he is happy who exercises himself in conformity with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life? Or must we add 'and who will live thus and die as befits his life'? Certainly the future is obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something in every way complete. If so, we shall call blessed those among living men in whom these conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled—but humanly blessed. So much for these questions.

THAT THE FORTUNES OF DESCENDANTS AND OF ALL A MAN'S friends should not affect his happiness at all seems a very unfriendly doctrine, and one contrary to the beliefs men hold; but since the events that happen are numerous and admit of all sorts of difference, and some come more near to us and others less so, it is evidently a long—indeed an endless—

task to discuss each in detail: a general outline will perhaps suffice. If, then, as some of a man's own misfortunes have a certain weight and influence on his life while others seem lighter, so too it is with those of all our friends, and if it makes a difference whether the various experiences are had by the living or by the dead (much more even than whether lawless and terrible deeds are presupposed in a tragedy or done on the stage), this difference also must be taken into account; or rather, perhaps, we must take into account that it is a problem whether the dead share in any good or evil. For it seems, from these considerations, that even if anything whether good or the contrary penetrates to them, it must be something dim and small, either in the abstract or for them, or if not, at least it must be such in degree and kind as not to make happy those who are not happy nor to take away their blessedness from those who are. The successes and misfortunes of friends, then, seem to have some effects on the dead, but effects of such a kind and degree as neither to make the happy unhappy nor to produce any other change of the kind.

THESE QUESTIONS HAVING BEEN ANSWERED, LET US CONsider whether happiness is among the things that are praiseworthy or rather among the things that are valuable; for plainly it is not to be placed among capacities. Everything that is praiseworthy seems to be praiseworthy because it is of a certain character and is related somehow to something else; for we praise the just man and the courageous man and in general both the good man and virtue because of the actions and deeds involved, and we praise the strong man and the good runner, and so on, because he is of a certain kind and is related in a certain way to something good and virtuous. This is plain also from the praises of the gods; for although it is evidently ridiculous that the gods should be referred to our standard, this is done because praise involves a reference, as we said. But if praise is for things such as we have described, plainly what applies to the best things is not praise, but something greater and better, as is indeed evident; for what we do to the gods and the most divine of men is to call them blessed and happy. And so too with good things: no one praises happiness as he does justice, but rather calls it blessed, as being something more divine and better.

Eudoxus also seems to have been right in his method of advocating the supremacy of pleasure: he thought that the fact that, though a good, it is not praised indicated it to be better than the things that are praiseworthy, and that this is what god and the good are; for by reference to these all other things are judged. Praise is appropriate to virtue; for from virtue men perform noble actions. Encomia are bestowed on deeds, whether of the body or of the soul. Perhaps precision in these matters is more appropriate to those who have made a study of encomia; but to us it is plain from what has been said that happiness is among the things that are valuable and complete. It seems to be so also from the fact that it is an originating principle; for it is for the sake of this that we all do everything else, and the principle and cause of goods is, we claim, something valuable and divine.

2

VIRTUE

SINCE HAPPINESS IS AN ACTIVITY OF SOUL IN ACCORDANCE with complete virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the nature of happiness. The true politician, too, is thought to have studied this above all things; for he wants to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws. As an example of this we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and the Spartans, and any others of the kind that there may have been. And if this inquiry belongs to political science, plainly the pursuit of it will be in accordance with our original plan.

Plainly, the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were looking for was human good and the happiness human happiness. By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness we call an activity of soul. But if this is so, plainly the student of politics must know somehow the facts about soul, just as the man who is to heal the eyes must know about the whole body also—and all the more since politics is more valuable and better than medicine. (Among doctors the more refined spend much labour on acquiring knowledge of the body.) The student of politics, then, must consider the soul, and must consider it with these objects in view, and do so just to the extent which is sufficient for the questions we are discussing; for further precision is perhaps something more laborious than our purposes require.

Some things are said about it, adequately enough, even in public discussions, and we must use these: for instance, that one part of the soul is irrational and one has reason. Whether these are separated as the parts of the body or of anything divisible are, or are two in definition but by nature inseparable, like convex and concave in the circumference of a circle, does not affect the present question.

Of the irrational part one element seems to be common to all and vegetative in its nature, I mean that which causes nutrition and growth; for it is this kind of capacity of the 1102b soul that one must assign to all nurslings and to embryos, and this same capacity to full-grown creatures (this is more reasonable than to assign some different capacity to them). Now the virtue of this seems to be common to all and not specifically human; for this part or capacity seems to be exercised most in sleep, while the good and the bad are least manifest in sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy are not better off than the wretched for half their lives; and this happens reasonably enough, since sleep is an idleness of the soul in that respect in which it is called virtuous or base), unless perhaps to a small extent some of the movements actually penetrate, and in this respect the dreams of upright men are better than those of ordinary people. But enough of this: let us leave the nutritive capacity alone, since it has by its nature no share in human virtue.

There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul—one which in a sense, however, shares in reason. For we praise the reason of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of their soul that has reason, since it exhorts them correctly and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another natural element beside reason, which conflicts with it and resists it. For exactly as paralysed limbs when we choose to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul: the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. Whereas in the body we see what moves astray, in the soul we do not; but perhaps we must nonetheless suppose that in the soul too there is something beside reason, resisting and contrary to it. (In what way it is distinct does not matter.) Now this too seems to have a share in reason, as we said: at any rate in the continent man it obeys reason—and presumably in the temperate and courageous man it is still more obedient; for in them it speaks on all matters with the same voice as reason.

Therefore the irrational element appears to be twofold. For the vegetative element in no way shares in reason, but the appetitive and in general the desiderative element in a way shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it: this is the way in which we speak of paying heed to one's father or one's friends, not that in which we speak of the rational in mathematics.[1] That the irrational element is in some way persuaded by reason is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all criticism and exhortation. 1103a And if this element also must be said to have reason, there will be two elements having reason, one having it strictly speaking and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's father.

Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference; for we say that some virtues are intellectual and others moral—understanding and judgement and wisdom being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking about a man's character[2] we do not say that he is a man of understanding or judicious but that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the man of understanding with respect to his state, and of states we call those which are praiseworthy virtues.

Book B

Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit (whence it gets its name '*êthikê*', which comes with a slight variation from '*ethos*' or 'habit'). From this it is plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance, a stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one habituates it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be habituated to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor against nature do virtues arise in us: rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.

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[1] The Greek phrase 'λόγον ἔχειν' means (i) 'possess reason', (ii) 'pay heed to', 'obey', (iii) 'be rational' (in the mathematical sense).

[2] 'Character' is ἦθος, and 'moral' is ἠθικός.

Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the capacity and later exhibit the activity. This is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses but the reverse: we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them. But virtues we get by first exercising them, as happens in the case of the crafts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by doing: for instance, men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, courageous by doing courageous acts.

This is confirmed by what happens in States; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator; and those who do not do so well miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a base one.

Again, it is from the same sources and by the same means that every virtue is produced and destroyed, and similarly every craft; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. Similarly for builders and for all the rest: men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also: by performing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by performing the acts that we do in fearful circumstances and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become courageous or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger: some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in a word, states arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind: it is because the states correspond to the differences between them. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth—it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.

SINCE, THEN, THE PRESENT INQUIRY DOES NOT AIM AT contemplation like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no advantage), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these also control the nature of the states that are produced, as we have said. Now, that we should[3] act according to correct reasoning is commonly agreed and must be supposed. (It will be discussed later—both what it is, and how it is related to the virtues.)

It must be agreed beforehand that the whole account of matters of action ought to be given in outline and not precisely—just as we said at the beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter; and matters of action and what is advantageous have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in precision; for they do not fall under any craft or set of precepts—rather, the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation.

But though our present account is of this nature we must try to give what help we can. First, then, let us consider this: it is the nature of such things to be destroyed by lack and excess, as we see in the cases of strength and of health (for as testimony to the unevident we must take the evident):

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[3] Adding δεῖν after πράττειν.

nd deficient physical training destroy the
ilarly too much and too little drink or food
while that which is proportionate both
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of temperance and courage and the other vir-
For the man who flies from and fears everything and faces up to nothing becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes over-confident; and similarly the man who enjoys every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible: temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and deficiency, and preserved by the mean.

Not only are the sources and causes of their birth and growth and destruction the same: their activities will be found in the same circumstances; for this is also true of the things which are more evident: for instance, strength is produced by taking much food and facing much exertion, and it is the strong man that will be most able to do these things. So too is it with the virtues: by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and it is when we have become so that we are most able to abstain from them; and similarly too in the case of courage: by being habituated to despise things that are frightening and to face up to them we become courageous, and it is when we have become so that we shall be most able to face up to frightening things.

WE MUST TAKE AS AN INDICATION OF STATES THE PLEASURE or pain that supervenes on the deeds; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who faces up to things that are fearful and delights in this, or at least is not pained, is courageous, while the man who is pained is a coward. For moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains: it is on account of pleasure that we do base things, and on account of pain that we

abstain from noble ones. That is why we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the correct education.

Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and emotions, and every emotion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains. This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of therapy, and it is the nature of therapies to be effected by contraries.

Again, as we said but lately, every state of soul has a nature relative to and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends to be made worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men become base, by pursuing and avoiding them—either the pleasures and pains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not, or by going wrong in one of the other similar ways that reason distinguishes. That is why men actually define the virtues as certain states of impassivity and rest; not well, however, because they speak simply, and do not say 'as one ought' and 'as one ought not' and 'when', and the other things that get added. We suppose, then, that this kind of virtue tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures and pains and that vice does the contrary.

The following facts also may make it evident to us that they are concerned with these same things. There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the ignoble, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to succeed and the bad man to err, and especially about pleasure; for this is common to the animals, and it accompanies all objects of choice—for the noble and the advantageous appear pleasant.

Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy: this is why it is difficult to rub off this phenomenon, engrained as it is in our life. And we estimate even our actions, some of both excessive and deficient physical training destroy the strength, and similarly too much and too little drink or food destroy the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and faces up to nothing becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes over-confident; and similarly the man who enjoys every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible: temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and deficiency, and preserved by the mean.

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The following facts also may make it evident to us that they are concerned with these same things. There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the ignoble, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to succeed and the bad man to err, and especially about pleasure; for this is common to the animals, and it accompanies all objects of choice—for the noble and the ad- 1105a vantageous appear pleasant.

Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy: this is why it is difficult to rub off this phenomenon, engrained as it is in our life. And we estimate even our actions, some of us more and others less, by pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry must be about these; for to feel delight and pain well or badly has no small effect on our actions.

Again, it is harder to fight against pleasure than against passion, to use Heraclitus' phrase, and both craftsmanship and virtue are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Therefore for this reason also the whole concern of both virtue and political science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad.

That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that by the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they are done differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are those in which it exercises itself—let this be taken as said.

THE PROBLEM MIGHT BE RAISED OF WHAT WE MEAN BY saying that we must become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts; for if men do just and temperate acts, they are thereby just and temperate, exactly as, if they do what is grammatical or musical, they are proficient in grammar and music. Or is this not true even of the crafts? It is possible to do something grammatical either by fortune or under the guidance of another. A man will be proficient in grammar, then, only when he has both done something grammatical and done it grammatically; and this means doing it in accordance with the grammatical knowledge in himself.

Again, the case of the crafts and that of the virtues are not similar; for the products of the crafts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character; but if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately: the agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them. In the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the

acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. These are not numbered in as conditions for the possession 1105b of a craft—except the bare knowledge; but as a condition of the possession of the virtues, knowledge has little or no weight, while the other conditions count not for a little but for everything and they result from often doing just and temperate acts.

Acts, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who does them as just and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man: without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.

But most people do not do these but take refuge in words and think they are being philosophers and will become virtuous in this way. They behave somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors but do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a course of treatment, so the former will not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy.

NEXT WE MUST CONSIDER WHAT VIRTUE IS. SINCE THINGS that are found in the soul are of three kinds—emotions, capacities, states—virtue must be one of these. By emotions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by capacities the things on account of which we are said to be capable of feeling these emotions—for instance of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the emotions—for instance, with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it intensely or weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other emotions.

Now neither the virtues nor the vices are emotions, because we are not called virtuous or base on the ground of our emotions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices; and because we are neither praised nor blamed for our emotions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or blamed. Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are choices of a kind or involve choice. Further, in respect of the emotions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way.

For the following reasons they are not capacities. We are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for simply being capable of feeling. Again, we have the capacities by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature (we have spoken of this before).

If, then, the virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, it remains that they are states.

Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.

WE MUST, HOWEVER, NOT ONLY DESCRIBE IT AS A STATE but also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the virtue and also makes it perform its task well. For instance, the virtue of the eye makes both the eye and its task good; for it is by the virtue of the eye that we see well. Similarly the virtue of the horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at running and at carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack of the enemy. So if this holds in every case, the virtue of man also will be the state which makes a man good and which makes him perform his task well.

How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be made evident also by the following consideration of the nature of virtue. In everything that is continuous and divisible

it is possible to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the object itself or relatively to us; and the equal is a mid-point between excess and deficiency. By the mid-point in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all; by the mid-point relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little—and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is midway, in terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount. It is midway according to arithmetical proportion. But the middle relatively to us is not to be taken so: if ten pounds are too much for someone to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to take it, or too little—too little for Milo, too much for one who is beginning his physical training. The same holds for running and wrestling. Thus an expert avoids excess and deficiency, but seeks the mid-point and chooses this—the mid-point not in the object but relatively to us.

If it is thus, then, that every branch of knowledge finishes its task well—by looking to the mid-point and referring its tasks to it (so that we often say of good works that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and deficiency destroy the goodness, while the mean preserves it; and good craftsmen, as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is more precise and better than any craftsmanship, as nature also is, then it must be such as to aim at the mid-point. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with emotions and actions, and in these there is excess, deficiency, and the mid-point. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them when you should, with reference to what you should, towards the people you should, with the end you should have, and how you should—this is what is both midway and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, deficiency, and the mid-point. Now virtue is concerned with emotions and actions, in which excess is a form of error, and so is deficiency, while the mid-point is praised and is a form of success; and both these things are characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since it is such as to aim at what is in the middle.

Again, it is possible to err in many ways (for the bad belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and the good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (that is why one is easy and the other difficult—to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult): for these reasons also, then, excess and deficiency are characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue:

> For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.

Virtue, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in[4] which the wise man would determine it. It is a mean between two vices, that which arises from excess and that which arises from deficiency; and again it is a mean because the vices fall short of or exceed what should be the case in both emotions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is in the middle. That is why in respect of its substance and the account which states its quiddity it is a mean, with regard to what is best and well it is an extreme.

Not every action nor every emotion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply baseness—for instance spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves base, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to succeed with regard to them: one must always err. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with whom you should, when you should, and how you should—rather, simply to do any of

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[4] Reading ὡς (with the manuscripts) rather than ᾧ.

them is to err. It would be equally absurd, then, to claim that in unjust, cowardly, and self-indulgent action there is a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency. But as there is no excess and deficiency of temperance and courage because what is in the middle is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we have mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency—rather, however they are done they are errors; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean.

WE MUST NOT ONLY MAKE THIS UNIVERSAL STATEMENT but also apply it to the individual cases. For among statements about actions those which are universal apply more widely, but those which are particular are more true, since actions have to do with individual cases, and our statements must harmonize with the facts in these cases. We may take these cases from the table.

With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is a mean. Of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is over-confident, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. With regard to pleasures and pains—not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains—the mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence such persons also have received no name. But let us call them insensible.

With regard to giving and taking of wealth the mean is liberality, the excess and the deficiency prodigality and illiberality. They exceed and fall short in contrary ways to one another:[5] the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls short in taking, while the illiberal exceeds in taking and falls short in spending. (At present we are giving an outline or summary, and are satisfied with this: later these states will be more precisely determined.) With regard to money there are also other dispositions—a mean, magnificence (for the magnificent man differs from the liberal man: the former deals with large sums, the latter with small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency, shabbiness: these differ from the states opposed to liberality, and how they differ will be stated later.

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[5] Reading δὲ αὐταῖς (with most manuscripts) rather than δ' ἐν αὐταῖς.

With regard to honour and dishonour the mean is pride, the excess is called a sort of vanity, and the deficiency is diffidence; and as we said liberality was related to magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small sums, so there is a state similarly related to pride, being concerned with small honours while that is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire honours as one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the man who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious, while the person in the middle has no name. The dispositions also are nameless, except that that of the ambitious man is called ambition. Hence the people who are at the extremes lay claim to the middle place; and we ourselves sometimes call the person in the middle ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes praise the ambitious man and sometimes the unambitious. The reason for our doing this will be stated in what follows. Now let us speak of the remaining states according to the method which has been indicated.

