# Encyclopedia of
WAR
& American
Society

PETER KARSTEN, Editor

Volume 3

Encyclopedia of

WAR
& American
Society

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Encyclopedia of
WAR
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University of Pittsburgh

volume 1

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Introduction

This encyclopedia includes substantial essays on the wars Americans have fought, their civilian and military leaders, and their major military institutions. It goes well beyond those subjects, however, in two significant ways. First, it probes the connections between our wartime expeditions and the experiences of the larger American society. This exploration is not limited to years of war; it also includes discussions of those aspects of society that bear the marks of wartime experience after the conflicts end. Second, in the third volume, the encyclopedia offers the user a host of documents (in a set of appendices that also includes a detailed chronology and extensive bibliography) linked to the entries that precede the appendixes. These documents include passages from letters, diaries, autobiographies, official documents, novels, poems, songs, and cartoons, as well as a number of tables of data, surveys, and public opinion polls. All are intended to extend the research capabilities of the user and serve as illustrations and evidence of the points made by the authors of the articles in the body of the encyclopedia.

My four associate editors and I have written several of the entries that fall within our own fields of expertise. Many experts in other fields have responded to our call, contributing the balance of the articles. In this way, we believe that we have produced a comprehensive, highly credentialed multidisciplinary historical work covering a wide range of general thematic categories, issues, and topics. They are, in alphabetical order:

> Arts and Culture
> Civil–Military Relations
> Economy and Labor
> Education (both military and civilian)
> Environment and Health
> Journalism and Media

> Law and Justice
> Planning, Command and Control
> Race, Gender, and Ethnicity
> Religion
> Science and Technology
> Veterans' Issues and Experiences
> The Wars themselves and their civilian
> and military leaders

The articles in these areas range from the general to the specific. Some, for instance, are overviews—for example, those on the conflicts Americans engaged in from the colonial era to the present, and those relating war to the economy, religion, civil–military relations, film, music, art, literature, theater, the media, and the environment. The later articles are meant to be guideposts for researchers interested in the various subject areas addressed in the encyclopedia. Others, shorter and more focused—such as those on specific individuals, novels, celebrations, or films (like **Ethan Allen Hitchcock**, *The Red Badge of Courage*, **Memorial Day**, and *The Deer Hunter*)—serve to provide greater depth and detail on these themes and subjects.

Some articles are more overtly related to American society in wartime, for instance, the entry on **Victory Gardens**, the public program established by the government to encourage individuals on the home front to plant vegetable gardens to supplement the nation's food supply. The articles more closely related to military history—such as those on the wars themselves or on specific phenomena within the services—include the **Racial Integration of the Armed Forces**, the role of **Women in the Military**, and the development of triage and emergency surgical care in **MASH Units**; these entries all address the social context and effects of the specific subject on the military and the American pub-

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lic. Thus, the article on the **Cold War** examines such topics as the public concern and hysteria over the superpowers' nuclear buildup and the censorship crusades instituted during this time, as well as the economic, ideological, and cultural elements of Cold War "containment" strategy (including the **Marshall Plan**, **Radio Free Europe**, and the **Fulbright Program**), and specific events, reactions, and measures taken (e.g., the **Korean War** and **Vietnam War**). Subjects and events only touched upon in the Cold War entry—the **Military–Industrial Complex** and **American Field Service**, for example—are explored in other articles (indicated at the end of each article under Related Entries). Those links lead users to societal connections not covered in detail in the larger articles, providing a network of cross-referenced content that will illuminate the larger historical context for each topic.

• • •

Wars affect societies in a number of ways. *Direct effects* can be traced as straightforward, tangible, or causal connections between military engagement and people, places, institutions, and societal attitudes. *Interactive relationships* occur when the social, political, and cultural contexts affect how a war is waged, which, in turn, may create subsequent changes in both the military and the society at large. *Indirect (unintended or "second-effect")* consequences result from less straightforward connections, such as demographic changes resulting from wartime conscription or new trends in film or literature resulting from protest movements; these changes frequently occur some time after the war has ended. The analysis below explores these types of effects in more detail, offering examples from the encyclopedia's entries (titles of which are indicated in boldface at their first mention) to illustrate the range of connections between war and American society.

Direct Effects

One of the more obvious and direct ways wars affect society is the potential for the devastation of private property, public infrastructure, and lives inherent in the act of waging war. Territory rich in resources and inhabitants can be absorbed into an enemy's borders or into one's own. The human casu-

alties are not limited to the death of a loved one in combat—American combatants have suffered from diseases contracted during their days in the service, with appalling death rates (at least until **World War II**). Moreover, **Prisoners of War** (POWs) can return home maimed with physical or psychological injuries (such as post-traumatic stress disorder and combat fatigue, discussed in the article on **Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related**), or with both.

Less pernicious alteration can occur, such as those in the mentalities of those who served during the **Revolutionary War**: those whose units operated for significant periods outside of their own states, be they from state militias or states' regimental line units of the Continental Congress, underwent a rapid change in their outlook, quickly adopting a more cosmopolitan view of the world. They became more conscious of the value of a more powerful federal union than did locally deployed veterans. The more widely deployed veterans also were the prime movers in the creation of the highly federalist **Society of the Cincinnati** immediately after the war, and were also far more supportive of the adoption of the proposed federal Constitution in the late 1780s than the militia that stayed close to home.

Two caveats should be noted about these types of direct effects. First, although many who served experienced changes in their physical or psychological well-being as a consequence of their service, other changes attributed solely to being in the military during wartime have more complex causes—partly rooted deep in the experiences of childhood, adolescence, or young adulthood. A number of studies demonstrate this: that some individuals undergoing changes during wartime military service do possess "predispositions," which can lead to such mental or emotional transformations during wartime as increased sexual promiscuity during and after war, a propensity to desert or go absent-without-leave, to abuse drugs and alcohol, to be susceptible to neuro-psychiatric illness, and to commit crimes after leaving the service.

A second caveat relates to temporary changes that are often represented as being more permanent than they really are. One of these effects relates to the rise in the percentage of women in the work force during wartime. The "**Rosie the Riveter**" phenomenon during World War II was real enough, but it was not the primary cause of the continuing

rise in the percentage of American women entering the work force after the war. That trend had been under way for more than half a century before the war, and the unprecedented increase of women working outside the home—caused by the drafting of millions of men for the war—reversed itself almost completely once the war ended and men returned to their homes and jobs. Furthermore, social psychologists and sociologists (as well as GI cartoonist **Bill Mauldin**) noted declines among GIs in their levels of "authoritarianism" (respect for authority) during World War II. Many did not care for the "hurry-up-and-wait" practices of the services or for the orders and treatment they got from many of the "90-day wonders" who served as their superior officers. Similarly, race relations after the racial integration of the armed services clearly were better in the foxholes than they had been in civilian life or the barracks. But these and several other combat-zone changes in attitude declined, according to social scientists, once the men were no longer in the combat zone or had been discharged into civilian life.

Interactive Relationships

The relationship between war and American society is also, at times, interactive; that is, the very way that we wage war has been affected by American society (differing, of course, in characteristics from one wartime experience to the next). This is clearly the case in the raising of America's military forces when hostilities were imminent. The general entry on **Conscription and Volunteerism** and the more focused entries on the **Colonial Militia Systems**, the **Preparedness Movement**, **Draft Evasion and Resistance**, the **Selective Service System**, and the **Doctor Draft** during the Korean War, and the modern **All Volunteer Force** together reveal the different perspectives and tensions between and among various groups: between those individuals supportive of conscription (who have claimed that those enjoying the benefits of life in the United States owe a civic obligation of military service in times of crisis); those who have preferred to join only with men of their own sort and community (the volunteer tradition); and those who have resisted calls for voluntary action as well as for compulsory measures (as in *United States v. Seeger* **and** *Welsh v. United States*). In some wars such resistance has blossomed into massive individual

and collective action. Thus on March 31, 1917, John Simpson, head of the Farmer's Union of Oklahoma, wrote to his senator of the anger that "nine out of ten farmers" felt toward the federal government's recent draft legislation; soon the "Green Corn Rebellion" of tenant farmers in that state bore out his claim. Others in 1917, and again during the Vietnam War, urged young draftees to refuse to report for service, and tens of thousands responded to these calls (evidence summarized in the **Antiwar Movements** and **Pacifism** entries). Still others have pressed for "national service," asking of young men (and conceivably women) that they fulfill their civic obligations either in the military or in some comparable nonmilitary public service organization like the Peace Corps, Vista, or Americorps. It may sound like a truism, but if so, it is an "interactive" one: The ability of the U.S. government to raise armies in times of war has always depended in a large measure on the extent to which American society supports the war.

The government has responded generally to such indifference or opposition with efforts to inspire the populace with **Propaganda Posters** or films, and to instill enthusiasm for the war effort (using public speakers to urge Americans, as the government did during the Cold War, to respond to the calls of the preachers of **Militant Liberty**). The critics have responded with **Political Cartoons** disparaging measures taken (or not taken) by the administration in power. Indeed, active government suppression of dissent in **World War I** was the primary inspiration for the creation of the **American Civil Liberties Union**.

When large numbers of men have been successfully compelled to serve, other obvious interactions with society result. For instance, when the 1940 federal draft law was enacted, tens of thousands of couples moved to secure marriage licenses at a faster rate than ever before, clearly inspired by the law's exemption of married men. And when Congress changed this within the year to read "married men with children," the birth rate rose sharply nine months later. The families of those who were drafted had to adjust to new circumstances. This led many women to enter the work force during World War II (a larger-scale case of what had transpired in World War I and the **Civil War** as well).

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The **Military Bases** that these personnel were sent to within the United States, as well as their surrounding communities, ballooned in size, with both social and economic consequences. Those on the home front had to cope with shortages of food and other essentials, with hoarding, inflated prices, and, eventually, with the **Rationing** of essentials. Those returning from their military duties after the wars sometimes brought **War Brides** who may not have been greeted with enthusiasm by their spouses' families and hometowns. Those returning to families they had left at the outset of the war sometimes faced a host of problems in their marriages, in readjusting to civilian life, and in making a living. Some marriages ended in divorce. Other reunited couples responded to the good fortune of the veteran's survival and rekindled their love by conceiving a child, which often produced distinct rises in the birth rate—after the Civil War, for instance, and especially following World War II, with the much discussed **Baby Boom**.

Another example of the interaction of wars and American society relates to the location and the character of the war. Those wars fought in our own backyard (the **Colonial Wars**, **Revolutionary War**, **War of 1812**, **Indian Wars**, **Mexican War**, **Campaign against the Mormons** [found under Mormons, Campaign against the], and, most notably, the Civil War and the decade of Reconstruction thereafter) were certainly interactive. They affected noncombatants on the home front in social, physical, and environmental ways that were more immediate than the effects of foreign campaigns, and they influenced the social landscape in clear and specific ways. These wars produced internment camps for suspected enemy nationals. And, as the existence of these camps demonstrates, the dividing line between "the enemy" and "us" sometimes can be relative or nonexistent. Native Americans, British Americans, Hispanic Americans, Japanese Americans, Italian Americans, and German Americans have, at various times, been regarded as both enemies and Americans. The Japanese American (and the lesser-known Italian and German American) internment camps of World War II are the most familiar to the modern reader, but many suspected Loyalists were interned during the Revolutionary War. Moreover, POWs taken during these backyard wars were often held under deplorable conditions, notably during the colonial wars, the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Indian Wars, and the Civil War.

Indirect, "Unanticipated," or "Second-Effect" Consequences

Wars have had less obvious but no less significant "second-effect" consequences for American society in a host of ways, some of which are not evident until the aftermath of a given war. We have already noted the Baby Boom and greater divorce rates after World War II, but the encyclopedia offers numerous other examples of these second-effect consequences.

Cultural Effects. A host of cultural changes have flowed indirectly from our wartime experiences. For instance, an increased attention to martial tonsorial fashion after major wars sometimes occurs in the general public, such as the interest in sporting "sideburns" after the Civil War, and crew cuts after World War II. The same connection might be drawn about attire (khakis and dungarees, now known as jeans). A clear increase in the popularity of **Pinups** developed after World War II, culminating in the magazine Playboy and its imitators. During each amassing of young men for war, as in the Civil War and the two world wars, the military encouraged such sports as baseball, boxing, and football. This appears to have helped boost interest after these wars in organized sports (see **Sport and War**), as well as **Wargaming** and **Military Reenactments** (under Reenactments, Military). With each war, the interest and demand for toy guns and uniformed toy soldiers have developed. The same may be said of "GI Joe" action figures and **Captain Marvel Comic Books**, as well as comic strips like ***The Sad Sack***, ***Beetle Bailey***, *Steve Canyon*, and *Doonesbury*.

Both during and after wartime, considerable attention has been given to war-related themes in music (see **Music and War**), theater (see **Theater and War** and **Musical Theater and War**), and literature, including poetry (see **Literature and War**). In general, all of these artistic fields evolved from a patriotic and celebratory form in the nation's first 125 years to works that had a more skeptical, indeed, cynical tone by World War I and thereafter. The manner in

which war has been reported to the public has also changed, from the earliest representations in popularly displayed paintings, prints, and lithographs (see **Visual Arts and War**) until being mostly replaced by **Radio (in World War II)**, **News Reels**, and Photography, which in turn yielded, at least in part, to film (see **Film and War**) and Television (see **Television and War**). The media (see **Media and War**) that provide American society with its information about warfare now include the older ABC, CBS, and NBC broadcast companies, and the newer round-the-clock coverage produced by firms such as **CNN**, as well as Internet sites and blogs. Our wars later reappear on television as dramatic or comic series such as *Combat!*, *M*A*S*H*, *China Beach*, and historical documentaries, such as Ken Burns's "The Civil War" and the products of The History Channel.

Even our everyday language (**Language and War**) has been affected. We have been borrowing from and incorporating military terms and jargon into our lexicon, including such words and phrases as *blitzing*, *outflank*, *snafu*, and *under siege*. The same may be said for the use of war-related rhetoric by public speakers. A well-known example of this is when Pres. Franklin Delano Roosevelt used military metaphors to evoke steadfast determination against the difficulties of the Depression in his first inaugural address in March 1933: "We must move as a trained and loyal army . . . with a unit of duty hitherto evoked only in time of armed strife . . . I assume . . . the leadership of this great army of our people . . . to wage a war against the emergency. . . ." Indeed, Roosevelt's **Civilian Conservation Corps**, administered by the Army, had some of these qualities.

Veterans Affairs and Experiences. Indirect effects of war can be seen in many veterans' organizations themselves, among them the Society of the Cincinnati, Aztec Club, **Grand Army of the Republic**, **Veterans of Foreign Wars**, **American Legion**, Military Order of the World War (I), **American Veterans Committee**, **AMVETS**, the **Disabled American Veterans**, **Jewish War Veterans**, **Vietnam Veterans of America**, **Vietnam Veterans against the War**, and American GI Forum. Most of these organizations have engaged in lobbying efforts to secure veterans' benefit programs, including the **Veterans**

Administration and the **GI Bills**, the construction of **Memorials and Monuments** to honor the fallen—among them Arlington National Cemetery, the World War II and Korean War memorials, and the Vietnam War Memorial—and the formal ceremonies of **Memorial Day** and Armistice Day.

This process of remembering, like many other war-related trends, was contested. Thus, Malcolm Cowley, a "Lost Generation" veteran of World War I, proposed in 1933 that it was "time to inscribe at the entrance to every veterans' graveyard and over the tombs of the unknown soldiers, 'They died bravely, they died in vain.'" Otherwise, celebration of "the useless deaths of the last war" would mislead other "generous and loyal men" to relive "the happy illusions" of the past. He was answered 12 years later by Dixon Wecter, who wrote of those veterans beginning to return from the combat zones of World War II: "When the war is over, he does not want to be called a fool. . . . Whatever the cost to him personally in this war . . . he wants to know that it has all been to some purpose." Related to this subject is the suggestion that politics frequently favors veterans, a proposition explored in the entry on **Veteran Status and Electability**.

Trends in the physical and socioeconomic mobility of veteran (and nonveteran "home front") populations can also be traced to wartime experiences. A popular song during World War I began with the line "How 'ya gonna keep 'em down on the farm, after they've seen Paree," and that held for both world wars. More than a quarter of all veterans of these wars moved out of their home counties for work or educational opportunities upon returning to the United States. Older inhabitants who had not secured their first jobs during the wars tended to remain; however, younger men and women who had not served in the armed services also moved to different counties (often where the job opportunities they had discovered during the war existed) in very nearly the same percentages as their veteran peers. The presence (or absence) in a community of significant war-related contracts for local businesses significantly affected the mobility of community's residents. During World War II, for example, the correlation between defense contracting and population decline was striking in the South. The state with the highest per capita contract dollars granted in

that region was Virginia, which experienced a 4.8 percent increase in population between early 1940, when such contracts became abundant nationwide, and late 1943. The lowest four states in terms of per capita contract dollar rates in those years—less than half those of Virginia—were North Carolina, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Arkansas, which all lost an average of 8 percent of their population

One study found that by 1971, and even 10 years after the Korean War, the earning ability of white veterans of the two world wars and the Korean War had slipped slightly behind their nonveteran peers who had the same levels of education and entered the same sectors of the workforce. This was not the case with returning African American veterans, who had slightly higher earnings than their nonveteran peers. A greater increase in earning ability can be seen among Mexican American veterans, whose advancement was considerably greater than their nonvet peers. The cause of this greater upward mobility, compared with their nonveteran peers, seems to have been the training received in service in both English-language skills—lacking in many Mexican-American vets before their service—and the regimentation of military life, which transferred to the civilian world of trade, business, and the professions (see **Latinos in the Military** and **African Americans in the Military**).

Military Institutions and Affairs. The changes in the structure of military institutions are among the less obvious long-term results of our military engagements. The various service academies and important military postgraduate schools, such as the **Army Industrial College**, were created in response to the experience of the military during various wars. Likewise, two administrative oversight boards—the **War Labor Board** and **War Industries Board**—were created during World War I and World War II to address problems that had been identified in prior conflicts.

Certain changes in the character or structure of civil–military relations also resulted from indirect effects of our wartime experience. These types of long-term effects can be seen in the steady rise (and ultimate control) of **Frontline Reporting**, for instance, and the creation of the **Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency**

(DARPA), charged with granting contracts to **Think Tanks** and to scientists to help conceptualize and design the warfighting systems of the next generation. One offshoot of the research at DARPA, it is worth noting, is the development of key innovations that led to the Internet. Other long-term changes in civil–military relations that also can be traced to such indirect effects are the **Posse Comitatus Act** of 1878, which helped to limit how federal forces could be used in domestic disturbances; the **Civil Defense** program, which addressed the increased interest—elevated during the Cold War—in protecting the civilian population; the **War Powers Resolution** of 1973, which sought to limit the power of the president to commit troops to conflicts and undeclared wars; the 1986 **Goldwater–Nichols Act**, aimed at improving communications and accountability within the armed services and between the services and civilian leaders; and the more recent establishment of the **Homeland Security** Department, intended to implement and strengthen security within domestic borders in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Relationship between the Military and Industry. What Pres. **Dwight D. Eisenhower** called the "Military–Industrial Complex" in his farewell address in 1961 is another example of the more distant but real connections between war (both hot and cold) and societal effects. The close connections between the military services and American industry had roots in the naval buildup of the late 19th century. However, an even more intriguing relationship emerged in World War I—one that became more complex during and after WWII—between the military–industrial nexus and both scientists and academics (including economists, statisticians, psychologists, social psychologists, sociologists, physicists, chemists, engineers, artificial-intelligence philosophers, and computer scientists). Since World War II, the military has been thrust by its civilian masters into a relationship (one characterized at first by doubt and distrust) with civilian-dominated think tanks and the **Systems Analysis** methodology practiced by civilian experts, many of them academics, employed both by the Department of Defense and by defense-related think tanks. These trends, and other innovations, some of which already have been

noted above (such as the creation of the Army Industrial College, the various war colleges, the **National War College**, and DARPA), had much to do with the ongoing phenomenon known as **Technology and Revolutionary Changes in Military Affairs**. Finally, by the turn of the 21st century, the Defense Department had accelerated the growth of a relatively new and highly controversial approach to supplying and supporting the armed services—that of employing entirely **Private Military Contractors** to perform a number of tasks (including some combat-related ones) that in the past had been assigned to uniformed military personnel.

Economic and Technological Effects. The economic effects of the relationship between war and society have been wide-ranging. They include certain economic costs and losses, such as **Labor Strikes** in wartime; changes in rates of employment and production; trade-offs in the use of public funds for weapons and manpower expenses, rather than schools, roads, or private sector reinvestments; and the environmental effects of nuclear testing and nuclear waste storage. The "spill-over" or "spin-off" effects of technological innovations arising from wartime efforts can be seen in many areas of the economy and industry; some of these changes have had lasting and varied effects on our daily lives. They include the Navy's funding of steel vessels in the 19th century; the development and manufacture of jeeps, synthetic rubber, and radar, which were World War II innovations; jet aircraft and MASH emergency triage measures, developed largely during the Korean War; nuclear energy, space satellites, and the **National System of Interstate and Defense Highways**, which were Cold War by-products; and the vehicle developed for the military as the "Humvee," which became popular during the Persian Gulf War. This high-riding descendant of the jeep was then adopted by entrepreneurs for civilians eager to experience its feel (who were also willing to pay the price of its fuel).

—*Peter Karsten*
University of Pittsburgh, 2005

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
ACLU

See American Civil Liberties Union.

Aerial Bombardment

Strategic aerial bombardment uses air power to damage an enemy's economy or attack civilians in an effort to weaken popular support for a war. This kind of bombing is distinguished from aerial attacks intended to support ground troops and interrupt supply lines. The history of aerial warfare is marked by a tension between the military benefits of strategic bombing and the legal protections accorded to civilians under the laws of war.

The World War I Era
In 1899, the first Hague Peace Conference prohibited the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new methods. The second Hague Conference of 1907 anticipated that air power would become a potent part of military arsenals and banned the attack or bombardment "by whatever means" of undefended cities, towns, and civilian sites such as hospitals, schools churches, art galleries, and private residences.

World War I ushered in the first sustained aerial attacks in defiance of the Hague ban. German zeppelins terrorized the British population and weakened morale. The inaccuracy of the bombing, however, limited the immediate military significance of these attacks.

The Conference on the Limitation of Armament, held between 1921 and 1922, resulted in a treaty signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan. Among the issues that the conference recognized and addressed was the threat posed by aircraft; it adopted the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, which restrict aerial attacks to military targets and prohibit bombardment intended to terrorize or injure civilians. The nonbinding Hague Rules were a retreat from the philosophy articulated by military analysts such as American Gen. Billy Mitchell, who argued that aerial attacks on civilians and cities would lead to popular agitation for the swift termination of military conflicts and result in fewer losses of life than trench warfare (Markusen and Kopf, 201–02).

The World War II Era
In early September 1939, as tensions increased between Germany and the rest of the world, Pres. Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, both pledged to avoid air attacks on civilians and urged Germany to adopt a similar policy. Germany made an aerial assault on Warsaw, Poland, in mid-September 1939. The air war spiraled out of control when Germany then launched a devastating attack on Rotterdam, the Netherlands, in May 1940. A month later the German leadership initiated an indiscriminate nine-month air campaign against Great Britain that resulted in the death of 45,000 and the destruction or serious damage of 3.5 million homes.

In October 1940, the British retaliated by shifting from the "precision" bombing of industrial sites to "saturation" attacks against German industrial and military installations. About 1,400 tons of bombs were dropped on Cologne, Germany, in May 1942, devastating 600 acres. In July 1943, the British launched Operation Gomorrah against Hamburg, engulfing the city in flames, heat, and smoke. Fourteen hours of bombing resulted in between 70,000 and 135,000 thousand deaths.

AERIAL BOMBARDMENT

American military leaders, including Air Force Commanding Gen. Henry Arnold, Gen. Curtis LeMay, and Gen. Carl Spaatz, commander of U.S. air forces in Europe and later in the Pacific, were instrumental in the decision by the United States to join Britain's unrestrained bombing campaign. In February 1945, more than 900 U.S. aircraft struck the German capital of Berlin, killing as many as 25,000; 10 days later, the Americans participated in the attack on Dresden. Two days of bombing resulted in the deaths of 45,000 civilians and the destruction of 13 square city miles (Markusen and Kopf, 167–75).

On March 9, 1945, the United States attacked Tokyo with more than 300 aircraft and roughly 2,000 tons of bombs. The six-hour raid reportedly killed 87,893, injured 40,918, and reduced six square miles of the city to rubble. This was followed by raids against 66 of Japan's most populated urban areas. Twenty-two million people, 30 percent of Japan's entire population, were left homeless and 900,000 civilians were killed. These attacks were a prelude to the dropping of atomic bombs on August 6, 1945, and August 9, 1945. As many as 70,000 people were immediately killed at Hiroshima and 40,000 at Nagasaki. Thousands of others died as a result of the exposure to radiation.

Despite the carnage on both sides, the war crimes trials at Nuremberg (1945–46) did not address the deployment of air power against civilians. This failure highlighted the fact that aerial bombardment had become an accepted strategy of modern warfare; the lack of attention to the crimes committed by pilots and decision makers continued in the subsequent trials conducted in Germany and throughout Europe and Asia. German and Japanese officials, however, were prosecuted for the mistreatment and summary execution of captured Allied pilots, establishing that pilots were to be accorded prisoner of war status.

The Korean War

The U.S. aerial strategy during the Korean War initially involved attacks against industrial centers in North Korea in an effort to lower civilian morale. The North Koreans absorbed these attacks and intensified their ground campaign. The Americans responded by sending nuclear-armed aircraft into the Korean theater in April 1951. This failed to deter North Korea's invasion of South Korea and a month later the United States initiated attacks against the supply lines supporting the invading North Korean and Chinese troops. Roughly one-half of the 740,000 American combat sorties flown during the war were devoted to interdiction or to surveillance.

The Vietnam Era

The U.S. policy of widespread bombing in Vietnam was implemented to intimidate and to deny safe haven to the enemy. By the end of 1969, the air ordinance dropped in Vietnam and Laos was twice that employed during World War II. Nuremberg prosecutor Telford Taylor criticized American aerial tactics as disproportionate and indiscriminate, and representing a form of collective punishment.

Under international pressure, the North Vietnamese retreated from prosecuting captured pilots as war criminals. The barrage of international criticism affirmed that strategic bombardment had become accepted practice.

In 1977, the U.S. Air Force finally issued a manual to clarify for its personnel the law of air warfare. Significantly, the pamphlet proclaimed that the principles of the law of armed conflict are the same on land, sea, or during air warfare. The principles outlined in the manual generally follow the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, which is recognized as embodying customary international law regarding the protection of civilians during armed conflict. The protocol affirms that all armed attacks, regardless of form, must discriminate between civilian and military targets and codifies the just war principle of proportionality.

Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan

On January 16, 1991, international coalition forces initiated a 39-day assault that drove invading Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The United States flew roughly 110,000 sorties and dropped 88,000 tons of munitions that, in aggregate, were roughly seven times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. This aerial attack was characterized by targeting so-called dual-use civilian targets—civilian structures that also possessed military value, including electric power

generation facilities, petroleum plants, transportation terminals, and communication centers. Iraq claimed that a significant number of casualties resulted from the bombing of the electric power grid, which disabled the water purification and health care systems and interfered with the distribution of food. American decision makers alleged that Iraq contributed to the resulting civilian casualties by situating military targets in residential neighborhoods and employing civilians as human shields.

On March 24, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Operation Allied Force in what proved to be a successful effort to halt Serbia's "ethnic cleansing" of Albanians in Kosovo. NATO reported that within the first four months, 37,465 sorties had been launched against 900 targets and that 35 percent of the 26,000 weapons employed were so-called smart, or guided, bombs. An investigative committee convened by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia determined that the bombing resulted in the inadvertent killing of 500 civilians. Disagreement arose about whether NATO had fulfilled its legal obligation to take all possible steps to verify that targets were neither civilians nor civilian objects and to minimize the incidental loss of civilian life.

The Kosovo campaign is emblematic of a trend towards "virtual war" in which militarily sophisticated Western regimes increasingly rely on long-range precision bombing and high technology in combat operations. Despite the accuracy of these weapons, the reliance on air power to interdict and confront combatants—rather than risk the loss and expense of inserting ground troops—carries with it the risk of unintentional and unavoidable civilian injuries and deaths.

The U.S. retaliation against Afghanistan in October 2001 was an attack of unprecedented technological sophistication, involving reconnaissance drones, electronic surveillance of communications, and satellite and laser directed targeting. Sixty percent of the 22,000 munitions and missiles employed were smart bombs, of which 70 to 80 percent were estimated to have fallen within 10 meters of their target. Civilian casualties nevertheless resulted from faulty intelligence and a reliance on cluster bombs, which spray bomblets over a wide area. These weapons were later employed by the United States in occupied Iraq to selectively target terrorist safe houses. This campaign also involved the introduction of deep-penetrating munitions with the ability to destroy underground bunkers. Studies indicate that faulty intelligence led to a number of unsuccessful attacks that resulted in civilian casualties.

The employment of increasingly sophisticated precision-targeted weapons systems is sounding the death knell for the age of mass carpet bombing. The challenge of modern aerial bombing for policy makers is to ensure that the targeting of laser- and satellite-guided weapons will be based on accurate intelligence. The need for precise targeting information is made more urgent by the fact that insurgent groups are increasingly countering the technological superiority of the United States by operating in small cells scattered throughout civilian areas. Decision makers will continue to be confronted with the challenge of clarifying the definition of a military target and determining when the value of a military target justifies the incidental death of civilians and destruction of civilian objects. The larger debate over the effectiveness of air power in waging modern military campaigns has yet to be resolved.

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Arnold, Henry Harley; *Enola Gay* Controversy; Geneva and Hague Conventions; Iraq War; Korean War; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Mitchell, William; Spaatz, Carl; Strategic Air Command; Vietnam War; World War I; World War II

—*Matthew Lippman*

Aerospace Industry

The American aerospace industry traces its roots to the aviation industry that evolved following the invention of the airplane in 1903. Like the pioneer aviation companies, America's aerospace firms have the military and commercial airlines as their primary customers. Although the manufacture of aircraft remained a dominant component, the shift from aviation to aerospace involved the introduction of new products based on new technologies—namely, jet and rocket engines. The new products, including jumbo jets, supersonic military aircraft, missiles, and spacecraft, brought significant changes to both military strategy and operations and to commercial airlines. They also led to the creation of civil, military, and commercial space programs.

Although some research on jets and rockets had been done in the United States, these new technologies had been developed in Europe and exported to the United States in the 1940s. The foreign origins of these two technologies highlight a recurring theme in the history of the aerospace industry, namely the international nature of the enterprise. In addition to adopting foreign technologies, international competition, both military and economic, influenced the development of the aerospace industry. After experiencing fairly steady growth in the 1950s and 1960s, during the last quarter of the 20th century and into the early 21st century the aerospace industry experienced a great deal of volatility. In the first decade of the new century, foreign competition and the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had analysts predicting a challenging future for the aerospace industry.

Roots of Aerospace Industry, 1908–45

Wilbur and Orville Wright conducted their historic first flights on December 17, 1903; however, the first public flights in the United States did not take place until 1908. From that year, when the Wrights and their chief rival Glenn Curtiss both grabbed headlines, until World War I, aircraft manufacturing remained a small, workshop enterprise. The Wrights and Curtiss emerged as the major manufacturers, with dozens of other would-be industrialists following suit. The nascent industry produced 49 aircraft in 1914, a number that jumped to 411 in 1916, with a large percentage sold overseas. The demand created by World War I, especially after U.S. entry in 1917, provided the opportunity for the first large-scale manufacture of aircraft and aircraft engines.

Despite a sharp fall-off in demand after the war, a number of individuals drew on their experiences to establish businesses to serve military and commercial markets. Although the 1920s proved economically challenging, new opportunities came with the 1930s. Despite the Great Depression, aviation proved to be a growth industry and a number of companies, Douglas Aircraft in particular, produced the planes that would help sustain the expansion of the U.S. airline industry. More important, conflicts around the globe created a demand eagerly met by U.S. aircraft manufacturers. Accused of being "Merchants of Death," aircraft makers defended their overseas sales as vital to their bottom lines.

The growth experienced in the 1930s was significant, but paled in comparison with the growth that came with World War II, which introduced the U.S. military to the potential of two new technologies—jets and rockets. Relatively small, often struggling enterprises, including Martin, Douglas, Lockheed, and Boeing were transformed into industrial giants.

The Cold War, the Space Race, and the Height of the U.S. Aerospace Industry, 1945–75

The military did carry out experimental programs involving both technologies during the war; however, the United States fielded no operational jet aircraft before the end of hostilities and only a few types of relatively short-range, solid-fuel rocket weapons. In addition, both the Navy and private firms experimented with liquid-fueled JATO (jet-assisted takeoff) rockets for use with heavily loaded cargo planes. After the war, with the help of captured German documents and expatriate scientists and engineers, the United States embarked on a number of programs to more fully exploit both new technologies.

When the military looked for private-sector companies to aid in the development of new weapons, it turned to the same aviation firms that had successfully developed and manufactured the advanced aviation weapons used during World War II. Boeing, for example, won the contract to build the B-47, the Air Force's first swept-wing, all-jet bomber, while Martin and Douglas built some of the first ballistic missiles fielded by the Air Force. The aviation companies that successfully developed new products based on the new technologies emerged as the early leaders of the nascent aerospace industry.

The Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union that emerged after World War II created a tremendous demand for new, advanced weaponry. Rapid technological advances resulted in the quick obsolescence of fielded weapons systems, further fueling sustained demand for new and improved models. In addition, the application of both jet and swept-wing technologies to commercial aircraft created a new class of passenger aircraft that found markets across the globe beginning in the late 1950s. The combination of demand from military and civilian customers created

thousands of new jobs in the industry; in 1959 aerospace surpassed the automobile industry as the nation's largest employer. That same year, the industry recognized the fundamental transformation that had taken place by changing the name of its industry group, the Aviation Industries Association, to the Aerospace Industries Association.

By the dawn of the 1960s, the aerospace industry had a third significant customer for its products, the civil space program developed after the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1958. Fueled by the Cold War, the civil space program soon evolved into a massive effort to beat the Soviet Union to the moon. At the height of the effort, NASA's budget was $4.5 billion, with $2.9 billion earmarked for the Apollo moon program. Although NASA personnel did much of the design work, aerospace companies around the country received the contracts to produce the necessary hardware and software. Once again, as after World War II, government spending had put the nation's aerospace industry on the cutting edge of technology.

The 1960s also witnessed the successful launches of military and civilian satellites. The military satellites, developed in secrecy, supplemented the work of manned reconnaissance aircraft, including the advanced U-2 and supersonic SR-71 developed by Lockheed's Skunk Works, and gave the military a secure "eye in the sky." Civilian satellites improved telephone and television transmissions.

The aerospace industry also found a niche in America's popular culture. While *The Life of Riley*, a series that had aired on both radio and television in the 1940s and 1950s, had focused on the life of a worker in an aircraft plant, the aerospace industry had its first representative on network television in the form of the character of Steve Douglas, the father in the long-running situation comedy *My Three Sons*. Played by Fred MacMurray, Steve Douglas was a former test pilot and engineer who worked for aerospace firms, first in a non-specific suburban location and then in California. One of the three sons, Robbie, played by Don Grady, was also shown working as an engineer for the same aerospace firm as his father until he was laid off— an action that reflected the realities of the aerospace industry in the early 1970s as, for example, the Apollo program wound down and Congress cancelled the U.S. program to develop a supersonic transport.

The postwar military emphasis on the aerospace industry was the background to My Three Sons, *one of television's most successful series in the 1960s. Fred MacMurray (seated), plays a widower and former test pilot, working as an aeronautical engineer in the suburbs. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)*

In some ways, the 1960s and early 1970s marked a high point in the aerospace industry. Many have argued that aerospace technologies reached their maturation as early as the 1960s and certainly by the 1970s and, thus, in the absence of a revolution in design or propulsion, only incremental changes are possible. Many important milestones in the quest for "higher, farther, and faster" all came about as a result of technologies developed in the 1950s through the 1970s. For example, as of 2004, the SR-71, fielded in 1966, still holds the record as the fastest aircraft; the Voyager I spacecraft, launched in 1977, holds the record as the human-made object farthest from Earth as it continues its journey out of the solar system; and humans last set foot on the moon in 1972. While the maturation of aerospace technologies did

not eliminate the desire to reach and make operational other goals (e.g., precision, stealth), it did mean that advancements were likely to prove more evolutionary than revolutionary and would come at greater cost.

Opportunities and Challenges, 1975–2001

By the mid-1970s the aerospace industry faced a number of challenges. Whereas during the 1960s and early 1970s American aerospace companies had dominated the world market for military, space and commercial craft, and support technologies, by the mid-1970s, they began facing declining budgets at home and increased competition from abroad. The government had begun cutting funds to the civilian space program as early as 1967 and aggressively slashed budgets following the completion of the last Apollo mission. Although NASA would develop a number of subsequent space missions, including the shuttle and the international space station, no program would garner the kind of resources that had supported NASA and its aerospace partners in the heyday of Apollo.

Military spending also declined after the Vietnam War. Unlike the space program, however, military spending recovered significantly in the 1980s under Pres. Ronald Reagan. With Reagan, the military fielded a new generation of ground- and sea-based missiles, the Peacekeeper and the Trident II, respectively. And, in partnership with the nation's aerospace industry, the military embarked on an ambitious research effort to produce a strategic missile defense system, nicknamed "Star Wars." The Reagan administration also supported research for and development of a number of new weapon systems designed to exploit advances in computer and electronics technologies.

The American public first became aware of the new generation military technologies in late 1988 when the Air Force and its prime contractor, Northrup, unveiled the B-2 stealth bomber. Although rumors about stealth technology and stealth aircraft had circulated since the late 1970s, this was the first time the United States fully acknowledged that it had developed such technology. The following year, the F-117A, a much smaller stealth bomber that had first flown in 1981 and had actually been operational since 1983, made its public debut in Operation Just Cause (1989), the effort to capture the Panamanian dictator Gen. Manuel Noreiga.

The full demonstration of advanced aerospace weaponry came in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, the multinational consortium formed to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait, which Iraq had invaded. Almost from the first night of the conflict, the high-technology weaponry employed dazzled American television audiences. The products of the American aerospace industry, including stealth aircraft and precision-guided weapons, as well as night-vision and advanced command-and-control technologies, gave the coalition forces, particularly the American contingent, overwhelming advantages and a clear technological supremacy.

The favorable publicity received in the wake of Operation Desert Storm brought a great deal of prestige to the aerospace industry; nevertheless, economic realities severely challenged it during the 1990s. The industry had achieved a postwar employment peak of 1.3 million in late 1989. During the 1990s and into the first decade of the 21st century, employment fell by 49 percent, reaching a 50-year low in late 2002. A number of factors were at work. Following Desert Storm, the U.S. government responded to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War by reducing military spending. In addition, the aerospace industry faced increasing competition from abroad. Airbus, a European consortium founded in 1970s to challenge the dominance of U.S. airline manufacturers, saw its share of the world market grow from 30 percent to nearly 50 percent by the early 1990s. This prompted a wave of consolidations that eventually resulted in Boeing emerging as the only U.S. manufacturer of commercial airliners. In 2003, for the first time, Airbus sold more aircraft than Boeing. In addition, as NASA shifted responsibility for the launching of satellites to commercial firms, these companies faced competition from an aggressive European Space Agency as well as the Chinese.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shocked the United States and severely damaged the commercial airline industry in the United States and across the globe. This downturn highlighted the problems facing the aerospace industry. Only the most optimistic estimates predict growth in employment, while most predict a further decline. An industry that had once been a symbol of technological advancement faces continued adjustment to a future as an industry that has matured.

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Related Entries

Arms Trade; CNN; Cold War; Economy and War; Iraq War; Satellite Technology

—*Janet R. Daly Bednarek*

African Americans in the Military

The racism of white Americans has been historically the most fundamental factor affecting the place of African Americans in the United States military establishment. The American colonies and later the United States formed a democracy rooted in the racial construct of white supremacy. White Americans subjected black people first to slavery and then to racial segregation. The American government's

denial of citizenship to black people forced them to find avenues through which they could prove their worthiness to have rights equal to those of white Americans. The willingness to shed blood and even die in defense of the country seemed to offer one path.

Yet African Americans learned repeatedly that military service to their country—even in wartime—did not ensure equality with white people. Black achievement went unremarked, except by other African Americans. It is a tribute to the perseverance of black American soldiers and civilians, and to the few white Americans who recognized the injustice and inefficiency that resulted from racism, that, in the 1940s, the United States finally made progress toward racial equality and recognition of black achievements and rights. In this evolution the military, instead of reflecting the attitudes of the most reactionary of racists—its southern officers—actually took the lead by integrating its ranks. By the beginning of the 21st century, the military had become a model for the rest of society in the area of civil rights.

As early as the 1600s in colonial America, black men served alongside white soldiers in some colonial militias. Yet only direct threat from invasion or Native American attacks compelled white colonists to arm black men and admit them into colonial militias. After the threat had passed, black soldiers found their numbers invariably diminished and their service forgotten. On the other hand, because harsh conditions at sea meant that naval service did not attract sufficient numbers of white men, black sailors throughout the colonial era served in integrated crews with their white shipmates.

In colonial times, white Americans pitted black Americans, free and slave, against Native Americans. In 1703, South Carolina actually promised freedom to slaves who killed or captured the red enemy—provided a white person witnessed his exploit—only to withdraw this promise in 1719 because of its threat to the institution of slavery. Twenty years later, white South Carolinians used Native American allies to suppress the Stono slave uprising.

With the approach of the American Revolution, freedman Crispus Attucks was among the five people killed by British soldiers in the Boston Massacre on March 5, 1770. Later, in 1775, African Americans fought in the New England units of the revolutionary forces. Many white soldiers arriving from the South to join forces in the North objected to the presence of black soldiers. Gen. George Washington consequently decided on October 8, 1775, to accept only white soldiers in the future. Black veterans could reenlist in the Continental Army, and Washington's desperate need for manpower enabled New England recruiters to ignore the ban and enlist free and enslaved blacks. However, black soldiers now found themselves increasingly relegated to labor-intensive noncombat roles such as building fortifications.

While small numbers of black soldiers (perhaps as many as 5,000) served the colonial cause, a smaller yet still significant number of black men and women (approximately 1,000) chose to serve with the British. They were encouraged to do so by a proclamation of Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia, which promised freedom to any slave who joined the British Army. Many of these men and women left with the British in 1783, resettling in British Canadian colonies. Some went on to migrate in the 1790s to the newly established British colony of Sierra Leone in Africa.

After the Revolution, the Militia Act of 1792 prohibited black men from serving in the militia, and white legislators eliminated black men from America's armed forces. The pattern of allowing blacks to serve in the military during wartime and refusing them any military association in peacetime, combined with white denial of their wartime service, had begun. The War of 1812 followed this pattern. A militia battalion of free blacks earned Andrew Jackson's praise at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815, but by 1834 laws forbade the formation of black militia. Nevertheless, black sailors made up some 10 percent of Oliver Hazard Perry's victorious crew at the Battle of Lake Erie, and the rigors of naval service ensured the continued necessity of free blacks in the Navy after the War of 1812. Once again, some slaves sought their freedom by fleeing to British lines. Jackson tried to stem this flow by visiting Louisiana plantations and offering freedom to male slaves who joined his force. More than 500 slaves upheld their end of this bargain by participating in the Battle of New Orleans; however, though Jackson commended their heroism, he reneged on his offer of freedom and returned the men to their slave owners.

African Americans would not serve in the Army again until 1862, when the desperate need for manpower during

the Civil War forced the Union to allow regiments of black volunteers. Nearly 186,000 black soldiers served in mainly federal regiments, most in the infantry but also in cavalry and artillery, led by white and even a few black commissioned officers. Although African Americans encountered racial prejudice within the Union Army, which paid them less than white soldiers of comparable rank, they fought well in some of the heaviest engagements of the war, including Port Hudson, Louisiana, and Fort Wagner, South Carolina, in 1863. Black soldiers suffered nearly 37,000 casualties, among them black troops attempting to surrender at Fort Pillow, Tennessee. Confederate Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, future founder of the Ku Klux Klan, ordered the men to be massacred. The Union began enlisting black troops only after Pres. Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation stating that slaves in the areas of rebellion were free. Black soldiers took special pride in advancing into southern communities to free their brethren and argued at the war's successful conclusion that they had played a critical role in saving the Union.

In the post–Civil War era, Congress authorized the formation of a few black regiments, and the 9th and 10th Cavalry, and the 24th and 25th Infantry—the famed "Buffalo Soldiers"—patrolled the far reaches of the western frontier from the most isolated and least hospitable forts. Concurrently, however, increasing segregation, Jim Crow laws, and lynchings affected the armed forces. The Navy not only eliminated integrated crews aboard ship but also reduced the diminishing number of black sailors to the rank of messmen, or servants. Of the few black appointees to West Point, only three survived the harassment and hostility of cadets and faculty to graduate between 1879 and 1889. The military academy would graduate no more African Americans until the 1930s; the Naval Academy would graduate its first black midshipman only after World War II. These brave individuals still faced isolation and silent treatment from their peers.

At the battlefront, however, African American soldiers fought in the Spanish-American War, some with the two cavalry regiments that charged up San Juan Hill with Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders. African American soldiers also participated in John J. Pershing's expedition into Mexico to chase the outlawed guerrilla leader Pancho Villa in 1914 to 1916. In these conflicts from the Civil War to World War I, African American soldiers repeatedly won the highest award for valor, the Congressional Medal of Honor.

When the United States entered World War I in 1917, only pressure from African American organizations forced the War Department and the Army—which had planned to relegate all black soldiers to labor battalions—to form two black combat divisions, the 92nd and the 93rd (provisional). The four regiments of the 93rd had the good fortune to serve in the French Army in 1918, where they earned the accolades and awards from the French even as the American Expeditionary Force high command constantly denigrated their feats and delayed their medals. The 92nd, officered by racist and mediocre white commanders, poorly equipped and trained compared with its white counterparts, still won more Distinguished Service Crosses and compiled a better record than four white divisions. Yet the 92nd's white commanders undertook a zealous campaign to demean and denigrate their black troops, in an effort to reduce the numbers of black soldiers who might serve in a demobilized postwar Army.

Such reactionary attitudes ensured that upon U.S. entry into World War II in 1941, the status of African Americans in the armed forces remained the same. The Navy consigned black sailors to the mess; the Marine Corps, the most rabid proponent of segregation throughout its existence, refused admittance to black men; while the Army limited numbers of African Americans. The manpower demands of the war, and the rise of the United States to the position of world power—simultaneously leading the struggle against a rabidly racist Germany and Japan and practicing its own racism—would gradually force some reluctant changes upon the American government. Initially, military commanders such as Virginia Gen. George C. Marshall insisted that the Army would not participate in, much less lead, any social change. But other, more enlightened civilians, in particular Eleanor Roosevelt and Assist. Sec. of War John R. McCloy, recognized the foolish waste of manpower that racism and segregation caused and pushed for black combat units. African American soldiers training at southern bases encountered discrimination and were lynched. Many black soldiers bitterly remarked that Nazi prisoners of war received better treatment from

Southerners than they did. Nevertheless, the need for manpower gradually offset racist custom.

The most notable result was the 99th Squadron, the "Tuskegee Airmen," who demonstrated, in the face of opposition from some white Air Force commanders and southern congressmen, that black pilots could master the most demanding technology and fight as well in the air as their white counterparts. The resulting all-black 332nd Fighter Group, the "Red Tails," never lost a bomber under their escort to enemy fighters, and bomber units actually requested their escort over enemy targets.

On the ground, the picture remained less rosy, as the Army reactivated only the 92nd Division for combat and separated the units of the 93rd Division. The 92nd fought in the difficult Italian campaign, once again led by mediocre white commanders and subject to accusations of inferior performance. American units, from commanding generals on down, did not generally acquit themselves very well in Italy, with the exception of the Japanese American 442nd Regimental Combat Team. The Nisei fought attached to the 92nd and became the most highly decorated combat unit in the European theater, while their families languished in internment camps in the U.S. West and South.

In northern Europe, black engineers cleared D-Day beaches of mines and tank traps, supply units formed the "Red Ball Express" to supply rapidly advancing American units, and antiaircraft units protected American forces from aerial attack. A black Tank Destroyer Platoon and the 761st "Black Panther" tank battalion would earn unit citations for their bravery, and some black artillery units served at Bastogne with airborne troops to repulse repeated German attacks in the battle of the Bulge. Ultimately, the severe losses of infantry prompted Allied Supreme Commander Gen. Dwight Eisenhower early in 1945 to request black volunteers for the infantry, to form black platoons to serve as a "Fifth Platoon" (the usual number of platoons in an infantry company being four) to be attached to white companies. African American soldiers thus "integrated" proved to be tough and aggressive fighters, as their white company commanders and peers attested. But at the end of the European conflict, the Army returned these black soldiers to their original segregated units.

In the Pacific, black infantry regiments serving as garrison forces in 1945 fought diehard Japanese soldiers continually. African American Marines, trained at Montford Point, supplied front-line units and often found themselves in combat. On the high seas, the Navy formed a few segregated antiaircraft gun crews and even commissioned segregated ships, while the Coast Guard, less conservative than the Navy, actually integrated the crews of two ships. Black engineer battalions built the Burma Road and the Alcan Highway, while black nurses could finally pursue their profession within the Army and Navy. Despite this limited progress, in the racially charged atmosphere of the two world wars from 1917 to 1945, the white military establishment prevented black soldiers from winning the Congressional Medal of Honor, regardless of their achievements.

Pres. Harry S. Truman's Executive Order 9981 of July 26, 1948, ordered equality within the armed forces, thus beginning the process of integrating the military, which the later manpower demands of the Korean War helped complete. Ironically, because so many military bases are in the South, the Army post often became an island of integration in a sea of segregation. The military also became an avenue of upward mobility for African Americans in a white society that at best only slowly accepted integration and at worst actively resisted and thwarted it.

By Vietnam, when racial tensions in the United States were reflected in its armed forces, black and white soldiers fought effectively in combat, although racial tensions reasserted themselves, often violently, in rear areas or on board ships of the fleet. In the early years of Vietnam, black soldiers fought in infantry units in disproportionately high numbers, an indication that any reservations about their ability in combat arms had disappeared. Black officers who joined during and after World War II progressed through the ranks to make general.

With Gen. Colin Powell's rise to the position of Army chief of staff, the existence of black generals and admirals in all branches of the service, and the presence of young African Americans in all the service academies and the enlisted ranks, the military establishment stands today among the most integrated institutions in the United States.

These African American fighter pilots were members of the squadron known as the "Tuskegee Airmen." Here, as part of a Mustang fighter group, they listen to a briefing at a military base in Italy in September of 1944. Tuskegee was the first training facility for black pilots who flew planes for the U.S. Army. (Getty Images)

Finally, in the 1980s and 1990s, the military establishment retroactively awarded Medals of Honor to one black soldier who had served in World War I and several to those who had served in World War II. Nevertheless, several additional African American World War I heroes such as Henry Johnson and William Butler remain unrecognized. The government also recognized the service and valor of the men of the Fifth Platoons in 1945. While problems persist, the United States military as a whole begins the 21st century an integrated entity.

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Related Documents

1861 e, f; 1862 a; 1863 a, b, c, d, e, f, g; 1864 a; 1865 a; 1900; 1918 c; 1919 b, c; 1932 a; 1941; 1942 a, b; 1944 c; 1945 a, b; 1948 b; 1972

—John H. Morrow Jr.

AFS

See American Field Service.

Agent Orange

Agent Orange is the code name for a powerful herbicide that the U.S. military regularly used as a defoliant and chemical weapon during the Vietnam War. Agent Orange was a 1:1 mix of 2,4,-D (2,4, dichlorophenoxyacetic acid) and 2,4,5-T (2,4,5 trichlorophenoxyacetic acid). U.S. armed forces employed Agent Orange, originally developed as a weed killer in the 1940s, to destroy forest canopies that hid Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units from U.S. air power and to secure outlying base areas.

Agent Orange was colorless, as were several other chemical defoliants developed for use during the conflict. The color coding came from identifying bands or stripes used on the 55-gallon drums in which manufacturers shipped the product. In addition to Agent Orange, the military used lesser amounts of Agent White, Agent Blue, Agent Purple, Agent Pink, and Agent Green.

Both the topography of Vietnam and enemy dispositions called for the use of herbicides. The U.S. military divided Vietnam into four zones of operations. The III Corps area, the area around Saigon from the South China Sea to the Cambodian border, experienced the most spraying; Viet Cong units regularly threatened Saigon. The I Corps area, along the 17th parallel separating northern and southern Vietnam and the border with Laos, was second in the quantity of Agent Orange applied, while II Corps in the central highlands and IV Corps in the Mekong Delta were third and fourth, respectively. The goal was to secure broad zones around Saigon and to limit North Vietnamese infiltration. Additionally, troops sprayed around perimeters of bases to keep the concertina wire and approaches free of vegetation and along riverbanks to help the riverine Navy hold down casualties from hidden fire on shore.

Agent Orange and Agent White were used mainly to destroy the forests of South Vietnam, while Agent Blue was used to destroy grain crops, thus denying food and supplies to the enemy. As a military weapon, these chemical agents were used in concentrations 20- to 40-times greater than normal for agricultural herbicidal uses. All told, the U.S. military sprayed 19 million gallons, or 72 million liters, of herbicides over South Vietnam from 1962 to 1971, with the

heaviest applications coinciding with the period of heaviest U.S. offensive activity, 1967 to 1969.

Overall military benefits of this herbicide spraying, code-named Operation Ranch Hand, are difficult to determine precisely, but it does not seem to have accomplished much. The spraying evidently did not materially impede the infiltration of men and matériel from North to South Vietnam; nor did it seem to limit the maneuverability of communist units in the South. It also apparently did not limit attacks against outlying U.S. bases, especially Special Forces and forward fire bases.

However, the long-term negative health effects on American combat veterans and Vietnamese civilians have been severe and continuing. Agent Orange contains dioxin (2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin). Mammals react individually and differently to dioxin exposure, and it is difficult to generalize the effect of prolonged exposure to high concentrations of dioxin for any population. Nonetheless, the long-term record seems clear. Sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) has been four times more likely to kill children of veterans exposed to Agent Orange than children of parents from the general, nonexposed population; this statistic reflects dioxin's impact on the human immune system. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has found an association between these herbicides and spina bifida in Vietnam veterans' children, too. The Veterans Administration and the NAS have also found a high rate of adult-onset diabetes among Vietnam veterans who participated in spraying operations.

The possible aftereffects for those exposed to the spray are wide ranging. A study in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* found that 80 percent of a group of 78 Vietnam War veterans reported extreme fatigue, more than 60 percent had peripheral neuropathies, 73 percent had depression, and 45 percent reported violent rages. Most recently, government agencies have issued a report citing "sufficient evidence of an association between exposure to herbicides" during the war and chronic lymphocytic leukemia. In an out-of-court settlement in May 1984, American manufacturers paid $180 million in damages for exposure to Agent Orange and resulting cancers, skin disorders, and liver illnesses.

The Vietnamese people report even worse medical outcomes. As U.S. Senator Gaylord Nelson has stated, "The U.S. has dumped [in South Vietnam] a quantity of toxic chemical amounting to six pounds per head of population, including women and children." Vietnamese researcher Vu Tong Huong claims that more than 50,000 children have been born in Vietnam with deformities and that there are countless aborted and full-term fetuses that could not survive owing to herbicide and dioxin poisoning.

In addition to the human cost, the landscape of South Vietnam has paid a price. As forests and foliage died from prolonged exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides, jungles and lush undergrowth have disappeared. Without trees and plants and their roots, absorption of rainfall has decreased, and annual rainy seasons have washed away precious topsoil, causing floods, exposed less friable soil underneath, and created gashes in the terrain. The result is decreased agricultural productivity.

The widespread use of Agent Orange has had a significant impact on American society. The indiscriminate use of these chemical agents, in concert with revelations concerning "free fire" zones, the My Lai massacre, and other events of the Vietnam War seemed to call into question the American character. For many Americans, the old Puritan image of America as "the city on the hill" had meaning, and these activities in Vietnam seem to show that America at war was no better and no worse than other nations. The image and idea were disturbing. More specifically, the widespread use of Agent Orange was yet another cause for many Americans to distrust the national government during the Vietnam War era. That distrust altered the landscape—and the composition—of America's political system, continuing into the 21st century: sadly, where once America's best and brightest entered public service, they were much more likely in the 25 years after Vietnam to enter business.

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Vietnam War

—Charles M. Dobbs

Air Force Academy

In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed legislation that formally established the Air Force Academy. One year later, the school—setting up a temporary home at Denver's Lowry Air Force Base—swore in its first class of 306 cadets. Since its founding, the academy has provided students with the academic, military, and physical training required to become Air Force officers. Its high academic and military standards, combined with its connection to aviation, made the academy a popular addition to the national military education system, a role it continues to play in the 21st century.

The United States created an independent Air Force in 1947, which served as a driving force behind the creation of an Air Force Academy. In 1949 Secretary of Defense James Forrestal appointed Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University, and University of Colorado President Robert Stearns to a commission tasked with studying the future of the nation's military service academies. Whereas Air Force officers had previously received their education from the Military Academy at West Point, New York, the board concluded that the United States should train students interested in a career in the Air Force at a separate academy.

The Korean War temporarily absorbed the funds needed to build the academy but planning continued

apace, even during the delay. The Air Force Academy Planning Board, headed by Lt. Gen. Hubert Harmon, who would also become the Air Force Academy's first superintendent, developed a plan for the academy's curriculum in consultation with academics from Columbia, Stanford, and Purdue Universities, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Because the traditions of the Air Force were closely linked to those of the Army, the Air Force Academy's initial curriculum and faculty closely mirrored those of the Military Academy at West Point. Most instructors were either graduates of West Point or had served on its faculty. Like West Point, the curriculum designed for the Air Force Academy offered no electives, set a goal of 12 students per class, and challenged students across a wide variety of academic disciplines.

Another committee, with members that included Gen. Carl Spaatz and aviator Charles Lindbergh, assumed the task of selecting the site for the academy. The committee narrowed the site for the academy to Alton, Illinois; Lake Geneva, Wisconsin; and Colorado Springs, Colorado. In June 1954, the Department of the Air Force chose Colorado Springs because of the area's longstanding military traditions and the availability of land; Colorado Springs was home to Ent Air Force Base and Fort Carson, and the site offered more than 18,000 acres of former cattle ranches set in the foothills of the Rampart Range of the Rocky Mountains. The academy's first students at the Colorado Springs campus arrived in 1958. The new academy soon boasted two dormitories, an architecturally innovative chapel with facilities for several religions, a library, classroom facilities, and state-of-the-art athletic facilities.

The Air Force Academy inherited its command structure and basic organization from West Point. A lieutenant general serves as superintendent with brigadier generals serving as academic dean and commandant of cadets. Colonels serve as heads of the academic departments and as director of athletics. The department heads, titled Permanent Professors, normally retain their positions for the duration of their military careers. The faculty initially consisted exclusively of military officers with masters and doctorates who served for fixed three-year tours of duty. A military captain or major, titled Air Officer Commanding,

headed each of the 40 (later 36) cadet squadrons, which formed the basic military and social unit of the academy.

In the late 1950s, under the direction of the academic dean, Brig. Gen. Robert McDermott, the Air Force Academy became the first service academy to reject a rigid and uniform academic program. In its place came a wide range of elective courses, academic majors, and interdisciplinary programs such as the Foreign Area Studies program, although the core curriculum remained unusually heavy compared with nonmilitary colleges. The academy's focus on engineering and science, moreover, resulted in all graduates, regardless of major, receiving a bachelor of science degree. This curriculum received the necessary approval from accreditation boards in time for the members of the first graduating class to receive their degrees and military commissions in Colorado Springs.

To complement the academic program, the Air Force Academy developed athletic and military programs to build the "whole man." All cadets participate in intercollegiate or intramural athletics; all cadets must also complete rigorous physical education requirements. A wide variety of summer programs, including language training, advanced military training, and visits to active Air Force bases worldwide complete the process.

The traditional "fourth-class" system, a disciplinary training program, sharply divided incoming students from upperclassmen. Upperclass cadets ran the cadet squadrons under the general supervision of air officers commanding, with third-class cadets (sophomores) bearing the primary responsibility for the military training of fourth-class cadets (freshmen). Fourth-class cadets retained a subordinate status until they were "recognized" en masse in the spring of their first year. They then became upperclassmen who assumed the primary responsibility of training the next group. The Air Force Academy has since replaced the "fourth-class" system with an Officer Development System designed to identify leadership roles for cadets at all stages of their academy careers.

In 1976, all of the military academies accepted their first female cadets. This decision came after a 303-to-96 vote in the House of Representatives and a voice vote in the U.S. Senate in favor of the admission of women.

Although the senior officers of the Air Force, Army, and Navy had all initially opposed the admission of women to the service academies, the transition went more smoothly than many expected. A sexual assault scandal at the Air Force Academy in 2003 came as a special shock to many close to the academy because the academy had traditionally enjoyed better gender relations than either West Point or the Naval Academy (Annapolis).

Unlike the faculty of the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, which included a number of civilian professors, the teaching staff at West Point and Colorado Springs remained almost exclusively military throughout most of the

Cadets march in formation at the Air Force Academy, ca. 1990s. The chapel, with its prominent architectural feature, rises in the background. (© Jim Richardson/CORBIS)

20th century. Departments had limited access to visiting professorships designed to bring in one civilian specialist per department for a one-year appointment. In the 1990s, however, Congress directed West Point and Colorado Springs to hire full-time civilians for their faculties in the interests of deepening and widening the qualifications of the academic departments. The dean and department heads remained active-duty officers, but the faculty at both institutions are now one-quarter civilian.

Despite its relative youth, the Air Force Academy has produced senior-level leadership for the Air Force, the nation, and its allies. The academy has produced more than 350 generals, 194 officers for foreign air forces, 140 CEOs of major corporations, 36 astronauts, two Air Force Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Ronald Fogelman, 1994 to 1997, and Gen. Michael Ryan, 1997 to 2001), and one member of Congress (Rep. Heather Wilson of New Mexico, elected in 1998). Its graduates serve around the world in a variety of civilian and military positions, underscoring the importance of the Air Force Academy and its mission.

The Colorado Springs site is also important in its own right. The campus, which contains more acreage than Manhattan in New York City, is unusually large for an institution whose student body rarely exceeds 4,400. Consistent with its role in producing pilots, the academy also has an airfield for flight training and parachuting. The altitude of the Air Force Academy varies from 6,380 to 8,040 feet, making it one of the highest elevation college campuses in the world, and provides unusual challenges for flight training. Measured by the number of takeoffs and landings, the airfield has become one of the busiest airports in the western United States in the 21st century. The academy's novelty, picturesque location, and proximity to other tourist destinations have made it a popular tourist attraction. A new visitor's center in 1986 helped to make the Air Force Academy one of Colorado's most visited man-made sites.

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Military Academy, United States; Naval Academy; Women in the Military

—*Michael S. Neiberg*

Ali, Muhammad

(1942–)
Boxer, Antiwar Activist

Muhammad Ali was born Cassius Clay on January 17, 1942, in Louisville, Kentucky. He grew up in a society where African Americans were supposed to be poor and humble, but his talents as a boxer and thinker, as well as his temperament, ensured that he would be neither. Ultimately he became a three-time world heavyweight champion and arguably the most famous antiwar activist in U.S. history.

Clay credits his embrace of fighting to the theft of his bicycle when he was 12. He thirsted for revenge, but Joe Martin, a local boxing coach, convinced him to learn something about boxing first. Clay was a natural. Six years later, in 1960, Cassius Clay won a gold medal representing the United States at the 1960 Olympics. But after a segregated Ohio restaurant refused him service, Clay threw his gold medal into the Ohio River.

Clay possessed a keen mind and a sharp wit, what reporters termed the "Louisville Lip." After predicting "to prove I'm great he will fall in eight," he bested the heavily favored world heavyweight champion Sonny Liston in a 1964

bout. Clay then announced "I am the greatest!" and refused to play the role of the modest athlete who let white reporters define his public persona. Clay was an amazing fighter, able to dance around the ring while jabbing his opponent (abilities that he later summed up as being able to "float like a butterfly, sting like a bee").

Meanwhile, Clay had begun to consider joining the Nation of Islam (NOI), the so-called black Muslims. He entered into long discussions with a leading NOI minister, Malcolm X, a radical who advocated both black pride and self-defense in the face of racist violence—striking a sharp contrast to the civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., whose Christian nonviolence was often applauded by white liberals. Malcolm X recruited Clay to the NOI. On March 6, 1964, he announced he had joined the NOI and had renounced his "slave name" in favor of Cassius X.

The sporting world was shocked. The heavyweight champion was viewed as representing the United States, and Ali's renunciation of Christianity was an act with political overtones. Ali announced that "I don't have to be what you want to be, I'm free to be what I want." Elijah Muhammad, the head of the Nation of Islam, then gave him the name Muhammad Ali in honor of a storied African and Muslim ruler. Many refused to call him Ali, although some, including reporter and sports commentator Howard Cosell, did adopt the new name. In 1967, when boxer Ernie Terrell sought to intimidate Ali by calling him "Clay," Ali destroyed him in the ring, taunting him with the line: "What's my name?"

By this point, Ali had come into conflict with the U.S. government over the war in Vietnam. After passing his pre-induction physical examination in Houston on April 28, 1967, he refused to be inducted into the Army, despite a promise by the government that if he kept quiet he would not have to serve in Vietnam. Instead Ali announced, "I ain't got no quarrel with them Viet Cong—no Vietnamese called me nigger." Amidst a rising tide of protest over civil rights and the war in Vietnam, the significance of his words were clear: Ali's fight, and that of all African Americans, was at home. Many white Americans were horrified that a man who made his living by boxing refused to fight for his country and claimed conscientious objector status for both religious and racial reasons. Opponents of the war, both at home and

abroad, were electrified. Here was a true heavyweight champion of the world, standing on principle against the most powerful government in the world.

The U.S. Boxing Federation (USBF) stripped Ali of his title and took away his boxing license; the federal government confiscated his passport. Prevented from fighting at home or abroad, Ali was unable to box, and thus earn, while he was in his prime. In June 1967 the courts sentenced Ali to five years in prison and fined him $10,000 for defying his induction, a decision that Ali battled for years before it was overturned by the Supreme Court in 1971. Although he never went to prison, Ali had lost three and a half years in the ring.

When Ali returned to the ring in 1971, he no longer had the speed of his youth, and he lost a title fight against Joe Frazier. Despite that setback, he fought once again for the title in 1974 against George Foreman. He bested Foreman in a widely publicized fight in Zaire, the famous "Rumble in the Jungle." Up against a fearsomely strong opponent, Ali did not dance but played the "rope-a-dope," allowing Foreman to pound his torso while Ali bounced against the ropes, which absorbed much of the force of the blows. Foreman tired himself out and Ali emerged the champion. Ali dominated heavyweight boxing throughout the late 1970s, losing his title in 1978 to Leon Spinks before regaining for a record third time. He retired in 1981. The next year he was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease.

Since his retirement, Ali has remained a spokesman for civil rights and world peace, raising more than $50 million for charities throughout the world. In 2000, the head of the United Nations named Ali a United Nations Spokesman for Peace. Occasionally, however, some critics have objected to Ali's rehabilitation as a lovable former champion. In the summer of 2004, Ali threw the opening pitch at a baseball game in Houston, leading one Hall of Fame pitcher, Bob Feller, to protest. Feller, a combat veteran of World War II who lost four years of his professional life to the service, said: "I object very strongly to Muhammad Ali being here to throw out the first pitch . . . This is a man who changed his name and changed his religion so he wouldn't have to serve his country, and, to me, that's disgusting." The furor over Ali's stance about Vietnam has mostly died away; the

ailing icon most commonly evokes sympathy and respect, not controversy.

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Pacifism; Vietnam War

—*John Hinshaw*

All Volunteer Force

In July 1973, military conscription (the draft) in the United States ended in favor of the all volunteer force (AVF). The decision to end conscription was prompted by the popular dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War that was partly expressed in protests against the draft. Vietnam era challenges to conscription also reflected the historic undercurrent of American reverence for personal freedoms and suspicion of the military. Although many within the military and the government worried that relying solely on volunteers for military manpower would leave the U.S. armed forces unable to meet worldwide commitments, those fears ultimately proved to be unfounded.

The Draft in America

The first federal conscription legislation was passed in 1863 in an effort to alleviate the Union Army's increasing manpower shortages during the Civil War. Resentment at the government's interference with traditional liberties and perceived inequities in the draft sparked violence against the provost marshals charged with enforcing compliance and also led to antidraft riots, most notably the July 1863 melee in New York City that left more than 100 people dead and many more severely injured.

By 1916, amid growing American concern over World War I, memories of earlier anticonscription violence faded. Moreover, groups like the National Security League and the Military Training Camps Association pushed energetically for greater military preparedness and urged creation of a conscription system that would provide the United States with a larger, better trained Army. A draft was also more cost-effective because it eliminated the need for enlistment bounties. Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916 despite some initial resistance. By setting quotas for skill and race, and by placing selection responsibility in the hands of local selective service boards, the administration gained Americans' acquiescence to conscription. Furthermore, the new Selective Service System (SSS) provided the model for managing military manpower throughout the remainder of the draft era. Although SSS provoked little organized resistance during the global crises of World War I and World War II or during the Korean War, by the 1960s—with the nation's large-scale commitment of combat troops to Vietnam—popular assent was eroding.

Unprecedented economic prosperity, along with the civil rights and women's movements, rekindled Americans' traditional ideological resistance to forced military service and brought social inequities to the fore. At the same time, popular support for the controversial war in Southeast Asia began to decline precipitously. This combination of dissatisfactions proved volatile, provoking widespread, large-scale antiwar and antidraft protests. Many activists opposed forcing young men into military service through conscription, contending that because the Selective Service boards were dominated by socially prominent white community members, the selection process singled out disadvantaged, nonwhite young men as prime draft material. Although protesters were largely middle-class university students, opponents of the draft also included members of the cultural and political elite, including Dr. Benjamin Spock, Coretta Scott King, economist Milton Friedman, and Sen. George McGovern. Ultimately, the increasing unpopularity of the Vietnam War forced the government to reconsider its draft policies.

Transition to the All Volunteer Force

In 1967, Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson, a Democrat, hoped small modifications in draft legislation would stop the protests, but the lack of substantive change only increased popular dissatisfaction. During the 1968 presidential campaign, Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon declared that modern war made a large conscript force obsolete. Instead, he asserted, new technology required a professional, volunteer force. Countering worries that an all volunteer military would prove too expensive, Nixon argued that America could not only afford an AVF, but that patriotism would ensure sufficient volunteers. He also warned, however, that it was unwise to stop the draft until after the Vietnam War ended.

Military leaders were not convinced that an AVF would work. The draft had been eliminated briefly after World War II and, without the draft as incentive, enlistments had plummeted. Close to half of all volunteers enlisted to avoid the uncertainties of the draft, and by 1970 more than 50 percent of the 13,000 men the Army recruited each month reported that they were influenced by the draft. A study ordered by the Army in September 1968 concluded that the loss of draft-motivated volunteers would force the military to lower its standards and, with fewer military veterans, popular support of national defense would weaken. Despite the Pentagon's reluctance, Nixon ordered a Department of Defense (DOD) study to examine the possible effects of ending the draft, vainly hoping this measure would defuse antidraft sentiment. When protests continued, Nixon introduced further superficial reform of the Selective Service process, such as attaching draft-age advisers to state draft boards. When protests still continued, Nixon instituted more substantial changes. He noticeably increased minority and female membership on local draft boards and prohibited active and reserve members of the military and anyone under 30 from sitting on these boards.

The president also initiated other important reforms. Aiming to make the draft more equitable, Nixon introduced a draft lottery, based on the birth dates of men aged 19 to 26. The first lottery occurred on December 1, 1969. He also replaced the longtime, but increasingly unpopular, director of Selective Service, Gen. Lewis B. Hershey. Despite his efforts, however, Nixon could not persuade protesters that the draft was fair, especially after the war's expansion into Cambodia in 1970. Antidraft protests declined only when Nixon began withdrawing troops from Southeast Asia and reducing the size of draft calls. Even after draft reauthorization in 1971, protest continued to fizzle, in part because the draft was extended for only two years. Significantly, reauthorization included measures paving the way for an AVF, such as pay raises for enlisted personnel and cash bonuses for combat infantrymen. In June 1972, the administration stopped sending draftees to Vietnam.

The AVF

Despite strong popular antidraft sentiment, some groups supported conscription. Although in the decades following World War II the military had been intentionally marketing itself as a profession comparable to any civilian occupation, many military leaders worried that ending Selective Service would turn military service into little more than a consumer product. Yet, in the first half of 1969 the Army had also quietly studied the feasibility of an AVF. Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation (PROVIDE) concluded that, while expensive, an all volunteer force could be maintained by improving pay, benefits, and living conditions, and by recruiting more women. The report also recommended that the Army support establishment of an all volunteer force. PROVIDE significantly influenced the conclusions drawn by the DOD's working group on the all volunteer force, Project Volunteer. Although the DOD and the Nixon administration's task force, the Gates Commission, agreed that an AVF was both possible and desirable, they disagreed about the process, the costs, and the timing. Project Volunteer members argued that an AVF would take more time and more money than the Gates Commission estimated. Public statements by military officers supporting SSS further complicated the process by prompting congressional involvement. After substantial political maneuvering, Nixon reasserted control over the all volunteer force debate. In the spring of 1970, he set a 1973 deadline for full transition to an all volunteer military.

Although the Defense Department declared the AVF a success as soon as the draft ended in July 1973, years passed before the all volunteer military functioned well. For the remainder of the decade and well into the 1980s, the armed

forces struggled to meet recruitment goals, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Despite enlistment bonuses, young people were reluctant to volunteer. The number of enlistees with high school diplomas climbed, but recruits' scores on service aptitude tests dropped. In 1973, less than half of the infantrymen stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, read above a 5th grade level. Twelve years later, 20 percent of military recruits could not read at the high school level. Widespread drug and alcohol abuse further reduced service members' ability to perform their duties. Morale was at a crisis point, with 40 percent of recruits leaving the military before completing their first year of service. In addition, large numbers of enlistees came from lower socioeconomic and minority groups, triggering public criticism of the military as unrepresentative of American society. By 1979, continuing problems with the AVF prompted several congressmen to call for a return to conscription.

At the same time, the Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan caused Pres. Jimmy Carter to become concerned that U.S. resources were insufficient for it to meet both its obligations and unanticipated crises. Despite having pardoned all Vietnam War draft evaders three years earlier, Carter reinstituted SSS registration for young men after their 18th birthday. His successor, Ronald Reagan, enforced draft registration by prosecuting men who failed to register and by making registration a prerequisite for college financial aid. Reagan is also often credited with an upturn in recruiting after he increased military pay. Moreover, as Reagan's "trickle down" economic policies increased unemployment, many youths found military service more attractive.

In 1983, a conference on the AVF's first decade concluded that the all volunteer force was healthy. Participants pointed out that 91 percent of new recruits were high school graduates and that well over half scored above average on service aptitude tests. Conferees also cited the military's high retention rates as proof the all volunteer force was finally successful. Although pay raises and high unemployment may have helped, the armed services had also improved their recruiting policies, implementing more refined marketing techniques to target potential recruits. Reductions in the size of the defense establishment during the late 1980s and into the 1990s also aided the services by permitting lower

recruitment and retention goals, thus allowing enlistment of only the most qualified. As a result, in the early 1990s, fully 96 percent of new recruits held high school diplomas, and throughout that decade and into the 21st century the quality of the all volunteer force remained high. Demographically, the percentage of minorities in the military remained static. The proportion of women in the armed forces, however, increased from 2 percent in 1973 to 11 percent in 1992. Career opportunities for women in the military also continued to expand, permitting them to train in areas previously open only to men, such as flying combat aircraft. The high quality of the all volunteer force was often cited as the source of success in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and in the war in Iraq in 2003.

Despite the military successes of the maturing AVF, it continued to evolve as it faced new challenges. After the end of ground combat operations in Iraq early in the 21st century, service members and their families expected troops to return home quickly. When the requirements of postwar stabilization often led to extension of soldiers' tours in Iraq beyond their discharge date, many service members initiated legal challenges to the government's authority to force them to serve. Moreover, the battlefield of the war in Iraq lacked a discernable front line, so that women often found themselves in firefights, with some killed, wounded, or taken prisoner by Iraqi forces. Continuing violence during postcombat stabilization efforts left women at risk while performing their standard duties. While no one seriously considered a return to the draft, resistance to what some Americans considered forced retention in the military, and the de facto expansion of military women's role during war, ultimately prompted new debates about the future character of the all volunteer force.

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African Americans in the Military; Antiwar Movements; Conscription and Volunteerism; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Iraq War; New York City Anti-Draft Riots; Recruiting Advertisements; Selective Service System; Vietnam War; Women in the Military

Related Documents

1965 b; 1976; 1977; 1988; 2004 a, c

—*Janet Valentine*

American Civil Liberties Union

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), established in January 1920, is the largest nonpartisan, nonprofit legal organization in the United States. It is dedicated to upholding and preserving the civil liberties guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution, particularly those expressed in the Bill of Rights. The ACLU has championed all 1st Amendment rights; the right to equal treatment regardless of race, gender, religion, or nationality; the right to due process; and the right to privacy. From the aftermath of World War I through the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism, the ACLU has struggled to preserve civil liberties in wartime, when issues of military necessity and national security have prompted the federal government and the U.S. military to attempt to restrict or abolish certain freedoms.

The ACLU was first organized by pacifists and other social reformers who joined forces during World War I to form the American Union Against Militarism (1914–17) and its successor, the National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB; 1917–20), which narrowed activists' focus to protesting the federal government's wartime crackdown on antiwar and antigovernment speech. NCLB members also pressured the government to maintain the civil rights of nearly 4,000 conscientious objectors (COs).

After World War I, the NCLB urged activist Roger Baldwin to take the helm. Baldwin eventually agreed, but only if he could establish a new organization—to be known as the American Civil Liberties Union. In the early 1920s, ACLU leaders responded to the government's wartime decision to restrict free speech by educating the public about the 1st Amendment through pamphlets and other publications, lobbying, and picketing campaigns.

In 1939, with another world war on the horizon, the ACLU began to reeducate the public about its loss of free speech during World War I, in the hope that an informed populace would pressure the government to avoid restricting free speech during the next war. Perhaps because of the ACLU's renewed activity in the prewar years, Pres. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration did not restrict antigovernment or antiwar speech during World War II.

By lobbying legislators, the ACLU leadership influenced the decision to include broader guidelines for COs in the Selective Services Act (1940), the bill instituting the draft. According to this law, men could become COs if their religious denomination prohibited military participation. Through the ACLU's National Committee for Conscientious Objectors, ACLU leaders developed legal strategies to assist

the nation's 42,973 COs and ensure that their civil rights were not violated.

The ACLU's two best known legal cases during World War II were its defense of two Japanese Americans who violated Executive Order 9066, which mandated the internment of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in detention camps. When President Roosevelt signed the order on February 19, 1942, the ACLU responded by publicly repudiating it and by taking on the legal defense of Japanese Americans who defied the order.

In both *Hirabayashi v. United States* and *Korematsu v. United States*, the Supreme Court upheld the defendants' previous convictions in lower courts, ruling that military necessity and the nation's security demanded that the curfews and internment orders be enforced. In 1988, after 44 years of ACLU lobbying, Congress acknowledged the government's miscarriage of justice in its wartime treatment of Japanese Americans and offered $20,000 in reparations to each Japanese American who had been interned.

During the Vietnam War, the ACLU successfully pressed for another expansion in eligibility for those desiring CO status. This effort ultimately led to two Supreme Court decisions that redefined the criteria for CO eligibility. In 1965, the Court ruled in *United States v. Seeger* that a belief in a supreme being and adherence to a recognized faith were no longer required, although a CO's reasons for nonparticipation in military service had to resemble those of members of conventional religions. In *Welsh v. United States* in 1970, the Court removed the religious qualification, stating that an individual's "ethical and moral beliefs" prohibiting military participation are sufficient to obtain CO status.

During the Vietnam War era, the ACLU also defended convicted antiwar protesters who burned their draft cards and desecrated the American flag. In all of these cases, the ACLU argued that protesters were exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression. In *United States v. O'Brien* (1968), the ACLU argued that burning a draft card was an exercise of one's freedom of expression. The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that destroying a draft card could not be construed as free speech.

The attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001, the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq (2003), and the war on terror have ushered in a new era in ACLU activism. In October 2001, in an effort to counter the terrorist threat, the federal government expanded its powers of surveillance of private citizens. Following passage of the USAPATRIOT Act, the ACLU launched protests against several of its provisions that infringe on the civil liberties of private individuals. In September 2004, the ACLU scored a victory when a federal judge overturned the act's provision that required telephone, Internet, and communication companies to give customers' personal information and call records to law enforcement officials if requested.

In addition to the ACLU's lobbying to oppose the federal government's efforts to expand its surveillance powers, the organization has launched a campaign to support enactment of the bipartisan Security and Freedom Enhancement Act (SAFE Act), which was introduced in Congress in April 2005. This act seeks to limit several provisions of the USAPATRIOT Act, including searches and seizures of private property without owner notification, intelligence wiretapping, and restrictions of free speech. Since the beginning of the war in Iraq, the ACLU has also successfully challenged the federal government's detention of both American and foreign terrorist suspects for years without due process of law.

Since the passage of the USAPATRIOT Act in 2001, the ACLU has experienced a vast increase in membership and donations. In 2005, the organization reported more than 400,000 members, up from 275,000 in the late 1990s. From its inception, the ACLU has experienced its most intense activity during times of war and international uncertainty, when the federal government's concerns about national security override the government's commitment to its constitutional obligations to honor the freedoms of private citizens.

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Related Entries

Antiwar Movements; Conscientious Objection; Japanese Americans, Internment of; Pacifism; Selective Service System; Vietnam War; War on Terrorism

Related Documents

1976 a, b; 2004 a

—*Judith E. Harper*

American Field Service

Shortly after World War I began in 1914, a group of Americans in France organized an ambulance service to evacuate wounded French soldiers from the battlefields. An organization, the American Field Service (AFS), was established through the work of those volunteers. By the war's end more than 2,400 volunteer ambulance drivers had participated, transporting hundreds of thousands of casualties. Between World War I and World War II, the organization sponsored fellowships for American and French youth to study abroad in France and the United States, respectively, in hopes of advancing friendships in and understanding of the other country. During World War II, AFS reorganized the volunteer ambulance corps, serving the Allied armies in all theaters.

After World War II, the organization's members elected again to replace the obsolete ambulance service with a peacetime project, one intended to promote better international relations and cooperation. Over the course of the next 55 years, that project, an exchange of students program, expanded, diversified, and evolved into the AFS Intercultural Programs. Between 1947, when the peacetime project began, and 2004, more than 300,000 youths from more than 50 countries had participated in AFS programs.

**The Early Years: Ambulance Drivers
and French Fellowships**

In August 1914, members of the American colony in Paris organized a military hospital to provide medical care to the French wounded. Other Americans residing in France volunteered to transport French casualties from the fields of battle to the military hospital near Paris. The "American Ambulance motor corps," an extension of the military hospital, provided more rapid vehicles for transporting the wounded than had the traditional mule-drawn carts. The drivers and ambulances became known as the American Ambulance Field Service. Their ranks were increased by vigorous recruiting and fund-raising efforts of supporters in the United States.

One of the early drivers, A. Piatt Andrew, was the force behind the official founding and shaping of the motor corps into the AFS. Andrew had been assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury and treasurer of the American Red Cross. During World War I and until his death in 1937, he served as inspector general of the AFS, its chief administrator. The organization was financed by civilians, staffed and run by volunteers. The young World War I ambulance drivers, carrying the wounded from battlefields to dressing stations, witnessed suffering and sacrifice, the horror and human cost of war. Ultimately, more than 2,400 World War I volunteers served, 127 of whom were killed either while serving as ambulance drivers or, in some cases, after completing their ambulance service tour of duty, as participants in active military service.

After World War I, the organization began sponsoring fellowships for American and French youth to study in each other's countries. The American Field Service Fellowships for French Universities was established in

1919 to perpetuate the affection for France shared by AFS rank-and-file members and leaders. American scholars were provided opportunities to live and work in France; French scholars studying in the United States were afforded comparable opportunities. The hope had been to endow 127 fellowships in memory of the ambulance drivers killed during the war; such endowment proved impossible to fund, however. Nevertheless, between the two world wars, the organization succeeded in granting 222 scholarships to American and French graduate students, 24 of whom had been World War I ambulance drivers.

The French Fellowships kept the AFS alive in the interwar years. Stephen Galatti, a former ambulance driver who succeeded A. Piatt Andrew as chief administrator in 1937, started the ambulance service rolling again in 1939. During World War II, the work of AFS was extensive, serving the Free French in Syria, the British 8th Army in the Middle East, and the British and Americans in Italy. AFS ambulanciers transported the sick and wounded in France, Greece, Syria, Africa, Italy, Holland, Germany, and Burma, worked with French, British, New Zealand, Australian, Indian, and African troops, and helped evacuate inmates of the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. By the end of World War II, more than one million casualties had been transported by 2,196 AFS ambulance drivers. Thirty-six drivers were killed, and 13 were taken as POWs.

AFS International Scholarships after World War II

Ambulance drivers sought to help the world remain at peace at the conclusion of hostilities. From their wartime experiences they had learned that living and working with individuals from different cultures fostered understanding, respect, and friendships—an avenue to peace. Under Galatti's leadership, they created an exchange of students program.

The endeavor was not limited to France and the United States, nor were participating students only males. The program began with 50 students from 10 countries (Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Syria) who were brought to the United States for the 1947–48 school year. Success during the early years raised the number of participating students and countries. Student numbers spiked in 1950 when the U.S. State Department provided AFS with grants to sponsor 111 German youth as AFS program participants. State Department grants to sponsor German and Austrian students continued until 1956.

Typically, during the academic year, foreign students lived with American host families and attended local high schools. Teenage students proved to be more flexible and more accepting of cultural differences than college-age students. The teens became active members of their host families, involved in the communities. Host families provided opportunities for the students to have learning experiences, form lasting relationships, and experience personal growth. A staff member in the AFS headquarters maintained a personal relationship with each student during the year, through letters and/or visits. Within each hosting community, local AFS chapters, consisting of representatives from the school, the larger community, and the school's student body, recruited host families and provided support to the AFS student and hosting family. The chapters helped raise funds for a participation fee, which enabled the school and community to host a foreign student, and, after implementation of the Americans Abroad program, to send a local American student abroad. At the end of the academic year, the foreign students were grouped for bus trips—staying for a few days with local families in other U.S. communities. The bus tours broadened the experiences for the students and provided internationalizing experiences for American host communities.

The AFS scholarship programs relied on working volunteers: host families who embraced the AFS student as a family member, chapter members, school representatives, fund-raisers, and bus-trip organizers. Volunteer field representatives supplemented the work of AFS headquarters' paid staff. Starting in 1950, "Returnees," AFS students who had spent a year in the United States and returned to their homes, organized programs for American teenagers to live with host families in their countries. These Americans Abroad programs expanded rapidly with increasing numbers of participating students and countries. As the AFS American and foreign student Returnees matured, many became adult volunteers in AFS activities in their home communities, leaders in development of new AFS programs and policies.

Numbers of participants in the intercultural programs and of supporting volunteers are indicators of expansion and diversification. During the 2004–05 academic year, with more than 50 countries participating, AFS Intercultural Programs/USA placed 2,687 students with American host families; more than 1,300 American students were hosted by families in 43 countries—for the academic year, a semester, or the summer; participating students were awarded more than $1 million in financial aid and scholarships. In the final decades of the 20th century, AFS Intercultural Programs developed Multi-National Programs, AFS partner countries administering the sending and hosting of students between countries other than the United States. In 1972 the AFS Educators Program was extended, facilitating the exchange of adult teachers between the United States and the Soviet Union, Poland; this effort was later extended to China, Thailand, Latin America, Jordan, and Ghana. Other new programs were implemented: Community Service, Homestay Language Study, 18+ Programs for High School Graduates. In 2004, volunteers who were supporting and facilitating the student exchanges numbered more than 8,000 in the United States and 100,000 worldwide.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Fulbright Program; World War I; World War II

—*Bonnie Klein Karsten*

American Legion

Since its establishment in 1919, the American Legion has been the largest and one of the most influential veterans organization in American history. Only the Grand Army of the Republic, which enrolled half of all surviving Union veterans of the Civil War by 1890, has had comparable impact and success in obtaining benefits and pensions for veterans and promoting patriotism. The Legion, in turn, helped shape conservative nationalism, the dominant American ideology of the 20th century, by reinforcing this ideology in local communities and lobbying local and state governments. The organization, which selected For God and Country as its motto, fought radicalism and appealed to the public's sense that U.S. wars have been fought not by professionals but primarily by citizen–soldiers who deserve to be rewarded for their sacrifices. The Legion also promoted a vision of "100 percent" as opposed to "hyphenated" Americans; that is, it argued that minorities should conform to traditional American cultural norms. With its reverence for religious and national symbols, the Legion has had a powerful impact on the nation.

Unlike the similar Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), which only enrolls individuals who served in combat theaters, the American Legion enrolls any veteran who served anywhere in the world at a time U.S. forces were engaged in combat. It has admitted veterans from World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Grenada invasion of 1983, the Gulf War of 1991, and the Iraq War. By 1920, approximately 843,000 of the nearly four million demobilized veterans of the American Expeditionary Force

(AEF) in World War I had joined the American Legion. Its membership rose briefly to 3.5 million after World War II, stabilizing around 2.5 million since the 1960s.

Three powerful forces led to the Legion's formation after World War I. First, most American soldiers in the war experienced a comparatively short and painless tour of duty. Of the four million men who were mobilized, less than half reached the battlefield in France and of those only about half saw combat. For three-quarters of the AEF, many traveling far from home for the first time, war was a great adventure that had been abruptly curtailed; they cherished the camaraderie among soldiers and escape from ordinary life and wanted to "Keep the spirit of the great war alive," as Legion promotional literature stressed. The quarter of the AEF who had seen battle hoped that the American government and public would remember their deeds and reward them for their sacrifices.

Second, those Americans who did see combat suffered casualties at least comparable to those of the other powers in the same amount of time: 50,000 dead and 300,000 wounded out of slightly more than one million men, most of whom served less than six months. Because the United States had to scramble to create the requisite bureaucracy to run a war, no attention had been paid to veterans' postwar care and adjustment.

Third, the world, including the United States, seemed to be on the verge of revolution inspired by the 1917 overthrow of Russia's imperial government and the Bolshevik's creation of the Soviet Union. The fear of communist activity within the United States (the Red Scare) reached its peak under Att. Gen. A. Mitchell Palmer. One-fifth of the nation's workforce went on strike in 1919, and left wing organizations such as the Socialist Party and the Industrial Workers of the World—both of which had attacked the war and thus the value of the veterans' participation—increased their activity. A great many veterans believed that having saved the nation during war, they needed to do so again in peacetime.

In 1919, a small group of reserve officers, headed by the war veteran and New York Assemblyman Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., launched a nationwide publicity campaign that brought nearly all of the budding veterans organizations being formed under the American Legion's umbrella. During its early years, the Legion smashed strikes and disrupted radical speeches and rallies. Legion leaders justified such actions, claiming that the authorities had called upon the organization to help preserve order; however, in some instances, leaders distanced the Legion from such behavior by representing the legionnaires as individuals acting without the sanction of the organization.

The Legion also became the most powerful domestic lobby for veterans' benefits. During the 1920s, up to one-fifth of the national budget was spent by the Veterans Bureau, established in 1921. The Legion's major achievements included gaining pensions for the disabled, widows, and orphans and initiating the construction of the veterans' hospital system. Many of the wounded had been made chronically ill, suffering from shell shock (neuropsychological disorders) or tuberculosis from poisoned gas, diseases that the nation's hospital system was ill equipped to handle. In 1923, the Legion headed the investigation that led to the removal of Gen. Charles Forbes, the corrupt director of the Veteran's Bureau; the Legion was also influential in the choice of his replacement, Gen. Frank Hines.

Unlike the VFW, the Legion delayed supporting the "bonus" or "adjusted compensation," which sought to reimburse veterans by about $500 each (to be awarded in 1945) for the failure of military pay to keep up with wartime inflation. The Legion was reluctant to support such payment because it attracted a more middle-class membership than the VFW and because its promotional literature had stressed that wartime service was a privilege rather than a burden for which compensation was required. Furthermore, many legionnaires thought the federal government had already done enough by making their organization (rather than the VFW) a major partner in the creation and investigation of the Veterans' Bureau. The Legion lost a quarter of its membership before it finally endorsed the bonus in 1924. During the Great Depression, the Legion would again hesitate to demand immediate payment of the bonus and refuse to endorse the Bonus Army that marched in Washington, D.C., in support of the payments. In the 1930s, however, membership would rise as Legion posts served not only as useful

intermediaries in helping veterans obtain benefits, but also as employment centers to help veterans get jobs. The Legion had campaigned successfully for veterans to receive preference for many state and federal jobs.

In the mid-1920s, with domestic radicalism more of a memory than a menace, the Legion abandoned its confrontational tactics and sought to instill "Americanism" through education. Legion posts sponsored Boy Scout troops, held Boys State competitions (essay contests on some aspect of patriotism), and, in 1925, introduced a youth baseball program. At the same time, the Legion joined with other patriotic organizations to monitor school textbooks, teachers, and curricula to ensure their patriotism.

Legion members were also active in community service. The Legion turned out in force to combat natural disasters such as floods and hurricanes. Legionnaires raised money by holding boxing matches, selling poppies, or holding raffles. The American Legion Auxiliary, composed of the wives and daughters of legionnaires, never numbered more than a quarter of the Legion, but it was especially active in visiting hospitals and making life more comfortable for the needy and handicapped. (Women who had served in the armed forces could join the Legion itself.)

To retain a broad nationwide membership, the Legion tried to avoid taking stands on issues that might compromise its key drives for veterans' benefits and Americanism. It tried to present itself as apolitical, would not officially endorse candidates, and prohibited Legion members from holding public office. Nevertheless, the Legion's publications and speeches indicated which lawmakers were supporting or opposing the Legion's agenda, and the group timed these to influence elections. The Legion's critics charged it with hypocrisy when it smashed strikes or promoted patriotism, but it replied that such activities were merely matters of supporting the government and law and order. In essence, the Legion used its "apolitical" position to avoid taking stands that would alienate large numbers of its members. For example, it allowed each state to decide whether to admit African Americans; consequentially, throughout the South they were barred. Elsewhere, blacks belonged, although not in large numbers, to segregated or integrated posts.

Immediately after World War I, the Legion, like the nation, was severely divided over the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, a white supremacist organization that gained in strength during the 1920s. The relationship between the Legion and the Klan varied by region. In the Midwest, membership in the two organizations overlapped considerably. In the East, where there were many Catholic and Jewish Legion members, and the South, where the Klan represented a populist challenge to the aristocratic families that dominated the Legion, the groups were rivals. Despite bitter debates at annual conventions, the Legion refrained from denouncing the Klan until 1925, when the Klan's corruption had become evident to the general public.

In 1919, the 18th Amendment instituted Prohibition, which made the manufacture, sale, and distribution of liquor illegal. Although "dry" Legion posts existed during this period, Legion conventions were notorious sites of drunken revelry. Most veterans considered Prohibition an illegitimate law passed when four million men of voting (and drinking) age were overseas. Nonetheless, it was not until 1931 that the Legion officially condemned the 18th Amendment.

During the mid-1930s, as unskilled and immigrant workers began to organize through the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Legion again became involved in labor violence. In the years following the Red Scare, when the Legion tried to avoid confrontational activities, it had cooperated with the American Federation of Labor, which was composed largely of skilled workers. They shared many members and the Legion used union labor whenever possible. However, during Franklin Delano Roosevelt's presidency (1933–45), legionnaires were prominent strikebreakers in the steel industry of Pennsylvania and Ohio, the textile industry of North Carolina, and the agricultural and longshoremen's unrest in California.

As World War II loomed, the Roosevelt administration and the Legion came closer together because they shared a commitment to national defense. The Legion voted, over significant opposition from isolationist members, to aid Britain in 1940 and the Soviet Union in 1941. It was instrumental in securing the passage of the peacetime draft and

in organizing homeland defense during the war. In 1944, former Legion Commander Harry Colmery created the GI Bill, which pulled together the numerous proposals to assist returning veterans with health care, college, and vocational training. The bill would provide more than $120 billion in benefits over the next quarter century.

Following World War II, the Legion lost members because of its fervent support of the Cold War and the investigations of Sen. Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee. In 1949, local legionnaires in Westchester County, New York, mobbed a concert by black activist Paul Robeson in Peekskill, although plans to murder Robeson failed. Realizing such actions were hurting the organization's public image, the Legion subsequently focused more on its welfare, education, and public service programs. The organization remains committed to veterans' rights, including keeping veterans' hospitals open, seeking treatment and compensation for veterans who have suffered from the herbicide Agent Orange in Vietnam or the Gulf War syndrome, and reminding the public of veterans' sacrifices and patriotism.

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Related Entries

Agent Orange; American Veterans Committee; AMVETS; Cold War; GI Bills; Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related; Society of the Cincinnati; Veterans Administration; Veterans of Foreign Wars; World War I; World War II

—William Pencak

American Peace Society

The American Peace Society is the oldest nonsectarian U.S. organization dedicated to peace among civil states, domestically and internationally. For more than 150 years, it has promoted the establishment of laws and institutions that would be able to arbitrate and adjudicate disputes among nations and thereby avoid war. The society has worked to establish a Congress of Nations and a World Court, conducted a variety of international peace congresses at the Hague, and lobbied for international treaties and institutions, such as the Pan American Union—all to "promote permanent international peace through justice," in the words of its charter. With roots in the peace movements of the early 19th century, the American Peace Society promoted a moderate, internationalist philosophy that at times ran counter to more radical pacifist and isolationist views of the larger American peace movement.

William Ladd, a retired sea captain and farmer from Maine, first proposed the establishment of the American Peace Society in 1828. The society was organized in New York City in May of that year through the association of state and local peace societies, the oldest of which was the New York Peace Society, which had been founded in 1815 by New York City merchant and pacifist David Low Dodge. Noah Worcester had organized the Massachusetts Peace Society in the same year. Societies from Maine, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania joined with the New York and Massachusetts organizations to form the American Peace Society.

The American Peace Society was the umbrella organization for its affiliated regional societies but also engaged in its own activities. Originally headquartered in Hartford, Connecticut, the society moved to Boston in 1835, where it was located until 1911, when it moved to Washington, D.C.

The peace movement prior to the Civil War, of which the American Peace Society was a part, gained members after the publication of Bowdoin College professor and clergyman Thomas Coggswell Upham's *Manual of Peace* in 1836. It argued for the founding of a congress of nations, an idea that Ladd had first proposed in 1832. Ladd and Upham also argued for the establishment of a world court that would arbitrate disputes without nations' resorting to arms.

The society's leaders during the 19th century also included New Hampshire merchant Samuel Elliott Coues, and, into the 20th century, Quaker and Earlham College English professor Benjamin Franklin Trueblood. Its corresponding secretary for many years was Boston Congregationalist minister George Cone Beckwith, who edited the society's magazine, *The Advocate of Peace and Universal Brotherhood*, earlier titled *The Harbinger of Peace and The Calumet*.

Throughout the 19th century, the society had a large, broad membership. It did not condemn defensive wars or individual acts of self-defense, thus both its goals and methods were moderate compared with those of some of its more restive members. Twice during the century, radicals who did reject self-defense broke away from the society to establish more strictly pacifist organizations.

The first of these was the New-England Non-Resistance Society, formed in Boston in 1838. It took its name from the biblical injunction, "Resist not evil." Under the leadership of such reformers as William Lloyd Garrison and Adin Ballou, it urged the abandonment of all use of force, even in self-defense, and the refusal to act in league with any "human government," including that of the United States, that used force. Where the American Peace Society encouraged working through the political process to establish just institutions, the New-England Non-Resistance Society encouraged people to be "Come Outers," i.e., to abstract themselves from any participation in politics. Ballou and Garrison published a newspaper, *The Non-Resistant*, to disseminate their views. The New-England Non-Resistance Society lasted until 1845.

Influential writer, activist, and Peace Society leader Elihu Burritt worked for the abolition of war, but also saw a place for a reformed government that would have a supra-national character. To promote that ideal, he formed the League of Universal Brotherhood in 1846, which encouraged its members, on the model of those who signed the Temperance pledge, to vow not to resort to arms and to regard the citizens of other countries as fellow citizens of the world.

The American Peace Society opposed the Mexican War but gave its support to the Union cause during the Civil War. It characterized the war as a "rebellion" rather than a war, which meant that the Union was justified in suppressing that rebellion as an act of self-defense. In addition, even some former Non-Resistants such as Garrison (but not others, such as Ballou and Burritt) came to support the war as a necessary means to abolish the evil of slavery.

After the Civil War, the philosophy of radical pacifism inspired some of the same antebellum pacifists, such as Boston merchant Joshua Pollard Blanchard, but especially those who were either Quakers, such as Lucretia and James Mott, or of Quaker descent, such as Alfred Harry Love, to found an organization in Philadelphia in 1866 that constituted the second pacifist group to break away from the American Peace Society, the Universal Peace Union. It published *The Voice of Peace* and *The Peacemaker* and lasted until 1920.

The American Peace Society developed and spread antiwar arguments and sentiments throughout America. It also gave energy to international efforts to promote peace and was partly responsible for the Hague Peace congresses and the Hague and Geneva peace conventions, which set important standards on the conduct of war, the working of the International Red Cross, and the adjudication of international disputes through such bodies as the International Court of Justice at the Hague.

The American Peace Society's membership fell steadily throughout the 20th century. Its magazine, which since 1932 has been titled *World Affairs*, continues to be published from Washington, D.C., but the society now has little more than a nominal existence.

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—*John Benedict Buescher*

American Red Cross

Since being established in 1898, the American Red Cross has been instrumental in aiding the U.S. military. During wartime, the American Red Cross filled a void by caring for the wounded, providing welfare services, facilitating contact between families and loved ones in the military, and helping veterans deal with government bureaucracies—tasks that overtaxed agencies of the federal government had neither the resources nor the time to address.

The Red Cross had its origins in 1864, when 16 European countries accepted the First Geneva Convention, which provided for the aid of all wounded in the time of war under provisions of neutrality and created the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC charter obligates the humanitarian organization to provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded in the time of war and to carry out a peacetime program of national and international relief in the result of natural and man-made disasters. Clara Barton founded the American chapter on May 21, 1881. The United States ratified the Geneva Convention in 1882, which brought the American Red Cross into the fold of the ICRC.

The American Red Cross engaged in its first relief effort in Cuba in February 1898, when the organization supervised the distribution of relief supplies to the several hundred thousand Cubans suffering from the Spanish policy of holding peasants in concentration camps. When the United States declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898, the American Red Cross redirected its efforts to assist the

Clara Barton and American Red Cross workers assembled on a dock in Cuba during the Spanish–American War. Barton is sixth from the left, in the front row. (© CORBIS)

volunteer Army regiments camped in the southern United States. The Red Cross provided the poorly supplied regiments with toothbrushes, sleeping apparel, cots, canned goods—even ambulances. When the Army launched its overseas expeditionary forces to the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, the American Red Cross followed, providing nursing staff and supplies not issued by the Army, such as mosquito netting, bedding, blankets, and towels.

Clara Barton arrived in Cuba aboard the relief ship *City of Texas*, the first vessel to enter the Santiago harbor. She was often seen unloading supplies and helping care for the sick and wounded soldiers taken from the frontlines. When the Spanish–American War ended in August 1898, many soldiers returning to the United States were suffering from malaria. The Red Cross provided kitchens and emergency hospitals at the various debarkation points, including Jacksonville, Florida, and Montauk Point on Long Island, New York.

In 1900, the Red Cross secured a federal charter that increased government oversight of the charity; in 1905, the Red Cross reorganized, with the result of greater financial reliance on the government, particularly the War Department. During World War I, the American Red Cross was once again called upon to provide assistance, both on the home front and in France, mostly by providing medical services to support the American Expeditionary Forces. In America the Red Cross set up a Home Service to help solve personal and family problems of veterans and their families. The Red Cross also operated 58 domestic and overseas hospitals for the military, staffing them with doctors, nurses, administrative personnel, as well as providing ambulances and trucks. At the time of the Armistice in 1918, more than 8,000 American Red Cross workers were in Europe providing medical, recreational, and welfare services. General Pershing expressed his gratitude to the Red Cross when he said: "No organization since the world began has done such great constructive work with the efficiency, dispatch, sympathy, and understanding with which the Red Cross has accomplished its work" (American Red Cross, 15).

World War II brought an even greater need for the American Red Cross than previously. At its peak in 1945,

the organization had 7.5 million volunteers with 39,000 paid staff assisting the military. The organization undertook a major recruiting drive for nurses and established blood donor services throughout the United States. By the end of the war the American public had contributed $784,000,000 in support of the Red Cross, and the Red Cross had received 134,000,000 pints of blood for military use. To assist servicepeople far from home, the American Red Cross volunteers offered financial assistance, staffed recreational facilities near training camps, and distributed books, magazines, birthday gifts, stationery, and other essential items. It also responded to 100,000 letters per week from relatives and friends of soldiers. Among the Red Cross's more noteworthy efforts was the weekly distribution of packaged supplies to American prisoners of war held in Europe.

As a result of these efforts, more than 27 million parcels containing food, medical supplies, and other donations were distributed by the International Red Cross in affiliation with the American chapter. Similar efforts in Japan were less successful because the Japanese government refused to allow neutral vessels to enter waters controlled by its military. One of the more memorable American Red Cross programs was the Club Mobiles—converted jeeps, ambulances, command cars, or weapon carriers that operated just behind the advancing frontlines distributing doughnuts and coffee. Some criticism of the Red Cross did arise during the war, however. Military personnel, for example, complained that promised care packages never arrived and questioned the competency of its staff to deliver quality heath care.

In August 1945 the American Red Cross expanded its efforts to assist the Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals by offering the services of its 40,000 staff members. Among other tasks, it assisted more than one million veterans and their families challenge disability claims that had been disallowed by the VA. American Red Cross workers were also assigned to VA hospitals to run recreational programs and to serve as nurses' aides.

During the Korean War, the Red Cross once again provided service personnel with financial assistance, counseling, and the means to contact family members. It also distributed

supplies and comfort articles to prisoners held in North Korea, as well as assisting them after their release. Although its efforts never reached the same scale of the two world wars, at the peak of wartime activity in 1952, 10,000 American Red Cross workers were employed at military installations at home and abroad. After the war ended, the American Red Cross continued to assist the occupation military forces remaining in South Korea; its main role was to provide relief and comfort to the troops, but it also assisted the South Korean Red Cross with recovery efforts.

Beginning in the 1960s, the advances in technology such as radio communications and computers allowed the Red Cross to gain greater control over its activities abroad. During the Vietnam War, the Red Cross provided assistance to both veterans returning home from the war and to refugees within Vietnam. More recently the Red Cross has focused its efforts in providing relief to victims of natural and man-made disasters. The agency also continues its association with the military by providing support to troops stationed throughout the world.

Despite its noble humanitarianism, the American Red Cross is not without its critics. Some suggest that the American Red Cross envisioned by Clara Barton has been negatively affected by bureaucratic and military control of the government. These critics contend that the American Red Cross is not an entirely independent agency, but more a propaganda agent for the military that puts a humanitarian face on the use of military force. Such criticism aside, the American Red Cross has played a major role in safeguarding the welfare of military personnel throughout the nation's conflicts from the Spanish-American War to the present. Throughout its history, the organization has provided a crucial link between the soldier and civilian society.

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Barton, Clara; Prisoners of War

—*Mitchell Yockelson*

American Veterans Committee

Created by liberal World War II servicemen and women as an alternative to more conservative veterans' groups like the American Legion, the American Veterans Committee (AVC) became a prominent veterans' organization in the immediate postwar years. Although it was never able to match the numbers or influence of other national veterans' organizations, the AVC worked for decades to provide a progressive voice for the nation's fighting men and women.

The AVC had its origins in an informal correspondence group of UCLA alumni who were serving in the armed forces. In 1943, they began to publish a bulletin that showcased a wide range of soldiers' opinions about the war and the home front. They also debated the shape of postwar America and what the role of the veteran might be upon return. Many correspondents hoped to create a new veterans' group that would be made up of vets from World War II and focused on furthering progressive ideas in civilian life. In February of 1944, with much of the group's membership in the service and abroad, Charles Bolté, an American veteran of the Canadian Army, coordinated efforts to create a liberal veteran's organization.

In July of 1944, Bolté and other like-minded veterans officially formed the American Veterans Committee, which immediately appealed to progressive, college-educated soldiers. Armed with the motto Citizens First, Veterans Second, the AVC distanced itself from groups like the Legion, which it viewed as exploiting its members' war service for political and economic gain. Instead, AVC members

looked for ways to integrate vets back into civilian life, and they championed many liberal causes in the immediate postwar years. The group promoted efforts at international peace, lobbied Congress to address the postwar housing crunch that veterans faced, and organized campaigns on labor and civil rights issues. The AVC picked up the endorsement of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and was the only national veterans' organization that required its chapters to be racially integrated.

At its peak in 1946, the AVC claimed to have 100,000 members, including such prominent veterans as Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr.; Oren Root, Jr., the son of a former secretary of state; World War II cartoonist Bill Mauldin; and war hero Audie Murphy. Political figures, including Richard Bolling, Warren Magnuson, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Medger Evers, were also members. The AVC even included Hollywood stars—John Huston, Douglas Fairbanks, Melvyn Douglas, and Ronald Reagan were all members.

Even with its substantial growth and name recognition, the AVC faced difficulties achieving its goals because of the growing threat of the Cold War during the years immediately following World War II. From the group's beginning, conservatives and other veterans' organizations had charged that the AVC was a front for communist activity. Communist veterans did, in fact, join the group in substantial numbers, and they were a particularly important part of the group's membership in New York and California. The accusations soon became so damaging that opponents in Congress banned the group from testifying before the House Committee for Veterans Affairs. This dramatically reduced the AVC's ability to act as a national voice on veterans' issues.

To restore the AVC's credibility, the liberal leadership of the group issued a resolution condemning communism in 1947 and took measures to exclude communist members. These actions caused the AVC to split into different factions, and the group's national conventions devolved into infighting between warring sides of liberals and radicals. By 1948, the liberal leadership successfully isolated the AVC's communist members, but the conflict over communism had reduced the AVC's membership to just 20,000. The group was never able to regain its previous membership numbers,

and the battle over the group's direction limited its ability to provide a liberal challenge to other veterans' groups.

Although the AVC saw its influence diminish by the 1950s, its members still provided a strong voice on veterans' issues and continued to support liberal policies. Promoting efforts to work for international peace, the AVC was an important part of the creation of the World Veterans Federation. The group also retained its focus on civil rights. The AVC worked for the integration of the military and lobbied for the passage of civil rights legislation; its lawyers submitted briefs in several landmark civil rights cases including *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954). In 1960, the group audited segregated Veterans' Administration (VA) facilities and helped initiate changes in the VA's policies.

The AVC was also at the forefront of improving the situation of women veterans. The AVC investigated VA services for women vets, which led to the creation of the VA's Advisory Committee on Women Veterans in 1983. The group also worked to protect female soldiers from discrimination in the armed forces.

Through its continued efforts to speak out on progressive issues, the AVC was able to remain a significant voice in veterans' affairs during the 20th century. Citing the advanced age and dwindling number of its World War II–era membership, however, the AVC decided to disband in 2001, leaving a legacy of commitment to its liberal principles.

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American Legion; Cold War; Mauldin, Bill

—Robert Francis Saxe

AMVETS

Founded in 1944 as the American Veterans of World War II, AMVETS is a veterans' organization that expanded its membership base in the subsequent decades to accept as members all honorably discharged veterans since World War II.

As the veterans of World War II began to come home, many wanted to join a veterans' organization. The Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) accepted veterans from all overseas wars, and in 1942 the American Legion—the leading organization of World War I veterans—voted to accept World War II veterans as well. Although thousands of the new veterans joined these established groups, many others saw them as the domain of older, more conservative veterans and unrepresentative of the generation that served in World War II.

During the war years, recently discharged veterans began to form small associations, mainly on college and university campuses. At George Washington University in Washington, D.C., Elmo Keel founded the Student Veterans of World War II. Also in Washington, a government worker, Andrew Kenney, formed the National Veterans of World War II. Keel and Kenney began to discuss merging their organizations, as well as the scores of other recently formed World War II veterans groups, into one national association. Nine organizations sent representatives to a 1944 meeting in Kansas City, Missouri, and on December 9 the delegates created the American Veterans of World War II, which the newspapers quickly shortened to "AMVETS."

As World War II veterans returned home in large numbers after 1945, AMVETS experienced substantial growth. Within a year of its founding, AMVETS boasted a membership of 60,000, with more than 100 local chapters across the nation. It established its national headquarters in Washington and held its first national convention in Chicago in 1945. In 1947 AMVETS received its congressional charter, the first World War II veterans group to do so. By 1948, AMVETS membership had reached 200,000 and it was the largest veterans' organization in America composed exclusively of World War II veterans.

Despite such impressive growth, AMVETS had difficulty competing with more established veterans groups. By 1946, the American Legion claimed 1.9 million World War II veterans and the VFW 1.6 million. Indeed, there was little to distinguish AMVETS from the established veterans' organizations. Like the American Legion and the VFW, AMVETS used military terminology, e.g., "commander" for leadership positions and "posts" for local chapters. As did other veterans' groups, AMVETS created auxiliary organizations for wives and sons of members, established a "fun making" group known as the "Sad Sacks" (named after the popular World War II comic strip character) and sponsored youth programs, memorialized war dead, and promoted "Americanism." Indeed, the only characteristic that distinguished AMVETS from the American Legion and VFW was its exclusively World War II veteran membership.

AMVETS also had difficulty staking out political ground. Like most veterans' groups, AMVETS was officially nonpartisan, with a primary political goal of promoting veterans' welfare. The group often joined with other veterans groups to press government at all levels for action on veterans' readjustment issues such as education, housing, and medical care. AMVETS also commented on the political questions of the day. Generally speaking, AMVETS tended to be more liberal than either the American Legion or the VFW. During the Korean War, for example, AMVETS was one of the few veterans' groups to support Pres. Harry S. Truman when he fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur for insubordination. The membership, however, was often deeply divided over political questions. At the 1946 national convention, furious debate erupted over whether AMVETS should condemn striking coal miners, and, in the end, it took no position on the issue. Indeed, with its support for universal military training, aggressive Cold War internationalism, and support for the suppression of communists and other "radicals," AMVETS differed little from the leading veterans' groups.

Strapped for cash and overshadowed by larger veterans associations, AMVETS in the late 1940s sought ways to increase its visibility and membership. One such initiative

was to find a prominent leader. After intense lobbying, Harold S. Russell accepted the position of national commander in 1949. Russell had lost both hands in a wartime training accident and had become famous for his portrayal of a disabled veteran in the 1946 film *The Best Years of Our Lives*, for which he received an Academy Award. Russell did indeed bring AMVETS increased visibility; in addition, he created a public relations department and hired a fundraiser who made the organization solvent. Russell was so popular that AMVETS amended its constitution to allow him to serve a second term as commander.

In 1949, AMVETS also explored the possibility of a merger with the American Veterans Committee (AVC), another prominent World War II veterans' organization. Unabashedly liberal, AVC membership included many veterans well connected in political, media, and academic circles. Some observed that the AVC would provide the "brains" and the AMVETS the "brawn" of a new World War II veterans' organization. However, the AVC had gained notoriety in its successful battle against a communist attempt to penetrate and influence its leadership. Although the AVC claimed to have expelled all communists, it still had a "pinkish tinge" in the eyes of many AMVETS members. The AMVETS national headquarters was bombarded with telegrams, letters, and phone calls from individuals and posts across the nation opposing the merger. AMVETS broke off merger negotiations.

In the end, AMVETS followed the model of the American Legion and the VFW by admitting veterans of subsequent wars. Korean War veterans were admitted in 1950, and Vietnam veterans in 1966. In 1984 AMVETS opened its doors to all who had served honorably since 1940, and in 1990 included National Guard and Reserve veterans as well. AMVETS has survived into the 21st century, though it has never seriously threatened the dominance of the American Legion or the VFW.

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—*Mark D. Van Ells*

Andersonville

Camp Sumter, or Andersonville as it was commonly known, was one of the largest prisoner-of-war camps of the Civil War. The Confederate prison remained open for 16 months, receiving a total of almost 43,000 Union prisoners—12,912 of whom died within its gates. The notoriously poor conditions at Andersonville and the resultant death rate prompted widespread public outcry in the North beginning late in 1864 and helped solidify, if only briefly, northern opinion about the depravity of the Confederacy. To this day, Andersonville is memorialized as an emblem of the sufferings of prisoners of war.

Located near Andersonville, Georgia, the camp opened in February 1864. Originally designed to house 10,000 on an area of 16.5 acres, by May 1864 Andersonville had more than 12,000 prisoners. The numbers continued to swell through the summer, forcing prison commanders to expand the compound to 26 acres in July. In August, the camp reached its highest population, approximately 33,000 prisoners, most of whom had little clothing and no shelter.

The entire area was enclosed by a stockade fence of rough-hewn logs approximately 15 feet high. Seventeen feet inside the stockade fence, a dead-line was delineated by 4-foot posts topped by a thin board. Any prisoner crossing the dead-line was likely to be fired upon without warning by guards on towers placed intermittently along the stockade. Outside the stockade, earthworks were erected to protect against cavalry raids; these were manned by members of the Georgia Home Guard, including an artillery company. Many

of the artillery pieces were pointed into the stockade to guard against attempts at mass escape.

Andersonville quickly became the most feared prison in the Confederacy because of its extremely unsanitary conditions. Water for bathing, drinking, cooking, and latrine use was provided by a swampy creek that flowed through the prison. Within a few weeks of operation, the creek was completely contaminated, becoming a major source of disease. The situation was exacerbated by the placement of the camp bakery, which dumped offal into the creek, upstream from the prison. Sufficient rations were never issued for all of the prisoners. At no time during its operation did Andersonville ever issue more than 12,000 rations in a single day. By August, the camp mortality rate was more than 100 prisoners daily. At the height of the deadly summer, a freshwater spring burst forth from the ground in the prison, providing water for thousands of prisoners. The captives named it "Providence Spring," believing it a gift from God to aid in their salvation. Prisoners also dug dozens of wells, with mixed success, in the hope of finding clean water.

As conditions within Andersonville worsened, prisoners turned upon one another. A group of prisoners, calling themselves "Raiders," preyed upon their fellow captives, attacking and robbing new prisoners as they entered the prison. In June, other prisoners formed a posse to attack the Raiders, capturing six ringleaders. The other prisoners conducted a trial of the leaders, sentenced them to death, and executed them, using a gallows provided by prison authorities. The executioners then buried the leaders in a separate section of the prison cemetery, forever secluding their remains from their fellow prisoners.

Andersonville quickly became notorious, and the northern public "waved the bloody shirt" both in the last year of the war and after. News of conditions at Andersonville leaked out as early as April 1864, when northern newspapers reported death rates of 20 to 25 prisoners per day. Pressure on Gen. William Sherman to do something prompted him in late July of 1864 to send Gen. George Stoneman's cavalry to cut Confederate rail lines into Atlanta and liberate Andersonville. Stoneman's raid failed to free the prisoners—indeed 600 of the raiders became prisoners themselves—but the raid did prompt Confederate commanders to relocate the Andersonville population to prevent the liberation of thousands of Union captives. By November of 1864, only the critically ill remained at Andersonville, those prisoners fit to move had been transferred to camps throughout Georgia and the Carolinas. Northern outcry swelled during the fall of 1864, reaching its peak after the war was over, when survivors returned home and began to publish reports of their captivity.

One of the most important figures associated with Andersonville was Capt. Heinrich Hartman Wirz, the interior commander of the prison in direct control of the prisoners. Wirz was reviled by his charges and was accused after the war of murdering Union captives. He was publicly tried on several counts of murder and abuse of prisoners, found guilty, and executed on November 10, 1865 at the Old Capitol Prison. Mere days after the execution, it was discovered that the most damning testimony of the trial was fabricated by a man who had never been a prisoner at Andersonville. The Wirz family has argued for decades that Captain Wirz did his best to save as many prisoners as possible from conditions beyond his control and that he was the scapegoat for the horrors of Andersonville. Wirz was the only member of the Andersonville command structure to be held accountable for the deaths of Union prisoners.

In the summer of 1865, a group of humanitarians, including Clara Barton, founder of the American Red Cross, traveled to Andersonville to identify those interred in the prison cemetery. The group successfully identified almost every grave and replaced the temporary markers with permanent headstones. Andersonville prison is now a National Historic Site, maintained by the National Park Service. It houses the American Prisoner of War Museum, a facility dedicated to the remembrance of American prisoners from all wars. The original facility is gone, but the gates to the prison have been rebuilt, as has one section of wall. Providence Spring still flows within the prison, covered by a monument erected by Andersonville survivors. The prison cemetery remains intact, a reminder of the fate of almost 13,000 Union prisoners.

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Atrocity and Captivity Narratives; Barton, Clara; Civil War; Prisoners of War

Related Documents

1866

—*Paul J. Springer*

Anti-Draft Riots

See New York City Anti-Draft Riots.

Antiwar Movements

For almost as long as the United States has gone to war, there have been antiwar movements. In surveying the history of U.S. antiwar movements, five broad observations can be made. First, with residents hailing from every part of the world, one or more U.S. ethnic groups will inevitably take an interest in overseas conflicts, either opposing or supporting American military intervention. Second, as a democracy in which citizens have differing opinions informed by their religious, class, and ethnic backgrounds, consensus on U.S. military mobilization is often difficult to achieve. Third, antiwar organizations have, over the course of two centuries, consistently drawn from a narrow demographic base. Fourth, U.S. antiwar groups have usually

been small, ideologically at odds with one another, and rarely effective—and only then at the cost of alienating the public. Fifth, antiwar groups have been drawn to a variety of philosophies, with some attracted to pacifism and others to violence.

Early Republic

Although Pres. George Washington had warned Americans to be leery of "foreign entanglements," his advice fell on deaf ears. Both presidents John Adams and Thomas Jefferson championed opposing sides in the era of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Adams and the Federalist Party regarded Great Britain as a bulwark against French nihilism. Jefferson and the Republican (later Democratic) Party announced their sympathies for the antimonarchist French. Adams involved the United States in fighting an undeclared naval war with France in 1797 (sometimes called the Quasi-War).

Republicans, led by Pres. James Madison, were outraged over the British Royal Navy's practice of boarding U.S. ships in search of alleged deserters; in response they declared war on Great Britain in 1812. Federalists, concentrated in New England, denounced the action; the Federalist state governments of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to send their militias to support the U.S. war effort in what became known as the War of 1812. Late in the war, in 1814, Federalist delegates from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Vermont converged in Hartford, Connecticut, to discuss seceding from the Union and making a separate peace with Britain.

In 1815 an affluent merchant, David Low Dodge, founded the New York Peace Society. Twenty-two Protestant clerics, college presidents, and writers followed Dodge's example, founding the Massachusetts Peace Society later that year. By 1828 antiwar groups in New York, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania formed the American Peace Society (APS). The APS's 300 members, among them the writer Ralph Waldo Emerson, advocated not only the abolition of war, but also of slavery and Roman Catholic immigration.

Civil War Era

The expansion of slavery in the American South led some within the APS to become more militant on this issue. In

1838 abolitionist and peace activist William Lloyd Garrison exhorted New Englanders to engage in disruptive acts of civil disobedience to deprive southern slave owners of federal financial, legal, and military support. Garrison's converts included New England author Henry David Thoreau, whose 1849 essay, "Civil Disobedience," encouraged citizens not to pay taxes that might be used to finance the Mexican-American War. This essay served as an inspiration to later nonviolent social activists, including the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Thoreau shared a belief that was widely held among war opponents in New England and some parts of upstate New York and the upper Midwest: they believed that Democratic president James Polk had provoked the war with Mexico to enable the annexation of Texas and to expand slavery in the West. This view became so prevalent that in 1848 a Whig majority in the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning the war with Mexico.

The decade of the 1850s witnessed deepened sectional divisions between North and South. Two events in particular served to further radicalize abolitionists and peace activists. First was the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), which permitted settlers in those western territories to vote on whether they wanted to sanction slavery in their state constitutions and led to widespread violence in the territories. Second was the U.S. Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision (1857), which ruled that slaveowners had a constitutional right to take their property (slaves) into any federal territory and that Congress had no right to prohibit such traffic in human chattel in the territories. In 1859 Thoreau cheered John Brown's attempt to seize a U.S. arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and organize a slave uprising. Other activists who embraced both abolition and peace argued against Brown's violent tactics.

By 1861, after several southern states had left the Union, APS leader Charles Sumner, a Republican senator from Massachusetts, urged Pres. Abraham Lincoln to both crush the rebellion and end slavery. APS activists were not pacifists: they opposed war against foreign powers. Since the Civil War was an internal insurrection led by U.S. citizens, it was not a war by their definition.

Antiwar activism centered in those areas of the North that possessed cultural and commercial ties to the South—notably the areas of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois near the Ohio River and in Pennsylvania counties bordering Maryland. Pro-southern groups such as the Pennsylvania Knights of the Flaming Circle provided intelligence to Gen. Robert E. Lee during his 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania. In 1864 opponents of the war in Charleston, Illinois, killed six Union soldiers. Clearly, these southern partisans were more motivated by anti-Union sentiments than by opposition to war and violence.

Democratic Ohio politicians such as U.S. Rep. Clement L. Vallandigham and state legislator Edson B. Olds in 1863 urged citizens to oppose conscription and the abolition of slavery. Vallandigham and Olds became two of the 15,000 antiwar Democrats, or "Copperheads," placed under arrest by state and federal authorities. The Copperheads, also called Peace Democrats, opposed the war and advocated instead for a negotiated settlement with the southern states. After being jailed for several months, Copperheads were often freed or exiled to the South or Canada.

Resenting the nativist sentiments of many abolitionist Republicans, Irish and German Catholics were often strongly Democratic and antiwar. In 1862 German Catholics in Wisconsin, protesting a state draft, stormed a courthouse, beat government officials, and destroyed records. Six hundred troops had to be deployed to restore order. In July 1863, Irish Catholics in New York, protesting the newly enacted federal Conscription Act, torched Army recruiting centers, killed police officers, and lynched African Americans. Federal troops had to be rushed from the Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, battlefield to end the worst urban riot in American history, in which at least 105 people died.

Having been elected in 1860 with 40 percent of the popular vote in a field of four candidates, Lincoln maintained a tenuous hold on the North. In 1864 antiwar Democrats captured control of their party, nominating former Union general George McClellan as their presidential peace candidate. Only Union general William T. Sherman's capture of Atlanta in September 1864 secured Lincoln's reelection.

World War I Era
America's victory against Spain in 1898, and the subsequent guerilla insurrection in the Philippines that killed 7,000 U.S.

Members of the Women's Peace Party at a dock in The Hague, Netherlands, where they participated in the International Congress of Women's antiwar demonstration in 1915. (© CORBIS)

soldiers and purportedly claimed the lives of 250,000 Filipinos, led to the formation of the Anti-Imperialist League. Its 30,000 members, including novelist Mark Twain, charged that Pres. William McKinley was attempting to establish an American Empire. Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan, having failed to defeat McKinley in 1896 with an economic-centered campaign, made anti-imperialism the focus of the 1900 election.

Bryan lost, but the issue of American imperialism did not disappear. In reaction to the outbreak of the World War I in Europe, Chicago social worker Jane Addams founded the Women's Peace Party in 1915. (This organization changed its name to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom in 1919.) Also in 1915, Protestant clergyman A. J. Muste established the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), which advocated complete noncooperation with the U.S. government.

Once Pres. Woodrow Wilson declared war on Germany in 1917, civil rights activist Roger Baldwin and the Peoples' Council for Peace and Democracy led demonstrations against conscription and the U.S. alliance with Great Britain, France, and Czarist Russia. Congress passed the Espionage Act (1917) and the Sedition Act (1918) to criminalize criticism of the war effort. Socialist Party leader Eugene V. Debs was convicted in 1918 for violating the Espionage Act when he defended the right of antiwar partisans to condemn the war. Meanwhile Baldwin and Muste were among the 4,000 conscientious objectors incarcerated for refusing to serve in the military. Baldwin founded the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in 1920 to provide legal aid to the advocates of unpopular political causes, including conscientious objectors.

Pockets of isolationist and/or anti-British sentiment in Boston, the Midwest, and Oklahoma, often among ethnic

Irish and Germans, existed, however, the epicenter of the World War I peace movement was New York City. Many of the thousands of New Yorkers who joined organizations such as the American Union Against Militarism, the No Conscription League, and the Peoples' Council for Peace and Democracy were immigrant Jews from Eastern Europe. They did not wish to ally with anti-Semitic Czarist Russia; their stance did not change after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution when Russia's communist leaders made peace with Germany.

A rift developed within New York's Jewish enclaves, with Rabbi Stephen Wise championing a war for European democracy and the establishment of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East. In contrast, anarchist Emma Goldman advocated draft evasion and revolutionary violence. Socialist labor lawyer Morris Hillquit joined the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union in defending draft resisters.

Hillquit ran for mayor of New York City in 1917 on an antiwar platform, evidence of how much importance many urban residents attached to U.S. foreign policy. New York's socialists distributed an unprecedented five million pieces of antiwar literature in support of the campaign. Election results were mixed: Hillquit was defeated and socialist congressman Meyer London of the Lower East Side lost his seat, but 10 socialists were elected to the New York Assembly. Of the socialist parties of the industrial West, of which the U.S. party was the most politically marginal, only the American branch opposed participation in the war.

World War II Era

Americans' enthusiasm for military intervention waned in the 1920s and 1930s. Most citizens had little interest in the world outside their own struggle for survival during the Great Depression. Despite increasing German and Japanese military aggression in the 1930s, public sentiment remained isolationist. A 1937 Gallup Public Opinion Poll reported that 70 percent of Americans thought that becoming involved in World War I had been a mistake. Only the Japanese attack on the U.S. Pacific fleet in December 1941, followed by Nazi Germany's declaration of war, forced Americans to reevaluate their opposition to war.

Isolationist tendencies were not limited to the United States. For example, in 1933, the Oxford University Student Union in England adopted a pledge not to defend Britain in the event of war. Subsequently, both the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID, established 1932) and the Communist Party's National Student League (NSL, founded 1931) encouraged students to embrace an equivalent American oath. In 1934 SLID and the NSL organized a peace strike in support of the Oxford Pledge. Activists claimed that 25,000 students—of which 15,000 resided in New York City—had participated in the strike.

In 1935 the newly founded American Student Union (ASU) mounted a second, larger, peace strike. Organizers claimed that anywhere from 150,000 to 500,000 students supported the Oxford Pledge—representing 11 percent to 37 percent of all college students. The University of California–Berkeley, the University of Chicago, New York City College, Columbia, Harvard, Smith, Stanford, and the University of Virginia witnessed rallies of varying size and militancy.

The ASU, plagued by sectarian disputes among socialists, communists, and Democrats, had lost much its campus clout by 1939 when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union joined forces to dismember Poland. Despite the failures of the ASU and SLID, their alumni, notably Walter Reuther and Molly Yard, graduated to positions of political influence. Reuther became president of the United Automobile Workers Union and Yard the leader of the feminist National Organization for Women.

Off-campus, the Catholic Worker Movement, founded in 1933 by former New York journalist Dorothy Day, dedicated itself to the moral reform of capitalism and to the abolition of war. But few Catholics embraced Day's religious pacifism. Of the 11,887 Americans who claimed conscientious objector status during U.S. participation in World War II, just 135 were Catholic.

Cold War–Vietnam War

The economic and military commitments required to sustain America's post–World War II policy of communist containment, along with opposition to conscription, fostered the growth of the largest peace organizations in U.S. history.

In demographic terms the composition of anti–Cold War and anti–Vietnam War groups differed little from earlier, similar organizations. Upper-class Protestants and Reform Jews predominated, many with college degrees and engaged in such professions as education, journalism, the ministry, and law. What was different about the post–World War II antiwar movement was its size. The expansion of higher education, the growth of white-collar professional employment as the U.S. economy shifted from unskilled manufacturing and toward "knowledge" fields, and the expansion of public-sector jobs in social work, teaching, and legal aid, swelled the ranks of potential critics of American society and foreign policy.

In 1957, editor Norman Cousins helped found the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE). Cousins and SANE initially focused their efforts on persuading presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. SANE claimed partial success when the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963 agreed to ban the atmospheric testing of atomic weapons (although underground testing was allowed to continue). With the military escalation of the Vietnam conflict in 1965, SANE shifted its attention to opposing that war and conventional military conflict in general; SANE grew to 25,000 members in the Vietnam Era.

Religiously motivated Americans came together in 1965 to found the Clergy and Laymen (later Laity) Concerned about Vietnam (CALCAV). Its leaders, who were overwhelmingly from mainstream Protestant and Reform Jewish congregations, included civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. Jesuit priest Daniel Berrigan was a rare Catholic in CALCAV's ranks. As would be expected of a group that grew out of seminaries and religiously affiliated colleges, CALCAV emphasized the importance of nonviolent protest and political education. Father Berrigan and his brother Philip moved beyond CALCAV's moderate tactics, choosing in 1967 and 1968 to launch raids on Selective Service offices to attempt to destroy draft files. Berrigan inspired a very small generation of activists—collectively known as the Catholic New Left—to raid draft boards across the United States.

By far the largest antiwar organization in post–World War II America was the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), founded by activists at such elite schools as the University of Chicago, Michigan, Harvard, and Swarthmore in 1962. Tracing its ancestry to the 1930s-era SLID, SDS embraced the socialist critique of U.S. capitalism and opposition to overseas military intervention. By 1968, one-third of its 100,000 members were "red diaper babies," the children of 1930s socialists and communists. SDS members were mainly middle- to upper-middleclass liberal arts majors from predominantly secular Protestant and Jewish households. Few Catholics, African Americans, or Republicans could be found.

As student organizations such as SDS expanded and embraced violent protest, they gained preeminence in the anti–Vietnam War movement. At the same time, however, their relative campus popularity and confrontational style angered off-campus constituencies. The violent clashes between radicals and Chicago police at the 1968 Democratic National Convention aroused further public disgust with peace activists. By 1969 the majority of Americans had turned against both the Vietnam War and those who protested against U.S. foreign policy. The Democratic Party, split between its pro- and antiwar factions, fell into disarray after its 1972 presidential peace candidate, George McGovern lost the votes of southern whites, working-class whites and union members, and blue-collar Catholics—the core Democratic voting blocs since the 1930s.

Since the 1960s antiwar organizations have multiplied, sustained by a host of charitable foundations and university study centers. Without the threat of conscription or the political and economic mobilization of America for major military operations, however, peace groups have not gained traction outside their traditional bases—the fringe of the Democratic Party and organizations of the far Left. The desire to avoid the social upheaval of the 1960s, what academics and pundits have called "the Vietnam Syndrome," is apparent. Many observers note that the fear of large-scale antiwar mobilization has likely contributed to Pres. George W. Bush's decisions in the war on terror to oppose conscription, the

expansion of U.S. armed forces, and to not call for civilian sacrifices and higher taxes.

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Ali, Mohammed; American Peace Society; Berrigan, Daniel and Philip Berrigan; Clergy and Laity Concerned about Vietnam; Conscientious Objection; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Film and War; Isolationism; Literature and War; Music and War; New York City Anti-Draft Riots; Pacifism; Quakers; Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; see also specific wars

Related Documents

1777 b; 1910; 1915 b; 1917 c; 1919 d; 1930; 1965 f; 1966 b, c; 1977

—*Kenneth J. Heineman*

Apocalypse Now

Film directed by Francis Ford Coppola, 1979

Apocalypse Now (1979) is widely considered to be one of the great movies about the Vietnam War. Directed by Francis Ford Coppola, the film is loosely based on Joseph Conrad's novella *Heart of Darkness* (1902) and, like its inspiration, develops vivid imagery and characters that can be interpreted either as a searing criticism of war, racism, and colonialism or as an unintentional expression of the values it is trying to indict. Coppola suggests that the Vietnam War was, at worst, a colossal waste of American resources and idealism, and at best, a monument to the country's naiveté and hubris.

In the film, Martin Sheen plays Capt. Benjamin Willard who is charged with finding and either bringing back or killing the brilliant but erratic Col. Walter Kurtz, played by Marlon Brando. Willard is weary of the war, but soldiers on with his assignment, intrigued by Kurtz. Like the protagonist in Conrad's novella, Willard will journey up a river, although now on a gunboat rather than a steamship. The mouth of the river is blocked by the Viet Cong (often referred to as "Charlie"), so before he can proceed, Willard must wait for an attack by American soldiers commanded by Lt. Col. Bill Kilgore (Robert Duvall). Kilgore is unwilling to attack— until he is informed of the great surfing at that beach. The result is some of the most vivid and absurd film imagery about Vietnam.

Kilgore's Air Cavalry launch their attack, playing Wagner's Ride of the Valkyries over loudspeakers beneath their helicopters to give themselves a psychological edge. The battle is lopsided; the Viet Cong in question are mostly villagers whose weapons are no match for the gunships' rockets and machine guns. Kilgore orders an air strike against a tree line, and jets pound the enemy with napalm. In one of the film's most-quoted speeches, Kilgore proclaims that, "I love the smell of napalm in the morning. You know, one time we had a hill bombed, 12 hours. When it was all over, I walked up. We didn't find one of them, not one stinking dink body. Smell, you know that gasoline smell. The whole hill. It smells like victory." Still under fire, Kilgore orders his men to surf and reluctantly they comply.

Willard and the crew travel up the river. Despite some lighthearted moments, such as waterskiing behind the boat, the war strips them of innocence. When they stop a Vietnamese family on a boat, fearful of an ambush, one of the men opens fire with a machine gun, killing everyone on board (except a puppy, which they adopt).

Further upstream, deeper into the heart of darkness, they encounter the last American outpost. One side of the river is controlled by the Americans, the other by the Viet Cong. The Americans control the day, Charlie rules the night. Every day, the Americans are ordered to build a bridge across the river. Every night, Charlie destroys it. The Viet Cong arrive at night and light up the sky with flares, tracer bullets, and rockets. The Americans are demoralized and terrorized. Willard searches in vain for someone in command; finally, he asks a grunt if he knows who is in command. The man answers "yes," and walks away.

Willard and the soldiers are disturbed and unnerved, but push on. The river is narrow now, and the Americans are attacked by the Montagnards, mountain dwellers whom Kurtz had organized to fight the Viet Cong. Now the Montagnards fight to prevent Kurtz from being taken from them. They ambush Willard's boat, killing the boat's commander, but still the men press forward.

When the Americans finally arrive at Kurtz's encampment, they discover that he, like the original Kurtz in Conrad's story, has become like a god to the people he commands. Conrad suggests that his Kurtz relied on mass murder to collect enormous stores of ivory, which he shipped down the river to the colonial authorities. (Conrad had been to the Congo Free State as a captain of a river steamer, and he saw the methods of the Belgian colonists that resulted in the deaths of up to 10 million Congolese.) Coppola's Kurtz is mad, but although the Army has decided his "methods are unsound," Coppola never shows exactly how Kurtz obtained his power. That Kurtz's methods are brutal is suggested by an American photographer, played by Dennis Hopper, who also worships Kurtz, although Kurtz once almost had him killed. Kurtz subjects Willard to his history and vision for what it will take to win the war. He recalls that, after his unit of Special Forces inoculated some Vietnamese children, the Viet Cong cut their arms off. "I thought: My God . . . the genius of that. The genius. The will to do that. . . .And then I realized they were stronger than we . . . [they] were not monsters. These were men . . . trained cadres. These men who fought with their hearts, who had families, who had children, who were filled with love . . . but they had the strength . . . the strength . . . to do that. If I had 10 divisions of those men, our troubles here would be over very quickly."

Instead, Willard kills Kurtz, less to fulfill his orders than to provide Kurtz with the spiritual release that he craves. Willard finds Kurtz's final message to him, which is to "drop the bomb and exterminate them all." This was an echo of Conrad's Kurtz, whose message to those who would protect the Congolese was to "exterminate all the brutes."

As with Conrad, the story is only told from the perspective of the outsiders; no Vietnamese emerges to interpret the narrative. In the end, the film leaves unresolved the exact cause of the horror evoked by the heart of darkness. Is it the war itself? If so, why? Is it colonialism—a stretch, given the organization of the movie—or, more likely, that the amorality of the "natives" lowers Americans to their level? Thus, while *Apocalypse Now* criticizes the war, it reflects a wider confusion among the war's opponents about the Vietnamese: Are they noble savages whom the United States corrupted, or savages who corrupted idealistic Americans? Or is war itself a savage endeavor that corrupts all that wage it? Whether "the horror" resulted from American ignorance, idealism, or hubris, the movie proved wildly popular with moviegoers and is now considered a classic. The film was

nominated for eight Academy Awards including Best Picture, and won two—for cinematography and sound.

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Deer Hunter, The; Film and War; *Platoon*; Rambo; Vietnam War

—*John Hinshaw*

Armored Vehicles

The production of armored vehicles is a highly specialized industry that first appeared during World War I and reached its height in the United States during World War II. Armored vehicles—including tanks, personnel carriers, and tracked artillery pieces—are very expensive and time-consuming to manufacture. Most require large engines, armament, and tracked propulsion systems. Traditionally, the United States has maintained neither a large peacetime military nor the weapons used by such a force, which has necessitated having the capability to rapidly produce weapons during wartime. Furthermore, armored vehicle technology is a very dynamic field, with rapid shifts in composition, structure, and philosophy. Despite such challenges, the American military has been very successful in procuring the armored weapons necessary for modern land warfare.

During World War I, America produced virtually no armored vehicles. Because the United States had not invested heavily in the technology and production facilities necessary for armored vehicles during the war, in the post-war period, American military engineers could experiment with several vehicle designs. In the 1920s, the Army relied upon lightly protected tanks with high mobility but little firepower. American planners expected the tanks to assume the role of 19th-century cavalry—screening infantry, raiding areas behind enemy lines, and performing reconnaissance. Thus, tanks would not face enemy armored units, which could be engaged by "tank destroyer" guns and self-propelled artillery. These light tanks had very little armor plating but a much stronger main armament, required fewer resources, and could be produced quickly during wartime. They were designed around a chassis and frame similar to that of an automobile; thus, assembly line automobile factories could be rapidly converted to the production of tanks and other armored vehicles.

American forces deployed to Europe in World War II discovered that their light tanks could not successfully engage German tanks. American commanders soon demanded a shift to medium tanks, with bigger armament and thicker armor plating. The heavier machines required a more durable assembly line for production, but the military could not wait for the construction of entirely new factories. Instead, the government asked domestic farm equipment manufacturers to convert to tank production while the new factories were completed. Despite conversion of existing factories, and the construction of new facilities, full-scale production of armored vehicles did not begin until 1943. Most of the nearly 100,000 tanks manufactured during the war were built in 1943 and 1944, when production reached an all-time high. In addition to producing tanks for American needs, the United States sent more than 30,000 tanks to allies throughout the world, along with thousands of other armored vehicles, through the Lend-Lease program.

The production of such large numbers of tanks required a huge amount of resources and civilian labor. Millions of individuals entered the workforce for the first time, making a tremendous impact upon the production capability of the United States. A number of unique advantages enabled American wartime production of armored vehicles to far outstrip that of any other nation. The United States was able to use existing factories to a large degree, possessed its own natural resources and a large domestic labor pool, and did not face the likelihood of combat on its own soil.

In the postwar years, converted factories returned to manufacturing their peacetime products. However, numerous facilities created exclusively for the production of armored vehicles remained. With the advent of the Cold War, government contracts for the production of armored vehicles continued. Maximum production efforts were no longer required, but armored vehicles continually evolved in the latter half of the 20th century, and thus production never completely ceased. The sophistication and specialization of modern armored vehicles have enabled production to be confined to dedicated factories. Research and development of new systems is a continual process, resulting in new orders for fresh production and retrofitting of existing models. American land forces remain very dependent upon the use of armored vehicles, but have not required the massive production rates of World War II since 1945.

American tank design fell behind that of its competitors both in the Soviet Union and in allied European countries until the release of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank in the late 1980s. Designed to counter the perceived Soviet threat, the Abrams is extremely heavy, very large, and carries a powerful main armament. The sheer size and complexity of the Abrams make unlikely the rapid production of large numbers of new tanks in the event of a full-scale war. This new form of tank—designed to directly engage enemy armored forces at long range rather than relying on speed, mobility, and numerical advantage—represented a complete reversal of American doctrine from World War II.

With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army has reconsidered its reliance on the Abrams. Deployments around the world have emphasized the effectiveness of its design, but also pointed up the difficulty of moving such heavy vehicles in large numbers. In the first years of the 21st century, the Army began to shift once again to a lighter, more mobile vehicle, the multipurpose wheeled chassis Stryker. It remains to be seen whether the Stryker will be capable of both personnel transport and serving as a weapons platform, as was envisioned by American planners.

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Related Entries

Military–Industrial Complex; Rosie the Riveter; Technology and Revolutionary Changes in Military Affairs; War Industries Board

—Paul J. Springer

Arms Trade

The conventional arms trade, a multibillion dollar business, is dominated by a few powerful countries. But while providing for legitimate defense needs, weapons transfers may also fuel violence and conflict. The United States remains the world's largest arms exporter—sending approximately $13.6 billion in weapons and completing nearly 57 percent of all global arms transfer agreements in 2003. In that year, the United Kingdom was second with $4.7 billion in deliveries, and Russia was third with $3.4 billion in deliveries. In arms transfer agreements, as opposed to actual deliveries, in 2003 Russia was second with $4.3 billion in agreements and

Germany was third with $1.4 billion in agreements. Thus the United States and Russia between them made nearly 74 percent of all international arms transfer agreements and the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom provided almost 76 percent of all weapons delivered.

Wealthy countries are not the only nations spending-money on arms. Developing countries divert precious resources to pay for the tools of war. In 2003, the developing world received $8.6 billion worth of weapons. The United States was responsible for $6.2 billion in weapons deals to developing nations—approximately 45 percent of all the conventional arms deals concluded with developing nations, delivering $6.3 billion in weapons to them in 2003. The value of worldwide conventional arms trade agreements in 2003 was over $26.5 billion.

For the most part, conventional arms are traded on the legal market. In the United States, most arms sales are governed by the 1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). U.S. law, through the AECA and FAA, is intended to ensure that U.S. weapons are transferred only to desirable actors. These regulations were developed to prevent U.S. weapons from undermining regional and global security and stability, weakening democratic ideals, supporting military coups, escalating arms races, exacerbating ongoing conflicts, causing regional arms build-ups, or being used to commit human rights abuses.

Arms sales provided by the United States fall into five categories, but by far the two largest and most well known are: foreign military sales (FMS), government-to-government sales negotiated by the Department of Defense, and direct commercial sles (DCS), sales negotiated by U.S. companies and foreign buyers. (The three other categories of arms sales are leases of military equipment, excess defense articles, or emergency draw downs of weapons stocks.) FMS are overseen by the Defense Department while DCS are administered by the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). Companies transferring arms through DCS must apply for a license for each arms transfer. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations lists all items considered munitions, which require licenses from DDTC to be transferred.

Transparency in Armaments

After the 1991 Gulf War, when it became clear that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had amassed a sophisticated arsenal of conventional weapons, nations realized that to enhance international peace and security, international transparency mechanisms must be developed to see where countries were exporting weapons. The resulting system was the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. The U.N. Register covers seven categories of weapons: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. The register is voluntary and states provide information on their imports, exports, military procurement, production, holdings and other information they deem appropriate. By 2003, 164 countries had participated in the U.N. Register. The United States has contributed information every year since the register's founding in 1992.

On a regional level, the United States participates in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in 1996 to promote transparency and greater responsibility in conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies transfers, with the goal of contributing to international peace and security and preventing the accumulation of destabilizing amounts of conventional arms. (Dual-use goods and technologies are those with both civilian and military uses.) The arrangement has 33 participating states (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States), virtually all of the export producing countries in the world. Participants in the Wassenaar Arrangement share information on potential arms exports, although export of those weapons is left to the discretion of the individual states.

The United States is one of the few countries to operate national transparency mechanisms. The U.S. government is required by law to release annual reports of U.S. arms exports through the FMS, DCS, Commerce Department

programs, and other government arms export programs; this "Section 655 Report" notifies Congress of potential arms sales above a determined amount and makes public all arms contract announcements. Moreover, the United States publishes an annual end-use monitoring report to demonstrate the tracking of weapons before they are shipped and once they leave U.S. borders. End-use monitoring is designed to ensure the proper use of U.S.-origin weapons and encompasses all laws, policies, regulations, and procedures used to verify that a foreign government or the authorized foreign recipient of U.S. defense articles is employing and controlling them in accordance with U.S. terms and conditions. However, in fiscal year 2003, the State Department completed end-use checks on less than 1 percent of all defense article licenses reviewed by DDTC.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

Although access to heavy conventional weapons remains of great concern, the greatest daily threats to international peace and security come from the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Small arms and light weapons include any weapon that can be carried by one or two people, mounted on a vehicle, or carried by a pack animal, ranging from machine guns to shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles. Cheap, portable, durable, extremely lethal, easy to use, and widely available, they are the weapons of choice for governments and nonstate actors alike. An estimated 639 million small arms were in circulation around the world in 2004.

The small arms trade—both legal and illicit—has flourished, with the legal small arms market estimated at $4 billion a year and the illicit market estimated at close to $1 billion. Small arms are more ubiquitous and are involved in a much more complex international trade than are heavy conventional weapons. No international transparency mechanisms have been established for global small arms transfers; accordingly, the true extent of the trade is impossible to ascertain. Small arms enter the legal market domestically through sales to individuals and internationally through both commercial sales and military aid. The illicit trade in small arms is linked to the legal trade, as most weapons on the black market arrive through some form of diversion. Small arms enter the black market through a variety of routes:

intentional violation of regional or international sanctions and embargoes, poor stockpile security, looting of national arsenals, theft and loss from government and military stocks and from civilian owners, sale for cash by soldiers, individuals buying weapons legally and reselling them illegally, and craft production.

The proliferation and misuse of small arms can have devastating consequences on a population, country, or region. The uncontrolled availability and abuse of small arms have created humanitarian disasters around the world, caused massive forced and voluntary migration, perpetuated violent conflict, and instigated new cycles of violence and crime. Surplus small arms often destabilize regions of conflict, weaken fragile states, and put troops at direct risk. Even in postconflict situations, the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms puts peacekeepers in danger, diminishes national and multinational business opportunities, impedes the ability of humanitarian and relief organizations to conduct their efforts, contributes to public health crises because of inability to securely deliver and provide health care, and hampers sustainable development. The abundance of these persistent weapons fuels or reignites conflicts, provides tools for criminal violence, and disrupts peace-building and development.

The Arms Trade and the War on Terror

As the United States prosecutes its war on terrorism, U.S. weapons sales and transfers are sometimes used as enticements to influence countries to support U.S. policies. In many cases, weapons have been provided to nations that the United States has criticized for human rights violations, lack of democracy, and prior support of terrorism, thus undermining the very principles enshrined in U.S. export law. The basis for offering weapons (either sold or given) seems to be a kind of quid pro quo: many countries desire military upgrades in exchange for intelligence sharing, use of bases and airspace, as well as loyalty. For example—prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq—Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates received approval for arms purchases, including planes, helicopters, and missiles, that had been delayed in the U.S. export system for years, as inducements for basing rights during a war in Iraq. In addition,

immediately after September 11, 2001, the United States was granted basing rights in Uzbekistan, which subsequently received nearly $100 million in U.S. military assistance for weapons purchases and training.

Observers are especially troubled by this practice because weapons, especially small arms—particularly valuable for terrorist networks—are difficult to control once they leave U.S. borders, with a high risk of them being diverted into the hands of the very people the United States is trying to defeat as part of its war on terror. Indeed, as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the United States could find itself facing down individuals armed with U.S.-origin weapons. Weapons threatening U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, such as Stinger surface-to-air missiles, were originally supplied by the U.S. government, to help the mujahideen oust the Soviet Union from the country. Weapons killing U.S. forces on a daily basis in Iraq may have originated from U.S. arms sales to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. Critics of current policies argue that the United States must ensure that the weapons it exports are used properly by improving end-use monitoring, destroying surplus and obsolete weapons, securing existing stockpiles of weapons, increasing international cooperation, and enhancing international transparency mechanisms.

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Related Entries

Gun Ownership, Military–Industrial Complex, War on Terrorism

—Rachel Stohl

Army Industrial College

The emergence of mass armies and industrialized technology gave added importance to the home front in 20th century warfare. Countries that could effectively organize their economic and manpower resources tended to enjoy the most success. The Army Industrial College was founded in 1924 in response to America's mobilization difficulties during

World War I. Officers were taught planning skills for expanding the Army to wartime strength and converting the economy to military requirements. Many courses consisted of case studies that could be used during an actual conflict. The worst scenarios involved global wars in which the economy and the Army were expected to expand to more than 10 times their peacetime size.

In accordance with public sentiment, Pres. Woodrow Wilson kept the United States out of the war until April 1917. When the country finally entered the conflict, the British and French armies were on the brink of defeat. The Bolshevik Revolution had knocked Russia out of the war, which allowed the German Army to devote its full resources to the Western Front. The German Navy also intensified its submarine attacks on merchant ships supplying Britain and France. German political and military leaders knew that these tactics might provoke American intervention, but they expected the war to be finished before the United States could make a difference. The U.S. Army was pitifully small; most soldiers and officers had spent their careers policing the country's western frontier, engaging in skirmishes with Native Americans. Its last attempt at organizing an expeditionary force during the Spanish–American War was a disaster. The congressional investigation following this debacle prompted important reforms under Secretary of War Elihu Root, but the Army was still not prepared to expand to the size needed in 1917.

Beyond the question of force size, the other side of the mobilization process involved the transformation of industrial production from commercial goods to wartime products, a practice known as industrial reconversion. Factory lines had to be retooled for military needs and additional processes developed to support new technology. Although the U.S. economy was the world's largest, the size of the conflict inevitably required a tremendous expansion of the economy to support the growth of the U.S. military as well as allied materiel requirements and the continuing needs of those at the homefront. The scale of expansion could and did create acute problems in the allocation of resources, transportation and distribution schedules, and labor and material costs.

The Wilson administration borrowed from Progressive ideas on economic planning in creating the War Industries Board (WIB), headed by Wall Street financier Bernard Baruch, to manage the economic mobilization. The WIB took unprecedented control of the economy, to the degree that the phrase "wartime socialism" has been used to describe the period. Baruch enlisted the support of fellow businessmen to work with corporations having large government contracts. They helped to determine production priorities, coordinate access to transportation networks, and resolve any labor or material shortages. The WIB enjoyed varying success in all three areas but suffered some notable failures, too. The American Expeditionary Force experienced critical shortages during its first months in France that limited its combat effectiveness. The mobilization effort also had to overcome its share of mismanagement, bickering, and racketeering at home. To some extent, senior Army leaders hampered the board's efforts because of conflicting priorities and distrust of the civilians running it. The WIB also did not initially have enough authority to force corporations to comply with its wishes.

Contingency planning had been a part of the military's procedures since the end of the 19th century. However, the problems encountered in gearing up for World War I convinced the Army that economic mobilization also needed to be an important part of its calculations. The Army Industrial College used the WIB as a springboard for mobilization planning in the 1920s and 1930s. Although specific scenarios varied, many assumptions were consistent: any general war would require at least a tenfold expansion of the Army; the United States might well be fighting on multiple, geographically separated fronts with unique logistical requirements; the economy must be able to support the needs of allies as well as its own forces. In the beginning, most of the work at the Army Industrial College revolved around planning for a fictitious M-day, or mobilization day. What tasks needed to be accomplished to meet certain requirements by M-day? Where should mobilization efforts be in the days and months thereafter, e.g., M-day +30, M-day +60, etc.?

By the 1930s, these efforts had become quite sophisticated. Planners assessed the availability of critical raw materials and suggested possible alternatives. Similar analysis was conducted on likely adversaries and how that could be turned to an advantage during war. The college developed

different blueprints for organizing a wartime economy and tested the suitability of possible manufacturers with sample orders. Most plans assumed the necessity of temporary agencies staffed by civilians, in hopes of alleviating the earlier friction between the military and the WIB. Students were also exposed to a wide range of speakers from business, government, science, and technology as part of their curriculum. Like the Army's other advanced schools, the Industrial College worked with other planning groups, especially the Army Navy Munitions Board and War Plans Division, to provide as comprehensive a mobilization plan as possible.

To some extent, the mobilization for World War II ran more smoothly as a result. Although needing nearly two years to fully mobilize, the Army undertook a far more complicated task than that in World War I. World War II was truly a global conflict, with the Army heavily engaged across the globe. The material needs of its allies were also greater, but the U.S. economy responded to the challenge, thus earning its reputation as an arsenal of democracy. The efforts of the Army Industrial College factored greatly into the success of this mobilization. Its graduates, along with officers from the War Plans Division, were among the Army's most prominent leaders, including Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. In the postwar spirit of defense unification, the Army Industrial College became the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, which was part of a larger conglomerate of military education, the National War College. Its mission remained the preparation of officers for strategic leadership as well as advanced research in mobilization and logistical planning.

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Related Entries

Economy and War; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Military–Industrial Complex; National War College; Spanish–American War; War Industries Board

—Todd Forney

Arnold, Henry Harley

(1886–1950)
American Air Force Officer

The architect of the American air arm that helped make the Allied victory in World War II possible, Henry H. "Hap" Arnold devoted his military career to the advancement of air power. His legacies also include the independence of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the technological supremacy that American military aviation has enjoyed since the mid-20th century.

Arnold was born in Gladwyne, Pennsylvania, on June 25, 1886. After graduating from West Point in 1907, he was commissioned in the infantry. He transferred into the aeronautical division of the Signal Corps three years later, becoming a flying instructor. During World War I, Arnold served in an administrative post, never experiencing combat.

Arnold enthusiastically embraced the air power theories of Gen. William Mitchell, the Army's outspoken advocate of strategic bombing and an independent air force. When Mitchell was court-martialed for insubordination in 1925, Arnold testified in his defense. Mitchell was convicted and Arnold considered resigning his commission, but decided he could best carry on Mitchell's work by remaining in the Army. He organized a number of practical air power demonstrations in the next decade, including an airdrop of supplies to snowbound villages and a flight of a formation of bombers from California to Alaska.

Arnold earned his first star in 1935 when he became assistant chief of the Army Air Corps. Three years later he was promoted to commander when his superior was killed in a flying accident. One of his first tasks was to manage the expansion of the air corps, authorized by Congress in response to rising war tensions in Europe. Britain and France were also purchasing American aircraft, and Arnold

had to work closely with manufacturers, who were unused to such large orders, to ensure that all their customers' orders were filled on time. Under his guidance, the air corps—redesignated the Army Air Forces (AAF) in 1942—became the largest and most powerful air arm in history and a significant factor in the Allied victories over Germany and Japan. Arnold also established the Civil Air Patrol, the AAF's civilian auxiliary, and the Woman's Army Service Pilots (WASPs), a cadre of female fliers whose domestic aircraft delivery flights freed male pilots for combat duty.

While on a fact-finding tour of Britain in early 1941, Arnold witnessed the test flight of a jet airplane. The United States had no comparable program; American aeronautical engineers had traditionally focused on improving existing technologies rather than developing new ones. Arnold quickly arranged for American manufacturers to design and produce jet engines and aircraft. The first American jet, a fighter, began flying in 1942, but was not used in combat during World War II.

Determined that the United States would not fall behind in aeronautical technology in the future, Arnold commissioned Dr. Theodore von Kármán in 1944 to survey the current state of aeronautics and to identify the technologies the air force should develop after the war. The resulting report, Toward New Horizons (12 vols.), guided air force research and development programs for the next five decades. Among the topics it examined were jet power, supersonic flight, aircraft manufacturing processes and materials, radar, fuels, rockets and missiles, communications, aviation medicine, and space travel.

In 1944 and 1945 Arnold prepared a series of reports for the secretary of war describing AAF activities during World War II and outlining his plans for the postwar AAF. The last of these, focusing on the future of American military aviation, was published almost verbatim in the February 1946 *National Geographic* as "Air Power for Peace." Arnold wrote throughout his career, presenting the case for air power and an independent air arm to the public through numerous articles and books such as *Winged Warfare*, *This Flying Game* (both written with fellow officer Ira Eaker), *Airmen and Aircraft*, and the Bill Bruce series for children. *Global Mission*, his autobiography, was published in 1949.

When the development of the advanced B-29 bomber was delayed by technical problems, Arnold ordered the airplane into production despite its defects. He also decided to employ the B-29 in the Pacific exclusively. In an attempt to prevent local theater commanders from interfering with the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, Arnold directed B-29 operations from Washington (although he delegated command to generals Curtis E. LeMay and Carl Spaatz). Once the atomic bomb became available, Arnold informed his fellow chiefs of staff that he believed that conventional bombing alone could defeat Japan. Having no other objections, however, he worked closely with the president, secretary of war, and joint chiefs to determine how best to use the new weapon.

Arnold was promoted to general of the Army (five stars) on December 21, 1944. He retired in 1946 and was succeeded by Carl Spaatz. Health problems prevented him from taking an active role in the postwar debates about air force independence; however, few then or since could argue that he had not done enough for the cause during his service career. The AAF became the USAF in 1947. Two years later, Arnold's rank was redesignated "General of the Air Force." He is the only five-star general the USAF has ever had.

Arnold suffered a fatal heart attack on January 13, 1950. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia.

"Hap" Arnold, whose career began in the biplane era and lasted into the jet age, understood that technology was the foundation of air power. He built the AAF into the largest and most advanced air arm of World War II and provided for its technological superiority for decades after. By his direct control of the B-29 force, he demonstrated the practicality of an independent air force.

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Related Entries

Aerial Bombardment; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Manhattan Project; Military Academy, United States; Mitchell, William; Spaatz, Carl; Women in the Military; World War II

—Roger Horky

Art

See Visual Arts and War.

Articles of War

In June 1775, when the colonists of British North America organized themselves to fight against the British Empire, their legislative body, the Continental Congress, passed legislation known as articles of war to regulate the Army. In November 1775, Congress also created a Navy and passed articles to govern it. The Marines were to be governed by the Army's laws when on land and the Navy's when on the water. With some minor changes in practice and procedure, these two sets of articles governed the military organizations of the United States for the next 175 years. Under these articles, servicemen surrendered a number of important civil liberties when they enlisted and were often subjected to harsher punishments than were common in civilian life. However, in the 20th century, mass mobilizations for two world wars brought changes to the system. Widespread complaints about military justice led the U.S. Congress, in 1950, to enact a Uniform Code of Military Justice governing all branches of military service, which narrowed the gap between civilian and military systems of justice.

When the Continental Congress met in the summer of 1775, the colonists already had considerable experience with systems of military justice. The colonies had almost all passed legislation to govern their militias, and a number of colonies had passed legislation to govern the provincial troops they had raised to fight alongside the British Army in imperial wars fought in North America, particularly the Seven Years' War. Additionally, in that war, when provincial troops were fighting beside the British, they came under the British articles of war. Thus, when the Revolutionary War broke out, colonists were already familiar with the basic outlines of military law.

Military law in this era had two particular features: it made servicemen legally subordinate to citizens, and it stipulated much harsher punishments than were common in civilian life. Both of these traditions had evolved from the traditional British fear, shared by the colonists, that an army was a threat not only to an enemy but also to the society that raised it, because a government might use the army against its own citizens. Consequently, soldiers surrendered a number of rights when they enlisted—most important, the right to a jury trial. Military cases were tried by an ad hoc panel, a court-martial. Even a death sentence could be handed down by a majority of a presiding panel that acted as judge and jury. The court-martial panel was made up of officers, by definition not peers of the accused, who was usually a soldier.

When the Continental Congress passed legislation to govern military service, it copied the British articles almost to a word. However, the colonists made one significant change. Congress shied away from implementing the brutal punishments used by the British Army and limited the use of the lash to 39 strokes (a limitation based in the laws of Moses). It did, however, allow the death penalty for offenses such as mutiny and desertion. George Washington, the first commander in chief of the Continental Army, and many of his senior officers, did not think that lash punishments were harsh enough, and successfully campaigned to allow punishment of up to 100 strokes.

Few amendments were made to the articles of war during the 19th century. In civilian life, a change in philosophy led to prison sentences aimed at reforming criminals, rather than corporal punishment to humiliate them. Many Americans came to view corporal punishment as an inappropriate sentence for free men and women in an enlightened democratic republic. This idea grew steadily as full citizenship and voting rights extended from white male property

owners in the 18th century to include all white men by the 19th century. Consequently, through the first half of the 19th century, corporal punishment in civilian life was restricted to those held in slavery.

These changes had limited impact on the military. New articles of war were passed in 1806 and other later legislative amendments, but these made only procedural changes. During the War of 1812, Congress did temporarily forbid flogging but still allowed a whole range of corporal punishments such as cobbing (being beaten with a wooden paddle) and riding a wooden horse (sitting with legs on either side of a narrow board, often with weights attached at the ankles, a position that became excruciating after a few minutes). Soldiers themselves were, as they had been in the 18th century, frequently men of low status, and the consensus among officers was that harsh punishments were necessary to keep order and discipline.

No other major changes were instituted before the Civil War. In that war the Army of the Confederate States operated under largely the same articles as those of the Union, though with differences in court organization. Black soldiers serving in segregated regiments in the Union Army were subject to the same laws as white troops. However, since all officers, and thus members of a court-martial panel, were white, punishments were sometimes harsher than they would have been for white soldiers. Flogging was prohibited in the Union Army in 1861 and in the Confederate Army in 1863, but courts-martial on both sides still used a variety of corporal punishments.

In the Navy, some amendments were made to the articles in the 19th century to reflect the fact that that branch of the service had been extended from a small coastal force to one that exercised power around the globe. However, no meaningful change was made in procedures and, as in the Army, a commanding officer could bring charges, convene a court-martial panel, and review the panel's decision. Although in some cases, a review by the judge advocate general, the Army's highest ranking lawyer, was required.

By the end of the century, corporal punishment had been abolished. The end of slavery caused people to think about the meaning of citizenship, and corporal punishment as a standard instrument of the courts gradually

became unacceptable in civilian and military life. Consequently, new articles of war in 1874 permanently prohibited flogging but otherwise made little change in military justice. The Army's isolation on the frontier, combined with the difficulty there of convening enough officers to fill a court-martial, frequently led to the continued use of creative forms of corporal punishment. However, far-sighted officers were slowly beginning to consider ways in which the gap between civilian and military practice could be narrowed.

The mass mobilizations of two world wars led to the most significant changes in military justice. Five million Americans served in uniform in World War I; although the war ended before the majority of them could be sent overseas, the mobilization exposed many citizens to military justice and some were concerned by what they saw. Additionally, from 1917 to 1918 in Texas, 19 black soldiers were summarily executed; many observers were enraged that the soldiers had not even have their cases reviewed by the office of the judge advocate general. In 1920, the articles of war were revised and the new articles included some procedural changes, but the reforms were not nearly as sweeping as some had hoped.

Major reform awaited the experiences of another mass mobilization. In World War II, 16 million Americans served in the military, exposing many more to military justice. Among that number were a large number of lawyers who served either in uniform or as civilian legal advisers in the judge advocate general's office to help process the large number of courts-martial. Many were appalled by the inequity of military justice, the inexperience of courts-martial panels, inconsistencies in sentencing, and the efforts of commanding officers to dominate the proceedings. As a result of their complaints—and of others in and out of the service—the Army and Navy separately commissioned several internal studies between 1943 and 1945 to consider changes. The move to reform military justice gained momentum after the war and resulted in the passage in 1950 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The new code did not resolve all difficulties or make military justice identical to civilian, but it did remove some of the greatest procedural problems of the court-martial system.

For more than 175 years, the articles of war stood with little alteration. Yet shifting ideas about crime and punishment slowly infiltrated military institutions. The status of free men in the society and their understanding of their obligations of citizenship caused subtle shifts in the practice of military law, even while many of its procedures remained unchanged. Mass involvement in military service was necessary, however, for political momentum to build to achieve the significant reforms of 1950.

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Related Entries

Customs of War; Desertion; Uniform Code of Military Justice

—*Caroline Cox*

Atomic Bomb

See Manhattan Project.

Atrocity and Captivity Narratives

Atrocity and captivity narratives are a literary genre almost unique to English citizens and their colonial counterparts. Stories of atrocities committed during the English Civil War in the 17th century, published by both sides, were a popular propaganda tool to demonize the enemy and justify retaliatory acts, which often prompted further publications. Truthfulness in the accounts was secondary to the shock value of detailed descriptions of the torture of prisoners, women, and children. In North America, the style was modified to encompass conflicts between English colonists and Native Americans and often revolved around a captive held prisoner by a Native American group.

The most common form of the captivity narrative from this period involved a solitary colonist taken prisoner, who almost always professed a great religious faith and portrayed the captors as uncivilized savages. The narratives often depicted acts of brutal violence, including the torture and execution of fellow captives. The imprisonment typically ended through a ransom or successful escape. By the end of the 17th century, the captivity narrative had become one of the most popular forms of literature within the American colonies and remained an important American genre through the 19th century. The captivity narrative, while not unique to the American colonies, was a dominant form only among English-speaking populations. Similar narratives in other regions never attained the popularity common in the English colonies.

One of the earliest colonial narratives was written by Capt. John Smith, taken captive in December 1607 by Native Americans living in the Chesapeake Bay area. He reported that he was guarded by dozens of warriors and lavishly fed by their chief, Powhatan, who apparently intended to execute Smith. Smith's narrative was first published in

1608, but not until 1624 did Pocahontas, daughter of Powhatan, appear in the tale, intervening to save Smith's life. In earlier editions, Smith made no mention of why his life was spared. Whatever the role of Pocahontas, Smith was released by his captors and allowed to return to Jamestown, where he dispatched the story of his captivity for publication in London. Smith's 1624 account of the incident has since become an American legend, the subject of countless retellings and revisions, from the romantic epic written by the British expatriate writer John Davis in 1803 to the animated Disney movie.

Smith did not understand the Native American custom of taking captives. The quest for prisoners arose from an ancient practice of strengthening a tribe through the forceful addition of new members. Women and children were the most common captives primarily because they were the most likely candidates for successful assimilation into a tribe. Much more rarely did men join a tribe and remain dedicated to the new social group. As European and Native American populations came into contact, the practice continued, although in some cases, prisoners were taken as a means of collecting ransoms.

Smith's narrative is less graphic than most and contains few descriptions of atrocities. Many other narratives include grisly details about the torture of colonists by Native Americans, which often culminates in execution and a cannibalistic feast. In particular, missionaries seem to have been tempting targets for these atrocities and the natural subject of many narratives. The underlying assumption of many captivity narratives is that all Native Americans are savage cannibals who cannot be integrated into civilized colonial society. According to these narratives, they are to be feared and avoided, never to be trusted. In many ways, Native Americans are portrayed as subhuman, particularly in their desire for the flesh and blood of Europeans.

One major subfield of captivity narratives concerns the imprisonment of women and children. The most important example of this type of narrative was written by Mary Rowlandson, captured during King Philip's War and eventually ransomed after months of captivity. Rowlandson's account has been credited with beginning the massive pop-

The title page of the 1773 edition of Mary Rowlandson's captivity narrative. (Courtesy Rosenbach Museum & Library)

ularity of captivity narratives within New England, although hers was certainly not the first such story published. Rowlandson, the wife of a minister, was forced to assume the duties of a servant in the household of Weetamoo, sister-in-law to Metacom, leader of the enemy tribes during the war. Her story includes more than a simple explanation of her survival as it was heavily edited and prefaced by Increase Mather, a powerful Puritan minister and colonial leader in Massachusetts. As such, it is laced with biblical references designed to enhance the faith of the reader and credits Rowlandson's faith as the sole reason for her survival.

The publication of Rowlandson's narrative was quickly followed by dozens of similar stories, most of which por-

tray Native Americans stereotypically. However, in some accounts the authors successfully joined the society of their captors and present their tales of captivity in a sympathetic or even proud style. This process of assimilation into an alien culture proceeded through a series of adoption ceremonies, the most famous of which was the mock execution. Some narratives incorporate a certain degree of ethnography, as the authors try to explain the cultural behavior of their captors, foreshadowing the practices of modern anthropologists.

As the colonial frontier moved west, and the threat of Native American attack receded for most of the population, the captivity narrative underwent literary changes. These stories became increasingly sensational, while accurate ethnographic information became increasingly rare. The captivity narrative remained a common writing style throughout the 18th century, and again became a dominant form during the American Revolutionary War, with one major change. In the Revolutionary period, the captors tended to be British, but the stereotypical cruelty and brutishness remained, and the victims were still typically women and children. After the war's conclusion, prisoner narratives from individuals confined on prison hulks in the New York harbor began to appear, with accompanying tales of the depravity of British guards and the murder of American prisoners.

In the 19th century, another form of captivity narrative emerged: the slavery narrative. As the abolitionist movement gained strength, the stories of escaped slaves became a popular form of entertainment as well as a propaganda tool to help expose the evils of slavery. Similar to earlier periods in the development of captivity narratives, these stories took the form of both fiction and nonfiction. The most famous example, the autobiography of Frederick Douglass, was published in 1845. This narrative revealed details about his life that could have resulted in his arrest as an escaped slave, but it also conveyed the harsh reality of slavery in a writing style that felt familiar to most northern readers. Undoubtedly, the low number of escaped slaves literate enough to write of their experiences limited the publication of slavery narratives. However, fictional accounts of slavery could evoke powerful imagery just as

well as autobiographical accounts. Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, published in book form in 1852, certainly evokes the reader's sympathy when discussing the plight of slaves separated from their families by capricious masters.

In the post–Civil War period, captivity narratives again shifted to a new group of prisoners. In the two decades after the end of the war, hundreds of published works detailed the life of prisoners of war (POWs) held in both the North and the South. Similar bursts of POW narratives appeared after every American war of the 20th century, with the largest number of publications appearing after World War II and the Vietnam War. The captivity narrative still remains a powerful literary force in the United States, the subject of countless fictional works and movies, but also of well-known nonfiction works such as Terry Anderson's *Den of Lions*, describing life as a hostage in Lebanon, and Betty Mahmoody's *Not Without My Daughter*, about a woman who escaped her marriage in Iran. In each case, the captors have become Middle Eastern Muslims, opening a new subfield for the captivity genre in the West. The idea of captivity still evokes powerful images for the American public and resonates with readers throughout the country.

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Related Entries

Andersonville; Colonial Wars; Memory and War; Native Americans in Colonial Wars and the Revolutionary War; Prisoners of War

—Paul J. Springer

AVC

See American Veterans Committee.

B

Baby Boom

The Baby Boom refers to the period from 1946 to 1961—the largest population explosion in U.S. history. This rise in births is attributable primarily to the return of more than 15 million servicemen and women to civilian life after World War II. The immediate consequences were a rise in the marriage rate, a rise in the birthrate (the Baby Boom), and the subsequent purchasing of homes in the suburbs (home ownership doubled between 1940 and 1960). The "Baby Boomers" (the name bestowed on this larger-than-average generation of youth) generated many social changes, including a rise sexual experimentation, a commitment to civil rights, the rock 'n roll revolution, the Peace Corps, the anti–Vietnam War movement, the women's movement, and the conservative backlash of the 1970s and 1980s. As the Baby Boomers started to raise their own families, they created a slightly smaller baby boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the early 21st century, concern has grown about the ability of the current social security system to provide

The Baby Boom

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 802, "Estimates of the Population of the United States and Components of Change: 1940 to 1978," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979.

Statistics on the Baby Boom and the surrounding years clearly show the spike in number of births immediately after the end of World War II, and the gradual increase in the years after.

adequate retirement benefits to the Baby Boomers when they start to retire after 2012.

The unintended demographic consequences of the drafting of millions of men during World War II had some limited precursors. First, a baby boom of sorts occurred in the aftermath of the Civil War, when more than one million men returned to their wives and sweethearts after two or more years of separation. In addition, after the war, slaves secured the right to form legally recognized marriages and raise children without fear of their being sold upon the death of debt-ridden owners. (A baby boom did not occur after World War I, nor after the Korean or the Vietnam wars, likely because partners typically were separated for less than two years.) Second, draft legislation passed prior to U.S. entry into World War II led to a pre-Baby Boom increase in birth rates. When Congress passed the first peacetime draft of young men in May 1940, it exempted married men (among others); in the next month the nation experienced a "marriage boom." In September, Congress amended the legislation to provide exemptions only for married men with children; nine months later a significant rise in births produced the first "baby boom" of the 1940s. (Hauser, 312).

However, the postwar rise in births was clearly the largest of its kind and surpassed earlier increases. The average age at marriage for women fell from 21.5 in 1940 to 20.1 by 1956. The percentage of unmarried women fell from 28 percent in 1940 to a 20th-century low of 19 percent by 1959. In 1940, recorded births reached 2,360,000; in 1946, the figure was 3,289,000. The numbers rose almost steadily to a peak of 4,255,000 births in 1957.

The federal government made raising families more affordable for poor veterans and their spouses. As many of the millions drafted for the war were of modest means, Congress provided the U.S. Children's Bureau with funds for Emergency Maternal and Infant Care between 1943 and 1949, which covered all those in the service whose enlisted ratings were at the lower end of the pay scale (EM-1 through EM-4). These funds reached one in every seven childbearing women. For other American couples, a measure of postwar prosperity inspired confidence in the future: the gross national product doubled and the average income of Americans tripled between 1940 and 1955 (Jones, 21).

Others may have found the decision to have children less difficult after reading Dr. Benjamin Spock's best-seller, *Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care*, which assured prospective parents that the process was much less daunting than had been portrayed by previous authors of manuals, such as John B. Watson's *Psychological Care of Infant and Child* (1928). Spock's manual, which appeared at the very onset of the Baby Boom in 1946, sold 12 million copies by 1960, outselling every book but the Bible.

The Baby Boom was both accompanied and soon followed by a rise in the divorce rate. The first spike, in 1946, was partly attributable to the the fact that some wives were unwilling to surrender the independence they had enjoyed as heads of the household during the war to their returning husbands, who saw themselves as the primary household authorities and decision makers. It was also due, to a lesser degree, to the emotional difficulties that some combat veterans faced in readjusting to civilian life. The divorce rate rose again in the 1970s, as Baby Boomers found their own marriages failing at greater-than-average rates.

The Baby Boomers were also considered to be responsible for a crime wave. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had begun compiling nationwide crime statistics in 1960, and for nearly a decade, beginning in 1970, it reported rises in the per-capita rates for violent crimes. Some feared that the "liberal" Supreme Court's decisions of the mid-1960s with regard to the rights of the criminally accused in state courts had given rise to criminal activities. However, scholars pointed out that these were the years that the Baby Boomers were reaching their mid-to-late teens and that generally persons in that age group committed a disproportionate number of such crimes. The "crime wave" turned out to be just the arrival of Baby Boomer testosterone.

Baby Boomers supported both liberal and conservative political movements. Young men and women of the first cohort of Baby Boomers (b. 1946–52) flocked to the Peace Corps (created in 1961 to send volunteer aid workers to other countries) and participated in the grassroots campaign to secure for Sen. George McGovern, the Democratic Party presidential nomination in 1972. Members of the second cohort (b. 1953–61) tended to be active in the conservative Republican Young Americans for Freedom. However, Baby

Boomers were neither decidedly liberal nor conservative. As a whole, their voting patterns mirrored those of other age groups, and their numbers helped to elect every successful presidential candidate from the first election that they were eligible to vote in (1968) to the present. In this and other ways, they proved to not to be as revolutionary as some have assumed, despite the antics of some of their more outspoken members, like the street-theater Youth International Party (Yippies) of the late 1960s or the more genuinely revolutionary Weathermen of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

One as-yet-undetermined consequence of the war-fueled Baby Boom is the future of social security. For several decades the Baby Boomers have been disproportionately represented among wage earners, garnering their and their employers' contributions for social security. As they retire, social security will have far fewer contributors and far more retirees drawing payments than in previous decades. Politicians and federal commissions have been wrestling with this drain on the economy for some time.

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Related Entries

Vietnam War; World War II

Related Documents

1947; 1949; 1950 a

—*Peter Karsten*

Barton, Clara

(1821–1912)
Civil War Nurse, Founder of the American Red Cross

Clara Barton was the most famous of many women who worked heroically to provide care and comfort to wounded Civil War soldiers. In so doing, she and others like her raised the nation's standards for the care of its fallen soldiers.

Born in Oxford, Massachusetts, in 1821, Barton began working as a teacher at age 15; in 1852 she founded a successful school in Bordentown, New Jersey. At the outbreak of the Civil War, Barton worked as a copyist in the U.S. Patent Office in Washington, D.C. She soon became engaged in distributing useful items to troops from her native Massachusetts who were stationed in and around Washington. Her appeals to her home state resulted in generous shipments of shirts, socks, jellies, and other items to make the soldiers' lives in camp more pleasant. After the first battle of Bull Run in 1861, she helped tend the many wounded who flooded into and around Washington. The experience made her determined to go to the battlefield next time, to be as close to the action as possible.

Tending to the wounded in the field was then considered unsuitable work for a woman, and military authorities were reluctant to grant her permission to enter the war zone. By August 1862, however, she succeeded in reaching the front in Virginia, accompanying several wagonloads of supplies for the soldiers. She arrived at the battlefield of Cedar Mountain four days after the battle and there had her first experience of tending the wounded on the front lines. Soon after she helped tend the much larger number of wounded from the second battle of Bull Run, winning the nickname "Angel of the Battlefield." At Antietam she was close enough to the action that a stray bullet passed through the sleeve of her dress and killed a man to whom she was handing a drink of water.

After Antietam, Barton was laid up for some time with typhoid fever. Back to work by December, she was at Fredericksburg for the major battle fought there that month and was once again under fire while tending the wounded. In May 1863 she accompanied her brother, a captain in the quartermaster corps, to Hilton Head, South Carolina, where she remained for several months, missing the great eastern campaigns of that spring and summer, but conducting a personal campaign of her own—an affair with a married colonel. After the failed assaults on Fort Wagner, Barton was back tending the wounded. Eventually, by means of constant entreaties, complaints, and requests to draw supplies from the quartermaster, she made herself unwelcome on Morris Island, and Gen. Quincy Gillmore ordered her back to Beaufort. Barton was outraged as well as deeply depressed and contemplated suicide.

She recovered, however, returned to Washington, and was soon tending the vast numbers of wounded from Grant's Overland Campaign and subsequent operations against Richmond. As wounded from the great campaign inundated the town of Fredericksburg, now a rear area, Barton acted forcefully to ameliorate appalling conditions; she convinced Sen. Henry Wilson of Massachusetts to pressure the War Department into taking immediate vigorous action to see that the wounded received at least marginally adequate food, shelter, and care. Once again Barton also helped with resources she raised privately.

As the dual siege of Richmond and Petersburg began, Barton found her way to the Army of the James in its lines on Bermuda Hundred. The U.S. Sanitary Commission, U.S. Christian Commission, and various state relief agencies were already setting up facilities to care for the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, and she did not want to share her sphere of activity with those agencies or indeed with any other caregivers except perhaps a few independents like herself. Barton never could get along with fellow workers who were not under her authority, and she routinely clashed with other nurses. With the Army of the James more or less all to herself, Barton made a good impression on its commander, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler, who assigned her to provide care and nutrition for the soldiers in a mobile field hospital.

Late in the war, Barton turned her energies to finding missing persons and gravesites—a staggering task, since a majority of the Union war dead had no known gravesites. She gained Lincoln's approval and set up a private organization that she called Friends of the Missing Men of the United States Army. She succeeded in accounting for several thousand men, though these were only a small fraction of the total number of missing from the war. She also supervised the registration of Union soldiers' graves at Andersonville, Georgia, the notorious Confederate prison camp where thousands had died. She helped oversee the establishment of a national cemetery there, prompting the Andersonville Survivors' Association to make her an honorary member. Thereafter, she went on the lecture circuit for two years with great success and became a national figure.

Traveling in Europe to rest and recover her health, Barton was on hand for the Franco-Prussian War, and once again she took an active role in trying to help soldiers and civilians who had been affected by the conflict. While in Europe she was impressed with the newly organized International Red Cross, and she determined to set up such an organization in the United States. Returning to America in 1873, Barton lobbied for congressional ratification of the first Geneva Convention, an international treaty aimed at ameliorating the effects of war on soldiers and civilians. After years of petitioning and agitation, she succeeded in establishing the American Red Cross in 1881.

Clara Barton was fearless, dedicated, and fiercely determined, but she was also headstrong and insatiably hungry for praise and recognition. Along with other women such as Mary Ann Bickerdyke and Dorothea Dix, she helped open the way for women in military nursing, and she brought welcome and much needed care and supplies to thousands of wounded soldiers. She was hindered, however, by her inability to administrate or to work with others cooperatively. Nevertheless she was part of an important forward step in the care of sick and wounded soldiers.

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Related Entries

Andersonville; Civil War; Nurses, Military

—*Steven E. Woodworth*

Beetle Bailey

Comic Strip by Mort Walker

First appearing in 1950, Beetle Bailey is a humorous comic strip that stars the slacker draftee whose attitudes and adventures came to represent the peacetime draft Army of the 1950s and 1960s. The strip was banned by military newspapers for a time for making fun of officers, but it has lasted more than 50 years and remains one of the most popular comic strips in American newspapers. Although story lines in recent decades have dwelt less on the absurdities of military life, the strip still reflects many aspects of the all volunteer force.

Beetle Bailey has been drawn for its entire existence by Mort Walker. Born in El Dorado, Kansas, Walker moved to Kansas City while still a boy. He became interested in cartooning at an early age and as a teenager had some strips published in Kansas City newspapers. After high school, Walker joined the staff of what later became Hallmark Cards, where he created some of the first humorous greeting cards. Walker was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1943 and served in Italy. He kept a sketchbook and diary that later provided the basis of the Beetle Bailey strip.

After the war, Walker earned a degree from the University of Missouri in 1948. His college days were marked by a tendency to poke fun at authorities and to stand up against pointless requirements. After graduation, he moved to New York City, earning a living as a freelance cartoonist. In 1950, he convinced King Features to buy a comic strip about a slacker college student. Originally named Spider, the main character later became Beetle Bailey. On September 4, 1950, Beetle Bailey appeared in 12 newspapers. His main objective in college appeared to be to enjoy himself as long as possible. With his hat always pulled down over his eyes, Beetle spent his time chasing girls, ducking classes, and shooting the breeze with his buddies.

After six months, King Features planned to cancel the strip. Only 25 papers were carrying it, whereas at least 100 customers were needed for the strip to break even. A newspaper editor suggested that Walker have Beetle enlist in the Army. On March 13, 1951, Beetle did just that, and the strip quickly became more popular. Since the Korean War had broken out in July 1950, Americans were suddenly more aware of the military. Beetle's habit of goading military authority and trying to get by with doing as little as possible fit the country's mood at the time. Unlike the character Sad Sack of World War II, Beetle was not a reluctant soldier who wanted to get the job done and return home, with fate conspiring against him. Instead, Beetle was a soldier who spent his time trying to avoid work and the general foolishness of military life. His attitudes were more in keeping with a period of limited warfare in a distant location, rather than the massive effort to defeat global evil in "the good war."

Walker quickly developed a supporting cast based on his own Army experience. Beetle's squad mates included the ladies' man (Killer), the intellectual (Plato), the operator (Cosmo), the rebel (Rocky), and the well-meaning idiot (Zero). His main adversary was Sgt. Orville Snorkel, the tough drill instructor who also doted on his boys. Snorkel became the career noncommissioned officer who had no life or family outside the Army. Lieutenant Fuzz was based on Walker himself—a new officer with a lot of energy and no common sense. The group was completed by General Halftrack, an elderly incompetent who commanded Camp Swampy, a base forgotten by the Pentagon. Other characters were added over time to give the cast a more multicultural appearance. African American Lieutenant Flap appeared in 1970. In the 1990s, Corporal Yo, an Asian American perfectionist, was

A Beetle Bailey strip showing two of its most memorable characters in a typical scenario—the drill instructor, Sgt. Orville Snorkel, admonishing Beetle Bailey. (King Entertainment)

introduced. The newest character is a computer geek named Gizmo, in a nod toward changing technology. The most interesting character may be Snorkel's dog, Otto. Unlike other animals that appear in the strip, Otto is fully anthropomorphized. Walker sometimes uses this character to offer an outsider's view on the oddities of human nature.

Walker's irreverence offended some in the military. Although originally intended for a civilian audience, Beetle Bailey also appeared in the military newspaper *The Stars and Stripes*. Walker was warned by a military friend in late 1952 that some brass considered his strip harmful to morale. At the beginning of 1954, Beetle Bailey was banned from the Pacific edition of *The Stars and Stripes*. That incident was widely reported by newspapers in the United States and ridiculed as an example of the military being unable to laugh at itself. The ban was soon lifted, and GIs were able to read *Beetle Bailey* again. Hundreds of civilian newspapers, attracted by the attention given the strip, added *Beetle Bailey* to their comic pages.

Walker ran into trouble with the military again in 1970, at the height of the Vietnam War. He introduced his first African American character, a streetwise lieutenant named Flap. *The Stars and Stripes* once again dropped *Beetle Bailey*, citing a fear that it would contribute to racial tensions. The newspaper recanted once again, and the strip again got a bounce from the publicity. By the 1980s, *Beetle Bailey* appeared in almost 2,000 newspapers in several different countries.

Unlike other characters in military-based comic strips, *Beetle Bailey* never saw combat. In fact, he never left Camp

Swampy. Walker never saw his strip as strictly military but regarded it as representative of any large hierarchical organization. He rarely commented on current events, although changing social mores eventually made their way into the strip. During the 1990s, feminist groups criticized Walker for the way General Halftrack leered at the beautiful Miss Buxley character. Walker sent Halftrack off to sensitivity training and toned down the appearance of sexual harassment.

Beetle Bailey remains the fifth most widely distributed comic strip in the United States. It has spun off comic books, merchandise, and books of collected strips. *Beetle Bailey*'s portrayal of an American soldier as a likeable goof-off has resonated with the public. His image has been appropriated by others, particularly editorial cartoonists, when making a point about Pentagon waste or military unpreparedness. For good or for ill, *Beetle Bailey* remains one of popular culture's enduring perceptions of American soldiers.

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Related Entries

All Volunteer Force; Captain Marvel Comic Books; Mauldin, Bill; *Sad Sack, The*; Visual Arts and War

—Tim J. Watts

Berlin Crises

The end of World War II left Germany divided into four zones of occupation, one each for the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Berlin, in the Soviet zone, was itself divided into four zones; during the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the participants had failed to decisively establish the status of Berlin. The West wanted a presence in the old German capital, but the Soviets preferred no Western presence in their zone. One firm agreement between the former allies was that the United States, Great Britain, and France would have road and air access to their zones in Berlin.

The division of Berlin, like the division of Germany as a whole, was intended to be temporary, lasting only until peace treaties were signed. However, Cold War tensions between the East and West made agreements difficult. From April 1945 until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990, Berlin was a focal point for conflict, tension, and finally progress in relations between the East and West. The result was a series of crises over the status of Berlin that led, notably, to the Berlin Airlift (1948-1949) and the construction of the Berlin Wall (1961). Over the subsequent decades, the United States, France, and England refused to give up their rights in Berlin. Although both Western and Soviet officials possibly would have preferred a compromise, East and West Germans themselves forced their respective sponsor states to maintain the division.

Berlin Crisis of 1948

The Berlin Crisis of 1948 was the result of failed economic and policy cooperation among the Allies. In early 1948 the United States and Great Britain had taken steps to create the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) by merging their sectors to create a common economic zone and new currency. These steps highlighted the ongoing economic difficulties in eastern Germany. The Soviets wanted a unified, demilitarized Germany, but a new currency in the western half of the country portended the formal division of Germany. At the same time, internal U.S. decisions may have threatened the Soviets. In March 1948 Pres. Harry S. Truman had requested a new peacetime draft and an increase in the size of the Army from 540,000 to 660,000, leading to the largest peacetime volunteer Army in U.S. history. These military increases, plus U.S. moves to recognize the FRG and impose a new currency, made the Soviets vitally interested in forcing the United States out of Berlin and, potentially, off the European continent. The Berlin Crisis of 1948, then, was a test of U.S. resolve over Berlin.

On June 24, 1948 the Soviets implemented a total ground blockade from western Germany to Berlin. The U.S. response to the Soviet ground blockade was swift: on that same day, President Truman directed that the United States would stay in Berlin. Lt. Gen. Curtis LeMay announced immediate operations to supply Berlin by cargo aircraft. On June 27 the United States flew 156 tons of supplies on 64 aircraft into Tempelhof Airport in Berlin. Within weeks, the United States had moved four squadrons of cargo aircraft to western Europe and was managing the largest continuous airlift in history. By spring 1949, the airlift, with British and French support, was averaging more than 8,000 tons per day in 24-hour operations with one aircraft taking off and landing every 90 seconds. The Allies airlifted more than 2.4 million tons of supplies between June 1948 and September 1949.

The West did not supply only its own military forces in Berlin. Operation Vittles was the airlift of civilian supplies and food. The Allies also built Tegel Air Base in Berlin, added runways to Tempelhof, and expanded facilities at Rhine-Main Air Base in Frankfurt. In addition, the United States moved 60 nuclear-capable B-29 bombers to bases in Great Britain.

On May 12, 1949, the Soviets reopened ground access to Berlin. The blockade had been a disaster for the Soviets. The crisis had sped the recognition of the FRG by the West

and hastened the creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Also as a result, the citizens of Berlin were forever loyal to the United States and were unwilling to be further cowed by the Soviets. And, while attempting to curb the West's access to Berlin, the Soviets had ensured that the West would insist upon rights of access. All the Soviets could do was declare victory, found the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in October, and claim that the East Germans were following their own will.

Berlin Crises of 1958 and 1961

More than a decade after the end of the 1948 Berlin Crisis, little progress had been made on consolidating the status of Berlin or improving conditions between a divided postwar Germany. During the 1950s, some 150,000 East Germans escaped every year to the West through the divided, but open, city of Berlin. The West continued to insist upon wartime rights of free access not only to Berlin but also between East and West Berlin. The GDR, founded in October 1949, could do little to stem the exodus without taking steps that would limit the rights of the West. In November 1958, Nikita Khrushchev, premier of the U.S.S.R., announced that the Soviets would sign a separate treaty with the GDR if the West did not solve the Berlin question within six months. The West could not allow such a unilateral action by the Soviets. Not only would acceding to such demand violate all agreements on the status of Berlin, it would force the West to recognize the GDR and its rights to regulate traffic, mail, and commerce, thereby accepting the division of Germany as permanent.

Although the United States was unwilling to allow the Soviets to unilaterally change the status of Berlin, it had few means to resist by force. In the late 1950s, U.S. military might was based on nuclear strength; lacking the conventional forces to challenge the Soviets in Europe, the United States agreed to hold negotiations with the Soviets and the deadline passed without incident. A conference of foreign ministers resulted in an 18-month extension of the deadline. With the agreement to keep talking, the Berlin Crisis of 1958 passed. However, East Germans continued to flee to the West through Berlin.

In June 1961, Khrushchev and Pres. John F. Kennedy met in Vienna. Khrushchev attempted to bully Kennedy into acceding to Soviet demands for final agreements on the status of Berlin and Germany. Khrushchev then set a new six-month deadline for formal agreements. Kennedy refused to be bullied and in July 1961 announced a policy of zero tolerance for interference in Allied rights to travel across East Germany to Berlin. Concurrently, he began a massive buildup of the armed forces. Kennedy requested an increase in the size of the Army from 875,000 to one million. He also requested increasing the Air Force by 69,000 and the Navy by 29,000. Kennedy then directed that a study be made of possible outcomes to various actions by the United States; this study developed the doctrine of flexible response, which required more robust conventional forces. At the same time, Kennedy doubled the draft call, requested authority to call up the Reserves, and requested funds to identify and mark civil defense fallout shelters.

As tensions increased, the movement of people from the East became an exodus and began to threaten the internal stability of the GDR. In the first six months of 1961, more than 200,000 people escaped to the West. Finally, the Soviets and East Germans agreed that drastic measures had to be taken and, on August 13, 1961, a barbed wire fence was erected to divide East and West Berlin. A concrete wall soon followed. The initial U.S. reaction was muted. In many ways, the end of the refugee flow reduced tensions. However, as the Soviets took other measures that included blocking Allied air and ground access to Berlin, Kennedy had to act. In late August of 1961, he ordered almost 150,000 Reserves and National Guard to active duty. The Air Force mobilized more than 30 aircraft squadrons and moved almost 300 aircraft to Europe. In Berlin, numerous standoffs occurred including a tense confrontation between U.S. and Soviet troops. Despite the increased tensions, the United States and Soviets began negotiating. As the crisis wound down in the summer of 1962 with no resolution, the Cuban Missile Crisis diverted attention to the Western Hemisphere. The Berlin Crisis of 1961 did not lead to a general settlement, but the Soviets and the United States realized that they would have to negotiate. At the same time, the United States reinforced its commitment to Europe and, under the flexible response doctrine, offered a credible, nonnuclear capability to counter the Soviets.

New Interpretations

Since the end of the Cold War, researchers have gained access to East German and Soviet archives and U.S. documents have been declassified. These indicate that the leaders of the FRG and GDR were far more important in the development and resolution of all three crises than had been appreciated at the time. In particular, the leaders of the GDR often forced the Soviets to take actions to support and bolster East German security and insisted on erecting the Berlin Wall. Evidence suggests that the Cuban Missile Crisis was linked to the Berlin Crisis. Khrushchev may have hoped that by diverting attention from Berlin and threatening the U.S. homeland, he could force Kennedy to accede to his demands on Berlin and Germany. No matter the interpretation, the Berlin Crises of 1948 and 1961 led to two of the most powerful symbols of the Cold War: the Airlift and the Wall.

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Related Entries

Civil Defense; Cuban Missile Crisis; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Selective Service System; Truman, Harry S.

—George Eaton

Berrigan, Daniel

(1921–)

Berrigan, Philip

(1923–2002)

Roman Catholic Priests and Peace Activists

The Berrigan brothers gained fame in the 1960s as vocal clerical foes of the Vietnam War. As leaders of the Catholic New Left, Daniel and Philip Berrigan attracted national news media attention for such actions as raiding Selective Service offices. They also stood trial in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1972 on charges of conspiring to kidnap Sec. of State Henry Kissinger, although the brothers denied that their kidnapping plot had progressed to the point of action. The Berrigans continued to protest U.S. foreign policy during the 1980s and 1990s, even after Philip Berrigan renounced his religious vows to marry Sister Elizabeth McAlister, a Catholic college professor, in 1969.

Daniel and Philip Berrigan were the youngest of six sons born on a Minnesota farm. Their father, Thomas, was a deeply religious Catholic of Irish descent, a strict disciplinarian, and a critic of political radicalism. Seeking escape from what they considered to be a drab, nonintellectual existence, Daniel went to study with the Jesuits while Philip excelled in collegiate sports at St. Michael's in Toronto.

Drafted into the U.S. Army in 1943, Philip served with an artillery battery in the European theater (Daniel, as a seminary student, was exempt). Philip later disparaged his military service and claimed that his exposure to southern

white racism while in the Army led him to join the Society of St. Joseph (Josephites), a religious order devoted to missionary work among African Americans. Daniel was ordained a Jesuit in 1952 and Philip a Josephite in 1955.

Both the Jesuits and the Josephites were Catholic religious orders that advocated religious engagement with secular political issues. The Josephites had long been unambiguous defenders of African American civil rights. The Jesuits had many members who were avowed critics of international and domestic communism, and even some who regarded the United States as equally culpable in the Cold War and exploitation of the Third World. The bishops who led the American Catholic Church did not become politically engaged until the 1930s, when they began to champion the rights of organized labor. Not all church leaders, however, supported labor unions. The crisis of the Great Depression revealed a political schism within the church that widened in the 1960s with the escalation of the Vietnam War. Within this controversial context the Berrigans began their own social activism.

Taking their cue from the encyclical Peace on Earth (1963), in which Pope John XXIII condemned the nuclear arms race and urged the United States to coexist peacefully with the Soviet Union, the Berrigans flung themselves into the antiwar movement. In 1964 they joined with young members of the Catholic Worker Movement (established in 1933) to form the radical pacifist Catholic Peace Fellowship. A year later, Daniel helped found Clergy and Laymen (later Laity) Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV). Given the paucity of Catholics and the abundance of mainline Protestant and Reform Jewish clerics in CALCAV, Daniel became a media sensation.

Responding to criticism from within the Catholic church, Daniel contended that white working-class Catholics—themselves once objects of Protestant discrimination—were now representing themselves as patriotic and anticommunist in order to be accepted as fully American. Catholic critics retorted that the Berrigans, and their predominantly middle-class, college-educated constituency, were simply seeking acceptance among the cultural elite. The Berrigans also found, to their chagrin, that radical members of other antiwar coalitions such as the Students for a

Democratic Society (SDS; established 1962) harbored suspicions about nonviolent religious activists.

In 1968 the Berrigans entered the Selective Service offices in Catonsville, Maryland, where they poured blood on stolen Selective Service files and then torched them with homemade napalm. The Catonsville raid and subsequent trial (also in 1968) inspired at least 53 similar incidents across the country. Actor and liberal activist Gregory Peck produced a sympathetic film in 1972, *The Trial of the Catonsville Nine*, that documented their efforts.

Sentenced to three years each, Daniel and Philip, while out on bail pending their appeals, went underground. Law enforcement officers quickly captured Philip while Daniel remained at large somewhat longer. While in prison Philip smuggled letters to Sister McAlister. The FBI obtained copies of Philip's letters, quickly exposing his marriage to McAlister. Based upon these same letters, as well as the testimony of a FBI informant within the ranks of Catholic antiwar activists, both Berrigans stood trial in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1972 for conspiring to kidnap Henry Kissinger. Their jury deadlocked, forcing a mistrial, and leading the federal government to drop its case.

After being acquitted in 1972 of plotting to kidnap Kissinger, the Berrigans resumed their protest activities. In 1980 the brothers raided a General Electric plant at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, in an attempt to cripple the guidance system of a nuclear missile. Convicted in 1981 of burglary, conspiracy, and criminal mischief, they were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 5 to 10 years. After nine years of court appeals, the "Plowshares Eight," as the defendants came to be known, were credited with completing 23 months of their sentences and given parole. The trial of the Plowshares Eight also became a media and film event, with actor Martin Sheen participating in the resulting film project, *In the King of Prussia* (1982).

The Berrigans subsequently mounted symbolic protests against a number of American policy initiatives abroad until Philip's death in 2002. In the 21st century, Daniel remains a fixture at protests against the war on terror. Just after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, he described the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as "symbols of idolatry" and U.S. imperialism that had

received biblical retribution. While lamenting the loss of lives on September 11, Daniel Berrigan insisted that the evil the United States had been doing overseas for decades had at last come home to roost.

The activism of Daniel and Philip Berrigan reflected, even as it influenced, the growth of a religious Left in the United States and especially within the Roman Catholic church. Since the 1960s American Catholic bishops have become more vocal in their opposition to U.S. defense spending, racism, and welfare cuts. However, in reaction to this activism, tens of thousands of middle- and working-class Catholics have left the Catholic church for more politically conservative Protestant denominations. Relations between activist American bishops and a more conservative papacy in Rome have remained strained as well.

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Related Entries

Antiwar Movements; Clergy and Laity Concerned about Vietnam; Conscientious Objection; Just War Theory; Pacifism

—*Kenneth J. Heineman*

Best Years of Our Lives, The

Film directed by William Wyler, 1946

The Best Years of Our Lives (1946) chronicled the difficulties that three World War II veterans experienced in readjusting to civilian life. Directed by William Wyler, the film dealt directly with the nation's postwar concerns about welcoming home combat veterans. Both a commercial and critical success, the film won seven Academy Awards in 1946, including Best Picture and Best Director.

After reading a 1944 story in *Time* about the lukewarm homecoming given to some wounded Marines, Hollywood producer Samuel Goldwyn asked writer Mackinlay Kantor to develop a story outline on the topic. Goldwyn tabled the project when Kantor presented him with a 400-page blank verse novel entitled *Glory for Me*. However, when Wyler returned from his wartime stint as an Air Force cameraman, he convinced Goldwyn that public concern about returning and wounded veterans gave the story commercial appeal. Wyler adapted Kantor's novel for the screen along with screenwriter Robert Sherwood and hired a film crew solely of veterans, assembling a cast of well-known actors, newcomers, and amateurs. Wyler even filmed on location in Cincinnati, Ohio, to capture the authentic feel of an American town—an unusual decision at a time when most films were shot exclusively on Hollywood sound stages.

The Best Years of Our Lives centers on the return of three veterans who meet during their flight home to Boone City, Iowa. They immediately bond while discussing their nervous excitement about seeing their loved ones again.

Over the next year, their lives continue to intersect even though they come from quite different social backgrounds.

Fred Derry (Dana Andrews) worked as a drugstore clerk before the war and married a gold-digging woman (Virginia Mayo) while on leave. Yet Fred's problems are larger than his doomed marriage. Returning home with high expectations of finding a better job, he soon realizes that his promotion to captain in the Air Force for his skill in sighting bombing targets was poor preparation for a white-collar job in the civilian economy. Fred finds himself back at the drugstore working at the perfume counter.

Al Stephenson (Fredrick March, who won an Academy Award for Best Actor) was a successful banker who returned home to a steady job and devoted family. Al's financial stability only partly blunts the emotional turmoil of returning home. He soon resorts to heavy drinking to ease his discomfort at intimate family gatherings and public functions celebrating him as a war hero. Beneath the good-humored banter of Al and his wife Millie (Myrna Loy) lurks the tension they feel in recognizing that the family has thrived despite Al's long absence. Al also feels out of place at work, where he struggles to interject a more caring attitude toward deserving veterans in his new job overseeing bank loans under the auspices of the GI Bill.

Al and Millie eventually find a common cause as they seek to end the love affair between the still-married Fred, who had developed a friendship with Al, and their daughter Peggy (Teresa Wright). The lovers meet when Fred winds up at the Stephenson household to sleep off the effects of a drinking binge with Al. A disheveled Fred awakens alone in the virginal Peggy's lace-covered bed, which signals the budding sexual tension between them. This scene, including the combat-related nightmares that plague his sleep and his immediate impulse to check for his wallet when he awakens in a strange woman's room, also gives some clues about Fred's military past. The romance between Fred and Peggy signals the end of Fred and Al's veteran-based friendship. Al's paternal impulses revive and, in a final salute to their dying friendship, Fred complies with Al's request to end his relationship with Peggy.

The sagas of Fred and Al inject the movie with drama and humor, but Homer Parish's story forms the film's emotional core. Homer is a double-amputee who lost both of his hands when the Japanese sunk his ship in the Pacific Ocean. Actor Harold Russell, an actual disabled veteran whose hands were blown off during a training camp accident, won two Oscars for his moving portrayal of Homer, one for Best Supporting Actor and a special award for being an inspiration to all returning veterans.

Homer's story effectively captured the anxiety the nation felt about the future of the war's 671,000 wounded veterans. In the film, Homer tries hard to maintain a cheerful demeanor but frustration with his physical dependence on others and his family's pity result in several angry outbursts. Fearful that his fiancée Wilma (Cathy O'Donnell) is marrying him out of a sense of duty and sympathy, Homer pushes her away. To prove her love, Wilma comes into Homer's bedroom one night, unflinchingly helps him take off his prosthetic hooks, and then passionately kisses him before tucking him into bed, proving herself capable of facing the truth of his amputated limbs and sexual needs. Wilma and Homer's subsequent happy marriage is paralleled by an equally joyful ending for Fred and Peggy, who reconcile now that Fred's wife has left him and he has found a new job turning junked military planes into houses for veterans.

The Best Years of Our Lives found a receptive audience among a public weary of wartime propaganda films. The film dealt openly with key postwar issues such as the emotional stability of veterans, the possibility of an economic downturn as demobilized veterans flooded the job market, and the stability of marriages marked by long absences. *The Best Years of Our Lives* is a classic war film that accurately captured the anxious mood of postwar America and also illuminated timeless issues surrounding veterans' return from war.

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Related Entries

Disabled American Veterans; Film and War; GI Bills; War Brides

—Jennifer D. Keene

Bierce, Ambrose

(1842–1914?)
Soldier, Journalist, and Author

Amid the firsthand accounts of the Civil War that flooded the market in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the writings of Ambrose Gwinnett Bierce spoke in a distinctive, often cynical voice that reflected the carnage and horror of battle. Although Bierce earned 15 commendations for his service as a Union soldier, he defined valor as "a soldierly compound of vanity, duty, and the gambler's hope."

Bierce was born in Meigs County, Ohio, on June 24, 1842, the son of a poor farming family, the 10th of 13 children, all of whom received names beginning with the letter "A." The family moved frequently, eventually settling in Indiana. In 1859 Bierce began studying at the Kentucky Military Institute, but he dropped out after one year. When the Civil War broke out in 1861, he immediately enlisted as a sergeant in the 9th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. He saw his first action at the battle of Shiloh in April 1862, where the 9th Indiana sustained high casualties. Thereafter, Bierce took part in many of the major battles of the war, including Corinth, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Resaca, Dalton, Kennesaw Mountain, and Franklin. In 1863 he was promoted to first lieutenant and joined Gen. William B. Hazen's staff as a topographical engineer.

At the battle of Kennesaw Mountain in June 1864, Bierce took a bullet to the head that lodged in his temple. Although he recovered from the wound, he suffered from searing headaches for the rest of his life. A few months later he was captured by the Confederates near Gaylesville, Alabama. He escaped and saw further action at the battles of Franklin and Nashville, but because he suffered frequent spells of dizziness and fainting, he was released from active duty in January 1865.

After the war Bierce moved to San Francisco and worked as a journalist for the next three decades. By 1868 he was a regular columnist for the San Francisco Examiner and he began publishing his short stories. In 1891 Bierce published his stories as a comprehensive collection—*Tales of Soldiers and Civilians*. Among these tales the most representative, and arguably the most powerful expression of Bierce's antiwar sentiment is "Chickamauga." The story centers on the experience of a six-year-old boy who observes dying soldiers from one of the Civil War's bloodiest battles. The grotesque imagery in this story illuminates not only the gruesome nature of war, but also its effects on the innocent. At the end of the tale the child returns home to find his mother has been shot through the head. Only then does the reader learn that the child is also a deaf mute.

Bierce was employed by newspaper tycoon William Randolph Hearst, who sent him to Washington, D.C., in 1896 as a lobbyist. By 1898 Hearst had become one of the most influential promoters of war against Spain. Despite his employer's views, Bierce vociferously opposed the war and warned of the dangers of conflict. Hearst fired him but Bierce continued his opposition in other newspapers. Once the Spanish–American War had broken out, Bierce continued his critiques of war policy as a war correspondent.

In 1911 Bierce published his *Devil's Dictionary*. After years of attempting to convince his readers of war's horrors, the author's definitions of war and peace in this volume illustrate his ultimate disillusionment. In this highly cynical work, Bierce defines war as a "byproduct of the arts of peace." Peace, on the other hand is "a period of cheating between two periods of fighting." This work earned the author the well-deserved nickname of Bitter Bierce.

In 1913, at the age of 71, Bierce decided to travel to Mexico where he wished to observe firsthand Pancho Villa's

revolution. Before he left, he toured the Civil War battle-grounds where he had fought. The last documented evidence of Bierce's life is a letter written by him on December 26, 1913, from Chihauhua, Mexico. Thereafter he disappeared without a trace. Although his body was never found, it is generally believed that he died at the Battle of Ojinega, June 11, 1914.

Like other writers of his age, Bierce's own war experience played heavily into his writing, both journalistic and military. But in an age where war accounts and regimental histories spoke of the grandeur of battle and the valor of fallen soldiers, Bierce offered a unique and caustic dissent. In vivid language andwith grotesque imagery, Bierce's war was one filled with horror, death, and a sense of futility that anticipated the literature of the Lost Generation after World War I.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Literature and War; Media and War

—Jacqueline G. Campbell

Bonus March

In 1932, during the Great Depression, World War I veterans marched in Washington, D.C., to demand early payment of their military bonus. The march demonstrated the importance of planning for soldiers' return home, the political clout of veterans, and the lingering importance of World War I for American society. The march ended in a physical showdown between World War I veterans and U.S. Army troops, raising additional questions about the proper use of the military within the country's borders.

In May 1932, a group of impoverished veterans from Portland, Oregon, decided to make a personal trek across the country to lobby Pres. Herbert Hoover and Congress for payment of their bonus—the name given to the adjusted compensation bond certificates that World War I veterans had received in 1924. The press picked up the story and thousands of veterans across the nation resolved to join the Oregon group in the nation's capital. Within a few short weeks, this grassroots protest turned into a full-fledged mass movement. Eventually more than 40,000 veterans descended on Washington, D.C.

The federal government gave veterans the adjusted compensation bonds to settle a simmering political dispute over excessive wartime profiteering. World War I veterans came home in 1919 to a depressed postwar economy that offered them few job prospects. The government was unprepared to demobilize the nation's first mass army and made little effort to help veterans find jobs. Frustrated over missing out on the high wages paid during the war, veterans soon denounced the government for allowing civilians to profit from war while paying soldiers only $1 a day. The draft, veterans argued, gave the government the power to determine who served in the Army and who stayed at home. The government, they concluded, had the moral responsibility to evenly distribute the financial burdens of war throughout the entire population. The American Legion, founded in 1919, proposed granting veterans a retroactive bonus payment that nearly doubled their wartime pay. In addition to helping redistribute some war profits, a bonus would partly relieve veterans' financial distress. World War I veterans initially wanted a cash settlement, but they eventually accepted

a bond (worth approximately $1,000) that was to mature in 1945. With the economy improving, World War I veterans agreed with the government that the money would serve them well in their old age.

The economic hardships of the Great Depression caused veterans to reconsider the wisdom of waiting for this money. Veterans now demanded immediate payment of their bonus to prevent foreclosures on homes and farms and to put food on the table. At first, veterans sent letters and telegrams to urge action from Congress. The campaign for immediate payment took a decidedly new direction with the Oregon group's decision to seek a personal meeting with the president.

As veterans poured into Washington, D.C., they set up a large, makeshift camp on the Anacostia Flats in sight of the Capitol and created smaller camps throughout the city. In the main camp, the veterans elected leaders, organized daily fatigue duties, and set a daily schedule for lobbying congressmen. Camp commanders also registered new arrivals to ensure that only genuine veterans lived in the camp.

As the weeks passed, the bonus marchers offered tours and interviews to visiting dignitaries and journalists. Hoover, however, never paid a visit to the bonus marchers or welcomed them to the White House. In fact, President Hoover and U.S. Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur believed that communists had sponsored the march as part of a plan to overthrow the government. While a few communists did settle in some of the smaller camps, overall the communists had negligible influence over the Bonus March. Other officials proved more sympathetic. The District of Columbia police chief, Pelham D. Glassford, a retired brigadier general who had commanded a field artillery unit during the war, helped secure government tents and rations for the marchers. Donations from American Legion and Veterans of Foreign War posts throughout the country also helped sustain the marchers.

The Bonus March appeared destined for an inglorious end when the Senate voted down a House-approved payment bill in June 1932. The House bill incorporated the inflationary tactic of simply printing the money needed to pay the bonus, a measure that the fiscally conservative Senate rejected. Before adjourning for the summer in July, Congress tried to encourage the veterans to leave the capital by offering loans against their eventual bonus to pay for their train fare home. With Congress out of session, the bonus marchers had no hope of receiving their money anytime soon. Hoover expected the veterans to accept their defeat and leave; instead, thousands resolved to remain.

On July 28, 1932, the local police initiated the first step of a piecemeal evacuation plan that called for evicting bonus marchers from a set of downtown buildings slated for demolition. The eviction quickly turned ugly when the police shot and killed two unarmed veterans. Fearing a riot, District of Columbia commissioners asked Hoover for troops to help clear the area. The federal troops, who had been on alert for months, were ready to respond in force.

Within a few hours, one squadron of cavalry troops, two battalions of infantry, a mounted machine gun squad, and six tanks assembled on the Elipse (the lawn behind the White House). MacArthur's aide, Maj. Dwight D. Eisenhower advised MacArthur to let his subordinates handle the riot, but MacArthur was convinced that the marchers were prepared to carry out a military coup. In full dress uniform, MacArthur and Eisenhower led their force down Pennsylvania Avenue. After clearing the downtown camps, MacArthur proceeded to the Anacostia Bridge where he received three separate messages from Hoover telling him not to cross the bridge into the veterans' main camp. MacArthur ignored these orders, and, near midnight, the Army drove the bonus marchers out of the city as the camp burned to the ground.

Hoover stood by MacArthur in the political turmoil that followed and never publicly revealed the general's insubordination. Hoover, however, paid a huge price for the bonus marchers' violent eviction. The Bonus March cemented Hoover's image as an uncaring president, out of touch with the suffering of the common man; this public perception contributed to Hoover's failure to win reelection in 1932.

Pres. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Hoover's successor, also opposed immediate payment, but handled the two subsequent bonus marches in 1933 and 1934 more successfully. Roosevelt carefully housed the few thousand veterans who attended the marches in an Army camp outside the city, provided them with truck transport to and from the Capitol each day, and offered the marchers jobs in the Civilian Conservation Corps when their allotted time to visit ended.

On Independence Day, July 4, 1932, Bonus March demonstrators protested at the Capitol in Washington, D.C. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

Roosevelt also went on the offensive, casting veterans as a selfish interest group whose demands would hurt government efforts to end the Depression. By 1936, government expenditures for New Deal programs were so vast that authorizing the funds to pay World War I veterans their bonus raised few objections among policy makers. That year, Congress overrode a presidential veto to approve immediate payment. More than 98 percent of veterans immediately cashed in their bonds.

The 1932 Bonus March lasted only two months, but the image of angry veterans marching on Washington, D.C., lingered much longer in the nation's memory. During World War II, in part to avoid similar problems with a new generation of veterans, the government planned more effectively to

help returning service personnel find jobs, buy a house, or complete their education by offering them a comprehensive set of benefits known as the GI Bill. The Bonus March, therefore, demonstrated the lasting political and economic effects of World War I and served as a cautionary tale for the U.S. government in the nation's next war.

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Related Entries

American Legion; Economy and War; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Veterans Administration; Veterans of Foreign Wars; World War I

Related Documents

1932

—Jennifer D. Keene

Born on the Fourth of July

Autobiography by Ron Kovic, 1976
Film directed by Oliver Stone, 1989

Volunteering for service in the Marines in 1968, Ron Kovic was a naïve teen who survived the Vietnam War and American indifference to its veterans to become a renowned and controversial veterans' activist. Kovic published *Born on the Fourth of July,* an account of his experiences, in 1976. When Oliver Stone brought Kovic's story to the screen in 1989, a wide range of Americans were made to reflect anew on the troubling fate of Vietnam vets returning home from a war that had bitterly divided U.S. society.

Responding to his country's call for personal sacrifice to stem the spread of communism—a call that had originated with Pres. John F. Kennedy in the early 1960s—Kovic volunteered for service in the Marines in 1968. Raised on heroic images of war shown in John Wayne movies and inspired by the respect and admiration of Americans for World War II

vets, Kovic imagined that military service was the way to fulfill his childhood dreams of heroism and sacrifice.

As a Marine fighting in Vietnam, however, Kovic failed to become the hero he had envisioned. Instead, he accidentally shot a corporal from his unit and then sustained an injury that left him paralyzed below the chest. Realizing that war, particularly the war he was fighting, was not simply heroic, Kovic began to lose his belief in his country and the government that sent him to fight.

Having survived his injury, Kovic endured a second nightmare when he entered the Veterans Administration hospital system. There he witnessed and experienced the neglect of returned soldiers. His autobiography recounts his hospital time in graphic detail. Feeling deeply betrayed, Kovic expressed his disgust at being treated as less than human and recorded the daily indignities he and fellow paraplegics endured. Kovic also experienced America's ambivalence toward the war during his homecoming, as he met neighbors who displayed discomfort at his appearance rather than the adulation he had expected. Struggling to find a place for himself, Kovic traveled to Mexico to a veterans' colony. After spending some time there, he returned to New York, where a broken leg forced him to return to the neglect of another VA hospital.

A veterans' protest convinced Kovic to participate in the antiwar movement, and he joined Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Despite becoming a media star in the organization, betrayal by informants and his peers' resentment of his celebrity status led to further disillusionment. In 1972, however, Kovic accompanied other vets to the Republican National Convention in Miami, where he was interviewed by TV newscaster Rodger Mudd. After disrupting Nixon's acceptance speech, Kovic was pushed from the convention floor and spat upon by a young Republican delegate.

Oliver Stone earned the Academy Award for Best Director for his film based on Kovic's life. Following the autobiography, Stone traces Kovic's journey from young idealist to fervent war protestor. Stone depicts Kovic (played by Tom Cruise) as an innocent, driven not by a sense of duty to Kennedy's ideals but by an overbearing mother. Drawing parallels to Kovic's deep Roman Catholic faith, Stone's film illustrates a journey of sacrifice, confession, and absolution.

Kovic's accidental killing of the corporal is the most damning act of his life, and Stone's film features a fictional meeting with the corporal's family to provide forgiveness for the cinematic Kovic.

Bringing Kovic's time in VA hospitals to visual life, Stone portrays Kovic as stripped of both his mobility and dignity. Kovic returns to an America that is indifferent and uncomfortable with the presence of veterans. This new America is filled with entrepreneurs and capitalists who declined service and prospered while men like Kovic gave their bodies and often sacrificed their lives to the war effort. Kovic's younger siblings, who listen to Bob Dylan and question the war, represent a new generation with which he cannot identify. Kovic's time in Mexico is presented as his lowest point, and a watershed moment during which he accepts that he will only find personal peace in the public arena as an advocate for veterans' rights.

Kovic appears at the 1972 Republican Convention as part of a contingent of veterans driven to seek exposure both on camera and at the convention. An emotional scene features the banished vets using their military skills to organize and storm the convention after being removed from the convention floor. Stone concludes the film with Kovic preparing to speak before the 1976 Democratic Convention. For Stone, Kovic's story is of a boy who strove to be a hero and became one on different terms, a "John Wayne in a wheelchair" who spent his adult life fighting a second war.

For Ron Kovic, the realities of Vietnam combat and American attitudes toward returning veterans clashed too sharply with the idealism that he was raised to embrace. Surviving physical injuries, disillusionment, and a loss of spirit, Kovic channeled his energy into speaking out against the war he once readily joined. Although Kovic has been criticized for pushing his own personal agenda at the expense of the veterans' movement, his celebrity has led to continued success as a visible activist for veterans' rights.

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Related Entries

Antiwar Movements; Film and War; Vietnam War

Related Documents

1957

—*Laura Finger*

Boxer Rebellion

(1900)

The Boxer Rebellion was a Chinese nationalistic backlash against Westerners in 1900 that endangered Americans and many Europeans. Brief but intense, it stands as a significant episode of anti-imperialist fervor at a time when the United States was just beginning to involve itself to a greater degree in international affairs and create its own empire.

By the late 19th century, European nations—Russia, Portugal, Italy, Great Britain, France, and Germany—had secured some territorial footing in China. After being

coerced and intimidated, China had allowed these nations to send Christian missionaries to proselytize throughout the countryside and gave special foreign concessions to control various "spheres of interest" with near autonomy. American missionaries had been in China for a number of years before the Boxer uprising, but the United States did not enter the diplomatic and commercial struggle until the depression of 1893. This interest accelerated after the United States acquired the Philippines in 1899. By 1900, several thousand Westerners were in China trying to change its soul, economy, and physical landscape through missions, mines, railroads, and telegraphs. U.S. Secretary of State John Hay was a strong proponent of the Open Door policy, whereby Western nations would respect China's political integrity and maintain commercial equality. This policy would also allow the United States entry into the lucrative "China market" without having its own sphere of interest.

The Open Door policy did not, however, salve a dormant anger among many Chinese that foreign changes and influences were destroying their traditions and culture. These Chinese fiercely opposed the coerced changes in their society and blamed foreign influence for the floods and famine affecting much of northern China. Dissidents found a voice in the Boxers, who were loosely organized groups of fanatical antiforeign, anti-Christian Chinese known for their skill in martial arts as well as their belief in invulnerability and an ability to summon thousands of "spirit soldiers" to assist them.

During 1899, the Boxers gained in popularity and numbers throughout northern rural China. By early 1900, most missionaries were aware of an increasing hatred of them as well as their Chinese converts. In May, Boxers moved across the countryside, destroying railroads, dismantling telegraph lines, and murdering Christian missionaries, including some Americans, as well as their Chinese converts, whom the Boxers detested as much as the "foreign devils." While the missionaries were threatened by the Boxers, Western diplomats in Peking did not move until the Boxers laid siege to a Belgian construction company in late May. The diplomats asked the empress of China for support, but it soon became evident that she supported the Boxers. When the Boxers openly appeared in Peking in late May, the various Western legations asked for and received token military support on June 1. Approximately 350 soldiers, including 50 U.S. Marines and five U.S. sailors, arrived to protect the Legation Quarter, which was soon teeming with hundreds of fleeing missionaries and thousands of Chinese converts. These forces patrolled the Legation Quarter until June 20, when the Chinese army besieged the diplomats. The multinational military force was woefully inadequate, with limited ammunition and firepower, but it managed to keep the Boxers and Chinese Imperial Army at bay until August 14, when more substantial forces relieved the Westerners.

Those Westerners and Chinese converts able to make it into the Legation Quarter before the siege began had to endure constant, although ineffective, assaults, sniping, and shelling from the Chinese, as well as bad and scanty food in temperatures over 100°F. For nearly two months, these Westerners looked beyond international rivalry and relied on each other for their survival and defense. On June 10, some 2,000 Western soldiers, including 100 U.S. Marines and sailors, left Tientsin to relieve the Legation Quarter. Depleted from heavy fighting, this force fought its way back to Tientsin, received reinforcements, including additional U.S. Marines and soldiers, and recaptured the city on July 15. On August 4, an international force of approximately 20,000 men left Tientsin for Peking. They engaged in some fighting on the trip north, but the worst enemy was the intense heat. The West had lost communication with the Legation Quarter and expected that it had been overwhelmed, but the relief force arrived at the Legation Quarter on August 14 and fought back their besiegers. Chinese forces quickly dissolved, and the Manchu Court fled Peking. Afterward, soldiers and Marines looted and plundered Peking, killing many Chinese, both Boxer and civilian. Although U.S. Pres. William McKinley expressly ordered that the American contingent avoid such behavior, some American soldiers and Marines undoubtedly took part in the rampage.

Reports of massacres of missionaries and converts across the Chinese countryside during that summer angered the West, but the U.S. government proved surprisingly conciliatory toward China, largely because Secretary of State Hay sought to protect China's territorial integrity with his Open Door doctrine. The American public, too, proved to be understanding of the Boxers. According to a study of newspaper

cartoons about this rebellion, most Americans understood the Boxers to be a reactionary movement against European imperialism. America was becoming more active in world affairs after the Spanish–American War and the acquisition of the Philippines (indeed, the U.S. Army was in the middle of putting down the Philippine Insurrection at this time). But American policy makers were sufficiently concerned about future access to the fabled "China market," widely believed to be a source of export prosperity for Americans, that they and their British counterparts managed to keep China's door "open" to all trade. However tenuously maintained, Hay's Open Door policy largely remained in effect until Japan decided to ignore it altogether with force in 1915 (when it seized German concessions on the Shantung Peninsula) and later with full-scale warfare in the 1930s. The Open Door policy and the Boxer Rebellion tied America, like it or not, to Chinese national interests until 1945.

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Related Entries

Butler, Smedley Darlington; McKinley, William; Philippine War

—*Jonathan A. Beall*

Brady, Mathew B.

(1823?–96)
Photographer

Mathew B. Brady is generally considered to be the most celebrated photographer of the American Civil War—but he might more accurately be described as the mastermind behind a grand project, for he took few of these photographs himself. He had the foresight to recognize the importance of chronicling such a major event in American history and the business acumen to envisage substantial profits from the enterprise. Ironically, although Brady gained renown for his Civil War photographs, this project also contributed to his financial ruin.

Brady was born near Lake George, New York, to poor parents of Irish heritage. Little is known of his childhood. However, in 1841 he moved to New York City to study the photographic process under Samuel F. B. Morse. Morse was an accomplished artist and inventor who, although better known for his work in telegraphy, also introduced the art of photography to America. Within three years Brady opened his own studio in New York. He initially specialized in portraits of famous Americans and quickly gained a reputation as America's foremost photographer. He had suffered from eye problems since childhood, however, and by the 1850s his failing eyesight led him to rely more heavily on his associates. Alexander Gardner, a Scottish chemist who was the leading expert in the new wet plate process, became Brady's right-hand man. In 1858 Brady put Gardner in charge of his Washington, D.C., studio. At the same time, he took a young apprentice, Timothy O'Sullivan, under his wing. In 1860 he photographed the presidential candidates, including Stephen Douglass and Abraham Lincoln. Later Lincoln was to credit Brady with assisting in his successful presidential campaign.

By the outbreak of the Civil War, Brady had attained great success, with two studios in New York and two in Washington, D.C. The conflict lent a powerful impetus for photography, as soldiers rushed to have their portraits taken to leave behind with loved ones. Many of the most famous Union officers were photographed at the Mathew Brady Studio, including Benjamin Butler, George McClellan, Joseph Hooker, and George Meade. Brady saw an opportunity and

determined to record the conflict. "A spirit in my feet said 'Go,'" he said, "and I went." Although friends tried to dissuade him, pointing out the many dangers of the battlefield as well as the potential financial risks, Brady was determined to make a visual record of the war. In July 1861, he personally photographed the aftermath of first major battle of the war at Manassas, Virginia. Thereafter Brady organized teams of photographers, including Gardner and O'Sullivan to travel with the Union Army. In 1863 Brady appointed longtime employee Andrew Burgess as his partner. Gardner, O'Sullivan, and Burgess were responsible for many of the photographs taken during the Civil War, although they were published under Brady's name.

Photographic technology of the 1860s was relatively new. Photographs taken on wet plates had to be processed immediately onto heavy glass negatives. As this required cumbersome equipment, photographers had to drive wagons to the battlefront. Soldiers called these portable dark-rooms "whatsit wagons." The several seconds required for an exposure offered no opportunity to capture movement, so battlefield photographs were normally taken during truces called for both sides to bury their dead. Brady's photographic teams roamed the battlefields. Not content simply to document what they saw, they commonly positioned dead bodies to capture the qualities they wished to convey.

Photographs could not be published in newspapers, which printed artists' line drawings instead, so Brady arranged for his work to be exhibited in his New York studio. In 1862, following the battle that was called the bloodiest day of the war, people flocked to see images of "The Dead of Antietam." This first true example of war photojournalism gave viewers a taste of what battlefield death actually looked like and the audience expressed horror at the terrible reality of the war. Later that year Brady published two collections of his photographs, *Brady's Photographic Views of the War* and *Incidents of the War*. Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the *Atlantic*

Photographer Mathew Brady with his processing wagon—called a "whatsit wagon"—on the road during the Civil War.
(© Bettmann/CORBIS)

Monthly of July 1863, wrote of Brady's work at Antietam, "Let him who wants to know what war is, look at this series of illustrations."

Throughout the war Brady continued to photograph military leaders including Ulysses S. Grant in 1864, and Robert E. Lee just one week after his surrender in 1865. In 1866, after a final exhibit at the New-York Historical Society, Brady offered to sell his collection for permanent display. His offer was rejected.

Brady had invested almost $100,000 into his project. During the war he supported his work by selling negatives and celebrity photographs in exchange for cameras and supplies. But at the end of the war few wanted to dwell on the vivid images of carnage and Brady's galleries began to lose money. By 1867 he could no longer manage his accumulated debt and was forced to sell his Washington gallery at auction. In 1871 Brady unsuccessfully petitioned Congress with an offer to sell his negative collection. He filed for bankruptcy two years later. The federal government eventually purchased 7,000 glass negatives for $25,000 in 1875. Many of these are now housed in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. (though some reportedly were used to plate a government greenhouse).

Brady spent his final years in poverty, almost blind, without close friends or family. On January 15, 1896, at that age of 73, he died in the alms ward of The New York–Presbyterian Hospital as a result of injuries sustained in a street accident. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery under a tombstone that reads RENOWNED PHOTOGRAPHER OF THE CIVIL WAR.

War photography was not new at the beginning of the American Civil War. Daguerreotypes had been made during the Mexican War (1846–48) and an English photographer, Roger Fenton, had taken photographs of the Crimean War (1853–56). Fenton's work, however, presented a glorified picture of war. Brady recognized a new way to document war, bringing the immediacy to the home front in a new and much more graphic way. His work showed the public the sheer human cost of war. Although his name has come to represent the beginnings of war photojournalism, Brady might better be remembered as an entrepreneur rather than an artist. Nevertheless, his photographic chronicle of the Civil War has given us important documentary evidence of the battlefield and illustrates the power of photography in producing a visual record of war.

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Related Entries
Combat-Zone Photography

—Jacqueline G. Campbell

Brant, Joseph
(1743–1807)

Brant, Margaret "Molly"
(1736–96)

Iroquois Leaders during the American Revolution

At the outbreak of the American Revolution, both the British Empire and the American colonists pressed Native American tribes to declare their loyalty and support. While some tribes, influenced by missionaries or fearing reprisals from colonists, joined the rebellion, most stayed loyal to Britain, often believing that their chances of autonomy and prosperity were greater under the crown. Siblings Joseph (Thayendanegea) and Margaret "Molly" Brant were examples of the success of British Indian policy in winning the support of the Mohawks through agents such as Sir William Johnson. Joseph Brant became a model for the British of what European education

and inclusion might hold for the tribes of the Hudson and Mohawk valleys. In return, the Brant siblings became ferocious British partisans during the Revolution and founders of Loyalist communities in postwar Canada.

Joseph and Molly Brant were the children of Margaret, a Native American woman of uncertain ancestry; their father was probably Margaret's Mohawk husband, Peter Tehowaghwengaraghkwen (though their surname most likely came from Niklas Brant, a later husband). Molly Brant was educated in the European style, so may have attended a mission school. Her political activity began in 1754, when she attended a Philadelphia land negotiation as part of a Mohawk delegation. Through Niklas Brant, Molly met Sir William Johnson, a recent widower, who was stationed in the colonies as the crown's Northern Indian Agent. By 1759, she had become his consort at Fort Johnson and Johnson Hall (Johnstown, New York) and had borne him the first of their eight children.

As a teenager, Joseph Brant fought for the British in both the French and Indian War and during the ensuing Pontiac's War. Through his sister, he was able to secure himself a place as Johnson's protégé. Johnson sent Joseph to Ebenezer Wheelock's Charity School for Indians in Connecticut for two years. Joseph then returned to the Mohawk Valley to work as Johnson's secretary, a position that taught him estate administration and gave him access to British society in the region. Joseph married the first of his three wives in 1765 and lived on a Johnson land grant. Molly, meanwhile, was accepted as Johnson's chatelaine, and became a powerful influence on Johnson and his agency.

Johnson died in 1774 on the eve of the American Revolution, leaving Molly and their children a generous provision. Molly quickly parlayed this bequest into a trading venture among the Mohawk living around Johnstown and lived among them, leaving Johnson Hall to her stepchildren. Joseph sailed for London in November 1775, hoping to lobby for a secure Mohawk land provision after Guy Carleton tentatively offered land rewards to Native Americans who remained loyal to the king. Despite his celebrity in Britain, which included presentation at court and induction into Freemasonry, Joseph could not deliver a commitment, although the exotic glamour of an attractive, articulate Native American made him extremely popular and his visit was widely covered in the London press.

Joseph returned home to find New York occupied by British troops, and he began work in the Mohawk Valley to break the declaration of the Iroquois nation's neutrality, eventually detaching some of the Six Nations to join the British in 1777. Approximately 300 Native Americans and as many as 100 Loyalists from the Johnson estate followed Joseph into the British Army. Using intelligence gained by Molly, Joseph's men successfully ambushed a relief force at Oriskany meant for Fort Stanwix. Molly's participation in intelligence gathering as both spy and spymaster ultimately exposed her to the wrath of the revolutionaries, and she was forced to flee to British Canada. For his part, Joseph led attacks on the colonial settlements at Cherry Valley and German Flats and unsuccessfully attempted to protect the Cayuga and Senecas from revolutionary reprisals.

Loyalist and Native American refugees fled to Fort Niagara and Fort Haldiman, where Molly kept the peace and organized rationing on behalf of the British commander, who treated her with great respect and acceded to her demand for a house at British expense. Joseph's men deflected George Rogers Clark's attack on Detroit in April 1781 by defeating his rear guard, but the British surrender at Yorktown doomed his resistance movement and prompted him to hold back his Native American allies in the interest of a generous peace. Unfortunately, the 1783 Peace of Paris ignored the efforts of Britain's Native American allies, and made no provision for those, like Joseph and Molly, who lost their land to the Revolution. Molly, however, demanded restitution for her lost property and received both the first and largest pension awarded to the Loyalists in Canada. She remained in Kingston with her daughters, a pillar of the Church of England and Loyalist society, until her death on April 16, 1796.

Joseph, by now married to his third wife Catherine Croghan (daughter of British Indian agent George Croghan), traveled again to London in 1785 to demand support for Native Americans. He was once more welcomed into British society and was awarded a pension as a half-pay captain, but he was unable to secure anything for the tribes who had aided the British. Canadian officials assisted him in acquiring an

estate at Burlington, Ontario, and a large tract of 570,000 acres on the Grand River for his followers, who eventually numbered 2,000. True to his training by Johnson, Joseph built a mill, was an able administrator, and attempted to bring prosperity to his settlers, but he realized that they needed investment funds and time to make the transition to a different life. Over British protest, he sold 350,000 acres of Grand River land to private buyers in an attempt to raise capital and was accused of personal profiteering from the transaction.

This deeply wounded Joseph, who was furious at the treatment of Native Americans remaining in the United States, especially the transactions forced on the Oneida by the state of New York and the 1789 Treaty of Fort Harmar, which dispossessed the Shawnee. Joseph traveled to Detroit and Sandusky to urge Native Americans to negotiate all land deals collectively and to stand as one against further incursions. Although his visits garnered interest within the Native American community, the federation that he spoke of never materialized. Joseph received a tribute of scalps that had been taken from Arthur St. Clair's men, who were defeated by the Miami in an ambush at the Wabash River in 1791, but he also lived to see massive land acquisition by William Henry Harrison. Highly regarded by the British, but unable to accomplish his goal of pan-tribal unity, Joseph Brant died at his Burlington mansion on November 24, 1807.

The careers of the Brants demonstrate the pull of the British Empire for populations that considered themselves threatened by the expansion of the American colonies, as well as the vital role that minority populations could play in the defense of the empire (whether as guerilla leaders, spies, or diplomats). Joseph and Molly Brant became founders of British Loyalist Canada and used their status to continue to lobby for the rights of indigenous peoples remaining within American borders.

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Related Entries

Native Americans in Colonial Wars and the Revolutionary War; Revolutionary War.

—*Margaret Sankey*

Bridges at Toko-Ri, The

Novel by James Michener, 1953
Film directed by Mark Robson, 1955

James Michener's *The Bridges at Toko-Ri* examines U.S. involvement in the Korean War through the experiences of a Navy combat pilot. The novel was quickly made into a movie. Imaginatively filmed by cinematographer Loyal Griggs and created with the full cooperation of the U.S. Navy, the movie featured a notable cast, a realistic and plausible plot, and spectacular aerial special effects for which the film won an Academy Award. Released just over a year after the cessation of hostilities in Korea, the film joined other interpretations of that war such as *One Minute to Zero* (1952), *Retreat, Hell!* (1952), and *The McConnell Story* (1955). Its thoughtful depiction of this war from the personal and humanized perspective of "loyal doubters" stood in contrast to these contemporary films touting the "good fight" against the fearsome hordes of the Red Menace. While *The Bridges at Toko-Ri* explored the "domino theory" (which maintained that if one country fell to communist expansion several others would follow), it also

invited audiences to consider more closely the lives of some of the American warriors who were sent forth as a wall of resistance to the seemingly ever-present communist threat.

Veteran World War II pilot Harry Brubaker (William Holden), settling into a comfortable postwar life as an attorney and family man in Denver, is called up to fly perilous missions from the fictional aircraft carrier USS *Savo Island* over heavily defended targets in Korea. Lieutenant Brubaker, a member of the inactive Reserves, is surprised and resentful that his number has come up considerably ahead of many active Reserve pilots, but he also realizes that he finds himself in this situation because of his high caliber and experience: the greatly reduced post–World War II U.S. armed forces struggled considerably to return to sufficient strength in late 1950 to carry out their mission in Korea. Despite his personal disappointment and his expressed doubts about the utility of the present conflict, Brubaker focuses his attention and professional skills on the missions he must fly over Korea.

During his ship's liberty port call in Japan, Brubaker is briefly reunited with his wife Nancy (Grace Kelly) and his two small daughters, while sea rescue helicopter pilot Mike Forney (Mickey Rooney) wreaks havoc in the bars of Yokosuka. Brubaker's Tokyo idyll is overshadowed by the treacherous mission over Toko-Ri that awaits upon his return to sea. Nancy has learned of this mission from Admiral Tarrant (Fredric March), who encourages her to consider the possibility of her husband's death despite Brubaker's attempts to shield her from that very possibility. The couple quietly comes to terms, and they devote their attention to each other on this short vacation together. On the eve of the attack on the bridges at Toko-Ri, Brubaker agonizes yet resolves to fly the mission, which he executes expertly and survives handily, but in the subsequent action against a secondary target his plane is hit, forcing him down on Korean soil. Mike Forney nonetheless brings his rescue helicopter in for a landing under enemy fire, but it is disabled, forcing Brubaker and Forney to defend themselves against approaching troops from a shallow ditch, where both are killed within minutes. This grim scene dissolves into an epilogue featuring the dispirited yet resolute admiral, who mourns Brubaker nearly as a surrogate son, yet marvels at the courage and sacrifice of "such men" even as they (and he) question their country's involvement in Korea.

Even with its starkly realistic and downbeat ending, *The Bridges at Toko-Ri* enjoyed great critical, commercial, and popular success upon its January 1955 release. Paramount, in fact, had agreed to hold its release until six months after that of MGM's *Men of the Fighting Lady* (1954), a documentary about wartime carrier flight operations also based on James Michener's writings. The blending of family dynamics with the military and political realities of the Korean "police action" set *The Bridges at Toko-Ri* apart from other films of the period. Its acknowledgement of the war's futility even as the troubled characters of Lieutenant Brubaker, Admiral Tarrant, and others "do the right thing" underscores the complex, lasting appeal of this cinematic icon of the Korean War era.

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Related Entries

Film and War; Korean War

—Gordon E. Hogg

Brownsville Riot

On the night of August 13, 1906, unknown raiders fired on the border town of Brownsville, Texas, killing one man and

wounding two others. White townspeople blamed the soldiers of the all-black 25th Infantry Regiment, which had three companies of its 1st Battalion stationed nearby at Fort Brown. Although all members of the battalion maintained their innocence, Army investigators concluded that approximately 15 soldiers had taken part in a raid on the town. Unable to wrest confessions from any of the alleged participants, Pres. Theodore Roosevelt dishonorably discharged all 167 enlisted men and noncommissioned officers stationed at Fort Brown and barred them from future military or civil service. African American leaders recoiled at Roosevelt's draconian response, while unsympathetic white commentators declared the shootings typical behavior of African Americans in uniform. Reflecting and rooted in the politics of white supremacy, the Brownsville Riot of 1906 laid bare the tensions involved in stationing African American Army enlistees in the deep South.

In multiracial Brownsville, where white Americans and European immigrants lived among a predominantly Mexican American population, a strict code of racial separation was maintained through a combination of so-called Jim Crow statutes and vigilante violence. In the weeks after black troops' arrival on July 28, 1906, white citizens of Brownsville physically assaulted the soldiers in the streets. One man pistol-whipped a private for purportedly insulting his wife, and another shoved a trooper into the Rio Grande for wandering around drunk in public. Charges that members of the 25th Infantry were attempting to rape white women circulated through town alongside the boasts of some townspeople that they would do everything in their power to run off the unwelcome regiment. Faced with the hostility of the civilian population, black troopers endured countless slurs and insults with considerable restraint.

Army officials would later argue that the soldiers chafed at their treatment and decided to retaliate. Minutes after midnight on August 14, rifle fire rang out between the edge of Fort Brown and the border of town. Soldiers on duty assumed an attack on the fort, but when the firing stopped 10 minutes later, the only victims were a white bartender, a Tejano policeman, and a Tejano bookbinder. Although the bartender died from his gunshot wounds, the other men survived and confirmed reports that the assailants had come

from the First Battalion at Fort Brown. In investigating the incident, the Army's inspector general based his conclusion of guilt on civilian testimony, physical evidence (spent cartridges from Army-issue rifles found piled in a Brownsville street the morning after the raid), and his own conviction that African American troops were inherently deceitful. Submitting his report to Pres. Theodore Roosevelt, he recommended that the president dismiss all of companies B, C, and D to punish the unknown culprits and the men whose silence protected them. To the dismay of his black constituency, Roosevelt followed the recommendation, forgoing any semblance of due process of law.

With the evidence against the soldiers too circumstantial to sustain a court-martial, some white observers also questioned the guilt of the accused raiders. The discharged men found their most influential defender in the Roosevelt rival and Republican senator from Ohio, Joseph E. Foraker. Spurred by political ambition and encouraged by the interracial civil rights organization, the Constitution League, Foraker took a hard look at the evidence in the Brownsville raid and found it lacking. He urged the Senate Committee on Military Affairs to conduct a hearing on Brownsville and the president's response to it.

The resulting Senate investigation lasted from February 1907 to March 1908. Although the committee ultimately voted nine to four to uphold the president's decision, the report submitted by Foraker and fellow dissenting Republican senator, Morgan G. Bulkeley of Connecticut, cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of the 1st Battalion. In addition to stressing the unreliability of the eyewitnesses as well as the racial biases of both the Army investigators and the people of Brownsville, Foraker and Bulkeley pointed to discrepancies in the evidence. All of the enlisted men in the battalion were accounted for in the moments after the shooting, the senators noted, as were their weapons and ammunition. At least one of the bullets recovered from the street the next morning did not match any of the cartridges supposedly spent during the shooting, and some soldiers had reported hearing shots from pistols (which none of the soldiers were issued) before they heard the rifle shots. Foraker and Bulkeley's meticulous examination of evidence begged the question of whether someone else committed the assault on

Brownsville and framed the 25th Infantry for the crime. Although the Roosevelt administration refused to credit the senators' report, the War Department did allow 14 of the dismissed soldiers to reenlist in 1910.

Brownsville and its legacy became a contentious point for Americans pondering the role of African Americans in the military. In the years leading up to World War I, white supremacists repeatedly cited Brownsville as proof that African Americans should not be armed or allowed to serve as combat troops. African Americans cited it as an example of the federal government denying them the protection of the law. In 1972, in the midst of the Vietnam War and nearly seven decades after the original Brownsville raid, the government finally moved to settle the issue. Citing the likelihood of prejudgment on the part of the inspector general, Congress granted honorable discharges to the men who Roosevelt had banned from military service. Dorsie Willis, the one member of the battalion still alive, accepted his discharge and a $25,000 pension, maintaining at age 86 the same thing he had claimed at age 20—that the Brownsville riot "was a frame up through and through."

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Buffalo Soldiers; Race Riots; Roosevelt, Theodore

—Adriane D. Smith

Buffalo Soldiers

During the last three decades of the 19th century, blacks made up about 10 percent of the strength of the U.S. Army. The fewer than 20,000 blacks who served as regulars, or members of the nation's standing army, would become known as the Buffalo Soldiers. Despite its many shortcomings, the regular Army, on balance, was one of the most racially impartial American institutions of the day. It was one of the few that offered blacks and whites the same pay for the same work. In other areas, such as the military justice system where black soldiers could bring charges and appear as witnesses, the Army was far ahead of civilian practices.

The Origin of "Buffalo Soldiers"

In the spring of 1866, a year after the end of the Civil War, Congress established the peacetime organization of the Army. The service of nearly 200,000 black volunteer soldiers during the war influenced the composition of this force: for the first time, blacks were permitted to enlist in the regular Army. Legislators specified that two cavalry regiments and four infantry regiments would be composed of "colored men." Three years later the Army was again reorganized into the shape it would retain until the start of the Spanish–American War in 1898: some 25,000 troops formed into 10 regiments of cavalry, 25 of infantry, and five of artillery. These provisions, which became codified in federal law, stated that blacks would form the 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry.

The name "Buffalo Soldiers" probably originated in the early 1870s in the Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma). The first published use of the name came in 1873, when a journalist noted that Indians compared the hair of black troops to the appearance of buffalo. Over time, the name gained some currency, mainly in the press but also in some private correspondence. Black soldiers probably knew of this name, but surviving records show that they did not use the term and instead used "colored" to describe themselves and the soldiers in their regiments. The name did not find wide use either inside or outside the Army until well into the 20th century.

Nearly half of the blacks who enlisted in the new regular regiments were Civil War veterans; most were former slaves.

Many were illiterate, and few had acquired skills beyond their experience as field hands and laborers. Congress recognized this problem and provided for the assignment of a chaplain in each black regiment; chaplains were responsible for the religious and educational instruction of the soldiers. The success of the school program, however, varied with the efforts of the individual chaplains, the support of regimental officers, and the interest of the soldiers themselves.

Over time some changes occurred in the enlistment pattern in the black regiments. Most soldiers still came from the South, but many were from the District of Columbia and the border states of Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. The Army had a minority of Northerners as well as a scattering of foreigners—mainly Canadians and West Indians. By the late 1870s, improved educational opportunities throughout the nation brought more literate recruits into the black units. The Army generally attracted the young, and most regulars were in their early twenties when they joined up. Most black regulars still listed "farmer" or "laborer" as their occupation before enlisting. Although some artisans joined the Army, the black units had difficulty meeting their need for soldiers with prior training as carpenters, blacksmiths, and saddlers.

Service in the West

Between late 1869 and the end of active Indian campaigns in the early 1890s, the bulk of the regular force—three-fourths of the infantry and all of the cavalry—were posted on the frontier west of the Mississippi River. The Army worked its soldiers hard and expected all of them to accomplish the same tasks. Constant patrols, seemingly endless work details, occasional combat, pushing Indians onto reservations, preventing white incursions onto these reserved lands, aiding civilian law officers, escorting cattle drives and settlers, guarding stage and freight lines, protecting railroad survey and construction crews, and delivering the mail were all part of the varied activities of the multipurpose frontier Army. Commanders often used their soldiers as a ready and disciplined labor force, and black and white regulars alike built roads, strung telegraph lines, and constructed all types of buildings at their garrisons. Such work, especially when soldiers compared their pay with the much higher wages earned by civilian workers, was a principal cause of dissatisfaction with Army life and desertion in all regulars regiments.

Black and white soldiers of the same rank received the same pay. Regulars were also uniformed, equipped, mounted, housed, and fed in the same way. Occasionally, black troops received older weapons and not the best of horses, but, at times, so too did all the white units. The Army's procurement and supply system, in combination with limited congressional appropriations, was to blame for such problems. Commanders would have been irresponsible had they implemented a policy that crippled a large part of the Army by deliberately sending only the second best to the black regiments. The Army's administrative offices—those that dealt with recruiting, medical services, and the military justice system—were by regulation, and nearly always in practice, color blind. Elderly and infirm soldiers of both races who had been honorably discharged were admitted to the government-sponsored Soldiers' Home in the nation's capital, while those found guilty by courts-martial were sentenced to the military prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Former soldiers, regardless of race, received the same pension benefits.

Military and Social Relations

Throughout the post–Civil War era, black detachments often made up half or more of the available force in some frontier areas. The Army rarely recruited up to its authorized strength and black regulars were sent where they were most needed. They were not segregated from white troops or from civilian settlements. Although black units were not rotated to garrisons in the more populous areas of the East, the same was true for the majority of the white units. On the frontier black and white regulars often served at the same post. Separate company barracks and eating facilities somewhat reduced contact between these groups, but in all military duties the color line was obliterated. Black noncommissioned officers (sergeants and corporals) were often in command of both black and white soldiers. The Army was probably one of the few places in America at this time where blacks gave orders to whites and expected to be obeyed.

Although commanders insisted on and enforced racial equality in all military duties, they did not believe in dictating

the social relations of their troops. Members of both races generally participated in separate social and recreational activities. Many exceptions to this pattern developed. Segregated athletic teams were common, but garrisons also fielded integrated teams, especially when competing against groups from other posts or civilians. Post canteens and reading rooms, which provided soldiers with a place to relax, were all fully integrated, as were most post schools and religious gatherings. Outside of post limits, civilian merchants were usually willing to sell goods and provide services to all soldiers regardless of race. Violent off-duty clashes between black and white troops and between black regulars and white civilians did occur, but these were exceptions to a pattern of general, if cautious, acceptance and tolerance.

Although black and white soldiers performed the same duties, some statistical differences between the two groups were evident. Desertion was often chronic in the post–Civil War regulars. Blacks, however, rarely deserted, and they also had a higher rate of reenlistment. While the total number of those who reenlisted was small, the fact that some black soldiers served multiple enlistments probably indicates a basic level of satisfaction with Army life. These long-service veterans, especially if they were noncommissioned officers, provided the black regiments with a valuable cadre of experienced soldiers. Overall, however, the large majority of all regulars did not make the Army a career, moving back into civilian life after serving one, usually a five-year, enlistment.

African American Officers

Black soldiers almost always served under the command of white officers. Henry O. Flipper, John Hanks Alexander, and Charles Young, however, were commissioned as officers after they graduated from the United States Military Academy in the 19th century, and five other men were appointed regimental chaplains. The collective experience of these black officers was one of proper, but reserved, dealings in all official functions but near total social isolation. A West Point diploma or a War Department commission declared these blacks to be officers and gentlemen, but few of their white fellow officers were willing to accept them as equals. In this, white officers reflected the prevailing racial views of much of American society.

Black enlisted soldiers could be promoted to the more specialized and higher paid ranks of Ordnance and Commissary Sergeant and Hospital Steward, and a few met the strict service, educational, and technical requirements for these positions. A black college graduate served briefly in the Signal Corps, but no blacks were enlisted in the small Engineer Corps and all artillery soldiers during this period were white.

Black Valor and the Double Standard

Regardless of their service and accomplishments, black regulars never escaped reminders that many within the military considered them to be second-class soldiers. As offensive as the arrangement was, racially segregated regiments were a given of the late-19th-century American Army. Black regulars also soldiered under racial myths and stereotypes that, despite abundant evidence to the contrary, would not evaporate. For example, whites in the Army could accept that blacks might be molded into capable soldiers, but at the same time they continued to believe, in the phrase of that time, that blacks were always "dependent on their white officers."

When individual blacks proved to be poor soldiers, whites would claim this as evidence that all black troops were useless. Others were ready to dismiss the gallantry of some blacks as exceptions to the belief that all blacks were innate cowards. Blacks were also excluded from the artillery primarily on the grounds that they did not have the intelligence to become gunners. The black regulars always had to satisfy two standards, the professional and the racial. From the beginning they managed to meet the Army's professional standards. Prejudice, however, was ever present.

Nevertheless, black regulars—and especially troopers of the 9th and 10th Cavalry—compiled an impressive record during 30 years of often arduous campaign service. The high command was not reluctant to use black troops in the field and officers did not hesitate to recognize the heroism of black regulars. Fourteen blacks received the Congressional Medal of Honor, and nine others earned the second highest award for bravery, the Certificate of Merit. The record also contains numerous instances where black noncommissioned officers, and occasionally privates, commanded detachments in action as well as in many routine military duties.

Ordered by Congress to enlist and maintain black regiments, often crippled by stingy appropriations, usually under strength—and all the while confronted with a wide range of tasks in the West—the Army had no choice but to employ all of its soldiers equally. During their first three decades of service, the black regulars compiled a creditable record that showed that they were capable soldiers: no better or worse than their white comrades. The service of these Buffalo Soldiers assured both the survival of their regiments and a place, however small, in the nation's public life.

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—*Thomas D. Phillips*

Butler, Smedley Darlington

(1881–1940)
General, U.S. Marine Corps

Smedley Darlington Butler was probably the most colorful and controversial Marine in American history. He outmaneuvered, overawed, or outfought hostile forces in the Philippines, China, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Haiti, winning two Congressional Medals of Honor in the process. Butler was lionized by the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the press, and writers of pulp fiction. He openly criticized the foreign policies of several U.S. administrations; when approached with the proposition that he lead a band of veterans in overthrowing the government of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, he revealed the plot to a congressional committee. From 1929 on, he was describing his overseas service in the corps as that of a "racketeering tool" of American capital abroad, but by 1931 this "maverick Marine" was no one's tool.

Butler was born in West Chester, Pennsylvania, in 1881, the eldest of three sons of a Quaker family. His father was elected to the U.S. Congress in 1896 as a Republican and served consecutive terms, including five as chair of the House Naval Affairs Committee, until his death in 1928. When war was declared against Spain in the spring of 1898, Smedley enlisted in the Marine Corps, three months before his 17th birthday. After a month of training, he was commissioned a second lieutenant and sailed in the company of

correspondent Stephen Crane for Cuba to join a battalion of Marines in the vicinity of Guantanamo. In 1899, Butler, now a first lieutenant, was sent to the Philippines where he saw some combat, until his battalion was sent to China in June 1900 to relieve foreign residents besieged by the ongoing Boxer Rebellion. In the course of this campaign he distinguished himself for courage and leadership displayed, was wounded twice, and contracted typhoid.

After a period of recuperation, he was to command a detachment of Marines at Culebra, an island east of Puerto Rico that the Navy would soon utilize for target practice. His dislike of naval officers began there, when his naval superiors ordered his Marines to dig a canal in the tropical heat and insect-infested terrain. Butler and his men contracted Chagres fever, and their contributions went unmentioned at the naval ceremony opening the island canal. In March 1903 his unit was ordered to Honduras as a show of force in support of a presidential contender there who had the confidence of the United Fruit Company and the U.S. government.

In 1909, Butler, now a major, was ordered to Panama to command the Marine battalion there. In early 1910, his unit was sent to Nicaragua in undisguised support of its pliable, pro–United Fruit Conservative Party. Ordered to secure and open the railway line from the coast to the capital, Managua, Butler at one point snatched a pistol from the grasp of a Liberal Party general blocking his small detachment's way. "His army burst out laughing," he later recalled. He contracted malaria while reducing Liberal resistance with both force and diplomacy. But by 1912 Butler had become infuriated with the open partisanship of his civilian and naval superiors, who were ignoring assurances he had given to compliant Liberal commanders that his Marines were there only to protect American property. Eventually the Liberal forces offered some spirited but futile resistance, killing a number of sailors and Marines. Butler complained to his wife: "It is terrible that we should be losing so many men . . . because Brown Bros. [a New York banking firm] have some money down here." He would later insist that his superiors had manipulated the Nicaraguan election of 1912 to ensure a pro-American government.

By 1914 Butler was in command of Marines at Veracruz, as the Wilson administration maneuvered to overthrow the Huerta government during the Mexican Revolution. He was dispatched as a spy to Mexico City, disguised as a former Panama Railway official sent by investors looking for opportunities in Mexico. He returned to Veracruz with precise maps and details of Huerta's artillery and garrison locations and strengths. In 1915 his battalion was sent to Haiti to protect the interests of the National City Bank of New York and to subdue caco "bandits" there. Once again, in a confrontation with rebel forces, he boldly pulled a caco general off his horse before his amused men, effectively divesting him of authority. By December Haiti was "pacified," and Butler was selected to organize and train the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, which would become the essential governing force in the country for the next several decades. In 1917 the Haitian parliament rejected a U.S.-drafted constitution sanctioning American ownership of land. Butler obtained a decree from the compliant Haitian president and, backed by his gendarmes, he dissolved the assembly.

In the summer of 1917 Butler was ordered to take command of the recently created advanced training facility at Quantico, Virginia. But he longed to get to the front. His father finally prevailed upon Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels, whose son was serving in Butler's regiment, to order the regiment to France in September. But the influenza epidemic struck the regiment while still at sea. More than 100 of his Marines died and hundreds more were debilitated. The unit was reassigned to rear-echelon duties, and Butler, now a brigadier general, was named commander of the major American staging camp at Pontanezen, near Brest. By the winter of 1917 to 1918 the camp was an overcrowded sea of mud with many dying of the flu. Butler installed walkways and improved kitchen and toilet facilities, transforming the camp into a sanitary, well-provisioned place with good morale. Nearly a million men passed comfortably through the camp every six months.

Butler again commanded Quantico from 1920 to 1923, staging Civil War reenactments in the region for throngs of guests from Washington, D.C.; between 1923 and 1925, on leave from the Marine Corps, he served as police commissioner of Philadelphia, aggressively enforcing Prohibition. While commanding the Marine base in San Diego from 1926 to 1927, he wrote and published an

autobiographical youth thriller, *Walter Garvin in Mexico* (1927). In 1927 his regiment was sent to China to protect American interests during the advance of Kuomintang (KMT) armies north from Shanghai. He successfully opposed the call by U.S. ambassador to China John MacMurray for a full-fledged military intervention to prevent the KMT from extending its power into the north. Butler's correspondence while in China further revealed his growing antipathy to the heavy-handed use of military forces to protect American property overseas.

In 1929 he was back in command at Quantico. His fame led to numerous offers to speak before business and veterans' organization conventions; Butler donated most of his fees ($3,315 in a three-month period in early 1931 alone) to private organizations aiding the unemployed. In December 1929 he told an audience in Pittsburgh how he and his Marines had rigged Nicaraguan elections in 1912 and manipulated the government in Haiti for several years. Pres. Herbert Hoover was angered, and Butler received a letter of reprimand from the secretary of the Navy. For a while, he toned down his remarks, but in January 1931 he repeated a story told by Cornelius Vanderbilt Jr. about the insensitivity to human life of Italian premier Benito Mussolini (with whom the United States maintained cordial relations). Prompted by the secretary of state, Hoover called for Butler's court-martial. Butler received considerable support in the press, as well as several offers from prominent political and military figures to testify on his behalf. Plans for a court-martial were shelved; Butler was allowed to write his own letter of reprimand, which included no apology to Mussolini.

Butler retired in September 1931. Deeply annoyed with the way Annapolis graduates were dictating the future of the Marine Corps, he published an article in the magazine *Liberty*, entitled "To Hell with the Admirals," critical of the manner in which the corps was being transformed into a mainline military force led by college graduates, at the expense of those officers who had risen through the ranks on the basis of proven combat leadership skills. In July 1932 he visited the Bonus March veterans encampment at Anacostia Flats and offered them his sympathy and support. Nine days later Gen. Douglas MacArthur ordered cavalry and infantry units to break up the camp and drive the veterans off.

Calling himself a "Hoover-for-ex-President-Republican," Butler toured the country, making some 40 speeches in support of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, his old friend from the days of his service in Haiti, when Roosevelt was assistant Navy secretary. In 1933, in collaboration with Lowell Thomas, he published an autobiography, *Old Gimlet Eye*. Butler returned to his critique of the role he had been dispatched to perform overseas both in that book and in an article in *The Nation*, where he called the military "a glorified bill-collecting agency."

Butler was critical of the "elitist" leadership of the American Legion, but was impressed with the more interactive style of leadership of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He was a popular speaker at many meetings of that organization and the Marine Corps League for the next several years. In early 1934 this popularity led to an invitation from a group of financiers upset with the Roosevelt administration's departure from the gold standard: they urged Butler to lead a mass of veterans to Washington and take over the government. The plot was to begin with successful lobbying efforts to place Butler in charge of the proposed Civilian Conservation Corps and its large number of presumably impressionable young men, who would then be joined by veterans recruited for the coup. The simultaneous appearance in the spring of 1934 of the American Liberty League, an anti–New Deal conservative organization led by some of the men named by those who had approached Butler, appeared to confirm its leadership and objectives. Instead of cooperating, Butler revealed the plot to a closed meeting of the House Un-American Activities Committee.

In 1935 Butler published *War Is a Racket,* a pamphlet (further condensed for a mass audience in *Reader's Digest*) linking wars to capitalism. He spoke critically of the navalist visions of Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Pres. Theodore Roosevelt, and of their efforts on behalf of naval construction, which he styled "their respective shots of imperialistic hasheesh." Butler began a relationship with the League against War and Fascism, a Popular Front organization with Communist Party participants, in the same year. When the League later championed intervention in the Spanish Civil War on the side of the Republic, however, Butler broke with it, preferring neutrality. Hence he supported Congressman Louis Ludlow's proposed constitutional amendment to

require a national referendum before war could be declared, and called himself "a military isolationist" before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee in 1938.

Butler died in June 1940. The Okinawa Marine Base was named after him, as was a destroyer. Other Marines, Col. Evans Carlson and Gen. David Shoup, would display some of his maverick traits but neither was as outspoken, controversial, or colorful as was Smedley.

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Central America and the Caribbean, Interventions in; Marine Corps; Philippine War; World War I

—Peter Karsten

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
Caine Mutiny, The

Novel by Herman Wouk, 1951
Film directed by Edward Dmytryk, 1954

An epic of ordinary men caught in the maelstrom of World War II, *The Caine Mutiny* earned author Herman Wouk the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction in 1952 and became a successful Broadway play, television movie, and motion picture. Critics hailed the novel as a serious examination of the unique moral dilemmas faced by naval officers in wartime, and applauded a sophisticated plot that offered no clear-cut heroes or villains. At the same time, mainstream audiences were drawn to Wouk's rousing action sequences and sharp dialogue, and to a dramatic court-martial so compelling that both the book and the film remain popular today.

The story revolves around Ensign Willis "Willie" Keith, a young naval officer serving aboard the USS *Caine* during World War II. The *Caine* is an old destroyer-minesweeper near the end of its useful life, and a far cry from the glorious assignment the Princeton-educated Keith hoped would await him in the Navy. He is appalled by the dreary and dirty life led by the weary crew of the ship when he joins them in 1943, and his growing disillusionment is fueled by Lt. Thomas Keefer, an intelligent would-be novelist filled with disdain for the Navy. Both are held in check by the ship's second-in-command, Lt. Steve Maryk, a cheerful and competent officer who hopes to make the Navy a career. They are hopeful when their commanding officer is replaced by Lt. Commander Philip Francis Queeg, whom Keith hopes will make the *Caine* a far more impressive military machine.

Instead, Queeg gradually reveals himself as a paranoid, insecure tyrant who oppresses the crew and proves incompetent in crisis. As Queeg founders through a series of mistakes and emotional outbursts, the officers become increasingly sullen and withdrawn. Keefer suggests to Maryk that Queeg is delusional and possibly insane, and when the captain freezes on the bridge during a furious typhoon, Maryk relieves him of command. In the subsequent court-martial for mutiny, Maryk is defended by Lt. Barney Greenwald, a brilliant defense attorney who secures his acquittal. Afterward Greenwald stuns the celebrating officers by blaming them for turning on Queeg rather than supporting him. He argues that Keefer was the real culprit for helping convince Maryk the captain was insane, and that Queeg and the rest of the regular Navy were heroes for defending the United States in peacetime and in the early years of the war when men like himself, Maryk, Keefer, and Keith were all civilians.

After the trial ends, Maryk is assigned to a dead-end post as the commander of a transport ship, Queeg is sent to await his retirement at a remote outpost in Iowa, and Keefer becomes the next captain of the *Caine*. Keefer's true character reveals itself when he panics and jumps overboard after the ship has been hit by a Japanese plane. Keith is left aboard to save the vessel; when he becomes captain at the end of the war his coming-of-age is complete. He understands the loneliness of command, realizes that he, Maryk, and Keefer were wrong to seize command of the ship during the typhoon in spite of Queeg's shortcomings, and concludes that the brave, ordinary men of the *Caine* were the real heroes of the war because they did their duty to the best of their ability despite their anonymity and lack of recognition. Keith returns the ship to New York City for decommissioning, decides to leave the Navy, and, at the end of the novel, attempts to reconcile with and marry May Wynn, the lovely nightclub singer

his mother and his own immaturity had led him to believe was beneath him.

The Caine Mutiny follows in the tradition of naval court-martial and mutiny sagas such as *Mutiny on the Bounty*, *Treasure Island*, and *Billy Budd*. The novel and movie resonated with readers and filmgoers who had lived through World War II and appreciated Wouk's realistic portrayal of naval life. That realism was rooted in Wouk's wartime service aboard destroyer-minesweepers in the Pacific. Nevertheless, some critics assailed his work as too long, too complicated, or too maudlin. Some attacked Wouk for spending much of the novel setting Queeg up as a villain only to partly redeem him at the end. William Whyte, who devoted an entire chapter to criticizing the tale in his book *The Organization Man*, argued that Wouk's conclusion that Queeg should have remained captain of the *Caine* even after he put the ship in danger during the typhoon proved the social triumph of the group over the wisdom and safety of the individual.

The Caine Mutiny has proved to be enduringly popular. It opened as a play starring Lloyd Nolan and Henry Fonda in Santa Barbara, California, on October 12, 1953, and, following a successful nationwide tour, debuted on Broadway in 1954. That same year the story was released as a film starring Humphrey Bogart, Van Johnson, and Fred MacMurray, and, though it lacked the depth of the novel and the court-room drama of the play, the movie was nominated for seven Academy Awards. This was Bogart's last major film role, and, under the expert direction of Edward Dmytryk, he delivered a riveting performance that earned him his third Academy Award nomination for best actor and placed *The Caine Mutiny* firmly in the popular imagination. Americans have shown the importance of Wouk's work by adopting the name of his antagonist as a catch-all descriptor of maniacal bosses: they call them "Queegs."

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Film and War; *From Here to Eternity*; Literature and War; World War II

—Lance Janda

Camp Followers

Camp followers, the women, children, and noncombatant men who follow an army during wartime, are the forgotten stagehands whose work helped produce the dramas of the great battles of the 18th century. Often viewed as parasites that attached themselves to an army and progressively weakened it, camp followers, particularly women, actually performed many important functions. They offered crucial logistical support essential to the effective operation of the army. They also provided much of the social structure that helped make military life bearable, creating a family atmosphere that smoothed rough edges. Differing gender roles, and the presence of camp followers, would have created methods for socializing and motivating male soldiers that would bear little resemblance to the techniques used in armies of the later 19th and early 20th centuries. This presence of large numbers of women and children living intimately and closely with soldiers created a military world that contrasts sharply with that of the 21st century.

Roles of Camp Followers

Camp followers were essential to the operation of an 18th-century army, and most commanders made arrangements to secure their presence. The largest portion of camp followers consisted of the families of the soldiers, but noncombatant men also contributed significant numbers of camp followers. Many of these were artisans, such as blacksmiths and

carpenters, who provided skills needed by the army. Others were private servants and sutlers (merchants licensed to follow the armies and sell provisions to the soldiers). These individuals, many of whom were women, provided various goods, including fresh foods and vegetables, that the army did not generally stock. Women also performed other important functions, such as cooking, nursing, and laundry.

Camp followers, on the whole, had an unsavory reputation. Included among them was usually a large group of prostitutes, entertainers, and others. Prostitution and other forms of sexual misconduct were perhaps not as common as imagined, but a certain percentage of female camp followers and male soldiers took part.

Camp followers were often accused of looting or encouraging other forms of reckless behavior, particularly drinking. Drunkenness constantly troubled commanders, yet alcohol (in moderation) was deemed necessary to the smooth functioning of an army, and camp followers often supplied the spirits. From the point of view of authority, camp followers could be a nuisance that tempted soldiers from their duty and encouraged disorderly behavior. The fact that camp followers were subjected to military law and sometimes kept under military discipline highlights the important role of these civilians and the difficulties that commanders sometimes encountered keeping them in order.

Women, Children, and Families

Most of the camp followers were the wives and children of soldiers. Adult female camp followers cooked, nursed the ill and wounded, sewed, laundered clothing, cleaned the camp, acted as servants to officers, and performed many other necessary daily tasks. Customarily some were allowed rations in return for doing the cooking and cleaning for a company, but usually far more women were following the army than were officially allowed rations.

The commonly held view was that most female camp followers were prostitutes. One reason for this assumption was that marriage customs were much more informal and unregulated among the "lower orders" of 18th-century American and European armies. Moreover, the custom was for a woman widowed by the death of a soldier husband to take another husband in the army almost immediately. As a result, many marriages, which were probably considered valid by the parties concerned, were often judged to be unsanctioned and immoral by outside observers.

Occasionally, officers' wives (usually referred to as "ladies," unlike other camp followers) would also follow the armies, as, for example, Martha Washington did on occasion. While some followed the army full-time, many more came only on short visits. As officers' wives usually had more genteel manners than the wives and camp followers of the enlisted men, they tended to escape the disapproval directed at most camp followers.

Although some camp followers stayed in quarters when the armies went on campaign, others accompanied the army on the march and in camp. The numbers who did so in North America would have been far smaller than in Europe because of the greater distances involved and the need for a European army's camp followers to travel overseas by ship. Nonetheless, historian Sylvia Frey estimates that 5,000 women followed the British armies in America during the Revolutionary War. Like all camp followers, these women often endured great hardships, walking behind the army as it marched.

Some women followed the army into the battlefield and sometimes even into action. Women carried water into the ranks during battles and occasionally served as baggage guard. Inevitably some women were killed; stories of women found among the dead seem to be a staple of 18th- and early-19th-century battle reports. As a result of their close integration into military life, many women had made an emotional and ideological commitment to the values of the army and identified themselves as members of it.

The families of soldiers were also part of the 18th-century American and European martial culture. With so many women following the drum, inevitably, vast numbers of children were also present. During the American Revolution, with an average British troop strength of 39,000, about 12,000 children and 5,000 women traveled with the British army. Furthermore, these statistics probably reflect a population of women and children significantly lower than normal given the British army's transatlantic deployment. Families—including women and children—lived in the camps or barracks with the soldiers and thus were also directly subject to, and a part of, the army and its martial culture.

CAMP FOLLOWERS

Boys were often raised to be soldiers; girls to be wives of soldiers—many camp followers were literally born into the army. It was customarily understood that boys who grew up following the army were intended to become soldiers as soon as they reached the necessary height. In essence, the 18th-century military world was often a cradle-to-grave proposition: one was born into it, educated by it, and quite possibly died in it.

Soldiers, Camp Followers, and Gender Roles

The presence of large numbers of women and children living in close proximity to male soldiers in an 18th-century army would have produced a social atmosphere much different from the social interactions prevalent in late-19th and early-20th-century armies. Traditionally, masculinity has been identified with bearing arms and defending women. The immediate presence of women, children, and noncombatant men would have helped to intensify this element of masculinity in a soldier who did bear arms. The close proximity of dependents with whom the male soldier had emotional ties would have been a powerful motivating force: a soldier would have been fighting directly to guard the lives of his loved ones and to prevent their possessions from being looted. While not necessarily the only factor influencing an 18th-century soldier, the desire to protect his family must have been a powerful motivation.

This military atmosphere, however, probably also served to reinforce many traditional gender roles for women. Scholars have argued that masculine and feminine ideals emerge in tandem. In the 18th century, armies' effort to produce male soldiers proud of bearing arms may likely have restricted women to designated female activities and occupations. Women did not normally bear or use weapons or actively participate in fighting: the legendary story of Molly Pitcher manning an American cannon is an exception. Yet, while women typically did not participate in battle, evidence suggests that women did sometimes directly encourage soldiers to fight. Encouragement is one of the traditional roles for women in warfare, and 18th-century armies made it possible for women to apply this sort of encouragement directly and unsubtly. In general, women camp followers seemed to have performed every possible task, both on and off the battlefield, to aid soldiers up to the point of using weapons and fighting the enemy themselves.

The Passing of the Camp Follower

In the 18th and early 19th centuries, women and other camp followers were a large and visible presence in armies in North America. They were certain to be found in close proximity to the larger armies of the French and Indian War (Seven Years' War), Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812. A vast change, however, began to occur in Western armies during roughly the second half of the 19th century. Gradually the duties once performed by the camp follower were militarized and taken over by soldiers. Increasingly the camp follower, and to a very large degree women, vanished from Western armies on campaign.

This transition began during the Civil War. In the early months of the war, women still resided in the camps; however, strong social pressures began to make them feel unwelcome. With the exception of nurses, finding women living or traveling with the army became increasingly uncommon. Concurrently, soldiers (or occasionally hired free blacks) were detailed to cook, clean, and generally look out for other soldiers—tasks that had previously been left to camp followers. As a result of these changes, from the late 19th century until the late 20th century, not only was soldiering a male occupation, but also armies themselves were largely all-male societies where women were only occasionally found as wives or nurses.

Driven by the insatiable manpower needs of the world wars, however, women began rejoining the American and European military world during the first half of the 20th century. Over the course of the century, they regained a place in the military world, while slowly altering military culture and its prescribed gender roles. Moreover, the conversion of the large American and European armies of the 20th century into the smaller, volunteer forces of the late 20th and early 21st centuries has led to the reappearance of the camp follower. As the military privatizes various support services, once again civilian employees cook, clean, and perform many of the functions previously supplied by the 18th-century camp follower.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Revolutionary War; Women in the Military

Related Documents

1759

—Scott N. Hendrix

Captain Marvel Comic Books

The family of comic books featuring Captain Marvel and members of his extended family were the most popular superhero comics during World War II and into the postwar era. Captain Marvel presented a simple message of optimism and patriotism, suitable for inspiring young people during an uncertain time. Children could identify with a grown-up superhero who could right the world's wrongs, but still had a child's point of view.

In 1939, Fawcett Publications decided to join the growing number of comic book publishers. Writer Bill Parker was ordered to create a hero to rival Superman, National Comics' best-selling superhero. Not wanting simply to copy Superman (an adult hero from another world), Parker aspired to create a fresh, new hero with whom the young readers could more closely identify. At first named "Captain Thunder," the hero was renamed Captain Marvel because the original name was already copyrighted. Parker's creation could turn from a boy into an adult superhero by saying the magic word "Shazam." The word was based on the first letters of six heroes of myth and biblical stories: Solomon, Hercules, Atlas, Zeus, Achilles, and Mercury. Each hero gave Captain Marvel certain characteristics, such as wisdom (from Solomon) and invulnerability (from Achilles). In contrast to the adult Superman, Captain Marvel was a homeless boy named Billy Batson who survived by selling newspapers. He first appeared publicly in *Whiz Comics #2* in February 1940 and was an immediate success. Children's fantasies about growing up and doing something important were embodied in Captain Marvel.

Part of the credit for the popularity of the *Captain Marvel* comic books goes to artist C. C. Beck. Although Beck had a degree in fine arts, he regarded himself as a cartoonist. He drew in a simple style, using as few lines as possible. Sometimes Beck skipped the backgrounds entirely. He modeled the captain's face on that of movie star Fred MacMurray. Beck also used bright colors to appeal to younger readers. He used a light opera–styled soldier's uniform as the inspiration for Captain Marvel's red and yellow costume, complete with white cape. After Beck established the style, other artists were employed to meet the demand.

Eventually, an entire studio of artists copied Beck's style, producing three to four stories for each issue of the captain's adventures. The stories were also written simply. Plot development was minimal, with the emphasis on action. The main writer for Captain Marvel was Otto Binder, who produced 986 of the 1,743 Captain Marvel stories between 1941 and 1953.

Captain Marvel was given to making puns and bad jokes during his fights. He came across as polite, good-humored, and often included patriotic and wholesome encouragement to his younger readers, such as "Never let anyone persuade you to break the laws of our great country." His signature exclamation was "Holy Moley!" Unlike Superman's adventures, which could be plodding and predictable, Captain Marvel stories were light and slightly satirical. The captain was known as the "Big Red Cheese" to his archenemies and the writers alike.

The popularity of Captain Marvel stories surprised Fawcett, but the company took advantage of its success. Since the captain shared *Whiz Comics* with other characters, Fawcett decided to produce a magazine devoted solely to Captain Marvel. Following a special issue in August 1940, *Captain Marvel Adventures* appeared in March 1941. Annual circulation rose from 2.6 million in 1941 to a high of more than 14 million in 1944. To help encourage readership, a series of stories saw Captain Marvel traveling to different U.S. cities, seeing local landmarks, meeting prominent citizens, and battling menaces. Fawcett made millions from a product that cost just 10 cents an issue. Additional profits came from Captain Marvel toys and products. The captain also made history when he became the first comic book superhero to appear in a movie serial in 1941. Starring Tom Tyler, the 12-chapter serial was set in Southeast Asia.

Captain Marvel was the first superhero to have a successful family of comics spun off from the original. The first of the second-generation heroes was Captain Marvel, Jr., who appeared in December 1941. He took over *Master Comics* in January 1942, followed by another title, *Captain Marvel, Jr.*, in November 1942. Captain Marvel, Jr., was a crippled boy who could turn into a hero by saying "Captain Marvel." To emphasize the difference between the two characters, Captain Marvel, Jr. had a blue costume and was drawn in a much more realistic way. He was the first boy superhero who was not just a sidekick. He was followed by Mary Marvel, the long-lost twin sister of Billy Batson and a character Fawcett hoped would capture the female market. Mary learned she, too, could turn into a superhero by saying "Shazam." Her costume was a demure feminine version of the captain's. She first appeared in December 1942 and became the lead character in *Wow Comics* in January 1943. She started a three-year run in her own comic, *Mary Marvel*, in December 1945. All three Marvel characters appeared in *Marvel Family Comics*, which ran from December 1945 to January 1954. Other members of the extended Marvel family included Uncle Dudley, a lovable imposter who pretended to be a relative; three lieutenant Marvels, who were boys, also named Billy Batson, from

Page from the January 1944 issue of Captain Marvel Adventures. *(© Ted Streshinsky/CORBIS)*

different parts of the United States; and Hoppy the Marvel Bunny, who carried the Captain Marvel persona into Fawcett's line of funny animal comics. Other supporting characters included Mr. Tawny, a talking tiger.

Captain Marvel and his family faced an assortment of recurring villains. The captain's earliest and most persistent foe was Sivana, a mad scientist. The most unusual may have been Mr. Mind. His identity was revealed at the end of a story that ran in segments for two years in *Captain Marvel Adventures*. Ultimately, Captain Marvel discovered that Mr. Mind was a worm with a voice-amplifying box.

Like other superheroes of the time, Captain Marvel counted Nazis and Japanese militarists among his enemies. During the first half of the 1940s, they provided the most real and satisfying opponents for comic book readers. Even before the United States entered World War II, Captain Marvel fought against thinly disguised Nazis. As early as January 1941, Captain Marvel protected a ship carrying refugees from "Gnatzi" planes and submarines. Within months, Nazis were openly fighting Captain Marvel. In *Whiz Comics #25*, the captain defeats Captain Nazi, a German superhero, who falls into the bay below. An elderly man and his grandson save the Nazi, who repays them by killing the man and crippling his grandson and later boasting of the nefarious deed to Hitler. Captain Marvel saves the boy, who becomes Captain Marvel, Jr. In the next issue of *Master Comics*, both Marvels team up to beat Captain Nazi. These stories, written before Japanese planes attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, presage the important role Axis villains would play in comic book stories during the ensuing four years after the United States entered the war that same month.

During the war, Captain Marvel and his family regularly foiled diabolical plots by Axis agents. Publishers encouraged their artists and writers to portray Nazis and Japanese as ruthless, ugly, and evil. Captain Marvel stories also played an important role in helping young readers deal with the war. Issues regularly included instructions on how to recycle materials, especially the paper on which the comics were printed. Boys and girls were encouraged to buy war bonds and stamps to support the effort. Even in the darkest days, Captain Marvel, with his optimism and good

humor, promised eventual victory for America. In June 1942, the captain joined the Army, and then in September 1943, he joined the Navy. The Captain Marvel image appeared on aircraft of at least one naval air squadron, depicting the hero tossing a bomb toward the Japanese.

Superhero comics, including *Captain Marvel*, declined in popularity after the end of World War II. C. C. Beck believed one cause was the demobilization of millions of soldiers. Millions of comics had reached servicemen overseas, where they provided cheap leisure reading. Post exchanges (the PXs on military bases where soldiers buy such items as toiletries and magazines) were second only to newsstands as outlets for *Captain Marvel* comics. By contrast, the demands of civilian life left little time for reading comics. Thwarting ordinary crooks also paled in comparison to saving the world from Hitler. During World War II, the Axis provided a clear enemy that united virtually all Americans. The threats of the postwar world were more complex and did not lend themselves to a thrashing by superheroes. Nuclear war threatened global destruction, no matter who dropped the bomb, while communism was an insidious threat of mass movements and subversive agents. With superheroes no longer offering a solution to the world's ills, publishers looked to other genres that could appeal to more mature readers. Superhero comics were replaced by romance, Western, and horror magazines.

In at least some of his postwar adventures, Captain Marvel tackled the issue of atomic war. He worked to prevent proliferation and preached the need for world peace. The captain also supported the United Nations as the hope for the future. In *Captain Marvel Adventures #66* (October 1946), he unsuccessfully tries to prevent atomic war. Just as it seems that mankind will be wiped out, the reader learns that what has been depicted was only a television show. The message is made clear, however, by one of the children, who realizes that humankind's survival depends on nations and individuals getting along.

Ironically, Captain Marvel did not meet his end at the hands of one of his foes, but in court. DC Comics, which had first filed an unsuccessful copyright infringement suit against Fawcett in 1941, arguing that Captain Marvel was modeled too closely on its Superman hero, pursued legal

actions until a federal judge found in 1953 that Captain Marvel was too much like Superman. Faced with declining sales, Fawcett decided to close down all its comic books. Captain Marvel made his last appearance in *Marvel Family* #89 in January 1954. The character was later purchased by DC and has periodically been revived. The characters were making appearances in various DC comics as of April 2005.

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Related Entries

Visual Arts and War; World War II

Related Documents

1971 a

—*Tim J. Watts*

Captivity Narratives

See Atrocity and Captivity Narratives.

Cartoons

See Political Cartoons.

Censorship and the Military

Although many might think that strained relations between the media and military officials first emerged during the Vietnam War, military–media relations in the United States have, in fact, been difficult since early in the republic's history. Such tensions have been especially sharp over the degree of censorship exercised by the military in wartime. During the Revolution, George Washington complained that Loyalist papers undermined morale while patriotic publishers often gave away sensitive military information. During the Civil War, the Union threatened reporters who breached censorship with courts-martial and took control of the telegraph lines in Washington, D.C., to better monitor communications. During World War I, reporters accredited to U.S. forces were sometimes stopped from traveling to the front lines to prevent disturbing reports from trickling back from the battlefield.

Military censorship is a complex issue not only because of 1st Amendment rights, but also because of the symbiotic relationship between the military and the media. Although operational security often requires that military officers conduct their business far from the eyes of a prying media, those same officers must have the support of their citizenry to conduct an effective war. To build political support for its operations and policies, the military relies on the media. The media shape public perceptions not only of success and failure in wartime, but of the military itself. This is no small consideration, especially in the age of the all volunteer force. For their part, reporters value access and prompt release of newsworthy (i.e., controversial) stories. Even though journalists often see themselves as the fourth estate (the institution that holds government accountable in a democracy), they also rely on the military for newsworthy material.

The nature of military censorship is also constantly in flux because it must respond to the political demands of the moment and to the emergence of new technologies that permit ever-increasing access to information and images from the battlefield. For years newsprint dominated wartime reporting, and newspapers could be monitored easily because of their need for centralized production. As

the electronic and information revolution unfolded, however, more people have been equipped with ways to transmit images and data almost instantaneously to a global audience. Military censorship has, accordingly, become increasingly problematic.

During World War II, the U.S. government, specifically the Office of War Information, imposed strict censorship of radio, newsprint, and even the letters soldiers sent home to their families. Information about the Bataan Death March, for instance, was withheld from the U.S. public for most of the war to spare families unnecessary anguish. Nevertheless, censorship did not prevent outstanding radio reporting by Edward R, Murrow, nor did it prevent Ernie Pyle, the most famous "embedded journalist," from winning a Pulitzer Prize in 1944 for his reporting on ordinary soldiers. Many young journalists made a career by risking life and limb while reporting from the front. Future television anchorman Walter Cronkite, for instance, served as a frontline reporter in the European theater covering the relief of Bastogne.

Reporters, however, did manage to irritate the high command with (true) stories of acrimony among senior Allied commanders and reports that the Nazis possessed superior weapons—also true. Additionally, wartime censorship could not prevent truly newsworthy stories from reaching the American public. In November 1943, Drew Pearson created quite a stir when he reported that Gen. George S. Patton had slapped two soldiers in Sicily in August 1943, and that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower had apparently tried to cover up the incident. Pearson, however, did not make an effort to publish what would have been the greatest scoop of World War II—information about the U.S. development of the atomic bomb, which he had uncovered in 1943 but remained silent about.

During the Korean War, reporters initially worked under voluntary guidelines, but military restrictions tightened once the situation on the ground deteriorated following Chinese intervention in the war. By the end of March 1951, all news stories had to be approved by military censors located in Japan. In January 1953, a Joint Field Press Censorship Group began to screen all film and written stories. Details about military reverses, the weaknesses of the

South Korean government, or poor U.S. equipment were filtered out of press reporting.

Probably because U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia increased over several years, U.S. press policy during the Vietnam War marked a departure from tradition. The U.S. military made no effort to censor wartime reporting; journalists were asked only to respect a code of conduct that prevented them from publicizing facts that could jeopardize ongoing operations. Virtually all reporters complied with these restrictions as they roamed the Vietnamese countryside, sometimes on their own, but often accompanying U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. Armed with lightweight film cameras, but no direct satellite feed, reporters turned Vietnam into the first "television war" as film images of all kinds were sent back to the living rooms of America. As the war progressed, however, a "credibility gap" began to emerge. Journalists noted that battlefield realities differed from the official briefings delivered in Saigon, the so-called Five o'clock Follies offered by military briefers at the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Although reporters claimed that they were only reporting events as they saw them and were not out to destroy public support for the war effort, many military officers believed that the U.S. military campaign in Vietnam was undermined by a hostile press. The Tet Offensive, during which reporters were able to capture spectacular scenes of fighting at the Marine firebase in Khe Sanh and the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, turned much official and public opinion against the war. In hindsight, these images were not necessarily characteristic of the situation in Vietnam, but the power of the media overwhelmed efforts to place this imagery in its proper context. One lesson the U.S. military took away from the Vietnam experience was that providing journalists free and unfettered access to the battlefield simply invited trouble.

In the 1980s, the U.S. military attempted to eliminate the problems encountered in Vietnam by using the principle of managed access to control the content of media reporting without resorting to censorship. By accrediting a limited number of reporters to press pools, then shepherding the reporters to selected locations, the military provided reporters access to operations, while attempting to

minimize misunderstandings or misinformation that often ended up in print. In practice, however, managed access left much to be desired from the reporters' perspective. Pool reporters gained very limited access to operations Urgent Fury (the 1983 invasion of Grenada), Earnest Will (the reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1987), and the 1989 invasion of Panama.

During operations the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the military again employed the pool system, and reporters continued to complain about limited access to the battlefield. Few took notice, however, because the liberation of Kuwait was marked by a major technological revolution: satellite television. Instead of delays of hours or days, reporters across the theater of operations, including Baghdad itself, could transmit live television images to viewers across the globe. These images, the excellent briefing skills of the local Coalition commander, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, and the carefully crafted disclosures of gun camera footage of guided weapons destroying targets with remarkable precision, made for riveting television viewing. During the Gulf War, the military was able to influence reporting, not through outright censorship, but by controlling the dissemination of the images and reports that the media needed to satisfy a global audience who expected live coverage of important battlefield events. Enterprising reporters, such as CNN journalists who covered the war from Baghdad, were always on the lookout for ways to escape the boundaries set by government and military officials.

Although military censors remained willing to pull the credentials of reporters who threatened to violate operational security, the war in Iraq beginning in 2003 saw unprecedented live combat coverage by embedded reporters. Now equipped with lightweight and portable satellite transmission systems, embedded reporters were able to transmit images via satellite as they rode atop armored vehicles racing toward Baghdad. The proliferation of digital cameras and video recorders, Internet access, and personal Websites (often called "blogs") also turned soldiers themselves into the ultimate embedded reporter. Stories of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, for example, became public after photographs taken by soldiers themselves made their way into the press.

Although embedded reporters are equipped with some of the most advanced communication technologies money can buy, allowing them to communicate directly with a global audience, the embedded reporters of the war in Iraq in many respects resemble the embedded reporters of World War II. They bond with the soldiers of their units, bolster morale, report sympathetically about the bravery and hardships endured by ordinary soldiers, and send back riveting images of the gallantry, horrors, and even atrocities of war. What became increasingly lost in the deluge of live coverage as the war progressed, however, was any detached analysis of the political or strategic implications of a military engagement unfolding on a distant battlefield.

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Civil War; CNN; Combat-Zone Photography; Committee on Public Information; Frontline Reporting; Iraq War; Korean War; Office of War Information; Persian Gulf War; Pyle, Ernie; Vietnam War; World War I; World War II

Related Documents

1944 a; 1966 c; 1971 b

—*James J. Wirtz*

Central America and the Caribbean, Interventions in

(1900–35)

The United States has always been concerned about the well-being of its Central American and Caribbean neighbors, if only to safeguard its own interests. Although rarely concerning itself in the affairs of these countries prior to the 20th century, between 1900 and 1935 the United States dramatically increased its involvement in the region for three intertwined reasons: first, the strategic need to protect the Panama Canal from European hands, which meant keeping Europe out of the region altogether; second, the urge to spread Christianity and democratic values to nations that Americans perceived as backward and in need of political reform; third, the need to protect American economic interests throughout the region, especially as its investments in the region increased during those decades. These interventions are emblematic of a time when the United States was beginning to take a more active role in global affairs, including the Spanish–American War in 1898, the annexation of the Philippines, and involvement in the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.

The first major intervention occurred in 1903 under Pres. Theodore Roosevelt when the United States obtained permission to build an interoceanic canal in Panama. In January 1903, the United States negotiated with Colombia to build a trans-isthmian canal across Panama, then a province of Colombia. The Colombian legislature rejected the treaty even as Panama was trying to secede and establish itself as a sovereign nation. Roosevelt then recognized Panama as a nation and sent naval warships and Marines to prevent Colombia from quashing the rebellion. After successfully seceding in November 1903, Panama brokered a deal with the United States to permit the construction of the canal.

Roosevelt also used the U.S. military in 1906 after Cuba's first free elections sparked a revolution on the island. Hoping to prevent Cuba from devolving into a land of revolutions, the president ordered a battalion of Marines and sailors to occupy Havana in September 1906. The United States maintained a military presence in Cuba until 1909, both to monitor elections and serve as a constabulary force.

Roosevelt's successor, William Taft, followed a foreign policy called "dollar diplomacy," whereby American banks would assist Central America's financial recovery, which would in turn increase American influence and undermine the region's reliance on Europe. In 1910, Taft used Marines under Maj. Smedley Butler to prevent the Nicaraguan government from crushing a rebellion that the United States wanted to see succeed, allowing the United States to become the unofficial financial protector of Nicaragua in 1911. When revolution broke out in 1912, Marines returned, routed the rebels in the jungles of Nicaragua, and actively helped to re-establish a pro-American government.

Pres. Woodrow Wilson understood the strategic importance of protecting the Panama Canal, but it was his social progressivism that led him to have the United States intervene to a greater degree than had Roosevelt or Taft. Wilson disapproved of a revolution in Mexico that installed as president the unelected Victoriano Huerta, and he looked for reasons to depose Huerta and give Mexicans a more democratic and stable government. In April 1914, Wilson found his excuse when Mexican authorities in the industrial city of Tampico mistakenly arrested some U.S. sailors. The seamen were quickly released with apologies, but Wilson demanded more from Mexico. Citing Mexican intransigence, Wilson ordered the invasion of the port of Veracruz, which the United States occupied for seven months. A military government under the Army and Marines reformed the city and its politics, helping force Huerta's resignation. Mexican frustration at the occupation was such that, when the military left in November, the city quickly reverted to its old ways.

Wilson used Marines as a tool of reform when he sent them to occupy Haiti in 1915 and protect foreign nationals during a bloody revolution, and then forced Haiti's leadership to find a president who would allow America to reform its country. The Marines stayed until 1934, keeping the president in power and working to create an effective national constabulary, while other Americans strove to reform Haiti's public health, sanitation, agricultural, and commercial institutions. Similarly, in 1912, Marines were ordered to the Dominican Republic to put down rebellions, suppress insurgents, disarm the countryside, and protect the customs houses from depredation by both the rebels and corrupt

Dominican officials. The United States withdrew in 1913, but returned in 1916 to suppress another group of Dominican insurgents; the Navy governed the Dominican Republic until 1922.

The last U.S. intervention in the region began in 1925 when civil war destabilized the government in Nicaragua. Three weeks after leaving the country, Marines returned to protect American citizens and property. Pres. Calvin Coolidge widened the intervention in 1927 to curb communist infiltration in the country, which meant chasing out the allegedly socialist insurgent Gen. Augusto C. Sandino. The Nicaraguans governed themselves while the Marines monitored elections and pursued the Sandinistas without success. In 1933, the Marines withdrew.

By 1928, Americans were questioning the concept of intervention as a valid form of diplomacy. The withdrawal of Marines from Nicaragua in 1933 and from Haiti in 1934 amounted to U.S. rejection of interventionism. By then, the public was against the use of such heavyhanded tactics. This change is clearly seen in Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1933 "Good Neighbor Policy," which limited interventions only to assisting threatened American citizens. The Good Neighbor Policy was consistent with the nation's desire for international isolation after an extended period of aggressive military and diplomatic activity in global affairs.

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Butler, Smedley Darlington; Gunboat Diplomacy; Marine Corps; Roosevelt, Theodore; Spanish–American War; Wilson, Woodrow

—Jonathan A. Beall

Chaplains in the Military

Of all areas of civil–military relations, the military chaplaincy presents the clearest example of the complexity of maintaining a standing, professional military in a democratic society that embraces the separation of church and state. Experiencing role confusion, individual chaplains serve two masters—the military and their denominations—and are considered noncombatants in the warfare machine. Critics have questioned its constitutionality and worried that the chaplaincy would "Prussianize" American youth, but since the American Revolution the armed forces have considered the presence of clergy essential to good morale and order.

The tradition of a military chaplaincy was well established in America when the Continental Congress first authorized ministers to serve with the rebel forces on July 29, 1775. Chaplains had long served with militias during the various colonial wars, and George Washington placed great importance on assigning clergy to his undisciplined troops. The commanding general hoped that the presence of ministers would help improve the moral character of the rank and file and thereby enhance the Army's reputation. The Army's 15 chaplains (who carried no official rank) served with 23 regiments and performed their varied duties during the Revolution without any central direction. The Continental

Navy exercised considerably more control over its chaplains (chosen by individual ship captains) with regulations that specified each man's religious and clerical duties aboard ship. Both Army and Navy chaplains, largely Protestant and non-Anglican and with little, if any, formal theological training, not only preached patriotism and ministered to the spiritual needs of the men under their care, but often addressed their medical and educational needs as well.

Prior to the Civil War, the versatile military chaplaincy struggled for existence and definition of purpose. The Navy integrated its shipboard ministers fully into the service, again supplementing their religious duties with teaching midshipmen (officers in training) navigation and mathematics. Congress, however, failed to provide the Army with any chaplains until the War of 1812, when a handful of ministers served at the brigade level. Following that conflict, Congress cut the chaplaincy to one man, stationed at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. In 1838, legislators finally responded to the Army's pleas for more ministers and appointed 20 civilians as chaplain–schoolmasters. In the absence of spiritual guidance for all 70 Army posts, circuit-riding missionaries ministered to most Army men and their dependents on the lonely frontier. The Mexican War proved to be disastrous to the effectiveness of the Army chaplaincy, as their garrison post assignments prevented them from traveling with troops until 1847, when Congress sent only one minister to the battlefront. Immediately following the war, however, the future of the military chaplaincy improved after Congress, resisting a reform movement within society that questioned the constitutionality of a publicly funded chaplaincy, passed legislation that provided all service personnel with the clergy necessary for the "free exercise of religion."

From the Civil War through World War I, the military chaplaincy acquired many of its modern characteristics and expanded to include Roman Catholic, Jewish, and black religious officials. Because many saw the Civil War conflict in religious terms, both the Union and Confederate forces appointed a large number of chaplains (nearly 3,700) who now required denominational affiliation, were forbidden to participate in battle, and performed ecumenical services along with their traditional supplementary clerical and educational tasks. In addition, chaplains for volunteer regiments served without commissions and possessed varying degrees of education and church affiliation. At the end of the war the military demobilized rapidly, retaining only 30 ministers as post chaplains until the Spanish–American War in 1898, when once again the services opened their doors wide to the clergy. After that conflict, reformers, including Sec. of War Elihu Root and Pres. Theodore Roosevelt, supported professionalizing the chaplaincy along with other military reforms of the day. In 1909, the War Department created the Board of Chaplains to gather information and to make recommendations "for a more effective chaplaincy." World War I prompted real modernization as nearly 2,400 ministers served the spiritual needs of the American military.

Because of the multitude of religious faiths represented in American forces during World War I, military ministries were largely ecumenical. The War Department established a quota system in the hopes that the number of clergy from each faith group would be representative of the number of personnel of that faith serving in the military. Chaplains traveled with troops, led worship, collected the dead, and recorded the location of their graves; they also worked with civilian religious groups, such as the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and Salvation Army, to provide troops with wholesome recreation, regulate behavior, discourage vice in and around training camps, and teach citizenship to immigrant recruits. Successes during the war led to the creation of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains with the passage of the 1920 National Defense Act following the end of hostilities.

During the 1920s and 1930s, the military chaplaincy faced uncertain times as pacifism gained strength and a number of churches withdrew their ministers from military service. With the Great Depression came further cutbacks until Pres. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) provided much needed work for the Army's remaining chaplains, until the mobilization for World War II once again dramatically increased their number. During the so-called good war, nearly 11,000 chaplains from 40 different faith groups served in the Army and Navy. Following World War II and in response to postwar revivalism, evangelicals sought greater representation

in the military in their fight to minimize the influence of liberal denominations that some accused of having communist sympathies. Vietnam War chaplains faced antiwar criticism as they processed conscientious objectors and dealt with race issues as well as drug abuse.

Women have served as chaplains since 1974 and have played a useful role as the armed forces grapple with problems associated with gender integration. In addition, the chaplaincy continues to diversify as the military embraces a host of religions, including Buddhism, Islam, and even Wicca, in its ranks.

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Related Entries

Militant Liberty; Pacifism; Religion and War

—*Lori Bogle*

Chemical Warfare

Chemical warfare is war that uses asphyxiating, poisonous, corrosive, incendiary, or otherwise debilitating gasses or liquids as weapons. Despite the limited use of such weapons in U.S. history, chemical warfare has been the subject of ongoing controversy in the United States throughout the 20th century. Soldiers and civilians alike have argued about whether or not the United States should develop and produce chemical weapons, what appropriate measures should be taken to protect U.S. troops abroad and citizens at home from enemy chemical attack, how the United States should discourage or prevent other nations from producing or using chemical weapons, whether the United States should destroy its own existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, and how chemical weapons in the United States can be destroyed safely.

The first instance of chemical warfare in modern war occurred during World War I. On April 22, 1915, the German Army released chlorine gas on the battlefield at the beginning of its attack on British and French forces near the town of Ypres in Belgium. While use of the gas did not produce the war-winning victory the Germans had anticipated, the poisonous fumes caused widespread disorder and many casualties among the Allied troops. After the battle at Ypres, chlorine and other poisonous gases and liquids such as phosgene and mustard were used on the battlefield by all the Western powers for the duration of World War I. By the time the United States entered the war, gas masks and poisonous clouds had become prominent features of the Western Front.

The U.S. declaration of war against Germany and the decision to send an American Expeditionary Force to the battlefields in France in 1917 caused the U.S. Army to begin preparing for chemical warfare. On August 17, 1917, Gen. John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, requested the creation of a Gas

Service and appointed Lt. Col. Amos A. Fries its first chief. The Gas Service was both an offensive and defensive organization. It trained American soldiers to defend themselves against chemical weapons by instructing them in the use of protective equipment such as gas masks and decontamination showers; it also supported the offensive activities of American chemical warfare units in the field, who used war gasses in battle against the Germans. Despite their preparations for chemical warfare, the American Expeditionary Force suffered terribly from gas attacks. American soldiers experienced a much higher percentage of gas casualties than any other belligerent nation.

During the interwar period, a large and vocal group of Americans questioned the wisdom and morality of chemical warfare. They opposed the continuation of the U.S. chemical warfare program, pointing to the suffering experienced by victims of gas attacks in France. Opponents of chemical warfare alleged that people exposed to chemical weapons suffered more than those harmed by more conventional weapons, such as bullets or artillery shells. They urged the abandonment of chemical weapons research, the destruction of existing supplies of chemical weapons, and the formation of international agreements pledging other nations to do the same. Defenders of continued American involvement in chemical warfare research argued that death or illness caused by gas was no worse than those caused by conventional weapons. They doubted that other nations could be trusted to abandon future development and use of chemical weapons, and insisted that the United States continue its own research in order to defend itself.

U.S. policy makers walked the middle of the road between proponents and opponents of chemical warfare through the 1920s and 1930s. The United States continued limited chemical warfare research and development, while publicly criticizing chemical warfare and supporting international agreements designed to limit the production and use of chemical weapons. U.S. negotiators sought to place limits on chemical warfare in conferences that led to the Washington Arms Limitation Treaty (1921–22), the Fifth International Conference of American States gas resolution (1923), the Geneva Gas Protocol (1925), and the World Disarmament Conference (1932). While these deliberations

were only moderately effective in creating international prohibitions against chemical warfare, they focused American public attention on the dangers of chemical weapons and made the nation unlikely to use them first in wars against future enemies.

Consequently, during World War II the United States directed most of its chemical warfare efforts toward maintaining readiness in the event an enemy used chemical weapons first. This required defensive and offensive preparations that would give the armed forces the ability to limit casualties and to retaliate in case of enemy chemical attack. The Army moved supplies of gas masks, other protective equipment, and chemical weapons to theaters where American forces were fighting. Defying predictions, neither Nazi Germany nor Imperial Japan used poisonous gasses against American soldiers or civilians during the course of the war. Nazi Germany had the ability to carry out a potentially destructive chemical warfare campaign against U.S. and other Allied soldiers. Among the nations of the world, it alone had developed nerve gas, a new type of chemical weapon far more lethal than any that had been used in war previously. The gas kills by attacking the victim's nervous system. Adolf Hitler chose to use his stockpiles of sarin and tabun nerve gas against concentration camp inmates, rather than the Allied soldiers fighting against Germany.

While the United States abstained from using poisonous gasses during World War II, the nation did conduct one type of chemical warfare against the Germans and Japanese. American troops used flamethrowers in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, and explosives containing flammable liquid gels (incendiary bombs) were used to set fire to enemy cities during the aerial bombing campaigns over Germany and Japan. These bombs combined gasoline with napalm (a mixture of naphthenic and aliphatic carboxylic acids) to create a highly flammable, but slow burning, weapon.

With the end of World War II, the need to protect Americans from chemical warfare gained new importance. The advent of nerve gas and the beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union led to predictions that the Soviets would use deadly chemical

weapons in a future war with the United States. While American policy makers gave priority to the development of the nation's nuclear arsenal during the Cold War, the United States also continued chemical weapons research and production during the period to prepare the armed forces for a potential Soviet attack.

Despite American opposition to the first use of chemical weapons against an enemy, the armed forces used Agent Orange, napalm, and other chemicals during the Vietnam War. While these weapons were ostensibly used as defoliants to help clear heavily forested areas, the United States was accused by members of the international community and the domestic antiwar movement of conducting chemical warfare against the Vietnamese. This criticism, combined with the growing feeling among American policy makers that the nation's chemical warfare program had become a diplomatic liability, caused the United States to begin to place limits on the development and use of chemical weapons.

On November 25, 1969, Pres. Richard M. Nixon unilaterally renounced the first use of chemical and biological weapons by the United States and pledged the eventual destruction of existing supplies of the weapons. In 1975, the U.S. Senate ratified the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. On June 1, 1990, Pres. George H. W. Bush and Gen. Sec. Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union signed a bilateral chemical weapons accord that established a ban on chemical weapons production, required the gradual destruction of all chemical weapons already produced, and called for inspections that would verify the agreement terms were being met by both nations. The Chemical Weapons Convention, a multinational treaty that pledged signatories to work together to eliminate their own chemical weapons production capabilities and work toward the worldwide elimination of chemical warfare, was approved by the Senate on April 24, 1997.

Public concern in the United States about chemical warfare abruptly escalated following the terrorist attacks at the beginning of the 21st century. The Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War, which begin in 2003, also focused public attention on chemical warfare—intelligence agency reports had indicated that Iraq possessed chemical weapons and would use them against American soldiers on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the United States has continued to destroy its own supplies of chemical weapons safely, while attempting to improve its ability to defend itself against the use of such weapons by an enemy.

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Related Entries

Agent Orange; Homeland Security

—Thomas Faith

Chief Joseph

(1840–1904)
Nez Percé Tribal Leader

Chief Joseph is often referred to as the "Red Napoleon" because of his skill as a military strategist; he outmaneuvered and outfought 2,000 American soldiers with only 800 Nez Percé. He led his band of Nez Percé across 1,400 miles of rugged terrain over three months in resistance to the U.S. government's reservation concentration policy. His incredible journey and ability to elude and defeat the U.S. Army gained him recognition as a skilled leader and tactician.

The Nez Percé tribes of the Northwest had early contact with missionaries and were converted to Christianity long before Joseph was born. Joseph's father was one of the first members of the tribe to convert to Christianity, adopting the name Joseph after his conversion and baptism in 1838. The elder Joseph was involved in early treaty agreements between the United States and the tribe. His son Joseph was born in 1840 in the Wallowa Valley of present-day northeastern Oregon.

In 1855, Joseph, the father, helped set up the Nez Percé reservation in Washington Territory. In 1863, gold was discovered on the reservation and whites moved into the area. The U.S. government took back almost one million acres of the Nez Percé reservation to meet the demands of the white miners and settlers. This left the tribe with only one-tenth of their original land. The elder Joseph denounced the treaty and moved his band to the Wallowa Valley to avoid hostile confrontations with the white settlers. He died in 1871 and his son Joseph became the new leader.

White settlers and miners in the region continued to pressure the government to remove all the Nez Percé from the area. On June 15, 1873, Pres. Ulysses S. Grant set aside 1,425 square miles of the Wallowa Valley for Joseph and his band and ordered all whites to leave the area; nevertheless, whites continued to settle on the land. Responding to the demands of the settlers, the federal government rescinded the order in 1875 and opened the area for white settlement. Joseph and his band continued to live in the valley despite orders for them to move. On

January 13, 1877, Commanding Gen. William T. Sherman ordered Gen. Oliver O. Howard to remove the Nez Percé from the area.

Joseph, wishing to avoid conflict with the Army and white settlers, began leading his people toward Idaho. But on June 14, 1877, three young Nez Percé got drunk and raided a white settlement; fearing retaliation by white settlers and knowing that troops were moving into the Wallowa Valley, Joseph and his band quickly fled. A few days later, 17 of his warriors became intoxicated again and killed more white settlers. Determined to stop the fleeing Nez Percé, General Howard dispatched Army troops to pursue them.

Joseph's retreat is still remembered as the most brilliant in military history. In late June 1877, the Nez Percé proved to General Howard they were worthy adversaries by defeating the Army at White Bird Canyon. In response, General Howard strengthened his command by adding additional troops. By July 15, 1877, the Nez Percé decided to head east across the Bitterroot Mountains to Canada to join Sioux leader Sitting Bull. General Howard relentlessly pursued them with 25 Bannock scouts, 200 cavalry, 360 infantrymen, and a 350-mule pack train. By August 6, the Nez Percé had crossed the Continental Divide and entered into the valley of the Big Hole River. Joseph stopped in the valley to offer his people some rest. On August 9, 1877, Col. Alvin Gibbons and the 7th Cavalry launched a surprise attack on the resting Nez Percé. The warriors retreated a short distance and then attacked the soldiers in their camp. The Nez Percé besieged the soldiers while Nez Percé women and children fled. The next day all the Nez Percé were gone.

On October 1, 1877, Gen. Nelson A. Miles offered a parley under a flag of truce, but at the meeting Miles captured Joseph and refused to release him. The Nez Percé took a soldier prisoner; in exchange for the soldier, Miles released Joseph. On October 5, 1877, after a five-day siege, Joseph surrendered himself and 400 Nez Percé to Miles. Ninety-eight warriors and 200 women and children escaped to Canada and joined Sitting Bull's camp. Over three months, the Nez Percé traveled 1,400 miles and left 120 dead on the trail.

Joseph never saw his homeland again. At his surrender, General Miles promised Joseph that he would be allowed to return to his home. Despite Miles's pleas, the Army sent the band to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and later to Indian Territory (Oklahoma). In 1885, after much advocacy work by Joseph and Miles, the Army moved Joseph and his band to a non–Nez Percé reservation in Idaho. Chief Joseph died in 1904, reportedly from a broken heart.

Chief Joseph and the plight of the Nez Percé symbolize the broken agreements and injustices faced by many Native Americans. In his later years, Joseph spoke out for equal treatment and freedom for Native Americans. Joseph's fight to retain his land and his flight from the Army was just one of many such conflicts between Native Americans and white settlers in the American West. Within the next two decades, the remaining independent Native American tribes in the United States would all be removed to reservations.

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Related Entries

Indian Wars: Western Wars; Sherman, William Tecumseh

—Stacy W. Reaves

Citadel, The

The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, has remained committed to military education since 1842 when the South Carolina General Assembly passed an act establishing the South Carolina Military Academy. Gov. John P. Richardson supported the idea of replacing state troops garrisoned at arsenals in Columbia and Charleston with cadets as a cost-effective way to provide military training for the young men of the state. Using the U.S. Military Academy as the model, two separate military academies were initially created, The Arsenal in Columbia and The Citadel in Charleston. In 1845 the two were consolidated: freshman spent their first year at The Arsenal, while older cadets finished their instruction at The Citadel. The state-supported educational institution was designed to train young men as citizen–soldiers to bolster military readiness whether the threat came from the federal government or from a slave rebellion. However, the need for cadets to stand guard over state military supplies coincided with the very real need for institutions of higher education in the South. State support of practical and scientific education, teacher training, and character and citizenship development of young men all came together in the creation of The South Carolina Military Academy. In contemporary times, The Citadel found itself at the center of controversy as female cadets struggled to gain acceptance in the traditionally male academy.

The Civil War and Reconstruction

As South Carolina took on a prominent role in the crisis leading up the Civil War, the cadets at the South Carolina Military Academy came to the defense of their state. When Union major Robert Anderson and his troops moved to Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, Citadel cadets occupied a newly constructed fortification on Morris Island to keep close watch. On January 9, 1861, that vigilance paid off. Citadel cadets fired upon the U.S. steamer *Star of the West*, forcing it to turn back before resupplying the Union troops and leaving Anderson no choice but to surrender the fort. On January 28, the Corps of Cadets formally became part of the state military establishment known as The Battalion of State Cadets. In addition to tasks such as prisoner escort,

basic training, funeral details, and garrison duty, the cadets took part in eight engagements in defense of Charleston and South Carolina. In February 1865 the South Carolina Military Academy ceased operation as a college when Union troops occupied The Citadel and burned The Arsenal in Columbia.

The contributions of Citadel cadets to the Confederate war effort undoubtedly influenced the state's decision to reopen the school. The school had provided 167 line officers for the Confederate Army, including 4 generals, 19 colonels, and 11 lieutenant colonels. Thanks in part to the efforts of Gov. Johnson Hagood (class of 1847), the school once again obtained state funding in 1882 as the Board of Visitors regained possession of The Citadel in Charleston. In 1910 the college's name was officially changed to The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina; the school continued its mission of educating young men under a military system, considering it the best preparation for the demands of citizens in both peace and war.

The Influence of Summerall and Clark

With the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, the federal government instituted the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) in colleges across the country. At The Citadel, ROTC meant that graduating cadets could now receive commissions in the regular U.S. military. However, it also signaled a decline in the military school tradition, as southern land-grant institutions abolished their corps of cadets. The Citadel's unique history and heritage enabled its military tradition to thrive while other schools made the decision to abolish the military components of their curriculum. By 1922 enrollment at The Citadel has expanded enough to require a larger campus along the banks of the Ashley River. The school would continue to improve the caliber of its academic instruction and expand the South Carolina Corps of Cadets under the guidance of two influential presidents: generals Charles P. Summerall, and Mark W. Clark.

President from 1931 to 1953, former Army Chief of Staff General Summerall steered the school through the financial difficulties associated with the Great Depression and World War II. Faced with the departure of virtually all cadets for active duty during World War II, Summerall succeeded in bringing the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) to campus. These enlisted men took academic coursework to compete for admission into Officers' Candidate School (OCS). After the war, veterans were permitted to take classes with the South Carolina Corps of Cadets under the GI Bill. When Gen. Mark Clark arrived at the Citadel just after concluding the armistice of the Korean War as commander of United Nations Forces, he also brought increased national recognition to the school. Clark, an ardent cold-warrior, saw his position at The Citadel as a means to shape the American generation who would confront communism. To achieve this, he aimed to educate the "Whole-Man," inaugurating programs to enlarge the school, physically toughen cadets, attract world-class guest speakers, and revitalize the Honor System.

Redefining the South Carolina Corps of Cadets

The Citadel's reluctance to admit minorities and women into the South Carolina Corps of Cadets forced the school into the national spotlight. After considerable controversy, the first African American cadet, Charles Foster, graduated from the Citadel in 1970. The issue of admitting women proved to be a more bitter struggle. In 1992, Patricia Johnson, a former naval petty officer, and two other female veterans applied to the Citadel's veteran's program in engineering. Johnson and the other women had no desire to join the Corps of Cadets, but wanted to attend day classes in the only accredited engineering program in Charleston. When their applications were rejected, Johnson sued. Rather than admit the female veterans, the school's administration abolished the program. A year later, Shannon Faulkner's application to The Citadel was initially accepted, only to be rejected as soon as her gender became known. Her subsequent lawsuit paved the way for her to sign in on August 12, 1995 as the school's first female cadet. Although Faulkner left the school after five days, the Board of Visitors was forced to eliminate gender as a criterion for membership in the South Carolina Corps of Cadets. In June 1996, the board voted to revoke its male-only admissions policy and in 1999 Nancy Mace became the first female graduate.

The Citadel continues to be one of the few colleges educating men and women in a military and disciplined environment. The 1,900 members of the South Carolina Corps of Cadets hail from all over the country. They live on campus in barracks in a regimental organization under the supervision of a cadet regimental commander and the school's commandant. The cadets pursue one of 19 degree programs at the college and attend classes taught by civilian faculty who nevertheless are all made members of the South Carolina Unorganized Militia. Cadets are also required to take ROTC coursework for their entire four years at the college under the instruction of active-duty military officers. Consistently, 33 percent of Citadel graduates are commissioned as officers in the U.S. armed forces, with the rest choosing nonmilitary careers in business, government, and professional fields. If the record-breaking 2,348 applications from high school seniors to be part of the class of 2008 is any indication, the concept of the citizen–soldier will continue to have 21st century resonance.

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Related Entries

Air Force Academy; Coast Guard Academy; Merchant Marine; Military Academy, United States; Naval Academy; ROTC Programs; Virginia Military Institute; Women in the Military

—Jennifer L. Speelman

Civil Defense

Civil defense—the protection of the civilian population during times of war—was not of major concern for Americans until the beginning of the Cold War. Although the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor sparked some civil defense preparations on the West Coast, by mid-1942 it was obvious that Japan would not be able to mount an attack on the mainland United States. The American civilian population was spared the bombing attacks that devastated Europe during World War II, thanks to the ocean barriers that had comfortably insulated America for much of its history.

Living with the Bomb

Two legacies of World War II—the creation of long-range delivery systems and nuclear weapons—would force Americans for the first time to contemplate the possible destruction of their own cities by an enemy. Beginning in 1950, the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) would produce films, pamphlets, and posters that emphasized civilian vulnerability to enemy attack. By 1953 the Soviet Union possessed the hydrogen bomb, a weapon with exponentially greater destructive force than the atomic bombs that had laid waste to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The power and crudity of these weapons further blurred traditional distinctions between military targets and civilian populations, and put the American home on the front lines. Writing in *Science News Letter* in 1955, Howard Simons proclaimed that "terrifying weapons have moved the foxhole, bunker and emergency ration from the infantryman's front-line to everybody's backyard. 'Dig or die,' and 'duck and cover,' apply not only to G. I.'s some 10,000 miles away,

A 1955 underground bomb shelter designed and made by Walter Kidde Nuclear Laboratories of Garden City, Long Island. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

but are realities for the politician, the housewife, the worker and the schoolboy" (Rose, 5).

Faced with the nearly insoluble problem of protecting American cities from nuclear attack, the Eisenhower administration adopted the civil defense policy of evacuating American urban residents to the countryside during times of nuclear peril. As FCDA chief Val Peterson so eloquently put it, "the best way to be alive when an atomic bomb goes off in your neighborhood is not to be there" (Rose, 4). The problems with evacuation were obvious from the beginning, and included the difficulty of clearing out any large city in a short time, and feeding and housing huge urban populations once they had been relocated. The evacuation strategy received a further blow after the "Bravo" hydrogen bomb test of 1954 spread unexpectedly high levels of radioactive fallout over a 7,000-square-mile area.

During the 1950s, groups that studied the problem of protecting the civilian population from radioactive fallout all recommended a national fallout shelter system in the $20 billion to $30 billion range. Still, Eisenhower clung to the evacuation policy, not only because evacuation was cheap and fallout shelters were not, but also because he feared that an elaborate shelter system would be a step toward a "fortress America" or even a "garrison state" (Rose, 90). Eisenhower was also convinced that his overall nuclear strategy—the buildup of nuclear forces that could deliver "massive retaliation" against any enemy attack—would serve as a deterrent and obviate the need for elaborate civil defense preparations.

Dig or Die

The Kennedy administration in 1961 significantly shifted both nuclear strategy and civil defense philosophy. John Kennedy and his advisers, including McGeorge Bundy and Maxwell Taylor, believed that Eisenhower had relied too heavily on nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation. Instead, the new administration advocated a "flexible response" that would give the president a number of options other than the nuclear one with which to address a crisis. The Berlin Crisis of 1961, during which Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev threatened to cut off all access to Berlin by America and its allies, pushed the Kennedy administration toward a reinvigorated civil defense. As in previous Berlin crises, the underlying question was whether the United States would defend Berlin even to the brink of nuclear war. On July 15, 1961, a tense Kennedy indicated that he was willing to take that step, and asked Congress for an additional $3 billion for the military. He also asked for an appropriation of $207 million to identify and mark spaces that could be used as public fallout shelters, noting that "the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved—if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available" (Rose, 2–4).

The Kennedy administration was clearly unprepared for the public reaction to this speech. Frightened citizens by the tens of thousands clamored for information on protecting their families during nuclear attack. The federal civil defense agency, now called the Office of Civil Defense, was not able to produce a pamphlet on the subject until December. *Fallout Protection: What to Know and Do about Nuclear Attack* was immediately savaged by the critics for its blithe optimism—it claimed, for instance, that nuclear war "need not be a time of despair" (Rose, 78); also, its argument for the effectiveness of fallout shelters depended upon the enemy restricting its attack to a five-megaton bomb blast at ground level. With the establishment of public fallout shelter spaces a couple of years in the future, the immediate emphasis in the early 1960s was on the private home shelter.

What followed was one of the most anguished debates of the entire Cold War period. The stakes were high because nuclear war seemed so close at hand. A Gallup poll released a few days after Kennedy's speech showed overwhelming support for Berlin "even at the risk of war" (Rose, 8), as well as a conviction among the majority that there would be another world war within five years. The controversy over fallout shelters, which *Business Week* succinctly described as "to dig, or not to dig" (Rose, 1), would embrace questions of nuclear strategy and national security, as well as class and moral questions. Some argued that a sheltered population would have a deterrent value and would make nuclear war less likely, while others claimed that national leaders would be more willing to take risks. Because fallout shelters were not equipped to cope with the tremendous blast and heat of nuclear weapons, proponents were forced to argue that the Soviets would concentrate their nuclear attacks against "counterforce" strategic targets and spare the civilian population. Opponents of fallout shelters claimed that any nuclear war would be "all-out," rendering the home fallout shelter worthless.

The fallout shelter debate also revealed some disturbing class issues. The median family income in 1961 was $5,315, and most experts recommended a minimum outlay of $2,500 for a shelter. Would only the well-to-do be able to provide protection for their families, while the less fortunate were being irradiated? There was also an urban–suburban divide on the issue of shelters. Building a private home shelter was impossible for residents of the inner city, regardless of income, and it was obvious to all that survival against nuclear attack would be greatly enhanced by residency in the suburbs. In a letter to Kennedy, John Kenneth Galbraith called the suburban bias of the fallout shelter program "a design for saving Republicans and sacrificing Democrats" (Weart, 256). Worst of all was the "gun-thy-neighbor" controversy, in which shelter owners expressed their willingness to shoot their neighbors if they tried to get into their shelters.

Every major American publication weighed in on the fallout shelter issue, and there was unprecedented interest at the grassroots level as well. Bob Dylan wrote a song about fallout shelters and Rod Serling produced a segment called "The Shelter" for *The Twilight Zone*. While the identifying and marking of public fallout shelters continued, only a few were available for the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and they would have been of dubious value because they were

installed in already existing structures not specifically designed for fallout protection.

There were a number of reasons why neither private nor public shelters were built in the numbers expected. The Cuban Missile Crisis badly frightened the United States and the Soviet Union, and, in the aftermath, the two superpowers made a concerted effort to avoid similar confrontations in the future. This easing of tensions was reflected in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and a lessened anxiety among the public that nuclear war might be just around the corner. There was very little congressional support for a national shelter program, and even that was eroded by the increasing monetary demands of the Vietnam War. Ordinary Americans also turned away from shelters because of the disturbing class and moral aspects that they represented.

The Big Sleep and the Reagan Years

After 1963, interest in civil defense would lapse into what historian Paul Boyer has called the "Big Sleep" (355) and would remain dormant for well over a decade. The antiballistic missile Safeguard was deployed in North Dakota in 1974, and was removed two years later because of problems of cost and effectiveness. The Carter administration shied away from building a national shelter system out of fears of threatening the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) talks, and, by default, evacuation reemerged at the center of civil defense policy, though no funding was forthcoming for such an effort.

The Cold War would heat up once again when the Reagan administration took control in 1981. The establishment of détente between the United States and the Soviets that had followed the signing of the original SALT treaty in 1972 was denounced by Reagan at his first press conference as "a one-way street the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims" (Isaacs, 333). A heated anticommunist rhetoric would be characteristic of the Reagan years, with Reagan famously describing the Soviet Union as "an evil empire," and promising to deposit communism on the "ash heap of history" (Isaacs, 334). To reverse what he saw as the decline of American power during the détente years, Reagan committed the country to a massive military buildup and to a huge civil defense program that would cost $4.2 billion over seven years. Reagan's civil defense plan would resuscitate

the evacuation strategy; it was premised on the belief that there would be at least a one week lead time during a crisis, and that during that time urban residents could be evacuated to the countryside and would be able to prepare their own fallout shelters.

The problems of evacuating large urban areas had gotten worse rather than better since the 1950s, and the sunny optimism of Reagan officials that this scheme could actually work—Undersecretary of Defense Thomas K. Jones declared "everybody's going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around" (Scheer)—did not impress legislators, who gave Reagan most of the weapons systems he wanted, but declined to approve an ambitious civil defense program. The hard line taken by the Reagan administration toward the Soviet Union increased anxieties about a nuclear war between the two countries and helped create the nuclear freeze movement, which called for a bilateral halt on all development and testing of nuclear weapons. The initial success of this movement was crushed by Reagan's overwhelming victory in the election of 1984. The following year the Reagan administration signaled a new approach to civil defense with its advocacy of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), an "active" defensive system designed to destroy enemy missiles in flight. The end of the Cold War and the unproven technology of such a system forestalled development of the expensive SDI, but the passing of a decade and the emergence of the war on terror have revived enthusiasm for both missile defenses and private home shelters.

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Related Entries

Berlin Crises; Cold War; Cuban Missile Crisis; War on Terrorism

—Kenneth D. Rose

Civil War

(1861–65)

The Civil War remains the bloodiest conflict in American history and one of the most far-reaching in its effects. Only the Revolutionary War and World War II are comparable. The Civil War preserved the Union, ended slavery, and set the stage for at least a tentative acceptance of African Americans as full citizens. It also culturally altered the United States from a relatively loose confederation of states into a single nation.

Civil War (1861–65)
Total Servicemembers: **3,342,081**
U.S. Population (millions): **34.3**
Battle Deaths: **214,938**
Other Deaths in Service (Non-Theater): **283,394***
Cost (in $ current billions): **5.20**

*Not including **26,000** to **31,000** deaths in Union prisons
Source: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.html>

Origins

Most historians see the conflict as the product of a fundamental difference in conceptions about the nature of the American republic: Which was the "real America," the North or the South? Was the United States a free republic with pockets of slavery or a slaveholding republic with pockets of freedom? The Republican Party argued that it was the former. When its candidate, Abraham Lincoln, was elected president in 1860, seven Southern states—South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas—seceded from the Union and formed the Confederate States of America. On April 12, 1861, after Lincoln refused to evacuate federal troops from Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, Confederate artillery bombarded the fort into surrender. Lincoln promptly called for 75,000 volunteers to quell the rebellion. Rather than remain in a Union that could be preserved only through violence, four more states—Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee—joined the Confederacy.

Mobilization and Grand Strategy

When the conflict began, the federal government could field only a small regular army of 16,000 men. The newly created Confederate regular army existed mainly on paper. Both sides relied overwhelmingly on volunteers to sustain the struggle, although this method of mobilization was eventually supplemented by a military draft. For the most part, mobilization was done through local communities and states. Prominent local leaders raised companies of troops, which were turned over to the state governor, who organized them into regiments of about 1,000 men each and assigned colonels to command them. The regiments were then mustered into national service but retained their state identities—the 33rd Virginia, 54th Massachusetts, and so on. It was not a perfect system, but in an era of limited national government it was the only workable one. Eventually about two million men wore Union blue; 800,000 donned Confederate gray. Most were volunteers: the draft accounted for just 6 percent and 11 percent of Union and Confederate enlistments, respectively.

The Confederacy had one key task: hold on to the de facto independence already gained. The task of the federal government was more difficult. It had to subdue the rebellious states, but not so viciously as to make a reunion impossible. It also had to worry about potentially driving some or all of the slaveholding border states—Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware—into the Confederacy through harsh policies, especially those that would undermine slavery. Both sides had to contend with internal dissent. The Confederacy had a substantial population of white Southern Unionists, to say nothing of 3.5 million slaves. The Lincoln administration faced the substantial political opposition of those opposed to preserving the

Union through force of arms. Some of these actively sympathized with the Confederacy.

Military Events: Conciliatory Phase, 1861–62

Political considerations help to explain Northern strategy during the war's first 18 months. Most Northern leaders believed that the allegiance of ordinary white Southerners to the Confederacy was weak and that substantial latent Unionist sentiment existed in the rebellious states. For those reasons, Gen. in Chief Winfield Scott recommended against a major offensive, arguing instead that the federal government should simply blockade the Southern coast, send a strong force down the Mississippi River both to control it and to isolate the Confederacy, and then wait for Unionist sentiment in the South to assert itself.

Lincoln agreed with Scott's assessment of Southern sentiment but rejected his strategy. He was concerned that the longer the Confederate government was permitted to exist, the more legitimacy it would acquire in the minds of ordinary white Southerners. Thus, Lincoln sought the quick capture of the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, to discredit the enemy government's claim to legitimacy and, if possible, end the rebellion then and there. This attempt resulted in defeat at the first battle of Manassas (July 21, 1861), also referred to as Bull Run. The Union Army and Navy then settled into the business of gaining control over the border states and initiating a blockade of the Confederate coast. By the end of 1861, the first task was largely accomplished, the second well under way.

In November 1861, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan succeeded Scott as general in chief. McClellan believed that the defeat at first Manassas had given the Confederate government credibility and thereby increased its grip on the allegiance of white Southerners. He sought to avoid further defeats by creating a very large, well-trained army before advancing again. At the same time, McClellan insisted that federal armies should strictly respect the constitutional rights of Southern civilians, including the right to hold slaves. He bitterly resented Lincoln's attempts to prod him into action before he was ready, worried about Lincoln's seeming inability to resist pressures in favor of emancipation, and in general regarded Lincoln as incompetent.

Within weeks, he came to resent and resist Lincoln, thereby becoming perhaps the most famous American example of a military commander who refused to respect the supremacy of civilian authority over the armed forces. (When Pres. Harry S. Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur in 1951, he explicitly viewed himself in the role of Lincoln and MacArthur in the role of McClellan.) Lincoln responded to McClellan by removing him as general in chief in March 1862, though McClellan retained command of the Army of the Potomac, the Union's principal army.

Union strategy in early 1862 concentrated on the capture of strategic points, especially New Orleans; the important railroad junction at Corinth, Mississippi; and Richmond. By June 1862 the first two—and many others—had fallen into Northern hands. The Confederacy was widely considered near defeat, particularly as McClellan's army, after a slow but seemingly irresistible spring campaign, came within five miles of capturing Richmond. But in the seven days' battles (June 25–July 1), Gen. Robert E. Lee effectively checked McClellan. It became clear that the war would continue indefinitely, a conclusion reinforced when Lee defeated an army under Maj. Gen. John Pope at the battle of second Manassas (August 29–30) and invaded Maryland. In the battles of South Mountain (September 14) and Antietam (September 17), McClellan forced Lee to withdraw into Virginia, but to Lincoln's intense disappointment failed to destroy Lee's army.

Until this time, Union military policy toward white Southerners had emphasized the protection of civilian property and a "hands off" attitude toward slavery. By July 1862, however, many in the North clamored for an end to this "kid glove" policy, and on September 22, 1862—capitalizing on McClellan's victory at Antietam—Lincoln issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, declaring that unless the rebellious states returned to the Union by January 1, 1863, the slaves living therein would be "thenceforward and forever free." (The rebels did not, of course, and Lincoln issued the final Emancipation Proclamation on New Year's Day.) The proclamation marked the war's true turning point, for it transformed a limited war to quell rebellion into an all-out, revolutionary struggle to reshape the social, economic, and political structure of the South.

Military Events: War in Earnest, 1863–65

Even if mistaken, the military strategies of Scott and McClellan at least had a rational, consistent relationship to a political understanding of the war. After McClellan's departure, federal commanders focused on gaining battlefield success without much thought to the political dimension of the conflict. Three months after the issuance of the final Emancipation Proclamation, for example, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant sought to bar black refugees from his lines. The government had to remind him of its new policy. Similarly, although from August 1862 onward the Lincoln administration encouraged Union commanders to seize Southern property that could be used to support the Confederate war effort, most generals ignored those orders unless pressing military necessity forced them to do so. Nevertheless, Union forces became less reluctant to exempt Southern civilians from the hardships of the conflict, and war in earnest became the watchword of the day.

Militarily the Confederacy held its own throughout the first half of 1863. In Virginia, three offensives by the Army of the Potomac failed, two under Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside (Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862, and the so-called mud march, January 1863), and one under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker (Chancellorsville, May 1–4, 1863). In middle Tennessee, the Confederate Army of Tennessee fought Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland to a standstill at Stone's River (December 31, 1862–January 2, 1863). In Mississippi, Grant failed in repeated attempts to attack the key river fortress town of Vicksburg.

Hooker's defeat set the stage for Lee's Army of Northern Virginia to invade Pennsylvania in June 1863. Lee's hope was to carry the war from Virginia soil and if possible to destroy Union Army. In the war's largest battle, the Army of Northern Virginia fought the Army of the Potomac (now under Maj. Gen. George G. Meade) at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on July 1–3, 1863. The Confederates decisively lost the battle, and about one-third of Lee's army became casualties.

Meanwhile Grant finally succeeded in capturing Vicksburg after a daring campaign and 47-day siege. About 30,000 Confederates surrendered on July 4, 1863. The twin triumphs at Gettysburg and Vicksburg are generally deemed to be the military turning point of the war. In the following weeks, Rosecrans adroitly maneuvered the Confederates out

A painting of the 1863 battle of Chickamauga, in Tennessee, by James Walker, an artist known for his paintings of important Civil War battle scenes. (Getty Images)

of middle Tennessee and seized the key rail center of Chattanooga. After a sudden reversal of fortune in the battle of Chickamauga (September 19–20, 1863), the Army of the Cumberland was besieged at Chattanooga but rescued by forces under Grant, who oversaw the victorious battle of Chattanooga (November 25, 1863).

Grant emerged as the obvious choice to command the Union armies. In March 1864 Lincoln appointed him general in chief. With his elevation to the top command, a coherent relationship between federal political and military strategy reappeared. The Emancipation Proclamation signaled the intent of the federal government to win the conflict by attacking Southern society as well as Southern armies. Under Grant, both became major targets.

Of equal importance, Grant was able to organize a simultaneous advance along the entire front to prevent Confederate forces from shoring up one threatened point by diverting strength from quieter sectors. He sought to destroy the enemy's main forces and viewed cities like Richmond and Atlanta as useful targets chiefly because the main Confederate armies would fight for them. He also wanted the 1864 spring offensive to be as strong as possible. He believed that detachments protecting key regions could often do their jobs as effectively by advancing as by remaining still, and in so doing would further pressure the Confederates. Grant also expected to combine the destruction of Southern armies with the destruction of Southern war resources.

Making his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, Grant personally supervised operations against Lee. The first encounter between Grant and Lee, the overland campaign (May 4–June 7, 1864), consisted of near-continuous operations and bled both sides heavily. Unable to defeat Lee north of the James River, Grant then crossed the river to attack the important rail center of Petersburg, 20 miles south of Richmond. When attempts to capture the city failed, he initiated a 10-month siege of the Richmond–Petersburg sector.

Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman had meanwhile advanced upon the key industrial city of Atlanta. The outnumbered Confederate Army of Tennessee, under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, could not prevent Sherman from reaching the outskirts of the city. In July, Confederate president Jefferson Davis replaced Johnston with a more aggressive general, John B. Hood. Hood's costly counterattacks could not stop Sherman either, and, on September 3, 1864, Union forces entered the city.

The year 1864 was a presidential election year. The fall of Atlanta occurred immediately after the Democratic Party nominated McClellan as its candidate to oppose Lincoln's bid for reelection. Although McClellan objected primarily to Lincoln's emancipation and conscription policies and agreed with Lincoln that the Union war effort should continue, the peace wing of the Democratic Party insisted that he run on a platform that termed the war a failure and called for a negotiated settlement. The platform would have caused problems for McClellan anyway, but Sherman's victory made the "war failure" plank sound ludicrous. Prior to Atlanta's capture, many observers considered Lincoln's reelection campaign to be in serious trouble. Afterward his fortunes improved dramatically, receiving a further boost when Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan won a series of victories in Virginia's Shenandoah Valley in the early autumn. In November, Lincoln handily won a second term to the White House.

Sherman followed up his victory by taking 60,000 men 220 miles from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia, in what became known as the March to the Sea (November–December 1864). Sherman made no attempt to occupy territory. Instead, his troops lived off the countryside, tore up railroads, and burned factories, warehouses, cotton gins, and any public property that could support the Confederate war effort. Although the civilians in their path had their larders ransacked and often suffered the theft or vandalism of personal property, few houses were burned and almost no Southerners suffered physical harm. Sherman's subsequent march through South Carolina in February 1865 was far more destructive, primarily because Sherman and his troops blamed the state for being the first to secede and thus for starting the war. Columbia, the state capital, was devastated by a fire during its occupation by Sherman's troops. While they may not have started it, it caused them little sorrow.

By early March Sherman had reached Fayetteville, North Carolina, and once again established a regular line of supply. He received substantial reinforcements and planned to link up with Grant, still outside Richmond–Petersburg barely 100

miles to the north. Lee made ready to abandon the Richmond–Petersburg defenses if necessary. On April 1, his army suffered an unexpected defeat at Five Forks and Grant's forces pierced his line the following day. Lee retreated to the west, hoping to elude Grant's army and join up with Confederate forces under Joseph Johnston in central North Carolina. Grant, however, pursued aggressively, cornering Lee near Appomattox Court House, Virginia. There Lee surrendered on April 9. Ignoring Jefferson Davis's insistence that he continue the war, Johnston surrendered to Sherman on April 24. Federal cavalry captured Davis on May 10, and the last remaining Confederate forces gave up on May 26.

The Navies

The Confederacy had an extensive coastline and numerous navigable rivers, all of which required protection. The Union needed to control these waters to throttle Southern commerce and secure lines of communication. Substantial tasks, but as the Confederacy had begun the war without a navy, both were possible—even though the Union had just 90 ships and only about half were fit for service.

Union naval duties included not only the blockade of Southern ports, harbors, and inlets but also protection of commerce and joint operations with land forces. During the war the Navy secured a number of lodgments on Southern shores—the most significant of which were the capture of New Orleans in April 1862; Mobile Bay, Alabama, in August 1864; and Wilmington, North Carolina (the South's last open port) in February 1865. Its riverine duties were equally extensive and Union gunboats played an indispensable role in opening the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers. By 1865 the Union Navy consisted of 671 ships, including 236 steam-driven vessels.

Major Confederate naval duties involved blockade running (although most blockade runners were actually civilian enterprises), commerce raiding, and harbor protection. Only a few attempts were made to break the Northern blockade, most notably by the ram CSS *Virginia* (*Merrimack*), which sank two Union warships and ran a third aground until neutralized by arrival of ironclad USS *Monitor*.

The most important naval operation was the four-year blockade of the Confederate coastline. Historians differ about its effectiveness. On the one hand, most blockade runners got through successfully. On the other, the blockade reduced traffic out of Southern ports to about one-third of its prewar norm. Moreover, it interdicted most intracoastal traffic, which placed a greater burden on the Southern railroad system and hastened its deterioration. Even so, the Confederacy had enough food, arms, and ammunition to get it through the entire war.

The Home Front: Economic and Fiscal Policy

The North began the conflict with enormous material advantages. It had a population of 22.3 million, compared with 9.1 million in the Confederacy, of whom 3.5 million were slaves. In 1860 the North produced 94 percent of the country's iron, 97 percent of its coal, and 97 percent of its firearms. It outdid the South agriculturally as well, accounting for 75 percent of the country's farm acreage, 60 percent of its livestock, 67 percent of its corn, and 81 percent of its wheat. All in all, the North held 75 percent of the nation's taxable wealth.

The South had only one major material advantage: in 1860 its cotton crop accounted for more than half the wealth generated from exports. The Confederacy might have converted much of this into specie had it sent abroad as much cotton as possible before the Northern blockade became effective. Instead, it deliberately withheld its cotton crop from European markets in the misguided hope that this would force Great Britain and France to intervene in its favor.

Even so, the North's formidable advantages were mostly latent. It could not capitalize on its edge in manpower if citizens did not come forward. Nor could it exploit its edge in manufacturing if it could not pay for the goods produced. Indeed, the Civil War dwarfed all previous American wars not only in terms of blood shed but also in terms of financial burden. The Northern war effort is estimated to have cost $2.3 billion, the Southern war effort about $1 billion.

Securing funds to pay for the war was a major challenge for both sides. The Union and Confederate governments began by employing the traditional American fiscal strategy of borrowing heavily to sustain their efforts. Within months this strategy proved unworkable. The federal government

then moved toward an adroit balance of legal tender (known as greenbacks), interest-bearing bonds, excise taxes, and the first income tax in American history. Ultimately it was able to pay about two-thirds of its military expenses through the sale of bonds and another fifth through the collection of import duties and taxes. Of equal importance, the Union fiscal system held the North's inflation rate to about 80 percent over the course of the war, a figure that compares favorably with the U.S. performance in World Wars I and II.

The Confederacy, by contrast, never managed an effective policy. It used a combination of interest-bearing bonds; a 10 percent "tax-in-kind" assessed on livestock, tobacco, and other crops; and direct seizure of goods. Even so it could cover only about 40 percent of its war expenses through taxation and the sale of bonds. It paid for the rest through fiat money in the form of treasury bonds, which were essentially promissory notes that could be rejected by the payee. As a result, the inflation rate in the South was higher than in the North, running 8000 percent by the end of the war. Not only was Confederate fiscal policy inadequate, it greatly exacerbated internal dissent within the Confederacy. Some historians consider it a significant factor in the South's defeat.

The North's substantial manufacturing base made possible the reliance on private contractors by the federal government for most of its needs; many future industrialists built their fortunes supplying the Union Army. By contrast, the South's limited manufacturing base required direct government involvement. Confederate ordnance and shipbuilding industries were all, in effect, nationalized entities, and, on the whole, surprisingly well-managed.

The Home Front: Social Dimensions

Roughly half of all Union and Confederate soldiers entered service during the first two years of the conflict. As the initial floods of volunteers subsided, both sides faced the task of keeping their armies supplied with manpower and both resorted to the draft. The Confederacy adopted its first conscription act in April 1862. It affected men between the ages of 18 and 35 but contained a long list of exemptions, including political officeholders, judges, and teachers. A second conscription act in October 1862 expanded eligible ages to include males between 35 and 45, while at the same time exempting one able-bodied white male from every plantation with 20 or more slaves. This "Twenty-Negro Law," coupled with provisions allowing the hiring of substitutes, contributed to a perception that conflict was a rich man's war and a poor man's fight, though the record shows that members of various classes served in roughly equal proportions. Eventually the Confederate Congress passed a third, more stringent draft in 1864 that made all able-bodied men between 20 and 45 subject to draft. Even so, the Confederacy secured only about 11 percent of its manpower needs through conscription.

The North turned to conscription only in March 1863, when Congress passed an Enrollment Act primarily to spur greater volunteering. Essentially a given community was assigned a manpower quota to fill and was spared from conscription if enough men came forward voluntarily. This led cities and states to offer enormous cash incentives to men willing to enlist. By 1865 bounties rose to more than $1,000 (this in an era when an urban laborer could expect to earn $300 per year). It is hard to gauge the act's military effectiveness. Only 6 percent of Union soldiers were directly conscripted, but thousands more enlisted wholly or partly because of the draft. Politically, the Enrollment Act was a disaster. Its provision for a $300 commutation fee (to get out of any given draft call-up) or the hiring of a substitute (to avoid service entirely) contributed to perceptions that it placed an unfair burden on the poor. The draft led to several riots, especially in New York City, where a July 1863 riot claimed at least 105 lives.

Both the Union and Confederate governments had to cope with substantial internal dissent. In the North, opposition focused not only on the draft but also the Lincoln administration's inclusion of emancipation as a major war aim. In the South, dissent tended to be of two kinds: first, among people sympathetic to secession but alienated by specific Confederate policies, especially conscription; and second, among people who remained loyal to the Union. This second group was generally concentrated in regions with few slaves, such as east Tennessee and western Virginia (which actually broke away in 1863 to form West Virginia). An estimated 100,000 whites from Confederate states served in the Union armies.

News stories of the antidraft riots that swept New York City in July of 1863, reported in The New-York Illustrated News. *(Getty Images)*

With so many men in service, the home fronts were disproportionately composed of women, and the war had a strong, though often temporary, effect on gender roles. It accelerated the influx of women into clerk, teacher, and nursing positions, especially in the North, and condemned many women to lifelong widowhood or spinsterhood. This was particularly true in the South, where the normal male-female ratio did not recover until the 1880s.

Emancipation

In many ways the war's central event was the destruction of slavery, and the Union Army played a major though reluctant role in managing the introduction of a free labor system throughout the South. At one time or another an estimated 500,000 slaves came under Union military control. The first fugitive slaves entered federal lines in May 1861, at a time when the Lincoln administration insisted that its war effort had nothing to do with emancipation. When it was discovered that the slaves had been employed in the construction of Confederate fieldworks, however, Union Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler refused to return them on the theory that as chattel property used to support the enemy war effort, they could be confiscated as "contraband of war." Although legally dubious, Butler's contention astutely met the political needs of the moment, and thereafter the term contraband became synonymous with a fugitive slave under Union military protection. By late 1862, dozens of "contraband camps" had sprung up in areas under federal control. The Union Army secured what useful labor it could from the inhabitants of the camps. In theory the laborers were paid, though in practice their wages were usually applied directly to the care of children and the old and infirm. The Union Army employed thousands of freedmen as teamsters, stevedores, construction workers, hospital orderlies and nurses, and cooks. Their service was often voluntary but sometimes coerced.

Once large areas came under Union control, the dominant system became one of contract labor, whereby the slaves were theoretically liberated but required to continue working under their former masters. If they remained, they were deemed to have accepted a contract for a wage or share of crop. Union commanders preferred this system because it got freed people off their hands quickly, with the least disruption to the economic and social systems. A few experiments were made with free labor, most famously by Sherman in early 1865. Bedeviled by tens of thousands of former slaves flocking to his army in coastal Georgia and South Carolina, Sherman sought to get rid of them. As a military expedient, he confiscated a great deal of coastal land in South Carolina, most of which had been abandoned by the owners, and ordered 40 acres be given to each family. He also offered to give the families Army mules to help with planting and harvest. This was a temporary expedient, however, and after the war the federal government

returned most of this land to the white owners, in part because permanent property confiscation was considered constitutionally dubious.

Memory

By the standards of most civil wars, the wounds of the 1861–65 conflict healed quickly. The North's abandonment of Reconstruction in 1877 was a big component of such healing, but so too was the early adoption of a national memory of the conflict that facilitated reconciliation. White Americans, North and South, soon removed slavery and emancipation as central motifs of the conflict, despite strenuous efforts by the African American community to give them continued prominence. The main organization of Union veterans, the Grand Army of the Republic, tried to maintain the sense of moral differences in the causes for which the two sides fought. It was unsuccessful also. The 1880s and 1890s saw the triumph of a view that both sides had fought for different but morally equivalent views of the American republic: the North for perpetual union, the South for state's rights and limited government. In many ways this perspective continues to dominate the popular imagination of the conflict.

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Related Entries

Barton, Clara; Bierce, Ambrose; Brady, Mathew B.; Custer, George Armstrong; Davis, Jefferson; 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry; Grant, Ulysses S.; Lee, Robert E.; Lincoln, Abraham; New York City Anti-Draft Riots; Reconstruction; Shaw, Robert Gould; Sheridan, Philip H; Sherman, William Tecumseh.; U.S. Sanitary Commission

Related Documents

1861 a, b, c, d, e, f; 1862 a, b; 1863 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i; 1864 a, b, c; 1865 a, b; 1866

—Mark Grimsley

Civilian Conservation Corps

On creating the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) in 1933, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt said that the program was "not a Panacea for all the unemployment, but an essential step in this emergency." The CCC formed an early and integral part of Roosevelt's package of New Deal programs, designed to ameliorate the suffering of the Great Depression. Based on a program Roosevelt had developed during his term as the governor of New York that put unemployed men to work planting trees, the CCC began with 500,000 unmarried men between the ages of 18 and 25 who entered work camps based in forests, national parks, and range lands. The first group of CCC men cleared land, built trails in national parks, and preserved Civil War battlefields.

The program, which lasted until 1942, required the efforts of many government agencies. The Department of Labor recruited the young men from among families already on government relief. The Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture determined the projects that CCC men worked on and provided technical expertise. The camps themselves were run by the Department of the Army. Each CCC member worked a 40-hour week and agreed to abide by camp rules. These rules included sending $25 of the $30 monthly salary to their

A group of Civilian Conservation Corps members at Camp Fechner in Big Meadows, Virginia, giving President Roosevelt a rousing welcome during his visit there in 1933. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

families, following orders from a supervisor, and appearing at all meetings punctually.

New Deal advocates envisioned the CCC as a program that would do more than provide temporary relief to unemployed young men. The CCC, they hoped, would also teach men a marketable professional skill and help them develop character and self-discipline. The Army's role was to provide the direction young "boys" needed to become "men." The Roosevelt administration also saw the CCC as a way to involve the Army, largely without a pressing mission in 1933, in New Deal–related work. The disciplined nature of the camps seemed to many a perfect fit for the Army, even if the mission consisted of clearing trees, not enemy blockhouses. Many Army officers balked at the notion, arguing that their job was to defend the United States, not monitor the activity of forest workers. As a result, the Army assigned large numbers of Reserve officers to CCC projects. Nevertheless, several prominent

officers, including future Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, accepted CCC assignments.

Army officers assumed the responsibility of meeting CCC enrollees at induction centers and putting them through an entry process similar to that of military recruits. Army officers administered medical exams, determined which enrollees were not healthy enough to join (these men received bus fare home), and dispensed clothes and equipment. The Army then organized the CCC members into companies of 200 men, which followed the military model with a chain of command and a division of responsibilities. Unemployed veterans with good military records also joined the CCC, often in company leadership roles. In 1934 the Department of War replaced its senior representative to the CCC, a major, with a brigadier general, an indication of the growing acceptance of the CCC among Army officials.

The Army, one of the only government agencies accustomed to working with large numbers of young men, also

provided administrative and bureaucratic support to the CCC. The program was divided into areas analogous to the system the Army used to structure its active-duty units in the United States. The Army Quartermaster Corps used its national network of suppliers, storage depots, and transportation systems to purchase, track, and dispense equipment. The Quartermaster also supervised the purchase and preparation of food. The Army Medical Corps provided vaccinations, administered routine medical and dental check-ups, and gave lectures in health and hygiene. The Army finance office prepared the paychecks and oversaw payment to contractors.

Over the course of the CCC's life, the Army came to assume an increasing role in leadership and administration. However, not all Americans were comfortable with the Army having such a dominant influence on young men. The Army did not enjoy a favorable reputation among young American men in the 1930s. Army-style discipline struck many as an inappropriate model for an economic recovery program because it implied that the men in the program were delinquents rather than victims of an economic catastrophe. CCC members occasionally complained that the presence of Army personnel suppressed political dissent in the camps and that officers used the program as a means of recruiting men into the armed services. The Army, moreover, showed an inconsistent commitment to Roosevelt's insistence that African Americans be included in the camps on an equal footing with whites.

The CCC, however, quickly became one of the most popular New Deal programs. More than three million men eventually participated in 4,500 camps in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The projects, including creating parks, fighting wildfires, and building flood control systems, provided visible and important benefits to local communities and also gave unemployed men useful work. The CCC planted more than 2.3 billion trees (amounting to more than 21,000,000 reforested acres), laid 90,000 miles of telephone cable to remote areas, and built 126,000 trails and roads.

The importance of the Army's role in the CCC program remains hard to assess. Army officials claimed that the discipline of the camps and the familiarity that millions of men had with the Army system made CCC men better soldiers than their non-CCC peers. The vast majority of CCC veterans joined the military when the program closed in 1942, although it is difficult to determine what role, if any, their CCC experience played in forming their military experience.

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Roosevelt, Franklin Delano

—*Michael S. Neiberg*

Civil–Military Relations

Political communities must have military institutions to wage war, whether defensively to ward off threats to the community or offensively in pursuit of some national interest. Those militaries, however, can pose a challenge of their own to the political community: they can seize power for themselves or otherwise impose their will on the rest of society. Thus, effective civil–military relations would seek to establish a military institution with the means to use coercive force to achieve society's goals, but not the desire to grasp power and control for itself. This challenge, which confronts every society, has produced a rich history of civil–military relations in the United States. For more than 200 years, war has shaped

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American civil–military relations, and civil–military relations have in turn shaped the American way of fighting wars. The record can be grouped around two central questions: How has war been controlled by civilians, and how have civil–military relations affected the conduct of war?

Controlling War

The framers of the American Constitution devoted considerable effort to the question of how best to keep war and its instruments subordinate to democratic rule. Their solution was to divide control of the military between the executive and legislative branches—the first having the power of command and the second the power to equip and maintain, as well as authorize the use of, the armed forces. The framers further divided the military institution itself into a small standing army capable of immediate action, and a larger citizen militia to augment the Army in times of need, but also to act as a check on the political ambitions of the regulars.

Theorists have long recognized that these structural innovations, while important, do not solve the civil–military problem once and for all. Congress, for example, no longer plays the active role the Constitution envisioned for it. Its influence over the use of force has dwindled dramatically in the latter half of the 20th century. Furthermore, the most well-known American prescription for civilian control, Samuel Huntington's vision of officer professionalization, is frequently thwarted by the fonders' checks-and-balances system. Huntington's model for so-called objective control demands that the civilian government define clearly separate spheres of military and civilian responsibility. If the civilians then restrain themselves from meddling in the military's sphere, Huntington argues, the officers will respond by "professionalizing" (i.e., refraining from interference in politics and focusing on their own realm of expertise). In practice, however, drawing a clear line between competencies has proved very difficult, and civilian leaders often have strong political incentives to become involved in military decisions. As a result, civilians have repeatedly encroached on military turf, while the military has engaged in political activity that does not square with the Huntingtonian ideal.

Recent scholarship has begun to treat control as a process, emphasizing its nature as a function of the strategic calculations of the actors, subject to the influence of internal and external threat environments. As rational actors, military officers' decisions on whether to obey civilian orders or not are affected both by expectations of direct punishments and by the types of monitoring mechanisms civilians use to keep track of military activity. If civilian preferences differ widely from those of the military, or if there is little danger that disobedience will be detected or engender serious punishment, officers are more likely to pursue their own personal or organizational preferences at the expense of civilian preferences. At the same time, both monitoring and punishment are costly for the civilian government, and when used excessively could result in disastrous micromanagement that actually undermines the performance of the military on the battlefield. Thus, the central task facing the civilian leadership is to strike a balance of the proper mix of monitoring and punishment to cause the officers to obey most of the time.

The Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz argued that leaving the decision making process in time of war entirely to the military would deprive it of its guiding logic, which is always and inevitably rooted in political goals. At the same time, von Clausewitz also argued that, beyond the setting of goals and parameters, civilians should leave the military to the actual conduct of the war. The history of American civil–military relations is a long and conflict-ridden story of civilian and military leaders arguing over how much political direction is appropriate in wartime. Perhaps the gravest civil–military crisis the republic has faced was the Truman–MacArthur controversy, triggered over a dispute about the constraints Pres. Harry Truman was imposing on the conduct of the Korean War. While theorists and historians differ over the extent to which micromanagement actually leads to bad military outcomes, at some point these concerns are trumped by the democratic principle that "civilians have the right to be wrong."

Conducting War

The very concept of civil–military relations presumes that there is a difference between the civilian and military domains. But how big that difference is—or should be—is contested, particularly with respect to the "whether" and "how" of waging war.

One school, the "militarists," argue that civil–military differences are substantial and that the two groups are sharply in conflict. Moreover, the key difference, according to this view, is the extent to which the military side prefers and champions military solutions to political problems. Preparing for war leads to war, for once the instrument exists, militarists argue, it will demand to be employed.

Another school also recognizes the differences as substantial, but contends that their preferences are directly opposite to the claims of the militarists. According to this school, the military mind accepts war as an inexorable fact and wishes to be prepared against it, but never feels prepared enough, and is thus reluctant to engage in any particular war. The military knows that force cuts both ways, and military command wishes to apply force only as the last resort and under favorable conditions. The history of American civil–military relations seems to support this position at the expense of the militarist school. Richard Betts's study of Cold War–era decisions on the use of force showed that, despite a healthy variety of views within both military and civilian camps, the military was not generally any more eager to wage war than were civilian political leaders. However, military leaders did tend to prefer the immediate use of overwhelming force rather than gradual escalation of military force.

The same pattern appeared in the 1998–99 Triangle Institute for Security Studies survey of military officers and civilian elites. Military officers strongly supported the use of force primarily for realpolitik missions such as defense of allies or access to vital resources; they were less enthusiastic about humanitarian operations or intervention in civil wars. Civilian elites with no military experience, on the other hand, tended to advocate a wider range of possible applications of military force. Also consistent with Betts's findings were indications that military and civilian attitudes on how to use force differed significantly. Officers preferred decisive, overwhelming campaigns, while civilian nonveterans were more supportive of incremental applications of force.