With regard to anger also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a mean. Although they can scarcely be said to have names, yet since we call the person in the middle good-tempered let us call the mean good temper; and of the persons at the extremes let the one who exceeds be called irascible, and his vice irascibility, and the man who falls short an inirascible sort of person, and the deficiency inirascibility.

There are also three other means, which have a certain likeness to one another but differ from one another; for they are all concerned with a sharing in words and actions, but

differ in that one is concerned with truth in this sphere, the other two with pleasantness; and of this one kind is exhibited in amusement, the other in all the circumstances of life. We must therefore speak of these too, that we may the better see that in all things the mean is praiseworthy, and the extremes neither praiseworthy nor correct but blameworthy. Now most of these states also have no names, but we must try, as in the other cases, to invent names ourselves so that we may be clear and easy to follow.

With regard to truth, then, the person in the middle is a candid sort of person and the mean may be called candour, while the pretence which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a boaster, and that which understates is self-deprecation and the person characterized by it a self-deprecator. With regard to pleasantness in amusement the person in the middle is convivial and the disposition conviviality, the excess is buffoonery and the person characterized by it a buffoon, while the man who falls short is a sort of boor and his state is boorishness. With regard to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in life in general, the man who is pleasant in the way one should be is friendly and the mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is obsequious if he has no end in view and a flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage, and the man who falls short and is unpleasant in all circumstances is quarrelsome and grumpy.

There are also means in the feelings and concerned with the emotions; for although modesty is not a virtue, praise is extended to the modest man. For in these matters too one man is said to be in the middle, and another to exceed, as for instance the bashful man who is ashamed of everything; while he who falls short or is not ashamed of anything at all is shameless, and the person in the middle is modest. Indignation is a mean between envy and spite, and these states are concerned with the pain and pleasure that are felt at the fortunes of our neighbours: the indignant man is pained at undeserved good fortune, the envious man exceeds him and is pained at all good fortune, and the spiteful man falls so far short of being pained that he even feels delight. But these states there will be an opportunity of describing elsewhere. With regard to justice, since it is not spoken of in only one way, we shall, after describing the other states, distinguish its two kinds and say how each of them is a mean; and similarly for the rational virtues.

THERE ARE THREE KINDS OF DISPOSITION, THEN, TWO OF them vices, involving excess and deficiency, and one a virtue, the mean, and all are in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme states are contrary both to the middle state and to each other, and the middle to the extremes: as the equal is greater relatively to the less, less relatively to the greater, so the middle states are excessive relatively to the deficiencies and deficient relatively to the excesses, both in emotions and in actions. For the courageous man appears over-confident relatively to the coward, and cowardly relatively to the over-confident man; and similarly the temperate man appears self-indulgent relatively to the insensible man and insensible relatively to the self-indulgent, and the liberal man prodigal relatively to the illiberal man and illiberal relatively to the prodigal. That is why the people at the extremes each push the person in the middle over to the other, and the courageous man is called over-confident by the coward and cowardly by the over-confident man, and correspondingly in the other cases.

These states being thus opposed to one another, the greatest contrariety is that of the extremes to each other rather than to the middle; for these are further from each other than from the middle, as the great is further from the small and the small from the great than both are from the equal. Again, to the middle some extremes show a certain likeness, as that of over-confidence to courage and that of prodigality to liberality; but the extremes show the greatest

unlikeness to each other. Now contraries are defined as the things that are furthest from each other, so that things that are further apart are more contrary.

To the middle point in some cases the deficiency, in some the excess is more opposed: for instance, it is not over-confidence, which is an excess, but cowardice, which is a deficiency, that is more opposed to courage, and it is not insensibility, which is a lack, but self-indulgence, which is an excess, that is more opposed to temperance. This happens for two reasons, one being drawn from the thing itself: because one extreme is nearer to and more like the middle, we oppose not this but rather its contrary to the middle. For instance, since over-confidence is thought more like and nearer to courage, and cowardice more unlike, we oppose rather the latter to courage; for things that are further from the middle are thought more contrary to it. This, then, is one reason, drawn from the thing itself. Another is drawn from ourselves; for the things to which we ourselves naturally tend more seem more contrary to the middle. For instance, we ourselves naturally tend more to pleasures—that is why we are more easily carried away towards self-indulgence than towards propriety. We describe as contrary to the mean, then, the states to which we are more inclined; and therefore self-indulgence, which is an excess, is more contrary to temperance.

THAT MORAL VIRTUE IS A MEAN, THEN, AND HOW IT IS SO, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess and the other deficiency, and that it is so because it is such as to aim at what is midway in emotions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated. That is why it is no easy task to be virtuous. For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle: for instance, to find the middle of a circle is not for everyone but for him who knows; so, too, anyone can get angry—that is easy—or give or spend money; but to do this to the person you should, to the extent you should, when you should, with the end you should have, and how you should, *that* is not for everyone, nor is it easy. That is why goodness is both rare and praiseworthy and noble.

That is why he who aims at the middle must first depart from what is the more contrary to it, as Calypso advises—

> Hold the ship out beyond that surf and spray.[6]

For of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so. Therefore, since to hit the middle point is extremely difficult, we must as a second best, as people say, take the least of the evils; and this will be done best in the way we describe.

We must consider the things towards which we ourselves are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and the pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the middle state by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent.

Now in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded against; for we do not assess it impartially. We ought, then, to feel towards pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and in all circumstances repeat their saying;[7] for if we dismiss pleasure thus we are less likely to err. It is by doing this, then, (to sum the matter up) that we shall best be able to hit the middle point.

This is no doubt difficult, and especially in individual cases. For it is not easy to determine how and with whom and on what provocation and how long one should be angry; for sometimes we praise those who fall short and call them good-tempered and sometimes those who are angry, calling them manly. But it is not the man who deviates little from goodness who is blamed, whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but the man who deviates more widely—for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reason, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses: such things depend on particular facts, and the assessment depends on sense-perception. So much, then, makes it plain that the middle state is in all things praiseworthy, but that we must incline sometimes towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency—for so shall we most easily hit the middle point and what is well.

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[6] Homer, *Odyssey* XII 219.

[7] See Homer, *Iliad* III 156–160.

3

ACTION

Since virtue is concerned with emotions and actions, and in voluntary cases praise and blame are bestowed, in those that are involuntary sympathy and sometimes also pity, to determine the voluntary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are studying virtue and useful also for legislators with a view to both honours and punishments.

Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take 1110a place by force or owing to ignorance; and that is enforced of which the originating principle is outside and nothing is contributed by the person who acts or is acted upon—for instance, if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him under their control.

With regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (for instance, if a tyrant were to order one to do something ignoble, having one's parents and children under his control, and if one did the action they would be saved but otherwise put to death), it is debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew any intelligent man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are desirable at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the originating principle that moves the

instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the origin is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself.

For such actions men are sometimes even praised when they face up to something ignoble or painful in return for great and noble objects; in the opposite case they are blamed, since to face up to the most ignoble treatment for no noble end or for a trifling end is the mark of a base man. On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed but sympathy is, when one does what he ought not under pressure which overstrains human nature and which no one would face up to. Some actions, perhaps, we cannot be compelled to do, but ought rather to die after the most fearful sufferings; for the things that compelled Euripides' Alcmaeon to slay his mother seem ridiculous. It is difficult sometimes to decide what is desirable at what cost, and what should be faced in return for what gain, and yet more difficult to abide by our decisions; for as a rule what is expected is painful and what we are compelled to do is ignoble, whence praise and blame are bestowed on those who have been compelled or have not. 1110b

What sort of things, then, should be called enforced? Shall we answer simply that actions are so when the cause is in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing? But the things that in themselves are involuntary, but now and in return for these gains are desirable, and whose origin is in the agent, are in themselves involuntary, but now and in return for these gains voluntary. They are more like voluntary acts; for actions are in the class of particulars, and the particular acts here are voluntary. What sort of things are to be chosen in return for what, it is not easy to state; for there are many differences in the particular cases.

If someone were to say that pleasant and noble objects have a force, compelling us from without, then all acts would be for him enforced; for it is for these ends that all men do everything they do. And those who act perforce and involuntarily act with pain, but those who do acts for their pleasantness and nobility do them with pleasure: it is ridiculous to make external circumstances responsible, and not oneself, as being easily caught by such attractions, and to make oneself responsible for noble acts but the pleasant objects responsible for ignoble acts. The enforced, then, seems to be that whose origin is outside, the person enforced contributing nothing.

Everything that is done owing to ignorance is non-voluntary: what produces pain and regret is involuntary. For the man who has done something owing to ignorance, and feels not the least vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of people, then, who act owing to ignorance he who regrets is thought an involuntary agent, and the man who does not regret may, since he is different, be called a non-voluntary agent; for, since he differs, it is better that he should have a name of his own.

Acting owing to ignorance seems also to be different from acting in ignorance; for the man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act owing not to ignorance but to one of the causes mentioned, yet not knowingly but in ignorance.

Now every depraved man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he should abstain from, and error of this kind makes men unjust and in general bad; but the term 'involuntary' tends to be used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage—for ignorance in choice is a cause not of involuntariness but of depravity, nor is ignorance of the universal (for *that* men are blamed), but rather ignorance of the particular circumstances in which the action is found and with which it is concerned (for it is on these that both pity and sympathy depend). For the person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily.

Perhaps it is well, therefore, to determine their nature and number. A man may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes also what (for instance, what instrument) he is doing it

with, and to what end (for instance, for safety), and how he is doing it (for instance gently or intensely). Now no one could be ignorant of all of these unless he were mad, and plainly too he could not be ignorant of the agent; for how could he not know himself? But of what he is doing a man might be ignorant, as for instance people say 'it slipped out of their mouths as they were speaking',[1] or 'they did not know it was a secret', as Aeschylus said of the mysteries, or a man might say he let it off when he merely wanted to show it, as the man did with the catapult. Again, one might think one's son was an enemy, as Merope did, or that a pointed spear had a button on it, or that a stone was pumice-stone; or one might give a man a draught to save him, and kill him; or one might want to touch a man, as people do in sparring, and strike him. The ignorance may relate, then, to any of these things, i.e., of the circumstances of the action, and the man who was ignorant of any of these is thought to have acted involuntarily, and especially if he was ignorant on the most authoritative points—which are thought to be what[2] he is doing and to what end. Further,[3] the doing of an act that is called involuntary in virtue of ignorance of this sort must be painful and involve regret.

Since that which is done by force or owing to ignorance is involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the originating principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action. Presumably acts done by reason of passion or appetite are not rightly called involuntary. For in the first place, on that showing none of the other animals will act voluntarily, nor will children; and secondly, is it meant that we do not do voluntarily any of the acts that are due to appetite or passion, or that we do the noble acts voluntarily and the ignoble acts involuntarily? Is not the latter ridiculous given that one and the same thing is the cause? But it would surely be absurd to describe as involuntary the things one ought to desire; and we ought both to be angry at certain things and to have an appetite for certain things, for instance for health and for learning. Also what is involuntary is thought to be painful, but what is in accordance with appetite is thought to be pleasant. Again, what is the difference in respect of involuntariness between errors committed upon calculation and those committed in passion? Both are to be avoided, but the irrational emotions are thought no less human, and therefore also the actions which proceed from passion or appetite are the man's actions. It would be absurd, then, to treat them as involuntary.

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[1] Reading λέγοντας (Aspasius) for λέγοντες, and αὐτοῖς (Lambinus) for αὐτούς. Bywater prints the manuscript text between obeli.

[2] Reading ὅ for ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις ('. . . thought to be the circumstances of the action and the end').

[3] Reading δέ (Thurot) for δή ('So, the doing . . .').

BOTH THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY HAVING been determined, we must next discuss choice; for it is thought to be most closely related to virtue and to discriminate characters better than actions do.

Choice, then, is evidently voluntary, but it is not the same thing as the voluntary: the voluntary extends more widely. For both children and the other animals share in voluntary action but not in choice, and acts done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary but not as chosen.

Those who say it is appetite or temper or will or a kind of belief do not seem to be correct. For choice is not common to irrational creatures as well, but appetite and passion are. Again, the incontinent man acts with appetite but not with choice; while the continent man does the reverse—he acts with choice but not with appetite. Again, appetite is contrary to choice, but not appetite to appetite. Again, appetite relates to the pleasant and the painful, choice neither to the painful nor to the pleasant.

Still less is it passion; for acts due to passion least of all are thought to be chosen.

But neither is it will or wanting, though it seems near to it; for choice cannot relate to impossibles, and if anyone said

he chose them he would be thought a fool; but you may want what is impossible, for instance immortality. And wanting may relate to things that could in no way be brought about by one's own efforts, for instance that a particular actor or athlete should win; but no one chooses such things, but rather the things that he thinks could be brought about by his own efforts. Again, will relates rather to the end, choice to what contributes to the end: for instance, we want to be healthy but we choose the acts which will make us healthy, and we want to be happy and say we do but we cannot well say we choose to be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things that are in our own power.

Nor can it be belief; for belief is thought to relate to all kinds of things, no less to eternal things and impossible things than to things in our own power; and it is distinguished by its falsity or truth, not by its badness or goodness, while choice is distinguished rather by these.

Now with belief in general perhaps no one says it is identical. But it is not identical even with any kind of belief; for by choosing what is good or bad we are men of a certain character, which we are not by holding certain beliefs. And we choose to get or avoid something good or bad, but we have beliefs about what a thing is or whom it is good for or how it is good for him: we can hardly be said to believe to get or avoid anything. And choice is praised for being of the object it ought to be of rather than for being correctly related to it, belief for being truly related to its object. And we choose what we best know to be good, but we have beliefs about what we do not know at all. And it is not the same people that are thought to make the best choices and to have the best beliefs, but some are thought to have fairly good beliefs but by reason of vice to choose what they should not. If belief precedes choice or accompanies it, that makes no difference; for it is not this that we are considering, but whether it is identical with some kind of belief.

What, then, or what kind of thing is it, since it is none of the things we have mentioned? It is evidently voluntary, but not all that is voluntary is an object of choice. Is it, then, what has been decided on by previous deliberation? For choice involves reason and thought. Even the name seems to intimate that it is what is chosen before other things.[4]

Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything an object of deliberation, or are there some things about which there is no deliberation? We ought presumably to call an object of deliberation not what a fool or a madman would deliberate about but what an intelligent man would. Now about eternal things no one deliberates, for instance about the universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side. But no more do we deliberate about the things that involve movement but always happen in the same way, whether of necessity or by nature or from any other cause, for instance the solstices and the risings of the stars; nor about things that happen now in one way, now in another, for instance droughts and rains; nor about matters of fortune, for instance the finding of treasure. Nor do we deliberate about all human affairs—for instance, no Spartan deliberates about the best constitution for the Scythians. For none of these things can be brought about by our own efforts.

We deliberate about things that are in our power and are matters of action; and these are in fact what is left. For nature, necessity, and fortune are thought to be causes, and also intelligence and everything that is brought about by man. Now every class of men deliberates about what are matters for their own action. And in the case of precise and self-sufficient sciences there is no deliberation, for instance about the letters of the alphabet (for we are not in two minds about how they should be written). Rather, the things that are brought about by our own efforts but not always in the same way are the things about which we deliberate, for instance questions of medicine or business matters. And we do so more in the case of the art of navigation than in that of gymnastics, inasmuch as it has been less precisely worked out, and again about the others in the same way; and more also in the case of the crafts than in that of the sciences—for we are more in two minds about them. Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the outcome is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal to deciding.

We deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall convince, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end. Rather, having set the end they consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means *this* will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last. For the person who deliberates seems to inquire and analyse in the way described as though he were analysing a geometrical construction (evidently not all inquiry is deliberation—for instance mathematical inquiries—but all deliberation is inquiry), and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming. And if we come on an impossibility, we give up, for instance if we need wealth and this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do it. Possible are things that might be brought about by our own efforts; and these in a sense include things that can be brought about by the efforts of our friends, since the originating principle is in ourselves. The subject of inquiry is sometimes the instruments, sometimes the use of them; and similarly in the other cases—sometimes the means, sometimes the mode of using it or the means of bringing it about.

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[4] 'Choice' is προαίρεσις, 'chosen before other things' is πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.

It seems, then, as has been said, that man is an origin of actions, that deliberation is about things which are matters of action for the agent himself, and that actions are for the sake of things other than themselves. For the end cannot be an object of deliberation but only what contributes to the ends. Nor indeed can the particular facts be objects of 1113a deliberation, as whether this is bread or has been baked as it should; for these are matters of sense-perception. If we are to be always deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity.

The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen, except that the object of choice is already determinate, since it is that which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice. For everyone ceases to inquire how he is to act when he has brought the origin back to himself and to the ruling part of himself; for this is what chooses. This is plain also from the ancient constitutions, which Homer represented; for the kings announced their choices to the people. The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have made an assessment as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation.

We may take it, then, that we have described choice in outline, and stated the nature of its objects and the fact that it is concerned with what contributes to the ends.

THAT WILL OR WANTING IS FOR THE END HAS ALREADY been stated; but some think it is for the good, others for the apparent good. Now those who say that the good is the object of wanting must admit in consequence that that which the man who does not choose correctly wants is not an object of wanting (for if it is to be an object of wanting, it must also be good; but it was, if it so happened, bad); while those who say the apparent good is the object of wanting must admit that there is no natural object of wanting, but only what seems so to each man. Now different things appear so to different people, and, if it so happens, even contrary things.

If these consequences are not approved of, are we to say that in the abstract and in truth the good is the object of wanting, but for each person the apparent good? That which is in truth an object of wanting is an object of wanting to the virtuous man, while any chance thing may be so to the base man, just as in the case of bodies also the things that are in truth healthy are healthy for bodies which are in good condition, while for those that are diseased other things are healthy (or bitter or sweet or hot or heavy, and so on); since the virtuous man assesses each class of things correctly, and in each the truth appears to him. For each state of character has its own ideas of the noble and the pleasant, and perhaps the virtuous man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and measure of them. In most things the error seems to be due to pleasure; for it appears a good when it is not. We therefore 1113b choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil.

The end, then, being what we want, and the things contributing to the end being what we deliberate about and choose, actions concerning the latter will be according to choice and voluntary. Now the activity of the virtues is concerned with these. Therefore virtue also is in our own power, and so too vice. For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and *vice versa*; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will be ignoble, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble, is in our power, to act, which will be ignoble, will also be in our power. Now if it is in our power to do noble or ignoble acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be upright or base.

To say that no one is voluntarily vicious nor involuntarily blessed seems to be part false and part true; for no one is involuntarily blessed but depravity is voluntary. Or should we dispute what has just been said and deny that a man is an origin or begetter of his actions as he is of his children? But if these facts are evident and we cannot refer actions to origins other than those in ourselves, the acts whose origins are in us must themselves also be in our power and voluntary.

Witness seems to be borne to this both by individuals in their private capacity and by the legislators themselves; for these punish and take vengeance on those who do depraved acts (unless they have acted perforce or owing to ignorance for which they are not themselves responsible), while they honour those who do noble acts, as though they meant to encourage the latter and restrain the former. But no one is encouraged to do the things that are neither in our power nor voluntary: it is supposed that there is no gain in being persuaded not to be hot or in pain or hungry or the like, since we shall experience these feelings nonetheless. Indeed, we punish a man for his very ignorance, if he is thought the cause of the ignorance, as when penalties are doubled in the case of drunkenness; for the origin is in the man himself, since it was in his control not to get drunk and his getting drunk was the cause of his ignorance. And we punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws that they ought to know and that is not difficult, and so too in the case of anything else that they are thought to be ignorant of through carelessness: we suppose that it is in their power not to be ignorant, since it was in their control to take care.

But perhaps a man is the kind of man not to take care? Still they are themselves by their slack lives the cause of their becoming men of that kind and of their being unjust or self-indulgent, in that they cheat or spend their time in drinking bouts and the like; for it is activities exercised on particular objects that make people so. This is plain from the case of people training for any contest or action: they practise the activity the whole time. Now not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular objects that states of character are produced is the mark of a thoroughly insensible person.

Again, it is irrational to suppose that a man who acts unjustly does not want to be unjust or a man who acts self-indulgently to be self-indulgent. But if without being ignorant a man does the things which will make him unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily. Yet it does not follow that if he wants he will cease to be unjust and will be just. For neither does the man who is ill become well on those terms—although[5] he may, perhaps, be ill voluntarily, through living incontinently and disobeying his doctors. In that case it was *then* open to him not to be ill, but not now, when he has thrown away his chance. In the same way, once you have thrown a stone it is too late to recover it; but nevertheless it was in your power to throw it, since the originating principle was in you. So, too, to the unjust and to the self-indulgent man it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind (that is why they are such voluntarily); but now that they have become so it is not possible for them not to be so.

Not only are the vices of the soul voluntary, but so also are those of the body for some men, whom we accordingly criticize: while no one criticizes those who are ugly by nature, we criticize those who are so owing to want of exercise and care. So it is, too, with respect to weakness and infirmity: no one would reproach a man blind from birth or by disease or from a blow, but rather pity him, while everyone would blame a man who was blind from alcoholism or some other form of self-indulgence. Of vices of the body, then, those in our own power are blamed, those not in our power are not. And if this be so, in the other cases also the vices that are blamed must be in our own power.

Now someone may say that all men aim at the apparent good but do not control how things appear to them: rather, the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character. If each man is somehow the cause of the state he is in, he will also be himself somehow the cause of how things appear; but if not, no one is the cause of his own bad actions but everyone acts badly owing to ignorance of the end, thinking that by these he will get what is best for him, and the aiming at the end is not self-chosen—rather, one must

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[5] Reading καίτοι (Rassow) for καί.

be born with an eye, as it were, by which to assess things nobly and choose what is truly good, and he is well endowed by nature who is nobly endowed with this. For it is what is greatest and most noble, and what we cannot get or learn from another, but must have just such as it was at birth, and to be well and nobly endowed with this will be complete and true natural endowment. If this is true, then, how will virtue be more voluntary than vice? To both men alike, the good and the bad, the end appears and is fixed by nature or however it may be, and it is by referring everything else to this that men do whatever they do.

Whether, then, it is not by nature that the end appears to each man such as it does appear but something also depends on him, or the end is natural but because the virtuous man does the rest voluntarily virtue is voluntary, vice also will be nonetheless voluntary; for in the case of the bad man there is equally present that which is brought about by himself—in his actions even if not in his end. If, then, as is asserted, the virtues are voluntary (for we are ourselves somehow co-causes of our states of character, and it is by being persons of a certain kind that we suppose the end to be so and so), the vices also will be voluntary; for the same is true of them.

With regard to the virtues in general we have stated their genus in outline, namely that they are means and that they are states, and that they tend by their own nature to the doing of the acts by which they are produced, and that they are in our power and voluntary, and act as correct reasoning prescribes. But actions and states are not voluntary in the same way: we control our actions from the beginning to the end if we know the particular facts; but as for states, though we control their origin, the particular way in which they develop is not known (any more than it is in illnesses), and yet because it was in our power to act in this way or not in this way, the states are voluntary.

4

THE MORAL VIRTUES

LET US TAKE UP THE SEVERAL VIRTUES AND SAY WHICH they are and what sort of things they are concerned with and how they are concerned with them; at the same time it will become plain how many they are. And first let us speak of courage.

That it is a mean with regard to fear and confidence has already been made evident; and plainly the things we fear are frightening things, and these are, broadly speaking bad things—that is why people even define fear as expectation of something bad. Now we fear all bad things (for instance disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death); but the courageous man is not thought to be concerned with all; for some things one ought to fear and it is noble to do so, and ignoble not to fear them—for instance, disgrace: he who fears it is upright and modest, and he who does not is shameless. But some people call him courageous by an extension of the word; for he has in him something which is like the courageous man, since the courageous man also is a fearless person. Poverty and disease we perhaps ought not to fear, nor in general the things that do not proceed from vice and are not brought about by the man himself. The man who is fearless of these is not courageous either. Yet we apply the word to him too in virtue of a similarity; for some who in the dangers of war are cowards are liberal and are confident in face of the loss of wealth. Nor is a man a coward if he fears an outrage to his wife and children or envy or anything of the kind; nor courageous if he is confident when he is about to be flogged.

With what sort of frightening things, then, is the courageous man concerned? Surely with the greatest; for no one is more likely than he to face up to what is fearful. Now death is the most frightening of all things; for it is the end, and nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead. But the courageous man would not seem to be concerned even with death in all circumstances, for instance at sea or by disease. In what circumstances, then? Surely in the noblest. Now such deaths are those in battle; for these take place in the greatest and noblest danger. And this agrees with the ways in which honours are bestowed in States and at the courts of monarchs. Strictly speaking, then, he will be called courageous who is fearless in face of a noble death, and of all emergencies that involve death; and the emergencies of war are in the highest degree of this kind. Yet at sea also, and in disease, the courageous man is fearless, but not in the same way as the seamen; for he has given up hope for safety, and is vexed at the thought of death in this shape, while they are sanguine because of their experience. At the same time, we show courage in situations where there is the opportunity of showing prowess or where death is noble; but in these forms of death neither of these conditions is fulfilled.

What is frightening is not the same for all men; but we say there are things frightening even beyond human strength. These, then, are frightening to everyone—at least to every intelligent man; but the frightening things that are not beyond human strength differ in magnitude and degree, and so too do the things that inspire confidence. Now the courageous man is as dauntless as a man may be. Therefore, while he will fear even the things that are not beyond human strength, he will fear them as he ought and as reason directs, and[1] he will face them for the sake of what is noble; for this is the end of virtue. It is possible to fear these more, or less, and again to fear things that are not frightening as if they were. Of the errors that are committed one consists in fearing what one should not, another in fearing as one should not, another in fearing when one should not, and so on; and so too with respect to the things that inspire confidence. The man, then, who faces and who fears what he should and with the end he should have and how he should and when he should, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is courageous; for the courageous man feels and acts worthily and as reason directs. The end of every activity is conformity to the corresponding state. This is true, therefore, of the courageous man. But courage is noble.[2] Therefore the end also is noble; for each thing is defined by its end. Therefore it is for a noble end that the courageous man faces things and acts as courage directs.

Of those who go to excess he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (we have said previously that many states have no names), but he would be a sort of madman or insensate person if he feared nothing, neither earthquakes nor the waves, as they say the Celts do not; while the man who exceeds in confidence about what is frightening is over-confident. The over-confident man is also thought to be boastful and a pretender to courage: thus[3] as the courageous man *is* with regard to what is frightening, so the over-confident man wants to *appear*; and so he imitates him where he can. That is why most of them are a mixture of over-confidence and cowardice; for, while in these situations they display confidence, they do not face what is frightening.

The man who exceeds in fear is a coward; for he fears both what he ought not and as he ought not, and all the similar characterizations attach to him. He is lacking also in confidence; but he is more conspicuous for his excess of fear in painful situations. The coward, then, is a pessimistic sort of person; for he fears everything. The courageous man has the contrary disposition; for confidence is the mark of an optimistic disposition. The coward, the over-confident man, and the courageous man, then, are concerned with the same things but are differently disposed towards them; for the first two exceed and fall short, while the third is in a middling state and as he should be; and over-confident men are impetuous, and are willing before the dangers arrive but draw back when they are in them, while courageous men are keen in the moment of action but quiet beforehand.

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[1] Adding τε after ὑπομενεῖ.

[2] Reading δή · ἡ δ' ἀνδρεία for δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία (which Bywater prints between obeli).

[3] Reading οὖν (Bywater changes to γοῦν).

As we have said, then, courage is a mean with respect to things that inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances that have been stated; and it chooses or faces up to things because it is noble to do so, or because it is ignoble not to do so. But to die to escape from poverty or love or anything painful is not the mark of a courageous man, but rather of a coward; for it is softness to fly from what demands exertion, and such a man faces death not because it is noble but rather to avoid something bad.

COURAGE, THEN, IS SOMETHING OF THIS SORT; BUT THE name is also applied to five other kinds. First comes the political kind; for this is most like it. Citizens seem to face dangers because of penalties imposed by the laws and reproaches, and because of honours; and therefore those peoples seem to be most courageous among whom cowards are held in dishonour and courageous men in honour. This is the kind of courage that Homer depicts, for instance in Diomedes and in Hector:

> Polydamas will be the first to taunt me;

and

> For Hector one day 'mid the Trojans shall utter his vaulting
>   harangue:
> 'Afraid was Tydeides, and fled from my face'.[4]

This kind of courage is most like that which we described earlier because it is due to virtue; for it is due to modesty and to desire of a noble object (honour) and to avoidance of reproach, which is ignoble. One might rank in the same class even those who are compelled by their rulers; but they are inferior, inasmuch as they act not from modesty but from fear, and to avoid not what is ignoble but what is painful; for those who control them compel them, as Hector does:

> But if I shall spy any dastard that cowers far from the fight,

and

> Vainly will such a one hope to escape from the dogs.[5]

And those who give them their orders and beat them if they retreat do the same, and so do those who draw them up with trenches or something of the sort behind them: all of these apply compulsion. But one ought to be courageous not under compulsion but because it is noble to be so.

Experience with regard to particular facts is also thought to be courage—this is why Socrates thought courage was knowledge. Other people exhibit this quality in other dangers, and soldiers exhibit it in the dangers of war; for there seem to be many empty alarms in war, of which these have had the most comprehensive experience: so they seem courageous because the others do not know the nature of the facts. Again, their experience makes them most capable of doing without being done to, since they can use their arms and have the kind that are likely to be best both for doing and for not being done to: so they fight like armed men against unarmed or like trained athletes against amateurs—for in such contests too it is not the most courageous men that fight best but those who are strongest and have their bodies in the best condition. Soldiers turn cowards, however, when the danger puts too great a strain on them and they are inferior in numbers and equipment; for they are the first to fly, while citizen-forces die at their posts, as in fact happened at the temple of Hermes. For to the latter flight is ignoble and death is more desirable than safety on those terms; while the former from the beginning faced the danger on the supposition that they were stronger, and when they know the facts they fly, fearing death more than what is ignoble. The courageous man is not that sort of person.

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[4] *Iliad* XXII 100 and VII 148–149.

[5] *Iliad* II 391 and XV 348.

Passion also is sometimes reckoned as courage: those who act from passion, like brutes rushing at those who have wounded them, are thought to be courageous, because courageous men also are given to passion. For passion above all things is eager to rush on danger, and hence Homer's 'He put strength in his passion' and 'He aroused their spirit and passion' and 'bitter spirit in his nostrils' and 'his blood boiled'.[6] For all such expressions seem to indicate the stirring and onrush of passion. Now courageous men act because of the noble, and passion collaborates with them; but brutes act because of pain—they attack because they have been wounded or because they are afraid, since if they are in a forest they do not come near one. Thus they are not courageous because, driven by pain and passion, they rush on danger without foreseeing anything fearful. At that rate even asses would be courageous when they are hungry—for blows will not drive them from their food; and their appetites make adulterers do many daring things.[7] The courage that is due to passion seems to be the most natural, and to be courage if choice and aim be added.

Men suffer pain when they are angry, and are pleased when they exact their revenge. Those who fight for these reasons, however, are pugnacious but not courageous; for they do not act for the sake of the noble nor as reason directs, but from emotion. They have, however, something akin to courage.

Nor are optimists courageous; for they are confident in danger only because they have conquered often and against many foes. Yet they closely resemble courageous men, because both are confident; but courageous men are confident for the reasons stated earlier, while these are so because they think they are the strongest and will suffer nothing. (Drunks also behave in this way: they become optimistic.) When their adventures do not succeed, however, they run away; but it is the mark of a courageous man to face things that are, and seem, frightening for a man, because it is noble to do so and ignoble not to. That is why it is thought the mark of a more courageous man to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarms than to be so in those that are foreseen; for it must have proceeded more from a state of character, because less from preparation; for acts that are foreseen may be chosen by calculation and reason, but sudden actions in accordance with one's state of character.

People who are ignorant also appear courageous, and they are not far removed from the optimists, but are inferior inasmuch as they have no self-confidence while these have. That is why the optimists hold their ground for a time; but those who have been deceived fly if they know or suspect that things are different—as happened to the Argives when they fell in with the Spartans and took them for Sicyonians.

We have, then, described the character both of courageous men and of those who are thought to be courageous.

THOUGH COURAGE IS CONCERNED WITH CONFIDENCE and fear, it is not concerned with both alike, but more with frightening things; for he who is undisturbed in face of these and bears himself as he should towards them is more courageous than the man who does so towards the things that inspire confidence. It is for facing what is painful, then, as has been said, that men are called courageous. That is why courage involves pain, and is justly praised; for it is harder to face what is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant. Yet the end which courage sets before it would seem to be pleasant, but to be concealed by the attending circumstances, as happens also in athletic contests; for the end at which boxers aim is pleasant—the crown and the honours—but the blows they take are distressing to flesh and blood, and painful, and so is their whole exertion; and because the blows and the exertions are many, the aim, which is but small, appears to have nothing pleasant in it. And so, if the case of courage is similar, death and wounds will be painful to the courageous man and he will receive them involuntarily, but he will face them because it is noble to do so or because it is ignoble not to. And the more he is possessed of virtue in its entirety and the happier he is, the more he will be pained at the thought of death; for life is best worth living for such a man, and he is knowingly losing the greatest goods, and this is painful. But he is nonetheless courageous, and perhaps all the more so, because he chooses noble deeds of war at that cost. It is not the case, then, with all the virtues that the exercise of them is pleasant, except in so far as it reaches its end. But perhaps nothing prevents it from being the case that the best soldiers are not men of this sort but rather those who are less courageous but have no other good; for these are ready to face danger, and they sell their life for trifling profits.