These civil–military attitudinal differences appear to have shaped American military behavior, if the presence of veterans in the political elite can be taken as a proxy for the degree of influence the military view has on policy at any given time. Since 1816, the fewer veterans in Congress and the Cabinet, the more likely the United States was to initiate the use of force—and, if force were used, the fewer the veterans, the more likely such force was to be at a lower, i.e., less decisive, level of escalation.

The civilian propensity to approve the use of force points to another theme in the evolution of American civil–military relations. Ever since George Washington's storied haggling with the Continental Congress over requisitions and supplies for his troops, doubts have been raised about the American public's willingness to bear the costs of war. In fact, the public has supported bloody and expensive wars, including the Civil War, which took some one million lives and cost more than $40 billion. In the 20th century alone, the public supported two world wars, a bloody stalemate in Korea, and more than 100 other military engagements. Even the war in Vietnam, the supposed exemplar of a public unwilling to bear costs, enjoyed majority support for a number of years. Support did not collapse until the public became convinced that the war was unwinnable.

After Vietnam, however, a conventional wisdom emerged that the American public had lost its stomach for bearing the human costs of war. The relentless TV images of body bags, it was said, had worn out the public will such that it would now support only essentially cost-free military operations, for example, cruise missile strikes and long-range bombing. This impression was only reinforced by the events that followed Vietnam: the hasty exodus from Beirut after the Marine barracks bombing in October 1983, the disorderly retreat from Somalia after the bloody "Black Hawk Down" Ranger raid in October 1993, the constrictive force protection policy in Bosnia, and the infamous demand for a zero-casualty war in Kosovo. Policy makers' fears of the public's response to casualties also help to explain decisions against military intervention in Rwanda, Congo, and Sudan.

Analysis of polling on public attitudes toward war since the 1980s, however, tells a different story. These studies emphasize two crucial factors: public beliefs about whether undertaking the military operation was right or wrong in the first place, and public beliefs about the likelihood of success

of the military operation. Both attitudes are significant and work in tandem, but beliefs about the likelihood of success appear to be more important in determining the public's willingness to tolerate American military combat deaths. Other factors that aid in shoring up public support include: an elite consensus supporting the war and the president showing sufficient resolve.

It is political leaders, not the public, who have exhibited a casualty phobia since Vietnam. Some presidents (for example, Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton) have been more sensitive to this matter than others (such as both presidents Bush), but all have expressed doubts that have affected the military's plans and strained the relationship. These presidential doubts have trickled down to shape military views and have constituted a major point of civil–military tension in the conduct of war. These concerns have also shaped relations with allies because, in comparison with other nations, the American military seem to place a higher priority on force protection.

Some have worried about the opposite problem, of a society too willing to embrace military options. Pres. Dwight Eisenhower warned that the logic of an arms race was creating a military–industrial complex whose interests were served by heightening the public's insecurity. The result would be a "garrison state"—a society organized around and dominated by production and preparation for war. Despite these concerns, the actual Cold War record shows that America did not become a garrison state. On the contrary, civil rights have flourished rather than languished in the years since Eisenhower, even while defense expenditures soared and the pace of American military activity accelerated.

The civil rights movement has affected civil–military relations. On the one hand, racial integration has clearly proceeded more swiftly within the military than in society at large. On the other hand, the military has lagged behind civilian society on gender equality issues and may also be doing so with regard to sexual orientation. On balance, however, military institutions appear to move roughly in tandem with civilian society.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, have brought questions of civil–military relations and war to the forefront of public thinking, but they did not fundamentally alter the underlying dynamics of the debate. Instead, the post–September 11 era has renewed many of these same debates. Civil–military disputes about how to fight the war in Afghanistan, and whether and how to fight the war in Iraq, followed the same patterns seen throughout American history, with civilians seeking a smaller and more streamlined deployment while military officers pressed for the overwhelming use of force. On the home front, the war on terrorism has renewed the debate over balancing civil liberties and American security during an ongoing conflict. Some have argued that the USAPATRIOT Act and other efforts by the administration of George W. Bush to provide domestic security infringe too severely on civil rights, while others have maintained that these changes are appropriate measures that increase American security without substantial risk to civil rights.

Despite these ongoing civil–military tensions, the United States can boast of an enviable record in civil–military relations—especially when viewed in comparative perspective. No coup has ever been attempted, much less been successful, and civilians have always prevailed in the most serious disputes. Moreover, the military has usually been effective in achieving the wide variety of missions that have been placed before it, and it has never suffered the kind of military defeat that leads to political collapse. All this, however, is not to say that the path has been soft and smooth underfoot. America may control vast military strength, but it also strains under vast military responsibilities in the post–September 11 world. Thus far, the United States has avoided turning into a society dominated by war, but it is still a society overshadowed by the threat of war. The constant challenge of reaching solutions to every new dilemma of civil–military relations and war must thus remain a central preoccupation of American political and social life.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; All Volunteer Force; CNN; Gays and Lesbians in the Military; Goldwater–Nichols Act; Media and War; Public Opinion and Policy in Wartime

Related Documents

1768 a; 1846 a; 1899; 1908; 1942 e, f; 1951; 1976 a; 2000

—*Peter D. Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Lindsay Cohn*

Clergy and Laity Concerned about Vietnam

Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV) became the largest ecumenical organization opposed to the war in Vietnam. A moderate group composed predominantly of Protestants, it maintained the American tradition of dissent despite opposition from the American government and the more conservative churchgoing public.

As early as 1963, ordained and lay church leaders had begun to speak out against the Vietnam War. As military action escalated, the protests of religious leaders also rose. In January 1966, Yale University chaplain William Sloan Coffin Jr. announced the formation of the National Emergency Committee of Clergy Concerned About Vietnam (CCAV) as an outlet for clerics who opposed U.S. policy in Indochina. Coffin had a history of political activism. Heavily involved with the civil rights movement, he had also cofounded, with Allard Lowenstein, Americans for Re-Appraisal of Far Eastern Policy in 1965 to push for official recognition of the People's Republic of China and advocate a cease-fire in Vietnam. Like many others in the religious community, Coffin had discovered the inequalities of American society through the civil rights movement, and this knowledge prompted him to reevaluate his acceptance of Cold War attitudes.

CCAV brought together many of the most prominent religious leaders in the nation, including the controversial antiwar priest Daniel Berrigan. Most of the members came from theologically liberal denominations: Methodist, Episcopal, Presbyterian, and United Church

of Christ. Lutherans and Baptists were also members. Although the organization was all-male at its beginning, it eventually included 13 women among its 75-member national committee.

By April 1966, the members of CCAV had become convinced that the U.S. government intended gradually to escalate the Vietnam War. They decided to keep their organization in existence for the duration of the war and formed Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam. Richard Fernandez, an ordained minister in the United Church of Christ who had once been arrested for civil rights activities, was named head of the new organization.

CALCAV's association with the American religious mainstream earned it greater respect in the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson than most of the other groups in the antiwar movement. It was even able to gain access to highly placed officials within the executive branch, though to little effect. CALCAV believed that the military escalation in Vietnam and the verbal attacks on war protesters at home indicated that the U.S. government was not genuinely interested in seeking a political solution to the war, despite statements to the contrary.

CALCAV maintained that the conflict in Vietnam did not result from communist aggression from the north but instead had begun as a civil war in the south. Some members challenged the arguments of the Johnson administration that American treaty commitments created a military obligation in Vietnam. Others denied the idea of monolithic communism and the validity of the domino theory (one country after another falling to communism) that had been used as early as 1954 by Pres. Dwight Eisenhower to justify intervention in Southeast Asia. Several leaders publicly stated that revolutions in some of these countries were needed to eliminate social, political, and economic problems and counseled the leaders of American government to respond to each individual situation rather than blindly interpret them all as communist-inspired attacks.

While maintaining a moderate antiwar stance, CALCAV increasingly began to denounce U.S. policy as immoral rather than merely erroneous. Believing that the United States was betraying its own ideals, CALCAV members spoke of a loss of moral integrity and argued that the

United States was no longer equated with the pursuit of justice and peace. By 1967, the continuation of the Vietnam War pushed many CALCAV members to adopt the tactics of civil disobedience. In violation of U.S. law, CALCAV collected draft cards at church services. These actions, along with CALCAV's advocacy of such unpopular positions as amnesty for war resisters and its investigation of American war crimes, separated the organization from national religious coalitions and limited its support among the middle class. However, CALCAV remained very concerned about its moderate image and repeatedly stressed that it was not connected to radical, pacifist, or traditional peace organizations.

When Republican candidate Richard Nixon won the presidency in 1968, CALCAV expressed hopes for an end to the Vietnam War. The organization believed that military escalation was ineffective and advocated a negotiated settlement. During the election, CALCAV had backed Democratic candidates, but the members thought that Nixon's election would bring the Vietnam War to an end within a year. They remained confident that the American political system would recognize and correct its own mistakes. By the end of Nixon's first year in office, CALCAV leaders agreed that his Vietnam policy was unacceptable, but many also viewed Nixon's policy of Vietnamization as the beginning of the end of the war. Vietnamization called for the gradual replacement of U.S. troops by South Vietnamese soldiers. CALCAV's growing support of draft evaders and deserters stemmed from its belief that the war was winding down. CALCAV became involved with American exiles in 1968 during a meeting of the World Council of Churches in Sweden. Several CALCAV representatives met with members of the American Deserter Committee, working with the committee to publicize the existence and problems of deserters in Sweden.

In 1970, CALCAV broadened its reform agenda beyond the war in Vietnam when it joined with the Episcopal Peace Fellowship to begin planning a campaign for corporate responsibility. The two groups issued a position paper arguing that corporations needed to change their priorities, focusing on goods, services, and patterns of production that were more humane and socially useful. CALCAV also

organized small groups within the various denominations to represent their churches at annual stockholders' meetings of corporations with significant military contracts.

With the signing of the 1973 Paris peace accords, the postwar malaise that affected so much of the antiwar movement took a toll on CALCAV organizers. CALCAV pushed for amnesty for Vietnam draft resisters and deserters but had trouble garnering support for war-related activities. After 1975, CALCAV's focus on Indochina disappeared, and the group emerged as a progressive organization concerned with issues of peace and justice worldwide. In the late 1970s, now known as Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC), it helped pass legislation in Chicago to ban the design, production, and storage of nuclear weapons within city limits. Headquartered in Decatur in the metro Atlanta area, by the end of the 20th century CALC had too few members to be active in any meaningful sense in public affairs.

CALCAV's ecumenical thrust was one of its most influential features. Churches with a history of social activism often addressed the conflict in Indochina, but many others feared this controversial issue and left their congregants with no outlet for their antiwar convictions. More than any other organization, CALCAV linked the diverse religious community together and permitted it to oppose the war with a united voice.

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Antiwar Movements; Berrigan, Daniel and Philip Berrigan; Cold War; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Religion and War; Vietnam War

—Caryn E. Neumann

CNN

CNN, the Cable News Network, debuted on June 1, 1980 at 6:00 A.M. CNN has since grown to have an enormous impact on the way Americans receive and expect their news. But it has also had an effect on the international incidents that it covers, providing leaders with opportunities to connect directly with other policy makers and constituents in moments of crisis and war.

The idea of an all-news channel had first arisen in the mid-1970s. The launching of a new satellite, SATCOM I, opened the way for new television stations to broadcast throughout the country. CNN founder Ted Turner had already enjoyed success in the medium of television before pioneering the all-news network; in 1976, he began broadcasting his "superstation" via satellite, showing Atlanta Braves and Atlanta Hawks games all over the country. When he turned his focus on creating an all-news network that would be broadcast by satellite, Turner began building a coalition of newsmen by bringing in Reese Schonfeld, a television newsman. As Turner knew virtually nothing about the news business, he gave his news associates a free hand in the hiring of anchors, journalists, and production staff.

CNN had many critics in its early days. Some dubbed it the "Chicken News Network." Few expected that the station would survive its growing pains, which were numerous. It began broadcasting in 1980 with a two-hour block of news, weather, and sports and continued throughout the day with two- and four-hour blocks with a financial news show, a sports show, and a prime-time newscast in the evenings.

The major networks responded to CNN by developing the Satellite News Channel (SNC), which provided half-hour news shows, repeated all day. Turner decided to launch a preemptive strike and create his own channel under a similar format first. Originally called CNN II, it was later renamed Headline News; it began airing in 1982. In 1983 Turner bought out the Satellite News Channel to end the conflict that had inflamed the early months of both SNC and CNN II.

Early studies showed that both CNN and the broadcast networks' evening news shows covered the same stories but for different lengths of time. Also, based on a survey of CNN personnel, researchers found that in the early years of CNN most of its employees displayed attitudes that were more closely aligned with business leaders than with network news personnel. Researchers stated as well that CNN personnel were more politically conservative than their network brethren, an observation that may be less accurate in more recent years.

Throughout the 1980s, CNN worked to gain respect and prominence. In 1982 Turner appeared on the cover of Time magazine, and in 1985 CNN turned its first net profit. In 1987 CNN moved its headquarters into a new building in downtown Atlanta. CNN covered the protest movement in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989 and kept broadcasting in the face of the ensuing crackdown by the Chinese government. Eventually, CNN's live feed was shut down by the Chinese authorities but not before it was able to broadcast the violence of the confrontation.

If one event can be stated as having established the American public's reliance on CNN, that event was the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The country of Iraq invaded its smaller neighbor Kuwait, and a 28-nation allied force—composed predominately of U.S. forces—entered the Persian Gulf region to compel Iraq to pull out of Kuwait. The United States began six weeks of offensive aerial operations in January 1991, followed by a few days of ground combat. This was a war fought on the television screens of America, and it was fought 24 hours a day on CNN. On the first night of the war, CNN's ratings increased twentyfold. CNN's coverage of the events was widely praised. News anchor Bernard Shaw, along with correspondents John Holliman and Peter Arnett,

reported directly from Baghdad as missiles and bombs landed on the city.

CNN carried official briefings as they happened from the Pentagon or the Central Command headquarters in Saudi Arabia via a pool system that limited the information fed to reporters. The network also replayed the briefings and even more popular film footage of the "smart bombs," munitions guided to very specific targets by laser beams. Equipped with a small camera, smart bombs relayed footage of what the projectile was "seeing" as it made its approach. This apparent pinpoint accuracy riveted viewers as they watched target after target enlarging on their screens until the final explosion. Only later was it revealed that smart bombs represented only 7 percent of the bombs dropped during the war. Regardless, they provided ideal footage for an all-news network.

CNN's role in the Persian Gulf permanently changed diplomacy and military decision making. American and foreign officials all watch CNN's international coverage. Replies to challenges, answers to questions, and exhortations to foreign populations can all be given in real time. The traditional processes of diplomacy have been abandoned in favor of the quick response on CNN. There is no longer any time to consult experts or to make and explore a nuanced analysis of events; instead, speed is key, with broadcasts being sent around the world continuously. Dubbed the "CNN effect," this phenomenon has changed diplomacy and forced officials to consider how to "package" events and decisions so they will play best on television. One clear example was the 100-hour ground war engaged in during the Persian Gulf War.

CNN also provided coverage of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001. Its reporters traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to cover the American military response to the Taliban. CNN's reporting was also prominent in the war in Iraq, which began in 2003, and the subsequent rebuilding effort in that country.

The strength of CNN is its immediacy. It presents events in real-time and for extended periods. However, competitors have cut into CNN's viewership. In 1996 MSNBC, a joint operation by NBC and Microsoft, hit the airwaves to provide an all-news format. That same year the Fox News

Channel began broadcasting. Fox News from the outset has been more controversial than CNN because its mission is to provide a counterpoint to what Fox considers the liberal bias of CNN and the major networks.

There have been other spin-off networks aside from Headline News: CNN International; CNNfn, which provided financial news until 2004; CNNSI, an all-sports news channel; and CNN en Español, for Spanish-language customers. CNN's networks are available to more than one billion people in more than 200 countries. CNN, along with the rest of Turner Broadcasting, merged with Time Warner in 1996 to create the world's largest media company. Time Warner then merged with America Online (AOL) in January 2000. Since its inception, CNN has solidified its role as one of the most influential media networks in the world. It not only reports news to people in their homes, it has also become a tool for newsmakers to affect materially current events.

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Related Entries

Censorship and the Military; Frontline Reporting; Iraq War; Media and War; Persian Gulf War; Public Opinion and Policy in Wartime; Television and War

—Jennifer S. Lawrence

Coast Guard Academy

The Coast Guard Academy, located in New London, Connecticut, is the smallest of the nation's four service academies and the only one not under the administration of the Department of the Defense. As a result, it is often forgotten by the public. However, since its founding, the academy has provided cadets with the academic, seamanship, and physical training required to become commissioned officers in the Coast Guard. Its high academic and military standards, combined with seagoing training during the summers, continue to produce future leaders not only for the Coast Guard, but also for the nation.

The Coast Guard Academy began in 1876 when Congress authorized a School of Instruction for the Revenue Cutter Service. Of 19 candidates, 9 were selected by competitive examinations and reported aboard the topsail schooner *Dobbin* in May 1877 for a two-year course of instruction. (The course of instruction would be expanded to three years in 1903 and to four years in 1930.) The academy admits only those ranking highest in nationwide tests of knowledge and aptitude; since its founding, the Coast Guard Academy remains the only military service academy that accepts cadets without political appointment or giving consideration to their state of residence.

In 1878 the 106-foot barque *Chase* replaced the *Dobbin*. Without classrooms ashore, cadets studied while working the ship between its homeport near New Bedford, Massachusetts, and ports in the South and Bermuda. The program was discontinued in 1890, when Congress specified that Revenue Cutter Service officers would come from an overflow of Naval Academy graduates. By 1894 an expansion of the Navy led to a need to reopen the School of Instruction.

In 1904 the school moved the *Chase* to Arundel Cove, Maryland, and added classroom space ashore. The steam

cutter *Itasca* replaced the *Chase* in 1910, when winter quarters were moved to Fort Trumbull in New London, Connecticut. The school's name was changed to the Revenue Cutter Academy in 1914, and, in 1915, with the creation of the U.S. Coast Guard from the merger of the Revenue Cutter Service and the Life-Saving Service, it became the Coast Guard Academy.

In February 1929 the efforts of Coast Guard commandant Rear Adm. Frederick Chamberlayne Billard bore fruit when Congress voted to appropriate the funds needed to build a suitable academy for the Coast Guard in New London. In the fall of 1932 the academy moved to its present location on the west bank of the Thames River in New London. In 1947, the United States acquired the 295-foot sailing barque *Eagle* from Germany as a war reparation and commissioned it into the academy, where it still serves as a seagoing classroom, giving cadets their first taste of life at sea.

The Coast Guard Academy command structure is similar to that of the other armed service academies. A rear admiral serves as superintendent with a captain as Commandant of Cadets. The faculty is a mix of permanent civilian faculty, permanent military faculty, and rotating military faculty. The permanent military faculty (Permanent Commissioned Teaching Staff) is removed from the line of the Coast Guard and staff members normally retain their positions for the duration of their military careers. Little, if any, tension exists between the academic and military professional emphases of the academy.

Each cadet completes a core curriculum oriented toward engineering, the sciences, and professional studies. A cadet may choose from among one of the academy's eight majors. All graduates, regardless of major, receive a bachelor of science degree. The academy offers an honors program that combines a technical education with liberal arts and cultural studies through a series of events and seminars. The honors program can lead to in-depth research projects and internships in Washington, D.C. Upper-class cadets who have demonstrated a high level of academic performance may also take elective courses at Connecticut College, also in New London.

For training in leadership and drill, the Corps of Cadets is organized into a regiment of two battalions of four companies each. Cadets run the Corps through their regimental chain of command. First Class (senior) cadets enforce rules as regimental staff officers and company commanders. The company commander is responsible to the company officer (a commissioned Coast Guard officer assigned to each company) for the performance of the company. Other First Class cadets fulfill junior officer roles and are assigned as department heads and division officers to assist the company commander. Second Class (junior) cadets' roles parallel those of Coast Guard senior enlisted, Third Class (sophomore) cadets parallel midgrade petty officers, and Fourth Class (freshman) cadets, called "swabs," fulfill the role of junior enlisted. Young cadets also develop leadership skills in classrooms and on the athletic fields. All cadets participate in intercollegiate or intramural athletics and must complete rigorous physical education requirements. During summer training, cadets take training cruises aboard the *Eagle* or other Coast Guard vessels and visit Coast Guard operational commands.

In 1976, under a congressional mandate, the Coast Guard Academy, along with the three other service academies, accepted its first female cadets. In the fall of 1979 Cadet First Class Linda Johansen became the first woman to command the corps of cadets at a service academy. She was among the first female graduates in June 1980.

Despite its small size and relative obscurity, the Coast Guard Academy has produced most of the Coast Guard's flag officers, 90 officers for foreign coast guards and navies, two astronauts, a number of college and university presidents, CEOs of major corporations, and a secretary of the Treasury.

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Related Entries

Air Force Academy; Coastal Patrolling; Military Academy, United States; Naval Academy; Women in the Military

—*C. Douglas Kroll*

Coastal Patrolling

Coastal patrolling is vital to a maritime nation such as the United States. Nearly 95 percent of all American foreign trade, valued at over $1.7 trillion, travels by sea. Coastal patrolling not only protects this trade but also forms an integral part of U.S. national security. Originally begun to enforce custom laws, coastal patrolling has grown increasingly—preventing drug smuggling, migrant smuggling, illegal fishing, and terrorism in the 21st century.

One of the first challenges facing the newly independent United States of America was to pull itself out of the bankruptcy that resulted from the American Revolution. That debt, at home and abroad, totaled $80 million. A new protective tariff would not only protect American manufacturing but also provide a means of raising desperately needed revenue. Alexander Hamilton, the nation's first secretary of the treasury, realized that the tariff would not command universal support. The American colonists had distrusted authority and, through a century of practice, had become expert at dodging the king's taxes. To an extent, it had become a patriotic duty to avoid paying British import taxes.

Hamilton knew that smuggling could not be suppressed by paper statutes alone; America needed a coastal patrolling fleet to prevent it. He therefore sought and, on August 4, 1790, obtained from Congress authority to launch a seagoing military coastal patrolling force in support of the national economic policy. The 10 armed revenue cutters—small, swift, and manned by American sailors—became the nucleus of what initially was called the "Revenue Service" and later "Revenue Marine Service"; it was given the official name of "Revenue Cutter Service" in 1863. The service merged with the Life-Saving Service in 1915 to become the U.S. Coast Guard.

While the initial purpose of coastal patrolling was to enforce U.S. tariff laws, it would soon include other functions. During the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800), the Revenue Marine cutters were ordered to defend the coast and repel any hostility offered to vessels and commerce by the French Navy. However, this responsibility was not to be allowed to interfere with the regular protection of revenue.

In 1808 the legal importation of slaves came to an end in the United States. Coastal patrolling duties began to include prevention of slave smuggling into the nation. Blocking and seizing slave smugglers remained a major function of coastal patrolling up to the Civil War.

During the War of 1812, coastal patrolling returned to its defensive role, this time against the British Navy rather than the French Navy. The first shots of the naval war were fired by one of the Revenue Marine cutters. After only one week of fighting, the cutter *Jefferson* encountered the British brig *Patriot*, splintered her topsides with roundshot, and brought her in as the first captive ship of the war.

The U.S. defeat of England during the War of 1812 did not end the threat to American ships. Pirates sailed in and out of the West Indies and plundered U.S. ships from their bases in Florida and Louisiana. Congress ordered coastal patrols of the area to "protect the merchant vessels of the United States and their crews from piratical aggressions and depredations" (Bloomfield, 27). The Revenue Marine cutters, searching the American waters and coastline hideaways, were followed by a punitive U.S. Navy squadron commanded by Comm. David Porter. The suppression of piracy remained a coastal patrolling concern until about 1840.

Coastal patrolling would also play a role in the long-festering Seminole troubles in the southeastern United States. Both Revenue Marine cutters and Navy warships engaged in battles with the Seminoles during the 1830s. At times, the mere presence of a cutter averted an attack on white settlers. When Seminoles threatened Tampa, Florida, in 1836, all the residents took refuge on ships in the harbor.

In 1837 coastal patrolling gained another function when Congress authorized the cutters to cruise the coasts in the

"severe portion of the Season" and render aid to vessels in distress. Winter coastal patrolling was a tough mission for these small sailing ships, yet the need was great. On average, 90 American ships were wrecked each year. Thus, the vast new responsibility of search and rescue was added to the earlier coastal patrol functions of protecting the revenue against smugglers, enforcing laws and embargoes, hunting pirates and slavers, and defending the coasts from foreign attack with the Navy.

During the Civil War, one of the chief Union goals was to cut off the South from all outside assistance by imposing a naval blockade and policing some 3,500 miles of Confederate coastline. This blockade would serve two major functions. First, by sharply reducing the Confederacy's access to foreign markets, it would make it more difficult for the South to wage war. Second, the blockade would demonstrate to foreign powers the Union's resolve to crush the rebellion.

The Union secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, had to convert a relatively small collection of ships into an effective coastal patrolling force. While waiting for new ships to be built, the Union scoured northern ports, purchasing ships of all types for use in patrolling the Confederate coastline. In effect, the bulk of the U.S. Navy joined the Revenue cutters in becoming a part of the coastal patrolling forces.

During World War I and World War II, coastal patrolling would once again be employed for defense, with ships guarding the coasts of the United States against attack and infiltration of spies and saboteurs. During the years of Prohibition between those wars, coastal patrolling also became very visible. The U.S. Coast Guard, now the nation's coastal patrolling force, was instructed to prevent the smuggling of any liquor into the country through the seacoasts or across the Great Lakes. The Coast Guard, with few cutters and long stretches of coast to patrol, was faced with a nearly impossible task. So much illegal liquor entered the country that in 1923 supporters of Prohibition demanded that the Navy join in the war against liquor smugglers. The Navy wanted no part of it. Secretary of the Navy Curtis Wilber declared: "The Navy Department has no intention of mixing in the efforts of the government to stop rumrunning. The business of stopping it is police duty and not Navy duty" (Bloomfield, 146). Despite this resistance, in 1924 Congress ordered 20 Navy destroyers

to be turned over to the Coast Guard for coastal patrolling. On December 5, 1933, the 18th Amendment was repealed and the "rum war" came to an end.

Since 1967 Coast Guard patrols have protected the U.S. 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which holds a significant source of renewable wealth, from foreign fishing vessel incursions. The Coast Guard now patrols the 3.36 million square miles of the EEZ with long-range surveillance aircraft, large cutters, and patrol boats. These patrols also protect endangered marine mammals such as whales, dolphins, seals, and sea lions from illegal poaching.

In 1999 the Coast Guard was provided with $260 million in supplemental funds to expand its coastal drug interdiction activities. These patrols are designed to deny smugglers the use of maritime routes and disrupt the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

In the 21st century, the patrolling of the coastline is conducted mostly by Coast Guard cutters, as well as by its ship-based deployable pursuit boats and specially equipped helicopters. As in the past, these patrols continue to prevent the smuggling of contraband, including drugs, illegal immigrants, technologies, illegal arms, and untaxed cargoes. Coastal patrolling enforces fishery laws, which prevent the depletion of fish stocks and other resources in the EEZ. Coastal patrolling also monitors environmental requirements, fights piracy, and seeks to prevent terrorists from entering the country. As such, coastal patrolling plays a major role in protecting the U.S. environment and economy, as well at its maritime safety and security.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Coast Guard Academy; Homeland Security; Indian Wars: Seminole Wars; Merchant Marine; War of 1812

—*C. Douglas Kroll*

Cold War

(1945–91)

The Cold War refers to the worldwide conflict following the end of World War II that pitted the West, a U.S.-led bloc of largely democratic and capitalist countries, against the East, a U.S.S.R.-led bloc of largely communist nations with centrally planned economies. The Cold War initially focused on Europe in the 1940s and 1950s, then shifted to Asia and beyond in the 1960s. Until the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the superpowers engaged directly in the conflict, creating several serious crises. After 1962, they eschewed direct confrontation, competing instead through Third World proxies. An ever-present threat of intentional or accidental nuclear war hung over the world from the 1950s onward, paradoxically stabilizing the struggle of the Cold War. Furthermore, both the war's long life and ideological underpinnings deeply affected American domestic politics and society from McCarthyism to Watergate.

Origins

The Cold War's origin is still the subject of contentious debate, with some revisionist historians placing it as early as the 1919 Allied intervention in the Russian civil war. While this school identifies the Cold War's principal cause as Soviet insecurity, more traditional scholars focus on Moscow's aggressive post–World War II foreign policy. Soviet suppression of Polish

democratic elections in 1946 and Stalin's speech in February of that year forecasting worldwide struggle against the West were soon followed by Winston Churchill's speech in March decrying the "Iron Curtain" descending across Europe. Action followed words as both sides pressed for advantage in a series of crises.

During the war, Soviet action presaged its postwar stance: Soviet troops, which had entered Iran with British forces in 1941 to forestall Axis influence, refused to withdraw in accordance with the agreed timetable. Using military leverage, the Soviets pressured Tehran for territorial and economic concessions until Western powers coaxed the Soviets to reduce their forces. Simultaneously, a communist insurgency pressured the Greek monarchist government and its British sponsor. Following a February 1947 warning from economically strained London that it could no longer defend Athens, Pres. Harry S. Truman declared that the United States would, "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This "Truman Doctrine" became part of a larger framework for addressing the Soviet threat.

A junior American State Department official provided that first widely accepted outline of a coherent American policy. George Kennan's 1947 article in *Foreign Affairs*, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," crystallized American policy in the early Cold War. Kennan held that, just as a shark must move forward or die, Moscow was compelled to expand to justify domestic totalitarian repression. If the West prevented the U.S.S.R. from expanding to other industrialized areas by supporting stable and prosperous democratic regimes, then communism would eventually collapse. "Containment" became a multifaceted strategy, combining economic, ideological, military, and cultural elements. The key economic component was the European Recovery Program, or "Marshall Plan," which provided more than $13 billion for economic recovery in Western Europe and successfully curtailed Soviet influence by reducing financial hardship—an important source of political support for communism. Other economic components included the Inter-American Development Bank, the Alliance for Progress, and, within the United States, the National Defense Education Act of 1958.

The containment policy also spurred a range of cultural programs and enterprises, including the Fulbright Exchange Program for U.S. and foreign academics in 1946, Radio Free Europe in 1949, and the United States Information Agency in 1953. The Truman administration, partly in response to Soviet criticism of American race relations, began the integration of the armed services and launched other support for the civil rights movement. The Peace Corps was established in 1961 as a nonmilitary and humanitarian way to exert American influence in many parts of world, and, in the 1950s, the State Department lent support to the student exchange program of the American Field Service, a private organization. The federal government's mobilization in the face of the Cold War even extended to music, with its facilitation of foreign concert tours by prominent American jazz musicians, including Louis "Satchmo" Armstrong.

Domestic Anticommunism

Fear of Soviet subversion was not limited to Europe. The Cold War reintroduced a potent ingredient to the witches' brew of the American domestic political scene. Fear of communism had precipitated a post–World War I "Red scare"—a threat more imagined than real. However, real communist activity expanded in the United States during the 1930s, as the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) became active in labor politics. Groups and individuals connected informally to the CPUSA, often through short-lived "popular fronts," became politically influential legal outlets for American communism.

At the same time, Soviet agents were busy recruiting sympathetic non-CPUSA members, so-called fellow travelers, in industry and government to help their cause. New Deal agencies, the Treasury Department, and most notably the State Department (with the recruitment of spies including Alger Hiss) became the focus of Soviet attention.

The tools to prosecute the perceived communist enemy also predated the Cold War. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), also known as the Dies Committee, was established in 1938 to investigate communist penetration of labor and popular fronts; it continued to function well into the Cold War. HUAC was also used as a political weapon against the New Deal. In addition, although not specifically targeted at communists, the Smith Act of 1940, which forbade the advocacy of the forcible overthrow of the government or belonging to a group that did, became the legal basis for pursuing communists in the postwar era. Nonetheless, the wartime alliance with the U.S.S.R. provided ample opportunity for continued communist infiltration of the Defense Department and defense industries; several agents were found within the atomic bomb program.

The series of postwar crises marking the start of the Cold War coincided with the erosion of support for the New Deal and of Democratic Party power. The Republicans swept to power in both houses in 1946 by attacking the New Deal and began associating its policies and programs with communism. Largely to defuse the political potency of the Republican anticommunist weapon, Truman launched a vigorous anticommunist program of his own. Executive Order 9835 mandated loyalty checks of more than two million employees and set up loyalty boards throughout the government to vet workers. In the end, however, they dismissed only 102. The Justice Department brought charges of violating the Smith Act against the CPUSA's National Board, its highest body. The subsequent circuslike trial resulted in a guilty verdict, which, combined with the Congress of Industrial Organization's ouster of most communist elements from the ranks of its labor unions, broke the CPUSA's waning influence and drove it underground. Fellow travelers also came under pressure, most notably in HUAC's 1947 investigation and trial of the "Hollywood Ten," which focused on communist writers in the entertainment industry. The result was the firing and blacklisting of writers, actors, and others in a widening array of businesses, while the same pressure was exerted on a number of schools and colleges.

Soviet power (as opposed to domestic communist activity) also came under intense scrutiny. Alger Hiss, a former senior bureaucrat in the State Department, testified before the HUAC in March 1948 that he was not a communist and did not know the man, Whittaker Chambers, who had named him as such. In fact, as intercepted Soviet communications later bore out, Hiss had been a Soviet agent since 1935, actively passing information to Moscow, and Chambers had been his courier. Hiss was convicted of perjury after Chambers produced microfilm (hidden in a

pumpkin) implicating him. The conviction damaged Truman and the State Department, while launching the career of HUAC member Richard Nixon.

The trail from a 1950 British spy case against atomic scientist and Soviet agent Klaus Fuchs eventually led to two Americans, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Even more than Hiss, the Rosenbergs became a cause célèbre, with partisans decrying them as traitors or as innocent victims of a witch-hunt. The Rosenbergs were both convicted of espionage, condemned to death, and executed in 1953, two years after their trial.

By 1950, these efforts by all three branches of the government broke the back of Depression-era and wartime Soviet espionage in the United States and exposed the infiltration of labor by the CPUSA.

Cold War Turns Hot: Berlin and Korea

The economic recovery instigated by the Marshall Plan included the western zones of Germany, which in 1948 had introduced a unified currency. Fearing a revitalized Germany under Western influence, the Soviets fomented the first major crisis of the Cold War in June 1948. Taking advantage of a postwar arrangement guaranteeing only air access to jointly occupied Berlin, 100 miles inside the Soviet zone, the U.S.S.R. closed off rail and road links hoping to force the West out. A massive airlift supplied the city with more than two million tons of supplies, ranging from basic foodstuffs at the start to luxuries as the pace of airlift increased. The Soviets lifted the blockade on May 1949, effectively admitting defeat and deferring a decision on Berlin. As insurance against increasingly provocative Soviet aggression, 12 nations joined together in a mutual-defense pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As one observer put it, NATO was designed to "keep the U.S. in, the Germans down, and the Soviets out."

The Soviets rapidly recovered from the humiliation caused by the Berlin Airlift with the detonation of their first atomic device in August 1949. Although of limited immediate military significance, the test had a profound psychological impact. This shock was reinforced two months later when

The official signing ceremony, which took place in Washington, D.C., in April 1949, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (AFP/Getty Images)

China, America's traditional ally in mainland Asia, joined the communist bloc with the establishment of Mao Zedong's People's Republic of China.

These shocks triggered the first comprehensive study of American national security policy during the Cold War. The resulting National Security Council Memorandum-68 (NSC-68), produced in 1950, was an ideologically charged call for wholesale revision of U.S. policy. Rather than aiming to contain Moscow and await its eventual demise, NSC-68 advocated an immediate buildup of conventional forces. In historian John Gaddis's term, it was a switch from Kennan's asymmetrical containment to a symmetrical one that matched the U.S.S.R. strength for strength.

As Truman considered restructuring of national security policy, Soviet armed and trained North Korean troops launched a devastating surprise attack against South Korea on June 25, 1950. Although U.S. Sec. of State Dean Acheson earlier had explicitly deemed Korea outside America's area of interest in the Pacific, Truman strongly believed that this blatant aggression was a direct challenge to the West and won United Nations approval for armed intervention. Despite initial reversals, U.N. forces crushed the communist army and drove it into North Korea. As Western forces drew closer to the Chinese border, Mao quietly warned that their presence would not be tolerated. When Western troops continued pushing north, more than 300,000 Chinese troops intervened, throwing U.N. forces behind the 38th parallel. However, the Chinese outran their supply lines and the war entered a static phase.

McCarthyism

As American troops bogged down against communist forces overseas, imagined communist infiltrators continued to inflame U.S. domestic politics. Despite the effective disruption of Soviet spy rings in the government and the rooting out of spies from the nuclear weapons program, anticommunism still provided fertile ground for domestic politics, exemplified in the early 1950s by Sen. Joseph McCarthy, a Republican from Wisconsin. He gained notoriety in 1950 during a speaking tour when he touted a list of "205 known Communists" in the State Department. In actuality, McCarthy was drawing on lists several years old, which had already been used in previous congressional hearings. Nevertheless, McCarthy attacked government officials and those in influential positions in society in his hearings to root out communist infiltrators. His assault on the State Department climaxed in June 1951 with an incoherent diatribe against the wartime Army chief of staff, former secretary of defense, and then-Sec. of State George Marshall.

After gaining control of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Government Operations Committee, following the 1952 Republican election victory, McCarthy continued his populist attacks against an increasingly wide spectrum of opponents, including alleged infiltrators at the Voice of America and American authors carrying communist literature at overseas American libraries. His shift in focus from the State Department to Army civilian workers eventually led to his downfall. His office's attempt to blackmail the Army into favorably treating a draft-eligible member of his staff, David Schine, and McCarthy's subsequent sloppy cover-up, brought about the televised Army–McCarthy hearings in April 1954. The senator's performance, using his normal tactics of insinuation and bullying, decisively undercut his public support and set the stage for his censure. McCarthy's political demise was rapidly followed by Supreme Court decisions under the new chief justice, Earl Warren, that undercut such tools of government anticommunist programs as loyalty oaths (*Cole v. Young*), the firing of employees who exercised their 5th Amendment rights (*Slochower v. Board of Education*), and the legality of congressional committees conducting investigations without drafting legislation (*Watkins v. United States*). This last case was a direct attack on HUAC.

Korean War Ends and "The New Look"

At the height of McCarthy's influence, and as the conflict in Korea dragged into its third year, the Cold War changed dramatically when Soviet leader Joseph Stalin died on March 5, 1953. In the leadership struggle that ensued, a troika briefly emerged consisting of Nikita Khrushchev, Georgi Malenkov, and Leventi Beria. When Beria wavered over continuing Stalin's iron-fisted control of Eastern Europe, East Berliners revolted in June 1953. After Soviet tanks quickly crushed the

rebellion, the troika sought to simplify external relations while they struggled with each other.

The Soviets strongly urged their Chinese and North Korean allies to agree to the armistice the U.N. had been seeking since 1951. When they balked, the new U.S. president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, opaquely threatened to use atomic weapons. The final armistice, signed on July 27, 1953, essentially restored the status quo ante bellum. To an American public fearful of Soviet power abroad, infiltration at home, and accustomed to thinking of World War II–style absolute victory as the norm in conflict, this outcome was unsettling, a feeling reflected in some of the more hysteria-filled Hollywood films produced in these years.

The new president placed American security policy on a wholly different footing than his predecessor (Harry S. Truman), choosing asymmetrical containment. Eisenhower's National Security Council issued NSC 162/2, implementing his vision of the Cold War as a long-term competition whose winner would be determined in the economic arena, not the battlefield. To preserve America's economic edge, Eisenhower sharply realigned military spending. He used the "bang for the buck" efficiency of nuclear weapons, in which the United States had a technological lead, to pare down expensive conventional forces.

The technological edge resulted from the development of new nuclear weapons in 1952. Where earlier atomic fission weapons carried the explosive equivalent of hundreds of World War II bombers, a single thermonuclear fusion device carried the power equivalent to that of all the munitions used between 1939 and 1945. Weapons also became smaller, as tactical atomic weapons designed for use on the battlefield multiplied in number and variety. Furthermore, jet bombers and even intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons became operational by the end of the decade. Although Eisenhower attempted to put in place arms control, most notably the Open Skies proposal in 1955, distrust of Soviet intentions and the technical impossibility of verification stalled progress.

Along with this emphasis on nuclear weapons, the United States hoped that the recovering European economies would contribute more to their defense. Formal recognition of West Germany in 1949 was followed by its rearmament and

These duck-and-cover exercises, meant to prepare children for nuclear attack, were practiced at schools throughout the country, as the United States escalated its nuclear weapons program during the Cold War. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

admission to NATO in 1955. In response, Soviet leaders formed the Warsaw Pact, which imposed unity on Eastern Europe but failed to quash the discontent first seen after Stalin's death. A 1956 Hungarian uprising was at first tolerated, but then brutally crushed by the Red Army, vividly showing the limits of Soviet tolerance and the coercive nature of the Eastern alliance. Despite the Eisenhower administration's aggressive "rollback" rhetoric, the West's muted response reinforced the hold that the Soviets had over Eastern Europe.

At the same time Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest, French and British paratroopers, acting in concert with Israel, seized the Suez Canal from Egypt. This intervention, however, threatened this last European attempt to retain imperial prerogatives. While Soviet leader Khrushchev bullied Britain with the threat of nuclear destruction, an infuriated Eisenhower threatened to cut off London's economic

aid unless the Europeans withdrew. Although Anglo-American relations recovered from the British embarrassment, already rocky Franco-American relations continued to unravel, with Paris ultimately leaving NATO in 1966.

Khrushchev, emboldened by his successful nuclear intimidation of the West, and feeling pressure from East German leader Walter Ulbricht to stop the flight of scientists and intellectuals from East Berlin, provoked a second crisis over the city in 1958. Khrushchev set a six-month time limit for the West to agree to a permanent German peace treaty and declare Berlin an "open city," which would have led to the withdrawal of U.S. and British forces. Eisenhower defused the situation by agreeing to a summit with Khrushchev at Camp David, in Maryland, a substantial personal victory for the Soviet leader, and the U.S.S.R. quietly let the deadline pass.

Two more crises in the 1950s engaged the United States on the other side of the world. The islands of Quemoy and Matsu, within sight of mainland China, were controlled by the Nationalist Chinese, who had been ousted during the communist takeover of the mainland. The islands became the scene of showdowns between the communists on the mainland and Taiwan (the seat of Nationalist Chinese forces) in 1955 and 1958. Both times, rapid U.S. intervention, including deployment of substantial air and seapower and thinly veiled nuclear threats, deterred invasion.

The 1958 Quemoy crisis marked a turning point in the Sino–Soviet relationship. Khrushchev, fearing Moscow would be drawn into direct conflict with Washington through Chinese aggression, tried to check its dangerous ally. Soviet and Chinese economic and, more critically, nuclear cooperation abruptly ended in 1959. This widening Sino–Soviet rift grew in importance through the 1960s as the two powers struggled to dominate revolutionary movements in Third World countries that were seeking independence from colonial powers.

These independence movements, some of which predated the Cold War, rapidly redrew the global map as European empires dissolved. Britain followed a two-pronged approach: granting independence after minimal struggle, beginning with India in 1947, while keeping those newly independent countries out of the communist bloc. These efforts led to extended counterinsurgencies in Malaya (now part of Malaysia) and Kenya. The French struggled

harder to keep their empire, first in Indochina and then Algeria, both efforts failing in 1954 and 1962, respectively. Despite the success of British and French independent nuclear programs in 1952 and 1960, respectively, the two powers fell to second-rank military status.

As Europe moved into the postcolonial era, its former colonies exuberantly moved into independence but rarely with stability or prosperity. Both superpowers sought new power in the realignment: the Soviet Union (and China) fostered revolutionary movements—from Vietnam to Cuba—while the United States both courted the new governments and overthrew them—notably in Guatemala and Iran in 1953.

While this covert struggle for Third World hearts and minds continued, the nuclear foundation of American security and the doctrine of massive retaliation based on it appeared to become fragile as the 1950s drew to a close. As growing Soviet nuclear capability threatened to inflict grievous harm in almost any conceivable nuclear exchange, a group of "defense intellectuals" critiqued massive retaliation and recommended reconfiguring the American military to credibly fight conventional war.

Public anxiety ratcheted up another notch when the U.S.S.R. launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, in October 1957, thereby demonstrating that an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat was more pressing. Public fear developed that the Soviets had already surpassed the United States in bomber production (the "bomber gap") as well as missile production (the "missile gap"). Although credible intelligence informed Eisenhower that these gaps were imaginary, the sensitive source of the information prevented him from publicly refuting it. The cynical exploitation of these fears for greater military expenditure by defense and industry leaders led Eisenhower to warn in his farewell speech in 1961 of a "military–industrial complex."

The election of John F. Kennedy to the presidency in 1960 marked a return to symmetrical containment as he increased American conventional forces, emphasizing counterinsurgency Special Forces. Kennedy's first crisis arose from a bungled attempt to oust Fidel Castro, the communist and anti-American leader who had taken control of Cuba in 1959. An abortive 1961 invasion by CIA-trained exiles at the Bay of Pigs undermined Kennedy's prestige, which was further damaged

by Kennedy's inability to secure a test ban agreement from Khrushchev at a summit meeting in Vienna later that year. Khrushchev prodded the young president by renewing his demands for the West to abandon Berlin. Kennedy's resolve, punctuated by his visit to Berlin itself, resulted in a tense standoff that failed to stop the Soviets from constructing the Berlin Wall to prevent East Germans from fleeing to the West, thus dividing the city until 1989.

In October 1962, these crises culminated in the most severe confrontation of the entire Cold War when the United States detected a covert Soviet attempt to place intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba. This effort to alter the strategic balance of power brought the U.S.S.R. and the United States to the brink of war as Kennedy blockaded Cuba, overtly prepared for an invasion, and ultimately forced missile-carrying Soviet freighters to turn back. This reckless Soviet gamble marked the closest the two nations came to a direct clash. After 1962, conflict continued, increasingly through proxies, however.

The crisis led to several important milestones. First, the clear Soviet defeat, coupled with domestic economic failures, led to Khrushchev's 1964 ouster and replacement by Leonid Brezhnev. Second, it gave impetus to the effort by the U.S.S.R., successful by the end of the decade, to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. Third, it led to the signing of the first nuclear arms control measure, the August 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which permitted only underground nuclear tests. This last, hopeful development was overshadowed by Kennedy's assassination on November 22, 1963.

Vietnam

His successor, Lyndon Johnson, faced the aftershocks of another assassination, that of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem on November 1, 1963. Diem had led South Vietnam since its 1954 independence from French colonial control. With American support, in 1956, he refused to cooperate with North Vietnam to coordinate previously agreed upon elections that would have addressed the unification of the country. Both Diem and his northern counterpart, Ho Chi Minh, consolidated control in their respective halves of the country through the late 1950s. Diem's efforts to eliminate communist elements

in the south escalated by 1961 into full-blown civil war against southern insurgents ("Viet Cong") armed and supplied by the North. Kennedy, fearing the fall of Vietnam's capital, Saigon, as the first "domino" in the region, dramatically increased the number of advisers aiding South Vietnam, although this deployment did little to stem its disintegration. Following Diem's assassination, communist advances and continued domestic instability threatened to eliminate the South Vietnamese government.

In August 1964, North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked U.S. naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, prompting Johnson to request and receive authorization from Congress to "take all necessary measures . . . to prevent further aggression." Johnson's rapid escalation against North Vietnam aimed at compelling it to withdraw support from the insurgency. Air strikes in immediate retaliation for the Tonkin attacks quickly transformed into a coercive but indecisive air campaign ("Rolling Thunder"), which lasted until 1968. As American Air Force personnel and aircraft came under attack at their air bases in South Vietnam, the United States introduced ground troops, first to defend the bases and then to conduct offensive operations against the Viet Cong.

American troop levels increased from under 25,000 advisers in 1964 to more than a half million combat soldiers in 1968, largely pushing aside the South Vietnamese Army. Massive search and destroy missions obliterated the South Vietnamese countryside with increasingly frantic efforts to root out the insurgents. The indiscriminate operations, while inflicting grievous casualties on the Viet Cong, alienated the population from both the American forces and the Saigon government, increasing insurgent support. Half-hearted (but heavy-handed) attempts to win "hearts and minds" faltered on the insurgents' strong appeal to Vietnamese nationalism and their depiction of the Americans as another in a succession of imperial, colonial intruders.

As American force levels increased, domestic support soured. Protest took root at universities and, together with a growing civil rights movement, blended with a counterculture movement that rejected previous social norms. Critically, Vietnam undermined Johnson's War on Poverty by draining support and resources from what he had hoped would be his primary legacy. The final blow to his presidency fell on

January 30, 1968, when the Viet Cong, whose imminent defeat had been repeatedly predicted, launched a country-wide offensive during the Vietnamese Tet New Year holiday. Although the offensive failed to topple the Saigon government, and American military response badly bloodied the insurgents, the Tet Offensive was widely regarded as a communist victory because it fatally undercut the eroding domestic American support for the war. Johnson's decision not to run for a second term created a dramatic split in the Democratic Party and paved the way for Richard Nixon's 1968 victory.

Nixon, and his national security adviser (later secretary of state) Henry Kissinger, sought peace in Vietnam through initiatives both inside and outside Southeast Asia. In South Vietnam, Nixon accelerated the training and arming of the South Vietnamese forces, with the ultimate goal of using them to replace American troops in combat operations. This policy, dubbed "Vietnamization," was one example of the "Nixon Doctrine," in which American-armed regional proxies would maintain stability in lieu of direct American intervention. Although permanent stability in Southeast Asia would be preferable, Nixon and Kissinger, at a minimum, wanted a "decent interval" between the departure of American combat troops and the fall of South Vietnam.

Engaging in these regional initiatives was only possible by exploiting the growing Sino–Soviet split. The cooling friendship between the two communist giants had frozen into mutual hostility by the mid-1960s as Mao's Cultural Revolution demonized Moscow, and Beijing developed nuclear weapons in 1964. In 1969, when China and the Soviet Union clashed on their border, Nixon used the split to U.S. advantage. Stealthy "shuttle diplomacy" led to Nixon's 1972 visit to Beijing and a dramatic warming in Sino–American relations. Nixon's and Kissinger's successful balancing of Beijing against Moscow brought about better relations with both powers as they jockeyed for American favor, fearing that the other would receive it. This triangular relationship changed the Cold War's basic dynamic and opened a period of lessened tensions, referred to as détente.

The First Thaw

The 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) began stabilizing the arms race by setting verifiable ceilings on nuclear delivery systems. This effort slowed the competition that had accelerated as the Soviet Union reached parity with the United States by the late 1960s, although new technologies including multiple independently retargetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) threatened a new round of competition. The reduction in military tensions was matched by economic ties symbolized by American grain sales and social progress in the Helsinki Human Rights Accord of 1975, which bound the Soviets to observe basic human rights, including the right of citizens in the Soviet sphere to emigrate, in exchange for the West's recognition of the existing borders in Eastern Europe.

For Nixon, the major benefit of détente was the separation of the North Vietnamese from their sponsors, eliminating the fear of a Korean War redux. This gave Washington freedom of action. To force North Vietnamese concessions, Nixon first ordered the secret bombing of Laos and Cambodia, then overtly invading the two countries in 1969 and 1970. These events, though, triggered a resurgence of the American antiwar movement, with 250,000 protestors marching on Washington in 1969. The death of four Kent State University protestors at the hands of Ohio National Guardsmen led Nixon to ease domestic unrest by speeding up withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Saigon's army was put to a major test during the Easter 1972 North Vietnamese offensive. Unlike Tet, this conventional assault proved vulnerable to a combination of American airpower and South Vietnamese ground forces. With the ground offensive stalled and an American air campaign hitting previously off-limit targets, the North Vietnamese agreed to negotiate. Secret talks in Paris produced a treaty that Saigon, excluded from negotiations, refused to sign. Hanoi's refusal to renegotiate broke up the talks and spurred a U.S. air operation to force Hanoi back to negotiations. Round-the-clock "Christmas" bombings ended when the North Vietnamese agreed to the American changes designed to placate the South Vietnamese. The last U.S. combat troops left soon thereafter, in 1973. Contrary to the treaty, but not to expectations, the North Vietnamese broke the accords, reinforced their troops in the south, and launched a final assault in 1975 that an exhausted United States refused to halt. The reunification ended a 30-year conflict and badly undermined global perceptions of U.S.

power and domestic confidence. In the interim, Nixon, who had centralized executive power to an unmatched degree, resigned in 1974 over the Watergate scandal.

Congress moved to reverse that centralization by investigating the domestic abuses of executive power by the CIA and FBI. Both agencies had been used by Nixon and his predecessors against domestic opponents in the civil rights and antiwar movements as well as political opponents. The Rockefeller Commission, created by Pres. Gerald Ford, and the Senate's Church Committee both investigated CIA intelligence operations and exposed covert CIA activities from Iran and Guatemala to Cuba and Vietnam. This exposure was matched by attempts, most notably the War Powers Act, to reassert legislative authority in foreign policy and of congressional oversight of intelligence activities.

While American prestige waned in East Asia, Israel's two victories over Arab armies in 1967 and 1973 demonstrated the continued volatility of the Middle East, a region once again subject to Cold War proxy conflicts. The 1973 war threatened direct superpower involvement when the Soviets hinted at intervention to prevent Egypt's collapse and the United States responded by visibly placing its nuclear forces on alert. Proxy wars spread south as Cuban troops fought South Africans for control of Angola. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopian and Eritrean troops fought their ancient conflict, fueled by superpower arms shipments.

Into this environment of spreading conflict and diminished American influence, Jimmy Carter's 1976 election to the presidency promised a change in American policy. His emphasis on human rights led him to reduce support to some American allies while also pressuring the Soviet Union to live up to the Helsinki accords. Carter continued negotiating a second SALT treaty and improved American relations with Latin America by signing the Panama Canal Treaty, which guaranteed the return of the canal to Panama in 1999.

The Second Cold War

These promising developments were checked by two crises. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan fatally undermined détente, leading Carter to begin the largest peacetime increase in American armed forces and, less effectively, to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics. He also announced the Carter Doctrine, defining any (Soviet) threat to the Persian Gulf and its oil as a challenge to American security. The second crisis dealt an even more severe blow to American prestige, when Iran, the key American ally in the Gulf, fell to an Islamic revolution. When the revolutionaries seized the U.S. Embassy and took its staff hostage, Carter's inability to negotiate or force their release sealed his electoral defeat by Ronald Reagan in 1980.

Reagan's election marked the resurgence of American conservatism and the onset of a second intense phase of the Cold War. Reagan dedicated his first term to aggressively reasserting American power abroad. Mirroring the "rollback" rhetoric of the 1950s, Reagan spoke of measures to reduce or remove Soviet influence beyond its borders and announced support for insurgents combating leftist governments. This manifested itself most visibly in financial and material aid to mujahideen fighters resisting the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, and support to "Contra" rebels fighting the new communist government in Nicaragua. In the strategic arena, Reagan pursued multiple initiatives including an upgraded ICBM, the MX, and revived research into a satellite-based missile defense against Soviet ICBMs, dubbed the "Star Wars" program. In Europe, he deployed Pershing II intermediate range ballistic missiles to counter Soviet deployment of the equivalent SS-20. The reckless but accidental Soviet shootdown of a Korean airliner marked the height of tension between the superpowers during Reagan's first term.

The Final Thaw

Aging Soviet leadership led to a rapid succession of the last Stalinist-era leaders. Brezhnev's 1982 death was followed by the ascension of Yuri Andropov, and, in 1984, of Konstantin Chernenko, who died the following year. Finally, a young new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, implemented two initiatives that inadvertently began unraveling the U.S.S.R. He recognized that the aging heavy industry and totalitarian state structure implemented by Stalin was weighing down the Soviet Union and directed the implementation of perestroika ("restructuring") to orient the U.S.S.R. toward a market economy. A parallel initiative, glasnost ("openness"), sought open discussion of both current problems and the darker periods of Soviet history. Gorbachev's and Reagan's 1986

summit meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, brought the two leaders closer together but failed to produce an agreement. The following year, however, the two countries signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which withdrew both the Pershing IIs and SS-20s from Europe. The two nations began negotiations over strategic arms reduction and the limitation of conventional forces in Europe.

The warming in U.S.–U.S.S.R. relations and new openness in the U.S.S.R. encouraged dissent in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine, which called for the use of military force to stabilize satellite nations. When the Hungarian government initiated reforms that led to a multiparty election, the Red Army did not intervene. The Polish "Solidarity" trade union, which had been brutally suppressed in 1981 by the Soviet-sponsored Polish government, won open elections in 1989, making it the first noncommunist government in Eastern Europe since the end of World War II. East Germans, stirred by their neighbors' examples, marched in the streets demanding an end to the most visible symbol of the Cold War—the Berlin Wall. When Gorbachev refused to save the East German regime, a rapid change of government led to the opening of border crossings on November 9, 1989. Communist governments in the remainder of Eastern Europe fell to popular movements by early 1990. The reunification of Germany that year marked the end of divided Europe.

The collapse of the Soviet's Eastern European empire, the failure of perestroika and glasnost to serve Gorbachev's objective of making communist leadership more appealing to the Soviet people, and the restless stirring of nationalist feeling within the Soviet Union itself completed the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. within a year. The Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), conquered by Stalin and absorbed into the U.S.S.R. in 1940, sought freedom. Other regions and ethnic groups followed their example. This disintegration, and Gorbachev's unwillingness to use force to suppress it, inspired an August 1991 hard-line coup attempt. Gorbachev survived, but only when Russian nationalist forces, under Boris Yeltsin's direction, came to the regime's rescue. The secession of major components of the U.S.S.R., including the Ukraine and Belarus, sealed the Soviet Union's fate. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and the Cold War thawed. The United States, the residual Russian Federation, and the re-created Ukraine entered into a process of significant reduction in nuclear weapons.

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American Field Service; Antiwar Movements; Baby Boom; Berlin Crises; Civil Defense; Cuban Missile Crisis; *Dr. Strangelove*; Economy and War; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Fulbright Program; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Korean War; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Marshall Plan; McNamara, Robert S.; Military–Industrial Complex; National Security Memorandum-68; Nitze, Paul Henry; Nuclear Strategy; Radio Free Europe; Rickover, Hyman; Special Operations; Spellman, Francis Joseph; Truman, Harry S.; Vietnam War; *WarGames*

Related Documents

1950 c, d; 1961; 1965 a, b, e; 1968 b; 1970 c; 1971 a; 1973; 1976 a

—*Edward A. Kaplan*

Colonial Militia Systems

In the colonial era, the militia system was linked to fundamental concepts of American citizenship; militias were considered to be one of three pillars of society, along with the church and local government. Militarily, the colonial militia was the primary instrument of defense for the American colonies. By the latter part of the 17th century, the militia had become more complex, as local militias continued to function as local defense forces, while militia volunteers and draftees made up the provincial expeditionary forces for major campaigns. The structures and functions of local militias and expeditionary forces continued to evolve through the series of imperial wars of the 18th century.

Early Colonial Militias

The first English colonists found themselves in precarious circumstances. Potential attack from Native Americans and England's European rivals compelled the colonists at Jamestown and Plymouth to immediately organize their defenses. For guidance, colonists turned to the English militia tradition, dating to the 12th-century Assize of Arms (1181), which obligated every able-bodied adult man in the community to provide military service for the common defense.

In Jamestown (settled in 1607), Capt. John Smith was one of several among the first colonists with professional military experience. Smith proved more forceful than most, however, and once he assumed responsibility for the defense of the colony he held every man responsible for militia duty. Facing the prospect of the colony's starvation and total collapse, Smith declared martial law and organized reluctant settlers to raid corn supplies of local Native Americans. Smith's authoritarian actions kept the colony alive without a formal militia structure. The founders of the first New England colony in Plymouth (1620) hired a military adviser, Miles Standish, to oversee the colony's defenses. In the early years of both colonies, community defense fell to the entire male community.

After a decade of settlement, the militia structures of Virginia and New England diverged, reflecting differences in their societies and circumstances. In Virginia, the emergence of tobacco as a cash crop stimulated the entrepreneurial individualism that produced a rapid expansion of dispersed plantations. The isolated plantations, however, hindered militia organization and were vulnerable to attack; a 1622 attack by local Powhatans devastated the English colony. The royal government determined to establish an effective militia by mandating universal military service for every man between the ages of 17 and 60. Orders instructed planters to take their weapons with them to church and into the fields when they worked.

In contrast to Virginia's dispersed settlement pattern, New Englanders settled closely around their meetinghouses, which enabled each town to maintain a militia company. In a total community effort, towns constructed fortifications that made each town an outpost and every freeman a soldier. The display of military prowess combined with competent diplomacy permitted New England to avoid major conflict during the early years of settlement.

17th-Century Militia Systems

Gradually over two decades, New England and Virginia transformed their ad hoc militias into formally structured militia systems. In New England, specialized "trained bands" received military training while the rest of the male population constituted a reserve. Between 1637 and 1676, New England's military planners learned from repeated conflicts with Native Americans that their best chance for success depended on their ability to counterattack quickly and

effectively. The Massachusetts militia adapted by creating special units of troops drawn from the trained bands based on particular skills, for example, tracking and marksmanship.

Their first major expedition during the Pequot War (1637) proved a tactical success but revealed shortcomings in command. As a remedy, New England colonies joined in a cooperative military establishment, the United Colonies of New England (1643). The confederation was formed expressly to provide mutual aid with both men and logistical support and to provide a central command. While imperfect, the New England regional coordinating council lasted for some 40 years.

By the time of King Philip's War (1675–76), the colonial militia system had begun to take on two distinct forms: local militia and provincial expeditionary forces. After damaging surprise attacks by Native American warriors in 1675, New England towns contributed more than 1,000 militia troops for a retaliatory provincial expedition. The evolution of the militia—from a universal community obligation for local defense to a formalized military force—required provincial officials to negotiate soldiers' pay rates and specify the destination and duration of service. Soldiers enlisted with the expectation that they were entering into a contract between equals. They insisted on electing the officers who would lead them, set the geographic limits of their service (often refusing to leave their own provinces), stipulated the rations and supplies to which they were entitled, and demanded discharge at the agreed expiration of their enlistment. As the scale and risks of expeditions grew, recruiters increasingly relied on enlistment bonuses to fill the ranks, and the social profiles of expedition soldiers shifted more toward young bachelors and the "lower sort" who were more likely to be enticed by economic incentives.

New England militias were subordinated to the selectmen of their towns; expedition forces reported to the provincial government. Operationally, local committees raised, equipped, and paid the militia, with the social composition of New England militia closely mirroring the community. In the local militia, the "better sort" of well-to-do and respectable men tended to be officers, while freeholders (property owners) filled the ranks; expeditionary forces relied more on the lower end of the social order for their rank and file.

During this same period, the evolution of the Virginia militia followed a different trajectory but arrived at a similar end. After quelling another Powhatan uprising in 1644, Virginia's militia organization suffered from complacency and neglect. Militia duty was burdensome to busy tobacco planters. The lack of support from established planters pushed frontier settlers to organize their own vigilante militia. In 1676, they attacked bordering tribes, but then quickly turned their wrath on the colonial governor in a violent outburst known as Bacon's Rebellion. After British regulars restored order, the royal government promptly restructured the Virginia militia, hiring professional soldiers for frontier duty and reserving future local militia service to the "better sort."

18th-Century Militia Systems

From 1689 to 1763, the demands on the militia system shifted predominantly to providing expeditionary forces to support British wars with Spain and France. By the time of King William's War (1689–97), provincial expeditionary forces were the primary unit for active duty, even though the militia remained the first line of defense for outlying towns. In the south at the turn of the century, the militia was only occasionally a viable force. When South Carolina experienced a Spanish attack in 1706, the militia rushed to defend the coastal capital Charleston, but during the Yamasee War (1715), militia turnout was dismal. Following the end of Queen Anne's War in 1714, southern colonial militias declined in military readiness and became exclusively the preserve of white planters who were more worried about slave rebellion than Indian attacks.

By the time of the culminating phase of imperial wars in North America (King George's War, 1744–48, to the French and Indian War, 1756–63), southern militias' main function was community policing. When Britain called upon Virginia for troops to support a Caribbean expedition, the Virginia assembly hired or drafted transients, laborers, and other landless persons because propertied men refused to enlist for distant expeditions. Men of property remained active in the militia while it functioned as a policing force at home, but most landholders avoided active duty on the frontier or expeditions by paying a fine for nonservice. In contrast, New Englanders from across the entire social spectrum turned out for an offensive expedition against French Canada in 1745. The French and their Indian allies were a long-standing menace to the northern colonies, and past experiences of predations motivated some

recruits. Others responded for army pay and the prospect of plunder, and still others for God and glory.

When the French and Indian War reignited hostilities, the British deployed a regular army to America and called on 30,000 colonial troops to support them. The war linked global imperial struggles to local frontier warfare, and New Englanders again joined the fray in considerable numbers. Because colonial militiamen in Massachusetts saw their military service as a contract, freely entered into and with stipulated limits, most joined voluntarily and were not disproportionately of the lower classes as was the case in Virginia.

As expeditionary forces increasingly fought the wars of empire, local militias became more important as social institutions than as military organizations. By the 18th century, militia training days were important community events in colonial society. Not only did the men come together to drill, the entire community joined in a civic holiday and a picnic, opened with a prayer by the minister of the congregation. Afterward, while the men drilled on the green, women cooked feasts and children socialized with other youngsters. Young women looked on as the young men fired their muskets and marched smartly on the training greens. Training day functioned as an initiation ritual for younger men entering into the world of adult manhood. It also was the stage upon which a community reconfirmed the ranks of citizenship and the social order. Those on the margins of the social proceedings at training days were the same people on the margins of full citizenship or prosperity—a diverse group that included servants, slaves, Native Americans, and transient laborers.

The Revolutionary Militia

The onset of the American Revolution inspired the last resurgence of colonial militia systems as effective military organizations. In 1775, the Minute Men were the American vanguard, as the larger part of the adult male population mustered for community defense. Once serious fighting began, however, the New England colonies reverted to the established model of the expeditionary forces in which recruits tended to be single young men able to handle the rigors of military life. When the war continued into another year, at Commander in Chief George Washington's urging, the American Congress authorized establishment of a truly national army, much more similar to the European model of a professional army. The demands of a continental war required a national army that superseded the capacities of the colonial militia systems, and henceforth the militias functioned as auxiliaries and recruiting pools.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Camp Followers; Colonial Wars; Rangers

Related Documents

1611; 1747; 1768 b; 1774; 1776 a, b; 1777 a; 1797

—Walter L. Sargent

Colonial Wars

(1607–1775)

Warfare was a recurrent, indeed endemic, characteristic of life in British North America. If colonial Americans shared anything, it was a common exposure to and familiarity with war. Two broad phases are discernable in the colonial wars. The first, lasting until about 1689, was fought primarily between colonists and Native Americans. The fundamental issues driving these wars were European encroachment on indigenous lands, the resulting shifts in power, and their effects, including depopulation and displacement. Other issues included slaving, trade, and the ripples from European imperial conflicts. Many of these wars were ancillary to larger, European-centered struggles. As European powers showed relatively little interest in these colonial wars and made few regular forces available for them, the main participants were colonial forces and Native American allies.

The second period ran from about 1689 to 1775. In contrast to the earlier era, the colonial wars from 1689 onward involved greater numbers of European regular forces and were more fully integrated within European grand strategy. Nonetheless, large numbers of colonials and allied Native Americans continued contributing large forces throughout the post-1689 wars.

Contact, Conflict, and Conquest (1607–89)

The Chesapeake

The English colonizers who settled Jamestown in 1607 brought a conception of conquest, an art of war, and behavior that had been shaped by England's subjugation of Ireland and by lessons learned in European wars. Their relations with the indigenous Powhatan Confederacy were uneasy from the outset, marked by mutual suspicion, hidden motives, misunderstanding, and violence. In 1607, members of the confederacy killed two colonists and captured John Smith. After his release, Smith instilled stricter military discipline among the colonists and began a program of raiding and intimidation designed to live off local indigenous peoples and cow them into submission and into providing food.

Smith's plan provoked the First Anglo–Powhatan War, which was marked by mutual savagery and heavy loss of life. The capture of Powhatan's daughter, Pocahontas, and her subsequent marriage to John Rolfe in 1614 provided the basis for a peace agreement. Within eight years, the expanding tobacco economy and growing population put increasing pressure on the land and on local Indian nations. Realizing that only war could stave off the English threat, Opechancanough, Powhatan's successor, launched an attack in March 1622 that killed nearly one-quarter of the colonists. Regrouping, the English waged total war, destroying villages and crops and killing every Indian in sight. The Second Anglo–Powhatan War lasted until 1632. In 1644, Opechancanough launched another desperate war for survival, which ended in 1646 when the Indians sued for peace.

Tobacco plantations proliferated and Virginia's population continued expanding. With growth came increased conflict as the population pushed west. Accusations of theft by a Virginia planter against members of the Doeg tribe prompted bloodshed and the summoning of the militia in 1675. The militia entered Maryland and indiscriminately killed both Doeg and Susquehannock, setting in motion a series of retaliatory attacks. Gov. William Berkeley instituted a defensive strategy, which displeased Virginia frontiersmen who wanted an aggressive strategy to crush the Indians. Planter Nathaniel Bacon responded to popular distress and dissatisfaction by assuming leadership of the militia. He challenged Berkeley's authority by leading the militia on raids against local tribes. Deemed a rebel by Berkeley, Bacon occupied Jamestown and forced Berkeley to accept his demands for a larger force and a broader campaign. Bacon's militia, in fact, killed relatively few Native Americans, turning instead against the governor in a civil war and burning Jamestown in September 1676. After Bacon died in October from dysentery, the rebellion effectively collapsed. An expedition of regular troops from England fully restored order—and the Crown's authority—in early 1677.

New England

Anglo–Indian relations in New England were little better than in the Chesapeake. From the outset, Puritans envisioned America as a land of lurking savages. Many harbored

deep suspicions and intense fears about indigenous peoples, believing them beyond the pale of civilized behavior and incapable of reason or trust. The Puritans regarded Native American religious practices as little more than witchcraft; many considered them Satan's minions and a challenge to their divinely ordered errand in the wilderness. What is more, many held that the Indians were conspiring against them. In the early stages of Puritan colonization, many of these fears can be attributed to ignorance and to the Puritans' precarious settlements, high mortality rate, and dependence upon indigenous peoples for survival. As the Puritan colonies grew, so did their confidence and self-assurance; but their general fear and suspicion of Indians abated little. Distance from England magnified their fears. Many associated the Indians with the darker and more savage connotations of the wilderness and believed that their contact with Indians threatened their identity as a civilized and godly people. Some Puritans even feared that they themselves might, in the end, turn savage.

Shortly after receiving news of the 1622 Powhatan attack in Virginia and fearing a similar attack by the Massachusett, Miles Standish launched a preemptive strike against the Wessagusett in 1623. As in the Chesapeake, the English population's growth and geographic expansion increased the chances for conflict. Looking to chastise the Pequot for two suspected murders, the Massachusetts Bay colony (later joined by Plymouth, Connecticut, along with the Narragansett and the Mohegan) waged war against the Pequot. In May 1637, a combined New England, Narragansett, and Mohegan force utterly destroyed the Pequot at Mystic, Connecticut. The few surviving Pequot dispersed or joined other nations. Embracing a strategy of terror and total war, the Puritans interpreted their victory in the Pequot War as a sign of God's grace and an affirmation of them as his chosen people.

New England's victory brought nearly 40 years of relative peace, but competition for land increased tensions, produced several war scares, and eventually led to a major conflict in 1675. Adding to the problem was the growing power and assertions of suzerainty by the New Englanders over the local nations. In 1675 Plymouth executed three Wampanoag for the murder of John Sassamon, a "praying Indian." Metacomet, known to the English as King Philip, led an allied Nipmuck, Pocumtuck, and Narragansett force against the Puritans. The New Englanders responded in kind. King Philip's War ended in 1676, after the beheading of Metacomet. More than 5,000 Native Americans and some 1,500 English died in the war.

The Middle Colonies
England seized New Amsterdam at the outset of the Second Anglo–Dutch War, taking possession of a colony whose borders, trade, and profits had been secured and extended by the Dutch through war and Indian alliances. In Kieft's War, New Netherlands waged a punitive war against the Wequaesqeek and ousted would-be Swedish colonists from Fort Christiana and nearby settlements in the Delaware River Valley. English seizure of New Netherlands eased the 1682 founding of Pennsylvania by providing it with a secure flank along the Delaware River. As the English were establishing their control of New York, France dispatched troops to Canada in 1665 to project Crown power and to protect the fur trade by attacking their Iroquois competitors in northern New York. The raids produced a short-lived peace. The 1677 New York–Iroquois Covenant Chain, an economic, diplomatic, and military pact committing each other in a common defense against French Canada, coupled with French expansion into the Illinois Country, helped ensure an ongoing state of war on the frontier.

Carolina
Carolina was at the crossroads of European and Native American competition for trade, profit, and empire; war was central to Carolina's early existence and success. After establishing Charles Town in 1670, Carolinians then exploited the region's two main resources, animal skins and Indian slaves, to enable them to import African slaves and establish a plantation economy patterned after Barbados. Relying on trade goods, diplomacy, and open aggression, Carolinians encouraged wars among rival Indian nations and against themselves to net captives for the imperial slave trade. Carolinians or allied Indians fought against the Kussoe, the Stono, and the Westo for human chattel, trade goods, and security. Scots settlers on the Savannah River, unwelcome competitors

regarded as interlopers by the English, allied with the Yamasee. In 1683 the Yamasee raided areas into Florida, destroying Spanish missions and taking Timucua captives for sale to the Scots. Combined Spanish–Timucua forces twice attacked the Scots in 1686 and 1687, destroying their settlement in the final attack—an event the English welcomed.

In their wars against Native Americans, Europeans learned from their changing circumstances and adapted their art of war to their new world and to the requirements of imperial trade and politics. Padded coats and leather jerkins replaced body armor and helmets even as firearms and hatchets replaced pole arms and swords. Infantry largely supplanted cavalry or forced its conversion to dragoons or mounted infantry. Eschewing large columns and formal battlefield tactics in favor of smaller, more mobile units, often acting through or in concert with allied Indians, colonists raided into the backcountry in imitation of their enemies and their "skulking way of war." It was indeed a New World.

The Struggle for Empire (1689–1775)

King William's War (1689–97)

King James II of England tried, through revocation of Massachusetts's charter and then creation of the Dominion of New England, to break down colonial resistance to imperial rule. Colonists were cautiously optimistic when William of Orange overthrew James in the Glorious Revolution, which temporarily joined the thrones of England and the United Provinces, and committed them to containing French expansion in the War of the League of Augsburg. Although Canada's population was smaller than that of the combined northern colonies, it benefited from a skilled militia, good Indian relations, and France's centralized command. Canadian and Indian forces raided along the New England–New York frontier, destroying Schenectady, New York, in 1690, as French cruisers out of Port Royal attacked New England shipping. Massachusetts raised an army, which under New Englander Sir William Phipps captured and destroyed Port Royal in May 1690. That same year intercolonial armies attacked Canada, but failed to take either Montreal or Quebec. New York's empty treasury and its internal political strife prevented the colony from upholding its agreement to help defend the Iroquois. Despite the

1697 Treaty of Ryswick, which ended the war, French and allied Indian attacks into Iroquois country continued, but failed to bring about a decision. Tiring of the attacks, a faction within the Iroquois Confederation contrived a surrender to the French and succeeded in turning the 1701 agreement into something of a victory, preserving Iroquois diplomatic independence while pledging to remain neutral in future Anglo–French wars.

Queen Anne's War (1702–14)

The death of Spain's childless Charles II in 1700 precipitated the War of the Spanish Succession, when William's Grand Alliance of England, the United Provinces, and Austria challenged the succession of Louis XIV's grandson, Philip of Anjou, to the Spanish throne. The Grand Alliance feared French hegemony in Europe, funded by Spain's American wealth. To force an English commitment in America and restrict their settlement to a line east of the Appalachians, Louis XIV ordered an expansion of French trading and military posts throughout the Great Lakes region and along the Gulf Coast. War began when Austrian forces invaded the Spanish Netherlands.

News of war reached North America in 1702, prompting a South Carolina attack upon St. Augustine, Florida. That same year William died, succeeded by Anne. St. Augustine was taken, but the Carolinians failed to take the Castillo de San Marcos because they lacked heavy guns and mortars. In 1706 Charles Town resisted a poorly led Franco-Spanish expedition, inflicting heavy casualties. Independent of imperial conflicts, North Carolina, aided by South Carolina and contingents of allied Indians, fought the Tuscarora War, which had been precipitated by Swiss and German settlers on Tuscarora land—many of them refugees from the ongoing war in Europe.

Along the New England–Canadian frontier, raiding (including the 1704 destruction of Deerfield, Massachusetts, and the retaliatory destruction of Acadian settlements), mutual atrocities, and strategic stalemate characterized the northern war. Two New England attempts against Port Royal in 1707 failed, but a combined provincial–regular force succeeded in 1710. In 1708 the Crown planned to take Quebec with a large force of regulars, provincials, and Indians

supported by a fleet; believing peace was near, however, England cancelled its plan to attack. In 1711 the new Tory government resurrected the plan, intending on an overland advance from the south on Montreal and an amphibious attack on Quebec from the east. The fleet entered the St. Lawrence River late in the season with short supplies. On August 20, some 160 miles from Quebec, 10 ships ran aground with a loss of 900 men, ending the invasion. The war ended in 1713 with the Peace of Utrecht, confirming British possession of Acadia, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Gibraltar, and Spain awarding the asiento de negros, a 30-year slave-trading monopoly, to Britain. Philip V was confirmed as king, and France and Spain agreed never to unite their thrones.

Following the war, the frontiers in South Carolina and New England ignited. Factionalism within South Carolina's government prevented it from successfully regulating trade with the Indians. Tired of the excesses and dishonesty of South Carolina traders, the loss of their lands for increasingly profitable rice plantations, and the diminution of their own slave and pelt trading, the Yamasee attacked settlements in 1715, coming within 12 miles of Charles Town, as Chickasaw and Creek parties went after the English traders among them. Desperate, South Carolina rallied quickly, summoning the militia and raising an army of more than 1,200 soldiers, half of whom were slaves. North Carolina also sent troops, while Massachusetts sent some surplus arms.

Creek attacks against the traders were intended as protests against the traders' sharp practices and as an expression of their power to the English. The Creek were prepared either to negotiate with the English or to expand the war. To determine English intentions, the Creek dispatched a party to meet with an English emissary treating with the Cherokee. A Cherokee faction, however, killed a number of the Creek party, claiming that this action had been carried out to prevent an attack on the English emissary. Viewing the Creek as impediments to their slave raids and trade with the English, the Cherokee had decided on war and successfully maneuvered the English into an expanded war against the Creek. The Yamasee War ended in 1716, but at high cost to all. Further south, tensions increased with Spain after Britain founded Georgia in 1732 as a buffer between South

Carolina and Florida. In Maine, the Abenaki responded to settler pressure on their lands in Dummer's War.

King George's War (1744–48)

Spanish authorities, suspecting British traders of violating the asiento and of smuggling, determined to stop and search British ships in Spain's American waters. Parliamentary anger boiled over into war after Robert Jenkins, a smuggler, displayed his severed ear, claiming Spanish officials were responsible for the mutilation. Britain's effort in the War of Jenkins' Ear had little to show for it. In 1739 British forces captured Porto Bello, Panama. Joining another force in Jamaica, the expedition moved on Cartagena, but suffered devastating losses from malaria. By 1742 roughly 3,000 of the 3,600 provincials in the expedition, whose ranks represented virtually all the British colonies, had died. In Florida, Spanish forces foiled a 1740 attempt against St. Augustine, but in turn suffered a setback in Georgia in 1742. The war ended inconclusively in 1742. Britain and France then went to war against each other in 1743 as the respective allies of Austria and Prussia in the War of the Austrian Succession.

French privateers out of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island attacked first. Perceiving the fortress as a great threat, Massachusetts raised a provincial army under William Pepperell to take it. Leaving Massachusetts in March 1745 and supported by ships of the Royal Navy, the New Englanders won a great victory when they forced Louisbourg's surrender in June. New England's celebration turned sour when, in 1748, Britain returned Louisbourg in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. One indecisive war had followed another.

The French and Indian War (1754–63)

The population of Britain's American colonies at mid-century continued growing and searching for new land. Groups of investors, such as the Ohio Company (which counted George Washington among its members), purchased western lands anticipating the expanding population's movement. Hoping to restrict British expansion, France established posts in the Ohio River watershed. In spring 1754 Gov. Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia dispatched Lt. Col. George Washington and a detachment of the Virginia Regiment with orders to expel the French from the Forks of

the Ohio. Washington's force happened upon and destroyed a French detachment en route to Virginia. Washington halted southeast of the fort at Great Meadows and built the aptly named Fort Necessity, where, on July 4, 1754, after a brief siege, he surrendered to a superior French force.

As Washington was working his way toward Great Meadows, representatives from seven colonies met in Albany, New York, to discuss forming a union with a grand council of colonial delegates, and a Crown-appointed president–general with the authority to oversee frontier settlement, make war and peace, levy taxes, and make laws related to defense and Indian affairs. The Albany Congress and its Plan of Union asked too much of the colonies, most of which would not countenance surrendering any autonomy. As the congress met, London reacted by ordering the reduction of Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario, Fort St. Frédéric on Lake Champlain, and Fort Beauséjour in Nova Scotia. The ministry ordered a provincial army raised and dispatched Gen. Edward Braddock with two regiments of foot and an artillery battalion to America. Braddock's force set off from Alexandria, Virginia, in June 1755, building a road as it slowly advanced on Fort Duquesne, en route to Niagara. On July 9, 1755, Braddock's column collided with a French, Canadian, and Indian force, which mortally wounded the general and routed his column in a three-hour fight. Col. George Washington, whose actions helped precipitate the war, distinguished himself by his bravery and coolness under fire. Elsewhere the British campaigns against Niagara and St. Frédéric collapsed. Beauséjour was the only success.

The war expanded into a broader, global conflict as Prussia and Austria once again went to war. The interwar Diplomatic Revolution had realigned traditional European alliances, as France, and later Russia and Sweden, joined Austria, their traditional enemy, and Britain and Prussia joined forces in the Seven Years' War. Their respective alliances (both reached in 1756) were intended to isolate Austria and Prussia from the growing war between France and Britain, but Prussia soon precipitated events by invading Austrian territory, activating the French alliance, and, in turn, dragging in Britain. In North America, the Earl of Loudoun arrived to replace the slain Braddock, while the Marquis de Montcalm assumed command of French forces in Canada.

Bad news greeted Loudoun shortly after his arrival in New York in 1756. French troops had destroyed Fort Oswego, giving France control of Lake Ontario. Loudoun also had to contend with the colonial assemblies, their sensitivity to quartering troops, and inadequate logistical support. As Loudoun wrangled with the assemblies, French-allied Indians attacked settlements throughout the backcountry. The British waged their own irregular war with ranging companies of backwoodsmen who scouted for the military and harassed the enemy. In the Shenandoah Valley, Washington's Virginia Regiment alone contended with a brutal brush war until Quakers in the Pennsylvania assembly temporarily stepped aside, allowing provincial troops to be assembled and dispatched to the backcountry.

Loudoun planned an assault on Quebec from the St. Lawrence River, bypassing Louisbourg, as a provincial army assumed the strategic defensive south of the river. However, William Pitt, the prime minister, pressured Loudoun to strike first at Louisbourg. Confusion and bad weather prevented offensive operations in 1757, keeping Loudoun and his army in Halifax. But by 1758 Pitt had adopted a strategy designed to expel France from North America permanently. Louisbourg would be taken while a British expeditionary force sailed up the St. Lawrence to Quebec. Another army would advance northward, along lakes George and Champlain to Montreal, and then to Quebec to join in the final attack. To the west Duquesne and Niagara would be taken to cut east–west communications and isolate France's western positions. As Loudoun waited, Montcalm struck. With an army of about 6,000 French and 2,000 Indians, he descended on Fort William Henry, forcing its surrender in August 1757.

Pitt replaced Loudoun with Maj. Gen. James Abercromby in 1758, ordering him to command the advance on Montreal. Pitt also ordered Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Amherst to take Louisbourg. Gen. John Forbes was given the task of taking Fort Duquesne. Abercromby abandoned his campaign after a disastrous attack on Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga), but did send a column under Col. James Bradstreet west to Fort Frontenac. In July 1758 Frontenac surrendered, giving control of Lake Ontario to Britain. As Abercromby retreated, Amherst laid siege to Louisbourg, which surrendered in July

1758. In the Pennsylvania backcountry, Forbes advanced, clearing a road through the wilderness. Unable to defend their positions along multiple fronts, the French abandoned and destroyed Duquesne in November 1758. Pitt's strategy of concentrating British power and resources in North America, advancing along multiple fronts, was paying off.

Following his success at Louisbourg, Amherst turned over command of the campaign against Quebec to Brig. Gen. James Wolfe, as Amherst himself assumed supreme command of British forces in America and personally directed the campaign against Montreal. Short of troops and unable to contend with the multiple advances, the French retreated before Amherst's army. In July 1759 a British column retook Niagara. Meanwhile, Wolfe was busy at Quebec. After landing his army in June, Wolfe probed the French defenses searching for a weakness. He hoped to fight a decisive battle on the open fields outside of Quebec's fortifications, the Plains of Abraham. Learning of a path that led to the field, Wolfe's army deployed before the city on September 13. A brief battle in which both Wolfe and Montcalm were mortally wounded ensued, and the garrison surrendered four days later. A French force attempted to retake the city in April 1760, but failed. In September, Montreal fell. French power in North America had been broken. Spain joined the war against Britain in 1762 and suffered the loss of Havana and Manila. The war ended in 1763 with the Treaty of Paris, with Britain retaining Canada.

Following the war, British administrators looked to reduce the war debt, a staggering £133.3 million, double the prewar debt. One way was by reducing the gifts given to Indian nations, which were a central component of Indian diplomacy symbolizing respect and standing. Indian leaders maintained their authority and influence by distributing the gifts to tribal members. When General Amherst cut back on the exchanges, he insulted the western Indians. This perceived contempt, along with the continuing land hunger of colonists, a spiritual revival led by Neolin, a Delaware prophet, and the leadership of the Ottawa Pontiac, contributed to the outbreak of Pontiac's War. The war led to the Proclamation of 1763, an unpopular decree among many colonists because it forbade the sale of Indian lands or expansion beyond the Appalachians. Britain's agreement to limit its military presence in the backcountry and its promise to restrain its colonists brought a peace. War would again break out in 1774 in Lord Dunmore's War, which pitted Virginians against Indians of the Ohio Country, who had rebelled after the Iroquois, who claimed suzerainty, ceded their lands in the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix.

The American Revolution started as a colonial war of rebellion, but evolved into a war for independence. It pitted colonists against the mother country and forced the Indians to take sides. Old trends continued in the newly independent United States. Western settlement, encroachment on indigenous peoples' lands, mutual suspicion, misunderstanding, and violence continued the colonial wars under a new government.

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Related Entries

Atrocity and Captivity Narratives; Brant, Joseph and Margaret "Molly" Brant; Camp Followers; Colonial Militia Systems; Customs of War; Draft Evasion and Resistance; European Military Culture, Influence of; Impressment; Indian Wars: Eastern Wars; Memory and War; Native Americans in Colonial Wars and the Revolutionary War; Pontiac; Rangers; Washington, George

Related Documents

1609; 1613; 1622; 1637; 1654; 1712; 1737; 1747; 1759; 1760; 1768 a, b

—*Ricardo A. Herrera*

Combat!

Television Series

As U.S. involvement in Vietnam escalated during the 1960s, network television aired numerous military-themed shows. The war drama *Combat!*, broadcast on ABC from 1962 until 1967, proved to be one of the most enduring and popular. *Combat!* followed the experiences of a squad in the 2nd platoon of King Company in the U.S. Army as they patrolled and assaulted their way across France following the Normandy landings in June 1944. *Combat!* explored the human cost of war in an intelligent and sophisticated manner and, although set in World War II, touched on important issues of the Cold War.

Each of the 152 episodes featured one of the two main stars, Rick Jason as Lt. Gil Hanley or Vic Morrow as Sgt. Chip Saunders. Hanley appeared more detached from his men, sometimes acting as a staff officer merely passing along orders to the squad. When the story featured Hanley, he carried the weight of command on his shoulders. He sometimes left the squad to complete a mission on his own. Saunders reflected the more complex emotional and moral strains of war. Although more edgy and brooding than Hanley, he also empathized better with the men. The supporting cast included Pierre Jalbert as Caje Cadron, Jack Hogan as Priv. William Kirby, Dick Peabody as Littlejohn, Shecky Greene as Priv. Braddock, Tom Lowell as Priv. Billy Nelson, and Steven Rogers as Doc Walton until 1963, followed by Conlan Carter as the medic thereafter. *Combat!* reached the top 10 shows in audience viewership in its third season, although it did not remain there.

Hollywood screenwriter Robert Pirosh developed *Combat!* for network television. Because Pirosh had served in the infantry in the European theater during World War II, his personal experience shaped the show he created and scripted. *Combat!* aimed at realistic portrayal of war. As a result, the cast underwent military boot camp training for a week in preparation for their roles. *Combat!* also included actual war footage from World War II. The Department of the Army rendered technical advice and other assistance to the production, which enhanced the show's authenticity.

Combat! explored many human dimensions of war: fatigue, heroism, cowardice, fear, violence, and physical and psychological suffering as well as nationalism, duty, and teamwork. The show characterized the war as gritty, miserable, and exhausting. It did not depict realistic blood or gruesome wounds, nor did it glorify war or killing. Higher echelons of command appeared callous toward or out of touch with the soldiers on the ground, and they often sent the squad to take an objective regardless of cost. Characters regularly perceived their individual actions as meaningless in terms of the final outcome of the war. For example, in the episode "Cat and Mouse," Hanley orders Saunders and his exhausted men out on a mission just after a grueling patrol where snipers and land mines had killed five men. A guest character, Jenkins, sacrifices his life so that Saunders can

take information regarding an impending German attack to the American command. When Saunders finally returns to American lines, he learns that the Americans had broken the German code earlier and already knew about the German plans. Saunders, disturbed by the meaninglessness of Jenkins's sacrifice, questions how command could value the lives of soldiers so little.

Combat! never directly addressed the war in Vietnam, but the popularity of such military shows suggests increased interest in issues of war as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia. Critics blamed *Combat!*, along with other military television shows, for depicting war unrealistically, thereby conditioning Americans to accept uncritically the Vietnam War. Other Cold War themes emerged in the show. For example, the Germans appeared technically and militarily superior, a reflection of the common contemporary perception of the Soviet Union's nuclear and military capabilities. *Combat!* episodes frequently dealt with uncovering the enemy's deception or the need to gather or deliver intelligence, which coincided with the public's interest in covert activities. The humanization of the German enemy also followed Cold War trends as the United States and West Germany were allies at the time the show was produced. As a result, Germans in *Combat!* proved to be capable, intelligent, and worthy opponents, and were rarely depicted as sadistic, buffoonish, or overly ideological.

As a television show, *Combat!* provided both entertainment and a commentary on war. Although it did not reflect exactly how Americans perceived war or American soldiers, it offered insights into the issues of the day and the ways Americans struggled to understand war and its impact. Even though it did not glorify war and often had antiwar or antiheroic themes, *Combat!* portrayed American soldiers in a positive manner. *Combat!*'s success highlighted the continuing engagement of the American public with the World War II experience while addressing the emerging concerns of the Cold War.

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Related Entries

*M*A*S*H*; Memory and War; Television and War

—*Lisa M. Mundey*

Combat, Effects of

Combat places tremendous physical and psychological demands on troops sent off to war, and society must understand that soldiers expect and deserve recognition for their hardships and sacrifices; in addition, those sent off to war need the support of their government and of those on the home front. In all of America's wars, support from the home front helped soldiers cope and motivated them to fight. The importance of that support is perhaps best illustrated by a negative example: in the later stages of the Vietnam War, flagging public support for the war contributed to the sagging morale and lowered efficiency of U.S. fighting forces.

Society also must accept returning veterans back into civilian life. Soldiers return either serially as individuals, as with the Korean and Vietnam wars, or in large numbers following a general demobilization at war's end, as in the case of the Civil War and the two world wars. The home-front citizenry, especially in cases of large demobilizations, feared that veterans returning from the brutal environment of war

with various vices acquired in service would seriously disrupt civilized society with their antisocial, even violent, behavior. These concerns have always been overblown, and most veterans adjusted to peacetime civilian life without incident, but some have difficulty overcoming the lingering physical or emotional effects of combat. Veterans also need assurances, through the memorialization process, that their sacrifices have not been in vain. A negative example again provides the best illustration: following the Korean War, veterans found that their contributions to fighting the "forgotten war" went largely unrecognized for many years.

The combat soldier needs help to cope with the deadly conditions at the front, and coping becomes increasingly difficult the longer the soldier remains in combat. While being either physically assaulted or under the constant threat of such assault, a soldier at the front must simultaneously handle fears and anxieties that can be close to overwhelming. The cumulative effect of these stresses and harsh conditions is inevitably regressive, and follows the same pattern for most soldiers in most wars. After surviving their first combat engagement, soldiers gain confidence and believe that they can cope with the environment of war, but sooner or later they come to realize that they are not the masters of their fate: death or maiming can occur at any time. At the same time soldiers are worn down physically. Eventually they might reach a point where they can take no more. Consequently, they might break down, run away, escape combat through self-inflicted wounds, or become dangerously fatalistic, no longer caring what happens.

First Combat

Soldiers encounter first combat either as individual replacements or as parts of green units (those entirely composed of untested soldiers), and their experience varies accordingly. As a member of a unit entering combat for the first time, soldiers are buoyed by the presence of comrades they have trained with, know well, and trust. A green unit often is overconfident and can make costly mistakes until leaders and soldiers gain experience. A soldier entering combat as a replacement, on the other hand, has the benefit of joining a seasoned unit that knows how to handle itself in combat. Taking advantage of this benefit, however, requires that new replacements integrate into their squads or platoons when the unit is not actively engaged in combat. The replacements thus have the opportunity to learn where they fit in and to meet the soldiers with whom they will be fighting. Too often, however, replacements are rushed, alone and afraid, directly into combat.

Whether a replacement or a member of a green unit, soldiers soon face the prospect of first combat. Soldiers learn in training that combat is a dangerous, deadly affair, but paradoxically many green soldiers fear, not death or injury, but behaving in a cowardly manner. Will they be equal to the rigors of combat? Will they do their part? Ser. Henry Giles, for example, waiting in England for his engineer company to be sent to the Normandy beachhead during World War II, could not "help thinking what it's going to be like and will I be able to stand up to it and what kind of guts have I really got" (Kindsvatter, 74). Prebattle jitters intensify as combat nears, often made worse if soldiers have to pass by carnage and destruction on their way to the front. Once tranquil countryside is often torn by shells and bombs, smashed or burned-out vehicles and equipment litters the landscape, and refugees and wounded stream by. Then comes the shock of seeing the dead. For most young, green soldiers, this will be their first encounter with violent death, and few ever forget it.

Upon engaging in their first fight, some soldiers are incredulous, not able to believe that the enemy is trying to kill them. Marine Pvt. James Doyle, for instance, in his first combat on Guam in World War II, was slow to take cover when the Japanese opened fire. Only after his failure to get down drew more fire and a shout from his buddy to "get down, yuh fool," did "the thing become personal. For the first time I realized that the people over on the ridge wanted to kill me. Hell, I didn't even know them" (Kindsvatter, 76). After the first moments of battle, fear usually sets in, paralyzing fear for some. For a few soldiers, fear of not performing well in their first fight is justified. For most, however, the training kicks in and they do what they have been trained to do, taking cover or advancing and returning fire.

Then, often as suddenly as it begins, combat ends; the shelling stops and one side or the other withdraws. In a few cases, such as an amphibious assault or hand-to-hand

combat, the fighting is so violent that soldiers, even veterans, have no coherent recollections of what has happened. For the green soldier, however, one realization sets in. He has survived. With a sense of relief, even pride, he tells himself that he performed satisfactorily, or at least had not run away: perhaps he is up to the challenges of combat after all.

Mastering the Environment of War

Green soldiers, of course, soon become veteran soldiers. Success in further engagements boosts their confidence and sharpens their skills. They learn to avoid rookie mistakes like bunching up under fire or revealing their positions by exposing a light or firing unnecessarily. They learn to protect themselves using cover and concealment. Their ears and reflexes become attuned to the sounds of battle, learning to distinguish the firing of friendly forces from that of enemy weapons and to judge how close an incoming artillery round will land.

Veteran soldiers not only learn to become effective fighters, having mastered soldierly skills—they also learn how to master their fears. Fear and anxiety are always a part of the combat experience. In fact, the closest thing to a truism in war is that all soldiers in combat situations are afraid. However, the confident veteran learns how to handle his fears. Some veterans even speak of their fears at this stage in their combat experience as being "useful." The adrenalin flows, senses heighten, and reflexes sharpen.

One factor in soldiers' ability to master their fears is the belief, generally held, that they will not be hurt. Despite the presence of death and destruction, many soldiers, feeling invincible, believe that "it can't happen to me." Lt. Frederick Downs felt that way, even after a month of combat in Vietnam: "A small part of our mind tried to retain its sanity by reminding itself over and over that it would never happen to us. It can happen to anyone else, but it would not happen to me" (Kindsvatter, 78). That soldiers in combat can cling to this sense of invulnerability for as long as some do is something of a mystery. The optimism, or ignorance, of youth may be a factor. Most soldiers are young and healthy and cannot or will not comprehend their own mortality.

In some cases soldiers believe that their luck will hold and carry good luck charms or religious medals to improve their odds of survival. Most soldiers believe that not only luck, but also skill, is on their side. Their newly mastered battle skills will keep them alive, along with alertness and a little caution. Doughboy Bob Hoffman in World War I was one of those soldiers who believed skill and caution could save him: "I never got careless; I always had my gas mask. I always carried a shovel and a pick with me throughout the war. . . . I was the champion digger of the American army" (Kindsvatter, 79). Ironically the death of fellow soldiers often reinforces this trust in soldierly skills. Those soldiers had died because they had made mistakes, had not stayed focused, or had not followed instructions. The veteran soldier would not "screw up" as they had.

Mastered by the Environment of War

Sooner or later most soldiers come to the stark realization, however, that no amount of luck or martial prowess will save them forever. It can happen to them. Usually a traumatic event, or series of events—being wounded, the death of a friend, a particularly bloody engagement that went badly—can bring home this discovery.

In some cases, the vicissitudes of war—the sheer randomness—bring the realization home as well. Perhaps a soldier tripped a booby trap, which might have been an avoidable mistake. But what about the next soldier in line who was killed in the blast as well? Most soldiers are not prepared for, and hence are shocked by, the regularity with which their comrades are killed or injured by accidents, often at the hands of fellow soldiers. Some casualties occur for the same reasons they do on the home front—traffic accidents, falls, or drownings. Other accidental casualties, however, are specific to the combat zone and involve fratricide—accidental death or wounding by fire from one's fellow soldiers. Marine Pvt. Eugene B. Sledge was almost one of these casualties. After nearly being killed by fire from an American tank during the fighting on Peleliu in the Pacific in World War II, he spoke for all soldiers when he said, "to be killed by the enemy was bad enough; that was a real possibility I had prepared myself for. But to be killed by mistake by my own comrades was something I found hard to accept. It was just too much" (Kindsvatter, 61). Soldiers are not prepared to die at the hands of their fellows, but they do so with

appalling frequency. Artillery might fire at the wrong coordinates, pilots strafe or bomb targets in friendly hands, nervous soldiers on guard duty mistake friends for infiltrating enemy, or tanks fire on vehicles or positions mistakenly identified as enemy.

Soldiers thus come to realize that they are not invulnerable. Fears that were once controlled, or even felt to be useful, can become increasingly difficult to suppress. What soldiers fear most, of course, is death or mutilation, but they fear certain crippling wounds, as well, such as loss of sight or limbs or genitals, as much as they fear being killed. Soldiers also come to fear certain types of weapons, especially those against which they can not effectively retaliate. They can feel helpless when strafed or bombed, or pounded by an artillery barrage, as did Cpl. William L. Langer during World War I: "Bombing, like shellfire, has always seemed a bit unfair to me. Somehow it makes one feel so helpless, there is no chance of reprisal for the individual man. The advantage is all with the shell, and you have no comeback" (Kindsvatter, 52). Mines and booby traps are also universally despised weapons because they are random, afford no chance for retaliation, and often cause the sort of maiming wounds that soldiers fear most.

As soldiers wrestle to control their growing fears, the physical environment of war concurrently wears them down. Of necessity, soldiers in the combat zone are exposed to climatic extremes. Oppressive heat, frigid cold, soaking monsoons, choking dust storms, viscous mud, and howling blizzards are often encountered, and soldiers suffer from heat exhaustion, frostbite, trench foot, and a wide range of tropical and desert maladies.

While suffering from the effects of the elements, soldiers also must continue their work, marching great distances over rugged terrain, perhaps carrying heavy loads of weapons and equipment. When not on the move, soldiers may be required to prepare defenses, digging foxholes or bunkers, stringing barbed wire, filling sandbags, and carrying supplies and ammunition forward. Lt. Joseph R. Owen, a Marine rifle platoon leader in the Korean War, explains that resupplying the front lines could be not only physically demanding but also dangerous: "Keeping the forward weapons supplied with ammunition was a dangerous job that

required exposure to enemy view. Under lethal small arms and mortar fire the bearers lugged heavy boxes of rifle, BAR [Browning Automatic Rifle], and machine gun ammunition, as well as crates of grenades, up steep, uneven grades. It was hard labor" (Kindsvatter, 32). Given such demands, in addition to guard duty and moving from place to place, soldiers habitually go without enough sleep. They often eat cold, monotonous combat rations for days on end—if they receive rations at all. They go for weeks at a time without bathing or putting on clean clothes. Already lean, soldiers lose weight, are weakened by various ailments, and are demoralized by their filthy living conditions.

Succumbing to the Environment of War

Soldiers eventually can become overwhelmed by the physical and psychological environment of war. Not all soldiers reach that point, however. Some are amazingly resilient. Others are not exposed long enough or do not experience harsh enough combat. Depending on the war in question, soldiers might rotate out of the combat zone before they have been shattered by the effects of battle. For some soldiers, however, the fears and harsh conditions wear on them until they can no longer function effectively. They become increasingly nervous, "shaky," or "shook up" and begin to wonder "how much more can I take?" Priv. Roscoe C. Blunt, after months of fighting in Europe in World War II, was one such soldier: "The mind becomes dulled by the physical and emotional stresses of war and regresses to the primal instinct of survival at all cost. This, I was afraid, was happening to me. . . . I began to worry, for one thing I didn't need . . . was a breakdown of my nerves" (Kindsvatter, 86). For soldiers like Blunt, the physiological symptoms of fear also become stronger: a pounding heart, cold sweats, knotted-up stomach, twitching and shaking, and involuntary urination or defecation.

Paradoxically, as soldiers grow physically shaky and hyperreactive, they can become increasingly accustomed to the carnage about them, appearing numb, almost oblivious, to its presence. The demeanor of soldiers who had reached this point is accurately captured by the World War II GI's term, thousand-yard stare, or what the Marines termed the bulkhead stare. Correspondent Ernie Pyle, the observant

chronicler of the World War II soldier, had witnessed that demeanor: "It's a look of dullness, eyes that look without seeing. . . . It's a look that is the display room for what lies behind it—exhaustion, lack of sleep, tension for too long, weariness that is too great, fear beyond fear, misery to the point of numbness, a look of surpassing indifference to anything anybody can do. It's a look I dread to see on men" (Kindsvatter, 87).

When a soldier reaches this point, he may break down psychologically, or "crack up" in soldier jargon; he may simply run away or desert. Or he may inflict wounds on himself. Being shot in the foot while "cleaning" one's weapon is an old favorite, but soldiers come up with other ploys as well, including deliberately contracting an ailment or condition such as frostbite.

In rare cases, soldiers surrender to fatalism. Fatalism is not to be confused with the more common phenomenon of premonitions of death. Some soldiers, often before a particularly fearsome battle, think that "my number is up." They write hasty farewell letters and exact promises from friends to tend to their belongings. But these soldiers do not want to die, nor do they seek death. The truly fatalistic soldier reaches the point of not caring anymore, and his actions, or lack of actions, betray this attitude. He might not dive for cover, grab for his helmet when under fire, cover his lit cigarette at night, or put on his flak jacket. In a few cases, soldiers actually seek "death by enemy bullet" by deliberately and carelessly exposing themselves to enemy fire or even making a suicidal advance on an enemy position. Examples of fatalism can be found in all wars, but arguably they were more prevalent in wars such as World War I and World War II, when soldiers served for the duration, with no foreseeable relief from the stresses of combat. During the Korean and Vietnam wars, soldiers knew that if they could hang on and survive until their rotation date, they would make it back to the States.

Thus a rotation system, whatever problems it may have caused for unit cohesion, was a key factor in helping soldiers cope with the effects of combat. But it also generated a unique problem as soldiers neared their rotation date— "short-timer syndrome." The short timer was increasingly reluctant to take any chances or expose himself to danger.

He grew nervous and irritable. He did not want to die the day before he was scheduled to depart. Short-timer syndrome is most commonly associated with the Vietnam War, but soldiers in the Korean War coming up for rotation suffered from it as well, as Marine Lt. Howard Matthias explains: "The short timer often became more irritable, short tempered and nervous. His conversation often indicated fears of getting hit during the last week or last patrol, especially by a stray shell. Every marine could enumerate instances when some poor bastard got it at that time" (Kindsvatter, 91).

With luck, soldiers make it home, but then face the challenge of reentering a society whose members, while appreciating his service and sacrifices, have little understanding of what he had gone through and a great deal of concern about his behavior when he got home. The Army, after all, trains soldiers to kill. Would the returning veteran be prone to violence and lawlessness? Certainly, home-front civilians assumed, he would at least come home with any number of bad habits acquired while in the service—smoking, drinking, drug taking, gambling, and whoring. The reality is that most veterans adjusted well to peacetime civilian society, wanting only to return to a normal life, a job, and a family.

Not all soldiers reintegrate smoothly into civilian life. Alcoholism or drug addiction are common problems. Some soldiers also generated idealized images of how wonderful life and home would be, a coping mechanism that helps them get through the war but that often leads to disappointment and family strife upon returning home. Finally, some veterans are haunted by their war experiences, suffering the psychological and even physical ailments associated with post-traumatic stress disorder, an illness officially recognized in medical circles following the Vietnam War, but one that arguably veterans of all of America's wars have suffered to some degree.

Although some returning veterans do suffer postwar effects from their service, what is remarkable is that most readjust to civilian life as well as they do. The support, acceptance, and even gratitude of friends, family, and community are essential in helping the veteran adjust to life at home. Even if those at home do not fully understand what combat soldiers have experienced, support for them on the

battlefield and at home has been shown to be essential to their well-being.

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Related Entries

Desertion; Frontline Reporting; Medicine and War; Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related; Psychiatry, Military; Replacement Depots

Related Documents

1861 d; 1864 c; 1942 c, d; 1944 a, b; 1945 b, c; 1948 a; 1949; 1953; 1964; 1965 d, e; 1966 a, d; 1967 a; 1968 a; 1971 c, d; 1972; 1975

—*Peter S. Kindsvatter*

Combat Fatigue

See Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related.

Combat-Zone Photography

Photographs from the combat zone connect Americans to past and present wars. Beginning with the Civil War, war photography brought the realities of combat into the homes of ordinary citizens. The best war pictures force viewers to think about the overall costs, meaning, and worthiness of the conflict. Throughout the two world wars, strict government regulations controlled the release of disturbing information and images to the public. In these and other conflicts, many wartime photographers willingly took pictures that bolstered morale at home. The captions that accompanied published photographs and the wartime political climate also influenced the psychological impact of specific images. Over time, however, the interpretation given to certain iconographic wartime images changed as concerns arose about historical accuracy or opinions evolved about a particular war.

The Civil War

The Civil War was the first war where a vivid and extensive collection of photographs documented the preparations and aftermath of combat. With the development of the ambriotype wetplate process, which produced a negative on a glass plate, photographers could leave their studios and visit the actual scenes of battles. Ambriotypes still required long exposure times and immediate development of the negative—

technical limitations that curtailed the possibility of photographing movement. Although no photographs of battles exist, Civil War photographers documented all aspects of the training camp experience, the postbattle carnage, and the physical devastation wrought in the South.

Mathew Brady's photographs are the most famous Civil War images, although because of his poor eyesight Brady hired a corps of assistants to take the actual photographs, which he then displayed in his much-visited New York gallery. Alexander Gardner, one of Brady's assistants, opened his own gallery in 1863 and with Timothy O'Sullivan produced some of the most memorable images of the war. Americans viewed war photographs by visiting a gallery or buying published sketchbooks. They also purchased individual photographs to arrange in private albums or viewed 3-D slides through stereoscopes. Without the ability to reproduce photographs, newspapers used engravings based on original photographs to disseminate the images.

Two different traditions of battlefield photography emerged during the war. The first focused on the human carnage and the second on the land where famous battles took place. O'Sullivan and Gardner became famous for their photographs of dead Confederate soldiers; images such as "Harvest of Death" depicted rows of fallen Confederate troops waiting for burial, while "A Sharpshooter's Last Sleep" focused on the death of one man. Captions accompanying these photographs highlighted the importance of preserving the Union, thus weakening any possibility of these

Mathew Brady's 1862 Civil War photograph "The Dead of Antietam." (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

images fostering sympathy for the enemy. When displaying photographs of Union dead, photographers highlighted the soldiers' heroic sacrifice for the cause but still faced some public criticism over turning personal tragedies into public spectacles. Much later, Gardner's Gettysburg photographs became controversial for a different reason, when historian William Frasinito revealed that in some cases, such as "A Sharpshooter's Last Sleep," Gardner and O'Sullivan had rearranged the body to create a better image. Outright falsification and the mislabeling of places in other photographs compromised the usefulness of these photographs for studying actual events on the battlefield.

Brady pursued a different course in battlefield photography, electing to focus on photographing the landscapes or vistas where battles had taken place. Partly because he and assistants arrived on the scene too late to take pictures of corpses and partly in response to customer preference, Brady took landscape shots of wide-open spaces, which allowed viewers to project their vision of the battle onto that space. What may now appear as simple views of fields and streams took on important symbolic meaning for Americans familiar with the places made famous by Civil War battles.

Spanish–American War

The Spanish–American War was the first American war in which war photography showed actual action during battle. Only a handful of photographers traveled to Cuba to document the land campaign and sea battles against the Spanish in 1898. The development of a handheld Kodak camera facilitated taking photographs of combat, although many photographers still relied on large, glass plate negatives to take quality photographs. Newspapers now had the ability to print photographs, a development that put increased pressure on photojournalists to get close to the action and transmit their photographs quickly to the United States. In sharp contrast to the Civil War, images from the battlefield poured into American parlors almost immediately.

Nonetheless, photographers still faced several obstacles in getting quality pictures. Tropical downpours or poor light often ruined photographs. Without the benefit of the telescopic lenses in use today, photographers had to risk their lives to get close shots of actual combat. Most photographers opted to remain at a safe distance and took panoramic photographs in which actual conditions or movements were hard to discern. The handful of intimate action shots included images that showed the Americans firing artillery in the battle of El Caney and crouching in the trenches before the attack at San Juan Hill.

As with their Civil War counterparts, photographers in the Spanish–American War took their most moving and effective photographs of the aftermath of combat. Most photographers, however, refrained from offering Americans graphic portrayals of death and suffering. American dead usually appeared as shrouded corpses. Photographers took more disturbing images of the wounded, but newspapers did not publish them. Photographers and newspapers had no similar hesitations, however, about explicit photographs of enemy dead. As during the Civil War, therefore, combat pictures reinforced the predominant view that the Army was fighting a just war heroically.

World War I

The scale of death and destruction during World War I was too vast to hide from public view, but the Allied and American governments instigated strict censorship policies to control what kinds of images their citizens saw from the front. Even before the United States entered the war, American journalists operated under strict controls put in place by British and French officials, who encouraged photographs of German atrocities. Americans saw limited images of embattled British or French troops, just enough to convince Americans that the Allies needed their help without persuading them that the Allied cause was already lost. When the United States entered the war, the government only credentialed 20 civilian photojournalists. The bulk of the photographs came from official military photographers working for the Army Signal Corps, which both censored all images released for publication and employed a cadre of Army cameramen to provide film stock for government documentaries. Government censors refused to allow the publication of even one photograph of American dead during the war, and photographs of the wounded showed American soldiers placidly receiving care by Army doctors. Photographs of ruined French villages and numerous pictures of mutilated German

dead were the closest Americans at home got to viewing actual combat during the war.

American photographers used a single-lens Graflex that allowed for fast exposure, control of focus, a large image size, and a telephoto lens. Both journalists and soldiers also carried clandestine Kodak cameras that resulted in thousands of unauthorized photographs. In theory, these technological advances made possible the taking of vivid and intimate images of combat. In reality, poor weather and trench warfare limited photographers' ability to take photographs that adequately conveyed the chaos, emotion, or excitement of battle. Photographs of men hovering in the trenches revealed horrendous living conditions but not the meaning of going over the top into a hail of machine-gun fire and artillery shells. Wide panoramic shots showed bursts of smoke and groups of men advancing, but relayed little emotion. The few photographs that depicted actual fighting were often fakes, posed shots meant to satiate public curiosity about the experience of combat.

World War II

As during World War I, military photographers took scores of official photographs, including aerial photography that provided key intelligence to military strategists. A limited number of accredited civilian photographers went into action with the troops where they faced the familiar challenges of weather and danger. For the first half of World War II, government officials strictly censored battlefield photographs. With little good news to report from Europe or the Pacific, military censors believed that photographs of dead American soldiers would weaken morale on the home front. By 1943, however, complacency at home in the wake of Allied victories in the South Pacific and North Africa convinced officials that Americans needed a dose of reality about the war. To convince Americans that victory was still a long way off, military censors approved the dissemination of bloody battlefield photographs.

The emergence in the 1930s of photo essay magazines, such as *Life* and *Look*, provided a perfect format for using combat photographs to tell stories about the war. In September 1943, *Life* magazine published one of the first photographs of American war dead, a view of three soldiers lying partly buried in the sand on Buna Beach in New Guinea, taken by George Strock. In an accompanying editorial, *Life* carefully presented the photograph as an image of American soldiers who had heroically given their lives for the cause of freedom. To ensure that battlefield shots continued to inspire Americans, censors forbade publication of photographs containing identifiable war dead, seriously wounded troops, badly mutilated corpses, or soldiers suffering from mental breakdowns. No similar restrictions existed for publishing photographs of enemy dead. Consequently, Americans saw plenty of gruesome photographs throughout the war. On August 13, 1945, *Life* magazine published a shocking slow-motion sequence of an Australian soldier firing a flamethrower into a bunker and a Japanese soldier emerging in flames.

By the D-Day invasion in June 1944, the U.S. military had accepted the importance of extensively photographing major combat operations. More than 100 military photographers and 27 American civilian photographers, who had each written his own obituary beforehand, followed the troops onto the Normandy beaches. The most famous photographer on the beach was Robert Capa. During the Spanish Civil War, Capa had taken perhaps the greatest war photograph of all time, of a bullet piercing the body of a Spanish Loyalist soldier. Several years after the photo's publication, accusations arose that Capa had staged the shot, a charge that recent investigators have discounted. Capa took over 100 action shots of the early hours of the landing on Omaha Beach. These photographs became even more precious after a *Life* staff member inadvertently melted nearly all the negatives while developing them, managing to salvage only 11 prints.

When American troops began liberating victims from concentration camps, the photographs were, one reporter wrote, so horrible that no newspaper normally would use them, but they were less horrible than the reality. Many photographs portrayed American soldiers before ovens crammed with corpses or piles of victims' belonging. By documenting the act of discovering Nazi atrocities, witness photographers helped Americans share the horror soldiers felt as they walked into the camps for the first time and undercut any attempt to deny the Holocaust. Photographs of German

civilians forced to view concentration camp victims reflected the general consensus that Germany be held accountable for this crime against humanity as well as for murdering prisoners of war and starting an aggressive war. These photographs served as moral and legal evidence of the Holocaust.

Not all images coming from the front were tragic or appalling; some were inspirational. Joe Rosenthal's candid shot of five Marines and one Navy corpsman raising a flag on Iwo Jima on February 23, 1945, is arguably the most famous image from World War II. "Old Glory Goes Up on Mt. Suribachi, Iwo Jima" shows weary soldiers working together to push the flag erect. This Pulitzer Prize–winning photograph contained the comforting suggestion that victory in the long uphill struggle to defeat Japan was at hand. Yet this photograph, as Rosenthal freely admitted, was not all that it seemed. What Rosenthal photographed was actually the second flag-raising, by a group sent to replace a smaller flag erected three hours earlier by the first patrol to reach the summit. Photographer Jim Lowery captured the first flag-raising in a much less dramatic photograph. Nor had the Marines conquered Iwo Jima when Rosenthal took the photograph: three of the Marines in his photograph died in the ensuing battle, which ended with an American victory a month later.

Overall, Americans saw many more images of combat in World War II than they had in World War I, particularly after the government eased censorship regulations in 1943. Throughout the war, however, combat photographers worked hand in hand with the government to create images that would bolster American support for the war. Similarly, the military willingly shared an abundance of censored film footage taken by uniformed cameramen working for private newsreel companies, to provide Americans with up-to-date images from the front when they went to the movies. This cooperative partnership between the press and government broke down partly during the Korean War and almost completely in the Vietnam War.

The Korean War (1950–53) and
Vietnam War (1962–73)

In Korea, the military first experimented with a policy of voluntary censorship but soon reverted to the official guidelines used so successfully in World War II. Combat photographers followed troops into battle, although the shift to nighttime fighting, which took place midway through the war, hampered documentation of many combat operations. Once again, photographers mostly offered the public images that supported the cause. Photographers respected American soldiers' privacy in death and showed American soldiers aiding Korean civilians.

Images of dead enemy troops were fewer in number and intensity than those shown in combat photographs taken during World War II. Little controversy followed the publication, in 1944, by *Life*, of the photo of a stylish young woman gazing thoughtfully at the Japanese skull perched on her desk, a souvenir from New Guinea sent to her by her sailor boyfriend. No similar images of enemy dead appeared in the American press during the Korean War. In the wake of the Holocaust, Americans had developed a newfound aversion to circulating images that suggested less-than-chivalrous conduct on the part of American troops. At the same time, however, a new emphasis on the destructive impact of the war on civilians emerged. This emphasis on the noncombatant experience of combat indirectly raised questions about how much the war (and by implication American policy) was helping or hurting civilians.

These questions continued during the Vietnam War, where images of civilian suffering were increasingly interpreted as evidence of faulty American policy and strategy. No outright censorship of images was implemented during the Vietnam War, and the military liberally credentialed members of the press to photograph the war. This was a decision that the military came to sorely regret, often blaming graphic images of the war's violence for eroding American support of the war. In future wars, combat photographers would once again contend with strict censorship rules. Even in Vietnam, reliance on military transportation, South Vietnamese censorship rules, and pressure from the U.S. government to follow voluntary guidelines influenced the types of images taken. The majority of the press remained supportive of the war until the Tet Offensive in 1968, after which reporters adopted an increasingly skeptical tone. Compared with previous conflicts, fewer photographs portrayed American soldiers as heroes. Instead, photographers graphically portrayed American dead and wounded along with civilian casualties of

combat. Atrocity photographs became the signature image of the war, including photographs of a Buddhist monk's self-immolation, the public execution of a Viet Cong prisoner, and burned children running and screaming after a napalm attack. The iconographic photographs of the Vietnam War were portraits of the South Vietnamese, with the Americans in the background.

Even military photographers inadvertently found themselves documenting more than standard military operations. Military cameraman Ron Haeberle witnessed the massacre of more than 400 civilians in the village of My Lai on March 16, 1968, capturing the haunting image of fearful mothers huddling to protect their children moments before American soldiers killed them. Published in *Life* magazine one year after the massacre, Haeberle's photographs outraged the public and helped prompt an official investigation into both the massacre and subsequent cover-up.

The Gulf War and Iraq War

Vietnam was the first war in which television transmitted a continuous stream of images into American homes. The war was not, however, televised live. Instead, television camera crews shipped their film footage to Japan or Saipan, where it then forwarded to New York for editing and broadcast. By contrast, in the 1991 Gulf War, satellite hookups truly allowed reporters to speak directly to American audiences from the front. But, ultimately, strict censorship by both the Americans and Iraqis thwarted the technological possibility of watching events as they unfolded.

To limit the publication of negative photographs, the Pentagon also retained strict control over photographers' movements during the Gulf War. Photojournalists chafed at being restricted to rear-area briefing stations while selected pool reporters went to the front. During the war, both official government censorship and media self-censorship restricted the taking and dissemination of combat photographs. Because of limited access to the frontlines, few photographers documented actual combat, wounded Americans, or dead civilians. Instead, the majority of photographs showed military hardware, political leaders, and destroyed buildings. These photographs promoted an image of American military and technological superiority, bolstering official claims that surgical missile strikes hit key military targets while sparing noncombatants.

Twelve years later, during the invasion of Iraq, the military once again allowed photographers to follow soldiers into action by embedding them with specific units. Photographers provided gripping images of soldiers engaged in fierce firefights and the warm welcome provided by Iraqi civilians. The key photographs of the war, however, documented the subsequent occupation. Private pictures taken by soldiers of their comrades abusing Iraqi prisoners and commercial photographers' shots of a jubilant crowd burning the corpses of slain American civilian contractors soon overshadowed victory photographs of American soldiers helping Iraqi civilians pull down a statue of Saddam Hussein. The Iraq War was the first conflict in which the Internet provided immediate access to private and commercial photographs, seriously hampering official efforts to control the flow of information. This new technology created an instantaneous link between the home front and the battlefield and gave Americans easy access to pictures deemed too grisly for conventional media outlets.

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Related Entries

Brady, Mathew B.; CNN; Film and War; Frontline Reporting; Media and War; Office of Censorship; Television and War

—Jennifer D. Keene

Commission on Training Camp Activities

On April 17, 1918, just 11 days after the formal U.S. declaration of war in World War I, the War Department created a new federal agency, the Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA), and charged it with protecting the men in uniform from the twin scourges of moral corruption and venereal disease. Americans had long associated military camps with disease and immorality; during the conflicts on the Mexican border, Pres. Woodrow Wilson had sent the well-known Progressive reformer, Raymond Blaine Fosdick, to assess conditions among the troops. With the outbreak of World War I, the president promised a new kind of camp and a new kind of soldier. In forming the CTCA, the president hoped to combat a real manpower issue by attacking a disease that reduced the number of combat-ready soldiers in each unit. At the same time, the president also envisaged a

larger role for the commission, hoping to create soldiers physically fit and morally pure—worthy of the nation and of the families that sent them to war. Philosophically, the CTCA embraced a form of cultural nationalism, hoping to reshape the men in uniform to match these Progressive reformers' own white, urban, middle-class values.

Reflecting its Progressive roots, the commission initially employed positive methods in its program to remake the American fighting man. Social hygiene education for both soldiers and civilians emphasized sexual purity, associating irresponsible sexual behavior with slackers and traitors. Applying the modern methods of advertising, the CTCA used placards, pamphlets, lectures, and films to spread the message of a single standard of sexual abstinence to soldier and civilian alike. Recreation programs, in turn, worked to cultivate chaste behaviors and upstanding values in both soldiers and women through carefully orchestrated leisure activities. From athletics programs to group sings, from camp libraries to soldier clubs, leisure activities inside the camp filled the men's time while also attempting to inculcate middle-class values and habits. A companion program for local women and girls complemented these efforts, promoting a feminine ideal that combined the traditional notion of women's moral and domestic responsibilities with a more modern, public role in the war effort. Recognizing the inevitability of contact between soldiers and the civilian female population, CTCA reformers established broad-based community recreation programs as well, hoping to replace promiscuous activity with carefully controlled meetings. The CTCA's counterpart in the local communities, the War Camp Community Service, stepped up to provide healthful recreation, and sponsored dances and parades, picnics and pageants, and commandeered local organizations to do their part for the appropriate care of the men in uniform.

Though the reformers in the CTCA hoped these positive programs would prove sufficient to control the men in uniform and their female civilian counterparts, the commission left nothing to chance, simultaneously embracing the more repressive side of Progressivism in its development of programs of chemical prophylaxis and law enforcement. Conceding the reality that some soldiers would engage in sexual activity despite the commission's best efforts, reformers

established a regimen of chemical prophylaxis, surprisingly effective if applied immediately following sexual contact, to which men were required to submit; failure to undergo the chemical treatment constituted a court-martial offense. Civilian women faced a much broader repression. Relying on a provision of the Draft Act, reformers established "moral zones" around the camps and sought their rigid enforcement. Beginning their efforts with the closure of red-light districts, reformers soon recognized the more complex problems of prostitution outside the districts, "charity" sex, and simple promiscuity. Seeking to control female sexual behavior, the CTCA developed a program that included both protective work aimed at deterrence and more severe efforts focused on the arrest, quarantine, detention, and reformation of sexually active women and girls. State and local governments and law enforcement agencies cooperated with the commission, passing laws, closing red-light districts, and building detention houses and reformatories.

Granted substantial federal power, the CTCA succeeded to a remarkable degree in establishing its programs of recreation, sex education, and law enforcement. Liberty Theaters, libraries, YMCA huts, and YWCA Hostess Houses sprouted in camps across the country, and athletics and singing programs took root alongside them. The social hygiene program flourished as well, providing the first substantial sex education program to millions of Americans. Law enforcement efforts also thrived, resulting in the detention of an estimated 30,000 women and girls for actual, suspected, and anticipated sexual improprieties. Although venereal disease remained a serious problem for the American military, the CTCA reformers succeeded in substantially lowering venereal disease rates among the men in uniform.

This success, however, reflected especially the importance of the chemical prophylaxis program. Though able to make a meaningful reduction in venereal disease among the troops, the CTCA reformers were significantly less successful in remaking American culture in their own image. Beginning with the soldiers and training camp communities, these Progressives had hoped to replace the diversity of competing American cultures with a single, standardized culture based on their own values and norms. Emphasizing social stability in the midst of war, however, the reformers

frequently undercut their own agenda for change, embracing existing status structures and reasserting traditional class, gender, and racial hierarchies. Though describing an inclusive and democratic culture, the CTCA nevertheless sought to assert its own cultural norms against all challengers.

Despite enjoying substantial federal power and employing the rhetoric of patriotism and loyalty, the CTCA reformers faced constant and continuing resistance from soldiers and civilians alike. From rural conservatives advocating a traditional Sabbath to proprietors of urban saloons, from prostitutes determined to practice their trade to feminists fighting for a truly new image of womanhood, Americans challenged the cultural nationalism of the CTCA. Perhaps the most vocal challenge came from African Americans, who asserted their right to meaningful democracy, resisted segregation in all its forms, and demanded the commission live up to its promises of justice and equality.

In the aftermath of the war, the CTCA's hopes for a changed nation were soon dashed. Like many other Progressives, the reformers in the CTCA found themselves removed from their positions of power in the postwar years. Although the programs of the CTCA would sometimes reemerge in alternate guises in the years to come—for instance, in the incorporation of the United Service Organizations (USO) in 1941—the commission itself left little institutional legacy, reflecting, perhaps, the nation's rush to "normalcy" in the aftermath of World War I.

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Related Entries

American Red Cross; Camp Followers; Wilson, Woodrow; World War I

—Nancy K. Bristow

Committee on Public Information

On April 13, 1917, shortly after Congress declared war on Germany, Pres. Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information (CPI) by Executive Order 2594, and appointed George Creel, the muckraking journalist, its civilian chairman. President Wilson believed that the nation was divided over the American entry into the war and hoped that the CPI, or Creel Committee as it became known, would mobilize public opinion in the United States behind the war effort and also gain international support. The CPI became the nation's first large-scale propaganda agency with Robert Lansing, the secretary of state, Newton Baker, the secretary of war, and Josephus Daniels, the secretary of the Navy, serving as associate chairs. By the end of the war, the CPI had found a way to exploit virtually all forms of mass communication.

The CPI eventually had two large divisions. The Foreign Section coordinated work abroad, and the Domestic Section sought to inspire the home front. Many of the records of the former division were either lost or destroyed after World War I and, hence, less is known about its operations than about the work of CPI's Domestic Section. Historians do know, though, that the Foreign Section had offices in more than 30 countries. As one of the CPI's feature-length films, *America's Answer*, explained, "'Old Glory' knows no alien soil when there is work to do in Freedom's name." The Foreign

Section used the business offices of American firms abroad to distribute propaganda. In Latin America, for example, Edward L. Bernays, who later helped to establish the field of public relations, enlisted Remington Typewriter, International Harvester, Ford, Studebaker, and many other corporations to support the CPI's efforts. To help send news stories, feature articles, and pictures worldwide, the CPI created a Foreign Press Bureau and a Wireless and Cable Service. The Foreign Section did not close its operations until June 1919.

On the home front, Creel and his associates created bureaus that targeted a wide variety of groups in American society, including laborers, women, industrialists, farmers, and the foreign born. By bringing its messages to such groups, the CPI attempted to make every man, woman, and child a participant in the war effort.

Because of his background in journalism, Creel turned instinctively to the world of print, persuading journalists, intellectuals, and other writers to support the war. One of the earliest subdivisions created in the Domestic Section was a Division of News, first headed by editorial writer J. W. McConaughy and later by *Chicago Herald* editor Leigh Reilly. Its initial goal was to coordinate the often confusing and conflicting news accounts that came from the U.S. Army and Navy. Its scope expanded rapidly to cover many other areas and, by the end of the war, it had issued approximately 6,000 news releases. Creel estimated that material from this bureau found its way into 20,000 newspaper columns each week, and boasted that even his harshest critics received a "daily diet" of information from the CPI in the morning newspapers.

A separate Foreign Language Newspaper Division, created in April 1917, monitored the hundreds of foreign-language publications in the United States. Starting in May 1917, and running through March 1919, the CPI published a newspaper, the *Official Bulletin*. Published Monday through Saturday, it carried pronouncements from the government and was distributed free to public officials, newspapers, post offices, and other agencies that disseminated information. Its circulation peaked at about 115,000.

In the effort to build an intellectual justification for American participation in the war, Creel also turned to historians, political scientists, constitutional authorities, and other

scholars. Creel appointed Guy Stanton Ford, a history professor and dean at the University of Minnesota, to the post of director the CPI's Division of Civic and Educational Publications. Ford's division published more than 100 titles that defined American ideals, indicted German militarism, promoted the expansion of the president's power in foreign relations, justified the nation's first intervention into a war in Europe, endorsed censorship, and informed U.S. citizens about what they could do to help speed victory. The most significant of these publications appeared in the *War Information Series* (1917–18) and the *Red, White, and Blue Series* (1917–18). Ford's bureau also produced a *War Cyclopedia* (1918), which had entries on such topics as freedom of speech and state rights versus national power. In September 1918, rather late in the war, Ford attempted to promote citizenship by distributing information to school children through the *National School Service*, a 16-page bulletin. Believed to have reached 20 million homes through students, this bulletin continued into 1919 under the auspices of the Department of the Interior.

Ford was highly influential in determining the content of much American propaganda. In addition to the Division of Civic and Educational Publication, he helped to prepare many of President Wilson's speeches. Wilson, of course, did not have access to the radio in the manner that later presidents would, but the CPI developed an ingenious way of delivering the chief executive's messages: the Division of Four Minute Men. First headed by Donald M. Ryerson, then by William McCormick Blair, and later by William H. Ingersoll, the Four Minute Men consisted of local leaders and opinion makers, perhaps 75,000 in number, who delivered short patriotic speeches at various venues, such as at movie theaters (at the changing of the reels). The topics for these four-minute speeches were provided to the speakers by the CPI in its weekly publication, the *Four Minute Man Bulletin*. In an age before radio, these local speakers became the president's surrogates. The CPI also established a separate Speaking Division that recruited speakers to deliver longer speeches. These orators were sometimes humorously referred to as the "Four Hour Men."

By 1917, the movie theater had become an institution in most American communities. The movies themselves became a powerful form of propaganda, as did many other forms of visual communication. The CPI established a Film Division, first to distribute movies made by the U.S. Signal Corps; but later, under the direction of Charles S. Hart, the agency expanded its operation to include cooperating with commercial producers to turn out motion pictures of its own, including newsreels that brought moving images of events in Europe to the movie theaters of America. The CPI's Foreign Film Division also circulated U.S. films worldwide. In 1918, the Film Division merged with the CPI's Picture Division. The Picture Division and the Bureau of Photographs exploited camera technology to the fullest. The latter bureau alone distributed more than 200,000 slides.

Propagandists learned quickly that visual images carried greater emotional impact than the printed word. In addition to distributing moving pictures and photographs, the CPI mobilized cartoonists, artists, advertisers, and exhibitors. A *Weekly Bulletin for Cartoonists* suggested themes for use in newspapers and magazines. Under the leadership of Charles Dana Gibson, a Division of Pictorial Publicity produced war posters, often in color. This division later joined with the CPI's Division of Advertising to create some of the war's most vivid images in posters designed to demonize the German military and to promote the Red Cross, Salvation Army, Liberty Loan drives, and many other causes. The apparent success of these posters in raising support, especially late in the war, did much to bolster the prestige of advertising in the business community. A Bureau of War Expositions and a Bureau of State Fair Exhibits displayed war equipment and other items related to conflict for the public to view.

Creel and the CPI set out to "make the world safe for democracy," yet, in their zeal, they may have contributed to weakening democratic ideals. In their efforts to achieve their goals, they were too ready to suspend free speech and freedom of the press, and they frequently confused Wilson's political goals with the national interest. Their work contributed to a form of nationalism that threatened to sacrifice the free individual to the will of the state. "There is a spiritual exaltation in 100,000,000 Americans united in a sacred cause, ready for any labor, anxious to serve, eager to take the places assigned them," said one CPI publication.

After the initial enthusiasm following victory and the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the reputation of Creel and the CPI declined in the following two decades. Many concluded that propagandists had oversold the war and had created a climate that suppressed legitimate dissent. When the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of War Information in World War II, it considered the CPI an example of mistakes to be avoided, and it turned down Creel's request to play a part in the nation's propaganda effort.

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American Civil Liberties Union; Office of War Information; Propaganda and Psychological Operations; World War I

Related Documents

1915 b; 1917 a, c, d; 1918 a; 1919 a, f

—*Stephen Vaughn*

Computer Technology and Warfare

Of all the technologies that came into general use during the latter half of the 20th century, few have had such a broad and fundamental impact on American society generally as computers. The widespread adoption and use of computer technology by the U.S. armed forces solved many challenging military problems and created opportunities for waging war more effectively and with less risk to human life. The military investment in computer development and production created an industry that would then have an equally profound impact on civilian life and society. But, as in the civilian world, the growing reliance on computers by the military created a number of practical and moral problems that were cause for ongoing concern.

By the time the United States entered World War II in 1941, civilian engineers in the United States and abroad had already begun to construct sophisticated mechanical and electronic calculating machines. The Army and Navy were keenly interested in using such machines for arithmetically intensive tasks such as designing weapons and preparing artillery ballistic tables. They also explored the use of computers as code breakers and flight simulators for training aircrews. The government commissioned universities to design and build these machines. The most famous was the Electric Numerical Integrator and Calculator (ENIAC), constructed and run for the Army by the University of Pennsylvania. ENIAC was one of the earliest digital computers and the first to be run by a stored program. Although it was not completed by the war's end, it was put to work afterward performing calculations for the design of the hydrogen bomb. Other important projects initiated during the war included Harvard's MARK I and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Whirlwind.

Supported by this heavy influx of military money, the technology improved rapidly, with computers becoming more capable and reliable. In the years following World War II, the government found new ways to apply computers to military problems such as air defense. For example, to defend North America from nuclear attack, the Air Force developed the

Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system, a network of automated command centers that analyzed radar data, tracked targets, and directed air defense weapons and interceptors. The Navy used computers to help defend its ships from air attack as well. By the 1980s, the new, completely automated AEGIS system could track, target, and destroy incoming jet aircraft and missiles in a matter of seconds, much more quickly than humans could react.

The military was continually pushing the limits of computer technology, and it poured money into computer and electronics research and development. One of the most important sponsors of computer R&D was the Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA; later the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA). Under its legendary first director, J. C. R. Licklider, IPTO sought to fund efforts that would have the broadest impact in both the military and civilian spheres. IPTO was responsible for groundbreaking advances in computer graphics, word processing and spreadsheet applications, e-mail, robotics, and the UNIX operating system. In 1969, IPTO established the first wide-area network, the ARPANET, which became the foundation for the Internet in the early 1980s.

Funding from ARPA and other agencies also helped train generations of computer scientists and engineers, many of whom then went to work on military projects in government-supported research labs. The military practically created the computer industry by spending vast amounts on computers, hardware components, and software. Companies such as IBM became major industry powerhouses from government money. Military projects spun off civilian applications: ENIAC led to the commercial UNIVAC, and SAGE spun off the SABRE airline reservation system.

The massive early machines were housed in large, fixed rooms, but by the 1960s and 1970s computers were becoming small enough to be portable. Computers as small as a circuit board or a single microchip could even be embedded on the munitions themselves, leading to the widespread development of so-called smart weapons. Guided bombs and missiles, first developed during World War II, saw extensive use in Vietnam, as microchips and other microelectronic components made them cheaper and more effective. Their operators

used radar, television cameras, laser beams, or wires to direct weapons to their targets. During the 1980s, guided weapons began to give way to a new generation of "fire-and-forget" munitions, which used onboard sensors or preprogrammed instructions to find a target without human control. The most notable was the long-range Tomahawk cruise missile, which made its debut in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The Tomahawk's onboard computer matched radar images of the terrain with preprogrammed digital images to correct its course while en route.

By the 1990s, computers had become so common and integral to military systems that no one thought of them as something separate from conventional military equipment. An Army official commented that "Literally every weapons system that we are planning and bringing into development employs minicomputers and microelectronics" (Levidow and Robins, 91). Computers were mounted or embedded in nearly every new vehicle, ship, and weapon, and they were also retrofitted onto older equipment. These miniature devices helped military personnel to navigate, locate the enemy, and guide the weapons. They kept jet aircraft from spinning out of control during high-speed maneuvers. They directed vast communications networks, combined and analyzed intelligence data, warned of equipment failures, and trained military personnel in realistic three-dimensional settings. It seemed that there was little that computers could not do.

However, the growing dependence on computers caused some significant problems. Computer hardware and software were highly complex and led to a huge increase in the cost and time required to develop new weapons. Furthermore, the technology evolved so rapidly that by the time the weapons were fielded, their components were already obsolete by civilian standards. Whereas the military once drove computer research and production, now the industry followed the civilian market, with relatively little need for military money or concern for military needs. To keep up with changes in technology and to reduce costs, the government was forced to turn to commercial sources such as Microsoft—a difficult challenge for military buyers and weapons designers. The military also invested heavily in specialized training in engineering and programming, and it hired armies of civilian technicians and

contractors. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who used the weapons had to be computer-literate and technically savvy. Many acquired the necessary skills as civilians before joining the military service.

The reliability and security of computers were additional issues. Computers were prone to errors caused by equipment failure, faulty programming, software bugs, or unanticipated circumstances. The networking of the military's computers exposed them to attack by malicious or enemy hackers. Many became nervous about giving machines too much control over powerful weapons because the rapid pace of modern warfare allowed little time to identify and correct errors. In 1987, the AEGIS cruiser Vincennes shot down a civilian Iranian airliner after mistaking it for an attacking warplane. Critics also worried because computers could not make moral judgments and might not recognize when the situation called for restraint instead of action. A major objection to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or "Star Wars"), begun in 1983 with the goal of defending the United States against a massive ballistic missile attack, was that a computer might make the decision to launch its weapons without humans "in the loop." If it made a mistake, the computer could accidentally start a war instead of prevent one.

Nonetheless, after the Persian Gulf War—which some observers called "the first information war" or the "knowledge war" (Campen, ix)—few doubted that computers were having a profound impact on warfare, although the exact nature of that impact was unclear. Many military and civilian leaders and thinkers proclaimed that a "revolution in military affairs" was under way, and they debated such concepts as "information dominance," "network-centric warfare," and "information warfare"—the disabling of an enemy's computer networks while protecting one's own. Other analysts thought the military was placing too much emphasis on high technology, which could not solve all the problems of terrorism, guerilla warfare, or humanitarian crises. By the end of the 20th century, however, one thing was clear: computer-based networks were making war more immediate and personal, at least for those on the same side. The World Wide Web, e-mail, chat rooms, and video teleconferencing linked soldiers with their commanders, military and civilian leaders with each other, military doctors with their wounded patients, journalists with their audience, and everybody with their families back home.

The U.S. government recognized early the value of computers and played a major role in the development of computer technology and, by extension, the computer industry. With military support, computers evolved from large, expensive calculating machines into sophisticated systems that could perform a vast array of functions more rapidly and efficiently than humans, while reducing the costs, personnel requirements, and risks to the combatants. Yet, like any other revolutionary technology, computers offer both benefits and drawbacks. The technology had fundamental limitations that were still being explored during the early 21st century. Building and using the machines properly posed endless challenges to military personnel, civilian leaders, and equipment designers.

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Related Entries

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Munitions Industry; Technology and Revolutionary Changes in Military Affairs; *WarGames*

—*Philip L. Shiman*

Conscientious Objection

As human society evolved from family and tribe to today's sophisticated nation-state, those wielding authority periodically (in some eras, frequently) compelled their subjects to participate in humanity's oldest organized endeavor—war. This power to force individuals to kill or be killed by strangers gave rise, albeit more slowly and in a less organized manner, to an opposite concept whose foundation in "kingdoms not of this world" inevitably would circumscribe governments' unrestricted right to compel participation in war. However, the balance can always be tilted by government in times of fear and stress.

Defining Conscientious Objection

In public discourse, conscientious objection often is used interchangeably with the more inclusive pacifism—the total opposition to the use of violence to settle disputes or, more narrowly, total opposition to war as an acceptable (i.e., moral) human pursuit. Definitions of conscientious objection in U.S. government directives contribute to this conflation. Department of Defense Directive 1300.6 focuses on the act of war fighting, defining conscientious objection as "a firm, fixed and sincere objection to participation in war in any form or the bearing of arms, by reason of religious training and belief." The Selective Service definition includes opposition even to "serving in the armed forces," as well as to bearing arms because of moral or religious principles. Both sources distinguish between objectors willing to serve in the military in noncombatant roles (e.g., medic or chaplain's assistant) and those who refuse any association with the military but agree to alternative public service if called.

The Colonial Experience

The earliest recorded incident of someone declining military training—recorded because the individual was "abused by the sheriff"—took place in Maryland in 1658 (Shapiro, 1994). Given the early influx of Europeans affiliated with the predominantly English and German "peace churches," others undoubtedly declined to participate in military campaigns against Native Americans—what the Puritan divine Thomas Hooker termed "the Lord's revenge."

The Maryland "abuse" may represent the exception more than the rule. Some colonial governments seized property from, fined, or imprisoned conscientious objectors. But for those affiliated with the peace churches, more colonies either completely exempted men who refused military service or allowed them to pay substitutes. Nonetheless, tolerance for such arrangements was sorely tested in the French and Indian War (1750–63), Revolutionary War (1775–83), and War of 1812 (1812–15), when larger levies were needed to fill the ranks.

The "Almost" Conscientious Objection Amendment
Practices from the colonial era carried over into key documents of the nascent United States. Because Congress cut the Continental Army to fewer than 100 officers and soldiers after the Revolutionary War, it subsequently had to beg states for land forces in every national defense emergency. Reflecting the prevailing mistrust of centralized authority, the Articles of Confederation (1781–89), which specified Congress's powers, required only that the forces be "cloathed [sic], armed and equipped," leaving the question of who would be in or be excused and why to the states.

The lack of a central authority able to ensure the common defense led to an entirely new foundational document for the United States, one that almost enshrined the concept of conscientious objection. The vehicle for this provision was the proposed 4th Amendment in the Bill of Rights (ultimately it became the 2nd Amendment). James Madison's draft initially read: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country: *but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person*" (emphasis added). During debate, the Senate dropped the concluding clause even though its spirit mirrored the sentiment driving the demand for formal, written protection of "essential rights" without which liberty dies (Powell , para. 33). A few delegates feared that a future federal Congress might use the "conscientious objection" clause to dissolve or at least disarm the state militias and replace them with a standing army.

The gradual transformation of this principle into the political and legal stance of civil disobedience occurred in New England—notably in Henry David Thoreau's refusal to pay the poll tax and taxes for Mexican War costs. For Thoreau, who outlined his views in an influential essay, "Civil Disobedience" (1849), following conscience was both a responsibility and a privilege.

From the Civil War to Iraq
The first Union conscription legislation (March 1863) politicized the issue of conscientious objection by exempting from service only those able to pay a $300 fine. In both this and February 1864 legislation, Congress also allowed alternative service for "members of religious denominations, who shall by oath or affirmation declare that they are conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles of faith and practice of said religious denominations" (Brock, 169). The Confederacy initially allowed substitutes and gave exemptions for reason of conscience upon presentation of a substitute or payment of a fine, but the combination of high casualties and a smaller population forced the elimination of all exemptions in February 1864.

Propaganda influenced public attitudes toward conscientious objection during the world wars. Alternative service again was available to members of the traditional peace churches, but any dissent to war or affirmations of pacifism were considered subversive, especially in the poisonous atmosphere of World War I. While the Selective Training and Service Act (1940) provided for alternative service, it also punished those who refused compulsory service, refused to register for the draft, or refused military induction if their conscientious objector claim was rejected. Draft boards during the Korean War followed procedures used for World War II.

In the Vietnam War, during which the United States abolished conscription in favor of an all-volunteer system, the gap between the total draft-age male population and service requirements was so large that deferments, especially for education, far outnumbered exemptions. The slow rise of the antiwar movement reflected two realities: the lottery draft system did not begin until December 1969 and pervasive education deferments cushioned the impact of the war on the middle and upper classes—who could afford college. Nonetheless, the eventual scale of conscientious objector claims during Vietnam was unparalleled. The Center on Conscience and War estimates: 3,500 conscientious objectors in World War I, 37,000 in World War II, 4,300 in Korea, 111 in the 1991 Gulf War, but 200,000 in Vietnam. Another 50,000 individuals went to Canada rather than go to Vietnam.

By December 2003, the Pentagon's numerous missions and smaller active duty structure forced it to draw deeply on the reserves to sustain the unexpectedly high numbers of ground troops required for Iraq and Afghanistan. To alleviate

the strain on the reserves, many in Congress voiced support for permanently expanding the Army and Marine Corps. Few, however, were bold enough to suggest reintroducing conscription, something Pentagon officials in particular adamantly opposed. Still, the more wary among the draft-age population began to consider the administrative hurdles to gaining conscientious objector status and, accordingly, sought advice about ways to demonstrate the depth of their moral opposition to armed conflict.

Absent a draft, the extent of conscientious objection cannot be known. Even the number already in uniform who claim conscientious objector status probably will be underestimated, as most rarely generate headlines except in media near their unit's base—and then only when someone goes absent without official leave or seeks asylum in another country. Still, groups advising service members have reported a massive increase in those seeking conscientious objector status since the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003. Many appear to be "selective objectors" who see the Iraq conflict—unlike the war in Afghanistan—as unjust or illegal.

While the general public seems inclined to respect the moral conviction on which conscientious objection rests—particularly when conviction informs the daily lives of those who claim it—respect can easily be shaded by any perceived selective exercise of this "conviction." Suspicion is always present that upsurges in conscientious objection claims when war nears or commences represent nothing more than fear of death. But an equally plausible explanation is that many who are subject to a military call-up simply had never considered the morality of organized killing or whether war is ever "just." For these individuals, war or its imminent onset is a catalyst for that critical self-examination without which, as Aristotle said, life is not worth living.

International Law

If the moral basis on which conscientious objection rests in part to the impossibility of "just war" (which is a transnational concept), it would be reasonable for international law and institutions to recognize this status. But international recognition and protection have come slowly. The Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly (1967) was the first multilateral organization to affirm conscientious objection as a

"personal right," absolving individuals of any obligation to perform armed service (Peace Pledge Union). Not until 1993, however, after once rejecting (1984) assertions that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights included a right to conscientious objection, did the U.N. Human Rights Committee finally brush aside the absence of a direct reference to conscientious objection in the Covenant, declaring "that such a right could be derived from article 18 [freedom of thought, conscience and religion] inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may conflict with the freedom of conscience."

One of the clearest statements of the principle underlying conscientious objection comes from the 1854 London Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends (Quakers) held during the Crimean War (1854–56): "No plea of necessity or of policy, however urgent or peculiar, can avail to release either individuals or nations from the paramount allegiance which they owe unto Him who hath said 'Love your enemies'" (Some Historic Statements).

As government's power becomes more centralized, the tendency, even in democracies, is to curtail individual rights and liberties, including the right to unbiased information necessary for informed opinions and responsible actions. The Founding Fathers understood that, over time, manipulating language could alter unconscious perceptions among the majority about the motives and rationales of dissenting minorities. Nowhere is this more evident than in Madison's original version of the 2nd Amendment, which recognized the supremacy of a well-reasoned (moral) conscience over all individual responsibilities to the state—even that of collective security. What sustains conscientious objection is its insistence on the completely moral life, one in which thought and action are consistently in harmony. Such unity is what keeps conscientious objection a relevant and powerful force in humankind's physical–spiritual world.

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Related Entries

All Volunteer Force; Antiwar Movements; Conscription and Volunteerism; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Pacifism; Quakers; Selective Service System.

Related Documents

1910; 1976 b

—*Daniel M. Smith*

Conscription and Volunteerism

Conscription as a means to fill an army's ranks offers many advantages. Because men are compelled to serve, the state does not need to offer financial incentives to draw them into military service. Conscription can therefore provide a large army much more economically than can most other accession systems. Conscription also brings men into the armed forces for a long enough time to train them in basic and advanced military procedures and skills. This process leaves the state with a large reserve of trained men to call upon in a national emergency. When conducted with a reasonable level of fairness and equity, conscription can also lead to a shared sense of service among a state's young males.

Despite these advantages, Americans largely resisted conscription until the 20th century. American libertarian ideals about limiting the power of government generally argued against the state possessing the power to remove men from the civilian job market, especially for compulsory

military service. The level of security provided (until 1941) by two large oceans also argued against the need to create a large standing army. Perhaps most important, Americans of the early republic saw large standing armies as a potential threat to civil liberties much more than as a means of protection from external enemies. Conflict with Native American nations created anxieties, but not enough to lead Americans to see compulsory military service as a solution.

Although some states had used drafts during the Revolutionary War, this authority more often led to men hiring substitutes than it did to men serving against their will. The Continental Congress did not assume the authority to impose military service, and the Constitution, while it empowers Congress to raise and support armies, makes no mention of doing so by conscription. Local pressure and economic hardship led many men into the military who might have preferred to avoid it, but the United States had no equivalent to the system of conscription that, for example, provided Napoleon's armies with more than two million conscripts.

Voluntary service, most often performed in local militias, has historically been embraced as the system most consistent with Americans' concepts of liberty. The Madison administration discussed introducing conscription during the War of 1812, but the plan faced enormous domestic opposition. Even had it passed, the limited power and immature bureaucratic apparatus of the young nation would likely have doomed conscription to failure. Instead, Americans fought the war as they had fought the wars on the frontier—with volunteers. Although their technical proficiency often left much to be desired, highly motivated American volunteers often fought quite well, as Andrew Jackson's lopsided victory over the British at New Orleans in 1815 testified.

The popularity of volunteerism was reinforced in the American mind by the apparent successes of American soldiers in the War of 1812 and later in the Mexican War. Volunteerism was therefore the most obvious method of drawing men into the armies of both sides when war between northern and southern states broke out in 1861. One year later, however, the 12-month commitments of the volunteers of 1861 had come to an end. After the initial rush to the colors at the beginning of the war, moreover, enlistments had not kept pace with the needs of the military. In

April 1862, therefore, the Confederate States of America introduced the first military draft in American history. The Union introduced its first conscription system one year later.

The American experience of conscription during the Civil War did little to recommend it as a method for funneling men into the armed forces. In the South, critics assailed the draft as a manifestation of the same violation of states' rights that had prompted secession in the first place. The southern system created domestic tensions by exempting planters with 20 or more slaves and including a substitution clause that allowed most men of means to avoid service should they so wish. The lack of a strong central government forced a decentralization of the management of the Confederate system, adding to its inefficiency and charges of unfair application.

Conscription proved to be unpopular in the North as well. Exemptions and substitution fees were unpopular with a majority of northern citizens, sparking violent opposition to the draft from Wisconsin to Pennsylvania to New York. Fueled by racial animosities, the 1863 antidraft riots in New York City left more than 100 dead. In both North and South, the draft served as an impetus to convince men to enlist voluntarily with local units rather than risk being conscripted into nationally based units, but the draft itself did not produce many soldiers. Fewer than 6 percent of all Union soldiers entered the Army via conscription.

The Civil War experience thus seemed to confirm to most Americans that the draft was both inconsistent with American values and an inefficient way to raise an army. America's ability to raise a large, highly motivated volunteer force to fight the Spanish–American War of 1898 offered further ammunition to those opposed to conscription. As Andrew Jackson had done at the beginning of the century, Theodore Roosevelt provided the nation with a visible heroic symbol of the volunteer movement, but many Americans may not have realized that the "Rough Riders" had been effectively accompanied up San Juan Hill by several units of black regulars. Roosevelt's ascension to the presidency in 1901 led to military policies based around a strong Navy and a re-formed, professional Army constituted of volunteers, not conscripts.

World War I led to reconsideration of the traditional American antipathy to conscription. The need to create a

large army played an important role in the American movement away from volunteerism, but the increasing complexity of modern economics almost demanded some form of conscription. Americans learned from the British experience (Great Britain did not introduce conscription until 1916) that a surge of volunteers often left key industries without the skilled labor they needed. The Wilson administration therefore settled on a policy of channeled manpower or selective service, designed to keep some workers out of the Army and in occupations (such as farming and mining) necessary to winning the war.

The spirit of American volunteerism, however, remained. Rather than compel men to register for the draft under the threat of prison, the administration relied on public relations campaigns and local pressure to induce men to sign up voluntarily for the draft. The government could then claim that it had not really operated a draft at all, but a selection from a nation that had volunteered en masse. The administration also sidestepped an offer from Teddy Roosevelt to raise and lead a volunteer American division. Despite resistance to the draft in many places, conscription, which provided 2.8 million of the 3.5 million Americans who served in World War I from 1917 to 1918, had won the day, although the government quickly cancelled conscription after the armistice of November 11, 1918.

The World War I system provided the model for the selective service of World War II. The administration of Franklin Roosevelt pushed through a controversial peacetime conscription law in 1940. The crisis caused by American entry into a two-front war led to the replacement of the 1940 system's call for men to serve one year. Instead, men drafted during the war were to serve for the duration. The United States drafted more than 10 million men for military service while retaining most of the same occupational deferments from World War I. Draft evasion proved to be only a minor nuisance to the government and, given the shared sense of national emergency, conscription saw little formal, organized opposition.

As it had done after World War I, the government stopped drafting men after the cessation of hostilities in 1945. But the growing specter of a Cold War led the government to reinstate peacetime conscription in 1948. Men

selected (including Elvis Presley and Willie Mays) served for 21 months. The system provided just over half of the men who served in the Korean War. Most of the draftees went to the Army; the Navy and the Air Force relied on the threat of conscription to induce men to volunteer.

Conscription remained in place after the end of major fighting in Korea in 1953. As the sense of national emergency receded and as the number of young men eligible for military service grew as a function of the Baby Boom, the nation faced a major surplus of draftees. It responded by raising the number of men exempted from conscription, including exemptions for married men and a massive increase in the number of men given a deferment to attend college. The result was a system of conscription that gave deferments disproportionately to white, middle-class men at the expense of working-class men and minorities.

The increased draft calls necessitated by the war in Vietnam revealed that the Selective Service System had fundamental flaws. Deferment decisions were made by local draft boards, which meant that men with family connections often received deferments they would not otherwise have merited. The draft provided only 16 percent of military personnel during the war, but draftees accounted for the majority of infantrymen and almost one-third of the Army's combat fatalities. Defense Department officials estimated that another one-third of volunteers were "draft motivated" because they volunteered for noncombat Army specializations or for service in the presumably safer Air Force or Navy. The manifest inequities of this system led to the introduction of a draft by lottery (based on a man's birthday) in 1969. The system was intended to reduce the appearance of unfairness, but most Americans saw it as only a minor change to an essentially unfair system. The large numbers of men who were able to evade the draft with impunity further undermined the legitimacy of Selective Service, even as the lottery system closed many loopholes and ended many deferments.

In 1971 Congress authorized the continuation of the draft, but only after a lengthy debate. The year before, President Nixon had created the Gates Commission to investigate the draft and make recommendations on its continuance. The Gates report strongly recommended a return

to a volunteer force, to be motivated by better pay, educational opportunities, and better housing, benefits, and marital support. President Nixon accepted the report, and the draft ended in 1973. Thereafter the All Volunteer Force came into effect, with the military accepting the Gates Commission's assumption that market incentives would be a sufficient attraction to enough men to fill the ranks of the armed forces. This assumption proved to be too optimistic, leading the military to accept increasing numbers of women throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Female participation helped to make up much of the shortfall in enlistments in the wake of Vietnam.

Despite the reintroduction of registration for the draft (for men only) by the Carter administration, the draft itself has not been reinstituted. Many analysts expected the Reagan administration to favor the return of the draft, but its libertarian impulses argued for volunteerism. Many military analysts today question whether conscripts would be appropriate for military operations that continue to grow increasingly complex. The volunteer tradition thus remains alive in the United States, as do the local traditions of the militia, now manifested in the deployments worldwide of National Guard units.

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All Volunteer Force; Conscientious Objection; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Impressment; New York City Anti-Draft Riots; Selective Service System

Related Documents

1774; 1776 a, b, c; 1777 a, b; 1785; 1797; 1830; 1861 a, c; 1862 a; 1863 a, b, f, g; 1917 c, d, e, f; 1965 b; 1976 b; 1977; 2004 a, c

—*Michael Neiberg*

Continental Army

On June 14, 1775, the Second Continental Congress adopted the New England militias then besieging the British Army in Boston as an intercolonial, or "Continental," Army. To make the army more truly continental, Congress authorized raising 10 companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, and soon called upon the other colonies to raise troops. The next day Congress selected George Washington as the commander in chief. The Continental Army reflected the aspirations, ideals, and realties of the Revolution. Initially a loosely organized association of colonial militias, it evolved into a hybrid institution that drew from and reconciled, not always successfully, both European military thought and American beliefs and behaviors. As a leading force of American resistance, it embodied the distinctiveness and identity of the American cause.

Forming and Organizing an Army

The militias surrounding Boston had long histories of service. They functioned as pools of semi-trained soldiers for local defense and as sources of volunteers and drafts for provincial regiments serving extended periods away from

home. In theory, all free men were enrolled. The reality, however, was different. Substitution, commutation, occupational and personal exemptions, and outright avoidance undercut the universal obligation. Under these circumstances, raising provincial regiments forced colonial authorities to negotiate with would-be soldiers over the terms, conditions, location, length and type of service, pay, bounties, and other important considerations.

Regular officers frequently noted that colonial soldiers tended to be independent and undisciplined. Mutinies, negotiations with authorities over service, or outright refusals to obey orders dumbfounded these officers, who often chalked up provincial behavior to cowardice. The soldiers' behavior, however, reflected their belief in the power, legitimacy, and universal applicability of contracts, including enlistment papers. They were, therefore, insisting upon their legal rights, often asserting their positions by withholding their labor over their employer's breach of contract. Thus, officials who failed to live up to their contractual obligations negated any expectations of obedience from the ranks. The Army adopted and raised in 1775 would face many of these same expectations and would struggle to integrate them within a more conventional regular military structure.

Shortly after appointing Washington, Congress also authorized the senior staff officers, added four major generals and eight brigadier generals, and published the Articles of War, which dictated the nature and style of Army discipline. The chief staff officers, adjutant general, mustermaster general, paymaster general, commissary general, and quartermaster general assisted Washington by performing vital administrative and logistical duties. The appointment of these general officers was both a military and a political necessity. Washington would need senior commanders for the separate field armies and departments, as well as for subordinate formations like divisions and brigades. Politically, the positions served as enticements and rewards: the more troops a colony mustered for service with the Continentals, the greater the likelihood it might win a coveted generalship for one of its own. Two of the major generals hailed from New England, one from New York, while the senior, Charles Lee, was a transplanted Englishman living in Virginia. Seven

of the eight brigadiers were New Englanders. Horatio Gates, the new adjutant general, was, like Lee, an English transplant in Virginia. While only three of the generals had extensive military service before the war, most of the others had experience as provincial officers in the French and Indian War or in colonial politics.

If American political realities dictated the initial selection of general officers, British military experience did the same for Army organization. Washington imposed basic order on the Army by organizing it into three divisions and six brigades and worked with Congress on appointing officers to the various staff departments. Within the Army itself, he entrusted the organization of subordinate staff positions to Horatio Gates. Washington's efforts at rationalizing Army organization included standardizing infantry regiments and other tactical units. Previously, the Yankee militia regiments boasted differing strengths, ranging from 599 to more than 1,000. In November 1775, Congress approved Washington's plans for eight-company regiments, with 728 soldiers, exceeding the 512 in a British regiment. To economize, Congress ordered Continental infantry regiments reorganized in 1778, an order opposed but obeyed by Washington, which put them on par with their British counterparts. Despite recruiters' efforts, it was a rare regiment that fielded anything like a full complement for very long. Col. Henry Knox, a former Boston bookseller, assumed command of the artillery, fashioning a highly competent force that proved its worth in early campaigns. As was the case for the infantry regiments, Britain provided a model for the American artillery.

From the outset, Washington modeled his army after Britain's. He hoped to create a European-style force, skilled in linear tactics, well-drilled, competent, and capable of besting British troops in open combat. He deplored the militia, which he considered a wasteful, unsteady force, unable or unwilling to fight in the open. By the end of 1776, the Army was well on its way to achieving the competence to which Washington aspired. It performed well in the Trenton and Princeton campaigns of December 1776 and January 1777. Short enlistments, however, hampered efforts at further improvement, indeed, even threatened the existence of the main Army.

Soldiers and Officers

Soldiers in 1775, and to a lesser extent in 1776, were highly enthusiastic about their service. They were impelled by a sense of duty and driven by a commitment to the American cause, which in their naiveté they believed could be won through the force of their virtuous self-sacrifice and ideological purity. Reality proved otherwise. Many of the soldiers who fought in 1775 and 1776 opted to leave the Army at their first chance. Washington had argued from the outset for a long-service, regular army. Only by enlisting soldiers for three or more years, he believed, could a competent professional force with an institutional memory be built. Congress, however, disagreed, believing that a standing army might threaten American liberties. During the summer of 1776, Congress reconsidered its position, authorizing three-year enlistments and the establishment of an 88-battalion Army.

Recognizing that more than appeals to virtue would be needed to enlist soldiers, Congress authorized land and cash bounties to recruit troops and induce veterans to reenlist. Some states resorted to conscription to fill their quotas. Wealthier citizens were able to avoid service by paying for substitutes—men who would fulfill more monied citizens' military obligations. Although these practices contradicted the concept of selfless duty to society, they do not imply that soldiers recruited through bounties or hired as substitutes were the scrapings of society nor do they mean that the Army was a perfect mirror of American society. Soldiering, as it had been for many young men in the colonial wars, was a means of establishing one's independence, but also an opportunity for adventure and comradeship. Often, prospective soldiers drove hard bargains for their enlistments. Patriotism and economic opportunity were not mutually exclusive. Bounties and other inducements were means of attaining personal autonomy that could be earned while serving society.

Recruiting officers was not a problem but retaining skilled ones and maintaining their morale and sense of personal honor was. Most had come from the upper strata of their societies and, because of their military service, were among those who had the most to lose socially and economically. Considerations of honor and economic and social standing drove officers to expect and eventually demand pensions. They viewed pensions as recognition of their service and sacrifice and as remuneration for their economic losses. After much debate, Congress granted seven years of half-pay for officers and an additional $80 bounty for soldiers who served until the war's end.

The Continental Army was never quite the British-style force Washington envisioned in 1775. Despite becoming disciplined and competent, its soldiers never fully surrendered their identity as Americans citizens cognizant of their rights nor their willingness to exercise those rights as they understood them. Continental regiments nearly mutinied in 1779; another mutiny was suppressed in 1780; in 1781 the Pennsylvania Line mutinied over pay, enlistments, discharges, and bounties; and in 1781 the New Jersey Line followed the Pennsylvania example. Once these soldiers' grievances were heard and remediation offered, they returned to duty. The mutinies, while dangerous to order, were not acts of disloyalty to the Revolution, but were instead resistance to authority that soldiers believed had reneged on its promises.

In the final years of the war, the issue of officers' half-pay resurfaced. In 1780 a large number of officers threatened to resign over the issue; in 1782 a faction within the Army encamped at Newburgh, New York, and demanded five years of full pay, suggesting it might resort to violence if its demands were not met. Some nationalists within Congress hoped to use this event, known as the Newburgh Conspiracy, as a means to strengthen the central government. On March 15, 1783, Washington addressed an assembly of officers and appealed to their honor, virtue, and devotion to the Revolutionary cause. In the end, the officers put the commonwealth ahead of their own self-interest.

Camp Followers

The host of camp followers was part of the larger Army community. Civilians called "sutlers," both authorized and extralegal, trailed the Army, providing hard-to-obtain goods and luxuries for soldiers, extending credit, and offering other creature comforts. Women were important members of the Army community, performing important functions as cooks, seamstresses, laundresses, and nurses. Other civilians worked within

the commissary, quartermaster, and paymaster departments. The Articles of War explicitly recognized camp followers by allotting selected numbers of them for duty as laundresses and cooks, providing them with rations and firewood, but also making them subject to military discipline should they interfere with military operations.

The Continental Army After the War

Congress began demobilizing the Army in June 1783. Most soldiers returned to civilian life, but with the feeling that they had been cheated by the Congress, by the states, and by the people. Unable to raise the money owed the soldiers, Congress sent them home with certificates worth three month's pay as their final due. Few ever realized the promise of attaining full membership or economic independence in the new nation. Many Americans repudiated the Continentals' service, arguing that the militia had sustained the Revolution and that the Army had been little more than a waste of resources. Dispirited and rejected by society, the Continentals were denied pensions for their service until 1818. Not until 1832 did Congress grant all veterans of the war old-age pensions.

Contrary to the wishes and fears of most Americans, the Continental Army was a standing army. It evolved from an idealistic, militia-based force motivated by notions of virtue and duty into a solid, competent, and skilled core of soldiers serving for pay and personal advancement, but also for the cause of independence. The Army was neither a mirror of American society nor a mercenary force divorced from the people. In the end, the Continental Army's skill enabled it to stand against and often defeat professional troops; its service and conduct embodied the spirit of the American Revolution and its members helped ensure American independence.

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Articles of War; Camp Followers; Colonial Militia Systems; Colonial Wars; Continental Army, Foreign Officers in; Customs of War; Desertion; Draft Evasion and Resistance; European Military Culture, Influence of; Impressment; Revolutionary War; Sampson, Deborah; Society of the Cincinnati; Washington, George

Related Documents

1776 a, b

—*Ricardo A. Herrera*

Continental Army, Foreign Officers in

In popular memory, the American Revolutionary War was waged solely by patriots fighting for their country and their liberties against the hired mercenaries of England's King George III. For the purveyors of this myth, the presence of significant numbers of foreign officers serving in the Continental Army (and large numbers of foreign-born soldiers serving in the ranks as well) has always been awkward. The presence of high-ranking foreigners in the Continental Army has customarily been explained in one of two ways. Foreign officers have generally been portrayed as either ideological converts to the cause of American freedom or as useless parasites who fastened onto the struggling Continental Army and blocked the promotion of deserving native-born Americans. Both of these views are based on a false impression of the Continental Army. Historians increasingly contend that the Revolutionary War was not fought on the American side by patriotic yeoman farmers. National myth to the contrary, after the first year or so, the war was instead waged by the regular Continental Army, which, in composition, was far more like the armies of the ancien régime in Europe than it was a revolutionary force.

Multinational Armies

In the mid-18th century, regular armies were, to a surprising degree, multinational. During the 1758 campaign to capture Fort DuQuesne from the French, George Washington was exposed to this reality and acquired much of his military training while serving under the command of Gen. John Forbes, a lowland Scot, and Forbes's right-hand man, Col. Henry Bouquet. The Swiss-born Bouquet had first served in a Swiss regiment in the service of the Dutch, then in another Swiss regiment in the service of Sardinia, and then in the Dutch Guard, before finally accepting a commission in the British Army. Bouquet's commission was in the 60th Foot, Royal American Regiment, which, during the mid-18th century, was made up of large numbers of Irish, Scots, and German soldiers. In European armies of the mid-18th century, both officers and soldiers commonly served in armies other than those of the nation of their birth. This would be true of the Continental Army as well, which would come to closely resemble its principal foe, the British Army.

Once the Continental Congress decided to raise a standing army of some size, it needed officers for that army, particularly officers with experience at the higher levels of command. However, not enough of these men were to be found in North America. (For instance, before being appointed commander in chief of the Continental Army, George Washington had served at no higher rank than that of colonel.) It also needed officers with certain specialized skills, particularly staff officers and military engineers—even less common in North America. The only realistic source for these officers was Europe, where armies often hired skilled men on the open market. So, from early on, the Continental Congress's representatives in Europe made it their business to try to find officers for their new army.

Motives for Service

Soldiers in 18th-century Europe often sought their fortunes outside the nation of their birth. The national origin of these "soldiers of fortune" varied, and some nationalities were always overrepresented: people who suffered persecution such as the "wild geese" of Ireland, or impoverishment such as the Scots, or those from areas such as central Germany or Switzerland where soldiering was a recognized trade with a long tradition of leaving home for wars. Moreover, for many "gentlemen," the field of battle was still the place to seek honor, and if one's homeland could not provide an honorable battlefield, then one traveled elsewhere to fight. Likewise, for the gentleman who had to earn a living, yet who wished to maintain his status as a gentleman, soldiering was one of the few acceptable occupations open to him, and he might have to travel a distance to find employment.

Less common, but not unknown, were instances of officers in one army sent to serve in another—either as part of an effort to provide assistance (as was the case for many of the French volunteers who would serve with the Continental Army) or as a type of observer. The last great European conflict, the Seven Years' War (1756–63), had ended more than a dozen years before the Continental Army was in the market for officers. As a result, many European officers, such as

Baron Friedrich von Steuben who served as the drill master of the Continental Army, were unemployed or underemployed and looking for work when the Continental Army was hiring.

Belief in the cause of the war was not a significant concern for foreign officers, which made the creation of multinational armies possible. Most 18th-century wars were not ideologically driven, and those who fought in them served for their own interests and were seldom strongly vested in their outcome. While the American Revolution to a degree broke this model and was, in many ways, an ideological conflict, the Continental Army itself was not generally ideologically motivated. Some foreign volunteers, particularly the French, were serving either at the request of their own government or to avenge the British defeat of France in the Seven Years' War. A few of the foreign officers who served in the Continental Army might have been inspired by the ideals of the American Revolution. The Marquis de Lafayette, who served with the Continental Army and was later prominent in the early stages of the French Revolution, is often cited as a foreign officer who fought out of a belief in the principles of the Revolutionary War; however, he was in a distinct minority.

Quarrels and Dissension

Despite the honorable status of the profession, foreign officers serving in the Continental Army were often very unpopular, both with their contemporaries and with historians. They were portrayed as frauds who overstated their qualifications and abilities, incompetents who blocked the promotion of deserving American officers, turbulent spirits who incited quarrels, and mercenaries whose loyalty could not be trusted. As in all clichés, there is a measure of truth: the Continental Army was seen as a "seller's market" and it certainly attracted a colorful collection of military adventurers. A foreign officer who received a commission possibly did prevent a native officer from receiving it, and the presence of foreign officers certainly did create quarrels.

These accusations, however, must be kept in perspective. Native-born officers' claims to military rank were often no more valid than those of foreign-born officers. Quarrels were endemic in the 18th-century military world, and American officers quarreled as eagerly as foreigners

over command, seniority, promotion, and many other issues. For instance, von Steuben grotesquely overstated his qualifications. He claimed, among other things, to be a Prussian lieutenant general when he had only reached the rank of captain; nonetheless, he is generally considered to have been the most useful of all the foreign officers who served with the Americans and was probably of greater use than most American officers. Interestingly, the single greatest instance of disloyalty that threatened the revolutionary cause came not from a foreigner, but a native-born officer, Benedict Arnold.

The Contributions of Foreign Officers

While much dissension has arisen about the participation of foreign officers in the Revolution, they did make substantial contributions to the Continental Army. In general, foreign officers honorably and successfully fulfilled their wartime responsibilities. Steuben attended to the drill and training of the Continental Army and often served as a type of chief of staff to George Washington. Other foreign officers provided specialized military skills that were not readily available in the colonies. The French officer Louis le Bègue de Presle Duportail served as the commander of the Engineering Corps, and foreign officers provided the majority of the Continental Army's skilled military engineers. The Polish officer Casimir Pulaski trained the Continental cavalry, and foreign soldiers helped organize the light infantry that became the elite arm of the Continental Army. A Prussian veteran, Capt. Bartholomew von Heer, commanded the Maréchaussée Corps, the Continental Army's military police force. More generally, the presence of experienced foreign officers, such as German officer Johann de Kalb—who came to American military from the French service—provided a pool of expertise that often proved useful to the American cause. George Washington frequently referred important questions to a board of general officers often consisting largely of foreigners.

Conclusion

Given the realities of the 18th-century military world, once the decision was made to organize a regular army, the presence of foreign officers was inevitable and most served

honorably and well. Although the participation of foreign officers alone did not gain the Americans victory, the presence of foreign officers helped the Continental Army develop into an effective fighting force that was nearly equal to the British Army. Foreign officers provided military skills, experience, and seasoned commanders, which simply were not available in the colonies.

However, for a Continental Congress and an American public already nervous about the presence of a regular standing army, the fact that much of the leadership of this standing army consisted of foreign officers could only, and perhaps understandably, increase this anxiety. On a more positive note, the presence of foreign officers in an army based on European models also provided a precedent that would outlive the Continental Army. The knowledge and methods introduced by foreign officers helped ensure that when the United States re-formed its regular army, that army would again reflect European patterns.

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European Military Culture, Influence of; Revolutionary War; Washington, George

—*Scott N. Hendrix*

Court of Military Appeals

A product of post–World War II lawmaking, the Court of Military Appeals is evidence of the reform impulse triggered by that war. The court, created because veterans thought their sacrifices deserved a fairer system of military criminal justice than the one they had experienced during the war, presided over a sea change in the way American courts-martial operated. Composed of civilian judges who serve as the armed forces' highest judicial authority, the court's existence confirms the supremacy of civil over military rule, the importance of an independent judiciary, and U.S. commitment to justice as well as discipline among its citizens in uniform. During the latter half of the 20th century, the court oversaw an increasingly civilianized—but still separate—system of criminal justice in the military.

Origins

Until Congress's Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) created the Court of Military Appeals in 1950, a court-martial verdict could only be challenged before a civilian court through collateral means—most often a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a suit for lost pay in a civilian court—rather than via a direct appeal. With the opening of the court's

doors in 1951, convicted servicemembers for the first time could appeal to a civilian court dedicated to military justice. The court exercised mandatory review of all courts-martial verdicts that imposed death sentences and provided discretionary review of other cases, including those involving other serious punishments or important legal issues. Judges were appointed to terms of 15 years rather than the life tenure that other federal judges enjoyed and were required to belong to different political parties, a provision intended to reduce partisanship. The first three judges appointed to the court by Pres. Harry Truman were Paul W. Brosman, dean of the Tulane Law School and a colonel in the Air Force; George W. Latimer, a justice on the Utah Supreme Court and an Army colonel during World War II who served until 1961; and Robert E. Quinn, appointed chief judge, a former governor of Rhode Island and Navy captain during World War II who remained on the bench until 1975.

Because the UCMJ was new, the court was not as bound by existing precedent as civilian courts, giving its judges a critical role in establishing the standards of military justice. Until 1983, when Congress authorized Supreme Court review of its opinions, the Court of Military Appeals was the court of last resort for almost all servicemembers convicted at courts-martial. In 1990, the court was expanded to five judges, and in 1994 it was renamed the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in an effort to echo the names of other federal courts of appeal and more clearly advertise its appellate role.

Impact

The military's highest court has played a crucial role in building a modern criminal justice system in the U.S. armed forces. Its opinions, most of which garnered little notice outside the ranks of the military, interpreted and enforced the reforms of the UCMJ, sometimes against the wishes of military officers. The court defined a baseline of "military due process" in early opinions, including *United States v. Clay* (1951), which articulated servicemembers' right to be informed of charges, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to be represented by counsel, to avoid self-incrimination, and to appeal a conviction.

The court attracted notice within the military because of dissatisfaction with its rulings and frustration at its power.

Throughout its first three decades, commanders and judge advocates resisted the court's authority and quarreled with its decisions, railing against the greater costs and inconveniences of the modernized military justice system. In 1956, the Air Force judge advocate general argued publicly that neither the UCMJ nor the Court of Military Appeals was necessary. By 1980, after controversial decisions limiting the powers of commanders and extending its own authority, the court's relationship with the military had deteriorated to the point that the Department of Defense suggested the court be abolished and its jurisdiction transferred to a federal circuit court. Although the court survived these attacks, it could not diffuse the tension created by its supervisory role over military justice.

Prosecutions of crimes related to war also raised the profile of the court. After the Korean War, *United States v. Batchelor* (1956) was foremost among a series of landmark cases involving American soldiers court-martialed for collaborating with communists in North Korean and Chinese prisoner-of-war camps. In the course of affirming the convictions, the court carefully considered many legal challenges to the verdicts regarding pretrial processing of the repatriated soldier and the sanity of the accused men. During the Vietnam War, the court considered and affirmed *United States v. Calley* (1973), the only conviction that resulted from the infamous My Lai massacre in 1968. Prosecutions for illegal drug use, which rose dramatically during and after the Vietnam War, posed legal issues that the court resolved by balancing the privacy and due process rights of individual servicemembers against the military's need to maintain good order and discipline.

Future

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces will continue to weigh the rights of individual servicemembers against the needs of the military and the exigencies of war, acting to ensure that military criminal justice does not operate beyond the reach of civilian legal authority. As the rights of civilians evolve under Supreme Court jurisprudence, the rights of servicemembers will follow suit, within the constraints of military service. For example, in 2004, the court decided *United States v. Marcum*, in which an airman challenged the

UCMJ's sodomy statute after the Supreme Court struck down state sodomy statutes as unconstitutional in *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003). Ultimately, the court held that the UCMJ's sodomy provision did not violate the Constitution as applied to the airman's acts, which were not protected by the liberty interest articulated in Lawrence because they involved sexual indiscretions prohibited by regulations barring intimate relationships within the military chain of command.

The military's highest court faced its next high-profile challenge when the courts-martial involving prisoner abuse in Iraq—including the trials of servicemembers who appear in the scandalous photographs taken at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and reproduced around the world—reached the court in 2005 and after. In previous cases, such as the My Lai case of Lieutenant Calley, the court considered and rejected the defense of superior orders, which argues that servicemembers should not be held criminally liable when they act at the command of a higher-ranking officer. Although this is often the best defense of those who commit indisputable atrocities during wartime, its application has been limited by the judicial recognition of soldiers' legal duty to disobey an order that is "manifestly illegal." By requiring that even low-ranking servicemembers exercise independent judgment, the Court of Military Appeals has put all military personnel on notice that they act at their own peril if they follow an order to commit a crime of war.

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Customs of War; Uniform Code of Military Justice

—Elizabeth Lutes Hillman

Crazy Horse

(1842?–77)
Leader of Lakota Sioux

Crazy Horse was one of the greatest Sioux leaders. His losing battle to stop white encroachment on Sioux land marked the end of the Sioux's nomadic hunter life on the Great Plains and the transition to reservation life. Crazy Horse is probably best remembered for his leadership at the battle of Little Bighorn.

Born circa 1842, Crazy Horse witnessed the struggle between whites and Sioux as a child. As a young man, he received his name Crazy Horse after he had a vision of a warrior on horseback immune to his enemy's bullets and arrows. The vision also prophesied that the warrior would one day be a great leader of his people.

Conflict between the Sioux and the United States was ongoing, including a major Sioux uprising in Minnesota on August 18, 1862. In 1865, the United States opened the Bozeman Trail, which ran through Native American lands in Montana and Wyoming. The government signed treaties with tribal leaders to prevent conflict between settlers and indigenous peoples. But many Sioux, including Sitting Bull, refused to sign the agreement: they did not want any whites passing through their lands.

Between 1865 and 1868, Crazy Horse fought alongside Red Cloud against settlers in Wyoming. A year after opening the Bozeman Trail, the government began constructing military posts. On December 21, 1866, Crazy

CRAZY HORSE

Horse, acting as decoy, led 80 soldiers from Fort Phil Kearny into a trap set by the Lakota Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho; the event became known as the Fetterman Massacre, and subsequently the United States sought peace with these Native American nations. In 1868, the U.S. government and members of the Sioux signed the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie. This treaty set aside the western Dakotas and eastern Wyoming as "unceded Indian Territory." The government agreed to abandon posts along the Bozeman Trail and the Sioux agreed to settle on reservations. Not all tribal leaders agreed with the treaty, and the Sioux split into factions shortly after its signing. Red Cloud and his followers went to live at the agency on White River. Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull still refused to cede land; they and the others who rejected settling on reservations stayed in the Powder River country.

In 1874, the U.S. government sent Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer on an expedition into the Black Hills of the Dakotas. Custer's expedition came back with reports of gold, which led to white settlers and miners moving into the Black Hills by 1875. The gold rush inspired the federal government to attempt to purchase Sioux land, but the Sioux refused. Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull opposed the policy of concentration on reservations and were willing to fight to retain their land and freedom. On December 6, 1875, Pres. Ulysses S. Grant ordered all indigenous peoples on unceded land to report to agencies by January 31, 1876. Weather and distance prevented part of the Sioux nation from reporting on time, while others—including Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull—refused to report to an agency entirely. The government declared them hostile and launched a war against them.

Crazy Horse was a key figure in this final U.S. military campaign against the Sioux. He led the Lakota Sioux in several pivotal engagements of the war. On June 17, 1876, Gen. George Crook's command stumbled upon Crazy Horse's camp. At the battle of the Rosebud, Crazy Horse fought Crook to a standstill and stopped the general's advance up the Rosebud River. Several days later, on June 25, 1876, Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull led Lakota and Cheyenne warriors against Custer's 7th Cavalry at the battle of the Little Bighorn. Crazy Horse flanked Custer's troops from the north

and west in a counterattack, while Sitting Bull led a charge from the east and south. The combined effort, leadership, and skill of Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull resulted in the destruction of the 7th Cavalry.

Custer's defeat at the battle of the Little Bighorn prompted the Army to redouble its campaign against the Sioux. Throughout the winter of 1876–77, U.S. troops relentlessly pursued the Indians. In January 1877, Gen. Nelson A. Miles overtook Crazy Horse's band. Miles's overwhelming force and use of artillery forced Crazy Horse to flee. The constant military pressure and the lack of food led Crazy Horse to surrender at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, in May 1877. The Sioux leader believed that he would receive a reservation on Sioux hunting grounds in the Powder River country. But as Crazy Horse and his people would apparently not return to the Powder River country, rumors spread that he planned to flee. General Crook ordered the arrest of Crazy Horse. On September 5, 1877, soldiers stabbed Crazy Horse several times while trying to subdue him, mortally wounding him.

Crazy Horse led his people in resistance to concentration on reservations. Except for Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse was one of the last major Sioux leaders to surrender to the United States. Crazy Horse's death served as a signal to his people that they could no longer resist the powerful domination of the white society without killing more of their people.

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Related Entries

Custer, George Armstrong; Indian Wars: Western Wars

—Stacy W. Reaves

Cuban Missile Crisis

In October 1962 the United States and the Soviet Union came closer to war than the two superpowers ever had—or ever would. After a 13-day confrontation, Pres. John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev backed off, with both making substantial concessions. The Cuban Missile Crisis, as it is known in the United States—in the Soviet Union, it was called "the Caribbean Crisis," and in Cuba "the October Crisis"—not only represented the apex of the Cold War but was also its most dramatic turning point. The Cuban Missile Crisis has had an enduring legacy in American culture, in scholarship on nuclear deterrence and crisis bargaining, and in recent vigorous debates over nuclear proliferation.

Historical Background

At the beginning of 1959, Cuban guerillas led by Fidel Castro overthrew the pro-American dictator Fulgencio Batista. Bymid-1960 Castro had firmly oriented the new regime against the United States, and his government grew increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for military and economic aid. Soon after his inauguration, the newly installed President Kennedy approved an Eisenhower administration plan for a military invasion by Cuban exiles. The exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, were swiftly crushed by the Cuban military, and the expected popular uprising failed to materialize. The Bay of Pigs fiasco reinforced the Kennedy administration's commitment to removing Castro from power, to the point that some have characterized it as an "obsession." Kennedy authorized the largest covert operation in CIA history, Operation Mongoose, to undermine the Castro regime and Cuban economy and perhaps to assassinate Castro. He also ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare plans for a future invasion of the island. In 1962 the administration succeeded in barring Cuba from the Organization of American States, in putting in place a comprehensive economic embargo, and in pressuring 15 Latin American nations to break off relations with Cuba. In the eyes of Kennedy and his advisers, a strong stance on Cuba was necessary to forestall aggressive Soviet action in a more consequential place: Berlin.

Khrushchev, too, saw the fate of his country and his leadership wrapped up in the fate of Cuba. The People's Republic of China was increasingly challenging the U.S.S.R.'s leadership of the Communist world, and a failure to defend Cuba with sufficient vigor threatened to undercut the Soviet Union's standing. Moreover, in late 1961 and early 1962, U.S. Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey finally became operational, placing the Soviet Union at an even greater strategic disadvantage: the United States held a 4 to 1 edge in intercontinental ballistic missiles and a 17 to 1 edge in deliverable warheads. In addition to these political and strategic incentives, Khrushchev also thought he saw an opportunity for Communist gains, believing that Kennedy was cautious, if not timid, and would not risk nuclear armageddon. When, in the late spring of 1962, Khrushchev offered to bring Cuba firmly within the Soviet Union's orbit and to deploy nuclear missiles under Soviet control, Castro, who with good reason feared for his life and for his regime, enthusiastically accepted the proposition.

The Crisis

During the summer of 1962, American suspicion about Soviet activities in Cuba grew, and the domestic political pressure on Kennedy became intense. In mid-September, the first Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles arrived in Cuba; in early October, nuclear warheads arrived. By late September, U.S. intelligence reported that missile sites appeared to be under construction, but not until October 14 did a U-2 spy plane turned up incontrovertible evidence. Particularly in light of repeated Soviet denials that they were developing (or would develop) Cuba's offensive capabilities,

the universal reaction of U.S. officials was that such provocation could not stand.

For a week, U.S. officials deliberated. On October 22, Kennedy addressed the world, demanding that the missiles be withdrawn and announcing the imposition of a naval "quarantine" (a blockade would have constituted an act of war) on shipments of "offensive" weapons to Cuba. At the same time, Kennedy ordered the military to prepare for air strikes or an invasion. U.S. naval forces took up positions two days later, and Soviet-bloc ships steaming toward Cuba decided at the last moment not to challenge the cordon.

The next week was a harrowing one as the world teetered at the edge of nuclear war. Soviet and U.S. decision makers weighed their options, and both Kennedy and Khrushchev deserve much credit for their caution. Kennedy in particular resisted recommendations and pressure—from among his closest civilian and military advisers and from outside the administration—to pursue more aggressive military action that would have raised the risk of unintended escalation. The style and substance of Khrushchev's missive of October 26 reflected the extreme stress under which the Soviet leader was operating; the letter offered to withdraw the missiles in exchange merely for an American promise not to invade the island. The next day, however, more tough-minded correspondence, perhaps pressed on the Soviet premier by the Politburo, articulated an additional, far less attractive, demand: the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Unsure which represented the real Khrushchev,

New Yorkers lineup for newspapers, eager for news on the events unfolding during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

Kennedy gambled: he simply ignored the second letter and accepted the first's terms.

The situation grew more tense when an American U-2 was downed during a Cuba overflight and another U.S. spy plane drifted into Soviet airspace. Fearful that the accelerating cycle of violence would eventually push the two powers over the precipice, Kennedy agreed to the terms of Khrushchev's second letter, but in a way that would permit the United States to save face. In exchange for the withdrawal of the missiles, he offered a public commitment not to invade Cuba and a private assurance that the United States would quietly withdraw the Jupiters a few months after United Nations inspectors confirmed that Soviet missiles had been removed from Cuban territory. Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy's proposal, and on October 28 the crisis all but came to an end. American officials congratulated themselves for having stared down the Russian bear, but the better informed among them knew that both sides had gone far to allay the other's concerns. On November 21 Kennedy announced that the United States was satisfied that the missiles had been withdrawn—Castro had denied U.N. inspectors access to the sites, so the United States relied on aerial photography instead—and that the quarantine was no longer in effect.

From the perspective of the American public, first informed of the missiles by Kennedy over television and radio, the Cuban Missile Crisis lasted just a week. Americans confronted the prospect of imminent nuclear war as one might expect: some were fatalistic, others lived in denial, but nearly all felt a most palpable fear and many panicked. Millions evacuated their homes, and all over the country shoppers raided supermarkets for emergency supplies. Tourists and other foreign visitors desperately sought to flee to safer parts of the globe. Americans faced the brutal fact that talk of civil defense in the preceding decade had been just that. When the crisis abated, the public was understandably relieved, but raised no clamor for an ambitious civil defense program to reduce the vulnerability to nuclear attack. Some undoubtedly understood that the nuclear revolution meant that defense had become impossible—they embraced the logic of nuclear deterrence. Most, however, simply avoided unpleasant realities, and others refused to abandon the elusive dream of foolproof defense—reflected

later in Ronald Reagan's focus on the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars," as it was more popularly known) and George W. Bush's commitment to missile defense.

Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis

Khrushchev's motives in placing missiles in Cuba have been the subject of much controversy. The emerging consensus appears to be that his primary goals were deterring an American invasion of the island, countering the overwhelming U.S. advantage in strategic nuclear weapons, and building the foundation for a triumph in the long-festering Berlin issue. Kennedy chose to proceed initially with the quarantine rather than a number of other possible options (air strikes, invasion, diplomacy) because he believed that only a strong display would persuade the Soviets of American resolve, while too strong a display could spark a full-fledged war. The most interesting question with regard to the United States is why the installation of the missiles was viewed as inherently threatening. With the notable exception of McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser, no other prominent member of the administration advocated doing nothing in response (and Bundy changed his tune when it became apparent that he was very much in the minority). The domestic politics of Cold War America played a role, but so too did concerns about the international repercussions of passivity, specifically, concerns were voiced about maintaining the U.S. reputation for resolve among its allies and adversaries alike.

That both superpowers ran such great risks for such apparently small rewards has led many scholars to interpret the crisis as a classic illustration of the impact of individual and organizational irrationality on foreign policy. Soviet and American decision making was rife with misperceptions and miscalculations—in part because policy makers suffered from cognitive and motivated biases and in part because they were misled by bureaucracies committed to parochial interests. Moreover, organizations following standard operating procedures nearly led the United States and the Soviet Union over the nuclear cliff. Soviet leaders wrongly saw a U.S. nuclear test in the Pacific, scheduled long before, as a clumsy effort at intimidation. U.S. decision makers perceived the downing of their spy plane over Cuba by Soviet

surface-to-air missiles as escalatory saber rattling by the Kremlin, for they incorrectly assumed that the order to shoot down the plane had come from Moscow. Yet such psychological and organizational explanatory templates have their limits as well: they cannot account for the Kennedy administration's consensus that the missiles threatened U.S. national interests.

Many have traditionally attributed the resolution of the crisis to American strategic and tactical superiority, but this was well-known to the Soviets before they embarked on this venture. The concept of deterrence has changed: the balance of power per se is now considered far less important than the balance of interests. The side that cares most deeply is willing to climb higher up the escalatory ladder, and it can consequently issue more credible threats; thus, its preferences will come to dominate. The proximity of Cuba to the U.S. mainland gave the United States an inherent advantage in the competition for credibility, but the Soviets, too, had strong reasons not to back down. Objective measures of strategic and tactical strength mattered less to the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis than the superpowers' perceptions of their respective interests and resolve.

The Crisis and Nuclear Deterrence

That the United States and the Soviet Union avoided war during the Cuban Missile Crisis is powerful evidence, according to some, of the logic of nuclear deterrence. When faced with mutual assured destruction, both countries grew cautious and carefully picked a path away from the brink.

But dumb luck and resolute leadership played an equally large, if not greater, role. Had Kennedy listened to many of his advisers and approved air strikes or an invasion, the Soviet Union and the United States might have laid waste to each other. The two countries again came close to war in 1973, during the war between Israel and the surrounding Arab states; on several other occasions, nuclear command and control faltered and accidents nearly grew into tragedies. The Cuban Missile Crisis is more clearly viewed not as a triumph, but as a cautionary tale.

Contemporary debates about the dangers of nuclear proliferation turn in part on such differing interpretations of the Soviet and American experience with nuclear weapons. The stability of deterrence during the Cold War may inspire confidence that future nuclear-armed states would show equal caution. If, however, the fact that the Cold War did not turn hot was less the product of reason than of luck and leadership, then any confidence that other nuclear rivals, India and Pakistan, for example, would be as fortunate might be misplaced.

The Crisis and the Cold War

The Cuban Missile Crisis represented the height of the Cold War—but arguably also its end. Between the mid-1940s and the early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a competition for global influence that knew no bounds. The crisis of October 1962 marked a critical turning point, as both superpowers identified a line that could not be crossed and negotiated ground rules that fundamentally altered the nature of their relationship. The two countries sought means of improving communication so that in future situations of crisis they could safely pull back from the brink, and they began a series of arms control negotiations—the most significant outcome being the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963). These explicit mechanisms of assuring stability in crisis were, however, less important than the tacit agreements forged over Cuba (the Soviets refrained from building Cuban offensive capability, and the United States reconciled itself to a Communist Soviet–allied regime on the island) and more generally over their respective spheres of influence. Covert activities to roll back Soviet control over Eastern Europe and American influence in Latin America, which were so common in the 1950s, were all but unheard-of after the crisis. Moreover, after 1962, both superpowers accepted the status quo with regard to Germany and relinquished any hope of reuniting the country on their side of the Cold War divide.

In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, superpower competition remained intense, but it was confined to areas of lesser sensitivity. By the mid-1960s, analysts spoke often of superpower relations after the Cold War—not because they optimistically projected from an incipient détente to a future in which superpower conflict would be absent. Rather, they appreciated that the very nature of superpower action had changed, that what had transpired was a difference of kind,

not just a difference of degree. When superpower tensions intensified in the late 1970s and early 1980s, many perceived a new Cold War, but in fact the post–Cuban Missile Crisis rules of the game remained essentially unchanged. The greatest challenge to them came not from Ronald Reagan's aggressive rhetoric regarding the "evil empire," but from his zealous pursuit of American invulnerability that threatened to undermine the Soviet nuclear deterrent.

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Related Entries

Berlin Crises; Cold War; Nuclear Strategy

—Ronald R. Krebs

Custer, George Armstrong

(1839–76)
Army Officer

George Armstrong Custer is the patron saint of American hubris. Even at its most flattering, his popular image is of a bold cavalier galloping headlong into disaster; at worst, Custer's image is embodied in the 1970 film *Little Big Man*: charging off to his own ruin and that of his men with the exultant cry, "Take no prisoners!" The image actually fits Custer's flamboyant persona, though it mocks his very real military abilities.

Born in New Rumley, Ohio, on December 5, 1839, Custer spent most of his youth in Michigan. He entered the U.S. Military Academy in 1857 and graduated in June 1861, dead last in a class of 34 cadets. The class was smaller than usual because a number of Custer's southern classmates had departed months before to join the defense of the Confederacy.

In June 1861 the Civil War had been under way for two months. Second Lt. Custer, assigned to the Union Army gathering near Washington, D.C., arrived just in time to see combat in the 1st battle of Manassas (Bull Run) on July 21, 1862. He spent his entire Civil War career with that Army, soon designated the Army of the Potomac, but remained a minor figure until he joined the staff of Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. Custer impressed Pleasonton with his energy and flair, and when Pleasonton received command of the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry Corps, he requested that three of his staff be commissioned as brigadier generals of volunteers. One of them was Custer, then only a brevet captain. When the 23-year-old Custer donned the shoulder straps of a brigadier general, he briefly became the youngest general in the Union Army.

Custer received command of the Michigan Brigade, distinguishing himself in a major cavalry action a few miles east of Gettysburg on June 3, 1863—fought at roughly the same time as Pickett's Charge. He gained increasing fame as a tough, flamboyant, hard-charging cavalry leader, particularly under Pleasonton's successor, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan. During the final retreat of Gen. Robert E. Lee's army from

Richmond and Petersburg, Custer was among the cavalry generals most responsible for bringing Lee to bay at Appomattox Court House. Custer ended the war a major general of volunteers. He was barely 26 years old.

Following the war, the volunteer commissions evaporated. Custer, like most officers, fell back on his regular Army rank, in his case that of lieutenant colonel. He became second-in-command of the 7th U.S. Cavalry, a unit that, for all practical purposes, he commanded until his death. Although well liked by his Civil War troops, he managed to antagonize many soldiers in his postwar outfit by his severe disciplinary policies and flamboyant displays. He was even court-martialed in 1867 and sentenced to a year's suspension from rank and pay. The charge, significantly, was leaving his post without authorization to visit his wife, Elizabeth Bacon Custer. The pair had a close, highly charged relationship, writing each other constantly during their lengthy separations. Custer left his post because he had heard nothing from her for an extended period and had become frantic to see her.

Custer was returned to active duty after only 10 months, thanks to Sheridan's intervention, and sent west to help subdue raiding Cheyenne war parties. Unable to overtake the war parties in the open field, Custer resorted to a common Army expedient: he traced them back to an Indian village and launched a surprise attack at dawn, forcing the warriors to stand and defend their women, children, and the elderly. More than 100 Cheyenne, many of them noncombatants, died in this battle of the Washita, which cemented Custer's reputation as an Indian fighter.

Custer participated in several other expeditions against Indians, but the Washita remained his only major encounter until the battle of the Little Bighorn nine years later. During the interval, he produced a series of informative, skillfully written magazine articles that were published in 1874 under the title *My Life on the Plains*, part of a tireless campaign of self-promotion that was continued after his death by his adoring widow, who proved to be equally skilled with the pen.

For all his exploits and self-promotion, Custer might well have remained an obscure figure. True, he fought gallantly during the Civil War and became a general at a tender age, but that conflict produced many other gallant, youthful generals. After the war, he showed skill as an Indian fighter, but not as much as several others. His notoriety derives from one simple fact: on June 25, 1876, Custer and his entire command—263 men—were annihilated by 2,000 to 3,000 Native American warriors at the Little Bighorn River in present-day Montana.

The defeat spawned a fascination with Custer that has never abated. As of the late 1990s, more had been written about him than any American save Abraham Lincoln. News of Custer's loss came at the height of the centennial celebration of U.S. independence, shocking the nation and spawning a cottage industry of attempts, some of them rather bizarre, to explain the debacle. The total loss of a command surrounded by a force 10 or 15 times its size would seem to require little explanation, but the larger force was composed of Sioux and Cheyenne, the smaller of white men. The cult of the Little Bighorn thus says something about the tenacity of white assumptions of superiority. As to what such a loss could mean to white America, Indian activist Vine Deloria supplied a pointed answer in the title of his best-selling 1969 manifesto: *Custer Died for Your Sins*.

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Civil War; Crazy Horse; Indian Wars: Western Wars; Sheridan, Philip H.

—*Mark Grimsley*

Customs of War

Soldiers know that you never use an umbrella while in uniform, and they know that you do not fire upon a white flag. Today these precepts are written into such varied codes as international law and military regulations, but long before such codification took place, soldiers followed these and many other unwritten rules, based upon their understanding of the "customs of war."

It is generally known that today's Laws of War—the body of international law that attempts to regulate the conduct of warfare—are the products of a series of international conferences beginning with one held in Geneva in 1863. What is less commonly understood is that these conferences did not start with blank slates.To a considerable degree, these conferences regularized long-standing European customs that guided the conduct of war. What is even less well understood is that not only did these traditions regulate actions between armies during war, covering such areas as the declarations of war, truces, and surrenders, they also covered conduct within armies, such as military discipline and the conduct of courts-martial. Even today, these customs continue to affect the organization and operation of modern armies.

The Disciplines of War

Shakespeare's Captain Fluellen knew the "disciplines of war," which to him meant subjects as diverse as the proper construction of a mine under the walls of Harfleur (Henry V, III, ii), and the knowledge that to kill the boys who were staying with the baggage was against "the law of arms" (Henry V, IV, vii). These literary references show that by Shakespeare's time (late 16th to early 17th centuries) a common, transnational understanding had arisen, both of how military tasks were to be performed and of how wars were to be conducted. The key concept here is transnational.

The military world of 16th- and 17th-century Europe was an international one. Soldiers, who moved freely about Europe in search of employment, carried military techniques and customs around Europe as well. Over time, a common understanding developed of many features of military life, from the large to the small. These customary usages arose for two important and interrelated reasons: first, as neither detailed manuals explaining how every conceivable military task was to be accomplished were available nor huge military bureaucracies in place to direct every aspect of military life, the "customs, usages, and disciplines of war" supplied European armies much of what was lacking. They were, in effect, early modern military Europe's standard operating procedures. Second, as the European military world was transnational, the pan-European nature of the "disciplines of war" enabled soldiers to move from army to army and fit in with a minimum of confusion. In short, like most other occupations in the early modern world, armies operated more on a customarily established corpus of knowledge than on written directives.

The Customs of War

By the time that large armies began operating in North America in the mid-18th century, these customs of war were well established and understood. In effect, they acted as a body of international military common law, whose provisions could be binding. Most European armies eventually wrote some of these customs into formal military law, known in the Anglo–American tradition as the Articles of War or, more correctly, The Rules and Articles for the Better Government of His Majesty's Forces, or the Rules and Articles for the Better Government of the Troops—the first an act of Parliament, and the second an act of the Continental Congress. The Articles of War of both the British Army and the Continental Army contained several references to the "Disciplines of War," for example: "Whoever shall make known the Watch Word [password] to any Person who is not

intitled to receive it, according to the rules and Disciplines of War . . . shall suffer Death, or such other Punishment as shall be inflicted upon him by a General Court Martial." (British Articles of War, sec. XIV, art. XV; American Articles of War, sec. XIII, art. 15) Even more remarkably, both also required officers sitting on courts-martial to swear that they would: "duly administer Justice . . . if any doubt shall arise, which is not explained by the said articles, . . . according to my Conscience, the best of my Understanding, and the Customs of War in the like Cases" (British Articles of War, sec. XV, art. VII; American Articles of War, sec. XIV, art. 3). In short, the Articles of War clearly recognized the existence of customary practices that were widely understood and, under some circumstances, had the force of law. British and Hessian officers commonly sat on each others' courts-martial, a fact that makes clear the international nature of the customs and disciplines of war and strongly suggests that they were probably more important than statute law in the practical regulation of mid-18th-century armies.

The customs and disciplines of war embraced two broad areas, the internal management of armies and relationships between armies in the field. The power of the customs and disciplines of war can be seen in the broad basic similarities shared by mid-18th-century European armies. At the most basic level—the fundamental structure of the military—one can see that the sizes of various units, as well as the ranks and responsibilities of the different officers, were broadly comparable across European armies of the mid-18th century. All armies were subdivided into regiments commanded by colonels, with companies commanded by captains. Even when the language changed, the terminology was usually similar, captain in English, capitaine in French, for instance. Similarly, military discipline was largely standardized within European armies: for example, enlisted soldiers understood that they were to behave deferentially toward their officers, removing their hats when they spoke to them, for instance. The customs and disciplines of war prescribed many of the ceremonial aspects of military life, the salutes of cannon fire, presented arms offered to generals, and the use of military music. Much—sometimes all—of this was uncodified.

The customs and usages of war also regulated the conduct of armies toward each other. For instance, the customs of war laid down the procedure for one army to contact another when it was desired to request a truce or to surrender. (A drummer or trumpeter was commonly used, often beating a specific drum beat, the chamade. This, for example, was how British Gen. Earl Cornwallis signaled his surrender at Yorktown during the American Revolution.) Custom laid down the procedure for surrender negotiations, the "capitulation" whereby the side surrendering proposed a list of terms, to which the victor could agree or otherwise. They laid down the procedure of parole, whereby an officer-prisoner would give his word not to escape and was allowed a degree of freedom while in captivity. They regulated the "exchange" of prisoners, whereby each side traded its prisoners for those its enemies held, and they covered the organization of the "cartel," the actual exchange mechanism.

By the 18th century the customs of war also attempted to limit the "collateral damage" of warfare upon communities surrounding the fighting. Custom embraced the concept of the noncombatant. Civilians, provided they did not commit hostile acts, were not to be harmed or molested. Conversely, all combatants were expected to wear a uniform, and any combatant caught not doing so was liable to be executed as a spy, as was British Maj. John Andre during the American Revolution. In theory, private property was to be respected. The laws and customs of war tried, with rather less success, to set procedures for acceptable foraging (the seizing of food and fodder) and to limit looting. The laws and customs of war also prescribed the courtesies that armies were to extend to each another. This was seen perhaps most noticeably during capitulations, in which the surrendering party laid great store on surrendering with "the honors of war": that is, being allowed to march out carrying the arms and colors, with music playing, then being allowed to stack their weapons neatly, rather than simply having them thrown down and walking away.

The Limits of the Customs of War

Ultimately the customs of war evolved because they met a need. They made both the operation of armies and the conduct of war more efficient and possible. These customs were always limited in one respect, however: they only applied when recognized armies faced one another, and usually

worked most effectively during large, stand-up battles and sieges. European armies quickly determined that the rules did not apply when facing Native Americans or most other non-Europeans. Nor were the customs and disciplines of war applied so stringently in the so-called petit guerre, the small war of raids and ambushes that tended to accompany the movement of European armies. The customs of war, moreover, at least in theory, did not apply when fighting internal rebellions. Although, if the rebellion grew large enough, as it did during both the American Revolution and the American Civil War, a decision was quickly made that following the customs and laws of war was necessary, as otherwise life would become too unpleasant for both sides. This illustrates two important points: first, that the laws of war existed because they were useful and made life easier for both sides during a war; second, that retaliation was the enforcement mechanism for violations—even the most genteel of 18th-century wars usually saw accusations of atrocity and retaliation for alleged violations of the customs and laws of war.

The second half of the 19th century saw, with the first Geneva Conference of 1863, the beginning of an international movement to regularize the customs of war into the laws of war, and this movement continued into the 20th century. Initially these conferences were simply codifying the existing "customs, disciplines, and laws of war." Later conferences attempted to expand upon them. These conferences have had mixed success, probably because they have operated under the same constraints as the older customs of war. Generally the old customs and laws of war worked best when they regulated the conduct of armies from similar cultures, when the combatants were not ideologically or personally vested in the outcome of the wars they fought, and when open field battles and sieges were the chosen methods of war. The laws and customs of war operated less successfully when vastly different cultures fought one another, when the combatants were strongly committed to their cause, and when more irregular methods of warfare were adopted. As modern warfare has changed from the first set of conditions to the second, it may explain the mixed success of the modern international agreements that have attempted to codify and replace the older customs and of war.

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Articles of War; Just War Theory; Uniform Code of Military Justice

—Scott N. Hendrix

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
DARPA

See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Davis, Benjamin O., Sr.

(1877–1970)
Brigadier General

Benjamin O. Davis, Sr. was the first African American to earn the rank of general in the U.S. military. Despite facing multiple barriers to advancement, Davis was a career military officer who consistently championed black equality and education for African American youth. His work not only influenced the military but also helped shape national public policy. Moreover, Davis's example of commitment and sacrifice encouraged generations of black soldiers and civilians.

Davis was born in Washington, D.C., on July 1, 1877. Because his father was a civil servant and his mother a nurse, Davis lived a middle-class life in segregated Washington. His mother hoped that he would become a minister, but Davis developed an early interest in the military from conversations with the father of one of his friends who was a Civil War veteran. The all-black 9th Cavalry, stationed adjacent to Washington in northern Virginia, also piqued his interest in a military career.

Benjamin was a student at the famous M Street School, an educational mecca for black Washingtonians. As he developed into an outstanding student-athlete, Davis joined the school's Cadet Corps. Davis was commissioned in the District of Columbia National Guard in 1898. Davis hoped to see combat in the Spanish–American War, but the Army kept him far from the front lines, a foreshadowing of both the great disappointments and great achievements that would make him famous.

Following his high school graduation in 1898, the Army made Davis a temporary first lieutenant in the newly formed 8th United States Volunteer Infantry, Company G. The Army stationed this unit in Chickamauga Park, Georgia, where Davis received his first bitter taste of life in America's Deep South. Davis combated the depressing effects of racism by preparing to become an officer in the regular Army. A year later, Davis was transferred to the unit of his childhood dreams, the 9th Cavalry, where he served as a private and, later, a corporal. Troop I of the 9th Cavalry was stationed in Ft. Duchesne, Utah, and in this western, rural isolation Davis continued to study and teach illiterate veteran soldiers to read and write. By 1900, the regular Army had only one African American officer—Lt. Charles Young of the 9th Cavalry. Nevertheless, Davis remained undaunted and used every available moment to prepare for the grueling officer's test.

In March 1901, Davis took the test, which included written sections on constitutional law, history, and mathematics, as well as physical and military drill requirements. After successfully completing the exam, Davis was discharged from the 9th Cavalry as an enlisted man, and then took his oath as a second lieutenant with the 10th Cavalry. Davis's success and persistence stood as a refutation of the racist assumptions of military leaders. In the years before World War I, Davis was posted in places as disparate as Arizona and Liberia, and even taught military science at Wilberforce University, a historically black institution in Ohio.

When the United States entered World War I, Davis was a lieutenant colonel but was sent to the Philippines.

DAVIS, BENJAMIN O., SR.

Despite the military's desperate need for experienced officers in France, Davis's white superiors were unwilling to place him in a position in which he either might command white soldiers or outrank a white officer. In letters he wrote home, Davis often described his frustrations with the racism that denied him opportunities taken for granted by others. After the war, Davis remained steadfast in his commitment to the military, training black soldiers throughout the state of Ohio and continuing to teach at both Wilberforce and Alabama's Tuskegee Institute. During the early 1930s, Davis assisted the famous pilgrimages of the Gold Star Mothers, women who traveled to Europe to visit the graves of their sons and husbands who were killed in World War I. Davis was the officer in charge of the commercial steamer that carried the contingents of black women to Europe—the trips were racially segregated—and accompanied the pilgrims on six of their journeys. Despite Davis's unswerving dedication, he would not command troops until 1937 when the Army placed him in charge of the legendary 369th Infantry Regiment. The next four years would change his life and, ultimately, change the Army.

In 1940, Pres. Franklin Delano Roosevelt promoted Davis to brigadier general. By that time, African Americans had expressed considerable outrage with continued segregation in the military. Although evidence of public grumbling about Davis's promotion is scant, many observers assumed that the promotion was timed to help Roosevelt's reelection. A year later, Davis was assigned to the inspector general's office and was asked to investigate race relations in the armed forces. From 1941 to 1944, Davis interviewed black soldiers, toured European battlegrounds, and documented the harassment, violence, and discrimination that were endemic in the segregated army. Davis's report recommended the integration of the military and special training for white soldiers who were unaccustomed to treating their African American counterparts as peers. Davis's groundbreaking research paved the way, in part, for the desegregation of the Army under Pres. Harry S. Truman in 1948. In the broader context, Davis's efforts were part of the growing struggle to desegregate all aspects of American life led by people like union organizer A. Philip Randolph,

educator Mary McCleod Bethune, and lawyer Charles Hamilton Houston.

After 50 years of service, Davis retired in 1948. By then, he had received numerous honors, including the Distinguished Service Medal for his service as a special consultant to the War Department and his research on racism in the military. During this period, Davis received perhaps his ultimate reward: witnessing his son, Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. graduate from West Point and fly with the Tuskegee Airmen. Davis died in 1970, having become the ultimate representative of the black soldier of the 19th and early 20th century who had to fight for the right to lead in the U.S. military.

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African Americans in the Military; Executive Order 9981; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces; Randolph, A. Philip; World War II; Young, Charles

Related Documents

1941; 1942 a, b; 1944 c; 1945 a, b

—*George White Jr.*

Davis, Jefferson

(1808–89)
Confederate president

As president of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis exerted a major influence on the strategy and course of the Civil War. Davis's success in motivating a majority of white Southerners to continue to fight and to support the war until the Confederacy reached the point of complete collapse was key in preventing a negotiated end to the Civil War and thus exerted a powerful influence on postwar society in the South.

Born in Kentucky, Davis grew up in Mississippi and attended West Point, graduating in 1828. Although he chafed under the academy's rules and was frequently in disciplinary trouble, his West Point experience became a central part of his self-image, and in later years he became an enthusiastic backer of the academy and its graduates.

After graduation Davis served seven years in the regular Army, resigned his commission in 1835, and took up residence on a plantation given to him by his older brother Joseph Davis. In 1845 he ran successfully for a seat in Congress, then resigned to accept a commission as colonel of the 1st Mississippi Rifles in the Mexican War. Davis won recognition at the battles of Monterey and Buena Vista, where he was wounded in the foot. He then returned to Mississippi to run successfully for the U.S. Senate. In 1850 he ran unsuccessfully for governor of Mississippi and was out of office until brought into the administration of President Franklin Pierce as secretary of war. The War Department made important advances during Davis's tenure, adopting the new rifle-musket and new tactics manual to go with it and dispatching a team of three officers—including future Union general George B. McClellan—to the Crimea to observe the ongoing conflict between Britain, France, and Russia.

When Pierce left office, Davis won election to the Senate, where he continued to serve until he resigned in January 1861 upon Mississippi's announced secession from the Union. The following month, delegates of six seceding states selected Davis as the president of the newly formed Confederate States of America, and he was inaugurated in Montgomery, Alabama, a few days later.

As president, Davis took a personal role in the formation of the Confederate Army. He dispatched Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard to command the forces confronting the U.S. garrison of Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. In early April, Davis ordered Beauregard to take the fort, triggering hostilities with the federal government. In late May, the Confederacy moved its capital from Montgomery to Richmond, Virginia, in part so that Davis—considered by many to be the Confederacy's foremost military leader—could be near the probable scene of fighting. When a Union army advanced from Washington toward Richmond that July, Davis deftly ordered the combination of two small Confederate armies to meet it, making possible the Confederate victory at the first battle of Bull Run.

The winter of 1861–62 was difficult for Davis: in September 1861 he allowed loyalty to an old friend to lead him into a serious blunder when he supported his West Point crony Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk in making an incursion into the state of Kentucky, driving many of its wavering citizens to support the Union cause. In February, another of his old West Point comrades, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, suffered a devastating setback when twin Union victories at forts Henry and Donelson cost him a quarter of his troops and half the state of Tennessee. When Johnston, one of the most respected officers in the former U.S. Army, attempted a surprise attack on Gen. Ulysses Grant at Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, his troops suffered defeat and he a mortal wound. Johnston's death was both a personal and a strategic blow to Davis, who was to prove unable to work as harmoniously with most other Confederate generals as he could with Johnston. As spring approached, the Confederacy's armies threatened to vanish with the expiration of one-year enlistments. Davis pushed through the Confederate legislature the first conscription law in American history, compelling soldiers to remain in the ranks.

By late May 1862 a Union army was on the outskirts of Richmond. When a bullet felled the commander of the defending Confederate force, Davis replaced him with his military adviser, Robert E. Lee. General Lee drove the Union forces from Richmond and won a series of dramatic, though costly, victories of the next year, providing a desperately needed boost to Confederate morale. The boost was all

the more necessary because of the unremittingly dismal Confederate fortunes west of the Appalachians, where the weakest Confederate generals faced the best Union generals and troops. Although Davis did a good job of supporting Lee in Virginia, he was ineffective in supervising the war in the West, failing to provide unified command and enforce subordination among generals, partly because his old crony, Polk, was the chief troublemaker. The fall of Vicksburg in July 1863, along with its 30,000-man Confederate garrison was a devastating blow to the Confederacy, and the fall of Atlanta, in September 1864, helped ensure Lincoln's reelection and extinguish any remaining chance that the Confederacy could outlast Union will to fight.

Although the subject of bitter criticism by various generals, politicians, and newspaper editors, Davis managed to maintain a working majority in the Confederate Congress until early 1865. In February, however, restive legislators forced on him a bill making Lee commanding general of all Confederate armies and thus at least partly curtail the president's direct control. Lee continued to cooperate with Davis during the waning months of the war, but he, like others, believed that Davis should have sought a negotiated peace much earlier. In fact, Davis maneuvered skillfully and successfully to foreclose all overtures toward a negotiated peace. Davis discredited the peace faction within the Confederacy by appointing several of his chief critics—and advocates of negotiations—to meet with Lincoln in the January 1865 Hampton Roads conference, but hemming them in with instructions that made Confederate independence a prerequisite of any settlement. Davis was then quick to seize on Lincoln's insistence on reunion as proof to citizens of the Confederacy that they had no alternative but fighting to the bitter end.

After the fall of Richmond, Davis fled south, seeking to carry on the war from Texas and Louisiana, but he was captured near Irwinville, Georgia, in May 1865. After the war Davis was imprisoned for two years in Fort Monroe, Virginia, while the government considered trying him for treason. Davis was eager for a trial, which he hoped to turn into a defense of the legality of secession. Such a trial would have been required to be held in Richmond, and the government soon realized that no Richmond jury would convict Davis of treason, no matter how overwhelming the case against him.

Rather than give the Confederate leader an easy victory and a bully pulpit, the administration of President Andrew Johnson in May 1867 released him. Thereafter he traveled to Canada, Cuba, and Europe, before settling for five years in Memphis as president of an insurance company. After the company's failure, Davis retired to Beauvoir, a coastal mansion near Biloxi, Mississippi, where he wrote his memoirs, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* (1881), and lived out the remaining years of his life, dying in 1889.

As Confederate president, Davis performed ably in some ways but had severe shortcomings as well. He built an army capable of resisting Union forces within months of secession, and he staffed it with some of the best officers in the prewar U.S. Army. Yet he was unable to maintain good working relationships with several of these generals, and he failed to remove those who proved themselves inadequate. He also practiced cronyism, much to the detriment of his cause. Davis's strategy has been called the "offensive-defensive"—a policy of aggressive reaction to incursions into what the Confederacy claimed as its territory. This, in theory, gave the Confederacy the advantage of the strategic defensive together with ability to maintain the initiative on the operational level. Under a skillful practitioner like Lee, such tactics could be spectacularly successful, but historians are sharply divided about the overall wisdom of the policy. Its critics assert that it squandered Confederate manpower in bloody battles and that a more Fabian policy of guerrilla warfare would have been better. Other historians point out that guerrilla warfare could not have achieved the Confederacy's chief war aim of preserving slavery and white supremacy in the South.

Davis strongly advocated long enlistments and extensive mobilization, including the Confederacy's groundbreaking 1862 conscription law. Some economic historians argue that the Confederacy was actually overmobilized, with too many men in the ranks and too few left to maintain production and tend to the needs of the home front. Certainly conscription became extremely unpopular in the South, especially the provision that allowed owners of 20 or more slaves to escape service. Furthermore, Davis at least acquiesced in the Confederate Congress's ruinous policy of financing the war by means of the printing press and then instituting impressment and de facto price controls. Davis probably realized

that the effort to impose a realistic tax policy was not worth the political capital it would have cost him.

Historians are divided about whether Davis did a good job of building a sense of Confederate nationalism. Although he ultimately failed in that task, the question is whether anyone could have succeeded. His defenders point out that he was regarded a superb orator, but his detractors observe that by the latter stages of the war he was the object of bitter denunciations in much of the Confederate press and public. Davis was a skillful enough politician to get at least the bulk of what he wanted from the Confederate Congress up until the closing months of the war, but he could not motivate his people in the same way that Lincoln did the people of the North. Davis's determination undoubtedly prolonged the war by many months and continued well beyond the point at which the Confederate states had any chance of obtaining a negotiated return to the Union.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Lee, Robert E.; Lincoln, Abraham

—*Steven E. Woodworth*

Deer Hunter, The

Film Directed by Michael Cimino, 1978

Written and directed by Michael Cimino, *The Deer Hunter* follows the fate of three young Russian-American steelworkers (Michael, Nick, and Steven, played by Robert DeNiro, Christopher Walken, and John Savage, respectively) from western Pennsylvania who join the Army to fight in Vietnam. The movie explores why young men join the military, the horrors of combat, and the readjustments returning veterans and their friends and family go through once the shooting stops. The film was a key work among a number of late 1970s films that grappled with the painful legacy of American involvement in Vietnam.

The first third of the movie takes places in an intensely ethnic and insular community dominated by the mill, the church, family, and especially the camaraderie of friends. The three men are intensely patriotic but naïve about what war is actually like. Michael attempts to talk to a Green Beret in a bar about the war, but the soldier refuses to discuss his experiences. As a psychological preparation for war, and as a last opportunity for bonding, the three set out on a deer hunting trip, during which Michael drops a trophy buck with one shot.

The middle of the film finds the trio in Vietnam. In the only combat scene of the film, a Viet Cong soldier massacres women and children but is killed by Michael who relies on a flamethrower rather than a rifle to kill his prey. The trio is quickly captured by the enemy who keep them captive in bamboo cages submerged in a river. The soldiers are brought out only to play Russian roulette against each other while the Viet Cong bet on the outcome. Michael tricks the Viet Cong into letting him play with three bullets, with which he kills his

captors and frees his friends. The experience shatters Nick and Steven, however, and the rest of the film details the way each comes to grips with the war on his own.

Michael returns home, but finds himself unwilling to play the role of war hero to his nonveteran friends and family. When Michael and his nonveteran friends go hunting, he lets his prize walk away because he cannot pull the trigger. Intensely isolated by his wartime trauma, he begins a relationship with Nick's fiancée, played by Meryl Streep, who is also suffering because Nick has decided to remain in Saigon. Michael seeks out Steven, who is both physically and psychically crippled and unwilling to return to face his hometown, friends, and bride in this state. Periodically he receives bundles of cash, which they realize must be from Nick. Michael returns to Saigon to rescue Nick from his new life as a professional gambler in the war's desperate final days. To save his friend, Michael again plays Russian roulette against his childhood friend, desperately seeking

to kindle a spark of recognition. Tragically Nick pushes his luck too far and shoots himself in the head. Michael brings his friend's body back home. The final scene finds the saddened group of friends at Nick's wake, singing "God Bless America."

The movie won five Academy Awards—for Best Picture, Best Leading Actor, Best Supporting Actor, Best Director, and Best Supporting Actress—and did well at the box office. Although Russian roulette was never played by anyone in Southeast Asia in the manner depicted in the movie, many reviewers saw the game as a powerful metaphor for the vagaries of war. Some more political critics lambasted the movie for recycling stereotypes about a brutal Asian enemy that were first used against the Japanese in World War II and later the communist Chinese in the Korean War. The movie shows the Viet Cong committing atrocities in uniforms that look strikingly like the ones worn by the Japanese in World

In this still from the film The Deer Hunter, *Michael, played by Robert De Niro, is guarded by his Viet Cong captors in a Vietnamese prison camp. (Getty Images)*

War II. Internationally, the film was generally seen as an apologetic statement on American involvement in Vietnam because it portrayed U.S soldiers, rather than the Vietnamese, as the real victims of the conflict.

The movie refuses both the gung-ho spirit of movies like the *Green Berets* (1968), which John Wayne directed specifically to counter the antiwar movement, and the staunch antiwar position of movies like, *Coming Home,* or *Who'll Stop the Rain?,* both of which premiered in 1978. Instead, the movie is ambiguous about the war, portraying it from the perspective of American soldiers. The often-unsympathetic views of the Vietnamese came from seeing them through the eyes of GIs.

Overall, *The Deer Hunter* overplays the prowar sentiments of working-class Americans, who by the 1970s had grown weary of the war and the ways that the rich and middle class could easily opt of military service. For all its attention to the details of mill-town life, with its shots of molten metal and bars open early in the morning for workers coming off the night shift, the movie contains no hint that the steel mills, far from being permanent, were about to be shut down. The mill-town world of *The Deer Hunter* is entirely white, a departure from reality but hardly the first time Hollywood ignored issues of race in its portrayals of working-class life.

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Related Entries

Film and War; Vietnam War

—*John Hinshaw*

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, more commonly known by its acronym, DARPA, was founded in 1958 as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The name has switched back and forth several times. ARPA was initially created to oversee and coordinate the separate rocketry programs of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. DARPA has since become a mid- to long-range research and development (R&D) establishment for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), focusing on research projects with a high risk of failure, but a high return when successful. Because of the nature of the research undertaken by DARPA, successful results are not necessarily limited to military uses and can lead to "spin-offs" (alternative uses of knowledge or technology other than those intended by the initial researchers) in the civilian world. The most famous of these spin-offs is the Internet, but there have been others whose effects are less obvious and less well known. While DARPA's mission has changed over time, its basic focus as an R&D management agency has remained.

When the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, into orbit on October 4, 1957, the American public demanded an immediate national response. U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower was not worried about Sputnik because he had access to secret information about both Soviet and U.S. efforts to launch a satellite. Nonetheless, public opinion forced his administration to act quickly. After consultation with the president and his science advisers, the new secretary of defense, Neil H. McElroy, announced the creation of the Advanced Projects Research Agency to coordinate the missile and rocketry efforts of all the armed services. ARPA was intended to eliminate problems and inefficiencies caused by interservice rivalries. After its official establishment in January 1958 under the secretary of defense, ARPA was immediately given responsibility for all U.S. space programs and advanced strategic missile research. The role of the agency itself, however, was largely managerial—the actual research and development for these programs continued to be carried out by the various armed services and selected civilian firms.

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

Not long after its creation, ARPA faced a challenge. When the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) began operation in October of 1958, Eisenhower transferred responsibility for all nonmilitary—and some military—space programs from ARPA to NASA. Responsibility for many of the remaining programs was returned to the individual services. This left ARPA an organization without a mission. Its very flat organizational structure (very few managers between the project directors and the head of the agency) with a lot of flexibility compared to other DoD research agencies was an asset when ARPA reorganized around a new idea: to sponsor and manage R&D into the kinds of ideas that were important to the Department of Defense but too undeveloped to be taken up directly by one of the armed services research labs.

This new, flexible, and agile ARPA would be strongly influenced by its leadership. Its third director, Jack P. Ruina, helped establish the agency's lasting character. Ruina came to ARPA in 1961 on leave from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was the first scientist to lead the organization. (ARPA's first director had come from the business world; its second director was a military man.) During his time at ARPA, Ruina established a very hands-off management style. He believed in hiring the best people to pursue the best technology and letting them do what needed to be done without his interference. He also recognized that the top people in industry and academia were not likely to stick around long, so he turned this into an advantage: new people meant new ideas, and new project managers were free to continue, redirect, or end the projects of the previous manager. The agency's culture of change and flexibility has persisted and may be seen in the variety of projects it sponsors.

In 1972, ARPA officially became DARPA to reflect its work in DoD projects. In 1993, however, the agency's name was changed back to ARPA. The removal of Defense from its official title was mainly a political move by Pres. Bill Clinton to recognize that the agency's research had broader applications than just military in an era when defense spending was problematic. This change was short-lived: in 1996, the majority Republican Congress restored the word Defense to ARPA's official name.

Because of its culture of change and its mission of conducting research for the benefit of the DoD as a whole, DARPA's projects have been many and varied. In 2003, the director of DARPA noted that perhaps 85 to 90 percent of projects failed to meet all expectations, but in keeping with the high risk-high return philosophy, the successes have been big. The most famous and far-reaching project was probably the development of ARPANET, a network of computers that is now recognized as the beginning of the modern Internet. Another big spin-off into the civilian sector was the satellite-based navigational system known as the Global Positioning System. Other successes have had less direct influence in civilian life, though their technologies have potential applications that are not recognizable in a single consumer product. Advances in stealth aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, improvements in radar and infrared sensors, and work in autonomous robotics may yet affect our lives in the form of improved materials, new manufacturing techniques, and greater automation.

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Related Entries

Computer Technology and Warfare; National Space Program; Satellite Technology; Technology and Revolutionary Changes in Military Affairs

—Laurence M. Burke II

Desertion

Desertion, commonly defined as a member of the armed forces being absent without permission from his or her unit for a period of at least 30 days, has been a constant problem in every military force in history. In the U.S. Army, desertion has typically been a particular issue during peacetime, especially when conditions of military service have been difficult or isolated. In the U.S. Navy, desertion rates have also been highest during peacetime. While peacetime desertion rates are often exacerbated by boredom or harsh discipline, wartime desertion rates tend to be more dependent on the morale of military forces and the popularity of the particular conflict. One of the most persistent methods of wartime desertion has been to desert while held as a prisoner of war, often at the urging of captors. Punishment for desertion during peacetime has varied, but desertion during wartime has always been considered to be an extremely serious crime and has typically been punished by execution of the offender upon capture.

The Revolutionary War

Desertion was rampant among American forces during the Revolutionary War. In particular, members of state militias deserted in high numbers, usually during planting and harvesting seasons when their families needed them to keep the farm going. Members of the Continental Army also deserted quite regularly, although their desertion rates were more often tied to service conditions. Desertions were particularly high after major defeats.

Regulars also disappeared in great numbers when the government failed to provide promised supplies or payments. State enlistment bounties complicated the system, as thousands of soldiers deserted their units only to reenlist and gain a new bounty payment. Each winter, the Continental Army was decimated by desertions, forcing Gen. George Washington to raise and train an almost entirely new army each campaign season.

One of the major reasons for the desertion of American troops at this time was concern for survival. Thousands of Americans taken prisoner by the British deserted while held in prisoner of war camps and in prison hulks; many of these deserters later reported that they feared death by starvation or disease if they did not agree to desert their service and join the British. The desertion problem was not limited to the United States, however; British regulars and German mercenaries deserted in high numbers as well, often with the assistance of American civilians. Like their American counterparts, one of the most common locations from which British and German soldiers deserted was the prisoner of war camp.

The Early 19th Century

In War of 1812, desertion rates and causes remained similar to those experienced during the Revolution. Desertion rates for American troops were especially high among those serving in the Great Lakes region, where U.S. forces suffered a number of setbacks and discipline was often lax. As in the Revolutionary War, prison camps proved to be fertile recruiting grounds for enemy commanders seeking to induce prisoners to desert. Immediately after the war ended, a large number of postwar desertions were recorded, as many troops considered their service to be over and did not wait for their formal dismissal from service.

During the Mexican War, many in the American forces were poorly trained, undisciplined volunteers who deserted in high numbers. The desertion rate was extremely high in units with a large percentage of recent immigrants. As in previous wars, desertions from the Army were encouraged by enemy civilians. A Mexican unit, the San Patricio Battalion, was formed almost entirely from deserters who left American service in exchange for promises of land and money. Many of the San Patricios were recent Irish immigrants, including their leader, John Reilly. The members of the San Patricio Battalion who were captured by American forces were tried for desertion. Those who deserted prior to the declaration of war were branded on the cheek with a "D" and whipped out of service. Every captured deserter who left after the United States had declared war was executed in a series of mass hangings.

The Civil War

During the Civil War, desertion was a problem for both the Union and Confederate armies. Both sides experienced

desertion rates of more than 10 percent during the war, for a total of almost 400,000 desertions. On each side, "bounty jumpers" sought to repeatedly enlist and desert, in order to amass large sums of money without actually remaining in service. As in previous wars, many desertions occurred during the winter months or in tandem with agricultural needs.

Thousands of prisoners of war escaped captivity by joining the forces of the enemy. In the North, Confederate prisoners were actively recruited for service on the western frontier, to free units and individuals for service against the South. In the South, Union prisoners faced the choice between desertion and joining the enemy or dying in a Confederate prison camp. When an entire unit of former Union prisoners was captured fighting for the Confederacy, they were pardoned after claiming they had deserted only to save their lives. Near the end of the war, as the Confederate situation deteriorated, entire units of the Confederate Army deserted simultaneously, with areas of the South becoming havens for bandit groups composed almost entirely of deserters. Similar bands of Union deserters roamed the western frontier for years after the end of the war.

Some historians have argued that desertion was a substantial factor in the defeat of the Army of Northern Virginia. As Union armies penetrated the interior of the Confederacy, Southern troops were beseeched by their families to desert and return home to protect their homestead. Such pleas certainly contributed to the epidemic of desertions that accompanied the deteriorating military situation for the South from 1864 to 1865.

Late 19th Century

In the period after the Civil War, peacetime desertion rates soared. Between the end of the war and the beginning of the Spanish–American War, almost 100,000 soldiers deserted service, primarily from frontier posts in the West. Awful living conditions while in service, combined with ample alternative economic opportunities, convinced individuals of all ranks and services to desert.

A bad situation became worse when the Army announced a pay cut in 1871, inspiring almost one-third of active servicemen to desert. Simultaneously, the Navy experienced historically high desertion rates, attributable in large part to the harsh discipline and the lack of advancement possibilities. During the Spanish–American War, desertion rates were extremely low, in part because of the short duration of the war. The ensuing prolonged engagement in the Philippine War, however, brought a rising desertion rate, despite the difficulty in actually leaving the war zone and returning home.

World Wars

Official records for World War I suggest that the desertion rate in the Army was more than 10 percent during the war; this figure, however, is derived using the definition of desertion at the time: any conscripted soldier who did not report for duty on time was designated a deserter by Army regulations, despite never having served in the Army. The percentage of troops who actually left the service without permission was less than 1 percent, a remarkably low figure for the American military. A number of factors probably contributed to this low rate, including close oversight of enlisted personnel by officers and the Atlantic Ocean, which stood between deployed troops and home.

Desertion rates remained low in the interwar period, not surprising given the lack of employment opportunities during the Great Depression. However, during World War II, the number of desertions rose rapidly, passing 6 percent in 1944. Unsurprisingly, desertion rates were higher in the European theater than in the Pacific theater, where the physical opportunity for desertion was quite limited. During the Battle of the Bulge (December 1944 to January 1945), one American private was executed for desertion as a warning to other American troops, and desertion rates dropped significantly in 1945. After the usual postwar rise in desertions, as draftees sought to leave service quickly, desertion rates dropped rapidly.

Cold War

Desertion rates remained low throughout the Korean War, hovering between 1 and 2 percent. American commanders sought to keep morale high, and thus desertions low, by pursuing a policy of rapid troop rotation in Korea. Despite the

best efforts of American officers, an extremely public case of desertions proved embarrassing to the United States, when several American prisoners of war refused repatriation and chose instead to remain with their communist captors. North Korea was accused of "brainwashing" American prisoners, attempting to delude them into denouncing their country and deserting their service. At the end of the war, in comparison, more than 20,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war refused to return to their homes, choosing instead to desert and remain in South Korea or move to Taiwan.

In the Vietnam War, American wartime desertion rates hit their highest point since the Civil War, peaking at more than seven percent—almost 80,000 deserters—in 1971 alone. During the course of the war, more than 500,000 members of all services deserted. Many of these deserters left their units while still in the United States, fleeing to foreign countries to escape prosecution. The high desertion rates contributed to the decision to end the draft and make the transition to an all volunteer force. In the period after the war, low morale and poor living conditions contributed to a steady desertion rate through the 1980s. The first Persian Gulf War saw another increase in desertion rates, again often involving troops who had not yet deployed from the continental United States. However, the rate remained relatively low, probably because of the short, popular nature of the war.

Desertions remained low through the 1990s, in part because of pay raises and greater opportunities for enlisted personnel within the military. While overall rates have remained low, two very public desertions occurred after the September 11 attacks. Two privates, upon receiving overseas deployment orders, deserted their units and fled to Canada with their families. While in Canada, they became very visible public figures, serving as a focal point for criticisms about the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq. The case of these privates demonstrates that desertion will always be an issue for every military, despite improved training, benefits, and discipline. Historically, wartime desertion rates have been directly linked to the perception of a war by American society and the progress made in the war, while peacetime desertion is primarily related to service conditions and thus less affected by social perceptions of the military.

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Related Entries

Conscientious Objection; Conscription and Volunteerism; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Prisoners of War; Uniform Code of Military Justice

Related Documents

1976 b

—*Paul J. Springer*

Disabled American Veterans

Since its formation in 1920, the Disabled American Veterans (DAV) has been the nation's most vocal advocate on behalf of disabled veterans and their families. Unlike larger veterans' organizations such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the DAV is composed exclusively of men and women who were disabled in military service. During the course of its history, the DAV has worked to educate lawmakers and the general public about the struggles of disabled veterans in civilian society. Through its numerous publicity campaigns and lobbying efforts, the organization has also helped Americans recognize the permanent impact of war on veterans' bodies and lives.

Despite competition from other veterans' organizations, the Disabled American Veterans of the World War (the name was shortened in January 1941) had already attracted tens of thousands of members by the early 1920s. Membership declined later in the decade but rebounded during the Great Depression and World War II (1939–45), swelling to a record 105,000 in 1946. As new generations of disabled veterans joined the DAV's ranks following conflicts in Korea (1950–53) and Vietnam (1964–75), its membership continued to climb, topping one million in 1985. Among its most prominent members have been two presidents, John F. Kennedy and George H. W. Bush. The organizational structure of the DAV comprises local chapters, state-level departments, and a national headquarters located in Cold Spring, Kentucky.

The establishment of the Disabled American Veterans of the World War (DAVWW) was a consequence of the overwhelming casualties of World War I, which the United States fought from 1917 to 1918. Despite the relative brevity of U.S. involvement in the war, more than 300,000 Americans servicemen returned home with gas-seared lungs, psychological disorders, and other debilitating injuries. By November 1918, few government programs were in place to meet the needs of America's disabled veterans. Many government hospitals, already overtaxed by the Spanish influenza epidemic, were unprepared for the influx of so many service personnel requiring long-term care. Moreover, disabled veterans seeking any form of government assistance faced a bureaucratic nightmare, made worse by the fact that no single agency was responsible for veterans' postwar readjustment. In the midst of a national recession, and burdened with lingering public prejudice against disabled people in general, countless wounded veterans had nowhere to turn for help.

To meet this need, local disabled veterans groups began to form across the United States. The DAVWW coalesced out of two such groups: the Ohio Mechanics Institute for Disabled Soldiers, located at a Cincinnati training school for disabled veterans, and an informal organization of disabled veterans from the University of Cincinnati. The organization began to take shape during the early months of 1920 under the leadership of Judge Robert S. Marx, later known as the "father of the DAV." The DAVWW was formally established on September 25, 1920, when the Cincinnati groups held a national caucus and established the organizational structure it has maintained ever since. On June 27, 1921, the DAVWW held its first national convention in Detroit, and 1922 saw the formation of the Disabled American Veterans of the World War Auxiliary—its members were the female relatives of disabled veterans.

The DAVWW's initial goal was to reform government policies and programs in favor of disabled veterans' interests. To cut down on bureaucratic entanglements, the DAVWW lobbied Congress to consolidate the Federal Board of Vocational Training, the Public Health Service, and the Bureau of War Risk Insurance into the Veterans' Bureau, an umbrella agency devoted solely to veterans' affairs. During the mid-1920s, the DAVWW worked closely with Veterans' Bureau officials to eliminate corruption and to expedite the benefits claims of disabled veterans and their families. It also petitioned lawmakers to fund generous rehabilitation programs and to liberalize government policies regarding disability compensation. By the early 1930s, the Veterans' Bureau was spending more than $500 million a year on veterans' services, despite the fact that more than 128,000 disabled servicemen had completed government rehabilitation programs. Even during the Great Depression, when the Roosevelt administration slashed the benefits of able-bodied veterans, the DAVWW helped mobilize Congress and public opinion to preserve many programs for disabled veterans.

Throughout its early history, the DAV worked alongside other veterans' organizations, particularly the American

In the late 1940s at the DAV Idento Tag plant, disabled American veterans assemble miniature license plates for distribution to the country's motorists. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

Legion, to secure exclusive rights for America's service-disabled personnel. Although the DAV shared many of the same values as the Legion (both actively promoted "Americanism" and anticommunism, for example), the two organizations often deviated in practice. Unlike the American Legion, the DAV worked on behalf of all disabled American veterans, regardless of race or political ideology. Moreover, the DAV was hostile to any attempt to usurp disabled veterans' privileged status in the public imagination; its commitment to preferential treatment for disabled veterans led to several rifts with other veterans' organizations. The most prominent came in 1944, when the DAV refused to support the GI Bill of Rights out of fear that it would divert funding from the war-disabled.

Since the end of World War II, the DAV has remained the nation's foremost champion of disabled veterans' interests.

Although its primary focus has always been disabled veterans' care, it also expanded its concerns to include the plight of prisoners of war (POWs) and personnel missing in action (MIAs). In 1976, the DAV helped fund the Forgotten Warrior Project in an effort to bring congressional and public attention to the issue of post-traumatic stress disorder. During the 1980s and 1990s, it developed a wide range of services and social programs to help disabled veterans achieve economic self-sufficiency and make the transition to civilian life. Throughout its history, the DAV has not only shaped U.S. policy toward disabled veterans but also provided a safety net when government programs fell short. In the wake of American-led conflicts in the Persian Gulf (1990–91), Afghanistan (2002), and Iraq (2003), the DAV has emerged in the 21st century with a renewed mission to ensure that Americans do not forget their disabled veterans.

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Related Entries

American Legion; Veterans Administration; Veterans of Foreign Wars

—*John M. Kinder*

Doctor Draft

The Doctor Draft, Public Law 779 of the 81st Congress, amended the Selective Service Act of 1948. Effective September 9, 1950, it authorized a separate draft for physicians for the first time in U.S. history. The act addressed the chronic shortage of military physicians caused by post–World War II demobilization and the additional requirements of the Korean War.

The sudden invasion of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) on June 25, 1950, by the North Korean People's Republic precipitated a military and political crisis that many statesmen feared would lead to a third world war. Shortly thereafter, the United Nations passed a series of resolutions condemning the invasion and asking member nations to assist in repelling the attack. As the North Koreans rapidly advanced, the United States mobilized the four Army divisions of the Far East Command then on occupation duty in Japan.

Like most Army and Marine Corps combat units in 1950, these divisions were at half strength and still equipped with World War II weaponry—no match for the Soviet-made tanks and artillery used by the North Koreans. Post–World War II demobilization and the cost-cutting and efficiency mandates of the National Security Act of 1947 in the newly created Department of Defense had compromised the ability of the United States to fight the first major military engagement of the Cold War.

The Army and Navy medical departments had experienced profound reductions of skilled medical personnel, especially physicians. At the onset of the Korean War, the Far East Command had only one-half of its authorized complement of medical officers; the doctors that remained had little field medicine experience. The situation was much the same in the Navy. Demobilization so depleted the ranks of regular medical officers that by 1950 only 22 Navy physicians had previous combat experience with the Marine Corps.

In the late 1940s, the Army and Navy developed undergraduate and graduate medical education programs to recruit and retain experienced physicians. Both provided scholarships, created teaching hospitals, and developed research programs in hopes of competing with civilian opportunities. Despite the success in elevating the medical professionalism of the services, neither program was able to attract enough physicians to satisfy operational requirements. Furthermore, many military leaders and planners questioned the usefulness of medical training that emphasized civilian medicine rather than knowledge and experience required in combat situations.

In 1947, James Forrestal, the first secretary of the Department of Defense, established the Committee on Medical and Hospital Services of the Armed Forces. The Committee was charged with co-coordinating all military plans and programs. The Armed Forces Medical Advisory Committee superseded this committee in November 1948, but, like its predecessor, it lacked the power to force the military surgeon generals to execute its recommendations. This committee presented several recommendations to the secretary of defense for recruiting physicians. Among them was the

Moral Suasion Campaign, targeting those who had participated in military medical education programs during World War II but had not served on active duty. Of the approximately 11,000 physicians contacted, fewer than 500 volunteered for active duty. Other programs were even less successful, and by the beginning of 1950 the issue of physician shortage—in particular the lack of military physicians trained and experienced in operational medicine—remained unresolved. The only solution seemed to be a special draft for doctors.

The invasion of South Korea magnified the need for military physicians, a need that could not be met by the small pool of active duty medical officers, physicians in training, and volunteers. Faced with this intractable and critical problem, the 81st United States Congress began a series of committee hearings to consider revising the Selective Service Act of 1948 to allow for the drafting of physicians. The consensus reached by Congress after the testimony of military and civilian medical experts was that physicians who had served in World War II would be protected as much as possible from the new draft.

On September 9, 1950, President Truman signed Public Law 779. Commonly referred to as the "Doctor Draft Law," it was the first conscription law in United States history to create a special draft for physicians and other medical specialists. All male physicians under the age of 50 were required to register for this special draft. The induction of physicians was based on a priority system. The first physicians to be inducted were those who had participated in Army- or Navy-sponsored medical training during World War II and had been on active duty for less than 90 days (priority 1), and those who received training and served more than 90 days but less than 21 months (priority 2). Physicians who had not served on active duty in any military or public health service after September 16, 1940 (priority 3) or physicians who had served in World War II (priority 4) were to be inducted last. To assist the Selective Service System, a National Advisory Committee and state and local volunteer advisory committees were established. These committees were directed to assess the needs of the military, to determine the impact on individual physicians and their civilian communities, and to make equitable recommendations to the Department of Defense.

The Doctor Draft Law achieved its purpose in providing a sufficient number of physicians for deployment in Korea and elsewhere in the military medical departments. The priority system of the draft, however, led to the induction of the most inexperienced physicians, those without any previous combat experience. Few physicians with World War II combat experience in treating seriously wounded men would serve in Korea. The combat reports of medical commanders, especially in the early months of the Korean War, highlighted the problems of providing combat medical care with inexperienced medical personnel.

The Doctor Draft was to terminate in July 1951, but the continuing medical requirements of the protracted Korean War and the Cold War compelled Congress to extend its term. The law was not allowed to expire until the end of the Vietnam War in 1973. The military has since relied on volunteers to fill physician quotas.

Although the all volunteer force concept has made general conscription unlikely, another Doctor Draft remains a possibility. In 1987, the Congress authorized the Selective Service System to develop a standby system for the drafting of medical professionals in case of future military mobilizations. The plan, the Health Care Personnel Delivery System, was developed by the Selective Service System; it requires all health care professionals under the age of 55 to register for possible induction when approved by the president and Congress.

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—*Eugene H. Ginchereau*

Dr. Strangelove

Film Directed by Stanley Kubrick, 1964

Dr. Strangelove, Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964), directed by Stanley Kubrick, is a cinematic black comedy that mocks the nuclear arms race, blending entertaining slapstick with insightful social commentary. Kubrick's use of storytelling devices, ranging from names suggestive of personality traits to hilarious dialogue closely modeled on well-known debates on nuclear strategy, make the film's larger themes accessible to most audiences.

The movie takes place in three locations: the fictional Burpelson Air Force Base, home of the 843rd Bomb Wing; the Pentagon's "war room"; and on board a nuclear-armed B-52 bomber. Burpleson's insane commander, Brig. Gen. Jack D. Ripper (Sterling Hayden), convinced that fluoridation of drinking water is a communist plot to "sap and impurify" America's "precious bodily fluids," unilaterally launches his bomb-laden aircraft against the Soviet Union. The president, Merkin Muffley (Peter Sellers)—unable to contact Ripper and unwilling to launch the remainder of Strategic Air Command to make use of the 843rd Wing's "head-start"—sends the Army to capture the general and extract the code necessary to recall the bombers. Ripper's deputy, Group Capt. Lionel Mandrake (also Sellers), discovers Ripper's derangement and demands the recall code, but the general commits suicide as the Army takes control of the base. Nonetheless, Mandrake determines the code and communicates it to the president, but only after Col. "Bat" Guano (Keenan Wynn)—suspicious of Ripper's death and Mandrake's imagined involvement—first threatens to hold Mandrake, whom he regards as a "deviated PRE-vert," incommunicado.

Muffley recalls all the bombers except one, whose damaged radio can't receive the order. At this point, Soviet Ambassador De Sadeski (Peter Bull) reveals the existence of an impossible-to-disarm Soviet "Doomsday Device," which will destroy the world if any nuclear weapon detonates on Soviet territory. Muffley's civilian nuclear strategist, the ex-Nazi Dr. Strangelove (also Sellers), confirms the device's practicability. When he asks why it had been kept secret, negating the deterrent effect, the ambassador says it was to be revealed on Monday because, "the Premier loves surprises." Muffley and Soviet Premier Kissov work to intercept the errant bomber, but to no avail, because the damaged aircraft has switched targets to one within range of its leaking fuel. After jury-rigging the electrical wiring to open the bomb bay door, the Texan pilot, Major Kong (Slim Pickins) rides the bomb down, bronco-like, to its target. In the final scene, the president takes solace in Dr. Strangelove's plan to reconstitute the nation after a century of survival in mineshafts . . . assuming the Soviets haven't already opened up a "mineshaft gap." The closing credits feature nuclear detonations to the background of Vera Lynn's wartime song "We'll Meet Again."

Dr. Strangelove was and remains one of the most important and effective films on nuclear war—not because it took on the subject directly, but because it slyly undermined a slew of beliefs and icons that had been largely accepted by the American public. The importance of military expertise—or the "military mind" as strategist Bernard Brodie put it—in a nuclear environment is minimized by the subversive portrayal of almost every military figure in the film. From Ripper's obsession with bodily fluids to Gen. Buck Turgidson's flippant assurances to the president about launching a nuclear strike—"I'm not saying we wouldn't get our hair mussed,"—the film's senior military staff, to a man, are disconnected from reality. The junior military members, represented by the crew members of the B-52, are automatons who unthinkingly follow all directions, comforted by Major Kong's assurances that there will be, "some important promotions and personal citations when this thing's over with." Feckless civilian leadership fares no better, most notably during Muffley's plaintive phone call to the womanizing, drunken Soviet premier. ("I'm sorry, too, Dmitri . . ." Muffley tells the premier, "All right, you're sorrier than I am, but I am sorry as well. . . .") Civilian nuclear strategists, embodied by Dr. Strangelove, are undermined by the main

theme of the movie, which belittles their attempts—the fail-safe system, Doomsday Device, and "mineshaft gap"—to rationalize nuclear war.

The concept of nuclear deterrence is also ridiculed. The Doomsday Device at the heart of the film was designed to destroy civilization, in an attempt to create the ultimate stabilizing deterrent. It is the consummate expression of growing post–Cuban Missile Crisis public discomfort with security guaranteed through a "balance of terror," which was the basis for the era's deterrent strategy. The power of human judgment, which should prevent monstrosities like the Doomsday Device, is also undercut. The film's entire chain of events is triggered by a single madman who sends his bombers into the U.S.S.R. under the auspices of a plan specifically designed to bolster retaliatory credibility. But perhaps the film's most direct target is the efficacy of any nuclear war planning. With notions of "victory" framed in terms of 20 million Americans dead and civilian leaders thoughtfully pondering the prospect of living underground for a century—details borrowed directly from contemporary works of nuclear strategy—Kubrick challenges the idea that nuclear war can ever result in any outcome better than absolute disaster.

As with the contemporary drama *Fail-Safe* (1964), which follows a very similar plot, the Air Force refused to cooperate with the movie's production. The principal complaint raised by the military, beyond the mockery of military figures, was that Kubrick distorted the Fail-Safe system, actually called "Positive Control." According to the Air Force, it would be impossible for a Ripper-like figure to unilaterally launch a strike.

Despite the government's reaction, *Dr. Strangelove* both reflected and shaped growing American unease with nuclear arms. Its release a little over a year after the Cuban Missile Crisis found an audience well prepared to question the safety brought about by ever-increasing numbers of offensive weapons. The change in attitude is made clear when the movie is contrasted with earlier movies lauding the Air Force, for example, *Strategic Air Command* (1955) and *A Gathering of Eagles* (1963). While *Dr. Strangelove* was similar in theme or aim to some contemporary films like *Fail-Safe* and *The War Game* (1965), it exceeded them in artistic merit and the effectiveness of delivering its message.

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Related Entries

Civil Defense; Cold War; Cuban Missile Crisis; Film and War; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Nuclear Strategy; Strategic Air Command; *WarGames*

—Edward A. Kaplan

Doolittle Board

The Doolittle Board convened in early 1946 to investigate complaints to the War Department about the state of relations between officers and enlisted men. The board issued a final report, known officially as "The Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships," in May 1946. In that report, the Doolittle Board concluded that the rapid and massive growth of the Army from 1940 to 1945 had resulted in some cases of poor training and indoctrination in the officer corps. The board also concluded that some officers had abused enlisted men and privileges and that reforms were required. The recommendations made by the board were relatively benign but led to changes, most

significantly to the rules of military justice—enlisted men could sit on courts-martial—and to allow officers and enlisted men to fraternize off duty.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Army rapidly demobilized its citizen army. Many of these discharged soldiers complained about conditions in the Army and, especially, about the officer corps. They focused on unfair officer privileges that enlisted men could not enjoy. Enlisted men made specific complaints about officer abuse of enlisted men and the existence of a caste system within the Army. Many of these complaints echoed similar grievances voiced against the Army after World War I and, indeed, every previous American conflict. In the earlier wars, the Army made only minimal changes to appease widespread civilian concern about officer abuses. This time, however, the War Department took these complaints more seriously. While many in the senior military considered these complaints to be nothing more than the grumblings of undisciplined and military-hating civilians, growing public criticism of undemocratic practices within the Army of a democracy put pressure in the military to respond.

The War Department's civilian leadership appointed a board to review the complaints. The board became known as the Doolittle Board after its most famous member, Gen. James H. Doolittle, who had commanded the Doolittle bombing raid over Japan in 1942.

The board interviewed witnesses, read letters, and reviewed laws, regulations, and military customs. It also surveyed other concurrent War Department studies concerning the military justice system, pay and allowances, and uniforms. The board concluded that while officers had some privileges that were necessary to good order and discipline, some distinctions made between officers and enlisted men had no place in a democratic society. It also concluded that these distinctions had become more pronounced with the rapid increase in the size of the officer corps during World War II and the concurrent lack of training that hastily mobilized officers received in proper officer conduct.

The board made 14 recommendations. The most important were: improvements in officer selection, training, and quality; equitable distribution of pay and allowances; better oversight of rank-associated privileges to reduce abuse;

changes to the Articles of War and justice system to include allowing enlisted men to sit on courts-martial; elimination of the hand salute when off duty; and elimination of restrictions on social interaction between officers and enlisted men. The board further determined that "all military personnel [should] be allowed, when off duty, to pursue normal social patterns comparable with our democratic way of life" (19–22).

The changes recommended by the Doolittle Board were criticized by supporters of a stricter, more disciplined, and hierarchical military structure. The sticking points were relaxation of fraternization rules, elimination of the hand salute off duty, and the sharing of officer privileges with enlisted men. Many subsequent critics blamed the Doolittle Board for the "democratization" of the military, and it became common to blame the Doolittle Board for the "destruction" of discipline. These critics ignored one of the board's stated guidelines: "[m]aintenance of control and discipline, which are essential to the success of any military operations." The board also noted that the vast majority of enlisted witnesses agreed that military operations require "discipline and strict obedience to orders" (14, 18). In addition, critics missed that many recommendations (similar uniforms, changes to pay and allowances, and inclusion of enlisted men on courts-martial) were simply recognition of changes that the War Department was already considering.

Other, more supportive, observers noted that the Army had poorly trained many wartime officers and called for more instruction in leadership as well as recognition of new permissive attitudes among the general population. Still others concluded that the composition of the board and its relatively benign recommendations indicated that the Army was attempting to silence its critics by agreeing to only the most modest reforms. G. D. Spindler concluded that the board's "very publicity was a part of an attempt to defend the legitimacy of the criticized authority . . ." (306).

The Doolittle Board in itself was probably not as significant to the evolution of military culture or justice as was the reaction to the board's conclusions and recommendations. To many, the board's recommendations led directly to discipline issues and poor performance in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. However, the board's recommendations can also be seen as a prudent reordering of some aspects of

military life that, while successful in the pre–World War II regular Army, would not be compatible with a large, draft-based Army during the Cold War. The vast majority of the board's recommendations remain in place today.

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All Volunteer Force; Articles of War; Mauldin, Bill; Uniform Code of Military Justice; World War II

—George Eaton

Draft

See Selective Service System.

Draft Evasion and Resistance

American society has often felt war's influence most immediately—and controversially—through the introduction of conscription. In nearly every war in which Americans have relied on some form of a draft to raise armed forces, evasion and resistance have occurred. Although drafts were a common threat in the 18th century, the threat was usually used to encourage volunteers. If a draft was nevertheless required, the process of selection varied widely, and many people found ways to avoid it. During the 19th century, under little military threat, and with the fears of a tyrannical British standing army still vivid in national memory, a draft was implemented only during the Civil War. In the 20th century, the demands of two world wars revived the draft, and the Cold War sustained it for nearly 30 years. In each case, the specifics of each draft law created openings for legal and illegal evasion.

The 18th Century

Known also as conscription or impressment, the draft in the 18th century allowed civil authorities to raise men for service in regular army, provincial, or militia units—usually for a short duration. Given the draft's compulsory nature, opposition to it was common among those selected for such duty. These were often members of the lower social classes or conscientious objectors from religious sects.

From the early colonial period through the Revolutionary War, religious dissenters, including Quakers, Mennonites, and Moravians, sought to evade compulsory military service. Several colonies imposed significant fines or physical punishments on such dissenters. Many colonies (later states) gradually came to recognize a conscription exemption for religious sectarians. North Carolina, for example, allowed Moravians to form their own frontier militia company for strictly defensive purposes during the Seven Years' War. Quakers in Pennsylvania were similarly exempt from conscription for military duty in the 18th century; even during the Revolutionary War, the 1776 Pennsylvania constitution allowed Quakers "conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms" to pay money in lieu of physical service.

The well-to-do colonist could also legally evade the draft in the 18th century through the hiring of a substitute. Conscripted men in Massachusetts during the Seven Years' War could pay a fine to the colony to be used to hire a substitute, with whom they would also negotiate an arrangement for service and pay a separate fee. During the same period, Virginia allowed men to avoid service by paying a similar fee in addition to a sum negotiated between draftee and hired replacement.

Other potential draftees avoided service in one colony by enlisting in the forces of another, if the latter paid a recruiting bonus. This practice, known as bounty jumping, was particularly common in the northern provinces.

To be drafted was widely unpopular, partly because civil authorities often resorted to conscripting the most marginal members of society. This served to stigmatize service as undesirable and led men to avoid enlistment or being impressed, particularly in the South where compulsory service was equated with slavery. The North Carolina Assembly, for example, passed a bill in 1755 that allowed for the drafting of vagrants in the colony between the ages of 21 and 50—a move indicative of most North Carolinians' general disinclination to serve during the French and Indian War. Later that year, the Assembly called for drafting unmarried militiamen for service outside North Carolina, an unpopular measure that resulted in widespread unrest within the province. The governor even called for a system of forts on the American frontier to be garrisoned by convicted felons and vagabonds. Virginia's practice of forcing into service men who could not demonstrate a regular trade or livelihood created resentment among those in this class, while reports of men hiding in swamps or in the mountains to avoid being drafted for military service were not uncommon throughout the colonies during colonial conflicts. Draft riots during the French and Indian War occurred in two Virginia towns, Petersburg and Fredericksburg, where local authorities refused to act to put down the disturbances. The extreme aversion to being drafted led British military authorities during the 1750s to forgo forcibly drafting colonial troops into regular battalions, despite the acute British need for manpower and clear legal authority to do so during wartime. The threat of widespread resistance to the draft in the 1750s led Massachusetts and Connecticut to avoid the use of impressment to fill the ranks of their regiments.

During the Revolutionary War, the rebellious states also relied upon the draft to fill the ranks of state regiments and regiments of the Continental Army, and, just as in earlier conflicts, men resisted what was perceived as onerous duty. In Virginia, for example, few draftees could be collected, and at least one member of the state legislature actively agitated against impressing men for service. Despite numerous exemptions and the possibility of "purchasing" substitutes,

new draft laws caused rioting throughout the state. For the most part, when the states sought to raise troops for long periods of service, they assigned quotas to the counties, which proceeded to muster the militia and call for volunteers. If this procedure proved insufficient for raising the requisite number of men, the shortfall would be "drafted" by various means, including election and by lot.

As the conflict entered its last few years, opposition to conscription, and perceived corruption in the selection of the conscripted, intensified among war-weary citizens burdened by shortages, inflation, and enemy incursions. This was particularly true in the South, where the British had moved active military operations in early 1780. Drafted units were unreliable, prone to desertion, and at times uncontrollable by their officers. Numerous state and local officials complained that men refused to be drafted for fear of losing family and property to British or Indian raids during their tours of duty. Many draftees deserted before reaching their assigned posts, often aided by the local citizenry. On several occasions in 1781, disorderly Virginia militia companies refused to comply with draft orders within their home counties, at times with the support of their leaders. County officers attempted to postpone the draft in their communities for fear of the violence and tumult it would create. In North Carolina, a group of "associators" in several eastern counties assembled to prevent the militia from being drafted in 1779, supplanting legitimate civil authorities in these locales. In other instances, rioters assaulted impressment officials, burned draft lists, and otherwise prevented the implementation of conscription. Hundreds, if not thousands, of draftees violently resisted draft officials or hid in remote regions of their states, often in groups. Despite numerous conscription laws in many 18th-century American statute books, colonial and Revolutionary authorities were rarely able to enforce the draft when it was opposed by the concerted efforts of large groups.

The Civil War

In spring 1862, when Richmond and other regions of the South appeared likely to fall, the Confederacy introduced the first draft since the Revolution. It immediately generated controversy. Because the draft law provided certain occupational exemptions (including for state officers, railroad

workers, clergy, teachers, hospital workers, and various industrial workers considered important to the cause), large numbers of Southerners flocked to those vocations; scores of new schools opened to accommodate the many young men who suddenly joined the teaching profession. Some governors, resenting the intrusion, appointed friends to government posts to save them from the draft.

Even more controversial, the Confederacy's draft law followed well-worn European and colonial tradition by formally tolerating legal draft evasion through the hiring of substitutes. Once the bidding for substitutes exceeded $1,000 and it became clear that some substitutes sold their services, deserted, and sold themselves over and over again, the Confederacy repealed substitution in December 1863. In isolated areas with little allegiance to the Confederacy, as well as among those who resented government intrusion into daily life, armed groups of resisters—sometimes whole towns—prepared to shoot any conscription official who came calling.

When, in July 1862, the Union turned to conscription to ease its own manpower problem, more than one-fifth of those called never showed up. Many of them headed to Canada, moved West, or disappeared into the wilderness. Unlike the Confederacy, the Union offered no occupational exemptions, but men could get exemptions if they persuaded a provost marshal that dependents (usually the elderly, orphans, or the infirm) could not survive without them. This policy opened the way for fraud, with many men pretending to be unfit physically or mentally or needing to care for someone. Northern men also could hire substitutes or pay a commutation fee of $300. The fee at least had the effect of keeping the cost of substitutes below $300. Thanks to all of these legal and illegal means of evasion, only 7 percent called actually served, although the threat of the draft certainly prompted widespread volunteer enlistment. Open resistance to the Union draft sometimes reached extremely violent levels. Armed draft opponents killed several provost marshals, and, in the worst case of draft-related violence, New York City experienced four days of bloody rioting in July 1863 that killed at least 105 people.

World War I

When war erupted in Europe in August 1914, a great debate ensued over America's stand. Opposition to the war reached such a pitch that "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier" became a wildly popular song, and Pres. Woodrow Wilson won reelection in 1916 largely on the basis of his campaign theme, He Kept Us Out of War. The following year, when Congress—at Wilson's request—not only declared war on Germany and its allies, but also passed a conscription law, not all Americans greeted the news warmly. Although local draft boards registered 24 million men for possible military service, as many as 3.5 million men never registered. Another 337,000 registered but did not answer when called for induction (many, in fact, fled to Mexico or Canada). Nonregistrants and open resisters proved so numerous that the government instituted "slacker raids" in which police dragnets rounded up sometimes tens of thousands of men—just to verify their registration status.

Other ways to get out of the draft included marriage, because the draft law exempted married men; as a result, thousands of single men rushed to marry their girlfriends. Some bribed physicians to attest to a registrant's poor mental or physical health; others turned to drugs or self-mutilation (amputating the trigger finger, for example). Some 65,000 men applied for conscientious objector (CO) status, though this did not necessarily prevent them from ill-treatment. At least 20,000 men with approved CO status were still inducted into the Army and sent to training camps where they often faced abuse from regular inductees. At least 500 were court-martialed and sent to Army prisons.

World War II

In September 1940, with Europe again embroiled in war, the U.S. Congress passed the nation's first peacetime draft, the Selective Training and Service Act, in anticipation of America being drawn into World War II. At first the law limited service to a year and capped the number of men drafted at 900,000. But when the United States entered the war in 1941, Congress amended the law to extend tours of service to six months beyond the war's end and authorized the Selective Service to draft as many men as the military needed.

In addition to establishing the mechanism that ultimately drafted more than 10 million men during World War II, the Congress also enshrined CO status in the new draft law. As a result, following American entry in the war, some

37,000 men performed alternative service, usually in Civilian Public Service camps. Duties often included working in hospitals, serving as medical test subjects, and firefighting. But some COs grew disgusted with the lack of substantive work in the national interest and protested, sometimes by leaving the camps. Such men usually found themselves in prison for violating the draft law.

Beyond conscientious objection, thousands of men resisted draft registration or tried to escape the draft through some subterfuge; the Justice Department investigated more than 300,000 alleged draft resistance cases and ultimately convicted more than 16,000 men for one form of draft law violation or another during the so-called good war. Others, presaging the later draft resisters of the 1960s, openly refused to register and welcomed prosecution and imprisonment. The so-called Union Eight, eight divinity students from Union Theological Seminary, received the most publicity. One of them, David Dellinger, a committed pacifist, continued to work on civil rights and in antiwar movements until his death in 2004.

The Cold War and Vietnam

When World War II ended, so did the draft—but only briefly. Growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled with concern over so many men leaving the service after the war, prompted Congress to renew the draft law in 1948. Over time, the system evolved to provide an extensive array of legal deferments and exemptions that effectively helped millions of men evade the draft. Outright draft resistance continued, as well (as many as

Students at Temple University in Philadelphia completing a test to qualify for deferment from the draft in 1951. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

80,000 may have resisted the draft during the Korean War) but thanks to deferments, millions escaped conscription.

The extensive deferment system came under increased scrutiny with the escalation of U.S. intervention in Vietnam, beginning in 1965. When Pres. Lyndon Johnson first committed ground troops to fight in Vietnam, draft calls quickly rose from 8,000 per month to more than 30,000. Draft boards became stricter about granting deferments and more diligent in checking up on each registrant's activities. Still, out of nearly 27 million men who reached draft age during the Vietnam War, 16 million avoided service legally (2.2 million were drafted, and 8.7 million enlisted voluntarily). The 2-S deferment for college and graduate students was most controversial as it became clear that working-class, poor, and minority men were more likely to be drafted than middle-class and wealthy men.

In addition to more than 60,000 men receiving CO status, another 60,000 or more (estimates vary) fled the country, most to Canada. Thousands of others employed age-old methods (faking injuries, mental illness, or homosexuality) to receive deferments. In New York City and Cleveland, the government indicted 38 fathers and sons for paying $5,000 for false papers to get deferments. One New York draft official was convicted of selling deferments for up to $30,000. So common were these various methods of draft evasion that they entered popular culture in a number of ways, notably through folk singer Arlo Guthrie's "Alice's Restaurant" and Phil Ochs's "Draft Dodger Rag," the latter enumerating a dozen ways to escape conscription.

In 1967 and 1968, a national draft resistance movement took shape, taking its inspiration from civil rights activists and lone draft resisters such as boxing champion Muhammad Ali. Ali, denied CO status by his Louisville, Kentucky, draft board, decided to refuse induction into the Army. He saw his heavyweight title stripped and was prevented from boxing until 1971, when the Supreme Court overturned his conviction. At the same time, in cities and towns across the country, draft resisters gathered to turn in their draft cards to the government and later, individually, refused induction. For a time, the movement garnered headlines across the country and led Johnson administration officials to recommend against an increase in troop strength

Selective Service Complaints of Draft Law Violations, 1966–70

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, 1971; U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, 1970, 12860; U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, 1967, 243; cited in M. Useem, *Conscription, Protest, and Social Conflict* (New York: John Wiley, 1973), p. 127.

As the Vietnam War increased in intensity, draft law violations increased considerably, rising from 4 per 100 inductions in 1966, to more than 12 in 1970.

for fear of more draft resistance. Ultimately, the Justice Department indicted 22,000 draft resisters and convicted 8,700, but fewer than 5,000 actually went to prison. By the time Richard Nixon took office as president, public support for the draft was very low. Deferments were widely criticized, draft evaders and resisters reviled; Nixon, therefore, moved first to introduce a random selection "lottery" system that eliminated most deferments, and, in 1973, he ended the draft altogether.

In the post–Vietnam War era, Americans once again grew accustomed to life without conscription. Following the nation's intervention in Iraq in 2003, some politicians and public commentators raised the prospect of renewing the draft—primarily as a way to spread the burden of fighting more equitably and, thus, eliminate the "backdoor draft" that mobilized thousands of Reservists and National Guardsmen. But the public

remained unmoved. Public opinion polls consistently showed overwhelming popular opposition to the draft.

Over the course of three centuries, conscription in America has been greeted with evasion and protest. Although draft "dodging" in the Vietnam War era has received the most attention in textbooks and is most vivid in national memory, draft evasion and draft resistance tactics have, in fact, been largely consistent throughout American history and have caused considerable controversy on the American home front.

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Related Entries

All Volunteer Force; Antiwar Movements; Conscientious Objection; Conscription and Volunteerism; Desertion; Impressment; Pacifism; Quakers; Selective Service System

Related Documents

1776 b; 1777 b; 1965 b; 1966 b; 1976 b; 1977 a

—John R. Maass and Michael S. Foley

Du Bois, W. E. B.

(1868–1963)
African American Activist, Scholar

A leading American intellectual and civil rights advocate, William Edward Burghardt Du Bois was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, in 1868. After undergraduate study at all-black Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, and graduate work at Harvard and the University of Berlin, Du Bois turned his attention to the academic study of American society and to the cause of social reform. He helped to found the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1909 and served for 24 years as the editor of its monthly magazine, *The Crisis*, an important platform for black America. During World War I, Du Bois challenged Pres. Woodrow Wilson to make good on his promise of winning the war for democracy by reversing the segregationist policies of his administration and extending full citizenship rights to African Americans. An internationalist in strategy and vision, Du Bois worked to illuminate the ties that bound American people of color to the larger world of foreign affairs.

Throughout World War I, Du Bois struggled to balance a pragmatic patriotism with his steadfast commitment to civil rights. As early as 1915, he had traced the roots of the war to the problem of the color line, citing European rivalry over African colonies as a primary cause of the conflict. He supported the war against Germany nonetheless, convinced that African Americans could use the war to secure equal rights at home. After the United States declared war on April 6, 1917, Du Bois predicted that service in the armed forces would help engage all African Americans in the civil rights movement while also demonstrating the high price they were willing to pay as American citizens.

Du Bois's most infamous war-time editorial, "Close Ranks" (published in *The Crisis* in July 1918), undercut the civil rights militancy he otherwise celebrated: in "Close Ranks," Du Bois urged his fellow African Americans to forget their "special grievances" for the duration of the war and give themselves unreservedly over to the American effort. To many civil rights activists, the call diminished Du Bois's

W. E. B. Du Bois at work at the offices of The Crisis, *for which he served as editor. (Getty Images)*

previous denunciations of war-time lynchings and race riots. Moreover, the editorial offered a disheartening addendum to his controversial support of a segregated Army camp for African American officers in Fort Des Moines, Iowa. The leading voice of the Progressive-era civil rights movement, Du Bois seemed to have forsaken the cause of integration.

His critics need not have worried. Despite his conciliatory tone in "Close Ranks," Du Bois never ceased in his attempts to hold the Wilson administration accountable to its black constituency. In the months following the November 11, 1918 armistice, Du Bois published documents exposing white officers' systematic abuse and exploitation of African American soldiers and laboring

battalions. Continuing his critique of colonialism in Africa as an obstacle to global security, he organized a Pan African Congress in early 1919 to coincide with the peace treaty negotiations in Paris. Four more such congresses were convened in the years between 1921 and 1945.

Du Bois's most celebrated editorial in the immediate post–World War I period announced that the time to close ranks had ended. In the May 1919 *Crisis*, Du Bois labeled returning veterans "soldiers of democracy" and wrote that they had saved democracy in France and would now "save it in the United States of America, or know the reason why." In the midst of the Red Summer of 1919, when 25 postwar riots and dozens of lynchings of black civilians and former soldiers swept the nation, Du Bois's words served as both lament and inspiration.

As Du Bois drifted toward a more radical economic critique of American racial exploitation in the 1930s, he increasingly linked domestic racial politics to international affairs. After traveling through Nazi Germany from 1936 to 1937, he underscored for readers of the black newspaper the *Pittsburgh Courier* the parallels between Nazi racial ideologies and those of American white supremacists. Resuming his work in the NAACP in 1944 after a 10-year absence, Du Bois pressured the American government to acknowledge the economic and racial exploitation that connected European colonialism, German fascism, and, in his estimation, American capitalism. As an NAACP consultant to the United States delegation at the founding conference of the United Nations (U.N.) in 1945, and in subsequent writings, Du Bois urged the international community to denounce American racism as part of a larger, global system that engendered fascism and forestalled democracy.

The Cold War hastened the fulfillment of some of Du Bois's most cherished reform goals. At the same time, the Cold War foreclosed almost as many possibilities as it created. The anticommunism of the postwar period made Du Bois's race-conscious Marxism unpopular within the NAACP, and in 1948 he permanently broke his ties with the organization. Three years later, federal authorities indicted Du Bois as "an agent of a foreign principal," claiming that his membership on the board of the leftist, antiwar Peace Information Center made him an agent of the Soviet Union. Although he was acquitted, the State Department refused to grant him a passport until 1958.

In 1961, as the momentum of the civil rights movement he had overseen for decades increased, Du Bois joined the Communist Party. That same year, he immigrated to Ghana with his second wife, Shirley Graham Du Bois. His death there on August 27, 1963, marked the end of a life that spanned from Reconstruction to the modern civil rights movement. A legendary thinker and tireless activist, Du Bois spent the war years helping black Americans define their place in American society and in the world.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Race Riots; World War I; World War II

Related Documents

1919 b

—*Adriane D. Smith*

E

Economy and War

To cover fully the economics of war would require an encyclopedia unto itself. This entry will provide brief introductions to four questions: (1) To what extent did economic forces cause America's wars? (2) After going to war, how has the United States managed the reallocation of resources? (3) How has the United States financed the reallocation of resources? and (4) What have been the economic legacies of war or of a given war?

The Economic Causes of America's Wars
Although economic forces are not the only causes of wars, perhaps not even the primary causes, all of the wars that the United States has fought have had important economic causes. Although the Revolutionary War had its origins in a wide range of political and cultural causes, the colonists were outraged above all by taxes—especially those imposed upon them by the Crown without their consent. American colonials were also irritated by mercantilist policies that limited their right to trade freely with the rest of the world, although research by economic historians has tended to minimize the actual costs to the colonists as a result of these policies. The most important economic cause of the Revolution, however, may have been British restrictions on western settlement. The Declaration of Independence alludes to these restrictions in its bill of particulars:

> He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.

The War of 1812 stemmed in part from the belief of the young United States of America that it could, as a neutral party, trade equally with both France and England during the Napoleonic Wars between those two countries. With both nations trying to enforce blockades (and both capturing American ships to do so), relations became strained. An equally if not more important factor that led to the conflict was the war fever in the West fueled by the prospect of expansion and economic growth. A successful war with Britain, Westerners thought, would lead to the annexation of Canada and to a fatal weakening of Native American resistance, thus opening vast new lands for settlement. In the end, after considerable diplomatic maneuvering, the United States decided to go to war with England, not France.

Land hunger, in particular the desire of Pres. James K. Polk for California, was also a factor behind the Mexican War. From the beginning of his administration, Polk had made the acquisition of California and the territory of New Mexico a high priority—in large part to prevent Mexico from ceding California to Great Britain (to which Mexico was in great financial debt) and thereby prevent U.S. expansion all the way to the Pacific Ocean. When Mexico refused a U.S. offer to purchase California, Polk pressured Mexico diplomatically and militarily. The Mexican government did not acquiesce to Polk's demands, however, and two years of war ensued. Mexico lost, and California and New Mexico were annexed by the United States. In 1850, its population bolstered by the gold rush, California became the 31st state.

A complex amalgam of political and moral motives lay behind the American Civil War, but at base such motives rested on economic factors. At one time, economic historians focused on the idea made famous by Charles and Mary Beard and Louis Hacker that northern industrial interests

pushed for the war. Partly this was because Northerners believed that ending slavery would significantly expand the market in the American South for northern industrial goods. The argument was that the skewed income distribution in the South limited demand for the staple products of northern industry, including textiles and basic housewares. Slaves were provided with very little, while their masters imported luxury goods. The Beards and Hacker also argued that northern industrial expansion required legislation that could not be passed until the South's political power was broken.

Subsequently, however, significant doubts were raised about what had become known as the "Beard–Hacker thesis." Stanley Engerman's 1966 critique was especially influential. After the war, the former slaves were poor, often scratching a living from sharecropping; they did not form a thriving market for northern industrial products. Close inspection of the major institutional changes resulting from the war—the National Banking Act, the Union Pacific Railroad, the land grant colleges, and so on—showed that although they were important to their respective sectors of the economy, they did not seem to have produced a significant acceleration in economic growth.

More recently economic historians have stressed slavery itself as the economic cause of the Civil War. Ending slavery would have meant a huge loss of capital for slave owners. As first shown by Yasukichi Yasuba, the value of an individual slave at maturity far exceeded the cost of rearing that slave. Southerners, moreover, knew that the political triumph of northern Republicans meant that the further expansion of slavery within the United States had become highly unlikely. As stressed by Robert W. Fogel, becoming an independent nation would give Southerners a chance to expand their version of slavery within the Americas. The Panic of 1857, a severe financial crisis, as shown by James L. Huston, may also have taught the Southerners some lessons about the potential value of independence from the North: the crisis was less severe in the South, cushioned, or so it appeared to many Southerners, by a relatively strong market for cotton. "Cotton was King."

Economic forces, it is usually assumed, and with some justice, were less important in the Spanish–American War than in other wars. Clearly, the sensationalist press, which inflamed public opinion by drawing attention to Spanish oppression in Cuba, played the major role. Yet a number of historians, Walter Lafeber prominent among them, see the Spanish–American War as the result of American efforts to expand overseas markets. The McKinley administration, moreover, decided to ask Congress for a declaration of war only after it had become convinced that Spain could not halt the Cuban Revolution and that the continued focus by the press on Cuba was hurting the securities markets and slowing the nation's recovery from the depression inaugurated by the Panic of 1893. As a result of the war, Cuba was freed but Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines became American possessions. The war to subjugate the Philippines—the Philippine insurrection—proved to be long and brutal.

America's involvement in World War I on the side of Britain, France, Italy, and their allies, reflected ties of culture and politics, but, as in other cases, these were entwined with economic motives. First and foremost was Germany's attempt to starve Britain out of the war through submarine attacks on Britain's maritime trade. U.S. trade with the Allies, who were running short of labor and raw materials, skyrocketed between 1914 and 1917. In addition, the Wilson administration was determined to defend our "neutral rights," refusing even to warn Americans against boarding vessels bound for the war zone. This policy, and the inevitable ship sinkings and losses of American life, brought the United States into repeated confrontations with Germany and helped propel the United States into World War I, just as Britain's blockade of the European continent during the Napoleonic Wars had helped propel the United States into the War of 1812.

The rise of Nazism in Germany and extreme nationalism in Japan during the 1930s were predicated in part on the idea that each nation could attain the status of a world power only by creating economically self-sufficient empires. Germany had lost World War I in part because the British naval blockade had deprived Central Europe of fertilizers crucial for crop production, resulting in widespread hunger that undermined support for the war. German military planners in the 1930s understood that Germany would need to produce fertilizers artificially and control agricultural areas in Eastern Europe if it were to be sure of winning another

war. Germany's attempt to achieve economic self-sufficiency, however, went beyond these concerns. For example, Germany tried to expand its economic interests in Spain to assure a continuous supply of raw materials, tungsten in particular. Ultimately, it was Japan's attempt to carve out an economic empire in Asia, and America's attempt to stop Japanese expansionism, that brought the United States and Japan into conflict, leading to Pearl Harbor.

Most of the American anticommunist campaign that followed World War II was a "Cold War." From 1946 to 1990, the United States maintained military spending at unprecedented levels for peacetime and wrestled diplomatically with the Soviet Union. On two occasions, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the Cold War turned hot. Although many political and ideological factors animated the conflicts during this period, one central, abiding question was economic: Should economies be organized on the basis of private ownership of property and coordinated through markets, or should the state be the main owner of property and coordinator of economic activity?

Reallocating Resources

The basic economic problem in wartime is how to transfer resources from the civilian sector to the military sector. Economists often analyze this transition with a "production possibilities curve" of the type shown in figure 1, which shows the amounts of civilian goods (butter) measured on the vertical axis, and military goods (guns) measured on the horizontal axis. The curve shows the maximum amounts a country could produce depending on how it allocated its resources. The proverbial expression "guns or butter," incidentally, is usually traced to Hermann Goering, who became the major planner of economic mobilization in Germany during the 1930s and is frequently quoted as having said "Guns will make us powerful; butter will only make us fat."

If a country allocated all of its resources to civilian production, it would produce A of butter and zero of guns. If it allocated all of its resources to military production and none to civilian production it would produce B of guns and zero of butter. (For this extreme to make sense one would need to think of some minimum of civilian production as an input in the production of guns.) The contrast between the Peace

The Production Possibilities Curve

Figure 1. The production possibilities curve shows the relationship between civilian and military production. As the production of military goods (on the x-axis) increases, that of civilian goods (on the y-axis) typically declines.

point on the curve and the War point illustrates the basic problem of mobilization: increasing war production normally means reducing civilian consumption. One measure of the cost of the war, to put it differently, is the civilian production that is thereby foregone.

Some of America's wars have involved relatively small reallocations of resources; this made the War point on the curve relatively close to the Peace point. The Spanish–American War is an example. From 1895 to 1897, the three years before the war, spending by the Army and Navy averaged about 0.62 percent of GDP. This percentage rose to a peak of 1.40 in 1898, averaging 1.27 percent from 1898 to 1900. On the other hand, some wars required a far more dramatic reallocation of resources. In the period from 1914 to 1916 leading up to U.S. involvement in World War I, spending by the Army and Navy (the newly created Air Force was then part of the Army) averaged about 1 percent of GDP. That figure rose to 6.17 percent in 1917, and reached a peak of 12.37 percent in 1918. That percentage would be even higher if other forms of production—ships built for the

government, munitions purchased by U.S. allies, for example—are taken into account.

If a country is at less than full employment when the war begins, unemployed resources can be allocated to the war effort, so more guns can be produced without reducing consumption of butter. This is illustrated in figure 1 by the economy at C. This economy can move horizontally to the right. It faces no trade-off until the production possibilities curve is hit. World War II, as is frequently observed, got the United States out of the Depression. One measure of the truth of this claim can be seen if we compare unemployment rates in the years 1939 and 1943. In 1939 the official unemployment rate was 17.2 percent and the total labor force was 55.8 million; in 1943 the unemployment rate was 1.9 percent and the total labor force was 64.6 million.

Keep in mind, however, that much of the movement toward full employment during World War II occurred before the United States entered the war. By December 1941 the unemployment rate had fallen to 5.94 percent. In 1941, to take an extreme but important example, American automobile companies sold 3.78 million automobiles. This was below the number sold in 1929, the best year before the Great Depression, but about the same as in other outstanding years such as 1925 and 1928. After Pearl Harbor, civilian automobile production was terminated, with automobile companies converted to the production of military vehicles, clearly a movement along the production possibilities curve. World War II, moreover, was an exception. Other wars began in more normal circumstances, and the potential for expanding production of military goods by employing previously unemployed resources rather than by reducing production of civilian goods did not exist on the same scale. The unemployment rate in 1916, the year before the United States entered World War I for example, was 5.1 percent.

Measuring the costs of war—as John Maurice Clark wrote in his still definitive 1931 investigation of the costs of World War I—"is either a relatively simple matter of tabulation and fiscal allocation; or else it is an economic problem of insoluble difficulty" (xi). We can add up the amount spent by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and if we are scrupulous we can add other war-related expenses of the government. All these numbers are available in the budget documents of the federal (and state and local) governments. But how do we value the lives lost? How, to take a narrower economic view, do we measure the loss of human capital?

Some idea of the costs of wars can be gleaned from Table 1, which shows estimates of the human and financial costs of the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War.

Clearly, the bloodiest war was the Civil War, followed by World War II. The other wars produced a distinctly smaller number of deaths and nonmortal wounds. Also clear is that the wars varied a great deal in terms of the resources devoted to them. World War II was the most costly of the hot wars in terms of resources. The high cost of World War II reflected the intensity of the conflict, the location of the battlefields, and the capital intensity (amount of capital per fighter) of the war. Altogether, about 18 months' worth of GDP was funneled into the war effort during World War II.

Perhaps somewhat surprising is the high cost of the Cold War. Similar factors—the length of the war, the global nature of the conflict, which required military and intelligence personnel to be posted around the world, and the capital intensity of the war—account for the high cost (30 months of GDP). The other wars were distinctly less costly, although World War I, despite it quick resolution, used up about six months' worth of GDP. The expenditure and GDP estimates for the Civil War are not as precise as the estimates for later wars. Nevertheless, the impression conveyed by the table of a more labor-intensive war—higher casualties but lower spending on the military—makes sense. Although five times as many men died in the Civil War as in World War I, in each case about a half a year's worth of GDP was allocated to the war effort. Battlefields that could be reached by marching or by railcar and the low capital intensity of the armed forces account for these wars' relatively small share of GDP.

In every war the flood of contracts coming from the military services or civilian supply agencies was at the core of the reallocation of resources from the civilian sector to the military sector. War contracts were always highly profitable and war contractors simply bid away the materials and services they needed from others. In World War II, the war that required the most extreme mobilization of the economy, the

Table 1 Human and Resource Costs of Six Wars

	Civil War	WWI	WWII	Korea	Vietnam	Cold War
Start	April 1861	April 1917	December 1941	June 1950	August 1964	March 1947
End	April 1865	October 1918	September 1945	July 1953	January 1973	October 1989
Months	48	20	45	37	102	512
Combat Deaths	214,938	53,402	291,557	33,629	47,356	NA[a]
Other Deaths	311,894	63,114	113,846	20,617	10,795	NA
Nonmortal Wounds	407,406	204,002	671,846	103,284	153,303	NA
Total Cost of the War in Billions of Current Dollars	3.70	32.4	306.7	49.9	122.3	4061.8
Average GDP in Billions of Current Dollars	7.0	62.1	186.0	359	968.3	1611.1
War Costs as a Percentage of GDP	53.1	52.20	164.9	13.9	12.6	252.1

Sources: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www.va.gov/pressrel/amwars01.htm> (May 22, 2005). Civil War figures include both the North and South. Nonmortal wounds for the South during the Civil War are unknown and were estimated by applying the ratio of nonmortal wounds to deaths for the North to the number of deaths for the South. Total Costs: Civil War: Claudia D. Goldin and Frank D. Lewis, "The Economic Cost of the American Civil War: Estimates and Implications," *Journal of Economic History* 35, no. 2 (1975): 304, 308. Total cost for the Civil War is the sum of direct military expenditures by the North and the South during the war. The Goldin and Lewis figures were adjusted upward to offset the discounts they applied to the data, and thus to make the figures more comparable to those for subsequent wars. Total Costs: Other Wars: Michael Edelstein, "War and the American Economy in the 20th Century," in *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States,* vol. 3, *The Twentieth Century,* ed. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Table 6.1. Nominal GDP. Johnston and Williamson. The estimates of GDP for the Civil War era are essentially trend values between more secure estimates for 1860 and 1869, and presumably include the South.
[a] There were few combat deaths during the Cold War; deaths occurred mainly among CIA operatives.

United States relied, after some experimentation, on "cost plus" contracts negotiated individually with the munitions makers. This system assured contractors very high profits at almost no risk because any unexpected increases in costs would be absorbed by the government. Prior to the war, the government had relied on competitive bidding to help hold costs down. During the war, however, competitive bidding was deemed to be too slow and cumbersome to achieve rapid mobilization.

Such contracts always attracted theirs share of crooks. Every war, as amply documented by Stuart Brandes in his provocatively titled but scholarly book *Warhogs* (1997), had its scandals: shoddy merchandise sold to the military at exorbitant prices and contracts awarded to friends and business associates. These scandals have drawn more attention and have often been exaggerated because of the unique moral stigma that attaches to profiteering during wartime. In an extreme case, shoddy merchandise could lead to loss of life on the battlefield. Such an extreme case is the theme of Arthur Miller's play *All My Sons* (1947) about profiteering in World War II. Perhaps the best known attack on war profiteering was launched in the 1930s by the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the Munitions Industry, the Nye Committee, which blamed American munitions makers for drawing America into World War I.

Much can be done, and has been done in various wars, to minimize profiteering. A vigilant press has been the first line of defense. In addition, investigations by government committees have uncovered problems and created incentives to avoid them. It is notable that presidents Andrew Johnson and Harry S. Truman earned their positions on the public stage by heading Senate committees investigating war contracts. Excess profit taxes and provisions for the renegotiation of contracts after the war have been used as a final line of defense. Still, it

seems likely, given the special circumstances in which wartime contracts are signed (speed is of the essence and both those responsible for issuing contracts and the firms they are dealing with are often unfamiliar with the work to be done), that some corruption will attend every mobilization.

In the colonial wars of the 18th century, and during the U.S. wars of the 19th century (the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish–American War) governments relied almost entirely on the private incentives created by these contracts to coordinate mobilization. During World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, however, the government created centralized bureaus—the War Industries Board, the War Production Board, and the National Production Administration, respectively—to coordinate the process. These agencies were charged with several tasks. The main one, however, was to provide answers to some basic questions: Which contracts should be filled first? Which raw materials should be given the highest priorities because they were used as inputs in the production of war goods? In part, the creation of these coordinating agencies reflected the complexity of modern warfare. But it also reflected broad changes in ideology. Many Americans, including the administrations responsible for managing the war efforts in the 20th century, were skeptical of the ability of the market to achieve a swift and efficient reallocation of resources.

The reallocation of labor to the production of war goods, unlike capital, was left to a much greater degree to pecuniary incentives. Although agencies were created to deal with wages, working conditions, and similar matters, the assumptions was that wages could be offered that were high enough to quickly achieve the needed reallocation of labor and yet low enough that taxpayers—who ultimately paid the wages when they paid for munitions—were willing to pay. The flood of workers into Detroit, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and other war production centers during World War II is testimony to the attractiveness of jobs and high wages. Marilyn Johnson's book on Oakland and the East Bay area in World War II is accurately titled *The Second Gold Rush* (1993).

The military services were another matter. To fill the ranks of the Army, the government historically turned to a draft. This was the story in the Revolution, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. It was assumed that a point would be reached in a major war where more soldiers could not be had at any price, or at least at any price taxpayers were willing to pay. In the Revolution and the Civil War, draftees were allowed to hire substitutes to serve in their place. Such a policy throws into sharp relief the distinction between economic efficiency and economic fairness. An economist focused on efficiency would point out that allowing the hiring of substitutes permitted a potential soldier with valuable skills to remain at home while someone with lower skills served in his place. Such a system, however, also permitted someone who had inherited wealth to remain at home, while someone without means had to serve. In short, the system of substitutes magnified the feeling, to take a phrase that became popular during the Civil War, that it was a "rich man's war and a poor man's fight." The New York City Draft Riots of 1863 were partly a reflection of the belief that a draft in which men of means could buy their way out was unfair. The draft was quickly revived when the United States entered World War I, but without the divisive system of substitution. In both World War I and World War II, despite some criticism, the draft was generally accepted as a necessary step toward winning the war.

The draft was ended after the United States withdrew from Vietnam in 1973. Widespread protests against the war by college-age youths had raised important political questions about the draft. Libertarian economists, in particular Milton Friedman and Walter Oi, exerted a marginal influence on U.S. policy by questioning the economics of the draft. Their main point was that a draft didn't really "save" resources. The difference between what would have to be paid to get a person to serve voluntarily and what was paid to that person as a draftee was simply a transfer from the draftee to the taxpayer, a tax, if you will, on the draftee. In either case the real cost to the economy—what the potential soldier could produce in the private sector—was the same. In March 1969, President Nixon established the Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, the Gates Commission, to study the feasibility of ending the draft. The commission, dominated by the economists, issued a report early in 1970 strongly advocating an all volunteer force. In 1973, Congress, drained by antiwar protests, harassed by

middle-class parents afraid for their sons, and impressed by the Gates Commission's report, refused to extend the draft law. It expired on July 1, 1973, effectively establishing all volunteer armed forces.

The technology for fighting wars has evolved rapidly and has tended to increase the cost of wars because the amount of capital required per soldier has increased, and because of the potential damage to human and physical capital has increased. During the Civil War, for example, the development of rifled muskets accurate at long range undermined the usefulness of straight ahead infantry charges (which were nevertheless made), producing enormous casualty rates that tried the patience of a nation. World War I saw the widespread use of the machine gun, a Civil War–era invention much improved on by Hiram Maxim in 1884, which further reduced the effectiveness of the infantry charge, and condemned soldiers to the horror of the trenches. New civilian technologies were also adapted to warfare. During the Civil War, both sides made use of the telegraph and the railroad, then relatively new technologies. With them the Union was able to coordinate troop movements and attacks over half a continent. In World War I, the airplane, then only a decade old, was widely deployed. Air power came into its own in World War II, vastly increasing the cost of war, both because of the high cost of producing aircraft and training flyers and because of the enormous material and human damage that could be imposed on an enemy.

Financing Wars

"Endless money," said the Roman statesman Cicero, "forms the sinews of war." Although several means have been available to governments for acquiring resources to fight wars, only three basic ways are available to modern governments to acquire the financial resources it needs: taxes, borrowing, and printing the money. All of these come in different forms: taxes may be excise taxes or income taxes, borrowing may be from domestic or foreign sources, and money may be paper currency or bank deposits.

The central financial question concerns how to balance these three approaches. Classical economists taught that wars should be financed mainly by taxation. Adam Smith argued that debt finance was bad mainly because it hid the costs of war. Taxes, in such an instance, would be raised only by a small amount, the amount needed to pay the interest on the debt, and the total cost of the war would not be brought home to the taxpayer.

At the end of the classical period, John Stuart Mill modified Smith's position. Mill thought that some borrowing would be appropriate. The test was whether interest rates rose; a rising interest rate was a sign that borrowing had been pushed too far. Today, however, many economists, following the lead of Robert J. Barro tend to argue nearly the opposite: that taxes should be moderated through the use of borrowing. The argument is that high tax rates discourage economic activity (taxes on wages, for example, discourage work) and that it therefore makes sense to limit wartime increases by resorting to borrowing. Debt, it is said, is useful because it permits the government to "smooth" taxes over time.

Financing a war simply by printing the money, most authorities agree, is a mistake because it produces inflation. Governments, however, often find it expedient to rely to some degree on printing money. The Continental dollar was the main vehicle for financing the Revolutionary War. The Continental Congress lacked the authority and administrative machinery to raise large amounts of money by taxes, and the still embryonic U.S. capital market was unready to absorb large amounts of debt. For similar reasons, the South relied mainly on the Confederate dollar during the Civil War. The North began by relying on paper money—the famous greenback, named for the green ink that was used to print it, and for lack of gold "backing" the note—but eventually was able to raise taxes and incur debt. Indeed, during the Civil War the North instituted the first national income tax (later declared unconstitutional), a tax on corporate profits, and taxes on alcohol and tobacco that are still with us. The South, not surprisingly, experienced far more inflation than did the North because of the South's reliance on printing money.

Once the Federal Reserve was established in 1913, the method of creating money changed. During the Civil War, the government simply printed the notes and used them to pay soldiers and suppliers. During World War I, however, the process became less transparent. The government sold bonds. These were purchased by the Federal Reserve, which had created new deposit accounts so it might be able to purchase

these bonds. The result in both cases was the creation of new purchasing power—and inflation. Indeed, inflation during World War I was, if anything, a bit greater than in the North during the Civil War, even though the Civil War lasted longer and saw far greater numbers of casualties. The inflation during World War I was also greater than that during World War II. Milton Friedman may have been the first to draw attention to the unusually high degree of inflation during the World War I era (much of the inflation came in the immediate postwar years) and its origin in monetary policy.

Although our modern economy could get by without financing wars through printing of new money, the temptation to do so to at least some degree has sometimes been strong. Only in the Korean War, thanks to early and sufficient tax increases, and in the Persian Gulf War, thanks to major contributions from U.S. allies, was the United States

able to avoid financing a substantial part of the war effort by printing money.

Figure 2 shows the price level (the GDP deflator) from 1790 to 1946. Throughout the course of the 19th century, prices remained more or less stable. The two wartime peaks, the War of 1812 and the Civil War, stand out. During both wars, the assumption was that the departure from the bimetallic standard and the printing of fiat paper money were temporary and that after the war the United States would return to the bimetallic standard at the prewar exchange rate and at the prewar price level. After the Civil War, the debate over returning to the prewar standard became heated. Democrats argued that the necessary deflation would hurt workers who might lose their jobs during a recession and farmers who were generally debtors. The Democrats favored various policies ranging from a slowing

Figure 2. This chart shows the relative rise in prices during major U.S. military engagements.

of the retirement of the greenbacks to making the greenback a permanent feature of the economy. The Republicans, on the other hand, argued that returning to the bimetallic standard (at the time a de facto gold standard) was a matter of national honor and that it would impress European capitalists who would then be more willing to invest in the United States. The Republicans prevailed, and in 1879 the United States returned to the gold standard at the prewar exchange parity and the prewar price level.

The Economic Legacies of America's Wars

America's wars have produced many long-term changes in the American economy. Here we will briefly draw attention to five of the most important: (1) the provision of veterans' benefits; (2) changes in the financial system; (3) changes in America's role in the world economy; (4) changes in labor markets; and (5) changes in the realm of economic theory.

Veterans' Benefits

The most obvious and possibly the most important economic legacies of wars are the benefits paid to veterans. To some extent veterans' benefits represent resources that are devoted to ameliorating the long-term costs of wars, such as money spent to treat physical or psychological damage caused by wars. But veterans' benefits also represent a transfer of resources from taxpayers to veterans to express the nation's appreciation for what veterans have suffered and accomplished. One might assume that veterans' benefits would be a relatively uncontroversial part of the federal budget, but they have often been the subject of bitter controversy.

A tradition dating from the colonial times held that the government would provide relief for soldiers and sailors who became sick or disabled as a result of military service; during the Revolution, the Continental Congress passed legislation that mandated such care. The demand by Revolutionary officers, however, to receive half pay over the remainder of their lives contingent solely on service until war's end proved far more contentious. (This was, in fact, what Britain had offered its officers.) Eventually, the officers were offered government bonds in lieu of an annuity. The interest on these bonds, however, remained unpaid until the Constitution established a more effective government structure. Pressure to enlarge the benefits and reduce the service requirements continued after the Revolution. Legislation passed in 1828 and 1832 created lifetime pensions, and the Widows Pension Act of 1836 created pensions for widows.

In addition to pensions paid in bonds or cash, veterans of the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Indian Wars, and the Mexican War received substantial grants of western lands. Land grants were given in part simply because this was the main asset of the federal government, but also in part because of the belief that settling military veterans on western land would provide protection from Native Americans. Land grants to veterans became controversial in a number of states where a substantial portion of the available land was given to the veterans. Making the land warrants negotiable was clearly a benefit to those soldiers who did not want to move to the frontier, but it also added to the controversy because it led many soldiers to sell their claims to "speculators."

In 1862 Congress provided pensions for disabilities caused by the war, and also pensions for widows, orphans, and, in some cases, dependent mothers and sisters. In addition, in 1865 Congress authorized the establishment of a "National Asylum" for Disabled Veterans. In the post–Civil War era, the Grand Army of the Republic, a Union veterans' organization, and others sympathetic to veterans, lobbied for a more generous law. As in the case of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, liberalization did come, although only after many of the veterans had died. Legislation passed in 1890 removed the requirement that the qualifying disability be the result of military service; legislation passed in 1904 made age itself a qualifying disability. One feature of the later versions of the Civil War pension that drew considerable criticism was the provision for pensions for widows in cases where the marriage took place after the war. This provision, justified as it was in many cases, opened the possibility of marriages of convenience between aged veterans and much younger women.

Although limited in many ways, the Civil War pension has been described as America's first social security system. By 1900, according to Dora L. Costa, a leading authority on the Civil War pensions, "21 percent of all white males over the age of 55 were on the pension rolls," and "the average

pension paid to Union Army veterans from 1866 to 1912 replaced about 30 percent of the income of an unskilled laborer, making the Union army pension program as generous as Social Security retirement benefits today."

After World War I, perhaps in reaction to the perceived abuses of the Civil War pension, the emphasis shifted from cash benefits to in-kind benefits: housing, medical care, and education. Pressure was brought to bear, however, for a bonus to be paid to veterans. One persuasive argument was that the wages paid to soldiers had been eroded by the wartime and postwar inflation. In 1924 a "bonus" was awarded, but one that was not scheduled for payment with interest until 1945. When the Great Depression hit, many veterans joined a campaign for an early payment of the bonus. In 1932 and 1933, thousands converged on Washington to demand immediate payment of the bonus. But neither the Hoover nor the Roosevelt administrations were willing to support such early payment. In 1936, however, legislation was passed, over a presidential veto, to grant the bonus. Roosevelt, although sympathetic to the veterans, believed that the bonus drained political support from more comprehensive relief programs.

A clear-cut victory over the Axis powers in World War II, the return to prosperity, and the large number of veterans returning to civilian life all assured that the United States would do well by the veterans of the "Good War." The famous Servicemen's Readjustment Act (1944), colloquially known as the GI Bill, provided a wide range of benefits including health care; mustering out pay; job placement; unemployment insurance; loans to buy a home, farm, or business; reemployment rights and other employment preferences; and educational benefits. The last has received considerable attention. The number of Americans going to college would undoubtedly have soared in the postwar era in any case. But the enrollment of veterans in colleges and universities under the GI Bill and their success as students accelerated the process.

The GI bills for subsequent wars were modeled on the World War II bill. Given the rise in real per capita income, such bills would logically have become increasingly generous, but this is not the case. In 1973, as noted above, the United States adopted an all volunteer armed force. From that time

on, the need for pension benefits as a tool for recruiting became the paramount determinant of the level of benefits.

Changes to America's Financial System

The disruptions to the financial system created by wars have had important long-term effects on the financial system of the United States. The National Banking Act, which gave the federal government the authority to charter banks, for example, was passed during the Civil War. The twin purposes were to bolster the market for government bonds during the war (national banks had to purchase government bonds when they went into business and when they issued notes) and to provide a currency (the national bank note) to replace the greenback after the war. The greenbacks had proven popular—particularly in the West where many banks were in trouble because of their holdings of Confederate bonds—because they provided a safe, uniform currency. But Congress feared that were the greenback to be made permanent, the government would not be able to resist the temptation to print too many. The result was a compromise: notes issued by private banks, but backed by federal government bonds.

The history of the income tax is also entwined with war. The first federal income tax was imposed during the Civil War, but was phased out by 1872. A new income tax was levied in 1894, but was declared unconstitutional. After the turn of the century, however, sentiment for an income tax grew again. One strand of support was the belief that an elastic source of revenue would be needed in wartime. The 16th Amendment to the Constitution authorizing an income tax was ratified in 1913, with Congress subsequently passing the first income tax law. Initially, income tax rates were low and applied to very wealthy taxpayers. During World War I, however, the base was broadened and rates were raised to very high levels. The high rates established during World War I were cut back during the 1920s, but were never returned to prewar levels.

America's Changing Role in the World Economy

America's wars, especially those of the 20th century, have significantly altered America's role in the world's financial system. Before World War I, Britain was the major source of capital for much of the developing world, and London was the world's financial center. The United States was a debtor nation that

relied on Britain and to a lesser extent other European countries for the capital needed to achieve rapid growth. During the war, Britain was forced to sell a large portion of its foreign securities to finance its war effort. After the war, the United States emerged as the major source of capital for much of the developing world, and New York became the world's leading financial center. This transition would probably have occurred in any case, but it was accelerated by the war.

The war did more than simply transfer financial hegemony from Britain to the United States: the entire architecture of the international financial system was rebuilt after World War I, but on a precarious foundation. A decision was made to maintain high wartime price levels and to return to the gold standard with currencies that maintained high gold content. Both decisions were understandable. Deflation, when it was tried, produced severe economic contractions. Upholding the gold standard, it was widely believed, was the cornerstone of financial stability. The result, however, was a fragile international financial system in which a large amount of fiduciary money was balanced on a small amount of gold. It was a system that required aggressive action by central banks, and international coordination of their efforts, to quash any widespread attempt to convert fiduciary money into gold. In addition, Germany emerged from World War I saddled with long-term reparations payments that were difficult to meet for both economic and political reasons and that became an ongoing problem for the world's financial system in the 1920s and 1930s. The international financial system, in other words, was vulnerable to panics, a vulnerability that was amply demonstrated by what unfolded during the 1930s.

After both world wars the United States emerged with its capital intact, even increased, and as a result the country found itself in a unique position in world markets. Traditional competitors, notably Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, were at a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis developing markets. On the other hand, U.S. trade with these leading industrial countries, a trade that was a benefit to both sides, declined severely. The decision by the United States after World War II to avoid the punitive measures that had been imposed on Germany after World War I, opting instead to help rebuild Germany and other European countries through the Marshall Plan, made economic as well as political sense.

Changes in Labor Markets

Popular belief holds that wars, especially World War II, have had an immense effect on the structure of the American labor force. During major wars, the labor force has been maintained and expanded by turning to those groups that were often left out: seniors, minorities, and women. World War II especially changed attitudes of both employers and employees, and in many cases these changes have persisted to the present day. The "Rosie the Riveter" campaign during World War II undoubtedly convinced many employers of the value of women workers and gave many women a taste for work in the paid labor force. World War II also accelerated the movement of African Americans from the South, where economic opportunities were limited, to war production centers such as Los Angeles, which would grow rapidly and provide employment opportunities after the war.

It is important, however, to avoid overstating the importance of war when considering long-term changes in the economy. This is especially true when it comes to the role of women in the labor force. As Claudia Goldin (1991) has pointed out, almost half the women who entered the labor force during World War II left after 1944, either voluntarily or because they were pushed out to make room (or so it was claimed) for returning servicemen. Goldin suggests, moreover, that factors other than the war, such as the rise of the clerical sector and increased education, account for the postwar rise in the participation rate of women in the paid labor force. The eliminating of "marriage bars"—rules that forced women to quit their jobs when they married—owed more to the decrease in the numbers of unmarried women than to the changes in ideology brought about by the war.

Changing Economic Theory

Finally, America's wars have also left a deep imprint on ideas about the appropriate role for the state in regulating the economy. The requirements for winning the Civil War empowered the Republican Party to pursue its agenda, which included a wide range of government programs aimed at unifying national markets and strengthening the industrial sector: the transcontinental railroads, the national banking system, a tripling in the number of federal district courts armed with greater powers, the land

grant college system, and high tariffs. In World War I, the federal government attempted to manage the economy through a range of government agencies such as the War Industries Board, the Food and Fuel Administrations, the Railroad Administration, and the War Labor Board. The success of the United States during the war created a halo effect around these agencies. In particular, Bernard Baruch, who headed the War Industries Board during the last part of World War I, considered the top-down management of the war economy to be a brilliant success and argued that it clearly provided a good model for future wartime economies and in some ways for peacetime economies. Although such ideas generally lost strength after the war, advocates of governmental solutions to the problem of the Great Depression could point to the government's role in World War I as a successful example of centralized planning and control.

The apparent success of World War II deficit spending in ending the Great Depression provided, or so many economists believed, practical proof for John Maynard Keynes's idea that the economy could be brought to full employment and kept there through the judicious use of fiscal policy. The apparent success of price controls and other forms of government regulation strengthened the belief, at least on the Left, that government planning was the key to full employment and price stability.

Both the military failures in Vietnam and the associated "stagflation" (simultaneous inflation and unemployment) on the home front had an opposite effect. Now it seemed that government planners were prone to making serious errors, and that the ability of planners to keep the economy on an even keel through fiscal policy was limited. Just as World War I and World War II helped make the case for big government, the Vietnam War helped to undermine it.

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Related Entries

All Volunteer Force; Greenbacks; New York City Anti-Draft Riots; see also specific wars

Related Documents

1766; 1776 a, b; 1940; 1961; 1965 a; 1968 b

—Hugh Rockoff

Education

See specific institutions.

Eisenhower, Dwight D.

(1890–1969)
General of the U.S. Army, 34th President of the United States

As the supreme commander of the Allied forces that defeated the Axis in Western Europe in World War II, and as a two-term president of the United States during the 1950s, Dwight David Eisenhower seemed to embody many of the most exemplary qualities of a particularly American success story. As a wartime leader he proved to be perhaps the 20th century's most adept commander of coalition warfare, as well as a superior manager of the massive and extremely complex logistical demands of large-scale military campaigns. As president, he was often criticized for eschewing bold initiatives—a similar criticism also dogged his military leadership—but he prudently and pragmatically guided the United States through some of the most dangerous times of the early Cold War.

Cadet to Commander

Eisenhower's roots were in mid America—he was born in Denison, Texas, but grew up mainly in Abilene, Kansas—and his origins were solidly middle class: his father worked as a mechanic in the local creamery. Throughout Eisenhower's rise to the pinnacle of national and international leadership, he would exemplify the potential of America's idealized egalitarian society to function as a true meritocracy, where talent and hard work could transcend pedigree as a determinant of success. In 1911, he scored well enough on a competitive examination to secure an appointment to West Point, where he proved to be a popular cadet who excelled as an athlete and as a prankster, but did not always excel in the classroom. "Ike," as his friends called him, graduated from the Academy in 1915, part of a class that also included future generals Omar Bradley and James Van Fleet. Unlike many of his classmates, however, Eisenhower would not see combat overseas during World War I, being posted instead to a stateside command at a tank-warfare training center in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The end of hostilities in Europe saw him transferred to Camp Meade, Maryland, the main base of the U.S. Army's armored corps. There he met and befriended George S. Patton, who had won acclaim fighting in France as a tank commander with the American Expeditionary Force.

As a military commander, Eisenhower never displayed the flamboyance of Patton or of Douglas MacArthur, for whom Eisenhower served as an aide during MacArthur's tenure in the 1930s as Army chief of staff and as military adviser to the Philippine government. Although Eisenhower never cultivated the dashing mystique or larger-than-life image of some of his more colorful colleagues, he was by no means lacking in charisma. Even one of his fiercest critics—the British general Bernard Montgomery, whose ego, ambition, and bombastic persona led him during World War II to chafe under, and frequently clash with, Eisenhower—admitted that the American general had "the power of drawing the hearts of men towards him as a magnet attracts the bits of metal." In Eisenhower's case, that power came from a warm, outgoing, and captivating personality that inspired affection and from a decisive, forceful (but not overbearing), and forthright command style that inspired trust.

Not having commanded troops in combat during World War I, Eisenhower rose through the ranks of the interwar U.S. Army by proving himself one of its most talented staff officers. In 1926 he graduated first in his class from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and in 1928 he completed the Army War College course with distinction. After various other assignments, including several years as MacArthur's chief aide in the Philippines, Eisenhower returned to the United States in 1939. A year later, with American involvement in the war, which was already under way in Europe, increasingly likely, Eisenhower was given the task of planning and coordinating logistics for a force of more than 200,000 troops conducting training maneuvers in Louisiana. Eisenhower's success at this assignment earned him the accolades of his superiors, including Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, and a promotion to brigadier general. Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Marshall brought Eisenhower to Washington, D.C., to head the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff, a position that made him effectively Marshall's right-hand man.

Coalition Warfare

Eisenhower accompanied Marshall to London in April 1942 for a planning meeting with the British for taking the offensive against the Axis. During talks with various British military and political leaders, including Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Eisenhower demonstrated a unique talent for getting along with various personalities and enabling them to work in harmony with one another—attributes that were perhaps most responsible for his eventual elevation to supreme command of the Allied forces in Western Europe. Allied victory depended on maintaining the unity of the coalition against the might of Germany. Eisenhower proved gifted with the qualities of diplomacy, flexibility, patience, and the firm authority necessary to ensure cooperation among political and military leaders with personalities as strong and antithetical to one another as Churchill, Charles de Gaulle (leader of the Free French forces), Patton, and Montgomery.

Eisenhower first demonstrated his mastery of coalition warfare, as well as his skills as a manager of huge and complex logistical operations, as the supreme commander of the Allied landings in French Northwest Africa (Operation Torch) in November 1942, and of the Allied seaborne invasions of Sicily and the Italian mainland between July and September of 1943. In all cases, the amphibious landings—each one larger and more logistically complicated than the previous—were successful. This achievement was greatly facilitated by Eisenhower's talent for diplomacy: in sensitive negotiations with Vichy French officials in North Africa and with officials of the Italian government during the Allied invasion of that country, Eisenhower was able to negotiate a truce in the first case and a surrender in the second, thus eliminating their forces as a source of resistance to the Allies. Eisenhower's managerial acumen also ensured that American and British operations in North Africa and Italy were characterized by a level of genuine and close cooperation between each nation's commanders that was unprecedented in the history of warfare.

Allied Supreme Commander

To a great extent, the Allied landings in North Africa and Italy were a prelude to the larger and long-planned objective of invading German-occupied France. Since the preponderance of men and material provided for this operation would be American, Allied leaders agreed that the commander of the invasion should be American as well. Eisenhower alone among senior American generals had proven that he could put together and manage an integrated Allied staff and could successfully lead combined Anglo-American operations. This, and the fact that the U.S. president, Franklin Roosevelt, did not want to lose George Marshall's services in Washington, made Eisenhower a natural choice to command Operation Overlord, the invasion of France.

On June 6, 1944, more than 100,000 Allied troops crossed the English Channel and landed on the beaches of Normandy in France in the largest seaborne invasion in the history of warfare. In some cases, stiff German resistance on the beaches inflicted many casualties on attacking troops, but the landings ultimately succeeded. The bravery and tenacity of Allied soldiers and the careful planning and courageous decision making of Allied commanders led by Eisenhower were responsible for such success. Certain decisions proved crucial: the elaborate campaign of deception waged by the Allies that convinced German leaders that the invasion of France would take place at Calais rather than Normandy; Eisenhower's insistence (over heated British objections) on dropping three airborne divisions (one British, two American) behind German lines to disrupt enemy communications and transportation prior to the amphibious landings; and Eisenhower's decisive and gutsy order to proceed with the invasion on June 6, despite the less-than-ideal weather in the Channel (the assault coming in such bad weather caught the Germans by surprise).

Overlord was the beginning of the end for Germany. From Normandy, Allied forces, with Eisenhower as their supreme commander (he received his fifth star in December 1944), gradually drove German forces eastward, liberating France, Belgium, and Holland after hard fighting. At Eisenhower's insistence, Allied forces during this period were divided into two major military groups, one primarily British and one primarily American, that advanced toward Germany more or less simultaneously along a broad front. The difficulty of supplying such a widely stretched front slowed Allied progress, prompting Montgomery, the

commander of the British Army group, to suggest that all transport and supplies be concentrated behind his section of the front for a single thrust into the heart of Germany that would ultimately carry the Allies to Berlin. Eisenhower rejected this idea, as well as two later requests by the British to try to reach Berlin before the Soviets.

Eisenhower's decisions to continue his broad-front strategy and to make no effort to liberate Berlin ahead of the Russians proved controversial and inspired the most heated criticism leveled at him during the war. Specifically, observers concerned with the postwar balance of power were alarmed that so much of Germany and Eastern Europe would be occupied by the Red Army, and thought that Eisenhower's strategies deserved at least some of the blame. Furthermore, the controversy surrounding these decisions reflected the more general criticism commonly directed at Eisenhower that, as a battlefield leader, he could sometimes be overly cautious in circumstances that called for greater boldness and audacity. Nevertheless, the Allies swept into Germany in the spring of 1945; in May of that year, Germany surrendered.

President Eisenhower

Overseeing the Allied victory in Western Europe ensured that Eisenhower emerged from World War II as one of America's most popular and celebrated military leaders. Almost immediately he was considered as a possible contender for the White House in the 1948 presidential election. However, other duties and offices would demand his attention in the first seven years after 1945: he would serve as the U.S. Army chief of staff, as president of Columbia University, and as the supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While holding these last two positions, Eisenhower quietly laid the groundwork for a presidential bid in 1952. That year, running as the Republican Party candidate, he defeated the Democratic nominee, Adlai Stevenson, to become the 34th president of the United States.

Eisenhower proved to be an extremely popular president, serving two terms in which his approval rating averaged 64 percent. Neither domestically nor internationally was his presidency characterized by bold initiatives or visionary policies. Much like his wartime leadership, Eisenhower's presidential style was generally prudent, pragmatic, resolute, and levelheaded. In the area of foreign policy, Eisenhower continued Harry S. Truman's policy of containing communist expansion, while avoiding direct confrontation with major communist powers such as the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China. Understanding where the United States held a military advantage over its adversaries in these years, he emphasized maximum reliance on the nation's superior nuclear arsenal to deter war and, in theory, authorized the use of nuclear weapons if deterrence failed. In fact, shortly after arriving in office, Eisenhower hinted broadly at the possibility of using nuclear weapons against China—a threat that helped bring an end to the Korean War.

In practice, however, Eisenhower showed a reluctance actually to employ atomic weapons. For instance, in 1954 he rejected using the nuclear option in Vietnam to prevent the besieged French garrison at Dien Bien Phu from being overrun by communist Vietnamese forces. Certainly, Eisenhower's idea of containing communist aggression often translated into covert or even overt intervention in various "hot spots"—his administration authorized attempted regime changes, some of which were successful, in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, among other places, and began the long and ultimately tragic U.S. military efforts to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. However, in crises where containment threatened to escalate into confrontation between the United States and the Soviets (e.g., Berlin in 1958), or between the United States and Communist China (e.g., Taiwan in 1954), Eisenhower pursued a policy combining firm rhetoric (which sometimes displayed deliberate ambiguity about his willingness to use nuclear weapons) with an openness to diplomatic solutions. Finally, in his farewell speech to the nation at the end of his second term, Eisenhower, the lifelong soldier, delivered a surprising and prescient warning about the growing danger posed to American society by what he called "the military–industrial complex," an emerging union between an immense military establishment and a large arms industry, whose increasing power and influence might one day undermine the country's liberties and democratic processes.

In his roles as wartime commander and president, Eisenhower represented a particularly long-standing ideal

of the American heroic tradition: the person of humble origins who, by virtue of intelligence, hard work, and content of character achieves greatness. Furthermore, Eisenhower's brand of battlefield leadership seemed peculiarly American as well, informed as it was less by the romantic mystique of martial genius than by the solid, down-to-earth virtues associated with the Midwest heartland and by the rational, pragmatic outlook associated with the corporate boardroom.

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Related Entries

Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; Military–Industrial Complex; World War II

—*Mark Sheftall*

Enola Gay Controversy

In 1994 and 1995, a stream of invective was directed against the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum (NASM). The museum had planned, under the guidance of director Martin Harwit, to exhibit the B-29 Superfortress *Enola Gay*, the plane that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945. The exhibit, organized primarily by curators Tom Crouch and Michael Neufeld, intended to examine the historical context of the airplane and its mission. Foremost among opponents of the exhibit was the Air Force Association (AFA); however, critics also included veterans, journalists, and politicians, who viewed the exhibit as a leftist, anti-American attack on history intended to make Americans feel ashamed of their role in World War II. At its core, the controversy pitted the research of historians against the memories and experiences of veterans.

From its opening in 1976, critics had accused NASM of divorcing its artifacts from their context, resulting in sterile exhibits that appeared to glorify the objects and extol the benefits of technological progress without providing historical perspective. When Harwit was named director of the NASM in 1987, he moved to change the museum's approach. For example, he altered the V-2 rocket display, a long-term exhibit, to include details of the slave labor that built the rockets and the death and destruction these rockets had inflicted on their targets. When the museum refurbished the World War I gallery, the new exhibit examined the myth of chivalrous conduct and clean battles of the "Great War in the Air." Reviewers welcomed the new approach as a needed change.

Soon after his arrival at NASM, Harwit began thinking about exhibiting the *Enola Gay* in a similar social context. Conservators told Harwit that they could restore the plane in time for the 50th anniversary of its mission in 1995—perfect timing for the exhibit. Discussion among the staff uncovered the importance of having any display of the *Enola Gay* avoid a celebratory approach. Harwit chose Crouch and Neufeld as lead curators on the exhibit planning team.

Crouch and Neufeld received approval for their planned exhibit in early 1993 and had the first complete draft of the exhibit script written by the end of the year.

Their script presented an introduction to the wartime events leading up to the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the development of the bombs and the B-29, Pres. Harry S. Truman's decision to use the bombs, the effects of the bombs, and the subsequent proliferation of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Crouch and Neufeld wanted to educate the public about debates among historians over the alternatives to using the bombs. The planning team also hoped to borrow items from Japanese museums to show the devastation caused on the ground.

Recognizing that they were dealing with a sensitive subject, Harwit took steps to identify contentious issues and prevent controversy. The museum hosted a symposium on strategic bombing that included talks and discussions by many notable and distinguished panelists, including historians, military men, and government advisers. Public reaction to the symposium guided the exhibit development. Once the first draft of the script was complete, an outside exhibit advisory committee reviewed it for accuracy and other problems. While recognizing that the script was a first draft and needed more work, the committee members were very positive about it.

The furious attacks against the NASM began with the April 1994 issue of the AFA's monthly Air Force Magazine. Harwit hoped to address the AFA's concerns by bringing them into the planning process, and he had sent them a review copy of the first draft with the request that it remain confidential. Instead, the AFA published an analysis of the script by the magazine's editor, John T. Correll. He called the exhibit "politically biased" and quoted portions of the script to prove it. Out of context, the quotes seemed to give the exhibit a Japanese bias. Although curators removed the most inflammatory sentences from subsequent drafts, critics continued to quote them as evidence of the NASM's political agenda. Correll also accused Crouch and Neufeld of looking at events with a late-20th century perspective. But, in fact, the questions they raised came from documents written at the time by Truman and his advisers, including Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Truman's chief of staff; Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson; and Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Correll had also found bias in the number of photographs showing either American or

Japanese casualties: many more photos showed Japanese suffering. The AFA mailed out packages with copies of the script, Correll's article, and an index showing where to find the objectionable content.

These packages, sent to larger and more vocal groups, only fed the opposition. Veterans' groups such as the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, national print and broadcast journalists, and many U.S. politicians soon began to speak out against the proposed exhibit. Some members of Congress called for formal investigations of the NASM and the exhibit development process, and threatened to withdraw all funding from the Smithsonian if the exhibit did not meet their ideas of balance. Conservative politicians and media pundits were already concerned about similar evidence of "politically correct revisionist" history in the proposed National Educational Standards. For them, the *Enola Gay* controversy was just more evidence that leftist, anti-American forces were taking control of the country.

In late 1994 and early 1995, some outside groups raised their voices to support NASM against the charges of politically correct and revisionist history. After two meetings to review the latest versions of the script, military historians from each of the armed services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense endorsed it. Only the Air Force remained opposed. Peace groups were offended by the opposition's uncritical endorsement of the atomic bombings. Historians rose up to decry the censorship of historical inquiry, accusing critics of the exhibit of engaging in the very revisionism for which they attacked the NASM. A few journalists took their fellows to task for writing stories without critical analysis of both sides' claims. However, their voices were too small and came too late to counter the critics' momentum.

In hindsight, the controversy arose for many reasons. Foremost was the disconnect between popular history—what some commentators have called the "National Myth"—and scholarly history. The common understanding of the atomic bombings was that they ended the war and thus saved the lives of many Americans who otherwise would have had to invade the Japanese home islands. This National Myth was created shortly after the war and helped veterans understand their own role, especially veterans of the 509th

Composite Group who participated in the bombing missions. It remained essentially unchanged in the public consciousness over the ensuing half century. In contrast, scholars had been discussing the bombs' significance for years and had come to a more nuanced understanding of events at the end of the war. While this view was well-known within the scholarly community, it was almost unknown among the general American public. Even though Crouch and Neufeld based their exhibit script on a debate that had developed over many years, to the veterans and other critics this story seemed to come suddenly out of nowhere and undermine and invalidate the veterans' experiences.

Timing made the problem worse. Harwit correctly predicted that the anniversary year would heighten interest in the exhibit, but that interest was detrimental. Public interest (and veterans' expectations) had been conditioned by other anniversaries of wartime events, such as the 50th anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1991, which were celebratory and commemorative. Thus, more people were interested in what the NASM was preparing, and more people were aware of the difference in tone that this exhibit would take.

The curators' lack of military experience was used as evidence that they were not qualified to tell veterans' stories. Veterans insisted that they had lived through the events, and no one else could possibly understand their experiences. NASM countered that they were working with documents and records of events that were secret at the time and therefore unknown to the veterans. While NASM did not try to exclude the veterans' experiences, it did intend to present those experiences as only one aspect of the exhibit.

On top of these problems, NASM was overwhelmed by the media and political attention. By law, the Smithsonian cannot lobby Congress, and it has only a small budget for public relations. The AFA, in contrast, considers lobbying and public relations to be a fundamental part of its mission. AFA members, plus those of the American Legion and other veterans' groups, completely overwhelmed any support the NASM could hope to muster.

After the negotiations with the Legion broke down, the secretary of the Smithsonian, I. Michael Heyman, cancelled the exhibit. Heyman had a mandate to increase external funding for the museum, and he decided that the negative attention would hurt the Smithsonian's ability to reach potential donors. Under pressure by critics, Heyman forced Harwit to resign; Crouch and Neufeld remained under a cloud for many years.

The intended *Enola Gay* exhibit might not have garnered such opposition if it had been scheduled at another time or in another museum. Many people assume that anything presented by the NASM represents official U.S. history. Therefore, opponents were more critical than they might have been had the exhibit been mounted elsewhere. In an anniversary year, following four years of commemorative events, people were expecting more commemoration. They were not prepared for an exhibit that challenged the history that "everyone" knew. The *Enola Gay* controversy continues to affect how museums present controversial subjects.

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Related Entries

American Legion; Manhattan Project; Memory and War; Veterans of Foreign Wars; World War II

—Laurence M. Burke II

Environment and War

War has had dramatic consequences for America's natural environment, not only from the inevitable physical destruction caused by battle but also by the processes of mobilization and training, and the technological developments that enable armed forces to participate in war. This is especially true of the conflicts beginning in the mid-19th century, when the outlines of modern warfare began to emerge. Prior to the Civil War, military conflicts in America were relatively localized and their effects on the environment limited. From the Civil War on, the technologies, character, and scope of military conflicts transformed the American landscape to an unprecedented degree.

Destruction and Preservation

As the only modern war fought entirely on U.S. territory, the Civil War resulted in more battle-related destruction to the American environment than any other. Soldiers and civilians described devastated landscapes during and after the war, noting that trees, rivers, and even mountains suffered damage during the conflict. Virginia was hardest hit, with nearly one-third of the major battles taking place within its borders, but the entire South suffered localized damage to natural, built, and agricultural landscapes.

Most of the damage has been erased by commercial and agricultural development over the battle sites, but preservation efforts by the National Parks Service have kept some reminders of the war's destruction. Many major Civil War battlefields have become National Battlefield Parks, which not only commemorate, interpret, and preserve the historical significance of the conflict but are also important habitats for endangered plant and animal species. By preserving the sites that witnessed the terrible physical destruction of the nation's human and natural landscapes, the Civil War National Battlefield Parks have also served an important role in environmental conservation efforts.

Pollution

Pollution is another consequence of war with important implications for the natural environment and human health. During the Civil War, urban areas like Chambersburg,

The land around the fortifications of Atlanta, Georgia, shows the environmental devastation caused by the Civil War. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

Pennsylvania, and Atlanta, Georgia, were burned, as were stockpiles of cotton and important war matériel across the South. The resulting smoke caused intense air pollution that affected local residents' health. A more recent example of air pollution resulting from an act of war is the dense smoke and particulate matter that clouded the air around New York City after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Although the pollution in both cases was temporary, other kinds of war-related pollution have lasted longer. Refuse and waste matter from the massive armies of the Civil War transformed rivers, streams, and ponds into sewers and garbage dumps.

Poor hygiene and inadequate waste disposal methods permitted disease to flourish and spread through the camps and surrounding populations. To combat the spread of bacteria and viruses—which might be seen as soldiers' natural enemies—the United States War Department created the Sanitary Commission in 1861. Its main mission was to clean up the camps and keep the rates of disease down; however, its most important contributions came after the war with its

program of City Cleansing. Thus, wartime problems of pollution and disease led directly to postwar efforts to control pollution and keep American cities clean and healthy.

Mobilization and Technology

In the 19th and 20th centuries, mobilization, the gathering of resources for war, had immediate and long lasting environmental consequences. During the Civil War, industry and agriculture in both the Union and Confederacy geared up to produce food, supplies, and arms for the troops. Cotton gave way to corn and wheat across the South, and Northern food supplies increasingly came from the relatively untapped resources of the western territories. There, mechanized farming techniques enabled more acreage to be put under production and ushered in the large-scale commercial farming that has come to typify modern American agricultural practices. The environmental repercussions of such wartime developments were most strongly felt in the West where native species of plants and animals—including the American bison—permanently gave way to corn, wheat, and cattle, greatly diminishing the biodiversity and environmental health of the region.

In the 20th century, military–industrial developments have had significant implications for the nation's landscape as well. One example is the development of DDT for insecticidal use during World War II. DDT's first large-scale application was during the war when the American military used the chemical to kill lice, preventing the spread of diseases like typhus among the troops. DDT proved so successful that it became a staple pesticide in America after the war, used by farmers against agricultural pests and by towns and cities to combat mosquito populations. DDT was perceived as a panacea for insect infestations. However, it had severe environmental consequences, as ecologist Rachel Carson documented in her 1962 book *Silent Spring*. Carson's warning against the use of DDT and her explanation of the ecological consequences of its use became the clarion call of the growing environmental movement. DDT, a wartime technology, thus became a focus of late 20th-century environmental activism.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of wartime technologies that have had obvious effects on the natural environment is the development and testing of nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War. Between July 1945, when the first nuclear device was detonated at Trinity Site in New Mexico, and 1963, when the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty was signed, the United States performed 210 atmospheric nuclear tests, about half of them at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) 65 miles north of Las Vegas. Between 1963 and 1992, when the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed, 824 underground nuclear tests occurred at the NTS. The localized environmental consequences of nuclear testing varied according to detonation type (atmospheric, surface, or underground), but included soil, water, and air contamination, massive cratering of the Earth's surface, and, of course, death for plants, animals, and insects caught in range of the device's heat, blast, and fallout areas.

Unlike the two nuclear bombs dropped during World War II on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, which killed an estimated 105,000 people immediately and an additional 150,000 within days from radiation sickness, the effect on human populations of nuclear testing has been indirect; high incidences of thyroid cancer in areas downwind from the NTS have been linked in part to the process of weather-related fallout dispersion. The waste products created in the process of developing and testing nuclear weapons also pose dangers to human and environmental health. The effects of storing such wastes at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad Caverns, New Mexico, have been hotly debated.

The relationship between war and the natural environment in America is complex. In some cases, depletion of natural resources resulted in war: the Beaver Wars of the late 17th century have been interpreted as a direct response to the declining beaver population in northeastern North America and the Iroquois Confederacy's need to preserve its position in the lucrative trade in beaver pelts. Conversely, U.S. Army leadership proposed the deliberate destruction of a resource, the western buffalo herds, as a strategy for defeating the Plains tribes in the late 19th century.

Fortunately, military engagements on U.S. soil have been minimal, resulting in less battle-related damage to the landscape than might be expected; however, preparation for war can be as destructive as waging it. Between 1941 and 2003, the U.S. Navy tested millions of pounds of weapons and ammunition on the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, causing

local soil and water contamination. Firing ranges and testing sites across the American South and West have had similar effects. Ironically, however, many of these military installations, through removing land from commercial and private development, served as inadvertent wildlife sanctuaries and upon decommissioning have been transformed into National Wildlife Refuges (NWR). Vieques became a NWR in 2003, as did the Rocky Flats Nuclear Arsenal, near Denver, Colorado. Thus, war may be destructive by nature, but its legacy for the American people and landscape has been a mixture of loss and hope.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Cold War; Manhattan Project; Medicine and War; Military Bases; U.S. Sanitary Commission; War on Terrorism; World War II

Related Documents

1967 b

—*Lisa M. Brady*

Espionage

See Intelligence Gathering in War.

Espionage and Sedition Acts

The Espionage and Sedition acts, passed in the midst of World War I, were separate pieces of legislation designed to limit treacherous behavior in wartime and to promote patriotism. The first, the Espionage Act, was approved on June 15, 1917, and set fines of up to $10,000 and prison terms for citizens who aided the enemy. The second piece of legislation was the Trading with the Enemy Act, which moved through Congress in October of 1917. And finally, the Sedition Act passed Congress on May 16, 1918. A fourth act, the Alien Act of 1918, is sometimes considered one of the Espionage and Sedition acts as well. The Alien Act gave the commissioner of immigration broad powers of deportation over noncitizens who engaged in hostile actions or held beliefs deemed hostile, such as anarchism.

These acts were strictly enforced by Postmaster Gen. Albert Burleson, with his control over the U.S. postal service. Burleson required local post offices to send him items such as newspapers that might have content that would violate the Espionage Act. The postal service also had to be supplied with English translations of all foreign-language newspapers that printed articles about the war. These

requirements were most stringently enforced with left-wing newspapers.

The Sedition Act forbade "any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy."

Most heavily persecuted under the acts were radicals, including socialists and labor organizations. The acts are credited with dealing a fatal blow to the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), a radical union. More than 100 members of the IWW were found guilty of violating the acts in Chicago alone. A Wisconsin congressman received a 20-year jail sentence for sedition. A man in Iowa received a one-year jail term for attending a meeting at which somebody else attacked the draft.

At times the prosecutions seemed to defy logic. Movie producer Robert Goldstein was convicted for attempting to cause military insubordination. Goldstein had made a movie, *The Spirit of '76*, in which he portrayed British soldiers participating in a massacre of women and children during the American Revolution. Goldstein received a 10-year sentence from a federal judge in 1919, serving three years before having the sentence commuted.

The most well-known person convicted under the new legislation was Eugene V. Debs. Debs served as the perpetual Socialist Party candidate for president in no fewer than five separate elections and recorded the best showing of any left-wing party presidential candidate in U.S. history when he garnered 6 percent of the vote in 1912. In June 1918, after visiting three socialists imprisoned in Canton, Ohio, for opposing the draft, Debs was arrested for delivering a speech in which he expressed his opposition to the draft. Under provisions in the 1917 Espionage Act, Debs was sentenced to a 10-year prison term. In 1919 he appealed his case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed his conviction in an opinion delivered by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. After serving three years, Debs was pardoned by President Warren Harding and, at the age of 66, released from prison.

Lawsuits involving the acts wound through America's courts. In two Supreme Court decisions, *Schenck v. United States* (1919) and *Abrams v. United States* (1919), the nation's highest court upheld the acts. In Schenck, Justice Oliver Wendell Homes made his memorable statement that speech had to present "a clear and present danger," which, in Holmes's opinion, the case definitely demonstrated. The Supreme Court upheld the Espionage and Sedition acts in six separate court cases after the war. One was Schenck; another involved the imprisonment of Debs. The other cases involved a pro-German newspaper editor, Bolshevik supporters during the Russian Revolution, and attempts to willfully interfere with successful military operations through written statements or speech.

The passage of the Espionage and Sedition acts reflected the public's declining willingness to tolerate dissent in wartime. Conviction rates were high. In the more than 1,500 prosecutions brought under the acts, more than 1,000 convictions were obtained. Judges and attorneys repeatedly stated that people who spoke out against the government during war could not hide behind the Constitution.

The Sedition Act was repealed by Congress in 1921. Most of the Espionage Act stayed on the books and was even used in World War II. In *Hartzel v. United States* in 1944, the Supreme Court heard a case that involved publishing and mailing attacks on the English, Jews, and the U.S. president. Though similar to the Schenck case, in *Hartzel* the Supreme Court ruled that, the activities did not constitute a crime, reflecting changing views on the Espionage Act since World War I.

Public opinion in the 21st century almost surely would not support such legislation. Numerous laws and court cases since World War I have expanded Americans' civil liberties, preventing such wholesale legislation. However, the acts certainly established a legislative precedent of increased vigilance in wartime. This theme is reflected in the more recent USAPATRIOT Act passed in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001.

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American Civil Liberties Union; World War I

—Jennifer S. Lawrence

European Military Culture, Influence of

When American soldiers stand to attention in the presence of an officer and salute, they are not only showing deference to their superiors in rank; they are also acknowledging that the origins of the U.S. Army (and for that matter the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) are to be found in Europe. The result of this European parentage is that, even today, the ethos of the American military shows the strong influence of European military culture. This martial culture was the prenational, pan-European culture of "the wars," the international military world that developed during the European wars of the 16th, 17th, and early 18th centuries. European soldiers shared a common way of life, with shared values, ideas, and traditions that were passed on, by way of the British Army, to the Army of the United States.

From the beginnings of the United States, even before the American Revolution, two different and, in many ways, mutually exclusive models of an army were available. One pattern saw soldiering as a special type of occupation, recruited largely from the economically depressed and other marginalized groups, and motivated by appeals to espirit de corps and military honor. Strongly hierarchical, this military model selected its leaders from members of an elite social group. The other model saw soldiering as every

citizen's duty. In this case, the military recruited from a relatively broad cross section of the population, used patriotism as a motivation, saw all of its members as the social equals of one another, and believed in electing its military leaders. The first model derived from the traditional martial culture of Europe; the second derived partly from classical and Renaissance concepts of citizenship and patriotism, partly from the more ancient obligation of all free men to defend the group when attacked. As an ideal, this second model would gain currency, in both Europe and America, amid the democratic revolutions occurring at the end of the 18th century.

In deciding how to fight their revolutionary war, the leaders of the American Revolution had to resolve a debate over which type of army to use. The idea of the "citizen–soldier" who fought out of love of country was in harmony with democratic ideals of the American Revolution. In contrast, the European type of army was widely seen as the instrument of tyrannical kings. Unfortunately, colonial militias were no match for the British Army. As a result, the Continental Congress decided to follow the European model and created an army, the Continental Line, that was organized, led, and motivated much like its British counterpart. To the citizens of the new republic, however, the composition and values of the colonial militias, the Minute Men of legend, made them more appropriate defenders of the "rights of freeborn Englishmen" than a "regular" army: thus popular memory would laud them as heroes and deem them the victors of the Revolutionary War. In reality, the militias functioned largely as auxiliaries (though often valuable auxiliaries) to the European-style Continental Line.

The fact, unpalatable to many, was that the American Revolution (unlike the French Revolution, which, in its early years at least, utilized a revolutionary army of the people) was waged by a military force that was seen by many as deeply antidemocratic in its workings and whose very existence was believed to be a threat to the new republic. Despite these concerns, a precedent had been set—though the Continental Army itself was disbanded at the end of the Revolutionary War, when the newly minted United States needed an army; a "regular" army was re-formed on the model of the Continental Line. Since then, and with only

occasional exceptions during America's major wars, the United States of America has been defended by a small regular Army, which operates in accordance with the traditional, European military culture. This regular Army was supplemented by state militias (later called the "National Guard") that, at least in theory, represented the more democratic ideal of the citizen–soldier.

European Military Culture

Some say that armies irritate democracies because they serve as a perpetual reminder that democracy is not the only successful type of government. Certainly the relationship between the culture of the regular Army of the United States and the ideals of the republic has generally been an awkward one. During the early years of the republic, critiques of the regular Army, which saw it as a threat to liberty, and opposed its officers for their supposed aristocratic values, were not uncommon. When augmenting the regular Army has been necessary, the culture shock of "freeborn" Americans upon encountering the ways of the military has often been severe.

For most of the 19th century, the regular U.S. Army was a small and insular organization, many of whose members served for a very long time. (Until 1860, it never, in peacetime, numbered more than 16,000 men.) It recruited largely from the economically distressed, with its ranks usually filled by large numbers of new immigrants. The officers, on the other hand, an even smaller group generally numbering only a few thousand, were usually members of America's middle class. By the 1840s, most officers were educated at the prestigious United States Military Academy at West Point.

The American regular Army generally followed the traditions of the standing armies of Europe. Close-order drill, drum-and-bugle calls, military music, ceremonies, and elaborate rituals of military courtesy were the staples of military life. Uniforms, always an important part of the military experience, were ornate and followed European models. Officers were expected to behave as heroic leaders. They wore uniforms that were distinctly different from those of the other ranks; on formal occasions, they carried swords and, for less formal occasions, swagger sticks, both traditional symbols of authority. The relationship between officers and enlisted men was based upon the European model that saw officers as "gentlemen" and enlisted men as distinctly not. Strict subordination was insisted upon, and discipline was maintained by severe punishment and regulated by the Articles of War, derived from those of the British Army of the 18th century. Enlisted men were expected to be deferential and obedient. They made formal gestures of submission by standing to attention when an officer spoke to them and by saluting. This social segregation and deference extended to military families as well. Officers had "ladies" while other ranks had only "wives." Among themselves, officers and their families engaged in a social life that mimicked, as closely as they were able, that of the upper class.

The regular Army saw itself as a thing apart, socially and culturally isolated from the everyday course of American life. Moreover, officers of the regular Army had also adopted the European officer's profoundly apolitical attitude; prior to World War II, members of the U.S. Army commonly did not vote, and they often regarded politicians with disdain.

The Regulars, the Militia, and West Point

For most of its existence, however, the regular Army was only a small part of the military establishment of the United States. Collectively, the various state militias far outnumbered a regular Army that was minuscule until the beginning of the 20th century. The militia, later known as the National Guard, was by the early 19th century a voluntary organization and has largely remained so. Unfortunately, but perhaps inevitably, the relationship between the regular Army and the militia historically has been strained.

Militias in America have generally tended to be much more democratic than the regular Army in matters of organization, discipline, and leadership. For most of the 19th century, they elected their officers, who, as a result, usually socialized with their men; thus, militia leadership could not follow the authoritarian regular Army style. Many militias, in fact, assumed military forms without performing any actual martial role, spending much of their time on parades and other social functions. By regular Army standards they were untrained and undisciplined.

Moreover, in contrast to the regular Army, militia members, and militia officers in particular, were usually involved

in politics, and election as a militia officer was often the beginning of a political career. From the perspective of the regular Army, state militias were incompetent, undisciplined rabble led by political hacks. From the perspective of the militias, the regular Army was an undemocratic, archaic, ritual-laden dictatorship led by officers who acted like aristocratic tyrants. Successive attempts to reform, or "regularize," the militias and National Guards from the 1880s to the 1980s were partly successful, but even today the regular Army tends to regard the National Guard as, at best, partly trained "Weekend Warriors."

The establishment in 1802 of the United States Military Academy at West Point should have helped to bridge the gap between European military culture and the citizen soldier. It professionalized the officer corps of the U.S. Army, and, in doing so, possession of specialized knowledge replaced membership in a social elite as the justification for an officer's right of command. In fact, West Point was originally intended to strengthen both the regular Army and the militia by training young men, primarily in engineering, but also in more general military skills.

This plan succeeded, but only in part. Over time, graduates of West Point came to dominate the officer corps of the U.S. Army, but West Point never graduated enough men to provide more than a tiny proportion of the officers for the militia. Moreover, the Academy was an institution steeped in European military culture, both in its technical aspects and in its attitudes. (This was true as well of its counterpart, the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, created in 1845.) For example, West Point taught engineering, European military strategy, tactics, and drill, as well as classical drawing and dancing. As a result, cadets at West Point absorbed the traditional "European" military culture of the regular Army, rather than the "Minute Man" ethos of the citizen–soldier. As a general rule, West Point graduates shared the regular Army's contempt for the militia, adopting the concept of an "officer and a gentleman" and the "aristocratic" and autocratic style of leadership that came with it. As a result, when the United States had to mobilize truly large numbers and employ conscription, profound culture clashes occurred when the Army was forced to absorb millions of new, and often involuntary, recruits.

The "Ikes" and the "Macs"

Perhaps America's generals can best illustrate the pronounced difference between the ideals of the American citizen soldier and traditional European military culture. Historian T. Harry Williams divided American generals into two types: the "Ikes" and the "Macs." Taking their name from Dwight "Ike" Eisenhower, the supreme commander in Europe during World War II, the Ikes were generals such as Eisenhower, Ulysses S. Grant, the general in chief of the Union Army during the Civil War, and Zachary Taylor, one of the two American commanders during the Mexican–American War. These men were generals who successfully led large American armies composed mostly of citizen–soldiers. Many attribute their success to their ability to "play against" the military type and win the trust of citizen–soldiers who regarded more traditional military leaders with suspicion. Whether consciously or otherwise, Eisenhower, Grant, and Taylor adopted a homespun, all-American image, seemed friendly and approachable, avoided military ceremony and fancy uniforms, and generally eschewed the trappings of European military culture. The Ikes were very popular with civilian leaders and with the citizen–soldiers they led.

The Macs are represented by and take their name from Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander in the southwest Pacific during World War II, and supreme commander in Korea at the beginning of that war. He, along with George McClellan, commanding general of the Union's Army of the Potomac from 1861 to 1862, and Winfield Scott, the other leader of the U.S. Army during the Mexican–American War and general in chief of the U.S. Army until 1861, are held to represent the other pole of military style. (In many ways John J. "Black Jack" Pershing, commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Force in France during World War I, and Gen. George S. Patton of World War II fame, would fit into this group as well.) These generals embraced, and often enjoyed, the role of traditional, European-style, "Great Commanders," with a martial and dramatic image. Less affable and approachable and more autocratic, they enjoyed military ceremony and wore distinctive uniforms. Civilian leaders felt very threatened by the Macs. The Macs' relationship with the soldiers they led was more complex: under certain circumstances they attained some popularity, but all of these generals somehow

seemed a bit out of place in the Army of the United States. It is worth noting that the three Ikes and the three Macs referred to above all harbored presidential ambitions, and five ran. All three Ikes won; both Macs (Douglas MacArthur was never nominated) lost. Americans seem to prefer their men on white horses to be wearing rumpled uniforms.

The End of the "Old Army"?

From the beginning of the republic to 1940, the regular Army of the United States was a small organization generally stationed in out-of-the-way corners of America. Isolated as it was, both socially and geographically, the regular Army could maintain the traditions of European military culture with only minor modifications. The large armies of citizen–soldiers raised during the Civil War and World War I simply did not last long enough to make any permanent impact on the regular Army's military culture; with the demobilization of the large armies at the end of the wars, the regulars happily returned to "real soldiering" and their accustomed ways.

From 1940 to 1973, however (with a gap of only a few months), the United States maintained a large conscripted military force of several million soldiers. This 33-year civilian intrusion did make large and seemingly lasting changes to the culture of the U.S. Army. (These changes, albeit to a lesser extent, would also affect the Navy and the Marine Corps. The Air Force, established as an independent service only in 1947, has always been the least "military" of the military services.) The better educated and more assertive citizen–soldiers of the mid-20th century would simply not accept the less democratic and more aristocratic aspects of European military culture, and, over this 30-year period, the U.S. Army shed most of its European heritage.

Perhaps the most important change was the development of Reserve Officer Training Corps at colleges and universities and Officer Candidate Schools to train college students and former enlisted men to be officers. With West Point–trained officers swamped under the vast number of new officers who came from many different social, cultural, and educational groups, the concept of the officer as a gentleman became little more than an ironic catchphrase. The immense social and disciplinary distance that had separated officers from enlisted men became impossible to maintain; over time most of the outward signs of this distance were eliminated. Officers lost many of their distinctions, and, by 1960, they were dressed in uniforms practically indistinguishable from those of the enlisted men. Swords and swagger sticks, the traditional signs of their status, vanished, as did the more elaborate forms of military courtesy.

More generally, military discipline was relaxed: coercive discipline was replaced by what were intended to be more persuasive methods. The post–World War II "Doolittle" Board oversaw the replacement of the old Articles of War by a much more "civilian" Uniform Code of Military Justice. Bugle calls and military bands largely disappeared from military life, and close-order drill became much less common. As the last men with pre–World War II experience retired, the "old army" faded away, and so did most remnants of European military culture. As service as a conscript became the norm for most American men, military service became much less unique and much more like a job for enlisted men. This change of tone was reinforced by the Army's need to recruit and retain skilled technicians to manage the machinery of a mechanized, and later computerized, force. Many now considered the figure of officer less that of heroic leader than that of military manager.

The U.S. Army became an all volunteer force again in 1973. The U.S. Army has since taken some very slight and tentative steps toward regaining some elements of the traditional European military culture. Officers are again attempting, with mixed success, to take on the mantle of the heroic leader. The adoption of the beret (which has become almost the universal headgear of the soldier) in place of baseball-style caps represents one small attempt to reconnect with a more martial image. Though larger than any volunteer army in American history, the U.S. Army is nonetheless reexperiencing its traditional isolation from mainstream American culture.

When the draft began in late 1940, many Americans worried that service in the military would militarize America. These worries proved unfounded: the military did not militarize American civilians—the civilians "civilianized" America's military. It remains to be seen if this change will be reversed.

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Colonial Militia Systems; Continental Army, Foreign Officers in; Customs of War; Doolittle Board; Military Academy, United States; Naval Academy; Revolutionary War

Related Documents

1611; 1637; 1772; 1774; 1776 b; 1797; 1800

—*Scott N. Hendrix*

Executive Order 8802

Executive Order 8802, signed by Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941, established the Fair Employment Practices Commission, a body authorized to investigate complaints of racial discrimination in companies under contract to supply war materials to the government. On the eve of the American entry into World War II, the U.S. government engaged in lofty rhetoric against racial supremacist regimes in Germany and Japan, but its own military remained racially segregated. Employers at defense plants, as everywhere, specified whether the advertised jobs were for white or "colored" men or women. African American labor activists sought to make the government narrow the gap between its principles and its practices. A. Philip Randolph, the head of the all-black union of Pullman Sleeping Car Porters, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) called for tens of thousands of blacks to march on Washington to protest racism. To head off the march, FDR agreed to issue Executive Order 8802.

The order created the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), which was designed to ensure that "there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin." If contractors did not want to abide by these federal regulations, they did not have bid on defense contracts. By 1942, however, nearly every medium and large sized company had become a federal contractor. The federal government now expanded its reach into tens of thousands of industrial workplaces through FEPC to ensure fair and equitable treatment of African Americans. In practice, the FEPC's powers were largely investigative, although the possibility remained that companies could lose lucrative defense contracts if they failed to abide by its decisions.

Randolph and other civil rights activists' frustrations with the FEPC had become so acute that, in 1943, he threatened another march on Washington. Blacks in the North had only recently begun to vote for the Democratic Party—reversing decades of preference for the Republicans—and thus Roosevelt had to respond to the threat of losing the support of northern states, such as Pennsylvania, where Republican political machines remained strong. Roosevelt responded by increasing the powers and staff of the FEPC via Executive Order 9346. Even when expanded and reorganized in 1943, the staff of the FEPC remained inadequate to police the vast number of factories and often relied on friendly organizations such

as Congress of Industrial Organization unions, the Urban League, and NAACP to help identify problem areas. For instance, in Chicago, particularly in the stockyards where a powerful and radical union had recently organized, the FEPC helped black workers make progress. In East Alton in southern Illinois, on the other hand, the lack of liberal, radical, and civil rights organizations meant that the FEPC and black workers got nowhere.

As the military absorbed veteran industrial workers and the defense boom sharply expanded the demand for industrial workers, companies in the North and West increasingly relied on local white women, southern whites, and African American men to fill the gap. In the industrial North, most companies hired white women first, then black men—with black women being hired only as a last resort. For instance, in Homestead, Pennsylvania, U.S. Steel assured the community that it did not hire southern blacks until it had exhausted the supply of local labor. White women, often relatives of other workers and soldiers, had the advantage of being nearly universally considered temporary employees, unlike black men who were expected to accrue seniority and remain employed after war's end. Consequently, white women were often placed in jobs that maintained the prewar racial division of labor. Companies hired black workers as laborers on furnaces melting metal at over 2000° F, or on coke ovens where gases from coal were extracted for fuel and chemicals—another hot and extremely toxic job.

Frustrated by these policies and protected as much by the war boom, their own solidarity, and their unions as the FEPC, black workers led illegal strikes to force involvement of the FEPC and their union and were somewhat successful in their efforts. A strike in a steel mill's coke ovens shut off the fuel needed to run the iron and steel furnaces. At that point, the FEPC and the military would intervene and often convince companies that continuing discrimination was less important than maintaining the production necessary to win the war. As a result, blacks began to gain access to skilled jobs in the coke ovens. Success depended upon a complex mix of factors, including the strength of local civil rights groups, the willingness of unions to work with the FEPC, and the response of white managers and workers. The FEPC proved a new vehicle with which black workers could

attempt to win the Double V campaign—victory abroad against fascism and victory at home against racism. Blacks made some progress in terms of access to better employment; nonetheless, at the war's end, blacks in steel and other industries remained overwhelmingly concentrated in the lowest paid, most dangerous, and most toxic jobs.

Unfortunately for these workers, business leaders and conservatives hated the FEPC. Black workers and civil rights organizations led a fight for a permanent FEPC, but in 1946 conservatives regained much political ground and the organization's funding was cut. In 1948, Pres. Harry Truman sent a bill to Congress to create a permanent FEPC, but conservatives killed the measure that year and again in 1950.

The FEPC proved that federal intervention in the workplace could work, although the wartime need to maximize production made the government reluctant to apply the sanctions needed to fully enforce FEPC's mandate. Although similar organizations existed in the 1950s, including the federal Office of Contract Compliance, and state and even municipal FEPCs, they were largely toothless. For instance, well in the 1950s and 1960s, entire departments of steel mills and many skilled jobs (for instance, machinists) remained, in effect, "white men's jobs" in both the North and South despite state and local FEPCs. Not until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the subsequent the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did the federal government once again assume a leading role in desegregating private workplaces throughout the nation.

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Related Entries

Related Documents

—*John Hinshaw*

Executive Order 9981

On July 26, 1948, Pres. Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9981, prohibiting racial discrimination and segregation in the U.S. armed forces. This directive was just one part of a wave of social reforms in the mid-20th century. Truman was desperate to win the presidential election of November 1948, but he also was interested in quelling the global criticism of American racism. Although demonstrations by the nascent civil rights movement encouraged the president to act, Executive Order 9981 also resulted from the protests and service of millions of people of color across the country. The order was a codified rejection of America's past and an attempt to direct the nation's military on a new, racially inclusive course.

Activism During World War II

As World War II raged, American politicians and pundits argued that the nation had to protect the globe's democracies. Concurrently, African Americans and others openly discussed the fight to create democracy at home. Acting on the suggestion of an anonymous black woman, labor organizer A. Philip Randolph launched the March on Washington movement in January 1941. Although the march never took place, the threat of a mass protest forced Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802, which prohibited racial discrimination in hiring by defense contractors. This was only a partial victory for African American activists, who wanted to desegregate the military as well.

Black journalists and civic leaders seized upon the language of the Atlantic Charter's "four freedoms" and demanded that the federal government prove its commitment to such noble ideals. Although African Americans had fought in every American conflict, racist assumptions persisted within the military that either limited the enlistment of black soldiers or confined them to subordinate and non-combat duties. In September 1940, a group of black leaders, including Randolph and Walter White, executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, sent President Roosevelt a seven-point program recommending, among other things, that recruitment, training, and mobilization of troops be determined by ability rather than race.

Concurrently, Judge William Hastie, appointed by the president as a civilian aide to Sec. of War Henry L. Stimson in 1941, worked from inside the War Department to remove racial barriers. Believing that Stimson and the uniformed military leadership clung to segregationist beliefs and wanted to keep black troops out of combat, Hastie resigned in protest on January 15, 1943.

Following the Allied victory in 1945, Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis Sr.'s reports on racism in the military added another plank to the platform for racial justice in the military. In particular, Davis pointed to the nearly impossible task facing black soldiers who were asked to maintain high morale as they faced daily mistreatment. Furthermore, Davis asserted that the Army was reinforcing, rather than defusing and refusing to support, this hostile environment. Consequently, he recommended—among other things—that black troops be removed from bases in the South and be assigned black officers. Despite all these efforts, many of the greatest arguments on behalf of soldiers of color came from the crucible of war.

Soldiers of Color

For many Americans, racial segregation was the natural social order derived from the belief that white Americans were superior in every respect to people of color. With regard to military service, this belief system caused many to assume that blacks and other nonwhites were too cowardly, weak, or stupid to perform at the same level as white troops. The consistent

demonstrations of valor and competence by soldiers of color not only shook white supremacy to its core, but it also demonstrated that these troops could serve on an equal basis in the Army without undermining its proficiency. The gallant service of soldiers of color was critical to social reform because the activism of the period would have been for naught had these soldiers lived down to the expectations of whites.

Despite the internment of Japanese Americans and immigrants in the continental United States following the attack on Pearl Harbor, 33,000 Japanese American men from the internment camps and Hawaii served in the Army. Several thousand worked in Military Intelligence, while others fought in both the Pacific and European theaters. Some volunteered to serve with Merrill's Marauders in Burma (an Army Ranger unit instructed to wreak havoc on Japanese communications and supply chains from behind enemy lines), while others in the 442nd regiment rescued Texas's "Lost Battalion," which was trapped in the Vosges Mountains by German troops. Hawaii's 100th Battalion was known as the "Purple Heart Battalion" because so many men were killed or wounded in combat in North Africa and Italy. At least one commander estimated that the contributions of Japanese American soldiers shortened the war by two years.

Chinese Americans also rushed to join the war effort. Emily Lee Shek became the first Chinese American woman to join the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAACS), even though she struggled to gain enough weight to reach the 105-pound minimum requirement. Overall, 13,499 Chinese American men (22 percent of the draft-eligible male population from this community) served in the military during the war.

African Americans responded to the call of duty with a similar verve. The number of African American soldiers exceeded 1.2 million. Despite the lack of combat training for most black troops, they acquitted themselves honorably. Dorie Miller, the Navy messman who shot down at least two Japanese planes during the attack on Pearl Harbor, embodied the determination of black enlisted personnel. Despite receiving the Navy Cross for his actions in Hawaii, Miller ended his career and life as a messman when his ship, the USS *Lipscombe Bay*, was sunk in the Pacific in November 1943.

Even when black soldiers were assigned to combat, the Army often overlooked their heroism. Serg. Edward Carter, for instance, single-handedly overwhelmed a German platoon in 1944. His wounds were so severe that his two German prisoners carried him back to the American lines. He was only awarded a Medal of Honor posthumously following an investigation by a team of researchers in the early 1990s. Units like the Tuskegee Airmen and the Red Ball Express also demonstrated the wit and skill necessary to fight competently in a modern Army. Not all accomplishments went unrecognized, though, as when the 761st "Black Panther" Tank Batallion earned a Presidential Unit Citation for Extraordinary Heroism.