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[6] *Iliad* V 470; XI 11; XVI 529; *Odyssey* XXIV 318.

[7] Most manuscripts here add a sentence which Bywater deletes: 'Those things are not courageous, then, which are driven on to danger by pain or passion'.

So much, then, for courage; it is not difficult to grasp its nature in outline, at any rate, from what has been said.

AFTER COURAGE LET US SPEAK OF TEMPERANCE; FOR these seem to be the virtues of the irrational parts. We have said that temperance is a mean with regard to pleasures (for it is less, and not in the same way, concerned with pains); and self-indulgence also is manifested in the same circumstances. Now, therefore, let us determine with what sort of pleasures they are concerned. We may take for granted the distinction between bodily pleasures and those of the soul, such as love of honour and love of learning. The lover of each of these things delights in that of which he is a lover, his body being in no way affected but rather his mind; but men who are concerned with such pleasures are called neither temperate nor self-indulgent. Nor, again, are those who are concerned with the other pleasures that are not bodily; for those

1118a who are fond of hearing and telling stories and who spend their days on anything that turns up are called gossips but not self-indulgent, nor are those who are pained at the loss of wealth or of friends.

Temperance must be concerned with bodily pleasures—but not with all of them. For those who delight in objects of sight, such as colours and shapes and painting, are called neither temperate nor self-indulgent; yet it would seem possible to delight even in these either as one should or to excess or deficiency. And so too is it with objects of hearing: no one calls those who delight excessively in music or acting self-indulgent, nor those who do so as they ought temperate. Nor do we apply these names to those who delight in smells, unless it be coincidentally: we call self-indulgent not those who delight in the smell of apples or roses or incense, but rather of unguents or of dainty dishes; for self-indulgent people delight in these because these remind them of the objects of their appetite. And one may see other people, when they are hungry, delighting in the smell of food; but to delight in this kind of thing is the mark of the self-indulgent man; for these are objects of appetite to him.

Nor is there in animals other than man any pleasure connected with these senses except coincidentally. For dogs do not delight in the scent of hares but in eating them—but the scent lets them perceive them; nor does the lion delight in the lowing of the ox but in eating it—but he perceived by the lowing that it was near, and therefore appears to delight in the lowing; and similarly he does not delight because he sees 'a stag or a wild goat'[8] but because he is going to make a meal of it. Temperance and self-indulgence, however, are concerned with the kind of pleasures that the other animals share in, which therefore appear slavish and brutish: these are touch and taste. But of taste they appear to make little or no use; for the business of taste is the discriminating of flavours, which is done by wine-tasters and people who season esty because they live by emotion and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by modesty; and we praise young people who are modestly inclined, but an older person no one would praise for being prone to shame, since we think he should not do anything of which he should feel ashamed. For shame is not even characteristic of an upright man, since it is consequent on base actions (for such actions should not be done; and if some actions are ignoble in very truth and others only according to belief, this makes no difference; for neither sort should be done, so that no shame should be felt); and it is a mark of a base man even to be such as to do any ignoble action. To be so constituted such as to feel ashamed if one does such an action, and for this reason to think oneself upright, is absurd; for it is for voluntary actions that modesty is felt, and the upright man will never voluntarily do base actions. Modesty may indeed be said to be conditionally an upright thing: if a good man did such actions, he would feel ashamed; but the virtues are not like that. And if shamelessness—not to be ashamed of doing ignoble actions—is base, that does not make it upright to be ashamed of doing such actions. Continence too is not virtue but rather a mixed sort of state; this will be shown later.

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[8] Homer, *Iliad* III 24.

Now let us discuss justice.

5

FRIENDSHIP *

AFTER WHAT WE HAVE SAID, A DISCUSSION OF FRIENDSHIP would naturally follow, since it is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods: indeed, rich men and those in possession of office and of power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which happens chiefly and in its most praiseworthy form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error. It aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness. Those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions: 'two men together'[1]—for with friends men are more able both to think and to act. Again, parent seems by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men but among birds and most animals. It is felt mutually by members of the same kind, and especially by men—whence we praise philanthropy. We may see even in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other. Friendship seems too to hold States together, and lawgivers to busy themselves more about friendship

Book Θ, 1155a

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* Chapters 5–8 of EE have usually been printed as Books EZH of NE (see pp. 5 and 20): hence the gap in the Bekker numbers here.

[1] 'Two men together see things that one would miss': Homer, *Iliad* X 224.

than about justice; for concord seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.

It is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who love their friends, and it is thought to be a noble thing to have many friends; and again we think it is the same people that are good men and are friends.

Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some set it down as a kind of likeness and say like people are friends, whence come the sayings 'Like to like', 'Birds of a feather', and so on; others on the contrary say 'Two of a trade never agree'. On this very question they inquire more deeply and in a more scientific fashion, Euripides saying that

> The parched earth longs for the rain, and heaven
> when filled with rain longs to fall to earth;

and Heraclitus that 'It is what opposes that helps' and 'From different tones comes the fairest harmony' and 'All things are produced through strife'; while Empedocles, as well as others, expresses the contrary view that like aims at like. The scientific problems we may leave alone (for they are not appropriate to the present inquiry); but let us examine those which are human and involve character and emotion—for instance, whether friendship can arise between any two people or people cannot be friends if they are depraved, and whether there is one species of friendship or more than one. Those who think there is only one because it admits of degrees have relied on an inadequate indication; for even things different in species admit of degree. We have discussed this matter previously.[2]

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[2] But not in the surviving parts of NE: Aspasius suggests that the reference is to a lost part; other commentators delete the sentence.

PERHAPS IT WILL BECOME EVIDENT IF WE COME TO KNOW what is lovable. For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful. Since it would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced that is useful, it is the good and the pleasant that are lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the good, or what is good for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. It is thought that each loves what is good for himself, and that while the good is in the abstract lovable, what is good for each man is lovable for him. (Each man loves not what is actually good for him but what seems good. This however will make no difference: we shall say that this is that which seems lovable.)

There are three grounds on which people love. Of the love of inanimate things we do not use the word 'friendship'; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a wanting of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to want wine to do well—if one wants anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself). To a friend they say we ought to want what is good for his sake. But to those who thus want good we ascribe only benevolence unless the same comes from the other side—for benevolence when it is reciprocal is friendship. Or must we add 'when it is recognized'? For many people feel benevolence towards those whom they have not seen but assess to be upright or useful; and one of these might return this feeling. These people seem to bear benevolence to each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not know each other's feelings? They must, then, recognize one another as bearing benevolence and wanting good things for each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.

THESE DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER IN KIND: SO THEREfore, do the forms of loving and friendship. So there are three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are lovable; for with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love, and those who love each other wish each other well in that respect in which they love. Those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure: it is not for their character that men cherish convivial people but because they find them pleasant. So those who love for the sake of utility feel affection for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the person loved is who he is[3] but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. So these friendships are only coincidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved but as providing some good or pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if they are no longer pleasant or useful they cease to love. The useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the ground of the friendship is done away, the friendship too is dissolved, inasmuch as it existed only for the ends in question.

This kind of friendship seems to exist chiefly between old people (for at that age people pursue not the pleasant but the beneficial) and, of those who are in their prime or young, between those who pursue what is advantageous. Such people do not live much with each other either; for sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant. Nor do they need such companionship unless they are beneficial to each other; for they are pleasant to each other only in so far as they have hopes of something good to come. Among such friendships people also class the friendship of host and guest.

The friendship of young people seems to aim at pleasure; for they live by their emotions, and pursue above all what is pleasant to themselves and what is immediately before them; (but with increasing age their pleasures become different). This is why they quickly become friends and quickly cease to be so: their friendship changes with the object that pleases, and such pleasure alters quickly. Young people are amorous too; for the greater part of being in love depends on emotion and is grounded in pleasure. This is why they love and quickly cease to love, changing often within a single day. But they do want to spend their days and lives together; for it is thus that they attain the purpose of their friendship.

Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good and alike in virtue; for these alike want good things for each other *qua* good, and they are good in themselves. Those who want good things for their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not coincidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good—and virtue is an enduring thing. And each is good in the abstract and to his friend; for the good are both good in the abstract and beneficial to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both in the abstract and to each other, since to each his own actions and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like. Such a friendship is, as might be expected, lasting, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends should have. For all friendship is grounded on good or on pleasure—either in the abstract or for him who has the friendly feeling—and is based on a certain resemblance. To a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of their nature; for in the case of this kind of friendship the other qualities also are alike, and that which is good in the abstract is also in the abstract pleasant, and these are the most lovable qualities. Love and friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men.

It is likely that such friendships should be infrequent; for such men are few. Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity: as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have 'eaten salt together'; nor can they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has been found lovable and been trusted by the other. Those who quickly show the marks of friendship to each other want to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are lovable and know the fact; for a will for friendship may arise quickly but friendship does not.

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[3] Reading ἐστιν <ὅσπερ ἐστίν> (Bonitz).

THIS KIND OF FRIENDSHIP, THEN, IS PERFECT BOTH IN RESPECT of duration and in all other respects, and in it each gets from the other in all respects the same or something similar, which is what ought to happen between friends. Friendship grounded in pleasure bears a resemblance to this kind; for good people too are pleasant to each other. So too does friendship grounded in utility; for the good are useful to each other. Among men of these sorts too, friendships are most permanent when the friends get the same thing from each other (for instance, pleasure), and not only that but also from the same source, as happens between convivial people, not as happens between lover and beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same things, but the one in seeing the beloved and the other in receiving attentions from his lover; and when the bloom of youth passes the friendship sometimes passes too (for the one finds no pleasure in the sight of the other, and the other gets no attentions). But many lovers on the other hand are constant, if familiarity has led them to feel affection for each other's characters, these being alike. But those who exchange not pleasure but utility in their love are both less truly friends and less constant. Those who are friends for the sake of utility part when the advantage is at an end; for they were friends not of each other but of what is expedient.

On the ground of pleasure or utility, then, even base men may be friends of each other, or upright men of base, or one who is neither of any sort of person. But for their own sake plainly only good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in each other unless some benefit accrues.

The friendship of the good too alone is proof against slander; for it is not easy to trust anyone about someone who has long been tested by oneself; and it is among good men that are found trust and the absence of unjust acts and all the

other things that are claimed of true friendship. In the other kinds of friendship there is nothing to prevent such things from arising.

Men apply the name of friends even where the ground is utility (like States—for the alliances of States are thought to aim at advantage), and to those who feel affection for each other on the ground of pleasure (as children are called friends). So we too ought perhaps to call such people friends, and say that there are several kinds of friendship—first and strictly speaking that of good men *qua* good, and by similarity the other kinds; for it is in virtue of something good and something similar that they are friends, since the pleasant is good for the lovers of pleasure. But these two kinds of friendship are not often united, nor do the same people become friends because of utility and because of pleasure; for things that are coincidentally connected are not often coupled together.

Friendship being divided into these kinds, base men will be friends because of pleasure or utility, being in this respect like each other, whereas good men will be friends for their own sake and *qua* good. These, then, are friends in the abstract: the others are friends coincidentally and through a resemblance to these.

JUST AS IN REGARD TO THE VIRTUES SOME MEN ARE CALLED good in respect of a state, others in respect of an activity, so too in the case of friendship; for those who live together delight in each other and confer good things on each other, whereas those who are asleep or apart at a distance are not exercising but are disposed to exercise their friendship—distance does not break off the friendship *tout court* but its exercise. But if the absence is lasting, it seems to make men forget their friendship: hence the saying 'Out of sight, out of mind'. Neither old people nor sour people seem to make friends easily; for there is little that is pleasant in them, and no one can spend his days with one whose company is painful, or not pleasant, since nature seems above all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant. Those who approve of each other but do not live together seem to be benevolent rather than friends. For there is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together (since while it is people who are in need that desire benefits, even those who are blessed desire to spend their days together; for solitude suits such people least of all); but people cannot live together if they are not pleasant and do not delight in the same things, as comrades seem to do.

The truest friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have frequently said; for that which is in the abstract good or pleasant seems to be lovable and desirable, and for each person that which is so to him; and the good man is lovable and desirable to the good man for both these reasons. It looks as if loving were an emotion, friendship a state; for there is such a thing as loving inanimate things as well, but mutual love involves choice and choice springs from a state; and men want good things for those whom they love, for their sake, not as a result of emotion but as a result of a state. In loving a friend men love what is good for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend. Each, then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal return in good will and in pleasantness; for friendship is said to be equality, and these things are found most in the friendship of the good.

BETWEEN SOUR AND ELDERLY PEOPLE FRIENDSHIP ARISES less readily inasmuch as they have less grace and take less delight in company; for these are thought to be the greatest marks of friendship and most productive of it. This is why, while young men become friends quickly, old men do not; for men do not become friends with those in whom they do not delight. Similarly for sour people. But such men may feel benevolence towards each other; for they want good things for each other and aid one another in need; but they are hardly friends because they do not spend their days together nor delight in each other, and these are thought the greatest marks of friendship.

One cannot be a friend to many people in the way of perfect friendship, just as one cannot be in love with many people at once (for it is like an excess, and it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one person); and it is not easy for many people at the same time to win intense approval from the same person, or perhaps even to be good. One must, too, acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar with him, and that is very hard. But it is possible for many people[4] to win the approval of many people on the ground of utility or pleasure; for many people are useful or pleasant, and these services take little time.

Of them, the one which is grounded on pleasure is the more like friendship, when both parties get the same things from each other and delight in each other or in the same things, as in the friendships of the young; for liberality is more found in such friendships. Friendship grounded on utility is for the commercially minded. People who are blessed have no need of useful friends but of pleasant friends; for they want to live with others, and, though they can bear for a short time what is painful, no one could face it continuously, nor even with goodness itself if it were painful to him: this is why they look for friends who are pleasant. Perhaps they should look for friends who, being pleasant, are also good, and good for them too; for so they will have all the characteristics that friends should have.

People in positions of authority evidently have different classes of friends: some are useful to them and others are pleasant, but the same are rarely both; for they look neither for those whose pleasantness is accompanied by virtue nor for those whose utility is with a view to noble objects. Rather, they look for convivial people in their desire for pleasure, and for men who are clever at doing what they are told—and these characteristics are rarely combined. We have said that the virtuous man is at the same time pleasant and useful; but such a man does not become the friend of one who is his superior, unless the latter is inferior in virtue; if this is not so, then being inferior he cannot establish proportionate equality. But such men are not so easy to find.

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[4] Reading πολλοὺς (Ramsauer) for πολλοῖς.

The aforesaid friendships involve equality; for the friends get the same things from one another and want the same things for one another, or else exchange one thing for another—for instance, pleasure for utility. We have said, however, that they are both less truly friendships and less permanent. It is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing that they are thought both to be and not to be friendships. It is by their likeness to the friendship based on virtue that they seem to be friendships (for one of them involves pleasure and the other utility, and these characteristics belong to the friendship based on virtue as well); while it is because the friendship based on virtue is proof against slander and is lasting, while they quickly change (besides differing in many other respects), that they appear not to be friendships because of their unlikeness to it.

THERE IS ANOTHER KIND OF FRIENDSHIP, WHICH INvolves a superiority—for instance, that of father to son and in general of elder to younger, that of man to wife and in general that of ruler to ruled. These differ from each other; for it is not the same that holds between parents and children and between rulers and ruled, nor is even that of father to son the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband. For the virtue and the role of each of these is different, and so are the reasons for which they love: the love and the friendship are therefore different also. The one party, then, neither gets the same from the other nor ought to look for it; but when children render to parents what they ought to render to those who brought them into the world, and parents render what they should to their children, the friendship of such persons will be lasting and upright. In all friendships involving superiority the love also should be proportional: the better should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more beneficial, and similarly in each of the other cases; for when the love is in proportion to worth, then in a way there is equality, and that is held to be characteristic of friendship.

Equality does not seem to take the same form in matters of justice and in friendship; for in matters of justice what is equal in the primary way is that which is in proportion to worth, while quantitative equality is secondary; but in friendship quantitative equality is primary and proportion to worth secondary. This becomes plain if there is a great interval in respect of virtue or vice or affluence or anything else; for then they are no longer friends, and do not even claim to be so. This is most obvious in the case of the gods; for they surpass us most in all good things. But it is clear also in the case of kings; for with them, too, men who are much their inferiors do not claim to be friends; nor do men of no worth claim to be friends with the best men or with men of great understanding. In such cases it is not possible to define exactly up to what point they can be friends; for much can be taken away and friendship remain, but not when one party is removed to a great distance, as a god is.

This is the origin of the problem of whether men really want the greatest goods for their friends—for instance, that of being gods; for in that case their friends will no longer be friends to them, and therefore will not be good things for them (for friends are good things). So if we were right in saying that a friend wants good things for his friend for his sake, his friend must remain the sort of being he is: it is for him as a man that he will want the greatest goods. But perhaps not all the greatest goods; for it is for himself most of all that each man wants what is good.

MOST PEOPLE SEEM, OWING TO AMBITION, TO WANT TO BE loved rather than to love. That is why most men love flattery; for the flatterer is a friend in an inferior position, or pretends to be such and to love more than he is loved; and being loved seems to be akin to being honoured, and this is what most people aim at. But it seems to be not for its own sake that they choose honour, but coincidentally. For most people delight in being honoured by those in positions of authority because of their hopes (for they think that if they want anything they will get it from them; and therefore they delight in honour as an indication of favour to come); while those who desire honour from upright men, and learned men, are aiming at confirming their own belief about themselves: they delight in honour because they are convinced of their own goodness by the assessment of those who speak about them. In being loved, on the other hand, people delight for its own sake—that is why it would seem to be better than being honoured, and friendship to be desirable in itself. But it seems to lie in loving rather than in being loved, as is indicated by the delight mothers take in loving; for some mothers hand over their children to be brought up, and know and love them but do not look to be loved in return (if they cannot have both): it is enough for them if they see them prospering; and they themselves love their children even if these owing to their ignorance give them nothing of a mother's due. Since friendship lies more in loving, and it is those who love their friends that are praised, loving seems to be the characteristic virtue of friends, so that it is those in whom this is found in proportion to worth that are lasting friends in a lasting friendship.

It is in this way more than any other that unequals can be friends: they can be equalized. Equality and likeness are friendship, and especially the likeness of those who are like in virtue; for being steadfast in themselves they hold fast to each other, and neither ask nor give base services, but rather (one may say) prevent them; for it is characteristic of good men neither to err themselves nor to let their friends do so. Depraved men have no firmness (for they do not even stay similar to themselves). They become friends for a short time because they delight in each other's depravity. Friends who

are useful or pleasant last longer—as long as they provide each other with pleasures or benefits. Friendship grounded on utility seems to be that which most easily exists between contraries—for instance between poor and rich, between ignorant and learned; for what a man lacks he aims at, and he gives something else in return. Under this head, too, one might bring lover and beloved, beautiful and ugly. This is why lovers sometimes seem ridiculous, when they claim to be loved as they love: if they are equally lovable then perhaps they ought so to claim; but when things are nothing like that it is ridiculous. Perhaps, however, contrary does not even aim at contrary in itself but only coincidentally, the desire being for what is in the middle; for that is what is good—for instance, it is good for the dry not to become wet but to come to the middle state, and similarly with the hot and in all other cases. These subjects we may dismiss; for they are foreign to our inquiry.

FRIENDSHIP AND JUSTICE SEEM, AS WE HAVE SAID AT THE start, to be concerned with the same things and to be found in the same places. For in every association there is thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too: men address as friends their fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers, and so too those joined with them in any other kind of association. And the extent of their association is the extent of their friendship, and also of justice. The proverb 'What friends have is common property' is correct; for friendship depends on sharing. Brothers and comrades have all things in common, but the others have definite things in common—some more, others fewer; for of friendships, too, some are more and others less truly friendships. And matters of justice differ too: those between parents and their children and those among brothers are not the same, nor those among comrades and those among fellow-citizens; and so, too, with the other kinds of friendship. So there is a difference also between what counts as unjust in each of these cases; and the injustice increases by being exhibited towards those who are more truly friends—for instance, it is a more terrible thing to defraud a comrade than a fellow-citizen, more terrible not to help a brother than a stranger, and more terrible to strike your father than anyone else. The claims of justice also naturally increase with the friendship, which implies that friendship and justice are found in the same places and have an equal extension.

All forms of association are like parts of political association: men journey together with a view to some particular advantage, and to provide something that they need for the purposes of life; and it is for the sake of advantage that political association too seems both to have come about originally and to endure—for this is what legislators aim at, and they call just that which is to the common advantage. The other associations aim at some particular advantage—for instance, sailors at what is advantageous on a voyage with a view to gaining wealth or something of the kind, fellow-soldiers at what is advantageous in war, whether it is wealth or victory or the taking of a city that they seek, and members of tribes and demes act similarly. All these seem to fall under the political partnership; for it aims not at present advantage but at what is advantageous for life as a whole. Some associations seem to arise for the sake of pleasure—religious guilds and social clubs; for these exist for the sake of offering sacrifice and of companionship[5]—they sacrifice and arrange gatherings for the purpose, and assign honours to the gods, and provide pleasant relaxations for themselves. For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings seem to take place after the harvest as a sort of first fruits, because it was at these seasons that people had most leisure. All the associations, then, seem to be parts of the political association; and the particular

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[5] The words 'Some associations seem . . . and of companionship' appear in the manuscripts immediately after '. . . and demes act similarly' in 1160a18: following a suggestion of Bywater, we transpose them to follow '. . . life as a whole'. (Bywater himself deletes the words and marks a lacuna after '. . . life as a whole'.)

kinds of friendship will correspond to the particular kinds of association.

THERE ARE THREE KINDS OF CONSTITUTION, AND AN equal number of deviations—perversions, as it were, of them. The constitutions are monarchy and aristocracy, and thirdly that which is based on a property qualification, which it seems appropriate to call timocratic,[6] though most people usually call it polity. The best of these is monarchy, the worst timocracy. The deviation from monarchy is tyranny (for both are forms of one-man rule); but there is the greatest difference between them: the tyrant looks to his own advantage, the monarch to that of the ruled. For a man is not a monarch unless he is self-sufficient and superior in all good things; and such a man needs nothing further; therefore he will not look to his own interests but to those of his subjects—one not like that would be a sort of monarch chosen by lot. Tyranny is the contrary of this: the tyrant pursues his own good. And it is more evident in the case of tyranny that it is the worst deviation, and it is the contrary of the best that is worst.

Monarchy changes into tyranny; for tyranny is the base form of monarchy and a depraved monarch becomes a tyrant. Aristocracy changes into oligarchy by the vice of the rulers, who distribute contrary to worth what belongs to the city—all or most of the good things to themselves, and office always to the same people, paying most regard to riches; thus the rulers are few and are depraved men instead of the most upright. Timocracy changes into democracy; for these are coterminous, since timocracy too tends to involve a mass of people, and all who have the property qualification are equal. Democracy is the least depraved; for its form of constitution is but a slight deviation. These then are the transitions to which constitutions are most subject; for these are the smallest and easiest changes.

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[6] 'Timocratic' is τιμοκρατικός and 'property qualification' is τίμημα.

One may find resemblances to the constitutions and, as it were, patterns of them even in households. For the association of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy, since the father cares for his children; and this is why Homer calls Zeus father: monarchy is supposed to be paternal rule. But among the Persians the rule of the father is tyrannical: they use their sons as slaves. Tyrannical too is the rule of a master over slaves; for it is the advantage of the master that is brought about in it. Now this seems to be a correct form of government but the Persian type is an error; for the modes of rule appropriate to different relations are diverse. The relationship of man and wife seems to be aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance with worth, and in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her. If the man has authority in everything it changes into oligarchy; for he does this contrary to worth and not *qua* better. Sometimes, however, women rule, because they are heiresses: they rule not because of virtue but because of riches and power, as in oligarchies. The relationship among brothers is like timocracy; for they are equal, except in so far as they differ in age; hence if they differ much in age, the friendship is no longer of the fraternal type. Democracy is found chiefly in masterless dwellings (for here everyone is on an equality), and in those in which the ruler is weak and everyone is in authority.

To each of the constitutions may be seen to correspond a type of friendship, just in so far as there corresponds a type of justice. The friendship between a monarch and his subjects depends on a superiority in benefaction; for he does well by his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep (whence Homer called Agamemnon shepherd of the people). Such too is the friendship of a father, though this exceeds in the greatness of its benefaction; for he is responsible for the existence of his children, which is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing. These

things are ascribed to ancestors as well. By nature a father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over descendants, a monarch over his subjects. These friendships imply superiority: that is why parents are honoured. The justice between persons so related is not the same but in proportion to worth; for that is true of the friendship as well. The friendship of man and wife is the same that is found in an aristocracy; for it is in accordance with virtue—the better gets more of what is good, and each gets what is fitting; and so, too, with the justice. The friendship of brothers is like that of comrades; for they are equal and of like age, and such persons are for the most part like in their emotions and their character. Like this is the friendship appropriate to timocratic government; for the citizens tend to be equal and upright, and so rule is taken in turn and on equal terms; and so too the friendship.

In the deviations, just as justice hardly exists, so too with friendship. And least in the worst form: in tyranny there is little or no friendship. For where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled, there is no friendship either, since there is no justice—for instance, between craftsman and tool, soul and body, master and slave. The latter in each case is benefited by that which uses it. But there is no friendship or justice towards inanimate things. Nor towards a horse or an ox, nor to a slave *qua* slave. For there is nothing common to the two parties: the slave is an animate tool and the tool an inanimate slave. *Qua* slave then, one cannot be friends with him. But *qua* man one can; for there seems to be some justice between any man and any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to a compact: so there can also be friendship with him in so far as he is a man. So while in tyrannies friendship and justice hardly exist, in democracies they exist more fully; for where the citizens are equal they have much in common.

Every form of friendship, then, involves association, as has been said. One might, however, mark off both the friendship of relations and that of comrades. Those of fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-voyagers, and the like are more like friendships of association; for they seem to rest on a sort of agreement. With them one might class the friendship of host and guest.

The friendship of relations, while it seems to be of many kinds, appears to depend in every case on paternal friendship; for parents feel affection for their children as being a part of themselves, and children their parents as as originating from them.[7] Now parents know their offspring better than their offspring know that they are their children, and the begetter is more attached to his offspring than the offspring to their begetter; for what comes from something is close to what it comes from (for instance, a tooth or hair or anything else to him whose it is), but the reverse is not so, or less so. Length of time produces the same result: parents feel affection for their children as soon as these are born, but children love their parents after some time has elapsed and they have acquired judgement or perception. From this it is also plain why mothers love more. Parents, then, love their children as themselves (for their issue are by virtue of their separate existence a sort of other selves), while children love their parents as being born of them, and brothers love each other as being born of the same parents; for their identity with them makes them identical with each other (which is the reason why people talk of the same blood, the same stock, and so on). They are, therefore, in a way the same thing, though in separate individuals. Two things that contribute greatly to friendship are a common upbringing and similarity of age; for 'two of an age take to each other', and familiarity makes for comradeship—that is why the friendship of brothers is akin to that of comrades. Cousins and other relations are attached by derivation from brothers—by being derived from the same stock. They come to be nearer or farther apart by virtue of the nearness or distance of their common ancestor.

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[7] Omitting τι (with the Laurentian manuscript).

The friendship of children to parents, and of men to gods, is as to something good and superior; for they have conferred the greatest benefits, since they are the causes of their being and of their nourishment, and of their education from their birth. This kind of friendship possesses pleasantness and utility also, more than that of strangers, inasmuch as their life is lived more in common. The friendship of brothers has the characteristics found in that of comrades (and especially when these are upright), and in general between people who are like each other, inasmuch as they are nearer to each other and have an affection for each other from birth, and inasmuch as those born of the same parents and brought up together and similarly educated are more akin in character; and the test of time has been applied most fully and firmly in their case.

Between other relations friendship is found in due proportion. Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for man is naturally inclined to form couples more than to form States, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than the State, and reproduction is common to animals. With the other animals the association extends to this point, but human beings live together not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the various purposes of life. For from the start the tasks are divided, and those of man and woman are different; and so they help each other by throwing their special gifts into the common stock. It is for these reasons that both utility and pleasure seem to be found in this kind of friendship. It may be grounded also on virtue, if the parties are upright; for each has its own virtue and they will delight in the fact. Children seem to be a bond (that is why childless people part more easily); for children are a good common to both and what is common holds them together.

How man and wife and in general friend and friend ought to live seems to be the same question as how it is just for them to do so; for it does not seem to be the same for a friend, a stranger, a comrade, and a schoolfellow.

THERE ARE THREE KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP, AS WE SAID AT the start, and in respect of each some are friends on an equality and others by virtue of a superiority (for not only can equally good men become friends but a better man can make friends with a worse, and similarly in friendships of pleasure or utility they may be equal or different in the benefits they confer). Equals must equalize on a basis of equality in love and in all other respects, while unequals must render what is in proportion to their superiority.

Complaint and grumbling arise either only or chiefly in the friendship of utility, and this is only to be expected. For those who are friends on the ground of virtue are eager to do well by each other (since that is a mark of virtue and of friendship), and between men who are emulating each other in this there cannot be complaints or quarrels: no one is vexed at a man who loves him and does well by him—rather, if he is a person of refinement he takes his revenge by doing well in return. The man who exceeds will not complain of his friend, since he gets what he aims at; for each man desires what is good. Nor do complaints arise much even in friendships of pleasure; for both get at the same time what they desire, if they take delight in spending their time together; and a man who complained of another for not affording him pleasure would seem ridiculous, since it is in his power not to spend his days with him.

The friendship of utility is given to complaint; for as they use each other for their own benefit they always ask for more, and think they have got less than is fitting, and grumble at their partners because they do not get all they ask for although they are worthy of it; and those who do well by others cannot help them as much as those whom they benefit ask for.

It seems that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other legal, one kind of friendship of utility is moral and the other legal. And so complaints arise most of all when men do not dissolve the relation in the spirit in which they contracted it. The legal type is that which is on fixed terms:

its purely commercial variety is on the basis of immediate payment, while the more liberal variety allows time but agrees on a *quid pro quo*. Here the debt is plain and not ambiguous, but in the postponement it contains an element of friendliness; and so for some there are no lawsuits about the matter—rather, they think that men who have bargained on a basis of trust ought to put up with it. The moral type is not on fixed terms: it makes a gift, or does whatever it does, as to a friend. But one claims to receive as much or more, as having not given but lent; and if a man is worse off when the relation is dissolved than he was when it was contracted he will complain. This happens because all or most men, while they want what is noble, choose what is beneficial; and while it is noble to do well by another without a view to repayment, it is the receiving of benefactions that is advantageous.

If we can we should return in proportion to the worth of what we have received; for we must not make a man our friend against his will: we must recognize that we were mistaken at the start and were well treated by a person by whom we should not have been—since it was not by a friend, nor by one who did it for the sake of doing so—and the relation must be dissolved as if we had received benefactions on fixed terms. Indeed, one would agree to repay if one could (if one could not, not even the giver would claim it); and so if it is possible we must repay. But at the start we must consider who our benefactor is and on what terms he is acting, in order that we may stand by the terms, or else decline.

It is disputed whether we ought to measure a service by its benefit to the receiver and make the return with a view to that, or by the beneficence of the giver. For those who have received say they have received from their benefactors what meant little to the latter and what they might have got from others—minimizing the service; while the givers conversely say it was the biggest thing they had, and what could not have been got from others, and that it was given in times of danger or similar need. Now if the friendship is one grounded on utility, is not the benefit to the receiver the measure? For it is he that asks for the service, and the other man helps him on the supposition that he will receive an equal benefit; so the assistance has been as great as the benefit to the receiver, and therefore he must return as much as he has received, or even more (for that would be nobler).

In friendships of virtue complaints do not arise, and the choice of the doer is a sort of measure; for in choice lies the element which controls virtue and character.

Differences arise also in friendship based on superiority; for each claims more, and when this happens the friendship is dissolved. Not only does the better man think it is fitting for him to get more (since more should be assigned to a good man), but the more useful man similarly expects so (for they say a useless man should not get as much, since it becomes an act of public service and not a friendship if the proceeds of the friendship do not answer to the worth of the deeds). For they think that, just as in a business association those who put more in get more out, so it should be in friendship. But the man who is in a state of need and is worse makes the opposite claim: it is the part of a good friend to help those who are in need; for what, they say, is the use of being the friend of a virtuous man or a powerful man if one is to get no enjoyment from it? It seems that each makes a correct claim, and that each should get more out of the friendship—but not more of the same thing: rather, the superior more honour and the needy more profit. For honour is the prize of virtue and of beneficence, while profit is the assistance given to need.