Chicanos and Native Americans also served in large numbers. Roughly half a million Mexican Americans served in the armed forces. Although Mexican Americans represented only one-tenth of the population of Los Angeles, they sustained one-fifth of the city's war casualties. In the Philippines, a Choctaw who had escaped his Japanese captors at the Battle of Corregidor led guerilla forces until the war's end. The all-Navajo Marine unit known as the Code Talkers camouflaged strategy and troop movements by signaling orders and reconnaissance data in their mother tongue. Ira Hayes of the Pima nation was one of the six Marines at the battle of Iwo Jima who planted the American flag at the summit of Mount Suribachi.

The presence of these soldiers was not always appreciated by their white counterparts. Thus, soldiers of color occasionally united for survival. For instance, a small group of African American soldiers found themselves surrounded and outnumbered by a large unit of hostile white soldiers in the Italian countryside. Just as the white soldiers were about to attack, a truckload of Nisei soldiers arrived, whipped the white soldiers, then smiled and waved goodbye to the black troops.

By proving their mettle in combat, soldiers of color made possible the envisioning by America's civilian and military leadership an Army in which soldiers were trained and promoted solely on the basis of merit. Moreover, this service gave the various communities of color a renewed confidence and determination that reverberated all the way to the White House. Although courageous service in an

American war effort was nothing new for women and men of color, their efforts on the battlefields of World War II were augmented by a galvanized movement for equality and the emergence of the Cold War.

The Fight on the Homefront

After the war, political and military leaders slowly began to recognize that civil rights organizations' assertions that racial discrimination was un-American might be valid. As President Truman pursued a civil rights program, the nationwide assault on racial discrimination continued on many fronts. Activists across the South challenged racial barriers to voting rights and education, while citizens throughout the country challenged housing and employment discrimination. Although the desire for an election victory loomed large in his mind, Truman also was concerned with the international reaction to the stubbornness of "Jim Crow" segregation.

America's global reputation was sullied by segregation and the invigorated black community—terrifically disappointed in the lack of progress toward a racially integrated society—gained the sympathy of tens of millions in Europe, Asia, and Africa. By the spring of 1948, A. Philip Randolph and other activists assured the White House and Congress that black youth would resist the draft unless the president issued an executive order ending segregation in the armed forces. Thus, when President Truman appointed a panel to study discrimination in the military, the panel's report, Freedom to Serve, became part of a multifront attack on racial discrimination throughout American society.

Many nations around the world took notice of race relations in the United States and the country's ghastly record made many skeptical of the legitimacy of America's claim to be the leader of the Free World. For example, 1946 was one of the worst years on record with regard to lynchings, and newspapers throughout the world reported on these barbarous crimes. Spurred in large part by the research of General Davis and the quiet advocacy of Judge Hastie, President Truman sought a way to make the United States more closely resemble the arsenal of freedom that it claimed to be—partly for moral reasons and partly to make the contrast between a democratic United States and an authoritarian Soviet Union even more dramatic. Because Truman's legislative initiatives often were blocked by conservatives, Truman issued an executive order to desegregate the military rather than trying to push legislation through Congress.

Without question, blacks led the fight for social justice in the arenas of warfare and public opinion in the 1940s. Executive Order 9981 bears witness to the persistence and faith of many of America's marginalized communities as they sacrificed and lobbied for a central place in the fabric of the nation. Even with sustained protest from several quarters and the leadership of the president, racial segregation in the military remained a reality until it was slowly erased in the crucible of the Korean War.

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Related Documents

1941; 1948 b

—*George White Jr.*

F

Families, Military

Although military families have been an integral part of the American military since its inception, only recently have they been officially recognized as a major component of military life. Official recognition of family concerns developed as the United States began to rely on an all volunteer force (AVF). Thereafter, the services developed myriad programs to help service members and their families cope with the unique challenges associated with military life, including regular separations between service members and families, frequent moves, and the dangerous aspects of military work. As a result, the services will likely continue to develop programs and services to make military life more manageable for military families.

History of Military Families

Military recognition of family concerns can be divided into three historical periods: the Revolutionary War to World War I, World War I through the 1950s, and the 1960s to present. Prior to World War I, military families were present in the form of camp followers, consisting mostly of soldiers' wives and children who provided services such as cooking, laundering, and sewing. This period may be described as one of neglect as the military never formally recognized the sacrifices of military families. Soldiers, especially enlisted men and junior officers, were discouraged from marrying and having families, and government policies provided limited relief to families of service members.

This period of neglect had been replaced by a period of ambivalence by World War I. The need for a larger standing army during the two world wars forced the Congress to be more sympathetic toward married service members than in the past. Several legislative acts in the early-to-mid-20th century provided formal support to soldiers' families. However, the military continued to discourage marriage, especially among younger enlisted personnel.

Ambivalence continued to describe military–family policy into the 1960s. Unlike previous wars, the U.S. military maintained a large standing army after World War II. Although a number of these soldiers were young, single conscripts, a large professional (and largely married) force developed at this time. In 1965, the Army made the first attempt to create an organization designed to support military families: the Army Community Service organization (now the National Military Family Association).

The change to an all volunteer force in 1973 solidified the role of soldiers' families in military life; the military would have to support families if it was to attract and retain a large standing volunteer force. This change was manifested in the 1983 white paper, The Army Family, by the Office of the Army Chief of Staff. This report outlined the role of military families in Army life. In addition to reviewing the history of the relationship of the Army and Army families over time, it also stated a new philosophy in which the Army "remains committed to assuring adequate support to families to promote wellness . . . and strengthen the mutually reinforcing bonds between the Army and its families" (Wickham, 16). Methods to achieve these goals include the improvement of employment assistance, better health care, improved support of child care facilities, and centralization of family support programs.

Military Families Today

The military family is now considered an integral part of military life. Family policies and organizations have been developed to make military life easier for families, primarily as a

means of maintaining morale and retaining quality personnel. Indeed, most modern research shows that a satisfying family life has both direct and indirect effects on service members' organizational commitment and retention decisions. As a result, almost every military base has some form of family support office, helping families with health care, housing, morale, welfare, and recreation services, access to child care, and family centers.

The services have approximately 1.4 million members; these service personnel have 1.9 million family members. Hence, the individuals in military families outnumber service members themselves. The military has a larger percentage of service members with families (58 percent) than without them (42 percent). Most of these are families of officers and mid-to-senior-ranking enlisted personnel; however, a growing number of younger enlisted personnel are marrying during their first term of service. The average military family comprises a service member, a spouse, and two children—very much like the civilian population. Most spouses are young—48 percent of them are 30 or younger. Thirty-nine percent of military children are under age 6.

Almost half of military spouses (48 percent) are under age 30 and more than 90 percent are female. Although more than half of officers' spouses (61 percent) are working or looking for work, 39 percent of them are neither in the labor force nor looking for work. Enlisted spouses are more likely to be working or looking for work (71 percent) than their officer counterparts. Enlisted spouses also have a higher unemployment rate than officer spouses (8 percent compared with 6 percent).

The Military Lifestyle

Military service exposes service members and their families to a number of unique challenges. For instance, much military work is inherently dangerous—family members worry about the health and well-being of service members. Service members are also required to separate from their families for different missions and training requirements. Military families are expected to relocate regularly, making establishing roots in any community difficult. The military has been referred to as a "greedy institution" because of the constellations of demands it makes on its personnel and their families.

War and Separation

The military routinely exposes members to dangerous working conditions. Service members risk injury and death as part of everyday duties, especially during times of war. Even noncombat occupational specialties in the military may involve the use of heavy equipment or other dangerous activities. Surveys regularly show that military families are very concerned about the safety of their spouses and other family members in service.

Safety concerns can be heightened when families are separated during unaccompanied deployments. Most separations are a result of training requirements, sea duty (for Navy personnel), and other unaccompanied tours. Peacekeeping missions have also become more prevalent. The length of separation may vary from a few days to a year or longer for wartime separations. Some evidence indicates that military families separate twice as often as civilian families. Seventy-three percent of service members report being separated at least one night in the last 12 months for work-related reasons. During peacetime, approximately 8 percent of married service members are on unaccompanied tours at any time.

The impact of separation on families depends on the nature and duration of separation. Separation stress is associated with physical and psychological illness such as anxiety and depression. Longer separations and tours of duty in more dangerous locations are associated with higher levels of distress compared with shorter, more training-oriented ones. Anxiety associated with separation also tends to be higher among families of junior personnel than senior personnel.

During times of war, most families seem to cope well with separations, although a significant number of families report emotional distress about the living conditions of their spouses, problems communicating with them, and the uncertainty of the deployment. Military families typically go through a four-stage adjustment process during separations: preparing for departure of the service member (pre-deployment), making structural changes to the family during the actual separation (deployment), preparing for the return of the service member (pre-reunion), and restructuring the family to reincorporate the service member into family life (postdeployment).

Mobility and Relocation

Military families traditionally move about once every three years. Families of officers tend to move at higher rates than their enlisted counterparts. Military families are much more likely to relocate for employment than their civilian counterparts; civilian relocations are more voluntary in nature than military moves.

Family adjustment to relocation depends on a number of factors. The first move is probably the most difficult because families have not had much experience in relocation. In addition, younger families, generally enlisted ones, are particularly prone to relocation stress as they have fewer resources with which to manage the move. Although the armed services cover most moving expenses, the majority of military families usually pay for some aspects of each transfer.

Relocation can have positive effects on families, too. Military families get an opportunity to see more places in the United States and around the world than most civilian families. Conversely, constant moving makes developing fiscal and social ties to any particular community difficult. For instance, building equity in a home is difficult for military families. They can also lack social supports from both family and neighbors at a particular location. Moving also disrupts the development of personal relationships among children at school and may cause problems in adapting to new schools because of the lack of consistency in school curricula. Military spouses also have difficulty developing their careers, as they are unable to accrue seniority in any particular workplace. As a result, unemployment rates of military spouses tend to be higher than their civilian counterparts.

Other Issues and Concerns

Military family life differs in several other aspects from civilian families. Military families often have to live overseas for one or more years. Some families find this enjoyable; for others, it is a source of great stress. In addition, the growing number of dual-career service members has forced the armed services to decide between family well-being and personnel efficiency. Finally, more normative constraints are imposed on military families than in the civilian world. For instance, spouses have traditionally been expected to play a major role in the career development of service members by participating in military functions and volunteer activities.

The role of Reserve and National Guard families in military life has been a growing concern since the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War in which significant numbers of Reserve personnel were activated. The nature of Reserve forces makes difficult the provision of some of the same family supports given to families of active-duty service members. Reserve forces traditionally come from a variety of areas around bases. Hence, no established "community" exists for these soldiers. In addition, Reserve service members typically serve one weekend a month and two weeks a year, limiting their ties to the military and other military families. Finally, many families of Reservists do not live close enough to a base to obtain services. These structural limitations make providing services to families of Reservists more difficult.

The unique nature of military family life has led the armed forces to adopt myriad family services, including daycare centers, counselors, and other family support programs. The needs of Reserve and National Guard families have been incorporated into this support system. Some of the armed services have been considering structural changes to help alleviate some of the burdens of military life on families. For instance, service members and their families may have the option of staying at certain duty stations for extended periods, a concept called "homebasing." Efforts to reduce the tension between military work and family life are considered essential to maintaining a professional volunteer force.

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Related Entries

All Volunteer Force; Camp Followers

Related Documents

1759; 1965 c; 1970 a, b; 1977

—*David Rohall*

Farewell to Arms, A

Novel by Ernest Hemingway, 1929

Ernest Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms* stands as a seminal statement of the hopelessness and widespread lack of conviction that characterized the attitudes of many participants in the "Great War." Within American letters and society, *A Farewell to Arms* is considered to have captured, and in a sense to have contributed to, the feeling of disillusionment about the failed ideals of the preceding generations—a significant expression, that is, of the "Lost Generation."

The novel tells the story of Lt. Frederic Henry, a young Red Cross volunteer serving with the Italian Army in World War I. While recounting some of his relationships with his Italian soldier colleagues from 1915 to 1918, the novel's narrative and emotional core treats Henry's love affair with his English nurse, Catherine Barkley. The novel begins in the fall of 1916, after a brief prologue summarizing some of the events of 1915. Frederic Henry is a dutiful but uncommitted supporter of the war effort. While friendly with his surgeon colleague, Lieutenant Rinaldi, and his unit's Catholic priest chaplain, on the whole Henry is a callow youth who steers clear of serious emotional involvements. Having enlisted for adventure rather thanout of conviction, he is skeptical about any larger purposes. Henry observes, in a much quoted passage from the novel:

> I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the expression in vain. We had heard them, sometimes standing in the rain almost out of earshot, so that only the shouted words came through, and had read them, on proclamations that were slapped up by billposters over other proclamations, now for a long time, and I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done to the meat but to bury it. There were many words that you could not stand to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. Certain numbers were the same way and certain dates and these with the names of places were all you could say and have them mean anything (184–185).

Henry is seriously wounded at the front by an Austrian trench mortar shell. He watches one of his ambulance drivers die in the same attack. Transported to a rear area hospital in Milan, Henry finds himself crippled; he is nursed back to health by Catherine Barkley. Over the next year Henry falls

in love with Barkley while regaining the use of his wounded legs. When Henry returns to front-line duty, Catherine is pregnant with his baby.

Henry returns to a disastrous situation. The Italian Army, defeated by the October 1917 Austro–German Caporetto offensive, is in full retreat. Hemingway, though he did not arrive in Italy until 1918, writes a superbly evocative description of the retreat. Lieutenant Henry leads his ambulance unit in retreat, but after his ambulances all break down, he and his men must march on foot. Some of his men are killed; several desert; Henry is even accused by the rear area Italian Army battle police of being a coward. (Ironically, Henry had just shot an Italian sergeant for deserting his unit against orders.) After watching several Italian officers shot as cowards on the basis of little or no evidence, Henry escapes by diving into a nearby river. Now a deserter, Henry hops a freight train and journeys to Stresa, where Catherine is stationed at a hospital.

A war-weary Lt. Frederic Henry rows with Catherine in a boat across Lake Maggiore to neutral Switzerland to make a new life for themselves and their baby. After several idyllic months in Switzerland, Catherine gives birth to a stillborn baby by Caesarean section before dying of a hemorrhage. *A Farewell to Arms* concludes with Frederic Henry numb with despair.

When the novel appeared, most literary critics and readers interpreted *A Farewell to Arms* as the frank story of a man ruined by World War I—and, by extension, of the effects of that war on Western civilization. H. L. Mencken articulated this view: "The virtue of the story lies in its brilliant evocation of the horrible squalor and confusion of war" (Stephens, 97). Bernard DeVoto offered a similar appraisal: "Here is how the war happened to a man and what it did to him. It is one experience in the years of chaos and unreason, a chart of the path forced on one atom" (Stephens, 83). John Dos Passos, Hemingway's close friend and fellow Italian Front veteran, wrote about World War I in similarly disillusioned terms in his novel, *1919*, helping, along with Hemingway, to define the "Lost Generation."

After *A Farewell to Arms* was published, Hemingway was lauded as America's greatest living writer about war.

He was paid lavishly as a war correspondent to cover the Spanish Civil War and World War II. In 1942, he was even chosen to edit and introduce a best-selling anthology of war writing, *Men at War*. Many World War II American novelists, among them Norman Mailer, were deeply influenced by *A Farewell to Arms*.

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Related Entries

Literature and War; Media and War; Memory and War; World War I

—Christopher M. Gray

54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry

The 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer (Colored) Infantry was the most famous African American regiment to serve in the Civil War, and the first to be recruited entirely in non-Confederate states.

The 54th owed its existence Massachusetts governor John A. Andrew. Until Andrew created the 54th, the first 11 African American regiments in the Union Army were recruited from "free colored" men and former slaves in Union-occupied areas of the Confederacy. These first southern black regiments of "Colored Infantry" were initially used mostly for guard and labor duties. However, the 1st South Carolina (Colored) Regiment proved effective in combat during coastal raiding through Georgia and Florida in February and March of 1863. Three Louisiana "Native Guard" regiments won Union generals' respect by executing repeated attacks against enemy entrenchments at Port Hudson, Louisiana, in May 1863.

But the U.S. War Department, as well as most northern politicians and generals, still opposed using these African American troops both because they thought them incompetent in combat and out of concern that treating them as regular combat soldiers would lead black soldiers to demand treatment equal to white soldiers. Governor Andrew, an ardent abolitionist, was eager to bring about racial equality, and he thought the best method for African Americans to achieve full citizenship was to fight for it on the battlefield. Frederick Douglass, the leading African American abolitionist and Andrew's close friend, agreed. Douglass argued that taking up arms for the Union was how black men could achieve full citizenship.

Thanks to Andrew's persistence, Army manpower shortages, and his own January 1, 1863, Emancipation Proclamation, Pres. Abraham Lincoln overrode northern racial bigotry. He ordered the War Department to allow Andrew to raise troops for the regiment on January 26, 1863. However, the War Department stipulated that these black troops could be commanded only by white officers. Congress added a further condition that black troops be paid $6.00 less per month than the standard $13.00 Union private's monthly salary.

Despite these racial inequities, black recruits from 24 different states, the District of Columbia, Canada, the West Indies, and even Africa, flocked to the 54th's colors. The regiment's recruits represented the African American elite: 50 percent of them were literate, some were in the professions, and only 25 percent were former slaves. Frederick Douglass's sons, Lewis and Charles, both joined the 54th; the former becoming the regiment's sergeant major. Their father worked successfully with his white abolitionist allies to meet the regiment's full recruiting quota; the surplus troops supplied over and above the regiment's quota of 800 were used to form a second regiment, the 55th Massachusetts.

Governor Andrew persuaded Robert Gould Shaw to assume command of the 54th in early March 1863. Andrew carefully selected the regiment's white subordinate officers as well: Lt. Col. Edward Hallowell, captains William Simkins and Luis Emilio, and Adjutant Garth Wilkinson James shared Shaw's combat experience, abolitionist convictions, and fierce desire to prove black troops equal to white troops. These officers' letters reveal how conscious and proud they were of the regiment's social as well as military significance. Shortly after its creation, the 54th, along with other black regiments, faced Confederate legislation authorizing the execution of both black Union troops and their white officers. This legislation combined with northern white bigotry to bond the regiment's white officers with their black troops. The 54th's officers and men, in a joint protest, all served without pay until Congress authorized equal wages to black soldiers.

After two months of rigorous drilling at Readville, Massachusetts, Shaw deemed the 54th battle-ready. The unit paraded through downtown Boston's cheering crowds on May 28, 1863, then embarked for service in the Southern Department. Arriving June 3 at Hilton Head, South Carolina, the 54th engaged in its first serious action on July 16 at James Island, South Carolina, impressing local Union commanders and white 10th Connecticut Infantry troops with their steadfast performance.

The James Island action was preliminary to a general Union attack on Charleston. Gen. George Strong, commander of the Charleston attack, admired both Shaw and his

A depiction of the 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry as it stormed Fort Wagner near Charleston in July of 1863. (Getty Images)

regiment. He requested that the 54th lead the otherwise all-white Union attack on Fort Wagner, which guarded Charleston's harbor. Shaw agreed, called on his troops "to prove yourselves as men," and then led them to storm Fort Wagner's earthworks under heavy Confederate cannon and rifle fire. Shaw and a few soldiers actually reached Fort Wagner's parapet, where they engaged Confederate soldiers in hand-to-hand combat. But soon the 54th's troops were either killed (as was Shaw), captured, or forced to retreat, which they did with good order and discipline. The 54th suffered 256 dead or wounded of its 600 effectives—the highest casualty rate of any of the 11 Union regiments involved in the Fort Wagner attack. General Strong also suffered a mortal wound in a later stage of the battle.

The 54th's attack on Fort Wagner, despite its failure, proved that African American soldiers could conduct themselves in combat with tremendous skill and valor. Sgt. William Carney, a freed former slave, saved the 54th's colors despite multiple serious wounds. He became the first black soldier awarded the Medal of Honor, although the honor was delayed until 1900. The regiment's performance had vindicated Governor Andrew, Frederick Douglass, and others who championed Union use of black military manpower; the Union now eagerly raised black regiments. Congress equalized the pay between black and white troops in June 1864, mostly because of publicity generated by the 54th's Fort Wagner heroism. Eventually 180,000 African American soldiers, or roughly 10 percent of all federal troops, served in the Civil War. They won 21 Medals of Honor and served in every capacity. Both President Lincoln and General Grant believed black troops played a decisive role in Union victory.

The 54th Regiment, under the command of Edward Hallowell, was involved in several major engagements until

the Civil War's end. At Olustee in 1864, the largest Civil War battle fought in Florida, the 54th helped cover the withdrawal of mostly white Union forces. It fought alongside its sister 55th Massachusetts regiment during the respective South Carolina and Georgia battles of Honey Hill and Boykin's Mill. The 54th was the first Union regiment to enter Charleston in February 1865. It was finally mustered out of service in August 1865.

The 54th's performance played a large role in the postwar Congress creating four all-black regular Army units: the 9th and 10th Cavalry, and the 24th and 25th Infantry regiments. These regiments, now integrated, still serve in the early 21st century.

The 54th enjoyed much post–Civil War fame because of its well-connected alumni. Luis Emilio published a fine history of the regiment in 1891. Augustus St. Gaudens sculpted a bas relief sculpture in Boston commemorating both Shaw and the regiment; it was dedicated in 1897 and is generally considered a masterpiece. Peter Burchard's 1965 book on Shaw and the 54th was turned into a remarkably accurate and moving hit motion picture, *Glory* (1989), which won several Academy Awards. The 54th Massachusetts also boasts a reenactment unit and Website.

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African Americans in the Military; Civil War; Fort Pillow Massacre; Grant, Ulysses S.; Lincoln, Abraham; Shaw, Robert Gould

Related Documents

1863 c; 1865 a

—*Christopher M. Gray*

Fighting 69th

The "Fighting 69th" is a New York National Guard regiment famous for its Irish Catholic ethnicity, its fighting qualities, and its alumni who often became powerful civilians.

The 69th New York regiment was founded specifically for New York City's Irish Catholic immigrants in 1851; the Tammany Hall political machine, which dominated New York politics from the mid-19th century into the mid-20th century, played a large role in creating the regiment. Anti-Catholicism and hatred of Irish immigrants flourished in 1850s America, contributing to the rise of the Know-Nothing Party. The Democrats of Tammany wanted to prove that Irish Catholic immigrants could be as patriotic, soldierly, and courageous as native-born Protestant Americans; they also wanted to protect Irish Catholics with their own militia unit. The 69th has served as the military escort of New York City's St. Patrick's Day parade since 1851.

The 69th was one of the first Union militia units to mobilize after Fort Sumter, in South Carolina, came under attack by Confederate forces on April 12, 1861. It first saw action at the battle of First Bull Run at Manassas Junction, Virginia, in 1861. The regiment was under the command of

Col. Michael Corcoran, an Irish Catholic opponent of British rule over Ireland. Corcoran was captured in the battle, so the regiment's command devolved to former Irish revolutionary Thomas Meagher, an even more colorful and legendary character than Corcoran.

Meagher was skilled at oratory and public presentation as well as at soldiering. He persuaded the War Department to let him create an all-Irish brigade under his command for the Union Army of the Potomac. The Irish Brigade usually comprised the 69th, 63rd, and 88th New York, the 28th Massachusetts, and the 116th Pennsylvania Infantry volunteer regiments. The Fighting 69th and its Irish Brigade parent were furnished with distinctive emerald green battle flags with harp and sunburst insignias. One of Brig. Gen. Meagher's motives in creating the brigade was to assemble a unit that could train and inspire native Irishmen to overthrow British rule in Ireland. Unfortunately for Meagher's dream, the Brigade's very valor caused it such high casualties throughout the Civil War that it was unable to serve as a vehicle of Irish national liberation once the war was over.

The bravery of the Fighting 69th was widely praised; it had received its admiring nickname from Gen. Robert E. Lee himself. When facing them, Gen. Stonewall Jackson also lamented the regiment's fighting qualities. After First Bull Run, the 69th fought battles in the Peninsular Campaign, at Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Spotsylvania Courthouse, Cold Harbor, the Petersburg Campaign, and Appomattox. Pres. Abraham Lincoln kissed the regiment's colors in June 1862, saying, "God bless the Irish Flag" (Demeter, 86). At Fredericksburg, the regiment and its parent Irish Brigade's suicidal charges at Marye's Heights inspired Lee to say: "Never were men so brave" (Demeter, 111).

Photograph of members of the Fighting 69th New York Regiment gathering around a seacoast cannon in the first days of the Civil War. Commander Col. Michael Corcoran is standing off to the left. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

The 69th's Civil War bravery came at a fearful price: of 2,000 Union regiments, the 69th and its sister 28th Massachusetts regiment ranked sixth and seventh, respectively, in the number of men killed or mortally wounded. The 69th led all New York regiments in killed and mortally wounded: 259. In addition the regiment suffered 148 missing, 535 wounded, 86 dead of disease or accident, and 56 dead from Confederate imprisonment, out of a total of 1,513 Civil War enlistments.

The Civil War sacrifices of the 69th and the Irish Brigade were remembered in postwar literary memoirs and physical monuments. Capt. David Conyngham, one of Meagher's staff officers, and surgeon William O'Meagher of the 69th, coauthored a classic memoir–history of the Irish Brigade in 1867, the same year Thomas Meagher drowned while governing the Montana Territory. Charles Halpine, a former journalist and Union staff officer who served as a lieutenant in the 69th, composed many sketches, poems, and songs in the 1860s based on members of the Irish Brigade and the 69th. Father William Corby, chaplain of the 88th New York, later became president of his alma mater, the University of Notre Dame. Corby wrote a moving memoir in 1893 recounting his service with the Irish Brigade. Both Meagher and Corby were commemorated with bronze statues in 1905 and 1910, respectively. The Irish Brigade commissioned a Celtic cross that was erected at Gettysburg in 1888 to memorialize the 69th.

Although the regiment was mobilized for the 1898 Spanish–American War, it saw no action. However, past combat prestige and Tammany political connections enabled the regiment to build a large new armory on Manhattan's Lexington Avenue in 1906. The 69th still occupies this armory. The regiment was mobilized for the 1916 Mexican punitive expedition under General Pershing. During this campaign, Irish Catholic reservists Capt. William Donovan and regimental Chaplain Father Francis Duffy became the most influential members of the regiment.

When the 69th was mobilized for World War I as the 165th U.S. Infantry Regiment of the 42nd "Rainbow" Division, it was aptly characterized as "a National Guard outfit composed of equal parts tradition, sentiment, and boisterousness" (Bacevich, 73). Col. Frank McCoy, a West Point regular officer, Scottish Presbyterian, and former military aide to Pres. Theodore Roosevelt, recognized that he needed Donovan, now the First Battalion's commanding major, and Father Duffy to help him mold this 80 percent Irish Catholic fraternity into a disciplined combat force. Both Donovan and Duffy enthusiastically assisted McCoy; they wanted Irish Catholics to prove themselves worthy American citizens. The 42nd's commander, Charles Menoher, the chief of staff, Col. Douglas MacArthur, and the artillery commander, Charles Summerall, also worked hard to train the 69th.

These officers' efforts succeeded. The 165th even outdid the 69th's Civil War record (3 Medals of Honor and 74 Distinguished Service Crosses among other decorations) while taking extremely heavy casualties; it was probably the finest American regiment of World War I. All of these officers except for Father Duffy became distinguished generals and statesmen: MacArthur and Summerall became Army chiefs of staff; McCoy excelled as general and diplomat; Menoher became chief of the Army Air Service; Medal of Honor winner Donovan became a famous Republican politician and director of the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. Father Duffy's services won him a posthumous statue and square in Manhattan. The regiment even boasted a journalist–poet, Joyce Kilmer, whose writings brought him much posthumous fame.

In 1940, Hollywood produced a hit movie, *The Fighting 69th*, starring James Cagney and Pat O'Brien, to dramatize the unit's World War I exploits and thereby persuade reluctant American Irish Catholics to support American entry into World War II. After Pearl Harbor, the 165th, now 70 percent Irish Catholic, was mobilized as part of the 27th Infantry Division, and fought well, but not spectacularly, at the island invasions of Makin, Saipan, and Okinawa.

On September 11, 2001, the 165th was mobilized after the terrorist attacks on New York's World Trade Center. Several regiment members were among the firefighters killed in the Trade Center's collapse. The regimental Armory served as a first aid station for victims of the disaster. A month later the regiment proudly celebrated its 150th anniversary as the embodiment of the New York Irish Catholic community.

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Related Entries

Civil War; MacArthur, Douglas; National Guard; Pershing, John Joseph; World War I; World War II

—Christopher M. Gray

Filibustering

Filibustering was the attempt by American citizens to use armed force to expand their economic and political influence beyond the borders of the United States in the years prior to the American Civil War. This initiative, carried out by private citizens against the explicit laws of the United States, was directed southward toward Cuba, Mexico, and the Central American republics. These illegal expeditions affected the diplomacy of the United States within its own hemisphere by damaging relationships with Latin American countries.

Areas of Filibuster Activity

Mexico became a focus of filibuster activity after its defeat in the Mexican War. Many Americans saw the defeated nation as a fruit ripe for the picking by enterprising young men eager to gain fame and fortune. Mexico was also seen as a place where new slave states for the United States could be created. Western Mexico drew the attention of Americans and foreigners living in California who had heard claims of gold deposits in the Sonora region.

One of the most famous of the filibusters, William Walker, was the first leader of filibuster expeditions to western Mexico. He occupied Baja California in November 1853, declaring the Republic of Sonora. This first attempt by Walker soon failed, and by 1854 Walker was back in the United States. A sizable contingent of French immigrants also attempted to move into Sonora, but they were defeated by local forces. One of the last filibuster schemes in Mexico was the Henry Crabb expedition that met a disastrous fate in Caborca, Mexico, in 1857—his expedition was captured and summarily executed by local government officials. Other filibuster groups also operated in areas south of the Rio Grande.

Filibusters also turned their attention toward Cuba after the end of the Mexican War in 1848, considering that island as the logical next focus of Manifest Destiny (the belief that the United States had the God-given right to expand its borders throughout the Americas). In Cuba, Southerners saw a perfect location for new slave states that might serve as a counterweight to new free states. They viewed Spain, Cuba's colonial ruler, as a declining European power that would offer little serious defense of the island. Also, Cuba's tropical climate was a perfect environment for the introduction of cash crops, cotton, and tobacco, from the southern United States.

Narciso Lopez conducted two major expeditions against the Spanish authorities on Cuba in 1850 and 1851. Many of

his filibusters were Southerners from the United States, including Roberdeau Wheat and William L. Crittenden; other wealthy Southerners provided funds for military equipment. Lopez and his men were defeated by the Spanish garrison during their last foray into Cuba and were put to death by the island authorities in August 1851.

William Walker's filibuster army in Nicaragua drew the most attention in the press and came the nearest to success in Central America between 1855 and 1860. The large profits being made by men like Cornelius Vanderbilt in the transcontinental route through Nicaragua to the Pacific Ocean drew American attention to the region. The internal politics and British diplomacy began to affect the profits from Vanderbilt's endeavor. The British government attempted to control the eastern shore of Nicaragua and the departure points for the transcontinental railroad. Their efforts prevented American companies from controlling the overland route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Walker became interested in the economic opportunities presented by Nicaraguan agriculture and transportation routes due to the influence of Byron Cole and Henry Crabb. Cole owned the *San Francisco Commercial-Advertiser*, for which Walker worked as an editor. Cole became involved in colonization and mining in Central America, and soon began to recruit Americans to fight in the Nicaraguan civil war. Crabb, a boyhood friend of Walker's, also began to recruit for the war in Nicaragua. While Cole traveled with Walker to Nicaragua, Crabb soon gave up on any moneymaking schemes in Central America, choosing to remain in California.

From 1855 to 1857, Walker was the dominant force on the ground in Nicaragua. His initial group of 58 men grew into a small army of 1,200. Walker assisted the Nicaraguan Democrats in taking over the country and completely defeating their domestic opponents, the Legitimist faction. Soon, Walker and his men had to fight a brutal war with surrounding Central American republics. Walker took over the presidency of Nicaragua, but was quickly defeated by the neighboring countries with the aid of Vanderbilt. Walker and a small band of survivors returned to the United States in 1857. Walker tried to return to Nicaragua later that year but was stopped by a U.S. Navy squadron. In 1860, he attempted to assist in a possible revolt in Honduras but was captured by the Royal Navy. Walker was turned over to the Honduran government, which tried him and then executed him on September 12, 1860.

United States and the Filibusters

According to United States law, filibustering was a violation of the Neutrality Law of 1818, which prohibited the organization within the United States of any armed force that intended to attack a friendly foreign power. The American government attempted, through the enforcement of this law, to prevent its citizens from participating in military adventures. Much of this enforcement consisted of preventing potential filibustering groups from organizing and collecting arms for future operations. U.S. marshals watched for these expeditions in ports like San Francisco and New Orleans, while the U.S. Navy stood ready to intercept any filibuster vessels. In 1855, Pres. Franklin Pierce issued a proclamation against filibustering and ordered federal district attorneys to stop any ships that might be carrying recruits and equipment for filibusters operating in Nicaragua. In 1857, the U.S. Navy joined the Royal Navy in blockading a Nicaraguan port that was being used to supply Walker's filibuster army.

Many filibuster groups used the smokescreen of colonization or immigration to disguise their true intentions. Some American politicians secretly supported filibuster groups as a method to increase the size of the nation through the introduction of new slave states. John A. Quitman, the Democratic governor of Mississippi and later a U.S. representative, unsuccessfully attempted to raise a filibuster army to take Cuba from 1853 to 1855, but was thwarted by Pierce's proclamation. The diplomatic problems caused by filibusters impeded the efforts of several U.S. presidents to purchase Cuba from Spain and the northern areas of Mexico from the defeated government in Mexico City.

Filibusters

The majority of the filibusters were young, unmarried fortune seekers and adventurers. In Narciso Lopez's Cuban expedition, about 55 of the 85 men were under the age of 25. Several teenage boys ran away from home to enlist in filibuster companies. Many were veterans of the war with Mexico or participants in the gold rush to California from

1848 to 1849. Inspired mainly by the hopes of profit, these men were, for the most part, white Southerners looking south to create another slave-owning empire.

Several Europeans also saw filibustering as a way to adventure and fortune. Many filibuster companies consisted of veterans of European wars or of the 1848 revolutionary movements. Immigrants also made up a large number of recruits to filibuster organizations, especially in Walker's filibuster army in Nicaragua. The register of Walker's army recorded roughly 287 Europeans. In the battle at Santa Rosa hacienda in Costa Rica in March 1856, the filibuster force consisted of a French battalion, a German battalion, and two American battalions.

Most of the filibuster groups were organized in loose companies. Walker's filibuster army followed a military organization scheme typical of the mid-19th century, with rangers, riflemen, light infantry, and regular infantry. The battlefield success of filibusters was attributable to their combat experience and their use of modern weapons, including revolvers and percussion rifles. Walker's army was defeated in the field in 1857 when Vanderbilt supplied advisers and weapons to the Central American nations fighting the filibusters. Vanderbilt's actions were motivated in part by Walker's revocation of his transit company's charter in central Nicaragua.

Many expeditions to Cuba and Central America were forced to use unreliable ships to ferry men and equipment. One of the reasons for the failure of the Lopez expeditions to Cuba was the inability to procure enough shipping to supply and reinforce the filibusters. Walker's army remained unique because it possessed its own navy—an armed schooner that had been captured from Costa Rica.

The filibuster movement was a violent extension of Manifest Destiny into Latin America. The term Manifest Destiny was coined in 1845 by newspaper editor John L. O'Sullivan, who also was a strong supporter of Lopez's expeditions to Cuba. Filibusters clearly grew out of the Mexican War, ultimately proving to be a severe handicap to American diplomacy in the hemisphere. Filibusters never achieved their dreams of fame and fortune, and many died violent deaths in their quest. Their legacy was severe damage to the good will between the United States and its Latin American neighbors, which was further eroded by later American interventions of the 19th and 20th centuries.

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Central America and the Caribbean, Interventions in; Civil War; Mexican War; Polk, James K.

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1849

—*William H. Brown*

Film and War

Along with television, film is the medium through which most Americans learn about and vicariously experience war. What movies say about war and about the nation's armed forces profoundly shapes the attitudes of the people who watch them. Vietnam War veteran Ron Kovic explained that seeing John Wayne war films as a youth inspired him to join the Marines

later in life, an experience shared by many Vietnam-era veterans. Soldiers deploying to the Middle East during the Persian Gulf War reported that their notions of war also came from viewing motion pictures. Americans learn something about the nature and meaning of war and the men and women who fight in those wars from motion pictures, and those interpretations are influenced by the time in which films are made.

Genre

Films about war predate World War II; however, the familiar genre of the "war film" evolved during that war. As a genre, war films collectively share similar conventions and symbols that audiences learn to recognize. Those elements typically include a military unit composed of a democratic mix of ethnicities and geographies (such as an Irishman, a Midwesterner, a New Yorker), a conflict within the group, a hero who reluctantly takes command, an objective that the group must achieve, and death. Filmmakers employ recognizable conventions that tell the audience what is going to happen next. Audiences know that when a fresh, young soldier sent to the front line for the first time shows his buddy a picture of his girl back home, he is not going to survive. Actors, such as John Wayne, repeat similar performances so often that they project a particular image regardless of setting. Audiences watching a war film starring John Wayne come into the theater with expectations about the kind of character the actor will play and the general plot of the film.

War films come in countless variations and subgenres, including movies about the infantry, submarines, the Air Force, and the Navy surface fleet as well as films about veterans, training, the home front, prisoners of war, and war as a backdrop for romance. Other films subvert the genre by doing the opposite of what the audience expects from the already familiar characterizations, conventions, and plot arcs. Films that do not depict combat can also be considered part of the war film genre, for example, *Casablanca* (1942), which depicts the effects of war on noncombatants. War films may also contain elements of other genres such as comedies, Westerns, and women's films.

Film Industry and Culture

Films are the product of an entertainment industry whose goal is to make a profit. Because motion pictures that appeal to audiences are the ones that will succeed, filmmakers attempt to predict and exploit audience preferences. At the same time, films are part of a creative process that originates with an individual or small group of creative people; thus a movie reflects the thoughts of a particular director or production team. Films are also made at a specific time and within a specific culture, both of which influence subject matter as well as the manner in which its audience will interpret the movie. Films that attempt to be historical and re-create a moment in time with some detachment and objectivity actually reconstruct and reinterpret those events for modern audiences. Even if a filmmaker makes a fictional movie for entertainment, the film says something about American ideals and values, as well as the meaning of that particular war for Americans. Some films are made intentionally to present a specific political statement or propaganda message. Audiences also respond to motion pictures based on their own experiences, beliefs, and politics, which may or may not correspond to the director's intentions.

Film is also subject to censorship. Some censorship is straightforward, as when a filmmaker complies with a film rating system. Other censorship is more subtle— expressing a filmmaker's taste and judgment, for example, which may reflect the mores of the time or the filmmaker's culture. Prior to the Vietnam War, war films portrayed combat without blood, profanity, or gruesome battle wounds. Subsequently, war films have pictured graphic wounds and captured the language more accurately, causing them to be designated for adult audiences.

A drive for authenticity prompted some filmmakers during and shortly after World War II to include combat footage in their war movies. Subsequent filmmakers recreated battle experiences through special effects. To teach actors the correct handling of weapons and basic tactics, some studios provided a version of boot camp for members of the cast. Additionally, the Department of Defense (the War Department prior to 1947) and each of the military services have provided or withheld assistance to motion picture productions. To garner assistance with props, shooting locations, and technical advice, the film generally must portray the military positively. Filmmakers who refuse to change scripts as directed by military officials have been denied backing. Prior to the Vietnam War, most filmmakers who asked for military support received assistance. Since

Vietnam unleashed antiwar and antimilitary sentiment, the armed forces have chosen more carefully the films they back.

Pre–World War II War Films

The first war featured in motion picture was the Spanish–American War, subject of a short propaganda film, *Tearing Down the Spanish Flag*, in 1898. Films became longer, more epic and dramatic thereafter, first in silent black-and-white format, then with the addition of sound, and eventually color. The Civil War inspired two great pre–World War II films, *The Birth of a Nation* (1915) and *Gone with the Wind* (1939). *The Birth of a Nation* follows two families on different sides of the Civil War. It also portrays the Ku Klux Klan positively, reflecting then-common white American attitudes toward African Americans. Both *The Birth of a Nation* and *Gone with the Wind* interpret the Civil War through the pro-Confederate myth of the "Lost Cause," which maintains that northern industrial and military might doomed the South to failure from the beginning, but that Southerners nonetheless fought proudly and honorably and endured postwar reconstruction with defiant determination. *Glory* (1989) challenges this interpretation by highlighting the contributions and heroism of African American soldiers to the Union cause.

Films about World War I are generally considered antiwar, and they contained pacifist messages through the 1920s and 1930s. Hollywood-produced World War I films often take the French, British, or Germans as their subjects. Principal characters frequently sacrifice themselves or survive the war but are maimed. Infantry movies depict the waste, death, and futility of war; films showcasing the air war highlight individual heroics. In *The Big Parade* (1925), three young men enlist in the Great War. Only one returns, suffering the loss of a leg and the emotional aftereffects of war. In the Oscar-winning *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1930), a German high school student enlists with his buddies after listening to a propaganda speech. The young men

A scene from All Quiet on the Western Front, *an Oscar-winning film, released in 1930, that illustrated the madness and cruelty of World War I. (Getty Images)*

lose their enthusiasm for war as artillery shells, machine guns, and a sniper kill each of them in turn. Both *The Big Parade* and *All Quiet on the Western Front* depict the brutality, senselessness, and impersonal nature of war and offer powerful antiwar messages.

What Price Glory? (1926) presents more comedy and romance and contrasts the experiences of hardcore, professional Marine Captain Flagg and fun-loving Sergeant Quirt. *What Price Glory* established the visual representation of the World War I trenches: barbed wire and barren landscape of no-man's-land. *The Dawn Patrol* (1930) describes the air war realistically and depicts adventure, grace under fire, and strong bonds of friendship among pilots, themes that would recur in later films. *Wings* (1927) recreated the era's combat dogfights with such excitement and accuracy that they garnered the film the first Academy Award for Best Picture.

As World War II approached, World War I films were interpreted differently. *Sergeant York* (1941) charts the evolution of a pacifist into a combat hero who kills 25 Germans and captures more than 100 during the last month of the war. Some criticized *Sergeant York* as pro-war propaganda. Warner Brothers studio maintained that the Oscar-winning film showed American working-class men and their ideals successfully bearing the burden of the last war.

World War II and Film

During World War II, Hollywood cooperated with the U.S. government to produce a number of inspirational feature films dramatizing the war. The War Department, Office of War Information, and Bureau of Motion Pictures instructed studios and directors to devise hopeful endings for their movies. Some directors, including Frank Capra and John Ford, donned military uniforms and produced films specifically promoting the war effort. Major Capra directed the propaganda film series, *Why We Fight*. Dozens of notable film stars, including William Holden (Army), Clark Gable (Army Air Force), Ernest Borgnine (Navy), and George C. Scott (Marines), joined the armed forces. As a lieutenant colonel in the Army Air Force, studio owner Jack Warner produced training and recruiting films as well as documentaries. Wartime censorship prevented filmmakers from portraying the armed forces unfavorably or depicting battle

wounds. Films also showed the home front. *Since You Went Away* (1944) encouraged brave resolve, support of the troops, and war work for women.

World War II films focus mainly on the American experience and justify the war's sacrifices by emphasizing a valid democratic cause. Characters in these films represent a range of social and ethnic figures, often working together in teams. Stories often followed a small unit of men on patrol or making a valiant last stand against a determined foe. Early films consciously encouraged patriotic fervor. Because the Japanese attacked the United States, filmmakers initially focused their efforts on the Pacific. Japanese were given either subhuman or superhuman characteristics and referred to in racist terms. *Wake Island* (1942) shows brave Marines defending the island against an invasion of evil, brutal Japanese forces. *Bataan* (1943) portrays a large, invincible, well-equipped Japanese force that nonetheless displays primitive and barbaric qualities while fighting. Americans describe the Japanese as "yellow skinned, slanty-eyed devils."

Whereas Japanese constituted an impersonal enemy, Germans appeared in personal terms and were seen as devious and efficient, with the Nazis being the most sneaky and sadistic. Italians were portrayed as disillusioned or as deserters. In contrast, citizens of Britain, France, Russia, and other American allies display positive characteristics. Emotional French burn with vengeance, and the proper British bravely assist the Americans with wit. These portrayals are evident in the film *Sahara* (1943). An Italian prisoner, who dislikes the war, is killed brutally by a captured Nazi pilot. Both British pluck and French bravery are evident. British determination and their staunch support for democracy over tyranny are established in *Mrs. Miniver* (1942) and French patriotic resistance to German occupation is manifest in *The Cross of Lorraine* (1943). *Mission to Moscow* (1943) props up the Soviets as American allies, and *The Boy from Stalingrad* (1943) depicts the brutality the Soviet people suffered at the hands of the Nazis. *The Dragon Seed* (1944) illustrates stoic Chinese heroism in rebelling against the Japanese invasion.

As the war progressed, movies attempted to make more "realistic" looking films. *Destination Tokyo* (1943) highlights the heroism of crews aboard submarines when one sneaks into Tokyo Bay to report weather conditions for an Army Air Force

raid led by Lt. Col. James Doolittle. By adhering to detail and proper Navy procedure, the movie attained new levels of accuracy and believability. The silent and claustrophobic feel also set the standard for future submarine films. *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo* (1944) also recreates the famous 1942 raid by Colonel Dootlittle, emphasizing the pilots' bravery.

By war's end, Hollywood had begun to celebrate the courage and gallantry of the ordinary foot soldier through darker, more realistic films. *The Story of G.I. Joe* (1945) dramatizes the observations of war correspondent Ernie Pyle as he accompanies the troops in Italy. Pyle joins the muddy misery of the common soldier, finding valor among the ranks and meaning in the mundane details. Scholars credit the film for glorifying the combat experience and making the sacrifice, suffering, and endurance of common soldiers appear heroic (as they were). By the end of 1945, however, American audiences had understandably tired of war. Combat films, such as *The Story of G.I. Joe, A Walk in the Sun* (1945), and *They Were Expendable* (1945) did poorly at the box office despite critical acclaim.

Postwar films explored the psychological ramifications of war, created an ideal image for military personnel, and reenacted World War II in epic sweeps with an eye toward realism. Most films contained a celebratory message, though some made antiwar statements in a period that saw the beginning of the Korean War. *The Best Years of Our Lives* (1946) highlights the difficulties three World War II veterans have upon returning home, readjusting to family, and picking up their civilian lives. *Twelve O'Clock High* (1949) examines the pressures of leadership in an Army Air Force bomber unit in England during World War II. Gen. Fred Savage pulls his men together, but the effort leads to mental breakdown and physical exhaustion. *The Red Badge of Courage* (1951) explores the issues of cowardice and heroism on Civil War battlefields. Decorated World War II veteran Audie Murphy plays Henry Fleming, who ran away from his first taste of combat, but eventually overcomes his fears.

Although he never wore a military uniform in the service of his country, John Wayne came to symbolize the military ideal for a generation of boys who would fight in the Vietnam War. Scholars cite John Wayne's performance as Sergeant Stryker in the *Sands of Iwo Jima* (1949) as the role

model for subsequent presentations of the American fighting man. *Sands of Iwo Jima* glorifies war as a crucible of manhood and heroism. Although despised, Stryker forces his men to learn the lessons they will need to survive the war. Stryker became a symbol for Marines and inspired many to join the ranks in the Vietnam era. Wayne continued this heroic persona in subsequent films such as *Flying Leathernecks* (1951). *Battleground* (1949) offers a similarly favorable view of the Army. *Battleground* follows a squad in the 101st Division that is surrounded by the Germans in Bastogne during the battle of the Bulge. The film conveyed a feeling of loneliness, particularly when sly Germans infiltrate the lines disguised as American GIs and soldiers could no longer reliably distinguish between American troops and the enemy. It captured the agony and misery of combat but with a newfound sense of humor unknown in the movies made during the war. *Battleground* offers a more victorious and celebratory interpretation of the war than films produced at the end of the war, such as *The Story of G.I. Joe, A Walk in the Sun*, or *They Were Expendable.*

World War II inspired heroic, epic stories, told in a documentary style. *The Longest Day* (1962) attempts to recreate the massive Allied assault on Normandy on D-Day, June 6, 1944. The film's actors portray actual historical characters. Although the director, Darryl Zanuck, intended to convey an antiwar message about the horrors of war, the film's ending glorifies American soldiers and foreshadows the Allies' eventual victory against Nazi Germany in 1945. *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (1970) recreated the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, but failed at the box office. Films such as *The Battle of the Bulge* (1965) and *Midway* (1976) provide perspectives of both the Allies and the enemy. *Midway* also criticized the United States internment of the Japanese through a love story featuring a sailor and a Japanese American girl.

By the 1960s, World War II had become a backdrop for a variety of film types. That war set the stage for romance and comedy in *Operation Petticoat* (1959), in which a submarine rescues five Army nurses stranded on an island in the Philippines. Likewise, the more recent *Pearl Harbor* (2001) constructs a love triangle between two pilots and a Navy nurse around the surprise Japanese attack. Commando raids featuring maverick characters emerged as a new format for

World War II stories. *The Guns of Navarone* (1961) follows a team of British commandos meeting up with Greek partisans to sabotage German antiship guns. *The Dirty Dozen* (1967) sets a group of criminals on a mission behind German lines just prior to the Normandy landings. The men are morally questionable, the leader is a bully, and the group displays irreverent, antiauthoritarian attitudes. Films such as *The Dirty Dozen* and *The War Lover* (1962), about a mixed-up bomber pilot who romances his friend's girlfriend, deglorify the sacrificing, heroic images of earlier World War II films and with them the type of military character John Wayne so effectively typified. American enemies are given more personal, human qualities, such as a German unit that tries to surrender to Americans in *A Midnight Clear* (1992) and thoughtful Japanese commanders and brave pilots in *Pearl Harbor*. World War II films have focused more on the war in Europe in recent decades, with fewer movies set in the Pacific, North Africa, or Italy.

Korean War and Film

Hollywood neither mobilized for the Korean War nor created clearly pro-war films. *The Steel Helmet* (1951) has a darker tone than the World War II pictures and does not leave audiences assured of American victory. *The Bridges at Toko-Ri* (1954) highlights Navy aviators flying missions off an aircraft carrier into Korea. Although it portrays the Navy favorably, the film also contains antiwar sentiments. The main character questions the war, complains that he has already served his time during World War II, and dies a meaningless death in a muddy ditch at the end. *Pork Chop Hill* (1959) contains similarly conflicting messages about duty and the meaninglessness of war. Some characterize the film as glorifying war and the determination of America's soldiers, while others detect an antiwar message about the futility of war.

Vietnam and Film

The only feature film set in Vietnam produced during the conflict was John Wayne's *The Green Berets* (1968). It preaches the reasons America must fight in the war in terms that closely resemble the official White House stance. *The Green Berets* looks like a World War II film, where the callous and brutal North Vietnamese enemy can be defeated in conventional war. In doing so, Wayne ignored the more complicated irregular war against the Viet Cong insurgency. The film did well with American audiences at the box office, but the public continued to grow more skeptical of the war, particularly as it was described by the White House.

Filmmakers commented on the war indirectly, with films ostensibly about other wars. The profanity, colloquial language, and hippie hair and clothing style of *MASH* (1970) reflects the Vietnam-era antiwar movement rather than the actual conflict in Korea, which it supposedly portrays. *MASH* follows the exploits of the staff of a mobile Army hospital. The doctors are irreverent fraternity boys disregarding the authority and decorum of the military system at every opportunity. The nurses are sex objects for the men and are as unfaithful to their husbands as the doctors to their wives. The only efficient military figure is the office clerk, Priv. "Radar" O'Reilly. Through profanity, graphic blood, and surgery scenes, the film, which later was adapted for television, broke with the "clean" representation of earlier war movies. Although set in Guadalcanal during World War II, *The Thin Red Line* (1998) muses on the nature of war and depicts a bloodthirsty commander more in line with representations of Vietnam than of World War II.

The tale of Gen. George S. Patton's World War II experience, told in the Oscar-winning *Patton* (1970), was interpreted differently by Americans who held opposing views on the Vietnam War. If released in a time before Vietnam, the movie would clearly appear to glorify Patton and reinforce the image of a victorious America. Some Americans believed that the United States needed a man like Patton in Vietnam. Audiences could also see the worst of the military come out in the character. Those people perceived Patton more as a madman or a maverick, and the movie reinforced their disillusionment with Vietnam.

In the late 1970s, a new phase of Vietnam War films emerged. Although filmmakers began to set movies in Vietnam, they did not intend to present the war in realistic, historically accurate detail. Instead, they commented on the psychological ramifications of war in surrealistic style. *The Deer Hunter* (1978) comments on the horrors and risks of war and the effect of the Vietnam War on working-class

Actor George C. Scott in Patton. Scott's uncompromising portrayal of the World War II general resonated with both sides of the debate about the Vietnam War when it was released in 1970. (Getty Images)

America. Patriotism compels three men from a Pennsylvania steel town to go to war, but the experience traumatizes them. It also proved the most violent and graphic mainstream war movie to that time. Drawing some of its structure and themes from Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness, Apocalypse Now* (1979) follows an Army soldier sent to assassinate an officer who has gone rogue. A series of disturbing incidents ensues, including the attack of a village so soldiers could surf on the beach and the execution of a wounded Vietnamese girl. One character delights in the incineration of Vietnamese from napalm. Drugs, senseless slaughter, and moral depravity are all represented on screen in a dark interpretation of the failed war.

Many scholars cite Oscar-winning *Platoon* (1986) as the definitive movie about the Vietnam War. Loosely based on the experiences of director Oliver Stone, the movie depicts the brutality and amorality of the irregular war. Stone showed a war in which friend could not be distinguished from foe, where the enemy set booby traps and ambushes, and where Americans killed civilians, raped girls, and burned down villages.

Filmmakers also explored issues of returning Vietnam veterans. *Coming Home* (1978) exposes the physical and mental challenges a paraplegic veteran faces and examines how his experiences turned him against the war. The Oscar-winning film also shows the mental breakdown of a Marine captain who had initially welcomed his deployment to Vietnam. *Born on the Fourth of July* (1989) similarly portrays the anguish of disabled veteran Ron Kovic as he struggles with the meaning of the war and a country indifferent to the plight of its returning soldiers. Director Oliver Stone has been criticized for fabricating parts of the real-life story for on-screen dramatics, but the film has also been praised for capturing the mood and experience of the Vietnam War through the stages of innocent patriotism, doubt about the war's purpose, and psychological trauma for the war's participants and Americans back home.

Two new interpretations of Vietnam appear in films from the 1980s. Refusing to accept defeat, some filmmakers created heroes that go back to Vietnam to win the war for America. In *Rambo: First Blood Part II* (1985), former Green Beret John Rambo returns to Vietnam to rescue prisoners of war. A second theme conceptualizes both the Vietnamese enemy and American soldiers as victims in the war, as seen in *Good Morning Vietnam* (1987).

We Were Soldiers (2002) attempts to restore the image of the Vietnam soldier to that of his World War II forebears. It picks up on the ultimate expression of the heroism, bravery, and fortitude of the "greatest generation" as expressed in Steven Spielberg's World War II film *Saving Private Ryan* (1998). Although the latter film recreates in bloody detail the brutal D-Day landings at Omaha Beach, the characters are heroic, sacrificing their lives to complete their mission. *We Were Soldiers* takes the same heroism, sacrifice, determination, and dedication to duty and applies these qualities to the Vietnam soldier. *We Were Soldiers* recreates the conventional war of an air cavalry (helicopter) drop into the Ia

Drang Valley in 1965. These men fight bravely and eventually defeat a determined and vastly more numerous enemy, risking their lives to save a cutoff platoon and to pull every wounded or dead soldier out of the landing zone, while the soldiers' wives demonstrate stoic patriotism back home. The Vietnamese are portrayed as an intelligent, determined foe.

Post–Vietnam War Films

Military films set in contemporary times enjoyed general popularity during the 1980s, including *An Officer and a Gentleman* (1982). In this film, a Navy brat with an attitude transforms himself through the efforts of a tough sergeant and through the love of a woman. Thrill-seeking F-14 pilot Lt. Pete "Maverick" Mitchell won over audiences in *Top Gun* (1986). With its adventure, danger, and romance, the film popularized naval aviation so much that it is often referred to as a "recruiting film" for the Navy. Other popular movies featured more sober subjects, such as the nuclear Cold War standoff between the United States and Soviet Union in *The Hunt for Red October* (1990).

Films set in the Persian Gulf War and the operations in Somalia in 1993 have continued the trend of realistic portrayals of battle wounds and profane language. Although the movies are ambivalent about war itself, they favorably portray America's armed forces. *Courage Under Fire* (1996) tells two interrelated stories: an officer dealing with the guilt of having accidentally fired on an American tank during the Gulf War, and a Medal of Honor investigation for Capt. Karen Walden, whose actions saved fellow Americans although she herself was mortally wounded. The events are told from several perspectives, giving the audience an ambiguous view of Walden's heroism under fire. In *Three Kings* (1999), also set during the Gulf War, a rogue unit decides to profit from the war by going after Iraqi gold. Ultimately, the men decide to protect Iraqi refugees rather than abandon them in order to keep the gold. *Black Hawk Down* (2001) shows in vivid, gruesome detail the battle and the wounds of the Army Rangers and Delta Force members as they are surrounded in Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993. The film depicts the brutality of waging modern war in an urban setting. Despite the blood, guts, and profanity, the men prove heroic, fight for each other, and promise not to abandon downed helicopter pilot Michael Durant.

Americans continue to flock to theaters to watch war films. The genre has proved popular over time, bringing new interpretations of America's wars to delight, horrify, and engage audiences. War films have consistently won both public popularity and critical acclaim through Academy Awards, showing the value Americans have placed on the experience of war through film. Although film does not reflect exactly American perceptions about war and the armed forces, it is responsive to the issues related to those topics, from veterans reintegrating into American society to the ultimate meaning of a war. Those topics change over time as Americans struggle to comprehend new and old wars alike. As long as audiences watch war movies, film will remain an important insight into society's changing attitudes and understanding of war.

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Related Documents

1957

—*Lisa M. Mundey*

Food Riots

See Revolutionary War Food Riots.

Forrest, Nathan Bedford

(1821–77)
Confederate General

Dubbed the "Wizard of the Saddle," and "That Devil Forrest," Nathan Bedford Forrest rose from private to lieutenant general in the Confederate cavalry during the American Civil War. His use of commonsense tactics and his ferocious combat leadership by example won him a reputation as one of the finest commanders of mounted troops on either side in the conflict. Forrest's most popular maxim was reputedly to reach the battlefield "first, with the most men," although the key to his success lay more accurately in the standing order, "Forward men,

and mix with 'em." His propensity for fighting is reflected in his claim to have slain one more opponent in hand-to-hand combat than the 29 horses killed beneath him in the war. Yet he often applied a combination of bluff and intimidation against his opponents that allowed him to defeat opponents with minimal bloodshed.

Nathan Bedford Forrest was born in the mid-Tennessee backcountry community of Chapel Hill on July 13, 1821, the son of William and Mariam Beck Forrest. The family moved to Mississippi when he was in his teens. At the age of 16, Forrest had to assume the place of his father when William died suddenly. Consequently, he received little more than six months of formal education.

As a young man, Nathan Bedford Forrest held several minor public offices in Hernando, Mississippi. On September 25, 1845, Forrest married Mary Ann Montgomery, began to raise a family, and sought financial security through a variety of business enterprises. Establishing himself as a small-scale slave owner, Forrest moved his family to Memphis and became increasingly involved in the slave trade in that city. He rose to planter status primarily by slave trading. When the war began, Forrest waited until Tennessee had left the Union to join the Confederate cause. Enlisting as a private, Forrest soon obtained authority from Tennessee Gov. Isham G. Harris to raise a cavalry command. As a lieutenant colonel, he embraced the responsibility for accomplishing this task with enthusiasm and energy, outfitting a battalion of mounted troops later designated as the Third Tennessee Cavalry Regiment.

Forrest's first significant battle experience came at the Battle of Sacramento, in Kentucky on December 28, 1861. He demonstrated the combat tactics he would employ so successfully throughout the war by personally engaging the enemy and employing pressure from the front while seeking to envelop an opponent's position through flanking operations. His reputation as a bold man of action began to take shape only in February 1862, when he led his command on a daring escape past Union lines rather than surrender with the Confederate forces surrounded at Fort Donelson, Tennessee. Two months later, the newly appointed colonel participated in the fighting at Shiloh. Here again he demonstrated impetuousness and courage when he abandoned a

screening assignment on the Confederate right flank to engage in the fiercest scene of action. During the retreat from Shiloh these same traits nearly cost him his life when he rode into a body of Union soldiers and was severely wounded before returning to the safety of his own lines. Forrest recovered to win new laurels in a raid against the Union outpost of Murfreesboro, Tennessee, on July 13, 1862, where he succeeded in capturing 1,200 men and ample military stores. With the victory, he established himself as a premier cavalry raider and was promoted to brigadier general.

His success as a raider continued with a fight through western Tennessee in December 1862 that wrecked railroad depots and miles of track and trestlework in the region. Although Forrest found himself trapped between two Federal forces at Parker's Crossroads on December 31, he managed to bring the bulk of his command out of the fight intact. This operation helped to thwart an early overland Union advance against Vicksburg. Then, in April and May 1863, he demonstrated his wizardry in pursuing and cornering Union raiders under Col. Abel Streight in northern Alabama. Although outnumbered, Forrest bluffed the Federals into thinking they faced a larger force of Confederates, and they surrendered.

In the summer of 1863, Forrest performed the more traditional roles of screening and scouting for the Army of Tennessee. He performed well in the victory at Chickamauga from September 18 to 20 but vocally condemned what he perceived as the failure of Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg to pursue the retreating Federals adequately. He left the Army of Tennessee soon afterward.

Now operating in Mississippi, Forrest received a promotion to major general in December 1863. Throughout the spring and summer of 1864, he remained active in the region. In February, he defeated W. Sooy Smith in a running fight at Okolona, Mississippi. Then, in April, Forrest engaged in his most controversial military action when his men attacked and overwhelmed a garrison of Tennessee Unionists and African American troops defending Fort Pillow, north of Memphis. The isolated post proved little match for the Confederates, but in the latter stage of the fight Forrest lost control of his men, some of whom killed members of the Union garrison who should have been

spared. African American troops were the largest proportion of the fort's defenders who died in the engagement or its aftermath. The accusation that he had deliberately attempted to massacre the garrison remained with Forrest, although he vehemently denied them until his death.

Perhaps Forrest's greatest military feats came over the next several months when he crushed a much larger force of Union cavalry and infantry under Samuel D. Sturgis at Brice's Crossroads in June; deflected a powerful invasion force under Gen. Andrew J. Smith at Harrisburg or Tupelo in July; and turned back another strike by that general with a sudden dash into Memphis in August.

In the autumn of 1864, the Forrest and his cavalry finally moved against Union supply lines in northern Alabama and Tennessee. Forrest's operations around Johnsonville, Tennessee, in October and November, included the capture of two Union vessels that he converted temporarily into Confederate service and the destruction of an important Union supply center.

Forrest then joined John Bell Hood's 1864 Tennessee Campaign, helping to push the Federals under John M. Schofield out of Columbia, but failing to slam the door shut at Spring Hill on November 29. Following the disastrous Confederate charges at Franklin the next day, Hood detached Forrest to threaten the Fortress Rosecrans at Murfreesboro, while he lay before George H. Thomas's Federals at Nashville. Then, as the Confederate Army stumbled away from its shattering defeat on December 15–16, Hood called upon Forrest to provide a rearguard. He may have performed his best work in that capacity by saving the Army of Tennessee from total destruction.

Receiving a promotion to lieutenant general in February 1865, Forrest assumed command of cavalry in the Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana. Yet his efforts to build a credible defense fell before the Union juggernaut led by James H. Wilson in the spring of 1865 that culminated in the capture of Selma, Alabama. Forrest pulled the remnants of his command together, surrendering them at Gainesville, Alabama, in May.

In the postwar period, Forrest struggled to rebuild his personal fortune. Despite undertaking numerous business enterprises, the most significant being the presidency of the

Selma, Marion, and Memphis Railroad, he never regained his financial equilibrium. He also found himself struggling to achieve "Home Rule" for white Conservative Democrats, assuming the leadership of a developing secret organization, the Ku Klux Klan. He lived to see the end of Reconstruction, dying in Memphis on October 29, 1877.

Nathan Bedford Forrest emerged from the war with near-legendary status as a cavalry commander. Yet, unlike Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and Jeb Stuart, who became American as well as Southern heroes, Forrest remains almost uniquely associated with the white supremacist underpinnings of the Confederacy. His prewar slave-trading activities, wartime connection to Fort Pillow, and postwar affiliation with the Ku Klux Klan made this result almost inevitable. A massive equestrian statue of Forrest in Memphis regularly draws calls for its removal from the African American community, while a more recently erected statue of him in a private park outside Nashville drew criticism when it was unveiled in 1998.

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Civil War; Fort Pillow Massacre

—*Brian S. Wills*

Fort Pillow Massacre

Fort Pillow was constructed by the Confederates in 1861, as part of the Mississippi River defenses designed to protect Memphis, Tennessee. But the Confederates evacuated the post, located on a bluff 40 miles north of Memphis, in June 1862. Union forces eventually incorporated it into a series of outposts to protect communications and supply lines in the region and to suppress guerrilla activity and contraband trading. By 1864, the fort was not only a tangible example of the Union presence in the region, but also an inviting military target. Fort Pillow achieved notoriety for the events of April 12, 1864, when southern troops assaulted the works.

The post itself comprised three lines of defense. The two outer lines stretched for such a distance as to require thousands of men to hold them from a determined assault. In April 1864, however, the garrison, under the command of Maj. Lionel F. Booth, consisted of between 557 and 580 men. These troops divided roughly between the white Unionists of the 13th Tennessee Cavalry and the African American troops of the 6th U.S. Heavy Artillery and the 2nd U.S. Light Artillery. Tennessee Union Maj. William F. Bradford served as second in command.

With such a small force available, troops were concentrated in the innermost third line of defense, an earthwork whose semicircular parapet was approximately 125 yards long, standing between 6 and 8 feet high, and measuring 4 to 6 feet across. In addition, as an impediment to assault, a 12-foot wide and 6-to-8-foot deep trench lay between the earthworks and any foe striking from the landward face of the fort. A steep bluff dropped off at the rear of the work, descending to a landing below, while two significant ravines cut the ground on either side.

Although the closer of the two outer lines lay on higher ground than the fort itself, Booth had only enough men to use it as a picket line (i.e., for sentries). Perhaps he hoped to hold the fort with the six artillery pieces he had or the promise of assistance from the nearby Union gunboat, New Era. In any case, Booth expressed no concern about the garrison, telling his superior, Maj. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut, on April 3, that he considered Fort Pillow "perfectly safe." Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest had designs

on Fort Pillow, which he explained in an April 4 report: "There is a Federal force of 500 or 600 at Fort Pillow which I shall attend to in a day or two, as they have horses and supplies which we need."

Early on April 12, the first Confederates arrived before the fort under Gen. James Chalmers. Driving the Federals into the inner works, the southern troops took up positions and Chalmers began to deploy sharpshooters to pin down the defenders. Among the early casualties was the post commander, Lionel Booth, shot through the chest at about 9:00 A.M. as he stood near one of the fort's embrasures. Command devolved to Major Bradford, although he continued to use Booth's name in communications with the Confederates.

Forrest arrived at about 10:00 A.M. and immediately began to reconnoiter the ground personally, as was his habit. He repositioned some of the marksmen, placed others, and immediately recognized the advantage presented by the location of barracks outside the fort and between the defenders and his own men. Fire from the Union fort cost Forrest several mounts, which were wounded or killed beneath him. Too late the Federals understood that the barracks served them poorly by obstructing their fields of fire and providing cover for the advancing Confederates. Belated attempts to burn the buildings succeeded only in eliminating the row nearest to the fort before southern shots drove the Union troops back.

Confederate forces also began to take up positions in the two ravines, which would allow them to approach the fort while protecting them from rifle fire. The plan of attack included positioning themselves in a manner that would permit them to disrupt the withdrawal of the garrison to the landing below. At 3:30 P.M., Forrest called for the unconditional surrender of the Union troops. "The conduct of the officers and men garrisoning Fort Pillow has been such as to entitle them to being treated as prisoners of war," he began. Then, employing for effect a threat he had used since his successful raid against Murfreesboro, Tennessee, in July 1862, he warned, "Should my demand be refused, I cannot be responsible for the fate of your command."

Apparently hoping to buy time for reinforcements to arrive, Bradford asked for an hour to consider the demand. Undoubtedly concerned about just such a rescue, Forrest

shortened the time for deliberation to 20 minutes. After further negotiation, including a demand from the Confederate commander for "an answer in plain English, Yes or No," Bradford (speaking on behalf of Booth) declared that he would not surrender.

Forrest sent his men across the short distance toward the fort. Bruised and battered by the loss of his horses earlier in the day, he did not accompany the men, who burst over the earthworks even without his example to propel them. A volley caused the Federals to break. Although the Union plan for defense contained provision for the New Era to cover the retreat with canister fire, Bradford saw the situation deteriorating around him and called out, "Boys, save your lives." The fighting quickly became chaotic and confusing. Many of the Federals tried to surrender, while others ran for their lives or tried to return fire as they fell back.

Remaining at the middle earthworks, the Confederate commander could not maintain control of the fighting. Some of the southerners showed no mercy. The Federal casualties of 231 men killed and 100 wounded far surpassed the attacking Confederate losses of 14 killed and 86 wounded. The black troops of the garrison suffered most severely: more than 60 percent of the Union deaths were within the black troops. Of 226 total prisoners, the Southerners took only 58 African Americans captive.

In the aftermath of the assault, the northern press labeled the events at Fort Pillow a "massacre." The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War latched onto the outcome of the engagement as an election-year bonanza, gathering testimony of Confederate atrocities that it concluded were indicative of "a policy deliberately decided upon and unhesitatingly announced." For the remainder of his life, Forrest denied the existence of such a policy and that he had perpetuated a massacre of the garrison. His assertions that he and other officers did what they could to prevent unnecessary slaughter suggests strongly that such killing nevertheless took place.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Forrest, Nathan Bedford

—*Brian S. Wills*

442nd Regimental Combat Team of Nisei

As the United States turned to war in 1941 in the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, many Caucasian Americans, especially along the U.S. West Coast and in the Hawaiian Islands, questioned the loyalty of Japanese Americans. When the draft calls increased, the Selective Service System classified Japanese American males as 4C, or non-draftable as enemy aliens. Many Japanese and Japanese Americans living along the U.S. Pacific coast were forcibly removed inland to internment camps, a sign of the hysteria that affected America in the desperate days after December 7, 1941.

Prior to the outbreak of war, units of the Hawaiian Territorial Guard included soldiers of Japanese ancestry. In the immediate aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Gen. Delos C. Emmons, commanding general of the Army in Hawaii, dismissed all Japanese Americans from the 298th and 299th Guard Regiments. Many of the disappointed soldiers offered to serve in any capacity. These trained and patriotic Japanese Americans cleaned grounds, built new installations, and engaged in other noncombatant and often menial tasks. The U.S. Army soon reversed Emmons's policy, however, and on May 26, 1942, Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall established the Hawaiian Provisional Battalion. Soon thereafter, some 1,300 men traveled to the mainland for additional training. They were under the command of 29 Caucasian officers selected for their background in psychological observation because the Army still harbored some doubts about these soldiers' patriotism. Basic training of what was renamed the 100th Infantry Battalion continued into December 1942, although most soldiers had undergone training as part of the Hawaiian Territorial Guard.

In February 1943, the battalion moved from Camp McCoy in California to Camp Shelby in Mississippi as part of the 69th Infantry Division. Given the sterling record of the battalion, on February 1, 1943 Pres. Franklin Roosevelt announced formation of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team (RCT), comprised of Japanese Americans, to consist of a headquarters company, antitank and cannon companies, a medical detachment, the 100th Battalion, and combat engineers. The expanded unit achieved one of the great combat records in the U.S. Army during World War II.

Given the treatment of people of Japanese ethnicity in America during the war, it was remarkable that any young men of Japanese descent volunteered. These brave individuals wanted to demonstrate that they were as patriotic and as committed to American values as citizens of European ancestry, and they intended to prove they deserved the

rights of citizenship by their willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice for the nation.

Problems began to emerge during training, however. Tensions grew between the troops from the Hawaiian Islands and those who came from the mainland. But after the soldiers visited one of the relocation camps and recognized that white Americans regarded them similarly regardless of their regional backgrounds, the unit came together.

The 442nd Regimental Combat Team first went to Italy, leaving Camp Shelby on April 22, 1944, and arriving in Naples on May 28. The men first saw combat with German troops near Suvereto and Belvedere on the Ligurian coast. In September, the 442nd transferred to southern France to help carry out Operation Dragoon, the amphibious assault on southern France. In October and November, they moved up the Rhone River Valley and saw action in the Vosges Mountains, liberating Bruyeres. In their most celebrated action of the war, the Japanese American troops rescued the "lost battalion," the 141st Texas Regiment. On October 25, 1944, with little rest and in a cold rain, the 442nd launched the rescue operation by fighting some four miles up and down hills, across ravines, through minefields and roadblocks against more than 6,000 fresh German soldiers. By November 17, 1944, when the 442nd was finally relieved, it had saved 211 Texas troops but suffered more than 216 dead and 856 wounded—in just one regiment of approximately 1,500 men.

In the end, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team achieved a remarkable record of bravery in combat. Its soldiers earned some 18,000 awards, including 9,500 Purple Hearts, 52 Distinguished Service Crosses, 7 Distinguished Unit Citations, and 1 Congressional Medal of Honor. However, and sadly, when the men of the team returned to America, despite their remarkable record, they faced the same racism they had left. Communities welcomed them back with signs that read "No Japs Allowed" and "No Japs Wanted." And, much as African Americans in the South and Hispanics in the Southwest, they were often denied service in white-owned establishments.

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Related Entries

Japanese Americans, Internment of; World War II

Related Documents

1942 f

—*Charles M. Dobbs*

From Here to Eternity

Novel by James Jones, 1951
Film directed by Fred Zinneman, 1953

From Here to Eternity (1951) was the first and by far the best-known novel of a trilogy written by James Jones about the U.S. Army in the World War II era. It is considered by many to be one of the best novels to come out of the experience of that war.

Born in 1921, Jones turned to writing after an unhappy childhood and a checkered career in World War II, during which he was twice decorated for bravery but also twice demoted to buck private. *From Here to Eternity,* Jones's first novel, transformed him from an unknown into an instant literary celebrity before age 30. Jones spent the rest of his life writing and assisting struggling young authors. He died in 1977 much beloved and admired by his peers.

Jones's World War II trilogy is built around three characters: a sensitive and contemplative private, an accomplished and worldly wise company top sergeant, and a jaded but morally decent company head cook. Jones changed the

names and fates of his three archetypes in the later two works (*The Thin Red Line* [1958] and *Whistle* [completed after his death by lifelong friend Willie Morris in 1978]), but the theme remains the same: the struggle of the anonymous and the underprivileged against the impersonal inhumanity of modern society.

The private, named Robert E. Lee Prewitt in *From Here to Eternity*, is a faithful and hardworking soldier who has found his only home in the Army after a difficult adolescence during the Great Depression. When faced with the prospect of compromising with the favoritism that would allow him to pursue his great passion, playing the bugle, Prewitt gladly opts instead to return to straight duty as an infantryman. Matters worsen when his company commander, Captain "Dynamite" Holmes, wants Prewitt to join the company boxing team. Prewitt is a quick and powerful fighter who has given up the sport after injuring a friend in a freak accident while sparring, and he resists the pressure when Holmes encourages the company NCOs to administer "the treatment," a series of unfair punishments for Prewitt's imagined failures in his duties. With some help from fellow soldier Angelo Maggio, a thoroughly disgruntled draftee from Brooklyn, and Alma, a prostitute trying to earn her way to financial and emotional security, Prewitt endures, winning the grudging admiration of Milton Anthony Warden, the top sergeant, who becomes Prewitt's implicit benefactor. However, matters again worsen, and Prewitt eventually is sent, on falsified charges, to the base stockade, where he suffers under the Army's officially sponsored sadism. There he meets Jack Malloy, a fellow inmate but an iconic character through whose teachings the reader sees the parallels between the book's central characters and Jones's view of the history of American socialism: battered by the powers that be but philosophically triumphant in the end.

Warden experiences yet another form of oppression as the exploited underling of the career-climbing Captain Holmes. In an attempt to strike back at his commanding officer, Warden risks 20 years in a federal prison to conduct a torrid love affair with Holmes's wife. But he unexpectedly discovers in her a kindred spirit and the only true love of his life, and the star-crossed pair must endure the domination of the same man who torments Prewitt. Mahlon Stark, the cook, provides a balance between Prewitt and Warden by befriending both and helping each find the strength to defy their commander's abuse of the company to further his own career. Ultimately, Prewitt triumphs over his oppressors by maintaining his integrity in the face of the great suffering, and ultimately death, meted out to him by his beloved Army. Warden achieves his own victory by preserving his humanity and the company despite poor leadership and then war after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The novel was adapted to the screen by Daniel Taradash and directed by Fred Zinneman. The 1953 film featured Montgomery Clift and Burt Lancaster starring as Prewitt and Warden, respectively. Donna Reed as Alma and Frank Sinatra as Maggio were recognized with Academy Awards for their performances in supporting roles. The film was a commercial success mostly because of its star-studded cast, which also included Ernest Borgnine, Claude Akins, and Jack Warden, and the celebrated chemistry between Lancaster and Deborah Kerr as Sergeant Warden's adulterous mistress. But Taradash's screenplay portrayed the brutalities of Army life as the result of aberrant individuals rather than the product of institutionalized class oppression that had been aggravated by the Great Depression as Jones had depicted it in his novel. The movie version also glossed over or neglected altogether many of the seamier sides of Jones's story in its efforts to adhere to the standards of cinematic propriety in early Cold War America. For instance, Alma was converted from a prostitute to a dance hall girl, and the homosexual behavior in the original story was completely eliminated.

From Here to Eternity briefly and indirectly entered the public consciousness again a generation later with the publication of Mario Puzo's *The Godfather* (1969) and Francis Ford Coppola's screen adaptation of the same name (1972). These fictional recreations of a crime boss's career include a subplot in which the Mafioso don intervenes to secure a highly prized film role for his godson, who is a thinly disguised fictionalization of Frank Sinatra. The unnamed film role was reputedly that of Maggio in *From Here to Eternity.*

Jones's novel was praised for its passion and gritty realism, but Hollywood's reluctance to criticize the Army or portray American class conflict during the heyday of McCarthyism diluted the book's potential impact on the

American public. The movie, seen by a much larger audience than the book's readership, transformed Jones's story from a tale of individual struggles against oppressive forces to a saga of individual passions.

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Related Entries

Film and War; Literature and War; World War II

—*Mark P. Parillo*

Frontline Reporting

Sometimes called "history's first draft," journalism presents its stories to an audience contemporary to, directly affected by, and able to affect these events. Although reporting from the front lines may have little direct impact on the course of a war, frontline journalism does bring American civilians as close to battle as most of them will ever get. In addition, reports about the strengths or weaknesses of government policies that lead to war and reports of government failures to adequately provide for soldiers at the front have affected the policies of democratic states.

Early Frontline Reporting

As long as there have been wars, there has been reporting of some sort from the front lines. Initially, this "reporting" took the form of the battle memoirs of the participants. Repeated informally and in tribal ceremonies passed from generation to generation, the oral history of every early tribe and clan is dominated by legends of heroic warriors. Those who heard these stories had no basis for comparing their version of the facts with the perspectives of others. Equal time around the tribal fire was not given to an enemy

spokesman. Only centuries later were future generations able to compare and contrast competing written accounts of the battles. As literate societies began to emerge and as states began to build, accounts of battles and military campaigns were recorded in official documents and in the works of scholars. Of course, these accounts lacked the crucial immediacy that separates journalism from history.

In 1837 the advent of the modern telegraph, like many technologies that would follow, provided opportunities for journalists, but also brought new challenges for militaries and governments. Reporters' accounts from the front lines could reach readers within hours rather than weeks and months. With greater capabilities to report came demands for more reporting and increased competition between newspapers.

Tensions between reporters and the military also increased. Military leaders accused journalists of providing incomplete, sensational, and inaccurate reporting in their haste to increase readership. Furthermore, timely news reporting enabled the enemy and wavering allies to get the news equally quickly and could exploit that information to their advantage. During the Civil War, Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman considered all journalists suspect and threatened to shoot them, but is said to have sarcastically stated that if he had, "[W]e would have reports from Hell by breakfast."

In addition to providing greater immediacy, reporting from the Civil War highlights two other issues related to press coverage that continue to this day. First is the power of visual images. Mathew Brady's groundbreaking photos did not capture the battles in progress, but they did depict the death and destruction that followed. The second issue revolves around the power of the press to shape events. For example, until the battle of Antietam (September 17, 1862), European powers withheld extensive, visible support from the Confederacy, despite the costs of Union blockades of Southern ports to European economies. Most military historians now agree that from a tactical standpoint, Antietam was, at best, a draw. However, history's "first draft," spun by Pres. Abraham Lincoln from early press reports, convinced the British to remain neutral. Those same reports gave Lincoln the public consensus he felt he needed to sign the Emancipation Proclamation (September 22, 1862).

Frontline Journalism Ascendant: Spanish–American War to Korea

Just prior to the end of the 19th century, the dramatic growth of urban, industrial America resulted in the comparable growth of the American commercial newspaper industry. Until this time, many American newspapers were little more than extensions of various political interests. By the 1890s, American newspapers were major corporate powers. Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst commanded huge media empires, driven by competition for increased readership and advertising dollars from the growing business and industrial sector.

In 1898, Hearst, sensing the potential for dramatic news in a swelling rebellion against Spanish rule in Cuba, began publishing lurid and sensational—and often erroneous—stories about Spanish actions against the Cuban uprising. In one legendary incident (whose accuracy is still somewhat in question), Hearst dispatched a correspondent to Santiago, who cabled back that while he could provide many pictures of Cuba's tropical beauty, there was no war. Hearst replied: "You supply the pictures; I'll supply the war." When war did occur, the dramatic and heroic reports of events such as the battle of San Juan Hill (July 1, 1898) and the defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila (May 1, 1898) were represented in hyperpatriotic terms with little regard for objectivity and accuracy.

Coverage of World War I (1914–18) depended on the nature of the press in each country, but, for the most part, the press viewed itself as an extension of the nation, and reporting was, accordingly, very patriotic and heavily censored. As the war dragged on and hundreds of thousands of soldiers were killed in ultimately futile struggles for limited gains, the earlier supportive press coverage clashed profoundly with the realities experienced by the citizens of those nations whose lands were battlefields.

American press coverage, however, was virtually the reverse. At first quick to reinforce American isolationism, the media then fueled outrage over Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare. In this way, reporting first delayed America's entry into the war (until April 6, 1917), then accelerated American intervention in the final year of the conflict.

By the end of World War I, political dissent had found a voice in its own press through increasingly popular journals such as *The Masses*. While the readership was largely confined to those who already shared the views of the editors and writers, some of the most dramatic and accurate frontline battlefield coverage of the war was provided by antiwar writers such as John Reed. Reed's unflinching reports of the horrors of early fighting in the Balkans and his dramatic account of the Russian Revolution (1917) were among some of the best writing of that era.

After the war ended, the American press quickly revived prewar isolationist opinion. The public now questioned the very rationale for the war. That isolationism outweighed the increasing reports of the fascist threat in Europe and Japanese militarism in the Far East.

A new generation of war correspondents began to emerge in the 1930s with battlefield accounts from the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), Italy's invasion of Ethiopia (1935–36), and Japan's conquest of China (1931–45). Ernest Hemingway's reports from Spain, Theodore White's reports from China, and Robert Capa's photographs from throughout the world did little to alter American public opinion. The public filtered these well-written, timely, and dramatic accounts through existing attitudes and beliefs. Where journalists saw their reporting as a warning about the need to confront evil before it grew further, most Americans saw these reports as a reaffirmation of the need to remain isolated from traditional conflicts in Europe and in Asia.

In the 1920s and 1930s, radio changed the nature of war coverage just as the telegraph and the advent of modern photography had in earlier years. The best-known example is Edward W. Murrow's reports from London during the early years of World War II before America's entry. As German bombers pounded London and other major British cities, Murrow broadcast from the roof of his studio. He captured the sounds of aircraft, of explosions, of sirens, as he intoned his famous tagline: "This [pause] is London." Murrow's reports and similar broadcasts helped raise public support for American arms sales and the lend-lease of weapons and equipment for the beleaguered British. In the wake of Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), those sympathies, combined with the sense of outrage, helped quickly mobilize the American public.

Frontline coverage of World War II (1939–45) was extensive but still not always timely. Even with radio, audiences did not hear news reporting in real time. Although timelier than in previous conflicts, stories were heavily censored by military officials and often delayed to ensure secrecy. Reporters covering the war were placed under strict military control, including the wearing of uniforms.

With these significant restrictions, reporters accompanied troops into battle. They flew missions with bomber crews and parachuted with airborne troops. A number were killed while reporting with units in the field. In addition to Edward R. Murrow, many others achieved significant public acclaim. Some, Walter Cronkite among them, went on to long and distinguished careers after the war. The most famous newspaper journalist of World War II was Ernie Pyle. He published numerous stories that centered on individual soldiers rather than on larger strategic issues or the details of battle. He was killed in the final months of the war while accompanying U.S. Army units near Okinawa.

Following World War II, journalists turned their attention to the Cold War (1945–91). Nuclear weapons deterred the two superpowers from all-out war, but many smaller conflicts needed press coverage. Some of these wars received extensive press coverage because troops were involved in efforts to maintain control over former colonies, as was the case of the British in Malaya (1948–60) and the French in Indochina (1945–54) and Algeria (1954–62). Western troops also took part in efforts to stop what were seen as proxy wars supported by the Soviet Union to extended the political control of communism. These conflicts included the Greek Civil War (1944–49), the Korean War (1950–53), and a number of other wars in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.

Covering these wars was extremely difficult for journalists. They were often not officially allowed to report on events in these combat zones. In some instances they were targeted by one or both sides and killed. The job of journalists was made even more difficult by the isolated and often primitive locations, by barriers of language and culture, and by limited access to technology—such as telephone and telegraph—needed to ensure timely reporting.

Beginning in the 1950s, television played an increasing role in the coverage of war. The Korean War was the first

The popularity of Edward R. Murrow's on-the-scene reporting during World War II was put to use during the Korean War when, in 1951, CBS sent him to report from the front. (Getty Images)

televised conflict. Initially, the impact of this new technology was very limited. Few American households had televisions, and newscasts were initially only 15 minutes. In other nations, including other industrialized democracies, access to television was even more limited and often tightly controlled by the government. The existing technology was too cumbersome to allow for true immediacy in the coverage of battlefield events. The television reportage was little more than an extension of movie newsreels.

The Press Versus the Military: Vietnam and Its Impact

Throughout the 1960s, the Vietnam War (1964–75) dominated the news. In the years since, historians and journalists have stressed the importance of television in the outcome of that war. One common phrase used is "the living room war."

Growing opposition to the war was blamed on television coverage, particularly coverage of combat and American casualties. In fact, actual coverage of combat was a small fraction of the television news reporting from Vietnam. Broadcasts from battlefields were taped and no timelier than most newspaper coverage. Public opinion polls did not reflect a significant impact from press coverage. Negative press coverage of the war followed rather than led public opinion.

Although press coverage did not affect the war's outcome, reporters' conduct on the battlefield set an important precedent. Unlike past wars, where access to the battlefield was restricted, reporters in Vietnam were relatively free to accompany units into the field if they were willing to take the risk. In the following 25 years, reporters have pressed for the same access to the battlefield that they enjoyed in Vietnam. Government officials, however, argued that the probing reports "lost" the Vietnam War and that domestic political support could not be maintained if the press had unfettered access.

After the failure to cooperate with the press during the intervention in Grenada (1983), the American government promised to establish better procedures for future conflicts. Under a proposed pooling system, a limited number of reporters, photographers, and broadcast crew members would accompany the military during the initial phases of any combat operations. The military would benefit by limiting the number of journalists it had to accommodate and would also maintain better operational security by isolating those select reporters just prior to deployment. The press would benefit by ensuring access to the battlefield in a more secure manner than if they were attempting to both report from and survive in the combat zone.

An additional benefit was the basic battlefield survival training the military provided to the press to ensure that they did not endanger themselves or the troops they were accompanying. Key to the success of this arrangement was the agreement by those selected for the pool to share their reports with those reporters left behind. This arrangement, hammered out after long negotiations, appeared to be the perfect balance of security, efficiency, and press access.

When the United States invaded Panama in 1989 and again during the Persian Gulf War (1991), the American government failed to live up to its part of the agreement. Not all reporters were notified; those few who did get advance word were not allowed to accompany troops and were often restricted to receiving official briefings after military actions were concluded. In all of these instances, the legacy of the mistrust between the military and the press stemming from the Vietnam experience was clear.

The Global Village: Post–Gulf War Conflicts

In the late 20th century, a combination of events signaled a coming change in the way war was reported. First was a change in the nature of warfare. The Gulf War had been a return to the kind of large, complex military operation that the press had covered in the two world wars, in Korea, and in Vietnam. During the Cold War, the many small conflicts were mostly extensions of the political struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now, without constraint and control by the superpowers, long-standing ethnic, regional, and sectarian clashes reemerged in many areas of the world. Reporters covering these wars did not have to seek access to the battlefield through powerful established government agencies. As a result, journalists flocked to places like the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and other scenes of bloody warfare. But the absence of government restrictions also meant the absence of a government safety net. Reporters were operating in lawless, anarchic environments, where journalists were, at best, accorded no special status or, worse, viewed as spies and agitators. Furthermore, journalists covering these conflicts often struggled to understand their larger context and contemporary motivations now that Cold War rules no longer seemed to apply.

New technologies again altered the tools of the journalist's trade. Broadcast journalism no longer involved cumbersome equipment requiring many skilled crewmembers to obtain footage that would be viewed hours later. Now, a reporter with a minicam and a satellite connection could broadcast events in real time. Cell phone technology allowed print journalists in virtually every location in the world to feed their eyewitness accounts direct to their publications without having to make their way to the nearest telegraph service office.

Another new information technology also undercut the unique role of the journalist. News of the Tiananmen Square

massacre in China (June 1989) reached the outside world through the Internet rather than by conventional media channels. Individuals with computer access had done what professional journalists, with all the resources of their television networks and newspapers, could not. The tragedy of September 11, 2001, brought an additional change to journalism. For the first time since the American Civil War, American civilians were under attack, and their fellow citizens watched in real time the events of that day. Journalists no longer had the exclusive opportunity to see and report events to a distant public. With the Internet, everyone now had the potential to provide their observations and their commentary to a wide audience.

Finally, the commercial nature of traditional journalism had significantly changed by the end of the 20th century. Major urban areas that once had multiple, competing newspapers now had perhaps one daily newspaper. Television had gone from three major networks to an explosion of channels delivered by cable or satellite dish. Television viewers often had their choice of more than 300 channels. Television news coverage had also become more heavily commercialized. Federal Communication Commission regulations no longer required some form of newscast as a public service responsibility of every television network. Networks now judged the success or failure of their news operations by commercial rather than journalistic standards. Traditional competition to get the important story right was replaced by competition to get the sensational story right now.

The number of people who watched any news sharply declined. Networks increasingly catered primarily to the audiences' preexisting ideologies and beliefs. Viewers, in turn, sought news from outlets that confirmed their existing views. This was the media landscape at the beginning of the war on terror (2001). The failures of the earlier pool system and government concerns about the importance of timely reporting as a means of maintaining public support led to a new technique for providing press coverage during the war in Iraq (2003).

Termed embedding, journalists were assigned to specific military units and remained with those units throughout combat operations. They voluntarily agreed to self-censor any information that would reveal operational secrets and endanger the success or safety of troop units in the field. Journalists could broadcast events in real time. While journalists did not have the freedom to move from unit to unit as they had in Vietnam, they had direct frontline access and the ability to do unrestricted reporting to a degree never before enjoyed by reporters.

The result was visually stunning images and gripping accounts; however, as many journalists and viewers discovered, the immediacy of battlefield reporting—while dramatic—provides little in the way of the larger context. Professional journalism also proved to be less essential than expected for the public's access to frontline battlefield events. Individual soldiers with digital cameras, cell phones, and laptop computers transmitted their own personal accounts. In past conflicts, letters from the front lines were normally heavily censored, long delayed in arrival, and kept as the exclusive property of the addressee. Now, these email accounts and photos could be shared on the Internet and forwarded many times over in a fraction of the time that a conventional letter or photo could be transmitted by surface mail. In one significant event that ultimately had ripple effects on domestic and international public opinion, digital photos of American soldiers abusing prisoners of war in Iraq were widely circulated and posted on the Internet long before journalists published the story.

Throughout history, coverage of war has been affected by the conduct of warfare, information technology, and the changing nature of mass media. Beginning with the war in Iraq in 2003, battles could now be seen with greater immediacy by a wider audience. Despite the powerful images and broader audience, little clear evidence has emerged that such news coverage can create new opinions or change existing ones. Furthermore, these small glimpses of isolated events do little to provide the broader context and strategic perspective that citizens of democratic nations require to intelligently contribute to the most significant and dangerous decision a nation is called on to make.

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Related Entries

Censorship and the Military; CNN; Combat-Zone Photography; Media and War; Newsreels; Office of Censorship; Propaganda and Psychological Operations; Radio Free Europe; Voice of America

Related Documents

1944 a; 1950 c

—*Jay M. Parker*

Fulbright Program

The end of World War II caused many of the world's citizens to pause and consider the horrible carnage, waste, and expense of the war. Several organizations were formed to secure a future in which wars of such magnitude could be avoided. The United Nations was created in 1945, and the year before that, a new International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the "World Bank") was established. In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) united Canada and the United States with many European nations in a mutual effort to secure the freedom and safety of the North Atlantic community. All of these organizations sought to promote peace through cooperation and better understanding of other cultures and countries. With the dramatic decline in European empires worldwide, and the equally dramatic emergence of the Soviet Union and the United States into postwar prominence, a diverse, competitive world order would require all the mutual understanding possible to help maintain peace.

One of these citizens of the world in this postwar period was James William Fulbright. Born in Missouri, reared in somewhat parochial northwestern Arkansas in a moderately prominent banking family, Fulbright attended the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville, where he established a record of solid B grades and more solid athletics, and gained widespread respect, sufficient to be elected student body president in 1923. Despite these modest credentials, Fulbright managed to be selected as a Rhodes Scholar, sending him to Oxford University in 1924. (Fulbright later admitted no truly outstanding candidates were on the list of applicants that year.) This seminal experience of traveling and studying in England, which was still recovering from the effects of World War I, was later to bear fruit by the creation of the international educational and cultural exchange program that bears Fulbright's name.

Following Oxford, where Fulbright obtained a master's degree, he returned to the United States and George Washington University in Washington, D.C., where he earned a law degree. At the age of 34, he was elected to the presidency of the University of Arkansas, making him the country's youngest university president. This appointment reflected Fulbright's accomplishments and credentials as a young man; in addition, it portended his lifelong interest in international public education.

FULBRIGHT PROGRAM

Elected to the House of Representatives as a Democrat in November 1942 and to the Senate two years later, Fulbright became aware at the conclusion of World War II in 1945 that surplus equipment and matériel already in Europe that was to be sold to the victorious European allies would yield a significant amount of "found money"—money that had already been budgeted, spent, and which subsequently would be returned to the U.S. Treasury. Senator Fulbright was convinced that part of the cause of the war was the widespread ignorance of differing peoples and cultures among all the combatants, including the United States. His Rhodes scholarship to Oxford had diluted his Arkansas parochialism and encouraged a wider perspective. Fulbright maneuvered to get this money committed to improving international understanding through an exchange program. Some U.S. State Department personnel expressed misgivings that the exchanges would provide an easy conduit for "Comintern" infiltrators to enter the United States. Some Republican senators expressed antipathies to renewed "internationalism" after such lengthy American involvement in European affairs. Nonetheless, Fulbright managed to steer his proposal through the Congress. Despite Pres. Harry Truman's private sentiments about "Senator Halflbright" as an "overeducated S.O.B.," Truman signed the legislation into law, creating the exchange program.

About 50 years after its inception, the Fulbright Program has become perhaps the most visible, prestigious, and widely acclaimed U.S. educational and cultural exchange program. Administered by the U.S. State Department and renewed with annual appropriations by the U.S. Congress of approximately $125 million, the program is supplemented by participant foreign countries with almost 20 percent additional funding. These monies are used for additional tuition grants, housing, salary supplements, and other support to U.S. scholars. The program enjoys broad bipartisan support and is never challenged except as a budgetary item that must compete with other federal priorities in both fat and lean times. Almost 100,000 "Fulbrighters" from the United States, and 160,000 individuals from another 140 countries, have now participated. Approximately 4,500 new grants are awarded via a competitive process each year. Within academic communities in the United States and abroad, a certain distinction attaches to a recipient of a Fulbright. Considering how isolationist the United States was before World War II and its subsequent assumption of "Free World" leadership following the war, the Fulbright Program has been of immeasurable importance in fostering understanding among nations and cultures. It has institutionalized the annual exchange of scholars and future leaders, "advertised" American academic and political cultures to receptive, newly independent countries, while broadening the quality of international understanding within the United States.

As with other U.S.-government-sponsored international programs—notably the Peace Corps—fears, particularly during the Cold War, have been expressed that the program would be used by the United States as a mechanism for intelligence operatives to spy—the reverse of early State Department worries of "Comintern" infiltration of the United States. Senator Fulbright was one of those who worried, and he fought to ensure that U.S. intelligence operatives were kept out of the program Such efforts have been rewarded; the Fulbright Program continues to attract highly qualified, serious scholars and students both to the United States and to other countries. The United States and the world are richer in mutual understanding and appreciation because of Senator Fulbright's vision.

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Related Entries

American Field Service; Cold War; Radio Free Europe; World War II

—Jeffrey A. James

G

Gays and Lesbians in the Military

The meanings attached to homosexual behaviors have been subject to a series of changing social constructions and ideologies in the modern era. Like sex itself, homosexuality has undergone a transformation from an intimate and private activity to a behavior that is increasingly part of a public and political discourse. Changing social perceptions and their political consequences have, in part, been the result of the application of behavioral models to public policy. During the 1950s, a medical model posited that homosexual behavior was part of a faulty developmental pattern and was used as a justification to remove homosexuals from government or military service. In other periods when homosexuality was considered to be innate, the rationale for policies that excluded or punished lesbians and gay men was less clear.

After World War II, the growth of a gay subculture became one of the notable social developments in America. The rise of a gay and lesbian milieu was not only an indication that the incidence of openly homosexual behaviors had increased in the United States, but that the rhetoric of maladjustment and treatment had given way to a discourse focused upon the rights and responsibilities of citizenship—including the duty of military service.

Practice and Policy, 1917–45

Several marked shifts in accepted understandings of homosexuality have occurred since 1900. The historical view of homosexuals as criminals was already on the wane; by the 1920s, early attempts at defining homosexuality as being biologically determined gave way to theories suggesting that the behavior was part of an abnormal developmental pattern. Like legal, medical, or theological professionals, military authorities were confronted with new paradigms concerning homosexual activity. Despite growing acceptance of homosexuality as an innate characteristic, however, self-professed gay men and lesbians would continue to be diagnosed as mentally ill or maladjusted well into the second half of the 20th century; openly homosexual men were thereby deemed unfit for service, unreliable security risks, and inherently disruptive to the ongoing operation of the armed services.

Before World War II, the American military did not have any uniform procedure for handling men accused of sodomy. While in theory all sodomists were to be court-martialed, in practice, men were administratively discharged, allowed to resign their commissions, or, in cases where evidence was insufficient to convict, returned to service.

During World War II, authorities debated the policies and practices surrounding homosexual activity, in part because of the widespread variance in the deposition of individual cases within the service. Military leadership of this era was more willing to accept the professional expertise of medical personnel concerning these behaviors—and in the medical profession, the notion of homosexuality as an illness rather than a crime was gaining popularity. Thus, the utility of incarcerating or segregating homosexuals was called into question.

Over the course of the war, military policy concerning homosexuality underwent several important changes. First and most important, the term homosexual had largely replaced the term sodomist, although the legal ramifications of same-sex behaviors were neither eliminated nor elucidated. People who engaged in same-sex behaviors could be separated from the service through

forced resignation or by administrative discharge. Even if no sexual activity had occurred, a growing body of policy supported the conceptualization of a "homosexual personality," who was to be barred at induction or separated upon discovery. Also during this period, the military definition of homosexuality was extended to women engaged in same-sex behavior.

While policies were designed to exclude or separate gay men and lesbians from service, most homosexuals served their hitch without disciplinary action. Indeed, the widespread mobilization of men and women gave rise to single-sex environments where many gay men and lesbians recognized their affectionate preferences for the first time. The emergence of a gay subculture within the armed services during World War II gave rise to parallel intelligence operations aiming to systematically identify, prosecute, and remove homosexual members from the service. As servicemen and women could be discharged for perceived tendencies as well as observed behaviors, an incentive developed to identify and prosecute homosexuals and lesbians who had previously gone undetected.

Postwar Developments: 1945–80

Following World War II, developmental rationales for homosexuality were undermined by groundbreaking surveys revealing that homosexuality was far more widespread in American society than previously believed. As economic and demographic trends quickened the pace of urbanization, and as the rhetoric of civil rights and feminism emerged, gay and lesbian activists tentatively began to challenge exclusionary policies as well as overarching social ostracism.

In 1949, the Department of Defense issued a memorandum that unified military policy. While still allowing each branch to develop its own regulations, the memorandum reiterated the belief that lesbians and gay men posed security risks and were unsuitable for service. Military actions were part of a larger political environment that increasingly systematized the prosecution of homosexuals. Like communists, homosexuals were singled out as security risks. In 1950, a Senate subcommittee issued a report, Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government. In 1953, Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10450, codifying sexual perversion as grounds for dismissal from federal employment.

Military analysts would later conclude that many of the Cold War rationales for excluding gay and lesbians were unjustified. In 1957, the Navy's Crittenden Report exposed the belief that homosexuals were greater security risks than their heterosexual counterparts as a red herring with little basis in fact and argued additionally that the widely held perception that gay men and lesbians acted as sexual predators had no basis in empirical data. The authors of the report did not favor the retention of confirmed homosexuals but acknowledged that the elimination of all those who might possibly have homosexual tendencies was probably an unworkable solution. By recommending an end to separation proceedings for those who exhibited proclivities rather than engaging in overt behaviors, the report further suggested that people accused of quasi-criminal behavior had the right to some form of due process.

The Crittenden Report's recommendations went unheeded and the procedures of accusation, interrogation, and separation of homosexuals from service continued. After the Vietnam War, however, a series of court cases challenged standard procedures, with service members bringing each branch to court. Three benchmark cases set the tone for U.S. military policy toward homosexuals: for the Navy, *Berg v. Claytor* (1977), *Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force* (1978), and *ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army* (1980). In each instance, the plaintiff argued that his or her conduct negated the military's assumption that homosexuality was incompatible with military service. In each case, the plaintiff eventually left the service after unsuccessfully challenging existing policy. These lawsuits, however, helped redefine rationales for excluding gay men and lesbians from service. Rather than upholding moral standards, separating the criminal from the innocent, or removing security risks, the basis for military policy now rested upon the proposition that a homosexual was incapable of efficiently completing her or his duties because of the lack of respect she or he would receive from her or his compatriots. Given the deference accorded the military by civil courts, challenges invoking due process or equal protection arguments found little success.

Sgt. Leonard Matlovich on the cover of the September 8, 1975, issue of Time *magazine. His was one of benchmark cases in easing military policy toward gays in the military. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)*

Don't Ask: After 1981

In 1981, the Department of Defense issued Directive 1332.14, making military policy on homosexuals uniform across all services. Perhaps the most startling aspect of the new policy was the working definition of a homosexual as " . . . a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." Rather than being perceived as a behavioral flaw, homosexuality was being recast as an integral part of an individual's identity, analogous to race, gender, or ethnicity.

By the early 1980s, American politics and culture at large had also been altered by the emergence of a gay and lesbian subculture. Rather than accepting the judgments of some psychiatric or some religious spokespeople that their conditions were deviant or morally wrong, lesbians and gay men began to challenge institutional frameworks that discriminated against them.

As had occurred during World War II, intelligence operations aimed at rooting out homosexuals expanded alongside the emerging gay and lesbian subculture within the military. According to the General Accounting Office, there were 16,919 discharges for homosexuality within the armed services between 1980 and 1991, 1.7 percent of all involuntary discharges in the Department of Defense for this period. On average, more than 1,400 service personnel were separated per year for homosexuality.

The year 1993 was a watershed in the history of homosexuals in the military. Pres. Bill Clinton directed Sec. of Defense Leslie (Les) Aspin to draft an executive order ending discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the armed forces. However, insufficient political, cultural, or military support existed for total acceptance of openly gay soldiers. The result was a compromise policy referred to as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue." This policy stated that homosexual orientation would not disqualify anyone from service unless they engaged in homosexual conduct, that homosexuality could not be the basis of separation proceedings unless it impeded suitability for service, and that investigations could not be initiated solely to determine sexual orientation.

The decade following the adoption of Clinton's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was characterized by confusion and backlash within the services, as conflicting signals were telegraphed to gay and lesbian service members as to whether disclosure would end their careers. Contradictory research reports either supported the belief that openly gay corps members impeded unit cohesion or, alternatively, posed no real threat to combat readiness. According to an advocacy group for gay and lesbian service members, the number of separations from service predicated upon orientation dropped in the decade following the policy's adoption. When compared with the earlier numbers compiled by the General Accounting Office, however, harassment of gay soldiers continued to be commonplace. Proponents of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" advocated its continued enforcement by arguing that the ban preserved privacy rights. A policy based on nondisclosure would ensure that heterosexual service members remained unaware of the sexual proclivities of their fellow soldiers, sailors, and corps members.

By 2003, 24 other nations, including Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and Israel had eliminated their bans on openly gay and lesbian troops without appreciable impact on readiness, conduct, or unit cohesion.

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Related Entries

Civil–Military Relations; Cold War; Vietnam War; Women in the Military; World War II

—*Timothy J. Haggerty*

Gender

See Women in the Military.

General Orders, No. 100

Published by the U.S. War Department in the middle of the Civil War, General Orders, No. 100 is regarded by many historians as the world's first official set of ethical guidelines about military conduct in the field. It is credited with influencing the subsequent development of international law about the rules of war.

The driving force behind General Orders, No. 100 was Francis Lieber, a German American professor of law at Columbia College (now Columbia University). In August 1862, Union general in chief Henry W. Halleck asked Lieber for his views on guerrilla warfare. Lieber obliged him with a thick manuscript that, predictably given both his strong pro-Union sympathies and the existing laws and customs of war, stacked the deck against guerrilla tactics. According to Lieber, "Partisans"—officially authorized troops who merely adopted irregular tactics—were entitled to be treated as ordinary belligerents only if they carried their weapons openly and wore distinguishing identification (such as armbands). But "self-constituted guerrillas"—i.e., nearly all of them—were simply "freebooters," "brigands," or "assassins," and entitled to nothing but execution. Halleck thanked Lieber for the treatise and ordered 5,000 copies for distribution to the Union Army. The treatise provided legal justification for the retaliatory tactics that Union field commanders had already begun to adopt.

In November 1862 Lieber wrote Halleck urging creation of a comprehensive set of guidelines for Union armies. Halleck responded by creating a committee consisting of Lieber and four generals, but the generals let Lieber do all the work. The result, published by the adjutant general's office on April 24, 1863, as General Orders, No. 100, was entitled, "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field." It ran to 9,000 words and was divided into 10 sections. Six of these addressed guerrilla activity, flags of truce, surrender, prisoner exchange, and the like. Another condemned "assassination," proclaiming a combatant or individual to be an "outlaw" and authorizing his death without due process. The rest covered such broad issues as military necessity, protection of noncombatants, war crimes, and the definition of insurrection, civil war, and rebellion.

"Military necessity," the code asserted, "consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war," and specifically included "all destruction of property . . . and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the Army." Citizens of an enemy country, it continued, were themselves enemies, and as such were subject to "the hardships of the war" (Hartigan, 48, 49).

Noncombatants were to be protected in their persons and "strictly private property" but this rule did not interfere with "the right of the victorious invader to tax the people or their property, to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, lands, boats or ships, and the churches, for temporary and military uses" (Hartigan, 52).

In its definition of the terms insurrection, civil war, and rebellion, the order explained that a rebellion was "an insurrection of large extent, and is usually a war between the legitimate government of a country and portions of provinces of the same who seek to throw off their allegiance to it and set up a government of their own" (Hartigan, 70). For that reason, in the parlance of General Orders, No. 100, the Civil War is officially known as "The War of the Rebellion."

General Orders, No. 100 called for military commanders to distinguish between loyal and disloyal citizens and to divide the disloyal into two further classes: "citizens known to sympathize with the rebellion without positively aiding it, and those who, without taking up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without being bodily forced thereto" (Hartigan, 71). This threefold division between loyal, neutral or passive, and actively disloyal citizens had already begun to emerge among Union military authorities, but the order made it official government policy for the first time. It called upon each commander to "throw the burden of the war, as much as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens," and authorized them to "expel, transfer, imprison, or fine the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to the government" (Hartigan, 71).

For all its subsequent fame, General Orders, No. 100, attracted surprisingly little attention at the time of its issuance. Generals, including Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Philip H. Sheridan, based their well-known destruction of Confederate property on the same laws and customs of war from which Lieber distilled the code, but they did so without direct reference to it. The order states that it was "approved by the president," which implies that it crossed Abraham Lincoln's desk, but, in fact, the phrase was legal boilerplate. Nothing in Lincoln's extensive presidential papers suggests that he ever saw it, or, if he did, commented upon it. In any event, the War Department had already published a general order encouraging the use or destruction of rebel property in August 1862 (and, unlike Lieber's Code, it is known that Lincoln was both aware of and in favor of the order). The destruction of enemy property lay within the already recognized limits of the laws and customs of war as laid out by the Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel in *The Law of Nations* (1758).

Comparing Vattel's chapters on war and Lieber's Code, however, reveal a striking difference in tone. Vattel tended to demarcate the limits of what a commander might legitimately do and then offer reasons why an enlightened commander would do less. The code created by Lieber typically established similar limits but his rhetoric invited commanders to be as tough as possible within those limits. "The more vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity," he argued. "Sharp wars are brief" (Hartigan, 50).

A month after his code was published as General Orders, No. 100, Lieber wrote Halleck with satisfaction, "I think the No. 100 will do honor to the country. It will be adopted as a basis for similar works by the English, French, and Germans. It is a contribution by the U.S. to the stock of common civilization" (Hartigan, 108). Subsequent events proved him correct. Its language greatly influenced such efforts as the Hague and Geneva conventions to create restraints on war.

The code also remained official U.S. policy long after the end of the Civil War. The original version of General Orders, No. 100 governed the U.S. Army during the Spanish–American and Philippine wars. A new field manual adopted in 1914 incorporated everything from the original code that remained relevant after the passage of a half century and echoes of the code lingered even in the 1940 field manual on the laws of war used by the U.S. Army during World War II.

Even if they have never heard of Francis Lieber, most Americans probably assume that the United States honors the rules of war, fights according to those rules, and wouldn't be surprised to learn that, through Lieber's Code, their nation played a significant role in shaping the modern rules of war. Yet one might understandably be shocked to learn that when U.S. commanders needed to take harsher measures against Filipino guerrillas (insurrectos) during the Philippine War, their solution was not to dispense with Lieber's Code but rather to invoke adherence to the letter of it; when it came to guerrilla warfare, the code was very strict. Coupled with the code's expansive definition of "military necessity," the antiguerrilla provisions opened the door to a very harsh policy. Noncombatants were concentrated into zones where they could be kept under surveillance. Food found outside the zones was to be captured or confiscated, and people found outside the zones were to be captured or killed. The number of Filipino civilians who died as a result of such policies is conservatively estimated at 200,000. Whatever its place in the history of modern international law, the Filipino people have no reason to feel grateful to Francis Lieber or his code.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Geneva and Hague Conventions; Just War Theory; Philippine War; Spanish–American War

Related Documents

1863 h; 1950 d

—Mark Grimsley

Geneva and Hague Conventions

Throughout history and across the world, warring parties have recognized restraints on the conduct of hostilities. By the end of the 20th century, two distinct yet closely related bodies of law had emerged, one known as Geneva law, for the protection of war victims, and one known as Hague law, dealing with means and methods of warfare. American politicians and military personnel have long been at the forefront of developing and promoting these laws. They played a leading role in the drafting of the most important treaties on the law of war—the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention.

Initial Developments

From early in its history, the United States was a leader in the development of rules to govern the conduct of war. In 1785, Benjamin Franklin and Frederick the Great of Prussia concluded a treaty of friendship and commerce that also codified principles for the conduct of war. The treaty is credited with being one of the first international agreements to contain such principles in written form. During the Civil War, the War Department approved the drafting of General Orders No. 100, the first official guidelines on the use of armed force and the proper treatment of prisoners and enemy civilians.

In 1864, several European states drafted the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, a treaty aimed at protecting

victims of armed conflict in distinction to restricting the means and methods of warfare. The convention grew out of the efforts of a Swiss businessman, J. Henri Dunant, who also inspired the creation of what became the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The 1864 Geneva Convention was followed by additional conferences and discussions, culminating in the major agreements reached in the two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The 1899 conference adopted various declarations prohibiting the use of certain weapons, as well as Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land that included an annex of regulations on the conduct of land warfare. In 1907, the 1899 conventions were modified and additional conventions and declarations were added. The annex on land warfare became part of Hague Convention IV of 1907. The preamble of both Hague II of 1899 and Hague IV of 1907 contains what is known as the Martens Clause, a progressive and binding set of principles applicable in all warfare and requiring "respect for the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience."

The 20th Century

At the outbreak of World War I, the Geneva and Hague conventions formed the basic law binding on the major belligerents. Nevertheless, the conventions were widely violated. In response, the victorious allies, including the United States, added a requirement to the Treaty of Versailles that those who had violated the law of war among the defeated states be tried and punished, including Germany's kaiser. The kaiser evaded trial by fleeing to the Netherlands. The Germans did hold a few trials at Leipzig and handed out a few mild sentences, but generally the obligation to hold accountable those who had committed war crimes was ignored by all sides.

The most determined response to the violations of World War I was a major new effort to improve Hague and Geneva law. In the area of Hague law, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan agreed in the 1922 Washington Convention to the first phase of naval disarmament. The year 1923 saw the adoption of the nonbinding Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare. In 1925, the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of

Warfare was adopted. In the area of Geneva law, in 1929 some nations adopted the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners and the Geneva Convention for the Relief of Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field. The ICRC also began developing a convention to protect civilians in time of war, but World War II broke out before the draft could be submitted to a diplomatic conference.

Some notable examples exist of compliance with the Geneva and Hague conventions during World War II. Certainly, British and American prisoners of war in Germany generally received treatment commensurate with the 1929 convention, as did German prisoners in British and American hands. Nevertheless, both sides could also be accused of widespread disregard of the rules. The indictment of the major war criminals at the end of the war, mostly drawn up by the United States, cited violations of the Hague and Geneva conventions as the basis for trials at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and other places after the war.

As in the aftermath of World War I, a major effort was made after World War II to thoroughly revise the law. This time, however, the focus was on Geneva law alone. Calls were made to reform Hague law, but no comprehensive effort was made, perhaps because no single state or organization considered itself the guardian of Hague law, as Switzerland considers itself the guardian of Geneva law. Still, the various arms control treaties, such as those banning chemical weapons, biological weapons, landmines, and environmental modification techniques, can be considered part of Hague law and through these treaties the effort continues to regulate the means and methods of warfare.

As to Geneva law, the Swiss government convened a diplomatic conference to thoroughly revise and improve the existing conventions. In 1949, four basic conventions were adopted: Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Geneva II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention III Relative to Prisoners of War, and Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

Geneva law focuses most essentially on combatants no longer fighting (hors de combat) and civilians. One of the

great innovations in the 1949 conventions is Article 3 common to all four, which directly addresses noninternational armed conflict or civil war. Article 3 is also considered a restatement of the of the core principles for the treatment of persons in armed conflict. It prohibits violent and inhumane treatment of any kind against persons "taking no active part in hostilities" and mandates access to such persons by impartial humanitarian organizations, such as the ICRC.

Despite the provisions in the 1949 conventions applicable to civil war, the decades of the 1960s and 1970s saw brutal anticolonial and civil wars. The Biafran War in Nigeria (1967–70) cost millions of lives mostly from hunger and disease. The Vietnam War (1964–74) raised the problem of guerrilla fighters and brought to the fore that the 1949 conventions had been designed with World War II in mind—something very different from what the world was experiencing in the wars of the developing world two decades later. Accordingly, the ICRC proposed major modifications to the 1949 conventions. By 1974 two draft protocols were ready for presentation to a diplomatic conference. Protocol I was designed to expand the category of conflicts considered "international," thus permitting the larger group of rules to be applied to more wars. Protocol II aimed at increasing the protections in noninternational armed conflicts. Delegates decided that "wars of national liberation" would be included among international armed conflicts. The protocol relaxed the criteria of the 1949 Geneva Convention provisions regulating which combatants may qualify for prisoner of war status. The United States opposed this relaxation during the negotiation.

On December 12, 1977, the United States signed Additional Protocols I & II of August 1977. Subsequently, the Reagan administration, although supportive of Additional Protocol II, deemed some of Protocol I "deeply flawed." The Protocol I provisions that the administration supported, it declared to be customary international law—law binding even without the explicit consent of a nation because most states generally regard it as binding.

When Yugoslavia began to disintegrate into civil war in 1991, the world was shocked to see fighting of such brutality in a European state; international humanitarian law was violated on a wide scale in ways reminiscent of World War II.

The United States encouraged the U.N. Security Council to form the first international criminal tribunal since Nuremberg to try war crimes and crimes against humanity, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In 1994, the Security Council added the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute war crimes and genocide. The ICTY and ICTR have produced important decisions interpreting the Hague Conventions, 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols, and customary international law. The creation of these tribunals influenced the founding of a court with general jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression. Nations and international organizations, including nongovernmental organizations, came together in Rome in the summer of 1998 to draft a statue for an international criminal court with general jurisdiction. The Rome Statute came into effect July 1, 2002. The Rome Statute and the code of crimes developed for application by the International Criminal Court (ICC) build on and add to, in important respects, Hague and Geneva law. For many, the ICC adds the vital missing element of Hague and Geneva law—a means to ensure enforcement of the law against individual violators when states are unwilling to do the job themselves.

Again, the United States was at the forefront of the effort to create a court with expansive jurisdiction over war crimes, but when it became clear that other delegations were not willing to give U.S. personnel a guarantee of exemption from the ICC, the U.S. government not only lost interest in the court but also became hostile toward its existence. This departure from traditional U.S. support for international criminal courts was followed by reconsideration of U.S. support for the substantive law of war, exacerbated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Top U.S. officials called the Geneva Conventions "quaint" and "obsolete" with respect to a variety of military actions they planned in the wake of those attacks.

Nevertheless, the United States demanded strict compliance with the Geneva Conventions by Iraq during the war that began March 19, 2003. In June 2003, the U.N. Security Council demanded that the United States and its coalition partners adhere to existing international law in their occupation of Iraq. In June 2004, in *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, the U.S.

Supreme Court looked to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for guidance for determining whether an individual, in this case an American citizen detained in Afghanistan, was an enemy combatant. Hague and Geneva law will no doubt continue to develop in response to changing times, but they will not be abandoned any time soon, certainly not by the United States, their longtime proponent.

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Related Entries

Aerial Bombardment; Articles of War; Atrocity and Captivity Narratives; Chemical Warfare; Civil War; Court of Military Appeals; Customs of War; Environment and War; General Orders, No. 100; Genocide; Prisoners of War; Uniform Code of Military Justice

Related Documents

1863 h; 1950 d

—*Mary Ellen O'Connell*

Genocide

Americans' horror of genocide reached its first peak after the initial discovery that millions of European Jews had been murdered in Nazi concentration camps during World War II. As shocked as Americans and the rest of the world were at the reports coming out of concentration camps newly liberated by Allied forces, that horror has, if anything, amplified and deepened in the years since 1945 as a result of a huge body of scholarly and popular publications, of movies, and of museums dedicated to the Holocaust. The term genocide (which comes from Greek genos [group or tribe] and Latin cide [killing]) came into use after World War II. To many, the logic seems to be that as Germany's leader, Adolf Hitler, stood for and implemented genocide, and because the United States opposed him and ultimately helped end the Holocaust, then the United States must have consistently opposed genocide. The historical reality is much messier.

The Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin proposed in the 1930s that international law should recognize and criminalize genocide. Lemkin argued that genocide is more than mass murder and more than the mass murder of a group because of its particular religious or ethnic identity. It is, he said, the wiping out of a group's ethnic, racial, national, or religious identity by a variety of means, including murder. Lemkin argued that Nazi policies directed at Jews, Roma (Gypsies), and other groups in the 1930s, including forced segregation, exclusion, and cultural assimilation, constituted genocide. Although Lemkin in large part developed the concept of genocide, the term did not acquire its legal standing until after the Holocaust.

In 1948, the United Nations passed a resolution against genocide, and countries began to sign treaties committing themselves to preventing genocide from ever happening again, whether in the form of mass murder or of forced cultural assimilation. Nevertheless, genocide has continued in

the postwar world. In 1994, more than half a million Tutsis were murdered by Hutus in Rwanda; the United States failed to act in time to prevent the massacre. Throughout its history, the United States has had a complicated and conflicted relationship with genocide, at times working diligently to end the killings of targeted populations, at other moments failing to act quickly enough. In some cases, the United States bears direct responsibility for the large-scale deaths of indigenous peoples.

Genocide in America

British settlers and American colonists carried out policies against indigenous populations that would be today considered genocidal. The colonists wanted land that was inhabited by groups of peoples whose languages, religions, and cultures were vastly different from those of the English. In addition, the immune systems of many indigenous populations were attuned to very different environments and diseases from what Europeans brought with them. For instance, smallpox, while it killed only 10 to 30 percent of Europeans who contracted it, killed 90 percent of the indigenous population who contracted it. At first the disease was spread by accident, but by the 18th century, Europeans had begun to understand how the disease was spread—with disastrous consequences. In the 1760s, Jeffrey Amherst distributed blankets infected with the smallpox virus to Native Americans in Massachusetts, devastating that population. Colonists frequently waged war against Native Americans with the avowed aim of exterminating them and appropriating their land. For instance, in 1776, the Continental Army carried out a campaign against the Cherokees, allies of the British, that involved burning Cherokee towns and villages, destroying their corn fields and stores of grain, and effectively wiping out the population.

Scholars estimate that before Europeans arrived in North America, the indigenous population was at least 10 million and perhaps as many as 12 or 15 million. By 1900, the U.S. Bureau of the Census estimated that fewer than 250,000 remained within the nation's borders and fewer than 350,000 throughout North America. Such a dramatic decline in population was accompanied by a comparable seizure of lands previously inhabited by indigenous groups.

When the United States became an international power, it continued some aspects of these policies against "Indians" abroad. For instance, when the United States purchased the Philippines from Spain at the conclusion of the Spanish–American War, the government resolved to keep the archipelago as a colony rather than liberate it. Between 1900 and 1903, the U.S. Army fought against Filipino insurgents who wished to establish a republic. Unable to defeat the guerrilla army via conventional means, the United States employed tactics comparable to those used against the Cherokees. At least 200,000 died, with some scholars estimating a much higher number. Such tactics were savagely criticized by some American writers, including Mark Twain.

America's Response to Genocide Abroad

For the rest of the 20th century, American attention focused on massacres committed by other nations. Between 1915 and 1923, the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey expelled a million Armenians to Syria and massacred half a million more in an "ethnic cleansing." When news of this massacre reached the United States via regular newspaper and reports by U.S. consulates, privately organized and funded American relief workers and missionaries traveled to Armenia to aid the victims. The United States, however, declined to declare war on the Ottoman Empire during World War I or to accept Armenia as a mandate from the League of Nations after the war.

The rise of fascism and anti-Semitism in Europe in the 1930s coincided with the Great Depression, creating an unfavorable political climate within the United States for lifting the strict immigration quotas imposed in 1924; an easing of these quotas would have allowed more Jewish refugees to flee Germany and Austria. American Jews and other groups agitated against Nazi policies, organizing boycotts of German goods and companies. In the aftermath of Kristallnacht, the carefully orchestrated destruction of Jewish synagogues and property in Germany in November 1938, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt recalled the American ambassador to Germany and publicly condemned the Nazi regime. Although immigration restrictions remained in place, Roosevelt urged leniency in reviewing the applications of Jewish refugees. Between 1935 and 1939, the United States accepted 200,000

of the 300,000 Jews attempting to leave Germany and Austria. Tragically, the United States also turned away many refugees who applied for admission, including the infamous case of German Jewish refugees aboard the SS *St. Louis* who could not find any country in the Western Hemisphere to grant them entry. These refugees subsequently found a haven in France, Britain, and the Netherlands, but many perished in the Holocaust, caught up in Hitler's conquest of Western Europe. In December 1942, the American, British, Soviet, and a number of other Allied governments issued a joint declaration condemning Nazi atrocities against European Jewry and warning that the architects of the "Final Solution" would be held responsible after the war ended. By 1946, during the Nuremburg trials, the Allies tried numerous German officials for "crimes against humanity." That standard, the one articulated by the jurist Lemkin, was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. Debate still rages around American actions during World War II, however, specifically centering on the 30-month gap between Hitler's invasion of Poland and the American entry into the war, and the Allied rejection of suggestions to bomb railroad lines leading to concentration camps as well as the camps themselves. Others counter that by winning the war, the United States played a crucial role in saving the majority of the world's Jews.

Perhaps not surprisingly, memory of the Holocaust has centered on the hope that the world would never again remain on the sidelines, failing to act in the face of the systematic murder of millions of innocent people. Unfortunately, despite the activism of Holocaust survivors within the United States, the nation did not react quickly enough in 1994 when a Hutu-led government directed a bloody massacre, often by crowds wielding machetes, of 800,000 Tutsis. For all the lofty rhetoric that the world would "never again" tolerate genocide, the international community abandoned its principles and left the Tutsi population to its fate. Making the tragedy more acute, the United Nations actually had thousands of well-armed peacekeepers on the ground in Rwanda. After his term in office ended, Pres. Bill Clinton apologized to the Rwandans.

More active was the American-led response to "ethnic cleansing" by the Serbian government in the contested area of Kosovo in 1999. In response to widespread reports of mass murder of ethnic Albanians, NATO initiated a bombing campaign intended to force the Serbian military to withdraw from the area. The bombings proved quite controversial internationally, recalling the earlier debate over whether attacking Nazi concentration camps and possibly killing innocent victims was an effective way to end genocide.

In 2005, a more clear-cut case of genocide emerged in the Sudan, where an Islamic government, based in the north of the country, encouraged militias to eliminate the generally darker-skinned animists and Christians in the south. A major contributing factor to the war, and to the artificially induced famine following the systematic destruction of crops and livestock and the hampering of international relief efforts, is that southern Sudan is rich in oil, exploited by international oil firms. Christian and humanitarian groups in the United States have pressured the government to act, but the initial U.S. response has been muted.

Genocide is an ancient practice still employed by governments to defeat internal and external enemies in times of war. Throughout the 20th century, the United States has consistently protested against the targeted massacres of specific populations, although the specific response of the nation to these events has also been weighed against its own economic and diplomatic interests. The United States has sought to build international coalitions to condemn genocide and, in rare cases, to take military action against its practitioners. How to respond effectively to the continuing threat of genocide in the modern world remains a distinct challenge for Americans.

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Related Entries

Holocaust, U.S., Response to; World War II

—*John Hinshaw*

German and Italian Americans, Internment of

Immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Presidential Proclamations 2525, 2526, and 2527 in accordance with the Enemy Alien Act of 1798, designating Japanese, German, and Italian nationals, respectively, as enemy aliens within the United States. In addition to the relocation and internment of thousands of Japanese Americans under the provisions of Executive Order 9066, issued on February 19, 1942, many resident aliens of Italian and German origin were similarly identified in a number of areas in the country and placed under varying degrees of restriction.

The Alien Registration Act of 1940 had required all aliens over the age of 13 to register with the Department of Justice and to report on changes in name, address, or employment. This move enabled the FBI and other agencies to locate more easily any alien deemed suspicious or a possible threat to domestic security. Within a month of the Pearl Harbor attack, the Department of Justice, in response to fears of further attacks from the Pacific, designated certain areas, primarily on the U.S. West Coast, as forbidden or restricted. In those designated areas, enemy aliens abided by strict curfew laws and could travel only under severe constraints, which sometimes required crossing certain neighborhood streets only with permission and a military escort.

Throughout the country, nearly 700,000 Italian resident aliens came under scrutiny. Many were required to surrender radios, binoculars, cameras, and flashlights to authorities after raids on their homes. By the end of February 1942, more than 10,000 designated Italian enemy aliens had been relocated inland or away from militarily sensitive shorefront communities, from Oregon to southern California—effectively closing down the coastal fishing industry. Several hundred German and Italian aliens from the West Coast were considered dangerous enough to be interned under military guard as far inland as Minnesota.

Some zealous military and government figures at that time had proposed widening the focus of relocation activities to target millions of American citizens of German and Italian ancestry on both coasts. However, the likely logistical drain on the U.S. military to supply enough guards for the many internment centers that would be required, combined with the inevitable economic disruption such a plan would entail, soon brought an end to such notions. President Roosevelt's Executive Order 9106 of March 20, 1942 exempted certain classes of German and Italian aliens from restrictions and opened the door to their becoming naturalized U.S. citizens. In the end, the internment (under the administration of the War Relocation Authority and the Immigration and Naturalization Service) of nearly 11,000 German and more than 3,500 Italian aliens in remote camps (as well as a number of their dependent family members who were naturalized or born citizens) was modest in comparison with that of the more than 120,000 Japanese

Americans who were forced into desolate "relocation centers." Germans and Italians, nevertheless, viewed their internment as equally unjust and arbitrary.

In late June 1942, with the prospect of enemy attack on the U.S. West Coast diminishing, the Western Defense Command cancelled all territorial restrictions, allowing thousands of Italian aliens to return from regional exile, though they remained under curfew and travel restrictions. On October 12, 1942, the status of "enemy" alien was lifted from Italians and exemption from arrest was expanded to cover further special groups of German and Italian aliens, primarily those over 70 years of age, the ill or infirm, and relatives of U.S. servicemen killed in the line of duty, many of whom were themselves aliens. In response to Italy's surrender on September 8, 1943, and its new status of "co-belligerent" under the terms of its armistice with the Allies, U.S. officials released more than half the remaining interned Italian aliens and directed that all Italian aliens previously excluded from security zones on the East and West coasts could return to their homes, except for those who still professed fascist sympathies.

Aliens detained in states along the East Coast were processed at New York's immigration center on Ellis Island, which would eventually house several hundred German aliens during the war years and beyond. The Ellis Island facilities would also function as a deportation and repatriation center for diplomats, stranded merchant sailors, and those aliens who had violated U.S. laws. In addition, during the war more than 3,000 Japanese, German, and Italian residents of Latin American countries were rounded up by regimes friendly to the United States and sent for processing through Ellis Island, where they were designated either for repatriation or internment in U.S. camps. By February 1944, because no invasion threat against the East Coast seemed imminent or plausible, restrictions on German aliens were further relaxed, including those on aliens once involved with the nationalist German American Bund. In June 1944, more than 100 German internees were paroled.

During this same period, alien internees in U.S. detention were encouraged to repatriate to Germany through neutral intermediaries like Spain or Sweden in exchange for captive American citizens. Through the end of 1945, several thousand had done so, many of whom returned to the United States in the postwar years. In July 1945, Pres. Harry Truman issued Presidential Proclamation 2655, which called for the deportation of "dangerous" enemy aliens to Germany, a cumbersome process that served mostly to lengthen the internment of those who appealed the directive, though many others were paroled by the end of 1945. The last remaining internment camp, Crystal City in Texas, was closed in late 1947, and its remaining internees were crowded into Ellis Island, which released the last German alien in August 1948.

The exclusion, relocation, and internment of Italian and German aliens in the United States was undertaken by the U.S. Department of Justice and elements of the armed forces as part of the dragnet that also included many thousands of Japanese Americans following Pearl Harbor. Although these measures were made to seem necessary at the time by those authorities who equated loyalty with ethnicity, such internment breached with much cruelty the civil liberties of those ethnic groups. The cost in terms of lost property or livelihoods was enormous to those relocated or interned even for a relatively short time, but the human cost in terms of privation, broken families, humiliation, and loss of faith in their new country was even greater. Internment camp experiences would haunt many for the rest of their lives, despite measures subsequently put forward by U.S. politicians to redress the injustice.

On February 19, 1976, Pres. Gerald Ford formally rescinded Executive Order 9066, and in 1980 Pres. Jimmy Carter endorsed legislation creating the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, whose findings and recommendations were published in 1983 as Personal Justice Denied. Pres. Ronald Reagan, signing the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, formally acknowledged and apologized for the "fundamental violations of basic civil liberties and the constitutional rights of these individuals of Japanese ancestry." In 2000, Congress passed the Wartime Violation of Italian Americans Civil Liberties Act, and in February 2004 Congress supported the establishment of February 19 as a day of remembrance to remind and educate U.S. citizens about injustices three American ethnic minorities endured in the name of wartime security.

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Japanese Americans, Internment of; Prisoners of War

—*Gordon E. Hogg*

Geronimo

(1829–1909)
Apache Leader

Geronimo was a prominent Apache leader during the Indian Wars of the late 19th century. White encroachment, forced concentration of Native Americans on reservations, and the deplorable conditions of the reservations resulted in several Apache leaders declaring war against whites and the U.S. Army. Geronimo led his people in the mountains and deserts of the American Southwest. Often portrayed as a cold-blooded savage, Geronimo fought to protect Apache land and way of life against white and Mexican intrusion.

Geronimo was born in June 1829 near the Gila River to a tribe accustomed to warfare and raiding. Mexican troops had a long history of attacking Apache camps and killing women and children. In raids throughout the 1850s, Mexican soldiers killed many of his family members—including two of his wives, several of his children, and his mother. These events created a deep hatred for Mexicans in the Apache leader.

In the late 1850s, white settlers began mining operations and creating settlements in the Southwest, increasing tensions between Apaches and whites; in September 1860, war broke out between the Apaches and the settlers. In response the U.S. government sent troops to subdue the Apaches. In 1872, Cochise, a tribal leader of an Apaches band, signed a peace agreement with Gen. Oliver Otis Howard. Many members of the band refused to recognize the treaty and continued raids on Mexican and white settlements. The U.S. government sent the secretary of the Board of Indian Commissioners, Vincent Coyler, to Arizona to attempt to broker peace with the Apaches, but Coyler failed and the government took military action against Cochise's band. In 1871, Congress appropriated $70,000 for relocating the Apache tribe to reservations in Arizona and New Mexico as part of the government's policy of regulating Native American tribes. Several bands of Apache complied and moved to the reservations.

Conflict between the Apaches and whites intensified after Cochise's death in 1874. The following year, the U.S. government closed two reservations and moved the resident Apache bands to the San Carlos reservation in Arizona. The relocations mingled mutually hostile bands, thus further straining the reservation's resources and worsening living conditions. Geronimo and two other Apache leaders led a band off the reservation into the mountains. The band spent two years evading U.S. troops before surrendering at Fort Wingate, New Mexico. In 1879, Geronimo and Apache leaders Victorio and Nana fled the reservation again with a group of followers. The Apaches conducted raids in Mexico and the United States during each break from the reservation. Frustrated, the U.S. government joined with the Mexican government to pursue the Apaches. On October 14, 1880, Mexican Col. Joaquin Terrazas surrounded Apache leader Victorio and his band in the Tres Castillos Mountains; Victorio was killed in the ensuing battle.

By the mid-1880s, Geronimo had emerged as the most prominent Apache leader. Pressure from the Mexican and American militaries forced him to return to the San Carlos

A photo taken in 1886 of the Apache leader Geronimo, on the right, with three of his warriors. (Getty Images)

reservation, where he again experienced deplorable conditions. Those, coupled with growing white settlements and incompetent U.S. government Indian agents, led Geronimo and his followers to again leave the reservation in 1883. The Army charged Gen. George Crook with following the Apaches into Mexico and returning them to the reservation by force. Between 1883 and 1886, Geronimo and his followers eluded the U.S. Army. Gen. Nelson A. Miles took charge of military operations against the Apache after Crook's resignation in 1885. In August 1886, Miles removed, as prisoners, all the Apache remaining at San Carlos to Florida, prompting Geronimo to surrender and join his people. The Apache leader formally surrendered to Miles in September 1886. Formal hostilities with the Apaches were thus ended.

Geronimo, his family, and his warriors were sent to Florida as prisoners of the U.S. government. In 1887, disease outbreaks in Florida caused the Army to move the tribe to Alabama; in 1894, the government moved the Apaches to Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In February 1909, Geronimo died as a prisoner at Fort Sill from a severe cold. Finally convinced

that the Apache people had assimilated into white society, the U.S. government released the tribe and allowed them to return to the Mescalero reservation in New Mexico; however, 187 Apache remained in Oklahoma.

Geronimo became a celebrity during his time as a prisoner. The American people were fascinated with American Indians and many wanted to see the great warrior who had so vexed the U.S. forces. Geronimo and his people were exhibited by the government in expositions across the country. Many others traveled to Fort Sill to see the Apache leader in captivity. As the tribal leader of the only American tribe held as prisoner by the U.S. government, Geronimo and the Chiricahua Apaches became iconic Indian warriors, even as they were victims of the last gasp of the Indian removal policy. Their defeat paved the way for white development of the American Southwest.

Geronimo has become a legend and an icon in American history, noted as being a fearless, resourceful, strong, and almost mystical leader. Today his name lives on as a symbol of strong leadership and fearlessness. Geronimo

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has been portrayed in many films, including *Geronimo* (1962) and *Geronimo—An American Legend* (1993), usually as either a tragic figure or a strong warrior. Ironically, long after his death, U.S. Army paratroopers began shouting "Geronimo!" when jumping from planes. Even software companies are named for the leader. Hundreds continue to visit his grave at Fort Sill every year, offering up prayers and leaving mementos.

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Buffalo Soldiers; Indian Wars: Western Wars; Sherman, William Tecumseh

—Stacy W. Reaves

GI Bills

In terms of their impact on American society, the various GI Bills passed by Congress remain among the most significant federal acts of the 20th century, leaving one of the more enduring legacies of World War II on the home front. Beginning with the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, or "GI Bill of Rights," as it is more commonly known, the federal government offered its soldiers a wide range of benefits, including education assistance, home loans, vocational training, and business loans as a reward for military service. The original GI Bill not only helped forestall a potential economic depression after World War II; it also improved the lives of millions of returning veterans. By giving them the option to enter higher education and own homes, the GI Bill enlarged a middle class that, in turn, irrevocably transformed the economic and social landscape of America. Despite later versions of the GI Bill being somewhat less generous than the 1944 version, veterans have continued to use federal benefits to improve their lives and make a significant contribution to society.

Background

Although veterans traditionally enjoyed some form of compensation for service, such as a pensions or mustering-out pay, no group of veterans had ever been given such generous recompense for their sacrifices as the returning World War II GIs. The bitter experience of many World War I veterans highlighted the need for an extensive veterans' benefits package. After World War I, most veterans received a train ticket home, a modest payment, and limited vocational rehabilitation benefits. In 1924, the government promised World War I veterans a one-time payment of roughly $1,000—to be paid after 20 years. For most veterans, such measures did not go far enough to compensate them for the time they had lost. In 1932, the economic hardships wrought by the Great Depression led thousands of veterans to march on Washington demanding early payment of their bonuses. The violent struggles that ensued following the Bonus March gave rise to fears of what might happen if millions of veterans were thrust back into society without guaranteed employment or any kind of financial assistance.

Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944

As early as 1942, the government began planning for the postwar influx of veterans. In the summer of 1943, the National Resources Planning Board advocated a comprehensive package of training and education benefits to help them readjust. More than 600 separate bills entered Congress, promising everything from medical coverage and education benefits to furlough pay. None gathered much momentum until the American Legion intervened. Formed

as a veteran advocacy group in 1919 and composed mainly of World War I veterans, Legion members knew better than most the needs of returning veterans. Harry Colmery, a World War I veteran and former Legion national commander, drafted a "Bill of Rights for GI Joe and GI Jane," which included sweeping provisions for such benefits as unemployment insurance, funding for higher education, employment training, and home loans. After the bill's introduction in Congress on January 1, 1944, the Legion conducted an intensive lobbying and media campaign to gain public and political support. Opponents ranged from educators, who feared a dilution in quality of the nation's college students, to disabled veterans, who feared that their benefits might be curtailed to accommodate the new measures. But the Legion's efforts prevailed, and on June 22, 1944, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 into law. The Legion's efforts ensured that the hardships endured by one generation of veterans would never again be felt so acutely.

The 1944 GI Bill offered a wide range of benefits. Returning veterans had the option of claiming unemployment insurance for the first 52 weeks after discharge at a rate of $20 per week. More than nine million out of approximately 15.4 million eligible veterans joined what became known as the "52-20 Club" for an average of 17 weeks before finding employment or furthering their education. In addition, more than 2.3 million took advantage of the low-rate home loans. These veterans expanded the nation's home-owning middle class and changed the very geography of the nation by inspiring the development of suburbs to accommodate the demand for housing. The 1944 bill also offered veterans loans to start businesses or invest in farming. But the education benefits remain among the best-known and, among veterans, the most appreciated aspects of the first GI Bill.

Before World War II, a college education tended to be the preserve of wealthier, generally white Americans. The benefits offered under the GI Bill forever changed the nature of higher education. The bill offered all veterans, irrespective of race, class, or gender, the opportunity to attend the college of their choice. Although many schools remained racially segregated, higher education in general became far more democratized as Americans from all walks of life entered school, many becoming the first in their family to do so. On the whole, veterans also proved to be some of the most dedicated and productive students of their generation.

Once they had chosen the school they wished to attend, veterans received up to $500 a year for tuition, and a single veteran received a monthly stipend of $50. This amount increased to $65 in 1946, and to $75 in 1948. A veteran who claimed dependents received a proportionally higher payment. The generous tuition payment allowed veterans to attend even the more elite colleges. To be eligible, a veteran had to have served at least 90 days and (as was true for later versions of the GI Bill) to have left the service with an "other than dishonorable discharge." In return, the veteran received benefits for one full year plus a period equal to the time of his or her service up to 48 months. By the program's end on July 25, 1956, approximately 50.5 percent of eligible veterans had claimed education benefits, including 2.2 million using them for higher education, 3.4 million for institutions such as vocational schools, and a further 1.4 million for on-the-job training.

Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952

The obvious success of the 1944 GI Bill prompted the government to offer similar measures to later generations of veterans. The Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, signed into law by Pres. Harry S. Truman on July 16, 1952, offered benefits to veterans who served for more than 90 days during the Korean War. The 1952 act did not offer unemployment compensation, but did provide for education and loan benefits. Korean veterans were eligible for funding equal to a period 1.5 times their length of service.

One significant difference between the 1944 and 1952 bills was that tuition was no longer paid directly to the chosen institution of higher education. Instead, veterans received a fixed monthly sum of $110 from which they had to pay for tuition, fees, books, and living expenses. This decision about tuition payments came after a government investigation uncovered incidents of deliberate tuition overcharge by some institutions under the original GI Bill. Although the monthly stipend proved sufficient for most Korean veterans, this decision would have negative repercussions for later veterans. By the end of the program on January 31, 1965,

approximately 2.4 million of 5.5 million, or roughly 43 percent, of eligible veterans had used their benefits—1.2 million had used them to enter higher education, more than 860,000 for other education purposes, and 318,000 for occupational training. More than 1.5 million Korean War veterans obtained home loans.

Vietnam-Era GI Bills (1966–1974)

Whereas the GI Bills of 1944 and 1952 were passed to compensate veterans for wartime service, the Veterans Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966 changed the nature of such legislation by extending benefits to veterans who served during times of war and peace. With this act, military service became a viable option for economic advancement. With overwhelming support from Congress, Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson signed it into law on March 3, 1966. But almost immediately, critics within the veterans' community and on Capitol Hill charged that the bill did not go far enough. At first, unmarried veterans who served more than 180 days received only $100 a month from which they had to pay for tuition and expenses. Given the rising costs of tuition since World War II, most found this amount insufficient. As a consequence, during the early years of the program, only about 25 percent of Vietnam veterans used their education benefits.

For the next decade, a battle raged in the government to make Vietnam-era veterans' benefits comparable to those of the veterans of World War II. In the face of objections from the fiscally conservative Nixon and Ford administrations, Congress succeeded on several occasions in securing benefit-level increases. For example, the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Acts of 1972 and 1974 raised benefits to $220 and $270 per month, respectively. By 1984, an unmarried veteran of the Vietnam era could claim $384 per month. As the funding levels increased, the numbers of veterans entering higher education rose correspondingly. Indeed, 1976, fully 10 years after the first veteran became eligible, was the year that the highest number of Vietnam-era veterans enrolled in schools. By the end of the program, more than 76 percent of the 10.3 million eligible veterans had used their benefits for education. In addition, more than 4.4 million veterans who served from 1955 to 1974 obtained home loans under the program. Millions more received occupational training.

Post–Vietnam Era GI Bills

Despite the movement to an all volunteer force in 1973, veterans continued to receive benefits, in part as an inducement to enlist, under the Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP), and the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB). From December 1976 through 1987, veterans received assistance under the VEAP. The VEAP departed from previous programs by requiring participants to make a contribution to their education benefits. The Veterans Administration then matched their contribution at a rate of 2 to 1. Enlisted personnel could contribute up to $100 a month up to a total of $2,700. To encourage enlistment, the Department of Defense frequently contributed "kickers" (bonus funds) to bolster the overall benefits package. Veterans who had served for more than 180 days could claim benefits for up to 36 months. Nearly 700,000 used their benefits for education and training under this program. The MGIB replaced the VEAP for those who served after July 1, 1985. This was a voluntary program in which participants could choose to have $100 deducted from their first year of pay. In return, veterans received a tuition allowance and a monthly stipend. As of October 2003, a single veteran with more than three years of active duty could claim $965 a month for up to 36 months under the MGIB in addition to tuition payments.

Since 1944, the numerous GI Bills have enabled millions of veterans to return from the hardships of military service and lead productive lives. In doing so, they have had an enormous impact on American society. No other legislation of the 20th century did as much to expand the middle class or fuel the nation's post–World War II economic prosperity. The GI Bills reveal how war, even when fought overseas, can have a tremendous impact on society at home and irrevocably transform a nation's social and economic landscape.

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Related Entries

All Volunteer Force; American Legion; Bonus March; Veterans Administration

—Mark Boulton

Goldwater–Nichols Act

Coauthored by Arizona Republican senator Barry Goldwater, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Alabama Democratic representative William Nichols, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 instituted profound changes to the operations and management of the U.S. Department of Defense. Signed into law by Pres. Ronald Reagan on October 1, 1986, it was intended to remedy certain operational and administrative failings encountered throughout the Vietnam War, in the 1982 Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, and in the invasion of Grenada in 1983. The bill sought to improve the quality of military advice provided to civilian decision makers, place greater responsibility upon combatant commanders, and institute greater cooperation and coordination among the individual military services.

The origins of Goldwater–Nichols can be traced back three decades prior to the bill's final passage. Various executive committees commissioned by presidents throughout the 1960s and 1970s concluded that chronic service parochialism

hampered the efficient functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). As early as 1947, civilian authorities found that individual JCS chiefs tended to grant authority to their respective service commanders alone rather than to officers responsible for leading an integrated armed force. These types of flaws led not only to ambiguities in determining the extent of a commanding officer's authority, but also promoted disunity among the different armed services. Following the 1975 withdrawal of U.S. military forces from South Vietnam, American civilian decision makers in both the White House and Congress reexamined the basic practices and responsibilities of the JCS. Lawmakers reiterated the presidential commission findings, affirming concerns that the individual services tended to supersede joint considerations. As legislators called for institutional alterations, they concentrated most on measures for consolidating military advice solely with the JCS chairman and for removing service-specific responsibilities from the other chiefs. Bipartisan congressional efforts toward changing JCS functions and management began in earnest following the February 1982 testimony of JCS chairman Gen. David C. Jones, in which he emphasized the inadequate organization of national defense.

In response to General Jones's warning, the Goldwater–Nichols Act outlined advising roles for both high-level civilian leaders and various high-ranking military officers. Regarding civilian positions, the law clarified where service planners were to gather military information, as well as who was to serve as the final authority in providing military advice—either the secretary of defense or individual civilian service secretaries. Under Section 113(k), the secretary of defense was to guide the formation of national security recommendations and policy for all departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in turn, were each responsible to the defense secretary for the formation of national security policies and programs for each of their departments. Under the act's provisions, the secretary of defense alone, rather than each of the individual civilian service secretaries, was authorized to act as the president's principal civilian source of military counsel from the Pentagon.

The most extensive organizational alterations that stemmed from the 1986 legislation affected the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and its chairman. Section 151(b) stipulated that the chairman was to serve as the principal military adviser to the president, National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. Section 151(c) specified that the remaining JCS members, as well as combatant commanders, were to serve the chairman as resources for formulating military recommendations. In addition to advising these high-ranking civilian authorities, Section 153(a) charged the chairman with directing military strategy, planning and preparing potential military responses, and assessing defense budget needs. To aid with these wide-ranging responsibilities, the bill created the new position of vice chairman, an officer with vaguely defined statutory duties responsible to the chairman and secretary of defense.

The Army chief of staff, chief of naval operations, Air Force chief of staff, and Marine Corps commandant retained their roles as military advisers in the JCS; however, the Goldwater–Nichols Act placed unprecedented constraints on their access to their civilian superiors. Although the service chiefs could continue to express military advice differing from that offered by the chairman, Section 151(d) stipulated that all opinions had to be articulated to their civilian superiors through the chairman. Even then, the chairman could withhold opposing views if he considered his own advice "unduly delayed" by their submission.

In addition to clarifying numerous civilian and military advising roles, Goldwater–Nichols placed greater emphasis on the command relationship between the president, the JCS, and individual combatant commanders. To this end, the law specified under Section 162(b) that the operational chain of command progress from the president through the secretary of defense to the combatant commanders. Necessity for such a measure stemmed primarily from confusion encountered during the failed rescue of the USS *Pueblo* in North Vietnam waters on January 23, 1968, at which time the secretary of defense and the CS were at odds over who had operational authority. To avoid such failures in the future, the legislation specifically excluded the entire JCS, including the chairman, from making command decisions. Mission accountability, once orders had been transmitted by the civilian decisionmakers in Washington, D.C., resided solely with the commanders in the field. Following 1986,

command decisions ordered by the president were to be communicated through the defense secretary to the chief military decision makers on the battlefield.

The Goldwater–Nichols Act also institutionalized measures for facilitating greater cooperation among the individual military services. The law provided strict appointment requirements for high-level military posts, with joint service as the overarching qualification. According to Section 152(b), only officers who had served previously as a JCS vice chairman, as well as one of the service chiefs or combatant commanders, could be appointed by the president as the JCS chairman. Assignment to the combatant commands first required that an officer manage integrated land, sea, and air forces through either contingency planning or field command. Additionally, Section 154(a) stipulated that the JCS chairman and vice chairman were not to be members of the same military service.

The legacy of the Goldwater–Nichols Act remains a point of continued debate. Civilian and military leaders alike highlight successes during Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the 1991 Gulf War as direct results of streamlining the operational chain of command. In a 1996 interview, former defense secretary Richard B. Cheney, the first secretary of defense held to the Goldwater–Nichols provisions, concluded that the legislation "made a significant and positive contribution in improving the quality of military advice" (Greeley and Schultz, 33). Gen. Colin L. Powell, the first JCS chairman to fully exercise the powers granted under the act, credited the legislation with improved operational performance during these operations in a 1996 interview.

Critics of the bill, however, claim that the legislation is too restrictive and that it represents a blow to civilian control of military affairs. Some, such as historians John F. Lehman and Harvey Sicherman, argue that Goldwater–Nichols gave the secretary of defense and JCS chairman advisory positions too much power—diminishing the president's range of military options through their broad discretionary powers. Others observe that by increasing the military advising authority of the defense secretary and JCS chairman, the legislation insulated the president from the viewpoints of the military chiefs and the individual civilian service secretaries.

In its Senate Intelligence Report, released in July 2004, the Senate Intelligence Committee revealed that the military advice presented to Pres. George W. Bush about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was based on faulty information, indicating that the quality of military advice provided to the president remain points of interest into the 21st century.

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Related Entries

Civil–Military Relations; Iraq War; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Powell, Colin; Vietnam War; War on Terrorism

—Jason Godin

Grand Army of the Republic

From its formation shortly after the end of the Civil War until the middle of the 20th century, the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) was the largest and most powerful organization of Union Army and Navy veterans. Founded on April 6, 1866, in Decatur, Illinois, by former Army surgeon Benjamin Franklin Stephenson, its proclaimed goals were "Fraternity, Charity and Loyalty." Its basic unit was the local post, with membership open to any honorably discharged Union veteran by a secret and unanimous vote of the post. At its height in 1890, the GAR comprised 6,928 local posts, which were important centers of for socializing and parts of a national patriotic and pension lobby that was probably the most influential voluntary organization of the Gilded Age. Except for Grover Cleveland, every president elected between 1868 and 1900 was a GAR member, and, by 1893, one dollar of every three spent by the federal government went to Union Army pensions, secured through the active lobbying efforts of the GAR.

Between 1866 and 1872, the GAR operated as a virtual wing of the Republican Party, boosting the careers of soldier–politicians such as John A. Logan, one of the managers of Andrew Johnson's impeachment in the House of Representatives. Grand Army members organized during the impeachment crisis to head off a feared presidential coup, turning out in force to elect Ulysses S. Grant in 1868. Although the Grand Army retained its association with the Republican Party into the 20th century (sparking the joke that GAR stood for "Generally All Republicans"), its overt partisanship declined following Grant's reelection in 1872. The turn away from politics, coupled with the depression of the mid-1870s and a general inclination to forget the war, pushed the GAR into decline, reaching a low of 26,899 members in 1876.

In the 1880s, the GAR revived as a fraternal order, emphasizing its secret initiation ritual (modeled on that of

the Masons) and the provision of charity to needy veterans. A female auxiliary, the Women's Relief Corps (1883), and a hereditary auxiliary that is still in existence, the Sons of Veterans (1878), were founded. In 1890 the GAR reached its peak membership of 409,489 and enrolled about 40 percent of eligible Union veterans, after which death began to thin the ranks. In the 20th century, it served mainly as a custodian of Memorial Day (which GAR commander in chief Logan had proclaimed as Decoration Day in 1868), and as the promoter of a conservative version of American patriotism. It held its last national encampment at Indianapolis in 1949.

While active, the GAR was best known as a pension lobby. Major pieces of legislation such as the Arrears Act (1879) and the Dependant Pension Act (1890), the products of veteran political clout, had profound effects on life in the Gilded Age. The Civil War pension system transferred wealth from the South to the North and West (where most Union veterans continued to live), set a precedent for social welfare provision that was both politicized and masculinized (women qualified for pensions only as widows and orphans), and provided a rationale for high tariffs. Politically, the system was a boon to Republicans, who rushed through pension claims from pivotal states in the Midwest, and poison to Democrats, as Pres. Grover Cleveland discovered in 1887 when his veto of a pension bill provoked howls of outrage from GAR members. The system was also very expensive— the Dependent Pension Act alone had cost more than $1 billion by 1907.

The GAR's attitude toward its former Confederate foes was complex. On the one hand, the organization insisted that (in the words of 1884 commander in chief William Warner) "we were eternally right and . . . they were eternally wrong." No one who had served a day in the Confederate forces could join the GAR, even if he had later deserted and joined the Union Army. GAR members became easily exercised over symbolic individuals such as former Confederate president Jefferson Davis, and by public displays of the Confederate flag. When Cleveland attempted to return captured Confederate battle flags to the southern states in 1887, the intensity of veterans' reaction forced him to back down. In the 1890s, the GAR began appointing "Patriotic Instruction Committees" to correct

what some members felt was a pro-Confederate bias among writers of public school history textbooks.

On the other hand, Grand Army men were usually willing to treat individual former Confederates cordially, sometimes contrasting them favorably with "loyal" non-combatants. Almost two dozen Blue–Gray reunions between 1881 and 1887 included GAR posts, and in 1889 the GAR national encampment formally endorsed one such reunion at Vicksburg. In the 1890s, the nation generally slid into a sentimental reunionism that emphasized the valor and "manliness" of both armies while downplaying slavery and race. By 1902, former Confederate general James Longstreet could join Union officers to review the Grand Army parade at Washington, while the GAR's own commander in chief solicited donations for Confederate veterans' homes. This reconciliation was complete by 1913 when Pres. Woodrow Wilson told veterans assembled for the 50th anniversary of the battle of Gettysburg that the war was "a quarrel forgotten."

White GAR veterans had an even more complex relation to their African American comrades. Black veterans were full members of the Grand Army—no other Gilded Age fraternal order could make that claim. White officers of black Union regiments helped their men secure pensions, African American abolitionist Frederick Douglass addressed the 1882 national encampment at Baltimore, and, when faced with a proposal to segregate its southern departments in 1891, the GAR refused. "During that fierce struggle for the life of the nation, we stood shoulder to shoulder as comrades tried," read the official report. "It is too late to divide now on the color line." In the white South, the GAR was always viewed as a Radical Republican front. Prospective members of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1870s were required to swear that they had never been members of the Grand Army or supported its aims.

The GAR as a whole was integrated; however, at the post level it was segregated. Posts in northern cities with small African American populations might accommodate a black member or two. But in cities such as Philadelphia or Boston, where the black population was large, the rule was separate posts. Black and white posts marched together on parade at the annual department encampment, but did not

otherwise socialize. When black veterans applied to white posts, they were often rejected. The GAR was more progressive on racial questions than virtually any other Gilded Age fraternal order, but that tolerance had its limits. As the order embraced Blue–Gray reunionism in the 1890s, issues of racial justice that had seemed pressing during Reconstruction began to fade.

After 1890, Grand Army members became preoccupied with the problem of transmitting patriotism to an American society much more heterogeneous than that of 1865. The GAR was probably about 80 percent native-born, with most immigrant members hailing from Britain, Ireland, or Germany—a composition reflecting the makeup of the Union Army. To some extent, it was cross-class, with farmers in "country posts" across the Midwest and wealthy merchants in bodies such as New York's George Washington Post 103, which met at Delmonico's, a fashionable and expensive restaurant in Manhattan that boasted a 100-page menu in English and French and the largest wine cellar in the city. But the waves of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe who began to arrive in the 1890s, and the fierce class conflict of the postwar era, aroused anxiety among GAR members. The leading Union veterans' newspaper, the *National Tribune*, became a fierce advocate of immigration restriction after 1888. Individual posts presented flags or sent members to visit urban schools, and the GAR national encampment began appointing "Patriotic Instruction Committees" in 1891. In the great strikes of the Gilded Age, the GAR usually openly supported property rights and public order. Members volunteered to help suppress the national railroad strike of 1877 and denounced "anarchy" thereafter.

The GAR's patriotic crusade climaxed in the 1898 war with Spain, which the order enthusiastically supported (Pres. William McKinley and Sec. of War Russell Alger were both GAR members). After the quick American victory, Grand Army speakers boasted of "a flag for all the world," and subsequent GAR encampments enthusiastically welcomed speakers who favored the national state and its policies. As the Union veterans aged in the 20th century, that role would pass to the American Legion, which also adopted the GAR's organizational structure and its patriotic school program.

Unlike the Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, however, the GAR never admitted veterans of later wars to membership, and, unlike the Society of the Cincinnati, it refused to become a hereditary organization. Thus, it passed out of existence with the death of its last member, Albert Woolson, in 1956.

The Grand Army left a large legacy. The Civil War pension system became a template for social welfare provision in the 20th century, prompting proposals to add new categories of beneficiaries (through "mothers' pensions," for example) as well as attempts to curb the system's political excesses (such as the World War I plan of "war insurance"). It pioneered the very idea of a mass veterans' organization—earlier veterans' groups had been limited to officers or to particular regiments—and its political activism set a precedent for later veterans' groups. Most important, the GAR was the first true nationalist lobby in the United States. It invoked the language of national loyalty against those it saw as divisive threats—immigrants, former Confederates, labor activists—and in so doing worked to preserve the Gilded Age status quo. The GAR's conservative nationalism bound military veterans to the national state for the first time and did so in a particular way that influenced veterans of all future wars.

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Related Entries

Memorial Day

—*Stuart McConnell*

Grant, Ulysses S.

(1822–85)
Union Army General,
18th President of the United States

Ulysses S. Grant is one of the most dominant figures in American military history, not only because of his achievements during the American Civil War, but also because, in the eyes of many, he has come to embody what historian Russell Weigley once called "the American way of war." To this day he is an icon for those who advocate immediate and direct military responses as a model of American military success and style. That a careful study of Grant's career has lessons to teach is undeniable; one may wonder, however, if the identification of him as the first modern general or a total warrior is altogether accurate or fully explains his career.

Born Hiram Ulysses Grant on April 27, 1822, the man who is known as Ulysses S. Grant because of a bureaucratic error on the part of a congressman seemed unlikely to emerge as one of the most significant figures in American military history. The son of an entrepreneurial tanner with a propensity for politics and controversy, the young man seemed unprepossessing enough, yet he qualified for an education at government expense. Entering West Point in 1839, Grant graduated four years later in the middle of his class, known mainly for his skill in mathematics and his horsemanship. Assigned to the 4th United States Infantry, he soon found himself part of Gen. Zachary Taylor's expeditionary force sent to the Texas–Mexico border, and in May 1846 Grant participated in the opening battles of the Mexican–American War.

Over the next year and a half, despite his assignment as the regimental quartermaster, he saw as much combat as anyone, displaying great courage in battle. Advancing to the rank of brevet captain, Grant returned home, marrying Julia Boggs Dent on August 22, 1848, before bouncing from peacetime assignment to assignment in Detroit, upstate New York, the Oregon Territory, and California. Separated from his family, alone, unhappy, unfortunate in business ventures, having taken to drink, and seeing very little future in a peacetime military, Grant resigned his commission on April 11, 1854, and made his way back to his wife and three children outside St. Louis (a fourth child would arrive in 1855). For the next six years he would struggle in civilian life before finally accepting a position in his father's general store in Galena, Illinois, in 1860. He was working in that store when war broke out the following April.

What happened during the next four years must be among the most amazing and dramatic rises to military prominence ever recorded. Although a West Point graduate and combat veteran, Grant did not receive a commission until June 1861, as the colonel of the 21st Illinois Infantry. Within two months he won promotion to brigadier general, chiefly through the influence of Galena's Republican congressman, Elihu B. Washburne. In September 1861, he responded to news of Confederate incursions into Kentucky by seizing Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers; two months later he saw his first serious combat at Belmont, Missouri, when what he later styled a diversion nearly turned into a disaster when a Confederate counterattack overwhelmed his initial success. In February 1862, along with Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote, he advanced upon a brace of Confederate forts along the Tennessee–Kentucky border, taking Fort Henry, along the Tennessee, on February 6, and, 10 days later, Fort Donelson, along the Cumberland, capturing some 12,000 Confederates after containing and repulsing a breakout attempt. This victory (at the time the largest capture ever made by the U.S. Army) brought him the nickname "Unconditional Surrender" because of the stiff terms he had offered Confederate commander Simon Buckner. Promoted to major general, he barely survived a run-in with his superior officer, Henry W. Halleck, and a surprise Confederate

counterattack at Shiloh, Tennessee, on April 6 and 7, 1862. Grant's grit and determination could not conceal the fact that he had been surprised and unprepared; his military career went into eclipse for months, although he gained some notice for Union victories at Iuka and Corinth, Mississippi, nearly six months later.

In the fall of 1862, Grant set his sights upon Vicksburg, Mississippi, the most important Confederate stronghold along the Mississippi River. An initial attempt to take the city via a two-pronged assault ended in disaster in December 1862; afterward, Grant reunited his Army of the Tennessee on the west bank of the river opposite Vicksburg. For months he experimented with various approaches to taking the city by a combination of canals and waterways. Each effort failed, exposing Grant to criticism from his rivals eager to replace him. With the arrival of spring and dry levees and roads, Grant finally was able to undertake the plan that from the beginning he believed offered the best chance for victory: marching his men south, crossing the river, and moving against Vicksburg from below. Beating back a Confederate advance at Port Gibson (May 1, 1863), he gathered three infantry corps, issued orders for his men to live off the land, headed northeast to Jackson, and entered the state capital on May 14, thwarting the efforts of Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston to unite with the Vicksburg garrison commanded by John C. Pemberton. Grant then turned west, defeated Pemberton at Champion Hill (May 16) and Big Black River (May 17), forcing the Confederates back into Vicksburg. After two frontal assaults failed (May 19 and 22), Grant laid siege to the city, capturing it and its 30,000 defenders on July 4, 1863, in the culmination of one of the most brilliant campaigns in American military history.

Grant's triumph at Vicksburg secured his hold on his command and the confidence of Pres. Abraham Lincoln. Three months later he was put in charge of Union forces in the area between the Appalachians and the Mississippi and ordered to relieve the besieged Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, Tennessee. After arriving in that city on October 23, within days Grant had ordered the implementation of a plan to open up a supply line; weeks later, after hurrying reinforcements forward, he oversaw the defeat of the Confederate forces (November 23–25). Satisfied that

Grant harbored no political ambitions and convinced that he was the man best qualified to take charge of the Union armies, Lincoln elevated Grant to command of the armies of the United States in March 1864 with the rank of lieutenant general. Grant fashioned a series of coordinated blows against the major Confederate field armies in Georgia and Virginia. He entrusted the former to his favorite subordinate, William T. Sherman, but supervised the latter effort personally, bringing him into direct confrontation with Confederate general Robert E. Lee. What Grant had intended as several offensive thrusts against logistical and political targets to force Lee to retreat or fight in the open turned into 40 days of nearly continuous and bloody combat, in which Lee succeeded in checking several of Grant's attacks but failed to prevent his crossing the James River and striking at Petersburg in mid-June 1864. Although Grant failed to take Petersburg and thus threaten Lee's logistical support and Richmond's connection to the Confederate heartland, he did succeed in pinning Lee down in defense of the Confederate capital. Lee tried to break Grant's stranglehold, notably by dispatching forces through the Shenandoah Valley to threaten points north and east, including Washington itself. But Grant held firm and eventually ordered Philip H. Sheridan to take care of the threat in the Shenandoah Valley. Through August, Grant's strategy appeared to have achieved little more than a bloody stalemate that engendered war-weariness and endangered Lincoln's reelection bid. That strategy succeeded, however, in cracking the Confederate lines when Sherman captured Atlanta on September 2, followed by Sheridan's triumphs in the Shenandoah. Reassured of eventual Union victory, voters reelected Lincoln.

Following the presidential contest, Grant approved Sherman's plan to march his troops across the Confederate interior to the sea, followed by a second march through the Carolinas. Despite some nervous moments, Grant was relieved when George H. Thomas crushed the last major Confederate threat at Nashville in mid-December 1864. As spring came to Virginia, Grant checked a breakout effort by Lee before launching his own offensive against Petersburg, resulting in the evacuation of both Richmond and Petersburg on the night of April 2, 1865. Launching an

immediate pursuit designed to prevent Lee from uniting with remaining Confederate forces in North Carolina or escaping to the Blue Ridge Mountains, which would prolong the war at great cost, Grant cut off the Confederate retreat and forced Lee's surrender at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865. His generous terms allowed Confederate soldiers to return home and spared Lee the humiliation of handing over his sword; they also provided a basis upon which to prevent prosecution of Confederate military personnel, notably Lee, for treason.

With the end of hostilities in 1865, Grant contemplated military intervention in Mexico to oust Maximilian's regime. He helped reorganize an enlarged regular Army that included, for the first time, black regiments. Given the Army's role in administering Reconstruction policy and in maintaining law and order in the occupied South, he found himself at the center of the debate over federal policy. This debate intensified after Pres. Andrew Johnson asked Grant to undertake a rapid tour of the South Atlantic states at the end of 1865. The president then submitted Grant's terse report to Congress as a justification of his lenient measures. Concerned about outbreaks of violence against the freedmen and their white allies and perturbed by reports of unfair treatment, Grant, who was elevated to four-star rank in 1866, positioned the Army to shield the freedmen. Grant worked closely with congressional Republicans in framing new legislative measures; he battled Johnson's efforts to thwart legislative intent; accepted reluctantly appointment as secretary of war ad interim in the wake of the suspension of Edwin M. Stanton and refused to join Johnson in defying Stanton's restoration. The resulting public break with the president reassured wavering Republicans that he would be a suitable presidential candidate in 1868. Reluctantly accepting the nomination, Grant prevailed in the fall contest, running ahead of his party.

As president, Grant continued to utilize military force to maintain order in the South, usually to protect Republican regimes and their supporters, including the freedmen. At the same time, he altered federal policy toward Native Americans in the trans-Mississippi West, taking advantage of a series of treaties negotiated in 1868 to replace military coercion and warfare with the removal of Native Americans

to reservations. On these reservations, the expectation was that they would be assimilated into white society through a process of education and religious indoctrination. Both policies collapsed during his second term, as white supremacist terrorism, limited federal power, and increasing public apathy in the North led to a retreat from intervention in the South; in addition, Grant's failure to stand fast against the pressures of white westward expansion, which escalated after the discovery of gold in the Black Hills in 1874, led to a renewal of the Indian Wars, including the disastrous battle of Little Bighorn on June 25, 1876. However, during the electoral crisis of 1876–77, Grant spoke softly but promised to react quickly to squelch any effort to disrupt the resolution of the dispute by force.

At the end of his second term in 1877, Grant embarked on a tour around the world, and was received as a prominent former world leader. After a failed bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1880, he retired to New York City, where his efforts to engage in business met with spectacular failure in 1884. That same year, he learned he was suffering from throat cancer. The need to provide for his family drove him to write the first of a series of articles on various battles and then his personal memoirs. The resulting two-volume work, hailed as a classic by many critics, offered in straightforward fashion his own account of the war in such persuasive language that readers often adopted his understanding as their own; the tone is authoritative and usually dispassionate, although some passages reflect dry wit or firm resolve. He completed the work days before his death at Mount McGregor, New York, on July 23, 1885. Buried in New York City, his body was removed to a majestic tomb overlooking the Hudson River on the occasion of his 75th birthday in 1897.

Grant's legacy to the American military tradition continues to evolve. Critics blasted him as an unimaginative, bloodthirsty butcher and cloddish plodder, but during most of the 20th century an image of Grant as a modern general, a master strategist, and a pragmatic, effective, levelheaded leader has emerged. Recently, this image has been augmented by the realization of Grant's understanding of the relationship between military means and political ends, his willingness to strike at Confederate logistics and morale as well as military forces, his evolving understanding of the

civil–military relationship that enabled him to forge a trusting working relationship with Lincoln, and his equally evolving commitment to emancipation of and the assumption by blacks of civil and political equality (demonstrated during the war by his endorsement of the use of black soldiers and his willingness to see a halt to prisoner of war exchanges unless black soldiers were included). Conceptions of Grant as the advocate of attrition and persistent hammering have undergone revision, as scholars now recognize as well his initiative and flexibility in response to changing situations. Some scholars have been willing to acknowledge his shortcomings, particularly in the earlier years of the war, when he did not always take sufficient care as to what the foe might be doing. "I don't underrate the value of military knowledge," he once observed, "but if men make war in slavish observance of rules, they will fail. . . . War is progressive, because all the instruments and elements of war are progressive. . . . The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on." Such deceptively simple maxims lay at the heart of one of the most fascinating figures in American military history.

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Civil War; Lee, Robert E.; Lincoln, Abraham

Related Documents

1863 g

—*Brooks D. Simpson*

Great Migration

The Great Migration was the largest internal mass movement of a racial or ethnic group in U.S. history. Migration has been a central dimension of the black experience in the United States. In the wake of the Civil War, thousands of former slaves tested the meaning of their freedom by leaving rural plantations for southern cities. By the 20th century, black migration had become national in scope. The most significant waves of African American migration in the 20th century have occurred in times of war. The years encompassing and immediately following World War I marked the beginnings of the Great Migration. The social, political, and economic dynamics of war both induced and facilitated relocating in search of better jobs, to escape segregation in the South, or to join relatives. Between 1910 and 1970 the demographics of African Americans shifted from being overwhelmingly southern and rural to largely northern and urban. During this period, more than six million African Americans abandoned the South in search of greater opportunity in the North, Midwest, and the West Coast.

Black migration during World War I was not solely from North to South—large numbers of rural African Americans relocated to nearby and steadily expanding southern cities. Nevertheless, major cities in the Northeast and Midwest offered the best potential for increased social, economic, and political opportunity and thus experienced the most significant increases in their black populations. Upwards of one million black Southerners left in search of a better life in the North during the war and throughout the 1920s. The most prominent migration streams flowed from rural areas of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas to Chicago, New York, Pittsburgh, and Detroit. The African American population of Chicago, one of the most popular migratory centers, increased by 50,000 to 75,000; Detroit's black community exploded from 6,000 in 1920 to 120,000 by 1930.

African-American Population in the U.S.

1910

one dot equals 1,000 African-Americans

1960

Source: U.S. Census.

A comparison of the African American population in 1910 and 1960 shows a general shift northward and into urban areas.

and political manifestations of white supremacy functioned as an even more potent force in the decision of African Americans to abandon the rural South. Black migrants actively searched for alternatives to the daily humiliations of Jim Crow and the ever-looming threat of violence that undergirded the southern power structure.

In addition, wartime employment opportunities pulled African Americans from their southern roots to major northern cities. African Americans eagerly filled industrial jobs left vacant because of the interruption of European immigration. Increased production demands brought about by the war made black people a vital source of labor for jobs normally considered off-limits. White agents often recruited southern African Americans for industrial employment and facilitated their arrival to a city.

Although shaped by the political economy of war, the Great Migration was fundamentally a grassroots movement propelled by the intrinsic desire for individual and familial safety, social dignity, political agency, and economic viability. African Americans did not need white labor agents to enlighten them about the benefits of leaving the South. Families carefully planned and strategized their departures. Migration often occurred in stages, with an individual family member leaving to scout housing and employment opportunities in advance of

Twentieth-century migration and its causes are traditionally analyzed in terms of "push-pull" factors; during the World War I era, economic and social conditions in the rural South pushed African Americans to actively seek out opportunities in northern urban areas. A depressed cotton market, compounded by the effects of successive boll weevil infestations further marginalized black sharecroppers. The social

his or her remaining kin. They were further aided by social networks, including previous migrants, family members, railroad workers, and communal organizations that informed potential "exodusters" of the prospects for a better life in the city and provided both tangible and intangible assistance to them in their transition. The *Chicago Defender*, for example, played an extremely important role. As the nation's largest-circulation black newspaper, the Defender encouraged the steady flow of African American Southerners by extolling the social and economic benefits of migration to Chicago, within the context of a stinging critique of southern white supremacy.

Resistance to mass southern migration existed among both whites and African Americans of various ideological persuasions. Predictably, white southern landowners decried the departure of significant segments of their black labor force and the potential fiscal ramifications. Booker T. Washington and other like-minded African American social leaders also attempted to dissuade potential migrants on the grounds that the South constituted the natural home of African Americans and urban life led to an inevitable decay of personal and moral values. Finally, the government became concerned that individual decisions by black farmers to seek other kinds of employment undermined its campaign to encourage maximum production and conservation of food at home to feed troops and civilians overseas.

Moving to the North was not a panacea. Employment opportunities became increasingly scarce and competitive following the war and the return of soldiers to their homes. De facto segregation characterized social and living conditions of most northern cities, resulting in the confinement of African Americans to congested neighborhoods. The growing black populations pushed racial boundaries, resulting in heightened tensions between whites and African Americans. A series of race riots swept the nation during this era, the most deadly occurring in East St. Louis, Washington, D.C., and Chicago, cities with large numbers of recent migrants.

The influx of southern migrants reshaped the character of African American communal life in the North. For example, the Great Migration exacerbated the significant role class played in the lives of black people. Longtime African American residents often viewed their newly arrived southern brethren as socially and culturally backward and feared that these newcomers would jeopardize the black community's tenuous social and political status in the eyes of whites. Nevertheless, migrants contributed significant social, political, and spiritual resources, profoundly transforming black culture, manifested in part in the advent of blues music and the arts of the Harlem Renaissance.

As was the case during the early years of the first Great Migration, further convulsions in the southern agricultural economy contributed to pushing rural African Americans out of the region during the 1930s and 1940s. The economic ravages wrought by the Great Depression, however, distinguished the migratory waves of this period from its World War I predecessor. Southern African Americans whose jobs involved working the land increasingly became refugees, as white landowners sought to maximize profits by mechanizing. The advent of the cotton harvester rendered the labor of thousands of African American farmers obsolete and further contributed to the disconnection of sharecroppers from the land that had been set in motion during the New Deal and the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Many of the thousands of African Americans arriving in northern cities could not secure employment in the constricted labor market.

World War II brought welcome relief. The war facilitated a second dramatic surge in African American migration, as more than five million African Americans left the South after 1940. Displaced workers flocked en masse to urban areas in search of wartime jobs and increased social freedom. Migration to popular northern cities such as Detroit, Chicago, New York, and Pittsburgh continued. However, the westward direction of the World War II–era Great Migration set it apart from that of the World War I era. Defense industries and the construction of naval shipyards attracted new residents by the millions. During the war years, approximately 350,000 African Americans migrated to California, with over 100,000 taking up residence in the San Francisco bay area.

While African American migrants faced many of the same challenges as previous arrivals, important differences existed. By World War II, African Americans had firmly established themselves in many northern cities and developed increased political influence in local affairs. This fact,

combined with a heightened political consciousness engendered by the war, inspired black migrants to demand greater social and economic rights. Despite the growing political significance of urban black constituencies, city governments struggled with varying degrees of success to peacefully incorporate new migrants into social, political, and economic municipal life and to mitigate interracial tensions. The nearly universal solution entailed residentially segregating African Americans within increasingly poor, overcrowded neighborhoods that steadily devolved into ghettos. In several cities, de facto segregation did not completely reduce the possibility of violent conflict. On June 20, 1943, Detroit erupted in a race riot that resulted in the death of 34 people, 25 of whom were African American.

African American migration from the South continued at a steady pace throughout the 1950s and 1960s. When the exodus began to slow by 1970, nearly half the nation's black population resided outside of the South, the vast majority living in cities. The Great Migration stands as a testament to the determination of African Americans to secure personal and familial freedom as they responded to larger social, political, and economic forces. It also illustrates how wars in the 20th century offered African Americans an opportunity to reshape their lives, which, in turn, reshaped the entire nation.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Race Riots; World War I; World War II

—*Chad L. Williams*

Greeley, Horace

(1811–72)

Editor of the *New York Tribune*, Presidential Candidate

As editor of the nation's most widely read newspaper during the Civil War, Horace Greeley exerted a powerful influence on northern public opinion—an influence that was frequently unhelpful to the Lincoln administration.

Born in Amherst, New Hampshire, Greeley came to New York City in 1831 and took jobs with local newspapers until he was able to start one of his own in 1841. Through much hard work over the next two decades, he built the *New York Tribune* into the nation's most influential newspaper.

He was an outspoken Whig and allied himself with Albany Whig powerbroker and fellow journalist Thurlow Weed as well as Weed's close ally, William H. Seward.

During the 1850s Greeley's *Tribune* took a strong anti-slavery stand, but its editor began to show his erratic nature. He followed his fellow northern Whigs into the Republican Party, but he became peeved at having received no public office in exchange for his stalwart advocacy of Weed and Seward, and so broke off his alliance with them. When Democratic senator Stephen A. Douglas was up for reelection in Illinois in 1858, Greeley exhorted Illinois Republicans to endorse Douglas rather than run a candidate of their own, because Douglas had resisted Pres. James Buchanan's efforts to foist a pro-slavery government on the unwilling voters of the Kansas Territory. When Illinois Republicans ignored Greeley's advice and nominated Abraham Lincoln instead, he used the Tribune's nationwide influence against the prairie lawyer. At the 1860 Republican Convention in Chicago, Greeley supported Missouri slaveholder Edward Bates against the odds-on favorite Seward. The nomination went to Lincoln.

When Lincoln won the election, Southerners began to talk of immediate secession from the Union; Greeley responded in the columns of the *Tribune* by defending the supposed right of secession. This aroused glee among the Southern fire-eaters and dismay among supporters of the Union. President-elect Lincoln wrote to Greeley, pointing out how destructive his statements were, and by January 1861, the *Tribune* had changed its tune and was denying the "right to dissolve this Union."

Within a few months, Greeley was clamoring for aggressive action against the secessionists. Learning that the Confederate Congress was scheduled to convene in Richmond on July 20, 1861, Greeley took up the cry of "Forward to Richmond!" Day after day the *Tribune* insisted that Union troops must take the city before the Confederate Congress met. Eventually the public pressure that Greeley helped arouse became strong enough to prompt the action he demanded. Lincoln directed Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell to advance, and the result was the Union debacle of First Bull Run. In the wake of that disaster, Greeley was in despair and wrote to Lincoln suggesting that the northern populace was now against the war and that it might be a good idea to give in and grant Confederate independence.

In August 1862, after Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan had failed in his Peninsula Campaign, Greeley addressed an open letter to Lincoln in the pages of the *Tribune*, titling his missive "The Prayer of Twenty Millions." In it he took the president to task for not being aggressive enough in attacking the institution of slavery. This article elicited Lincoln's famous reply, including the statement, "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union." But, in fact, Lincoln had already made up his mind to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

Greeley continued to believe that subduing the Confederacy by force of arms was impossible, and he persisted in acting on this pessimism. Late in 1862 he contacted the pro-Confederate French ambassador in Washington, urging him to secure French intervention to halt the war on the basis of Confederate independence. The ambassador, Henri Mercier, was only too happy to try, and had his government send inquiries to Secretary of State Seward, which Seward, on behalf of the Lincoln administration, indignantly rejected. Greeley remained adamant in his near-treasonous course, corresponding with Ohio Copperhead politician Clement L. Vallandigham, and promising a fellow journalist that he would "drive Lincoln" into a negotiated peace by foreign mediation.

Greeley opposed Lincoln's renomination and as late as August 1864 was canvassing the governors of the loyal states, seeking from them expressions of discontent with Lincoln and a desire to dump him from the ticket. While continuing to agitate to get Lincoln removed from the ticket, Greeley became involved in another highly questionable effort to secure peace without victory. During the summer of 1864 Confederate commissioners Clement C. Clay and Jacob Thompson traveled to Niagara Falls, Ontario, and communicated with Greeley by an intermediary, hoping to elicit major concessions from Lincoln or, failing that, to discredit Lincoln with the war-weary northern voting public. Greeley played directly into their hands and wrote a letter urging Lincoln to grant the men safe conduct to Washington, D.C., and back. Lincoln agreed to provide a safe conduct for anyone who could control the

Confederate armies and had proposals for peace on the basis of preserving the Union and emancipation, and he charged Greeley with carrying his message to the Confederate commissioners. Greeley balked, but Lincoln shrewdly insisted, giving Greeley a letter for the commissioners conveying the same message. The Confederates refused to negotiate on that basis and denounced Lincoln as a hypocrite. Greeley reechoed their denunciation in the columns of the *Tribune*.

On the day Lincoln was shot in 1865, Greeley wrote an editorial bitterly attacking the president. It would have run the next morning had not the *Tribune's* managing editor wisely suppressed it. In 1872 Greeley was the presidential nominee of the hapless Liberal Republican movement. Three weeks after his resounding defeat in the election, he died after a brief illness.

Horace Greeley presided over one of the most influential newspapers in the country during the Civil War. Although viewed by much of the public as a spokesman for the Republican Party, Greeley was as often as not at odds with the Lincoln administration. His extreme instability led him from cries of "On to Richmond" one week to whimpers that the war was lost the next, from bold demands for emancipation to insistent whining for a negotiated peace agreement that would surrender the great moral cause of the war. Greeley's erratic pen was one of the many difficulties with which the long-suffering Lincoln had to contend.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Davis, Jefferson; Lincoln, Abraham; Media and War

Related Documents

1862 d; 1865 a

—*Steven E. Woodworth*

Greenbacks

Wars cannot be won without money, and the Civil War occurred on such a scale that both the Union and the Confederacy struggled to create fiscal policies adequate for the task. The Confederacy never did. The United States government succeeded by creating a system based on an artful balance of taxation, interest-bearing bonds, and nationally issued legal tender notes known as "greenbacks," after the green dye used to print them. Prior to 1862, the U.S. government was required by law to pay its debts using specie (gold and silver) or specie-backed paper currency.

War costs—the training, provisioning, and paying for vast armies and a navy to blockade the entire South—quickly drained the U.S. Treasury of its specie reserves. Sec. of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase told Congress on February 3, 1862, that "immediate action is of great importance. The Treasury is nearly empty." A New York congressman, Elbridge G. Spaulding, proposed that the government issue its own paper currency as banks could do and that such currency not be redeemable for specie.

Serious questions arose about this proposal during the ensuing congressional debate. The U.S. Constitution gives the Congress the power "to coin money," which implies that Congress may authorize specie or perhaps specie-backed

currency, but legislators disagreed about whether this provision extended to paper money backed only by the assurance of the national government. Many worried that adding millions and millions of new dollars to the currency would cause a dramatic increase in prices and lead to inflation, affecting the entire economy.

Still, the overwhelming need to prosecute the conflict outweighed such considerations. On February 25, 1862, Congress passed the first Legal Tender Act, which authorized printing of $150 million in Treasury notes and compelled their acceptance for debts, public or private, the sole exception being interest on government bonds, which was still required to be paid in specie. Subsequent acts (July 11, 1862, and March 3, 1863) increased the amount of greenbacks in circulation to $450 million. The bills were widely accepted, though the value did fluctuate at times in relation to the gold dollar, according to the progress of the war, from a low of about 40 cents in early 1864 to near par value by war's end. Even so, inflation averaged just 80 percent (comparable to U.S. experience in the two world wars of the 20th century).

After the war ended, as the national government reduced the size of both the military and the infrastructure that supported it, the future of the greenbacks became a political issue. Creditors wanted the bills retired and taken out of circulation as quickly as possible. With less money in circulation, debt payments owed to creditors would be more valuable, benefiting banks and lending institutions but at the same time hurting borrowers, especially farmers.

Within 18 months of the war's end, the huge military had been disbanded, government purchases had decreased, and the country was in a recession. Debtors wanted to slow the rate at which the government was retiring the greenbacks. The compromise was to keep $356 million in circulation, which pleased neither side.

The Panic of 1873, the worst economic downturn in American history to that time, fueled the continuing debate about the fate of those greenbacks still in circulation. Pres. Ulysses S. Grant eventually sided with lenders and vetoed a measure to print more paper currency. In 1875, Grant approved the Specie Resumption Act, which ordered redemption of all greenbacks by January 1, 1879.

Such action was expected to dampen inflation and, with less money in circulation, would have increased the real value of debt—thus bankers welcomed what borrowers feared. Groups that had been working to repeal the new law coalesced in the National Greenback Party. A compromise in 1878, reflecting the deep divisions in the nation and in Congress, allowed for some new paper money to be put into circulation, backed by gold from recent discoveries in the West. The Bland–Allison Act of 1878 also permitted some coinage of silver dollars. Indeed, the continuing challenge of lenders and debtors, of price inflation and deflation, soon turned to bimetallism, with both a gold- and silver-backed currency, and the greenback issue was soon relegated to the back burner.

The National Greenback Party was typical of third parties in the latter half of the 19th century. Voters were tied in many ways to their parties, either Democratic or Republican, and were unwilling to vote for the other party and, in a way, betray a trust. They tended to express their frustration by supporting a third party as a protest, as in the case of the National Greenback Party. In 1876, the party's candidate, Peter Cooper, received 80,000 votes in the presidential election. In 1878, the group changed to the Greenback–Labor Party, receiving more than one million votes and seating 14 members in Congress. In 1880, the party nominated Gen. James B. Weaver and sought to broaden its appeal by including women's suffrage, federal control of interstate commerce, and a progressive income tax. Weaver, however, received only 300,000 votes. In 1884, the party nominated Benjamin F. Butler, who did rather poorly in the polling and the party disbanded, but it had shown the importance of monetary policy as part of the national political debate.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Economy and War

—*Charles M. Dobbs*

Gun Ownership

From the beginning of European settlement of North America, personal gun ownership has played an important, and often contentious, role in American society in times of war and peace alike. Privately owned guns made their way into most major armed conflicts fought until the end of the 19th century, both helping and hindering military efforts. Legal limits on gun ownership began in the early colonial period and, despite the passage of the 2nd Amendment, continue today as our society attempts to work out who has a right to posses firearms and what types of weapons should be available for personal ownership.

Privately Owned Guns in War

The majority of the firearms used to fight most early American wars belonged to the soldiers carrying them. Although the British government typically provided guns for its soldiers in its standing armies, soldiers' pay was often docked to cover the cost of the firearms because ownership was thought to give soldiers incentive to take better care of their weapons. Most colonies had laws requiring all able-bodied men, beginning at age 16 and lasting until at least age 50, to join militias (locally trained and operated military units). These laws also mandated that each man furnish himself with an appropriate firearm, as well as gunpowder, shot, and cartridge boxes. Not all men complied, and many towns did supply guns to their militias, although they also often sold the soldiers the guns. Although many government-owned arms not sold to soldiers were kept in designated storage areas, or returned after the end of fighting, publicly owned arms have appeared in lists of private belongings, suggesting that some of these weapons may have been treated as if they were privately owned.

Since colonial defense centered around the militia unit, gun ownership was crucial to winning early wars. Many of the wars fought between white settlers and Native Americans, such as the Pequot War (1637) and King Philip's War, or Metacomet's War, (1675–76) relied exclusively on the militia of the colonies involved and thus were heavily supported by private gun ownership. After 1689 the colonies were drawn into a series of global conflicts, including King William's War (1689–97), Queen Anne's War (1702–14), and the French and Indian War (1754–63) for which they received some British assistance but still heavily utilized the militia. During the Revolutionary War (1775–83), armed militia led the early fighting, most famously the minutemen who fought in the first battles at Lexington and Concord. Later the militia provided crucial support to the Continental Army and did so with privately owned weapons. Although many supporters of the Continental Army, including Gen. George Washington, disliked the disorderly and often disobedient militia, the militia system garnered enough support for the right to bear arms to be placed in the Bill of Rights, proposed in 1789.

When fighting the British during both the American Revolution and the War of 1812 (1812–14), the privately owned firearms of American militiamen caused logistical problems but also offered certain advantages. Men brought with them a wide variety of guns, each of which required a different caliber of bullet and charge of gunpowder—making the coordination and standardization of supplies difficult. Also, any militiaman using a rifle could not stand up to open battle situations because rifles took a great deal of time to reload. In contrast, the British government issued the smoothbore Brown Bess, which it produced to shoot a uniform-sized ball and to operate on a uniform powder charge. The smoothbores could be reloaded and fired a few times a minute. However, one advantage that the hodgepodge of militia firearms held over the Brown Bess was their often superior accuracy. This made the militia ideal for sniper fighting but relatively poor and close to defenseless in open battle. For much of the war, but especially after the battle of

Saratoga, the Continental Army relied on French (and other foreign powers') supplies of standardized Charleville muskets, which made this force more effective on the open battlefield and supply distribution much easier.

During the War of 1812, the American militia again faced the British Brown Bess, and proved the superiority of the militiaman's rifle in certain battle situations. Although the militia's greatest victory, the battle of New Orleans, occurred after a peace agreement had been reached, the impact of this American victory, popularly attributed to the rifles of backwoodsmen, lifted the spirits and hopes of the young nation. This victory elevated the militia—and privately owned rifles—to a place of great national respect.

By the time of the Civil War the trend had almost completely reversed: men typically did not bring guns to war, but rather came home with them. Both the United States and the Confederacy provided men with guns, which eased the troubles of supplying soldiers on both sides with cartridges and promoted the use of new, deadlier weapons technology. After the armistice soldiers on both sides came home with their weapons. The end of both World War I and World War II also flooded the gun market with surplus military guns at very low prices, vastly increasing the number of military-grade firearms in private ownership.

As the government continues to provide guns to soldiers, personal gun ownership is no longer a requirement for military service. Some states continue to authorize volunteer militias for the defense of the state; these organizations are separate from the state's National Guard contingents. Personal firearms' ownership allows these organizations to arm and prepare themselves to fight to defend their state and their freedom should they be needed, a tradition that closely parallels the purpose of the earliest American militias.

Gun Ownership and the Law

In the colonial period (1607–1776), most colonies' laws mandated that freemen own guns so they might serve in the militia and protect the colony. Although laws restricted certain groups from owning firearms, most notably Native Americans and later African slaves, gun ownership was encouraged among free whites. Legislation making gun ownership obligatory did not necessarily result in all men possessing a gun.

Scholars have debated the number of colonists who actually owned working guns, as well as the extent to which firearms were used in everyday life. Although a highly contentious subject, and varying greatly by region, many historians place the percentage of the free households owning guns at between 40 and 70 percent. The considerable cost of purchasing and maintaining a weapon and the necessary accessories such as powder and shot kept gun ownership out of the realm of possibility for the poorest. Although technically illegal in most colonial situations, Native Americans secured firearms through trade with different European allies: the French, Dutch, and Spanish, or from English colonists willing to risk the penalties of firearms' trade for the profits it brought.

With the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the right of private citizens to own guns gained constitutional protection. The 2nd Amendment validated the importance of privately owned firearms in protecting the fledgling republic: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." This provision ensured the continuation of the tradition of personal gun ownership in the developing nation just as new technology began to make firearms more accessible.

In the 19th century, changes in manufacturing technique, an increase in American manufacturers, and new styles of firearms made guns cheaper and more accessible. Legally, the 2nd Amendment protected the rights of citizens to own guns, but the right did not extend to many individuals living in America, most notably the slave population. A portion of the U.S. Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision (1857), a suit that made slavery legal in all U.S. territories, originally focused on Scott's possession of a firearm.

Unfortunately, records on firearms' ownership were not kept prior to the reorganization of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms in 1968; thus we have no reliable figures on the number of Americans who owned guns during the 19th and most of the 20th centuries. Gun censuses taken in the late 20th century indicate that about half of American households possessed some kind of gun.

While 19th-century laws had limited gun ownership rights to certain racial groups, 20th-century gun laws focused on banning certain types of weapons entirely. As

new technologies produced more deadly weapons, legislatures took steps to ban private ownership of many weapons, particularly those considered most dangerous or most likely to be used by criminals.

Although the use of privately owned guns has changed since the ratification of the Bill of Rights, even in the 21st-century, the 2nd Amendment continues to fuel intense debate and political controversy about its extent and purpose. The rise of a standing army, well equipped with weaponry by the government, and a proliferation in the number of sophisticated and dangerous firearms available to the public have led some to question the relevance of the 2nd Amendment and contemplate the limits of the right to bear arms. To understand the intent of the 2nd Amendment, the importance of firearms' ownership in the development of the United States must not be overlooked. Privately owned guns allowed the colonies to protect themselves and win wars against foreign powers and their own government; thus personal gun ownership was valued by those who wrote and ratified the Constitution and deemed necessary to protect the United States and its citizens.

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Related Entries

Colonial Militia Systems; Colonial Wars; Militia Groups; Munitions Industry; Revolutionary War; War of 1812

Related Documents

1611

—Amy Ann Cox

Gunboat Diplomacy

"Gunboat diplomacy" refers to a foreign policy that relies on force or the threat of force. To some extent, such an

approach to foreign policy has always existed between empires and nations. But in the American political lexicon the term is most commonly applied to U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean, Central America, and the northern tier of South America during the first three decades of the 20th century. Thereafter, this policy gave way to the "Good Neighbor Policy" formulated first by Herbert Hoover and then put into practice by Franklin D. Roosevelt, whereby the United States would commit to refraining from armed intervention in Latin America.

One of the first examples of American gunboat diplomacy was the mission of Comm. Matthew C. Perry, who steamed with eight ships, one-third of the U.S. Navy, to "open" Japan to trade with the United States in 1853. When Perry returned, as promised, the next year, the Tokugawa Shogunate agreed to the Treaty of Kanagawa in part out of recognition of what unbridled European powers were doing in nearby China. Naval shows-of-force followed in Korea, Hawaii, and China.

The Spanish–American War in 1898 gave the United States an overseas empire after the seizure of territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The war made clear the advantages of an ocean-going Navy to defend both coasts, the benefits of a trans-isthmian canal in Central America to save the long sea voyage around the southern tip of South America, and the need to secure bases in the Caribbean at the canal's eastern approaches. This strategic interest, coupled with pressure from banks and other businesses in the region, prompted the State and Navy departments to commit naval and marine forces to the Caribbean and Central America after 1895. Between the war with Spain in 1898 and U.S. entry into World War I in 1917, the U.S. government established a virtual hegemony in these waters. Some in the United States, calling themselves anti-imperialists, expressed their opposition to such interventions.

The process was aided by Pres. Theodore Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. To prevent German interference in 1904 in the affairs of the Dominican Republic, he declared and assumed the right of "an international police power," a right that he and succeeding presidents later exercised in Cuba, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and other nations. Roosevelt had already interfered in Colombian affairs. A

French company had failed at great cost to construct a canal across the narrow Panamanian isthmus, which was at the time a part of the province of Panama in Columbia. An official in that company and some Panamanian elites conspired in 1903 to establish an "independent" Panama; Roosevelt quickly recognized Panama as a sovereign nation and ordered U.S. naval forces to move toward the new country's coasts to defend against a possible response from Columbia. The leaders of the newly independent Panama signed a treaty giving the United States rights to build and operate a canal and to control land on either side until 1999. The canal, completed in 1914, remains an engineering marvel. More important in terms of gunboat diplomacy, the Panama Canal also drew U.S. government attention to the affairs of the Caribbean and Central America.

U.S. Army troops returned to Cuba from 1906 to 1909 under terms of the Platt Amendment of 1901, which forbade outright annexation of the island. In 1909, the U.S. Marines helped overthrow the government of Nicaragua, and they virtually occupied that country from 1912 through 1933. The U.S. Marines largely ran the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924.

In succeeding years, U.S. armed forces regularly interfered in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations to the south. After chasing Pancho Villa in northern Mexico, American armed forces occupied the Mexican port of Veracruz from 1914 to 1916. The United States also occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934.

The catchphrase used to justify such interference in the internal affairs of other countries changed over the decades. During the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, it was the "Roosevelt Corollary": if a Caribbean or Latin American nation failed in its obligations to a "great power," the United States, invoking this Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, would intervene in the offending nation and "correct" the "problem." During the presidency of Howard Taft, it was "Dollar Diplomacy," the aim of which was to secure the Caribbean and the bordering nations of Latin America for investment by U.S. banks and corporations by posting American Customs and Treasury officials in nations that were on the brink of bankruptcy. Pres. Woodrow Wilson wanted to expand Progressivism into foreign relations, and

he justified the continuation of gunboat diplomacy by the need to to punish "immoral" nations in the region. The Republican presidents of the l920s returned to Dollar Diplomacy and a hunt for stability. In the 1930s Pres. Franklin Roosevelt, despite a few brief landings of naval personnel in Cuba to protect American property, advanced the "Good Neighbor Policy," which seemingly ended this era of American intervention in the affairs of other nations. Roosevelt proclaimed that "in the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others." Thus an era appeared to come to an end.

Depending on one's perspective, however, the United States may be said to have continued Gunboat Diplomacy as a means of statecraft around the world. In the aftermath of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, U.S. military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intervened, with mixed success, to prop up or to establish regimes friendly to the United States regardless of their democratic status. In 1953, the CIA helped overthrow the supposedly communist-leaning regime of Mohammed Mossadeq in Iran, restoring the shah to power. The following year, the United States overthrew Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala. The U.S. government supported Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in Cuba until 1959 and thereafter tried to destabilize the government of Fidel Castro, including training and then inadequately supporting the invasion of Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Pres. Lyndon Johnson approved an occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965 to overthrow Juan Bosch, and Pres. Richard Nixon supported the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile. A Senate committee in the late 1960s discovered that the Navy had deployed carrier task groups throughout the world in reaction to reports of "trouble" some 62 times in the 15 years since the outbreak of the Korean War, and that the State Department had been aware of only 29 of these deployments.

Some critics claim that the United States has never abandoned gunboat diplomacy, using an expansive definition of the term whereby military action, short of total war, replaces diplomacy and blurs the line with "limited war." Such critics would characterize the American war in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War, and the subsequent Iraq War, which began in 2003, as modern examples of gunboat diplomacy. Others feel that the term should be limited to its original context.

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Related Entries

Butler, Smedley Darlington; Central America and the Caribbean, Interventions in; Marine Corps; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Roosevelt, Theodore; Spanish–American War; Wilson, Woodrow

—Charles M. Dobbs

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
Hague Convention

See Geneva and Hague Conventions.

Halsey, William F., Jr.

(1882–1959)
World War II Navy Field Commander

Adm. William Frederick Halsey, Jr., called "Bull" Halsey in the press, was a famed U.S. Navy field commander in the Pacific theater during World War II. Admired for his fighting approach to command and his outspoken hatred of the Japanese enemy, Halsey held several crucial commands during the war. A controversial decision at the battle of Leyte Gulf, in addition to negligence that allowed his forces to be caught in a typhoon, damaged his reputation; but he remained a hero with the public and a legendary naval icon.

Halsey was born in 1882, the son of a naval officer and the latest in a family of seafarers. After several earlier attempts to earn an appointment, Halsey was admitted to the U.S. Naval Academy in 1900. An undistinguished student, he was already demonstrating qualities in the athletic and social spheres that would make him a successful leader. He was dubbed "everybody's friend" in the academy yearbook, but he was also keenly interested in all matters naval and military. Upon graduation, he served aboard a series of battleships and cruisers, including an around-the-world trip from 1907 to 1909 on Teddy Roosevelt's "Great White Fleet."

Shortly thereafter, however, he began his service aboard destroyers, where during the next two decades he made his reputation as an aggressive commander and capable leader of men. Once on maneuvers he ordered his destroyers so close in for an attack on some battleships that his ships inflicted more than $1 million in damage with their "dummy" torpedoes. At the age of 50, sensing that the Navy's future lay with aviation, he pulled some strings to go through flight school with men half his age. After earning his wings in 1932, he spent the next several years learning carrier formations and tactics. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, he was one of the Navy's leading aviation experts and much admired as a supportive but no-nonsense commander.

With the loss of so much of its battleship strength on the opening day of warfare in the Pacific theater, the U.S. Navy had to rely on its aircraft carriers to bring the fight to the Japanese until American shipyards could rebuild the fleet. This situation brought Halsey immediately to the fore as one of America's most daring and successful leaders. He led a series of carrier raids in early 1942, including the legendary Doolittle raid on the Japanese home islands. He missed the battle of Midway in June because of a temporary but disabling skin affliction, but shortly thereafter he was appointed to command of the South Pacific Ocean Area during the desperate critical campaign for Guadalcanal. Halsey's firm resolve to hold the island in the face of mounting Japanese pressure was the finest moment of his career. He won the lasting gratitude of the Marines when he told their commander at the darkest hour of the campaign, "I promise you everything I've got," and then was as good as his word. After six months of tenacious fighting in which the advantage went first to one side and then the other, the Japanese withdrew the last of their troops from Guadalcanal, ceding the island and its critical airfield to the Americans.

During the next year, Halsey led the revitalized American counteroffensive up the Solomon Islands chain and cooperated with Gen. Douglas MacArthur in isolating Rabaul, the major Japanese naval and air base in the region. In 1944, he and Adm. Raymond Spruance assumed command of the now powerful U.S. carrier forces for a series of operations in the central Pacific. To keep the pressure on the Japanese, the two admirals alternated command, with one leading a major amphibious assault while the other planned the next operation ashore with his staff. In this fashion, the fleet slugged its way through the Marshalls, the Marianas, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and finally Okinawa. By the time the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, Halsey's carriers and surface ships were cruising the waters around the home islands with impunity, raining destruction with bombs and shells.

Although always careful with the lives of his men, Halsey was bold and aggressive with his forces. While this quality often paid off in saving time and lives by advancing the timetable for planned operations, it also led to his most controversial decision. During the invasion of Leyte Island in the Philippines in October 1944, he led the fast carriers and modern battleships in pursuit of weak Japanese carrier forces, exposing the vulnerable transports and supply ships in Leyte Gulf to attack by a powerful force of Japanese battleships and cruisers. Only the heroism of a minuscule covering force of undersized escort vessels and the timidity of the Japanese commander averted a major disaster. Halsey formally defended his decision after the war, but it was this action and the fleet's subsequent encounter with an avoidable typhoon, in which three ships were lost, that sullied his ultimate battlefield record.

Halsey was, however, much more than one of the important American field and theater commanders of World War II. His adamant refusal to contemplate failure or withdrawal from Guadalcanal in the darkest days of the war in the Pacific heartened the nation, and Americans rallied around his belligerent defiance of the Japanese threat and his condemnation of their brutalities. When he said in a 1945 interview that he hoped American bombers would spare Emperor Hirohito's white horse because he looked forward to riding it after victory was won, people from all over the

U.S. sent him saddles and other riding tack for that anticipated event. To Americans, he was always "Bull" Halsey, the personification of the American warrior.

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MacArthur, Douglas; World War II

Related Documents

1942 c, d; 1944 b

—Mark P. Parillo

Harlem Hellfighters

As one of the most celebrated African American units of all time, the 369th Infantry Regiment's heroic performance in battle during World War I posed a direct challenge to American Army officials' claim that blacks were unfit for front-line duty. In the interwar period, celebrations of the unit's achievements helped energize the civil rights movement as it adopted a more militant tone. The regimental band led by Lt. James Reese Europe also gained fame in both the United States and France and has been credited with introducing jazz to the European continent. The regiment's drum major, Sgt. Noble Sissle, later gained fame on Broadway as a singer, conductor, and composer.

The "Harlem Hellfighters," as the 369th Infantry Regiment came to be called, traces its roots to June 2, 1913,

when the governor of New York, William Sulzer, signed into law a bill authorizing an all-black regiment for his state's National Guard, but several years passed before the unit was organized. On June 16, 1916, the unit was formally organized as the 15th New York Infantry Regiment and mobilized with other National Guard regiments along the Mexican border. A white officer, former Nebraska National Guardsman, and attorney Col. William Hayward played a key role in recruiting and organizing the regiment. Other officers were graduates of Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, and sons of elite New York families, such as Hamilton Fish, Jr., who was commissioned as captain by Hayward. The 200 African American residents of New York City who formed the nucleus of the regiment first met at a Harlem cigar store with a dance hall above it that the unit converted into a temporary armory.

When President Wilson declared war in April 1917, the 15th New York was recruited to war strength and sent to Camp Whitman in Poughkeepsie, New York, for training. It also guarded various points around New York City to protect against sabotage. Hayward attempted to have the regiment integrated into the 27th New York Division and the 42nd Rainbow Division, but was rejected by the divisional commanders who told him that black was not a color of the rainbow. In October 1917, the 15th was sent to Camp Wadsworth in Spartanburg, South Carolina, for formal training. Racial tensions in Spartanburg prevented these black soldiers from entering local stores or riding on the city's streetcar. Fearing that a riot would ensue, Hayward met with Sec. of War Newton Baker in Washington, D.C., and persuaded the War Department to remove the 15th from Wadsworth. On December 27, 1917, the regiment left Spartanburg and shortly thereafter embarked for overseas service in France.

In France the regiment was sent to a Service of Supply camp at St. Nazaire. Despite having trained for combat, the men were ordered to build storehouses and docks, and undertook stevedore work. Gen. John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, had no immediate plans to send his African American units to serve at the front with the white regiments. Pressure from Hayward, as well as civic organizations in the United States

and a desperate French Army in need of replacements, persuaded Pershing to allow the 15th New York and three other black regiments to serve with the French. These four regiments were formed into the 93rd Division and remained with the French Army for the remainder of the war. The 15th was federalized as the 369th United States Infantry Regiment in March 1918.

The 369th wore American uniforms, but the men were issued French helmets, brown leather belts and pouches, and their weapons were mainly supplied by the French. It was assigned to the 161st French Division in the Afrique Sector, which was west of the Argonne Forest and largely held by French colonial troops. On April 8, 1918, the regiment saw its first combat with the 16th French Division and served with it until July 3. During this period the regiment gained notice when a 24-man German patrol conducted a trench raid against a sector held by the 369th on May 13, 1918. A communication post in this sector was guarded by two enlisted men, Needham Roberts and Henry Johnson. They were the first to hear the enemy and engaged the approaching Germans. Despite receiving wounds, both Roberts and Johnson used pistols, rifle butts, and a bolo knife to kill a number of the enemy and drive the others away. For their bravery they were awarded the French Croix de Guerre, but they were denied medals by the American Army.

The regiment returned to combat and, after participating in the second battle of the Marne, was attached in July to the 161st French Division for the Allied counterattack. On August 19 the regiment was pulled from the line after having been at the front for 130 consecutive days. It then returned to the front on September 25 and fought with the Fourth French Army in conjunction with the American drive during the Meuse–Argonne offensive. The 369th distinguished itself by capturing the important village of Sechault against strong resistance upon the heights north of the Dormoise River. There the unit suffered numerous casualties and was without food and reinforcement during the attack. Because of the regiment's gallantry in action, the French called it the "Harlem Hellfighters" and awarded it the Croix de Guerre.

In mid-October of 1918 the regiment was deployed to a quiet sector in the Vosges Mountains and remained there until the armistice of November 11. It had spent 191 days at

the front, more than any other American unit, and had not lost any men as prisoners. General Pershing designated the 369th the first Allied unit to advance to the Rhine for occupation duty. On February 17, 1919, the 369th returned to the United States and marched up Fifth Avenue in New York City to enthusiastic crowds; Lt. James Europe was at the head of the parade with the 60-piece regimental band.

During World War II the 369th Infantry was reactivated on May 15, 1942, and again attached to the 93rd Division. It trained at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and Camp Young, California, and participated in various maneuvers and exercises. The 369th left San Francisco on January 28, 1944, for the Pacific theater, landing in Guadalcanal the following month. From there the regiment moved to Munda Airfield on New Georgia Island in the Central Solomons. The 369th spent most of its service time training, supplying labor details, conducting tactical exercises, and patrolling throughout the islands. The last resulted in numerous Japanese killed and taken prisoner.

After the war, the unit returned to the National Guard and underwent several redesignations and reorganizations and, after the desegregation of the American military in 1948, ceased to be solely an African American unit. More recently the regiment was reactivated as the 369th Transportation Battalion and served during the Persian Gulf War, and was then redesignated the 369th Support Battalion. It remains a component of the National Guard in New York City.

As the most visible example of African American military achievement in the segregated Army of World War I, the unit played an important role in the African American community, providing a symbol of heroism and underscoring the hypocrisy of America's war for democracy in Europe even as its minority citizens at home were subject to manifold injustices. James Europe, Henry Johnson, and Needham Roberts became household names in Harlem. Their examples were held up by such prominent civil rights activists as W. E. B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey to encourage civilians to join the cause for civil rights at home in the postwar period.

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African Americans in the Military; Du Bois, W. E. B.; World War I; World War II

—*Mitch Yockelson*

Related Documents

1919 b, c

Hastie, William Henry

(1904–76)
Civil Rights Lawyer, Educator, Federal Judge

African American attorney and educator William Henry Hastie devoted his life and career to ending segregation and discrimination in American society. Together with his cousin Charles Houston (who, like Hastie, had been dean of the Howard University Law School), and their student, future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, Hastie devised and executed the legal strategy used by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to chip away at legalized segregation and discrimination in the 1930s and 1940s, thereby laying the groundwork for the group's ultimate victory in the landmark Supreme Court case, *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954).

As a law professor at Howard University, Hastie trained a cadre of civil rights lawyers who shared his vision and carried on his work. As assistant solicitor in the Interior Department and later as a federal judge in and governor of the U.S. Virgin Islands, he worked to end segregation there and prepare the residents for self-rule. Even his failure to convince the U.S. military of its need to desegregate during World War II furthered his goal of bringing racial equality to national attention.

Born in Knoxville, Tennessee, on November 17, 1904, Hastie was educated at Amherst College and Harvard University Law School. Thereafter, he practiced law in Washington, D.C., and taught at Howard University Law School, then one of the principle centers of civil rights activism in America. He also joined the NAACP's legal team and, with Houston and Marshall, chose, prepared, and argued the group's first desegregation and discrimination cases.

In 1933 Hastie was named assistant solicitor in the Department of the Interior, where he handled such issues as Native American oil rights, federal support for vocational education, and employment discrimination against African Americans. His most enduring achievement at the department, however, was his work on legislation that included a new, more democratic constitution for the U.S. Virgin Islands. Hastie's efforts brought him to the attention of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he joined FDR's "black cabinet"—a group of African American federal officials who informally advised the president on racial matters.

In 1937 Roosevelt appointed Hastie to a four-year term as a federal judge in the Virgin Islands. Although he served only two years, Hastie had considerable impact on the islands' political and social culture by encouraging the formation of a broad-based political party, the protection of civil liberties, and an end to discrimination.

Hastie resigned in 1939 to become dean of Howard University Law School, but in 1940 he took a leave of absence when Roosevelt appointed him civilian aide to Sec. of War Henry Stimson. Initially, Hastie resisted the high-level appointment because he knew his success at ending segregation in the military would be limited, given the racist attitudes of many in the armed forces. However,

he ultimately agreed to serve because he believed that any effort to end segregation at home would help defeat fascism abroad.

As Hastie suspected, his tenure was difficult, and many of his initiatives were thwarted. Sometimes he was deliberately misled or denied access to information about the ways blacks in the military were treated. He persisted, however, in opposing plans to segregate housing and dining facilities, supporting officer training for African Americans, and protesting unwarranted disciplinary and legal actions meted out to African Americans in service. Hastie did win some victories. Thanks to his efforts, more African Americans joined the Army, more were trained in integrated schools, and more African American units were formed.

Still, conditions for African Americans in the service remained poor, a fact Hastie highlighted when he resigned in 1943 to protest what he termed "the reactionary policies and discriminatory practices" of the fledgling Army Air Corps (*New York Times*, 1976). Ironically, Hastie's resignation fostered the military's acceptance of African Americans. After he left, the military began to desegregate more systematically, integrating training schools (except for the famed Tuskegee Air Base) and opening up opportunities for African Americans to attend schools of aviation medicine and become medical officers.

Undaunted, Hastie returned to Howard University Law School and his NAACP work. During this time, he and Marshall won victories in two important civil rights cases—one that ended white primaries in the South and another that halted segregation in interstate transportation.

In 1946, Hastie was appointed the first African American governor of the Virgin Islands. Three years later he was named a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit—again the first African American to be appointed to such a position. He became chief judge in 1968 and, at his death on April 14, 1976, he was a senior judge.

Hastie's impact on American society and the military was enormous. As a teacher, he educated a generation of African American civil rights lawyers who shared his vision of a color-blind America. His work on the constitution of the U.S. Virgin Islands and his subsequent efforts to build democratic institutions there prepared that nation for successful

self-governance. His principled resignation over the failure of the Army Air Corps to desegregate during World War II served as a catalyst for the integration of the American military. His most important legacy, however, lies in his work with the NAACP. The court cases that he worked on in the 1930s and 1940s helped demolish legalized segregation and discrimination in the United States and laid the foundation for a more equitable society for all Americans.

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African Americans in the Military; Davis, Benjamin O., Sr.; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces

Related Documents

1941; 1942 a, b; 1944 e; 1945 a; 1948 b

—*Mary Jo Binker*

Health

See Medicine and War.

Hiroshima

Book by John Hersey, 1946

John Hersey was one of the first Western journalists to arrive in Hiroshima, Japan, after the city was destroyed by an atomic bomb on August 6, 1945. His purpose was to interview survivors and to witness firsthand the condition of the city. In plain, unemotional language, he detailed the various effects of the bomb and humanized its victims. Based on interviews with six survivors who had avoided the full brunt of the blast, *Hiroshima* describes in poignant detail the severe radiation burns suffered by thousands in the city, the resulting illnesses and social rejection victims suffered, and the obliviousness of authorities in Japan.

Hersey's report was published in a single issue of the *New Yorker* on August 31, 1946, taking up nearly the entire text allotment of that issue in a highly unusual move for the magazine. It was published as a book later that year by Alfred A. Knopf. Hersey returned to Japan several decades later, producing a second edition in 1985 that brought the stories of these six victims up-to-date.

Hersey tells of the disaster through the stories of a Japanese Methodist pastor, a German Jesuit priest, two Japanese doctors, a young female clerk employed in a war-related tin works, and the widow of a Japanese tailor. He describes survivors flocking to the hospital of one of his characters, Dr. Terufumi Sasaki, hours after the blast: "Wounded people supported maimed people; disfigured families leaned together. Many people were vomiting. . . . Tugged here and there in his stocking feet, bewildered by the numbers, staggered by so much raw flesh, Dr. Sasaki lost all sense of profession and stopped working as a skillful surgeon and a sympathetic man; he became an automaton, mechanically wiping, daubing, winding, wiping, daubing, winding" (35).

Hersey relates how a colleague of the office worker was burned beyond recognition simply because of how that person was physically positioned, while others in the vicinity were left apparently unscathed—at least initially. The pastor, Rev. Kiyoshi Tanimoto, found men and women on a spit of land in a river, drove a boat onto the bank and urged them to get on board. "They did not move and he realized they were too weak to lift themselves. He reached down and

took a woman by the hands, but her skin slipped off in huge, glovelike pieces" (60).

Those who survived the initial blast soon developed boils and other symptoms of radiation exposure. They later found themselves shunned by Japanese who had not been exposed. Hersey summed up his six survivors' lives a year after the bomb was dropped: the clerk was crippled; the priest was back in the hospital, still suffering from radiation sickness; the surgeon was "not capable of the work he once could do"; the doctor whose private hospital had been destroyed "had no prospects of rebuilding it"; the pastor "no longer had his exceptional vitality." Their lives "would never be the same," but they did share one feeling: "a curious kind of elated community spirit, something like that of the Londoners after their blitz—a pride in the way they and their fellow-survivors had stood up to a dreadful ordeal" (114).

The riveting quality of Hersey's narrative, told as it was from the perspectives of inhabitants of the former enemy's city, affected Americans as they became aware of the enormity of the destructive capacity of atomic weapons. The book may also have helped to change American attitudes toward the Japanese people. Charles Poore's review in the November 10, 1946, edition of the *New York Times* begins, "In the waning days of last August people all over the United States who read *The New Yorker* suddenly began to discuss the harrowing experiences of a clerk in the personnel department of a tin works, a doctor in a private hospital, a tailor's widow . . . ".

Hiroshima became a centerpiece in later debates about nuclear war, contributing to popular sentiment that such weapons should never again be employed. For example, in March 2005 Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told a *New York Times* reporter that, after having been assigned the book in a college course in the late 1960s, he decided to change his major from chemistry and mathematics to political science in the hope that some day "I could prevent nuclear war" (Mar. 18, 2005).

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Civil Defense; Cold War; *Dr. Strangelove*; Literature and War; Nuclear Strategy; Truman, Harry S.; World War II

Related Documents

1945 e

—*Jeffrey A. James*

Hispanics

See Latinos in the Military.

Hitchcock, Ethan Allen

(1798–1870)
Military Officer and Man of Conscience

Private U.S. citizens have felt reasonably free to criticize their government's war policies and to decline to volunteer for service in time of war (except when subject to conscription). Professional soldiers who have taken the oath to protect and defend the Constitution are not so free. Hence, when such a professional is called upon to participate in a war he or she regards as immoral or unwinable, that individual may face a crisis of conscience. Ethan Allen Hitchcock faced more than one such crisis and left an extensive diary documenting his thoughts.

Hitchcock was born in Vermont in 1798, the son of a federal judge. His mother was the daughter of Ethan Allen, the leader of Vermont's struggle for independence from the colony of New York and a military leader of the Green Mountain Boys during the Revolutionary War. Hitchcock's

parents secured his appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1814.

Hitchcock proved to be an avid student and sought to stay on at the academy for an unprecedented fourth year, but he was commissioned in 1817. He was promoted on the basis of his successful facilitation of the dredging (rows of pilings deepening the channel by narrowing and accelerating the water's flow) of Mobile Bay in 1818. From 1824 to 1827 he served as an instructor in military tactics at West Point, during which time he was advanced in rank to captain. His leisure was spent reading classical works of philosophy and theology.

In 1827 he and several of his academy colleagues objected to Superintendent Sylvanus Thayer's unlawful calling of a Board of Inquiry. He and others were placed under arrest and then reassigned; Hitchcock was ordered to a distant post in the West. He appealed to the secretary of war and then to Pres. John Quincy Adams, explaining to a friend that his "conscientious conviction of the justness of my opinion" had left him no other choice. While on the way to his regiment, he appealed again to the president and soon learned from a newspaper account that Adams had decided that Hitchcock was right. Thayer honored him by securing his recall to serve as the academy's commandant of cadets. When the next president, Andrew Jackson, personally intervened with a case of academy discipline in 1830, Hitchcock traveled to Washington, D.C., appealed to Jackson, and secured a reversal. But the president persisted in intervening in academy discipline; in 1831 both Thayer and Hitchcock resigned their posts in protest.

Hitchcock took several months of leave to visit his older brother, Henry, chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court and a planter. Henry offered him a cotton plantation said to be worth $10,000 yearly if he would resign his Army commission and move to Mobile. Hitchcock declined. His diary thereafter contains entries critical of slavery.

In 1832 Hitchcock objected in his diary to Col. James Gadsden's defrauding of Seminole leaders in negotiations. When the Second Seminole War began in 1836, Hitchcock was named assistant adjutant general and was soon negotiating with the Seminole leader, Osceola. But, he wrote in his diary, "the government is in the wrong, and this is the chief cause of the persevering opposition of the Indians, who have nobly defended their country." By 1837 he was serving as the disbursing officer within the Indian Bureau in St. Louis, Missouri. He angered some by refusing to honor the claims of speculators who had acquired Indian treaty land claims for a fraction of their value. Hitchcock was sustained in those actions by his superiors in Washington and promoted to the rank of major. In 1842 he was sent to the Five Nations in Indian Territory to hear their complaints of fraud. Hitchcock concurrently appealed to the chair of the House Indian Affairs Committee and to the secretary of war for a just settlement of the seeming endless Seminole War, with the suggestion that the Seminoles be guaranteed permanent sovereignty of the Everglades region. Soon he was dispatched as the lieutenant colonel of the 8th infantry regiment to the war zone in Florida. "I confess to a very considerable disgust in this service," he wrote. With considerable delicacy and humanity, he persuaded the Seminole chief, Pascofa, to agree to move to Indian Territory with his exhausted, hard-pressed people.

By 1845 the Polk administration and Texas leadership had secured a formal annexation of Texas—and within months Mexico and the United States were at war. "If I could by any decent means get a living in retirement," he wrote in November, "I would abandon a government which I think corrupted by both ambition and avarice." In March 1846, he added that the war was "a most unholy and unrighteous proceeding; but, as a military man, I am bound to execute orders." Hitchcock served with Gen. Zachary Taylor's forces in Corpus Christi until a debilitating illness forced him to withdraw for surgery and convalescence. "The [professional] soldier," he observed in November, "may be ordered into an unjust war," but, unlike others, "he cannot at that time abandon his profession—at all events, not without making himself a martyr." Thus in December, having recuperated, he prepared to join Gen. Winfield Scott's Veracruz expedition as Scott's inspector general. He told his diary: "in this [war] I must be an instrument." But simultaneously he wrote to Unitarian minister Theodore Parker, an outspoken critic of the war: "I wish [to enter] my

protest against [this war] as unjust on our part. I am here not by choice, but because, being in the army, it is my duty to obey the constituted authorities. As an individual I condemn . . . this war: as a member of the government I must go with it until our authorities are brought back to a sense of justice." When General Scott's columns reached the vicinity of Mexico City, in June 1847, Hitchcock obeyed Scott's order to prepare and distribute an Address to the People of Mexico justifying the U.S. measures. He was brevetted colonel for gallantry at Contreras and Churubuseo, and brigadier general for his service at Molino del Rey, and was granted a federal land warrant for 160 acres. This he gave to a cousin. "It is for service in the field," he noted, "but as it was in a detestable war, I have concluded to put it out of my hands."

In the early 1850s he commanded the Pacific Military Division while noting that the actions he felt called upon to take against native tribes in California and Oregon were prompted by white violations of native treaty rights: "It is a hard case for the troops to know the whites are in the wrong" he noted, "and yet be compelled to punish the Indians if they attempt to defend themselves."

In the spring of 1855, he was ordered to join his regiment and report to Gen. William Harney in a campaign against the Brule Sioux. This he recorded as "the most fatal order" he had ever received, for he regarded Harney as "the man whom I hold in least respect of all men in the army." En route to the posting, on October 6, he tendered his resignation from the Army, observing therein that he could not "place myself under orders of such a man" so lacking in "humanity." He soon heard of Harney's treacherous parley-ruse with a band of Brule on September 3, after which Harney's men fell upon the band, killing 86 men, women, and children.

His resignation was accepted, and for several years Hitchcock lived quietly in retirement. But early in the Civil War, at the age of 64, he was offered the command of the Army of the Tennessee. He declined, but was thereupon summoned to Washington, where Sec. of War Edwin Stanton and Pres. Abraham Lincoln urged him to relieve Gen. George McClellan as the head of the Army of the Potomac. Again he declined, fearing that his health was not up to the rigors of camp and field. By November 1862 he was named advising general of the War Department.

In April 1862, Hitchcock drew up the regulations that were to govern the treatment of Confederate prisoners of war; in November of that year he was appointed commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. In December he chaired the committee that oversaw Prof. Francis Lieber's drafting of General Order 100, the first codified laws of warfare, to govern the conduct of Union troops in the field.

In 1863 he presided over the court-martial of a Maryland civilian accused of having helped Confederate cavalry locate a herd of cattle. The evidence did not warrant a finding of treasonable conduct, and the man was merely admonished, prompting Secretary Stanton to dissolve the court and to order a second trial. Hitchcock penned a scathing protest, and the secretary relented. Hitchcock died in 1870.

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Civil War; Lincoln, Abraham; Mexican War; Military Academy, United States

Related Documents

1835; 1966 c; 1971 b; 2000

—*Peter Karsten*

Holocaust, U.S. Response to

Few aspects of World War II have evoked as much controversy as how the United States responded to the genocidal policies of Nazi Germany. At the time, Nazi atrocities sparked widespread debate between isolationists and interventionists, centering on the extent to which the United States was responsible for the safety of citizens of other countries. Beginning in the 1960s, a number of historians argued that the U.S. government, especially the State Department and the armed forces, had failed to take actions that could have rescued a significant number of Jews from Hitler's regime. Other scholars have concluded the United States did all it could to rescue European Jewry. They maintain that the only way to thwart Nazi genocide was to secure the military defeat of Nazi Germany.

Prewar Responses

The anti-Semitism of the Nazis became quickly apparent when the regime came to power in January 1933. In March 1933, the American Embassy in Berlin and U.S. consuls reported numerous mob attacks on Jews as well as the systematic removal of Jews from positions in government, education, and the legal profession. The U.S. press gave significant coverage to the anti-Semitic writings and actions of the Nazi regime.

Although political and ethnic divisions existed within American Jewry, these reports generated widespread alarm. Several organizations, such as the Joint Distribution Committee and the American Jewish Committee, began initiatives to aid the embattled German Jewish community. American Jews were joined by other religious and nonsectarian organizations, most notably the Quaker American Friends Service Committee. Moreover, the Jewish War Veterans together with other Jewish organizations, as well as a number of churches, civic organizations, and intellectuals joined in publicizing Nazi policies and organizing boycotts of German goods. Not all Americans believed the United States should actively intervene in another country's internal affairs, however, and a number of American corporations continued to operate their subsidiaries in Germany. In addition, although a significant number of American athletes supported the idea of a boycott, the American Olympic Association voted by a narrow margin to participate in the 1936 Olympics held in Berlin.

The U.S. government's response to German Jews fleeing Germany was similarly mixed. The Roosevelt administration supported efforts by the League of Nations to coordinate the resettlement of German refugees and played a key role in organizing an international conference at Evian, France, in 1938 to consider solutions to the problem. At the same time, the U.S. State Department, which was roundly criticized by Jewish groups and others, was rigidly enforcing immigration laws that denied entry to Jews seeking to flee Germany, Austria (after 1938), and Czechoslovakia (after 1939). Although much of the public was considerably dismayed by the plight of refugees fleeing Europe, Congress in the 1930s consistently refused to relax strict immigration quotas, even for refugee children. Anti-Semitic sentiments certainly played some part, but the Great Depression and high unemployment also inhibited support for admitting more refugees.

Jews fleeing Germany faced enormous obstacles, especially the restrictions the Nazis placed on taking assets out of the country and the need to find countries that would accept refugees. In 1939, newspapers widely covered the plight of the Jewish refugees aboard the passenger ship *St. Louis*—denied entrance into Cuba, they searched in vain for safe harbor before turning back to Germany. Despite the reluctance of the United States and other Western countries to lift immigration barriers, William D. Rubenstein in *The Myth of Rescue* (1997) has calculated that nearly 72 percent of German Jews were able to leave Germany from 1933 to 1939 (although some fled to countries later conquered by the Nazis). Unfortunately, some German Jews, especially the elderly, were reluctant to leave Germany; although the Nazis remained consistently anti-Semitic, policy implementation displayed significant ebbs and flow in harshness.

The systematic destruction of Jewish synagogues and other property during Kristallnacht in November 1938 led to a decisive heightening in the level of persecution and convinced many German Jews to flee. American newspaper editorials almost uniformly condemned this act of barbarity, while Pres. Franklin Roosevelt recalled the American ambassador to Germany; breaking with diplomatic precedent, he

publicly condemned the Nazi regime. A number of prominent Republicans echoed his condemnation, including former president Herbert Hoover. Kristallnacht—along with the German decision to annex much of Czechoslovakia in 1939—led Roosevelt to support a military buildup by the United States.

The Outbreak of War

The United States did not intervene when war broke out in Europe on September 1, 1939. Considerable isolationist sentiment to stay out of the war existed—even as late as the fall of 1941. Although the Roosevelt administration denounced the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Nazis, the debate over American entry into the war centered around the strategic threat posed by German aggression, especially Hitler's potential for attacking or infiltrating the Western Hemisphere. Most American Jews were interventionists, but some supported the noninterventionist organization, America First. Most isolationists did not support Nazi anti-Semitism. One important exception was the famous pilot Charles Lindbergh, who in 1941 delivered an address blaming American Jews for supporting intervention in the war against Germany and urging them to stop in order to safeguard their place in American society.

The United States entered World War II after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Germany's declaration of war against the United States a few days later. Key German governmental leaders met in January 1942 to plan the systematic mass murder of European Jewry. German extermination policies, especially the creation of death camps in Eastern Europe, would be kept secret; nonetheless, considerable evidence was available, much provided by eyewitnesses who had escaped from Nazi death camps, of the full extent of the genocide. In December 1942, the American, British, Soviet, and a number of other Allied governments issued a joint declaration condemning Nazi atrocities against European Jewry and warning that the architects of the Final Solution would be held responsible after the war ended. Throughout the war, American Jews held a number of public protests seeking to bring public attention to the plight of the European Jewry and urging greater action from the U.S. government.

Rescue and Bombing

Significant divisions existed within the U.S. government over how to respond to Nazi atrocities, especially those aimed at Jews. Before Pearl Harbor, such cabinet secretaries as Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and Interior Secretary Harold Ickes pressed for a more vigorous action by the United States. American Jews were a key component of FDR's political coalition and a number of prominent Jewish leaders had considerable access to him, most notably Rabbi Stephen Wise. The State Department, both prior to and after Pearl Harbor, continued to fear an influx of Jewish refugees. Once war broke out, several State Department officials initially remained skeptical of eyewitness accounts of Nazi death camps. In 1944, Morgenthau gave FDR a copy of "Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the Jews," a report of the Treasury Department; shortly thereafter the government shifted official policy. The United States would be the only Allied nation to create an agency devoted exclusively to rescuing European Jewry. The War Refugee Board, an interdepartmental agency, actively worked to aid refugees from Nazi Germany and played an important role in seeking to safeguard Jews who escaped to Spain, as well as Hungarian Jewry.

One of the most contentious issues surrounding the American response to the Holocaust was the alleged efforts of Nazi officials to offer Jews for ransom. Overall, the United States (as well as the British government) remained skeptical of these plans. At the Bermuda Conference in 1943 to consider the plight of European Jewry, both American and British delegates rejected efforts to negotiate directly with Hitler. Although most government officials remained adamant about avoiding negotiations, some Jewish leaders wanted to attempt it, in hopes of saving lives.

Militarily, the United States and the other Allies could do little in 1942 and 1943 to aid European Jewry. Not until British victory at El Alamein, Egypt, in October 1942 was the threat to Palestine ended. Only after the German defeat at Stalingrad in January 1943 did the tide in Europe decisively turn in favor of the Allies. In fall 1944, the United States along with the Great Britain, Sweden, and the Vatican took an active diplomatic role in pressuring the government of Hungry to prevent the deportation of Hungarian Jews to

death camps in Poland. These efforts were only partly successful, but they succeeded in saving a significant number of Hungarian Jews.

Most European Jews who were to be murdered by the Nazis were already dead before the U.S. Army Air Force had the capacity to send long-range bombers to Eastern European death camps. The first proposals to bomb the death camps and railroads leading to them emerged as part of an effort to stem the deportation of Hungarian Jewry in 1944. Even among Jewish leaders in the United States and Palestine, disagreements emerged over the wisdom of destroying the death camps, given the inevitable loss of innocent life. In contrast, those who argued for bombing maintained that it remained more important to stop the apparatus of destruction. In the end, the U.S. Air Force opposed efforts to divert air resources to missions attacking the death camps, stressing the need to devote resources to winning the war. Although some in the American military were anti-Semitic and certainly some were insensitive, it is also true that the summer and fall of 1944 were critical times for the Allied war effort, and the Army Air Force was needed to provide support for the invasion of Normandy and the battle for France. Moreover, some scholars question whether strategic bombing of the railroads leading to the extermination facilities would have been successful. The capabilities of American and British Air Forces were limited and long-range bombers had difficulty destroying most targets, especially transportation facilities.

Liberation and the Memory of the Holocaust

The Soviets liberated the first death camps in Eastern Europe in 1944, including many evacuated by retreating German forces. In 1945, American troops liberated a series of concentration camps including Buchenwald, Dachau, and Mauthausen. Many American soldiers and key Allied leaders were stunned by what they discovered inside. Not only did American journalists document the extent of Nazi inhumanity, but Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered Germans in the American zone of occupation to view the atrocities committed in the death camps.

When the Nuremberg war crimes tribunals began in 1945, top Nazi leaders were charged on four counts: crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and conspiracy. Although Nuremberg has been criticized as simple "victor's justice," the tribunals established important legal precedents for international standards for the crime of genocide. The occupying powers in all four occupied zones of Germany (American, British, Soviet, and French) also tried war criminals in their jurisdictions. The Holocaust and other crimes against humanity prompted the United States and other nations to strengthen international law to prohibit genocide.

Ultimately, the United States did accept large numbers of displaced persons who had been victims of the Nazis. But even after 1945, many Americans were reluctant to drop immigration barriers and welcome large numbers of refugees.

During the Cold War, the Holocaust faded in the public memory, but in the late 1960s and 1970s, Americans began to build large memorials commemorating the Holocaust. Initially, most were built by American Jews in synagogues and Jewish community centers; increasingly, however, memorials began to be built by local, state, and national governments and nonsectarian private organizations. By the late 1970s, Americans viewed the Holocaust as a defining reason for U.S. entry into World War II. In 1979 Pres. Jimmy Carter committed the United States to build a national museum dedicated to the Holocaust; it opened in 1994. Although many efforts to commemorate the Holocaust stress the importance of ensuring that genocide never happen again, the United States has failed to take effective action to halt genocide in Cambodia in the 1970s, Rwanda in 1994, and Sudan in 2004. As in the 1930s, debates continue about whether or not it is in U.S. interests to intervene on behalf of foreign citizens.

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Related Entries

Genocide; Jewish War Veterans; Quakers; World War II

Related Documents

1975

—*G. Kurt Piehler*

Homeland Security

The scale and audacity of al Qaeda's September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States dwarfed all earlier strikes against the nation, arguably affecting U.S. society to a degree not experienced since the Civil War. Not even the surprise strike by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in 1941, or the terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City in 1993 left Americans' sense of security violated to the degree that the September 11 attacks did. As a consequence, America took stock of itself and its defenses, as those charged with the protection of the country sought to prevent future attacks.

In March of 2005, the Department of Homeland Security instituted new exit procedures at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. During a press conference to unveil the new policies, Homeland Security official Diane Evans stands at a new departure terminal, where visitors must have their pictures and fingerprints taken, as well as their passports recorded electronically. (AP Photo, AP)

The task of protecting American soil against the newly apparent (if not wholly new) threat of another catastrophic terrorist attack fell to the Office of Homeland Security. Established in October 2001, it became the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on November 25, 2002. The first secretary of homeland security was Tom Ridge. Secretary Ridge—a former governor of Pennsylvania—headed the DHS until 2004 when he resigned and was replaced by Michael Chertoff. The DHS has described its mission as being threefold: prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage from potential attacks and natural disasters.

The new department's formation was the largest government reorganization since the founding of the U.S. Department of Defense half a century earlier. The DHS absorbed 22 previously separate government agencies and comprised some 180,000 employees at its inception. In addition to a Management Directorate, which was responsible for

personnel issues as well as budgetary and management concerns, the new organization had four other major divisions.

The largest, the Border and Transportation Directorate—which comprised agencies such at the former U.S. Customs and Immigration and Naturalization services, as well as the Transportation and Security Administration—was responsible for securing U.S. borders and transportation systems. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate was charged with maintaining America's ability to prepare for and recover from terrorist attacks and natural disasters. The research and development efforts of the DHS were coordinated by the Science and Technology Directorate, which was responsible for ensuring that America was prepared for the widest possible range of terrorist attacks, up to and including strikes with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate was to handle the intelligence related to homeland security, to take preventive and protective measures, and to issue warnings as the need arose.

Responsibility for the homeland defense element of America's wider homeland security effort was assumed by the newly established U.S. Northern Command (Northcom) in 2002, which conceived of its task as preventing, preempting, deterring, and defending against aggression toward American territory. Homeland defense was more narrowly defined as "the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States." Northcom, whose area of responsibility included the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico (and surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles, as well as the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands), initially comprised 500 civil servants and uniformed personnel drawn from across the U.S. armed forces, and had no standing combat force of its own.

In addition to countering external threats against U.S. territory, Northcom was authorized to provide military assistance to America's civilian authorities if directed by the president or the secretary of defense. This proved to be a particularly controversial aspect of the command's operations, with accusations arising that it seriously undermines the Posse Comitatus Act (1878), which prohibits the U.S. military from being used for domestic law enforcement.

Such concerns were underpinned by wider misgivings about the degree to which civil liberties risk being compromised in the pursuit of homeland security. This was especially true with regard to the USAPATRIOT Act. This act (full name: The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) was signed into law by Pres. George W. Bush on October 26, 2001. It permitted the indefinite imprisonment without trial of any non-U.S. citizen who the attorney general ruled to be a threat to American national security, while relieving the government of any responsibility to provide legal counsel to such detainees. The act also permitted greater latitude in intelligence gathering and permitted the government to make such arrests as it deemed necessary for homeland security.

That the USAPATRIOT Act passed the U.S. Senate by 68 to 1, and the House of Representatives by 356 to 1 revealed the degree of outrage (as well as bipartisanship) that the September 11 attacks initially engendered among America's politicians. To a degree, this reaction was mirrored in the U.S. public, with polls showing no initial widespread alarm at the introduction of the act.

Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the measures adopted by the United States in the name of homeland security grew. The American Civil Liberties Union condemned the USAPATRIOT Act as unconstitutional, an opinion supported by U.S. District Court Judge Audrey B. Collins, who ruled in January 2004 that elements of the act were overly vague and violated the 1st and 5th Amendments. Judge Collins's ruling followed the introduction of earlier bills, in both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, designed to limit the USAPATRIOT Act.

The tension between defending and denying civil liberties became more apparent with the arrest of U.S. citizens in the pursuit of what was termed the war on terror. Early arrests included Jose Padilla, who was arrested on suspicion of being involved in a plot to explode a radiological dispersal device ("dirty bomb") and denied a regular civilian trial. In 2004, H.R. 10, (9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act) was passed. It permitted America to deport non-U.S. terrorist suspects to countries known to use torture provided "diplomatic assurances" were obtained that torture would not

be used. Some commentators questioned the effectiveness of such safeguards, citing the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen deported from America to Syria in 2002; he was tortured during detention despite prior assurances having been obtained that torture would not be used against him.

Another homeland security measure, "profiling"— when individuals sharing certain ethnic and other characteristics deemed to be common to enemy organizations like al Qaeda are singled out for security checks—has also been criticized. Likewise, measures introduced to screen foreigners at American ports became increasingly unpopular overseas. Citizens of U.S. allies found themselves subject to visa restrictions and fingerprinting (which prompted some to retaliate by ordering U.S. citizens entering their countries to be fingerprinted also). Foreign citizens' seizure in Afghanistan and detention at the holding center established for terrorist suspects at the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, also grew to be a contentious issue at home and abroad, as did the establishment of military tribunals to try such suspects.

Such misgivings notwithstanding, some argue that such measures are necessary if America is to avoid being the target of another September 11–style attack. Indeed, many fear that any future attack could be even worse and that al Qaeda and its affiliated groups are actively seeking to use improvised WMD in any such strike. This argument contends that the possibility of terrorists using chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological materials is grave enough to justify stern countermeasures.

The series of terrorist scares that periodically gripped America in the years following the September 11 attacks further exacerbated such fears, illustrating the fine line that exists between alerting the public and alarming them. While experts remained divided about the best way to improve homeland security, within a few years of the 2001 attacks much work had been done to improve America's defenses, with air travel safety, intelligence sharing, border security, and the protection of the country's major infrastructure all enhanced. Such improvements took time to put in place and came amid much recrimination over how the September 11 attack could have happened at all. Moreover, they were not without their limitations. No country can be made totally secure against terrorist attacks, least of all one as vast and open as the United States. The greatest challenge for those responsible for America's homeland security would continue to be implementing the measures needed to maintain safety without curtailing the very liberties they sought to defend.

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Related Entries

American Civil Liberties Union; Posse Comitatus Act; War on Terrorism

—*Mark Burgess*

Hunt for Red October, The

Novel by Tom Clancy, 1984
Film directed by John McTiernan, 1990

The Hunt for Red October (1990) is a film based on a 1984 Tom Clancy novel of the same name. John McTiernan directed the tale of Jack Ryan, a young Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst played by Alec Baldwin. The movie

uses Hollywood's conventions for war movies (crusty old commanders, hesitant bureaucrats, eager young warriors) and combines them with the ambiguities and mystery befitting a tale where a CIA analyst plays one of the good guys. Hollywood war movies go beyond politicians' speeches, academic books, or journalism to provide the public with a compelling emotional sense of what war and spying entails, generally reinforcing the idea that our side not only has the big guns but is always right as well.

When the film opens, the British have taken photos of the latest Soviet nuclear submarine, *Red October*. Ryan is puzzling over the unusual "doors" on the vehicle with his tough mentor, Adm. James Greer (James Earl Jones). They ascertain that the doors are part of a new kind of stealth drive that would allow the ship to slip past American radar and possibly launch a first strike on the United States. Indeed, when the *Red October* engages its drive, it essentially disappears from view of the U.S. submarine that has been tracking it.

Capt. Marko Ramius (Sean Connery), commander of *Red October* is a brilliant seaman whose political loyalties are somewhat suspect. With his wife's death died many of Ramius's illusions about the glories of socialism. His men love him and Ramius loves to taunt the stiff-necked political officer charged with safekeeping the political loyalties of men who command a ship that could cause Armageddon. The character of Ramius echoes the characterization of German soldiers in Hollywood movies made well after World War II but about that war—honorable enemies who loved their country but were anti-Nazi themselves. This theme was first developed in another submarine movie, *The Enemy Below* (1957), about Captain Von Stolberg (Curt Jurgens). *The Enemy Below* and films like it have been seen by historians as an effort to undo the dehumanization of Germans in World War II propaganda, especially important since by 1957 Germans were allies in the Cold War. *Red October* takes this notion of humanizing the enemy soldier a step further, as Ramius actually kills the political officer shortly after beginning the voyage. The film does not humanize the Soviet Union, whose agents and advocates are depicted as both brutal and inept, but suggests that at this advanced date, the United States felt it was winning the

battle for the "hearts and minds" of many in the U.S.S.R. (For example, some Russian characters in the film dream of owning a RV and traveling the open roads of America.)

Just what is Ramius up to? Burning his bridges, he has left a message for his Soviet masters that leaves no doubt that he intends to defect to the West. Ramius does this to ensure that his crew will not develop second thoughts now that the Soviet Navy is trying to kill them. For its part, the United States is skeptical of Ryan's claims to understand Ramius's intentions, believing that Ramius has gone over the edge because of his wife's death and intends to take the world with him.

Thus Ramius begins a game of cat and mouse that ranges over the Atlantic Ocean as he engages what was once his own navy and tries to signal his intentions to his lifelong foe that he means them no harm. On the U.S. side, Ryan is almost alone and forced to go into the "field"— the Atlantic—in a desperate attempt to convince the U.S. Navy not to kill Ramius, at least not before Ryan is able to contact him. Ramius's task is complicated, not by his crew, whom the viewer could imagine rebelling rather than taking on their own navy (defecting is one thing, but fighting your own people is another), but by the backup political officer who attempts to scuttle the ship rather than let it be taken by the Americans.

The Hunt for Red October is a Cold War thriller based on a series of "what ifs" that seemed either plausible or laughable depending on how you viewed the Soviet threat in the late 1980s. The movie is based on the assumption that the Russians were about to overtake the United States in the arms race, but by the time the movie made it to theaters, the U.S.S.R. was near collapse. The United States, not the Soviets, introduced stealth technology and a variety of other first-strike technologies (such as a system to communicate with submarines without having them surface).

The movie was the last in a series of movies in the 1980s, such as *Top Gun* (1986), that arguably helped to rebuild the public image of the military that had been lost in the jungles of Vietnam. Besides providing entertainment, these movies all worked within the assumption that the enormous buildup of the U.S. military begun in the 1970s by the Carter administration and then continued by the Reagan administration was justified. Within a year of *Red October*'s release, the

Soviet Union had collapsed and Hollywood searched for another set of bad guys. Hollywood tried a variety of scary scenarios, such as international drug dealers, Russian nationalists (who could seize nuclear weapons), domestic agents or rogue soldiers before settling on international terrorists.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Film and War

—John Hinshaw

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
Impressment

Throughout the 18th and into the early 19th century, impressment, the practice of seizing men to serve in the Royal Navy, was a major American grievance, contributing to the origin of both the American Revolution (1775–83) and the War of 1812 (1812–15). The violation of seamen's rights and the concurrent damage done to American trade helped to unite many of the colonists and, later, the citizens of the young United States in taking up arms against Britain.

When the Royal Navy began its rapid and vast wartime expansion at the end of the 17th century, the ravages caused by impressment resulted in an immediate uproar in England's American colonies. Seamen fought hard to avoid service in naval vessels. Wages were lower than on merchant ships and privateers, discipline was often harsher, the risk of death in battle or from disease higher, and enlistment terms substantially longer. The only way of getting seamen into such a service was through the employment of press gangs—groups of men authorized and willing to use all necessary violence to physically secure seamen. At the first sight of these gangs, sailors fled; if caught, they resisted strenuously. Once impressed, resistance frequently took the form of mass desertions. To the government these difficulties only confirmed the necessity of using force when recruiting manpower for its naval vessels. Seamen were not the only ones complaining about impressment—merchants claimed that it caused severe harm to their trade, as merchantmen bypassed English colonial ports for fear of having their crews pressed. This was an argument well-designed for maximum political impact in the mercantile era. As the whole point of the empire, and therefore of the Navy, was to encourage English trade, any impediment to that purpose had to be removed. Sustained petitioning by colonial merchants against impressment prompted Parliament to pass An Act for the Encouragement of Trade to America, also known as the Sixth of Anne, in 1708.

Throughout its long history, impressment never had clear legal sanction. Proponents argued that it rested on time-honored custom, on the necessity of defending the realm, and was at least implicitly sanctioned by statuary law. Some, however, claimed that it violated the rights of Englishmen as such rights had been enshrined in the Magna Carta, while others pointed out that King John, less than a year after promulgating the Great Charter in 1215, issued warrants for a major press, thus expressly, if again implicitly, excluding seafaring labor from its protections. The Sixth of Anne continued this tradition of legal ambiguity. It clearly prohibited the Navy from pressing in the colonies, but whether governors could continue to do so was left unstated. Equally unclear was whether the act was perpetual or designed to last only until the conclusion of peace. After the end of the War of Spanish Succession in 1714, naval commanders were told the act had lapsed, but colonial governors continued to receive instructions referring to it.

With the renewed outbreak of war in 1739, desertion rates shot up, the Navy impressed, and colonial merchants once again complained. In response, Parliament passed another act, but it forbade impressment only in the West Indian sugar islands. North Americans reacted with fury, rioting against press gangs, legally harassing them, and, in a few cases, burning their boats. The conflict grew particularly intense in Boston. In 1746, a press gang killed two men and, in 1747, a hot press (that is, one ignoring all protective certificates against impressment) ordered by Comm. Charles Knowles of HMS *Lark* touched off an urban

insurrection that was only put down several days later with the aid of the militia. After watching the multiethnic working class of Boston's waterfront riot against British impressment, Samuel Adams was one of the first to recognize the beginning of a revolutionary movement that had moved from laying claim to the rights of Englishmen to securing the rights of all people.

The conflict abated when the War of Austrian Succession drew to a close in 1748, but returned with full force at the beginning of the Seven Years' War in 1756. Violent clashes between press gangs and seamen erupted throughout the British Empire—nowhere more so than in the port cities of North America. Although peace returned in 1763, the Navy was now charged with the renewed enforcement of the Navigation Acts and therefore continued pressing. Many of those Americans who had considered the practice a necessary evil during wartime now came to see it as one more instance of British tyranny. In 1768, Bostonians reacted to a press by a gang from HMS *Romney* by burning a customs boat. A year later a court in the same city quickly ruled the killing of a press ganger to be justifiable homicide before John Adams had the chance to argue the illegality of impressment in North America. The imposition of the Stamp Act in 1765 had fused the seamen's struggle with the growing American resistance to imperial administration, injecting the latter with a decades-long experience of violently resisting attempts by the British state to infringe on their rights, as men, to life and liberty. Up to and throughout the years of the Revolution, seamen remained at the forefront of the battle against Britain.

When Britain mobilized its Navy in 1793 for the final showdown with France, impressment once again led to tensions between the now-independent United States and its former mother country. If American resistance had formerly revolved around the rights of Englishmen and then around those of man, now the rights of citizens of a sovereign nation were at stake. Britain, short of manpower, refused to accept that anyone born before independence was anything but a British subject and claimed, with some justification, that her sailors were deserting by the thousands to join the booming American merchant marine. Hence the Royal Navy proceeded to stop and search American merchant vessels,

pressing anyone who could plausibly be considered British. Already in 1792, Thomas Jefferson had adamantly maintained that "the simplest rule will be, that the vessel being American, shall be evidence that the seamen on board her are such" (Selement, 409). Lacking sufficient firepower to back up such a simple rule, Americans spent much futile diplomatic energy over the next 15 years trying to reach a compromise with Britain, during which time the Royal Navy continued to press thousands of men with impunity.

After the British frigate *Leopard* attacked the American frigate *Chesapeake* in 1807 to retake four deserters, killing three Americans and wounding 18 in the process, relations between the two countries broke down. A period of economic warfare began as Britain issued its Orders in Council, restricting neutral trade with France. Napoleon, with his Berlin and Milan decrees, tried to stop trade with Britain, and the United States first passed the Embargo Act of 1807 and then the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, trying to put pressure on the European belligerents, but mostly hurting her own economy. Eventually, the United States declared war on Britain in 1812, citing impressment as a major cause. When the United States concluded a peace treaty in 1815, however, no mention was made of the practice. In reality, British meddling on the frontier and interference with maritime trade had played a larger role than impressment in driving the United States into its first declared war.

With the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, impressment was slowly phased out by the Royal Navy, never again to return. For well over a century it had made a decisive contribution to defining the relationship between England and North America. Its role in fomenting revolutionary anger along North America's Atlantic seaboard has been well established by historians, as has its importance in souring relations between the young United States and Britain. One key question that remains to be systematically studied is the place of efforts to end impressment in the context of Atlantic-wide struggles against all forms of forced labor, the most important, of course, American slavery.

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Conscription and Volunteerism; Desertion; Draft Evasion and Resistance; War of 1812.

—*Niklas Frykman*

Indian Army Scouts

From the early colonial period to the end of the 19th century, Native Americans fought alongside European and later Euro-American forces against other indigenous peoples. Because of the distinctive nature of such warfare, with its emphasis on mobility and surprise, the U.S. Army came to rely greatly on the assistance of Indian scouts and auxiliaries to locate and fight hostile indigenous peoples. Indian scouts did much more than guide troops through unfamiliar terrain and locate hostile camps. They carried dispatches between commands, spearheaded attacks against enemy villages,

caught Army deserters, policed the reservations, escorted scientific expeditions and railroad crews, and on various occasions saved troops from starvation in the field or from disaster in battle. Indian scouts contributed significantly to the conquest of North America.

Indians enlisted as scouts for a variety of reasons. When serving against their enemies, scouts fought to gain war honors, to exact revenge, to acquire horses and plunder, to earn additional income to support their families, or to escape the confines of the reservation. The situation was more complex when they served against people of their own nation. In such cases, factional, clan, or band considerations often played an important role. Sometimes scouts sought to persuade their fellows to surrender peacefully to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. In other cases, the scouts hoped to win the favors of the Army and obtain better bargaining positions for their people in future negotiations with the government. Pawnee, Arikara, Crow, Apache, Seminole, Delaware, and Shoshone scout units received national attention. In reality, however, Native Americans from virtually all nations, sometimes in large numbers, served as scouts for the Army at some point.

The Army Reorganization Act of 1866 formalized the use of Indian scouts. It authorized the Army to enlist 1,000 scouts, but official counts were rarely kept, and at times the Army appears to have deployed many more than were formally authorized. The scouts, employed by the Quartermaster Department, received the same pay as regular troops and were furnished guns, uniforms, and horses. As soldiers they were cost-effective, requiring little training, and they could be discharged when their services were no longer needed. They were also highly effective in combat. They posed a great threat to the independence of hostile tribes. Unsurprisingly, tribes that provided Indian scouts often became the target of revenge expeditions by other Native Americans. The Sioux and the Cheyenne, for example, intensified their raids against the Arikaras and Pawnees in the 1870s in part to discourage them from allowing their warriors to enlist as scouts.

Indian scouts remained distinctly apart in terms of Army organization and doctrine for various reasons. First, the War Department remained focused on conventional European-style warfare and, following the Mexican War, regarded

Native American resistance to U.S. expansion merely as a "distraction." Hence, it failed to develop procedures that would allow the Army to deal more effectively with indigenous peoples. Second, some senior officers believed that the use of Indian scouts diminished the Army's prestige. Third, the Interior Department, which was in charge of Indian affairs, objected to the use of Indian scouts because such employment supposedly retarded the department's "civilization" policies. Finally, the greatest prejudice against the use of scouts was the widespread fear that Native Americans could not be trusted. Incidents such as the 1881 "Cibicu mutiny," when some Apache scouts turned against the Army during a fight, aroused the suspicions of commanding officers. In reality, such incidents were extremely rare. In fact, Indian scouts proved to be loyal soldiers and the desertion rate among them was much lower than among regular soldiers. Thirteen scouts won Congressional Medals of Honor.

Although the impact of Indian scout service on indigenous cultures is more difficult to measure, it seems to have been significant. Through their service, Indian scouts accelerated the conquest of the West. As a result, they may have prevented the escalation of the Indian Wars into more truly genocidal affairs. Military service also eased assimilation pressures on individuals by allowing them to leave the confines of the reservation and put their traditional skills to use. In some cases, scout service saved families from destitution and starvation. Occasionally tribes that furnished scouts for the Army received political rewards. Little Wolf's band of Northern Cheyennes, for example, was allowed to remain in Montana partly because of services rendered to the Army after 1878. More often than not, however, the government ignored the loyal service of its Indian scouts. For instance, the Apache scouts who had been instrumental in rounding up Geronimo's forces in the 1880s were nevertheless removed to Florida along with the famous war leader. Few scouts succeeded in securing military pensions from the government.

During the 20th century, the image of the Indian scout has been controversial. In the 1960s and 1970s, during the height of the Red Power movement, advocates often labeled scouts as "traitors of their own race" or "dupes" of the U.S. government. Although some of these sentiments continue to linger, most Native American nations regard the Indian scouts

A rare photo taken in the 1870s of Custer (sitting) with Indian scouts. The Indian standing in front of the entrance to the tent is thought to be Curly, recorded as the only survivor of the battle of Little Bighorn. (© Bettmann /CORBIS)

as the first Native American patriots. Their service, like that of other Native Americans now serving in the U.S. armed forces, is honored at tribal gatherings and ceremonies.

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Related Entries

Indian Wars: Eastern Wars; Indian Wars: Seminole Wars; Indian Wars: Western Wars; Native Americans in the Military

—Mark van de Logt

Indian Wars: Eastern Wars

Once the United States won its independence from Great Britain, the infant nation faced many pressing problems—forming a stable government, establishing trade, dealing with foreign powers, and paying off war debts among them. The sale of unsettled land between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River in the eastern United States was critical to paying off those debts. The presence of Native Americans on this land served as the only real obstacle to white settlement. Native Americans constituted independent nations that claimed much of the same territory as the United States. Conflict between Native Americans and the new United States was inevitable and would lead to a series of wars between Native American tribes and U.S. forces in the eastern United States.

In 1787, while the United States was still operating under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance. One component of this law provided the framework for the distribution and use of the lands that would eventually make up the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. It also codified the principle that the lands west of the Appalachians legally belonged to Native Americans.

For the most part, white Americans were willing to admit that the land the Native Americans resided upon was the usufructuary property of those tribes, though subject to the laws of the United States. The problem then centered on the means by which white settlers could secure proper title to those lands. Legally, only three methods were available: military conquest, purchase, or transfer of Native American titles for the relief of debt. Outright wars of aggression were not acceptable to much of the American public nor was waiting for Native Americans to sell their lands or relinquish them for debts.

Although the United States had little stomach for outright military aggression, Americans were quick to respond to real or imagined threats from Native Americans. If provoked in any manner, the government felt justified in carrying out punitive wars against Native Americans, then demanding cessions of large amounts of land from the defeated tribes. A disgraceful aspect of this process was that white settlers would often provoke Native Americans to violence and then clamor for government protection.

Peaceful negotiation would prove to be no more honorable. Most indigenous peoples' customs held that all land belonged to the tribe in common, and federal law stipulated that only the federal government was entitled to purchase land from Native American tribes. Settler purchases from individual Native Americans were thus violating the legal norms of both cultures. Compounding the problem was that indigenous peoples generally believed in a decentralized form of government. No one chief had the right to sell his tribe's land. Such an act was normally the province of the tribal council. As a result, treaties with the Indians were often obtained through questionable methods. Fraud and deception were common, as was the practice of dealing not with the tribal council, but with a chief or group of chiefs who could be manipulated by the government negotiators. Native Americans might and did protest the legality of such treaties, generally without success.

Little Turtle's War

The first major uprising faced by the United States was Little Turtle's War (1790–95). In the first year of his presidency, George Washington authorized an expedition to quell violence in the Ohio Valley. That expedition, and one the following year, suffered severe losses at the hands of Little Turtle

and warriors from several tribes residing in the area. The war ended on August 20, 1794, when the Native Americans were defeated at the battle of Fallen Timbers near the west end of Lake Erie. The following year, the tribes signed the Treaty of Fort Greenville, which ceded all of what would become Ohio and most of Indiana to the United States.

Tecumseh

Although the various Indian nations were never a real threat to the general security of the United States, they often allied themselves with the British. The Shawnee leader Tecumseh recognized that only a unified Native American presence could stand against white expansion. Although initially successful in bringing about an Indian alliance, the movement lost ground after the battle of Tippecanoe on November 7, 1811. In need of support, Tecumseh sided with the British during the War of 1812. While white Americans could understand the need for the Indians to defend their homes, they could not countenance them being allied with the British. In their eyes, Tecumseh and many other Native Americans became mortal enemies when they joined the English effort. Hopes of a Native Confederacy vanished after Tecumseh's death at the battle of Thames on October 5, 1813.

The Creek War

To the south, members of the Creek Nation had also heard the message of Tecumseh. Not all Creeks, however, heeded the call. Civil war broke out in 1813 between the Upper Creeks, who generally agreed with Tecumseh's message of resistance to white culture, and the Lower Creeks, who had begun to assimilate into the white world. When the fighting spilled over into white settlements and a British presence was thought to exist among the Upper Creeks, the Tennessee Volunteers and their commander, Andrew Jackson, were ordered into the war. The Creek Civil War ended with the battle of Horseshoe Bend on March 27, 1814. In the resulting Treaty of Fort Jackson, both Upper and Lower Creeks were forced to cede most of their land to the United States.

Indian Removal Measures, 1819–38

In the years following the War of 1812, westward expansion continued, fueled in part by land bounties given to soldiers for service during the war. The Louisiana Purchase also played a part in the push to displace indigenous peoples. Prior to 1803, the geographical boundaries of the United States limited how far the government could force the Indians to move. After the acquisition of the vast western territory, however, the amount of land open for indigenous resettlement seemed limitless.

Native Americans resisted as best they could, but the efforts proved futile. Between 1819 and 1824, bands of Kickapoo warriors conducted raids on white settlements in Illinois, but succeeded only in bringing more federal troops into the area. The conflicts moved north into Wisconsin, and in June 1827 members of the Winnebago tribe attacked a pair of boats whose crewmen had kidnapped a number of Winnebago women. Federal and territorial forces were called out and the uprising was quickly quelled.

In addition to having to fight the federal government, many tribes were forced to deal with the individual states. In the 1820s, Georgia pressured the federal government to complete the removal of Creek and Cherokee tribes from the state. When Pres. John Quincy Adams refused to be pushed into a situation he felt was either illegal or immoral, a confrontation between the president and George Troup, Georgia's governor, nearly erupted in violence. Although Troup backed down, the Native Americans were soon forced to sell much of their land.

With the 1828 election of Andrew Jackson—a proponent of Indian removal policies—to the presidency, the notion of removing all eastern Native Americans to land in the west became a political reality. Congress passed the Indian Removal Act in 1830, which granted Indian nations unsettled land in the West in exchange for their lands within state borders. Federal negotiators were soon traveling throughout the South and Old Northwest, using any means available to entice indigenous peoples to sell their lands in the East for new homes in the Indian Territory. Most Native Americans saw the inevitability of removal and tried to make the best deal they could. Others, notably the Cherokee, sued under their treaty rights in federal court. Although the Cherokee received support from the Supreme Court, President Jackson refused to acknowledge the Court's rulings.

Some tribes took up arms, but only the Seminoles of Florida enjoyed any measure of success (see entry). In 1832, the Sac war leader Black Hawk went to war in hopes of remaining on ancestral land in Wisconsin. Faced with an overwhelming white force, Black Hawk and his followers attempted to flee west, but were caught while trying to cross the Mississippi River. In the 1836, Creeks in Alabama went to war in a last-ditch attempt to prevent removal. Pressed by white forces gathering on their east and west, Creek resistance soon faded. One by one, the Indians were herded west, resulting in the famous Trail of Tears (the removal of the Cherokee from 1838 to 1839, although other tribes suffered equally harsh treatment). With the exception of a few small remnant groups, by 1842 most Native Americans had been removed from the eastern United States.

The young United States had taken 50 years to remove Native American tribes from the eastern half of the nation. All parties had learned valuable lessons during these years of conflict. Whites came to realize that long-standing tribal animosities prevented Native Americans from forming a united front against expansion. They also had learned that while the Indians could be brave and tenacious warriors, rarely could they hold out for any time against the U.S. Army. The Indians, on the other hand, repeatedly learned that the United States could be neither defeated nor trusted and that no portion of their ancestral homeland was safe. Over the next 50 years, tribes in the West would learn these same painful lessons.

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Related Entries

Indian Wars: Seminole Wars; Indian Wars: Western Wars; Jackson, Andrew; Native Americans in Colonial Wars and the Revolutionary War; Osceola; Tecumseh

Related Documents

1800; 1814

—John and Mary Lou Missall

Indian Wars: Seminole Wars

The Seminole Wars were the longest, deadliest, and most expensive conflicts engaged in by the U.S. government with indigenous peoples. These three wars mark the first instance of the United States having to face a prolonged guerrilla war and the only instance of Native Americans forcing the federal government to sue for peace. The wars stemmed from the national policies of territorial expansion and Indian removal; they also were tied closely to the issue of slavery.

The First Seminole War (1817–18)

Almost from its inception, the United States had coveted Spanish Florida. During the Revolution and again in the War of 1812, Florida had been a staging ground for British incursions into the southern states. In addition, runaway slaves from southern plantations sought refuge in Florida. Lawless elements from Georgia raided Seminole villages, often resulting in violent retribution by the Seminoles. Spain, too weak to defend its vast New World empire, could do little to control or protect those living along the border with the United States.

Following the War of 1812, tensions continued to mount along the border. On November 30, 1817, the Seminoles

retaliated for an attack on one of their villages, killing 35 soldiers and at least 6 civilians who were attempting to ascend the Apalachicola River. Shocked by the killings, the government ordered Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson to invade Florida. Jackson, along with many officials in Washington, viewed the incursion as more than a retaliatory raid upon the Seminoles. They saw the war as an opportunity to eliminate what had become a refuge for runaway slaves, as a means to expel a lingering British influence, and as a possible way to wrest Florida from Spain. Backed by a large force of regulars, militia, volunteers, and Indian mercenaries, Jackson quickly drove the Seminoles from their homes in north Florida.

Jackson then convened a military tribunal that led to the execution of two British subjects who had been taken prisoner during the war. He then moved west, capturing Pensacola on May 27, 1818—in violation of an order not to attack any Spanish installations. These actions led to diplomatic confrontations with both England and Spain and to a congressional investigation of Jackson's actions. During the hot debate throughout the country about civilian control over the military and the character of American foreign policy, Jackson's strength as a political force soon became obvious.

Spain ceded Florida to the United States in 1819 in exchange for the American relinquishment of its tenuous claim to Texas and the assumption of $5 million of claims by American citizens against Spain. In September 1823, the Seminoles signed the Treaty of Moultrie Creek, forcing them onto a four-million acre reservation in central Florida. In 1830 Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, which called for the removal of all Native American groups residing east of the Mississippi to new lands in the West. In 1832 the Seminoles were pressured into signing the Treaty of Payne's Landing, which spelled out the details of their removal. Denying the legality of the treaty, the Seminoles refused to gather for emigration. Jackson, then president of the United States, would consider no alternative to their removal.

The Second Seminole War (1835–42)

Throughout 1835 the Seminoles made preparations to defend their homeland. Open warfare began on December 28, when the Seminoles annihilated a column of 108 soldiers under the command of Maj. Francis Dade. On the same day, the famous

Seminole leader Osceola led an ambush that killed Indian Agent Wiley Thompson. Several days later the Seminoles scored another major victory, repulsing a force of 750 men led by Brig. Gen. Duncan Clinch. From late December and into January of 1836, Seminole war parties attacked and destroyed Florida's prosperous sugar industry, freeing hundreds of slaves in the process. The few hundred troops stationed in Florida could do little to defend the territory.

The year 1836 proved frustrating for both the Army and the government. The Army's two highest field officers, major generals Edmund Gaines and Winfield Scott, each led large forces into Florida but failed to subdue the Seminoles. Remarkably determined to remain in their homeland, Seminoles lived in a vast unmapped territory that was virtually unknown to whites. In addition, the subtropical climate of Florida would prove devastating to the white forces. Constant summer rains made overland travel almost impossible. Disease killed 10 times as many troops as did Seminole bullets. Escaped slaves joined the Seminoles, while other blacks served as spies. This was the kind of war that the U.S. military was unprepared to fight.

Americans soon realized they were involved in a major war. News from "The Florida War" figured prominently in newspapers and magazines throughout the country and in congressional debates. Thousands of volunteers and conscripted militia were called into service from all parts of the nation. A naval squadron was formed to patrol the coast, while sailors and marines were sent ashore to supplement the Army and ferry troops over the watery landscape. The Second Seminole War severely drained the economy, costing approximately $30 million over seven years (the annual federal budget was around $25 million).

In December of 1836, command of the war was handed over to Maj. Gen. Thomas Jesup. Mounting a swift and flexible campaign, Jesup was able to force the Seminole leadership to capitulate in March of 1837. The territory remained relatively peaceful until June 2, when the Seminoles fled the detention camps and the war recommenced. Whether the Seminoles were sincere in promises to emigrate or were simply buying time is difficult to determine. Distrust of whites and the presence of slave catchers near the camps may have forced the Seminoles and their black allies to flee.

Feeling that the Seminoles had dealt dishonorably, Jesup resorted to equally questionable tactics. By the winter of 1837 he had succeeded in capturing most of the senior chiefs of the Seminole Nation, many of them being taken under a flag of truce. Included were Micanopy, head chief of the Seminole Nation, King Philip, head of the powerful Mikasuki band, and Osceola, who would soon die in federal custody and become a martyr for the cause of Indian resistance.

In the fall of 1837, Jesup staged the largest campaign ever carried out against a Native American nation. More than 9,000 men, about half of them volunteers and militia, moved through the peninsula from north to south. Pushed to exhaustion, many of the Seminoles were captured or surrendered. Others chose to make a stand. On Christmas Day 1837, the war's largest battle was fought along the northern shore of Lake Okeechobee. Arrayed against more than 300 Seminoles were Col. Zachary Taylor and more than 800 soldiers. Although Taylor's troops suffered severe casualties and failed to capture the Seminoles, the battle was declared a great American victory and Taylor became a national hero.

By February of 1838, Jesup realized that the nature of the war had changed. The majority of the Seminole Nation had been captured, surrendered, or killed, while the remainder had fled to the inhospitable Everglades. Knowing that chasing them deeper into the swamp would be fruitless, Jesup suggested that the war be ended and the remaining Seminoles be allowed to stay temporarily in south Florida. The Jackson administration, heavily invested in the policy of Indian removal, would not renegotiate. Compromise with one indigenous group might lead to compromise with others. Jesup was ordered to continue the war for as long as it took to remove all Seminoles from Florida.

Forces were reduced, however, and command passed to Taylor, who had been elevated to brigadier general after the battle of Okeechobee. Feeling that an attempt to hunt down the Seminoles in their Everglades haunts would be fruitless, Taylor focused on defending the settled portions of the territory. This strategy helped settle the frontier but did little to end the war. By the end of 1838, more whites had become casualties than Seminoles. The American public began to sympathize with the tenacious Seminoles and became indignant when the territory employed bloodhounds in a futile attempt to locate their villages.

Within a year of Jesup's departure, the government was willing to reconsider its position. In response to congressional pressure, the administration dispatched Commanding Gen. Alexander Macomb, the Army's highest officer, to negotiate a settlement with the Seminoles. On May 18, 1839, Macomb and a representative of the Mikasuki leader Abiaca (commonly known as Sam Jones), reached a verbal agreement that allowed the Seminoles to remain in the Everglades for an unspecified time. The war violently resumed on July 26 when a large band of Seminoles attacked a trading post on the Caloosahatchee River, killing both civilians and soldiers. For reasons of simple thievery or out of a profound distrust of whites, the Seminoles threw away their chance at peace.

Faced with no choice but to continue the war, the government pursued the Seminoles for an additional three years. Groups of soldiers and sailors penetrated the Everglades in canoes, destroying Seminole hideouts and mapping likely hiding places. Under intense pressure, the Seminoles found survival difficult. By early 1842, both sides were willing to give up the fight. The Seminoles were tired of running, and the administration of John Tyler was tired of paying for the war. Content to leave a few hundred Seminoles in the Everglades, the government declared the war over on August 14, 1842.

The Third Seminole War (1855–58)

The fear of even a few hundred Seminoles was enough to keep settlers from moving into southern Florida. Continued pressure was applied to those remaining in hopes of convincing them to emigrate to the West. Every attempt was rebuffed. Military survey parties were sent into the Everglades to harass the Seminoles and map their villages. In December of 1855, Seminole leader Holata Micco (better known as Billy Bowlegs) reacted violently to the pressure, attacking one of the survey parties and killing a number of soldiers.

For the next 30 months, the Army scoured the Everglades, destroying Seminole villages and forcing the inhabitants into more inhospitable locations. Finally, in

March of 1858, Bowlegs was convinced that it was to his advantage to join the majority of Seminoles who were now living in what would become Oklahoma. After the departure of Bowlegs and his people, about 150 Seminoles remained scattered throughout Florida. Most of the nearly 3,000 Seminoles who now call Florida home are descended from those few remaining families.

The Seminole Wars were a national tragedy. Not only were approximately 3,000 Seminoles forcibly removed from their homes, but thousands on both sides lost their lives. Many who survived the wars were left with shattered lives—from economic loss, family loss, or the effects of lingering disease. The Seminole Wars were the result of an inflexible government policy that produced a war with no real winners.

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Related Entries

Jackson, Andrew; Osceloa; Scott, Winfield

Related Documents

1835

—*John and Mary Lou Missall*

Indian Wars: Western Wars

The U.S. Army played an important role in the opening and conquest of the American West. Its responsibilities were varied: to explore and map the territory; to escort workers and facilitate the construction of railroads; to guard major highways and migration routes; to subjugate Native American peoples by force or treaty; to police and oversee Indian reservations; to prevent intertribal warfare; and to avert the outbreak of hostilities between Native American groups and settlers. These responsibilities were undertaken by a chronically undermanned Army facing Native Americans who resisted infringement upon their lands. Furthermore, the unconventional style of Indian warfare posed additional challenges to the Army's performance. Nevertheless, by the 1890s Indian resistance had been broken and the Army's principal mission in the West had been accomplished.

Background to the Indian Wars of the West

The Indian Wars in the West were the immediate result of American expansion and the movement of Euro-Americans across the continent following the acquisition of the territories of Louisiana (1803), Texas (1845), Oregon (1846), and the Southwest (1848). The rich natural resources of these territories attracted trappers, traders, miners, railroad companies, hunters, and homesteaders. By 1890, some 8.5 million immigrants had crossed the Mississippi River to settle in the West. Inevitably, this influx of settlers caused tensions with the 300,000 Indians who inhabited the region and who depended on its natural resources for their survival.

The consequences of westward expansion on Native American peoples were severe. Disease, warfare, and starvation resulted in tremendous suffering and depopulation. The population of the indigenous peoples of California, for example, plunged from 150,000 in 1850 to 35,000 in 1860. Between 1848 and 1890, the U.S. Army fought many wars with western tribes, who resisted the destruction of their

resources, removal from their land, relocation onto reservations, forced acculturation, dismissal of their traditional ways, and abrogation of their treaty rights by federal policies.

In the Pacific Northwest, Native Americans were forced onto reservations following the Rogue River War, the Yakima War, and the Spokane War—all in the mid to late 1850s. In 1872 the Modocs took up arms in a desperate attempt to return to their homeland. Four years later, Chief Joseph led the Nez Percé on a march to Canada to seek a better future for his people. Both the Modocs and the Nez Percé failed to accomplish their goals, but their exploits on the battlefields caused major embarrassments for the Army.

On the northern plains the Army faced a powerful alliance of the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho, who particularly resented the decimation of the buffalo herds and the depletion of grass, timber, and game resources by migrants. Hoping to avoid armed confrontations, the United States negotiated the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, in which it promised to protect Indians against migrants and vice versa. In return for annuities and other payments, these Native Americans allowed the Army to construct forts along the Oregon and California trails. Unfortunately for all concerned, the government failed to provide the promised protection and prompt annuity payments, and hostilities soon erupted.

War began in earnest in 1854 when Lt. John S. Grattan led an Army unit into battle against the Sioux. Grattan's force was promptly annihilated. In retaliation, the following year Gen. William S. Harney destroyed a neutral Sioux village near Ash Hollow in present-day Nebraska, using a ruse to mislead the Sioux into thinking he would parley with them. Hostilities intensified during the Civil War. In 1862, the Santee Sioux in Minnesota rose up. Fighting soon spread to the western plains. In 1864, a Colorado volunteer unit attacked and massacred a friendly Cheyenne village at Sand Creek, Colorado. During Red Cloud's War, the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho repeatedly inflicted embarrassing defeats upon the Army, including the 1866 destruction of an American command under Capt. William J. Fetterman. Although a new treaty concluded hostilities in 1868, warfare continued sporadically. The discovery of gold in the Black Hills by an Army expedition under Lt. Col. George

Armstrong Custer in 1874 triggered a new wave of immigration and consequently the Great Sioux War of 1876 to 1877. Inspirational leaders such as Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Dull Knife, and Little Wolf led the Sioux–Cheyenne–Arapaho alliance. Despite several spectacular victories, including the defeat of Custer's command at the Little Bighorn (June 25, 1876), most Indians surrendered in 1877 after the Army conducted an extensive winter campaign.

On the southern plains the Army faced another mighty alliance, this one composed of the Southern Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, and Comanche. The causes of warfare here were similar to those on the northern plains. Fighting erupted in the 1850s when the alliance targeted settlements and migrants along the Texas and Santa Fe trails. In 1868 and 1869, the Army conducted a number of campaigns against Native Americans. Following the defeat of the Cheyenne at the battle of the Washita (1868), the resisting Native Americans were forced onto reservations in Indian Territory. Here they faced disease and starvation. Hoping to save the buffalo from extinction by white hunters, the Kiowa, Comanche, and Cheyenne once again took up arms against the United States in 1874. This war ended in 1875 after a successful winter campaign by the Army wore out the three groups.

After the Sand Creek Massacre (1864), the Army's Indian policy came under increasing criticism from religiously inspired interest groups in the East who favored a more humanitarian approach. Responding to these pressures, the government first sent peace delegations to negotiate a series of treaties with the western tribes in 1867 and 1868. Under President Grant's "Peace Policy," religious denominations also took control of Indian agencies to end mismanagement by corrupt government officials. Unfortunately, these measures only complicated Indian policy further. Army commanders, Bureau of Indian Affairs officials, and eastern humanitarians accused each other of mishandling the situation. Criticism of the government's treatment of Native Americans reached a high point with the publication of Helen Hunt Jackson's *A Century of Dishonor* (1881), which exposed the tragedies caused by the government's Indian policies and led to the creation of several Indian rights groups, such as the Indian Rights Association

(1882) and the National Indian Defense Association (1885). These organizations had a tremendous influence on Indian policy for the next half century. Many westerners, however, continued to favor more radical solutions and called for decisive military action.

Compared with the Great Plains, the harsh environment of the Southwest posed even greater challenges for the Army. Although the subjugation of the sedentary Navajos was accomplished with relative ease in the 1860s, defeating the Apaches proved more difficult. Small warrior bands led by charismatic leaders such as Victorio, Cochise, and Geronimo made optimal use of the rugged landscape and frequently crossed the U.S.–Mexican border to elude capture. The use of Indian scouts and the adoption of light cavalry tactics eventually wore down Apache resistance. Geronimo, the last of the Apache war leaders, surrendered in 1886.

The last major event in the Indian Wars was the destruction of a band of poorly armed Sioux Ghost Dancers at Wounded Knee Creek, South Dakota, in December 1890. For the Army this event marked the end of the military phase of the settlement of the West. For many Native Americans, however, the Wounded Knee Massacre came to symbolize the ruthlessness of the frontier Army and the injustices of U.S. Indian policy.

Effect of Western Warfare on the Army

For most of its existence, the Army was too small and ill-suited to accomplish its mission as a frontier constabulary efficiently. The total number of troops that garrisoned stations in the West never exceeded 25,000 men. Actual strength was even less as desertion, sickness, and high mortality rates continually diminished the Army's capacity to put troops into the field. In addition, the troops were poorly trained and generally ill-prepared for war with indigenous peoples. Because the Army regarded Indian resistance as a temporary and regional distraction, it never developed policies to deal effectively with it. The Military Academy at West Point did not offer courses on Indian warfare. As a result, the quality of unit commanders varied from the able to the utterly incompetent. The seniority system further prevented innovative and able men from attaining positions of authority within the military hierarchy.

The Army never learned to match the mobility of Native Americans or their ability to live off the land. Unlike the Army, Indians were not burdened by cumbersome supply trains. Furthermore, Indians generally tried to avoid pitched battles and preferred to strike quickly and unexpectedly. The Army tried to minimize its disadvantages by establishing forts and depots at strategic locations, directing converging columns into the field, conducting winter campaigns, and utilizing lighter pack trains and Indian scouts. Although some officers, including George Crook and John Pope, expressed sympathy for the struggle of indigenous peoples, others, William T. Sherman and Philip S. Sheridan among them, advocated total war with deliberate destruction of food, shelter, clothing, and livestock. Some officers also included noncombatants as targets.

Despite the efforts of the Army, the conquest of the West was not accomplished until the closing decades of the 19th century. During four decades of western warfare, the Army recorded relatively few successes. Engagements with enemy forces were rare, and casualties were low. Between 1865 and 1898, a total of 106,000 troops served in the West. According to unofficial records, 919 servicemen died on the field of battle, and an additional 1,025 were wounded. Accurate statistics on the number of deaths related to disease, sickness, malnourishment, and exhaustion do not exist. Accurate statistics on the number of Indian casualties during the wars are even more difficult to obtain. Historian Robert M. Utley estimated the number of Native American battle-related casualties at 6,000. Many of these, however, were noncombatants.

Military operations in the West were not cost-effective. The expeditions conducted by generals Patrick E. Connor and Alfred Sully in 1865, for example, cost $20 million (exclusive of pay), but did not result in any significant battlefield successes. In 1873, the Army deployed more than 1,000 soldiers (both regular and volunteer) to dislodge some 60 Modoc warriors from their positions in the lava beds of northern California. With a cost of nearly half a million dollars, the Modoc campaign far exceeded the expense of the new reservation they had been denied before the outbreak of hostilities. Although the Indian Wars placed a heavy burden on American taxpayers, the promise of access to land

and resources nevertheless kept the policy of removal and relocation in place.

Although significant, the role of the Army in the subjugation of Native Americans was limited. Other factors, such as railroad development, settlement, and the eradication of the buffalo and other game, contributed greatly to the conquest of the West. Nevertheless, the Army left an indelible mark on the western landscape. Apart from mapping the western territories (by such "pathfinders" as John Charles Frémont), the Army built roads and highways to facilitate settlement, aided immigrants along the western trails, made contributions in the fields of science and ethnology, maintained the law in frontier communities, and boosted economic development of the West through government contracts. Towns and communities developed around forts and military bases, and even though many forts became obsolete at the close of the Indian Wars, they were often maintained for the economic benefit of rural communities. Some are still in operation today; others have been preserved as historical sites, attracting thousands of visitors each year. The same holds true for certain Indian War battlefields. Perhaps the most popular of these is Little Bighorn Battlefield National Park, which attracts over 400,000 visitors annually.

For Native Americans, the conquest of the West marked the end of a way of life. But the battles over land, resources, and broken treaties continue in the courts of the United States. At stake are land and water rights, tribal sovereignty, and compensation for past injustices.

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Related Entries

Crazy Horse; Geronimo; Hitchcock, Ethan Allen; Indian Army Scouts; Indian Wars: Eastern Wars; Indian Wars: Seminole Wars

Related Documents

1915 a

—Mark van de Logt

Influenza Pandemic of 1918–19

The influenza that spread throughout the world from 1918 to 1919 was one of the deadliest pandemics in human history. It sickened at least one-quarter of the world's population, 2 to 4 percent of whom died, usually from complications of pneumonia. Influenza killed more people in one year than World War I had killed in four: the flu killed 40 to 50 million compared with 9 to 12 million war dead. The pandemic came in three deadly waves: the first in the spring of 1918, the second and most deadly wave in the late summer and fall of that year, and a third, weaker but still lethal, wave in early 1919. In the United States, an estimated 25 million people became ill and 675,000 died. The influenza pandemic followed wartime

Pandemic of 1918–19
Influenza Pathways: Second Wave

Weeks, beginning
September 14th

1 Week 1
2 Week 2
3 Week 3
4 Week 4
5 Week 5
6 Week 6

← path of spread

Source: Gerald F. Pyle, *The Diffusion of Influenza: Patterns and Paradigms,*
(Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), p. 48.

This map shows the sequence and path the influenza pandemic of 1918–19 took across the country.

transportation routes across oceans and continents, heaping misery on a world already struggling with the mass death and destruction of modern industrial warfare.

Like the common flu, the 1918 influenza had a short incubation period, a high sickness rate, and was highly contagious, spreading from person to person most often in airborne droplets. This virus, however, had unusually severe symptoms. A quick onset of illness, high fever, severe headaches, torpor, nosebleeds, a blood-producing cough, and cyanosis—a blue cast to the skin caused by lack of oxygen in the blood—often enabled public health officials to pinpoint to the day the flu's arrival in a community. The 1918 flu was also unusually lethal, especially for young adults. Whereas influenza usually kills only the very weak in a population—the youngest and very oldest—and creates a "U-shaped" mortality curve, the 1918 virus was also deadly to people ages 20 to 40. It killed both the weakest and the strongest in society, producing a "terrible W" curve of

high mortality for the young and old at the extremes of the demographic spectrum, with an unusual peak at its center.

Medical professionals did their best to save flu patients, but in an era before virology and antibiotics, they lacked effective tools. Treatment included bed rest, a light diet, aspirin for fever and pain, and keeping the patient warm in hopes of preventing pneumonia. Recovery usually occurred after a few days unless pneumonia, which was often lethal, developed.

The origin of the influenza of 1918 has long been a mystery and the virus responsible was not identified until 1997. Influenza apparently first appeared in March 1918 in the American Midwest and from there spread to soldiers in several U.S. Army training camps. The virus then traveled to Europe, probably aboard troopships, to the Western Front where in May and June it sickened thousands of soldiers but killed few in this first wave. In the wretched conditions of trench warfare, however, the virus flourished, mutating into

an especially virulent strain that exploded worldwide in August 1918. This deadly second wave of flu appeared simultaneously in the Atlantic ports of Boston, Brest (France), and Freetown (Sierra Leone), once again following troops and the increased trade generated by the war. From these points (and probably others), it spread throughout the globe within weeks.

From Boston, influenza struck Army trainees at nearby Camp Devens, Massachusetts, during the week of September 7, and from there swept the country south and west, following wartime transportation routes. It hit Kansas on September 21, northern California and Texas on September 27, and by the week of October 16 the epidemic was nationwide. Sickness rates averaged 25 percent, but varied widely, from 15 percent of residents in Louisville, Kentucky, for example, to a staggering 53 percent in San Antonio, Texas. Such penetration caused influenza to reduce American life expectancy by almost 12 years in 1918.

When influenza reached a locality, it often caused a sort of social paralysis. It sent thousands of people to bed pale and helpless, flooded hospitals with patients, crowded morgues and cemeteries, and caused officials to close schools, government offices, stores, theaters, and churches in an effort to prevent the spread of the disease. So many nurses and physicians had gone into military service that many communities faced critical personnel shortages and had to recruit medical workers from the ranks of the retired or from training schools.

Influenza also took a toll on war mobilization and undermined Army training and transport plans. The epidemic so depleted the labor force that some war industries and mines had to suspend operations. The War Department took steps to control the epidemic in the training camps, but so many new recruits were entering the camps and falling ill, the Army provost marshal had to cancel the October 1918 draft call. Given the wartime emergency, however, the Wilson administration declined to significantly reduce crowding on troopships and continued the national campaign of massive parades and rallies to sell war bonds.

In Europe, influenza attacked Allied and German armies with equal virulence, filling field hospitals and transport trains with weak, feverish men all along the Western Front. In October 1918, at the height of American Expeditionary Force's Meuse–Argonne offensive, influenza dramatically reduced the number of soldiers who could fight and threatened to overwhelm medical services. More American soldiers died of disease than in combat. The War Department estimated that flu sickened 26 percent of the Army—more than 1 million men—and accounted for 82 percent of total deaths from disease. By mid-November, the flu had subsided in Europe, but reappeared in January and February 1919. This third wave—less powerful but still deadly—spanned the globe. By mid-1919, influenza had probably infected all susceptible human hosts in the world and thus burned out.

During the epidemic, Army medical officers conducted autopsies on flu victims and sent samples of diseased lung tissue to the Army Medical Museum for research. Almost 80 years later, in 1997, scientists at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology analyzed these tissue samples using the polymerase chain reaction process, and for the first time were able to identify the influenza virus of 1918–19 as type A, H1N1. Influenza epidemics emerge periodically in the human population and public health officials continue to monitor the ever-evolving flu virus in order to develop vaccines. In the event of an outbreak of another virulent strain, such knowledge, as well as viral therapies and antibiotics, might help to control the spread of the disease and reduce the mortality rate.

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Related Entries

Environment and War; Medicine and War; Nurses, Military; World War I

—Carol R. Byerly

Information Technology

See Computer Technology and Warfare.

Intelligence Gathering in War

Since the Revolutionary War era, American political and military leaders have recognized the value of gathering intelligence on their adversaries, especially in wartime. Early attempts to collect intelligence in wartime were typically small, ad hoc efforts that ended quickly once peace returned. They emphasized the use of spies to secretly acquire information that contributed to success in battle. Such information included knowledge of the enemy's strengths, weaknesses, intentions, and dispositions. Beginning in the late 19th century with the creation and growth of permanent intelligence organizations, the collection of intelligence was no longer limited to wartime. In peacetime, American intelligence gathering became a long-term effort to collect information from open and clandestine sources to aid government policy makers and avert strategic surprise. The intelligence gathered included information about the intentions and capabilities of potential foreign adversaries and, occasionally, data on U.S. citizens and groups deemed to be subversive.

The development of several new technologies shifted the focus of American intelligence gathering from human to technological sources. The introduction of new means of communication, such as the telegraph, radio, and telephone, expanded the flow of information, giving intelligence agencies more opportunities to intercept and read messages of interest. Increasingly sophisticated cameras and other imaging technology, mounted first on airplanes and later on satellites, also enabled intelligence organizations to gather extremely accurate information from great distances. The growth of peacetime intelligence activities and the increased emphasis on technical collection methods generated and continue to generate debates about the effectiveness of American intelligence gathering and its compatibility with democracy.

The American Revolution

Intelligence gathering played an important role in the American Revolution. Gen. George Washington listed gaining more information about British forces as one of his most important duties when he assumed command of the Continental Army in July 1775. Washington established a network of spies to monitor British movements and intentions. Using a variety of cover stories, Washington's agents moved freely in and out of British-controlled Philadelphia and New York, carrying intelligence on British troops, fortifications, supplies, and plans.

The primary source of intelligence from abroad during the Revolution was the Committee of Secret Correspondence, established by the Continental Congress on November 29, 1775. The committee's members acquired foreign publications, hired spies, and funded propaganda activities to both discover and influence the attitudes of foreign powers about the American cause. Many of the committee's activities were cloaked in secrecy. It used codes, ciphers, and invisible inks to communicate with its agents and kept secret their names and those of its correspondents.

After the American Revolution ended, the systems created for gathering intelligence were disbanded. Intelligence collection became the responsibility of the president, who dispatched military observers or special agents to gather specific information when necessary. At the request of President Washington, Congress established the Contingent Fund for Foreign Intercourse, often called the secret service fund, in

1790. The president had to certify the sums spent from the fund but could conceal the purposes and recipients. The creation of the fund reinforced the belief that the government could legitimately withhold information related to intelligence gathering from both Congress and the American public. Within three years, the size of the fund increased to $1 million, 12 percent of federal budget. Initially, the money was used largely to ransom American hostages held in Algiers and pay off foreign officials. The size of the contingent fund varied over the next several decades, but the belief that intelligence gathering should be kept secret remained constant. When the House of Representatives asked Pres. James K. Polk to surrender the accounts of all payments from the fund during the previous administration, Polk refused. He explained that in wartime or when war was imminent, employing individuals to collect information was often necessary. Such individuals, generally, could obtain information successfully only if secrecy was guaranteed.

The Civil War

When the Civil War began, both the Union and the Confederacy lacked organizations devoted to the systematic collection of intelligence. Instead, they relied on ad hoc efforts to gather information on the size and movements of the enemy's armies. Generals on both sides organized their own intelligence operations, devised projects, hired spies and detectives, and assigned missions. One of those hired was Allan Pinkerton, head of one of the world's first private detective agencies. Pinkerton served as the intelligence chief of Union general George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac. Pinkerton recorded several well-publicized arrests of Confederate spies but consistently failed to estimate correctly the size of the enemy force. Pinkerton's faulty intelligence reinforced McClellan's cautious nature and contributed to the general's eventual dismissal.

The most effective intelligence organization of the war was the Bureau of Military Information, created as part of Gen. Joseph Hooker's Army of the Potomac in 1863. It regularly supplied accurate intelligence assessments that directly contributed to the success of Union military commanders. The bureau gathered its intelligence from prisoners, deserters, refugees, newspapers, cavalry scouts, and agents in

Confederate territory, among other sources. When the Civil War ended, however, the Bureau of Military Information was dissolved and the United States returned to the occasional use of special agents or observers to gather intelligence.

Although the Civil War did not produce a permanent intelligence organization in the United States, it did prompt an important court decision regarding intelligence. Pres. Abraham Lincoln recruited publisher William A. Lloyd to serve as a part-time spy and promised to pay him $200 per month plus expenses. When Lloyd returned to the North after Lincoln's assassination, however, the government reimbursed him only for his expenses. Lloyd's suit to obtain the compensation promised eventually reached the Supreme Court. In an 1876 decision, the Court recognized that the president had the authority to employ secret agents and that contracts made with those agents were binding. Nevertheless, it ruled against Lloyd, arguing that such contracts were inherently secret and that suits threatening to reveal confidential material were not valid.

Late 19th Century

By the 1880s, the traditional practice of sending officers on periodic observation tours to Europe was no longer sufficient to keep the Navy apprised of the latest technological developments. Warship design was changing so rapidly and being debated so vigorously that the reports were often outdated by the time the officers returned home. The volume of published material available on foreign fleets and naval-building programs was also increasing exponentially. To take advantage of this flood of potential intelligence, proponents of naval modernization drew on the experiences of American businesses, particularly railroads, with the organizational control of information. In 1882, they established the nation's first peacetime intelligence organization, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), to systematize the collection of information on foreign navies. Three years later, the Army founded its own intelligence office, the Military Information Division (MID).

The Spanish–American War in 1898 provided the first wartime test for the ONI and MID. Before the war started, military attachés provided detailed information on Spanish war plans and troop strength; other MID officers conducted clandestine reconnaissance missions in Cuba and Puerto

Rico. After the war began, the primary intelligence objective was to locate and track Spanish warships. Naval attachés in Europe hastily created networks of informants and scouted on their own to learn more about the Spanish Navy's intentions and capabilities. A new source of intelligence, however, definitively located the Spanish fleet. The Army's Signal Corps used well-placed sources in the Western Union telegraph office in Havana, Cuba, to intercept communications between Madrid and Spanish commanders on the island. When a Spanish squadron arrived in Cuba, the commander immediately notified his superiors via telegraph, thus revealing his position to the American military as well.

World War I

Despite a relatively successful performance in the Spanish–American War, the ability of the United States to collect intelligence was still limited and fragmented when World War I began. Little coordination existed between the new intelligence organizations and central direction was nil. Yet soon after war was declared, the Army and Navy received massive infusions of money and rapidly expanded their foreign intelligence operations. As part of this expansion, the Army created its first permanent communications intelligence agency to intercept and read foreign communications.

The primary focus of U.S. intelligence gathering during World War I, however, was preventing domestic subversion. The need to mobilize the entire population in support of the war effort made American political and military leaders anxious about the loyalty of foreign-born soldiers and residents. The extensive sabotage and subversion campaign conducted by German agents exacerbated their concerns. To combat subversion, the recently created Bureau of Investigation (later renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]), the ONI, and the MID monitored and occasionally harassed large numbers of individuals considered potentially dangerous aliens or radicals. After the war ended, labor unrest, race riots, and a series of bombings attributed to radical labor and communist groups provoked a wave of hysteria known as the Red Scare and a further expansion of domestic intelligence gathering. The campaign against internal subversion culminated in the 1920 Palmer raids, named for Attorney Gen. A.

Mitchell Palmer. Without warrants, federal agents raided meetings of communist and labor organizations and arrested more than 4,000 people, most of whom were later released for lack of evidence. The raids were the first time the federal government had waged a major peacetime intelligence campaign against internal subversion.

Although the United States continued to rely primarily on military and naval attachés to gather foreign intelligence after World War I, technical collection methods grew increasingly important. The Army's communications intelligence organization became a joint venture with the State Department—known as the Cipher Bureau or, more popularly, the Black Chamber. Partly financed by a secret contingent fund similar to the one created after the American Revolution and operating from a secret location in New York City, the Cipher Bureau focused on breaking the diplomatic codes of Japan, Great Britain, and Germany. Its ability to intercept and read Japanese messages during the 1921 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments aided American negotiators, although its productivity eventually declined. Sec. of State Henry Stimson halted State Department funding for the Cipher Bureau in 1929, later declaring, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Even as the Cipher Bureau was ceasing operations, the Army and the Navy were creating new organizations to intercept and decrypt foreign communications. The Army's Signal Intelligence Service cracked the main Japanese diplomatic cipher in 1936 and began delivering daily reports to the president.

World War II

The ability to read Japanese diplomatic signals was not enough to avert one of the greatest intelligence failures in American history: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The disaster of Pearl Harbor contributed to increased centralization of American intelligence gathering. Five months before the war began, Pres. Franklin Roosevelt had created the position of coordinator of information and appointed wealthy New York lawyer and war hero William Donovan to fill it. Donovan was charged with collecting, analyzing, and correlating all information bearing upon national security. His rapid accretion of influence and responsibility provoked resentment among the military

intelligence agencies and the FBI. To mollify the opposition, Donovan's organization was placed under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. The OSS supplied essential facts and intelligence estimates to policy makers and conducted covert operations to aid military campaigns. As the war progressed, the OSS expanded to include more than 12,000 operatives, military and civilian. Most OSS recruits were young and college educated; nearly one-third of its employees were women, who served as field operatives or in clerical positions. OSS agents helped guide the 1942 Torch landings in North Africa, supported Allied bombing campaigns in Europe, and conducted guerrilla activities in Yugoslavia, Burma, and other countries.

The most important intelligence gathered during World War II came from the interception and decryption of Japanese and German communications. American code breaking revealed Japanese intentions to attack the island of Midway, an important outpost in the Pacific, in 1942. The U.S. Navy was thus able to position its aircraft carriers and successfully attack the Japanese fleet. The outcome of the battle was still a near thing, but Japan's loss of four carriers turned the tide in the Pacific. The ability to read German ciphers also helped the Allies counter the threat of German submarines in the Atlantic and defeat the German Army in Europe.

The Cold War

Intelligence gathering became a permanent and major part of the national security apparatus during the Cold War, with large intelligence organizations operating at quasi-wartime levels on a continuous basis. Yet a massive expansion of American intelligence gathering did not appear likely when World War II ended. Pres. Harry S. Truman, who distrusted peacetime intelligence organizations, dissolved the OSS in October 1945. Within a few months, however, Truman recognized a need for a centralized intelligence system. After several tentative attempts to establish an organization that would plan, develop, and coordinate all federal intelligence activities, the National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The law charged the CIA with coordinating the nation's intelligence activities and collecting, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence

affecting national security. It also prohibited the CIA from engaging in law enforcement and restricted its internal security functions. The 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act permitted the CIA to employ confidential fiscal and administrative procedures similar to those used to keep intelligence spending secret since the American Revolution.

The Department of Defense was concurrently moving to centralize signals intelligence (such as eavesdropping and code breaking). In 1949, it established the Armed Forces Security Agency to coordinate signals intelligence among the military services. In 1952, the organization was renamed the National Security Agency (NSA) and given more authority to coordinate signals intelligence among the various government agencies. The NSA soon became the U.S. government's largest intelligence organization, in terms of both budget and personnel. It operated the most sophisticated computer complex in the world and a global network of listening and relay stations.

The U.S. intelligence community also dramatically improved its ability to collect imagery intelligence, which involves aerial (and later, space) reconnaissance. In the late 1950s, the CIA sponsored the development of the U-2 spy plane. The U-2 was capable of flying above foreign air defenses and taking remarkably detailed photos. The pictures taken by U-2s calmed American fears that the Soviet Union possessed a strategic military advantage and helped reduce international tensions. In 1960, the United States launched the first reconnaissance satellite. The satellite took photos from space and sent them back to Earth in a reentry capsule. In one flight, it covered more territory than all the flights during the four years of the U-2 program. By 1977, American satellites were able to send digital images from space to the president's desk in one hour.

During the Vietnam War, American intelligence efforts again focused on combating perceived domestic subversion. Presidents Johnson and Nixon believed that domestic opposition to the war was the result of communist influence. They directed the CIA to investigate foreign involvement in various dissent and peace organizations. Although the CIA found no communist influence, both Johnson and Nixon refused to believe the findings and asked the agency to continually expand its investigations. When CIA spying on the

antiwar movement was revealed in 1974, the agency had established nearly 10,000 files on U.S. citizens, including 14 past or present members of Congress. The NSA had also intercepted the communications of 1,680 U.S. citizens or groups between 1966 and 1973.

The revelations about domestic spying operations, which were soon followed by others about covert operations abroad, resulted in much closer scrutiny of the intelligence community. Both houses of Congress created special committees to examine the community's activities; the fundamental issue in the committees' hearings was the role of intelligence in an open society. Intelligence operations contribute to national security, but they require secrecy to be effective. Too much secrecy, however, can lead to abuses. In an effort to strike a better balance between secrecy and democracy, Congress established standing committees in both houses to monitor the executive branch's management of the intelligence community.

Many of the issues that figured prominently in the history of American intelligence gathering in war resurfaced in the 21st century. Despite impressive technological advances, intelligence gathering remained imperfect. The intelligence community failed to provide adequate warning of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and did not accurately estimate the size and scope of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program in the run-up to the Iraq War. The intelligence failures were attributable, at least in part, to the lingering dependence on technological collection methods and the resulting neglect of human intelligence sources. The spread of international terrorism further blurred the line between peacetime and wartime intelligence gathering by producing a dramatic increase in the scope and pace of intelligence activities. It also prompted reformers to reiterate their demands for greater centralization.

Finally, the growth of terrorism prompted the passage of legal provisions granting the government greater latitude to collect domestic intelligence. The USAPATRIOT Act of 2001 expanded the power of the government to monitor and intercept communications domestically, expanded its ability to conduct warrantless searches of records such as book-borrowing histories at libraries, and encouraged greater information sharing between the intelligence community and domestic law enforcement. Opponents of the act claimed that it threatened civil liberties, while supporters argued that it was an important tool to combat terrorism. The expansion and centralization of intelligence operations and the debate over the Patriot Act highlighted the still unresolved issues of the effectiveness of intelligence and its proper role in a democracy.

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Related Entries

Espionage and Sedition Acts; Satellite Technology; Ultra and Enigma

Related Documents

1846 a; 1942 e, f; 1976 a

—*Robert G. Angevine*

Integration

See Racial Integration of the Armed Forces.

Internment Camps

See German and Italian Americans, Internment of; Japanese Americans, Internment of.

Iraq War

(2003–)

The Iraq War was the first major demonstration of the so-called Bush Doctrine, named for Pres. George W. Bush. Initially laid out in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City's World Trade Center and the Pentagon, that doctrine implicitly repudiated the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine, which had taken a very cautious view of the use of American military force. The Bush Doctrine was most fully elaborated in the president's June 2002 commencement speech at West Point. In that speech, President Bush indicated that the United States would engage in preemptive war should it or its allies be threatened by terrorists or rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction; that it would do so unilaterally if need be; and that it would seek to promote liberty and democracy throughout the world. The Bush administration emphasized each of these points in explaining its rationale for going to war with Iraq in March 2003.

But the conflict must also be seen against the backdrop of a problematic, arguably failed policy of containing Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991. American policy makers initially thought that Saddam Hussein's Baathist dictatorship would fall after its humiliating defeat. Indeed, rebellions did break out throughout Iraq, but Hussein's regime remained intact and slaughtered tens of thousands of Iraqis, quashing the revolution. The United States still confronted a hostile and fractious regime that sought at every turn to avoid complying with the armistice terms—especially those dealing with inspections aimed to ferret out Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Over the next decade Hussein played a cat-and-mouse game with U.N. weapons inspectors and the United States. American policy makers replied by launching retaliatory attacks against Iraq's military and police structure. American pilots enforced no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq, while the United Nations continued a regime of sanctions initially imposed when Iraq invaded Kuwait in July 1990. None of these measures prevented Hussein from ordering his Republican Guard to deploy into southern Iraq in preparation for a second invasion of Kuwait in 1994. A quick American response deterred the Iraqis, but only at the last moment. By 2000, sanctions clearly were having a terrible effect on the Iraqi people while exerting little influence over Saddam Hussein. Nevertheless, neither the international community nor Americans appeared willing to engage in a major military campaign to overthrow the dictator.

Planning the War

The attacks of September 11 by the terrorist group al Qaeda fundamentally changed the calculus for American policy makers. Within a matter of months U.S. forces had attacked and overthrown the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was actively supporting al Qaeda. Early in 2002, President Bush and his advisers turned to Iraq. Hussein's regime represented a seemingly perfect target for a forward-leaning policy of preventive action against terrorism: Iraq had supported terrorist groups throughout the Middle East over the past several decades. Moreover, Hussein had launched two wars against Iraq's neighbors (Iran from 1980 to 1988; Kuwait from 1990 to 1991), while using gas warfare against his own people in 1988 (the most egregious case being the attack on Halabjah that killed over 5,000 Kurds). Many in

the administration concluded that Iraqis would welcome a military effort to overthrow Hussein.

Major planning for an invasion of Iraq began in spring 2002. At that time, the Bush administration initiated efforts to enlist foreign support—a task that proved difficult. Few Arab states lined up in support; only Kuwait, Qatar, and some of the other Gulf states proved willing to support such an effort. Several of America's European allies, who had enthusiastically supported the intervention in Afghanistan, resisted the idea of a military invasion of Iraq. France, Germany, and Russia all refused to support the coming war. Only the British, led by Prime Minister Tony Blair, supported the war with major military forces. Great Britain supplied one-third of the ground forces that launched the initial attack, while its Air Force provided tanker support and substantial numbers of fighter-bombers.

Military planning for the war proved easier than diplomatic efforts. Planners had the advantage of having watched Iraq's military over the previous decade. The fact that American and allied aircraft had flown tens of thousands of sorties over the no-fly zones without losing a single aircraft indicated that Iraq no longer possessed a viable air defense. Close observation of Iraq's ground forces indicated that they rarely, if ever, engaged in serious training. Moreover, because of his paranoia, Hussein had divided Iraq's ground forces into a number of separate organizations—the regular Army, the Republican Guards, the Special Republican Guards, the Baath Party militias, and a number of fedayeen and martyrs' brigades—none of which cooperated at any level. Indeed, unbeknownst to coalition planners, Hussein prevented his military from entering the environs of Baghdad or even participating in planning for the capital's defense.

By the autumn of 2002, planning had advanced to the point where the flow of military forces into the region could begin. The main thrust of the ground offense would come from Kuwait. In addition, planners hoped to launch a major offensive from Turkey against Iraq's northern provinces. From Kuwait two American divisions, the Army's 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division, and one British division, the 1st UK Armoured Division, would cross into Iraq. The initial objectives would be as follows: for the

British, the Ramalah oil fields and Basra, Iraq's second largest city; the U.S. Marines would support the British and swing west to cross the Euphrates. They were to advance through the central Mesopotamian Valley toward An Numinayah on the Tigris River. Concurrently, the 3rd Infantry Division (ID) was to drive up desert roads west of the Euphrates to reach the Karbala Gap, one of the main approaches to Baghdad from the west. Along the way it was to seize a number of key bridges over the Euphrates. The bridge north of An Nasiriyah was particularly important, because two Regimental Combat Teams of the 1st Marine Division were to cross at that point.

A drive from the north, with a British division and the 4th ID, was also scheduled to play a role in the defeat of Iraq's military forces. However, that operation depended on Turkish cooperation, and the Turks proved recalcitrant. Just before Christmas, they concluded that the Turks would not allow Coalition troops on their territory. Over the next two months the British changed their deployment plans and managed to assemble the 1st UK Armored Division in Kuwait. That switch explained the rather strange composition of the division: one heavy armored unit and two light brigades. So late was the British deployment that armorers finished outfitting the last Challenger II tank with its desert kit just three days before the start of operations.

The planning for the air campaign was substantially different from what had been planned in the 1991 Gulf War. There would be no prolonged air offensive before the ground operations began. Because so many American and British troops had concentrated in Kuwait, planners decided that dispersal was the best means of protection against possible use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Thus, ground forces would disperse forward by launching their ground attack concurrently with the air offense. Nevertheless, air planners determined to launch a massive, "shock and awe" aerial assault on Hussein's centers of power in the optimistic assumption that such overwhelming force would cause the regime's collapse.

As allied planning progressed, Saddam Hussein apparently refused to believe that the Americans would actually initiate a major ground war. On the one hand, the dictator underestimated American resolve; on the other, he believed

that international opposition, particularly by the Europeans, would prevent an American offensive. Should an attack occur, he was confident that the Iraqi military would be able to inflict sufficient losses on the supposedly casualty-averse Americans to make them quit. Accordingly, right up to the outbreak of war, Hussein forbade defensive measures such as mining the oil fields or the bridges across the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for destruction.

The March to Baghdad
The campaign began a day ahead of schedule when intelligence indicated that Hussein might be at a hideout in Baghdad. A hurriedly mounted F-117 strike hit that target just before dawn on March 20, but the dictator was elsewhere. On the following night the "shock and awe" offensive began blasting downtown Baghdad. Coalition aircraft and ships launched 600 cruise missiles, while strike aircraft, including B-1s and B-2s, flew 700 missions and struck more than 1,000 targets. Although a stunning display of military might, the attack on Baghdad had an unintended effect: by leveling ministry and party buildings, it destroyed much of the evidence of the regime's crimes as well as the administrative apparatus necessary to govern the country. Yet the attack was hardly sufficient to shake the regime's political control of Iraq.

Meanwhile, the ground invasion had begun. Under the command of the Coalition land component commander, two corps drove into Iraq. To the west, the 3rd ID spearheaded V Corps; the 101st Airborne and the 82nd Airborne Divisions followed in support of the 3rd ID. To the east, I Marine Expeditionary Force controlled the British 1st Armoured Division, supported by elements of the Marine Corps' Task Force "Tripoli," and the 1st Marine Division (1st Mardiv). The British quickly grabbed the Ramalah oil fields (which had not been prepared for demolition) and then continued their advance on Basra.

The advance of 3rd ID up the west bank of the Tigris ran into little serious opposition from regular Iraqi units, which remained in the cities and towns along the Euphrates. However, the division's brigade combat teams (BCTs), as well as their supporting logistic units, found themselves under constant attack by tactically inept but fanatical bands

of fedayeen, as well as a few suicide bombers. Tank crews used few 120mm main gun rounds but vast amounts of machine gun and small arms ammunition.

On March 25 a vicious shamal—a combination of rain, dust, and flying mud particles—blew into Iraq, covering soldiers and marines. Visibility declined to almost zero. Fedayeen attacks increased, while under cover of the storm Hussein's commanders attempted to move a significant number of units to adjust to the American drive from the south. However, the shamal, although seriously hampering visibility on the ground, failed to screen Iraqi movements from observation by Coalition aircraft. Bombarded by precision munitions from a darkened sky, the Iraqis took terrible losses. Those who survived deserted in droves.

On March 27 senior American commanders agreed on a short pause to prepare their forces for the drive on Baghdad. Part of the reason for the halt: Army units were low on fuel and ammunition. The halt was particularly important for the 3rd ID, which needed the troops from the 101st and 82nd to cover the cities and towns along the Euphrates. Such cover would enable the 3rd ID to concentrate its combat power on the Karbala Gap. On April 1 the Army's 1st and 2nd BCTs moved across the Euphrates and into the gap. Within a day, the 3rd ID was through the gap, and the road to Baghdad lay open. By April 3 Abrams tanks and Bradley armored personnel carriers had reached the environs of Baghdad International Airport.

The airport was secure by the evening of April 4, and the military leadership then launched the 2nd BCT on a raid into the heart of Baghdad. On April 5 and 6, the Abrams and Bradleys swept through the center of Iraq's capital with few casualties and the loss of only a single tank, but on the three main intersections a series of ferocious firefights broke out that lasted most of the day. The Americans kept open the supply lines to the 2nd BCT and broke the back of Iraqi resistance in the capital.

While the 3rd ID was breaking through the Karbala Gap, the Marines were having equal success in its drive through the Mesopotamian Valley. In capturing An Numaniyah, the Marines had surrounded substantial numbers of Iraqi troops in the valley, most of whom threw their uniforms away and went home. By April 3, the Marines had seized the bridges at

An Numinayah and were crossing to the east bank of the Tigris. With the 5th RCT in the lead, the Marines now began to advance on Baghdad. By April 7 all three RCTs were crossing the Diyalah River on the eastern outskirts of the Iraqi capital. On April 9, in a much-televised event, a crowd of civilians, assisted by an American armored recovery vehicle, toppled a large statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad's Firdos Square. (Initially thought to be a spontaneous demonstration, the event appears to have been at least partly staged, and most of the civilians were Arab workers from other countries, not Iraqis.) The conventional war in Iraq was over. But in many respects the fighting had just begun.

The Insurgency

By May 1, 2003, the day President Bush triumphantly declared "major combat operations" at an end, 140 American and 33 British service personnel had died in the Iraq War. Combat deaths in the months that followed were much greater, and in September 2004 the Pentagon reported that the 1,000th American soldier had perished in Iraq. Most fell victim to improvised explosive devices planted by a wide array of insurgents, ranging from former members of the Baathist regime to Shiite fundamentalists to terrorists who had filtered into Iraq from other countries.

This sobering development came as no surprise to many analysts, who foresaw that the removal of Saddam Hussein would inevitably leave a major power vacuum. In the months leading up to the war, both civilian commentators and senior military officers had stressed that a large number of troops would be required to handle the chaos and troubles that would come in what was inaptly designated as "the post-conflict phase." The chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Eric Shinseki, warned that this phase would require more, not fewer, troops to bring stability to Iraq, and that they would be needed for a considerable time. But in a decision that became increasingly controversial in the months that followed, Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his senior civilian advisers in the Pentagon brusquely rejected such counsel.

The improvised government that succeeded Saddam Hussein, the Coalition Provisional Authority, took power amid massive looting and a widespread breakdown in law and order that opened the door to what became a significant insurgency in the months that followed. By June 28, 2004—the date on which the United States returned sovereignty to Iraq—717 American servicemen had been killed, over and above the 140 who died during the 43 days of the conventional campaign. By January 30, 2005—the date of elections to form a permanent Iraqi government—total American deaths had exceeded 1,400, with no end to the insurgency in sight. An estimated 16,000–18,000 Iraqi civilians had also perished.

The Impact at Home

Despite misgivings on the part of many Americans and fierce opposition on the part of others, more than 70 percent of Americans initially endorsed President Bush's decision to invade Iraq. They watched as media coverage—much of it delivered live by journalists who traveled "embedded" with specific military units—showed the rapid, almost unchecked Coalition advance. But more widespread doubts about the war began when the occupation of the country got off to a rocky start. These were increased by American service personnel who were able to e-mail disquieting information to their relatives and friends, and by service personnel, journalists, and Iraqi civilians who posted photographs online and opinions on "blogs." A blog kept by a 24-year old Iraqi woman known only as "Riverbend" consistently ranked among the top 50 most read blogs on the Web.

By mid-2004, no weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq (Saddam Hussein had apparently implied that he did hold such weapons as a way to maintain his stature in the Arab world) and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (commonly called the 9/11 Commission) concluded that, at best, only the most tenuous connections had existed between al Qaeda and the deposed Baathist regime. These two facts, coupled with the ongoing violence there and the damaging revelations of the abuse by U.S. soldiers of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison west of Baghdad, convinced about half of Americans that the war was not worth the cost. But despite intense criticism and a strong challenge in the 2004 presidential election from Democratic nominee Sen. John Kerry, Bush steadfastly maintained

Demonstrating against the Bush administration and the Iraq War, protestors carrying 1000 mock coffins representing the U.S. death toll marched up Seventh Avenue in New York City on August 29, 2004, passing Madison Square Garden, the site of the Republican National Convention. (Associated Press, AP)

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Persian Gulf War; Rumsfeld, Donald; Television and War; War on Terrorism; Weinberger–Powell Doctrine

Related Documents

2004 a, b, c

—*Williamson Murray*

that the conflict was an integral and necessary component of the war on terror. His reelection, however narrow the victory margin, might have suggested that a majority of Americans still agreed with him.

Nevertheless, debate continued over the wisdom of the invasion and whether sufficient cause existed under international law to legitimize the attack. Some wondered if the Iraq war was a distraction from, or even a hindrance to, the effective prosecution of the war on terror. Even so, the courage shown by the Iraqis who went to the polls on January 30, 2005, impressed even the most skeptical critics of the invasion, and some earlier critics began to wonder, cautiously but publicly, if perhaps the Bush administration might have been right after all. Nevertheless, much contention over the war continued well into 2005.

Isolationism

Referring to the period between the two world wars (1919-1939), isolationism is generally associated with the concept of an American retreat from world affairs after World War I. The isolationism America's leaders embraced during that period stemmed from a long-ingrained foreign policy that stretched back to George Washington's farewell address of 1796. American diplomacy had since been shaped by: (1) the geo-strategic security that two oceans offer the United States, separating it from Asia and Europe; (2) the immense wealth of the continent's resources, in turn fueling U.S economic growth; and (3) the avowed objective of keeping the United States clear of Europe's diplomatic and military quarrels. Although Pres. Theodore Roosevelt had pulled

America onto the imperialist bandwagon in the early 1900s in areas such as Cuba, the Philippines, and China, these activities were judged a temporary, if natural, extension of the Monroe Doctrine and appeared more as an unavoidable economic step.

Interwar isolationism arose in response to the new "internationalism" proposed by Pres. Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I. Seeking, at the Versailles peace settlement talks, to replace traditional realpolitik with moral values and the force of law, as idealized in the League of Nations and its Covenant, Wilson sought to make the United States a permanent player in the stabilization of European international relations. Wilson attempted to bypass Congress, with its many critics of internationalism, with his plans for substantial U.S. international involvement. The Senate, led by Republican senator Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and majority leader, proposed in November 1919 a series of amendments to the Treaty of Versailles, which were refused by Wilson. Lodge's actions represented the consensus of opinion on foreign affairs then existing within mainstream America. Lodge managed to rally the opposition to Wilson's project and ensured that the American membership in the League was defeated in March 1920.

Between 1921 and 1933, a series of Republican presidents (Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover) set American diplomacy on the path of political and economic independence in world affairs. The foreign relations of these administrations were not, however, "isolationist." Rejecting any connection with the League of Nations, the Republican administrations of the 1920s used alternative channels to ensure American influence.

One channel was economic. American foreign investors, who very actively pursued U.S. economic interests abroad, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, more than doubled their foreign investments between 1919 and 1929. Moreover, the British and French governments had largely financed their efforts during World War I by contracting enormous debts in the United States. Although the Senate's World War Foreign Debt Commission eased the repayment schedule, the underlying problem persisted: the Allies could not repay their war debt unless the Germans made good on the repara-

tions imposed on them by the Treaty of Versailles. When the Americans stepped forward to assist German reparations payments with the Dawes and Young plans in 1924 and 1929, respectively, American influence on the European economy became most apparent.

The second channel was the quest for naval disarmament. The United States, through a series of international conferences on naval arms limitation (in Washington, 1921–22; London, 1930 and 1935–36), worked with Britain, France, Italy, and Japan toward an international agreement limiting the risk of an arms race among the world's naval powers. Although the United States sought mainly to improve relations with Britain and contain the rise of the Japanese imperial Navy, the question of arms limitations kept America influential in defining post–World War I international relations.

The three administrations in office between 1921 and 1933 thus kept the United States active in world affairs despite the growing disillusionment of the American public about the effects of U.S. involvement in World War I. The United States managed to maintain considerable international influence and the freedom to act in accordance with national interests despite not having joined the League of Nations or allying with any other power.

When the international crises in Europe and in the Far East combined with the effects of the Great Depression to threaten world peace in the 1930s, the United States retreated from world affairs. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931), Hitler's rise to power (1933), and the expiration of the naval arms limitation agreements (1937) led to a greater isolationist impulse in the United States. Involved with domestic problems and the implementation of the New Deal, America retreated from world affairs until the early years of World War II. Above all else, Americans wanted a government able to find a solution to its economic crisis. Although an internationalist who had supported Wilson's policies, Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt's election to the presidency in 1932 came about in large part because of his promise of a New Deal to address that crisis.

America's isolationist impulse was embodied in the Neutrality acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937, a series of laws designed to safeguard the country's neutrality in case of

war. Prohibiting loans to warring countries, the Neutrality acts also established the sale of raw materials or manufactured products by the United States as "cash and carry": the buyer paid for the goods on purchase ("cash") and had to transport the goods on his own ship ("carry"). The "cash and carry" act allowed the American economy to supply the needs of warring nations without the risk of involving the U.S. in war.

Events in Europe and Asia progressively altered American public opinion and shook the nation out of its isolationist stance. The outbreak of direct Sino–Japanese hostilities in 1937 further exacerbated relations between Japan and the United States because of the growing threat to the U.S. Open Door policy (designed to protect equal economic access to China). Furthermore, as war seemed closer in Europe after Germany's annexation of Austria (March 1938) and Czechoslovakia (March 1939), Roosevelt grew convinced of Germany's desire to build an empire. After the eruption of war in September 1939 between Germany and the Allies (primarily France and Britain), Roosevelt demanded revision of the Neutrality acts. Congress agreed. In November 1939, Congress authorized, under the "cash and carry" clause, the export of weapons and war materials. By doing so, the United States kept an officially neutral stance toward the ongoing war in Europe and Asia while, in fact, becoming increasingly supportive of the Allied cause.

The collapse of France in May 1940 shook American public opinion. The defeat of the French Army, which was considered to be one of the most powerful armies in the world, crushed American expectations of a Franco–British victory over Nazi Germany. The debate surrounding potential U.S. involvement was heated. On one side were such groups as the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies; led by Republican William Allen White, the bipartisan organization was sympathetic to the Allied cause and urged American assistance to Britain. On the other side of the debate was the America First Committee, a national organization of leading isolationist voices, including Philip La Follette, former governor of Wisconsin, and aviator Charles Lindbergh, who wished to mobilize public opinion against intervention in the war in Europe. Dominated by anti–New Deal Republicans, speaking in the name of midwestern America, the America First Committee failed to reach liberals opposed to growing U.S. involvement with Britain, and eventually Russia. Furthermore, the avowed Anglophobia—and anti-Semitism—of many of its speakers proved to be a liability at a time of growing sympathies for the plight of Britain.

Roosevelt interpreted his reelection of November 1940 as an approval of more active help for England. When Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Britain informed the president that declining financial reserves in Britain made impossible the purchase of weapons and goods under the dispositions of the Neutrality acts, Roosevelt proposed the lend lease bill, which was accepted by Congress on March 11, 1941. Lend lease, which was also extended to Soviet Russia after the German invasion of June 1941, authorized the president to "send, transfer title […], exchange, lease, lend" war materials and goods to nations fighting Nazi Germany. Repayment was expected to be "in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory." The interventionist argument gradually took hold: America was slowly becoming a British ally.

Some historians consider that Roosevelt, by helping England fight Nazi Germany, fought a proxy war aimed at keeping America away from conflict. Although Roosevelt's motivations in formulating his foreign policy remain debatable, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, put a definite end to American isolationism.

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Arms Trade; Butler, Smedley Darlington; Economy and War; Munitions Industry; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Wilson, Woodrow; World War I; World War II

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
Jackson, Andrew

(1767–1845)
U.S. Army General,
7th President of the United States

Believing in the superior martial abilities of the citizen–soldier over those of the experienced professional soldier, Andrew Jackson rode military success from the 1815 battle of New Orleans to the American presidency in 1829. As president, he maintained the same conviction and self-assurance that defined his battlefield conduct in a struggle that favored equality over privilege. Inspiring an entire generation, Jackson symbolized the spirit of American democracy that transformed the nation between 1800 and 1845.

Early Life

Jackson was born in the Waxhaws region of the Carolinas in March 1767, shortly after his father died. His formative years were influenced by the British invasion of the Carolinas during the American Revolution. He was captured as a civilian by the British after fighting in the August 1781 battle of Hanging Rock, South Carolina. Jackson's lifelong hatred of the British was cemented when a British officer slashed him with his sword after Jackson refused to wipe mud from the officer's boots. This hatred grew even fiercer after his mother and two older brothers died while held by the British during the war.

Legal and Military Career

Admitted to the bar in 1787, Jackson moved to Tennessee to pursue lucrative opportunities in a new frontier state. He married into a prominent family and entered politics, serving as representative and senator in Congress, and judge on the Tennessee superior court. In 1792, Jackson's success led to an appointment as judge advocate for the Davidson County militia, beginning his association with citizen–soldiers. After losing his first bid to be elected major general of the Tennessee militia in 1796, Jackson won election to the same post six years later and came to regard that office as second only to that of state governor.

Agreeing to provide boats and manpower to Aaron Burr in 1805, Jackson anticipated joining Burr's expedition to wrest the Southwest from Spain and thereby expand the United States. When Burr was tried for treason, Jackson testified on his behalf. He considered coconspirator Gen. James Wilkinson, who had sworn allegiance to Spain in 1787, to be the real traitor. During the trial, Jackson's public attacks against Wilkinson and his supporters in the Jefferson administration curtailed his opportunities for further military advancement.

Deterioration of relations between Great Britain and the United States prompted Jackson to leave his plantation and make preparations for what he hoped would become a war with Britain. Jackson called for 2,500 Tennessee volunteers in March 1812 only to see his initiative rejected by Pres. James Madison. Six months later, Tennessee governor William Blount authorized Jackson to lead 2,000 Tennessee militia to assist General Wilkinson in defending New Orleans. Dismissed at Natchez, a dismayed Jackson returned to Nashville, despite having earned the respect and admiration of his men for his courage, fortitude, and leadership, traits that would characterize Jackson throughout his career.

In 1813, Jackson intervened in a dispute between his brigade inspector, William Carroll, and Thomas Hart Benton

that culminated in a street brawl that left Jackson seriously wounded and weak from loss of blood. Jackson's recovery was cut short by news of the attack on Fort Mims, Alabama, by the Creek Indians. With his arm in a sling, Jackson led 5,000 regulars and volunteers from Tennessee to retaliate. Destroying the Creek village of Tallushatchee, Jackson's forces then defeated the Red Stick Creeks at Talladega. His troops endured great privations that strained Jackson's ability to maintain a cohesive fighting force, and he repeatedly threatened to execute soldiers who sought to return to Tennessee. Strengthened by the arrival of 800 recruits in January 1814, Jackson launched a spring campaign against the Creeks. On March 27, Jackson's force of regulars and militia successfully attacked a fortified Creek encampment at Horseshoe Bend, effectively ending Creek resistance. Dictating terms to the defeated Indians, the Treaty of Fort Jackson, signed in August 1814, ceded more than 23 million acres of Creek land in Georgia and Alabama to the United States.

As a reward for his success, Jackson was promoted to major general in the U.S. Army and was charged with protecting the Gulf Coast from British attack. Jackson promptly invaded Spanish Florida, capturing Pensacola to deprive the British of a base of operations. By December, Jackson began preparing the defense of New Orleans, a city believed to be the objective of a British invasion force commanded by Gen. Edward Pakenham. Assembling a fighting force of 5,000 U.S. regulars, volunteers from several states, New Orleans free blacks, and Baratarian pirates, Jackson slowed the British by attacking them on December 23, thus buying more time to prepare his defenses. Digging in on both sides of the Mississippi River, the British were forced to attack across open ground against strong American positions.

Pakenham, although he sent 8,000 men in a frontal assault on January 8, 1815, failed to breach Jackson's earthen rampart. Combined fire from American artillery, muskets, and rifles inflicted more than 1,500 casualties, one of whom was Pakenham, compelling the British to abandon their offensive. Suffering only six killed and seven wounded in his main lines, Jackson had won a great victory, one that not only brought a close to the War of 1812 with an apparent American victory, but elevated Jackson to a position of national prominence.

Jackson was retained as major general in command of the Southern Department after the War of 1812. His 1817 invasion of Spanish Florida and his order for the execution of two British agents he believed were aiding marauding Indians caused controversy in Washington, Madrid, and London. Backed reluctantly by Pres. James Monroe, Jackson narrowly escaped congressional censure for his actions, which ultimately led to the purchase of Florida from Spain. Named first governor of the Florida Territory, he resigned his military commission in 1821 to pursue national office.

Politician and President

After serving briefly as senator from Tennessee, Jackson lost the 1824 presidential election as a consequence of the "corrupt bargain" made between Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams. Winning a sweeping electoral majority in 1828, and then again four years later, Jackson proclaimed himself to be the champion of the common man, fighting against the forces of privilege that had come to dominate the nation in the decade following the War of 1812. This belief sustained Jackson in his efforts to stop nullification (asserting the political will of the majority, instead of allowing South Carolina to reject the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832), remove the Indians from the Southwest, and destroy the Second Bank of the United States, an institution with tremendous economic influence that returned a profit to wealthy American and foreign investors.

In Jackson's view, the military was guilty of both extending and receiving the favors of the federal government. Since 1824, the General Survey Act had allowed the president to order Army officers to conduct surveys for "nationally significant" works of internal improvement. The Adams administration had embraced a broad interpretation of national significance, resulting in officers being employed by state and private companies and otherwise detached from their regiments for work on isolated projects designed to benefit specific regions of the country. Embracing an idea comparable to that set forth in the 1831 Maysville Road Veto, Jackson maintained that Army officers educated at the public expense had an obligation to perform tasks that were for the benefit of the entire nation, not, as was the case with the Maysville Road, limited to the confines of a single state. To end this extension of federal privilege, Jackson commanded

officers to return to their regiments in 1831 and repeated the order in 1836; the practice formally came to an end with the repeal of the Survey Act in 1838.

Despite having previously praised it as the best school in the world, Jackson came to view the United States Military Academy (at West Point) as a source of privilege because it held a virtual monopoly on training officers commissioned to the Army. Continuing to extol the virtues of the citizen–soldier, Jackson and his political allies sought to reverse this trend, supporting numerous proposals to close the Academy. Although unsuccessful, Jackson did open the ranks of the Army officer corps to civilians, appointing 47 officers to new regiments formed in 1833 and 1836.

Although he lacked any formal military training, Jackson's determination and iron will, coupled with his understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of militias, had led him to victory at New Orleans—a success bolstered by his belief in the infallibility of the American citizen–soldier. Without his victory at the battle of New Orleans, Andrew Jackson almost certainly would not have become president of the United States. His entry into national politics heralded and was accompanied by a transformation of the American political landscape characterized by a resurgence of political egalitarianism. Reinforcing these ideas through presidential policy, Jackson may have retarded the development of military professionalism, but he left an indelible mark on American political thought.

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Memory and War; Military Academy, United States; War of 1812

Related Documents

1824; 1830

—*Robert P. Wettemann Jr.*

Japanese Americans, Internment of

The Japanese naval air strike at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, shocked the American people and immediately threw great suspicion on Japanese Americans. A series of factors contributed to this: fear of a Japanese attack on the mainland and of sabotage by Japanese Americans; continuing anti-Asian and specifically anti-Japanese racism; envy at the success of Japanese American farmers; and some legitimate security concerns. It all coalesced to prompt the U.S. government to deny the civil rights of more than 100,000 Japanese Americans living in West Coast states and relocate them for the duration of the conflict.

On February 19, 1942, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which authorized the forced evacuation of all individuals of Japanese descent living in the states of Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, and Arizona. It did not matter whether these individuals held Japanese or American citizenship, or whether they were born in Japan or in the United States. The federal government moved similarly against individuals of German and Italian descent, although the measures taken were not of comparable scale, intensity, or duration. Most German Americans and

Italian Americans were more integrated into general American society than first and second generation Japanese.

The debate continues whether Japanese Americans posed a threat to national security. Several studies conducted by the Navy intelligence and the State Department agreed that the overwhelming majority of Japanese, be they first or second generation, were loyal to the United States and did not pose a security threat. However, there were a few intercepted Japanese messages claiming a spy network in the United States and, whether accurate or overblown, these messages helped to feed the hysteria.

The military commander of the Pacific states region, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. John DeWitt, issued Proclamation No. 1 on March 2, 1942, two weeks after the issue of Executive Order 9066. This proclamation created military areas in West Coast states and asserted the right to remove anyone of enemy ancestry. By May 9, most Japanese Americans were forced to move. In most cases, the evacuees had little more than a week or 10 days to appear at a series of relocation centers with whatever belongings they wished to take with them. It was a brutal process. Families had scant time to pack, much less to arrange for the orderly sale of farms and small businesses. For example, one order of May 3, 1942, to persons of Japanese ancestry living in Los Angeles gave them only six days to comply with the evacuation order. Some area residents took advantage of the plight of their neighbors by purchasing the evacuees' homes and businesses at well below market value, which added to this regrettable chapter in American history.

Some Japanese Americans challenged the legality of these evacuation orders, but the U.S. Supreme Court found for the U.S. government. In such cases as *Yasui v. United States* (1943), *Hirabayashi v. United States* (1943), *ex parte Endo* (1944), and *Korematsu v. United States* (1944), the

Japanese Americans interned at an assembly center in Santa Anita, California. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

court upheld the initial curfews aimed at individuals of Japanese ancestry and the constitutionality of the exclusion order. It would be many years, nearly four decades, before federal district and appeals courts overturned these decisions, ruling that the government had withheld key evidence that had taken away the habeas corpus rights of American citizens.

The relocation was a multi-step process. People receiving the order had to report to centers from which they were sent to one of 17 temporary assembly centers, from late March until mid-October 1942, while the more permanent camps in isolated areas of the West were being completed. They remained at these isolated camps until Japan's surrender, at which time Japanese Americans were deemed to be no longer a threat to national security. These assembly centers were mostly in California, reflecting the high percentage of Japanese Americans who lived in that state.

There were ten War Relocation Camps. They were Minidoka in Idaho, Heart Mountain in Wyoming, Amache in Colorado, Jerome and Rohwer in Arkansas, Gila River and Poston in Arizona, Topaz in Utah, and Manzanar and Tule Lake in California. On average, each camp held 10,000 prisoners, though the count varied from as few as 7,318 at Amache to 18,789 at Tule Lake. The camps were located in places where isolation and weather combined to further humiliate the camp populations: hot deserts or high mountain plateaus and, in many cases, they were on Indian reservations.

Strong critics of the relocation initiative equated these internment camps to Nazi concentration camps, although they certainly were never the equivalent of Dachau or Büchenwald. In many cases, prisoners were allowed to move outside the camp and settle in surrounding areas. And some 35,000 individuals relocated to interior states. Colorado deserves special mention, since its governor, Ralph Carr, invited all Japanese Americans to relocate to Colorado, welcoming them as valued residents. (Carr's courageous actions cost him any future political career.) The camp at Tule Lake in California, on the other hand, was reserved for those individuals suspected of disloyalty and their families; this camp had watchtowers, fences, and armed guards.

Camp conditions varied, though none of them was especially pleasant. A 1943 government report noted that the camps had tarpaper-covered barracks of simple frame construction that lacked plumbing and cooking facilities. Civilian contractors, working under time deadlines, used plans for military barracks and not for housing for families with, in many cases, small children. The Heart Mountain camp in Wyoming had barbed wire enclosing barracks with unpartitioned toilets and army cots, and a camp budget that provided 45 cents per day per inmate for food rations. And there were no provisions for those inmates who, in the rush to move, did not bring the warm clothing that northwestern Wyoming winters dictated. Inmates did help make the camps livable and bearable. They helped organize essential services, worked in camp offices, canteens, mess halls, hospitals, and schools. They earned the equivalent in military script of a monthly salary of $8 to $16 for workweeks that averaged 44 hours.

After the campaign for the Marianas Islands in summer 1944, it was clear to Americans that Japan no longer had any hope for victory, and the threat of sabotage or attack was slight. On January 2, 1945, the U.S. government rescinded the exclusion order, and camp inmates gradually began to return to their homes and rebuild their lives. While the U.S. government had indexed and warehoused the personal possessions of the internees and had provided receipts, many Japanese Americans suffered substantial financial losses on the forced, rapid sales of farms, businesses, and homes.

As the Civil Rights movement in America reached full tide in the 1960s, a younger generation decided it was time to seek redress for what had happened to Japanese Americans during the war. It took many years, but in 1976, Pres. Gerald Ford announced the evacuation was "wrong," and in 1980, Congress established a commission to study the situation. Three years later the commission reported in Personal Justice Denied that racism more than military necessity drove the internment. And, in 1988, Pres. Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provided financial redress of $20,000 for each living camp internee, for a total of $1.2 billion. Four years later, Pres. George H. W. Bush signed an amendment to the act, authorizing an additional $400 million in benefits.

Canada and some Latin American countries also interned citizens and residents of Japanese ancestry during World War II. This may have been because of genuine fear,

anti-Japanese and anti-Asian prejudice, and a desire to curry favor with the United States.

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German and Italian Americans, Internment of; World War II

Related Entries

1942 e, f; 1947

—*Charles M. Dobbs*

Jewish War Veterans

Founded as the Hebrew Union Veterans Association, the Jewish War Veterans (JWV) is the oldest veterans' organization in the United States. Like the American Legion and other larger nonsectarian veterans' groups, the JWV builds camaraderie and is also an interest group lobbying for government benefits for veterans. As a Jewish organization, combating anti-Semitism at home and abroad has been a core mission of the JWV. After the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, the JWV sought to build support for the new country, especially among veterans.

Growing anti-Semitism in the early 1890s played a key role in encouraging Jewish veterans to form their own distinctive veterans' organization. The JWV formed in 1912 by the merger of two smaller organizations: the Hebrew Union Veterans Association (founded in 1896) and the Hebrew Veterans of the War with Spain (founded in 1899). In 1918, the group took the name Hebrew Veterans of the Wars of the Republic.

As a result of the massive immigration of Eastern European Jews in the 1890s and early 1900s, large numbers of Jews served in the American military during World War I. The reaction of the federal government to these Jewish servicemen and veterans was ambiguous. On the one hand, the military authorized the Jewish Welfare Board to establish programs to meet the spiritual and recreational needs of Jewish servicemen. On the other, national and military leaders expressed concern about the loyalty of Jewish Americans and other "hyphenated" Americans, especially after the success of the Bolshevik Revolution.

Under the leadership of Spanish–American War veteran and New York City judge Maurice Simmons, the JWV invited Jewish veterans from all wars to join. In 1922, the organization convened its first national convention and selected Simmons as its first national commander. In 1929, the organization adopted the name Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America. Although more than a quarter of a million American Jews served in the U.S. military during World War I, only a small fraction joined the Jewish War Veterans—a pattern in keeping with veterans group membership generally.

During the 20th century, the JWV had much in common with the nonsectarian and nationally based American Legion. Both used the community-based post as the institutional building block. Both the JWV and Legion offered opportunities for social interaction through meetings and recreational activities. Many posts also performed a variety of community service projects, such as visiting sick veterans, sponsoring youth athletic activities, soliciting funds for charitable organizations, and working with local schools. Like the Legion, the JWV held an annual national convention that served not only as an opportunity to influence public policy but also as an occasion for camaraderie. Both maintained auxiliary organizations for spouses. Many members of the JWV were also members of the larger American Legion and

Veterans of Foreign Wars. In fact, several leaders of the JWV encouraged members to become actively involved in these larger veterans' organizations to advance the interests of all veterans and of American Jewry.

After Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, the JWV took a leading role in organizing a campaign within the United States to protest the racial policies of Nazi Germany. Jewish War Veterans joined with other anti-Nazi groups in organizing protest marches and boycotting German-manufactured goods. In contrast to the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, JWV veterans favored liberalizing immigration quotas to enable greater numbers of refugees fleeing Nazi Germany to enter the United States.

After World War II, the JWV lobbied the Truman administration and Congress to support U.S. recognition of the State of Israel and joined other Jewish organizations in providing financial support for the new country. In opposition to the uncritical American embrace of West Germany as an ally in the postwar period, the Jewish War Veterans in the late 1940s and early 1950s expressed misgivings about rearming West Germany, citing the extent of anti-Semitism remaining there.

Domestically, the JWV continued to fight for a more inclusive vision of America. To this end, it opposed Jewish quotas at American universities and supported civil rights legislation aimed at ending segregation in the South. The JWV lobbied Congress to liberalize immigration laws and took a special interest in allowing displaced European persons to enter the United States. In contrast to the American Legion, the JWV often espoused a liberal political agenda. But the organization did cooperate with J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI in the early 1950s to root out communists within American society. Brig. Gen. Julius Klein, a major force in the organization in the 1940s and 1950s, had significant links to Republican senator Robert Taft.

Much like the larger American Legion, the JWV had difficulty attracting Vietnam veterans to its ranks. As the population of World War II veterans aged, many posts lost membership and began to sell their meeting places. Although a small organization, the Jewish War Veterans played an important role in combating anti-Semitism at home and abroad. It also ensured that American society remembered the distinctive contribution of Jewish veterans.

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American Legion; Holocaust, U.S. Response to

—*G. Kurt Piehler*

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the principal government agency that formulates U.S. military strategy and promotes integrated operations among all branches of the U.S. armed forces. Its membership consists of the Army chief of staff, the chief of naval operations, the Air Force chief of staff, and the commandant of the Marine Corps, as well as a chairman and vice chairman. Selected from any of the four military services by the president, the chairman serves as the nation's highest-ranking military officer and principal military adviser, with additional duties that include presiding over the JCS and its support staff. Since its informal creation during World War II and its legal formalization in 1947, the JCS has experienced profound changes in its responsibilities.

The origins of the JCS trace back to World War II and the need for greater coordination among Allied war planners. Because the United States lacked a comprehensive war planning institution similar to the British Chiefs of Staff

Committee, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt directed Gen. George C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff; Adm. Ernest J. King, the commander in chief, U.S. Fleet; Adm. Harold R. Stark, the chief of naval operations; and Gen. Henry H. Arnold, the Army Air Forces chief of staff to assemble in January 1942 for the purpose of coordinating Allied planning and operations. With the consent of the president, the officers became the principal American military war strategists and also the de facto heads of all U.S. armed forces during the war. While serving on the Combined Chiefs of Staff with their British counterparts, the American military heads additionally assumed the interservice mandates (conferring, discussing, and formulating recommendations for all measures calling for cooperation among the services) that were first assigned to the Joint Army and Navy Board in July 1903. The service chiefs collectively commanded the development of U.S. military strategies in both the Atlantic and Pacific, and controlled the management of all U.S. military operations.

During World War II, naval membership within the JCS changed shortly after its first official meeting on February 9, 1942. Following Admiral Stark's March 1942 departure to Europe for his new position as theater commander of U.S. naval forces, Admiral King assumed additional responsibilities as chief of naval operations by order of the president. The need soon arose for an additional naval officer to balance Army–Navy membership. On July 20, 1942, in an effort to achieve this end, President Roosevelt appointed Adm. William Leahy to the JCS as chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. For the rest of the war Marshall, Arnold, King, and Leahy compromised and acted as a Joint Chiefs of Staff, although no formal legislation ever recognized them as such.

This lack of statutory identification changed shortly after the end of the war. Signed by Pres. Harry S. Truman, the National Security Act of 1947 marked the first legal recognition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the nation's primary military advising body. In addition to unifying all the U.S. armed forces into a single Department of Defense, the 1947 act designated the Army chief of staff, the chief of naval operations, and the chief of staff of the independent Air Force as JCS members, specifying each of them as principal military advisers to the president and secretary of

defense. To further facilitate cooperation and coordination among the various services, the legislation stipulated that the entire JCS had to provide unanimous consent before any JCS military counsel reached civilian decision makers. Responsibilities of the service chiefs included military planning, establishing unified field commands, managing joint staff activities, and creating joint Army–Navy policy.

While perhaps definitive in outlining JCS membership and duties, the 1947 National Security Act contained no measures for the appointment of a successor to Admiral Leahy as chief of staff to the commander in chief. As disagreements over the operation of the JCS strained relations between the interservice body and Defense Sec. James V. Forrestal, civilian leaders began to fear that Admiral Leahy's position would remain unfilled after his retirement in March 1949. As a short-term solution, in February 1949 President Truman appointed retired Army chief of staff and World War II hero Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as temporary presiding officer of the JCS and principal military adviser to the president and secretary of defense.

Eisenhower presided over the JCS for the next six months until Defense Sec. Louis A. Johnson swore in Gen. Omar N. Bradley in August 1949 as the first JCS chairman. Under a series of 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, the chairman became a permanent JCS member, presiding over the entire JCS anywhere from a two- to four-year term unless the nation was at war, in which case the chairman could then serve for the duration of the conflict. The legislation empowered the chairman, who functioned as a nonvoting member, to set JCS meeting agendas and preside over JCS meetings. The service chiefs still collectively remained the principal military advisers to the president, secretary of defense, and National Security Council.

Member responsibilities within the JCS changed in the late 1950s, however, as congressional reforms altered specific institutional functions. The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act made the chairman a voting member with principal control and oversight of a larger Joint Staff. Vice chief positions were created in the Army, Navy, and Air Force for assuming the day-to-day service management duties of the service chiefs. In addition, the 1958 law

removed the JCS from the nation's operational chain of command by granting the president authority to establish integrated commands in the field directly.

Over the next three decades, the government began to perceive failings in basic JCS practices and responsibilities, which led to new defense concerns. Various presidential commissions throughout the 1960s and 1970s concluded that JCS functions were plagued by chronic service parochialism. Most publicized among the executive groups was the Symington Committee, commissioned by Pres. John F. Kennedy and headed by Missouri's Democratic senator Stuart Symington. In 1960, the committee reported that national defense planning was a process weakened by the dominance of individual service interests. Especially in the wake of the Vietnam War, lawmakers in Congress reiterated such findings and called for the consolidation of military advice solely with the JCS chairman and the removal of service-specific responsibilities from the other chiefs. Appeals for altering JCS functions and management were answered by the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Signed into law by Pres. Ronald Reagan on October 1, 1986, the act targeted the operational and administrative failings encountered during the Vietnam War.

The Goldwater–Nichols Act profoundly affected the powers granted to the JCS in general and individual JCS members in particular. To avoid the ambiguous character of operational orders flowing from the JCS to the individual service commanders, the act specified that the nation's chain of military command stretched directly from the president and secretary of defense to the commanders in the field, eliminating the JCS from decisions about operational courses of action altogether. In a further effort to eliminate chronic interservice rivalries, the 1986 act stipulated that an officer first had to serve in a joint command position to be considered for future promotion to the JCS. The member most affected by the Goldwater–Nichols Act, however, was the JCS chairman. Under its provisions, the chairman, rather than the corporate JCS, served as the principal military adviser to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. In addition to advising these high-ranking civilian authorities, the chairman headed the formulation of military strategy, planning potential military

responses, and assessing defense budget needs. To aid with these increased management responsibilities, the bill created a new position of vice chairman to serve as the second-highest ranking officer of the U.S. armed forces. The vice chairman did not have any specific statutory duties other than voting as the presiding officer in the chairman's absence.

Since its creation in World War II, the JCS has been integral in the formation of overall national military strategy. However, its development and evolution reveal it to be not only a bureaucratic agency that has experienced significant change, but also a measure of civil–military relations in the United States. Early JCS members had enormous influence on their civilian superiors, carrying out their responsibilities largely through personal relationships between the individual service chiefs and the White House. As the need for efficient military management continued after World War II, however, the creation of a permanent chairman position with strong oversight and advisory powers challenged such personal channels between solider and statesman. By the time of the passage of the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Act, Congress had designated the JCS chairman as the nation's principal military adviser in an attempt to remedy unclear military orders and to address and alleviate the bitter rivalry between the various services encountered during the Vietnam War. To be sure, the personalities, individual perceptions of service roles, and personal relations between civilian superiors and JCS members continue to be of paramount importance into the 21st century.

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Arnold, Henry Harley; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Goldwater–Nichols Act; Marshall, George Catlett; Powell, Colin; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.; Vietnam War; World War II

—Jason Godin

Jones, John Paul

(1747–92)
Revolutionary War Hero

John Paul Jones, a captain in the Continental Navy, became a hero of the American Revolution because of his eagerness to engage the enemy, his boldness in battle, and his tactical successes. Some histories of his exploits have exaggerated his role and left out personal failings. However, his wartime achievements and ideas about professionalism shaped the U.S. Navy for generations.

Jones's early working life was marked by both success and scandal. John Paul (he only took the last name of Jones many years later) was born in Scotland in 1747 to a poor family. He was ambitious and, like a number of boys of the era, escaped poverty by going off to sea. At 13, he was apprenticed to a merchant mariner who traded in Virginia and the Caribbean. He served in a variety of capacities as a merchant sailor, including as third mate on a slaving ship—a trade he quickly abandoned. Through luck and skill, he became the master of a merchant ship by age 21.

However, his success was marred by scandal and a reputation for a violent temper. In one incident, John Paul had decided not to pay his sailors in the customary way when his

ship arrived in the Caribbean island of Tobago. The crew mutinied and in a brawl that followed, John Paul killed the ringleader. To avoid arrest, he fled the island and remained in hiding for most of the next two years. When he resurfaced in Virginia in late 1774 (where his brother then resided), he began using the surname of Jones.

After the Revolutionary War broke out in April 1775, John Paul Jones was commissioned in December—the first lieutenant commissioned in the new Continental Navy; he sailed on board the *Alfred*. His ship was among several that crippled a British 20-gun vessel. In May 1776, he was rewarded for this feat with an appointment as captain of the *Providence*. As captain, he successfully captured several British merchant ships. He was also successful in outmaneuvering British warships, often escaping them with skilled seamanship.

In 1777, Jones sailed to France on the *Ranger*, carrying the news of the American victory at Saratoga. As Jones approached France in February 1778, the French Navy acknowledged Jones's salute (a naval courtesy extended between ships), thus making France the first foreign power to recognize the flag and sovereignty of the United States. Jones became captain of the *Bonhomme Richard* and, from France, successfully engaged the British frigate *Serapis*. Although fighting against a better-armed and faster vessel, Jones showed daring, courage, and tenacity in a struggle that became known as the battle off Flamborough Head (on the east coast of England). It was in this battle, fought at close quarters, that the British commander asked if Jones was ready to surrender, to which Jones supposedly responded with the now famous phrase: "I have not yet begun to fight." While Jones probably did not utter these words (they do not appear in any account of the battle until more than 50 years later), all the eyewitness accounts indicate that Jones gave an emphatic refusal to surrender. The battle ended in an American victory and Congress passed a resolution of gratitude. Jones spent the remaining years of the war enjoying his fame in France and the United States and lobbying unsuccessfully for a promotion to rear admiral.

During the war, Jones kept up a steady stream of letters to his friends in Congress with suggestions for improving the management and organization of the Navy. His ideas

were largely ignored, partly because his suggestions were intended to boost his own campaign for promotion and recognition. However, his ideas also fell on deaf ears because the young United States did not immediately imagine itself becoming a great naval power. Only as the 19th century progressed were his suggestions recognized as prophetic. Jones also thought that officers should be chosen by merit and not by birth or connections, that they should be well-educated men of honor, and that—along with sailors—they should be well-trained.

The conclusion of the war did not end Jones's desire for active duty. He traveled to France to try to claim prize money owed to him from his various captures. There he enjoyed romantic entanglements and continued his campaign for promotion by mail. In 1788, he accepted an offer to become a rear admiral in the service of Queen Catherine the Great of Russia. In the 18th century officers and soldiers commonly served in the armies or navies of a number of nations in pursuit of action and employment. While serving with the Russians, Jones fought in the Black Sea against the Turks. However, although Jones could navigate the oceans, he could not navigate Russian court politics; he returned to Paris in 1790 where he died two years later. In 1905, his remains were discovered in an unmarked grave in Paris and moved to the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, to be reinterred. In 1913, they were finally moved to a large, specially built crypt in the academy's chapel.

Never in command of a large fleet, John Paul Jones did not have the opportunity to show his abilities as a strategist (directing the naval war as a whole), but he did demonstrate his seamanship and boldness in naval battles. In combat, he practiced aggressive tactics. He sought to engage enemy ships rather than to harass or avoid them, and he understood the psychological advantage of wearing down an enemy. His determination, courage, and accomplishments make him an important figure in Revolutionary history, while his ideas and vision for the organization of the Navy make him an important figure in American naval history.

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European Military Culture, Influence of; Revolutionary War

—Caroline Cox

Journalism

See Frontline Reporting; Media and War; and specific institutions and people.

Just War Theory

Before 1989, the Pentagon named military operations using randomly generated words. That year, Operation Blue Spoon to overthrow Panama strongman Gen. Manuel Noriega became, for public relations reasons, Operation Just Cause. Now names are crafted with "an eye toward shaping domestic and international perceptions about the activities they describe" (Sieminski, 81). Naming operations has become grist for the propaganda mill's justification of war, thus validating the observation that truth is war's first casualty.

The realities of war differ enormously from the picture sketched by the rhetoric used to rally popular support for armed conflict. Although few willingly march off to just any war, history records numerous instances in which millions died for what were characterized as "just" wars.

Just War: Origins and Development

Jus ad bellum (law on going to war) and jus in bello (law in war, which will not be explored in depth here) emerged as formal concepts in the 4th and 5th centuries with St. Augustine of Hippo's refutation of charges that

Christianity had undermined the Roman polity. The Christian message, he argued, is peace, but those who willfully attack the peace—heretics and pagans—legitimately could be opposed by force wielded in God's name. As Augustine wrote in *The City of God*, "For it is the wickedness of the opposing group which compels the wise man to wage just wars."

Augustine proposed four justifications for "legitimate" wars: self-defense, to reclaim property, recover debt, and punish. Augustine also held that Christians had a divinely given duty to prevent the triumph of evil in this life, thus removing barriers to Christians becoming professional soldiers.

By the late 17th century, a consensus had emerged among Western theologians and authors of treatises on international law that seven jus ad bellum criteria must be met for a conflict to be "just":

- just cause (correct a grave public evil or self-defense)
- legitimate authority (only governments can declare war)
- right intention (secure a just and comprehensive peace for all belligerents)
- probability of success (overcoming the evil prompting war)
- proportionality (amount of force and weaponry limited to that needed to win)
- last resort (first exhaust all other means—diplomatic, economic, social)
- the evil and suffering from war must be less than the evil eliminated

The several humanitarian considerations restricting armed conflict (jus in bello) coalesced only in the mid-20th century:

- proportionality (as above)
- noncombatant immunity (only armed forces or other government agents participating in hostilities are legitimate targets)
- humane treatment of prisoners of war and medical and religious personnel
- prohibitions against using certain conventional weapons such as land mines and napalm
- safe conduct for those under white truce flags

- no targeting of undefended cultural, religious, or dangerous sites (e.g., nuclear power plants)

Evaluating U.S. Wars

Clearly, these principles attempt to regulate the occasions for going to war as well as the activities of combatants in war. But does history sustain traditional schoolbook claims that America only fights just wars? The record is mixed.

European colonists, bent on acquiring land, quickly came to blows with Native Americans, virtually annihilating entire peoples such as the Pequots and Narragansett in New England and the Algonquian confederacy in Virginia. Sometimes, especially when responding to attacks on settlements, the Europeans' actions were clearly excessive. Pastor John Robinson acknowledged this in reproving the Plymouth colony's militia: "Necessity . . . of killing so many (and many more, it seems, they would if they could) I see not" (Buffington). Rhode Island's Roger Williams noted the recurring tendency to claim war as "defensive." William Williams cautioned the Bay colony's leaders in a 1737 sermon ("Martial Wisdom Recommended") that Christians should fight "only in a just cause. Not to gratify pride, Avarice and Ambition, to increase or enlarge our Possessions by the ruins of those who might dwell securely by us" (Buffington).

"Taxation without representation" summarized the view of many colonists that Parliament had suborned their rights as Englishmen. Others opposed the presence of a standing army quartered in their homes. Still others were intent on removing English regulation of commerce. Considering that the concept of "just rebellion" against duly constituted authority was still suspect even in Protestant Europe (albeit the "authority" now resided as often in oligarchies as in monarchs), the reasons propounded by the prowar colonists did not clearly conform to that era's prevailing interpretations of "just war."

Similarly, advocates for war against England in 1812 believed they had just cause. Citing "national honor," merchants and ship owners whose crews were being impressed by the Royal Navy joined with land-hungry "hawks" to press Pres. James Madison to declare war despite his misgivings about becoming embroiled in Europe's quarrels. Conversely, the Mexican War appeared to critics of the just war concept—Col. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Rev. Theodore Parker,

and Henry David Thoreau, among them—as little more than a land grab coupled with an opportunity to expand slavery's domain. Ulysses S. Grant, a lieutenant during this conflict, regarded the Mexican War "as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation" (Grant).

The Civil War presents a more complex case. Many abolitionists, believing that only violence could extirpate slavery, applauded John Brown's raid against the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry—an initiative that Brown expected would ignite a slave uprising. When war finally came, Pres. Abraham Lincoln could not be sure the North would prevail, especially if slavery were the issue. As Lincoln's primary goal was preserving the Union, he could ill-afford to alienate southern sympathizers residing in border states that had not seceded. Thus his Emancipation Proclamation (July 1862) formally promised to free slaves only in states that remained in rebellion after January 1, 1863.

Spanish brutality—forcing Cubans into concentration camps—moved many Americans to regard war against Spain in the late 1890s as "just." Inflammatory journalism fed this sentiment, including the incorrect presumption that Spanish agents blew up the USS *Maine* as it lay in Havana's port. Behind the scenes, "manifest destiny" proponents joined business barons to exploit the moral outrage and rising nationalism to advocate war. In April 1898, war came; by mid-August, Spain was defeated. In the process the United States had wrested from Spain the territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, Cuba, and the Philippines. Cuba escaped direct U.S. control in 1901, but the United States denied Filipinos their independence, leading to a four-year bloody insurrection whose echoes lasted until a commonwealth was declared in 1934.

The confluence of three geopolitical currents cloud claims that wars in the 20th and 21st centuries were "just."

The first current is international trade and its corollary, "freedom of the seas." Threats to this "vital" interest and U.S. neutrality "validated" U.S. entry into World War I. But Sen. George Norris saw something more nefarious driving the war fever: "enormous profits of munitions manufacturers, stockbrokers, and bond dealers" (Norris). Sen. Robert La Follette, noting the country's overwhelming opposition to war, decried the Wilson administration's rush to support the allies, who violated U.S. neutrality at least as much as did Germany.

A related, though not decisive, interest motivating prewar U.S. support for Britain in both world wars is the perennial U.S. opposition to one country dominating Eurasia. What impelled President Wilson was a belief that might could serve "right" and peace; later, Pres. Franklin Roosevelt foresaw the necessity of war to curtail the depredations of Japan and Hitler's Germany—and their closing of the doors to free trade in Europe and the Far East. As a contributing current for two global wars, this interest influenced Cold War anticommunist "containment" alliances and "hot wars" in Korea and Vietnam. Although Navy chaplain John O'Connor and theologian Paul Ramsey (in his book, *The Just War* [1968]) sought to make the case for the "justness" of the Vietnam War, many remained unconvinced.