It seems to be so in constitutions also: the man who contributes nothing good to the common stock is not honoured; for what is common is given to the man who is a common benefactor, and honour is something common. For it is not possible to get wealth from the public stock and at the same time honour. For no one puts up with the smaller share in all things; and so to the man who loses in wealth they assign honour and to the man who is willing to be paid, wealth, since proportion to worth equalizes and preserves the friendship, as we have said.

This then is also the way in which we should keep company with unequals: the man who is benefited in respect of wealth or virtue must give honour in return, repaying what he can. For friendship requires a man to do what he can, not what is consonant with the other's worth, since that cannot always be done: for instance, in honours paid to the gods or to parents—no one could ever return to them what they are worth, but the man who serves them to the utmost of his power is thought to be an upright man.

This is why it would not seem open to a man to disown his father (though a father may disown his son): being in debt, he should repay, but there is nothing a son can give that has the worth of what he has received, so that he is always in debt. Creditors can waive a debt and so a father can do so. At the same time it is thought that no one perhaps would repudiate a son who was not excessively depraved; for apart from the natural friendship it is human nature not to reject assistance. But the son, if he is depraved, will avoid aiding his father, or not busy himself about it; for most people want to be well treated but avoid treating others well, as a thing inexpedient.

So much for these questions.

Book I

IN ALL FRIENDSHIPS BETWEEN DISSIMILARS IT IS, AS WE have said, proportion that equalizes and preserves the friendship: for instance, in political friendship the shoemaker gets a return for his shoes in proportion to his worth, and the weaver and the rest do the same. Now here a common measure has been provided in the form of money, and everything is referred to this and measured by this; but in the friendship of lovers sometimes the lover complains that his excess of love is not met by love in return (though perhaps there is nothing lovable about him), while often the beloved complains that the lover who formerly promised everything now performs nothing. Such incidents happen when the lover loves the beloved for the sake of pleasure while the beloved loves the lover for the sake of utility, and they do not both possess the qualities expected of them. If these be the objects of the friendship it is dissolved when they do not get the things for the sake of which they loved; for each did not feel affection for the other person himself but for the qualities he had, and these were not enduring: that is why the friendships also are transient. But the love of characters, as has been said, endures because it is self-dependent. Differences arise when what they get is something different and not what they desire; for it is like getting nothing when we do not get what we aim at—for instance, the person who made promises to a lyre-player, promising him the more the better he sang, but on the morrow, when the other demanded the fulfilment of his promises, said that he had given pleasure for pleasure. If this had been what each wanted, all would have been well; but if the one wanted enjoyment and the other profit, and the one has what he wanted while the other has not, the terms of the association will not have been kept; for each fixes his mind on what he asks for, and it is for the sake of that that he will give what he has.

Who is to fix the worth of the service, he who makes the offer or he who takes it up? The one who offers seems to leave it to the other. This is what they say Protagoras used to do: whenever he taught anything, he bade the learner value the worth of the knowledge, and accepted the amount so fixed. But in such matters some men approve of the saying 'Let a man have his fixed reward'.[8]

Those who take the cash and then do none of the things they said they would, owing to the excesses of their promises, reasonably find themselves the objects of complaint; for they do not fulfil what they agreed to. The sophists are perhaps compelled to do this because no one would give cash for the things they know. These people, then, who do not do what they have been paid for, are reasonably made the objects of complaint.

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[8] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 370.

Where there is no agreement about the service, those who offer something for the sake of the other party cannot (as we have said) be complained of (for that is the nature of the friendship of virtue), and the return to them must be made 1164b
on the basis of their choice (for choice is characteristic of a friend and of virtue). And so too, it seems, for those who have shared their philosophizing; for its worth cannot be measured against wealth, and no honour would balance their services—but it is perhaps enough, as it is with the gods and with one's parents, to give what one can.

If the giving was not of this sort but was made on conditions, then perhaps the return made ought (if it is at all possible) to be one that seems to both to be in accordance with worth; but if this is not done, it would seem not only necessary that the person who gets the first service should fix the value, but also just; for the second will get what it was worth to the first if he takes the amount by which the first was benefitted or which he would have given for the pleasure.

We see this happening too with things put up for sale, and in some places there are laws providing that no lawsuits shall arise out of voluntary contracts, on the supposition that one should settle with a person whom one has trusted in the spirit in which one associated with him. The law holds that it is more just that the person to whom credit was given should fix the terms than that the person who gave credit should do so. For most things are not given an equal value by those who have them and those who want to get them: each class sets a high worth on what is its own and what it is offering; yet the return is made on the terms fixed by the receiver. Perhaps the receiver should value a thing not at what it seems worth when he has it, but at what he valued it at before he had it.

A FURTHER PROBLEM IS SET BY SUCH QUESTIONS AS whether one should in all things give the preference to one's father and obey him, or whether when one is ill one should trust a doctor, and when one has to elect a general should elect a man of military skill; and similarly whether one should render a service by preference to a friend or to a virtuous man, and should show gratitude to a benefactor or oblige a comrade, if one cannot do both.

Are not all such questions hard to decide with precision? For they admit of many variations of all sorts in respect both of the magnitude of the service and of its nobility and necessity. But that we should not give the preference in all things to the same person is plain enough; and we must for the most part return benefactions rather than give to comrades, as we should pay back a loan to a creditor rather than make one to a friend. But perhaps even this is not always true: for instance, should a man who has been ransomed out of the hands of brigands ransom his ransomer in return, whoever he may be (or pay him if he has not been captured but requests payment), or should he ransom his father? It would seem that he should ransom his father in preference even to himself.

As we have said, then, generally the debt should be paid, but if the gift is exceedingly noble or exceedingly necessary, one should defer to these considerations. For sometimes it is not even fair to return what one has received, when the one man has done a service to one he knows to be virtuous, while the other makes a return to one he believes to be depraved—nor, sometimes, lend in return to one who has lent to oneself; for the one person lent to an upright man, expecting to recover his loan, while the other has no hope of recovering from one who is vicious. So if the facts really are so, the claim is not fair; and if they are not but people think they are, they would be held to be doing nothing absurd. As we have often said, then, discussions about emotions and actions have as much definiteness as their subject-matter.

That we should not make the same return to everyone, nor give a father the preference in everything, as one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, is plain enough; and since we ought to render different things to parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors, we ought to render to each class what is appropriate and fitting. And this is what people seem in fact to do. To marriages they invite their kinsfolk, for these have a part in the family and therefore in the actions that affect the family; and at funerals also they think that kinsfolk, before all others, should meet, for the same reason. And it would be thought that in the matter of food we should help our parents before all others, since we owe our own nourishment to them, and it is more noble to help in this respect the authors of our being even before ourselves. Honour too one should give to one's parents as one does to the gods, but not any and every honour; for one should not give the same honour to one's father and one's mother, nor again should one give them the honour due to a man of understanding or to a general, but rather the honour due to a father, or again to a mother. To all older persons, too, one should give honour appropriate to their age, by rising to receive them and finding seats for them and so on. To comrades and brothers one should allow freedom of speech and common use of all things. To kinsmen and fellow-tribesmen and fellow-citizens and to every other class one should always try to assign what is appropriate, and to compare the claims of each class with respect to nearness of relation and to virtue or usefulness. The comparison is easier when the persons belong to the same class, and more of a task when they are different. Yet we must not on that account shrink from it but decide the question as best we can.

ANOTHER PROBLEM THAT ARISES IS WHETHER FRIENDSHIPS should or should not be broken off when the other party does not remain the same. Perhaps there is nothing absurd in breaking off a friendship based on utility or pleasure, when our friends no longer have these attributes? For it was of these attributes that we were the friends; and when they have failed it is reasonable to love no longer. But one might complain if someone who cherished us for our utility or pleasantness pretended to love us for our character. For, as we said at the start, most differences arise between friends when they are not friends in the way they think they are. So when a man has been mistaken and has assumed he was being loved for his character when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must hold himself responsible; but when he has been deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is just that he should complain against his deceiver—and with more justice than one does against people who counterfeit the currency inasmuch as the cheating is concerned with something more valuable.

If one accepts another man as good, and he becomes depraved and is believed to become so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved but only what is good. What is vicious neither can nor should be loved; for one should not be a lover of viciousness nor become like what is base (and we have said that like is dear to like). Must the friendship, then, be forthwith broken off? Or not in all cases but only when they are incurable in their depravity? If they are capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assistance of their character than to their property, inasmuch as this is better and more appropriate to friendship. But a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing absurd; for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend: when his friend has changed, therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up.

If one friend remained the same while the other became more upright and far outstripped him in virtue, should he treat him as a friend? Surely he cannot. When the interval is great this becomes most plain—for instance, in the case of childhood friendships: if one friend remained a child in intellect while the other became a fully developed man, how could they be friends when they neither approved of the same things nor delighted in and were pained by the same things? For not even with regard to each other will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw) they cannot be friends; for they cannot live together. But we have discussed

these matters. Should he, then, behave no otherwise towards him than he would if he had never been his friend? Surely he should keep a remembrance of their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather than strangers, so to those who have been our friends we ought to make some allowance for our former friendship, when the breach has not been due to excess of depravity.

FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ONE'S NEIGHBOURS AND THE 1166a marks by which friendships are defined seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself. For men think a friend is one who wants and does what is good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend, or one who wants his friend to exist and live, for his sake—as mothers do for their children, and friends do who have come into conflict. Some think a friend is one who lives with and has the same tastes as another, or one who grieves and feels delight with his friend; and this too is found in mothers most of all. It is by some one of these characteristics that friendship is defined.

Each of these holds of the upright man's relation to himself (and of all other men in so far as they assume that they are good; and virtue and the virtuous man seem, as has been said, to be the measure of every class of things). For he has the same views as himself, and he desires the same things with his whole soul; and so he wants for himself what is good and what seems so, and does it (for it is characteristic of the good man to exert himself for the good), and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the thinking element in him, which is thought to be the man himself); and he wants to live himself and to be preserved, and especially the element by virtue of which he thinks. For existence is good to the virtuous man, and each man wants for himself what is good, while no one chooses to possess the whole world on condition of becoming someone else (for even now God possesses the good) but rather on condition of being whatever he is. And the element that thinks would seem to be the man himself, or to be so more than any other element in him. And such a man wants to live with himself; for he does so with pleasure, since the memories of his past acts are delightful and his hopes for the future are good and such hopes are pleasant. His mind is well stored too with subjects of contemplation. And he grieves and takes pleasure, more than any other, with himself; for the same things are always painful and pleasant, and not one thing at one time and another at another; and he has, so to speak, nothing to regret.

Since each of these characteristics belongs to the upright man in relation to himself, and he is related to his friend as to himself (for his friend is another self), friendship too is thought to be one of these attributes, and those who have these attributes to be friends. Whether there is or is not friendship between a man and himself is a question we may dismiss for the present; but there would seem to be friendship in so far as he is two or more, to judge from what has been said, and from the fact that the excess of friendship is like one's love for oneself.

The attributes named evidently belong even to the majority of men, base though they are. Are we to say then that in so far as they approve of themselves and assume that they are good, they share in these attributes? Certainly no one who is thoroughly base and impious has these attributes, nor even seems to do so. They scarcely belong even to base people; for such people are at variance with themselves, and have appetites for some things and wants for others—for instance, incontinent people: they choose, instead of the things they themselves think good, things that are pleasant but harmful. Others again, through cowardice and idleness, shrink from doing what they think best for themselves. Those who have done many terrible deeds and are hated for their depravity even flee from life and destroy themselves. Depraved men look for people with whom to spend their days, and flee themselves; for they remember many a vexatious deed and anticipate others like them when they are by themselves, but when they are with others they forget. And having nothing lovable in them they have no feeling of love towards themselves. So such men do not feel delight or grieve with themselves; for their soul is rent by faction, and one element in it by reason of its depravity grieves when it abstains from certain acts, while the other is pleased, and one draws them this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them in pieces. If a man cannot at the same time be pained and pleased, at all events after a short time he is pained because he was pleased, and he could have wished that these things had not been pleasant to him—for base men are laden with regrets.

Thus the base man does not seem to be lovingly disposed even towards himself, because there is nothing in him to love. So that if to be thus is the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to avoid depravity and should endeavour to be upright; for so one may be both friendly to oneself and a friend to another.

BENEVOLENCE IS LIKE FRIENDSHIP BUT IS NOT THE SAME as friendship; for one may feel benevolence both towards people whom one does not know and without their knowing it, but not have such a friendship. This has been said already. But benevolence is not even friendly feeling. For it does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accompany friendly feeling; and friendly feeling implies intimacy while benevolence may arise of a sudden: for instance, towards competitors in a contest: we come to feel benevolence for them and to share in their wishes, but we would not do anything with them. For, as we said, we feel benevolence suddenly and affection superficially.

Benevolence seems to be an origin of friendship, as the pleasure of the eye is an origin of love. For no one loves if he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved, but he who delights in the form of another does not, for all that, love him: rather, he does so when he also longs for him when absent and craves for his presence. So too it is not possible for people to be friends if they have not come to feel benevolence, but those who feel benevolence are not for all that friends; for they only wish well to those for whom they feel benevolence, and would not do anything with them nor take trouble for them. That is why one might by an extension of the term say that benevolence is an idle friendship, which when it is prolonged and reaches the point of intimacy becomes friendship—not the friendship based on utility nor that based on pleasure; for benevolence does not arise on those terms. A beneficiary bestows benevolence in return for what has been done to him, and in doing so does what is just; while he who wants someone to prosper because he hopes for affluence through him seems to have benevolence not to him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a friend to another if he serves him for the sake of some use to be made of him. In general, benevolence arises on account of some virtue and uprightness, when one man seems to another noble or brave or something of the sort, as we said in the case of competitors in a contest.

Concord also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is not sameness of belief; for that might occur even with people who do not know each other; nor does one say that people who have the same views on any and every subject are in concord—for instance, those who agree about the heavenly bodies (for concord about these is not a friendly relation); rather, one says that a State is in concord when men have the same views about what is to their interest, and choose the same things, and act on what they have resolved in common. It is about matters of action, therefore, that people are said to be in concord, and, among these, about matters of consequence and in which it is possible for both or all parties to get what they want—for instance, a State is in concord when all its citizens think that the offices in it should be elective, or that they should form an alliance with Sparta, or that Pittacus should be their ruler at a time when he himself was also willing to rule. But when each of two people wants it for himself, like the captains in the *Phoenissae*, they are in a state of faction: it is not concord when each of the two thinks the same thing, whatever that may be,

but rather when they think the same thing in relation to the same person—for instance, when both the common people and the upright men want the best men to rule; for thus do 1167b all get what they aim at. Concord seems, then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is said to be; for it is concerned with things that are to our advantage and have an influence on our life.

Such concord is found among upright men; for they are in concord both with themselves and with one another, being, so to say, of one mind (for the wishes of such men are constant and do not flow this way and that like a race in a strait), and they want what is just and what is advantageous, and they aim at these things in common. Base men cannot be in concord except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends, since they covet more in matters of benefit and undertake less in matters of exertion and public service; and each man wanting things for himself quizzes his neighbour and stands in his way. For if people do not watch it carefully the common interest is soon destroyed. The result is that they are in a state of faction, putting compulsion on each other but unwilling themselves to do what is just.

Benefactors are thought to love the objects of their benefaction more than those who have been well treated love those that have treated them well, and this is inquired into as being paradoxical. Most people think it is because the latter are in the position of debtors and the former of creditors; and therefore as in the case of loans debtors wish their creditors did not exist while creditors actually take care of the safety of their debtors, so it is thought that benefactors want the objects of their action to exist since they will then get their gratitude, whereas beneficiaries take no interest in making this return. Epicharmus would perhaps declare that they say this because they look at things on their vicious side, but it is like human nature; for most people are forgetful, and aim rather to be well treated than to treat others well.

But the cause would seem to be more natural, and the case of those who have lent money not to be similar. For they have no friendly feeling to their debtors, but only a wish that they may be kept safe with a view to what is to be got from them; while those who have done a service to others cherish and love those they have served even if these are not of any use to them and never will be. This is what happens with craftsmen too: every man cherishes his own product better than he would be cherished by it if it came alive. This happens perhaps most of all with poets; for they cherish their own poems excessively, showing an affection for them as if they were their children. This is what the position of benefactors is like; for that which they have treated well is their product, and therefore they cherish it more than the product does its maker. The cause of this is that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved, and that we exist by activity—by living and acting—and that the product is in a way the maker in activity. So he feels affection for his product because he does so for his own existence. And this is natural; for what he is in capacity, his product manifests in activity.

At the same time, to the benefactor that which depends on his action is noble, so that he delights in the object of his action, whereas to the patient there is nothing noble in the agent but at most something advantageous, and this is less pleasant and lovable. What is pleasant is activity in the present, expectation for the future, and memory of the past; but most pleasant is that which is active, and similarly this is most lovable. If a man has made something, his product remains (for the noble is lasting); but for the person acted on the utility passes away. And the memory of noble things is pleasant, but that of useful things is not at all so, or less so. The reverse seems true of expectation.

Further, loving is like producing, being loved like being acted upon; and loving and its concomitants are attributes of those who are superior in action.

Again, all men have more affection for what they have won by exertion: for instance, those who have made their wealth love it more than those who have inherited it; and to be well treated seems to involve no exertion, while to treat others well is a task. These are the reasons, too, why mothers are fonder of their children: bringing them into the world costs them more exertions, and they know better that the children are their own. This last point, too, would seem to apply to benefactors.

THE PROBLEM IS ALSO RAISED OF WHETHER A MAN should love himself most, or someone else. People criticize those who cherish themselves most, and call them self-lovers, using this as an epithet of ignobility; and a base man seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more so the more depraved he is—and so men complain that, for instance, he does nothing which does not touch on himself—while the upright man acts for the sake of the noble, and the better he is the more so; and he acts for his friend's sake, and sacrifices his own interest.

But the facts clash with these arguments, and this is not unreasonable. For men say that one ought to love best one's best friend, and a man's best friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake, even if no one is to know of it; and these attributes are found most of all in a man's attitude towards himself. And so are all the other attributes by which a friend is defined; for, as we have said, it is from this relation that all the characteristics of friendship have extended to others. All the proverbs take the same view: for instance, 'A single soul', and 'What friends have is common property', and 'Friendship is equality', and 'Charity begins at home'. All this will be found most in a man's relation to himself: he is his own best friend and therefore ought to love himself best. It is therefore reasonably a problem which of the two views we should follow; for both are credible.

Perhaps we ought to mark off such arguments from each other and determine how far and in what respects each is true. If we grasp the sense in which each party uses the expression 'self-lover', the truth may become plain. Those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe self-love to people who assign to themselves the greater share of wealth, honours, and bodily pleasures; for these are what most people desire and busy themselves about as though they were the best of all things—that is why they are fought over. So those who are covetous with regard to these things gratify their appetites and in general their emotions and the irrational element of the soul; and most men are of this nature. That is why the epithet has taken its meaning from the prevailing type of self-love, which is a base one. It is just, therefore, that men who are self-lovers in this way are reproached for being so. That it is those who assign such things to themselves that most people usually call self-lovers is plain; for if a man were always busy that he himself, above all things, should act justly, temperately, or in accordance with any other of the virtues, and in general were always to try to secure for himself the noble course, no one would call such a man a self-lover or blame him.

But such a man would seem rather to be a self-lover; at all events he assigns to himself the things that are noblest and best, and gratifies the most authoritative element in himself and in all things obeys this. Just as a State or any other organization is most properly identified with the most authoritative element in it, so is a man; and therefore the man who cherishes this and gratifies it is most of all a self-lover. Besides, a man is said to be continent or incontinent according as his intelligence has or has not the mastery,[9] on the assumption that this is the individual himself; and the acts men have done from reason are thought most properly their own and voluntary. That this is the individual himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also that the upright man cherishes most this part of him. That is why he is most truly a self-lover, of another type than that which is a matter of reproach, and as different from that as living

according to reason is from living according to emotion, and desiring what is noble from desiring what seems advantageous. Those, then, who busy themselves in an exceptional degree with noble actions all men approve and praise; and if all were to strive towards what is noble and strain every nerve to do the noblest deeds, everything would be as it should be for the common good and everyone would secure for himself the goods that are greatest, since virtue is the greatest of goods.

So the good man should be a self-lover (for he will both himself profit by doing noble acts and benefit his fellows), but the depraved man should not; for he will harm both himself and his neighbours, following as he does base emotions. For the depraved man, what he does clashes with what he ought to do, but what the virtuous man ought to do he does; for the intellect always chooses what is best for itself, and the good man obeys his intellect. It is true of the virtuous man too that he does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and dies for them if he ought to; for he will surrender wealth and honours and in general the goods that are fought over, gaining for himself nobility, since he would prefer a short period of intense pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment, a twelvemonth of noble life to many years of humdrum existence, and one great and noble action to many trivial ones. Those who die for others doubtless attain this result; it is therefore something great and noble that they choose for themselves. They will surrender wealth too on condition that their friends will gain more; for while a man's friend gains wealth he himself achieves nobility; he is therefore assigning the greater good to himself. The same too is true of honour and office: all these things he will surrender to his friend; for this is noble and praiseworthy for himself. Reasonably enough, then, he is thought to be virtuous, since he chooses nobility before all else. He may even surrender up actions to his friend, and it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend's acting than to act himself. In all things praiseworthy, therefore, the virtuous man is seen to assign to himself the greater share in what is noble. In this way, then, as has been said, a man should be a self-lover; but in the way in which most men are so, he ought not.

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[9] 'Continent' and 'incontinent' are ἐγκρατής and ἀκρατής, each of them cognate with κρατεῖν or 'to master'.

IT IS ALSO DISPUTED WHETHER THE HAPPY MAN WILL need friends or not. It is said that those who are blessed and self-sufficient have no need of friends; for they have the things that are good, and therefore being self-sufficient they need nothing further while a friend, being another self, furnishes what a man cannot provide by his own effort—whence the line: 'When fortune is kind, what need of friends?'[10] But it seems absurd, when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods. And if it is more characteristic of a friend to treat well than to be well treated, and to be a benefactor is characteristic of the good man and of virtue, and it is nobler to treat friends well than strangers, then the virtuous man will need people to treat well. This is why the question is asked whether we need friends more in good fortune or in bad, on the supposition that a man in bad fortune needs benefactors and that those in good fortune need people to treat well. Perhaps it is absurd, too, to make the blessed man a solitary; for no one would choose to possess all good things on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others. So this holds of the happy man; for he has the things that are by nature good. And plainly it is better to spend his days with friends and upright men than with strangers or any chance persons. Therefore the happy man needs friends.

What then is it that the first party means, and in what respect is it true? Is it that most men think that it is useful people who are their friends? Of such friends indeed the blessed man will have no need, since he already has the things that are good; nor will he need those whom one makes one's friends because of their pleasantness, or he will need them

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[10] Euripides, *Orestes* 667.

only to a small extent (for his life, being pleasant, has no need of adventitious pleasure); and because he does not need such friends he is thought not to need friends.

But that is surely not true. For we said at the start that happiness is a certain activity, and activity plainly comes into being and is not present like a piece of property. If happiness lies in living and being active, and the good man's activity is good and pleasant in itself, as we said at the start, and if a thing's being one's own is one of the attributes that make it pleasant, and if we can contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, and if the actions of virtuous men who are their friends are pleasant to good men (since both have the attributes that are naturally pleasant)—if this be so, the blessed man will need friends of this sort, since he chooses to contemplate upright actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend are such.

Men think that the happy man ought to live pleasantly. If he were a solitary, life would be hard for him; for by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active, but with others and towards others it is easier. So his activity will be more continuous, being in itself pleasant, as it ought to be for the man who is blessed; for a virtuous man *qua* virtuous delights in virtuous actions and is vexed at vicious ones, just as a musical man takes pleasure in beautiful tunes but is pained at base ones. A certain training in virtue arises also from living together with the good, as Theognis remarks.[11]

If we look deeper into the nature of things, a virtuous friend seems to be naturally desirable for a virtuous man. For that which is virtuous by nature, we have said, is for the virtuous man good and pleasant in itself. Now life is defined in the case of animals by the capacity of sense-perception, in that of man by the capacity for perception or for thought. A capacity is referred to its activity, and the authoritative element is in the activity. So life seems strictly speaking to be perceiving or thinking. Life is among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves, since it is determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the good. That which is good by nature is also good for the upright man. (That is why life seems pleasant to all men.) But we must not apply this to a depraved and corrupt life nor to a life spent in pain; for such a life is indeterminate, as are its attributes. (The nature of pain will become more evident in what follows.) If life itself is good and pleasant (which it seems to be, from the very fact that all men desire it, and particularly those who are upright and blessed; for to them life is most desirable, and their life is the most blessed); and if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in similarly all other cases there is something which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think; and if to perceive that we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for existence is perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one lives is one of the things that are pleasant in themselves (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is good present in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good men, because to them existence is good and pleasant (for they are pleased at the consciousness of what is in itself good); and if as the virtuous man is to himself, so is he to his friend also (for his friend is another self)—then just as his own existence is desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend. Now his existence was seen to be desirable because he perceived his own goodness, and such perception is pleasant in itself. He ought, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and this will come about in their living together and sharing in discussion and thought—for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place.

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[11] 'From good men you will learn good things; but if you mix with the bad, you will lose what sense you have': Theognis, lines 35–36.

If, then, existence is in itself desirable for the blessed man (since it is by its nature good and pleasant), and that of his

friend is very much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are desirable. Now that which is desirable for him he must have, or he will be lacking in this respect. The man who is to be happy will therefore need virtuous friends.

SHOULD WE, THEN, MAKE AS MANY FRIENDS AS POSSIBLE, or—as in the case of hospitality it is thought to be gracefully said that one should be 'neither a man of many guests nor a man of none'[12]—will it apply to friendship as well so that one should neither be friendless nor have an excessive number of friends?

To friends made with a view to utility this saying would seem thoroughly applicable; for to do services to many people in return is a laborious task and life is not long enough for its performance. Therefore friends in excess of those who are sufficient for our own life are superfluous, and hindrances to the noble life; so that we have no need of them. Of friends made with a view to pleasure, also, few are enough, as a little seasoning in food is enough.

But as regards virtuous friends, should we have as many as possible, or is there a limit to the number of one's friends, as there is to the size of a city-state? You cannot make a State of ten men, and if there are a hundred thousand it is a State no longer: the proper quantity is presumably not a single number but anything that falls between certain fixed points. So for friends too there is a fixed number—perhaps the largest number with whom one can live together (for that is thought to be most characteristic of friendship); and that one cannot live with many people and distribute oneself among them is plain. Further, they too must be friends of one another, if they are all to spend their days together; and it is a hard business for this condition to be fulfilled with a large number. It is found difficult, too, to feel delight and to grieve appropriately with many people; for it is likely to happen that one has at once to be pleased in the company of one friend and to mourn with another. Presumably, then, it is well to look to have not as many friends as possible but as many as are enough for the purpose of living together; for it would seem impossible to have an intense friendship with many people. This is why one cannot be in love with several people: being in love tends to be a sort of excess friendship, and that can only be felt towards one person; therefore intense friendship too can only be felt towards a few people. This seems to be confirmed in practice; for we do not find many people who are friends in the comradely way of friendship, and the famous friendships of this sort are always between two people. Those who have many friends and mix appropriately with them all are thought to be no one's friend (except in the way proper to fellow-citizens) and such people are called obsequious. In the way proper to fellow-citizens, indeed, it is possible to be the friend of many and yet not be obsequious but a truly upright man; but one cannot have with many people the friendship based on virtue and on the character of our friends themselves, and we must be content if we find even a few such.

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[12] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 715.

DO WE NEED FRIENDS MORE IN GOOD FORTUNE OR IN BAD?

They are looked for in both; for while men in times of bad fortune need help, in times of good fortune they need people to live with and to treat well—for they want to do good. Friendship is more necessary in bad fortune, and that is why it is useful friends that one needs in this case; but it is more noble in good fortune, and that is why we also look for upright men, since it is more desirable to be their benefactor and to live with them. For the very presence of friends is pleasant both in good fortune and also in bad, since pain is lightened when friends grieve with us. That is why one might raise the problem of whether they share as it were our burden, or—without that happening—their presence by its pleasantness, and the thought of their grieving with us, makes our pain less. Whether it is for these reasons or for some other that our pain is lightened, is a question that may

be dismissed: at all events what we have described evidently takes place.

But their presence seems to contain a mixture of various factors. For on the one hand, just to see one's friends is pleas- 1171b ant, especially in times of bad fortune, and becomes a certain help against pain (for a friend tends to comfort us both by the sight of him and by his words, if he is tactful, since he knows our character and the things that please or pain us); and on the other hand, to perceive that a friend is pained at our misfortunes is painful; for everyone shuns being a cause of pain to his friends. For this reason people of a manly nature guard against making their friends share their pain, and, unless he be exceptionally insensible to pain, such a man cannot face the pain that ensues for his friends, and in general does not admit fellow-mourners because he is not himself given to mourning—women and effeminate men delight in those who lament with them, and they love them as friends and companions in grief. But in all things one plainly ought to imitate the better type of person.

The presence of friends in times of good fortune implies both a pleasant passing of our time and the thought of their pleasure at our own good things. That is why it would seem that we ought to summon our friends eagerly to share our good fortunes (for it is noble to be beneficent), but summon them to our bad fortunes with hesitation; for we ought to give them as little a share as possible in our evils—whence the saying 'Enough is my own misfortune'. We should invite friends most of all when they are likely by suffering a few inconveniences to do us a great benefit.

Conversely, it is fitting to go unasked and eagerly to those in bad fortune (for it is characteristic of a friend to do good, and especially to those who are in need and have not claimed anything: such action is nobler and pleasanter for both); but when our friends are enjoying good fortune we should join eagerly in their activities (for they need friends for these too), but be tardy in coming forward to be the objects of their kindness; for it is not noble to be eager to receive benefits.

But we must no doubt avoid getting the reputation of killjoys by repulsing them; for that sometimes happens.

The presence of friends, then, seems desirable in all circumstances.

IS IT THE CASE THAT, JUST AS FOR THOSE IN LOVE IT IS SEEING which most contents them, and they prefer this sense to the others because it is this above all which gives rise to being in love and which keeps it in existence, so for friends the most desirable thing is living together? For friendship is an association, and as a man is to himself, so is he to his friend: now in his own case the perception of his existence is desirable, and so therefore is that of his friend's, and the exercise of this perception occurs when they live together, so that it is reasonable that they aim at this. And whatever existence means for each class of men, or whatever it is for the sake of which they choose life, in that they want to occupy themselves with their friends: so some drink together, others dice together, others train together and hunt together or philosophize together, each spending their days together in whatever most contents them in life. For since they want to live with their friends, they do and share in those things as far as they can.[13] Thus the friendship of base men is depraved (for because of their lack of firmness they share in base pursuits, and they become depraved by becoming like each other), while the friendship of upright men is upright, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by correcting each other; for from each other they take the mould of the characteristics they approve—whence the saying: 'From good men, good things'.[14]

So much, then, for friendship: our next task must be to discuss pleasure.

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[13] Reading ὡς οἷόν τε (with the Laurentian manuscript) for οἷς οἴονται, and deleting συζῆν.

[14] Theognis: above, 1170a12 and note.

6

PLEASURE

Book K

AFTER THESE MATTERS WE OUGHT PERHAPS NEXT TO DISCUSS pleasure. For it is thought to be most intimately connected with our human kind: that is why in educating the young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain. It is thought, too, that to delight in the things we ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on virtue of character. For these things extend right through life, with a weight and power of their own in respect both to virtue and to the happy life, since men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful. Such things, it will be thought, we should least of all omit to discuss, especially since they admit of much dispute.

For some say pleasure is the good, while others, on the contrary, say it is thoroughly base—some no doubt being convinced that the facts are actually so, and others thinking it has a better effect on our life to exhibit pleasure as a base thing even if it is not; for most people (they think) incline towards it and are the slaves of their pleasures—that is why they ought to lead them in the contrary direction, since thus they will reach the middle state. But surely this is not correct. For arguments about matters concerned with emotions and actions are less reliable than facts; and so when they clash with the facts of perception they are despised, and discredit the truth as well. For if a man who heaps blame on pleasure is once seen to be aiming at it, his inclining towards it is thought to imply that it is all like that—for most people are not good at drawing distinctions. True arguments seem, then, most useful not only with a view to knowledge but also with a view to life; for since they harmonize with the facts

7

HAPPINESS

NOW THAT WE HAVE SPOKEN OF THE VIRTUES, THE FORMS of friendship, and the varieties of pleasure, it remains to discuss in outline happiness, since this is what we state the end of human nature to be. Our discussion will be the more concise if we take up what we have said already. We said, then, that it is not a state; for if it were it might belong to someone who was asleep throughout his life, living the life of a plant, or, again, to someone who was suffering the greatest misfortunes. If these implications do not meet with approval, and we must rather class happiness as an activity, as we have said before, and if some activities are necessary and desirable for the sake of something else while others are so in themselves, plainly happiness must be placed among those desirable in themselves, not among those desirable for the sake of something else; for happiness does not lack anything but is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is looked for apart from the activity. And virtuous actions are thought to be such; for to do noble and virtuous deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake.