The third current is America's dependence on imported oil. In February 1945, Roosevelt struck an "oil-for-protection" bargain with the founder of modern Saudi Arabia. Honoring this bargain was one trigger for the United States' commencing the U.N.-endorsed 1991 Persian Gulf War. The more prominent justification used by Pres. George H. W. Bush to rally Congress and the U.S. public to support military action as "just" was standing up to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. The 2003 war in Iraq had less justification, particularly with regard to the "last resort" principle.

From their beginnings, just war formulas attempted to subordinate armed might to right by regulating the occasions for war and activities of combatants in war. The problem has always been: Who defines "right"? Both the League of Nations and the U.N. enshrined peace as the right that nations were to uphold. That nations still identify right in terms of narrow national interests demonstrates the gap between the ideal and the reality of international politics.

Traditionally, oppressed peoples could not "justly" rebel because their rulers determined the people's rights. "Legally" escaping oppression required intervention of a foreign power to overthrow the oppressor. The American Revolution redefined "legitimate authority." By making human rights and dignity the touchstones of legitimate authority, the founding fathers gave life to just revolutions by the people (Yoder), thus narrowing the gap between theory and reality.

Nevertheless, a future U.S. president still has the power to launch a military strike and justify it as "defensive" because a

"vital national interest" was perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be at risk. In a world of nation-states competing for power, practical politics inevitably triumphs over theoretical principles.

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Related Entries

Conscientious Objection; Geneva and Hague Conventions; Language and War; Pacifism; Religion and War

Related Documents

1609; 1613; 1622; 1637; 1654; 1737; 1768 a; 1835; 1846 b; 1850; 1863 h; 2004 b

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
Korean War

(1950–53)

The Korean War—considered the forgotten war by some because it fell between the "good" war, World War II, and the "bad" war, Vietnam—was the first time in the nuclear age when the United States committed its forces to combat. It presented several problems to the nation's political and military commanders, and it marked many changes in American military institutions.

The war demonstrated America's willingness to actively pursue the foreign policy of containment that had been outlined in the immediate postwar period, and it illustrated that even nuclear powers need to maintain effective conventional forces. The war has more significance to military history than its length, cost, or results would indicate; the tactics and strategic decisions of the war from the Pusan perimeter, to the Inchon landings, to the Yalu River and back, will be debated for many years at military staff colleges and by military historians. It was a classic "limited" war—constrained by geography and restrictions on the use of weapons. The Korean conflict

Korean War (1950–53)

Total U.S. Servicemembers (Worldwide):	**5,720,000**
U.S. Population (millions):	**151.7**
Battle Deaths:	**33,741**
Other Deaths (In Theater):	**2,835**
Other Deaths in Service (Non-Theater):	**17,670**
Non-mortal Woundings:	**103,284**
Cost (in $ current billions):	**54.00**

Source: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.html>

was also the first war fought by United Nations (U.N.) forces, a coalition of 19 countries; the first war in which jet aircraft flew combat missions against each other; the first war in which the U.S. armed forces were racially integrated; and it will be remembered for the psychological torture of U.N. prisoners.

Prelude to War

Perhaps the simplest explanation for the outbreak of war in Korea derives from Korea's strategic location. Positioned as the focus of the interest of three great Asian powers—China, Russia, and Japan—Korea has always been the scene of rivalry, and each power at one time or another has tried to assert its hegemony over it. For centuries the Korean state was a tributary of China. When imperial China, weakened under the Western assault in the late 19th century, lost the Sino–Japanese War of 1895 and the Japanese defeated the Russians in the Russo–Japanese War in 1905, Japan became the dominant power in East Asia. In 1910, Japan incorporated Korea into its empire, maintaining control over that country until 1945.

In August of 1945, with Japan's defeat in World War II, the Korean people were jubilant. At last they were free—or so they thought—and they wished to establish a free and unified Korean government. The war's end, however, created a shift in regional power that was to have a lasting impact on Korea. With Japan prostrate and China about to descend into civil war, a new regional order was established by the United States and the Soviet Union.

During World War II, at the many conferences held by the Allied leaders, the status of Korea was rarely discussed. On the night of August 11, 1945, two young U.S. army officers were given less than an hour to put together a plan for that country. Korea was to be divided into Russian and

American zones of occupation; the question was where to draw a viable boundary line between the two zones. To halt the Russian advance, the U.S. State Department wanted the boundary as far north as possible, but the Army and the Navy knew they could not occupy such a vast area. Looking at a wall map, the two officers, on their own, decided on the 38th parallel, which evenly bisected the country and passed just north of the Korean capital of Seoul. This line was accepted by the Army, Navy, and State Departments and—to the surprise of the Americans—the Russians.

The Russian and American armies thus occupied Korea, and Korean hopes for immediate independence were dashed. The nation was divided unnaturally into asymmetrical halves—the North containing most of the raw materials, electrical capacity, and industry, and the South having more people and agricultural acreage. The military occupations were to be temporary, but as the Cold War came to divide Russia and the United States, the temporary division became permanent. The Russians in the North established the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea under Kim Il Sung, a member of the Korean Communist Party who had been trained in Russia. The United States created the Republic of Korea in the South, lead by Syngman Rhee, a Princeton Ph.D. with an Austrian-born American wife. Rhee was a political conservative and very anticommunist.

The withdrawal of Soviet and American occupation troops in 1948 and 1949 did not end the interest of the two powers in Korea. In the North, the Soviet Union trained an army of more than 130,000 men, many were veterans of Mao's armies who had fought in China, and provided North Korea with T-34 tanks and much modern military equipment. In the South, the United States trained a 95,000-man defense force but provided very little modern equipment. The South Korean force was sufficient to handle an internal threat, but it was deficient when matched against the North's greater capabilities for conventional war.

Thus, five years after the defeat of Japan, the balance of power in northeast Asia underwent a major readjustment. The region stood divided between the spheres of communism and the West at the mid-line of the Korean Peninsula, and the stage was set for war.

The War Begins

With the consent of both Moscow and Beijing, and believing that it could win easily, North Korea invaded the South on June 25, 1950. The invasion began at 4:00 A.M. when eight divisions of North Korean tanks and infantry moved across the 38th parallel. Rhee, with his inferior force, determined to stand and fight. Pres. Harry Truman appealed to the U.N., while Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in the Far East, immediately flew to Korea. On June 26, with the backing of the U.N. Security Council (the Russians were absent in protest of the failure of the U.N. to seat Communist China), President Truman approved the movement of U.S. forces to defend South Korea, and U.S. involvement began.

The four South Korean divisions were no match for the Communist Army, and Seoul fell on June 28. Three days after the fighting began, the first American troops were deployed. They were dubbed "Task Force Smith" after their commander, Lt. Col. Brad Smith. Many in Smith's force believed that once the North Koreans saw the Americans they would run, but Task Force Smith, although brave, was routed. This defeat put an end to American cockiness. The rest of MacArthur's troops, mostly new recruits who entered the Army soon after World War II, were in bad shape: poorly trained, with old and obsolete equipment, they had been softened by easy duty occupying Japan. The pattern of defeats by the North Koreans continued through July.

As MacArthur moved to shore up the crumbling defenses in Korea, the U.N. asked the United States to form a military command, and General MacArthur was made overall commander. Gen. Walton H. Walker was appointed the commander of the U.S. 8th Army in Korea. Using the advantage of interior lines of defense (the benefit a defender has in moving forces around a beleaguered area) and with virtual command of the air, he moved to defend the last quadrant of the peninsula, an extensive defense perimeter around the town of Pusan.

With his back to the wall, MacArthur conceived the idea of an amphibious landing on the Korean coast far above the besieged forces at Pusan. He noted how Seoul was only 25 miles from the coast of the Yellow Sea. He believed that a surprise amphibious landing at the port of Inchon, followed

by a drive on Seoul, could recover the capital, cut off the North Korean forces concentrated around Pusan, and perhaps provide a springboard for a subsequent drive into North Korea. The boldness of his maneuver worried the planners, but MacArthur was determined to carry it out and through sheer dint of his personality, he pushed the idea through.

Landing at Inchon on September 15, 1950, the American and Korean troops overcame the light defenses of the harbor. So complete was the surprise and so unlikely was the prospect of the assault at Inchon, that the North Koreans failed to defend the port properly. The assault team then began to advance on Seoul, albeit at a slower rate than they might have and at the same time the 8th Army under General Walker broke out of the Pusan perimeter. The North Koreans were caught in the middle. With the help of close air support and interdiction provided by the U.S. 5th Air Force, the North Koreans were routed and by the end of September the North Korean Army ceased to exist in the south. This was one of the most remarkable turnarounds in modern warfare; on September 29, allied forces were back in Seoul and President Rhee accepted the restoration of his country from a jubilant MacArthur.

Advance to the Yalu

The defeat of North Korea at Inchon now posed a dilemma for American policy makers. On the one hand South Korea was restored and communism was contained; on the other, a communist challenge was still possible in Europe and policy makers were afraid that Korea would divert resources from NATO and Europe, which was considered the main area of the Cold War conflict. While the debate was going on, Rhee decided to attack North Korea with or without U.S. and U.N. support. After much debate, Truman authorized MacArthur to advance above the 38th parallel and the U.N. approved this action.

However, Truman approved the advance only if neither the Soviet nor Chinese gave signs of intervening. The president was eager to demonstrate U.S. will and resolve in Korea, but he also wanted to avoid a third world war. On October 15, at a meeting on Wake Island, MacArthur assured Truman that the chance of Chinese or Soviet intervention was minuscule.

As the war continued, progress by the allied forces was rapid. On October 19, the North Korean capital of Pyongyang was captured and within five days advance allied units were at the Yalu River, which borders China. So fast was the allied advance that they outran their supply lines. As U.N. forces approached the Manchurian border, they began to encounter Chinese military units. However, MacArthur's intelligence analysts concluded that only a few Chinese reenforcements had entered Korea and that China has not committed great numbers of troops.

In retrospect, this analysis was one of the great mistakes of the war and was to have profound political and military implications. On November 25, just five months after the war had begun, the Chinese sledgehammer—300,000 Chinese troops with rigorous march, bivouac, and camouflage discipline—hit the U.N. command. U.N. forces began to crumble against the overwhelming Chinese force. Within three days, it was evident to all that the Chinese intervention had completely changed the character of the Korean conflict. American forces began to withdraw rapidly. The Third Marine Division and the Seventh Infantry Division found themselves surrounded by Chinese troops and had to fight their way out of several traps. In the greatest retreat in Marine Corps history, allied forces literally fled and by December 15 were back to the 38th parallel. To make matters worse, on December 24, the allied field commander, Gen. Walton Walker, was killed in a jeep accident.

Ridgway and MacArthur

Within 48 hours, Matthew Ridgway, a hero of World War II and a known combat commander who enjoyed MacArthur's full confidence, was appointed commander of the 8th Army. Ridgway inherited a dispirited and defeated Army. In one of the great feats of modern military history, he turned the war around. He motivated his troops, conveying an offensive spirit by appearing at the front line with two hand grenades hooked on his chest. He explained to his soldiers in simple terms why the United States was fighting in South Korea. He observed units in action and relieved commanders as necessary. In late January 1951, he opened a series of offensive operations: Thunderbolt, Ripper, and Killer. His forces advanced from point to point, pausing only to eliminate enemy units and

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in the Far East, is presented with the flag of the United Nations as he prepares to take command of the U.N. forces in the Korean War. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

holding against counterattacks. The 8th Army retook Seoul and established the Kansas Line, which approximately straddled the 38th parallel. His advance then stalled out.

While Ridgway fought the war in Korea, MacArthur, discouraged by the retreat from the Yalu, considered other measures to ensure victory. On his own initiative he made public statements threatening to enlarge the war by carrying it into China, possibly with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Army and even nuclear weapons. However, many opposed any expansion of the war, including most of the nations in the U.N. force. In an effort to control MacArthur, Truman ordered him to clear all public statements with Washington.

Had MacArthur sent his proposals as confidential options to the president, MacArthur might have maintained his position. A subsequent series of statements by MacArthur and an uncleared letter sent to Joseph Martin, House minority leader and a bitter opponent of Truman's policies, moved Truman to relieve MacArthur.

Relieving MacArthur of his command was probably one the most enduring issues of the war, demonstrating the core American principle of civilian control of the military. MacArthur came home after years overseas to a hero's welcome. He addressed Congress and then retired. Republican critics of Truman and the war spoke out vehemently against

MacArthur's removal, but the decision was supported before Congress by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Omar Bradley.

After MacArthur was relieved, Ridgway assumed command of the Far East theater and moved to MacArthur's old headquarters in Tokyo. Replacing Ridgway in Korea was Gen. James A. Van Fleet, who eventually was able to control the stationary line at the 38th parallel.

Negotiations Begin

The defeat of the U.N. Command in North Korea and the perceived strength of the Chinese forces led Washington to believe that a total victory in Korea could not be achieved and, with the American public becoming disenchanted with the war, Truman began to think about a negotiated settlement rather than a military victory. Several overtures were made by both General Ridgway and the Russians (acting as mediators for the North Koreans), but neither side trusted the other.

The North Korean and Chinese negotiators displayed a consistent pattern of obfuscation and delay. Their tactics at the talks were determined by two hard-nosed calculations. First, they needed time to move their supply lines from China and Russia to consolidate their position; second, they believed that the Americans were an impatient people and that prolonging the talks might diminish their will to continue and thus they might get more concessions. The two sides sat down to talk on July 25, 1951, and the talks dragged on for two years. The main issues were the repatriation of prisoners, the fixing of a demarcation line and demilitarized zone, and the arranging of a supervising entity to monitor and carry out the cease-fire and armistice.

The most significant delay was caused by the question of repatriating prisoners. The communists wanted to exchange all prisoners across the board, while the allies wanted to give the prisoners a choice of returning to China and North Korea or staying in the South. The negotiations continued to drag on and were further complicated by riots of North Korean and Chinese prisoners in the American prisoner-of-war camps. At one camp, Koji Do, the North Korean and Chinese prisoners, hoping to achieve concessions, seized Brig. Gen. Francis Dodd and held him a captive for a short time.

The delay in negotiations meant that the war continued; many died in the last days of fighting over the final location of the armistice line—fighting for such famous places as Pork Chop Hill and Heartbreak Ridge. Finally, after an additional 19,000 communist and 9,000 U.N. casualties, a breakthrough occurred in the talks, partly attributable to changes in leadership: in 1953, Dwight Eisenhower became president and pledged to go to Korea himself to end the war, and the Soviet Union's leader Joseph Stalin, died. In the final settlement, each prisoner could freely choose his destination. On July 27, 1953, three years after the war began and a full two years after the agenda topics had been determined, the two sides signed an armistice. Prisoner exchange began immediately. More than 21,000 Chinese and North Korean prisoners chose to live in noncommunist nations; 349 U.N. troops, including 21 Americans, also refused repatriation.

Between June 1950 and July 1953, some 5.7 million Americans were in uniform with about 1.5 million of them rotating in and out of Korea. Some 33,629 were killed in action and, excluding civilians, more than 100,000 were wounded. The U.N. lost more than 3,000 men and endured 12,000 casualties; the Republic of Korea lost 59,000 men and had 293,00 casualties; communist losses were put at 1.5 million killed and wounded. Civilian casualties numbered more than two million.

For over 50 years the Korean peninsula has been divided between two diametrically opposed regimes. No peace treaty has ever been signed, only an armistice. The demilitarized zone still exists; more than 30,000 U.S. military personnel are still stationed in Korea to act as a deterrent against further aggression. A war that was never legally declared has never really ended. Kim Jong Il, the son of Kim Il Sung and the leader of North Korea, has defied the United States and the world with a threat of nuclear proliferation. Although talks between North and South Korea about unification are ongoing, the uneasy armistice still exists.

In the classic sense, America did not win the war. After the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers in World War II, the end of the Korean War seemed murky and, for many Americans, unsatisfactory. However, in Korea, the

United States demonstrated a loyalty and determination that greatly influenced its allies. Perhaps the greatest result of the war was that the United States had drawn a line in Korea and demonstrated a willingness to "contain" communism—arguably the war's chief accomplishment.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Doctor Draft; MacArthur, Douglas; MASH Units; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Truman, Harry S.

Related Documents

1950 c, d; 1951; 1969

—Donald M. Goldstein

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
Labor

See Labor Strikes; Economy and War.

Labor Strikes

Labor strikes in wartime are as old as the United States. American industrialization began following the War of 1812, and by 1880 America was the world's premier industrial power. Its "labor wars" were also the fiercest on Earth. Government intervention during the two world wars finally brought these bloody labor conflicts to an end, and labor–management relations became domesticated.

Early Conflicts

From the founding of Jamestown, Virginia, in 1607, America has been characterized by violent clashes between the haves and have-nots. But the colonies had no labor strikes, as we know them; members of the Journeymen Printers Union struck against their local shops in New York City in 1776, but this was an anomaly, because America was not yet an industrial society. The Industrial Revolution began in America around 1820 and an industrial working class (or proletariat) began to form. Even so, class conflicts tended to take the forms of political action, producer and consumer cooperatives, demonstrations by the unemployed, and the creation of the world's first workingmen's political parties, rather than labor strikes.

As the world's first modern industrial war, the Civil War was a great stimulus to American industry. By the war's end, labor, which had begun to organize into municipal and regional labor unions, had become a newly powerful cultural and political force. Indeed, the peak of union membership in the 19th century came in the war year of 1864, which witnessed both the largest percentage of the workforce unionized as well as the largest union membership in raw numbers.

The fast pace of industrialization continued after the war. By 1870 America produced one-third of the world's coal, iron, and steel, with nonagricultural workers accounting for just under half of the total workforce. The 1870s also brought the nation's first business empires: the railroads. Along with them came the rise of the corporation, necessary to generate the large sums needed to finance these huge industrial enterprises. But as corporations grew and matured, so did the size of the industrial proletariat and the labor movement. Coupled with the government's laissez-faire ("hands-off") stance toward the economy at that time, this was a recipe for conflict. Large scale, often violent, labor strikes took place throughout the latter half of the 19th century. The summer of 1877 was a watershed, as general strikes involving tens of thousands of workers brought the nation to a virtual standstill.

World War I

As America entered World War I in 1917, a massive strike wave engulfed the country. Widespread class warfare could not continue if the nation's economy was to be efficiently mobilized for the war effort. Therefore, for the first time, the federal government intervened in both the management of the economy and in labor–management relations. This established the precedent for government intervention in the economy and in labor-management disputes, which became the pattern for the rest of the 20th century.

Even before America's entrance into the war, supplying the Allied war effort had increased industrial production. This industrial expansion—along with the military draft, initiated in May 1917—created widespread labor shortages,

which greatly benefited labor organizations. Older unions grew and new ones were formed. Between 1914 and 1920 union membership grew to more than five million, an increase of 70 percent, accounting for almost 20 percent of the total nonagricultural workforce.

As union membership grew, so did labor–management strife. Between 1915 and 1920, inflation doubled consumer prices and, even though more workers were employed, purchasing power fell. At the same time, government regulations capped workers' wages, but not business profits. In addition, state governments had abolished laws governing hours of work and safety conditions, and in 1916 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional federal legislation banning the sale across state lines of goods produced by child labor.

In the summer of 1915, East Coast munitions workers centered in Bridgeport, Connecticut, led a short and successful strike, which brought the eight-hour workday to the munitions industry. Workers in other industries quickly followed their example and were similarly successful. Between 1916 and 1920, more than one million workers went out on strike each year, a larger proportion of the workforce than during any other four-year period in American history, before or since. Between April 1917, when America entered the war, and November of that year, strike waves in shipbuilding, metal trades, and coal mining resulted in the loss of six million workdays.

Faced with such unrest, the federal government stepped in. Agencies and commissions were established to oversee labor–management relations in a number of industries; for example the railroads were closely regulated by the new Railway Labor Board. These bodies routinely included representatives of organized labor, giving unions unprecedented recognition and legitimacy. The most important such agency the Wilson administration created was the War Labor Board (WLB), established in 1918.

The WLB included representatives from both management and labor, as well as two "public members," who acted as co-chairs: the unremittingly antiunion former president William Howard Taft, and Frank P. Walsh, a Progressive supporter of the labor movement. The WLB supported the idea of collective bargaining, the eight-hour workday, improved working conditions, and equal pay for women workers, all as part of the government's goal of obtaining an informal no-strike pledge from labor. Toward this end it mediated and helped settle more than 1,000 disputes and brought about the election of workers' committees in 125 factories. While strikes did still occur, labor leaders generally supported such government intervention and reciprocated by supporting the war effort. By the end of World War I, American organized labor was stronger than it had ever been.

The War Labor Board was disbanded at the end of the war, but it (and agencies such as the Railway Labor Board, which continued until 1926) established the precedent of government intervention in labor–management disputes, a precedent to which the government would return in the next great economic crisis and the next great war.

Postwar Stress

The year 1919 witnessed a massive wave of strikes, most notably in steel, in an attempt to unionize that industry. A general strike also was called in Seattle, and even police went on strike in Boston. In every case, the workers lost and the unions were crushed. Union membership fell drastically throughout the next decade. In 1920 union membership had stood at five million nationally, but by 1933 it was down to 2.5 million, about 8 percent of the nonagricultural workforce.

The Great Depression of the 1930s brought change once again. It swept the Democratic Party into power and the Democrats, in turn, passed legislation favorable to labor. The most important such legislation was the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, known as the Wagner Act, after its sponsor, New York Sen. Robert Wagner. A wave of unionization followed, and by 1937 union membership had climbed to 7.7 million, from 2.5 million in 1933, representing about 22 percent of the nonagricultural workforce. By 1940, union membership would stand at 10 million.

World War II

By 1940, World War II was already raging in Europe and the Pacific. Although the United States had not yet been pulled into the global conflict, the nation was already the "arsenal of democracy" and the principal supplier of the British war effort. This prewar mobilization for war at last revived the depressed economy.

Prewar economic mobilization also ratcheted up labor-management conflict. Between June 1940 and December 1941, almost 2.5 million workers, most of them members of Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) industrial unions, went out on strikes. These strikes quickly won pay increases and increased union rolls by 1.5 million. Management was more willing to accede to union demands than in the past because it now had lucrative war-related contracts and could not afford to have production interrupted.

One of the biggest and most important of these strikes was against Ford Motor Company, which had successfully resisted the tide of auto industry unionization in the late 1930s. On April 1, 1941, tens of thousands of Ford workers went on strike at the massive River Rouge Ford plant in Michigan. Ford was faced with the prospect of a long strike that would jeopardize immensely profitable government contracts. After six days, this last bastion of antiunionism in the auto industry collapsed and Ford signed a closed shop (union-members only) contract with the United Auto Workers (the first of its kind in the auto industry), which brought the 100,000 workers at Ford plants into the union.

Urgent and lucrative military contracts made corporations more willing than in the past to agree to union demands, thus work stoppages in 1940 and 1941 were shorter and much less violent than those of the previous decade. In addition, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt was already turning away from domestic reform to face the growing international crisis. He joined with business leaders, the military, and congressional conservatives to condemn such strikes and call for an end to the conflicts.

Roosevelt had already co-opted an important American Federation of Labor (AFL) leader, Sidney Hillman, head of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, by appointing him to a leading position at the Office of Production Management. Thereafter, Hillman gave the AFL exclusive bargaining rights for all government war-related construction contracts. By 1944, AFL carpenters had doubled their membership; boilermakers grew from a 1938 membership of 28,000 to 336,900; plumbers from 37,7000 to 130,000; and electrical workers from 175,000 to 312,9000. In all, AFL building trades unions added 1.25 million new members by 1944.

Like Wilson during the previous war, Roosevelt also moved to intervene in labor–management disputes. In March 1941, in the wake of a violent strike at a Milwaukee defense plant, Roosevelt established the 11-member National Defense Mediation Board, later to become the National War Labor Board. Roosevelt brought in CIO chief Philip Murray as one of the Mediation Board's four labor representatives. Murray quickly pledged CIO cooperation with the administration's goals. The remaining three labor representatives were United Mine Workers secretary-treasurer Thomas Kennedy; George Meany, secretary-treasurer of the AFL; and George Harrison, president of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, unaffiliated with either the AFL or CIO. The remaining seats were divided between employer and government representatives. The Mediation and War Labor boards established industry-wide wage patterns for the first time and helped shape the internal workings of many new industrial unions. They formalized a pattern of government management of the economy and "normal" and bureaucratic labor–management relations. Labor's acceptance of their decisions was made more likely by making the union leadership itself part of the decision-making process.

By June 1941, the federal government demanded that all big labor–management disputes be settled by the board. As the Mediation Board called for the end to a particular strike as soon as a dispute was brought before the it for mediation, this essentially amounted to a policy of no strikes at all. The entire union hierarchy agreed (except for the United Mine Workers, led by John L. Lewis), and this "no-strike pledge" soon became mandatory and more explicit than the implicit one asked of labor during World War I. In addition, the board now had the authority to issue binding decisions in labor disputes and to establish work conditions and pay scales. It thus became the final arbiter in labor–management disagreements.

To reconcile the labor movement to these developments, the board initiated a "maintenance of membership" policy, which, more than anything else, created the huge growth in labor unions during the war years. The board mandated that any new worker who began working at a unionized shop (and all defense-related industries were, by then, unionized) was to be automatically enrolled in and pay dues

to the union. New workers had two weeks in which to "opt out"; if they did not do so, membership in the union was "maintained" and workers could not resign. Thus, as industrial production expanded throughout the war, so, too, did union membership. By war's end, total union membership had grown by 50 percent, from 10 million to 15 million.

Even so, unauthorized "wildcat" strikes continued. Wages were a major reason. The board was set on keeping inflation under control; therefore, wage hikes were largely curtailed by government regulation for the duration of the war. The key to the War Labor Board's approach was its "Little Steel" wage policy. (The term Little Steel refers to all steel companies other than U.S. Steel, which was known as "Big Steel.") In a July 1942 decision, the board increased wages for workers at the Little Steel companies by 15 percent from January 1, 1941, levels, corresponding to what the board

argued was the cost of living increase over those 18 months. Most unionized steelworkers had already won a wage increase of 15 percent in the spring of 1941; thus, no further wage increases would be granted for the war's duration. This "Little Steel Formula," based on industry-appropriate wage levels in January 1941, was then extended to all other sectors of the economy. This unprecedented government intervention in the economy would result in fixed wages—no one would get a larger wage increase until the war ended.

Wage resentment lingered and production intensified, while safety conditions deteriorated. Wages were low, profits were high, and workers were angry. The board, however, made clear that strikes were no longer an option. When a strike broke out in 1941 at the Inglewood, California, plant of North American Aviation, which produced training planes for the Army Air Corps, Mediation Board member and CIO

Meeting held by the War Labor Board in 1943, part of the government's efforts to avoid strikes by mine workers. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

president Philip Murray pressured the CIO-affiliated United Auto Workers, which represented the workers, to declare the strike unauthorized, illegal, and communist-motivated.

But workers ignored orders by the UAW leadership to return to work. Roosevelt ordered 2,500 Army troops to the plant, where they dispersed picket lines and banned all worker meetings within a one-mile radius of the plant. The strike was soon broken, which established the power of the Mediation Board's directives; its orders would be backed by military force. Such strikes would not be tolerated "for the duration." However, the stick was not used without the carrot. In July, the board ordered big wage hikes for workers at North American Aviation, which the UAW took credit for.

Localized dissatisfaction continued. Wildcat strikes over shop floor control, work assignments, piece-rate wages, and production schedules remained endemic and increased from 1942 until the end of the war. In January 1944, a national railway strike was narrowly avoided. Avoiding confrontation with the pugnacious John L. Lewis and his United Mine Workers, however, was impossible.

Neither Lewis nor his followers had ever accepted the Little Steel Formula, and coal miners clamored for higher wages. Lewis declared war on the formula and, in an effort to demolish it, led his union out on strike four times in 1943. Lewis and his union were vilified and an angry Congress retaliated. In mid-June 1943, following the third UMW strike in just six weeks, Congress passed (over Roosevelt's veto) the Smith–Connally War Labor Disputes Act, which authorized the use of military force to seize strike-bound mines and factories and provided for fines and jail terms for strike leaders. Advocating a work stoppage in defense industries was now a crime. The new law also mandated a 30-day "cooling off" period in other industries, followed by a secret National Labor Relations Board–supervised strike vote by union members, before a strike could be launched. It also banned labor unions from contributing financially to political campaigns, something Republicans had long desired.

This powerful antiunion legislation did not intimidate Lewis and his union. On November 1, 1943, the UMW went on strike a fourth time and all of the nation's 530,000 bituminous miners walked out. Using his new powers, Roosevelt sent in troops and seized strike-bound coal

mines. He also threatened to draft striking miners. Lewis replied that the president "could not dig coal with bayonets" and refused to back down. Instead, the president retreated. Roosevelt ordered Sec. of the Interior Harold Ickes to bypass the War Labor Board (which had a policy of not negotiating with a striking union) and negotiate a contract acceptable to the mine workers. The resulting wage increases of 25 percent essentially abolished the Little Steel Formula for the coal industry, although it remained in place elsewhere. Next to the creation of the CIO itself, this was perhaps the greatest victory of Lewis's career. He had faced down a wartime president and won.

Inspired by this example, wildcat strikes by at least 150,000 steelworkers broke out on Christmas Eve 1943, as steelworkers also demanded wage hikes. Again, Roosevelt personally intervened and ordered the War Labor Board to grant benefits to the strikers and to consider their wage demands. For the most part, however, the Little Steel Formula remained in force for the remainder of the war and top union leaders neither challenged the wage policy nor deviated from their no-strike pledge. But the Smith–Connally Act had proven ineffective as a wartime antistrike weapon when used against powerful unions determined to resist. Its lasting legacy was to give the government increased authority to curtail labor's political rights, and it represented the first rollback of labor's legislative gains; many aspects of Smith–Connally would be revived in the postwar Taft–Hartley Act (1947).

The Cold War

Organized labor would never again mount such critical strikes during wartime as had Lewis and the UMW during World War II. During the Korean War, even left-wing unions such as the West Coast International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) patriotically supported the war. The ILWU had been expelled from the Congress of Industrial Unions, the more liberal of the two labor confederations at the time, because it had refused to mandate an anticommunist pledge for its membership and renounce the leadership of Leftist radicals such as Harry Bridges. On July 13, 1950, slightly more than two weeks after President Truman ordered American military forces into combat in Korea, Bridges's own San Francisco local passed a resolution

supporting the war. Although Bridges was personally opposed to the war, longshoremen's locals all along the West Coast quickly passed resolutions endorsing American intervention in Korea.

Organized labor, for the most part, was just as supportive of America's role in the Vietnam War. But, perhaps harkening back to its radical past, the ILWU seemed of two minds on the war. Along the West Coast, that war provided much work for the ILWU and membership rolls mushroomed during the 1960s. Union members were working full-time at high wages loading military supplies bound for Southeast Asia. Still, at its 1965 convention, ILWU members overwhelmingly passed a resolution condemning the war and calling for the withdrawal of all troops.

But even the ILWU did not engage in strikes against the war or in strikes that might have hampered the war effort. In fact, one might say the only longshoremen's strike related to the Vietnam War was in support of it. In 1967 Dr. Benjamin Spock, the noted pediatrician and anti-war protestor, purchased a new 35-foot sailboat, which he wished to have shipped to his summer home in the Virgin Islands via maritime freight. However, as Dr. Spock said in his autobiography, the longshoremen at the Brooklyn docks called him "a rich traitor," and refused to load his yacht. Spock ended up hiring a crew to sail it to the Caribbean.

Long before this, however, the pattern of government intervention in labor–management disputes, begun by Wilson's War Labor Board, the 1935 Wagner Act, and Roosevelt's War Labor Board, had been established. The secular trend of 20th-century economic and labor–management relations, spurred by global war and economic crisis, was away from laissez-faire capitalism and toward government intervention to regulate the economy, rationalize labor–management relations, and put an end to the endemic conflict of the "labor wars" era.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Economy and War; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; War Labor Board; World War I; World War II

—Eric Leif Davis

Language and War

Joseph Heller's book *Catch-22* (1961) made famous the peculiar nature of military language. A World War II veteran, Heller invented characters who dealt with improbable combinations of words that led to officers named Major Major and tackled entirely new situations that seemingly exhausted the possibilities of the English language. The book's title has entered the English language to describe the modern individual's frustrations in dealing with a large and impersonal bureaucracy. Heller used language to satirize the military as an institution. The effectiveness of the work, which was subsequently made into a film of the same name, comes in part from the unusual ways in which the military uses the English language.

As Heller understood, the U.S. military employs a lexicon that is even more specialized than that used by other

professions. Each branch of the service, moreover, has its own way of using language; for example, the Army and Navy often have two different terms for the same entity. A soldier puts ice in his drink, uses a latrine, and leans against a wall at his post, whereas a sailor puts hard water in his drink, uses the head, and leans against the bulkhead on station. The Navy, unlike the Air Force, has no pilots; it has naval aviators. Members of smaller units and military specializations use their own terms to distinguish themselves from the larger military. Such specialized use of language serves to create "in" groups and "out" groups, not just between military personnel and civilians, but also among subgroups of military professionals.

The dizzying number of acronyms and abbreviations used by the military serves the same function. Thus "I must leave by the end of the day for a short trip to the Pentagon to prepare for my next assignment," rendered into Air Force speak, becomes "I must leave for a pre-PCS TDY to OSD NLT COB." The latter may sound ridiculous, but it has the advantage of being intelligible only to those who understand the "in" lexicon. Even a linguistic concept as simple as the term car is transformed into a POV (personally owned vehicle). Acronyms and abbreviations also help to render civilian language into a bureaucratic linguistic system that facilitates administration.

This specialized language has roots in the military's need for secrecy. By using specialized language, military units can both disguise their operations and linguistically identify those who should be informed of details and those who should not. Thus, during the two world wars, the code names for military operations had no relationship to the purposes of the operations themselves. The code name for the 1944 invasion of France—Overlord—would give no hint about Allied intentions to anyone who overhead it or discovered the term; nor would the Allied code names for the proposed 1945 invasion of Japan at Kyushu (Olympic) or the development of the atomic bomb (the Manhattan Project).

Code names could, however, be used to help authorized individuals determine their unit's place in an operation. For instance, the two American landing beaches for Overlord carried code names of American places, Omaha and Utah, while the non-American beaches did not. Similarly, the

beaches for the proposed invasion of Japan all carried code names of American automobile manufacturers. These names revealed nothing of the planners' intentions, but were easy for Americans to remember and discern as part of a larger operations plan. Passwords used by sentries to control access to secure areas fulfilled a similar role. American soldiers in the Pacific theater of World War II often chose passwords with the letters "l" and "r" on the assumption that the Japanese had difficulty pronouncing them.

Over time, military code names have become less based on maintaining secrecy than on inspiring troops and the general public. Smaller operations still carry code names designed to disguise and confuse prying eyes, but the military now chooses its code names for larger operations with an eye on public relations. For example, the use of names like Operation Enduring Freedom for the removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan hinted at both the operation's role in removing the oppressive Taliban regime and destroying anti-American terrorist groups. Operation Anaconda, the attempt to encircle and entrap al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, gave the impression of a slow and deliberate annihilation of enemy forces with its reference to a snake that suffocates its prey. The code name for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, served a similar purpose and employed language intended to highlight the altruistic side of the war. The names Operation Urgent Fury (the 1983 military intervention in Grenada) and the 1991 Gulf War's Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm all fulfilled the same roles while underscoring the essential lethality of military campaigns.

Sardonic humor also plays a role in creating military language. Military professionals, charged with the management of tremendous instruments of destruction, sometimes use language to ease some of the tension and pressure associated with their tasks. Thus some American Intercontinental Ballistic Missile crews wore uniform patches reading "Delivery in twenty minutes or less or the second one is free" after a pizza delivery chain's slogan; and, during the Vietnam War, Army helicopter crews called their powerful machines "Puff the Magic Dragon" after the peaceful dragon in a popular children's song. The American military also played on a slogan from a package delivery service asking

the "customer" to use its services "when it absolutely, positively, has to be destroyed overnight." Such use of language sounds bloodthirsty, but it is ultimately intended to help military professionals handle the overwhelming tasks they are asked to perform.

The intensity of war itself produces changes in language. Militaries use euphemisms to cover the true horror of war. Thus a man accidentally killed by a comrade is a victim of friendly fire. Civilians accidentally killed are collateral damage. Dead soldiers are wasted or lost. In cases where language offers no terms at all to describe new phenomena, soldiers invent them. The intentional killing of one's own officers in Vietnam came to be known as fragging, a reference to the fragmentation grenades used in such incidents. Soldiers also use language to reveal their own image of themselves. Soldiers have often described themselves in animalistic terms, reflecting their close-to-nature existences and the general indifference with which they often feel civilians treat them. Thus soldiers call themselves "grunts" or "dog faces" and they wear "dog tags." They eat "slop" in a "mess hall" and, when not in a "fox hole," they sleep in a "pup tent."

In part because of its colorful nature and in part, perhaps, because of its military–martial origins, military language has entered civilian language. The list of such terms is long and varied and includes words and phrases like no man's land; in the trenches; over the top; under siege; booby trap; spit and polish; go nuclear; camouflage; frontline; barrage; shell shock; lousy; sector; rank and file; trench coat; outflank; take cover; hit the deck; firestorm; cover my flank; and firing line. Some organizations and professions, most notably sports teams, make widespread use of military terms. Football terminology seems uniquely suited to borrowing from military language and includes blitz, bomb, and ground attack. Other military terms describe events that have no direct civilian terms. Snafu (Situation Normal, All Fouled Up) and fubar (Fouled Up Beyond All Recognition) describe a situation familiar to soldiers of all wars when operations go exactly to plan, but are nevertheless complete disasters.

The language of soldiers has long been famous for its excessive profanity. One could obtain a more realistic picture of military language by replacing fouled in the snafu and fubar acronyms with the "f" word soldiers more often used. The almost exclusively male character of military units until recent years helps to explain the coarseness of language, giving rise to the phrase "swearing like a sailor" (or a "bos'n"). Military language also makes frequent references to sex. For instance, armies are said to "penetrate" enemy lines, "seek consent" before "inserting" forces into friendly territory, and "thrust forward." Until recently, soldiers often learned marching rhythm and cadence by chanting sexually explicit "Jodie calls." Even when not explicit or vulgar, military language could nevertheless emphasize sexual themes. American sailors in World War II, for example, referred to their life vest as "Mae Wests."

Military service, being global, has also brought words from other languages into English. Soldiers in World War I brought back from France the term souvenir, which rapidly replaced the older term keepsake. Military personnel in the Philippines popularized an Americanization of the Tagalong word boondocks to describe remote areas. Spanish words like guerrilla to describe an irregular warrior came into general American usage as a result of long deployments of American military personnel in Latin America. Nuclear testing in 1946 at Bikini atoll in the South Pacific gave us the word bikini, when a French fashion designer chose to name his new creation after the event. In the 1950s and '60s, an attractive woman might be referred to as a "bombshell." Military language has thus added a rich and lasting element to the English language in the United States.

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Related Entries

Literature and War

—*Michael Neiberg*

Latinos in the Military

The ranks of volunteer and drafted military personnel in the 20th century and beyond have been enriched by the presence of more than a million men and women of Latin American origins. While this population has included Puerto Rican, Cuban, and many other Caribbean, Central American, and South American immigrants and their offspring, the majority of these men and women have been Mexican Americans ("Chicanos").

More than 500,000 Latinos served in the military during World War II. Chicanos were overrepresented at the heroic defense of the Philippine bastion of Corregidor and thereafter on the Bataan Death March. Throughout that war, Chicanos served with distinction; 17 won Congressional Medals of Honor, a number in excess of any other ethnically-identified group (Allsup, 16). Even so, Chicanos in Los Angeles experienced vicious, racially-inspired beatings and attacks upon their communities by Anglo civilians, servicemen, and Los Angeles Police Department officers in June of 1943. This 10-day clash, which left more than 100 Mexican Americans seriously injured and many more imprisoned, became known as the "Zoot Suit Riot."

Latinos were also overrepresented among applicants for service in the combat-oriented Marine Corps in 2001, though they remained slightly underrepresented in the armed services compared to their age echelon (16.2 percent) in the population. Along with African Americans, they remained overrepresented among military accessions throughout the first five years of the 21st century. Latinos suffered one in every nine combat fatalities (11.1 percent) in the Iraq War between March 2003 and April 2004, while constituting 10 percent of all Army–Marine Corps combat

soldiers, but they were actually underrepresented within these combat ranks. African American combatants, by comparison, suffered 14 percent of all U.S. combat fatalities, while constituting 15.2 percent of all Army–Marine Corps combatants (Gifford, 208; Kelly, C-7).

There is significant evidence that Latinos who have served in the military in the past century have benefited from their service experiences in ways that veterans from other minority groups, or even Anglo vets, have not. A study found that by 1971, Latinos in southwestern states (largely Chicanos) who had served in World War II and the Korean War were earning significantly larger salaries 10 or more years after their military experiences had ended than did non-service Chicanos who had attained similar levels of education and performed similar jobs. The same study found that black veterans were earning only slightly more than black non-vets, and that Anglo vets were earning slightly less than Anglo non-vets (Browning et al., 81). This discrepancy appears to have been due in part to the fact that the highly structured routine of military life resembled the structured work culture of Latinos' later civilian employment. This higher rate of progress for Chicano veterans may also stem from their having more greatly increased their facility with English (useful again in civilian employment) than had those Chicanos who had not served.

In addition, Latinos nationwide who had been drafted from World War II through 1973, when the Selective Service System was established, were found in 1990 to be more active politically (voting and participating in campaigns) after leaving the service than were their counterparts who had not been drafted (Leal 1999, 163-165). And, whether drafted or not, Latinos who had served during those years acquired more English language proficiency and made more Anglo friends. Similarly, Anglos who had served were more likely that non-vet Anglos to make Latino or black friends (Leal 2003, 216-221).

One manifestation of the political activism that military service appears to have stimulated in Chicano veterans was the creation shortly after World War II of a Chicano veterans' organization, the American GI Forum. The Forum originated in south Texas but steadily grew and

spread throughout the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, and Colorado. Its founder was Maj. Hector Garcia, who served in the Army first as an infantry company commander and later as a physician (his civilian profession). He earned a Bronze Star and six Battle Stars representing different theaters of the war. Soon after his decommissioning, he began working in 1947 to end a broad range of discrimination against Chicanos in the Corpus Christi area of south Texas, where he practiced medicine. In March 1948, he posted notices calling for a meeting of Chicano veterans in the region to halt discrimination against Chicanos by local Veterans Administration officials and to demand the presence of Latinos on the recently created Selective Service draft boards in Texas. While one in five residents of Texas was of Mexican origin, no such persons had been appointed to a draft board in the state (Allsup, 37).

In January 1949, Garcia was notified of a funeral home in Three Rivers, near Corpus Christi, that had denied funeral services to the widow of PFC Felix Logoria, a Chicano killed during the war, whose remains had recently been recovered. Garcia telephoned the funeral home's owner, Tom Kennedy, and was told that Kennedy had "to do what the white people want." Garcia responded: "But this man . . . was a soldier who was killed in action . . . worthy of all our efforts and our greatest honors." Kennedy's answer: "No, that doesn't make any difference." Garcia telegrammed Texas Sen. Lyndon Johnson and called a protest meeting. Congressman Lloyd Bentsen, columnist Drew Pearson, and radio commentator Walter Winchell joined Garcia in denouncing Kennedy's discrimination. Senator Johnson responded with a telegram calling Kennedy's act unjust and "deplorable" and offered to have the remains of "this Texas hero" interred in Arlington National Cemetery if Kennedy remained intransigent, which he did. The reaction to this outrage rallied Chicano veterans. In 1950, the novelist Edna Ferber asked Garcia for advice while crafting *Giant*, her novel of the development of Texas. He introduced her to other Forum members. Both her novel and the script of the film based upon it consequently contained scenes of discrimination against Chicanos, including that of the denial of funeral services to one killed during World War II (Allsup, 40-49, 63-64).

The American GI Forum blossomed. By early 1950, its chapters throughout the Southwest had swelled to more than 100. With the outbreak of the Korean War, these chapters intensified their lobbying for Chicano representation on local draft boards, finally securing some victories there. During the early stages of the Vietnam War, Forum chapters supported President Johnson's efforts. Younger Chicano activists, however, did not, and in June 1970, Forum members in California resolved that the war was "immoral." The Forum pioneered an 18-city "Veterans Outreach Program" in January 1973. The Nixon Administration terminated funds for this in March 1974, but the Forum found other resources and provided assistance to nearly 100,000 veterans during the next few years (Allsup, 140-47).

Latinos served with distinction in every branch of the services and in every war the United States participated in throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. For many, their years in the service also served as an acculturation experience.

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—*Peter Karsten*

Lee, Robert E.

(1807–70)
Civil War General

Robert E. Lee exemplified the best in the first generation of Army officers trained at the U.S. Military Academy during and after the reforms of the school's superintendent, Sylvanus Thayer. When the Civil War broke out in 1861, he sided with the Confederate States of America, becoming not only its preeminent general but also a major cult figure associated with the Southern "Lost Cause."

Born in Stratford Hall, Virginia, on January 19, 1807, Lee was the son of Revolutionary War hero Henry "Lighthorse Harry" Lee. He entered the U.S. Military Academy in 1825, graduating second in his class four years later with no demerits, a rare achievement. His strong academic record and obvious leadership ability brought him his choice of branch assignments; in 1829, he entered the Corps of Engineers. Lee's early assignments involved not only military tasks, such as the construction of coastal forts, but also important civilian missions, such as an authoritative survey of the disputed state boundary between Ohio and Michigan and a critical rechanneling of the Mississippi River to preserve St. Louis as a major port.

During the War with Mexico in 1847, Lee served as a captain on the staff of Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, who regarded his service in the campaign against Mexico City as invaluable. Thereafter, Lee's military career progressed rapidly. In 1852 he was appointed superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, where he presided over the expansion of its four-year curriculum to five. Three years later Lee was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and in October 1859 he commanded a detachment of U.S. Marines sent to quell an abortive slave insurrection mounted by John Brown at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Lee captured Brown and seized or killed a number of his followers without losing any of the 18 hostages Brown was holding.

In March 1861 he was promoted to full colonel. After the firing on Fort Sumter, South Carolina, the next month, Pres. Abraham Lincoln offered him command of the U.S. forces being assembled to suppress the South's rebellion. Lee declined the offer and, when his native Virginia seceded on April 19, accepted command of its military forces.

Lee's first year in the Civil War was undistinguished. He performed well in the organization of Virginia's troops but had no success in an autumn campaign to regain the western part of the state from Union occupation. A brief stint on the South Atlantic coast gave way in March 1862 to an appointment as senior military adviser to Confederate president Jefferson Davis. Lee played a significant behind-the-scenes role, ultimately gaining Davis's full confidence. When Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, was seriously wounded on May 31, 1862, Davis named Lee to replace him. Lee held the post for the rest of the war. (In February 1865 he was also appointed commander of all Confederate armies, but this occurred too late in the war for it to be a significant aspect of his career.)

When Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia, the Union Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, had advanced to within seven miles of Richmond. Firm in the belief that no purely defensive campaign could halt the Union Army, Lee quickly organized a counteroffensive. In the Seven Days battles (June 25–July 1, 1862), his troops surprised and ultimately pushed back the Union forces, an outcome that disappointed Lee as he had aimed at nothing less than the destruction of the enemy.

The Seven Days battles established Lee's characteristic pattern of generalship. Although the troops he commanded were outnumbered in this campaign, as well as in each of his subsequent campaigns, Lee seized the offensive at the slightest opportunity. His maneuvers were bold, his attacks aggressive and unremitting. He sought to both defeat and

destroy the enemy. Often this style of war won dazzling victories, as in the battles of Second Manassas (August 29–30, 1862) and Chancellorsville (May 1–4, 1863). However, this approach also brought him close to disaster, particularly on the two occasions when Lee tried to fight the war on the North's soil. An invasion of Maryland in September 1862 lasted less than two weeks before Lee and his army fought for sheer survival in the battle of Antietam (September 17, 1862). The following summer an even more ambitious invasion of Pennsylvania in the three-day battle of Gettysburg (July 1–3, 1863) ended disastrously with the death of one-third of the Confederate soldiers.

Despite such losses, Lee continued to seek an offensive victory. He met his match in the equally aggressive Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, who in 1864 was able to keep the initiative and pin Lee to a protracted and ultimately fatal defense of the cities of Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia. In April 1865, Grant broke through Lee's lines. Lee attempted to retreat to join other Confederate forces in North Carolina but was trapped near Appomattox Courthouse and forced to surrender.

After the war ended in 1865, Lee accepted the presidency of Washington College (now Washington and Lee University) in Lexington, Virginia. He took pride in his generalship and the army he commanded, but showed no bitterness about Confederate defeat and soon gained a reputation as an advocate of sectional reconciliation, a stance he maintained until his death from heart failure on October 12, 1870.

The dominant view of Lee's generalship has always portrayed him as one of the greats in American military history. His campaigns continue to be studied as models of how bold, aggressive leadership can compensate for a numerically inferior force. A substantial minority view, however, has pointed to the high human cost of this strategy, and called his generalship fundamentally inappropriate for an army whose manpower base was less than half that of its opponent. Critics have also added that Lee's tactics gravely underestimated the advantages that the rifled musket and field fortifications would have given to a defender. Furthermore, they have faulted him for focusing too narrowly on Virginia and failing to give due weight to other theaters of conflict.

Lee's defenders have agreed with the general's own assessment that in the long run, the North's larger population and stronger economic base made defeat of the South almost inevitable. If the Confederacy had had a chance for military success, it needed to come early, and Lee's slashing counteroffensives came closer to achieving that success than those of any other Southern commander. The proximity of the region in which Lee operated to Washington, D.C., and the populous eastern seaboard also meant that his campaigns were closely watched. Lee's victories contributed to Southerners' morale, cast doubt upon the Lincoln administration's handling of the war, and for many months led European governments to anticipate eventual Confederate independence. These achievements may well have made the conflict significantly longer than would otherwise have been the case.

Lee's contemporaries judged him not only a great general but also a great man: gentlemanly, considerate, balanced in judgment, and stoic in temperament. After the war his admirers in the influential Southern Historical Society made a conscious effort to elevate him above all other heroes in the Confederate pantheon. They insisted that he had yielded at Appomattox only to overwhelming Union numbers, and they shifted responsibility for his military mistakes to others to make him seem a flawless commander. They even played up his attractive character to portray him as Christlike. This incarnation of martial and human perfection, they argued, was the culmination of the values of antebellum Southern society. Lee became, in short, the foremost symbol of the Lost Cause in the South.

Lee's secular canonization became national once it became apparent that reconciliation between North and South required the creation of a national myth suggesting that each section had fought for different but equally noble principles. Lee's heroic qualities and his acceptance of Confederate defeat made him perfectly suited to this myth, and he was often compared to Lincoln. Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Gerald R. Ford praised Lee as a national hero, and the United States has honored him repeatedly. At West Point, Lee Barracks stands alongside Grant Barracks and Lincoln Hall. Camp Lee (now Fort Lee), near Petersburg, Virginia, was named for him, as was the M3 Lee medium tank, which saw service in World War II, and the nuclear submarine USS *Robert E. Lee*, which saw service from to 1960 to 1983.

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Civil War; Grant, Ulysses S.; Mexican War; Military Academy, United States; Scott, Winfield; Thayer, Sylvanus

—Mark Grimsley

LeMay, Curtis Emerson

(1906–90)

Air Force Officer, Chief of Strategic Air Command

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay was the commander most closely associated with the emergence of American strategic air power. The first chief of the Strategic Air Command, he organized the turn from precision daylight to nighttime incendiary bombing attacks on Japan in World War II. The phrase "bomb them into the stone age" is credited to him.

LeMay was born in Columbus, Ohio, in 1906, to a family of small means. His toughness and ambition helped him work his way through Ohio State University. Upon graduation, he received a reserve commission, but he resigned that commission to attend the Army's flying school, Kelly Field, to realize a dream he had held from his earliest days. His performance as a flying cadet was so exceptional that the Army offered him a regular commission—a highly unusual honor at the beginning of the Depression. Throughout the 1930s, LeMay displayed extraordinary interest in expanding his horizons, becoming not only one of the foremost instrument pilots in the days of "by-the-seat-of-the-pants" flying, but also one of the pioneers in aerial navigation.

LeMay was not a lovable man. Because of an attack of Bell's palsy that paralyzed one side of his face early in his career, he consistently had a glowering look. Throughout his career he led by example. In wartime as well as peacetime, he would ask of his men nothing that he had not already done himself. He was also a ruthless and tireless trainer of those who served under him. Despite the difficulties with which the Depression encumbered America's military, LeMay's career flourished. In 1937 and 1938, he served as the lead navigator on a number of pioneering flights to South America. In May 1938 LeMay navigated a force of three B-17s to an interception of the Italian liner *Rex* nearly 800 miles off the Atlantic coast, an extraordinary feat given the technology of the time.

LeMay was promoted to captain in 1940 and his career advanced quickly. In early 1942 he received command of the 305th Bombardment Group—a group with no planes, no men, no maintenance facilities, and no crew chiefs. He created the 305th out of the rawest of material and then led it to Europe as one of the best-trained units in the 8th Air Force. LeMay consistently led the most dangerous missions. As he commented, "I don't mind being called tough, since I find in this racket it's the tough guys who lead the survivors."

On August 17, 1943, now commanding the 3rd Air Division, LeMay led the great Regensburg–Schweinfurt mission. The mission's intent was that the 3rd Air Division would attack Regensburg and then continue on to North Africa, leaving German fighter squadrons milling around to the west of the target. Then, after an interval long enough to force the German fighters back to the ground to refuel and rearm, a second bomber force would attack Schweinfurt

without opposition. Unfortunately, plans went awry; heavy fog blanketed the bomber fields of England, and LeMay's bombers were the only ones trained and able to take off and assemble under such conditions. LeMay's group lost 24 of 146 bombers dispatched. But the second force assembled and left England so late that the Germans were ready and waiting when it reached Schweinfurt. They lost 36 bombers.

LeMay received a promotion to major general in early 1944 and was sent to command XX Bomber Command—a force equipped with America's new super bomber, the B-29, that was assembling in China to attack Japan. Here LeMay experienced one of the few failures of his career. The logistics behind moving the B-29s to China and then supplying and maintaining them were monumental. Moreover, once the Japanese recognized what the Americans were planning, they launched a ground campaign that dispersed Chiang Kai-Shek's ill-trained and corrupt divisions and seized the bases.

Gen. Harold "Hap" Arnold, commander of the U.S. Army Air Forces throughout World War II, elected to pull LeMay out of India in early 1945 and reassigned him to command the B-29s based in the Marianas, which soldiers and Marines had seized in summer 1944. By the time LeMay assumed command, the B-29s had been a major disappointment—given their cost, such a failure might threaten the possibility of an independent air force. Already hampered by flying at high altitudes where the jet stream above Japan severely affected their ability to attack targets, the Americans also discovered that precision attacks against Japan's decentralized economy, with its large number of dispersed targets, were simply not possible.

LeMay's solution was to disregard American air doctrine that posited attacks on key industrial targets. Instead, he chartered an approach similar to the area bombing campaign that the Royal Air Force's Bomber Command had waged against Germany from 1941 to the end of the war. He ordered the B-29s stripped of gunners, armor, machine guns, and ammunition to increase their bomb-carrying capacity. They would now attack at night instead of daytime. Their targets would be cities, not factories. The result was a stunning series of raids that burned the heart out of one vulnerable Japanese city after another. The great Tokyo raid of March 1945 had the dubious distinction of killing more civilians than

any other raid of the war—even more than would die in the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of that year, ending the war.

After the war was over, LeMay continued to succeed in his career. In the immediate aftermath of the war, he served as the director of research and development of the new U.S. Air Force. He was then promoted to lieutenant general and given command of U.S. air forces in Europe. In that position he played a key role in creating the air bridge to Berlin that enabled that city to survive the Soviet blockade of all imports by rail or road. In the midst of his efforts to maintain the Berlin Airlift, he was assigned to take over the U.S. Air Force's fledgling Strategic Air Command (SAC), which he headed from October 1948 to July 1957, receiving promotion to four-star general in 1951. When he assumed command, SAC possessed fewer than 100 "intercontinental" B-36 and B-50 bombers, as well as a number of B-29s, none of which could reach targets in the Soviet Union from the United States. LeMay presided over a massive expansion of the command to the point that SAC came to dominate virtually the entire Air Force. He also oversaw the introduction of the B-47 and B-52 bombers and the KC-135 tanker, aircraft that formed the core of America's nuclear strike force.

After commanding SAC, LeMay became the vice chief of staff of the Air Force; from 1961 to 1965, he served as chief of staff of the Air Force. A vivid character, he is said to have been the inspiration for the wild-eyed, warmongering General Buck Turgidson in the Stanley Kubrick film, *Dr. Strangelove* (1964). As the senior officer in the Air Force, LeMay came up against Pres. John F. Kennedy's secretary of defense, Robert McNamara. On a number of issues—particularly those dealing with ballistic missile development—the secretary of defense proved correct. But LeMay proved correct about the Johnson administration's policy of graduated response against North Vietnam in 1965—such a policy had no hope of success. His own suggested policy became notorious: "My solution to the problem," he wrote in his memoirs, "would be to tell [the North Vietnamese Communists] frankly that they've got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression or we're going to bomb them into the stone age." (LeMay later insisted that the phrase "bomb them into the stone age" was the

invention of his ghostwriter, novelist MacKinlay Kantor.) LeMay left office and retired just as the ill-fated air campaign against the North—Operation Rolling Thunder—began. He left an Air Force that represented a significant force for deterrence, but that possessed little ability to adapt to new challenges. In retirement, LeMay, ever the crusty defender of his record, ran for vice president in 1968 on the ticket with the reactionary governor from Alabama, George Wallace. That decision permanently marred his record. Nevertheless, Curtis LeMay was one of the great combat commanders of World War II.

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Aerial Bombardment; Arnold, Henry Harley; Berlin Crises; Cold War; *Dr. Strangelove*; McNamara, Robert S.; Nuclear Strategy; Strategic Air Command; Vietnam War; World War II

—*Williamson Murray*

Lincoln, Abraham

(1809–65)
16th President of the United States

Abraham Lincoln is universally regarded as one of America's greatest presidents and one of its most effective commanders in chief. He is also one of the most mythic figures in American history, a fact that helps to explain his standing as the country's quintessential war president.

Born in rural Kentucky on February 12, 1809, Lincoln grew up in Indiana and reached manhood in Illinois, the state in which he made his career. Starting out as a clerk in a small store in New Salem, near Springfield, Illinois, he soon strove to become a public figure within his community. As part of that effort, Lincoln served in the militia during the Black Hawk War of 1832. He saw no combat and later made light of this, his only military experience. He nonetheless enlisted for three successive 30-day terms of service—in his own words, he "went the whole campaign"—and was elected captain of a militia company. This achievement gave him lifelong satisfaction. Even after the war's conclusion, Lincoln volunteered for yet a fourth term of service. Something about military life clearly appealed to him.

A member of the Whig Party who served several terms in the Illinois legislature, by the 1850s Lincoln was also a prosperous lawyer of wide reputation. He was married to Mary Todd Lincoln. They had four sons, but only one, Robert Todd Lincoln, survived to adulthood.

Abraham Lincoln was elected to the U.S. Congress in 1846, and served a single term from 1847 to 1849. His time in Washington coincided with the Mexican War, a conflict whose wisdom and justice he openly questioned. Like most Whigs, Lincoln was careful to vote in favor of the military appropriations required to sustain the armies in the field. Nevertheless, he forcefully criticized their commander in chief, Democratic Pres. James K. Polk, averring in one address before Congress that Polk must feel "the blood of this war, like the blood of Abel, crying from the ground against him." He was especially incensed by what he considered the duplicity of the case for war that Polk presented to Congress, and argued that in his conduct of the war Polk sought to escape scrutiny "by fixing the public gaze on the exceeding brightness of military glory—that attractive rainbow, that rises in showers of blood, that serpent's eye, that charms but to destroy" (Basler, 439).

As the slavery controversy intensified in the 1850s, Lincoln joined the fledgling Republican Party, which was committed to excluding slavery from the western territories. In 1858 he ran for the U.S. Senate. He lost, but his debates

with opponent Stephen A. Douglas gave him national stature and paved the way for a presidential run in 1860. Although he received less than 40 percent of the popular vote, he won a resounding victory in the Electoral College and became president-elect. Viewing a Republican president as illegitimate and unacceptable, the state of South Carolina seceded in December 1860. By the time Lincoln took office on March 4, 1861, seven states in the lower South had left the Union and formed the Confederate States of America.

Lincoln supported peace talks but refused to permit discussion of terms that ran counter to his party's opposition to slavery in the territories. He refused to evacuate the garrison of Fort Sumter, which controlled the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, and on April 12 Confederate artillerists opened fire on the fort. Lincoln promptly summoned 75,000 troops to quell the rebellion, a move that led four states in the upper South to join the Confederacy as well.

Although many considered him a political lightweight with neither the experience nor judgment to deal with this civil war, Lincoln unhesitatingly—and extra-legally—raised additional troops (Congress retroactively endorsed his action), and suspended habeas corpus in the border state of Maryland. The Supreme Court eventually condemned this latter measure, but only after the war. He overruled his general in chief, Winfield Scott, and insisted on an immediate offensive to end the rebellion quickly.

As Scott feared, the premature offensive resulted in defeat. Lincoln simply replaced Scott a few months later and quietly insisted that Scott's successor, George B. McClellan, undertake another offensive as quickly as possible. In June 1862, McClellan came close to capturing the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia. When a sudden Confederate counterattack forced him to withdraw, McClellan, not wholly without reason, excoriated Lincoln for failing to support him

The first reading of the Emancipation Proclamation to Lincoln's cabinet, in a reproduction of the original picture painted at the White House. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

properly. McClellan also divined, correctly, that Lincoln was edging toward making the destruction of slavery a Union war aim. He warned Lincoln, again correctly, that this would stiffen Confederate resistance. Lincoln went ahead with his agenda anyway, awaiting only McClellan's victory at Antietam (on September 17, 1862; a battle also known as Sharpsburg) to give the appearance that he was issuing the Emancipation Proclamation from a position of strength, not weakness.

The eradication of slavery now seems perhaps the most compelling justification for the enormous human cost of the Civil War. But at the time, Lincoln received plenty of criticism from those, like McClellan, who believed that Lincoln needlessly cloaked the war aim of emancipation in what was properly a struggle to preserve the Union. Some present-day historians are nearly as critical of Lincoln for precisely the opposite reason. They note that Lincoln acted only after the actions of the slaves themselves undermined Lincoln's initial pledge not to interfere with slavery. The steady flow of slave refugees into Union lines, some historians argue, forced Federal commanders either to return them, and thus prop up the institution of slavery, or harbor them and erode it. Most historians, however, believe that Lincoln's emancipation policy displayed a masterly understanding of the linkages between politics and military strategy.

Lincoln's activism did not end with emancipation. He also pressed for the first conscription act in U.S. history, for the enlistment of African American troops on a massive scale, and for unprecedented new fiscal and taxation measures to prosecute the war. Two years before Sherman marched to the sea, Lincoln issued a presidential directive urging Union forces to seize or destroy civilian property whenever it aided the Confederate military effort. He unhesitatingly interfered with field operations—including those of his last and greatest general in chief, Ulysses S. Grant.

Persistently claiming that circumstances controlled him, and not the reverse, and always maintaining the air of a gentle, long-suffering man, he was in fact one of the most remorseless chief executives in American history. His political opponents saw him as a tyrant who trampled on the Constitution. They exaggerated, but most historians agree that he firmly, fiercely expanded the meaning of that Constitution. He assuredly squeezed every drop of power from his Constitutional prerogatives as commander in chief.

Lincoln often defied the radical Republicans within his own party, albeit mostly in terms of the more deliberate speed with which he embraced policy measures they favored. But in 1864, he rejected their program for Reconstruction; fended off several attempts to dump him in favor of an alternative Republican presidential candidate; survived a frightening period in which the Union war effort seemed stalled; and handily won reelection against a formidable challenge from his former subordinate, George McClellan, the Democratic nominee. Lincoln cannily blocked a number of efforts to negotiate an end to the war, without really seeming to block them.

He heard news in April 1865 that Richmond had at last fallen. He visited the city and toured the residence of his counterpart, Jefferson Davis, and then returned to Washington—only to be shot by John Wilkes Booth while attending a play in Ford's Theatre on Good Friday, April 14. Lincoln died the following morning.

Lincoln was the only U.S. chief executive whose administration took place entirely during wartime—and also the only one to come under enemy fire. His Gettysburg Address is by far the greatest American oration commemorating the nation's military dead. He was the first president to exploit fully the vast war powers of his office, and wartime presidents have looked to him ever since as a model and inspiration. Harry S Truman, for example, explicitly likened his travails with Douglas MacArthur to Lincoln's strained relationship with McClellan. Lincoln's eventual removal of McClellan became Truman's model of how to resolve those travails.

The inscription on the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., reads: "In this temple, as in the hearts of the people for whom he saved the Union, the memory of Abraham Lincoln is enshrined forever." The national myth maintains that Lincoln was the only man who could have saved the Union. In this instance, the national myth is not far wrong.

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Civil War; Davis, Jefferson; Grant, Ulysses S.; Lee, Robert E.; MacArthur, Douglas; Mexican War; Polk, James K.; Reconstruction; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Scott, Winfield; Sherman, William Tecumseh; Truman, Harry S.

Related Documents

1862 b; 1863 g

—Mark Grimsley

Literature and War

From the time of the *Iliad*, warfare has been one of the key literary themes of Western culture. American war literature both reflects and challenges American attitudes toward war, nationality, violence, and gender, particularly manhood.

Despite war's importance as a literary subject, very little literature about war has endured from the first hundred years after the American Revolution. Americans did not even begin to establish a distinctive literary culture until the decades before the Civil War. American war literature has, in large part, reflected the Romantic resistance to the machine age, extending the tradition of such writers as Thomas Carlyle, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Henry David Thoreau. The major writers of this time period, including Nathaniel Hawthorne, Edgar Allan Poe, Walt Whitman, Mark Twain, and Henry James, were more interested in themes of guilt and innocence, exploring the various forms of violence between members of a society rather than violence resulting from armed conflicts. By the end of the 19th century, this emphasis had begun to change, partly as a result of the disappearance of the frontier, the greater involvement of the United States in foreign wars, and the rise of the military as a separate establishment. Important works that exemplify this shift include Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage* (1895), Herman Melville's *Billy Budd* (written c. 1888, published 1924), and Ambrose Bierce's *Tales of Soldiers and Civilians* (1891). Since 1895, when Crane proved that military experience was not a prerequisite for writing successfully about war, the theme of warfare has drawn the attention of major novelists to the extent that, one might argue, it has become a literary rite of passage. Since the 1950s, the subject of war has attracted novelists not only as a permanent feature of technological society but also as a powerful metaphor for life in the 20th century.

The subject of war has been less attractive to poets in the United States. For example, U.S. poets produced no concentration of high-quality poetry in reaction to any particular war that compares with what British poets produced about World War I. Although poets have written in response to every major U.S. conflict, very little of their work, with the exception of the best poetry of the Civil War, has been anthologized regularly.

American war literature reflects attitudes toward armed conflict and toward the military establishment that are in many ways unique. Beginning with colonial resentment of British forces, Americans have always been suspicious of

large standing armies and strong central governments. The dominant ideology that informed the early republic valorized the citizen–soldier over hired regulars, a man who took up arms for patriotic reasons rather than for pay. Despite a seeming lack of interest in maintaining war readiness, however, Americans have frequently been aggressive and quick to successfully mobilize and commit to war. Traditionally, Americans have expanded and contracted the Army according to their needs, mobilizing sporadically, and often with the spirit of sudden intense crusades.

Americans, until recently, have correspondingly lacked a military caste or tradition of military honor. The United States was, until the mid-20th century, one of the few Western societies in which the officer class was not a well-regarded part of the social fabric. It is hardly surprising, then, that the enlisted man has been the muse of American war novelists and poets, while European writers have preferred to focus more on the officer class. American authors have generally espoused soldierly virtues, but impugned the military establishment.

Patriotism and the American Revolution (1775–83)

James Fenimore Cooper's *The Spy: A Tale of the Neutral Ground* (1821) is both the first American historical novel and the first American novel about war. Cooper's novel is about a spy who obtains crucial information for George Washington during the American Revolution. Writing at a time when the American novel was in its infancy, Cooper relied on Sir Walter Scott's romances for his narrative structure. As in Scott's stories, Cooper's characters are challenged by momentous historical circumstances in which events on the battlefield are intertwined with events in private households. Yet Cooper, in choosing a common man for his ideal patriot, departed from Scott in more than just his choice of historical setting. Rather than focusing on a heroic officer and gentleman such as Washington, Cooper's hero is Harry Birch, a lowborn peddler whose services to the patriots' cause, though vital and dangerous, are for the most part unacknowledged and behind the scenes. At the time when Cooper was writing, the upper class believed that ordinary citizens were incapable of pure patriotic feeling devoid of desire for material gain. For most of the novel, Birch is mistaken by upper-class patriots for a base, self-serving British spy. The novel's climax occurs when even

Washington mistakes Birch's motives and offers him gold in exchange for his service. Birch spurns his offer and is recognized by his social betters in the final chapter. The novel, then, aligns Birch, via his selfless interest in his country, with the great American general, statesman, and spiritual father.

American literary traditions had yet to be established at the time of the Revolutionary War, and very little poetry about that war is considered to have enduring value, until Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote the "Concord Hymn" (1837) with its famous "shot heard round the world" line. This poem was sung on July 4 of that year at the completion of a monument commemorating the battles of Lexington and Concord. It celebrates the nation's first citizen–soldiers, the "embattled farmers," in a spiritual light that recalls Cooper's ideal of selfless patriotism: "Spirit, that made those heroes dare/To die, and leave their children free,/Bid Time and Nature gently spare/The shaft we raise to them and thee" (Allison et al., 375). Other poems of and about the Revolutionary War are Phillis Wheatley's "To His Excellency General Washington," Paul Laurence Dunbar's "Black Samson of Brandywine," and Philip Freneau's "The British Prison Ship" and "To the Memory of the Brave Americans."

The War of 1812 and the Mexican War (1846–48)

The British bombardment of Baltimore during the War of 1812 inspired Francis Scott Key's patriotic "Defense of Fort McHenry" (1814). The poem's first stanza, sung to the tune of an old English drinking song, has become known to every American as "The Star-Spangled Banner." James Russell Lowell's *The Biglow Papers* are of interest with regard to the Mexican War. A series of satiric poems, prose sketches, and critical miscellanea, they marked the true beginning of Lowell's career as a widely known publicist of antislavery causes. The first series centered on the Mexican War; the second on the issue of slavery. In both, Lowell severely criticized the greed, hypocrisy, and brutality underlying the methods, doctrines, and policies of the statesmen of his day and their constituents.

Male Initiation, the Wounded Body, and the American Civil War (1861–65)

The Civil War has had an enormous impact on American consciousness and is easily the most written about event in

American history. It remains the war in which Americans sacrificed the most. More Americans died in the Civil War than in all our other wars combined. Despite the enormous literary attention to the Civil War, and the generally fine quality of books written by Northern writers such as John DeForest's *Miss Ravenel's Conversion from Secession to Loyalty* (1867), Ambrose Bierce's *Tales of Soldiers and Civilians* (1891), and Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage* (1895), no epic, fictional or poetic, has been singled out as the ultimate Civil War masterpiece. The literary critic Daniel Aaron has suggested that Americans writing in the 40 years following the Civil War were hampered by the blinding emotions evoked by that war, especially as these were caused or exacerbated by the issues of race and slavery. Southern vision, Aaron suggests, was further distorted by passions arising from the war's devastation of the South and the further humiliations and assaults of Reconstruction. Among the relatively few Southern writers considered to have risen above these problems are the poet Henry Timrod, the diarist Mary Chestnut, and the novelist George Washington Cable. *The Crisis*, written by the American novelist and Annapolis graduate Winston Churchill, depicts the war as it was experienced in St. Louis. This book was regarded as an epic at the time it was first published in 1901 and was extremely successful, selling 320,000 copies in the first three months after its publication.

The general consensus is that a great Southern voice to comment on the war did not come forward until William Faulkner. Faulkner, whose career did not begin until the mid 1920s, was more interested, however, in the war's aftereffects than in the war itself. At the end of the 20th century, Charles Frazier's *Cold Mountain* (1997) was referred to as an American *Odyssey* and has achieved both great critical acclaim and popularity. Emotionally powerful and historically sound, Frazier's depiction of deserters, slaves, marauders, and bounty hunters in the war-ravaged South brings to light the many aspects of that war that have been all but effaced by the glorious generals, heroes, and military victories of Civil War legend.

The best-known novel of the Civil War, and perhaps the most famous American novel treating the subject of warfare, is Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage*. Although written 30 years after the war ended, Crane's novel is highly realistic in its rendering of the details of the battlefield. However, *The Red Badge of Courage* is more an exploration of the nature of war in general than about the specific issues of the Civil War. Crane universalized his protagonist, Henry Fleming, a young Union volunteer, whom he refers to as "the youth." The novel compellingly explores a number of themes that have continued to resonate throughout much of the war literature written since. Among these are the themes of male initiation, the wound as a cultural symbol of masculinity, and the realities versus the myths of war. Fleming learns that receiving a wound, a red badge of courage, or of having endured the risk of dying, is the price of initiation into American manhood in wartime. Fighting alongside his fellow soldiers, he experiences "a temporary but sublime absence of selfishness" (Crane, 176) that again recalls the citizen–soldier ideal. Crane's narration, however, maintains an ironic distance throughout the novel that invites the reader to question whether Fleming has truly achieved this ideal.

In poetry, the Civil War inspired *Drum Taps* (1865) by Walt Whitman, which he later incorporated into his life's work, *Leaves of Grass* (1855–92), and *Battle-Pieces and Aspects of the War* (1866) from Herman Melville. Although other poets such as Henry Timrod, Thomas Baily Aldrich, and Francis Orrery Ticknor wrote Civil War verse, and though Julia Ward Howe's "Battle Hymn of the Republic" and Lloyd Mifflin's "The Battlefield," about Gettysburg, have great power and import, Whitman and Melville's volumes have been considered to be the most significant and lasting treatments of the war. Both men were Unionists deeply moved by the sacrifices made and both emphasized the need for reconciliation. Whitman's volume documented the war in a highly personal, individualized manner, while Melville, who experienced the war at a greater distance, recorded its major events, more in the manner of a philosophical historian.

Whitman's war poetry has a remarkable range that reflects not only his formidable talent, but also his need to reconcile his passionate response to the suffering he witnessed with his equally passionate belief that the war was necessary to the survival of the country and to democracy. The poems in *Drum Taps* range from verses infused with martial spirit such as "Beat! Beat! Drums," to moving representations of the grief

suffered by families, as in "Come up from the Fields Father," to images of blood, death, ether, and cries of agony in a makeshift hospital in "A March in the Ranks Hard-Prest, and the Road Unknown."

Whitman's verse, anticipating Crane, puts the wounded American body before the reader in a way that had not been done before. But Whitman uses his poet's song to transform these bodies into a spiritual vision that brings to full fruition the patriotic spirit envisioned by Cooper and Emerson. He develops the theme of intertwined spiritual identity between symbolic fathers and sons of the republic in the bond he envisions between himself and a dead soldier in the poignant dramatic monologue "Vigil Strange I Kept on the Field One Night." Whitman further expands this vision in his elegy to Abraham Lincoln, "When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloomed." In this multifaceted poem, Whitman celebrates the common purpose, identity, and spirit uniting Lincoln, the war dead, and all Americans.

Among Melville's more well-known Civil War poems are those that chronicle and interpret the events of specific battles, such as "Malvern Hill," "The March into Virginia," and the much anthologized, "Shiloh: A Requiem" (1866). In another of these battle poems, "A Utilitarian View of the Monitor's Fight" (1866), Melville anticipates the dehumanizing effects of modern technological warfare. His poem responds to one of the most widely publicized forms of new technology used in the war, the ironclad vessel. On May 9, 1862, the Union *Monitor* had engaged the Confederate *Merrimack* at Hampton Roads, Virginia, in a battle that proved inconclusive. For Melville, this skirmish marked the end of chivalric warfare. For the soldiers who fought with this new technology, there was "No passion; all went on by crank,/Pivot, and screw,/And calculations of caloric" (Melville, 61). Melville's sense of heroism as one of the casualties of modern technology presages one of the main themes of the literature of World War I and beyond.

Literature of Protest and World War I (1914–18)
The U.S. entry into World War I in 1917 has been characterized as The Great Crusade, reflecting an American tendency to embark on "crusades" in waging war. But the literature of World War I is characterized by cynicism,

negation, disillusion, numbness, absurdity, alienation, sterility, and sexual dysfunction—in short, by voices of protest. The writers of the Great War felt compelled to express the cultural and emotional shock experienced by men and women who came of age during and immediately following the war. These writers and the generation that they spoke for have come to be known as the "Lost Generation." Among the most important novels of this time period are John Dos Passos's *Three Soldiers* (1921), E. E. Cummings's *The Enormous Room* (1922), Thomas Boyd's *Through the Wheat* (1923), Ernest Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms* (1929), and Humphrey Cobb's *Paths of Glory* (1935).

The enormous wave of protest that characterizes World War I literature was largely a result of the naïveté, idealism, and optimism with which Americans, even more so than their European counterparts, went into the war and the degree to which their expectations were shattered by the dehumanizing effects of mass machine warfare. Despite the advent of trench warfare during the American Civil War, Americans went into World War I with antiquated ideals of heroism. By the time Stephen Crane wrote *The Red Badge of Courage*, the Civil War had already become legend. The cultural environment of the Great Crusade was one in which patriotism, religion, and nationalism were intensely interconnected. The cultural ethos at the time associated religion with nationalism and pacifism with blasphemy. Religious organizations such as the YMCA promoted the ideal of the soldier as a virgin and Christ figure. Novelists who were inspired by and who helped to promote these ideals include Willa Cather, Edith Wharton, Temple Bailey, and Mary Shipman Andrews. Cather's *One of Ours* (1922) and Wharton's *The Marne* (1918) and *A Son at the Front* (1923) represent well the idealism with which many young men entered the war.

Later World War I literature served up protests against the patriotic and religious rhetoric that was so prevalent during the war. Dos Passos, both in *1919* (1932) and *Three Soldiers* (1921), for example, makes a searing attack on the officers, public relations personnel, YMCA secretaries, and socialites who made their careers out of the war, and depicts the success of these sectors in contrast to the suffering of the common man.

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The Great War shattered the idea of war as the proving ground of manhood. The conditions of the battlefront in World War I were some of the most absurd and demoralizing in the history of warfare, all of which helped to create a sense of psychic emasculation. Trench warfare called for a passive rather than active form of service. The military leadership, unprepared for the new technologies it had created, witnessed a kind of stasis as inadequate elements of armor and communications pitted infantry against machine guns and massed artillery. The result was that both sides endured some of the most staggering losses in history, often with inconclusive results. With no tactical objectives able to be accomplished, the war became one of mass attrition. Men faced further demoralization from the degrading filth of the trenches, which became mass open burial grounds.

E. E. Cummings, using himself as his subject in *The Enormous Room*, parodies rather than protests the war. Although not definitively a novel, play, essay, or history, yet at the same time containing elements of all these genres, The Enormous Room defies categorization. Describing the French military camp in which he was imprisoned on a false charge of treason (1917–18), Cummings performs the role of a kind of jester of language, juggling the horrors and absurdities of the war in a kind of grotesque carnival. The camp, figured as an enormous room imprisoning a multinational and multilingual struggle for survival, is the central metaphor of the book, interchangeable with the war itself. Cummings as the character refuses to suffer; when his expression begins to take on the nature of a protest, he mocks himself. Ultimately, Cummings retreats from the war into the world of art.

The protagonist of Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms,* Fredric Henry, exchanges the role of warrior for that of lover. Henry is emasculated by mass technological warfare in which the soldiers are required to be passive and in which there is no possibility of individual or heroic action. The horrors and absurdities of the war culminate in Henry's retreat from Caporetto. Deciding that it is no longer possible to play by the rules, Henry deserts and attempts to redeem his sense of manhood by devoting himself to his lover, Catherine. Henry is denied this last resort when Catherine dies after delivering their stillborn son. The final image of Henry walking home from the hospital in the rain poignantly conveys the tragic sense of impotence felt by an entire generation.

Carl Sandburg's "The Grass" (1918) is the most frequently anthologized World War I poem written by an American. The poem is Whitmanesque in its tone and central metaphor, in which the image of grass is used to suggest the mortality of the flesh and the obliterations of time, in combination with the immortality and the healing power of the spirit as it is manifested in the natural world. The poetic voice, personified as the grass, conveys extreme war weariness when it asks that the dead multitudes from Napoleonic battlefields, American Civil War battlefields, and World War I battlefields be piled high, to "Shovel them under and let me work." The poem, as it turns away in disgust from war's destruction, asserts the healing powers of art, for the voice is, as it is with Whitman, that of both grass and poet. Other especially rich World War I poems include E. E. Cummings's "I sing of Olaf glad and big," and "my sweet old etcetera," Archibald Macleish's "Memorial Rain," Mikhail Naimy's "My Brother," and Alan Seeger's "Rendezvous." Also important for of their poignant "I-was-there" veracity are a number of the poems written by the "doughboys," for the GI newspaper *The Stars and Stripes*.

Literature of the Absurd, the Antihero, and World War II (1939–45)

The 1930s, whether despite or because of the Great Depression, were a time of marked optimism for writers in the United States. Two major American novels are set in the time period before the United States entered World War II in 1941: Ernest Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* (1940) and James Jones's *From Here to Eternity* (1951). For Whom the Bell Tolls considers the individual in the context of social justice and against the backdrop of political and social issues on a grand scale. *From Here to Eternity* examines the peacetime Army, dramatizing not only the tensions between the individual and the group, but also the Army's difficulty in maintaining its own distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate violence, violence being not only inherent to its way of life, but, as the novel's culmination in the attack on Pearl Harbor reminds us, the very reason for

its existence. At the same time, *From Here to Eternity* also manages to celebrate to a certain extent the satisfaction of peacetime service, despite its tragic ending in which the protagonist, in a manner that echoes Melville's *Billy Budd*, is sacrificed to the Army's imperfect discipline.

Many drafted servicemen entered World War II with little of the Great War's sense of crusading spirit but regarded service as an unpleasant necessity from which they hoped to return home to civilian life as soon as possible. Many World War II novels share characteristics that mark them as being very different from those of World War I. For instance, they reflect the growing cynicism of the American citizen toward his government. From World War II, on through Korea and Vietnam, the value of military service, along with the good of the nation, is more and more brought into question.

World War II novels tend to be wider ranging in subject and content than those of World War I. They are more likely to take a multifaceted approach to representing the American soldier and to explore the meaning of the war within the scope of American society than to focus, as did novels of the preceding war, on a single protagonist. Many depict characters who desire economic advancement or to escape the stigma of minority status. World War II novels also include high-ranking military commanders, often depicted as having unappealing qualities. Among the major novels that reflect these trends are Harry Brown's *A Walk in the Sun* (1944), James Gould Cozzens's *Guard of Honor* (1948), Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead* (1948), James Jones's *From Here to Eternity,* and John Hersey's *The War Lover* (1959).

Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead* exhibits many of the new characteristics that mark novels treating World War II. In his representation of the personal histories, points of view, and the combined fate of the members of a single squad mission in the Pacific theater, Mailer also depicts the racism, anti-Semitism, class prejudice, and economic disenfranchisement that the "average" American citizen–soldier brought with him to the war. Mailer's American soldiers, even thousands of miles from home, contend with hostilities from one another that are far more frightening than any the Japanese might present. His mystical, brilliant, yet frustrated General Cummings has become the fictional prototype of the sinister commander obsessed with power and metaphorically identified with the machine.

The period from 1957 to 1966 ushered in a small but groundbreaking group of American war novels that treated war largely from within the framework of an international literary movement known as absurdism. These included Mark Harris's *Something about a Soldier* (1957), Joseph Heller's *Catch-22* (1961), Kurt Vonnegut Jr.'s *Mother Night* (1961), James Jones's *The Thin Red Line* (1962), and William Hoffman's *Yancey's War* (1966). War literature of the absurd has its origins in the horrors of World War I and its sense of the loss of the possibility for heroic action or the sense of combat as ennobling. The specter of nuclear war only highlighted the absurdity of war as a phenomenon that defied rationalization and led the public to distrust the government's ability to contain war, control its outcome, or represent the interests of the individual. Black humor became one of the main approaches these novelists took to reawaken readers to horrors to which they had become numbed. The thoughts of *Catch-22*'s Yossarian, as he stares at Snowden's fatal wound, provide a powerful example of this technique: "Here was God's plenty all right . . . liver, lungs, kidneys, ribs, stomach and bits of the stewed tomatoes Snowden had eaten that day for lunch. Yossarian hated stewed tomatoes."

American war literature made two distinct contributions to literature of the absurd: (1) the invention of the antihero and (2) the incorporation of the pop art movement. The antihero also has its origins in World War I in such characters as Fredric Henry, who takes pride in performing an act of negation. After World War II, the heroic ideal begins to disappear or take a different form. The antihero, for the most part a purely American invention, represents a new solution to the problem of heroism and individuality. The antihero might, at first glance, seem selfish or unpatriotic because he is not a leader or martyr for an ennobling cause, devoting himself instead to the principle of staying alive. He is, however, in keeping with more traditional heroes, ultimately brave, optimistic, loyal, and humane. Yossarian, for example, is flagrantly unconcerned about ideals of duty or honor but cares strongly about the welfare of Nately's whore's kid sister

and flies "straight and level into the flak" on 70 missions. Distrusting the establishment, he finds a way to escape both heroic death and incorporation into the system without being selfish or cowardly. In effect, he defies the traditional defining dichotomy of manhood by refusing to be either coward or hero. The antihero reflects the tenacity of American optimism in the face of modern absurdities.

This tenacity is also reflected in the American use of the pop art movement. Aspects of the pop art movement incorporated by novelists of the absurd include the sardonic celebration of the banal, commercial, industrial aspects of modern war and culture in ways that emphasize the vigorous, erotic, and surreal. *The Thin Red Line* employs especially rich use of pop art techniques. One of the most obvious examples is the novel's use of collage, its assemblage of familiar objects in new and compelling forms.

Two American poems about World War II have become classics. Randall Jarrell's "The Death of the Ball Turret Gunner" (1945) and Richard Eberhart's "The Fury of Aerial Bombardment" (1947) both focus on war in the air, which had become dramatically more sophisticated and of greater strategic importance since the advent of air warfare in World War I. Jarrell's brief but intense poem develops the trope of a machine gunner's death as a grotesque abortion. The poem is narrated from the point of view of a gunner who is figured as an unborn fetus contained in the plexiglass sphere of a B-17 or B-24 bomber, figured as the "belly" of the state (Allison et al., 707). The gunner rises above the Earth, "from the dream of life," to awaken to "black flak and the nightmare fighters." The last line has a deflating horror: "When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose."

In Eberhart's poem the young men who have died in aerial combat are remembered only as names on a military training list in which they had proved they could distinguish "the belt feed lever from the belt holding pawl" (Allison et al., 659). Both poems depict the mechanical dehumanization presaged by Melville's "A Utilitarian View of the Monitor's Fight," and both reflect the disdain for the state that is so prevalent in the novels of this time and beyond. Other especially poignant World War II poems include John Ciardi's "A Box Comes Home," Langston Hughes's "Jim Crow's Last Stand," Lincoln Kirstein's "Vaudeville,"

Edwin Rolfe's "No Man Knows War," and Winfield Townley Scott's "The U.S. Soldier with the Japanese Skull." And the poems of GIs published in The Stars and Stripes offer other, less polished, but equally powerful poetic insights into the effects of the war.

Korea (1950–53) and Vietnam (1965–73)

In America's next major conflicts, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, more than 80,000 Americans died in battle and more than 250,000 were either wounded or missing in action. After World War II, despite new awareness of the importance of the involvement of the United States in foreign affairs, Americans were eager to return to peacetime conditions and allowed their military to contract in customary fashion. The reintroduction of the draft to fill the ranks of the armed forces during the Korean War was resented by the small minority called upon to serve, even though there was relatively little public protest against it. Korean War fiction reflects a more self-oriented resentment on the part of soldiers as opposed to the idealistic resentment that characterized the literature of World War I. The protagonists of William Styron's *The Long March* (1956) and James Michener's *The Bridges at Toko-Ri* (1952), having already served in World War II, consider this further demand on them to be unjust. As Brubaker in *The Bridges at Toko-Ri* insists, the situation is all the worse because no one in America knows or cares what Korea is about. The Korean War, then, marks the moment in American war literature when the American citizen thinks primarily of his personal welfare and is deaf to appeals to his patriotism.

At the same time, these and other novels of the Korean War, such as Curt Anders's *The Price of Courage* (1957) and Ernest Frankel's *Band of Brothers* (1958), emphasize the dependence of soldiers on one another for their survival, along with the idea that a man is motivated to fight for his buddies rather than for abstract causes. Thomas McGrath's elegiac poem to the soldiers who died in Korea and Vietnam, "Ode for the American Dead in Asia" (1964, rev. 1968), begins and ends with images of the dead among the rice paddies. The soldiers here are depicted as fighting in a war they neither wanted nor understood. They are further represented as having been groomed by the state, sanctioned by

the church, and misguided by the military establishment into a brief existence of bravery and ignorance. Two other important poems about Korea are Rolando Hinojosa's sardonic "A Sheaf of Percussion Fire" and James Magner Jr.'s haunting elegy "Repository."

The major novels of Vietnam include David Halberstam's *One Very Hot Day* (1967), Tim O'Brien's *Going After Cacciato* (1975) and *The Things They Carried* (1990), and James Webb's *Fields of Fire* (1978). Most of these focus on the dilemma of male initiation and the contrast between myth and reality, some echoing Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage*. Many also examine the media, the family, and the military as social institutions that gave young men misleading views of war derived from Americans' experience immediately following World War II. These views left soldiers ill-equipped to deal with conditions in Vietnam. Although much serious war fiction and poetry by the mid-1960s had already begun to denigrate traditional patriotic ideals, these ideals were still very much alive in popular culture of the Cold War, particularly as represented in films about World War II. Such ideals often turned to bitterness for characters in Vietnam novels. As a soldier in Webb's *Fields of Fire* complains, "What the hell am I doing here, anyway? Where's the goddamn ARVNs? Who needs this shit, huh? I ain't any hero. Goddamn John Wayne, anyway."

Many Vietnam War narratives, and Webb's novel especially, also point to the family as reinforcing such traditional patriotic values. Fathers who fought in World War II recommended a similar experience for their sons in Vietnam, many of them upholding war as the ideal testing ground of manhood and considering military service a debt they owed to their country. Finally, a majority of narratives bitterly condemn the military institution for preparing soldiers to fight a conventional war modeled after World War II, rather than the guerrilla war they got. David Halberstam's *One Very Hot Day* is particularly concerned with this failure. His protagonist Captain Beauchamp is an aging, overweight, washed-up, career officer who served in World War II and Korea before coming to Vietnam. Beauchamp's thoughts convey the U.S. military's deplorably inadequate military strategies in Vietnam and soldiers' consequent experience of the war as chaotic, formless, and meaningless.

Halberstam's novel dramatizes the complete shattering of Beauchamp's worldview.

Vietnam writers also convey the many aspects of Vietnam that had the capacity to "spook" soldiers or to push tensions to an unbearable degree. Among these were the Viet Cong's use of booby traps and other innocent-looking devices that made the simple acts of walking or breathing dangerous. In addition, the Vietnamese used civilians, including children, as combatants. These practices horrified American soldiers, who had been trained to view civilians as a distinctly noncombatant category. The inability of American soldiers to distinguish Vietnamese combatants, particularly in a guerrilla war, meant that for them anyone was suspect, including women, children, and the aged. The task of destroying this unconventional enemy was distinctly out of tune with the American soldier as warrior–savior. The enemy in Vietnam, felt but not seen, took on a preternatural quality. Vietnam narratives refer to the enemy as "ghosts," "devils," and "phantoms." The word hero came to signify a sure and meaningless death ticket. It became a word on which soldiers heaped their contempt as they advised the FNGs (Fucking New Guys) not to be "heroes" if they wanted to remain alive. Survival is described by many writers as the reigning value among men in Vietnam.

Many Vietnam War narratives focus on the experience of veterans after they return home. Novels that deal with veterans' struggles to reintegrate into life in the United States include Webb's *Fields of Fire*, O'Brien's *The Things They Carried*, and Bobbie Ann Mason's *In Country* (1986). Soldiers returning home from Vietnam faced hostility from many quarters. The cultural environment in the United States, marked by protests rather than parades, did not celebrate Vietnam veterans—combatants in a war that was not only unpopular but the only war that Americans had ever lost. The general public, incensed by such highly publicized incidents as the My Lai Massacre, associated soldiers with wartime atrocities. Soldiers naturally experienced profound alienation as they exchanged the role of soldier for what they now imagined themselves to be: pariahs. Many civilians, more than in past wars, did not want to hear soldiers recount their stories, but instead sought from returning vets a vow of silence. One can get a sense

of the weight of this vow in the thoughts of Norman Bowker, a vet who ultimately hangs himself in O'Brien's *The Things They Carried*:

> A good war story, he thought, but it was not a war for war stories, nor for talk of valor, and nobody in town wanted to know about the terrible stink. They wanted good intentions, good deeds. But the town was not to blame, really. It was a nice little town, very prosperous, with neat houses and all the sanitary conveniences. (169)

The Vietnam War generated more fine poetry than any other modern American war. In addition to the wealth of poetry written by veteran poets such as D. F. Brown, Bryan Alec Floyd, and Walter McDonald, to name but a few, much Vietnam poetry grew out of the dramatic revitalization of American poetry of the late 1950s and 1960s. During this time young poets, in contrast to their immediate predecessors who tended to fall in line with the social and aesthetic values of the New Critics, began to combine aesthetic innovation with various forms of social critique and political protest against the Vietnam War as well as such issues as racism, sexism, and the destruction of the natural environment. These poets included the beat poets, the confessional poets, the Black Mountain poets, the deep image poets, and the poets of the New York school. The deep image or surrealist poets were among the most active in protesting the Vietnam War. Their contributions include Robert Bly's scathing denouncements of the war in "The Teeth Mother Naked At Last" (1970) and "Counting Small Boned Bodies," James Wright's "A Mad Fight Song for William S. Carpenter, 1966," and Galway Kinnell's bitter "The Dead Shall Be Raised Incorruptible" (1971). Many of the major poems about Vietnam, including Daniel Berrigan's "You Could Make a Song of it, A Dirge of It, A Heartbreaker of it," W. D. Ehrhart's "For a Coming Extinction," Robert Penn Warren's "Bad Year, Bad War: A New Year's Card, 1969," and Bruce Weigl's "Song of Napalm," like so many of the novels, stress America's difficulty absorbing this war into its conscience and consciousness. Overall, the literature of Vietnam is, in many respects, a demand for words in place of silence, and therefore an important part of America's mourning of Vietnam.

The Persian Gulf War (1991)

The Persian Gulf War has yet to be digested by literary culture, but Carolyn Kizer's "On a Line from Valéry" (1996) gives some idea of themes that are likely to surface as literature about this war becomes better known. Written in the traditional French form of the villanelle, Kizer develops the apocalyptic imagery of the French poet Paul Valéry in relation to the Gulf War, alluding near the poem's conclusion to the possibility of nuclear winter.

The Persian Gulf War represents the complete realization of Melville's prophecy of mechanized and dehumanized warfare. The war took on a surreal quality for most Americans as the Western media packaged the conflict as a kind of video-game entertainment. The United States vastly outstripped Iraq in technological and matériel resources. The war saw only 146 U.S. casualties (including 12 women), while approximately 100,000 Iraqis were killed. Kizer's poem suggests that pride in such a lopsided victory is impossible for Americans and expresses repugnance for the latest manifestations of military might, such as air strikes and poisonous gas, in humankind's bleak history of brutality and destruction. Similar themes are conveyed in Walt McDonald's powerful "The Winter of Desert Storm," which dramatizes the contrast between the daily lives of caring parents and grandparents and America's violent action and capability. Finally, Margaret McDermott's "The Harvest Matrix 2001," Robert Bly's "Call and Answer," and Michael Waters's "Complicity" address the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Bush administration's responses to them.

Since Stephen Crane published *The Red Badge of Courage* in 1895, the war novel has attracted many of America's most talented writers and become a recognizable form of a literary rite of passage. American war literature as a whole has carried on the Romantic tradition of resistance to the dehumanizing effects of the machine age. The subject of war has attracted poets and fiction writers as a permanent feature of and apt metaphor for technological society and life in the 20th century. The American soldier's experience in war has long been and remains one of the most powerful literary

subjects for exploring American attitudes toward violence, the relationship of the individual to the state, and male tradition. Often after a war, a social mandate appears to repress the horrors attendant on that war—whether to promote healing or to keep ready the next generation of warriors. Although especially true of the Vietnam War era, Walt Whitman alluded to the same tendency when he said of the Civil War, "The real war will never get in the books." Much American war literature reflects the determination on the part of writers to get the real war into their books. In many cases, it is a demand for words over silence, and therefore an invaluable expression of what it has meant and continues to mean to be an American.

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Related Documents

1861 b; 1915 a; 1918 b; 1930; 1933; 1943; 1944 b; 1945 c, d, f; 1946 b; 1957; 1971 a; 2001

—*Gail Sullivan Hammill*

Lynch, Jessica

(1983–)
U.S. Soldier

Priv. Jessica Lynch was easily the most famous soldier of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and arguably the most celebrated

female war hero since Molly Pitcher. Many aspects of Lynch's story were subsequently disputed or disproved, but her celebrity status remained intact. The saga of Jessica Lynch reveals not only that women are performing new roles in the military that challenge traditional gender roles, but also underscores the importance of the media in shaping public opinion about female soldiers and the war itself.

What is not in dispute is that Lynch served in a support unit that transported supplies to soldiers during the invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003. With rare exceptions, U.S. forces faced minor resistance and raced past Iraqi troops, most of which disbanded. Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfield deployed U.S. troops in a new way, pushing past enemy forces toward the capital of Baghdad in an attempt to force a surrender or collapse of the regime, rather than securing captured territory. Ultimately this revolutionary strategy resulted in a spectacularly quick collapse of the Saddam Hussein government, but it also left U.S. supply lines extended and vulnerable to attack. On March 23, Lynch's convoy made a wrong turn off the main supply route, itself subject to attacks, and into an area of fierce resistance. Her convoy took extremely heavy fire that killed many of her comrades. Lynch received extensive injuries, was captured by Iraqis, hospitalized, and rescued a few days later by U.S. forces.

By April 1, U.S. media reported that Special Forces had rescued Lynch and had filmed the dramatic rescue with night-vision technology. Relying on anonymous military sources, the electronic and print media reported that when Lynch was captured, despite being shot, she had valiantly fought off her attackers, firing her weapon until out of ammunition. The media also alleged that Iraqi forces had mistreated Lynch, perhaps even raped her.

Much of this reportage was subsequently disproven. Lynch was injured when the Humvee in which she was riding crashed. Her gun was clogged with sand; she never fired it. Iraqi doctors apparently gave her adequate care and at one point offered to turn her over to U.S. forces, but U.S. soldiers refused to allow the ambulance past a checkpoint, perhaps even firing at the ambulance that contained Lynch. The Iraqi military had abandoned the hospital hours before

the rescue, thus calling into question the "firefight" recorded by the U.S. forces.

The U.S. military's version of her story held, despite some reports to the contrary, until mid-May, when British news stories, based in part on interviews with Iraqis, questioned the fundamentals of the story. A month later, the *Washington Post* interviewed unnamed U.S. military officials who agreed that key elements of the story reported to the press (that Lynch had fired her weapon, had been shot, stabbed, or tortured, and that the hospital was heavily guarded) were untrue.

The military honorably discharged Lynch, whose injuries prevented her from further duty. Lynch returned to the United States amid intense publicity. She immediately signed a book contract and received a $1 million advance.

As a private citizen, Lynch herself disputed key aspects of the story the military had built around her. In an interview with ABC News, Lynch said that she had no memory of being raped, although medical records indicate that was a possibility. She also said she never fired her weapon and declined the title of hero, leaving that honorific for the members of her unit who were killed. Rather than being tortured by Iraqis, Lynch reported that "no one beat me, no one slapped me." While grateful for her rescue, she also acknowledged that the military used her as a "symbol" and suggested that the filming of the rescue was "wrong."

The unraveling of the Jessica Lynch myth helped push the story from the headlines. Events also conspired to make "America's sweetheart" less important. Within a few months after May 1, the day that President Bush announced the end of major combat operations beneath a banner reading "Mission Accomplished," the continued killing and wounding of American soldiers in Iraq remained front-page news. Ironically, more soldiers have been killed and injured in the occupation of Iraq than in its capture.

A year after the Jessica Lynch story broke into the news, another female soldier became an icon of the war in Iraq. Photos of Lynndie England helping to humiliate Iraqi detainees in the notorious Abu Ghraib prison symbolized to many Americans the overall failure of the American humanitarian mission in Iraq. The photograph of England holding the leash securing a naked Iraqi man became infamous. Like

Lynch, England also hailed from a small town in West Virginia and was of modest means. Unmarried and pregnant by another guard (also accused of abuse of prisoners), England represented the anti–Jessica Lynch.

The saga of Priv. Jessica Lynch reveals the importance of the media in modern warfare and how sophisticated the U.S. military became in managing its image during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The initial Lynch story also helped the military depict the Iraqis as uncivilized and sexually depraved, stereotypes that circulated freely in the media frenzy of wartime reporting. The military was able to get its version out to the U.S. media, regardless of the veracity of the story or even the cooperation of the individuals involved.

The attention that the U.S. military, media, and public lavished on Jessica Lynch also echoes older stereotypes about women. American women, particularly white women, have long been portrayed as innocents, needing protection of men. Thus Lynch's capture and rescue played into older stereotypes about defenseless women and rapacious enemies, providing echoes of propaganda distributed during previous American wars. As an armed and heroic defender of herself, Lynch became a kind of postmodern Joan of Arc figure. Unlike England, Lynch's sexuality was kept within the limits of tradition and respectability, as the media focused on her marriage to another soldier. The Lynch saga suggests that while the U.S. military is ready and willing to have female soldiers serve as combatants, the public and the mass media are less willing to surrender older views of women as in need of protection.

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Nurses, Military; Sexual Abuse and Harassment; Tailhook Convention; Women in the Military

—John Hinshaw

M

MacArthur, Douglas

(1880–1964)
U.S. Army General

One of the most celebrated and controversial military leaders in American history, Douglas MacArthur achieved his greatest notoriety in World War II as the U.S. commander in the Pacific theater. MacArthur best embodied the nation's will, effort, and ultimate victory in its war against Japan; his elevation to this iconic status was assured when, in March 1942, having been forced after months of dogged resistance to abandon the Philippines to Japanese invaders, he electrified an American public desperate for heroes and hopeful signs in those dark days by declaring, "I shall return." Those three words, repeatedly and reproduced ad continually over the airwaves and in print, and matched with the iron-jawed visage of the general, stoic behind aviator sunglasses and a corncob pipe, came to symbolize his and the nation's determination and certainty of eventual triumph. When, two years after his pledge, MacArthur did in fact stride victorious from a landing craft onto the beach of Leyte, in the soon-to-be-liberated Philippines, his legend was secure.

Since the end of World War II, and particularly in the wake of the ignominious conclusion to his extraordinary military career in the midst of the Korean War, historians, journalists, and other commentators have steadily chipped away at the exalted image of MacArthur that emerged from the Pacific campaign. Such demythologizing was inevitable: for a nation that prefers its heroes to wear their mantle with a modicum of humility and discretion, MacArthur was a too-proud tower, a target for toppling at the first opportunity. From his earliest days in the public eye, he was a flamboyant self-promoter. As a 38-year-old brigadier general in World War I (and the youngest division commander in the U.S. Army), MacArthur earned the nickname "the Dude" for his rakish, nonregulation attire—heavy muffler, bright turtleneck sweater, floppy hat, loose field jacket, and riding crop. It was a look as carefully cultivated as his later trademark of sunglasses, pipe, and bomber jacket. MacArthur was equally careful to cultivate an aura of military genius; whether he possessed such genius is still a matter for debate. What is certain, however, is that few 20th-century American generals presided over achievements as epic in scale and consequence as those associated with MacArthur.

Man of Destiny

MacArthur was born to a prominent military family. His father, Arthur, was a Civil War Medal of Honor winner and military governor of the Philippines from 1900 to 1901. MacArthur graduated first in his class at West Point in 1903, with the highest academic record achieved there in 25 years. He first gained national attention in World War I, where, as the commander of the 42nd ("Rainbow") Division, he won numerous medals for conspicuous valor and garnered considerable praise for his successful battlefield leadership. Sec. of War Newton Baker, for instance, declared him America's best frontline general.

After 1918, MacArthur continued his meteoric rise within the Army. Between 1919 and 1922, he served as superintendent of West Point, carrying out a host of crucial reforms that brought the Academy's academic curriculum and military training into the 20th century. By 1925 MacArthur was America's youngest major general, and by 1930 he was chief of staff of the Army. His tenure in this position saw one of the most controversial episodes of his

career, and one that would permanently stain his reputation in some circles. In July 1932, at the height of the Great Depression, masses of protestors, many of them veterans, proclaimed themselves the "Bonus Army" and marched on and encamped in Washington, D.C. MacArthur, believing their leadership to have been infiltrated by communist agitators, personally directed the use of regular Army troops to suppress and disperse them. Casualties in the operation were relatively light, but the spectacle of U.S. Army cavalry advancing with drawn sabers to rout unemployed veterans brought the scorn and ridicule of the press and general public upon the Army and upon the head of MacArthur himself.

The Bonus Army incident illuminates the political conservatism and intense anticommunism that would be consistent themes in MacArthur's long career. He was a die-hard Republican who cultivated a small but fervent following among members of the right-wing establishment in America. In 1944 and 1948, some of these supporters tried unsuccessfully to secure his nomination as the Republican presidential candidate. He never openly sought political office, but more than any serving senior officer since perhaps Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan during the Civil War, MacArthur's public profile and pronouncements seemed designed for a national political stage. Very often he looked and sounded more like a statesman than a general, leading many to suspect that he, in fact, harbored political ambitions.

Far Eastern General

In 1935 MacArthur stepped down as Army chief of staff and accepted an appointment in the Philippines as military adviser to the commonwealth government. In many ways he found this an ideal position. It enabled him to renew his family's long association with those islands, which had been his first posting after graduating from West Point. It appealed to his vanity and ego, particularly after the commonwealth government granted him the rank of field marshal, though his aide at the time, Dwight Eisenhower, privately regarded such a title as pompous and ridiculous given that the Philippines had no real army. Finally, his new position, in a remote but important outpost of American empire, provided him with a platform more suited to his

ambitions than a conventional stateside posting. Beginning with the Philippines, MacArthur would become America's preeminent "Far Eastern" general, shaping, and in many ways personifying, the U.S. relationship with Asia for two decades. He would do so not only on the battlefield, but also at times almost as an American proconsul in the region. For example, having defeated Japan in war, MacArthur presided from 1945 through 1950 over that country's occupation as the supreme commander for the Allied powers, a position that gave him viceroy-like authority to reconstruct Japanese society according to the U.S. government's dictates.

Throughout his career, MacArthur promoted his vision of a U.S. foreign policy centered on Asia and did everything within his power to reorient American priorities toward the Pacific—more specifically, toward the parts of the Pacific where he held command. In the late 1930s, in his role as military adviser to the Philippine government, MacArthur strove to change existing American war plans that wrote off the Philippines as indefensible in the event of a Japanese attack by creating a Filipino citizen army strong enough (with U.S. air and naval support) to resist an invasion. Such a force was nowhere near completion when the Japanese assault came in December 1941, and MacArthur's most powerful weapons, an impressive fleet of warplanes newly arrived from America, were destroyed on the ground in the early hours of the attack. MacArthur, who had been appointed the commanding general of U.S. Army forces in the Far East five months before Pearl Harbor, soon withdrew his American and Filipino forces to the Bataan Peninsula and the nearby island fortress of Corregidor, where their heroic endurance of the Japanese siege inspired the American public.

In March 1942, MacArthur—having become a national hero too valuable to fall into Japanese hands—was spirited from the Philippines to Australia, where a month later he was given command of the Southwest Pacific area, one half of the Pacific theater of operations. Command of the other half fell to Adm. Chester Nimitz of the U.S. Navy. Not surprisingly, MacArthur chafed within this divided command and constantly argued that Washington's resources and strategic emphasis should be concentrated on his own Southwest Pacific Area. Short-shrifted or not, MacArthur

did very well with what he had. Against formidable odds, forces under his command prevented the Japanese conquest of New Guinea in the summer of 1942, thereby helping to eliminate Japan's immediate threat to Australia. In the fall and winter of 1942 to 1943, MacArthur's forces launched a hard-slogging, high-casualty offensive in Papua New Guinea and achieved a decisive victory. The cost, however, led MacArthur to adopt an innovative pattern in later offensives: bold and aggressive use of air and sea power against the supply lines and bases of the enemy, and avoidance of direct assaults on enemy strongholds in favor of bypassing ("leapfrogging") and isolating them. In this way, Allied troops under MacArthur seized one Japanese-held island after another in their march toward what was the general's ultimate objective, the liberation of the Philippines.

Other American commanders and policy makers were less certain that the road to Japan inevitably passed through the Philippines. Nimitz and the Navy, for instance, believed Formosa (now Taiwan) would provide a better stepping-stone to the Japanese home islands. MacArthur, in typical fashion, used persuasion, politics, veiled threats to resign, and his own powerful public relations machine to convince his colleagues and superiors to support his agenda—which, in the case of the Philippines, bordered on a personal obsession. In October 1944, American troops, and MacArthur, landed at Leyte. In January 1945 Allied forces began the liberation of the main island of Luzon.

Apotheosis and Downfall

In December 1944 MacArthur received his 5th star and was given command of all U.S. Army units in the Pacific. Following Japan's capitulation, the general presided over the surrender ceremonies on the deck of the U.S. battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. For the next five years he supervised the economic and social reconstruction and political democratization of Japan, garnering almost universal acclaim for what many contemporaries regarded as a remarkably enlightened occupation. After an almost unbroken string of monumental triumphs since 1942, MacArthur's prestige and standing were perhaps at their highest point in the years between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War.

When communist North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, MacArthur was recalled to battlefield leadership. Appointed the commander of U.S. and United Nations forces in Korea, MacArthur quickly succeeded in halting the North Korean offensive, and then, in what is often judged to be the single most brilliantly conceived and executed military operation of his career, successfully conducted a bold and improbable amphibious landing at Inchon, behind the North Korean line of advance, that contributed decisively to the subsequent rout of North Korean forces in South Korea. As the triumphant U.S. and U.N. forces swept north of the 38th parallel into North Korea in the fall of 1950, however, they were attacked by hundreds of thousands of communist Chinese troops that poured across the border in a massive intervention that caught MacArthur and other U.S. leaders by surprise. As the Allied forces were sent reeling down the peninsula, MacArthur advocated aggressive countermeasures (including bombing targets inside China) that threatened to escalate the conflict into a full-scale war between the United States and China, one that might have resulted in direct Soviet intervention as well. When the Truman administration rejected MacArthur's proposals for widening the war, the general responded by publicly criticizing the president and the overall direction of administration policy in Asia. Truman found this intolerable; in April 1951, the president relieved MacArthur of command in Korea. Upon returning to the United States, the general received a hero's welcome and, in an address to a joint session of Congress, unwittingly provided the epitaph to his remarkable career by reminding the legislators that "Old soldiers never die; they just fade away."

The criticisms of the Truman administration that led to MacArthur's ultimate downfall were consistent with his often-expressed belief that Asia should be the highest priority of American foreign policy, and that Asia, rather than Europe, was the arena where the great contest between communism and democracy would be decided. They also exemplified certain flaws of MacArthur's character—including excessive ambition, vanity, hubris, and a tendency to conflate his own ideas and agendas with the good of the country—that ultimately undermined his gifts as a commander and ensured that he would remain one of the most colorful and controversial military icons within American society.

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Bonus March; Civil–Military Relations; Korean War; Truman, Harry S.; World War II

Related Documents

1932; 1951

—*Mark D. Sheftall*

Mahan, Alfred Thayer

(1840–1914)
Author and Naval Strategist

Alfred Thayer Mahan was a 19th-century naval officer who greatly influenced the modern U.S. Navy. Unlike most officers whose reputations were built at sea, Mahan's legacy was as an author and naval strategist.

Mahan was the son of Dennis Hart Mahan, the notable reformer of the United States Military Academy at West Point. The younger Mahan chose Annapolis instead and graduated second in the class of 1859. Like most officers who sided with the Union, he served in its naval blockade of the Confederacy during the Civil War. Although his service was undistinguished, Mahan's wartime experiences influenced his later writings on the importance of naval strength to national power.

Mahan served in a variety of ship billets after the war, but he never acquired a taste for sea duty. Recognizing that this limited his opportunities, he jumped at an invitation from Adm. Stephen Luce to join the faculty of the newly founded Naval War College in 1884. After Luce was recalled to an operational assignment in 1885, Mahan succeeded him as president of the college and helped keep the fledgling school operational. His faculty lectures on naval history were published in 1890 in a landmark book, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History*.

Mahan's reputation among modern historians is mixed. Many scholars have debunked his historical skills, arguing that his evidence does not sustain the sweep of his theories. However, recent work also casts Mahan in a more positive light by focusing on the legacy of his innovative, if somewhat flawed, ideas. Mahan was most interested in addressing far-reaching questions relating to national power and development, such as why some countries achieved prominence and what sustained their political and economic power.

Mahan insisted that the common thread was a strong navy. Throughout history, nations have looked to the oceans to build their economies and secure alliances. With rare exceptions, nations that lacked a strong navy had not withstood the test of time. Strong navies, on the other hand, protected nations from attack. The preeminent example Mahan used to support his theories was Great Britain. England built its empire's foundations on the strength of the Royal Navy. Its foremost rival, France, was a tremendous land power, but its navy was never strong enough to challenge England seriously beyond the European continent.

Mahan asserted that the United States could also become a world power, but only if the military embarked on

making critical changes. In his opinion, the country's naval strategy was woefully deficient. The Navy had directed most of its attention to coastal defense—it was a "brown-water" Navy. It did not have enough ships to maintain much "blue-water" presence (projecting the nation's diplomatic and economic interests overseas), so during wartime it focused on commerce raiding or single ship engagements. Mahan believed that such tactics violated the cardinal rules of warfare. He borrowed from Napoleon's ideas on land warfare—especially on the concentration of force and the design of decisive battles—in making his recommendations. England's mastery of the seas came from a concentrated battle fleet, which projected power over a wide radius. In wartime, Mahan argued, a navy's primary purpose was the destruction of the enemy's main battle fleet, after which it could blockade the enemy's coast or destroy its commerce to complete the victory.

Proponents of Mahan's theories used them to justify naval building programs both in the United States and around the world. The substance of his ideas was not necessarily new, but their cogency and eloquence made them persuasive even to civilians. Great Britain appreciated the credit he had given it, while Kaiser Wilhelm II made Mahan's book required reading in the German Navy. In the United States, Theodore Roosevelt was one of his greatest supporters.

The advance of Mahan's ideas coincided with a revolution in naval technology. Coal-fired, steam-powered generators were running most manufacturing plants in the mid-19th century, and most warships were equipped with steel-plated armor of varying thicknesses. At the turn of the century, however, navies experimented with new gun turret designs, communications, and electrical power systems to make their fleets more lethal. Battleships became the cornerstone of a modern fleet, epitomizing Mahan's concept of sea power. Countries were ranked on the number and quality of their battleships, although Mahan disagreed with officers like Adm. William Sims who used this as a call for larger artillery.

To some extent, Mahan's theories sparked the naval race between England and Germany before World War I. However, leaders of these countries failed to recognize the flaws in his ideas. Mahan did not place Britain's rise to power in its historical and geographical context. Although, in fairness, he cannot be faulted for failing to anticipate the impact of submarines or aircraft, his ideas did not address the question of new technologies. Finally, Mahan did not address the social or economic implications of naval expansion. Building a fleet of modern battleships was tremendously expensive. Given the investment, countries might hesitate risking them in battle, as the British and Germans did for much of World War I. Most of the actual fighting, as it turned out, occurred between smaller combatants and submarines.

Mahan wrote many other books and articles on naval history, often with similar themes. He also served as president of the American Historical Association in 1902. His involvement in nonmilitary activities made his career highly unusual. By and large, naval officers did not write books; they went to sea. If officers pursued additional schooling after Annapolis, it was technically focused for service in the Navy's bureaus. Mahan's stature and persona did not erase this anti-intellectual trend within the Navy, but his career did provide the service with an example of the importance of higher and continuing education.

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Related Entries

Gunboat Diplomacy; Mahan, Dennis Hart; Naval Academy; Naval War College; Roosevelt, Theodore

—Todd Forney

Mahan, Dennis Hart

(1802–71)
U.S. Military Academy Professor

Dennis Hart Mahan was the most influential American military thinker of the first half of the 19th century. His writings were the first significant attempt to make the principles that guided the Western way of war accessible to an American audience. In addition, his work as the preeminent member of the faculty at West Point and, more specifically, as professor of engineering and the art of war, played a significant role in shaping and fostering the professional sense that developed within the U.S. Army officer corps during the decades preceding the Civil War.

Mahan was born in New York City on April 2, 1802, although he spent most of his childhood in Norfolk, Virginia. Initially interested in a career in medicine, Mahan ultimately decided to enter the U.S. Military Academy in 1820 to take advantage of its courses in drawing, which he had become interested in while studying medicine. However, Mahan's affinity for mathematics quickly attracted the attention of the faculty, especially Superintendent Sylvanus Thayer; by the end of his second year at the Academy, Mahan was serving as a mathematics instructor.

Mahan graduated at the top of his class in 1824 and received a commission in the elite corps of engineers, but, at Thayer's suggestion, he remained at West Point as an instructor. Two years later, Thayer decided that Mahan should go to Europe to further his study of engineering. After a four-year stint in Europe, where he spent most of his time studying French military institutions, above all the School of Application for Artillerists and Engineers at Metz, Mahan returned to West Point in 1830. After a brief period as acting professor of civil and military engineering, he became a permanent professor in 1832 and soon thereafter modified his title to professor of engineering and the art of war.

When Mahan was a cadet at West Point, the antebellum Army was at the tail end of an era of reform whose objective included developing a greater sense of professionalism in the officer corps. As a member of the faculty at West Point, Mahan helped future officers gain a firm grounding in the technical aspects of war. He concluded that the literature on

this subject was insufficient for American officers to achieve the highest peak of professional development. Consequently, he produced a prodigious body of scholarship on military subjects that included *Complete Treatise on Field Fortifications* (1836), *Summary on the Cause of Permanent Fortifications and of the Attack and Defense of Permanent Works* (1850), and *An Elementary Course of Military Engineering* (2 vols., 1866–67). His most important and best-known work was *An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Outpost, and Detachment Service of Troops, With the Essential Principles of Strategy and Grand Tactics*. First published in 1847, this book—popularly known simply as *Outpost*—not only was used at West Point, but also became popular with American militia and volunteer units.

In addition to his accomplishments as a scholar, Mahan was recognized as the most important member of the faculty at antebellum West Point. Not only did his class in civil and military engineering become the capstone course for cadets, Mahan also quickly assumed leadership of the Academic Board that governed the Academy. Under Mahan's guidance, the board was a bastion of conservatism that resisted any challenges to the culture and curriculum that Thayer had established while superintendent.

Aloof, sarcastic, and quick to call attention to faults, Mahan was a demanding instructor who was respected but rarely loved by cadets. His methods were designed to instill intellectual discipline and an understanding of fundamental principles leavened by an appreciation of the need to apply them according to the dictates of common sense. Despite his accomplishments and reputation as a military thinker, Mahan's course focused mainly on civil engineering and the science of fortification with only nine hours devoted to the "science of war." Although the amount of formal course time dedicated to such topics as strategy, civil–military relations, and logistics was insufficient to provide cadets with more than a cursory introduction to these subjects, Mahan encouraged future officers to study military history so they could better understand his points about the principles of war and the need to apply them pragmatically. In line with this vision, Mahan presided over a "Napoleon Club" during the 1850s that was composed of junior officers stationed at West Point who studied the Napoleonic campaigns.

Despite his Virginia upbringing, Mahan never considered offering his services to the Confederacy. During the Civil War, which began in 1861, he naturally followed the course of the war closely and took great pride in seeing his former students achieve high commands in the Union and Confederate armies. Finally, in 1871, West Point's Board of Visitors advised the War Department that Mahan's age precluded his continuance on the staff at the Academy. Despondent at the prospect of retirement, Mahan committed suicide by jumping off a steamboat into the Hudson River on September 16, 1871.

Mahan clearly understood the unique cultural factors that would shape the conduct of war by American commanders, especially the close connection between war and society in a country that always relied heavily on citizen–soldiers in wartime. This was apparent in his advocacy of fortifications to avoid heavy casualties and the attendant arousal of popular passions that could compromise the ability of military professionals to execute war according to established principles. Nonetheless, his approach to war was more influenced by the rationalist spirit of the Enlightenment and the idea that specialized expertise was required to support the emerging professional ethic in Western armies, perspectives that clashed with the more democratic ethos that prevailed in American society. Consequently, although Mahan helped cadets gain an appreciation for the technical realities of war—a favorable development in the evolution of the U.S. Army officer corps—he also sowed the seeds for difficulties in civil–military relations.

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European Military Culture, Influence of; Mahan, Alfred Thayer; Military Academy, United States; Thayer, Sylvanus

—Ethan S. Rafuse

Manhattan Project

The United States was the first country to create a nuclear weapon and remains the only one to use such a weapon in war. The atomic bomb, and the government-appointed Manhattan Project that developed it, continues to provoke ambivalence among Americans more than 60 years later. On the one hand, many Americans regard the Manhattan Project as a testament to the country's "can do" spirit and ability to mobilize scientific and material resources. Moreover, it is certainly the case that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped end World War II. Yet, at the same time, it was impossible not to recognize that these events ushered the world into a somber new era in which, for the first time, humanity possessed the means to destroy itself.

In the first four decades of the 20th century, physicists began to unlock the mysteries of the atom. As their understanding of the atom's characteristics grew, so too did their sense that the atom's secrets might open the door to unheard-of potential for military and civil purposes. The theories and the experiments of the 1930s culminated in an experiment in December 1938 in which two German scientists, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman, managed to split uranium atoms and achieve the release of energy. Given Albert Einstein's equation of the relationship between matter and energy ($e = mc^2$) the splitting of atoms and the resulting release of energy had enormous implications.

In the United States, American and émigré scientists immediately understood the implications of the German success. In August 1939 Einstein wrote to Pres. Franklin Roosevelt to warn him that the Germans were on the track

of creating a super weapon. The U.S. government's response was initially meager: a paltry grant of $6,000 to Columbia University, which arrived in early 1940. But the fall of France and most of the rest of Western Europe to the Nazi Blitzkrieg in spring 1940 thoroughly alarmed the Roosevelt administration, and it secretly unleashed the vast resources of the U.S. government in a quest, code-named the Manhattan Project, to build an atomic bomb. The bomb's original target was Nazi Germany, believed to have a major atomic weapons program of its own. In fact, the German effort was highly tentative in nature and made little headway, in part because of Nazi contempt for "Jewish science."

Indeed, Nazi anti-Semitism helped ensure that the Manhattan Project could draw not only on American-born scientists, but also on a considerable number of Europe's greatest physicists, who had fled Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. Among a host of scientific talent, two nuclear physicists would play the crucial roles in developing the weapons: Enrico Fermi and Robert Oppenheimer. Fermi was not only a first-rate theorist, but also a brilliant experimental physicist. He had left Italy in December 1938 to accept an academic position in the United States. Under his leadership, scientists at the University of Chicago created the first nuclear chain reaction on December 2, 1942.

By that time, a massive scientific complex was well under construction at Los Alamos, New Mexico, where much of the core work of the Manhattan Project would be conducted. Major subsidiary plants were also built at Hanford, Washington, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The Hanford and Oak Ridge facilities provided the plutonium and uranium for the bombs that would be dropped on Japan. Overall management of the project fell to an Army engineer, Maj. Gen. Leslie Groves, who possessed extraordinary talents for organization and management. Groves provided the laboratories, the manufacturing facilities, and the work force that allowed the scientists to get on with their work. He also recognized talent, and in the development of the atomic bomb he recruited and supported Robert Oppenheimer, whom he noted might not have a Nobel Prize, but was nevertheless "a real genius."

One final piece was needed to create an atomic weapon: a device that could bring the uranium and plutonium to critical mass at the precise moment needed to destroy the target. The man tasked to solve this vital problem was U.S. Navy commander William S. "Deak" Parsons. Parsons had graduated from the Naval Academy in 1922 and had quickly established himself not only as an exceptional fleet officer, but also as a first-class technologist. In the 1930s he had played a major role in developing radar for the Navy. In September 1939 he had been assigned to the Naval Proving Grounds, where he was the leading figure in developing the "proximity fuse" for antiaircraft shells.

The task Parsons confronted was immense. Ultimately his team of engineers came up with two different design concepts. The first involved constructing what was quite literally a gun inside the bomb. This gun would fire a small amount of fissionable material into a larger amount. When combined, the two would yield the critical mass known to generate an instant, explosive atomic chain reaction. The second concept involved a spherical design that would implode. It would use the explosive force on the outer sphere to force the fissionable material into a critical mass within the weapon. Both approaches involved extensive design and engineering problems that at times seemed nearly insurmountable. An early drop test of the "little boy" (the gun design) was characterized as "an ominous and spectacular failure." Moreover, the weapons design had to include close work with specially designed B-29s to ensure that the entire weapon would work from initial drop to detonation without destroying the aircraft that carried it. In this highly technical work, Parsons was the key player. On July 16, 1945, the "fat man" (the spherical design) was tested in New Mexico. Groves and Oppenheimer expressed some fear that if it did not work, they would have some explaining to do before Congress. Parsons observed the explosion from the air. "Fat man" worked. The atomic age was born.

Despite massive efforts, the bomb was not ready in time for use against Germany, which surrendered on May 8, 1945. The question then became whether such weapons should be used against the Japanese. The Manhattan Project scientists themselves debated this question. A few even suggested that the American government should provide the Japanese government with a demonstration of the bomb's power. But in the end, policy makers and military leaders, concerned that

J. Robert Oppenheimer (left) with Maj. Gen. Leslie Groves at the Alamogordo, New Mexico, test site for the atomic bomb. They are standing at what remains of the steel tower that supported the bomb. (Getty Images)

such a demonstration might not work, concluded that the first use of the weapon should be in combat.

On August 6, 1945, the first bomb—a "little boy" design—was dropped on Hiroshima, a major port city chosen because it had suffered little damage from previous bombing. It was therefore thought that it would best demonstrate the bomb's unprecedented destructive power. At least 70,000 people were killed by the blast. Many thousands more perished later from injuries or radiation sickness. Three days later the only remaining atomic bomb in existence—a "fat man" design—fell on Nagasaki. At least 35,000 died immediately after the blast.

Then and later, the decision to drop atomic bombs was controversial. A number of historians have argued that the Japanese government was on the verge of surrender in summer 1945. In fact, the peace feelers sent out to the Japanese embassy in Moscow by a small group within the Japanese foreign office did not represent the actual attitudes of the

Japanese military leaders who maintained an iron hand over the governance of Japan. The attitude of Japan's military leaders was that their honor, according to the code of Bushido, demanded a suicidal defense of the Japanese home islands. Even the most realistic among Japanese military leaders believed that only a fanatical defense against an American invasion would earn Japan better terms.

What makes the dropping of the bombs appear the least unattractive alternative is that the other courses of action would likely have resulted in even worse outcomes. At the same time that the atomic bombs were dropped, American air, sea, and land forces were gathering on Okinawa and elsewhere in the Pacific for a massive invasion of Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's major islands. That invasion, code-named Olympic, was scheduled for November 1, 1945. Initial planning estimates placed American casualties in the invasion at between 25,000 and 40,000. This estimate was based on the fact that Magic (code name for intelligence gathered from decryption and translation of Japanese military transmissions) indicated that the Japanese had approximately 150,000 troops on the island at that time, and on extrapolations from the casualties that American troops had suffered in the fighting on Okinawa. But by late July, further decrypts indicated that the number of Japanese defenders had risen to nearly half a million and was still growing. Thus, American casualties would likely have been far higher than the initial estimates.

Confronted by such numbers, it appears that Adm. Ernest King, the chief of naval operations, was about to recommend canceling Olympic in favor of a blockade of the Japanese home islands. Considering that much of Japan's population was already on the brink of starvation, while its leaders were displaying no disposition to surrender, such an approach would have lowered American casualties had the war continued, but it would certainly have imposed terrible suffering on the Japanese people. That suffering would have been exacerbated by the fact that B-29 bombers, having destroyed most of Japan's cities by summer 1945, were about to switch their emphasis to Japan's transportation network, the destruction of which would have made the distribution of food supplies throughout the home islands impossible. The result would have been mass starvation throughout the home islands that would have led to the deaths of millions of civilians.

The new American president, Harry S. Truman, had few doubts about whether the United States should use the new weapons to bring the war to a conclusion. He had served as a combat officer during World War I; thus, the terrible casualties suffered by American soldiers and marines on Okinawa and Iwo Jima carried a visceral meaning to the president. Moreover, at the time no one, not even the scientists, understood the terrible long-term effects that the radiation accompanying the use of such weapons would have. Thus, the American leadership decided on using the bombs against Japan.

The response of Japan's military leaders to the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima suggests why the dropping of a second bomb was necessary. Most minimized the attack. The chief of the naval general staff suggested that America could possess only a few such weapons, while international opinion would prevent the Americans from perpetrating another such horror. The dropping of the second bomb on Nagasaki proved otherwise. Still the military leadership refused to advise surrender. Nevertheless, a tie vote among his counselors allowed Emperor Hirohito to step in and make the decision to surrender on his own. Thus, Japan and the United States were saved from further terrible bloodletting.

The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki may have had important consequences other than to end World War II. As the examination of the wreckage left in the wake of the bombs as well as continuing deaths from the long-term effects of radiation slowly worked into the consciousness of scientists, political leaders, and the public, the true horror of nuclear weapons unfolded. That understanding may well have prevented the use of nuclear weapons by either the Soviets or the Americans during the Cold War.

Even so, the atomic bombing of Japan has remained a controversial issue that excites strong passions on both sides. A 1994 controversy over how the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum should represent that attack, centering on an exhibition of the refurbished B-29 *Enola Gay* to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, made national headlines as veterans, peace activists, and historians clashed repeatedly. In the end, the Smithsonian largely scrapped the interpretive dimensions of the exhibition. Half a century after the event, the Manhattan Project and atomic bomb remained volatile subjects.

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Aerial Bombardment; Cold War; *Enola Gay* Controversy; *Hiroshima*; Oppenheimer, J. Robert; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.; World War II

Related Documents

1944 b; 1946 b

—*Williamson Murray*

Marine Corps

Born in the American Revolution, tempered in World War I, and raised to the status of national icon in World War II, the U.S. Marine Corps is an air–ground expeditionary force designed to seize advanced air and naval bases when necessary

and to capture ports and beaches as the prelude for extended land campaigns by American air forces and armies. If directed by the president, the Marine Corps can execute nearly any military operation except the conduct of nuclear warfare. By law its operational forces are built around three ground divisions and three aircraft wings of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.

The Marine Corps' history divides into four historical eras, each defined by principal military functions: (1) service at sea aboard U.S. Navy warships, 1775 to 1898; (2) service as expeditionary ground forces of infantry and light artillery to protect American lives and property in foreign lands and, upon occasion, to undertake reformist imperialism through military pacification and occupation, 1898 to 1941; (3) development and employment as a wartime expeditionary force for amphibious operations as part of a naval campaign conducted by the U.S. Navy, presumably against Japan, and for the defense and seizure of advanced naval and air bases, 1910 to 1945; and (4) creation of the amphibious forces for operations to support the Cold War strategy of forward, collective defense and for participation in extended land campaigns in Korea and Vietnam as well as campaigns outside the Cold War context in Panama, Lebanon, Haiti, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq. For its ability to respond quickly to emergencies, the Marine Corps envisions itself as the "nation's 911 force-in-readiness."

Soldiers at Sea

Influenced by the Royal Navy's marines of the 18th century, the Continental Congress and its congressional successor under the Constitution of 1787 provided the warships of the Continental Navy (1775–83) and the U.S. Navy (1794–present) with detachments of marines for routine shipboard duties (to prevent or suppress mutinies, to enforce ship regulations) and for combatant functions like firing muskets from "the fighting tops" or sail platforms, manning guns in an emergency, and leading boarding parties and raids against shoreline objectives. The Continental Marines, authorized by Congress on November 10, 1775, never exceeded 2,000 officers and men and did not play an important role in the Revolution. Nevertheless, ships' guards did participate in the few ship-to-ship engagements of the sea war, formed two small battalions for naval expeditions against British posts in

the Caribbean and Canada, and participated in one campaign (at Princeton, 1777) with the Continental Army. A force recruited and deployed for local missions and single ship cruises, the Continental Marines disappeared with the Continental Navy at war's end.

Convinced that the new nation required a navy to combat pirate operations in the Mediterranean and to deter an Anglo–French naval war against "neutral" maritime commerce in the Caribbean, Congress reestablished the Navy in 1794 by authorizing the building of six new frigates and the commissioning of lesser warships. The Naval Act of 1794 provided that large warships would have marine ships' guards; another act, the Naval Act of July 11, 1798, designated these guards as a "Corps of Marines." The Act of 1798, refined by the Marine Corps Act of 1834, made the U.S. Marine Corps a separate service within the Department of the Navy. The operational control of marine ships' guards and detachments at naval stations (marine barracks) rested with the senior naval officer in command. A senior Marine Corps officer, however, designated the commandant, would serve as the commanding officer of all marines for recruiting, training, support, discipline, administration, and related administrative matters as defined by Congress. Members of the Marine Corps would govern themselves ashore by the Articles of War (U.S. Army) and at sea by naval regulations; any confusions (and they were many) were adjudicated by the secretary of the Navy and Congress.

The only claim the Marine Corps could make to elite status throughout the 19th century stemmed from its being the smallest of the armed forces, reaching only around 3,000 during the Civil War and 4,800 in the 1898 Spanish–American War. For most of the pre–Civil War period, the Corps numbered around 2,000 officers and enlisted men, but almost doubled in size after the Civil War when the Navy began a fleet modernization and expansion program in the 1880s. Driven by a few senior officers, however, the Marine Corps tried to develop a reputation for smart appearance, strict discipline, a high state of training, and bravery in combat. The Corps profited from the service of Archibald Henderson as commandant, because Henderson tied the Corps' well-being to a favored relationship with Congress. When presidents from Andrew Jackson to Theodore Roosevelt questioned the

Corps' existence, Congress raced to the rescue, even defying the recommendations of the Department of the Navy for reducing the Corps' independent status.

Henderson and his successors as commandant ensured that marines appeared in almost every battlefield and sea engagement fought by Americans in the 19th century—a century of national expansion. Marines fought from ship masts and in boarding parties in engagements with the Barbary pirates and the French and English navies between 1796 and 1815. One small detachment participated in the seizure of Derna in Libya and the capture of Mexico City in 1847 (references to which are made in the opening of the "Marine's Hymn": "From the halls of Montezuma/to the shores of Tripoli"). Small detachments fought the British at Bladensburg, Maryland, (1814) and at New Orleans (1815) with distinction. Henderson himself led battalions against the Creek and Seminole in the 1830s. Marines assaulted the Harpers Ferry firehouse to capture John Brown and destroy his abolitionist army. Marines appeared on the battlefields of Bull Run and Fort Fisher in the Civil War. During the Mexican War, marine landing parties captured ports on both the Pacific and Gulf coasts as part of the naval blockade. Marines fought pirates and mobs in Algeria, Sumatra, Korea, Formosa (now Taiwan), Samoa, Egypt, Panama, and in several American cities, including Washington, D.C. The post–Civil War Marine Corps, influenced by a handful of progressive officers, followed U.S. Army reforms in training, marksmanship, officer education, tactics, and planning. Aware of the advantages of real elitism—as opposed to posturing elitism—Marine Corps officers of the late 19th century focused on finding a wartime mission that the Navy and the nation required.

Colonial Infantry

Marines also became "State Department troops" after the war with Spain. Some marines liked the role of colonial infantry, shared with the U.S. Army, because they wanted to widen the institutional gap between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Colonial policing in the Philippines, China, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic had its attractions: exotic adventure, generally favorable newspaper publicity, no great risk of crippling casualties (only 100

deaths in combat), active operations and leadership opportunities for junior officers and noncommissioned officers, and double pay and advanced rank in the constabularies formed by the occupation officials in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, colonial service had its perils: hideous death at the hands of the outraged inhabitants of occupied lands, terminal and crippling illnesses, boredom and drunkenness, press criticism for atrocities real and imagined, family separations or primitive living abroad, and a high level of frustration with American policy, whether set by the State Department or Navy Department. The colonial infantry experience, especially the heroics of marines in the suppression of the Boxer Uprising in China in 1900, brought the Marine Corps into the public consciousness and allowed an expanded Corps (11,000 officers and men by 1916) to be recruited throughout the United States with higher enlistment standards.

The Marine Corps of the colonial infantry years, however, managed to maintain its love affair with Congress and the public, even when some of its members embarrassed the Corps with war crimes and callous leadership. The Navy insisted that the "State Department" Marine Corps needed to surrender its role as ships' guards and focus on training for a wartime mission centered on the defense and capture of advanced fleet bases. A marine battalion demonstrated the utility of such training when it secured a fleet anchorage at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1898 during the naval blockade of Cuba's southern coast. The subsequent extension of an American military presence to the Philippines, Guam, Cuba, China, Hawaii, the Canal Zone in Panama, and the Virgin Islands awakened the Navy to the fact that it could not protect these new possessions or spheres of interest (such as the Caribbean Basin) without operating bases. Neither the Navy nor Congress was eager to assume the cost of building and defending major foreign bases. The alternative to permanent bases was to prepare to seize and build operating bases and then defend them from naval and air attack. The force for such missions had to be larger and more technically advanced than colonial infantry because it would have heavy artillery, antiaircraft artillery, engineering and communications battalions, and its own aviation. The Navy's admirals, in league with a clique of Naval Academy–trained Marine

Corps generals, worked to pass off the colonial infantry mission to the Army and to make the Marine Corps an expeditionary advanced base force.

Amphibious Assault Force

Although the Marine Corps conducted advanced base planning for operations before World War I, that war created a new strategic context that gave the Corps a true claim to military innovation and operational distinctiveness. From an expeditionary force of a fixed defense regiment, mobile defense regiment, and aviation detachment of 1916, War Plan Orange, the contingency plan for a Pacific War, envisioned a Fleet Marine Force by 1940 of at least 2 assault divisions, 2 complementary aircraft wings, and at least 10 defense battalions of heavy seacoast and antiaircraft artillery—a fivefold expansion of the 1916 Corps that would include 28,000 officers and enlisted men.

The creation of the Fleet Marine Force passed through several historical turning points in just 20 years. World War I produced two effects, the first being the combat reputation and all-arms experience gained in France in 1918. Not another single brigade—among the some 40 other World War I infantry brigades—received as much favorable publicity. Marine officers learned how deadly modern combat could be: 2,457 combat deaths and 18,894 wounded in a brigade whose authorized wartime strength was 8,000 marines. Marines saw the defensive power of machine guns, obstacles, and field artillery. They also flew bombing missions. The second influence was Japan's success in taking and holding German islands across the central Pacific—the Palaus, Saipan, and Tinian in the Marianas, as well as the Carolines. The 1920 revision of War Plan Orange recognized the new menace these islands posed as fortified air and naval bases for the Imperial Japanese Navy Combined Fleet. The U.S. Navy had little confidence that the Washington treaties of naval limitation and Asia–Pacific nonaggression (1922) would last. As directed by the General Board, the Navy's planners, Commandant John A. Lejeune directed the Marine Corps to train for amphibious assaults. Maj. Earl H. Ellis gave concrete form to Lejeune's concepts in Operations Plan 712, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia (1921).

For 20 years, despite brigade commitments to Nicaragua and China, the Marine Corps placed primary emphasis on developing amphibious tactics and techniques for landings where they would face armed resistance. Modest exercises in the early-to-mid-1920s dramatized the lack of adequate landing craft, light artillery, tanks, engineering equipment, and radios. The only hope for fire superiority in the ship-to-shore movement was naval gunfire and close air support. With few units available for experimentation, the faculty and students of the Marine Corps schools turned to war games and studies, drawn together in 1934 as the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*, the bible for amphibious operations that was adopted as doctrine by both the Navy and Army. With troops available in 1934, the Navy conducted annual fleet landing exercises for the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), one brigade on each coast. Before U.S. entry into World War II in 1941, the FMF had found a good landing craft with a bow ramp. The Higgins boat developed by Andrew J. Higgins of New Orleans, who developed an amphibian tractor to climb over reefs, incorporated the Army's light 75 mm. and 105 mm. howitzers, and worked out some techniques for directing naval gunfire and close air support strikes. Marine aviation groups and defense battalions assumed the defense of island bases already in American hands, which put them in the front lines of 1941 and 1942 in the Philippines, Guam, Peiking (Beijing), Wake Island, and Midway Island.

The wartime Fleet Marine Force (1941–45) proved that the Marine Corps could expand and fight a mass, industrialized war without compromising its elite standards. In fact, the Asia–Pacific war ensured that marines would seize the public imagination and define "uncommon courage" as "a common virtue," as claimed by Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, the Navy's senior theater commander. Instead of a 100,000-man force, the FMF became six divisions and four aircraft wings of almost 669,000 officers and enlisted men. Almost one-fifth of this force became casualties, though this was still a lower casualty rate than those of bomber and submarine forces during World War II. From the rigors of boot camp and officer candidate schools, wartime marines, commanded by senior officers tested in France and the Caribbean, fought their way through the Solomons and Cape Britain Island (from 1942 through 1944), isolating the Japanese base

of Rabaul and eroding scarce Japanese air and naval forces. The FMF's focus shifted to the Central Pacific with the assault on Tarawa Atoll in November 1943, the first amphibious assault upon a prepared defense.

From Tarawa to Okinawa (April 1945), marine divisions proved that no Japanese ground force defense could stop the FMF. No landing (except uncontested Okinawa) was perfect, no follow-up campaign error-free. Refinements in air and artillery support—with the stress on careful, precision strikes—characterized the atoll battles in the Gilberts and Marshalls. The victories in the Marianas (Saipan, Tinian, and Guam) showed the FMF's crushing power in protracted land campaigns, especially when marine air forces arrived on captured airfields. Marines on Peleliu and Iwo Jima showed that they could overcome the most deadly and sophisticated positional defenses, which had been manned by die-hard Japanese veterans. The Okinawa campaign resembled the marine ordeals in 1918, but the Japanese defenders could not lengthen the campaign to their strategic advantage. At war's end, four marine divisions went to China and Japan to secure the surrender. The Marine Corps had become one of the most visible participants in defeating Japan, and the Army used its doctrine in landings in Africa, the Mediterranean, and France.

Force-in-Readiness

Its War Plan Orange mission accomplished, the U.S. Marine Corps faced a new obstacle—peacetime economizing and the shift of national strategic emphasis from naval forces to a nuclear-armed U.S. Air Force. Although the nation's security policy stressed forward, collective defense such as the NATO Alliance (1949), nuclear deterrence monopolized defense spending, slashed from $42 billion (1946) to $13 billion (1950). The postwar FMF retained two divisions and two aircraft wings, but none of these could be fully manned on a troop base of 75,000. The National Security Act of 1947 ensured that the Marine Corps would have primacy in the development and operations of amphibious warfare, but budget constraints and the assumption that air strikes, nuclear or not, would endanger a massed amphibious task force put the Fleet Marine Force at risk. The one major FMF innovation was experimenting with helicopters as an alternative to landing craft, the birth of "vertical envelopment" doctrine.

The Korean War brought new life to the Marine Corps as part of a national military mobilization. Only by calling up some 80,000 reservists could the Marine Corps send a full division (the 1st) and aircraft wing (the 1st) to Korea, where both served with distinction. By 1953 the Marine Corps reached a strength of 250,000 officers and enlisted personnel (women marines became a permanent part of the Corps in 1947) in three divisions and three aircraft wings, established by Public Law 416 (the Douglas–Mansfield Act, June 1952). In the Korean War era, 424,000 marines served in the war zone with 30,544 casualties. The new 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing remained in Japan after the war. As part of the more robust forward, collective defense of the 1950s, the Marine Corps created and supported small marine corps for South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Taiwan. As for the war itself, Marine Corps operations proved the lethality of close ground–air cooperation, now enhanced by helicopter assaults and soon adopted as "airmobility" by the U.S. Army. Traditional marine fighting skills made history at the Inchon landing and the liberation of Seoul (September 1950) and the dramatic withdrawal from the "Chosin" (Changjin) Reservoir.

Even with some budget and force reductions dictated by Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower's "new look" defense policy, the Marine Corps used its enhanced stature to develop the FMF's air–ground task forces. The Navy also began a continuous program of amphibious ship construction that led to the creation of large carrier-type assault ships capable of launching helicopters and amphibian tractors and landing craft simultaneously. The most striking innovations were air assault and troop transport helicopters, the vertical takeoff and landing AV-8 "Harrier" aircraft, a versatile wheeled light armored vehicle (LAAV), frequency-hopping secure radios, and a new family of amphibian tractors. To ensure interoperability and a place in NATO war plans, the Marine Corps accepted Army tanks, artillery, vehicles, and ordnance even though their weight created landing challenges. The heaviest load, however, was the challenge presented by the war in Vietnam.

Unlike earlier wars, the Vietnam War weakened the Marine Corps, halting a decade of modernization. That war turned marines in the public imagination from selfless heroes to racist, drug-ridden murderers. In fact, ground and air marines fought well to hold South Vietnam's five northern-most provinces, targets of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) operations and guerrilla warfare. The bulk of the FMF—two ground divisions (plus two wartime regiments) and a reinforced aircraft wing— became the III Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam, although it would conduct little amphibious warfare. Instead, the 3rd Marine Division (Reinforced) fought a conventional war along the 17th parallel against NVA raiders, the most notable engagement at Khe Sanh, while the 1st Marine Division battled guerrillas in the populated areas and countered other incursions from Laos. To support this commitment—and compensate for 103,453 casualties—the Corps expanded from 190,000 to 310,000 without a reserve mobilization, which had been rejected by Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson. Draftees and temporary officers, as well as subpar recruits forced upon the Corps by Sec. of Defense Robert S. McNamara, produced difficult leadership problems, which deepened after 1969 by increasing drug use and racial incidents. The war brought 391,000 marines to Vietnam, one-third of whom became casualties. Leaving Vietnam by the end of 1971 represented a command decision by senior leaders to save the Marine Corps if they couldn't save Vietnam.

After a difficult decade of postwar readjustment, the Marine Corps returned to its "911" role of forward deployed, sea-based emergency force. Between 1981 and 2002, FMF units from battalion to corps strength performed peacekeeping missions in Lebanon, Somalia, Liberia, El Salvador, East Timor, Panama, Kuwait, Grenada, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan. In these varied and sometimes controversial operations, 301 marines died and 261 were wounded in combat, the worst event being the death of 238 marines in a terrorist bombing in Beirut, Lebanon (October 1983). The Marine Corps retained its ability to conduct opposed amphibious operations, but its training tilted to counterterrorism and urban operations after the Gulf War in 1991. It also stressed greater firepower and

target acquisition technology for its infantry and mounted forces. The Marine Corps intends to use its few good men and women with minimal risk to itself and maximum danger to the nation's enemies, whoever they may be.

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—*Allan R. Millett*

Marshall, George Catlett

(1880–1959)
Military and Diplomatic Leader, Nobel Peace Prize Winner

As head of the U.S. Army between September 1939 and November 1945, George C. Marshall played a leading role in mobilizing the ground and air forces for World War II, conducting a two-front, multitheater coalition war against the Axis powers, arranging for demobilization, and designing a postwar military establishment. A man of great public stature and considerable diplomatic skill, Marshall was selected by Pres. Harry S. Truman in late 1945 to attempt to mediate the civil war in China. As secretary of state, he proposed and vigorously lobbied for the massive congressional foreign aid package that became known as the Marshall Plan. Beginning in September 1950, shortly after the start of the Korean War, he spent a year as head of the Defense Department.

Early Career
Marshall was born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, on the last day of 1880 to parents with extensive family roots in Kentucky and Virginia. He matriculated at the Virginia Military Institute in September 1897 and attained the highest cadet rank available to him every year. Scholastically, he finished in the middle of his class, graduating in 1901 with a degree in civil engineering. The Spanish–American War convinced him to seek a career in the Army; and he served in the Philippines from 1902 to 1903. In 1906, he was chosen to attend the Army school at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Having been the top student for two years, he was made an instructor for two more years. He served as instructor for various National Guard units (1907–12 and 1933–36), earning a reputation as a friend of the Guard that would prove useful during the mobilization of 1940 to 1942.

In June 1917, he became the First Division's chief of operations and training. In July 1918, he moved to the headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces as assistant chief of planning. He planned the first independent American raid at Cantigny, France (May 1918), and was head of the team planning the St. Mihiel and Meuse–Argonne offensives that were carried out from September through November of 1918. He drew important lessons from his World War I experiences that influenced the conduct of the 1940 to 1942 mobilization and the planning for the post–World War II military.

Between May 1919 and June 1924, Marshall was an aide to Gen. John J. Pershing. In the mid-1920s, he was stationed for three years in Tientsin, China. Between 1927 and 1932, he served as chief of instruction at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, where he gradually reformed the school's faculty and methodology to emphasize simplicity, individual initiative, and the leader's need to operate under conditions of mobile warfare with imperfect knowledge of the battlefield and the enemy. During the 1930s, Marshall headed three Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) districts, where he espoused greater use of reserve officers to assist the Army and sought to facilitate educational programs for CCC men.

In July 1938, Marshall returned to the War Department as head of the War Plans Division, and in October he was made deputy chief of staff. Marshall became friends with Harry L. Hopkins, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt's key adviser, and Frank M. Andrews, who commanded GHQ Air Force. They, together with Henry H. Arnold, chief of the Army Air Corps, undertook to educate Marshall in air power ideas and values. Later, Marshall would make certain that airmen were chosen for significant General Staff positions.

Role as Army Chief of Staff
In April 1939, Roosevelt chose Marshall to be Army chief of staff, effective September 1. The U.S. Army (which

included the air forces) was small—about 190,000 plus reserves, roughly 20th in size in the world—and mainly equipped with World War I–era weapons and ideas. Roosevelt was more concerned with matériel production and the Navy than with the Army, and he did not wish to create the more than 200 division ground force that Marshall believed necessary to defeat the German Army. After a number of reevaluations, in early 1944 Marshall decided to gamble that 90 combat divisions would be sufficient for victory. He was correct, as it turned out.

A firm believer in civilian control of the military, Marshall was loyal to the commander in chief and unwilling to seek to overturn administration policies with which he disagreed by secretly going to Congress or the press. Marshall's rapport with Congress was excellent, but he made little headway within its chambers with getting significantly larger funding for mobilization until the fall of France.

Marshall favored a strategy of defeating Germany first while trying to hold the line against Japan in the Pacific. The U.S. Navy preferred a more aggressive policy in the Pacific, and Marshall tended to follow the Navy's strategic lead in that theater. In 1942, he believed that the Allies should prepare for a 1943 invasion of northwest France, fearing that a move into the Mediterranean, as the British desired, would delay the cross-Channel invasion, involve U.S. forces in a peripheral theater, and divide Allied resources. Roosevelt agreed with the British on a North African invasion in 1942. Marshall continued to insist that the buildup in Britain for the cross-Channel invasion was the key to Anglo–American strategy, but he overestimated the quality of the training and experience his ground forces had acquired by 1942, and events demonstrated that the North African campaign was a necessary precondition to the campaign in Western Europe.

By mid-1943, British prime minister Winston Churchill and Roosevelt were generally agreed that Marshall would lead the 1944 cross-Channel invasion and Marshall's protégé, Dwight D. Eisenhower, would return to become chief of staff. Marshall, however, refused to ask for the job, insisting that the president do what he thought best. At the second Cairo Conference in early December 1943, Roosevelt told Marshall that he "could not sleep at night with you out of

George C. Marshall speaking after receiving the Oak Leaf Cluster medal from President Truman. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

the country." (Bland and Stevens, 3:195.) Eisenhower became supreme Allied commander in Europe while Marshall continued to run the majority of the military effort from the Pentagon.

As Army chief of staff, Marshall oversaw the Manhattan Project, which developed the nuclear bomb. His normal method of operating was to secure superior subordinates to run specific projects—e.g., Oveta Culp Hobby for the Women's Army Corps or Leslie R. Groves for the atomic bomb—and then to avoid micromanaging them while protecting them politically and administratively. Determined to end the war quickly and keep U.S. casualties as low as possible, Marshall supported the strategic bombing campaigns and the use of atomic bombs on Japan.

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Marshall's Roles after 1945

In December 1945, President Truman sent Marshall to China to attempt to negotiate a settlement to the civil war between nationalists and communists, which threatened to destroy China and to encourage Soviet interference. To everyone's surprise, Marshall negotiated a cease-fire on January 10, 1946, and a February 25 agreement to demobilize and reorganize the military forces in the country. Both sides believed that fighting was in their interests, however, and the agreements broke down in April and May. Marshall repeatedly warned China's leader, Chiang Kai-shek, that governmental and military reforms were necessary, because the nationalists could not defeat the communists by military action alone. Marshall left China on January 8, 1947, to take the job of secretary of state on January 21.

Republican Party domination of both houses of Congress necessitated Marshall adopting a nonpartisan approach to foreign policy. He reorganized the State Department's bureaucracy and returned the department to a prominent role in policy making. He supported Truman's efforts to contain the military's tendency to expand its funding and the number of its overseas bases. Marshall encouraged West European nations in their self-defense efforts and considered himself one of the instigators of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He is best remembered, however, for his proposal of the European Recovery Program, an aid program designed to reconstruct the economies of postwar Europe. He was so influential in the program's development and administration that it came to be known as the Marshall Plan.

After a brief retirement and a stint as head of the American Red Cross (1949–50), Marshall became secretary of defense in September 1950. His chief job was to complete the mobilization for the Korean War. He sided with the president in his clash with theater commander Gen. Douglas MacArthur over the latter's belief in widening the war and the issue of military subordination to civilian authority. MacArthur was relieved of command in April 1951. Once the allied position in Korea had stabilized, Marshall retired from public office for the last time in September 1951.

Marshall's last major public appearance was in December 1953, when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize for America's Marshall Plan efforts. He died on October 16, 1959, and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

George C. Marshall was one of the most important soldier–statesmen of the 20th century. Winston Churchill called him the true organizer of Allied victory in World War II. His ability to pick good subordinates—and willingness to listen to and trust them—was exceptional. He consistently demonstrated a willingness to take a historically informed view of contemporary developments, to consider the other person's situation and viewpoint, to strive for organizational balance and efficiency, and to emphasize the primacy of civilians in civil–military relationships. He disliked war and was a vigorous proponent of collective security and the United Nations. Marshall was a soldier of peace.

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—Larry I. Bland

Marshall Plan

The European Recovery Program—popularly known as the Marshall Plan, after Sec. of State George C. Marshall who made the first public announcement of it in a speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947—is generally regarded as one of the most successful U.S. government initiatives of the 20th century. The program's $11.8 billion in grants and $1.5 billion in loans over nearly four years were intended to shore up Western Europe's economy following the devastation of World War II, restore international trade, and to undermine the appeal of communism in Europe. Its economic impact was moderate over the whole period but crucial in the first year (1948); equally important was its psychological effect on European populations.

Origins of the Plan

The U.S. wartime lend–lease program had pumped $3.7 billion into France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Norway, and Iceland, plus much more into Great Britain, mostly for war-related materials, but a significant amount was granted for civilian supplies. That program ended shortly after victory was declared in Europe, and subsequent U.S. foreign aid was negotiated with European nations bilaterally. Between July 1945 and March 1948, the United States gave or lent $7.3 billion to 11 West European nations, including Austria and Germany. In addition, money for various civilian relief purposes in the U.S. occupation zones of Austria and Germany came from the U.S. Army's budget.

Despite American aid, Europe continued to deteriorate economically. France argued for detachment from Germany of the key industrial areas of the Ruhr, Saar, and Rhineland. The key source of energy, coal (especially from German mines), was in short supply. Farmers had no confidence in the value of local currencies, had few consumer goods available to purchase, and were consequently reluctant to supply food. Western European economies were running serious balance of payments deficits, and their citizens' ability to trade internationally was rapidly declining.

Soviet–American relations had deteriorated after 1945, and the United States felt compelled to step in when Great Britain announced in February 1947 that it could no longer afford to support the governments of Greece (involved in a civil war with communist rebels) and Turkey (being threatened by the Soviet Union). "It is not alarmist," Marshall told a February 27 meeting of congressional leaders, "to say that we are faced with the first crisis of a series which might extend Soviet domination to Europe, the Middle East and Asia." (Department of State, 5:61.) Pres. Harry S. Truman's March 12 Truman Doctrine speech resulted in a congressional appropriation of $400 million in U.S. aid for Greece and Turkey. After 43 fruitless meetings in Moscow between March 10 and April 24 with the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, Marshall came away with a greater appreciation of the political and economic plight of most of Europe and a conviction that the Soviets were expecting to reap political benefits from the increasing social and economic misery.

By the spring of 1947, many American observers (e.g., George F. Kennan, head of the State Department's new Policy Planning Staff, and William L. Clayton, under secretary of state for economic affairs) had to admit that they had grossly underestimated the degree of destruction Europe's economy had suffered from the war. By the end of May, Marshall's advisers agreed on three points: (1) the United States had to commit a large amount of grant funds over several years; (2) the European nations had to take collective initiative to identify needs and coordinate policies; (3) the offer had to be made to all European states to avoid the implication that the United States sought to divide Europe into American and Soviet blocs, although the assumption was that the Soviets would never accept economic conditions such as openness, free trade, and American supervision.

Marshall decided upon Harvard University on June 5 as the best place and time to make a speech on Europe, and he hurriedly arranged to receive a long-delayed honorary degree from that school. His speech was deliberately low-key: no

master plan was enunciated nor were potential domestic enemies galvanized to mobilize against foreign aid.

Upon hearing about Marshall's speech, British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin contacted French foreign minister Georges Bidault and arranged for talks to open on June 17. Two days later, Bevin and Bidault invited Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov to join them in Paris on June 27 to prepare a response. The Soviet Union, however, did not wish to undermine its newly created economic sphere of interest in

Eastern Europe, become dependent on the West for manufactured goods, or permit a supranational body to determine priorities and quotas for the communist bloc. Charging that the Marshall Plan was merely American economic imperialism, Molotov left the meetings on July 2. The following day, Bidault and Bevin issued invitations to 22 additional European nations to meet in Paris for discussions. Two days later, 16 nations— Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,

U.S. Economic Assistance under the European Recovery Program

Iceland
29.3

Norway
255.3

Sweden
107.3

United Kingdom
3,189.8

Denmark
273.0

Ireland
147.5

Netherlands
1,083.5

Belgium-Luxembourg
559.3

Germany, Fed. Repub.
1,390.6

France
2,713.6

Austria
677.8

Portugal
51.2

Total economic assistance,
April 3, 1948–December 31, 1951
(millions of dollars)

> 1,000   500–1,000
100–500   <100

Italy (incl. Trieste)
1,508.8

Greece
706.7

Turkey
225.1

Source: Statistics & Reports Division, Agency for International Development, November 17, 1975.

Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Great Britain—began meeting as the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC). Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia declined to attend. Switzerland ultimately declined to participate in the Marshall Plan; West Germany became a direct participant after its government was established in 1949.

American diplomats were not officially represented on the CEEC, but their activities were constant in Paris, guiding the process and overcoming objections. George Kennan was dispatched in mid-August to tell the delegates that the United States would not accept a collection of national shopping lists, that U.S. funding was likely to be far less than the $29 billion being discussed, and that it expected CEEC plans to take into account a number of conditions: (1) economic viability without extraordinary outside aid had to be achieved within four years; (2) U.S. funding would diminish over that period; (3) aid recipients had to demonstrate convincing proof of progress; (4) long-term national projects would have a lower priority than Marshall Plan projects; (5) national currencies were to be stabilized and budgets balanced to contain inflation; (6) trade barriers would be eliminated among them and plans initiated for a customs union; (7) an organization would be established to oversee all these matters on a continuing basis (ultimately, the OEEC—Organization for European Economic Cooperation).

The Europeans presented their report to the United States on September 22. It asked for $7.12 billion in 1948 and $19.31 billion from 1948 through 1951. On November 10, congressional hearings began on the European Recovery Program (ERP). Lobbying efforts for and against the Marshall Plan had been vigorous for months by the time Secretary Marshall opened the public testimony on the bill on January 6, 1948. Despite lengthy and vigorous debate, the ERP bill easily passed in both houses of Congress; President Truman signed the bill on April 3, 1948. The appropriation was $5.2 billion for the first year.

The Plan in Operation

Considerable discussion about how to administer the ERP ensued. A majority in Congress insisted that the program be independent of the State Department and that a businessman head the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)

that was to implement and administer the Marshall Plan. Paul G. Hoffman, head of the Studebaker Corporation, was sworn in as administrator on April 9, 1948. The ECA's Washington, D.C., office handled the domestic politics and policy making, while an office in Paris, under W. Averell Harriman, coordinated resource allocations via a mission in each recipient nation's capital. The ECA had no real enforcement power; it had to persuade the U.S. and recipient nations' governments to follow its recommendations.

The Marshall Plan was not intended to provide Europe with a vast infusion of capital. Most of the capital for European recovery came from the participating nations themselves. The ECA worked particularly to alleviate strategic bottlenecks and foreign-exchange problems. A significant proportion of Marshall Plan aid in the early months of the program was used to finance purchases of relief commodities (e.g., wheat), but by the summer of 1948, the ECA was pressing European governments to place greater emphasis on capital investment. Marshall Plan leaders had great faith in macroeconomic management and planning.

The history of the Marshall Plan is largely the story of U.S. and European efforts to increase industrial and agricultural production, establish and maintain internal financial stability, expand foreign trade, and create mechanisms for economic cooperation. European nations spent most of their Marshall Plan money in the United States to finance imports of: raw materials and semi-manufactured products ($3.430 billion); food, feed, and fertilizer ($3.192 billion); machines, vehicles, and equipment ($1.853 billion); and fuel ($1.567 billion).

ECA leaders believed that improved productivity was the key to Europe's independence from U.S. assistance. In 1949, the ECA created its Overseas Technical Assistance and Productivity Program to facilitate the transfer of U.S. business knowledge and industrial practices to Marshall Plan nations. This program outlived the Marshall Plan by several years and ultimately cost about $1 billion. Thousands of people were involved, including Europeans making lengthy visits to various U.S. industries and farms to learn new techniques and American technical experts advising in Europe. This program facilitated the transfer of American attitudes, habits, values, and ways of life to Marshall Plan countries and influenced the European boom of the 1950s and 1960s.

The Korean War, especially China's intervention in November 1950, marked the beginning of the end for the Marshall Plan. Rapidly increasing military spending was straining America's economy. As a result, conservatives began demanding reductions in Marshall Plan aid. Moreover, a general retreat toward economic nationalism occurred in Congress and elsewhere as President Truman's labor–farm–business coalition that had supported the Marshall Plan broke down. The European Recovery Program officially ended on December 31, 1951. Marshall Plan aid had averaged 1 percent of U.S. gross national product for nearly four years.

American planners had vigorously pursued the idea of Western Europe's integration. In practice, this resulted in efforts to: create supranational institutions like the OEEC; unify Europe's economies; end French–German antagonism, thereby mobilizing German economic power; and persuade the British to link their economy with that of continental Europe. Judged by what was accomplished during the Marshall Plan period against its planners' goals, the plan's successes were modest. Nevertheless, separating Marshall Plan aid from the reconstruction of a democratic West Germany is not easily done. Although not required for recovery itself, Marshall Plan aid was essential for the broad-based expansionary recovery that stabilized the European welfare state. Looking beyond 1951 and measuring the economic distance traveled by West Europe in the decade after the program ended, the world can see that the Marshall Plan was one of the great economic success stories of the 20th century—one that flowed, ironically, from the devastation of Europe in World War II.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Economy and War; Marshall, George Catlett.; Truman, Harry S.

—*Larry I. Bland*

M*A*S*H

Television Series

M*A*S*H, the television series set during the Korean War, debuted on September 17, 1972, to underwhelming ratings. The program was based on the groundbreaking 1970 film adaptation of the novel *M*A*S*H*, which was written by a veteran Korean War surgeon using the pseudonym Richard Hooker. The movie's unabashed non-patriotic tone, graphic portrayal of wounds, frank depiction of sexual activity, drug use, and other shockingly realistic aspects of the seamier side of the American military was revolutionary. The television series preserved the same nonchalance about sex, excessive drinking, and insubordination while challenging

Four of M*A*S*H*'s main characters. Capt. Benjamin Franklin "Hawkeye" Pierce (Alan Alda) in the driver's seat, surrounded by, from left to right, Maj. Margaret "Hot Lips" Houlihan (Loretta Swit), Capt. "Trapper John" McIntyre (Wayne Rogers), and Col. Henry Blake (McLean Stevenson). (Getty Images)*

television network norms by openly depicting the realities of war inside and outside the operating room.

First broadcast on Sunday nights from 8:30 to 9:00 P.M., this comedy looked at the daily travails of the 4077 *M*A*S*H* (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital) and was a thinly disguised critique of Vietnam. Capt. Benjamin Franklin "Hawkeye" Pierce (Alan Alda), Army surgeon and reluctant recruit, was the center of an ensemble cast of some of television's most memorable characters. These included Hawkeye's tentmate and womanizing co-conspirator Capt. "Trapper John" McIntyre (Wayne Rogers); the tightly wound stickler for Army regulations, head nurse Maj. Margaret "Hot Lips" Houlihan (Loretta Swit); Maj. Frank Burns (Larry Linville), Houlihan's paramour and perennial target of Hawkeye's and Trapper's jokes and pranks; Cpl. Walter "Radar" O'Reilly (Gary Burghoff), the socially awkward company clerk who earned his nickname for his uncanny ability to anticipate his colonel's commands before they were uttered and to detect "choppers"

airlifting wounded GIs before the sound was audible to anyone else; Lt. Col. Henry Blake (McLean Stevenson), the bumbling but well-meaning camp commander; Cpl. Max Klinger (Jamie Farr), the soldier with a flair for women's fashion who was determined to get a psycho discharge; and Fr. Francis Mulcahy, the mild-mannered and sincere chaplain of the unit.

M*A*S*H defied the conventions of traditional sitcoms, which relied heavily on laugh tracks or were filmed before studio audiences using the three camera technique pioneered by Desi Arnaz for *I Love Lucy*. *M*A*S*H* was filmed more like a movie and made limited use of laugh tracks—and never in the operating rooms. It succeeded more than any half-hour show before or since at blending comedy and drama. Most episodes mixed over-the-top antics with sobering vignettes. During an 11-year run, punctuated with countless awards including 14 Emmys, the program built a steady audience and garnered critical praise. It also touched a collective nerve by feeding and feeding off of the emotions

of a war-weary nation that was increasingly disillusioned but afraid to lose hope.

M*A*S*H premiered amid a confluence of events that would alter American society forever. Pres. Richard Nixon's 1968 pledge of "peace with honor" in Vietnam had deteriorated into a war of secret bombings and faltering attempts to put the South Vietnamese in charge of their own defense. The country was still recovering from the deaths of four student protesters fired on and killed by Ohio National Guardsmen at Kent State University in 1970. It was also six weeks away from Sen. George McGovern's crushing defeat at the hands of Nixon. The investigation of an June 1972 break-in at Democratic National Headquarters, which would unravel Nixon's presidency before the end of his second term, was just beginning. A cloud of conspicuous unease had settled over the entire country. By the time the *M*A*S*H* pilot aired, antiwar sentiment was no longer the sole province of draft-card-burning hippies, college brats, effete intellectual snobs, and errant movie stars. It had seeped into the hearts of average Americans.

In January 1973, as the Watergate investigation heated up, the peace accord meant to end hostilities in Vietnam was signed. Later that year, as *M*A*S*H* settled into its second season in the coveted timeslot between *All in the Family* and *The Mary Tyler Moore Show*, it began to win the audiences that would make it a television legend. Having ended its first season ranked 46 out of 84 shows in the television ratings, the show then became a top 10 staple and never again fell below 15 for the rest of its run. With the January cease-fire already broken and the Watergate scandal consuming the presidency, *M*A*S*H* began to find its voice, raising the political and moral questions that vex the human soul and psyche—ambitious for a 22-minute sitcom.

Oddly, television viewers in a nation big on chest thumping but not so big on introspection seemed able to stomach regular doses of insults and insight dispensed by the authority-defying, regulation-flouting, women-chasing, martini-swilling surgeons of the 4077th—Hawkeye, Trapper John McIntyre, and later B. J. Hunnicutt (Mike Farrell). Administered straight, their brand of antimilitary rhetoric and moralizing might have been too much to tolerate. But taken with equal measures of cynicism, adolescent silliness, often brilliant wordplay, and childish

pranks, such transgressive iconoclasm was palatable. Some of their most satisfying pranks and pointed barbs came at the expense of fellow surgeon, the prickly Maj. Frank Burns, aptly nicknamed "ferret face." Whiny, self-pitying, incompetent, cowardly, and blind to the suffering around him, Burns played loosely with Army discipline when it suited him, most famously his adulterous affair with Hot Lips, but self-righteously invoked Army protocol against anyone he judged disruptive, degenerate, or un-American. Invariably his plans backfired and Burns would end up angrily sputtering something inane, such as, "Unless we all conform, unless we follow our leaders blindly, there is no possible way we can remain free."

But generally the well-executed pranks weren't entirely malicious: when a wounded underage soldier is determined to return to the front lines until he can go home a hero, Hawkeye appropriates the Purple Heart that Frank weaseled out of the Army when he wrenched his back and awards it to the kid; Trapper and Hawkeye create a fictitious officer so that his salary can support a local orphanage; Hawkeye manipulates the system to get a hardship discharge for an immigrant soldier. The schemes helped preserve sanity and humanity in an environment where the tension was not about facing bullets but how to deal with the aftermath of battle and the profound implications of having no other certainty than the voice over the loudspeaker announcing "incoming wounded." Forced to piece together mangled bodies in an ill-equipped Army field hospital between a mountain range and a minefield, the doctors and nurses struggled to cope with the savagery of war. Even while operating elbow deep in the chests of wounded soldiers (an aspect of the show that broke ground for television), they tried to keep the war at arm's length with rapid-fire banter laced with sexual innuendo and glib commentary on life and death.

Several changes to this core cast occurred over the course of the program's 11-year-run, but from start to finish the show distinguished itself by incorporating interesting, well-drawn characters into the ensemble. As characters came and went, each embraced unique brands of defiance, contempt, comfort, acceptance, and humor to endure mind-numbing boredom, depression, and impotence. Lt. Col. Henry Blake practiced golf; Col. Sherman Potter (Harry Morgan), who had served in the cavalry in World War I, had his horse; Radar clutched his

teddy bear at night; and Maj. Charles Emerson Winchester relied on Bostonian superiority. Some of the show's finest moments featured Hawkeye spraying invective as wildly as a machine gunner with his eyes closed. One famous outburst came from the October 8, 1974, episode entitled "O.R.," in which Hawkeye says, "I just don't know why they're shooting at us. All we want to do is bring them democracy and white bread. Transplant the American dream. Freedom. Achievement. Hyperacidity. Affluence. Flatulence. Technology. Tension. The inalienable right to an early coronary sitting at your desk while plotting to stab your boss in the back."

Countless episodes of *M*A*S*H* seemed to say, "It's no use." That might well have been the motto for the 1970s, a decade overcome by malaise and book-ended by a divisive war and the rising political fortunes of Ronald Reagan, who inspired nostalgia for simpler times. Toward the end of its run, just as *M*A*S*H* had reflected an anxious society during its early years, it took on a milder tone and traded some of its irreverence for political correctness as the country veered toward political complacency. Hot Lips the sex object became Margaret the capable compatriot, and the Army was modestly rehabilitated in the character of career military officer Col. Potter. The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 officially marked the end of the 1970s, an exhausting decade of political and social challenges. Reagan conferred absolution upon a country that for so long had been at odds with itself by his assurances that our worst times were behind us and that a peaceful, prosperous, and proud era was dawning. Thereby released, Americans retreated from the kind of activism that had defined the late 1960s and 1970s. Even as *M*A*S*H* was winding down, Reagan was gearing up for a reelection campaign in which he would declare, "It's Morning in America". When the finale came in February 1983, the real-world conflicts that had shaped the show in its early years seemed very remote. But just the same some 125,000,000 people—the largest audience ever for a regular television show—tuned in to say good-bye to the soldiers of the 4077 *M*A*S*H*.

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Related Entries

Film and War; Television and War

—*Beth Scully*

MASH Units

A Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) is a self-supporting, tented, portable medical unit designed to provide front-line combat care. The U.S. Army Medical Department developed the idea for a highly flexible, self-contained surgical hospital based on its experience in World War II. By 1948, five of these hospitals had been authorized by the surgeon general of the Army, and they were the first medical units deployed in Korean War. MASHs were used extensively in the Vietnam War, and in all subsequent major conflicts including the Gulf War and the Iraq War. MASHs helped develop and refine the principles and techniques of coordinated trauma care that serve as the foundation of the modern civilian trauma management system in the United States.

Military medical planners have always struggled to find optimal methods for providing combat casualty care, continually trying to establish the right balance among mobility, proximity to the combat zone, and safety of medical personnel. The first important innovation in modern warfare was the introduction of motorized vehicles in World War I to transport surgical teams and their equipment to the front. In World War II,

mechanized field hospital platoons and forward surgical teams were created to provide close medical support to troops in Europe. The jungles and mountainous terrain of Asia necessitated an even more mobile medical unit, the portable surgical hospital capable of being moved on the backs of porters.

Shortly after World War II, the surgeon general of the Army established the Surgical Consultants' Division to evaluate the performance of the Army Medical Department in combat casualty care. The research team, led by Michael E. DeBakey, was charged with making recommendations for improvements in surgical techniques and facilities. One of the proposals of DeBakey's team was the creation of a more mobile and surgically capable frontline surgical hospital. By 1948, the Army had developed the MASH, commissioning them as regular and permanent units of the Army Medical Department. When the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, three of the five active MASH units (the 8055th, 8063rd, and 8076th) were hastily outfitted in Japan and sent to Korea in July 1950.

The prototype MASH was a 60-bed hospital intended to support an infantry division. It had five surgical tables, preoperative and postoperative areas, and full ancillary support including a laboratory, X-ray suite, and blood banking. An experienced team could erect and dismantle a MASH in 10 hours. The contingencies of Korea, however, radically changed the methods and capabilities of these units. Because of the inadequate road and rail system and the fluid nature of combat in the early part of the war, the helicopter became the predominant means of accessing the MASH. In addition, these units were forced to act not only as limited-service forward hospitals but also as full-service evacuation hospitals, serving multiple infantry divisions. By the end of 1950, the MASH bed capacity had grown to 200 and the units were routinely providing sophisticated definitive surgery, including frontline neurosurgery and vascular surgery. The introduction of the MASH units and these new surgical procedures helped reduce the mortality rate of wounded men in Korea.

MASHs have been deployed in all major conflicts since the Korean War, including the Vietnam War, Bosnia, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War. In the 21st century, the Army Medical Department has questioned the practicability of using MASH units in the small unit, quick strike, and limited warfare envisioned in the future. Instead, MASH units are being consolidated into combat surgical hospitals (CASHs), which can spin off more mobile and efficient medical groups(forward surgical hospitals) as needed. The only remaining MASH unit, the 212th, based in Miesau, Germany, was sent to the Middle East in January 2004 to support the invasion of Iraq.

MASH units have remained in the public consciousness because of the popular, long-running television series, *M*A*S*H* (1972–83). But the most important civilian legacy of the MASH is the modern metropolitan trauma-management system. During the 1960s, a movement began in the United States and Europe to apply the medical knowledge and techniques learned in Korea and Vietnam to the management of small- and large-scale civilian trauma. The first civilian trauma unit was formed at Cook County Hospital in Chicago and by the early 1970s most states had developed integrated trauma-management systems anchored in regional trauma centers with quick-response emergency helicopter transport service.

Although the military is decommissioning the remaining MASH units, the name still lives on in the civilian community. Wherever large-scale disasters occur and whenever traditional hospitals cannot operate, medics have and will continue to rely on mobile, temporary onsite medical units.

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Doctor Draft; *M*A*S*H*; Medicine and War

—*Eugene Theodore Ginchereau*

Mauldin, Bill

(1921–2003)
Cartoonist

Cartoonist Bill Mauldin (full name William Henry Mauldin) is best known for championing the infantryman in World War II through his characters Willie and Joe, ordinary GIs thrust into combat. Willie and Joe experienced bitter cold, mud, the exhaustion of combat, stuffed-shirt officers, and rear-echelon "garret-troopers," but they endured. In 1945, Mauldin won a Pulitzer Prize for his work and continued to follow his characters as they confronted housing shortages and other readjustment problems faced by veterans. In time Maudlin became a first-class political cartoonist, championing various liberal causes, especially the civil rights movement.

Childhood

Mauldin was born on a farm in New Mexico in 1921. His family was of modest means, and his father, a jack-of-all-trades, kept them on the move throughout the Southwest for much of Mauldin's childhood. The young Mauldin took an interest in cartooning, observing a local cartoonist at work, and at the age of 15 he responded to an ad placed by Chicago's Academy of Fine Art. He borrowed the tuition from his grandmother and enrolled. He joined the school's Junior ROTC unit, later quipping, "The free ROTC uniform appealed to me" (*Brass Ring*, 50). Upon graduation in 1939 he joined a National Guard unit with a friend and was soon serving jointly as a cartoonist for the *45th Division News* and as an infantryman on training maneuvers with his unit.

While serving stateside with the 45th Division, Mauldin got to know the individuals who would serve as his famous characters. "Willie" was modeled after a laconic Oklahoman, Johnnie Waddell. "Joe" was originally inspired by a Native American from Oklahoma whom Mauldin's tentmates called the "Medicine Man"—"a smart-assed Choctaw Indian" (*Up Front*, 42) with "the eyes of a turkey buzzard, a broken beak, . . . a degree from the University of Oklahoma, a talent for memorizing and reciting epic poems, and a conviction that there would never be peace with the white man until it was legal for Indians to buy whiskey" (*Brass Ring*, 96).

Up Front in the Mediterranean Theater

As his two characters "matured" overseas, Mauldin later wrote, "for some reason Joe seemed to become a Willie and Willie more of a Joe." Mauldin did not choose to depict Willie and Joe as risk-taking daredevils, but as representatives of "the great numbers of men who . . . sweat in the foxholes that give their more courageous brethren claustrophobia." He understood instinctively what sociologists referred to as the importance of the primary group: Willie and Joe "go on patrol when patrols are called for, and they don't shirk hazards, because they don't want to let their buddies down." He also gave the characters qualities noted by social scientists and other observers: they "fight and kill even though they hate killing and are scared to death while doing it" (*Up Front*, 45). Mauldin's style in drawing all of his characters—bold black brush strokes, with few distinctions between light and dark—

The June 18, 1945, Time *magazine cover featuring Willie, one of the pair of GIs serving as Bill Mauldin's main characters in the cartoons he created for* The Stars and Stripes *during World War II. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)*

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captured well the stark conditions of mud, rocky terrain, snow, life and death.

Mauldin's unit was committed to the campaign in Sicily in 1943. His drawings for the *45th Division News* there utilized what was left of local printing presses. He and his colleagues managed to arrange for the financing of a simple volume of his efforts to commemorate the end of their campaign, the *Sicily Sketchbook*, offered to the men for 25 cents a copy including postal mailing. Some 25,000 men purchased it. Later his unit was part of the 5th Army's drive up the Italian peninsula; while paying one of his regular visits to his company (at Monte Cassino in December 1943), Mauldin was wounded in the shoulder by a mortar fragment. In these same months of going back and forth between the divisional newspaper unit in the rear and his infantry unit at the front, Mauldin got to know and respect the beloved newspaper reporter Ernie Pyle and famous combat photographer Robert Capa, both of whom would die in the course of the war.

Mauldin's talent attracted the attention of the public at home, in part because of a column Pyle wrote about him in one of his syndicated columns. In early 1944, his drawings were picked up by the United Features Syndicate for widespread distribution in the United States. He also attracted much attention in the European theater itself, from critics, such as the military commander of the Allied occupation forces in Naples, and enthusiastic supporters, like Gen. Mark Clark, commander of the 5th Army, Lt. Gen. Lucian Prescott, and Col. Egbert White, a professional newspaper man in charge of *The Stars and Stripes* (the popular European-theater GI-targeted Army newspaper that White had to helped to create while serving in World War I). White recruited Mauldin to serve as the Mediterranean theater's cartoonist, a position that was based in Rome. His drawings for *The Stars and Stripes* won him a Pulitzer Prize in 1945.

Mauldin sought the freedom to portray the war from the infantrymen's perspective, including their views of officers. The ideal officer, he wrote, "knows his business" and is "firm and just." But Mauldin also tried "to make life as miserable as possible" for those who did not live up to their leadership responsibilities. Some "old line officers" were shocked by the "spirit of passive rebellion" that Mauldin

saw in "this citizen army," the cartoonist later observed. When he drew a number of cartoons poking fun at officers who put themselves ahead of their men or lacked other qualities that might earn the respect of their men, Mauldin drew the wrath of no less a figure than Gen. George Patton, who called for a meeting with the upstart sergeant-satirist. Mauldin survived the meeting with his job intact, in part because he had earned the respect of leaders like Clark, Prescott, and the European Allied commander, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower (*Brass Ring*, 195, 202–3; *Up Front*, 28–29, 178–79, 184–86).

Mauldin wrote in the same direct and pithy style as he drew. In the introduction to *Up Front*, a best-selling collection of his commentary and drawings on the war, he made the following suggestion to those at home who wanted to understand what life on the front was truly like:

> Dig a hole in your back yard while it is raining. Sit in the hole until the water climbs up around your ankles. Pour cold mud down your shirt collar. Sit there for forty-eight hours, and . . . imagine that a guy is sneaking around waiting for a chance to club you on the head or set your house on fire. Get out of the hole, fill a suitcase full of rocks, pick it up, put a shotgun in your other hand, and walk on the muddiest road you can find. Fall flat on your face every few minutes as you imagine big meteors streaking down to sock you. After ten or twelve miles (remember—you are still carrying the shotgun and suitcase) start sneaking through the wet brush. Imagine that some one has booby-trapped your route with rattlesnakes . . . Give some friend a rifle and have him blast in your direction once in a while. [Imagine you confront a bull that sees you] Run like hell all the way back to your hole in the back yard . . . and get in. If you repeat this performance every three days for several months you may begin to understand why an infantryman sometimes gets out of breath. But you still won't understand how he feels when things get tough. (*Up Front*, 143–44)

Late in 1944 Mauldin provided these thoughts to the families and friends of GIs who were still on the front lines:

A lot of people aren't very smart when they write to a soldier. They complain about the gasoline shortage, or . . . anger him in a hundred different ways. . . . A man feels very fine fighting a war when his girl has just written that she is thinking that perhaps they made a mistake. . . . A soldier's life revolves around his mail. (*Up Front*, 24)

Of returning veterans, he wrote that they needed only to be "taken back into their civilian lives and given a chance to be themselves again." Mauldin also insisted that the "steady portrayal" of combat vets as future "social problems" was misguided.

There will be a few problems . . . [but] the vast majority of combat men are going to be no problem at all. . . . [They were] going to be too tired and sick of it to bother anybody who might be worrying about their becoming problems. They don't need pity. . . . They simply need bosses who will give them a little time to adjust their minds and their hands, and women who are faithful to them. . . . No set of laws or [GI] Bill of Rights . . . can do that job. Only their own people can do it. So it is very important that these people know and understand combat men. (*Up Front*, 8–11)

Back Home: From Willie and Joe to Political-Cartoon Satirist

By 1945 Mauldin was back in the states, a well-paid syndicated cartoonist whose work appeared in several hundred newspapers. A number of his drawings in the next two years depicted Willie or Joe "back home" (also the title of his second book), readjusting to life with their families, seeking work or a place to live—commentaries on the situations many veterans faced. In 1952 he went to Korea for *Collier's* magazine and published an account of his experiences and drawings there (*Bill Mauldin in Korea*). He told his story through a number of engaging "letters" from Joe, now a war correspondent, writing to Willie, now a family man and homebody. Thereafter he drew Willie and Joe only twice: for the funerals of Gen. George Marshall and Gen. Omar

Mauldin's take on what veterans faced returning from the war. The caption read, "There's a small item on page 17 about a triple axe murder. No veterans involved." (© 1947 by William Mauldin. Reprinted by permission of Harper Collins Publishers.)

Bradley, two men who had earned his respect. But his characters were not forgotten. In 1995, the U.S. Postal Service issued a Willie & Joe stamp to commemorate the 50th anniversary of V-E Day.

Mauldin knew that his combat characters could offer only so much in the way of commentary on the domestic scene, and he soon began to express himself through drawings on current political issues. His low-income southwestern background and his military service with Native Americans and other Depression-era survivors, coupled with a sympathy for the working soldier in the foxholes, led him to join the American Veterans Committee and to criticize the American Legion's preoccupation with veterans' benefits and its WWI-era leadership's refusal to give WWII vets any voice in Legion decisionmaking. He testified before the Doolittle Board (which had been charged with

recommending reforms in military regulations and practices) in 1946 on the need to increase officer respect and concern for enlisted personnel. He championed civilian control of the military, and he offered dozens of biting artistic blasts at racism. In one of Joe's letters to Willie from Korea, Mauldin sent this message to American society about the recent racial integration of the military:

> Willie, I kept noticing these guys, about one colored to ten white, all through the company. They seemed to fit in fine. They all seemed to be used to it. You will see a colored man and a white man with a southern accent you can cut with a knife, and they will be sharing a two man bunker and kidding each other like they'd been buddies all their lives. (*Bill Mauldin in Korea*, 73)

In 1975 Mauldin told an interviewer from *Target* magazine that "the one thing that meant the most to me was the whole civil rights thing in the sixties. It was . . . natural for me in a way because it always seemed to me that the black was the enlisted man of our society. I don't like a man being told he's unequal until he gets a chance to prove his own inequality." He was present in Oxford, Mississippi, in the fall of 1962 when James Meredith, surrounded by federal marshals, integrated the University of Mississippi. Mauldin may have been the civil rights movement's strongest and most persistent voice on the nation's op-ed pages in the 1950s and '60s.

In 1951 Mauldin appeared in the film adaptation of Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage*, which starred his friend Audie Murphy. He ran unsuccessfully for Congress as a Democrat in 1956 (in a predominantly upper-middle-class Republican district). His depiction of Russian dissident writer Boris Pasternak toiling beside a fellow political prisoner in the Siberian snow, with the caption "I won the Nobel Prize for Literature. What was your crime?" won him his second Pulitzer Prize in 1959. In 1962, he moved from the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* to the *Chicago Sun-Times*, and was chauffeured from the Chicago airport to his new office in an Army jeep. He was present when Pres. John Kennedy delivered his speech at the Berlin Wall in 1963. When Kennedy was assassinated, Mauldin limned what may be his most famous image: Abraham Lincoln, seated at his memorial, bowed and in tears.

Two years later, to "get his own feet wet," he traveled to Vietnam to visit his son, a helicopter pilot, and witnessed a devastating mortar attack on an air base near Pleiku (*I've Decided I Want My Seat Back*, 118–23). In time he moved his office back to rural New Mexico, faxing and eventually FedExing his drawings to the *Sun-Times*. By the turn of the century, an aging Mauldin had developed Alzheimer's disease and spent his last years in a nursing home. After a colleague took notice of his plight and alerted readers of the *Sun-Times*, World War II vets began to descend on the place. His room was deluged with pictures and letters from his admirers. He died on January 22, 2003, and was buried in the Arlington National Cemetery. The nation's political cartoonists offered dozens of their own versions of Willie and Joe, mourning their friend.

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1943 a; 1945 g; 1947

—*Peter Karsten*

McKinley, William

(1843–1901)
25th President of the United States

William McKinley's administration encompassed the Spanish–American War and the colonization of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands. Although some Americans were critical of U.S. overseas expansion, McKinley's image as a successful wartime leader helped him win election to a second term in 1900.

McKinley's participation in the Civil War provided him with firsthand military experience. He enlisted as a volunteer for the Union Army at the age of 18. Having gained widespread recognition as a commissary sergeant when he brought food and water to his colleagues pinned down at the battle of Antietam, McKinley obtained a commission and fought in the heavily contested Shenandoah Valley. He left the Army with the brevet rank of major and used that military title throughout his life.

Although his political career certainly benefited from his service record in the Union Army, McKinley was a gentle, even-tempered, and thoughtful individual. His wartime experience convinced him that conflict should be avoided if possible. As an Ohio congressman and later governor, McKinley exhibited a commitment to compromise and arbitration. During his 1896 campaign for the presidency, he never anticipated that he would lead his country into war.

A revival of prosperity shortly after his inauguration diffused concerns about the economy and monetary standards that had dominated the campaign. Public attention increasingly focused on a civil war in nearby Cuba. In 1895 rebels had revived their opposition to Spanish colonial rule, and their guerilla tactics proved remarkably successful. As Spanish authorities resorted to increasingly repressive techniques, U.S. newspapers portrayed the Cuban rebels in a very positive light, comparing them with American patriots in the 1770s. Such press agitation put pressure on the president to act.

Hoping for a peaceful outcome, McKinley pursued a diplomatic course, urging the Spanish government to moderate its behavior. By early 1898, however, the president had become convinced that the government in Madrid would never make enough concessions to satisfy the rebels. When the American battleship *Maine* blew up and sank in Havana harbor in mid-February, calls for American intervention reached a fever pitch. Simultaneously, many of the business leaders who had supported McKinley's moderate approach concluded that only decisive American action would end this damaging and emotional crisis. No one was surprised when McKinley sent a war message to Congress in early April.

The ensuing Spanish–American War was enormously popular. Hundreds of thousands of young men rushed to volunteer, the Navy was thrilled to have an opportunity to try out its new all-steel, steam-powered vessels, and the music of John Philip Sousa stirred civilian pride and passion. Just five days after Congress approved the war declaration, Comm. George Dewey sailed his small squadron into Manila Bay in the far-off Philippines and utterly destroyed the Spanish force lying at anchor.

McKinley established a war room in the White House to monitor the worldwide action. There, connected by telephone to various military bureaus and commanders, he made certain that no significant orders to the field were transmitted without his authorization. Even Dewey was able to utilize British cable service through Hong Kong to send and receive confidential messages in a timely fashion. The hasty mobilization put enormous strains on a War Department accustomed to supporting only some 25,000 troops. McKinley personally superintended the buildup and battlefield strategy when his secretary of war, Russell Alger, proved to be incompetent. The president was much better served by Navy Sec. John D. Long. Fortunately, the military campaigning was brief and definitive. U.S. forces destroyed the Spanish fleet protecting the southern Cuban city of Santiago in early July. The Spanish government sued for peace when American Army units encircled the city. Concurrently, detached forces captured Puerto Rico and Guam, and troops shipped out for the Philippines.

The president now faced the task of articulating the country's war objectives. As diplomats gathered in Paris, McKinley decided that the United States should retain control of Puerto Rico and Guam. The Teller Amendment attached to the war declaration specifically prohibited

American colonization of Cuba, however, so the president insisted only that the Spanish relinquish their authority over the island. The Philippines presented the most difficult conundrum. After agonizing deliberation, McKinley demanded that Spain transfer control of its Pacific colony to the United States. These provisions were included in the Treaty of Paris signed in December 1898.

Postwar complications quickly developed. Led by Elihu Root, whom McKinley had named to replace Alger as secretary of war, the administration developed a military occupation plan for Cuba. By 1901 the president's advisers had drafted the Platt Amendment, which would grant the island limited autonomy. The situation in the Philippines was much less satisfactory. Rebellion broke out after ratification of the treaty, and American Army and Navy units remained locked in a bloody war for another two years. Three times as many Americans were killed in this conflict as had died in combat during the Spanish–American War. But because military authorities suppressed news about this continuing conflict, the realities on the ground did little to dampen popular enthusiasm for what Ambassador John Hay called "a splendid little war."

Some contemporaries and many historians criticized William McKinley for being weak-willed and bowing to popular opinion and the business community. In fact, he played the hand he was dealt with finesse and intelligence. Acutely aware of the rampant expansionist ambitions many of his fellow Republicans expressed, he pursued a controlled and cautious course. His wartime policies provided a means for venting and ultimately containing this expansionist sentiment. His prudent diplomacy and his wise choice of subordinates ensured that his administration would continue to function effectively and retain control during an extremely emotional period. When he was shot by an anarchist in September 1901, McKinley bequeathed to his vice president and successor, Theodore Roosevelt, an enhanced international status for the United States and a diplomatic policy blueprint that Roosevelt, as president, would pursue with only minor modifications.

Many Americans, however, shared McKinley's doubts about the wisdom of plunging into a full-scale imperialist mode. Superintending and defending colonies and expanding American interests in Latin America and the Far East put strains on the nation's leadership and its resources. Moreover, these responsibilities often seemed inconsistent with the isolationist tradition that had characterized and comforted earlier generations. But greater American participation in world affairs was probably inevitable in the 20th century, and McKinley's thoughtful, restrained approach established reasonable precedents for future actions.

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Spanish–American War

Related Documents

1899; 1900

—*John Dobson*

McNamara, Robert S.

(1916–)
Secretary of Defense

Robert S. McNamara served as secretary of defense from 1961 through early 1968, during the presidential administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. During his tenure, his institution of a quantitatively oriented, civilian-dominated approach to military budgeting and decision making revolutionized the Pentagon but outraged military

leadership. McNamara was a major architect of U.S. strategy in the Vietnam War, for which he has subsequently been widely criticized.

Robert Strange McNamara was born on June 9, 1916, in San Francisco. He attended the University of California at Berkeley, graduating in 1937 with a degree in economics. In 1939, McNamara completed a master's degree in business administration from Harvard University; soon after, he returned to Harvard to accept a faculty position in the business school. During World War II, McNamara served in the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), performing systems analysis—providing quantitative inputs into complex operational planning—for operational forces. In November 1945, McNamara joined a group of former USAAF systems analysts hired by Henry Ford II to shake up the management of the Ford Motor Company. After 15 years of success at Ford, McNamara became president of the company in October 1960.

Just seven weeks later, McNamara was asked to join the cabinet of president-elect John F. Kennedy as secretary of defense. The main strategic concept of the Kennedy administration was "flexible response," a focus on building up U.S. conventional military forces that had been neglected under the cost-saving, nuclear-dependent "massive retaliation" strategy of the Eisenhower administration. To implement the flexible response strategy over the objections of the often hidebound military services, McNamara sought to impose a more centralized, civilian-directed management system. Once in office, he quickly organized a group of exceptionally talented aides, many of them young academics, who upset the civilian–military balance of power in the Pentagon. McNamara's "Whiz Kids," as they came to be known, spoke the common language of quantitative systems analysis, which under McNamara became the basis of Pentagon decision making. The uniformed military leaders had been accustomed to using their professional judgment to justify service programs. Under McNamara, these sorts of arguments were swept aside in favor of quantitative analysis. The military services deeply resented McNamara's lack of deference to their professional expertise, yet the Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System (PPBS) that McNamara instituted remains in place today.

McNamara also played a major role in shaping U.S. nuclear strategy, ultimately settling on "assured destruction": in place of the established commitment to nuclear supremacy, the United States would moderate its increases in strategic nuclear forces, concentrating instead on maintaining a retaliatory force sufficient to inflict a level of destruction upon the Soviet Union that would deter Soviet leaders from an initial strike. During the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, McNamara counseled against the military strike advocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—his argument in favor of "overt military action" short of war formed the basis of the "quarantine" that successfully resolved the most dangerous U.S.–Soviet confrontation of the Cold War. This experience left McNamara convinced that he needed to impose even stricter control over the military services.

McNamara's tenure as secretary of defense was ultimately defined by his central role in the escalation of the U.S. military presence in Vietnam. As the northern-backed, communist-led insurgency in South Vietnam gained strength, McNamara accepted the conventional wisdom that the fall of South Vietnam must be prevented lest all of Southeast Asia come under the control of the Soviet Union. Although McNamara initially embraced mobilization, as the U.S. role expanded he sought to accommodate the political needs of the president. President Johnson, concerned that he must avoid "losing Vietnam" as his Democratic predecessor Harry Truman had "lost China," was nevertheless reluctant to accede to a national mobilization that would likely require retrenchment, and perhaps abandonment, of his ambitious domestic agenda.

Seeking to balance domestic and global priorities with the deteriorating situation in Vietnam and increasingly convinced that the military leadership's pressure for a rapid, massive U.S. offensive against North Vietnam was unlikely to succeed and might result in Chinese intervention, McNamara trod a perilous middle path between the Joint Chiefs' advocacy of an aggressive strategy and the outright withdrawal counseled by some of the president's civilian advisers. Instead, he oversaw a strategy of gradual escalation: U.S. forces would increase incrementally in strength sufficient to prevent a collapse in South Vietnam, with the hope that the North Vietnamese regime would eventually

realize that its efforts in the South were unavailing. McNamara remained publicly confident, repeatedly assuring the president and the public that the Free World would prevail in South Vietnam; privately, he came to doubt the enterprise but despaired of a means to secure an honorable U.S. withdrawal.

Having lost both faith in the effort in Vietnam and the president's confidence, McNamara resigned as secretary of defense on February 29, 1968. His Pentagon legacy remains as controversial as his tenure. On the one hand, McNamara's Pentagon reforms have endured despite early resentments, reducing interservice rivalry and effecting significant cost savings; his efforts to rein in expansion of U.S. nuclear forces arguably helped create the preconditions for the negotiated arms limitation treaties and agreements of the 1970s and 1980s. On the other hand, the Vietnam strategy he oversaw was ultimately disastrous—a reality he dwelt on at length in his 1995 apologia *In Retrospect*.

Robert McNamara was and remains an extraordinarily controversial figure. He was clearly brilliant, yet he failed to recognize his limits or his errors. McNamara's role in the Vietnam conflict remains the major focus of controversy for both war supporters and opponents alike—a reality that mirrored reactions to the gradual escalation strategy that the he oversaw in Southeast Asia. McNamara, the epitome of the post–World War II American technocrat, sought to leverage his expertise to manage his way out of what grew to be an impossible situation. In the 2004 documentary film *The Fog of War*, McNamara observed that his actions had been taken in the context of the Cold War and had to be viewed in that light. This is a significant point, as the Vietnam conflict was fundamentally shaped by the Johnson administration's need to respond simultaneously to domestic, diplomatic, and military concerns. But it is possible to feel sympathy for the difficult situation that McNamara found himself in while at the same time lamenting the consequences of his refusal to make hard choices. Robert McNamara saw the perils of both escalation and disengagement in Vietnam (albeit incompletely) and sought to maneuver between them. In so doing, he crafted an unworkable policy that failed disastrously; thus, he remains a target for criticism of the Vietnam War from both ends of the ideological spectrum.

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Civil–Military Relations; Cuban Missile Crisis; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Nuclear Strategy; Vietnam War

—*Erik Riker-Coleman*

Media and War

The effects of war on U.S. media have been twofold. First, wartime brings to the fore issues surrounding censorship of antiwar sentiments that influence the content or messages of various media, their flourishing or dismantling, and the lives of people involved in media industries. Second, war has often spurred the growth of new media forms that last well into the ensuing peace.

Colonial and Revolutionary Wars

The latter effect was apparent in the earliest English colonial wars against indigenous peoples, such as King Philip's War, "the most fatal war in all of American history," measured by casualties relative to the population (Lepore, xiii). No fewer than 21 contemporary published accounts of it appeared. Some, like Puritan minister Increase Mather's *A Brief History of the War* (1676), were labeled "histories" or narratives although they described current newsworthy events. Others represented personal testimony of English participants, particularly former captives of warring tribes, as in Mary Rowlandson's *Soveraignty and*

Goodness of God (1682), the foundational captivity tale, a still-vibrant genre.

Captivity tales and other Indian war narratives usually appeared in pamphlet form, as did many of the period's controversial religious and secular debates. Little wonder, then, as political tensions mounted between Britain and the colonies after 1763, that discontent among the colonists would also be expressed in this form. From 1763 until July 1776, for example, no fewer than 195 political pamphlets on declaring colonial independence were published, from the deferential protest of John Dickinson's *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania* (1768) to the full-throttle attack on monarchal tyranny in Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* (1776). With an unprecedented 150,000 copies circulating, Paine's diatribe helped sway public opinion toward independence. Such pamphlets, along with the 137 or so newspapers published before the Revolution's end, largely advanced the revolutionaries' cause.

Despite print media's centrality to and in the Revolution, printers themselves only gingerly moved toward partisanship, for fear of abandoning a long-standing market strategy of either publishing opposing positions or eschewing controversy (the chilling effect of potential charges of seditious libel cannot be discounted, either). As the imperial crisis worsened, however, Patriots increasingly sought ideological solidarity, thus any middle ground that printers might have previously claimed quickly became untenable. Many hapless conservatives, wishing to maintain neutrality, along with outright Loyalists, were simply victimized by Patriots via censorship or mob action. Loyalists themselves were not above responding in kind, sending Patriot printers fleeing from occupied cities.

Although often printed irregularly on the run, newspapers provided essential wartime intelligence and supplanted pamphlets as the premier media venue for politics. The Continental Army even had its own printer traveling with the troops and serving them by providing accurate news under the direct oversight of none other than George Washington. Papers provided a convenient single-stop news outlet, where readers glimpsed the doings of the Continental Congress, while learning details of battles, albeit mostly well after the fact. More controversially, editors pioneered the practice of publishing accounts of recent troop movements. Such reportage would become a persistent bone of contention between military, with its responsibility to protect its forces, and the press, with its desire to serve its public (and sell papers). Although reports might be based upon rumor and could even be damaging, the Continental Congress was timid about attempting to restrain the press because it could not effectively exercise authority over it.

Anglo–French Conflict and the War of 1812

Such government timidity with regard to the press would be short, for the Revolution had stigmatized the earlier notion of a neutral "free and open press" as Loyalist. Yet the emerging ethic of a "press of freedom" (Martin, 3–4, 94), that is, one that advances human liberty by whatever means, even those highly partisan, was not without internal contradictions. The era of international warfare that ensued in the wake of the French Revolution prompted many to ask exactly what government policy toward the press would serve the end of freedom. Pro-French Republicans and pro-British Federalists differed profoundly in their answers, while still agreeing that presses should be instruments of liberty. In the late 1790s, with public opinion in some regions of the country running strongly pro-French, Federalists seeking war with France blamed partisan Republican newspapers and struck back with the Sedition Law (1798–1801), purportedly to ensure freedom by protecting the government from false and malicious reporting and thus criminalizing virtually all criticism of policy. At least 25 journalists were prosecuted under threat of heavy fines and imprisonment.

Thomas Jefferson's election to the presidency in 1800 ushered in Federalism's eventual decline and helped set the stage for the War of 1812 against Britain, during which the Republican press vigorously called for national nonpartisan (i.e., anti-Federalist) solidarity against the common foreign enemy. Although some Federalist editors reluctantly supported the war, others muddled on in opposition, even facing angry mobs. As with the earlier Loyalists, opposition to war could be life-threatening. By war's end, a partisan press seemed here to stay, even before the emergence of mass politics with the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. Yet it must be remembered that because of the costs of production,

newspaper circulation remained limited, affecting opinion makers more than the masses directly.

The Mexican War

The Mexican War was a landmark in media history because technological advances since the War of 1812 resulted in extensive news circulation. Steam-powered presses that replaced the hand press in the 1830s made possible the printing of 12,000 sheets an hour by 1846. "Dailies" could now bring cheap, often sensationalistic, breaking news to the masses. James Gordon Bennett's daily, the *New York Herald*, as well as the *New Orleans Picayune and Delta*, sent correspondents to Mexico, the first time American reporters thoroughly covered a foreign war. Another first was the use of telegraph lines for war news. Bennett availed himself of the limited lines that then existed to receive intelligence hours ahead of the mails. Some of the earliest photographers captured actual war images, albeit very few. More widespread were war-inspired lithographs, sometimes published in magazines.

Although Pres. James K. Polk tried to control leaks to the press and used the Washington Union to promote his position on the war and to influence Congress, he saw no general need to censor war news. Yet martial law allowed for the suppression and censorship of newspapers in U.S.-occupied areas such as Matamoros. In at least one case, Polk ordered Gen. Zachary Taylor to shut down an American-owned paper there; editors at home usually supported such censorship. Although not all intelligence from the battlefield was made available to the press, both Mexican editors and U.S. printers who tagged along with the Army supplied ample news in the embattled territory. The latter set up in 14 occupied urban centers and conducted 25 so-called war papers whose primary audience was the troops in the field, but whose reportage reached back to the home front.

The Civil War

Censorship was of much greater concern during the Civil War. By this time, editors, who were cooperating under organizations such as the Associated Press, Western Associated Press, and the Confederate Press Association, were becoming dependent upon now-extensive telegraph lines for intelligence. Early in the war, the departments of State and War censored telegraph messages from Washington, D.C., while in the South they were monitored from the first Confederate capital in Montgomery, Alabama. On the battlefield, military officers kept sensitive intelligence out of circulation, including at times drawings by artists in the field. Since the late 1850s, illustrated monthlies and weeklies had become popular forms of news and entertainment. Although some war engravings were inaccurate, Winslow Homer's *First Day's Firing at Yorktown*, sketched for an 1862 wood engraving destined for *Harper's Weekly*, was so detailed that Union generals feared it would reveal too much about their operations. Among home-front periodical and telegraph-board readers, censorship created an even greater degree of skepticism about whether news reports, often contradictory or false, could be trusted.

Servicemen, too, though frustrated by untrustworthy news stories, eagerly consumed whatever periodicals they could get to while away off-duty hours. News agents after 1863 could bid for contracts to sell papers to the Army. Benevolent voluntary organizations such as the United States Sanitary Commission also collected books, papers, and magazines to distribute to the troops. To supply additional reading material, field presses that usually handled official orders also issued books and pamphlets; some soldiers published their own papers in print or manuscript form. Novels, now plentiful and often very cheap, amused them, but daily reading could include the Bible, religious tracts, or science, technology, and legal books. Book publishers, responding to servicemen's need for compact transportable books, put out paperback short tales or abridged biographies. For religious reading, the U.S. Christian Commission, often working with established religious societies, sent delegates to distribute en masse tracts, Bibles, and hymnbooks, founded reading rooms, and circulated traveling libraries.

The Spanish–American War

By the time war with Spain broke out in 1898, the newspaper industry was so powerful that some reportage, particularly sensationalistic "yellow journalism," was instrumental to U.S. involvement. William Randolph Hearst's widely circulated and blatantly pro–Cuban independence *New York Journal*

New Yorkers gathering around bulletin boards with news items posted during the Spanish–American War by the New York Journal, *a pro–Cuban independence newspaper. (© CORBIS)*

and Joseph Pulitzer's similarly positioned *New York World* fanned the flames of war. When the U.S. battleship *Maine* exploded in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898, the *Journal* was quick to blame Spain, a move that set the stage for the declaration of war on April 25 of that year.

Newspapers thereafter continued to cover unfolding events and to shape opinion at home. Author Richard Harding Davis, whom Hearst had earlier sent to Cuba to cover hostilities, later filed stories romanticizing the Cuban cause and extolling the "Rough Riders," Theodore Roosevelt's voluntary cavalry that fought in the battle of San Juan Hill. Most intelligence originated with military officials or cable operators, not correspondents, however. Because lines between the U.S. and Cuba were cut during the war, journalists there had to deliver their information via boat to Key West cable offices where their stories were often censored.

In addition to print media, early film also brought war images, actual, reenacted, and fictionalized, before the public. In silent movies lasting less than 60 seconds, audiences could see the remains of the *Maine*, the Rough Riders in action, and troops mobilizing. That the films were sometimes shown in urban theaters once every hour testifies to their popularity. It evidently made little difference that some "Philippine" footage was alleged to have been taken in New

Jersey or that naval scenes were shot using water-filled tubs and floating miniature ships.

World War I

As soon as the United States entered World War I, propaganda (and ultimately censorship) systems were put in place. Pres. Woodrow Wilson appointed George Creel, a Progressive-era muckraking journalist, to head the newly formed Committee on Public Information (CPI) that included the secretaries of the Navy, State, and War. The CPI aimed at publicizing the war positively through print, oratory, and visual media, among them silent feature films (some two hours long), reaching upward of 10 million people each day. For example, a CPI division on motion pictures financed three patriotic films and sponsored 75,000 "four-minute men" who showed up in theaters to deliver inspiring speeches, often while the reels of these two-hour films were being changed by the projector operator. The CPI's daily bulletin was issued to well over 100,000 recipients. Many journalists and intellectuals answered Creel's call to write pieces that supported the war and demonized the German enemy. While the CPI was not authorized to censor the media (Creel advocated voluntary self-monitoring instead), it did issue a Preliminary Statement to the Press in May 1917 that advised editors of their responsibility to thwart publication of so-called dangerous news that could compromise armed forces' operations, and even suggested that negligent editors were traitors. But, as head of the CPI, Creel also was a member of the government Censorship Board that watched over telegraph, telephone, and cable communication. In this role, he monitored periodicals, especially those sent abroad; all U.S. magazines presented articles for the board's review in advance of publication.

Wartime legislation subjecting communication structures to government censorship had a chilling effect on media. This was especially true in the case of a throwback to the 1798 Sedition Law, the Espionage Act of 1917, under which materials purportedly advocating disloyalty, insubordination, treason, or obstruction of military recruitment were barred; similar materials could be refused by the post office. Some films were censored, although socialist publications and those questioning the war suffered the most. Under a 1918 sedition amendment, writing or publishing anything disloyal to the government, armed forces, or flag was made a criminal act. About 2,200 people were prosecuted under the Espionage Act. Under the Trading with the Enemy Act (1917), foreign-language news periodicals were required to provide translations for government scrutiny. The net effect was a drastic curtailment of the freedom of domestic media producers.

Press censorship extended overseas. War correspondents had to be accredited by the military. Accreditation had been attempted during the Civil War, but it was not so thoroughly nor strictly enforced during that conflict as it was during World War I, when the unaccredited were frequently arrested. Still, accrediting at least allowed reporters routine access to the front, if not freedom from censorship.

Although media outlets experienced unprecedented restrictions during World War I, the media industry also benefited from being harnessed for war aims. The golden age of silent film with its star-studded studio system centered in Hollywood was just beginning as the nation entered the war. Because the war hampered the European film industry's progress, it helped establish American firms' international predominance. Pro-war propaganda films, including an early "preparedness" film, *The Battle Cry of Peace* (1915), in which New York City is unexpectedly attacked, set the stage for later involvement, while films with such titles as *The Kaiser's Shadow* (1918) and *To Hell with the Kaiser* (1918) invited patriotic audiences to sneer at the enemy. Yet war films comprised less than 75 percent of American movies.

World War II

By contrast, nearly one-third of all American films made during the final three years of World War II were about that war. At home, Americans allotted about 23 percent of their recreation money to the cinema, while troops overseas watched thousands of films donated by the War Activities Committee. Although many patriotic features were made, films were subject to some government oversight through the Office of War Information's (OWI) Motion Picture Bureau. Designed to promote propaganda, it sponsored Frank Capra's now classic *War Comes to America* (1945) and encouraged other filmmakers to portray African Americans more positively to secure their participation in the war.

As in World War I, censorship accompanied propaganda campaigns. Calling upon the 1917 Espionage Act, the military cleared all news containing casualty figures; in addition, telephone, cable, and telegraph messages to and from enemy countries via communication companies were interrupted. The Office of Censorship reviewed incoming and outgoing news and periodicals shipped to foreign countries. By this time, the African American press had come under government surveillance for its sometime antiwar stance; the Pittsburgh Courier, however, promoted the "Double V" stance for victory both at home (equal rights) and abroad. Government control of radio facilities, including NBC and CBS, was accomplished through the OWI, which also financed their overseas broadcasting through the Voice of America (VOA).

Used mainly by the military in World War I, radio had by the early 1940s become the primary medium for spreading news and propaganda. By the beginning of World War II, about 90 percent of American households had at least one receiver. Radio aired reports from the European theater, including Edward R. Murrow's *This Is London* on CBS, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt's wartime "fireside chats," the OWI series *This Is Your Enemy*, and singer Kate Smith's war bonds sales pitches. Radio also brought Glenn Miller's orchestra to many homes. Before Miller joined the Army in 1942, audiences could hear his brand of big band swing three nights a week on the *Chesterfield Hour*. Later, Miller created the Army Air Force Orchestra that dedicated tunes to military units; on his Armed Forces Network, he broadcast plays about the "Four Freedoms" along with his band music.

In many ways, World War II's visual imagery spoke louder than words. Alfred Eisenstadt's 1945 photo for *Life* magazine of a newly returned sailor embracing the first woman who crossed his path in Times Square on Victory in Japan Day, remains one of the most memorable images from the war, alongside Joe Rosenthal's February 1945 photograph of marines placing the American flag atop hard-won Mt. Suribachi on Iwo Jima. Photojournalists relayed vivid images of wartime disruption and devastation at home, too. Dorothea Lange and Ansel Adams documented the internment of Japanese Americans in concentration camps across the western United States. Max Desfor's 1945 photographs of Hiroshima blighted by an atomic bomb brought him world renown. Harsh images of the battlefront, however, were often censored. Photographs of combat were submitted to field censors who sent them back to the United States for further review. Many photographs deemed unfit for public viewing, such as sympathetic portrayals of the Japanese or images of emotionally distraught U.S. troops, were sealed in a Pentagon file. Images that met with military approval included "pinup" posters of often provocatively clad female movie stars, Rita Hayworth and Betty Grable among them. The latter's photo had circulated among five million servicemen by the end of the war.

The Korean War

Images of the Korean War mostly came in the form of Army Signal Corps photographs or films and Associated Press photographs. Denied darkrooms, the press had to develop film in Japan. Americans could also witness the war in action through newsreels shown in movie theaters. Although television technology was well developed, only 15 percent of Americans had televisions in their homes by the beginning of the war in 1950. Although some TV cameras were in Korea, live coverage was impossible; most of what was seen on TV was government film footage.

As in World War II, radio was still largely responsible for getting the news out. The Voice Of America, under State Department control after 1945, could broadcast only to foreign countries by terms of the 1948 Smith–Mundt Act; as a propaganda vehicle, the VOA early on suggested that North Korea's invasion of South Korea was inspired by the Soviet Union and gave the impression of domestic consensus about involvement.

Some of World War II's correspondents also covered the Korean War. Having earlier been among the Allied troops liberating the Nazi concentration camps at Dachau and Buchenwald, Marguerite Higgins's Korean battlefield coverage for the *New York Herald Tribune* earned her a Pulitzer Prize (1951) for foreign correspondence; she was the first woman to receive one. The Associated Press's Max Desfor won a Pulitzer Prize for his stunning photograph of the Taedon River bridge wreckage and civilian disruption. Censorship of news on casualties and derogatory commentary on the armed forces was imposed upon accredited correspondents.

The Vietnam War

During the Vietnam War, however, censorship was not enforced. Reporters, including many more women than had been active in World War II, had unprecedented battlefield access and were generally at liberty to travel anywhere to cover breaking events. Reporters were regularly briefed by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and were provided with official news releases. Newspeople nonetheless agreed to follow MACV guidelines that restricted reportage of, for example, intelligence, tactical troop movements, or air strikes. At various times throughout the war, censorship was considered but ultimately rejected because of the infeasibility of enforcement, the "unofficial" status of the war, and reluctance to alienate the press, whose presence in South Vietnam was ever-increasing.

Throughout much of the early war, Saigon-based correspondents reported favorably of government policies. But increasingly they were torn between, on the one hand, representing the administration's declarations that American involvement was limited and that attacks on the North and the Viet Cong were merely retaliatory, and, on the other, the often contradictory events they saw unfolding on the ground, especially as the war escalated under Pres. Lyndon Johnson. Reporters became less and less able to reflect the administration's optimism.

Tensions between reporters and the administration reached a high point under Pres. Richard Nixon, especially over the secret bombings and escalation in Cambodia that contradicted Nixon's promise to withdraw from Vietnam. At times, Nixon even saw the press as an enemy. Indeed, some journalists who questioned war policies, including CBS's Daniel Schorr or the *Washington Post*'s Mary McGrory, found themselves on a Nixon administration "enemies list." The period's growing number of antiwar activists were also subject to government wiretapping and other interventions. Even the *New York Times* faced, in the 1971 Pentagon Papers case, an eventually unsuccessful attempt at prior restraint centering on its publication of a classified retrospective exposé of war-related decision making and public manipulation.

Vietnam was the first so-called television war. The introduction of lightweight sound cameras made TV coverage more feasible and jet travel allowed film to be shipped home rapidly. The spread of television into virtually every American home by 1965 enabled viewers to see Vietnam coverage daily. Before the January 1968 Tet Offensive, approximately 75 percent of televised commentators expressed pro-administration views; after Tet, that had changed to two-to-one against administration policies. The event was regarded, therefore, as a turning point in public perceptions that the war was not going to be easily won, albeit these perceptions had been steadily shifting as the casualty rate rose, independent of media views.

Imagery of the war, whether on TV or in print, was often shocking. Highly sensational were a series of photographs of monks who, in protest over the South Vietnam regime's treatment of Buddhists, dowsed themselves with gasoline and lit themselves on fire. Associated Press reporter Malcolm Browne's 1963 photo of one incident was the first to create a worldwide stir as a visual statement of the war, followed by Eddie Adams's 1968 Pulitzer Prize–winning image of a Vietnamese police chief's executing a Viet Cong captive at point-blank range. Perhaps the greatest long-term visual shock occurred with the fall of Saigon at the end of 1975, with its televised chaos of the last Americans and their hangers-on departing the country.

Military Interventions after Vietnam

The shadow of the media's purported role in the American debacle in Vietnam, which may have amounted to little more than being the messenger of bad tidings, hung over subsequent war coverage. The government and the military would react by fielding a range of strategies to keep the media in check. The first of these, imposed during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, was perhaps the most disastrous. Reporters were kept far from the scene of fighting for its first two crucial days—a virtual freeze-out of media as irrelevant, potentially bothersome, bystanders. The press hardly took this limited battlefield access lying down and, after much complaining and negotiating with the Department of Defense, the presence of reporters on front lines far away from regular news beats was to be ensured through the use of a National News Media Pool. A small number of selected representatives from the press would be allowed access to battlefields and forward positions under security restrictions

and tight rules. Obviously, the press pool could easily fall so much under the thumb of the military that its independence and effectiveness could be comprised, as happened in the invasion of Panama in 1989 when the 16 press representatives were brought in too late and in too limited a capacity to cover the event. Defense Sec. Richard Cheney was later blamed, through an internal investigation set in motion by the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, for putting operational secrecy before the public's right to know.

The Persian Gulf War produced an unusual tension between, on the one hand, the official press pool largely stuck behind the lines in places like the Dhahran International Hotel, occasionally sent by Central Command (CentCom) on often unnewsworthy missions, and, on the other, new groups of independent operators ("unilaterals") and unencumbered cable news teams availing themselves of 24-hour broadcast access and satellite transmission for their reporting. The contrast between major network reporters far from the action repeating official information they were fed and those from these newer organizations filing from near bombing target sites in Baghdad could not have been starker. Cable News Network (CNN) and its on-the-ground reporters such as Peter Arnett and Bernard Shaw became the real winners in the ratings war with other more conventional news outlets and their anchors. Although some observers accused the reporters of virtual treason for witnessing and reporting the horrors of modern warfare from the enemy side, the mainstream press was criticized for collaborating with the military in producing an image of a bloodless, push-button, sanitized war. On the home front, the U.S. media constantly portrayed the war as the un-Vietnam, with broad public support, symbolized by omnipresent images of yellow ribbons tied around trees in support for the troops abroad.

For war reporters, things would only get worse in the next major military ground operation. Public support for armed intervention in Afghanistan in the form of Operation Enduring Freedom after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in combination with the remoteness of battlefields and the special security requirements of covert commando operations, all but scuttled hopes for meaningful U.S. press coverage. Although Enduring Freedom began on October 7,

a press pool was not even formed until November 25; nor was there anything similar to the central official military information outlet that had operated in Dhahran during the Gulf War. Some independent reporters had to fend for themselves, making their own contacts with the two contending Afghan forces, the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, to get stories. Apart from these reports and information the military itself released, Afghanistan is regarded as the least adequately covered war in American history.

The Iraq War

A disheartened press, largely perceived by the public as irrelevant to legitimate government aims in the war on terror faced the task of sorting fact from fable in the run-up to the Iraq War. At this time, brutal economic competition was leading television networks and print media news bureaus alike to cut their staffs around the world. Moreover, the administration-friendly and highly successful news organization Fox News was now in the competition, as were a proliferation of independent Websites doing their own "reporting" and analysis from across the political spectrum. The ranks of the press, which had managed to maintain a solidarity based on claims to objectivity throughout most of the 20th century, had been broken. Little wonder, then, that the traditional press could not effectively assess administration claims that Saddam Hussein posed a threat to U.S. security. For example, at a White House press conference on March 6, 2003, the eve of the invasion of Iraq, reporters could only pitch pre-vetted "softball" questions such as "How is your faith guiding you?" to Pres. George W. Bush. This impotence only demonstrated further that the Fourth Estate could not afford to be adversarial in a moment of national crisis lest it alienate its consumers.

Now that military planners could no longer reasonably consider the press much of a threat, they no longer tried to cut it out entirely, but rather rationalized its role within a framework of public information management as part of the war's larger strategic design. The most visible and telling component of the change was the extensive use of reporters "embedded" under strict rules in combat units to give the public insight into the on-the-ground "realities" of war (little carnage was shown). Rules were so tight that reporters could be kicked

out for so much as finger-drawing a map in the sand suggesting a unit's location, as happened to Fox News Channel's Geraldo Rivera. Despite the restrictions, as many as 600 American and British reporters would be embedded with troops, resulting in what has been called "the most covered war ever" (Tumber and Palmer, 161). The news organizations embraced this opportunity because it promised dramatic footage and first-person reportage that could play well on television. It turned out to be a boon for the military's public relations, too, because most of the embedded reporters ("embeds") bonded with their units to report the war from the soldiers' viewpoint, as heroes in harm's way successfully facing down a determined enemy. To effect such visual reportage on the move, reporters' kits were no longer limited to the traditional pen and paper or typewriter, but now included a small digital camera, a laptop with image-editing capability, and a satellite link to transmit data and/or voice, though some organizations had more elaborate and less portable gear for their embeds. The embeds' most enduring visual moment from the war, albeit clumsily staged as a supposedly spontaneous popular demonstration merely assisted by American troops, was undoubtedly the April 9 toppling of Saddam Hussein's statue in Firdos Square in Baghdad. This episode was actually a marine-initiated psychological operation with only a few Iraqis present. By contrast, behind-the-lines reporters dependent upon briefings from CentComm headquarters in Qatar fared only a little better than their predecessors in the Gulf War in wresting timely information from tight-lipped military officials (veteran reporter Peter Arnett sat out the conflict after NBC fired him for giving a March 31, 2003, Iraqi television interview critical of U.S. policy). Still, the ever-worsening trend of mutual hostility between the post-Vietnam military and the press seemed reversed in the Iraq War. Seen another way, a system of controlling information within the parameters of the public's "right to know," even if that amounted to little more than validating government policy, was finally being achieved.

New media developments, however, began to challenge that control during the war and the occupation that followed. Perhaps the most significant of these came from offshore media producers, particularly Qatar's Arabic news station al-Jazeera. That network did not hesitate to broadcast to its estimated 45 million viewers images of the civilian casualties of U.S. bombings of Iraqi towns and cities, as well as captured British and American service personnel, the latter of which sparked bitter protests from their respective governments. Al-Jazeera and other regionally based media organizations also managed to broadcast footage from areas where it was simply too dangerous for Western journalists to go. It all amounted to a "take" on the war often at odds with what U.S. military planners wanted to show, yet too tempting for ratings-hungry U.S. news organizations to avoid entirely. Thus, some images and stories originating with al-Jazeera worked their way into major network broadcasts or metropolitan dailies.

Traditional print and television reporting did manage one striking, enduring story: inmate abuse by American guards and other personnel at Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison. Although these incidents were first reported by *New Yorker* journalist Seymour Hersch and related images were first broadcast on *60 Minutes II* on April 29, 2004, the story had legs not because of these traditional outlets, but through constant reiteration on the Internet.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the 21st century, American media seemed content to play a supporting role in the Bush administration's military interventions and postwar occupational policies. This trend toward foreign policy synchrony between the government and the media has resulted in limited and largely unsympathetic coverage of domestic critics and street-level antiwar protests. At the same time, however, audiences' interest in news media of all sorts was withering, so conventional war journalism's future looked very dim. War reportage was gaining a transitory audience at the peak of the fighting, only to experience an abrupt sloping off immediately thereafter. Will the new media of the Internet and subscription broadcast solidify into an independent center of sustained policy analysis and critique? It remains to be seen. Ever-tighter control of public information control and suppression of dissent might well be the near-future consequence of heightened security needs accompanying the war on terror. If so, the relationship of war and media in U.S. history may be beginning a new chapter.

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Related Entries

Censorship and the Military; CNN; Combat-Zone Photography; Espionage and Sedition Acts; Frontline Reporting; Newsreels; Office of Censorship; Political Cartoons; Propaganda and Psychological Operations; Propaganda Posters: World War I; Propaganda Posters: World War II; Radio in World War II; Voice of America

Related Documents

1970 c; 1971 b

—Ronald J. Zboray and Mary Saracino Zboray

Medicine and War

The horrific high-tech weapons of 20th-century warfare give deadly meaning to Russian surgeon Nikolai Pirogov's definition of war as an epidemic of trauma. However, 18th- and 19th-century wars might more accurately be described as epidemics of disease. Throughout the nation's first 145 years, more American soldiers died of infectious diseases than from battle injuries. Even in minor conflicts, microbes proved more deadly than bullets: in the Second Seminole War, 75 percent of deaths were attributable to malaria.

Death tolls understate the impact of disease on warfare. Healthy combatants win wars; the sick are ineffective. Debilitation from disease causes an enormous drain on an army's resources and compromises its fighting strength. For every typhoid fever victim who died in the Spanish–American War in the 19th century, for example, 13 survived and were unfit for duty for at least two months. The 20,738 cases of typhoid fever that occurred during that war were the equal of 20 infantry regiments out of action.

Infectious diseases were the bane of 18th- and 19th-century armies. As physicians of that era had few effective

remedies, the greatest contributions of military medicine were to disease prevention. With the groundwork in preventive medicine laid, 20th-century military medicine focused more on the management of mass casualties, trauma surgery, and psychiatry.

Preventive Medicine

Immunization

The American invasion of Canada in 1775 failed because of a smallpox epidemic. Smallpox was so dangerous in the camps and on campaign that Gen. George Washington became convinced that only variolation (smallpox inoculation) could prevent the destruction of his army. Evidence of British efforts to infect American troops with smallpox strengthened Washington's resolve to pursue this course. Introduced in Boston in 1721, variolation consisted of inserting matter from a smallpox pustule under the skin of a healthy individual. A mild attack of the disease usually ensued, followed by lifelong immunity against smallpox. (Most British soldiers had either survived the disease in childhood or been inoculated in the military.) Because inoculated soldiers actually contracted the disease, they had to be quarantined. But the military risks of troops temporarily sidelined were far less than those posed by an epidemic. The Continental Army's adoption in 1777 of mandatory inoculation was the most significant medical success of the Revolutionary War. A smallpox-free Army contributed substantially to winning the war.

In 1798 British physician Edward Jenner introduced the safer method of vaccination (L. vaccinia, cowpox). Scratched into the skin of healthy subjects, cowpox virus (obtained from lesions on a cow's teat) conferred immunity to smallpox. Vaccination soon became the method of choice for preventing smallpox. On the eve of the War of 1812, Sec. of War William Eustis, a physician, ordered the vaccination of all American troops. Its success spurred Congress in 1813 to establish a vaccination program for civilians.

Smallpox mortality rates plummeted in the late 1800s as vaccination gained widespread acceptance, and a milder strain of smallpox, Variola minor, replaced the more virulent Variola major. By the 1970s Americans were no longer routinely vaccinated against smallpox. In 1979 the Global

Commission for the Certification of Smallpox Eradication reported the eradication of the disease. In the 21st century, fears of bioterrorism have revived interest in smallpox vaccination.

For each soldier killed in combat during the Spanish–American War, more than seven died from disease. (Ratios of disease deaths to combat deaths—an index of how many soldiers died from disease for each soldier killed in combat—for America's major wars are listed in the accompanying table.) The chief culprit was typhoid fever, one of the most formidable diseases of 19th- and early 20th-century military life. Army physician Walter Reed and his associates on the U.S. Army Typhoid Board unraveled the epidemiology of typhoid fever. Having shown that every regiment could contain chronic typhoid carriers, that human contact and flies readily transmitted the disease, and that camp sanitation was rarely up to par, it followed that some simple and effective method was needed to immunize the troops. Antityphoid inoculation developed by British pathologist Almroth Wright was introduced into U.S. Army clinical trials in 1909 with remarkable results. Only 5 of 12,644 soldiers inoculated developed the disease; none died as a result. In 1911 the U.S. Army became the first military organization in the world to make antityphoid inoculation compulsory. Typhoid vaccine (killed typhoid bacteria) is credited with reducing the World War I typhoid death rate 185-fold compared with the Spanish–American War. If the typhoid fever morbidity rate had remained unchanged, more than 500,000 typhoid cases would have been reported among the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) during World War I.

The typhoid epidemics in the military encampments had civil repercussions. City officials, fearing similar outbreaks, attended more assiduously to public health measures, such as water purification, sewage treatment, animal waste disposal, and milk inspection. Typhoid vaccine was not given routinely to civilians; however, it was resorted to in emergencies such as the 1937 Ohio River flood, during which polluted drinking water threatened to spread typhoid among 13,000 homeless families.

Infectious diseases nevertheless remained a problem for the military in World War I: 53,402 American soldiers and sailors died in combat, 54,000 died of disease. Influenza and

Ratios of Disease Deaths to Combat Deaths (Killed in Action and Died of Wounds) in America's Major Wars

ratio
(disease deaths to every one combat death)

2.7 : 1 — Revolutionary War, 1775–83
2.5 : 1 — War of 1812, 1812–15
6.5 : 1 — Mexican–American War, 1846–48
2.0 : 1 — Civil War, 1861–65
7.4 : 1 — Spanish–American War, 1898–1902
3.1 : 1 — Philippine War, 1899–1902
1.0 : 1 — World War I, 1917–18
0.4 : 1 — World War II, 1941–45
0.6 : 1 — Korean War, 1950–53
0.2 : 1 — Vietnam War, 1964–73

Source: Chambers 849, Cirillo 31-2, Crosby 206, Grob 145, Summers 76.

its sequelae (pneumonia) accounted for 80 percent of the total deaths from disease. The influenza virus mutated so rapidly that the flu vaccine available in 1918 proved ineffective against the new, lethal strain. That infectious diseases were reduced to a minor threat during World War II and Korea was attributable, in large part, to the immunization of American troops against smallpox, typhoid, typhus, yellow fever, tetanus, plague, and cholera.

The immunization program of the military may or may not have been influential as a model for civilian medicine. In any event, preventive medicine was practiced widely in the civilian sphere, especially in regard to childhood diseases. In 2004, American children were routinely immunized against hepatitis B, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (whooping cough), Hemophilus influenzae, pneumococcus, polio, measles, mumps, rubella (German measles), and chickenpox.

Sanitation

Pollution in military camps was taken for granted throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. During the Mexican–American War, the high ratio of disease deaths to combat deaths was attributable to abysmal sanitary conditions aggravated by rapid mobilization, undisciplined volunteers (regulars practiced good hygiene), and inexperienced line officers in command. The mistakes of 1846 were repeated in the Civil War and the Spanish–American War, because advances in civilian public health in the interwar years were ignored

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by the military. The vile fecal odors that permeated regimental campsites were an infallible index of the military's neglect of sanitation. During the Civil War, when a medical officer objected to the smell, he was dismissed by the commanding officer with the remark that it "was inseparable from the army. . . . it might properly be called the patriotic odor" (Cirillo, 4). Medical officers could only advise; they depended on the cooperation of line officers in authority to implement any sanitary policies. This cooperation was not often forthcoming, with the result that medical disasters continued to plague the military establishment.

Philadelphia physician Benjamin Rush's *Directions for Preserving the Health of Soldiers Recommended to . . . the Officers of the United States Army* (1778) had placed the responsibility for the health of an army directly on the shoulders of its line officers (commanding officers). Unfortunately for the welfare of the military, Rush's recommendations went unheeded until the typhoid epidemic in the Spanish–American War exposed the culpability of line officers and led to reforms in military education. With the establishment of the Department of Military Hygiene (1905) at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, line officers were instructed in the fundamentals of military hygiene and camp sanitation. Military hygiene became an integral part of military science, with line officers becoming responsible for safeguarding the health of their commands.

Mosquito Extermination

Occupation of Cuba after the Spanish–American War posed a serious threat to Army personnel, because yellow fever was endemic to the island. Once again Walter Reed was chosen to head the U.S. Army Yellow Fever Board charged with investigating the etiology and prevention of this dreaded disease. Within a remarkably short time, Reed and his coworkers discredited previous theories on yellow fever and demonstrated that the disease was transmitted solely by means of the bites of infected female Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. Reed's work attracted considerable attention and led to the recognition of military medicine as a legitimate specialty. By 1946 Surgeon Gen. Raymond Bliss was able to boast: "The days of isolation are over. . . . Army medicine is a branch of American medicine" (Smith, 1618).

Mosquito extermination gave Americans a scientific rationale for preventing a repeat of the notorious yellow-fever epidemics that had decimated Philadelphia (1793), New Orleans (1853), and Memphis (1878). Centuries-old dogmas of miasmas, quarantine, and burning the homes and personal effects of yellow fever victims were abandoned. Applying the new methods, Maj. William Gorgas and his sanitary team waged a relentless war against mosquitoes on the Isthmus of Panama, eradicating yellow fever and malaria from the Canal Zone. Between 1904 and 1914, this work saved more than 71,000 lives during construction of the Panama Canal. Similar antimosquito campaigns opened the tropics—long known as the "white man's grave"—to American expansion.

Medical Evacuation

In 1862 Jonathan Letterman, medical director of the Army of the Potomac, devised an ambulance system—under control of the Army Medical Department—that revolutionized the evacuation of the sick and wounded. Gradually, better means of transportation evolved. Horse-drawn wagons were supplanted by automobile and airplane ambulances in World War I, and by helicopters in the Korean and Vietnam wars. The quicker a wounded soldier reached a rear-area hospital where aseptic surgery and medicines were available, the more likely the outcome would be favorable. The mortality rate of hospitalized wounded in World War II was halved in the Korean War, because the average evacuation time was reduced from 12 to 15 hours to 4 to 6 hours. In Vietnam, the addition of a medical radio network connecting helicopters with hospitals further increased efficiency. Wounded reached a hospital within 2 hours of injury; 97.5 percent survived—the lowest died-of-wounds rate in American history.

The military's organizational and administrative innovations for handling casualties were adopted by civilian society. In the wake of the Civil War, ambulance services were organized in most major cities and towns in the United States. The great success of air ambulances in Korea and Vietnam awakened civilian authorities to the potential of MEDEVAC choppers for saving the lives of heart attack, traffic accident, and gunshot victims.

Trauma Surgery

Most casualties in America's wars were caused by small-arms fire. The most significant change in the military rifle over the course of history, from the medical perspective, was the increase in muzzle velocity. From a Civil War velocity of less than the speed of sound (1,088 ft/sec), the M16/AK47-type weapons in Vietnam fired bullets in excess of 3,000 ft/sec. High-velocity bullets caused extensive tissue damage beyond the bullet track, and blood vessels not in the direct path of the projectile were destroyed. Half of all World War II wounds of the extremities ended in amputation. Arterial repair, the outstanding surgical innovation of the Korean War, vastly reduced the number of amputations. Sophisticated vascular repair surgery was commonplace during the Vietnam War.

Bullets often take erratic paths after entering the body, making it impossible to find them by probing. During the Civil War, the insertion of unsterilized probes and unwashed fingers into gunshot wounds caused infections, with pernicious consequences. In the Spanish–American War, X-rays were used for the first time, with great effect, as a diagnostic aid in the treatment of wounded American soldiers. World War I brought X-ray technology to the bedside. Thereafter, wherever surgery was performed during wartime, X-rays were used.

World War I was the driving force behind the development of radiology as a medical specialty in the United States. Army surgeons who had become accustomed to working as a team with radiologists continued the habit when they returned to private practice. Even returning doughboys (the nickname given to infantrymen), who had gained an appreciation of X-rays overseas, demanded them when they were confronted with illness.

Hemorrhage caused wounded soldiers to go into shock (low blood pressure, chills, and rapid heartbeat), which could quickly turn fatal. In World War I, transfusions of whole blood were found to control shock and improve the surgical outcome. In the Korean War, it was discovered that shock patients required more blood (average 3.3 pints) than previously thought. This information was critical for civilian trauma surgery, which was increasingly being confronted with severe automobile injuries.

Amputation, the hallmark of Civil War surgery, was done chiefly to control wound infections. In World War I, 12 to 15 percent of the wounded died from infections. This was reduced to 3 percent in World War II, largely attributable to the introduction of penicillin, an antibiotic derived from a mold, Penicillium notatum.

Penicillin was discovered in 1928 by Scots bacteriologist Alexander Fleming. Because of problems with its isolation, purification, and large-scale fermentation, penicillin was still a laboratory phenomenon at the beginning of the war. Howard Florey, Ernst Chain, and Norman Heatley—the Oxford University team that first extracted and tested penicillin in mice and humans—tried in vain to interest British pharmaceutical companies in producing enough antibiotic for clinical trials. The wartime demand for standard drugs was simply too great. In 1941 Florey and Heatley traveled to the United States where, after much effort, Americans were persuaded to take up the gauntlet. The American pharmaceutical industry made penicillin a therapeutic reality by collaborating in a massive development program. By D-Day (June 6, 1944), 100 billion units per month—enough to treat 40,000—were being manufactured. From 1944 to the collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945, American deaths from infection approximated zero. In the postwar era, millions of civilians benefited from antibiotics.

Psychiatry

War shatters minds as well as bodies. Even battle-hardened veterans experience mental breakdowns after sustained fighting. The existence of combat neuroses had gone unrecognized until World War I when British soldiers began arriving at Casualty Clearing Stations in France with a puzzling array of psychosomatic symptoms. Medical experts labeled the syndrome "shell-shock," because it was thought to be due to shock to the central nervous system from the concussive effect of exploding artillery shells. (The Western Front had been the scene of incessant cannonade.) The British treated their psychiatric casualties with drugs and evacuation home; the American Expeditionary Force employed a policy of rest and recuperation (R&R) at forward aid stations.

Applying R&R therapy 25 years later in North Africa during World War II, more than 70 percent of battle fatigue

(the term that superseded shell-shock) cases were returned to their units within 48 hours. World War II research revealed that every soldier had a breaking point, which was about 88 days of combat. The great insights into war neuroses gained in World War II—psychological casualties were not cowards or weaklings, but normal people breaking down under extraordinary circumstances—were ignored by postwar psychiatrists who believed that childhood experiences produced abnormal individuals who were predisposed to mental breakdowns.

In the Korean War, rotation of combat units and R&R leaves in Japan reduced the number of psychiatric casualties. Vietnam introduced the concept of delayed stress reactions— soldiers who appeared normal in the war zone who later developed debilitating emotional problems when readjusting to civilian life. The term post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), coined in 1980, implied that this was a new condition arising from the so-called surreal nature of war in Vietnam. Historical evidence clearly shows, however, that Civil War veterans suffered from the same symptoms: nightmares, flashbacks, disoriented thinking, depression, and anxiety. The difference in the 20th century was that veterans' issues became politicized. As a result of successful lobbying by activist groups, PTSD was instated as a service-related disability.

Conclusion

Some aspects of medical science (typhoid epidemiology, insect vectors) and practice (penicillin, X-rays, trauma surgery) have been advanced by the urgency of war, while others have generally been unaffected (immunizations, psychiatry). When medicine does benefit from war, often it is military medicine itself (antityphoid inoculation, military hygiene, medical evacuation), not its civilian counterpart. In addition, civilian health care may suffer as a result of wartime reallocations of material and human resources. Social historian Roger Cooter argues that, from a combatant's standpoint, "war is not good for medicine so much as medicine is good for war" (1553). From the Revolutionary War on, the military's ultimate reason for preserving the health of its soldiers is to have them fit enough to face death in battle.

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—*Vincent J. Cirillo*

Memorial Day

In 1868, the Grand Army of the Republic's (GAR) national commander, John Logan, proclaimed May 30 of that year a day when all GAR posts throughout the country would pay tribute to the fallen soldiers of the Civil War. Logan's pronouncement established Memorial Day (initially known as Decoration Day) as a semiofficial day of remembrance throughout the North, but the practice of decorating Union and Confederate soldiers' graves with flowers and flags predated his proclamation. In 1866, for instance, the women of Columbus, Mississippi, decorated both Union and Confederate graves, an act praised by *New York Tribune* editor Horace Greeley as a sign that the South was ready to reunite. Several other northern and southern towns claimed that their local rituals inspired Logan to make his declaration. Not until 1966 did the federal government declare Waterloo, New York, as the birthplace of Memorial Day.

The emphasis on honoring the average citizen–soldier departed from the past practice of primarily honoring national heroes, such as George Washington or the Marquis de Lafayette. On the first national Decoration Day ceremony, 5,000 attendees at Arlington National Cemetery tried to strike a tone of reconciliation by decorating the graves of both Union and Confederate troops with the American flag. The tone struck by GAR posts throughout the land was less conciliatory, reflecting the increase in sectional bitterness caused by Reconstruction policies that required the South to recognize the rights of freedmen before gaining readmission in the Union.

The official GAR ceremony called on all post members to attend church in uniform the Sunday before Memorial Day.

On May 30, posts assembled and marched to their town cemeteries where they decorated soldiers' graves and then conducted short services filled with patriotic speeches and music, including selections such as "God Save Our Union." As one GAR commander from Massachusetts explained in 1874: "Memorial Day is the day on which we commemorate the memory of our fallen comrades, and let it be forever understood that we distinguish between loyalty and disloyalty." The question of which flag to use in commemorating the dead also caused a rift between the North and South that hurt efforts to organize shared commemorative rituals. GAR members bristled at the thought of Southerners decorating graves or marching with Confederate flags on Memorial Day. In response, several southern states, in alliance with local Ladies Memorial Associations, began organizing their own rituals to honor their fallen heroes, creating Confederate Memorial Days that are still observed on different dates throughout the South.

Celebration of Memorial Day took on particular significance in the African American community, offering a time to celebrate the contribution of black soldiers to the Union victory and to comment on the current state of race relations. The fraternity between black and white Union veterans, as evidenced by the willingness of the GAR to welcome black posts, received special mention during many Memorial Day commentaries in the black press. In addition, African American celebrants focused on Memorial Day as a moment to reaffirm the cause of emancipation and equal rights as well as union. In Boston, for instance, black veterans decorated the graves of William Lloyd Garrison and Charles Sumner on Memorial Day. In 1878, Frederick Douglass underscored the abolitionist purpose of the war in a Memorial Day address, insisting that the war had been "between the old and new, slavery and freedom, barbarism and civilization."

By the 1880s, Decoration Day had become known as Memorial Day. Ceremonies now focused on using this day to remember the nation's fallen with ceremonies meant to inspire patriotism among the youth of a new generation who had no personal recollection of the war. "So to the indifferent inquirer who asks why Memorial Day is still kept up we may answer, it celebrates and solemnly reaffirms from year to year a national act of enthusiasm and faith," Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., a Civil War veteran and a future Supreme Court

justice, noted in a Memorial Day address in 1884. Using Memorial Day ceremonies to instruct the nation's youth in the nature of sacrifice also required underscoring the justness of the Union cause. This revival of sectional antagonism each Memorial Day stood in sharp contrast to other rituals of the period that tended to focus on celebrating Union and Confederate veterans as honorable men who fought nobly for their respective causes. As Reconstruction came to an end, the nation increasingly preferred to view the Confederacy through the haze of "Lost Cause" imagery that emphasized the valor of Confederate soldiers and the romantic character of antebellum plantation life. Veterans' reunions and encampments, however, still remained more neutral places to celebrate the valor of each side than Memorial Day ceremonies.

The Spanish–American War and World War I helped transform Memorial Day into an occasion to remember the dead of all wars. Memorial Day addresses tended to focus more on the theme of reunification to muster support for the new national military crusades. After World War I, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (inspired by John McCrae's poem, "In Flanders Fields") began selling poppies to raise money for disabled veterans before Memorial Day, a practice that continues to this day. Along with the passage of time, this shift in emphasis diluted the role Memorial Day ceremonies had traditionally played in reviving animosity between the North and the South. Discussion shifted to reminding Americans each year of the true purpose of Memorial Day, especially in times of peace. In the 1950s, members of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Division initiated the practice of decorating every grave in Arlington Cemetery with an American flag. In 1971, Congress shifted the observance of Memorial Day to the last Monday in May, arousing some criticism that a day of formal remembrance had turned into an excuse for workers to enjoy a three-day weekend. In 2000, Congress made an effort to remind Americans of the holiday's original meaning by passing a resolution urging Americans to observe a moment of silence each Memorial Day at 3 p.m. local time.

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Related Entries

Grand Army of the Republic; Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; Veterans Day

Related Documents

1864 c; 1938

—*Jennifer D. Keene*

Memorials and Monuments

Like many other societies, the United States has shaped some of its most prominent public spaces around war memorials that identify formative experiences of the nation and propose visions of peacetime order. While the development of this landscape has at times shared in transatlantic trends, American war memorials have often followed a separate pattern that reflects not only the particular military history of the country but also a persistent ambivalence toward the centralizing, hierarchical, expansionist implications of the commemorative vocabulary inherited from the triumphal arches and columns and equestrian statues of the Roman Empire.

The Early Republic

The contrast between monuments from the Seven Years' War and those commemorating the American Revolution illustrate this tension. After repeal of the Stamp Act refreshed colonists' eagerness to celebrate the ascendant British Empire, in 1770 the New York legislature installed a

gilded equestrian monument of George III atop a marble pedestal in New York City, an echo of the Roman practice that marked the provinces with equestrian statues of the emperor, the only person who could be thus memorialized. Patriots rejected that tradition by toppling the New York statue soon after issuance of the Declaration of Independence and melting it down to make ammunition. Monuments to George Washington demonstrated the struggle to imagine an alternative iconography. A 1783 congressional resolution to place an equestrian statue of the commander of the Continental Army in the new capital was soon disregarded. The cornerstone for what became the Washington Monument was not laid until 1848, and the structure was not completed until 1884. For years the most prominent tribute to Washington was Horatio Greenough's colossal portrait statue outside the U.S. Capitol (1840), controversial for its use of classical dress but thoroughly conventional in depicting the general surrendering his sword after the success of the Revolution, highlighting the surrender of military authority to civil authority.

When equestrian monuments began to appear in the United States in the 1850s, Americans remained wary of their ideological connotations. Thomas Crawford's design for a monument to Washington in Richmond (1858) adapted from the Berlin monument to Frederick the Great the format of a mounted military leader surrounded by representative figures of his era, but the sculptor was careful to explain that he depicted Washington pointing forward not as an act of command but as an exhortation to his soldiers. The same democratic emphasis was even more evident in monuments to the other American war hero honored by antebellum equestrian monuments, Andrew Jackson, most notably in Clark Mills's statue (1853) in Washington, D.C., depicting Jackson as an embodiment of nature rather than military discipline.

The United States took more readily to another European commemorative trend, the emergence during the wars of the French Revolution of monuments to citizen–soldiers who sacrificed their lives for the nation. Early examples included the obelisk dedicated in 1799 to residents of Lexington, Massachusetts, who died in the opening engagement of the American Revolution; the monument placed in Washington in 1806 honoring six naval officers who died on the Barbary Coast; and the memorial installed in New York in 1808 to Revolutionary martyrs who died on prison ships in New York Harbor. By 1860, about 50 Revolutionary War battlefields featured monuments that marked the historic sites for visitors and honored the dead. The most important of these was the Bunker Hill Monument at Charlestown, Massachusetts, the site of spectacular ceremonies featuring widely circulated speeches by Daniel Webster at both the laying of the cornerstone in 1825 and the dedication in 1843. Here, too, the selection of a funereal obelisk for the design partly reflected a determination to avoid the imperial associations of a column.

Expansion of the Memorial Tradition

After the Mexican War, battlefield commemoration of fallen soldiers was complemented by the erection of several monuments in states where these men had volunteered for service. This pattern swept the country in the wake of the Civil War. Many community monuments arose in northeastern towns, although important early midwestern examples include Randolph Rogers's soldier memorial for Spring Grove Cemetery in Cincinnati, Ohio (1865), the first American monument to take the form of a statue of a rank-and-file soldier. Because these monuments had no coordinated source of sponsorship, a wide range of types emerged. In the immediate postwar period, most of them emphasized death in one way or another. The most common early design was the obelisk, and the sentinel figure that soon became iconic originally had close associations with death as a result of the vulnerability of picket guards in the Civil War and their imputed tendency to reflect during lonely midnight vigils on lost comrades as well as on families at home.

By the end of the 1880s almost 200 single-figure soldier statues had been placed around the country, and many cities aspiring to something grander had installed a shaft surrounded by statues of soldiers and sailors. Inscriptions routinely echoed Lincoln's praise in the Gettysburg Address for men who had died so that the nation might live. Monuments in the defeated South were slower to appear but followed a similar design trajectory. In early years they were placed in cemeteries more frequently than their northern counterparts, in part because southern communities usually lacked

the village green that provided an alternative location in New England towns. The most striking difference between northern and southern monuments was that women played a much more prominent role in the sponsorship of Confederate monuments, which added to the associations with mourning while also creating a useful political platform for white southern women.

The convergence of Union and Confederate monuments was a key part of the process by which remembrance of the Civil War settled into an intersectional focus on manly courage, the loss of life, and citizens' obligations to their country rather than the controversies over race and slavery that had precipitated the war. Very few monuments effectively highlighted the centrality of emancipation to the wartime transformation of American society. Instead, monuments became one of the main features in the development of battlefield parks, a forum explicitly intended to advance sectional reconciliation by honoring the experiences shared by veterans on both sides. But the most critically acclaimed Civil War memorial proved to be the one that centered most directly on the topic of race in the redefinition of American citizenship: Augustus Saint-Gaudens's monument to Robert Gould Shaw and the 54th (Colored) Regiment of Massachusetts, dedicated in Boston in 1897. Commentators have long debated whether the high-relief panel, which depicts the mounted Shaw alongside his marching troops in a review upon their departure for the war, more fully expresses the promise of a racially integrated democracy or the persistence of racial hierarchy.

Civil War monuments shifted significantly as the Union monuments dedicated to all soldiers who had served in the war began during the 1880s to outnumber the monuments dedicated to soldiers who had died. The same recognition of veterans took hold in the South during the first decade of the 20th century as the installation of Confederate monuments accelerated to its peak. These monuments were now much more often placed in town centers than in cemeteries. The iconic stationary sentinel increasingly gave way to memorials that depicted soldiers marching, fighting, or carrying flags. This trend, which aligned the image of the Civil War soldier with monuments recalling other conflicts, such as Daniel Chester French's *Minuteman* (1875) in Concord,

Massachusetts, continued into the Spanish–American War. T. A. R. Kitson's *The Hiker* (1906), the most frequently reproduced monument to soldiers of that struggle, aptly illustrates the rising ideal of strenuous masculinity.

Tributes to military authority moved in a different direction. The Jacksonian preference for animated leaders who shared the experiences of their men and expressed the influences of nature continued after the war in such works as Saint-Gaudens's memorial to Adm. David Farragut in New York City (1881). By the turn of the century, monuments to commanders usually depicted them as still and removed, a treatment extended to such unlikely subjects as Nathan Bedford Forrest in Memphis, Tennessee (1905), and George Armstrong Custer in Monroe, Michigan (1910). The sites chosen for these monuments dramatized the Gilded Age social hierarchies they reinforced. The towering equestrian Robert E. Lee in Richmond, Virginia (1890), struck the keynote for the class and racial deference expected to prevail in the new elite neighborhood to be built up around the statue on Monument Avenue. The equally imposing equestrian tribute to William Tecumseh Sherman on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., (1903), which depicts the general watching his men in the Grand Army Review of 1865, puts citizens walking along the principal boulevard of the capital in the place of soldiers under the review of their commanding officer.

New visions of national glory emerged at the same time. In 1888 the mayor of Brooklyn vetoed an appropriation for a conventional shaft surrounded by soldiers as too funereal, and the city instead dedicated a monument on Grand Army Plaza (1892) reminiscent of the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. Yorktown, Virginia, acquired an impressive triumphal column in 1885, a little more than a century after the surrender of Cornwallis ended the Revolutionary War. The same year, the dedication of the Washington Monument established at the center of the National Mall an awe-inspiring demonstration of American strength, in which a modern elevator whisked visitors to what was then the most commanding engineered vista in the world.

The most striking expression of American imperial ambition was the redesign of the Mall at both of its ends. At the Capitol end was an enormous monument to U. S. Grant

An August 28, 1963, civil rights demonstration in front of the Lincoln Memorial. (Getty Images)

(1922), designed as a parade-reviewing stand for the president. Its composition emphasized the distance between the calm reserve of the Union commander depicted in the equestrian statue at the center and the frenzied strife that was the fate of the valorous soldiers depicted on the wings. At the other end of the Mall was the Lincoln Memorial (1922), which marked the distinctive American victory in the Civil War by serving as an anchor for the conciliatory Memorial Bridge, a link between the Union capital and the Virginia home of Confederate leader Robert E. Lee, converted during the war into Arlington National Cemetery. The imposing temple also illustrated a powerful vision of political order by inviting citizens to climb the marble steps and enter the enclosed sanctuary to express their reverence before Daniel Chester French's colossal statue of the war president. Nevertheless, the Lincoln Memorial soon became pivotal to a grassroots democratic movement, as African Americans began to hold civil rights rallies at the site shortly after the segregated dedication ceremonies. This strategy drew national attention when black opera star Marian Anderson broadcast a radio concert from the memorial on Easter Sunday 1939 after the Daughters of the American Revolution denied her the use of their hall.

Modernity and the War Memorial

American memorials of World War I reflected both the specific national experience in the conflict and the influence of the commemorative tradition. Internationalists encouraged the United States to follow the lead of its allies in such remembrances as the dedication of a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery (1921). But most monuments to American doughboys shared less with somber statues of the French poilu than with the animated figures in then-recent monuments to soldiers of the Civil War and Spanish–American War. The most widely reproduced memorial of the war was E. M. Viquesney's *Spirit of the American*

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Doughboy (1920), which featured a soldier leaping "over the top" from his trench, advancing through barbed wire and preparing to throw a grenade. Other popular designs similarly shared an ideal of martial heroism remote from the nightmarish essence of trench warfare. American monuments also interpreted the Great War in conventional terms of victory more readily than had European monuments, as in Cass Gilbert's and Daniel Chester French's First Division Memorial in Washington (1924). Pacifist influences deepened later in the 1920s, but they did not produce the antiwar statements that characterize some European monuments. Concurrently, the American recoil against its own commemorative tradition also distinguished it from other nations. Appalled by the mass production and marketing of Civil War monuments, a substantial movement called for remembrance of World War I through utilitarian memorials—such as libraries, auditoriums, and community centers—instead of statues or purely commemorative architectural forms. Although in Europe such alternative remembrances were widely considered an inadequate response to the catastrophic loss of life, in the United States the proposal sparked a reasonably evenly matched debate and resulted in war memorials of many kinds.

With the coming of World War II, champions of utilitarian memorials dubbed them "living memorials" and gained the upper hand in commemorative planning. The lack of enthusiasm for traditional war memorials to commemorate World War II had a number of reasons, including the nature of the war, in which more than half of the casualties were civilians, and which had left the shadows of the Holocaust and nuclear weaponry over all nations. World War I monuments had not repaired the American dissatisfaction with war memorials that had grown through commemoration of the Civil War. To the contrary, the modernist movement in art tended to reject the concept of the public monument, which in any case fit less readily into urban frameworks increasingly organized around automobiles. In addition, the pervasiveness of photographs and film had undercut the authority of monuments in commemorative visual culture. This last point is illustrated by the most influential World War II monument, the Marine Corps Memorial in Arlington, Virginia (1954). The image of soldiers planting a flag on Iwo Jima struck a

responsive chord not only because it drew on the tradition of vigorous soldierly statues but also because it faithfully reproduced a well-known photograph and an event depicted in newsreels and later in the popular movie *The Sands of Iwo Jima* (1949). The connection between soldiers and the home front had come to center on the mass media rather than on local communities, many of which merely added the names of World War II casualties to previous war memorials.

If the American tradition of war memorials slipped into dormancy after World War II, it revived dramatically with the dedication of Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial (1982) on the Mall in Washington, D.C., one of the most important artistic and cultural events in the United States during the late 20th century. The highly polished, black granite, V-shaped wall embedded in the earth as a rift or gash is the antithesis of the memorials at which its ends point—the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial. Incised on the wall are the names of all 57,692 American military personnel who lost their lives in the Vietnam conflict. Although the list is in chronological order of death date, the memorial denies a linear narrative reading by beginning the names at the vertex of the wall, the lowest point of the adjacent inclined walkway, and continuing along the right wing; it resumes at the end of the left wing where visitors enter the memorial, and the list of the dead ends back at the center. The product of a reexamination of the American martial heritage that also influenced the U.S. Navy Memorial in Washington, D.C. (1987)—described by its designer, Stanley Bleifeld, as a tribute to life at sea rather than to national naval power—the Vietnam Veterans Memorial introduced into American commemoration the critical style of war memorials that had emerged in Europe after World War I. That iconoclasm sparked controversy, and Lin's opponents succeeded in placing near her work an American flag and a conventional statue of three American soldiers in Vietnam. But Lin's elegant synthesis of memorialization and artistic modernism soon became the most popular monument in Washington, its open arms comforting visitors who honor the dead by touching or tracing the names and by other acts of remembrance, including the placement of military medals, photographs, personal letters, and a vast array of other mementoes at the wall. The

The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall, designed by Maya Lin. (© James P. Blair/CORBIS)

National Park Service established a Vietnam Veterans Memorial Collection to preserve these items, which numbered about 30,000 when the Park Service and the Smithsonian Institution began to organize the first exhibition from the collection in October 1991. As such practices helped the Vietnam Veterans Memorial develop into the leading symbol of the honor accorded American veterans, the memorial demonstrated that a monument can be a complex, dynamic site with meanings defined by different segments of the public as well as the designer.

The Vietnam Veterans Memorial contributed significantly to a renewal of interest in public monuments, and particularly war memorials. Communities across the country erected tributes to their soldiers of the Vietnam War and in many cases followed by honoring veterans of World War II and the Korean War. The most prominent initiatives took place on the Mall in Washington. Glenna Goodacre's Vietnam Women's Memorial (1993), a figurative ensemble,

added to the set of monuments honoring female military personnel that dated to early 20th-century tributes to Civil War nurses. The Korean War Veterans Memorial (1995), which includes 19 stainless steel soldiers advancing in full gear, represents the most elaborate extension of the tradition of soldier statues. The memorial also seeks to provide both an interactive experience paralleling Lin's work and to incorporate other modern media of remembrance by featuring a long black granite wall sandblasted with approximately 2,000 photographic images from the Korean War.

Contemporary visual culture played a less conspicuous but crucial part in the completion of the National World War II Memorial (2004), for which fund-raising accelerated sharply upon the success of the film *Saving Private Ryan* (1998). The project aroused substantial controversy, in part because the site on the Mall selected for the monument threatened to infringe upon the area in front of the Lincoln Memorial that had become an iconic forum of American

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democracy in the aftermath of the March on Washington led by Martin Luther King Jr. in 1963. Moreover, Friedrich St. Florian's design for the memorial plaza—shaped by arches symbolic of the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, surrounded by 56 pillars representing each of the states and territories in the United States during the war and embellished by several ornamented walls and a reflecting pool with fountains—struck critics as tritely bombastic and unfortunately reminiscent of the commemorative style favored by the German and Italian regimes against which the United States had fought in that war.

Conclusion

The debate over the National World War II Memorial illustrates the continuing American ambivalence over remembrance of war in public monuments. Dedication of the triumphal space amid an ongoing war in Iraq reflects an increased readiness to claim an expansive international role and to concentrate vast military authority in the federal government. But discussion of the monument has revealed much disagreement about the position of the United States in the world and the position of the war-making authority in national governance. Moreover, despite the prestige of several World War II commanders, the monument does not indicate, as the inherited classical tradition did, that military rank offered a useful model for the hierarchical organization of peacetime society. The history of American war memorials, beginning with the toppled statue of George III and continuing through the pride, indifference, grief, admiration, and other responses elicited by subsequent monuments, suggests that the resonance of the addition to the Mall and the future course of the commemorative tradition will be determined in part by the extent to which Americans choose to adopt the memorial as a stage for the ongoing enactment of national life.

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Related Entries

Combat-Zone Photography; Film and War; Grand Army of the Republic; Literature and War; Memorial Day; Memory and War; Television and War; Theater and War; Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; Visual Arts and War

Related Documents

1930; 1938

—*Thomas J. Brown*

Memory and War

Wars, to paraphrase the scholar Samuel Hynes, are often not only extraordinary military and political events in the history of a society, but also extraordinary imaginative events. They can change, among other things, how people see themselves, their society, their nation, the world, and their country's place in the world. Individual memory, of the subjective kind that everyone has who experiences any given event, is distinct from collective memory, which is a shared understanding of the meaning of a communal experience. Typically, such shared understandings are transmitted most easily in the form of a narrative that structures and interprets the event through language and imagery comprehensible to the entire group. What is basically a simplified narrative can then coalesce into the dominant collective memory of that event.

For instance, many men and women within American society share an understanding of the nature and meaning of World War II (to cite one example that will be explored in detail below) that conforms to a narrative that reduces complex and ambivalent wartime experiences into a coherent but comparatively simple (and sometimes distorted) collective "memory of the war." Of course, this kind of consensus understanding serves to strengthen the cohesion of the society in which it occurs. However, when a society's collective "memory" of a given event is dominated by a particular narrative, then typically other competing or contrasting narratives are suppressed or marginalized. The memory is thus incomplete and possibly even inaccurate, casting doubt upon the value of the "lessons" to be drawn from it.

War is thus much more than a mere violent political event. It is also an important source of symbols, celebrations, monuments, art, literature, and iconic figures that help define a nation's culture and bind its society. The memory of a war becomes a way for a nation to use its past to serve the present. Thus each succeeding generation has sought new ways to redefine and "re-remember" past wars.

The 17th and 18th Centuries

Colonial Wars

In the 17th and 18th centuries, three wars—King Philip's War, the French and Indian War, and especially the Revolutionary War—left deep, lasting imprints on American imagination, society, and culture. The memory and representation of wars with indigenous peoples had a profound impact on future American attitudes toward, and treatment of, Native Americans. Historians of the colonial period have nominated a variety of conflicts as being the crucial one that cemented an image of all Indians as "bad Indians." Perhaps the two most commonly cited are King Philip's War, a bloody conflict between New England settlers and Native Americans, or the more widespread French and Indian War. Jill Lepore, in particular, has advanced an innovative interpretation of how New Englanders deliberately shaped their memory of King Philip's War to downplay or occlude their own atrocities, while increasingly excluding Native Americans from the possibility of civility.

Despite the experience of King Philip's War, many colonists continued to build productive and mutually beneficial relationships with Indians over the next century. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Revolution, the denigrating characterization of Native Americans was resurrected "as a propaganda tool against the British" (Lepore, 187). Colonists sought to depict English troops as savages in

an attempt to increase the resolve of patriots. The French and Indian War, however, had affected a broad swath of the colonial population, cementing for many of them a harsh view of Native Americans. That war also created another memory for colonists who served in the militia alongside the British Army: an impression of British military arrogance and cruelty. Although the war ended in a British–Colonial triumph, it nevertheless revealed deep differences in cultural values between American and English society that would contribute to resistance and revolution in 1775.

The American Revolutionary War

The Revolutionary War arguably had the most profound effect upon American society. Not only did victory secure independence, it provided a unique opportunity for a people to remake their society and political culture. Historian Gordon Wood has argued that the war unleashed a radical revolution that transformed politics, economics, and social relations. Americans replaced a monarchical form of government with a democratic republic, and replaced a hierarchical society based on chains of dependency with a more open society based on principles of self-government, individual merit, and voluntarism.

In addition to unleashing fundamental institutional and social changes, the Revolutionary War became one of the principal sources of symbols used by 18th-century patriots and later generations to define American culture and society. The Revolution is a vital part of what Abraham Lincoln, in his first inaugural address (1861), called "the mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field, and patriot grave, to every heart and hearthstone" that unites Americans and sustains the nation's ideals. There is, however, no single "memory" of the Revolution. As one historian has written, as America changed ". . . so too has the Revolution's place in our historical imagination" (Kammen 1978, 75).

During the Revolution, the heroism of its leaders, especially those killed in battle such as Joseph Warren at Bunker Hill and Richard Montgomery at Quebec, inspired unity and resolve. Treated as martyrs in the cause of liberty, such men became part of the public memory of the war that helped to weave 13 separate states into an American society. After the war, commemoration of patriots in monuments, Fourth of July celebrations, and various "public fetes" not only expressed the nation's gratitude for their sacrifices, but also shaped the meaning of America as a pluralistic society defined and bound by its Revolutionary principles.

In the early 19th century, a new generation expanded the symbolism of the Revolutionary War to include the ordinary soldier. In 1808, for example, partly for partisan purposes and partly as a reflection of growing class divisions, political leaders in New York City proposed a monument to honor the thousands of men who had died as prisoners of war on English ships in Brooklyn's Wallabout Bay. Public interest in the valor and sacrifices of the rank and file increased as the nation embraced democratic values and institutions.

American celebration of its Revolutionary War veterans also heightened as the nation moved once again toward war with England, which began in June 1812. Conflict with England and France over the impressment of American seamen led to calls to rearm the nation and to reignite its "Spirit of '76" to defend the nation against this new threat to its independence. Fourth of July orators, writers, artists, and historians recast the memory of the Revolution to inspire patriotism among the young. Orators honored America's citizen–soldiers when they portrayed the Revolution as a "people's war." This concept "dramatized the Revolution as an epochal uprising of a virtuous citizenry against corruption and tyranny. It transformed the Revolutionary generation into a mythic people who embodied the spirit of '76" (Resch, 3). After war with England began in 1812, leaders were troubled when the sons of '76 failed to rally to the nation's defense with the patriotic fervor of their fathers. The lesson of that war was clear: American society remained dangerously fragmented.

Between the end of the war in 1815 and Lafayette's triumphal return to the United States in 1824 and 1825 to celebrate 50 years of independence, political and cultural leaders used memories of the Revolutionary War to forge social solidarity by creating a spirit of nationalism based on that war. Nationalists viewed the soldiers in the same light as the mythic warriors of ancient Greece and Rome. Efforts were made to preserve former battlefields and encampments, such as Valley Forge, as hallowed ground. Painters

and writers, among them James Fenimore Cooper, made the war the subject of their craft. In 1818 Congress awarded pensions to veterans of the Continental Army to honor their service and to express the nation's gratitude for their sacrifices; in 1832 pensions were awarded to nearly every remaining veteran. Soldiers who had lived in obscurity were celebrated as heroes and models of patriotism for future generations to follow. Furthermore, by elevating the ordinary soldier as a cultural icon of virtue, the nation reaffirmed the ideals of the Revolution. Remembering the veterans of the Revolution helped to create a more democratic society. Where celebrants of the war in the 1780s had largely credited independence to the nation's leaders, the generation that followed credited the citizenry for delivering the country from tyranny.

The celebration of 50 years of American independence in 1825 marked the growing sense of a common national identity that united a diverse society. That unity would later be challenged and shattered over of the issue of slavery. But for the moment Americans North and South were tied together by the glorified memory of the Revolution. Leading up to the grand celebration, Americans funded memorials to soldiers of the Revolution. Lafayette's tour of old battlefields drew public attention to a collective past and belief in a providentially guided future. On July 4, 1825, nearly 100,000 people gathered in Charlestown to see Lafayette lay the cornerstone to the monument commemorating those who fought at Bunker Hill. More than a stone structure to honor the New England militia who fought there, the monument represented a vision of the American nation as a society bound by the ideals, memory, and images grounded in the Revolutionary War.

The 19th Century

The Early Republic

At the beginning of the 20th century, Americans celebrated the centennial of an event that seemed to unite the country's increasingly heterogeneous population. The creation of Perry's Victory Centennial Commission presented citizens with an opportunity in 1913 to shape the memory of a military triumph none of them remembered—Adm. Oliver Hazard Perry's 1813 victory over the seemingly invincible

British at Lake Erie. In Louisville, Kentucky, citizens at public celebrations waved pennants that declared "The Perry Centennial is on and the Glory is Ours." The pennant bore an image of Admiral Perry standing in the bow of a small boat being rowed through a seascape of naval warfare. Standing beside an American flag and pointing the way through the battle, this depiction of Perry unmistakably resembled images of George Washington crossing the Delaware River, thus linking the War of 1812 to the Revolution. Forgotten in the 1913 celebrations were military blunders and the objections to the War of 1812 by some citizens of New England, who had threatened disunion and negotiations for a separate peace and whose actions foreshadowed the growing sectional rifts to follow.

Perry's victory took its place beside Andrew Jackson's victory at the battle of New Orleans in 1815 as major touchstones along the young nation's pathway to national security. The victories of this war and others during the 19th century produced heroes, symbols, and memories that unified diverse groups of peoples and helped them define what it was to be an American. The memory of war proved to be particularly potent in political causes. At the national level, William Henry Harrison and Andrew Jackson were among those who successfully parlayed their military careers into political success, and there were many more at the local level.

The collective memories of frontier conflict with Indians and their European allies shaped the memories of both Native Americans and settlers. In the Ohio Valley region, 20 years of intermittent war between 1775 and 1795 forged attitudes that would be carried into the trans-Mississippi West with the Lewis and Clark expedition and every subsequent expansion that followed. The process of dispossession and usurpation that followed such victories as the battle of the Thames imbued military leaders with an aura of invincibility and toughness that carried over into the political arena. The political success of "Old Hickory," as Jackson became known, was based in large measure on his appeal to the "common man" as a fighter whose men had shown little mercy to Native Americans at the battle of Horseshoe Bend in 1814. Memories of such frontier warfare reinforced white beliefs that possession of the land before them was their and the nation's destiny.

The Mexican War fulfilled the dreams of American expansionists led by President Polk. Like those before it, the war produced its own heroes and symbols. These, in turn, shaped the memories of Americans. Gen. Winfield Scott, whose career reached back to the War of 1812 and who had served for 20 years as commanding general of the Army, bridged the distance between a national struggle for survival and the expansionistic war with Mexico. Collectively, the total armed force of approximately 100,000 men, with only about 14,000 in the largest single army in the field, produced enough nicknames and war stories to launch a presidential campaign. Gen. Zachary Taylor, dubbed "Old Rough and Ready," had the appearance of a calm leader and unpolished farmer, two qualities that made him popular and that helped gain him to the White House.

The Civil War

The veneer of national unity that military victory suggested to the popular imagination fell apart during the 1850s, despite more than a generation's worth of compromise and efforts to address sectional differences. Once secession became reality, both the North and the South used the memory of the American Revolution to mobilize the public. Soldiers' mothers became virtuous symbols of the republic on both sides and were called upon to replicate the revolutionary "Spirit of '76" by sending their men to the front and by supporting them at home. Sheet music, patriotic envelopes, and prints carried virtually every imaginable revolutionary symbol—eagles and shields, Lady Liberty, coiled serpents—to legitimize for both sides the sacrifices required to wage the war. Secessionists described their campaign as an effort to separate a virtuous South from a corrupt and overbearing North, casting the war as a second American Revolution. In time, the southern Army of Northern Virginia, for example, became in the Confederate imagination the equivalent of George Washington's revolutionary army. Citizens on the southern home front saw the fate of their nation linked to the fortunes of Robert E. Lee's army. Northerners, on the other hand, described the war's goals first in terms of preserving the Union created by the first generation of Americans, and, ultimately, in the emancipation of four million slaves,

thus preserving and extending the ideal of human equality espoused by the founding generation.

Following the Civil War, most white Southerners, alienated by Reconstruction and military occupation, could no longer recognize their own past within the larger national narrative of victory. The southern political elite used the memory of the Civil War to heal wartime divisions within the South between Unionists and secessionists, and redirected lingering anger and bitterness toward Republicans, black and white. Confederate veterans joined in a campaign of political terrorism to win back the political landscape in areas where Radical Republicans had been successful at the polls, and a campaign of violence followed. The result was the solid South, a generation of white men willing to follow the Democratic Party as champion both of the "Lost Cause" and of white supremacy. In the process of sectional reconciliations that followed the Compromise of 1877, Unionist and emancipationist memories were lost.

Women played a vital role in memorializing the war, just as they had in supporting the war effort at home. Women North and South spearheaded the commemoration of patriots through monuments and parks and in cemeteries. Richmond, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., devoted prominent public spaces to large monumental sculptures of key military figures. Smaller cities and counties erected statues to remember not only their leaders and their dead but also the service of the local common soldiers. In badly divided regional borderlands, the war's home-front conflicts were still revealed years after Appomattox. For example, Greene County, Tennessee, erected statues of both Union and Confederate veterans on its courthouse lawn. In Kentucky, national and regional movements created shrines for native sons Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis.

The commodification of war memory, continuing throughout the 19th century to varying degrees, was perhaps best reflected in the post–Civil War era by the major reunions of the Grand Army of the Republic and the United Confederate Veterans. These annual veterans' conventions took over host cities, filled hotels, boardinghouses, tent camps, and schools, staged parades, and even reenacted battles. A wide array of badges, booklets, flags, lapel pins, and other souvenirs were sold. Between the reunions, veterans'

magazines, such as *Confederate Veteran*, constructed wartime memory in letters and articles, with some of the topics, particularly the war records of generals and regiments, hotly contested.

The postwar country politician who on one occasion declared to voters that he had fought and died for the Confederacy was obviously exaggerating, but postwar political consequences of the war in the North and South were truly enormous. Public celebrations such as the Fourth of July and Confederate Memorial Day reminded citizens in both sections of the sacrifices made by communities. Politicians waved "the bloody shirt" to mobilize voters behind both the Democratic and Republican parties. The Grand Army of the Republic, the Union veteran's organization, was a potent political force sometimes called the "Grand Army of the Republican Party."

As the 1800s came to a close, the spirit of expansionism and nationalism that had characterized the century formed a basis in memory for conflicts far beyond the nation's boundaries.

The 20th Century

The American imaginative reconstruction of the military events of the 20th century has proved particularly profound, although the United States has generally been spared the levels of extreme carnage and physical devastation seen in Asia or Europe. Nevertheless, certain 20th-century wars in which the United States has played a major role had and have a tremendous and profoundly influential presence within the nation's culture. Other conflicts, by contrast, seem to have vanished from the popular memory altogether, although there can be no doubt that they are seldom so dimly recollected by the individual veterans who served in them.

For the United States in the 20th century, the creation of a shared narrative of military experience has provided social cohesion in some instances but created other problems along the way. This is particularly true of the dominant collective memories of the nation's experience in two of its largest and most costly wars, World War II and the Vietnam War. Memories of those wars continued for decades after the cessation of hostilities to frame how Americans perceived and approached a wide variety of political, social, and cultural issues. Furthermore, the conventional narratives and imagery associated with World War II and the Vietnam War represent highly divergent understandings of war, American society, and the relationship between the two. As collective memory, World War II and Vietnam have enjoyed a ubiquity within American culture unparalleled among the nation's 20th-century conflicts; in terms of their relative cultural presence, they significantly overshadow the overwhelming majority of the many wars waged by the United States in the years between 1901 and 2001. Before examining further the two conflicts that are most evident as "remembered" wars, it is useful to contextualize them in relation to the nation's "forgotten" wars.

"Forgotten" Wars

The United States over the course of the 20th century has been involved in dozens of military conflicts, ranging from small-scale interventions, largely in Latin America and the Caribbean, to major international wars waged against other global powers. Most of these conflicts, including some of the larger ones, have very little presence within the nation's culture. For instance, America's "little wars" of the early 20th century—its imperial adventures in various locales from Nicaragua to Haiti to China—have scant public attention beyond a few academic specialists and political activists. For these conflicts, the usual cornerstones of collective memory (monuments to the fallen, commemorative holidays, media commentary, literary and artistic representations) are all but absent. Perhaps this is not surprising, given the limited duration and scale of most of these interventions. However, even the relatively long and bloody Philippine War of 1899 to 1902 (arguably the first significant, sustained overseas military campaign engaged in by the United States), in which about 1,000 Americans and 220,000 Filipinos died, is all but forgotten within the larger national culture.

Even some of the largest and most costly 20th-century wars have made a surprisingly faint imprint on the country's cultural landscape. For instance, no national memorial has been dedicated solely and specifically to the more than 100,000 Americans who died serving their country overseas in World War I, although the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington, Virginia, did to some extent fulfill that purpose

between 1921 and 1958. This absence is particularly striking, given that participating in World War I actually required a gargantuan effort by the United States—however brief that involvement was in relation to that of Europe. Raising and equipping a fighting force that increased the number of Americans in uniform from 126,000 in 1917 to five million by the end of the war in 1918, as well as constructing and acquiring enough ships to transport them to Europe in time to play a crucial role on the battlefield—all this was a feat of unprecedented national mobilization. As such, that experience foreshadowed the even greater national effort that would be required after Pearl Harbor in 1941 and heralded the beginning of the end of the nation's traditional isolation from "foreign entanglements."

Nevertheless, other than in history books, the epic tale of U.S. involvement in World War I and its consequences remains relatively untold. Compared with World War II or Vietnam, the American experience in the Great War has seldom been the subject of film, art, or popular fiction. The one major exception to this cultural near-invisibility is in the realm of high literature. A number of American war veterans who would become some of the country's foremost novelists and poets, including Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, E. E. Cummings, and John Dos Passos (all of whom had, perhaps significantly, served in foreign militaries), produced well-regarded postwar works about, or set during, the war. These works constituted an important American contribution to the great international outpouring of antiwar literature during the 1920s and 1930s. In this arena, and only in this arena, World War I looms larger within American culture than other 20th-century conflicts. Like the work of contemporaries in other countries, particularly Britain, France, and Germany, the novels and poetry of these postwar American writers expressed disillusionment not only with the war (whose horrors and futile waste they described graphically and compellingly), but also with Western civilization generally for its hypocrisies, excesses, and other flaws culminating in the senseless self-immolation of 1914 to 1918. These narratives of disillusion, however, though they would to some extent provide a template for representing and interpreting a later and much more nationally traumatic American war in Southeast Asia, never really penetrated

deeply into the country's popular consciousness, as they did, for example, in Britain. The crucial reason for this lack of long-term cultural resonance was that the U.S. experience in the next world war, according to the dominant national narrative, seemed to provide an antidote to many of the diseases—at least those afflicting America—that had been diagnosed by the "disillusioned" writers of the interwar period.

Without a doubt, the fact that the United States emerged victorious from a second world war, one in which the country was involved for far longer and that involved an even a more massive mobilization of the nation's human and material resources (with ensuing dramatic and long-term social changes), explains to a great degree why World War I is not as prevalent in the country's popular memory as might be expected. It was simply overshadowed by the subsequent conflict. For example, on the national level, and, typically, on the local level as well, commemorative rituals and monuments originally designed to pay homage to the fallen of the Great War increasingly after 1945 widened the scope of their observance beyond that war in and of itself. Armistice Day, which had first been proclaimed in the United States on November 11, 1919 (the one year anniversary of the cease-fire that ended hostilities in World War I), was, after 1938, observed as a federal holiday devoted exclusively to remembering the sacrifices of that conflict. In 1954 Armistice Day became Veterans Day, a holiday honoring all U.S. veterans.

Perhaps ironically, the creation of Veteran's Day occurred only one year after the end of the Korean War, a major 20th-century conflict that cost the lives of more than 30,000 Americans, 900,000 Chinese, and two million Koreans (North and South). The Korean War has been so overshadowed by the wars that bracket it, World War II and the Vietnam War, that its veterans bitterly refer to it as "the Forgotten War." Not until 1995 was the Korean War commemorated with a national memorial in Washington, D.C. The most visible pop-cultural legacy of the conflict was a long-running and highly rated television comedy, *M*A*S*H* (based on a popular 1970 film of the same name), set at a U.S. Army field hospital during the war. However, as many critics have pointed out, even this television series did not aim to specifically depict the Korean War experience, but rather used that conflict as a device

and a backdrop for exploring universal themes related to war and human relations.

World War II and Vietnam: The "Good War" Versus the "Bad War"

Some wars seem "forgotten" within the collective American consciousness—perhaps because their perceived ambiguity does not allow them to be easily imagined and represented as simple, compelling, meaningful narratives. World War I was portrayed by many Americans as a flawed and unnecessarily costly victory that not only failed to achieve the better world that might have justified such horrendous carnage, but actually made a future war all but inevitable.

Similarly, the outcome of the Korean War certainly cannot be seen as an unambiguous victory. The cost in lives contrasted with the continued existence of the North Korean communist regime and the continued presence of thousands of American troops argued against a declaration of clear victory. Thus, for the purposes of narrative, it proved very difficult to depict either World War I or the Korean War, in terms of America's involvement, as either "good" or "bad." Such sweeping and facile categorizations are, of course, useless for understanding the actual historical events and consequences of any conflict nor do they reflect the reality that for many men and women who experience war, there is no such thing as a "good" one.

At their core, however, the most culturally resonant narratives of the nation's 20th-century war experiences, the narratives of World War II and the Vietnam War, embody archetypes of this dichotomy: World War II is the quintessential "good" American war, while Vietnam epitomizes the "bad" American conflict. World War II was for America a "righteous" war in which the suffering and sacrifice endured by the nation and its soldiers were justified by the necessity, and the accomplishment, of vanquishing evil enemies who had attacked the country and aimed to enslave the world. Vietnam, on the other hand, was not only a defeat, but also a mistake: a bungled, tragic misadventure born of dubious motivations. America achieved nothing in that war to justify the carnage, waste, and domestic turmoil that it engendered. As archetypes, each war symbolizes or illustrates for many observers and commentators fundamentally different versions of the larger American historical narrative.

The prevailing collective understanding of World War II is consistent with and central to the traditional American celebration of the United States as the world's main defender and beacon of liberty, democracy, free enterprise, and other political and economic virtues. Vietnam, on the other hand, represents a darker alternative American narrative, one that highlights the consistent violence, racism, exploitation, and imperialism that accompanied the America's rise to global preeminence. During the Cold War, the dominant collective "memory" of World War II as a righteous battle by an exemplary nation to save the world from the forces of darkness informed the attitudes and actions of the nation's decision makers and the general public as they confronted the challenge of communism in various parts of the world, including Southeast Asia.

By the 1960s, growing disillusion over the deepening quagmire in Vietnam was fundamental in inspiring the emergence—primarily on the Left—of a counter-narrative that, like a photographic negative, presented the dark inverse of the traditional American image epitomized by World War II. In the context of this counter-narrative, to cite just one example, the massacre of Native Americans in 1890 at Wounded Knee in South Dakota was not an aberrant tragedy, but was linked to the 1968 massacre of Vietnamese villagers at My Lai by the dark threads of racism, violence, and imperialism running throughout American history. This alternative vision of the American experience—most evident in the arts, the media, and academia—while far from culturally dominant, has been profoundly influential since the late 1960s in transforming the mainstream understanding of U.S. history and society. At the very least, by focusing on those victimized by, or excluded from, the orthodox story of American triumph, the counter-narrative has presented a powerful challenge to some of the complacent assumptions and reassuring mythology underpinning much of the celebratory narrative.

Of course, exponents of this counter-narrative have often been guilty of their own excesses and distortions, thereby giving ammunition to those who would defend an idealized image of America. Thus, while unabashed celebration of the American experience since the 1960s has been more frequently mitigated within the culture by the dark underbelly

exposed by the counter-narrative, the grand meta-narrative of American history and society remains generally positive, with the "best" characteristics and impulses of the nation exemplified by World War II. As a pillar of this particular faith, that war's status as a "good war" remains somewhat sacred, as evidenced by the anger that can be aroused in its defenders if this ideal seems to be significantly threatened.

The Vietnam War, after a brief postwar period when its presence within American culture was conspicuously slight, has been incorporated into the national narrative as a "bad war" fought by "good people"—that is, by the American soldiers who, depending on the source, were either victims or heroes in a hopeless cause. So prevalent are the cultural representations of both World War II and the Vietnam War—on film, in literature, in media commentary, as commemorative objects (in the form of solemn monuments, serious museum exhibits, or frivolous kitsch), and as academic subjects— that two illustrations of their presence within the culture as collective memory will have to suffice.

The Enola Gay Controversy

In January 1994, curators at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum completed a draft version of the text to accompany a planned exhibit of the *Enola Gay*, the B-29 bomber that dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945. The text composed by the museum staff reflected the intention of the exhibit's planners to address the ambiguous legacy of the fateful mission carried out by the *Enola Gay*. The curators emphasized the darker strains of the mission's legacy, choosing to focus primarily on the suffering of Hiroshima's civilians in the aftermath of the attack and on the fearful nuclear age ushered in by that atomic blast. They also placed the atomic bombing in the context of a brutal, racially charged war in the Pacific that was characterized by atrocities committed by both sides. When the content of this version of the exhibit text became known to the general public shortly after its completion, the museum's curators found themselves embroiled in a political firestorm.

For several months, until the weight of controversy finally forced the museum to cancel the exhibit, the draft script endured a sustained assault from various opponents, including veterans' groups, military lobbying organizations, conservative politicians, journalists and media commentators, and ordinary citizens. The exhibit's curators were accused of, among other things, being "anti-American" and promoting a "politically correct" version of history. The exhibit's organizers were perceived by their critics to have transgressed the idiom of celebratory commemoration that many believed was the only appropriate mode of representing and interpreting the American experience in World War II in a forum such as the National Air and Space Museum. For such critics, the text of the *Enola Gay* exhibit reflected a political and aesthetic viewpoint created in the post-Vietnam era now being unjustifiably turned against World War II, perhaps one of the only remaining sturdy pillars of the national mythology. That this should take place in one of the nation's preeminent promulgators of public history proved too grave to tolerate. Cultural representations of the American experience in World War II that are obviously geared toward a mass audience (a criterion that excludes most academic history, as well as World War II–themed works of literature such as Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, James Jones's *The Thin Red Line*, and Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead*) challenge the dominant collective memory of that conflict as the quintessential American "good war" only at their peril.

The Changing Image of the Vietnam Veteran

Collectively remembered as the 20th century's epitome of the "bad" American war, the Vietnam War resisted, for nearly a decade after its end, any consensus about the appropriate idiom for its commemoration—or whether it should be commemorated. The customary objects of war commemoration— the conflict's veterans—posed a problem for such a project. During the war, their image in the collective consciousness of Americans not actually fighting in Southeast Asia had been formed not primarily by the heroic fantasies of Hollywood (in contrast to World War II, very few feature films made depicting the war in Vietnam while it was going on, *The Green Berets* [1968] being the sole example of a direct Hollywood treatment of the war in Indochina released between 1964 and 1973), but by the documentary realities of television and other media. In these outlets, soldiers appeared at times heroic, but just as often profoundly human, and sometimes even barbaric.

Moreover, a vocal minority of those opposed to the war represented the soldiers themselves as the agents and embodiments of what they saw as the United States' murderous, imperialist agenda in Southeast Asia. Hence the silence and disregard that initially greeted many returning veterans, a passive reproach from civilians that was far more typical than the abuse and taunts of "baby killer" that so commonly figure in what are perhaps mostly apocryphal stories of hostile receptions on the home front.

More than any other single phenomenon, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and the emotional, overwhelmingly positive response it inspired in the American public after its dedication in 1982, provided the model for commemorating the difficult legacy of Vietnam. In so doing, it contributed decisively to the formation of a Vietnam War narrative that placed the veterans at its center, focusing on their suffering, sacrifice, and abandonment by their country, rather than on the still-divisive issues related to the specific American policies and ideological assumptions that shaped the nature and course of the conflict.

In its planning stages, the memorial, which was designed by Maya Lin, generated significant controversy. Critics attacked Lin's designs, which proposed a long black stone wall inscribed only with the names of the more than 58,000 Americans who died in the war, as "a black gash of shame and sorrow," a "degrading ditch," a "tombstone" and a "slap in the face," among other epithets. For these critics, the memorial's somber minimalism, modernist abstraction, and deviation from the didactic, figurative tradition of American war memorials contained an implicit condemnation of the Vietnam War, despite the organizers' explicit claim that the work strove for political neutrality. In the end, Lin's design was built, and the public's collective embrace of it surprised even her most enthusiastic defenders. More than 150,000 people attended its dedication, and in the 1990s it became the most heavily visited site on the Washington Mall. The nature of the memorial space allows visitors to interact with the structure itself to an unusual degree; men and women touch the names carved in the stone, leave artifacts and letters at the site, and otherwise engage in highly personal rituals of remembrance. "The Wall," as the memorial is popularly known, invites very individualized responses from those in its presence, which is perhaps the only plausible way an unpopular, still-controversial war can be commemorated in a form that creates social cohesion rather than exacerbates divisions. Finally, the memorial played a fundamental role in redefining public attitudes toward the Vietnam veterans, transforming them from symbols of humiliating national defeat and shameful national aggression, to heroes or victims of a war that was "bad" for reasons beyond their control. Thus the veterans, as sympathetic objects of commemoration, became icons around which to build the kind of collective consensus conducive to healing the wounds inflicted by the war.

Surveying the collective memory of America's 20th-century wars, one might conclude that most of these conflicts, including some of the largest and most costly, occupy a relatively small place within the nation's culture. Perhaps the primary explanation is that many of these conflicts do not easily resolve into the kinds of basic and compelling master narratives that lodge tenaciously within the collective cultural memory. By contrast, World War II and the Vietnam War were not only two of America's biggest and bloodiest 20th-century conflicts, but they are also credible as narrative representations of the quintessential "good" war and the epitome of the "bad" war. Thus, these two titanic conflicts continue to dominate America's collective cultural memory of war in the 20th century, with all manner of political and social consequences. Moreover, as the examples of the *Enola Gay* exhibit and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial demonstrate, these two wars provide opposing, yet intertwined, narratives that significantly inform an ongoing discourse about the nature of American society and the nation's role in the world.

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Related Entries

Atrocity and Captivity Narratives; *Enola Gay* Controversy; Film and War; Grand Army of the Republic; *M*A*S*H*; Memorial Day; Revolutionary War Pensions; Society of the Cincinnati; see also entries on specific wars

Related Documents

1864 c; 1938; 1964; 1975

—John Resch, Mark Wetherington, and Mark David Sheftall

Merchant Marine

The U.S. merchant marine is the country's commercial shipping fleet. The shipping industry has played a vital role in the development of America by connecting the United States with the global economy and serving as a bridge for both trade and immigrants. Despite its predominantly civilian role, the merchant marine has also factored prominently in wartime logistical planning. Civil–military cooperation in maritime transportation has made possible the projection of American military strength overseas.

The Protection of American Trade

English colonial seafarers enjoyed the protection of the Royal Navy to ensure safe passage for ships and goods crossing the world's oceans. With ample timber for shipbuilding, American vessels became an important part of the maritime landscape, supplying Britain and the Caribbean with trade goods and agricultural products. Although Americans resisted the enforcement of the Navigation Laws in the 1760s, the growth and financial success of the American commercial shipping fleet was a result of British naval protection.

After achieving political independence in the American Revolution, U.S. ship captains found themselves in a vulnerable position as the fledgling government could offer little protection on the high seas. The American belief in "Free Goods and Free Ships" meant little when faced with seizure of goods and impressment of sailors. Between 1783 and 1812, roughly 10,000 American sailors were taken from their ships and "pressed" into service on British warships. The American maritime community, critical of the Articles of Confederation, recognized the need for a navy authorized by the federal Constitution.

In addition to European adversaries, American merchant ships also faced a threat from the Barbary Coast powers (Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli). Rather than pay the required "tribute" in exchange for safe passage, in 1794 Congress authorized the construction of six frigates (of these, the *Constitution*, *United States*, and *Constellation* were completed) to form the nucleus of the American Navy. In 1798, the issue of free trade in the Caribbean resulted in the creation of the Department of the Navy as a Cabinet rank, with Benjamin Stoddert as secretary and an undeclared Quasi-War with France. The desire to defend national honor and safeguard American freedom on the high seas was also one of the major causes of the War of 1812. Throughout this era, the Navy's primary mission was considered to be the protection of American foreign trade.

The Civil War and the Period of Decline

The Civil War deeply affected the merchant marine. Prior to the outbreak of war, American merchant vessels carried two-thirds of the country's imports. After the war, that would drop to one-third. A variety of technical, strategic, economic, and social factors contributed to this decline. The Union Navy, faced with the daunting task of blockading 3,000 miles of southern coastline and conducting riverine operations in conjunction with the Army, desperately needed vessels. The Navy chartered and purchased as many merchant steamships as possible and placed them on blockade duty, thereby taking the ships out of commission for trade.

Lacking shipbuilding facilities and experienced sailors, the Confederate Navy based its naval strategy on commerce raiding. Unarmed northern merchant vessels made easy targets. The most successful Confederate captain, Raphael Semmes of the CSS *Alabama*, sunk 60 ships in 22 months at sea. As insurance rates skyrocketed, northern shipowners attempted to offset their financial losses by selling their ships to neutral countries. After the war, Congress steadfastly refused to allow those vessels "sold-foreign" during the war to be bought back and placed on the American registry.

The collapse of the cotton trade, which had sustained more than 50 percent of the antebellum foreign trade, also affected the merchant marine. Finally, the transition to steam propulsion further compounded the problems of the merchant fleet. American shipbuilders, lacking expertise and inexpensive iron, could not compete with the British steamship manufacturers. During Reconstruction, badly needed capital went instead to railroad corporations, as the country looked away from the sea and toward the West.

A New Definition of Sea Power

Naval officers lamented the postwar decline of the merchant marine. At the newly created United States Naval Institute

(est. 1873), the merchant marine and its relationship to the Navy were frequently discussed. Reform-minded officers like Stephen B. Luce used firsthand experience and historical examples to argue for a strong commercial fleet, which would not only contribute to the overall health of the American economy, but would also provide a manpower reserve for the U.S. Navy during times of war. In 1882, the winning article of the Naval Institute's essay contest was titled: "Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline and the Means to Be Taken for Its Revival." Carlos G. Calkins, one of the contributing authors, urged the Navy to create a Bureau of Mercantile Marine to assume responsibility for merchant marine inspection and licensing.

Without going that far, the Navy did assign active duty officers to state maritime academies as instructors. Working with the New York City Board of Education, Stephen B. Luce drafted a bill for Congress to establish a system of maritime education. An edited version, the Marine Act of 1874, authorized the establishment of nautical schools in the ports of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and San Francisco. Supplied with training vessels from the U.S. Navy, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts established the first three state nautical schools in 1874, 1889, and 1891, respectively. Using the Naval Academy as their model, instructors taught cadet-midshipmen academic subjects, seamanship, and navigation as well as conducting an annual transatlantic training cruise. Naval officers hoped that the creation of nautical schools for merchant mariners would once again attract Americans to the merchant service, elevate its degree of professionalism, heighten its prestige, and halt the overall decline of the merchant marine.

The "revival" of the merchant marine would mean, naturally, the augmentation and modernization of a U.S. naval fleet capable of offensive operations to protect it—a fact not lost on those naval officers actively working for the creation of a "New Navy." By the time noted naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan published *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660–1783* in 1890, naval officers were already convinced that overseas possessions, a battleship Navy, and a strong merchant marine would allow the United States to take its place as a world power. However, the American-flag merchant marine continued to decline

despite the acquisition of new battleships, not to mention the islands of Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippines. By 1900 the merchant marine carried only 8 percent of U.S. foreign trade. The United States entered the new century without a substantial commercial shipping industry.

Sealift and National Security

At the dawn of the 20th century, the traditional relationship between the Navy and merchant marine had diminished. A new role for the merchant marine soon emerged when the U.S. Army found itself charged with the task of strategic sealift of American military forces overseas. The Spanish–American War had demonstrated the woeful lack of planning and thought given by Army officers to transportation of troops overseas. To send troops, equipment, and animals to Cuba, the Army scrambled to charter merchant vessels and quickly convert them into troop transports. Retaining their civilian crews, the ship captains proved reluctant to endanger the vessel and crew by entering a war zone. To correct these deficiencies and facilitate the flow of Army personnel to quell the Philippine Insurrection, the War Department created the Army Transport Service, the Army's own merchant marine. The Military Transportation Act of 1904 strengthened the relationship between the Army and merchant marine by requiring that all supplies for the Army be carried on U.S.-flag vessels.

This new system of military sealift was inadequate to deal with the demands of the World War I. The Shipping Act of 1916 created the first federal agency, the United States Shipping Board, to supervise and regulate the merchant marine. When the United States entered the war, the Shipping Board created the Emergency Fleet Corporation (est. 1917) to undertake a massive shipbuilding program. Faced with the German submarine threat, Rear Adm. William S. Sims, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, convinced skeptics in both the Navy and merchant marine that a "bridge to France" could be established by using the convoy system. Sailing in close formation and escorted by naval destroyers, the combined efforts of British and American merchant vessels, the Army Transport Service, and the Navy's Cruiser and Transport Service succeeded in ferrying two

million members of the American Expeditionary Force across the Atlantic Ocean.

A similar convoy system was utilized in the battle of the Atlantic during World War II. The United States relied upon the merchant marine to carry troops and supplies around the world as well as supply the other Allied powers. The War Shipping Administration (est. 1942), under the auspices of the U.S. Maritime Commission (est. 1936), was responsible for the Army's and Navy's shipping needs. To address the shortage of trained officers and engineers, the Maritime Commission created the Merchant Marine Cadet Corps in 1938 and the Merchant Marine Academy in 1943. Unlike their British counterparts, the 225,000 American merchant mariners who served on Liberty ships in World War II retained their civilian status. They were denied any veterans' benefits after the war, despite suffering 6,103 casualties.

During the Cold War, the United States merchant marine could no longer effectively compete in world shipping. Millions of tons of American ships were transferred to foreign flags of "convenience" or "necessity" (such as Liberia) to escape the higher costs of labor, safety, operations, taxation, and insurance. Yet the need for military sealift operations and the fear that foreign ships could not be relied upon in wartime secured a place for the merchant marine in national defense planning. The federal government approved a series of operating and construction subsidies to support the merchant marine. Faced with the failing merchant marine, the Department of Defense (est. 1947) sought to consolidate ocean transportation on government-owned vessels for both the Army and Navy under the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS; est. 1949). The Korean War provided enough shipping for both the MSTS and subsidized companies, however, the end of the war exposed the rivalry began the two factions. The passage of the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 attempted to divide cargos between them, stipulating that at least half of military cargos had to be carried on privately owned merchant ships. During the Vietnam War, military personnel were airlifted into war zones, but heavy equipment and supplies continued to arrive by sea. The widespread adoption of container ships, however, required modern port facilities. Consequently, the Army and Navy constructed adequate facilities at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Danang.

The U.S. merchant marine contributed significantly to both the commercial and military needs of the country. In the 19th century a unique relationship developed between the commercial and naval fleets. However, as American-flag merchant marine tonnage declined in the 20th century, the role of strategic sealift became more important to the survival of the merchant marine. Clearly, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated the continuing need to supply U.S. military operations overseas. Even with the vessels of the Military Sealift Command (est. 1970) and the Ready Reserve Force (est. 1984), the United States suffered from a lack of trained seafarers and vessels capable of carrying heavy equipment. To achieve the initial buildup of supplies, the United States chartered 100 foreign-flag vessels. The role of the American-flag merchant marine in future conflicts is uncertain.

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—*Jennifer L. Speelman*

Merton Center

See Thomas Merton Center.

Mexican War

(1846–48)

The Mexican War was the first major occasion when American forces successfully waged war beyond the boundaries of the United States. A string of glittering U.S. triumphs in the conflict added vast new territory to the country, created a surge of national pride, and convinced European powers that the United States was the preeminent power in North America. One of the most fateful conflicts in which the United States has ever engaged, it also bequeathed a legacy of suspicion and hostility from Mexico that has never fully subsided and exacerbated sectional tensions within the United States that placed the country on a direct path to civil war in 1861.

Origins and Objectives

The Mexican War can be seen as part of a larger pattern of expansionism, including attempts to seize Canada in 1775 and between 1812 and 1814; the acquisition of Florida in 1819 after a series of border clashes led by Gen. Andrew Jackson; and the forced removal of Native Americans to west of the Mississippi River. Undergirding the need for expansion was the "understanding" that a sound republic, as the Democratic Party conceived it in the 1830s and 1840s, must be based on a nation of independent farmers and an economy that provided the greatest individual opportunity as well as geographical and social mobility. This mobility, in turn, would prevent the development of a rigid class structure that would undermine democracy. These beliefs were closely entwined within the concept of Manifest Destiny.

Because the desired regions were already occupied by Mexicans and indigenous peoples, the U.S. policy was racist: "Removal, eclipse, or extermination—not acculturation and assimilation—awaited the Indians, blacks, and mixed-blood Mexicans on the continent," notes a prominent historian of Jacksonian expansionism (Hietala, 261). The lands were instead to be settled by whites already living in the United States and by European immigrants whom the Jacksonians welcomed.

The immediate origins of the conflict lay in the Texas Revolution of 1835 to 1836. Anglo American settlers gained independence from Mexico after the battle of San Jacinto. They had captured Pres. Antonio López de Santa Anna, who agreed to independence as the price of his own freedom. But the Mexican government refused to honor the agreement, which had been made under obvious duress. For the next nine years Mexico and the extralegal Republic of Texas fought a protracted though inconclusive border war, and the Mexicans warned the United States that if it annexed Texas, as many Texans desired, it would entail the gravest consequences.

As a result, the U.S. government remained cool to the idea for nearly 10 years. Then Pres. John Tyler, in a bid to shore up his unpopular presidency, made annexation the issue on which he pinned his hopes for reelection in 1844. The attempt did not benefit Tyler's political fortunes, but Democratic candidate James Knox Polk made annexation of Texas a central issue in his successful bid for the presidency. In the final days of his administration, Tyler asked Congress to annex Texas by joint resolution, which was done in February 1845. Thereupon Mexico broke off diplomatic relations with the United States.

Mexican War (1846–48)
Total U.S. Servicemembers (Worldwide): **78,718**
U.S. Population (millions): **21.0**
Battle Deaths: **1,733**
Other Deaths in Service (Non-Theater): **11,550**
Non-mortal Woundings: **4,152**
Cost (in $ current billions): **.07**

Source: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.html>

The annexation of Texas made war with Mexico likely but not inevitable. Historically, the southern boundary of Texas had long been recognized as the Nueces River, but Polk exacerbated tensions by supporting a highly dubious claim that the Rio Grande, not the Nueces, formed the boundary of Texas with Mexico. He also sent secret orders to Comm. John D. Sloat of the Pacific Squadron to capture the principal ports of California if Mexico attacked Texas.

As his order to Sloat suggests, Polk had larger ambitions than Texas. He also wanted California with its superb natural harbors at San Diego and San Francisco. He tried to purchase California and New Mexico for as much as $35 million, but the Mexican government could not accept any such settlement and still remain in power. It became apparent that the United States could not get what Polk wanted except through war. Hoping to provoke Mexico into striking first, Polk ordered troops under Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor to cross into the disputed boundary between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande. The Mexican government declared a state of "defensive war." Two days later Mexican and American forces fought a skirmish north of the Rio Grande in which 11 U.S. dragoons were killed. Upon receiving the news, Polk asked Congress for a declaration of war. He received it on May 13, 1846, and by wide margins: 173 to 14 in the House of Representatives, 40 to 2 in the Senate.

Polk and his Cabinet rapidly came up with an audacious plan to win the war. To supply the needed military manpower, Polk doubled existing units to 15,000 by filling them to full strength. Congress also authorized the raising of 50,000 volunteers. A portion of these forces, under Col. Stephen Watts Kearny, would do the actual job of seizing the desired regions from Mexico. Kearny would first march to Santa Fe, seize that commercial center, await reinforcements, and then continue his march to California. As Kearny had only 1,600 troops for the expedition, the plan depended on the semi-autonomous status of New Mexico and California, which were provinces only loosely tied to Mexico. Neither strong local resistance nor strong protection from the Mexican government was expected.

Taylor, already operating along the Rio Grande, would cross into northern Mexico and seize one or two major cities. The Polk administration believed that, confronted with the loss of its northern provinces and a major American military presence in a more populous region, the Mexican government would sue for peace.

The Early Campaigns

Kearny departed from Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, on June 5; he reached Santa Fe on August 18 after a grueling, 900-mile march. The governor of New Mexico made no attempt to defend the city and Kearny entered unopposed. Subsequently reinforced by additional volunteers, he continued on to California while 1,200 volunteers under Col. Alexander Doniphan of Missouri moved on El Paso del Norte (present-day Juarez, Mexico).

Kearny reached California in early December of 1846. By then Anglo settlers living in California had gone into revolt, creating the short-lived "Bear Flag Republic." Naval landing parties had occupied Monterey and Los Angeles. Mexican forces fought back, but by mid-January 1847 the province was in U.S. hands. Doniphan, meanwhile, had defeated a Mexican force at El Paso del Norte on December 25, 1846, and won a second victory just north of Chihuahua on February 28, 1847.

Despite the April 25 skirmish that furnished Polk with his rationale for war, the first major engagements by Taylor's troops occurred in May 1846, when 4,000 men under Gen. Mariano Arista crossed the Rio Grande near its mouth. In the battles of Palo Alto (May 8) and Resaca de la Palma (May 9), Taylor repelled two attacks. Mexican casualties in the two battles exceeded 1,600; the Americans lost fewer than 200.

On May 18, Taylor crossed the Rio Grande and seized the port city of Matamoras. The Polk administration sent reinforcements and ordered Taylor to capture Monterrey, the provincial capital of Nuevo Léon. In September he captured the city after a bloody three-day battle. Subsequently Taylor continued onward to occupy Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila. Thus, by early 1847 the United States had occupied all the territory it desired in northern Mexico and held three provincial capitals—Monterrey, Saltillo, and Chihuahua—as bargaining chips. The Polk administration's original calculations had the Mexican government suing for peace at this juncture. But Polk had already begun to realize that he had underestimated Mexico's determination to resist.

To Conquer a Peace

Polk first opted to secure a change of government. Santa Anna, then living in exile in Cuba, sent word to Polk that if allowed to return to his homeland he would use his influence to negotiate a swift end to the war. Polk made sure he received safe conduct through the naval blockade of the Mexican coast. In August 1846, Santa Anna once again stood on Mexican soil—but not as peacemaker. Instead he portrayed himself as a patriot come to save the nation from American imperialism. By the end of 1846 he was both commander of Mexico's Army and its president. He quickly struck Taylor's troops a massive though unsuccessful blow at the battle of Buena Vista (February 22–23, 1847).

Polk's second option was to march the U.S. Army directly into the capital, Mexico City. This operation was placed in the hands of Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, the Army's general in chief and the only man considered skilled enough for the task.

Scott's army landed near the Gulf port city of Veracruz on March 9. It bombarded the town, killing hundreds of civilians, and captured the city after a 20-day siege. The following month Scott began to advance. At Cerro Gordo, where the main highway from the coast to Mexico City ascended into the mountains, Scott discovered that Santa Anna had blocked the way with about 10,000 men. Scott's young engineers, however, found a way around the Mexican defenses and the battle on April 18 was an American triumph.

Thereafter Scott ran into problems. Two thousand men fell ill and were hospitalized. Thousands more volunteers simply went home when their 12-month enlistments expired. Only in August, after receiving reinforcements, could Scott resume his advance inland. Even then he was down to about 10,000 troops—Santa Anna had 30,000—and his line of supply was undependable. Told of this development, the duke of Wellington, famed for his victory over Napoleon at Waterloo and an observer of the campaign in Mexico, declared, "Scott is lost. . . . He can't take [Mexico] city, and he can't fall back upon his base." (Eisenhower, 298)

But possessing a skill as great as Wellington's, Scott kept up his offensive through a series of adroit maneuvers, time and again breaching positions thought impregnable by the Mexicans. The final assaults on Mexico City were brilliantly handled, and on September 14, 1847, Scott's army entered the capital. Its loss so badly paralyzed Mexican political life that within a few weeks the Mexicans opened negotiations for peace.

The Public Views the War

Politically the war was a highly divisive, partly because the Whigs and Democrats genuinely disagreed about its wisdom and objectives and partly because they consciously sought out opposing stands as a means to win election. It was clear to everyone that without Polk's election to the presidency and his aggressive policy toward Mexico, no war would have been fought. Although most Whigs voted for the war and for military appropriations to sustain it, they nevertheless tried to make opposition to the war an issue that would help them win electoral contests.

On the one hand, Whigs extolled the achievements of the American armies, particularly as the two principal field commanders, Taylor and Scott, were members of their party. On the other, they savaged the Polk administration for causing the war, for misrepresenting the truth in requesting a declaration of war, for mismanaging the war, and for pursuing a war aim—territorial expansion—that was at odds with American values. Republican institutions should expand by example, not coercion, some argued. Others, playing the race card, pointed out that expansion would entail the annexation of a morally degraded people who were "unfit . . . to sustain a free government" (Holt, 250).

Perhaps the most famous political document to come out of the Mexican War was a rider to a military appropriations bill introduced in August 1846 by David Wilmot, a freshman Democratic congressman from Pennsylvania. Known as the Wilmot Proviso, it pledged to bar slavery from any territory that might be acquired from Mexico as result of the war. Although never passed into law, it was several times resurrected in various forms and each time produced the same outcome: southern representatives and senators voted against it without regard to party. Because it opened the door to the sectional controversy, the Wilmot Proviso was a fateful milestone on the road to civil war, but for precisely that reason it offered little advantage to the Whigs as a campaign issue.

Instead, Whig opposition to the war focused on territorial expansion of any kind. For southern Whigs, "No

Territory" rendered further fighting pointless, it preserved sectional harmony, and—by rendering the Wilmot Proviso irrelevant—it protected the South from attack. For northern Whigs, "No Territory" offered the clearest distinction between them and the Democrats and, unlike the Wilmot Proviso, did not run the risk of regional division.

Polk realized that the Whigs, who opposed the war, might very well reap the benefit from an American victory because Taylor and Scott were both Whigs. He therefore tried to pack the Army as full as possible with generals—even if they had little or no military experience—who were loyal to the Democratic Party; he also toyed with the idea of making Sen. Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri a lieutenant general so that he, not Scott, would be the top American commander.

Despite their differences, most Whigs and Democrats supported the war effort to some degree. Comparatively few Americans condemned the war outright. Among these were the country's small but vocal peace societies, abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison (who condemned the war as one "of aggression, of invasion, of conquest, and rapine" [Johannsen, 275]), and, most famously, the transcendentalist writer-philosopher Henry David Thoreau, who spent a night in jail after refusing to pay taxes that would support the war and went on to compose "Civil Disobedience," an essay that influenced Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.

Nevertheless, the war was popular with most people, who overlooked the dubiousness of its origins and objectives and instead were fascinated by the details of its course and conduct. Through newspapers, aided by the recently invented telegraph, they got war news almost daily. Nine New Orleans newspapers maintained correspondents in the field; their stories were copied and recopied to other papers across the country. Cheap paperback novels, already popular, shifted their subject matter to provide war themes. James Fenimore Cooper of *Leatherstocking* fame published serially a novel about the war while it was still being fought.

Composers cranked out patriotic songs about the war. Playwrights wrote plays and collaborated with artists to produce theatrical lectures known as "the moving panoramas," in which long canvas paintings featuring scenes from the war were unrolled from a large cylinder. Other artists produced woodcuts and lithographs depicting the war—Nathaniel Currier of Currier & Ives was the most prolific of these. The conflict also saw a few grainy daguerreotypes that were among the first war photographs ever taken.

The war expanded America's awareness of the rest of the world and of its place within it. William H. Prescott's recently published *History of the Conquest of Mexico* was widely read by those serving in Mexico, who saw themselves as the martial heirs of Cortés. (Indeed, at the beginning of the war, the secretary of the Navy ordered Prescott's book added to the library of every warship.) Soldiers contrasted their own prosperous republic with a poorly developed country that seemed to have been hobbled by a parasitic military dictatorship and oppressive Roman Catholic church. At the same time, they were fascinated by Mexican culture. The American adoption of mustaches and cigarettes dates from the Mexican War, as do such words as corral and patio.

The War's Legacy

The capture of Mexico City gave the United States so much leverage over Mexico, at least in Polk's mind, that he considered annexing not just its northern provinces but the entire nation. Such action probably would have led only to a prolongation of the conflict. Fortunately, his chief negotiator, Nicholas Trist, stuck to his original instructions and a peace agreement, the Treaty of Guadalupe–Hidalgo, was signed in February 1848. Under its terms, Mexico conceded the loss of Texas (with its boundary stipulated as the Rio Grande), and also gave up California and New Mexico. In exchange, the United States assumed the claims of American citizens against the Mexican government and also paid Mexico $15 million.

The United States gained 1.2 million square miles of land: almost half of Mexico's prewar territory, though less than 1 percent of its population (who became U.S. citizens under the terms of the treaty). The United States also became acknowledged in Europe as the preeminent power in North America. One result of this new status was that Great Britain considered Canada a hostage to American good will. Although another generation would pass before the United States and Great Britain put the quarrels of 1775 and 1812 behind them, the Mexican War was a major, if unintentional, step in that direction.

The United States recruited about 90,000 men for the conflict; of these, only about 30,000 served in the field. Victory cost the nation more than 10,000 dead, mostly from disease, as well as $100 million in war expenses. (Mexican deaths are estimated at 25,000.) The war poisoned relations with Mexico for decades. It also bequeathed an unexpected political nightmare. Polk's supporters welcomed the war because they believed it would enhance American prosperity and bind the nation more closely together. Instead, the war confirmed Whig fears that sectional antagonism would follow such an expansionist conflict. No sooner had the western territories been won from Mexico than the question arose of whether and to what extent slavery could be introduced into them. The United States proved unable to contain the issue within its political system. The result was civil war in 1861.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Grant, Ulysses S.; Polk, James K.; Scott, Winfield

Related Documents

1846 b; 1849

—*Mark Grimsley*

Militant Liberty

Developed by John C. Broger of the Far East Broadcasting Company in 1954 and championed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Arthur Radford, Militant Liberty, a companion program to the Code of Conduct (1955), was one of a number of ideological initiatives supported by the Department of Defense (DoD) during the early days of the Cold War. Along with political, economic, and military means, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations relied on psychological warfare to convince the Soviet Union that the American people were determined to resist communism at home and abroad. A number of policy papers, including George Kennan's Long Telegram (1946) and National Security Council Memorandum-68 (NSC-68; 1950), had brought up the issue of the potential psychological advantage of the Soviets in possessing a single party line as opposed to America's pluralistic society. Both recommended that the government take steps to create a unified national will and character as a deterrent to communist advances. Truman attempted to do so by calling for a program of Universal Military Training (UMT) that, if passed, would have stressed moral and spiritual values for American youth. He also created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) in 1951 to coordinate various international

propaganda efforts of private and governmental agencies in promoting an evangelical democracy as a model for Third World nations in resisting communism.

President Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, viewed ideas as weapons and supported military efforts to reach out to the American public with evangelical anticommunism. Such efforts increased after the so-called "prisoner of war scandal," when 21 Americans held captive by the enemy during the Korean War refused repatriation at the end of that conflict. Although military investigations indicated that the Korean POWs had behaved no less patriotically than POWs had in any war, the DoD claimed that American homes, schools, and churches had failed to teach traditional values and crafted the Code of Conduct to both define proper POW behavior and as the first step in articulating a discernable national ideology. The military worded the code as ambiguously as possible about what actions POWs would be held accountable for while implying that a new standard of behavior would be expected of all Americans.

Admiral Radford championed Broger's Militant Liberty as a companion program to the Code of Conduct. Militant Liberty preached Americanism with "personal evangelism in the political rather than the religious field" and taught American democracy to militaries in Third World nations, including French Indochina and Guatemala. It also provided a "political religion," according to its proponents, for revitalizing America's national character. By comparing democracy's "sensitive individual conscience" to communism's "annihilated individual conscience," Broger claimed that it was possible to measure a nation's commitment to authoritarianism or freedom (by examining its discipline, religion, civics, education, social order, and economics) on a scale of −100 to +100. Admiral Radford hoped that Militant Liberty and Code of Conduct training would give service personnel the ideological armor needed to resist communist indoctrination and asked the nation's religious leaders to take a leading role in spreading its principles at home and abroad.

Broger claimed that if America did not provide Third World nations with "a new faith, militantly propagated by articulate natives," communism would (Osgood, 2001). The DoD, however, soon discovered that Militant Liberty (now code-named Project Action) was unworkable abroad because it relied too heavily on printed materials to reach largely illiterate populations. More hope, however, was placed on the concept's use with the American public. Sec. of Defense Charles E. Wilson authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff to hire a public relations firm to adapt Militant Liberty as a supplement to the Code of Conduct and enlisted the aid of Kenneth Wells of the Freedoms Foundation of Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, to market Broger's ideals throughout society. Wells and other civilian evangelicals valued the program's defense of America as God's chosen nation and actively participated in Militant Liberty briefs for the DoD and other government agencies. In 1955, officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff even traveled to Hollywood to urge John Wayne and John Ford to incorporate Militant Liberty themes into motion pictures. In January of the next year, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare followed the DoD's suggestion and held a national forum on how to disseminate the Code of Conduct and Broger's special brand of evangelical democracy to the nation's homes, schools, and churches.

Cover of a pamphlet published in 1957, promoting the ideals of the Militant Liberty program. (Private collection)

The military services embraced the Code of Conduct (although its interpretation of treasonous behavior would be modified to reflect the realities of torture during the Vietnam War), however, they ultimately rejected Militant Liberty because of its religious underpinnings. The program's link to political extremists such as Fred C. Schwarz of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade caught the attention of investigative reporters concerned about evangelical influences within the DoD, making it extremely difficult for Radford and Broger to pursue civilian indoctrination further. Broger, however, continued his efforts to define liberty, serving first as deputy director of Armed Forces Information and Education in 1956 and then director in 1961. He also promoted evangelical democracy through People-to-People, an international Americanism program founded by President Eisenhower that centered on the testimonials of American citizens to spread American principles abroad, and with Abraham Vereide's International Christian Leadership to organize evangelicals within the Pentagon and other branches of the government with weekly prayer groups. The attempt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to create a national indoctrination program with Militant Liberty, while unusual, was not unexpected. According to political scientist Samuel Huntington, the alliance served as "a warning symptom of the derangement of American civil–military relationships" during the early Cold War.

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Committee on Public Information; National Security Memorandum-68; Office of War Information; Propaganda Posters: World War II

—*Lori Bogle*

Militarization and Militarism

Militarization refers to the process whereby some nation-states in certain eras devote more than the usual amount of their gross national products to their military forces, call into service more than the average number of personnel per capita, and organize for war. Militarism also refers to the adulation of warrior culture (customs, uniforms, parades, traditions). The two phenomena sometimes coincide, but they need not.

For example, in the first generation of North American settlement, several of the English colonies attained significant states of militarization, but, with the exception of Virginia, few experienced militarism. The United States rarely reached levels of either militarization or militarism comparable to the levels evident in, for instance, Prussia or pre–World War II Japan. Militarism clearly did emerge in identifiable forms by the 1840s and 1850s and can be detected thereafter in a number of manifestations. In addition, the United States reached remarkably high levels of militarization during the Civil War, World War II, and the Cold War for reasons that deserve attention.

Colonial Era and the Early Republic

In the earliest stage of settlement of colonies like the Plymouth and Virginia companies, military considerations, both defensive and offensive, loomed large and colonial leadership expected militia service and military discipline. Substantial numbers of the adult male population served during the French and Indian War and the American Revolution. But colonial dislike of standing armies was deep-seated and enduring; respect for the military prowess of

ordinary citizen–soldiers and a belief that they were vital to the defense of civil and political liberties would persist until well into the early 20th century. Colonial militia and wartime volunteer companies in New England expected to have a voice in selecting their leaders. By the late 17th century, nowhere in the colonies did such forces tolerate the sort of discipline and drill found in the regiments of British regulars. Militarization of colonial society was of relatively brief duration, and little respect was found for militarism in colonial America.

Nor do we detect much evidence of it in the early republic. After the American Revolution, a number of officers created the Society of the Cincinnati, an officers-only veterans' organization that was hereditary—that is, the sons of these officers, and their sons and grandsons, were to constitute its ranks. The society lobbied for a strong central government with a standing army; and some of its leaders hoped that their war commander, George Washington, would accept the title of king in such a government. Here was an organization with both aristocratic and militaristic overtones and aims. But it was feared and despised by most Americans, who preferred a republican form of government and regarded state militia (or volunteers) as preferable to a federal standing army. Mason "Parson" Weems offered this assessment of the losses of federal regulars in the battle of Fallen Timbers (1794) in his *Life of Washington*:

> After the first shock [of the news] the loss of these poor souls was not much lamented. Tall young fellows, who could easily get their half dollar a day at the healthful and glorious labours of the plough, to go and enlist and rust among the lice and itch of a camp, for four dollars a month, were certainly not worth their country's crying about.

The creation of West Point in 1802 by Pres. Thomas Jefferson and his allies in Congress was intended in part to ensure that the federal Army of the next generation or more would be a bastion of republican values and virtues. Although Jefferson's supporters were themselves largely critical in their attitudes toward things military, the institution they had created was soon condemned for its aristocratic and militaristic ways. In the early 1830s, a number of Democrats in the Congress and in the administration of Pres. Andrew Jackson sought to extinguish the academy. It survived, largely by persuading Congress that its graduates, who were trained as civil engineers, were of enormous value to the building of the nation's infrastructure.

Militarism in the Mid-19th Century

Nonetheless, by the 1840s and 1850s clear signs of civilian respect for militarism were everywhere. Military colleges like the Virginia Military Institute and its counterparts in Georgia and Louisiana, the Citadel in South Carolina, and Norwich University (originally Norwich Academy) were created, as were numerous military preparatory schools. Filibustering expeditions, made up of armed American volunteers, led by would-be dictators, were launched against Central American nations. Officers serving during the Mexican War created the Aztec Club, akin to the Society of the Cincinnati in its policy of hereditary membership. Novels celebrating warriors and histories of the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War appeared. The chivalric novels of Sir Walter Scott, celebrating the virtues of noble warriors, became immensely popular, as were "Ring" tournaments where mounted men dressed as medieval knights jousted to win prizes awarded by fair ladies.

Across the country, more than 100,000 men in late adolescence and early manhood flocked to volunteer military drill companies during these decades, despite the absence, generally, of any actual need for such military units. A striking example of such a volunteer company is that of young Elmer Ellsworth and his Chicago Zouaves. Ellsworth became fascinated with the fancy drill companies he had seen in rural New York and organized one of his own—the Black Plumed Riflemen. He moved to Chicago, where he found part-time employment as a drillmaster for other volunteer companies. When he met a French veteran of a Zouave regiment that had seen service in the Crimean War, Ellsworth determined to create such a unit in Chicago, complete with the unique Zouave uniform of red cap, loose pantaloons, and mustaches and goatees.

In 1859 Ellsworth became a student of law in the firm of Lincoln & Herndon, and his admiring friends elected him

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Cover of a song sheet that celebrates Elmer Ellsworth's Zoave Cadets. (Sam DeVincent Collection of Illustrated American Sheet Music. Archives Center of the National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Behring Center)

captain of the National Guard Cadets, whereupon he transformed 60 young men into the United States Zouave Cadets and taught the members the gymnastic French drill, complete with bugle commands and "Zouave tig-e-r-r!" yell. After the Zouaves dazzled spectators in Chicago, Ellsworth led the company on a national tour of 20 northern cities in the summer of 1860, challenging local companies to drill competition and impressing them all, including the cadets at West Point. A sensational success, Ellsworth and his Zouaves became celebrities. His mentor, John Hay (Abraham Lincoln's clerk), noted that Ellsworth's lithograph portrait "sold like wildfire," and that "schoolgirls dreamed over the graceful wave of his curls" while "shop-boys tried to reproduce the Grand Seigneur air of his attitude." Imitation Zouave companies appeared in several of the cities his unit had visited.

When Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor in early 1861, Ellsworth raised a regiment of New York firemen and marched them to the defense of Washington. His unit was ordered across the Potomac to Alexandria, Virginia, in late May, and Ellsworth was shot to death by the proprietor of a hotel there while tearing down the Confederate "Bonnie Blue" flag from its roof. His funeral service was held in the White House, and he thereupon became the very first Union "martyr" of the Civil War and one of several of its more colorful militaristic figures.

From the Civil War through World War I

Many of the first waves of enthusiastic volunteers on both sides of the Civil War regarded the conflict as a test of their mettle and manhood—but many of these men soon came to question their more militaristic views. They now took cover when under fire and many declined to reenlist when their tours of duty came to an end. But others retained some of the militaristic characteristics they had come to admire and imitate. Photographs of several Civil War generals show them with their right hands tucked into their tunics in the fashion of Napoleon Bonaparte. Dying men were depicted in paintings as having died with nobility, and some accounts of their deaths in the diaries and letters of their comrades were equally romantic. H. Clay Trumbull's description of the death of Navy Lt. S. W. Preston before Fort Fischer may serve as an example:

> When Preston found that he was dying he turned himself on his back on the beach, straightened out his handsome form to the full, reached up his arms, and with both hands carefully gathered under his head the soft sand and a tuft or two of the shore-grass as a supporting pillow, then folded his arms, with his neatly-gloved hands across his chest, and deliberately composed himself to die (Trumbull, 40).

In the decade following a bloody civil war, the reunited states experienced little militaristic rhetoric and no evidence of militarization. But significant signs of militarism began to appear again in the last quarter of the century. According to historian James Malin, a "cult of

Napoleon worship" was clearly evident by the 1890s, as were signs of real admiration for "the stamp of stern Oliver" (Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell). Patriotic organizations like the Society of American Wars and the Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution emerged in the late 19th century, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars was founded in 1913.

By the late 19th century some of the harsher memories of the Civil War had faded for many veterans; what remained were fonder recollections of camaraderie and sacrifice. Membership in the Grand Army of the Republic, the organization of the rapidly aging veterans of the Union Army, had been declining; in the 1880s it rose, peaking in 1890. On Memorial Day in 1895, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and a thrice-wounded Massachusetts veteran of the war, addressed an audience at his alma mater, Harvard College, and offered some decidedly militaristic observations:

> [A]s long as man dwells upon the globe, his destiny is battle. . . .War, when you are at it, is horrible and dull. It is only when time has passed that you see its message was divine. . . . I rejoice at every dangerous sport which I see pursued . . . [S]word-slashed faces inspire me with sincerest respect. . . . I gaze with delight upon our polo-players. If once in a while in our rough riding a neck is broken, I regard it . . . as a price well paid for the breeding of a race fit for headship and command . . . [K]eep the soldier's faith against the doubts of civil life. . . . [L]ove glory more than the temptations of wallowing ease. (Holmes, 75–82)

Three years later Holmes would write to a friend of his pleasure at "hearing some rattling jingo talk" urging war with Spain, and Assistant Navy Sec. Theodore Roosevelt would borrow one of Holmes's phrases, "rough riders," in organizing a volunteer cavalry company of western range hands for the campaign in Cuba during the Spanish–American War. Roosevelt coined a similar phrase when he urged American men to "lead the strenuous life." Shortly thereafter, in the early 20th century, the British-bred Boy Scout movement made its way to the United States to accomplish precisely that—complete with uniforms, outdoor encampments, and hikes. As the Boy Scouts grew in popularity, so did the works of Marine Corps band director and composer John Philip Sousa, whose rousing marches remain popular throughout America to this day.

In 1910 Col. Edward Mandell House's *Phillip Dru, Administrator* appeared. The novel told of a revolution led by Dru, a charismatic West Point graduate, against a "corrupt" elected civilian government in Washington, which culminated in a battle in which 60,000 combatants died. Dru then marched on Washington and displaced the government in Napoleonic (or Cromwellian) fashion with an enlightened dictatorship for a year, before stepping down and sailing into the Pacific sunset with his wife. Remarkably, House would within three years serve Pres. Woodrow Wilson as a kind of chief of staff.

The popularizing (and misinterpreting) of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859) and *Descent of Man* (1871), soon styled Social Darwinism, reinforced an ages-old view of mankind as combative, but with a new "insight" into "the struggle" among races and nations for "the survival of the fittest." In 1909 the *Army and Navy Journal* attacked critics of military spending with a "Darwinian" argument: "When every boy . . . is eager to go out and beat his neighbor in football, baseball or some other game, representing the ever-continuing conflict of earthly existences, what does he care about being told that a cannon shot costs more than a small house . . . [or] more of that kind of misleading talk?"(Sept. 4, 1909, 15). Similar arguments also came from professed anti-imperialist and Harvard philosopher William James, who was sufficiently influenced by these and other anthropological and biological views of his day that he would tell his audience in 1910:

> Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us. . . . Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood. . . . There is a type of military character which everyone feels that the race should never cease to breed, for everyone is sensitive to its superiority. (James, 4, 6)

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Perhaps the most counterintuitive evidence of civilian militarism in these years can be seen in the Salvation Army, an evangelical organization created by Methodist minister William Booth in the 1860s in Britain. "The Army" took root in the United States in the 1880s and was flourishing by the turn of the century. The organization engages in social service and spiritual regeneration, but it is does so with symbols and trappings that have militaristic overtones. Its members are uniformed "soldiers" and "officers." The "Army" attacks "the fortresses of sin." Its newsletter is *The War Cry*, and its bands play and sing "Onward Christian soldiers, marching as to war." This otherwise benign organization came into being in the era of Social Darwinism and Anglo American imperialism, thus its militaristic structure and expressions are completely understandable.

By 1910 America possessed enormous industrial capacity, producing as much iron and steel as did France, Germany, and Great Britain combined. But the nation did not choose to pursue a policy of naval construction comparable to that of Great Britain or Germany, nor—despite calls for universal military training by a number of elites—did it institute military conscription as had France, Germany, and Russia. Some Americans clearly were militaristic, and most of these (and others) favored such militarization, but these voices were still in a decided minority.

Europe descended into war in 1914; concurrently in the United States, a substantial "Preparedness" movement grew within urban, cosmopolitan, and commercial middle class and elite circles. The movement secured enthusiastic Army support in the form of pay-as-you-go summer training camps for potential junior officer volunteers. When Congress declared war in 1917, it passed the first major conscription act in American history. The commander of America's expeditionary force, Gen. John Pershing, wore a crisp tunic and the West Pointer's "Sam Browne" belt and was popular with some of the drafted "doughboys." Others preferred retired Gen. Leonard Wood as a man "more like a civilian than a West Pointer." But when some 12,000 recently returned veterans of the war were surveyed in 1919, they rejected having "a military man as president" by a 3-to-1 margin. Nonetheless, they favored the continuation of "compulsory military training" by a 3-to-2 margin (Wecter, 372). This

might be due to the cognitive dissonance many must have experienced when drafted; it was, in any event, consistent with the hopes of the newly created Universal Military Training League and the views of Army colonels P. S. Bond and C. F. Martin, who explained in their pamphlet *Your Boy and the Other in Universal Military Training*:

> It is a matter of national concern that proper habits of thought and action be inculcated in our young men. . . . National training alone [in youth camps for boys and girls] will . . . be the most powerful instrument in history for the development on a gigantic scale of a race of better men and women, supermen who alone can create and maintain that greater civilization. (Bond and Martin, 123–24)

Three new veterans' organizations emerged during and after World War I: the American Legion, the Disabled American Veterans, and the more elitist Military Order of the World War. The last organization, created in the fall of 1920, identified service in the war with medieval Christian knights, attacked pacifists and liberals, and mirrored its predecessors, the Society of the Cincinnati and The Aztec Club, in that it was limited to officer veterans and their sons. But it attracted only 2 percent of all officer veterans. Those who advocated militarization and admirers of militarism in America in the 1920s and '30s were not influential.

Although the United States emerged from the war as the only creditor nation in the world, it did not engage in militarization over the next two decades. Federal spending on the military services fell from 28.3 percent of all such spending in 1913 to 15.5 percent in 1940. Neutrality legislation was enacted in 1935, in hopes of preventing the economic reliance on trade with one side of any future European war; such reliance, Congress believed, had led the United States into World War I. A Gallup poll in 1938 found that 73 percent of those asked believed the United States had erred in entering that war, and, despite the failure of a proposed constitutional amendment to require a national referendum on a declaration of war in Congress, a poll in 1939 showed 58 percent of respondents still favoring such an amendment.

World War II and the Cold War

America's general aversion to militarism continued, even in wartime. GIs in World War II identified with the scruffy, unmilitaristic frontline characters "Willie" and "Joe," the creations of *Stars and Stripes* cartoonist Bill Mauldin. And most soldiers, as well as Mauldin himself, admired the more down-to-earth figures cut by generals Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley than they did that of the more militaristic Gen. George Patton. After the war GIs and their veterans organizations (including two new ones, the AmVets and the American Veterans Committee) lobbied Congress for legislation that would force the military leadership to show more respect for enlisted personnel. A Board of Inquiry headed by retired Gen. Jimmy Doolittle heard their grievances and recommended a number of changes.

The onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s led to the first major peacetime draft. With the North Korean attack upon South Korea in the summer of 1950, a steady and massive buildup of troops and weapons, following the recommendations of National Security Council Memorandum-68 (which had been drafted shortly before that war began) was begun. The nuclear stockpile rose from 150 megatons in 1953 to some 19,000 megatons in 1960. By 1958 some 2.6 million persons were in the armed services, down some 30 percent from the peak year of the Korean War era, but larger than any peacetime force had ever been; and the reserves were growing, too. In his farewell address in 1961, Pres. Dwight Eisenhower warned of a growing alliance between U.S. industry and the military, what he called a "military–industrial complex," but the militarization continued largely unabated into the late 1980s. The nation fought an increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam in the 1960s and early '70s, punctuated by street theater protest and its Broadway-musical counterpart, *Hair*. But the public's respect for the military services rose to an all-time high, as it blamed the civilian leadership for the Vietnam quagmire. This was grasped by Hollywood when it turned the popularity of John Rambo, the angry veteran hero of *First Blood* (1982), into *Rambo: First Blood Part II* (1985) and *Rambo III* (1988).

Indeed, the war metaphor was adopted for a host of non-martial purposes in these years: Americans waged "war" on drugs, smoking, crime, hunger, poverty, cancer, and AIDS, and engaged in "culture wars." Perhaps the rise in popularity in the past generation of both military reenactments and war games provide evidence of a rise in civilian militarism. Is the fact that the United States has led the world in sales of weapons since 1985 evidence that the military–industrial complex is still in place? The U.S. military today is clearly the strongest in the world, and it is regularly rated by the American public as the most or one of the most respected institutions in the nation. Those facts serve as measures of the distance that the nation has traveled since colonial times.

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Arms Trade; Butler, Smedley Darlington; Citadel, The; Cold War; Colonial Militia Systems; Filibustering; Military–Industrial Complex; Preparedness Movement; Rambo; Reenactments, Military; Roosevelt, Theodore; Wargaming

Related Documents

1637; 1768 a, b; 1772; 1800; 1830; 1850; 1864 c; 1910; 1961; 1971 a; 2004 a

—*Peter Karsten*

Military Academy, United States

The United States Military Academy (commonly known as West Point) was established in 1802 to prepare officers for career service in the U.S. Army. The school was located at West Point, New York, the strategic installation Benedict Arnold had attempted to hand over to the British during the Revolutionary War. By the Civil War, most of the Army's senior leaders were Academy graduates. In addition to serving as leaders in the armed forces, Academy alumni have contributed to the growth of American society as explorers, political and business leaders, scientists, and inventors. The Academy played a crucial role in developing their professional abilities and molding their characters.

Establishment of the Military Academy

Early Americans were skeptical of the need for a professional military school, fearing that it would perpetuate a military aristocracy and believing that state militias were adequate for defending the country. However, members of the Federalist Party, including George Washington, favored a stronger national army led by trained professionals. Many in this group had served in the Continental Army and witnessed occasions of poor performance by militias under fire. Ironically, the Federalists' archrival, Thomas Jefferson, ultimately authorized the school's creation, but set it up in a way that attempted to preserve republican values. Congress would regulate the size of the Academy and determine which individuals would receive appointments. Academy supporters also deflected criticism by emphasizing the school's engineering benefits rather than its war studies.

The Academy struggled during its early existence: too few instructors and an unclear curriculum and purpose. The War Department often reassigned its most capable officers and students to what it considered to be more important priorities. The school's status stabilized in the 1820s during the tenure of Sylvanus Thayer, its first notable superintendent. Thayer created a multitiered program that developed cadets academically, professionally, and morally. Although this structure has been through many permutations, the Academy has followed this basic approach throughout its history. Thayer modeled a high standard of professional decorum, which became a trademark of Academy graduates. Through rigorous inspections, cadets learned to maintain an impeccable standard of military bearing. Officers on the Academy staff scrutinized cadets' conduct to ensure that it was honorable.

The strength of its academic program gave many graduates the grounding to achieve distinguished careers with the Corps of Engineers; in turn, these graduates established the Academy's reputation as an elite engineering college. Thayer's protégé, Dennis Hart Mahan, helped to solidify the

Academy's academic foundations. After graduating in 1824, Mahan taught cadets civil and military engineering virtually uninterrupted until 1871, except for four years spent studying abroad early in his career. Mahan's list of pupils included distinguished graduates like Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, and William T. Sherman. Although he taught engineering, Mahan's courses included a traditional military emphasis with specific applications to combat.

Early Challenges and the Civil War

Academy graduates were gradually assigned to units at both eastern posts and on the frontier, but the Mexican War was the first genuine test of the school's training. Many future leaders in the Civil War, including Grant, Lee, and Jefferson Davis, had significant roles in the earlier conflict. The challenges of leading a volunteer Army deep into Mexico were tremendous, but Academy graduates contributed to the Army's success with their skills in planning and organization. However, relationships between volunteers and Academy officers was often uneasy. Academy graduates looked upon their colleagues and troops as undisciplined, while volunteers interpreted the graduates' attention to detail as martinet behavior.

The Civil War only magnified many of these stereotypes; 259 graduates sided with the Confederacy while 638, including Southerners like George Thomas, stayed loyal to the Union. Academy graduates dominated the upper echelons of leadership in both the Union and Confederate armies. Not all of the volunteer generals were failures nor were all of the Academy officers successful, but these situations were more the exception than the rule. The emergence of mass armies and modern technology eliminated any remaining preconceived notions about the proficiency of part-time officers. Reformers, most notably William T. Sherman, used the war to enact further changes to move toward a professional officer corps. West Point would be the cornerstone of a whole system of officer education; by the 1880s and 1890s, officers began to attend advanced schools related to their careers.

These reforms coincided with a new outlook on the primary role of the Army. The United States needed a regular Army that could expand to wartime strength quickly and was prepared to fight overseas. Emory Upton, a graduate of the class of 1861 and a darling of Sherman, did the most to give intellectual breadth to this vision. After traveling throughout Europe, Upton wrote two landmark books while serving as commandant of cadets: *The Military Policy of the United States* (published after his death in 1904) and *The Armies of Asia and Europe* (1878). Upton believed the U.S. Army should model itself after the great armies of Europe, especially Germany. These powers were wrestling with similar problems of wartime mobilization and contingency planning, but were light-years ahead of the United States. Upton's arguments buttressed the new system of officer education, with West Point as its linchpin. A highly trained officer corps would oversee operational and logistical planning and serve as the leadership cadre for wartime expansion.

The Academy Experience

Despite Jefferson's democratic hopes, the Academy drew most of its cadets from the middle to upper classes of American society. Many cadets came from families with a history of military service. Their religious affiliation was disproportionately Episcopalian. For the most part, Academy traditions were in tune with how cadets had been raised before coming to West Point. Its strict hierarchy reinforced the importance of the chain of command and of following orders. The ascetic lifestyle instilled personal discipline, teaching cadets to persevere despite tremendous obstacles. Loyalty was another bedrock value of the Academy, but, as the Civil War demonstrated, different institutions could compete for the cadets' allegiance. Regardless, graduates were generally faithful to their bond with one another.

To some degree, the West Point has always entrusted the indoctrination of plebes (freshmen) to its upperclassmen. The process began the summer before the first academic year with basic instruction in close order drill, service etiquette and customs, and the proper wearing of the military uniform. Plebe indoctrination also included its fair share of hazing even though the Academy formally condemned it. Upperclassmen often used their own experiences to perpetuate what they considered to be important "traditions." To some extent, hazing increased in the late 19th century because of lingering war weariness and the difficulties of

reestablishing the Academy as a national institution. Tough-minded superintendents, including Gen. John Schofield, eventually curtailed the more egregious acts of hazing and restored traditional disciplinary standards.

The Academy graduated its first African American, Henry Flipper, in 1877, but only two others followed him before 1900. (In contrast, the Naval Academy did not graduate its first African American, Wesley Brown, until 1949.) A good number of African American cadets were ill-prepared for the academic program and were dismissed from West Point. Most of them were either ostracized or harassed by white cadets. One of the worst episodes involved Johnson Whittaker, who entered in 1876. Whittaker broke a racial taboo by fighting with a white cadet who struck him. Shortly afterward, he was found beaten and bound in his room. The Academy concluded that Whittaker had done this to himself, perhaps to avoid worse treatment, a charge he denied throughout his life. Whittaker failed academically, but his plight attracted national attention to how poorly African American cadets were treated by their peers. West Point would not make lasting progress toward racial integration until the 1970s. By that point, roughly 15 percent of the corps of cadets were African Americans and the institution had appointed its first black commandant, Gen. Fred Gordon.

The MacArthur Reforms and Wartime Mobilization
The U.S. Army entered World War I desperately short of junior officers. To fill the void, the Academy adopted a three-year, abbreviated schedule that graduated cadets as quickly as possible. Basic training in infantry skills and small unit leadership was accelerated. Many academic courses were shortened or dropped entirely to make room in the curriculum. The Academy also began offering flight instruction to cadets. It hoped to construct its own fixed-wing airfield, but budget constraints always prevented it. War's end created an awkward situation for the Academy—many of those who had attended accelerated classes could benefit from additional coursework, but few graduates were eager to return to West Point. The Army resolved the issue by returning these individuals to the Academy to finish their education but allowing them to retain their officer status.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur became the first postwar superintendent in 1919. Just 39 years old, he was eager to leave his mark. MacArthur embarked upon a series of curriculum reforms, many of which were opposed by the Academic Board, which consisted of the school's senior military professors. In MacArthur's opinion, the curriculum had focused so much on mathematics that the Academy had fallen behind other civilian engineering schools. Limited changes were made during his tenure, but West Point returned to its rote curriculum after he left office. MacArthur also fought to expand the Academy's size from roughly 1,500 to 2,400 cadets, to better keep pace with Army's expansion.

West Point faced an even greater mobilization crisis during World War II and again adopted the three-year, accelerated program. Compounding these problems, the War Department approved a plan that allowed up to 60 percent of any graduating class to accept commissions in the Army Air Corps, which left traditional combat branches, such as the infantry, armor, and artillery, even more short-handed in terms of their complement of Academy graduates. The Academy was also left drastically short of instructors. Typically, its faculty was made up of graduates at the rank of captain or major, but in wartime the operational forces had the greater need for these officers. As a result, the Academy turned to reserve and officers who were not graduates to fill its faculty. Many of these wartime practices would prove to be the springboard for permanent reforms to the academic program in the postwar era.

Post–World War II Era
Gen. Maxwell Taylor, another ambitious young alumnus, became the first superintendent after World War II. Like MacArthur, Taylor pursued reforms that brought him into conflict with the Academy staff. He created the office of dean to oversee the academic program and attempted to reform the curriculum, both over the objection of the Academic Board. Taylor also pursued reforms of the honor system and plebe indoctrination to help formalize processes within these traditions. Future superintendents would build on many of these reforms. Gen. William Westmoreland persuaded Congress to double the size of

the Academy, which made it roughly equivalent to the size of the Naval Academy. Gen. Garrison Davidson added electives to the uniform curriculum and Gen. Andrew Goodpaster implemented a majors program, both of which helped align the curriculum with other elite engineering colleges.

West Point had more than its share of troubles in the postwar period. The integrity of the honor system came under question in the 1951, when 90 cadets, including many football players, were separated for sharing information on quizzes and exams. The scandal led to the firing of popular coach Red Blaik, who had built the Academy into a football powerhouse. Another scandal occurred in 1976 in which 152 cadets were separated for cheating in a tough electrical engineering course. Ninety-eight offenders were readmitted after a congressional hearing pressured the Academy to examine its own culpability in creating the scandal. The Posvar Commission recommended sweeping changes in 1988 to reduce the tendency of officials to use the honor code to enforce regulations. Prior to these reforms, cadets were often asked blanket questions about their adherence to conduct regulations; they either incriminated themselves or risked providing a false answer that could be handled under the Academy honor system.

Academy leaders fought the admission of women until the bitter end, arguing that the school existed to produce combat officers; women, they argued, would never be allowed in combat, thus they did not belong at West Point. Proponents of integration persuaded Congress in 1976 that this narrow definition of West Point's mandate was not altogether accurate. Academy graduates were also serving in various technical and support branches, positions that could not be legitimately closed to women. The class of 1980 admitted 116 women; unfortunately, many of them faced persecution from male cadets who felt their presence undermined Academy traditions. Female cadets gradually became more accepted in the 1980s and 1990s. Their performance eventually won over more of their male counterparts; growing numbers of women also provided more effective support for one another. Despite all the changes, the Academy's mission has remained consistent with its mandate to provide career officers to the U.S. Army.

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Air Force Academy; Citadel, The; Coast Guard Academy; Naval Academy; Service Academy Chapels; Virginia Military Institute

Related Documents

1838

—Todd Forney

Military Bases

American military bases have transformed the landscape of the nation, especially in the South and West. The various roles that the military post has played in history demonstrate the extent to which the military as an institution extends far beyond the realm of national defense. Military installations led the way in the nation's westward expansion and continue to drive many local economies. In addition, installations have shaped civilian attitudes about the role of the military in society and have transformed the culture of many regions. The contemporary military post remains a visible and constant reminder of the extensive defense establishment in the United States. This account is limited to the continental United States, however, America's projection of power abroad has resulted in many installations around the globe.

MILITARY BASES

Early Military Posts

The history of military posts in America is much older than the history of the United States itself. The indigenous peoples of North America constructed various types of fortress- or garrison-type facilities. The Spanish, with a militarized form of colonization in the South and West, built presidios, roughly equivalent to forts, and castillos, which were more modest fortifications. Jamestown, the first permanent European settlement in North America, included a fort. Even early New York City had a fortification or protective wall (hence Wall Street), built across the island of Manhattan. During the colonial era, the British manned forts along the frontier in an attempt to provide a buffer between white settlers and Native Americans, as well as to discourage French and Spanish incursions.

After the Revolutionary War, the frontier forts changed hands as the new nation took possession. In 1783, George Washington wrote "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," in which he asked Congress for adequate numbers of troops to garrison the posts of the frontier, especially Fort Pitt, in Pennsylvania, and the fortress at West Point, New York, which he described as the "key to America." In Washington's estimation, the posts would "awe the Indians, protect our trade, prevent the encroachment of our neighbors from Canada and the Floridas, and guard us at least from surprises."

From the earliest days of the republic, military posts in all forms played an important and growing role in the nation's expansion and economic and social development. The earliest outposts were largely self-sufficient operations with the post and access roads constructed by soldiers. Road construction was probably the greatest contribution of the soldier to the settlement of the old Northwest. However, as westward expansion continued, the Army came to rely increasingly on civilians for transportation and provisions, thus giving an economic boost to the areas surrounding posts. In addition to providing protection and security, the posts also served as cultural centers (libraries and social gatherings), established the first schools on the frontier, provided medical care and mail service for the surrounding community, and became the focal point for religious observances. Although some post communities eventually became metropolitan areas, it was just as likely that they did not. Typically, an area had to have other advantages as well: transportation, fertile land, and natural resources. Nevertheless, garrisons played an essential role in providing security and economic opportunities in the old Northwest and Southwest.

Posts in the Frontier West

After the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, the Army extended its frontier boundaries west of the Mississippi. Throughout the 19th century, the United States established a wide variety of different installations. Post is a general term for any installation where troops are "posted." Eventually, cantonment came to mean a temporary encampment, as it would in World War I, and the designation of fort meant a permanent facility. (While the term Army base is used by civilians on occasion, the American military does not use this designation.) For the greater part of the 19th century, however, there were no hard and fast rules regarding terminology. Some permanent sites were initially called cantonments, others were designated as forts even though they were known to be very temporary affairs.

Between 1804 and roughly 1845, the Army constructed posts in front of the advancing white settlers, thus maintaining a buffer between settlers and Native Americans. By 1845, 24 of the Army's 56 military posts were west of the Mississippi. After the Mexican War, westward migration accelerated and keeping whites and Native Americans separate was no longer possible. For the next 40 years and with the notable exception of the American Civil War, the Army would serve as a constabulary, primarily focused on controlling the Native American population. Forts sprung up at major settlement areas in Texas, Oregon, New Mexico, and California. Outposts were also established along the various migration, trade, and communication routes. The Army established many permanent installations in the two decades after the American Civil War, the period of the major Indian wars in the West.

From the 1880s until the Spanish–American War, the Army focused on the oversight of Indian reservations, thus lessening the need for small posts and outposts sprinkled across the West. Many interior facilities were closed and greater emphasis was placed upon coastal

defense fortifications as the nation increasingly interested itself in world affairs. Interior posts that remained open could oversee larger areas because of improvements in transportation and communication. Although the days of the frontier post were numbered, some had already grown into major installations and therefore survived into the modern era: forts Leavenworth, Bliss, Riley, Sill, and Sam Houston, and Jefferson Barracks.

At the beginning of war with Spain in 1898, the Army occupied 78 posts across the nation. The exigencies of war would force the abandonment of some western posts (reduced to 66 by 1902); others were maintained with small caretaking units. The War Department designated temporary training encampments in Virginia, Georgia, and Florida, all of which soon came under close scrutiny because of poor administration, lack of provisions, and high mortality from typhoid fever (often misdiagnosed as malaria), and poor sanitary conditions.

During the winter of 1898 to 1899, the War Department designated several temporary holding camps for soldiers preparing to rotate through occupation duty in Cuba and Puerto Rico. These camps, primarily in the foothills of the southern Appalachians, proved to be very successful in terms of function and health. Many of the southern locales selected in late 1898 would become America's military towns in the 20th century.

Early 20th-Century Bases

The war with Spain demonstrated to the fledgling world power that its ground forces required more extensive training. Legislation passed in 1901 authorized the War Department to select four sites around the nation for such training. Because of the well-publicized economic boost experienced by towns that served as points of embarkation and as hosts for camps in 1898 and 1899, the Army now had to contend with the politics of post location to a degree not experienced before.

Politics and economic development had always factored in the location of installations, but boosterism and salesmanship intensified the pressure in 1901. The result was the first "base chase" of the 20th century as towns across the nation vied for one of the training reservations. Eventually, the Army selected Fort Riley, Kansas, Chickamauga Park, Georgia, Conewego Park near Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and Nacimiento Ranch in California. The Army did conduct occasional maneuvers at these and other stateside locales, but generally they were underutilized in the following decade as large numbers of the regular Army served abroad, primarily in the Philippines. In 1908, the Army's largest and most extensive training facility, Fort Stotsenburg in the Philippines, had grown to 150,000 acres, more than seven times the size of Fort Riley, Kansas, the largest post in the continental United States.

Ever mindful of the economic impact of military posts, towns and cities across the nation campaigned to be selected as a site for one of the national Army camps or National Guard cantonments when the United States entered World War I in April 1917. Eventually, national Army camps were distributed around the nation based upon population. The Army sited cantonments disproportionately in the South, many in locales used during the winter of 1898 to 1899. Although climate is generally considered the reason for the South's selection for these tent cities, other factors also contributed to the decisions: terrain and soil, transportation, cost of land, availability of water, and political influence. The posts of 1917, larger and more extensive than the Spanish–American War camps, soon proved to be inadequate for training an army for modern, industrialized warfare.

In 1918, the War Department established three massive training installations, eventually known as forts Benning, Bragg, and Knox. Fort Bragg, as originally configured, consisted of over 120,000 acres (12 x 25 mi.). During previous wars and campaigns, the Army frequently established posts on government land or on land that was provided by local governments in hopes of boosting the economy and providing greater protection. But the size and location of these "superbases" entailed the acquisition of land of thousands of private citizens, and some objected vociferously. Not only were these posts designed for the scale of the World War I battlefield, but they were also expected to be permanent. The superbases of 1918 were designed as much for future warfare as for the present.

The small size of the Army during the interwar period resulted in the underutilization or abandonment of most of

the reservations established during World War I. But with World War II approaching, existing posts were soon bursting at the seams; the Army quickly established many other installations of the size and scale of the superbases of 1918. Although the military established installations all across the nation, the mobilization for World War II confirmed the South's reputation as "America's boot camp." Almost overnight in 1940, the region became home to countless new Army posts, air bases, marine camps, and naval installations, what *Time* called the "Defense Boom in Dixie." All this in a region that already had several installations dating from World War I. By the end of 1945, as one report noted, two-thirds of home front defense installations could be found between Washington, D.C., and west Texas.

Training centers were established in every state of the South, some at existing facilities such as Fort Bragg outside of Fayetteville, North Carolina, and others at recently acquired sites such as Camp Stewart near Savannah, Georgia. Much of the southern land (more than 700,000 acres) was inexpensive to purchase but also isolated, as military personnel soon learned. Before the military could move in, thousands of rural Southerners (25,000 by one estimate) were forced out. All were compensated for their losses, but many considered the government's purchase price to be exceedingly low, especially when compared with the inflated wages that typically resulted from the military's arrival. As one farmer noted, a relatively unskilled carpenter on an Army post could earn upward of $10 a day, almost the same amount the War Department paid the farmer for an acre of his land. Southerners did not necessarily embrace the change in landscape or the increase in local activity and intrusion into their lives, but they took full advantage of the money made available by the military's presence.

The Cold War and Beyond

The Cold War guaranteed that the United States would not demobilize after World War II to the extent that it had after previous wars; the defense needs of the Cold War required a large, permanent, and professional force. As a result, many of the installations established during the world wars remained operational. Along with the continued economic benefits that came with hosting a large military facility, base towns also realized that, in the nuclear era, they had become targets. But for many boosters, the irony of reduced security because of the presence of a post was more than counterbalanced by the continuing infusion of federal dollars into the community.

This economic impact was further amplified by a number of social factors: service personnel were more likely to retire near military installations and the ever-growing number of military personnel who were married and had families. The Cold War years also saw a substantial increase in the numbers of civilians employed at installations. Last, the boom-and-bust cycles of wartime mobilization were replaced by the relative stability of the Cold War. Many military communities came to believe that their economy was based entirely upon defense and some made little effort to diversify that economic base. Although the actual impact of defense spending was typically less than many boosters assumed, the military did little to disabuse them of this notion—at least as long as the service wanted to keep the installation.

The Cold War years were not without rounds of base closings, typically in the name of efficiency. Defense Sec. Robert McNamara oversaw a substantial reduction in the number of installations in the early 1960s. During the 1960s and 1970s, 60 major bases were closed before Congress enacted legislation in 1977 that effectively prevented further reductions. While some communities never fully recovered from the loss of a defense facility, others found that the return of government land to the tax rolls and the value added by private sector development of this land more than offset the loss of defense dollars. However, in some cases, especially air base towns, the government moved out and defense contractors moved in, keeping the community closely tied to the defense establishment.

The highly politicized Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds, resulting from the force reduction at the end of the Cold War (1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995), have greatly affected the number and orientation of installations and have threatened the economic well-being of military communities. Between 1988 and 1995, 97 of the nation's 495 major facilities were designated for closure. By 2001, 387 military installations had been closed or "realigned," and the

Department of Defense claimed that it still had close to 25 percent excess capacity at the remaining 259 major installations. In percentage loss of personnel, the Northeast and Midwest fared the worst and the South the best. In actual numbers, California lost more personnel than any state, enduring more than 50 percent of the overall personnel reductions. Some states, such as North Carolina and Georgia, actually increased the number of active duty personnel stationed within their borders, a reminder that realignment and consolidation figured in the equation.

BRAC is still a priority for the military, even in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Many military communities are now fully mobilized in response to the announcement of preliminary recommendations of the 2005 BRAC round that could close or realign a quarter of the remaining facilities. As with so many aspects of the American military, decisions about post retention and elimination are influenced by many factors; in addition, the requirements of the military must be balanced with political and economic considerations.

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Related Entries

Economy and War

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Military Families

See Families, Military.

Military–Industrial Complex

The term military–industrial complex describes the interlocking institutional relationships among weapons manufacturers and the military and intelligence services. The phrase was first used by Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower in his farewell address to the country on January 17, 1961. Eisenhower sounded a note of warning about what he identified as the increasing ties between the military and industrial sectors.

In a free market, producers respond to the demands of consumers. When asked why they make weapon systems, whether tanks, planes, atomic bombs, or computer software, companies reply that they are simply responding to the defense needs as determined by an elected government. In a market with few suppliers and a single buyer that pays for these purchases with taxpayers' money, however, a number of questions arise. Are the goods and services provided by these companies a good value for money? Are they even needed?

Total Prime Contract Awards by Leading Military Contractors, 1960–67

total prime contract awards ($ millions)

- Lockheed Aircraft — 10,619
- General Dynamics — 8,824
- McDonnell Douglas — 7,681
- Boeing Co. — 7,183
- General Electric — 7,066
- North American-Rockwell — 6,265
- United Aircraft — 5,311
- AT&T — 4,167
- Martin-Marietta — 3,682
- Sperry-Rand — 2,923
- General Motors — 2,818
- Grumman Aircraft — 2,492
- General Tire — 2,347
- Raytheon — 2,324
- AVCO — 2,295
- Hughes — 2,200
- Westinghouse Electric — 2,177
- Ford (Philco) — 2,064
- RCA — 2,019
- Bendix — 1,915
- Textron — 1,798
- Ling-Temco-Vought — 1,744
- IT&T — 1,650
- IBM — 1,583
- Raymond International — 1,568

leading military contractors, 1960–67

Percent of Total Sales Comprised by Military Contracts, 1960–67

percent of total sales

- Lockheed Aircraft — 88
- General Dynamics — 67
- McDonnell Douglas — 75
- Boeing Co. — 54
- General Electric — 19
- North American-Rockwell — 57
- United Aircraft — 57
- AT&T — 9
- Martin-Marietta — 62
- Sperry-Rand — 35
- General Motors — 2
- Grumman Aircraft — 67
- General Tire — 37
- Raytheon — 55
- AVCO — 75
- Hughes — NA
- Westinghouse Electric — 13
- Ford (Philco) — 3
- RCA — 16
- Bendix — 42
- Textron — 36
- Ling-Temco-Vought — 70
- IT&T — 19
- IBM — 7
- Raymond International — NA

leading military contractors, 1960–67

Source: James L. Clayton, ed., *Economic Impact of the Cold War*, Harcourt, Brace, 1970, p. 44 (Table 12).

These charts illustrate the economic effect of military business on the country's leading military contractors in the years surrounding Pres. Eisenhower's coining of the term military–industrial complex.

Military contractors actively lobby Congress and the Pentagon to pay for their research and development and to purchase their products. In 1999, 15 companies obtained 44 percent of all Department of Defense (DoD) appropriations for weapon systems. Two companies received 20 percent of all contract dollars; for many defense companies, the DoD is their only customer. Many top officers and military analysts build lucrative careers in those companies that supply the military, then use their contacts to sell the government expensive and sometimes faulty weapons systems. Occasionally, government officials jump back and forth between the public and private sectors. Such blurring of the distinction between the two sectors raises questions about individual companies gaining undue influence over government policy decisions. The same pattern has held true for Democratic and Republican administrations in the post–World War II period.

Identifying the Military–Industrial Complex

In his farewell speech, Eisenhower made several

astute observations. He noted that the military–industrial complex was relatively new and that it had emerged to address the developing Cold War. As president, and before that as a general, Eisenhower had himself done as much as any man to ensure that both the military and its contractors marshaled the men and matériel to fight first fascism and then communism. As he prepared to leave public service, however, Eisenhower observed that the enormous political and economic power of the military–industrial complex was deeply entrenched in Washington culture and that it posed a powerful obstacle to alternative uses of taxpayers' money. Already in the 1950s, the military spent more money than the combined profits of all major U.S. corporations, and he argued that an entity of such power extended its influence into every part of the federal, state, and even local governments. Eisenhower urged us to ". . . guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." Only "an alert and knowledgeable citizenry," he concluded, can ensure that "security and liberty may prosper together."

Since Eisenhower originally identified many of the features of the military–industrial complex, scholars have expanded his analysis to observe that the military–industrial complex reshaped the economy of the country, affected its cultural and political character, and increased the firepower available to the military. Scholars have also uncovered military, economic, political, and even cultural trends before the Cold War that helped pave the way for such a powerful confluence of military and corporate power.

The Military–Industrial Complex: Historical Precedents and Prototypes

Many have argued that before the 20th century, the oceans surrounding the United States protected it from foreign threats, and that the country's response to the world wars and the rise of the Soviet Union required fundamental changes in its political institutions and cultural assumptions. However, this is not an accurate portrayal of the historic relationship among the military, the government, and American society and culture. Although the United States had a small standing Army, it nonetheless remained in a more or less constant

state of war in the 18th and 19th centuries—whether with Native Americans (groups that the U.S. Constitution treated as foreign nations), the "Barbary Pirates," Britain, or Mexico. In the South, local militias patrolled against runaway slaves and prevented or put down slave revolts. Only in 1890 did the government secure or close the Western frontier against Native Americans. Within a few years, the United States began (some historians say continued) its territorial expansion, this time with a war against Spain. The result was that the United States acquired territorial holdings in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, as well as economic interests and a military base in Cuba. The United States also acquired Hawaii and the Panama Canal. A 1962 State Department report found that between 1798 and 1945, excluding the numerous Indian wars, the United States sent armed forces overseas more than 100 times, mainly to force open overseas markets. These wars were not nearly as large as those of the 20th century, but they indicate that Americans were comfortable with the proposition that war was necessary for the expansion of the country and the economy.

If war was an extension of politics, that warriors enjoyed high political status in the United States is no surprise. Again, the standing Army and Navy of the United States were relatively modest, but military service was generally seen as a good preparation for public service. The first president of the United States, George Washington, had been the top officer in the Revolutionary War. Many soldiers went from the military into politics, including such notable politicians as Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln and less eminent politicians such as William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and Ulysses S. Grant. Theodore Roosevelt led the Rough Riders in the Spanish–American War, Harry S. Truman was a captain of field artillery in World War I, and Franklin D. Roosevelt was assistant secretary of the Navy during the same conflict. Eisenhower had been in command of all Allied troops in Western Europe. Long before the Cold War, Americans had learned to trust leadership of their country to those men who had led its troops into battle, thus creating a firm link between the military and the nation's political elite.

There were also economic antecedents to the military–industrial complex, although on a far smaller scale

than what was to come. Military contractors often made handsome profits during time of war, the result of, at best, the government's indulgent attitude toward contractors. During the Civil War, for instance, J. P. Morgan bought defective rifles from the federal government on the East Coast for $17,500, and sold them to another armory in St. Louis for $109,000. The vast fortunes of many "robber baron" philanthropists such as Morgan, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Philip D. Armour, and Jay Cooke originated in the sales of metal, meat, and uniforms to the Union Army. After the war, the government's expenditures on the military vastly decreased.

Only during the buildup of the deep-water Navy after the 1880s did some companies develop an ongoing relationship that could be considered a precursor to the military–industrial complex. For instance, Bethlehem Steel, Carnegie Steel (later purchased by U.S. Steel), and Midvale were the only suppliers of armor plate for the U.S. Navy; all three cultivated warm relationships with Navy purchasing officers. The rates of profit proved extremely generous, in normal times around 60 percent. Andrew Carnegie confessed that "there is a good deal [of money] to be made in the armor making plants working in perfect harmony"—that is to say, colluding on price. A similar trend in England was noted by Winston Churchill, who wrote that "the Admiralty demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on eight." Despite periodic scandals (such as in the 1890s and 1900s when U.S. companies were caught selling steel to the czar of Russia for half the price they sold it to the U.S. Navy), the relationship between the Navy and big steel remained strong.

Although this case is suggestive of later trends, the U.S. Navy at the time was not especially large, and the "armor trust" remained the exception to the rule of a government with a limited standing army. During World War I, the United States spent 15 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on the war. With limited government oversight, profits of munitions companies skyrocketed. Between 1913 and 1917, the price of armor plate increased by 700 percent. The U.S. government convinced steel companies to sell steel to the Navy for the "patriotic" price of 258 percent more than the 1913 price. In 1918, the War Industries Board instituted

cost-plus contracting that allowed companies to earn a 10 percent profit. Many companies found inventive ways to increase their profits by artificially elevating their costs with lavish executive salaries and bonuses. Controlling costs, therefore, required constant vigilance by government auditors. Excess profit taxes and luxury taxes on goods used primarily by the wealthy were also intended to limit the accumulation and spending of war profits. Critics of these profits dubbed Bethlehem Steel and DuPont, among others, as the "Merchants of Death," accusing these arms dealers of working behind the scenes to encourage war. Such criticism helped ensure that in the 1920s, as had been the case after previous conflicts, military spending dropped back to prewar levels.

The Development of the Military–Industrial Complex Leading up to World War II

Most scholars view World War II as the crucial turning point in the development of the military–industrial complex. In the years leading up to U.S. entry in the war, under Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, the U.S. government had broken with the traditions of limited or laissez-faire government and intervened in the economy as never before. The federal government engaged in unprecedented regulation of businesses as part of a larger effort to stimulate the economy and end the Great Depression. By 1939, the year Hitler's forces invaded Poland and sparked international conflict, the U.S. found an additional boost for its ailing economy in arms sales to foreign countries. Under Roosevelt's watch, the government had grown larger and better able to engage in large-scale and complex endeavors. Equally important, government interventions in the economy had gained widespread, although hardly universal, public support. Consequently, the New Deal prepared the ground for the intimate and lasting ties created between government, large companies, and the general public during World War II.

In the interwar period, the United States spent less than 1 percent of its GDP on defense. At the height of the war, the country spent 30 percent of its GDP on military efforts. Furthermore, the government's interventions facilitated the rise of big business as small and medium-sized businesses could not effectively lobby for government contracts or assistance. Then-senator Harry Truman observed that, from

January 1940 to June 1941, 66 companies that donated "dollar a year" men, experts whose real salaries were paid by their companies, to run government agencies also secured $3 billion in government contracts—nearly twice as much as all the money spent on defense in 1938. During the war, two-thirds of wartime military contracts went to 100 companies, the top 10 companies got one-third, and one (General Motors) received 8 percent of the total.

As had not been the case during World War I, the government regulated war contractors to ensure quality and prevent profiteering. The government also imposed steep taxes on the very wealthy, who could expect to pay up to 90 percent of their income for the war effort. Many companies refused to invest their capital in complex war projects. In response, the federal government assumed the cost of building the many factories, mills, and shipyards to make war matériel, so much so that by the end of the war, 25 percent of U.S. industry was owned by the public. Half of these factories were managed by just 26 companies. Sometimes the plants were new; in other cases they had been built onto existing factories, for example, the steelmaking furnaces added to U.S. Steel's Homestead Works, which rolled armor plate for the Navy. After the war, the contractors had the option to buy the factories—in U.S. Steel's case, for 50 cents on the dollar. Although not without friction or controversy, the government's relationship with big business had resulted in a flood of ships, planes, and other supplies, and numerous new technologies needed to win the war, including pharmaceuticals, radar, and the atomic bomb.

Large corporations controlled strategic technologies or materials, but, as both sides discovered, their political loyalty was not always reliable. For instance, the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) held an effective monopoly on computing technology, which was vital to the unprecedented logistical needs of government during World War II. Through its subsidiaries in Europe, from 1933 until 1945, IBM also sold or rented its Hollerith machines to the Nazi regime, and custom-made the punch cards for its military or for agencies that classified German subjects' race and religion. More disturbingly, the Nazi regime needed IBM to help it develop lists of Jews collated from a complex assortment of public records. Neither the

Nazi nor Allied governments completely trusted IBM, but neither could afford to forgo such critical technology. IBM was not an isolated case. Even after the United States entered the war, Standard Oil sold patents on its aircraft fuel, through its subsidiaries in Europe, to the Nazis, thereby enabling German bombers to reach farther into the Atlantic and sink Allied ships. If most companies acted patriotically during the war, not all did, which suggests that some companies pursued their economic self-interest at the expense of the public and their nation.

As President Eisenhower later observed, the military–industrial complex was a new phenomenon in American life. In every war prior to World War II, the United States built up military forces necessary to resolve the conflict and then disbanded the vast majority of those troops at the end of hostilities. In 1945, the United States spent more than $600 billion (in 2003 constant dollars adjusted for inflation) on World War II; by 1948 spending on defense had dropped to $100 billion. Even this latter figure was quite high by historical standards—more than five times more, as a percentage of GDP, than the United States had spent in 1938. These spending levels indicated that after World War II, the United States only partly disbanded its military, a break with previous patterns. These higher levels of spending were necessary because the United States remained the sole military occupier of Japan, and joined the French, British, and Soviets in occupying Germany. The United States was reluctant to withdraw its presence throughout the world, arguing that such presence enhanced world security and protected U.S. economic interests by encouraging a steady exchange of raw materials and U.S. manufactured goods.

By 1949, as the Cold War began to take shape, U.S. military spending increased to levels close to those of World War II. Even after the end of the Korean War in 1953, U.S. spending (in inflation-adjusted 2003 dollars) reached almost $400 billion. (As a percentage of GDP, however, Cold War spending never exceeded 15 percent, roughly the levels spent on World War I and less than half the cost of World War II.) However, the crucial difference was that during the Cold War, U.S. spending was not only large enough but sustained enough to reshape the U.S. economy and government. This new level and reach of military spending

reverberated throughout the country's political and intellectual life as well.

The Rise and Consolidation of the Military–Industrial Complex

A few years before Eisenhower's speech, an influential account of the military–industrial complex, although he did not call it that, was written by sociologist C. Wright Mills—*The Power Elite* (1956). Eisenhower may well have borrowed ideas for his speech from Mills, who worked at Columbia University, where the former general served as president from May 1948 to January 1953. Like Eisenhower, Mills pointed out that the size of the U.S. military required a huge bureaucracy housed in the world's largest office building, the Pentagon, which had employees who did nothing but change lightbulbs. Mills argued that this bureaucracy, like any other, was self-perpetuating and largely self-serving.

The bureaucratization of the military changed the nature of the armed services. Throughout the 19th century, officers in both the Army and the Navy rose only slowly through the ranks, even if they saw combat, which most of them did. An increasingly bureaucratized military allowed officers to rise steadily through the ranks, even if most officers, particularly those in fields such as strategic command, never saw combat.

During World War II and continuing into the Cold War, effective control of the military passed into the hands of the military bureaucracy, which increasingly demanded secrecy in its dealings with public officials. For instance, Congress approved the Manhattan Project to develop an atomic bomb, but, because of the secrecy surrounding the project, it could exercise no effective oversight over the program it had agreed to fund. The Cold War expanded the boundaries of secret projects or agencies, especially intelligence agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency, at the expense of congressional authority. In response to such secrecy and to the increasingly specialized nature of knowledge involved, the military began to regulate itself. As in World War II, the military relied extensively on corporate expertise as it could not develop effective weaponry without the technical and economic expertise that only corporations possessed. For their part, corporations needed military advice on which projects would be long-lasting, and thus worthy of large-scale investment of time and resources. To quote Mills, "generals advised corporation presidents and corporation presidents advised generals."

During the 1950s, the relationship between the Pentagon and strategic corporations tightened. In some cases, the government created new sectors, such as aerospace, computers, and electronics (the so-called ACE industries), funding almost all of the research and development, and then buying all of the finished products. All first-generation computers were sold to the military. Only in the mid-1950s did computers become affordable enough to find commercial outlets. Even such later technologies as the Internet arose out of military needs (in this instance, from the desire for a decentralized means of communication in the event of a nuclear war that would disrupt or destroy telephonic networks). Many of these new industries were located in western states, particularly California, which benefited from far more federal spending than it paid in taxes. A comparable subsidy of southern states occurred as the large number of military bases there helped it join western states in what some scholars call the "Gun Belt." Of course not every region could benefit in this manner, helping exacerbate the economic hardships of midwestern and northeastern states (the Rust Belt) after the 1970s.

The Role of Ideology and Universities

The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West was in part a struggle of ideas and ideologies. Accordingly, a strong ideological component to the military–industrial complex developed along with its political and economic power. Throughout the 1950s, the military, defense contractors and their supporters in politics, universities, and the press promoted the view that the United States had to maintain the strongest military in the world. To bolster this argument, they often cited the West's inattention to the growing threat of fascism, as well as the even more disastrous attempt in 1938 by British prime minister Neville Chamberlain to negotiate with Adolph Hitler. Chamberlain became infamous for reporting that in exchange for German interests in Czechoslovakia, he had averted another world war and achieved "peace in our time." The result was that Czechoslovakia, whom some

believed could have militarily withstood German invasion had the West supported it, was invaded and made a vassal of the Nazis. World War II came only a year later, and the democracies were left to confront a much stronger and more confident Nazi Germany.

Thus throughout the Cold War, a cadre of experts in foreign relations, military affairs, and intelligence, calling themselves "pragmatists" or "realists," claimed that efforts to negotiate with the communists in the Soviet Union were doomed to failure. The only reliable route to peace, they felt, lay through strength and eternal vigilance. Communists could not be trusted because they were the ideological heirs of totalitarianism, whose only goal was world domination. Consequently, after World War II, the United States backed Chinese general Chiang Kai-shek, who vied for power with the communist Mao Zedong. When career diplomats in the State Department, the so-called China hands, warned that ally Chian Kai-Shek was politically isolated (he favored landlords in a country dominated by peasants) and that Mao was open to negotiations with the United States, they were first ignored and later hounded from office as communist sympathizers by Sen. Joseph McCarthy. The result was that the debate over the appropriate response to the rise of communism was carried out largely among government analysts.

The military–industrial complex also included universities in their institutional matrix. Thousands of officers received both academic and military training as hundreds of colleges and universities joined the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program. After the Soviet Union launched *Sputnik*, the first Earth-orbiting satellite, Congress radically increased support for higher education in science, engineering, and even foreign languages. As centers of research and learning, universities became important defense subcontractors. At least 1,000 scholars in the humanities and social sciences had connections to the CIA. Certain fields of study, including physics, computer science, and electrical engineering, grew in tandem with the nuclear, computer, and aerospace industries. During the Vietnam War, antiwar protests forced ROTC as well as recruiters from the CIA and defense contractors off some campuses.

By the 1980s, the decline in government support for student tuition and nonmilitary research had left universities more reliant on corporate and especially military research. For instance, the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon, both in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were the two largest military subcontractors, ahead of even large corporations headquartered in the area, such as Westinghouse Electric, which made both nuclear and conventional weapon systems. University researchers did not make the bombs, but did engage in and provide the basic and applied research that made the weapon systems possible. At Carnegie Mellon, two-thirds of all graduate students worked in the fields of computer science and electrical engineering, and more than 99 percent of their research support came from defense-related research, such as Star Wars. Even such departments as psychology and philosophy (for training in psychological testing and computation linguistics, respectively) received virtually all of their support for research from the military, especially the Department of the Navy.

The Military–Industrial Complex since the End of the Cold War

From 1948 until 1989, the United States justified its historically high military spending as the cost of fighting communism. In current dollars, the United States spent $10 trillion to $20 trillion on the Cold War and its subsidiary struggles (in Vietnam, Korea, Central America, and elsewhere). Even after the self-destruction of the Soviet Union and the embrace of capitalism in practice if not in theory by China, U.S. military spending declined only slightly. (As a percentage of economic activity, however, military spending has decreased from 15 percent of GNP to about 5 or 6 percent). Whether motivated by the bureaucratic imperative of self-preservation or sincere in its beliefs that Cold War weapon systems remained necessary, the military marshaled reasons to argue that high levels of spending remained necessary. Likewise, many military contractors, probably motivated less by patriotism than by their inability to survive in a free market, also lobbied politicians to maintain high levels of military spending. In 1987, spending was $437 billion (2003 adjusted); by 1998 it had decreased to $303 billion. (The size of its armed forces declined somewhat more, in part the result of contracting out support functions to the private sector.) Still, even before September 11, 2001, the United

States spent more on its military than any other country in the world—eight times as much as either China or Russia. By 2003, defense spending (excluding the CIA, Homeland Defense, etc.) was $379 billion and rising. That year, the United States spent more than the combined military expenditures of the next 20 countries, all of which, except China and Russia, were U.S. allies. The United States and its allies account for two-thirds of all military spending in the world.

Without a credible military threat in the form of international communism, from 1990 until September 11, 2001, the military–industrial complex searched for another reason to justify its existence. During those years, the U.S. military became increasingly involved in such activities as drug interdictions, peacekeeping and/or "nation-building" missions abroad (as in Kosovo). However, Cold War projects continued, often unabated, seemingly fulfilling Mills's analysis of a self-serving, self-perpetuating institution. The most notorious of these Cold War weapon systems that refused to die was the "Star Wars" program, designed to use satellites to destroy a potential Soviet nuclear missile launch against the United States. Originally proposed by Pres. Ronald Reagan, the system continued to draw a few billion dollars each year for research, even though it never worked.

In the 1950s, military contractors typically sold goods (nuclear weapons, computers, or aircraft carriers) to the military; after the 1990s, corporations increasingly provided services such as management of vital military programs. In part this reflected a fundamental change in the political climate. A major theme of Pres. Ronald Reagan's was the inefficiency of government compared with that of corporations. This represented a major shift from the New Deal principle that government could offset the greed and self-interest of corporations. Reagan set the tone for subsequent presidents who proclaimed the death of big government. Increasingly, government saw its job as one of subcontracting services, often to large military contractors. For instance, in 1998 Lockheed received a $3.44 billion contract to manage NASA's space operations. (Much of NASA's work involves the military's projects in space, such as deploying communication satellites and "killer satellites.") Often such privatization ends up costing more than letting civil servants do the job. For instance, a 1996

General Accounting Office study found that almost 80 percent of more than 250 depot maintenance contracts given to the private sector ended up costing more than military personnel would have cost. In 2003 and 2004, the company awarded the contract to deliver fuel from Kuwait to Iraq ran over its original bid by 90 percent.

Even in the 1950s and 1960s, corporations occasionally provided services to the military. For instance, as ships acquired sophisticated electronic and computer equipment, which often broke down, companies sometimes provided the maintenance for their hardware or software. This feature of the military–industrial complex expanded greatly in the 1990s. As the military downsized in the 1990s, it outsourced some of its support and logistics functions to corporations. In essence, corporations increasingly gained control over lucrative service contracts with the military.

During the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequently, private companies that had won "no bid contracts" (i.e., contracts awarded without competition) delivered supplies to ground troops. Private companies fed troops, rebuilt electrical grids, and provided the security personnel (many of whom were former members of the military) on reconstruction projects. Up to one-quarter of the funds allocated for the reconstruction of Iraq has gone to private security firms. Special Forces employed by the military often earn less than $30,000 a year, whereas private contractors are often paid $15,000 to $25,000 a month. Private contractors are even used to obtain information from detainees, a fact that came to light in the 2004 Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal.

The U.S. response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, relieved the military–industrial complex of having to find a rationale for its existence. Terrorism has become the Cold War of the 21st century. Cold War projects, such as Star Wars, have not been discontinued. Indeed, after September 11, the Bush administration fully funded the program, with an estimated cost of between $60 billion and $100 billion dollars, despite the fact its key components have never been shown to work. Instead of defending the United States from the Soviet Union, the second Bush administration maintained that the Star Wars program would prevent "rogue nations," such as North Korea, from launching a nuclear missile at the United States.

The military–industrial complex has helped remake the U.S. military, economic, political, and cultural landscape in the decades following 1940. The military–industrial complex has lost none of its considerable political influence. Nor has supplying or servicing the military become less profitable. Has the military–industrial complex made America a safer place? Or has the logic of high military spending resulted in increased pressure to use military force to resolve international disputes? Scholars and citizens will continue to debate these and other questions arising from what President Eisenhower in 1961 correctly predicted would be one of the most important influences on American society in the 20th century and beyond.

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Arms Trade; Cold War; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Economy and War; Munitions Industry; Preparedness Movement; War Profiteering; World War II

Related Documents

1961; 1965 a; 1968 b; 2000

—*John Hinshaw*

Military Nurses

See Nurses, Military.

Military Psychiatry

See Psychiatry, Military.

Military Reenactments.

See Reenactments, Military.

Militia Groups

The self-described militia groups that began to form during the 1990s were part of a grassroots movement challenging the authority of the federal government to intervene in local affairs. The use of the term militia was intended to bring to mind the Jeffersonian political philosophy framing one side of the argument about national defense in the early years of the United States.

The relationship of these militia groups to the libertarian debates of the early republic were, however, something of a stretch. Historically, a militia was an armed force recruited by a central authority from the civilian population of a particular county or region, usually to serve in defense

of the home territory. The use of militias increasingly gave way to a combination of conscript and professional militaries in both continental Europe and Britain during the 18th and 19th centuries; however, locally controlled militias continued to be important in the United States up until World War I.

Despite skepticism and resistance on the part of the professional military and of the Federalist Party under George Washington, support for militias was enshrined in the 2nd Amendment to the Constitution: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed."

Although widely interpreted in the latter part of the 20th century as referring to an individual's right to own firearms, the 2nd Amendment was shaped by the constitutional conflict between those in favor of a strong national government and those who saw militias as a guarantee against the abuse of power by such a government. This debate continued throughout the 19th century. Militia units played a significant role in the War of 1812 and the Civil War, but their importance declined sharply thereafter. At the end of the 19th century, the militias themselves were replaced by National Guard units, sponsored and funded by the individual states. The federal Militia Act of 1903 recognized these new National Guard units as the "Organized Militia" of the United States, and the National Defense Act of 1916 gave substantial control and training responsibility over the Guard units to the regular Army. The latter law continues to govern federal–state military relations.

The first self-described militia groups appeared in 1993, catalyzed by two bloody confrontations between federal law enforcement agencies and private citizens. The first confrontation was between federal fugitive Randall Weaver and the U.S. Marshall Service. Weaver, a minor figure in extreme right-wing American politics, refused to appear for trial and retreated along with his family to their remote home at Ruby Ridge in the mountains of northern Idaho, resulting in a months-long standoff. On August 21, 1992, after a firefight in the surrounding woods left both federal Marshall William Degan and Weaver's 14-year-old son, Samuel, dead, the standoff escalated into a bloody siege. Several people were killed, including

Weaver's wife, Vicki. Ten days after the siege began (August 31), a wounded Randy Weaver surrendered to the FBI.

In 1993, a similar standoff took place between the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and a religious group calling itself the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas. As in the Weaver case, the Waco conflict ended in a siege, with the Davidian compound surrounded by hundreds of federal law enforcement agents. However, the Waco standoff ended much more violently than did Ruby Ridge. The onset of an assault by law enforcement led to the apparently intentional immolation of the compound by the Davidians themselves, causing the deaths of scores of people, including many children.

To various extreme Right political organizations, both the Waco and Ruby Ridge affairs provided spectacular "proof" of the corruption of the U.S. government. In response, these groups began to advocate the formation of militias. Virtually all of the ideas of the militia movement of the 1990s, including belief in a worldwide conspiracy to undermine American sovereignty, control of the American government by a secret group of traitors (often identified as Jews), and the need to organize local armed groups to defend real, patriotic Americans against government oppression, were presaged in the Posse Comitatus movement of the previous decades.

The idea of a Posse Comitatus was popularized by William Potter Gale in the early 1970s. Defined in various ways, the group was constituted as bands of armed volunteers organized to enforce constitutional principles as interpreted by group members. Gale and his followers insisted that the federal government had no authority to intervene in state and local matters such as education, that the Federal Reserve Bank was an illegal conspiracy, that the federal income tax was unconstitutional, and that they were, as "sovereign citizens" of the various states, immune to and from federal law. Probably best known for adherent Gordon Kahl's violent confrontations with law enforcement in the early 1980s, the Posse convened its own "common law courts" and issued indictments and injunctions against public officials, threatening to enforce death sentences against those convicted of treason. This was the worldview and set of pseudo-legal techniques that would be adopted by the militias.

No hard numbers are available for militia adherents at their peak in 1994 and early 1995, but estimates range from a few thousand to a few tens of thousands, with several hundred thousand supporters. These numbers began to decline only after April 19, 1995, when a bomb planted by Timothy McVeigh with the help of Terry Nichols destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, resulting in the deaths of 168 people. Although not militia members, both men were steeped in extreme Right ideology and conducted the bombing in retaliation for Waco and Ruby Ridge. The most deadly act of terror committed by American citizens on U.S. soil, the bombing led to congressional hearings and a moral indictment of the militia movement, resulting in a drastic decline in both membership and visibility.

In retrospect, the militia movement is probably best understood as part of the traditional American struggle to define individual liberty. However, the movement should also be recognized as one that was animated by an extreme Right political ideology that has little relation to this larger debate. Although more radical elements of the "gun rights" movement did ally themselves with militias, the primary activities of militia groups were unrelated to gun ownership. Rather, militia groups combined a rhetorical link to the historic debate over self-organized military units with the politics of paranoia and often bigoted conspiracy theories, politics that have not disappeared in the years since 1995.

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Related Entries

Civil–Military Relations; Colonial Militia Systems; National Guard; Posse Comitatus Act

Related Documents

1611; 1774

—Steven L. Gardiner

Mitchell, William "Billy"

(1879–1936)
General and Air Power Enthusiast

William "Billy" Mitchell was the most outspoken advocate in the United States of air power and an independent air force during the interwar period. Despite his eventual court-martial and public resignation from the military, his ideas formed the central intellectual matrix for the U.S. Army Air Corps in the years prior to World War II. His theories influenced the strategic air bombardment campaign—the Combined Bomber Offensive, of World War II. Eleven years after his death, one of his goals, the creation of a separate U.S. Air Force, became a reality.

Mitchell, the son of a U.S. senator, was born into an influential Milwaukee, Wisconsin, family that had inherited money from that state's railroad and banking interests. Upon the outbreak of the Spanish–American War in 1898, he used family connections to acquire a commission in the regular Army's Signal Corps, which was responsible for communications. He stayed in the Army after the war, rising to the rank of major. Mitchell took flying lessons on his own time and at his own expense. The investment paid off when Mitchell was named commander of the new aviation section of the signal corps in 1916.

He soon arranged a posting to Spain, a neutral nation in World War I, so that he could observe the war as closely as

American neutrality permitted. Upon America's entry into the war in April 1917, Mitchell, now a lieutenant colonel, went immediately to France. He toured the Western front and quickly came to appreciate the possibilities of air power. Because Mitchell was one of the few American senior officers in Europe at the time of America's entry into the war, his firsthand observations of the war were invaluable to American Expeditionary Forces commander Gen. John Pershing, who arrived in France two months later.

During World War I Mitchell became convinced that mastering the air was the key to the future of warfare. He rose to colonel and incorporated many of the ideas of Great Britain's most influential air power enthusiast, Sir Hugh Trenchard, in his work. As commander of the American First Army Air Service on the Western front, Mitchell began new air missions and used innovative tactics in support of ground operations, including pursuit (fighters), bombardment, and close air support. At the September 1918 battle of St. Mihiel, Mitchell organized more than 1,400 airplanes into the largest air armada to date. Mitchell's experiences at St. Mihiel and during the war more generally convinced him that air power would only reach its full potential if America followed the British pattern and created an independent air service. Otherwise, he believed, traditionalists in the Army and Navy would never fully consider the potential of aviation.

After the war Mitchell toured Europe to learn about other nations' plans for their air forces. In 1921 he was promoted to brigadier general and named assistant chief of the Air Service. He wrote a book, *Our Air Force* (1921), to bring his ideas to the American public. To prove his theories about the dominance of aviation to his fellow officers, he staged a number of aerial demonstrations designed to show that air power, not sea power, was the best for defending American shores. In the most famous case, he used custom-designed 2,000-pound bombs to sink a captured German battleship, the *Ostfriedland*. Mitchell's air attack sank the anchored, undefended ship, considered by several admirals to be unsinkable, in less than 30 minutes. Two years later Mitchell designed an even larger operation that used air power to sink three American battleships in succession.

Throughout the 1920s, Mitchell became more outspoken both in his advocacy of aviation and his criticism of the leadership of the Army and Navy. Mitchell argued that land-based airplanes (planes not on carriers) were not only a more militarily effective way to wage war, but also cheaper and more effective than the large battleships and aircraft carriers preferred by the Navy. Influenced by the ideas of Italian theorist Giulio Douhet, Mitchell contended that air power alone could win future wars. He increasingly turned to a sympathetic media to depict the nation's generals and admirals as old-fashioned men unwilling to see the coming future.

In 1925 Mitchell went too far, accusing the Navy and Army of criminal negligence, incompetence, and treason for their unwillingness to support a separate air service and larger budgets for aviation. His court-martial for insubordination became a national media event. Although most media outlets depicted him as a champion of national defense fighting inane and short-sighted bureaucrats, Mitchell was found guilty and suspended. In response, he resigned from the Army and became even more active as a civilian advocate for air power.

Mitchell deserves credit for forcing the Army and Navy to confront issues that they would have preferred to ignore. Willing to stand up for a principle in which he deeply believed, he was the greatest theorist of air power in the United States, even predicting that the Japanese could use naval aviation to attack a vulnerable U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. He remains the intellectual godfather of the U.S. Air Force, which named the dining hall at the Air Force Academy in his honor. His hometown of Milwaukee appropriately named its airport after him.

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Related Entries

Aerial Bombardment; World War I

—*Michael S. Neiberg*

Monuments

See Memorials and Monuments.

Mormons, Campaign against the

(1857–58)

From its beginnings, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints had experienced persecution and violence from other Americans. After moving to more isolated western land in 1846, the Mormons' new Zion became the Utah Territory under U.S. control as a result of the Mexican Cession. The underlying causes of the campaign against the Mormons were anti-Mormon prejudices in American society, but the immediate causes were the power struggles between the church and the federal government.

Brigham Young, the Mormons' leader, was named territorial governor in 1850, but the attempt to reconcile non-Mormon territorial officials with Mormon believers and their ways led to a number of sharp conflicts. On one side, a string of incompetent or staunchly anti-Mormon territorial officials and, on the other side, the Mormons, ever mindful of their having disobeyed laws or judgments they regarded as unjust, created a strained political environment. In 1857, three territorial non-Mormon officials spread tales of Mormon violence and rebellion, claiming that they had had to flee to save themselves. Although these complaints were tainted by half-truths, the prevailing anti-Mormon attitudes in American society demanded that the government teach the unruly sect a lesson. In May 1857, Pres. James Buchanan ordered Commanding Gen. Winfield Scott to send about 2,000 soldiers to escort the new territorial governor, Alfred Cumming of Georgia, to the Utah Territory and to ensure the proper execution of federal laws.

Given Utah's location in the mountains, the Army raced against time and the oncoming winter. The expedition was rapidly organized and two regiments were sent, but one, the 5th Infantry, was unfit for action after its difficult duty hunting Seminoles in Florida. Supplies and provisions were also rapidly bought and concentrated. Last, a change in command was made early on, to Col. Albert Sidney Johnston, but he was not with the forces when they moved west. When the infantry moved, its members did not move together but were days apart; the cavalry support was months behind.

The Mormons regarded the movement as an invasion, not an escort, and decided to resist. They adopted a scorched earth and harassment strategy—trying to obstruct the Army, stampede its livestock, and burn grass before the column. They hoped to have the expedition caught in the mountains during the winter. This the Mormons did most effectively on October 4 and 5, 1857, when they exploited a 30-mile gap between the two infantry regiments and the Army's lack of cavalry by attacking three wagon trains, burning 72 supply wagons carrying food.

Short of supplies, still without an ultimate commander, and facing the onset of bad weather in the mountains, the expedition temporarily attempted a roundabout march into northern Utah from Ham's Fork in southwest Wyoming on October 11. When Johnston made contact in late October, he ordered the force back to Ham's Fork and began a 35-mile march to Fort Bridger on November 6. The march was slow, painful, and very arduous. Snowstorms hit, with temperatures falling to as low as 40°F below zero. Many draft animals and horses died along the march, and nearly two weeks were needed to cover the 35 miles, but only one man died on the way. Upon reaching Fort Bridger, the Army discovered that the Mormons had burned it. Johnston, a careful and dutiful officer, had set up an adequate camp nearby for the expedition and the new territorial officials. With the few supplies available, Johnston kept his forces busy and well

disciplined. By the spring of 1858, the expedition had high morale and a fighting spirit.

By late 1857, the Mormons feared a spring campaign that would exterminate their church. Young ordered the evacuation of northern Utah and gave instructions to selected men to burn the towns if the Army made any advances toward them. With the aid of Thomas Kane, a non-Mormon who supported the Mormons, Brigham Young and Alfred Cumming came to an agreement in early 1858. In April, Cumming accompanied Kane to Salt Lake City and determined that the Mormons did not desire to rebel against the Union. About the same time, President Buchanan pardoned anyone who agreed to submit to the laws of the United States. In early June, Johnston's resupplied force marched through an abandoned Salt Lake City. Mormon fears of an angry, undisciplined Army destroying homes and private property were unfounded. The marchers encamped in a remote area 40 miles from Salt Lake City and became a constabulary force. What had started with a bang ended with a whimper.

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Related Entries

Civil–Military Relations; Scott, Winfield

—*Jonathan A. Beall*

Movies

See Film and War.

Munitions Industry

The production of munitions, typically conventional weapons and ammunition, has been an important aspect of every American war effort. During certain wars, American war production has been a key factor in the outcome of the conflict. The production of munitions has increased dramatically during wartime, as existing weapons stocks are rapidly depleted. The rapid industrialization of the United States over two centuries has seen the munitions industry remain at the forefront of technological change, and it has even become a vital part of the peacetime economy. As weapons systems become more complex and production times increase, the munitions industry is likely to remain a crucial aspect of American military planning.

During the American Revolution, Patriot forces had great difficulty obtaining and maintaining sufficient weapons. After the war, the memory of these problems led the new U.S. government to establish federal arsenals for the production of munitions, initially at Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Although centralized, the federal arsenals initially still required specialized workers, each producing individual pieces one at a time. In 1798, Eli Whitney agreed to produce muskets for

the government, and he introduced the concept of interchangeable parts. The system was gradually adopted by the federal arsenals, allowing faster, cheaper production and easier maintenance. In a controversial argument, one historian has suggested that this cheaper manufacturing process allowed for the rapid spread of guns throughout civilian society in the middle of the 19th century.

During the Civil War, many private firms were awarded contracts to produce weapons for both the Union and Confederate forces, as government arsenals alone could not meet the demand. The Union's massive industrial capacity allowed it to far outstrip the Confederacy in munitions production and played a key role in the eventual Union victory. During the war, approximately 90 percent of all the small arms produced in the United States were produced for the use of the Union. In the late 19th century, production by private corporations increased, as munitions producers sought to sell weapons both to private American citizens and to the U.S. military through massive government contracts.

By the outbreak of World War I, American corporations were capable of tremendous output and were the largest exporter on the world armaments market. As the war intensified in Europe, the demand for weapons steadily increased. American corporations sold untold numbers of munitions to European governments on credit. Many American factories converted production lines to the creation of munitions, primarily for export. American companies capable of producing chemicals, propellants, and explosives were of particular interest to warring nations. Most American weapons exports went to Britain and France, with millions of dollars in unsecured loans. After the war, as isolationists questioned why the United States had intervened in Europe, a congressional commission was formed to investigate the relationship between the major munitions producers of the United States and the decision to go to war. The Nye Committee announced in 1936 that munitions producers had used questionable tactics to secure contracts with the American government and to encourage loose regulations for weapons exports. Furthermore, the largest companies involved in the munitions industry actively fought against the arms limitation agreements of the 1920s and 1930s. The Nye Committee sought to deter munitions companies from direct involvement or influence in the American military system, leading to a series of Neutrality acts in the late 1930s, which sharply curtailed the export of munitions from the United States.

American munitions production reached new heights during World War II. Pres. Franklin Roosevelt referred to the United States as the "Arsenal of Democracy," producing huge amounts of war supplies for the Allied nations. Beginning in March 1941, through the lend–lease program, the United States was able to transfer massive amounts of munitions to its allies around the globe. American war production was perhaps the most significant contribution the United States made to the Allied war effort. Over the course of the war, American factories produced thousands of tanks and airplanes, millions of rifles, and more than one billion pieces of ammunition. This unprecedented quantity was largely accomplished by converting existing factories to war production. Modern assembly line methods and an abundance of resources have made the United States the largest wartime munitions producer in world history.

During the Cold War, many American corporations continued producing munitions, becoming dependent upon government patronage. In a 1961 speech, President Eisenhower warned of the rise of a military–industrial complex, which would exert undue legislative and economic influence. Research and development of new weapons became largely privatized, as corporations created new designs catering to the needs of the American military in hopes of obtaining lucrative contracts. In contemporary times, the defense industry remains a major employer within the American economy and holds contracts worth hundreds of billions of dollars with the U.S. government. War production is now a continual process, with the United States remaining one of the largest munitions exporters in the world. Although the most sophisticated weapons systems require specialized production facilities, the simplest munitions, such as individual firearms and ammunition, can be produced in almost any assembly line factory. In the event of a full-scale war, American corporations almost certainly would again be willing and able to quickly convert factories to war production.

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Arms Trade; Economy and War; Military–Industrial Complex; War Industries Board

—Paul J. Springer

Murphy, Audie

(1924–71)
World War II Hero

One of 12 children born to poor Texas cotton sharecroppers, Audie Murphy was forced to grow up fast. When he was seven, his father abandoned the family. The boy took on a man's responsibilities, helping to harvest cotton crops and hunting for small game to supplement the family diet. Murphy's hunting prepared him to later become a superb "spot shooter." His mother died of exhaustion in 1940, further burdening the 15-year-old with family duties. Because Murphy spent so much time supporting his family, he attended school for only five years. But he exhibited a thirst for life, learning, and fame not quenched by his desperate circumstances.

Murphy tried to enlist when the United States entered World War II, but the Marines, Navy, and Army Airborne all rejected the 5'5", 115-pound teenager as too small. On his 18th birthday, June 20, 1942 (Murphy lied; it was actually his 17th), the Army accepted Murphy for infantry duty. He excelled in both basic training and infantry school, was promoted to corporal, and took assignment in March 1943 to Company B, First Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, late in the North African campaign. Murphy served his entire combat stint with this unit.

The 3rd Infantry Division, thanks to its able first combat commander, Maj. Gen. Lucian Truscott, transformed its volunteers and ordinary draftees into an elite force. Thirty-seven of its soldiers earned Medals of Honor during World War II, a record unequaled by any other Army division. The division fought in every Mediterranean and European theater of operations campaign from North Africa to Germany. Audie Murphy became the outfit's most famous alumnus.

Even as a new replacement, Murphy impressed Company B peers with his character and tactical skills. He was a born leader whose quiet strength, cool demeanor, and knack for anticipating enemy intentions inspired and reassured his buddies. Seeing little combat in Tunisia, Murphy soon went *To Hell and Back*, as he titled his frank memoirs during the bloody campaigns of Sicily, Anzio, Rome, southern France, and Germany. Murphy stood out as a scout, patroller, sniper, user of combined arms, and leader of men. He rose from corporal to battle-commissioned lieutenant, commanding his own Company B in less than two years.

Murphy performed his most famous feat on January 11, 1945. Counterattacking German troops supported by six tanks began to flank Company B's position in the Colmar Pocket of southeast France. Murphy moved well forward of his company's troops, whom he ordered to take cover, and called in dangerously close support artillery fire. When the German tanks and troops kept advancing, Murphy, already seriously wounded, mounted a burning and abandoned American tank destroyer. He fired the tank destroyer's .50 caliber heavy machine gun at assaulting German infantry for over an hour; killing 50 and wounding many others. Because Murphy broke their counterattack by destroying

their supporting infantry, the German tanks withdrew. Murphy received the Medal of Honor for this action. This decoration capped the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver and Bronze Stars, and other medals he had been awarded. Murphy was credited with personally killing 240 Axis soldiers. When VE Day arrived, he was only 19 years old.

The handsome young Texan appeared smiling on the July 16, 1945, cover of *Life* magazine. Movie actor James Cagney saw the cover and decided Murphy had the makings of a movie star. He invited the young soldier to live on his California estate and offered to help him in Hollywood. Cagney quickly discovered what Murphy's close friends knew: the warrior was still suffering from the ordeals of combat. Until his death 26 years later, Murphy experienced what was later diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder. He was the first war hero to explicitly admit he suffered from this condition and worked hard to publicize both its symptoms and the need for treatment.

Murphy's tense demeanor (he always slept with a loaded pistol), hair-trigger reflexes, and craving for thrills often made life difficult for both his family and friends. He indulged in womanizing, gambling, fast driving, and violent confrontation, which his success as a movie star enabled him to afford. Neither of his wives, actress Wanda Hendrix and former flight attendant Pamela Archer, was able to tame Murphy's wild passions. Hard work enabled Murphy to be something more than a mediocre movie actor. He appeared in 44 feature films between 1948 and 1969; starring in 39 of them. His friend, director John Huston, directed two of Murphy's best performances: *The Red Badge of Courage* (1951), based on Stephen Crane's classic Civil War novel, and *The Unforgiven* (1960). Murphy played himself in *To Hell and Back* (1955), based on his best-selling 1949 autobiography. The movie was Universal Studio's biggest financial success until *Jaws* (1975). Murphy later admitted he "never saw" the $800,000 he earned from it—all went to gambling and bad investments. Murphy starred in many Westerns; probably the best is *No Name on the Bullet* (1959), a subtle and ironic look at a gunfighter. His most challenging role was the title character of *The Quiet American* (1958), the movie based on Graham Greene's novel about American bumbling in 1950s Vietnam.

Audie Murphy playing himself in To Hell and Back *(1955), an autobiographical film based on his 1949 book. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)*

By 1965, Murphy's mostly B movie career dried up. His spendthrift ways created heavy debts. Even penning hit songs like "Shutters and Boards" failed to rescue him. Desperate for cash, he got involved with organized crime figures in a vain effort to broker a presidential pardon for convicted union boss Jimmy Hoffa. Murphy died in a commuter plane crash in 1971. Vietnam War America was then so hostile to military heroes that his death occasioned little notice. Murphy himself commented acidly that the American military was being made a scapegoat in Vietnam for the failures of America's political rulers. But this great soldier has not been forgotten; only President Kennedy's grave site had received more Arlington Cemetery visitors by the turn of the 21st century than Audie Murphy's.

Audie Murphy's life and image show that the United States paid a high price for World War II—not just of its fallen soldiers but of the combat veterans who returned home. Murphy's smiling image on *Life*'s cover belied his struggles. Murphy was never really able to acclimate himself to post–World War II American peacetime life, a fact he

frequently recognized aloud. His close friend, cartoonist Bill Mauldin, observed that Murphy's refusal to compromise was both his glory and his tragedy. Murphy extended concern and compassion to Vietnam veterans because he saw himself in them.

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Combat, Effects of; Film and War; Mauldin, Bill; Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related; Pyle, Ernie; *Red Badge of Courage, The*; World War II; York, Alvin Cullum

—Christopher M. Gray

Music and War

Music is ideal for expressing the intense emotions related to war, and those works inspired by conflicts in which the United States was involved reflect the diversity of American music. From simple folk songs to large choral works and classical symphonies, this music documents how Americans reacted to war—how it affected their lives and feelings of nationalism.

Revolutionary War (1775–83)

The music related to the Revolutionary War was both contentious and celebratory. Early songs provided inspiration, encouraging the citizenry to rebel and seek independence. Some also incited protest, however, resulting in heated public disputes as parodies appeared in response to certain songs.

Songs of this era were usually adaptations of British melodies that were known to most of the colonists. By writing new text to old tunes, songs could be easily disseminated. The events leading up to the war inspired such songs as "Free America" with lyrics by Dr. Joseph Warren, who died at the battle of Bunker Hill. Sung to the tune of "The British Grenadiers," it appeared in print as early as February 1770, which was some time before the movement to free America was popular:

> Lift up your heads, ye heroes,
> And swear with proud disdain.
> That wretch that would ensnare you
> Shall lay his snares in vain;
> Should Europe empty all her force
> We'd meet her in array,
> Oppose, oppose, oppose, oppose
> For free America.

One of the earliest of America's composers, William Billings, was a tanner from Boston. His choral work "Chester" (1778) combined patriotic and religious fervor. The first completely American patriotic song, it quickly became one of the most popular "hits" of the day: "Let tyrants shake their iron rod/And Slav'ry clank her galling chains;/We fear them not, we trust in God,/New England's God forever reigns."

The subject of songs changed with the start of armed conflict, as tales of glorious victories were written in support of the fledgling nation. Nathanial Niles's "The American Hero," subtitled "Made on the Battle of Bunker Hill, and the Burning of Charlestown," reflects on war in general and provides a remarkable portrayal of the ideal American hero,

ready to accept death for the cause of freedom: "Life, for my country and the cause of freedom,/Is but a trifle for a worm to part with." Other popular songs were inspired by specific battles, such as "The Riflemen of Bennington" (c. 1770s). This anonymous song tells the tale of the skirmish at Bennington, Vermont, where American soldiers, under the command of General Stark fought victoriously against Burgoyne's troops:

> Why come ye hither, redcoats? Your mind what
>   madness fills?
> In our valleys there is danger, and there's danger on
>   our hills.
> Oh, hear ye not the singing of the bugle wild and
>   free?
> And soon you'll hear the ringing of the rifle from the
>   tree.

Regimental bands during the Revolution consisted primarily of drums for keeping the troops organized, sounding duties, and beating marches above the noise of artillery. Gradually fifes (small, flute-like instruments) were included to perform simple tunes that boosted morale and often antagonized the opponent, such as "The White Cockade," a Jacobite (Scots) tune that was played at Concord Bridge. The most famous of these bothersome tunes was "Yankee Doodle." Although the origin of the tune is unknown, the well-known verse by the surgeon Richard Shuckburg dates from the French and Indian War. During the early years of the war, the British utilized this tune to mock the colonials, but after several victories the rebels adopted it as their own and even played it triumphantly at General Lord Cornwallis's surrender after the siege of Yorktown in 1781.

Composers of instrumental music, primarily piano music, followed the European tradition of writing war-related music depicting battles. The earliest, and perhaps the only, example of a Revolutionary War piece written by an American composer is James Hewitt's "Battle of Trenton" (composed in 1797, many years after the battle), which features musical quotations of "Yankee Doodle" and "Ah! Vous Dirais-Je Maman" (the tune commonly known as "Twinkle Twinkle Little Star").

War of 1812 (1812–15)

The War of 1812 marked the final dissolution of musical ties with Britain. War-related music became more patriotic, representing the new America to the global community with such songs as Francis Scott Key's "Star-Spangled Banner" (1814) and "Arise Arise Columbia's Sons Arise" (anonymous, n.d.). Although Key's text was linked to the popular tune "Anacreon in Heaven," songs were increasingly composed with less reliance on existing melodies.

Most of the popular songs inspired by this war concerned naval battles with elements of the powerful British fleet. The battle between the USS *Constitution* and HMS *Guerriere*, for example, inspired several anonymous ballads, including "Hull's Victory" for Capt. Isaac Hull, who commanded the victorious American frigate. "The Constitution and the Guerriere," another anonymous song, is sung to the tune of an old English drinking song often used for such celebratory texts.

The most famous battle of the war, the battle of New Orleans, inspired many songs, among them "The Hunters of Kentucky" (1822) with lyrics by Samuel Woodworth and a melody adapted from a comic opera. This song documented the heroics of Andrew Jackson and his fellow Kentuckians during the battle and it later served as Jackson's campaign song when he ran for president in 1828:

> They found, at last, t'was vain to fight,
> Where lead was all the booty;
> And so they wisely took to flight,
> And left us all our beauty.
> And now, if danger e'er annoys,
> Remember what our trade is;
> Just send for us Kentucky boys,
> And we'll protect you, ladies.
> O Kentucky, the hunters of Kentucky.

The battle of New Orleans also inspired works for piano. Philip Laroque, a resident of New Orleans, composed the "Battle of the Memorable 8th of January 1815" (1815). It contains programmatic techniques to portray the battle: certain passages evoke the sounds of horses galloping and simulate the sounds of cannons firing. These musical representations of

battles allowed those at home to vicariously experience the victories of the war.

Mexican War (1846–48)

The expanded availability and popularity of pianos, innovations in the publishing industry, and the affordability of sheet music, all contributed to the marked increase of music related to the Mexican War. The number and quality of songs grew as American songwriters honed their skills and developed a unique style, responding to a growing middle-class market. Composers continued to focus on battles and individuals, but they also began introducing more sentimental topics. An anonymous song about Gen. Zachary Taylor, "Rough and Ready, The Soldier's Song" (1847), for example, combines the glories of battle with the portrait of the weary soldier:

> 'Twas in the woods at Vera Cruz, a group of soldiers
> lay
> Fatigued and worn with working at the guns the
> livelong day.
> Their faces were begrimed with sand and smoke
> from shot and shell
> Exploding in the crumbling earth, for fast the
> missiles fell
> Yet cheerily they chatted, for their hearts with hope
> beat high,
> And they knew the hour of victory was surely
> drawing nigh

Many popular songs offered a romanticized description of what may have transpired on the battlefield, allowing grieving families to imagine a heroic death for their own son, brother, or sweetheart. "The Dying Soldier of Buena Vista" (1849), composed by Orramel Whittlesey with lyrics by Col. Henry Petrikin, exemplifies this trend and anticipates the tear-jerker, "mother" songs of the Civil War:

> Tell her when death was on my brow,
> And life receding fast,
> Her voice, her form, her parting words,
> Were with me to the last.
> On Buena Vista's bloody field,

> Tell her I dying lay.
> And that I knew she thought of me,
> Some thousand miles away.

As the population and economy grew and publishing costs fell, songsters emerged as a favorite way of disseminating popular songs. Published without music, these portable pocket-size booklets contained lyrics that could be sung to well-known tunes and were intended to entertain, distract, and generally boost morale of the soldier. One of the best sources of songs from the Mexican War is *The Rough and Ready Songster*, which included T. A. Durriage's "Remember the Alamo" (1848). Durriage's inspiration was Gen. Sam Houston's address to his troops before battle of San Jacinto (1836): "Heed not the Spanish battle yell,/Let every stroke we give them tell,/And let them fall as Crockett fell,/Remember the Alamo!"

Significant improvements in the construction of the piano and the increasing availability of this instrument inspired many keyboard works during the Mexican War. Many of these pieces were composed for the amateur pianist with simple harmonies and repetitive chords. Stephen Foster, more widely known for his songs, composed one battle piece for piano, entitled "Santa Anna's Retreat from Buena Vista" (1848), a "quickstep" or fast-paced military march. Piano pieces that imitated military bands were so popular that composers often turned to military music for inspiration. "Santa Anna's March" (1847) for piano by William Ratel, for example, is an arrangement of a tune originally played by Mexican Army bands.

Civil War (1861–65)

Despite their political differences, the Union and Confederate armies shared a love of music, carrying songsters with them and using them often. Instruments were plentiful and soldiers entertained themselves whenever and wherever possible. Bands proliferated, both within and outside the military action. On the home front, singing around the parlor piano was a common way to spend an evening and sheet music sales increased significantly during the Civil War.

Songwriters during the Civil War were less concerned with documenting events of the war than with selling their

songs. Although songs about battles continued to be written, sentimental songs of death and mourning overwhelmed them in quantity and popularity. As songs became more personal, dealing with the emotions related to the war, both at home and on the battlefield, composers could appeal to both sides of the conflict with their sheet music.

Songwriters such as Stephen Foster, George F. Root, and Henry Clay Work were especially prolific during the Civil War. Foster's songs suggest prevailing attitudes during the war, starting with the optimistic "I'll Be a Soldier" (1861) and "That's What's the Matter!" (1862) and abruptly changing tone with the mournful "Was My Brother in the Battle?" (1862) and "When This Dreadful War Is Ended" (1863).

Root composed such sentimental hits as "The Vacant Chair" (1861), "Tramp! Tramp! Tramp! or The Prisoner's Hope" (1864), and "Just Before the Battle, Mother" (1862), which is a wonderful example of a "mother" song, which were especially plentiful and popular during the Civil War. The third verse promotes Root's other famous bestseller "Battle Cry of Freedom" (1861):

> Hark! I hear the bugles sounding,
> 'Tis the signal for the fight.
> Now may God protect us, mother,
> As He ever does the right.
> Hear "The Battle Cry of Freedom,"
> How it swells upon the air,
> Oh yes, we'll rally 'round the standard
> Or we'll perish nobly there.
> Farewell, mother, you may never
> Press me to your breast again;
> But, Oh, you'll not forget me, mother
> If I'm numbered with the slain.

Both Union and Confederate soldiers and civilians could commiserate with these shared tragedies and appreciated these songs. A Confederate officer noted in his diary during the battle of the Wilderness that he heard the Union forces singing "The Battle Cry of Freedom" one night, and one of his pickets exclaimed: "Good heavens, captain, what are those fellows made of, anyway? Here we've licked 'em six days runnin' and . . . they're singing 'Rally round the flag.'"

"All Quiet on the Potomac Tonight" (1863) is often considered the earliest antiwar song because of its graphic portrayal of the death of a picket. The practice of shooting pickets was supposedly abolished after the appearance of this work. It originally appeared as a poem by Ethel Lynn Beers called "The Picket Guard" in *Harper's Weekly Magazine* (November 30, 1861) and was later set to music by John Hill Hewitt:

> All quiet along the Potomac, they say,
> Except now and then a stray picket
> Is shot as he walks on his beat to and fro,
> By a rifleman hid in the thicket.
> 'Tis nothing, a private or two now and then
> Will not count in the news of the battle;
> Not an officer lost, only one of the men,
> Moaning out all alone the death rattle.

Both sides adopted sentimental songs about experiences common to everyone in the war. "Weeping Sad and Lonely" (also known as "When This Cruel War Is Over," 1862) with words by Charles C. Sawyer and music by Henry Tucker was sold by publishers in the North and South. This song captured the sentiment of letters the men received from home, and is believed to have inspired desertion on both sides: "Weeping, sad and lonely,/Hopes and fears, how vain,/ When this cruel war is over, /Praying! That we meet again."

Rallying songs were needed to maintain morale and encourage enlistment. Foster contributed to this repertoire with "We've a Million in the Field" (1862), a setting of James Sloan Gibbons's "We're Coming Father Abraam [sic], Three Hundred Thousand More" (1862), which was written in response to a serious need for more troops:

> You have called us and we're coming, by Richmond's
>   bloody tide,
> To lay us down for freedom's sake, our brother's bones
>   beside…
> Six hundred thousand loyal men and true have gone
>   before,
> We are coming, Father Abraam, three hundred thou-
>   sand more.

The first popular rallying song of the Confederates was "The Bonnie Blue Flag" (1861) by the Irish American composer Harry McCarthy, and sung to the tune of the "Irish Jaunting Car." It called for the support of states' rights and listed those that joined the Confederacy. The song was immensely popular and was published in many editions and songsters. McCarthy lost popularity in the South, however, when he moved to Philadelphia, presumably to avoid the draft.

> Then here's to our Confederacy, strong we are and
>   brave,
> Like patriots of old we'll fight, our heritage to save.
> And rather than submit to shame, to die we would
>   prefer
> So cheer for the Bonnie Blue flag that bears a single
>   star.

Daniel Decatur Emmett's "Dixie" similarly became a rallying cry for the South, although it was composed by a northern minstrel singer and was one of Lincoln's favorite songs. Emmett, a staunch Union supporter, wrote another version entitled "Dixie for the Union" but the original version never shed its southern identification.

In the South, songs emerged after the war lamenting its outcome. James Innis Randolph, who served with the Confederate Army and J. E. B. Stuart, was bitter following the defeat of the Confederacy and expressed his feelings in "I'm a Good Old Rebel" (1867) set to the mournful tune "Joe Bowers":

> O I'm a good old rebel,
> Now that's just what I am,
> For this "Fair Land of Freedom"
> I do not give a damn.
> I'm glad I fit against it
> I only wish we'd won
> And I don't want no pardon
> For anything I done.

The Civil War would be the last war to inspire the obligatory piano battle pieces. Thomas Bethune (commonly known as "Blind" Tom) composed "Battle of Manassas"

(1866), a work innovative in its use of tone clusters, which sound like cannon fire. Accompanying the fray, one can hear "Yankee Doodle" and "Star-Spangled Banner."

Steadily increasing in size during the first half of the 19th century, bands flourished during the Civil War, performing more music, more often, and for more people, including the enemy. Sources describe instances when regiments, camped in close proximity, could enjoy performances by both sides. The addition of brass instruments to the original bugle, fife, and drum corps, along with improvements in instrument design, made it possible for bands to play any style of music, including arrangements of popular songs, in addition to their standard repertory of patriotic tunes and marches. Patrick S. Gilmore, bandmaster of the Union Army, adapted a well-known Irish song, "Johnny I Hardly Knew Ye" and transformed it into the rousing march, "When Johnny Comes Marching Home" (1863). Many historians believe that the influx of used instruments into New Orleans at the conclusion of the war played a significant role in the birth of jazz.

Spanish–American War (1898–1902)

The music associated with the Spanish–American War is less mournful and more intensely patriotic than Civil War music, possibly because of the war's short duration. Sentimental songs about soldiers dying declined in popularity in the 1890s, with the exception of Charles K. Harris's "Break the News to Mother" (1897), which became popular after the sinking of the USS *Maine*. Songs like "When the War Is O'er" (1898) didn't have much opportunity to obtain popularity before the war came to a close, but Joseph Hayden and Theodore Mertz's "There'll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight" (1897), was adopted and sung by Theodore Roosevelt's "Rough Riders." It was played as well by a marine band as U.S. forces entered Tientsin, China, during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.

After the sinking of the *Maine*, several songs appeared referencing this tragedy, or titled "Remember the Maine!" Other popular songs early in the war reflected a prevailing attitude of impatience and eagerness to avenge the "dead heroes," as they are called in "The Yankee Message, or Uncle Sam to Spain" (1898). "Uncle Sam, Tell Us Why Are You Waiting?" (1898), a patriotic song and chorus by Monroe H.

Cover of the sheet music to K. Harris's "Break the News to Mother" (1897), popular in the Spanish–American War. (Bettmann/CORBIS)

Rosenfeld, features a picture on the cover of the sheet music of a woman with an outstretched hand in what appears to be an accusatory stance. "Awake United States" by Marie Elizabeth Lamb similarly encourages the initiation of conflict: "Awake it is no dream;/Dost hear the sailors' scream?/Comrades will you go?/Avenge the cruel blow!"

Some popular songwriters documented the important actions of the war, but patriotic fervor dominated popular music, with titles like "Uncle Sam Forever" (1898), "The Flag That Has Never Known Defeat" (1898), and "There is No Flag Like the Red, White and Blue" (1898).

As in the Civil War, soldiers in the lengthier conflict in the Philippines improvised their own songs. When fighting persisted there from 1899 to 1901, some put these words to Root's "Tramp, Tramp, Tramp, the Boys Are Marching":

Damn, damn, damn the Filipinos;
Cross-eyed kakiak ladrones.
Underneath the starry flag,

Civilize 'em with a Krag.
And then we'll go home to our beloved homes.

The country's patriotism extended to instrumental music, exemplified by the popularity of marches, which were arranged interchangeably for piano and band. "The Hobson Two Step March" (1898), "Home from Manila March and Two Step" (1899), and "First Victory March Two Step" (1898) were particularly popular.

During this era, bands continued to grow in size and quantity, as well as stature. John Philip Sousa's band and his compositions captured the essence of the prevailing American spirit and patriotism. Sousa's "El Capitan March" (1896), derived from his popular operetta, for example, was performed by the band of Commodore George Dewey's flagship, USS *Olympia* as his squadron steamed into Manila Bay. Other regimental bands also provided entertainment, supplying patriotic songs as well as arrangements of popular songs, in addition to standard instrumental music (quick-steps, marches, and so on).

One of the first large-scale orchestral pieces inspired by war is the "Manila Te Deum" (1898) by Walter Damrosch. For solo quartet, chorus, and orchestra, this setting of the Roman Catholic prayer, marks the first use of a liturgical text for a war-related work by an American composer. It praises God and gives thanks for Admiral Dewey and his victory at Manila Bay.

World War I (1914–18)

Music related to World War I that was composed for the market is characterized by a continued sense of optimism and patriotism. To bolster morale and rally the population, songwriters adapted the popular Tin Pan Alley style, named for the tinny sound of the upright pianos used to compose and promote popular songs in music publishing houses on the "alley" in New York City. This style dominated the structure of most hit songs from the late 19th to the mid-20th centuries.

Songs advocating neutrality were popular prior to America's involvement in the war. Irving Berlin, known for his patriotic songs, initially advocated neutrality with his work "Stay Down Here Where You Belong" (1914), and W. R. Williams contributed "We Stand for Peace While Others War" (1914): "We stand for peace while others war/Tho' war,

we know is sin/But Uncle Sam's a neutral power/And we must stand by him."

The first overtly antiwar songs also appeared during these years. Alfred Bryan's "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier" (1915) was initially very popular, and this is reflected in the Wilson administration's and the Democratic Party's maintaining that they had "kept us out of [the] war" during Wilson's successful reelection campaign in 1916. But once war was declared in the spring of 1917, the song became so contentious that the singer who recorded it, Morton Harvey, was blacklisted from the recording industry. When America entered the war, it was answered by "I Didn't Raise My Boy to be a Coward," "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Slacker," and "America, Here's My Boy."

The most popular song of the era was George M. Cohan's "Over There" (1917). Inspired by a bugle call, it captured the patriotic spirit of the times and energized the country's songwriters, poets, and propagandists to reiterate the title phrase. Even Cohan himself echoed the phrase in his later compositions, like "Their Hearts Are Over Here" (1918) ("The boys are over there, but their hearts are over here"), a song about the women on the home front.

With a population consisting of so many recent immigrants, uniting the population and encouraging them to set aside their loyalties to their birthplace and support the war became an important goal. Popular songwriters responded to the call with songs like "When Tony Goes Over the Top" (1918) (about an Italian barber), "The Army's Full of Irish (A Man from Erin Never Runs, He's Irish)" (1917), and "I'm an American, That's All" (1915).

Several songs, like "Angel of No Man's Land," "My Angel of the Flaming Cross," and "That Red Cross Girl of Mine," promoted women's participation in the war, usually as nurses. The volunteer efforts of women were appreciated, inspiring some songs like "She'll Be There" (1917) and Al Piantadosi's "What an Army of Men We'd Have, if They Ever Drafted the Girls."

While patriotic songs encouraged those at home, soldiers on the front lines dealt with the rigors of war with humor or irony. "Oh, How I Hate to Get Up in the Morning" from Berlin's *Yip Yip Yaphank* (1918) provided an outlet for the realities of war. In France soldiers were heard singing about the easy life the generals ("tin hats") led:

Oh, it's drive the general's car my boy, if you want to
    come out whole.
For a tin hat never takes a chance with his immortal
    soul.
They always sleep between the sheets and eat three
    squares a day
While the dough boy's up to his neck in mud for
    thirty-three dollars pay.

When war ended other comic songs, like "How 'Ya Gonna Keep 'Em Down on the Farm (After They've Seen Paree)?" (1919) reflected on the tendency of rural veterans to relocate to cities.

For the first time, recordings made music available to all Americans, including soldiers overseas. Special phonographs were designed and sent to the troops. The shortage of shellac, however, put new records at a premium. The used and unsold records solicited from dealers entertained the troops with a repertoire of patriotic and traditional music, although most soldiers preferred the popular new style, ragtime.

World War I was the first war in which the government took an active role in promoting music in the armed forces. To encourage more singing, the Commission on Training Camp Activities of the Army and Navy departments published a songbook, *Songs of the Soldiers and Sailors*, in 1917, while the National Committee on Army and Navy Camp Music published the *Army Song Book* in 1918. Training camps for Army bands were established to improve the quality of the U.S. military bands, which were considered to be inferior to European bands.

During World War I, some African American soldiers in Europe were less than enthusiastic about being there, and were overheard by Lt. John Jacob Niles ("song-catcher" extraordinaire and author of *Singing Soldiers*) singing these lines to the tune of "Mademoiselle from Armentieres":

I don't know why I went to war; tell me, oh tell me
    now.
I don't know why I went to war, or what these folks
    are fightin' for
Tell me oh tell me now.

James Reese Europe was the regimental jazz bandleader of the Harlem Hellfighters. While fighting overseas, Europe composed "On Patrol in No Man's Land" a musical portrayal, in ragtime, of a patrol experience (recorded in 1919).

Classical music composers wrote lengthy, robust compositions related to the war. Leo Ornstein composed a collection of 10 piano pieces entitled *Poems of 1917*. It is a virtuoso collection with subtitles connecting it to the Great War, including "No Man's Land," "The Sower of Despair," "The Orient in Flanders," and "A Dirge of the Trenches." Charles Ives's *Three Songs of the War* (1917) includes a setting of John McCrae's well-known poem "In Flanders Fields," and utilizes short musical suggestions of "My Country 'tis of Thee" and other patriotic songs.

World War II (1939–45)

During World War II, many different kinds of music flourished, as jazz, blues, and country songwriters supported the war. Art music composers were especially eloquent, drawing on their personal feelings to inspire their works. Noting the impact that popular songs had during World War I in supporting the war, songwriters, publishers, and even the U.S. government attempted to stimulate the production of songs that would both boost morale and earn money. In 1941 the federal government commissioned Irving Berlin to write a popular war song to boost the sales of war bonds. Unfortunately "Any Bonds Today?" did not create the excitement that they had hoped, even though many were entertained when Bugs Bunny sang it in a cartoon. Berlin had more success with "God Bless America" (1938). Originally composed for World War I but not released, he revised it in time for World War II and it became such a hit that singer Kate Smith was required, by popular demand, to perform it regularly throughout the war.

The most popular songs of the war were accidental hits, like Frank Loesser's "Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammunition" (1942) and Jimmy McHugh's "Comin' in on a Wing and Prayer" (1943), songs associated with exaggerated deeds. The country sensation, "There's a Star-Spangled Banner Waving Somewhere" (1942), portrays the dashed hopes of a disabled youth who was unable to participate in the conflict.

Spike Jones's "Der Fuehrer's Face" (1943) is an example of the tendency to make fun of Hitler in the media; it parodied the Nazi anthem "Horst Wessell Lied" in the melody. Originally composed for a Disney cartoon entitled "Donald Duck in Nutsy [Nazi] Land," it became such a hit during production that the cartoon was renamed after the song.

Many popular songs like "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" (1941) were purely for entertainment. "Rosie the Riveter" (1942) was one of the few songs to deal with the role of women in the manufacturing industries. Sentimental tunes like "Don't Sit Under the Apple Tree (With Anyone Else but Me)" (1942) reflected the anxiety and hopefulness with which families awaited the return of their loved ones. Berlin's "White Christmas" (1942) was tremendously popular—more than a million men had been drafted and many were far from home during the holidays. The U.S. government didn't want the draftees thinking about going home just yet and was uneasy with these nostalgic songs, but especially unhappy with "When the Lights Go On Again" (1942) by Eddie Seller, Sol Marcus, and Bennie Benjamin:

> When the lights go on again all over the world,
> and the boys are home again all over the world,
> And rain or snow is all that may fall from the skies
> above,
> a kiss won't mean "Goodbye," but "Hello" to love

Jazz groups also contributed to the war effort. Luther Henderson's "A Slip of the Lip" (1942) was composed after the government circulated the warning "Loose lips sink ships," urging everyone to be careful with sensitive troop-deployment information. The Duke Ellington Orchestra subsequently recorded the best-known version of this song.

Blues composers made contributions to the music coming out of the war. Brownie McGhee, Josh White, and Sonny Terry recorded "Move Into Germany" in March 1944, using a characteristic blues style to assert, "We're going to move into Germany, change this old world around." While not in a pure blues format, Johnny Mercer's "Duration Blues" (1944), dealt comically with the difficulties of war:

For anything and ev'ry thing
There's stamps you got to use,
The D's and G's are groceries
And I think the T's are shoes.
You have to be an FBI man,
To figure out all the clues
And that's the situation,
When you got the Duration Blues.

Still facing racial discrimination at home, many African American musicians pointed out the hypocrisy of participating in the fight for freedom against foes overseas. Andy Razaf, Eubie Blake, and Charles Cooke wrote "We Are Americans, Too" (1941), expressing their dislike of segregation of the armed forces:

We have given up our blood and bone,
Helped to lay the Nation's cornerstone;
None have loved Old Glory more than we,
Or have shown a greater loyalty.
Bunker Hill to the Rhine,
We've been right there in line,
Serving the Red, White and Blue.
All our future is here, everything we hold dear—
We are Americans too!

A Singing Army Is a Winning Army was the slogan printed on the bottom of the stationery of the Almanac Singers. Although this group of labor-activist folk singers/songwriters would be associated with antiwar songs in later years, during World War II it actively promoted the war. Group member Woody Guthrie wrote several pro-war folk songs, including "The Reuben James" (1941), which focused on those lost when a destroyer by that name guarding a convoy was sunk by a U-boat.

Although the U.S. government often sought to involve composers of popular songs in the war effort, it did little to support composers of art music. The Army Air Corps, however, commissioned works from Samuel Barber and Marc Blitzstein, who were serving as enlisted men. The result was Barber's Symphony No. 2, in 1944 (rev. in 1947), and Blitzstein's Airborne Symphony (1946) for soloists, male voice choir, and orchestra. Shortly after the war ended, the Navy approved the production of *Victory at Sea* (1952), an NBC TV documentary series highlighting the Navy's participation in World War II, to be used for recruitment and training. Richard Rodgers, well known for his musical collaborations, *Oklahoma!* (1943) and *South Pacific* (1949), was asked to write the memorable incidental score for this 26-episode work.

Some composers turned to material of the Civil War to honor those who fought in World War II. For example, the Gettysburg Symphony (No. 6) by Roy Harris is based on the text of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, while Aaron Copland's "A Lincoln Portrait" (1942) for speaker and orchestra similarly draws on Lincoln's speeches and writings for its inspiration. Copland's "Fanfare for the Common Man" (1942) was composed for the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra, in response to an appeal made to 18 American composers for patriotic fanfares to honor World War II soldiers. William Grant Still, the first African American to have a work performed by a major symphony orchestra, composed "In Memoriam: The Colored Soldiers Who Died for Democracy "(1943) to call attention to their contribution to the war.

Korean War (1950–53) and Cold War (1945–91)

The indistinct character and length of the Cold War led to a wide variety and quantity of musical compositions; music associated with the Korean War was not as widely enjoyed as that of previous wars, and few works have remained in popular memory. Songwriters were no longer composing in the Tin Pan Alley style, and the individual singer/songwriters who dominated the hit parade were not inspired by this conflict. In retrospect, the only ones who appeared interested in singing about the Korean War were the soldiers who were fighting it. They no longer relied on songwriters to commemorate or comment on the war; they wrote the songs themselves. As a result, many of the songs associated with this war are the result of improvised texts based on preexisting tunes.

Some of the published songs that survive (anonymously) from this era communicate a sense of frustration and dissatisfaction with the armed services as well as the war. "Itazuke

Tower," sung to the music of "Wabash Cannonball," is a fictitious conversation between the traffic control tower and a pilot, who doesn't survive the landing because of bureaucratic obstructions:

> Itazuke tower this is Air Force 801,
> I'm up in pilot's heaven and my flying days are done,
> I'm sorry that I blew up, I couldn't make the grade,
> I guess I should have waited till the landing was OK.

Other songs complain about mechanical problems with the aircraft. "Come and Join the Air Force," also sung to "Wabash Cannonball," complains of the poor quality of the airplanes and "The AJ Song" (c. 1954–55) is sung to the tune of "The Wreck of Old '97," a song about a train collision, with similarly critical remarks about aircraft malfunctions.

Country music songwriters, however, were prolific during the Korean War. Some created patriotic tunes, such as Jimmy Dickens's "Thank God for Victory in Korea" (1953); others, songs about lovelorn soldiers, as in "I'm a Heartsick Soldier on Heartbreak Ridge" (recorded by Ernest Tubbs). The most popular Korean "sweetheart" song was "Dear John Letter" (1953) and it became a hit for several country music stars including Pat Boone (1960). The lyrics tell of a woman who writes to her lover (supposedly in Korea) telling him that she has married his brother. "Rotation Blues" (recorded by Bill Monroe in the 1950s) is a country music adaptation of the blues, complete with yodeling:

> I got the rotation blues
> I'm a lonely soldier sitting in Korea
> I'm a lonely soldier sitting in Korea
> But rotation's coming so I shouldn't have no fear
> Just a few more weeks and rotation gonna set me free
> Just a few more weeks and rotation gonna set me free
> Because the F.E.C. [Far Eastern Command] is too
>   pretty for me
> I got the rotation blues

The paranoia about nuclear war inspired several popular songs in the late 1950s and early 1960s, such as "Universal Soldier" by Buffy Sainte-Marie. After serving in the Army, satirist Tom Lehrer wrote "We'll All Go Together When We Go" (1959) a humorous portrayal of a nuclear holocaust with echoes of the hymn "In the Sweet By and By":

> Oh we will all fry together when we fry.
> We'll be french fried potatoes by and by.
> There will be no more misery
> When the world is our rotisserie,
> Yes, we will all fry together when we fry.

Bob Dylan's "Masters of War" (1963) and P. F. Sloan's "Eve of Destruction" (1965), popularized by Barry McGuire, also commented on the possibly impending nuclear destruction. Some radio stations refused to give "Eve of Destruction" airtime because of its pessimistic lyrics. A more recent and poignant addition to the repertoire of songs about nuclear war is Sting's "Russians" (1985), which humanizes America's adversary and draws hopeful similarities between the two superpowers:

> We share the same biology
> Regardless of ideology
> Believe me when I say to you
> I hope the Russians love their children too

In the Cold War era, America's art music composers continued to compose music inspired by World War II, the Holocaust, and also in reaction to the potential nuclear war. Lou Harrison's "Pacifka Rondo" (1963) for chorus and Asian instruments, for example, was composed in protest to the nuclear testing in the Pacific Ocean. But art music composers were similarly uninspired by the Korean War, with a few exceptions. "Sonata in Memory of the Korean War Dead" (1952) for violin and piano, by Lowndes Maury, includes elements of blues as well as military marches and may be the only example of a work actually composed during the conflict. "God Love You Now" (1971) is a more recent classical work, dedicated as "An Ode for the American Dead in Korea." It is scored for choir, speaker, assorted instruments, and reverberation device by Donald Erb and Thomas McGrath.

Vietnam War (1964–75)

Antiwar music found its greatest expression during the Vietnam War. Protest music was certainly not new, but the number of original compositions related to the war, as well as the candid (and often vehement) subject matter, was extraordinary. Art music composers similarly turned their attention to commenting negatively on the war.

Probably the most famous song of this era is Country Joe McDonald's "Feel Like I'm Fixin' to Die Rag" (1965). The satirical text is accentuated by the instrumentation, which simulates a carnival:

> And it's one, two, three,
> What are we fightin' for?
> Don't ask me I don't give a damn
> Next stop is Vietnam.
> And its five, six, seven,
> Open up the pearly gates.
> Well, ain't no time to wonder why,
> Whoopee! We're all gonna die.

Other, similarly humorous songs that lampoon the draft include Arlo Guthrie's "Alice's Restaurant" (1966) and Phil Ochs's "Draft Dodger Rag" (1965):

> I hate Chou En Lai, and I hope he dies,
> but one thing you gotta see
> That someone's gotta go over there and that someone
>   isn't me
> So I wish you well, Sarge, give 'em Hell
> Yeah, Kill me a thousand or so
> And if you ever get a war without blood and gore
> Well I'll be the first to go

Although rock and roll didn't address the war as often, songs like The Doors' "Unknown Soldier" (1968) and Edwin Starr's rock-funk song "War" (1970) did gain popularity. John Fogerty's "Fortunate Son" (1970), recorded by Fogerty's band Creedence Clearwater Revival, called attention to the rich who were often able to avoid the draft.

Folk singers turned their attention almost exclusively to protesting the war. Pete Seeger's "Where Have All the Flowers Gone," (1956) became a theme song for protestors of this war, while his "Waist Deep in the Big Muddy" (1967) was popular with the soldiers who lived it. "Lyndon Johnson Told the Nation" (1965) by Tom Paxton highlights the idea that the war was fought on two fronts, at home and Vietnam:

> The word came from the very top
> That soon the shooting war would stop
> The pockets of resistance were so thin.
> There just remained some trouble spots
> Like Vietnam, Detroit and Watts [Los Angeles],
> Gene McCarthy and Ho Chi Minh

Blues singers also composed songs about Vietnam, like Johnny Shines's "So Cold in Vietnam" (1966) and John Lee Hooker's "I Don't Want to go to Vietnam" (1968): "I'm sittin' down here thinkin', I don't wanna go to Vietnam/I have all these troubles at home, I don't wanna go to Vietnam."

Some songs by soldiers reflected the prevailing attitude of other servicemen. Richard C. Peet, a veteran of the Vietnam War, wrote "A Soldier's Lament" (1968), depicting the sentiments of soldiers who, although they didn't like the war, resolved to consider it their duty:

> Fight, fight, fight
> Bloody day and bloody night.
> There's no rest for the weary likes of me.
> But they say our cause is right,
> And so willingly I fight,
> No matter what the bitter odds may be.

Other soldier–songwriters composed songs in support of their fellow troops, but not necessarily of the war. Sgt. Barry Sadler, a member of the Army's Special Forces who was wounded in Vietnam, wrote "Ballad of the Green Berets" (1966) in support of his colleagues. The song became an instant hit with a segment of the population that was increasingly at odds with the antiwar movement. Terry Skinner's "Battle Hymn of Lt. Calley" (sung to the tune of "Battle Hymn of the Republic") honored an officer convicted by court-martial of murdering unarmed women and children in cold blood, and was especially hostile to the antiwar demonstrators:

While we're fighting in the jungles they were march-
ing in the street
While we're dying in the rice fields they were helping
our defeat
While we're facing V.C. bullets they were sounding a
retreat
As we go marching on

Art music composers were likewise caught up in the tide of protest against the war. Lou Harrison offered three works from 1953 to 1968, each entitled "Peace-Piece." The second of these is the most antiwar with a text that compares Lyndon Johnson with Hitler and Stalin. Ned Rorem composed "War Scenes" for male voice and piano (1969) with texts by Walt Whitman, while William Mayer used letters from soldiers fighting in Vietnam to compose "Letters Home" (1968) for mixed chorus, soloists, speakers, and orchestra.

Composers often utilized technology and modern musical techniques to inject realism into their compositions, while many vocal works included screaming to portray terror and agony. As a result, performances became elaborate, with complex instrumentation and lots of sound layering. John Downey composed "Almost 12" in 1971 for chamber orchestra. During this short work, the music is improvised, except when altered sections of "Star-Spangled Banner" and "America" are heard amidst the sound of bombs coming from the plucked strings of the bass.

Gulf War (1991) and Iraq War (2003–)

The increasing use of the Internet to share music has considerably changed the audience for music inspired by America's most recent wars. Many new works, by amateur as well as professional composers, bypass commercial release and are only available through this medium. To avoid displeasing high-paying radio networks or record publishers, some antiwar songs composed by well-known artists may be found only on the Internet; they are not on publicly available recordings. Whereas earlier wars inspired a sense of community through the group singing of songs and shared experiences, digital technology has allowed for more independent listening. As a result, no major rallying songs were written to

inspire confidence either on the battlefield or at home. The introduction of personal stereo systems in tanks allows troops to listen to any music they like and interviews with soldiers indicate that the preferred songs are highly rhythmic and often violent. Soldiers often play songs like Triple 6 Mafia's "Die a Soldier" (2000), Drowning Pool's "Bodies" (2001) ("Let the bodies hit the floor/let the bodies hit the floor") and Mystikal's "Round Out tha Tank" (1998) to prepare themselves mentally prior to a skirmish. Megadeath's "Architecture of Aggression" (1998), a heavy metal rock song about the 1991 bombing of Iraq, is introduced by the sound machine gun fire and followed by lyrics with allusions to wars of ancient civilizations:

Great nations built from the bones of the dead,
With mud and straw, blood and sweat,
You know your worth when your enemies
Praise your architecture of aggression.

Country songwriters, historically recognized for maintaining a conservative stance, increasingly turned toward pacifism. Merle Haggard, known for "Okie from Muskogee" (1969)—a song advocating traditional values in the midst of the anti–Vietnam War movement—spoke out against the news networks' treatment of the war in Iraq in "That's the News" (2003): "No-one is the winner an' everyone must lose/Suddenly the war is over: that's the news." Willie Nelson, a free-spirited country songwriter, also contributed what has been described as a Christmas song with a message, "Whatever Happened to Peace on Earth?" (2004): "How much oil is one human life worth?/And what ever happened to peace on earth?"

But some country songwriters continued to compose patriotic songs. Darryl Worley's "Have You Forgotten?" (2003) and Toby Keith's "Courtesy of the Red White and Blue (The Angry American)" (2002) resemble older songs written in support of rallying around a common purpose (the terror attacks of September 11, 2001).

As soldiers in previous wars wrote their own lyrics to existing tunes, troops fighting in the Gulf and Iraq wars documented their feelings with their own music as well as their own texts. A documentary produced by VH1 in 2004,

Soundtrack to War, described how soldiers are writing original music to memorialize fallen friends and cope emotionally with war. Spc. Janel Daniels, soldier-songwriter who composed "Home of the Brave," told a reporter in 2004 "All you have is destruction around you. You have no idea what's about to happen. It's so hard with everything going on. Music is vital out there."

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Related Entries

Harlem Hellfighters; Musical Theater and War; Niles, John Jacob; Propaganda and Psychological Operations; Radio in World War II; Rosie the Riveter; "Star-Spangled Banner, The"; Theater and War; War on Terrorism

Related Documents

1777 c; 1824; 1838; 1849; 1863 i; 1865 b; 1899; 1915 b; 1918 c; 1919 e; 1929; 1950

—*Mariana Whitmer*

Musical Theater and War

Although musical theater is usually associated with toe-tapping smiles and dancing girls, it also has dealt at times with America's wars. Some such shows were too grating on the sensibilities of American audiences and never made it to Broadway or achieved lasting popularity. Other musicals found sufficient producer capital and greater resonance with audiences.

Composers, writers, and audiences for musicals did not really exist in the United States until the late 19th century, when the popularity of the light opera works of such British and continental composers and librettists as Gilbert and Sullivan and Franz Lehar spread to this continent. Consequently, musicals celebrating wars fought earlier do not appear until long after their conclusion.

Broadway Musicals About the American Revolution and the Civil War

The nation's first steps toward independence were celebrated nearly two centuries later in the musical *1776*. First staged in 1969, this show by Sherman Edwards (music and lyrics) and Peter Stone (book) involves meetings of the Continental Congress and the drafting of the Declaration of Independence. "Mama Look Sharp," sung by a congressional courier caught in the middle of battle, stands in contrast to the generally comedic tone of the rest of the show: "The soldiers they fired, oh Ma did

we run. But then we turned round and the battle begun. Then I went under, oh Ma am I done?"

The first musical about the Civil War appears to have been *When Johnny Comes Marching Home*, with music by Julian Edwards and lyrics by Stan Stange. The show enjoyed brief popularity in the winter of 1902 to 1903. Two more recent shows that made it to Broadway were set in Civil War times. *Shenandoah*, by Gary Geld and Peter Udell, first staged in 1975, dealt with a Virginia farm family facing the nightmare of the Civil War. *Civil War*, written by Frank Wildhorn with book by Gregory Boyd and lyrics by Jack Murphy, premiered in 1998. Boyd called it "an attempt to create a new music-theatre event that tries to express a sense of the time, the character and the emotional landscape of an America that is struggling to define itself during a time of terrible and profound change." Lincoln sings words that he once spoke. A Confederate recruit misjudges the task before him: "I will cut a dashing figure; I will make the ladies swoon; I'll be back by fall to kiss 'em all, If the war don't end too soon." Jack Kyrieleison's *Battle Cry Freedom* (later changed to *Reunion*) has been performed in a number of venues since its Goodspeed Opera House debut in 1996, though not on Broadway. The work's six vaudeville actors, "performing in 1890" before a backdrop of photographs from the war, represent Civil War statesmen, generals, soldiers, nurses, slaves, reporters, preachers, and spies, and sing 26 songs that were popular during the Civil War era.

From the Spanish–American War Through World War I

The Shoo-fly Regiment, a musical written by and starring African Americans, with music by Bob Cole and lyrics by J. Rosamond Johnson, opened on Broadway in 1907. The star, a graduate of Tuskegee Institute, volunteers for service in the Spanish–American War. After service in the Philippines, he returns to his sweetheart and marries her. One scholar believes that the show's romantic plot may have offended the white Broadway audience of that era inasmuch as such sentimentality was regarded as "taboo in black shows" (Woll, 1989). The show closed after 15 performances.

America's "small" wars in Third World countries visited by U.S. gunboats, cruisers, and marines in these years

spawned a number of "gunboat" musicals, most notably those of George Ade, an anti-imperialist. *The Sultan of Sulu* (1902), set in the South Pacific, spoofed the imposition of American rule on an island acquired as a result of the peace treaty with Spain. *The Sho-Gun* (1904), set in Korea, satirized naval assistance provided to an American businessman in that country. Both were hits in Broadway and Chicago.

Over the Top, a Broadway musical review that opened in December 1917 featured American biplanes attacking a German trench. Florenz Ziegfeld's *Follies of 1917*, produced four months after the United States had entered the war, included songs by Irving Berlin and Victor Herbert and three war-related "tableaus," including a flashback to Paul Revere's ride and an appearance by "Woodrow Wilson," reviewing a troop of showgirls dressed patriotically and engaged in precision drill before a huge American flag. The *Ziegfeld Follies of 1918* included a number with dancing girls riding onto the stage in Army uniforms in an armored tank. Ziegfeld also staged several of his dancing girls with one breast bared, representing Lady Liberty and adding a titillating flavor to the patriotic fervor of the times.

George M. Cohan used fundamental patriotism as motifs in his shows. *Little Johnny Jones* (1904), *Forty-five Minutes from Broadway* (1906), and *George Washington Jr.* (1906) offered such songs as "Yankee Doodle Dandy" and "You're a Grand Old Flag." When America entered World War I in 1917, Cohan wrote one of his better-known songs, "Over There" for one of his "reviews":

So prepare, say a prayer, Send the word, send the
    word to beware.
We'll be over, we're coming over, And we won't come
    back till it's over over there.

Irving Berlin, born Israel Baline, offered another popular song of World War I, "Oh, How I Hate to Get Up in the Morning." Berlin sang the song himself as an Army recruit at Camp Upton, a training camp, in his *Yip Yip Yaphank* (1917), a show he created to raise funds for the Army Emergency Relief Fund during the war. Another to draw upon his wartime experience in these years was Vincent Youmans, who had been drafted. In the Navy he began setting troop shows.

Later, he wrote a popular show, *Hit the Deck* (1927), an American sailor comedy based on the 1922 play *Shore Leave*; the show featured the song "Join the Navy."

Also in 1922, George and Ira Gershwin teamed up with George S. Kaufman to produce a satire on war, *Strike Up the Band*, which originally didn't make it past Philadelphia. Rewritten as a gentler satire in 1930 by Morrie Ryskind, the show was a hit on Broadway. *Johnny Johnson* by Paul Green and Kurt Weill saw its first performance at Lee Strassberg's The Group Theater in 1936. Johnny is a reluctant draftee, critical of the war he is ordered into. He manages to stop the fighting briefly by overwhelming a coterie of Allied generals with laughing gas, but when they come to their senses, he is consigned to an insane asylum for some 10 years. After his release, Johnny becomes a toymaker and offers the final song, a paean for peace. The show had a run of only 68 performances.

World War II

During World War II, Berlin wrote a second all-soldier revue *This Is the Army* (1942) to again raise funds for Army Emergency Relief. In 1943, Oscar Hammerstein borrowed Georges Bizet's opera, *Carmen*, and produced it with an all-black cast in a setting "near a parachute factory in a southern town." "Don Jose" became "Corporal Joe;" Carmen became "Carmen Jones," a name that served as the show's title. A *Ziegfeld Follies* opened on Broadway in the same year, spoofing rationing. Milton Berle played "J. Pierswift Armour," a butcher with black-market steaks squirreled away in a safe. The show was not well received by reviewers, but Broadway audiences loved its silliness; it played 553 times. In 1944, *Follow the Girls* told of a burlesque star who opens a canteen for servicemen to help the war effort. This "flimsy excuse for endless parades of showgirls . . . bumping and grinding" (Jones, 2003) in scanty outfits disappointed the critics again, but delighted audiences 884 times.

Shortly after World War II, Broadway warmed to *South Pacific* (1949), with music by Richard Rodgers and lyrics by Oscar Hammerstein. The show's book was based loosely on short stories by James A. Michener and followed a U.S. Navy nurse during World War II in the Pacific

islands. After falling in love with a French plantation owner, the nurse is shocked to discover that he has mixed-race children from an earlier relationship. A subplot deals with the romance between Marine Corps Lt. Joe Cable and an island girl, Liat, which also addresses the issue of racial prejudice. The lieutenant sings "You've got to be taught to be afraid, of people whose eyes are oddly made, and people whose skin is a different shade; you've got to be carefully taught./You've got to be taught, before it's too late; before you are six or seven or eight, to hate all the people your relatives hate. . . . "

The show was a great success, and *South Pacific* won a Pulitzer Prize for confronting these issues (concurrently, Pres. Harry Truman had ordered the desegregation of the military services).

Ten years later Rodgers and Hammerstein wrote another show, set in pre–World War II Austria, that was just as well received. *The Sound of Music* (1959) was based on the true story of an Austrian family who fled Nazi occupation in 1939. Another successful musical, *Cabaret*, was based on the book *Goodbye to Berlin* by Christopher Isherwood, a work that formed the basis for the play and film *I Am A Camera*. The musical captures the atmosphere of pre–World War II Berlin and depicts events such as Nazi persecution of Jews as well as Nazi disdain for the "decadence" of gays. With book by Joe Masteroff and music and lyrics by John Kander and Fred Ebb, the show made its Broadway debut in 1966 and ran for three years.

1940's *Radio Hour* by Walton Jones (1979), set in the Hotel Astor in December 1942, was a review offering songs popular during World War II in the fashion of *Reunion*. *Swingtime Canteen* (1995) was a similar off-Broadway review, set in a "Hollywood canteen" in London in 1943. A recent musical with a World War II setting appears to have been Diane Tauser's *I'll be Seeing You*, which opened in Syracuse, New York, in 2004. A nurse and a tank commander fall in love overseas. He is captured in North Africa; the two reunite after the war.

The Cold War and Vietnam

Several musicals have addressed themes related to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Gian-Carlo Menotti's opera for Broadway, *The Consul* (1950), concerned a woman's effort to leave her communist-governed country. Despite the grim nature of the story (she eventually commits suicide), the show ran for 269 performances to a sympathetic Cold War audience. Cole Porter wrote the music and lyrics, and George S. Kaufman, Leueen McGrath, and Abe Burrows wrote the book for *Silk Stockings* (1955), a tale about an American theatrical agent, a Russian composer seeking to defect to the West, and a beautiful Soviet apparatchik. It served up a heart-warming plot of love overcoming Cold War adversity and enjoyed a run of 478 performances. Mary Rodgers (Richard's daughter; music) and Martin Charnin (lyrics) staged the less successful *Hot Spot* in 1963. An opportunistic Peace Corps worker (Judy Holliday) in the needy nation of D'Hum urges the head of state to tell the U.S. ambassador of a communist-led subversive movement in order to secure foreign aid. *Hot Spot* flopped, offending some and disappointing others.

Chess, with musical score by two members of the Swedish rock group ABBA and lyrics by Tim Rice, concentrates on the political and emotional stalemate of the Cold War with a "world-televised" chess match between the top U.S. and Soviet grand masters. First performed in London's West End, it opened on Broadway in 1988 after having been rewritten somewhat to make the American grand master appear less obnoxious. It played on Broadway for 68 performances. A more recent musical with a Cold War subplot, *Berlin, the Musical*, by Erik Orton, deals with the Berlin Airlift of 1948, an opening shot in the Cold War. It enjoyed some success when it opened in New York in 2003.

The Vietnam War inspired several musicals; the "in-your-face" character of the off-Broadway show *Now Is the Time for All Good Men* (lyrics, Gretchen Cryer lyrics; music, Nancy Ford) in 1967 may have led to its short run. A pacifist, teaching Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience" in a small town in Indiana, loses his job and is driven from the community when it is learned that he had been court-martialed as an Army deserter. The musical *Hair*, with lyrics by James Rado and Gerome Ragni and music by Galt MacDermot, proved more popular; this rock musical told the tale of a group of hippies, one of whom unsuccessfully seeks to avoid being drafted during the

Vietnam War. *Hair* premiered off-Broadway as the inaugural offering of The Public Theater, but moved to Broadway in April 1968, where it stayed for 1,472 performances. This show introduced male and female nudity, obscene language, and the desecration of the American flag. Its road company met with local resistance in Boston; Oklahoma City; West Palm Beach, Florida; Atlanta, Georgia; Charlotte, North Carolina; Mobile, Alabama; and Chattanooga, Tennessee. Boston's district attorney was the first to try to shut it down for its "lewd and lascivious" character and desecration of the flag. But the company won this and all future legal cases, culminating in a landmark victory before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1975 (420 U.S. 552). A movie version of *Hair* was directed by Milos Forman in 1979.

Photographic images of the Vietnam War inspired two Frenchmen, Claude-Michel Schonberg and Alain Boblil, to create *Miss Saigon*, which premiered at the Theater Royal, Drury Lane, in London on September 20, 1989, and closed more than 10 years later. It opened in New York at the Broadway Theater, April 11, 1991, and ran for 10 years. The musical is an adaptation of Puccini's *Madame Butterfly*, which is itself based on the report in the late 19th century by an American missionary's wife of the abandonment of a geisha bride by an American naval lieutenant. *Miss Saigon* tells the story of an American soldier and a young Vietnamese woman who are introduced in a Vietnamese nightclub/brothel in the final stages of the Vietnam War. The two fall in love, go through a form of marriage, and the soldier promises to take his new wife back to the United States with him. With the sudden evacuation of American troops during the fall of Saigon, the American solider is forced to leave her behind. Some of the lyrics treat the same issues of racial stereotyping addressed in *South Pacific*: "I'm from a world that's so different from all you are," the lead character sings. John, an African American sergeant, sings of the many children sired by American GIs and left in Vietnam: "They're called Buiddoi, the dust of life, conceived in hell and born in strife." The plight of those Vietnamese allied with the United States is conveyed by those who call out as helicopters lift others from the roof of the embassy: "They'll kill who they find here; don't leave us behind here."

A more recent musical dealing with the Vietnam War is *One Red Flower* (originally called *Letters from 'Nam*) by Paris Barclay. Words from letters and poems written by soldiers in Vietnam are sung by seven actors to '60s rock and roll. It enjoyed a run at the Signature Theatre in Arlington, Virginia, a mile from the Vietnam War Memorial on the Washington Mall, in 2004.

Some musicals continue to be written with America's military conflicts woven into the plot line, but harsh criticism of America's wars rarely make it to the Broadway theaters. American producers may be uncomfortable with such direct assaults. American audiences more clearly are, voting against the majority of them with their wallets.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Music and War; Theater and War; World War I; World War II; Vietnam War

—*Adam Karsten*

My Lai Massacre

The slaughter of more than 500 Vietnamese civilians by soldiers of C Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry on March 16, 1968, was one of the worst atrocities of the Vietnam War. The incident gave rise to controversial and highly publicized legal proceedings. Although a court-martial found 1st Lt. William L. Calley, Jr. guilty of 22 premeditated murders for his role in what happened in the village of My Lai, Calley served less than five months in prison. The reason: the politicization of the case by Pres. Richard Nixon and thousands of others on both sides of the national debate over Vietnam.

The hamlet of My Lai was not the objective of the search-and-destroy mission in which Charlie Company was participating on March 16. Their mission was to destroy the Viet Cong's 48th Local Force Battalion, believed to be holed up in My Khe, a coastal village east of My La. Charlie Company and its sister unit, Bravo Company, were supposed to push eastward toward My Khe, acting as the hammer that would crush the 48th Battalion against an anvil created by another sister unit, Alpha Company, by Navy "swift boats," and by an aero scout company. Charlie Company had been told to expect fierce opposition. Seeking to steel his men for what was to come, on the eve of the operation the company commander, Capt. Ernest Medina, gave them an impassioned pep talk following a memorial service for one of their fallen comrades. Some of his men thought Medina told them during these remarks to kill every living thing in the village. Others remembered it differently. Whatever the case, most of the men of Charlie Company, overcome by the loss of buddies to a hidden enemy who killed with mines and sniper fire, were primed to kill.

When their helicopters landed in My Lai on March 16, the men encountered something very different from the potent Viet Cong unit they had expected. The enemy they sought had withdrawn to the mountains far to the west, leaving behind a civilian population the soldiers had been told would be gone to market. Charlie Company found mostly women, children, and old men. Nevertheless, pumped-up soldiers with confused orders about precisely what they were supposed to do began blazing away. An erroneous report from a pilot that the men on the ground were taking small-arms fire added to the confusion, as did the dense vegetation that divided the physical environment into small compartments, making it impossible to see what was happening only a few yards away. Discipline disintegrated. Out-of-control soldiers polluted every well in the hamlet, slaughtered all the livestock, and sexually assaulted countless women. They also murdered more than 500 Vietnamese civilians.

Lieutenant Calley, the commander of Charlie Company's First Platoon, played a leading role in this carnage. Apparently, he ordered P.F.C. Paul Meadlo to kill a group of Vietnamese civilians whom Meadlo and another soldier had collected near a trail junction. Later, according to a number of witnesses, Calley joined Meadlo, Sgt. David Mitchell, and P.F.C. Joseph Dursi in pushing scores of unresisting civilians into a ditch, where they slaughtered them. Calley was also convicted of killing an elderly Buddhist monk he was trying to interrogate, after first hitting him in the face with the butt of his rifle; the lieutenant also shot a baby.

Much of what Calley and other members of Charlie Company did was reported almost immediately by a helicopter pilot, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson. Thompson witnessed it from the air, rescued some potential victims, and apparently confronted Calley at the scene. Other members of the aero scout company also complained about what had gone on at My Lai, and one soldier threatened to inform his congressman. Nevertheless, for over a year the massacre remained a secret outside the larger organizations of which Charlie Company was a part: Task Force Barker, the 11th Brigade, and the Americal Division. Senior officers of these units had engaged in asystematic cover-up. The Peers Commission, which investigated the massacre for the Army, reported later: "Within the Americal Division, at every command level from company to division, actions were taken or omitted which together effectively concealed from higher headquarters the events which had transpired."

Ron Ridenhour wrecked this cover-up. Ridenhour, who had trained with some members of Charlie Company in Hawaii, learned about the massacre from one of them, Charles "Butch" Gruver. Horrified by what Gruver told him, Ridenhour set out to learn more about what had happened at My Lai by questioning other soldiers who had been there.

After his return to the United States, Ridenhour wrote a long letter to his congressman, Morris Udall, sending copies to other members of Congress, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretaries of the Army, Defense, and State. Responding to inquiries from Udall, the military launched an investigation. The decorated infantryman who conducted it, Col. William Wilson of the Inspector General's office, interviewed 36 witnesses with involvement in the massacre and the cover-up. What he found led Wilson to turn the My Lai matter over to the Criminal Investigation Division. CID Agent Andre C. R. Fehr developed sufficient evidence to persuade the Army to freeze Calley on active duty and charge him with murdering at least 107 people.

After an Article 32 investigation recommended a court-martial, the former platoon leader stood trial on those charges at Fort Benning, Georgia, in late 1970 and early 1971. The court-martial, which consisted of six combat veterans, five of whom had seen action in Vietnam, convicted Calley of killing at least 21 Vietnamese. Almost certainly he had killed far more; determining the precise number was difficult, however, for the Vietnamese had long since buried their dead. To identify victims, the court had to rely on pictures of bodies taken by a combat photographer.

Although almost certainly guilty of more than 20 murders, Lieutenant Calley spent less than five months in the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth. He had been sentenced to life. While Calley appealed his sentence, however, he remained under house arrest in his apartment at the Fort Benning Bachelor Officers' Quarters, a privilege accorded him by Pres. Richard Nixon. Calley's sentence was reduced to 20 years by the commanding general of the 3rd Army. Although the Court of Military Review and the U.S. Court of Military Appeals sustained that sentence, Sec. of the Army Howard "Bo" Callaway reduced it by half. Calley had barely begun serving this sentence when a Georgia federal district judge, J. Robert Elliot, overturned the conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed Elliot's decision, but with little effect. By the time that court had ruled, Calley was already eligible for parole, and Callaway ordered his release.

Although convicted of mass murder, Calley spent less time in jail than many people convicted of misdemeanors because his case had become a political cause célèbre. Calley was widely viewed as a martyr, in great part because no one else involved in the My Lai affair received any actual punishment. By the time the massacre came to light, several participants were dead. Others could not be prosecuted because they had completed their Army service—military courts no longer had jurisdiction over them. As Congress had never passed legislation giving civilian courts authority to try crimes committed by former members of the armed forces while they were in service, they were untouchable. Of those who remained on active duty, only Captain Medina, Sergeant Mitchell, Sgt. Charles Hutto, and Capt. Eugene Kotouc stood trial for crimes committed at My Lai. Prosecutors were unable to present strong cases against them, sometimes because Congress had tainted potential witnesses by calling them to testify in hearings on the massacre. Also, jurors sympathized with the accused. In the Medina trial, the prosecution bore the additional burden of a dubious judicial instruction, which required it to convince jurors that the captain "knew" (rather than only "should have known") about the atrocities the men of Charlie Company were committing. Courts-martial acquitted all of the other participants in the massacre who were brought to trial. The only cover-up participant who was ever tried was the 11th Brigade's commanding officer, Col. Oran Henderson, and that case too ended in acquittal. Apart from Calley, only the two top officers of the Americal Division received sanctions, and their penalties consisted of letters of reprimand, loss of medals, and (in one case) a demotion.

That only a lowly lieutenant suffered real punishment fueled widespread sentiment that he was being made a scapegoat. A solid majority of Americans rallied around Calley. Capitol Hill found itself awash in pro-Calley correspondence and phone calls, and country and western stations reverberated with the strains of "The Battle Hymn of Lieutenant Calley." When Nixon allowed Calley to remain in his apartment while appealing his sentence, opinion polls showed that 75 to 80 percent of the public supported the president's action. In part this was because Americans viewed war crimes committed by their own soldiers differently than those committed by others. In addition, many Americans thought a "little guy" was being made a fall guy

for the actions of others. Most of all, for both supporters and opponents of the Vietnam War, Calley had become a symbol. "Hawks" thought he was being punished simply for waging a war they supported. "Doves" believed he was being punished for what they considered the inevitable consequences of a mistaken national policy. Only a minority was willing to accept the reality that Lieutenant Calley had been court-martialed for committing a barbaric war crime.

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Related Entries

Uniform Code of Military Justice; Vietnam War

Related Documents

1863 h

—*Michal Belknap*

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
Naked and the Dead, The

Novel by Norman Mailer, 1948

The Naked and the Dead was the first major novel to emerge from World War II and was an immediate critical and financial success. Largely well reviewed in the national press, Norman Mailer's debut novel sold more than 200,000 copies in its first year and spent 63 weeks on the *New York Times* bestseller list, including 11 weeks at the top. Some reviewers, however, found its violence too graphic and its depictions of ordinary soldiers depraved and unrealistic. Many found it obscene. Although Mailer substituted the word *fug* for the more vivid *fuck* to make *The Naked and the Dead* more acceptable to a wider range of readers, the presence of even this variant in a book published in 1948 merely added to its notoriety.

The novel depicts the invasion of a fictional Pacific island, Anopopei, by a regiment of a fictional infantry division. Its commander, Major General Cummings, is a controlling, calculating man who has conceived his campaign as a slow, methodical advance against a dug-in Japanese force. His aide, Lieutenant Hearn, is a somewhat idealistic Harvard graduate and former labor organizer who becomes a sounding board for Cummings's ideas on power, leadership, politics, and the human condition. Officers, he contends, must take privileges beyond those afforded enlisted men to ensure that the soldiers will fear them and thus fight more effectively. Hearn disagrees, but soon finds that the general has made him into his own best example of the effects of that kind of leadership. A parallel plot shows the members of an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon serving on various details including a brief, harrowing stint in combat. The men are a representative cross section of soldiers, among them Southerners, Jews, a Catholic, and a Hispanic, led by an extremely competent but psychopathic killer, Sergeant Croft.

The two plots combine when Cummings relieves Hearn and assigns him to lead the platoon on a patrol around the unoccupied side of the island to gather intelligence to help revive his stalled offensive. This patrol brings out each character's limitations and capabilities as a soldier; a number are killed or wounded. Some of those who survive carry a wounded private, Wilson, to the landing beach, and the latter half of the novel alternately depicts their struggles and those of the patrol. Resentful of Hearn's taking command of his unit, Croft engineers the lieutenant's death, enabling Croft to lead the men up a mountain about which he has become obsessed but which is tangential to the platoon's mission. The patrol ends in failure, the men routed near the mountaintop by a sudden swarm of bees. Meanwhile, in Cummings's absence, Japanese resistance mysteriously collapses, and the campaign ends successfully. Neither Cummings's plans nor the reconnaissance have anything to do with the victory.

Brooklyn-born Mailer graduated from Harvard, where he majored in aeronautical engineering, in June 1943, and was drafted in March 1944. Trained as an artillery surveyor at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, he was assigned to the 112th Cavalry, a unit sent to the Philippines in 1945. There he participated in the campaigns on Leyte and Luzon, serving in several capacities, including a series of lengthy intelligence and reconnaissance patrols. This assignment became the basis for much of the novel's action, with both the mountain and the bee swarm incidents having actually occurred. The men in the platoon are drawn from soldiers Mailer met in basic training. The novel takes its title from an earlier Mailer

play, based on his very brief stint as an orderly at Mattapan State Hospital, a psychiatric hospital in Massachusetts. Drawing heavily on the example set by John Dos Passos in his *U.S.A.* trilogy (1930–36), the novel includes "Time Machine" passages that present vignettes of the men's lives before the war.

After the novel's success, Mailer formed a production company with the actor Burt Lancaster to produce a film version. Negotiations with the Army over equipment use caused this project to fail. The producer and agent Paul Gregory acquired the rights from Mailer, intending his client Charles Laughton to direct it, but Raoul Walsh was selected instead. Starring Raymond Massey as Cummings, Aldo Ray as Croft, and Cliff Robertson as Hearn, the film was shot in Panama and released by RKO Pictures in 1958. The film significantly modifies the story, including having Croft killed and Hearn the wounded man brought back. This allows him to give a speech to Cummings in the film's finale, utterly rejecting his mechanistic view of mankind. The film also features the actor Joey Bishop in one of his earliest film roles, and the stripper Lily St. Cyr appears early in the film as Wilson's girlfriend. The film was not a commercial success.

The Naked and the Dead almost immediately put Mailer in the front rank of American novelists. The writer John Steinbeck contended that the novel demythologized the war. Cummings's ideas on leadership reflect a type of fascism, a Nietzschean vision of power over individuals and societies, to which Hearn is opposed. He sees individuals as having authority over themselves, and the submission of a soldier to the authority of the Army as temporarily necessary to prosecute the war. The men thus represent two conflicting views of postwar American society, and it is significant that Hearn is the less studied and articulate of the two. Fighting the war, Mailer seems to say, creates the conditions under which fascism might well flourish in the United States. Against this larger struggle, the individual actions of the soldiers lack meaning. The novel stands as the first fictional questioning of the purpose of the war and what the effects of winning it might have on American society, which was, at the time the novel appeared, already becoming embroiled in the Cold War. For many, Mailer's novel remains the standard by which all other war novels are judged.

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Related Entries

Film and War; Literature and War

—Michael Burke

National Guard

The National Guard is a unique American military institution, with foundations in the colonial state militias of early America and the uniformed militia that appeared during the 30 years before the Civil War. By the early 20th century, the National Guard had won limited federal aid and recognition as the Army's volunteer reserve. Thereafter, state soldiers provided a reserve force to the Army, and eventually the Air Force, in times of war and national emergency. At the same time, guardsmen served their home states when needed in natural disasters and civil disorders. The modern Guard represents one half of America's long-standing dual-army tradition: like the militiamen who preceded them, guardsmen simultaneously served their states and fought alongside the regular Army as citizen–soldiers in the nation's wars.

The Compulsory and Volunteer Militias

Twelve of the original 13 colonies (Pennsylvania was the exception) required militia service from able-bodied white

men. Militiamen were required to arm and equip themselves, and to appear regularly at training drills. From the local militia's origins in the early 17th century to its demise 200 years later, townships and counties trained and supervised the compulsory militia. Although valuable in defending communities from attack by Native Americans, the compulsory militia was ineffective in offensive military operations.

Colonial and state militia systems, which reserved the right to set their own criteria for enlistments and selecting officers, also functioned as mobilization systems to organize volunteers for prolonged campaigns with British regulars, the Continental Army during the Revolution, and the U.S. Army after 1783. The ideals of the colonial militia were incorporated in the Constitution, notably by leaving control of the militia firmly in the hands of the states. The compulsory militia declined rapidly after 1787, as states found it increasingly difficult to enforce militia training or compel troops to turn out in times of emergency, while the regular Army assumed the militia role of frontier Indian service and the major role of defending the nation.

However, another element of the militia, volunteer companies, expanded after 1820 and gave new life to state military systems. Often referred to as the uniformed militia, the volunteers provided an outlet for men with an avocational interest in military matters. The companies also served as fraternal, political, and social organizations for a growing middle class in antebellum America. Although sanctioned by state militia authorities, the uniformed militia companies were largely self-regulating, electing their own officers, writing company regulations, selecting their own uniforms, and recruiting new men according to their own standards. Clothed in elaborate, gaudy uniforms and dedicated to intricate close-order drills, the volunteers traveled from city to city visiting other units for drill competitions and socializing. The military value of these volunteers was questionable, but the uniformed companies kept alive the idea of a state citizen–soldier militia that was so important to those who wrote the Constitution. Moreover, the companies were deeply entrenched in their local communities—they were the only soldiers most Americans ever saw.

The Civil War and the Rise of the National Guard

An undetermined number of volunteer uniformed militia helped to form the first regiments when North and South went to war in 1861. The efforts of these few thousand were quickly overshadowed by the mass armies that followed. However, state militias played a vital role by raising the volunteer regiments that formed the Union and Confederate armies. Americans had always preferred that their soldiers be volunteers, as seen in the stiff resistance to the Union draft in particular. The state effort in raising volunteer regiments was a continuation of an old militia practice and may be seen as the epitome of the American faith in the locally recruited volunteer citizen–soldier, expected to return to civil life in his own community once war was over.

The manpower demands of the Civil War shattered the state militia systems. After the war, volunteer companies reappeared, but many faced financial insolvency as few states continued to support their militias. Then, in 1877, a great railroad strike swept across the country. Existing state military forces failed to quell the disorder, while other states had no militia to call out, forcing some governors to ask the federal government for regular troops. In the aftermath of the strike, many states, led by New York and Pennsylvania, reorganized their militias and provided financial aid to support local volunteer companies. Nearly everywhere, the states called their refurbished volunteer militia the National Guard, a force that by the late 1890s stood at 100,000 men.

State military reform in the 1870s and 1880s gave National Guard volunteers a stability the compulsory and uniformed militia never knew. Financial support for armories, equipment, and summer camps ensured the Guard some military efficiency. State laws required annual company inspections, set new standards for commissioning officers, and organized regiments to control the previously independent local companies. Nonetheless, the National Guard of the late 19th century resembled the antebellum volunteers in several ways. Guard companies continued to elect their own officers, and they retained strong social affiliations with their local communities, sponsoring dances, plays, banquets, and drill competitions to raise funds. Guardsmen served voluntarily and without compensation, yet were liable to a state call for riot duty. As state funding fell well short of the money

needed to maintain units, states found it difficult to impose strict regulations on their soldiers as long as guardsmen bore much of the burden of supporting their organizations.

In 1879, Guard officers met in St. Louis to organize the National Guard Association (NGA). The NGA began a decades-long effort to win both federal financial support and legal recognition as the first reserve of a wartime volunteer army. Guardsmen sought the reserve role partly to offset their role as an industrial constabulary; states frequently called out their troops during the turbulent years of the late 1800s. Strike duty invariably eroded the Guard's self-image as servants of the people and hampered recruitment as well. Recognition as a national reserve force would give the Guard a dignity often lost when policing picket lines. To gain federal support, the Guard stressed the role state volunteers had long played in fighting the nation's wars, noting in particular the valorous service state volunteers gave in the Civil War. But efforts to win federal aid and a legal reserve role failed. Congressmen saw no reason to spend money on the Guard in an era of peace, while Army officers questioned the military value of state soldiers.

War with Spain in 1898 gave the National Guard the opportunity to prove that it was an effective ready reserve. Although guardsmen volunteered by the thousands—indeed, the Army had more volunteers than it needed—state units were usually badly trained, ill-equipped, and led by poorly prepared officers. The War Department was unprepared for war as well. Confusion and chaos ruled during the 1898 mobilization, with the Army supply system breaking down while ill-trained state volunteers poured into the mobilization camps. Camp diseases killed thousands of guardsmen with only a few seeing combat because the war was so short. State soldiers sent to the Philippine Islands performed well, but they had several months of Army training and occupation duty before combat began in 1899. Few could question the National Guard's commitment to the volunteer heritage, but the 1898 experience made clear that state soldiers fell well short of being a genuine combat-ready reserve.

Federalization of the National Guard

The 1898 war marked the last time the United States relied on state-recruited volunteers to man its wartime armies. In 1903, Congress reorganized the Army, created a general staff system, and replaced the 1792 Militia Act with a law granting federal aid to the National Guard and authorizing the War Department to oversee Guard organization. The new law began a 20th-century trend wherein Congress increased aid to the state soldiers while expanding the Army's authority over them. Between 1901 and the mid-1930s, annual federal aid grew from $1 million to $32 million. At the same time, the War Department imposed Army inspections, training requirements, and officer examinations. It told the states what units to organize and disbanded local units that failed federal inspections.

Expanding federal control precipitated bitter confrontations between Army officers and National Guard leaders, an on-again, off-again conflict that has endured to the present. (In 1916, 1920, and in the mid-1940s, the War Department attempted to eliminate the Guard as a federal reserve.) Guardsmen wanted federal money and a legal role as the Army's reserve but resented what they saw as federal intrusion into state military matters. Although federalization altered permanently the state volunteer's place in American military policy, the National Guard retained a state status in peacetime. The Guard continued to recruit young men to its local units and kept much of its old social-fraternal-athletic character. Strike duty, especially in the years 1900 to 1920, remained the Guard's major active duty service to the states. As the Army did not expect the Guard to be a combat-ready reserve, weekly drills and summer camps were not very demanding, and in many respects the Guard continued to govern its daily affairs.

Guardsmen confronted the reality of what it meant to accept federal drill pay when ordered to federal service in 1916, 1917, and 1940. Few guardsmen understood that enlistment meant they were obliged to report for duty when called by the president. The 1916 mobilization, which sent the Guard to patrol the Mexican border, first demonstrated the Army's authority over the Guard. Guardsmen learned during the mobilizations that, when in federal service, the Army could reorganize the Guard as needed, discharge unfit officers, and send state soldiers overseas.

During the world wars, conscription replaced the state volunteer system as the chief source of wartime manpower.

The 71st Regiment of the New York National Guard departing for duty along the Texas–Mexico border in 1916. (© CORBIS)

The National Guard nonetheless made major contributions: Guard units provided 40 percent of the infantry divisions during World War I. The entire Guard mobilized for World War II. Soldiers of Wisconsin and Michigan's 32nd Division fought early battles in New Guinea, Texans in the 36th Division battled their way up the Italian peninsula, and Virginia's 29th Division went ashore on Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944. Although the National Guard retained its traditional right to fight, and the federal government spent billions on the state forces after 1945, the Guard's contribution to the nation's war armies declined steadily throughout the 20th century as the nation turned to the draft. Consequently, the largest number of guardsmen serving in a national conflict after 1898 did so in World War I (400,000.) Just 300,000 guardsmen (100 percent of the force) were called for World War II and the numbers declined steadily thereafter

The Cold War and Vietnam

During the Cold War, the United States altered its traditional military policies, centralizing military command systems, expanding the regular forces, establishing a peacetime draft, and vastly increasing defense spending. The National Guard barely survived these revolutionary changes. The newly established Department of Defense (DoD) attempted but failed to eliminate the National Guard. The Guard's role was actually expanded, with the creation of an Air National Guard (ANG, as contrasted with the ARNG, the Army Guard) as a reserve for the newly created U.S. Air Force. However, the Guard surrendered much of the independence it had enjoyed in the interwar years. By the mid-1950s, the federal government provided state soldiers 70 percent of their support, by the mid-1990s, 95 percent, which allowed DoD to control nearly all the Guard's actions.

During the Cold War years, the DoD frequently altered reserve component policy, notably in the mid-1960s when it reduced the ARNG by eliminating 19 combat divisions and nearly 20,000 guardsmen. The Guard recouped its lost personnel during the Vietnam War, but the end of the war brought sharp reductions in defense spending and another round of cuts in the ARNG. The Army Guard reached its lowest strength since 1950 when it fell to under 350,000 in 1979. When defense spending soared in the 1980s, the ARNG climbed to a historical high of 456,960 in 1989. Smaller than the Army Guard, the ANG experienced steady growth from the late 1940s, reaching an average strength of 116,000 in the late 1980s.

Service in the post-1945 National Guard required more time, training, and education than previously. Advances in military technology and doctrine made the weekly two-hour armory drills insufficient to prepare soldiers and airmen for war. The ANG established new patterns for training in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in large part because of the technological complexity of the Air Force. Air guardsmen shifted to monthly weekend drills and employed guardsmen as civil service technicians to maintain aircraft. Beginning in 1953, ANG flight crews volunteered to serve in a runway alert program with aircraft ready to fly 24 hours a day. For decades, ANG pilots and crews voluntarily provided the Air Force with cargo transport and refueling globally. The ANG's close cooperation with the Air Force and the level of its peacetime activities required more full-time technicians. In the mid-1960s, 22 percent of the ANG were technicians and full-time manning approached one-third by the early 1990s.

Until the mid-1970s, the ARNG served as a mobilization force, not a ready reserve. Consequently, it relied on fewer technicians (only 3 percent in 1961) and confined its training efforts to the United States. A small number of ARNG soldiers manned antiaircraft missile sites full-time for 20 years from the early 1950s. Too often in the 1950s and 1960s, guardsmen found themselves back in the streets policing their fellow citizens rather than training for war. From the federalization of the Arkansas National Guard during the Little Rock school integration crisis in 1957 through the early 1970s, guardsmen assisted state and federal officials in controlling civil disorders stemming from racial conflicts and Vietnam War protests. Some of the 1960s urban riots overwhelmed a force trained and equipped to fight modern war, not to police the citizenry. The inability of the Michigan National Guard to quell the 1967 Detroit riot led Gov. George Romney to request the aid of federal troops.

By the late 1960s, the DoD had made riot control a part of the Guard's annual training. The war protests also presented the Guard with an ethical conundrum. Although Guard leaders pushed for a mobilization, Pres. Lyndon Johnson feared that activation would generate protests and called only a few state soldiers during the war. In effect, the Guard appeared to be a draft haven for men who did not want to go to war. Guardsmen were then called out to police people their own age who were opposed to the war and the draft. The Guard's nadir came in May 1970, when Ohio guardsmen killed 4 students and wounded nine during a war protest at Kent State University. Two decades passed before the National Guard overcame its image as a home for draft evaders. Despite protests from the state soldiers, only 50 percent of the Guard (183,000, ARNG and ANG) served in the Korean War, a mere 5 percent during Vietnam (24,309), few of whom went to Southeast Asia, and only 13 percent (74,811) in the 1991 Gulf War. In the Gulf War, most ARNG and ANG units mobilized were support and service units.

The Contemporary Guard

ARNG service came to mirror that of the ANG when the DoD adopted the Total Force policy in the face of sharp budget cuts following the end of the Vietnam War. Total Force allowed the Army and Air Force to maintain large combat units with reserve components to provide support services when war came. However, the National Guard had always prided itself as a combat service and successfully lobbied to retain some combat units. Under Total Force, the ARNG adopted training and planning systems similar to the ANG. ARNG took on more full-time technicians, shifted to weekend drills, and began participating in training exercises outside the United States. By the 1980s, service in the ARNG was more professional, time-consuming, and federally oriented than a guardsman of the 1890s could have imagined.

Victory in the Gulf War coincided with an ongoing reassessment of American defense policy, prompted by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War led to budget cuts, a redefinition of national strategy, and changes in the size and function of the armed forces. The new policies, coupled with how the regular services used reserve components in the Gulf War, profoundly affected the National Guard. Between 1991 and 2004, the ARNG lost nearly 100,000 soldiers (22 percent) while the ANG dropped 11 percent, from 117,786 to 107,000. Most of the ARNG losses came when the Army cut Guard combat units, a legacy of the Gulf War when the regular service mobilized only a few ARNG ground-combat maneuver units. ANG losses mirrored those of the ARNG, as the Air Force also called up far more support than combat organizations from the state fliers. Moreover, the Army won congressional authority to take greater control of ARNG training and peacetime administrative operations to improve the Guard readiness. The budget cuts and unit reorganizations led to the most strained Guard–Army relations since the late 1940s.

At the same time, Guard service became more demanding. The Army increased training demands, more and more guardsmen were deployed outside the United States for annual training, and from the mid-1990s onward, guardsmen took on overseas peacekeeping duties in relief of regular units. In 1994, for example, a composite ARNG battalion served a six-month tour in the Sinai Desert while other Guard units went to Haiti in 1995. In the late 1990s, ARNG combat organizations performed peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, prompted the largest National Guard mobilization since World War II. In the weeks following September 11, nearly half the Guard reported for homeland defense. ARNG and ANG members in varying numbers continued meeting homeland defense needs long after the attacks. Combat operations in Afghanistan in late 2001, followed by an all-out invasion of Iraq in early 2003, placed more demands on the Guard. Initially, ARNG and ANG forces provided combat support for the regular services, especially in Iraq, but as the conflicts persisted, the DoD made plans to send ARNG combat units to Afghanistan and Iraq to relieve Army forces, an unprecedented wartime assignment for the National Guard.

Post–September 11 activations seriously stressed the ARNG, particularly because certain unit types, including military police, engineers, and transportation, were frequently activated. While the Guard assumed expanded homeland defense duties and ongoing support of overseas regular forces, it operated on peacetime budgets and strengths. This necessitated the transfer of men and equipment from inactive units to activated organizations, leaving the inactivated units well below readiness levels.

Persistence has been the National Guard's most significant achievement. Although warfare changed dramatically and the place of the United States in world affairs altered even more profoundly, the Guard endured. For decades, it has adapted to major military changes without losing its close connections with local communities. A DoD study noted that the nation's reserve components "serve as one of the military's most visible institutional links to the rest of American society" (Dept. of Defense, 13), an argument National Guard advocates have made for more than a century.

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Civil War; Cold War; Colonial Militia Systems; Conscription and Volunteerism; Iraq War; Peacekeeping Operations; Persian Gulf War; Spanish–American War; Vietnam War; War on Terrorism; World War I; World War II

Related Documents

1774; 1797

—Jerry Cooper

National Security Council Memorandum-68

National Security Council Memorandum-68 (NSC-68) was the preeminent policy document shaping U.S. strategic thinking during the early years of the Cold War. Its interpretation of the Soviet Union as an expanding, aggressive, and duplicitous power whose influence had to be checked across the globe is a hallmark of the era.

After World War II, the United States, although at peace, faced an increasingly hostile environment with its wartime ally the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's Red Army, maintained at great strength, began occupying the country's war-exhausted neighbors—beginning with Poland in 1945. As the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons, the possibility of potential conflict with that country raised serious political, scientific, and moral questions among U.S. policy makers.

The Soviet Union maintained its military strength after the war; the United States, however, took a more measured approach. Pres. Harry S. Truman, fearing the economic effects of massive rearmament in peacetime, capped the defense budget at $12 billion in 1948. To review options in this tense period, Sec. of State George C. Marshall created the Policy Planning Staff in 1947 to formulate proposals and write papers on long-term foreign policy concerns and goals.

George F. Kennan, veteran diplomat and expert on Russia, became the initial director of the staff. His "long telegram" to the State Department (1946) and his anonymous article in *Foreign Affairs* (1947), known as the "X" article, had established the idea of containing Soviet influence and maintaining the balance of power in Europe and East Asia; such containment, Kennan believed, would guarantee U.S. national security. The chief means of containment would be diplomatic, economic, and psychological, best embodied in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Containment was predicated on the assumption that the Soviets were too weak and too cautious to risk open war.

The communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and communist victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949 challenged Kennan's belief. After the Soviets exploded their first atomic device in autumn 1949, Truman authorized the development of a hydrogen weapon and ordered a reassessment of U.S. foreign and defense policy. Kennan, increasingly at odds with the State Department, left in 1950. His deputy, Paul Nitze, then led the policy analysis. The result was National Security Council Memorandum-68: "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," better known as NSC-68.

NSC-68 included Kennan's idea of "containing" Soviet action to protect U.S. national security. This would include political and economic support for allies (mostly through the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine) threatened by Soviet-backed insurgencies. But NSC-68 also recommended a greater emphasis on military means of containment, such as alliances and increased spending to maintain

large peacetime conventional and nuclear forces. It viewed the Soviets' foreign policy as a reflection of their despotic nature: expansionist, domineering, global in scope, and antithetical to U.S. security.

NSC-68 differed from Kennan's idea of containment, however, by emphasizing the need for massive military resources to contain Soviet action and deter future Soviet adventures. The threat of force, according to the policy makers, was required to convince the Soviets of American resolve. The mere appearance of weakness might increase the risk of war. NSC-68 placed high value on "perception" of strengths and weakness in determining Soviet action—a significant policy departure from the concept of containment.

NSC-68 also argued that Soviet influence needed to be contained in "peripheral" areas as well as Europe and Japan. In short, the United States had to view its security in global terms. "Any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin," the document stated, "would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled." NSC-68 did call for driving wedges between communist movements in various nations and Moscow, though it felt most (excluding Yugoslavia) were instruments of Soviet influence.

Although NSC-68 acknowledged that compromising American liberal democratic values in pursuit of security could be dangerous, the document countered that in a fight for survival against the Soviets such a step might be necessary. The United States, it insisted, should respond to the Soviet development of atomic capabilities by increasing its nuclear arsenal, including hydrogen weapons. This buildup would deter Moscow from considering a first strike because the Soviet Union would not survive a retaliatory strike. NSC-68 also argued that increasing the defense budget need not cripple the U.S. economy. Even so, Sec. of State Dean Acheson asked that the $40 billion price tag attached to the programs NSC-68 proposed be removed from the document before it was shown to Truman.

The document was completed on April 14, 1950, on the eve of North Korea's invasion of South Korea, and its timing could not have been better. President Truman, a fiscal conservative, initially dismissed the document as hyperbole, but the North Korean attack in June 1950 changed his mind. Truman, like many others, felt Stalin was behind this assault on the American security periphery. NSC-68 was validated by the conflict and became de facto U.S. security policy during the autumn of 1950, ushering in, for the first time in American history, an era of massive peacetime rearmament.

Critics have deplored NSC-68's use of exaggerated rhetoric and internal contradictions since its publication in 1975. The need to react to perceived Soviet global influence gave Soviet leaders, unbeknownst to them, an inordinate amount of potential influence over U.S. actions. For some, NSC-68 remains the most militant symbol of American overreaction to Soviet intention and is responsible for U.S. involvement in the peripherally strategic area of Vietnam as well as for the global arms race.

NSC-68's cultural impact may be most prevalent in popularized visions of a military–industrial complex: government and arms industries inflating the Soviet threat to justify increased defense budgets and ever-increasing purchases of military hardware that could not be used in battle. Others see NSC-68 as a bold attempt to clarify and organize U.S. security interests during a period of uncertainty. It reflects how Washington viewed itself after the United States had assumed a position of global importance. This self-perception clashed with the growing antiwar movement of the 1960s. It divided popular opinion on America's role in the Cold War between "hawks" seeking to maximize America's security interests against a dangerous adversary, and "doves" who feared such actions circumvented the cause of peace in the thermonuclear age by increasing the risk of war.

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Cold War; Korean War; Military–Industrial Complex; Nitze, Paul
Henry; Truman, Harry S.

—Jason S. Ridler

National Space Program

The U.S. national space program began as a military pro-
gram. In 1958, the civilian National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) was created specifically to promote
nonmilitary, peaceful uses of space, and became the lead
agency in the space program. However, the military retained
a significant role in the national space program, and NASA
and the Department of Defense (DoD) continue to work
together in the exploration and use of space.

The military had been involved in modern rocketry
from its earliest days. Military interest and assistance helped
support Robert H. Goddard, an American scientist who built
the first successful liquid-fuel rockets in the 1920s. During
World War II, the most advanced rocket work was being
done by the Germans. In the closing days of the war, the
U.S. military sent special teams into newly captured German
territory to collect items of technical and scientific interest—
not only equipment and information, but also scientists and
engineers. The U.S. military captured roughly 100 partial
and complete examples of the advanced German liquid-
fueled rocket known as the V-2. The military also acquired
the German rocket scientist Wernher von Braun and several
members of his team responsible for the design of the V-2.
In similar fashion, the Soviet Union acquired sample V-2s
and the rest of the development team. The competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union for primacy
in space was thus established.

In the immediate postwar era, rockets remained experi-
mental. As advanced as the V-2 was, its capabilities were still
very limited. Aircraft and artillery were better suited for deliv-
ering weapons, but the military saw the potential of rockets as
weapons. Von Braun and his team agreed to work for the
United States, forming the core of a postwar team of scientists
and engineers attempting to make better rockets. An early
step in this process was gaining a better understanding of
high-altitude environments. Accordingly, when the Army
launched captured and rebuilt V-2s to test their operation and
engineering, it also sent aboard a payload of scientific instru-
ments that would return vital information about the rockets,
their payloads, the atmosphere, the Earth, and the sun, thus
expanding scientists' understanding of astrophysics.

This quest for "dual use" knowledge (useful for practical
military applications as well as fundamental scientific inquiry)
has continued to be a part of the National Space Program and
helps to explain why both NASA and the DoD continue to
play a role in the program. Knowledge of weather is as impor-
tant to the military as it is to civilians. Furthermore, the tech-
nology of weather satellites is not fundamentally different
from that of reconnaissance satellites. Likewise, communica-
tions, navigation, even oceanographic and Earth-resource
satellites have both military and civilian applications.

The military also had much to do with developing the
launch vehicles (rockets) that deliver these satellites into
orbit. When the Soviets announced their plan to orbit a
satellite (using a modified ballistic missile) as part of the sci-
entific International Geophysical Year of 1957–58, America
followed suit. Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted to mini-
mize the sense that the national space program was purely
military and also wanted to avoid slowing the development
of intermediate range ballistic missiles and intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM). Consequently, he chose a Navy
missile developed for research purposes, rather than the
Army's modified ballistic missile, to attempt the first
American satellite launch. The Navy eventually succeeded in
launching the satellite *Vanguard 1*, but early, very public
failures of the rocket, along with Soviet successes with
Sputnik and its successor satellites, led Eisenhower to allow
the Army to compete. The Army's Jupiter missile launched
the first American satellite, *Explorer 1*, in 1958.

NASA continued to find use for military rockets. Throughout the 1960s, modified ICBMs launched satellites and astronauts. Even the upper stage of the Saturn rockets was designed by the DoD's Advanced Research Projects Agency. The "Space Race" between the United States and the Soviet Union was seen by some as a thinly veiled demonstration of ICBM capability. U.S. public reaction to Soviet successes showed that people were at least peripherally aware of the connection between national defense and a successful space program. Even at the beginning of the 21st century, all of NASA's unmanned launchers (the *Atlas*, *Titan*, *Delta*, and *Scout*) had ICBM pedigrees, though the missiles they were based on were no longer in use by the military. In addition, although the space shuttle was designed by NASA, the DoD had considerable influence on its design.

In an effort to further de-emphasize the military portion of the national space program, President Eisenhower succeeded in getting the National Space Act of 1958 passed into law. This act created NASA and established it as the primary agency of the space program. Although the management was civilian, NASA nevertheless continued to depend heavily on the military for knowledge, equipment, people, and other support. The most visible active-duty military personnel were the astronauts, but service personnel also filled management and support positions. In addition, many servicemen and servicewomen resigned from the military so that they could continue working at NASA, adding to the military influence on NASA's organizational culture. NASA tried to hire civilians, but, especially in the early years, the expertise needed by NASA was primarily found in the military. Not until NASA began recruiting astronauts for the space shuttle in 1978 would true civilians (not just ex-military) make up a significant portion of the astronaut corps.

Many of the preparations for the first U.S. manned launches (*Mercury*) were made by the military: once NASA was established, it took over the manned program from the military. In addition to the nearly complete *Mercury* program, the military also turned over planning for *Gemini*, *Mercury*'s successor. However, the military was still interested in manned spaceflight. The Air Force proposed running its own manned spaceflight experiments in a program called "Blue Gemini" that would use NASA equipment and facilities but work entirely under military control. Other Air Force proposals in the 1960s included the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, an early space station, to be serviced by the *X-20* "Dyna-soar," a precursor to the space shuttle that would be launched by a rocket, but return to Earth using the flying abilities of a wingless "lifting body." The research that was to be done through these proposals was either scrapped or included as part of normal NASA missions; only the *X-20* made it as far as the testing stage. Beginning in 1985, the space shuttle was used for several DoD missions reminiscent of the Blue Gemini plans. Public information on these missions is limited to launch and landing info, crew names, and vague statements of mission accomplishments.

Continued military interest in unmanned space missions was highlighted by the Strategic Defense Initiative, the so-called Star Wars program. Initially conceived in the 1980s as a way to defend against or deter a Soviet nuclear attack, the program was revived in the late 1990s as a means to defend against the possibility of a small number of nuclear missiles launched by a "rogue nation." The program explored a variety of methods to detect and destroy incoming missiles using both Earth- and space-based sensors and weapons. Such systems would also be capable of destroying enemy reconnaissance, targeting, and navigational satellites while including countermeasures of their own to make them less susceptible to enemy attack. Although SDI brought new public attention to some military aspects of the National Space Program, the program itself was not new: many of its underlying ideas were first conceived during the 1960s. Likewise, the military has quietly continued to improve its search and reconnaissance satellites, which now collect information across much of the electromagnetic spectrum and are capable of delivering high-quality data in real time. Similar effort has gone into communications and navigation satellites. The global positioning system (GPS) is simply the latest in a long line of navigational aids for the military, though that is often forgotten in the face of the number of GPS units available in the civilian market.

The military's continuing role in the national space program is easy to overlook. Rocket launches, particularly unmanned launches, have become so routine that the media typically ignore them. Furthermore, in promoting the peace-

ful exploration and use of space, NASA plays down its connections with the DoD. Military launches, whether manned or unmanned, often carry secret payloads, and so mission details are also kept secret. With so little public attention, the considerable influence that the military still exercises on the national space program is easy to miss. The provisions of the Space Act of 1958 require NASA to work with the DoD on projects of mutual interest, and sometimes even provide support to military-only projects. This ensures that money is not wasted in duplicate efforts. It also ensures that the military continues to have a place in the national space program.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Satellite Technology

Related Documents

1968 b

—Laurence M. Burke II

National System of Interstate and Defense Highways

The modern American interstate system, so crucial to the development of suburbs and the internal mobility of Americans, had its origins in defense. In 1919, Dwight Eisenhower, then a lieutenant colonel, participated in the Transcontinental Motor Convoy, designed to test how readily the Army could move military resources overland from one coast to another. The convoy took 62 days to travel 3,251 miles from Washington, D.C., to San Francisco. Covering fewer than 60 miles per day, they arrived at their destination five days behind schedule. The convoy spent half its time on unpaved roads and experienced more than 230 accidents, most caused by poor roads or bridges that could not withstand the strain of the heavy Army vehicles.

To a logistically minded officer like Eisenhower, the convoy was a clear warning that the nation's road network was a logistical nightmare and vulnerable to sabotage. If agents of a foreign power managed to infiltrate the United States, they could virtually disable the nation's overland transportation network by demolishing a relatively small

number of essential bridges and tunnels. Indeed, the designers of the convoy experiment had imagined just such a case and assumed that in wartime the trip would have taken even longer. Eisenhower later wrote that the Transcontinental Motor Convoy started him thinking about the creation of a much less fragile national network of two-lane highways to facilitate the movement of men and matériel.

Highway System Initiatives before World War II
Road construction was an important part of the New Deal public works program following the Depression. In 1938, the administration of Pres. Franklin Roosevelt began studies on the feasibility of building a six-route national toll road system. This system was later rejected out of fears that the tolls collected could not support the costs of building and maintaining the roads. The same study also envisioned a complementary system of 26,000 miles of non-toll highways with two lanes in each direction and a limited access design to reduce congestion. Three years later, Thomas MacDonald and the Interregional Highway Committee laid out a map for a system of national roads that later became the basis for the interstate highways. However, the economic crisis of the Depression, followed by the need to devote money to rearmament, combined to force the government to shelve the program.

By 1944 the idea of a national highway system had been revived, partly because the war had shown the difficulty that Eisenhower had foreseen of moving equipment and men over the nation's wholly inadequate highway system. By the end of the war, government planners had envisioned a 40,000-mile network and began work on the system in 1947. Congress, while acknowledging the value of such a system, provided little funding for it. A second attempt in 1952 provided $25 million in matching funds to states that wished to participate. The demand from the states was overwhelming, and federal funding projections had to be dramatically increased to $955 million within just a few months.

Eisenhower and the National Highway System
Dwight Eisenhower's election to the presidency led to two dramatic changes to the system. First, Eisenhower, recalling his 1919 Transcontinental Motor Convoy experience, saw the interstate system as crucial to national defense. Therefore, he vastly increased federal funding in both absolute and relative terms. Under the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, the federal government assumed 90 percent of the costs of building the new network of highways. With that money came federal control over routes and designs, which became standardized along the limited-access pattern.

Second, Eisenhower changed his mind about creating a system of two-lane highways. His World War II experiences led him to admire the German Autobahn, which had been built in the 1930s. That system of four-lane highways allowed the German Army to move men and supplies quickly across the interior of Germany. The 1956 legislation envisioned a system of multilane highways, requiring road design standards to be based on projections of traffic levels for 1975. Legislation in 1966 required all interstate highways built thereafter to have at least four lanes.

Eisenhower faced pressure from members of Congress who argued that the system was getting too expensive and threatened to disrupt the balanced budget that many members of Eisenhower's administration favored. Eisenhower thus tied the interstate project's costs to projected revenues from federal gasoline taxes. Set at two cents per gallon, the tax provided $575 million per year for road construction and maintenance. Linking the interstate system to national defense allowed the government more easily to call for extensive funding for a project whose costs threatened to spiral out of control. Eisenhower created a rhetorical connection by naming the road network "The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways." The government needed the additional money as the network required the construction of 55,000 new bridges. By the 1990s the nation boasted more than 40,000 miles of highway that carried 20 percent of all American road traffic. Eisenhower's 1919 cross-country trip that took 62 days before the interstate system can now be covered in about 40 hours. In 1990, the Bush administration changed the name of the system to reflect the accomplishments of the man recognized as its most important creator. The new name, "The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways," also maintains a link to the military heritage of the system.

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Related Entries

Army Industrial College; Cold War; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Homeland Security; Military–Industrial Complex

—*Michael S. Neiberg*

National War College

The National War College is one of six schools that sit near the top of the American military's program of professional military education. In addition to the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps all run their own separate war colleges. The National War College follows a similar curriculum as these service colleges, but it is more formally understood as a school that teaches joint operations, national policy, and military strategy. Based at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., the National War College draws its students from senior members of all branches of the armed services (lieutenant colonels; commanders; colonels/captains) as well as civilians from relevant agencies such as the departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the United States Information Agency. Since 1984, foreign officers from allied nations have also attended the college.

The idea for such a school came during World War II as the problems of directing joint operations became manifest to senior American military leaders. In 1943, Army Air Force Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold oversaw the development of the Army–Navy Staff College. Known as ANSCOL, the school offered a 21-week course to senior leaders of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Students attended classes and exercises at the facilities of each service, underscoring the joint nature of the modern American military. The college's students studied logistics, command, and the direction of operations with other services and nations. ANSCOL's philosophy stemmed from two guiding principles: the need to teach American officers of different services how to work together, and the need to see military operations in as wide a political, economic, and international context as possible.

In June 1945 ANSCOL leaders recommended continuing the joint education approach. The Navy's Pye Board had already advanced the same idea the previous year, and the Army's Gerow panel agreed in 1946. With the approval of all the key players in place, the departments of War, Navy, and State announced the formation of the National War College that year. The initial plan for the college envisioned it serving as a higher college that would build upon and in some ways supercede existing war colleges in place for the Army and Navy. The Army even closed its war college in anticipation of the National War College taking over many of its functions.

The concept of joint service cooperation, in vogue among many political and military officials, dominated the National War College's identity. The Army volunteered space for the new facility, and the Navy provided the first superintendent. The superintendent changed every three years, rotating between the three (and after the creation of the Air Force in 1947, four) services. The State Department also provided a senior administrator, starting with George Kennan. The faculty came from captains and colonels with advanced degrees, as well as some civilian professors. Most of the last were on one-year visiting appointments from their positions in civilian colleges, although the War College later added a permanent civilian component to its faculty.

The National War College's mission statement called on it to "prepare its graduates for joint high-level policy and command and staff responsibilities and for strategic planning duties with the separate services." Students were to be officers who were able enough to be promoted to flag rank. The college's designers hoped that it could thus serve as the primary capstone education for future admirals and generals. The college would ideally have taught these officers to work together, appreciate the problems of other services, and, more recently, to familiarize senior military leaders with the key operating concepts of relevant civilian agencies.

The joint approach to professional education proved unsatisfactory to leaders of all the services, many of whom never supported the concept of the National War College superceding the service war colleges. The Navy maintained its war college at Newport, Rhode Island, to teach service-specific issues. The Army also saw the joint curriculum as too restrictive and reopened its war college in 1950, moving it to permanent quarters at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, the following year. The Air Force also built its own war college at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. The service war colleges soon introduced a tradition of exchanging officers from sister services, echoing the principle of joint operations. As a result of these changes, the National War College no longer stood as an institution above the service war colleges, but as a peer and rough analogue. The Air Force underscored that parity by selecting at random which senior officers would attend its own war college, which would exchange at the Army or Navy war college, and which would attend the National War College.

During the Cold War, the National War College curriculum strove to place military operations within political and economic context. Students of the 10-month program spent six weeks in a course on the free world and associated powers, four weeks on the communist bloc, and three weeks on the uncommitted areas. They also continued ANSCOL's tradition of sending students to the bases of all four services to give officers direct exposure to the methods and mentalities (not to mention paperwork) of other services.

Today, the mission and curriculum of the National War College remains largely unchanged. Its faculty, now 60 percent civilian, offers courses in American politics, area stud-

ies, and broad strategic concepts. Beginning in 1994, graduates of the National War College have earned a master's degree in national security strategy, reflecting the increasing academic rigor of the program. Today the college enrolls 200 students and is part of the National Defense University, which also includes the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Information Resources Management College, the Joint Forces Staff College, and the School for National Security Executive Education.

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Related Entries

Air Force Academy; Army Industrial College; Military Academy, United States; Naval Academy; Naval War College

—*Michael Neiberg*

National War Labor Board

See War Labor Board.

Native Americans in Colonial Wars and the Revolutionary War

European expansion in the North American continent precipitated violent conflict. However, because European empires

NATIVE AMERICANS IN COLONIAL WARS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

in America were weak and Native Americans were organized into relatively small, autonomous political units, wars during the colonial period did not usually erupt along the stereotypical lines of "Indians" against "whites." Instead, conflict on a significant scale usually involved a coalition of Europeans and indigenous peoples against a similar alliance between Europeans and a different group of Native Americans.

Indians formed a significant part of the strategic equation in every conflict fought on land during the colonial period. Given their numbers, their military prowess, and their knowledge of local geography, Native Americans were inevitably cultivated as allies by European nations jockeying for control of North America. Native Americans proved willing for their own reasons. Despite this often-uneasy cooperation, relations between Native Americans and whites did not improve during the colonial and revolutionary eras, because of incompatible goals and different cultural assumptions about war itself.

The 16th and 17th Centuries

Armed conflict was a staple of relations between the newcomers and Native Americans from an early date. The mid-16th-century Spanish expeditions in the Southeast and Southwest, led by Hernando de Soto and Francisco de Coronado, respectively, terrorized the indigenous peoples they encountered, some of whom fought back effectively. Although Native Americans were generally unable to prevent the creation of permanent European settlements, they did pose serious challenges. One of the more serious came in 1622 when, after numerous English insults, the Powhatan Confederacy attacked the Virginia colony, killing about 400 colonists—fully a quarter of the total population. A thorough reorganization and reinforcement of the colony ensued. The former governor, Capt. John Smith, deployed the rhetoric of Indian treachery and savagery in describing the "massacre" at the "bloudy and barbarous hands of that perfidious and inhumane people," whose victory he characterized as "base and brutish." Smith ignored provocations and similar actions by the English. Depictions like Smith's became the basis of European attitudes—and policies—toward Native Americans.

Conflict flared elsewhere as well. In New England, Puritans elevated a 1636 conflict with the Pequot that was rooted in practical matters such as land, tribute, and several murders, into a religious war. Associating the Pequots with Satan, the Puritans attacked a settlement of women, children, and elders, killing as many of its inhabitants as possible and selling many survivors into Caribbean slavery. In addition to its genocidal intensity and purpose, the Pequot War is also notable because the Puritans had enlisted Mohegans, Narragansetts, and Mohawks to fight on their side. Native Americans often proved willing to work with colonial forces to settle scores among themselves or to curry favor with the colonizers. This proved to be the case again in King Philip's War, in which the English were able to enlist Mohawks from New York to fight the Wampanoags, Narragansetts, and Nipmucks in New England. Although the war took the lives of 1 in 10 New England adult males, it reduced Native American numbers by up to 40 percent. Once again, distorted print accounts of the fighting and its causes circulated widely and solidified anti-Indian sentiment among the white population. Although King Philip's War demonstrated the effectiveness of cooperation and coordination among tribes in resisting European colonization, this only underscored the permanence of European settlement. Native Americans had failed to threaten New England's existence.

The arrival of Europeans in North America intensified rivalries between indigenous peoples in several ways. First, the spread of European diseases reduced the population of indigenous communities. Because Native Americans regarded the adoption of captives as a legitimate means of replenishing population, increased warfare followed epidemics. The introduction of guns also promoted warfare. Available for purchase from European traders, guns provided important advantages to warriors. Access to guns, however, was limited by what indigenous peoples could offer in trade. In the North, this meant increasing (and increasingly deadly) competition over fur-hunting grounds and trade routes. In the South, where traders were interested in buying individual Native Americans for resale as slaves in the Caribbean, the threat was even more direct. Thus, guns became necessary protection against attack, but their acquisition involved aggression against other Indian communities.

Intertribal raiding linked to commerce with Europeans helped spark the most successful uprising in colonial

America, New Mexico's Pueblo Revolt of 1680. Having gained access to European weapons and horses, the Apaches expanded their raiding activities in both scale and scope, much to the detriment of their Pueblo neighbors, against whom more and more of this raiding was directed. Suffering in the midst of a prolonged drought, the Pueblo blamed both the ensuing crop failures and the increasing tempo of Apache raids on the Spaniards' suppression of their religious rituals. Increasingly desperate, the residents of more than two dozen Native American communities overcame their linguistic differences to launch simultaneous attacks on the Spanish, forcing the colonists to flee. Although the Spanish reconquered New Mexico 12 years later, they prudently refrained from reinstituting many of their harsher practices concerning land, labor, and religion. The pattern of increased accommodation of Native American culture that resulted from the Pueblo Revolt is reflected today in the distinctive hybrid culture of the modern Southwest.

The 18th Century

The Spanish reconquest of New Mexico was prompted by rumors of French activity in the interior West. As European empires consolidated their presence in North America, that continent's settlers became embroiled in conflict when those empires went to war. For example, when Queen Anne's War—also known as the War of the Spanish Succession—set Britain against both Spain and France, Abenaki and Catholic Mohawk warriors from New France raided New England settlements. In the Southeast, Britain's Carolina settlers armed the Creek nation to attack Spanish interests, including mission stations and the settlement of St. Augustine, in Florida. In King George's War (sometimes referred to as the War of the Austrian Succession), the Abenakis again raided England's northern settlements with devastating results, while a joint English–Mohawk attempt to repay the favor by taking Montreal failed. The English were, however, more successful in prompting Native Americans to attack French interests in the Ohio Valley.

None of the earlier colonial wars matched the intensity or decisiveness of the Seven Years' War, in which Native Americans played a crucial role. Although that war's more common name, The French and Indian War, incorrectly

suggests that Native Americans fought only on one side, it does convey the importance of the role played by indigenous peoples, and the more effective alliances the French were able to forge with them. Indeed, France had no choice but to rely upon the help of Native Americans as the numbers of French soldiers and settlers were vastly inferior to those of England.

The success of the French alliance with Native Americans is attributable in part to the dramatic missteps of the English commander Edward Braddock, who disdained the guerrilla-style tactics, such as concealment, of Native Americans. Those tactics were rooted in Native American warfare, which focused on securing captives or goods, or demonstrating bravery. Because Native American communities were small, they could not tolerate heavy losses and fighters were conservative when it came to risk. To Native Americans, European open-field fighting seemed senseless in the mass carnage it produced. For their part, Europeans thought concealment cowardly and were appalled by Native American practices of kidnapping and ritual torture.

Despite the many reverses in the early years of the war, Britain's superior numbers, coupled with its greater ability to produce and distribute weapons and ammunition, carried the day. Britain's commercial prowess and its blockade of French ports made it increasingly difficult for the diplomats of New France to supply their erstwhile allies with European trade goods. Britain had no such trouble, and many Native American groups switched sides. However, with the departure of the French from the North American mainland, Britain soon decided to curtail the supplies it provided its Native American allies—supplies still needed for hunting and self-defense. The British also proved unwilling or unable to remove offending backcountry settlements. In a stunning bid for unified Native American control of trans-Appalachia, the Ottawa chief Pontiac and his religiously inspired followers successfully attacked and captured British frontier forts in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes regions in 1763.

Although the British were able to reassert control by 1764, this hard-fought epilogue to the Seven Years' War made the British to realize that a durable peace required reining in the colonists, whose enthusiasm for the land of indigenous peoples ultimately led to conflicts that proved

costly to the cash-strapped Crown. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 prohibited settlement west of the ridge of the Appalachians. Although the Proclamation Line reduced tensions with Native Americans, it inflamed backcountry settlers and colonial land speculators, who saw such lands as crucial to their economic futures. By appeasing Native Americans, Great Britain alienated its own colonists.

The American Revolution

With the wounds of the Seven Years' War and more recent frontier conflicts still fresh, the Patriots drew upon anti-Indian sentiment to win support for the American Revolution. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence condemned the king for his attempts "to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions." Like John Smith's account, it remained silent about provocations from the other side. Nevertheless, similar appeals proved useful for raising soldiers, particularly after the initial flush of enthusiasm for the war had faded.

Although the rebellious colonists and their government generally portrayed Native Americans negatively for the purposes of recruiting whites, they simultaneously lobbied hard to enlist Native Americans as allies. This effort succeeded primarily among groups already surrounded by white settlements or situated precariously close to the frontier, such as the Catawba of South Carolina and the Oneida on the New York frontier. These Native Americans were aware of their vulnerability to attack and dispossession by the white settler population. They hoped that a show of solidarity with their Patriot neighbors would guarantee their rights in the future.

Although the British did not employ Indians early in the war, they ultimately did win a greater share of Native American support. Although the British had been inconstant allies in the past, Native Americans recognized the greater threat posed by the white settler population, whose abuses had been restrained, at least in part, by the imperial government. Britain had maintained a cadre of Native American agents to manage relations with their fellows, and they proved invaluable. As the war became increasingly desperate, Native Americans made significant contributions to both sides. However, the superiority of British recruitment was clear. In New York, Iroquois warriors rolled the frontier back to the east. Cherokee raiders did likewise in the South. Nevertheless, although Britain's Native American allies had again demonstrated their military strength, Britain's surrender left them vulnerable to dispossession. The United States asserted the defeat of Native Americans by association and claimed their lands by right of conquest.

The American Revolution did not really end in 1783; it continued as a war of U.S. territorial expansion, most vigorously in the Ohio country. Native American fighters under the leadership of the Miami chief Little Turtle dealt the U.S. Army a defeat in 1790 and another, more devastating one, in 1791. Native American resistance in the Ohio country ended only in 1795, after the British closed the gates of a fort to Native American fighters fleeing U.S. general Anthony Wayne's men after the battle of Fallen Timbers. Native Americans had not suffered great losses at Fallen Timbers; the British response, however, made clear that Native Americans could no longer depend upon them for needed weapons and ammunition. In the treaty negotiations that followed, Native Americans ceded most of present-day Ohio, opening it up to a tremendous influx of immigrants. Thus, the U.S. defeat of the Indians of the Eastern Woodlands ultimately owed more to their superior technology and numbers rather than military performance.

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Related Entries

Colonial Wars; Indian Army Scouts; Native Americans in the Military; Pontiac; Revolutionary War

—*Karim M. Tiro*

Native Americans in the Military

Native Americans have played a prominent role in virtually every war in U.S. history. Although numerically small in comparison with other minority groups, American Indians have contributed a disproportionately large number of soldiers, often serving in some of the most dangerous military occupations. Influenced to a large extent by popular stereotypes of Native Americans as "instinctive warriors," military commanders assigned their Native American soldiers duties as scouts, messengers, and patrol leaders; as a consequence, their casualty rates were often significantly higher than that of other ethnicities. Government officials agreed that Native Americans were a unique tactical asset, but also encouraged military service as a means of expediting their assimilation into the majority society. Much of the history of Native Americans in the armed forces, therefore, reveals the paradox of a people recruited for their alleged "warrior ethic," but also for the purpose of extinguishing the very traits for which they were employed.

Antebellum Service

Throughout the latter decades of the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries, indigenous peoples found themselves in a cross fire between American and British armies for control of territories east of the Mississippi River. Keen to protect their lands and way of life, Native Americans maneuvered to maintain neutrality or, failing that, to ally with the side most apt to advance their specific interests.

During the American Revolution, the Continental Congress authorized George Washington to recruit 2,000 Native American allies, primarily from the Iroquois League (Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, Senecas, and Tuscaroras). The British also sought Iroquois assistance. Although desperate to maintain neutrality, the unity of the Iroquois League quickly unraveled in the face of relentless pressure from each side. At the battle of Oriskany (August 1777), a force of Oneidas, fighting alongside American forces, fired upon their Mohawk brethren who had sided with the British. By the war's end, the 200-year-old Iroquois Confederacy lay in ruins as Oneidas, Tuscaroras, and a faction of Onondagas took up arms in support of the Continental Army against pro-British Mohawks, Cayugas, Senecas, and other Onondagas.

When the United States again went to war against the British in 1812, Gen. Anthony Wayne employed Choctaw and Chickasaw scouts from the Southeast against a determined pan-Indian movement in the northwest led by the Shawnee leader Tecumseh. To the south, Gen. Andrew Jackson enlisted the support of Choctaw and Cherokee auxiliaries in his efforts to subdue the "Red Stick" faction of the Creek nation. On March 27, 1814, Jackson's army, accompanied by Cherokee and Creek allies, destroyed Red Stick resistance at the battle of Horseshoe Bend. A few months

later, a Choctaw contingent fought alongside Jackson's army at the battle of New Orleans.

Civil War and the Late 19th Century

Both Union and Confederate governments sent emissaries in 1861 to the Indian Territory in hopes of recruiting members of the so-called Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Seminole, and Creek) for assistance during the Civil War. Given their long history of poor relations with the U.S. government and that some members of each tribe were slaveholders, most of the estimated 3,000 Native Americans who served during the Civil War fought for the Confederacy. Some 1,000 Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, for instance, battled Union forces in the Trans-Mississippi theater at the March 1862 battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas. Cherokee leader Stand Watie, a brigadier general, surrendered to Union forces on June 23, 1865, the last Confederate general to lay down his arms.

In its efforts to concentrate indigenous peoples onto reservations in the West during the post–Civil War era, the U.S. Army employed hundreds of Native Americans as scouts and auxiliary troops; they provided their commanders with crucial intelligence and insight on Native American tactics and strategies. The 1866 Army Reorganization Act regularized the practice by authorizing the enlistment of up to 1,000 Indian scouts for six-month periods. Generals George Crook and Nelson A. Miles, for example, employed Apache scouts in campaigns against Chiricahua Apache leaders Geronimo and Nana, while Lipan Apache and Tonkawa scouts aided Col. Randall Mackenzie in the Red River War of 1874; Crow scouts served with George Custer in his fateful stand against the Northern Cheyenne and Sioux in 1876.

Native Americans chose to enlist as scouts for several reasons. Members of numerically weak tribes saw alliances with whites as essential to their survival against traditional enemies. Indian scouts earned a salary and received food rations, clothing, and ammunition. Such earnings often allowed their families to enjoy a higher standard of living. Finally, serving as Army scouts provided young men with opportunities to achieve prominence among their people, as well as temporary freedom from the social and economic confines of reservations.

World War I and World War II

U.S. entry into World War I in April 1917 was a watershed moment in the history of Native American participation in the military. First, it settled the issue of whether Native American soldiers should be integrated into regular units, or, like African Americans, be segregated into race-specific regiments. Advocates of segregated units argued that Native American cultures and the "cult of the warrior" could best be preserved if the Army created several Indian regiments. Opponents argued that integrating Native Americans into regular units would hasten their assimilation and adoption of "civilization." Although military and government officials ruled against the creation of all-Indian units, the argument would persist throughout the war years.

A second important issue settled during World War I concerned the draft and enlistment of Native Americans. The Selective Service Act of May 1917 required all men between the ages of 21 and 31 to register for the draft. This included Native Americans who were citizens, as well as the roughly one-third of Native American men who were not citizens. Although both citizen and noncitizen Native Americans could enlist for service, only citizens could be drafted. Local draft boards struggled with determining citizenship status, and many noncitizen Native Americans were drafted. An additional problem occurred with tribes such as the Iroquois that maintained that their members were immune from the draft as they were citizens of a sovereign nation. In 1918, the Iroquois unilaterally declared war on Germany and then permitted their men to serve in the U.S. military as "allies."

Approximately 10,000 to 12,000 Native Americans served in the U.S. military during World War I—nearly 20 percent of the adult male population. Owing in large part to popular racial stereotypes that portrayed them as instinctive warriors, Native American troops received the most dangerous assignments: trackers, scouts, messengers, and patrol leaders. In October 1918, Army officials began experimenting with the idea of using Native Americans to transmit information in their own languages via telephone. By the war's end, Choctaw, Osage, Cheyenne, and Comanche "code talkers" had been used to transmit messages—setting the precedent for the more famous Navajo code talkers of World War II.

Two Navajo code talkers—part of a Marine regiment in the Pacific—transmitting messages during World War II. (© CORBIS)

Native American men again were called to register for the draft on the eve of America's entry into World War II. As all Native Americans had been granted citizenship by the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, the problems of determining citizenship status experienced during World War I did not recur. By November 1941, nearly 42,000 Native Americans ages 21 to 35 had registered, and 60 percent of the 4,500 Native American men in service prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had enlisted. By the war's end, an estimated 25,000 Native Americans had served—including 800 Native American women who were members of the Women's Auxiliary Corps (WACs) and the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES).

The disproportionate Native American contributions to the two world wars have no simple explanation. Like other Americans, Native American soldiers hoped to protect their homeland and demonstrate their patriotism and devotion to country; others saw military service as a means of social and economic mobility and perhaps as an escape from the unemployment and poverty associated with reservation life. The lure of travel and excitement and an opportunity to gain prestige and status in the eyes of their people attracted young men of all ethnicities from around the country to military service.

Korea and Vietnam

Native American service in the U.S. military continued in the 1950s and 1960s during the Cold War. Hundreds of Native American veterans of World War II served in the Korean War; three Native American soldiers received the Medal of Honor for particularly heroic service during that conflict. An estimated 42,000 Native Americans served in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. More than 250 died between 1965, when regular ground forces were committed to the conflict, and 1973, when American forces were finally withdrawn. The stereotype of the Native American as instinctive warrior persisted. More than 60 percent of Native American soldiers served in combat specialties in Vietnam, with more than 40 percent serving in infantry units. These soldiers drew particularly dangerous assignments such as "walking point" and serving on scout patrols because of their commanders' misconception that Native Americans possessed an innate ability to track and read their environment.

Effects of Military Service: The Paradox

Native Americans who served in the military returned home with new insights and attitudes about the world, their country, and often about themselves. For many Native Americans, the war years brought about a renewal of customs and traditions that had not been practiced in a generation. Native American veterans of World War I, for example, returned home to victory dances, war songs, feasts, and giveaways. A fortunate few even gained admittance to previously inaccessible warrior societies. Other veterans returned home bearing deep physical and emotional scars that undermined their reintegration into society. In an effort to alleviate such difficulties, Zuni and Navajo veterans of World War II—particularly those who had come into contact with dead enemy soldiers—participated in traditional purification rituals before they were allowed to return to their homes. Military

service, therefore, can be seen as a catalyst for cultural renewal among Native American peoples, an irony considering the goals of government policy makers who had hoped that military service would encourage assimilation.

The 21st Century

Native Americans continue to play an integral role in the United States military. An estimated 2,000 served in the Persian Gulf during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the early 1990s; approximately 12,000 Native American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines were in the armed forces at the end of the 20th century. The persistence of certain racial stereotypes combined with tribal expectations continue to influence the assignments and military specialties of Native American soldiers. Native American men and women continue to volunteer for various reasons, and Indian nations continue to praise and honor their warriors in the 21st century.

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Related Entries

Custer, George Armstrong; Indian Army Scouts; Native Americans in Colonial Wars and the Revolutionary War; Tecumseh

Related Documents

1946 a

—*Thomas A. Britten*

Naval Academy

The Naval Academy was founded in 1845 as a four-year program of training and education to produce career officers for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. George Bancroft, the secretary of the Navy, authorized the school's creation while serving as acting U.S. secretary of war. Since the academy's founding, its graduates have dominated the senior leadership of the Navy and the Marine Corps; many have attained distinguished civilian careers in business, politics, science, and technology.

Establishment of the Naval Academy

Until the creation of the academy, the Navy followed the British custom of training its officers at sea. Bancroft and other reformers believed that this system of preparation was too haphazard to give consistent results. Although some captains took their responsibilities seriously, others ignored their training obligations or treated their midshipmen cruelly to gauge their fitness for service. This system led to periodic scandals, the most infamous of which was the Somers incident of 1842. Midshipman Philip Spencer, along with two conspirators, were hanged on the training brig for allegedly organizing a mutiny. An event of this magnitude

would have attracted attention under normal circumstances, but Spencer was the secretary of war's son and the ship's captain had a reputation for excessive discipline. The ensuing outcry prompted the end of the Navy's longstanding practice of training midshipmen at sea.

The American public was long ambivalent toward the creation of professional military schools. Many believed that their existence fostered attitudes of elitism among military officers that were dangerous to the health of the new republic. Since the nation's founding, citizen–soldiers had been deemed sufficient to ensure its security and were not seen as threats to civil liberties. A standing army did not seem essential with large oceans protecting America's borders from its greatest threats. Americans tolerated the establishment of the Military Academy at West Point in 1802, but were more comfortable with its existence as an engineering school than as a repository for martial knowledge and values and as a potential training ground for a military aristocracy. By contrast, the creation of a professional naval school did not generate much popular resistance. Americans were not as suspicious of the Navy as they were of the Army. Nor did the Navy have to contend with an institutional rival like the regular Army did with the state militias and volunteer companies.

Bancroft sidestepped the thorny issue of congressional funding by locating the academy on an Army post, Fort Severn, in Annapolis, Maryland. At the time, this seemed to be a wise decision. The land was near the Chesapeake Bay, which provided an ideal training site. However, the school's fixed boundaries, with water on one side and Maryland's capital on the other, left little room for expansion. The academy's limited capacity became an issue in the 20th century as the naval officer corps grew to meet the country's needs as a world power. Although undermining Annapolis, 20th-century naval leaders would develop alternative commissioning sources, including the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) and Officer Candidate School (OCS).

The Naval Academy Experience

In the 19th century, Naval Academy midshipmen were a fairly homogeneous group demographically. Many came from upper-middle-class or upper-class families. Significant numbers were "Navy juniors" whose fathers or brothers had also attended Annapolis. Their religious upbringing was largely "High Church" Protestantism. Chapel attendance was mandatory; many sermons reflected on service values of hierarchy, duty, and obligation. The Naval Academy did not practice formal segregation, but it would not graduate its first African American, Wesley Brown, until 1949. This culture produced a very tight-knit community. Academy graduates dominated the upper echelons of the Navy's leadership; most alumni completed a minimum of 20 years of active service. The common glue was the Annapolis experience.

The heart and soul of the academy culture was Bancroft Hall, which was technically the midshipmen's dormitory. Most indoctrination occurred during plebe (freshman) year with various rituals and traditions practiced in Bancroft Hall. The purpose of plebe year was twofold: to inculcate in plebes the outlook and traditions of the naval profession and to eliminate those who seemed unfit to join that community. Such a culture nourished unauthorized activities, including hazing. Many officers either encouraged or condoned upperclassmen's actions as they also believed them essential to the academy culture and necessary preparation for leading in combat. However, most such assumptions were never subjected to any systematic analytical tests and remained largely unproven, causing the loss of midshipmen who probably would have made fine officers.

Early Challenges and Expansion

The Naval Academy has periodically faced challenges to its existence, the first of which occurred during the Civil War. The conflict divided the school just like it did other military institutions. Many midshipmen from the South followed the example of its highest-ranking officer, Superintendent Franklin Buchanan and resigned their commissions. Buchanan would later command the Confederacy's most famous ironclad, the *Merrimack*, in its battle with the U.S. Navy's *Monitor*. Many midshipmen from the North were assigned to the Union blockade after completing their studies. The school itself was temporarily relocated to Newport, Rhode Island, as the government was concerned about Maryland seceding from the Union.

The postwar Naval Academy enjoyed a renaissance in the late 19th century under Superintendent David Dixon

Porter and Commandant Stephen Luce. Its physical facilities were renovated to accommodate a growing student body. With the advent of a steam-powered Navy, a debate arose over whether the academy should continue its emphasis on preparing line officers or become more technically focused to produce engineering officers. Between 1866 and 1882, the academy's curriculum focused on both, maintaining a dual-track program of midshipmen and cadet engineers. However, the academy gradually abandoned this divided curriculum and adopted a more technically oriented curriculum that produced line officers who had taken enough engineering courses to serve in that capacity at some point in their careers. The academy's growing importance coincided with the Navy's emerging role in international affairs. Many elites, including Pres. Theodore Roosevelt, subscribed to the theories of national greatness in Alfred Thayer Mahan's seminal book *The Influence of Seapower upon History* (1890), which emphasized the importance of naval strength to a country's development and power.

In the 20th century, World War I and World War II created mobilization emergencies for Annapolis. In both cases, the academy adopted a three-year accelerated program to meet the requirements of a rapidly expanding fleet. The curriculum began focusing on practical subjects midshipmen needed for combat. Virtually all of the great naval heroes from World War II, including Ernest King, Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, and Raymond Spruance, were academy alumni. More graduates were killed in action and were awarded the Medal of Honor in World War II than in all of the nation's previous conflicts combined. The academy went to great lengths to commemorate its victories from World War II, honoring its Medal of Honor recipients by renaming their midshipman rooms after them. Annapolis also took possession of various trophies of war, including ships' bells and battle flags, and showed the award-winning television documentary *Victory at Sea* (1952–53), which celebrated the war's naval campaigns, to inspire future classes of midshipmen.

World War II was a turning point in the Navy's and hence the Naval Academy's history. Unlike previous conflicts, the post-1945 Navy would not demobilize but would expand to meet an extensive deployment schedule. Rear Adm. James Holloway Jr., a future superintendent and chief of naval personnel, created a multitiered commissioning pipeline that preserved the academy while meeting personnel needs. As part of the Holloway Plan, passed by Congress in 1946, Annapolis would expand from its pre-war size of 3,000 to 3,500 midshipmen to anywhere from 4,000 to 4,500 midshipmen. Wartime commissioning sources, such as the NROTC and OCS, became permanent programs to make up the difference. The Holloway Plan did inadvertently reinvigorate the older debate of the necessity of an independent academy. To many outsiders, it seemed more cost-effective to educate officers at civilian schools and then have the Navy complete their training. Holloway strongly maintained that the academy's value went beyond the education it provided, focusing on its role in the midshipmen's professional socialization. Its values and traditions purportedly inculcated a love for the service that produced superior retention rates among its graduates.

Technological Innovations and Institutional Reforms

The development of new technology, such as jet aviation and atomic energy, helped to initiate a major overhaul of the curriculum. Until that time, midshipmen followed a lockstep program in which they completed the same courses regardless of their abilities or academic desires. Often using examples from fleet systems, this curriculum thoroughly prepared midshipmen to be junior officers. However, some students complained that this program rewarded memorization skills more than critical thinking. A growing chorus of reformers, including Admiral Holloway, advocated a more flexible curriculum based on overarching principles that graduates could use throughout their careers. Holloway envisioned Annapolis becoming an elite engineering college, or, in his words, an "MIT on the Severn." The expansion of the officer corps along with more rigorous academic standards greatly changed the academy's demographic composition. An applicant's academic record became more important than political connections in gaining appointment. Increasing numbers of midshipmen from middle-class and working-class families, as well as Roman Catholics, entered the academy. However, not much progress was made toward racial integration until the late 1960s.

Holloway's vision took on greater urgency with the launching of the Soviet satellite *Sputnik* in 1957. Many Americans worried that the country was losing its technolog-

ical edge in the Cold War. Adm. Hyman Rickover, the father of the nuclear-powered Navy, used the crisis to demand additional reforms. Rickover had a narrow interest in expanding the pool of graduates into the nuclear propulsion program. However, his critique summarized a growing fear among senior officers that the lockstep program was outdated. Annapolis had little choice in 1959 but to accept a comprehensive evaluation by civilian educators. The Curriculum Review Board, headed by Dr. Richard Folsom of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, undertook a six-month study of the curriculum and the training program before making its recommendations.

Annapolis initiated many reforms on its own and was forced to implement others in the 1960s. Academy leaders characterized these changes as an "academic revolution." Although such designation may have been overly dramatic, the results were striking. The lockstep program was replaced with a more conventional curriculum of validation and electives. Ultimately, midshipmen completed academic minors and majors. The academy hired additional civilian faculty and a dean to run the academic program. However, the tone of the "academic revolution" was its most striking aspect. Most midshipmen would attend graduate school during their careers. Despite some resistance among upperclassmen and officers, training priorities, including Bancroft Hall, no longer overshadowed the academic program. The four-year schedule was adjusted to accommodate the greater emphasis on academics.

The academy struggled to adapt to these institutional changes amid the turmoil of the Vietnam War. Morale was difficult to maintain as the war continued. Midshipmen discovered classmates killed in the conflict on casualty boards posted in Bancroft Hall and were occasionally heckled by protestors for being part of the Vietnam-era military. Changing social norms also brought many regulations into question. Midshipmen were frustrated with academy grooming standards that they felt ostracized them in the larger society. Several midshipmen successfully challenged the constitutionality of mandatory chapel attendance before the Supreme Court in 1972. Attrition rates, which normally hovered around 25 percent, soared in some classes to above 40 percent. The academy adapted to these circumstances:

obsolete regulations were replaced with those that were more reflective of fleet standards, such as rules concerning the consumption of alcohol and the maximum length of hair; new liberty and automobile privileges were also granted.

Despite resistance from the academy and alumni, Congress allowed women to enter Annapolis in 1976. Reverberations from gender integration occupied the school's attention well into the 1980s. The academy also suffered embarrassment from a series of honor and conduct scandals in the early 1990s. Eventually, the Naval Academy discovered a new balance between its responsibilities of training and education. Ironically, its culture's core values remained similar to the past: an emphasis on career military service and loyalty to the nation and to one's shipmates.

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Related Entries

Air Force Academy; Citadel, The; Coast Guard Academy; Marine Corps; Merchant Marine; Military Academy, United States; Naval War College; Service Academy Chapels; Virginia Military Institute; Women in the Military

—Todd Forney

Naval War College

The Naval War College was established in 1884 in Newport, Rhode Island. Sec. of the Navy William Chandler, supported by Progressive reformers such as Adm. David Dixon Porter and Adm. Stephen Luce, argued that the Navy desperately needed such an institution. Before the creation of the Naval War College, an officer's formal education ended after graduation from the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. The War College was intended to serve as an advanced professional school for middle- and senior-grade officers who needed to prepare for higher command. Its creation also symbolized the growing professionalism of the naval officer corps, which coincided with the emergence of other recognizable professions during the Progressive movement of the late 19th century.

Stephen Luce's appointment as the college's first president helped establish its professional credentials and tone. Luce designed the college to be engaged in original research that supported the Navy's strategic objectives. Students completed a one-year program of seminars, lectures, and readings that focused on practical problems. Special emphasis was given to strategic planning, operational concepts, and the impact of new technology. Although most faculty members were naval officers, the college later hired civilian scholars along with visiting faculty from the other armed services. Undoubtedly, Luce's most important appointment to the college was Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a professor of naval history and his eventual successor as president.

The founding of the Naval War College also reflected the transition from a "brown-water" to a "blue-water" Navy. The proper focus of naval operations was an ongoing source of debate in the 19th century. Proponents of a brown-water Navy insisted on a more limited role that focused on coastal defense. Blue-water enthusiasts, on the other hand, suggested a more expansive role with the Navy projecting the nation's diplomatic and economic interests overseas. Concerns about national security did not directly influence this transition; the Atlantic and Pacific oceans kept the country well protected from its greatest threats. However, by the late 19th century, the United States was discovering substan-

tial interests overseas. These concerns gained momentum with the publication of Mahan's seminal book, *The Influence of Seapower upon History* (1890), which helped support this shift toward a blue-water Navy.

Mahan's theories went hand in glove with the Open Door policy of the United States, which stated the country's intentions to keep the Chinese market free of European colonialism and hence open to American trade and business development. The Naval War College also contributed to the protection of national interests through strategic planning, commonly known as wargaming. Officers examined various contingencies and developed detailed plans to address them. Students were encouraged to think broadly and to speculate on a wide range of potential threats. Although some adversaries seemed more likely than others, the college even considered hostile scenarios involving countries that were normally allies.

By the 20th century, most major powers engaged in some form of contingency planning. The collective efforts of the Naval War College and the Army's War Plans Division helped to create the famous Color Plans in the decade or so before World War I and Rainbow Plans in the 1930s, which were the cornerstone of American grand strategy before World War II. The War College devoted most of its attention to War Plan Orange, the scenario involving Japan. Military leaders suspected that hostilities were most likely to erupt in the Western Pacific during a period of increasing tension. If this did occur, the Japanese would attempt to secure victory by destroying the major American installations in the area, especially in the Philippines. American success thus depended upon how quickly a relief effort could be mounted. The Navy could expect increasing levels of attacks the closer it approached the major theater of operations.

Although a wonderful resource, contingency planning contained serious pitfalls. One of strategic planning's paramount virtues is flexibility. However, with all the work that went into war plans, originators easily developed a myopic attachment to them. Planners also made flawed or erroneous assumptions. War Plan Orange, for example, assumed that a first strike would happen in the Far East, and consequently that a fleet would have to move quickly to relieve forces in the region. However, the plan did not

consider what would happen if the Japanese hit closer to home or if bases were overrun before the plan could be executed. Although the Navy used many details from War Plan Orange during World War II, many of its underlying assumptions turned out to be unsound.

In the 20th century, many distinguished naval officers served on the staff of the Naval War College. Adm. Raymond Spruance, the hero of Midway, was selected as its first post–World War II president. He and other veterans blended lessons from the conflict into the curriculum. The college's research mission became more formalized in the late 1940s with the creation of an annual Strategy Forum and the publication of its own professional journal, *The Naval War College Review*. Adm. Stanfield Turner, who would become the director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Pres. Jimmy Carter, assumed the presidency of the college in 1972 as the United States disengaged from Vietnam. Turner instituted classical studies from strategists such as Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz into the curriculum. Adm. James Stockdale, former Vietnam prisoner of war and Medal of Honor recipient, became the college president in 1975. Stockdale maintained most of the existing curriculum, but also believed in a broadened approach that included philosophy and ethics.

The Navy's blue-water mission changed somewhat in the 1990s to more of a littoral (shore) focus as well as efforts toward drug interdiction and counterterrorism. Yet the Naval War College continued its mission of preparing officers for higher command. The college has focused its efforts in recent years on the impact of new, largely information-based technology, the so-called revolution in military affairs, on naval warfare. It has also supported broadened research into how the Navy can best support the nation in dealing with its most pressing strategic problems and interests, such as the war on terror.

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Coastal Patrolling; Gunboat Diplomacy; Mahan, Alfred Thayer; Naval Academy; World War I; World War II

—*Todd Forney*

New York City Anti-Draft Riots

The draft riots that broke out in New York City in 1863 were among the most dramatic breakdowns of domestic order in the 19th century. With the initiation of conscription for military service in July of 1863, a witch's brew of racial and ethnic tensions, economic concerns, class resentment, and political antipathies exploded in New York; the result was a week-long spate of violence that was only put down with the intervention of federal troops.

The immediate cause of the riots was resentment of the white, largely Irish rioters of the U.S. government, which had resorted to conscription to fill the ever-growing demand for military manpower for the ongoing Civil War. Earlier in the war, the North had relied on voluntary recruitment to fill the ranks (although elements of coercion in the "volunteering" process had provoked resistance in some places), but by 1863 the continued need for soldiers threatened to outstrip the remaining supply of volunteers. As a consequence, in March 1863, Congress passed an act instituting a military

draft. The draft aroused class tensions throughout the states of the Union. Individuals with sufficient means were permitted to either pay a $300 "commutation" fee, exempting them from the current draft call, or to hire "substitutes" to serve in their place. These provisions angered many men who could not afford to buy their way out of military service.

In New York, resistance to the draft was further energized by local economic and political factors. New York had a large Irish population, mostly recent immigrants, who were discriminated against and restricted to low-income and low-status jobs. Irish New Yorkers were overwhelmingly Democratic in their political loyalties, faithfully supporting the Tammany Hall political machine that had run the city for decades. Although the Democratic allegiance of Irish New Yorkers was largely local—a result of Tammany's energetic recruitment of immigrants through patronage jobs and other economic assistance—Irish New Yorkers also shared the national Democratic Party's ambivalence toward the Republican administration's war effort. Some Democrats supported the war as a means of restoring the Union, however, many others felt that the "Black Republican" Lincoln administration's real goal was to free the southern states' African American slaves—a goal that they vehemently opposed. Working-class Democrats' opposition to African American freedom was in part a product of racial prejudice (a trait common to many Republican opponents of slavery as well), but was also underlain by the concern that releasing millions of penniless blacks from slavery would flood the labor market and depress wages. These feelings were particularly acute among economically and socially marginalized Irish immigrants, who feared they would be hardest hit by African American competition. In New York, Democratic politicians—including the governor—and newspapers played on Irish workers' prejudice and economic fears, heating tensions to the boiling point. Draft officers began to issue draft calls over the weekend of July 11 to 12, 1863; on Monday, July 13, New York erupted in the bloodiest episode of civil violence in American history.

During the riot, semi-organized gangs, consisting largely of Irish immigrants, roamed the streets. Although a substantial amount of looting and indiscriminate violence occurred, the mobs specifically attacked the draft offices and other federal property. They soon began targeting African Americans—lynching several and beating or burning the homes of others. Also singled out were well-dressed young men (who were presumed to be wealthy enough to buy their way out of military service), prominent Republicans, the offices of Republican-leaning newspapers, and some allegedly antilabor businesses. New York police and the small military force on hand proved unable to halt the violence, forcing the Lincoln administration to rush several regiments of battle-hardened federal troops fresh from the recently concluded battle of Gettysburg to the streets of New York, where they suppressed the rioters after several days of fighting. Before calm was restored on July 17, at least 105 people were killed, including 11 African Americans, 2 policemen, and 8 or 9 soldiers in addition to rioters; around 200 people were severely injured.

Tensions remained high even after a measure of order had been restored to the city—20,000 federal soldiers remained in the city to ensure that the draft order was executed. In the end, however, the draft issue became largely moot, as the New York City Council agreed to appropriate city funds to pay the commutation fee for any New Yorker who was drafted—a tactic that would be repeated in many Democratic strongholds across the Union. Although the riots temporarily disrupted the conscription process in New York, they did not prevent the policy from achieving its ultimate goal—manning the Union armies. The draft was largely intended to stimulate "voluntary" enlistment—and, in conjunction with substantial monetary "bonuses" offered to volunteers, succeeded. The combination of draftees and draft-induced voluntary enlistments proved sufficient to bring troop numbers up to full strength.

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African Americans in the Military; Civil War; Conscription and Volunteerism; Draft Evasion and Resistance

Related Documents

1863 f

—*Erik Riker-Coleman*

Newsreels

Theatrical newsreels, produced in America from 1911 to 1967, were 8-to-10 minute compilations of film clips with voice-over narration (subtitles during the silent era) on important and entertaining events in the nation and around the world. They were released twice weekly, and typically were the first item shown on a cinema bill, before the cartoon, serial, and feature film. At their peak in the 1930s and 1940s, newsreels were a significant source of political information, seen by tens of millions of Americans each week. During wartime, for morale and security reasons, the American government attempted to control both their content and their tone.

Newsreels were of marginal importance during World War I because of the technical limitations of film at the time, and also because of heavy censorship. All combatants were reluctant to allow newsreel cameramen near the front lines, and, prior to 1917, filmmakers often staged fake battle scenes and presented them as real. After America entered the war on April 6, 1917, civilian photographers were banned from the fighting front, and all combat footage was shot by cameramen and technicians from the U.S. Army Signal Corps. Although Signal Corps films are of great historical interest, film quality was often poor and coverage was sporadic. The footage obtained was rigorously censored not only by the military, but by the civilian Committee on Public Information (CPI), often called the Creel Committee after its dynamic and controversial director, George Creel. A few

dramatic scenes, such as the sinking of the Austrian battleship *St. Stephen*, passed the censors, but overall, American cinema audiences between 1914 and 1918 saw little that was either authentic or interesting.

Between 1918 and 1941, newsreels became technically more sophisticated and also more entertaining. Although they favored such subjects as sports, bathing beauties, and train wrecks over politics, and although narration was often light-hearted and superficial, newsreel companies did send intrepid cameramen to cover wars and revolutions around the globe. With the rise of militaristic regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the beginning of World War II in Europe on September 1, 1939, dramatic images of German dictator Adolf Hitler's speeches, marching Nazis, and the bombing of Shanghai and London appeared on American movie screens.

After the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the government moved quickly to integrate newsreels, like other media, into the war effort. Direct censorship was not imposed. Instead, access to combat zones was restricted, and the Office of War Information (OWI) worked closely with newsreel companies to ensure that footage shown in theaters revealed no military secrets and was not harmful to civilian morale.

Each of the five major newsreel companies (Fox Movietone, Pathe News, Universal Newsreels, News of the Day, and Paramount News) was allowed to send two camera crews to each major fighting front. Smaller companies such as All-American News, which in 1943 was supplying news of interest to African Americans to 365 segregated Negro theaters in urban areas and the South, were not included. The footage shot by civilian cameramen was pooled, combined with greater amounts of footage shot by Signal Corps and U.S. Navy photographers, and subjected to stringent military censorship before being released to the newsreel companies. OWI also created its own company, Universal Newsreels, whose films were distributed overseas and were intended to show the United States in a favorable light.

Newsreel companies, although they grumbled at these restrictions, complied with the conditions imposed by military officials. They frequently used scripts and commentaries provided by the Signal Corps and the Navy Department, and

This still is from a newsreel about the establishment of the Allied beachhead in Salerno, Italy, on October 1, 1943. It shows a landing craft taking a hit during the operation. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

were open to story suggestions by the OWI's Newsreel Division—not least because OWI's director, Elmer Davis was a professional journalist who was sympathetic to their complaints. Newsreels regularly incorporated war bond appeals and other war-related public service material. Fox Movietone, News of the Day, and *The March of Time* (a longer newsreel "magazine") even established schools to train military cameramen and technicians.

This cooperation stemmed as much from self-interest as from patriotism. In 1944, the U.S. population was less than half what it would be in 2000, but 95 million tickets were sold at cinemas around the country each week. That vast public hungered not only for news, but for striking visual

images of the war. Newsreels provided both. During the war, roughly 75 percent of newsreel content (much of it combat footage) concerned war and politics, a proportion four times higher than before the war. The images Americans saw were censored (the sinking of American battleships at Pearl Harbor, for instance, was not shown until many months later), but they were real.

After World War II, the importance of newsreels declined rapidly. Combat photographers in Korea sent back gritty and often moving footage of such subjects as winter combat and released prisoners of war, but already television was competing successfully with newsreels in providing such images to American viewers.

Newsreels were a medium of entertainment as much as information, and their coverage of issues and events was superficial. Nevertheless, and particularly during World War II, they played a vital role in maintaining civilian morale and in providing the information needed by citizens of a democracy at war. They also provided the first film images of what war was like to the American public, and newsreel cameramen pioneered the techniques of combat photography that would be further refined in Vietnam and subsequent conflicts.

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Related Entries

Censorship and the Military; Combat-Zone Photography; Film and War; Frontline Reporting; Media and War; Office of War Information

—*Bernard Hagerty*

Niles, John Jacob

(1892–1980)
Composer, Song-catcher, and Musicologist

John Jacob Niles was the most important collector of songs sung by ordinary American doughboys during World War I.

His father was a folksinger and square-dance caller, his mother a pianist and church organist.

Niles was raised in rural Kentucky, where he learned both the songs of ordinary people and the basics of music theory and composition. His first major composition, "Go 'Way from My Window," was derived from words he had heard uttered by an African American hired hand on his father's farm. Another, "I Met Her in Venezuela," was based on words he heard dockworkers in Boulogne chant during World War I. Later compositions, all containing fragments of folk music he had overheard, include "Black Is the Color of My True Love's Hair" and "Jesus, Jesus, Rest Your Head."

Niles's first published collection of folk music, arrangements of eight spirituals, was *Impressions of a Negro Camp Meeting* (1925). Others included *Songs of the Hill Folk* (1934) and *The Ballad Book* (1961). He toured the United States and Europe with contralto Marion Kerby from 1928 to 1933, performing folk songs and spirituals. He gave two solo performances at the White House. Niles made several recordings of folk songs for RCA Victor, and he also composed oratorios and cantatas, as well as the Niles Merton Songs 22, based on the poetry of Trappist monk Thomas Merton.

What makes Niles interesting within the context of war and society, however, are the two collections of songs that resulted from his service in France during World War I: *Singing Soldiers* (1927) and *Songs My Mother Never Taught Me* (1929). Niles had joined the aviation unit of the Army's Signal Corps in 1917 and, throughout the war, ferried planes from their delivery ports; he sometimes did aerial reconnaissance of enemy positions at the front. In December 1917, while in Paris, he came upon Theodore Botrel's *Les Chants du Bivouac*. Botrel had been commissioned by the French War Ministry to prepare and perform patriotic songs and poems for les poilus (French infantrymen) and was known as "Chansonnier des Armées." Niles sat down at a piano in his hotel and, with the help of a French aviator, sampled Botrel's collection. He thereupon "decided to borrow M. Botrel's idea and attempt a collection of United States Army war songs" that would differ from Botrel's in being "as nearly as possible an unexpurgated record" of what the men were actually singing, songs that "revealed thoughts that would otherwise have died unspoken" (Niles 1927, vii, 13).

Niles soon found his ear drawn to the songs of African Americans more than to their white counterparts, since, as he said, "the imagination of the white boys did not, as a rule, express itself in song. They went to Broadway for their music, contenting themselves with the ready-made rhymes and tunes of the professional song-writers." He "gave up recording the songs of white boys," he said, and sought those who "sang the legend of the black man to tunes and harmonies they made up as they went along." Black soldiers, Niles felt, were the only ones "who sang anything original." The songs, he wrote, reminded him of "the haunting melodic value found in the negro music I had known as a boy in Kentucky," and when the war ended, he set about soliciting additional songs from others, including W. H. Handy, "the 'Blues' authority" of his age (Niles 1927, vii–ix).

Niles heard a group of black soldiers working on a train wreck near Chateauroux one day and noted that "when white boys sang this tune" about going home, "they borrowed their verses from the songs of other wars," while these black soldiers "made up their own verses." He recorded 11 such verses, among them, "Officers, they live up on de hill/We live down in de muck and de swill." Another ran, "When I came over I was mama's pride and joy/Now I'm just one of the Hoy-Poloy." Elsewhere, watching African Americans singing as they unloaded quartermaster trucks, he recorded these lines: "Black man fights wid de shovel and pick/Never gets no rest 'cause he never gets sick." And, "Jined de army to get free clothes/What we're fightin' 'bout, nobody knows." On a train four men from the 92nd Division, assigned to wash dishes and pots, sang for Niles. "Oh, you jined up fur fightin' in a he-man's war/An' you're goin' to do your fightin' in a French freight car" (Niles 1927, 2, 10–16).

Most such songs reflected the plight of the typical black soldier in France, gang labor, but Niles did hear African American combat veterans sing. Several men of the 366th and 367th Infantry Regiments, "the Buffaloes," descendants of the 24th and 25th all-black infantry regiments of the past, sang, "When 366th [367th] went over de top/Kaiser's army wuz a flop." These regulars were more positive about their experiences than were draftees who Niles had heard. A group of black combat engineers sang, "When I think 'bout de doctors clippin' off a leg or two/I'd like to tell dose

drafters at de Court House what to do," and "Oh de States is full o' people tellin' how de war is fit/But when it comes to fightin', never fit a single bit." Another group sang, "I don't know why I went to war, or what dese folks are fightin' for," and "I don't know why I totes dis gun, cause I ain't got nothin' 'gainst de Hun" (Niles 1927, 48–50, 54–70; Niles and Moore 1929, 200–210).

Niles's second collection, *Songs My Mother Never Taught Me* (1929), contained a few additional songs of black soldiers but was essentially given over to those of white soldiers, sailors, and airmen. While these songs may not have been quite as creative as those of African Americans, they expressed just as effectively the sentiments of these men toward their officers and the war. "Oh, It's Drive the General's Car, My Boy" and "What the Colonels and the Generals Do" are blistering critiques of Army commanders who "never take a chance with [their] immortal soul[s]/They always sleep between the sheets and eat three squares a day/While the doughboy's up to his neck in mud for thirty-three dollars pay." Another reflected war-weariness: "I don't want to go in the trenches no more/Where hand-grenades and whiz-bangs they roar;" "So send me over the sea/Where the Heinies can't get at me;" "The war ain't so bad if you're wearin' a star/But bein' a private don't get you so far." Each verse ended: "Oh, my, I'm too young to die/I want to go home" (Niles 1927, 2–3; Niles and Moore 1929, 109–113, 221–23). Niles the song-catcher thus provided us with both tuneful and powerful insights into the minds and attitudes of a generation of World War I doughboys.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Music and War; World War I

Related Documents

1918 c

—*Peter Karsten*

Nimitz, Chester Williams

(1885–1966)
World War II Pacific Fleet Commander

Chester Nimitz was an Allied theater commander in the Pacific Ocean as well as commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific fleet during World War II. Well known for his strategic sense and quiet but firm leadership, Nimitz became an American hero as much for the type of military leader he represented as for his victories in the field.

Nimitz was born on February 24, 1885, in Fredericksburg, Texas. His father died before he was born, and Nimitz was raised by his mother and paternal grandfather. He grew up helping out at his family's hotel while working to complete his own schooling, and he seemed destined to lead an undistinguished small town life until he met two newly minted U.S. Army second lieutenants, recent graduates of the Military Academy. The Texas allotment for West Point was already filled, however, so young Chester set his sights on the Naval Academy, took the difficult qualifying examinations though not yet a high school senior, and won his district's appointment to Annapolis in 1901.

Despite having to make up his missing high school credits, Nimitz excelled through hard work, graduating seventh in a class of 114 in 1905. After serving in the Pacific fleet aboard a battleship and a cruiser, he commanded a gunboat and a destroyer. The relative shortage of junior officers at that time allowed him to emerge relatively unscathed from what might otherwise have been a career-ending incident in

1908 when he ran his destroyer aground on a Philippine mud bank. Nimitz subsequently demonstrated great patience with his subordinates, one of the hallmarks of his command style. He was next transferred to submarines, where he earned a reputation as an engineering expert, particularly in diesel engines. During World War I, he served as the chief of staff to the U.S. Navy commander of submarines in the Atlantic Ocean, Adm. Samuel S. Robison, who became Nimitz's friend and mentor.

Under Robison's influence, Nimitz changed his focus from engineering to personnel and organizational management. Shortly thereafter his skills were put to the test when he was assigned to oversee construction of a submarine base at Pearl Harbor. He later commanded a destroyer division, the cruiser *Augusta*, and a battleship division, but his time as naval ROTC superintendent at Berkeley (California) as well as two stints in the Bureau of Navigation, which oversaw personnel assignments throughout the service, most honed his skills at judging character, building organizations, and leading men.

Nimitz was a logical choice to take command, then, when Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt decided on a major high-level shake-up in the Pacific after the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Nimitz was appointed commander in chief, U.S. Pacific fleet, passing over more than 50 admirals with seniority. The position was restructured after Pearl Harbor to include responsibility for all American naval vessels and personnel in the entire Pacific theater, including those under U.S. Army or British command in the waters of East Asia and the Antipodes. Soon thereafter Nimitz was also made commander in chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, the theater commander for the North, Central, and South Pacific Ocean Areas.

The first task facing Admiral Nimitz upon arrival in Pearl Harbor was to halt the Japanese advances throughout the Pacific. This he accomplished with the skillful use of aircraft carrier task forces at the battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, followed a month later by the stunning victory over the more numerous and experienced Japanese carrier forces at the battle of Midway. The Allies went on the offensive in August with the invasion of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, where the Japanese were constructing an airfield

that could threaten communications with Australia. In a long campaign of attrition, land, sea, and air forces fought over the island for six months before U.S. Marine and Army units finally eliminated the last of the resistance in February 1943. The tide of the war in the Pacific had turned.

Nimitz's forces continued westward up the Solomon Islands chain toward Rabaul, Japan's major base in the entire region, in a series of amphibious assaults. Concurrently, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of the South West Pacific Area, was approaching Rabaul from the south. The two-pronged approach reduced the mighty base to impotence without requiring actual seizure. Nimitz then used his growing carrier and amphibious strength to drive through the Gilbert, Marshall, and Marianas archipelagoes in the Central Pacific, while MacArthur, supported by elements of the U.S. Pacific fleet, drove along the northern coast of New Guinea. The twin offensives converged on the Philippines, where the invasion of Leyte Island in October 1944 triggered the battle of Leyte Gulf, the last great naval battle of World War II. In the first half of 1945, Nimitz directed the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, both desired for support of operations against the Japanese home islands. Nimitz's armadas were cruising off Japan and pounding it with aerial attacks and surface gunnery when the Japanese surrender in August 1945 rendered direct invasion unnecessary. Nimitz and MacArthur presided over the signing of the surrender aboard the battleship *Missouri* on September 2, 1945.

Admiral Nimitz served for two years as the chief of naval operations (CNO), the Navy's highest uniformed office, after the war and then retired into peaceful obscurity in California. He died in 1966.

Nimitz had proven to be a highly skilled strategist who quickly mastered the new dimensions of combined air and sea campaigns waged over the immense distances of the Pacific. He conceived the strategy of isolating and bypassing some enemy strongholds while seizing others to serve as bases for the next thrusts. This practice saved not only time but many American lives, as the Japanese again and again were forced to try to defend key points with insufficient preparation. The island-hopping strategy was not implemented without controversy, however: MacArthur strenu-

ously objected to Nimitz's plan to bypass the Philippines and instead seize Formosa and portions of the China coast to serve as staging areas for the final assault on the Japanese Home Islands. The disagreement was so deeply rooted that Roosevelt himself traveled to the Pacific to settle the dispute, ultimately siding with MacArthur's view that the Philippines should be retaken. Nevertheless, Nimitz's strategy lay behind the long drive across the Pacific, one of the great military achievements in history and the inspiration for NBC's critically and commercially successful serial documentary *Victory at Sea*, with its musical score by Richard Rodgers.

Nimitz's greater achievements, however, may have been his unparalleled ability to cooperate effectively with willful and volatile spirits such as MacArthur and wartime CNO Ernest J. King, to inspire brilliant but personally difficult subordinates such as William F. "Bull" Halsey and Richmond Kelly "Terrible" Turner, and to forge his entire command into a force of incomparable efficiency and morale that fought its way across the world's largest ocean to an unmitigated triumph.

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—*Mark P. Parillo*

Nitze, Paul Henry

(1907–2004)
Policy Adviser

Paul Nitze's contribution to American Cold War strategy extended across seven presidential administrations. Nitze's steadfast belief in dealing with the Soviets from a position of strength to attain U.S. national security goals made him a dangerous hawk to his critics and the model cold-warrior to his admirers.

Born in Amherst, Massachusetts, in 1907, Nitze made a name for himself during the Depression as an investment banker with the firm of Dillon, Read and Company. In 1940 Nitze accompanied firm president James Forrestal to Washington, D.C., to serve as a special assistant to Pres. Franklin Roosevelt.

Nitze first worked on economic affairs, but in October 1944 he was assigned to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, which was to assess the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaigns against Germany. Nitze's work on the survey concluded that the bombing of basic industries had been more effective in retarding German industrial production than the efforts against more specific targets. In the summer of 1945, Pres. Harry S. Truman authorized a similar survey to investigate the effects of conventional and atomic bombs used against Japan. Nitze, now vice chairman of the survey in Japan, soon established himself as an expert on atomic weapons, their uses, and their relationship to conventional weapons.

Nitze believed that, although deadly, atomic weapons had made neither conventional forces nor war itself obsolete. Japan had suffered worse total casualties in firebomb raids during the war without surrendering. In short, the value of atomic weapons compared with conventional bombing was quantitative, not qualitative. Chillingly, the report recommended that the United States prepare against future atomic attacks by building bomb shelters. While Washington dismissed these recommendations, Nitze maintained his belief in the need for both conventional and nuclear forces.

After the war, Nitze became deputy director of the Office of International Trade Policy, contributing to the creation of the Marshall Plan (1947). In 1949 Sec. of State Dean Acheson appointed him deputy of the Policy Planning Staff, under George Kennan. After the Soviets detonated their first atomic device in 1949, Truman asked the Policy Planning Staff to reexamine U.S. security policy. After Kennan left the staff, Nitze was named its director. He led the Policy Planning Staff in producing National Security Council Memorandum-68 (NSC-68), the document that reshaped Kennan's "containment" theory to emphasize military force over economic, diplomatic, or psychological means to preserve U.S. national security in the face of an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. The rationale: the Soviets respected only strength, thus a legitimate threat of force would guarantee security. The document reflected Nitze's aversion to relying solely on atomic weapons and called for massive rearmament. The outbreak of the Korean War convinced Truman (initially somewhat skeptical of Nitze's views) of the document's validity, and NSC-68 ushered in the age of U.S. peacetime rearmament during the Cold War.

With the 1953 inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Nitze was out of the government but contributed to the 1957 Gaither Report on the perceived "missile gap" between the United States and the Soviet Union. The missile gap reflected a fear on the part of many Americans that the Soviet Union was racing ahead of the United States in the development and production of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Again, Nitze argued for increased conventional rearmament and a nationwide program to build bomb shelters to convince the Soviets of the American will to survive a first strike, thus deterring aggression. Eisenhower rejected the report as alarmist and tried to bury it. Nitze argued publicly against Eisenhower's "massive retaliation" policy, by which the United States would deter Soviet aggression with the threat of massive nuclear exchange, calling Eisenhower's policy inflexible and dangerous.

Nitze returned to Washington in 1961 in the administration of incoming president John F. Kennedy. He was appointed assistant secretary of defense for international affairs and served on Kennedy's Executive Committee of the National Security Council (or ExComm) during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. But Nitze's willingness to risk war during that crisis and the earlier Berlin Crisis isolated him from Kennedy's inner circle.

Nitze served Pres. Lyndon Johnson for four years as secretary of the Navy before being named deputy secretary of defense in 1967. In the aftermath of the February 1968 communist Tet offensive in Vietnam, Nitze, a member of Johnson's Senior Advisory Group, suggested immediately sending more troops to Vietnam. Failure in Vietnam, Nitze feared, would make the Soviets question American resolve, creating a crisis in Europe. Unimpressed with Johnson's approach to Vietnam, Nitze refused to defend publicly the president's war policy.

Nitze's final policy contributions were on arms control. He helped draft the original Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), but resigned as a delegate to the second round of SALT II talks at Geneva in 1974, fearing that those talks would freeze the missile development at a point where the Soviets had a substantial lead in intercontinental ballistic missiles. An opponent of the foreign policies of Pres. Jimmy Carter, Nitze became an arms limitations specialist for Pres. Ronald Reagan. In 1982 he took his famous "walk in the woods" outside Geneva with Yuri Kvitsinsky, his Soviet counterpart at the deadlocked "Euromissile" talks. (The episode formed the basis of the Broadway play *A Walk in the Woods* by Lee Blessing.) In a daring departure from his tough stand with the Soviets, Nitze proposed an unauthorized bargain requiring each nation to withdraw substantial missiles systems from Europe. Both Moscow and Washington disavowed the agreement, and Nitze's political influence plummeted. He left public life for good in 1984, but was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by Reagan in 1985.

Nitze's views represent a particularly hard strand of American values forged during the early days of the Cold War that persisted to the end of his public career. Nitze saw Stalin and his successors as the heart of the threat to America's national security. That threat, he insisted, had to be met with strong action that bordered on the very intransigence that Nitze so disliked in the Russians. The ideology of communism and the influence of Moscow had to be checked wherever it challenged America's global interests, be they in Southeast Asia or Europe. Severely at odds with the antiwar movement of the 1960s, Nitze stood firm, unrepentant and assured of the rightness of America's cause.

Paul Nitze will be remembered as a Cold War veteran of seven administrations whose overall influence on U.S. Cold War strategy was nearly unparalleled. His death in 2004 marked the end of an era in American history that Nitze himself can, for better or worse, be credited with shaping. The Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, which Nitze cofounded in 1943, was named after him in 1986.

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—Jason S. Ridler

NSC-68

See National Security Council Memorandum-68.

Nuclear Strategy

Since the nuclear age dawned over the desert at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, politicians and soldiers have struggled with the question of how best to employ nuclear weapons to achieve national objectives in peace and war. In the United States, civilian defense intellectuals dominated the quest to develop nuclear strategy and a new nuclear

diplomacy, a quest that was supported by a community of scholars who embraced the prevention of a nuclear holocaust as the critical social and political issue of the Cold War. The growth in the number, range, and destructive power of Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons eventually created a nuclear revolution in which deterrence was the dominant strategy and stability (the absence of superpower war) was the outcome. Nuclear deterrence, which threatened retaliation in kind to prevent war, and the policy of containment, which promised a gradual mellowing of Soviet power if open hostilities could be avoided, formed a coherent and politically acceptable way for the nations of the West to wage the Cold War. Today, the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is again highlighting the effort to devise ways to reduce the likelihood of war involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Nuclear Strategy During the Cold War

The U.S. detonation of nuclear weapons over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 remains the only actual use of nuclear weapons in war. U.S. planners apparently hoped that the destructive power of the new weapon, combined with the realization that the U.S. forces were free to rain death and destruction over Japan at will, would shock the Japanese government into coming to terms with their hopeless situation and surrender.

The administration of Pres. Harry Truman was slow to integrate nuclear weapons into U.S. force planning and force structure, but the 1949 Soviet test of a nuclear weapon and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 accelerated the development of nuclear strategy and force structure in the United States. In the event of a war in Europe with the Soviet Union, the U.S. plan was to use low-yield nuclear weapons in a strategic bombing campaign. In this scenario, the U.S. Air Force would switch to conventional bombs after exhausting its small arsenal of fission bombs in the effort to prevent the Soviet Army from reaching the English Channel. Limited nuclear capability, however, did not prevent the Truman administration from making veiled nuclear threats during the 1948 Berlin Crisis—by moving nuclear-capable B-29 bombers to England—or hinting that it might use nuclear weapons at the outbreak of the Korean War.

The Eisenhower administration was the first to exploit fully U.S. nuclear weapons in defense policy. By the mid-1950s, new fusion weapons (hydrogen bombs) were being incorporated throughout the U.S. military, new intercontinental bombers were being fielded, and medium-range systems capable of reaching the Soviet Union were being forward-deployed to U.S. allies. These new fusion weapons could produce large explosive blasts equivalent to many megatons of TNT, orders of magnitude greater than the fission weapons (atomic bombs) used against the Japanese, or could be engineered in lightweight designs for air-to-air missiles, artillery projectiles, or even man-portable packages. Eisenhower, a fiscal conservative who believed that the Cold War could ruin the United States financially, saw nuclear weapons—which cost about 10 percent of the U.S. defense budget during the Cold War—as an inexpensive way to deter the Soviet Union. His "New Look" policy shifted resources away from the U.S. Army toward the U.S. Air Force, cut military personnel, and fully integrated nuclear weapons into the U.S. military, thereby gaining "more bang for the buck." The New Look relied on the declared nuclear doctrine of massive retaliation, whereby the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons at times and places of its own choosing in response to communist aggression. The Eisenhower administration made nuclear threats repeatedly—to end the Korean War and to twice threaten the People's Republic of China during the Offshore Islands Crises—but Eisenhower himself balked at a French request to use nuclear weapons to relieve their besieged garrison at Diem Bien Phu in Vietnam.

The Soviet Union also integrated nuclear weapons into its military plans. The Soviets produced medium-range bombers and missiles to hold U.S. allies hostage, taking great pains to exaggerate their nuclear capabilities. American fears of Soviet progress in nuclear weapons and delivery systems led to perception in U.S. intelligence circles of a "bomber gap," following the May 1, 1955, flyover above Red Square of the first all-jet Soviet bomber, as well as a "missile gap," prompted in part by the Soviet launch of the first artificial satellite, *Sputnik* in 1957. Soviet premier Nikita Khruschev was quick to exploit these fears by bragging about Soviet weapons production and by making none-too-veiled nuclear threats of his own, especially during the 1956 Suez Crisis.

Eisenhower, a seasoned soldier and statesman who took a dim view of alarmists, could barely contain domestic political pressure to increase greatly the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Fears of a missile gap were deftly exploited by in 1960 by John F. Kennedy, the Democratic presidential candidate. Kennedy accused his opponent, Vice President Richard Nixon, and the previous administration of allowing the Soviets to pull ahead of the United States. Nixon, who had access to classified intelligence estimates, knew that the nuclear balance actually favored the United States, but he could not reveal this information without compromising U.S. security.

As Kennedy entered the White House in 1961, U.S. nuclear forces and strategy began to take on a form they would maintain until the end of the Cold War. A triad of long-range bombers, land-based, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles carried by nuclear-powered submarines began to be deployed. Khruschev's bluster and bluff backfired—the U.S. defense buildup sparked by Soviet nuclear capabilities actually gave the United States a distinct advantage in the nuclear competition with the Soviets by the 1960s. In fact, Khruschev's decision to place nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba during the fall of 1962 was partly an effort to offset U.S. nuclear superiority. The deployment provoked the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most serious nuclear confrontation of the Cold War. Although the public fear of nuclear war waxed and waned throughout the Cold War, the crisis was especially harrowing. Hundreds of thousands of people spontaneously evacuated U.S. cities as the specter of nuclear holocaust loomed in the minds of people everywhere.

By the early 1970s, a situation of strategic parity had emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union as both superpowers deployed relatively survivable long-range nuclear forces. These secure second-strike forces were capable of launching a devastating nuclear attack even after absorbing a nuclear strike to "assure destruction of the opponent," although some strategists called for more counter-military or counterforce strategies intended to destroy the opponent's conventional or nuclear forces. Decades of formal arms control negotiations actually helped stabilize this situation of mutual assured destruction by eliminating an arms race between offensive missiles and missile defenses, by eventually placing numerical limits on forces, and by providing a forum to explain strategic choices and concerns to the other side. By the end of the Cold War, improved accuracy, warhead miniaturization, multiple warheads per missile, and new delivery systems (e.g., cruise missiles, stealth bombers, large missiles) were threatening the survivability of all land-based forces and infrastructure. New nuclear technologies and programs were abandoned by the early 1990s, however, as Russia and the United States froze their nuclear research programs and undertook drastic cuts in their deployed nuclear forces.

Principles of Nuclear Strategy

Ever since 1946, when Bernard Brodie initiated a dialogue about nuclear doctrine with the publication of *The Absolute Weapon*, scholars, planners, and policy makers have embraced three principles in devising nuclear strategy. First, nuclear weapons, especially high-yield fusion devices, are extraordinarily destructive, making active and passive defenses against them extremely difficult to mount. Even if defenses are highly effective and only a few bombers or missiles penetrate them, the nuclear weapons that get through can still inflict enormous death and destruction. Once a nuclear weapon is detonated, no practical way exists to shield populations or industrial infrastructure from its blast effects—at least not without moving all construction underground. As Thomas Schelling noted, nuclear weapons make possible a "Diplomacy of Violence," whereby nations can destroy each other's societies without first destroying their opponent's military forces.

Second, unlike conventional war, in which outcomes truly depend on the performance of competing soldiers, equipment, strategy and command, nuclear war is far more predictable and is barely affected by the intangibles of morale and leadership that often sway conventional battles. Thus, the outcome of nuclear war can be estimated with some accuracy in advance. For example, if a one-megaton nuclear weapon bursts without touching the ground over an urban area, 50 percent of the people within five miles of the detonation will die. By the end of the Cold War, systems analysts had been able to study thousands of permutations of

various war scenarios and could calculate nightmarish war outcomes with what appeared to be great accuracy.

Third, although nuclear war can be fought and won, the only way to win is to be first to use nuclear weapons in what someone called a "splendid first-strike" that completely destroys the opponent's nuclear force. Hence the attraction and threat of preventive war and preemption were never out of the minds of strategists concerned about nuclear hostilities.

Given these three principles, most planners and academic observers believed that deterrence was (and is) the only realistic nuclear strategy, especially when defeating a nuclear-armed opponent in one preventive or preemptive blow is not possible. Thus, when facing a nuclear-armed opponent, crisis stability—the absence of incentives for either party to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis—is of paramount importance. Deploying nuclear forces in a way that enables a nation to survive a surprise attack reduces the incentives for both parties to be first to use nuclear weapons. Because the strength of deterrence lies in the damage that can be inflicted in a second strike after suffering the worst an opponent can do, survivable forces and the ability to maintain positive and negative command and control lie at the heart of deterrence. This point was made in the 1950s by Albert Wohlstetter after he became concerned that the officers in the Strategic Air Command (SAC) were thinking about deterrence in the wrong way: their forward-deployed bomber force was highly vulnerable to a sneak attack and therefore served as a weak deterrent to Soviet aggression. This led to the creation of the Distant Early Warning radar stations in the far North, the constant airborne deployment of some SAC aircraft, and an increase in the number of SAC bases.

Deterrence also places a premium not only on possessing a secure second-strike retaliatory capability, but also on making a credible commitment to execute the threat against a target or targets valued by the opponent. Because deterrence exists in the mind of the opponent, it is imperative to convince the enemy that the capability and will to implement deterrent threats are real. Nuclear threats are highly credible when facing a weakly armed enemy but, as an opponent begins to create its own second-strike capability, many observers believe that the threat of nuclear retaliation becomes inherently incredible. Is the threat of suicide, they argue, even mutual

suicide, ever credible? To solve this problem, policy makers and planners began to see utility in "threats that leave something to chance," to use Schelling's apt phrase. Thus, even though it might not be rational or reasonable for policy makers to order the use of nuclear weapons, they can take steps to increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used by subordinate commanders. In a situation of mutual assured destruction, nuclear strategy boils down to a competition in risk taking, a willingness to run the risk of Armageddon to achieve political or military objectives.

The Future of Nuclear Strategy

Many observers believe that the term nuclear strategy itself is an oxymoron because of the irrationality inherent in the attempt to harness nuclear weapons to achieve political objects with an "Assured Destruction" policy that increasingly sounded like "Assured Suicide." In the aftermath of the Cold War, many around the world breathed a sigh of relief that the superpowers had avoided nuclear war and began to allow their respective arsenals to atrophy. The proliferation of small arsenals of WMD and the threat that these weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists, however, has reenergized the search for conventional and unconventional ways to destroy these nascent chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities before they can be used against civilian targets. As the 2003 Iraq War demonstrated, preventive and preemptive war is seen by some as a legitimate and necessary response to state and non-state actors that are perceived to be beyond the reach of deterrence.

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—James J. Wirtz

Nurses, Military

Armies and navies have always required medical care. In the history of American wars up until World War II, disease and accidents were much more frequent causes requiring nursing care than battlefield casualties.

Background

At all times, from the colonial period to the present, most of the personnel in the medical services have been men. In the period before the Civil War, women occasionally served in temporary roles, usually after major battles. Nevertheless, some very notable women emerged throughout the 19th century in roles of administrator, organizer, and caretaker. During the Civil War, the U.S. Sanitation Commission, a federal non-military agency, handled most of the medical and nursing care of the Union armies, together with necessary acquisition and transportation of medical supplies. Dorothea Dix, serving as the commission's superintendent, was able to convince the medical corps of the value of women working in their hospitals. Equally important was Clara Barton, whose Civil War nursing efforts had earned her the nicknames "Angel of the Battlefield" and the "American Nightingale." In 1881, Barton helped found and served as the first president of the American chapters of the International Red Cross. No women nurses were involved officially in the Indian Wars but the Spanish–American War required nurses to help with large numbers of sick soldiers. Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee was put in charge of selecting contract nurses to work as civilians with the U.S. Army. In all, more than 1,500 women nurses worked as contract nurses during that 1898 conflict.

Professionalization was a dominant theme during the Progressive Era, because it valued expertise and hierarchy over volunteering in the name of civic duty. Congress consequently established the Army Nurse Corps in 1901 and the Navy Nurse Corps in 1908. The Red Cross became a quasi-official federal agency in 1905 and took upon itself primary responsibility for recruiting and assigning nurses. In World War I the Red Cross recruited some 20,000 registered nurses (all women) for military and Navy duty in 58 military hospitals; they helped staff 47 ambulance companies that operated on the Western Front. More than 10,000 served overseas, while 5,400 nurses enrolled in the Army's new School of Nursing. The women were kept well back from the front lines, and although none was killed by enemy action, more than 200 had died from influenza by war's end. Demobilization reduced the two corps to skeleton units designed to be expanded in the event of another war.

Eligibility at this time included being female, white, unmarried, a volunteer, and a graduate of a civilian nursing school. Julia Flikke, for example, the assistant superintendent of nurses at a Chicago hospital, enlisted and became chief nurse at an Army hospital in France, then served on a hospital train that rushed casualties from the aid stations to the long-term care hospitals. Flikke remained in the Army after the war. After 12 years at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., she was promoted to captain and became the assistant superintendent of nurses. She succeeded in creating new billets for occupational therapists and dieticians. She became superintendent, with the rank of colonel, in 1938. Flikke's small headquarters in 1942, though it contained only 4 officers and 25 civilians, supervised the vast wartime expansion of nurses. She only took unmarried women between the ages of 22 and 30 who had their R.N. degrees from civilian schools. They enlisted for the war plus six months and were dropped if they married or became pregnant.

Upon Flikke's retirement in 1943, she was succeeded by Florence Blanchfield, who successfully promoted new laws in 1947 that permanently established the Army, Navy and Air Force Nurse Corps, giving the nurses regular commissions on exactly the same terms as male officers. A month before she retired in 1947, Blanchfield became the first women to hold a regular Army commission.

NURSES, MILITARY

World War II

The much larger contingent of U.S. forces that would be committed to battle during World War II, as well as the larger territory over which those forces would be spread, required a significantly expanded nursing corps. Hundreds of new military hospitals were constructed for the expected flow of casualties. Fearing a massive wave of combat casualties once Japan was invaded, President Roosevelt called on Congress early in 1945 for permission to draft nurses. With the quick collapse of Germany early in 1945, and the limitation of the war in the Pacific to a few islands, the draft was not needed and was never enacted. By the end of the war, the Army had 54,000 nurses and the Navy 11,000—all women. Much larger numbers of enlisted men served as Army medics and Navy pharmacy mates. These men were, in effect, practical nurses who handled routine care under the direction of nurse officers. Medical advances greatly increased survival rates for the wounded: 96 percent of the 670,000 wounded soldiers and sailors who made it to a field hospital staffed by nurses and doctors survived their injuries. Amputations were no longer necessary to combat gangrene (penicillin and sulfa drugs proved highly effective). Nurses were especially involved with air evacuation, postoperative recovery procedures, and new techniques in psychiatry and anesthesia.

Congresswoman Frances Payne Bolton had influenced the U.S. Army to create a nursing school during World War I. Soon after the United States entered World War II, she introduced legislation that became, in 1943, the Nurse Training Act (also known as the Bolton Act) that created the Cadet Nurse Corps. The act provided scholarships in civilian schools to help 124,000 women study for R.N. degrees and channel them into the two nurse corps. Mabel Keaton Staupers, born in Barbados and trained at Freedmen's Hospital School of Nursing in Washington, D.C., became the first paid executive secretary of the National Association of Colored Graduate Nurses in 1934. Staupers worked tirelessly to secure equal treatment for the association's 175 members. Her work finally paid off when the Bolton Act promoted integration of nursing schools. However, segregation and exclusion was military policy during the war. In all, 217 African American nurses served in all-black Army medical units. Not until 1945 did the Navy induct its first five African American nurses.

Women nurses were not the only women recruited by the American military during World War II. Starting in 1942, Congress passed legislation to create women's Reserves for the Army (WAAC, WAC), the Navy (WAVES), the Marines (Women Marines) and the Coast Guard (SPARS). In all, more than 350,000 women wore military uniforms during World War II. Many served in hospitals as orderlies and practical nurses. Despite their longer history, the two nursing corps lagged behind the women's Reserves in terms of rank and benefits. Nurses had held "relative rank" in the Army since the 1920s and in the Navy since 1942, which meant that they wore the insignia of officers but were paid less than men and did not give orders to men. The status anomaly was finally removed in 1947. The WACs suffered from an unfounded slander campaign that suggested that only women with loose morals would join women's Reserves. All the women's Reserves suffered to varying degrees from such vicious rumors, though none so directly as the WACs.

Military nurses had the opposite experience. There was no question that nurses belonged near wounded soldiers and sailors and that their presence and skills made a difference. Nursing was seen as a female role and was widely praised as excellent training for motherhood. During the war, these nurses were often stationed in areas where they had to perform complex healing and managerial roles reserved stateside for doctors. Nurses had to teach male corpsmen and male and female nurse's aides how to do the basics while they directly assisted the doctors. Nurses could give orders to the male corpsmen because it was always assumed that the orders really came from a man, the doctor.

Army and Navy nurses were stationed throughout the world. Nurses attended the wounded at Pearl Harbor and faced the Japanese invaders on Guam and the Philippines. Five Navy nurses stationed at Guam were captured and exchanged for other POWs. Eleven other Navy nurses were interned in the Philippines at camps at Santo Tomas and Los Banos along with 70 Army nurses. All survived the 37-month ordeal in part because all remained active, helping care for the wounded in these camps. Approximately 6,500 Army nurses were assigned to the Army air forces, and for practical purposes served in a separate organization. The highest prestige was accorded the 500 flight nurses serving on hospital planes that evacuated the wounded.

Nurses after the War

Although individual nurses found discrimination and low-paying menial work awaiting them, the nursing profession came of age in the postwar period. Professionalism became the goal. The war had allowed women for the first time to seize control of the nursing profession. The Red Cross—an agency controlled by male non-nurses—lost its control over nurses as the new professional organization, the American Nursing Association (ANA) gained prominence and influence. The nurses promoted integration; hospitals began dismantling "blacks only" wings, and in 1951 the National Association of Colored Graduate Nurses merged with the ANA. Men were allowed into the Army, Navy, and Air Force nursing corps in the 1950s, and by 2000 accounted for more than 25 percent of the total.

Nurses were quickly recruited and sent near the front lines during the Korean War, Vietnam War, and all other post–WWII conflicts. The exact numbers who served in Korea and Vietnam are not known. Some of the World War II nurses remained in the nurse corps after that war; others remained in the Reserves and were called up during Korea and Vietnam. Women veterans of World War II were deeply affected by the Vietnam War and most opposed putting women in combat units.

New medical advances and improvements in transportation, especially the use of helicopters for evacuation, have proven especially important in recent decades. The result is a demand for more highly trained nursing specialists. During Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991, some 2,200 Army nurses served in 44 hospitals. After 1995, Army nurses were deployed with medical units in support of NATO and alliance troops in Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Gender barriers began falling rapidly partly as a reflection of the increasing egalitarianism in American society, and partly as the result of decades of women's striving. The first women to reach flag rank received their stars in 1970. Hazel Johnson-Brown became the first African American woman to head the Army Nurse Corps in 1979, and the first African American woman general. Finally, in 2004, the Army upgraded the rank of head of its Nurse Corps to major general, pinning the second star on Gale Pollock.

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Women in the Military; Women in the Workforce: World War I and World War II; World War II

—D'Ann Campbell

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
Office of Censorship

The Office of Censorship (OC) was established by an executive order of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt on December 19, 1941, just 12 days after America entered World War II. Its task was to oversee all civilian radio broadcasts and print media, both within the United States and across U.S. borders, to ensure that no information was transmitted or disseminated that might be of use to America's enemies. Under its director, Byron Price, the OC accomplished this task efficiently and with surprisingly little controversy. It remains one of the more successful moments in America's long-term struggle to balance national security and civil rights.

In World War I, censorship and propaganda functions of the U.S. government had been combined in the Committee on Public Information (CPI), better known as the Creel Committee after its director, George Creel. The arrangement did not work well: censorship was heavy-handed and sporadic, and the committee was accused of overzealousness and infringement upon constitutional rights. In World War II, therefore, the functions were separated, with the Office of War Information (OWI) responsible for propaganda, and the OC responsible for security-related censorship.

The OC operated under the assumption that enemy agents were in the United States and might read any newspaper or magazine, or listen to any radio broadcast. Therefore, all information that might conceivably give the Germans or Japanese any military advantage was banned, including troop movements, the sinking of American or Allied ships (unless the Germans or Japanese certainly knew of them), the location of war factories, the president's day-to-day movements, and even local U.S. weather. This ban had to be enforced on 901 commercial radio stations, many of

which broadcasted 24 hours a day, as well as in thousands of newspapers and magazines. In addition, the OC censored cables, telephone calls, radio-telegrams, letters, and printed matter coming into or going out of the United States. The OC had no responsibility for censorship of the military, including bases on U.S. soil; the War Department and the service branches decided for themselves what information to release, which included censoring soldiers' mail.

The OC's job was not only dauntingly large. It also had the potential, given Americans' devotion to the 1st Amendment rights of free speech and a free press, to generate a great deal of resentment. President Roosevelt acknowledged this when he announced the formation of the Office of Censorship, saying, "All Americans abhor censorship, just as they abhor war. But the experience of this and of all other Nations has demonstrated that some degree of censorship is essential in wartime, and we are at war" (Sweeney, 35).

Price proved to be an inspired choice as the OC's director. A career journalist and former head of the Associated Press, Price had the confidence of the media, and he consistently fought to keep censorship as limited and unobtrusive as was consistent with national security. Rather than creating a massive bureaucracy, Price opted for a voluntary censorship code that relied on the common sense and patriotism of reporters and editors. Embodied as the Code of Wartime Practices and revised several times during the war, it was sent to every newspaper, magazine, and radio station in the country.

The Office of Censorship possessed broad powers, including the right to shut down offending radio stations if necessary, but these were never used. On the whole, compliance with the code was high. There were numerous minor violations, typically involving a rural newspaper printing a

picture of a local defense plant, or reporting the date on which a local soldier was to be shipped overseas. These usually involved a misunderstanding of the code and were quickly corrected. There were also small absurdities and annoyances: a radio broadcaster could announce that a major league baseball game was being postponed or delayed, but could not announce that it was due to rain, since that would reveal weather conditions.

There were also a few larger controversies. Price had to resist attempts by elements within the military to take over civilian censorship and make it more Draconian. The popular and controversial radio journalist Drew Pearson, renowned for his ability to ferret out government secrets, was required to submit his radio scripts for advance censorship. But the greatest difficulty was with foreign-language broadcasts. American stations broadcast 1500 hours per week in 29 different languages, and the OC insisted that all such shows be scripted and monitored, and that a translation be made. Many stations, rather than comply with these requirements, chose to end foreign-language broadcasts for the duration of the war.

The OC did its work efficiently during World War II, helping to keep secrets as small as the weather and as large as the Manhattan Project, the development of the atomic bomb. Necessarily, the freedom of expression of American citizens was compromised by the OC's existence, but Price and his staff did their best to limit the damage. Their attitude is perhaps best shown by their agency's end: at Price's insistence, the Office of Censorship went out of business on August 15, 1945, after Japan surrendered and World War II ended.

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Related Topics

Censorship and the Military; Committee on Public Information; Media and War; Office of War Information

—Bernard G. Hagerty

Office of War Information

The Office of War Information (OWI) was established by an executive order of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 13, 1942. Its purpose was to coordinate news and information sent out by the U.S. government during World War II and to oversee domestic and foreign propaganda in support of the war effort. Under its director, the distinguished radio journalist Elmer Davis, the OWI had some solid accomplishments. Overall, though, the agency lacked sufficient resources and authority and was rent by internal disagreements. It was not completely successful in presenting a single, clear picture of American actions and intentions either to the world or to the American public.

In the years before World War II propaganda, the mass media was mistakenly believed to have an almost magical power to control public opinion. For example, Josef Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, seemed able to create fanatical adulation among the German people for the dictator Adolf Hitler. Political scientist Harold Lasswell convincingly asserted that propaganda was an important weapon of war. Therefore, in the late 1930s and 1940s, the U.S. government created several agencies, such as the Office of Facts and Figures, to control news and information. The OWI was created to bring rational central direction to these agencies.

The OWI was assigned a wide range of tasks. Overseas, it explained American war aims and tried to put the United States in a favorable light. It cooperated with the military in a program of psychological warfare against U.S. enemies. The OWI broadcast news by shortwave radio to neutral, enemy, and occupied countries, and in Europe beamed German-language propaganda intended to weaken the enemy's will to fight; in addition, it dropped 800 million OWI leaflets onto enemy territory, urging Germans and Japanese to surrender. The office also sent millions of magazines and pamphlets overseas, including the glossy, 80-page magazine *Victory*.

The OWI's tasks at home were even more wide-ranging. The Bureau of Publications created posters and pamphlets on hundreds of subjects. The Bureau of Radio coordinated the broadcast of public service messages about the war. The Bureau of Motion Pictures made documentaries and distributed those made by other government departments. It also worked with Hollywood filmmakers to ensure that the war was treated "appropriately" in the movies. The radio networks were difficult to regulate; the OWI had little statutory authority to compel them to follow guidelines. Nevertheless, most broadcasters cooperated with the war effort, broadcasting messages about war bond and Red Cross drives, incorporating patriotic themes into entertainment programs, and creating new, war-themed shows such as *Words at War* and *Command Performance*.

Hollywood also cooperated with the war effort, but on its own terms. The OWI issued detailed guidelines for photoplays; units of American soldiers, for instance, were to be portrayed as ethnically and regionally diverse, to show that the war was being fought by and for the whole society, not any one group. Moviemakers largely conformed to these guidelines. They resisted, however, when OWI officials wanted them to emphasize serious dramas that focused on the important issues behind the war, and to forsake their usual light, escapist fare. Some serious films, such as *The Moon Is Down* (1943), were made, but lighthearted musicals and comedies like *Blondie for Victory* (1942) and *Hollywood Canteen* (1944) were much more common—and much more popular among moviegoers.

The OWI was not a popular agency. Americans distrusted propaganda, in part because the idea of manipulating peoples' beliefs seemed undemocratic, and in part because many remembered the overzealous and controversial propaganda efforts of the Committee for Public Information (CPI), better known as the Creel Committee after Director George Creel, during World War I. Elmer Davis understood this, and promised honesty: "I believe that the American people are entitled to know everything that the enemy knows; that the better they understand what this war is about, the harder they will work and fight to win it" (Davis and Price, 9). He was not able to live up to his promise; politicians and military commanders often held back or slanted information, and journalists complained vociferously that they were being misled.

The OWI was also troubled by disagreement about its primary task. Idealistic officials such as the poet Archibald MacLeish and the playwright Robert Sherwood wanted to use the agency to promote democracy and social justice; other officials, recruited from Madison Avenue advertising firms, were simply interested in using modern advertising techniques to help win the war. President Roosevelt gave the idealists little support, and conservatives in Congress were so alarmed by the idealists' liberal agenda that they slashed the OWI's budget.

The news received by Americans during World War II was most often accurate, if not complete. American propaganda efforts, directed toward raising morale at home and building support for the United States abroad, were massive and sometimes effective, and the OWI deserves credit for these achievements. Nevertheless, Americans' dislike of propaganda, and the independence of American media, ensured that the OWI faced a task that it could not fully accomplish.

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Related Entries

Committee on Public Information; Film and War; Office of Censorship; Propaganda and Psychological Operations; Radio in World War II

—*Bernard G. Hagerty*

Oppenheimer, J. Robert

(1904–67)
Scientist

J. Robert Oppenheimer is best known for his leadership of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. program during World War II to design and build the world's first atomic weapons. Although his work as a scientist displayed immense talent and wide-ranging interests, he will forever be known to Americans and the world as the man who headed up the project to build "the bomb."

Oppenheimer was born on April 22, 1904, in New York City. He attended Harvard University and earned a degree in chemistry. He received his doctorate in 1927 at the University of Göttingen in Germany, known for its focus on theoretical physics. He returned to the United States in the summer of 1929 and took up a teaching position in the physics department at the University of California, Berkeley, where he proved himself to be unusually skilled at explaining complex theories in physics to non-specialists. This facility made him popular at Berkeley among his students and would serve him well in his later work with the Manhattan Project.

Oppenheimer held his academic position at Berkeley until 1943. By that time his interests had become more political. Although he had never been especially interested in politics before, his girlfriend, Jean Tatlock, a member of the Communist Party, influenced Oppenheimer to become involved in union activity and, as he stated himself, "just about every Communist Front organization on the West Coast." These political involvements would later be used against him.

In the early 1940s, scientific developments in Germany led many scientists in the rest of Europe and in the United States to speculate that Germany was trying to construct a weapon out of the recently discovered process of atomic fission. When this information was presented to Pres. Franklin Roosevelt in a letter signed by such notables as Albert Einstein, Roosevelt gave the go-ahead for the U.S. military to develop a similar weapon. Scientists across the country began working on the formula and design of an atomic weapon. In early 1942 Oppenheimer was brought in as one of the many scientists on the project. He quickly impressed those in charge and was promoted to one of two men supervising the construction of the bomb mechanism. When the other man resigned in the spring of 1942, Oppenheimer assumed total command. The senior government scientists then realized the true scale of the project and enlisted the help of the U.S. military. Gen. Leslie Groves was appointed head of the project in September 1942. Groves met with Oppenheimer and decided to appoint him head of a new laboratory soon to be built at Los Alamos, New Mexico, which would house the entire bomb project.

Oppenheimer worked at maintaining morale and focus at Los Alamos, where a select group of scientists soon arrived with their families from all over the country. Oppenheimer was fairly successful at it. Bomb mechanisms were developed, material was received, and despite the resignations of some scientists in early 1945, the project did produce a successful test in July. After atomic weapons were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Oppenheimer was showing signs of strain. He confessed to President Truman that he had blood on his hands, though he had

never publicly questioned the moral implications of the atomic weapons he had helped build.

After the war, Oppenheimer took a teaching position at Princeton University. His loyalty to the United States came under question as part of the Red Scare of the early Cold War era. Oppenheimer's brother, also a scientist, had been a member of the Communist Party, and Oppenheimer's own past political leanings led him to be targeted as well.

Oppenheimer had already been the focus of such investigations for years. He was periodically followed and his telephones were bugged throughout much of the 1940s. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) held a hearing on Oppenheimer's activities in 1954. Oppenheimer himself was examined for over 20 hours. The hearing lasted four weeks. In the end, the commissioners concluded that Oppenheimer was now a security risk and would no longer have top clearance. The vote, which came just 36 hours before Oppenheimer's contract with the AEC would have expired, marked Oppenheimer for the rest of his life. He continued to teach and tried to repair his reputation as the atmosphere of the McCarthy era faded.

Oppenheimer's contributions to the American victory over Japan were immense. He managed to hold together a group of isolated scientists and keep them on the task of building a new weapon without allowing discord or frustration to overpower them. The subsequent investigation into Oppenheimer's loyalty during the early years of the Cold War reflected the new type of war society faced, in which one may not always know the face of his enemy. His legacy may have been marred by the accusations against him, but there was never any evidence that Oppenheimer had ever been disloyal to the United States.

Oppenheimer became ill with throat cancer in 1966. He began a series of radiation treatments but continued to travel and give interviews as much as possible. The cancer eventually overwhelmed him, and he died on February 18, 1967.

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Manhattan Project; World War II

—Jennifer S. Lawrence

Osceola

(c. 1804–38)
Seminole leader

Osceola was the most influential Seminole leader during the Second Seminole War (1835–42). His relentless endeavors to keep his people in Florida captured the interest, imagination, and sympathy of Americans, and inspired many Seminoles in their efforts to attain a common goal. Though not a Seminole by birth, Osceola became the tribe's most gifted and recognized leader.

Osceola's mother was a Creek Indian who lived near the Tallapoosa River in Alabama. Some accounts insist his father was an Indian while others claim that his mother was married to William Powell, an English trader. As a youth, Osceola was called Billy Powell. Most accounts from the Seminole War period refer to him as "Osceola, or Powell." His proper Indian name, in the Muskogee tongue, was Asi-Yaholo, meaning Black Drink Singer, a reference to a strong, ceremonial black tea. It was this name that would eventually be corrupted to Osceola. He was later given the

title "Talcy," or Tallassee Tustennuggee, in acknowledgement of his leadership capabilities.

Along with his mother and other members of the Red Stick faction of the Upper Creeks, Osceola was driven to Florida following the tribe's defeat in the Creek Civil War (1813–14). In April 1818, Andrew Jackson attacked their village on Econfina Creek in north Florida as part of the First Seminole War (1817). During the fight, the youth was captured but later released. Spain soon ceded Florida to the United States, and with the Treaty of Moultrie Creek (1823) the Seminoles and refugee Creeks living among them were relocated to a reservation in central Florida.

During 1832 and 1833, the Seminoles and the United States engaged in negotiations that led to the signing of treaties at Payne's Landing and Fort Gibson. These documents, obtained either by fraud or coercion, stipulated that the Seminoles would remove to designated lands west of the Mississippi River. The government's efforts to enforce the treaties were thwarted by the majority of Seminoles, who opposed removal. Osceola's bold defiance attracted public attention and compelled other Seminoles to oppose the government policy. Osceola was further outraged when captured and imprisoned briefly by Indian agent Wiley Thompson in the summer of 1835. Once freed, Osceola led the war party that assassinated Thompson on December 28, 1835, an act that signaled the commencement of the Second Seminole War.

The ascendancy of Osceola within the Seminole community was remarkable because of his position as an outsider among the tribal leadership. As a Creek, he was not a true Seminole, nor was he related to the traditional hereditary line of chiefs. Indeed, many Seminole leaders resented his popularity among their people. Osceola rose to prominence because he was not afraid to speak his mind and to voice his frustrations, the same frustrations felt by many of his fellow tribesmen. His being an outsider did not hinder his rise to prominence: the Seminoles were of Creek origin and were in fact a nation made up of various groups, including runaway slaves. It was an open society where a man could rise on the strength of his words and his actions.

Osceola not only spoke against removal—he also took some of the first actions to prevent it. In the interest of solidarity, he and his followers persuaded the tribal council to impose a death sentence upon anyone who volunteered to emigrate. When Chief Charley Emathla and his followers agreed to removal, it was Osceola who carried out the death sentence. As a military leader, Osceola stood out among his peers. He was a leader at the battle of the Withlacoochee, where a sizable white force was repulsed, and at the battle of Camp Izard, where the Seminoles held more that 1,000 U.S. soldiers under siege for over a week. Osceola made headline news and captured the imagination of Americans who identified with the patriotic motives of an individual fighting for his country and his people.

Despite numerous setbacks in 1836, the United States relentlessly pursued the Seminoles. On March 6, 1837, many of the senior chiefs of the Seminole Nation signed a capitulation and agreed to emigrate. Undaunted, Osceola and 200 warriors entered the detention camp and led the surrendered Indians back into the forests and swamps. Feeling he had been dealt with treacherously, U.S. Gen. Thomas S. Jesup, commander of the war, responded with treacherous actions of his own. On October 21, Jesup ordered Osceola and his followers seized when they came in for talks under a white flag of truce.

Imprisoned initially at Fort Marion in St. Augustine, Osceola and his closest followers were later moved to Charleston. Supposedly suffering from malaria when captured, Osceola died at Fort Moultrie on January 30, 1838, and was buried with military honors. His bravery and cunning in battle, along with his dishonorable capture and subsequent death in captivity, served to make Osceola a martyr for both Indians and whites. Numerous towns and counties throughout the United States have been named in his honor. The tenacity of the Seminoles was personified in Osceola, a gifted leader and a symbol for the most worthy of causes: the defense of home and family.

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Related Entries

Indian Wars: Seminole Wars; Hitchcock, Ethan Allen

Related Documents

1835

—John and Mary Lou Missall

P

Pacifism

Nine days after terrorists struck U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, Pres. George W. Bush, standing before a joint session of the U.S. Congress, unequivocally declared: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." In declaring war on terror, the president challenged the world to accept his absolutist vision in which there is no nuance, no separation of evil deeds from evildoers, no room for expressing an alternative, traditional stance: pacifism. In the weeks before the March 20, 2003, U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, whether they saw themselves as pacifists or simply as individuals opposed to war, millions in the United States and around the world rallied for pacifism.

Concept and Definition

Pacifism as a concept and a practice has many facets and nuances. Conceptually, it can be either a personal moral choice or a universal duty. When considering its practice, some believe in total nonviolence in all human encounters. Others accept the idea of self-defense and state compulsion (or threat of compulsion) in a system of law governing society. Still others are "conditional" pacifists: they refuse to pay taxes supporting war preparations, oppose specific wars, or object to special circumstances, e.g., "nuclear pacifists."

Such variations and qualifications aside, pacifism may be defined as "the theory that peaceful rather than violent or belligerent relations should govern human intercourse and that arbitration, surrender, or migration should be used to resolve disputes" (Moseley). This broad definition, going well beyond the proposition that no person is entitled to gratuitously cause another pain, sees all forms of violence as intrinsically evil, even the use of force to resist or subdue other violence. This, in turn, points to the pacifist's fundamental belief that peace is the supreme good in this world.

Colonial-Era Pacifism

Among the various traditional peace churches transplanted to the colonies, the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) was the most active in trying to shape an environment founded on peace. Influential in what would become Rhode Island, New Jersey, and North Carolina, and dominant in Pennsylvania between 1682 and 1756, the Society of Friends opposed raising "defensive armies" because they inevitably become "offensive" in pursuing and punishing the aggressor.

Quakers frequently refused to help construct fortifications or provide for any martial endeavor, as a result often incurring great financial loss, imprisonment, and occasionally death. Most Quakers also refused to pay "war" taxes or "fines" in lieu of military service, all of which constituted, in their view, immoral state compulsion. Members of other "nonresistant" denominations ("resist not evil"), while abjuring all war and civic participation, nonetheless accepted the state's authority up to the point of compulsory service in warfare.

During the American Revolution, religious pacifists unwilling to support either side maintained that revolution was tantamount to war and just as surely violated God's plan for humankind. While many again suffered significant personal loss, this period also saw the beginning of humanitarian relief efforts for civilians provided by Quakers and, to a lesser extent, by other religious pacifists.

Pacifism in the 19th Century

Citing "national honor," land-hungry western "hawks" in Congress, bolstered by New England merchants and ship

owners whose crews were being "impressed" by the Royal Navy, pressured Pres. James Madison to declare war on Britain. At the end of this "neither just, necessary, nor expedient" War of 1812, David L. Dodge founded the first U.S. "peace society" in New York (Meltzer, 55). Others followed in New England and Pennsylvania, and, in 1828, William Ladd welded most of the then 50 local organizations into the century's most influential U.S. peace organization, the American Peace Society (APS).

The appeal—and ultimate downfall—of the APS lay in its dual opposition to war and slavery. APS abolitionists saw slavery both as an inherent evil and an institutionalized form of war. Luminaries of the movement—Ralph Waldo Emerson, William Lloyd Garrison, and Henry David Thoreau among them—opposed war and slavery. Garrison, who formed the New England Anti-Slavery Society in 1832 and the New England Non-Resistance Society in 1838, opposed all state-sponsored violence and endorsed civil disobedience. Thoreau advocated withholding "war taxes" to protest against the Mexican-American War, a military initiative many saw as a land grab by slave interests seeking new territory. Thoreau and Emerson applauded John Brown's 1859 raid on the Harpers Ferry federal arsenal, which Brown hoped would ignite a slave rebellion. When the southern states seceded, many APS members, including their leader, Sen. Charles Sumner, urged action. They argued that suppressing rebellion was a "police power," and that war occurred between nations. Moreover, "police action" would end the "war" that was slavery. Others in the organization remained staunchly pacifist. APS never recovered from this split.

Ethical pacifism, as distinct from antiwar movements based on political or economic grounds, was left largely to traditional peace churches during the Civil War. After Appomattox, pacifists reformed their ranks. Socialists who saw war as another manifestation of state power over workers embraced pacifism. Alfred H. Love established the Universal Peace Union (UPU) in 1866; its social agenda made it the most radical of late-19th-century peace organizations: it called for full equality for minorities, justice for Native Americans, and women's and labor rights. The UPU reached its height in the years around 1900, during which

time its annual conferences drew 10,000 attendees. The organization made a concerted, albeit unsuccessful, effort to prevent the 1898 Spanish–American War.

Many Americans, recoiling from the bloody occupation of the Philippines after that war, joined the new Anti-Imperialist League. William Jennings Bryan made opposition to the occupation a major issue in his 1900 presidential campaign. Although Bryan's defeat dampened the group's appeal, the Anti-Imperialist League's core issues were to surface time and again over the 20th century.

20th-century Pacifism

As the "Concert of Europe" agreement among Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria to maintain the peace in post-Napoleonic Europe disintegrated, peace societies multiplied. Many, like the Carnegie Endowment, were oriented toward finding alternatives to war rather than relying on religious proscriptions. This new direction was evident in the 1899 and 1907 Hague conventions regarding the peaceful settlements of disputes and limitations on the means used to conduct warfare. But "progress" proved ephemeral despite a show of popular support during the 1907 meeting that extended the 1899 protections for noncombatants. Some 40,000 people attended seven sessions of the National Arbitration and Peace Congress held at New York City's Carnegie Hall April 14–17. In churches across America, 50,000 sermons on peace were preached on what came to be called "Peace Sunday."

Grassroots societies also appeared. In 1914, Jane Addams started the Woman's Peace Party; in 1915, A. J. Muste founded the Fellowship of Reconciliation; and in 1917, Roger Baldwin, who in 1920 began the American Civil Liberties Union, cofounded the New York City–based People's Council for Peace and Democracy. But both the old and new pacifisms had not yet encountered the fire of extreme, self-interested nationalisms. In America as elsewhere, self-interest eventually won; in 1917, America entered the "war to end all wars." Pacifism was driven underground as prominent antiwar figures were jailed for breaking the draconian censorship imposed by the 1917 Espionage and 1918 Sedition acts.

At war's end, pacifism rebounded. Women took the lead; their organizations, along with the newly formed War

Pacifist and founder of the People's Council for Peace and Democracy Roger Baldwin speaking to Columbia University students at a 1935 antiwar rally, which was part of a nationwide student demonstration. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

Resistors League (1923), undertook to educate the public about war's folly. Governments, too, took measures in line with the aims of pacifism: 62 countries signed a "peace pact" in 1929 outlawing war. During the 1930s, British and U.S. students organized debates, rallies, and marches against militarism. That decade was pacifism's high-water mark: "mainline" churches adopted pacifism and secular organizations mushroomed. But the League of Nations faltered in the face of Italian and Japanese aggression and German rearmament.

World War II was a supreme challenge for pacifists. As in the Civil War, many were torn between competing principles: embracing pacifism or resisting genocidal oppression by efficient war machines. Then Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. If not a "just" war (because all wars contravened Christ's teaching), this for many pacifists—especially large numbers of Quakers—was at least a necessary one to resist a powerful evil.

The indiscriminate use of new, powerful weapons—particularly the atomic bomb—raised new concerns among pacifists who watched the creation of a permanent U.S. national security architecture after the war. These concerns were further sharpened by such episodes as Gen. Douglas MacArthur's request to use "the bomb" against China during the Korean War, and Pres. Dwight Eisenhower's decision to rely on nuclear weapons for America's Cold War defense.

As before, pacifists responded by organizing against these new realities. In 1957, Norman Cousins and others founded the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. It lobbied for a comprehensive test ban treaty, tasting success in 1963 when the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to stop atmospheric and underwater testing and to ban tests in space.

Another reality soon emerged: Vietnam. Early pacifist critics included Dorothy Day, cofounder of the Catholic

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Worker Movement (1933), and Thomas Merton, who was "silenced" on the subject by church authorities. In 1966, Clergy and Laity Against Vietnam War (CALCAV) was formed by, among others, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Daniel Berrigan. The largest Vietnam-era antiwar organization, Students for a Democratic Society (1962), opposed both military intervention and what it saw as capitalism's "war-for-profit" motive. By 1968, the society claimed 100,000 members; then it turned to violent protests and quickly lost its standing with the wider public.

While post–Vietnam War presidents frequently employed military force, most engagements such as those in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) happened with little warning and ended quickly. Pacifism after Vietnam seemed to channel its energies into supporting international treaties to control arms, limit military expenditures, and provide humanitarian assistance. Not until the 1991 Gulf War, with its six-month build-up of coalition armies, did the peace community have time to react before fighting commenced. And, although the world was unsurprised when the United States struck Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, few people expected that large U.S. contingents would still be fighting in both countries into 2005.

Despite all the organizing, writing, rallying, and marching for peace, U.S. pacifists at best can claim that their activities shortened or ameliorated the effects of armed conflict by pricking the moral conscience of the nation or making the political price of "staying the course" too high. Yet such seemingly small achievements have a cumulative effect: the expansion and acceptance of international laws limiting the practice of war and regulating its conduct.

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American Peace Society; Antiwar Movements; Conscientious Objection; Just War Theory; Public Opinion and Policy in Wartime; Quakers; Religion and War; Thomas Merton Center; Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Related Documents

1850; 1910; 1976 b

—*Daniel M. Smith*

Patton, George S.

(1885–1945)
Army General

Gen. George S. Patton was considered to be the outstanding American tactical commander of World War II by his German opponents. He was also the most controversial and colorful member of the Allied high command, a paradoxical figure who combined medieval chivalry with an expert grasp of the latest military technologies.

Patton's character derived partly from his family heritage. His father descended from Virginia generals serving in both the American Revolution and the Civil War. Patton's maternal grandfather, Benjamin Wilson, was a Tennessee millionaire and founder of the California orange industry. Growing up in southern California, the future general experienced both southern aristocratic and western influences. Young Patton got to know his father's business partner, former Confederate partisan John Mosby. He decided early to become a soldier, a rare choice for a cultivated rich boy. Thanks to his father's politicking, Patton was admitted to West Point after a year at the Virginia Military Institute. He graduated in 1909 with future Army generals Devers, Eichelberger, Simpson, and John C. H. Lee.

Patton, a skilled equestrian, chose to serve in the cavalry. Although delighting in cavalry exercises and polo, Patton was a serious military intellectual. He read military historians and thinkers ranging from Herodotus and Thucydides to G. F. R. Henderson and Liddell Hart. Patton mastered sailing well enough to captain a yacht across the Pacific and earned an aviator's license in 1928. Understanding how ships and airplanes operate helped Patton later master how ground, sea, and air forces interacted in war. He cultivated powerful political friends such as Henry Stimson and Senator James Wadsworth, who later became a congressman. While courting favor from those above him, Patton also displayed an intense concern for the soldiers he commanded.

Patton won Gen. John J. Pershing's favor while serving in Mexico. As America entered World War I a year later, Patton became the American Expeditionary Forces' leading tank commander. Despite spending only a short time in combat with his tank brigade, Patton impressed future Army chief of staff George Marshall. He won a wartime (brevet) promotion to colonel by Armistice Day, his 33rd birthday, then reverted to his prewar rank of captain.

In 1919, Patton began a crucial friendship with Dwight Eisenhower. Despite major contrasts in personality and background, the young officers became friends because both believed armored vehicles and airplanes were vital to winning future wars. Both men were also protégés of the interwar Army's leading military intellectual, Gen. Fox Conner. Like Conner, they championed the policy changes necessary to combine arms and new technologies in armored, amphibious, and airborne warfare. Although Patton and Eisenhower were compelled by interwar Army service politics to mute their commitment to combined arms, they continued to help and encourage each other.

During the interwar period, Patton was generally restless and unhappy; the onset of World War II cured his misery. Gen. George Marshall appointed Patton to choice armored training assignments, where he shined from 1940 to 1942. Appointed commander of the North African invasion Western Task Force under Eisenhower in the fall of 1942, Patton executed this amphibious invasion of Morocco with skill and low casualties. After U.S. II Corps was mauled and humiliated by the Germans at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia, Patton took command to swiftly revive its morale with victory at El Guettar in March 1943. Eisenhower then assigned Patton to plan and administer America's role in the amphibious invasion of Sicily.

Sicily represented both a peak and a valley for Patton. At first forced to play second fiddle to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army, Patton broke free of imposed constraints and led the rookie U.S. Seventh Army to seize the key Sicilian city of Messina ahead of Montgomery's British Forces. Patton exhibited daring, ruthless drive, and a keen understanding of tactical exploitation.

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Unfortunately, Patton's passion for victory led him to harangue and slap two battle-fatigued American privates in field hospitals. Patton frequently visited front-line soldiers and field hospitals but detested emotional casualties lacking visible battle wounds. Patton fiercely disciplined his natural sensitivity to endure combat's brutality; he despised men unable to make a similar effort. The slapping incidents, offenses punishable by court-martial, quickly garnered press attention.

Eisenhower responded to the scandal by both punishing and protecting Patton. He urged war correspondents to understand how his friend's nervous energy made him "one of the guarantors of our victory." Eisenhower then chastised Patton by commanding him to personally apologize to Seventh Army units for his behavior. Despite Patton's penances, he was removed from the command of the Seventh Army. He lost the chance to command the American D-Day forces invading France; Patton's deputy Omar Bradley took his place.

Ironically, the Wehrmacht refused to believe that Patton had been demoted; its generals believed Patton, not Britain's Montgomery, would command the impending invasion. Aware of this, the Allies used Patton as a decoy to command a fake Army Group to fool the Germans into thinking Pas de Calais, not Normandy, was the invasion target. While playing decoy, Patton received command of the Third Army in January 1944.

The Third Army landed in France in late July 1944. General Bradley at first kept Patton on a short leash. But Patton's subordinate commanders Troy Middleton and John Wood acted in their commander's place by swiftly exploiting the Operation Cobra breakthrough into a daring breakout for Third and First Armies. Bradley finally unleashed Patton to rip the German lines open by attacking spectacularly in three different directions. Patton personally spurred Third Army's men to push themselves beyond normal endurance. No World War II army ever moved faster than Third Army in August 1944; two German armies found themselves being encircled. For baffling reasons, Bradley and Montgomery prevented Patton from immediately closing the Falaise Gap, thus allowing 40,000 German troops to escape encirclement and prolong the war.

Patton's brilliant exploitation of the 1944 French campaign made the five Allied armies victims of his success; they outran their supply lines by early September. Patton was halted; available supplies went to Montgomery's failed airborne attack against Arnhem. The Wehrmacht revived itself with the aid of bad weather; resistance stiffened against Third Army in Lorraine. The German generals, having decided that Patton was their most dangerous opponent, counterattacked vigorously to stall his advance. By December, the Third Army found itself able to mount major offensive operations again, but the First Army was surprised by a German maneuver that became the battle of the Bulge. So Patton performed another tactical miracle: in just three days, he shifted III Corps 90 degrees in terrible weather and over poor roads to counterattack the German penetration's southern shoulder. The Third Army completely surprised the Wehrmacht, relieving the Bastogne siege. Patton wanted to accomplish another encirclement, but his superiors overruled him.

Patton finally executed his ideal encirclement in the March 1945 Rhine–Palatinate campaign. In a master stroke, he surprised and surrounded 10 German divisions, which quickly surrendered. Then the Third Army crossed the Rhine and moved faster through Germany than any other Allied army; Patton reached Austria and could have liberated Czechoslovakia but was stopped by Eisenhower in May 1945, near Prague.

After the German surrender in May 1945, Eisenhower named Patton military governor of Bavaria and ordered him to remove all Nazis from the region. Patton, who intensely disliked the U.S.S.R. and felt that some former Nazi administrators would be needed for Germany to function well enough to check the rise of communism there, refused and was relieved of command of the Third Army. Two months later he was paralyzed in a traffic accident. He died of an embolism in December 1945.

An impressive motion picture and several fine biographies and memoirs have elevated Patton alongside Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant as an American military folk hero. His tactical daring, impatient individualism, contempt for convention, anachronistic chivalry, genuine religious feeling, and profane humor have left a rich store of anecdotes. Patton's battlefield and political enemies perhaps appreciated him most. Hitler and Stalin both paid grudging tribute to him. Col. Gen. Herman Balck, considered the

Wehrmacht's top battlefield commander, called his onetime opponent Patton, "the outstanding tactical genius of World War II" (Farago, 505).

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Eisenhower, Dwight D.; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall, George Catlett; Pershing, John Joseph; Pyle, Ernie; Spellman, Francis Joseph; Technology and Revolutionary Changes in Military Affairs; World War I; World War II

—*Christopher M. Gray*

Peacekeeping Operations

In the 1990s, the American military was more often engaged with keeping the peace than with fighting wars. Peacekeeping in this period often proved more difficult than conducting full-fledged combat operations. Peacekeeping became a major mission of the U.S. armed forces and a much more commonplace and dangerous task than had previously been the case. Peacekeeping also became an increasingly contentious issue. Indeed, arriving even at a universally accepted definition of peacekeeping is difficult. In its most common usage (and in the formulation that is therefore used in this article), peacekeeping can be broadly described as military measures designed to assist the control and resolution of armed conflict. However, peacekeeping's rapid evolution in the 1990s led to the emergence of many new terms and concepts that attempted to encompass the new scope of its operations. Peacekeeping as practiced during the Cold War was now termed traditional, in contrast with the emerging post–Cold War variant, which involved greater superpower participation, and was both wider in scope and more operationally demanding. Both strategies were eventually subsumed by the umbrella term "peace operations"—a misleading expression in that it often involved both peacekeeping and combat duties.

Historical Developments

Peacekeeping originated in the League of Nations commissions that were established after World War I. It has since largely fallen under the auspices of the United Nations, although never explicitly articulated in that organization's

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charter. Peacekeeping was originally conceptualized as an alternative to collective security (which was embodied in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and sought to maintain security through the collective action of nation-states) lest any attempt to engage in collective action escalate into all-out conflict between superpowers. Typically, Cold War–era peacekeepers were assigned tasks like monitoring buffer zones and cease-fires. Missions revolved around three principles: the necessity of obtaining the consent of the parties involved in a conflict; the impartiality of the peacekeepers; and, the nonuse of force. These operations—such as the United Nations Emergency Force deployed to the Suez Canal and Sinai Peninsula from 1956 to 1967—were undertaken mainly by "middle nations," powers accepted as sufficiently removed from the ideological poles of the Cold War and any local conflicts of interest to therefore be considered impartial.

These principles changed when the Cold War ended in the early 1990s. The most immediately noticeable characteristic of peacekeeping at that time was the number of new operations undertaken, with 26 new U.N. peacekeeping missions established between 1988 and 1995 alone—twice the number initiated during the previous 40 years. Reduced tensions between the United States and Russia permitted far fewer vetoes by the major powers at the U.N. Security Council and led to more peacekeeping operations. But the end of the Cold War also contributed to a need for more operations, for example, in Somalia, where the withdrawal of superpower interest was followed by the country's eventual degeneration into anarchy. Concurrently, what has been called the "CNN effect" led to an increased public demand for military intervention to alleviate humanitarian disasters worldwide. The nature of peacekeeping operations evolved rapidly. "Traditional" Cold War–era peacekeeping gave way to more aggressive operations that deployed larger, more robustly armed forces whose increased responsibilities included rebuilding failed states, delivering aid, peace-restoration, and establishing and maintaining "safe havens." Significantly, these operations sometimes took place without the consent of those originally involved in the conflict.

The new strategic situation also paved the way for countries that previously had been less involved—like America—

to carry out peacekeeping missions; the end of competition between superpowers now permitted participation in such undertakings. Underlying these actions was the general belief of the United Nations and national governments that peacekeeping could become a much more proactive tool in international security issues. Such optimism was severely tested in the ensuing decade—especially in the United States, a major contributor to peacekeeping operations in the 1990s.

American Peacekeeping, 1990–99

The peacekeeping operations in which the United States participated from 1990 through 1999 were almost entirely U.N. ventures; they were not only geographically dispersed but they also involved substantial numbers of American personnel. Of these operations, one, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) had been under way in Sinai since 1982. Established to help implement the Camp David peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the MFO was an American-led, and mainly American-staffed, non-U.N. initiative. It resembled the "traditional" peacekeeping model much more than did other such operations that America undertook from 1990 through 1999 and, unlike many of these, it presented no big operational challenges.

One of the first new peacekeeping missions after the Persian Gulf War involved the United States—together with Turkey and Great Britain—in establishing "no-fly zones" over northern and southern Iraq to help address the Kurdish and Shiite refugee crises, caused by Saddam Hussein's oppression of those two groups. These operations—dubbed "Provide Comfort" and "Southern Watch," respectively—often blurred into measures designed to contain the Iraqi regime and deter it from further aggression, and, in the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, to the degrading of Iraqi air defense systems. However, they were typical of peacekeeping operations begun in the closing decade of the 20th century: they took place in the "Gray Zone" between humanitarian-type intervention and the interpositional peacekeeping of the Cold War era on the one hand, and active peace enforcement or full-blown combat operations on the other.

This was also true of the peacekeeping missions undertaken by U.S. forces in the former Yugoslavia. There, "ethnic

cleansing—as the mass forced migration and killing of Bosnian Muslims by Serb forces became known—led to an extension of the mandate of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which had been dispatched to neighboring Croatia in the spring of 1992 to monitor a cease-fire. UNPROFOR was also deployed to Bosnia in June of that year. U.S. military involvement began around the same time, with American aircraft flying food and medicine into Sarajevo, then under siege by Bosnian Serbs. U.S. involvement deepened along with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) when Operation Deny Flight began in April 1993. As its name implies, the operation enforced a no-fly zone over Bosnia–Herzegovina. U.S. aircraft took part in the mission, engaging and even shooting down Serb planes on occasion. American warplanes were also involved in attacks on Serb forces in Mostar, and in the cities of Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zepa, which had been declared "safe areas" by the United Nations on May 6, 1993. The United Nations had also declared Srebrenica to be a safe area on April 17 the same year; it fell to Serb forces in August after having been abandoned by its Dutch U.N. defenders, and thousands of Bosnians were subsequently murdered. The episode highlighted the dilemma facing peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia, who, lacking the appropriate means, ability, and higher-level political will to perform their missions, relied instead on the (often nonexistent) consent of belligerents to a degree that left the supposed defenders of peace powerless.

In 1993, U.S. ground forces became involved in the Yugoslav conflict, with 300 initially sent to nearby Macedonia to join 700 Scandinavian troops as part of the U.N. Preventative Deployment Force. Another 1,500 U.S. troops were dispatched to Bosnia–Herzegovina and Croatia to prepare for a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) that was subsequently deployed to implement a peace agreement in the region, with some 3,000 others sent to Hungary, Italy, and Croatia in support of IFOR and its advance guard. More U.S. troops later joined IFOR and its successor, the NATO-led Stabilization Force. As the focus of the Yugoslav conflicts shifted to Kosovo in 1999, U.S. ground and air forces were deployed there also. Once again, air power played a significant role, as did NATO, under whose auspices American warplanes

took part in an 11-week air campaign designed to halt Serbian aggression against ethnic Albanian Kosovars. As it had elsewhere in the Balkans, peacekeeping from the air had mixed results in Kosovo, and it was followed by the deployment of over 7,000 U.S. ground troops to the region.

If the Balkans provided the most protracted of America's new peacekeeping deployments in the 1990s, Somalia demonstrated the limits of such operations. U.S. peacekeepers were deployed to the East African country in December 1992 after war broke out between rival clans following the 1991 collapse of the Somali government. The troops were part of an American-led, U.N. authorized Unified Task Force (UNITAF), dispatched to ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid to the country after the existing United Nations Operation in Somalia force proved insufficient. Operation Restore Hope, as UNITAF's mission was called, ended in May 1993, with U.S. forces remaining to participate in its successor, UNOSOM II. Attacks on UNOSOM II by forces loyal to Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed led to the launching of operations against him by an American Rapid Reaction Force. The hunt for Aideed (who evaded capture) ended with the deaths of 18 U.S. personnel (and hundreds of Somalis) in a single engagement in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993. The episode, during which television broadcasts showed images of a dead American being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, along with footage of a captured U.S. airman, effectively ended U.S. involvement in Somalia. On October 7, Pres. Bill Clinton announced that American forces would leave the country in six months.

Events in Somalia had repercussions elsewhere, especially in Rwanda. In 1994, the Clinton administration refused to become involved in any sort of peacekeeping effort despite Rwanda's decline into a bout of genocidal violence that cost between a million and a million and a half people their lives and led to the displacement of millions more. American non-involvement appeared to have been based on fears of "another Somalia." Events in Haiti in October 1994 were similarly affected by fallout from Mogadishu. On that occasion, some 200 U.S. and Canadian troops embarked upon the *Harlan County* to provide training to the Haitian military under a deal whereby the country's military leaders would

step down in favor of the democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The vessel was met by a mob of protesters and was ultimately withdrawn without disembarking the troops, suggesting that both the protest organizers and the Clinton administration had drawn similar lessons from America's intervention in Somalia.

Somalia also affected U.S. policy toward peacekeeping generally, influencing Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25). Released in May 1994 and originally planned to support an expanded U.N. role in peacekeeping, in the wake of Mogadishu, it became a means of limiting American involvement in such operations by setting stricter criteria as to when and how such operations would occur. Rwanda may be viewed as the first test and the victim of PDD 25; however, Operation Uphold Democracy, in which a 20,000-strong U.S. invasion force landed in Haiti to facilitate Aristide's return to power (some 11 months after the *Harlan County* incident), suggested that the policy's effects were short-lived. Yet Somalia undeniably represented a watershed in the U.S. peacekeeping experience. American efforts to keep the peace in the Balkans would continue through the 1990s, with U.S. troops also deployed to East Timor in 1999 in support of the U.N. multinational force that was attempting to restore peace there. However, after Somalia, America approached peacekeeping missions much more warily than it had in the first half of the decade.

The Peacekeeping Debate

The 1990s saw peacekeeping become one of the U.S. military's most contentious missions. The underlying question was whether the American military should get involved in such operations at all, which question was part of a larger debate about whether peacekeeping was best undertaken by those whose primary mission was combat. A narrower question also arose: Were U.S. armed forces in particular suited to such tasks, schooled as they were in a doctrine that often appeared to favor overwhelming force over restraint? America's status as sole superpower argued both for and against its acceptance of peacekeeping missions. American military power carried with it a moral obligation to act in situations requiring peacekeepers, some contended, and any failure to do so risked damaging U.S. prestige. Moreover,

America was often the only power militarily capable of taking action or of convincing others to do so. However, such action risked exposing U.S. peacekeepers to unacceptably high risks from adversaries who sought to inflate their own status by engaging the remaining superpower.

Such hesitation was compounded by what some saw as casualty aversion on the part of the U.S. public, politicians, and military chiefs. Episodes such as the American pullout from Somalia, the *Harlan County* incident in Haiti, and the refusal to become involved in Rwanda appeared to substantiate these views. Often, such casualty aversion clashed with demands that something be done to alleviate the humanitarian disasters made so painfully evident by the mass media. Some argued, however, against American involvement in peacekeeping unless a clear national interest was at stake—a position, they asserted, that was supported by the failed operation in Somalia, which had been undertaken for purely humanitarian reasons.

Some of the staunchest opposition to peacekeeping during this period originated in Congress, which was particularly concerned that it be consulted prior to any commitment of American troops as peacekeepers. The problem was partly addressed by the monthly meetings held by the Clinton administration to inform Congress on peacekeeping operations, although sporadic attempts were made to introduce legislation that placed conditions on such deployments. Congress also expressed misgivings about the placing of American troops under U.N. control, although this became less of an issue as the decade progressed and the number of U.S. personnel under U.N. command declined.

By contrast, the question of American funding for peacekeeping operations proved thornier. Such funding had traditionally been less of an issue as the "incremental" costs of such missions—the amount spent on them in addition to regularly anticipated costs—were relatively low. This changed when peacekeeping became a growth industry in the 1990s. Payment for its costs, which were drawn not from specific budget allocations but from supplemental appropriations, suddenly threatened to raise defense-spending levels above the caps set by Congress. An effort to address this was begun in 1996, and a special Department of Defense Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer

Fund was eventually established through which annual amounts were budgeted for ongoing peacekeeping operations. This fund did not entirely resolve the problem, however; operations in Bosnia and Kosovo subsequently sought resources from supplemental funding. The issue of overdue U.S. financial contributions to the United Nations was also a problem for peacekeeping throughout this period. According to scholar Trevor Findlay, the increasing congressional opposition to America paying these debts (which stood at $3.24 billion by 1994) negatively affected U.N. peace operations more than PDD 25.

Another worry shared by many in Congress and in the military was that the high level of U.S. involvement would leave the military unable to fight should the need arise. As well as threatening to overstretch U.S. forces, peacekeeping also presented difficulties in terms of combat readiness. Training and deploying troops to keep the peace, it was argued, risked degrading their capabilities to fight wars. However, others argued that peacekeeping training and duties complemented and improved basic military skills and capabilities. The problem of military fitness was made especially urgent by post–Cold War defense cuts. It is impossible to determine how much the diversion of funds to peacekeeping training and operations affected overall military capabilities—especially in light of the fact that peacekeeping had become one of the primary tasks facing America's armed forces in the 1990s. Similar reasoning was applied to the debate over whether peacekeeping would detrimentally affect the structure of the armed forces. Was it, in fact, useful to the Army to retain the specialists needed to perform peacekeeping missions—such as infantry, civil affairs, military police, and psychological operations units? The need to fill many of these positions with reservists also led to strong disagreements about issues such as retention problems among volunteers and political fallout when they were recalled to active duty repeatedly or for long periods. Finally, peacekeeping had implications for military morale—U.S. personnel were divided over their participation—and recruitment (with some arguing that peacekeeping missions had a positive effect).

Paralleling these debates was a wider one about whether America's military needed the sort of force structure necessary to win the massed armor battles it had once planned for but now seemed unlikely to face. America's peacekeeping experience during the 1990s suggested that this was no longer the case. As the 1990s drew to a close, peacekeeping operations were less popular than when the decade began. Dampened American enthusiasm for peacekeeping contrasted starkly with the increasing political fragmentation and ethnic violence of the post–Cold War world, much as the contradictions between the humanitarian impulses driving peacekeeping contrasted with the American tradition of casualty aversion. It has been said that "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job but only a soldier can do it." As the 20th century gave way to the 21st, much the same might have been said of role played by the world's sole remaining superpower.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Genocide; Iraq War; Persian Gulf War; War Powers Resolution

—*Mark Burgess*

Pentagon Papers

The "Pentagon Papers" is the nickname for a 47-volume history of American involvement in Vietnam compiled by the Pentagon. The official title was *History of U.S. Decision Making Process on Vietnam Policy*. It was commissioned by then-secretary of defense Robert McNamara. Begun in June 1967, the history was not finished until January 1969, but covered events only through 1965. It was written as an in-house history, and only 15 copies were made. Of its 7,000 pages, 3,000 focused on historical studies, with the remainder being copies of government documents. The Pentagon Papers showed that actual U.S. decision making in Vietnam did not always parallel the government's public pronouncements. They also confirmed that some officials had warned repeatedly about the possibility of a quagmire in Vietnam.

By 1969, Daniel Ellsberg, a former Pentagon employee, White House consultant, and employee of the Rand Corporation, had become disaffected with U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Ellsberg had contributed to the Pentagon Papers when he worked for the Pentagon but had never read the entire history. While at Rand, Ellsberg obtained a full copy and decided that he wanted to leak the information to the press in the hope of affecting U.S. policy on the war. Using the photocopy machine of a friend, Ellsberg spirited out hundreds of pages each night from Rand and returned them the following morning. It took several weeks to produce a complete copy of the Pentagon Papers.

Ellsberg allowed a reporter to photocopy his personal copy of the collected papers, and the *New York Times* began publication of excerpts on Sunday, June 13, 1971. The following day the Nixon administration announced that it was opposed to the continued publication of the Papers. Citing threats to national security, government lawyers appeared in court on Tuesday morning, June 15, and asked for an injunction against the *New York Times,* the first time the government had sued the press to forestall disclosure of information for national security reasons. The injunction was issued with a hearing to be held later that week.

That same week, the *Washington Post* obtained copies of the Pentagon Papers through its own means, and editor Ben Bradlee and publisher Katharine Graham decided, over the objections of the *Post*'s lawyers, to begin their own publication of the material. The White House then filed suit against the *Post*. Soon other newspapers joined (12 in all) and were summarily hit with lawsuits. Major newspapers across the country fought the White House lawsuits, citing the 1st Amendment right to a free press. At the end of June, the Supreme Court ruled against the federal government in a 6-to-3 vote. The majority justices believed injunctions against the newspapers either were not permissible or were simply inapplicable in this case. Across the country, newspapers began publishing further excerpts from the Pentagon Papers. Book-length versions were published over the ensuing months, but entire volumes remained classified and unpublished for years. In 1983, previously unpublished material finally made its way into the public's hands.

The content of the Pentagon Papers did influence many American citizens to both oppose the war and question their government. They discovered, for example, that even as Pres. Lyndon Johnson was stating publicly in 1964 that U.S. combat troops would never be sent to Vietnam, he and his advisers were already developing entry plans. There is no evidence that the papers compromised U.S. interests abroad; it is also unlikely that the disclosure of the papers had any impact on the conduct of the war in Vietnam.

The Pentagon Papers have another legacy. In an effort to discredit Ellsberg in August of 1971, the White House had a group of men led by G. Gordon Liddy break into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office in California. The men were unable to find any personal files on Ellsberg, but this episode represents the first illegal act of the clandestine

group soon to be dubbed the "plumbers." The "plumbers" were designed to fix "leaks" and later participated in the bugging of the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel. Their arrest began the downfall of the Nixon administration, resulting finally in the president's resignation in August 1974.

The Pentagon Papers episode demonstrated to the American public that their faith in what the government had been telling them about the Vietnam War was misplaced. Obviously, Nixon's administration bore a substantial brunt of the public outrage because of the continued U.S. involvement in the now questionable war. However, the fact that the Papers implicated previous administrations resulted in a general distrust of politicians quickly followed by questions about their integrity. These events, coupled with the larger scandal of Watergate, fundamentally changed the American people's relationship with their government and with politicians.

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Antiwar Movements; McNamara, Robert S.; Media and War; Vietnam War

Related Documents

1970 c

—*Jennifer S. Lawrence*

Pershing, John Joseph

(1860–1948)

Commander of the American Expeditionary Force (World War I)

John Joseph Pershing was an Army officer best known for leading the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) during World War I. In addition to serving as its combat commander, Pershing essentially developed the AEF into an independent army. At the time, leaders from the European powers were skeptical of American military capabilities. The U.S. Army had stumbled badly during its last overseas service, the Spanish–American War. Many British and French commanders insisted that American troops serve as part of existing Allied units because they believed that was the quickest way of getting them into battle and blocking the German offensive in 1918. But Pershing took such proposals as insults to the professionalism of the American officer corps. He also agreed with Pres. Woodrow Wilson that the Army's performance was critical to the nation's role in the peacemaking process.

Early Military Career

Pershing was born in rural Missouri in 1860, the son of a small shopkeeper and farmer. Although he was unsure about a military career, Pershing enrolled at the United States Military Academy to finish his education. Although only an average student at West Point, he excelled in his military duties to the extent that he was chosen as senior cadet captain, the school's highest military honor. Lieutenant Pershing served with distinction in the 6th Cavalry on the American western frontier. He won a commendation from Gen. Nelson Miles during the final campaign against Chief Geronimo and the Apache. These achievements earned him the command of the Sioux Scouts, which he led during the battle of Wounded Knee. His Indian-fighting career earned Pershing a reputation for organizational efficiency and personal bravery.

This service also provided the context in which Pershing gained his famous nickname of "Black Jack," a reference to his outspoken support of African American troops. Contrary

to existing racial prejudices, Pershing argued that African Americans could make good soldiers, given what he saw on the frontier. Pershing's new moniker was far from complimentary; indeed, in some circles, he was known as "Nigger Jack" Pershing, which the press eventually softened because of the general's prestige. These epithets reflected the Army's prevailing attitudes toward African Americans as well as personal animosity for Pershing—the result of his reputation as a strict disciplinarian.

Pershing served briefly at West Point as an instructor in cavalry tactics, but returned to field service during the Spanish–American War. As a captain in the 10th Cavalry, he again demonstrated coolness under fire that drew the attention of none other than Theodore Roosevelt. In 1899, Pershing was transferred to the Philippine Islands where he helped to put down the Muslim Moro insurrection. During this episode, Pershing demonstrated another key quality that marked his career, an ability to work with soldiers of different ethnicities and cultural backgrounds than his own. Pershing prepared to lead indigenous troops by studying the Koran and learning their dialects. Still only a captain, Pershing commanded five troops of cavalry and a battalion of infantry and artillery in the battle to take the Moro stronghold at Lake Lanao.

Pershing was later assigned to duty with the General Staff in Washington, D.C., where he found himself the darling of the city's political elite, including President Roosevelt. While there, he married Helen Warren, the daughter of Sen. Francis Warren of Wyoming, in a ceremony attended by the president. Given his past accomplishments and newfound political connections, Pershing was rewarded with new assignments that furthered his chances at promotion. While only a major, he served as a military observer during the Russo-Japanese War, often interacting with foreign officers quite senior to him. In 1906, President Roosevelt promoted Pershing to brigadier general, bypassing more than 800 officers to do so. In the tradition-bound Army of that era, a president rarely trespassed seniority. Many of Pershing's peers protested what they viewed as political nepotism, but Roosevelt persisted in having the appointment confirmed, and the new general returned to the Philippines to command the military department on Luzon.

The Punitive Expedition in Mexico

Pershing returned to the United States in 1914 to command the Army's 8th Brigade in San Francisco. This assignment was a time of great personal tragedy. In August 1915, Pershing's wife and three daughters were killed in a fire at their quarters in the Presidio. Pershing threw himself into his work after leaving his sole surviving child with family in Nebraska.

Several crises loomed that the Army was unprepared for. Besides the war in Europe, tensions were growing between the United States and Mexico. The worst episode involved an attack in March 1916 by forces of the Mexican nationalist and outlaw leader Pancho Villa on the town of Columbus, New Mexico, that left 17 Americans dead or wounded. Despite calls for action from the Wilson administration, the Mexican government did not capture Pancho Villa.

Pershing was put in charge of what was called "the punitive expedition" to bring Villa to justice. Eventually, 12,000 American soldiers were deployed to Mexico as part of the search. However, the difficult and unfamiliar terrain, along with the Mexican government's intransigence, made finding Villa impossible. Pershing gained additional experience organizing and leading a large operational command, experience most other generals did not have on their resumes. The highly publicized affair also put his name before the public, making him the leading candidate for other operational commands once the United States became involved in World War I.

Command of the American Expeditionary Force in World War I

President Wilson promoted Pershing to the command of the AEF over five other generals senior to him. Pershing's relative youth was also a factor in winning this assignment. Wilson wanted a general with the stamina to handle what he knew would be a difficult job. Nothing in the Army's history approached the complexity of what was about to be undertaken. Mobilization planners were predicting the end strength of the AEF to be around three million soldiers. Even adding the National Guard and reserve forces, this was essentially creating an army out of

nothing. The majority of this force would have to be organized and trained before it was battle ready, which could take two to three years.

Pershing and his staff left for France in May 1917 before any combat troops had sailed. His officers were challenged to create the logistical infrastructure, the supply depots and lines of communication, to support an independent army. Many British and French officers believed that this effort was an unnecessary delay and preferred that troops be routed as soon as possible into existing Allied units. Pershing and Wilson never viewed this as an option. The American public would never have tolerated their troops being used as cannon fodder for the next disasters on the Western Front. Despite their troops' inexperience, Pershing and his officers also believed that Americans would perform better under their own commanders.

As commander of the AEF, Pershing often had to defend the decision to form an independent army to the civilian leaders of the French and British governments. His bluntness in doing so led some foreign officials to request that President Wilson relieve Pershing of command. However, by the spring of 1918, Pershing had five divisions ready for combat, enough to form an army. In expediting combat troops to France, the AEF lacked the support troops to sustain operations. To get his troops combat experience and to relieve the pressure on Allied forces, Pershing agreed to have some units serve temporarily under French command. But these forces were to be released to American control as soon as the AEF became operational, and finally happened in July. The First American Army took over a supposedly quiet sector of the Western Front, the St. Mihiel salient. However, fighting flared up in this area as the Germans launched their last major offensive of the war.

The AEF contributed the most to the Allied victory during the Meuse–Argonne campaign in the summer of 1918. As American troop strength increased, Pershing assumed responsibility for a larger sector of the Allied front. The inexperience of the AEF showed in its first few battles, and probably resulted in higher casualties. The courage and freshness of the American troops more than compensated for any performance deficiencies and ulti-

mately broke the German attack. The specter of an unending stream of American reinforcements led to an armistice that November. Pershing's tenacity in building and preparing the AEF contributed in large part to the expedition's success.

After the war, Pershing was promoted to general of the armies, a rank that had previously been held only by Civil War luminaries Ulysses S. Grant, William Sherman, and Philip Sheridan. Despite calls to enter politics, Pershing remained in the Army, possibly because he was aware of the poll of nearly 13,000 World War I veterans in 1919 who answered the question "Would you favor a military man for President" with a resounding no (9,471 to 3,208); the stiff and formal Pershing would have been the figure in the minds of most of these veterans. Eventually he served as the Army's chief of staff. Pershing also wrote an autobiography, *My Experiences in the World War* (1931). In his later years, he assumed a role that was largely ceremonial, representing the United States at various conferences abroad and in celebrations commemorating the Army's achievements during World War I.

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Geronimo; Harlem Hellfighters; National Guard; Philippine War; Spanish–American War; Wilson, Woodrow; World War I

—*Todd Forney*

Persian Gulf War

(1991)

The Persian Gulf War was the first major conflict engaged in by United States after the Cold War ended in 1989. Under the orders of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Army occupied the neighboring country of Kuwait in August 1990. The pretext for the invasion was that Iraq intended to retake territory to which it had an historical claim. The United States intervened in the crisis as part of an international coalition sponsored by the United Nations. American action reflected Pres. George H. W. Bush's vision of what he called a "New World Order"; as the only remaining superpower, the United States would lead other countries to stand against aggression and preserve international stability. The United States would probably have intervened in the crisis unilaterally if necessary; Kuwait's oil reserves, one-tenth of the world's supply, were vital to Western economies. The Bush administration believed that inaction would encourage further aggression against other oil-rich countries in the region.

Origins of the Crisis

Iraq had a history of being an aggressor nation under Hussein's leadership. From 1980 to 1988, Iraq fought a fratricidal war against Iran to determine which country would dominate the region. In that conflict, the Iraqi military used a range of illegal chemical and biological weapons. Hussein was also notorious for repressing ethnic minorities in consolidating his power in Iraq. However, his expansion efforts had strained

Persian Gulf War (1991)

Total U.S. Servicemembers (Worldwide):	**2,322,332**
U.S. Population (millions):	**260.0**
Deployed to Gulf:	**694,550**
Battle Deaths:	**147**
Other Deaths (in Theater):	**235**
Other Deaths in Service (Non-Theater):	**914**
Non-mortal Woundings:	**467**
Cost (in current billions $):	**61.00**

Source: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.html>

the resources of the Iraqi economy. The occupation of Kuwait was intended to pump additional resources into his depleted treasury. Moreover, Hussein was irritated that Kuwaiti oil production was driving prices below market value.

Although Kuwait was important to the United States, Hussein did not believe America would go to war over it. April Glaspie, the American ambassador to Iraq, failed to disabuse Hussein of such notions with her ambiguous warnings about the United States protecting its friends in the region. In any event, the Bush administration equivocated because the United States had no regional defense treaties that mandated a defense of Kuwait. Hussein interpreted this to mean that an invasion would result in, at most, economic and political sanctions.

Operation Desert Shield

The U.S. military had substantial naval and air forces in the region, but not enough ground power to roll back or contain the Iraqi Army, and even if it had, the Bush administration faced a challenge in preparing the nation for the most significant ground combat since the Vietnam War. In determining the scale of its response, the United States was initially concerned with safeguarding its relationship with its most important ally in the region, Saudi Arabia.

The buildup of forces was called "Operation Desert Shield"; it was the first real test of a mobilization concept developed in the 1980s called the "Rapid Deployment Force." The idea was to have a few units ready to deploy at a moment's notice. The Army kept its airborne divisions at peak effectiveness; they had top priority for staff replacements and new equipment. The Marine Corps pre-positioned a lot of heavy equipment, for example, tanks, trucks, and artillery, at bases overseas, including Diego Garcia, an isolated island in the western Indian Ocean. Troops could more easily be moved into position and then matched up with their equipment.

To some extent, the buildup was the easy part. It deterred further aggression, but freeing Kuwait would be a different matter. The United States explored a number of options short of war for reversing the occupation. A naval blockade to enforce economic sanctions against Iraq was begun. The Navy's goal was twofold: an embargo on Iraqi oil would cripple

its economy; U.S. forces could also weaken Iraq's military by preventing new supplies from reaching the country. The U.S. government froze Iraq's financial assets in the United States to put further economic pressure on Hussein.

The Bush administration also worked with the United Nations to obtain formal international condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The president believed this to be the first step in building a coalition of countries should military action become necessary. He understood that the United States would bear the brunt of any fighting regardless of how many other countries became involved. However, an international effort was desired because the U.S. government hoped the participation of many countries would allay long-standing suspicions (based on the U.S. relationship with Israel) in the Middle East about the United States. The U.N.'s endorsement was also critical in quelling the public's concern that the country was becoming embroiled in another Vietnam. Bush promised that if war did come, the United States would intervene with overwhelming military force to achieve clear and definable goals, consistent with his administration's Weinberger–Powell Doctrine, so named because it had been outlined by the Reagan administration's secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, and refined by Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Bush.

Operation Desert Storm

The critical variable with all of these efforts was time. Eventually, political, diplomatic, and economic pressure might have forced concessions from Saddam Hussein. However, the longer the occupation continued, the more difficult it might be to dislodge Iraq's army from Kuwait. Weather was also an important factor. A war fought in the Middle Eastern winter would be better than one in spring or summer, when high temperatures would challenge American troops and degrade their equipment. Also, although the United States had forged a credible alliance, time could fray these relationships.

Before war could begin, the United States had to increase its forces from what were in place for Operation Desert Shield. In November 1990, President Bush more than doubled American troop strength in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. Many of these troops, including the Army's heavily armored VII Corps, came from forces normally stationed in western Europe. This expansion also required massive call-ups of Reserve and National Guard units. The government did not institute a draft, but many Americans feared one would be necessary if the war lasted too long or if casualties were too severe. President Bush did not ask Congress to declare war, but he did seek its approval to enforce the stipulations of the U.N. Security Council resolutions. These efforts were a conscious attempt to avoid what were viewed as the strategic mistakes of the Vietnam War, specifically the policies of gradual escalation and draft deferments.

The conflict began on January 16, 1991, with a massive bombing campaign to cripple the Iraqi command-and-control infrastructure. Despite efforts to limit civilian casualties, the destruction of Baghdad's electric power grid left thousands of Iraqis without power or water, which took its toll on the city's population as the war continued. In addition to conventional air strikes, the American military capitalized on new technology, like Tomahawk cruise missiles and laser-guided bombs. This "new" type of war received significant media attention on cable news networks such as CNN. The air war also targeted military positions inside Kuwait to soften enemy defenses before the ground assault began. Although Iraq had one of the largest air forces in the Middle East, most of its planes and airfields were destroyed within the first days of the conflict. Hussein promised a prolonged conflict similar to the Vietnam War, claiming that the United States did not have the stomach for a long war. Iraq also threatened the use of biological and chemical weapons against coalition forces or Israel if its forces were attacked.

The top American military leaders, including Powell and the commanding general of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, devised a battle plan to minimize American casualties. The ground campaign would not begin until the air war had sufficiently weakened Iraq's army in Kuwait and cut off its control and communications from Baghdad. The Marine Corps would prepare for several amphibious landings to confuse Iraq's leadership about where the main assault would be launched. American ground forces located in western Saudi Arabia would take advantage of their superior communications and maneuverability to circumvent

the prepared defensive positions of Iraq's army. The ground war, which began on February 24, 1991, achieved a level of success beyond most planners' expectations. The bulk of the Iraqi Army consisted of poorly motivated conscripts who quickly surrendered to coalition forces. American armored and airborne units skillfully cut off the retreat of important elements of Hussein's elite Republican Guard divisions and either destroyed or incapacitated them in decisive battle. The ground war concluded in just three days with a minimum of casualties, virtually the opposite of what had been feared.

Aftermath

President Bush and General Powell resisted calls to continue the war into Iraq in order to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. Neither Bush nor Powell felt that the U.N. resolutions authorized such an action and worried about its effect on the cohesion of the alliance. They also wanted a clean end to the war, and the ejection of Iraq's army from Kuwait provided the opportunity for a convenient exit from a potential quagmire. Iraqi and coalition leaders formally agreed to cease-fire terms on March 3, 1991. On the positive side, Kuwait was liberated at a cost of just 246 American deaths. The Iraqi military had suffered an ignominious defeat; virtually all of its offensive capability appeared to have been destroyed. The war seemed to cripple Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction. Hussein also appeared to be on the verge of being ousted from power.

Time has shown that many of these perceptions were incorrect, which soured many Americans on their victory. Hussein's regime survived to be a continued threat to stability in the Middle East. As much as possible, he rebuilt his military forces and crushed Kurdish and Shiite uprisings, which had been inspired, in part, by those groups' anticipation of assistance from the coalition. However, the United States did accomplish a significant victory, organizing and leading a coalition of nations that liberated Kuwait at minimal cost. The victory restored the American people's faith and confidence in their armed forces, and President Bush claimed the war helped the nation to cure "the Vietnam syndrome." Although this too was exaggerated, American leaders no longer conducted foreign policy in the shadow of failures in Vietnam.

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All Volunteer Force; Chemical Warfare; CNN; National Guard; Powell, Colin; Schwarzkopf, H. Norman; Vietnam War; Weinberger–Powell Doctrine

—Todd Forney

Philippine War

(1898–1902)

Often portrayed as either a continuation of the conquest of the western frontier or a precursor to Vietnam, the American pacification of the Philippines is more accurately interpreted in the context of the 19th-century wars of imperial conquest. Superior weaponry, training, leadership, and logistics allowed a numerically small Western force to overcome a more numerous but internally divided resistance. What made the American accomplishment notable was the development of an effective pacification strategy that combined chastisement and conciliation.

The Military Conquest of the Philippines

The outbreak of the Spanish–American War on April 25, 1898, was followed almost immediately by the U.S. defeat of the Spanish naval squadron at the battle of Manila Bay on May 1. Comm. George Dewey's small fleet dealt a crippling blow to Spanish power and ignited widespread

Filipino uprisings throughout the Philippines. Many of these movements were headed by local elites and had little connection to the earlier independence movement directed by the exiled Emilio Aguinaldo. Although Aguinaldo returned on June 23 and proclaimed his leadership of a revolutionary government dedicated to Philippine independence, his actual control was largely confined to south and central Luzon. As Spanish authority collapsed, Pres. William McKinley, seeking to exploit Dewey's success and unaware of the local situation, ordered an American military expedition to capture the capital city of Manila. The first troops arrived in Manila Bay on June 30 and were rapidly increased to some 14,000, sufficient to take Manila against desultory Spanish resistance on August 13.

The military occupation of Manila alienated Aguinaldo, who sought to maintain a siege of the American forces at the same time he consolidated his military and political power. For his part, McKinley kept his ultimate intentions toward the Philippines unclear until December, when he instructed the commissioners negotiating peace with Spain to demand the entire archipelago. Although historians still debate his real motives, McKinley justified acquisition largely in moral terms: the United States had an obligation to bring economic prosperity, social justice, and peace to the Filipino people. However, his December 21, 1898, proclamation, while declaring that the nation's goal was one of "benevolent assimilation," made clear that U.S. authority would be extended throughout the archipelago, by force if necessary. Aguinaldo and his supporters proclaimed the formation of the Philippine Republic on January 20, 1899, but the government was national in name only. Outside of Luzon, insurgent leaders gave either little or no allegiance to Aguinaldo and they, in turn, were given virtually no representation in his government. Neither Aguinaldo nor the local civil and military authorities that wielded actual power sought to include the peasantry, who made up the vast majority of the population. The elitist character and objectives of the nationalist leaders weakened Filipino popular support for the revolution.

Relations between Aguinaldo and the U.S. Army rapidly deteriorated after the occupation of Manila and McKinley's December declaration. After a number of incidents, fighting broke out on the night of February 4, 1899, and for the next 10 months U.S. and Filipino conventional forces struggled for control of Luzon. In the second battle of Manila (February 4–22, 1899), American forces under the command of Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis drove Aguinaldo's army back from the capital, inflicting crucial losses in matériel and personnel. Two successful offensives in March captured the Republic's capital of Malolos and cut Aguinaldo's army in two. In late April, a sustained offensive into central Luzon almost destroyed what remained of the rebels, but a combination of weather, disease, poor communications, and logistical problems allowed the demoralized Filipino forces to escape. The summer monsoon led to a halt in major conventional operations on Luzon and the relief of the state volunteers who had enlisted to fight Spain.

In October, reinforced by a newly recruited federal volunteer force, Otis launched a three-pronged attack designed to encircle Aguinaldo's army. Two divisions drove north, pinning the insurgents' main force, while an amphibious brigade landed at Lingayen Gulf to block its retreat. On November 13, 1899, Aguinaldo ordered the remnant of his army to scatter, return to their homes, and take up guerrilla warfare. Although his rear guard was destroyed on December 2, he escaped into the mountains of northern Luzon. With the main insurgent conventional forces scattered, in January and February 1900 American expeditions conquered the area south of Manila and occupied most of the major ports in the Visayan Islands. Believing that no effective armed resistance remained, Otis reorganized his tactical units into operational forces and spread them throughout the archipelago. The Army's objective was to prepare the way for U.S. colonial government by imposing law and order, reviving the economy, and winning over the population.

The Guerrilla War, 1900–02
The American occupation provoked strong opposition in much of the archipelago. As American troops entered the countryside, Filipino guerrillas ambushed patrols, attacked supply lines and communications, sniped at sentries, assassinated collaborators, sabotaged economic and social reform projects—and then disappeared into the population. Many insurgents believed that sustained guerrilla warfare would

lead the American public to repudiate McKinley in the upcoming 1900 presidential election and induce the rapid withdrawal of the U.S. forces. Drawn largely from the same elites who controlled provincial towns, the guerrilla leadership had strong local connections that allowed it to raise recruits, secure supplies, and hide among the population. However, the most notable aspect of the guerrilla resistance was its regional variations. In almost half of the archipelago's provinces no armed clashes between Americans and rebels occurred, and in other areas the occupying soldiers were more popular than their irregular opponents. Many of those who resisted the Americans had little or no connection to Aguinaldo. They included Muslims who sought martyrdom through ritual suicide attacks; indigenous religious cults; peasant movements that sought land reform; brigands; and local political factions that controlled armed gangs. In occupying the Philippines, the U.S. military stepped into a society that was breaking apart from ethnic, religious, and class rivalries. The U.S. armed forces attempted to put it back together again, village by village.

American pacification in the Philippines was characterized by a combination of conciliation and coercion. Heeding McKinley's orders to act as an agent of benevolent assimilation, Army leaders sought to win Filipino support for colonial rule by progressive reforms in sanitation, health care, education, government policies, and the legal system. Otis deployed his forces into hundreds of company garrisons throughout the archipelago. The Army built roads, schools, markets, and wells, soldiers taught Filipino students in newly established schools, and Army doctors vaccinated thousands of civilians. Otis himself rewrote much of the archipelago's law code, and other officers worked to create civil governments that would provide essential social services to their citizens.

Although such reform activities proved attractive to many Filipinos and gained Americans crucial support in some areas, in others the guerrillas fought on. The Americans had to employ considerable military coercion as well. Soldiers conducted extensive small-scale military operations, most of them patrols of fewer than 100 men, which scoured the surrounding countryside. Aided by Navy gunboats and mounted units, mobile forces soon developed

practical and simple tactics for fighting in the jungles, swamps, and paddies. Against particularly skilled or elusive opponents, some soldiers focused on destroying homes, crops, and livestock—both as retribution and to deny the guerrillas supplies and shelter. By mid-1900, such destructive measures had become more and more common in some areas, leading to a sharp contrast between the benevolent policies articulated by the Army high command and the punitive sanctions that were practiced. Otis's successor, Gen. Arthur MacArthur, recognized the depth and complexity of the guerrilla resistance, but was unwilling to follow the advice of many field officers and adopt more stringent pacification measures.

In December 1900, his resolve stiffened by McKinley's reelection and increasing pressure from both the U.S. government and his field officers, MacArthur announced the implementation of more punitive measures against guerrillas and their supporters. He lifted many of the legal prohibitions, allowing officers to arrest, jail, fine, and deport suspects, and letting soldiers destroy the crops, livestock, and houses of guerrillas or their supporters. In early 1901, the tide of war clearly turned. American soldiers, most of them veterans of more than a year of fighting, swept through formerly invulnerable insurgent strongholds. Relying on increasingly effective intelligence, they broke up the insurgent logistical and recruitment networks. They were joined by an increasing number of Filipino soldiers, police, and militia. Insurgent leaders and their guerrillas began to surrender. Aguinaldo was captured in April and issued a proclamation urging his followers to surrender. Resistance would continue until May 1902 in some areas of Luzon and on the island of Samar, but the Philippine War was effectively won by the summer of 1901. On July 4, 1902, Pres. Theodore Roosevelt declared the "insurrection" officially over. The American-led constabulary brought a higher level of peace than had previously existed in the countryside, all but ending centuries-long problems of banditry, communal feuds, sectarian rebellions, and other violence.

Consequences of the Philippine War

The long-term consequences of the Philippine War are still debated. Revelations of American troop misconduct—the

devastation of villages, the torture of suspected insurgents, and the summary execution of prisoner—were widely reported in the anti-imperialist press and prompted a Senate investigation in 1902. Although the U.S. administration and the military argued that only a few soldiers misbehaved, their opponents argued that the war had been won only by the indiscriminate slaughter of Filipino civilians. The administration's assertions initially prevailed, and public outrage quickly turned to other concerns, such as regulating trusts and patent medicines, and debating issues of urban reform. However, the anti-imperialist argument revived with the isolationism that took hold after World War I and became the dominant intellectual paradigm during Vietnam, so that by the 1980s textbooks in the United States portrayed American troop behavior as racist, cruel, and murderous. Overlooked were the military's social reforms in law, education, commerce, health, and transportation, which contributed to a general improvement in the welfare of the population. Overlooked too were the many examples of friendly relations between soldiers and Filipino civilians and the fact that tens of thousands of Filipinos assisted American military forces. Recently historians have accepted a more balanced interpretation of the war that emphasizes the localized nature of Philippine resistance and America's ability to combine coercion and conciliation.

In many respects, however, the war and the ensuing occupation demonstrated the perils of imperial overreach. The Philippines did not prove to be an economic bonanza. Private financial investment in the islands was modest in scope, and influential Americans viewed Philippine products, particularly sugar, as unwelcome competition. Coupled with these fears were those of Filipino immigration and job competition, a concern that attracted a substantial racist presence to the anti-imperialist movement. As a result, a large number of Americans—farmers, laborers, supporters of Asian exclusion, liberal Democrats, isolationists—urged that the United States cut its ties to the Philippines. Nor did the islands provide sufficient economic or strategic entry into the Far East. With Japan's emergence as the dominant power in the western Pacific in 1905, the islands became a strategic liability. They were too weak to serve as a base for offensive purposes and their

defense drew matériel and personnel away from other, more important areas. By the 1930s American military and political leaders sought to undo the war's result and to grant independence to the Philippines even before some Filipino leaders desired it. The Japanese attack in the Pacific at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941 inflicted a humiliating defeat and taught Americans to reassess the high cost of empire.

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Related Entries

Gunboat Diplomacy; McKinley, William; Roosevelt, Theodore

Related Documents

1863 h; 1899; 1900

—*Brian McAllister Linn*

Photography

See Combat-Zone Photography.

Pinups

After World War I, many American soldiers came home from Europe with French postcards depicting sensual young women. During the 1920s, middle-class youth rebelled against the strict moral codes of the previous generation, and American magazines began to publish illustrations of flappers and bathing beauties. By the end of the decade, bathing beauty calendars had become popular. World War II, however, saw pinups, photos, and illustrations of beautiful young women in seductive poses become a major industry. Pinups were legitimized during World War II when the U.S. government and the film industry operated hand in hand to distribute pictures of glamorous Hollywood stars to soldiers overseas. The walls of barracks, the bulkheads of ships, and the fuselages of airplanes were covered with pinup girls of all types. These pinups served as objects of sexual desire; they also functioned as links to home.

Pinups came in a range of styles: they could be innocent photographs of women in swimsuits or explicit pictures of nudes. Commercial pinups were sexually evocative and widely distributed. *Esquire* magazine was famous for its popular pinup illustrations, first featured in 1933. These pinups targeted the sophisticated tastes of the urban upper-class male. Pinup artwork featuring *Esquire*'s famous Varga girls drawn by Antonio Vargas, for example, often became aircraft nose art when flyers copied the illustrations onto their planes. Varga girls were painted in a delicate watercolor style but were quite voluptuous. Other illustrators popular during World War II for their pinup art included George Petty, whose Petty girls preceded the Varga girls as pinups in *Esquire*, Rolf Armstrong, who is considered to be the father of the American pinup, and Gil Elvgren, who created art deco pinups from the 1930s into the 1940s that were widely circulated among the servicemen during World War II.

The most popular pinup to make it onto an aircraft nose was a comic-strip creation named Miss Lace. Cartoonist Milton Caniff contributed a comic strip, *Male Call*, to the U.S. Department of War's Camp Newspaper service. Miss Lace is the most popular comic strip pinup girl of all time, surpassing Al Capp's Daisy Mae from the *Li'l Abner* comic strip—although Daisy Mae was painted onto many airplanes

also. Miss Lace was a dark-haired beauty who was innocent but very sexy and was meant to remind servicemen of the "All-American" women back home. *Male Call* was discontinued after the war because Caniff considered Miss Lace to be a product of her time, and the fantasy was no longer necessary once the armed forces came home.

Pinups came in other forms: Hollywood stars' pictures were featured in magazines sent to soldiers; wives and girlfriends had pinup photographs taken to send to their husbands and boyfriends; and famous illustrators created morale-boosting artwork. Several starlets had pictures taken "for the boys." These included exotic brunettes like Jane Russell, Hedy Lamarr, and Dorothy Lamour. Blondes were also popular with the men in the armed forces. The most popular pinup by far was blonde Betty Grable, a self-described girl-next-door. The photograph of her in a swimsuit with her "million dollar legs" was shot from the back and

Dorothy Lamour, as the pinup girl of the leatherneck motor transport batallion on Okinowa in 1945. (© Bettmann/Corbis)

was the most widely distributed picture of the war. As a testament to her popularity, in 1944, Miss Grable starred in the motion picture *Pin-Up Girl*.

Betty Grable was popular not only because she was beautiful and sexy, but also because she seemed attainable. She represented all women on the home front, standing for the sweetheart back home. Historian Robert Westbrook states that the Hollywood Victory Committee learned from stars who entertained the troops "that the boys preferred women who reminded them of their mothers and sisters" (596). Although Hollywood glamour attracted attention, it was a yearning for home and normality that really appealed to the men in uniform.

Aside from simply distributing pinup girl pictures in *Yank*, the official GI magazine, the government used pinups as a means to carry important reminders and messages to the troops—for example, about the risk of telling potential spies about troop movements. In a series of propaganda posters featuring beautiful young pinups, the American government referred to the dangers of careless talk. These posters, issued by the War Department, warn armed forces personnel about telling or writing women back home about where they will be deployed because that information could fall into the wrong hands. The posters used the pinup girl image to catch servicemen's attention and increase the chance that they would absorb the government's important message.

Pinup girls of World War II provided an important, morale-boosting distraction for the men who served their country during the war. While pinups took several different forms, all of them led servicemen to dream of home and the women for whom they were fighting. A masterful combination of glamour and wholesomeness kept men fantasizing about how wonderful it would be to "get the job done" and go home again. Pinups have enjoyed a postwar legacy, reappearing in *Playboy* magazine in the 1960s and thereafter.

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Related Entries

Propaganda Posters: World War II; Visual Arts and War; World War II

—Marguerite E. Hoyt

Platoon

Film directed by Oliver Stone, 1986

Platoon (1986), a film about the Vietnam War, was directed by Oliver Stone, one of the most controversial, talented, and prolific filmmakers in Hollywood. Since 1986, when Stone achieved national prominence with his movies *Salvador* and *Platoon*, he has directed and released a host of films that make pointed and highly controversial statements about American society and recent American history. In *Platoon, Born on the Fourth of July* (1989), *The Doors* (1991), *JFK* (1991), *Heaven and Earth* (1993), and *Nixon* (1995), Stone offers his interpretation of the Vietnam War, the assassination of President Kennedy, the personality of President Nixon, and the culture of the 1960s. In *Wall Street* (1987), *Talk Radio* (1988), and *Natural Born Killers* (1994), Stone critiques post-Watergate America by exploring, respectively, insider trading, neo-fascism, and the glamorization of violence by the media.

Although Stone's historical interpretations remain highly controversial, *Platoon* represents one of the best and

most realistic depictions of the infantry experience in Vietnam ever committed to film. *Platoon* was also a commercial and artistic success, grossing $137 million at the box office and winning Academy Awards in 1987 for best picture and best director. *Platoon*'s gritty, visceral, and realistic portrayal of an infantryman's experience in Vietnam as well as the film's enormous emotional tension and the moral ambiguity of all the characters involved make it a truly remarkable work. Before *Platoon*, Hollywood had used Vietnam as a setting or device in popular and familiar American narratives that either did not directly address the Vietnam War (such as *The Deer Hunter* or *Coming Home*) or indulged in nationalistic fantasy and revisionist interpretations of the war in an effort to relieve the national trauma and to rebuild American self-confidence; the Rambo trilogy best exemplifies this genre of Vietnam War film. Oliver Stone, himself a veteran of the Vietnam War, fought as an infantryman with the 25th Infantry Division and later the 1st Cavalry Division between 1967 and 1969. *Platoon* is therefore both a semiautobiographical work and a provocative commentary on the war.

Stone conceived of the movie shortly after returning from Vietnam in 1969, but anxiety arising from his wartime experiences and serious personal problems prevented him from finishing the first version until 1976. The basic narrative of *Platoon* combines the coming of age of a young man in wartime with a morality play that has the forces of good and evil vying for possession of the young man's soul. The character Chris Taylor, who represents Oliver Stone and is played by Charlie Sheen, arrives in Vietnam as a raw recruit. The infantry unit to which Chris is assigned features two powerful sergeants. Both sergeants are professional soldiers and highly skilled killers. Sergeant Elias (Willem Dafoe) is a kind and decent warrior who believes in selective, restrained violence and voices doubts about the war; Stone imbues the character with Christian symbolism. Sergeant Barnes (Tom Berenger), on the other hand, is the inversion of Sergeant Elias—a harsh, barbaric, unscrupulous killer who represents unrestrained violence, evil, and death. The audience is informed early on that the only thing that can kill Barnes is Barnes. The characters of Barnes and Elias are based on actual sergeants Stone encountered during his service in Vietnam.

When the unit loses some men to booby traps and discovers the mutilated body of one of their soldiers whom the enemy had captured, they seek to avenge their losses on a nearby village. The men brutalize and rape the villagers, and even the main character Chris succumbs to some darker impulses and torments a disabled villager. One of the men, Bunny (Kevin Dillon), is a psychopathic southern redneck who gleefully murders a villager with the butt of his shotgun, while Barnes, in a fit of pure rage, murders a Vietnamese woman and threatens to shoot a young girl if the villagers do not provide information about the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldiers in the vicinity. At the very moment when it seems that Barnes might prompt his men to murder all the villagers, Sergeant Elias arrives, confronts Barnes in a fistfight, and threatens to inform commanders of the illegal killings. The scuffle between Barnes and Elias is broken up, and the platoon is ordered to raze the village, destroy an unearthed stockpile of food and weapons, and evacuate the villagers.

Although Elias has stopped a massacre, his actions at the village have created a very dangerous enemy in Barnes, and soon the platoon is divided into two hostile camps supporting one sergeant or the other. During a subsequent combat operation, and before Elias can testify to investigating officers about the murders in the village, Barnes kills Elias. When Chris learns Elias was not killed by enemy action but by Barnes, he considers murdering Barnes but is faced with a difficult conundrum. By murdering Barnes, he would simply become another Barnes. In the movie's horrific climax, a wounded Chris discovers a bleeding Barnes struggling for life on the battlefield after an extraordinarily vicious nighttime battle against waves of North Vietnamese soldiers. Chris takes the opportunity to kill Barnes with an enemy rifle. He is sent home soon thereafter.

Platoon's success as a movie lay in its extraordinarily gritty and brutal realism. Stone's writing, directing, and cinematography convey the tension, fear, and exhaustion that were the constant companions of America's Vietnam combat veterans. Stone expertly illustrates the difficulties posed by the mere physical environment of Vietnam and the sense that American soldiers were an unwelcome presence in a strange and hostile environment. Booby traps and mines

could be anywhere, and the enemy might appear at any time. The scorching heat, dust, rain, and mosquitoes simply aggravated the suffering. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are portrayed not only as professional and dangerous but also as nearly invisible. The audience sees only brief glimpses of the enemy in the film, as the NVA and VC are merely phantom-like silhouettes during a night ambush, a distant, fleeing figure in black pajamas, a scurrying figure in a dark tunnel, or a barely visible presence assembling just outside the perimeter wire under cover of the jungle.

Platoon also succeeds in demonstrating the conflicts and divisions within American society that the war created by inverting the conventional combat film formula, especially as codified in the films made about World War II from the 1940s and 1950s. World War II films typically feature a cross section of Americans facing the rigors and suffering of combat who unite against a vicious and immoral enemy. Questions of morality and wartime objectives in World War II films are simple and very clear. In contrast, *Platoon* highlights the moral ambiguity of the war by leaving the Americans' objectives and moral character murky. Elias and Barnes, while representing good and evil, respectively, also represent conflicting American objectives in Vietnam. Elias wants to save Vietnam while Barnes seeks to destroy it. Like the nation that had sent them to Vietnam, the platoon becomes bitterly divided into factions and turns on itself. Even the murder of Barnes by Chris is fraught with moral ambiguity: an act of justice or Barnes's ultimate triumph in the struggle for Chris's soul? *Platoon* also highlights the divisions within American society over the issue of the draft and college deferments, the counterculture, and the growing racial tensions of the 1960s.

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Related Entries

Apocalypse Now; *Born on the Fourth of July*; *Deer Hunter, The*; Film and War; Vietnam War

—*James Ehrman*

Political Cartoons

Their combination of stinging humor, exaggeration, and visual clarity makes cartoons an ideal medium for engaging

in political affairs. Since before the American Revolution, cartoons have been used to comment on issues of war and national defense. Cartoons rarely appeared in print prior to the 1880s because of the technical difficulties of reproducing them (although some appeared in the decade before the outbreak of the Civil War). Since then, however, most daily newspapers have carried editorial cartoons. Throughout the 20th century and into the 21st, comic strips and the Internet have also carried war-themed graphic art.

1754–1865

The first American political cartoon was drawn by Benjamin Franklin and published in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* on May 9, 1754. It depicted a snake divided into eight segments, each labeled as a colony or region of British North America, above the motto JOIN OR DIE. It was meant to persuade the colonies to approve the Albany Plan of Union, a plan for mutual defense against the French in Canada and their Indian allies. Because of its illustrious author and clear message, the cartoon was used again in 1765, during the Stamp Act Crisis, and in 1774, on the eve of the American Revolution.

Franklin's cartoon was crudely drawn and unsubtle in its message. In 1770, the silversmith and patriot Paul Revere made an engraving that was technically more advanced, but inaccurate in its details and blatantly propagandistic in its intent. It depicted British troops firing on unarmed civilians during the Boston Massacre of March 5, 1770. Revere made it seem like a massacre indeed. As one authority puts it, "The Revere engraving, although masquerading as a realistic picture of the event, was really a political cartoon meant as propaganda for the anti-British element" (Hess and Kaplan, 55). In a final irony, the engraving was actually the work of another artist, Henry Pelham; Revere stole it, without attribution and with some details changed to make the British look more culpable than they really were.

Because newsprint was expensive and engraving techniques laborious, only a few other war-related cartoons were printed prior to the 1850s. None were as influential as the Franklin and Revere engravings. During the crisis leading up to the Civil War, however, and during the war years, a number of powerful cartoons were printed. A typical engraving from 1861—printed by Currier & Ives, the purveyors of

scenic Americana—showed the secession-bound leaders of the southern states, mounted on donkeys (and in the case of South Carolina's leader, on a pig), galloping toward the edge of a cliff. A pro-Confederate 1863 cartoon by Adalbert J. Volck showed Pres. Abraham Lincoln and northern politicians bloodily sacrificing the nation's youth on the altar of "Negro Worship." America's most influential political cartoonist, Thomas Nast, began his career during the Civil War. His best cartoon, possibly the best drawn during the war, was titled "Compromise with the South," and printed in *Harper's Weekly* in 1864. In it a weeping Columbia (the female symbol of America) and a Union veteran, one-legged, on crutches, with his head bowed in shame, confront a smiling, arrogant, whip-carrying southern officer across the grave of "Union Heroes who died in a Useless War." It is an attack on the Democratic Party, whose presidential nominee in 1864, Gen. George McClellan, was suspected by many of favoring a dishonorable peace with the Confederacy.

1865–1941

In the decades after the Civil War, the skills and influence of cartoonists increased rapidly. Thomas Nast, the greatest of them, was credited with helping to bring down the corrupt Tammany Hall political machine of William Marcy "Boss" Tweed in New York City. Homer Davenport, Frederick Opper, and others developed national reputations. In the 1890s, cartoonists helped bring about the Spanish–American War. An insurrection against Spanish rule in Cuba had begun in 1895. The two great newspaper moguls of the time, Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst, decided to increase circulation for their papers by whipping up a war frenzy, using slanted news articles, inflammatory editorials, and cartoons depicting the Spanish as brutes and torturers. Others followed their lead. Grant Hamilton in *Judge* magazine was particularly vicious; one of his typical cartoons depicted Spain as a leering gorilla standing on the grave of sailors killed in the sinking of the American battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898, and holding a knife dripping blood. The implication was that the Spanish had blown up the *Maine*, though even the most careful late-20th-century investigations have failed to establish whether the sinking was caused by an internal explosion or a mine, and

no evidence exists that the Spanish were responsible for it. Such cartoons helped bring about an American declaration of war on April 25, 1898.

World War I began in Europe in 1914, but the United States, under Pres. Woodrow Wilson, was determined to stay out. Wilson even won reelection in 1916 under the slogan, "He Kept Us Out of War." Most American newspapers and cartoonists, however, favored France, Britain, and their allies over the Central Powers. Anti-German cartoons by Sid Greene, Rollin Kirby, and the Dutch artist Louis Raemakers turned American opinion against Germany and toward U.S. involvement. When the United States entered the war in 1917, it did so because German submarines were sinking American ships as they approached Britain, not because of any press frenzy. Once war began, the government recognized the potential of cartoons and included a Bureau of Cartoons in its domestic propaganda agency, the Committee on Public Information.

During the 1920s, America was at peace. Beginning in the early 1930s, however, as dictators and militaristic regimes arose or strengthened in Germany, Italy, Japan, and other countries, American cartoonists found themselves torn between fear of a new war and anger at these aggressive dictators. Thus, the Pulitzer Prize–winning cartoons for 1930, 1937, and 1941 show the dangers and horrors of war; those for 1933, 1938, and 1940 protest the actions of Germany and Japan. Perhaps the most powerful is C. D. Batchelor's 1937 prizewinner: a skull-faced prostitute labeled "War" stands in her doorway and says to a young man labeled "Any European Youth": "Come on in. I'll treat you right. I used to know your daddy."

Political Cartoons During World War II

America's entry into World War II, triggered when the Japanese bombed the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, quickly resolved any ambivalence among cartoonists. Although antiwar cartoons disappeared, political controversy did not. Most cartoons during the war were unabashedly patriotic, blistering America's enemies and exhorting civilians to work harder and sacrifice more. Some newspapers, such as the *Chicago Tribune,* supported the war but opposed the administration of Pres. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and the *Tribune*'s cartoonists followed suit. Other artists saw it as their patriotic duty to lampoon hoarders, war

With the caption, "Atta Boy!," this 1918 cartoon typified those supporting U.S. involvement in World War I. (© CORBIS)

profiteers, and inept politicians; the Clifford K. Berryman cartoon that won the Pulitzer Prize for 1944 castigated Congress, the president, bureaucrats, and union leaders for haphazard and inefficient wartime manpower mobilization. Even Theodor Seuss Geisel, the beloved Dr. Seuss of postwar children's books, penned a series of whimsically effective cartoons for the left-wing newspaper *PM*, attacking not only Germany and Japan, but also American business owners who, he suggested, were more interested in profits than in victory.

While many at home were portraying our soldiers as gung-ho, enthusiastic heroes, a young man named Bill Mauldin, who cartooned for the soldiers' newspaper *The Stars and Stripes*, was showing Americans what it was really like on the front lines. His heroes, Willie and Joe, were American privates, weary, dirty, unshaven, and cynical about officers, propaganda, and the war—but they did their duty as best they could. Mauldin's 1945 Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoon was sarcastically titled "Fresh, spirited American troops, flushed with victory, are bringing in thousands of hungry, ragged, battle weary prisoners" (News Item). The

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prisoners indeed are those things, and the GIs bringing them in, through a cold rain in a muddy, shell-torn town, are just as ragged and exhausted. Some "superpatriots" at home and in the military objected to Mauldin's realism, but both his fellow soldiers and the American public loved him.

Since World War II

After 1945, America's problems, and the concerns of cartoonists, were very different. The postwar period saw the United States locked in a decades-long Cold War with the Soviet Union, a period punctuated by limited but bloody conflicts in Korea and Vietnam and darkened by fears of a nuclear exchange. Many cartoonists commented on all of these problems. None was more influential or had a longer career than Herblock (real name Herbert L. Block), who was prolific from 1929 until his death in 2001. Herblock's "Mr. Atom," a personification of the atomic bomb, appeared in cartoon after cartoon for decades. As early as 1965, Herblock warned against escalating American involvement in Vietnam. In 1999, he drew cartoons castigating the Yugoslav dictator Slobodan Milosevic's atrocities in Kosovo and supporting the U.S. bombing campaign there.

The postwar era also saw a new form of political cartooning: the comic strip. During World War II, the storylines for Superman, Captain America, and other characters in "comic books" had these superheroes fighting Nazis and "Japs"—hardly sophisticated political comment. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, comic strip artists began seriously engaging political and social issues, including war. Two artists particularly distinguished themselves: Harold Spiegelman and Garry Trudeau. Spiegelman's graphic novel *Maus*, an affecting and frightening interpretation of his parents' experience as concentration camp survivors in Germany during the Holocaust, treats the murder of millions of Jews, Russians, Gypsies, and others during World War II. Trudeau's long-running comic strip, *Doonesbury*, is a hard-hitting, often liberal political commentary that appears on the comics pages of most U.S. newspapers. Perhaps Trudeau's most poignant and controversial war storyline came in 2004, when he had one of his characters, B.D., lose a leg fighting in Iraq. Just as with Mauldin's work, some saw this as an antiwar statement, others as a tribute to American soldiers.

Trudeau was hardly the only one drawing cartoons about the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its aftermath; hundreds did so, offering images both for and against American actions. Cartoonists, still passionately concerned with war and national defense, have found new outlets for their work—in graphic novels, comic strips, and on the Internet—in addition to their decades-long position on the editorial pages of newspapers. However, the decline in newspaper readership and the proliferation of television news programs and Internet news sources, have made cartoonists less influential in forming public opinion on matters of war and peace as they were in earlier decades. Certainly no current cartoonist occupies so prominent a place in American society as Thomas Nast, Bill Mauldin, or Herblock once did.

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Related Entries

Captain Marvel Comic Books; Committee on Public Information; Mauldin, Bill; Media and War; *Stars and Stripes, The*

Related Documents

1943 a; 1945 e; 1947

—Bernard G. Hagerty

Politics

See Veteran Status and Electability.

Polk, James K.

(1795–1849)
11th President of the United States

James Knox Polk was by far the strongest president between Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln and one of the strongest presidents ever. A poll of historians in 2000 ranked him 10th among U.S. chief executives—a "near-great" president. Yet Polk remains comparatively unknown to most present-day Americans. Perhaps this is because he embroiled the United States in a blatant war of aggression against its southern neighbor, Mexico—an act at odds with America's historical view of itself as a country that fights wars only in self-defense. Still worse, the conflict placed the nation more or less directly on the road to civil war a dozen years later. Noted Ulysses S. Grant, who fought in the Mexican War as a young officer: "Nations, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. We got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times" (v. 1, 56). Nevertheless, Polk must be credited for grimly, efficiently, and single-mindedly gaining for the United States precisely what most Americans wanted.

Born in North Carolina in 1795, Polk moved with his family to Tennessee when he was 11 years old and there made his life and political career. He won election to the Tennessee House of Representatives in 1823 and soon became a friend and close associate of Andrew Jackson, who thereafter served as Polk's mentor and role model. Another close ally of Polk was his wife, Sarah Childress Polk, who served as a political adviser as well as a careful monitor of his often precarious health.

A firm Democrat, in 1825 Polk was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he served until 1839, the last four years as speaker of the House. Thereafter he ran successfully for governor of Tennessee but lost two subsequent bids for reelection. For that reason he seemed an unlikely choice for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1844.

Polk did receive the nomination after the front-runner, Martin van Buren, publicly opposed the annexation of Texas, since 1836 an independent republic settled largely by Anglo-Americans. Correctly perceiving that the tide of public opinion was shifting toward a policy of westward territorial expansion, Polk came out squarely in favor of annexation, assisted behind the scenes by Andrew Jackson. He narrowly won election over his Whig opponent, Sen. Henry Clay, who, like Van Buren, had spoken against acquiring Texas.

Opposition to the annexation of Texas stemmed largely from warnings by Mexico that such a move would be regarded as a hostile act. Emboldened by Polk's election, however, Congress authorized the annexation by joint resolution in February 1845, and Texas became a state in December of that year. Polk, however, had much larger territorial ambitions: acquisition of the Oregon country in the Pacific Northwest, whose ownership was disputed with Great Britain, and acquisition of the Far West, especially California, from Mexico.

Despite a policy of seeming brinkmanship in which Polk famously sought the entirety of the Oregon country to the latitude of 54 degrees 40 minutes north—"Fifty-four forty or fight!" was the bellicose war cry—Polk's administration was easily satisfied with the territory south of the 49th parallel, the present-day boundary with Canada. The government of Mexico, however, could not surrender the amount of territory Polk wanted (almost half of the Mexican republic's land area) without committing political suicide. In this instance, Polk's policy of brinkmanship was real. The American army that

occupied Texas after the state's annexation was eventually ordered into a disputed region between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande—"sent," as Grant subsequently noted, "to provoke a fight" (v. 1, 68). The gambit succeeded. Polk was soon able to crow to Congress that Mexico had invaded American territory and shed American blood.

The region of Mexico coveted by the United States was sparsely populated. Relatively modest American forces, conveniently pre-positioned as Army "exploration expeditions" or naval shore parties, were soon able to bring most of the region under U.S. control. But not even a string of victories by the main American army in the Monterrey region of Mexico was able to bring Mexico's government to the bargaining table. Worse, to the highly partisan Polk's way of thinking, his principal generals, Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott, were rival Whigs with presidential ambitions. Polk therefore tried to pack the volunteer ranks of the Army with as many Democratic generals as possible, at one point even considering Missouri's Sen. Thomas Hart Benton for the post of general in chief.

Reluctantly, Polk entrusted Scott with a daring plan to land near the Mexican port of Veracruz, capture it, then march inland upon the capital of Mexico City, thereby forcing a peace settlement. In 1847, after one of the most dramatic campaigns of the mid-19th century, Scott did exactly that. The ultimate victory gave the United States such leverage at the negotiating table that Polk briefly considered annexing the entire Mexican republic, only to have his chief negotiator, Nicholas Trist, settle for merely the northern half of Mexico at a cost of $18.5 million.

Polk left office in early 1849. At 53 he was still a relatively young man but, ruined by the exertions of office, he died after only three months of retirement. Of his record as president, historian Arthur S. Schlesinger, Jr., has written, "He knew what he wanted, and got it, but it killed him" (442).

Polk's success in securing the Oregon Territory and Mexican Cession completed the expansion of the continental United States, with the exception of the modest Gadsden Purchase—the southernmost part of Arizona and New Mexico—in 1853. The acquisition of splendid harbors such as San Francisco opened the door, directly or indirectly, to America's extra-continental expansion: Alaska and the

Hawaiian Islands as well as numerous Pacific outposts and, from 1899 to 1946, the Philippines. But it came at a cost. It not only set in motion the chain of events that led to the Civil War, but also strained relations with Mexico for more than a century thereafter.

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Related Entries

Grant, Ulysses S.; Jackson, Andrew; Mexican War; Scott, Winfield

Related Documents

1846 a

—*Mark Grimsley*

Pontiac

(ca. 1720–69)
Ottawa War Leader

The conclusion of the French and Indian War in North America left the British Empire in possession of French

Canada, extending into the strategic and valuable Ohio River Valley. In acquiring this land, the British also took on obligations to the Indians of the region, with whom the French had maintained generous financial and diplomatic arrangements. The British were unwilling to continue such relations and began planning for the expansion of military fortifications as well as the arrival of British settlers whose presence was bound to antagonize indigenous peoples—who would lose hunting land and prestige, as well as be in far closer contact with the British than they had been with the French. Intense dissatisfaction with the change in colonial overlords led to a violent confrontation that, in the long term, shaped British (and later American) relations with Indians in extremely negative ways.

An important figure at the center of these changing relations was the warrior and leader Pontiac, whose origins and activities before 1763 are obscure. Although he identified himself as an Ottawa and was likely born in Ottawa lands on the Detroit River, his mother may have been a Chippewa. As a young warrior, Pontiac probably took part in King George's War as a French ally, and he may have been among the Ottawa who attacked Gen. Edward Braddock on the Monongahela near Fort Duquesne. The first written mention of Pontiac occurred in 1757 in the papers of Sir William Johnson, who described him as a war chief who demanded a tangible reward from the French for his loyalty in the fighting. The British military authorities first encountered Pontiac at the handover of Fort Detroit, where he appeared at the head of a still pro-French entourage of Ottawa.

By 1761, the indigenous peoples surrounding British forts in the Ohio River and Great Lakes region were deeply disappointed with their new status and treatment by Gen. Jeffrey Amherst, who failed to distribute the liberal amounts of powder and shot he had promised as well as the expected presents of blankets, tools, and money. Even more insulting was the new British restriction of alcohol sales—previously, they had encouraged the distribution of spirits to cause disturbances among those peoples who were pro-French. Merchants refused credit to indigenous peoples and often overpriced their goods when dealing with them. Settlers also began to trickle into the

region, setting off confrontations. Rumors that the French wished to continue the war, or that they would support an uprising, flew through disgruntled indigenous populations around the Great Lakes (although a call by the Seneca to rise against the British failed to attract supporters).

In 1762, Pontiac met with French agents and representatives of the Huron, Chippewa, and Pottawatomie, and, fueled by the popular proclamations of the Delaware Prophet, formed a conspiracy designed to strike at British forts, particularly Fort Detroit. It is a point of contention among historians whether Pontiac spearheaded the entire conspiracy or if his actions simply triggered existing plans against British garrisons. Pontiac himself set off the rebellion on May 7, 1763, with an attempt to take Fort Detroit under the guise of a friendly visit. Maj. Henry Gladwin, who had probably been warned, refused the large party entry, forcing Pontiac to establish a siege position two miles above the fort with approximately 450 men. From there, he led Huron and Chippewa warriors in an attack on English settlers, the ambush of a British army column, and the destruction of outbuildings around the fort. Throughout the siege, Pontiac attempted to remain on good terms with French settlers, issuing paper receipts for food and supplies levied from their farms and offering them protection in return for skilled military aid. The French response was cool, however, and no experienced European soldiers volunteered to help. Pontiac, although in a strong position, could not take the fort by direct assault; nor could he prevent it from receiving reinforcements and supplies by boat.

Meanwhile, other tribes widened the rebellion. In June, the Miami and Ottawa attacked Fort St. Joseph, Fort Wayne, Fort Ouiatenon, and Fort Michilimackinac, successfully carrying out deceptions that gained them entrance into the forts. Delaware and Mingo besieged Fort Pitt, while the Shawnees and Senecas attacked Fort Venango, Fort Le Boef, and Presque Isle. Pontiac was in communication with leaders of these forces, but it is unclear if he directed their actions. At Detroit, Gladwin began playing Pontiac's allies against one another, a tactic that was heightened in effectiveness by the growing Ottawa aggression against uncooperative French settlers. Pontiac showed tactical innovation by attempting to send fire rafts against supply boats. Although

he annihilated a sortie by Capt. James Dalyell at Bloody Bridge, he could not take the fort itself.

The rebellion began to collapse when Fort Pitt and Fort Ligonier were reinforced in July. A more substantial British presence could not, however, stem vicious settler vigilante actions like those of the Paxton Boys in Pennsylvania. The cooler autumn weather and the official news from French officers in Missouri that no aid was to be forthcoming finally caused Pontiac to break off the siege and withdraw to Sandusky, Ohio. Pontiac contacted the Illinois, Shawnee, and Arkansas in an attempt to encourage attacks on southern British positions, but he could not keep the resistance alive in the face of tribal dependence on British goods, especially gunpowder.

The British signed an agreement with Pontiac in 1766, acceding to his demand that they acknowledge no claim to possess all former French land (although they had no intention of agreeing to this as a legal treaty). Pontiac went south, living with the Illinois until June 1766, when he stabbed an important chief and left under a cloud. Other tribes became jealous of his high-status treatment during conferences at Fort Oswego and began to shun him.

Pontiac was murdered outside a general store in Cahokia, a trading post outside of St. Louis, on April 20, 1769, by a Peoria who claimed that the British instigated it as an assassination. The incident may also have been undertaken by the Illinois in revenge of the 1766 stabbing. Pontiac was buried in Cahokia or St. Louis; the precise location of the grave is unknown.

Pontiac's War, whether historically attributable to him alone or not, was significant for Americans and for the British Empire. The resurgence of Indian attacks along the white frontier, so soon after the terrifying years of early French ascendancy during the Seven Years' War, cemented in many settlers' minds the irretrievable savagery of indigenous peoples. The war also pushed British imperial administrators to seek ways of streamlining the administration of their American territory, confirming not only their desire to restrict white settlement to the eastern seaboard but also the need for a permanent garrison. The ensuing restrictions on access to land, and especially the new methods of raising revenue for permanent garrisons, quickly aggravated British–colonial relations and ultimately helped lead to the American Revolution.

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Related Entries

Colonial Wars; Native Americans in Colonial Wars and the Revolutionary War

—*Margaret Sankey*

Port Chicago Mutiny

The Port Chicago Mutiny of 1944 placed the military's discriminatory racial policies in the public eye. The incident highlighted the harsh realities of a segregated military that fought for liberty overseas while placing African Americans in jobs that afforded them less status and placed them in tremendous danger. All of the manual laborers at Port Chicago, California, were black, and all of their officers

were white. The case of what became known as the Port Chicago Fifty underscored the second-class treatment afforded to African Americans despite their enthusiastic participation in the war effort. The case became a national cause célèbre that remained active until 1999 when the Navy finally pardoned one of the last two surviving members of the Port Chicago Fifty.

On July 17, 1944, a massive explosion rocked the Port Chicago Naval Munitions Base near San Francisco. Explosives being loaded onto two transport ships detonated, sending hundreds of pounds of munitions raining down on workers and civilians in the nearby town. The ensuing explosions killed 320 servicemen and injured another 390. More than 300 buildings were damaged and the two transport ships (along with much of the dock facilities) were destroyed. One source later compared the power of the blasts to a five kiloton bomb; windows as far away as 20 miles were shattered and a column of smoke and fire 12,000 feet high was visible for miles.

The explosion killed and wounded African Americans disproportionately because the Navy used only black laborers for dangerous jobs such as those at Port Chicago. Of the 320 men killed, 202 were black; of the 390 men injured, 232 were black. Most of those killed had volunteered for military service hoping to see combat duty; instead, they were given the dangerous job of loading munitions. Their jobs became even more perilous when white officers began betting on whose laborers could load munitions the fastest, creating a situation where safety was routinely subordinated to speed. Officers calmed their men's fears by telling them the bald-faced lie that none of the shells they were loading was fused.

The deadly explosions at Port Chicago constitute the worst domestic loss of life during the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and account for 15 percent of all African American naval casualties in World War II. A Navy investigation into the incident found that the facility had not provided black workers with any training in handling dangerous materials nor had a safety manual been written to ensure proper safeguards were in place. Black workers, who could not even eat in the mess hall until all whites had finished eating, saw the incident as symptomatic of the larger problem of racial discrimination. They demanded changes in the safety arrangements at Port Chicago and the nearby Mare Island Shipyard before returning to work.

The Navy determined that it could not identify the cause of the explosion and therefore decided not to institute changes in safety procedures. A Navy court of inquiry refused to assign blame or to punish any of the white officers for creating a dangerous working environment. The Navy then granted one month's leave to white survivors of the incident, but gave no leave at all to black survivors. At the same time, Rep. John Rankin of Mississippi orchestrated a reduction in the compensation given to the families of those killed in the blasts from $5,000 to $3,000. With white workers still on their leave, the Navy ordered 258 black workers back to work on the loading docks. They refused, leading the Navy to arrest 50 presumed ringleaders and charge them with mutiny, a crime that carries the possibility of a death sentence. The remainder of the workers were threatened with capital charges and ordered back to work after a three-day incarceration in a makeshift brig.

With American servicemen fighting in Normandy and in the Philippines, the Navy tried to depict the alleged mutineers as slackers whose refusal to work deprived American servicemen in deadly combat of needed weapons. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) responded by sending its chief counsel, future Supreme Court justice Thurgood Marshall, to observe the proceedings. African American newspapers made the trial, which lasted 32 days, into a national news story. After deliberating for an average of just two minutes per accused sailor, the all-white jury of naval officers found all 50 guilty. Sentences ranged from 8 to 15 years in prison and/or hard labor.

Marshall, who was outraged at what he had seen, took up the case and began to pressure the Roosevelt administration to look into Navy policies. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt helped to lead a public clemency campaign that kept the issue alive and controversial. In 1946 the Truman administration granted clemency to 47 of the Port Chicago Fifty, although the Navy did not overturn the convictions and did not reverse the dishonorable discharge given to each man; thus the sailors remained ineligible for veterans' benefits. The Navy did, however, reexamine its racial policies in light of the intensely negative publicity the case had generated.

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Before the end of the war, it had ended segregation as a policy, although in practice racial discrimination remained in place on many ships. The Navy also began to assign white sailors to munitions loading duties.

The Port Chicago incident was part of a larger process that highlighted the basic injustice of the military's racial policies. It also marked the willingness of civilian organizations like the NAACP and the National Urban League to challenge those policies in military and civilian courts. The Truman administration understood the hypocrisy in segregating the military while at the same time claiming the moral high ground in a nascent ideological Cold War with the Soviet Union. President Truman ended segregation in the military by executive order in 1948.

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African Americans in the Military; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces; World War II

Related Documents

1941; 1942 a, b; 1944 c; 1945 a, b; 1948 b

—*Michael S. Neiberg*

Posse Comitatus Act

The Posse Comitatus Act restricts the circumstances under which U.S. military forces can be used to address domestic disturbances. Passed in 1878 in response to the South's anger at the use of federal troops during Reconstruction, it has since evolved into an important—if often misunderstood—foundation of American civil–military relations.

Posse comitatus—literally "power of the county"—was a legal concept carried into the American tradition from English common law. It held that, when necessary, authorities could call forth the entire male citizenry to aid in the execution of the law (from which was derived the "posses" of Western lore). During the post-Civil War Reconstruction period, Republican state and local officials in the former Confederate states, facing violent opposition from elements of the heavily Democratic southern white population, resorted to the deputization of local U.S. Army troops under posse comitatus to enforce laws and apprehend suspects. This had been done primarily in cases involving organized intimidation or assaults on African Americans or white Republicans (ironically, the legal precedent for the use of the Army as a posse comitatus had been set during the 1850s through the use of soldiers to apprehend fugitive slaves). The Grant administration and the Republican-controlled Congress supported this policy. Despite military assistance to southern Republican governments, southern Democrats gradually regained control over the former Confederate states during the 1870s, a process that culminated in the Compromise of 1877, which resolved the crisis resulting from the disputed 1876 presidential election. With Reconstruction officially concluded, southern Democratic congressmen pushed through the Posse Comitatus Act to ensure that the Army could not be used against them in the future. Disillusioned by years of service in the South, the Army leadership broadly supported the measure. The consequence was that employing the Army to enforce the law would in the future be specifically restricted:

> From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress.

Despite its rather sinister origins, by restricting the employment of the U.S. military in domestic conflicts, the

act serves an important function. The Posse Comitatus Act does not forbid the use of troops in domestic law enforcement (a common misconception). Rather, it requires the president to issue a direct order authorizing their employment for such purposes.

Although presidents in the years since 1878 have often employed military forces to restore order—the most notable recent instance is the 1992 Los Angeles riots—the Posse Comitatus Act has generally ensured that decisions to employ military force are made by the president rather than by state or local officials or Army officers in the field. In so doing, the Posse Comitatus Act has generally acted to substantiate the desire of civilian and military leaders alike to limit the domestic employment of federal military forces.

Since 1981, the Posse Comitatus Act has been revised several times to permit greater latitude in the employment of military forces in law enforcement, most notably in the war on drugs: military units have participated in more than 5,800 counter-drug missions between 1989 and 2004. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., by members of the al Qaeda terrorist network, efforts to expand the military role in homeland security efforts led to concerns on both ends of the political spectrum: some conservatives feared that the act would unduly restrict such activities, while civil libertarians cited the wisdom of the Posse Comitatus Act principle of limiting the military's domestic role.

The idea underpinning the Posse Comitatus Act remains significant in American civil–military relations because it reflects long-standing interests of both civilian and military leaders. On the one hand, civilians are reluctant to countenance an expansive military role in domestic security. On the other, the military has no desire for that role. It does not want to be distracted from its traditional role of fighting wars, particularly given the inherent danger of the military being caught up in partisan squabbling. Although some commentators have noted that the legal breadth and policy influence of the Posse Comitatus Act tend to be overstated, the enthusiasm of civilians and military leaders alike for the principles behind it ensured that the employment of federal military forces in domestic security missions remained circumscribed even as such activities increased following the 2001 terrorist attacks.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Civil–Military Relations; Homeland Security; Reconstruction; War on Terrorism

—*Erik Riker-Coleman*

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

See Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related.

Powell, Colin

(1937–)
General, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State

Throughout his military career, Colin Powell displayed his great organizational talents and political acumen in a succession of posts, culminating in his appointment as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1989. Powell was the first African American officer to occupy the nation's highest military post and only the fourth to achieve four-star rank. During his tenure as chairman, Powell leveraged the power of his office to an unprecedented degree, gaining a significantly greater recognition nationwide and arguably exercising greater influence than any chairman in recent memory. Powell returned to government service in 2001 to serve as Pres. George W. Bush's secretary of state.

Roots

Colin L. Powell was born in Harlem in New York City in 1937, the son of working-class Jamaican immigrants. Growing up in the ethnically diverse but rough-edged neighborhood of Hunts Point in the South Bronx, Powell later attested to a colorful but "directionless" youth (1995, 17). Although not a stellar student, he attended the City University of New York, joining the CUNY Reserve Officer Training Corps detachment. Powell found that he excelled in the ROTC and determined to pursue a military career.

After receiving his Army commission in June of 1958, Powell progressed through a series of assignments in the United States, Germany, and two tours in Vietnam. Powell then attended the Army's Command and General Staff College, the National War College, and earned a master's degree in business administration from George Washington University. A one-time C student, he excelled at each of these institutions.

Inside the Beltway

While Powell commanded at the battalion and brigade level, he spent much of his time in the 1970s and 1980s in a succession of posts in Washington, D.C., often serving in civilian agencies. Powell was selected as a White House Fellow in September 1972 and assigned to the Office of Management and Budget. His abilities impressed OMB director Caspar Weinberger and his deputy Frank Carlucci, under whom Powell would work once again in the administration of Pres. Ronald Reagan. Powell also served in the Defense Department during the presidency of Democrat Jimmy Carter. Unimpressed by Carter's national security policy, however, Powell voted for Republican Ronald Reagan in 1980.

Powell was called back to Washington once again in 1982, this time to serve as senior military assistant to Sec. of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Working with Weinberger, Powell began to establish the foundations of his legacy, helping Weinberger in 1984 to frame what was then known as the Weinberger Doctrine, a set of principles that established conditions for restricting the circumstances in which U.S. troops should be deployed overseas. Powell's Vietnam experiences made him quite sympathetic to Weinberger's efforts to ensure that U.S. troops were sent into combat only with the will and wherewithal to win decisively.

In January 1987, with the National Security Council (NSC) in chaos because of the the Iran–Contra affair, newly appointed National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci pulled a reluctant Lieutenant General Powell away from his long-sought corps command in Germany to aid in the rebuilding of the NSC as deputy national security advisor. When Carlucci succeeded Weinberger as secretary of defense, Powell took over as security advisor, thus continuing his service at the highest levels of politico-military policy making.

Chairman

Powell was promoted to four-star rank in April of 1989 and served briefly as commander of the Army's Forces Command. In August 1989, however, he was appointed to the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Powell was only the second chairman to wield the new authority vested in the office by the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Powell would aggressively employ the powers of his office to redefine the chairmanship.

Of Powell's acts as chairman, among the boldest and most significant was his decision to seize the initiative on

defining the size and character of the post–Cold War American military establishment. Powell, remembering the post-Vietnam budget cuts that produced the "Hollow Army" of the 1970s, sought to set a floor for budget and force structure. The plans that resulted from Powell's initiative came to be known as "the Base Force"—the minimum military establishment required to meet the nation's global security commitments. The Base Force was more than helpful foresight on the part of the chairman; it was a successful effort to set the terms of the debate on post–Cold War military strategy, ensuring that, although the U.S. military's missions would change and the military's size would decrease, its basic structure and strategies would remain largely the same. Powell pushed the program through basically on his own, without seeking the approval of the other Joint Chiefs and without significant input until after the fact.

Powell's interpretation of the Weinberger Doctrine, which came to be known as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, focused on the importance of employing massive U.S. force to rapidly overwhelm an adversary. The doctrine was extremely influential on the deployment of the U.S. military during his tenure as chairman. The 1989 Panama invasion was undertaken with massive force and concluded in relatively short order. Of greater consequence was the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Powell was an outspoken voice of caution during the run-up to the war; he pressed repeatedly—and to an extent unusual for a military officer—for giving diplomacy and economic sanctions time to effect the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait without military action. When Pres. George H. W. Bush remained intent on offensive military action, however, Powell worked to ensure the provision of overwhelming force to Central Command (CENTCOM) commander in chief Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf; he also ensured that communications between Washington and CENTCOM were routed through him, thus exercising a significant degree of influence over operations. Powell's prominent role during the war and the dramatic success of Gulf operations greatly enhanced his already significant national image and his power.

Powell's subsequent service during a partisan transition in the White House placed him in a position that was at once challenging and empowering. Relations between Powell and the incoming administration of William Jefferson Clinton were outwardly cordial, but Powell was privately (and not entirely secretly) at odds with the new administration on a number of issues: what Powell saw as the president-elect's excessive enthusiasm for squeezing out the so-called peace dividend—savings in military spending that the post–Cold War environment would presumably facilitate; the possibility that Clinton might be too quick to deploy U.S. military forces in peacekeeping or peacemaking missions, most notably in the war-torn former Yugoslavia, which Powell perceived to be a hopeless quagmire unlikely to find successful resolution by means of military force; and the president's campaign pledge to end the armed services' ban on service by homosexuals. Because of his popularity both with the public and with the Washington power structure, his personal talents, and the power of his office, however, Powell was in a strong position to push his agenda—especially given the incoming administration's relatively weak foreign policy and military credentials.

Some critics argued that Powell exceeded the bounds of civil–military propriety in his efforts to publicly argue against intervention in Bosnia and, more directly, in resisting Clinton's moves to implement the removal of the gay ban in the first days of his administration. On this latter subject Powell was especially adamant, convinced that allowing admitted homosexuals to serve in the military would damage the cohesion of military units and reduce the number of "straight" male and female recruits. Powell dismissed out of hand suggestions that the gay ban had any compelling resemblance to racial segregation in the armed forces. Powell and his fellow chiefs publicly opposed the president on the gay ban issue, echoed by much more forceful statements from military retirees. By July of 1993, the administration effectively surrendered on the issue by announcing the face-saving "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Powell and the administration maintained an effective and respectful working relationship, but the general declined a proffered third two-year term as chairman (which would have been unusual, as most chairmen have served two terms) and retired from active duty in September 1993.

POWELL, COLIN

Statesman

After retirement, Powell remained a public figure. During 1995 and 1996, speculation was rampant that Powell—the object of vice presidential feelers in 1992—would run for president. He came out openly as a moderate Republican, but in the end decided against a presidential campaign. In December 2000, president-elect George W. Bush announced that Powell was his nominee for secretary of state. Powell was unanimously confirmed by the Senate, and he took office on January 20, 2001.

Many observers speculated that Powell would play a dominant role in the administration's foreign policy. As it turned out, in the wake of the transformation of U.S. priorities following the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, Powell found himself increasingly marginalized in administration debates as the hawkish Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney held the president's ear. Powell was reportedly most alarmed with the administration's enthusiasm for invading Iraq. In the end, however, Powell did go to the United Nations in February of 2003 to make the administration's case for war. He argued that Iraq possessed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, was pursuing a nuclear capability, and had ties with the terrorist group al Qaeda. Although many remained skeptical (including Powell himself, according to some accounts), Powell's international reputation as a moderate increased the impact of the presentation. Accordingly, he came in for much criticism when no large stockpiles of banned weapons were found in the aftermath of the invasion. In early 2004, Powell confidants reported him to be increasingly frustrated with his inability to influence administration policy and concerned for his legacy as a moderating voice in American foreign policy. Powell resigned from the State Department in late 2004.

Colin Powell remained a broadly popular figure in the United States even after the Iraq invasion. His life story, his symbolic status as an embodiment of Americans' best hopes for racial integration, and his socially conscious political conservatism all contributed to his appeal, as did his core conviction that the United States should remain both supremely powerful and quite cautious in its foreign policy. These attributes were, to a significant extent, the fruits of Powell's long military career. Serving for more than three decades in an institution that provided a vehicle for social mobility, he was an early leader in racial integration, committed to resolving "people" issues, and imbued with a commitment to ensure military strength balanced by a reluctance to use it. Powell's complex position within the administration of George W. Bush—publicly carrying the ball for a case that he had opposed while ensuring that his dissent would later be made known—was not unlike the position of the post-Vietnam U.S. military officer corps generally: loyalty bounded by an unwillingness to be left as scapegoats. As such, Powell the Statesman arguably retained much of Powell the Soldier.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Civil–Military Relations; Gays and Lesbians in the Military; Iraq War; Peacekeeping Operations;

Persian Gulf War; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces; Vietnam War; War on Terrorism; Weinberger–Powell Doctrine

—Erik Riker-Coleman

Powell Doctrine

See Weinberger–Powell Doctrine.

POWs

See Prisoners of War.

Preparedness Movement

The Preparedness Movement, a campaign to improve America's defense capabilities, began around 1910 and continued past the beginning of World War I. The movement can arguably be dated to Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood becoming the Army chief of staff in July of 1910. Wood used his position to attack the problems of the armed services with the same zeal he had displayed as military governor of Cuba from 1900 to 1902. Wood and his staff instituted efficiency measures to prepare the military to meet the demands of defending the nation in the 20th century. In 1910 Wood inherited an army of 100,000 men spread across the globe in China, the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone. These outposts, along with the resources needed to defend the long continental coastline of the United States, meant the Army was spread thin. The strength of the U.S. Navy (at the time ranked third in the world behind Britain and Germany) mitigated that vulnerability, although more than 90 percent of its ships were understaffed. Still, it was the strength of the Navy that allowed the Army to wither while the United States was protected behind its ocean moats. When pleas to Congress met with resistance, Wood and his followers found other ways to prepare the Army. Wood then sought to harness the power of public opinion to overcome a tight-fisted Congress.

Wood gathered like-minded individuals such as former president Theodore Roosevelt, military historian Frederick L. Huidekoper, and Henry Cabot Lodge to support his initiatives. Their first action was to establish an Army League to lobby for Army issues much as the already established Navy League did for the Navy. In December 1914 the National Security League formed under the leadership of S. Stanwood Menken. Claiming prominent citizens among its members, including financiers and business executives, the National Security League appealed for a congressional investigation of the nation's defenses. These civilian lobbyists could make a more persistent and vigorous case than Wood could as a member of the General Staff.

The Army also copied a naval program that took college students on board ship for a summer. Wood's idea was to bring college students to a summer camp to learn the rudiments of soldiering. Wood's camp at Gettysburg in 1913 was one of two that he sponsored. The aim of these camps was twofold: to provide military instruction and to expose future American leaders to military ideas. Thus these camps not only provided the Army with potential officers in a crisis but also introduced ideas and concepts to leaders who could then spread the doctrine of preparedness.

The beginning of the war in Europe in August 1914 stunned Americans who believed the world too civilized for war. It also made them all too aware of the shortcomings of the U.S. Army. The fighting on the Western Front in Europe shocked those Americans who could imagine their fate if the United States were made to face the winner of that conflict. Suddenly their ocean moat seemed much smaller, and General Wood's pleas for military preparedness more worthy of a hearing. The sinking of the *Lusitania*, a British ship with many Americans on board, by a German submarine on May 7, 1915, increased popular protests about and support for military preparedness and offered encouragement to preparedness advocates.

When nearly 1,000 students signed up for the 1915 summer camps, Leonard Wood expanded the summer camp program. With the financial support of Bernard Baruch, a wealthy financier and Democratic Party supporter, and the backing of Theodore Roosevelt, General Wood drew up plans for similar camps to enlist the business and academic

communities to acquire the skills that might be needed in a military emergency. Thus, on August 9, 1915, one train left Grand Central Station in New York filled with lawyers, bankers, politicians, and civil servants for Wood's camp in Plattsburgh, New York, and another headed for the Presidio in San Francisco, to a similar camp there. When the camps broke up on September 4, 1915, they had achieved more than just teaching the basics of military lore; the event reawakened patriotism among the country's elite, affirmed their belief in military instruction, convinced them of the inadequacy of their training, and provided prominent men to lobby the president and Congress for more extensive defense measures.

Opposing the preparedness effort were Pres. Woodrow Wilson and an array of domestic critics who opposed a large standing army and excessive government spending. Wilson, himself vaguely uncomfortable with armed might, considered his role and that of the United States in the European war as an arbiter speaking from the moral high ground. Foremost among the opponents of preparedness were locally oriented farmers and their organizations who turned a blind eye to foreign threats. As a group, farmers were suspicious of big government and big corporations, worried about militarism, hostile to tax increases, and grounded in more traditional American values of thrift and self-reliance.

German Americans were another large group antagonistic to calls for preparedness. While increased defense expenditures were nominally intended to defend only against those foreign countries hostile to the United States, the prevailing national sympathy for Britain and France, and the possibility that any measures they voted for could be used against their homeland, made many German Americans vocal opponents of preparedness.

Organized labor and socialists also opposed preparedness. Labor advocates, long skeptical about the military and accustomed to military action against labor strikes, tended to oppose preparedness efforts to increase military spending and the size of the Army. Although some prominent labor leaders such as Samuel Gompers backed preparedness, they were unable to enlist their labor associates on its behalf. Socialists, much as their counterparts in Europe, tended to see military preparedness and war as inimical to the working class.

The same month the National Defense measure passed in Congress, another incident encouraged preparedness forces. On March 9, 1916, forces of the Mexican outlaw and revolutionary leader Pancho Villa attacked and burned to the ground the small town of Columbus, New Mexico. The ensuing punitive expedition led by Gen. John Pershing exposed many of the problems inherent in fielding a mobile land force. The force took too long to organize and deploy; it was underequipped, and the Signal Corps aircraft frequently broke down. The inability of Pershing to catch Villa and the inadequacy of the American forces was another blow to antipreparedness forces inside and outside Congress.

The months following Villa's incursion (and congressional battles over preparedness) witnessed a remarkable episode in American history: preparedness parades. On May 6, 1916, New York City's preparedness parade included 135,000 people marching down Manhattan's Fifth Avenue. Preparedness parades followed in cities across the country on June 3, 1916, when supporters marched in 10 cities. Businesses took advantage of the festive air of the parades to run "Preparedness Day" specials in advance of the celebration. By this time most groups acknowledging the growing influence of preparedness, including German Americans, also joined in many of the parades.

General Wood's campaign for preparedness aimed beyond the military. For Wood and others like Teddy Roosevelt, "the strenuous life" could be an ordered, quasi-military one that benefited all who participated. Their own military experiences, as well as their awareness of what had been accomplished at the summer camps, convinced them that military experience tended to level and homogenize those men who shared its hardships. Wood and Roosevelt felt that this effect would, in turn, benefit American youth and hasten the assimilation of recent emigrants from eastern and southern Europe. These ethnic groups, derisively called "hyphenate" Americans, were perceived by many to be split in their loyalties between the United States and their native countries. For Roosevelt and Wood, preparedness was as much about "Americanism" as it was about armament.

In the end, only parts of their program for Americanization and defense materialized. It established a reserve of officers,

authorized a larger peacetime army as well as the large 1916 naval construction program, and mandated a draft in time of war. However, the increased military spending still left the United States ill-prepared for entrance into World War I. The ultimate effect of the Preparedness Movement may have been to broaden the perspective of the electorate, preparing it not simply for defense but also for conscription and for war. When the war ended, America rapidly demobilized its army. A new preparedness movement in the late 1930s repeated the themes that Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt began emphasizing in 1910.

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Related Entries

Roosevelt, Theodore; World War I

Related Documents

1908; 1915 b

—Reginald L. Gingell

Prisoners of War

Prisoners of war (POWs) have been a part of virtually every military conflict in world history. The definition of a POW and the treatment given to individuals captured by the enemy have changed continuously for centuries. The overall trend has been to expand the definition of POWs and generally improve the conditions of captivity. Simultaneously, the exchange of POWs during war—the most common disposition of prisoners in the 18th and 19th centuries—has become a rare occurrence. Most modern POWs remain in captivity for the duration of a war, to be repatriated at the end of the conflict if they survive. The relationship between enemy POWs and the American public has changed with each conflict, ranging from strict segregation of prisoners during the Civil War to close relationships between enemy prisoners and American citizens during World War II. The public awareness of the conditions faced by American POWs has gradually increased, culminating in the media coverage of the saga of Priv. Jessica Lynch during the Iraq War of 2003.

Early POW Practices

Prior to the modern era, prisoners were typically killed or enslaved, according to the whim of the victor. Both the Greeks and the Romans kept physically healthy prisoners for the slave markets, while the Romans also used prisoners for rowing galleys and in gladiatorial contests. In the Middle Ages, captured common soldiers still risked death or enslavement, while the knightly class protected themselves with a code of chivalry that occasionally allowed prisoners to ransom themselves, although this custom was not followed in wars with non-European populations. The idea of humane prisoner treatment was not commonplace until Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius created a system of rules governing the treatment of POWs. His arguments were not universally accepted, but his work publicized the plight of POWs.

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As nationalist impulses led to the creation of mass armies, soldiers were no longer individuals fighting for glory and wealth, but an arm of the nation-state, and therefore prisoners were no longer responsible for negotiating their own release. At the end of the Thirty Years' War, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) included the release of prisoners by all captors without ransom. Despite this isolated incident, the holding of captives for ransom remained a popular practice. Many attempts were made to codify the value of prisoners, usually based upon military rank. Prisoner exchanges soon became common, as enemy nations offset the ransom of prisoners of equal value by simply exchanging them. For the first time, common soldiers could hope for release during a conflict, although exchange was more likely for officers. During the Seven Years' War, England and France established the first POW cartels—agreements that allowed prisoner exchanges on a rank-for-rank basis. Unfortunately, the clumsy systems required equal numbers of prisoners at specific rank. While awaiting exchange, officers were often allowed to give their parole and return to their lines, but enlisted men usually remained in captivity until exchanged.

Colonial powers transplanted European ideas about POWs to the New World. The European cartel systems were occasionally applied to the fighting in North America, but colonial militias and their Native American allies greatly complicated the issue. Native Americans recruited by both the French and the English did not follow the rules of European warfare and refused to submit to the European system. Generally, the accepted rules of POW treatment applied only between forces of European descent. Europeans who surrendered to Native American auxiliaries could not expect quarter (the merciful treatment of helpless captives) even when the auxiliaries were commanded by European officers.

The Revolutionary Period

During the American Revolution, British forces initially refused to consider American rebels as legitimate combatants. Thousands of captured Americans endured terrifying conditions aboard floating prisons called "hulks," which were anchored in New York harbor. The hulks primarily housed political prisoners and American privateers. Thousands perished aboard the prison hulks, mostly from disease brought on by crowded conditions and poor rations. American troops captured in the field or upon ships of war received some, if not all, of the protections of POWs.

George Washington took a personal interest in the fate of POWs and implored British commanders to guarantee the safety of captured Americans. The most compelling reason that British commanders had for offering protection to captured Americans was the threat of retaliation: over the course of the war, American forces captured thousands of British troops, and the Americans based their POW policies upon the practices of the enemy. British officers gave paroles for a limited liberty, on their oath that they would not attempt to escape. Enlisted regulars awaited the end of the conflict in encampments away from population centers. Militia members were often paroled and allowed to return to their homes. Prisoner exchanges happened on an irregular basis during the Revolution, primarily upon a rank-for-rank basis. Officers were exchanged more often than enlisted soldiers, although general battlefield exchanges were not prohibited by either side.

In 1795, the United States and Prussia concluded a treaty that included provisions for the treatment of POWs in the event of war between the two nations. The treaty was the first concluded between two nations not at war that specifically addressed the treatment of POWs. Shortly afterward, the United States became involved in two minor conflicts involving POWs. The Navy captured hundreds of French sailors during the Quasi-War with France. These captives were exchanged for American sailors held by the French, continuing the policies and precedents established in the Revolutionary War. During the period of conflict between the United States and the Barbary powers, American forces took few prisoners. However, the United States negotiated to send provisions and clothing to Americans held captive, and eventually paid a ransom for American citizens held prisoner by the enemy.

The Early Republic

When the United States and Britain again went to war in 1812, both sides acknowledged the legal status of POWs and the need to maintain prisoners for exchange. Early in the

war, British forces captured 23 Irish American soldiers on the Canadian front and deported them to England to stand trial as traitors. British commanders maintained that citizens born as British subjects were guilty of treason if they fought against British troops. The United States protested the action and threatened to retaliate against British officers if any of the captives were harmed. In response, the British placed captured American officers into close confinement, as hostages against the safety of British POWs. A series of retaliatory measures followed, with each side threatening to execute dozens of POWs. The British court system found the Irish Americans not guilty of treason. The men returned to ordinary POW status, and each side gradually released its hostages from close confinement.

In May 1813, in the midst of the War of 1812, the United States and Great Britain signed a formal cartel of exchange for POWs. The cartel established a system of rank equivalencies for the exchange of prisoners of different ranks. For the first time a workable system was created by determining the value of all ranks in terms of privates. For example, a commanding general was equal to 60 privates, while a lieutenant equaled four privates. For the first time, the United States could exchange personnel without needing captures of equal rank. As in earlier conflicts, officers benefited most from the new policies and were almost always exchanged before any enlisted personnel.