Pleasant amusements also are thought to be of this nature: we choose them not for the sake of other things; for we are harmed rather than benefited by them, since we are led to neglect our bodies and our possessions. But most of the people who are deemed happy resort to such pastimes. That is why those who are convivial on such occasions are highly esteemed at the courts of tyrants: they make themselves pleasant in the tyrant's favourite pursuits, and that is the sort of man they want. These things are thought to be of the nature of happiness because people in power spend their

leisure in them. But perhaps such people are no indication; for virtue and intelligence, from which virtuous activities come, do not depend on power. Nor if these people, who have never tasted pure and generous pleasure, resort to the bodily pleasures, should these for that reason be thought more desirable; for boys, too, think the things that are valued among themselves are the best. It is reasonable, then, that, as different things seem valuable to boys and to men, so they should to base men and to upright men. Now, as we have often maintained, those things are both valuable and pleasant which are such to the virtuous man; and to each man the activity in accordance with his own state is most desirable, and so to the virtuous man that which is in accordance with virtue. Happiness, therefore, does not lie in amusement: it would, indeed, be absurd if the end were amusement, and one were to take trouble and suffer hardship all one's life in order to amuse oneself. For, in a word, everything that we choose we choose for the sake of something else—except happiness, which is an end. Now to be busy and to exert oneself for the sake of amusement seems silly and utterly childish. But to amuse oneself in order that one may be busy, as Anacharsis puts it, seems correct; for amusement is a sort of relaxation, and we need relaxation because we cannot exert ourselves continuously. Relaxation is not an end; for it is taken for the sake of activity.

The happy life is thought to be one of virtue, and it requires seriousness and does not consist in amusement. We say that serious things are better than laughable things and those connected with amusement, and that the activity of the better —whether it be a part or a man—is the more virtuous; but the activity of the better is superior and thereby more of the nature of happiness. And any chance person—even a slave—can enjoy the bodily pleasures no less than the best man; but no one assigns to a slave a share in happiness—unless he assigns to him also a share in life. For happiness does not lie in such pastimes but, as we have said before, in virtuous activities.

IF HAPPINESS IS AN ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH VIRTUE, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best. Whether it be intelligence or something else that is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine (whether it be itself also divine or the most divine element in us), the activity of this in accordance with its own virtue will be complete happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said.

This would seem to be in agreement both with what we have said before and with the truth. For this activity is the best (since intelligence is the best thing in us and the objects of intelligence are the best of knowable objects). Again, it is the most continuous, since we can contemplate more continuously than we can perform any action. And we think happiness must have pleasure mingled with it, and the activity of understanding is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities: at all events philosophy is thought to offer pleasures marvellous for their purity and their firmness, and it is reasonable that those who know will pass their time more pleasantly than those who inquire. And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to contemplative exercise. For while a man of understanding, as well as a just man and the rest, needs the necessaries of life, when they are sufficiently equipped with things of that sort the just man needs people towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the others is in the same case, but the man of understanding, even when by himself, can contemplate, and the more so the greater his understanding: he can perhaps do so better if he has collaborators—but still he is the most self-sufficient. And this activity alone would seem to be cherished for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the action. And happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace. Now the activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to be unleisurely. Warlike actions are completely so; for no one chooses to be at war, or prepares for war, for the sake of being at war: a man would seem absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about battles and slaughter. But the action of the politician is also unleisurely, and (apart from the political action itself) aims at power and honours, or at all events happiness, for himself and his fellow citizens—a happiness different from political action, and plainly sought as being different. So if among virtuous actions political and military actions are distinguished by nobility and greatness, and these are unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable for their own sake, whereas the exercise of intelligence, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in seriousness and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its own pleasure (and this increases the activity), and if the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the blessed man are evidently those connected with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness for man, if it be allowed a complete term of life (for none of the attributes of happiness is incomplete).

Such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that of the other kind of virtue. If the intelligence is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us being men to think of human things, and being mortal of mortal things. Rather, we must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and do everything to live in accordance with the highest thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and value surpass everything. This would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better part of him. It would be absurd, then, if he were to choose the life not of himself but of something else. And what we said before will apply now: that which is appropriate to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing, and so for man the life of the intelligence is best and pleasantest, since intelligence more than anything else is the man. This life therefore is also the happiest.

But in a secondary degree the life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is happy; for the activities in accordance with this are human. Just and brave acts, and other virtuous acts, we do in relation to each other, observing what is fitting to each with regard to contracts and services and all manner of actions and with regard to the emotions, and all of these are evidently human. Some of them seem even to arise from the body, and virtue of character to be in many ways bound up with the emotions. Wisdom, too, is coupled with virtue of character, and this with wisdom, since the originating principles of wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtues and correctness in the moral virtues is in accordance with wisdom. Being connected with the emotions, the moral virtues will concern our composite nature; and the virtues of our composite nature are human: so, therefore, are the life and the happiness which correspond to these. The virtue of the intelligence is separate: let this much be said about it; for to describe it precisely is more than our purpose requires. It would seem to need external equipment little, or less than moral virtue does. Grant that both need the necessaries, and do so equally, even if the politician's exertions have more concern with the body and things of that sort; for there will be little difference there. But in what they need for the exercise of their activities there will be much difference. The liberal man will need wealth for his liberal actions; the just man will need it for the returning of services (for wants are obscure, and even people who are not just pretend to want to act justly); the brave man will need power if he is to accomplish any of the acts that correspond to his virtue; and the

temperate man will need opportunity—for how else is either he or any of the others to be recognized? It is debated, too, whether choice or action is more authoritative over virtue, which is taken to involve both. It is surely plain that its completion involves both; but for actions many things are 1178b needed, and more the greater and nobler they are. But the man who is contemplating needs no such things, at least with a view to the exercise of his activity. Rather, they are, one may say, even hindrances, at all events to his contemplation; but in so far as he is a man and lives with a number of people, he chooses to act virtuously: he will therefore need such aids to living a human life.

That complete happiness is a contemplative activity will appear from the following consideration as well. We suppose the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy. But what sort of actions must we assign to them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem ridiculous if they make contracts and return deposits, and so on? Acts of a brave man, then, facing up to what is frightening and confronting dangers because it is noble to do so?[1] Or liberal acts? To whom will they give? It will be absurd if they are to have money or anything of the kind. And what would their temperate acts be? Is not such praise vulgar, since they have no base appetites? If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, everyone assumes that they live and therefore that they are active themselves: we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? Therefore the activity of god, which is especially blessed, will be contemplative; and so of human activities that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness.

This is indicated, too, by the fact that the other animals have no share in happiness, being completely deprived of such activity. For while the whole life of the gods is blessed, and that of men too in so far as some likeness of such activity belongs to them, none of the other animals is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation. Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy, not coincidentally but in virtue of the contemplation; for this is in itself valuable. Happiness, therefore, must be a kind of contemplation.

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[1] The text of this sentence is uncertain.

Being a man, one will also need external prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation—rather, our body also must be healthy and must have food and other attention. Still, we must not think that the man who is to be happy will need many things or great things if he cannot be blessed without external goods. For self-sufficiency and action do not depend on excess, and we can do noble acts without ruling earth and sea; for even with moderate resources one can act virtuously (this is manifest enough; for private persons are thought to do upright acts no less than the powerful—indeed even more); and it is enough that we should have so much as that; for the life of the man who is active in accordance with virtue will be happy. Solon perhaps described happy men well when he said that they are moderately equipped with externals but have done (as he thought) the noblest acts and have lived temperately. For one can with but moderate possessions do what one ought. Anaxagoras also seems to have assumed that the happy man is not rich or powerful when he said that he would not be surprised if the happy man were to seem absurd to most people; for they assess things by externals, since these are all they perceive.

The beliefs of men of understanding seem, then, to harmonize with our arguments. But while such things carry some conviction, the truth in practical matters is assessed from the facts of life; for these are in control. We must therefore survey what we have already said, bringing it to the test of the facts of life, and if it harmonizes with the facts we must accept it, but if it clashes with them we must assume it to be mere words. Now he who exercises his intelligence and

cultivates it seems to be both in the best state and most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that they should delight in that which is best and most akin to them (and this is intelligence) and that they should reward those who cherish and honour this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them and acting both correctly and nobly. And that all these attributes belong most of all to the man of understanding is plain. He, therefore, is the dearest to the gods. And the same man will presumably also be the happiest, so that in this way too the man of understanding will be especially happy.

8

CONCLUDING REMARKS

IF THESE MATTERS AND THE VIRTUES, AND ALSO FRIENDship and pleasure, have been dealt with sufficiently in outline, are we to suppose that our programme has reached its end? Surely, as is said, in matters of action the end is not to contemplate and recognize each of them but rather to do them. With regard to virtue, then, it is not enough to know: we must try to have and to use it, or try any other way there may be of becoming good.

If arguments were in themselves enough to make men upright, they would justly (in Theognis' words) have won many great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as things are, while they seem to have power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among the young, and to make a character which is gently born and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the many to gentlemanliness. For these by nature obey not modesty but fear, and do not abstain from base acts because of their ignobility but because of punishments: living by their emotions they pursue their own pleasures and the means to them, and avoid the opposite pains, and have not even a conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it. What argument would remould such people? It is impossible, or not easy, to remove by argument the traits that have long since been fixed in the character; and perhaps we must be content if, when everything by which we are thought to become upright is present, we get some hold on virtue.

Some think that we are made good by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching. Nature's part plainly is not

in our power: rather, as a result of some divine causes it is present in those who are truly fortunate. Argument and teaching are perhaps not powerful with all men: the soul of the pupil must first have been worked on by means of habits for noble delight and hatred, like earth which is to nourish the seed. For he who lives by his emotions will not hear argument that discourages him, nor grasp it if he does; and how can we persuade one in such a state to change? In general emotion seems to yield not to argument but to force. The character, then, must somehow already be related to virtue, loving what is noble and being vexed at what is ignoble.

It is difficult to get from youth up a correct training for virtue if one has not been brought up under correct laws; for to live temperately and with endurance is not pleasant to most people, especially when they are young. That is why their nurture and occupations should be fixed by law; for they will not be painful when they have become customary. But perhaps it is not enough that when they are young they should get the correct nurture and attention: since they must, even when they are grown up, practise and be habituated to them, we shall need laws for this as well, and generally speaking for the whole of life; for most people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than what is noble.

This is why some think that legislators ought to invite men to virtue and encourage them to act for the sake of the noble, on the supposition that those who have been uprightly moulded by the formation of habits will listen to such things; and that punishments and penalties should be imposed on those who disobey and are less well endowed by nature, and that the incurable should be completely banished. An upright man (they think), since he lives for what is noble, will obey reason, while a base man, whose desire is for pleasure, is corrected by pain like a beast of burden. This is why they say the pains should be those that are most contrary to the pleasures such men cherish.

If (as we have said) the man who is to be good must be nobly trained and habituated, and go on to spend his time in upright occupations and neither voluntarily nor involuntarily perform base actions, and if this can be brought about if men live in accordance with a sort of intelligence and correct order, provided this has strength—if this be so, the paternal command has not the required strength or compulsive power, nor in general has the command of one man, unless he be a king or something similar; but the law has compulsive power, while it is at the same time an account proceeding from a sort of wisdom and intelligence. And while people hate men who set themselves contrary to their impulses even if they do so correctly, the law when it commands what is upright is not burdensome.

In the Spartan State alone, or almost alone, the legislator seems to have taken care of nurture and occupations: in most States such matters have been neglected, and each man lives as he wants to, Cyclops-fashion, 'to his own wife and children dealing law'.[1] Now it is best that there should be a common and correct care for such matters; but if they are neglected by the community it would seem fitting for each man to help his own children and friends towards virtue, and that they should be able to do this or at least to choose to.[2]

It would seem from what has been said that one can do this better if he makes himself capable of legislating. For common care plainly is effected by laws, and upright care by virtuous laws—whether written or unwritten would seem to make no difference, nor whether they are laws providing for the education of individuals or of groups—any more than it does in the case of music or gymnastics and other such occupations. For

as in States laws and character have force, so in households do the words and the habits of the father, and the more so because of their kinship and his benefactions; for children start with a natural affection and disposition to obey. Further, individual education has an advantage over education in common, as individual medical treatment has; for while in general rest and abstinence from food are good for a man in a fever, for a particular man they may not be; and a boxing instructor presumably does not prescribe the same style of fighting to all his pupils. It would seem, then, that the detail is worked out with more precision if the care is particular to individuals; for each person is more likely to get what suits his case.

But individuals[3] can be best cared for by a doctor or gymnastic instructor or anyone else who has the universal knowledge of what is good for everyone or for people of a certain kind (for the sciences both are said to be and are concerned with what is common); but there is perhaps no reason why some individual may be well cared for by an unscientific person who has studied precisely in the light of experience what happens in each case, just as some people seem to be their own best doctors, though they could give no help to anyone else. Nonetheless, it will perhaps be agreed that if a man does want to become master of a craft or of a contemplative science he must go to the universal, and come to know it as well as possible; for, as we have said, it is with this that the sciences are concerned.

And surely he who wants to make men, whether many or few, better by his care must try to become capable of legislating, if it is through laws that we can become good. For to get anyone whatever—anyone who is put before us—into the right condition is not for the first chance comer: if anyone can do it, it is the man who knows, just as in medicine and all other matters which give scope for care and wisdom.

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[1] Homer, *Odyssey* IX 114.

[2] In the manuscripts the words 'and . . . do this' appear immediately after '. . . for such matters' in 1180a30: following a suggestion of Bywater, we transpose them to follow '. . . towards virtue' in 1180a32. (Bywater himself deletes the words and marks a lacuna after '. . . towards virtue'.)

[3] Reading καθ' ἕνα for καθ' ἕν.

Must we not, then, next examine whence or how one can learn how to legislate? Is it, as in other cases, from politicians? After all, it was thought to be a part of the political art. Or is a difference apparent between the political art and the other sciences and skills? In the others the same people are found offering to teach the skills and exercising them—for instance, doctors or painters; but while the sophists profess to teach politics, it is practised not by any of them but by the politicians, who would seem to do so by a certain capacity and experience rather than by thought; for they are not found either writing or speaking about such matters (though it were a nobler occupation perhaps than composing speeches for the law-courts and the assembly), nor again are they found to have made politicians of their own sons or any other of their friends. But it was reasonable that they should if they could; for there is nothing better than such a capacity that they could leave to their States or could choose to have for themselves or, therefore, for those dearest to them. Still, experience seems to contribute not a little; for otherwise they would not have become politicians by familiarity with politics—that is why it seems that those who aim at knowing about the art of politics need experience as well.

Those of the sophists who profess the art seem to be very far from teaching it. For, to put the matter generally, they do not even know what kind of thing it is nor what kinds of things it is about—otherwise they would not have made it identical with rhetoric or even inferior to it, nor have thought it easy to legislate by collecting the laws that are thought well of. They say it is possible to select the best laws, as though even the selection did not demand judgement and as though correct assessment were not the greatest thing, as in matters of music. For while people experienced in any discipline assess its products correctly and can judge by what means or how they are achieved and what harmonizes with what, the inexperienced must be content if they manage to see whether the product has been well or ill made—as in the case of painting. Now laws are as it were

the product of politics: how then can one learn from them to be a legislator, or assess which are best? Even medical men do not seem to be made by a study of text-books. Yet people try, at any rate, to state not only the treatments but also how particular classes of people can be cured and should be treated, distinguishing the various states; but while this seems beneficial to experienced people, to the ignorant it is useless. Perhaps, then, while collections of laws and of constitutions may be serviceable to those who can consider them and assess what is done rightly or the contrary and what fits with what, those who go through such collections without knowledge will not assess them rightly (unless it be spontaneously), though they may perhaps become more judicious in such matters.

Since our predecessors have left the subject of legislation unexamined, it is perhaps best that we should ourselves consider it, and in general the question of the constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability the philosophy of human nature. First, then, if any part has been discussed by earlier thinkers, let us try to review it; then in the light of the constitutions that have been collected let us consider what sorts of thing preserve and destroy States, and what sorts the particular kinds of constitution, and to what causes it is due that some are rightly administered and others the contrary. When these things have been considered we shall perhaps be more likely to see which constitution is best, and how each must be ordered, and what laws and customs it must use. Let us make a beginning of our discussion.