American treatment of British captives was fairly lenient by comparison with British standards. U.S. marshals oversaw British POW compounds, managing to maintain good order and keep the POWs in reasonably good health. American prisoners held by the British did not fare so well. At no time were American prisoners a high priority for British jailors. Throughout the war, British prisons held almost 100,000 French POWs captured on the European continent, and only a few thousand Americans. Complaints about inhumane treatment of Americans were almost constant, particularly for the unfortunate prisoners sent to England. Most of the Americans held in England had served on privateering vessels, and the British did not judge them as deserving the full protections of naval personnel captured aboard warships. They were held in miserable conditions, particularly in the notorious Dartmoor Prison. Prisoners complained of

Diagram of England's notorious Dartmoor Prison, used to house American POWs captured on privateering vessels during the War of 1812. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

dark, crowded cells, rotten meat and moldy bread, and sadistic guards. On April 6, 1815, months after the war's end, American prisoners at Dartmoor demonstrated in the prison to protest their continued captivity. In response, the British prison commandant ordered his troops to open fire, killing 7 and wounding 60.

During the Mexican War, American POW policy became more focused on convenience. American logistics were insufficient to support two armies under Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott while also maintaining thousands of prisoners. Thus, both generals held prisoners only long enough to effect battlefield exchanges and regain American prisoners. Once all captured Americans had been redeemed, Mexican prisoners were ordered to give their parole not to fight against the U.S. Army for the remainder of the war and were then released. The idea of parole had precedent in North America, including during the American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, but in Mexico it was applied to a much broader segment of the enemy forces, with almost no prisoners retained as hostages against parole-breaking by Mexican forces. This policy saved the American commanders from feeding, housing, and guarding the thousands of

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prisoners taken in the war, but it also returned able-bodied soldiers to the enemy. Reneging on paroles was rampant, to the consternation of Taylor and Scott. However, enlisted Mexican prisoners almost certainly did not understand the nature of the parole system or they were forced to rejoin their country's army regardless of their parole status. In 1847, Pres. James K. Polk commended Winfield Scott for his humane behavior toward captives, but also ordered him to begin holding Mexican officers for the duration of the war. Before this shift in policy could begin to have a major effect, Scott captured Mexico City and essentially ended the war. The only significant shift in American policy during the war was the decision not to parole masses of enemy troops in the future.

The American Civil War

During the American Civil War, more than 400,000 Americans were held as POWs. Of that number, more than 50,000 died in captivity, in roughly equal numbers on each side. On both sides, the primary cause of death was disease, resulting largely from neglect. Both the Union and the Confederacy held prisoners for the duration of the war in extremely crowded enclosures, and neither side provided adequate supplies for the maintenance of their captive populations. Exchanges, while agreed upon in principle, soon broke down in practice. The Union found that exchanging prisoners was of greater benefit to the Confederacy, as Confederate prisoners tended to leave Union prisons in better physical condition. As the war continued, the conditions for prisoners on each side grew worse. The Confederacy often returned prisoners to the Union on parole in the hope of forcing an exchange, or at the very least alleviating the problem of supplying thousands of Union POWs. These paroled prisoners were often put into confinement within Union lines, most notably at Camp Parole, Maryland, to prevent the desertion of Union parolees who might become available again for Union service through a prisoner exchange.

Officers and enlisted personnel were sent to separate enclosures during the Civil War. Officers received better medical care, housing, and supplies from their captors, and often reported the most difficult aspect of captivity to be the ennui associated with endless days of imprisonment. For enlisted personnel, the situation was far more a matter of life and death, with the struggle for survival often absorbing most of the day. Disease, in particular dysentery, plagued enlisted POWs; in addition, POWs came down with smallpox and measles. Medical supplies in Civil War prison camps were rare, particularly in the South, where medicines were not available for front-line troops, much less Union POWs.

Neither side entered the war prepared for the scale of prisoner operations that became necessary over the four-year conflict. As a result, both sides spontaneously created prisoner policies, with disastrous results. In the North, prison camps were typically located close to rail lines, to make the supply of massive camp populations more feasible. In the South, prisons were often placed within population centers, to facilitate the guarding of prisoners. As northern armies gradually pushed into Confederate territory, officials of the Confederacy authorized prison compounds to be deliberately placed away from civilian populations and railroads, in the hope that prisoners could not be freed by Union cavalry raids. This policy led to the creation of the most notorious prison of the war, Camp Sumter, more commonly referred to as Andersonville.

Andersonville, first opened in February 1864, became the symbol for the depravity of prison camps on both sides of the war. It was initially designed to house between 8,000 and 10,000 prisoners on 17 acres of swampy land in Georgia. However, its population quickly swelled, and by August 1864, more than 30,000 POWs filled the camp, with a mortality rate of more than 100 per day. The prison was operated for less than one year, yet accounted for almost half of all Union prisoners' deaths in Confederate captivity. The primary cause of mortality in the prison was the unsanitary conditions of the prison, where the only supply of water was a slow-moving creek that served for drinking, cooking, bathing, and as a latrine.

Despite the awful record of the Confederacy in providing for Union captives, Confederate prisoners fared little better in northern prisons. Many Union prison camps had mortality rates comparable to southern prisons, though none approached the sheer numbers of Andersonville. In particular, Camp Elmira, located in New York, has been singled out

as a horrible example of Union negligence. At Elmira, one-quarter of the camp population died while in captivity, largely because of inadequate shelter. It has been argued that the Union, with its greater supply and transport capability, could and should have maintained its prisoners better, and should not have had a mortality rate comparable to Union prisoners in the South.

The Union made one lasting effort during the war to improve the conditions of captivity for prisoners on both sides. In 1863, Pres. Abraham Lincoln issued General Order Number 100, a list of rules governing the conduct of Union armies in the field. Originally conceived and written by Dr. Francis Lieber, the so-called Lieber Code included numerous provisions for the treatment of POWs. According to the orders, POWs should be given adequate rations, medical care, shelter, and protection from members of the capturing army and the general public. Prisoners should not be punished for attempting to escape. Enlisted prisoners could be put to work on behalf of their captor, though not on projects of a military nature. Lieber's ideas were implemented only on a limited basis by the Union Army, but they laid the groundwork for later international conventions regarding POW treatment.

International POW Conventions

In the conflicts after the Civil War, the United States and other nations sought to alleviate the horrors of captivity while putting prisoners to productive use. The ideas contained within the Lieber Code became the basis for a series of international agreements about the treatment of POWs. Delegates from all the major European states drafted the Brussels Convention of 1874, which codified the minimum standards of POW treatment acceptable to the international community. However, the Brussels Convention was not ratified, and the subject was not addressed again until 1899. In that year, Czar Nicholas II called for an international convention to meet at The Hague for the creation of a system of rules of land warfare. This convention adapted the Lieber Code for international application. In 1907, Pres. Theodore Roosevelt called for another Hague Convention to modify and modernize the rules of warfare. A substantial portion of the convention was dedicated to the issue of POWs, who

were to be maintained in a humane fashion at the expense of the detaining nation. In return, the captives could be used for labor on nonmilitary projects for the benefit of their captor. The Hague Convention was in effect during World War I, providing a useful framework for the POW operations. Not all of the belligerent nations were signatories of the Hague Convention, presenting serious difficulties in interpreting the laws; in addition, the language of the document was vague.

The Geneva Convention, signed in 1929, was a much more specific explication of acceptable POW treatment. The Hague Convention had contained only 17 articles about POWs—the Geneva Convention had 97 articles addressing all aspects of POW life, from capture to repatriation. It made specific provisions for the amount and type of labor acceptable for POWs to perform, and required that all signatories follow its provisions regardless of whether enemy nations had signed the document. It emphasized that enemy prisoners should be moved from the battlefield as quickly as possible. Prisoners were to be maintained with the same level of rations as the captor's own troops, housed in comparable accommodations to garrison troops, and provided the highest possible level of medical care. The document remained unintentionally vague in some aspects of POW treatment, such as the type of food and clothing to be issued to prisoners and the method of repatriation at the end of conflicts—a fact that was exploited by many nations during World War II, including the United States.

In 1949, representatives of 57 nations reconvened in Geneva, hoping to modify the 1929 agreement. Chief among the complaints was the food ration provided by the earlier agreement. The 1949 convention set an absolute minimum standard for rations, sufficient to prevent weight loss or nutritional deficiencies. The 1949 convention also expanded the definition of POWs to groups previously excluded by the earlier agreements, including civilians accompanying military forces but not serving as part of them. A prisoner's captivity was redefined to begin the moment he or she fell into the hands of the enemy, at which point all of the protections of the Geneva Convention would immediately apply. Further, the prisoner was explicitly forbidden from renouncing the rights

secured under the convention. Like previous agreements, the Geneva Convention of 1949 sought to govern all aspects of POW treatment; unlike the earlier agreements, the 1949 convention includes a provision for the punishment of any individual who violates the rights of POWs.

American Imperialism

The American POW experience in the Spanish–American War was by definition short. Unlike previous wars, however, American commanders had actually planned for the utilization of prisoners during the war. Gen. Nelson A. Miles expected to capture thousands of Spanish prisoners and hoped to use them in the construction of roads throughout Cuba to aid the American advance. He suggested that Spanish forces not be sent to the continental United States, out of fear that the American population would be exposed to infectious diseases.

When Spanish forces surrendered in Cuba and the Philippines, they were offered lenient terms, including parole and quick repatriation. All Spanish POWs taken in Cuba were repatriated to Spain within two months of capture, and, in general, they expressed surprise at how well they had been treated by their American captors. In the Philippines, repatriation was slower because of the ongoing insurrection, yet all Spanish troops were evacuated from the Philippines by the end of 1900. Enemies captured in the Philippine Insurrection were given amnesty upon taking an oath of allegiance to the United States, with the exception of individuals convicted of rape, murder, and arson. The treatment of Philippine POWs varied by island, but did not usually involve a prolonged confinement. In short, the American experience with POWs (rather than as POWs) during the Spanish–American War was brief and mostly positive. American troops held prisoner by the Spanish, though few in number, also reported receiving excellent treatment prior to exchange. Those captured by insurgents, however, were not given the international protections of POW status, and on several occasions were executed by their captors.

The United States in the World Wars

Prior to American involvement in World War I, American commanders again considered the issue of how to handle captured enemies. In 1916, the Navy and War departments agreed that the Army should be given custody of all enemy POWs. On March 29, 1917, the War Department issued regulations on the care and feeding of enemy prisoners. As the United States became involved in the war, the regulations proved vital to American forces, which were quickly inundated with prisoners. The fundamental question about enemy POWs was whether to keep them in Europe or send them to the United States. After a careful review of applicable laws, the decision was made to keep captured German prisoners in Europe to serve as a labor force for the American Expeditionary Forces. They also served, unofficially, as hostages against the safety of American POWs held by Germany.

POWs on both sides reported fairly comfortable living conditions behind the battle lines. Prisoners were required to work, but for the most part were not forced to contribute directly to the war effort. The provisions of the Hague Convention, while not considered binding because not all of the belligerents were signatories, were, in general, adhered to by both sides in the conflict on the Western Front. Prisoners received rations and housing identical to those given to fighting forces, and medical care equivalent to that of the captor's troops. Prisoners were used for a wide variety of tasks, including woodcutting, road maintenance, and duties associated with their own internment. At the end of the war, German prisoners were not immediately repatriated; they were kept in France as laborers to help repay the costs of the war. The United States returned its POWs sooner than any Allied nation and exerted diplomatic pressure on Britain and France to return their prisoners to Germany.

More prisoners were taken during World War II than in any other conflict in human history. Millions of prisoners were taken around the world, and a significant percentage of those prisoners did not survive. The war between Germany and the Soviet Union was especially brutal, with approximately 80 percent of all POWs taken on the Eastern Front dying in the hands of the enemy. On the Western Front, the situation was much better, as both the Allies and the Axis powers strove to adhere to the Geneva Convention. In the Pacific, however, the question of prisoners involved a cultural

clash of such proportions that by the end of the war neither side was particularly interested in taking prisoners, much less in seeing to their welfare.

The first major POW operations involving the United States during World War II came during the Allied invasion of North Africa. The United States agreed to accept custody of almost all POWs in the region, with the result that more than 100,000 German and almost 50,000 Italian prisoners were shipped to the continental United States by the end of 1943; by the end of the war, more than 400,000 POWs, mostly Germans, resided in America. More than 500 POW camps, mostly in rural areas, were established to house the prisoners, who became part of a vital workforce, with more than 90 percent of them put to work, primarily in agriculture, with some assigned as laborers to individual families. Their use was greatly opposed by labor unions, on the grounds that it undermined the security of important industries and put the nation at risk of sabotage while taking jobs from civilians. After Italy switched sides in the war, thousands of Italian prisoners were allowed to join Italian service units and serve in war-related industries in the United States. These prisoners, while retaining POW status, were given remarkable liberties within the United States in exchange for their labor.

After Germany's surrender, millions more German soldiers were suddenly in custody of the United States. American logistics were insufficient to provide for such an influx of prisoners, who would drain food stocks and require guards but contribute almost nothing to even their own maintenance. Accordingly, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower decreed that prisoners who were not members of the German SS, the most politicized unit of the Third Reich, should be freed from captivity on parole and sent home. Eisenhower further ordered that these individuals should be considered "Disarmed Enemy Forces" (DEFs), not POWs, thus absolving the United States from the responsibility to care for and feed them under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. Eisenhower's action both alleviated strained supply lines and allowed non-dangerous individuals to return home rather than languish in prison camps throughout Europe. After the war ended, some alleged that Eisenhower had deliberately starved German citizens by refusing to feed them from Allied stockpiles. The primary evidence for this claim was the fact that millions of prisoners disappeared from Allied rosters without explanation on official forms. Their disappearance, however, was attributable to their discharge and the fact that the Allied powers did not keep track of the movements of DEFs. The soldiers neither died nor disappeared; they were released into the civilian population.

Unlike the war in Europe, the Pacific Theater did not result in hundreds of thousands of prisoners being sent to America. The emphasis upon naval operations lowered the rate of captures in the Pacific, as did the Japanese adherence to the bushido code, which forbade warriors to surrender. Barely 5,000 Japanese prisoners were forwarded to the United States for confinement, although thousands more were held in various island locations. At the battle of Iwo Jima, an estimated 20,000 Japanese soldiers were killed, with fewer than 1,100 taken prisoner, most of whom were captured after being incapacitated by wounds. At Okinawa, by early June 1945, more than 60,000 Japanese had been killed while fewer than 500 had been taken prisoner. The Japanese government routinely informed the families of Japanese POWs that their loved ones had been killed and repeatedly refused to accept lists of Japanese prisoners held by American forces.

The Cold War Era

During the Korean War, the POW situation was complicated on both sides by the nature of coalition warfare and by a fundamental misunderstanding of the enemy. Chinese and North Korean prisoners were kept in a huge island prison at Koje-Do, where security was lax and fanatical communists terrorized the other prisoners. United Nations forces discovered that many North Korean and Chinese POWs had been forced into service and did not wish to be repatriated at the end of the war. According to the Geneva Convention, all POWs must be sent back to their homeland at the end of a conflict, but U.N. commanders did not wish to force any POWs to return to a communist state. Despite threats from fellow prisoners, thousands of POWs requested asylum in South Korea rather than repatriation. After months of negotiations, it was decided that any prisoner that refused repatriation would have to face an interrogation by representatives of his or her home nation, who would attempt to convince the prisoner to accept repatri-

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ation. By all accounts, the interrogations involved numerous threats and intimidation tactics, yet 15,000 Chinese and 8,000 North Korean prisoners chose to accept asylum in Taiwan and South Korea rather than be sent home.

Chinese officials openly announced that they would not be bound by the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and they attempted to indoctrinate captured U.N. troops through political harangues and constant harassment. After the war ended, the behavior of the communist forces was referred to as an attempt to "brainwash" American troops and their allies. A few U.N. soldiers refused repatriation, including 21 Americans and one British marine. Under duress, many more U.N. POWs cooperated with the demands of the enemy, issuing written and verbal statements attacking capitalism, democracy, and the Western world, showing another way in which prisoners, an extremely vulnerable group, could be manipulated and harassed while in the power of the enemy.

Responding to the collaboration of certain American POWs with their Chinese captors, President Eisenhower issued a new military Code of Conduct in 1955, containing six statements about the behavior of American military personnel. According to the code, every American soldier must be prepared to give his or her life in defense of the nation. No soldier may surrender while still possessing the means to resist. If made a prisoner, every soldier must continue resistance, particularly through escape. Prisoners must maintain discipline, with the senior officer assuming command of other American prisoners. Prisoners could give only their name, rank, and serial number to interrogators, while maintaining faith in their country and their religion to survive captivity.

The code was first tested during the Vietnam War, when some American prisoners remained in captivity for up to seven years. North Vietnam, a signatory of the Geneva Convention, announced that it was not bound by the provisions of the agreement because the United States had never declared war upon North Vietnam. Captured Americans were not regarded as POWs, they were instead referred to as criminals or "air pirates." American prisoners in North Vietnam, numbering just under 2,000, were subjected to the worst aspects of captivity, including torture, harassment, and deprivation. Many of the American POWs were confined in a prison dubbed the "Hanoi Hilton," where they were pressured to engage in propaganda acts against the war. At the end of the war, hundreds of American prisoners were unaccounted for, and the issue remained in the public spotlight for decades.

In South Vietnam, the status of Viet Cong captives was a major issue. The United States turned all captures over to the South Vietnamese government, which placed POWs in a series of large island prisons. These prisoners were not maintained according to Geneva standards, although the treatment of POWs in South Vietnam was more humane than that extended to American POWs in the north. Viet Cong guerrillas repeatedly manufactured international incidents by shelling POW enclosures with rockets and mortars, and then complained to the international community that prisoners held by South Vietnam were unprotected from the ravages of war. As in the Korean War, fanatical ideologues dominated enemy prison compounds and terrorized their compatriots with threats and acts of violence.

After the Cold War

For almost two decades after the end of American involvement in Vietnam, the United States military intervened in a number of locations around the world but did not undertake POW recovery operations on a significant scale. In 1990, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, American planners reconsidered the logistical difficulties of housing and feeding thousands of enemy prisoners. American units constructed two large prison compounds, named Camp Brooklyn and Camp Bronx, in Saudi Arabia for the expected Iraqi POWs. Initial plans called for the orderly processing of Iraqi POWs into the camps for evaluation, interrogation, and advancement into Saudi Arabian custody. The two camps were each designed to hold up to 28,000 prisoners, yet neither was completed before prisoners began to arrive. American commanders underestimated the number of Iraqis who would surrender—almost 100,000 were formally processed by the two camps despite the brevity of the ground campaign. The camps were efficient, yet understaffed for the overwhelming influx of prisoners. Because the war ended quickly, coalition forces were not required to maintain prisoners for long and

were able to repatriate Iraqi POWs before the difficulties of long-term captivity appeared.

The war on terror, begun in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, raised new questions about the definition of POWs. Many of the combatants facing American troops in the field were not the representatives of a legally constituted government. Terrorist organizations certainly did not see themselves as bound by the Geneva Convention; the United States announced that prisoners from the war on terror would be treated humanely; however, they were not given formal POW status and its legal protections. Several hundred prisoners captured in Afghanistan in 2001 were shipped to Guantanamo, Cuba, to be held and interrogated by American military intelligence forces as part of the effort to destroy the al Qaeda terrorist network. The Pentagon argued that the detainees should not be considered POWs and should be subject to trial by military commissions, but federal courts ruled in 2004 that the commissions were illegal and that the prisoners were entitled to POW status.

In 2003 an American-led coalition launched an invasion of Iraq, capturing thousands of Iraqi military personnel. Unlike the earlier conflict, Iraqi prisoners remained in captivity for a prolonged period, and combatant prisoners were mixed with individuals held for criminal offenses. By not separating POWs from civil prisoners, American commanders demonstrated that the Geneva Convention would not be explicitly followed in postwar Iraq. In early 2004, disturbing reports surfaced in the media alleging the systematic abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the hands of their American captors. Shown in photographs published in numerous media outlets, prisoners were forced to strip naked and assume humiliating positions, while being threatened with physical punishment or execution for disobedience. The shocking images brought the issue of POWs to the forefront of American political discussions. The treatment of the prisoners, particularly those held at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad, certainly involved massive violations of the Geneva Convention. According to some of the individuals accused in the abuse scandal, civilian authorities and members of the military intelligence community gave orders to "soften up" the prisoners for interrogation. In response, a massive system of abuses arose that included

alleged torture, sexual assault, deprivation of food and clothing, and deliberate attempts to destroy the physical and mental health of the POWs. In response to the initial allegations, the Army immediately removed the commandant of the Abu Ghraib prison and initiated courts-martial against the prison guards shown in the photographs. Outrage at the treatment of the prisoners was not limited to the American public; the evidence led to an immediate response within the region and galvanized opposition to the occupation of Iraq. Several individuals were convicted of a variety of offenses relating to the Abu Ghraib scandal; most chose to plead guilty to lesser offenses rather than facing courts-martial.

The Iraqi POW abuse scandal will almost certainly affect the way in which the United States conducts prisoner operations in the future. In the post-Vietnam era, POWs have been maintained and guarded by elements of the Army Reserve and the National Guard. By most accounts, these units have been poorly trained and unprepared for the scope of their task. In the Gulf War, the duration of captivity was so short that the major problems associated with delegating the POWs to Reservists did not clearly emerge, but the Abu Ghraib scandal will force the military to reconsider prisoner operations. Historically, the United States has been at the forefront of efforts to improve the conditions of POWs, but America must remain diligent if it is to keep its status as a nation interested in the humanitarian principles of aiding POWs held by any nation.

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Related Entries

Andersonville; Articles of War; Atrocity and Captivity Narratives; Customs of War; General Orders, No. 100; Geneva and Hague Conventions; Lynch, Jessica

Related Documents

1775; 1776 c; 1863 h; 1866

—*Paul J. Springer*

Private Military Contractors

For many Americans, the 1975 photograph of a helicopter rescuing people from an apartment rooftop in Saigon symbolizes the failure of the Vietnam War. What most do not know is that the rescue also demonstrates the prominent yet shadowy role played by private military contractors (PMCs) in American history. The helicopter was operated by Air America, then owned by the Central Intelligence Agency but first established as a private company, Civil Air Transport (CAT). Air America and CAT had a long and secretive role in the service of the U.S. military in Southeast Asia.

Terms such as mercenary and soldier of fortune have been replaced by PMC as the description preferred by those in the military services industry. Mercenary and soldier of fortune, in the narrowest terms, describe an individual who sells his or her military skills to a foreign nation and does not serve as a member of a designated government force. But both words, especially mercenary, are often used loosely and can apply to those who fight for other nations in support of a cause, sometimes as part of a government force, as well as those who seek adventure or status or even citizenship in the host nation. Profit is not always the primary motive for mercenary service. As the Air America example demonstrates, PMCs who serve their own nation can be categorized as mercenaries. The narrow definition of mercenary typically refers to combat duty and does not include the vast array of support and training services, the activities performed by many present-day PMCs. Closely related to mercenaries are filibusters, American military adventurers (most common in the 19th century) with no connection to any government entity who serve in private expeditions against nations not at war with the United States and, therefore, violate U.S. law.

PMC service to the United States is as old as the nation itself—in fact, a bit older. The Declaration of Independence may have accused King George III of "transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete works of death, desolation, and cruelty" in the colonies, which he did by employing Hessians and other Germans, but the Continental Army also used mercenaries, although to a far lesser extent. The Marquis de Lafayette, whose early involvement with the Continental Army qualifies as mercenary duty, is certainly the best known of the Europeans who served the cause of independence. But others made notable contributions, for example, Swiss officer Friedrich von Steuben played a prominent role in training American units; two Poles, Kazimierz Pulaski and Tadeusz Kosciuszko, chief engineer of West Point; the German Johann Kalb and the Irish-born Thomas Conway. In addition to the nation's use of PMCs, some of its early war heroes served under other flags, including John Paul Jones who served in Russia and David Porter who served in Mexico.

The naval version of the mercenary, the privateer, contributed to the Revolutionary War effort at sea against the

formidable British Navy. After independence, the fledgling nation also used PMCs to help compensate for America's inadequate naval forces. The 1787 Constitution authorized Congress to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," thus officially sanctioning privateering. The United States used privateers to great effect against the British during the War of 1812.

The young nation also employed land-force mercenaries during its early years. In 1804, a former American consul to Tunis, William Eaton, concocted a scheme to overthrow the pasha of Tripoli, then at war with the United States. Eaton's plan was approved by the president and secretary of state. With the help of a few hundred mercenaries, mostly Muslims, Eaton nearly achieved his goal in early 1805 before learning that the United States had come to terms with Tripoli.

Despite the U.S. Neutrality Act of 1818 and other laws and treaties that prohibited citizens from participating in military expeditions formed in the United States and directed against nations with which the United States was at peace, thousands of Americans served in private units that invaded or intended to invade Canada, Central and South America, and the Caribbean. Filibuster William Walker, perhaps the most notorious of all, actually controlled Nicaragua for a short time in the 1850s. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, American soldiers of fortune in Central America, known as "Banana Men," worked directly for private concerns and indirectly for the U.S. government. (As recently as the 1980s, American mercenaries working for the Central Intelligence Agency were active in Nicaragua.)

Frederick Townsend Ward of Massachusetts, arguably the most successful American soldier of fortune of the 19th century, began his mercenary duties as a filibuster in Nicaragua, then served with the French during the Crimean War, but achieved lasting fame as the leader and organizer of a Chinese mercenary force, later known as the Ever-Victorious Army, sanctioned by the Ch'ing dynasty and charged with defeating a massive and violent revolt known as the Taiping Rebellion.

For some Americans, the Civil War provided the requisite training for future mercenary work abroad. During the 1870s and 1880s, 50 Americans, mostly veterans of the Civil War, and including a few West Point graduates, accepted commissions in the Egyptian Army with the sole caveat

being that they would not take up arms against the United States. The Civil War also provided mercenary opportunities for other nationalities in the wake of the various wars of revolution in Europe. Foreigners served as mercenaries with both the Union and Confederate armies, though the former attracted greater numbers. Many served as staff officers and a few reached the rank of general. Their motives varied. Some fought for the cause of liberty (at least those who joined the Union Army) and others to sharpen or maintain their skills, sometimes with the intent of gaining promotion in their native lands.

The mercenary tradition continued during the 20th century as American PMCs served around the globe, both as individuals and in units. American citizens fought on both sides of the Cuban Revolution, against insurgencies in the 1960s and 1970s, and in defense of Israel. Americans, largely motivated by cause and adventure, not profit, also served under foreign supervision in units consisting largely of American citizens on at least four occasions during the 20th century: the World War I flyers of France's Lafayette Escadrille named in honor of the Marquis de Lafayette; the Kosciuszko Squadron in 1920 (Poland) named after the Polish soldier of fortune who fought with the Continental Army; the Washington and Lincoln brigades of the Spanish Civil War (Spain); and Chennault's Flying Tigers during World War II (China).

During the early years of the Cold War, the United States trained German and Eastern European volunteers, many hailing from postwar labor service units and including former Waffen SS members, for counterinsurgency in the event of an attack by the U.S.S.R. on Western Europe. In addition, approximately 5,000 volunteers originally from the Soviet Union and occupied territories trained as a rapid deployment force for incursions into Soviet territory after a nuclear engagement. In 1950, Congress passed the Lodge Act, thus permitting "alien nationals residing outside the United States" to enlist in the Army. Dubbed the "Volunteer Freedom Corps," a combination of a jobs program for refugees and a Cold War foreign legion, the effort gained impetus under President Eisenhower's New Look strategy of the 1950s, which emphasized "burden sharing"; however, it failed to garner the requisite support in Western Europe and

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was eventually canceled in 1960. Some Lodge Act recruits, or "Iron Curtain nationals," trained in guerrilla warfare and formed the nucleus of the original Special Forces, or Green Berets, in the early 1950s. After World War II, the U.S. government also used contract soldiers, Americans and other nationalities, to perform hazardous duty in locales considered too politically risky or controversial for government forces (Congo, Cuba, Angola, Laos, Colombia) or in cases where American military forces required special local knowledge (Vietnam).

Generally, mercenary operations throughout history have benefited from the surfeit of warrior labor that remains after extended periods of conflict: the European wars of revolution, World War II, and the Cold War. After Vietnam, many expected large numbers of American veterans to participate in mercenary campaigns in Africa and elsewhere. One former Green Beret, so confident of this result, founded *Soldier of Fortune* magazine in 1975 to advertise mercenary employment. A few opportunists even started mercenary training schools in the United States. The expectations were never realized, for two primary reasons. First, beginning in the 1960s, the U.S. government let it be known that any American citizen who joined a foreign mercenary unit would forfeit his or her citizenship. Second, when compared with the military personnel of traditional colonial powers (Great Britain, France, Belgium), Americans generally have had little experience with extended pacification and occupation duties abroad.

Although American soldiers of fortune played but minimal roles in the Third World mercenary campaigns of the 1970s, the decade did see the emergence of another phenomenon that would change the face of the military services industry—what one scholar is now calling "the new business face of warfare." Beginning in the 1970s and aided by the post–Cold War reduction of government forces, a new corporate model of PMC has emerged. These firms provide a host of services: logistics support and intelligence, training and planning, and actual combat operations. Many of these firms are or have been based in Great Britain and South Africa; however, several U.S. corporations also compete in the private military services sector. Some U.S. firms, including Dyncorp, Vinnell Corporation, and Science Applications International

Corporation (SAIC), started as more traditional defense contractors (providing hardware and technical support) during the Cold War but have expanded their operations to include PMC duties. Others, such as Military Professional Resources, Inc., founded in 1989, sought to take advantage of the trend in military "outsourcing" at the end of the Cold War. Firms such as Brown and Root Services expanded logistical support operations from the civilian realm to the military. Blackwater, Inc., founded in 1998 by former U.S. Navy Seals, claims to have prepared thousands of "security personnel" for various duties around the world in addition to training police and military units. To date, no U.S. firm is known to have been directly involved in combat operations.

The U.S. government has shown little interest in encouraging the growth of combat-ready PMCs but has supported the expansion of other sectors of the military services industry. American use of PMCs, by some estimates, has increased tenfold since the Gulf War in 1991. Largely driven by the urge to "outsource," the U.S. Department of Defense signed more than 3,000 contracts between 1994 and 2002 with a value surpassing $300 billion, far exceeding the previous decade. PMCs are now involved in activities considered essential for the U.S. military: maintaining bases, conducting Army aviation training, and providing services for the F-117 stealth fighter and B-2 stealth bomber, as well as the U-2 reconnaissance plane, and many naval vessels.

The 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq has generated even greater interest in and controversy about the role of PMCs. Serious questions remain about the legal ramifications of PMC use by the U.S. government, the quality of training and the compatibility of such training with that of regular forces, the potential "brain-drain" from traditional government forces, accountability, and cost effectiveness.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Cold War; Filibustering; Iraq War; Revolutionary War; War on Terrorism

—*Jonathan F. Phillips*

Production, War

See Aerospace Industry; Armored Vehicles; Munitions Industry.

Profiteering

See War Profiteering.

Propaganda and Psychological Operations

Psychological operations (also referred to as psychological warfare) is a term often used interchangeably with propaganda and deception operations. All are actions that target mental rather than physical elements of an enemy's capabilities. Although virtually all military actions produce some form of psychological effect, psychological operations are specific and deliberately planned, and they are both supplemental to and supportive of conventional operations. The effective use of psychological operations can make up for the limited size and capability of a conventional force. However, large modern militaries also make use of psychological operations to minimize risks and maximize effectiveness.

Historical Background and Definitions

In his classic 6th-century work *The Art of War*, Chinese military strategist and philosopher Sun-Tzu cited numerous examples of commanders who confused, misled, and deceived their enemies and by so doing won victory without engaging in battle. Sun-Tzu contended that such successes were far preferable to utilizing the full weight of military force. The classic book *On War* (1832), by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, frequently cites the importance of the psychological dimensions of warfare. During World War II, both sides calculated psychological factors into their military planning. For example, Germany's blitzkrieg (lightning war) tactics stunned French defenders, while Japan had hoped that the attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941 would be so demoralizing that America would be unable to mount an effective response.

The term psychological operations has negative connotations, conjuring up Hollywood images of "brainwashing" and the use of trickery and lies to increase enemy casualties. However, psychological operations can be positive or negative: propaganda is information—positive or negative, true or false—aimed at supporting and advancing a particular cause. In the U.S. military, "white propaganda" is accurate information, "gray propaganda" provides positive views while avoiding contradictory data, and "black propaganda" is inaccurate and deliberately misleading.

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PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Types of Psychological Operations

Psychological operations can be divided into a number of categories: deception, persuasion, and information. In practice, most operations involve some element of each category, and these categories often overlap in tactics and techniques. All categories of psychological operations require formal, specialized planning and normally involve specially trained and equipped personnel.

Deception operations are attempts by one military force to deceive another about its intentions and actions. They can be either defensive or offensive and can be done at any level, from small-unit tactics to major strategic operations. During World War II, Allied forces created an elaborate deception to convince Germany that the invasion of Sicily (July 10, 1943) would actually take place near Greece. False documents were created and placed on the body of a man who had died of an ailment mirroring the effects of drowning. The body, dressed in a British military uniform and equipped with a false identity, was set adrift in currents that would eventually take it to a location where German agents were likely to have access to the documents. When the body was returned to British authorities, the documents appeared to be undisturbed. Closer examination proved that the documents had been opened and resealed. Shortly afterward, military intelligence reports indicated a large-scale movement of German troops toward the phony invasion site. Ultimately, many Allied lives were saved.

A similar operation took place during the Persian Gulf War. Coalition forces used a variety of means to convince Iraqi government officials that a major amphibious assault on the shores of Kuwait was being planned. The Iraqi military remained in place to the east—to repel the invasion that never came. Meanwhile, coalition forces swept far to the west, encountering much less resistance than anticipated.

Persuasion campaigns were also waged during the Gulf War to urge Iraqi soldiers to surrender rather than fight. Videos of modern, high-tech Coalition weapons were broadcast into Iraq. Leaflets were dropped on known Iraqi positions to convince the soldiers to surrender. In some cases, the leaflets were addressed to specific Iraqi units, as a means of demonstrating the effectiveness of Coalition intelligence. The leaflets also warned of pending air strikes, providing specific times when they would occur. After the air strikes were carried out on schedule, a second leaflet drop offered a final opportunity to surrender.

Persuasion campaigns are sometimes publicly referred to as "information campaigns"; however, information campaigns are, as the name implies, used to convey information. For example, during disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations, psychological operations units use printed material, mobile loudspeakers, and media broadcasts to provide information on the locations of relief supplies, shelter, and medical support. These units provide similar assistance in post-conflict and stability operations. Information campaigns are also used to counter damaging and disruptive rumors. This type of positive propaganda can be used to effectively counter deliberate misinformation promulgated by the opposition.

Psychological operations are not limited to the battlefield or to military targets. They can be directed at political leaders and the civilian population. Actions such as demonstrations of military might, standing down forward-deployed forces, and broadcasting threats or conciliatory statements can be important steps to achieving key strategic political objectives. These efforts may head off military confrontations, separate the population from political leaders, appeal to potential allies, and discourage those who might align with enemies.

Psychological Operations in Context

In all forms of psychological operations, information must first be perceived as credible to be effective. Empirical research consistently demonstrates that psychological operations are not effective when they demand that individuals reject deeply held ideas or worldviews. Instead, they work best when they reinforce existing beliefs and values. Credibility is reinforced by the ability of target audiences to effectively relate the information they receive to what they already accept and believe. For example, Gulf War Coalition messages were reinforced by air strikes and by widely reported fair treatment of those who surrendered. Iraqi psychological operations included radio broadcasts directed at American forces. U.S. soldiers were told that while they were fighting against Iraq, their wives and girlfriends were

back home " . . . sleeping with Bart Simpson." As Bart Simpson was a popular cartoon character, these broadcasts generated laughter and derision rather than surrenders. During World War II, Japanese psychological operations included similar broadcasts by a number of female radio disc jockeys all using the pseudonym of "Tokyo Rose." The allies tuned in to hear contemporary music and to mock false claims of Japanese victories.

Effective psychological operations require attention to history and culture. Operational planning must take into account both the nature of the enemy's political process and the relationship between its military and government. Those planning and conducting operations must consider differences in literacy levels and language, making sure to include dialects and idioms. During United Nations relief operations in Somalia in the early 1990s, initial information campaigns were hindered by the unavailability of trained Somali speakers, with disputes arising about the proper translation of leaflets and broadcasts. Likewise, during the Persian Gulf War, many of the early psychological operations materials were prepared in an Arabic dialect more appropriate for Egypt than the Gulf region.

Psychological operations are affected by the development and spread of information technology. With each new method of communication—movable type, radio, television, the Internet—techniques and tactics have changed. They are also altered by shifts in the nature of warfare and by the development of political institutions. With all these changes, what remains constant is the absolute requirement for credibility with the target audience.

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Related Entries

Media and War; Militant Liberty; Persian Gulf War; Radio Free Europe; Radio in World War II; Voice of America

—Jay M. Parker

Propaganda Posters: World War I

Large color posters were used as war propaganda for the first time during World War I. The poster had been recognized as a useful advertising tool since the early 19th century, and as an art form since at least the 1890s, but not until World War I, the first "modern" war, were posters widely deployed for political purposes. Although the United States did not enter the war until April 1917 (30 months after France, England, and Russia had gone to war against Germany and Austria–Hungary), more than 20 million posters were printed in America—more than in all the other

belligerent nations combined. Posters exhorted all Americans to join the war effort via a variety of means: by sending support to European refugees, by enlisting in the armed forces (or by joining support groups such as the YMCA, the Salvation Army, or the Red Cross), by buying Liberty Bonds, and by conserving material resources. This attempt to mobilize an entire civilian population rather than just an army typifies the new kind of "total" warfare ushered in by World War I.

When war broke out in 1914, the United States remained neutral although its support was avidly sought by both the Central and Allied Powers. Belligerents on both sides aimed propaganda, including posters, at Americans. Germans were depicted as a direct threat—particularly after one of their U-boats sank the *Lusitania* in 1915. This event inspired one of the war's most famous images, Fred Spear's "Enlist!" which shows a mother and child sinking to the ocean floor. In addition, American businesses and organizations used war posters to solicit support for refugees and aid efforts. After the United States entered the war, poster production intensified.

Having experienced two years of neutrality, many Americans needed to be convinced that entering the "European" war was in their national interest. Pres. Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information (CPI) to produce official propaganda and to control the release of information in support of his decision to use the war to "make the world safe for democracy." Under the direction of journalist George Creel, the CPI influenced the public less through censorship than through the innovative dissemination of propaganda, including news bulletins, artwork, pamphlets, speeches, films, and posters. A whole department within the CPI, the Department of Pictorial Publicity (DPP), was devoted to visual propaganda. Almost 300 artists and illustrators, including the highly successful Charles Dana Gibson and Howard Chandler Christy, donated their labor and designs to the DPP. In addition to the more than 700 poster designs produced by this official organization, thousands of others were printed independently by the armed forces, businesses, local and state communities, and private organizations. As in other countries, organizations used contests to solicit designs from art schools and amateurs.

Thus, while many war posters were recognizable as the work of illustrators who drew ads and images in popular magazines, many others were anonymous.

Posters provided an ideal vehicle for propaganda because they could convey a clear, simple, and often emotionally charged message. They were cheap to produce. They could be hung almost anywhere (shop windows, building walls, classrooms, billboards) and reproduced in magazines and leaflets. Although it is difficult to document viewers' responses, the effectiveness of posters seems undeniable given the success of the publicity campaigns that they advertised. The Red Cross told viewers, "You can help," and apparently Americans agreed: 30 million people had joined

H. R. Hopps's "Destroy this Mad Brute" poster. (Private collection)

the organization by war's end. Americans oversubscribed for war bonds by more than $5 billion. Posters also helped sell the once-controversial idea of conscription, which met with widespread cooperation and even enthusiasm.

Certain themes dominated American propaganda posters. Many portrayed the German enemy as a barbaric "Hun" who perpetrated atrocities on women and children, and who might invade American soil. H. R. Hopps's "Destroy this Mad Brute" provides a perfect example. Such images appealed to male viewers' need to "Protect the Nation's Honor" (as one poster put it) and to ensure the safety of their families at home.

Recruitment posters often targeted a specifically male audience, encouraging young men to join the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. Such posters glamorized the soldier as a muscular hero and avoided realistic images of trench warfare, killing, wounding, or death. Posters suggested that if a male viewer wanted to "Be a Man," he should join the service. Men were also enticed with images of adventure and possibilities of self-improvement.

Many posters made direct appeals to women, who were pictured as contributing to the war effort in both traditional and untraditional ways. The U.S. Food Administration asked women to conserve meat and wheat in their domestic roles; the Red Cross implored them to roll bandages and to serve as nurses. But women were also invited to join the Marine Corps as telephone operators, to work in factories, and to drive trucks and ambulances near the front. World War II's famous female icon, "Rosie the Riveter," can trace her ancestry to posters produced in 1917 and 1918.

Other posters made general appeals to patriotism, using figures of Columbia, Uncle Sam, the flag, and the Statue of Liberty. Some addressed immigrant populations in their native languages, asking them to "Remember [their] First Sight of Liberty" and support their adopted nation; some offered African Americans a chance to fight for freedom abroad and, thus, to demonstrate their right to freedoms at home. Many posters pictured the war effort, and particularly military recruitment, as uniting an American population divided along lines of class, ethnicity, age, gender, and occupation. Although such themes may seem particularly American, many were directly borrowed from European designs. Uncle Sam's declaration "I Want You" was borrowed directly from an image of the British general, Lord Kitchener. In addition, many European posters pictured the military's ability to create unity among different classes and nations; others pictured industrial and military workers as partners in the war effort.

Propaganda posters provide powerful visual access to the period and to the preoccupations and ideals of everyday viewers as designers imagined them. Posters exerted a strong influence on how Americans pictured the war in Europe. They showed citizens images of themselves as useful participants in the war effort and of their nation as a world power. The precedents these posters set continue to be relevant today, even as the poster has been surpassed in importance by photography, television, and digital media.

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Related Entries

American Red Cross; Propaganda Posters: World War II; Wilson, Woodrow; World War I

—Pearl James

Propaganda Posters: World War II

During wartime, the U.S. government has often used propaganda posters to convey important messages and to influence its citizens. World War I was the golden age of the poster, but many powerful posters were created during World War II. By 1939, print media had been eclipsed as a vehicle for mass communication by newsreels, films, and, most important, radio. But the government still produced propaganda posters in mass quantities to communicate with the public. To be effective, these posters depended on symbols that would be recognizable and readily understood by their viewers, conveying what their creators hoped were clear messages. In addition to being made accessible through sheer quantity, these posters also had to be intelligible visually and culturally, and varied enough to be eye-catching. By using a wide range of symbols, graphic artists were able to appeal to a large audience. Propaganda posters were visible to people from all walks of life, all races and classes—no purchase (newspapers or magazines) or technology (radio) necessary. Posters were in store windows, on billboards, in train stations, and on the sides of buses.

Posters of World War II were not as stylish or beautiful as those of World War I; they tended more toward realism and utility. A few images, however, carried through both wars. The image of the German Hun was still in use during World War II, but not as extensively as previously. Hitler's image took the place of the Hun, personifying the German enemy. One of the most famous characters used during both wars was Uncle Sam, created by James Montgomery Flagg.

In 1917, he drew Uncle Sam pointing his finger at the reader with the slogan "I Want You." This iconic image was recreated throughout both wars because of its recognizable popular persona. (A less appealing Uncle Sam was later drawn by critics of the Vietnam War.)

As in World War I, during World War II, government agencies used posters for recruiting, fund-raising, increasing production, and for mobilizing the home front. Men and women were asked to serve their country in the armed forces and factories. They also were asked to conserve food and natural resources as they had done in World War I. During World War II, however, a new form of poster appeared warning people against careless talk. Slogans such as "Loose Lips Sink Ships" became part of everyday language, as did images like Siebel's haunting poster of a drowning soldier.

Posters depicting women were also popular during both wars. During World War II, women were shown in a much different fashion than during the earlier war. Gone were the goddess-like women in flowing dresses, and also missing for the most part were women shown in positions that invoked the imagery of rape. World War II posters portrayed women as alternately glamorous and average. Some poster women wore makeup and stylish clothes as they went off to new secretarial jobs, while others wore aprons and canned food for their families. Some of the most famous and memorable posters depicted women working in factories, including the poster of Rosie the Riveter.

One prominent element missing from posters of both world wars was men and women of color; they were almost never shown in government propaganda posters. The few exceptions included a famous poster campaign showing the boxer Joe Louis in combat, and a series of posters drawn by the African American artist Charles Alston, who had painted murals for the American government during the Great Depression and was part of the Harlem Renaissance. His posters depicted famous African Americans and highlighted their war contributions.

Poster production during World War II was under closer supervision than ever before. The Office of War Information (OWI) was created in 1942 to oversee American propaganda campaigns, taking charge of both poster production and distribution. The OWI used a team of artists who volunteered

A typical World War II poster showing an average woman pitching in on the war effort by canning. American households were encouraged to can food from their own gardens to help with the serious and growing food shortages of our allies overseas. (National Archives and Records Administration)

their time to create propaganda posters for government agencies. The number of posters distributed each month was staggering. The OWI had a list of 750,000 retail and service institutions for direct mail distribution. This list had more than 150 classifications, including bars, high schools, hotels, banks, and department stores. The government also sent posters to railroad and subway stations. Postal trucks displayed 20,000 posters, and 7,500 were available to commercial fleet operators. The largest distributor of OWI posters during World War II was the Boy Scouts of America. In more than 2,800 communities, the Boy Scouts delivered posters to retail outlets for display at street level. The Boy Scouts could receive more than one million posters per month from the

OWI. Such huge distribution leaves little doubt that a tremendous number of people viewed this propaganda.

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Related Entries

Newsreels; Office of War Information; Pinups; Propaganda Posters: World War I; Recruiting Advertisements; Rosie the Riveter; Visual Arts and War; World War II

—*Marguerite E. Hoyt*

Protest

See Antiwar Movements; specific events.

Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related

As soldiers experience the strain of combat, psychiatric disorders sometimes develop. In earlier wars, notably the Civil

War, military medical personnel, as well as the larger military establishment and the general public, failed to recognize the severity of psychiatric trauma related to battle. During World War I, however, when "shell-shocked" doughboys reacted psychologically to the dire circumstances of combat in Europe, modern psychiatry began to seriously consider and treat the psychological effects of combat on the soldiers, and the term psychoneurosis came into use, replaced by the term combat fatigue during World War II. The stress of guerrilla warfare that soldiers in the Vietnam War faced, however, increased a particular kind of psychological trauma, one that struck often after soldiers returned to their civilian lives. This phenomenon has been identified as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a term that has entered the general nonmilitary medical lexicon and is now used as a diagnosis for a range of reactions to severe stress.

Combat fatigue and PTSD are separate but closely related medical conditions brought about by the stresses inherent in war and combat. PTSD is an emotional reaction that occurs in soldiers or veterans after they have left the combat zone, sometimes long after, whereas combat fatigue, which has also gone by other names as discussed below, refers to the emotional and psychological impairment of soldiers still in the combat environment. The severity of disablement can vary considerably, but combat fatigue generally prevents a soldier from continuing to function in combat, at least temporarily, while PTSD impairs a soldier or veteran's ability to function in society after returning from combat. PTSD, broadly applied, includes stress-related illnesses that anyone might suffer following a traumatic event, such as a serious accident or natural disaster, but the term was first applied to Vietnam War veterans suffering from various emotional problems related to their war experience.

The History of Combat-related Psychiatric Disorders

That soldiers could break down psychologically from the stresses of combat became widely recognized and accepted during World War I, when such breakdowns were called "shell shock," but the case can be made that psychological breakdowns had also occurred in the American Civil War. These cases were generally referred to as "nostalgia." Afflicted soldiers were depressed, homesick, exhausted, and often suffered physical ailments such as loss of appetite or chronic diarrhea that were probably the result of stress. The attitude of most Civil War commanders and many military doctors was that soldiers suffering from nostalgia were malingering, but severe cases clearly could no longer continue to fight. These soldiers were usually either shifted to noncombatant duties or discharged from service.

Prior to U.S. entry in World War I in April 1917, British and French doctors had already encountered casualties suffering from tremors, terror states, deafness, blindness, or paralysis. The term shell shock was applied, reflecting the initial belief that these casualties suffered from concussion caused by shelling. By the time of America's entry into the war, however, military psychiatrists had come to understand that the cause was not physiological, but psychological. By war's end, the term war neurosis had officially replaced shell shock to reflect this new understanding.

War neurosis and psychoneurosis were the terms in use when American soldiers engaged in serious combat in 1943 in North Africa in World War II. Unfortunately, psychoneurosis implied a personality defect as the primary cause for breaking down, hence "psycho cases," as they were inevitably nicknamed, were not always viewed as legitimate casualties, much as had been the case for nostalgia sufferers in the Civil War. Casualties exhibited symptoms such as terror states, gross tremors, severe startle reactions, mutism, and catatonic-like syndromes that indicated an inability to cope with battlefield conditions.

The belief in character disorders as the main cause of breakdown came into question, however, as the fighting progressed. Doctors began to notice that soldiers with no prior history or indications of character disorders and who had performed bravely under fire for weeks or even months were beginning to snap, or "crack up," to use soldier jargon. Psychiatrists concluded that external factors, specifically the stressful and physically debilitating environment of combat, must be as important as character flaws, if not more so, in causing breakdowns. In May 1943 the terminology shifted again, from psychoneurosis to exhaustion and eventually to combat fatigue, to emphasize these external factors. The combat-fatigue casualty was shaky, hypersensitive, burned out, and had trouble sleeping.

The term combat fatigue remained in use throughout the 1950s and 1960s during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Cases similar to those occurring in World War II were common during the Korean War, especially during the first year of fighting. The sporadic nature of fighting during the Vietnam War, although intense on occasion, did not generate many cases of classic combat fatigue brought on by long-term exposure to combat. Doctors did see psychiatric casualties, however, in response to short but intense periods of combat, often in conjunction with a traumatic event such as the loss of a comrade or trusted leader. Some psychiatrists revisited the issue of character disorders, calling such cases "combat reaction" or "pseudo-combat fatigue," to distinguish them from classic combat fatigue, reflecting the fact that personality flaws may have predisposed these soldiers to breaking down sooner rather than later.

Following the Vietnam War, psychiatrists noticed that a growing number of veterans were suffering from various emotional problems stemming from their wartime service. Veterans were nervous, short-tempered, depressed, suffered from insomnia, plagued by flashbacks and disturbing memories, or guilty about surviving when their comrades had not. This condition, first designated "post-Vietnam syndrome," was officially recognized as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in 1980 in the 3rd edition of the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-III).

Some psychiatrists in the 1970s argued that this condition, which might have occurred in veterans of earlier wars, was especially prevalent in Vietnam veterans because of the troubling nature of that war, the lack of public support and recognition for returned soldiers, and the failure of the government to provide aid to troubled veterans. More recent scholarship argues convincingly that PTSD, though not called such, was experienced by veterans in earlier wars as well, perhaps in numbers equaling or exceeding PTSD cases following the Vietnam War. (See especially Dean, *Shook Over Hell.*)

The Causes of Combat Fatigue

Psychiatrists and sociologists believed that a mix of behavioral and situational (external) factors caused psychological breakdown, although they did not always agree on the relative importance of behavioral versus situational factors in contributing to that breakdown. Military psychiatrists believed that psychological screening of new recruits would eliminate those with behavioral flaws that would contribute to breakdown, and since World War I such screening has been part of the recruit or draftee induction process. Fourteen of every 1,000 inductees in World War I and 94 of every 1,000 inductees during World War II were rejected for service for mental or emotional reasons.

The significant number of combat-fatigue cases in those and later wars indicates that this screening was marginally successful at best. For one, the screenings were hurried and perfunctory, given the large numbers of wartime inductees. Complicating matters were the inductees who wanted to appear unstable to avoid service and, conversely, the inductees with behavioral problems who tried to cover them up because they wanted to serve or did not want to be labeled a "psycho." The main reason psychological screening failed to prevent large numbers of breakdowns, however, was the fact that every soldier, no matter how well adjusted, had a breaking point. Although certain character traits such as excessive anxiety or an inability to adjust socially to the military group might hasten a soldier's emotional collapse, the situational factors in combat were so harsh and stressful that no one could endure them indefinitely.

Physical exhaustion caused by the hardships of combat was common and seemingly so overwhelming that some observers attributed breakdown to physical wear and tear alone. This plausible theory did not hold up, however. For example, troops might be pushed beyond the point of exhaustion while pursuing a retreating enemy, but psychiatrists noticed that incidents of combat fatigue dropped off dramatically in such a situation. In sum, harsh physical conditions and exhaustion alone did not cause psychiatric breakdowns, but most military psychiatrists considered them contributing factors.

If physical exhaustion was at most a contributing factor, then only psychological trauma remained to explain why, beyond personal characteristics in some cases, a soldier broke down. Traumatic stress caused breakdowns, but considerable debate occurred over what fear, or mix of fears and

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anxieties, most contributed to that stress. A few psychologists and sociologists argued that anxiety over having to kill and the guilt that resulted pushed soldiers to the breaking point. Such cases did occur, but a majority of psychiatrists considered the stress produced by the fear of death or mutilation to be the main cause of breakdown. Psychiatrists noticed that the more intense the fighting, the higher the casualty rates, and the longer soldiers were exposed to combat, the higher the number of breakdowns.

While psychiatrists, and the soldiers themselves, came to understand that the fear of death, ever-present in the combat zone, was a primary stress producer, they acknowledged that a host of additional factors added to their stress. Some soldiers were anxious or guilty over killing. Most were physically worn down by the hardships of combat. The green soldier feared that he might not hold up in combat, revealing himself to be a coward. Some suffered from loneliness and yearned for the affection of loved ones. Some soldiers were torn by grief or rage over the loss of close comrades or suffered guilt over surviving, perhaps even feeling somehow responsible for their comrades' deaths. Lack of faith in the unit's leadership could add to soldiers' anxieties. The wonder is not that so many soldiers cracked under the strain of combat, but that so many carried on under such conditions for as long as they did.

The Extent of the Phenomenon

That soldiers in war and veterans after the fight often suffered crippling emotional illness (whatever that illness happened to be called at the time) is without doubt. The important question remains, how many suffered from psychiatric breakdown? No one can be certain. Soldiers with physical ailments were sometimes misdiagnosed as combat-fatigue cases or vice versa. Commanders sometimes used the combat-fatigue category to get rid of malcontents or soldiers with alcohol or drug problems. Conversely, some commanders tried to minimize the number of reported cases of psychiatric casualties because a high rate might indicate morale or leadership problems. Combat-fatigue casualties treated at the lowest levels often did not make it into any count. Some soldiers broke down more than once and hence were double counted. Finally, varying attitudes toward psychiatric casualties in the different wars affected the reported rates. The belief during the Civil War that nostalgia cases were actually malingerers, for example, led to a relatively low number of reported cases. Undoubtedly many Civil War deserters were suffering the effects of nostalgia, but could get relief only by running away.

Some sample statistics, albeit suspect, at least make clear that combat fatigue was a serious problem. About 2 casualties per 1,000 in the Civil War were nostalgia, and an additional 1 per 1,000 was listed as "insanity." Nine of 1,000 doughboys separated from the service during World War I were discharged for mental reasons. Between 28 and 101 casualties per 1,000 in World War II, depending on the theater of fighting, were classed as combat fatigue. In the Korean War, 37 per 1,000 and in the Vietnam War 12 per 1,000 were combat-fatigue casualties. The statistics on Vietnam veterans who suffered or are suffering from PTSD vary widely, depending on definitions and methodology, from as low as 3.5 percent to 25 percent or higher.

Treating Combat Fatigue

Whatever the war, the soldier in the combat zone faced a host of situational stresses; although each soldier wrestled with his own personal mix of anxieties, fear of death or mutilation accompanied by some degree of physical exhaustion remained the main stress producers for most. The techniques found most useful in treating psychiatric casualties, therefore, were remarkably similar in all wars, at least once they were discovered during World War I. Treatment of nostalgia by regimental surgeons in the Civil War, however, was rudimentary at best. Various medicines or tonics were administered, usually with little success. Activity was prescribed, if combat was not ongoing, to alleviate homesickness and boredom. Soldiers were also cajoled—nostalgia indicated moral turpitude, which must be sloughed off. Patriotic service and devotion to duty were considered paramount.

The search for causes and cures for shell shock in World War I was more systematic and successful. The treatment techniques that emerged from World War I still largely stand in good stead, although they were not formalized as principles until 1955 by military psychiatrist Albert J. Glass. These treatment principles are captured by the acronym PIES (proximity,

immediacy, expectancy, and simplicity). Proximity refers to the treatment of combat-fatigue casualties as far forward as possible. Immediacy means treating them expeditiously. Expectancy calls for reassuring casualties that they will quickly recover and return to duty. Simplicity refers to the need to keep the treatment process simple and straightforward.

In application, these principles meant treating the combat-fatigue casualty at or near a forward aid station. The sufferer was placed out of immediate danger and allowed to rest, have a hot meal, and clean up. In some cases medicine was administered to promote sleep. The battalion or regimental surgeon and medical corpsmen, who ideally had been trained by the division psychiatrist to identify and treat combat fatigue, assured the casualties that they would soon feel fit and rested and rejoin their outfits.

This simple treatment process was remarkably successful in returning combat-fatigue casualties to duty. During World War II, for example, 60 percent of the casualties treated near the front lines were returned to duty in two to five days. As with the statistics on the number of combat-fatigue casualties, however, statistics on recovery rates are suspect, in that some soldiers who returned to duty quickly broke down again. Others never fully recovered and, at best, could perform only noncombat duties.

Despite these statistics, the PIES treatment process unquestionably returned many combat-fatigue casualties to combat duty. This austere treatment close to the front worked precisely because it was close to the front. The casualty was not removed from the combat zone. The soldier being treated was safe enough, perhaps in an aid station dugout or cellar, got a much-needed physical respite, and, even more important, got relief from the stress caused by fear of imminent death. But the combat-fatigue casualty was not far removed from his unit and was still being treated like a soldier, not a patient. The combat-fatigued soldier still considered himself part of his unit and did not want to let his buddies down. Nor did the soldier want to embarrass himself by seeming to be shirking or cowardly. Thus, after a few days of rest and reassurance from the medics and doctors, the soldier wanted to rejoin his unit.

Of course, not all combat-fatigue casualties could be treated effectively in the forward areas. Some had such severe symptoms that they needed to be evacuated to the rear, to the psychiatric wards of the field hospitals. A problem encountered early in both world wars was "over evacuation"—forward treatment was not possible because of the shortage of psychiatric specialists and medical facilities. Once a combat-fatigue casualty was bedded down in a safe, clean hospital, far to the rear, the chances of recovering sufficiently to return to combat dropped off dramatically. Removed from the dangers and hardships of the combat zone, the casualty resisted, albeit subconsciously, returning to it. The soldier's symptoms, which could include depression, amnesia, psychosomatic illnesses, extreme startle reaction, irritability, insomnia, grief, and extreme physical weakness, tended to harden and recovery proceeded slowly, if at all.

Even soldiers hospitalized for wounds or ailments sometimes developed psychiatric disorders as they began to recover physically. For example, in a World War II study of 3,921 soldiers who had been hospitalized and eventually discharged from the Army as psychologically unfit, only 1,707 had been admitted as psychiatric casualties. The remaining 2,214 had initially been admitted for wounds or illness, and only when in the hospital did they develop serious symptoms of psychiatric disability.

Discharge from the service, of course, did not mean that these emotionally scarred soldiers miraculously recovered or that their country did not have a responsibility to continue caring for and treating them. In addition, some soldiers recovered from combat fatigue sufficiently to continue to serve, but returned home after the war or after their tour of duty only to be plagued by PTSD. As late as 1940, for example, 9,305 World War I veterans were still hospitalized or in domiciliary care facilities for neuropsychiatric problems connected with their wartime service.

The increased recognition given to PTSD during and following the Vietnam War led to many diagnoses. Depending on the definitions and methodology used, as few as 4 or as many as 25 in 100 veterans suffer from PTSD. Indeed, the diagnosis has come to be used in noncombat situations as well for stress-related illnesses following accidents or natural catastrophes. This is a remarkable example of how American experience in wartime has affected arenas—general medicine, in this case—beyond military affairs.

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Related Entries

Combat, Effects of; Desertion; Disabled American Veterans; Medicine and War; Psychiatry, Military

Related Documents

1948 a; 1953; 1965 c; 1968 a

—*Peter S. Kindsvatter*

Psychiatry, Military

One of the defining features of modern war is the vast number of psychiatric casualties it leaves in its wake. Throughout the 20th century, psychiatric casualties of America's conflicts—ranging from temporary confusion and fatigue to hysterical blindness and paralysis—outnumbered battlefield fatalities by more than 100 percent. The field of military psychiatry began as an effort to treat psychiatric casualties and, when possible, return traumatized soldiers to the line of fire. Since World War II, military psychiatrists have also worked to predict psychological collapse and prevent its development, both on the battlefield and upon return to civilian life.

Although initially viewed with skepticism by wartime commanders, military psychiatry evolved into an integral part of America's armed forces, as the need to minimize psychiatric breakdown became a vital component of U.S. military doctrine. The institutional acceptance of military psychiatry was also a consequence of vocal public concern about abandoning psychologically damaged servicemen. Since the field's inception at the turn of the 20th century, military psychiatrists have struggled with two frequently antithetical duties. American society expects military psychiatrists to take the time to alleviate the permanent symptoms of combat-induced trauma before returning soldiers to their units or homes. The military, however, often places a premium on reducing the number of troops lost to psychiatric breakdowns, even if afflicted soldiers are returned to active duty at the expense of their long-term mental health. Advocates view military psychiatry as a means of

reducing psychiatric casualties in times of war and easing veterans' mental transition to peacetime society. However, the field also exemplifies a broader tension in American culture between the harsh demands of wartime and the values of civil society.

The Civil War to World War I

Although historians have identified examples of psychiatric collapse in the most ancient of wars, the field of military psychiatry is decidedly modern. Its antecedents are first recognizable in the Civil War, when physicians began to notice Union soldiers exhibiting a wide range of abnormal behaviors. Frequently labeled as "nostalgia" or "nervousness," symptoms of psychiatric collapse included emotional and physical fatigue, general insanity, and a debilitating longing for home. Military surgeons also diagnosed thousands of men, many of whom showed no signs of physical injury, as suffering from paralysis, tremors, or "soldier's heart" (severe cardiac palpitations).

Military leaders often viewed such men as cowards, lacking the stamina and "manly character" necessary for combat. Civilian neurologists, on the other hand, tended to have a different view. Schooled in 18th- and 19th-century theories of biological psychiatry, which attributed abnormal behavior to damage in the brain or nervous system, they sought to establish a physiological explanation for soldiers' symptoms. With the help of citizens of the northern states, who viewed mentally ill servicemen as a threat to public safety, doctors urged the Union Army to end its practice of mustering out psychiatric casualties, and leaving them to fend for themselves or wander the countryside. By 1863, the U.S. government had founded St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C., the first American institution exclusively for mentally ill soldiers; that same year Union forces initiated the world's first psychiatric screening program of potential recruits. Such measures, however, did little to treat the most severe psychiatric casualties, and many traumatized soldiers were institutionalized or left impoverished at the war's conclusion.

Military psychiatry did not emerge as a recognized discipline until the Russo-Japanese War, when the Russian military became the first to both keep accurate records of psychiatric casualties and develop a network of clearing stations staffed by specialists in the treatment of psychiatric collapse. Not until World War I, however, did military psychiatry receive widespread attention in Europe and the United States. When the war began, many British specialists continued to believe that psychiatric breakdown—routinely characterized as "shell-shock"—was the result of the concussive effects of modern weaponry, especially large-caliber artillery. This explanation was soon abandoned, however, as European psychiatrists found that patients with head wounds or spinal damage rarely exhibited symptoms of psychiatric collapse. By the time the United States entered the war in April 1917, most psychiatrists believed that "shell-shock" was a misnomer, and that "war neuroses," as psychiatric casualties came to be called, were largely psychological rather than physiological in origin.

Ironically, the psychological basis of war neuroses seemed to confirm what most military leaders had long suspected: breakdown in combat could be traced to a soldier's weak constitution. Many American consultants during World War I were specialists in abnormal psychology, which predisposed them to the belief that psychiatric collapse was the result of internal factors, including hereditary mental illness, and not the wartime environment. In May 1917, Dr. Thomas Salmon, the medical director of the newly created National Committee for Mental Hygiene, traveled to Europe to investigate British and French techniques for treating psychiatric casualties. Upon his return, Salmon recommended a two-part program that involved excluding recruits predisposed to mental breakdown and treating psychiatric casualties as near the front as possible.

This "forward treatment" of casualties, a cornerstone of modern military psychiatry, had been initiated during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 and was eventually adopted by British psychiatrists during World War I, who recognized that soldiers evacuated to England rarely returned to service. Within a year of Salmon's trip, the United States had established a three-tiered system of military psychiatry based on the severity of cases, with psychiatrists organized at division hospitals, advanced neurological hospitals, and large base hospitals. By November 1918, the American military had 693 psychiatrists in service, with 263 stationed abroad.

In their brief experience during World War I, American psychiatrists discovered that the best therapies for psychiatric casualties were relatively simple. A regime of bed rest, warm food, exercise, and counseling quickly administered by a well-trained staff proved sufficient for most cases of psychiatric collapse. Unfortunately, as U.S. forces advanced quickly in the final months of the war, the forward treatment of psychiatric casualties became exceedingly difficult. All too often, psychiatric casualties were evacuated far behind the front lines, with little chance of rejoining the fight. Of the roughly two million American servicemen stationed abroad during World War I, 106,000 were evacuated for psychiatric reasons, 69,394 of whom failed to return to their units. In the eyes of many psychiatrists, such losses confirmed the need to implement higher enlistment standards; only by eliminating those men predisposed to mental collapse could American forces maintain high troop strength under modern battlefield conditions.

World War II and the Korean War

The psychiatric effects of combat did not disappear at the close of World War I. At the end of 1919, psychiatric casualties remained the single largest group of hospitalized veterans. However, efforts to educate the public on the realities of combat-induced trauma often fell on deaf ears, as many Americans continued to view "shell-shock victims" with uncertainty or fear. Pressured by veterans' groups and sympathetic journalists, the U.S. government spent nearly $1 billion on psychiatric casualties between the world wars. Seeking to avoid such costs in the future, in November 1940 the military initiated a comprehensive screening process to weed out vulnerable recruits. By the end of World War II, draft board psychiatrists had examined 18 million men, rejecting 970,000 because of psychiatric disorders or past emotional illness.

Despite such measures, U.S. forces in Europe and the Pacific suffered high rates of psychiatric casualties. Over the course of the war, more than one million men exhibited debilitating psychiatric symptoms, with psychiatric casualties evacuated to military hospitals at double the rate of World War I. By 1943, it had become increasingly obvious to medical authorities that even the most hardened combat veterans were susceptible to psychiatric collapse. That same year,

the diagnostic term psychoneurosis, with its connotations of insanity, was replaced with the more benign-sounding combat exhaustion. More important, military psychiatrists came to realize that no one can become entirely acclimated to modern war. Indeed, one postwar study determined that 98 percent of soldiers would suffer psychiatric breakdowns after 35 days of sustained combat.

Many psychiatric strategies attempted during World War II did not gain widespread acceptance until the Korean War. Foremost among them was a return to forward psychiatry, which became known by the acronym PIE (Proximity, Immediacy, Expectancy). Not only should casualties be treated near the front lines (Proximity), but they should receive care as soon as possible (Immediacy), with the reassurance that they would soon return to their units (Expectancy). World War II had also introduced the use of chloral hydrates and other sedatives to treat cases of battle shock, a procedure that was refined during the Korean War. Moreover, both World War II and the Korean War proved that the best way to reduce psychiatric casualties was to foster unit cohesion. Military psychiatrists determined that group identification was the strongest means for sustaining men in times of stress. This principle was often undermined by the policy of rotating individual soldiers out of the combat zone, a practice that led many soldiers to develop debilitating psychosomatic symptoms, collectively known as "short timer's syndrome," as their evacuation dates approached. Short timer's syndrome was characterized by extreme apathy, psychosomatic ailments, fear, psychological breakdown, a sense of impending dread, or a reliance on superstition.

Even when implemented, the techniques of military psychiatry were not able to stave off all psychiatric casualties in Korea. The war saw more than 48,000 U.S. servicemen evacuated for "battle fatigue," many showing symptoms of noncombat stress (malaise, alcohol abuse, lower back pain) due to months of waiting on the front lines. In the end, the Korean War seemed to prove that, despite the military's best efforts, psychiatric casualties remained inevitable in modern war.

The Vietnam War and Beyond

More so than any other U.S. conflict, the Vietnam War redefined the public's understanding of military psychiatry and

combat-induced trauma. During the war, military psychiatrists were frequently criticized by antiwar activists for their role in perpetuating the conflict. However, military psychiatry became far more visible once the war was over. Although relatively few men collapsed in combat, between 500,000 and 1.5 million American soldiers suffered from debilitating mental disorders upon their return to the United States. Their symptoms, which often lasted for years, ranged from social withdrawal and sleep disorders to troubling flashbacks and paranoia. Working with such men in Veterans Administration hospitals during the 1970s, military psychiatrists joined with social workers and veterans' groups to push for increased public recognition of the struggles of traumatized veterans. More important, they helped convince the American Psychiatric Association to introduce a new diagnosis, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), to describe the long-term effects of catastrophic stress (combat-induced or otherwise) on the human psyche. The acceptance of PTSD not only helped remove the stigma associated with psychiatric collapse, but also fostered a greater public appreciation of the devastating effects of mental trauma.

Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States has increasingly relied upon small, flexible mental health teams to collect and analyze psychological data, prepare service personnel for combat, and debrief them upon returning from the field. In the Persian Gulf War, and later in Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003), American military psychiatrists continued to stress the principles of forward psychiatry, with particular emphasis on unit cohesion, mandatory counseling, and medication. They have also begun to integrate more time-tested practices with advanced technologies to better monitor the mental health of U.S. forces. However, military psychiatrists will have to continue to adapt if they hope to minimize the long-term mental suffering of future military personnel. Indeed, the high rates of suicide, psychiatric collapse, and PTSD among U.S. forces in the Iraq War suggest that military psychiatry remains, at best, an inadequate response to the stresses of modern combat. Throughout its more than 100-year history, the field of military psychiatry has evolved as a means of easing the mental suffering of those in combat. Its growing acceptance by both the military and the general public represents a heightened awareness of the toll modern war exacts on the human psyche. From the 1910s forward, military psychiatrists have been at the forefront of research on stress-related trauma, and their collective findings continue to shape both popular and professional attitudes toward the victims of psychiatric collapse. At the same time, however, military psychiatry has played a critical role in making modern war possible. By reducing the numbers of men and women incapacitated by war-related mental illness, military psychiatry allows armies to maintain higher troop strength and morale, which lets them fight longer. In addition, one might even accuse military psychiatrists of counteracting a "healthy" revulsion to modern war, thus making it that much easier for war to flourish in the future.

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Related Entries

Combat, Effects of; Medicine and War; Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related

Related Documents

1948 a; 1953; 1965 c; 1968 a

—*John M. Kinder*

Psychological Operations

See Propaganda and Psychological Operations.

Public Art

See Memorials and Monuments.

Public Opinion and Policy in Wartime

Public opinion plays an important role in shaping American policy on war and peace issues. The United States has engaged in several wars and military interventions since the advent of public opinion polling in the 1930s. The results of these polls allow analysts to draw certain conclusions about the relationship between public opinion and military ventures.

Public Interest in Foreign Affairs

For the most part, Americans' principal focus is on domestic matters; they are inclined to pay little attention to foreign policy issues, including those of war and peace, unless there appears to be a direct threat to the United States. Their attention can be caught by major threats or by explicit, specific, and dramatic dangers to American lives overseas, but once these concerns fade, people return their attention to domestic issues with considerable alacrity—rather like "the snapping back of a strained elastic," as one analyst has put it (Almond, 76).

For example, in the 1930s domestic problems dominated Americans' attention even as a major war loomed in Europe. Only when war actually began after Hitler's forces invaded Poland in September 1939, and as war against Japan approached in the Pacific from late 1939 through November 1941, did foreign affairs come to the forefront of Americans'

professed concerns. Once World War II ended, attention to international concerns dropped to almost nothing. Intermittent interest arose at various points during the crises and wars of the Cold War, but only a very few issues and incidents—most notably the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—have superseded domestic concerns since 1973.

Public Evaluation of Military Engagements

In general, the American public seems to apply a fairly reasonable, commonsense standard of benefit and cost when evaluating issues of war and peace. An assessment of probable and potential American casualties is particularly important in this evaluation. Accordingly, in contemplating the application of military force, a president typically considers the degree to which the public values the venture, the degree to which it is willing to tolerate U.S. battle deaths to accomplish the goal, and the potential for the political opposition to exploit the situation should American deaths surpass those considered tolerable by the public.

After Pearl Harbor, the public had no difficulty accepting the necessity, and the cost, of confronting the threats presented by Germany and Japan. After the war, it came to accept international communism as a similar threat and was willing to enter the wars in Korea and Vietnam as part of a perceived necessity to confront communist challenges in those countries. However, as the Cold War's two hot wars progressed, they were continually reevaluated, and misgivings mounted about the wisdom of those wars. This decline of support appears to have been related primarily to mounting American casualties, not to television coverage or antiwar protests; the decline of enthusiasm followed the same pattern in both wars, although neither public protest nor television coverage were common during the Korean War.

Policy in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 seems to have followed a similar calculus. A fair number of Americans accepted Pres. George H. W. Bush's claim that it was worth some American lives—perhaps one or two thousand, far lower than were suffered in Korea or Vietnam—to use armed force to turn back Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. But the poll data made clear that support for the effort would have eroded quickly if significant casualties had been suffered—something that happened with Pres. George

Cumulative Deaths and Public Support of the Korean and Vietnam Wars

Data from J. Mueller (1973), reprinted in Larson (1996).

Data on the evolving attitudes of the American public toward two recent conflicts as the number of casualties rose.

W. Bush's war in Iraq in 2003. A similar pattern (at much lower casualty levels) is evident when the public has been asked about peacekeeping ventures in places like Bosnia.

Reaction to Casualties

The American public is especially concerned about their prisoners of war. In a May 1971 poll, 68 percent agreed that U.S. troops should be withdrawn from Vietnam by the end of the year. However, when asked if they would still favor withdrawal "even if it threatened [not cost] the lives or safety of United States POWs held by North Vietnam," support for withdrawal dropped to 11 percent.

Outrage at the fate of American POWs in Bataan in the Philippines probably intensified hatred for the Japanese during World War II, almost as much as the attack on Pearl Harbor. The emotional attachment to prisoners of war was also central to the lengthy and acrimonious peace talks in Korea. Concern about American prisoners and of those missing in action continued to haunt discussions about Vietnam for decades. After the Somali firefight of 1993, the Somalis held one American soldier prisoner. Although the demand to withdraw was great, several polls showed that this demand was substantially contingent on first recovering the prisoner.

Although Americans are extremely sensitive to American casualties, they seem to be remarkably insensitive to casualties suffered by others, including essentially uninvolved—that is, innocent—civilians. Americans demonstrated little

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sympathy for the Japanese civilian population during World War II. Many saw Japanese civilization as one huge war machine targeted against the United States. Thus, asked what should be done with the Japanese after the war, 10 to 15 percent of Americans in various polls conducted during the war favored extermination. After the war was over, 23 percent said they regretted that many more atomic bombs had not "quickly" been used on Japan before they "had a chance to surrender."

But the Gulf War of 1991 was radically different in this respect: 60 percent of the American public held the Iraqi people to be innocent of any blame for their leader's policies. This lack of animosity toward Iraqis did not translate into a great deal of sympathy among the American public for civilian casualties caused by air attacks, however. Extensive pictures and publicity about civilian casualties resulting from an attack on a Baghdad bomb shelter during

the war had no impact on support for bombing. Moreover, dramatic images of the "highway of death" and reports that 100,000 Iraqis had died in the war scarcely dampened enthusiasm at the various "victory" and "welcome home" parades and celebrations.

Isolationism

After the end of the Cold War, some became concerned that the American public would turn isolationist as little enthusiasm was evident for sending American troops to police such trouble spots as Bosnia and Haiti. Since World War II, however, the public's acceptance of such involvement has generally remained at much the same level. Isolationism rose a bit after Vietnam and has declined somewhat since then, but, for the most part, any overall changes have been modest.

Any reluctance to intervene, therefore, should not be seen as some sort of new isolationist impulse. Americans

This chart shows the changing attitudes of Americans during the post World War II era.

were willing, at least at the outset, to send troops to die in Korea and Vietnam because they subscribed to the containment theory of holding communism in check, seeing that ideology to be a genuine threat to the United States. Polls from the time make clear the American public had little interest in losing American lives simply to help out the South Koreans or South Vietnamese. Similarly, "protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression" (not to mention actually fighting to do so) has usually achieved comparatively low ratings among foreign policy goals both during and after the Cold War. Thus, the public has never had much stomach for losing American lives in ventures and arenas that are of little concern to it or in ventures that are essentially humanitarian.

War and the Presidency

When American troops are sent abroad into dangerous situations, a "rally round the flag" effect is usually in evidence, with the commander in chief's approval ratings rising sharply. But this phenomenon tends to be fleeting. The public does not seem to be very interested in rewarding—or even remembering—foreign policy success. George H. W. Bush found little lasting electoral advantage in the large, dramatic victory of the 1991 Gulf War (or, earlier, for the successful Panama intervention); nobody gave Dwight Eisenhower much credit for a successful venture into Lebanon in 1958, to Lyndon Johnson for success in the Dominican Republic in 1965, to Ronald Reagan for a successful invasion of Grenada in 1983, or to Bill Clinton for forcefully resolving the Bosnia problem in 1995. Even Harry Truman, who presided over the final stage of the massive triumph in World War II, saw his approval ratings plummet within months because of domestic concerns.

At the same time, military failure is not necessarily devastating politically. For example, considerable support is usually seen for abandoning low-valued military expeditions that become overextended without particularly blaming the administration that sent them in. The lessons of Korea and Vietnam suggest that electoral punishment follows a substantial rise in casualties. But, if a venture is seen to be of little importance, a president can abandon the cause without fear of inordinate electoral costs.

Although Americans place a high value on the lives of other Americans, their reaction when Americans are killed varies considerably. In some cases, overseas deaths lead to demands for revenge, in others for cutting losses and withdrawing. Which emotion prevails seems to depend on an evaluation of the stakes involved. When Americans were killed at Pearl Harbor in 1941 or at the World Trade Center 60 years later, the call for revenge against the perpetrators was overwhelming. When the value of the stakes does not seem to be worth additional American lives, however, the public has shown a willingness to abandon an overextended or untenable position. Thus the public came to accept, even substantially to support, the decision to withdraw policing troops from Lebanon in 1983 after a terrorist bomb killed 241 U.S. marines in that country's civil war. Americans said after the fact that they considered the expedition to Lebanon to have been a failure; however, many felt that it had been "a good idea at the time," and it seems to have had no negative electoral consequence for the president (or for Marine Corps recruitment).

Similarly, the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers in Somalia in 1993 helped lead to outraged demands for withdrawal (after the lone American POW was recovered), not for calls to revenge the humiliation. By the time the 1996 election rolled around, the public had substantially forgotten about it. Unlike the problems with Japan in 1941 or al Qaeda terrorists in 2001, the situations in Lebanon and Somalia were not seen to present much of a wider threat to American interests, and the public was quite willing to support measures to cut losses and leave.

This tendency might apply even to a much more highly valued venture like the one in Vietnam. The perceived foreign policy value of maintaining the American position in Vietnam declined for years, and, most important, America got its prisoners of war back in a 1973 agreement. For these and other reasons, Americans accepted defeat in Vietnam with remarkable equanimity. Amazingly, the debacle in Vietnam was actually used by the man who presided over it, Gerald Ford, as a point in his favor in his reelection campaign of 1976. When he came into office, he observed, "we were still deeply involved in the problems of Vietnam" but now "we are at

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peace. Not a single young American is fighting or dying on any foreign soil."

Although political demand is overwhelming that casualties in ventures deemed of little importance be extremely low, the public seems to have little problem with keeping occupying forces in place as long as they are not being killed. Thus, having an "exit strategy," a "closed-end commitment," or "a time-certain for withdrawal" (see Weinberger–Powell Doctrine) is not deemed to be important except perhaps for selling an interventionist policy in the first place.

After the Somalia "Black Hawk Down" fiasco, for example, the Americans stayed on for several months and, since no one else was being killed, little attention was paid or concern voiced. Similarly, although little public or political support was evident for sending U.S. troops to Haiti in 1994, almost no protest was made about keeping them there as no one was killed. Although Clinton suggested that policing troops sent to Bosnia in 1995 might be withdrawn after one year, again little protest was voiced when their stay was extended. And Americans tolerated—indeed, hardly noticed—the stationing of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in Europe, Japan, and South Korea for decades on end. If they are not being killed, it scarcely matters to the public if the troops are in Macedonia or in Kansas.

On the other hand, if American troops start being killed in low-valued ventures, public and political demands will quickly be heard to get them out whatever "time-certain" for withdrawal had previously been arranged. Thus, despite calls for knowing in advance what the endgame will be, the only "exit strategy" required is a tactical arrangement to yank the troops abruptly and painlessly from the scene should things go awry.

However, the president does not necessarily need public support in advance to pull off a military venture. Initial support seems to have little long-term relevance to the venture or long-term support for it. In the case of a successful venture, the opposition simply dissolves and goes on to other issues; in the case of failure, the instigator can judiciously cut losses and abandon the mission, and notable negative ramifications are unlikely.

Therefore, as long as American casualties are kept low, the president has quite a bit of leeway in, for example, humanitarian interventions that are not highly valued. Because of public inattention, the long-term political consequences from such ventures—whether successful or not—are likely to be few. By the time of the next election, such ventures will have become nonissues.

The Media

The public's agenda and attitude on issues of war and peace tend to be set much more by the objective content of the issue and by the position of major policy makers (including the political opposition) than by the media. Given the public's limited attention span, the media are often given great credit for setting the political agenda—something sometimes known as the "CNN effect." However, it is difficult to argue that the media had much independent impact in whipping up interest in most of the international concerns that have diverted the public's attention from domestic matters over the last several decades. Rather, the chief determinant has been the often overwhelming weight and drama of the events themselves and the leadership exercised by the major policy makers, especially the president.

Overall, when it comes to public opinion the media seem not so much to act as agenda-setters as purveyors of information they hope will tantalize. They report on a wide variety of topics and are constantly seeking to attract the public's attention as well as to boost sales and ratings. Like any other industry, the media are susceptible to the market, and they follow up on those items that stimulate their customers' interest. In that very important sense, the media do not set the agenda; ultimately the public does.

Although the American public does not characteristically focus on international issues, its response to wars and military interventions is generally reasonably coherent. Most notably, it is sensitive to the values and the costs (particularly in American casualties) involved in the event itself.

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Related Entries

Antiwar Movements; Civil–Military Relations; Cold War; Iraq War; Isolationism; Korean War; Media and War; Peacekeeping Operations; Persian Gulf War; Prisoners of War; Television and War; Vietnam War; World War II

—John Mueller

Pyle, Ernie

(1900–45)
Journalist

Ernie Pyle was one of the most popular American journalists of World War II. Traveling with U.S. military units to cover their wartime campaigns, Pyle experienced and wrote about the war as the fighting men themselves lived it. Although he was on a first-name basis with many generals, he refused their comforts and preferred life in the infantry unit to life in a general's headquarters. Pyle gained his fame by personalizing the large, anonymous war and making his readers feel as if they understood the soldiers who fought it.

After studying journalism at Indiana University, Pyle went to Washington, D.C., in 1923, where he impressed his bosses with his clear, fluid writing. He traveled around the country during the Great Depression, capturing the desperation and poverty of a nation in crisis. Pyle did not write about the grand questions of politics and economics; rather, he tried to demonstrate how individual Americans dealt with the crisis. He captured their pain, their frustration, and their hopes for a brighter future. He thus personalized a national and international event and at the same time developed the style for which he would become known.

Pyle worked for leading newspapers in New York and Washington, D.C., covering aviation and finally serving as managing editor of the *Washington Daily News.* Lacking an interest in editing, Pyle returned to reporting in 1934. In November 1940 Pyle accepted an assignment to go to Europe and cover the war during the battle of Britain. In England he developed a deep sympathy with the plight of the British people and helped American readers identify with Britain's wartime struggles.

After three months overseas, Pyle returned to the United States to help care for his wife, Geraldine "Jerry" Pyle, who suffered from severe physical and emotional problems. His marriage ended in a divorce in 1942, although he remained close friends with his former wife. Her suicide attempt and rejection of his offer of remarriage tormented Pyle.

The divorce, and the U.S. entry into the war, led Pyle to request another overseas assignment. His first war columns

came from North Africa in November 1942. Forbidden by censorship regulations to report on operations and grand strategy, Pyle reported on the men who made up the American Army and their attitudes toward war. He always identified men by their hometowns, referring, for example, to "a friend of mine, Maj. Ronald Elkins of College Station, Texas" (Nichols, xx). He also talked to men in virtually all military specialties. He carefully listened to the men, asking few questions, taking no notes, and letting them tell him their perspectives on the war.

Pyle did not attempt to gloss over unpleasant details of the war. He noted shortcomings in American policy and warned the American people early on that the war would be long and difficult. He also believed that American soldiers were too arrogant and reliant on their massive stores of weapons and supplies. Early in the war, Pyle understood that to defeat the German Army, American soldiers would have to grow colder and harder, a prospect he regretted. His honesty made him even more respected because his writings stood out so markedly from reporters who parroted optimistic official communiqués. As he became increasingly popular, he also grew increasingly hard to censor. Because he rarely concerned himself with issues above those that concerned the common soldier, he rarely needed access to classified material. The censors thus generally left his material untouched.

His style and his ability to personalize the war to millions of civilians at home led to greater fame. Eventually his writings appeared in more than 400 American dailies. In 1943, a publisher compiled his early columns into a book, *Here Is Your War*, which became a national best-seller. After covering the relatively brief Sicilian campaign from July to September in 1943, Pyle returned to the United States a national hero. He met with Secretary of War Henry Stimson, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, several boards of senior officers, and a Hollywood producer who wanted to make a movie about Pyle's life. (A heavy smoker, he also signed a contract to use his face to promote Chesterfield cigarettes.)

In December, Pyle returned to Italy where he remained until April 1944. There he wrote some of his most emotional articles. He had become more determined than ever to communicate the horrors of war to his readers and to explain to them the sacrifices made by American soldiers. He gained

the soldiers' respect by honestly reporting their exploits without embellishment. Traveling with the soldiers, Pyle endured the same wartime conditions, coming so close to the front at Anzio in Italy that he barely escaped enemy shelling.

In April 1944 he arrived in London to find that he had been awarded a Pulitzer Prize. He also discovered that the long-anticipated Allied invasion of France was imminent. Gen. Omar Bradley offered Pyle the rare chance to be with him as the D-Day operation began on June 6, 1944. Typically, Pyle declined and landed in France on June 7 with elements of the American 36th Division. He followed American soldiers from the Normandy beaches to the bloody breakout at St. Lô to the liberation of Paris in August. Exhausted both mentally and physically, Pyle returned to the United States in September—an even larger hero than before. Feted by Hollywood and made wealthy from publishing contracts that yielded two more books, he became a reluctant celebrity.

In January 1945, Pyle left California for the Pacific Theater at the request of the Department of the Navy. The Navy had hoped that Pyle might report on the experiences of its sailors and marines in the same manner as he had done for the soldiers of the army in Europe. Before leaving California, he told a friend that he felt that he had used up all his luck and that he might not return. He arranged his finances before his departure, leaving most of his new wealth to his former wife, with whom he was still deeply in love.

Pyle grew frustrated at the amount of time he had to spend on ships and away from the men he had come to know so well. He covered the bloody Okinawa campaign of April–May 1945 with the marines and worked hard to understand the differences in the war in the Pacific from the one he had covered in Europe and North Africa. His columns captured the intense hatred American soldiers felt toward their Japanese enemies. Whereas Pyle believed that Americans had to learn to hate the Germans, they instinctively and deeply hated the Japanese, both because of their racial differences and because of the no-surrender ethos with which the Japanese soldiers fought.

On April 18, 1945, Pyle landed with the men of the Army's 77th Infantry Division on the island of Ie Shima, less than five miles from Okinawa. He was pleased to be covering

the Army again, because he understood its culture and structure so intimately. Pyle had promised the Army that he would not go ashore at Ie Shima with the first wave of the operation because of the danger involved. While advancing in a jeep on day two of the operation, his convoy was hit with machine-gun fire. Pyle jumped into a ditch, then lifted his head to respond to the call of an injured soldier. A sniper's bullet struck him in the temple, instantly killing him. Appropriately, he was buried in a plain soldier's coffin on the island. Next to his grave soldiers placed a marker that read, "At this spot the 77th Infantry Division lost a buddy, Ernie Pyle, 18 April 1945."

Pyle's death, which came a week after that of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, struck the nation deeply and reminded Americans of the price of victory. The new president, Harry S. Truman, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, and thousands of ordinary soldiers expressed their condolences and sorrow. A New York company proposed to raise enough money to bring Pyle's body back from Ie Shima and build a large memorial park in his honor to house his remains. His former wife, who died of grief six months later, stopped the plan, saying that Ernie Pyle would have wished for no other fate than to remain with the soldiers with whom he had spent the war.

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Related Entries

Frontline Reporting; World War II

Related Documents

1944 a

—*Michael S. Neiberg*

Q

Quakers

In 1661, George Fox, leader of the Society of Friends, or Quakers, issued a Declaration "against all plotters and fighters in the world." Fox declared that the sect, formed in England some eight years earlier, rejected all "war and fighting," which, he maintained, originated "from the lusts of men" (Brock, 25). Thereafter, pacifism became the distinguishing characteristic of the Friends—prior to the 20th century all members were required to renounce personal violence or face disownment. At base, the Quakers' rejection of violence arose from their conviction that all people possessed an "Inner Light" through which they could receive God's grace. The "light within," Friends believed, enabled everyone to respond to spiritual appeals rather than to the use of force.

Quakers carried these pacifist ideals with them to North America in the 1660s, but the most notable example of early Quaker pacifism was in the colony of Pennsylvania, established by Quaker William Penn in 1682 as a "Holy Experiment." In contrast to their colonial neighbors, Pennsylvania's Quaker leadership established generally peaceful relations with the local Delaware and Shawnee. Holding political power also required Friends to exercise the police functions of the state, requiring that Quaker leaders distinguish between coercion necessary to maintain a peaceful society and violence perpetrated on neighboring peoples. More problematic for Quakers was the colony's increasing entanglement in the imperial wars of the 18th century. Though Friends refused personal military service (and Pennsylvania under Quaker leadership lacked a militia), they faced a dilemma when called upon to support financially the military efforts of the British Crown. Moreover, the growing non-Quaker population of the colony—particularly on the

frontier—sought military protection from Native Americans and their European allies. During the Seven Years' War, the conflict between the sect's principles and its exercise of power led Quakers to resign from the colonial assembly and abandon their Holy Experiment. Thereafter, Quaker influence in Pennsylvania declined sharply. Indeed, during the American Revolution, Friends throughout America faced outright hostility and repression (including the 1777 arrest and detention in Virginia without trial of 17 leading Philadelphia Quakers) for their refusal to support the revolutionary cause. Still, out of sympathy for the American cause, a smaller group of Quakers—most notably the "Free Quakers" of Philadelphia—abandoned their pacifist beliefs and supported the armed effort of the revolutionaries; they faced disownment from their church as a result.

By the end of the 18th century, Quakers had largely turned inward; they sought to reform the sect and ensure that members adhered strictly to the various tenets of the faith ("testimonies") rather than seek to change the wider world. This "quietism" led Quakers to eliminate slaveholding by members, but it also promoted widespread factionalism. In the process, the peace testimony lost much of its vitality. Indeed, Quaker quietism even led most Friends to eschew cooperation with non-Quaker pacifist reform groups in the 1830s and 1840s, despite their common goals. The fragility of the peace testimony became clear during the Civil War, when large numbers of northern Quakers—particularly after the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863—joined Union forces to end slavery. Caught between their pacifist heritage and a passionate opposition to slavery, a significant minority of Quakers abandoned the former, and many members escaped church disciplinary action for their activities that supported the war. Yet most Friends remained faithful to the

peace testimony during the war, refusing to serve in the military or to pay war taxes and facing imprisonment or seizure of property as a result. The situation was particularly bleak for the small number of Quakers in the South, many of whom agreed to pay commutation fines to the Confederate government in lieu of military service—a measure that Friends had rejected during previous 19th-century wars as a violation of religious freedom.

By the end of the 19th century, the peace testimony had become even more moribund among Friends. In particular, Evangelical Quakers, generally newer converts to the faith, tended to disregard pacifism, though it remained a central part of the sect's official testimony. Many Friends protested American imperial expansion in Cuba, the Philippines, and Central America at the turn of the century. The American entry into World War I in 1917, however, sparked a recommitment among many Quakers to the sect's traditional pacifist tenets. In late April 1917, concerned Friends met in Philadelphia and formed the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) to find alternative service opportunities for conscientious objectors to the war and to organize relief efforts in Europe. Since its formation, the AFSC has undertaken relief and reconstruction efforts throughout the world's war-torn regions, and was awarded, along with the British Friends Service Council, the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947. After World War II, the AFSC's orientation became increasingly political—including intense criticism of U.S. militarism and foreign policy during the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and in Iraq—as the organization sought, in cooperation with other progressive organizations, to counter the economic and social conditions that lead to warfare.

Even as the AFSC expanded its efforts to promote a pacifist agenda, the Quaker church in the 20th century relaxed its discipline, so that testimonies such as pacifism were left to individual conscience rather than decided as a corporate body. In this more liberal environment, many Friends continued to uphold the peace testimony. Quaker churches worked to create alternative service outlets for their members in times of war, most notably during World War II, when the AFSC helped create and administer the Civilian Public Service (CPS) program for conscientious objectors. Overall, however, the sect's relaxed discipline enabled large numbers of Friends to violate the peace testimony. During World War II, for example, 90 percent of eligible U.S. Quakers served on active duty, and only 7 percent of the 12,000 men who served in the CPS were Friends. Thus, in the 20th century, the most active proponents of the traditional Quaker peace testimony were the service organizations affiliated with the church. In contrast, individual members often abandoned their commitment to pacifism, particularly when—as in World War II—they perceived a conflict between war aims and peace. Nonetheless, since the 17th century, large numbers of American Quakers have been willing to risk their social standing, their property, and on occasion their lives in the effort to promote peace both at home and abroad.

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American Peace Society; Conscientious Objection; Draft Evasion and Resistence; Pacifism; Religion and War

—A. Glenn Crothers

Quantrill's Raiders

Although irregular warfare occurred throughout the occupied South during the Civil War, a band of Missouri guerrillas, led by William Clarke Quantrill, engaged in a series of especially vicious, effective, and notable exploits. Organized in December 1861, Quantrill's Raiders included such notorious characters as George Todd, Frank and Jesse James, Cole Younger, and "Bloody Bill" Anderson. Until the death of Quantrill in 1865, the pro-Confederate band engaged in a series of bloody raids and exploits intended to terrorize Missourians loyal to the Union and Union forces.

A combination of factors contributed to the formation of Quantrill's Raiders. First, a deep bitterness, resulting from the struggle over the status of slavery in Kansas during the 1850s, existed along the Kansas–Missouri border. Although the controversy had been resolved by 1861, many free-soil Kansans (who opposed the extension of slavery into the western territories) viewed the outbreak of the Civil War as an opportunity to exact revenge on pro-slavery Missourians who had plagued Kansas's territorial phase. In late 1861, Kansas "jayhawkers" conducted a series of raids into western Missouri that inflamed the local population and created a sympathetic region for pro-South guerrillas to operate in.

Another factor that fueled Quantrill's operations was that by early 1862 Union military authorities had managed to expel Confederate armies from Missouri. Consequently, pro-Confederate Missourians had no other way to act on their fury against the often heavy-handed federal authorities other than by supporting or joining the guerrilla bands that popped up throughout the state at the start of the war. Moreover, Missouri was nominally a loyal state, thus the federal authorities tended to devote their finite manpower elsewhere. This made Missouri, especially the still raw frontier region along the Kansas border, a fertile field for guerrilla operations.

Quantrill actually began the war as a Kansas jayhawker but, sensing a better opportunity, switched sides during the summer of 1861 and joined the pro-South Missouri State Guard. When the State Guard retreated from Missouri that fall, Quantrill deserted and organized a guerrilla band in December. In Quantrill, the guerrillas of western Missouri found a ruthless, charismatic, and talented leader. He quickly attracted a vicious set of followers. It is impossible to determine how many of those who followed Quantrill were merely psychopaths for whom the war provided a convenient outlet for their violent urges, how many were sincerely committed to the cause of Confederate independence, and how many were simply provoked by Unionist outrages. Regardless of the motivation of its members, the band was exceedingly effective. For the most part, their operations consisted of low-level raids and ambushes in which small units employed hit-and-run tactics based on the horse and revolver. When their actions provoked a strong Union response, Quantrill's men would scatter into squads of two or three and find sanctuary in the thicketed Sni-a-Bar region of Jackson County, Missouri. Another popular tactic was to wear the uniforms of captured Union soldiers, ride up to unsuspecting members of the Union Army, and shoot them at point-blank range.

Quantrill's first significant operation was the sack of the village of Aubry, Kansas, in March 1862. In August, his band participated in an attack on a Union garrison at Independence, Missouri, and in the battle of Lone Jack. That same month, Quantrill's operations received official sanction from the Confederate government in Richmond, Virginia, under the new Partisan Ranger Act (1862). After receiving a commission as a captain in the Confederate Army, Quantrill led bloody raids on Olathe and Shawneetown in Kansas

before leading his band south to Arkansas for the winter. Quantrill then traveled to Richmond to petition for a commission as a colonel. Although his application was rejected in November 1862 by a government that preferred to deal with partisans and guerrillas at arm's length, Quantrill began signing his orders as "Colonel Quantrill."

The most spectacular of Quantrill's exploits was the 1863 sack of the militantly antislavery town of Lawrence, Kansas. Upon returning to western Missouri in May 1863, Quantrill resumed low-level operations while contemplating a raid against Lawrence. Then, on August 14, a Kansas City jail in which Union authorities were holding relatives of known guerrillas collapsed. Taking advantage of the fury of the local population over this incident, Quantrill assembled a force of 450 men for the raid on Lawrence. Aided by lax management of the border defenses by the Kansas government, Quantrill's command crossed the border unmolested late on August 20, 1863. Early the next morning, his men entered Lawrence and spent three hours looting and burning the town. Over 180 of its residents were murdered in cold blood. Union authorities responded to the outrage by issuing Order No. 11, which directed that the counties around Kansas City be depopulated in order to deny the guerrillas their base.

In October, Quantrill's followers committed another atrocity when they ambushed and massacred a Union cavalry detachment at Baxter Springs in Kansas. In early 1864, Quantrill briefly was supplanted as leader of his band by Todd and Anderson, but was able to regain control after Todd and Anderson were killed during an 1864 raid into Missouri led by the Confederate commander Sterling Price. Then, in January 1865, Quantrill decided to undertake an impractical mission to assassinate Pres. Abraham Lincoln. Looting and murdering as they traveled east, Quantrill's band managed to reach Kentucky before Union cavalry patrols caught up with them. During a skirmish near Bloomfield on May 10, 1865, Quantrill was wounded in the spine. He died in captivity on June 6, 1865.

The exploits of Quantrill's Raiders were as notable for the strong response they provoked from federal authorities as they were for the insignificant contribution they made to the cause of Confederate independence. However, the attempt by federal authorities to deny Quantrill and his men their base in the civilian population through the depopulation of western Missouri, although ultimately ineffective, was fully in line with established practice in cases where guerrilla operations blur the line between combatants and noncombatants. Without the support of the people of western Missouri, Quantrill's band could not have operated successfully. Indeed, although their exploits made them infamous in the minds of most Americans, Quantrill and his men would remain heroes to pro-South residents of western Missouri well into the 20th century.

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Related Entries

Civil War

—Ethan S. Rafuse

R

Race Riots

Periods of warfare in American history have been coupled with moments of collective violence on the home front, including, most notably, race riots. The domestic impact of war in stimulating demographic, political, and economic dislocation among American citizens has customarily strained the fragile bonds maintaining tranquility between whites and various marginalized racial groups to their breaking points. Although many incidents of collective racial violence were spontaneous, they were not simply irrational outbursts of pent-up rage and hostility: race riots reflected the existence of deep and long-standing social tensions and anxieties. As such, participants behaved with a sense of purpose, be it to maintain neighborhood boundaries or protest police brutality. Although certain prevailing social conditions—such as migration and urban adjustment, economic competition, political tensions, and the domestic presence of soldiers and veterans—link race riots across various periods of warfare, the riots themselves do not follow a specific typology. Each incident of collective racial violence was historically unique and shaped by the social, political, and economic conditions affecting participants in each specific area.

The years of the Civil War and Reconstruction witnessed several virulent race riots, as many whites, North and South, passionately resisted the elevation of emancipation and African American civil rights to the central goal of the war. The most deadly incident was the New York Anti-Draft Riots of July 1863. Enforcement of the federal Draft Act on July 13, 1863, set off five days of widespread violence. Mobs of predominantly Irish immigrants attacked government officials, wealthy white New Yorkers, and, most prominently, African Americans. The mobs lynched 11 black men, injured

dozens more, and destroyed hundreds of buildings, including a black orphanage. The violence functioned as a dual expression of class antagonism and racism.

For southern African Americans, the early years of Reconstruction proved to be just as deadly as the war itself. The Memphis, Tennessee, and New Orleans riots are of particular significance. On May 1, 1866, a group of black discharged Union soldiers intervened in the arrest of a fellow veteran by Memphis police. Thus commenced three days of rioting where white mobs terrorized the city's black community, killing children, raping women, and burning homes, schools, and hospitals erected by the Freedmen's Bureau. A total of 46 African Americans died in the massacre. The subsequent New Orleans riot had significant implications for the future of Presidential Reconstruction, a plan to readmit former Confederate states into the Union quickly once they had formally emancipated their slaves. On July 30, 1866, the opening day of the state constitutional convention, more than 200 black supporters, mostly Union veterans, encountered a mob of hostile whites resistant to any change in the political and racial status quo. In the ensuing confrontation, police and anti-Republican forces killed 35 African Americans, 3 white radicals, and injured more than 100 others. Northern Republicans used the incident to galvanize support for Radical Reconstruction, a broader plan to provide freedmen with political rights and economic assistance.

Riots erupted intermittently throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Wilmington, North Carolina, 1898; Atlanta, Georgia, 1906; Springfield, Illinois, 1908), but the World War I era was marked by a dramatic surge in collective racial violence. Factors contributing to race riots during this period included black migration to northern cities, interracial job competition, heightened black political consciousness

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and white reactions to it, and the physical presence and symbolic potency of black soldiers and veterans.

The 1917 East St. Louis Riot, one of the worst incidents in American history, stemmed from increased black migration to the city, which many white workers perceived as a threat to their political and economic status. Weeks of racial tension culminated on July 2, when mobs of whites descended on the black community and set it ablaze. Estimates of the number of African Americans killed ranged from at least 39 to upwards of 200, in addition to more than 300 homes and businesses destroyed.

The Houston Riot later that year demonstrated the potential calamitous results of stationing African American soldiers in the South, as well as the determination of African American servicemen to challenge violently white racism. On the night of August 23, 1917, soldiers of the all-black 24th Infantry stormed downtown Houston, Texas, and enacted retribution for weeks of persistent racial discrimination and abuse by opening fire on white civilians and police officers. When the smoke cleared, 17 white men and 2 black soldiers lay dead. Three separate courts-martial found 110 soldiers of the battalion guilty and 13 were summarily executed without opportunity to appeal.

A rash of lynchings and race riots swept the nation in 1919 during what came to be known as the "Red Summer." The dramatic influx of southern black migrants, compounded by the return of black and white soldiers, strained social and economic relations between the races in many cities. The July 19 riot in Washington, D.C., which resulted in 39 deaths, set the tone for the summer of violence. Chicago erupted only days later on July 27 when a group of white swimmers at Lake Michigan stoned an African American youth to death after he mistakenly crossed the lake's imaginary color line. When a group of black witnesses gathered to protest the refusal of the police to arrest those responsible, anxious whites took their actions as a sign of aggression. Although the National Guard was deployed to restore order on the fourth day of the riot, the violence continued for nearly two weeks. Thirty-eight people died, 23 African Americans and 15 whites. Race riots during the Red Summer assumed the form of pitched battles. They were not strictly northern and urban in character, as violence erupted

in locations such as Longview, Texas; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Alaine, Arkansas. Although whites were responsible for instigating the violence, African Americans actively defended themselves and their communities. This reflected a transformation in African American political consciousness commonly referred to as the "New Negro."

Race riots during the World War II era followed a similar pattern. Black migration to major northern cities led to increased interracial economic and residential competition. The war for democracy abroad, as well as the experience of military service, likewise emboldened African Americans to challenge white supremacy and demand their citizenship rights. Although fewer in number than during and after World War I, riots during World War II were equally violent and racially polarizing. The Harlem Riot, on August 1, 1943, stemmed from an assault on a black soldier by white police officers. Rumors of the soldier's death enflamed black Harlemites, who proceeded to loot and destroy white businesses. Six African Americans were killed and hundreds arrested. The worst race riot of the World War II era occurred in Detroit on June 20, 1943. The influx of black migrants and the resulting overcrowding heated race relations to a boiling point. What began as a skirmish at a local park escalated to all-out racial warfare. By the time federal troops restored order, the death toll had reached 34—25 black, with more than 700 injured and property damage in the millions.

Like American race relations in general, collective racial violence during World War II did not follow a strict white–black divide. For example, the Los Angeles Zoot Suit Riot in 1943 reflected California's reactionary wartime racial climate. Mexican immigration to southern California had increased dramatically as a result of the Bracero Program, enacted on August 4, 1942, by the U.S. and Mexican governments, that granted contracts for displaced Mexican farmers to work as much-needed wartime agricultural laborers. In response to the swelling population and a perceived rise in gang violence, Los Angeles police began to target Mexican American young men. In this context, from June 3 to June 13, 1943, white sailors on temporary leave attacked Mexican Americans, singling out men wearing zoot suits, a stylistic signifier of cultural and generational rebellion. Despite the

one-sided nature of the violence, police arrested more than 600 Chicano youths.

Social unrest associated with the war and the civil rights movement shaped the race riots of the Vietnam era. The war and the civil rights movement's goals of dismantling southern segregation ignored increasing joblessness, inadequate housing, and substandard educational opportunities plaguing many urban African Americans. Increasing numbers of black men were sent to Southeast Asia while denied social and economic opportunities at home. Indeed, the riots of the mid-to-late 1960s served as an implicit critique of the Vietnam War's impact on African Americans, as well as a dramatic wake-up call that civil rights was not a strictly southern problem. Race riots occurred throughout the nation, most notably in Harlem (1964); Newark, New Jersey (1967); and Detroit (1967).

The riot in the Watts section of Los Angeles in particular came to symbolize urban racial violence during the Vietnam era. The riot erupted on the night of August 11, 1965, following an incident of police brutality. The six days of widespread looting, burning, and violence were marked by shoot-outs between police, National Guardsmen, and African Americans that resembled military battles. The riot left 34 dead, more than 1,000 injured, and property damage exceeding $100 million. Watts marked a symbolic transition in the civil rights movement from nonviolence to "Black Power."

The socioeconomic pressures of war—urban migration, job competition, residential tensions—have shaped the history of collective racial violence in the United States. Moreover, periods of warfare have historically heightened expectations for social change, and, in the case of African Americans, for political and citizenship rights. As such, black servicemen and veterans, both physically and figuratively, have often played a central role in wartime race riots. Incidents of collective racial violence reflect the ability of war to test the meaning and viability of racial democracy in the United States.

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African Americans in the Military; Brownsville Riot; Great Migration; Vietnam War; World War I; World War II; Zoot Suit Riot

Related Documents

1863 f; 1919 c

—*Chad L. Williams*

Racial Integration of the Armed Forces

For much of U.S. history, the status and employment of African Americans in the armed forces has mirrored their

position in society at large. But in the late 1940s, with the leadership of Pres. Harry S. Truman, the military began the slow process of transforming itself into a leader in race relations. By the early 1950s, growing numbers of African Americans were serving in combat units, and the segregation of those units by race was crumbling. The obstacles to the promotion of blacks within the services were dismantled more slowly, but African Americans eventually entered the officer corps in growing numbers. Half a century later, two observers would conclude that the U.S. armed forces "contradicts the prevailing race paradigm." According to sociologists Charles S. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, the Army "is an organization unmatched in its level of racial integration. It is an institution unmatched in its broad record of black achievement. . . . It is the only place in American life where whites are routinely bossed around by blacks" (1–2). Although the U.S. armed forces are no racial utopia, they can now fairly be characterized as a relative success story in terms of racial integration and equal opportunity.

Race, the World Wars, and the Early Cold War

During World War I, the U.S. armed forces initially sought to avoid relying on black manpower. Later, however, they shunted African Americans into support roles without regard to their qualifications; toward the end of the war small numbers of African Americans were permitted to take part in combat under the American flag through the poorly staffed, poorly trained, and poorly equipped all-black 92nd Division. Four black National Guard regiments assigned to the 93rd Division (provisional) fought ably within more receptive French infantry divisions. Some 380,000 African Americans ultimately entered the U.S. armed forces in World War I. They accounted for 9 percent of the Army and 8.15 percent of the American Expeditionary Force, but just 2.87 percent of the Army's combat strength. The artillery, the aviation corps, and the Navy remained almost entirely off-limits to African Americans. The majority of black volunteers and draftees, however, remained stateside. Under the "Work or Fight" laws that were enacted across much of the South in 1918, many were put to work as manual laborers on large plantations to alleviate labor shortages. For Sec. of War Newton Baker, the highest priority was the war effort, not meeting the demands of racial justice.

After the Armistice, the racism that had earlier been part of the normal order in the American military returned with a vengeance. While the black troops of the 92nd and 93rd Divisions awaited their return home, at the request of the Army, segregationist ("Jim Crow") rules were imposed all over France. As the military downsized, the Army pursued every available means to limit the enlistment of blacks, shrink the size of the legally mandated black regiments, and consign those forces to demeaning duties. As late as 1940, a time when African Americans were nearly 10 percent of the population, blacks accounted for less than 2 percent of the ranks and an infinitesimal proportion of the officer corps.

The greater demands of World War II compelled the armed forces to seek greater African American involvement in the war machine, but their participation remained highly circumscribed. Although the Selective Service Act (1940) assured African Americans a place in the expanding military, the War Department ardently defended segregation throughout the war. As they had in World War I, military officials believed that rectifying inequities within the armed forces should take a backseat to winning the war; they failed to understand that racial discrimination was actually an impediment to victory. Dispatched to the South for basic training, African Americans from the North encountered rigid formal segregation for the first time. When they went off base, their uniforms offered scant protection against slights, slurs, and even bodily assault. The majority—nearly 60 percent—were again relegated to the tail of the military beast, laboring in service units under white officers (only 19 percent of whites were given such assignments). Nevertheless, larger numbers of African Americans were permitted to join in combat than in World War I, and, during the final push on the Western Front, some even served in integrated companies. The war years did bring some progress for African American soldiers, but these advances were generally minor, and none came close to challenging the overarching system of segregation.

In 1946 the Gillem Board, charged by the War Department with assessing the past and making recommendations for the future use of black troops in the Army, sought to build on the wartime experience in formulating the Army's future racial policy. Fairly progressive by the standards of the day, the board recommended increased black representation

in the officer corps and combat units and close working relationships between segregated units, but its overarching vision of the forces was segregated down to the mess hall and barracks. Perhaps to protect African Americans, the Gillem Board instituted a quota so that the postwar Army's race ratios would mirror those of society. But a more traditional view swiftly took hold. Fearing a flood of uneducated African American soldiers, Army planners reduced black participation, and the black share of the Army's enlisted force had declined below the required ratio by mid-1947. In general, the Gillem Board's efforts to create military career opportunities for blacks remained unimplemented.

Toward Racial Integration

The mounting Cold War brought renewed attention to the military's racial practices. By mid-1947, President Truman had become convinced that the country could not return to a peacetime military strength, and he pressed Congress for universal military training. The African American labor leader A. Philip Randolph had demonstrated his formidable skills as an organizer of "direct action" on a national scale in the early 1940s when he forced Pres. Franklin Roosevelt to create the Fair Employment Practices Committee by threatening a massive march on Washington. In 1948 Randolph threatened to discourage African Americans from obeying the call to arms unless segregation were abolished.

In his February 1948 civil rights address to Congress, Truman had promised to eliminate segregation throughout the federal government, including the armed services, but the unexpectedly strident Southern reaction had subsequently cooled his ardor. As the campaign wore on in the spring and summer, Truman barely touched on civil rights; he did not submit bills for congressional consideration nor did he act on matters fully within his authority. But when the southern Democrats, the so-called Dixiecrats, walked out of the Democratic Convention, Truman was free to court the African American vote. In late July, he issued his long-awaited executive order (E.O. 9981) prohibiting racial discrimination and, as the president soon clarified, segregation—in the armed forces.

Truman appointed a committee, chaired by Judge Charles Fahy, to work with the armed forces to implement the order. The Navy and Air Force swiftly submitted plans that met with the committee's approval. With Truman's steadfast support and occasional intervention, the committee eventually overcame the Army's resistance as well. But little changed in practice until the Korean War. In combination with the elimination of the racial quota, wartime manpower pressures led to commanders' experimentation with racial integration in combat units. As evidence streamed in hailing these units' performance (both anecdotal reports as well as more systematic data accumulated by social scientists in Project Clear), integration won converts at the highest levels. It was soon extended to basic training and other areas. Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was equally committed to racial integration—at least within areas under clear federal purview—and by mid-decade, military installations were largely integrated. However, local mores continued to govern the treatment of African American soldiers off base.

From Korea to Vietnam

The armed forces stood out as an anomaly in conservative 1950s America. Thanks to the integration of the enlisted ranks, millions of young white and black Americans now fought, ate, and slept alongside each other—unheard of in a society marked by Jim Crow laws in the South and pervasive informal segregation in the North. Racial liberals and civil rights activists hailed integration in the armed forces as both a sign that society's racial barriers would soon collapse and as a practical tool that could help break down those barriers.

They were overly optimistic. As blacks and white fought together, stereotypes of black cowardice and incompetence fell by the wayside, but battlefield camaraderie failed to translate into deep social bonds. As even early experiments with integrated combat forces found during World War II, "the more military the environment, the more complete the integration. Interracial comity is stronger in the field than in garrison, stronger on duty than off, stronger on post than in the world beyond the base" (Moskos and Butler, 2). Today, in fact, white veterans' attitudes on major race questions are little different from those of nonveterans, and residential and educational segregation remain facts of American life.

New opportunities were made increasingly available to African American soldiers and noncommissioned officers,

Opinion of Armed Forces Personnel on Racial Integration

"As time goes on, do you think that white and colored people in the United States will get along better together than they do today, not as well as they do now, or about the same as now?"

Opinions of future success of integration

they will get along better together

they will get along about the same as now

they will not get along as well as now

white Quartermasters in all-white units

white Quartermasters in integrated units

black Quartermasters in integrated units

black Quartermasters in all-black units

percentage of Quartermasters agreeing with each statement

100

80

60

40

20

0

13%
65%
22%

68%
23%
7%

85%
13%
1%

82%
15%
2%

responses from Quartermaster Corps personnel in 1951

Source: Leo Bogart, ed. *Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army* (Chicago, 1969), pp. 176, 353,355.

and many found the military increasingly attractive as a career. By the mid-1960s, black reenlistment rates exceeded those of whites. Although integration in the enlisted ranks proceeded apace, African Americans' entry into the officer corps grew more slowly. Just 1.6 percent of commissioned officers were African American in 1962, and little progress was made in the decade that followed. In the Navy, African Americans accounted for not even 1 percent of officers. Part

of the explanation lay in the resistance of white officers, but another contributing factor was the relatively small size of the African American college-educated cohort and in that group's preference for more lucrative careers in the private sector.

Other forms of discrimination persisted as well. In 1962 Pres. John F. Kennedy revived the Committee on Equality of Opportunity in the Armed Forces under the authority of the 1948 executive order that had created the Fahy Committee.

Two years later the committee reported that Jim Crow continued to flourish off base, subverting morale in the ranks. Commanders sometimes worked with local authorities to support racist practices and often refused to investigate allegations of discrimination. Moreover, the armed services were plagued by severe miscommunications: even well-meaning white officers were often unaware that some of their behavior and vocabulary could be deeply offensive to their black enlisted men. The services, however, were not equally enthusiastic about addressing the concerns raised by the Gesell Committee and similar groups. Only the Army was willing to make an officer's promotion contingent upon his success in eliminating segregation in surrounding civilian communities.

By the mid-1960s, as the U.S. operational commitment to South Vietnam grew rapidly, some African Americans charged that young black men were bearing a disproportionate share of the burden. Although politically explosive, this allegation was off the mark. Throughout the war, African Americans were slightly underrepresented among servicemen in Vietnam. Although deferments were most widely available for those from the middle and upper classes, a disproportionate number of African Americans were disqualified because of poor health or because of their low scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. Blacks were indeed overrepresented in ground combat units—because of socioeconomic class, however, rather than overt racism. Those recruits who hailed from the lower economic classes and lacked obvious skills—a category into which many African Americans fell—were most likely to be placed in infantry units. Moreover, eager for the extra pay, black career soldiers often volunteered for airborne or airmobile units. Although African Americans accounted for a disproportionate share of casualties at the height of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, they suffered a slightly lower percentage of combat deaths through March 1973 compared with their share of the military-age population.

Nor could the military long isolate itself from the racial turmoil that began to afflict civilian society. Despite cooperation on the battlefield, in the latter half of the decade racial friction began to rise in the rear echelon areas (behind the front lines), when integrated front-line troops were withdrawn for rest or retraining. The military initially denied that race was a significant factor in the escalating violence within units, but evidence to the contrary accumulated in Vietnam and wherever American servicemen and servicewomen were to be found. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, black prisoners rioted at a stockade in Vietnam, black and white Marines awaiting discharge at Camp Lejeune engaged in open racial warfare, serious racial clashes occurred on board several naval vessels, and a California air base suffered four days of race-related rioting. Racial motives also figured in at least some cases of "fragging"—the killing of officers by soldiers, at times by fragmentation hand grenade—which became a serious problem as the war wore on. The costly violence proved an impetus to wide-ranging reform, though traditionalists perceived a dangerous compromise of discipline. Across the armed forces, seminars on race relations and racial sensitivity training were instituted. Books, magazines, and exchange items of particular interest to African Americans were made increasingly available. The Afro (or some similar hairstyle) was deemed acceptable. These mostly symbolic gestures helped foster a new climate of racial awareness. More substantively, the chief of naval operations, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, pledged to rectify the underrepresentation of African Americans at all levels in the Navy—and acted upon it. By the early 1970s, as racial violence engulfed the armed forces, military leaders became sincere advocates of race reform—if only because they finally understood that racial discrimination was undermining the organization's efficacy, on and off the battlefield. The solution, they believed, lay in education.

In the Era of the All Volunteer Force
The strife of the early 1970s gave way later in the decade to relative calm, although this was not due to the efficacy of the military's educational programs. Indeed, all problems were not solved: African Americans remained alienated. Blacks, graduating from underfunded and inadequate secondary schools, performed relatively poorly on the armed forces' aptitude tests and were given the least desirable tasks. In the early 1980s, more than half of those assigned to supply administration and more than 40 percent of those in unit supply, food service, and other specialties were African American, and African Americans were significantly underrepresented in military police, armor and amphibious, combat operational

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control, combat engineering, track vehicle repair, and aircraft jobs. Despite the Army's explanations, African Americans considered themselves to be victims of discrimination. The military justice system also suffered from deeply rooted bias: blacks were more likely than whites to be charged with rule violations, be brought before a court-martial, be confined before trial, and be convicted; they also received heavier sentences. Contrary to the expectations of the early advocates of racial integration, task cohesion did not yield social cohesion, as blacks and whites—albeit to a lesser extent than in civilian society—inhabited separate social worlds. Yet a real transformation had taken place.

One reason was the abandonment of the draft in 1973 in favor of volunteer recruitment. As some predicted, African Americans and other minorities came to be vastly overrepresented in the ranks. A decade later, blacks accounted for 33 percent of the Army's enlisted strength, 22 percent of the Marine Corps', and even 12 percent of the Navy's. Increasing numbers of African Americans became noncommissioned officers—35 percent of senior NCOs in the Army were black in 1995. However, those who remained in the armed forces, white and black, were there because they wished to be, and their career incentives compelled them to play by the rules of the game.

Another reason was the increasing integration of the military's leadership, both civilian and uniformed. By the end of the 1970s, just over 5 percent of officers were African American, with the Army leading the way and the Navy bringing up the rear. This trend continued over the next decade: by 1995 more than 11 percent of all Army officers and around 5.5 percent of officers in the other services were black. The higher the individual's rank, the less likely he or she was to be African American. Despite the positive effects of improving leadership integration, on the whole the underrepresentation of African Americans in such positions—relative to their overrepresentation among the enlisted—troubled the Defense Department and especially black leaders.

The most virulent forms of racism have been extirpated from the U.S. armed forces. The extensive use of the U.S. military in the 1990s focused media attention on the institution, but little centered on race relations. Nevertheless, African Americans in the military remain acutely sensitive to persistent, subtle forms of discrimination. A major study conducted by the armed forces in 1996–1997 found severe differences between blacks' and whites' perceptions on most major questions of race relations in the military. Blacks were far more likely than whites to find fault with the general state of race relations, to complain of racial discrimination in such matters as assignment and evaluation, to doubt the efforts made by military leadership at all levels to reduce racial discrimination and harassment, and to conclude that the military had paid far too little attention to racial problems in recent years. The perception gap between blacks and whites is, in some cases, particularly great among officers. Blacks and whites, however, generally agree that racial conditions in the armed forces are, across a range of social and economic areas, better than in the civilian sphere—with blacks, despite their unstinting criticism, particularly conscious of the military's accomplishments.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Buffalo Soldiers; Executive Order 9981; Harlem Hellfighters

Related Documents

1919 b, c; 1932; 1941; 1942 a; 1944 c; 1945 a, b; 1948 b; 1972

—Ronald R. Krebs

Radio Free Europe

In the years following World War II, many within the U.S. government, including former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan, began to discuss using a radio station as a tool in the ongoing ideological struggle against communism. Such a station, it was hoped, could help weaken the Soviet government's hold on the societies it ruled by providing more open discussion of current news and events and promoting Western values. For this purpose, Radio Free Europe (RFE) was established in 1949. Its main aim was to provide communications services to eastern and southeastern Europe, the Russian Federation, and southwestern Asia.

Two years later, in 1951, the Radio Liberty (RL) service was established with goals similar to those of RFE; however, its mandate was to broadcast to the constituent states of the Soviet Union. Although RFE and RL were funded by the U.S. Congress through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), each organization operated as a nonprofit entity and received donations from outside sources as well. The two organizations merged in 1975 into a single entity, known as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

The role of the CIA in both organizations was deliberately kept from the public for nearly two decades. Some commentators even suggest that many mainstream news outlets, while cognizant of the fact, neglected to reveal the link to the CIA, in complicitous efforts to encourage public support for RFE and RL. Public support was indeed manipulated by a CIA-sponsored mask—called the Crusade for Freedom—which solicited donations for RFE and RL under the pretense that it was funded by private groups and individuals. The *New York Times* revealed that these groups were sponsored by the CIA in 1967.

The RFE/RL and its operations were quite complex. With more than 1,500 employees, most of whom worked at the organization's center in Munich, Germany, the enterprise was a multinational polyglot journalistic enterprise. Various languages were spoken inside the organization itself. In fact, the Radio Liberty staff meetings were held in English, German, Russian, and Turkish.

During the 1970s, writers, editors, technicians, and producers worked from 21 nations behind the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. About 100 people were employed to listen year-round to Eastern European and Russian radio stations. The research conducted was largely published in English and had a wide circulation in the United States and Europe. In this way, the West learned what radio listeners in the countries behind the Iron Curtain were told—and not told—by their officials.

When the CIA stopped financial support of the RFE/RL in 1971, funding—as well as oversight—was transferred to a presidentially appointed Board for International Broadcasting (BIB). At the same time, the increasing inflation in Germany and the resulting devaluation of its currency strained the budgets of RFE/RL. Budget cuts forced the elimination or suspension of important language services and maintenance of the technical facilities that transmitted the radio signal across the Iron Curtain.

The organization went through another substantial transition following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Many argued that, with that collapse, the need for a U.S. counterpoint to the Soviet Union's monolithic information machine had evaporated. In 1994, however, BIB's responsibilities were moved to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which oversaw all U.S. military international broadcasting, including similar services such as Voice of America and Radio Marti, a service targeted at Cuba. In 1995, RFE/RL moved its headquarters from Munich to Prague in the Czech Republic. Its deployment began to change, extending its reach and mission to other areas of the world, reestablishing its purpose. In 1994, Radio Iraq was established, as was Radio Farda, a Persian-language service aimed at the people of Iran. Its network now numbers more than 210 partner broadcasting stations and 590 transmitter sites that air programs in the FM and AM frequencies across 12 time zones. The Internet offers a new frontier for RFE/RL, allowing it to develop new audiences and expand its reach into previously untouched areas.

The Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War, which began in 2003, demonstrate that winning hearts and minds can be as important an offensive operation as military engagement itself. The effectiveness, however, of endeavors such as RFE/RL can be hard to quantify. Although many analysts of, as well as participants in, the Cold War credit RFE/RL with a substantial role in the eventual collapse of Soviet communism, the effectiveness of more recent RFE/RL endeavors is harder to assess. As the conflicts in which our armed forces are engaged become less clearly defined, the goals of the RFE/RL become harder to pinpoint. Nevertheless, the program remains strong. With 18 services broadcasting in 27 languages—covering Europe, the Middle East, and southern Asia—the organization persists in its primary mission: providing news, information, and analysis to societies that—at least as far as the United States is concerned—need them.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Media and War; Militant Liberty; Propaganda and Psychological Operations; Voice of America

—Benjamin Zyla

Radio in World War II

In the 1930s and 1940s, before the advent of television, radio was by far the most important mass medium, providing drama, comedy, and variety entertainment as well as news and commentary to immense audiences. Radio personalities such as Jack Benny and Walter Winchell drew weekly audiences that have rarely been equaled by any television show.

During World War II, radio played a pivotal role in providing news and information, in maintaining the morale of civilians and soldiers, and in psychological warfare.

Even before the United States entered the war, radio affected perception of events in Europe and Asia and of the nations that were to be allies and enemies. Germany beamed short-wave radio propaganda to German Americans; later German broadcasters would produce an English-language program of swing music, *Charlie and His Orchestra*. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) countered with its North American Service, featuring crisply delivered news and speakers such as the playwright J. B. Priestley.

More important, though, were American radio reporters stationed in Europe, including William Shirer and Edward R. Murrow. Shirer's reports from Berlin in the 1930s, and from France as he followed the German invasion in 1940, helped Americans understand the danger of the Nazi regime. Murrow's reports during the Blitz, the German bombing of London from 1940 to 1941, were even more influential. Millions of Americans heard his signature line, "This . . . is London," delivered as he stood on the roofs of buildings during bombing raids, describing what he saw and sometimes holding out his microphone to catch the crash of bombs and the rattle of antiaircraft fire. As the poet Archibald MacLeish said to Murrow, "You burned the city of London in our houses, and we felt the flames that burned it. You laid the dead of London at our doors and we knew the dead were our dead—were all men's dead—were mankind's dead—and ours" (Barnouw, 151). Murrow's reports created sympathy for Britain and made it easier for the U.S. Congress to pass measures, such as the 1941 Lend-Lease Act, to send military aid.

Nearly all Americans owned or had access to a radio during World War II, and it was the most trusted and commonly used source for news. From the bombing of Pearl Harbor, announced in a dramatic bulletin at 2:26 P.M. Eastern time on December 7, 1941, to the end of the war, coverage of war-related events was lavish. It was also popular: a 1945 survey showed that 76 percent of listeners had a preference for evening news programs, 61 percent got most of their news from the radio, and 81 percent thought radio news was fair, while only 39 percent thought newspapers were fair.

Radio news did have its problems. Broadcasts from war zones by on-the-spot reporters were censored by the military; even at home, stories considered to involve national security—such as the sinking of ships or development of new weapons—could be blocked or delayed by the civilian Office of Censorship (OC), meaning that Americans did not get the full story. Rumors, on the other hand, were sometimes reported as facts. And, by postwar standards, the language used on radio may seem racist and jingoistic—the Japanese were often referred to as "Japs" or "Nips," and Walter Winchell called Germans "Ratzis."

Because commercial radio was so popular, it played a key role in rallying support for the war effort and in keeping up the spirits of soldiers and civilians. Shows such as *Words at War* provided dramatizations of war stories. The entertainer Bob Hope and others often presented their broadcasts from military bases. The War Department and the Office of War Information (OWI) even set up their own network to broadcast programs to American soldiers overseas, the American Forces Radio Service (AFRS), which featured both radio shows from home (with the commercials deleted) and original shows with soldiers serving as announcers and disk jockeys. AFRS was also responsible for the most spectacular radio variety show ever, *Command Performance*. Each week, American soldiers could request their favorite Hollywood and Broadway stars to appear on this show—and no one ever turned down *Command Performance*. By the end of the war, AFRS programs were sent to more than 800 outlets serving American soldiers around the world. The American Forces Network, which broadcast AFRS programming to forces in Europe, was so popular that Britain's government objected to it, fearing that the popular and racy American shows were seducing British civilians away from the BBC's programming.

Nearly all radio shows acknowledged the war in some way and did something to boost home-front morale or support the war effort. For example, in the juvenile serial *Terry and the Pirates*, the hero joined with his prewar enemy, the Dragon Lady, to fight a guerilla war against the Japanese. Crooners sang patriotic songs; Kate Smith's rendition of "God Bless America" was probably the most played American song of World War II. And the wildly popular comedy *Fibber McGee and Molly* not only ended each show with an appeal

for readers to support the Red Cross, buy war bonds, or invite a soldier for Thanksgiving dinner, but often incorporated war themes into its shows. In one show, for instance, the lovably obnoxious Fibber buys meat on the black market to circumvent the rationing system, but by the end of the show is brought to realize all of the reasons he shouldn't and vows never to do so again.

Commercial radio's support for the war effort was voluntary and was neither coerced nor organized by the government. The OWI encouraged patriotic themes and messages, the OC made sure that nothing was broadcast that might compromise military security, but the stations and networks (CBS, NBC Red and NBC Blue, which in 1943 became ABC) decided on the content of programs. The most notable exception to this came with foreign-language programs on American stations, which were monitored so closely by the OC that some stations chose to cancel foreign-language programming during the war.

Despite their patriotic cooperation, radio stations and program sponsors were not above making money from the war. A War Advertising Council (set up by advertising agencies, not the government) allocated public service messages to radio stations, but a blizzard of commercial advertising, often using war-associated slogans, was also broadcast. One of the most successful was American Tobacco Company's Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War! campaign, which involved sending hundreds of thousands of free cigarettes to soldiers each week, then letting radio audiences know about it. One reason for the plethora of advertising was a high war-profits tax; although the requirements of military production meant that many companies had few products to sell to civilians, it still seemed to make more sense to spend their profits from government contracts on radio commercials, which would keep their brand name in the public eye, rather than give the money back to the government as taxes.

Broadcast radio also had a direct military use, particularly in Europe. Before the D-Day invasion of Europe on June 6, 1944, the American Broadcast Station in Europe (ABSIE) sent messages to encourage the anti-Nazi resistance movements in occupied countries. After the invasion, ABSIE—supplemented by the powerful transmitter of Radio Luxembourg, seized intact by the Allies—also broadcast propaganda to Germany, attacking the Nazi regime and urging German soldiers to surrender. The Allies even used "black" broadcasting, sending out messages that falsely claimed to be from an anti-Nazi station within Germany itself. It is hard to measure the effects of this psychological warfare, but surrendering German soldiers often mentioned having heard these radio broadcasts.

After World War II, television would rapidly replace radio as the primary medium for entertainment and news. During the war, though, radio was both technologically sophisticated and at the peak of its power and influence. Broadcasters willingly harnessed that power to the requirements of a nation at war.

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Related Entries

Media and War; Office of Censorship; Office of War Information; Propaganda and Psychological Operations

—Bernard G. Hagerty

Rambo

Film Series, 1982–88

The Rambo film series goes beyond the simplistic, explosive action-adventure films characteristic of the 1980s. Profitable and popular, the Rambo films embodied many Americans' attitudes on Vietnam, the Cold War, and the relationship between military and civilian life. Although each sequel became less complex in its means of expression and displayed increasingly gratuitous violence, the films illustrate many Americans' view of war during the Reagan years.

The series began with the 1982 release of *First Blood*, starring Sylvester Stallone as Vietnam veteran and former Green Beret John Rambo. Now a drifter, Rambo has a run-in in the town of Hope with the bigoted sheriff and his staff of hostile policemen. After being arrested and jailed, Rambo suffers flashbacks to his captivity as a POW. He then escapes into the wilderness, eluding state police and incompetent National Guardsmen. Rambo then brings the war back to Hope. After destroying much of the town, he is defused only by Colonel Trautman, his Army commander and mentor. Acknowledging the trauma of Vietnam, Trautman convinces Rambo to surrender peacefully.

Trautman's confrontation with Rambo is a commentary on the difficulties some veterans experienced following the Vietnam War. After serving as an elite soldier, the returning veteran was reviled as a criminal in the United States. Rambo screams to Trautman: "Then I come back to the world and I see all these maggots at the airport, protestin' me, spitting, calling me baby killer and all types of vile crap!" Sacrificing so much for a war "someone didn't let us win," Rambo is the personification of the veteran spurned by his society. Rambo's victimization in civilian life and his destruction of Hope are symbolic of one perception of the Vietnam conflict. Betrayed by a society ambivalent about the war, war is then unleashed against that society. Of the Rambo films, *First Blood* is the most introspective and presents the most powerful social commentary.

First Blood was a commercial success, earning $13 million at the box office. The popularity of *First Blood* would later be dwarfed by its 1985 sequel, *First Blood, Part II*. Imprisoned, Rambo is given an opportunity to earn a pardon by returning to Vietnam to discover if American POWs are still in captivity. However, that supposed mission is a ploy—with the government invested in the message that no POWs remain alive, Rambo's true mission is to prove the government's position. When Rambo defies expectations and discovers several POWs, he is betrayed by the government bureaucrat who leads the mission. Abandoned and captured, Rambo endures brutal torture. After escaping from his captors, Rambo then emerges from the wilderness as a primal force of vengeance. He descends on the prison camp and wipes out the Soviet and Vietnamese garrison with a knife and bow and arrow. Capturing a helicopter, Rambo rescues the POWs and fights his principal Soviet adversary in an aerial helicopter duel. After he returns to the American base, Rambo assaults his commander and destroys the computers and equipment symbolizing the machinery of the government that betrayed America's POWs.

First Blood, *Part II* was panned by critics but was a huge success, earning $150 million. The film's popularity led to Rambo toys, a cartoon, and other merchandise. The social commentary of the film expressed the conservative sentiments of the Reagan era: the problems of Big Government, the renewal of the Cold War, and a revived patriotism. Pres. Ronald Reagan even referred to Rambo during a televised speech following a jet hijacking in 1985. Much of the criticism of *First Blood, Part II* focused on the level of violence: Rambo is transformed from a traumatized Vietnam veteran in the original film into a superhuman killing machine. Whereas only one death is filmed in the original, in Part II this number grows to 69. Critics also argue that Part II lacks creativity. The plot closely resembles that of a Western rescue film: Rambo replaces the cowboy, communists substitute for Indians, and POWs take the place of the distressed damsel.

The Rambo series ended with an unsuccessful third entry, *Rambo III*, released in 1988. Instead of Vietnam as the central setting, Rambo goes to Afghanistan to fight alongside Islamic mujahideen against the Soviets. In many ways this setting foreshadows Pres. George H. W. Bush's sentiment following the Persian Gulf War that America had "kicked the Vietnam syndrome" and was now willing to flex its global muscle. Rambo's Vietnam experience, however, had always defined his character for audiences. Without this association,

The Rambo Movies: Instances of Onscreen Violence and Death

	First Blood (1982)	First Blood, Part II (1985)	Rambo III (1988)
Number of bad guys killed by Rambo with his shirt on	1	12	33
Number of bad guys killed by Rambo with his shirt off	0	46	45
Total number of bad guys killed by Rambo no matter how attired	1	58	78
Number of bad guys killed by accomplices of Rambo acting on their own	0	10	17
Number of good guys killed by bad guys	0	1	37
Total number of people killed	1	69	132
Number of people killed per minute	0.01	0.72	1.30
Time at which the first person is killed	29'31"	33'34"	41'9"
Number of people killed per minute from that point until the end of the film (not including the ending credits)	0.02	1.18	2.39
Sequences in which Rambo is shot at without significant result	12	24	38
Number of sequences in which good guys are tortured by bad guys	2	5	7

audiences failed to connect. Even a high death count, now at 132, could not produce a blockbuster.

The Rambo films represent the Vietnam War very differently from such films as *The Deer Hunter, Platoon,* or *Full Metal Jacket*, where Vietnam is a morally ambiguous conflict at best. Filmed during the Reagan era, the films' values reflect aspects of a resurgent conservatism. Thus John Rambo will always be associated with the trauma of Vietnam and the attitudes associated with the Reagan presidency.

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Film and War; Vietnam War

—*Daniel Hutchinson*

Randolph, A. Philip

(1889–1979)
Labor and Civil Rights Leader

Asa Philip Randolph, commonly known as A. Philip Randolph, was one of the nation's foremost labor and civil rights leaders. In a career that spanned both world wars,

Randolph consistently saw African American racial justice as a corollary of economic justice. As such, he dedicated his life to fulfilling the promise of racial and industrial democracy for black and working people. During both world wars, Randolph fearlessly demanded social and economic justice for African Americans and workers of all colors despite government efforts to intimidate and subdue him.

Randolph was born on April 15, 1889, in Crescent City, Florida. Randolph's father, an African Methodist Episcopal preacher, instilled in his son the value of education, collective solidarity, and responsibility to the race. In 1907, Randolph graduated from Cookman Institute, the first high school for African Americans in Florida. Faced with minimal social and economic possibilities, Randolph, like thousands of other African Americans from the rural and small-town South, moved to New York City in 1911.

Randolph quickly became immersed in Harlem's rich cultural, political, and intellectual milieu. While working odd jobs, he attended night classes at City College of New York (CCNY), where he studied economics, sociology, and philosophy. This provided Randolph with his first exposure to Marxist theory and provided the intellectual foundation for his subsequent attraction to socialism. In 1915 Randolph met Chandler Owen, a student in politics and sociology at Columbia University who shared his affinity for radical social change.

Randolph's commitment to socialism solidified through participation in a student group at CCNY and by attending lectures at the Rand School, where he developed a relationship with Eugene Debs, the five-time Socialist Party candidate for president. Randolph became a well-known soapbox orator in Harlem and translated his burgeoning socialist ideology to action by attempting to organize workers. He formally joined the Socialist Party in 1917 and challenged other young black radical intellectuals to move beyond a narrow focus on race and place the plight of the black working class in the broader context of an integrated struggle for social and economic justice.

The political and intellectual ferment of World War I further radicalized Randolph's politics. The Russian Revolution in 1917 brought Marxism as a solution to the struggles of oppressed peoples throughout the world into increased focus. For African Americans, the war tested the rhetoric and reality of democracy for a nation steeped in white supremacy.

In 1917, Randolph, along with Chandler Owen, founded *The Messenger* newspaper. *The Messenger* allowed Randolph to make use of both his piercing analytical insight and dynamic organizational skills. The newspaper distinguished itself as one of the most influential African American periodicals of the war and postwar period, a time when radical black periodical culture flourished. Randolph and Owen firmly believed African Americans' best hopes rested in class-based interracial cooperation. *The Messenger* forcefully criticized black social and political leaders spanning a broad ideological spectrum, on one page lambasting W.E.B. Du Bois's bourgeois accommodationism and on another denouncing Marcus Garvey's messianistic racial nationalism. The paper earned the dubious distinction as "the most dangerous of all the Negro publications" from Attorney Gen. Mitchell Palmer. Through speeches and the pages of *Messenger*, Randolph assumed the stance of a conscientious objector to the war and encouraged African Americans to avoid military service. For this reason Justice Department officers arrested Randolph along with Owen for violating the 1917 Espionage Act during a rally in Cleveland, Ohio.

Randolph remained politically active in the interwar period, despite intense federal repression of radicalism and, later, the onset of the Great Depression. He frequently lectured at the Rand School and in 1921 ran for New York secretary of state on the Socialist Party ticket. During the interwar years Randolph focused his energies on the plight of black Pullman porters. The Pullman Company, the largest employer of African American men in the nation during the 1920s, was notorious for systematically exploiting its black workers. At the behest of a disgruntled group of African American Pullman employees Randolph established the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) in July 1925. Over the next 10 years, Randolph struggled to win union recognition for the BSCP. Intense resistance to the efforts of the BSCP from the Pullman Company, which branded Randolph a radical agitator, was compounded by lukewarm support from the black middle class, which was fearful of risking their precarious social and economic status. The nascent union gained increased traction following the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 and in 1936

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when it received a charter from the American Federation of Labor. Randolph's persistence led to the BSCP's winning its first contract from the Pullman Company in 1937, resulting in a wage increase and reduced hours. This milestone solidified Randolph's place at the forefront of the black labor movement and brought him national acclaim.

World War II marked a high point in Randolph's political activism. Randolph encapsulated the "Double V" philosophy—victory against fascism abroad and victory against racism at home—by challenging the systemic barriers confronting black workers seeking wartime industrial employment. As a demonstration of his resolve, Randolph organized the March on Washington Movement and threatened to send upward of 25,000 African Americans to the nation's capital on July 1, 1941. On June 25, 1941, only days before the march, Pres. Franklin Roosevelt acceded to Randolph's demands and issued Executive Order 8802, which outlawed racial discrimination in defense industries and established the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) to investigate complaints.

Randolph's leadership and activism during World War II continued into the immediate postwar period. In late 1947 and early 1948, Congress debated a peacetime draft bill submitted by Pres. Harry Truman. Randolph vigorously opposed any form of compulsory military service in which African Americans remained segregated, and he organized to protest the proposed law. In a dramatic meeting at the White House on March 17, 1948, he informed President Truman that, "Negroes are in no mood to shoulder a gun for democracy abroad so long as they are denied democracy here at home." He later stated his intention to urge African Americans to resist induction unless the armed forces were formally desegregated. Congress passed the draft law in June 1948. In addition, Truman finally realized the implications of Randolph's threat of black mass resistance; Randolph's activism was one factor that induced the president to issue Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948, which officially made racial discrimination in the U.S. military illegal.

Randolph's leadership and influence shaped the tenor and focus of the Black Freedom Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. As new organizations competed for leadership, Randolph functioned as an elder statesman and urged cooperation. Along with Bayard Rustin, he organized the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, held on August 28, 1963—22 years after its first conception. Randolph served as the historic occasion's opening speaker. In 1964, Randolph received the Medal of Freedom from Pres. Lyndon Johnson, the highest award for civilians. He remained committed to his radical democratic vision of social and economic justice for black people until his death in 1979.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Executive Order 8802

Related Documents

1941

—*Chad L. Williams*

Rangers

Rangers have stamped American society and its military traditions with a force disproportionate to their numbers. Whether serving on colonies' or states' formal defensive establishments or in ad hoc companies of frontiersmen

drawn from local militias, Rangers were ubiquitous in the military affairs of the colonial and early national periods. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the "Ranger ideal" profoundly shaped American politics and letters. During and following World War II, Rangers formed the core of the U.S. Army's elite and, later, the U.S, Special Operations Forces.

History

The English first used *range* as a verb in the 14th century to describe the act of patrolling specific areas by military and law enforcement bodies; in North America, Anglo-Americans applied that description to those who fought Indians. Rangers first appeared on the American military scene in the late 17th century. Before King Philip's War and the Susquehannock wars, Americans depended upon a small cadre of European mercenaries to lead their armies of settlers in pitched battles against indigenous peoples. By the mid-1670s, however, an evolution in Native Americans' tactics from organized battle to what is loosely known as guerrilla warfare presented Anglo-Americans with a new military challenge. Pitched battles with Native Americans proved increasingly difficult and dangerous.

Colonists on the frontier grasped that small parties of soldiers could sortie forth and strike indigenous communities before Native American raiders could destroy isolated farms and settlements. Ranger warfare also allowed frontier settlers to wage war relatively cheaply and without large outlays of men and matériel. Beginning with Benjamin Church, an officer in the Plymouth militia who in King Philip's War sought tutelage from friendly Native Americans on how to operate effectively in the wilderness, settlers gradually developed a way of war in which Rangers burned indigenous villages and fields and killed combatants and noncombatants alike. The focus on hit-and-run raids, ambushes, and the brutalization of enemy noncombatants, often fueled by bounties placed on Native American scalps, dominated war making in backcountry North America in King William's War, Queen Anne's War, the Tuscarora War, the Yamasee War, Dummer's War, and the early wars of King George II (the War of Jenkins' Ear and King George's War). Over time, two types of Ranger forces developed: in the North, Rangers were primarily infantry, while in the South, Rangers were more akin to the mounted dragoons of Europe. Only with the arrival of large numbers of British regulars to fight the Seven Years' War—the last of the Anglo-French imperial wars in North America—did European approaches to warfare challenge the primacy of Ranger warfare among frontier settlers.

Even in those conflicts in which British regulars bore an increasing burden of war, Rangers remained a crucial component of American expansion on the frontier. In King George's War in Nova Scotia, Ranger companies of Anglo-Americans and Native Americans of New England commanded by John Gorham proved to be key to Great Britain's subjugation of the indigenous peoples and French Acadians of the Maritime Provinces. During the Seven Years' War, successive British commanders depended on Robert Rogers's Rangers to serve as the scouting and intelligence arm of their Army. Rogers's Rangers accepted the surrender of the French outposts in the Ohio country and Upper Great Lakes region following the Peace of Paris in 1763, and Rogers's "19 Standing Orders," the first written instructions for making war by an American, has remained the basis for the U.S. Army's Ranger doctrine.

In Lord Dunmore's War, Virginia Rangers won claim to Kentucky. During the Revolutionary War, George Rogers Clark and his veteran Rangers of Lord Dunmore's War seized the Illinois country from Native Americans and the British, while the British enlisted hundreds of Americans in Loyalist Ranger companies and unleashed them in a brutal war of terror on the New York frontier. In the late 1780s and early 1790s, John Sevier cleared the southeastern frontier of hostile Native Americans with Rangers from western North Carolina. Near the same time, Maj. Gen. Anthony Wayne skillfully employed the mounted Rangers of Kentucky as part of his conquest of much of the Ohio country. During the War of 1812, William Henry Harrison and Andrew Jackson used Ranger tactics to conquer the Old Northwest and Old Southwest.

Following the War of 1812 and the conquest of the indigenous peoples of the eastern half of the United States, American military interests turned away from the Rangers and toward developing a regular professional army akin to contemporary European forces. The regular Army took over the role of patrolling the frontier and fighting Native Americans, although informal volunteer militias, when called, would continue to lean on the Ranger tradition of violent, irregular warfare.

During World War II, when the U.S. Army sought to create an elite unit to join Canadian and British commandos on the raid against Dieppe, France, in 1942, it called them "Rangers." The Rangers' best-known feat of the war occurred during the Normandy landings in June 1944, when the 2nd Ranger Battalion scaled the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc to destroy German gun emplacements. In the longest sustained combat history for any American Ranger unit, the 75th Ranger Regiment served in Vietnam from August 1969 to September 1972. The "Ranger Tab," the small patch worn by graduates of the U.S. Army's Ranger school at Fort Benning, Georgia, remains a mark of distinction and admiration for American soldiers.

Influence on American Politics and Letters

On the frontier with "Indian Country," Rangers entered the pantheon of military heroes. Both Gorham and Rogers used their exploits as Rangers to win commissions in the regular British Army. John Sevier's credentials as a Revolutionary War guerrilla and as the conqueror of the Chickamauga faction of the Cherokees ensured him Tennessee's first governorship in 1796. Andrew Jackson parlayed his record as an Indian fighter into two terms as president. Indeed, between 1828 and 1840, a frontiersman (read: Ranger) headed every winning presidential ticket, including William Henry Harrison in 1840.

Even though the political influence of the frontier, and thus of Rangers and frontiersmen, declined as Americans became focused on slavery in the late 1840s and 1850s, the Ranger ideal found expression in American literature. The protagonist of James Fenimore Cooper's *Leatherstocking Tales* is the sharpshooting "pathfinder" Natty Bumppo, or "Hawkeye." In Cooper's stories, the pathfinder is a peacetime version of the Indian-fighting Ranger. Cooper's pathfinder identity proved particularly durable. A century after Cooper published *Leatherstocking Tales*, Walter Edmunds's *Drums Along the Mohawk* and Kenneth Roberts's *Northwest Passage* again idealized Rangers, and both historical novels became the basis for major Hollywood productions.

Many scholars have taken umbrage at calling Rangers early America "heroes." Historians now see the Rangers in a more critical light, less as agents of civilization on the frontier and more as conquerors. Indeed, some historians have even questioned their efficacy. Still, among the general public,

Rangers are idealized. The American Rangers who fought in the "Indian Country" of Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993 won public acclaim. With their colleagues in the Special Operations Forces, Rangers will continue to play a large role in the war on terror and will continue to influence American military traditions and society.

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Related Entries

Colonial Militia Systems; Colonial Wars; Jackson, Andrew; Literature and War; Memory and War; Native Americans in Colonial Wars and the Revolutionary War

—John Grenier

Rationing

Victory in World War II depended in large part upon the production of military equipment at home. Because the

making of consumer goods interfered with war-related production, the U.S. government banned or restricted the manufacture of goods such as automobiles and refrigerators, and instituted a comprehensive system for rationing food, gasoline, and other commodities. Despite some grumbling and a flourishing and illegal black market, the system was equitable and efficient. Americans were well-fed during the war, and shortages of consumer goods caused few hardships.

Wartime rationing was a new experience for Americans. During the Revolutionary War, some states, including Massachusetts, passed laws fixing wages and the prices of food and manufactured goods. These laws were difficult to enforce and had little effect; inflation was rampant, and goods often scarce. During the Civil War, the U.S. government relied upon the free market and the North's agriculture and industry to supply everything that was needed. The Confederate government and some individual southern states made sporadic attempts to control the production and distribution of some commodities important to the war effort. Gov. Zebulon Vance of North Carolina, for instance, seized the entire output of his state's textile mills to make uniforms for North Carolina's soldiers. However, no civilian rationing system was put in place.

Food and fuel were controlled but not rationed during World War I. The Food Administration, under future U.S. president Herbert Hoover, regulated the purchase of grain and the distribution of food to processing companies, but it did not control retail prices. It encouraged conservation of food by asking Americans, especially housewives, to observe a "meatless Tuesday" and "wheatless Wednesday" each week, as well as a meatless and a wheatless meal each day. The Fuel Administration, in response to a shortage of coal, ordered some businesses to observe a "heatless Monday." These pleas fell on at least some deaf ears: Americans from Eastern Europe, for example, were outraged when told they should substitute cornbread for their preferred diet of wheat bread. Corn, they maintained, was for pigs. President Wilson's Democratic Party suffered losses in the 1918 bi-election wherever the congressional district had significant numbers of such traditionally Democratic voters.

Much stricter rationing was necessary during World War II. America's military strategy in that war was based in part upon producing and transporting a volume of guns, ships, and airplanes that Germany and Japan would be unable to match. Consumer goods had to be sacrificed to maximize war production. The sacrifice, however, had to be seen to be shared equally, or civilian morale would suffer. That meant both rationing and controlling prices. As one scholar puts it, "Theoretically, rationing accompanied by price controls was designed to do two things: combat high inflation and ensure equitable distribution of scarce resources" (Bentley, 19).

The agency chosen to administer rationing was the Office of Price Administration (OPA), headed for most of the war by Chester Bowles. It issued ration books to 132 million Americans, controlled the production and distribution of hundreds of items, and regulated prices charged in every store in America. Meat, sugar, and canned goods were rationed, as well as gasoline, automobile tires, and clothing. Civilian automobiles ceased production, the last one rolling off the assembly line on February 10, 1942. Home appliances were made in severely restricted quantities. Some items were rationed even though not in short supply. Ample gasoline, for example, was available from 1943 on, but it was rationed because rubber was scarce. America's mechanized military ran on rubber tires, and much of the prewar supply had come from Asian countries now occupied by Japan. Therefore, the government discouraged Americans from driving and using up precious rubber.

The OPA set up rationing boards in every county in the United States, staffed by 250,000 volunteers. In May 1942, every American was issued War Ration Book One, containing stickers (or "stamps") that entitled the holder to buy, at a price no higher than the government-set maximum, a controlled product. Food was rationed on a point system—each type of food was given a point value, and each person was given 50 "blue points" each month to spend on processed foods of his or her choice (including canned and dried foods as well as juices), and 60 "red points" for meat and fats. Clothing was rationed by stamps that allowed each person to buy, for instance, three pairs of shoes per year. Gasoline was rationed through a priority system—most drivers got an A sticker, entitling them to buy four gallons per week. Those who could prove they needed to drive longer distances, such as doctors making house calls, got the more generous B or C stickers. To buy a new tire, drivers had to apply to their local ration boards for a certificate.

Special attention was paid to the role of women. Although many entered the workforce during the war and were indispensable to war production, they retained their roles as primary shoppers and food preparers in most households. The government therefore designed radio, newspaper, and magazine advertising campaigns to persuade women to feed and care for their families using fewer materials, and to teach them how to do so. Cookbooks with recipes and instructions for home canning were printed. Millions took the Home Front Pledge: "I will pay no more than top legal prices—I will accept no rationed goods without giving up ration points."

All Americans were urged to recycle as well as conserve. Women turned in cooking fats, to be used in making explosives. Citizens donated books and magazines for the troops. Children, organized under names such as Tin Cannoneers, went door-to-door collecting tin, aluminum, and rubber. Often, the items collected were never actually used to make weapons, but the process led Americans to feel that they were contributing to the war effort.

The shortage of consumer goods required sacrifice by all, and different people coped with the situation in different ways. Many took to walking or riding bicycles rather than driving, although bicycles were also rationed. Clothing and

Lines outside a rationing board office in March, 1943, in New Orleans. (© CORBIS)

tires were patched and appliances repaired; the slogan was Use It Up, Wear It Out, Make It Do, or Do Without. Some foods, such as bread, eggs, fresh fruits, and organ meats such as liver were not rationed, and an estimated 20 million people responded to the call by planting Victory Gardens to grow their own vegetables.

Others coped less honestly. Some hoarded food, buying large amounts of sugar or coffee before rationing went into effect. Those who had the money and did not mind the risk could buy almost anything, from beefsteak to automobile tires, on the black market, at prices far higher than the legal maximum. Ration stamps were counterfeited and sold. Cattle rustling revived in the West, with meat from pilfered steers sold on the black market. Even many otherwise legitimate businesses cheated; of 1,000 sugar wholesalers checked by OPA inspectors, 750 were found to be in violation of government rules.

Most Americans, however, did not cheat. Because the OPA was the department that forbade Americans from doing as they pleased, it was unpopular with consumers and businesses. Yet opinion polls showed that Americans consistently approved of both price controls and the principle of fair and equal rationing. They understood that war production was crucial and that the best cuts of meat should go to the men and women in the armed forces. Americans were annoyed by the day-to-day difficulties of rationing, but most were prepared to sacrifice to win the war, as long as everyone was treated equally.

Shortages were less severe in the United States than in any other combatant nation. In Britain, for example, gasoline for civilians was nearly unobtainable, and in the Soviet Union, the civilian food ration was barely enough to maintain physical efficiency. And, while consumer goods were scarce, most Americans had plenty of money to buy them, because the need for war production had created a boom economy, with high wages and plenty of jobs (unemployment was 1.9 percent in late 1944). For an America coming out of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the war years were good, despite rationing and shortages.

The grave threat that the nation faced during World War II, and the nature of modern industrial war, made necessary the mobilization of every resource to support the fighting

forces. The nation did so successfully. Munitions production skyrocketed. America became, in the words of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the "arsenal of democracy," providing munitions for our own armed forces and for our Russian, Chinese, and British allies. Civilians had to sacrifice a part of their economic freedom to allow this to happen. Mistakes were made by the OPA, and many people were tempted by the black market, but, on the whole, the system worked well and was fair, and Americans cooperated with it, not out of fear or threat of punishment but of their own free will.

The rationing system in World War II was unique in American history. During the oil crisis of 1973, Pres. Richard M. Nixon, who had served as a naval officer attached to the OPA during World War II, ordered ration coupons for gasoline to be printed, but they were never used.

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Related Entries

Economy and War; Victory Gardens; World War II

—Bernard G. Hagerty

Reconstruction

(1862–77)

Reconstruction, the name commonly given to the period at the close of and immediately after the Civil War, refers not just to an historical era but to an objective and a process. The reconstruction of a viable Union was the North's main objective during the Civil War; how this was to be accomplished was a thorny political and constitutional, as well as military, puzzle.

Reconstruction began as soon as federal armies captured significant amounts of Confederate territory. The Lincoln administration had to make decisions about how such territory was to be governed; the usual resort was to grant commanders wide authority over everyone within their military jurisdictions. In some instances, Lincoln appointed a military governor with theoretical power over an entire state. Andrew Johnson, for example, was installed as military governor of Tennessee in March of 1862. The influence of military governors, however, tended to be limited to regions remote from the zone of active hostilities—when commanders and military governors clashed over the best policy to be applied toward Southern civilians, the Lincoln administration tended to back the commanders.

In the short run, federal authorities faced two principal tasks: (1) the maintenance of order and (2) the creation of a workable policy to address the numbers of slaves that soon sought protection under the Stars and Stripes. The first was reasonably straightforward. White civilians were divided into three basic categories: the loyal, the neutral or passive, and the actively hostile. Whenever possible, the Lincoln administration gave legal recognition to a state government composed of Southern Unionists, though its powers might be negligible. Virginia had such a government, for example; its main achievement was to give permission for its northwestern counties to form the state of West Virginia in June 1863.

The Army and Emancipation

Slaves, on the other hand, gave federal authorities no end of headaches, particularly during the war's first year, when the administration's stated policy was to restore the Union without touching slavery. Even so, hundreds of slaves escaped into federal lines. Thousands more came under Union jurisdiction through military conquest. Either way, the practical question of what to do with the slaves foreshadowed the central problem of Reconstruction: What to do with the freedpeople, or more precisely, how to manage the transition from slave labor to free labor in the South? The Union Army became, almost despite itself, the principal midwife of this transition.

Although the U.S. government would not adopt emancipation as a war aim until January 1863, the first experiments with free African American labor began as early as November 1861, when thousands of slaves found a precarious freedom after a joint Army–Navy force captured Port Royal and Hilton Head, South Carolina, in November 1861. There the solution was to put them to work growing cotton for the U.S. Department of the Treasury. In other areas, so-called contraband camps sprang up in which freedpeople were concentrated and put to work, again under government supervision, under conditions that ranged from adequate to miserable. A Massachusetts clergyman came uncomfortably close to the truth when he pronounced the system to be nothing but "government slavery. Old Pharaoh slavery was government slavery, and Uncle Sam's slavery is a Counterpart" (Berlin, et al., 170).

In a few instances, lands abandoned by white planters were turned over to former bondsmen as experiments in free labor. The most famous instance of this occurred in February 1865, when Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman issued Special Field Order 15, under which African American families living in coastal South Carolina received 40 acres of land. But this was rare. In any event, most of the families who received land under this practice lost it after the war when the former owners successfully pressed for the return of their property.

By far the most common practice was to create a system of contract labor. Slavery was formally abolished, slaveholders became employers, their slaves became employees, and by military fiat everyone concerned was deemed to have accepted a contractual relationship in which the new employers were obliged to pay the new employees a wage or else a share of the crop. Neither the former slaveholders nor the former slaves had any say in the matter. The Army created and enforced the contract labor system by the logic of military necessity. It maintained stability and created the least interference with the vigorous conduct of the war.

In March 1865, as the war neared its end, Congress created the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands—usually called the Freedmen's Bureau—and placed it within the War Department. Headed by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, its first and only commissioner, the bureau's principal job was to guard the interests and welfare of the four million African Americans who had gained freedom under either wartime emancipation or the 13th Amendment, which finally abolished the last vestiges of slavery in December 1865. It did so principally by protecting freedpeople from employer fraud and abuse and by fostering education efforts. Considering the scope of its responsibilities, the bureau's size was absurdly small: at its peak in 1868, it employed fewer than 1,000 assistant commissioners, agents, and clerks. Nor was it ever considered more than a temporary expedient; over time it scaled back its activities and was finally terminated altogether in 1872.

From Presidential to Congressional Reconstruction

Aside from emancipation, Lincoln's first major steps toward reconstruction took place in December 1863, when he issued a Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction. The proclamation offered generous terms under which most white Southerners, other than Confederate officials or military officers, could obtain amnesty simply by taking an oath of allegiance to the Union and by accepting emancipation. It included a plan whereby a state in rebellion could return to the Union whenever a number of voters equivalent to at least 10 percent of those who had cast ballots in 1860 took the oath. They could then create a loyal state government.

Radical Republicans scorned this "Ten Percent Plan" as far too lenient. Lincoln defended it as an important wartime measure by which to undermine Confederate resistance. Unconvinced, Radical Republicans in Congress responded with a much tougher set of conditions embodied in the Wade–Davis bill, passed in July 1864. Under the bill, at least half of eligible voters would have to take the oath of allegiance to the Union. Then delegates could be

elected to a state convention that would repeal secession and abolish slavery—but with a major catch. To qualify as a voter or delegate in this process, an individual had to take an additional, "ironclad oath" pledging that he had never voluntarily supported the Confederacy. Lincoln vetoed the Wade–Davis bill, so it never became law. Nevertheless, it pointed out a major conundrum: Just who had the final say in Reconstruction policy, the president or Congress?

By the end of the war, Lincoln's Ten Percent Plan had made modest progress in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, but Lincoln himself considered the plan a wartime expedient and, with the coming of peace, he might have adopted a stricter policy. His assassination in April 1865, however, put Vice President Andrew Johnson, his successor, in charge of postwar Reconstruction.

Most observers thought that Johnson would be far tougher than Lincoln had been. The Tennessean had been famous during the war for insisting that treason must be made odious and traitors punished. In fact Johnson proved amazingly relaxed in his terms to the defeated South, a paradox explained by his larger belief in state's rights, limited government, and white supremacy. He provided a blanket amnesty for all but the most high-ranking Confederate officials and military officers and for the wealthiest former Confederate civilians—then issued special pardons to tens of thousands of them. He laid out a blueprint for Reconstruction that simply called for each former Confederate state to elect delegates to create new state constitutions. He required these constitutions merely to renounce secession, accept emancipation, and repudiate the Confederate debt.

The result, in the eyes of most Republicans, was sheer disaster. They heard reports of violence against freedpeople. They read the "Black Codes," passed by most Southern state legislatures in the autumn of 1865, which grotesquely restricted the civil liberties of African Americans. In December Republicans in Congress were asked to seat delegations from former Confederate states that were studded with former Confederate generals and high-ranking officials, including former Confederate vice president Alexander Stephens.

Republicans refused this request, employing on a vast scale a rarely used constitutional provision by which Congress is permitted to determine the qualifications of its members. The result was soon a full-scale political war with Johnson, who defiantly refused to compromise on any significant issue, particularly those addressing the political or civil rights for freedpeople.

Thwarted by Johnson's ceaseless vetoes, Republicans used their two-thirds majority in Congress to override them, then pressed for a 14th Amendment that essentially defined African Americans as citizens and gave states the option of either enfranchising black males or losing congressional seats and electoral votes proportionate to the number of its African American residents. Another section of the proposed amendment barred a significant number of former Confederates from holding state or federal office, while another repudiated the Confederate debt. A final section empowered Congress to enforce the amendment by passing appropriate legislation.

This legislation took the form of five laws, passed in early 1867, that placed the U.S. Army at the center of a system designed to force the former Confederate states (with the exception of Tennessee, already readmitted) to create new constitutions and governments palatable to the Republicans. Three Reconstruction Acts divided the 10 states of the South into five military districts, each commanded by a general who would see to it that constitutional conventions were called, former Confederates were barred from voting, and African American men enfranchised. Two additional acts were passed to block Johnson, as far as possible, from interfering with the process—as president, Johnson was constitutionally charged with enforcing the law and therefore had the potential not to enforce laws with which he disagreed.

Together, the five acts created what is variously known as Congressional, Radical, or Military Reconstruction. The last has often misled people into believing that the former Confederacy was literally under military occupation. This was not the case. The South had a population of 11 million. By contrast, in October 1867 the Army had only 21,117 troops in the region—16,084 if one excepts Texas, where most troops were actually in place to defend the frontier with Mexico. By October 1870 the number had dropped to 9,050 (4,310 if Texas is left out); and by October 1876 it had dwindled to 6,011 (2,969 if Texas is omitted). The real point of "military reconstruction" was to give Army officers the

mission of ensuring that elections were called and that civilian governments in the South functioned more or less in accordance with federal law.

Moreover, many Army officers were skeptical of the mission that Congress had given them, particularly those aspects aimed at the political enfranchisement or economic uplifting of blacks. Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, for example, testified before a congressional committee that "the best thing that Congress or State [sic] can do is to legislate as little possible in reference to the colored man beyond giving him security in his person and his property" (Sefton, 61). Nevertheless, by mid-1868 the Army had supervised the creation of new governments, conforming to the wishes of Congress, in each of the 10 former Confederate states.

In many respects, these governments proved as progressive and democratic as any in the United States up to that time—they not only supported education and internal improvements but also gave African American men the vote. They had their share of corruption, but no more so than state governments in other parts of the Union. Most white Southerners, however, considered them not governments but regimes—the illegitimate puppets of a hated Republican Party—and began at once to attempt to destroy them.

The Violence of Reconstruction

The new Republican governments consisted of an uneasy coalition of white Southern Unionists, African Americans, and businessmen. The first group loathed blacks nearly as much as it did former secessionists. The second sought to translate their fledgling political power into social and economic equality while lacking most of the tools, especially education, land, and capital, to do so. The third sought investment in railroads and industry and, at the same time, wanted a labor force that was reliable and pliant. Under the best of circumstances this coalition would have had trouble cohering. The circumstances of Reconstruction tore it apart within 10 years.

In addition to these internal difficulties, the Republican Party in the South faced two major external problems. First, like any American political party, it had to govern by consent of the governed. Second, it discovered that no amount of good will could gain that consent from a majority of white

Southerners. On the contrary, white conservatives fought the new order in any way they could.

Often this occurred through the ordinary workings of politics. White conservatives complained that the Republican governments were not truly representative because they excluded so many gallant former Confederates from voting. Republican legislators, hoping to increase their claim to legitimacy, reenfranchised former Confederates, then watched in dismay as those reenfranchised Confederates provided the margin needed to vote them out of office. Several states were "redeemed"—returned to conservative control—as early as 1870.

Sometimes white conservatives opposed Republican measures through more shadowy means: social ostracism, economic boycotts, casual intimidation, and even outright violence. Historians increasingly seem willing to regard the violence of Reconstruction as an extension of the Civil War, "a campaign begun in defense of slavery before the war and continued after it in order to uphold the practice of white supremacy" (Perman, 139). Race riots in Memphis and New Orleans in 1866 helped convince Congress of the need for Radical Reconstruction, but mob attacks, assassinations, and even insurgencies by paramilitary organizations dogged the course of Reconstruction.

The Ku Klux Klan is by far the most famous of these entities. Although it pretended to be a unified "Invisible Empire," with former Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest as its head, the Klan was more probably a loose affiliation of paramilitary organizations that operated widely in the South. Other groups less well known today were just as significant and arguably more effective. In Louisiana, the White League hammered away at Republican rule, notably in the Colfax massacre of 1873 when more than 100 African American men, women, and children were killed during one of that state's many disputed elections. Its Mississippi counterpart was the Rifle Clubs. In South Carolina, it was the Red Shirts. Each of these organizations functioned as the military arm of the white conservative political movement; their strategy was summarized in the phrase: "Carry the election peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must" (Rable, 153). Federal troops were periodically used to curtail such violence, most impressively from 1871 to 1872 when Pres. Ulysses S. Grant

declared nine South Carolina counties to be in a "state of rebellion." Invoking the recently passed Enforcement Acts, he suspended habeas corpus, declared martial law, and used federal military and judicial authorities to root out and arrest suspected Klansmen. But the effort failed to destroy the organization. As time passed and the North wearied of the seemingly endless outbreaks of violence in the South, state governments were expected to handle matters on their own. This they could not do. By 1877 every former Confederate state was back under white conservative control.

The Legacy of Reconstruction

For many decades, most white Americans shared an understanding of Reconstruction as a ghastly mistake in which vindictive Northern politicians exploited gullible former slaves to impose corrupt regimes over the prostrate Southern people. Within this mythology, the Ku Klux Klan and other organizations merely stood up for decency and fair treatment. This view was promoted in both serious and popular histories of the period and blazed upon the silver screen in films such as *Birth of a Nation* (1915) and *Gone with the Wind* (1939). But it depended heavily on assumptions of white superiority. By the mid-20th century these assumptions became less tenable, and historians came to view Reconstruction as a major failure that allowed Southern conservatives to retrieve most of the political power lost during the Civil War. A slightly more optimistic interpretation sees it as an "unfinished revolution" that nevertheless laid the constitutional groundwork for the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s—a period sometimes called the "Second Reconstruction."

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Related Entries

Civil–Military Relations; Civil War; Forrest, Nathan Bedford; Grant, Ulysses S.; Lincoln, Abraham; Race Riots

—*Mark Grimsley*

Recruiting Advertisements

Recruiting advertising in broadcast and print media, as well as at local community events, is an important public relations function for the military services. Advertising and concerted public relations campaigns improved public perceptions of

the armed forces in the 1950s, for instance, and attempted to refurbish their image after the Vietnam era. As the military services invested in more focused, professional advertising, public recognition of the campaigns increased. Appealing slogans, coupled with improved benefits, bonuses, and other tangible elements, have helped maintain enlistments for the armed forces since the establishment of the all volunteer force in 1973. Recruiting advertising thus raises the public's awareness about the armed forces, creates leads for recruiters to pursue potential enlistees, and contributes to the military's public image.

Colonial Era to World War II

As early as the colonial and revolutionary eras, recruiters for the armed forces worked in person and also advertised through posters and printed publications. Newspaper advertising was well-established by the Civil War. As communication technologies advanced, the military services utilized new media such as radio and motion pictures to spread their recruiting messages. Recruiting themes focused mainly on patriotic appeals with additional references to benefits, paid bounties, and the responsibilities of manhood. One famous World War I–era recruiting poster featured a young woman dressed in a sailor's uniform, saying, "Gee! I wish I were a man. I'd join the Navy." The Marine Corps advertised itself as The First to Fight. Advertising during World War II emphasized patriotism and referenced the heroism and sacrifice of America's fighting forces.

Postwar Era

After World War II, recruitment efforts concentrated on retaining trained and skilled war veterans. In 1947, Army–Air Force advertising targeted middle-class parents and their young adult children to persuade them that military jobs and careers were appropriate and carried prestige. Attuned to the reach and influence of radio, military officials convinced the top four radio networks to provide free airtime in addition to public service airtime to broadcast recruiting programs. Officials also persuaded widely circulated national magazines, such as *Life* and *The Saturday Evening Post*, to donate free full-page advertising space for military recruiting. Local recruiting efforts included band

A well-known U.S. Navy recruitment poster used during World War I. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

performances, displays in high schools, and exhibitions at state and county fairs. Recruiting themes focused on education, specialized training, and continued service to country.

Draft Era

Although Congress reauthorized the draft in 1948, recruiting advertising continued to target volunteers. Integrated recruiting campaigns began to reach audiences in larger numbers. The Federal Communications Commission required television and radio networks to donate public service time, which the military services used to broadcast recruiting advertisements. These commercials, however, often aired late at night when young adults did not watch or listen. Better exposure came during sporting events, Armed

Forces Week, or from sponsoring celebrity shows. Posters, brochures, and other print media constituted the majority of the recruiting advertising budgets. The Navy and Marine Corps relied exclusively on public service advertising, but the Army and Air Force paid for some print advertising in magazines. All the services, including the National Guard and Reserves, continued to employ local advertising.

Across the military services, recruiting themes included good pay, educational opportunities, potential careers, and new technology. For example, the Army adopted the slogan: One Army on Alert: That This Nation Shall Not Perish. A poster featuring this slogan showed missile batteries protecting a city in the background. To these themes, the Air Force added emphasis on the future and on space technology. The Navy offered travel and adventure, and the Marine Corps built up a tough, elite image with such slogans as: Once a Marine, Always a Marine. Each service ran advertisements that appealed to American heritage and the prestige of the armed forces. The National Guard and Reserves emphasized their roles as citizen–soldiers, and employed slogans such as: Double Duty American, Weekend Warrior, and Modern Minutemen. During the Korean War, recruiting advertising once again emphasized patriotism and manhood, and incorporated images of combat. Although recruiting during the Vietnam War also included calls to serve one's country, these advertisements did not feature combat imagery.

Historians disagree on the ultimate effectiveness of military advertising and public relations in the early Cold War era. Some point to the threat of unemployment, the lure of action, the attractiveness of fringe benefits, and especially the reinstatement of the draft as more central than advertising to the decision to enlist. But advertising undeniably raised public awareness of the military and affected its image. In 1971, the advertising agency Ayer discovered that up to 35 percent of the target audience remembered the campaign theme: Your Future, Your Decision. Choose Army.

All Volunteer Force

Recruiting advertising dramatically increased in importance as Congress abolished the draft and the services began recruiting volunteers after 1973. As a result of public disillusionment with the Vietnam War, the military services, particularly the Army,

confronted the task of rebuilding their public image. During the draft era, the Reserves and National Guard had experienced little trouble filling units, but with the advent of the all volunteer force, for the first time they, too, purchased advertising to promote their services. The Army National Guard, for example, instituted the Try One in the Guard campaign to recruit trained and experienced veterans in hopes they would remain past the initial one-year commitment. Advertising across the services reached out with new emphasis to women and African Americans.

After the Vietnam War, the armed forces fine-tuned their recruiting advertising. As television grew in influence, Congress authorized paid broadcast advertising in 1977. The military services used television advertising chiefly for the visual impact of showcasing the service and its technology. Commercials were aired during football games and highly rated television shows. Radio repeated and reinforced recruiting messages at a lower cost than television. Magazine advertising targeted young adults who might not be reached through television alone. Print media highlighted a service's characteristics and attempted to elevate its prestige. Local advertising supported national recruiting campaigns.

The military services did not compete with each other in so-called comparative advertising. They agreed that one arm could not advertise benefits not offered by the other services. The new, highly focused campaigns were successful. By the 1990s, half of enlistees indicated that recruiting advertising influenced them to speak to a recruiter.

The longest, most well-known recruiting slogan belongs to the Marine Corps. We're Looking for a Few Good Men debuted on a Revolutionary War recruiting poster and remained the service's main advertising slogan until the nation's bicentennial in 1976. That year, the Marine Corps adopted The Few, The Proud to acknowledge women marines and to appeal to potential female recruits. In 1981, the Army introduced Be All You Can Be, one of the most highly acclaimed and recognized slogans in modern advertising. That campaign raised awareness of the Army and its benefits. When market research indicated that young adults regarded military life as dehumanizing, the Army shifted the focus to appeal to individualism. Soldiers were portrayed as dedicated, intelligent, and highly motivated, and they were

shown using high-tech equipment. With this change in emphasis, the Army adopted An Army of One in 2001. Other services have responded similarly. During the 1980s and 1990s, Navy advertising had accentuated technology and adventure, as in You and the Navy: Full Speed Ahead and It's Not a Job, It's an Adventure, but the new slogan Accelerate Your Life evoked excitement on a personal level. Air Force advertising keyed into individualism by instituting the slogans Cross into the Blue and We've Been Waiting for You. The National Guard tapped into this theme with You Can.

Research on recruits' motivations to enlist from the 1950s through the 1990s indicated that most recruits entered military service for the benefits, not for patriotic reasons. As a result, recruiting advertising emphasized educational and financial benefits and avoided imagery of war. During Vietnam and even through the short, quick victory of the 1991 Gulf War, advertising emphasized the tried and tested themes of education, travel, and career advancement.

Some analysts have criticized this recruitment advertising as unrealistic and misleading, because it never represents either the mundane or the terrifying aspects of military service. This tendency, they argue, may lead to eventual disappointment and resentment in recruits, thereby hurting retention rates. One study of active duty soldiers' responses to the Be All You Can Be advertising campaign indicated that they found the commercials unrealistic and deceptive compared with their actual experiences in the Army.

Recent recruiting drives have broken markedly with the past in the matter of presenting images of combat. The Marine Corps and the Army have reintroduced calls to patriotism, service to country, and combat imagery in their recruiting advertising. The Marine Corps has highlighted its combat role in Afghanistan in its For Country publicity campaign. The Army has also referred to its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and pictured deployed soldiers in desert camouflage uniforms. Recruiting advertising has become one of the most widely recognized public features of the armed forces. Although the military services hired advertising agencies earlier, professional advertising based on market research has become more important and more widespread since the institution of the all volunteer force. Recruiting advertising influences increasing numbers of potential recruits, and many Americans recognize the services' catchy slogans. Attuned to its target audience, recruiting advertising accents different aspects of service to keep in touch with its market's interests. Additionally, advertising creates one of the principal images of the armed forces, thereby shaping public perception and affecting military–civilian interaction.

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Related Entries

All Volunteer Force; Conscription and Volunteerism; Propaganda Posters: World War I; Propaganda Posters: World War II; Selective Service System

—Lisa M. Mundey

Red Badge of Courage, The

Novel by Stephen Crane, 1895

The Red of Badge of Courage is a classic literary work about the Civil War by Stephen Crane. Through the eyes of a young soldier experiencing his first combat during the battle of Chancellorsville, Crane examines the interplay under the stress of combat of the values of regard for human life, self-preservation, and most important, courage.

Stephen Crane was born in Newark, New Jersey on November 1, 1871, the 14th child of Rev. Jonathan Townley Crane and Mary Helen Peck Crane. Both his father and mother were writers and encouraged the gift in their son. At age 17, Stephen, through his brother Townley, a journalist, got a job reporting on social and cultural events in Asbury Park, New Jersey. In 1893, Crane used money left to him after the death of his mother to publish his first novel, *Maggie: A Girl of the Streets.* The work was not a financial success, and it made Crane rethink his writing style. He had already sent a copy of his novel to Hamlin Garland, an author whom he admired. Garland, along with others, had launched the style in America known as "literary realism." Garland and Crane soon developed a friendship, and Garland later lent Crane the money to get *The Red Badge of Courage* published.

The Red Badge of Courage, published in 1895, centers on a young soldier, Henry Fleming. The story begins on the banks of the Rappahannock River in the spring of 1863, where Henry, a recent recruit to the 304th Regiment, waits with the rest of the Union Army for orders to march. Their destination is Chancellorsville and an encounter with the Confederate Army under Robert E. Lee. Henry enlisted, like so many others in wartime, with a romanticized view of heroism of war. Neither the ideology nor the politics of the war interest him much; rather, he is animated by the desire to become a hero in combat and to earn a lasting reputation. Henry takes himself through the possible scenarios of battle while talking with his fellow soldiers. He tries to convince himself that he will not run from the fighting and that even death may be a necessary price to pay for glory in combat.

During the battle at Chancellorsville, Henry holds his ground, in part because he is boxed in by his fellow soldiers. He feels that even if he wanted to, he could not run away. However, when his unit is attacked a second time, Henry runs, telling himself that he had no chance of survival if he stayed and that all who did were fools. Henry is shaken in this belief, though, when he overhears a general stating that his unit had indeed repulsed the Confederate attack. As he continues to flee, Henry still tries to convince himself that his actions were justified. His path takes him through the woods, where he comes upon a soldier's corpse. The sight of this dead soldier, covered in ants and decaying, has a dramatic impact on Henry. This dead soldier's anonymity deprived him of any glory for his courage, whether or not he deserved it. The encounter makes Henry question his most fundamental beliefs and values.

His flight eventually places him in a column of wounded soldiers. Henry is envious of these men, as he views their wounds as a visible display of their valor, a "red badge of courage" that Henry wishes he, too, had. One of the soldiers begins to talk with Henry, asking him repeatedly where he is wounded. Embarrassed, Henry manages each time to skirt the question. He realizes that one of the more severely wounded men is a friend from his regiment, Jim Conklin. Henry promises to take care of Jim, but to no avail, as Jim wanders off the road and dies. Henry begins to wander the woods with the tattered soldier, but abandons him when he can no longer bear the questioning about his own nonexistent wound.

Henry eventually gets close enough again to hear the fighting when he finds himself in the middle of a retreating Union regiment. When he tries to stop one of the soldiers to question him, he is struck in the head with the butt of a rifle. When he is able to reunite with his old unit, Henry's comrades believed that his wound was the result of a gunshot, and they take special care of him for what they believe is a serious injury sustained in combat. The next day Henry finds himself again in combat with his regiment. He directs his rage, which was inflamed by overhearing derogatory remarks by another officer about his regiment, against the enemy and gains distinction as one of the best fighters in the regiment. As he glories in his demonstrated bravery, Henry feels a sense of guilt about his previous actions. However, this feeling soon passes as he takes solace in a

steady confidence that after his experiences he is now a man and, now purged of the "red sickness of battle," he can look forward to peace.

Crane's work is considered one of the great American realist novels. Crane's depiction of the realities of the battlefield has been especially praised by readers. The work is still assigned reading in high schools and many colleges. The novel's main themes continue to resonate with American readers: the hope to be seen as courageous, the desire to flee from danger, the fear of carnage, the significance of one person in a sea of chaos, and at times even a bloodlust born of anger.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Literature and War

—*Brian Stokes*

Red Cross

See American Red Cross.

Reenactments, Military

Many weekends across America, thousands of warriors clad in the uniforms of bygone wars take to the field at hundreds of sites. These weekend warriors are military reenactors: hobbyists whose avocation is an attempt to "reenact" the experience of soldiers of the past. Since the 1960s their numbers have swelled; witnessing a reenactment, either live or on television or film, is now one of the most common ways in which everyday Americans encounter history.

Reenactments have swept the world of public history, and many historical sites today include "living historians" who attempt to portray the doings of those who once lived there. The overwhelming majority of reenactors today are military reenactors, who attempt to demonstrate and, they claim, experience for themselves the lives of soldiers from wars past. The typical military reenactment involves uniformed reenactors setting up a camp and inviting the public to come and view the equipment and speak to the reenactors. Usually the day is not complete until a mock battle is fought. The number of reenactors involved can range from one to more than 10,000, though a figure in the hundreds would probably be typical. Smaller reenactments might feature only a few soldiers with their personal gear; larger reenactments will feature enough reenactors to represent large military units, and significant quantities of military gear, including horses, artillery, vehicles, and tanks, depending upon the war being depicted.

Perhaps the first military reenactments occurred in the late 19th century when veterans of the battle of Gettysburg walked the route of Pickett's Charge in a staged scene of reconciliation at "the Angle." In the 1920s, elements of the Marine Corps from the Advanced Training Base at Quantico staged some re-creations of various Civil War and World War I battles. In one famous instance in 1976, members of the Confederate Air Force (an organization that preserves and flies old warplanes) staged a reenactment of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

But the modern military reenactment is largely an offshoot of the concept of living history. Living history was originally an attempt to make the experience of visiting a museum more meaningful by showing visitors not simply a passive display of objects in a glass-fronted case, but people living with and using the site and the objects. Living history first became popular in the United States, before World War II, when costumed interpreters were introduced at the site of Colonial Williamsburg. After the war, the idea spread rapidly. The 1960s and 1970s proved to be fruitful years for historical reenactment as a hobby. The Society for Creative

Anachronism, a worldwide organization of medieval re-creationists, was organized in 1964, while English Civil War reenactment got its start in the United Kingdom with the foundation of The Sealed Knot Society in 1968.

Living history was originally conceived as a means by which professional historians could make history more meaningful to the public. Since the widespread adoption of military reenactment as a hobby, however, the overwhelming majority of those practicing living history have been amateurs. Amateur military reenactments have unquestionably become the tail that wags the dog of living history.

It is probably possible to find reenactors representing every army in history, from ancient times to Desert Storm. A partial list of armies and conflicts being reenacted by U.S. groups would include: the Roman legion, the Vikings, the medieval period, 16th-century Spanish in Florida, English Civil War, French and Indian War, American Revolutionary War, War of 1812, Mexican–American War, Civil War, Indian Wars, Spanish–American War, Boxer Rebellion, Great War, World War II, and the Vietnam War. The groups mentioned above are usually reenacting all sides of their respective conflict, even going so far as to include German SS soldiers from World War II.

Reenactments have become a staple at many an impoverished historical site, museum, and local historical society. These institutions, perennially underfunded, are usually eager to host a military reenactment that promises to bring the public to their site. Military reenactors have also successfully invaded Hollywood: today, when making a war movie, Hollywood routinely hires reenactors as extras; they provide

A Revolutionary War military reenactment at Washington Crossing Historic Park in Pennsylvania, ca. 1989. (© Kelly-Mooney Photography/CORBIS)

their own equipment and usually supply a higher level of historical authenticity than would otherwise be available. Moreover, the History Channel and the Discovery Channel commonly use military reenactors when making documentaries. Even the National Park Service, which once attempted to hold military reenactors at arm's length, now cooperates eagerly with them, even at Gettysburg, by consensus the most sacred of the American battlefields.

In the United States, the Civil War is, by an overwhelming margin, the most popular war to reenact. Even the Revolutionary War, which one might expect to be the most popular of American conflicts, seems to take a distinct second place to the War Between the States. In fact, reenacting the American Civil War seems to be popular worldwide.

From its inception, many practitioners of living history have reported feeling that they were, for a moment, living in a previous time. For military reenactors, and especially those military reenactors who reenact the Civil War, this sense of time travel is allied to, and sometimes supplanted by, a strong emotional connection to the soldiers who fought in that war. For some reenactors, the practice has acquired something of the character of a passion play. Such deeply felt emotions have helped to turn military reenacting, and particularly Civil War reenacting, from a hobby for people who like to perform living history into something quite different.

For most, Civil War reenactment is an activity that provides an opportunity for male bonding, a chance to experience the emotions described above, and more subtly, but perhaps most important, it is an occasion for white Americans to celebrate national myths that are perhaps less celebrated in the larger American society than they used to be. Although this is largely a positive phenomenon, albeit one that is a long way from the original purpose of living history, for a small minority of those who reenact the Confederate Army, an element of southern nationalism and a persistent attempt to deny that slavery was a causal factor in the Civil War are present; those issues, when combined with a degree of racism, can become problematic.

Partisans of military reenactments will defend them with two arguments that are often made more generally about living history. The first, which might be called the "experimental archaeology" argument, is that by trying to use weapons and equipment from past wars, participants can better understand how the equipment was used and gain insights that can throw a valuable light on larger historical questions. The second argument is that living history generally and military reenactments in particular do more to attract an audience—to interest them in and teach them about history—than do labels on museum cases and books on bookshelves.

The experimental archaeology argument obviously has something to it. True, using the equipment and tactics of a previous time can generate useful insights; however, this kind of experimental archeology can be deceptive: just because a living historian or reenactor finds a way to make something work, that does not guarantee that that was the way it was made to work in the past. In addition, the sensation of time travel and emotional connection described above can convince the unsuspecting reenactor that it was done that way, when, in fact, no external evidence supports such claim.

The argument that military reenactors and living historians are more successful at teaching history than books or museums is also both true and false. Certainly the public would rather watch people dressed in period clothing, doing period tasks, than look at items in a display case or read. Problems can arise with what the reenactors themselves are saying and doing. Many military reenactors are incredibly knowledgeable about their subject and eager to share their knowledge; many others are not. Even worse, they are sometimes misinformed, and, occasionally, as in the case of a few southern Civil War reenactors, are actively spreading disinformation.

More Americans are getting their history from reenactors than from books. The question is: What kind of history? Living history, military reenactments, and reenactors and their alliance with museums and historical sites across America, and their infiltration of film and television have, to a large degree, changed the nature of the historical experience in America. It has changed it from something that is learned, and (ideally) intellectually engaged with, into a form of entertainment that is consumed, a process that Jim Weeks has dubbed "heritage tourism." Moreover, the primacy of military reenactments as the most common form of living history encountered has the result of making the popular view of American history increasingly martial and increasingly traditional, at a time

when academic American history is moving in very different directions. Military reenactments are a phenomenon that historians are only beginning to recognize, with most academic historians not yet realizing their scale. Heritage tourism is big business, and it only looks to become bigger. More people are interested in watching a reenactment than are interested in reading history or visiting a museum; military reenactments and living history generate more interest in history, military and otherwise, than any other medium. More traditionally inclined historians might do well to ponder this fact and remember Gerald George's warning: "There are no captive audiences off-campus."

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Related Entries

Butler, Smedley Darlington; Civil War; Film and War; Gun Ownership; Militarization and Militarism; Militia Groups; Wargaming

—*Scott N. Hendrix*

Religion and War

Since the founding of the nation, the U.S. military has appreciated the value of both organized religion and religious nationalism (civil religion) in achieving its national security goals. Colonial militias called upon ministers for prayer, but it would be the religious underpinnings of the Revolutionary War that began the formal interaction between the military and religion that has persevered to today.

Military chaplains are the most obvious manifestation of that interaction. While they hold dual accountability to both their home denominations and their chain of command, most are fully incorporated into the armed forces—once enlisted—and by necessity preach an ecumenical, or common-denominator, religion to meet the spiritual needs of the majority of men and women under their supervision. By homogenizing the major faith groups (Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish) and providing spiritual justification for the nation's military objectives, chaplains promote a militant form of religious nationalism.

This so-called American civil religion entails the belief that the United States is God's chosen nation—the New Israel—and that the military is the instrument of God's will. According to its precepts, if the American people reject sin and willingly sacrifice their own self interest for the common good (especially during times of war), God will reward the nation with victory and prosperity. The military's use of civil religion complements rather than replaces denominational faiths and serves an important unifying function. Such was the case during the Revolutionary War when both Congregational and Presbyterian churches supported the patriot cause with their financial and spiritual resources. Employing biblical ideology, clergy also greatly strengthened the will to fight by calling for Americans, God's chosen people, to throw off their English bondage (Egyptian bondage, in the biblical narrative) and create a new nation based on divine principles as had the Israelites of the Old Testament.

Religious nationalism continued to play a crucial role in the new republic's military affairs following the Revolutionary War. While early legislation regarding the armed forces did not specifically mention religion, the founding elite considered patriotic faith an essential component of the

citizen–soldier concept. According to the Uniform Militia Act of 1792, the United States could avoid the dangers to liberty created by a large standing army by requiring all able-bodied males to train with militias while the national government maintained a small regular army to patrol the frontier. During hostilities, according to the theory behind the legislation, the army would expand with citizen–soldiers who would sacrifice their own self interest to volunteer for military service. Because American defenses would depend on the civic virtue of the American citizen—values that national leaders believed the public lacked—the military (along with the family, church, law, press, and free public education) would need to instill the requisite masculinity, personal morality, patriotism, and self-sacrifice into the national psyche. While civic virtue is not necessarily related to spirituality, the armed forces found organized religion and religious nationalism the most effective means to communicate to the American people the values it believed necessary for national defense.

The link between military service and the national character has been well accepted by the American public. For example, at the beginning of both the War of 1812 and the Spanish–American War there was considerable public support for a long war to teach the civic and moral virtues as well as to teach the masculinity believed lacking in the nation's youth. The coupling of personal morality and spirituality with masculinity, however, has historically presented the U.S. armed forces with an interesting dichotomy. The military, according to common perceptions still held by the public (despite the integration of women into the armed forces) both uplifts character as well as corrupts it—perhaps indirectly—by turning "boys" into "real men," a transition that frequently engenders various vices, such as heavy drinking and womanizing. In order to attract middle-class recruits, the armed forces has worked closely with religious organizations to create a civilized and moral environment without "softening" or "emasculating" the American male. The armed forces generally have succeeded in keeping the two sides of military character education in balance by viewing religion as a masculine endeavor that teaches self control but not the eradication of male passions. Additionally, the military has relied on the nation's churches and various religious agencies to provide the spiritual justification necessary for a strong national will during times of war.

Historically, once war is declared, American churches have rallied to the battle flag. Such was the case during the Civil War when denominations (some of which had already split North and South over slavery) supported their respective sections with patriotic fervor. While northern churches were nearly unified in their support of the Union, all of them did not advocate freeing the slaves at the beginning of the conflict. Those congregations generally reversed their position, however, after the Emancipation Proclamation gave the war a holy cause. The notable exception to northern religious solidarity was a number of pacifist faiths, including the Society of Friends (Quakers) and Mennonites, who opposed war in general. Most Quakers refused to fight but many did serve in medical roles and were instrumental in educating the recently freed slaves. A variety of Christian benevolent societies, such as the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and United States Christian Commission (USCC), distributed religious tracts and other reading materials to soldiers and sailors and emerged as important and lasting contributors to the health, morale, and religious activities of American service personnel.

The most interesting religious phenomenon of the Civil War was the outbreak of wide-ranging revivals that spread from military camp to military camp, on both the Union and Confederate side. While estimates of conversions vary widely (ranging from 1,000 to 200,000), the Civil War was reportedly the most evangelical of the nation's armed conflicts. The intense religiosity was partly a result of prewar revivalism of the 1850s, but the divisive nature of the Civil War certainly was a main factor. The conflict rent the nation and its symbolic position as God's chosen nation in two, leading to a civil–religious identity crisis. President Abraham Lincoln understood the unifying power of civil religion and called for a national fast day on March 30, 1863 so the people could confess their sins (materialism and toleration of slavery) and pray for national forgiveness. The vast suffering and loss of life during the war also intensified millennial thought (soon coming of the Kingdom of God on earth) and convinced many that the blood spent on both sides was atonement for the sin of slavery.

Religious activities in the armed forces declined rapidly following the Civil War as the greatly demobilized army found itself preoccupied with Reconstruction, labor disputes, and defeating the Plains Indians. The Navy, ranked third in the world during the war, now patrolled distant stations with a handful of outdated ships incapable of fleet action. In the 1880s, religiosity increased with America's arrival onto the world stage with a "new army" and a "new navy." Following the destruction of the USS *Maine* in 1898 and the Spanish–American War that followed, America's Christian churches called for a martial crusade to deliver the Cuban people from their Catholic oppressors and, more often than not, viewed new territorial acquisitions at the war's end as potential mission fields. While a number of religious leaders claimed that the burdens of empire were antithetical to America's traditional moral principles, for the most part, religion, patriotism, and militarism combined into a potent imperialistic force at the end of the 19th century.

Building on the positive public relations regarding the military following the Spanish–American War, a number of turn-of-the-century reformers known as progressives advocated Universal Military Training (UMT) to increase the public's civic and moral virtue. Theodore Roosevelt, Leonard Wood, and others were influenced by the Progressive era ideals of Muscular Christianity ("manly" religion) and the Strenuous Life (Spartan living to improve one's character) and believed that a well-ordered society based on Protestant beliefs could be strengthened through a year of peacetime military training that would bring about a "conversion experience of patriotism" for the American public. Progressive concerns about the lack of virtue of the American public seemed confirmed when venereal disease rates skyrocketed near training camps during the Mexican crisis of 1916 and the following preparedness movement in the lead-up to World War I. Pres. Woodrow Wilson and other progressives claimed that "moral sanitation" was immediately needed to keep Americans spiritually fit for combat and worthy to lead warring nations into a new world order. Along with maintaining morality in military encampments through the athletic and religious activities provided by the Young Men's Christian Association and the Salvation Army, the War Department also regulated vice by establishing moral zones

around World War I military camps where it outlawed alcohol and prostitution.

In order to win the war, the Wilson administration suppressed a number of civil liberties (jailing antiwar activists) and launched an effective propaganda campaign that depicted Germans as the epitome of evil. America's churches, for the most part, were swayed by such tactics and overwhelmingly supported the war. A number of pacifist clergy even claimed that unlike other wars this conflict was sanctioned by God and it was the Christian's duty to fight. However, when the war ended and many of the propaganda stories proved false, a reaction set in: many clergy members were so angered that they refused to participate in the military's mobilization for World War II. Without strong support from the nation's religious leaders, the War Department gave less attention to religious principles in its motivational materials and instead emphasized new techniques in psychology and social engineering to instill the fighting spirit. Chaplains served valiantly during the war, and after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor most denominations did provide essential support. However, organized religion—in general—did not participate at the same level that it had during World War I.

The early Cold War, America's most overtly religious period of the 20th century, saw a complete reversal in the interaction between the military and religion. The postwar nation appeared to be in the midst of a character crisis. The American people had demanded rapid demobilization following the war despite the nation's worldwide responsibilities, and GI behavior in occupied territories had indicated a breakdown in moral standards. Now facing an atheistic enemy, the armed forces moved to evangelicize its personnel and revitalize the national character as a bulwark against communist advancement. Evangelicals had recently increased their representation in the military chaplaincy and within the Department of Defense (DOD) hierarchy and viewed the "total institution" of the military training camp as a new mission field. For a brief period following the Korean War, military evangelicals worked closely with political and religious extremists in designing cold war seminars—a series of public conferences, often referred to under the rubric of Militant Liberty, that taught militant Christian anticommunism to the American people. By 1964 public criticism ended the DODs involvement in the contro-

versial programs just as Congress authorized President Lyndon B. Johnson to increase military assistance to South Vietnam.

Not since the Civil War has a war caused so much controversy as has the Vietnam War. In the beginning of the war, a small—but very vocal—minority of religious leaders opposed the intervention. In fact the vast majority of Americans supported the war until the casualties rates began to rise and until the Tet offensive (1968) proved the United States was not winning. The United States was decidedly anticommunist and the military–religious alliance demonstrated by the earlier Cold War seminars was still intact. Billy Graham and other neoevangelists continued to support the war but did so out of necessity, while politically active fundamentalists supported the war wholeheartedly and claimed that dissenters were traitorous. Over time, however, more and more Church leaders—Protestant, Jew, and American Catholic—joined the debate on whether the war was either a just war, or an immoral and racist conflict. A number of religious organizations and associations—such as the United Church of Christ, the United Presbyterian Church, the National Council of Churches, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Clergyman's Emergency Committee for Vietnam, and the most influential Clergy and Laity Concerned about Vietnam—joined the growing antiwar movement. Military morale fell to an all time low as DOD attempts to improve the will to fight failed miserably. A number of factors account for this failure including the antiwar mood back home, the draft policy, difficulties of combat in Southeast Asia, and America's so-called "no-win policy." Widespread drug use among American GIs, racial unrest, and even fragging (killing of an officer by his men) convinced the nation that the U.S. soldier possessed few of the moral and civic values believed held by the founding generation.

Religious nationalism, in decline following the Vietnam War, reemerged during Ronald Reagan's presidency and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Persian Gulf War, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the beginning of the Iraq War reinvigorated American civil religion. In support of the Iraq War, despite vocal protests against it, many individuals and communities enthusiastically flew the national flag and held patriotic religious services across the nation. Once the Bush administration failed to find weapons of mass destruction and the Iraq War turned into a protracted conflict, however, divisions emerged leading many not only to question America's role in the current war but also to ponder the proper use of civil religion by the government to build support for military conflict.

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American Peace Society; Chaplains in the Military; Civil War; Clergy and Laity Concerned about Vietnam; Cold War; Conscientious Objection; Militant Liberty; Pacifism; Persian Gulf War; Preparedness Movement; Revolutionary War; Roosevelt, Theodore; Quakers; Service Academy Chapels; Spanish–American War; Thomas Merton Center; Vietnam War; War of 1812; World War I; World War II

Related Documents

1609; 1622; 1654; 1737; 1915 a; 2004 b

—*Lori Bogle*

Replacement Depots

The replacement depot, or "repple depple" in World War II jargon, received American soldiers arriving overseas to fill vacancies caused by casualties or soldiers rotating home. The depot fed, housed, and to some extent trained these individual replacements until they were assigned to a unit. The replacement depot is most commonly associated with World War II, but some form of replacement depot was needed in most of America's wars.

In wars of the 19th century, for example, the United States established "rendezvous points" or "camps of rendezvous and instruction." Militia units or newly raised state volunteer units reported to these camps to be sworn into federal service and to obtain uniforms, arms, and equipment. Often, particularly during the Civil War, some effort was also made to train the troops, at least in basic drill, but most training was left to the units themselves. In addition to organizing and preparing units, the camps also served as recruit depots. Regiments in the field sent teams back to recruit replacement soldiers. Those recruited were also provided uniforms, arms, equipment, and perhaps some rudimentary training at the camps of rendezvous before setting off to join their regiments.

The nature of warfare in the 20th century greatly complicated the process of providing replacements. First, the variety of skills needed by a modern army made it difficult to determine how many replacements would be needed and in what specialties they should be trained. In both world wars the Army underestimated the number of infantry replacements needed, which led to soldiers in non-shortage specialties being "reclassified" as infantrymen. In other cases entire units were disbanded or "skeletonized" to provide infantry replacements. The second complicating factor in providing replacements in the 20th century was that the United States fought in overseas wars. Stateside camps provided initial training, but the military needed a system that could receive replacements arriving overseas and link them with their units. The overseas replacement depot figured prominently in this process.

With the American Expeditionary Forces in France in World War I, the replacement system that emerged contained six depot divisions, which were infantry divisions converted to handle replacements. The Army retained company and battalion cadres, to which arriving replacements were attached, but the bulk of the depot divisions' manpower was turned into replacements, mostly infantry. Replacements generally spent less than a week in the depot division before being sent forward to one of five corps replacement battalions, which in turn assigned them to established Army divisions. Problems arose because divisions were reassigned to different corps so frequently that replacements earmarked for a particular division kept arriving at the wrong replacement battalion. By the end of World War I, the corps replacement battalions were being converted into advance replacement depots to provide support to all divisions within their assigned regions, regardless of what corps they belonged to.

A similar system of replacement depots emerged during World War II, particularly in the European theater. By the war's end there were two replacement depots in England and 12 in Europe. Replacements were attached to company and battalion cadres within the depots. The reception depots, one in England and one at Le Havre, France, received the replacements. These replacements were quickly sent to an intermediate or stockage depot where they were issued weapons and equipment, had their service records updated, collected back pay, and, depending on the length of their stay, received some training.

Ideally replacements stayed at the stockage depot only a few days before being sent to forward depots supporting the field armies, where they received their unit assignments. In reality some replacements languished in the depots for weeks, and morale suffered accordingly. Housing facilities were rudimentary and little entertainment was provided. Training was makeshift, usually conducted by replacement leaders also going through the system. The lonely replacement felt no kinship with the other replacements or with his temporary cadre leaders. He grew bored and increasingly anxious as he wondered when and to what unit he would be assigned.

Hospital returnees, known as "casuals," added to the replacement's anxiety with their lurid tales of life at the front. During both world wars casuals entered the depot system along with the new, or "green," replacements. Ideally casuals would return to their old units, which they very much wanted to do, but there was no guarantee. Casuals often found themselves

being sent to new units, an event common enough to cause many to go "AWOL to the front," escaping the replacement depot or even the hospital to rejoin their old outfits without orders. The personnel managers finally learned the importance of camaraderie by war's end, and during the Korean and Vietnam wars soldiers who had recovered from wounds or illness were returned to their old units.

The unsatisfactory conditions in the repple depples led to investigations in 1944, and living conditions were improved and entertainment outlets provided. But the larger issues of the individual replacement system remained. Green replacements left the depot to join units where they knew no one. In the best of cases they joined their unit when it was out of combat zone and they had a chance to integrate into their platoon and even train with it before going into combat. All too often, however, the Army rushed replacements straight into combat-line units, with sometimes tragic consequences. Arguably during the Korean and Vietnam wars the U.S. military did a better job at training replacements and integrating them into their units, but introducing individual replacements into combat will always be traumatic for those involved.

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Related Entries

Civil War; Commission on Training Camp Activities; Conscription and Volunteerism; Selective Service System; World War I; World War II

—Peter S. Kindsvatter

Reserve Officer's Training Corps

See ROTC Programs.

Revolutionary War

(1775–83)

The Revolutionary War was the military phase of a much larger and longer conflict between Great Britain and its 13 North American colonies over the constitutional nature of the British Empire and the proper relationship of the colonies to the mother country. The conflict had its immediate roots in the aftermath of the French and Indian War—known also as the Seven Years' War or the Great War for Empire—when a series of parliamentary acts intended to reform imperial governance and increase revenues to service wartime debts pro-

Revolutionary War (1775–83)	
Total U.S. Servicemembers (Worldwide):	**217,000**
U.S. Population (millions):	**3.5**
Battle Deaths:	**4,435**
Non-mortal Woundings:	**6,188**
Cost (in $ current billions):	**.10**

Source: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.html>

voked widespread colonial protests. Because of generally lax British governance prior to the French and Indian War, the American colonies had matured and developed their own distinctive political philosophy, one that was deeply suspicious of any perceived attempts at curtailing their accustomed rights and privileges. Thus, many colonists suspected ministerial motives and concluded that a parliamentary conspiracy was aimed at suppressing colonial freedoms and reducing the colonists to conditions of servitude. Politically sophisticated and long used to governing themselves, many colonists organized committees of correspondence, intercolonial congresses, and, finally, began preparing to resist by force British attempts at enforcing imperial rule.

The outbreak of violence both subsumed and contributed to social protest and the radicalization in parts of society. Mob action had been a staple of colonial protest in the years preceding the outbreak of violence and contributed to the growth of revolutionary sentiment. In major cities protestors rioted in reaction to the Stamp Act of 1765, a confrontation between a mob and sentries provoked the Boston Massacre of 1770, Rhode Islanders seized and burned the revenue cutter Gaspée in 1772, and Bostonians destroyed tea in 1773. In the backcountry, uprisings against Hudson River Valley landlords, an irregular war between New York and the Green Mountain Boys over title to the Hampshire Grants, and Scots-Irish frontier vigilantism against Indians on the Pennsylvania frontier, punctuated the 1760s and 1770s. In the Carolinas prewar protest and vigilante groups, known as Regulators, fought against established authority for more equitable political rights.

From Colonial Rebellion to War for Independence
Combat began the morning of April 19, 1775, when militiamen and British forces clashed at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts. On April 18, Gen. Thomas Gage, royal governor of Massachusetts and commander in chief of British forces in North America, dispatched 600 soldiers to the town of Concord, some 16 miles from Boston, hoping to arrest the Massachusetts Provincial Congress and destroy colonial caches of arms, munitions, and other supplies. About five miles out of Concord, local militiamen met the British column on Lexington Green and the first shots of the war were fired. Undeterred, the British pressed on to Concord where they destroyed some munitions and flour, but also encountered increasing numbers of militiamen. By the day's end, more than 320 British colonists and regulars were dead or wounded. Protest had become a civil war within the empire.

In the days and weeks following the first shots at Lexington and Concord, more than 10,000 New England militiamen converged on Boston, besieging the British garrison. Well to the north, along Lake Champlain in New York, the Green Mountain Boys, a group of Vermont militiamen led by Ethan Allen and joined by Benedict Arnold of Connecticut, captured Fort Ticonderoga, its garrison, and, more important, its artillery on May 10, 1775. As events transpired, the Second Continental Congress met in Philadelphia to assert control and oversight, and impose order on the growing conflict. On June 14, 1775, it adopted the New England militia surrounding Boston as the Continental Army and called upon Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to raise rifle companies. The next day Congress appointed George Washington, a veteran of the French and Indian War, commander in chief of all Continental forces. It now fell directly to Washington to create an army out of militiamen and short-term volunteers.

Before Washington assumed formal command, however, colonial troops around Boston occupied Breed's Hill on the Charlestown Peninsula, north of the city. Originally instructed to fortify Bunker Hill, American officers and engineers decided instead on Breed's Hill because it overlooked Boston and would thus provide a commanding location for artillery to bombard the city and harbor. Working throughout the night of June 16, the Americans fortified the hill and garrisoned it with about 1,000 men. The next day the Royal Navy bombarded the American position in preparation for a landing by 1,500 British regulars under Gen. William Howe. The Americans, under Col. William Prescott, inflicted heavy casualties on the British and repulsed two assaults. Reinforced by fresh troops, the third British attack succeeded when the Americans ran out of ammunition. The British suffered more than 1,050 casualties that day, one-fifth of their forces; the Americans more than 400.

On July 2, Washington arrived at Cambridge and assumed command of the Army; he was not impressed, finding it poorly supplied, undisciplined, slovenly, and untrained.

He aimed to create a regular army, albeit one motivated by political principles. In time he also came to realize, if not fully appreciate, the usefulness of the militia. As Washington strove to impose order and discipline, he ensured that the siege lines encircling Boston were completed and set in motion plans for military operations against Canada, considered by many Americans to be the 14th colony.

Congress had authorized the invasion of Canada in June 1775; not until September, late in the campaign season, however, did two American columns make for Canada, one under Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler headed up the Hudson River Valley–Lake Champlain route to Montreal, while the other under Col. Benedict Arnold advanced northward through the Maine wilderness toward Quebec. The operation, however, was not coordinated; each column advanced independently of the other. Beset by ill health, Schuyler relinquished command to Gen. Richard Montgomery, whose force entered Montreal in November. In December, Montgomery's and Arnold's columns joined together, mustering fewer than 1,000 soldiers. Unable to mount an effective siege because of short supplies, low numbers, enlistments that would expire on December 31, and soldiers insistent upon the strict terms of their enlistment contracts, they launched a hasty assault on the 30th. Initially successful, the American attack faltered shortly after Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded. Quebec remained in British hands. The remnants of the American force remained in Canada until May 1776 when British reinforcements arrived, forcing the Americans to retreat.

While the American siege of Quebec lingered on, the siege of Boston was coming to a climax. In November 1775, Col. Henry Knox, Washington's chief of artillery, led an expedition to Fort Ticonderoga to retrieve the fort's heavy guns. Knox's soldiers transported more than 50 pieces of artillery to Boston by February, where they were later emplaced on Dorchester Heights, overlooking Boston and its harbor from the south. Rather than attack the Americans, Gen. William Howe, who had replaced Thomas Gage as commander, decided to evacuate Boston. By March 17, 1776, the last British troops had left the city, and by the 27th the evacuation fleet departed for Halifax, Nova Scotia.

As fighting intensified and spread from New England to Canada, many Americans found their attitudes toward Britain

changing. War had hardened them against the possibility of reconciliation with Britain and had even begun radicalizing the nature of struggle from a conservative one to preserve colonial rights and liberties toward the revolutionary goal of declaring independence. These attitudes were further refined in Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*, first published in Philadelphia in January 1776. In his pamphlet, Paine systematically attacked the foundations of monarchy and argued for independence, declaring that America's cause was the cause of the world, framing the struggle as a defense of natural rights. Americans simply could not return to the old relationship.

By May 1776, radicals dominated the Congress and now recommended to the colonies that they adopt forms of government that were suited to the emergencies they faced. In early June, Congress appointed a committee of five, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, Robert R. Livingston, and Thomas Jefferson, to draft a declaration of independence. Approved on July 4 by Congress, the Declaration of Independence was read before the Army on July 9. The nature and purpose of the war had changed.

As Congress debated independence, the British prepared for the next phase of the war: invading New York and establishing a permanent base of operations. But to what end? British goals were unclear, and even contradictory, and their strategic conception muddled. The ministry wanted the rebellion crushed and imperial power reasserted. In trying to accomplish this task, the Crown appointed General Howe's elder brother, Adm. Richard Lord Howe, as commander in chief of British forces in North America. Howe, like his brother, deplored the rebellion and was genuinely fond of Americans, but he preferred a negotiated settlement that would restore amicable relations between Britain and its colonies. Further complicating the Howe brothers' mission was William Howe's concern for preserving his forces. Like many 18th-century European armies, Howe's was a small, well-trained, but not easily replaceable army of long-service soldiers. Normal campaign wastage from disease and desertion was bad enough, but pyrrhic victories like Bunker Hill were disastrous. Thus fear of another victory like Bunker Hill compounded Howe's need to preserve his army.

June 1776 found British forces launching two major amphibious operations. Ordered to take Charleston, South

Carolina, forces under Gen. Henry Clinton landed near Fort Moultrie on the 16th, but failed to seize it. The fort later drove off a squadron under Comm. Sir Peter Parker on the 28th. Clinton, however, would return in 1779 and take the city in 1780. Well to the north, on June 29, 1776, American observers noted the approach of British warships and transports off Sandy Hook, the approach to New York. On July 2, 1776, the Howe brothers began landing troops on Staten Island and would continue building the size of the force until it reached 32,000 soldiers, including 8,000 German soldiers, mostly from Hesse-Kassel, hired out by their princes.

The Continental Army fortified the southern tip of Manhattan Island. However, Brooklyn Heights, across the East River to the south, dominated the American positions. To protect Manhattan, Washington divided the Army of 17,000 and took up positions on Long Island, to the front of Brooklyn Heights. Howe's forces landed on Long Island on August 22. On the night of August 26–27 Howe sent a flanking column to turn the eastern flank of the American line. Keeping the American right occupied, the flanking column forced the Americans from their positions and drove them against the edge of the river. Rather than finish off the Americans, Howe hesitated and waited, a decision that allowed the Continental Army to escape on the evening of the 29th. By September 15 the British had driven Washington out of New York and occupied the city; they would hold it until 1783. At nearly every stand Howe drove the Americans from their positions from Harlem Heights to White Plains, captured 3,000 Americans at Fort Washington, and pushed the Continentals into New Jersey. Throughout November 1776 a British force under Gen. Charles Earl Cornwallis pursued Washington's beaten Army across New Jersey and into Pennsylvania.

This Currier & Ives lithograph captures one of the most celebrated events of the Revolutionary War: Washington leading the Continental Army across the Delaware River near Trenton, New Jersey. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

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As 1776 came to a close Washington and the Revolution faced a crisis. The Army was down to about 3,700 soldiers; some 14,000 others in three separate commands were scattered throughout northern New York, while Gen. Charles Lee, a former British officer, commanded some 7,500 Continentals in northwest New Jersey. Many of Washington's most experienced soldiers had signed six-month or one-year enlistments that would expire near the close of the year. Although Washington had argued for longer terms, Congress refused out fear that longer enlistments would create a standing army that an ambitious, disloyal general might use to suppress American liberties and set himself up as a dictator. Not until September 1776 did Congress agree to longer enlistments and also authorize the creation of an 88 battalion army. As at Quebec, expiring enlistments led to a decision to strike, this time with greater success. Washington had come to understand that the Continental Army embodied the Revolution, and that the success of the Revolution depended upon the survival of the Army. He needed a victory to give spirit to the populace, persuade his veterans to reenlist, and spur further enlistments.

As the 1776 campaign wound to a close, both armies went into winter quarters to rest and prepare for the spring. Lord Cornwallis dispersed his troops in a defensive cordon across New Jersey, placing the Hessian brigades along or near the Delaware River. On Christmas night the Continental Army crossed the Delaware at McConkey's Ferry, about 10 miles north of Trenton, New Jersey. The Continental Army surprised or drove in the Hessian outposts, and in a short, sharp battle killed, captured, or wounded 918 of the 1,382 Hessians in Col. Johann Rall's brigade. Washington followed up the victory by successfully defending Trenton against a series of skillful British attacks on January 2, 1777, and then by attacking and defeating a British brigade at Princeton the next day. Washington's victories, coupled with militia actions against British foraging parties throughout the state, forced Cornwallis into a small perimeter near Brunswick.

In the months leading up to and during the Trenton and Princeton campaigns, the Americans established a style of warfare suited to their society and its circumstances. Congress delegated substantial authority and trust to Washington for the prosecution of the war, while retaining oversight of the war effort. Despite challenges to Washington's authority from Charles Lee and Horatio Gates, the coordination and direction of American strategy remained substantially in Washington's hands. Military authority and command were therefore unified under a single commander, but one who was ultimately answerable to civil authority, establishing an important precedent in American civil–military relations.

From Philadelphia to Saratoga

Washington's Continentals maintained winter quarters in the vicinities of Morristown and Basking Ridge, New Jersey, allowing them to observe and maintain a safe but reasonable position in relation to Cornwallis and Howe, should either venture out. British commanders planned two major offensives for 1777. Unlike the Americans who benefited from their unity of command and a larger strategic conception that equated the survival and success of the Revolution with that of the Continental Army, British forces suffered from divided command and a lack of strategic vision. In London, Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne won approval from the ministry for a Canadian-based operation to isolate New England from the rebellion. Burgoyne planned an advance down the Hudson River Valley with a supporting eastward thrust under Lt. Col. Barry St. Leger from Lake Ontario along the Mohawk River Valley. Burgoyne counted on a northward advance along the Hudson by General Howe's forces in New York City that would complete the operation and sever New England from the rebellion.

Burgoyne's campaign started in late May with an army of more than 8,300 soldiers, including Germans, Canadians, Loyalists, and more than 400 Native American allies from various nations. Burgoyne hoped the threat of Native American attacks would terrorize the Americans into submission. By early July, he captured Fort Ticonderoga. Rather than continuing by water and portaging to the Hudson from Lake George, Burgoyne shifted his army's operations and slogged through the forests to the river and in so doing lost his momentum. On August 15, New England militiamen—stiffened by a handful of Continentals—defeated a German foraging party at Bennington. Nearly two weeks later, St. Leger's force fell back to Canada after giving up the siege of

Fort Stanwix. As Burgoyne slowly advanced, his Native American allies indiscriminately attacked families of all political loyalties. The attacks only served to bring out the militia in ever-greater numbers. The effects were multiplied by the shooting and scalping of Jane McCrea by Panther, a Wyandot warrior. Engaged to a Loyalist officer, her death and Burgoyne's failure to prosecute Panther exacerbated American hatred of the British and their allies, while undercutting British claims to be the providers of protection and justice. By September, Burgoyne was at Saratoga, where he fought two battles against an American force under Horatio Gates. Burgoyne's advance was checked, and he appealed to Sir Henry Clinton in New York for assistance. Clinton, back from his December 1776 occupation of Newport, Rhode Island, pushed 40 miles northward, hoping to divert American strength from Saratoga, a hope that fizzled. On October 17, 1777, Burgoyne surrendered 5,800 soldiers.

While Burgoyne was making his way through the forest, William Howe was at sea with some 18,000 soldiers heading for Philadelphia. Britain's divided command structure allowed Burgoyne and Howe to conduct their campaigns independently of the other, without direction or coordination from a higher command authority and without having to give consideration to the actions or needs of fellow commanders. Free to pursue his own objectives, Howe aimed to capture the American capital. He landed at Head of Elk on August 25; on September 11 at Brandywine Creek, he defeated Washington. Fifteen days later Howe occupied Philadelphia, and on October 4 repulsed Washington's attack at Germantown. After a period of maneuvering, Howe's army went into winter quarters in Philadelphia while Washington and his Continentals did so at Valley Forge. Washington made good use of the encampment; the Army continued improving its tactical proficiency by mastering more complex drills and maneuvers, improving its already commendable discipline, and sending out detachments to guard civilians and supplies and to harass British foraging parties.

A Wider War

The 1777 campaign netted little for the British. The secretary of state for America, Lord George Germain, was responsible for overseeing the war, but he failed to coordinate British operations or to give strategic direction to them. Britain had little to show for its string of victories. For the Americans, however, 1777 brought important dividends. The victory at Saratoga prompted France to sign treaties of amity and commerce and of alliance. After having surreptitiously supplied the Americans, France formally recognized their independence and would, by June 1778, be at war with Britain. By 1779, Spain, also a secret supply source, entered the war as a French ally. The American war was an ideal opportunity for France and Spain to make good some of their territorial losses to Britain in previous wars and to regain a measure of national dignity and influence in international politics. Thus, the war for independence had expanded into a greater European struggle waged in the West Indies, along the Gulf Coast, in the Mediterranean, and on the seas off India.

In March 1778, Sir Henry Clinton replaced Sir William Howe. Germain instructed him to shift his attention to the French threat by detaching troops to help defend the West Indies and Florida. Furthermore, Germain ordered Clinton to retain New York, but to focus his upcoming campaign on the South, rather than try to subdue all of the colonies. British naval resources, moreover, were taxed by the increased commitments occasioned by France's entry into the war. Fear of invasion forced Britain to concentrate much of its naval power at home, while still deploying enough ships to protect colonial possessions, to threaten those of France in the Caribbean and India, and to continue operations in America.

Clinton abandoned Philadelphia in June, sending Loyalists, sick and wounded soldiers, and some supplies to New York by sea. On June 18 he led his army overland, through New Jersey. On June 28, the Americans attacked Clinton's rearguard, commanded by Cornwallis at Monmouth Court House. Although the battle was inconclusive, the Americans, despite some early confusion, acquitted themselves well.

Shortly after Clinton's transports reached New York, a French fleet under Comte d'Estaing arrived off Virginia. At the end of July, the French fleet entered Narragansett Bay in conjunction with an American operation to retake Newport. Poor allied communications and coordination, a gale that damaged many French ships, and the evaporation of the militia ended the first Franco-American attempt at joint operations.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The War Shifts Southward

Clinton launched the southern strategy in late 1778. On December 29, an expedition captured Savannah, Georgia. A month later British forces took the inland town of Augusta. In response, the French and Americans attempted a joint operation against Savannah in September 1779. Bloody fighting forced the allies to give up their operations in October and withdraw.

With Georgia secured, Clinton turned his attention once more to Charleston. Sailing south from New York with 8,000 soldiers, he laid siege to the largest and wealthiest city in the region. On May 12, 1780, Gen. Benjamin Lincoln surrendered the city and more than 5,500 troops in the Americans' worst defeat of the war. Before returning to New York, Clinton issued a proclamation that undercut British interests by giving Americans one of two choices: openly declare for the Crown or be treated as rebels. The policy was unenforceable and only succeeded in alienating neutrals. Left in command, Lord Cornwallis established a series of small posts throughout South Carolina with the goal of subduing the state and its neighbor to the north.

A hastily organized American force under Horatio Gates attempted to halt Cornwallis but was crushed on August 16, 1780 at Camden, South Carolina. For the rest of 1780 and much of 1781, Loyalist and Patriot irregulars fought a vicious partisan war throughout the Carolina backcountry. Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton's Loyal British Legion earned a particularly cruel reputation after killing Virginia Continentals attempting to surrender at Waxhaws Creek. However, on October 7, 1780, a force of western militiamen dealt the British their first setback at King's Mountain, South Carolina, when they defeated a combined force of regulars and Loyalist militia. The following week, Gen. Nathanael Greene took command of the American effort. Greene worked hard to restrain the militia and bring Loyalists and neutrals to the American cause through pardons and consideration for lives and property, although he was not often successful in doing so. Nonetheless, he succeeded to such a degree that Georgia and South Carolina reestablished their states' governments.

Greene, like Washington, realized that preserving the Army was the best means to preserve the cause of independence. He avoided direct confrontations with the British unless it was to his advantage to fight. Waging an irregular war designed to wear down his enemy over time, Greene effectively drew Cornwallis into a precarious position by forcing the British to destroy their supplies in order to pursue the Americans. Greene divided his force into two wings, giving one to Brig. Gen. Daniel Morgan. On January 17, 1781, Morgan defeated Tarleton's combined Legion and regulars at Cowpens, South Carolina.

Greene, hoping to replicate Morgan's victory, turned and fought Cornwallis at Guilford Court House, North Carolina, on March 15. Cornwallis won but at heavy cost. In need of reinforcements and re-supply and counting on British naval superiority, Cornwallis marched to Yorktown, Virginia, a tobacco port on the peninsula formed by the James and York rivers easily accessible to the Royal Navy, but a potential trap for an army without such naval power. Greene, meanwhile, returned to South Carolina, commencing a campaign to capture the remaining British garrisons.

On August 14, a French fleet under Comte de Grasse left the West Indies for the Chesapeake Bay, anchoring inside the bay by the end of the month. Within a week of de Grasse's departure for Virginia, Washington's Continentals were en route from New Jersey to Yorktown, followed by a French Army under Comte de Rochambeau. On September 5, a British fleet under Adm. Thomas Graves arrived off the Virginia capes and fought an inconclusive battle with de Grasse, after which he withdrew to New York for repairs. During the battle a French convoy out of Newport, carrying siege guns and supplies, slipped into the anchorage.

On the morning of September 28, the allied armies marched out of Williamsburg to Yorktown where they laid siege to Cornwallis's fortified camp. In a traditional siege directed by French military engineers, the allied armies pushed to within 300 yards of the British lines by October 11. The night of the 16th, Cornwallis tried to ferry his troops across the river to Gloucester, but a storm brewed up, preventing all but a handful from escaping. The next morning Cornwallis sent word to discuss the terms of surrender. On October 19, 1781, Washington signed the articles of capitulation and the last major British field army surrendered. Yorktown was the last major battle of the war. In February 1782, Parliament ordered a cessation of offensive operations

in America. The Peace of Paris, recognizing American independence, was signed on September 23, 1783.

Beyond Independence

Americans had won their independence, but at great cost to all and with tremendous economic dislocation. Some 60,000 to 80,000 Americans who had remained loyal to the Crown immigrated to Canada, England, and the West Indies. Not all Loyalists fled. Many of the mercantile elite remained in New York and Philadelphia. Some 1,000 or so black Loyalists who had served with the British Army settled in Sierra Leone, in West Africa, while others settled in the West Indies or Canada. For several years after the war, American and British diplomats argued over the issue of compensation for slave owners whose bondsmen had run away. The war had been a disaster for Native Americans, many of whom had tried to preserve their uneasy neutrality. During the war, white Americans had launched several expeditions, designed to punish and terrorize, into the lands of indigenous peoples. After the war, newly victorious and vengeful, white Americans sought to punish those Indians who had allied with the British. Now free of British control, the western frontier was open to conquest and settlement. State and national governments assisted settlers in laying claim to western lands ceded by Britain through treaties and by force.

The war's effects on society and the economy were widespread. War provided opportunities for social and economic advancement by accumulating liquid wealth through speculation and privateering, but also destroyed liquid assets through inflation and the flight of capital. Supplies had to be imported because the colonies manufactured so few of the finished goods needed to fight the war. Agriculture, the mainstay of the colonies, suffered from lost labor, destroyed crops, and difficulty getting goods to foreign markets where they might be exchanged for bills of credit. With little specie circulating, state and Continental governments resorted to printing money, which caused a ruinous inflationary cycle, and to foreign loans, chiefly from France and the Dutch Republic.

The war contributed to the gradual breakdown of colonial parochialism and helped foster the sense of a common American identity that transcended narrow provincial identities. States' representatives to the Congress served alongside those from different states and regions. Soldiers whose service took them across state and regional lines, and those whose work brought them into contact with other Americans and foreigners, often realized that they had much in common with fellow Americans. Furthermore, the Loyalist exodus contributed to the growing sense of national identity by narrowing the spectrum of political beliefs. As Americans participated in and reacted to their revolution, they recognized and challenged in limited but important ways proscriptions on the liberties of others.

Women were recognized for their contribution to the political health of the nation through "republican motherhood," raising virtuous sons and daughters of the republic. To do so, they would need rudimentary education to help them understand the requirements of republican citizenship. Chastened by their rhetoric of freedom, northern states began abolishing the institution of slavery. Some were prompted through lawsuits brought by slaves, others introduced gradual manumission. Even in the South, there existed for a short time the possibility of ending the institution, as Southerners confronted the paradox of slavery in a nation founded on the principles of equality.

What had begun as a constitutional crisis sparked by clumsy efforts at imperial reform became a colonial rebellion and civil war that evolved into a revolution, established a new republic, and fostered limited but pervasive social changes.

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Related Entries

Brant, Joseph and Margaret "Molly" Brant; Colonial Militia Systems; Colonial Wars; Continental Army; Customs of War; European Military Culture, Influence of; Jones, John Paul; Memory and War; Native Americans in Colonial Wars and the Revolutionary War; Revolutionary War Food Riots; Revolutionary War Pensions; Sampson, Deborah; Smallpox and War; Society of the Cincinnati; Washington, George

Related Documents

1766; 1768 a; 1774; 1775; 1776 a, b; 1777 a, b, c; 1785

—*Ricardo A. Herrera*

Revolutionary War Food Riots

Crowds of civilian men and women rioted over food prices or to claim access to foodstuffs from 1775 to 1779. On more than 30 occasions, crowds confronted merchants who had raised prices on West Indies sugar, farmers who had withheld salt or produce from the market, and even local Patriot committees responsible for storing tea. The riots occurred in rural towns as well as port cities in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. Many of these riots expressed support for the war effort. Some rioters sought to secure lower prices on behalf of Continental Army soldiers and their families. A few outbreaks revealed potential conflict between military and civilian supply. Although the riots were a response to wartime economic disruptions, they also expressed a vision of social fairness that had shaped the Patriot movement during the prewar years. They reflected a deeply held, popular understanding of patriotism in the era of the Revolution.

Food rioters in Revolutionary America acted in the traditions of the English poor, whose purposeful riots aimed at preventing the export of grain, securing lower prices, and forcing goods onto the market in times of shortage. A broad belief in a popular right of access to necessary foodstuffs at reasonable prices—a "moral economy"—characterized such crowds in the 18th century. Colonists in North America had rarely rioted in these ways, in part because they suffered less often from shortages of flour, grain, or bread. But the Revolutionary War brought economic and social dislocation. Britain's naval blockade deprived the colonies of imported goods; military mobilization redoubled demand for domestic foodstuffs and manufactures; warfare disrupted production in many areas. Facing shortages, Americans acted much like British crowds across the Atlantic. Women's participation in some riots, and the rioters' frequent choice of paying their victims a "reasonable" price for seized goods, show that the American crowds were following Old World precedents.

America's wartime crowds also acted in accord with Patriot ideas about social and economic obligations among neighbors and countrymen. Since 1765, the resistance

movement had engaged many colonists in boycotts of trade. Trade boycotts sought to pressure English merchants and manufacturers into lobbying Parliament to change policy, but they also aimed at changing relationships within American society. Those who joined the movement agreed not to import, consume specific foreign goods, or raise prices on scarce goods on hand. Well-to-do colonists in particular pledged to limit use of imported finery and patronize local artisans instead. Everyone who joined promised to put aside profit for a common sacrifice. In effect, the boycotts created what might be called a "Patriot Economy," a system of exchange ruled by distinctive ideals of fairness. Patriots transacted with those who shared their ideals, and anyone who violated the boycotts might be shunned and labeled an "enemy to the country." These agreements were enforced by self-appointed bodies and elected committees throughout the colonies. Patriot committees depended in turn on crowds and the threat of crowds. When the First Continental Congress adopted a trade boycott, the Continental Association of 1774, it placed these values—and these forms of coercion and mobilization—at the center of the Patriot movement.

The outbreak of war in 1775 made patriotic economic behavior even more important. In the shared emergency, those who advanced their own private interests seemed unpatriotic. In Maryland, for example, one defender of crowds questioned the political allegiance of those who hoarded salt. "Was they real friends to their country as they stile themselves, would they ingross that necessary article salt, and keep it from the necessitous as they do . . . ?" (Archives of Maryland 16: 17–18). In other cases, too, commentators identified crowd members as true Patriots, their victims likely Tories. Indeed, Patriot authorities depended on crowds. To pay for the war, the Continental Congress and the states issued paper money. Soon, disruptions of supply and increased demand created price inflation, first in the price of West Indies imports, then in the price of domestic farm products. Several factors caused the paper bills to depreciate in value. Tories and Quakers refused the money, governments poured an excess of bills into the economy, and every military reversal undermined confidence in the money. In this situation, supporting the value of the money meant supporting Revolutionary authorities along with soldiers and their families. By contrast, those who discounted the bills were vulnerable to the label of "Toryism" and the threat of crowds.

Food riots centered in those areas where warfare and the influx of paper money had most disrupted the economy. Four New England states, for example, passed laws in early 1777 to outlaw withholding goods from the market and set price ceilings for many domestic and imported goods as well as labor. These laws empowered local committees to continue to police local economic exchange. Crowds acted alongside committees, often supporting them, sometimes threatening or supplanting them to enforce the law. By mid-1777, merchants in the seaport towns and other conservatives rallied to repeal price control legislation. Yet, with or without laws on the books, many men and women acted to enforce their sense of the Patriot economy. Women's crowds, which numbered roughly one-third of the total, appeared in Beverly and Boston, Massachusetts; New Windsor, New York; and East Hartford, Connecticut. Crowds of men took action in these same colonies in 1777, seeking to lower prices of bread, sugar, tea, and other goods. The crowds included middling and respectable Patriot citizens as well as many of the "lower sorts." Many Americans sympathized with crowds' efforts to ease the civilian situation and bring justice to the troops.

By 1779, price riots had largely come to express the grievances of urban lower classes. This shift reflected economic changes: by the late 1770s, prices of domestic foodstuffs were rising faster than prices of imports, and urban consumers felt the pinch. It also reflected changed attitudes among some Patriot authorities. Moderate leaders backed away from the idea that an individual's economic behavior indicated his or her political allegiance. Some leading men, including Congressman Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, found themselves accused of profiteering by local committees. Moderates began to discourage crowds and committees, considering them too radical. Yet, as prices soared, the buying power of a military wage plummeted.

Tensions grew between many poorer people, who saw themselves sacrificing for the cause, and their more comfortable neighbors, some of whom seemed half-hearted or

belated Patriots at best. In October 1779, these tensions resulted in gunfire and bloodshed, when Pennsylvania militiamen confronted, in the streets of Philadelphia, conservatives accused of profiteering and Toryism. Fear of similar conflicts led merchants in Boston and Providence to limit their prices voluntarily. Yet many among the Patriot elite drew back from the stringent commitments of a once common cause. Congress and the states now courted the support of wealthy and conservative men. They became less willing to condemn wartime profit taking as they sought to enlist the profit-minded to support their governments. Late in 1779, Congress resolved to cease issuing paper money. In the following years, Congress abandoned the effort to maintain a Patriot economy. Some of the Patriot movement's original social and economic ideals gave way in the face of the long and costly war.

These riots offer us insight into Americans' experience of the Revolution on the home front. They testify to a popular commitment to ideals of patriotism that called for shared sacrifice and opposed profiteering. They reveal disputes between, on the one hand, poorer and more middle-class Patriots, who saw themselves shouldering the burdens of the conflict and, on the other, the profit-minded well-to-do. Issues of fairness to veterans remained divisive in the 1780s and early 1790s, when Americans debated just payment of the war debt. How great a gap would Patriots accept between those who sacrificed for the cause and those who profited from it?

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Related Entries

Continental Army; Economy and War; Public Opinion and Policy in Wartime; Rationing; Revolutionary War; War Profiteering

—Barbara Clark Smith

Revolutionary War Pensions

Historians estimate that between 200,000 and 250,000 men served in the Revolutionary War in all branches of military service. In the years following the war, however, men who had been soldiers or noncommissioned officers received little public recognition of their service. Most Americans believed that everyone, citizens and soldiers alike, had endured the hardships of the war years and done their part to achieve independence. Veterans did not begin to receive sympathetic public attention until more than 20 years after the Revolution, when the nation enjoyed a period of prosperity and growing nationalism following the War of 1812. The country found renewed interest in the experiences of the men of the Revolution and some veterans published memoirs about their experiences. Americans overcame their fear that men who received government pensions would become pawns of the government, and, in 1818, Congress granted pensions to veterans who served in the Revolutionary War based on financial need. As the veterans reached old age, they finally received public acknowledgment, social and financial, for their service.

In contrast to soldiers and noncommissioned officers, Continental Army officers had received public recognition for their service ever since the Revolution. As the war ended in 1783, some officers formed the Society of the Cincinnati, an organization that only admitted officers who had served at least three years in the Continental Army. The

society celebrated the accomplishments of officers and fought for the military pensions Congress had promised them—five years of full pay after their service ended.

Ordinary soldiers had received some rewards for service. During the war, in an effort to get men to enlist, state and national governments had offered inducements such as land warrants, a gratuity to be paid at the time of discharge, and pensions to dependents in the event of wartime death or permanent disability. However, some soldiers sold their land warrants to speculators for needed cash. Others were not financially able to hold on to the land they had settled, and many quickly spent their gratuity payments.

Unlike officers, soldiers did not form any veterans' organizations. Not until later in the 19th century did poor working men begin to form associations and clubs. So, Revolutionary soldiers drifted back into civilian life without an organization to connect them to each other or to advocate for their welfare. For decades after the end of the fighting, they were largely absent from annual public celebrations, such as the Fourth of July and the anniversaries of battles of the war.

After Congress's decision to grant pensions in 1818, pension legislation steadily offered benefits to more and more veterans. The first pension acts provided pensions for those in financial need who had served at least nine months in the Continental Army. In 1820, the legislation was amended to require veterans to pass a means test to qualify. The means testing did little to reduce the number of applicants; about 30,000 veterans applied under these need-based acts. In 1828, the pension laws became more generous. Veterans no longer had to be poor to qualify because service alone made them eligible. Further legislation expanded eligibility requirements to allow widows to apply. The final piece of Revolutionary pension legislation was passed in 1878, offering pensions to the widows of veterans who had served for only 14 days.

The need-based pension applications revealed the dire state of many veterans. Some men had never recovered their strength following the hardships experienced during the war. Applicants had to produce verified lists of their possessions and these showed that they were approaching old age in desperate poverty. Some were either completely penniless or had assets of less than $50, and many owned only a few household possessions.

Even those veterans who applied later on the basis of service seemed to be struggling financially more than men of their generation who did not serve. One detailed study of veterans from the town of Peterborough, New Hampshire, who applied for both need-based and service-based pensions found that, as a group, these men had done less well economically than others in their community. This study, by historian John Resch, found that a disproportionate number of veterans in the community lived in poverty. He also discovered that even those who had begun life with some financial assets slipped down economically more than others in their age group who had not served. Resch speculated that their economic difficulties may have resulted from trouble readjusting to civilian life or feelings of alienation after the war.

In total, more than 80,000 men or their widows applied for Revolutionary War pensions. The records of those applications are one of the nation's greatest archives of materials on the war, veterans' experiences, and family histories. Although a vast majority of applications offered only minimal information, a number of applicants submitted engaging accounts of their war years. Because veterans or their widows frequently had no discharge papers, the only way they could prove their service was to offer as much detail as possible about it. The records thus list such information as eyewitness accounts of memorable events or battles. If possible, applicants also produced letters from former commanding officers, fellow soldiers, or neighbors who remembered their service. If the applicant was a widow, she needed to provide evidence of her marriage. Again, without paper certificates, reputable members of the community had to testify to the validity of her marriage and the widow's application often included details of the couple's children and other family relations. Consequently, the files—available to the public at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and at National Archive depositories around the United States—are a wonderful historical resource for scholars researching the era and for genealogists researching family histories.

More than 20 years passed before soldiers of the Revolution were celebrated for their accomplishments in gaining the nation's independence and more than 30 passed before Congress awarded them pensions. For those who lived long enough to receive them, the pensions helped veterans

and their widows obtain the necessities of life and added to their comfort in old age. The pension system established by Congress greatly expanded the role of the federal government in the lives of its citizens. It also increased the size of the government as a large number of employees and agents were required to administer it. The system laid the foundation for all future public pensions in the United States.

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Related Entries

Memory and War; Revolutionary War; Society of the Cincinnati

Related Documents

1833

—*Caroline Cox*

Rickover, Hyman

(1900–86)
Naval Officer and Educator

Hyman Rickover was a naval officer who effectively created the nuclear propulsion program for the U.S. Navy. Rickover also advocated reforms of the American school system during the education crisis of the 1950s. Rickover's career was marked throughout by controversy, resulting not only from the positions he took but also from his acerbic manner in defending them. As a result, Rickover was sometimes denied credit for important accomplishments, like reforming the Naval Academy curriculum and getting the Navy involved in the mission of strategic nuclear deterrence. Rickover, one of the longest serving officers in the Navy's history, retired from active duty in 1982 as a full admiral with 64 years of active service.

Early Life and Military Career

Rickover was born on January 27, 1900, in an area of Poland controlled by the Russian Empire. His family immigrated to the United States in 1905 to escape the persecution of Jews in their native country. Rickover received an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy in 1918. Although he was capable of handling the school's academic demands, Rickover struggled at Annapolis, in part because he did not blend in socially with other classmates; the traditional midshipman demographic was Anglo-Saxon and Protestant, Rickover was from Eastern Europe and Jewish. His ethnic and religious heritage contributed to Rickover's being ostracized, but his contentious personality played a significant role in his difficulties as well. As a result, Rickover had a confrontational relationship with the Naval Academy and its alumni throughout his career. He insisted that many of its professional traditions were silly and detracted from the midshipmen's education while most alumni maintained that these practices were a vital part of their professional socialization. Both sides had difficulty recognizing how their own experiences had colored their interpretations of the Naval Academy.

Rickover completed conventional sea tours on destroyers and battleships during the early 1920s. In 1927, he was

reassigned to the Naval Academy to begin graduate studies in electrical engineering; in 1929 he received his master's degree from Columbia University. (At the time, few officers completed graduate degrees; the ones who did were generally earmarked for careers in the Navy's technical bureaus. Graduate school was not important for promotions; most screening boards looked at an officer's performance during sea duty.) In the early 1930s, Rickover completed his first tours on board submarines. German submarines had played an important role in commerce raiding and blockade duty during World War I, but most navies in the 1930s were still wrestling with the strategic implications of this weapons platform. In 1933, Rickover translated the German submarine manual, *Das Unterseeboot*, into English; it became a basic instructional text for the American submarine community.

Rickover did not have the temperament for operational command. After he failed to be selected for submarine command, Rickover transferred to engineering duty, a technical specialty within the Navy that did not produce many flag officers. During World War II, Rickover excelled in his assignment as head of the Electrical Section in the Bureau of Ships. In this position, Rickover managed experts from both the Navy and civilian industry working on numerous technical issues affecting wartime operations.

The Nuclear Propulsion Program and the Sputnik Education Crisis

In 1946, Rickover received basic training in nuclear power at the government facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. He came away from this experience convinced that atomic energy was the future of marine propulsion. To some extent, Rickover took up the banner of nuclear propulsion to advance his career—as a limited duty officer, he would have likely not made admiral without this opportunity. In 1949, Rickover persuaded the Navy to create a Naval Reactors Branch within the Bureau of Ships with himself as its head, while maintaining a similar position within the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). This dual responsibility was by his design—because of his regulatory powers within the AEC, few officers felt confident challenging any of his decisions. Rickover built an empire within the Navy that was all but untouchable.

Rickover ruled the nuclear propulsion program with an iron fist from the 1950s until his retirement in 1982, controlling virtually all aspects of reactor design and personnel. Every officer who joined the program weathered a personal interview with Rickover, who was notorious for castigating their academic records (especially those from the Naval Academy), family background, and reasons for joining his program. However, from the standpoint of outsiders, Rickover's management of the nuclear propulsion program was an unqualified success. The Navy launched its first nuclear powered submarine, the *Nautilus*, in 1955, and many others thereafter. Nuclear submarines, armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles, gave the country a strategic deterrent that could survive a first strike from the Soviet Union. It also enhanced the Navy's prestige, which had been in decline since the creation of the U.S. Air Force in 1947.

Rickover also used his position to speak out for reforms to the American education system. The launching of the Soviet satellite *Sputnik* in 1957 caused Americans to worry that the country was losing its technological edge in the Cold War. Rickover insisted the country would fall further behind if conditions in its schools were not improved; he argued that students had grown soft from overemphasis on humanities and life-experience classes instead of basic instruction in mathematics and the sciences. Rickover especially condemned the curriculum of the nation's service academies, saying that cadets and midshipmen spent too much time on their professional traditions at the expense of their education. Supporters in Congress listened to Rickover and began demanding reforms at the academies. In the case of the Naval Academy, these criticisms helped instigate substantial academic reform, in which the academy's standard curriculum was replaced with a more conventional one where midshipmen completed academic minors and majors. Rickover preferred that enrollment be limited to midshipmen who wanted to become engineers, but academy leaders resisted the scope of such changes. However, the curriculum was structured to produce a mix of 80 percent technical majors and 20 percent nontechnical majors.

Rickover's success did have its costs. He rejected nuclear-reactor prototypes that critics have argued may have been more efficient and less expensive than the ones chosen.

Numerous qualified officers were eliminated from the reactor program simply because Rickover disliked them, and any officer who developed into a potential rival was transferred from the program. Unsurprisingly, Rickover earned his fair share of enemies, so much so that he was not initially selected for admiral despite his accomplishments. Faced with the possibility of mandatory retirement, Rickover marshaled his allies in Congress, who demanded a special hearing on why he was passed over for promotion. This special intervention resulted in his promotion to rear admiral in 1953.

From that point on, Rickover became virtually unaccountable. He survived numerous chiefs of naval operations and even presidents who wanted to oust him from office.Not until he disagreed with Pres. Ronald Reagan's defense buildup in 1982 was he forced into retirement at the age of 82. Rickover will forever be known as the "father of the nuclear Navy," an accomplishment that benefited the Navy, the country, but also Rickover personally. Beyond the programs, Rickover's legacy also extended to the culture of the Navy. His program was understood to be the elite branch of the naval service. Academic and professional excellence was a prerequisite for joining this community; before Rickover, an officer's academic pedigree rarely mattered in opportunities for promotion. Many officers who went on to fleet command and beyond started their careers in the nuclear propulsion program. For better or worse, this ensured that Rickover's legacy lasted with the Navy into the 1990s and beyond. The Navy eventually recognized his contributions by naming the primary engineering facility at the Naval Academy and a Los Angeles–class attack submarine in his honor.

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Cold War; Manhattan Project; Naval Academy; Nuclear Strategy

—*Todd Forney*

Ridgway, Matthew Bunker

(1895–1993)
Soldier–Statesman

Matthew Ridgway was a hero of World War II and the Korean War. He replaced Gen. Douglas MacArthur when MacArthur was relieved by Pres. Harry Truman in the famous Truman–MacArthur controversy, but later resigned as chief of staff of the Army because of differences in thinking about policy and force structure.

Ridgway was born in 1895 at Fort Monroe, Virginia. His father, Thomas, was a West Point graduate; his mother, Ruth, was a concert pianist. After growing up on Army posts, Ridgway enrolled at West Point, graduating on April 20, 1917, two weeks after the United States had declared war on Germany. He was eager to test his mettle in the trenches of France, but by the luck of the draw he was ordered back to West Point as an instructor in Romance languages—a bitter pill for him to swallow.

During the ensuing years, Ridgway ascended the Army ladder. Within the small peacetime Army he was noted as a comer. As the years rolled by, he was selected for all the right professional schools, a two-year tour at the Army command and staff school, and a year at the Army War College. His facility with words enabled him to draft complicated war plans and analytical staff papers and speeches with comparative ease. He mastered Spanish and, during the 1920s and 1930s, was one of only a dozen Army officers fluent in that language. This led to several military assignments in Latin America, which broadened and enriched his career.

Fundamentally, Ridgway was a soldier. He much preferred life in the field to a desk or a classroom. However, his talent for paperwork, his fluency in Spanish, and the shortage of peacetime field units led him to many staff jobs prior to World War II. During that period, he spent only two years in the field directly in command of troops (five different

companies and a battalion), but on these occasions he excelled. He demonstrated a talent for getting his men to perform. His working motto was: Haven't Got the Time—We'll Get Up Early, Stay Up Later at Night. The standard joke among the GIs about him was: There Is a Right Way, a Wrong Way, and a Ridgway.

During his long career, Ridgway had the good fortune to work often for George Marshall. When appointed chief of staff, Marshall assigned Ridgway to the War Department to serve in the War Plans Division—first as a detail officer, then as chief of the Latin American section. When war came, Ridgway was promoted to brigadier general and assigned to the 82nd Infantry Division.

Marshall envisioned a plan of making the famous invasion of France an airborne operation. This grand design was not implemented, but Ridgway was chosen to pioneer the operation; Ridgway's infantry division was converted to airborne, and he led the introduction of American forces into combat with the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. The operation was at best mediocre. However, in subsequent airborne operations—Salerno, Normandy, Holland, and Germany—and during the battle of the Bulge, his command performed so brilliantly that his leadership in battles became legendary. Despite having a bad back, Ridgway made five jumps, including the D-Day jump into Normandy. After the Normandy invasion he was promoted to command the 18th Airborne Corps, which was made up of units from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions.

As a division and a corps commander, Ridgway was an inspiration on the battlefield, commanding his troops directly and exposing himself to enemy fire. He emerged from World War II as a three-star general with a chest full of medals and an enviable reputation. His successor, Jim Gavin, said, "Ridgway was undoubtedly the best combat corps commander in the American army in World War II." General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower wrote that "he was one of the finest soldiers this war has produced."

In September 1945, he was assigned to command the Mediterranean theater of operations and was appointed deputy supreme Allied commander, Mediterranean. In 1946 he was assigned to represent General Eisenhower on the military staff committee at the United Nations—first in London and then New York City. After a brief tour of duty as commander in chief, Caribbean command, he was assigned to the General Staff in Washington.

Ridgway assumed command of the 8th Army in Korea on December 26, 1951, after Gen. Douglas MacArthur had been relieved of his command by Pres. Harry Truman. He was given command of an Army in full retreat, but he turned defeat into something approaching victory. This has led historians to consider him "one of the best combat soldiers this country has ever produced."

On April 11, 1951, he was appointed Allied commander in chief of the U.N. Command in Japan, again succeeding General MacArthur. In May 1952 he was named Allied supreme commander in Europe, this time succeeding Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Thus, in 13 months he replaced two of the greatest—Ike and Mac.

While chief of staff of the Army, Ridgway prepared a comprehensive study for then-President Eisenhower, which recommended that the United States stay out of Vietnam and not get bogged down in a war on the Asian continent. He also did not agree with President Eisenhower's "New Look" policy, which called for a reduction in conventional U.S. forces, a buildup of strategic air command and more dependence on nuclear weapons for future encounters. Ridgway believed that the infantry was the heart and soul of the Army and that more troops were needed in the Cold War, not fewer. His thinking caused him to have a falling out with the administration and he retired in 1955 to live the rest of his life in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

During his retirement he served on several boards of trustees, including the board of the Mellon Institute (where he was chairman), a science and engineering research facility. When his only son was killed in an accident in 1971 he withdrew from the public eye. He wrote two books—*Soldier*, his autobiography, published in 1956, and *Ridgway and Korea* in 1974. He died in 1993 at the age of 98. He is considered to be one of the five best field commanders in U.S. Army history and the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security at the University of Pittsburgh was named in his honor.

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Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; Truman, Harry S.; World War II

—*Donald M. Goldstein*

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano

(1882–1945)
32nd President of the United States

Although widely judged to be one of the great presidents—on par with George Washington and Abraham Lincoln—Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) also was one of the most controversial. Assuming the presidency at the height of the Great Depression, he reordered the relationship of the federal government to individuals, state governments, and the economy. A politically astute and even opportunistic decision maker, Roosevelt's style of leadership accepted and encouraged conflicting opinions within his administration. Roosevelt greatly expanded the power and authority of the executive branch, especially in areas of war and peace. As commander in chief, FDR gave the senior uniformed military officers direct access to him and established the institutional basis for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a wartime president, Roosevelt led the United States into a global war against Nazi Germany, imperial Japan, and fascist Italy, a military enterprise that would change how Americans viewed the role of the United States in the world.

Early Life and Political Career

Born in 1882 in Hyde Park, New York, to a family of privilege, Franklin D. Roosevelt attended Groton School and Harvard College before studying law at Columbia University Law School. In 1905 he married Anna Eleanor Roosevelt, a distant cousin, who would play a pivotal role in his political career, especially as First Lady. Although FDR worked briefly for a Manhattan law firm, he soon embarked on a political career with his election to the New York State Senate in 1910. In 1913, Roosevelt followed the path of his cousin Theodore Roosevelt when Pres. Woodrow Wilson appointed him assistant secretary of the Navy. Serving under Naval Secretary Josephus Daniels, FDR gained experience in the area of naval administration and managing labor relations in U.S. Navy yards. After America's entry into World War I in 1917, Roosevelt contemplated enlisting in the military, but Daniels and Wilson discouraged him.

As vice presidential nominee of the Democratic Party in 1920, FDR embraced Wilsonian internationalism and supported American membership in the League of Nations. Defeated resoundingly by Republican Warren G. Harding, Roosevelt returned to New York. In 1921, Roosevelt experienced a loss of mobility of his legs as a result of an attack of infantile paralysis (polio). Elected in 1928 as governor of New York state, Roosevelt won the Democratic Party nomination for president in 1932 and decisively defeated President Herbert Hoover in his bid for reelection.

Grappling with the Depression was the dominant focus of Roosevelt's first term in office. Although federal spending increased dramatically in his first term, FDR continued his predecessor's policy of maintaining a small regular Army. Roosevelt placed one relief agency, the Civilian Conservation Corps, under the control of the U.S. Army. Roosevelt did increase naval expenditures in his first term in office and took an active interest in naval affairs. Like Hoover and Calvin Coolidge, Roosevelt opposed granting veterans of World War I an early payment of their bonuses.

While campaigning, Roosevelt had abandoned his earlier public support of American membership in the League of Nations, but once elected he did try unsuccessfully to get the Senate to ratify American participation in the World Court in 1935. His policy regarding the Far East was a continuation of Hoover's and Secretary of State Henry Stimson's policy of nonrecognition of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. Although Roosevelt did establish diplomatic

relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, he launched few substantive diplomatic initiatives in Europe. He also supported a series of neutrality laws that restricted American trade with combatants and prohibited Americans from traveling on the vessels of belligerent nations. FDR established the Good Neighbor Policy that publicly proclaimed an end to the unilateral right of the United States to use the American military to intervene in the affairs of Latin American countries (with the exception of Cuba in 1934).

Historians differ on whether Roosevelt had become a convert to isolationism or simply remained a political realist who recognized the deeply isolationist sentiment of American society. Although the United States condemned the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, FDR took few substantive actions against either aggressor. He also invoked the neutrality legislation during the Spanish Civil War, which deprived the anti-fascist loyalist government access to American matériel. In 1937, FDR delivered a speech in Chicago that called on nations of the world to quarantine aggressor nations; historians have been divided over whether this deliberately vague pronouncement represented a watershed in Roosevelt's view of America's role in the world. One interpretation sees the Quarantine speech as a sort of trial balloon, as FDR sought to see if public opinion would support a more activist policy. In 1938, he encouraged a negotiated settlement of the differences between Germany, Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia over the fate of the Sudetenland, a region with a predominantly German population that had been incorporated into Czechoslovakia in 1919. After Britain and France caved in to German demands and forced Czechoslovakia to make territorial concessions under the Munich Agreement, Roosevelt pushed for greater appropriations for the U.S. military, especially in aviation, but also continued to issue public calls for peace.

The Great Debate

With the outbreak of war in Europe on September 1, 1939, the Roosevelt administration invoked neutrality, but in his public declarations and through limited covert aid, Roosevelt aligned the United States with Great Britain and France. Roosevelt soon convinced Congress to modify neutrality legislation, enabling Britain and France to purchase war supplies in the U.S. on a cash-and-carry basis. The defeat of France in June 1940 profoundly shifted the attitude and policies of Roosevelt and his administration about the war. Using executive authority, FDR traded superannuated American destroyers to Britain in return for leases to bases on British possessions. Also in 1940, FDR successfully lobbied Congress and the public to support America's first peacetime draft. He invited Republican internationalists to join his administration, making Henry Stimson secretary of war and Frank Knox secretary of the Navy.

Roosevelt won reelection to an unprecedented third term in 1940. Although both candidates had supported extending aid to Great Britain, significant isolationist sentiment remained across the country. In one of his most controversial actions, FDR used the FBI to conduct surveillance of isolationists, including members of Congress. Opponents of FDR accused him of duplicity and questioned the wisdom of aiding Britain. Although Roosevelt had argued during his campaign that American interests were served by aiding Britain, he had also pledged not to send American forces to fight in Europe.

In 1941, Roosevelt increased U.S. commitment to Great Britain through the Lend-Lease program. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, he overruled his military advisers and also provided aid to the Soviets. While engaging in highly critical rhetoric against Nazi racism in Germany, Roosevelt was pushed by black activists at home—including A. Philip Randolph—for greater integration in the growing war-production workforce. Roosevelt relented in June, issuing Executive Order 8802, which aimed to investigate complaints of racial discrimination in companies under military contract to the government. In August 1941, Roosevelt formally aligned the United States and Great Britain in the Atlantic Charter, which was issued after the first summit meeting with Winston Churchill, prime minister of Britain. In fall 1941, Roosevelt used American naval forces to help the British and Canadians convoy supplies across the Atlantic. As a result of these deployments, American merchant and Navy ships came under attack.

Roosevelt often had little respect for hierarchy and his relationship with the State Department and Sec. of State Cordell Hull remained distant and formal. For instance, Hull seldom accompanied FDR to the many wartime summit meetings FDR had with Allied leaders. Hull and junior level officials, however, played a key role in stiffening economic sanctions against Japan. In fall 1941, FDR accepted Hull's decision to press Japan to abandon its alliance with Hitler and leave China or risk continued U.S. pressure. Faced with dwindling supplies of oil, Japanese leaders launched an attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941; the following day, Congress declared war on Japan, and two days after that, Germany honored commitments to Japan and declared war on the United States.

War Leader

Despite the severe reverses American forces suffered in the Pacific, Roosevelt continued to adhere to a Europe-first strategy. In terms of coalition warfare, FDR agreed with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and the U.S. Army chief of staff George Marshall that opening a second front as quickly as possible was imperative. Faced with pressure from the U.S. Navy for more resources to stem the Japanese tide in the Pacific and the difficulties of opening a second front in France in 1942, FDR committed American troops to fighting in North Africa in Operation Torch. Although Roosevelt later agreed to the invasion of Sicily and Italy, he eventually forced Churchill to support opening the long-delayed second front in France in June 1944.

Throughout the war, Roosevelt continued a series of summits with key Allied leaders, especially Churchill. To assure Stalin of Western intentions, he declared at the Casablanca conference in 1943 that the Allies would only accept the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, FDR worked to develop a personal connection with Stalin. Roosevelt's wartime diplomacy with the Soviet Union would evoke much controversy after his death, especially during the early years of the Cold War. For the sake of Allied unity, FDR postponed many key decisions about postwar territorial settlements in Eastern Europe and Asia. Roosevelt has been criticized for making too many concessions to Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, and for accepting vague guarantees of democratic elections in Poland and other Eastern European nations.

Roosevelt's attitudes toward both the Soviets and British were complex and guarded. For instance, before Pearl Harbor, FDR authorized the development of the atomic bomb as an Anglo-American project, but kept it secret from Stalin. In 1944, FDR later signed a secret agreement with Churchill about the future use of atomic weapons. Although Roosevelt fostered a close relationship with Churchill, he also expressed his opposition to British imperialism. In terms of strategy, FDR and his military advisers remained cool to Churchill's efforts to develop a war strategy in the Mediterranean and Balkans that bolstered British interests.

Domestically, Roosevelt recognized that the war had further diminished public support for continued economic reform. Moreover, Roosevelt actively encouraged Republican leaders to enter his administration in an effort to spur war production. Although Roosevelt was criticized for the divided lines of authority in his administration and the production bottlenecks that ensued, the United States nonetheless proved able to arm a military of 15 million men and women and still send substantial war matériel to the British Empire and the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt did embrace a continuing role for the United States in the postwar period, but in contrast to Wilson after World War I, he moved cautiously to win broad public support, taking care to include prominent Republicans in the process. Although an internationalist and one of the key architects of the United Nations, Roosevelt believed that the Big Powers—the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and China—should play a decisive role in preserving stability in their respective spheres of influence.

Roosevelt died on the eve of victory against Germany and Japan. In many ways, like Lincoln in the Civil War, FDR died at a crucial moment in the transition from war to peace. By April 1945, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were already strained. We will never know how FDR's death influenced the course of Soviet–U.S. relations. Could his personal diplomacy with Stalin have prevented, or at least ameliorated, the hardening of relations between the two superpowers in 1945? Or would FDR have broken with Stalin and pursued the containment policies of his successor Harry S. Truman? It is certain that by leading America into

World War II, FDR succeeded in bringing the long American tradition of political isolation to an end. After Roosevelt's death, Americans embraced membership in the United Nations and a more internationalist foreign policy.

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Civilian Conservation Corps; Marshall, George Catlett; Randolph, A. Philip; Roosevelt, Theodore; World War II

Related Documents

1941

—*G. Kurt Piehler*

Roosevelt, Theodore

(1858–1919)
26th President of the United States

Theodore Roosevelt, perhaps more than any other individual at the turn of the 20th century, helped build the United States into an imperial nation. As a writer, assistant secretary of the Navy, soldier, 26th president, and former president, he worked from the 1880s through the end of World War I to expand and reform the U.S. Army and Navy, assert the nation's diplomatic influence, and protect its new overseas interests. The construction of the Panama Canal, the creation of a modern, large-battleship Navy, and the mediation of international conflicts represent some of his well-known accomplishments. However, he also helped shift cultural and political attitudes about American power and international affairs, and he laid a foundation for later leaders to transform the United States into a global power.

From an early age, Roosevelt equated physical power with influence, security, and cultural vitality. Asthma and illness plagued his youth, which led Roosevelt to embrace physical exercise to overcome these frailties. He also demonstrated an early love of military affairs. His senior thesis at Harvard College focused on the history of the naval campaigns of the War of 1812. Published in 1882 as "The Naval War of 1812," this work anticipated the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan on sea power and the importance of overseas colonies and trade for national greatness. In fact, Roosevelt would become one of Mahan's chief promoters because his ideas helped broaden public support for a modern-battleship Navy.

Roosevelt believed that the United States needed to seek greater international involvement to maintain a superior

national character. He embraced the theories of historian Frederick Jackson Turner about the impact of the frontier on creating a distinctive American identity and worried that with the disappearance of the frontier lifestyle, such virtues as courage, boldness, and physical hardiness would decline. In Roosevelt's judgment, Americans required more involvement in the international arena to maintain their strength as a people and nation. Part of his emphasis on manly virtues stemmed from his acceptance of the theory of Social Darwinism. As an avid student of natural history, Roosevelt believed that only the strongest nations and peoples would prevail in competitions for resources and influence. Moreover, he believed that by engaging in imperial struggles for colonies, markets, and dominion, Americans would strengthen their collective character. A more powerful military force would facilitate American participation in such efforts.

Roosevelt gained the opportunity to make these ideas a reality in the 1890s. After serving as a New York state legislator, U.S. civil service commissioner, and New York City police commissioner, he became assistant secretary of the Navy after William McKinley won the presidency in 1896. Roosevelt worked hard to increase the Navy's readiness and improve the quality of its personnel. He also championed its deployment against Spain, which was brutally suppressing a revolt in its colony of Cuba. In his preparations for a potential conflict, Roosevelt seized the chance to prepare the Navy for action in the Pacific against Spain's other major colony, the Philippines. After the battleship USS *Maine*, sent to observe conditions in Cuba, exploded in Havana harbor in 1898, he joined sensationalist "yellow newspapers" in blaming Spain for the vessel's destruction.

Following McKinley's call for war against Spain, Roosevelt resigned from the Navy Department and gained a commission as a lieutenant colonel in the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, the so-called Rough Riders. Combining troops from the West with eastern military elites, this unit attracted national attention for its colorful adventures and military successes. On July 1, 1898, Roosevelt led the Rough Riders in charges up the San Juan Heights outside Santiago de Cuba. Despite this success, many miseries afflicted the Cuban expedition, and

Roosevelt complained about supply shortages, medical problems, and losses from disease. Nonetheless, the Rough Riders became a symbol of the glories of imperial adventure in Cuba, and its exploits made Roosevelt a national hero, partly because some journalists underplayed other units' contributions. Upon returning home, Roosevelt became the governor of New York and then, in 1901, vice president under McKinley. Roosevelt was sworn in as president in September 1901 after McKinley's assassination.

As president, Roosevelt made military matters a top priority. He wanted U.S. military forces to be capable of protecting the nation's new overseas interests and worried about public support for imperialism. Roosevelt had witnessed a divisive debate over annexing the Philippines and had also inherited a war against Filipino insurgents that was draining popular enthusiasm for imperial ventures, especially after reports of American atrocities. Nonetheless, the new president continued McKinley's colonial policies in the Philippines and also pressed for a reformed and expanded military. He so rapidly enlarged the Navy that when he left office in 1909, the naval budget had doubled and the fleet had 20 battleships. Roosevelt also sponsored efforts to explore the potential of new technologies such as aircraft, submarines, and machine guns.

In addition to increasing the size and strength of the military, Roosevelt also worked to reform the organizational structure of military personnel. After his experience in Cuba, he felt that the armed services needed better institutions for planning and command, and thus supported the creation of an Army general staff. He also believed that Army officers in the top ranks were often too old, so he worked to overhaul promotion policies. When Congress failed to pass his promotion reforms, Roosevelt used his own authority to promote officers, sometimes advancing them over hundreds of their seniors. Such bold actions attracted public attention, and, indeed, Roosevelt frequently orchestrated public events to popularize his military policies. For example, he personally planned, and participated in, fleet reviews and the dedication of military monuments. The dispatch of the battle fleet on a cruise around the world in 1907 represented Roosevelt's grandest public gesture. The world cruise of the "Great White Fleet"— so named for the color of the vessels—was designed to swell

American pride, impress potential foes, and test the Navy with a long-distance voyage. By contrast, some of his presidential actions proved controversial, such as the arbitrary dismissal of 167 African American troops after racial tensions exploded into violence in Brownsville, Texas, in 1906. Roosevelt discharged the troops without giving them a hearing and discounted white officers' statements that the accused black soldiers had not been involved in the incident.

Military forces also played a significant role in Roosevelt's foreign policy. He frequently cited the African proverb that one should "speak softly and carry a big stick." Thus he claimed that U.S. naval maneuvers in 1902 and 1903 discouraged the Germans from violating the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela. In articulating his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt sent forces to Santo Domingo in Colombia, declaring the intention of the United States to police the affairs of its Latin American neighbors. In late 1903, U.S. naval forces supported a revolt in the Colombian province of Panama, which led to its independence as well as the construction of the Panama Canal. This link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans shortened the transit for both trade and naval vessels from one American coast to the other. Roosevelt's rough treatment of Colombia, however, tarnished the benevolent image of the United States in Latin America.

The Panama Canal was completed in 1914, but the outbreak of World War I in Europe soon overshadowed the accomplishment. Roosevelt used his position as a prominent former U.S. president to urge American military readiness, and he supported the Preparedness Movement, which organized civilian training camps. Civic-minded professionals and business people attended and received military training at these camps to be ready for national mobilization if the need arose. The sinking of the British passenger liner *Lusitania* by a German submarine in 1915, with 128 Americans among the dead, led Roosevelt to call for more forceful action against Germany. He grew increasingly frustrated with Pres. Woodrow Wilson's determination to maintain neutrality and welcomed U.S. intervention in the war in April 1917. Hoping again for military glory, Roosevelt asked to raise a military unit, but Wilson refused the request. Instead Roosevelt sent his four sons to war. All returned except the youngest, Quentin, who was killed in 1918 during air combat. Roosevelt himself did not live long past the war's end in November 1918. Weakened by a variety of maladies, he died in January 1919.

Before, during, and after his presidency, Theodore Roosevelt challenged the traditional isolationism of the United States, favoring a more active international role. He believed that the nation had already accomplished much in its short history but that the American people were headed for an even greater destiny. An ardent imperialist, he held that the world would benefit from the spread of American ideas and institutions, and that the American national character would grow stronger from the effort. He also put a modern stamp on the U.S. Army and Navy, and established precedents for an activist presidency. The image of Roosevelt as the Rough Rider president has remained indelibly etched into the American popular consciousness.

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Brownsville Riot; Central America and the Caribbean, Interventions in; Mahan, Alfred Thayer; Philippine War; Preparedness Movement; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Spanish–American War

—*Matthew M. Oyos*

Rosie the Riveter

The character Rosie the Riveter, like GI Joe, was created during World War II and had life in many genres. Rosie originally represented women who held traditionally male jobs in American defense industries for the duration of the war. As songwriters, journalists, artists, filmmakers, scholars, and reformers constructed their own renditions of Rosie, she gained iconic status. By the turn of the 21st century, scholarly and popular publications, documentary films, Websites, and permanent museum exhibits honored her history and the actual women wage earners she represented. Like other iconic images, Rosie has taken on different meanings over time. Not only does she represent the female defense-industry worker but any woman who performed a "man's" job during the war. More broadly, she has become a symbol of women's perennial struggle for autonomy and personal freedom throughout the world.

Rosie the Riveter appeared in four different genres from 1942 to 1944: on a poster to boost war production, in a popular song, in a government film to sell war bonds, and on a magazine cover. The precise chronology of their production is unclear. The fictive image from the 1940s that the U.S. public most associates with Rosie the Riveter was created in 1942 by J. Howard Miller for the Westinghouse War Production Co-Ordinating Committee, part of the U.S. government's wartime effort to promote cooperation between labor and management. Initially Miller's image of a blue-collar female worker bore no association with a riveter or a woman named Rosie. The connection between Miller's image and the fictive character Rosie the Riveter developed soon after.

Miller's simple but arresting image succeeded admirably in communicating the message of a worker's dedication to war production. Set against a golden yellow background, the woman figure wears work clothing with the colors of the U.S. flag. Attired in a dark blue work shirt, with a red and white polka dot bandana on her head, Miller's female worker rolls up her right sleeve and flexes her muscular bicep to demonstrate her determination to produce whatever was necessary to win the war. She proudly proclaims in a cartoon-like format, "We Can Do It!" By omitting any references to specific jobs, Miller created an Everywoman of physical strength and emotional resolve to inspire wage earners everywhere to deliver uninterrupted wartime production. Of all the government-sponsored wartime fictive images of women, Miller's has become the most familiar. Not only has the poster image been reproduced in different sizes and print formats, but it can be found on coffee mugs, T-shirts, tote bags, and refrigerator magnets. The image and slogan have been associated with causes other than World War II.

Miller's Everywoman probably became associated with the imaginary character Rosie the Riveter after the successful publication and broadcast of a popular song by that name, released by the Paramount Music Corporation in February 1943. Rosalind P. Walter, a Long Island philanthropist who worked on an assembly line in an aircraft factory, inspired the song. In their original 1942 musical composition, writers Redd Evans and John Jacob Loeb created a five-stanza song immortalizing Rosie, a well-to-do young woman who gave up "sipping dry martinis" and "munching caviar" at upscale cocktail bars to work selflessly as a riveter in industry. Rosie's patriotic service, the song proclaimed, complemented her boyfriend's military service in the Marine Corps; together, the song says, they were an unbeatable team. Before the song was recorded, Paramount eliminated the stanza about martinis, transforming Rosie from a upper-class socialite to an average citizen, probably to heighten the song's popular appeal. Paramount chose Kay Kyser, a zany showman and radio performer, to record the song, and he played it on his popular radio program.

The song "Rosie the Riveter" inspired the renowned illustrator Norman Rockwell to honor Rosie with a cover drawing for *The Saturday Evening Post*, whose circulation reached four million readers during the war. Published on Memorial Day, May 29, 1943, Rockwell's Rosie exploded with religious and political symbolism. Like the federal government's wartime poster art and the popular song "Rosie the Riveter," Rockwell made his Rosie physically strong and patriotic. But the resemblance ended there. Rockwell's Rosie departed from Miller's glamorous poster image of a woman worker and the physically attractive pinup photographs of women entertainers so popular among military personnel during the 1940s.

The most famous image—created by J. Howard Miller for the Westinghouse War Production Co-Ordinating Committee—associated with the Rosie the Riveter character popular during World War II. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Although his model was a slim 19-year-old telephone operator from his hometown, Rockwell's Rosie was a mature adult around 30 years old, attired in a work shirt and overalls, with a muscular build and confident demeanor. Seated atop a column looking nonchalantly off in the distance, Rosie handles multiple tasks: she balances a large industrial riveting tool on her thighs and steps on a copy of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, while munching on a sandwich. In the background a huge rippling image of an American flag fills the entire frame. To give his image religious significance, Rockwell playfully borrowed some features from Michelangelo's painting of the prophet Isaiah from the Sistine Chapel ceiling; Rosie's posture, the position of her head, and the placement and size of her arms evoke Michelangelo's Isaiah. Like Isaiah who, according to the Bible, carried out God's charge to convert sinners into righteous people, Rosie's dedicated herself to defeating German

fascism. Lest the religious symbolism elude viewers, Rockwell ever so gently crowned Rosie with a halo for her good deeds.

Rockwell's Rosie gained even greater public familiarity when *The Saturday Evening Post* donated the painting to the U.S. Treasury Department for its Second War Loan Drive. The painting toured the United States with other artists' works to drum up support for government war bonds to defray the costs of the war.

The first film featuring a woman riveter by the name of Rose was probably produced in 1944, when actor Walter Pidgeon went to Ford Motor Company's Willow Run Aircraft Factory in Ypsilanti, Michigan, to make a film promoting war bonds. Coincidentally, Pidgeon discovered that Ford employed a young widow named Rose Will Monroe, who riveted metal parts for B-24 and B-25 bombers. Since the song "Rosie the Riveter" had already made Rosie a popular figure, Pidgeon capitalized on the situation and invited Monroe to participate in the film.

In newspaper and magazine articles published during and after the war, the term Rosie the Riveter referred to women who worked in defense jobs. Many journalists inquired about Rosie's whereabouts when the war ended. Did she lose her manufacturing job when the soldiers returned to the United States? Did technological innovations displace her from industrial work? Did she voluntarily leave industry to marry and raise a family? The women's liberation movement sparked new interest in the fictive and actual Rosies. Why was Rosie portrayed only as a white person? Why did the iconography always suggest women intended to work for wages only for the duration of the war? What effect did the iconography have on women's participation in the labor force and their treatment at work?

The power and adaptability of Miller's iconic image continues in the 21st century. On September 25, 2001, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States, editorial cartoonist Anne Telnaes used Miller's image as a symbol of women's autonomy and personhood to contrast with the suffering of women under the Taliban in Afghanistan. Telnaes, only the second woman to win a Pulitzer Prize for editorial cartooning, created a tableau of two contrasting images on the wall of a museum with the caption, "We Can Do It!" On the left hung a framed black-and-white drawing

of Miller's image next to a framed image of a pair of women's eyes against a blackened canvas. By contrasting the U.S. government's use of its woman power with the Taliban's brutal efforts to obliterate women's presence, Telnaes gave Miller's image new meaning: women must be free to flex their muscles wherever they are.

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Propaganda and Psychological Operations; Propaganda Posters: World War II; Recruiting Advertisements; Visual Arts and War; World War II

—*Maurine W. Greenwald*

ROTC Programs

By the early 21st century, the Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC) enrolled roughly 200,000 college students nationwide. The vast majority of these students accepted commissions in the armed services upon graduation. ROTC produces several times more officers annually than the service academies, less expensively, and is a critical component of the national defense system. ROTC officers have reached the most senior ranks of the military, including Gen. Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and secretary of state l and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John Jumper.

The ROTC program began in 1916 as part of the National Defense Act (NDA) passed by Congress that year. With World War I raging in Europe and American involvement appearing increasingly likely, the government sought ways to prepare America for war while maintaining American neutrality. Private citizens had already begun to do so in programs like the voluntary Preparedness camps at Plattsburgh, New York. The 1916 NDA merged military training programs already in place at Land Grant colleges with similar programs created at dozens of colleges nationwide. The officers produced by ROTC were to become the leaders of a National Guard system that the NDA expanded from 100,000 men to 400,000 men.

ROTC officers were to be "citizen–soldiers" distinct from the officers produced by the United States Military Academy at West Point and the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis. Educated in a civilian environment and trained to become officers in the National Guard and the Reserves, they fit into a long tradition of nonprofessional volunteer service in times of national emergency. By the end of World War I, the ROTC program had units at 135 colleges, all of which offered a two-year basic course, often mandatory for all physically fit males, and a voluntary two-year advanced course for men who sought a National Guard or Reserve commission. The basic course was intended to ensure that the nation had a large population of educated men with at least a working familiarity with the military in the event that their services might be needed. Until the end of World War II, ROTC officers largely remained in a

reserve capacity. As its designers intended, few ROTC officers made the military a career.

University presidents were often more supportive of ROTC than were military officers. In peacetime, the Army often questioned the need to devote resources to the training of thousands of men who enrolled in ROTC only to fulfill a college requirement and, of more significance, were unlikely ever to serve on active duty. The Army and Navy especially challenged the wisdom of having units at small liberal arts colleges where the number of interested students was often quite low. Nevertheless, university administrators saw the program as having several important local functions that included offering a visible demonstration of the university's patriotism and civic virtue; the program's presumed moral and physical fitness benefits; and the sense of "order" that ROTC units seemed to confer.

During World War II, most colleges and universities suspended their ROTC programs and hosted much shorter officer commissioning programs. The sound performance of ROTC-trained officers during the war improved the attitude of Army officials toward the program. Army officials now argued for a greatly expanded ROTC program to train officers after the war. The emergence of the Cold War and North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950 underscored the need for an officer training program to complement the relatively small service academies. By 1955 ROTC had programs on 313 campuses in all 50 states and in Puerto Rico.

Shortly after World War II, the Navy recognized the importance of ROTC as a means of recruiting the large numbers of technically trained young men it needed for modern sea warfare. To encourage men to take the advanced course, the Navy introduced the Holloway Plan, which provided scholarships to select students in exchange for their commitment to serve in the Navy for five years. The rapid expansion of the American armed forces meant more opportunities for ROTC graduates to serve on active duty, although service academy graduates were still more likely to be promoted and to remain in the armed services after their mandatory commitments expired.

Despite the program's general popularity in the 1950s, universities and the armed services had to negotiate several contested points. The Army supported dropping the mandatory

basic course on the grounds that training all college men of the Baby Boom generation would be prohibitively expensive. After initial hesitation, most large schools agreed, leading to the end of mandatory ROTC at most large public colleges and universities by 1964. University presidents and faculty successfully pushed for the ROTC curriculum to include more academic classes and shifted courses in purely military subjects like map reading, drill, and marksmanship to summer training camps off campus. In 1964, the ROTC Vitalization Act formalized these changes and also reduced the number of ROTC contact hours from 480 to 360, thereby allowing students more time for academic courses. The same act authorized each service 5,500 full scholarships per year as well as monthly stipends for ROTC cadets.

The Vietnam War placed ROTC in a particularly exposed position. As the most visible manifestation of the military on college campuses, ROTC units and formations became lightning rods for campus groups wishing to display their anger over the war. Between 1969 and 1971 ROTC units reported 71 major hostile incidents and 172 minor incidents, some violent. Less dramatically, faculty senates and curriculum committees issued reports recommending major changes to the administration of ROTC programs. Some campus groups called for the abolition of ROTC or for the removal of military training from the campus itself.

Most students and campus officials, however, continued to support ROTC. Some argued that the Vietnam War demonstrated the need for broadly educated officers with familiarity in such subjects as political science, area studies, and foreign languages. Universities, they contended, provided a more solid background in these areas than did the service academies. Others argued that by virtue of their separation from the service academies, ROTC-trained officers were less invested in military culture and more likely to question military practices and traditions. Only in the Ivy League and Eastern liberal arts colleges did administrators press for, and succeed in, removing ROTC units, but these units had been unproductive for years. Their closing did not cause the military much concern. The students at these schools, mostly from the upper middle class, were generally uninterested in military service and had more enticing and lucrative opportunities in the civilian job market. Students at

these schools, and those that did not offer ROTC, retained the option of cross enrolling at a nearby host school to take ROTC courses. The services opened ROTC units at public colleges and universities in the South and Midwest, where interest in the military was generally higher. From 1968 to 1974, the number of ROTC units in the East dropped by 30 while the number in the South increased by 33. This process led to more people from the working class and lower middle class joining the officer corps, a process sometimes called the "bluing" of the American military.

The Vietnam era led to other major changes in ROTC. Many schools removed academic credit for ROTC courses unless they were taught by civilian faculty. Other schools eliminated weapons training and even the wearing of uniforms on campus. Military instructors sometimes lost their academic titles and had to accept more civilian oversight into ROTC curriculum, administration, and personnel. The military responded by sending more highly qualified officers to campuses and making a tour of duty at an ROTC unit more important in an officer's career progression. Academic qualifications also became more important. All Air Force ROTC instructors had master's degrees in 1969, and the percentage of instructors with doctorates increased dramatically.

The end of the draft in 1973 caused much greater concern to military and academic officials than did the campus turmoil of the Vietnam era. The draft had been a major motivator to ROTC enrollment, influencing men to join ROTC in lieu of taking the risk of being drafted into the Army. Enlisting in ROTC gave men draft deferments, allowing them to finish college, and the opportunity to serve in the more prestigious officer corps. With the end of the draft such motivations disappeared. ROTC enrollments plummeted by as much as two-thirds on some campuses.

The transition to the all volunteer force had a tremendous, and completely unanticipated, impact on the racial and gender composition of the ROTC. With sign-ups in a virtual freefall and with university communities embracing affirmative action programs, ROTC became a natural outlet for women and African Americans seeking military experience or military careers. Because of the small size of the service academies and their limited opportunities for women, ROTC quickly became the means by which almost all women and African Americans became officers. The success of women in ROTC programs helped lead to the 1976 congressional act that opened the service academies to women.

More recently, ROTC has come under fire on some campuses because of the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy toward gays and lesbians. This policy stands in direct contrast to the policies of many colleges and universities that guarantee nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The universities and the armed services have reached a general compromise on the issue whereby the armed services agree not to investigate the sexual orientation of ROTC cadets who choose to keep their sexual orientation private.

At the beginning of the 21st century, officers commissioned through ROTC were unlikely to seek a military career. They did, however, have the option to serve in any military specialty. For example, approximately half of the Air Force's pilot training slots were reserved for ROTC graduates, with ROTC-trained officers forming an integral part of the modern military. Although envisioned initially as a program to train reserve officers in minimal military skills, by bringing in officers with a variety of intellectual and economic backgrounds and technical skills, ROTC has become indispensable to the daily operation of the active-duty military of the United States.

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Related Entries

Air Force Academy; All Volunteer Force; Military Academy, United States; Naval Academy; Preparedness Movement

Related Documents

1950 b

—Michael S. Neiberg

Rumsfeld, Donald

(1932–)

U.S. Secretary of Defense

Born July 9, 1932, in Chicago, Illinois, Donald Henry Rumsfeld was both the 13th and the 21st U.S. secretary of defense. His career was distinguished by public service to four Republican presidents as well as management excellence in private industry. In the public sector, Rumsfeld has the distinction of being both the oldest and youngest individual ever to serve as secretary of defense. He assumed the highest civilian post at the Defense Department in January 2001 at the age of 68 under Pres. George W. Bush, having held the same position previously under Pres. Gerald R. Ford at the age of 44.

After attending Princeton University on dual academic and naval reserve officer training scholarships, Rumsfeld graduated with a bachelor of arts degree in 1954. He then served for three years in the U.S. Navy as a naval aviator and flight instructor. After discharge, Rumsfeld traveled to Washington, D.C., and served for one year as administrative assistant to Republican representative David Dennison of Ohio. He then spent a year working on the staff of Republican representative Robert Griffin of Michigan before returning to Chicago in 1960 for a job in investment banking.

In 1962, Rumsfeld was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives; the voters of Illinois reelected him three times before he resigned on May 25, 1969, to direct the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and serve as administrative assistant to Pres. Richard M. Nixon. Following his one-year tenure at OEO, Rumsfeld continued to serve in various high-level positions for the Nixon administration for the next four years. He held the posts of counselor to the president as well as of director of the Economic Stabilization Program (1971–72). He was also U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1973 until Nixon's resignation in 1974 following the Watergate scandal.

Although noted for his services in the Nixon administration, Rumsfeld assumed even greater responsibility and higher visibility during the three-year presidency of Gerald R. Ford. First designated head of the August 1974 transition team between the Nixon and Ford administrations, Rumsfeld served as White House chief of staff from 1974 to 1975 until he was succeeded by deputy chief of staff Richard B. Cheney. Immediately following the position change, Ford named Rumsfeld secretary of defense. Confirmed in 1975 as the 13th and youngest secretary of defense in American history, he remained at the Pentagon until Georgia governor Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency in January 1977. Before leaving office President Ford presented Rumsfeld with the Presidential Medal of Freedom on January 19, 1977, the highest national award available to civilians.

During the next 24 years Rumsfeld remained active both in the private and public sectors, heading various pharmaceutical and telecommunications firms while participating on federal panels. From 1977 until 1985 he headed G.D. Searle & Company, a corporation specializing in pharmaceutical production. Rumsfeld was named "Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry" twice during his eight-year tenure with Searle, first by the Wall Street Transcript in 1980 and again by Financial World in 1981. During that time he also served on President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control (1982–86) and as special presidential ambassador to the Middle East (1983–84). After spending five more years in the private sector while also serving as a member of the Commission on U.S.–Japanese Relations (1989–91), Rumsfeld assumed the post of chairman and chief executive officer (1990–93) of General Instrument Corporation, a telecommunications

company; from 1997 until January 2001, he served as board chairman of the pharmaceutical business Gilead Sciences.

In 2001, Pres. George W. Bush appointed Rumsfeld to the position of secretary of defense. Rumsfeld introduced unprecedented reforms to the operations and development of U.S. armed forces. He created the Office of Force Transformation in October 2001 to facilitate an increase in the mobility and deployment speed of the American military. The following year he cancelled production of the Army "Crusader" artillery gun so that funds could be used to develop high-tech weaponry designed to protect more mobile ground troops. Rumsfeld deemed the 40-ton weapon "a system originally designed for a different strategic context" (New York Times, May 16, 2002) and other Pentagon officials considered it to be too heavy and old-fashioned.

Rumsfeld's second tenure as defense secretary was shaped largely by the global war on terror. In response to terrorist attacks coordinated by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, he authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in October to topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to search for the terrorists they had been harboring. Acting on intelligence reports indicating that Iraq possessed a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, Rumsfeld also oversaw U.S.-led coalition forces in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, a military campaign that ousted Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. The military effort in Iraq, however, did not go uncriticized as citizens and soldiers denounced the defense secretary's war planning. A number of retired high-ranking officers publicly questioned whether Rumsfeld underestimated the amount of forces and matériel necessary for victory. In May 2004 Rumsfeld faced political and public pressures to resign following the release of photographs showing American soldiers abusing detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. He rejected the calls to step down but assumed personal responsibility for the abuse cases in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.

Rumsfeld's second tenure as defense secretary and his management positions in the private sector have been devoted to achieving greater operational efficiency. His goals for increased speed and mobility in the nation's armed forces suggest a managerial style similar to Robert S. McNamara and Casper Weinberger, other successful businessmen who were later appointed defense secretaries. As Rumsfeld and his policies continue to shape the American military effort in the war on terrorism, the criticism that he faces regarding his war planning affirms the continued accountability of U.S. defense policy makers to the American people.

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Related Entries

Iraq War; Joint Chiefs of Staff; McNamara, Robert S., ROTC Programs; War on Terrorism

—*Jason Godin*

Russia, U.S. Intervention in

U.S. intervention in the Russian civil war is one of the forgotten wars of the United States. Pres. Woodrow Wilson was reluctant to intervene openly in the civil war, in part because many left-leaning Americans sympathized with the Soviet government that took power in Russia in November

1917. During World War I, when Wilson dispatched small military expeditions to northern Russia and Siberia in the summer of 1918 in response to increasing pressure from Britain and France (part of the Allied powers), he did not explain his reasons and objectives fully and candidly to the American people; accordingly, many of the soldiers who served in the expeditions did not understand why they were in Russia. They felt that they had been abandoned, especially after World War I ended in November 1918 and they did not return home.

Although Soviet leaders made U.S. intervention in Russia a prominent theme of their propaganda about Western hostility to the socialist state, American writers tended to treat the expeditions as obscure sideshows of World War I. Through the last decade of the Cold War, only a small minority of Americans knew that U.S. soldiers had fought against communist (or "Red") forces during the Russian civil war (Shipler, 48). Despite the lack of attention given to this war, U.S. intervention in Russia, one of the first "secret wars" of the 20th century, was an important factor in the post–World War I reaction against Wilsonian internationalism.

Origins of the War and Pressure for Intervention

When the autocratic government of Tsar Nicholas II was overthrown in a popular revolution in March 1917, many Americans hoped that a democratic Russia, led by a liberal provisional government, would fight more vigorously against the Central powers (led by Germany and Austria–Hungary). After the United States entered the war against Germany in April 1917, however, the Russian Army and Navy grew increasingly demoralized, even mutinous, while Russian society became polarized between radical and reactionary camps. The U.S. government tried to buttress the provisional government with $300 million in loans and pro-war publicity campaigns, but radical socialists seized power in November. The new Soviet regime, headed by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin, quickly opened peace negotiations with Germany and Austria–Hungary. Alarmed by the prospect that German forces would be transferred from the Russian front to help deliver a knockout blow in France before large U.S. contingents could cross the Atlantic,

British and French leaders urgently called for military intervention in Russia to re-create an Eastern Front (and later to remove the Soviet government).

U.S. Resistance to Direct Military Intervention in Russia

Although President Wilson secretly authorized indirect financial support for anti-Bolshevik forces in southern Russia in December 1917, he repeatedly rejected Allied proposals of direct military action for several reasons. First, U.S. military leaders argued insistently that World War I was going to be won on the Western Front, that diverting U.S. forces from France would be a mistake, and that Allied proposals to regenerate an Eastern Front with demoralized Russian soldiers were hopelessly impractical. Second, Wilson feared that overt foreign intervention would provoke a nationalist reaction and push Russia further toward an alliance with Germany. Third, Wilson and his top advisers worried that joining or even approving military intervention in Russia would undermine American public support for the war against Germany by seeming to contradict the idealistic Wilsonian principles of nonintervention and self-determination. Finally, Wilson and his closest aides believed that calling on Japan to intervene in Siberia—a centerpiece of many Allied proposals—would endanger the U.S. policy of preserving an open door for American commerce in Northeast Asia and also be vehemently opposed on the U.S. West Coast, where anti-Japanese sentiment was intense. Thus, American public opinion was one of the key constraints on the Wilson administration's approach to intervention in Russia.

The Decisions to Intervene

After the Soviet government hesitantly ratified a rapacious peace treaty with the Central Powers, and Germany launched a new Western offensive in March 1918, desperate Allied leaders renewed their appeals for military intervention in Russia. Members of Congress and American journalists grew more receptive to such appeals. As the Bolsheviks increasingly appeared to be dupes or agents of the German kaiser (the archvillain of American wartime propaganda), and as U.S. doughboys (infantrymen) began to cross the Atlantic in significant numbers, more Americans favored

action that might compel Germany to keep some forces on the Eastern Front.

In this altered climate, Wilson reconsidered the Allied proposals. At the end of May he agreed to send U.S. soldiers to northern Russia and in early July he approved a joint U.S.–Japanese intervention in eastern Siberia. However, as Wilson confidentially informed Allied leaders, he still rejected military intervention for the purpose of restoring an Eastern Front. Instead, he declared, U.S. troops were to be used to guard military stockpiles, to help patriotic Russians organize their self-defense (against whom was not specified), and to assist pro-Ally Czechoslovakian soldiers who were supposedly stranded along the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Historians have advanced strikingly different interpretations of the U.S. decision to intervene. Some, positing that the Wilson administration's statements can be accepted at face value, have argued that Wilson wanted to "rescue" the allegedly beleaguered Czechoslovakian forces. Others have pointed to evidence that Wilson wanted to use the relatively large and well-organized Czech legion to secure a non-Soviet Siberia (which it did). Some have argued that Wilson only reluctantly yielded to persistent pressure from Allied leaders because he would need their cooperation at a postwar peace conference. Others have suggested that the military expeditions are best understood as two of the many limited, indirect ways that Wilson sought to assist anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian civil war (for example, by allowing the ambassador of the defunct Russian provisional government secretly to use U.S. funds to send military supplies to "White" armies).

Deployment of the American Expeditions

Although scholars have disagreed about why Wilson dispatched expeditions to northern Russia and eastern Siberia, what the U.S. forces did there is not in dispute. In September 1918, the 4,500 men of the 339th Infantry Regiment (dubbed "Detroit's Own" because many of the soldiers came from that city) arrived at Archangel, a key Russian port on the White Sea. The commanding officer lacked definite instructions about the deployment of his regiment; however, the U.S. ambassador to Russia, former Missouri governor David R. Francis, approved British plans for using American soldiers in offensives to the south and

southeast (toward Moscow and aimed at an eventual linkup with Czech and White forces in Siberia). Although weak Bolshevik forces initially retreated from Archangel, in the fall the growing Red Army thwarted the overly optimistic British plans. As news of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, arrived from France, American soldiers found themselves in fierce combat against numerically superior Red forces along a front 100 to 200 miles inside Russia.

In Siberia the larger U.S. expeditionary force consisted of the 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments (who had sailed from the Philippines) and 5,000 doughboys from the 8th Division, newly trained at Camp Fremont in northern California. The commander of the Siberian expedition, Gen. William S. Graves, had been briefed before departing by Sec. of War Newton D. Baker, who had serious doubts about the wisdom of the venture. Backed up by Baker, Graves adopted a strict interpretation of Wilson's aide-mémoire and tried to keep U.S. forces largely neutral in the struggle between different Russian factions in Siberia. He thereby frustrated U.S. diplomats and military officers who wanted to provide active support to anti-Bolshevik armies under Russian admiral Alexander V. Kolchak. However, by patrolling the railways between Vladivostok and Lake Baikal, American soldiers were safeguarding the route over which supplies were shipped to White forces in western Siberia. As a result, U.S. troops occasionally clashed with Red partisans who attacked the railroad, as well as with Cossack marauders who did not accept Kolchak's authority as supreme ruler of Siberia.

Deterioration of Morale and Demands for U.S. Withdrawal

In both northern Russia and eastern Siberia, soldiers who had enlisted to free France from the threat of the German "Huns" found themselves in difficult and sometimes dangerous conditions long after the war against Germany had ended. Because the Wilson administration denied that it was waging war against Bolshevism and failed to provide other convincing explanations for continuing the expeditions, many soldiers saw no valid purpose for their suffering and sacrifice. Consequently, the incidence of self-inflicted wounds, suicide, alcoholism, and venereal disease among the expeditionary forces was abnormally high.

As veterans of the Archangel or "Polar Bear" expedition recalled, "The glory of dying in France to lie under a field of poppies had come to this drear mystery of dying in Russia under a dread disease in a strange and unlovely place" (Moore, et al., 15). Angry at mistreatment by arrogant British officers (who had overall command in northern Russia), suspicious of British economic motives, and troubled by waging an undeclared war against ordinary Russians, some came to view the Archangel expedition as un-American. As one officer wrote, "rankling deep forever in the consciousness of every Archangel soldier is the thought of . . . the weak abandonment by his country of everything to which he had pledged his manhood faith" (Cudahy, 116–17). A YMCA secretary who served with the troops in northern Russia similarly observed that the American soldier there was "fighting a war that was foreign to all he had ever thought of America" (Albertson, 36).

Although news from Arctic Russia and Siberia was limited and letters from soldiers were sometimes censored, the alarming stories that reached home led parents and wives to demand the return of their sons and husbands. After Republican senator Hiram Johnson of California and other members of Congress sharply questioned the purpose of the Archangel expedition, in February 1919 President Wilson ordered the troops to be withdrawn. The 339th Infantry Regiment consequently left Archangel in June 1919. However, Wilson worried that recalling the Siberian expedition while 70,000 Japanese soldiers remained in eastern Siberia would lead to the establishment of an exclusive Japanese sphere of influence there. As a result, roughly 9,000 U.S. soldiers stayed in Siberia. Only after the Red Army chased Kolchak's troops eastward across Siberia in the fall of 1919 did U.S. officials decide to evacuate all American forces. The last American soldiers left Vladivostok in April 1920.

Impact on Congressional and Public Opinion

Paradoxically, as politicians, journalists, and the families of soldiers became increasingly vociferous about the need to withdraw from Russia, anti-Bolshevik sentiment was rising in the United States to the hysterical peak of the Red Scare in late 1919 and early 1920. As Wilson had declined to wage

Public demands for the return of American forces from Russia were fierce, as this cartoon represents. It ran in the San Francisco Chronicle *on September 22, 1919. (Private collection)*

war openly against the Soviet regime, public and congressional support for intervention in Russia evaporated even as hostility to socialism became more intense and widespread. The failed interventions in Russia also undermined Wilson's internationalist agenda: many progressives viewed the expeditions to northern Russia and Siberia as dangerous precedents of presidential usurpation of war powers and undeclared war to crush revolutionary movements. Such concerns contributed to the decisions of "peace progressives," including senators Hiram Johnson, William Borah, and Robert LaFollette, to vote against U.S. membership in the League of Nations.

While the many forms of American intervention failed to prevent a Red victory in the Russian civil war, similar "secret wars" would be waged later against other radical or communist governments. During the Cold War, diplomatic non-recognition, economic blockade, covert action, and secret financial support for insurgent forces would be

employed against the governments of China, Cuba, and Nicaragua—as they had been against Soviet Russia.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Wilson, Woodrow; World War I

Related Documents

1919 d

—*David S. Foglesong*

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
Sad Sack, The

The Sad Sack was an enormously popular, humorous comic strip that appeared in the Army's *Yank* magazine between 1942 and 1945. *The Sad Sack* captured the plight of the American citizen–soldier, drafted into an armed forces with a culture he could not master or even understand. Millions of GIs identified with the main character, even while they looked down on him as a misfit and a loser.

The Sad Sack was the brainchild of George Baker, who graduated from high school during the Depression. Baker worked at odd jobs while studying art in night school for a month and a half. In 1937, he moved to California, hoping to play for a minor league baseball team. Baker ended up taking a job at Walt Disney Studios as an animator. After being trained in the Disney style of animation, Baker was assigned to do background effects. His credits include work on *Pinocchio*, *Fantasia*, and *Bambi*.

While on strike against the Disney studio in June 1941, Baker was drafted under the new Selective Service System Act. Like thousands of other men going through basic training, Baker found the Army's way of doing things nearly incomprehensible; its methods of operation and indoctrination were rigid and regimented in ways that most servicemen had never encountered. He was stationed at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and did animation work on films for the Signal Corps, which prepared training films for recruits. In his spare time, Baker developed the idea of a comic strip centering on the experiences of an average soldier. He hoped to sell the strip after leaving the service, but publishers showed no interest. Baker's creation received new life when the Defense Recreation Committee sponsored a contest for cartoons by servicemen.

His entry won and was reprinted by newspapers and magazines across the country.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Army established a weekly magazine for enlisted men, produced by enlisted men. The publication was named *Yank*, and first appeared in April 1942. When the editors saw Baker's winning entry for the Defense Recreation Committee, they asked him to submit a weekly strip for *Yank*. *The Sad Sack* became the magazine's first regular feature. Baker himself was transferred to the staff of *Yank* and spent the war producing weekly strips. He traveled extensively throughout the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific theaters, keeping in touch with enlisted men, and gathering ideas for the cartoon. *Yank* was eventually published in eleven different editions meant to serve the various theaters of operation, and *The Sad Sack* appeared in all of them, garnering a readership of millions of servicemen. Baker made a conscious effort to keep the strip generic enough so that soldiers in all theaters could identify with it. *The Sad Sack* became the leading feature in *Yank* and overshadowed the other regular comic feature, *GI Joe*, drawn by Dave Breger, a well-known artist.

Baker wanted Sad Sack, an average soldier, to be more like the draftees he encountered than the cheery, ideological soldiers portrayed in popular movies and propaganda images. Sad Sack was small, homely, and maybe a little stupid. He was resigned to his fate and saw his Army service as a job to endure so that he could return to civilian life. No matter how hard he tried to be a good soldier, Sad Sack was always the victim of circumstances or of the Army's bureaucracy. His name was a sanitized version of the old Army slang for a loser: "a sad sack of shit." Even so, Sad Sack never gave up trying.

George Baker with examples of his cartoon strip The Sad Sack *in the background. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)*

The Sad Sack strip had no dialogue; it used pantomime to tell its story. Uniforms were baggy, and the ground was perpetually muddy. Sergeants were Sad Sack's tormentors, while officers generally ignored his existence. His daily routines included KP (kitchen duty), digging ditches, and moving heavy items from one place to another for no apparent reason. The logic of Army life always eluded Sad Sack. He never rose above the rank of private, no matter how hard he tried.

Sad Sack fought on all fronts during the war. He did his duty diligently, although things never turned out for him. In

one strip, he fought his way ever closer to Paris. When he finally arrived in the liberated city, he found it was now off-limits to enlisted men. In another strip, Sad Sack captured a German soldier, only to learn that prisoners were being sent to the United States, while he was required to remain in Europe.

The Sad Sack was enormously popular with both servicemen and the general public. Many real life units adopted the main character as a mascot, and his image appeared on airplanes and tanks in different theaters. The comic strip was reprinted in many civilian newspapers and magazines. *The Sad Sack* strips were also published in book form in two collections during the war and sold well. Sad Sack became the chief character in a stage show entitled *Hi, Yank*, which was performed at military bases and on Broadway. Merchandise such as ash trays and glasses featured Sad Sack. A movie based on the strip was released, with Jerry Lewis in the title role. When the war ended, Sad Sack was mustered out and returned to civilian life. He appeared in the Sunday comics in the late 1940s, but Sad Sack was a failure as a civilian. The Sunday comic was discontinued in the early 1950s.

The Sad Sack was resurrected during the 1950s in a comic book published by the Harvey Company. He returned to the Army, with a supporting cast of characters, and the comic sold well for the remainder of the century. Baker drew all the covers for the comic book until his death in 1975.

The Sad Sack captured the attitudes and experiences of American civilian–soldiers of World War II. Like Sad Sack, they viewed their service as a job to be done—successfully, they hoped—until they could get back to their real lives. Like Sad Sack, they were often mystified by military life, but they took comfort in knowing they adapted to it better than he did. No comic feature from subsequent wars ever captured the contemporary Army experience like *The Sad Sack*.

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Related Entries

Mauldin, Bill; Media and War; Visual Arts and War

—*Tim J. Watts*

Sampson, Deborah

(1760–1827)
American Revolutionary War Soldier

Deborah Sampson (also spelled Samson) of Massachusetts was one of the first known American women to impersonate a man in order to serve in the Army. Under the name of Robert Shurtleff (also spelled Shurtliff), she enlisted in the Continental Army during the American Revolution, and served from May 20, 1782, until October 25, 1783. Other women who tried to join the Army disguised as men were quickly discovered and punished. Sampson, however, was able to conceal her gender for some time. When her secret was finally discovered, she received an honorable discharge and was acclaimed for her heroism and dedication to the Revolutionary cause.

Sampson's early life was difficult. Her father abandoned the family when she was five years old, and her mother, sick and impoverished, dispersed Sampson and her siblings to relatives. She lived first with a cousin, Ruth Fuller, who died three years later. Then Sampson spent two years with an elderly widow, who also died within a few years. After this, the 10-year-old Sampson was a servant in the household of Jeremiah Thomas and his family. At 18, she left the Thomas' and for four years held a variety of jobs, including that of school teacher.

A number of factors probably contributed to Sampson's enlistment in the Army. Sampson would later say that she had been devoted to the Revolutionary cause. Certainly, her entire life was spent in Massachusetts surrounded by political upheaval, talk of war, and, sometimes, war itself. But since

colonial women possessed few property rights and no political rights, Sampson's gender and poverty excluded her from any political stake in the outcome of a war fought over property rights and political representation. Perhaps, like many young men of the time, she was drawn by a desire for adventure, regular pay, and the bounty (a cash bonus for enlisting). She may also have been familiar with books and songs about women who served in British or European armies.

Sampson was not the first woman to conceal her gender to serve in the Revolutionary War. Earlier in the war, two other women had dressed as men, but they were quickly discovered. The first, whose name is not known, was discovered, suspected of sexual misconduct, publicly humiliated, and discharged from the 1st New Jersey Regiment. The other enlisted in Massachusetts as Samuel Gay but deserted three weeks later. When apprehended, she was identified as Nancy or Ann Bailey. She was charged with enlisting to receive the bounty payment and was fined, sentenced to two months in jail, and discharged from the Army. These female soldiers faced public condemnation as a result of their deceptions.

Sampson's experience in the Army was very different. She concealed her gender for a long time and, when injured in a battle at Tarrytown, New York, she treated her own wounds to avoid discovery. The military and social customs of the time also helped Sampson keep her secret. Soldiers rarely would have seen each other naked. Washing was usually cursory, and soldiers, living in rough conditions, had few clothes and slept in the same garments that they wore during the day. Sampson's physical attributes also helped her deception. At five feet seven inches, she was tall for a woman of the era and would have been the same height as many of the men with whom she served. Her lack of facial hair was also not extraordinary, since many boys who were too young to shave served in the Army. In an era when all women wore floor length skirts or dresses, someone wearing a hunting shirt and leggings—common garb for soldiers—would have been assumed to be a man.

It was only when Sampson was incapacitated by a fever at the end of the war and sent to a hospital in Philadelphia that her identity was discovered by a doctor. She was not humiliated or punished, but honorably discharged. Not everyone approved of her actions, though. Her church, the First Baptist Church in Middleborough, Massachusetts, excommunicated her when rumors circulated that she was serving in the Army dressed as a man. Nonetheless, within a few years after the war, Sampson had become a celebrity, largely through her own efforts. She married Benjamin Gannett (also spelled Gannet) in 1784 and vigorously pursued a pension from state and federal governments for a disability from her leg wound. With the help of writer Herman Mann, Sampson published *The Female Review* (1797), a fictionalized autobiography of her experiences. Mann also helped Sampson organize a lecture tour in 1802.

There are several factors that might account for the fact that Sampson met with public acceptance rather than hostility for taking on a traditionally male role. She successfully concealed her identity until the end of the war and the disbanding of the Army, so her actions could not be perceived as undermining military success. There were no rumors or charges that questioned her virtue—that is, her sexual purity. Additionally, she quickly reverted back to what society considered an appropriate female role: she married a year after the war and went on to raise a family.

Sampson's military service demonstrated women's capabilities during wartime. Just like that of her male counterparts, her service was recognized by public authorities. Not only did she receive a disability pension for her leg wound, but, when federal military pensions were introduced on the basis of financial need in 1818, she applied for and received one. After her death in 1827, her husband received the benefits that would normally be paid to widows. However, despite this public praise and acknowledgement of Sampson's service and sacrifice, society was not ready to alter its perceptions of what women could or should do to serve their country. It would be more than 200 years before Americans began to accept the idea of women serving in the military in a combat role.

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Related Entries

Camp Followers; Revolutionary War; Revolutionary War Pensions; Women in the Military

—*Caroline Cox*

Satellite Technology

Military use of satellites has enhanced command and control of far-flung forces, provided vast amounts of data, and enabled precise positioning on the globe. Modern satellites also perform a variety of data-related tasks like reconnaissance, navigation, weather observation, and communications relay. Although the concept of an artificial satellite had existed in the scientific community for years, it was not until after World War II when American and Soviet scientists and engineers—working independently, but both building on the expertise of the Nazi rocket program—finally orbited an artificial satellite.

In May 1946, the RAND Group of Douglas Aircraft released the first comprehensive look at the uses for artificial satellites. The report, *Preliminary Design of a World-Circling Spaceship*, looked at the military potential of artificial satellites, and suggested three missions: weather, communications relay, and reconnaissance. However, with significant technological problems to overcome, with an Air Force wedded to airplanes for strategic reconnaissance, and with military budgets shrinking in the wake of World War II, the military largely ignored the potential of satellites until the late 1950s.

The military was not the only organization investigating the usefulness of satellites. In late 1945, British writer Arthur C. Clarke suggested the geostationary orbit as the most useful for communications relay satellites. Today, the ring of geostationary slots where the majority of communications satellites orbit is called the Clarke Belt. In 1951, the British Interplanetary Society speculated on the scientific research applications of an artificial satellite. In 1955, S. Fred Singer proposed his Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of the Earth (MOUSE) to the American Rocket Society as a scientific instrument for studying the upper reaches of the atmosphere, which airplanes and balloons could not reach. Although never adopted, MOUSE was the first satellite program widely talked about in scientific and engineering circles. In the early 1950s, Soviet scientists and engineers published papers and gave talks in an effort to share scientific and engineering knowledge, but also in an effort to show the world that Soviet science and engineering matched the West's capabilities.

In October 1957, the Soviet Union became the first nation to orbit a satellite when an R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile launched *Sputnik I*. The satellite, an aluminum sphere less than two feet in diameter and weighing less than 200 pounds, also launched the field of space law by establishing the precedent of freedom of overflight in space. A month later, the Soviets orbited *Sputnik II*, an even larger satellite, with a dog as a passenger. On December 6, the United States' attempt to launch *Vanguard I* failed spectacularly in a nationally televised rocket blast. The satellite ejected from the booster when it exploded, and beeped helplessly on the ground, earning it the nickname "Kaputnik." Scientist Wernher von Braun and his team quickly proceeded with their satellite, *Explorer I*, which launched less than three months later. Instruments aboard detected the Van Allen radiation belts around the Earth. Scientist James Van Allen had built the satellite's Geiger counter and theorized that radiation bombarded it, which was later confirmed by other satellites.

Needing more accurate information about the Soviet strategic arsenal, Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower directed the Central Intelligence Agency in 1958 to develop a reconnaissance satellite to replace the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. In

1960, the first fully successful mission featured the world's first photoreconnaissance satellite, as well as the first mid-air recovery of a re-entry vehicle from space when a U.S. Air Force plane recovered the capsule in the air over the Pacific. The mission returned more imagery of the Soviet Union than all the previous U-2 flights.

The telephone company AT&T launched the first commercial telecommunications satellite into low-Earth orbit in 1962. In 1964, after two years of refinement, *Syncom III* went into the Clarke Belt above the International Dateline. From there, Americans saw a broadcast of the 1964 Olympics' opening ceremonies "live via satellite" from Japan. However, in 1964, an international consortium of communications satellite users called Intelsat pushed private utilities out of the commercial satellite business. Intelsat's first satellite, *Early Bird*, went into operations in 1965 with 240 telephone circuits. The relatively small satellite—it weighed less than 100 pounds—revolutionized space-based, long-haul communications. By the time of *Intelsat* 5, much larger satellites carried at least 12,000 telephone circuits and two color television channels.

To meet its strategic communications needs, the military initially tried leasing commercial satellite circuits, but quickly decided that unpredictable patterns of use and remote operating locations required a dedicated military system. The first military communications satellite was *Courier IB*, launched in 1960 for a 17-day test of the concept of active relay and of solar-powered spacecraft. By 1968, the military had a constellation of over 25 satellites performing communications relay. Today, the military uses a combination of military and commercial satellites—most of which orbit the Clarke Belt—to meet its telecommunications needs.

Under the leadership of Ivan Getting, in the early 1960s the Aerospace Corporation established the basis for a global navigation system for vehicles moving rapidly in four dimensions (latitude, longitude, altitude, and time). The system became known as the Global Positioning System (GPS). The primary military purpose was to allow improved command and control of forces through precise position awareness. Modern munitions, so-called smart weapons, use GPS for precision guidance. Civilian applications of the system, which is provided free of charge by the military, include use as a navigation aid in planes, ships, and vehicles, as a tracking device for hikers, and even to search for stolen cars.

Meteorological (weather) satellites were developed simultaneously by the military and NASA, but for different purposes. The military developed weather satellites to both provide better weather support to warfighters and to enhance its ability to reconnoiter the Soviet Union. NASA developed weather satellites to monitor Earth's climate. Military weather satellites generally orbit in low-Earth, polar (north–south) orbits, while the more-familiar television news pictures come from civilian weather satellites in the Clarke Belt. NASA launched its first successful weather satellite, *Tiros I*, in 1960. From the Clarke Belt, weather satellites monitor not just cloud movements across the surface of the Earth, but also pollution, ocean currents like the Gulf Stream, ice floes, and sand storms in the desert. Advance warning of hurricane development, provided by weather satellites, has saved countless lives.

The military's use of satellites has evolved from simply higher platforms for reconnaissance of the enemy to aiding in the command and control of military forces in any weather. Civilian applications of space technology have evolved parallel to or following military developments in order to meet the specific needs of the civilian community.

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Related Entries

National Space Program; Technology and Revolutionary Changes in Military Affairs

—David C. Arnold

Saving Private Ryan

Film directed by Steven Spielberg, 1998

Steven Spielberg's Academy-Award winning film is a fictional story of honor, decency, and courage set against the 1944 Allied invasion of Normandy. *Saving Private Ryan* and its bloody depiction of the landings on Omaha Beach in the opening sequence typified a new era of combat film, offering a gritty, realistic, and personalized view of combat that represented a stark contrast to Darryl F. Zanuck's treatment of the D-Day invasion, *The Longest Day* (1962). Generating increased interest in World War II, the film sparked the planning, design, and construction of museums and memorials to veterans nationwide. Its critical and commercial success prompted the making of other films about World War II, collectively helping return that war to popular consciousness.

The Robert Rodat screenplay is loosely based upon the story of Fritz Niland, a soldier of the 101st Airborne Division, who was withdrawn from his position outside Carentan, France, just one week after the Normandy landings. Niland lost two brothers in the Normandy invasion, and a third had been killed in the China–Burma–India theater. When the War Department discovered what had happened, they sent soldiers in after the sole surviving son, extracted him from the combat zone, and sent him home.

Saving Private Ryan contains the three elements that define the World War II combat film: hero, group, and mission. Capt. John Miller (Tom Hanks) plays the reluctant hero, an intrepid yet vulnerable high-school English teacher turned Ranger who leads his squad of GIs away from the horror of Omaha Beach only to be presented with a seemingly impossible mission: rescue Priv. James Ryan, a paratrooper lost behind enemy lines, so he may return home as his family's sole surviving son.

The squad under Miller's command contains stereotypical characters present in virtually every cinematic military unit. Unflappable Sergeant Horvath (Tom Sizemore) carries cans of sand collected from the hostile beaches on which he has landed. The translator, Corporal Upham (Jeremy Davies), is skilled in language but not in combat, having joined the unit only after its other translators were killed. Jewish Private Mellish (Adam Goldberg) sobs after being given a Hitler Youth knife on D-Day. Italian American Caparzo (Vin Diesel) cannot help but save a little girl, even if it means disregarding his captain's orders and losing his own life. The sensitive medic, Wade (Giovanni Ribisi), struggles to help men find peace on Omaha Beach, only to be killed when the squad storms a German bunker. Jackson (Barry Pepper) is the skilled sniper who calls upon the Lord while killing the enemy. The cynical Brooklynite Reiben (Edward Burns) repeatedly raises the question that is at the core of the film—specifically, why should a squad of perfectly good men be risked to save only one?

After a lengthy search, Miller's squad finally finds Private Ryan (Matt Damon), fighting with a group of mis-dropped paratroopers defending a bridge over the Merderet River in the fictional town of Ramelle that the Germans

Tom Hanks as Capt. John Miller in a scene from Saving Private Ryan. *(© CORBIS SYGMA)*

must take to successfully repel the Allied invasion. When Ryan refuses to leave his post, Miller, remaining true to his orders, has no choice but to remain and add the guns of his squad to those already holding the bridge. Making a dramatic last stand against overwhelming odds, Ryan, Reiben, and Upham survive the battle, but Captain Miller and the others die before U.S. reinforcements arrive.

In the closing scenes of the film, a mortally wounded Miller pulls Ryan close, whispering "Earn this" in his ear. With this exchange, coupled with scenes from the film showing the aged veteran Ryan with his family at the American cemetery overlooking Omaha Beach, *Saving Private Ryan* departs from the combat genre film, making an immediate connection between World War II and contemporary society. Turning to his wife, Ryan asks her if he has led a good life. While Ryan may be asking for redemption, the argument can also be made that Spielberg, the son of a World War II veteran, is urging successive generations not to squander the sacrifices made by the veterans of World War II.

A commentary on human decency in the midst of warfare and destruction, *Saving Private Ryan* was critically acclaimed by World War II veterans and their descendants. The film generated considerable interest in the war at a time when the number of its veterans was steadily declining. As a product of their film collaboration, Spielberg and Tom Hanks joined D-Day historian Stephen Ambrose as founding supporters of the National D-Day Museum in New Orleans, which opened in 2000. In addition to spawning interest in other film projects, *Saving Private Ryan* helped attract national attention to the creation of the National World War II Memorial in Washington, D.C., a monument that provided a lasting tribute to the World War II generation.

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Related Entries

Film and War; Memory and War; World War II

—*Robert P. Wettemann, Jr.*

Schuyler, George

(1895–1977)
Journalist

George S. Schuyler is touted as the most prolific African American journalist of the 20th century. Born in Providence, Rhode Island, and reared in Syracuse, New York, as a youth he was fascinated by the early presence of blacks in the military. Schuyler perused the pages of Civil War veteran Joseph T. Wilson's illustrated book *The Black Phalanx* (1890), which chronicled the persistence and gallantry of blacks as far back as the American Revolution. Black protest and affirmation of manhood had been the order of the day long before Schuyler put pen to paper in an effort to trouble the waters of inequity in America's armed forces during World War II.

By 1912, the small African American population of Syracuse felt the weight of discrimination. Jobs outside of the service sector were rarely available. For the ambitious Schuyler, Syracuse, with its exclusionary hiring practices, held no promise of a better life. Enlistment in the Army was an obvious choice. The Army offered travel and, above all, respectability.

Schuyler served two terms in the armed forces. It was during his second tour of duty in Honolulu, Hawaii, that he would begin to hone his writing skills by contributing to *The Service*, a civilian magazine whose core audience was enlisted soldiers. After U.S. entry into World War I, the Army implemented its first Negro Officer's Training Camp in Des Moines, Iowa. Schuyler was one of 80 non-commissioned officers of the segregated 25th Regiment appointed to help train the new recruits. Already a corporal, Schuyler was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant.

While on leave and awaiting his next assignment, Lieutenant Schuyler was taunted into tarnishing an otherwise exemplary career. He approached a foreign-born white bootblack in Philadelphia's train station and requested a shoe shine. The indignant bootblack responded that he refused to shine a "nigger's" boot, and Schuyler exploded. In a fit of emotional indignation, he deserted the armed forces, refusing to serve a country that tolerated such gross racial injustices. He surrendered before being declared AWOL. Schuyler's discharge and subsequent sentence upon court-martial was five years imprisonment, later reduced to one year by Pres. Woodrow Wilson. An exemplary prisoner, Schuyler would serve only nine months. Outside of his wife, Josephine, and a close personal friend, knowledge of his desertion was never made public until it was discovered years after his death.

In 1922, A. Philip Randolph, organizer of the black labor union the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and publisher of *Messenger*, offered Schuyler his first professional employment in the field of journalism. Schuyler became managing editor of *Messenger*, which folded in 1928. A friend once observed that, unlike Randolph, Schuyler was a socialist more by association than inclination; even though he joined the party in 1921, he never seriously embraced the party or its politics. As Schuyler explained, it was the opportunity for intelligent discourse with his peers that drew him to the Socialist Party.

As early as 1927, Schuyler's writings captured the attention and respect of the renowned "dean of American letters," H. L. Mencken. Of Schuyler, Mencken would comment, "I am more and more convinced that he is the most competent editorial writer in this great free Republic" (Schuyler, 234). Mencken often solicited essays from the satirist Schuyler for inclusion in his publication *The American Mercury*. Schuyler's prowess drew the attention of other publishers within the white press. *New York Evening Post* publisher George Palmer Putnam hired Schuyler as an investigative reporter. Considering the segregationist practices of the times, Schuyler was an anomaly among black journalists.

By the 1930s, Schuyler was recognized as a full-fledged member of a black intellectual group of writers, professionals, and activists who regularly voiced their opinions in the black press about domestic and foreign affairs that merited the attention of their readership. Most expressed strong antiwar sentiments regarding America's attitude towards involvement in a second world war. Schuyler was a member of the isolationist America First Committee, and his pamphlet *Why We Are Against the War* was widely distributed by the Negroes Against the War Committee.

Blacks were increasingly being denied their civil rights within the United States, yet they were fighting in Europe to secure the rights of others to democracy on their shores. Despite their valiant performance in World War I, they had returned home to hostility and humiliation at the hands of intolerant whites, again faced with exclusionary practices in employment, education, and housing; nothing had changed. The hypocrisy of democracy on the mainland for blacks was an open wound, still festering, not yet healed. Even so, by the 1940s, antiwar sentiments expressed in most black periodicals would give way to expressions of support for America's involvement in a second world war. In response to ongoing discrimination against blacks and in support of the war, the *Pittsburgh Courier* initiated the "double V" campaign, advocating victory (democracy) for blacks at home, as well as for Europeans abroad. The "double V" campaign was heralded by the black press throughout the country. Civilians were soon penning "double V" victory songs, while black women sported "double V" hairdos. Still, the federal government would launch an investigation of the black press, faulting it for encouraging low morale among black civilians and soldiers. The "double V" campaign was one of the targets.

Schuyler's most radical journalistic essays were carried in the pages of the *Pittsburgh Courier* and *The Crisis*, the journal of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Schuyler's association with the

Courier would span four decades. In a relationship that began in 1925, he would write the unsigned editorials for the *Courier*, his own column titled "Views and Reviews," and launch his "novellas" *Black Internationale* and *Black Empire* (under a pseudonym) as a recurring series during the 1930s. In 1944, he was appointed city editor of the New York edition of the *Pittsburgh Courier*. In 1964, the *Courier* demoted Schuyler from editorial writer to columnist due to its displeasure with his extreme right-wing commentary, which did not express the views of the paper.

It was through the vehicle of the black press that Schuyler expressed his isolationist sentiments regarding African American participation in World War II. In that war, not only were U.S. soldiers' barracks segregated, but so was their very blood through the efforts of the American Red Cross. Insults of this nature provided fertile fodder for attack and were editorialized by Schuyler and others through the pages of the black press. He also railed against U.S. internment of more than 100,000 blameless Japanese Americans from 1942 to 1945.

In his satirical and iconoclastic writings in both the *Courier* and *The Crisis*, Schuyler argued that America needed to secure democracy for all people at home first, before attempting to accomplish it for others in Europe. Ever the skeptic, and a staunch anti-communist, he warned the black public that they were again in danger of being duped by the government—as they had been during World War I—into believing that America would honor democracy at home and push for inclusion of African Americans in all facets of American life. For Schuyler, the fascist tactics of the Axis were no less cruel than those carried out at home on blacks by a color-phobic America. Schuyler argued that America had drastically failed the black soldier during and after World War I.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Du Bois, W. E. B.; World War I; World War II

—Patricia Pugh Mitchell

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman

(1934–)
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command

Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf concluded a long U.S. Army career as commander-in-chief of U.S. Central Command during the 1990 to 1991 Persian Gulf War. With the swift allied victory over the armies of the Republic of Iraq in Operation Desert Storm, Schwarzkopf became a celebrity, virtually overnight.

Schwarzkopf was born in Trenton, New Jersey, in 1934. His father was a West Point graduate and World War I veteran who returned to active duty in World War II. After the war, young Norman and the rest of the family joined Brigadier General Schwarzkopf in Iran and subsequently followed him to duty stations in Geneva, Berlin, and Rome. Despite developing somewhat of a "continental" self-image during his overseas adolescence, Schwarzkopf was intent on following his father in pursuing a career in the U.S. military.

In 1956, Schwarzkopf graduated from West Point, ranked 42nd out of 485 graduates, and was commissioned a

2nd lieutenant of infantry in the U.S. Army. During the early years of his career, his activities included attending numerous military schools, earning a master's degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Southern California, and serving two tours teaching mechanics at West Point. He also served two tours in Vietnam, the first as an adviser with a Vietnamese airborne division; the second was as a staff officer at U.S. Army Vietnam headquarters, and subsequently commanding a battalion in the Americal Division. He was wounded twice in Vietnam and received numerous decorations for valor.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Schwarzkopf's assignments included attending the Army War College, serving as military assistant to the assistant secretary of the Army for financial management, and commanding at the brigade, division, and corps levels. In 1983, Schwarzkopf commanded Army forces in Operation Urgent Fury, the U.S. invasion of Grenada in which notoriously disjointed American forces overwhelmed the small Grenadan and Cuban forces garrisoning the island.

In November of 1988 Schwarzkopf was promoted to four-star rank and became head of the U.S. Central Command, the unified command focused on the Middle East region. The end of the Iran–Iraq War that year left the region somewhat less chaotic for a short interlude. With Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, however, Schwarzkopf would find himself the center of U.S. and world attention.

During the course of operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (the defensive operations/military buildup in Saudi Arabia, and the offensive to retake Kuwait, respectively), Schwarzkopf was elevated from obscurity to one of the most widely recognized American military officers of the post–World War II era. Along with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Colin Powell, Schwarzkopf became the public face of the American military amid the media frenzy that developed during the buildup to war in the Persian Gulf.

In 1991, Schwarzkopf was hailed as a brilliant strategist for directing the now-famous "left hook" operational movement that outflanked the Iraqi forces through the open desert. In some later analyses, however, he drew increasing criticism. In particular, retired marine Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor and New York Times correspondent Michael Gordon

argued that Schwarzkopf became fixated on his plans and failed to perceive early-on that the Iraqi forces were much more brittle than had been expected; in consequence, the intended diversionary frontal assault that was supposed to "fix" the Iraqi forces in Kuwait for envelopment by the "left hook" instead sent them into pell-mell flight and allowed them to escape across the Iraqi frontier ahead of the VII Corps knockout punch. This, coupled with Schwarzkopf's acquiescence in General Powell's pressure for a quick end to the war, allowed the bulk of the Iraqi Army to survive the war. This in turn aided Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in suppressing postwar rebellions and reconsolidating his control of Iraq—consequences that tarnished the Desert Storm victory, as Iraq remained a threat to American interests in the region in the years that followed. Despite this, Schwarzkopf's reputation remained largely unsullied by his postwar critics.

For his role in commanding the victorious coalition forces, Schwarzkopf returned to the United States to a hero's welcome. After his retirement in late 1991, he became a much sought-after and very well compensated public speaker, author of a best-selling autobiography, and director of several major corporations. He also developed a personal friendship with Pres. George H. W. Bush. In 2000, Schwarzkopf gave a speech via satellite to the Republican National Convention, joined other retired military officers in endorsing George W. Bush's candidacy for the presidency, and made numerous campaign stops with the candidate and Powell. During the post-election recount chaos in Florida, Schwarzkopf—a Florida resident in retirement—played a well-publicized role in the Bush team's effort to push the issue of the potential undercounting of presumably Republican-heavy overseas military ballots. It was thus notable when, in January of 2003, Schwarzkopf expressed to a journalist his concern that the Bush administration was being overly hasty in its moves toward a second war with Iraq.

Schwarzkopf's reputation as a great general rests on the swift, decisive, and, from the U.S. perspective, very low-casualty victory in the Persian Gulf War. Those positive attributes of the Gulf War were in part the product of a distinctly limited and very clearly defined set of war aims—the United States would liberate Kuwait and destroy the Iraqi Army, but had no intention of conquering Iraq itself in 1991.

Although this cautious approach came in for criticism during the 1990s as Iraq remained a major security concern for the United States, the wisdom of the 1991 approach was often cited after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was followed by a lengthy anti-coalition insurgency.

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Related Entries

Civil–Military Relations; Iraq War; Persian Gulf War

—*Erik Riker-Coleman*

Scott, Winfield

(1786–1866)
General-in-Chief of the U.S. Army

Winfield Scott is regarded by many as the most accomplished soldier of the 19th century. His long and productive career influenced a generation of U.S. military officers. A capable military administrator, Scott's prowess on and off the battlefield shaped an American military policy that planted the seeds of military professionalism in the officer corps and transformed the U.S. Army into an effective fighting force.

Born near Petersburg, Virginia, in 1786, Scott dropped out of the College of William and Mary, studied law, and eventually joined the military. He enlisted in a voluntary cavalry unit before receiving a commission as a captain of light artillery in 1808. Accusing his superior of being a traitor on a level equal with Aaron Burr, Scott was court-martialed in 1810 and suspended from active duty for one year.

Scott's subsequent baptism by fire in the War of 1812 convinced him of the link between military discipline and battlefield effectiveness. In 1812 Lieutenant Colonel Scott commanded elements of the 2nd Artillery in an attempt to cross the Niagara River and invade Canada. At the Battle of Queenston Heights, Scott and other American regulars surrendered and were captured by the British. Exchanged in March 1813, Scott helped plan the attack on Fort George before participating in the failed Montreal offensive. In that campaign, he observed that those untrained militias led by elected officers were no match for veteran soldiers commanded by officers schooled in the art of war. When he was promoted to brigadier general in March 1814, Scott had the opportunity to put these lessons into practice. He was ordered to Buffalo, New York, where he initiated a training program to reform his tattered brigade. Earning the sobriquet "Old Fuss and Feathers" for his fastidious attention to detail and military decorum, he drilled his men for as many as 10 hours a day, six days a week. At the end of four months, Scott's troops were a highly disciplined force well-suited to the rigors of military duty.

On July 5, 1814, Scott demonstrated that rigorous training could produce great results, defeating the British at Chippewa in the first battle of a renewed Niagara offensive. Less than three weeks later, Scott's brigade fought in the climactic battle of the Niagara Peninsula when challenged at Lundy's Lane. The brigade attacked a larger British force instead of waiting for reinforcements, but Scott's men held their ground until relieved. This earned the respect of those within the military establishment and won Scott the acclaim of the American people. He was subsequently promoted to major general, a rank he retained at the end of the war.

In the decade following the War of 1812, Scott made a name for himself in the peacetime Army, participating in the postwar reduction in force, writing the Army's first drill manual (which would be used for nearly 45 years), and drafting the general regulations for the U.S. Army. He also proved adept at settling disputes and maintaining peace. In 1832 he

negotiated treaties to end conflict with the Sauk and Fox tribes, and traveled to Charleston, South Carolina, to thwart nullification. In 1838 he supervised the removal of the Cherokee from Georgia, South Carolina, and Tennessee to Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma), before dealing with British officials to maintain peace along the New England–Canadian border. Repeated demonstrations of honesty and leadership won him both recognition and promotion from American politicians. In July 1841, Scott received command of the entire U.S. Army, a post he would hold for the next 20 years.

He stayed in Washington, D.C., until the time of the outset of the Mexican War, when he received news of Gen. Zachary Taylor's 1846 victories in Northern Mexico. Scott soon concluded that only the capture of Mexico City would bring total victory. A reluctant Pres. James Polk gave Scott command of a field army, privately fearing that Scott's invasion plans would elevate him, like Taylor, to presidential hopeful. Scott's force successfully conducted the first major American amphibious landing in 1847, and captured Veracruz before marching into Central Mexico. In an effort distinguished by the capable performance of recent U.S. Military Academy graduates, Scott led a largely flawless five-month campaign. He skillfully conducted a war of maneuver, captured Mexico City, and then remained as military governor until a peace settlement could be reached. In the treaty of Guadalupe–Hidalgo, ratified in 1848, Mexico abandoned title to territory in Texas north of the Rio Grande and ceded New Mexico and California to the United States, ultimately relinquishing more than 500,000 square miles of territory to its northern neighbor.

When he returned to the United States in 1848, Scott was unable to translate military success in Mexico to political success at home. Unable to win the Whig nomination for president in 1848, he won it in 1852, only to be defeated by New Hampshire Democrat Franklin Pierce.

As general-in-chief, Scott continued making contributions to the nation and its military establishment, improving military drill and discipline, and defusing further Anglo–American tensions in the Puget Sound area in 1859. Scott remained loyal to the Union at the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, and was instrumental in developing the Anaconda Plan. This plan combined a naval blockade of the Atlantic Coast with an offensive down the Mississippi River in order to defeat the Confederacy through economic strangulation. Scott's plan of exhaustion, coupled with a drive towards Richmond, Virginia, became part of the overall Union strategy, one further modified by Pres. Abraham Lincoln when he realized the South's inability to defend against constant, simultaneous advances from multiple directions. Scott retired in 1861 and was succeeded as general-in-chief by George B. McClellan. Scott died and was interred at West Point, New York, in 1866.

Scott's 50-year leadership helped define the U.S. Army as a military force and set it on a path towards professionalism. His contributions place him among the ranks of the nation's most influential military leaders. Aside from George Washington and a few senior American generals who commanded during the latter phases of World War II, no one exerted greater influence on the American military than Scott.

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Related Entries

Lee, Robert E.; Mexican War; Polk, James K.; War of 1812

—*Robert P. Wettemann, Jr.*

Selective Service System

The Selective Service System is the agency responsible for administering the conscription of military personnel in the

United States. It is commonly known as "the draft." Created in 1917 in response to American entry into World War I, the system was revived in 1940 and established as a permanent agency of the U.S. government. From 1940 to 1973 (with the exception of 1947, when Congress permitted draft authority to lapse), the Selective Service System inducted 14,900,987 American men into the armed services. Draft registration was reinstituted in 1980 and continues to the present, even though the likelihood of a return to the draft as of the early 21st century remained low.

World War I

Congress passed the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, in order to raise a massive American army to win the war in Europe. The system was designed to facilitate the rational apportionment of manpower to the multiple tasks required of an industrialized state at war: while the primary goal was to build up the strength of the armed forces, the architects of the American system learned from mistakes of the earlier entrants into the war (both France and Germany found themselves compelled to "draft" men from the front lines back to the fields and factories) and made provisions for the deferment of laborers in agriculture, arms production, shipbuilding, and other industries deemed crucial to the war effort.

Another key feature of the Selective Service System was its localism. While the national Selective Service agency exercised central authority, the system was designed expressly to push decisions on draft classifications and deferments down to some 4,000 local draft boards staffed by volunteers throughout the country. This move was intended to build trust in the system.

The task was a daunting one, but the newly formed Selective Service agency proved up to the job. The magnitude of the system's accomplishment is revealed by the numbers: the total strength of the armed forces in 1916 was 179,376 men; during the 18 months of the war, the military ranks expanded to 3,685,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines. Of these, 2,810,296 were conscripts supplied by the Selective Service System from the more than 24 million men aged 18 to 45 who had registered. While resistance to the draft developed in some communities, Selective Service was overall a major success.

World War II

With the war won, the system was deactivated in 1918. During the interwar years, a variety of alternative conscription measures were considered, notably including a proposal for universal military training. These were ultimately rejected as too controversial; consequently, the draft as instituted in World War II closely resembled its predecessor. In 1940, after the fall of France, growing concern that the United States would be drawn into the wars raging in Europe and Asia led to the reactivation of the system through the Selective Service Act of 1940. Men ages 21 to 35 were required to register; inductions resulted in the expansion of the armed forces from 458,000 in 1940 to 1.8 million in 1941. In a last-ditch effort to maintain American neutrality, Congress restricted draftees to service in the United States and its territories and limited their term of service to one year; the act was extremely unpopular among draftees and was renewed in the summer of 1941 by only a single vote in the Senate.

With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, remaining reservations about American belligerency vanished overnight, and the draft laws were adapted to wartime service. All military personnel were inducted for the duration of the conflict. After President Roosevelt's issuing of Executive Order 9279 in December 1942, voluntary enlistment was suspended for men of draft age—18 to 38, briefly raised to 45—in order to facilitate easier regulation of manpower flows to the three military branches. The order also stipulated that African Americans must be drafted and distributed among the services at a ratio of 10 percent of total manpower flows, roughly equivalent to their percentage of the national population. This measure substantially increased the numbers of blacks in the military, even though racial segregation remained in effect.

From 1940 to 1945, some 36 million men registered with Selective Service, of whom 9,837,610 were inducted into the military. In order to reach that number, standards were progressively relaxed as the U.S. approached the limits of its available manpower: 16.1 million Americans—nearly one-sixth of the U.S. male population, along with 350,000 women—served in uniform during the war. Widespread industrial deferments (crucial to the incredible wartime performance of the U.S.

economy as the "Arsenal of Democracy," but including dubious measures such as the 2 million deferments granted to the tobacco industry as a "crucial war industry") added to the difficulties of raising sufficient military manpower for the global war. Still, the system was once again successful in accomplishing the task at hand.

The Cold War

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, another short-lived movement favoring universal military training (UMT) arose. Far from embracing the expensive UMT proposal, Congress instead allowed Selective Service induction authority to lapse at the end of 1946. As the U.S.–Soviet relationship deteriorated, however, inductions resumed in 1948; 1947 would be the only year between 1940 and 1973 during which no Americans were drafted. With the outbreak of the Korean War, Selective Service inductions rose from 9,781 in 1949 to 219,771 in 1950; from 1951 through 1971, the lowest number of men inducted annually was 82,000. Between 1948 and 1973, Selective Service supplied 4,879,348 men to the armed forces.

During the Cold War, the longtime Selective Service director, Gen. Lewis Hershey, sought to employ the draft as an instrument of social engineering, using student and parental deferments in an effort to encourage a better-educated workforce and stronger families in addition to economically manning the nation's military forces (Griffith, 10). While the Army (which had the largest manpower requirements of the services and was perceived by potential enlistees as the least desirable branch in which to serve) received the great majority of draftees during the Cold War, conscription affected the entire military. Voluntary enlistments in all four service branches were significantly enhanced by an influx of "volunteers" motivated at least in part by a desire to avoid being drafted into the Army. The officer ranks too were swelled by college-educated ROTC graduates with similar motivations.

As the Baby Boom generation reached the age of conscription, however, the Selective Service System faced an unusual challenge: the number of draft-eligible young men was in excess of the military's manpower needs, and thus it strained Selective Service's creativity in supplying enough deferments. This called into question the need for the draft at

all. Beginning in 1963, some members of Congress and other observers began to question the increasingly haphazard assignment of military service. The military was less and less dependent on draftees. In 1954, 58 percent of Army inductees were draftees; in 1961, draftees made up only 22 percent, while 1964 projections suggested that only 11 percent of services' inductees would be draftees in the near future. A major reason for this was the expansion of the eligible population: from 8 million in 1958, it rose to 12 million by 1962. While 88 percent of 26-year-olds who met physical and mental standards had served in the military in 1958, by 1965 that number had dropped to 65 percent. The growing number of men not called to duty undermined the universality of the draft, an important element in maintaining public support.

The Vietnam War temporarily staved off the demographic crisis for Selective Service as the Johnson administration's decision to wage the war without taking the politically dangerous step of calling up the Reserves required dramatically increased draft calls—but doomed the system in the end. While Americans broadly continued to support the draft into 1966, attitudes changed rapidly, particularly among middle-class students. While draftees made up less than 20 percent of armed forces personnel worldwide, the percentage of draftees sent to Vietnam varied from 50 to 80 percent, where they made up a large majority of the frontline combat units that suffered the most casualties. Given the arbitrary and discriminatory practices that had developed in the Selective Service System as a result of the demographic boom, these unpleasant realities fueled youth resentment of the draft.

Transition to the All Volunteer Force

Richard Nixon entered the White House in 1969 having made promises to reform the Selective Service System. In 1969, new deferment classifications were forbidden and a lottery system was instituted that effectively limited the period of draft eligibility to one year, in place of the previous seven-year window of eligibility. In 1971, Congress dictated further changes in the application of the draft. These included eliminating student deferments and mandating that local draft boards more closely reflect the racial and ethnic makeup of the communities they served. In the

meantime, however, the 1969 Gates Commission had recommended to the president that the nation transition to an all volunteer force, preserving Selective Service for the emergency of a general war. Despite reluctance in many quarters, Nixon in 1973 signed legislation implementing the end of the draft. The last 646 draftees were called in January of 1973; in July, induction authority officially expired.

Although the Selective Service machinery fell into disuse after the suspension of registration on March 29, 1975, civilian and military leaders continued to worry into the 1980s that a return to the draft might be necessary. There were widespread fears that the all volunteer force would fail to supply sufficient recruits. Moreover, military leaders and many civilian officials continued to see the draft as an essential connection between the military and society, an expression of a fundamental obligation of citizenship and a symbol of Americans' willingness to meet the nation's Cold War commitments.

In mid-1979, Congress began earnestly debating reinstating draft registration. Although the administration of Pres. Jimmy Carter was reluctant at first, the twin shocks of the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 induced Carter to support a resumption of registration in January 1980. Carter called for the registration of women as well as men; however, Congress refused because of concerns that doing so might presage the breakdown of barriers against women serving in combat. In the end, registration was reinstated with relatively little resistance. As the 1980s wore on, fears that a return to the draft might be imminent faded along with declining Cold War tensions. The all volunteer force proved more than capable of meeting the nation's manpower needs. By the end of the Cold War it supplied an enlisted force of unprecedented high quality.

Selective Service Today

Eighteen-year-old men continue to be required to register with Selective Service and are required to keep Selective Service updated regarding any address changes until their 26th birthdays. Failure to register is a criminal offense punishable by a fine of up to $250,000 and up to five years in jail, though few prosecutions are undertaken. The fact that federal student aid is contingent on proof of registration induces many men to register who might otherwise be reluctant. In 2002, 86 percent of eligible men were registered.

Strains on U.S. military manpower resulting from the Iraq War led to concerns in some quarters about a return to conscription, in part stemming from a populist call during the run-up to the war by a former draftee, Rep. Charles Rangel, a Democrat from New York. Rangel called for a draft in order to spread the burden of military service to the sons and daughters of the American elite. Despite widespread suspicion among young people that a draft is imminent, there is little likelihood of that happening, barring dramatic changes in the global picture. After 30 years of the all volunteer force, the military establishment has little enthusiasm for dealing with conscripts, and the political costs of instituting a draft would be enormous.

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Related Entries

All Volunteer Force; Cold War; Doctor Draft; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Korean War; Iraq War; Vietnam War; World War I; World War II

Related Entries

1965 b

—*Erik Riker-Coleman*

Seminole Wars

See Indian Wars: Seminole Wars.

Service Academy Chapels

American military academies prepare cadets and midshipmen to be career officers in their respective services. However, the academies at West Point, Annapolis, Colorado Springs, Kings Point, and New London, as well as state-affiliated academies, like The Citadel and Virginia Military Institute, are also national landmarks that attract thousands of visitors each year. Perhaps the most distinctive buildings on their grounds are the chapels. To some extent, each chapel physically represents the mission and role of its respective academy. The chapels have also been the focal point for important events in the life of the institution and its students. They have hosted innumerable weddings, baptisms, and funerals for faculty, staff, and alumni. The importance of these deeply personal events speaks volumes to the institutional bond the academies have maintained with their members.

Recurring chapel events, such as holiday concerts, memorial services, and graduation ceremonies, figure prominently into the institutional calendar each year. Many important traditions revolve around the chapels, too. Plebes (freshmen) at the Naval Academy, in Annapolis, do not officially shed their status until they see the chapel dome after their first summer training (youngster) cruise. The Naval Academy also uses its chapel to define the radius of the enforcement of many regulations (e.g., regarding the consumption of alcohol or the wearing of military uniforms), which in effect communicates to midshipmen that the chapel is the heart of Annapolis.

The chapels have also played an important role in professional socialization. Services help to indoctrinate students in the core values and beliefs of the institution. Up until the 1970s, chapel attendance was mandatory. Students marched to chapel each Sunday; the liturgical routine of these services included prayers and hymns with a strong military message. Professional socialization did not occur in the chapels alone, but the spiritual significance of the services did add the weight of God in encouraging cadets and midshipmen to do their duty.

The aesthetic qualities of the chapels are consistent with the schools' overall architectural themes. Any modernization efforts have resulted in an upgrading of the chapels. The two oldest academies, West Point and the Naval Academy, undertook significant expansions near the end of the 19th century. In both cases, these schools built new chapels to service enlarged student bodies. However, the renovations also provided the opportunity to showcase the modern mission of the two schools. The Naval Academy finished construction of its current chapel in 1908. Built in the Beaux Arts style, the chapel was originally designed in the form of a Greek cross, with each arm of equal length, and held more than 1,500 worshippers. In 1905, the chapel became the final resting place of the symbolic founder of the U.S. Navy, John Paul Jones. Numerous professional traditions evolved surrounding the upkeep of Jones's burial site. Marine sentries maintain a constant guard over his crypt, and midshipmen are required to visit it several times during their plebe year. Over the years, important modifications were completed to the existing structure. The chapel's most distinctive feature is its dome, which was originally terra cotta and was replaced with copper in 1929. In the 1930s, another expansion increased seating to more than 2,000 worshippers and transformed its design into more of a Latin cross.

West Point completed construction of its current chapel in 1910. The Gothic style of this facility dominates the school's skyline above the Hudson River. Just like the Naval Academy,

West Point uses its chapel to reinforce standards of military professionalism. The most prominent stained glass window in the main sanctuary is inscribed with the academy's motto of Duty, Honor, and Country. Other windows include inscriptions from various graduating classes. Many list two dates, the donor class and the group that graduated exactly one hundred years before it. The placement of these dates recognizes two important traditions: classmate loyalty and the unbroken chain of graduates—the famous long gray line. The first pews inside the sanctuary contain silver plates that list the names of celebrated generals and superintendents, such as Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland, and Andrew Goodpaster. It is a practice that reflects the institutional emphasis on hierarchy and respect for the chain of command.

For much of their histories, chapel services at the two oldest academies largely followed Episcopalian traditions, which mirrored the religious beliefs of 19th-century American society. The hierarchical nature of the Episcopal Church was also compatible with the military culture of the academies. West Point and Annapolis did little to accommodate the spiritual needs of students with different beliefs until relatively recently. Up until World War II, Catholic midshipmen attended mass outside the Naval Academy. After the war, the large presence of Catholics forced the academy to assign Catholic chaplains on a regular basis. West Point did not finish construction of a Jewish chapel until 1984.

In contrast, the Air Force Academy chapel was designed as more of an interfaith facility from the beginning. Built in 1963, it reflected a growing secularism in society. The religious education of cadets was still a priority, but the Air Force Academy did not emphasize one belief system over another. Just like the other schools, the Air Force Academy has used its chapel to reinforce institutional values. The 17 silver spires symbolize the power of flight reaching towards the heavens. The sleek, steel architecture conveys the modern mission of the newest military service.

In 1972, seven cadets and midshipmen challenged before the Supreme Court the constitutionality of mandatory chapel attendance. Interestingly, academy superintendents defended the tradition from a professional standpoint, not a religious one. They argued that it was a vital component of their students' character development. Cadets and midshipmen were expected to attend to the spiritual welfare of their subordinates once they became officers. The court rejected this rationale and made chapel voluntary. Chapel attendance at all schools dropped after this decision. Even so, the chapels remain academy landmarks and repositories of their most important traditions.

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Related Entries

Air Force Academy; Coast Guard Academy; Military Academy, United States; Naval Academy

Related Documents

1965 b

—*Todd Forney*

Seven Days in May

Novel by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey, 1962
Film directed by John Frankenheimer, 1964

Seven Days in May was a best-selling novel written by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey. It was later adapted

by Rod Serling of *Twilight Zone* fame and made into a film directed by John Frankenheimer. The novel traces the unfolding of a military coup in the United States and remains an important document of the impact of the Cold War upon American society.

Seven Days in May centers upon Marine Corps Col. "Jiggs" Casey, director of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his discovery of a military coup plotted by the staff chairman, World War II hero Gen. James Matoon Scott, to whom Casey reports directly. The chairman and his fellow plotters among the senior military leadership intend to use the pretext of a major military exercise later that week to overthrow the president of the United States. The president is a liberal poised to wind down the Cold War significantly by concluding a sweeping arms control agreement with the Soviet Union—which the conspirators regard as based on a fatally over-optimistic view of Soviet intentions.

As director of the Joint Chiefs, Casey is in a position to see coded "back channel" messages circulating between the chairman and other officers involved in the coup. His suspicions being raised but lacking proof, he takes his concerns to the president. The president takes Casey's warning seriously but avoids precipitous action that might accelerate the coup rather than defuse it. Instead, he puts the colonel and a handful of his close associates to work obtaining hard evidence of the plot and carefully feeling out military commanders outside the plotters' circle. Ultimately the president confronts General Scott with his knowledge of the coup and forces Scott and the three other disloyal members of the Joint Chiefs to resign on the spot. The president then orders the news quickly passed over military channels to make clear to the other plotters that the game is up. Fearing the disastrous precedent that even a failed coup might cast over future civil–military relations in a still-dangerous world, however, the president insists on keeping the entire affair a secret. Authors Knebel and Bailey were Washington journalists by trade. Prior to their foray into Cold War fiction, they had collaborated on award-winning reporting on the 1945 Potsdam Conference and produced a widely praised book on the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. *Seven Days in May* director Frankenheimer was an up-and-coming filmmaker whose previous films included the 1962 Cold War

thriller *The Manchurian Candidate*. When *Seven Days in May* appeared in bookstores in 1962, it sold briskly, topping the *New York Times* best-seller list on November 18—a date, it is worth noting, just weeks after the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The book remained a national bestseller for nearly a year. The film version of *Seven Days in May* was popular as well: it performed well at the box office in 1964 and was nominated for numerous awards, including two Academy Awards.

As Knebel and Bailey admitted in a 1962 *New York Times* interview, part of the explanation for the success of *Seven Days in May* lay in the fact that its plot struck a nerve with Americans at the time of its appearance. The novel and film versions of the story appeared amid a spate of similarly themed and successful works. That same year, 1962, also saw the publication of Harvey Wheeler and Eugene Burdick's best-selling novel *Fail-Safe*, the plot of which centered on an "accidental" nuclear war. Sidney Lumet's film version of *Fail-Safe* appeared in 1964 along with another film with a similar plot, albeit a dramatically different tone: Stanley Kubrick's black comedy *Dr. Strangelove*. Against a background of U.S.–Soviet crises culminating in the October 1962 missile crisis in Cuba, the commercial success of so many darkly inflected works suggests the extent of concern among the American public about the progress of the Cold War and the accompanying unprecedented prominence of a permanently mobilized military in "peacetime" American society and policy.

The actual plot of *Seven Days in May* appeared fanciful to many. Yet it was close enough to uncomfortable realities of the Cold War to resonate powerfully with worried Americans. On the one hand, the conventional wisdom regarding military intervention in civilian politics suggests that the prospect of a military coup d'état in the United States—with its long, unbroken tradition of civilian control of the military and its strong, assertive civil society and media—was effectively non-existent. Within the military, *Seven Days in May* was greeted with scorn: officers dismissed the possibility of a military revolt against the Constitution they were sworn to defend. However, there is a broad spectrum of potential encroachments upon civilian control short of marching upon the White House. And there

were enough incidents of civil–military friction during the years preceding the publication of *Seven Days in May* to arouse concern on the part of civilians discomfited by the unpleasant realities of the Cold War "garrison state."

Seven Days in May appeared a little more than a decade after one of the most notorious breakdowns of military submission to civilian authority in the history of the country— Gen. Douglas MacArthur's open disagreement with the Truman administration's determination to avoid risking further escalation of the Korean War, and MacArthur's subsequent relief from active duty. Several other factors combined to give *Seven Days in May* a chilling degree of verisimilitude in its day: the presence of outspoken hardliners such as Adm. Arthur Radford and Gen. Curtis E. LeMay among the nation's senior military leaders during the ensuing years; the serial crises in Berlin and Cuba in 1961 and 1962, particularly the 1962 missile crisis; and the tensions in the Pentagon resulting from the clash between Defense Sec. Robert McNamara and the military leadership. In fact, it was a disturbing off-the-record conversation with LeMay that inspired Knebel to undertake the writing of *Seven Days in May*. In the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Air Force general told Knebel that he considered Pres. John F. Kennedy a coward for his handling of the crisis. It later emerged that LeMay—longtime commander of the Strategic Air Command and subsequently Air Force chief of staff—had on a number of occasions taken steps to allow himself the authority to order a nuclear attack without consulting civilian leaders. These were measures he justified at one time as a necessary precaution should communications be unreliable in a crisis (Lambert; Blair; Kohn and Harahan, 92–95). It is worth noting, however, that contrary to the 1962 pattern that informed *Seven Days in May*, the senior military leadership was by the latter half of the 1970s broadly supportive of strategic arms control efforts, more so than many civilian leaders during the Reagan administration.

Seven Days in May exaggerated the danger of direct military intervention in civilian politics, but there was an element of truth in its warnings about the civil–military relationship. The Cold War saw the military elevated to a level of influence in American society and government much greater than it had ever before enjoyed in peacetime. (Indeed,

whether the era of the Cold War, quite independent of the "hotter" Korean and Vietnam years within its time span, was really "peacetime" is itself debatable.) This, coupled with the attendant growth of the defense budget and the ever-present threat of nuclear war, left many Americans profoundly uneasy with the power of the "military-industrial complex." Although the Cold War scenario of Seven Days in May no longer has the sort of immediacy it once did, the themes of the book and film remain compelling as concerns over civil–military relations continue to be raised in the early 21st century, years of American military preeminence.

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Related Entries

Civil–Military Relations; Cold War; *Dr. Strangelove*; Film and War; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Literature and War; Militant Liberty

—Erik Riker-Coleman

Sexual Abuse and Harassment

The sexualized taunting and abuse of American women in uniform was widely publicized during the last decades of the 20th century. The infamous Tailhook convention in 1991 was the most explosive incident in a series of military scandals that revealed sexual harassment—sometimes culminating in sexual assault—as a common feature of military life. But sexual abuse and harassment began long before Tailhook made headlines. War creates opportunities for sexual violence, and the weapons and physical strength that ensure success in battle increase the likelihood that some soldiers will overpower nonconsenting sexual partners. Military tradition has also at times encouraged soldiers to take sexual liberties with civilian women in return for the sacrifices that military service requires. In order to address the problem of military sexual assault and harassment, U.S. commanders have crafted policies and laws intended to control the sexual aggression of servicemembers. When women became a sizable presence in the ranks of the armed forces in the 1970s and 1980s, stopping sexual abuse and harassment became an issue of workplace equality as well as a means of preserving military effectiveness and protecting women from sexual violence.

Rape and War

Rape has an enduring association with war. Long dreaded as a consequence of failure and celebrated as a right of victory, rape remained an acknowledged part of warfare in the 20th century. Two of the most notorious modern incidents of wartime rape took place during World War II: the rape of more than 100,000 German women by Allied troops in Berlin (a conservative estimate; some claim nearly two million German women were raped by the Red Army troops of the Soviet Union alone), and the mass rape of thousands of Chinese women by Japanese soldiers in the "Rape of Nanking" in 1937. The Serbs' genocidal mass rape in the Bosnia–Herzegovina war (1992–95) focused attention on rape as an international war crime. Many of the worst cases of soldiers raping during war have involved sexual violence across lines of race and ethnicity.

American troops have not escaped the modern soldier's propensity to rape. From the Civil War to the wars in Iraq in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, advancing and occupying U.S. servicemen have participated in individual and group sexual assaults. The military justice system prosecuted some of these incidents, but many went unpunished because of commanders' reluctance to spend scarce resources gathering evidence to try crimes committed in the heat of battle.

While soldiers undoubtedly rape more often and with greater impunity during war, rape has also been a problem for the U.S. military during times of relative peace, especially in the vast draft-generated military of the Cold War years. Incidents of military rape, some also involving other types of sexual harassment, were widely reported by the news media after the late 1970s. Front-page stories of sexual assaults reported a series of rapes at Fort Meade, Maryland, in 1979; the rape of a 12-year-old girl in Okinawa in 1995; the rape of trainees by drill sergeants at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, in 1996; and sexual assaults by male cadets against female cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado in 2003. These incidents had political repercussions and often prompted policy revisions. For example, after the rape in Okinawa in 1995 by U.S. marines, outrage in the local community almost forced U.S. marines to leave the island; after the *Denver Post*'s reports of rapes at the Air Force Academy in 2003, the Office of the General Counsel of the Air Force convened a group to investigate better ways to deter and respond to sexual assaults.

U.S. military and civilian leaders repeatedly expressed regret and frustration over the rapes committed by servicemen, but they were reluctant to accept the feminist argument that military culture fosters sexual violence among men. For example, one much-noticed study suggested that the military could reduce its rape rate by altering its culture of masculinity, promoting more women to positions of authority, and encouraging a more enlightened view of sexual relations (Morris, 1999). The military countered by asserting its intent to investigate and prosecute offenders, and it pointed out that the rates of sexual violence against women were as high in U.S. civil society as in the military.

A particularly contentious arena of military policy has been the tradition of military prostitution. American servicemen are

customers in the sex industry that surrounds many posts and bases, particularly overseas, where military-sponsored studies have also revealed a high rate of sexual harassment of servicewomen. In World War I France and in Cold War–era Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines, military installations and "rest and relaxation" destinations became havens for prostitution throughout the 20th century.

Sexual Harassment of Servicewomen

The term "sexual harassment" was coined in the 1970s to describe certain types of illegal sex discrimination in the workplace. Since then, courts, legislatures, and other governing bodies have sought to improve women's health, safety, and economic opportunity by defining, identifying, and eliminating sexual harassment. In general, sexual harassment is workplace behavior related to a person's sex that either affects the terms of that person's employment (known as quid pro quo sexual harassment) or creates a hostile work environment. Examples include the sexual assault of employees by employers or coworkers, unwanted sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, and the distribution of pornographic images and language. Like instances of sexual assault during war, many of the worst incidents of sexual harassment have been triggered by racist, ethnocentric, and sexist assumptions about sexual availability and female promiscuity. The civil law of sexual harassment evolved through the 1980s and 1990s under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Virtually all major U.S. employers, including government agencies, adopted policies to address the problem.

The history of sexual harassment in the military reflects the distinctiveness of military service as an American workplace. It also reveals the barriers that women have overcome in order to serve in uniform. As early as 1910, Navy nurses had to protect their reputations against accusations of promiscuity. During World War I, Army nurses in France reported being propositioned by patients in hospital wards. During World War II, many of the more than 350,000 women who served in the military found their off-duty liberty restricted by policies intended to protect their safety and reputation. After World War II, the number of women in the service remained relatively low until the mid-1970s.

As the number of women in the military began to increase, driven by the need for personnel after the end of the draft and by political pressure for equal opportunity, sexual harassment became an increasingly serious problem.

Many aspects of military life make managing sexual harassment especially difficult for servicewomen and commanding officers alike. Because the military is characterized by a high degree of deference to authority, servicewomen were, and are, less likely than civilian women to challenge superiors by reporting sexual harassment, which complicates efforts to document the full extent of the problem. The military policy of discrimination against lesbians, which made women who refused the unwanted advances of men vulnerable to charges of homosexuality, also kept some women from reporting their abusers. A servicewoman's rejection of a sexual advance was sometimes ignored because of the myth that all military women were promiscuous. Because unauthorized absence was a military crime, servicewomen could not easily seek other employment if they encountered an uncomfortable or threatening situation.

In the face of these systemic challenges, military and civilian leaders took a hard line against sexual harassment. The first Army court-martial conviction for sexual harassment arose out of a Fort Meade scandal that broke in 1979 involving rapes and other abuse. Subsequent military studies tried to gauge the scale of harassment, and each one confirmed the significance of the problem. In 1988, for example, 73 percent of female respondents to a Navy survey reported experiencing sexual harassment during their service. During the 1980s, each branch of service established a policy prohibiting sexual harassment. These policies collectively became known as "zero tolerance," indicating that the military would not accept any sexual harassment as part of a military workplace.

The Tailhook Association convention in September 1991 was perhaps one of the most embarrassing incidents of sexual harassment the Navy encountered. Male Navy pilots surrounded unsuspecting female guests—including 14 officers—at the convention, and passed them down a gauntlet. The men grabbed at their bodies and attempted to strip off their clothes, taunting them all the way down the line. After the incident, the services instituted more training to educate

servicemembers about sex-integrated workplaces and the harmful consequences of sexual harassment. Nonetheless, sexual harassment remained pervasive. A 1995 Department of Defense survey found that more than 70 percent of active-duty servicewomen had experienced sexual harassment during the preceding 12 months. After the rapes by drill sergeants at Aberdeen in 1996, an Army hotline fielded thousands of calls, and further allegations of sexual abuse and coercion surfaced among female trainees at Fort Leonard Wood and the U.S. post in Darmstadt, Germany. The Navy found rampant sexual harassment between 1996 and 1998 at its Great Lakes Naval Station basic training unit. In 1998, the highest ranking enlisted soldier in the Army was court-martialed for sexual harassment. Sgt. Maj. of the Army Eugene McKinney had been appointed to a blue-ribbon commission on sexual harassment. After his appointment, several women came forward, alleging that McKinney had sexually harassed them. The first servicewoman to accuse McKinney was then herself accused of being a lesbian; soon after, McKinney, an African American, argued that he was a victim of racial bias. McKinney was acquitted of all criminal charges except one, obstruction of justice, thus ending his military career in ignominy but denying his accusers vindication. For the Army, the entire affair was a public relations disaster.

Silent Victims: Servicemen

While the public victims of military sexual harassment have been female, servicemen have also been victims of rape and sexual harassment. Since the Vietnam War, the military changed its training to prepare servicemembers—male and female—for the sexual torture and rape they might face as prisoners of war. Not all sexual assaults have taken place at the hands of enemy forces, however. Courts-martial have prosecuted servicemen for forcible sexual assault of fellow troops. The reporting of male rape and other forms of sexual assault has been hindered by the military's anti-homosexual policies; a serviceman who revealed even a nonconsensual sexual encounter with another serviceman risked being accused of homosexuality himself. The ban on service by homosexuals also placed servicemen who were considered gay at risk of harassment and assault. In 1992, P. O. Allen R.

Schindler was bludgeoned to death in Japan by fellow shipmates; in 1999, Priv. 1st Class Barry Winchell was murdered in his sleep by fellow soldiers at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Both crimes were motivated by the victims' suspected homosexuality. While such extreme acts of violence were rare in the U.S. military by the early 21st century, harassment based on perceived sexual orientation—including taunts, threats, and physical intimidation—was not.

Impact on Military Missions

Military recruiting, retention, morale, and effectiveness have been harmed by sexual abuse and harassment in the U.S. armed forces. Future commanders and political leaders will use education, regulation, and criminal prosecution to counter the military traditions of masculine authority and sexual prerogative that have made military sexual harassment such an intransigent problem. In 2004, graphic images of prisoner abuse came out of Abu Ghraib, an Iraqi prison then under the control of the American forces who ousted Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The sexualized degradation and taunting documented by some of the most appalling photographs suggest that sexual harassment will be a national security concern of the future as well as a personnel problem of the past.

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Related Entries

Air Force Academy; Camp Followers; Gays and Lesbians in the Military; Tailhook Convention; Women in the Military

—Elizabeth Lutes Hillman

Shaw, Robert Gould

(1837–63)
Union Army Colonel

Robert Gould Shaw was the most famous of several Boston Brahmin abolitionist Union officers who fought in the Civil War. His wealthy and cultivated parents, Francis and Sarah Shaw, both participated actively in antebellum reform movements devoted to female education, temperance, and the abolition of slavery. Shaw's parents even participated in the famous Brook Farm commune experiment fictionalized in Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The Blithedale Romance* (1852). Shaw counted among his friends such New England establishment figures as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Hawthorne, Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. and Jr., William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Sen. Charles Sumner,

Gov. John Andrew, the Lowell family, and the family of William and Henry James.

Shaw's parents had five children, but Robert was the only son. He thus received special, sometimes unwanted attention. Educated at elite American and European boarding schools, Shaw became a cosmopolitan gentleman. He spoke five languages, played the piano and violin, and traveled extensively overseas.

Before the Civil War, Shaw demonstrated little ambition and seemed to be casting about for a purpose in life. He entered Harvard University but dropped out in 1859 in his third academic year, bored with scholarship. He tried working in the family trading business but, despite doing well, he became bored with that as well. Shaw even dreamed of seeking adventure in the West.

The Civil War gave Shaw a purpose. He enlisted in the elite 7th New York "Silk Stocking" Regiment for three months as a private in 1861 but saw no action. Then Shaw enlisted as an officer in the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry. The bored pre-war playboy discovered he was a more than competent soldier while fighting in the Shenandoah Valley, at Cedar Mountain, and at Antietam. Shaw served as both a general's aide and a company commander.

Shaw was not a loner; he was close to several other Boston Brahmin Harvard students who achieved Civil War fame and who came to symbolize the commitment of a certain class of Bostonians to the war for the Union, and more particularly, the war against slavery. These friends included John Quincy Adams and Charles Francis Adams, Jr., who were the sons of Ambassador Charles Francis Adams and brothers of Henry and Brooks Adams; Charles Russell, Jr. and James Russell Lowell II, both nephews of the poet and editor, James Russell Lowell; Garth Wilkinson and Robertson James, brothers of William and Henry James; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the future Supreme Court Justice; and Shaw's Harvard tutor, Francis Channing Barlow. Barlow, who married Shaw's sister Ellen, became a superb infantry division general. Charles Russell Lowell, Jr. married Shaw's sister Josephine and served as a cavalry brigade commander admired by Gen. Philip Sheridan and writer Herman Melville. Henry Lee Higginson served as a fine cavalry officer. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was wounded twice while serving as an infantry officer. Holmes

later wrote of himself and these Civil War veterans that "our hearts were touched with fire."

After first scoffing at the notion, in September 1862 Shaw publicly advocated arming black men as soldiers to help win the war. His wartime encounters with runaway slaves compelled him to see black people as fellow humans deserving full dignity and citizenship. But when his father visited him in Virginia with Gov. John A. Andrew's February 1863 written offer to command the 54th Massachusetts, Shaw hesitated. The reasons for this may be suggested from William James' memorial oration for Shaw: "In this new negro-soldier venture, loneliness was certain, ridicule inevitable, failure possible, and Shaw was only twenty-five; and although he had stood among the bullets of Cedar Mountain and Antietam, he had till then been walking socially on the sunny side of life" (Shaw, 25).

Shaw first rejected Governor Andrew's offer to command the 54th, fearing he was too inexperienced for regimental command. He finally accepted command of the regiment at the urging of the 2nd Massachusetts' commander. Shaw journeyed to the 54th's camp at Readville, Massachusetts, to train the regiment. Fortunately, Charles Russell Lowell's 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry was also bivouacked at Readville, providing Shaw with emotional support from his friend, and his sister Josie. Shaw did not at first understand his African American troops; he kept personally aloof from them for that reason and to maintain discipline.

Soldiering in South Carolina and Georgia brought Shaw and his regiment closer. The colonel, his officers, and his soldiers bitterly resented the regiment's orders to help burn the town of Darien, Georgia, on June 10, 1864. Shaw protested the atrocity to Governor Andrew, thus leading indirectly to President Lincoln's relief of Department of the South commander, Maj. Gen. David Hunter. Shaw also campaigned for the 54th to take part in the Union attack on Charleston's Fort Wagner. The young colonel got his wish to prove his black regiment's skill and valor, and died on Fort Wagner's parapet at the head of his troops. Before the attack he told Edward Hallowell how desperately he hoped for his wife Annie's company again. But he composed himself, handed his last letters to a newspaper correspondent for safekeeping, and formed the 54th into line to do his and the regiment's duty.

Fort Wagner's Confederate commander Gen. Johnson Hagood thought he was humiliating Shaw by ordering his body thrown into a mass grave with his black troops, reportedly exclaiming, "He is buried with his niggers" (Burchard, 143). Hagood's act and words served only to apotheosize Shaw and his men in the eyes of the North and of succeeding generations. Confederate Lt. Iredell Jones at Fort Wagner observed more accurately, "The Negroes fought gallantly, and were headed by as brave a colonel as ever lived" (Burchard, 143). Jones' sentiments were echoed by a roll call of artists who crafted commemorations to Shaw and the 54th over the next century—many of them already intimately connected to Shaw's family: poets Ralph Waldo Emerson, James Russell Lowell, Paul Laurence Dunbar (whose father served with the 55th Massachusetts), and Robert Lowell, grandnephew of James Russell; philosopher William James (brother of the 54th's adjutant); educator Booker T. Washington; musical composer Charles Ives; sculptor Augustus Saint-Gaudens; and movie director Edward Zwick. The land for Harvard's Soldiers' Field was donated by Henry Lee Higginson in 1890 in memory of his friends Shaw, Charles Russell Lowell, and their Harvard friends who died in the Civil War. As William James observed to his brother Henry with envy, "poor little Robert Shaw [was] erected into a great symbol of deeper things than he ever realized himself" (Shaw, vii).

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African Americans in the Military; Civil War; 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry; Fort Pillow Massacre; Grant, Ulysses S.; Lincoln, Abraham

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1863 b, c; 1865 c

—*Christopher M. Gray*

Sheridan, Philip H.

(1831–88)
Civil War General

Philip Sheridan became one of Ulysses S. Grant's top lieutenants by the end of the Civil War and personified perhaps more than any other general the remorseless determination necessary to achieve victory.

Sheridan graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1853 and served on the frontier until the outbreak of the Civil War. His early Civil War assignments were important but unglamorous postings in the quartermaster and commissary departments. In May 1862, however,

Sheridan received the combat assignment he had long coveted, as colonel of a cavalry regiment. Autumn brought promotion to brigadier general and transfer to Kentucky, to command an infantry. Sheridan's division was present at the battle of Perryville, but strict orders from his corps commander, who did not understand the situation on the battlefield, prevented it from engaging in major combat.

The division fought intensely at the battle of Stone's River, winning badly needed time for Union forces to regroup. His promotion to major general was dated from the first day of Stone's River, as recognition of his service there. At the battle of Chickamauga, Sheridan's division fought fiercely but briefly in a vain attempt to stem the massive Confederate breakthrough. Sheridan rallied his division and was leading it back to the battlefield when he received orders to retreat.

On November 24, 1863, Sheridan's division was one of four that broke through the Confederate defenses. Grant, who was in command on the battlefield, was impressed. Several months later when Grant moved to Virginia as commanding general of all Union armies, he took Sheridan with him to command the Army of the Potomac's hitherto indifferently led cavalry corps.

When the spring offensive began in May 1864, Sheridan stumbled in his duties as cavalry commander, impeding the army's progress and contributing to the failure to achieve decisive results in the battle of the Wilderness. For this reason and because of the personalities of both men, Sheridan clashed bitterly with Army of the Potomac commander (Grant's subordinate), Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.

Grant directed Meade to dispatch Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry on a raid to the outskirts of Richmond. Sheridan's troops defeated Jeb Stuart's Confederate horsemen at Yellow Tavern not far from Richmond, mortally wounding Stuart himself. After the fight, Sheridan led his cavalry to join the Union Army of the James, east of Richmond, for a period of rest and refitting before returning to the Army of the Potomac. In early June, Grant dispatched Sheridan and his men on a raid to the west of Richmond, where the Union horsemen clashed with their Confederate counterparts at the indecisive two-day battle of Trevilian Station. Although Sheridan failed to cut the Confederate

supply lines to Richmond, he did help to distract the attention of the Rebel cavalry away from Grant's simultaneous move to the south bank of the James River.

In July, Gen. Robert E. Lee made use of the Shenandoah Valley to send a Confederate raiding force under Jubal Early all the way to the outskirts of Washington. Though Early soon had to retreat from the vicinity of the capital, he remained in the lower Shenandoah Valley, a thorn in the side of Union efforts in Virginia. On August 6, Grant assigned Sheridan to command the newly formed Army of the Shenandoah. On September 19, 1864, Sheridan's 40,000 men defeated Early's 12,000 at Winchester, Virginia. Sheridan caught up with the fleeing Early two days later at Fisher's Hill and thrashed him again. Confident that Early's army posed no further threat, Sheridan turned his attention to carrying out Grant's order to render the Shenandoah Valley no longer useful to the Confederacy. On October 6, his army marched back down the valley. For more than seventy miles, Sheridan's men killed or confiscated livestock, and burned barns, mills, and granaries.

Early, reinforced to 18,000 men, launched a surprise attack at Cedar Creek on October 19, driving the Union troops back in disorder. Sheridan, who had been attending a high command conference in Washington, was on his way back when he heard the sounds of firing. He rode from Winchester to Middletown, calling on stragglers to rally and return to the fight. Arriving on the battlefield, Sheridan regrouped his army and at 4 P.M. launched an attack of his own. Early's army collapsed under the onslaught.

Sheridan was back with Grant in the spring of 1865 for the final offensive against Lee. On April 1, he commanded a task force that seized a key crossroads at Five Forks, west of Petersburg, but he was dissatisfied with the performance of his subordinate, V Corps Comm. Gouverneur K. Warren. Using authority Grant had given him, Sheridan summarily sacked Warren. Though probably not warranted by Warren's performance on that day, the action was more than justified by that general's dismal record of non-cooperation over the preceding months. Thereafter Sheridan played a key role in cornering the Confederates at Appomattox Court House.

After the war Sheridan commanded U.S. troops sent to the Mexican border to threaten Emperor Maximilian and persuade Napoleon III to withdraw his troops from Mexico. Sheridan also briefly administered Reconstruction in Texas and Louisiana, where he favored a stern treatment of former Rebels. His strict rule was nevertheless insufficient to prevent a July 30, 1866, riot perpetrated by the New Orleans police against blacks in the city, which killed 34 of them. Sheridan's willingness to be firm with recalcitrant white southerners earned him the displeasure of Pres. Andrew Johnson, who favored a more conciliatory approach.

Thereafter Sheridan commanded troops contending with American Indians on the Great Plains. Recognizing the superior mobility of the Plains Indians, Sheridan finally prevailed over them by a policy of relentless pressure, such as the 1868 winter campaign that produced George A. Custer's victory at the Washita River, in what is today Oklahoma. As in his operations against the Rebels, Sheridan was hard and remorseless. One witness attributed to him the statement, "The only good Indian is a dead Indian," though Sheridan denied having used that expression. He directed most of the operations on the Great Plains from his headquarters in Chicago, where in October 1871 he acted energetically to help stop the infamous Chicago fire and provide relief for the citizens of the damaged city. From 1884 until his death in 1888, he was commanding general of the U.S. Army.

Although neither as skillful nor as aggressive as Grant, Sheridan was one of Grant's most important subordinates during the final year of the war. He provided the relentless, hard-hitting leadership necessary to bring the conflict to a successful close.

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Chief Joseph; Civil War; Crazy Horse; Custer, George Armstrong; Grant, Ulysses S.; Indian Wars: Western Wars

—Steven E. Woodworth

Sherman, William Tecumseh

(1820–91)

Civil War General

William Tecumseh Sherman was one of the generals most closely identified with the Union victory during the Civil War. After the conflict he became commanding general of the U.S. Army, during which time he presided over the destruction of the Plains Indians tribes and the resurgence in military professionalism in the 1870s and 1880s. But he is best known as an advocate of total war and for the epigram, "War is hell," a dictum that lies at the core of the "realist" tradition in American strategic thought.

Born in Lancaster, Ohio, on February 8, 1820, Sherman was nine years old when his father died, at which time he became the foster son of Thomas Ewing, a powerful state politician. Ewing used his connections to secure Sherman's appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Sherman graduated in 1840, sixth in his class, and became a 2nd lieutenant of infantry. He saw limited combat during the final years of the Second Seminole War and none during the Mexican War, although he was involved in the American occupation of California.

In 1853 Sherman left the Army and became a businessman in California. He had little success, however, and by 1857 sought to regain an appointment as an officer. Although no berths were available, friends secured him a position as superintendent of the Louisiana Military Seminary. During the secession crisis he resigned and went back north, where he soon became a colonel in the Union army. It was as a colonel that he led a brigade at the battle of First Manassas (July 21, 1861).

Portrait of Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman in 1865 wearing a black armband in honor of slain president Abraham Lincoln. (Source © Bettmann/CORBIS)

Following the battle, Sherman was promoted to brigadier general and sent to Kentucky to serve as second-in-command of the Union forces gathering in that state. While in temporary charge, he became convinced that the Confederate troops on his front were numerically superior to his own and suffered what was rumored to be a nervous collapse. After a few months' convalescence in Lancaster, he joined the forces under Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, then gathering near Shiloh Meeting House, Tennessee, for an offensive against Corinth, Mississippi.

On April 6, 1862, a Confederate force under Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston surprised Grant's men at Shiloh and drove them back with heavy losses. Sherman, although as surprised as anyone, led his group with tenacity and earned Grant's respect and confidence. In the second day of fighting, Union forces regained their positions, but the surprise and the horrendous casualties placed Grant under a hail of criticism. He briefly considered resigning, but Sherman

talked him out of it. Thereafter the two began one of the most important strategic partnerships of the war. Sherman served as one of Grant's corps commanders during the Vicksburg Campaign (December 1862–July 1863) and again during the Chattanooga Campaign (November 1863). When Grant went east to take command of all Union forces, Sherman remained in the west in charge of the Military Division of the Mississippi, a vast geographical expanse encompassing most of the territory between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River.

Grant's plan for the 1864 campaign called for a simultaneous offensive by all Union field forces. His instructions to Sherman called upon him to "break up" the Confederate Army of Tennessee while inflicting as much damage as possible on enemy war resources. Sherman complied by advancing the combined armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio against the critical industrial center of Atlanta, Georgia, one hundred miles southeast of Chattanooga, Tennessee. After a grueling five-month campaign, Sherman managed to capture Atlanta on September 2, 1864. It proved impossible to hold the city and continue offensive operations, however. Freed from the need to interpose itself between Sherman's forces and Atlanta, the Confederates were able continually to threaten the single railroad that connected Atlanta—and Sherman's forces—to the North. Realizing that Atlanta could never serve as a base for further operations, Sherman decided to create a new base at Savannah, Georgia, where easy access to Union Navy-controlled waters would make resupply assured and unassailable. To do this would require marching 60,000 men about 220 miles, all while living off the countryside.

The Civil War had seen raids before, but never on such a scale. When Grant hesitated to authorize the operation, Sherman responded that the operation was not only feasible, but it would also level a devastating psychological blow to the Confederate civilian population. The march would show the Confederate government's inability to protect its citizens. "I can make the march," he vowed, "and make Georgia howl!"

Sherman left Atlanta on November 16, 1864. Before leaving the city his troops destroyed everything in the city of military value. They continued the destruction as they marched across the state, wrecking railroads and burning factories, cotton gins, and other buildings important to the Confederate war effort. By December 21, against weak opposition, Sherman captured the port of Savannah on the Atlantic coast. After resupplying his army, Sherman began a march through the Carolinas on February 1. This second march, which Sherman considered more ambitious and difficult than the first, was intended to link up with Grant's army. Before he could do so, however, Grant ended the deadlock at Petersburg, Virginia, and forced Gen. Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army to surrender on April 9, 1865.

Sherman's adversary, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, then began surrender negotiations. In an ill-advised move, Sherman reached a preliminary agreement involving not only the surrender of Johnston's forces but a general peace settlement between the Union government and the former Confederate states. Sherman later defended his initiative by claiming that he was merely carrying out the wishes of Pres. Abraham Lincoln, who had just been assassinated but whose policy Sherman thought he understood from a brief meeting with Lincoln and Grant just before the Carolinas campaign. Whatever his motives, Sherman far exceeded his authority. Pres. Andrew Johnson and Sec. of War Edwin Stanton angrily instructed him to deal only with a strictly military capitulation and sent Grant to convey these instructions in person. Johnston surrendered to Sherman on April 26. The rebuke from Washington, however, left Sherman so angry that when a month later he encountered Stanton at the grand review of the victorious Union Army, he refused to shake Stanton's hand.

Sherman emerged from the war as a Union hero second only to Grant, and his memoirs, published in 1875, found an avid audience. In 1869, when Grant became president, Sherman became commanding general of the U.S. Army, a post he held until 1883. During that time he oversaw the final campaigns against the Plains Indians and the closing years of military Reconstruction. Deeply conservative, he was skeptical and at times sharply critical of nearly all aspects of the Republican Party's views and programs, particularly its efforts on behalf of former slaves. He believed that if the Johnson administration had only endorsed his lenient peace terms in 1865, most of the violence that characterized Reconstruction could have been avoided.

Sherman's most important contribution as commanding general was the support he gave to a new wave of military professionalization. In 1875 he sent Lt. Col. Emory Upton and two junior officers on a round-the-world fact-finding tour of other armies. He was sympathetic to Upton's subsequent call—made largely in vain—for the United States to rely more thoroughly on its regular Army as opposed to volunteer forces. In 1881 Sherman authorized the creation of a School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas—the forerunner of the modern Command and General Staff College. His rationale for this move was not as forward-thinking as the act itself suggests. An aide recalled that one of his major hopes for the School of Application was that it would improve officers' penmanship, and he confided to Gen. Philip H. Sheridan that the school would give officers a respite from their miserable frontier posts.

In the decades following the Civil War, no fewer than five Union generals became presidents of the United States. The Republican Party several times importuned Sherman to run for that office but he always refused, most famously in 1884 when he rebuffed the offer, saying categorically, "I will not accept if nominated and will not serve if elected." It became one of the most famous (and misquoted) statements in American political history. Even so, it did not come close to Sherman's most famous utterance, "War is hell," which was in fact a distillation of a sentence in a speech he gave in 1880 to a crowd assembled for a Grand Army of the Republic encampment in Columbus, Ohio. "There is many a boy here to-day who looks on war as all glory," Sherman said, "but, boys, it is all hell." He died in Saint Louis, Missouri, on February 14, 1891.

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Civil War; Grand Army of the Republic; Grant, Ulysses S.; Indian Wars: Western Wars; Military Academy, United States; Sheridan, Philip H.

Related Documents

1864 b

—*Mark Grimsley*

Smallpox and War

For centuries, smallpox, or *variola major*, ravaged Asia, Africa, and Europe. However, successive epidemics left people from those places with a degree of immunity to the disease. As a result of colonization and the slave trade, Europeans and Africans brought the disease to North America. There, when epidemics struck, mortality rates for people of European or African descent often ranged between 15 to 25 percent. When an epidemic struck Native Americans who had never been exposed to the disease before, it could kill well over 50 percent of the population. Smallpox particularly thrived in the conditions of war. Overcrowded camps and the movement of troops over large areas allowed smallpox to be rapidly transmitted. Consequently, smallpox was often a devastating companion to, and occasionally an instrument of, war.

In the 21st century, smallpox exists only in laboratories. As a result of a campaign by the World Health Organization to eradicate smallpox, there have been no naturally occurring cases of the disease since 1977.

The disease's symptoms begin with a headache, backache, nausea, and fever. A few days later, the disease's distinctive pustules appear all over the body and, most distressingly, on the face. Pustules on the inside of the mouth and throat make it impossible to drink or eat. People afflicted with smallpox can transmit the disease through the air by droplets in a cough, by touch through the open pustules or through the particles of scabs that fall off after forming over the pustules.

By the first decades of the 18th century, colonial Americans had learned two means of acquiring immunity. One was through exposure to the disease. Even a mild case of smallpox gave a person lifetime immunity. The other means was through inoculation. Knowledge of this practice reached the West in the early 18th century from Asia and West Africa, regions of the world where smallpox was endemic. In North America, the Puritan minister Cotton Mather heard about the procedure in 1716 from Onesimus, his African slave, and publicized it. Inoculation involved taking matter from a smallpox pustule and placing it into a healthy individual by puncturing the skin. This produced a mild case of the disease and thus provided future immunity. Although inoculation reduced the death rate dramatically and was increasingly used, it still posed some risks. In 1796, the British doctor Edward Jenner discovered that a dose of the less harmful cowpox offered people immunity to smallpox, thus making inoculation simpler and safer.

Smallpox often found a home among armies. Tired and poorly nourished soldiers living in close quarters in an overcrowded camp provided easy transmission of the disease. Smallpox just added to the general misery of the soldiers already suffering from diseases such as dysentery and typhus. During the Seven Years' War, colonial, French, and British soldiers, as well as the Native American allies of both sides, suffered from smallpox in addition to the usual plagues of camp life.

The first known incident of an attempt to use smallpox as a weapon of war in North America was in 1763. Pontiac, the leader of the Ottawa nation, was resisting the presence of British authority in western Pennsylvania. Local traders, with the consent of the British generals Jeffrey Amherst and Thomas Gage, sent hospital blankets used by smallpox victims to the Native Americans. Although there is no evidence that this early attempt at biological warfare was successful, British letters and account books of the period make it clear that the intent was to spread the disease deliberately to a population they knew to be particularly vulnerable.

The scale of previous outbreaks of smallpox was small compared to the great epidemic that swept the continent during the American Revolution. During this war, campaigns often covered hundreds of miles, and British and American troops transported the disease as they fought. Additionally, during the Revolution, the Americans feared the British would try to use smallpox as a weapon again. When the Americans were besieging the British in Quebec and in Boston in the early months of the war, smallpox broke out in both towns, and victims of the disease were sent away from the towns toward the American lines. There are no British records indicating a deliberate intent to spread the disease, but the Americans suspected the British of doing so. Whether it was introduced naturally or deliberately, smallpox killed many hundreds of American troops.

In addition to the movements of soldiers and refugees, new lines of long-distance trade between European colonizers and Native Americans also facilitated the spread of this particular epidemic. Native Americans and traders from British Canada, the United States, and the Spanish Empire carried smallpox along with their trade goods. Historian Elizabeth Fenn has estimated that this continent-wide epidemic resulted in the death of at least 130,000 people in North America.

The American Revolution was the last war during which Americans died in large numbers from smallpox. George Washington, who initially thought inoculation too risky, was finally convinced of its efficacy. In 1777, he began a campaign to inoculate his army, which was completed by 1778. Smallpox continued to dog the army, but soldiers never again suffered to the extent that they had in the early months of the war or at any time during the 18th century.

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Medicine and War; Pontiac; Revolutionary War; Washington, George

—*Caroline Cox*

Society of the Cincinnati

Founded as a hereditary society for Continental Army officers and their descendants, with a vision of preserving hard-won wartime camaraderie, the Society of the Cincinnati is now the oldest and most prestigious hereditary society in the United States. In its early years, the Society of the Cincinnati became the center of American debates about the role of the military in the new nation, the possibility of an aristocratic caste developing around officer status, and the dangers of mimicking European decorations and honors for men who were citizens, not subjects. The society's participation in westward expansion and education—indeed its very survival—were made possible by institutional changes that reflected America's increasingly confident image as a nation of opportunity and one in which the civil–military relationship was a source of strength rather than social conflict.

After the Revolutionary War ended, Congress kept the Continental Army on active service, although the men were bored and restless as they surrounded British-occupied New York City. Many officers feared that Congress would fail to pay their back salary, and agitated by addresses anonymously circulated during the winter of 1782 to 1783 (most probably by Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates and his subordinate Maj. John Armstrong), some discussed a coup against Congress. In 1783 George Washington defused the angry soldiers with a moving speech that won their loyalty and patience. Much of Washington's staff, however, feared continuing plots and

even the disintegration of the Army if steps were not taken to cement their bonds and lobby Congress in a respectable and organized way for their back pay.

Henry Knox, who had discussed a patriotic and fraternal order of soldiers as early as 1776, drafted the organization and membership requirements of the Society of the Cincinnati. The Institutes, as the papers were called, (the founders of the society gave their documents a formal title for publication) were proposed at Frederick von Steuben's headquarters in Fishkill, New York, on May 13, 1783. They laid the foundations for a society of Army officers, to be continued by primogeniture through their male descendents, and also outlined the ideals of well-funded charitable support for war widows and orphans. Additionally, the Institutes included provisions for technical education to ensure a pool of potential officers trained in engineering and the sciences. In a nod to George Washington, who agreed to become the president of the organization, the group chose the name Society of the Cincinnati after the 5th century BC Roman general Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, who, after a distinguished military career, returned to his farm rather than receive glory and rewards for his triumphs. This classical allusion was repeated in the society's motto, *Omnia relinquit servare rempublicam* (He gives up everything to serve his country).

Officers joined the society by pledging a month's pay at their separation rank to the general fund, and quickly organized annual meetings for state societies. The national organization planned to meet every three years and to maintain contact among the state societies thorough Committees of Correspondence. Membership in the society was expanded to include foreign officers, including the Polish Thaddeus Kosciuszko, the German baron Frederick William von Steuben, the French naval and Army officer Marquis de Lafayette, and admirals Francois de Grasse and Jean-Baptiste-Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau. Maj. Pierre L'Enfant was commissioned to design a badge, which was produced in Paris. Washington received a special diamond-studded version as a personal gift from the French naval officers, but refused to accept the gift as a private citizen. He instead insisted it belong to the president of the society as a badge of office.

Criticism of and hostility toward the society was fierce and immediate. Critics charged that it existed to found a hereditary aristocracy, perhaps even a permanent and privileged officer caste similar to that of Prussia. Political conspiracy theories, one of which was written by Noah Webster, posited that the society had been formed to force Congress to make an advantageous settlement to officers who were owed arrears in pay. Elbridge Gerry and Samuel Adams feared the influence of foreign members of the society, while Thomas Jefferson and John Adams objected to the society as repugnant to Republican principles. The kings of Poland, Prussia, and Saxony objected as well, forbidding their subjects to join or wear the badges, while French King Louis XVI grudgingly allowed the formation of a French society on July 4, 1784. In America, pamphlets by Aedanus Burke and Webster sparked debates in state legislatures, leading to widespread condemnation of the society and prejudice against its members.

In the face of this reaction, George Washington urged the society to change its Institutes, allowing for the admission of honorary members who had not been officers in the Revolution, placing the society's formidable funds at the disposal of state legislatures as investment capital, and advising the chapters to seek charters from their individual states. The society followed all of Washington's recommendations, yet it also asserted its legitimacy in print: comparing itself to the Masonic Order, the society asked whether soldiers were expected to give up their rights to associate and join fraternal orders.

Although the society eschewed official political affiliation, many members lobbied for a reform of the Articles of Confederation and were disproportionately represented in the Constitutional Convention, as drafters of the Constitution, and among those who promoted its ratification. Society members tended to be Federalists and used their group connections to promote projects that included national improvements and expansion initiatives, such as the Ohio Company. Arthur St. Clair, a member of the society and a major investor in the Ohio Company, named the city of Cincinnati after the organization. Although two members, Luke and Elijah Day, participated in the economic uprising known as Shays's Rebellion (1786–87), the majority stood against the rebels and took part in suppressing the action, winning the group public approbation. The society also carried out its obligation to disperse charity funds to eligible widows and children, and endowed an academic chair at Washington and Lee University.

However, by the time sons and nephews began replacing original members in the 1810s, many state societies were moribund; some disbanded by the 1830s. The French Revolution put an end to the French branch. The society insisted that only the 13 original states could have chapters, limiting the participation of western settlers. A deliberate re-cultivation of the society in the 1850s led to the "Rule of 1854," a chance for membership for descendents of eligible men who had not joined in 1783, for whatever reason. This temporarily resurrected society activities, before the Civil War shattered the organization again. Only in the 1880s, when more inclusive groups, such as the Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution and the Grand Army of the Republic, had been founded to commemorate the centennial of the Revolution, did the society become popular again under the leadership of Hamilton Fish. This rise in popularity resulted partially from the society's inclusion of the descendents of officers killed in action, American naval officers, and its provisions to accept collateral male descendents in the absence of a direct heir. In 1894, the Daughters of the Cincinnati formed to allow the participation of female descendents.

In the 20th century, the society re-admitted their French colleagues, who opened their branch once again in 1925 after close contact with American officers in World War I. The society proved a useful diplomatic tool during the visit of Winston Churchill, who was initially offered an honorary membership during a World War II visit to the United States, but was then found to be eligible for full status through the ancestor of his American mother, Jennie Jerome. In 1937, Larz and Isabel Anderson willed their Renaissance Revival house on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, D.C., to the society as a headquarters. This building now houses a large and valuable archive of revolutionary records and library of books relating to the colonial and early national period. It continues to serve as the national headquarters of the society.

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—Margaret Sankey

Spaatz, Carl

(1891–1974)
U.S. Air Force General

A longtime advocate of air power, Carl Andrew Spaatz supervised the American strategic bombing campaigns during World War II. When the U.S. Air Force became an independent service branch in 1947, he served as its first chief of staff.

Born in Boyertown, Pennsylvania, on July 28, 1891, Spaatz attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he got the nickname "Tooey." Spaatz was an average student, indifferent to military discipline but always neat in appearance. He graduated in 1914.

Spaatz decided that he wanted to become a pilot when he saw aviation pioneer Glenn Curtiss fly past the Academy in 1910. His first assignment after being commissioned, however, was to an infantry regiment. A year later, he transferred to the Army Air Service and attended flight school in San Diego. Upon earning his wings he was posted to the squadron supporting the 1916 Punitive Expedition sent to Mexico in response to raids in American territory by Mexican guerrillas. When the United States entered World War I in 1917, Spaatz was given command of the flight school at Issoudon, France. During his 11-month tenure, he improved the school's appalling safety record and restructured its curriculum to emulate European programs. In the last month of the war, he was assigned to a fighter squadron and claimed three air-to-air victories.

After the war, Spaatz commanded a series of fighter and bomber units and airbases. In the course of his duties, he came into regular contact with Gen. William Mitchell, the Army's most outspoken advocate of air power. At Mitchell's court-martial for insubordination in 1925, Spaatz served as a defense witness. Having recently attended the Air Corps Tactical School, where Mitchell's theories were being discussed and refined, Spaatz argued eloquently that the Air Service should be independent of the Army, as Mitchell had long maintained. Although Mitchell was ultimately found guilty, Spaatz became a press favorite, helping to bring issues of air power, strategic bombardment, and Air Service autonomy to public attention.

Spaatz also promoted air power through demonstration flights. In 1929 he set an endurance record. His Fokker trimotor, called the Question Mark, remained aloft for 151 straight hours (over six days), landing only when the engine malfunctioned. Fuel, oil, water, food, and messages were transferred manually from another aircraft. More than just a publicity stunt, the flight was an early step in the development of inflight refueling, which has been an integral part of American military air operations since the 1950s.

Spaatz attended the Command and General Staff School in 1935. Because he opposed the established Army doctrine that subordinated aircraft to ground forces, the

instructors nearly failed him and recommended that he never be given a staff assignment. However, his superiors in the Air Corps, sharing his opinions of air power, ignored the suggestion. Spaatz held several staff positions in the next five years.

Spaatz received his first star in 1940, after conducting an observation tour in England during the battle of Britain. Once the United States had entered World War II, he was assigned to a series of command positions of ever increasing responsibility in the European and Mediterranean theaters, culminating in his assignment as commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe in 1944. Committed to daylight precision bombing, he helped persuade the British to coordinate their nocturnal bombing campaign with American daytime raids. He also gave his fighter pilots permission to hunt down enemy interceptors rather than remain close to the bombers and wait for them to be attacked. His most trying duty as commander was prioritizing targets. Assessments of the relative values of various target systems changed frequently, and his superiors occasionally imposed their own target lists on him.

In March 1945 he took command of the Strategic Air Force in the Pacific, where he supervised the bombing of Japan, although his subordinate, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, is more closely identified with the campaign. When informed about the existence of the atomic bomb, he insisted that any orders he received regarding its use be delivered in writing. Spaatz believed that such a powerful weapon should not be authorized verbally. He also argued that Japan could be defeated by maintaining the conventional bombing campaign and the air and sea blockades already underway. In the end, however, Spaatz had little power to decide whether, when, where, or how the atomic bombs were to be used.

In 1946 Spaatz succeeded Gen. Henry Harley Arnold as chief of staff of the Army Air Forces (AAF), formerly the Army Air Corps. His first task was to manage the drastic post-war demobilization of the AAF, which he reorganized into three major units: Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Air Defense Command. The next year, despite significant opposition, particularly from the Navy, the AAF became the independent U.S. Air Force, with

Spaatz as its first chief of staff. In 1948, he helped negotiate the Key West Agreement, by which the Army, Navy, and Air Force identified their respective roles and missions, and the types of aircraft each were allowed. He retired with the rank of four-star general in July 1948.

Spaatz remained active throughout his retirement. He chaired the Civil Air Patrol from 1948 until 1959 and often testified before Congress about defense issues. Although he never produced any memoirs, he wrote numerous magazine articles and was a columnist and military affairs editor for *Newsweek*. In the 1950s, he helped select Colorado Springs, Colorado, as the site of the Air Force Academy, where upon his death he was buried on July 14, 1974.

Spaatz was an effective leader who spent his entire professional life promoting military air power. The strategic bombing campaigns he conducted during World War II contributed significantly to the Allied victories over Germany and Japan. By successfully demonstrating the value of strategic air power, Spaatz made an independent U.S. Air Force possible.

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—*Roger Horky*

Spanish–American War

(1898–1902)

In 1898 the United States went to war against Spain to liberate the Spanish colony of Cuba. To the rousing cadence of Sousa marches, a massive outpouring of patriotism and enthusiasm greeted the decision for war. Incredibly easy naval victories kept spirits high. The Spanish capitulation after barely three and a half months reassured the American people of the rightness of their cause. However, no one was prepared to deal with the responsibilities the conflict left in its wake. Managing disgruntled colonial populations and grappling with continuing instability in the Caribbean plagued policy makers and military planners long after the guns fell silent and the bands stopped playing.

Responding to the Crisis

The conflict began in 1895 when New York–based Cuban exiles decided to revive their stalled rebellion against Spanish rule. José Martí led an armed expedition back to the island. Although he was killed almost immediately, the spirit that he and his fellow fighters ignited swept the eastern end of the island. Spain responded by sending thousands of fresh soldiers and a new governor-general, Valeriano Weyler. He instituted a *reconcentrado* policy: collecting rural residents in towns or camps where Spanish troops could "protect" them and, more to the point, prevent them from aiding the rebels. Disease, starvation, and death plagued the artificially concentrated population. The rebel support group, or junta, that remained in New York gener-

ated an avalanche of news reports describing an oppressed people seeking to overthrow an autocratic regime. The junta frequently drew comparisons to the American peoples' democratic revolutionary struggles in the 1770s.

Bitter rivals William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer owned competing New York newspapers, the *Herald* and the *World*. To promote circulation, the newspapers published sensational stories about the Cuban "patriots" struggling against colonial oppression personified by "Butcher" Weyler. In addition to relying on junta press releases, both newspapers sent reporters to the embattled island seeking more sensational stories. These spread to newspapers nationwide, and American public opinion became increasingly sympathetic to the rebel cause.

When Republican William McKinley became president in March 1897, pro-rebel emotionalism pervaded the country. At one extreme were "jingoes" who insisted that the United States had a moral duty to go to war to aid the rebels. More moderate Republican businessmen favored neither side but desired a quick end to a conflict that disrupted their trade, the New York Stock Exchange, and America's recovery from an economic depression that had begun in 1893. McKinley was no jingo, so he urged Spain to cancel its repressive policies and negotiate a settlement. This approach annoyed the Spanish minister to the United States, Enrique Dupuy de Lome, who wrote a Cuban friend criticizing McKinley as "weak" and a "bidder for the admiration of the crowd." A rebel sympathizer stole the letter from the Havana post office and sent it to Hearst. On February 9, 1898, the "de Lome Letter" dominated the *Journal*'s front page, adding fuel to the anti-Spanish firestorm.

Six days later, the U.S.S. *Maine* blew up and sank in Havana Harbor, killing 266 U.S. Navy men. The *Maine* had been dispatched to Cuba ostensibly to protect and perhaps evacuate endangered American citizens. In fact, Havana was so peaceful that U.S. authorities rationalized the mission as a resumption of the Navy's routine practice of calling at foreign ports to stimulate trade. Many Americans shared Assistant Sec. of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt's view that the destruction of the *Maine* was "an act of dirty Spanish treachery." A full-dress naval court of inquiry, however, failed to determine who or what had caused the explosion. A scientific analysis in the 1970s concluded that spontaneous

Spanish–American War (1898–1902)	
Total U.S. Servicemembers (Worldwide):	**306,760**
U.S. Population (millions):	**74.6**
Battle Deaths:	**385**
Other Deaths in Service (Non-Theater):	**2,061**
Non-mortal Woundings:	**1,662**
Cost (in $ current billions):	**.40**

Source: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.html>

A cartoon typical during the Spanish–American War. The caption reads "Peace in Cuba under Spanish rule is worse than hell." (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

combustion in poorly maintained coal bunkers had spread fire to adjacent powder magazines.

After the *Maine*, even conservative business leaders concluded that American intervention was essential. McKinley requested a war declaration from Congress on April 11, 1898, after the Spanish government failed to fully implement his final armistice proposal. Both houses approved a joint resolution ten days later. While the rebels had eagerly sought American emotional and even material support, they were not pleased with this development, fearing the United States would end up replacing Spain as Cuba's colonial overlord. They could find some reassurance in the language Colorado Sen. Henry M. Teller added to the war declaration. The Teller Amendment explicitly disclaimed any American intention to exercise sovereignty over the island.

Fighting the War

The United States was scarcely prepared to fight; the regular Army contained barely 25,000 soldiers. Its younger officers had never participated in large-scale troop maneuvers; many generals were superannuated Civil War veterans. Following time-honored tradition, McKinley called for volunteers. The popular response was so large that only a fraction of those who did volunteer actually served, and a much smaller number saw overseas action. On paper, the Navy appeared far more prepared for war. Dozens of modern, steam-powered steel vessels had joined the fleet since 1881, but these ships had barely even been tested. And, like their Army counterparts, Navy officers had never participated in large-scale maneuvers.

Even so, the first stunning American success was a lopsided naval victory halfway around the world just ten days after Congress approved its war resolution. Roosevelt had ordered Commodore George Dewey to keep his four-ship Far Eastern squadron "full of coal" and prepared for combat. When the war began, Dewey steamed from Hong Kong to Manila Bay in the Spanish colony of the Philippines. His attack on May 1 left the decrepit Spanish ships anchored in the bay either sunk or abandoned. One American died of heart failure below decks and seven other Americans were slightly wounded. News of this victory electrified the American people, although few had a clear idea of where Manila or even the Philippine Islands were located.

Subsequent reports that Adm. Pascual Cervera had left Cadiz, Spain, with a large fleet created a momentary panic in east coast cities until the U.S. Navy discovered that he had slipped undetected into southeastern Cuba's Santiago Bay. An American fleet quickly blockaded the harbor. The logical strategy would have been to maintain the blockade, cutting the increasingly demoralized Spanish forces off from all hope of reinforcement or resupply. That, however, would have denied thousands of eager volunteer soldiers any part in this wildly popular war.

One such volunteer was Theodore Roosevelt, who resigned from the Navy Department and joined the Rough Riders, an enthusiastic volunteer regiment that included

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cowboys and Harvard students. Col. Leonard Wood and Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt had the right political connections to get their regiment transferred to Tampa Bay to prepare for an amphibious assault on Cuba. For weeks, the Rough Riders and dozens of other units languished in unsanitary camps, rife with dysentery and other diseases. The Navy finally assembled a ragtag fleet of converted merchantmen, monitors, and other inappropriate vessels to ferry the soldiers to Cuba. Although 600 Marines assaulted and captured Guantanamo Bay, intending to use it as a safe anchorage, most of the troops waded ashore at nearby Daquiri Beach. The Americans finally met rebel soldiers there and insisted upon pursuing their own objectives without much consultation with the Cubans. As U.S. units stumbled toward Santiago, they encountered stiff Spanish opposition at the small towns of El Canay and Las Guasimas. Roosevelt's unhorsed cavalry and two regiments of black regular soldiers charged up Kettle Hill in support of other units assaulting San Juan Hill, the center of a ring of fortified elevations east of Santiago. By nightfall on July 1, Americans controlled the hills and trained their weapons on the vulnerable city below.

Two days later Admiral Cervera received orders to vacate the harbor. As his ships steamed along the southwest coast, they presented easy targets for gunners on the blockading American fleet. In short order, the entire Spanish fleet was sunk or forced ashore. While the U.S. Navy suffered no loss of life in this engagement, the capabilities of the American land forces was quickly deteriorating. The skirmishing on the way to Santiago had killed more than 200 soldiers, and the rest were tired, hungry, and running short of supplies; a large percentage of them were extremely ill. Gen. Rufus Shafter dared not risk his feeble force in another attack, so he hammered out a cease-fire with the city's Spanish authorities that took effect on July 17. Determined to grab some glory for himself, the top general in the U.S. Army, Nelson A. Miles, led troops fresh from Florida on a sweep of Puerto Rico.

McKinley had meanwhile ordered 15,000 volunteer and regular Army troops to the Philippines. Along the way, some detoured to Guam and effortlessly seized control of that Spanish colony. Like their compatriots in Cuba, the American troops who went ashore south of Manila encountered a rebel force eager to overthrow Spanish control. Facing overwhelming American and Filipino force, the Spaniards cooperated in a carefully staged American takeover of Manila itself. The only major problem was that the rebels failed to follow the choreography, in part because it left them outside the capital city. A cease-fire ended the fighting on August 13.

Negotiating the Peace

Three days earlier, the government in Madrid had agreed to halt all its defensive activities and asked France to mediate. McKinley sent his secretary of state, three senators, and a Republican newspaper editor to negotiate a treaty in Paris. No one disputed the fact that Spain had irretrievably lost control of Cuba, Guam, and Puerto Rico. The Spanish had acceded to a quick cease-fire in August, hoping to stifle American interest in the Philippines, but Dewey's stunning victory remained the emotional highlight of the conflict. McKinley conducted an exhaustive canvass to assess public opinion regarding possible annexation. Meanwhile the business community developed a growing interest in using both Guam and the Philippines as way stations to exploit potential markets in China. Perhaps as important to the president was his conclusion that the United States had a God-given duty to spread the benefits of its democratic system and American-style Christian religion to the Filipinos.

Signed December 10, 1898, the Treaty of Paris transferred colonial control of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines from Spain to the United States. In line with the Teller Amendment, Cuba was liberated from Spanish authority but its future status was left ambiguous. The United States also agreed to pay $20 million to Spain for ceding the Philippines. The U.S. Senate voted 57 to 27 to ratify the treaty on February 6, 1899. A couple of days earlier, however, Filipino rebels assaulted American positions, setting off a bloody two-year conflict that killed more than ten times as many American soldiers than the 385 who had perished in combat during the Spanish–American War.

This lingering problem did little to dampen the American people's enthusiasm for what Sec. of State John Hay called a "splendid little war." Despite being a very small war, the conflict had broad ranging consequences. It transformed the United States into a significant colonial power,

earned it respect as one of the world's great powers, gave it enormous responsibilities in coping with its possessions and protectorates in Latin America and the Far East, and prompted a national debate, played out in the Senate, over whether to annex the Philippines.

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McKinley, William; Media and War; Philippine War; Roosevelt, Theodore

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—John Dobson

Spellman, Francis Joseph

(1889–1967)
Archbishop of New York, Military Vicariate

Francis Joseph Spellman served as the Roman Catholic archbishop of New York and archbishop of the American military, a post known as the military vicariate, from 1939 to 1967. He played an outsized role in American diplomatic and military affairs due to his close friendships with Pope Pius XII, several American presidents, and many generals and admirals.

Born the son of a prosperous, small-town grocer, Spellman was educated at Fordham College in New York and North American College seminary in Rome, and was ordained as a priest in 1916. Spellman befriended his powerful seminary professors, who doubled as Vatican Curia officials. While Spellman outwardly conformed to the Curia's wishes, inwardly he was an American nationalist, who resented what he perceived as European condescension toward Americans. The future cardinal decided early to favor his country over his church whenever obligations to the two powers conflicted.

Unaware of his American politics, Spellman's Curial friends sped him up the ecclesiastical ladder. He was appointed both chancellor and auxiliary bishop for the Boston Archdiocese in 1922 and 1932, respectively. More importantly, from 1925 to 1932, he was the first American cleric to serve the Curia. There he befriended Vatican Secretary of State, Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli, the future Pius XII. Pacelli, who usually regarded Americans as naïve children, respected Spellman as his American counterpart. Both hated communism, especially as incarnated in the Soviet Union. Spellman lived up to Pacelli's high expectations; he excelled at Vatican secret diplomacy while Mussolini, Stalin, and Hitler extended their grasp over Europe. In 1931 he even smuggled Pope Piux XI's anti-Fascist encyclical out of Rome to Paris for publication, despite being shot at by Mussolini's police.

Spellman's 1932 return to Boston increased his power. Cardinal Pacelli made his favorite American the Vatican's go-between to newly elected Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt; this, indeed, made Spellman the Vatican's primary representative in the United States. President Roosevelt consulted Spellman on many matters concerning American Catholic voters and the Vatican hierarchy. Ironically, the politically conservative Spellman detested Roosevelt's policies on the Soviet Union, the economy, labor, race, and education. Yet this odd couple plotted together on the president's reelection strategies; the personal politics of Spellman's fellow prelates; and American foreign policy positions toward Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union. When Pacelli became pope in 1939, he elevated Spellman to the dominant American see: the archbishopric of New York. This office

also included the military vicariate, the Roman Catholic chaplaincy to America's armed forces.

Contradictions underlay Spellman's life and work. His notorious love of luxury and his covert homosexuality seemed to stand in contrast to the passion he held for the military and his duties as military vicariate. Spellman also did not let his Christianity prevent him from embracing American militarism; he even became a strategic bombing enthusiast. He cherished high-level meetings with American admirals and generals. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, the global strategist who formulated the American "Victory Plan," which was used to help win World War II, described his friend and fellow Catholic with awe: "The military vicar was a very sophisticated military and political thinker. He thought in terms of what happened in one country in one part of the world and how it affected another on the other side of the world."

Spellman enthusiastically endorsed the country's strategy during World War II, pushing reluctant Irish, German, and Italian American Catholics into rallying behind the 1940 peacetime conscription bill. He also backed Roosevelt's undeclared Atlantic naval war against Germany. After the United States formally entered World War II, Spellman became the American military's most visible chaplain. Even Spellman's bitter critics conceded his patriotism was sincere; he could be found every Christmas season, dressed in military fatigues, enduring harsh and dangerous conditions while visiting American troops overseas at their various front lines. While visiting the troops, Spellman continued his secret missions for Roosevelt, helping to negotiate Italy's 1943 surrender and acting as emissary to leaders such as Francisco Franco in Spain, Charles de Gaulle in France, and Eamon De Valera in Ireland, as well as Polish leaders in exile.

Spellman was unable to convince Roosevelt in 1944 that the president was enabling the expansion of Soviet imperialism. But Pius XII rewarded Spellman for his faithful service in 1946; Pius XII made him a cardinal and also offered him the Vatican secretary of state post. Spellman accepted the former honor but declined the latter, preferring to remain in the United States as its most powerful Catholic prelate. While administering the New York Archdiocese, a Herculean

task in itself, Spellman simultaneously began openly waging the Cold War—but since Pres. Harry Truman was often cool to him, the cardinal sought other allies. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, senators Pat McCarran and Joseph McCarthy, and CIA officials all found Spellman aiding their investigations of Soviet spies and sympathizers. Spellman's relentless politicking led New York politicians to dub the New York archdiocesan headquarters the "Powerhouse."

Spellman's power peaked during the Korean War; never did he appear more respectable, right, and impregnable, since the war seemed to vindicate Spellman's hard-line anti-communist stance. He even embraced Douglas MacArthur after the general was fired by Truman. Pres. Dwight Eisenhower tried to cultivate the cardinal, but the prelate responded by remaining loyal to Senator McCarthy even after the 1954 censure. Spellman also blasted Ike for losing North Vietnam to communism in 1954; the president responded by enabling Spellman protégé Ngo Dinh Diem—who Spellman had "discovered" in a Maryknoll seminary in New Jersey—to become South Vietnamese premier in 1955. It was a move that would prove fateful in the course of the intensifying Vietnam conflict.

Spellman's influence on church and state declined with Pius XII's 1958 death and John F. Kennedy's 1960 election. Pope John XXIII and Kennedy shunned Spellman for antithetical reasons; the former thought Spellman not Catholic enough while the latter regarded Spellman's brand of Catholicism as overly strident. Spellman bitterly opposed their fashionable liberalism, especially refusing to approve their respective détentes with Moscow. Curiously, the cardinal did approve Kennedy's 1963 coup against his friend Diem, which in retrospect is considered to rank among America's greatest blunders in Vietnam.

John XXIII and Kennedy died in 1963. Their successors, Pope Pius VI and Pres. Lyndon Johnson, were both afraid of Spellman and pretended to solicit his advice. Spellman openly defied Pius VI's frantic efforts to negotiate a Vietnam peace; during December 1966, he hailed American troops in Vietnam, calling them "holy crusaders" waging "Christ's war against the Vietcong and the people of North Vietnam." Radio Moscow jeered how Spellman "openly contradicts the Pope's appeal for peace in Vietnam," while American war

protesters began calling Vietnam "Spellman's War." Protesters even disrupted a Mass he celebrated in January 1967. But the cardinal refused to be cowed. Later that year, on December 2, Spellman died in New York City.

Cardinal Spellman's identification with Americanism and Roman Catholicism made him his country's leading clerical militarist for three decades. With his militarism strengthened by religion, Spellman believed that Caesar and Christ always marched in tandem. And unlike Archbishop Fulton Sheen, an equally ardent anti-communist, Spellman failed to recognize that the Vietnam War possibly cost the United States much more than it was worth.

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Chaplains in the Military; Cold War; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; Patton, George S.; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.; Vietnam War; World War II

—Christopher M. Gray

Sport and War

Sport and war have been linked in the American experience since the early years of the republic. In some eras, the use of sport to pass time and gain relief from boredom or stress of military service has been the most prevalent phenomenon. At other times military officers have seen sport as an important means for training their personnel, whether to enhance physical readiness and aptitude for the rigors of warfare, to affect the troops' psychology by inculcating martial spirit, or both. Finally, advocates of sport and supporters of the military have sometimes indulged in elaborate exchanges of metaphor, conflating sport and war in an effort to achieve their usually very different respective interests. The first of these tendencies—the least structured and the least self-conscious—has shown itself throughout American history, while the other two have been bound more closely to specific, though sometimes long, periods in the development of the military, sport, and society.

There is little evidence to suggest official, formal, and regular support for sport and organized games within the American military until well into the 19th century. This is not surprising, since other institutions later closely associated with sport, such as colleges and universities, similarly kept their distance. The general sporting culture in the colonial and early national periods was shaped largely by small groups united by common interests (such as Southern gentlemen engaged in horse racing), by spontaneous action of citizens seeking release from tedium and drudgery, and by brief seasonal participation in an American variation of England's "festive tradition." The military itself, whether the militia before or immediately after the Revolution or the very small professional force created after 1789, was organized and trained more narrowly than was the case a century or more later. Sport in the military, then, was generated largely from the bottom up, and, as in colleges, the primary interest of responsible officials was that nothing develop that was untoward and disruptive of traditionally defined military training and military proficiency.

Prior to the Civil War, sports such as baseball were only beginning to find a substantial following of participants and spectators in the country at large, let alone within the military. During the war, however, Union soldiers especially used such games as remedies for the long periods of boredom that intervened between the horrific demands of combat. These activities reflected spontaneous interest and enthusiasm shared among the soldiers—not an organized effort by officers to instill discipline and character or to ensure health. They took place in training areas, and even in prison camps and near fields of battle. After the war, as after some later wars, some veterans who had been exposed to sport while in uniform

became advocates of that sport in the postwar period, while many others formed part of a new base of spectators.

Even so, there were occasional "statistical outliers," notably those who prefigured the middle-class and upper-middle class preoccupation with the pursuit of sport to transform personal values, to prepare practically for the rigors of war, and to strengthen societal institutions. A primary example of such outlying enthusiasts was Thomas Wentworth Higginson, ardent promoter of "muscular Christianity" in the antebellum years and the commander of a black regiment during the Civil War. In his *Army Life in a Black Regiment*, Higginson insisted not only that his antebellum sporting pursuits had given him the requisite spirit to fight steadfastly but also that they had specific applications; he claimed, for example, that his recreational boating and swimming had prepared him to be the commander of a flotilla of armed steamers during the war.

What Thomas Wentworth Higginson asserted, somewhat in exaggeration, gradually assumed something close to mainstream status in Army and Navy thinking during the latter decades of the 19th century. Soldiers and sailors who practiced sport for recreation and relief in the last decades of the 1800s, yet also seeing sport as shaping men's temperament for war, included individuals destined to hold the highest positions. Leonard Wood, a close associate of Theodore Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff under William Howard Taft, delighted in horseback riding and hiking, and he regularly engaged in boxing matches with his boss, Gen. Nelson Miles (chief of staff under Roosevelt), during the war against the Apache. He soon added football to his program. Expressing a comprehensive rationale for the introduction of sport into the training and development of soldiers and sailors, the eminent psychologist William James called sport the "moral equivalent of war"—cultivating commitment and character through material, bodily effort—which was meant to be material and practical in effect and not merely a metaphorical boost to morale.

High-profile practitioners of sport such as Wood and Miles created a positive climate for sport at an institutional level rather than mere tolerance of it among individuals. In the 1880s, the War Department officially recognized sport and gymnastic exercise as promoting military preparedness but allocated no special funds to cultivate them. During the

1890s, in articles in professional journals, younger officers took the lead in promoting sport as a preparation for war, and by the start of the 20th century high-ranking officers included football, baseball, boxing, fencing, and other sports as "part of [soldiers and sailors'] drill"; they had become part of the "duty day." This change reinforced the promotion of "combative" sports in the public schools through organizations promoted by retired military officers.

Enhanced ability to fulfill one's military mission now served as a parallel motivation to pursue sport along with the individual pursuit of recreation and the quest for relief from the tedium of routine responsibilities. In 1886–87, the Army used skiing to help achieve its mission to protect Yellowstone National Park from poachers, as patrols operated on skis (then called "snowshoes"). Company M of the 1st Cavalry initially garnered little attention for its efforts, which were conducted for their practical payoffs and not as a publicity stunt. But circumstances conspired to bring these ski patrols to wider attention. A member of an abortive exploratory expedition into Yellowstone to be led by Arctic explorer Lt. Frederick Schwatka, photographer Frank Jay Haynes went off on his own when the larger expedition faltered, documenting the park in a 175-mile circuit. Some of his pioneering images depicted scouts and patrols on skis. In the 1890s, writer Emerson Hough reported on his excursions into Yellowstone for the Chicago Tribune, drawing attention to the Army's use of skis. The Proceedings of the Association of Military Surgeons in 1900 concluded that skiing in the park was essential for the troops. Foreign military journals took note.

Yet even as the military brass aimed to use skiing to accomplish their mission, they discouraged recreational skiing. Capt. Moses Harris said that conditions in the park made snowshoe, or ski, travel difficult in the 1880s, noting in an official report that it should not be considered a diversion. But soldiers often felt otherwise, seeing it as their most meaningful opportunity for recreation. Some visitors predicted that winter vacation travel would soon become a regular feature of the park—a prediction not so much inaccurate as premature. Official interest in the military utility of sport conformed to customary expectation, but so did the unofficial, spontaneous pursuit of skiing as recreation among the soldiers when their duty day was done.

How much sport would be promoted by the military and how it would impact the ability to fight a war depended largely on issues of authority and control. Since military service entailed physical demands and psychological commitment, and since sport was now perceived to affect both, military leaders grew increasingly unwilling to leave such matters to chance. In World War I, sports were promoted in military camps in the United States during the massive buildup of troops, and later at those in France, first as a prophylactic against the vice that supposedly flowed from idleness. Civilian volunteers initially led this movement in the camps, but military authorities eventually assumed control to enforce their behavioral standards as well as their chosen aims.

Similarly, in the immediate postwar era, relief from boredom predominantly motivated most enlisted personnel, while discipline, good order, the avoidance of vice, and the cultivation of teamwork and compliance prevailed as the goals of regular officers. Inter-unit competition in boxing, football, and other sports was regularized, imposing a homogeneous version of masculinity and cultivating a sense of group superiority. Both beliefs were tested in international competition against British, French, and other nationals in the Inter-Allied Games of 1919, or "Military Olympics," where Americans attempted to push their rules in sports such as boxing and to show physical and moral dominance by an impressive number of wins. American successes in track and field events were exploited predictably for political–military purposes. American military officers, such as George S. Patton Jr. at Stockholm, had been Olympians before the war. The actual Olympics and the post–World War I military derivative made it easy to hold a highly positive, if stereotypical, image of oneself while vigorously projecting it to the public in America and to the world at large.

Such developments were unsurprising in an era that saw the rapid expansion of the public relations and advertising industries. At the international level, even Pres. Woodrow Wilson used any suggestion of American strength as ammunition in the peace negotiations, as if athletic prowess was what it took to win in battle. Impressions had material impact. Thus the years between the two world wars saw a continued interest within the U.S. military in shaping character and in physically fitting service personnel for war even

as they paid closer attention to the public relations value of success in competitions. During World War II, for example, extensive baseball and boxing programs were developed within the armed forces in order to showcase star athletes such as Joe DiMaggio and Joe Louis. Meanwhile, close links continued between the military and civilians in specialized sports such as equestrianism, which was fostered at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas.

After war broke out in Europe in September 1939, several avid skiers including early promoters of the sport such as Minot "Minnie" Dole, founder of the United States National Ski Patrol, urged the creation of units of "ski troops" within the U.S. Army. Finnish resistance against attack by the Soviet Union testified to the value of maintaining military operational capability during the war's first winter. The German "winter warfare" in Scandinavia, notably encompassing operations in Norway, also suggested the practical value of skiing skills originally acquired for recreational purposes. In 1940, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall was finally persuaded of the merits of Dole's proposal, and the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment was formed, eventually growing into the 10th Mountain Division. Dole recruited hundreds of expert skiers—some 500 received naturalization papers at Leadville, Colorado, just south of the regiment's training site at Camp Hale, in recognition of their military service.

The impact of the 10th Mountain Division on the ski industry in post–World War II America is rightfully legendary, with division veterans Peter Seibert becoming a key developer of Vail and Friedl Pfeiffer destined to become a leader in promoting Aspen as a winter resort. Similarly, the Army pointed the way to the postwar future with some of the earliest mechanical lifts in Colorado. (The Army's Cooper Hill ski training area, near Camp Hale, had the longest T-bar lift in the world at the time.) The service also fostered the use of laminated skis and favored other improvements that added to durability—an obvious merit for military purposes but just as useful for civilian recreational skiers.

But promotion of the postwar ski industry did not interest the Army, which focused on utilitarian goals. The 10th Mountain's men had to fill a perceived deficiency. If mountain warfare in snow and ice should take place, the 10th, the Army insisted, must meet the challenge. And they trained with this

The boxer Joe Louis training in front of servicemen at Fort Dix in 1942. Louis served in the war, as did other well-known athletes of the day. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

in mind, practicing rock climbing and rappelling as well as skiing. Even at the start of the 21st century, discarded ammunition boxes were to be found in the National Forest areas surrounding Camp Hale. Winter camping took on Himalayan extremes—temperatures sometimes dropping below -40° Fahrenheit, with tents caving under the weight of heavy snowfalls. As events actually transpired, the division's mountain skills played an important role—but without the snow. The division was committed to service in Italy in 1944 entailing spearheading the Po River Valley attack. Some 992 men from the unit were killed in action, and many more were wounded, some with severe permanent impairment.

Practical employment of skiing and rock climbing by the 10th Mountain Division inverted the process by which skiing had emerged as a sport in the first place. Even in Europe, the utilitarian role of skiing was clear, for example, in the

emergence of well-organized ski troops in Norway at the end of the early modern era. Skiing grew as recreation as it declined in practical roles such as mail delivery or national defense. The same shift in emphasis took place in America as well. Playful competition and diversion could coexist with utilitarian purpose, but they grew faster as utilitarian roles diminished—a change typically occurring with the enlargement of middle-class convenience and comfort. But military necessity overrode those processes, and the Army's approach to using sport was institutionally humorless, regardless of what some of the soldiers made of it whenever they could.

Famous athletes who served in the military, such as champion boxer Joe Louis, boosted the morale of troops through various appearances and events for the troops, while also contributing to the nationwide perception of fairness in the mobilization of manpower for the war effort. Unlike what happened in later wars, notably the Vietnam War, professional athletes served in the military during World War II in large numbers.

Meanwhile, throughout World War II, editorial cartoons appeared that equated wars with sporting contests, making them seem familiar, comprehensible, and perhaps even inevitable, while also depicting Army and Navy personnel to be as "American as apple pie." After the war, leaders of the individual services as well as key figures of the new Department of Defense routinely invoked the language of sport to explain complex national security issues to the public by means of simple metaphor. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Omar Bradley explained the need for interservice cooperation by invoking the dynamics of a football team in which defensive linemen, quarterbacks, linebackers, and other players all had critical roles, even though they were different. Another leading figure described a spasmodic launching of nuclear weapons as an "exchange of bombing punts."

But during the second half of the 20th century, sport and war interacted in the American experience in much more complex ways, including the most substantial commitment of material resources ever to cultivate service personnel's participation in sport. In the immediate post–World War II years, the mixing of sport and military imagery continued for the purpose of winning public support for complex defense policies. But there was also a "lifestyle" shift in

which the soldier, sailor, airman, or marine became a continuously available model for emulation by civilians. By the early 1960s, during the presidency of John Kennedy and afterward, concern to avoid dissipation and promote a warrior ethos renewed themselves, even among civilians, and "lack of muscle" was widely seen as a key threat to success in international affairs. A "cult of toughness" developed, and a renewed passion for combative sports in the military paralleled organized efforts to build moral strength by exposure to physical stresses, a notable example being survival and resistance training including simulated POW experiences.

But the larger challenge to the armed forces was to integrate sports that were tough (and sometimes individualistic and unruly) into the regimented military life. After the armed forces were set on an all-volunteer footing in 1973, measures such as "adventure training"—for example, using whitewater rafting to develop "physical address"—also helped to present military service as a positive lifestyle choice. By 1978, the Army Sports Office aimed to enlist elite athletes by establishing the World Class Athletes Program, so that success even at the level of the Olympic Games would enhance self-image among soldiers while projecting positively to the civilian community as well. Meanwhile, an aggressive effort developed under leaders such as Army Vice Chief of Staff Maxwell Thurman to standardize gyms at a high level, while also fostering competitive sports programs. In general, in all the services a greater share of resources was committed to physical development and sports competition than ever before in American military history.

At the start of the 21st century, as an "international war on terror" was proclaimed by key U.S. civilian and military leaders, the need to integrate sport into the life of active-duty military personnel deployed to war zones increased. In Afghanistan, for example, in December 2004, military personnel who were dedicated runners refused to let their Taliban enemy get in the way of staging a marathon at a U.S. base outside Tarin Kowt, held as a collateral event with the Honolulu Marathon, to which some of the military runners had ties. Some 311 persons participated, suggesting how much sport had become a part of the routine in the altered form of warfare that promises to continue long into the future.

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Civil War; Patton, George S.; Preparedness Movement; Recruiting Advertisements; Religion and War; Roosevelt, Theodore; World War I; World War II

—*Donald J. Mrozek*

Spying

See Intelligence Gathering in War.

Stars and Stripes, The

The Stars and Stripes, a newspaper for American troops overseas, was first published during World War I, was revived upon U.S. entry into World War II, and has appeared continuously since 1942. Although authorized and subsidized by the Defense Department, it is independent in its news coverage and editorial stances; *Stripes* is dedicated to serving the ordinary soldier, not the military high command. From time to time, this has brought it into conflict with military and civilian authorities and would-be censors, but the paper has retained its journalistic freedom.

No fewer than four newspapers called *The Stars and Stripes* were printed during the Civil War (1861–1865), but these were unofficial, impromptu, and short-lived affairs not directly related to the present newspaper. The best-known of these was first printed on November 9, 1861, in Bloomfield, Missouri, by members of the 11th, 18th and 29th Illinois Volunteer Regiments. The real *Stars and Stripes* was the brainchild of 2nd Lt. Guy T. Viskniskki, a U.S. Army officer stationed in Paris in 1918. Viskniskki persuaded the commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France, Gen. John J. Pershing, that a troop newspaper would be good for morale. Pershing approved the idea—and, importantly, set the precedent of allowing soldiers to run the newspaper with little interference from the top brass. The weekly *Stripes* of World War I, printed in Paris, ran for 71 editions from February 8, 1918, to July 13, 1919, and contained in its eight pages not only news but editorials, letters, sports, humor, and poetry. It sold for ten cents (or 50 French centimes), and in 1919 its circulation reached 526,000.

The World War I newspaper had several interesting features. For one, it accepted advertising (it has not done so since 1942), so that American soldiers were inundated with blandishments to buy such things as Burberry overcoats, Fatima cigarettes, and Wrigley's chewing gum. Also, most of the 300 reporters, editors, and other staff were enlisted men rather than officers. They included such luminaries as the *New York Times* drama critic Alexander Woollcott; Steve Early, who would be press secretary to Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1933 to 1944; cartoonist Abian "Wally" Walgren; and Grantland Rice, the sportswriter who in the 1920s would immortalize Notre Dame's football "Four Horsemen." And *Stripes* had one feature that would be repeated in World War II: an Orphan Fund, soliciting donations from American soldiers for the youngest victims of war.

In 1919, as the U.S. forces went home, *The Stars and Stripes* ceased publication, though it was succeeded for a while by *The Amaroc* (American Army of Occupation) *News*. It would be revived in Britain during World War II. By early 1942, thousands of American GIs had begun descending on that country in preparation for the eventual invasion of Hitler's Europe. On April 18, 1942, the first edition of the new *Stripes* was printed in Northern Ireland. It was a weekly at first, just as in the previous war. By November of 1942, however, it had moved to London and become a tabloid-sized daily, sharing presses and office space in Printing House Square with the staid and venerable *Times* newspaper. As Pershing had done in World War I, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and European theater commander Dwight D. Eisenhower decided to allow *Stripes* to be "the soldiers' newspaper," with considerable freedom to publish what its editors wished. Once again, the editors and staffers were talented enlisted men, such as the cartoonist Bill Mauldin and future TV personality Andy Rooney.

Editors and staff took full advantage of that freedom. The newspaper printed news, jokes, interviews, editorials, and sports. It printed letters, often filled with bitter complaints, by ordinary GIs (the title of the letters column in the later Paris edition of *Stripes* was "B-Bag," with the subtitle "Blow It Out Here"), and comic strips, such as *Li'l Abner* and *Blondie*. It printed the cartoons of Bill Mauldin, whose *Willy and Joe*, two weary, unshaven, and unheroic GIs who nevertheless did their duty as best they could, won Mauldin a Pulitzer Prize in 1945. And it printed "cheesecake" photos of scantily clad young women. This last feature offended the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, who complained that the newspaper "has a daily photo of some glamour queen, usually a Hollywood star . . . presumably for the purpose of providing 'pinups' to enliven the bare walls of barracks" (Reynolds, 172).

When the U.S. Army invaded North Africa in November of 1942, *The Stars and Stripes* quickly followed.

The front page of the May 23, 1919, issue of The Stars and Stripes, *published in Paris. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)*

It did so again after Allied forces landed on the beaches of Normandy on June 6, 1944. Mediterranean editions were printed in Algiers, Casablanca, and Oran (in Algeria). The first Continental edition was printed at Saint Mere-Eglise, on the Normandy beachhead, and as American forces advanced, enterprising *Stripes* staffers trailed along, looking for undamaged presses to print new editions. Before the war ended, editions would be printed in Rennes, Nice, Liege, Strasbourg, Rome, Paris, and several other places. Circulation in 1944 would reach 800,000. A Pacific edition began in Honolulu on May 14, 1945, and a Tokyo edition on October 3, 1945.

After World War II ended, America's new role in the world and the beginning of its rivalry with the Soviet Union ensured that American soldiers would continue to be stationed abroad. *The Stars and Stripes*, therefore, continued to publish. At the beginning of the 21st century its headquarters

was in Washington, D.C., but editions have been published in, among other places, Germany, Kuwait, and Iraq—wherever American troops have been present in large numbers. *The Stars and Stripes* has been criticized by congressmen, clergymen, and generals over the years, and it is by no means immune to outside influences. Nevertheless, it has retained its essential independence and its commitment to serving the ordinary men and women of the armed forces.

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Censorship and the Military; CNN; Iraq War; Mauldin, Bill; Media and War; Television and War; Vietnam War; World War I; World War II

Related Documents

1945 c

—Bernard Hagerty

"Star-Spangled Banner, The"

The national anthem of the United States, "The Star-Spangled Banner," is a musical composition long associated with the power of the American military. Although many consider it little more than the formality before the first

pitch of a baseball game, the poem carries within its lines the ability to stir the American imagination about the nation's greatness and its past military glories. As powerful as it can be to hear, it has an equally stirring story behind its creation.

The writing of the poem originated during the War of 1812 between Great Britain and the United States. In the summer of 1814, the British successfully attacked and burned the American capital city of Washington, D.C., as part of a largely successful raid in the Chesapeake Bay area. The inhabitants of Baltimore, seething with anti-British sentiment, knew they were the Redcoats' next intended victims. The garrison at Baltimore's Fort McHenry braced for the battle that lay ahead.

The preceding summer, garrison commander Maj. George Armistead, believing British assault upon the fort was imminent, had requested the creation of a flag large enough that when the British arrived they could not possibly fail to see it from a great distance. Under government contract, Mary Young Pickersgill, a local maker of merchant ship flags, created for Armistead a garrison flag 30 feet wide and 42 feet long.

A year later, in the summer of 1814, the raiding British arrested Dr. William Beanes of Maryland for arranging the arrests of British deserters and stragglers. John Skinner, a federal agent in charge of prisoner exchanges, accompanied by attorney and poet Francis Scott Key, won Beanes's release; nevertheless, since the three men knew when the British planned to attack the city, they were detained until the end of hostilities on a truce ship, eight miles from the fort.

The attack on Fort McHenry began on the evening of September 13, 1814. During the ensuing 25-hour bombardment, the three men watched anxiously aboard the truce ship. At dawn, Key viewed the fort. To his surprise, Armistead's men, in an act of defiance, hoisted the large garrison flag over the fort. The presence of the flag meant the fort had not surrendered. Inspired by the sight of the huge ensign waving in the breeze, Key immediately began writing the poem "The Defence of Fort McHenry."

Upon his return to the city on the night of September 16, Key checked in at a hotel and revised the draft of the poem he had written while at sea. Published first as a handbill, the original publication contained an introduction conveying the

context and background of the poem, but did not name Key as the author. On September 20, the poem appeared with a new title, "The Star-Spangled Banner," set to a well-known tune of the day, "To Anacreon in Heaven." "Anacreon" was a drinking song often performed by the members of the Anacreontic Society of London, named after the ancient Greek poet Anacreon of Teos. Charles Durang performed Key's poem publicly in Baltimore for the first time to its new tune in October of 1814.

In the years after the War of 1812, the song's popularity grew. During the Civil War, Union musicians played the anthem when receiving heads of state aboard ships. In 1889, the Navy Department ordered it played during the morning color ceremony, and in 1893, the Navy revised the regulation and ordered the playing of the anthem during both morning and evening ceremonies. The Army, beginning in 1895, required the playing of the song at every flag lowering ceremony, and by 1916, both services regarded the song as the nation's anthem.

In 1918, through the determined efforts exerted by The Maryland Society and The Daughters of the War of 1812 led by Mrs. Reuben Ross Holloway, congressman J. Charles Linthicum of Maryland introduced a bill to adopt "The Star-Spangled Banner" as the national anthem. After 12 years of arduous lobbying by Linthicum and his congressional allies, the House of Representatives passed the bill on April 21, 1930, and the Senate on March 3, 1931. Pres. Herbert Hoover signed the bill into law upon the Senate's passage, making "The Star-Spangled Banner" the official national anthem of the United States.

The poem and its tune have detractors. Written in the key of C major in 6/4 time signature (although now performed in the slower 3/4 time signature), the music is in a vocal range not obtainable by untrained singers. Some hold the tune in low regard, while others do not like the words, contending they contain too much of the martial spirit. Nevertheless, Key's poem remains the national anthem performed today as an integral part of most civic events and sporting contests.

The specific flag of which Key wrote, though in delicate condition, remains under the watchful eyes of the curators and preservers in the National Museum of American History at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington. Though it is

tattered and shorter in length owing to cutting by souvenir hunters, Americans regard it as a priceless historical artifact.

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Related Entries

Music and War; War of 1812

—James S. Baugess

Strategic Air Command

Strategic bombing stood at the core of the argument for a separate U.S. Air Force. The use of airplanes to deliver bombs to targets far beyond the battlefield represented an independent, offensive mission that would justify the creation of an air arm equal in status to the Army and the Navy. During the 1920s and 1930s, American airpower enthusiasts developed the doctrine of strategic bombing that would shape the U.S. air campaign during World War II. In the post-war period, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) emerged not only as the central component of the U.S. Air Force, which was created in 1947, but also of the Cold War policy of nuclear deterrence.

In 1946, with an eye toward independence, the Army Air Forces reorganized. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, commanding general of the Air Forces, established three major operating commands: the Strategic Air Command, the Tactical Air Command, and the Air Defense Command. The Air Force would take control of these commands upon its formation. As the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union took shape in the late 1940s, it became clear that the SAC would take center stage, as it was the only organization within the U.S. military with the ability and experience to deliver atomic weapons.

At first, however, the SAC was in poor shape and seemed unfit to effectively carry out its mission. Not only had post-war demobilization left it with a bare minimum of personnel and increasingly obsolete equipment, but a plan that called for the extensive cross training of personnel resulted in weakly trained crews and strained morale. Its deficiencies were highlighted during the Berlin Crisis in 1948, when Soviet forces in eastern Berlin blockaded the U.S., French, and British-controlled sectors of the city. In response, Chief of Staff Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg ordered Gen. Curtis E. LeMay home from Europe to take command of the SAC.

LeMay took command in October 1948 and immediately oversaw the transfer of the SAC headquarters from Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland to Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska. Once settled, LeMay initiated an intensive training program. Although his reforms did result in some improvements, SAC remained understaffed and poorly equipped for its atomic mission until appropriations increased with the Korean War in the 1950s, and the United States formally adopted a policy of deterrence.

Under the presidencies of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, SAC emerged not only as the largest component of the Air Force, but also as the centerpiece of the nation's policy of deterrence, with its threat of massive retaliation.

While overall the military shrank after 1953 and military budgets stagnated, SAC proved the exception to the general pattern. It was celebrated in the 1955 film *Strategic Air Command*, starring Jimmy Stewart as Lt. Col. "Dutch" Holland and June Allyson as his wife Sally. SAC gained the personnel and the equipment needed to serve as a deterrent force. Surplus B-29s from World War II gave way initially to the B-50 and then to the B-47, the first generation all-jet bomber. The first intercontinental bomber, the B-36, remained the key to deterrence until the eight-engine, all-jet B-52 appeared in 1955. To support these bombers on their long-range missions, SAC adopted aerial refueling and acquired its first tanker aircraft, the KC-97. By the end of the decade, the all-jet KC-135 entered the SAC inventory.

Although bombers remained its most visible symbol, SAC also gained the responsibility for the manning and maintaining of the nation's expanding inventory of ground-based missiles. In the 1950s the Air Force took the lead in the development of the first generation intercontinental ballistic missiles. Under the guidance of Maj. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, the Air Force developed and fielded the liquid fueled Atlas, Titan I, and Titan II long-range missiles. In the 1960s, Atlas and Titan I were retired and Titan II was significantly augmented by the solid-fueled Minuteman.

Throughout its history SAC recognized its central mission as that of nuclear deterrence, while at the same time preparing for global thermonuclear war, a war it never had to fight. Instead, SAC often found itself struggling to maintain its central mission capability while participating in very different kinds of wars, especially in Vietnam. During that conflict, SAC B-52s flew a number of very limited strategic bombing campaigns, from Rolling Thunder to Linebacker II. In at least one case, the siege of Khe Sanh, B-52s even flew a mission best described as close air support. All, however, involved the use of conventional rather than nuclear weapons.

Following the Vietnam conflict, SAC returned its focus to its nuclear mission. The 24-hour airborne alerts, begun in the 1950s, remained in place, and the Air Force pushed for replacements for the aging B-52s, including both the B-1 and the stealthy B-2 bombers. Following a significant build-up in military spending under Pres. Ronald Reagan , including retirement of the Titan missiles and the fielding of the

Peacekeeper, the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a series of world events that brought fundamental changes. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the formal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought an end to the Cold War that had driven American foreign and military policy since the late 1940s. These events, combined with treaties that reduced the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union, diminished the urgency of the nuclear deterrent mission. Symbolically, on September 18, 1991, SAC stood down from its alert status. In a massive reorganization of the Air Force, on June 1, 1992, SAC and the Tactical Air Command ceased to exist, replaced by a new, combined Air Combat Command.

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Related Entries

Aerial Bombardment; Cold War; Nuclear Strategy

—Janet R. Daly Bednarek

Stratton, Dorothy C.

(1899–)
Director of U.S. Coast Guard SPARs

During World War II, America needed every available man and woman to contribute to the war effort. Since the great majority of military jobs were non-combat, clerical positions, often held by women in civilian society, the shortage of men could best be met by women. American notions of proper gender roles, however, demanded that first a suitable

gender-segregated organization be created to handle the influx of women workers. Dorothy Stratton served as the first director of the Coast Guard women's organization and created the nickname SPARs from the initials of the Coast Guard motto, *Semper paratus* (Always Ready).

Dorothy Stratton was born on March 24, 1899, in Brookfield, Missouri, the daughter of a Baptist minister. She earned a degree in psychology from Ottawa University, and a PhD in student personnel administration from Columbia University. After serving as dean of girls at a high school in California, Stratton moved in 1933 to Purdue University in Indiana as associate professor of psychology (she became full professor in 1940) and dean of women, with responsibility for protecting and disciplining the women undergraduates.

As dean of women, Stratton pioneered many programs to increase the number of women who attended college and specifically the number of women who majored in the sciences. Purdue's enrollment soared from 600 to 1,400 female students. She established a career center for women graduates, and under her direction the first three dormitories for women were built. With her student personnel colleague, Helen B. Schleman, she co-authored a how-to social guide in 1940 entitled *Your Best Foot Forward*. Stratton established a national training school for fraternity and sorority housemothers, which nationalized the Purdue model of coeducation.

Stratton had long urged her undergraduate women to volunteer for civic duties, so when her nation called she served on the Army Board to select officers for the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC, renamed WAC in July 1943). She later took a leave of absence from Purdue to join the first class of women officers for the Navy, trained at Smith College in Massachusetts. These women reservists were nicknamed the WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service). Stratton served at the WAVES radio training school at the University of Wisconsin.

Congress and the top brass military responded to public pressure by demanding the finest possible role models as senior officers for women reservists. The Army and Marine Corps selected civic leaders from high society and business; the Navy selected Mildred McAfee, president of one of the seven sister colleges. The Coast Guard operated as a unit of

Capt. Dorothy C. Stratton, the director of the Coast Guard SPARs, receiving the Legion of Merit medal from Adm. Joseph F. Farley, commandant of the Coast Guard, on January 16, 1946. (© Bettman/CORBIS)

the Treasury Department in peacetime and as a unit of the Navy Department in wartime. When Congress in November 1942 established the Coast Guard Women's Reserves Corps, the Coast Guard looked to the WAVES for leadership. As a highly visible dean of women at a major state university, Stratton was a strong choice. She could reassure parents that their daughters would not only demonstrate their patriotism, but also learn skills to make them better housewives, and would be well taken care of while on duty. Stratton understood the problems and needs of college-age women, having worked in bureaucracies designed to accommodate and model impressionable young women. She was also well connected with other women educators who could help in their recruiting efforts.

Stratton was sworn in on November 24, 1942, as the director of the SPARs, with the rank of lieutenant commander. In

spring of 1943 the SPARs were formally separated from the WAVES, and by January 1944 Stratton was elevated to the rank of commander, and a month later to the rank of captain. (Before the 1970s it was politically impossible to have a woman at flag rank of admiral or general.) For assistant director she selected her Purdue colleague, Helen Schleman. Stratton did not have command responsibility over units of SPARs. The women were assigned to shore billets throughout the Coast Guard, but did not serve on cutters, on overseas missions, or on combat operations such as submarine chasing. Most worked as yeomen (clericals) or storekeepers and radio operators. Stratton's major formal responsibilities involved recruitment and training. Informally her roles were to find out what the Coast Guard needed, convince the admirals that her SPARs could handle the job, and negotiate with field commanders who misunderstood the role of women in uniform and wanted to assign them menial tasks. As the public face of the SPARs, Stratton had many symbolic and publicity roles. The false rumors and sexual innuendoes that plagued WACs did not seriously affect SPARs.

Under Stratton's leadership, 10,000 enlisted women and 1,000 officers served during the war as SPARs, including five African American women who entered in 1945. The Coast Guard employed the highest percentage of women reservists of any of the services. Stratton's Legion of Merit commendation praised her success in inspiring "the finest type of women to volunteer her services to her country." It correctly celebrated "her keen understanding of the abilities of women, her vision of the jobs which they could perform, and her consummate test in fitting women into a military organization." Typically humble, Stratton explained that she was accepting this award because it "is to the Legion that it is awarded, the Legion of 11,000 who volunteered to do a wartime job" (Tilley, 1999). In January 1946, Stratton resigned; Schleman then became the second director. Stratton always told women "if we make good now, new avenues will open after the war" (Kernodle, 1942). She served four years as the director of personnel for the International Monetary Fund (1946–1950) and ten years (1950–1960) as national executive director of the Girls Scouts of America.

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Related Entries

Coast Guard Academy; Women in the Military; Women in the Workforce: World War I and World War II; World War II

—*D'Ann Campbell*

Systems Analysis

Systems analysis, sometimes referred to as operations research, is a bundle of analytical techniques used in both the civilian and military spheres to dissect problems and find cost-effective solutions. It is an extraordinarily powerful, egalitarian tool because it values mathematical and analytical rigor over personal experience, bureaucratic preferences, history, or current political fashion. Systems analysis drives everything from airline scheduling to delivery of goods at the local supermarket. It has also played a crucial role in warfare

for nearly a century, and its "optimization" techniques formed the basis of U.S. nuclear strategy.

Systems analysis begins by providing a stark assessment of the objective to be achieved along with a "measure of effectiveness" to assess progress toward achieving that objective. To understand the problem at hand, analysts apply one of many techniques: simulation, linear and non-linear programming, dynamic programming, queuing and other stochastic-process models, Markov decision processes, econometric methods, data envelopment analysis, neural networks, expert systems, decision analysis, and the analytic hierarchy process. Virtually all of these methodologies are based on a mathematical model that describes the system under consideration and the key variables that drive outcomes. By modeling a system, analysts can assign values to the different components of a problem, thereby exploring the relationships among them. By manipulating the values assigned to important variables in a system, analysts can explore what may happen to the system under different circumstances.

Systems analysis was a British–American innovation from the World War II era that used battlefield data to optimize resources to achieve specific military missions. One of the earliest and most effective applications of systems analysis was in anti-submarine warfare. Given the novelty of submarine warfare in both world wars, there was little experience to guide a response to commerce raiding by submarines. A debate raged over the best way to move supplies across the Atlantic Ocean. Would it be better to sail merchant ships in convoys or alone, or to use escort ships as hunter-killer teams? Would it be better to bomb submarine facilities along the French coast? Systems analysts discovered that aerial reconnaissance reduced the effectiveness of submarines by forcing them to operate under water, thereby impeding their ability to maneuver into a position to fire torpedoes at approaching merchant ships. Air patrols did not necessarily sink more enemy submarines than surface ships, but they reduced the operational effectiveness of the opposing submarine force, creating a "mission kill" by preventing submarines from carrying out their mission. Systems analysis also played a major part in the U.S. strategic bombing campaign in

World War II by identifying targets—oil refineries, aircraft manufacturing plants, railroad switching yards—whose destruction had a disproportionate effect on the enemy's war effort when compared to attacks on other targets.

Analysis played a major role in U.S. nuclear war planning, which came to be known as the Single-Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). Developing the SIOP was a major effort, taking years to optimize the destructive power of thousands of nuclear weapons by matching the characteristics of several types of warheads with hundreds of targets that had been painstakingly identified by planners. Systems analysts reduced conflicts between ingress and egress routes for bombers and reentry vehicles, with the goal of preventing destruction of incoming warheads or bombers by warheads that had just detonated. Systems analysts spent decades simulating various first- and second-strike scenarios (many people credit systems analysts for devising and employing these concepts) on the basis of a normal day-to-day operating status and a generated alert status, in order to calculate the ability of available nuclear forces to achieve their wartime objectives.

Analysts sometimes discovered disturbing trends when they explored exchanges between opposing nuclear forces. By the mid-1970s, U.S. analysts were concerned that their land-based missile force was becoming increasingly vulnerable to a first-strike as Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles were uploaded with multiple, highly accurate independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). One proposed solution to reduce the vulnerability of land-based missiles was to field large numbers of mobile missiles (either on railroad cars or shuttled on transporters among missile silos) so that the Soviets would be unable to target them effectively.

The John F. Kennedy administration's Defense Department, led by Robert S. McNamara, is generally credited with introducing systems analysis as a guide to weapons procurement decisions. McNamara had come to believe in the power of systems analysis during his tenure as president of the Ford Motor Company. He believed that throwing money at problems in the absence of analytic justification could prove counterproductive. Increasing defense spending, in McNamara's view, could reduce security if it propped up obsolete organizations or forces that failed to deliver

much benefit when compared to the resources they consumed. Just because standard operating procedures or weapons match bureaucratic preferences, or just because they worked in the past, does not guarantee that they will respond to current or anticipated national objectives. Bureaucratic preferences are not necessarily rational in economic terms or when it comes to meeting the novel challenges encountered on a future battlefield.

Armed with relatively simple analytic techniques, McNamara set out to reform the way the Defense Department allocated resources. The results were revolutionary, shocking a generation of officers who were not prepared to see their World War II combat experience dismissed as irrelevant. Benefiting from the efforts of his "Whiz Kids," a team of gifted individuals who populated a newly created Office of Systems Analysis in the Pentagon, McNamara used this independent analysis to evaluate the positions adopted by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, positions that usually were based on bureaucratic preferences or even the chiefs' personal wartime experiences. By utilizing the "law of diminishing returns," for instance, systems analysts helped to slow the arms race by demonstrating that the relationship between the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of death and destruction they produced was not linear. By tying force levels to assured destruction criteria, reflecting the notion that additional strategic forces produced diminishing marginal returns, McNamara stopped resources from being wasted simply to make the "rubble bounce" in an all-out nuclear exchange.

Systems analysis, however, was quickly viewed as a lethal threat by members of the uniformed military because it provided McNamara with the basis for canceling several "sacred cows"—weapons that were highly desired by the military even though they only made a modest contribution to U.S. security. McNamara cancelled the Air Force's supersonic B-70 bomber and the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile system after it was determined that more cost efficient methods could be used to deliver nuclear warheads against Soviet targets. In a sense, McNamara used systems analysis to strengthen civilian control over the U.S. military. The results of this analytic and managerial revolution reverberate in today's debates

about the relationship between military expertise and analysis in setting defense priorities.

By the late-1960s, the limits of systems analysis had been made all too clear in the jungles of Southeast Asia. The U.S. military had quickly embraced systems analysis, not only because it was the best way to advance one's cause in McNamara's Pentagon, but because it also offered a useful way to identify the best weapons and operating procedures from a host of alternatives. In hindsight, however, it is clear that policymakers, officers, and analysts had made the mistake of substituting analysis for strategy—employing tools best used to measure or characterize a situation as a substitute strategy itself. Preoccupied with measuring progress in the war, they failed to consider how, or even if, key "measures of effectiveness" were indicators or real progress toward victory. The bombing of North Vietnam, for instance, was assessed not by the impact it had on the willingness or ability of Hanoi to conduct the war, but by tracking the month-by-month increase in the tonnage of bombs dropped over the North. Because they lacked traditional "measures of effectiveness" in fighting a counterinsurgency (e.g., the movement of battle lines toward an opponent's capital) analysts developed a variety of quantitative measures to assess progress in Vietnam.

The most infamous of these measures was the body count, whereby allied soldiers routinely counted the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy after each engagement. Analysts then used this data to assess progress in meeting the "attrition objective," i.e., killing more of the enemy than could be replaced by local recruitment or infiltration from North Vietnam. When this "crossover point" was reached, analysts could claim (they in fact did in June 1967) that the U.S. military had achieved one of its objectives and was in fact winning the war. Systems analysis was even used to determine what factors—arming troops with more machine guns, artillery support, more effective treatment of trench foot—were associated with an increase in body counts (it turned out to be the number of sorties flown by attack helicopters). Yet, despite subjecting every aspect of the war to sustained scrutiny, the U.S. effort in Vietnam turned out to be an extraordinarily costly disaster.

Today, systems analysts are highly sensitive to the fact that operations research was misapplied during the Vietnam War. They are first to point out the limits and strengths of

systems analysis. The U.S. military also is sensitive to the limits of efforts to quantify progress in war. When journalists asked in the opening days of the Persian Gulf War about the body count, military spokespeople reacted in horror and commented, "We don't do that anymore."

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Related Entries

Cold War; Economy and War; Nuclear Strategy

—James J. Wirtz

T

Tailhook Convention

The Tailhook Convention of 1991 involved the U.S. Navy in a bitter controversy over allegations that officers had engaged in numerous acts of excessive drinking and sexual misconduct. The episode cast a shadow not only on the specific individuals involved, but on the Navy's overall culture—especially its treatment of women.

The term tailhook refers to the device on naval aircraft that catches the flight deck cables during their recovery onboard an aircraft carrier. The Tailhook Association is a semi-official organization of naval aviators, endorsed by, but not a part of, the Navy. The group's annual conventions enjoyed a longstanding reputation for being boisterous affairs. However, the Tailhook Association argued that its conventions were an important Navy tradition. Besides the revelry, its members used the event to build relationships within the naval aviation community as well as to instill the important traditions of that culture.

Naval aviation first became a distinct warfare community after World War II. Since naval aviation appeared to have a highly significant role in the postwar world, its officers acquired a reputation for being among the Navy's elite. Although many of its traditions were consistent with older service values, naval aviation developed a culture that was in many ways unique within the Navy. The popular expression "work hard, play hard" reflected what was the foremost value of this community. Flying off aircraft carriers demanded very high degrees of skill and precision; despite the intense training, accidents still occurred even to the most proficient of pilots. The dangerous lifestyle bred a mentality that naval aviators were entitled to certain rewards. For example, naval aviators were not as observant of the chain of command as officers in other warfare communities. The camaraderie of flying transcended the traditional barriers of rank and position within the Navy.

The stereotypical aviator supposedly kept up a social lifestyle that was more glamorous than that of his peers in the surface Navy. Aviators drove fast cars, consumed large amounts of alcohol, and dated the most attractive women off-duty. Although clearly a stereotype, such behavior occurred often enough to maintain a sense of privilege for naval aviators within the aviation community and the Navy at large. Many of these perceptions were captured in the popular 1986 movie *Top Gun.* The film's box-office appeal encouraged some naval aviators in the 1980s and 1990s to adopt such stereotypical daredevil behavior to an even greater degree. Taken to an extreme, this type of culture nourished behavior that was boorish, reckless, and misogynistic. Within this environment, women were seen as yet another reward for the dangerous missions carried out by male aviators, who generally did not conceive of women as their professional equals.

Other operational and organizational issues in the Navy also helped to frame the context of the 1991 Tailhook Convention. This particular meeting was the first to take place after the Persian Gulf War. Naval aviators had flown numerous dangerous missions in support of the air campaign, the success of which many observers were crediting for the short duration of the conflict. Naval aviators had also been the service's only casualties from the war. Afterwards, Tailhook participants appeared to want even more than usual opportunities to recuperate and relax from the wartime stress. Navy leaders were also considering substantial changes to the roles of women in the service. Prior to 1991, female aviators were not assigned to carrier-based squadrons,

even though some of them were qualified pilots in these aircraft. Women were excluded from these roles because it could involve them in combat; however, the restrictions also tended to limit their career opportunities. Many male aviators resented any attempts to reverse the status quo.

At the center of the 1991 Tailhook controversy were allegations made by Lt. Paula Coughlin, a female aviator. Coughlin charged that she and other female guests at the convention had been sexually assaulted when they were forced to run through a gauntlet of male aviators. Shocking as these charges were, the Navy's reaction to them was perhaps more so. Coughlin's immediate superior initially dismissed her complaint, insisting that she was overreacting and did not understand the stress her male counterparts were under. As details surfaced, the public also learned that the Secretary of the Navy, Lawrence Garrett III, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Frank Kelso, were in attendance at Tailhook. Although both men denied seeing anything that resembled Coughlin's accusations, it was apparent that they acquiesced to many other acts of questionable behavior. Both Garrett and Kelso would ultimately resign their positions because of their involvement in the scandal.

The Navy's initial approach to Tailhook tended to be more whitewash than investigation. Although 140 Navy and Marine Corps officers were referred for possible charges, none of them was indicted on the more serious allegations, such as sexual molestation. Most were charged with such lesser offenses as indecent exposure, conduct unbecoming an officer, or failure to act in a proper leadership capacity. As such, none of these officers ever went before a court-martial; any disciplinary action was handled through the Navy's non-judicial punishment system, otherwise known as "captain's mast." The type of punishment that could be awarded at captain's mast was limited, so the guilty parties were fined or given letters of reprimand, actions that did seriously jeopardize their naval careers. (In a time of military downsizing, even a minor rebuke would be cause for an officer not to be promoted.) However, none of the accused received any jail time.

Many people in the public and Congress found the Navy's handling of the crisis to be unacceptable. Congress ordered a more extensive review of Tailhook, but this additional measure did little in terms of holding the immediate

parties accountable. Coughlin eventually resigned from the service, but her alleged attackers were never prosecuted. Even so, the congressional outcry did prompt a searing investigation of problems within the Navy's culture that led to Tailhook. Many supporters of the Navy believed that this turned into a witch-hunt, reminiscent of the anticommunist McCarthy–era investigations. Congress blocked the promotion of officers who were tainted in the slightest degree by Tailhook. The most egregious of these cases involved Adm. Stanley Arthur, the prospective head of the Navy's Pacific Command, and Comm. Robert Stumpf, the commanding officer of the Blue Angels. Both officers had attended Tailhook, but were in no way involved in any criminal wrongdoing. Eventually, the Navy implemented a policy according to which every officer, prior to being promoted, had to sign a release stating that he had not attended Tailhook nor did he know anyone who did. Without such a release, that officer's file was set aside for special evaluation.

The plight of officers Arthur, Stumpf, and others unleashed a culture war between supporters and opponents of the traditional Navy. James Webb, a decorated Vietnam War combat veteran, author, and Secretary of the Navy under Pres. Ronald Reagan, decried the attacks on what he labeled the "warrior culture" that had been instrumental in the Navy's victories in previous wars. Reformers argued that Tailhook was not an isolated incident but reflected deep, antifeminist attitudes within the Navy's culture. The new Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jeremy Boorda, the first non-Annapolis graduate to hold this position, was often caught in the middle of these vicious debates. Boorda was criticized for not defending officers during the Tailhook controversy. (There is some thought that these divisions played a role in his 1996 suicide—although the more probable cause was the disgrace surrounding allegations that Boorda had not earned some of the medals he wore from his Vietnam War service.) The storm surrounding the 1991 Tailhook Convention dissipated in the late 1990s, but the forces that created it continue to linger beneath the surface of the Navy's culture.

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Related Entries

Naval Academy; Persian Gulf War; Pinups; Sexual Abuse and Harassment; Women in the Military

—*Todd Forney*

Technology and Revolutionary Changes in Military Affairs

World War II to Present

As a seismic shift in the international security environment commenced in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, military affairs specialists began to speculate about a revolutionary transformation in the American conduct of warfare. The very same information technologies that have opened up closed societies and altered the global economy were presumed to be the principal drivers of revolutionary changes in modern warfare. Historians began to compare these changes to the interwar years of the 1920s and 1930s. During that period, advances in the internal combustion engine, aircraft design, and communications were equally available to the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet only Germany fully exploited the operational and organizational importance of these advances in such initiatives as the September 1939 invasion of Poland that sparked World War II and, later, the Blitzkrieg (or "lightning war") that featured rapid speed and tight coordination between air and land forces in attacking enemy positions.

But two distinct forms of revolutionary change were clearly at work during World War II and, arguably, are at play today, too. The first and broader phenomenon, called a military revolution, results from deep social and political upheavals that have equally reshaped societies and the way military institutions ultimately fight and win wars. The mass politics of the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution's war-enabling capacities, and the advent of nuclear weapons represent three distinct military revolutions that have profoundly altered the circumstances under which military institutions prepare for and conduct war. The second and more narrowly focused phenomenon, called a revolution in military affairs (RMA), although conditioned by the ongoing and emerging effects of military revolutions, is a period of intense military innovation in which entirely new operational concepts encompassing doctrine, tactics, and technology merge to create quantum improvements in military effectiveness. This entry examines such enhancements in American military capability created by the ongoing information revolution, which could itself become the next great military revolution shaping several RMAs—all with profound consequences for the future of warfare and the nation's security.

Legacy of the Interwar Years

During the critical interwar years separating the two great wars of the 20th century, military institutions around the world faced many challenges posed by the enormous technological and tactical innovations occurring. Yet available resources for meeting those challenges often fell behind the considerable stakes of keeping current with the latest developments. Some nations succeeded while others failed, with huge consequences for the opening of World War II. Though Germany had fewer resources and less advanced technology to work with compared to France or Great Britain, it managed to produce a combined-arms RMA that produced huge gains in the war's first three years. And although the American, British, and Japanese navies were roughly comparable in terms of size and sophistication, only the American and Japanese navies achieved significant improvements in naval power by creating carrier-based naval air facilities to accompany fleets into battle.

What distinguishes winners from losers in the quest to implement revolutionary changes in warfare? Historians

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point to several distinctive characteristics. Foremost is that technology more often than not plays a secondary role to other driving factors. Although technology may be equally available or may feature more prominently in some nations' capabilities, it alone will not suffice to enable the implementation of an RMA.

Equally important is specificity with respect to a certain adversary and to a particular military challenge, against which operational concepts and organizational changes are rigorously examined, tested, and eventually implemented. Germany after World War I certainly faced particular adversaries under the severe restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty—far less favorable for them than they might have wished. Nonetheless, German military institutions were keen to experiment with and eventually to adopt new forms of armored warfare, the first signs of which became evident during the last two years of World War I. France, by contrast, faced a specific adversary in Germany but drew the wrong lessons from its few offensive efforts in World War I, which left France solidly favoring a defensive doctrine that was rapidly overwhelmed by Germany's combined-arms offensive in 1940.

A third factor helping to explain why some countries succeed and others fail is the presence of a receptive service culture. Unless a military service is willing to undertake serious self-examination and experimentation that could challenge extant doctrine and procedures about forms and methods of conducting warfare, the prospects for truly revolutionary change will be severely diminished. The importance of contingent events often provides the necessary catalyst for change within otherwise hidebound service cultures. The Versailles Treaty's harsh treatment of Germany furnished the wherewithal for German military leaders to turn the severely downsized German officer corps into a more progressively oriented body willing to examine lessons from the past with ruthless attention to their import for the future.

Finally, RMAs furnish military organizations with enormous advantages at the operational and tactical levels of warfare, but even the most effective RMA will not succeed if the larger national strategy is flawed. Germany's astounding results in the May 1940 military campaign against France

did not translate into strategic success against the Soviet Union later in the war. The latter campaign required intelligence and logistical capabilities that far exceeded those required for the stunning successes of 1939 and 1940. Beyond that, the arrogance of Nazi leadership led it to underestimate Soviet war-fighting skills and capabilities throughout the entire war. In the end, no RMA can compensate for the lack of shrewd strategic planning and equally skilled political leadership in the conduct of warfare.

The Nuclear Military Revolution

The RMAs that emerged during World War II not only contributed eventually to Allied success against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, but also greatly magnified the number of deaths and casualties compared to the century's first world war. Driven in part by much stronger ideological passions, World War II claimed the lives of three times as many people as the earlier war. This drastic increase resulted largely from revolutionary advances in amphibious, ground, and air warfare. The nuclear revolution definitively brought the war to its conclusion, while leaving strategists and military planners perplexed over the weapon's true meaning for the future of warfare. Married to the long-range ballistic missile, nuclear weapons conveyed the prospect of virtually instantaneous war resulting in untold human deaths and total destruction of economies. Many strategists posited that once both the United States and the Soviet Union had produced enough nuclear-armed missiles—comfortably secured from surprise attack in underground silos or in submarines hidden in the world's oceans—a form of strategic stalemate would obtain, which came to be known as Mutually Assured Destruction. Such stalemate, however, did not deter some strategists and military planners from going further. Reacting to what they saw as serious limitations in deterrence strategy, a competing school of nuclear credibility theorists supported plans to integrate battlefield nuclear weapons and Limited Nuclear Options into counterforce strategies, which affected military force structure and weapons procurement alike.

However effective and valuable nuclear weapons may have been seen to be within superpower think tanks and secure vaults, both the United States and Soviet Union,

aided by technological change, sought to improve their conventional weapons capabilities under the shadow of nuclear Armageddon. The West, led by the United States, had gained clear advantages over the Soviet Union because of its capacity to match advanced electronics and sensors with conventional weapons in order to produce precision guided munitions (PGMs). These advanced PGMs were delivered not only by increasingly stealthy aircraft but also by long-range ground- and sea-based cruise missiles, which would prove decisive eventually in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Such advances closed the gap between "conventional weapons" and "weapons of mass destruction." (Soviet military theorists began to take note of American use of PGMs in the 1970s, and reasoned that, to the extent that these systems created new operational concepts and altered organizational approaches to warfare, they could create the conditions for revolutionary change.) At the same time, other Soviet military theorists had dismissed as erroneous previous assessments suggesting that the rates of advance for tank forces during a nuclear war could approach 100 kilometers per day. These theorists insisted that a nuclear war's adverse effects on the functioning of command and control would constrain advance rates. Such analyses gave impetus to new operational concepts and organizational changes in Soviet military planning not unlike those being investigated by American military theorists in the late 1970s and early 1980s, emphasizing maneuver warfare supported by long-range conventional fire support.

The Emerging RMA

The 1991 war in the Persian Gulf against Iraq only dimly reflected signs of revolutionary changes in warfare. Virtually all the weapons used, however effective, were decades old. Nor were there any dramatic doctrinal, operational, or organizational innovations demonstrated. But there was evidence of revolutionary increases in effectiveness in the area of long-range precision strikes. Postwar analyses demonstrated that although comparatively few PGMs were used, compared to "dumb" (meaning unguided) bombs (only 10 percent of the bombs used were PGMs), to the extent they were employed, each aircraft using them could attack two targets in a single sortie (flight). By comparison, aircraft using "dumb" bombs needed six sorties to attack only one target. This difference represented a significant order-of-magnitude increase in effectiveness for PGMs.

But the most notable demonstrations of new military technologies were the various forms of information communicated and used around the battlefield. In past wars, information about the enemy's strength, location, and intentions had always played an important but secondary role. Operations were undertaken in the absence of information, and the means for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information often failed to pierce the "fog of war," and in some cases even added to it. But the American-led coalition in 1991 had unprecedented access to precise information—from satellite-gathered intelligence, global positioning and meteorological data, maps derived from remote sensing, airborne surveillance radars detecting moving vehicles, to missile-launch detection data. At the same time, Iraq was denied access to similar kinds of information by virtue of the coalition's precision strikes on their command-and-control system, executed swiftly within minutes of the war's start. The critical role of information in the 1991 Gulf War suggested something new was brewing.

What seemed to be underway in the emerging revolution was the elevation of information above both attrition and maneuver; in effect, information permitted attrition and maneuver capabilities to be applied with unprecedented effectiveness. Military experts began to forecast future military employment of microprocessors ubiquitously throughout their force structures, as well as remote sensing technology, unmanned systems, and high-speed, large-capacity communications networks, forming a huge grid. The technology fueling this revolution does not itself destroy anything, nor does it transport physical objects such as troops or equipment over long distances. Instead, such technology enables the precise application of force against an enemy's vital centers of gravity, and it supports the assembly and deployment of forces in space and time so as to maximize their operational impact and minimize their own vulnerability to enemy action.

A distinguishing feature of the emerging RMA is that the underlying technology is driven at least as much by the civilian commercial economy as by government-sponsored

military research and development. This reality has its ominous side. Rather than being relegated to permanent inferiority vis-à-vis the developed world, minor powers will have increasing access to capabilities that will directly counter American military superiority in the 21st century. Two examples illustrate current trends indicative of this reality. The first, resulting from access to commercial boring equipment, permits countries such as North Korea and Iran to bury much of their production and deployment capacity in order to deliver weapons of mass destruction underground, safely protected from American PGM strikes. Second, access to such weapons of mass destruction is becoming increasingly easier. The chemical industry's production of pesticides furnishes all the essential ingredients for chemical weapons, while the rapid and ever-widening spread of biotechnology research means that the once high barrier to producing biological weapons is coming asunder.

If a country cannot acquire a ballistic missile to deliver such weapons, then it might turn to a land-attack cruise missile, a weapon that only a few short years ago was exclusively available to the United States and Russia due to their tight control of advanced, highly classified guidance systems. But the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) of satellites, which was originally developed to help American soldiers, sailors, and airmen precisely know their bearing, has now become an essential commercial product, guiding civilian ships at sea, commercial aircraft, and even consumer automobiles; it is feared that such devices could guide enemy cruise missiles earmarked for American targets. Thus, America's enemies are likely to avoid going head to head with conventional American superiority and may choose instead to threaten American interests with weapons of mass destruction.

Whither Revolutionary Change after September 11?
The September 11, 2001 surprise attack on New York City and the nation's capital profoundly transformed not only America's approach to protecting its homeland, but the Pentagon's approach to thinking about implementing revolutionary changes in the way it fights wars. Except for the Marine Corps, which embraces the challenges of counterinsurgency and urban warfare, America's military services in late 2001 still saw their central task as preparing to fight and win conflicts against modern, conventional armed forces. The invasion of Afghanistan to eliminate the Taliban and al Qaeda's sanctuary, together with the subsequent invasion of Iraq and its growing insurgency, have tested America's military capacity to respond to a range of contingencies outside its preferred fighting preferences. To some extent, America's preoccupation with the war on terror puts revolutionary change on hold, but it also furnishes important lessons about how the emerging military revolution needs to take shape.

Even before the American military deployed to Afghanistan, the Pentagon's defense chief, Donald Rumsfeld, had called for a military transformation characterized by the creation of rapidly deployable, agile, stealthy forces that could respond to various contingencies with a minimum of logistical support. The principle measure of effectiveness would be represented less by the number of weapon platforms that could be brought to bear than by the quality of networking between sensors and shooters. The quest was to achieve simultaneity of precision weapon strikes with significantly greater effects than ever before. Despite the institutional hindrances to military change evident in continuing service interest in major military platforms, the lessons drawn from Afghanistan demonstrated that Rumsfeld's objective force could return substantial dividends in the future.

Operations in Afghanistan saw U.S. Special Forces slipping behind enemy lines and calling in devastatingly effective airstrikes on enemy forces, which broke the Taliban and al Qaeda line of resistance and allowed U.S.-backed Afghan resistance fighters to ride into battle on horseback to achieve victory. Truly, 19th-century warfare met the 21st century, although the key to victory proved to be the fusion of targeting activities on the ground with precision air strikes. This tactical innovation had two principle ingredients. First, U.S. Air Force ground controllers were integrated into U.S. Army Special Forces and equipped with GPS receivers and commercial off-the-shelf laser binoculars. Second, combat aircraft were armed with the 2,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)—a relatively cheap modification to an existing "dumb" bomb that enabled them to be guided extremely precisely to their targets by signals from GPS

satellites. In previous combat operations such as Kosovo, aircraft armed with JDAM took off from their bases with predetermined target coordinates, greatly reducing their targeting effectiveness against time-critical targets that had managed to move during the aircraft's flight time. In Afghanistan, air controllers on the ground, armed with the proper equipment, were able to reduce the amount of time between identifying a target and attacking it from hours to minutes by passing precision coordinates on the target to aircraft circling overhead at 35,000 feet altitude.

In past military campaigns, airpower was prosecuted in pre-defined sequential increments. Intelligence platforms would collect information largely on fixed targets, and a target list would be drawn up against which to task specific aircraft as part of an overall air plan. A wave of aircraft would then execute this plan and return to their bases for subsequent pre-defined missions. In Afghanistan, airpower was employed in near simultaneous rather than sequential form due to the rapid integration of sensor data into the allocation of airpower. Much like a civilian air traffic controller, ground air controllers just outside the target area called in any number of fighters or heavy bombers to hit targets identified and subsequently approved for targeting within minutes of their disclosure. Compared to the target-to-sortie metric of 2:1 in the 1991 Gulf War, it is now conceivable that each fighter carrying eight smart bombs and each B-2 stealth bomber carrying 216 such weapons could achieve, on a single sortie, as many target kills as the number of bombs they carry.

Radically improved precision targeting is but one of several illustrations of the revolutionary potential of network-centric warfare, or the capacity of geographically dispersed forces to perceive substantially the same picture of events occurring within a broad battle area. This allows dispersed forces to mass weapon effects without massing forces, which takes time and increases force vulnerability to counterfire. Afghanistan also demonstrated the increasingly powerful role in network centric warfare played by space-based communications and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Satellite communications and overhead reconnaissance and surveillance systems demonstrated dramatic improvements over their performance during the 1991 war against Iraq, when these systems were largely responsive to the national intelligence

community's needs rather than the needs of soldiers. In Afghanistan, near-real-time video data from UAVs were relayed via orbiting communication satellite to command centers and ground air controllers. This radical broadening of awareness about what was occurring on the battlefield enabled the operation's commander to direct the battle from his headquarters in Tampa, Florida, while maintaining instantaneous connection to forward headquarters in Kuwait and Uzbekistan. As only one indication of the growing importance of information, the Pentagon leased 800 Mbps of commercial satellite support compared with 100 Mbps during the 1991 Gulf War—a seven-fold increase in bandwidth to support one-tenth the number of troops.

However much Afghanistan may have demonstrated revolutionary improvements in military effectiveness, several qualifications are important to note. Much more difficult operational environments than Afghanistan can be readily imagined. Finding and rapidly attacking small bands of terrorists in the jungles of the Philippines would be much harder than targeting al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in mountain redoubts. Effectively delivering shock firepower while minimizing both friendly and civilian casualties in urban settings would be more daunting still. The prediction that 85 percent of the world's population will be located in cities by 2015 is a sober reminder of the challenges facing military forces prosecuting small wars against terrorists or insurgents. These unwelcome but inevitable operating environments place a premium on technology breakthroughs in foliage penetration radar, miniaturized missiles and drones, variable effect dial-a-yield munitions, multipurpose robots, and exceptionally agile fiber-optic missiles capable of high-G turns, just to mention a few. Even with the advantages that technological progress may offer, fighting in such hostile environments will demand much greater attention by the military services to new operational concepts and organizational changes for fighting counterinsurgency warfare.

Revolutionary Change in Counterinsurgency Warfare?

If nothing else, the post-war circumstances facing the American military services after their campaign against Iraq in 2003 have revealed their continuing disinterest—

with the notable exception of the U.S. Marine Corps—in counterinsurgency warfare. Arguably, this form of warfare lies at the heart of not only stabilizing postwar Iraq but also the search for remaining al Qaeda and Taliban elements in Afghanistan as well as the global campaign against terrorism in many different and diverse geographic regions. The U.S. Army, still feeling the effects of Vietnam, seems least ready to embrace counterinsurgency warfare. Despite pressure from the senior civilian leadership in the Pentagon, the Army remains fixated on what it perceives as its central task: preparing to fight and win conflicts against conventional land forces.

To be sure, despite the Army's efforts to move past Vietnam's lesson that counterinsurgency was largely a futile endeavor, there were fitful attempts to develop counterinsurgency warfare doctrine and capabilities after Vietnam. The Reagan administration's efforts to help counter the insurgency in El Salvador invigorated thinking about counterinsurgency doctrine and produced some notable successes in training led by its small advisory group in El Salvador. But the Army as an institution remained solidly committed to large-unit maneuver operations and the role of firepower. Small-unit operations and patrolling in urban and jungle environments remained the exception rather than the rule in Army thinking and actions. The 1991 Gulf War essentially eclipsed nascent interest within Army schools in sharpening counterinsurgency skills. Moreover, in the decade following the 1991 Gulf War, counterinsurgency thinking fell even further, being reduced largely to a "political" task, with the Army's role as one of furnishing support to host-nation operations. Direct Army engagement was viewed as inimical to U.S. interests to the extent that it turned a local war into an American one.

The postwar insurgency in Iraq and continuing war on terror have slowly combined to force a more serious consideration of employing Special Operations Forces and other specialized units (military police, civil affairs, and improved intelligence collection and foreign language skills) more effectively and creatively in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Thus far, the thrust of this effort is largely quantitative: increasing the size of these units by moving personnel from other army branches into these specialties. Yet there is an obvious danger in lowering standards

in highly specialized skill areas simply to demonstrate resolve that non-standard forms of warfare are increasingly important. The U.S. Marine Corps has replaced many Army units in Iraq because of their proven success and experience in small-unit operations. The Marines also plan to invigorate their Vietnam-era concept of Combined Action Platoons, or small units that train the local population to defend against insurgents. But the Marines are stretched thin with only one-third the active-duty personnel of the Army, not to mention the Army's large reserves.

The overall prospects for revolutionary changes in counterinsurgency operations look dim. The technological dimension is being investigated without producing any silver bullets. Yet, truly revolutionary change will not occur without military institutions' embracing the need to improve counterinsurgency operations, however messy, protracted, and politically uncertain. The Pentagon's civilian leadership in the early 21st century certainly pressed the Special Operations Forces to examine and adapt to the demands of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency warfare. However, the continuing insurgency in Iraq and the uncertain but continuing demands of fighting the war on terror make true revolutionary transformation at once challenging and problematic.

Implementing Revolutionary Changes in Warfare: A Scorecard

Military revolutions have tended to unfold unevenly, and the current RMA that is reshaping the way America fights its wars is no exception. Surely, the decisive victory America experienced in 1991 against Iraq represented the emergence of truly profound changes in military operations. The increases in military effectiveness experienced in 1991 were the product of considerable experimentation and training in the aftermath of America's withdrawal from Vietnam. New operational concepts focused on improvements in precision targeting, the suppression of enemy air defenses, and operational maneuver on the ground—even though they were examined in a NATO-Warsaw Pact context—matured sufficiently to prove enormously effective against a less capable Iraq. After the 1991 war, America's technological superiority over any conceivable adversary was seen, somewhat misleadingly, as the deciding factor in the continuing evolution of

changes in military affairs. No doubt America has decided technological advantages over its competition. Given U.S. leadership in the relevant commercial sectors, as well as its overall economic performance and investments in defense, it would appear natural for the United States to continue exploiting its early lead in absorbing new information technologies. But the American military has demonstrated less notable progress in doctrinal and organizational change—most importantly in truly joint operational formations involving the integration of components of each service to perform specific missions. Lacking this experimentation and transformation, no amount of technological superiority alone will produce truly transformational change in military capability.

History shows that relative economic and industrial performance or the strength of defense investment does not always determine the outcomes of military competitions. Necessity is frequently the determining force for change. America's adversaries drew important lessons from both the 1991 and 2003 American military campaigns against Iraq. They have already begun to change the manner in which they plan to challenge American forms of warfare. Certainly, tying down America in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns and pursuing intransigent terrorist operations will continue to challenge the American military to adapt and respond more effectively. But state adversaries too are investing resources in two continuing areas of potential American weakness: defending against a toxic mix of ballistic and cruise missiles, which could make American access to its overseas bases increasingly problematic; and area-denial capabilities (coastal anti-ship missiles, mines in shallow water, and land-based strike forces), which make littoral waters in areas like the Persian Gulf challenging environments within which to achieve success.

Whether or not military institutions will become sufficiently serious about self-examination and experimentation—the key elements of change—remains highly uncertain. Even though the U.S. Army has failed to embrace counterinsurgency operations with sufficient resolve, they are trying to transform their service from a heavy, mechanized force to a light but lethal force dependent on its dominant information edge, speed, and mobility. How relevant such a force concept will become in the less preferred and harsh urban or jungle environments that may dominate future warfare remains a critical issue. The U.S. Navy, too, seems intent to experiment with and eventually deploy a networked cluster of smaller littoral warfare vessels, including unmanned underwater vessels, more suitable to the challenge of area denial. As for the U.S. Air Force, even though it remains the service least interested in self-examination and radical experimentation, some progress is being made to examine how unmanned air combat vehicles might transform the way various air missions are executed in the future. Far more uncertain is the extent to which the services will truly implement joint warfare concepts of operation to cope with particularly challenging missions. Turning American missile defenses into a tightly integrated and carefully orchestrated joint operation, capable of dealing with both ballistic and cruise missile threats while avoiding air fratricide to the extent possible, remains a notable gap in the current American quest to achieve a revolution in military affairs.

Finally, and most importantly, RMAs imbue military organizations with vast advantages over prospective adversaries in the operational and tactical domains of warfare. No matter how effective they may be, such advantages cannot compensate for flawed national strategy. The American military's 21-day march to Baghdad in April 2003 was seen as a vindication of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's determination to transform the U.S. military into a tightly integrated offensive force capable of tremendous "shock and awe." Yet America's abysmal postwar strategic planning assumptions powerfully display how the failure of national strategy can rapidly eclipse overwhelming military power on the sea, on the ground, and in the air.

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Aerial Bombardment; Chemical Warfare; Cold War; Computer Technology and War; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Economy and War; Homeland Security; Intelligence Gathering in War; Manhattan Project; McNamara, Robert S.; Military–Industrial Complex; National War College; Nuclear Strategy; Peacekeeping Operations; Persian Gulf War; Rangers; Rumsfeld, Donald; Satellite Technology; Strategic Air Command; Think Tanks; War on Terrorism; World War I; World War II

—Dennis M. Gormley

Tecumseh

(c. 1768–1813)
Shawnee Leader

Native Americans living in the aftermath of the American Revolution were disillusioned by the actions of the new U.S. government, which acted to promote settlement of areas the British had reserved for native tribes, and which gave sanction to land transfers and sales of dubious legality. Tecumseh, bolstered by the religious prophecies of his brother, the "Shawnee Prophet," attempted to revive Joseph Brant's dream of a confederation of Native Americans able to repulse attempts to erode their traditional lands, and to return to a more spiritually pure world. Tecumseh's innate military talents as well as his dignity and humane conduct made him both a figure of admiration and a serious danger to American power in the Old Northwest.

Born circa 1768 in present-day Ohio or West Virginia, but possibly during a family visit to Creek lands in Alabama, Tecumseh ("Shooting Star") was the second son of Pukeshinwau, a Kispoko Shawnee, and his wife Methoataaskee, a Pekowi Shawnee. Although the family had returned to Ohio in 1758, they maintained extensive connections to their Creek and Alabama relatives and allies, connections which Tecumseh later called upon in his efforts to foster multi-tribal cooperation. Tecumseh grew up in the tense situation that resulted from the ceding of Ohio land to white settlement by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768). Tecumseh's father was killed in a clash with Col. Andrew Lewis at Point Pleasant in October 1774, and the family was left in difficult circumstances. Tecumseh became a skilled hunter and an accomplished warrior under the tutelage of his elder brother Cheesekau, and probably saw his first battle alongside him in 1786 at Mad River when elements of the Shawnee attacked flatboats led

by Benjamin Logan. In 1788, the family traveled south and reconnected with their associations among the Cherokee and Chickamauga. Tecumseh suffered a broken leg during the journey that left him with permanent damage.

Returning to Ohio with Cheesekau in 1791, Tecumseh saw the disastrous results of American settlement in the region for the Shawnee and quickly joined forces with the local resistance. Cheesekau was killed in Cumberland in 1792 during a raid. Though Tecumseh was not present at the defeat of Arthur St. Clair on the Wabash, he survived the battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794. Having successfully escaped capture, he became embittered at the refusal of the British to give him sanctuary at Fort Miami. Throughout the late 1790s, Tecumseh lived as an independent chief, building a reputation for his generosity and his good treatment of captives. During this period, he sired his only son, Paukeesa, by the Shawnee–white Mamate, in 1796. Tecumseh was known for marrying frequently and briefly, but to a single woman at a time, which was unusual for the Shawnee.

In 1805, an epidemic—probably of smallpox or influenza—threw the Shawnee into crisis. Tecumseh's youngest brother, Tenskwatawa ("The Prophet"), who had been previously a marginal member of the community, emerged as a spiritual leader, demanding stricter moral standards and separation from the ways of life brought by the white settlers. Tenskwatawa's directives drew supporters to Shawnee settlements at Greenville and Prophetstown, which, despite Tecumseh's eloquent assurances of peace, alarmed both the territorial governor, William Henry Harrison, and white settlers in the region. Foreseeing the possibility of war between Britain and America, Tecumseh began to contact tribes alienated by the 1809 Treaty of Fort Wayne (including the Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Sac and Fox, Winnebago, Miami, and Ottawa) in order to present a program of collective negotiation with the whites and a revival of confederation. He also contacted the British at Fort Malden for clandestine support. Tecumseh was an impressive diplomat and orator, and he made use of widely recognized tribal symbols like the calumet and wampum to overcome language and tribal rivalries. The tribes' dependence on American annuities for financial and material support, however, proved difficult to overcome.

Attempts to reassure Harrison of his peaceful intentions floundered in both 1810 and 1811, and the last meeting at Vincennes in August 1811 concluded with Harrison convinced that Tecumseh was inciting Iroquois refugees to settle in the Ohio Valley. Tecumseh soon departed for a diplomatic tour to the Creek, Choctaws, and southern Shawnee, leaving his brother to supervise the community at Prophetstown. Unfortunately, Harrison was bent on reducing the number of Native Americans gathered there, and the Prophet proved unable to restrain some of the braves who were harassing white settlers in the area. Finally, Harrison marched on the town in November 1811 and instigated the disastrous battle of Tippecanoe. When Tecumseh returned in January 1812, he found the town burned and many of his supporters scattered.

Despite this setback, important natural phenomena—including the appearance of a comet and the New Madrid earthquakes—gave the tribes confidence to unleash a series of raids on settlements and American positions in the spring of 1812. Their position was buttressed by the June 18 declaration of war by the United States on Great Britain. Tecumseh disliked the British, but he believed they offered the greatest hope for Native Americans of attacking the United States and regaining land lost to treaties. Maj. Gen. Isaac Brock, left with little to defend Upper Canada, welcomed Tecumseh and his followers, who represented the aggressive members of many regional tribes as far-reaching as the Dakota Sioux and Iroquois. These men, who could sometimes gather in groups as large as 500 to 600, proved invaluable in turning back the invasion of Canada by William Hull and helping to effect the stunning capture of Brownstown and Detroit.

However much they appreciated his military contributions, the British declined to fulfill Tecumseh's expectation of supporting an attempt to retake the Old Northwest. Tecumseh left the British lines in 1812 to lead a failed attack on Fort Harrison before returning in April 1813 to rejoin those followers of his who had remained to fight with the British at Raisin River. Tecumseh's reputation was increased on all sides by his tactical prowess in preventing the relief of Fort Meigs by attacking flatboats carrying 1,200 volunteers from Kentucky. When 800 of these Kentuckians landed to

destroy a battery of British cannon, Tecumseh baited a trap by ordering his men to retreat. The Americans pursued and found themselves surrounded. As many as 50 may have been killed before Tecumseh arrived and insisted that the Americans be treated as prisoners rather than killed or tortured. Unfortunately, Tecumseh's efforts to unite the southern tribes in rebellion misfired, and the Cherokee, Creek, and Alabama suffered defeats by Andrew Jackson in the course of the War of 1812.

Tecumseh was badly wounded in the battle of Moraviantown while covering the British retreat from Fort Malden, and on October 5, 1813, he was killed while holding the left wing of the British line at the battle of the Thames. It is unknown who fired the fatal shot, although Kentucky senator Richard Mentor Johnson claimed to have done so in his unsuccessful 1836 campaign for the presidential nomination (Johnson would become Van Buren's vice president). Tecumseh's burial site is unknown. After his death, he came to be regarded as a Canadian national hero for turning back the American invasion, a champion of Pan-Native American rights, and a heroic and noble figure to Americans, resulting in a spate of namesakes, notably Civil War general William Tecumseh Sherman.

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War of 1812; Brant, Joseph and Margaret "Molly" Brant

—*Margaret Sankey*

Television and War

Since its first commercial broadcasts in the 1940s, American television has aired dozens of series featuring the armed forces. Along with film, television allows Americans who have not experienced combat or military life to learn about it vicariously. What television depicts about war and about the nation's armed forces profoundly shapes the people who watch it. Coverage of the military services in documentaries and entertainment programs has been overwhelmingly favorable, partly owing to the inherent conservatism of the medium but also because of the participation of the military services. Nevertheless, audiences have continued to watch even when shows confronted more controversial issues. Despite an increasing variety of genres and shows, the appeal of combat genres, military settings, and military characters has endured with American audiences.

During the 1950s, television emerged as a popular mass entertainment medium. It reached nearly 85 percent of American homes in 1957 and 95 percent by the end of the following decade. Because the television industry depended on income from advertisers, who lavished funds on the highest-rated shows, there has always been pressure on television writers, directors, and actors to respond to the expectations of market audiences. Shows could not be too controversial, yet they needed to address timely and pertinent social issues. As television became more popular, audience expectations for quality programming rose. The television industry has also fought criticism that it broadcasts too much violence. Given these conditions, military series have needed to strike a balance between the pressures of being socially conservative and of exploring the human issues of war.

The Good War and the Cold War

At least 16 military-based television series aired between 1949 and 1960, including the critically acclaimed *Crusade in Europe* and *Victory at Sea*, and the long-running *Navy Log*, *The Big Picture*, and *The Phil Silvers Show*. Documentaries in the 1950s helped establish World War II as the "good war" and highlighted contemporary issues and events in the early years of the Cold War. Regardless of format, all shows consistently provided a flattering and positive view of the armed

forces. *Crusade in Europe* (1949) marked the first major television documentary and the first show dedicated to the military. Based on Dwight D. Eisenhower's memoir, it relived World War II and portrayed American troops as brave, skilled, and heroic. The success of Crusade in Europe prompted *Crusade in the Pacific* in 1951. *Crusade in the Pacific* extended its coverage of World War II to comment on contemporary operations in Korea.

The popular and critically acclaimed documentary *Victory at Sea* (1952–53) reinforced the idea of the "good war." Based on the work of historian Samuel Eliot Morison, *Victory at Sea* recounted the U.S. Navy's role in World War II and added a distinct Cold War perspective. *Victory at Sea* can be described as self-righteously moralizing, in that it implied an American consensus about issues and highlighted America's innocence and liberation of the oppressed. *Victory at Sea* proved so popular that it aired on television and in theaters around the world. The Army created its own successful documentary series, *The Big Picture* (1953–59). The Army provided the 828 episodes to network television free of charge, and reruns aired until 1971.

Another form of war programming to appear on television, the anthology series, emerged in 1953. Anthology stories resembled theater plays, with each episode featuring a unique setting and plot. Accordingly, anthologies did not rely on a specific set of characters. Although most anthology series featured a military character or setting, shows such as *Navy Log* (1955–58) and *West Point Story* (1956–58) focused on a specific service arm. Each show reenacted actual events, sometimes changing names or dates. *Navy Log* relived World War II and featured contemporary issues, events, and weaponry. Often the episodes focused on ordinary sailors, either in battle settings or in their personal lives. West Point Story intended to portray the cadets as typical young men of the time, facing personal challenges and successes. Both *Navy Log* and *West Point Story* received assistance from their respective service. *Men of Annapolis* (1957–58) provided the same function for the cadets at the naval academy. Applications for admission into the military service academies increased as these shows aired.

Comedian Phil Silvers created the first fictional series featuring military themes to air on network television. *The Phil Silvers Show* (1955–59) adopted a contemporary setting at the fictitious Fort Baxter, Kansas. Silvers played con artist Master Sergeant Ernie Bilko, who ran gambling rings and every other sort of profit-making scheme imaginable. His character, though often loud and arrogant, proved likable. His smooth talking got him and his men out of trouble on many occasions. Bilko ran circles around the base commander, Colonel Hall, but his patriotism was never seriously in doubt. Bilko usually ended up the biggest loser in his own schemes.

Vietnam

As the conflict in Vietnam heated up, the television industry responded to the interest in the military by vastly increasing the number of military-themed shows on the air. Between 1961 and 1970, the three networks broadcast 11 military drama series and 15 military comedies. Ten of those series ran for three seasons or more, and *Combat!*, *McHale's Navy*, *Gomer Pyle USMC*, *I Dream of Jeannie*, and *Hogan's Heroes* all topped 100 episodes. When the majority of Americans grew to disapprove of the war after 1968, the genre disappeared just as quickly. Like the film industry, television refrained from setting stories in Vietnam, perceiving the topic to be too controversial even in the early days of American intervention in Southeast Asia. Corporate sponsorship might have contributed to the conservative response, as some sponsors also held defense contracts. One defense contractor, RCA, owned the television network NBC. Politically and socially, the "good" war appeared safer territory than Vietnam. Most television shows in the 1960s that featured World War II did so in fictionalized accounts, either in heroic combat dramas or amusing comedies. Some have suggested that the World War II series, like the popular spy genre, unwittingly supported the official White House perspective on the Cold War and the war in Vietnam.

Combat! (1962–67) proved the most significant of the World War II combat dramas. It followed the experiences of a squad in the 2nd platoon of King Company in the United States Army as they patrolled and assaulted their way across France in 1944. *Combat!* explored the human cost of war in an intelligent and sophisticated manner, though it did not depict graphic wounds or language. It also touched on Cold

War issues in its interaction with Allies, its emphasis on intelligence, and its humanization of the German enemy who had become a Cold War ally. *Combat!*, which received assistance from the Department of the Army, occasionally incorporated combat footage to attain a sense of authenticity.

Based on a novel and film, *Twelve O'Clock High* (1964–67) initially followed the exploits of (and command pressures on) Brig. Gen. Frank Savage as he led the 918th bomber group in daylight raids over occupied Europe and Germany. Savage died during the second season and was replaced by Col. Joe Gallagher. Audiences watched Gallagher's character grow in wisdom and experience. In addition to highlighting the pressures of war, the show humanized the German enemy, depicting them as intelligent foes.

The Rat Patrol (1966–68), an action–adventure series set in North Africa, featured three Americans and a British soldier on adventures and intrigue against the German enemy led by Captain Dietrich. It depicted a black and white world where characters did not question the war or confront moral dilemmas. Even fascism was largely absent from the show. Dietrich proved a professional soldier, not an ideologue, and Nazis who did appear were made into sinister caricatures. *The Rat Patrol* crossed genre lines to incorporate many of the techniques of the spy genre that had become popular during the Cold War. If the men in *Combat!* had feared that their actions would be meaningless in the aftermath of the war, the Rat Patrol directed the outcome of the war in each episode. The Arab natives appeared in stereotypical, racist, and strangely foreign terms, yet the Patrol attempted to win their hearts and minds to the Allied cause, paralleling the American efforts toward the Vietnamese populace at that time. The members of the Rat Patrol were selfless and patriotic, and anyone critical or cynical regarding the war was labeled an enemy. *The Rat Patrol* claimed victory each episode, suggesting that war could be fun and easy to win.

Comedy proved even more popular than combat drama. In *McHale's Navy* (1962–66), con artist Lieutenant Commander McHale led his rag-tag patrol boat crew into and out of various schemes under the nose of base commander Captain Binghamton. Set on a South Pacific island during World War II, the cast rarely encountered a hostile enemy and did not face life-threatening situations. It regularly poked fun

at rank, regulations, and military decorum. *Hogan's Heroes* (1965–71) ventured into satire and parody. The Allied prisoners of war in the German camp Stalag 13, which included a Frenchman, an Englishman, and an African American among others, contributed to the war effort by conducting intelligence and rescue operations under the incompetent eyes of commandant Colonel Klink and Sergeant Schultz, who "sees nothing" of the prisoners' work. Some critics argued that a prisoner of war camp did not provide the appropriate setting for comedy, but the show depicted loyal soldiers competently doing their duty. The men in Stalag 13 adhered to military decorum and respected rank more steadfastly than did the crew on *McHale's Navy*.

Some of the military-themed shows crossed over into the western genre. *F Troop* (1965–67), which was a slap-stick comedy about the frontier post of Fort Courage, turned into one of the most successful of this kind. Ineffectual Capt. Wilton Parmenter commanded the post, but like Sergeant

A still from Hogan's Heroes. *Bob Crane as Hogan is kneeling. Leaning over him is Helga, Col. Klink's secretary, played by Cynthia Lynn. To her right is Klink (Werner Klemperer) and next to him is Sgt. Schultz (John Banner). (Getty Images)*

Bilko, scheming Sergeant O'Rourke and his side-kick Corporal Agarn really ran the outpost. They established a profitable business with the local Native American tribes. Local girl Jane proved the best shot in town.

Gomer Pyle USMC (1964–70), although set during peacetime, aired through much of the Vietnam War era. Charismatic Gomer somehow managed to bungle through Marine Corps basic training to arrive at Camp Henderson, California. Gomer's naiveté and simpleminded honesty and trust annoyed Sergeant Carter, who attempted to personify the tough Marine Corps image. Episodes focused on Marines in garrison, who spent their time drilling, going on field exercises, and going out on the town with a weekend pass. The show did not mention or reference the war in Vietnam. Some critics have argued that the bloodless combat of the dramas and the escapist humor of such comedies as Gomer Pyle prevented the American people from confronting on television the real war in Vietnam. Increased violence and graphic material in television and film in later years, however, does not appear to have affected negatively American attitudes toward war.

By the 1970–71 television season, all of the military-themed series had left the air. More ethnically diverse shows appeared on television, and taboos on language and subject matter began to loosen. The most successful military show ever broadcast, *M*A*S*H* (1972–83), debuted in this new milieu. Based on the film of the same name, *M*A*S*H* followed the doctors and nurses of an Army field hospital set during the Korean War. It initially tapped into the distaste many Americans felt about the war in Vietnam by adopting an irreverent, antimilitary flare. Critics hailed the award-winning program as one of the most literate shows to air. With humor and sensitivity, *M*A*S*H* confronted controversial issues such as sex, drugs, alcoholism, loneliness, homosexuality, and women's rights. Over the years, the characters grew in complexity, and the show's tone changed with the times. As the military became rehabilitated from the Vietnam era during *M*A*S*H*'s last seasons, the show changed its antimilitary attitude significantly and contained fewer sexual innuendos and bouts of drinking. By the end of the series, the men and women of the 4077th no longer lampooned the Army, but demonstrated its competency, care, and concern.

One of the most critically acclaimed documentaries about the Vietnam War, *Vietnam: A Television History* (1983), also confronted the controversial issues of the war with sensitivity. Overall, the series balanced its interpretation, offered multiple perspectives, and provided clarity and analysis to complex issues. Some critics from the political right argued that the show emphasized the nationalism of North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh over his communism.

By the late 1980s, the combat drama reemerged, focusing on Vietnam instead of World War II. *Tour of Duty* (1987–90) followed a diverse platoon of infantrymen as they struggled to stay alive through their one-year tour in Vietnam in 1967. Situated at a firebase in the Central Highlands, the platoon faced the battle-hardened and well-supplied North Vietnamese Army regulars. Like *Combat!*, *Tour of Duty* strove to examine the human elements in war. It also confronted controversial issues such as racism, prostitution, and the antiwar movement. *China Beach* (1988–91) was also set in Vietnam in 1967. Like *M*A*S*H*, this award-winning show featured Army nurses and doctors experiencing the personal and war-related pressures of being near combat. It also tackled controversial issues such as racism, abortion, drug use, post-traumatic stress disorder, and the problems facing returning veterans trying to reintegrate into American society.

The Great Wars Recreated

One of the most critically acclaimed documentary series of all time is Ken Burns's *The Civil War* (1990), which covered comprehensively the era from the division of the states over the issue of slavery through President Abraham Lincoln's assassination. It examined subjects ranging from the battlefields to the home front, juxtaposing the perspectives of soldiers, civilians, women, and slaves. Overall, the documentary balanced northern and southern sympathies. Some scholars criticized the series for its oversimplified interpretation of the slavery issue, which valorized the morality of northern abolitionists and vilified Southerners for the evils of the institution. Conversely, southern General Robert E. Lee and Confederate President Jefferson Davis received praise.

Based on the book of the same name by historian Stephen Ambrose, the ten-part miniseries *Band of Brothers*

(2001) recreated the actual events of a company of airborne troops during training, D-Day, the Battle of Bastogne, and postwar occupation duty. Although depicting the hardships and mental and psychological brutality of war, including gruesome wounds, the men of Easy Company were heroic members of America's "greatest generation."

Mixing Genres

As *The Rat Patrol* and *F Troop* had done previously, *JAG* (1995–) merged popular genres, in this case by placing lawyers in a military setting. Navy Comm. Harmon Rabb and Marine Lieut. Col. Sarah MacKenzie were two lawyers who routinely represented opposing sides of contemporary issues facing the Navy and Marine Corps. The drama dealt with controversial issues such as sexual harassment, but it also branched into action and adventure stories. The resolutions to the episodes generally offered a favorable view of the military, the men and women who serve, and the United States. *Navy NCIS* (2003–) combined the popular investigative aspect of *JAG* with an equally popular genre of forensic science. The characters of the show were civilian special investigators and forensic scientists who work to resolve crimes for the Navy and Marine Corps. The show also reflected contemporary issues with regard to the military, including operations in the Middle East and international terrorism. The Navy and Marine Corps were represented positively.

Military-themed television shows have proved robust and enduring. Nearly every television format from documentaries to dramas, comedies, and miniseries has produced a military-based version. Audiences have consistently shown the military premise to be popular, even when confronting the harsh realities and ramifications of war. The shows have changed in subject matter and tone as American society and culture has changed over time. Audiences continue to reflect and struggle to understand war and military life through television.

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CNN; *Combat!*; *M*A*S*H*; Media and War; Memory and War; *Twelve O'Clock High*

—*Lisa M. Mundey*

Thayer, Sylvanus

(1785–1872)

Superintendent of the United States Military Academy

Sylvanus Thayer was the most important figure in the transformation of the United States Military Academy at West Point into a vibrant institution for the training of Army officers. As superintendent of West Point from 1817 to 1833, he

enacted reforms that fundamentally shaped the academy and, with it, the character of the Army officer corps for decades.

Born in Braintree, Massachusetts, on July 9, 1785, Thayer graduated from Dartmouth College in 1807 and secured an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy that same year. Because of his manifest intellectual gifts and the lack of clear structure and standards at West Point at the time, Thayer was able to graduate from the academy after only a year as a cadet and was commissioned a second lieutenant of engineers in 1808. He spent the next four years serving as an engineer along the eastern seaboard of the United States and teaching mathematics at West Point. During the War of 1812, Thayer saw extensive service and achieved the regular rank of captain and a brevet (honorary) promotion to major. In 1815 the War Department sent Thayer to Europe to study military institutions and obtain military literature and teaching tools for use at West Point. Two years later, he assumed command at West Point.

At the time of Thayer's appointment, West Point was beginning to emerge from an early history in which its organization, curriculum, and purpose were haphazard and ill-defined. In the aftermath of the War of 1812, many military and civilian leaders believed that there needed to be a greater degree of technical proficiency and professionalism in the officer corps. Thayer's task was to transform West Point so it could serve as the foundation for this effort.

Thayer arrived at West Point in June 1817 and immediately solicited information and recommendations from the faculty regarding the academy's organization and curriculum. A few weeks later, he ordered a general examination of the cadets. When the results confirmed his suspicion that the cadets were not making sufficient progress in their studies, Thayer ordered the faculty to prepare weekly reports on their classes. After a few months following a revised curriculum and much stricter discipline, a second round of examinations took place in December 1817. The cadets' improvement convinced Thayer that he was on the right track. The practice of weekly reports and semiannual general examinations became a permanent part of the program at West Point.

Thayer also standardized the curriculum so that it would be more in line with what he had witnessed in Europe, mandating that all cadets take a four-year course of study that emphasized mathematics and engineering. This was a manifestation of the powerful influence of French military ideals throughout the Western world in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, although there were also a number of practical reasons for this emphasis. First, from the inception of the Military Academy in 1802, it was hoped the academy would provide the Army with officers who possessed proficiency in the technical aspects of warfare—especially engineering—since the United States had been compelled to turn to European officers trained in these skills during the Revolutionary War. It was also believed that a highly technical curriculum would foster mental discipline and thus prepare cadets for leadership. Finally, Thayer was conscious of the growing nation's need for engineers and that the production of civil engineers was a means by which West Point could serve the nation—and justify its own existence—in peacetime.

Thayer also insisted on small classes that were organized by merit, with competition encouraged through the merit roll, which was determined by academic and military performance and conduct. For military training, Thayer instituted summer encampments during which cadets received practice in drill, conducted artillery and engineering exercises, and socialized with each other, building personal bonds that would create a sense of fellowship among graduates. To oversee the operations of the academy, Thayer established the Academic Board, composed of the superintendent, the commandant of cadets, and the principle instructors. For decades, the board would be dominated by individuals who shared Thayer's vision of the academy. The board also served as a bulwark against any effort to change the culture, curriculum, and structure that he instituted at West Point. To promote the academy, Thayer encouraged civilians to visit West Point to observe the cadets as they trained, cultivated good relations with politicians in Washington, and he invited learned men and political leaders to the academy to witness the semiannual examinations.

After 1829, however, Thayer found himself in frequent conflict with Pres. Andrew Jackson. Although Jackson once proclaimed West Point "the best school in the world" (Crackel, 101), the president and many of his supporters

considered Thayer's management of the academy autocratic and designed to foster a "military aristocracy" that was incompatible with the American tradition of citizen soldiery and democratic ethos. After Jackson was reelected to a second term, Thayer decided in January 1833 to resign as superintendent.

Thayer remained in the Army after leaving the military academy, and rose to the regular rank of colonel and the brevet rank of brigadier general. Until ill health compelled him to resign his commission in June 1863, Thayer supervised engineering projects along the eastern seaboard and—through protégés like professor Dennis Hart Mahan, who continued to dominate the Academic Board at West Point—lobbied against efforts to modify the program he had established at the academy. Thayer also established a school of engineering at Dartmouth. He settled in Braintree, Massachusetts, where he died on September 7, 1872.

Although the U.S. Military Academy had existed for 15 years before Thayer's appointment as superintendent, his leadership made West Point a truly important institution in American life. Cadets exposed to "the Thayer system" not only became leaders in the army, but also made critical contributions to the development of the nation as engineers and managers by applying the skills they developed at West Point. Thayer is justly remembered as the "Father of the Military Academy."

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European Military Culture, Influence of; Hitchcock, Ethan Allen; Jackson, Andrew; Mahan, Dennis Hart; Military Academy, United States

—Ethan S. Rafuse

Theater and War

Theater audiences have applauded plays and spectacles about American wars since the 1770s. Given the importance of war in forging the new nation, dramatized military actions were a prominent part of American theatrical entertainment between 1790 and 1840. Warfare gradually receded as a major theme in the theater after 1840, however, and even the dramatic possibilities of the Civil War did little to revive audience interest in military plays. Only in the 1930s did theater spectators return in large numbers to consider national wars. By then, memories of World War I and the threat of another one sparked a national conversation about pacifism and combat. The challenges and problems of war during World War II and the Cold War that followed it played to many attentive U.S. spectators through the 1970s. Despite intermittent military conflicts after 1980, the American theater had little to say about U.S. wars for the rest of the century. Concern about the "war on terrorism" and combat in Iraq, however, sparked renewed interest in warfare among alternative theaters and audiences after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

War on Stage, 1770–1840

Although amateur and professional troupes initiated theatrical productions soon after European colonies were established in the Americas, it was not until the revolutionary era that American theater artists began to move away from European, particularly British, models. Colonial pamphleteers published several dramatic dialogues to protest purported British outrages in the 1770s. While most of these pieces were not intended for performance, they inspired Mercy Otis Warren, the chief dramatic propagandist for the American cause, to pen *The Adulateur* (1772), a five-act tragedy that called for an armed response to the "Boston

Massacre." She followed this piece with *The Group* (1775), which ridiculed the imposition of martial law in Boston, and *The Blockheads* (1776), which attacked British occupying forces and their Tory sympathizers.

Warren's plays never reached production, however. Patriots had come to associate the theater with English "extravagance and dissipation," as the Continental Congress termed it in 1774, and they banned play production altogether for the duration of the Revolutionary War. Even George Washington was forbidden from staging *Cato*, a celebrated republican tragedy, as a means of inspiring his troops during the winter at Valley Forge. In contrast, British officers and Tories in occupied New York City enjoyed a thriving theater for most of the war. Although a few patriots understood that the theater might serve their cause, the anti-theatrical prejudices of revolutionary republicanism stamped out most theatrical activity from 1776 into the mid-1780s.

Most cities revoked their anti-theater laws, and performances resumed in the late 1780s, inducing several new playwrights to join most spectators in applauding the recent Revolution. Royall Tyler in *The Contrast* (1787), for example, honored the patriots' efforts by making his sentimental hero a colonel from the Continental Army who saves the heroine from the clutches of an Anglicized American fop. *Bunker Hill, or the Death of General Warren* (1797), by John D. Burk, celebrated American resistance to British tyranny with a miniaturized reenactment of the battle onstage, complete with cannon fire. Patriotism in the new republic, however, restricted as well as animated dramatic tastes. Manager-playwright William Dunlap found little success with his neoclassical tragedy *Andre* (1798), which was based on the hanging of a British spy, because his drama elevated enlightened reason over narrow-minded nationalism. Revised as *The Glory of Columbia: Her Yeomanry* (1803) and manned with patriotic American farmers to capture the spy, the renamed play was a hit at Fourth of July celebrations in playhouses for years.

The War of 1812 also inspired many dramatic efforts. These included *The Eighth of January* (1829) and *Triumph at Plattsburg* (1830), both by Richard Penn Smith. Like most plays about the struggle, these works understood the fighting as the second war for American independence. Mordecai

Noah, who published documentary-like plays set during several American wars, also penned *Marion*, *The Hero of Lake George* (1821). Noah's most popular effort was *She Would Be a Soldier* (1819), composed for a New York actress who cross-dressed as a man (a sexually titillating "breeches role") and fought at the battle of Chippewa.

The other novelty role in *She Would Be a Soldier* was a Native American warrior, initially played by Edwin Forrest. Forrest would soon become the first native-born star of the American stage, and several of the vehicles crafted for his stardom were essentially tragic versions of the American War of Independence. In *Metamora* (1829), set in Puritan New England, for instance, a heroic Indian chief dies for his people by fighting against invading Englishmen who steal their land and enslave their women. Forrest played other tragic champions of republican liberty: the rebellious slave Spartacus in *The Gladiator* (1831) by Robert Montgomery Bird, and the leader of a peasant revolt in medieval England in *Jack Cade* (1835) by Robert T. Conrad. These tragedies were Jacksonian morality plays, warning the American people not to abandon the eternal fight for liberty and turn against their heroic, God-given leaders. With his muscular build and stentorian voice, Forrest starred as a martyr to the people in these plays to further many of the goals of Jacksonian republicanism. (This did not include the goal of "Manifest Destiny," however; Forrest's *Metamora* died cursing the white man's victory over his tribe.) Forrest played each of these roles several hundred times, often to packed houses of patriotic working-class spectators, from the 1830s into the 1850s.

As the popularity of *Metamora* suggests, the Indian Wars between the Revolution and the Civil War inspired a variety of dramatic treatments. Before 1830, most of these plays borrowed from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to depict Native Americans as noble savages. The Pocahontas story was a favorite theme, and U.S. playwrights often depicted Indian–white conflict in sentimental terms as avoidable. After 1830 and the forced removal of most tribes to lands west of the Mississippi, more dramatists tended to racialize Native Americans and to represent them as uncivilized savages, fit for destruction by the westward advancing whites. While noble savages still led tribes in *Oralloosa* (1832),

Tecumseh (1836), and *Pontiac* (1836), their followers, like the murdering redskins of *Nick of the Woods* (1838), were increasingly treacherous and bloodthirsty. Unsurprisingly, no American play during these years portrayed the Indian Wars from the perspective of U.S. imperialism or genocide.

Warfare in Retreat, 1840–1920

Although the Mexican War produced in the mid 1840s a few predictable melodramas about American victories, most U.S. theatergoers were becoming middle-class and turning away from warfare as a significant dramatic theme. Their focus shifted to familial, social, and political problems closer to their everyday lives. By 1861, warfare had come to seem a romantic adventure to most Americans. This made the death tolls and social upheavals of the Civil War all the more shocking and, for commercial playwrights, effectively unstageable. No playwright attempted a serious treatment of the war in the 1860s. While the battles were raging, theaters in the North and South primarily treated soldiers and civilians to nostalgic melodramas, light comedies, and patriotic spectacles.

In the North, blackface minstrelsy, despite its generally "old-folks-at-home" ideology, upheld the Union. Minstrelsy as a separate genre of entertainment featuring white men in blackface had begun in 1843, and during the 1850s minstrel troupes sentimentalized southern plantations as happy homes for Jim Crows, Earth Mother mammies, and feminized old uncles. Nonetheless, most minstrel skits and songs celebrated Union victories after 1861, although they seldom mentioned Pres. Abraham Lincoln and skirted the effects of the Emancipation Proclamation. Minstrel songs such as "Just Before the Battle, Mother" also encouraged audiences to weep for the fallen. After 1865, minstrelsy satirized Reconstruction and attacked all attempts at securing racial equality.

Tellingly, major playwrights did not engage the dramatic possibilities of the Civil War until the failure of Reconstruction had settled the fate of black citizens in the United States, and even then the plays ignored the issue of slavery that had divided the Union. Bronson Howard, the first U.S. citizen to make his living solely as a dramatist, penned *Shenandoah* for the New York stage in 1888. Its emphasis on romance drove home the need for reconciliation among whites in the North and South. Except for occasional episodes from the battlefields (General Sheridan's famous ride that suddenly reverses the course of the fighting at the Battle of Shenandoah in the play, for instance), the melodrama features four pairs of couples from opposing sides of the conflict that struggle to realize their romances. This love-across-the-battle-lines device proved popular in other Civil War melodramas as well, such as *Held By the Enemy* (1886) and *Secret Service* (1895), both by William Gillette. David Belasco's *The Heart of Maryland* (1895) offered a similar mix of romance, sensation, and conventional villainy, with more realism and titillation in his wartime thriller. These escapist melodramas simply avoided the bloody realities of Civil War battles. Further, the need for national unity based on whiteness that was applauded by white spectators in these plays evaded and abetted the racism that was increasing against black citizens and many groups of foreign immigrants in the 1880s and 1890s.

Similar notions of white supremacy undergirded the success of the Wild West shows. In the 1880s Col. William Frederick "Buffalo Bill" Cody began the first of these outdoor, traveling productions, which generally featured displays of shooting, roping and riding skills, a stagecoach holdup, and Indians attacking a cattle ranch. Cody hired Black Elk, Sitting Bull, and other defeated Indian chiefs to appear in his spectacles. Like many post–Civil War plays about the frontier, such as *Horizon* (1870) by Augustin Daly, the Wild West shows depicted Native Americans as impediments to the march of civilization. In fact, engineer–showman Steele MacKaye incorporated most of Cody's production into his *Drama of Civilization* extravaganza staged at Madison Square Garden in 1885. The victory of white frontiersman over red savages in the Wild West shows, enormously popular into the 1920s, turned the military defeat of Indian nations in the 19th century into a cultural disaster for Native Americans.

Although American victory in the Spanish–American War energized a few vaudevillians and theatrical opportunists to produce some patriotic spectacles, the musical stage presented the most sustained versions of American nationalism between 1900 and 1920. Chief among the flag

wavers was George M. Cohan, who wrote "You're a Grand Old Flag" (1904) and made references to American victories in Cuba and the Philippines in several of his songs. A proponent of American intervention into World War I, Cohan was awarded a Congressional medal for his famous song "Over There" (1917), which celebrates the inevitability of allied victory now that the "Yanks are coming . . . over there." Irving Berlin's all-soldier revue *Yip Yip Yaphank* (1918), with its memorable "Oh, How I Hate to Get Up in the Morning," also beat the drums for U.S. victory.

War and Peace, 1920–80

After 1920, however, many American theatergoers, increasingly an educated minority among urban entertainment seekers, turned against the recent U.S participation in World War I. *What Price Glory?* (1924) by Maxwell Anderson and Laurence Stallings, a Marine Corps captain who had lost a leg in combat, reflected some of this disillusionment, but warfare in this hardboiled version of life in the trenches remained a romantic, if dangerous, adventure. In several plays from 1927 to 1940, Robert E. Sherwood captured much of his generation's gradual change from isolationism to engagement. Sherwood set his initial antiwar arguments in the midst of Roman Italy at the time of Hannibal's invasion in *The Road to Rome* (1927). The dramatist presented Western civilization as a petrified forest in a 1935 play with the same title. His theme was that, unless they were stopped, gangsters, like European dictators, could easily kill off the petrified poets and intellectuals of the West. Sherwood followed this allegory with another, *Idiot's Delight* (1936), which stranded hapless and cynical representatives of Western culture in a Swiss hotel on the eve of the next war. Finally, in *There Shall Be No Night* (1940), Sherwood urged that the United States intervene against Hitler to rescue European democracies.

While pacifist dramas dominated Broadway during the early and mid-1930s, plays urging U.S. intervention gained popularity at the end of the decade. Believing that World War I had primarily benefited capitalist munitions makers, Paul Green and Irwin Shaw, respectively, wrote *Johnny Johnson* (1936) and *Bury the Dead* (1937). Skepticism about warfare under capitalism also animated *Paths of Glory* (1935), by Sidney Howard, and *Ten Million Ghosts* (1936), by Sidney

Kingsley. After 1938, however, more plays argued for military opposition to European fascism. These included *Waltz in Goose Step* (1938), *Brown Danube* (1939), *Another Sun* (1940), *Candle in the Wind* (1941), by Maxwell Anderson, and *Watch on the Rhine* (1941), by Lillian Hellman.

Unlike the response of the American theater to U.S intervention in World War I, some of the country's best authors supported the war effort with popular plays after Pearl Harbor. Novelist John Steinbeck penned *The Moon Is Down* (1942), Broadway veteran Maxwell Anderson composed *Storm Operation* (1944), and Moss Hart turned from comedy writing to *Winged Victory* (1943). In addition, theatrical stars joined Hollywood and radio personalities in U.S.O. (United Service Organizations) corps to entertain American troops at home and abroad.

The intrusiveness of the war effort into American life, along with fears that another war might soon follow, led several playwrights after 1945 to examine many aspects of the recent conflict with their business-class audiences. Some plays, like *Mr. Roberts* (1948), portrayed the unheroic tedium of life behind the battle lines, while others, such as *Command Decision* (1947), emphasized the importance of responsible leadership. Arthur Laurents's *Home of the Brave* (1945) examined the ethnic tensions that had debilitated American morale during combat. Many plays, most notably *The Diary of Anne Frank* (1955), based on Anne's censored diary, reported events that had justified American fighting. Several, including Maxwell Anderson's *Truckline Café* (1946) and Arthur Miller's *All My Sons* (1947), featured problems encountered by returning veterans. By placing the tragic figure of a man whose work in airplane manufacturing had caused the death of several pilots at the center of his drama, Miller's play also raised questions about moral responsibility that had ramifications for the role of the new United Nations.

Nagging problems concerning the past war, however, soon gave way to plays that attempted to grapple with the more ambiguous and insidious realities of the Cold War. Although the situation examined in Herman Wouk's *The Caine Mutiny* (1954) occurred during the war, the play focused on the Cold War concern of preserving the legitimacy of the U.S. Navy's command structure. Brainwashing and drug addiction afflicted a returning veteran from the

Korean conflict in Michael Gazzo's *A Hatful of Rain* (1955). While several playwrights wrote plays that commented on the hysteria and paranoia behind McCarthyism, Arthur Miller's *The Crucible* (1953), which links the fear and opportunism in the domestic hunt for Communists to the Puritan witchcraft trials in Salem, Massachusetts, remains the classic.

Concerns about national security and nuclear proliferation animated Cold War anti-Communism. Miller and several other playwrights struggled to write a play about the atomic bomb, but only a few succeeded in crafting believable and moving dramas that addressed the enormity of the problem. Lorraine Hansberry's postapocalyptic allegory, *What Use Are Flowers* (1962), won critical respect for challenging nuclearism. Lanford Wilson based his antinuclear play *Angels Fall* (1982) on a nuclear accident in New Mexico, and Arthur Kopit used black humor to defuse nuclear fear in *End of the World* (1984). These plays prefigured the popular success of Tony Kushner's two-part *Angels in America* (1991, 1992). Kushner's "gay fantasia," as he called it, exorcised many of the ghosts of the early Cold War (including the killing of the Rosenbergs for supposedly passing nuclear secrets to the Russians) by suggestively linking the AIDS crisis to images of nuclear fallout.

When the Cold War heated up in Vietnam, many theater artists opposed the U.S. intervention. Several radical theater troupes, including the Living Theatre, The San Francisco Mime Troupe, and The Bread and Puppet Theatre, mounted protest productions in the late 1960s. Ad hoc guerrilla theater companies sprang up on university campuses to oppose the war and the selective service draft. Chief among the Broadway playwrights to challenge U.S. policies in Vietnam was David Rabe. Rabe's Vietnam trilogy —*The Basic Training of Pavlo Hummel* (1971), *Sticks and Bones* (1972), and *Streamers* (1976)—paints a war in which patriotism, racism, and blind obedience to orders conspire to create soldiers programmed as killing machines but stuck in absurd and deadly situations. In *Streamers*, for instance, two grizzled, drunken sergeants compare themselves to parachutists who have jumped out of a plane only to find that their chutes will not open. To Stephen Foster's tune "Beautiful Dreamer" they sing "Beautiful Streamer," in ironic recognition of the fate of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

During most of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, American theatergoers, increasingly a wealthy minority of the population, witnessed fewer images about war on their stages than in any decade since the 1920s. And the Broadway stage had little to say about the U.S. "war on terrorism" following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Alternative theaters in New York and elsewhere, however, responded with several productions and demonstrations against the war in Iraq.

Conclusion

Between 1790 and 1840 and again between 1930 and 1980, American theater artists and audience members applauded and analyzed depictions on American stages of national preparedness and patriotism, military heroism and folly, and conflicts and controversies about warfare. The U.S. commercial theater, however, mostly ignored the realities of combat from the Civil War through World War I and again after 1980. Audience composition, concerns, and expectations have largely determined the response of the American theater to American wars.

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Related Entries

Antiwar Movements; Civil War; Cold War; Film and War; Literature and War; Music and War; Revolutionary War; Television and War; Vietnam War; Visual Arts and War; War of 1812; World War I; World War II

—*Bruce McConachie*

Think Tanks

Think tanks originated in the United States in the early 20th century in response to a desire among both public and private citizens for more venues to discuss and document world affairs, public policy, and American society. Today think tanks are more accurately described as public policy research organizations, and their activities cut across a spectrum that includes academic analysis, issue advocacy, and even policy activism. The philosophy behind think tanks comes from the progressive belief that more and better information shared by government leaders will lead to enlightened policies benefiting the public interest. Some of

the earliest American think tanks carry familiar names: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910), the Council on Foreign Relations (1921), the Brookings Institution (1916), and the American Enterprise Institute (1943) are among some of the better known. The vast majority of think tanks, however, are smaller and less well known. They exist to serve demands for knowledge, analysis, and evaluation at local, regional, and national levels.

A handful of think tanks serve only one client: the United States government. Created to conduct research and development during the Cold War, the Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) support different federal agencies and over the years have housed highly influential thinkers. For example, during the Cold War, Rand Corporation scholar Albert Wohlstetter's analytical studies on nuclear strategy led to the "second-strike" and "Fail-Safe" concepts for deterring nuclear war.

With the right timing, a think tank product can also have tremendous influence on public attitudes. Another Rand scholar, Herman Kahn, believed that nuclear war could be won. At Rand, he studied the application of such analytic techniques as game theory and systems analysis to military theory. This school of thought clashed with other think tank outputs such as the "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," a four page document credited with launching the American nuclear freeze movement, authored in 1980 by Randall Forsberg of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies.

A typical think tank product is a substantive report that comes with a synopsis of the content plus an interpretation of the content in the form of policy recommendations, or "talking points." Some of these reports are complex, academically oriented books, others are monographs filled with charts and figures, and still others are written as mainstream hardback books offering policy advice. Some organizations have minimal packaging and publicity departments to get their message to the public and to policy makers. Other organizations devote considerable resources to the task.

Beginning in the 1980s and continuing after the end of the Cold War, policy research organizations grew to attain a global reach, numbering more than 4,000. Over

half of all American think tanks that exist today were founded after 1980. Many are extensions of academic departments and are attached to universities. Others occupy office buildings in American cities and the environs of Washington, D.C. With the global communications revolution and the rise of an increasingly ubiquitous mass media, demand increased for more organizations that specialize in making data comprehensible, or "user-friendly." The development of more democratic and participatory systems of government also contributed to this demand. The trend continues today as ever-increasing amounts of information create a parallel need for analysis and interpretation. Most think tanks aim to serve both government policy makers and the public. Others are more exclusive, serving as internal creative resources for private sector corporations or industries. Think tanks often cover a broad array of issues, from domestic housing to international security, for example. Others specialize in such knowledge niches as tax policy or religious freedom.

Variously known as "knowledge brokers," "policy wonks," or "idea entrepreneurs," individuals who work at think tanks often come from academia, working largely outside the hard-nosed, pragmatic environment of policy makers. Many others, however, attempt to place themselves directly at the intersection of theory and practice. Often, public or private sector professionals, after working in government or business, will join a think tank in order to do specialized research, write, and contribute to policy debates at state capitals or in Washington, D.C. Their ideas often appear as articles, reports, or recommendations about a specific policy challenge. Some organizations resist academic labels, establishing themselves as functional specialist groups or expanding to employ both knowledge specialists and practical implementers. Several examples of this phenomenon can be found in the field of conflict resolution, where an organization might produce case studies of peace building, prevention, and participation, but also act as advisers or facilitators for anything from a corporate board retreat to international boundary disputes.

In order to compete effectively, think tanks seek to brand themselves with a distinct reputation and unique knowledge products. Some are required to be independent

and non-partisan in their analysis. Others are more overtly political, and some are distinctly ideological, seeking to directly influence policy makers to implement their agenda. The 1990s witnessed the reign of the ideological think tank. The rigorously conservative Heritage Foundation is probably the best-known illustration of successful policy influence. Founded in 1973, Heritage has grown into a formidable force both in Congress and in any Republican-occupied White House. In 2003, the Center for American Progress was founded with the intent to provide similar services for liberal ideas. This organization operates from a comparative disadvantage, however, as ideologically conservative think tanks substantially outnumber their liberal or centrist counterparts at both the state and national levels. Although conservative philanthropies do not disburse more financial support in general, they do strategically fund policy-oriented think tanks at far higher levels than their liberal counterparts.

The appropriate role of think tanks and their influence on public policy is an ongoing debate. Disregarding objective analysis, ideologically driven organizations do not distinguish between balanced knowledge expertise and narrow advocacy. Unlike academia, their documents and reports are not subject to standard fact checking or rigorous peer review. Funding is another important indicator of bias. Funding can come through governments, political parties, individual memberships, corporations, or philanthropic organizations. Think tanks claiming to be autonomous and independent often turn out upon examination to be otherwise. Too tied to certain types of financial support, a think tank may acquire a "hired-gun" reputation for producing ammunition for its benefactors rather than objective information for the public interest. This occurred, for example, during the late 1990s in debates about global climate change. Some think tanks produced academic-looking reports funded by commercial entities with a direct financial interest in a pro-industry policy outcome. Once exposed, such recommendations become one-sided talking points and not problem-solving policy analysis. Such outcomes stray quite a distance from the original intent of think tanks: to promote the public interest over cronyism and special interests.

The realm of policy influence in which think tanks operate will probably grow increasingly murky as more Americans realize the need to organize ideas effectively in order to influence policy. This realm is difficult to categorize partly because the rules governing the activities of think tanks are blurry and not easily enforceable. United States law prohibits nonprofit organizations—including think tanks—from engaging in partisan politics, yet drawing a clear line between a governing philosophy and a political endorsement is almost impossible. Think tanks that succeed with their agendas must know exactly how far to push an issue so that "idea sharing" does not cross the line into lobbying, which is a highly regulated activity. Another tactic is to time the release of a set of recommendations to occur immediately before an important policy action, such as a vote in Congress. Alternatively, some think tanks avoid direct contact with policy makers and elected leaders altogether. Others build close alliances with activist organizations that are set up to participate directly in influencing a narrow policy agenda.

Liberal, conservative, or centrist labels aside, all think tanks seek to disseminate their research and recommendations to policy makers, as well as to the news media, influential opinion leaders, universities, interested peer organizations, and members of the public. Presenting complex information in clear and simple language is paramount. A policy research organization's ultimate goal is to be the first to frame an upcoming issue in order to become the "go to" name for inquiries requiring specialized knowledge.

Global events or political changes can profoundly influence the research and strategic direction of think tanks. This is most obvious with think tanks that cover world affairs. The Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. These two tidal changes made necessary new ways of understanding international relationships—a veritable gold mine for think tanks because of their interdisciplinary and flexible nature. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States marked another turning point. The impact of September 11 created a universal shift in think tank activities as the attacks made obvious the need to dramatically reevaluate U.S. security as a more long-term and inclusive concept. This shift has created unusual alliances and new collaborative partnerships as well. For example, universal education, the stabilizing impact of women, and the importance of poverty reduction are now routinely noted at Army-sponsored conferences. In the spirit of public interest, these changes also erased the line between international and domestic security, underlined the need for comprehensive change in our federal agencies, and promoted far-sighted policy making in the process. Building a U.S. government capacity for post-conflict reconstruction is now a high-profile issue taken up by many think tanks. As a policy issue, it has garnered resources and official interest in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Such new coalition-building around policy ideas to benefit the public interest fits well the original think tank criteria of progressive problem solving for the public good.

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—Lorelie Kelly

Thomas Merton Center

The Thomas Merton Center at Bellarmine University (Louisville, Kentucky) was founded in October 1969 after the American Trappist monk Thomas Merton made Bellarmine the repository of his manuscripts, letters, journals, tapes, drawings, photographs, and memorabilia. The Center functions as a central resource—nationally and internationally—for research and continued scholarship on Merton and the ideas he espoused: the contemplative life, spirituality, ecumenism, understanding between East and West, peace, and social justice. The Merton Center offers courses and seminars, arranges for retreats, and provides access to its resources to the general public and scholars alike. Besides the collections of manuscripts and published works, the Center holds and displays examples of its namesake's artwork, as well as the work of his father, the artist and New Zealand native Owen Merton. The International Thomas Merton Society (founded in 1987) has its home in the Center, where it publishes *The Merton Seasonal* (a quarterly) and *The Merton Annual*. The Society is affiliated with the Thomas Merton Society of Great Britain and Ireland (Winchester, England, established in 1993), which publishes the semiannual *Merton Journal*.

The life's work of Thomas Merton (1915–68) has long inspired admiration and emulation among a wide range of readers, thinkers, and advocates of religious inquiry, world peace, and social justice. "Father Louis" (from his ordained name) entered the Abbey of Our Lady of Gethsemani in Trappist, Kentucky on December 10, 1941, after his studies of languages and literature in Europe and at Columbia University. Through some of the most uncertain years in the 20th century, Merton devoted himself to a life of contemplation and wrote prolifically about the connections between the divine spirit and the human condition. While taking part in a world religious conference in Bangkok, Thailand, he died by accident on December 10, 1968—27 years to the day after taking his monastic vows. His immensely popular autobiography *The Seven Storey Mountain* (1948) remains in print; it has been widely translated and is the best-known single work among his prodigious writings.

In November 1963, some four years before he made arrangements to place his manuscripts in the library at Bellarmine University, Merton acknowledged that many of his writings had by then expanded beyond the contemplative or purely spiritual, but voiced a wish to avoid being considered only an "inspirational" writer. In addressing such issues as interracial justice and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, for example, he hoped to connect those concerns to his belief in the basic truth that all humankind should aspire to live in peace. It was this belief that inspired the establishment of the Thomas Merton Center as an institution of active scholarship and involvement in public affairs.

The activities of another Thomas Merton Center (TMC), established in 1972 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, similarly derive their inspiration from the example of Merton's advocacy for peace and social justice. Founder Larry Kessler, TMC's staff, and its many adherents have represented a broad range of religions and philosophies, and their myriad protests, fasts, and vigils have focused on such issues as the war in Vietnam, hunger, militarism throughout the world, apartheid and other forms of racial discrimination, exploitation of workers, and the many root causes of poverty. TMC has offered seminars on nonviolence, the contemplative life, and the pursuit of simplicity in modern human existence, and it has sponsored delegations to trouble spots such as Nicaragua and El Salvador while maintaining contact with events of social import in Haiti and Mexico in more recent years. Though many of its efforts are regional in scope, its international influence is evident, and TMC extends word of its interests and activities by means of its monthly newsletter, *The New People.*

Organizations that take the name of Thomas Merton do so with the assurance that it bestows a thoughtful seriousness of intent to their undertakings, be they intellectual, spiritual, and contemplative or in the service of civil disobedience and nonviolent dissent in the face of perceived social injustice. Merton's evolving convictions manifestly led to his own expansion of religious and social consciousness, and his life's example has proven compelling and worthy of imitation.

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Related Entries

Pacifism; Religion and War

—*Gordon E. Hogg*

369th Infantry

See Harlem Hellfighters.

Tiger Force Recon Scandal

Tiger Force entered the pantheon of elite U.S. military units in the early days of America's war in Vietnam. Faced with significant enemy resistance in the central highlands of South Vietnam, U.S. Army leaders ordered the creation and training of a reconnaissance-attack force to operate there in 1965. Volunteers from the 101st Airborne division were formally assigned to headquarters company but actually attached to the 1st battalion, 327th regiment, as two "Tiger Force" platoons (named for their tiger-striped uniforms that were, according to author David Hackworth, "scrounged from the Green Berets"). The 327th, operationally commanded by Maj. David Hackworth, was deployed in Kon Tum province in the central region of South Vietnam to detect and engage enemy forces. For the next several years its companies and the Tiger Force platoons confronted the enemy frequently. Two Tiger Force members, 1st Lieut. James Gardner and Staff Sgt. John Gertsch, were posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for conspicuous acts of courage. Tiger Force entered the toy soldier arena in 1988 when the "G.I. Joe" model toy company created a "Tiger Force" group. The real Tiger Force members of the 101st saw action in the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War. In late 2003 elements of the Tigers were guarding oil pipelines against insurgents there near Mosul. But in that same year the American public learned of charges that war crimes had been committed by one Tiger Force reconnaissance platoon in the summer and fall of 1967, charges that tarnished this elite force's name.

Tiger Force engaged the enemy in fierce firefights at Qui Nohn, My Cahn, and Dak To in 1966. Lieut. Col. Gerald Morse assumed command of the 1/327 in early 1967. In early May one of the Tiger Force platoons was deployed to the east near the coast in Quang Ngai province when experienced sniper fire and booby traps. On May 15 the platoon was ambushed near Duc Pho by elements of a North Vietnamese battalion: two men were killed and 25 wounded. Specialist 5 Lonnie Butz, a medical aidman, performed so fearlessly and effectively in that engagement that he was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. But shortly thereafter the damage to Tiger Force's honor began.

Soon after the Duc Pho ambush, Lieut. James Hawkins arrived with more than 20 replacements and assumed command of the platoon, which moved north into the Song Ve valley, a rice-growing region, to see to the removal of the farmers there. Leaflets had been dropped throughout the region calling on the inhabitants to move to relocation camps being created for them to deny the enemy the rice harvest. For the most part, the residents of the valley refused to move, even when military aircraft began spraying some of their rice paddies with defoliants in early August. The area was declared a free-fire zone, which meant that, there being no other friendly forces in the region, the local officer-in-charge no longer had to communicate with either U.S. or South Vietnamese authorities to obtain clearance to fire on suspected enemy positions.

Lieutenant Hawkins and his top two sergeants, Harold Trout and William Doyle, appear to have interpreted that designation as a license to kill all those who had not yet removed to the designated camps and began to kill and to order the killing of villagers. A local Buddhist monk who came to the unit to complain of the treatment of villagers in June was shot to death. Sergeant Doyle later explained: "It didn't matter if they were civilians. If they weren't supposed to be in an area, we shot them." Sergeant Forrest Miller told army investigators that the killing of interrogated villagers became "an unwritten law." PFC Ken Kerney recalled that "we weren't keeping count." Medic Rion Causey described what he called an all-too typical event: "We would call on the radio to say that we find nine people in a hootch…and word would come back, 'kill them.' So…we shot them." Specialist Dennis Stout, an army journalist for the Screaming Eagle, the 101st's newsletter, visited the unit in July and was appalled by what he saw—as many as 35 women and children rounded up and killed in a rice paddy. "I've lived with this for a long time," he recalled in early 2004.

On July 23 Dao Hue, an elderly carpenter, was carrying geese in baskets to his village late at night when he was stopped by Sgt. Leo Heany, who brought him to Lieutenant Hawkins and Sgt. Harold Trout for questioning. Heany later told army criminal investigators that he felt the frightened man posed no threat to the unit, but Hawkins shook and cursed him, and Trout clubbed him to the ground. While medical aidman Barry Bowman sought to treat the man's head wound, Hawkins shot him twice, killing him. On July 28 a supply of beer arrived for Hawkins by helicopter, and Hawkins and several of his men proceeded to drink copiously. Hawkins then ordered men to fire on ten farmers in a nearby field. Several were killed. The platoon was relocated further north to Chu Lai in Quang Nam province, a region with dense jungle and forest cover. On September 1 Colonel Morse ordered the commencement of Operation Wheeler, a reconnaissance sweep, and set a long-term objective of 327 kills for his unit. He also renamed the three battalion companies: A Company became the Assassins; B Company, the Barbarians; C Company, the Cutthroats; Colonel Morse gave himself the call-name "Ghost Rider." In the course of the next several days of operations the unit encountered significant North

Vietnamese resistance; five men were killed and twelve wounded. Hawkins broke the remaining men into fire teams of four to six men and attacked the villages. The number of unarmed Vietnamese killed rose steadily for the next three months; one medic recalled that some 120 were killed between late September and early November. Villagers under interrogation were tortured and killed. Some of their ears were cut off and strung together as necklaces. Medical aidman Larry Cottingham may have been exaggerating, but he later recounted to the *Toledo Blade* that "there was a period when just about everyone had a necklace of ears." (There had been reference to this prior to 1967: *Washington Post* reporter Ward Just, traveling with a Tiger Force platoon during the action north of Dak To in June 1966, wrote that one of its men "sent the ears of dead VC to his wife, through the army postal system" [Just, 171].) During an interrogation, PFC Sam Ybarra slit the throat of a Vietnamese man with a hunting knife and then scalped him. He later killed a teenage boy "for his tennis shoes" and decapitated an infant in a hut in early November. In late November he was cited by the command in the Army's newspaper in Vietnam for providing the unit's 100th kill.

Several soldiers sought to stop the killings. Specialist William Carpenter tried to prevent the first killing on May 10 and observed of the shooting of the rice farmers on July 28: "It was wrong…. There was no way I was going to shoot." (*Toledo Blade* story). Medic Bowman complained to a chaplain about the killing of an old man. Sgt. Gerald Bruner complained to Captain Carl James of battalion HQ about the killing of a farmer by Sergeant Doyle. When nothing was done, he transferred out of Tiger Force. Lieut. Donald Wood, an artillery forward observer, argued with Hawkins about the killings and complained to his superiors, to no avail. Frustrated, he transferred out of the unit in August.

As a result of complaints and a confession offered to superiors by some members of the unit, in 1971 the army ordered its criminal investigators to conduct interviews with a widening number of soldiers. The process took several years, during which time six suspects and eleven witnesses were allowed to leave the army, rendering them unavailable except as volunteers to appear at any trials. A report was sent to the Army's secretary, Bo Calloway, and others to Secretary

of Defense James Schlesinger and President Richard Nixon's legal counsel, John Dean. Trout rose to sergeant major and retired; Hawkins rose to the rank of major and retired as well. No charges were ever filed against anyone.

There the matter rested until an investigative reporting team from the *Toledo Blade* took an interest in the matter, obtained the report and the statements of witnesses, interviewed a number of surviving veterans of the unit, and published their findings in a series of stories in October 2003, which won a Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting in 2004. The Army briefly reopened the investigation in late 2003, but then closed it without further action three months later, ignoring offers by both Stout and Causey to meet with army criminal investigators.

What had led this platoon to behave as it did? In articles appearing in both the *Blade* and the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, Sergeant Doyle explained the unit's conduct in terms of the dangers (snipers, booby traps, not knowing who was friend or foe), and concluded: "So you did any goddamn thing you felt like doing." Medic Harold Fischer recalled: "We were out of control." Medic Rion Causey believed that "everyone was bloodthirsty." PFC Sam Ybarra clearly "lost it" when his buddy, PFC Ken "Boots" Green was killed by sniper on September 28. "Doc" Savage recalled that "we all felt Sammy had gone psycho after that."

To be sure, the unit had been placed in a hostile environment, a "necessary condition" for what ensued. But so had other units, and few had reacted as this one had. When the story broke in 2003, several veterans of Tiger Force posted emails expressing their disbelief and anger on the unit's website, http://www.tigerforcerecon.com/. The site moderator observed: "The greatest majority [of our comrades] were not calloused, nor without conscience…and heart." Nonetheless, some of these veterans allowed that Sam Ybarra had indeed "gone psycho."

Ultimately, it appears that a combination of poor leadership and character deficiencies of a few of the unit's members were the conditions that accounted for the atrocious acts: Battalion commander Morse's renaming of Tiger Force's companies and his lack of supervision of the units in the field appeared to Lieutenant Hawkins and two of his sergeants to be green lights for their too-literal reading of the term "free-fire zone." In any event, the three leaders in the platoon, Hawkins, Doyle, and Trout, and perhaps no more than three of their subordinates appear to have been responsible for most of the acts that discredited the good name of one of the more professional and effective army units in the past half-century.

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Related Entries

Combat, Effects of; My Lai Massacre; Vietnam War

Related Documents

—*Peter Karsten*

Tomb of the Unknown Soldier

World War I saw the introduction of many new ways of memorializing military deaths that occurred in the service of the nation. By the Armistice of 1918, America's war dead, though substantially less than that suffered by other nations, still numbered more than 100,000. Honoring a promise made in 1918, the War Department agreed to

provide families with the choice of either bringing home the bodies of loved ones who died overseas (at government expense) or leaving their deceased buried in national cemeteries overseas. For those families whose loved ones' bodies had never been found, however, there would be no personal headstone and no place to grieve or mourn. Modern weapons of mass destruction used during the war had resulted in an inordinate number of men unaccounted for, graves totally destroyed during battle, and vast numbers of dead who remained unidentifiable. In honor of these 4,500 American "unknowns," national political and military leaders in the United States followed the example of England and France, who each buried one unidentified soldier in 1920. On November 11, 1921, the third anniversary of the end of World War I, America laid the body of an unidentified soldier to rest at Arlington Cemetery in Virginia and designated it their "Unknown Soldier." In October 1920, U.S. Army Sergeant Edward Younger chose the body amidst much ceremony in Chalons-sur-Marne, France, before it was shipped to Washington, D.C.

Assurance of anonymity mattered more than rank, race, or social status for this exercise in democratic memory. Part invented and part copied symbolism, the Unknown Soldier represented the ideal of national community. The solemn pageantry and commemorative memorialization failed, however, to mask the postwar tension, divisiveness, and political rancor of a society disillusioned by war. Disagreements over where the body should be buried, how many unidentified bodies should be returned, the suitability of Arlington due to its isolated location, and

The dedication of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in which the body of one unidentified casualty of World War I was laid to rest at the Arlington Cemetery in Virginia, on November 11, 1921. (© CORBIS)

the best day for burial (since some believed Memorial Day more appropriate), reflected the postwar ambivalence within American society at large.

More than 90,000 citizens filed past the casket the day before burial to pay homage to the Unknown Soldier as he lay in State under an honor guard in the rotunda of the Capitol. New York Congressman Hamilton Fish, Jr., himself a World War I veteran and author of the initial legislation to create the memorial, was the first to place a wreath upon the soldier's tomb. He was followed by scores of veterans and fraternal and service organizations paying their respectful tributes. On the morning of November 11, the procession moved solemnly through streets lined with Americans who gathered to witness the casket as it was moved to the national cemetery. Pres. Warren G. Harding conferred the Unknown Soldier with the Congressional Medal of Honor and the Distinguished Service Cross in the presence of dignitaries from several nations, who in turn decorated the soldier with their military medals.

The president called upon Americans to observe two minutes of silence that morning and communities across the nation joined in local public ceremonies centered upon the cause of peace. While few Americans wanted war, the ritual did not heal divisions over how to best preserve peace. Even the white marble tomb placed over the grave of the Unknown Soldier caused tension when many remained undecided as to whether it should symbolize victory or peace.

Five years passed before Congress finally authorized a compromise sculpture for the sarcophagus, featuring three allegorical figures of Peace, Valor, and a dominant central Victory. America, an ambivalent nation struggling with the memory of war, would repeatedly focus its remembrance on victory and not on death in order to justify the sacrifices made. This policy served as the underpinning upon which the nation's commemoration ceremonies and monuments would stand for decades—both literally and figuratively.

The confusion and uncertainty surrounding the burial of the Unknown Soldier in the years directly following the war are significant since they reflect patterns and practices that continued to mark American remembrance throughout the interwar period. Individualism, diversity, and sectionalism were transcended by rhetoric emphasizing America's homogeneity, the model representation of a true democratic society. The optimistic intentions depicted by the shrine's devotion to victory and peace proved short-lived however, as the country entered another world war in 1941.

Today the Tomb contains the remains of unknown American soldiers from World Wars I and II and the Korean Conflict. In 1998, DNA testing identified the remains of the Unknown Soldier from the Vietnam War as Air Force 1st Lt. Michael Joseph Blassie. Blassie's body was exhumed, and the crypt reserved for the Vietnam Unknown will remain vacant.

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Memorial Day; Memorials and Monuments; Memory and War; Veterans Day

Related Documents

1930

—Lisa M. Budreau

Truman, Harry S.

(1884–1972)

33rd President of the United States

Harry S. Truman was a president who fought in one war and then led the nation through two others as chief executive, making some of the most controversial wartime decisions in the nation's history. He oversaw the final victory of the Grand Alliance in World War II and approved history's only case of the battlefield use of nuclear weapons. Truman was pivotal in shaping the foundation for U.S. policy throughout the Cold War, and he is remembered for his controversial firing of Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War—by which he firmly established the supremacy of the president's civilian authority over the military even in wartime—and for the integration of the American armed forces that began during his administration.

Truman's military history surpassed that of most American presidents. Born in 1884 in Lamar, Missouri, Truman grew up in what is now the Kansas City suburb of Independence, intent on a military career. He applied for admission to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point but was rejected because of his poor eyesight. Instead, he joined the Missouri National Guard in 1905 as an enlisted man. In 1917, after the American declaration of war against Germany, Truman rejoined the Guard and, to his own surprise, was elected first lieutenant in the 2nd Missouri Field Artillery. On August 5, 1917, his unit was sworn into the regular army as the 129th Field Artillery, a component of the 35th Division. The regiment went to France in May 1918, and eventually fought in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Truman was commissioned a second lieutenant and was made a battery commander. He commanded almost 200 soldiers, mostly Irish Catholics from Kansas City with a reputation for unruliness. Truman won their loyalty, and many of these men became Truman's trusted friends and his local postwar power base. In 1919, Truman was discharged as a captain.

When he returned from the battlefields of Europe, Truman opened a men's clothing store in Kansas City. The store failed after only three years amidst the postwar recession. He was elected to one of the three administrative positions of

judge of the Jackson County Court in 1922 but failed to gain reelection in 1924. Two years later he was elected presiding judge in the Jackson County Court, a position he held until he was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1934.

As a senator, Truman focused on interstate commerce. After his reelection in 1940, he became chair of the Senate's Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, which examined industry for cases of profiteering and waste of taxpayer dollars. Visiting a large number of military installations and war plants across the country, Truman became convinced that mismanagement of defense appropriations led to massive overspending. The Special Committee questioned witnesses during hundreds of hearings and published more than 50 reports, its efforts reputedly saving $15 billion. This gave Truman national publicity and a reputation as an honest politician pivotal to the war effort. It may also have helped him to become Franklin D. Roosevelt's running mate in 1944, a position he did not really want and accepted only after FDR insisted. After the inauguration, he met the president only a couple of times outside of cabinet meetings, and Roosevelt kept his vice president at arm's length: FDR did not discuss with Truman any matters pertaining to the approaching end of the war or any details about the development of the atomic bomb. When Truman was summoned to the White House on April 12, 1945, to learn from Eleanor Roosevelt that the president had died and that he was to become the 33rd president of the United States of America, he knew precious little about the Roosevelt administration's stance on critical issues involving the war.

Thus, Truman was not well prepared for the duties that now fell to him. In the European theater of war, military operations were coming to a close. By the end of April 1945, American forces had advanced beyond the lines that divided the zones of occupation of Germany upon which the Allies had agreed at the Yalta conference, Hitler had committed suicide, and Soviet and American forces had met at the River Elbe. The last of the German forces surrendered on May 8. In the Pacific theater, however, fierce fighting still raged, and many believed that war might continue another year and would not be won until the Japanese mainland had been successfully invaded, at a potentially heavy cost in American lives. Hence, when Truman was informed while attending

the last of the wartime conferences, at Potsdam, Germany, that the atomic bomb had been tested successfully, he approved its use against Japan in the hope of saving American soldiers' lives. On August 6 and 9, 1945, the U.S. Army Air Force dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, killing more than 100,000 people immediately and perhaps as many as 200,000 more from radiation in the months and years to come. The Japanese emperor pushed his unrelenting military leaders to capitulate on August 14. The formal surrender took place on September 2 on board the USS *Missouri*. Truman's argument that the deployment of the atomic bomb was necessary to end the war as soon as possible and to save American lives is still debated by historians, but he never regretted the decision.

During the first years of his presidency, Truman not only had to manage the final stages of the Allied victory in World War II but also had to forge new policies for a world in which the power relations had dramatically shifted. Regional hegemons Nazi Germany and Japan had been defeated, Great Britain was gradually losing its status as a world power, and the Soviet Union was emerging as the most important power in continental Europe. Relations with that wartime ally had been rapidly deteriorating even before the war was over because of massive ideological differences that found their expression in diverging policies in Europe and Asia. The Truman administration reacted with foreign policies intended to "contain" the Soviet Union, that is, to keep the philosophy and influence of communism from spreading beyond Soviet borders. Such steps as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and American membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) all aimed to build or strengthen actual or potential American allies in the confrontation with the Soviet Union. While the United States concentrated on Europe, the Cold War, which was to last more than 40 years, turned into armed conflict in Asia, soon involving the United States. Only five years after World War II, the United States was engaged in another conflict, the Korean War.

Korea had been a Japanese colony since 1910. After Japan was defeated, American and Soviet occupation forces oversaw Korea's transition to self-government. In zones of occupation separated by the 38th parallel, the Americans

and Russians conducted rival reconstructions of the Korean peninsula. When U.S.–Soviet relations continued to worsen, both occupying powers established governments friendly to themselves. The Soviets installed Kim Il Sung in the north, and the United States established a government under Syngman Rhee in the south. In 1949, the same year that saw the victory of the Communist Party under Mao Zedong in China, the United States withdrew its military forces from South Korea, now officially called the Republic of Korea. On June 25, 1950, the army of the Soviet-backed regime in the north, named the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, attacked South Korea.

When the Soviet delegate boycotted the United Nations Security Council meeting on the invasion, the UN was able to pass a resolution to support South Korea without encountering a Soviet veto. UN assistance, however, consisted chiefly of American military aid. U.S. forces stationed in Japan were ill-equipped and poorly trained, but they rapidly deployed to the peninsula to help an overwhelmed South Korean Army trying to halt the rapid advance of the well-trained and Soviet-equipped North Korean forces.

As the United States rapidly expanded its military forces to deal with the crisis, the services had to abide by Executive Order 9981, signed by Truman on July 26, 1948, which ordered equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. Basic training was soon unofficially integrated when it became impracticable to have separate units for African Americans. As combat casualties in Korea mounted, it became unworkable to send African American replacements exclusively to black-only units, and the army's practice of maintaining segregated units gradually broke down. By the end of 1952, the American forces in Korea were fully integrated.

The initial onslaught of the North Koreans pushed the UN forces back until they finally stabilized a defensive line, known as the Pusan Perimeter. By September, only a fraction of the territory of the Republic of South Korea remained under UN control. Meanwhile, General Douglas MacArthur, who had been named supreme commander of the UN forces, prepared for a landing behind enemy lines at In'chon. This bold counterstroke broke the North Koreans'

overstretched supply lines and changed the tide of the war. The UN forces (in addition to U.S. forces, 15 other UN members supplied troops) bolstered by American World War II veterans who had been recalled into service, subsequently pushed back the invaders past the 38th parallel.

Despite warnings that China would react if the UN forces drew closer to the border at the Yalu River, the Americans and their allies continued to advance. On October 19, 1950, Chinese troops, supposedly volunteers, crossed the border into Korea, eventually pushing the UN forces back across the 38th parallel. MacArthur, who had been confident that his army would be able to win the war by year's end and had bragged that American forces would be home by Christmas, became desperate and called for the use of atomic bombs on China, an option strongly opposed by Truman.

An infusion of new and, by now, better-trained troops, more artillery, and fresh commanders stabilized the frontline position near the original frontier by May 1951. While the president was involved in political negotiations to end the war, MacArthur repeatedly and publicly contradicted Truman, until the president removed him from command on April 11, 1951. A prolonged stalemate ensued until a ceasefire was established on July 27, 1953. By that time Truman had been succeeded as president of the United States by Dwight D. Eisenhower. Truman, who as president had made the historic decision to drop an atomic bomb on Japan and who had fired one of the most popular generals of his time, returned home to Independence, Missouri, as he told the American people in his Farewell Address on January 15, 1953, as "a plain, private citizen."

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Related Entries

Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; World War II

Related Documents

1948 b

—Michael Wala

Twelve O'Clock High

Film Directed by Henry King (1949)

The 1949 motion picture *Twelve O'Clock High* portrayed World War II U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) bomber command in the European theater of operations. The movie dramatizes how USAAF officers trained and led their bomber crews to perform daylight precision-bombing raids while enduring heavy combat losses. The movie's characters struggle with service politics, self-pity, cowardice, alcoholism, and nervous collapse while trying to perform their strenuous duties honorably and effectively. The movie's title derives from the USAAF practice of identifying attacking enemy aircraft locations by the hands of a clock. The film illuminates America's ambivalent feelings about the hard discipline and high casualties necessary to win a war against a fanatical foe.

Twelve O'Clock High is based on a 1948 novel of the same name by Beirne Lay Jr. and Sy Bartlett, who also co-wrote the screenplay with director Henry King. Lay and Bartlett served as both USAAF staff and combat officers in the Eighth Air Force. Lay's flying skills even enabled him to command the 487th Bomb Group. Both authors knew legendary Brig. Gen. Frank Armstrong Jr., who led the first (August 1942) and last (August 1945) USAAF bombing raids of World War II. Their novel is dedicated to Armstrong, the model for its lead character, Brig. Gen. Frank Savage (played in the film by actor Gregory Peck).

Like Armstrong—who during the war relieved his friend Col. Charles Overacker of command of the 306th Bomb Group—in the book and film, Savage relieves his friend, Col. Keith Davenport (portrayed in the film by Gary Merrill), from command of the 918th Bomb Group (306th multiplied times 3). The time is late 1942, and the 918th is "hard luck," meaning it suffers high casualty rates. It also rarely hits its targets. Davenport is both too fatigued and too forgiving to restore the group's combat effectiveness. So Maj. Gen. Ben Pritchard (played by Millard Mitchell)—modeled on U.S. Eighth Air Force's first Commander, Maj. Gen. Ira Eaker (1896–1987)—orders Savage to assume command and whip the group into shape. Pritchard warns Savage that the future of daylight precision bombing is at stake; the 918th must succeed for the Air Force's primary mission to succeed.

Duly warned, Savage imposes severe discipline on the 918th. He makes the group's executive officer, Lt. Col. Ben Gately (played by Hugh Marlowe) a whipping boy for the group's failings, verbally humiliating him for being drunk on duty. Then he demotes Gately to the command of a B-17, "The Leper Colony," whose crew is composed of the group's foul-ups. Savage replaces Gately with hard-bitten Maj. Joe Cobb (actor John Kellogg). Next, Savage cancels all off-base group passes and imposes "spit and shine" discipline. The 918th drills relentlessly in formation flying and bombing drills. In essence, Savage demands that the 918th grow up, and he demands everyone deliver a "maximum effort." The group's flight surgeon, Maj. "Doc" Kaiser (actor Paul Stewart), warns Savage not to push his men beyond their limits. Colonel Davenport also asks him to ease up. But

Savage continues his strict regimen: during briefings he tells pilots to stop feeling sorry for themselves, telling them, "Consider yourselves already dead!"

Angry over Davenport's loss of command, the 918th responds to Savage's martinet methods by rebelling. Recognizing there is little time to revive the group's pride and self-respect, Savage enlists the help of the 918th's Adjutant, Maj. Harvey Stovall (played by Dean Jagger in an Oscar-winning role), who knows Savage hated relieving Davenport. Stovall stalls the mass request for transfers by the 918th's officers. Savage helps himself by inspiring the most respected and beloved of the pilots, Medal of Honor winner Lt. Jesse Bishop (actor Robert Patten)—whose character is based on actual Medal of Honor pilot Lt. John C. Morgan—to help Major Cobb persuade the other officers to give Savage a chance. Cobb is exultant when he tells Savage that he and Bishop quelled the revolt. Savage, hiding his true emotion of gratitude, tells Cobb he refuses to be the 918th's babysitter.

The group soon recognizes Savage has revived their combat effectiveness. The 918th even manages to bomb the target on a mission that had been aborted by other groups. The unit's pride and confidence are restored, and even Colonel Gately's "Leper Colony" of misfits becomes a superior aircrew. Soon Major Stovall, the group's chaplain, Savage's chauffeur, and even General Pritchard stow away on B-17s to experience the group's successful bombing missions.

Bombing success, however, brings more difficulty. The 918th begins bombing long-range targets in Germany, where USAAF fighters cannot provide escort. The group thus becomes more vulnerable to Luftwaffe fighter attack. The movie uses terrifying actual AAF footage of American bombers being attacked by German ME-109s and FW-190 fighters. Antiaircraft fire, or flak, is also effectively depicted. The footage, combined with Leon Shamroy's fine film noir cinematography, forcefully convey the bomber crews' combat ordeal.

Despite heroic self-discipline, Savage is emotionally overcome by the 918th's heavy losses over Germany. Bishop and Cobb are killed on successive raids against Germany's ball-bearing factories, which were based on the actual Schweinfurt attacks. Succumbing to the ill-advised tendency

to "over-identify" with his men, Savage reacts as if his own sons are lost. While trying to board his B-17 for the third and final ball-bearing raid, Savage suffers a nervous breakdown; the 918th's missions have beaten him down. Peck magnificently portrays Savage's emotional exhaustion during the breakdown. Savage, with the last of his strength, orders Ben Gately, whom he fails to recognize, to take command. Savage then silently sits on a bed waiting for the 918th to return from the mission, oblivious to the help offered by fellow officers. The group returns with the target hit and only one bomber lost. Savage begins to recover from his breakdown. Both Colonel Gately and the 918th have redeemed themselves; they have "grown up."

Because it frankly confronts the problem of commanding men to risk their lives to accomplish demanding missions, *Twelve O'Clock High* is an established classic, with many fans among veterans. World War II bomber veterans think it the most accurate film depiction of their experience, according to their Websites. A 303rd Bomb Group veteran described it as "the best war film ever produced on the war." The bomber veterans quibble over only a few inaccurate details, such as warming up bomber engines before the entire crews are aboard. The movie continues to be shown at leadership classes for the Air Force Academy, certain Navy courses, and even to leadership groups in the private sector. It inspired a popular ABC television series of the same name broadcast from 1964 to 1967.

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Related Entries

Film and War; Television and War

—Christopher M. Gray

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
Ultra and Enigma

In the early 1920s a German manufacturer advertised an enciphering machine that it declared unbreakable. The machine, called the Enigma, used a series of rotors and electrical plugs to encipher a message before transmission. The operator would type what was to be transmitted into the machine after moving its rotors to certain settings, and the machine would then encipher the message before transmission. The receiving station, which would know the settings for that particular time or day, would feed the enciphered transmission into the machine in reverse order to obtain the original plain text message.

Confronted with the task of defending Germany's frontiers with an army limited to 100,000 by the Treaty of Versailles against the vastly superior forces of France and her Eastern European allies, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the German Army immediately bought the machine and began adapting it to military purposes. Given the increasing sophistication of radio as well as the need to control military forces over large distances, the Enigma machine offered potential for protecting message traffic between combat units and their controlling headquarters.

Unbeknownst to the Germans, the Poles had discovered that their neighbors were using a complex enciphering machine. Both by espionage and "borrowing" from the Warsaw post office over a weekend an Enigma machine that was being sent to the German Embassy in Warsaw under diplomatic immunity, the Poles soon had a working copy of Enigma. To decipher German transmissions, the Poles put their best theoretical mathematicians to work. For much of the 1930s they succeeded in reading the vast majority of the German Army's radio traffic. But with the approach of war, the Germans added a number of refinements to Enigma,

and in early 1939 the Poles were no longer able to break into German message traffic. In one of the most important meetings of 1939, the Poles turned over the results of their work and several copies of Enigma to the British and French in late August.

Hitherto the British had underfunded their code-breaking organization, the Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS), located at Bletchley Park. Thus, GCCS had had no success in unscrambling the vast numbers of German encoded radio transmissions, which the three German services and other government organizations were using. The Polish contribution was, therefore, monumental because it significantly advanced what British cryptologists knew about the method the Germans were using to protect their radio transmissions. Nevertheless, throughout the rest of 1939 and the first half of 1940, the British had little success in breaking into the German message traffic. In fact, the Enigma system should have remained largely unbreakable throughout the war. But the Germans transmitted so many messages from so many different stations and possessed such a belief in the superiority of their technology that a number of users compromised the codes by sloppy procedures, such as consistent message formats, transmitting messages at the same time every day, and by transmitting huge numbers of unimportant messages.

By spring 1940, Bletchley Park began to have some minor success. But the intelligence gained was spotty at best. The initial decrypts did little to save the Allies from defeat in Scandinavia and northwest Europe in spring 1940. However, they did provide some help during the battle of Britain. In one important case they provided R. V. Jones, the young head of British scientific intelligence, with a crucial clue that allowed him to determine the frequency on

which a German blind bombing device was operating, thus setting the initial conditions for the defensive measures that mitigated the impact of the German Blitz—the nighttime bombing offensive against Britain staged throughout the winter of 1940–41.

From 1940 on, Luftwaffe signals proved particularly helpful in providing the clues (called "cribs") that allowed British code breakers to access German message traffic regularly. Moreover, Luftwaffe messages often contained important intelligence on the operations of the other services. But it was one thing to gain intelligence, another to persuade commanders to act on that intelligence. In late May 1941, for example, British decrypts of Luftwaffe messages indicated that the Germans were planning to seize the main airfields on Crete by airborne assault in the opening move to seize the island. Nevertheless, the British commander, although informed of this intelligence, placed most of his defending troops along the beaches and left only minimal forces to guard the main airport at Malame. The Germans quickly seized that critical point and then flew in sufficient troops to conquer the rest of the island.

Through May 1941, the cryptologists at Bletchley had had no success in breaking into the transmissions of the Kriegsmarine, the name given the German navy in World War II. This was particularly harmful, because at the end of 1940 sinkings of British merchant ships by German U-boats began to increase. By spring 1941 the U-boat offensive was threatening to cut Britain's lifelines. In May 1941 the Royal Navy obtained the U-boat Enigma settings for the next two months by capturing a weather trawler and a U-boat. The Germans had expected that such incidents might happen but remained confident the British could break Enigma transmissions only for a short period. They were wrong. For the rest of 1941 the British read the U-boat traffic consistently and thus were able to maneuver convoys around U-boat concentrations. British losses to U-boat attacks dropped drastically for the rest of the year. In this case alone, one can argue that Ultra intelligence, the name given to the information intercepted by the Allies, by itself was decisive. At the end of 1941, however, the Germans introduced an additional rotor into the Enigma machines on U-boats, and for almost all of 1942 Bletchley was unable to break U-boat messages.

At the end of 1942, the British again broke the U-boat code, and Ultra intelligence played a major role in the Allied victory, particularly in the great convoy battles of the spring of 1942 that finally broke the back of the U-boat threat.

Ultra intelligence played a significant role in Allied land and air campaigns throughout the rest of the war. In 1942, it was particularly important in disrupting German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's supply lines from Italy to North Africa by alerting British aircraft and ships based at Malta about the sailings of Axis convoys. In 1943, it played a major role in cutting off Axis supply lines to Tunisia. In the fighting in Normandy in August 1944, Ultra alerted the Americans that the Germans were planning a major counterattack at Mortain, which again set the stage for a major Allied victory. In the air war, Ultra allowed Anglo–American intelligence to build an almost complete order of battle of the Luftwaffe and follow the breakdown of German air capabilities under the pressure of Allied air offensives. In the summer and fall 1944, Ultra alerted the commanders of America's strategic bombing forces of how badly the Germans were being hurt by attacks on their petroleum industry. Nevertheless, there were failures. At times Ultra's highly secret, compartmentalized intelligence allowed crucial pieces of information to slip through the cracks. Thus, in early September, Ultra intelligence warned that the Germans had moved two SS armored divisions for rest and refit to the neighborhood of Arnhem, where the great Allied airborne offensive would land 12 days later. Because Allied intelligence analysts did not know that the operation was going to take place, however, the message's significance was entirely missed.

Ultra intelligence played a major role in Allied victory in World War II. Its importance was suggested by an exchange between a German academic and a British historian in the early 1970s, when the secret finally broke. The German exclaimed when appraised of the extent of the Allied success in breaking the German Enigma codes: "Then why didn't you win the war earlier?" The British academic replied: "We did!"

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Related Entries

Intelligence Gathering in War; World War II

—Williamson Murray

Uniform Code of Military Justice

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. Chapter 47, is the body of law that sets forth a system of justice for the U.S. military. The code is applicable in all its parts to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard in times of war and peace. It contains the substantive and procedural law governing military justice and its administration in all of the armed forces of the United States. The code established a military court system, defined offenses, authorized punishment, and provided procedural guidance and statutory safeguards that conform to the due process clause of the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Additionally, the code established a Court of Military Review in each branch of the armed forces that automatically reviews cases where sentences include capital punishment, a punitive discharge, or imprisonment in which the term exceeds one year. Furthermore, it established the Court of Military Appeals, which acts to protect the safeguards of an accused person by reviewing certain cases from all branches of the armed forces. Automatic review before the Court of Military Appeals occurs when a sentence is affirmed by the Court of Military Review in one of the branches and involves a general or flag officer or involves capital punishment.

1948–51: Drafting of the Code

At the conclusion of World War II in 1945, a considerable amount of criticism arose regarding the justice systems of the Army and Navy, which at that time covered all military services in the United States—the Air Force was not officially established until 1947—but operated under separate and distinct systems of justice. The Army operated under the Articles of War, and the Navy operated under the Articles for the Government of the Navy. Many felt that the justice systems of both branches were harsh, arbitrary, characterized by command influence, and used as an instrument of discipline. Consequently, the secretary of war and secretary of the Navy commissioned several independent boards and committees to conduct studies of both systems, including the Board on Officer–Enlisted Men's Relationships, headed by Gen. James Doolittle. The Doolittle Board called for a "review of the machinery for administering military justice and the courts-martial procedure." It recommended "making all personnel subject to the same types of punishment." Accordingly, the Army and Navy submitted separate bills for introduction early in the 80th Congress revising their respective systems of military justice.

During the first session of the 80th Congress (1947–49), however, the National Security Act was passed, creating a separate Department of the Air Force and unifying the armed forces under a single Department of Defense. Because the revisions submitted by the Army and Navy differed in many respects and to avoid establishing a third distinct system of military justice for the Air Force, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee suggested to Sec. of Defense James Forrestal that a bill be prepared for introduction early in the 81st Congress that would provide a uniform system of justice for all branches of the armed forces. Consequently, in July 1948 Forrestal appointed a committee, chaired by Harvard Law School professor Edmund Morgan, to draft a Uniform Code of Military Justice that would be equally applicable to all branches of the armed forces.

The drafting of the code began in August 1948. The Morgan Committee worked almost in complete secrecy, never

circulating its drafts outside the Department of Defense. According to Morgan, "the committee endeavored . . . to frame a Code that would be uniform in terms and in operation and that would provide full protection of the rights of persons subject to the Code without undue interference with appropriate military discipline and the exercise of appropriate military functions" (Morgan, 22). On February 8, 1949, the Morgan Committee presented its proposal to Congress. Following extensive hearings and testimony, Congress passed the proposal, and Pres. Harry S. Truman signed the code into law on May 5, 1950, as Public Law 81–506. The newly created system of military justice under the code limited a commander's authority and expanded the rights of servicemen. More important, it attempted to combine the command-dominated military justice system with the civilian justice system, heavily emphasizing due process.

1951–69: The Struggle for Definition

The drafters of the code, recognizing that discipline could not be maintained without justice, created a comprehensive justice system regulated by the demands of duty and obedience. Consequently, the code encompasses both common law crimes and offenses unique to the armed forces. Common law crimes contained within the code include murder, rape and carnal knowledge, and burglary. Crimes unique to the armed forces include absence without leave, assaulting or willfully disobeying a superior commissioned officer, disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer, and misbehavior before the enemy. Moreover, the code contains two articles that encompass a wide range of unspecified conduct. Article 133, entitled Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, states "any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." The conduct punishable under Article 133 includes acts committed in an official or unofficial capacity that tend to reflect adversely on an officer's character and compromise his or her ability to lead and hold the respect of fellow officers. Article 134 prohibits "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses

not capital of which persons subject to [the UCMJ] may be guilty."

Although the code provided an outline for a new system of military justice, many questions were left unanswered. For example, Article 36 required the president to establish a comprehensive set of procedural rules and modes of proof for the unified court-martial system, and Article 56 authorized the president to establish maximum punishments for noncapital offenses. Consequently, on February 8, 1951, President Truman issued Executive Order 10,214 prescribing the *Manual for Courts-Martial* (1951), which supplements and explains various provisions of the code. The code and the *Manual* went into effect on May 31, 1951.

The Court of Military Appeals, however, invalidated a number of provisions prescribed by the *Manual*, ruling that they were inconsistent with the code. In *United States v. Rinehart* (1957), for example, the court invalidated a provision of the *Manual* that authorized members of the court to consult the *Manual for Courts-Martial* during the course of a trial or while deliberating findings or sentences. The court's ruling in *Rinehart* displayed its willingness to challenge the status quo and establish a military justice system that closely resembled its civilian counterpart.

Although the military justice system improved under the code, it remained significantly different and inferior in comparison with the civilian criminal justice system. This was significantly emphasized in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *O'Callahan v. Parker* (1969) where the Court limited the jurisdiction of courts-martial over service members by requiring that offenses be service connected for them to be subject to court-martial jurisdiction. According to the Court ruling, "Courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law" (265). The Court's decision reflected that, despite its many advances, the system of military justice under the code still needed further refinement.

1969–87: Further Refining the UCMJ

On August 1, 1969, the Military Justice Act of 1968, which had gained the support of key members of the military and congressional reformers, went into effect. The result of several years of study, debate, and compromise within

Congress and the Department of Defense, the Military Justice Act of 1968 was designed to bring the military justice system closer to its civilian counterpart by providing the foundation for a system of judicial authority and independent courts. For example, it gave the boards of review the power to function as true appellate courts and placed the law officer under the command of the judge advocate general rather than under the local commander, who was generally responsible for obedience and discipline. The reforms of the Military Justice Act of 1968—undertaken because of the Vietnam War—came at a time when attention was again focused on the deficiencies of the court-martial system. Confronted with problems such as increased absence without leave, desertion, racial violence, drug abuse, political dissent, and war crimes, court-martial rates rose astronomically. Consequently, a number of efforts were implemented to improve quality of life, morale, and discipline within the armed services.

Between 1975 and 1978 the Court of Military Appeals engaged in what has been described as the COMA revolution. In a series of decisions, the court limited the powers of commanders over pretrial confinement, expanded the rights of servicemen by protecting the accused's right to counsel, and broadened the authority and responsibility of the military judge to assure that the accused received a fair trial. Furthermore, the court incorporated into military law constitutional protections relating to search and seizure, interrogations and self-incrimination, and the right to a speedy trial.

The COMA revolution served as a catalyst for judge advocates general to examine critically the military justice system and consider ways to improve it, leading to several important changes. In 1980, for example, the armed forces adopted the Military Rules of Evidence, which followed the format and standards of the federal rules of evidence. Three years later, Congress passed the Military Justice Act of 1983, which permitted the accused to waive appellate review, authorized the government to appeal certain rulings of the military judge, and reorganized pretrial and post-trial processing. Most important, it extended the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court to review decisions of the Court of Military Appeals directly on writs of certiorari. The revised *Manual for Courts-Martial* (1984) incorporated these changes.

1987–Present: Stability

From 1987 to the present, the military justice system under the code has enjoyed a period of stability, experiencing only minor changes. In 1994, for example, Congress changed the name of the Court of Military Review to the various U.S. Army/Navy/Air Force/Coast Guard Courts of Criminal Appeals and the Courts of Military Appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. In 1998, the judge advocate general granted tenure to trial and appellate judges under Army regulation 27–10. Military judges now typically serve for a period of three years. Despite public scrutiny and criticism, the system of military justice has endured under the code it has shaped into a respectable system of justice, now more closely resembling the civilian criminal justice system.

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Related Entries

Articles of War; Court of Military Appeals; Doolittle Board; Sexual Abuse and Harassment

—*Ronald C. Desnoyers Jr.*

United States v. Seeger and *Welsh v. United States*

Supreme Court decisions in *United States v. Seeger* and *Welsh v. United States* have helped to define conscientious objector (CO) status under Section 6(J) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act (1958). The section exempts from military combat service those who are opposed to participation in war owing to their "religious training and belief," defined as a belief in a supreme being that involves duties or obligations above that of any human relationship. Such a belief was not considered tantamount to "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal code."

The first of these cases to come before the court involved Daniel Seeger, a New York resident. Seeger first claimed CO status in 1957 on the basis of possessing a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed." Opposing the provisions for CO status strictly as a function of belief in a divine being, Seeger invoked philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle to support his ethical belief in a greater good, as distinct from a faith in a supreme being. The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied

Seeger's appeal for draft exemption on the basis that his objection did not involve belief in a supreme being.

When Seeger refused to report to military camp upon the denial of his conscientious objector claim, he was placed on trial. His lawyer argued that although Seeger did not profess belief in a supreme being, the belief he did hold could be "accommodated" under the concept of "religious training and belief." This argument was rejected by the court, and Seeger was convicted. However, the conviction was overturned in the court of appeals, which maintained that requiring a belief in a supreme being as part of the conscientious objector definition amounted to compelling specific beliefs, and was accordingly unconstitutional under the due process clause of the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The case made its way to arguments before the Supreme Court in 1964 and was decided in 1965. The unanimous decision of the court focused on the interpretations of "Supreme Being" and "religious training and belief." After considering the many different religious denominations and other ways that people define religion and a supreme being, the court asserted that Congress in 1958 had picked its phrasing well in writing the objection so as not to differentiate among religions. The debates in Congress demonstrate the careful effort taken to be very precise in the selection of the language for the original Universal Military Training and Service Act. The court determined in its ruling that the requirement for CO status should be "…whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious."

The 1970 Supreme Court decision in *Welsh v. United States* further refined the definition of conscientious objection to military service. In 1966, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was denied status as a conscientious objector when it was ruled that his professed objections to military service did not have a religious basis. Though denied exemption, Welsh still refused to report for duty, and was sentenced to three years in prison by a United States district judge. The appeals court also rejected his claim on the basis that his objection did not meet the religious standard of Section 6(J) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act.

The case held many similarities with the Seeger case, but there were some important differences in their particular objections. First, the government argued that Welsh was much more adamant than Seeger in denying that his views were religious. When filing out his application for status as a religious objector, Welsh had crossed out the word "religious" before he signed, whereas Seeger had placed quotation marks around it. Second, the case was made that, unlike Seeger, Welsh's views were "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or merely a personal moral code." This differed significantly from Seeger, whose views the court determined "occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends . . . " The nature of Welsh's views was made clearer by an examination of a letter that he sent to his local board. In it Welsh claimed that "the military complex wastes both human and material resources" and that the United States misunderstood the "political, social and economic realities of the world" and hence failed "our responsibility as a nation." It was clear that Welsh's views were not simply a matter of how to define religion.

The court's decision in *Welsh* had major implications for the eligibility and consequences of CO status. The court looked at the case not in terms of what defines a religion, but instead whether Congress had the authority to mandate a link between religion and conscience. In a split decision, the court ruled that Congress had overstepped its authority by making this link. The opinion of the court was that now, "If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time," conscientious objector status can be upheld.

The cases of *Seeger* and *Welsh* have had a lasting impact. The decisions first redefined "religion" and then declared that forcing a "religious" basis as the only way to gain CO status was unconstitutional. The court has since further clarified its decisions by rejecting an argument that objector status could be attained for a specific conflict—i.e., refusing to serve only in a particular war. In a broader sense, the cases are also another piece of the continuing interpretation of the separation of church and state.

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Related Entries

All Volunteer Force; Conscientious Objection; Conscription and Volunteerism; Religion and War

—*Brian Stokes*

U. S. Sanitary Commission

The U. S. Sanitary Commission (USSC) was a national, civilian-led government relief organization that contributed food, clothing, medical supplies, and other aid to the Union Army during the Civil War. During its four years of operation, it coordinated the volunteer labor of hundreds of thousands of civilian women and men in the North, raised an estimated $15 million worth of goods for the well-being of soldiers, and worked with the military to deliver medical care to the troops.

In April 1861, Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell, the first woman in the United States to graduate from a medical school, and her sister Dr. Emily Blackwell, both of New York City, were the first to conceive of the idea of a national relief operation in the days following the onset of the Civil War. The Blackwells envisioned that their organization, the Woman's Central Association of Relief (WCAR), would train female nurses to work in the military hospitals and organize the contributions of volunteers in the soldiers' aid societies.

Unitarian minister and social reformer Henry Whitney Bellows, also from New York, joined the Blackwells in the WCAR effort. His meetings with government and military officials in Washington, D.C., and his tour of the camps and

inspection of Union troops convinced him that the WCAR was too limited a venture to meet the extensive needs of the Union Army's grossly understaffed Medical Department. Bellows's trip to Washington in June 1861 inspired him to create a vast, centralized bureaucracy headquartered in Washington that would closely monitor the immediate needs of the military and communicate those needs to a massive network of local soldiers' aid societies throughout the North and West. Joining Bellows were New York attorney and social reformer George Templeton Strong, who became the USSC's treasurer, and Frederick Law Olmsted, chief designer of Central Park, who served as the general secretary. With Bellows, they formed a powerful national organization.

Although Pres. Abraham Lincoln was unconvinced of the nation's need for a civilian relief effort of this scope, calling the USSC a "fifth wheel to a coach," he approved the new agency on June 13, 1861. In the early weeks of the USSC, Bellows issued a call to all citizens in the North to establish a soldiers' aid society in every village and town. These societies were instructed to raise funds for the USSC and gather donations of food, clothing, bedding, bandages, and other medical supplies. Under Bellows's direction, male USSC leaders and doctors helped organize and administer the Union military hospitals. These medical advisers also guided the military on the proper screening of recruits to ensure a healthy fighting force.

Although all citizens were urged to provide money and goods for the war effort, women performed most of the actual labor and were the primary fund-raisers and contributors. In fact, the soldiers' aid societies were

This illustration by Thomas Nast—showing the ways women participated in the work of the U.S. Sanitary Commission—appeared in Harper's Weekly during the Civil War. (© Applewood Books, Inc., reproduced by permission of Applewood Books and harpersweekly.com)

directed by and composed primarily of women, though men also participated.

From the early months of the war until its conclusion in April 1865, Northern women gathered in thousands of soldiers' aid societies to sew shirts and knit socks for the troops. They scraped lint and gathered scraps of fabric to be used as bandages, collected food, and sent supplies to the front. Early in the war, these goods were sent directly to local regiments, but by 1862 most were shipped to the USSC branch offices in the North's major cities and then on to Washington, D.C. (Northern men and women also sent supplies to a rival organization, the United States Christian Commission, which also worked to ease the suffering of Union troops.) From there, male USSC agents delivered the goods to Union troops. From the fall of 1863 through 1865, Northern women and men staged wildly successful fundraising bazaars known as sanitary fairs to boost USSC contributions. In all, the sanitary fairs raised nearly $4.4 million.

Although the top leadership of the USSC was composed of white upper-middle-class men, the leaders of the branch USSC societies in the North's largest cities were white elite and upper-middle-class women. Women branch leaders were the individuals most responsible for encouraging the volunteers. Among the most influential and effective branch leaders were Louisa Lee Schuyler in New York City, Abby Williams May in Boston, and Mary Ashton Rice Livermore and Jane Blaikie Hoge in Chicago.

In addition to the masses of women who contributed to the USSC through their local soldiers' aid societies, 3,200 white Northern women, earning $12 per month ($1 dollar more than Union privates received), served as nurses in the Union military hospitals under the auspices of the USSC. Prison and mental health reformer Dorothea Dix, who had been appointed superintendent of female nurses of the Union Army in June 1861, oversaw all aspects of USSC women nurses and made sure that only "plain," mature women over the age of 30 were assigned to the hospitals. Several hundred women also served on the hospital ships of the USSC's Hospital Transport Service. Although thousands

of additional white and African American women (an exact number is not known) nursed soldiers on the battlefields, in the camps, and in regimental hospitals, most of the nurses during the Civil War were men.

The USSC was officially disbanded in mid-1865, although Northern women continued to care for the needs of veterans and their families in their communities for years afterward. No civilian organization since the Civil War has contributed as greatly or as directly to the U.S. military as the USSC did during the Civil War. The USSC experience is a prime example of the way in which national patriotism is invoked to produce a groundswell of civilian participation and support on behalf of a war effort.

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Related Entries

Civil–Military Relations; Civil War; Nurses, Military; Women in the Military

—*Judith E. Harper*

Veteran Status and Electability

Whit Ayres, a Republican pollster commenting before the 2002 Senate races, claimed that "ever since Sept. 11, we've noticed that a military background—particularly combat experience—is one of the most prominent positives for candidates," whereas "in the past, it was not a significantly positive factor." It is premature to assess Ayres's statement about a shift in the importance of military background post-September 11. But it is the case that military background, or veteran status, has played an important role, historically, on the perceived electability of presidential candidates and of members of the House of Representatives. Data as to the actual effect of veteran status on electability are unsupportive of that presumption but not conclusive. More research is called for; what does appear clear, however, is that over time party leaders have favored nominating veterans for top federal elected offices.

Nominations, Elections, and Veteran Status

The office of the president is a logical one to examine in terms of veteran status and electability because of the president's role as commander in chief and in policy decisions that affect the military. In presidential races from 1788 to 2004, veterans were chosen to run 46 times while nonveterans were chosen and ran 62 times (a 3:4 ratio). In the period prior to the Civil War (1788–1860), veterans ran 14 times, nonveterans 27 times. From the Civil War to the year before U.S. entry into World War I (1864–1916), a period during which the veteran to nonveteran ratio was higher than in previous decades owing to the vast numbers of Civil War vets, veterans and nonveterans were candidates for the presidency in equal

numbers (13 times). Between the election following World War I and the last election during World War II (1920–44), only one veteran ran for the presidency while nonveterans ran 13 times. During the Cold War years (1948–88), however, veterans outnumbered nonveteran presidential candidates 12 to 7. Since the end of the Cold War (1992–2004), a veteran ran six times, a nonveteran twice.

In 24 presidential races, a veteran faced another veteran or a nonveteran faced another nonveteran. Three races were uncontested (the first two, in 1788 and 1792, when George Washington had no opposition, and in 1820, when James Monroe ran unopposed). Hence, 27 races involved a veteran vs. a nonveteran. Of these, veterans won 17, nonveterans, 10. These data seem to suggest that veterans had an advantage over nonveterans in running for president. But if the extent of combat experience is weighted (a combat veteran counting as 1, one who saw no combat one-half), the balance shifts to 14 with combat experience and 12 without combat experience or without military service at all—not a significant difference.

Why, then, did political party leaders choose veterans for presidential races at rates that, for most of these years, were higher than the proportion of veterans in the adult male population? In the only research of its kind, Albert Somit (1948) explored the possibility of whether "military hero" status aided the electability of presidential candidates. Somit noted that a number of individuals had military careers of such distinction and glory that their careers were the central factor contributing to their nomination for president. More than 40 percent of the presidential nominees between 1828 and 1916 could be styled military heroes. Using this classification, Somit found that military heroes received a greater percentage of the popular vote than others, whether they won or lost, and tended to win by larger

margins when running against nonheroes. Somit concluded that a political party that nominated a military hero increased its chance of winning the election.

Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus (1957) also conducted a unique investigation of whether veteran status enhanced a House of Representative candidate's chances of winning a seat during congressional elections in 1950, 1952, and 1954. They concluded that the overrepresentation of veterans in the primary process (and consequently in slight accretions in the House itself across the six-year period) was attributable to the way in which the parties nominated candidates. They found that both parties nominated a substantially higher percentage of veterans than their percentage in the adult male population (nearly 50 percent higher), which eventually resulted in an overrepresentation of veterans in the House (55 percent, versus their percentage in the adult male population of 40 percent). Nonetheless, they found that in these three elections, voters, when confronted with a veteran facing a nonveteran, showed absolutely no disposition to favor the veteran!

A Contemporary Case Study

While evidence suggests that veteran status does not significantly help the electability of those who run for the highest elected offices, it is evident that party leaders continue to think that military experience will make a difference. Indeed, the importance placed on military service was born out in the 2004 presidential election. One of the most effective advertising campaigns in that race was that of the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT). In 2004 the SBVT ran ads as a 527 group (so named for the tax code allowing them to collect campaign donations without the same limits as political action committees) against Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry. The SBVT's mission was to call Kerry's war record into question with a focus on his tours of duty in Vietnam and the injuries that garnered him three purple hearts and bronze and silver stars. The SBVT also took issue with Kerry's 1971 statements that war crimes were being committed by American soldiers in Vietnam. SBVT was funded and assisted in 2004 by supporters of George W. Bush and led by John O'Neill, who had been hired in the early 1970s by Nixon White House staffer Charles Colson in an explicit attempt to "take down" Kerry after his testimony

against the Vietnam War before the Senate. Colson orchestrated press conferences so that O'Neill could attack Kerry's antiwar stance and created Vietnam Veterans for a Just Peace, featuring O'Neill as the primary spokesperson.

The Colson–O'Neill Vietnam Veterans for a Just Peace plan is an example of attacking a candidate's military service to undermine his appearance of heroic virtue and hence electability. Indeed, political pundits have suggested that Republicans are typically seen as stronger on security and national defense than Democrats and that Democratic candidates can bolster their image by having a military background. The truth of the charges levied by O'Neill and the SBVT were found to be contrary to evidence the media uncovered in Navy records and in interviews with other Swift Boat commanders who had served with Kerry, including a *Chicago Tribune* editor who had served with Kerry. Kerry's silence in the face of their criticism may have damaged his credibility and hence his electability. George W. Bush, Kerry's opponent, remained on the outskirts of the controversy— possibly to divert attention from questions about his own military service. Bush, who was enlisted in the Texas National Guard and then transferred to the Alabama National Guard, appears to have been absent from his Alabama unit between 1972 and 1973 according to available records.

Adding to the diversion of attention was the news story aired by CBS that contained forged documents supporting the inconsistencies in Bush's National Guard record—a story for which CBS later fired four executives. These documents gave the impression that allegations about Bush's absence from the Alabama National Guard were false. The process of diverting attention from his own service and allowing the SBVT to attack's Kerry's record could have given Bush the small lead that he needed in order to win against Kerry (exit polls reported that veterans alone voted for Bush over Kerry by a 58 percent to 42 percent margin).

Veteran Status and War Policy

While veteran status has historically given presidential candidates only a slight edge and has given no edge to House candidates, differences in the ways in which veterans govern might contribute to their greater electability. Chris Gelpi and Peter Feaver examined the proportion of policy makers

Veterans in the Cabinet, House of Representatives, and U.S. Population

Source: Feaver, Peter and Christopher Gelpi. *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force*. Princeton University Press, 2004.

A chart comparing the percent of veterans in Congress and the Cabinet to the percent of veterans in the general population.

(members of the House of Representatives and the president's Cabinet, including the president and vice president) with military experience and examined military conflicts from 1816 to 1992. The percentage of veterans in the Cabinet and House rose at rates greater than those of veterans in the general population after the conclusion of the Civil War, World War I, and World War II (see figure). During the course of the 176 years represented in this study, the percentage of veterans in the House ranged from 13 to 72 percent of total membership, those of veterans in the Cabinet from 0 to 92 percent.

Gelpi and Feaver examined conflicts during these 176 years to determine whether, controlling for relevant variables,

veteran policy makers were more inclined to initiate military action during disputes with other countries. They divided the disputes into those they labeled "interventionist," against countries where their military had at least a 99:1 disadvantage against the United States and were not allied with a major power. They labeled as "realpolitik" those disputes against countries that did not meet either of the two criteria for an interventionist dispute. In general, they found that the higher the proportion of policy makers having military experience, the lower the probability that the United States would initiate a military dispute; the higher the proportion of policy makers with military experience, the more likely the United States

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was to initiate a realpolitik rather than an interventionist military dispute. Of particular note was the fact that the greater the number of policy makers with military experience, the greater the level of force used once a conflict had been initiated. That is, historical data show differences in the way that veterans decide to engage in military actions: veterans are more likely to be cautious about entering into conflicts, especially those in which vital U.S. security interests are not at play; but once they decide to engage in war, they use more force. This propensity is consistent with the military-crafted Weinberger–Powell Doctrine.

Historical data confirm that veteran status may not actually influence the electability of a political candidate and that military intervention has been lowest when the proportion of veterans in the Cabinet and in the House is highest. Contemporary pundits have suggested that candidates can enhance their image if they draw attention to their military background in a post–September 11 world. Certainly, a race as close as the 2004 presidential election, ultimately decided by 120,000 votes in the state of Ohio, could have been influenced by military service. In any event, it remains to be seen whether veteran status will continue to be regarded as important in the decades to come.

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Related Entries

Civil–Military Relations; Public Opinion and Policy in Wartime; Weinberger–Powell Doctrine.

—*Reynol Junco and Peter Karsten*

Veterans

See Bonus March; Combat, Effects of; GI Bills; Memory and War; Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related; Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; Veteran Status and Electability; Veterans Administration; Veterans Day; specific groups.

Veterans Administration

Military service inevitably involves some sort of sacrifice on the part of those who serve. In addition to risking loss of life or suffering a debilitating injury, military personnel typically have to devote several years of their lives to military service, time that could have been spent pursuing an education, a career, or starting a family. The realization of these sacrifices has prompted the U.S. government to offer benefits to those who have served, varying in type and substance since the end of the Revolutionary War. These benefits, which have included mustering out pay, medical care, insurance, and education benefits, are intended as both a reward for service and as compensation for time lost from civilian life. As the wars of the 20th century demanded that increased numbers of civilians be conscripted for service, the government began to offer a more comprehensive set of benefits. Several different agencies were charged with the task of administering these benefits until the creation of the Veterans Administration (VA) in 1930. Since its inception, the VA has evolved into a vast organization dedicated to administering the multitude of benefits on offer to the nation's veterans. It has aided the millions of returning soldiers in the transition back to civilian life and offered invaluable help in lessening the burden of service.

The principle that all citizens have a special obligation to care for their veterans has existed in America from the beginning of the country's history: indeed, the founders of the Plymouth colony pledged to take care of their disabled soldiers. During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress promised soldiers, among other things, mustering out pay and pensions for the disabled. During the first half of the 19th century, benefits were extended to widows of deceased soldiers and their surviving dependents. In addition, individual states offered medical assistance to injured veterans.

The devastating nature of the Civil War left the nation with an unprecedented number of veterans. This ultimately led to pressure on Congress, in a year when there was a federal budget surplus (1890), to increase its efforts to assist veterans. The lobbying efforts of the nationwide veterans' organization The Grand Army of the Republic ensured that Civil War veterans received the most generous and widely available pensions the government had yet offered. In addition to offering pensions to almost 1.9 million former Union Army soldiers (Confederate soldiers were denied such privileges until 1958, when only a handful remained alive), the government offered aid to disabled veterans through the National Home for Disabled Soldiers. By 1930, the government administered 10 such homes in addition to more than 50 veterans' hospitals. Veterans of the Indian Wars and the Spanish–American War received similar benefits at the end of the 19th century. But the total wars of the 20th century forced the government to create a more structured and permanent benefits system.

America's entry into World War I led to an unprecedented mobilization of manpower for an overseas conflict. More than 5 million veterans, including some 200,000 with injuries, reentered society after service. In 1917, the government for the first time recognized the need to compensate veterans for time lost from civilian life by offering World War I veterans vocational rehabilitation and insurance, as well as compensation for the disabled. As a further reward for service, the government also authorized the payment of a one-time cash bonus to be paid in 1945. But because of the financial pressures brought on by the Great Depression, veterans descended on Washington in June and July of 1932 demanding early payment of those bonuses in what would be known as the Bonus March.

Despite an increase in the scale and nature of veterans' benefits after World War I, administration of these benefits proved problematic. Responsibility for distributing the appropriate benefits fell to three different agencies: the Bureau of Pensions of the Interior Department; the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers; and the Veterans Bureau. Pres. Warren G. Harding signed the Veterans Bureau into existence in 1921, but almost immediately the agency encountered problems. Financial scandals forced Charles Forbes, the first head of the Veterans Bureau, to leave his post after only two years. Moreover, many veterans complained that having to go through three separate agencies meant wading through a lot of unnecessary bureaucracy.

To avoid administrative overlap and to save on costs in the midst of the Depression, Pres. Herbert Hoover created the Veterans Administration in July 1930. The VA assumed responsibility for the distribution of benefits and the medical care of veterans. To head the VA, Hoover chose Frank T. Hines, Charles Forbes's successor at the Veterans Bureau. Hines gained respect as a hard working and efficient VA head. But he conceived of the VA as little more than a service agency, dedicated only to enacting federal policies regarding veterans. As a consequence, the VA remained an essentially conservative agency under his tenure, administering benefits and aid but rarely promoting specific policies or a pro-veteran agenda. World War II challenged this limited mandate.

The problems experienced by returning World War I veterans, combined with the economic exigencies of massive demobilization, convinced many of the need to offer World War II veterans a more comprehensive slate of benefits. The result was the much-heralded Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, or "GI Bill of Rights," signed into law by Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 22, 1944. The GI Bill offered nearly 16 million veterans unemployment compensation; home, business, and farm loans; and education benefits. More than any other act or event, the GI Bill solidified the principle that the federal government had an obligation to address the needs of both its able-bodied and disabled veterans after service.

The VA assumed responsibility for administering the new benefits. But the vast number of veterans returning and the unprecedented levels of benefits on offer demanded that the VA become a more extensive and efficient organization. Frank Hines resigned amid allegations of substandard care in some VA hospitals. Pres. Harry S. Truman appointed Gen. Omar Bradley to replace him. Bradley, the successful and well-respected World War II general, brought far more dynamism to the role of VA head. Although Bradley headed the VA for only three years, the agency increased its staffing levels and pay scale, and it played a more active role in policy making under his tenure. In addition, the establishment of a VA Department of Medicine and Surgery in 1946, headed by a chief medical director, ensured that VA hospitals proved

more capable of meeting the needs of the multitude of returning injured veterans. The administrative demands of the GI Bill forced the VA to become a far more modern and efficient organization. To aid the distribution of benefits, the VA increased greatly the number of regional veterans' centers. By becoming more decentralized, the VA became much more responsive to veterans' needs. Contact with VA became a regular feature of post-service life for many veterans.

The passage of later versions of the GI Bill meant that veterans of both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts continued to receive education benefits, loans, and medical assistance through the VA. Under the Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, Korean War veterans received benefits comparable to those of World War II, except for unemployment payments. Vietnam veterans received benefits similar to Korean veterans under the Veterans Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966 and the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Acts of 1972 and 1974. The continuation of GI Bill benefits and the millions of additional veterans created by the Korean and Vietnam conflicts ensured that the VA continued to grow both in size and significance.

During the early 1970s, however, the VA drew considerable criticism from Vietnam veterans who believed that the agency was not meeting their educational and medical needs. Media reports of substandard hospital care led to an inquiry on Capitol Hill. The educational benefits offered Vietnam veterans did, at first, fall short of those offered to their World War II predecessors until Congress enacted a series of increases throughout the 1970s. Donald Johnson headed the VA from 1969 through 1974. His attitude about benefits levels in particular infuriated many Vietnam veterans. Despite the best efforts of veteran advocacy groups and numerous congresspersons and senators, Johnson repeatedly rejected calls to increase veterans benefit levels, claiming that veterans were adequately cared for. Many accused him of adhering too closely to the fiscal retrenchment of the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations and ignoring the real problems faced by Vietnam veterans. Johnson's failure to fight on behalf of veterans served as a reminder that the VA functioned primarily as an agency dedicated to administering federal policy regarding medical aid and benefits rather than as a veterans' advocacy group.

Despite its problems during the Vietnam era, the VA remained a vitally important agency within the government and in the lives of veterans. In 1973, the VA assumed control of the National Cemetery System from the Department of the Army, providing gravesites for veterans, their spouses, and dependents. Since 1979, the psychological needs of veterans suffering from combat trauma as a result of their service have been addressed by more than 200 Readjustment Counseling Service centers throughout the country. The VA established these centers essentially to help the many Vietnam veterans who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. Although for some these centers came too late, many more found the counseling to be an indispensable part of their readjustment to civilian life.

The VA continued to administer benefits and medical assistance to post-Vietnam era veterans. The 1976 Veterans Educational Assistance Program first offered education benefits to the all volunteer force established after 1973. Vietnam veteran Max Cleland oversaw much of this program as head of the VA under Pres. Jimmy Carter. Since 1985, veterans have received benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill. Efforts have also been made to help homeless veterans with transitional housing and aid.

The wars of the 20th century produced millions of veterans and many more dependents in the United States. By the century's end, more than 70 million Americans were eligible for a wide range of benefits from the VA. Consequently, since its inception in 1930, the agency has expanded into a vast bureaucracy. The heightened role and significance of the VA resulted in its elevation to cabinet level status when, on March 15, 1989, Pres. George H.W. Bush signed into existence the Department of Veterans Affairs. Edward Derwinski served as the first secretary of Veterans Affairs until 1992. In terms of employees, the VA ranks second only to the Department of Defense among cabinet agencies. Its budget request for the fiscal year 2006 stood at 70.8 billion dollars. It oversees more than 120 national cemeteries, 163 hospitals, and more than 850 medical clinics. The VA medical system provides for the largest medical training program in the United States and is responsible for some of the most important research currently underway on treatments for mental health, AIDS, and age-related illnesses.

As increasing numbers of personnel were needed for military service during the 20th century, there existed a clear need for a comprehensive package of benefits and a bureaucratic system modern enough to oversee their distribution. The creation of the Veterans Administration ensured that veterans could receive their appropriate benefits in an efficient manner. Because of measures such as the GI Bill, the VA—and later the Department of Veterans Affairs—has been able to assist veterans with the often difficult transition back to civilian life. It has ensured that the long-held principle that veterans deserve some form of compensation for their service has become a reality for the millions of servicemen and women who put their lives on hold in service of the nation.

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Related Entries

American Legion; American Veterans Committee; AMVETS; Bonus March; GI Bills; Grand Army of the Republic; Jewish War Veterans; Veterans of Foreign Wars; Vietnam Veterans of America

Related Documents

1833; 1932

—Mark Boulton

Veterans Day

Veterans Day, formerly known as Armistice Day, officially received its name in America in 1926 through a congressional resolution. In 1917, Pres. Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that the World War I would be the "War to End All Wars." If these idealistic hopes had succeeded, November 11 might still be called Armistice Day. Within years of the holiday's proclamation, however, war broke out again in Europe. Millions more Americans were called to fight and many died in battle; in order to honor them and those who would serve in future wars, Armistice Day was renamed Veterans Day. A day reserved for remembrance and reflection was not immune, however, to the political debates surrounding most American wars, and Veterans Day often became a time when conflicting views about the necessity of specific wars were aired.

At 11:00 A.M. on November 11, 1918, World War I came to an end with the signing of the cease-fire agreement at Rethondes, France. One year later, November 11 was set aside as Armistice Day in the United States to remember the sacrifices made by men and women during the war. Veterans' parades and political speeches throughout the country emphasized the peaceful nature of the day, echoing the theme of national unity against tyranny. Since the Civil War, Memorial Day (originally Decoration Day) had traditionally been a day when the dead of all conflicts were honored during reverent ceremonies, and their graves decorated with flags and flowers. Veterans of the Civil War and the

Spanish–American War continued to honor their dead on Memorial Day in May (April in some southern states), whereas Armistice Day was designated as a national day commemorating America's participation in World War I.

Armistice Day ceremonies in the United States were similar to those observed in France and Great Britain, with processions, wreath-laying ceremonies, and a moment of silence to pay homage to those who died in the war. On the 3rd Armistice Day, November 11, 1921, America further followed the example of its allies by burying an Unknown Soldier in an impressive ceremony over an elaborate tomb at Arlington Cemetery in Virginia. The event not only bolstered efforts by the American Legion to make Armistice Day a national holiday but established rituals intended to unify a nation still ambivalent about its involvement in the war.

Although united in their desire to pay tribute to those who fought and died in the war, Americans could not agree on the precise nature and intent of Armistice Day commemorative rituals. The American Legion, the largest veterans' organization to emerge following the war, endeavored to ensure that the achievements of American veterans were remembered. Featuring hymns and prayers in memory of loved ones who had died in the war, ceremonies sponsored by the Legion emphasized the terrible cost of war and the need to work for a new, more harmonious, world order. Despite the strong message of peace, Legion parades often included a military component, including rifle or artillery salutes to the dead.

Others preferred to strip Armistice Day of its militaristic character, emphasizing instead the tragedy of war and the preservation of peace. In the 1920s a series of disarmament treaties and pacifist promises such as those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which outlawed the use of aggressive war by its signatories, created a sense of optimism that there might never be another war. Members of national peace movements believed war could only be stopped through disarmament and pacifism, while the American Legion insisted military preparedness provided the best assurance against future wars. The lack of consensus reflected the ongoing ambivalence Americans felt about the path that led to intervention in World War I and the ultimate purpose of the sacrifice of so many lives.

Despite years of political lobbying and campaigning by the Legion, Congress did not vote to designate Armistice Day a federal holiday until 1938. By this time, it was obvious that another war was imminent and once again Americans risked being called to fight. Emotional memories of the previous conflict stirred isolationists and peace groups to urge the government away from another foreign entanglement and toward stringent neutrality. However, after the unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, patriotic fervor and the perceived need to defend the nation against further attacks proved the decisive factors that united the nation behind another war.

After 1945, Americans continued to observe Armistice Day on November 11 as the Legion opened its membership to a new generation of veterans. Together they joined each year in the same rituals and commemorative ceremonies established previously. In 1954, Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower signed a bill proclaiming that November 11 would now be called Veterans Day, to honor veterans of all American wars. In 1971 Pres. Richard Nixon declared it a federal holiday on the second Monday in November. Seven years later, however, the nation returned the annual observance of Veterans Day to November 11, regardless of where it fell in the week. Thus, the historical significance of the date was preserved and attention once again was focused on the initial purpose of Veterans Day—to honor the nation's veterans, not to provide Americans with a long weekend.

Despite its origins in World War I, each generation of veterans has embraced Veterans Day as a moment for collective reflection. Each war leaves in its wake a plethora of monuments, holidays, cemeteries, museums, and archives that serve as reminders of the human sacrifice war entails. These remain, like Veterans Day, effective in providing people with a sense of common identity as Americans no matter how divided they may otherwise be by class, region, gender, religion, or race.

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Related Entries

American Legion; Memorial Day; Tomb of the Unknown Soldier
—*Lisa M. Budreau*

Veterans of Foreign Wars

The Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) is an organization open to all American veterans who have earned service badges for participating in overseas military campaigns. Founded after the Spanish–American War, the VFW has served as a fraternal association dedicated to the welfare of American veterans and their families. To that end, the VFW has played an important role as a political lobbyist in furthering veterans' legislative agendas at the federal and state levels. Since its inception, the VFW has also voiced veterans' perspectives on American national security and foreign relations issues. Joining with other patriotic organizations, the VFW has championed unswerving dedication to American political institutions and supported the creation of memorials and commemorations of the nation's wars. Comprised of local units called posts, the VFW reaches into thousands of communities across the United States. At both national and local levels, the organization mediates overseas veterans' relationship with the rest of American society.

The Origins of the VFW

The VFW traces its origins to two veterans' groups, the National Association of the Army of the Philippines and the American Veterans of Foreign Service, both of which formed in 1899 after the Spanish–American War. These groups operated independently until a merger in 1913. After a referendum in 1914, the original organizations consolidated under the banner of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States. The organization initially competed for members with another group, United Spanish War Veterans. After 1914, the VFW opened its membership to all honorably discharged veterans who served on foreign shores or in hostile waters in any war, campaign, or expedition recognized by Congress with a campaign badge or service clasp. By expanding the organization beyond service in Cuba and the Philippines during the Spanish–American War, the VFW opened its doors to some two million potential new members of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) sent to France in World War I.

Besides seeing the war as an opportunity to attract new members, the VFW also tried to exert some influence on defense policy. Between 1914 and 1917, while the United States stayed neutral as World War I raged in Europe, the VFW argued for a greater level of military preparedness in the event the United States joined the fighting. The VFW wanted to prevent a repeat of the difficulties caused by the hasty and poorly organized mobilization during the Spanish–American War.

During World War I, the VFW waived membership fees for active duty military personnel and heavily recruited the AEF camps in France for new members. Former president Theodore Roosevelt became one of the VFW's wartime recruits based on his service in the Spanish–American War, thus stimulating publicity for the organization. While the VFW membership grew to 20,000 in 1919, it did not enjoy the same success in the immediate postwar period as the organization's rival for Great War veterans, the American Legion.

During the 1920s, the American Legion eclipsed the VFW in terms of membership and political clout. However,

the two organizations worked in tandem throughout the decade to improve benefits, medical care, and pensions for all veterans, widows, and orphans. In addition, both lobbied for the payment of a bonus to World War I veterans as "adjusted compensation" for the meager wages received during the conflict. In 1924, a deferred bonus payment was granted to World War I veterans in the form of interest-bearing certificates, which would mature in 1945.

In 1921, the VFW established a National Service Bureau in Washington, D.C., to promote veterans' interests. In 1922, the VFW initiated the annual Buddy Poppy drive; every Memorial Day, lapel-pin poppies are sold by VFW members to benefit disabled veterans and to remind Americans of the costs of war. Throughout the late 1920s, the VFW also sponsored legislation in Congress to make Francis Scott Key's "The Star-Spangled Banner" the official national anthem of the United States. In 1931, this drive finally succeeded.

In the 1930s, the VFW grew dramatically as a result of the organization's leadership in securing immediate cash payment of the World War I bonus and for helping reverse drastic cuts in veteran benefits enacted by the Economy Act of 1933. The VFW never challenged the primacy of the American Legion as the largest veteran organization. Yet, between 1929 and 1941, the VFW surged from fewer than 70,000 to 214,000 members, more than tripling its membership despite the fact that the Depression wreaked havoc on most dues-paying voluntary associations. The VFW played an important role in the origins of the 1932 Bonus March, in which more than 40,000 World War I veterans marched on Washington to demand early payment of their bonus; the VFW fought persistently for immediate payment of the bonus at a time when the Legion opposed the measure. From 1932 to 1936, the VFW never wavered in its support of immediate cash payment, a position that brought it into direct confrontation with the popular Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt. On foreign policy matters, the VFW joined with those in favor of American isolationism and promoted strict neutrality in world affairs. The VFW's populist message in the 1930s brought the organization enormous institutional gains and placed it in the middle of Depression-era politics.

World War II brought a new infusion of members into the VFW. While the VFW had supported the slow drift towards war after 1940, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the organization vigorously joined the war effort. During the war, VFW members served as civil-defense personnel and training camp instructors. Many others renewed their military service at advanced ages. In 1942, the VFW instituted a pilot-training program that prepared desperately needed new recruits for flying duty in the armed services. Moreover, in 1944, the VFW became involved in the legislative battle over the proper manner in which to compensate returning veterans and ease their readjustment into civilian life. The VFW initially opposed the expansive benefits that were outlined in the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, more popularly known as the GI Bill, out of fears that the nation would abandon such an expensive system once wartime patriotism flagged. Ultimately, the VFW joined with the bill's champion, the American Legion, in helping secure legislative victory. With the GI Bill, the United States passed one of the most expansive pieces of social welfare legislation in the country's history and profoundly shaped postwar society by providing education, housing, and job training to millions of veterans.

After World War II, the VFW stood at its greatest political and numerical strength, with some 1.5 million members. During the Cold War, the VFW continued the organization's record of staunch anticommunism begun in the years following the Bolshevik Russian Revolution of 1917. In the waging of the Cold War, from U.S. involvement in Korea to Vietnam, the VFW supported an aggressive and militant foreign policy for the United States in battling communism. Even when public support for the Vietnam War waned, the VFW never wavered in its opinion of the war's merits, nor of American soldiers' honorable service. From World War II through the Vietnam conflict, the VFW attempted to account for and repatriate prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action (POW–MIAs). After the Vietnam War, the search for living POW–MIAs and the attempts to identify the remains of the unidentified dead became an even larger VFW project as it worked with the U.S. government and the governments and private citizens of Korea and Vietnam.

After the Vietnam War, the VFW became an outspoken critic of the Veterans Administration's (VA) handling of veterans' post-traumatic stress disorder and of the physical ailments associated with exposure to the chemical defoliant

Agent Orange. In these battles, the VFW struggled with the uncooperative VA and military bureaucracies before finally securing treatment and compensation, respectively. After the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the VFW supported research into what became known as Gulf War Syndrome, a debilitating but mysterious illness, and challenged the U.S. military to provide information on vaccinations given to the troops and possible other causes of the syndrome. The post-Vietnam era also found the VFW very active in supporting public memorials for the veterans of the Korean and Vietnam wars. The Vietnam War and Korean War memorials on the Washington Mall were dedicated in 1982 and 1995, respectively.

Throughout the history of the organization, the VFW has been an outspoken champion of veterans' benefits, healthcare, and pensions, serving as a vital intermediary between veterans and the federal government. As the VFW brings together veterans in thousands of communities across the country, it also acts as a constant reminder of the long-term impact of war on the American people.

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Related Entries

Agent Orange; American Legion; Bonus March; GI Bills; Memorials and Monuments; Preparedness Movement; Prisoners of War; Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related; Spanish–American War; "Star-Spangled Banner, The"; Veterans Administration

—Stephen R. Ortiz

Victory Gardens

The campaign to encourage Victory Gardens was probably the most successful home front effort waged by the U.S. government during World War II. Victory Gardens were originally intended to supplement the food produced by commercial growers in order to prevent shortages around the country. They became important morale-building and unifying weapons as well, providing emotional support for many Americans, who felt that their participation in the Victory Gardens program helped the country's war effort. Victory Gardens were so successful in supplementing the country's food supply that by 1945 American per capita consumption of fresh vegetables and vitamin C reached its all-time high.

Victory Gardens had their roots in World War I. By the time the United States entered the war in April 1917, government officials had studied how European countries mobilized their nations for war. Preferring voluntary compliance to regulation, as many of the European nations did, the federal government asked citizens to conserve food and to plant gardens to produce as much of their own food as possible. Known as War Gardens, these plots sprang up everywhere and were regarded as testaments to patriotism. Talks by the Committee on Public Information's Four-Minute Men promoted War Gardens to audiences around the country. The National War Garden Commission prepared publications with instructions on planting and caring for vegetable gardens. When World War I ended, the Commission continued to call for individual gardens to meet peacetime needs. After the armistice, the name given to these plots was changed to Victory Gardens. The return of peace, however, led to the virtual disappearance of Victory Gardens by 1920.

During the Great Depression, various governmental bodies called on citizens to return to the World War I tradition in creating gardens to feed the needy. Peacetime Victory Gardens, however, failed to catch on, possibly because many who needed the food lacked money for seeds and gardening tools.

The beginning of World War II, however, saw the resurrection of the Victory Garden program. Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States was supplying food to Great Britain and the Soviet Union. After the United States entered the war, many farm laborers were called into the armed forces. Hence, the demand for food increased, while the labor supply declined. The Department of Agriculture took the lead in calling for individual Americans to plant Victory Gardens to make up for shortfalls in production. Because most foods were rationed during the war, Victory Gardens were also a means of supplementing American diets.

In December 1941, Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard arranged a National Defense Garden Conference in Washington, D.C. Representatives of gardening organizations, seed companies, the agricultural press, and other organizations met to discuss how to encourage Victory Gardens. The program they soon developed proved to be very successful. Its goals were defined as increasing the production and consumption of fresh vegetables and fruits, encouraging the preservation of surplus vegetables and fruits by individual families, allowing families to save money by not having to purchase produce, providing opportunities for urban dwellers to garden, and maintaining the morale and spiritual well-being of the nation.

Although voluntary, the Victory Garden program proved to be extraordinarily popular. Local organizations, such as defense councils, arranged for expert gardeners to provide advice to novices. The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers developed model ordinances for city and town governments that would allow Victory Gardens on public property and would discourage theft. Businesses promoted Victory Gardens for their employees. Some, such as Westinghouse, provided land for employees' clubs as well as sponsored advertisements about the program in newspapers and magazines. Millions of Americans dug up their backyards to plant gardens. In urban areas, public gardens were created on municipal property and vacant lots, and city-dwellers were able to reserve a plot for their own planting. Schools created gardens that were worked by the students; the products of these gardens often were served in the cafeterias. Other organizations—from prisons to Catholic convents—created gardens. It was estimated that 22 million families had planted gardens during the 1942 growing season. The U.S. Department of Agriculture hoped that by 1943 there would be 18 million Victory Gardens in the country. Results surpassed that expectation, however. At least 20 million gardens were reported in Gallup polls in the early spring, and *House & Garden* predicted that 25.5 million families would plant gardens in 1943. About 40 percent of the vegetables and fruits consumed by Americans during World War II were produced in Victory Gardens.

Because many Americans had not raised their own vegetables and fruit before, the U.S. Department of Agriculture published a series of pamphlets with directions for creating Victory Gardens. Individual states also formed their own Victory Garden committees and published guidebooks for gardeners. Publications included information about when to plant different crops in different regions and what kind of growing conditions worked best for different plants. Sample layouts for the gardens were popular, as were tips on what kinds of plants would yield the best harvests. Seed companies published instructional booklets and prepared packets of seeds for different areas. Lists of recommended vegetables were published, with an eye toward a balance of vitamins. Authorities cited the health benefits of consuming fresh produce, aiming to prevent malnutrition and foster a healthy population. Recommended vegetables included lettuce, kale, and cabbage in the leafy category, and suggested root vegetables included potatoes, turnips, and carrots. Over one-third of the vegetables produced were tomatoes, since tomato plants could yield abundantly in a limited space. Organizations also published pamphlets with instructions on how best to preserve surplus vegetables and fruits. People dried and froze the produce they grew, but the most popular method of preserving Victory Garden's crops was canning. Americans canned an average of 165 jars of food per family annually during the war.

A man buying seeds for a Victory Garden in May of 1943, with a government-issue poster supporting the Victory Garden program in the background. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

While Victory Gardens produced an enormous amount of food for civilian consumers, they also played an important role in helping morale and building national unity. Gardening helped give families a sense of order in a world that seemed otherwise chaotic. Like the paper and scrap metal drives that were popular during the war, Victory Gardens allowed civilians to feel they were contributing to the war effort. As many posters reminded them, "Our Food is Fighting." Women, children, and the elderly could all take part.

Rationing ended soon after the Japanese surrender, and the immediate need for Victory Gardens disappeared. American society soon returned to its old habits, with only fond memories of a time when everyone pulled together to grow vegetables for victory.

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Related Entries

Civil Defense; Rationing

—Tim J. Watts

Vietnam Veterans Against the War

The Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) was formed in April 1967 by a handful of American servicemen who had returned to the United States after their tours of duty in Vietnam. It gained national prominence over the next several years for its often radical antiwar activities but faded from public view with the end of the conflict in Vietnam. It regained the spotlight briefly in 2004 when one of its former leaders, John F. Kerry, became the Democratic Party's candidate for the presidency.

VVAW initially cultivated a staid public profile, sending well-groomed spokesmen to lobby elected officials to reduce spending on the war. By late 1967, new chapters were being organized in the Midwest and on the West Coast. The Tet Offensive in January–February 1968, however, prompted a change in VVAW's profile and approach. The Vietnamese communists' display of apparently formidable military resources discredited Pres. Lyndon Johnson's direction of the war. In New England, VVAW chapters supported Johnson's antiwar challenger, Sen. Eugene McCarthy, in the New Hampshire primary, and McCarthy's victory there contributed to Johnson's decision not to seek reelection.

Radicalized by the 1968 assassinations of antiwar presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy and nonviolent civil rights activist Martin Luther King Jr., VVAW temporarily lost mainstream veterans' support. It was revitalized the following year, when public protests against Pres. Richard M. Nixon's continuation of the war led to increased membership, including urban veterans with links to radical organizations such as the Black Panthers. Revelations about the killing of Vietnamese civilians by U.S. Army units at My Lai further boosted membership by increasing VVAW's appeal to veterans troubled by their experiences in Vietnam. The organization still had only a few hundred members, however, until the late spring of 1970, when antiwar protests accelerated nationwide following the deployment of U.S. combat forces into Cambodia. The subsequent shooting of students by National Guard troops during an antiwar demonstration at Kent State University in Ohio drew more middle-of-the-road Americans to the antiwar movement. VVAW gained hundreds of new members, many with middle- and upper-class backgrounds.

At the same time, however, the organization's leaders began to cooperate more closely with radical political groups. Besides the Black Panthers, VVAW also worked with the Citizens' Commission of Inquiry into War Crimes in Indochina, which, following the publicity surrounding the My Lai massacre, was trying to identify Vietnam War veterans willing to speak openly about Americans' violations of international and military laws in Southeast Asia.

VVAW activists also adopted more militant antiwar tactics, including disrupting meetings of local draft boards. In September 1970, VVAW leaders organized Operation RAW (Rapid American Withdrawal), in which some 150 veterans and supporters, many wearing disheveled military uniforms with service medals and antiwar paraphernalia, marched from Morristown, New Jersey, to Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. On the way they acted out battlefield scenarios, such as the capture and interrogation of civilians, in a chaotic and sometimes dangerous street theater that condemned U.S. involvement in Vietnam. A climactic rally included speeches by actors and prominent antiwar activists Donald Sutherland and Jane Fonda, and by Navy Vietnam veteran, Silver Star recipient, and VVAW member John Forbes Kerry of Massachusetts. Kerry became a spokesman for VVAW and traveled to Paris, where he met with Vietnamese communist representatives.

In early 1971, VVAW organized its own "investigation" of illegal activities by U.S. forces in Vietnam, including alleged crimes against Vietnamese civilians. Modeled on the unofficial International War Crimes Tribunals, VVAW's Winter Soldier Investigation opened in Detroit in February 1971, financed in part by Fonda and musician Graham

Nash. The "investigation" elicited personal testimonies from veterans as well as hearsay about abuses and atrocities committed in Vietnam.

In April 1971, VVAW organized Dewey Canyon III, a reference to the U.S.-supported military incursion into Laos that had begun in January. Some 1,000 veterans participated in Dewey Canyon III. A few hundred marched to Arlington National Cemetery, while others assembled on the steps of the U.S. Capitol to throw down their service medals and ribbons. Congressional hearings were convened, and in nationally televised testimony John Kerry urged the country to turn away from the "'barbaric war'" in Vietnam.

During this period, VVAW pioneered veterans' "rap groups," in which veterans discussed their memories of the war, disenchantment with the military, and hardships in readjusting to civilian life as Vietnam veterans. For many veterans these "rap sessions" provided social and psychological support. Mental health professionals used the "rap group" model in Veterans' Administration initiatives to treat war-related stress and, later, to gain clinical recognition of the post-traumatic stress disorder syndrome.

By the end of 1971, however, VVAW membership was in decline. To regain media attention, VVAW activists undertook several high profile actions, including temporarily seizing the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor. President Nixon's decision to mine North Vietnam's harbors in May 1972 re-energized some VVAW chapters, as did Jane Fonda's visit to Hanoi in July. Even so, the winding down of American involvement in Vietnam left the VVAW without a mission. The organization remained intact, albeit with a substantially decreased membership. It published a newsletter and later a Web site, while continuing to advocate veterans' benefits issues.

The VVAW experienced a renewal of interest during the 2004 presidential campaign when John Kerry, then a U.S. senator from Massachusetts, became the Democratic Party's presidential candidate. A private organization, the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, which included veterans who had served with Kerry in Vietnam, challenged Kerry's truthfulness about the circumstances surrounding the award of his several Vietnam service medals. Criticism of Kerry's actions also proliferated with the new phenomenon of Internet "blogs," individuals' commentaries posted on political-interest websites. Kerry defended his wartime actions and acknowledged his VVAW activities, including his meetings with communist diplomats in Paris, but also apologized for any distress his antiwar advocacy had caused other veterans. VVAW found new life rebutting the charges made against Kerry by the Swift Boat group and other critics. Even so, Kerry lost the election to incumbent George W. Bush by 3.5 million votes.

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Related Entries

Born on the Fourth of July; Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related; Race Riots; Selective Service System; Veterans Administration; Vietnam Veterans of America; Vietnam War

—Laura M. Calkins

Vietnam Veterans of America

The Vietnam War enlarged existing mainstream veterans' organizations in the United States and produced many new veterans' associations, among them the Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA). These newer organizations sprang up in part because many of the more than 2.5 million soldiers, sailors, and airmen who served within the borders of Vietnam (and nearly a million more who were stationed in the Southeast Asian theater of operations) felt more comfortable working with groups that better reflected their generation's outlook. The "founding principle" of the Vietnam Veterans of America makes this point crystal clear: "never again shall one generation of veterans abandon another." The organization seeks "to promote and support the full range of issues important to Vietnam veterans, to create a new identity for that generation of veterans, and to change public perception of Vietnam veterans."

Vietnam veterans experienced several outwardly novel situations that seemed to require the creation of supportive organizations to service both traditional wartime problems as well as distinctively Vietnam-related difficulties. Along with such customary troubles as physical disabilities and family or career adjustments that returning veterans of earlier wars faced, Vietnam veterans also had to deal with a host of dreadful, apparently unique circumstances: a lengthy, unpopular war that the United States lost; accusations of widespread atrocities committed by American soldiers upon Vietnamese civilians; a popular perception that large numbers of these soldiers were drug addicted and socially dysfunctional; war-induced psychological damage labeled post-traumatic stress disorder; physical maladies resulting from improper handling of such toxic substances as Agent Orange; ecological devastation; and numerous media images that clearly demonstrated the horrors of that war.

Television coverage of the Vietnam War provided graphic, ghastly, and immediate images that media in prior wars could not convey. Although similar terrible consequences occurred in past wars, the media's ability to chronicle combat had vastly improved by the time of hostilities in Vietnam. Photographs or footage of self-immolated monks, summarily executed Viet Cong, a napalmed girl, and swaths of denuded jungle captured war as it really is, not as it was typically presented in Hollywood recreations, which by the 1960s had become America's chief purveyor of the popular history of previous conflicts. Perhaps the media of earlier, more popular military campaigns were willing to downplay, delay, or overlook reportage of negative incidents, thereby diluting or eliminating their impact. In Vietnam such imagery became defining, damning representations of that Cold War conflict. And all of those images reflected on Vietnam veterans, whom the VVA hoped to redeem.

Bobby Muller formed Vietnam Veterans of America in 1978. It was chartered by Congress in 1986 and claims a membership of more than 50,000. Headquartered in Silver Spring, Maryland, it is managed by a national board of directors. It is funded exclusively by private contributions (cash, household goods donations, etc.) and organized as a not-for-profit corporation. The VVA has 43 state councils and 525 local chapters, and publishes *The VVA Veteran* and several guides to veterans' benefits. VVA Service Representatives are available throughout the nation to assist Vietnam veterans in need. The VVA also engages in nonpartisan research topics "pertaining to the relationship between Vietnam-era veterans and the American society, the Vietnam War experience, the role of the United States in securing peaceful coexistence for the world community and other nations . . .".

The VVA lobbies members of Congress, the president, and other influential Americans to improve the treatment of needy Vietnam veterans. According to the VVA Website, such improvements include "physical and cultural . . . growth and development," as well as the promotion of "self-respect [and] self-confidence . . .". It also involves ending discrimination against Vietnam veterans in general and women and minorities in particular; securing government benefits for Vietnam veterans as a whole and assisting individuals in obtaining them; helping the widows and orphans of deceased veterans; and aiding homeless veterans and those with other war-related disabilities.

Unlike most veteran's organizations, however, the VVA leans a bit to the left on many issues—or, as VVA congressional liaison John Terzano put it, from its early days the organization had "a progressive agenda when it [came] to

working on justice issues and war and peace issues, and foreign policy issues." For example, the VVA went to court (*Vietnam Veterans of America, et al. v. Robert S. McNamara, et al.*) to obtain data about veterans who were exposed to chemical and biological agents during the 1950s and 1960s in Shipboard Hazard and Defense (SHAD) testing—just as Korean War-era military personnel were exposed to atomic testing and Vietnam veterans to Agent Orange. Nor did Bobby Muller's trip to Hanoi to investigate issues involving Agent Orange and troops missing in action (MIAs), underwritten by *Penthouse Magazine*, endear the organization to most other veterans' organizations. The VVA also fought with rival veterans' groups for influence, most notably with the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), over Pres. Ronald Reagan's appointment of John Behan as head of the Veterans' Administration in 1981. The VFW successfully opposed Behan's nomination because he had organized veterans who had claimed exposure to Agent Orange. Nonetheless, the VVA did produce successful results, including the creation of Vietnam Veterans Week (May 28–June 3), prompting the study of Agent Orange, and revising the Vietnam Veterans' Act to favor veterans with service-related disabilities.

VVA publications provide an accurate indication of the organization's goals and activities. Thus VVA guides include booklets with such titles as *The Guide on VA* (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs) *Claims and Appeals*; *Guide on Agent Orange*, *Guide on PTSD* (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder), and *Guide to Veterans Preference*. Its journal, *The VVA Veteran*, similarly features articles whose topics veterans want discussed. The July 2004 issue, for example, contains an interview with Twyla Tharp, the choreographer of the Broadway play *Movin' Out*. The play deals with the problems of three young Long Island men upon returning home from Vietnam. The issue also reviews *In the Shadow of the Blade*, a documentary that traces the path of a restored OH-1H "Huey" helicopter across America, drawing to it at each stop Vietnam veterans and their loved ones and friends who can reconnect with each other, revitalize old memories, and come to terms with the past. Another article deals with Vietnam Veterans' Park in Nashville, where a wall displays the names of Tennessee's 1,289 soldiers who died in that conflict, and a plaque that recognizes all state veterans "who

served with distinction and valor, but often without recognition." The issue also contains a book review by preeminent Vietnam War scholar George Herring, assessing the VVA's own publication, *Inside the Pentagon Papers*, by John Prados (an established specialist of the conflict) and Margaret Porter. Also included are articles and reports touching on PTSD, substance abuse, women veterans, homeless veterans, veterans' benefits, reunions, methods for locating veterans, and health concerns. Other issues investigate the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Operation Baby Life, MIAs—these and other subjects still vital to the lives of those who served in Vietnam.

By organizing their Vietnam comrades, by publishing pertinent studies relating to veterans' affairs, and by conducting hard-nosed lobbying, the Vietnam Veterans of America became a political force. Though not a traditional veterans' organization, the VVA has likely improved the lot of Vietnam veterans and their families by putting effective political pressure on Washington politicians. The VVA also contributed to the ongoing rehabilitation of the Vietnam veteran's image, from one of pitiable loser to noble warrior.

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Related Entries

Veterans Administration; Veterans Day; Veterans of Foreign Wars; Vietnam Veterans against the War; Vietnam War

—*Thomas D. Reins*

Vietnam War

(1964–75)

The Vietnam War was perhaps the most important and influential event in American history in the last half of the 20th century. That war, which claimed the lives of more than 58,000 American soldiers and millions of Vietnamese, was certainly not, in human terms, the costliest conflict in American history; the American Civil War and World War II each claimed far more American lives. The Vietnam War was, however, a conflict that divided the nation more deeply than any since the Civil War. Military involvement in Vietnam ignited and exacerbated the profound social and political

Vietnam War (1964–75)

Total U.S. Servicemembers (Worldwide):	**9,200,000**
U.S. Population (millions):	**204.9**
Deployed to Southeast Asia:	**3,403,000**
Battle Deaths:	**47,415**
Other Deaths (In Theater):	**10,785**
Other Deaths in Service (Non-Theater):	**32,000**
Non-mortal Woundings:	**153,303**
Cost (in $ current billions):	**111.00**

Source: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.html>

upheavals of the 1960s and early 1970s, eroded Americans' trust in their political and military leaders, sapped American military and economic strength, and damaged the credibility and prestige of the United States in international affairs.

The Vietnam War also created deep and enduring social and political divisions between those who served in Vietnam or supported the American effort there, and those who opposed the war or avoided military service. The legacy of Vietnam has haunted the American people and deeply influenced American foreign policy since its conclusion in April 1975. The divisions and issues that emanate from the American experience in Vietnam are not likely to subside until the generation that fought in Vietnam or protested the war at home is no longer a significant element in American society.

Background to the War

The roots of America's painful experience in Vietnam can be traced back to the political and economic policies that the United States adopted in an effort to contain the spread of communism after World War II. In the wake of that war, the United States sought to help the Japanese and European economies recover from the devastation of the war and to create politically friendly, militarily strong, and economically prosperous regimes capable of containing and resisting the internal and external threats posed by communists. Vietnam became an important source of raw materials and foodstuffs for these recovering economies, and the United States obtained French cooperation in European affairs by acquiescing to French demands to reassert control of their former colonies in Southeast Asia.

Despite substantial material and financial support from the United States, French forces proved incapable of defeating the Viet Minh during the First Indochina War (1946–54). The issue of Vietnamese independence was to be discussed at a conference among the major powers scheduled for May 1954. French forces were defeated at Dien Bien Phu just days before the conference opened, and the defeat, a bitter humiliation for France, broke French will to continue the war in Indochina. At the Geneva Conference, Vietnam was divided between the communist north, under Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh, and the noncommunist South, under the control of Ngo Dinh Diem. The vacuum caused by the

departure of the French was soon filled by the United States, which gradually committed increasing amounts of aid and advisers to South Vietnam in an effort to keep communism in Southeast Asia confined to North Vietnam. In supplying aid to the Diem regime, American policy was guided by what Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower called the "domino theory," which argued that if one country fell to communism in Southeast Asia, others would surely follow, and if the process was left unchecked, India and Japan would eventually be forced into the communist camp. Such an eventuality would, according to Eisenhower, be disastrous to the military and economic security of the free world.

Despite generous amounts of military and economic aid and the presence of several hundred American advisers, the Diem regime had difficulty generating and maintaining support in the Vietnamese countryside and often alienated peasants, Buddhists, and intellectuals. When the agreed-upon elections to reunify the nation were cancelled by the Saigon government, South Vietnamese who favored Ho Chi Minh's regime mounted an insurgency aimed at toppling Diem from power. After 1959, North Vietnam began to assist the rebel forces in the South, which soon became known as the Viet Cong.

Deepening U.S. Involvement

In early 1961, Pres. John F. Kennedy inherited a deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. Kennedy, young and inexperienced, was determined to stand up to Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's advocacy of wars of national liberation. Embarrassed by the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and facing dangerous challenges from the Soviets in Berlin, Cuba, and Laos, Kennedy believed the United States had to demonstrate its resolve to thwart communism in Vietnam. Mindful of the domestic political fallout following Mao Zedong's victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Kennedy also feared that a communist victory in Vietnam would destroy any chance at reelection in 1964, unleash a new wave of McCarthyism, and perhaps permit reactionary opponents an opportunity to repeal the progressive domestic programs of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.

Kennedy dramatically increased the level of American aid, including the number of advisers. He permitted American advisers to engage in combat, dispatched Special Forces units, and authorized the use of napalm and defoliants. The American advisory contingent, which amounted to only a few hundred during the Eisenhower presidency, peaked at 16,000 at the time of Kennedy's assassination in November 1963.

Although Kennedy did much to deepen American involvement in Vietnam and was determined to stem the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, he expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of an expanded American role in Vietnam and resisted pressure to dispatch U.S. combat units to Vietnam. His attempts to deal with the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam were also complicated by contradictory reports on the nature and strength of the insurgency and by the unpopularity of the Diem regime.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and the Dispatch of U.S. Combat Forces

Upon President Kennedy's assassination on November 22, 1963, Pres. Lyndon Johnson inherited the conundrum of Vietnam. Like Kennedy, Johnson feared the international and domestic repercussions that Vietnam's fall to communism would have on his presidency, his party, and his domestic legislative agenda. In the months following Kennedy's assassination, Johnson managed to postpone any major decision regarding intervention in Vietnam as he sought to win the presidential election of 1964, and concentrate on his legislative programs. These priorities explain Johnson's carefully circumscribed response to a confirmed North Vietnamese naval attack on August 2, 1964, and an alleged attack two days later upon U.S. naval vessels patrolling the waters off North Vietnam. Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese naval installations and also obtained the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution from a pliant U.S. Congress. This resolution, a major step in widening America's role in Vietnam, granted the president the authority to use whatever means necessary to protect South Vietnam and U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia.

Despite his enhanced authority, President Johnson refrained from escalating the war until well after the presidential election of 1964. Discouraged by the growing strength of the Viet Cong and fearing an imminent collapse of the South Vietnamese government, in early 1965 Johnson gradually

expanded the scope of American involvement. First, Johnson ordered U.S. warplanes to commence bombing North Vietnamese targets in February 1965 in retaliation for heightened Viet Cong activity. Johnson soon authorized a far more comprehensive air campaign against North Vietnam. Dubbed "Rolling Thunder," this initiative was designed to increase the cost of North Vietnam's support of the insurgency in the South, demonstrate American resolve, and buoy the morale of South Vietnam. The president also ordered U.S. Marines to South Vietnam in March to provide base security for units engaged in Rolling Thunder. Once on the ground, the Marine mission quickly shifted from base security to offensive operations in the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam.

Rolling Thunder and the introduction of a few Marine combat units did nothing to retard the progress of communist forces in South Vietnam or to enhance the determination of South Vietnamese forces. In the summer of 1965, the Pentagon and the American ambassador to South Vietnam warned that the Saigon government would not survive without the immediate introduction of significant numbers of American combat troops. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recommended the gradual deployment of 100,000 U.S. troops to undertake large-scale combat operations. President Johnson approved the recommendation and in July ordered the dispatch of 50,000 combat troops. By November 1965, the number of American troops in South Vietnam had risen to 165,000; many of these had already engaged North Vietnamese Army forces in a bitter struggle in the Ia Drang Valley.

Escalation of the War

President Johnson's decisions in 1965 launched the United States on the longest and most divisive foreign conflict in its history. However, the goals President Johnson wanted to achieve with military force were strictly limited: to avoid a humiliating defeat in South Vietnam and keep it and adjacent territories out of Chinese hands, and, only secondarily, to assist the South Vietnamese people to live in freedom. The military operations themselves were also strictly limited. Johnson, fearful of provoking either China or the Soviet Union, forbade U.S. ground forces from invading North Vietnam and from eliminating communist base areas in Laos and Cambodia. The air campaign against North Vietnam was also carefully designed to preclude any incident that might provoke the two communist superpowers. The hope was that the gradually intensifying air campaign in the north and massive search and destroy operations in the south would impose an unacceptable level of casualties upon communist forces and compel North Vietnam to negotiate an end to hostilities. In order to assuage public concerns and not alarm Beijing and Moscow, Johnson refrained from building public support for the war. He did not ask Congress to commit additional resources, nor did he call up the Reserves or declare a state of emergency.

American troop levels in Vietnam steadily increased, from 184,000 troops in December 1965 to 385,000 a year later and over 500,000 by the end of 1967. Although Johnson placed strict geographic limitations on both air and ground operations, U.S. forces were generally granted a free hand to wage the war in South Vietnam. The Americans used their prodigious firepower to kill thousands of communist troops, but the enemy could always retreat into their Cambodian or Laotian sanctuaries and were never in danger of losing more men than they could replace. The use of massive firepower in South Vietnam was frequently counterproductive, since it often killed Vietnamese civilians, damaged vast areas of the countryside, and generated enormous numbers of refugees, all of which alienated many potential supporters of the Saigon regime.

Division at Home

As the American ground war in Vietnam intensified, draft calls in the United States increased, and as the flag-draped coffins and wounded veterans returned home, opposition to the war increased dramatically. The proliferation and testing of nuclear weapons and the economic, social, and political consequence of the Cold War arms race had already spawned a broad, multifaceted coalition of peace activists by the early 1960s, and the focus of their efforts shifted to the war in Vietnam beginning in 1965.

Although the peace movement was dedicated to stopping the war, it was by no means united, and no single person or organization orchestrated its activities. There were three broad categories of activists: members of the Old and New Left political organizations; radical pacifists devoted to revolutionary nonviolence; and those who questioned the

wisdom of using American military might in Vietnam, whom we might call "peace liberals." There were sharp differences among the factions regarding goals, methods, and tactics. The peace liberals, for example, never questioned the legitimacy of Johnson's authority or the foundations of American power, while the more radical elements not only condemned the war as an imperialist adventure but also argued that it was a symptom of the moral bankruptcy and injustice of the entire political, economic, and social system.

The escalating violence in Vietnam motivated the movement to act despite the deep internal divisions. In the autumn of 1965, more than 25,000 activists descended on Washington, D.C., to protest the war. The following spring, the size and scale of the protests increased, with nationwide protests that numbered upwards of 150,000 people. The antiwar movement gained additional momentum as a result of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on the war, during which highly esteemed political figures such as George Kennan and Gen. James Gavin questioned the wisdom of the war and criticized it as a diversion of resources from more important strategic priorities. The public dissension of such figures during the hearings opened the way for many members of the Washington establishment to oppose the war.

In 1966, African American civil rights leaders began publicly questioning the wisdom of the war in Southeast Asia. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and others were concerned that the demands of the Vietnam War would retard the Great Society social programs and civil rights initiatives. African American leaders were also angry over the disproportionately large number of black Americans who were being drafted and serving in Vietnam during the first years of the American ground war. More radical African American leaders even encouraged black youth to refuse military service.

Whatever respectability Gavin, Kennan, and King lent the peace movement's message was lost when a growing number of hippies attached themselves to the cause. "Hippy" is a generic term for a wide variety of youthful activists who rejected American bourgeois values. Hippies shocked middle-class America with their dress and hairstyles and their uninhibited experimentation with mind-altering drugs, sex, and music. They were often highly visible on college campuses and in more liberal regions of the country,

such as on the east and west coasts. More strident factions further alienated mainstream Americans with threatening rhetoric and "antiestablishment" actions. Public opinion polls throughout the period from 1965 to 1973 indicated that the only thing more unpopular than the interminable conflict in Vietnam was the antiwar movement.

Despite their inability to convince the majority of middle-class Americans of the wisdom of an immediate end to the war, the antiwar movement continued to attract supporters, especially among American youth, and staged impressive protests in 1967 and 1968. Despite the growing size and number of protests, the war in Vietnam continued. Frustrated by the apparent futility of their methods, some factions of the antiwar movement shifted from protest to active resistance, attempting to shut down draft induction centers, stop military recruiting on college campuses, and prevent universities from doing business with corporations associated with the defense industry or undertaking defense-related research. Those who engaged in resistance also counseled young men to claim conscientious objector status, exploit the various deferments and loopholes of the Selective Service System or defy it outright by burning their draft registration cards, or, as a last resort, flee to Canada. A very small number of extremists even resorted to acts of domestic terrorism; incidents of arson and bombing against government buildings escalated dramatically between 1968 and 1970.

As the peace movement grew larger and more raucous in its demands for an end to the war, the policies of the U.S. Selective Service System during the Vietnam War provided yet another source of lasting division and bitterness for the nation. Approximately 27 million young men became eligible for the draft during the years of direct U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, but only 2.5 million—less than 10 percent—saw service in Vietnam. Of the 2.5 million who served in Vietnam, fewer than 10 percent served as infantrymen. Despite the relatively low odds of being drafted and placed in a combat unit in Vietnam, many young men who opposed the war went to great lengths to avoid military service in Vietnam. A safe and socially acceptable way to avoid duty in Vietnam was by joining the National Guard or the Reserves. Those eligible to be drafted also sought student deferments, conscientious objector status, or a note from a

sympathetic doctor indicating one was physically or psychologically unfit for military duty. Some young men even feigned insanity or homosexuality or deliberately injured themselves in order to obtain draft exemption. Manipulation of the Selective Service System was widespread and ultimately meant that a disproportionate share of the fighting and dying in Vietnam fell to rural and working class youths who lacked the desire, ability, or means to avoid the draft. In an effort to correct such inequities, in 1970 a lottery system was instituted that was based on birthdays, replacing the old system of issuing quotas to local draft boards.

As the war continued, the burden of serving and fighting in Vietnam fell on an army made up of increasing numbers of draftees. Moreover, the manpower turnover in combat units was extraordinarily high because the military limited the soldier's tour of duty in Vietnam to one year. As a result of these two factors, the U.S. military began to reflect the

values and divisions so evident in American society. Antiwar, antiauthoritarian attitudes among soldiers mushroomed, and troop morale plummeted, especially beginning in 1969 when newly elected Pres. Richard Nixon began to withdraw troops from Vietnam and seek a negotiated end to the war. The military also began to encounter very serious breeches of discipline, as incidents of desertion, mutiny, drug use, and the murder of officers (called "fraggings") escalated.

1968: The Turning Point

The turning point of the American military effort in Vietnam occurred in January and February 1968 with the Tet Offensive. North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong units launched coordinated attacks throughout South Vietnam. The attack was a costly military defeat for the communist forces, as American firepower decimated those who exposed themselves by going on the offensive. However, the scale

Delegates to the 1968 National Democratic Convention in Chicago march against the Vietnam War, bringing the proceedings in the hall to a stop. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

and ferocity of the attacks, coming so soon after an extensive government public relations campaign that had stressed progress in the war and the impending collapse of the communist forces, shocked the American public and seriously eroded the will to continue the war. With public support for the war plummeting, members of the Washington elite began to look for a way out of the quagmire.

The year 1968 became one of the most divisive and chaotic in American history. In March, Sen. Eugene McCarthy, a Democratic peace candidate, nearly won the New Hampshire presidential primary race, and massive "dump Johnson" rallies were organized across the country. Government expenditures for the war and the massive Great Society social programs led to mounting inflation and some panic about the national and world economic outlook. Senior policy makers and advisers began urging the president to negotiate an end to the conflict. In late March, Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection. A few days later, Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee, and riots erupted across the nation. In June, Robert Kennedy, the leading Democratic presidential candidate, was murdered in California. In August, antiwar demonstrators and police engaged in a violent melee outside the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. To many it appeared that the nation was descending into civil war.

Nixon's Search for "Peace with Honor"

Richard Nixon won the presidency in November 1968 with a campaign that stressed law and order at home and "peace with honor" in Vietnam. President Nixon, as devoted as his predecessors to preserving American prestige, planned to extract the nation from the quagmire in Vietnam by gradually pulling out U.S. troops and handing over responsibility for the war effort to South Vietnamese military forces, a process known as "Vietnamization." Nixon also ordered the secret bombing of communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and attempted to intimidate the leaders of North Vietnam by threatening to use nuclear weapons if a satisfactory settlement could not be formulated. Despite these actions, real progress at the Paris peace talks proved elusive. The talks, which had been underway since May 1968, were deadlocked by the North Vietnamese insistence on concessions,

such as a bombing halt, as a precondition to any productive diplomatic activity. North Vietnamese diplomats may also have pursued a strategy of stalling and stalemate, calculating that steadily ebbing American support for the conflict would ultimately force Washington to withdraw from the war. No serious discussions of a settlement occurred until the autumn of 1972.

In April 1970, Nixon, in an effort to destroy communist sanctuaries, buy time to build up the South Vietnamese regime, and reinforce the American negotiating position in Paris, ordered U.S. forces to invade the border areas of Cambodia. The action unleashed a storm of angry protests across the United States. At Kent State University in Ohio and Jackson State University in Mississippi, police and National Guard troops, dispatched to quell student rioting, fired on protestors, killing several students. Unrest on college campuses exploded and forced many campuses to shut down.

In March 1972, when nearly all U.S. combat units had been removed from the South, North Vietnam launched a conventional invasion of South Vietnam in an effort to unify the country. The North's invasion was blunted with massive American air power. Nixon also removed many of the restrictions on targets in North Vietnam and ordered the mining of Haiphong Harbor in an effort to choke off the flow of supplies into North Vietnam. Nixon's efforts to encourage rapprochement with China and the Soviet Union also threatened to isolate the North Vietnamese regime. After the failure of the North's conventional invasion, progress at the peace negotiations improved, and by the autumn of 1972 it appeared as if a settlement was in reach. In Paris secret talks between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had succeeded in hammering out the basic elements of a settlement. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States would withdraw its remaining troops within 60 days of a ceasefire, the North Vietnamese would return American prisoners of war, and a National Council of Reconciliation and Concord would administer elections and implement the terms of the agreement. The agreement did not compel the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the territory of South Vietnam and permitted the sovereignty of the Viet Cong within specific areas of South Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese regime, however, perceiving the proposed settlement as a fig leaf to cover the American abandonment of their client state, was outraged by the terms of the proposed agreement and demanded changes. In an effort to obtain South Vietnamese acquiescence to the agreement, U.S. officials used a combination of promises and threats. The United States delivered massive amounts of military aid to South Vietnam in advance of the agreement, promised swift and severe retaliation against any future North Vietnamese attempts to use military force against the South, and finally threatened to sign the peace accord with North Vietnam without the South's endorsement. The United States eventually obtained the South's reluctant approval for the peace accord, but not before the North Vietnamese negotiators broke off the talks. It was to convince the North Vietnamese to return to the negotiation table that Nixon, in December 1972, ordered the heaviest bombing of North Vietnam of the war. Negotiations resumed in January, and a peace agreement, similar to the draft completed before the bombing, was signed, formally ending American involvement in the war. The exit of U.S. military forces from Vietnam as outlined in the Paris peace accords was reinforced in July 1973 when the United States Congress passed a law that prohibited U.S. combat activities in Southeast Asia after August 15, 1973.

Without active U.S. military assistance, the prospects for the long-term survival of South Vietnam were poor. The American public was bitterly divided over the war by 1973, and the Watergate scandal that ultimately forced President Nixon to resign further polarized the political landscape. Given the unlikely probability of American military intervention under these conditions, North Vietnam took the opportunity to launch a massive invasion of South Vietnam in the spring of 1975. South Vietnamese forces were quickly overwhelmed, and the South Vietnamese regime collapsed with fantastic speed. So quick was the collapse that American embassy staff and American civilians had to be evacuated from Vietnam in a massive and hastily organized helicopter airlift. The fall of Cambodia and Laos to indigenous communist movements that same month magnified the humiliating American failure in Southeast Asia.

Aftermath of the War

As a result of the war in Vietnam and the social and political upheavals of the 1960s, the United States was a far different nation in 1975 than it had been when its combat troops entered South Vietnam ten years earlier. Although the United States was still the preeminent superpower, its relative economic and military strength had eroded, in large part due to the enormous resources it had devoted to preserving a non-communist South Vietnamese regime. Politically, the nation was deeply divided. Vietnam veterans took exception to the mistreatment and neglect they received from both the government and American society in general, and resented those who avoided service and protested the war. The "credibility gap," the chasm between official government pronouncements on the war and accounts by journalists and veterans on the progress of the conflict, was exacerbated by the Watergate scandal and President Nixon's resignation. In the years following the Vietnam War, Americans demanded a far more cautious foreign policy and were extraordinarily wary of involving U.S. military forces in Third World conflicts.

A divisive debate also emerged regarding the reasons for the American defeat. Some blamed journalists and peace activists for breaking the nation's will to continue the war, some blamed the restrictions placed on American military operations by civilian leaders, while others saw a flawed military strategy that directed the use of conventional forces against an unconventional enemy as the primary reasons for the defeat. A few pointed to the egregious corruption of the South Vietnamese regime and the impossibility of overcoming the power of Vietnamese nationalism short of exterminating North Vietnam.

Regardless of the reasons for the defeat, the war destroyed Americans' unquestioned devotion to anticommunism. Alongside the sweeping social changes brought about by the Great Society programs, the civil rights movement, the sexual revolution, feminism, and the counterculture, the Vietnam War sharpened the political and ideological divisions within American society. Although the tremendous speed and decisiveness of the Gulf War victory in 1991 diminished the power of the "Vietnam syndrome" among Americans, and perhaps signaled the resurgence of a more confident and assertive use of U.S. military power, the memories of

Vietnam continue to provoke bitterness and division. Since the 1980s, as the generation that fought the war has gradually moved into positions of prominence and power, the issue of who served and who avoided service has emerged as an enduring and divisive remnant of America's longest war.

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1965 a, b, c, d, e; 1966 a, b, c, d; 1967 a, b; 1968 a, b; 1969; 1970 a, b, c; 1971 a, b, c, d; 1972; 1973; 1976 a, b; 1977

—*James Ehrman*

Virginia Military Institute

The Virginia Military Institute was established in 1839 on the site of a state arsenal just outside the Blue Ridge mountain town of Lexington, Virginia. The state government had authorized its creation as a military college that would also provide cadets with a technical education in the sciences and engineering. As such, the Virginia Military Institute became

the first state-supported military college in the United States. Unlike its federal counterpart, the United States Military Academy at West Point, its cadets were not entitled to a regular commission in the United States Army. Many early graduates did serve with distinction as military officers, especially during times of national emergency. Many others went into civilian occupations in business, engineering, the law, and education. The school instilled high standards of personal discipline and honor, and provided practical training in leadership.

Early History

The first years of the institution were marked by frequent upheaval, as had been the case at other academies such as those at West Point and Annapolis. As the federal government had done at those academies, the Commonwealth of Virginia had laid a basic framework of what it expected from the Virginia Military Institute: a four-year curriculum split more or less evenly between military training and a technical education. But it was often vague in defining the details of what that program should specifically entail. As such, early cadets attended classes, participated in infantry drill, and were largely restricted to their barracks, with little coordination among their activities or training. However, just as Sylvanus Thayer had done with the Military Academy or George Bancroft with the Naval Academy, the Virginia Military Institute grew owing to the work and vision of several key figures who expected more out of the institution.

Col. Claudius Crozet was appointed as the first president of the institute's Board of Visitors. Crozet was a Frenchman who had served under Napoleon and later became a professor of engineering at West Point after moving to the United States. In 1839, he was the chief engineer of Virginia, working on several key construction projects for the state. With many graduates not pursuing permanent military careers, Crozet believed the curriculum should be technically focused, but in ways geared towards civilian applications, such as civil engineering or transportation. Based on his experiences with mass conscription in Napoleon's France, he also knew that military training needed to be an important component of the program to prepare cadets to step into officer roles in the event of an emergency.

The institute's first superintendent, Gen. Francis Smith, was also crucial to its development. Smith graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1833 and came to the Virginia Military Institute from Hampden-Sydney College, where he had been a professor of mathematics. Smith held his position at the institute for more than 50 years, an extraordinarily long time for an academy superintendent; most officers rotated out of such positions every four or five years. Smith's tenure was especially important in establishing the institute's professional traditions, many of which resembled those at West Point. The institutional culture valued discipline above all else, a priority demonstrated through the institute's insistence on an unquestioning obedience to orders. Cadets also learned to equate their personal honor with that of the institution and their classmates, and the cadet who brought shame to either one stood to be severely punished. Most of the institute's traditions were instilled during the cadets' rat (freshman) year.

The Civil War

Unlike the case at the federal service academies, students and faculty of the Virginia Military Institute universally supported the Confederacy after the state's secession in April 1861. Indeed, several senior cadets provided additional security at the execution of abolitionist John Brown in Charles Town, Virginia. Many alumni answered their states' call for service and accepted commissions in the Confederate Army. Without a doubt, the most famous individual associated with the institute to serve in the Civil War was Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. Jackson was not a graduate, but he had served on the faculty as a professor of natural philosophy since 1851. Contrary to popular opinion, Jackson seems not to have been very popular with the cadets, nor to have distinguished himself as a teacher. In fact, in 1856, a group of alumni petitioned General Smith to have Jackson removed from his position. Smith looked into these issues, but after interviewing other cadets he did not believe that there was enough evidence to warrant Jackson's dismissal.

To some extent, the war resurrected Jackson's military career and standing within the institution. The school played up its association with Jackson as his reputation increased as one of the South's preeminent combat commanders. After

his inadvertent death from friendly fire at the battle of Chancellorsville, Jackson's place in the school's pantheon of heroes was established. The Corps of Cadets also won renown for their courage under fire at the battle of New Market in May 1864. The entire student body, a group of approximately 257 cadets minus some of the younger boys, marched in relief of an outnumbered Confederate force under Gen. John C. Breckenridge, the first and only such time in which a service academy's entire student body fought as a single combat unit. Ten cadets were killed in the fighting and 45 others were wounded. Ever since, the institute has commemorated the sacrifice of those fallen cadets in the hope of instilling such values in its current cadets.

20th Century Mission

Large portions of the institute's facilities were destroyed during Gen. David Hunter's advance into Virginia. The school reopened its doors to 55 cadets in October 1865. For much of the late 19th century, the Virginia Military Institute languished owing to budgetary problems and low enrollments. However, its plight was similar to that of other colleges in the state. Yet the institute survived and underwent a gradual expansion in the early 20th century, eventually reaching a size of approximately 1,300 cadets. The academic curriculum also changed significantly in step with the new technologies of industrialization. The institute continued, however, to be technically focused. The new century also brought greater opportunities for cadets to pursue full-time military careers. As the United States became more active in the world, the size of its military gradually expanded. The Military Academy at West Point continued to supply the bulk of the army's regular officers, but there were greater opportunities for commissions for students from schools such as the Virginia Military Institute.

The institute's military accomplishments peaked during World War II. Sixty-two graduates achieved flag or general rank in the course of that war. The institute's two greatest heroes were arguably George Patton, one of the war's greatest combat commanders, and George Marshall, the Army chief of staff who created the wartime army, the largest such force in the nation's history. Marshall accomplished this feat in record time; his army was ready to fight in a little over two

years, much sooner than most of the Allied and Axis planners had anticipated. He went on to become Pres. Harry Truman's secretary of state and, later, secretary of defense.

The postwar threat from the Soviet Union did not allow the United States to demobilize after World War II. As a result, the army had a greater need for officers, more than could ever be supplied by the Military Academy. A permanent ROTC program provided greater commissioning opportunities for Virginia Military Institute cadets than ever before. Even so, many cadets used their experiences to pursue leadership positions in civilian careers rather than serve in the military.

Admission of Women

Congress abolished the restriction on women attending the federal service academies in 1976. However, state supported schools like The Citadel and the Virginia Military Institute continued to exclude women well into the 1990s. The idea of female cadets was just as foreign to the culture and traditions of these institutions as it was to that of the federal service academies. And as long as the state schools could resist gender integration, their leaders and alumni chose to do so. As groups promoting the admission of women pressured them to make changes, these institutions could not maintain their stance.

In the hopes of staving off integration, the Virginia Military Institute supported the creation of a comparable program for females in 1995 called the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership at nearby Mary Baldwin College. This program also focused on character building and leadership development, but was entirely separate from the Virginia Military Institute. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1996 that this halfway measure was unconstitutional for a state-supported school, inasmuch as it did not meet the standards of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. As such, the Virginia Military Institute began accepting its first female cadets in 1997. Unfortunately, these women faced many of the same prejudices that their predecessors had experienced at the federal service academies nearly a generation before.

The objective of the Virginia Military Institute today remains similar to that of the past: to provide a technically

based education along with character development programs that allow members of its now co-ed student body to be successful leaders both in the military and in the civilian world.

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—Todd Forney

Visual Arts and War

Humans use visual frames of reference to rekindle memories and connect with past events. The early history of the United States, including military events, is recalled through an array of forms and structures, especially memorials, paintings, and prints. Prior to the onset of photography and its extensive use in the Civil War and to a far lesser extent in the Mexican War, visual awareness of earlier wars can be directly attributed to paintings and prints of these conflicts. Such pictures excite the imagination and inspire patriotism and devotion.

Early War Art

One of the earliest practitioners of war art in America was Amos Doolittle, who created four engravings depicting the events at Lexington and Concord in 1775; these were the first eyewitness depictions of war in the country and are among only a handful of contemporaneous images of the Revolution. Later, John Trumbull's grand epic paintings, which appeared after the end of hostilities, were inspired by the success his fellow countryman Benjamin West experienced with his stirring canvas of the death of General Wolfe at Quebec in 1759. West, Trumbull, and John Singleton Copley realized that grand heroic tableaux depicting military events might appeal to the art-buying public and began to produce a series of war-inspired paintings suitable for commercial engravings.

The Revolutionary War, as any other war, was followed by a period of assessment, then one of nostalgic overview. In the first decades of the 19th century, illustrated histories of the Revolution began to appear, aimed at exploiting the groundswell of interest in the beginnings of the new republic. Artists and illustrators such as Alonzo Chappel turned their attention to the task of creating representations of the great battles that shaped the country. Historical painting continued into mid-century, epitomized by Emanuel Leutze's canvas, *Washington Crossing the Delaware*.

The Civil War and Aftermath, 1861–1900

The Civil War spawned countless paintings and illustrations capturing the four years of fighting. Capitalizing on the public fixation with the war, commercial printmakers including Currier & Ives began to produce popular, highly stylized lithographic prints of the battles and personalities. Some mainstream artists such as Winslow Homer committed to canvas the scenes they had witnessed. It was the era of the "special artist" employed by such illustrated newspapers as *Harper's Weekly* and *Frank Leslie's* and sent to the front to sketch the events. Homer was among this small, select group, which also included Alfred and William Waud. At the same time, Mathew Brady, Alexander Gardiner, and others were exploiting a ready market for photographic images of the war and portraits of the combatants.

A period of nostalgia for the Civil War set in during the 1870s and 1880s, and artists and publishers responded with illustrated histories and paintings popularizing the conflict. The period saw the serialized publication of *Civil War Battles and Leaders* in *Century Magazine*, with sketches by

Benjamin West's famous painting of the death of General Wolfe in Quebec in 1759, an example of the epic war paintings popular with artists and with the art-buying public at that time. (From the collections of the Library of Congress)

Edwin Forbes and others. At the same time, academic artists, including Gilbert Gaul, William Trego, and Julian Scott (a veteran of the war) began to exhibit war-related canvases at the National Academy and elsewhere, hoping to attract buyers from among the many veterans.

Simultaneously, the large battle panoramas were touring the major cities. The panorama phenomenon had crossed the Atlantic from Europe along with continental artists accustomed to painting huge 360-degree canvases. "Cycloramas," as they were called in America, became popular entertainments for a decade or two, presenting to a fee-paying public such great battles of the war as those at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Atlanta. The growing demand for battlefield monuments and war memorials during the last two decades of the century provided work for numerous sculptors.

Also during this period, the country was engaged in numerous small campaigns against Native Americans. These were duly covered in the press but aroused little interest—with one notable exception: the massacre of the U.S. 7th Cavalry at the Little Bighorn River in Montana in 1876 and especially the death of the expedition's commander, Gen. George Armstrong Custer. Numerous artists attempted to capture the "last stand" of this small group of "brave" white soldiers surrounded by the "heathen" warriors. It was a theme mirrored in European military art of the same period and touched peoples' emotions so much that they clamored for reproductions of the paintings. The subject of the Indian Wars was made popular in the paintings of Frederic Remington in the 1890s, while Howard Pyle at the same time depicted scenes from America's military past.

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The war in Cuba in 1898 provided the art media with a similar opportunity to create prints, panoramas, and academic paintings, but the war ended before this market could develop fully, and the continuing conflict in the Philippines failed to capture public imagination. However, a little-known apparatus, the movie camera, which would later revolutionize battle reportage, made an early appearance in the war, and entrepreneurs such as Thomas Edison filmed staged battles in the hope of attracting public attention and money.

Twentieth Century Developments

When war broke out in Europe in 1914, many in America considered that war to be strictly a European conflict. Beyond the illustrated coverage in the press, few artists were attracted to the campaigns on the Western Front during World War I. Even after official artists began accompanying American troops in 1918, the pictorial coverage beyond the papers back in the States was limited. Some souvenir pictures were published, providing work for such commercial artists as Frank Schoonover and Gail Porter Hoskins. However, one visual medium did gain strong footing during World War I: posters for recruiting and fund-raising appeared on a mass scale and more than any other visual form epitomized the image of war for the home front, establishing the reputations of many leading artists including Howard Chandler Christy. War cartoons were also a mode of expression made popular by Louis Reymaekers and others.

The emergence of cinematic pictures showing the fighting on the Western Front had a profound impact on the visual realizations of subsequent armed conflicts. During World War II, the public got its images of the fighting from the cinema and numerous glossy magazines such as *Life*. Apart from the continued popularity of the poster and the cartoon, however, the more static visual arts took second place. Various private companies, including Abbott Laboratories and Standard Oil, commissioned artists to record various war-related activities for advertising purposes; Abbott also commissioned Thomas Hart Benton to paint a series of allegorical scenes of the horrors of war. In 1943, the War Department sent official painters to the various fronts, but some questioned the need for these artists, arguing that the movie camera and photography had eclipsed painting. Exhibitions of war paintings were held around the country to bolster the war effort, but enthusiasm paled in comparison to that exhibited for the moving images that appeared in movie houses across the country.

Advances in technology over the succeeding decades meant that Cold War conflicts, in particular Vietnam, were brought home to the living room by television. Soldier art, beyond officially sanctioned paintings and drawings, was now produced primarily as a means of personal expression, often by veterans. Some created visual statements opposing the war, while a few sought to make a profit from their art. In the post-Vietnam era, the majority of war art was produced by commercial artists for the print market, although the Defense Department still commissions artists to cover wars involving American forces around the globe.

Often dismissed as merely illustration or anecdotal by art historians, the paintings of war created by Americans over the past 200 years have nonetheless created a lasting record of the military history of the country and represent in many cases the only visual images of conflicts that occurred before the age of photography. Many Americans have been inspired by such art, which has served to foster a sense of pride and nationalism.

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Brady, Mathew B.; Combat-Zone Photography; Film and War; Memorials and Monuments; Memory and War; Political Cartoons; Propaganda Posters: World War I; Propaganda Posters: World War II; Recruiting Advertisements

—Peter Harrington

Voice of America

The Voice of America (VOA), headquartered in Washington, D.C., is the international broadcaster for the United States to the rest of the world, to the citizens of countries either friendly or hostile to America, in times of peace and in times of war. Since its founding in 1942, it has broadcast news and feature programming over the radio, and it has more recently broadcast as well over television and the Internet. VOA has advanced American interests abroad by broadcasting information about U.S. culture and institutions to audiences around the world.

VOA's charter, which has the force of law, mandates that the agency adhere to principles of accuracy, objectivity, balance, and comprehensiveness. More informally, the agency has characterized at least part of its job as "telling America's story to the world," as broadcaster Edward R. Murrow described it. VOA thus provides a global audience with information it could not otherwise get. Many societies lack access to critical, trustworthy, accurate information about America or even information about human rights abuses, for example, in their own countries. VOA has sought to ensure that people around the world receive reliable information about America, even if it reflects poorly on the United States, in the conviction that such openness would serve America's highest diplomatic interests by demonstrating the value of a free press.

The Voice of America's founding came just months after the United States entered World War II. Its mission was clear from the first VOA broadcast on February 25, 1942, when William Harlan Hale proclaimed, in German, "The Voice of America speaks. Today, America has been at war for 79 days. Daily, at this time, we shall speak to you about America and the war. The news may be good, the news may be bad—we shall tell you the truth."

VOA broadcasts editorials representing the views of the American government, though always clearly labeling them as such. Editorials are the only part of the programming not produced by VOA, but by a separate policy office, which clears the editorials it writes with the State Department. The rest of VOA programming consists of news and information about the United States as well as international and regional news. It also aims to provide alternative views of world events to peoples who may be living in societies where the government monopolizes the media. For example, VOA broadcast detailed coverage from Tiananmen Square in 1989 to its large audience in China. That practice has often put VOA at odds with some individuals and governments overseas, prompting responses ranging from denunciations of VOA as a propaganda organ for the American government to elaborate efforts to block and jam VOA radio and television signals.

VOA's influence around the world has not come exclusively from its news coverage and editorials. During the Cold War, for example, VOA built a huge following in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for its broadcasting of American jazz, through programming hosted by long-time VOA music broadcaster Willis Conover. VOA Africa Division's programs for many years featured broadcaster Leo Sarkisian's unique treasury of field-recorded African music.

VOA programming comes from many sources: wire services and independent, commercial news media, as well as its own journalists in the U.S. and abroad. VOA journalists keep their overseas audiences in mind, pursuing stories at home and abroad that will be of interest to them. VOA programming at the beginning of the 21st century broadcast in 44 languages.

From its very early years, VOA has been presented in English, but it has also broadcast in such languages as German, Polish, Russian, Japanese, Tibetan, Kurdish, and Bahasa. American foreign policy interests are evident, particularly in VOA's shifting of broadcasting resources from region to region and from language to language, depending on where policy makers have perceived challenges to American interests.

VOA has correspondents, stringers, and news bureaus all over the world, but its programming is produced in and broadcast via shortwave and satellite from studios in Washington, D.C. In 2004, VOA estimated the weekly audience for its radio and television programming to be almost 100 million. The programming has always relied on shortwave broadcasting from VOA's transmitters around the world, but it has also broadcast regionally via AM and FM frequencies through relationships with foreign affiliate stations. Television programming is delivered by satellite, both to individuals with receiving dishes and to affiliate stations, who rebroadcast it as part of their own programming. VOA has invested itself in establishing a significant Internet presence as well.

As VOA observed its 60th anniversary in 2002, it looked to its future as part of a reorganized U.S. international broadcasting effort. A newly established Broadcasting Board of Governors provided oversight to VOA, as well as to other U.S. broadcasters, such as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Martí, and Radio Free Asia. VOA also anticipated expanding its services into new technologies, including text messaging and satellite radio, to deliver its programming. Its importance as a representative of American society to the rest of the world continues into the 21st century.

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Media and War; Radio Free Europe; Radio in World War II

—John Benedict Buescher

Volunteerism

See Conscription and Volunteerism.

W

War Brides

Falling in love in the midst of war is not a modern phenomenon. As early as the founding of the first English colonies, American soldiers have met and married foreign brides during times of battle, often despite lack of official approval. But "war brides"—the collective term used to describe foreign-born brides of U.S. servicemen stationed abroad—did not truly enter social consciousness until the end of World War II. The sheer number of American troops spread across the globe during that era, the length of their service, and the close contact with foreign populations, proved a fertile ground for the romantic relationships that would change immigration laws, ethnic and racial relations, and American society forever.

The first of these changes was the War Brides Act of 1945, which loosened immigration laws to expedite the entry of more than 100,000 war brides, predominantly those from Europe. As immigration laws continued to relax over the next two decades—and, in particular, with the end of the Korean and Vietnam wars—another wave of predominantly Asian war brides landed on American soil. Although the most recent wars in the Middle East have seen few marriages, U.S. troops stationed throughout the world during peacetime continue to marry abroad and bring home new wives and families that help shape America's multicultural landscape.

British War Brides

U.S. troops began to arrive in the United Kingdom in 1942. While a welcome military presence, American troops faced some social resentment in Great Britain. A popular British saying of the time cast them as "overpaid, oversexed, and over here." (U.S. troops, in turn, dismissed British troops as "undersexed, underpaid, underfed, and under Eisenhower.")

Still, the American mystique was powerful in that day. In a 2004 *Orlando Sentinel* article, Mary Weyrauch, a British war bride, recalled, "We thought Americans were always living it up. . . . In the movies we saw, it looked like all they did was go on holidays and drive around on Saturday night." Pamela Winfield, author of two books on war brides—and a British war bride herself—said in a 1986 *New York Times* article, "They were different, and so polite. . . . And they were so handsome in their uniforms, which fit better than the British boys."

The mystique was built on more than Hollywood and manners. U.S. troops were also far better off than their British counterparts—earning three times the income, and dining daily on the equivalent of nearly a week's worth of British wartime food rations. Even American soldiers, many of them children of the Depression, could be overwhelmed by the money and food provided by the War Department. This, combined with the notion of U.S. troops as valiant liberators, set the stage for thousands of budding romances. At the end of the war, the number of troops married abroad prompted Congress to pass the War Brides Act in December 1945, to expedite the entry of new brides to the United States.

Beginning in 1946, 70,000 British war brides set sail for the United States aboard U.S. naval ships and luxury ocean liners, such as the *Queen Mary*, which had been converted for military use. These 70,000 comprised the largest group of immigrants—male or female, from any single country—of the 1940s.

Their arrival was heralded by newspapers, and many were greeted at the docks by open arms and friendly faces. Yet their reception had many negative aspects as well. When the war brides arrived, they were sent to processing centers, where they were often made to undress for medical inspection. Some complained that they were treated like cattle. And even after "processing," many war brides faced hostility

in public. One British war bride recalled, in a 1986 *Chicago Tribune* article, being told "go back to your own country!" as she toured New York City in a bus emblazoned with "GI War Bride" on one side.

How well a woman acclimated to the United States depended a lot on her expectations. Those taken by glamorous notions of the United States often felt fooled. Those from cities experienced culture shock upon arriving in their new husbands' rural towns. Others adjusted more easily. Some had preexisting transatlantic ties to extended family and friends. (The British were the least affected by early 20th-century laws restricting European immigration.) Many joined groups to maintain relationships with each other and with their homeland. Almost immediately following the departure of the first war brides in 1946, the Transatlantic Brides and

Parents Association was founded. This group helped arrange reduced-rate travel for war brides and their families.

In many ways, the tale of British war brides is a happy one: language barriers and cultural differences were negligible compared to war brides from other parts of Europe, and they did not encounter the racism that would plague Asian war brides of the coming generation. Their history is recalled with a tone of nostalgia—and many war brides themselves speak fondly of their past. As Pamela Winfield recalled in the *Chicago Sun-Times*, "We were a special act of Congress, a moment in history."

Brides From Throughout Europe

Of course, British women were not the only war brides of World War II. Women throughout Europe—particularly

German war brides and fiancées arriving in New York on December 14, 1948. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

from France, Italy, and Germany—were swept up by whirl-wind romances with soldiers come to liberate their countries.

Whereas British war brides slid easily—though not seamlessly—into American society, non-English-speaking war brides faced language barriers and, in many cases, resentment. German and Italian war brides fared the worst. From the beginning, fraternization between U.S. troops and Italian or German nationals was looked down upon socially and was forbidden outright by the military. But U.S. service-men fell in love and proposed marriage nonetheless.

Prospective brides underwent a tedious interview process. For German brides, both a Nazi and someone per-secuted by Nazis had to testify that she had no Nazi ties. Once in the United States, German war brides, in particular, were derided as Nazis.

In all, by 1950, an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 women from across continental Europe had married U.S. service-men. By the 1960s, however, the number of European war brides decreased as the number of U.S. troops in Europe fell. By then, the next wave of war brides—resulting from other conflicts in which the United States had involved its troops—was well under way.

Asian War Brides

Asian immigration to the United States had been severely restricted since the end of the 19th century. But the end of Word War II brought, in addition to the War Brides Act and the GI Fiancées Act, the repeal of Exclusion Act and a loos-ening of the quota system for Asians in particular. Chinese, Indian, and Filipina war brides were among the first to arrive. The largest group of war brides, however, came from Japan and, later, Korea.

Approximately 30,000 Japanese war brides came to the United States in the postwar period. In their homeland, they were often cast as opportunists, traitors, and prostitutes. In a 2000 *Los Angeles Times* article, a Japanese war bride named Miwako Cleeve recalled how she was treated by family and countrymen: cousins threw rocks at her, an uncle removed her name from the family tree, the Japanese government official who processed her exit papers said, "Leave, we don't want you."

The reception in the United States was not altogether better. Like brides from other vanquished countries, Japanese brides were met with resistance and resentment upon arrival in the United States, compounded by fierce racism. Those married to African American soldiers experienced additional prejudice, including disapproval from other Japanese war brides. (Until the late 1960s, it was still illegal in many south-ern states for blacks to marry other races.)

The product of these mixed marriages—biracial chil-dren—also became an issue. A *Saturday Evening Post* arti-cle from 1952 reads:

> [T]he effect of these mixed marriages on American life at home is still to come—the arrival of thousands of dark-eyed brides in Mississippi cotton hamlets and New Jersey factory cities, on Oregon ranches or in Kansas country towns. The thousands are on the way, and their bright-eyed children soon will be knocking on school doors in most of the 48 states. The great question of how they will fit in and whether they generally will be welcomed or shunned remains to be answered.

Korean war brides in the postwar period fared similarly. The first Korean war bride arrived in 1950, but most did not come to the United States until after the end of the Korean War in 1953. Continued U.S. military presence means that Korean women are still entering the United States today as spouses of U.S. servicemen. It is estimated that one in four Korean immigrants can trace his or her lineage to the arrival of a Korean war bride.

Like Japanese war brides, Korean brides were dispar-aged as prostitutes and opportunists by Korean nationals and Americans alike. (These beliefs were not entirely unfounded, since in GI camptowns prostitution was tacitly promoted by the U.S. military, and as with war brides from elsewhere in the world, some women saw life in America as a reprieve from the poverty of their war-torn country.) Korean war brides shared with their Asian peers formida-ble obstacles with respect to language, culture, custom, and food. (Religion played a smaller role for Koreans, who were often Christian, than for Buddhist Japanese.) Postwar Asian war brides, in particular, found themselves shunned by their home country and marginalized or isolated in their

new one. As Korean immigrant communities grew, however, many found comfort and support in community organizations and the Korean–American church.

By the end of the Vietnam War, the number of foreign-born women married to U.S. servicemen was striking: an estimated 67,000 Japanese, 28,000 Korean, and 8,000 Vietnamese. These numbers are based on Immigration and Naturalization Service records; and not all foreign-born wives, particularly those from the Philippines, are considered "war brides." In the years of relative peace that followed, those numbers have continued to grow.

Twenty-First Century War Brides and Beyond

In a 1991 *Los Angeles Times* article about U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War, a diplomat said, "This was probably the first war in history without war brides." Indeed, few war brides have emerged from that war, or from the most recent conflicts in Afghanistan or Iraq. Many attribute this to the changing nature of war in the 21st century and the significant religious and cultural differences—particularly governing interactions between men and women—between the United States and most Islamic countries. Still, love persists in the midst of war. One well-reported case of war brides from Iraq involved two military men who converted to Islam and married Iraqi women in secret. At first, the Army threatened to court-martial both soldiers, and the war brides themselves received death threats and were harassed in public. One soldier eventually agreed to divorce. The other negotiated his discharge from the Army and moved to Jordan to be with his wife.

With U.S. troops continuously stationed throughout the world, war brides (or, to be more accurate, military brides) will continue to change American life, though in different, more subtle ways than the brides of the postwar period. Though by no means a homogenous group, war brides share a particular understanding of military culture, the critical glare of foreign-born parents and American-born in-laws and neighbors, language barriers, and culture shock. Historically, these war brides may be said to have led the way for new immigrants pouring into the U.S. melting pot.

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Related Entries

Families, Military

—*Laura Lambert*

War Industries Board

The creation of the War Industries Board (WIB) was one example of how World War I transformed the relationship between the government and civilian society when the nation for the first time organized its resources to fight a total war. The WIB functioned as the main government clearing house that coordinated the channeling of civilian resources to meet the military's ever-growing industrial and transportation needs. Despite its lack of a clear legal mandate, the board played a major role in most sectors of the economy during the

war, particularly during the latter period of U.S. involvement. Its functions included the prioritization and allocation of raw materials, the formulation of production priorities, price fixing, the establishment of transportation priorities, and intervention into labor markets.

The evolution of the WIB was complex, with several roots. One model and predecessor was the Navy Consulting Board (NCB), founded in July 1915. The NCB formed a partnership among Navy Department staff, industrial leaders, and second tier naval officers. Through this body, production capabilities and priorities were surveyed and discussed, but the NCB never actually set in motion any mobilization plan. A second strand of origin came from the National Defense Act of 1916. The act gave the president the power to make any order for war material obligatory. It also authorized a survey of U.S. industry to determine war production conversion capabilities. Because Pres. Woodrow Wilson campaigned on a moderate peace platform in 1916, little was done to implement these provisions until after the election.

The Council for National Defense (CND) was the forerunner that would most directly evolve into the WIB. The CND was a voluntary organization that brought private sector leaders together with pro-preparedness governmental officials. By the second half of 1916, the government was funding the CND, and the wealthy financier, Bernard Baruch had emerged as a key figure within the organization. Southern born, but deeply entrenched in New York financial circles, Baruch had excellent ties to both industrial leaders and government officials, as well as close links to both the southern and Wall Street forces of the conservative wing of the Democratic Party, including President Wilson.

With the break in diplomatic relations with Germany in February 1917, followed by the declaration of war in April, there was a sudden, rapid increase in war mobilization. Draft notices were sent out in July 1917, and draftees began reporting to their training bases in September 1917. This led to enormous food, clothing, equipment, and transportation needs. At the same time, many branches of the government, particularly the Army and Navy, were placing large orders and sending out frequently conflicting signals or orders about priorities. The General Munitions Board, set up in April 1916, proved inadequate for the coordination of production and purchases. Severe inflation, totaling 85 percent over the two years prior to July 1917, wrecked havoc with budgets and disrupted the economy.

As a result, in June 1917 Sec. of War Newton D. Baker sent to President Wilson, on behalf of the CND, a request to establish a War Industries Board. In his order launching the WIB, Wilson supported Baruch's vision of searching for a middle path between a laissez-faire approach and tight, legally mandated government control.

In its first months of existence, the WIB was a decentralized organization that lacked formal power and adequate funding and staffing. The WIB did not make purchases for the government and had little power in that area. It could merely recommend price levels and lacked the authority to enforce those recommendations. Further, it did not have effective liaisons to many key military sectors, including the shipping and aircraft boards.

The early WIB was not without accomplishments, however. Baruch succeeded in drawing many key industrial leaders into service for the WIB and brought them into contact with the relevant government war agencies. Many businessmen, fearing rigid price controls, greatly preferred the voluntary restraints negotiated through the WIB. The WIB was able to discuss priority issues with industry and helped solve some key raw material allocation problems. The United States Chamber of Commerce threw its support behind the WIB approach.

Yet difficulties in procurement persisted. President Wilson became embroiled in a public conflict with the steel industry over pricing. Gen. John J. Pershing predicted failure for a spring offensive unless production, supply, and transport issues were resolved. Meanwhile, the railroad system, still largely without a coordinated plan, had generated a hopeless tangle that was seriously retarding the war effort, prompting a federal government takeover in December 1917.

After constant prodding from Baruch and others, President Wilson adopted the view that greatly strengthening the WIB was key to an improved war effort. On March 4, 1918, the president issued a new executive order to that effect. The WIB would now function as a distinct agency and in May was formally removed from the aegis of the CND.

The most visible sign of the WIB's new powers was its ability to set war production priorities. Since its power to

enforce these priorities remained vague, the group continued to rely heavily on voluntary cooperation. Yet, in an atmosphere of record profits for most military suppliers, strong support for the war effort, and the heavy involvement in the WIB's commodity sections of prominent business leaders, the voluntary support from industrialists and businessmen was generally forthcoming. At the same time, the WIB relied upon cooperation from other government agencies, particularly the Army and Navy, which were fearful that the WIB was too sympathetic to business.

Within the WIB, each commodity section was generally headed by a prominent industrialist from that industry. The section was charged with establishing priorities for output and transportation, addressing the raw materials needs of the industry, coordinating large-scale production, and trying to hold down prices to the government and the public, while meeting the industry's profit needs or desires. As Baruch put it, the powers of the commodity sections "extended only to the point where someone opposed it."

Actual price-fixing or setting policy was not vested in the WIB itself. Instead, Wilson set up a body that consisted of Baruch; two WIB members, including its labor representative; the Federal Trade Commission chairman; the Tariff Commission chairman; and the head of the Fuel Administration. Lacking specific congressional legislative authority, the body functioned primarily through persuasion and pressure, mostly via appeals to patriotism and arguments that specific legislation would be less favorable to business than voluntary restraint.

The WIB also issued 56 circulars, or restrictions on civilian-oriented industries. One example was the limitation of private home construction, except in heavily impacted areas. Another was the automobile industry, in which the WIB mediated the demand of some in the military that all production of private automobiles and other consumer goods cease to counter the demand for these goods fueled by the prosperity of the war years. The outcome was a voluntary restraint on the number of passenger cars produced.

Other WIB policies or functions included establishing priorities for the transport of war material and the inventorying of freight cars and locomotives—something that, amazingly, had not been done prior to 1917. Although these priorities were not always followed, they greatly facilitated the movement of war goods. The WIB attempted a general inventory of industrial capacity and potential in the nation, eventually encompassing some 18,000 factories.

The WIB also worked in the area of conservation of resources, focusing more on efficiency than on ecology. An oft-cited example was ending the practice of retailers returning day-old bread to central bakeries, and the resulting discounted sale and use of the bread.

Responding to the over-crowding and labor shortages of the industrial Northeast, the WIB also pushed for the geographic distribution of war production. In addition, the WIB sent a mission to Europe to coordinate supply issues with the Allies. Finally, in the latter stages of the war, the WIB began exploring labor priorities and restrictions on the recruitment and movement of labor. The war ended before this effort went far.

The WIB had done little planning for postwar reconversion, and the sudden collapse of Germany and the end of the war caught the board by surprise. Wilson's coolness towards a continuation of war-time governmental intervention into the economy and the Republican Congress, elected in November 1918, further convinced Baruch that winding down the WIB would be wise. This was despite the fact that many industrialists, including the majority involved in steel production, urged a continued role for the WIB. Price agreements and priority orders expired at the end of November 1918. In late November, Baruch asked President Wilson to terminate the WIB effective January 1, 1919. In early December, Wilson agreed, and the WIB ceased to function by late December.

The WIB provided the first vivid example of how a governmental agency could organize and rationalize the economy to improve the flow and distribution of goods. Although its existence was short, the agency's influence was widely felt over the next 25 years. Wartime cooperation on the part of business convinced some reformers in the 1920s that a new cooperative ethos between the government and business would replace the earlier progressive emphasis on regulation. The WIB also offered a useful model during the New Deal, when the federal government created the National Recovery Administration (NRA) to establish production

standards, price controls, and uniform wages within specific industries. In peacetime, however, the Supreme Court proved unwilling to authorize this kind of government-sponsored coordination and ruled the NRA unconstitutional. When the nation found itself once again embroiled in war in 1941, the WIB offered an important precedent as the country mobilized its economic resources.

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Related Entries

Economy and War; World War I

—*Mark McCulloch*

War Labor Board

The National War Labor Board—often referred to simply as the War Labor Board (WLB)—supervised and intervened in many aspects of collective bargaining from 1942 to 1945. During that period, the WLB settled contract disputes and played a major role in establishing wage rates, working hours, and union security provisions. It also intervened directly in a number of strikes. The WLB was at the center of labor relations and labor mobilization during World War II and was instrumental in furthering war production. It also played an instrumental role in lowering inflation and improving the positions of unskilled workers, African Americans, and women. In some important respects, the WLB also helped to shape the world of postwar labor relations.

Immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt called an emergency meeting of 12 labor and 12 management representatives to discuss the creation of an agency responsible for preventing work stoppages during the war. The meeting issued a no-strike no-lockout declaration and agreed that a new board should be established, but the group deadlocked on the issue of guaranteeing union security. Management wanted to deny any government agency authority over this issue, while the labor representatives pressed for union security to be part of contracts settled by the new board.

By executive order, President Roosevelt established the WLB on January 12, 1942. The new agency took over the caseload of the defunct National Defense Mediation Board (NDMB) and was tripartite in nature, with four representatives each from management, labor, and public sectors. The board was first chaired by William H. Davis, the former head of the NDMB, and George W. Taylor succeeded him in March 1945. The WLB immediately established the principle that it should turn first to independent, collective bargaining in disagreements between management and labor. Only if an impasse persisted would the WLB review a case and settle the contract, while trying to avoid work stoppages.

In its first major cases, the WLB dealt with union security issues. In these cases, the public members generally sided with the labor representatives: first, to agree to consider such cases; and second, to establish a principle known as "maintenance of membership." This was a modified union shop provision, under which any worker who had joined the union would remain as a member for the duration of the contract. If a union shop (one in which all workers had to join the union after employment) or a closed shop (where only union members were hired) were already in effect, the WLB would

approve it in lieu of maintenance of membership. A key corporate move towards grudging acceptance of this principle came in May 1942, when U.S. Steel announced that it would comply with the Federal Shipbuilding decision.

In the opening months of its existence, the WLB was fairly free to rule on wage increases as it saw fit. The International Harvester decision, arrived at during this period, established the general principle that wages should keep pace with inflation and be high enough to grant workers decent and healthy lifestyles. Given the low wage levels that prevailed at the end of the Depression, this formulation was broadly favorable to workers.

Almost immediately, however, this position of the WLB began to erode. On April 27, 1942, President Roosevelt sent to Congress a seven-point anti-inflation plan. In this environment, on July 16, 1942, the WLB issued perhaps its most significant decision, the Little Steel Formula. This mandate—arrived at during deadlocked negotiations between the United Steelworkers and Bethlehem, Inland, Republic, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube—determined that wage increases in this case, and all others, would not exceed to a level 15 percent above where they had stood on January 1, 1941.

This formula remained the guiding principle of the WLB on wages for the duration of the war. Labor criticized it on several grounds. First, they argued, the general rate of inflation far exceeded 15 percent, and the increase was particularly steep in manufacturing towns. They further argued that the gap preserved the very low wages that had prevailed as a result of the Depression and the previous absence of mass unionization. Corporations argued that weekly wages had kept pace with inflation, although hourly wages had not. This was true because of the longer hours worked during the war, especially overtime at premium pay. They also argued that higher increases would lead to runaway inflation.

Within the Little Steel Formula, there was substantial room for tinkering, since the WLB allowed for inequity exceptions and for the improvement of "substandard" wages and conditions. The public members of the WLB were generally sympathetic to minimizing regional pay disparities, by lifting southern and rural wage rates, but they were cool to the expansion of shift differentials, since they wanted few barriers to round-the-clock production. The board also allowed for increasing female wage rates to lessen discrimination, even if those increases topped 15 percent, while individual merit raises were excluded from consideration.

In 1942, conservative pressures on the WLB increased with the passage of the Economic Stabilization Act. More significantly, on September 18, 1942, Roosevelt issued an executive order calling for the freezing of wages. For a brief period, it seemed that the WLB would effectively go out of business, but on October 3, Executive Order 9250 was issued, allowing for exceptions along the lines of the Little Steel Formula. The Order, however, also made decisions of the WLB subject to the approval of the Office of Economic Stabilization (OES), headed by conservative Democrat James Byrnes, and ordered the board to limit all wage increases to the Little Steel Formula—even those that did not involve cases of dispute.

During this period, unions concentrated their cases at the WLB on lifting general wage increases up to the Little Steel Formula limits and on pushing for the removal of inequities. The WLB also created regional boards to handle the increasing volume of cases. This period ended, however, in April 1943, when Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9328, the "Hold-the-Line" order. This stripped the board of power to address inequities and strengthened the review and denial powers of the OES. Under this order, very little power remained with the WLB, and labor protested in its strongest terms yet. In May, Roosevelt issued a new order, allowing the WLB to reclaim some powers. In the interim, however, the board had thrown out some 10,000 inequity cases, or 60 percent of its backlogged caseload.

For the remainder of the war, more and more collective bargaining cases ended in impasse, stuck before a WLB that was unlikely to approve across-the-board wage increases. With a restive labor force clamoring for raises to keep pace with inflation, the board turned increasingly towards the acceptance of incentive wage plans to boost actual earnings.

The most important strike of the war years, the 1943 series of walkouts by coal miners, also involved the WLB. In April 1943, United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) Pres. John L. Lewis refused to appear before what he called a "discredited political agency" in a case involving a wage increase and the issue of portal-to-portal pay. The board

denied the union's claims and the coal miners struck. A promise by the board to reopen the case brought a temporary return to work, but on June 18 the new WLB ruling made only minor changes. Several more strikes took place, and eventually the WLB was forced to approve a settlement that granted the UMWA its $1.50-a-day wage hike, based on portal-to-portal pay and a shortened lunch period.

The WLB was a major force against wildcat strikes by denying any wage gains they might result in, and by sanctioning—even ordering—the termination of wildcatters by their employers. At the same time, a carrot-and-stick approach was utilized to pressure labor leaders to clamp down on militancy. Unions that complied were rewarded with maintenance of membership and dues check-off, while workers who resisted could find themselves fired and drafted, or their union broken and decertified. The public members of the WLB also strongly favored management prerogatives in issues involving new technology and plant movement and closure, generally acting to restrict labor from involvement in those areas. The WLB urged the immediate settlement of jurisdictional disputes between competing unions, but usually did so on the basis of the status quo, which favored the more entrenched American Federation of Labor at the expense of newer unions.

Labor now centered its attacks on the accuracy of the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) cost-of-living calculations. The BLS estimated the price hikes since January 1941 at 23.4 percent, when Roosevelt appointed five WLB members in December 1943 to a new panel to come up with a more accurate figure. This panel arrived at an inflation figure of 27 percent; but the report was not completed until late 1944, and then simply sent to Roosevelt for "study."

Cases involving the major mass production industries came before the board in 1944, but dragged on in deadlock. By early 1945, labor frustration began to peak, and the executive board of the United Auto Workers urged withdrawal from the WLB. Textile Workers Pres. Emil Rieve did resign from the board, and pressure grew from other unions to do the same.

Conservative corporate leaders became increasingly restive with the enhanced bargaining power of workers now that full employment levels had been obtained—and by the

partial recognition of such bargaining power by the WLB. A notable example of such resistance was Montgomery Ward's chairman Sewell Avery's refusal to comply with a WLB order to extend an expired contract. This defiance resulted in the seizure of the plant by troops (under order from President Roosevelt), one of 40 such wartime examples, most of them in the latter half of the conflict.

As it became clear that the war would soon end, cases brought before the WLB in 1945 were more about positioning for the post-war collective bargaining showdown than they were about hopes that the board would actually settle them.

With the end of hostilities overseas, the WLB began to fade away. On August 18, 1945, President Harry Truman's Executive Order 9599 allowed the WLB to grant wage increases "if they did not affect prices." The board then decided it would only accept new cases if they were jointly submitted by labor and management. In October, the WLB went a step further and refused to take any new cases. It also voted to formally dissolve, effective December 15, 1945.

The WLB maintained a mostly strike-free environment during a period when prices outstripped hourly wage rates and in an atmosphere of acute labor shortage. It had, at the same time, greatly assisted in the growth of unions and in the stabilization of collective bargaining patterns. In so doing, the WLB had both greatly assisted the U.S. war effort and set the stage for a massive wave of strikes following the war.

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Related Entries

Economy and War; Labor Strikes

—*Mark McColloch*

War of 1812

(1812–15)

The "Second War for Independence" fought between the United States and Great Britain was the product of already strained relations exacerbated by war in Europe. The war was ostensibly fought for freedom of the seas, to end impressment, and for territory in Canada; yet the eventual peace treaty changed these circumstances little. However, the Battle of New Orleans, fought after the treaty was signed, fostered the perception that the United States won the war and ushered in a new era of American nationalism.

Origins of the Conflict

In 1783, few European countries, particularly Great Britain, welcomed an independent United States into the community of nations. The outbreak of war between Great Britain and France in 1793 further strained U.S.–European relations. Not only did British troops occupy posts in the Old Northwest until 1796, but both France and England began interfering with American shipping in the Atlantic to prevent the other from gaining an economic advantage from the overseas trade. By 1807, the

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War of 1812 (1812–15)	
Total U.S. Servicemembers (Worldwide): **286,730**	
U.S. Population (millions): **7.6**	
Battle Deaths: **2,260**	
Non-mortal Woundings: **4,505**	
Cost (in $ current billions): **.09**	

Source: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.html>

British were stopping American ships on the high seas and impressing sailors into the Royal Navy. While some impressed sailors were in fact deserters from the Royal Navy, others were British-born, naturalized American citizens, a status ignored by Great Britain. Both Britain and France also enacted naval blockades that hurt American overseas shipping interests.

Having exhausted diplomatic solutions, Pres. Thomas Jefferson announced an embargo that confined American vessels to their ports. When the embargo crippled the American economy, Jefferson reopened trade with all nations but Great Britain and France. Jefferson's successor, James Madison, offered a trade monopoly to the first nation that would stop interfering with American trade. Napoleon Bonaparte seemingly promised an end to French aggression contingent upon an end to the British blockade. Madison, hoping to pressure the British, took advantage of the French offer and imposed nonimportation against Great Britain in November 1810.

In addition to free trade and sailors' rights, frontier troubles appeared to give the United States a *causus belli*. Since 1783, American settlers in the Northwest clashed repeatedly with Indians of the region. In 1808, the Shawnee chief Tecumseh and his brother Tenskwatawa, "The Prophet," began unifying western tribes to prevent further American expansion. Blaming the British for increased Indian activity, Indiana Territory Gov. William Henry Harrison led an army to Prophet's Town, Tecumseh's capital, defeating the Shawnee at the November 7, 1811 battle of Tippecanoe. Demoralized, Tecumseh and his followers looked to the British for aid and support, increasing American calls for war against Canada.

"Mr. Madison's War"

By 1812, western and southern Republicans concluded that war was necessary to protect American neutral rights and stop impressment. Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and the "War Hawks" also argued that the western frontier should be defended. Federalists, concentrated in New England in and the northern mid-Atlantic region, opposed the war, fearing continued commercial losses. Less bellicose Republicans argued that the absence of a stable banking system (as the charter for the First Bank of the United States had expired in 1811), limited tariffs, and inadequate trade revenues, combined with the poor state of the armed forces, left the

nation economically unprepared for a conflict. The Army numbered a mere 6,700 poorly trained men, commanded by aging officers. The Navy was well trained and commanded, but it had only 16 vessels with which to challenge a numerically superior Royal Navy. Congress debated Madison's call for a declaration of war against Great Britain, narrowly approving it for presidential signature on June 18, 1812, unaware that the British Parliament had repealed the provisions the United States found offensive only two days earlier.

The War in the North

Relying upon militia and unproven officers, the American campaigns of 1812 proved inconclusive and costly, despite Great Britain's inability to commit fully to the conflict. Gen. William Hull's offensive into Upper Canada ended in defeat when he surrendered the 2,000-man Detroit garrison without firing a shot. Gen. Stephen Van Rensselaer's inability to reinforce an invasion that had crossed the Niagara River and stormed Queenston Heights led to comparable disaster. Militia under Gen. William Dearborn remained against orders in Plattsburgh, New York, refusing to march on Montreal on the basis that they were raised to defend New York, not attack Canada.

The 1813 campaigns represented only a slight improvement. By May, U.S. forces sacked York, the capital of Upper Canada. By September, American Naval Commodore Oliver H. Perry had built a fleet on Lake Erie, where the numerical advantages of the Royal Navy were negated. Perry's victory on Lake Erie enabled Hull's replacement, Gen. William Henry Harrison, to retake Detroit and challenge the British and their Indian allies in Upper Canada. In October 1813, the British were defeated at the Battle of the Thames, and Tecumseh was killed, halting plans for an Indian union. Elsewhere, the lack of cooperation among senior officers hindered offensive operations, leaving the United States no closer to victory in 1813 than it was in 1812.

The War in the South

American forces were more successful in the South. After the August 1813 attack on Fort Mims in Alabama, Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson of Tennessee conducted a campaign against Creeks in Alabama that culminated in a March

1814 victory at Horseshoe Bend. Defeated militarily, the tribe ceded two-thirds of its territory in the Treaty of Fort Jackson in August 1814. For his efforts, Jackson was commissioned a major general in the U.S. Army and tasked with defending the Gulf Coast.

The 1814 Offensives

The collapse of Napoleon's empire in 1814 allowed Great Britain to rush fresh troops to the United States. Blockading the East Coast, the British proposed invading the United States via Niagara and Lake Champlain, coupled with an offensive up the Chesapeake Bay and another against New Orleans. Before British troops could arrive, however, U.S. forces launched another offensive across the Niagara. At Chippewa and Lundy's Lane in July 1814, Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott proved the value of well-trained and capably officered regulars, but accomplished little, as a stalemate was reached in the region by the end of the year's campaigning.

Macdonough and Plattsburgh

In September 1814, British Maj. Gen. Sir George Prevost massed 17,000 veterans in Quebec and Montreal, hoping to seize territory in upper New York. Defending Plattsburgh with 3,500 men, American Gen. Alexander Macomb called upon nearby governors for reinforcements. Electing to await the arrival of the British Fleet, Prevost hoped to pin down Macomb's force and then attack Plattsburgh, following a British naval offensive on Lake Champlain. The British fleet on the lake was blocked by American Naval Lt. Thomas Macdonough, who commanded a small fleet. After the American flagship endured repeated broadsides, it swung its undamaged guns into action, battering the British into submission and gaining control of Lake Champlain. Losing 2,000 men in the attempt to take Plattsburgh, Prevost retreated into Canada, convinced that he could not continue his offensive without gaining control of the lake.

The Chesapeake Campaign

With American attention focused on the Niagara front and on Lake Champlain, a second British force advanced up the Chesapeake. In early June 1814, Vice Adm. Alexander Cochrane and Maj. Gen. Robert Ross sent one British

squadron up the Potomac River towards Washington and another up the Chesapeake towards Baltimore. Targeting the nation's capitol, Gen. William Winder's 6,000-man American militia tried to defend Bladensburg, but was no match for 4,000 battle-hardened British regulars. After defeating Winder's forces, the British captured Washington and burned the Capitol, the White House, and other public buildings in retaliation for the sacking of York in 1813.

Moving on to Baltimore, the British force was slowed by earthworks manned by more than 13,000 American militia and regulars, as well as the star-shaped Fort McHenry, a brick fortification garrisoned by U.S. regulars commanded by Maj. George Armistead. At North Point, Maryland, militia stalled the British land advance in a battle that felled their commander, General Ross. Bombarding Fort McHenry, the Royal Navy hoped to reduce it by shelling before moving on towards Baltimore. The successful defense of the fortress throughout the night of September 13 to 14 inspired Francis Scott Key, a Baltimore lawyer, to write the poem that would become famous as "The Star-Spangled Banner." The strength of Fort McHenry, coupled with other well-fortified positions held by a numerically superior force, caused British Vice Adm. Cochrane to abandon his objective.

Dissension within the United States

In the wake of Washington's destruction, 26 delegates from the New England states, angered by raids and trade losses from the British blockade, met in Hartford, Connecticut, in December 1814 and January 1815 to discuss "Mr. Madison's War." Proposing constitutional amendments designed to reduce Republican political influence, the delegates threatened secession—the first time this had occurred in the

The bombardment of Fort McHenry, near Baltimore, in 1814, as represented in a contemporary drawing from the same year. The defense of the fort was the inspiration for "The Star-Spangled Banner," which was to become the American national anthem. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

young country's history—if their demands were not met. These included limiting the president to one term, prohibiting successive presidents from the same state, limiting trade embargoes to 60 days, excluding the foreign-born from federal offices, abolishing the three-fifths law for taxes and representation, and requiring a two-thirds vote to declare war and admit new states. But the grievances of the Hartford Convention were soon overshadowed by good news from Europe and New Orleans.

The Treaty of Ghent

In August 1814, British and American diplomats initiated negotiations in Ghent, Belgium, to end the war. Hoping to end impressments and win indemnities for seized ships, American negotiators were held up by the British, who sought territorial concessions in Maine and New York to create an Indian buffer state; demilitarization of the Great Lakes; access to the Mississippi; and an end to American fishing off the Canadian coast. The British secretly hoped that military victories in North America would strengthen their position; but altering their plans, the British dropped their demand for an Indian state and insisted instead on the retention of occupied territory. The Americans countered with status quo ante bellum, invoking a return to the borders as they existed before the war began, and hoping that setbacks on Lake Champlain would weaken British resolve. Facing war weariness both at home and abroad, the British finally signed the treaty on Christmas Eve, 1814, agreeing to terms of status quo ante bellum, despite the fact that the New Orleans campaign was already underway. The war would end upon ratification, but the issues that had caused the conflict remained to be settled.

New Orleans and Victory

Setting out from Jamaica in October 1814 with a force of 7,500 veteran soldiers, British Gen. Edward Pakenham had sought to capture New Orleans. Regarding the treaty that transferred the Louisiana territory from Spain to France as invalid, the British hoped to establish a colony and potentially return Louisiana to their Spanish allies, the Treaty of Ghent notwithstanding. On the other side, commanding a hastily assembled force of U.S. regulars, western volunteers, free black men, and Baratarian

pirates, Gen. Andrew Jackson prepared defensive positions astride the Mississippi River, blocking the approach to the city by land or water. On the morning of January 8, 1815, Pakenham's forces attacked the American positions in a frontal assault. Defeated by a combination of artillery and musket fire that left Pakenham and 2,000 others killed or wounded, the British withdrew from the Gulf, unable to capture the most important port in the western United States and fulfill their goal of territorial acquisition.

Aftermath

Because of their victory in the Battle of New Orleans, Americans came away from the war considering themselves victorious, despite the fact that none of the issues that had precipitated the war were resolved. Jackson's victory bolstered the case of those who believed in the efficacy of an army of citizen soldiers, though militia failures elsewhere contributed to the realization that the United States would need a regular army commanded by capable officers to protect itself. While Mr. Madison's War could not be considered particularly successful for the United States, it nonetheless had a lasting influence on the young republic.

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Related Entries

Impressment; Jackson, Andrew; Scott, Winfield; "Star-Spangled Banner, The"; Tecumseh

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1814

—*Robert P. Wettemann, Jr.*

War on Terrorism

(2001–)

September 11, 2001, ushered in a new age in America and in America's relations with the world. On that date, terrorists flew hijacked airliners into both of the World Trade Center towers, killing themselves, their fellow passengers, and several thousand people inside the buildings. Another hijacked plane was flown into the western face of the Pentagon—the Arlington, Virginia, headquarters of the U.S. military. Yet another crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after its passengers, having heard of the earlier attacks at the Pentagon and World Trade Center, stormed their hijackers. This brave but Pyrrhic victory prevented an attack on another prominent American landmark—possibly the U.S. Capitol Building or the White House itself.

As America and the world watched on live television, both of the Trade Center's towers collapsed; many emergency workers and firefighters were killed along with those they had entered the buildings to rescue. The final death toll in New York was over 2,600, with the total number of people killed in the four attacks totaling around 3,000, including all passengers on the aircraft. This tally, while horrifically high, was—considering the fact that over 50,000 people worked at the World Trade Center on a typical day—also mercifully low. That said, the sheer scale and scope of these attacks dwarfed any previous terrorist strike.

Immediately after the attacks, America was a nation in mourning and a nation under siege; for the first time, air traffic was almost totally grounded for three days. The state of alert that followed the attacks in the United States was also mirrored overseas, with flights over London, for instance, barred for several days. The New York Stock exchange closed until September 17, and within a week of its reopening, the Dow Jones Industrial Index experienced its largest drop ever over such a short time period. America was effectively a nation at war, with its leaders vowing vengeance on those responsible for the most serious attack on the continental United States in almost 200 years, and its citizens demanding justice for an outrage they could barely believe had happened. The September 11 attacks impacted U.S. society at a fundamental level, and were viewed by many as not only an attack on America, but as an attack on the civilized world itself.

Onlookers watching the smoke and flames pouring from the World Trade Center in New York following terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. (Associated Press/AP)

The September 11 Attacks in Context

Suspicion for the attacks quickly fell on al Qaeda—an Islamist terrorist organization headquartered in Afghanistan and commanded by a wealthy Saudi Arabian exile, Osama bin Laden. September 11, 2001, was not the first occasion that the United States had been targeted by al Qaeda. Bin Laden had issued the first of several declarations of war against America as far back as 1996, and al Qaeda, like other Islamist terrorist groups, was behind several attacks against U.S. interests in the preceding decade. The first such attack was believed to have taken place in Aden, Yemen, in December 1992, when a hotel hosting U.S. troops en route to a humanitarian mission in Somalia was bombed; two Austrian tourists were killed in this attack, but the Americans had already left before the bomb exploded. Al Qaeda was also believed to have helped train and arm some of those who fought a pitched battle against American troops in Somalia in October 1993, resulting in 18 American deaths and an eventual U.S. withdrawal from the East African country.

In addition, bin Laden's organization was linked to the February 1993 truck bombing of the World Trade Center in New York that left six dead and a thousand wounded, as well as to a disrupted plan to blow up the city's Holland and Lincoln tunnels, among other landmarks. The group was further implicated in a plot to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific in 1995, as well as a bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the same year that killed seven people, five of them American. Al Qaeda also carried out truck bombings at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998, killing more than 250, including 12 Americans, and injuring thousands more. Two years later the group used an explosives-packed motorboat to kill 17 Americans aboard the USS *Cole*. As such incidents illustrate, and as the final report of the commission established to examine the 2001 assaults pointed out, "The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise."

Bin Laden is believed to have helped found al Qaeda in the 1980s. The organization was initially formed to train, support, and fund the many foreign fighters who flocked to Afghanistan to join the Muslim mujahideen resistance movement after the Soviet Union's invasion of the country in 1979. The al Qaeda leader returned to Saudi Arabia in 1989 after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. After being confined to Jeddah due to his opposition to the Saudi government's close relationship with America, bin Laden fled to Sudan, where he began to invest in the country's infrastructure, setting up legitimate businesses including farms and a road construction company. By January 1994, bin Ladin was suspected to be financing at least three terrorist training camps in Sudan. The al Qaeda leader's support for Islamist fundamentalist movements led the Saudi government to revoke his citizenship and freeze his assets in 1994. Two years later, bin Ladin moved back to Afghanistan after international pressure caused Sudan to expel him. While there he enjoyed a close relationship with the Taliban regime and continued to run terrorist training camps.

Al Qaeda differs from most terrorist groups in that it is a kind of loose network that works to inspire, support, train, and incite like-minded organizations. This decentralized mode of operations makes it more difficult to counter than more conventional terrorists. Al Qaeda itself also undertakes specific operations on occasion, with such attacks—like those of September 11, 2001—sometimes planned years in advance. Led by an Egyptian, Mohammed Atta, the September 11 attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, some of whom prepared for their mission with flying lessons in America. All the hijackers—who used knives, box cutters, and pepper spray to gain control of their assigned aircraft—died in the attacks. Such martyrdom is a common characteristic of Islamist terrorist groups; their willingness to die is another factor that makes them particularly difficult to counter.

Bin Laden's self-professed goals included the expulsion of American forces from the Arabian Peninsula and the overthrow of existing secular Muslim governments, to replace them with a new caliphate—a pan-Islamic dominion, ruled by religious law. Al Qaeda's war on the West was likely more nuanced than these aims, baldly stated, suggest. As terrorism expert Jessica Stern argues, this war was probably also partly motivated by what many young Muslims perceived to be their humiliation in the face of Western dominance across many realms. In addition, analyst Michael Scott Doran contends that al Qaeda's attack on America may have constituted an effort to draw the United States and the West into what was effectively a civil war between moderate

and extremist interpretations of Islam, with any Western counterattack likely to have swollen the ranks of the Islamists or Islamic extremists.

Framing the War on Terrorism

The parameters of the War on Terrorism were broadly outlined by Pres. George W. Bush on September 20, 2001. Speaking during an address to a joint session of Congress and the American people, President Bush said of this confrontation that it "begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." The President referred to these actions as a "war on terror"—a term that would remain in sporadic use, despite being effectively replaced by the slightly more semantically correct (but often equally contentious) War on Terrorism. This phrase would spawn its own variation—the Global War on Terrorism—a term sometimes attributed to the first Bush administration's department secretary of defense, Paul Wolfowitz.

During the first State of the Union Address after the September 11 attacks, President Bush spoke of an "Axis of Evil," referring to countries that he considered to be either practitioners or sponsors of terrorism, and which had—or could develop—weapons of mass destruction. Initially, this axis comprised Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; it was later expanded to include Cuba, Libya, and Syria. While military action against any of these countries was not explicitly promised, the "Axis" nations were effectively put on notice that the United States would pursue such action if deemed necessary.

On September 18, 2001, the use of military force against those responsible for the September 11 attacks was sanctioned by the U.S. Congress. The scope of this resolution reflected the sense of outrage that the nature and scale of the September 11 attacks invoked. These assaults—the first significant military strikes against the continental United States since the War of 1812—were viewed not only as blows against the country's military and economic might (quite literally in that they were directed at the Pentagon and the World Trade Center), but as attacks on America's society and way of life itself. A wave of patriotism swept the country; and in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, international sympathy and support for America was generally high.

Newspaper headlines across the world expressed revulsion at the attacks, with the French newspaper *le Monde*—not known for its pro-U.S. sympathies—famously declaring on its September 12th front page, "*Nous Sommes Tous Americains*" (We are all Americans). Memorial services were held in many cities across the world. A day after the attacks, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article 5 of its treaty (which says that an attack on one member is an attack on all) for the first time, with NATO aircraft subsequently taking part in air patrols over American territory.

America Strikes Back

The U.S. government's response to the September 11 attacks had domestic and overseas components that varied militarily as to the intensity and visibility of operations. The first of the high-intensity/high-visibility operations was Operation Enduring Freedom. It was initially to have been called Infinite Justice, but the operation was reportedly renamed amid fears that it would offend the religious sensibilities of Muslims, who might consider that only God was capable of administering such judgment. The campaign began on October 7, 2001, and was directed against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the al Qaeda training camps in the country. The capture of bin Laden was a major American aim. A U.S.-led invasion force, working with the Northern Alliance—a loose network of anti-Taliban rebels—ousted the Afghan government by the end of 2001. However, bin Laden was believed to remain free, possibly hiding in the Afghan–Pakistan border regions; still at large, he continued to issue statements condemning America and promising further terrorist acts from al Qaeda and its supporters. An International Security Assistance Force (subsequently taken over by NATO), made up of a coalition of countries, undertook peacekeeping duties in Afghanistan after the Taliban's ouster, while a U.S.-led effort to eradicate Taliban and al Qaeda remnants continued.

Similarly, efforts to locate, capture, or eliminate al Qaeda leaders continued to form an integral part of the U.S. response. While bin Laden's exact whereabouts and status would remain uncertain for some time, other top al Qaeda operatives were taken prisoner or eliminated relatively early

in the campaign. Mohammed Atef, thought to have been one of bin Ladin's top commanders, was believed killed during U.S. bombing in Afghanistan in November 2001; and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was believed to have planned the September 11 attacks, was captured in Pakistan in March 2003. Despite that, al Qaeda proved resilient. It also lived up to its self-proclaimed role as a vanguard for like-minded groups and continued to inspire other Islamist terrorist organizations to follow its example by attacking the United States and its allies. In the years following September 11, al Qaeda or its affiliates were linked to a series of such attacks, as far afield as Bali, Morocco, Madrid, and London. Meanwhile, bin Laden was almost displaced as public enemy number one by a new terrorist bogey-man, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, after the latter's involvement in resistance to U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, and in a grisly kidnapping campaign there in which hostages were decapitated on videos distributed via the Internet.

The U.S. led-invasion of Iraq in 2003 was explicitly linked to the war on terrorism by the Bush administration. The administration insisted that the regime of Saddam Hussein not only had links with al Qaeda, but was in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which—it was claimed—the regime might either use itself or pass on to terrorists. Many specialists questioned whether this was actually the case, pointing out the irreconcilable natures of al Qaeda's brand of religious fundamentalism and the secular regime of Saddam Hussein. Many criticisms were also raised surrounding the subsequent failure to find evidence of Iraqi WMD following this regime's ouster. The invasion itself was said by many regional and terrorism experts to have served as a rallying point for America's foes. Such debates aside, the American-led war in Iraq became inextricably linked to the War on Terrorism in that it diverted U.S. resources away from that wider effort and drew terrorists like al-Zarqawi into the fray.

Other aspects of the War on Terrorism were of a lower intensity and visibility. These included a CIA operation in Yemen in November 2002, in which a Predator unmanned aircraft launched a missile strike, killing six al Qaeda operatives. Other initiatives included the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), which was designed to intercept terrorist activity in that region, and training operations undertaken by U.S. troops with local forces in places like the Philippines and Georgia.

Defending the American Homeland

Domestically, the United States response to the September 11 attacks revolved largely around the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was tasked with protecting America from future terrorist attacks. This was established on November 25, 2002, and became operational two months later, having begun life as the Office of Homeland Security in October 2001. The new department was headed by Tom Ridge—the former governor of Pennsylvania and the first United States secretary of homeland security. The largest government reorganization since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1949, the DHS's formation consolidated 22 separate government agencies and 180,000 employees under one organization and was made up of four major directorates: Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Science and Technology; and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.

The year 2002 also saw the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which assumed responsibility for the homeland defense aspect of the overall security effort. NORTHCOM distinguishes security from defense, describing homeland security as including "the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S territory." By comparison, it defines homeland defense as "the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States." NORTHCOM's mission thus extends beyond the bounds of the War on Terrorism. According to the Pentagon, the creation of the new command was both a reflection of the post-Cold War strategic situation and a reaction to the September 11 attacks. That said, NORTHCOM—whose area of responsibility encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles (as well as the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands)—performs a role closely tied to America's antiterrorist campaign.

911

The command has few permanently assigned forces and is comprised of approximately 500 civil servants and uniformed personnel from all services. As well as countering threats to U.S. territory, NORTHCOM is also authorized to provide military assistance to civil authorities as directed by the president or secretary of defense. This aspect of its operations proved to be particularly controversial, with some saying it dangerously weakens the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the U.S. military being used for domestic law enforcement.

Similarly controversial was the short-lived Total Information Awareness initiative. Conceived by retired U.S. Adm. John Poindexter—a Pentagon consultant and former National Security Advisor under Pres. Ronald Reagan—this computer surveillance system was intended to trawl through virtually all the personal records of every American citizen and analyze this data in an effort to identify terrorists. The program was renamed Terrorist Information Awareness (TIA)—possibly in an attempt to make it more palatable to the American public and to lawmakers. The program's original logo, which bore the Latin inscription "Scienta est potential" (Knowledge is power) and an all-seeing eye surveying the world from atop a pyramid, was likewise scrapped amid a hail of criticism, in which some detractors described it as "Orwellian." In 2003, the U.S. Senate voted against funding for any "deployment and implementation of the [TIA] program." This restriction did not extend to research, however; and some suspicions remained that the U.S. government was still combing the personal files of American citizens, albeit under other guises than TIA. Another of Admiral Poindexter's antiterrorist proposals involved the creation of a type of futures market in which bets would be placed on potential terrorist operations; this system, it was claimed, could offer clues about the likelihood of real attacks, but was also shelved after it provoked outrage from some U.S. politicians. Equally ill-fated was a scheme to set up an Office of Strategic Influence, intended to coordinate U.S. propaganda operations; like the other proposals, it was shelved after being negatively received.

The U.S. response to al Qaeda's attack on America also included efforts to cut off terrorists' financial resources. Towards that end, measures were taken to block and intercept the flow of monies to al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. If appropriately monitored, it was also believed that this money trail could help uncover enemy operatives, with the financial War on Terrorism considered an important part of the overall campaign. However, with the September 11 attacks believed to have been relatively inexpensive (at approximately $500,000), it appeared unlikely that such measures alone would suffice to defeat al Qaeda or like-minded groups.

The Legal War

Such initiatives were accompanied by new antiterrorist legislation, including the signing into law of the USAPATRIOT Act by President Bush on October 26, 2001. This allowed for indefinite imprisonment without trial of non-U.S. citizens deemed by the attorney general to pose a threat to America's national security. It absolved the government of any obligation to provide legal counsel to detainees or to announce arrests; permitted activities such as the searching of premises without their occupants being immediately informed; and provided greater lassitude generally in intelligence gathering. Significantly, the bill relating to the act was passed in the U.S. Senate by 98 votes to one and in the House of Representatives by 356 votes to 66. Polls also showed that the U.S. public was, initially, not widely alarmed by the PATRIOT Act (full name: The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001).

However, many civil liberties groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, condemned the PATRIOT Act as unconstitutional. Public dissatisfaction with the act grew as grassroots activists across America increasingly voiced their concern over aspects of the legislation. Meanwhile, in January 2004, U.S. District Judge Audrey B. Collins ruled that the PATRIOT Act's ban on providing "expert advice or assistance" to groups judged to be terrorist was overly vague and in violation of the 1st and 5th amendments. The ruling came in a lawsuit filed by the Humanitarian Law Project on behalf of plaintiffs who faced up to 15 years imprisonment if they advised groups on the peaceful resolution on the Kurdish refugee problem in Turkey. Bills designed to limit the powers of the PATRIOT Act were introduced at both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, and the act continued to be controversial.

A demonstration in Buffalo, New York, protesting the USAPATRIOT Act, following a meeting of Att. Gen. John Ashcroft with law enforcement officials on Monday, Sept. 8, 2003. (Associated Press/AP)

A month after signing the PATRIOT Act, President Bush issued an executive order authorizing those accused of terrorism to be tried by military tribunals. It was initially envisaged that these tribunals would meet in private and could pronounce death sentences by recommendation of a two-thirds majority jury, comprised of military officers. This suggestion met with a mixed response, drawing both support and criticism from the American public and politicians. Advocates of such tribunals claimed they were necessary as America was fighting a war on terrorism, and would help avoid any intimidation of jurors and protect intelligence sources. Critics maintained that many of the protections afforded defendants in civilian courts would be denied them at such tribunals, with secrecy equating to a lack of accountability. Many U.S. allies were similarly opposed to this legislation, which was amended in March 2002.

Under the revisions, sessions would now largely be made public, with defendants allowed to review any evidence amassed against them. The unanimous agreement of the entire panel—comprised of three to seven military officers, rather than the twelve members of the public who served on civilian juries—was now needed to pass a death sentence. However, the tribunals still proved controversial in that they permitted procedures such as admitting second-hand evidence (that would be banned in civil courts) and obliged defendants to accept military lawyers unless they could afford to hire civilian ones themselves. Defendants were also barred from appealing in federal courts, being restricted to petitioning review panels that could include military and civilian members.

The establishment of military tribunals was assisted and justified by the U.S. government's classification of enemy

personnel in the War on Terrorism as "unlawful combatants" who, because of the nature of their actions, were not protected as fully by international law as "lawful" belligerents. This stance was strongly criticized by many both within and outside the United States, as were its attendant clauses that allowed American citizens to be considered "enemy combatants." Many feared that this would effectively allow anyone to be indefinitely detained without trial, arguing that the adoption of the term "enemy combatant" refuted the Geneva Conventions and was unprecedented in U.S. legal history. Advocates of the approach denied this, citing a 1942 case against German saboteurs apprehended in the United States.

Some nationals of U.S. allies soon fell foul of America's post-September 11 reading of the Geneva Conventions and other treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Many were detained at the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which eventually became notorious after being turned into a holding center for prisoners captured by American forces in the Afghan campaign and then the wider War on Terrorism. Likewise, U.S. citizens such as Yaser Esam Hamdi (captured while fighting against American forces in Afghanistan with the Taliban) and Jose Padilla (arrested on suspicion of being involved in a plot to explode a radiological dispersal device—or "dirty bomb"—in the United States), were denied regular civilian trials. The United States also found itself accused of engaging in torture after pictures of abuse suffered by prisoners being held by American forces at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were made public. These accusations spread to include bases like Bagram in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. There were also allegations that America was sending prisoners to countries known to practice torture for interrogation—in effect, subcontracting its interrogations while avoiding the use of torture itself.

The War over the War

Since the War on Terrorism began, there was much debate over whether it is possible or desirable to wage such a conflict at all. Any war on terrorism, went the argument, could only be a war in the sense that a war could be waged on cancer or poverty. Moreover, a war risked putting too much emphasis on military means. To many, the drawn-out nature of the conflict in Iraq was evidence of the folly of such an approach. Because

of these issues—only a few years into what was expected to be a long conflict, by whatever name it is known—there were those, both within and without the United States, who questioned the degree to which America's post-September 11 security polices furthered their self-professed goals of fostering relations among the great powers and establishing and maintaining an international coalition against terrorism.

Within America itself, the War on Terrorism became a central issue in the political arena and, together with the conflict in Iraq, a pivotal topic in the 2004 election campaign. Meanwhile, domestic opposition to American antiterrorism legislation grew, while others claimed that such measures were necessary to prevent another September 11—even as debate over whether those attacks could have been prevented through more proactive measures on the part of America's intelligence services continued to reverberate. Many concerns centered around the dangers of inadvertently restricting the very freedoms that the U.S. antiterrorist effort sought to protect. Such dilemmas, it was feared, would only deepen the longer America's so-called War on Terrorism continued.

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Related Entries

American Civil Liberties Union; Homeland Security; Iraq War; Peacekeeping Operations; Posse Comitatus Act

Related Documents

2001; 2004 a, b, c

—*Mark Burgess*

War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution was an attempt by Congress to assert its primacy in war-making policy decisions. Although presidents have often used military force without a resolution for war, Congress felt compelled to correct this situation only during the Vietnam War era. Even then, Congress' actions were a corrective for a problem it had largely created itself.

According to Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, the power to declare war rests with Congress. The national legislature is also responsible for raising and supporting the armed forces. In Article II, section 2, however, the president is designated commander in chief of the Army and Navy. This establishes something of a war-making partnership between the legislative and executive branches of the government, a provision intended to prevent unnecessary wars.

Early on August 1, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats fired on USS *Maddox* while the destroyer was on a spying mission in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although the attackers were driven away, Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson dispatched USS *C. Turner Joy* to join the *Maddox* in the gulf. On August 4, both ships reported a second attack by the North Vietnamese. Despite serious doubts about whether the vessels were fired upon, Johnson asked Congress for authority to use military force to deter further attacks. With only two dissenting Senate votes, the legislature passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, authorizing the president "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." Through this resolution the president deployed the first combat troops to South Vietnam. Over the next few years, the number of Americans fighting in Vietnam rose, peaking at around 500,000 in 1968. By the time Johnson left office in 1969, dissatisfaction with escalation in Vietnam already had many congresspersons considering ways to keep the executive branch from again engaging the nation in undeclared wars. In 1971, Congress quietly withdrew the president's unrestricted authority to make war by repealing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Furthermore, by 1973, congressional gall at America's continued involvement in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal surrounding Pres. Richard M. Nixon moved Congress to pass the War Powers Resolution. Intended to check presidential interference with Congress' constitutional prerogative to declare war, the resolution was narrowly passed over Nixon's veto on November 7.

The War Powers Resolution was not intended to shut the president out of decisions for war, but rather to make the process more collaborative without obstructing the executive branch's authority to respond promptly during

military crises. Indeed, the law is called a resolution rather than an act as a concession to congresspersons who worried that a statute required a constitutional amendment. A resolution also seemed to preserve congressional rights while preventing presidential abuse of war powers. In the event of an emergency, the president was required to inform the legislature that a military response had, or would be, employed, and provide justification for using armed force. The report had to be made within 48 hours of taking action. From that moment, Congress had 60 days to determine whether the president's decision was legal. If congressional approval was not forthcoming, military forces had to return home by the end of the two-month decision window, although the president could request a 30-day extension. Moreover, Congress reserved the right to require the president to bring deployed military forces home at any point during the 60-day period.

Despite the resolution, the line between congressional and presidential authority over war making remains blurry, and the legislature's desire to shoulder its responsibility shaky. During the Persian Gulf War, Public Law 102-1 authorized Pres. George H. W. Bush to use armed force—under the terms of U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq's occupation of Kuwait—once he had concluded that diplomacy would not resolve the crisis. When Pres. Bill Clinton committed troops to war-torn Bosnia in 1996, Congress ultimately failed to declare war or to require withdrawal of American troops. In October 2002, Public Law 107-243 authorized Pres. George W. Bush to use armed force in any way he considered "necessary and appropriate" to secure the U.S. against an Iraqi threat. In each instance, Congress debated whether the president had met the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, as well as the meaning and intent of the resolution itself, but ultimately left the decision for war in the hands of the executive branch. In the final analysis, the War Powers Resolution did little to enforce Congress's authority to declare war.

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Related Entries

Iraq War; Korean War; Persian Gulf War; Vietnam War

Related Documents

1973

—*Janet Valentine*

War Profiteering

That many businessmen profit unduly during wartime, charging exorbitant prices for scarce goods or services, or that they benefit from close connections to politicians or the military, are charges that go back to before the origins of the republic and have continued through every war the country has ever fought. Some historians believe such charges have been warranted, while others argue that what seems to be price gouging is an unavoidable effect of supply and demand. The question of whether individuals or

businesses should profit from war is a key moral quandary that highlights an uncomfortable reality: war can sometimes be economically beneficial for certain segments of the American population.

During the wars against the Pequots in the 1630s, gunsmiths charged what to many settlers seemed to be unconscionably high prices. During the American Revolution, Thomas Paine claimed that rich patriots hoarded grain and only sold this basic necessity when the price had skyrocketed—a charge that some historians dispute. However, popular anger against rising prices was real. In Philadelphia, speculation in grain so near the country's breadbasket led crowds to warn that "hunger will break through stone walls"—that is, into the storehouses of the wealthy.

Probably the most egregious example of speculation during the Revolutionary War was in currency. During the course of the war, the gold value of the Continental government's paper money plummeted and inflation ensued. Towards the end of the war, speculators traveled the country, purchasing seemingly worthless currency or certificates that the government issued to soldiers in lieu of paper money—sometimes exchanging Spanish silver coins for the promissory notes at a rate of ten cents on the dollar. By 1781, the new American government turned to hard currency and redeemed the notes with gold or silver. This provided a windfall to the speculators, who were accused by many of having inside information about the coming change in monetary policy. Public discontent with the hard-money policy contributed to Shays's rebellion in 1786.

During the Civil War, the practice of war profiteering arose again, allowing many businessmen to amass enormous fortunes. As before, a cooperative government helped facilitate the practice. The young J. P. Morgan purchased defective rifles from one federal armory and sold them to another for a profit of more than $100,000. The fact that carbines sometimes blew off the thumbs of the Union soldiers firing them was seemingly a small matter. Another famous millionaire, Cornelius Vanderbilt, added to his fortune by selling the government boats that were completely rotten. Fortunes were made by selling the Army boots made of defective leather, rotten meat, and the like—and not just during the Civil War. Later, during the Spanish–American War of 1898,

some historians calculate that many more American soldiers were killed by rancid canned foods than by the Spanish.

During World War I, American manufacturers made enormous sums selling shells, armor, and ships to the Allies. Given the severity of the conflict and the high costs of building new factories, prices soared. In the case of naval armor, the price rose 700 percent in just three years. At the beginning, the Allies paid cash, but soon turned to massive loans, organized through Morgan's bank with the approval of the federal government. When the Russians pulled out of the war in 1917, those loans became riskier. In 1917, the United States intervened on the side of the Allies. After the war, critics charged that munitions companies on both sides of the Atlantic, such as DuPont and Krupps—the so-called Merchants of Death—had manipulated or even caused the conflict for their mutual enrichment.

In response to charges that the United States had entered World War I to secure repayment of war loans to private banks, the federal government adopted measures intended to limit the profits of war contractors during World War II. Charges that some companies engaged in unethical practices arose once again. After the war, the Senate found that several powerful companies, among them Ford, Standard Oil, and General Electric, continued to trade crucial—and therefore lucrative—materials, goods, or technologies with the Axis powers. Trade between the German branches of American firms occurred generally through Swiss or Swedish subsidiaries. In the case of Standard Oil, the sale of patented ingredients enabled German bombers to fly farther into the Atlantic for longer periods, sinking more Allied ships. While the Senate investigated these cases, the government did nothing. The vast majority of wartime contracts went to the largest, and often most politically connected, corporations. While profit levels were regulated, contractors bid on a "cost-plus" profits basis, so contractors had an incentive to boost production costs (salaries, etc.) as a way of padding profits. These practices were investigated by then Sen. Harry Truman, but often continued into the Cold War.

During the Cold War, companies producing goods for the military obtained most or all of their research dollars from the government, which represented a guaranteed

market for those goods; consequently, defense contracts were lucrative, and costs on the vast majority of weapons systems grew dramatically. The permanent wartime economy that emerged proved highly lucrative to a number of firms, leading again to a pattern of media criticism and government inaction. For instance, in the era of Ronald Reagan, one defense contractor billed the government hundreds of dollars for a simple hammer. As in the past, companies that were well-connected to either Democratic or Republican politicians won lucrative contracts. The firm of Kellogg, Brown and Root, one of the chief financial backers of Lyndon Johnson, won numerous Vietnam-era contracts. The firm was later purchased by Halliburton, which drew charges during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq for over-billing to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars.

While it is difficult for scholars or citizens to know definitively whether companies are engaged in war profiteering or simply enjoying a healthy profit consistent with free-market capitalism, it remains clear that throughout U.S. history the profit motive has often been powerful enough to override patriotic considerations. As Woody Guthrie put it in his 1950s song "Stetson Kennedy," "if we take the profit out of war, we'll all forget what we were fighting for."

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—*John Hinshaw*

WarGames

Film directed by John Badham, 1983

WarGames, a 1983 film about a teenage computer hacker (Matthew Broderick) who accidentally almost triggers World War III, was marketed as a youth-oriented film but became popular with audiences of all ages. Young people enjoyed seeing Broderick's character outwit grown-ups and save the world, while adults viewed the film as a commentary about nuclear war and the role of machines in human affairs.

WarGames was just one of a number of theatrical and television movies with nuclear war themes released in the early 1980s. These include *Testament*, a 1983 drama about a family's struggle to survive after a nuclear war; *The Day After,* a 1983 made-for-television movie about the effects of a nuclear attack on a midwest city; *Countdown to Looking Glass,* a 1984 cable "mockumentary" recounting the events leading to a thermonuclear exchange; and *The Manhattan Project,* a 1986 comedy/thriller in which a student builds a working atomic bomb as a school science project. *WarGames* was arguably the most popular and best remembered of these films. In addition to these films, many music videos, a very new art form at the time, featured images of missiles, fireballs, and mushrooms clouds, as did the video arcade game Missile Command.

This proliferation of nuclear-war-themed entertainment in the early 1980s reflected the concerns of the times. Fears of nuclear annihilation increased worldwide after Ronald Reagan won the 1980 American presidential election. The former actor's fierce, anti-Soviet rhetoric, in which he described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," led many to believe he was an irresponsible "nuclear cowboy" willing to launch a first strike without provocation. Reagan did little to dispel this perception. Just months before his reelection in 1984, he joked about "outlawing" the Soviet Union while testing a microphone: "We begin bombing in five minutes."

Of course, Hollywood produced movies about nuclear war long before the Reagan era. Twenty years earlier, films such as *On the Beach* (1959), *Dr. Strangelove* (1964), and *Failsafe* (1964) had received much popular and critical acclaim. Like *Failsafe*, *WarGames* posits an accidental triggering of nuclear war—leading the *New York Times* to ask "Could it ever happen?"

Despite its title, *WarGames* does not emphasize the "war as game" theme. None of the adult characters believe that war is a competition played for fame, honor, or glory. They are professionals who perceive war as a deadly serious endeavor. The "game" of the title is the simulation they use to practice their skills, hoping that they will never need to apply those skills. However, when Broderick's character plays "global thermonuclear war" with the "War Operations Planning and Response" (WOPR) computer, it initiates a real nuclear countdown. The military officers are horrified when the game turns real.

In contrast with many antiwar films, such as *Dr. Strangelove* and *Catch-22* (1970), *WarGames* does not portray the military officers as warmongering buffoons. The Air Force general played by Barry Corbin is presented sympathetically. He is skeptical of giving WOPR control over U.S. nuclear assets and agonizes over the decision to retaliate when WOPR indicates missiles incoming, not knowing whether the attack is real or a simulation. Nonetheless, the U.S. Air Force objected, albeit quietly, to the movie, saying that it contributed to public fears by misrepresenting the service's nuclear security arrangements.

In addition to its criticism of war, *WarGames* also explores the theme, common in science fiction, of humanity's over-reliance on technology. The WOPR computer that nearly destroys the Earth is intended to relieve humans of the burden of waging nuclear war. Supporters of a computer-controlled launch system argued that, if the president decided that nuclear war was necessary, no individual should be able to compromise its execution. Likewise, this technology would also prevent a disturbed individual (such as Gen. Jack D. Ripper in *Dr. Strangelove*) from beginning a nuclear war without authorization.

Yet technology, intended to serve humanity, can turn on and destroy its creators. In *WarGames*, the completely autonomous WOPR is given the authority and ability to launch a nuclear strike on its own. Like HAL in *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968), WOPR will fulfill its programming regardless of the consequences. It cannot be overridden and will play its "game" to the end, no matter what the cost.

WarGames was released at a time when only a handful of technophiles had computers in their homes and when the computer was still a thing of awe to the general public. (Indeed, for many Americans the movie was their introduction to personal computing and hacking; the film inspired many to seek careers as computer programmers and engineers.) As were HAL and the title machine in *Colossus: The Forbin Project* (1970), WOPR is sentient and can learn—something rarely seen in films anymore, since computers have become so familiar. What distinguishes WOPR from its predecessors is that it can empathize with humanity: when it realizes the destruction that a nuclear war will cause, it is appalled and ends the countdown. "What a strange game," it observes. "The only winning move is not to play."

WarGames combines many classic themes of the science fiction and antiwar genres in an entertaining package. It is far more than an artifact of Reagan-era nuclear paranoia. The Cold War may be over, but the film's appeal endures.

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Related Entries

Cold War; Computer Technology and Warfare; *Dr. Strangelove*; Film and War; Wargaming

—Roger Horky

Wargaming

Wargames, or conflict simulations, are games that recreate historical and hypothetical wars, campaigns, and battles. Military and government personnel play wargames to practice skills, rehearse for real conflicts and crises, and explore the impact of new technology and weapons. Hobby wargamers play for fun and to learn about military history. Educators use wargames to introduce students to the problems encountered by historical figures.

There are four main categories of wargames: miniatures games, computer simulations, live-action events, and board wargames. The first three types were originally developed for and by military organizations, but all have commercial entertainment applications. In live-action games, players decide what to do as individuals in a particular battle scenario (although they are often guided by a coach). The other formats cast players in the role of commanders who make decisions for all battle units. Professional wargames of all types are usually more elaborate and sophisticated than their commercial counterparts.

Wargaming traces its origins to chess, itself a stylized and abstract representation of medieval warfare. Enthusiasts have long tinkered with the rules of chess to represent real-life combat more "accurately," adding terrain effects, scaled movement rates, ranged weapons, special units, and other "realistic" features. In the early 19th century a Prussian junior officer proposed that the army should use one of these chess-based games for training. His chief of staff was so impressed that he ordered a Kriegspiel ("wargame") kit for every regiment. The original Kriegspiel was a miniatures game, played with wooden blocks that represented units on a sandtable sculpted into a landscape. Combat was originally resolved by a roll of the dice, but "free" Kriegspiel, introduced in 1876, used referees. The many Prussian military successes between 1864 and 1870 prompted other armies and navies to adopt wargaming. Most used adaptations of the original Kriegspiel at first but soon developed their own games, adding rules for logistics, political factors, and advances in military technology and doctrine.

In both world wars and many other 20th-century conflicts, most of the belligerents relied on tabletop games to work out strategic, operational, and technical problems before committing their forces. American admiral Chester Nimitz observed in 1960 that, with the exception of the Japanese kamikazes, every aspect of World War II in the Pacific had been anticipated through wargaming. However, admirals and generals sometimes failed to apply what they learned from wargames. During World War I, the Russians played wargames to test strategies for their advance into Prussia. During these games, they identified several potential problems and developed solutions for them. Yet in the actual campaign, they repeated the mistakes, but not the corrections. Leaders sometimes also drew erroneous conclusions from wargames. While preparing for their 1914 invasion of France, the Germans used wargames to refine their plans. These games almost always predicted a German victory—especially when Kaiser Wilhelm II was playing.

Both the Soviet and American governments and armed forces continued to employ wargames throughout the Cold War, seeking the best ways to fight in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and other conflicts. However, Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense under presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, discovered a new application for them. Long a proponent of scientific management techniques, McNamara relied on wargames to determine the cost-effectiveness of new weapons systems. However, wargames are only as useful as the assumptions made when designing them. Many of McNamara's simulations modeled budgetary factors alone and failed to account for political and other issues not easily quantified.

Computerized wargames appeared in 1958 when the U.S. Navy introduced the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS). Conceptually, these games differ little from their tabletop predecessors, although the computer's memory capacity and speed allows a much greater level of detail to be modeled. The computer also transformed flight simulators into wargames. The earliest simulators were simple mechanical devices demonstrating how control inputs affect flight attitude. The introduction of digital technology in the 1970s permitted the development of flight simulators that totally immerse trainees in a virtual environment, complete with enemy forces, equipment malfunctions, and flight characteristics all programmed into the system. Tank crews, ship crews, and even foot soldiers also use simulators.

Armies have conducted training maneuvers for centuries, but live-action wargames with formal rules are a 20th-century innovation. Modern technology permits highly realistic military training exercises. The Army's MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) gear, made for tanks and heavy weapons as well as for individual soldiers, uses light beams to register hits on special sensor equipment. There are similar devices for aircraft. Computer datalinks permit real-time tracking of all participants and replays for postgame assessments.

Another form of live-action conflict simulation is the role-playing exercise. Government officials and military personnel use these to work out policy problems. Participants are assigned different, often incompatible objectives, then try to resolve their differences through negotiation. Law enforcement agencies employ these exercises to train for hostage negotiations and other interpersonal conflicts.

Recreational wargaming emerged in the early twentieth century. The entertainment potential of military wargames inspired a number of commercial adaptations, the best known being Little Wars, published in 1913 by British author H. G. Wells. An ardent pacifist, Wells hoped that games could become a substitute for war; at times, however, the wargaming hobby is criticized for promoting militarism and glamorizing war. Most enthusiasts maintain that they play just for the fun of matching wits with an opponent or, in the case of live-action games, for the physical activity.

Little Wars was a miniatures game, replacing Kriegspiel's wooden blocks with lead figurines. Miniatures battles, with their colorfully painted soldiers maneuvering about a model landscape, complete with buildings and trees, are often grand spectacles. Since the hobby's origins, wargamers have gotten their supplies from toy companies, model manufacturers, and specialty concerns that produce a wide variety of miniature soldiers, vehicles, ships, buildings, and landscape accessories.

Many wargamers also read speculative fiction, which inspired a group of American enthusiasts to add fantasy elements to their tabletop battles in the mid-1970s. Their focus soon changed from engaging in combat to developing characters, and they began writing rules—far more complex than those for professional role-playing exercises—to recreate the lives of individual sorcerers and warriors. The result was

Dungeons and Dragons, one of the earliest role-playing games. The role-playing hobby quickly grew more popular than its antecedent, and remains so into the 21st century.

Board wargaming developed as an inexpensive alternative to miniatures. Instead of metal pieces on a sandtable, board wargames use cardboard pieces and cardstock maps, usually overlaid with hexagons to regulate movement. The first board wargames were published in the early 1950s. The hobby's popularity peaked some 20 years later. Board wargamers have always been a minority in the general games market, so mainstream board game publishers produce few wargames. Most board wargame companies are owned and operated by hobbyists, often on a shoestring budget, yet some publish a dozen or more new titles each year.

Commercial computer simulations resemble board wargames more than they do arcade-style video games. The appeal of computer wargames may be attributed to their animated graphics, ease of play (the computer handles all game mechanics), and solo playability—artificial intelligence is usually a tolerable substitute for a human opponent. Since the mid-1990s, most computer games can be played online against multiple opponents. Combat flight simulators always sell well, a computer being far better suited than a two-dimensional gameboard for recreating dogfights.

Most live-action wargames are grown-up versions of children's games such as Capture the Flag. Paintball uses gas-powered guns to fire dye-filled wax projectiles. Lazer Tag (and its poorly remembered predecessor, Photon) uses infrared equipment similar to the Army's MILES gear. Mock dogfighting services allow ace wannabes to fly real airplanes (supervised by licensed pilots) that are equipped with laser targeting and sensing devices adapted from Air Force models.

The equipment for live-action games can be found in toy, sporting-goods, and department stores, while most electronics and software retailers carry computer wargames. Board wargames and the rules, figures, and landscapes for miniatures games, however, are usually available only at specialty hobby shops, though many do business online and by mail order. Most wargamers tend to play only one category of game, all of which have their networks of clubs, conventions, tournaments, and magazines.

The armed forces will rely on wargames long into the future. Prospects for the wargaming hobby, however, are uncertain. Computer and live-action games appeal to many people and are likely to remain popular in the future. Board and miniatures wargaming, however, will probably remain specialty hobbies. They are perceived as too intellectually demanding for the general public, yet are also dismissed as frivolous "kiddie games."

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Related Entries

Computer Technology and Warfare; Technology and Revolutionary Changes in Military Affairs; *WarGames*

—*Roger Horky*

Washington, George

(1732–99)

1st President of the United States, Commander of the Continental Army

As commander of the Continental Army, president of the Constitutional Convention, and first president of the United States, George Washington helped to steer the new American republic from revolution to nationhood. While other statesmen, most notably Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, took the lead in writing the seminal texts that defined the purposes and processes of American government, Washington did more than anyone to establish the character of the new nation's military and political leadership. Firm and impartial, dignified yet selfless, and prudent above all else, his status as an exemplar of the principle that power must be tempered by restraint constitutes his most important contribution to the American experiment in limited government.

Early Life and Career

Born in Westmoreland County, Virginia, in 1732, Washington was the son of Mary Ball and Augustine Washington, an ambitious tobacco planter. When his father died in 1743, George Washington went to live with his older half brother, Lawrence, who in 1751 took him to Barbados. There he contracted smallpox, developing an immunity to the disease that would later claim the lives of thousands of soldiers in the Continental Army. A year later, when Lawrence Washington died of tuberculosis, his 2,500-acre Mount Vernon plantation became part of Washington's inheritance.

Already Washington had begun work as a surveyor employed by Virginia's influential Fairfax family, into which Lawrence had married. He charted the Fairfaxes' land holdings in the Shenandoah Valley, where he gained a familiarity with the trans-Appalachian West that was further strengthened in 1754 when, as a young officer in the Virginia militia, he journeyed into the Ohio Country to secure his colony's land claims against those of the French. There he surrendered in a battle that helped to ignite in North America the Seven Years' War. Soon afterwards he accepted an appointment as commander of Virginia's frontier militia, a position he held until 1758.

Upon his return to Mount Vernon, Washington solidified his status as a member of the gentry. In 1759 he married Martha Dandridge Custis, a widow whose estate of 18,000 acres, when combined with the lands that he had inherited or purchased, made him one of Virginia's richest men. He

enlarged and renovated his house, secured seats as a vestry-man and justice of the peace, and won election as a member of the House of Burgesses. He earned a reputation as an able legislator and ardent critic of British imperial policies. In 1774 he collaborated with fellow planter and statesman George Mason on the Fairfax Resolves, which recommended a unified colonial boycott of British imports. With these credentials Washington traveled to Philadelphia as one of Virginia's delegates to the Continental Congress.

Revolutionary General

There, dressed in the uniform of the Virginia militia, Washington attracted the notice of many peers. Like them, he shared the civilian legislators' disdain for British encroachments on colonists' rights, including Parliament's apparent attempt to intimidate Americans by stationing on their shores an army whose protection their popular assemblies had never requested. Like them, he seemed willing to take great risks to resist British policies. Unlike them, however, he had warfighting experience and a carefully nurtured public reputation as a military man. These facts, combined with the realization that military engagements against the British at Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts probably secured northern support for the resistance movement, made Washington—a delegate from the most populous colony in the South—an easy choice to unite the colonies as commander of the Continental Army in June 1775. Entrusted with building an army powerful enough to secure victory, he could also be trusted to restrain that army from threatening republicanism.

Washington took charge of American forces at Boston, which the British soon evacuated. Poorly supplied and inadequately trained, his troops failed to prevent British capture of New York City in 1776. They withdrew to Westchester County and then New Jersey where, after a string of defeats, victories at Trenton (December 26, 1776) and Princeton (January 3, 1777) bolstered his army's flagging morale. Even so, losses at Brandywine (September 11, 1777) and Germantown (October 4, 1777) allowed British forces to occupy Philadelphia for the winter. Meanwhile, his army endured harsh conditions at Valley Forge, and rumors circulated that critics sought to displace him from command. In

1778, however, Washington's forces began to reap the benefits of increasing professionalism. Earlier in the war, members of his army saw themselves as "citizen–soldiers" destined, after brief enlistments, to return to their farms. Now, thanks to Washington's reforms in training and discipline, an increasing number took pride in their status as "regulars."

With the war in the North essentially a draw, Washington encamped in New York until the vulnerability of British forces in Virginia caused him to improvise a brilliant plan. In the late summer of 1781, Washington's forces, joined by the French, rushed south to engage the British and corner them at the Yorktown peninsula. There, after the arrival of a contingent of French warships, the British Army surrendered on October 19. The victory owed much to French–American coordination, but what made it possible was Washington's success at unifying an army of individuals around a military ethic that placed nation before self and the liberty of America above all else.

Although no major battles followed Yorktown, Britain continued to hold several American cities, and not until September 1783 did all sides sign a peace treaty. In the meantime, Washington encamped with his army near Newburgh, New York. There his officers grew restless. Many feared that the cash-strapped Continental Congress would fail to honor its promises regarding military pay and pensions. Rumors of mutiny circulated, as did anonymous tracts suggesting that, should Congress not satisfy the officers' demands, the army might either march west and leave the United States undefended or, if the war ended, refuse to disband. Interpretations differ over the seriousness of these threats, but few dispute that Washington's March 1783 remarks before his officers—whom he urged to obey civilian authority and place the nation's interests above their own—put an end to any possibility of a widespread military revolt. Such might not have been the case had not Washington, whose wealth allowed him to serve without a salary and who observed great tact and deference in his dealings with Congress and state governors, set such a positive example. Although some feared and more than a few hoped that he would use his position to secure permanent power for himself, in November, after hearing word of the conclusion of peace, Washington bid farewell

to his soldiers; then, before Congress in December, he tendered his resignation.

Nation Builder

By retiring, Washington acted unlike many of the world's previous military leaders. He also secured for himself the adoration and trust of Americans, who compared him to Cincinnatus, the famed Roman warrior who fought for his nation but, after achieving victory, traded his sword for his plow. Named president of the Society of the Cincinnati, a veterans organization that drew criticism for its hereditary system of membership, Washington chose to distance himself from the group rather than sully his reputation. During the next phase of Washington's life, he drew on the public's trust to make the most of opportunities to unify Americans in support of a plan to better secure their liberty.

For him the need was apparent. Under the Articles of Confederation, the central government had little power to raise revenue or compel states to contribute men and money to wage the Revolutionary War. Leadership of the Continental Army also allowed Washington to see beyond regional prejudices and develop a keen sense of nationalism. He agreed to preside over the convention that, in 1787, met in Philadelphia and proposed a new Constitution that placed a strong executive at the head of a more robust national government. Some opposed the Constitution because it curtailed the independence of states from distant authority and created a government capable of threatening Americans' liberty. Others, however, supported its ratification, in part because of the understanding that Washington, who had proven that he could be trusted with power, would serve as the nation's first president.

Unanimously elected, Washington took office on April 30, 1789, and served two four-year terms. As a symbol of the new national government, he sought to cement American unity by visiting every state. In 1789 he toured all of New England except Rhode Island, where he traveled in 1790 after it ratified the Constitution; in 1791 he toured the South. As the principal maker of national policy, he aimed mainly to avoid exacerbating division. From a geographically and ideologically diverse cabinet he often received divergent advice. Virginia's Jefferson, who served as secretary of state, disagreed frequently with New York's Alexander Hamilton,

the treasury secretary, over issues relating to finance, foreign policy, and constitutional interpretation. Washington struggled to steer a middle course but drew criticism from some Jeffersonians for decisions to use armed force to confront the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion and, through the 1794 Jay Treaty, avoid an armed confrontation with Great Britain. In the first instance, state militias proved strong enough to quell a tax revolt in western Pennsylvania. In the second, Washington feared that citizen–soldiers would fare poorly against the professional British army. Americans' continuing reluctance to support a military establishment made diplomacy the safest means for resolving with Britain disputes over trade and its continuing occupation of western lands.

Washington declined invitations to seek a third term and retired as president in 1797. Although his policy stances caused a few to question his commitment to liberty, no one failed to notice this final renouncement of power. Two years later he died at Mount Vernon. Americans unleashed an unprecedented outpouring of grief. Henry Lee, a fellow veteran of the Revolution, eulogized Washington as "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen" (Ellis, 270).

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Civil–Military Relations; Colonial Wars; Continental Army; Revolutionary War; Revolutionary War Pensions; Smallpox and War; Society of the Cincinnati

Related Documents

1776 b

—*Robert M. S. McDonald*

Wayne, John

(1907–79)
Actor

For both the World War II and Vietnam generations, the motion picture icon John Wayne embodied the place where American manhood and martial valor met. Whether riding "tall in the saddle" or portraying a no-nonsense soldier, Wayne presented to Americans and moviegoers around the world an image of American manhood that was captured in his nickname "the Duke." As with many men whose image is larger than life, the real life John Wayne was less heroic, more complex, and arguably more interesting than the tough-talking marine who dominated the screen.

Wayne was born Marion Michael Morrison to middle-class parents—his father was a druggist—in 1907. His father moved the family to California, where Wayne learned to ride. He got his start in film in the 1920s and, by 1939, had secured small parts in almost 70 films. John Wayne finally made a break from the B-movie list when the director John Ford, to whom his career would be forever linked, had him play a major role in *Stagecoach* (1939).

Despite the success of *Stagecoach*, Wayne's career began waning as he was getting too old to play the role of a

pretty boy, and his rather wooden presence on the screen limited the types of parts he received. But he was saved by World War II. Many major actors joined the service (James Stewart, for instance, saw combat in the Air Force), and Wayne's status improved owing simply to the resulting decrease in competition. This was not Wayne's finest moment, as he essentially avoided service; as one historian put it, "he used every excuse but the dog ate my homework." Nonetheless, on screen Wayne's career took off, and he began to play not just the hero, but the middle-aged leader of men, a persona that catapulted him to iconic status.

During the war, Wayne played soldiers, but now he shifted from young man to the honest, tough-talking father figure in films such as *They Were Expendable* (about the Navy). After the war, Wayne continued to hone this character, headlining such movies as *The Sands of Iwo Jima* (1949). John Ford also cast Wayne in a number of his westerns, including the memorable *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* (1949).

Wayne was a staunch conservative who reveled in films such as *The Alamo* (1960), which cast Americans as the heroic defenders of freedom against despotism. In this film, Wayne played Davy Crockett, whose interest in preserving the honor of a beautiful Mexican woman led her to believe in the Americans' altruistic motives toward Mexico. Wayne often took pains to ensure that his heroes were considerate to non-whites, although some viewed such relationships as reinforcing stereotypes.

John Wayne's politics arguably got the better of him when he put his own money into making *The Green Berets* (1968), Hollywood's first Vietnam movie. Here Wayne plays Col. Mike Kirby, who leads a band of tough Americans and South Vietnamese against ruthless communists, eventually convincing a liberal journalist (played by David Janssen) of the righteousness of the American cause. The film did not enjoy either box office success or critical acclaim. Wayne's identification with the war effort made him a target of anti-war and counterculture protest, and he remained a target years after his death. For instance, in Stanley Kubrick's *Full Metal Jacket* (1987), the character Joker ironically affects a John Wayne swagger and cowboy accent, often asking those around him, and himself, "Is that you John Wayne? Is it me?" The jazz poet Gil-Scott Heron argued in 1981 that

John Wayne, as Col. Mike Kirby in the 1968 film The Green Berets. *(© John Springer Collection/CORBIS)*

America really wanted Wayne to be president, to take them back to the days before "fair was square, when the cavalry came straight away, and all American men were like Hemingway." However, "since John Wayne was no longer available, they settled for Ronald Ray-Gun."

For better and for worse, John Wayne represented the American ideal of martial spirit and manliness in the decades between Pearl Harbor and the evacuation of Saigon. For many Americans, Wayne represented what was best about America: he was not just a great American, but symbolized American determination and idealism in times of war. For the generations raised on "John Wayne westerns" and war movies, Wayne had become the face of the American soldier. One veteran recalled, however, that during World War II, Wayne was booed by soldiers wounded in the Pacific when

he toured a hospital in Hawaii in a cowboy outfit. William Manchester claimed that "this man was a symbol of the fake machismo we had come to hate." While Manchester confessed that he, and many marines, hated *The Sands of Iwo Jima*, such views bordered on the treasonous to many veterans and aficionados of popular culture.

Wayne's chain smoking finally got the better of him in 1979, when he died of cancer. That year, Congress honored him with a gold medal in recognition of his service to the country.

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Film and War

—*John Hinshaw*

Weinberger–Powell Doctrine

Since 1984, the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine has exerted a significant influence over American foreign policy decision-makers when the deployment of U.S. military forces is under consideration. The Weinberger–Powell Doctrine, originally conceived by Reagan administration Sec. of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and subsequently reshaped by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin L. Powell (who as Weinberger's senior military assistant in 1984 had helped to refine the secretary's ideas), argues that the United States ought to proceed with caution: military forces should be deployed only under narrowly circumscribed conditions and with the expectation that massively superior U.S. forces will be employed in order to overmatch an adversary, allowing the intervention to be concluded quickly and with few American casualties.

On November 28, 1984, Weinberger gave a speech before the National Press Club in Washington entitled The Uses of Military Power in which he outlined six conditions that ought to be met before deploying U.S. troops overseas:

1) The United States "should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies."

2) If it was deemed necessary to send troops into combat, "we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning."

3) "We should have clearly defined political and military objectives" susceptible to the application of military force.

4) "The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary."

5) "[T]here must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress."

6) "Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort."

While Weinberger's immediate inspiration was the disastrous 1982 to 1984 U.S. intervention in Lebanon (which he had opposed from the beginning), the Weinberger Doctrine—so labeled by the *Washington Post* in an editorial shortly after Weinberger's speech—was very much an outgrowth of the so-called Vietnam syndrome. In the wake of U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, many Americans felt a deep reluctance to commit troops abroad as well as uncertainty with regard to foreign policy matters in general. The Doctrine was an effort to lay out conditions that could make military force "usable" again in defense of crucial national interests while avoiding missions of lesser significance; in those circumstances when American troops would be committed to battle, the Doctrine was intended to prevent the gradual escalation, unclear goals, and public discord that had contributed to American failure in Vietnam.

The Weinberger Doctrine was arguably most influential in shaping the 1991 Persian Gulf War. That intervention, motivated by a clear national interest in safeguarding Middle East oil supplies, was supported by the Congress and was prosecuted quickly and with overwhelming force. Many observers viewed the successful results as a dramatic vindication of the Weinberger Doctrine.

During the early 1990s, the "Weinberger Doctrine" evolved into the "Powell Doctrine," as Gen. Colin L. Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the administration of Pres. George H. W. Bush, became a forceful advocate for a recast version of Weinberger's principles. The success of the Gulf War, rather than causing Powell to revise his cautious prewar position with regard to the commitment of U.S. forces, led him to recast Weinberger's conditions with an emphasis on his second and third points: the need to employ overwhelming force and the identification of clear, achievable objectives.

In contrast to Weinberger, who more expressly sought to limit the circumstances under which U.S. forces might be deployed to situations "vital to our national interest," Powell was more concerned with seeking to make sure that military force would be employed in a manner that would ensure swift resolution and low American casualties. That being said, the practical effect of Powell's demand for overwhelming force would be to raise the stakes when military intervention was under consideration, presumably leading to fewer interventions.

The October 1993 battle in the Somali capital of Mogadishu, in which 18 American special operations soldiers were killed in what had begun as a humanitarian relief mission, seemed for a time to give Powell's point of view a dominant position in Washington debate—particularly given the general's great stature and the limited foreign policy credentials of the new Democratic administration of Pres. Bill Clinton. Powell vigorously opposed U.S. military intervention in the brutal civil war raging in Bosnia, which, he feared, would lack several of the elements of the Doctrine. This delayed U.S. and NATO entry into that conflict. For the same reasons, his successors effectively blocked proposals from some within the Clinton administration that the United States intervene quickly to halt the genocide underway in Rwanda in 1994.

By the latter half of the 1990s, however, the dominance of the Weinberger–Powell paradigm was less clear: U.S. troops were deployed as peacekeepers in Bosnia, and the NATO alliance had prosecuted a distinctly "gradualist" air campaign against Serbia in reaction to its policies in its Kosovo province. Increasingly, skeptics suggested that the Doctrine was a means of avoiding intervention rather than a means of ensuring success. A cautious military and a more interventionist Democratic administration seemed to move toward an uneasy truce: rather than foregoing interventions that might not adhere to the Weinberger–Powell criteria, force might be employed with the stipulation that American casualties would be kept to an absolute minimum.

Events following the transformative September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States by the Saudi renegade Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization further diminished the relevance of the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine. After the United States was attacked, there was little question that it would respond in some fashion. At the same time, in the Global War on Terrorism, the U.S. faced an unconventional conflict that offered little likelihood of decisive resolution, given the difficulty of bringing military power to bear on a non-state group. During 2002 and 2003, a reluctant military leadership—and Sec. of State Powell himself—were unable to prevail in the George W. Bush administration's debates over the prospect of a second war with Iraq. The war was subsequently launched in the spring of 2003, with smaller ground forces than military leaders had advocated.

While the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine retained a significant presence in the national security arena at the turn of the 21st century, events during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations suggested that, in practice, civilian leaders of both parties saw the need to keep open the nonconventional military options that the Doctrine sought to rule out. In the end, the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine was more often cited by critics of actual or potential interventions than strictly adhered to by policymakers.

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Civil–Military Relations; Iraq War; Peacekeeping Operations; Persian Gulf War; Powell, Colin; Vietnam War; War on Terrorism

—*Erik Riker-Coleman*

Wilson, Woodrow

(1856–1923)
28th President of the United States

Woodrow Wilson served as president of the United States prior to and during World War I. Although remembered as an internationalist, Wilson initially worked to preserve the nation's neutrality, believing that intervention in Europe was not in U.S. interests. Indeed, he won reelection in 1916 on an antiwar platform epitomized by the slogan "he kept us out of the war." The president had reversed this position by April 1917, when he asked Congress to declare war. The late entry into the conflict created a mobilization crisis, which Wilson overcame by expanding government control over society and the economy. President Wilson also saw the war as an opportunity to reshape the international political order, which he elaborated upon in the Fourteen Points. Wilson pursued this agenda at the Versailles Peace Conference, but was unable to persuade the Senate to ratify the treaty.

Early Life and Political Career
Wilson was born in 1856 in Virginia, the son of a Presbyterian minister. His father held assignments throughout the South,

including stints in Georgia and South Carolina during the Civil War. Wilson would become the first Southerner elected to the presidency since 1860. At the time, Wilson was also one of the most highly educated men ever to hold the office. He completed his bachelor's degree from Princeton University, a law degree from the University of Virginia, and eventually his doctorate in political science from the Johns Hopkins University. After completing his education, Wilson embarked upon a career in academia, which culminated in the presidency of Princeton University in 1902.

Wilson began his career as a political and social conservative within the Democratic Party. He adhered to many traditional southern positions, including support for segregation and states' rights. His first public office was the governorship of New Jersey in 1910.

Wilson ran for president in 1912; the other two candidates were the Republican incumbent, President William Howard Taft, and Taft's predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, who was now affiliated with the Progressive Party. Ironically, all of these candidates claimed to be progressive, but their definitions of what that entailed were different. The campaign became a contest between two versions of progressivism: Wilson's New Freedom and Roosevelt's New Nationalism. Wilson prevailed, but both programs probably would have pursued similar agendas in regard to industrial regulation and social welfare.

Wilson's First Term
The Wilson Administration secured stricter antitrust legislation, oversaw the creation of the Federal Trade Commission, and passed needed income tax legislation to redistribute the tax burden away from property owners, such as farmers. A Federal Reserve Act created a national banking oversight board and a more elastic currency capable of promoting stability in the money system—and hence the economy. Wilson ordered a limited military intervention in the Mexican Revolution from 1914 to 1916, in an attempt to stabilize the country and steer it towards an American-style democracy. Many Mexicans resented American interference, believing that it was primarily motivated by a desire to protect its economic interests.

Wilson proclaimed American neutrality when war erupted in August 1914. He was disgusted with the European

alliances, which he believed had fueled tensions between the major powers. The combination of new military technology and mass conscript armies resulted in a bloodbath. The war quickly turned into a stalemate on the Western Front; both sides were incurring heavy casualties that did little to resolve the conflict. Wilson, like many Americans, was more sympathetic to Britain and France; he abhorred the brutalities of German militarism, most evident in its violation of Belgium's neutrality. However, these concerns did not dissuade Wilson from following the nation's longstanding isolationist path. The majority of Americans agreed with the president's position, as evidenced by his reelection in 1916.

Mobilizing for War

Wilson gradually abandoned isolationism in favor of intervention. From 1914 to 1916, tensions between Germany and the United States escalated, due to Germany's repeated violations of U.S. neutrality. The Germans did not believe that the United States ever intended to be truly neutral and decided to do whatever was necessary to win the war. The most egregious acts involved submarine attacks on ships bound for Britain and France with Americans onboard. It did not matter to Wilson and other Americans that these merchant ships were supplying Germany's enemies.

Wilson also began viewing the American intervention in more philosophical terms. The actions of Germany and its allies were an assault on the values and traditions of Western liberalism. A German victory would be disastrous to freedom and liberty not only in Europe but also around the world. German militarism perpetuated elites who controlled that country's economy and government. The same was true in many other imperial regimes. As the situation unraveled in Russia, Wilson believed that the oppressed peoples in these empires would choose either to follow the path of the Bolshevik Revolution or take a middle course typified by the Western democracies. American intervention was critical to an Allied victory as well as to the securing of international support for Wilson's vision of a democratic, postwar world.

However, Wilson faced serious challenges in preparing the country for war. The United States Army had to expand dramatically, either through volunteering or the draft, to fight the massive German Army in France. The American economy was the world's largest, but it was not geared towards a wartime production schedule that included supplying the American military and its allies, as well as domestic consumers. Many Americans supported the war, but others, including labor unions, socialists, and recent immigrants did not see the point of participating in a European war. Public resolve would probably be tested once the military began suffering heavy casualties.

Wilson dealt with this crisis by expanding the powers of the federal government. He appointed muckraking journalist George Creel to head the Committee on Public Information (CPI) to promote the war to the American people. CPI's approach was twofold: showcase the high moral purpose of the war and demonize the enemy. Meanwhile, Wilson appointed Wall Street financier Bernard Baruch to lead the War Industries Board (WIB), to oversee the economy's conversion to wartime production. The WIB determined production priorities and distribution schedules, allocated raw materials, and set fair profit levels. It assumed unprecedented regulatory powers, to a degree that historians have sometimes labeled the period "wartime socialism." Further examples of this trend towards government expansion included the Food Administration headed by Herbert Hoover, which encouraged farmers to increase production through a program of subsidies and other incentives, and the Railroad Administration, led by Wilson's son-in-law and secretary of the treasury, Robert McAdoo, which took over the management of the railroads for the duration of the war. Wilson also implemented the Selective Service Act, the first draft since the Civil War. Local officials were entrusted with its administration, which successfully muted most resistance.

Wilson and the Versailles Treaty

Wilson argued that the goal of the war involved more than just defeating Germany. In an April 2 address to Congress, Wilson argued that "the world must be made safe for democracy." On January 8, 1918, Wilson laid out a utopian postwar scenario, wherein countries might resolve their differences peacefully in what he called the Fourteen Points. He talked about the importance of "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at" instead of the secret alliances that had triggered

this war. Wilson described a world in which all countries enjoyed freedom on the high seas, a deliberate rebuke to the Anglo–German naval race that had also precipitated World War I. He also introduced a new principle of ethnic self-determination, which laid the basis for groups such as the Serbs to have their own countries once the older empires, like Austria–Hungary, were dissolved.

The centerpiece of the Fourteen Points was the concept of a "general association of nations," which came to be called the League of Nations, where countries would settle their differences peacefully. The League would also provide collective security to its members. Aggressors would be deterred from attacking smaller countries, like Belgium, because they would not want to oppose the entire international community. Wilson's vision was met with skepticism at the Versailles Peace Conference; and some of his objectives, such as self-determination, were only partially achieved. But through sheer force of will, Wilson persuaded the allies to accept his most important goal, the League of Nations. However, Wilson faced even stiffer resistance at home, in the Republican-controlled Senate.

Several Republican senators hesitated to commit the United States to an organization that might involve it in a war without congressional approval. Already in fragile health, Wilson suffered a stroke while taking the case for the treaty nationwide before the American people. Wilson's efforts ultimately were in vain; the Senate blocked ratification in 1918 by seven votes. Wilson lived until 1924, but was essentially an invalid for the rest of his second term.

To some extent, Wilson's internationalist vision was simply too grand for the times. World War I was not enough of an emergency for Americans to abandon their sense that the country should not become embroiled in Europe's or the rest of the world's crises. It would take another world war, just a decade later, to convince them that the United States ought to play a larger role in the international community.

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Pershing, John Joseph; Preparedness Movement; Roosevelt, Theodore; Selective Service System; War Industries Board; World War I

Related Documents

1918 d

—*Todd Forney*

Women in the Military

Early Roles

Women have been an integral, if often marginalized, part of the American military since its inception. As early as 1775, the U.S. Congress specified that Army units could enlist one female nurse for every ten sick or wounded men. Throughout the 19th century the linkage between women and military service remained focused on traditional female roles like nursing. By the time of the Spanish–American War in 1898, the U.S. Army had 1,200 female nurses caring for soldiers in Cuba and the United States. With the Army Reorganization Act of 1901, the Army officially created a permanent female nursing corps. Like most early attempts to include women in the defense establishment, this act marginalized women by denying the nurses rank, equal pay, and retirement benefits. In 1908 the Navy went further, establishing the Navy Nurses, the first group of women to formally serve as members of the uniformed services. The first nurses, known as the "sacred twenty," evolved into an organization with 160 members by 1917.

In some rare cases, women attempted to go beyond the traditionally feminine roles that the military tried to assign to them. A small number of women, such as the

Revolutionary War soldier Deborah Sampson, disguised themselves as men and participated in combat operations, sometimes with the tacit approval of their male comrades. Such women clearly violated a widely accepted belief in the United States that, until quite recently, has placed men in the role of warrior and women in the role of those whom the warriors protected. During the Civil War, Union nurse Mary Livermore noted the presence of a "large number" of women who disguised themselves as men to fight in the war. Scholar Linda Grant de Pauw places the number of women who disguised themselves as men at 250 in the Confederate army and 400 in the Union army, although an exact count is impossible to determine.

More traditionally, the military has accepted women into clear second-class roles or into roles more in tune with commonly accepted notions of gender. Nursing fit most obviously into these patterns. During World War I, the Army expanded its unit of nurses from 403 in early 1917 to more than 21,400 by the end of the war. Almost half of these nurses saw overseas service. The Navy added more than 1,000 nurses during the war, building on its already path-breaking "sacred twenty."

The personnel needs of the Army during World War I ran counter to desires to maintain traditional gender roles. Accordingly, the armed services reached a compromise that placed enlisted women in administrative roles under the status of civilian contractors. In October 1917, Gen. John Pershing requested 100 female telephone operators fluent in French. These women were volunteers who, although working directly for the Army, received no military rank and had pay scales similar to those of nurses, not the uniformed, male members of the Army. The Army soon recruited women to serve under an analogous status in several administrative departments in the United States and Europe. The Navy recruited 13,000 yeomen (F), better known as "yeomenettes." Although banned from service at sea, "yeomenettes" received full military status, pay, and retirement benefits.

The end of World War I led to a massive reduction of American military forces, and military women were among the first to be let go. The Navy quickly cancelled its yeomenette program and introduced legislation in the 1925 Naval Reserve Act that limited service in the Navy to male citizens only.

Similarly, despite studies showing massive female interest in military service in the event of war, the Army abolished its position of director of women's programs in 1931. Most officers and members of Congress viewed women's military participation during World War I as an exigent act designed to meet a temporary emergency, not as a template for future integration of women into the American military.

Creating the Women's Auxiliaries

The personnel needs of World War II led to an even greater expansion of women's roles. The U.S. Army's decision to limit the size of military forces to 90 infantry divisions, designed to maximize the number of men who could remain in industrial jobs, created an additional need for women to fill military roles. In May 1941, with the international crisis building, Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers, who had served with the Army in England in World War I, and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt proposed a bill to incorporate female volunteers into the Army. The senior leadership of the Army forced a compromise that enlisted women as part of an auxiliary unit whose members were not part of the larger Army structure and thus did not receive rank and pay in accordance with men.

The creation of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) set the pattern for women's service in World War II. WAAC members were clearly understood to be volunteers and noncombatants. The Navy moved more slowly, but in July 1942 it introduced a broadly similar organization called the WAVES, whose very name—Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service—underscored its auxiliary and secondary role. WAVES were to occupy positions in the U.S. Navy in order to free male sailors and marines for service on ships and overseas duty. In the words of one recruitment poster for female marines: "Be a marine. Free a marine to fight."

By the middle of the war, Army and Navy senior leaders acquiesced to external pressure and institutional reason, offering women full military status in order to simplify the legal and administrative requirements of military women. In July 1943, the WAAC became the WAC (Women's Army Corps), dropping "auxiliary" and providing full military rank to WAC members. Women remained a small proportion of the armed forces (never more than 2.3 percent), but served

in increasingly important roles until the end of the war in 1945. The majority of military women (64 percent) served in administrative positions, but others challenged the definitions of "female work" significantly. Navy scientist and WAVES member Grace Hopper used her Ph.D. in mathematics to help develop the electromagnetic Mark I and Mark II calculating machines. She remained in the Navy until 1986, when she retired as an admiral. Other women assumed commands and performed tasks previously reserved for men, including service on the highly technical LORAN (Long-Range Aid to Navigation) systems and the Manhattan Project, which developed the atomic bomb. Women did not serve in combat, but they did become gunnery instructors, mechanics, and truck drivers. By the end of the war, the Army had dropped its insistence on women staying stateside. More than 17,000 members of the WAC served overseas.

Another group of women volunteered to fly combat aircraft from their point of manufacture in the United States to bases overseas. The 1,000 members of the Women's Air Service Pilot program (WASP) encountered more official hostility from the senior ranks of the Army, partly because the traditionally male job they performed threatened gender roles much more than did the WAC or WAVES programs. The women who joined the WASP program received no military rank and no military benefits, despite serving at more than 120 air bases and logging more than 60 million miles in combat aircraft. WASP pilots also flight-tested new airplanes, a dangerous job that cost 38 WASP pilots their lives. In 1980 Congress finally authorized veteran status for the WASP pilots, but denied them full military benefits.

As the experience of the WASP showed, women who volunteered for military service in World War II faced tremendous challenges. In order to ensure that military women did not appear to challenge conventional images of women, members of the WAC and WAVES were depicted as being feminine even while they performed masculine work. This image often ran counter to women's efforts to have men take them seriously as military colleagues. Women faced harassment, condescension, and an aggressive slander campaign by those opposed to women serving in the military.

World War II WASP pilots assigned to the 2nd Ferrying Group, Ferrying Division, at New Castle Army Air Base, near Wilmington, Delaware. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

The campaign spread rumors that alleged that the WAC and WAVES consisted of lesbians and, somewhat paradoxically, that these units were filled with women who were sexually promiscuous with their male peers.

Army and Navy nurses served overseas in large numbers as well. The Army employed 57,000 female nurses; the Navy, 11,000. They often served at or very near the front lines. Sixty-seven Army nurses became prisoners of war following the Philippines campaign (1941–42) and endured the brutal conditions of Japanese prisoner of war camps for three years. Despite the dangerous conditions in which they served, military nurses, operating in more traditional female roles, elicited much less controversy than did those serving in the WAC and WAVES programs.

Postwar Debates

The end of World War II led to a significant drawdown of the American military. As in 1918, the women's programs were among the first to be cut. The numbers fell from a high of 100,000 WACs and 86,000 WAVES in 1945 to only 5,000 WACs and 1,600 WAVES by 1948, respectively. Most women, like most men, were happy to return to their prewar lives after 1945; but many women had hoped to continue their military service. Several senior military leaders and members of Congress disapproved; they recommended disbanding the WAC and WAVES altogether and returning the military to an all-male status. Women remained in administrative jobs while Congress and the services continued to debate the issue. Nursing remained an exception to the general pattern. In 1947, the Army–Navy Nurses Act permanently integrated nurses into the regular line of the armed services and opened ranks as high as lieutenant colonel/commander to nurses.

The Army–Navy Nurses Act and the growing threat of Cold War competition with the Soviet Union led to planning for a permanent role for military women. Senior military leaders like generals Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and Carl Spaatz, and Adm. Chester Nimitz, all lent their support to the idea. They argued against a more conservative congressional plan to admit women only into the military reserves. Despite these high-level supporters of women in the military, Congress opposed any legislation that would create what one congressman called "an army of women." Congress also argued that providing military women with the same dependent benefits provided to military men would create an unpalatable image of women working to support their idle husbands. Still others argued that military status was incompatible with motherhood.

The result of these debates was the compromise Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. Like the Army–Navy Nurses Act of the previous year, the Women's Armed Services Integration Act made women a regular and permanent part of the active and reserve portions of the American armed services. The act also set important limits on women's service, including: a ceiling on women's participation set at 2 percent of total service strength; separate promotion lists by gender; parental consent for women under the age of 21; a ban on dependent access to health care (unless a woman could claim that she was responsible for more than 50 percent of the dependent's financial support); and a ban on female service in combat aircraft and on board ships (other than hospital ships and transports outside combat areas).

The Women's Armed Services Integration Act and subsequent legislation assumed that women did not want a career in the military. In 1951, Pres. Harry S. Truman signed legislation mandating that women separate from the military if they became mothers by giving birth, by marrying a man with children, or by adopting. The services also allowed women to abandon their military commitments without penalty if they married.

As a result of the limits imposed by the Women's Armed Services Integration Act, the percentage of women in the military never exceeded 2 percent and rarely reached 1.5 percent, even during the Korean War. The low numbers of women in the military reflected the official, second-class status of women more than a lack of interest among women in military service. By another clause in the Women's Armed Services Integration Act, only the heads of the WAC, WAVES, and WAF (Women in the Air Force) programs could attain the rank of colonel or captain. The logjam of the promotion system thus limited the abilities of women to attain rank commensurate with their knowledge and experience. The poor job opportunities and continued sexual harassment that both female officers and enlisted women faced also led to high

attrition rates. By the late 1950s, less than 1.3 percent of American military personnel were female.

Consequently, more than 80 percent of American military women who served in the Vietnam War were nurses. Army nurses served in areas dangerously close to the Demilitarized Zone and were often under fire. Eight Army nurses were killed in action during the war. Members of the WAC, WAVES, and WAF programs also served in Southeast Asia, most commonly at the Military Assistance Command headquarters in Saigon in South Vietnam. Despite their service in a combat zone as medical personnel, they were forbidden to take weapons training or carry side arms.

As the Vietnam War grew increasingly unpopular and Selective Service increasingly controversial, Army planners began to reconsider the use of military women. Enlisting more military women offered the possibility of reducing the number of men that the Selective Service System had to draft. As early as 1964, the armed services had officially supported a revision of the 2 percent limit on women's service legislated in the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. In 1967, Pres. Lyndon Johnson signed Public Law 90-130, which removed the 2 percent quota and also removed the limits on women's promotions, although separate promotion lists by gender remained. By 1973, women made up 2.6 percent of the Army, 2.2 percent of the Navy, and 2.9 percent of the Air Force. These modest increases were less than supporters of Public Law 90-130 had envisioned, but did demonstrate significant growth compared to the 1950s. The law, however, did not change the fundamentally unequal status of military women.

Expanded Opportunities

The end of conscription in 1973 had a dramatic impact on the nature of women's military service. With the armed services no longer able to count on the draft to compel men to serve, and with the military now generally held in low regard among young males, the new all volunteer force had to reconsider the employment of women. In the absence of the draft, military pay and living conditions also improved, making the military a more attractive career option for women. Although many members of Congress and many in the Pentagon still hoped to keep the number of military women

small, senior uniformed leaders like the Navy's chief of naval operations, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, supported taking active and aggressive steps to improve the numbers and status of military women.

As part of his package of reforms, Zumwalt argued for the abolition of the WAVES on the grounds that a separate structure for Navy women was incompatible with the Navy's desire to offer women equal opportunity. In 1973 the WAVES were disbanded, quickly followed by the abolition of the WAF (1976) and WAC (1978) programs as well. Zumwalt and the Air Force's Theodore Marrs led the move to open up Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programs to women in the early 1970s on the same terms as men. These programs opened a large officer corps accession program to women and allowed them to take weapons training alongside men.

The success of the ROTC integration program led further to the opening of the service academies to women in 1976. Sen. Jacob Javits of New York had first recommended a woman for appointment in 1972, but the Naval Academy rejected the nomination. Congress began to take action in response to lawsuits alleging that denying women access to the academies also unfairly denied them access to senior rank. Sen. Patricia Schroeder of Colorado led a bipartisan effort to introduce an amendment to the 1975 Defense Authorization Bill that would integrate the academies. It passed by a voice vote and was signed into law by Pres. Gerald Ford with little congressional controversy.

The courts also began to take an interest in many aspects of the unequal legal status of military women. By early 1973, some 30 states had approved the Equal Rights Amendment, making its ultimate passage seem likely. The military assumed that, if passed, the Equal Rights Amendment would lead to legal challenges regarding any aspects of military service that made distinctions according to gender. Even though the amendment ultimately failed, these challenges began almost immediately. In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled that the military had to offer women the same dependent benefits offered to men. Consequently, the military decided to replace the terms "husband" and "wife" with "spouse." Other court cases led the military to change its policy requiring unwed women who became pregnant to give up their duties

and declared that the Navy could not refuse women service aboard ship based solely on their gender.

The smooth integration of women into analogous institutions during the 1970s undermined the military's arguments against the further integration of women into the military. Women became successful members of police forces, fire departments, the Secret Service, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Moreover, the military's own studies determined that the integration of women did not undermine unit cohesion. The Army's MAX WAC study of 1977 and REF WAC study of 1978 found that the presence of women in a unit did not impair that unit's performance. The military also discovered that women applicants had on average higher test scores than men and that women in the services missed far less time due to alcohol, drug use, and going AWOL. Even with pregnancy leave figured in, men still had nearly twice the absentee rate of women. The services soon found solutions to other problems such as restroom facilities, uniforms, and pregnancy policies.

These changes led to a dramatic rise in the numbers of military women. The administration of Pres. Jimmy Carter firmly supported the recruitment of more military women, which led to the appointment of Department of Defense officials sympathetic to the expanding the number of military women as well as their roles. Between 1973 and 1981 the percentage of female Army personnel rose from 2.6 percent to 9.4 percent. The percentage of women in the Air Force rose from 2.9 percent to 11.1 percent, in the Navy from 2.2 percent to 7.4 percent. The number of women entering the services also increased pressure to open more jobs to them. In 1978, the Coast Guard—part of the Department of Defense in times of war only—opened all sea going billets (quarters) to women on exactly the same terms as men. Although pressured to follow suit, the Navy continued to ban women from ships designated as combat vessels. The Air Force and Army also held to policies prohibiting women from combat. The Army's Direct Combat Probability Coding system coded each Army job P1 to P7, based on its likelihood of facing combat. Those at the highest end of the scale were closed to women.

The administration of Pres. Ronald Reagan supported limiting the number of women in the military but did not support the desires of some officials to roll back the military participation of women. The percentages of female military personnel thus continued to grow throughout the 1980s, though at a slower pace than in the 1970s. As a result, military operations and deployments during the Reagan years—such as those in Grenada and Panama—inevitably included women. They also showed that the Direct Combat Probability Coding system could not keep women safe from the dangers of military service. At times, the system proved to be dangerously inefficient: in some cases, unit commanders decided to deploy units to combat areas without their female soldiers, leaving the units without mission-critical personnel. In another case, an Army division commander ignored the Direct Combat Probability Coding system and sent his unit's women into combat areas.

At the same time, women were demonstrating proficiency in a wider range of military specialties. The Defense Department therefore had to deal with women performing more jobs within the context of the services' desires to keep women away from combat. In 1988 the Pentagon discarded the direct combat Probability Coding system in favor of a Risk Rule system that reduced the Army's seven classifications to two: combat and non-combat. The change opened more jobs to women but retained the presumption that women could be protected from harm by denying them the right to serve in certain jobs. But the Risk Rule failed to operate as designed in Panama, where several women came under fire.

The Persian Gulf War witnessed the deployment of more than 33,000 women overseas and demonstrated two important points that military studies had long concluded: first, that women had become a necessary and competent component of any large military operation; and second, that no amount of legislation could eliminate the risk to female military personnel. The intense media attention that accompanied the war placed these issues directly in the national spotlight.

The success of military women in the Persian Gulf War led to a movement to change the legislation governing the military service of women. On May 22, 1991, two members of Congress—Democrats Patricia Schroeder and Beverly Byron—sponsored a bill to remove the exclusions of women from combat service in the Navy and the Army. The

Pentagon initially supported the bill, but later joined Pres. George H. W. Bush's administration in opposing it. A controversial, nonbinding residential commission on the issue of women in combat issued a report opposing women in combat just after the election of Bill Clinton in 1992.

The Clinton administration ignored the report and moved quickly to open more military jobs to women. Soon after his appointment, Sec. of Defense Les Aspin, a longtime supporter of expanding roles for women, dropped the Risk Rule and opened combat aviation to women. In the early months of 1994, the Air Force welcomed its first female fighter pilot, and the Navy assigned its first women to aircraft carriers. The Clinton administration issued guidance to the Pentagon stating that women could not be banned from a military assignment based solely on the danger that the assignment posed. Aspin also announced that the Clinton administration intended to open all military jobs to women except special operations, ground combat, and service on submarines.

Abiding Problems

The progress that women made in breaking barriers stood in marked contrast to the pervasive problems of sexual harassment and assault. In 1979, the *Baltimore Sun* ran a series of stories on sexual harassment incidents and rapes at Fort Meade in Maryland. These articles brought the issue to public attention and led to a series of congressional hearings in 1980. The Army's own investigations revealed that half of all female personnel had experienced harassment and that sexual harassment was a primary reason for women choosing not to reenlist. With the new attention came new discipline, including the Army's first-ever court martial conviction for sexual harassment.

Military studies also revealed that the problem of sexual harassment was more pronounced overseas than in the United States. A tour of European and Pacific bases by a congressionally appointed committee in 1986 and 1987 showed that sexual harassment was a commonplace occurrence that went unpunished by chains of command in Hawaii and the Philippines. The Pentagon classified the committee's report, but it was subsequently leaked to major U.S. newspapers. A new round of investigations followed, and several Philippine commanders were reassigned; but the problem remained, as

evidenced by the rape of 24 women in 18 months at the Navy's Orlando, Florida, training center in 1990.

Sexual harassment jumped on to the front pages as a result of the behavior of several naval aviators at the bacchanalian 1991 Tailhook convention in Las Vegas. More than 80 women were assaulted at the conference while some officers looked on and others took pictures. Forcing women to "run the gauntlet" at Tailhook had been a feature of the conference for years. In 1991, however, the events at Tailhook stood in sharp contrast to the treatment of military women months earlier during the Persian Gulf War. A Tailhook victim and aide to an admiral publicized the events at the conference after the admiral ignored her pleas to investigate. The Tailhook scandal grew larger as some Navy officers refused to cooperate with investigators.

In 1996, a sexual assault scandal at the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground underscored the continuing depths of the problem. In 2003, allegations of sexual assault and harassment emerged at the U.S. Air Force Academy as well. To some, the assaults and harassment are expressions of male opposition to the intrusion of women into the traditionally male world of the military. To others, they are representative of failures of leadership. One Army study concluded that sexual harassment and sexual assault cost the Army more than $500 million per year in litigation and lost work time.

The recent experiences of women in the American military is thus a history of achievement amidst abiding problems. In both world wars, women served on a temporary, emergency basis, laying a foundation for the accomplishments that followed. In the past 30 years, military women have shattered glass ceilings and demonstrated marked proficiencies in numerous jobs previously held only by males. At the same time, however, the persistence of sexual harassment and sexual assault highlights the serious issues and challenging conditions that military women continue to face.

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Related Entries

Nurses, Military; Sampson, Deborah; Sexual Abuse and
Harassment; Tailhook Convention

Related Documents

1759

—*Michael S. Neiberg*

Women in the Workforce: World War I and World War II

Women in the United States have always worked, whether
inside or outside the home during peacetime or wartime, but
their labor-force participation received special public and
government attention during the two world wars of the 20th
century. Whether women worked for wages during the
world wars, and in what capacity they were employed,
largely depended on the duration of U.S. military involve-
ment and the labor force needs of the military. In the case of
World War I, most armed forces personnel drawn into the
services for the war effort left the labor force for less than
two full years, whereas in World War II the drafting of per-
sonnel began in mid-1940, and most did not return home
until 1946. Thus, few women were needed to take men's
places during World War I.

The conscription of millions of American men into the
armed forces from December 1941 until August 1945 ended
the unemployment problem of the Depression years; it pro-
vided homeland jobs to millions of women and men. During
both world wars, private employers and the federal govern-
ment expected women to relinquish their nontraditional
wage work at the war's conclusion. All media during World
War II repeated the mantra that women were replacing men
only until the armed forces returned from overseas. For both
national emergencies, women were considered a reserve
labor force, but not all women perceived their working status
as temporary. Demobilization only briefly depressed women's
employment. After both world wars, married women's labor
force participation continued to rise as part of a long-term
secular trend throughout the 20th century.

World War I

World War I accelerated preexisting trends in the nature and
location of women's employment. Beginning in the last quar-
ter of the 19th century, the second stage of industrialization
increased mass production, distribution, and consumption.
Employers sought women for unskilled and semiskilled jobs
in manufacturing, sales, offices, and telephone service.
Several factors determined the work options of men and
women: their formal educational options and types of job
training; the "appropriateness" of their wage work; their pay
scales and advancement opportunities; and their entitle-
ments to legal protections. The gender system intersected
with racial, class, and ethnic barriers to circumscribe individ-
uals' job opportunities and earning power. While the

wartime labor shortage created temporary job vacancies for women in typically male-dominated fields, women's presence in such unconventional roles ended with demobilization. When the dust settled, women as a group returned to the jobs they had entered or dominated before the war.

During World War I, women sought information about job openings from the United States Employment Service, combed newspaper advertisements for job leads, and exchanged employment information with family and friends. Thousands of white women left domestic service, textile mills, and clothing shops to work in the steel, metal, chemical, lumber, glass, and leather industries. According to one detailed federal government survey of wartime production, women comprised 20 percent or more of all workers making electrical machinery, airplanes, optical goods, motion picture and photographic equipment, musical instruments, leather and rubber goods, dental supplies, and food, as well as paper, paper goods, and printed materials. Experienced clerical workers sought higher-paying jobs in government offices and telegraph and telephone exchanges.

Pervasive racism further limited African American women's job opportunities during World War I, reinforcing their concentration in domestic and personal service. Private-sector employers throughout the United States segregated workers by race, assigning the most undesirable jobs to people of color. Since Pres. Woodrow Wilson made racial segregation the official policy for all federal civilian jobs during his first term, a woman's job location within the federal bureaucracy was determined by the color of her skin. Only when a light-skinned African American was mistaken as Caucasian did she work side by side with a member of another race. In the private sector, some black women acquired factory jobs, especially in tobacco- and food-processing plants and, to a much lesser extent, in the leather, metal, paper-products, clothing, and textile industries. Because proportionally more married black women had been working for wages than had wives of other races, institutional racism during the war intensified economic hardships for families of color.

Male-dominated trade unions during World War I disliked the substitution of women for men. Invidious stereotyping and economic concerns motivated men to treat women as interlopers and adversaries. Across the social-class spectrum, most men adamantly believed that biology destined men and women to assume different social responsibilities. Male molders, foundry employees, machinists, telephone repairers, teamsters, coal miners, electrical workers, to name only a few, used bureaucratic, legal, or personal tactics to bar or discourage women from working in their fields. The barriers multiplied when middle-class female reformers joined forces with male trade unionists to lobby states for laws restricting women from jobs deemed especially risky to their physical or moral well-being. Employment in mines, quarries, shoeshine parlors, bowling alleys, and trucking firms became off-limits to women. An Ohio law prohibited women from becoming bellhops, taxi drivers, gas meter readers, freight handlers, or molders. When women succeeded in entering male-dominated industries, unions admitted women as a temporary expedient against employers hiring women to undercut men's wages. In industries under federal control, such as the transcontinental railroads, government records document men sexually harassing female co-workers in offices, machine shops, and freight yards. Male streetcar employees taunted female trolley conductors and threatened to strike unless their companies stopped hiring them. Such workplace behavior was not designated a form of unlawful sex discrimination until the passage of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

The so-called female interlopers strove to keep their new jobs because, contrary to popular notions about women working for pin money, women's wages in fact helped their families meet essential expenses. Such women included widows, single mothers, or daughters of low-income or debt-ridden parents. Knowing that union labor earned higher wages than non-union labor, these women embraced the opportunity to acquire union membership.

World War II

In many important respects, the narrative of women workers during World War II resembles women's stories during the previous war: a severe labor shortage created vacancies in factories, stores, and offices; racial discrimination by employers, despite the president's executive order to the contrary, narrowed job options for women of color relative to white women; and after the war women of all races were expected

to return to their prewar employment or withdraw from the work force altogether to attend to domestic duties full time. World War II differed from the first in two ways, however: a much larger number of women wage earners entered the labor force, and an explosive increase in trade union membership laid the foundation for a new wave of labor feminism among blue-collar women in the 1950s, the likes of which had not been seen in the United States since the 1910s.

According to the federal government, between 1940 and 1945 the number of women workers increased from 11 to 19.5 million. The number of women workers reported in the 1940 census under-represented the number of women who would have entered the labor force in the normal course of their lives had the United States not suffered so many years from the Great Depression. Approximately 3.5 million, or less than half, of the women who entered the job market between 1940 and 1945 took jobs because of the severe wartime labor shortage and/or government appeals to patriotism. Like their World War I counterparts,

working-class women eagerly left their lower paying, often unskilled or semiskilled jobs, for higher paying, more challenging work normally reserved for men in the manufacturing, sales, clerical, and service sectors.

Family responsibilities strongly influenced which women entered the labor force. Single women, who composed almost half of the female labor force in 1940, continued wage earning during the war. Young wives without dependents rallied to the call for workers as did older married women with grown children. Employment without the benefit of substantial support services from the government or from employers discouraged mothers with children or other dependents who viewed family work as their first responsibility. When the war ended, many single women who had worked prior to the war left their jobs voluntarily, presumably to marry and raise families. Older married women did not automatically relinquish their jobs to returning soldiers; in some workplaces they stayed at their wartime posts until they were forced out. Their desire to continue working outside the home contributed to a major shift in

Women welders at a shipbuilding plant in Mississippi in 1943. (National Archives and Records Administration)

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the expectations and options of women after World War II as the number of married mothers chose to combine domestic and wage work.

As had been the case during World War I, World War II only temporarily disrupted the long-term trends in women's employment. The wartime labor shortage brought more women into the durable goods industries of iron and steel, automobile and aircraft, shipbuilding, chemical, rubber, petroleum, and machinery manufacturing; but few women retained these jobs after the war. During and after the war, women remained dominant in the nondurable goods sectors of textiles, food, and clothing production, and their presence in the clerical and service sectors grew substantially during and after the labor shortage.

Even though the war did not change women's overall position in the labor force, it taught women of all races valuable lessons about the need for economic, social, and political reforms in American society. U.S. government propaganda against European and Asian fascism and imperialism empowered African Americans to press for legal measures that would guarantee their full citizenship in the United States. Waging a two-front war against fascism abroad and white racism at home, African American women complained to the new Fair Employment Practices Commission against employers like the Chicago State Street department stores for refusing to hire them, ostensibly because of their race, despite a severe labor shortage. The national spotlight on women's employment, their success in performing men's jobs, and the dramatic rise in trade union membership emboldened women to act collectively on their own behalf. As the labor movement grew, a new chapter in the history of class and gender politics unfolded in American society.

During the war, women trade unionists in different industries introduced a new agenda for women's rights at work. They pressured unions and employers in the private and public sectors to base their wages on their skills and performance instead of their gender. They targeted sex-based restrictive labor legislation for reconsideration, and after the war they pressed for maternity leave and child care policies in union contracts. Women's visibility and leadership increased in such unions as the United Packinghouse Workers of America, the United Automobile Workers, the United Electrical Workers and the International Union of Electrical Workers, the National Federation of Telephone Workers, and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union. Although their efforts produced mixed results, these wartime workers should receive credit for launching a new wave of labor feminism.

Contrary to popular notions about women's postwar immersion in domesticity, married women's labor force participation rose after World War II, and public opinion slowly softened its objections to wage work for wives and mothers. The postwar economic boom attracted older married women with school-age children to take clerical, manufacturing, and service jobs. The freedoms for which the war had been fought whetted African Americans' desire for justice and fair play in all walks of American life. Profoundly dissatisfied with their designated place in American society, southern black women would soon assume key positions in the grass-roots mobilization to end racial segregation and discrimination. The ideals of a new world order based on democracy and liberty had the unintended consequence of discrediting the old world order of unequal racial and gender power relations throughout the United States.

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Baby Boom; Labor Strikes; Rosie the Riveter; Sexual Abuse and
Harassment; Victory Gardens; War Industries Board; War Labor
Board; World War I; World War II

—*Maurine W. Greenwald*

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
(WILPF) formed in 1915 to abolish the causes of war, work
for peace, and create political systems that would bring
equality for all. Still in existence at the beginning of the 21st
century, WILPF supports total and universal disarmament,
the abolition of violence for settling conflicts, and the cre-
ation of an international economic order that is not focused
on profit and privilege.

With members representing close to 40 nations from all
regions of the world, WILPF is notable for its longevity as
much as for its achievements. In the early days of World War
I, suffragists Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence of Great Britain
and Rosika Schwimmer of Hungary toured the United
States to persuade American suffragists to push their neutral
government to take the lead in negotiations to end the war.

The image of sisterhood presented by these two women
from warring countries galvanized women's opposition to the
war and helped to launch the National Woman's Peace Party
in Washington, D.C., in January 1915. The Woman's Peace
Party would later become the U.S. section of WILPF. The
progressives who founded the group were part of the first
generation of women to insist that women were as capable as
men. The established, mixed-sex peace groups that deferred
to male authority and did not allow women to fully partici-
pate by holding leadership positions or by formulating policy
had frustrated them. For this reason, WILPF was an organi-
zation of women. Feminism would always be crucially
important to the group.

Pethick-Lawrence, Schwimmer, and 1,500 other suffra-
gists met in the Netherlands on April 28, 1915 to show that
women of all countries could work together in the face of a
massive, worldwide war. Americans joined with Britons,
Hungarians, Germans, Austrians, Italians, Poles, Belgians,
Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes. The participants in the
International Congress of Women at The Hague protested
against World War I, suggested ways to end the conflict, and
hoped to devise strategies to prevent war in the future. They
rejected the theory that war was inevitable and decided to
create an organization to work for peace. The group was first
known as the International Committee of Women for
Permanent Peace; the name changed to WILPF at their sec-
ond meeting, in 1919. Conceived from the very beginning as
an international organization, the umbrella committee set up
13 national committees. Although every committee was
located either in Europe or North America, members of
WILPF regarded themselves as citizens of the world. Jane
Addams, a social worker and one of the most famous women
in the United States at the time, served as the first president
of the international organization.

WILPF sought to assemble a panel of neutral states for
continuous mediation of conflict. The members believed
that if Europe was in disorder because of deep-rooted injus-
tices or because some nations were deprived of commercial
or political opportunities, the solution could be discovered
more effectively through conversation than by bloodshed.
They argued that bloodshed would eventually lead to
exhaustion and, at that point, nations would be forced to

negotiate. WILPF believed that it made much more sense to begin with negotiations rather to than end with them after many had died.

WILPF faced considerable difficulty finding an audience during World War I. They could not persuade any country to begin the mediating process, and the entrance of the United States into the conflict in 1917 shocked American pacifists. The national climate was such that those who did not stand strongly with the U.S. government were regarded with suspicion if not outright hostility. Addams became the target of enormous public criticism for her peace activities. Undeterred, Addams and other WILPF members argued that the role of nurturer had given women a stronger sense of moral obligation than men. Therefore, she insisted, there must be equal participation by women in all levels of society if social justice is ever to be realized. In 1917, WILPF became the first secular peace organization to establish lobbying headquarters in Washington, D.C., for the purpose of establishing ongoing relations with legislators in an attempt to influence policy.

After World War I ended, WILPF saw the formation of the League of Nations as a victory for the beliefs held by women of peace. While the League never functioned in the effective way that they had envisioned, WILPF and other American peace leaders had urged its creation repeatedly upon Pres. Woodrow Wilson. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, WILPF concentrated on working with the League. It sent missions to trouble spots around the world with the plan of talking with all sides to head off a conflict. Emily Greene Balch, an American founder of WILPF and its general secretary, went on a mission to Haiti when U.S. Marines occupied it. Balch's 1927 book, *Occupied Haiti*, helped publicize the American presence there and spurred the withdrawal of the Marines. Balch earned the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts.

As fascism rose in Europe, WILPF turned its attention to stopping this movement. While some national committees, particularly those with direct experience of Nazism, wanted to use aggressive tactics against fascists, others opposed any sort of violence. Many WILPF members joined other peace advocates in urging disarmament to ensure international peace. The dispute over ideological and tactical differences split WILPF. Membership declined dramatically, but the organization became the only women's peace organization to survive World War II.

WILPF's membership never regained its prewar heights. Its work after World War II centered on supporting the United Nations and opposing the threat of atomic weapons. It became one of the first groups to speak out against the Vietnam War with a 1963 campaign against military escalation in Indochina. However, the American branch soon split on whether to demand unconditional U.S. withdrawal or to back a ceasefire coupled with negotiations. By 1969, WILPF had become firmly convinced that the U.S. government's position was morally indefensible, and they called for a quick withdrawal. Yet the group remained too small to make much of an impact. It continued to work for world peace and human rights in subsequent decades but has had trouble achieving much notice.

WILPF is notable for bringing together women from around the world to work for peace. Its efforts to minimize and manage disputes before they erupted into war aimed to create a world free from bloodshed and oppression. Although not successful in ending violent conflicts, WILPF helped to create peaceful structures in the form of the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations.

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Related Entries

American Peace Society; Antiwar Movements; Butler, Smedley Darlington; Gunboat Diplomacy; Pacifism; Wilson, Woodrow; World War I

—*Caryn E. Neumann*

World War I

(1917–18)

World War I cemented the importance of international trade to the nation's economic well-being, and it gave America a prominent role in bringing peace to Europe. The United States established itself as a world military power by playing a key part in the Allied victory. On the homefront, the government assumed unprecedented power over the economy, drafted a mass army, and limited civil liberties. Pres. Woodrow Wilson sought a new international role for the United States in the Fourteen Points, a document that established the major goals of American foreign policy for the rest of the century. Ultimately, World War I blazed the path for greater governmental involvement in the economy and established how the United States would mobilize for total war during the next world war.

World War I (1917–18)
Total U.S. Servicemembers (Worldwide): **4,734,991**
U.S. Population (millions): **102.8**
Battle Deaths: **53,402**
Other Deaths in Service (Non-Theater): **63,114**
Non-mortal Woundings: **204,002**
Cost (in $ current billions): **26.00**

Source: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.html>

The United States Enters the War

World War I began in Europe in August 1914. The European conflict soon turned into a world war as Britain, France, and Germany enlisted help from their far-flung colonial empires. For the next four years the Central Powers (Germany, Austria–Hungary, Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria) faced off against the Allies (France, Britain, Belgium, Russia, Italy, Serbia). In 1914, Pres. Woodrow Wilson vowed to keep the United States neutral in thought as well as deed, but the nation's economic dependence on international trade made this a hard promise to keep. Initially, Wilson prohibited American banks from making loans to belligerent nations purchasing goods in the United States. By 1915, with the Allies running short of cash to buy American products, Wilson lifted the ban to avoid sending the American economy into recession. American banks took the first step away from neutrality by overwhelmingly loaning money to the Allied side.

A trade war that erupted between Britain and Germany also made the American position of neutrality difficult to maintain. With their armies settled into a war of attrition in the trenches along the Western Front, Britain and Germany turned to the seas to gain the advantage. The British instituted a blockade and mined the North Sea to prevent goods from reaching Germany. The Germans used a new and deadly weapon, the U-Boat, a type of submarine. Wilson expected each nation to recognize the rights of neutral nations to trade with whomever they wished, a position that became untenable as the stakes for each side rose. Wilson accepted the British mining with minimal protest and few American ships ventured into the North Sea to continue trading with Germany. The German strategy of unconditional submarine warfare, however, enraged Wilson. After 128 Americans perished aboard the British passenger ship the *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915, Wilson demanded that Germany renounce its policy of attacking any ship that entered the European war zone. Germany protested that it had warned American passengers to stay off the *Lusitania*, which indeed was carrying munitions. After two more controversial ship sinkings involving American passengers, Germany acceded to Wilson's demands in order to keep the United States out of the war. Germany issued the Arabic

Pledge on September 1, 1915, agreeing to warn passenger ships before a U-Boat attack. The Sussex Pledge made on May 4, 1916, extended this warning to merchant ships.

On February 1, 1917, Germany changed course and resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in an attempt to force Britain out of the war before the United States could come to her aid. Germany began indiscriminately sinking any merchant or naval ship headed to Britain, France, Italy, and the eastern Mediterranean. Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, but still hesitated in asking Congress to declare war. On March 9, Wilson authorized the arming of merchant ships; and on March 18, the Germans sank three American merchant ships without warning, killing American citizens. In the midst of this crisis on the high seas, the American public learned the contents of the Zimmermann telegram. On January 15, 1917, the German foreign minister, Arthur Zimmermann, instructed the German ambassador in Mexico to advise the Mexican government that Germany would finance a Mexican attack on the United States to recover Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona (land lost to the United States in the 1840s). Zimmermann also suggested that Mexico encourage Japan to attack American island possessions in the Pacific. British intelligence operatives intercepted the telegram and gave it to the United States on February 23, 1917. German naval aggression and Zimmermann's attempt to incite a Mexican attack directly challenged the nation's economic and physical security. Consequently, the United States declared war against Germany on April 6, 1917.

Mobilizing for War

Having made the decision to enter the war, the United States faced the critical task of raising an army and putting the economy on a war footing. In a mere 18 months, the U.S. Army grew from 200,000 to four million, and the government assumed unprecedented control over the civilian economy. To raise the required troops, the government instituted a national

The New York Herald *headline on May 8, 1915, the day after the* Lusitania *was sunk by a German subarine. (Getty Images)*

draft rather than rely primarily on volunteers. Eager to dispel the popular impression that a draft forced reluctant men into the Army, the government called conscription "selective service," to portray the draft as a modern management technique that selected only the best men as soldiers. Conscription in World War I was a resounding success. By the end of the war, approximately 24 million men had registered for the draft, which raised 72 percent of the wartime army. Overall, 15 percent of all adult American men served in the war, but the draft affected some groups more than others. Most married men with dependents, as well as skilled industrial workers, stayed home, while immigrants, African Americans, and Native Americans were all drafted in numbers greater than their proportional representation in the population.

The large-scale industrial warfare on the Western Front required a constant stream of supplies for the mass armies facing off along the trenches. The American government adopted a host of strategies to mobilize the economy, creating the War Industries Board (WIB) in July 1917. The WIB began as a relatively weak organization but gradually accumulated the power to set prices, standardize production codes, and purchase goods for Allied governments. To encourage compliance from business, the WIB set priority schedules that determined which industries and plants received raw materials. It also offered manufacturers easy access to credit and generous profits in government contracts. Getting industrialists on board only solved half of the economic puzzle, however. To prevent labor disputes and strikes from interrupting the flow of supplies, the government established the National War Labor Board to arbitrate labor disputes; enforce a 40-hour work week and eight hour day; ensure union recognition; and provide a living wage. These important gains for the labor movement did not, however, outlive the war.

The Food and Fuel Administration oversaw the production and distribution of these critical resources. Both agencies relied on high prices to stimulate production and propaganda to encourage conservation. Organized around the slogan "food will win the war," the Food Administration urged Americans to plant War Gardens and consume less wheat, meat, and sugar. Some government agencies took more drastic actions. On December 26, 1917, for example,

the Railroad Administration took over the railroad industry after congestion, fuel shortages, and labor disputes brought rail traffic to a standstill. The government, however, amply rewarded railroad companies with generous payments for governmental use of private trains and track.

The final challenge was paying for the war. The war cost Americans over $26 billion, which amounted to $2 million an hour or 8.7 percent of the nation's estimated wealth. The government raised taxes and sold war bonds to pay for the war. War bonds came in every shape and size to reach all strata of the population, ranging from 25-cent thrift stamps to $50 certificates. Overall, the four war bond drives and one victory bond campaign raised $21.4 billion. Besides raising money, war bond campaigns also connected Americans emotionally to the war effort.

The Committee on Public Information (CPI) coordinated the dissemination of most wartime propaganda. Under the leadership of George Creel, the CPI also published an official daily bulletin of war news and organized war expositions. To accommodate the nation's large immigrant population, the CPI distributed pamphlets and posters in foreign languages. In addition, the agency sponsored lectures by volunteers called Four-Minute Men who spoke on war-related topics in movie houses, fairs, and churches.

Coercive measures played a role as well in creating unity on the home front. The Espionage Act of 1917 prohibited both aiding the enemy and discouraging men from serving in the military. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of applying these prohibitions to disloyal speech as well as to behavior, arguing that circumstances determined when speech posed a "clear and present danger" to the republic. In 1918, the Sedition Act went even further and prohibited profane remarks about the government, flag, or uniform of the United States. As wartime passions rose, nearly half of the states barred teaching German in public schools, and patriots tried to purge German words from the English language by renaming hamburgers "liberty sandwiches" and sauerkraut "liberty cabbage." More ominously, occasional mobs attacked German Americans or businesses with German-sounding names. In nonpartisan fashion, the mainline Democratic and Republican party leadership in Congress and the states also targeted socialists

and other dissident grassroots movements, like the northern Plains Non-Partisan League and the Oklahoma "Green Corn" tenant farmer movement.

Despite the constant drumbeat insisting on 100 percent Americanism, ethnic communities still exerted political clout during the war. Disaffected German Americans who opposed the nation's war against Germany, angry Irish Americans who hated Great Britain, and offended East Europeans who objected to the Food Administration's entreaty to eat corn instead of wheat (corn in their view was for hogs), all turned against the Democrats in the 1918 midterm election, causing them to lose control of Congress just as President Wilson prepared to travel overseas to participate in the peace treaty negotiations.

Fighting the War

In the months it took the United States to mobilize its army and economy, the situation turned dire for the Allies along the Western Front in France. Russia signed a separate peace treaty with Germany in March 1918. Peace along its Eastern Front allowed Germany to concentrate the bulk of its army against the French and British. That same month, the Germans opened up a massive offensive along the Western Front to try to win the war before the Americans arrived in force. The few American units already in France played a pivotal role in stopping the German offensive in the battles of Chateau Thierry (May 27–June 5) and Belleau Wood (June 6–25). The American Army finally took over its own sector of the Western Front in the fall of 1918. In the battle of St. Mihiel (September 12–16), the first major operation commanded solely by American generals, 550,000 Americans fought successfully for four days to reduce a salient held by the Germans since 1914. Ten days later, the Meuse–Argonne offensive (September 26–November 11) began. This campaign was the American part of a coordinated Allied offensive along the entire Western Front. Nearly 1.2 million soldiers participated in this final American battle of the war, more soldiers than the entire Confederate Army during the Civil War.

American soldiers behind the lines made a significant contribution to the eventual Allied victory as well. For the first time in American history, the majority (60 percent) of American soldiers served in the noncombatant positions needed to supply and support troops on the front lines. Nearly 89 percent of African American soldiers served in such positions, constituting over one third of the Army's labor units.

On the high seas, the Allies made steady progress in stopping German U-Boat attacks by adopting a convoy system that sent groups of ships across the Atlantic together under the protective watch of destroyers. The convoy system, along with depth charges, dramatically reduced Allied shipping losses. Meanwhile, the continued Allied blockade of Germany made it increasingly difficult for Germany to feed its people and arm its troops.

Defeated on the battlefield and at sea, Germany sued for an armistice. On November 11, 1918 the fighting ceased. Overall, 53,000 Americans died in action and 204,000 were wounded in what amounted to six months of battle. Nearly the same number of Americans soldiers died from disease. Many were victims of the Spanish Influenza Pandemic that swept throughout the world in 1918, killing a total 25 million people, including half-a-million Americans. By comparison, over 7.5 million soldiers from all nations died during the war.

The Versailles Peace Treaty

Active fighting ended on November 11, 1918, but negotiating the actual peace treaties lasted well into 1919. Before the United States even entered the war, Pres. Woodrow Wilson called for a peace without victory. Once America began fighting, Wilson tried to define Allied war goals in a speech to Congress that became known as the Fourteen Points. Key parts of the Fourteen Points included allowing people to choose their own government (the principle of self-determination); freedom of the seas; freedom of trade; revising national borders in Europe to reflect ethnic groupings; and settling future international disputes through a League of Nations. The Fourteen Points resonated poorly with the Allies, who expected the war to strengthen, not weaken, their colonial empires and established trading routes. The strong desire for revenge against Germany on the Allied side created another key difference between Wilson and Allied leaders as they headed to Paris to negotiate the official peace treaties with each Central Power.

The Versailles Peace Treaty ended the war between the Allies and Germany. The treaty provided for a League of

Nations and incorporated the charter for this international organization into its text. Article X of the League Covenant required member nations to come to the defense of one another, a provision that soon became controversial in the United States. American opponents to the Versailles Treaty claimed that this provision gave the League the power to control American military forces and even declare war for the United States. President Wilson embarked on a nationwide speaking tour to dispute this interpretation and rally support for the treaty. After speaking before a large, enthusiastic crowd in Colorado, Wilson fell ill and rushed back to the White House, where he suffered a severe stroke. Wilson's condition was hidden from the public, but his sudden silence on the treaty left the field open to its critics. Republican senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the main opponent of the treaty, proposed adding a reservation to the treaty that explicitly protected Congress' right to declare war. Wilson, however, refused to accept any modifications of the original treaty. As a result of this standoff, the Senate did not ratify the Versailles Treaty, and the United States never joined the League of Nations. Instead, the United States signed its own separate peace treaty with Germany on August 25, 1921, that simply ended the war.

American participation in World War I had a tremendous impact on American society. Millions of young men left their homes to fight overseas in horrendous conditions that left many physically wounded and emotionally scarred. At home, the government used a variety of techniques to rally support for a war that the nation had taken two-and-a-half years to enter. Some government agencies relied on propaganda and financial incentives to ensure cooperation, while others resorted to placing key industries and resources under direct government control. These wartime activities became important models for both the New Deal and economic mobilization during World War II.

The sudden ending of the war threw millions of Americans out of work, and the termination of the protections offered under the wartime supervision of the National War Labor Board resulted in a mass of postwar strikes in 1919. Union leaders now had a new appreciation for the role that the federal government could play in aiding their cause. At the end of the war, Americans debated the possibility of ensuring world peace through the League of Nations. Although the Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty, the government negotiated several key disarmament treaties in the 1920s. The principles articulated in the Fourteen Points lasted even longer in guiding American foreign policy. Both domestically and internationally, therefore, the legacy of World War I continued to resonate well after the guns fell silent along the Western Front.

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American Civil Liberties Union; American Legion; Committee on Public Information; Conscientious Objection; Espionage and Sedition Acts; Harlem Hellfighters; Influenza Pandemic of 1918–19; Pershing, John Joseph; Preparedness Movement; Russia, U.S. Intervention in; Selective Service System; *Stars and Stripes, The*; Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; Veterans Day; War Industries Board; Wilson, Woodrow; Women in the Workforce: World War I and World War II; York, Alvin Cullum; Young, Charles

Related Documents

1915 b; 1917 a, b, c, d, e, f; 1918 a, b, c, d; 1919 a, b, c, e, f; 1930; 1932; 1933

—Jennifer D. Keene

World War II

(1941–45)

World War II was fought at the height of an era of industrial mass production and intense nationalism. With military forces numbering in the millions and requiring myriad

World War II (1941–45)	
Total U.S. Servicemembers (Worldwide):	**16,112,566**
U.S. Population (millions):	**133.5**
Battle Deaths:	**291,557**
Other Deaths in Service (Non-Theater):	**113,842**
Non-mortal Woundings:	**671,846**
Cost (in $ current billions):	**288.00**

Source: Deaths and Nonmortal Wounds: Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Wars*. <http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.html>

weapons, foodstuffs, vehicles, munitions, and other forms of support, the United States mobilized its material and human resources completely, causing serious dislocation of the civilian economy and way of life. Consequently, the war effort resulted in a level of civic participation as great or greater than any other war in American history. The war affected virtually every aspect of American society and culture, and marked a watershed in the history of the American people.

War on Two Fronts

World War II was the product of the serious economic and political dislocation in the aftermath of World War I and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, the settlement that ended that war and was construed by many to have exacted not merely severe but vengeful measures against Germany. Within the next two decades, Nazi Germany's insistence on recovering territory lost to Poland in the Versailles settlement was the spark that ignited the tinder of the collapsing world order. On September 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler's German Army invaded Poland, setting in motion a sequence of events that led to World War II.

Germany's armored doctrine and superior military leadership were responsible for some stunning victories in the war's early years, but overconfidence prompted Hitler to order the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, which heretofore had been content to remain a neutral trading partner of Germany and Italy. Six months later, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the conflict as well. The entire complexion of the war changed with these two attacks, for now the combined resources of the Allies (consisting mainly of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States) dwarfed those of the Axis powers (principally Germany, Italy, and Japan) in most important categories. The war became a test of the Allies' ability to actualize and best employ their theoretical advantages in numbers to offset the Axis coalition's greater experience and generally superior weaponry. The Allies also faced certain territorial advantages aiding Germany's defense, that is, the classic military edge conferred by fighting on the defensive along a perimeter where it was easier for the defender than the attacker to shift forces among critical locations.

It was the large-scale confrontation on the Russian Front that gradually eviscerated the German war machine.

People gathering around a radio outside of the Capitol building in Washington, D.C., as they listen to President Roosevelt declare war on December 8, 1941, the day after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

The Red Army ground the Wehrmacht to dust in a series of massive operations. Meanwhile, the British and Americans swept North Africa clear of Axis forces in early 1943, invaded Sicily and Italy that summer, and then mounted the largest amphibious operation in history with the Normandy invasion in June 1944. The pressures from east and west led to the collapse of German resistance in the spring of 1945.

Meanwhile, the Japanese had seized much of east and southeast Asia in the months following Pearl Harbor, but their momentum was blunted at the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and June 1942, respectively. The Allies, primarily the Americans, then launched twin offensive drives through the southern and central Pacific. The relentless pressure kept the Japanese on their heels, and the two offensives finally converged in October 1944 in the Philippines. Though the Japanese resorted to the use of suicide kamikaze attackers

and other desperate measures, the American-led onslaught proved overpowering. There followed the recapture of the rest of the Philippines and the seizure of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, two stepping-stones on the path to the Japanese home islands. By the summer of 1945, U.S. task forces were patrolling the waters off Japan and mercilessly pounding everything that might support further resistance.

Allied offensives on the continent of Asia were slow in developing, and plans to sweep the Japanese from the Asian land mass by reopening land communications from Burma into western China were eventually abandoned when the trans-Pacific drives proceeded ahead of the originally conceived timetables. American submarines effectively blockaded the Japanese homeland, and American bombers burned Tokyo and other cities, causing immense damage and casualties. As the Allies prepared for the invasion of Japan itself in August 1945, the twin shocks of the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the Pacific war at last convinced the diehards in the Japanese army and government to sue for peace.

The American People and the War

World War II was one of the most widely supported wars in American history. Despite some antiwar sentiment from traditional pacifists, such as Congresswoman Jeanette Rankin and actor Lew Ayres, there was little organized resistance to conscription or other aspects of the war effort, which ranged from rationing and blackouts to war bond and scrap drives. This was partly the result of the national outrage over the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; but it was also a byproduct of the public's perception of the war as a "good war," that the Axis enemies embodied an evil worthy of being defeated, no matter what the cost might be. This perception was continually fostered by the government—and the media that worked with it—to promote war aims.

Every state, and nearly every community, had its own civilian defense program, and within a month of America's entry into the war, over 5.5 million citizens were enrolled in more than 7,000 defense councils to oversee blackouts; air raid watches; and anti-espionage and anti-sabotage operations. There was, however, a difference between the public's support for the aims of the war in the abstract and the actual

performance of individual sacrifices and duties in authorized government programs. The Office of Civilian Defense (OCD), for example, was organized well before Pearl Harbor, but it was decentralized and scarred by libelous accusations. First lady Eleanor Roosevelt helped organize some national programs, but under her guidance the OCD was accused of organizing frivolous and extravagant events, such as hiring disreputable performers to entertain people during black-outs. The charges were spurious, yet the OCD never over-came an image of unnecessary and wasteful officiousness.

Despite some panic at home in the first weeks after Pearl Harbor, especially on the two coasts, Americans soon under-stood that there was little danger of direct attack on the con-tinental United States. Most complied as best they could with defense regulations and added them to the list of duties they looked forward to discarding with the return of peace.

Because of the need for large-scale production to sup-port the war effort, maintaining the public's anger and com-mitment to victory that had been generated by the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a top priority of govern-ment propagandists. While most of this effort was carried out by the Office of War Information (OWI), active cooper-ation came from the film, music, radio, print, and other media. The propaganda, from posters and radio spots to Frank Capra's OWI *Why We Fight* film series, emphasized two principal themes. First, the enemy, whether rabid Nazi or inscrutable Japanese, bordered on the subhuman but was also cunning and dangerous—a sly, fierce animal. Hence, for the war effort to be successful, every American had to work hard at his or her job, be vigilant about spies and saboteurs, and be willing to sacrifice for the cause. Second, though the enemy might win some victories along the way, the Allies' values and virtues would in the end prove to be morally and militarily superior to the best the enemy could offer.

The propaganda effort was also notable for the images of the enemy that it constructed or reinforced among the American public. The German—and to a lesser extent, the Italian—people were in the wrong, but it was because they had allowed evil and duplicitous leadership to guide them. The implication was clear: get rid of the Nazis and the Fascists, and the Germans and Italians could be reformed into respectable citizens of the world community. But the Japanese public was represented as preternaturally militaris-tic, fanatical, unoriginal, and incorrigible. Such thinking had important wartime consequences, such as the internment of American citizens of Japanese descent on a far greater scale than was imposed on Italian Americans and German Americans. This perception of the Japanese also contributed to a readier acceptance of the use of atomic bombs against Japan. In the long run, such depiction of the enemy led to further problems when Japan became an important U.S. ally in the postwar world order.

Popular Culture

After a decade or so of severe economic hardship, Americans found ready employment because of the war effort and could once again devote time and money to their own interests and pursuits. Disposable income rose substantially because of increased employment, yet the war-induced scarcity of many commodities and forms of entertainment limited how Americans spent their free time and money.

Even though nonessential travel as well as luxury items for personal consumption virtually disappeared because of the wartime demands on facilities and services, consumers found other pleasures with which to occupy themselves. Movies and radio programming became more popular than ever, despite the reduced availability of film for Hollywood and components for new radios. Even with shortages of alco-hol, bars and nightclubs did a rousing business as well. Americans also resorted to simpler, stay-at-home pleasures, such as chess, checkers, and card games. Magazine subscrip-tions and book readership rose, too, despite cutbacks in the allotment of paper to the popular press.

Not surprisingly, the theme in music and other popular entertainment at the war's outset was national pride and the will to carry on for victory. Unabashedly patriotic songs—such as "To Be Specific, It's Our Pacific," "You're a Sap, Mr. Jap," and "Let's Put the Axe to the Axis"—dominated the popular music charts in the early months of 1942. As the war rolled on and Americans realized how many years might pass before peace and the boys could actually return, the theme in popular culture shifted to nostalgia for absent loved ones and dreams of the good old days—or how it would be in some blissful future. "White Christmas," both the song

released by Bing Crosby and the movie of the same title in which he starred, were typical of this sentimental yearning for loved ones and better times, as was the movie *Casablanca* (1942) with its more strictly dramatic tone. This blended into the next phase, in which separated couples talked to each other, professing their love and asking their mates not to stray, as in the Andrews Sisters' popular hit "Don't Sit Under the Apple Tree with Anyone Else But Me." By the time the war was drawing to a close, entertainment media articulated the twin themes of war weariness and celebratory homecoming in victory.

Throughout the war there was also a subtheme of escapism, both in wild comedies (often depicting the travails of the citizen–soldier as he attempted to adapt to military life) and in westerns and adventures, such as the superheroes of the comic books. This may account for the war's most striking, popular culture phenomenon: the teen idol Frank Sinatra. Boyish and without the virility of a sex symbol such as Clark Gable, Sinatra, with his slender build and deceptively youthful face, seemed to many as the son, kid brother, or boy next door who had gone off to do his duty—and who wistfully hoped for his return one day to a better future. Although Sinatra was 27 years old in 1942, teenage girls found him irresistible, often screaming hysterically at his performances. This home front phenomenon was paralleled by the widespread resort to the "pinup" by the GIs—inspired in part from normal sexual desire, but also symbolic of the girl back home, as part of the future, for whom the boys had gone off to fight.

Total Mobilization

The sheer scale of the forces engaged in World War II necessitated huge production efforts by the belligerents, and U.S. industrial mobilization was all the greater because of the need to support its less economically developed allies. It is no exaggeration to point out that, due to this mobilization, the nation would never be able to return to the way things were before the attack on Pearl Harbor—even years after the war had ended.

Despite the substantial economic recovery generated by French and British war orders before American entry into the war, there were still more than 3.5 million unemployed

workers scattered across the country in December 1941. But the twin demands for military manpower and industrial labor quickly changed those circumstances. Nearly 15 million men and women would eventually serve in the armed forces, creating a labor shortfall that could only be bridged by granting unprecedented economic opportunities to the social groups that had traditionally suffered discrimination: women, ethnic minorities, the "Okies" displaced by the Great Depression, the uneducated, the aged, and the infirm.

The sudden plenitude of industrial jobs at decent wages touched off a vast internal migration. The largest influx was to cities of the upper Midwest and to the coasts. The Census Bureau calculated that more than 15 million Americans had changed residences to different counties by the time the war ended, and half of those were living in different states. Five-and-a-half million left farms to take large-city jobs, but many came from small towns or from among the urban unemployed. The result was chaos in the cities and the proliferation of factory towns. With the government committed to building industrial facilities, and with local property owners concerned about the influx of undesirables, there was little incentive to build proper housing or to extend sanitation and other basic services into neighborhoods settled by "transient populations." Many feared that properly accommodating these new workers would lead to crime-riddled slums.

As a result, prices of basic services, such as housing and transportation, rose precipitously, even as the quality of those services declined from overuse and shortages of investment for expansion and maintenance. The new urban citizens lived in trailers, basements, tent communities, and any other space that could be crudely modified for habitation. Longtime residents grumbled at the newcomers whenever they couldn't find a seat in a restaurant or on a bus, and they waited impatiently—both for peace and the expected end to the alien presence. But despite heavy turnover in employment owing to the overall scarcity of labor, the new workers by and large remained after the war, having established themselves as profitable consumers who boosted the local economy. The American demographic landscape was thus permanently changed—not only by the burgeoning urban population, but also because of the radical transformation of the cities' ethnic and generational composition.

Full-scale mobilization for the war intruded on Americans' lives in other ways, too. Many basic commodities became widely unavailable. Some items, such as women's hosiery made of silk (or the new nylon), became difficult or impossible to get, forcing American women simply to learn to live without. A great many more items, while not completely unavailable, were scarce, requiring the Office of Price Administration to oversee a vast rationing system, which controlled products ranging from food to gasoline.

Automobile tires provide a good example of wartime scarcity. Japanese conquests in East Asia early in the war gave Japan control of 97 percent of the world's rubber-producing areas, and American stockpiles held only about a year's supply of tires. Military needs claimed three-quarters of that supply, meaning civilians were hard pressed to keep their cars in operation. The nation's 30 million automobile owners turned to retreads or paid exorbitant prices for the few tires still left on the market. Some wooden tires were used by trucks, but they proved to be a poor substitute. Leather, cornsilk, and plastic were also investigated as replacements for rubber in tires, but none proved suitable. Myriad plants, from guayule to dandelions, were studied, but none could replace rubber. Synthetic rubber made from petroleum was more promising, but it took time and money to erect manufacturing plants. Meanwhile, a nationwide scrap rubber drive was launched, and citizens turned in 335,000 tons of old bathmats, hot water bottles, and overshoes, which was enough to make some low-grade tires, but hardly constituted a solution.

President Roosevelt finally appointed a board under the chairmanship of mobilization expert Bernard Baruch to study the situation, and their report recommended gasoline rationing as the only way to prevent the tire shortage from becoming a crisis. Accordingly, one year after Pearl Harbor, the government, in order to stretch the nation's tire supply, reduced speed limits to 35 miles per hour, banned recreational driving, and instituted a gasoline rationing system. Ration books were issued to all Americans, and gasoline had to be paid for with both cash and ration coupons. Americans grumbled and some bought black market fuel and tires, but by and large most citizens accepted these measures as a necessary sacrifice for the war effort. The same pattern held true for clothing, cigarettes, bicycles, alarm clocks, baby carriages, and all sorts of food products, from sugar and meat to vegetables and butter. Americans adjusted their diets, wardrobes, and lifestyles, and life went on.

Because of the sacrifices made and inconveniences endured by the American public, U.S. industrial mobilization in World War II was a stunning success. In the period of 1942 to 1945, the nation's gross domestic product was never less than double that of Great Britain and the Soviet Union combined, and it was anywhere from 37 to 216 percent greater than the combined GDP of the Axis powers (including Austria and Occupied France) during the same period. Through standardization of design, mass production methods, centralized planning and coordination through the War Production Board and Office of War Mobilization, and profit

A lineup of "victory ships" at a naval shipyard on the West Coast of the United States, waiting for supplies and final outfitting before shipping off to advance bases in the Pacific— an example of the full-scale mobilization of production in the war effort. (National Archives and Records Administration)

incentives for private industry, the American economy flooded the critical battlefields around the globe with weapons and equipment. In 1942 alone—well before the enemy believed the American economy could be converted to full-scale war production—the United States out-built the entire Axis combined in aircraft (47,000 to 27,000); tanks (24,000 to 11,000); and merchant shipping (8 million to less than 1 million deadweight tons). American production rose again in 1943 and peaked only in 1944. During the war, the Ford Motor Company produced more war material on its own than did the entire nation of Italy. Similarly, the famed Willow Run B-24 assembly plant in Michigan produced aircraft at one quarter the rate, measured by weight of airframe, of the entire Japanese aircraft industry.

The impact of American mobilization and production on the battlefield is difficult to overestimate. Not only did the United States expand its own military forces to unprecedented levels (12 million men and women were in uniform by the time the war ended), providing a major contribution to victory on battlefields seldom closer than 3,000 miles from American shores, but the United States allowed the Allies to reach their full military potential through Lend–Lease, a program of direct, uncompensated military and economic aid to any and all enemies of the Axis. Many of the impressive British and Soviet battlefield successes were won with American weapons and equipment. The United States sent the Soviet Union thousands of tanks, aircraft, and antiaircraft guns; cloth for uniforms, boots, and food; and other basic necessities for the Red Army. More beneficial in the long run were the many raw materials and capital goods the United States sent its allies through Lend–Lease. For example, U.S. Lend–Lease material dispatched to the Soviet Union included nearly half-a-million trucks, half-a-billion dollars' worth of machine tools; 2,000 railroad locomotives; and staggering sums of raw materials. Thus, even comparing national production figures will not convey the true contribution to total Allied production offered by the United States. It was the Soviets who marched into Berlin in 1945, but the Red Army did it on American boot leather, supplied by American trucks, and supported by aircraft built with American materials and machinery.

Soldiers in the Pacific routinely intoned the ditty, "The Golden Gate in 'Forty-Eight," to indicate their belief that the war would last for many years, to which the reply was, "The Bread Line in 'Forty-Nine," which embodied the widespread belief that a postwar depression would end this war boom as it had after World War I. However, American consumerism continued to expand dramatically after the war. The postwar boom was also encouraged by the Serviceman's Readjustment Act, better known as the "GI Bill," which granted various benefits to veterans as a show of the nation's gratitude for their service. In the first decade after the war, half of the veterans received professional or academic training under the bill's educational provisions, and a quarter of them built homes with government loan guarantees. The result was a major boost to the construction and education sectors and—even more important—the cultivation of an adaptable work force for the growing economy. World War II thus ushered in a quarter century of prosperity—a dramatic contrast to the 15 years of economic hardship suffered during the Great Depression and the shortages of the war years.

Changing American Society

The tremendous U.S. military and economic efforts in World War II carried a price for the American people. The war had an enormous impact on families. Husbands and fathers went away, sometimes for years. Alcoholism among women increased dramatically. The strain on relationships was often too much, and divorce rates hit an all-time high. One reason sociologists and psychologists gave for break-ups and marriage tensions was the returning father's distress at his wife's independence and the reluctance of the last-born child to accept this unknown father as an authority figure. Contributing to the difficulties of readjustment were post-traumatic stress disorder (though the term itself was not coined until after the Vietnam War). The discovery by servicemen that the skills and concerns that had once been so central to their existence now had little value or meaning in civilian society also made readjustment difficult. But many marriages withstood the strain, though often at great psychological cost to both partners.

The war had an impact on the institution of marriage in other ways. Many couples had rushed to the altar when

the threat of separation loomed; in the first quarter of 1942, sales of wedding rings quadrupled. Romances also blossomed between soldiers in training and local women, many ending in quick marriages. The government instituted a system of monthly pay allotments for spouses of servicemen, intended to reduce the draft exemption for men with household dependents. However, this practice also spawned the nefarious "Allotment Annie" industry, whereby unscrupulous women cultivated serial romances and marriages from the procession of soldiers heading off to the front, always hoping for the ultimate jackpot of the $10,000 GI death benefit, while collecting multiple monthly allotment checks in the meantime.

America's sexual behavior was profoundly altered as well. With so many men in uniform, the demographics of most American communities changed in one of two ways: either there were far fewer young men around, or there was a base nearby that provided the community with a bounty of young men, who were periodically let loose for leave, paid well enough to have a good time, and lonely for companionship of all sorts—but especially of the female variety. The familiar British complaint that "the trouble with you Yanks is that you're overpaid, oversexed, and over here" resonated with many an American community, too, especially with parents raising a daughter near a military installation. "Khaki wacky" teenagers hung around train stations and bus depots where GIs arrived in town for a night of liberty; they came to be called "V-girls" in a society where "V" stood for victories of all sorts. Often the intent was just a pleasant evening and some attention from the handsome young men in uniform, but V-girls gained a reputation for lax sexual morality that was not entirely unfounded, though no reliable figures exist. One estimate states that only about 1/2 of 1 percent of teenage females were V-girls, yet wartime studies showed that soldiers contracted venereal diseases at a higher rate from local girls than from professional prostitutes.

There were some attempts to safeguard the morality of the young boys gone off to serve their country by closing houses of prostitution, yet some sought to contain the problem by sponsoring safe, clean houses near military bases. In the end, most of the soldiers developed a dual code of conduct: one set of values when at home with people they knew,

and another altogether for the new and alien environments they came to visit during the war, whether overseas or in other parts of the United States. Given their long separation from their spouses, married men faced the same choices and often succumbed to the same temptations. For those who had lived through the morally conservative years of the Great Depression, the behavior of young people, male and female, was nothing short of shocking. Both sexes viewed morality differently after the war, even those who embraced traditional monogamy and the nuclear family in peacetime.

Children, too, endured the impact of the war. One facet of reduced adult supervision was the proliferation of the V-girls, some as young as 13; but all children inevitably experienced less control of their daily schedules because of absent fathers and working mothers. Grandparents, neighbors, and older siblings were pressed into service as babysitters; but despite those volunteer efforts, the youth of America has seldom had such free a rein as did those during World War II. Arrests among young people rose by 20 percent in 1943, and the term "juvenile delinquent" first came into common usage. Overall rates for violent crime were down, mainly because the largest single group of perpetrators, young adult males, were enlisted; but crime rates for children climbed precipitously during the war years. The foundation was laid for the hot rodders, motorcyclists, and other rebellious youth of the 1950s; the only elements missing during the war years were the leather jackets and the greater independence afforded by gas-powered vehicles.

Despite the often deleterious effects on family life caused by the war, there was much promise of lessening racial segregation and discrimination practices, thanks to the heavy demands for manpower. In the end, however, such hopes were disappointed. As early as the summer of 1941, the African American labor leader A. Philip Randolph was organizing a march on Washington to protest discriminatory hiring policies; but he called the march off when Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which banned such hiring discrimination and also established the Fair Employment Practices Commission to monitor enforcement. Some 700,000 African Americans migrated to the industrial cities in search of jobs, but often found jobs difficult to come by, and often faced discrimination and segregation in their

new environments. Conflicts with established white labor groups were at the root of the problem, but so too was the decline in living conditions that resulted from wartime pressures in the urban areas—conditions invariably blamed on the newcomers. Racial tensions were often high and occasionally erupted into violence, including extended "race riots" in Los Angeles, Detroit, and New York. In the end, African Americans made some gains toward equality in employment and living conditions, but the full-blown civil rights movement was still a decade away. Nonetheless, initiatives taken to deal with wartime labor shortages helped to lay the foundation for the success of the civil rights movement in a later era.

The same might be said of feminism. Six million women labored in war industries during the war, and many others worked outside the home. They faced discrimination in wages and promotion, enmity from coworkers, accusations of unprofessional or distracting behavior and dress, and lack of support at home, where everyone expected the woman of the house to keep the household and the children as safe, clean, and happy as before. Because of the paucity of support services for women—such as day care facilities at the workplace—and inflexible scheduling that made it difficult to undertake grocery shopping and other fundamental chores, the turnover rate among female employees was very high. Traditionalists decried the movement of women into the workplace; they pictured it as the first step in the disintegration of the American family, revered as the moral bedrock of society.

However, the labor shortage forced even the most reluctant employers to turn to female workers, and by mid-1942 many companies developed recruiting campaigns aimed specifically at women. Cynics grumbled, "Remember how women used to have to get married to get men's wages?" But in reality, women were paid less than men; and by the war's end, female workers had won the begrudging acceptance of most detractors. As the war industries geared down to peacetime production levels, women were usually the first to be let go, but their venture into the previously male-dominated workplace indelibly altered—for both genders—the image of the American woman. Having played her part in war and accepted reversion to her peacetime roles afterward, American women would have the self-confidence to challenge the politics of the established gender order in the not-too-distant future—or inspire their daughters to do so.

Whether one is thinking of the family or of larger social groups, the war forever altered fundamental American institutions. Ironically, upon their return to the states, the soldiers who fought to preserve American values discovered that the society they had fought to preserve had itself changed, owing in no small measure to the efforts undertaken in the homeland to ensure victory.

World War II in History and Memory

Based on the sheer number of people directly affected, World War II remains the single most influential event in American, and world, history. Touched off by forces that had been fermenting for decades, the war was fought in an age that required total participation by the belligerent societies; it thus impacted the lives of a higher percentage of Americans than any other conflict in U.S. history, aside from the Civil War. It shaped the lives of that generation not only during the war but for decades to come, creating a set of values and beliefs that would be challenged by the nuclear culture of the Cold War, the "antiestablishment" movements of the Vietnam era, and the growing individualism and self-centeredness of the 1970s and 1980s. For the generation that experienced it, World War II would remain the single most influential factor on their political beliefs, worldviews, and personal philosophies. For them, World War II would always be the "good war," or the "big one," when Americans worked together to achieve military success for God-given righteousness and freedom for all.

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1940; 1941; 1942 a; b, c, d, e, f; 1943; 1944 a, b, c; 1945 a, b, c, d, e, f; 1946 a, b; 1947; 1948 a; 1949; 1950 a; 1953; 1964; 1975

—*Mark P. Parillo*

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
York, Alvin Cullum

(1887–1964)
World War I Hero

In the last days of World War I, Alvin C. York came marching out of the Argonne Forest with 132 German prisoners and a remarkable story of individual daring. One of the least likely combat heroes in American history, the Tennessee-born York initially sought conscientious objector status based on his membership in the Church of Christ in Christian Union—a small, pacifist denomination founded in Ohio during the Civil War. York reluctantly accepted induction only after the Selective Service denied his pleas for deferment on religious grounds. However, his army superiors persuaded him that America was fighting God's battle in the Great War, an argument that transformed the reluctant draftee into a veritable soldier of the Lord. With a newfound confidence in the rightness of the conflict, York shipped to France in May 1918, as an infantryman in the 82nd Division.

On the morning of October 8, 1918, during the final Allied offensive in the Argonne Forest, York and the other members of a small patrol found themselves behind German lines, cut off from American forces and under heavy fire. With half of his comrades dead or wounded, York, armed with a rifle and a pistol, boldly challenged a German machine-gun nest, killing approximately two dozen men and calling on the rest to surrender. In the course of a few hours, he silenced 35 machine guns and captured four officers and 128 enlisted personnel. Promoted to the rank of sergeant for a feat that Allied commander Marshal Ferdinand Foch called "the greatest thing accomplished by any private soldier of all the armies of Europe," York received numerous decorations, including the Medal of Honor and the Croix de Guerre.

An April 1919 article in the *Saturday Evening Post*, the most widely circulated magazine in America at that time, made York a national hero virtually overnight. York's explanation that God had been with him during the firefight meshed neatly with the popular attitude that American involvement in the war was a holy crusade. As a conscientious objector turned citizen–soldier turned combat hero, York captured both the public's ambivalence about the war and its pride in military victory. York returned to the United States in the spring of 1919 amid a tumultuous public welcome and a flood of business offers from people eager to capitalize on the soldier's reputation. In spite of these lucrative opportunities, York decided to return to his Cumberland Mountain hamlet of Pall Mall, in the Valley of the Three Forks of the Wolf River, where he spent the rest of his life working to bring schools, roads, and economic development to his mountain neighbors.

York lived quietly in Tennessee until the eve of World War II, when his advocacy for military preparedness again made him prominent. Filmmaker Jesse Lasky persuaded York that a film about his World War I experiences would serve as a call to arms for the nation in a time of growing international threat. Directed by Howard Hawks with Gary Cooper in the title role, *Sergeant York* appeared in July 1941, just six months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Cooper received an Academy Award for his portrayal of Alvin York. The film brought York a financial windfall, but by the 1950s, mismanagement of the income and Internal Revenue Service claims against his earnings brought the old soldier to the brink of bankruptcy. Prominent friends provided financial support and helped him to negotiate a settlement with the IRS a few years before his death in 1964.

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At a time of domestic upheaval and international uncertainty, Alvin York's pioneer-like skill with a rifle, his homespun manner, and his fundamentalist piety endeared him to millions of Americans as a kind of "contemporary ancestor," a pioneer backwoodsman reincarnated in the midst of the 20th century to slay the nation's enemies. As such, he seemed to affirm that the traditional virtues of agrarian America still had meaning in the new era. In short, York represented not what Americans were, but what they wanted to think they were. He lived in one of the most rural parts of the country at a time when the majority of Americans lived in urban areas; he rejected riches at a time when the tenor of the nation was crassly commercial; he was pious at a time when secularism was on the rise. For millions of Americans, York embodied their romanticized understanding of the nation's past when men and women supposedly lived plainer, sterner, and more virtuous lives. Ironically, although York endured as a symbol of an older America, he spent most of his adult life working to help modernize his rural mountain region.

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Related Entries

Conscientious Objection; World War I

—*David D. Lee*

Young, Charles

(1864–1922)
African American Army Officer

In 1889, Charles Young became the third African American to graduate from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Young built an impressive military resume over the next three decades, advancing to the rank of colonel in spite of ongoing racial hostility; Young's rise through the Army ranks coincided with the growing strength of white supremacy in American politics and society. Racial discrimination, ever-present in Young's career, crested in the early months of World War I when senior Army officials forced him into retirement, against his wishes and despite the protests of the African American public, to avoid the possibility of a black colonel commanding a regiment.

Young was born in Kentucky in 1864 and reared in Ripley, Ohio. After graduating from West Point, he served five years as a second lieutenant in the all-black 9th and 10th cavalries. In 1894 he transferred to Ohio's Wilberforce University to teach military science and tactics, French, and math. By the time of his promotion to first lieutenant in 1896, Young was the highest-ranking black officer in the Army, and when the Spanish–American War broke out two years later, he was the only black officer qualified to lead combat troops. The Army granted Young a wartime promotion to major and placed him in charge of training the 9th Ohio Volunteer Battalion, an African American National Guard unit. Although his men did not see action in Cuba, Young's rank and responsibilities made him an anomaly in a military establishment convinced of black soldiers' inferiority. After the war, Young received a promotion to captain and rejoined the 9th Cavalry in the Philippines where he helped to suppress the independence movement led by nationalist Emilio Aguinaldo.

Following the Spanish–American War, legislators in the South systematically disbanded their states' black militias, arguing that they did not want armed African Americans thinking themselves the equal of white men. The War Department and officials in the regular Army went along with this expansion of segregationist, "Jim Crow" policies by maligning the ability of African American officers, blocking black enlistments

in combat roles, and assigning black regulars to places where their presence would not upend racial hierarchies.

Young spent much of his career out West or abroad. After the Philippine Insurrection, he was garrisoned with the 9th Cavalry at the Presidio in San Francisco, where he served in 1903 as the acting superintendent of Sequoia National Park. From 1904 to 1907, he was assigned to work with the Military Intelligence Division as an attaché in Haiti. He returned to the Philippines and the 9th Cavalry in 1908. In 1912 he left for Africa, serving as a military attaché and adviser in Liberia. Young's first opportunity to act as a superior officer to a large number of white commanders came with the 1916 Punitive Expedition against Mexican revolutionary Francisco "Pancho" Villa. By the time of the expedition, when American troops pursued Villa and his followers across the Mexico border, Young had been promoted to major and made a squadron commander in the 10th Cavalry. The squadron performed admirably under Young, saving a white squadron from almost-certain death at the hands of 600 Mexican *federales* and receiving citations and accolades for their work. His success made him a hero in the African American community.

Young's promotion to lieutenant colonel in the wake of the Punitive Expedition made him the highest-ranking African American officer in military history, but it also turned him into a more visible target for white supremacists. As the nation geared up for World War I, white officers in the 10th Cavalry rebelled against the possibility that Young, on his way to becoming a full colonel, would be put in charge of their regiment. Supported by Mississippi Sen. John Sharp Williams, they convinced Pres. Woodrow Wilson and officials in the War Department to remove Young from the regular Army. At the behest of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Tasker Bliss, a military medical board examined Young and concluded that his high blood pressure and other health problems made him unfit for active duty. He was promoted to full colonel but placed on the retired list.

Astounded and dismayed, Young maintained that he was healthy enough to serve despite the pretext used to retire him. To prove his physical fitness, he mounted a horse in Ohio, where he was acting as a military adviser to the state's adjutant general, and rode almost 500 miles to Washington, D.C. The stunt won the support of the black press and African Americans across the country, but it gained him little sympathy from the Wilson administration. Although he was disappointed, Young remained loyal to the military and urged African Americans to support the war effort unreservedly. Young stayed in retirement until five days before the Armistice on November 11, 1918, when he was returned to active duty at Camp Grant, Illinois.

Following World War I, Young accepted an assignment to once again become military attaché in Liberia. He suffered a stroke while on an investigative tour in Nigeria and died in a British military hospital in January 1922. The British government in Nigeria buried with him with military honors. In 1923, they returned his body to the United States, where he was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

To African Americans, Col. Charles Young's military career was, as his close friend and old Wilberforce colleague W. E. B. Du Bois wrote, a "triumph of tragedy." His shoddy treatment at the hands of the Wilson administration became emblematic of the fierce discrimination experienced by thousands of African American soldiers during World War I and after. At the same time, his seemingly boundless capacity for loyalty served to inspire those African Americans determined to love America as it could be, instead of turning their backs on America as it was. Throughout his military career, Young held fast against Jim Crow with all the dignity that befitted his uniform.

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Related Entries

African Americans in the Military; Buffalo Soldiers; Du Bois, W. E. B.; Philippine War; Spanish–American War; World War I

Related Documents

1900; 1919 b, c

—*Adriane D. Smith*

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
Zoot Suit Riot

The Zoot Suit Riot refers to a ten-day period in June 1943 in Los Angeles, California, when civilians and servicemen clashed with young Mexican Americans, whose distinctive dress gave name to the encounter. The term "riot" is misleading because the event was actually a series of beatings and fights that continued uncontrolled for a week and a half. It was an example of how a city's social dynamics and tensions were heightened during wartime. The situation in Los Angeles was particularly contentious in this period. Increased numbers of Mexicans had been moving into Los Angeles in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. By the time of World War II, California faced an explosive mix between the various ethnic groups residing there, the transient military populations training in the state, and the still lingering ideology of white supremacy.

Although the zoot suit has become most identifiable with Mexican American youth because of the riot, the zoot suit itself had been popular in Europe and throughout the United States for numerous years prior to the 1940s. This distinctive style of dress involved wearing pants that were loose-fitting but tapered and cuffed at the ankles and large jackets that had wide shoulders. Large-brimmed hats often accompanied the outfit. The flamboyance of the suit itself and the brazen attitude of many of its wearers gave rise to certain terms. "Zoot suiter" referred to a young man with supposed delinquent tendencies who was shunned by much of mainstream America.

Zoot suiters demonstrated a rebellious attitude that was at odds with the patriotic spirit of the times. Tensions in the Los Angeles area towards zoot-suit wearing young men had also been exacerbated by a serious of articles published in the *Los Angeles Times* that referred to Mexican Americans in demeaning terms. Also playing a part in the tension was the constant fear that Japan might stage an attack on the West Coast. Conformity became even more important under such circumstances.

The outbreak of violence in 1943 was sparked by a street fight between sailors and young Mexican American men at the end of May. Sailors organized a few days later to retaliate against the zoot suiters. The first night, the servicemen attacked young boys (12 to 13 years of age). The following night the sailors, unable to find many zoot suiters, went into Mexican American neighborhoods, rampaging through restaurants, bars, and theaters. There was a distinct change in tactics, as any Mexican American encountered became a target, not just zoot suiters. Over the next several nights, more and more people joined in the attacks. Some were servicemen, including Army soldiers and marines; some came from installations as far away as Las Vegas. Others were citizens of Los Angeles who were eager to join in the fracas and vent their frustrations against people of color.

During the riot, thousands of off-duty servicemen were joined by hundreds of local white civilians who proceeded to attack not only Hispanic youths but also young African Americans and Filipinos. The military men beat and stripped minorities wearing zoot suits of their clothing. In this they were even encouraged by a Los Angeles newspaper, which counseled its readers to burn the seized zoot suits in fires.

The official figures stated that 112 Mexican Americans suffered serious injuries and that more than 130 others were injured who did not seek hospital care. More Mexican Americans were arrested and jailed than any other group. Ninety-four Mexican Americans were jailed, as compared to 20 servicemen and 30 non-Hispanics. The public as well as

some law enforcement officers cheered the beatings and then saw to it that the victims were arrested. Police officers were quoted after the riots as stating that they did not want to arrest servicemen.

The United States military all but admitted that it could not control the sailors and servicemen who were participating in the riots. The servicemen were literally disappearing without leave from their bases for days at a time. Finally, in a desperate effort to control the situation, the military forbade sailors from even going to Los Angeles. Servicemen involved in the fights were never prosecuted for their actions, either by civil authorities or by the military. The Los Angeles City Council then banned the wearing of zoot suits on city streets, attaching a 30-day jail sentence to the offense.

Around this same time, young men wearing zoot suits were attacked in other cities as well. In California a citizens' committee investigated the riots and concluded that racism was the root cause of the melee. Other riots arose across the nation during the war years, though most were directed at African Americans. From Beaumont, Texas, to Detriot and New York's Harlem, tensions grew as both demographics and class distinctions changed. The Zoot Suit Riot clearly shows the prejudice that was at work in Southern California, and it demonstrates how a passion for patriotism can transform ordinary citizens into an uncontrollable mob.

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Related Entries

Latinos in the Military; Race Riots; World War II

—*Jennifer S. Lawrence*

Chronology

1607

Soon after English settlers from the Virginia Company establish an outpost at Jamestown Colony, members of the Powhatan Confederacy kill two colonists and capture John Smith. After his release, Smith enforces stricter military discipline among the colonists and intensifies repression of local indigenous peoples.

1622–32

Chief Opechancanough's Confederation of Tidewater Indians attacks the Virginia Company's settlements in the spring of 1622, killing a quarter of the population. The company secures military aid from England and the Potomack, and fights Openchancanough's forces for nearly 11 years before the two sides agree to terms of peace.

1637

The Pequot War, the first serious armed conflict in New England between colonists and indigenous peoples, is fought in modern-day eastern Connecticut.

1644–46

Chief Opechancanough, in his 90s, leads another attack on the Virginia colonists, killing nearly 500 on the first morning. The colonists, however, now have better palisades and arms, and vastly outnumber their attackers—who are this time completely defeated.

1675–76

King Philip's (or Metacomet's) War, a general uprising of indigenous peoples to resist continued expansion of the English colonies in New England, leaves more than 5,000 Native Americans and some 1,500 English dead. The war

ends shortly after Metacomet (his Christian name was Philip) is killed by a band of turncoat Sakonnet warriors.

1682

William Penn establishes the colony of Pennsylvania as a "Holy Experiment" in Quaker pacifism, following the declaration by Quaker leader George Fox 20 years earlier "against all plotters and fighters in the world."

1689–97

King William's War is fought. It is the first in a series of colonial conflicts between France and England for supremacy in North America.

1702–14

Queen Anne's War is fought in Europe and North America over the succession to the Spanish throne. In North America, fighting occurs between British and French forces in the north and between British and Spanish in the south.

1715–18

A confederation of Yamasee and other Muskhogean-speaking peoples in the colony of South Carolina attack colonists. South Carolinians secure the aid of North Carolinians and the Cherokee; the Yamasee are defeated and driven back into their primary area of settlement, present-day Georgia.

1744–48

King George's War involves military operations in North America that stem from the War of the Austrian Succession in Europe. Following King William's War and Queen Anne's War, this becomes the third major conflict between the

British and French that extends to American soil, culminating in the French and Indian War.

1747

In efforts to augment the ranks of their crews during King George's War, officers and men from British vessels land in Boston harbor and "press" men into service under the terms of parliamentary legislation. Bostonians react furiously, trapping several officers attending a dinner at the governor's house. Within a few days the British naval commander agrees to release most of those pressed in exchange for the release of his officers, and the Boston Press Gang Riot ends.

1754 (MAY 9)

The first American political cartoon, drawn by Benjamin Franklin, is published in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*. It depicts a snake divided into eight segments, each labeled as a colony or region of British North America, above the motto Join Or Die.

1754–63

The French and Indian War, the American name for the conflict in North America between Great Britain and France (in Europe known as the Seven Years' War), takes place. The war establishes British dominance of North America.

1763

The Royal Proclamation of 1763 prohibits settlement west of the ridge of the Appalachian Mountains, thereby inflaming backcountry settlers and colonial land speculators, who see Native American land as crucial to their economic futures.

1765 (MARCH 22)

The Stamp Act, requiring all American colonists to pay a tax on every piece of printed paper they use, is passed by the British Parliament. The money thus collected is intended to help pay the costs of defending and protecting the American frontier near the Appalachian Mountains. The act, opposed by many colonists, is seen as an attempt by

England to raise money from the colonies without involvement or approval of colonial legislatures.

1770 (MARCH 5)

Tensions between British Redcoats and colonists lead to British troops firing on a crowd of civilians, killing five people in what becomes known as the Boston Massacre. The event has been seen by some historians as a watershed in the progress toward independence.

1775–83

The Revolutionary War is fought. The first shot at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, occurs on April 19, 1775; the Treaty of Paris recognizing American independence is signed on September 3, 1783.

1775 (JUNE 14)

The 2nd Continental Congress adopts the New England militias then besieging the British Army in Boston as intercolonial, or "continental," forces.

1775 (JULY 29)

The Continental Congress authorizes ministers to serve with the rebel forces, establishing the American tradition of a military chaplaincy.

1775 (NOVEMBER 29)

The first intelligence-gathering unit in the United States, the Committee of Secret Correspondence, is established by the Continental Congress. The committee's members acquire foreign publications, hire spies, and fund propaganda activities to discover and influence the attitudes of foreign powers about the American cause.

1776 (JULY 4)

A Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America, demanding independence from Great Britain, is adopted by Congress in Philadelphia. The Declaration of Independence begins with the words "When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another . . ." and

establishes a clear rationale for American independence. The document would make its first newspaper appearance in the *Pennsylvania Evening Post* on July 6 and have its first public reading on July 8, in Philadelphia.

1778

William Billings, a tanner from Boston, composes the choral work "Chester," which combines patriotic and religious fervor. The first completely American patriotic song, it quickly becomes one of the most popular songs of the day.

1785

Benjamin Franklin and Frederick the Great of Prussia conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce that also codifies principles for the conduct of war. The treaty is credited with being one of the first international agreements to contain principles of the law of war in written form.

1787

With the United States still operating under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress passes the Northwest Ordinance. One component of this law provides the framework for the distribution and use of the lands that would eventually make up the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. It also codifies the principle that the lands west of the Appalachians legally belong to Native Americans.

1789 (April 30)

George Washington takes office as the first president of the United States, serving two four-year terms.

1792

After serving in the Continental Army during the Revolution, black men are prohibited from further service in the militia by the Militia Act of 1792, inaugurating a pattern that would endure for many decades of allowing blacks to serve in the military during wartime and refusing them any military association in peacetime.

1798

Producing muskets for the U.S. government, Eli Whitney introduces the concept of interchangeable parts. The system is adopted by the federal arsenals, allowing faster, cheaper production and easier maintenance. Some historians have observed that this cheaper manufacturing process allowed for the rapid spread of guns throughout civilian society in the middle of the 19th century.

1798–1800

The federalist government of Pres. John Adams wages an undeclared naval war in the Atlantic against France (the Quasi-War) and passes the Alien and Sedition Acts (1798) to suppress media criticism.

1802

The United States Military Academy is established at West Point, New York.

1803

The United States acquires approximately 800,000 square miles of territory (mostly west of the Mississippi River) for $15 million when Pres. Thomas Jefferson and others negotiate the Louisiana Purchase from France.

1812–15

The War of 1812 is fought. After the Revolutionary War leaves relations between the United States and Great Britain strained, hostilities resume over a variety of issues, including the failure of the British to withdraw from American territory around the Great Lakes and British support of Native Americans on the frontiers.

1814 (September 13)

During a British attack on Fort McHenry in Baltimore, Maryland, Francis Scott Key writes the poem "The Defence of Fort McHenry," which seven days later would become "The Star-Spangled Banner." It receives its first public performance in Baltimore the following month. It would not become the national anthem until 1931.

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1815 (JANUARY 8)

Andrew Jackson defeats the British at the battle of New Orleans.

1815

Affluent merchant David Low Dodge founds the New York Peace Society. Twenty-two Protestant clerics, college presidents, and writers follow Dodge's example, founding the Massachusetts Peace Society later that year.

1817–58

The Seminole Wars, the longest, deadliest, and most expensive conflicts with indigenous peoples fought in the United States, are conducted in three phases (1817–18; 1835–42; 1855–58) in Florida between the United States and the Seminole.

1819

Norwich Military Academy is founded in Vermont by Capt. Alden Partridge, the first superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

1828 (MAY)

The American Peace Society is established in New York City.

1830

Congress passes the Indian Removal Act, which calls for the removal of all Native American peoples residing east of the Mississippi to new lands in the West.

1838

Abolitionist and peace activist William Lloyd Garrison exhorts New Englanders to engage in disruptive acts of civil disobedience to deprive slave-owning Southerners of federal financial, legal, and military support. Garrison, who formed the New England Anti-Slavery Society (1832) and the New England Non-Resistance Society (1838), opposed all state-sponsored violence.

1839

The Virginia Military Institute, the first state-supported military college in the United States, is established at Lexington.

1842

The government of South Carolina establishes two state military academies, The Arsenal at Columbia and The Citadel at Charleston. In 1845 The Arsenal is closed and its students and faculty merge with those at The Citadel.

1845

The United States Naval Academy is established at Annapolis, Maryland.

1846 (MAY 13)

After Mexican and American forces fight a skirmish north of the Rio Grande in which 11 U.S. dragoons are killed, Pres. James Polk asks for and receives a declaration of war from Congress. The Mexican–American War would continue until February 1848.

1846–48

Antislavery writer James Russell Lowell writes pseudonymous letters from "Ezekeil Biglow, farmer," and "Birdofredum Sawin" to the *Boston Courier*. He is critical of the war with Mexico and especially of military recruitment methods.

1848

Henry David Thoreau publishes "Civil Disobedience," encouraging citizens not to pay taxes that might be used to finance the Mexican–American War.

1848 (FEBRUARY)

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo is ratified, forcing Mexico to abandon title to territory in Texas north of the Rio Grande and to cede New Mexico and California to the United States.

1853

William Walker, the most notorious of a number of "filibusters" seeking to carve new slave states in Central America and the Caribbean, leads a body of men in his first of three failed attempts to accomplish this end, in Sonora, Mexico. After establishing a substantial foothold in Nicaragua in 1855, he is driven out in 1857. His

third attempt in 1860 in Honduras results in his execution there.

1859 (OCTOBER 16)

John Brown leads a handful of men in a raid on the Harpers Ferry federal arsenal—a move Brown hoped would ignite a slave rebellion.

1860 (DECEMBER 20)

South Carolina is the first state to secede from the Union following the election the previous month of Abraham Lincoln as president of the United States. From January to June 1861, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee also secede, in that order.

1861 (FEBRUARY 18)

Jefferson Davis, having resigned his U.S. Senate seat the previous month upon Mississippi's announcement of its secession, is inaugurated as provisional president of the newly formed Confederate States of America in Montgomery, Alabama.

1861 (JUNE 13)

Pres. Abraham Lincoln authorizes the U.S. War Department to create the U.S. Sanitary Commission. The agency was conceived by two doctors, Elizabeth Blackwell, and her sister, Emily Blackwell, to function as a national, civilian-led government relief organization. The commission contributed food, clothing, medical supplies, and other aid to the Union Army during the Civil War.

1861 (JULY)

The first battle of the Civil War, the battle of Bull Run, is fought at Manassas, Virginia.

1861 (NOVEMBER)

Representatives from a number of counties in western Virginia meet at Wheeling to begin drafting a constitution for a breakaway state. In May 1863, voters approve the constitution and the newly elected legislature petitions Congress to become the 35th state, West Virginia.

1862

Photographer Mathew Brady publishes two books of his Civil War photos, *Brady's Photographic Views of the War* and *Incidents of the War*.

1862 (FEBRUARY 25)

Congress passes the first Legal Tender Act, which authorizes printing of $150 million in Treasury notes. Known as "Greenbacks," these notes would remain in use in Union states throughout the Civil War and for several years thereafter.

1862 (SEPTEMBER 22)

President Lincoln issues the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, declaring that unless the rebellious states return to the Union by January 1, 1863, the slaves living therein would be "thenceforward and forever free." The rebels do not comply, and Lincoln issues the final Emancipation Proclamation on New Year's Day of 1863.

1863 (JANUARY 26)

President Lincoln orders the War Department to allow black troops to be raised for the 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer (Colored) Infantry. Black recruits from 24 states, the District of Columbia, Canada, the West Indies, and even Africa flock to the 54th's colors. Robert Gould Shaw is appointed the regiment's commander.

1863 (APRIL 24)

General Orders, No. 100, entitled Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, is published. Written primarily by Francis Lieber, a German American professor of law at Columbia College, the document is regarded by many historians as the world's first official set of ethical guidelines about military conduct in the field.

1863 (JULY 1–3)

The battle of Gettysburg, in Pennsylvania, is one of the bloodiest of the Civil War. Pres. Abraham Lincoln's brief (266 words) Gettysburg Address honoring the dead of that

battle on November 19, 1863, stands among the great presidential addresses in American history.

1863 (JULY)

In New York, antidraft riots break out on July 13 and last for five days. Mobs of predominantly Irish immigrants attack government officials, wealthy white New Yorkers, and African Americans. They lynch 11 black men, injure dozens more, and destroy hundreds of buildings, including an orphanage for African Americans. The riots would rank among the most dramatic breakdowns of domestic order in the 19th century.

1863 (AUGUST 21)

William Clark Quantrill, a pro-Confederate Missourian, leads a force of 450 men to attack the militantly antislavery town of Lawrence, Kansas. "Quantrill's Raiders" spend three hours looting and burning the town, killing 180 of its residents.

1863 (DECEMBER)

President Lincoln issues a Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, offering terms under which most white Southerners, excluding Confederate officials and military officers, could obtain amnesty simply by taking an oath of allegiance to the Union and by accepting emancipation. It includes a plan whereby a state in rebellion could return to the Union whenever a number of voters equivalent to at least 10 percent of those who had cast ballots in 1860 took the oath. They could then create a loyal state government.

1864

Several European countries draft the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. This convention, which grew out of the efforts of Swiss businessman J. Henri Dunant, is followed by others developed over the next century in Geneva, Switzerland, and The Hague, The Netherlands. All of these documents promulgate overall guidelines for the conduct of war.

1864 (FEBRUARY)

Confederate prison Camp Sumter (known by its more notorious name Andersonville) opens in Georgia.

1864 (APRIL 12)

The Fort Pillow Massacre takes place. In a move to recapture the fort they had built in 1861, Confederate forces under Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest attack Fort Pillow, near Memphis, killing more than 200 Union troops, many of them African Americans.

1864 (SEPTEMBER 3)

Union forces under Gen. William T. Sherman enter Atlanta.

1864 (NOVEMBER 29)

Colorado militia colonel John Chivington leads 700 men into the Southern Cheyenne village of Black Kettle at Sand Creek in southeastern Colorado, despite having been told by U.S. Army officers at Fort Lyon that Black Kettle had surrendered. Chivington's troops kills more than 150 Native Americans. The massacre prompts a congressional investigation.

1865 (APRIL 9)

Confederate general Robert E. Lee surrenders to Ulysses S. Grant and his Union forces at Appomattox Court House in Virginia.

1865 (APRIL 14)

Pres. Abraham Lincoln is assassinated at Ford's Theatre in Washington, D.C., by John Wilkes Booth.

1866 (APRIL 6)

The Grand Army of the Republic, the largest and most powerful organization of Union Army and Navy veterans, is founded in Decatur, Illinois, by former Army surgeon Benjamin Franklin Stephenson.

1866–67

Beginning as a loose affiliation of paramilitary organizations operating widely in the South during Reconstruction, the Ku Klux Klan forms and announces

itself at an 1867 convention in Nashville, Tennessee, as the "Invisible Empire of the South." It is led by former Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest.

1868 (MAY 30)

Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) national commander John Logan enjoins all GAR posts to pay tribute to the fallen soldiers of the Civil War, thereby establishing what would become known as Memorial Day (initially known as Decoration Day).

1870–74

Congress passes the Force Act (1870) and the Ku Klux Klan Act (1871), directing the Army to suppress the Klan's depredations against blacks and white Republicans. Those measures prove to be effective in South Carolina, but less so elsewhere.

1873

The United States Naval Institute is established.

1874

Col. George Armstrong Custer's 7th Cavalry leads a geological expedition into the Oglala Sioux's Black Hills to determine whether gold deposits are to be found there. The report of the presence of gold leads to a flood of prospectors and the abrogation in 1876 of the treaty with the Sioux.

1876

The United States Coast Guard Academy is established.

1876 (JUNE 25)

Gen. George Armstrong Custer's 7th Cavalry is defeated by Lakota Sioux and Cheyenne warriors led by Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull at the battle of Little Bighorn. Custer's defeat prompts the Army to redouble its campaign against the Sioux and hastens the end of indigenous people's resistance to being placed on Indian reservations.

1877

The U.S. Military Academy at West Point graduates its first African American, Henry Flipper.

1877

Labor calls strikes against railroads throughout the United States and local militia units prove unable or unwilling to protect railway property. Units of the federal armed services are ordered to perform these duties.

1878

The Posse Comitatus Act, restricting the circumstances under which U.S. military forces can be used to address domestic disturbances, is passed in response to Southerners' anger at the use of federal troops during Reconstruction. The act would evolve into an important foundation of in the evolution of American civil–military relations.

1879

National Guard officers meet in St. Louis, Missouri, to organize the National Guard Association.

1881

A Century of Dishonor, by Helen Hunt Jackson, is published, exposing the tragedies caused by the government's policies toward Native Americans. It leads to the creation of several Indian rights groups, including the Indian Rights Association (1882) and the National Indian Defense Association (1885).

1881

Clara Barton founds the American Red Cross.

1884

The Naval War College is established to serve as an advanced professional school to prepare middle- and senior-grade officers for higher command, contributing to and acknowledging the growing professionalism of the naval officer corps.

1890 (DECEMBER)

A band of poorly armed Sioux Ghost Dancers at Wounded Knee Creek, South Dakota, is massacred in the last major engagement of the Indian Wars. For the Army this event marks the end of the military phase of the settlement of the

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West. For many Native Americans, however, the Wounded Knee Massacre becomes emblematic of the ruthlessness of the frontier Army and the injustices of U.S. Indian policy.

1895

The Red Badge of Courage, a Civil War novel by Stephen Crane, is published.

1898 (FEBRUARY 19)

The USS *Maine* explodes in Havana Harbor, Cuba, amid suspicions (later shown to be unfounded) that it was sabotaged by Spanish troops. The event fuels support for a war with Spain. The Spanish–American War begins in April 1898.

1898 (JULY 1)

Establishing a symbol of the glories of imperial adventure in Cuba, Teddy Roosevelt leads the Rough Riders and units of the black 9th and 10th U.S. Army Cavalry Regiments in charges up the San Juan Heights outside Santiago de Cuba.

1898 (DECEMBER 10)

The Treaty of Paris transfers colonial control of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines from Spain to the United States.

1899–1902

The Philippine War is waged, during which the United States attempts to quell Filipino insurrections in America's newly acquired colonial territory.

1900

The Boxer Rebellion takes place in the early months of 1900. Boxers attack foreign missionaries in the Chinese countryside and then in the diplomatic quarter in Peking (Beijing).

1901

With the Army Reorganization Act of 1901, a permanent female nursing corps is created.

1903

The first of several major U.S. interventions in Central America is instigated after Pres. Theodore Roosevelt obtains permission to build an interoceanic canal in Panama. In January, the United States negotiates with Colombia to build a canal across the Panamanian isthmus, at the time a province of Colombia. The Colombian legislature rejects the treaty even as Panama is attempting to secede and establish itself as a sovereign nation. Roosevelt then recognizes Panama as a nation and sends naval warships and members of the Marine Corps to prevent Colombia from quashing the rebellion. After successfully seceding in November 1903, Panama brokers a deal with the United States to permit the construction of the canal.

1903

The Militia Act of 1903 recognizes newly emergent National Guard units as the "Organized Militia" of the United States, but requires that units engage in summer training maneuvers with regular Army units, to be subject to some regular Army standards, and to submit to inspections by regular Army officers.

1906 (AUGUST 13–14)

Black infantrymen from the 25th Infantry Regiment in Brownsville, Texas, are accused of firing on white towns-people ("the Brownsville Riot").

1911

Ambrose Bierce publishes his *Devil's Dictionary*, in which he defines war as "a byproduct of the arts of peace" and peace as "a period of cheating between two periods of fighting."

1912

Jewish War Veterans, one of the oldest veteran's organization in the United States, forms.

1913

Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) is established.

1914

Panama Canal is completed under U.S. direction and remains in U.S. control until 1999.

1914 (August)

World War I begins in Europe.

1914 (October)

The American Field Service is created to provide American volunteer ambulance drivers for the war in France.

1915

Chicago social worker Jane Addams founds the Women's Peace Party (later the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom) to abolish the causes of war, to work for peace, and to create political systems that would bring equality for all.

1915 (April 22)

The German Army releases chlorine gas against British and French forces near the town of Ypres in Belgium. It it the first use of chemical weapons in warfare.

1915 (May 7)

The British ship *Lusitania*, with many Americans on board, is sunk by a German submarine.

1915 (summer)

East Coast munitions workers centered in Bridgeport, Connecticut, lead a short and successful strike, bringing the eight-hour workday to the munitions industry.

1915 (August 9)

Amid protests about America's lack of military preparedness in the wake of the sinking of the *Lusitania* and other incidents, a train carrying lawyers, bankers, politicians, civil servants, and the first of many students from Ivy League colleges leaves Grand Central Station for a camp in Plattsburgh, New York. The month-long session to improve the country's preparedness, to be repeated the next year in several venues, is part of a larger countrywide "Preparedness Movement."

1915 (December 4)

Henry Ford's Peace Ship sails from Hoboken, New Jersey, for Stockholm with a number of prominent pacifists in a vain attempt to arrange an end to the World War I.

1916

The Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC) is established to provide military training on college campuses as part of the National Defense Act passed the same year.

1917

James Montgomery Flagg creates the most recognizable poster of both world wars, a picture of Uncle Sam pointing his finger at the viewer over the slogan I Want You.

1917

A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen found *Messenger*, one of the most influential African American periodicals of the war and postwar period. Through its pages, Randolph and Chandler assume the stance of conscientious objection to the war and encourage African Americans to avoid military service, prompting Justice Department officers to arrest the two for violating the 1917 Espionage Act.

1917 (April 2)

In a speech to Congress, Pres. Woodrow Wilson, arguing for U.S. involvement in World War I, utters the phrase "the world must be made safe for democracy."

1917 (April 6)

The United States declares war against Germany, officially entering World War I.

1917 (April 13)

Shortly after Congress declares war on Germany, President Wilson creates the Committee on Public Information—the nation's first large-scale propaganda agency—to mobilize public opinion in the United States behind the war effort, and also to gain international support.

CHRONOLOGY

1917 (APRIL 17)

Eleven days after the formal U.S. declaration of war, the War Department creates a new federal agency, the Commission on Training Camp Activities, to protect men in uniform from moral corruption and venereal disease.

1917 (MAY 18)

Congress passes the Selective Service Act with the intent to raise a massive American army to win the war in Europe. The act requires all men between the ages of 21 and 31 (including Native Americans) to register for the draft.

1917 (NOVEMBER)

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia overthrows the post-imperial government of Kerensky's Social Democrats. In March 1918 the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is signed, which is favorable to Germany, and ends Russia's participation in World War I.

1917–18

The Espionage and Sedition acts are passed as separate pieces of legislation designed to limit treacherous behavior in wartime and to promote patriotism. The Espionage Act, approved on June 15, 1917, sets fines of up to $10,000 and prison terms for citizens who aid the enemy. The Sedition Act forbids "any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy."

1918

The War Labor Board is established to set wartime labor policies and secure a strong workforce.

1918 (MARCH)

A strain of influenza appears in the United States as the first of three waves of a flu pandemic that continues into 1919, killing 40 million to 50 million people worldwide, and 675,000 in the United States.

1918 (MARCH 4)

Pres. Woodrow Wilson issues an executive order to give the War Industries Board (WIB), under the leadership of Bernard Baruch, the power to function as a distinct agency to coordinate the channeling of civilian resources to meet the military's ever-growing industrial and transportation needs. The WIB would transform the relationship between the government and civilian society as the nation for the first time organized its resources to fight a total war.

1918 (JUNE)

Under provisions in the 1917 Espionage Act, Socialist Eugene V. Debs is arrested for delivering a speech in Canton, Ohio, in which he expressed his opposition to the draft. Debs was sentenced to a 10-year prison term. In 1919 he appeals his case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which unanimously affirms his conviction in an opinion delivered by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. After serving three years, Debs was pardoned by Pres. Warren Harding in 1921.

1918 (JULY)

W. E. B. Du Bois publishes an editorial in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's magazine, *The Crisis*, urging blacks to "Close Ranks" and support the war effort. He would publish a series of impassioned editorials in *The Crisis* over the following months urging support for black soldiers, including "Returning Soldiers."

1918 (NOVEMBER 11)

An armistice is signed in the forest of Compiègne, France, ending fighting in World War I.

1919 (MARCH 15)

The American Legion is established, unifying many of the newly founded veterans' groups.

1919 (JUNE 28)

The Treaty of Versailles is signed, forcing Germany to pay severe war reparations and stripping it of its colonial territories.

1919 (November 11)

On the one-year anniversary of the end of World War I, Armistice Day is proclaimed. After 1938, November 11 was observed as a federal holiday devoted exclusively to remembering the sacrifices of that conflict. In 1954 Armistice Day became Veterans Day, a holiday honoring all U.S. veterans.

1920 (January)

Roger Baldwin founds the American Civil Liberties Union.

1920

The Disabled American Veterans of the World War (renamed Disabled American Veterans in 1941) is established.

1920

The last U.S. troops are withdrawn from Russia after an intervention lasting two years in Russia's civil war.

1921

The Veterans Bureau is established.

1921 (November 11)

On the third anniversary of the end of World War I, the United States lays the body of an unidentified soldier to rest at Arlington Cemetery in Virginia, designating him the country's "Unknown Soldier." It follows England and France in this gesture to recognize the thousands of soldiers unaccounted for or mutilated beyond recognition in war.

1924

The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 grants citizenship to all Native Americans.

1924

The Army Industrial College is founded to train officers in facilitating economic mobilization in wartime.

1925

The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare is instituted.

1929

A Farewell to Arms, a World War I novel by Ernest Hemingway, is published.

1929 (October)

Stocks in America and throughout the world suffer devastating losses in value. The Crash of 1929 ushers in the Great Depression, which would last through the 1930s.

1930 (July)

The Veterans Administration is established to administer benefits for the nation's veterans.

1931

Pres. Herbert Hoover signs into law a bill that makes "The Star-Spangled Banner" the national anthem.

1932 (May–July)

The Bonus March takes place in Washington, D.C. Veterans of World War I march on the city to demand early payment of military bonuses owing to financial pressures brought about by the Great Depression.

1933

After 30 years of American military interventions in Caribbean and Central American countries, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt announces a "Good Neighbor Policy." Limiting interventions to assisting threatened American citizens, the Good Neighbor Policy expresses the American people's desire for international isolation.

1933 (March)

The American embassy in Berlin and U.S. consuls report numerous mob attacks on Jews, as well as the systematic removal of Jews from positions in government, education, and the legal profession.

1933 (March 31)

The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) is established as part of Roosevelt administration's program to provide emergency aid to unemployed youth and to revitalize the nation's natural resources.

CHRONOLOGY

1935

The first in a series of neutrality acts is signed into law, embodying America's growing isolationist impulse.

1938

The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), also known as the Dies Committee, is established to investigate communist penetration of labor and other organizations in the United States.

1938

The insecticide DDT is created to kill lice and prevent the spread of such diseases as typhus; its first massive application would be with troops in World War II. DDT would become a staple insecticide in the United States after World War II.

1939 (AUGUST)

Émigré German scientist Albert Einstein writes Pres. Franklin Roosevelt to warn him that the Germans are on the track of creating a nuclear weapon.

1939 (SEPTEMBER 1)

The German army invades Poland, setting into motion the events that would lead to World War II.

1940 (MAY)

The Selective Service and Training Act goes into effect; it exempts married men from the draft.

1940 (SEPTEMBER)

After a sharp rise in the marriage rate in the wake of the May statute, Congress amends the Selective Service Act to exempt only married men with one or more children.

1941 (MARCH)

In the wake of a violent strike at a Milwaukee, Wisconsin, defense plant, Pres. Franklin Roosevelt establishes the 11-member National Defense Mediation Board, later to become the National War Labor Board.

1941 (APRIL 1)

Tens of thousands of Ford workers strike the massive River Rouge plant in Michigan. Faced with the prospect of losing immensely profitable government contracts, Ford signs a closed shop (union-members only) contract with the United Auto Workers—the first of its kind in the auto industry—which brings the 100,000 workers at Ford plants into the union.

1941 (JUNE)

Executive Order 8802 is signed by Pres. Franklin Roosevelt. It establishes the Fair Employment Practices Commission, a body authorized to investigate complaints of racial discrimination in companies under contract to supply war materials to the government.

1941 (AUGUST)

The Office of Price Administration is created by Executive Order 8875.

1941 (DECEMBER)

Representatives of gardening organizations, seed companies, the agricultural press, and other organizations meet with Sec. of Agriculture Claude Wickard to discuss how to encourage Victory Gardens in the United States. The program's goals are to increase the production and consumption of fresh vegetables and fruits, encourage the preservation of surplus vegetables and fruits by individual families, and maintain morale while offering all Americans a means of participating in the war effort.

1941 (DECEMBER 7)

Japanese warplanes attack the U.S. Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, provoking a declaration of war by the United States.

1941 (DECEMBER 19)

President Roosevelt establishes by executive order the Office of Censorship to monitor all civilian radio broadcasts and print media, both within the United States and across U.S. borders, to ensure that no information is transmitted or disseminated that might be of use to America's enemies.

1942 (JANUARY 12)

By executive order, President Roosevelt establishes the War Labor Board (WLB) to supervise and intervene in various aspects of collective bargaining. From 1942 to 1945, the WLB would settle disputed contracts and play a major role in establishing wage rates, hours, and union security. It also would help shape the nature of postwar labor relations.

1942 (FEBRUARY 19)

President Roosevelt signs Executive Order 9066, which mandates the internment of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in detention camps throughout the western United States.

1942 (FEBRUARY 25)

The Voice of America (VOA) makes its first radio broadcast, in German, commencing its mission to provide information about America and the war to international audiences. The VOA would continue spreading information to the world about U.S. culture and institutions into the 21st century.

1942 (JUNE 13)

By executive order, President Roosevelt establishes the Office of War Information to coordinate news and information sent out by the U.S. government during World War II and to oversee domestic and foreign propaganda in support of the war effort.

1942 (NOVEMBER 24)

Dorothy Stratton is sworn in as first director of the Coast Guard women's organization, or SPARS, with the rank of lieutenant commander.

1942 (DECEMBER 2)

Under the leadership of Enrico Fermi, scientists at the University of Chicago create the first nuclear chain reaction.

1943 (FEBRUARY 1)

Pres. Franklin Roosevelt announces the formation of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, comprised of Japanese Americans. Amid doubts about the loyalty of the regiment's

soldiers, the 442nd achieves one of the most outstanding records of any regiment in World War II.

1943 (MAY 29)

Norman Rockwell's *Rosie the Riveter* painting appears on the cover of *The Saturday Evening Post's* Memorial Day edition.

1943 (MID-JUNE)

Following the 3rd United Mine Worker strike in just six weeks, Congress passes (over President Roosevelt's veto) the Smith–Connally War Labor Disputes Act, which authorizes the use of military force to seize struck mines and factories and provides for fines and jail terms for strike leaders.

1943 (JUNE)

More than 100 Mexican Americans in Los Angeles are seriously injured, and more are jailed, during racially inspired attacks on their communities by military servicemen and Los Angeles police. The 10-day clash would become known as the "Zoot Suit" riot.

1943 (JULY)

The Women's Army Corps (WAC) is established, providing full military rank to WAC members.

1943 (SEPTEMBER)

Life magazine publishes one of the first photographs (taken by George Strock) of American war dead, a view of three soldiers lying partly buried in the sand on Buna Beach in New Guinea.

1943 (NOVEMBER 1)

The United Mine Workers strike for the 4th time since the spring, involving all of the nation's 530,000 bituminous coal miners. Using his new powers under the Smith–Connally War Labor Disputes Act, Roosevelt sends in troops and seizes strike-bound coal mines, threatening to draft striking miners. The union refuses to back down, and Roosevelt orders Sec. of the Interior Harold Ickes to bypass the War Labor Board (which had a policy of not negotiating with a

striking union) and negotiate a contract that proves to be acceptable to the mine workers.

1944 (MAY 22)

Life magazine publishes a photo of a young woman seated at her desk writing a thank you note to her friend, a Navy lieutenant, who had sent her the skull of a Japanese soldier that sits before her on her desk.

1944 (JUNE 6)

On D-Day, more than 100,000 Allied troops cross the English Channel and land on the beaches of Normandy in France in the largest seaborne invasion in the history of warfare. D-Day proves a decisive turning point for the Allies in World War II.

1944 (JUNE 22)

President Roosevelt signs into law the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, or "GI Bill of Rights" as it is more commonly known, by which the federal government offers soldiers a wide range of benefits, including education assistance, home loans, vocational training, and business loans as a reward for military service. One of the most expansive pieces of social welfare legislation in the country's history, the GI Bill would be credited with making possible profound changes to the social fabric of postwar America.

1944 (JULY 17)

A massive explosion rocks the Port Chicago Naval Munitions Base near San Francisco, California, killing 320 servicemen and injuring another 390. The incident exposes racial discrimination given the disproportionately large number of African Americans killed; they were working under extremely dangerous conditions. The Port Chicago Mutiny follows.

1944 (NOVEMBER)

The American Veterans Committee is organized.

1944 (DECEMBER 9)

Delegates from nine organizations meeting in Kansas City, Missouri, create the American Veterans of World War II, which becomes known as "AMVETS."

1945 (APRIL 18)

War correspondent Ernie Pyle is killed by a sniper while on the front lines on Ie Shima with elements of the Army's 77th Infantry Division.

1945 (MAY)

German forces begin to surrender on European battlefields. The formal unconditional surrender is signed May 7. May 8 is declared VE (Victory in Europe) Day.

1945 (JULY 16)

The first nuclear device is detonated at Trinity Site, near Alamogordo, New Mexico.

1945 (AUGUST 6)

An atomic bomb is dropped from the American B-29 bomber *Enola Gay* onto the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Some 70,000 people die in the blast and thousands more die later from effects of radiation. A second bomb is dropped on Nagasaki three days later.

1945 (AUGUST 15)

Photographer Alfred Eisenstadt captures one of the most memorable images from World War II, "V-J Day, Times Square, 1945," showing a newly returned sailor embracing the first woman to cross his path in Times Square on Victory in Japan Day. The photo would be featured on the cover of *Life* magazine.

1945 (SEPTEMBER 2)

Formal surrender of Japan onboard the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay.

1945 (DECEMBER)

Congress passes the War Brides Act, which loosens immigration laws to expedite the entry of more than 100,000 war brides, predominantly from Europe, into the United States after soldiers return home from World War II.

1946

The Best Years of Our Lives, a film directed by William Wyler about World War II veterans, premieres.

1946

Congress establishes the Fulbright Program for academic exchanges.

1946 (MAY)

The Doolittle Board issues its report about the relations between officers and enlisted men, leading to some improvement in the treatment of enlisted personnel and to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

1946 (AUGUST 31)

Hiroshima, by John Hersey, is published in a single issue of *The New Yorker* magazine; the book, about the aftermath of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, in August 1945, is published by Alfred Knopf later in 1946.

1947

The U.S. Air Force is established as a distinct branch of the U.S. military.

1947

The National Security Act of 1947 establishes a secretary of defense, unifies the service, and creates a separate Air Force, a National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It charges the new agency with coordinating the nation's intelligence activities and with collecting and evaluating intelligence affecting national security.

1947

The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) investigates and puts on trial the "Hollywood Ten," communist writers in the entertainment industry. This results in the firing and blacklisting of writers, actors, and others in a widening array of industries, as well as in many schools and colleges.

1947 (JUNE 5)

In a speech at Harvard University, Sec. of State George C. Marshall makes the first public announcement of the European Recovery Plan. Subsequently known as the

"Marshall Plan," it would become one of the most successful government initiatives of the 20th century.

1947

George Kennan, a junior State Department official, provides the first widely accepted outline of a coherent American Cold War policy in his article published in *Foreign Affairs*, "Sources of Soviet Conduct."

1948

The Naked and the Dead, a World War II novel by Norman Mailer, is published.

1948

The first MASH (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital) units are authorized by the surgeon general of the Army to provide front-line combat care. They are the first medical units to be deployed in the Korean War in 1950.

1948 (MARCH)

Activist Chicano veterans in south Texas organize the American GI Forum.

1948 (JUNE 24)

A new Selective Service Act is passed by Congress.

1948 (JUNE 24)

Fearing a revitalized Germany under Western influence, the Soviets foment the first major crisis of the Cold War—the Berlin Crisis of 1948. Taking advantage of a postwar arrangement guaranteeing only air access to jointly occupied Berlin, 100 miles inside the Soviet zone, the Soviet Union closes off rail and road links hoping to force out the West. Pres. Harry Truman declares that American forces will remain in Berlin, and a massive airlift supplies the city with more than two million tons of supplies. The Soviets eventually lift the blockade, effectively admitting defeat and deferring a decision on Berlin.

1948 (JULY 26)

Pres. Harry Truman signs Executive Order 9981, prohibiting racial discrimination and segregation in the U.S. armed forces.

CHRONOLOGY

1949

Radio Free Europe is established as a tool in the ongoing ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. It would provide communication services to Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the Russian Federation, and southwestern Asia in the hope of weakening the Soviet government's hold on the societies it rules by providing more open discussion of current news and events and promoting Western values.

1949

Local American Legion members in Westchester County, New York, mob a concert by black opera singer and civil rights activist Paul Robeson.

1949

The U.S. Naval Academy graduates its first African American, Wesley Brown.

1949 (AUGUST)

The Soviet Union tests its first nuclear device.

1949

Twelve O'Clock High, a World War II film directed by Henry King, premieres.

1950

National Security Council Memorandum-68 (NSC-68) calls for wholesale revision of U.S. Cold War policy. It reshaped Kennan's "containment" theory to emphasize military force over economic, diplomatic, or psychological means to preserve U.S. national security in the face of an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. NSC-68 would emerge as the preeminent policy document of U.S. strategic thinking during the early years of the Cold War.

1950

The Federal Civil Defense Administration begins to produce films, pamphlets, and posters emphasizing U.S. vulnerability to enemy attack—especially from the Soviet Union.

1950

Beetle Bailey, a humorous comic strip that stars the slacker draftee whose attitudes and adventures come to represent the peacetime draft Army of the 1950s and 1960s, makes its first appearance.

1950

The Uniform Code of Military Justice is signed into law by Pres. Harry Truman. The code attempts to combine the command-dominated military justice system with the civilian justice system, emphasizing due process.

1950 (JUNE 25)

In a move that sparks the Korean War, North Korean tanks cross the 38th parallel separating North and South Korea. The following day, Pres. Harry Truman authorizes the movement of U.S. troops to defend South Korea.

1950 (SEPTEMBER 9)

The nation's first draft of doctors is signed into law to address the drastic shortage of medical personnel after post–World War II demobilization and in response to the additional requirements of the Korean War.

1951 (APRIL 11)

President Truman announces the dismissal of Gen. Douglas MacArthur from his duties as Allied commander of United Nations forces in the Far East (Korea).

1952 (JULY 16)

Pres. Harry Truman signs into law the Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, which offers education and loan benefits to veterans who served for more than 90 days during the Korean War.

1952 (OCTOBER)

The popular and critically acclaimed documentary *Victory at Sea* begins airing on NBC. The 26-episode series, recounting the U.S. Navy's role in World War II, reinforced the idea of the "good war."

1953

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are executed two years after being convicted of espionage.

1953

From Here to Eternity, a film directed by Fred Zinneman based on the 1951 novel by James Jones, premieres.

1953

Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower signs Executive Order 10450, codifying sexual perversion as grounds for dismissal from federal employment, including the military.

1953 (JULY 27)

An armistice is signed ending the Korean War.

1954

The Caine Mutiny, a World War II film directed by Edward Dmytryk based on the 1951 novel by Herman Wouk, premieres.

1954

The United States Air Force Academy is established.

1954

Militant Liberty, formulated by John C. Broger of the Far East Broadcasting Company, appears. It is one of several ideological initiatives supported by the Department of Defense during the early days of the Cold War.

1955

The Bridges at Toko-Ri, a Korean War film directed by Mark Robson based on the 1953 novel by James Michener, premieres.

1955

Strategic Air Command, a film directed by Anthony Mann and starring Jimmy Stewart, premieres.

1956

Pres. Dwight Eisenhower's promotion of a national system of interstate highways leads to the Federal Aid Highway Act

of 1956 and the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. In 1990 it is renamed The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways.

1957

Norman Cousins and others found the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy to lobby for a comprehensive test ban treaty. The organization realizes some success in 1963 when the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union agree to stop atmospheric and underwater testing and to ban tests in space.

1957 (OCTOBER 4)

The Soviet Union launches the first artificial satellite, *Sputnik*, into orbit.

1958

The civilian National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is created to promote nonmilitary, peaceful uses of space, and becomes the lead agency in the space program.

1961 (JANUARY 17)

In his farewell address to the American public, Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower warns of the rise of a "military–industrial complex" and its undue legislative and economic influence. Only "an alert and knowledgeable citizenry," Eisenhower urged, can ensure that "security and liberty may prosper together."

1961 (MARCH 1)

Pres. John F. Kennedy signs an executive order establishing the Peace Corps.

1961 (JUNE)

At a meeting in Vienna, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev attempts to bully Pres. John F. Kennedy into acceding to Soviet demands for final agreements on the status of Berlin and Germany and sets a six-month deadline for formal agreements. Refusing to be bullied, Kennedy, in July 1961, announces a policy of zero tolerance for interference in Allied rights to travel across East Germany to Berlin, and at the same time begins a massive buildup of U.S. armed forces.

CHRONOLOGY

1961 (AUGUST 13)

After more than 200,000 people flee East Germany for the West during the first six months of the year, a barbed wire fence is erected to divide East and West Berlin. It is soon replaced by a stone wall. The Berlin Wall would stand as both a physical barrier and a symbol of the Cold War until November 1989.

1962

Combat!, a television series set during World War II, airs its pilot; the series runs until 1967.

1962

Students for a Democratic Society is founded on several U.S. college campuses.

1962

Rachel Carson publishes *Silent Spring,* warning against the effects of the insecticide DDT, which had been developed for use in World War II and became widely used in the United States after the war.

1962 (OCTOBER)

The Cuban Missile Crisis is sparked when U.S. aerial surveillance on October 14 confirms Soviet missile sites in Cuba capable of delivering nuclear warheads to American soil. President Kennedy addresses the world on October 22, demanding the removal of the missiles. For a week, the United States and the Soviet Union teeter on the brink of nuclear war.

1963

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water (often shortened as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) is signed by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

1963

Associated Press reporter Malcolm Browne photographs an incident in Vietnam involving Buddhist monks dousing themselves with gas and burning themselves alive, one of

the first visual statements against the war in Vietnam to be circulated around the world.

1963 (NOVEMBER 22)

Pres. John F. Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas.

1964 (AUGUST)

After U.S. ships patrolling in the Gulf of Tonkin come under attack from North Vietnamese forces on August 2, Pres. Lyndon Johnson orders retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese naval installations and obtains the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution from Congress. This resolution, a major step in widening America's role in Vietnam, grants the president the authority to use whatever means necessary to protect South Vietnam and U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia.

1964

Seven Days in May, a Cold War suspense film directed by John Frankenheimer and adapted by Rod Serling from the 1962 novel by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey, premieres.

1964

Dr. Strangelove, Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, a film directed by Stanley Kubrick satirizing the nuclear arms race, premieres.

1965

The Supreme Court decision in *United States v. Seeger* establishes that a belief in a supreme being and religious membership are no longer required to claim conscientious objector (CO) status, although a CO's reasons for nonparticipation must resemble those of members of conventional religions. The Court would further refine this decision five years later in *Welsh v. United States* by removing the religious qualification, stating that an individual's "ethical and moral beliefs" that prohibit military participation are sufficient to obtain CO status.

1965 (APRIL 17)

Organized by Students for a Democratic Society, more than 25,000 activists descend on Washington, D.C., to protest

the war in Vietnam—the first major demonstration against that war.

1966 (MARCH 3)

Pres. Lyndon Johnson signs into law the Veterans Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, which, unlike previous GI bills, extends benefits to veterans who served during times of war and peace. With this act, military service becomes a more viable option for economic advancement.

1966 (APRIL)

The religious protest group, Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam, is formed.

1967 (APRIL)

Vietnam Veterans Against the War is formed by a number of American servicemen who have returned to the United States after tours of duty in Vietnam.

1967 (JUNE)

Boxer Muhammad Ali is convicted for refusing induction into the U.S. Army. He is stripped of his heavyweight title, fined $10,000, and sentenced to prison for five years (though he served no time). The verdict is reversed by the Supreme Court in 1971.

1968 (JANUARY–FEBRUARY)

North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong units launch coordinated attacks throughout South Vietnam in the Tet Offensive. Although the attacks amount to a costly military defeat for the communist forces, their scale and ferocity, coming so soon after an extensive U.S. government public relations campaign that had stressed progress in the war and the impending collapse of the communist forces, shock the American public and further erode an already declining will to continue the war.

1968 (MARCH 16)

The My Lai Massacre, the slaughter of more than 500 unarmed Vietnamese civilians by soldiers of C Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, Americal Division, gives rise to

highly-charged legal proceedings and fuels the public's concerns about the Vietnam War.

1968 (APRIL 4)

Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., is assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee.

1968 (JUNE 5)

Sen. Robert F. Kennedy is assassinated in Los Angeles.

1968 (AUGUST 26–29)

Antiwar demonstrators and police engage in a violent melee outside the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

1968 (NOVEMBER)

Richard Nixon wins the presidency with a campaign stressing law and order at home and "peace with honor" in Vietnam.

1968

In U.S. v. O'Brien, the American Civil Liberties Union argues that burning a draft card is an exercise of freedom of expression. The Supreme Court disagrees, ruling that a conviction for violating a statute prohibiting the destruction of an individual's draft card cannot be dismissed on free speech grounds.

1969

The Information Processing Techniques Office of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA; later the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA) establishes the first wide-area network, the ARPANET, which becomes the foundation for the Internet in the early 1980s.

1969 (AUGUST 1)

The Military Justice Act of 1968 goes into effect.

1969 (DECEMBER 1)

The lottery draft system replaces the Selective Service System in the United States.

CHRONOLOGY

1970 (APRIL)
President Nixon orders U.S. forces to strike at suspected enemy forces operating within the "Parrot's Beak" border area of Cambodia, unleashing a storm of protests across the United States by opponents of the war.

1970 (MAY 4)
At Kent State University in Ohio, police and National Guard troops, dispatched to quell student rioting, fire on protestors, killing four students and wounding nine others. Unrest on college campuses explodes, forcing many institutions to shut their doors. Ten days later, riots at Jackson State University in Mississippi leave two students dead from Mississippi state trooper bullets.

1971 (JUNE 13)
The *New York Times* begins publication of excerpts from the "Pentagon Papers"—the first public appearance of what would eventually emerge as a 47-volume history of American involvement in Vietnam compiled by the Pentagon.

1972 (JUNE)
After seven cadets and midshipmen challenge the constitutionality of mandatory chapel attendance at U.S. military academies, a federal appeals court rules that attendance must be voluntary.

1972 (SEPTEMBER 17)
The television program *M*A*S*H* airs its pilot episode. The series, set during the Korean War but appearing during the Vietnam War, would run until 1983.

1973
The Supreme Court rules that the military must offer women the same dependent benefits offered to men.

1973 (JULY)
Military conscription (the draft) ends in the United States in favor of an All Volunteer Force.

1973 (NOVEMBER)
Congress passes the War Powers Act.

1975 (APRIL)
U.S. helicopters evacuate the embassy in Saigon, South Vietnam, on April 29, and Saigon falls to North Vietnamese forces on April 30. The Vietnam War comes to an end.

1976
Military academies in the United States accept the first female cadets.

1976 (FEBRUARY 19)
Pres. Gerald Ford formally rescinds Executive Order 9066, which Pres. Franklin Roosevelt had signed in 1942 authorizing the internment during World War II of 120,000 Japanese Americans.

1978
The Deer Hunter, a Vietnam War film directed by Michael Cimino, premieres.

1978
Vietnam Veterans of America is established by Bobby Muller. The organization's founding principle is "Never again shall one generation of veterans abandon another."

1979
Apocalypse Now, a Vietnam War film directed by Francis Ford Coppola, premieres.

1979
Pres. Jimmy Carter commits the nation to build a national museum dedicated to the Holocaust. The museum opens in 1994.

1979
The first Army court-martial conviction for sexual harassment results from scandals at Fort Meade, Maryland, involving rapes and other abuse.

1980
The third edition of the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders*

(DSM-III) officially recognizes post-traumatic stress disorder as a condition suffered by many returning soldiers.

1980

"Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," a four-page document written by Randall Forsberg of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, is credited with launching the American nuclear freeze movement.

1980 (JUNE 1)

The Cable News Network (CNN) airs its first broadcast, ushering in the era of 24-hour televised news.

1981

The Army introduces the Be All You Can Be recruiting campaign, one of the most highly acclaimed and recognized slogans in modern advertising.

1982

The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, referred to as "The Wall," designed by Maya Lin, is dedicated on the Mall in Washington, D.C.

1982

First Blood, the first in the Rambo series of films starring Sylvester Stallone as a maladjusted Vietnam veteran, is released.

1983

The United States intervenes in Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury).

1983

WarGames, a film about the threat of accidental nuclear war directed by John Badham, premieres.

1984 (NOVEMBER 28)

Sec. of Defense Caspar Weinberger delivers a speech (The Uses of Military Power) before the National Press Club in Washington. In the speech, he outlines six conditions that should be met before deploying U.S. troops overseas. This speech, later refined by Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs Gen. Colin Powell, forms the basis of what would come to be known as the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine.

1986

Platoon, a Vietnam War film directed by Oliver Stone, premieres.

1986 (OCTOBER 1)

Pres. Ronald Reagan signs the Goldwater–Nichols Act, which seeks to improve the quality of military advice provided to civilian decision makers, to place greater responsibility upon combat commanders, and to institute greater cooperation and coordination among the individual military services.

1988

After 44 years of lobbying by the American Civil Liberties Union, Congress acknowledges the government's miscarriage of justice in its wartime treatment of Japanese Americans, and offers $20,000 in reparations to each Japanese American who had been detained in one of the several internment camps in the western United States.

1989

Born on the Fourth of July, a film directed by Oliver Stone and adapted from the 1976 autobiography by disabled Vietnam veteran Ron Kovic, premieres.

1989 (JUNE)

The Polish "Solidarity" trade union, which had been brutally suppressed in 1981 by the Soviet-sponsored Polish government, wins open elections, making it the first noncommunist government in Eastern Europe since the end of World War II.

1989 (JUNE 4)

After weeks of student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, Chinese troops, and tanks crack down on the demonstrators, killing hundreds in what becomes known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre.

CHRONOLOGY

1989 (NOVEMBER 9)

The Berlin Wall separating East and West Germany is breached, and the border is opened. The formal reunification of Germany in October of the following year marks the end of a Cold War–divided Europe.

1990

The Hunt for Red October, a Cold War suspense film directed by John McTiernan, premieres.

1990 (JULY)

Under orders of dictator Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Army occupies neighboring Kuwait. That act prompts the sequence of events that include the mobilization under the name Operation Desert Shield and the Persian Gulf War under the name Operation Desert Storm.

1990 (SEPTEMBER 23–27)

Ken Burns's documentary *The Civil War* airs on PBS. The series, featuring archival photographs and documents, contemporaneous music, interviews with historians, and narration by a wide range of well-known Americans, would be hailed as one of the most comprehensive documentary treatments of any war ever presented.

1991 (JANUARY 16)

The U.S. bombing of Baghdad in the Persian Gulf War begins.

1991 (FEBRUARY 23)

The ground war in Iraq begins. The cease-fire is proclaimed March 3.

1991

Charges of sexual abuse by women attending the Navy's annual Tailhook Convention in Las Vegas, Nevada, lead to investigations and scandal for the Navy.

1991 (DECEMBER 25)

Mikhail Gorbachev resigns as president of the Soviet Union, effectively marking the end of the U.S.S.R.

1992 (AUGUST 21)

Randall Weaver, refusing to make a required court appearance, retreats with his family to their remote northern Idaho home at Ruby Ridge, beginning a 10-day standoff with U.S. marshals that ends in a bloody siege leaving several dead. The incident helps to fuel a growing antigovernment "militia movement" in the United States that lasts through much of the 1990s.

1993

Pres. Bill Clinton announces a more permissive policy on gays and lesbians in the military, immediately challenged in private by the military's Joint Chiefs. A compromise, known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," is reached.

1993 (OCTOBER 3)

An American Rapid Reaction Force, in an effort to capture Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed, loses two Blackhawk helicopters and 18 personnel in a battle with Somalis in the streets of Mogadishu. The episode—during which television broadcasts show images of a dead American being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, along with footage of a captured U.S. airman—effectively ends U.S. involvement in Somalia. It also has a role in shaping U.S. decisions about intervening in other conflicts, including the ethnic genocide in Rwanda the following year.

1994

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum opens in Washington, D.C.

1995

The Korean War Veterans Memorial is dedicated on the Mall in Washington, D.C.

1995

The *Enola Gay* controversy is prompted by an exhibit planned at the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima from the B-29 *Enola Gay*. Several veterans organizations object to the

exhibit's perceived critical slant, leading to substantial revisions to the exhibit.

1995

Initially accepted into The Citadel, Shannon Faulkner's application is rejected once her gender becomes known. Her subsequent lawsuit paves the way for her to sign in on August 12, 1995, as the school's first female cadet. Although Faulkner leaves the school after five days, the Board of Visitors is forced to eliminate gender as a criterion for membership in the South Carolina Corps of Cadets.

1995 (AUGUST 19)

The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City is destroyed by a bomb planted by "militia" enthusiast Timothy McVeigh with the help of Terry Nichols; 168 people die.

1996

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is established to promote transparency and greater responsibility in sales of conventional arms and to contribute to international peace and security by preventing destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms. Thirty-three countries, including the United States, participate in the agreement.

1998

Saving Private Ryan, a World War II film beginning with the D-Day landings at the beaches of Normandy, France, directed by Stephen Spielberg, premieres.

1999

The Panama Canal, controlled by the United States since its opening in 1914, returns to Panamanian control.

1999 (MARCH 24)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization launches Operation Allied Force to halt Serbia's "ethnic cleansing" of Albanians in Kosovo.

2000

The National D-Day Museum opens in New Orleans, Louisiana.

2001 (SEPTEMBER 11)

Four U.S. commercial passenger jets are highjacked by terrorists associated with al Qaeda and crashed into U.S. sites, killing 2,986 people. Two planes hit the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, destroying both buildings; another hits the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, just outside the nation's capital; a fourth crashes in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania—presumably headed toward a location in Washington, D.C. The September 11 attacks have profound economic, social, cultural, and military effects throughout the world.

2001 (SEPTEMBER 20)

In an address to a joint session of Congress and to the American people, Pres. George W. Bush uses the phrase "war on terror" to describe the administration's intentions in the wake of the September 11 attacks, setting a seemingly long-term agenda for the country.

2001 (OCTOBER 7)

The United States begins a military campaign against Taliban forces and al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan.

2001 (OCTOBER 26)

Pres. George W. Bush signs into law the USAPATRIOT Act, which permits the indefinite imprisonment without trial of any non-U.S. citizen the attorney general rules to be a threat to American national security, while relieving the government of any responsibility to provide legal counsel to detainees. The act also contains provisions criticized as infringing excessively on Americans' individual rights.

2002 (NOVEMBER 25)

The Department of Homeland Security is established in an effort to protect against terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.

CHRONOLOGY

2003

A sexual assault scandal unfolds at the U.S. Air Force Academy.

2003 (March)

U.S.-led forces begin the bombing of Baghdad on the night of March 21, launching the Iraq War. The ground invasion commences soon thereafter. Numerous reporters, referred to as "embeds," accompany soldiers on the march toward Baghdad, providing unprecedented coverage of war to people around the world.

2003 (May 1)

Pres. George W. Bush, appearing on the deck of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* under a banner that reads "Mission Accomplished," declares "major combat operations" in the Iraq War at an end. American troops, however, continue operating in Iraq, becoming more embroiled in the ensuing conflict between Iraqi factions.

2004 (April)

The National World War II Memorial opens in Washington, D.C.

2004 (April 29)

Photographs of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq are first broadcast on CBS's *60 Minutes II*.

2004 (July)

The Senate Intelligence Committee reveals that the military advice given to Pres. George W. Bush about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was predicated on faulty information.

2004 (September)

A federal judge overturns the USAPATRIOT Act's provision requiring telephone, Internet, and communication companies to respond to law enforcement's requests for access to customers' personal information and call records.

2004 (September)

The Pentagon reports that the 1,000th American soldier had been killed in Iraq.

Documents

Documents

989

DOCUMENTS

Documents

991

DOCUMENTS

1609

REV. WILLIAM SYMONDS'S SERMON CRITICIZING THE VIRGINIA COMPANY'S VIOLENCE AGAINST NATIVES

Some of the early English and Scots colonists in their North American "plantations" treated indigenous peoples with unwarranted violence. This led some of their countrymen to remind them of Christian Just War concepts. Example: word came to the spiritual leader of the Plymouth Pilgrims, Pastor John Robinson, in 1623 that the Plantation's employed military leader, Capt. Miles Standish, had led a sortie against Massachusetts Native Americans who had threatened the lives of fur trader Thomas Weston and his men, claiming that Weston had cheated them. Standish had killed several. "Oh, how happy a thing had it been," Robinson wrote, "if you had converted some before you had killed any! . . . [Y]ou being no magistrates over them were to consider [only] what by necessity you were constrained to inflict. Necessity of this . . . I see not . . . [I]ndeed I am afraid lest, by these occasions, others should be drawn to affect a kind of ruffling course in the world." Similarly, in the passage that follows, Rev. William Symonds, troubled by news of the killing of a number of Tidewaters in Virginia, delivered these admonitions during a London religious service for those about to join the first wave of colonists in 1609:

O but, in entering of other countries, there must needs be much lamentable effusion of blood. Certainly our objector was hatched of some popish egg; & it may be in a JESUITS vault, where they feed themselves fat, with tormenting innocents. Why is there no remedy, but as soon as we come on land, like Wolves, and Lions, and Tigers, long famished, we must tear in pieces, murder, and torment the natural inhabitants, with cruelties never read, nor heard of before? must we needs burn millions of them, and cast millions into the sea? must we bait them with dogs, that shall eat up the mothers with their children? let such be the practices of the devil, of Abaddon the son of perdition, of Antichrist and his frie, that is of purple Rome. As for the professors of the Gospel, they know with Jacob and his posterity, to say to Pharaoh, To Sojourn in the land are we come; for thy servants have no pasture, &c. They can with Sampson live peaceably with the Philistines, till they be constrained by injustice, to stand upon their defence. They can instruct the barbarous princes, as Joseph did Pharaoh and his Senators; and as Daniel did Nabuchad-nezer, &c. And if these objectors had any brains in their head, but those which are sick, they could easily find a difference between a bloody invasion, and the planting of a peaceable Colony, in a waste country, where the people do live but like Deer in herds, and (no not in this stooping age, of the gray headed world, full of years and experience) have not as yet attained unto the first modesty that was in Adam, that knew he was naked, where they know no God but the devil, nor sacrifice, but to offer their men and children unto Moloch. Can it be a sin in Philip, to join himself to an Ethiopian charet? Is only now the ancient planting of Colonies, so highly praised among the Romans, and all other nations, so vile and odious among us, that what is, and hath been a virtue in all others, must be sin in us?

NOTE: The language and typography in this excerpt have been updated to modern English.

SOURCE: William Symonds, A Sermon Preached at White-Chappel (London: Eleazar Edgar, 1609).

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Wars; Just War Theory; Religion and War

1611

JOHN WINTHROP ON THE EVILS OF GUN OWNERSHIP

By the time that the English were beginning to colonize North America, the British Parliament had begun to limit the owning and use of firearms largely to men of property, in part to curb the poaching of game on their estates. Nevertheless, some men without property acquired firearms. In 1611 young John Winthrop (soon to become the chief magistrate of the English court at Norwich, East Anglia, and, in time, the first governor of the Puritan's Massachusetts Bay Colony) offered these entertaining thoughts in his diary on his use of his musket.

Finding by much examination that ordinary shooting in a gun, etc: could not stand with a good conscience in my self,

as first, for that it is simply prohibited by the law of the land, upon this ground amongst others, that it spoils more of the creatures than it gets: 2 it procures offence unto many: 3 it wastes great store of time: 4 it toils a man's body overmuch: 5 it endangers a man's life, etc: 6 it brings no profit all things considered: 7 it hazards more of a man's estate by the penalty of it, than a man would willingly part with: 8 it brings a man of worth and godliness into some contempt: —lastly for mine own part I have ever been crossed in using it, for when I have gone about it not without some wounds of conscience, and have taken much pains and hazarded my health, I have gotten sometimes a very little but most commonly nothing at all towards my cost and labor:

Therefore I have solved and covenanted with the Lord to give over altogether shooting at the creek; —and for killing of birds, etc: either to leave that altogether or else to use it, both very seldom and very secretly. God (if he please) can give me fowl by some other means, but if he will not, yet, in that it is [his] will who loves me, it is sufficient to uphold my resolution.

NOTE: The language and typography in this excerpt have been updated to modern English.

SOURCE: Winthrop Papers, vol. 1, 1498–1628 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1929).

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Militia Systems; European Military Culture, Influence of; Gun Ownership; Militia Groups

1613

DEFENSE BY WILLIAM STRACHEY OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY'S VIOLENCE AGAINST NATIVES

Criticism of the treatment by Virginia colonists of some of their Rapahanock and Powhatan Confederacy neighbors continued to be expressed in English circles, prompting that colony's secretary, William Strachey, to include these passages in the company's defense within his report of the colony's first five years of operation.

. . . What open and actual injury shall we do to the poor and innocent inhabitants to intrude upon them? I must ask them again, In which shall we offer them injury? for proffer-

ing them trade, or the knowledge of Christ? From one of these two or both the injury must proceed. Why? What injury can it be to people of any nation for Christians to come unto their ports, havens, or territories, when the law of nations (which is the law of God and man[)] doth privilege all men to do so, which admits it lawful to trade with any manner of people, in so much as no man is to take upon him (that knoweth any thing) the defence of the savages in this point, since the savages themselves may not impugn or forbid the same, in respect of common fellowship and community betwixt man and man; albeit I will not deny but that the savages may (without peradventure) be ignorant of as much, and (alas) of more graces beside, and particularities of humanity, the reason whereof being, because (poor souls) they know not the good which they stand in need of; but we that are Christians do know how this law (enriching all kingdoms) gives privileges to ambassadors, keeps the seas common and safe, lays open ports and havens, and allows free scales and liberal access for whosoever that will import unto them such commodities as their countries have, and they want; or export from them some of their plenty (duties and customs provincial observed). If this be so for the first, concerning the other it may fully be answered with this demand, shall it not follow, if traffic be thus justifiable (which intended nothing but transitory profit and increase of temporal and worldly goods) shall not planting the Christian faith be much more? Yes by how much the divine good (not subject to change, and under no alteration), excels, takes an account, and surveys, and surpasseth all things, and all our actions are to bend their intentions thitherward; and what way soever we make, yet miserable and wretched he whose every line he draws, every act and thought do not close and meet in the center of that. . . .

But yet it is injurious to the natural inhabitants, still say ours. Wherefore? It is because it is, now indeed, a most doughty and material reason, a great piece of injury to bring them (to invert our English proverb) out of the warm sun, into God's blessing; to bring them from bodily wants, confusion, misery, and these outward anguishes, to the knowledge of a better practice, and improving of these benefits (to a more and ever during advantage, and to a civiler use) which God hath given unto them, but involved and hid in the bowels and

womb of their land (to them barren and unprofitable, because unknown); nay, to exalt, as I may say, mere privation to the highest degree of perfection, by bringing their wretched souls (like Cerberus, from hell) from the chains of Satan, to the arms and bosom of their Saviour: here is a most impious piece of injury. Let me remember what Mr. Simondes, preacher of St. Saviour's, saith in this behalf: It is as much, saith he, as if a father should be said to offer violence to his child, when he beats him to bring him to goodness. Had not this violence and this injury been offered to us by the Romans (as the warlike Scots did the same, likewise, in Caledonia, unto the Picts), even by Julius Caesar himself, then by the emperor Claudius, who was therefore called Britannicus, and his captains, Aulus Plautius and Vespatian (who took in the Isle of Wight); and lastly, by the first lieutenant sent hither, Ostorius Scapula (as writes Tacitus in the life of Agricola), who reduced the conquered parts of our barbarous island into provinces, and established in them colonies of old soldiers; building castles and towns, and in every corner teaching us even to know the powerful discourse of divine reason (which makes us only men, and distinguisheth us from beasts, amongst whom we lived as naked and as beastly as they). We might yet have lived overgrown satyrs, rude and untutored, wandering in the woods, dwelling in caves, and hunting for our dinners, as the wild beasts in the forests for their prey, prostituting our daughters to strangers, sacrificing our children to idols, nay, eating our own children, as did the Scots in those days, as reciteth Tho. Cogan, bachelor of physic, in his book De Sanitate, cha. 137, printed 1189, . . .

All the injury that we purpose unto them, is but the amendment of these horrible heathenisms, and the reduction of them to the aforesaid manly duties, and to the knowledge (which the Romans could not give us) of that God who must save both them and us, and who bought us alike with a dear sufferance and precious measure of mercy.

For the apter enabling of our selves unto which so heavenly an enterprise, who will think it an unlawful act to fortify and strengthen our selves (as nature requires) with the best helps, and by sitting down with guards and forces about us in the waste and vast unhabited grounds of theirs, amongst a world of which not one foot of a thousand do they either use, or know how to turn to any benefit; and there-

fore lies so great a circuit vain and idle before them? Nor is this any injury unto them, from whom we will not forcibly take of their provision and labours, nor make rape of what they cleanse and manure; but prepare and break up new grounds, and thereby open unto them likewise a new way of thrift or husbandry; for as a righteous man (according to Solomon) ought to regard the life of his beast, so surely Christian men should not show themselves like wolves to devour, who cannot forget that every soul which God hath sealed for himself he hath done it with the print of charity and compassion; and therefore even every foot of land which we shall take unto our use, we will bargain and buy of them, for copper, hatchets, and such like commodities, for which they will even sell themselves, and with which they can purchase double that quantity from their neighbours; and thus we will commune and entreat with them, truck, and barter, our commodities for theirs, and theirs for ours (of which they seem more fain) in all love and friendship, until, for our good purposes towards them, we shall find them practice violence [no more].

NOTE: The language and typography in this excerpt have been updated to modern English.

SOURCE: William Strachey, The Historie of Travaile into Virginia Britannia (London: Hackluyt Society, 1849).

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Wars; Just War Theory

1622

VIRGINIA COMPANY SEC. EDWARD WATERHOUSE DEFENDS COMPANY'S CONDUCT DURING 1622 WAR

A defense similar to the one above (see document, 1613), but one more frank in its tone, was offered nine years later by Strachey's successor, Edward Waterhouse, after the Powhatan had attacked the colony in 1622, killing 25 percent of its population, in an attempt to regain lands and sovereignty.

THUS have you seen the particulars of this massacre, out of Letters from thence written, wherein treachery and cruelty have done their worst to us, or rather to them-

selves; for whose understanding is so shallow, as not to perceive that this must needs be for the good of the Plantation after, and the loss of this blood to make the body more healthful, as by these reasons may be manifest.

First, Because betraying of innocency never rests unpunished: And therefore Agesilaus, when his enemies (upon whose oath of being faithful he rested) had deceived him, he sent them thanks, for that by their perjury, they had made God his friend, and their enemy.

Secondly, Because our hands which before were tied with gentleness and fair usage, are now set at liberty by the treacherous violence of the Savages not untying the Knot, but cutting it: So that we, who hitherto have had possession of no more ground than their waste, and our purchase at a valuable consideration to their own contentment, gained; may now by right of War, and law of Nations, invade the Country, and destroy them who fought to destroy us: whereby we shall enjoy their cultivated places, turning the laborious Mattock into the victorious Sword (wherein there is more both ease, benefit, and glory) and possessing the fruits of others labours. Now their cleared grounds in all their villages (which are situate in the fruitfullest places of the land) shall be inhabited by us, whereas heretofore the grubbing of woods was the greatest labour.

Thirdly, Because those commodities which the Indians enjoyed as much or rather more than we, shall now also be entirely possessed by us. The Deer and other beasts will be in safety, and infinitely increase, which heretofore not only in the general huntings of the King (whereat four or five hundred Deer were usually slain) but by each particular Indian were destroyed at all times of the year, without any difference of Male, Dame, or Young. The like may be said of our own Swine and Goats, whereof they have used to kill eight in ten more than the English have done. There will be also a great increase of wild Turkeys, and other weighty Fowl, for the Indians never put difference of destroying the Hen, but kill them whether in season or not, whether in breeding time, or sitting on their eggs, or having new hatched, it is all one to them: whereby, as also by the orderly using of their fishing Wares, no other known Country in the world will so plentifully abound in victual.

Fourthly, Because the way of conquering them is much more easy than of civilizing them by fair means, for they are a rude, barbarous, and naked people, scattered in small companies, which are helps to Victory, but hinderances to Civility: Besides that, a conquest may be of many, and at once; but civility is in particular, and flow, the effect of long time, and great industry. Moreover, victory of them may be gained many ways; by force, by surprise, by famine in burning their Corn, by destroying and burning their Boats, Canoes, and Houses, by breaking their fishing Wares, by assailing them in their huntings, whereby they get the greatest part of their sustenance in Winter, by pursuing and chasing them with our horses, and blood-Hounds to draw after them, and Mastiffs to tear them, which take this naked, tanned, deformed Savages, for no other than wild beasts, and are so fierce and fell upon them, that they fear them worse than their own Devil which they worship, supposing them to be a new and worse kind of Devils than their own. By these and sundry other ways, as by driving them (when they flee) upon their enemies, who are round about them, and by animating and abetting their enemies against them, may their ruin or subjection be soon effected. . . .

Fiftly, Because the Indians, who before were used as friends, may now most justly be compelled to servitude and drudgery, and supply the [?] of men that labour, whereby even the meanest of the Plantation may employ themselves more entirely in their Arts and Occupations, which are more generous, whilst Savages perform their inferiour works of digging in mines, and the like, of whom also some may be sent for the service of the Sommer Ilands.

Sixtly, This will for ever hereafter make us more cautious and circumspect, as never to be deceived more by any other treacheries, but will serve for a great instruction to all posterity there, to teach them that Trust is the mother of Deceit, and to learn them that of the Italian, Chi non fida, non s'ingamuu, He that trusts is not deceived; and make them know that kindnesses are misspent upon rude natures, so long as they continue rude; as also, that Savages and Pagans are above all other for matter of Justice ever to be suspected. Thus upon this Anvil shall we now beat out to our selves an armour of proof, which shall for ever after defend us from barbarous Incursions, and from greater dangers that

otherwise might happen. And so we may truly say according to the French Proverb, Aquelq, chose malheur est bon, Ill luck is good for something.

Lastly, We have this benefit more to our comfort, because all good men do now take much more care of us than before, since the fault is on their sides, not on ours, who have used so-fair a carriage, even to our own destruction. Especially his Majesties most gracious, tender and paternal care is manifest herein, who by his Royal bounty and goodness, hath continued his many favors unto us, with a new, large, & Princely supply of Munition and Arms, out of his Majesties own store in the Tower, being graciously bestowed for the safety and advancement of the Plantation. As also his Royal favor is amply extended in a large supply of men and other necessaries throughout the whole Kingdom, which are very shortly to be sent to VIRGINIA.

NOTE: The language and typography in this excerpt have been updated to modern English.

SOURCE: Edward Waterhouse, *A Declaration of the State of the Colony and the Affaires in Virginia* (London, 1622).

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Wars; Just War Theory; Religion and War

1637

Excerpt from Captain John Underhill's Account of a Raid on a Pequot Village

Several thousand Puritans from England and the Massachusetts Bay Colony migrated in the mid-1630s to what is now Connecticut. In the eastern half of that region they came to loggerheads with the powerful Pequot nation whose people brooked no trespass on their domains. Violent encounters between Pequot and newcomers led to a Puritan punitive expedition in 1637. Capt. John Underhill, a Puritan settler who had gained military experience in the service of Philip William, prince of Orange, while self-exiled with his fellow Puritans in Holland, commanded the Massachusetts Bay contingent of this expedition. His

account of the ensuing war includes these passages. Note the evidence of a cultural difference between the ways that Europeans their Narragansett and Mohegan allies conceived of the limits to war.

. . . Having our swords in our right hand, our Carbines or Muskets in our left hand; we approached the Fort. Master Hedge being shot threw both arms, and more wounded; though it be not commendable for a man to make mention of any thing that might tend to his own honour; yet because I would have the providence of God observed, and his Name magnified, as well as for my self as others, I dare not omit, but let the world know, that deliverance was given to us that command, as well as to private soldiers. Captaine Mason and my self entering into the Wigwams, he was shot, and received many Arrows against his head-piece, God preserved him from any wounds; my self received a shot in the left hip, through a sufficient Buffcoat that if I had not been supplied with such a garment the Arrow would have pierced through me; another I received between neck and shoulders, hanging in the linen of my Head-piece, others of our soldiers were shot some through the shoulders, some in the face, some in the head, some in the legs; Captaine Mason and my self losing each of us a man, and had near twenty wounded: most courageously these Pequots behaved themselves; but seeing the Fort was too hot for us, we devised a way how we might save our selves and prejudice them; Captaine Mason entering into a Wigwam, brought out a fire-brand, after he had wounded many in the house, then he set fire on the West-side where he entered, my self set fire on the South end with a train of Powder, the fires of both meeting in the center of the Fort blazed most terribly, and burnt all in the space of half an hour; many courageous fellows were unwilling to come out, and fought most desperately through the Palisadoes, so as they were scorched and burnt with the very flame, and were deprived of their arms, in regard the fire burnt their very bowstrings, and so perished valiantly: mercy they did deserve for their valour, could we have had opportunity to have bestowed it; many were burnt in the Fort, both men, women, and children, others forced out, and came in troops to the Indians, twenty, and thirty at a time, which our soldiers received and entertained with the point of the sword; down fell men, women, and children, those that escaped us,

fell into the hands of the Indians, that were in the rear of us; it is reported by themselves, that there were about four hundred souls in this Fort, and not above five of them escaped out of our hands. Great and doleful was the bloody sight to the view of young soldiers that never had been in War, to see so many souls lie gasping on the ground so thick in some places, that you could hardly pass along. It may be demanded, Why should you be so furious (as some have said) should not Christians have more mercy and compassion? But I would refer you to David's war, when a people is grown to such a height of blood, and sin against God and man, and all confederates in the action, there he hath no respect to persons, but harrows them, and saws them, and puts them to the sword, and the most terriblest death that may be; sometimes the Scripture declareth women and children must perish with their parents; sometime the case alters: but we will not dispute it now. We had sufficient light from the word of God for our proceedings. . . .

. . . Our Indians came to us, [sic]-eyed at our victories, and greatly admired the manner of English men's fight; but cried mach it, mach it; that is, it is naught, it is naught, because it is too furious, and slays too many men. Having received their desires, they freely promised, and gave up themselves to march along with us, wherever we would go.

NOTE: The language and typography in this excerpt have been updated to modern English.

SOURCE: John Underhill, *Newes from America; or, a New and Experimentall Discoverie of New England* (London: Peter Cole, 1638).

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Wars; European Military Culture, Influence of; Just War Theory; Militarization and Militarism

1654

Letter of Roger Williams

The founder of the Rhode Island colony, Roger Williams, maintained a lively correspondence with the government of his northern colonial neighbor, Massachusetts Bay. This included some protests against what he felt were that colony's

failure to maintain some basic Just War principles in its dealings with Rhode Island's closest Native American neighbors, the Narragansett. Here he reminds the government in Boston that "all men of conscience or prudence ply to windward, to maintain their wars to be defensive. . . . "

To the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony
To the General Court of Massachusetts Bay.

PROVIDENCE, 5, 8, 54. (so called.)
[October 5, 1654.]

MUCH HONORED SIRS,—I truly wish you peace, and pray your gentle acceptance of a word, I hope not unreasonable.

We have in these parts a sound of your meditations of war against these natives, amongst whom we dwell. I consider that war is one of those three great, sore plagues, with which it pleaseth God to affect the sons of men. I consider, also, that I refused, lately, many offers in my native country, out of a sincere desire to seek the good and peace of this.

I remember, that upon the express advice of your ever honored Mr. Winthrop, deceased, I first adventured to begin a plantation among the thickest of these barbarians.

That in the Pequot wars, it pleased your honored government to employ me in the hazardous and weighty service of negotiating a league between yourselves and the Narragansetts, when the Pequot messengers, who fought the Narragansetts' league against the English, had almost ended that my work and life together.

That at the subscribing of that solemn league, which, by the mercy of the Lord, I had procured with the Narragansetts, your government was pleased to send unto me the copy of it, subscribed by all hands there, which yet I keep as a monument and a testimony of peace and faithfulness between you both.

That, since that time, it hath pleased the Lord so to order it, that I have been more or less interested and used in all your great transactions of war or peace, between the English and the natives, and have not spared purse, nor pains, nor hazards, (very many times,) that the whole land, English and natives, might sleep in peace securely.

That in my last negotiations in England, with the Parliament, Council of State, and his Highness, I have been forced to be known so much, that if I should be silent, I

should not only betray mine own peace and yours, but also should be false to their honorable and princely names, whose loves and affections, as well as their supreme authority are not a little concerned in the peace or war of this country.

At my last departure for England, I was importuned by the Narragansett Sachems, and especially by Ninigret, to present their petition to the high Sachems of England, that they might not be forced from their religion, and, for not changing their religion, be invaded by war; for they said they were daily visited with threatenings by Indians that came from about the Massachusetts, that if they would not pray, they should be destroyed by war. With this their petition I acquainted, in private discourses, divers of the chief of our nation, and especially his Highness, who, in many discourses I had with him, never expressed the least tittle of displeasure, as hath been here reported, but in the midst of disputes, ever expressed a high spirit of love and gentleness, and was often pleased to please himself with very many questions, and my answers, about the Indian affairs of this country; and, after all hearing of yourself and us, it hath pleased his Highness and his Council to grant, amongst other favors to this colony, some expressly concerning the very Indians, the native inhabitants of this jurisdiction.

I, therefore, humbly offer to your prudent and impartial view, first these two considerable terms, it pleased the Lord to use to all that profess his name (Rom 12:18,) if it be possible, and all men.

I never was against the righteous use of the civil sword of men or nations, but yet since all men of conscience or prudence ply to windward, to maintain their wars to be defensive, (as did both King and Scotch, and English and Irish too, in the late wars,) I humbly pray your consideration, whether it be not only possible, but very easy, to live and die in peace with all the natives of this country.

For, secondly, are not all the English of this land, generally, a persecuted people from their native soil? and hath not the God of peace and Father of mercies made these natives more friendly in this, than our native countrymen in our own land to us? Have they not entered leagues of love, and to this day continued peaceable commerce with us? Are not our families grown up in peace amongst them? Upon which I humbly ask, how it can suit with Christian ingenuity to take

hold of some seeming occasions for their destructions, which, though the heads be only aimed at, yet, all experience tells us, falls on the body and the innocent.

NOTE: The language and typography in this excerpt have been updated to modern English.

SOURCE: Roger Williams, The Complete Writings of Roger Williams, vol. 6 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963).

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Wars; Just War Theory; Religion and War

1712

JOHN BARNWELL'S EXPEDITION AGAINST THE TUSCARORAS OF NORTH CAROLINA

In September 1711 the Tuscarora people of eastern North Carolina launched an attack against encroaching European colonists. The Tuscarora were particularly disturbed by the founding of New Bern in 1710, but they were also responding to a long series of aggressive actions engaged in by traders and slave raiders. The Tuscarora's initial attacks devastated the white frontier, and North Carolinians, generally powerless to respond, asked for help. South Carolina dispatched an expedition of 33 whites and about 500 allied Native Americans (mostly Yamassee) under the command of Col. John Barnwell. Barnwell marched into the southern Tuscarora towns, and, in a complicated series of sieges, truces, broken truces, and more sieges, he forced the capitulation of a major Tuscarora force defending a fort near Hancock's Town (or Catechna). Barnwell and his men and allies returned to South Carolina. Possibly because of Barnwell's actions in taking slaves from among the Tuscarora, war quickly broke out again and would continue sporadically as late as 1715. The following excerpts from his journal convey a sense of Barnwell's tactics and attitudes toward Native Americans.

The 29th I marched hard all day and most of the night, that if possible I might surprise this great town, but to my great disappointment they discovered us, being continually upon their guard since the massacre [i.e. the Tuscaroras' initial attack]. Tho' this be called a town, it is only a plantation here and there

scattered about the Country, no where 5 houses together, and then 1/4 a mile such another and so on for several miles, so it is impossible to surprize many before the alarm takes. They have lately built small forts at about a miles distance from one another where ye men sleep all night & the women & children, mostly in the woods; I have seen 9 of these Forts and none of them a month old, & some not quite finished.

[Barnwell stormed one fort at Narhontes, and]

Next morning ye Tuscaruro town of Kenta came to attack us, but at such a distance I could not come up with them so I ordered two of Capt. Jack's Company to cross a great Swamp that lay at the back of us and ly close untill they heard our firing, and then to come on the back or rear of the Enemy if possible to surround them, accordingly they did, but being two [too] eager, they did not time [it properly, and we took] but 9 scalps & 2 prisoners which I ordered immediately to be burned alive.

[Now with an army of 153 whites and 128 Indians, Barnwell besieged Hancock's Fort. Progress was slow, and required the digging of zigzag approach trenches. Finally the trenches came up the palisade wall, and]

.. . . we gained ye ditch & sevll times fired ye pallisades wch ye enemy like desperate villians defended at an amazing rate. This siege for variety of action, salleys, attempts to be relieved from without, can't I believe be parallelled agst Indians. Such bold attacks as they made at our trenches flinted the edge of those Raw soldiers, that tho' they were wholly under ground yet they would quitt their posts and with extreme difficulty be prevaled upon to resume them. The subtell Enemy finding the disadvantage they were under in sallying open to attack our works took ye same method as we did and digged under ground to meet our approaches. . .

[Barnwell found the effort of assault too costly in lives and especially time, so he finally offered terms under which the Tuscaroras could surrender. They agreed to a list of articles that included admitting Barnwell's force into the fort. Barnwell paraded his forces through the entrance and]

I might see by the strength of the place a good many would be killed before it could be forced. Some base people

was urging to take this opportunity [to seize the Tuscaroras] but I would sooner die. In truth they were murderers, but if our Indians found that there could be no dependence on our promises, it might prove of ill consequence . . .

NOTE: *The language and typography in this excerpt have been updated to modern English.*

SOURCE: *"Journal of John Barnwell," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 5, no. 6 (1898–99): 42–55, 391–402.*

RELATED ENTRIES: *Colonial Wars; European Military Culture, Influence of*

1737

MASSACHUSETTS'S REV. WILLIAM WILLIAMS ON JUST WARS

In the 18th century, sermons on Just War were to be heard in a number of the settled British colonies of North America. A prominent Presbyterian minister, Gilbert Tennent, offered one in Pennsylvania in the 1740s. The passages below are drawn from a sermon preached before "the Honorable [Massachusetts] Artillery Company [on] the day of their [sic] election of officers" in 1737 by the Congregationalist minister William Williams.

. . . a Christian State . . . exposed to the *Incursions and Ravages* of proud, ambitious or covetous Men . . . is needful, that they should take care for their own *Security* and *Defence*. God can indeed, make those who are disposed to be their *Enemies, to be at peace with them*. And it is the highest interest of any People to labour to be in good terms with the great Ruler and Governour of the world; and *to put their trust in Him*, as their defence. Yet since, according to the ordinary Course of Providence, his own People have seldom enjoyed *lasting peace*, but have been expos'd to Invasions and Incroachments of unreasonable Men, therefore it is needful and prudent for them to be upon their Guard and Defence, and be able to *repel force by force*. Otherwise their Civil and Sacred Liberties, their Lives and Properties, and all that is dear unto them, may be in the utmost hazard. So that by the *principles*, which the God who hath made us, hath implanted in us, it is plain that Christians

need Armour of Defence against their Enemies, that they may not be made a Prey unto Devourers.

Self-preservation is a fundamental Law of humane Nature, and *Christianity* does not overthrow any such Laws but establish them.—This is intimated to us, by that of *our Lord* to his Disciples, *Luk.* 22, 35, 36.—*He said unto them, when I sent you without purse and scrip and shoes, lacked ye any thing? and they said nothing. Then said He unto them, But now he that hath a purse let him take it,—and he that hath no Sword let him sell his Garment and buy one:* Signifying, "that the Instruction which He gave them for the Execution of their first Commission, was but temporal, and for that time only observable, now the time requireth that you be armed to Encounter many Difficulties. Now the posture of your affairs will be much altered, you must expect Enemies and Oppositions; and the Tragedy will begin with me—. You stand concerned to make as good *preparation* as you can in these things, &c." If our Lord does not design to teach *Ministers* to take *Arms for their Defence*, nor in the least intend that the Gospel should be propagated by the *Sword*; yet he intimates to them and to all succeeding *Christians*, that they must not expect or depend on *Miracles* for their Supply or *Defence*,—but that the Sword may become as necessary as our *Cloathing*.—Nor is this at all inconsistent with that Repremand of our Saviour unto *Peter, Mat.* 26. 52. *Then said Jesus unto him, put up thy Sword now into its place; for all they that take the Sword shall perish with the Sword.* For this is to be understood, of private *Persons* taking up the Sword against the lawful *Magistrate*, or *Persons* who have not a *lawful* Call or Warrant. And thus all *Christians* are to learn the *same Lesson*. Men must have the Sword orderly put into their hands, before they may use it. It was not the Design of our Saviour to set up a *Temporal Kingdom*, or civil Dominion, as he saith, in another place, "*My Kingdom is not of this world, else would my Servants fight,*" (Joh. 18. 36.) or they might reasonably do it.

The lawfulness of *weapons of War*, and the benefit of well appointed Arms, disciplined and skilful Soldiers, has been well shew'd from this Desk,—Let it suffice therefore, now to suggest,

That the LORD himself hath this Title given Him as his great Honour: particularly in that *Song of Triumph* after the miraculous Destruction of his People's *Enemies, Exod.* 15.

Jehovah is a Man of War—. And how often is he call'd, *The Lord of Hosts?*—The *Lord strong and mighty:*—the *Lord mighty in Battle!*—This at least, intimates that a warlike Genius, dextrous Skill and undaunted Courage, are honourable qualifications among Men.

NOTE: The language and typography in this excerpt have been updated to modern English.

SOURCE: William Williams, Martial Wisdom Recommended; A Sermon Preached [to] the Honorable Artillery Company [on] the day of their election of officers (Boston, 1737).

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Wars; Just War Theory; Religion and War

1747

MASSACHUSETTS LT. GOV. THOMAS HUTCHINSON'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOSTON PRESS GANG RIOT OF 1747 IN HIS *HISTORY OF THE COLONY*

Britain's imperial wars of the 18th century created seasonal demands for additional naval personnel. British naval conscription measures of the day, authorized by Parliament, were simple and direct. The vessel in need sent a "press gang" of sailors under the command of an officer ashore to draft ("impress") unwary men possessed of no skill or trade that would have exempted them from such treatment. Commodore Charles Knowles, commanding a small squadron of warships in the vicinity of Boston in 1747, sent such a party ashore to find replacements for some sailors who had deserted. When they seized a number of likely candidates, word of their presence spread quickly and a number of Knowles's officers, dining with Lt. Gov. Thomas Hutchinson, found themselves besieged and threatened by a large and angry mob. The lieutenant governor's report of the incident follows.

IN 1747 (NOV. 17TH) HAPPENED a tumult in the town of Boston equal to any which had preceded it, although far short of some that have happened since. Mr. Knowles was commodore of a number of men of war then in the harbour of Nantasket. Some of the sailors had deserted. The commodore

. . . thought it reasonable that Boston should supply him with as many men as he had lost and, sent his boats up to town early in the morning, and surprized not only as many seamen as could be found on board any of the ships, outward bound as well as others, but swept the wharfs also, taking some ship carpenters apprentices and labouring land men. However tolerable such a surprize might have been in London it could not be borne here. The people had not been used to it and men of all orders resented it, but the lower class were beyond measure enraged and soon assembled with sticks, clubs, pitchmops, etc. They first seized an innocent lieutenant who happened to be ashore upon other business. They had then formed no scheme, and the speaker of the house passing by and assuring them that he knew that the lieutenant had no hand in the press they suffered him to be led off to a place of safety. The mob increasing and having received intelligence that several of the commanders were at the governor's house, it was agreed to go and demand satisfaction. The house was soon surrounded and the court, or yard before the house, filled, but many persons of discretion inserted themselves and prevailed so far as to prevent the mob from entering. Several of the officers had planted themselves at the head of the stair way with loaded carbines and seemed determined to preserve their liberty or lose their lives. A deputy sheriff attempting to exercise his authority, was seized by the mob and carried away in triumph and set in the stocks, which afforded them diversion and tended to abate their rage and disposed them to separate and go to dinner.

As soon as it was dusk, several thousand people assembled in king-street, below the town house where the general court was sitting. Stones and brickbatts were thrown through the glass into the council chamber. The governor, however, with several gentlemen of the council and house ventured into the balcony and, after silence was obtained, the governor in a well judged speech expressed his great disapprobation of the impress and promised his utmost endeavours to obtain the discharge of every one of the inhabitants, and at the same time gently reproved the irregular proceedings both of the forenoon and evening. Other gentlemen also attempted to persuade the people to disperse and wait to see what steps the general court would take. All was to no purpose. The seizure and restraint of the commanders and other officers who were in town was insisted upon as the only effectual method to procure the release of the inhabitants aboard the ships.

It was thought advisable for the governor to withdraw to his house, many of the officers of the militia and other gentlemen attending him. A report was raised that a barge from one of the ships was come to a wharf in the town. The mob flew to seize it, but by mistake took a boat belonging to a Scotch ship and dragged it, with as much seeming ease through the street as if it had been in the water, to the governor's house and prepared to burn it before the house, but from a consideration of the danger of setting the town on fire were diverted and the boat was burnt in a place of less hazard. The next day the governor ordered that the military officers of Boston should cause their companies to be mustered and to appear in arms, and that a military watch should be kept the succeeding night, but the drummers were interrupted and the militia refused to appear. The governor did not think it for his honour to remain in town another night and privately withdrew to the castle. A number of gentlemen who had some intimation of his design, sent a message to him by Col. Hutchinson, assuring him they would stand by him in maintaining the authority of government and restoring peace and order, but he did not think this sufficient.

The governor wrote to Mr. Knowles representing the confusions occasioned by this extravagant act of his officers, but he refused all terms of accommodation until the commanders and other officers on shore were suffered to go on board their ships, and he threatened to bring up his ships and bombard the town, and some of them coming to sail, caused different conjectures of his real intention. Capt. Erskine of the Canterbury had been seized at the house of Col. Brinley in Roxbury and given his parole not to go aboard, and divers inferior officers had been secured.

The 17th, 18th and part of the 19th, the council and house of representatives, sitting in the town, went on with their ordinary business, not willing to interpose lest they should encourage other commanders of the navy to future acts of the like nature, but towards noon of the 19th some of the principal members of the house began to think more seriously of the dangerous consequence of leaving the governor without support when there was not the least

ground of exception to his conduct. Some high spirits in the town began to question whether his retiring should be deemed a desertion or abdication. It was moved to appoint a committee of the two houses to consider what was proper to be done. This would take time and was excepted to, and the speaker was desired to draw up such resolves as it was thought necessary the house should immediately agree to, and they were passed by a considerable majority and made public.

> In the house of representatives, Nov. 19th, 1747.
>
> Resolved, that there has been and still continues, a tumultuous riotous assembling of armed seamen, servants, negroes and others in the town of Boston, tending to the destruction of all government and order.
>
> Resolved, that it is incumbent on the civil and military officers in the province to exert themselves to the utmost, to discourage and suppress all such tumultuous riotous proceedings whensoever they may happen.
>
> Resolved, that this house will stand by and support with their lives and estates his excellency the governor and the executive part of the government in all endeavors for this purpose.
>
> Resolved, that this house will exert themselves by all ways and means possible in redressing such grievances as his majesty's subjects are and have been under, which may have been the cause of the aforesaid tumultuous disorderly assembling together.
>
> T. Hutchinson, Speaker.

The council passed a vote ordering that Captain Erskine and all other officers belonging to his majesty's ships should be forthwith set at liberty and protected by the government, which was concurred by the house. As soon as these votes were known, the tumultuous spirit began to subside. The inhabitants of the town of Boston assembled in town meeting in the afternoon, having been notified to consider, in general, what was proper for them to do upon this occasion, and notwithstanding it was urged by many that all measures to suppress the present spirit in the people would tend to encourage the like oppressive acts for the future, yet the contrary party prevailed and the

town, although they expressed their sense of the great insult and injury by the impress, condemned the tumultuous riotous acts of such as had insulted the governor and the other branches of the legislature and committed many other heinous offences.

The governor, not expecting so favorable a turn, had wrote to the secretary to prepare orders for the colonels of the regiments of Cambridge, Roxbury and Milton and the regiment of horse to have their officers and men ready to march at an hour's warning to such place of rendezvous as he should direct; . . . Commodore [Knowles] dismissed most, if not all, of the inhabitants who had been impressed, and the squadron sailed to the great joy of the rest of the town.

SOURCE: Thomas Hutchinson, *The History of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay*, 2nd ed. (London, 1765–1828), 2: 489–92.

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Militia Systems; Colonial Wars; Impressment

1759

PETITION FROM ARMY WIFE MARTHA MAY FOR FREEDOM TO CARRY WATER TO TROOPS

European and American colonial military forces were often accompanied by women— spouses of soldiers serving in the regiment or others employed to cook, sew, and wash for the troops. When the soldier-husband of such a "camp follower" was killed, or when he ran afoul of military discipline, the man's wife could experience real distress, especially if, as in this case, she reacted in a manner that offended the power-that-was.

Carlisle

4th June 1759

Honoured Sr/

Please to hear the Petition of your Poor unfortunate Servant Martha May now confined in Carlisle Gaol Please your Honr as my husband is an Old Soldier and Seeing him taken out of the Ranks to be Confined Put me in Such a Passion that I was almost beside myself but being

informed, after that I abused Yr Honour, to a High degree for which I ask Yr Honour a Thousand Pardons, and am Really Sorrow for what I have said&done; Knowing Yr Honour to be a Compationate, and Merciful Man, I beg and hope you will take it into Consideration that it was the Love I had for my Poor husband; and no—hill will to Yr Honour, which was the cause of abusing so good a Colonel as you are. Please to Sett me at Liberty this time & I never will dis-oblige yr Honour nor any other Officer belonging to the Army for the future as I have been a Wife 22 years and have Traveld with my Husband every Place or Country the Company Marcht too and have workt very-hard ever since I was in the Army I hope yr honour will be so Good as to pardon me this [onct (stricken out)] time that I may go with my Poor Husband one time more to carry him and my good officers water in ye hottest Battles as I have done before.

I am

Yr unfortunate petitioner and Humble Servant

Mara May

[Endorsed] Petition of Martha May to carry Water to the Soldiers in the heat of Battle.

[Addressed]

To the Right Honble Colonel Bouquet

SOURCE: Martha May to Henry Bouquet, June 4, 1758, in *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, vol. 2, page 30.

RELATED ENTRIES: Camp Followers; Colonial Wars; Families, Military; Women in the Military

1760

Lt. Col. James Grant and Gen. Jeffrey Amherst Discuss How to Subdue the Cherokees

Frontier friction between the Cherokee of the southern Appalachians and white settlers led to three expeditions against the Cherokee from 1759 to 1761. The 1760 expedition had destroyed a number of Cherokee villages, but had not ended the war. In the following excerpts, British Gen. Jeffrey Amherst and Lt. Col. James Grant, the designated commander of an expedition to begin in the

spring of 1761, discuss how to defeat the Cherokee. Their discussion highlights a number of patterns in British wars against Native Americans: the intention to "chastise" rather than conquer; the reliance on devastation as a strategy; and the seemingly insoluble problem of what to do if indigenous peoples merely fled and refused to surrender or make peace.

[Amherst to Grant to December 21, 1760.]

[Y]ou will proceed to the inland frontiers, or wheresoever the enemy may be within the Province of S. Carolina; & act against them offensively by destroying their towns & cutting up their settlements as shall occur best to you for the future protection of the Colony; the lives & the properties of the subjects; the most effectual chastisement of the Cherokees; the reducing of them to the absolute necessity of suing for pardon & peace; & the putting it out of their power of renewing hostilities with any degree of imminent danger to the Province. Immediately after you have completed this service, as I observed before, you are, with the troops under your command, to return to Charlestown, & to embark with the whole on your return here [New York], . . .

. . . No people are more easily surprised than Indians, they must at all times be pushed. If they are, they will not stand, but trust to flight and are easily conquered, so no people are more dangerous enemies when given way to, as their motions are very quick, and their howlings, with the notions the soldiers are too apt to have of their barbarities, create the greatest confusion . . .

Grant replied to Amherst's above orders by asking a series of questions. This letter preserves both Grant's questions and Amherst's replies. One of Grant's questions asked:

Query 3rd: After cutting up the Indian settlements, and following the Cherokees as far as troops can with any degree of safety, supposing they retire only, and don't ask for peace, what is to be done?

Answer: You are to pursue the Cherokees as far as shall be practicable; to distress them to your utmost; & not to return until you have compelled them into a peace, or that you receive orders for so doing. . . .

SOURCE: Edith Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers, 1756-1763, The Southern Sector,* (Bowie, Md.: Heritage Books, 1999), 153–54, 163.

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Wars

1766
COMMENTS FROM BRITISH PAMPHLET ON COLONIES' REFUSAL TO PAY TAXES

Once the Seven Years' (French and Indian) War had ended, the Crown and Parliament, under pressure from an officer serving therein, decided to provide support for some regiments that had not been maintained in peacetime prior to that war. Several companies of men belonging to regiments that had served in the North American theater of the war were based in colonial seaport cities and taxes were levied on the colonists to pay for them. These taxes prompted widespread resistance, and a constitutional crisis emerged that led to a flurry of pamphlets supporting one side or the other. In one such pamphlet, these inflammatory passages, probably penned by a British officer and veteran of the war in America, must have infuriated colonial New Englanders who saw it.

I take your word for it . . . and believe you are as sober, temperate, upright, humane and virtuous, as the posterity of independents and anabaptists, presbyterians and quakers, convicts and felons, savages and negro-worshippers, can be; that you are as loyal subjects, as obedient to the laws, as zealous for the maintenance of order and good government, as your late actions evince you to be; and I affirm that you have much need of the gentlemen of the blade to polish and refine your manners, to inspire you with an honest frankness and openness of behaviour, to rub off the rust of puritanism and to make you ashamed of proposing in your assemblies, as you have lately done, to pay off no more debts due to your original native country.

SOURCE: The Justice and Necessity of Taxing the American Colonies Demonstrated (London, 1766).

RELATED ENTRIES: Economy and War; Revolutionary War

1768 a
A LETTER FROM SAMUEL ADAMS TO THE BOSTON GAZETTE

Fear of and disdain for "standing armies" came, to one degree or another, in every ship carrying successive waves of colonists from the British Isles. The earliest settlers recalled Charles I's garrisoning of his Irish regulars in English cities. Others had read of the occasional encroachments on civilian control by Rome's Praetorian Guard or the condotierri *of the Italian city-states. When the Crown garrisoned British regulars at Boston, men like Samuel Adams (writing as "Vindex") soon raised those fears in the pages of the December 12, 1768, issue of the* Boston Gazette.

IT IS A VERY IMPROBABLE SUPPOSITION, that any people can long remain free, with a strong military power in the very heart of their country:—Unless that military power is under the direction of the people, and even then it is dangerous.—History, both ancient and modern, affords many instances of the overthrow of states and kingdoms by the power of soldiers, who were rais'd and maintain'd at first, under the plausible pretence of defending those very liberties which they afterwards destroyed. Even where there is a necessity of the military power, within the land, which by the way but rarely happens, a wise and prudent people will always have a watchful & jealous eye over it; for the maxims and rules of the army, are essentially different from the genius of a free people, and the laws of a free government. Soldiers are used to obey the absolute commands of their superiors: It is death for them, in the field, to dispute their authority, or the rectitude of their orders; and sometimes they may be shot upon the spot without ceremony. The necessity of things makes it highly proper that they should be under the absolute controul of the officer who commands them; who saith unto one come, and he cometh, and to another go, and he goeth. Thus being inured to that sort of government in the field and in the time of war, they are too apt to retain the same idea, when they happen to be in civil communities and in a time of peace: And even their officers, being used to a sort of sovereignty over them, may sometimes forget, that when quartered in cities, they are to con-

Documents

sider themselves & their soldiers, in no other light than as a family in the community; numerous indeed, but like all other families and individuals, under the direction of the civil magistrate, and the controul of the common law—Like them, they are to confine their own rules and maxims within their own circle; nor can they be suppos'd to have a right or authority to oblige the rest of the community or any individuals, to submit to or pay any regard to their rules and maxims, any more than one family has to obtrude its private method of economy upon another.

It is of great importance, and I humbly conceive it ought to be the first care of the community, when soldiers are quartered among them, by all means to convince them, that they are not to give law, but to receive it: It is dangerous to civil society, when the military conceives of it self as an independent body, detach'd from the rest of the society, and subject to no controul: And the danger is greatly increased and becomes alarming, when the society itself yields to such an ill grounded supposition: If this should be the case, how easy would it be for the soldiers, if they alone should have the sword in their hands, to use it wantonly, and even to the great annoyance and terror of the citizens, if not to their destruction. What should hinder them, if once it is a given point, that the society has no law to restrain them, and they are dispos'd to do it? And how long can we imagine it would be, upon such a supposition, before the tragical scene would begin; especially if we consider further, how difficult it is to keep a power, in its nature much less formidable, and confessedly limited, within its just bounds!—That constitution which admits of a power without a check, admits of a tyranny: And that people, who are not always on their guard, to make use of the remedy of the constitution, when there is one, to restrain all kinds of power, and especially the military, from growing exorbitant, must blame themselves for the mischief that may befall them in consequence of their inattention: Or if they do not reflect on their own folly, their posterity will surely curse them, for entailing upon them chains and slavery.

I am led to these reflections from the appearance of the present times; when one wou'd be apt to think, there was like to be a speedy change of the civil, for a military government in this province. No one I believe can be at a loss to know, by whose influence, or with what intentions, the troops destin'd for the defence of the colonies, have been drawn off, so many of them, from their important stations, and posted in this town. Whether they are to be consider'd as marching troops, or a standing army, will be better determined, when the minister who has thus dispos'd of them, or G. B——d,* or the Commissioners of the customs, if he or they sent for them, shall explain the matter; as they who did send for them, assuredly will, to Britain and America. I dare challenge them, or any others to prove that there was the least necessity for them here, for the profess'd purpose of their coming, namely to prevent or subdue rebels and traitors: I will further venture to affirm, that he must be either a knave or a fool, if he has any tolerable acquaintance with the people of this town and province, nay, that he must be a traitor himself who asserts it. I know very well, that the whole continent of America is charg'd by some designing men with treason and rebellion, for vindicating their constitutional and natural rights: But I must tell these men on both sides the atlantic, that no other force but that of reason & sound argument on their part, of which we have hitherto seen but precious little, will prevail upon us, to relinquish our righteous claim:—Military power is by no means calculated to convince the understandings of men: It may in another part of the world, affright women and children, and perhaps some weak men out of their senses, but will never awe a sensible American tamely to surrender his liberty.—Among the brutal herd the strongest horns are the strongest laws; and slaves, who are always to be rank'd among the servile brutes, may cringe, under a tyrant's brow: But to a reasonable being, one I mean who acts up to his reason, there is nothing in military achievement, any more than in knight errantry, so terrifying as to induce him to part with the choicest gift that Heaven bestows on man.

But whatever may be the design of this military appearance; whatever use some persons may intend and expect to make of it: This we all know, and every child in the street is taught to know it; that while a people retain a just sense of Liberty, as blessed be God, this people yet do, the insolence of power will for ever be despised; and that in a city in the midst of civil society, especially in a time of peace, soldiers of all ranks, like all other men, are to be

protected, govern'd, restrain'd, rewarded or punish'd by the Law of the Land.

*[Editor's Note: "G. B——d" refers to the Massachusetts Bay Colony's Governor, Francis Bernard; direct reference to Bernard might have invited a charge against the Boston Gazette of seditious libel.]

SOURCE: Article signed "Vindex," *Boston Gazette*, December 12, 1768, as given in *The Writings of Samuel Adams*, ed. H. A. Cushing (Boston, 1904), 1: 264–68.

RELATED ENTRIES: *Civil–Military Relations; Just War Theory; Militarization and Militarism; Revolutionary War*

1768 b

EXCERPTS FROM TRYON'S JOURNAL OF THE EXPEDITION INTO THE BACKCOUNTRY

During the late 1760s, a vigorous protest movement developed in the piedmont counties of North Carolina. Small farmers for the most part, they called themselves "Regulators," referring to their desire to "regulate" the workings of local government, which they felt had become increasingly corrupt. In the summer of 1768 Royal Gov. William Tryon sought to raise a militia to protect the upcoming fall court session in Hillsborough—in the heart of Regulator country. In this excerpt, Tryon describes his efforts to convince the militia of Rowan County (also a piedmont county) to join his expedition. It is a vivid example of the ways in which elite leaders in the colonial era found themselves negotiating for the allegiance and support of the militia. Here Tryon pulled out all the stops, meeting separately with the officers, showing letters of support from a variety of ministers, and then manipulating the traditional militia muster to try to garner the support of the militiamen.

July 6, 1768- October 2, 1768

Fryday 26th August. Eleven companies of the Rowan regiment marched into Town before 12 o'clock when the Governor ordered all the Captains and Field Officers to repair to Mr Montgomery's where he communicated to them the transactions that had passed between him and the Insurgents, at the same time that he read the several corre-

spondence between them, except the Insurgents first address to the Governor and the Papers that accompanied them, which the time would not permit him to do. However the Governor explained the full extent and purport of them. The Governor also laid before these gentlemen the great necessity of a strict union of every honest man and well wisher of his Country at a juncture when the calamities of a civil war were impending. Colonel Osborn then spoke warmly in support of Government and the Liberties and Properties of the Inhabitants, which he said was in great Danger if these Insurgents should be able to overturn Hillsborough Superior Court. He then read a letter from four dissenting ministers directed to their Brethren the Presbyterians, wherein the wicked conduct and practises of the Insurgents were sensibly touched upon, the support of Government earnestly recommended and enforced—vide letter.

The Officers then desired to have a Conference among themselves and retired to a private room. In less than an hour they waited on the Governor again, when Colonel Osborn in the name of the whole returned the Governor their hearty thanks for the trouble he had taken to preserve the Peace of this Province, and told him it was at the request of those gentlemen that he assured the Governor they would unanimously assist him in the cause in hand with their utmost efforts. The Governor then marched into the field to review the regiment; as he passed along the front of the regiment, he spoke to every Company explaining to them the danger this country was in from the rash, obstinate & violent Proceedings of the insurgents, and that if every honest man and man of property would not with fortitude stand up in support of their liberties and Properties, this Province would inevitably fall into a civil war. That he should have occasion for a body of men to preserve the Peace at the next Superiour Court of Hillsborough, which was threatened to be attempted under solemn Oath by the Insurgents –That for this service he should draft no men, but receive those only who turned out Volunteers That after the Battalion had fired and a Discharge of the Artillery The Governor should order all those who were willing to serve His Majesty King George and protect the Liberties of the Country to move out of their ranks and join His Majesty's union colours in the front of the regiment, accordingly as soon as the regiment had gone through their

Fire by companies and the discharge of three pieces of artillery the Governor invited all His Majesty's Subjects, friends to the Liberties & Properties of their Country, to join the King's colours and immediately quitted his horse, took the King's colours in his hand, inviting the Volunteers to turn out to them. The first Company that joined the union Colours was Captain Dobbins', upon which the Governor took Captain Dobbins' Colours (each Company having a pair of Colours) and delivered the King's Colours into the hands of the ensign of that Company; congratulating Capt: Dobbins (who had been in service) on the honour he had obtained and merited. Other Companies immediately followed the first and in a few moments there was but one Company in the Field that declined turning out the Captain of which however honourably quitted his Company and joined the Kings Colours. Each Company as it joined the Colours was saluted with three huzzas and the whole with a discharge of the Swivel guns after which the men joined again in a battalion grounded their arms, went to the right about, and marched to refresh themselves with the Provisions His Excellency had provided for them. They were ordered to stand to their arms, when each man in the ranks had a drink of either Beer or Tody, to His Majesty's health and prosperity to North Carolina – It is to be observed that one Company (Captain Knoxes) did not turn out to join His Majesty's Colours as Volunteers but remained in their ranks and afterwards without partaking of the refreshments provided, marched out of the Field carrying that shame and disgrace with them, and the just contempt of the Regiment, which their conduct apparently incurred. The Battalion was then dismissed, and the Field Officers, Captains and Gentlemen waited on the Governor to dinner, where the health of His Majesty and the Royal Family, Prosperity to the Province and success to the Rowan and Mecklenburg Volunteers were drank.

SOURCE: *The Regulators in North Carolina: A Documentary History, 1759–1776* (Raleigh, N.C.: State Department of Archives and History, 1971).

RELATED ENTRIES: *Colonial Militia Systems; Colonial Wars; Militarization and Militarism*

1772

EXCERPT FROM "THE DANGERS OF STANDING ARMIES" BY JOSEPH WARREN

The Fatal Fifth of March, 1770—also known as "The Boston Massacre"—was regarded in New England as a consequence of the stationing of British troops in colonial urban centers like Boston and New York, where off-duty soldiers competed for work with local artisans. For many years New Englanders gathered on March 5 to hear orations like this one by the man who would die commanding Massachusetts's troops at Bunker Hill three years later:

The ruinous consequences of standing armies to free communities may be seen in the histories of SYRACUSE, ROME, and many other once flourishing STATES; some of which have now scarce a name! Their baneful influence is most suddenly felt, when they are placed in populous cities; for, by a corruption of morals, the public happiness is immediately affected; and that this is one of the effects of quartering troops in a populous city, is a truth, to which many a mourning parent, many a lost, despairing child in this metropolis, must bear a very melancholy testimony. Soldiers are also taught to consider arms as the only arbiters by which every dispute is to be decided between contending states; —they are instructed implicitly to obey their commanders, without enquiring into the justice of the cause they are engaged to support: Hence it is, that they are ever to be dreaded as the ready engines of tyranny and oppression. —And it is too observable that they are prone to introduce the same mode of decision in the disputes of individuals, and from thence have often arisen great animosities between them and the inhabitants, who whilst in a naked defenceless state, are frequently insulted and abused by an armed soldiery. And this will be more especially the case, when the troops are informed, that the intention of their being stationed in any city, is to overawe the inhabitants. That, this was the avowed design of stationing an armed force in this town, is sufficiently known; and we, my fellow-citizens have seen, we have felt the tragical effects! —THE FATAL FIFTH OF MARCH 1770, can never be forgot-

ten—the horrors of THAT DREADFUL NIGHT are but too deeply impressed on our hearts—Language is too feeble to paint the emotions of our souls, when our streets were stained with the BLOOD OF OUR BRETHREN, —when our ears were wounded by the groans of the dying, and our eyes were tormented with the sight of the mangled bodies of the dead. —When our alarmed imagination presented to our view our houses wrapt in flames, —our children subjected to the barbarous caprice of the raging soldiery—our beauteous virgins exposed to all the insolence of unbridled passion, —our virtuous wives endeared to us by every tender tie, falling a sacrifice to worse than brutal violence, and perhaps like the famed Lucretia, distracted with anguish and despair, ending their wretched lives by their own fair hands. —When we beheld the authors of our distress parading in our streets, or drawn up in regular battallia, as though a hostile city; our hearts beat to arms; we snatched our weapons, almost resolved by one decisive stroke, to avenge the death of our SLAUGHTERED BRETHREN, and to secure from future danger, all that we held most dear; But propitious heaven forbade the bloody carnage, and saved the threatened victims of our too keen resentment, not by their discipline, not by their regular army,—no, it was royal George's livery that proved their shield—it was that which turned the pointed engines of destruction from their breasts.!!! The thoughts of vengeance were soon buried in our inbred affection to Great Britain, and calm reason dictated a method of removing the troops more mild than an immediate recourse to the sword. With united efforts you urged the immediate departure of the troops from the town—you urged it, with a resolution which ensured success—you obtained your wishes, and the removal of the troops was effected, without one drop of their blood being shed by the inhabitants.

!!! I have the strongest reason to believe that I have mentioned the only circumstance which saved the troops from destruction. It was then, and now is, the opinion of those who were best acquainted with the state of affairs at that time, that had thrice that number of troops, belonging to any power at open war with us, been in this town in the same exposed condition, scarce a man would have lived to have seen the morning light.

The immediate actors in the tragedy of that night were surrendered to justice.—It is not mine to say how far they were guilty! they have been tried by the country and ACQUITTED of murder! And they are not to be again arraigned at an earthly bar: But, surely the men who have promiscuously scattered death amidst the innocent inhabitants of a populous city, ought to see well to it, that they be prepared to stand at the bar of an omniscient judge! And all who contrived or encouraged the stationing troops in this place, have reasons of eternal importance, to reflect with deep contrition on their base designs, and humbly to repent of their impious machinations. . . .

Even in the dissolute reign of King Charles II, when the house of Commons impeached the Earl of Clarendon of high treason, the first article on which they founded their accusation was, that "he had designed a standing army to be raised, and to govern the kingdom thereby." And the eighth article was, that "he had introduced arbitrary government into his Majesty's plantations." —A terrifying example, to those who are now forging chains for this Country!

You have my friends and countrymen often frustrated the designs of your enemies, by your unanimity and fortitude: It was your union and determined spirit which expelled those troops, who polluted your streets with INNOCENT BLOOD. —You have appointed this anniversary as a standing memorial of the BLOODY CONSEQUENCES OF PLACING AN ARMED FORCE IN A POPULOUS CITY, and of your deliverance from the dangers which then seemed to hang over your heads; and I am confident that you never will betray the least want of spirit when called upon to guard your freedom. —None but they who set a just value upon the blessing of Liberty are worthy to enjoy her.

SOURCE: Joseph Warren, *The Dangers of Standing Armies* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1772).

RELATED ENTRIES: European Military Culture, Influence of; Militarization and Militarism

1774

NORTH CAROLINA MILITIA ACT OF 1774

As colonial economies and societies developed, their laws about their militias tended to change as well. A growing number of classes of artisans and professions, deemed indispensable to the vitality of the colony, were exempted from militia duties. The original militia law for the Carolinas in 1669 required "all inhabitants and freemen . . . above 17 years of age and under 60" to be "bound to bear arms, and serve as soldiers when the grand council shall find it necessary." By 1774 the law in North Carolina read as follows:

WHEREAS A MILITIA may be necessary for the defence and safety of this province.

I. Be it Enacted by the Governor, Council and Assembly and by the Authority of the same That all Freemen and Servants within this province between the Age of Sixteen and Sixty shall compose the Militia thereof and that the several Captains of the same shall Enroll the names of all such Freemen and Servants of which their several Companies consist and shall at their respective General Musters return a Copy thereof to the Colonel of their respective Regiments under the Penalty of Five Pounds Proclamation money to be levied by a Warrant of Distress from the Colonel of their Regiment directed to the Sheriff of the County to which the said Regiment belongs which Sheriff shall be paid out of the said Penalty the sum of ten Shillings: and in case any Sheriff shall neglect or refuse to serve such Warrant he shall forfeit and pay the sum of five pounds to be recovered by action of Debt in any court of Record and be applied as hereinafter directed which Copy so returned shall by every Colonel be returned to the Governor or Commander in Chief for the time being under the like Penalty and that all persons after being so Enrolled who shall at any time (Unless rendered incapable by sickness or other accident) neglect or refuse when called upon to appear at such times and places where Ordered by the Colonel or Commanding Officer, there to be mustered, Trained and exercised in Arms and be provided with a well fixed Gun shall forfeit and pay it at a private Muster five Shillings, if at a General Muster Ten Shillings and shall also be provided with a Cartouch Box, Sword,

Cutlass, or Hanger, and have at least Nine Charges of powder made into Cartridges and sizeable Bullets or Swann Shot and three Spare Flints a Worm and a picker under the Penalty if at a private Muster the Sum of two Shillings and Six pence if at a General Muster Five Shillings to be levied by a Warrant of distress from the Captain of the Company directed to the Serjeant of the same who is hereby impowered to Execute the said Warrant and distrain for the said Fines and Penalties in the same manner as Sheriffs are impowered to distrain for public Taxes and shall make return thereof to the Captain which Serjeant shall deduct one Shilling and four pence out of every Fine so levied and in Case such Serjeant or Serjeants shall neglect or refuse to serve any Warrant or Warrants to him or them so directed he or they for such Neglect or refusal shall be fined Twenty Shillings to be recovered by a Warrant from the Captain directed to any other Serjeant under the same Penalty to be accounted for and applied as other fines in this Act directed. . . .

III. Provided also, That no member of his Majesty's Council, no member of Assembly, no Minister of the Church of England, no Protestant Dissenting Minister regularly called to any Congregation in this Province, no Justice of the Superior Courts, Secretary, Practising Attorney, no man who has borne a Military Commission as high as that of a Captain or Commissioned Officer who has served in the army, no Justice of the Peace, nor any Person who hath acted under a Commission of the Peace, no Clerk of the Court of Justice, Practicing Physician, Surgeon, Schoolmaster having the Tuition of ten Scholars, Ferryman, Overseer having the care of six Taxable slaves, Inspectors, Public Millers, Coroners, Constables, Overseers and Commissioners of Public Roads, Searchers, or Branch Pilots so long as they continue in office shall be obliged to enlist themselves or appear at such musters.

IV. Provided nevertheless, That in case any such Overseer having the Care of six Taxable Slaves shall be seen in the muster Field on the days of General or Private musters they shall be liable to a Fine of forty shillings to be levied by a Warrant from the Colonel or Commanding Officer and applied as other Fines in this Act directed.

V. And be it further Enacted, by the Authority aforesaid, That if the Captain, Lieutenant, or Ensign, or any Two of them shall adjudge any Person or Persons enrolled as aforesaid, to be

incapable of providing and furnishing him or themselves with the Arms, Ammunition, and Accoutrements, required by this Act, every such Person shall be exempt from the Fines and Forfeitures imposed by Virtue of this Act until such Arms, Ammunition, and Accoutrements, shall be provided for and delivered him by the Court Martial; to be paid for out of the Fines already collected, and that may hereafter be collected. . . .

SOURCE: Walter Clark, ed., *State Records of North Carolina*, 26 vols. (Winston-Salem, N.C., 1895–1914), 23: 940–41.

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Militia Systems; Conscription and Volunteerism; European Military Culture, Influence of; National Guard; Revolutionary War

1775

PETER OLIVER'S INTERVIEW WITH POW. WILLIAM SCOTT

Peter Oliver, a prominent Tory active in the service of "king and country," asked a Revolutionary lieutenant captured at Bunker Hill how he had decided to serve. Although we cannot know with certainty whether the lieutenant, William Scott, was being truthful, or whether he was quoted correctly, we do know that he went on to serve in a Patriot uniform (violating his parole) after having been released by the British; in any event, he is quoted as having replied:

The case was this Sir! I lived in a Country Town; I was a Shoemaker, & got my Living by my Labor. When this Rebellion came on, I saw some of my Neighbors get into Commission, who were no better than myself. I was very ambitious, & did not like to see those Men above me. I was asked to enlist, as a private Soldier. My Ambition was too great for so low a Rank; I offered to enlist upon having a Lieutenants Commission; which was granted. I imagined my self now in a way of Promotion: if I was killed in Battle, there would an end of me, but if my Captain was killed, I should rise in Rank, & should still have a Chance to rise higher. These Sir! were the only Motives of my entering into the Service; for as to the Dispute between great Britain & the Colonies, I know nothing of it; neither am I capable of judging whether it is right or wrong.

SOURCE: Douglass Adair and John A. Shutz, eds., *Peter Oliver's Origin and Progress of the American Revolution* (San Marino, Calif.: Huntington Library, 1961), 130. For a discussion of Scott see *John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 165–79.

RELATED ENTRIES: Conscription and Volunteerism; Prisoners of War; Revolutionary War

1776 a

DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED MEN AND OFFICERS OVER WEALTHHOLDING THIRDS OF TOTAL RATABLE STATE POPULATION[1]

The states' "Patriot" militias were, with a few exceptions, more representative of the socioeconomic structure of the states than were the regiments that each state raised for the Continental Line. Most of the latter contracted to serve for longer periods of time than did the members of the state militias. We know the socioeconomic composition of a few of these Continental Line units. This table is based on Mark Lender's analysis of 88 New Jersey officers and 710 enlisted men on the muster rolls between late 1776 and mid-1780 (the only period when the records were sufficiently detailed to enable him to conduct the analysis).

PERCENTAGE OF ENLISTED MEN FROM:		
Lower Third[2]	Middle Third	Upper Third[3]
61%	29%	10%

PERCENTAGE OF OFFICERS FROM:		
Lower Third	Middle Third	Upper Third[4]
0	16	84

[1] Based on data in Lender, "Enlisted Line," chap. 4.

[2] Includes 46 percent propertyless soldiers.

[3] Includes 1 percent of the soldiers in the wealthiest tenth.

[4] Includes 31.8 percent of the officers in the wealthiest tenth.

SOURCE: Mark Edward Lender, "The Social Structure of the New Jersey Brigade: The Continental Line as an American

Standing Army," in *The Military in America from the Colonial Era to the Present,* ed. Peter Karsten (New York: Free Press, 1980), 70.

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Militia Systems; Conscription and Volunteerism; Continental Army; Economy and War; Revolutionary War

1776 b

GEN. WASHINGTON'S LETTER TO CONTINENTAL CONGRESS ON REENLISTMENT DIFFICULTIES

The following is an excerpt from a letter written by George Washington, serving as general of the Continental Army, to the Continental Congress. In it, Washington addresses the Congress's view on reenlistment difficulties and details his observations about the state militia forces, Army discipline, and the selection of officers:

To The President of Congress
Colonel Morris's, on the Heights of Harlem,
September 24, 1776.

It is in vain to expect, that any (or more than a trifling) part of this Army will again engage in the Service on the encouragement offered by Congress. When Men find that their Townsmen and Companions are receiving 20, 30, and more Dollars, for a few Months Service, (which is truely the case) it cannot be expected; without using compulsion; and to force them into the Service would answer no valuable purpose. When Men are irritated, and the Passions inflamed, they fly hastely and chearfully to Arms; but after the first emotions are over, to expect, among such People, as compose the bulk of an Army, that they are influenced by any other7 principles than those of Interest, is to look for what never did, and I fear never will happen; the Congress will deceive themselves therefore if they expect it.

A Soldier reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged in, and the inestimable rights he is contending for, hears you with patience, and acknowledges the truth of your observations, but adds, that it is of no more Importance

to him than others. The Officer makes you the same reply, with this further remark, that his pay will not support him, and he cannot ruin himself and Family to serve his Country, when every Member of the community is equally Interested and benefitted by his Labours. The few therefore, who act upon Principles of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop in the Ocean. It becomes evidently clear then, that as this Contest is not likely to be the Work of a day; as the War must be carried on systematically, and to do it, you must have good Officers, there are, in my Judgment, no other possible means to obtain them but by establishing your Army upon a permanent footing; and giving your Officers good pay; this will induce Gentlemen, and Men of Character to engage; and till the bulk of your Officers are composed of such persons as are actuated by Principles of honour, and a spirit of enterprize, you have little to expect from them.—They ought to have such allowances as will enable them to live like, and support the Characters of Gentlemen; and not be driven by a scanty pittance to the low, and dirty arts which many of them practice, to filch the Public of more than the difference of pay would amount to upon an ample allowe. besides, something is due to the Man who puts his life in his hands, hazards his health, and forsakes the Sweets of domestic enjoyments. Why a Captn. in the Continental Service should receive no more than 5/. Curry [5 s. currency] per day, for performing the same duties that an officer of the same Rank in the British Service receives 10/. Sterlg. for, I never could conceive; especially when the latter is provided with every necessary he requires, upon the best terms, and the former can scarce procure them, at any Rate. There is nothing that gives a Man consequence, and renders him fit for Command, like a support that renders him Independant of every body but the State he Serves.

With respect to the Men, nothing but a good bounty can obtain them upon a permanent establishment; and for no shorter time than the continuance of the War, ought they to be engaged; as Facts incontestibly prove, that the difficulty, and cost of Inlistments, increase with time. When the Army was first raised at Cambridge, I am persuaded the Men might have been got without a bounty for the War: after this, they began to see that the Contest was not likely to end so speedily as was immagined, and to feel their consequence,

by remarking, that to get the Militia In, in the course of last year, many Towns were induced to give them a bounty. Foreseeing the Evils resulting from this, and the destructive consequences which unavoidably would follow short Inlistments, I took the Liberty in a long Letter, . . . to recommend the Inlistments for and during the War; assigning such Reasons for it, as experience has since convinced me were well founded. At that time twenty Dollars would, I am persuaded, have engaged the Men for this term. But it will not do to look back, and if the present opportunity is slip'd, I am perswaded that twelve months more will Increase our difficulties fourfold. I shall therefore take the freedom of giving it as my opinion, that a good Bounty be immediately offered, aided by the proffer of at least 100, or 150 Acres of Land and a suit of Cloaths and Blankt, to each non-Comd. [noncommissioned] Officer and Soldier; as I have good authority for saying, that however high the Men's pay may appear, it is barely sufficient in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of goods, to keep them in Cloaths, much less afford support to their Families. If this encouragement then is given to the Men, and such Pay allowed the Officers as will induce Gentlemen of Character and liberal Sentiments to engage; and proper care and precaution are used in the nomination (having more regard to the Characters of Persons, than the Number of Men they can Inlist) we should in a little time have an Army able to cope with any that can be opposed to it, as there are excellent Materials to form one out of: but while the only merit an Officer possesses is his ability to raise Men; while those Men consider, and treat him as an equal; and (in the Character of an Officer) regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd; no order, nor no discipline can prevail; nor will the Officer ever meet with that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination.

To place any dependance upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender Scenes of domestick life; unaccustomed to the din of Arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of Military skill, which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to Troops regularly train'd, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge, and superior in Arms, makes them timid, and ready to fly from their own shadows.

Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, (particularly in the lodging) brings on sickness in many; impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful, and scandalous Desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others. Again, Men accustomed to unbounded freedom, and no controul, cannot brook the Restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and Government of an Army; without which, licentiousness, and every kind of disorder triumpantly reign. To bring Men to a proper degree of Subordination, is not the work of a day, a Month or even a year; and unhappily for us, and the cause we are Engaged in, the little discipline I have been labouring to establish in the Army under my immediate Command, is in a manner done away by having such a mixture of Troops as have been called together within these few Months. . . .

Another matter highly worthy of attention, is, that other Rules and Regulation's may be adopted for the Government of the Army than those now in existence, otherwise the Army, but for the name, might as well be disbanded. For the most attrocious offences, (one or two Instances only excepted) a Man receives no more than 39 Lashes; and these perhaps (thro' the collusion of the Officer who is to see it inflicted), are given in such a manner as to become rather a matter of sport than punishment; but when inflicted as they ought, many hardened fellows who have been the Subjects, have declared that for a bottle of Rum they would undergo a Second operation; it is evident therefore that this punishment is inadequate to many Crimes it is assigned to, as a proof of it, thirty and 40 Soldiers will desert at a time; and of late, a practice prevails, (as you will see by my Letter of the 22d) of the most alarming nature; and which will, if it cannot be checked, prove fatal both to the Country and Army; I mean the infamous practice of Plundering, for under the Idea of Tory property, or property which may fall into the hands of the Enemy, no Man is secure in his effects, and scarcely in his Person; for in order to get at them, we have several Instances of People being frightend out of their Houses under pretence of those Houses being ordered to be burnt, and this is done with a view of seizing the Goods; nay, in order that the villany may be more effectually concealed, some Houses have actually been burnt to cover the theft.

I have with some others, used my utmost endeavours to stop this horrid practice, but under the present lust after plunder, and want of Laws to punish Offenders, I might almost as well attempt to remove Mount Atlas.—I have ordered instant corporal Punishment upon every Man who passes our Lines, or is seen with Plunder, that the Offenders might be punished for disobedience of Orders; and Inclose you the proceedings of a Court Martial held upon an Officer, who with a Party of Men had robbed a House a little beyond our Lines of a Number of valuable Goods; among which (to shew that nothing escapes) were four large Pier looking Glasses, Women's Cloaths, and other Articles which one would think, could be of no Earthly use to him. He was met by a Major of Brigade who ordered him to return the Goods, as taken contrary to Genl. Orders, which he not only peremptorily refused to do, but drew up his Party and swore he would defend them at the hazard of his Life; on which I ordered him to be arrested, and tryed for Plundering, Disobedience of Orders, and Mutiny; for the Result, I refer to the Proceedings of the Court; whose judgment appeared so exceedingly extraordinary, that I ordered a Reconsideration of the matter, upon which, and with the Assistance of fresh evidence, they made Shift to Cashier him.

I adduce this Instance to give some Idea to Congress of the Currt. [current] Sentiments and general run of the Officers which compose the present Army; and to shew how exceedingly necessary it is to be careful in the choice of the New Sett, even if it should take double the time to compleat the Levies. An Army formed of good Officers moves like Clock-Work; but there is no Situation upon Earth, less enviable, nor more distressing, than that Person's who is at the head of Troops, who are regardless of Order and discipline; and who are unprovided with almost every necessary.

SOURCE: John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington*, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932), 106–16.

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Militia Systems; Conscription and Volunteerism; Continental Army; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Economy and War; European Military Culture, Influence of; Revolutionary War; Washington, George

1776 c
ACCOUNT OF WALTER BATES, CONNECTICUT LOYALIST

Walter Bates, a young Loyalist from Darien, Connecticut, whose family was active in support of the British, was 16 years of age in 1776 when he was seized by rebels and tortured in the hope that he would inform on other Loyalists.

At this time I had just entered my sixteenth year. I was taken and confined in the Guard House; next day examined before a Committee and threatened with sundry deaths if I did not confess what I knew not of. . . . I was taken out by an armed mob, conveyed through the field gate one mile from the town to back Creek, then having been stripped my body was exposed to the mosquitoes, my hands and feet being confined to a tree near the Salt Marsh, in which situation for two hours time every drop of blood would be drawn from my body; when soon after two of the committee said that if I would tell them all I knew, they would release me, if not they would leave me to these men who, perhaps would kill me.

I told them that I knew nothing that would save my life.

They left me, and the Guard came to me and said they were ordered to give me, if I did not confess, one hundred stripes, and if that did not kill me I would be sentenced to be hanged. Twenty stripes was then executed with severity, after which they sent me again to the Guard House. No "Tory" was allowed to speak to me, but I was insulted and abused by all.

The next day the committee proposed many means to extort a confession from me, the most terrifying was that of confining me to a log on the carriage in the Saw mill and let the saw cut me in two if I did not expose "those Torys." Finally they sentenced me to appear before Col. Davenport, in order that he should send me to head quarters, where all the Torys he sent were surely hanged. Accordingly next day I was brought before Davenport—one of the descendants of the old apostate Davenport, who fled from old England—who, after he had examined me, said with great severity of countenance, "I think you could have exposed those Tories."

I said to him "You might rather think I would have exposed my own father sooner than suffer what I have suffered." Upon which the old judge could not help acknowledging he never

knew any one who had withstood more without exposing confederates, and he finally discharged me the third day.

SOURCE: Catherine Crary, ed., *The Price of Loyalty* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 81–82.

RELATED ENTRIES: Conscription and Volunteerism; Prisoners of War; Revolutionary War

1777 a

PETITION OF SAMUEL TOWNSEND TO NEW YORK STATE CONVENTION

The Patriot militia served, John Shy has observed, as a kind of thought-police, maintaining loyalty to the cause in the presence of passing enemy forces. Samuel Townsend, a farm laborer from Kingston, New York, found himself in "hot water" after he spoke critically, while "in his cups," of a Patriot Committee of Safety's order to all communities to pursue men who had enlisted in Loyalist regiments.

Kingston Jail, April 30, 1777

TO THE HONORABLE the REPRESENTATIVES
of the STATE of NEW YORK in CONVENTION ASSEMBLED:

The petition of Samuel Townsend humbly sheweth

That ye petitioner is at present confined in the common jail of Kingston for being thought unfriendly to the American States. That ye petitioner some few days ago went from home upon some business and happened to get a little intoxicated in liquor, and upon his return home inadvertantly fell in company upon the road with a person unknown to yr petitioner and in discoursing and joking about the Tories passing through there and escaping, this person says to yr petitioner that if he had been with the Whigs, [they] should not have escaped so. . . . To which your petitioner, being merry in liquor, wantonly and in a bantering manner told him that in the lane through which they were then riding five and twenty Whigs would not beat five and twenty Tories and, joking together, they parted, and yr petitioner thought no more of it. Since, he has been taken up and confined and he supposes on the above joke.

Being conscious to himself of his not committing any crime or of being unfriendly to the American cause worthy of punishment. . . . That yr petitioner is extremely sorry for what he may have said and hopes his intoxication and looseness of tongue will be forgiven by this honorable convention as it would not have been expressed by him in his sober hours. That yr petitioner has a wife and two children and a helpless mother all which must be supported by his labor and should he be kept confined in this time his family must unavoidably suffer through want, as yr petitioner is but of indigent circumstances and fully conceives it is extremely hard to keep him confined to the great distress of his family as well as grief of yr petitioner. Yr petitioner therefore humbly prays that this honorable convention be favorably pleased to take the premises under their serious consideration so that yr petitioner may be relieved and discharged from his confinement or [granted] such relief as to the honorable house shall seem meet and ye petitioner shall ever pray.

Samuel Townsend

SOURCE: Catherine Crary, ed., *The Price of Loyalty* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 151–52.

RELATED ENTRIES: Colonial Militia Systems; Conscription and Volunteerism; Revolutionary War

1777 b

ACCOUNT CONCERNING CONNECTICUT MEN'S REFUSAL TO SERVE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Nathaniel Jones and 16 other Farmington men were jailed in 1777 for refusing to serve the Revolutionary cause. After a time, they recanted, were examined, and were released upon satisfying the Revolutionary government in Connecticut that "there was no such thing as remaining neuters."

On report of the committee appointed by this Assembly to take into consideration the subject matter of the memorial of Nathl Jones, Simon Tuttle, Joel Tuttle, Nathaniel Mathews, John Mathews, Riverius Carrington, Lemuel Carrington, Zerubbabel Jerom junr, Chauncey Jerom, Ezra Dormer, Nehemiah Royce, Abel Royce, George Beckwith, Abel Frisbee, Levi Frisbey, Jared Peck, and Abraham Waters, all of Farmingon, shewing that they are imprisoned on suspicion of their being inimical to America; that they are ready and will-

ing to join with their country and to do their utmost for its defence; and praying to be examined and set at liberty, as per said memorial on file, reporting that the said committee caused the authority &c. of Farmington to be duly notified, that they convened the memorialists before them at the house of Mr. David Bull on the 22d of instant May and examined them separately touching their unfriendliness to the American States, and heard the evidences produced by the parties; that they found said persons were committed for being highly inimical to the United States, and for refusing to assist in the defence of the country; that on examination it appeared they had been much under the influence of one [James] Nichols, a designing church clergyman who had instilled into them principles opposite to the good of the States; that under the influence of such principles they had pursued a course of conduct tending to the ruin of the country and highly displeasing to those who are friends to the freedom and independence of the United States; that under various pretences they had refused to go in the expedition to Danbury; that said Nathaniel Jones and Simon Tuttle have as they suppose each of them a son gone over to the enemy; that there was, however, no particular positive fact that sufficiently appeared to have been committed by them of an atrocious nature against the States, and that they were indeed grossly ignorant of the true grounds of the present war with Great Britain; that they appeared to be penitent of their former conduct, professed themselves convinced since the Danbury alarm that there was no such thing as remaining neuters; that the destruction made there by the tories was matter of conviction to them; that since their imprisonment upon serious reflexion they are convinced that the States are right in their claim, and that it is their duty to submit to their authority, and that they will to the utmost of their power defend the country against the British army; and that the said committee think it advisable that the said persons be liberated from their imprisonment on their taking an oath of fidelity to the United States: Resolved by this Assembly, that the said persons be liberated from their said imprisonment on their taking an oath of fidelity to this State and paying costs, taxed at £22 7 10; and the keeper of the gaol in Hartford is hereby directed to liberate said persons accordingly.

SOURCE: Public Records of the State of Connecticut, vol. 1, 259–60. John Shy's reference in an essay led the editors to this passage. See Shy, "The American Revolution: The Military Conflict as a Revolutionary Conflict," in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen Kurtz and James Hutson (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., by the University of North Carolina Press, 1973), 121–56.

RELATED ENTRIES: Antiwar Movements; Conscription and Volunteerism; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Revolutionary War

1777 c

THE RIFLEMAN'S SONG AT BENNINGTON

In the summer of 1777, Gen. John Burgoyne drove south from Canada toward New York City in an attempt to link up with British forces there and cut New England off from the main Continental Army. Growing short of provisions, he sent several hundred German, Loyalist, Indian, and British troops under Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum to seize the Patriot storehouse at Bennington, Vermont, which he was led to believe was inadequately defended. It was not. Some 1,800 Patriot forces under Col. John Stark defeated both Baum and British replacements under Lt. Col. Heinrich von Breymann on August 16. The British lost 200; some 700 were captured. Burgoyne, dealt a fatal blow, surrendered at Saratoga on October 17. This "Rifleman's Song," celebrating the Patriot victory, is similar to many others written and sung throughout the next century that treat the American volunteer soldier as superior to regulars.

Why come ye hither, Redcoats, your mind what madness
    fills?
In our valleys there is danger, and there's danger on our hills.
Oh, hear ye not the singing of the bugle wild and free?
And soon you'll know the ringing of the rifle from the tree.

    Chorus:
    Oh, the rifle, oh, the rifle
    In our hands will prove no trifle.

Ye ride a goodly steed, ye may know another master;

Ye forward came with speed, but you'll learn to back much faster.

Then you'll meet our Mountain Boys and their leader Johnny Stark,

Lads who make but little noise, but who always hit the mark.

Tell he who stays at home, or cross the briny waters

That thither ye must come like bullocks to the slaughter.

If we the work must do, why, the sooner 'tis begun,

If flint and trigger hold but true, the sooner 'twill be done.

SOURCE: Burl Ives, *Song Book* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1966), 92–93.

RELATED TOPICS: Music and War; Revolutionary War

1785

TORY VETERAN'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING TREATMENT BY PATRIOTS

Maurice Nowland, a Tory veteran, told a royal commission that he had served briefly as a Revolutionary soldier "by Compulsion" and/or "from attachment to a friend." These excerpts are from testimony before the commission:

MEMORIAL OF MAURICE NOWLAND

26th of May 1785.

Maurice Nowlan—the Claimant—sworn:

Is a Native of Ireland & went to America in 1770 to New York. He was settled in 1774 at Cross Creek & followed a Mercantile Line & carried out 200 Gas. He took part with Govt at first & rais'd a Company in 1776 & join'd Coll Macdonald at Cross Creek. Produces a Warrant for the rank of Captn with the Pay as such. He was four Years and ten Months in Captivity. He broke Gaol at Reading in Octr 1780 & got to New York from whence he went in 1781 to Charlestown. He got a Warrant from Coll Stuart to raise a Company in North Carolina but being obliged to evacuate Wilmington suddenly he was not able to raise the Company. Warrant produced dated 30th of Octr 1781. At the Evacuation of Charlestown he came to Engd. He never sign'd any Association or took any Oath. When he was in confinement he was offer'd his whole property if he would join them. He recd the pay of Captn up to this time & now receives half pay. He has an Allowance of £50 a Yr from the Treasury which he has had from the 1st of Jany 1783 & he now continues to receive it.

Neil McArthur—sworn.

Knew Mr Nowland in 1774. He was a very loyal Subject. He was a Storekeeper. He raised a Company in 1776. He was a long time confined. He married a Daur of one Wm White he married in Ireland. Wm White was an Irishman. He is not acquainted with any of [Maurice Nowlan's] Lands. He knows he had an House at Cross Creek can't tell what he gave for it. Does not know what it was worth but believes £500 S. Would have given £500 for it.

FURTHER TESTIMONY TO THE MEMORIAL OF MAURICE NOWLAN

2d of June 1785.

Maurice Nowlan—sworn.

Admits that he was one of the Party who went by the desire of the Rebel Committee to intercept a letter written by Govr Martin which they effected. Says however that he did not go by choice. Says he went by Compulsion & that he was taken out of his Bed. Says however that he should have been in no personal Danger if he had avoided going. Says there were two Companies in Arms in America at that time for the purpose of learning their Exercise. One Co was attach'd to America & the other to G. B. He was in that which was attached to America. He was an Assistt Lieutt. Being asked why he did not tell this Story when he spoke of his own Case he says he was confused & that he was not asked. Thinks notwithstanding this that a Man may be said to have been uniformly loyal. He chose his Co. from attachment to his friend. He join'd the British because he always meant to do it. Admits that he always thought that the British would succeed.

Alexander McKay—sworn.

Did not know that Mr Nowlan was one of the Party to take Captn Cunningham till this Day. Says in the Case of Vardy [another claimant] this affected his Opinion because he knew his Sentiments but it does not alter his opinion of Nowlan's Loyalty.

DOCUMENTS

SOURCE: H. E. Egerton, ed., *Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of American Loyalists* (Oxford: Roxburghe Club, 1915), 368–69.

1797

Gov. Samuel Adam's Farewell Address

Gov. Samuel Adams delivered a farewell address to the Massachusetts legislature on January 27, 1797, that left no doubt as to where he stood on the question of whether the nation should rely in the future on the states' militia systems or on the federal government's regular Army.

PERMIT ME TO CALL your attention to the subject of the Militia of the Commonwealth. —A well regulated militia "held in an exact subordination to the civil authority and governed by it," is the most safe defence of a Republic. —In our Declaration of Rights, which expresses the sentiments of the people, the people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence. The more generally therefore they are called out to be disciplined, the stronger is our security. No man I should think, who possesses a true republican spirit, would decline to rank with his fellow-citizens, on the fancied idea of a superiority in circumstances: This might tend to introduce fatal distinctions in our country. We can all remember the time when our militia, far from being disciplined, as they are at present, kept a well appointed hostile army for a considerable time confined to the capital; and when they ventured out, indeed they took possession of the ground they aimed at, yet they ventured to their cost, and never forgot the battle of Bunker Hill. The same undisciplined militia under the command and good conduct of General Washington, continued that army confined in or near the capital, until they thought proper to change their position and retreated with haste to Halifax. —If the Militia of the Commonwealth can be made still more effective, I am confident that you will not

delay a measure of so great magnitude. I beg leave to refer you to the seventeenth article in our Declaration of Rights, which respects the danger of standing armies in time of peace. I hope we shall ever have virtue enough to guard against their introduction. —But may we not hazard the safety of our Republic should we ever constitute, under the name of a select militia, a small body to be disciplined in a camp with all the pomp & splendor of a regular army? Would such an institution be likely to be much less dangerous to our free government and to the morals of our youth, than if they were actually enlisted for permanent service? And would they not as usual in standing armies feel a distinct interest from that of our fellow-citizens at large? The great principles of our present militia system are undoubtedly good, constituting one simple body, and embracing so great a proportion of the citizens as will prevent a separate interest among them, inconsistent with the welfare of the whole. —Those principles, however, I conceive should equally apply to all the active citizens, within the age prescribed by law. —All are deeply interested in the general security; and where there are no invidious exemptions, partial distinctions or privileged bands, every Man, it is presumed, would pride himself in the right of bearing arms, and affording his personal appearance in common with his fellow-citizens. If upon examination you shall find, that the duties incident to our present system bear harder on one class of citizens, than on another, you will undoubtedly endeavour, as far as possible, to equalize its burthens.

SOURCE: Harry Alonzo Cushing, ed., *The Writings of Samuel Adams* (New York, 1907), 4: 402–03.

1800

EXCERPT FROM MASON WEEMS'S *A HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND DEATH, VIRTUES & EXPLOITS OF GENERAL GEORGE WASHINGTON*

The Rev. Mason Locke Weems (known as "Parson Weems") published his famous Life of Washington *in 1800, one year after George Washington died. It went through 59 editions before 1850. Best known for its tale of the young Washington chopping down his father's favorite cherry tree, the book contains this passage about the war in the mid-1790s with indigenous peoples of the Ohio Valley. Ask yourself whether such a passage on the loss of American military lives in a 21st century account of contemporary warfare would pass as unnoticed and unobjected to as this one did.*

Some of the Indian tribes, . . . were obliged to be drubbed into peace, which service was done for them by General Wayne, in 1794—but not until many lives had been lost in preceding defeats; owing chiefly, it was said, to the very intemperate passions and potations of some of their officers. However, after the first shock, the loss of these poor souls was not much lamented. Tall young fellows, who could easily get their half dollar a day at the healthful and glorious labours of the plough, to go and enlist and rust among the lice and itch of a camp, for four dollars a month, were certainly not worth their country's crying about.

SOURCE: Mason Weems, *A History of the Life and Death, Virtues & Exploits of General George Washington* (New York: Macy-Masius, 1927).

RELATED ENTRIES: European Military Culture, Influence of; Indian Wars: Eastern Wars; Militarization and Militarism

1814

TREATY OF GHENT

Americans who called for war with Britain in 1812 often made use of the catch-phrase "Free Trade and Sailor's Rights." The second of these two terms referred to the British practice during the Napoleonic Wars of impressing sailors found on vessels flying the flag of the United States who were suspected of being deserters from British warships. The ensuing War of 1812 was concluded with the Treaty of Ghent, which contained eleven articles. The text covers national boundaries, American conflict with Native Americans, and even slavery, but it does not mention the term impressment anywhere.

Treaty of Peace and Amity between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America.

His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America desirous of terminating the war which has unhappily subsisted between the two Countries, and of restoring upon principles of perfect reciprocity, Peace, Friendship, and good Understanding between them, have for that purpose appointed their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, His Britannic Majesty on His part has appointed the Right Honourable James Lord Gambier, late Admiral of the White now Admiral of the Red Squadron of His Majesty's Fleet; Henry Goulburn Esquire, a Member of the Imperial Parliament and Under Secretary of State; and William Adams Esquire, Doctor of Civil Laws: And the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, has appointed John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, Citizens of the United States; who, after a reciprocal communication of their respective Full Powers, have agreed upon the following Articles.

ARTICLE THE FIRST.

There shall be a firm and universal Peace between His Britannic Majesty and the United States, and between their respective Countries, Territories, Cities, Towns, and People of every degree without exception of places or persons. All hostilities both by sea and land shall cease as soon as this Treaty shall have been ratified by both parties as hereinafter mentioned. All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this Treaty, excepting only the Islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay and without causing any destruction or carrying away any of the Artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain

therein upon the Exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty, or any Slaves or other private property; And all Archives, Records, Deeds, and Papers, either of a public nature or belonging to private persons, which in the course of the war may have fallen into the hands of the Officers of either party, shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored and delivered to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong. Such of the Islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties shall remain in the possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the Exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty until the decision respecting the title to the said Islands shall have been made in conformity with the fourth Article of this Treaty. No disposition made by this Treaty as to such possession of the Islands and territories claimed by both parties shall in any manner whatever be construed to affect the right of either.

ARTICLE THE SECOND.

Immediately after the ratifications of this Treaty by both parties as hereinafter mentioned, orders shall be sent to the Armies, Squadrons, Officers, Subjects, and Citizens of the two Powers to cease from all hostilities: and to prevent all causes of complaint which might arise on account of the prizes which may be taken at sea after the said Ratifications of this Treaty, it is reciprocally agreed that all vessels and effects which may be taken after the space of twelve days from the said Ratifications upon all parts of the Coast of North America from the Latitude of twenty three degrees North to the Latitude of fifty degrees North, and as far Eastward in the Atlantic Ocean as the thirty sixth degree of West Longitude from the Meridian of Greenwich, shall be restored on each side:-that the time shall be thirty days in all other parts of the Atlantic Ocean North of the Equinoctial Line or Equator:-and the same time for the British and Irish Channels, for the Gulf of Mexico, and all parts of the West Indies:-forty days for the North Seas for the Baltic, and for all parts of the Mediterranean-sixty days for the Atlantic Ocean South of the Equator as far as the Latitude of the Cape of Good Hope.- ninety days for every other part of the world South of the Equator, and one hundred and twenty days for all other parts of the world without exception.

ARTICLE THE THIRD.

All Prisoners of war taken on either side as well by land as by sea shall be restored as soon as practicable after the Ratifications of this Treaty as hereinafter mentioned on their paying the debts which they may have contracted during their captivity. The two Contracting Parties respectively engage to discharge in specie the advances which may have been made by the other for the sustenance and maintenance of such prisoners.

ARTICLE THE FOURTH.

Whereas it was stipulated by the second Article in the Treaty of Peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America that the boundary of the United States should comprehend "all Islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States and lying between lines to be drawn due East from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part and East Florida on the other shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, excepting such Islands as now are or heretofore have been within the limits of Nova Scotia, and whereas the several Islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy, and the Island of Grand Menan in the said Bay of Fundy, are claimed by the United States as being comprehended within their aforesaid boundaries, which said Islands are claimed as belonging to His Britannic Majesty as having been at the time of and previous to the aforesaid Treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three within the limits of the Province of Nova Scotia: In order therefore finally to decide upon these claims it is agreed that they shall be referred to two Commissioners to be appointed in the following manner: viz: One Commissioner shall be appointed by His Britannic Majesty and one by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and the said two Commissioners so appointed shall be sworn impartially to examine and decide upon the said claims according to such evidence as shall be laid before them on the part of His Britannic Majesty and of the United States respectively. The said Commissioners shall meet at St Andrews in the Province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to

adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said Commissioners shall by a declaration or report under their hands and seals decide to which of the two Contracting parties the several Islands aforesaid do respectely belong in conformity with the true intent of the said Treaty of Peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three. And if the said Commissioners shall agree in their decision both parties shall consider such decision as final and conclusive. It is further agreed that in the event of the two Commissioners differing upon all or any of the matters so referred to them, or in the event of both or either of the said Commissioners refusing or declining or wilfully omitting to act as such, they shall make jointly or separately a report or reports as well to the Government of His Britannic Majesty as to that of the United States, stating in detail the points on which they differ, and the grounds upon which their respective opinions have been formed, or the grounds upon which they or either of them have so refused declined or omitted to act. And His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States hereby agree to refer the report or reports of the said Commissioners to some friendly Sovereign or State to be then named for that purpose, and who shall be requested to decide on the differences which may be stated in the said report or reports, or upon the report of one Commissioner together with the grounds upon which the other Commissioner shall have refused, declined or omitted to act as the case may be. And if the Commissioner so refusing, declining, or omitting to act, shall also wilfully omit to state the grounds upon which he has so done in such manner that the said statement may be referred to such friendly Sovereign or State together with the report of such other Commissioner, then such Sovereign or State shall decide ex parse upon the said report alone. And His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States engage to consider the decision of such friendly Sovereign or State to be final and conclusive on all the matters so referred.

ARTICLE THE FIFTH.

Whereas neither that point of the Highlands lying due North from the source of the River St Croix, and designated in the former Treaty of Peace between the two Powers as the North West Angle of Nova Scotia, nor the North Westernmost head of Connecticut River has yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line between the Dominions of the two Powers which extends from the source of the River st Croix directly North to the above mentioned North West Angle of Nova Scotia, thence along the said Highlands which divide those Rivers that empty themselves into the River St Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean to the North Westernmost head of Connecticut River, thence down along the middle of that River to the forty fifth degree of North Latitude, thence by a line due West on said latitude until it strikes the River Iroquois or Cataraquy, has not yet been surveyed: it is agreed that for these several purposes two Commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, and authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding Article unless otherwise specified in the present Article. The said Commissioners shall meet at se Andrews in the Province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said Commissioners shall have power to ascertain and determine the points above mentioned in conformity with the provisions of the said Treaty of Peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three, and shall cause the boundary aforesaid from the source of the River St Croix to the River Iroquois or Cataraquy to be surveyed and marked according to the said provisions. The said Commissioners shall make a map of the said boundary, and annex to it a declaration under their hands and seals certifying it to be the true Map of the said boundary, and particularizing the latitude and longitude of the North West Angle of Nova Scotia, of the North Westernmost head of Connecticut River, and of such other points of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such map and declaration as finally and conclusively fixing the said boundary. And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing, or both, or either of them refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements shall be made by them or either of them, and such reference to a friendly Sovereign or State shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth

Article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ARTICLE THE SIXTH.

Whereas by the former Treaty of Peace that portion of the boundary of the United States from the point where the fortyfifth degree of North Latitude strikes the River Iroquois or Cataraquy to the Lake Superior was declared to be "along the middle of said River into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said Lake until it strikes the communication by water between that Lake and Lake Erie, thence along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said Lake until it arrives at the water communication into the Lake Huron; thence through the middle of said Lake to the water communication between that Lake and Lake Superior:" and whereas doubts have arisen what was the middle of the said River, Lakes, and water communications, and whether certain Islands lying in the same were within the Dominions of His Britannic Majesty or of the United States: In order therefore finally to decide these doubts, they shall be referred to two Commissioners to be appointed, sworn, and authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding Article unless otherwise specified in this present Article. The said Commissioners shall meet in the first instance at Albany in the State of New York, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said Commissioners shall by a Report or Declaration under their hands and seals, designate the boundary through the said River, Lakes, and water communications, and decide to which of the two Contracting parties the several Islands lying within the said Rivers, Lakes, and water communications, do respectively belong in conformity with the true intent of the said Treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing or both or either of them refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements shall be made by them or either of them, and such reference to a friendly Sovereign or State shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth Article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ARTICLE THE SEVENTH.

It is further agreed that the said two last mentioned Commissioners after they shall have executed the duties assigned to them in the preceding Article, shall be, and they are hereby, authorized upon their oaths impartially to fix and determine according to the true intent of the said Treaty of Peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three, that part of the boundary between the dominions of the two Powers, which extends from the water communication between Lake Huron and Lake Superior to the most North Western point of the Lake of the Woods;-to decide to which of the two Parties the several Islands lying in the Lakes, water communications, and Rivers forming the said boundary do respectively belong in conformity with the true intent of the said Treaty of Peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three, and to cause such parts of the said boundary as require it to be surveyed and marked. The said Commissioners shall by a Report or declaration under their hands and seals, designate the boundary aforesaid, state their decision on the points thus referred to them, and particularize the Latitude and Longitude of the most North Western point of the Lake of the Woods, and of such other parts of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing, or both or either of them refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations or statements shall be made by them or either of them, and such reference to a friendly Sovereign or State shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth Article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein revealed.

ARTICLE THE EIGHTH.

The several Boards of two Commissioners mentioned in the four preceding Articles shall respectively have power to appoint a Secretary, and to employ such Surveyors or other persons as they shall judge necessary. Duplicates of all their respective reports, declarations, statements, and decisions, and of their accounts, and of the Journal of their proceedings shall be delivered by them to the Agents of His Britannic Majesty and to the Agents of the United States, who may be

respectively appointed and authorized to manage the business on behalf of their respective Governments. The said Commissioners shall be respectively paid in such manner as shall be agreed between the two contracting parties, such agreement being to be settled at the time of the Exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty. And all other expenses attending the said Commissions shall be defrayed equally by the two parties. And in the case of death, sickness, resignation, or necessary absence, the place of every such Commissioner respectively shall be supplied in the same manner as such Commissioner was first appointed; and the new Commissioner shall take the same oath or affirmation and do the same duties. It is further agreed between the two contracting parties that in case any of the Islands mentioned in any of the preceding Articles, which were in the possession of one of the parties prior to the commencement of the present war between the two Countries, should by the decision of any of the Boards of Commissioners aforesaid, or of the Sovereign or State so referred to, as in the four next preceding Articles contained, fall within the dominions of the other party, all grants of land made previous to the commencement of the war by the party having had such possession, shall be as valid as if such Island or Islands had by such decision or decisions been adjudged to be within the dominions of the party having had such possession.

ARTICLE THE NINTH.

The United States of America engage to put an end immediately after the Ratification of the present Treaty to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such Ratification, and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities. Provided always that such Tribes or Nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their Citizens, and Subjects upon the Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such Tribes or Nations, and shall so desist accordingly. And His Britannic Majesty engages on his part to put an end immediately after the Ratification of the present Treaty to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of

Indians with whom He may be at war at the time of such Ratification, and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities. Provided always that such Tribes or Nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against His Britannic Majesty and His Subjects upon the Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such Tribes or Nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

ARTICLE THE TENTH.

Whereas the Traffic in Slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and Justice, and whereas both His Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavours to accomplish so desirable an object.

ARTICLE THE ELEVENTH.

This Treaty when the same shall have been ratified on both sides without alteration by either of the contracting parties, and the Ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington in the space of four months from this day or sooner if practicable. In faith whereof, We the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty, and have hereunto affixed our Seals.

Done in triplicate at Ghent the twenty fourth day of December one thousand eight hundred and fourteen.

GAMBIER. [Seal]
HENRY GOULBURN [Seal]
WILLIAM ADAMS [Seal]
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS [Seal]
J. A. BAYARD [Seal]
H. CLAY. [Seal]
JON. RUSSELL [Seal]
ALBERT GALLATIN [Seal]

SOURCE: National Archives and Records Administration. At our.documents.gov.
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=20&page=transcrip (July 22, 2005).

DOCUMENTS

RELATED ENTRIES: Impressment; Indian Wars: Eastern Wars; War of 1812

1824

LYRICS TO "THE HUNTERS OF KENTUCKY," A POPULAR SONG CELEBRATING JACKSON'S VICTORY OVER THE BRITISH

This song, first performed in a Richmond, Virginia, theater, is one of a number of antebellum songs celebrating the tradition of the volunteer soldier. An instant "hit," it was often sung at political rallies supporting Andrew Jackson for president:

Ye gentlemen and ladies fair, who grace this famous city,
Just listen, if you've time to spare, while I rehearse a ditty;
And for the opportunity conceive yourselves quite lucky,
For 'tis not often that you see a hunter from Kentucky.

    Chorus:
    Oh, Kentucky! the hunters of Kentucky.

We are a hardy free-born race, each man to fear a stranger,
Whate'er the game we join in chase, despising toil and
    danger;
And if a daring foe annoys, whate'er his strength and
    forces,
We'll show him that Kentucky boys are alligator horses.

I s'pose you've read it in the prints, how Packenham
    attempted
To make old Hickory Jackson wince, but soon his schemes
    repented;
For we with rifles ready cocked, thought such occasion
    lucky,
And soon around the general flocked the hunters of
    Kentucky.

You've heard, I s'pose, how New Orleans is famed for
    wealth and beauty
There's girls of every hue, it seems, from snowy white to
    sooty.

So Packenham he made his brags, if he in fight was lucky,
He'd have their girls and cotton bags in spite of old
    Kentucky.

But Jackson he was wide awake, and wasn't scared at trifles,
For well he knew what aim we take with our Kentucky
    rifles;
So he led us down to Cyprus swamp, the ground was low
    and mucky,
There stood John Bull in martial pomp, and here was old
    Kentucky.

A bank was raised to hide our breast, not that we thought of
    dying,
But then we always like to rest unless the game is flying;
Behind it stood our little force, none wished it to be greater,
For every man was half a horse and half an alligator.

They did not let our patience tire, before they showed their
    faces—
We did not choose to waste our fire, so snugly kept our
    places;
But when so near to see them wink, we thought it time to
    stop 'em,
And 'twould have done you good I think to see Kentuckians
    drop 'em.

They found at last 'twas vain to fight, where lead was all
    their booty,
And so they wisely took to flight, and left us all our beauty,
And now if danger e'er annoys, remember what our trade
    is,
Just send for us Kentucky boys, and we'll protect your
    ladies.

SOURCE: "The Hunters of Kentucky" (New York: Andrews, Printer).

RELATED ENTRIES: Jackson, Andrew; Music and War

1830

Sec. of War John Eaton on Inability to Fill Army Ranks

The disdain men like Parson Weems had in the 1790s for U.S. Army regulars persisted well into the 19th century. In 1830, John Eaton, secretary of war under Pres. Andrew Jackson, wrestled with his department's inability to find enough able men "obtained upon principles of fair contract" to fill his enlisted quota of 6,000 men. Eaton noted that there were 12 million Americans in 1830. In other words, Congress had authorized the raising of an army of 1 enlisted man for every 2,000 persons. In 2005 the U.S. population was about 296 million, and the authorized enlisted strength of the U.S. Army was about 450,000 or about 1 enlisted man for every 660 persons. In 1830 the Army had more trouble recruiting a third as many men per capita in peacetime than it would in 2005 in wartime.

Different feelings, altered habits, higher self-respect, and honorable incentive, in some form or other, must be produced, or the evils deservedly complained of in our army, will continue. Partial remedies are mere palliatives, and cannot answer any permanent good.

The law-giver who would reach reform, must, in the adoption of his means, look for the approbation and sanction of society; and here allow me to say, that popular opinion, in the absence of war, is not with the existing law for the punishment of desertion. In time of peace, public opinion turns with abhorrence from the severity of the penalty, and renders the law a dead letter on the statute book. Milder punishments should be resorted to, carrying with them a more appropriate and certain effect.

A more important consideration, however, than the infliction of punishment as a remedy, should be looked to. If we inspirit the soldiers of our army, rather than dishonor them, and excite them through the avenues of honorable emulation, may we not expect a return more in accordance with the dignity of human nature, the character of our people, and the genius of our institutions? There is a constant proneness in man to better his condition, and every obstacle that society interposes to check this, is impolitic and unwise.

As our army is at present organized, the gallant and faithful soldier has no opportunity afforded him to rise above his enlisted condition. He may become a corporal, or sergeant, but, with that humble advance, his hopes and his ambition terminate. Knowing that impassable barriers exist, to prevent his elevation, all incentive is destroyed, and ambition is quieted. He feels that his country has placed on him the seal of abasement, and he sinks dispirited under its withering influence. But if the door to promotion be unbarred, and the law shall recognise no distinction except merit—that the highest honors may be reached by the humblest private—what a noble incentive would it create, what enthusiasm would not follow? Multitudes then would be found advancing, who now feel the stubborn interdiction which hangs upon their hopes and expectations. There is a buoyancy in hope, that sustains in adversity, and which leads on in prosperity; extend it to the soldier, and the creations of his own fancy will give a moral force and an elevated cast of character, to which, without it, he will be an alien.

The graduates of West Point Academy, from established practice, and not by authority of law, have the exclusive privilege of entering the army. All other portions of the community are excluded. The private who has served faithfully through danger and privation, and who, from experience, has learned to obey, (thereby making himself the better qualified to command) on surveying the prospects before him, finds that each year brings a stranger to command him—a junior officer from the Military Academy. This state of things must weaken the inducements to a correct and faithful course of conduct. The non-commissioned officers, knowing that no servitude, however long or faithful; no deportment, however exemplary; no valor, however distinguished; entitle them to promotion—that they but serve only as instruments for the advancement of others—feel the injustice, and sink under the despondency it produces. . . .

Another suggestion, in connexion with this subject, deserves consideration. At present, the law allows a premium to the recruiting officer for every soldier he shall enlist: this, either in whole or in part, passes to the non-commissioned officer, who superintends the performance of this duty. Under the temptation presented, it operates as a bounty for the encouragement of frauds, as it leads to

active efforts to entrap the young, the inconsiderate, and the intemperate, by improper allurements and vicious devices. This regulation ought to be abrogated, that every inducement to impropriety may be removed, that the citizen may not be imposed on, and that the Army may be composed of men who seek the service voluntarily, rather than those who have been entrapped in a moment of intoxication, and who awake from the stupor with abhorrence, anxious only to devise means how they are to escape from their dread condition. If none other present, desertion becomes the alternative; and this is sustained by the fact that more than half the desertions which take place are with the new recruits.

A country possessing twelve millions of people, ought surely to be able at all times to possess itself of an Army of six thousand men, obtained upon principles of fair contract: if this cannot be effected, then will it be better to rely on some other mode of defence, rather than resort to the expedient of obtaining a discontented and besotted soldiery. To this end orders have been given to our recruiting officers forbidding any enlistments if the persons be in the least intoxicated.

SOURCE: Senate Doc. no. 62, vol. 2, 21st Cong., 1st Sess., 1829–30.

RELATED ENTRIES: *Conscription and Volunteerism; Jackson, Andrew; Militarization and Militarism*

1833

REVOLUTIONARY WAR PENSION APPLICATION

In the early 19th century, Congress passed a series of laws allowing pensions for veterans of the American Revolution. To apply, veterans went to their local courthouse and swore out a statement of their service. The pension office of the War Department retained their applications on file with other supporting documentation. Depending on the state, the courthouse, and the pension law in effect, various standardized forms were also used to aid in the processing of the pension. Certain vital statistics and statements of service were required, but occasionally some veterans took the opportunity to tell longer stories. What follows is a partial transcription of South Carolina veteran James Dillard's sworn affidavit (S6797), as well as an image of a common standardized form used for his application. It is representative of an average pension application. Note that the statement was usually delivered orally and recorded by the court clerk, thus the switching of pronouns from "he" to "I" and back again. The pension records are now filed in the National Archives as the "Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty Land Warrant Application Files, 1800–1900, (M804).

The State of South Carolina
Laurens district

To Wit

On this Eleventh day of July Anno Domini 1833 personally appeared before the Honorable Henry W. Dessaussure one of the chancellors of the said state in open Court being a Court of Chancery now sitting for the district and state aforesaid, Capt. James Dillard a resident of Laurens district in the State of South Carolina aged Seventy seven or Seventy Eight years, who being first duly sworn according to Law, doth on his oath make the following declaration in order to obtain the benefit of the provisions made by the act of Congress passed June 7 1832. That he entered the service of the United States under the following named officers and served as herein after stated.

This applicant was born in Culpepper County in the State of Virginia in the year 1755 or 1756 according to the information derived from his parents, having in his possession no record of his age. That he was living at the time he entered the service in what was then called Ninety Six District in the state of S Carolina near where he now lives and where he has continued to live to this day.

I enlisted under Capt _____ Perieuhoof [?] in Col William Thompson's Regiment of State Troops at Ninety Six otherwise called Cambridg in So Carolina for six months, some time in the month of September 1775 and at the time of Col Drayton's Campaign in that part of the State. That he was marched with a detachment of State Troops under the command of Col. Thomson from Ninety Six to Dorchester in So Carolina where he was stationed for the protection of the magazine of that place untill the expiration of his term of service which was in March 1776. Immediately upon the expiration of

his first term of service, he again enlisted under Capt Perieuhoof in the same company and Regiment of State Troops commanded by the same officers for the term of eighteen months. During this term of service he was taken from Dorchester to the 10 mile house near Charleston where we were stationed for some time, and during that time Capt Perieuhoof died and was succeeded by Capt Brown. While stationed at the 10 mile house an express arrived and we were marched in the night time to Charleston where we arrived about sunrise in the morning and after receiving some refreshment we were carried over to Sullivan's Island (Fort Moultrie). Genl Lee was at this time Commander in Chief at Charlestown, Col. Moultrie had the immediate command at Fort Moultrie assisted by Maj. Marion. He was in the engagement in which Sir Peter Parker was repulsed in his attack upon Fort Moultrie in June 1776. Some time after this engagement we were removed to Charleston, from there to the 10 mile house, from the 10 mile house we were marched to Nelson's Ferry on Santee River, from thence to Purysburgh on Savannah River and after lying there a short time were were marched back to Nelsons Ferry on Santee River. From that place we were marched to [. . . .] where we remained untill he was discharged to the best of his recollection in September 1777. During the next spring this applicant volunteered his services in Capt. Josiah Greer's company of militia, in Col James William's Regt, Robert McGrary Lieut Col. and Received the appointment of Sergeant Major, and served during the expedition to Florida under the command of Genl Andrew Williamson. This expedition proceeded beoynd [sic] St. Mary's River and then returned to So Carolina after a tour of better than four months when this applicant was again discharged. After his return from Florida he again voluteered under Capt McGrary and swerved [sic] a tour of one month in pursuit of Col. Boyd who commanded a detachment of Tories. He next volunteered as a private under Capt. Thomas McGrary and served three months on the Indian frontier as a militiaman to prevent the Tories and Indians from molesting the people of the State. After the fall of Charleston he took refuge in No Carolina untill about the first of August 1780 when he joined Col. James Williams and was elected a Captain in his Regiment and received a Commission signed by Governor Rutledge, which has been lost or mislaid. With this Regiment he was marched to Kings Mountain and with the commands of Cols Campbell, Shelby, Sevier & Cleveland participated in the Victory gained over Col. Ferguson at that place where his Col. James Williams was killed. After this action Col Joseph Hays succeeded to the command of the Regiment and this applicant continued in his command as captain with the same Regiment employed in almost constant service to the close of the war. During the time Col. Hays commanded the Regiment this applicant was engaged under the command of Col. Washington of the Continental Line in a battle in which the tories were defeated at Bush River and at the taking of Williams Fort. He was also at the Battle of Cowpens under the command of Genl Morgan in which Tarleton was defeated when he received a gunshot wound. He was also at the siege of 96 under Genl Green, and was in command of the same company. In the close of the year 1781 Col. Joseph Hays was killed and was succeeded by Col. Levi Casey. Under him the Regiment proceeded under Genl Andrew Pickens to Edisto River where they defeated the tories under Col. Cunningham and this applicant was again wounded. He also received two other wounds, saber cuts, in skirmishes with the Indians. After he recovered of his wound he was sent by Col. Casey with a part of his company to join Genl Pickens in an expedition to the Cherokee Nation to compel them to deliver up Tories who had taken refuge there. This tour was about two months and during the time a treaty of peace was made with the Indians. This was the last service this applicant performed and was in the year 1783. This applicant received a discharge but it has been lost or destroyed and has no other papers relating to his services than is herewith forwarded. He hereby relingquishes [sic] every claim whatsoever to a pension or annuity except the present and he declares that his name is not on the pension Roll of any agency in any state. He refers to the Revd John B. Kennedy and Robert Lord Esquire, Golding Tinsley, James Tinsley, & Thomas Entrick [?] to testify as to his services and character. Sworn to and subscribed on day and year aforesaid.

X James Dillard [he has signed his own name, next to an X]

SOURCE: "Selected Records from Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty Land Warrant Application Files, 1800–1900." Microfilm in the library of the National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution, (M805).

1835 (to 1854)

A Crisis of Conscience and Ethan Allen Hitchcock

Several 18th-century British (and late-18th-century American) Army officers not serving in active regiments declined invitations to serve in wartime with impunity on the grounds that they did not regard a war as "just." The creation of the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1803 steadily replaced the recruiting of officers in this fashion. By the 1830s officers in the U.S. Army increasingly regarded the military as a lifetime profession. Hence an officer with a troubled conscience faced a career dilemma as well as a moral one. Ethan Allen Hitchcock left a rich record of his wrestling with such moral questions in his diary, edited by W. A. Croffut. His first dilemma was with the way a fraudulent treaty with the Seminoles in 1832 (Payne's Landing) was being enforced while he served in Florida in 1835. (Others include what he viewed as the problematic nature of the war with Mexico, the treatment of Indians in the West, and possible war aimed at wresting Cuba from Spanish control in 1854.) During 1835, the Seminole treaty was sent to Gen. Wiley Thompson, the Indian agent in Florida, with orders to announce to the Indians that, in compliance with their treaty, they must go west.

The king and his chiefs were called together at Fort King, but the moment they heard from the agent the object of the council, they loudly and earnestly denied that there was such a treaty as he alleged. The point of disagreement was upon the article in the treaty touching the deputation; and when they were informed that the six men sent to the West had signed the paper offered to them by Major Phagan, their authority to do so was utterly repudiated. It appeared to the officers of the garrison that the chiefs were entirely in the right; and it appeared also that the king had been kept in ignorance of what the deputation had done until it was disclosed by General Thompson. The Indians themselves, having been compelled to sign that paper in disobedience of the orders they had received, had maintained silence about it, never having informed the king of what they had done. At least this is the only rational solution of the matter.

Councils were then held from time to time for several weeks while a correspondence was being carried on between General Thompson and the government, in which the President insisted upon the execution of the treaty; but on each occasion when it was presented to them they stoutly denied its validity, and on one occasion, while the treaty was lying open on the council table, Miccanopy, pointing to it, exclaimed, 'That is not the treaty: I never signed that treaty!'

'You lie, Miccanopy,' said the agent Thompson, 'Interpreter, tell him he lies, for there is his signature,'—putting his finger on his mark.

But Miccanopy did not lie; for, although his mark was upon that paper, he meant only to deny that he had signed such a paper as was then interpreted to him.

By this time these councils had become quite boisterous, and a young Indian in the council name Osceola, who was called in English by the name of Powell, stood up in council, and with much gesticulation denounced the treaty and everything done about it. This General Thompson imprudently construed into a disrespect to himself, and, not regarding the freedom of debate which the Indians are even more tenacious about in council than the whites, he signified his wish to the commanding officer to have a section of the guard placed at his disposal, which soon appeared, and General Thompson ordered the guard to seize Osceola and put him into confinement, in irons. This was accordingly done, but not without some difficulty, for the young Indian became frantic with rage, and if he had had weapons about him, it would have been very dangerous to approach him; but he was overpowered and carried to prison in irons.

Upon this, General Thompson wrote desponding letters to the government, and it was uncertain for a time what was to be done or what could be done. Osceola, on his part, acted like a madman; he was perfectly furious when anybody came near him. After some days of frenzied violence he seemed to have formed his ultimate purpose and settled down into a perfect calm. He sent word to General Thompson that he wished to see him, and General Thompson, having been

informed of his quiet disposition, permitted an interview. In this interview Osceola became exceedingly submissive; acknowledged himself to be entirely in the wrong; apologized for what he had done, and asked General Thompson's forgiveness; declared that he was now willing to go to the West with his people, and, as he had been made a sub-chief over a small band, he told General Thompson that if he would release him and allow him to go among his people, he would bring them all in, and deliver them to the agent.

General Thompson then addressed a letter to President Jackson direct, in which, with great exultation, he informed the President that all the difficulties were now overcome; that Osceola had gone out to bring in his people, and that the treaty would be executed. But nothing was further from Osceola's intentions than compliance with his promises. He had resorted to them only for the purpose of gaining his liberty, that he might employ it in seeking revenge upon General Thompson for the outrage put upon him by arresting him for 'words spoken in debate.'

Osceola, being at large, armed himself, and lay in wait for an opportunity of taking the life of the man whom he regarded as the foe of his people. General Thompson had been in the habit of walking between the agency house and the fort, which were separated from each other a few hundred yards, with clumps of bushes here and there along the road, affording places of concealment. An opportunity did not offer itself for the execution of Osceola's purpose for some days, and he thought it necessary to give General Thompson some evidence of his fidelity, to throw him, or keep him, off his guard. With this object he gathered up a few of the women and children of his band, and exhibiting these he told General Thompson that his people had become so much scattered that he had not been able to find them, but that he would do so as soon as possible. General Thompson had no suspicion of his purpose, and allowed him to go out again; and, as he did not care to detain the women and children, they were allowed to go also.

A few days after this, on the 28th of December, 1835, Osceola, with some of his band, concealed by bushes near the road leading from the fort to the agency house, saw General Thompson approach, accompanied by a lieutenant, Constantine Smith, and the Indians, securing their aim, at a signal fired,

killing both the agent and his companion. Osceola immediately fled and took command of the Indians in the field [sending out a runner to all chiefs directing that no white woman or child should be harmed, "for this fight is between men."]

This tragedy happened on the very day on which the main body of the Indians under Miccanopy waylaid Major Dade, who was marching up from Tampa Bay to Fort King, with two companies of infantry and a piece of artillery. When within about thirty-five miles of Fort King this body of troops was ambushed, and the whole party destroyed except three who escaped from the massacre and got back to Tampa Bay.

The Indians had taken the alarm from the disclosures made in the councils at Fort King, and had banded together resolved to resist any attempt at a movement of troops in their country for their expulsion from it. Many of them knew the officers at Tampa Bay. . . .

July 8, 1836. . . . I hardly know what it is proper to do. When I left General Gaines all was quiet on the Sabine. I was temporarily attached to his staff and had his orders to return to him from Washington, but I thought the order was for my accommodation, and believing active service in that quarter at an end, I did not hesitate to avail myself of Major Smith's offer to relieve him at New York. Now I hear that General Gaines has actually crossed the Sabine and gone with his army to Nacogdoches in Texas. I am puzzled what to do. I regard the whole of the proceedings in the Southwest as being wicked as far as the United States are concerned. Our people have provoked the war with Mexico and are prosecuting it not for 'liberty' but for land, and I feel averse to being an instrument for these purposes. . . .

July 1837. . . . Report to the Secretary of War, . . .

I have crossed the purposes of a band of greedy speculators and brought upon myself the maledictions of many who will pretend an infinite degree of sympathy for the very half-breeds whom they have cheated and almost robbed by what will be boldly put forth as a legal proceeding. Be the consequences what they may, I rejoice that I have, for a few weeks at least, suspended the execution of this business. One claim of $1800 was sold under duress for $400. Can such a transaction pass in review without condemnation because it may wear the color of law? It is monstrous; and, if lawful, the law is a scourge to the innocent. . . .

June 22 [1840]. "We are ordered to St. Louis (Jefferson Barracks) and then, after the sickly season, to Florida. I saw the beginning of the Florida campaigns in 1836, and may see the end of them unless they see the end of me. The government is in the wrong, and this is the chief cause of the persevering opposition of the Indians, who have nobly defended their country against our attempt to enforce a fraudulent treaty. The natives used every means to avoid a war, but were forced into it by the tyranny of our government. . . .

Nov. 1 [1840]. . . . The treaty of Payne's Landing was a fraud on the Indians: They never approved of it or signed it. They are right in defending their homes and we ought to let them alone. The country southward is poor for our purposes, but magnificent for the Indians —a fishing and hunting country without agricultural inducements. The climate is against us and is a paradise for them. The army has done all that it could. It has marched all over the upper part of Florida. It has burned all the towns and destroyed all the planted fields. Yet, though the Indians are broken up and scattered, they exist in large numbers, separated, but worse than ever. . . . The chief, Coocoochee, is in the vicinity. It is said that he hates the whites so bitterly that 'he never hears them mentioned without gnashing his teeth.' . . .

Nov. 14. . . . General Armistead is entirely subdued and broken spirited. His confidence in his success has been boundless and his letters to Washington have doubtless been written in that temper. I cannot help thinking it is partly his own fault. If he had freely offered the Indians an ample reward to emigrate, or the undisturbed possession of the country south of Tampa Bay, he might have secured peace. I have suggested his making the overture now, but he declines. Not only did he refuse to make the offer he was authorized to make, but at the very time when Halec [Tustenugga] was here in amicable talk he secretly sent a force into his rear, threatening his people at home! . . . I confess to a very considerable disgust in this service. I remember the cause of the war, and that annoys me. I think of the the folly and stupidity with which it has been conducted, particularly of the puerile character of the present commanding general, and I am quite out of patience. . . .

29th Aug [1845]. Received last evening . . . a letter from Captain Casey and a map of Texas from the Quarter-master-General's office, the latter being the one prepared by Lieutenant Emory; but it has added to it a distinct boundary mark to the Rio Grande. Our people ought to be damned for their impudent arrogance and domineering presumption! It is enough to make atheists of us all to see such wickedness in the world, whether punished or unpunished. . . .

1st Oct. . . . [T]his morning . . . as frequently of late, [General Zachary Taylor] introduced the subject of moving upon the Rio Grande. I discovered this time more clearly than ever that the General is instigated by ambition—or so it appears to me. He seems quite to have lost all respect for Mexican rights and willing to be an instrument of Mr. Polk for pushing our boundary as far west as possible. When I told him that, if he suggested a movement (which he told me he intended), Mr. Polk would seize upon it and throw the responsibility on him, he at once said he would take it, and added that if the President instructed him to use his discretion, he would ask no orders, but would go upon the Rio Grande as soon as he could get transportation. I think the General wants an additional brevet, and would strain a point to get it. . . .

2d Nov. Newspapers all seem to indicate that Mexico will make no movement, and the government is magnanimously bent on taking advantage of it to insist upon 'our claim' as far as the Rio Grande. I hold this to be monstrous and abominable. But now, I see, the United states of America, as a people, are undergoing changes in character, and the real status and principles for which our forefathers fought are fast being lost sight of. If I could by any decent means get a living in retirement, I would abandon a government which I think corrupted by both ambition and avarice to the last degree. . . .

25th March [1846]. . . . As to the right of this movement, I have said from the first that the United States are the aggressors. We have outraged the Mexican government and people by an arrogance and presumption that deserve to be punished. For ten years we have been encroaching on Mexico and insulting her. . . .

26th March. . . . My heart is not in this business; I am against it from the bottom of my soul as most unholy and

unrighteous proceeding; but, as a military man, I am bound to execute orders. . . .

[Hitchcock became ill and was evacuated to recover in the United States.]

Sunday, May 24. . . . I am necessarily losing, from a military point of view, all the honors of the field. I was hoping that no collision would take place. . . . My absence from my regiment at such a time as this is a species of death; yet the doctor says I must not think of going south in the hot weather, as he has another surgical operation to perform. . . .

10th Nov. I am very much disgusted with this war in all of its features. I am in the position of the preacher who read Strauss's criticism of the Gospel History of Christ. Shall he preach his new convictions? Shall he preach what his audience believes? Shall he temporize? Shall he resign? Here the preacher has an advantage over the soldier, for, while the latter may be ordered into an unjust and unnecessary war, he cannot at that time abandon his profession—at all events, not without making himself a martyr. In the present case, I not only think this Mexican war unnecessary and unjust as regards Mexico, but I also think it not only hostile to the principles of our own government—a government of the people, securing to them liberty—but I think it a step and a great step towards a dissolution of our Union. And I doubt not that a dissolution of the Union will bring on wars between the separated parts. . . .

[Having recovered, Hitchcock was ordered to join in a expedition under the overall command of Gen. Winfield Scott.]

New Orleans, Dec 15, 1846. High time to use my notebook. Left Louis on 21st, and got here the 31st. With other officers have since waited for a steamer to take us to the Brazos at S. Lago in western Texas. Report is fully confirmed that General Scott will take the conduct of the war, and it is considered settled that the castle of San Juan at Vera Cruz is to be assailed. My regiment is with Taylor at Monterey.

My feeling towards the war is no better than at first. I still feel that it was unnecessarily brought on by President Polk, and, not withstanding his disclaimers, I believe he expressly aimed to get possession of California and New Mexico, which I see, by his message received here today,

he considers accomplished. Now, however, as the war is going on, it must, as almost everybody supposes, be carried on by us aggressively, and in this I must be an instrument. I certainly do not feel properly for such a duty, particularly as I see that my health is almost sure to fail me . . . I feel very much like making a sacrifice of myself and drawing the curtain between me and this life. I am convinced that no contingency connected with this war can affect that in me which, by its nature, is immortal, and the end must be the same be my passage to it what it may. As a matter of taste and choice, I should prefer a more quiet career, and one in which I could pursue my favorite studies, of philosophy. But this is not to be. . . .

February 27, 1847. Colonel Hitchcock to Rev. Theodore Parker in Boston: I coincide with you in your views of this abominable war. Humble as I am, I wish not to fall a victim to this war without entering my protest against it as unjust on our part and needlessly and wickedly brought about. I am here, not by choice, but because, being in this army, it is my duty to obey the constituted authorities. As an individual I condemn, I abominate this war: as a member of the government I must go with it until our authorities are brought back to a sense of justice. . . .

September 7, 1847. . . .

3 P.M. At 1, I was at the General's. He read to me his order for massing the troops by to-morrow noon. Quitman and Twiggs are ordered to Misquoique, but a brigade is this afternoon to threaten the city by the Piedad route (between San Antonio and the Chapultepec route), and to-night Worth, with his division and one brigade of Pillow's is to attack and destroy the foundry. Thus matters now stand. The foundry is under the guns of Chapultepec, and its destruction by daylight might be very difficult if not impossible without first silencing the commanding guns. Hence it is to be attempted to-night. So the orders contemplate. . . .

6 P.M. I am alone in the extensive garden attached to the house of the consul, in which I am quartered. I look upon the great variety of fruits and flowers in vast abundance and luxuriance, and I ask why the monster-genius of war is allowed to pollute such scenes.

I have often entered my protest against this war, and to-day I hear, from very good authority, that our commissioner

has said that if he were a Mexican he would die before he would agree to the terms proposed by the United States. He ought, then, to have refused the mission he has undertaken. A degrading proposition is alike dishonorable to him who proposes as to him to whom it is proposed. . . .

[In the early 1850s, Hitchcock commanded the army on the Pacific Coast.]

August 5, 1852. . . . The wrong [at the headwaters of the San Joachim River] came, as usual, from white men. The Indian commissioner last year made treaties with these Indians, and assigned them reservations of land as their own. The whites have not respected the proceedings of the commissioner, but have occupied the reservation to a considerable extent and established a ferry within the lands assigned to the Indians. To this the Indians seem to have objected, and one of them told the ferryman that he was on their land and he would have to go away, because his boat and apparatus stopped the salmon from ascending the river. This, it is said, was considered a hostile threat, and a party of whites was raised to go among the Indians and demand an explanation. As what had been said to the ferryman was said by only one or two and was not advised by the tribe, the latter was taken entirely by surprise by this armed party, and, knowing nothing of its object and becoming alarmed, some it is said were seen picking up their bows, and this was considered a sign of hostile intent and they were fired on and fifteen or twenty were killed! Some of the Indians belonging to the tribe were, at the moment their friends were fired on, at work on a white man's farm some miles distant, without the smallest suspicion of existing causes of hostility.

Affairs thereupon assumed a threatening aspect, and a great council has been appointed for Aug. 15th, at which all the surrounding tribes will assemble on King's River, to discuss the question of going to war with the whites. It is to overawe this council that I have sent the troops to Fort Miller. It is a hard case for the troops to know the whites are in the wrong, and yet be compelled to punish the Indians if they attempt to defend themselves. . . .

October 24, 1852. . . . I have to-day given away my land-warrant for 160 acres of land to my cousin. I have felt some

disposition to locate this land in my own name and retain it, as it is for service in the field (in the Mexican War); but as it was in a detestable war, I have concluded to put it out of my hands. . . .

May 1854. . . . [We] make a quarrel with Spain, really for the purpose of seizing the island of Cuba. I have not the smallest sympathy with the movement. I think that republican principles would be injured by the annexation of Cuba to the United States.

I have been seriously thinking of resigning from the army. . . . I consider the slavery in our country an element guided by passion, rather than by reason, and its existence among us is shaking the whole fabric of our government. Abolitionists would abolish the institution of slavery as the real evil, whereas the real evil is the want of intelligence from which slavery itself took its rise. Men in a passion, as Plato says, are already slaves.

As to leaving the army: I may do so if I choose at this time and no one to notice me, for I am unknown except to a few friends. If I wait and a war with Spain be forced on us by the headlong ambition or false policy of the Cabinet at Washington it might be hazardous to retire, even though in principle opposed to the war, not only as unjustifiable toward Spain but as impolitic and injurious as respects ourselves. I do verily believe that such a war would be a downward instead of an onward step for our republican institutions, and might easily justify my own conscience in refusing to be an instrument in the unjust campaign.

I might draw a line between my duty to remain in the army to repulse any attempt made from abroad upon us, and the questionable duty of going beyond our borders to inflict wrong upon another people, with probable injury to us in the end. I had this point in consideration on entering into the Mexican War, the grievous wrong of which was perfectly apparent to me, but I did not resign. My principles were not then so clear to me as they have since become, and it would have been more difficult to act freely then than now—in case I mean, of a war with Spain manifestly for the acquisition of Cuba. . . .

New York, May 31. I am in doubt as to leaving the army, wishing to do so, but uncertain as to the result. I do not wish to be moved by the slightest disposition to avoid

service and responsibility. One point of weight with me is my personal opinions, after reading Plato, as I have, and finding myself more than ever a cosmopolite. The truth is, I am not sufficiently devoted to my profession, or even to my government, to make service a pleasure. I consider war an evil, whether necessary or not. It indicates a state of comparative barbarism in the nation engaged in it. I am also doubtful as to governments, and feel disposed to think that with my views I ought to live under what Plato, in the Statesman, speaks of as the 7th government. The question remains whether I can pass from a practical to a theoretical life, and whether, being a member of society, I am not bound to act with it. If I resign I wish to do so in such a frame of mind as to have no after regrets. This, in fact, is the principle which I wish to have guide me in whatever I do, for my eternity is here and now.

St. Louis, Oct. 6, 1855. I have prepared a letter, now on the table before me, addressed to Colonel Thomas, Asst. Adj.-General to General Scott, tendering the resignation of my commission in the army. My leave of absence terminates to-day, and I have thought for several years that if circumstances should compel me to serve under [General Harney's] orders, I would resign. It has now happened. I have been placed under the orders of a man for whom I have not the smallest respect—a man without education, intelligence, or humanity. I have not acted hastily. I have not resigned in a passion. I am not under the influence of anger or pique, nor do I feel a sense of mortification because an unworthy man has been set over me. Least of all do I suppose that I shall be missed from the army, or that my country will notice my withdrawal to private life. I know how little a great nation depends upon any mere individual, and how still less upon so humble a person as myself. I am content to be unnoticed. If I could really do some great and glorious good I should be willing to take the reputation of it, but I have not the smallest desire for mere notoriety. It is a rare thing in our service for a full colonel (brevet brigadier-general) to resign, and thereby relinquish all contingent advantages, but I voluntarily surrender them all rather than to place myself under orders of such a man as I know [General Harney] to be.

[W.A. Croffut, the editor of Hitchcock's diary, added this paragraph of his own.]

Shortly after these words were written a messenger came galloping across the prairies towards St. Louis telling the story that our soldiers, under [General Harney's] command, had perpetrated the bloody butchery of Ash Hollow, in which, after a treacherous parley, and while they were negotiating terms of peace, they fell upon the Brules and exterminated the tribe. The New York Tribune characterized it as "a transaction as shameful, detestable, and cruel as anywhere sullies our annals," and the St. Louis News said that the commander "divested himself of the attributes of civilized humanity and turned himself into a treacherous demon, remorseless and bloodthirsty." When he read the horrible narrative General Hitchcock congratulated himself anew on having sent his resignation.

SOURCE: W. A. Croffut, ed., *Fifty Years in Camp and Field* (New York: Putnam, 1909), 81–85, 111, 116, 120, 122, 123, 198, 202, 212, 214, 225, 228, 229, 237, 296, 396, 404, 411–12, 418–19.

RELATED ENTRIES: Hitchcock; Ethan Allen; Indian Wars: Seminole Wars; Just War Theory; Osceola

1838

Lyrics to "Benny Havens, Oh!"

Benny Havens operated a tavern in the immediate vicinity of the United States Military Academy at West Point near Buttermilk Falls some time in the 1820s. Many cadets regarded an after-hours visit to this tavern as a true measure of one's daring and skill, and a number found their way there on the sly in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s. The tavern was not off-limits to officers stationed at the Academy, and in 1838 Lt. Lucius O'Brien penned a number of verses, sung to Thomas Moore's song "The Wearing of the Green," that became popular with both officers and cadets. After O'Brien was killed in action in the Second Seminole War in 1841, each graduating class added a verse. The song has more than 50 known verses, but the most often sung are the first and the sixth of the nine given here:

1033

Come fill your glasses, fellows, and stand up, in a row,
To singing sentimentally we're going for to go.
In the Army there's sobriety, promotion's very slow,
So we'll sing our reminiscences of Benny Havens, Oh!

> Chorus:
> Oh! Benny Havens, Oh!
> Oh! Benny Havens, Oh!
> We'll sing our reminiscences of Benny Havens, Oh!

Let us toast our foster father, the Republic, as you know,
  Who in the paths of science taught us upward for to go;
And the maidens of our native land, whose cheeks like roses
    glow,
  They're oft remembered in our cups at Benny Havens, Oh!

To the ladies of our Army our cups shall ever flow,
  Companions in our exile and our shield 'gainst every woe;
May they see their husbands generals, with double pay also,
  And join us in our choruses at Benny Havens, Oh!

Come fill up to our Generals, God bless the brave heroes,
  They're an honor to their country, and a terror to their foes;
May they long rest on their laurels, and troubles never know,
  But live to see a thousand years at Benny Havens, Oh!

To our kind old Alma Mater, our rock-bound Highland home,
  We'll cast back many a fond regret as o'er life's sea we roam;
Until on our last battle-field the lights of heaven shall glow,
  We'll never fail to drink to her and Benny Havens, Oh!

May the Army be augmented, promotion be less slow,
  May our country in the hour of need be ready for the foe;
May we find a soldier's resting-place beneath a soldier's blow,
  With room enough beside our graves for Benny Havens, Oh!

And if amid the battle shock our honor e'er should trail,
  And hearts that beat beneath its folds should turn or
    basely quail;
Then may some son of Benny's, with quick avenging blow,
Lift up the flag we loved so well at Benny Havens, Oh!

To our comrades who have fallen, one cup before we go,
  They poured their life-blood freely out pro bono publico;
No marble points the stranger to where they rest below,

They lie neglected far away from Benny Havens, Oh!

When you and I and Benny, and all the others too,
  Are called before the "final board" our course in life to view,
May we never "fess" on any point, but straight be told to go,
  And join the army of the blest at Benny Havens, Oh!

This song, like "Army Blue," we are printing here because it is dear to our friends and rivals, the Cadets of the United States Military Academy. In addition it is beloved by every alumnus of West Point; and there are few midshipmen or naval officers who have not become acquainted with it. Benny Havens, it is understood, was originally a sutler on the West Point reservation and very popular with the cadets of earlier days; but in the course of hallowing years the name has in a way become synonymous with West Point itself.

SOURCE: Joseph W. Crosley and the United States Naval Institute. *The Book of Navy Songs.* Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Academy, 1955. Reprinted by permission of the Naval Institute Press.

RELATED ENTRIES: Military Academy, United States; Music and War

1846 a
LETTER FROM PRES. JAMES POLK TO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON SECRECY IN EXECUTIVE BRANCH DEALINGS

This document is one of the earlier examples of the debate between the president and the Congress about the nature of executive secrecy, and the limits to which diplomatic activity could be kept secret. This letter from Pres. James K. Polk to the House of Representatives lays out one version of the executive branch's justification for preservation of at least some secrecy. The particular controversy referred to relates to the secretary of state who served under Polk's predecessor, specifically the secretary's negotiations with Britain over the northeastern boundary of the United States and Canada.

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1846.
To the House of Representatives:

I have considered the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, by which I am requested "to cause to be furnished to that House an account of all payments made on President's certificates from the fund appropriated by law, through the agency of the State Department, for the contingent expenses of foreign intercourse from the 4th of March, 1841, until the retirement of Daniel Webster from the Department of State, with copies of all entries, receipts, letters, vouchers, memorandums, or other evidence of such payments, to whom paid, for what, and particularly all concerning the northeastern-boundary dispute with Great Britain."

With an anxious desire to furnish to the House any information requested by that body which may be in the Executive Departments, I have felt bound by a sense of public duty to inquire how far I could with propriety, or consistently with the existing laws, respond to their call.

The usual annual appropriation "for the contingent expenses of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations" has been disbursed since the date of the act of May 1, 1810, in pursuance of its provisions. By the third section of that act it is provided—

That when any sum or sums of money shall be drawn from the Treasury under any law making appropriation for the contingent expenses of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations the President shall be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause the same to be duly settled annually with the accounting officers of the Treasury in the manner following; that is to say, by causing the same to be accounted for specially in all instances wherein the expenditure thereof may in his judgment be made public, and by making a certificate of the amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable not to specify; and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum or sums therein expressed to have been expended.

Two distinct classes of expenditure are authorized by this law—the one of a public and the other of a private and confidential character. The President in office at the time of the expenditure is made by the law the sole judge whether it shall be public or private. Such sums are to be "accounted for specially in all instances wherein the expenditure thereof may in his judgment be made public." All expenditures "accounted for specially" are settled at the Treasury upon vouchers, and not on "President's certificates," and, like all other public accounts, are subject to be called for by Congress, and are open to public examination. Had information as respects this class of expenditures been called for by the resolution of the House, it would have been promptly communicated. . . .

If the President may answer the present call, he must answer similar calls for every such expenditure of a confidential character, made under every Administration, in war and in peace, from the organization of the Government to the present period. To break the seal of confidence imposed by the law, and heretofore uniformly preserved, would be subversive of the very purpose for which the law was enacted, and might be productive of the most disastrous consequences. The expenditures of this confidential character, it is believed, were never before sought to be made public, and I should greatly apprehend the consequences of establishing a precedent which would render such disclosures hereafter inevitable.

I am fully aware of the strong and correct public feeling which exists throughout the country against secrecy of any kind in the administration of the Government, and especially in reference to public expenditures; yet our foreign negotiations are wisely and properly confined to the knowledge of the Executive during their pendency. Our laws require the accounts of every particular expenditure to be rendered and publicly settled at the Treasury Department. The single exception which exists is not that the amounts embraced under President's certificates shall be withheld from the public, but merely that the items of which these are composed shall not be divulged. To this extent, and no further, is secrecy observed.

The laudable vigilance of the people in regard to all the expenditures of the Government, as well as a sense of duty on the part of the President and a desire to retain the good opinion of his fellow-citizens, will prevent any sum expended from being accounted for by the President's certificate unless in cases of urgent necessity. Such certificates have therefore been resorted to but seldom throughout our past history.

For my own part, I have not caused any account whatever to be settled on a Presidential certificate. I have had no occasion rendering it necessary in my judgment to make such a certificate, and it would be an extreme case which would ever induce me to exercise this authority; yet if such a case should arise it would be my duty to assume the responsibility devolved on me by the law.

During my Administration all expenditures for contingent expenses of foreign intercourse in which the accounts have been closed have been settled upon regular vouchers, as all other public accounts are settled at the Treasury.

It may be alleged that the power of impeachment belongs to the House of Representatives, and that, with a view to the exercise of this power, that House has the right to investigate the conduct of all public officers under the Government. This is cheerfully admitted. In such a case the safety of the Republic would be the supreme law, and the power of the House in the pursuit of this object would penetrate into the most secret recesses of the Executive Departments. It could command the attendance of any and every agent of the Government, and compel them to produce all papers, public or private, official or unofficial, and to testify on oath to all facts within their knowledge. But even in a case of that kind they would adopt all wise precautions to prevent the exposure of all such matters the publication of which might injuriously affect the public interest, except so far as this might be necessary to accomplish the great ends of public justice. If the House of Representatives, as the grand inquest of the nation, should at any time have reason to believe that there has been malversation in office by an improper use or application of the public money by a public officer, and should think proper to institute an inquiry into the matter, all the archives and papers of the Executive Departments, public or private, would be subject to the inspection and control of a committee of their body and every facility in the power of the Executive be afforded to enable them to prosecute the investigation.

The experience of every nation on earth has demonstrated that emergencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary for the public safety or the public good to make expenditures the very object of which would be defeated by publicity. Some governments have very large amounts at their disposal, and have made vastly greater expenditures than the small amounts which have from time to time been accounted for on President's certificates. In no nation is the application of such sums ever made public. In time of war or impending danger the situation of the country may make it necessary to employ individuals for the purpose of obtaining information or rendering other important services who could never be prevailed upon to act if they entertained the least apprehension that their names or their agency would in any contingency be divulged. So it may often become necessary to incur an expenditure for an object highly useful to the country; for example, the conclusion of a treaty with a barbarian power whose customs require on such occasions the use of presents. But this object might be altogether defeated by the intrigues of other powers if our purposes were to be made known by the exhibition of the original papers and vouchers to the accounting officers of the Treasury. It would be easy to specify other cases which may occur in the history of a great nation, in its intercourse with other nations, wherein it might become absolutely necessary to incur expenditures for objects which could never be accomplished if it were suspected in advance that the items of expenditure and the agencies employed would be made public.

Actuated undoubtedly by considerations of this kind, Congress provided such a fund, coeval with the organization of the Government, and subsequently enacted the law of 1810 as the permanent law of the land. While this law exists in full force I feel bound by a high sense of public policy and duty to observe its provisions and the uniform practice of my predecessors under it.

With great respect for the House of Representatives and an anxious desire to conform to their wishes, I am constrained to come to this conclusion. . . .

JAMES K. POLK.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil–Military Relations; Intelligence Gathering in Wart; Polk, James K.

1846 b

EXCERPTS FROM *THE BIGLOW PAPERS*

Boston Brahmin James Russell Lowell, a foe of slavery and the Mexican War, penned a number of letters from fictitious plain Massachusetts folk upset with the Polk administration's Mexican War policies. He sent these letters to the Boston Courier *throughout the course of the war. This, the first of them, begins with an introduction from farmer "Ezekiel Biglow," offering the Courier a poem his son "Hosea" had "thrashed out" after an unpleasant encounter with an Army recruiting sergeant.*

No. I.

A Letter

FROM MR. EZEKIEL BIGLOW OF JAALAM

TO THE HON. JOSEPH T. BUCKINGHAM,

EDITOR OF THE BOSTON COURIER,

INCLOSING A POEM OF HIS SON,

MR. HOSEA BIGLOW.

JAYLEM, june 1846.

MISTER EDDYTER: —Our Hosea wuz down to Boston last week, and he see a cruetin Sarjunt a struttin round as popler as a hen with 1 chicking, with 2 fellers a drummin and fifin arter him like all nater. the sarjunt he thout Hosea hedn't gut his i teeth cut cos he looked a kindo's though he'd jest com down, so he cal'lated to hook him in, but Hosy woodn't take none o' his sarse for all he hed much as 20 Rooster's tales stuck onto his hat and eenamost enuf brass a bobbin up and down on his shoulders and figureed onto his coat and trousis, let alone wut nater hed sot in his featers, to make a 6 pounder out on.

wal, Hosea he com home considerabal riled, and arter I 'd gone to bed I heern Him a thrashin round like a short-tailed Bull in flitime. The old Woman ses she to me ses she, Zekle, ses she, our Hosee's gut the chollery or suthin anuther ses she, don't you Bee skeered, ses I, he's oney amakin pottery. . .

EZEKIEL BIGLOW.

THRASH away, you 'll hev to rattle
　　On them kittle drums o' yourn,—

'Taint a knowin' kind o' cattle
　　Thet is ketched with mouldy corn ;
Put in stiff, you fifer feller,
　　Let folks see how spry you be,—
Guess you 'll toot till you are yeller
　　'Fore you git ahold o' me ! . . .

Ez fer war, I call it murder,—
　　There you hev it plain an' flat ;
I don't want to go no furder
　　Than my Testyment fer that ;
God hez sed so plump an' fairly,
　　It 's ez long ez it is broad,
An' you 've gut to git up airly
　　Ef you want to take in God.

'Taint your eppyletts an' feathers
　　Make the thing a grain more right ;
'Taint afollerin' your bell-wethers
　　Will excuse ye in His sight ;
Ef you take a sword an' dror it,
　　An' go stick a feller thru,
Guv'ment aint to answer for it,
　　God'll send the bill to you.

Wut 's the use o' meetin-goin'
　　Every Sabbath, wet or dry,
Ef it 's right to go amowin'
　　Feller-men like oats an' rye ?
I dunno but wut it 's pooty
　　Trainin' round in bobtail coats,—
But it 's curus Christian dooty
　　This ere cuttin' folks's throats.

They may talk o' Freedom's airy
　　Tell they 're pupple in the face,—
It 's a grand gret cemetary
　　Fer the barthrights of our race ;
They jest want this Californy
　　So 's to lug new slave-states in
To abuse ye, an' to scorn ye,
　　An' to plunder ye like sin.

Aint it cute to see a Yankee

Take sech everlastin' pains,
All to git the Devil's thankee,
Helpin' on 'em weld their chains ?
Wy, it 's jest ez clear ez figgers,
Clear ez one an' one make two,
Chaps thet make black slaves o' niggers
Want to make wite slaves o' you.

SOURCE: The Biglow Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: George Nichols, 1848).

RELATED ENTRIES: Antiwar Movements; Conscription and Voluntarism; Just War Theory; Mexican War

1849

LYRICS TO "I'M OFF FOR NICARAGUA"

American "filibusters" launched several unlawful quasi-military assaults on Sonora (Mexico), Nicaragua, Cuba, and Honduras in the 1850s. Most were Southerners hoping to expand the borders of slavery. This unsympathetic ditty spoofed the "filibustering" craze.

One day, while walking down Broadway,
What should I meet,
Coming up the street,
But a soldier gay,
In a grand array,
Who had been to Nicaragua!
He took me warmly by the hand,
And says, "old fellow, you're my man.
How would you like
A soldier's life,
On the plains of Nicaragua?
Then come with me down to the ship,
I'll quickly send you on your trip,
Don't stop to think, for there's meat and drink
On the plains of Nicaragua.

I scarcely knew what to do or say;
No money I had,
My boots were bad,
Hat was gone,

My pants were torn,
So I was off for Nicaragua.
He took me in, and did me treat,
Gave me a cigar and grub to eat;
And on his scroll did my name enroll,
A soldier for Nicaragua.
He took me down unto the ship,
Quickly sent me on my trip;
But, oh Lord! wasn't I sea-sick,
Going to Nicaragua.

But after ten days of sailing away,
We saw the land of San Juan;
My heart beat light,
For I thought it all right,
When I got to Nicaragua.
But when they got me on the shore,
They put me with about twenty more,
To fight away
Or be hanged, they say,
For going to Nicaragua.
Now, wasn't I in a pretty fix:
If I could only have cut my sticks,
You'd never caught me playing such tricks,
As going to Nicaragua.

Next morning, then, in grand array,
All fagged and jaded,
We were paraded.
At close of day,
We were marched away
To the army in Nicaragua.
Not a bit of breakfast did I see,
And dinner was the same to me.
Two fried cats
And three stewed rats
Were supper in Nicaragua.
Marching all day with sore feet,
Plenty of fighting and nothing to eat,
How I sighed for pickled pigs' feet,
Way down in Nicaragua.

The Costa Ricans tackled us one day;

In the first alarm,

I lost my arm;

But we made them yield,

On Rivas' field,

Way down in Nicaragua.

The Yankee boys fought long and well,

They gave those Costa Ricans—fits:

But wasn't I dry

And hungry,

Way down in Nicaragua!

Marching all day, and fighting away,

Nothing to eat, quite as much pay,

Do it all for glory, they say,

Way down in Nicaragua.

But when I was on duty, one day,

Give 'em the slip—

Jumped on the ship,

And bid good-by,

Forever and aye,

To the plains of Nicaragua.

And, when I got to old New York,

I filled myself with beans and pork;

My friends I cheer, and in lager beer

Drown times in Nicaragua.

And now I tread Columbia's land,

Take my friends all by the hand;

And if ever I leave 'em, may I be—blessed,

To go to Nicaragua.

SOURCE: "I'm Off for Nicaragua" (New York: H. De Marsan).

RELATED ENTRIES: Filibustering; Mexican War; Music and War

1850

EXCERPT FROM A. A. LIVERMORE'S *WAR WITH MEXICO*

Abiel Abbot Livermore won an American Peace Society prize for the best essay on how in the future the United States (and the rest of the developed world) might avoid wars like the one it had recently waged against Mexico. These excerpts are drawn from the society's publication of that essay.

CHAPTER XXIX: SUBSTITUTES FOR WAR

. . . What is needed is, that the idea of a great pacific tribunal to settle the disputes of the world, should be broached, familiarized to the people, sent abroad on the wings of the press, hammered by dint of heavy and oft-repeated arguments into the mass of admitted and accredited truths, and then the work is done. We have trained mankind to war, we must now train them to peace. When the spirit of peace is largely developed in the public sentiment of Europe and America, this institution will be born in a day. The tendency of these remarks is to show that the agitation of the subject is what is now most exigent. By books and pamphlets, by the living voice and the inspired pen, this theme must be brought home to the minds and hearts of men, and they must be made to feel that every individual, be he high or low, rich or poor, is vitally concerned in having the great quarrels of kingdoms justly and amicably settled, as he is that justice should be done between man and man, and peace and order prevail in his hamlet or village. For in the earthquake shocks of war a thousand homes are overturned, and the mark of blood is left behind on ten thousand spheres of life once usefully and happily filled by fathers, sons, husbands, brothers. Let us hope, and labor, and pray, that the day may not be far distant when civilized and Christian men will see the madness of war, its bald inconsistency with the theory of a republican government, its hostility to the spirit of the present age, and its nullification of every law, and promise, and prayer of the Lord Jesus Christ.

CHAPTER XXX: PACIFICATION OF THE WORLD.

. . . When we consider how little has been done to prevent war, and how much to cultivate its spirit, and to invest its feats with a factitious glory; how literature and the fine arts, and politics, and, sad to confess, even professed Christians have encouraged, applauded, and diffused the passion for arms, we wonder not at the frequency of battles, and the human blood that has stained half the land and sea of the whole earth. Indeed the martial spirit has been so prevalent, mankind have drunk it so greedily as if it were as innocent as water, that we are prone to forget what a thorough education

we give our children for war, and how little we do for the pacification of the world.

For when we inquire how this vast underlying passion for war has been educated and ripened in the heart of society, we shall be constrained to answer: It is by the war-songs of childhood, and the studies of the classics. It is by the wooden sword, and the tin drum of boyhood. It is by the trainings and the annual muster. It is by the red uniform and the white plume, and the prancing steed. It is by the cannon's thunder, and the gleam of the bayonet. It is by ballads of Robin Hood, and histories of Napoleon, and "Tales of the Crusaders." It is by the presentation of flags by the hands of the fair, and the huzzas for a victory. It is by the example of the father and the consent of the mother. It is by the fear of cowardice, and the laugh of the scorner. It is by the blood of youth, and the pride of manhood, and stories of revolutionary sires. It is by standing armies, and majestic men-of-war. It is by the maxims of self defence, and the cheapness of human life, and the love of excitement. It is by novels of love, and the "Pirate's Own Book." It is by the jars of home, and the squabbles of party, and the controversies of sects. It is by the misconception of the Bible, and ignorance of God. It is by the bubble of glory, and the emulation of schools, and the graspings of money-making. By one and by all, the heart of the community is educated for war, from the cradle to the coffin. When we sow the seed so copiously, we must not complain that the harvest is abundant.

SOURCE: War with Mexico (Boston: W.M. Crosby and H.P. Nichols, 1850).

RELATED ENTRIES: Just War Theory; Mexican War; Militarization and Militarism; Pacifism

1861 a

OFFICERS STAYING IN THE U.S. ARMY OR JOINING THE CONFEDERACY, BY REGION OF BIRTH*

One old saw had it that virtually all southern-born West Point graduates "went South" when their home states seceded. In 1903 Francis Heitman found the records and "did the math." Here are the results. Officers joined the

Confederacy in greater proportion the further South their home state.

Region	Joined CSA (%)	Stayed USA (%)	Resigned & Withdrew (%)	Total
LOWER SOUTH (N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla., Miss., La., Texas)	100 (79.4)	20 (15.9)	6 (4.8)	126
UPPER SOUTH (Va., Tenn., Ark.)	93 (58.9)	57 (36.1)	8 (5.1)	158
BORDER (Del., Md., Ky., Mo., D.C.)	48 (27.4)	118 (67.4)	9 (5.1)	175
NORTH	28 (4.5)	597 (95.1)	3 (0.5)	628
TOTAL	269 (24.7)	792 (72.9)	26 (2.4)	1,087

*Foreign-born officers and officers whose places of birth are unknown have been grouped by place of appointment.

SOURCE: Francis B. Heitman, comp., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, from Its Organization, September 29, 1789, to March 2, 1903 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903).

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil War; Conscription and Volunteerism

1861 b

MARK TWAIN'S ACCOUNT OF HIS BRIEF CONFEDERATE CAREER

Some time after the Civil War, Samuel Clemens ("Mark Twain") whimsically described his brief experience as a Confederate volunteer.

IT WAS LATE, and there was a deep woodsy stillness everywhere. There was a veiled moonlight, which was only just strong enough to enable us to mark the general shape of objects. Presently a muffled sound caught our ears, and we recognized it as the hoof-beats of a horse or horses. And right away a figure appeared in the forest path; it could have been

made of smoke, its mass had so little sharpness of outline. It was a man on horseback, and it seemed to me that there were others behind him. I got hold of a gun in the dark, and pushed it through a crack between the logs, hardly knowing what I was doing, I was so dazed with fright. Somebody said "Fire!" I pulled the trigger. I seemed to see a hundred flashes and hear a hundred reports; then I saw the man fall down out of the saddle. My first feeling was of surprised gratification; my first impulse was an apprentice sportsman's impulse to run and pick up his game. Somebody said, hardly audibly, "Good—we've got him!—wait for the rest." But the rest did not come. We waited—listened—still no more came. There was not a sound, not the whisper of a leaf; just perfect stillness; an uncanny kind of stillness, which was all the more uncanny on account of the damp, earthy, late-night smells now rising and pervading it. Then, wondering, we crept stealthily out, and approached the man. When we got to him the moon revealed him distinctly. He was lying on his back, with his arms abroad; his mouth was open and his chest heaving with long gasps, and his white shirt-front was all splashed with blood. The thought shot through me that I was a murderer; that I had killed a man—a man who had never done me any harm. That was the coldest sensation that ever went through my marrow. I was down by him in a moment, helplessly stroking his forehead; and I would have given anything then—my own life freely—to make him again what he had been five minutes before. And all the boys seemed to be feeling in the same way; they hung over him, full of pitying interest, and tried all they could to help him, and said all sorts of regretful things. They had forgotten all about the enemy; they thought only of this one forlorn unit of the foe. Once my imagination persuaded me that the dying man gave me a reproachful look out of his shadowy eyes, and it seemed to me that I would rather he had stabbed me than done that. He muttered and mumbled like a dreamer in his sleep about his wife and his child; and I thought with a new despair, "This thing that I have done does not end with him; it falls upon them too, and they never did me any harm, any more than he."

In a little while the man was dead. He was killed in war; killed in fair and legitimate war; killed in battle, as you may say; and yet he was as sincerely mourned by the opposing force as if he had been their brother. The boys stood there a half-hour sorrowing over him, and recalling the details of the tragedy, and wondering who he might be, and if he were a spy, and saying that if it were to do over again they would not hurt him unless he attacked them first. It soon came out that mine was not the only shot fired; there were five others—a division of the guilt which was a great relief to me, since it in some degree lightened and diminished the burden I was carrying. There were six shots fired at once; but I was not in my right mind at the time, and my heated imagination had magnified my one shot into a volley.

The man was not in uniform, and was not armed. He was a stranger in the country; that was all we ever found out about him. The thought of him got to preying upon me every night; I could not get rid of it. I could not drive it away, the taking of that unoffending life seemed such a wanton thing. And it seemed an epitome of war; that all war must be just that—the killing of strangers against whom you feel no personal animosity; strangers whom, in other circumstances, you would help if you found them in trouble, and who would help you if you needed it. My campaign was spoiled. It seemed to me that I was not rightly equipped for this awful business; that war was intended for men, and I for a child's nurse. I resolved to retire from this avocation of sham soldiership while I could save some remnant of my self-respect. These morbid thoughts clung to me against reason; for at bottom I did not believe I had touched that man. The law of probabilities decreed me guiltless of his blood; for in all my small experience with guns I had never hit anything I had tried to hit, and I knew I had done my best to hit him. Yet there was no solace in the thought. Against a diseased imagination demonstration goes for nothing.

SOURCE: Mark Twain, "The Private History of a Campaign That Failed," in *The American Claimant and Other Stories and Sketches* (New York: Collier, 1899), 276–79.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil War; Literature and War

1861 c

AN ENGLISHMAN'S MEMORY OF ENLISTING IN AN ARKANSAS REGIMENT

Henry Stanley, the future journalist and "rescuer" of Dr. David Livingstone in Africa, had been a young English resident of Arkansas in 1861. He later recalled the impulse that had led him to enlist in a regiment there.

The young men joined hands and shouted, "Is there a man with soul so dead, Who never to himself hath said—'This is my own, my native land?' 'An honourable death is better than a base life,'" etc., etc. In the strident tones of passion, they said they would welcome a bloody grave rather than survive to see the proud foe violating their altars and their hearths, and desecrating the sacred soil of the South with their unholy feet. But, inflamed as the men and youths were, the warlike fire that burned within their breasts was as nothing to the intense heat that glowed within the bosoms of the women. No suggestion of compromise was possible in their presence. If every man did not hasten to the battle, they vowed they would themselves rush out and meet the Yankee vandals. In a land where women are worshipped by the men, such language made them war-mad.

Then one day I heard that enlistment was going on. Men were actually enrolling themselves as soldiers! A Captain Smith, owner of a plantation a few miles above Auburn, was raising a Company to be called the 'Dixie Greys.' A Mr. Penny Mason, living on a plantation below us, was to be the First-lieutenant, and Mr. Lee, nephew of the great General Lee, was to be Second-lieutenant. The youth of the neighbourhood were flocking to them and registering their names. Our Doctor,—Weston Jones,—Mr. Newton Story, and his brothers Varner, had enlisted. Then the boy Dan Goree prevailed upon his father to permit him to join the gallant braves. Little Rich, of Richmond Store, gave in his name. Henry Parker, the boy nephew of one of the richest planters in the vicinity, volunteered, until it seemed as if Arkansas County was to be emptied of all the youth and men I had known.

About this time, I received a parcel which I half-suspected, as the address was written in a feminine hand, to be a token of some lady's regard; but, on opening it, I discovered it to be a chemise and petticoat, such as a negro lady's-maid might wear. I hastily hid it from view, and retired to the back room, that my burning cheeks might not betray me to some onlooker. In the afternoon, Dr. Goree called, and was excessively cordial and kind. He asked me if I did not intend to join the valiant children of Arkansas to fight? and I answered 'Yes.'

At my present age [60] the whole thing appears to be a very laughable affair altogether; but, at that time, it was far from being a laughing matter. He praised my courage, and my patriotism, and said I should win undying glory, and then he added, in a lower voice, 'We shall see what we can do for you when you come back.'

What did he mean? Did he suspect my secret love for that sweet child who sometimes came shopping with her mother? From that confidential promise I believe he did, and was, accordingly, ready to go anywhere for her sake. . . .

About the beginning of July we embarked on the steamer 'Frederick Notrebe.' At various landings, as we ascended the river, the volunteers crowded aboard; and the jubilation of so many youths was intoxicating. Near Pine Bluff, while we were making merry, singing, 'I wish I was in Dixie,' the steamer struck a snag which pierced her hull, and we sank down until the water was up to the furnace-doors. We remained fixed for several hours, but, fortunately, the 'Rose Douglas' came up, and took us and our baggage safely up to Little Rock.

We were marched to the Arsenal, and, in a short time, the Dixie Greys were sworn by Adjutant-General Burgevine into the service of the Confederate States of America for twelve months. We were served with heavy flint-lock muskets, knapsacks, and accoutrements, and were attached to the 6th Arkansas Regiment of Volunteers, Colonel Lyons commanding, and A. T. Hawthorn, Lieutenant-colonel.

SOURCE: Dorothy Stanley, ed., *The Autobiography of Sir Henry M. Stanley* (Boston and London: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 165–66.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil War; Conscription and Volunteerism

1861 d

EXAMPLES OF CONFEDERATE SOLDIERS' EXPERIENCES ON BATTLEFIELD

A young Confederate officer and two enlisted men commented on the hardening effect of seeing dead soldiers on battlefields day after day:

I felt quite small in that fight the other day when the musket balls and cannon balls was flying around me as thick as hail and my best friends falling on both sides dead and mortally wounded Oh Dear it is impossible for me to express my feeling when the fight was over & I saw what was done the tears came then free oh that I never could behold such a sight again to think of it among civilized people killing one another like beasts one would think that the supreme rule would put a stop to it but wee sinned as a nation and must suffer in the flesh as well as spiritually those things wee cant account for.

• • •

Up on the bluff we saw the first dead Yankee—he lay stark and cold in death upon the hillside among the trees in the gloom of the gathering twilight; the pale face turned towards us, upon which we looked with feelings mingled with awe and dread. We had heard and seen many new and strange things that day. Later on in the war, we could look upon the slain on the battlefield with little less feeling than upon the carcass of an animal. Such are some of the hardening effects of war. I don't think we were again as badly scared as on that day; I was not, I am sure.

• • •

I saw the body [of a man killed the previous day] this morning and a horrible sight it was. Such sights do not affect me as they once did. I can not describe the change nor do I know when it took place, yet I know that there is a change for I look on the carcass of a man now with pretty much such feeling as I would do were it a horse or hog.

SOURCE: W. H. Morgan, *Personal Reminiscences of the War of 1861–65* (Lynchburg, Va.: J.P. Bell, 1911), 62.

Two barely literate privates from Alabama wrote home during the Civil War, describing their horror at what Bell Irvin Wiley called their "Baptism of fire":

Martha . . . I can inform you that I have Seen the Monkey Show at last and I dont Waunt to see it no more I am satsfide with Ware Martha I Cant tell you how many ded men I did see . . . thay ware piled up one one another all over the Battel feel the Battel was a Six days Battel and I was in all off it . . . I did not go all over the Battel feeld I Jest was one one Winge of the Battel feeld But I can tell you that there Was a meney a ded man where I was men Was shot Evey fashinton that you mite Call for Som and there hedes shot of and som ther armes and leges Won was sot in the midel I can tell you that I am tirde of Ware I am satsfide if the Ballence is that is one thing Shore I dont waunt to see that site no more I can inform you that West Brown was shot one the head he Was sent off to the horspitel . . . he was not herte very Bad he was struck with a pease of a Bum[.]

• • •

We have had every hard fite a bout ten miles from Chatta nooga on Chick a mog ga creak in gor ga . . . i com out safe but it is all i can say i have all ways crave to fite a lit[tle] gust to no what it is to go in to a bat tle but i got the chance to tri my hand at last anough to sad isfi me i never wan to go in to an nother fite any more sister i wan to come home worse than i eaver did be fore but when times gits better i will tri to come home thare has ben agrate meney soldiers runing a way late ly but i dont want to go that way if i can get home any other way.

SOURCE: Bell Irvin Wiley, *Life of Johnny Reb* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943), 32–33.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil War; Combat, Effects of; Conscription and Volunteerism; Psychiatric Disorders, Combat Related

1861 e

EXCERPT FROM *ANGLO-AFRICAN* EDITORIAL

Northern blacks tended to see the beginning of hostilities as an opportunity to bring an end to slavery. The New York Anglo-African *editorialized thus:*

The outbreak of the war . . . is but another step in the drama of American Progress. We say Progress, for we know that no matter what may be the desires of the men of Expediency who rule, or seem to, the affairs of the North,—the tendencies are for liberty.

God speed the conflict. May the cup be drained to its dregs, for only thus can this nation of sluggards know the disease and its remedy . . .

The free colored Americans cannot be indifferent to the progress of this struggle. . . . Out of this strife will come freedom, though the methods are not yet clearly apparent. . . . Public opinion purified by the fiery ordeal through which the nation is about to pass, will rightly appreciate the cause of its political disquiet, and apply the remedy. . . . It must be that the key to the solution of the present difficulties, is the abolition of slavery; not as an act of retaliation on the master, but as a measure of justice to the slave—the sure and permanent basis of "a more perfect Union."

SOURCE: Editorials, *Anglo-African,* April 20 and 27, 1861.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Civil War

1861 f

COMMENTS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN SPY ALLAN PINKERTON

Blacks performed important spying missions and functions for the Union Army. Allan Pinkerton, chief of the U.S. Secret Service, went to Memphis, Tennessee, posing as a Southerner in 1861. He recalled:

Here, as in many other places, I found that my best source of information was the colored men, who were employed in various capacities of a military nature which entailed hard labor. The slaves, without reserve, were sent by their masters to perform the manual labor of building earthworks and fortifications, in driving the teams and in transporting cannon and ammunition. . . . I mingled freely with them, and found them ever ready to answer questions and to furnish me with every fact which I desired to possess. . . .

John Scobell undertook several missions for Pinkerton in Virginia. Pinkerton described Scobell's work as follows:

Among the many men thus employed, was a negro by the name of John Scobell, and the manner in which his duties were performed, was always a source of satisfaction to me and apparently of gratification to himself. From the commencement of the war, I had found the Negroes of invaluable assistance, and I never hesitated to employ them when, after investigation, I found them to be intelligent and trustworthy. . . .

All refugees, deserters and contrabands coming through our lines were turned over to me for a thorough examination and for such future disposition as I should recommend. John Scobell came to me in this manner. One morning I was seated in my quarters, preparing for the business of the day, when the officer of the guard announced the appearance of a number of contrabands. Ordering them to be brought in, the pumping process was commenced, and before noon many stray pieces of information had been gathered, which, by accumulation of evidence, were highly valuable. Among the number I had especially noticed the young man who had given his name as John Scobell. He had a manly and intelligent bearing, and his straightforward answers to the many questions propounded to him, at once impressed me very favorably. He informed me that he had formerly been a slave in the State of Mississippi, but had journeyed to Virginia with his master, whose name he bore. His master was a Scotchman, and but a few weeks before had given him and his wife their freedom. The young woman had obtained employment in Richmond, while he had made his way to the Union lines, where, encountering the Federal pickets, he had been brought to headquarters, and thence to me. . . .

I immediately decided to attach him to my headquarters, with the view of eventually using him in the capacity of

a scout, should he prove equal to the task. . . . I resolved to send him into the South, and test his ability for active duty. Calling him into my quarters, I gave him the necessary directions, and dispatched him, in company with Timothy Webster, on a trip to Virginia. Their line of travel was laid out through Centreville, Manassas, Dumfries, and the Upper and Lower Accoquan.

John Scobell I found was a remarkably gifted man for one of his race. He could read and write, and was as full of music as the feathered songsters. . . . In addition to what seemed an almost inexhaustible stock of negro plantation melodies he had also a charming variety of Scotch ballads, which he sang with a voice of remarkable power and sweetness. . . . Possessing the talents which he did, I felt sure, that he had only to assume the character of the light-hearted, happy darky and no one would suspect the cool-headed, vigilant detective, in the rollicking negro whose only aim in life appeared to be to get enough to eat, and a comfortable place to toast his shins.

. . . Carefully noting everything that came in his way he traveled through Dumfries, Accoquan, Manassas and Centreville, and after spending nearly ten days in these localities he finally made his way to Leesburg, and thence down the Potomac to Washington. His experiences on this trip were quite numerous and varied, and only a lack of space prevents their narration. Sometimes, as a vender of delicacies through the camps, a laborer on the earthworks at Manassas, or a cook at Centreville, he made his way uninterruptedly until he obtained the desired information and successfully accomplished the object of his mission.

His return to Washington was accomplished in safety and his full and concise report fully justified me in the selection I had made of a good, reliable and intelligent operative.

SOURCE: Allan Pinkerton, *Spy in the Rebellion* (New York: G.W. Carleton, 1883), 194, 344–46, 366.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Civil War; Intelligence Gathering in War

1862 a

EXCERPT FROM OFFICIAL ARMY RECORDS ON IMPRESSMENT OF BLACK WORKERS

During the war, slaves and free blacks did much of the work on Confederate fortifications and entrenchments, as these documents indicate.

R. H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General, to General J. B. Magruder at Yorktown, Virginia, Feb. 15, 1862:

The War Department finds it necessary to impress slaves and free negroes to extend and complete the fortifications in the Peninsula. You will therefore call upon the citizens of Dinwiddie County, by direction of the Secretary of War, to send forthwith one-half of their male slaves between the ages of sixteen and fifty to execute this work on the Peninsula.

Jefferson Davis to Governor John Letcher of Virginia, Oct. 10, 1862:

In accordance with an act passed by the Legislature of Virginia October 3, 1862, I have the honor to call upon Your Excellency for 4,500 negroes to be employed upon the fortifications. . . . It is unnecessary to call Your Excellency's attention to the importance of a prompt and efficient response to this call, in view of the necessity of completing the works for the defense of Richmond.

SOURCE: War of the Rebellion . . . Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 volumes (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880–1901), Series 1, vol. 51, part ii, 472–73, 633.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Civil War; Conscription and Volunteerism

1862 b

EXCHANGE BETWEEN HORACE GREELEY AND ABRAHAM LINCOLN

In 1862, President Lincoln threatened to veto a proposed confiscation bill that would have stripped those in rebellion of their property on the grounds of treason. The bill was criticized by moderate Republican members of Congress

from slave-holding border states, but it also fell afoul, in Lincoln's eyes, of the provision in the Constitution (art. 3, sec. 3, cl. 2) that "no [congressional] attainder of treason shall work . . . forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted." In other words, slaves might be freed from their rebellious owners, but upon the death of those rebels, their children were to inherit all such "property." Incensed by Lincoln's "strict construction," Greeley excoriated him in a letter dated August 19, which was printed in the New York Tribune *on August 20, 1862. Lincoln replied two days later.*

To ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President of the U. States:*

DEAR SIR: I do not intrude to tell you—for you must know already—that a great proportion of those who triumphed in your election, and of all who desire the unqualified suppression of the Rebellion now desolating our country, are sorely disappointed and deeply pained by the policy you seem to be pursuing with regard to the slaves of Rebels. I write only to set succinctly and unmistakably before you what we require, what we think we have a right to expect, and of what we complain.

I. We require of you, as the first servant of the Republic, charged especially and preëminently with this duty, that you EXECUTE THE LAWS. Most emphatically do we demand that such laws as have been recently enacted, which therefore may fairly be presumed to embody the present will and to be dictated by the present needs of the Republic, and which, after due consideration have received your personal sanction, shall by you be carried into full effect, and that you publicly and decisively instruct your subordinates that such laws exist, that they are binding on all functionaries and citizens, and that they are to be obeyed to the letter.

II. We think you are strangely and disastrously remiss in the discharge of your official and imperative duty with regard to the emancipating provisions of the new Confiscation Act. Those provisions were designed to fight Slavery with Liberty. They prescribe that men loyal to the Union, and willing to shed their blood in her behalf, shall no longer be held, with the Nation's consent, in bondage to persistent, malignant traitors, who for twenty years have been plotting and for sixteen months have been fighting to divide and destroy our country. Why these traitors should be

treated with tenderness by you, to the prejudice of the dearest rights of loyal men, we cannot conceive.

III. We think you are unduly influenced by the counsels, the representations, the menaces, of certain fossil politicians hailing from the Border Slave States. Knowing well that the heartily, unconditionally loyal portion of the White citizens of those States do not expect nor desire that Slavery shall be upheld to the prejudice of the Union—(for the truth of which we appeal not only to every Republican residing in those States, but to such eminent loyalists as H. Winter Davis, Parson Brownlow, the Union Central Committee of Baltimore, and to The Nashville Union)—we ask you to consider that Slavery is everywhere the inciting cause and sustaining base of treason: the most slaveholding sections of Maryland and Delaware being this day, though under the Union flag, in full sympathy with the Rebellion, while the Free-Labor portions of Tennessee and of Texas, though writhing under the bloody heel of Treason, are unconquerably loyal to the Union. So emphatically is this the case, that a most intelligent Union banker of Baltimore recently avowed his confident belief that a majority of the present Legislature of Maryland, though elected as and still professing to be Unionists, are at heart desirous of the triumph of the Jeff. Davis conspiracy; and when asked how they could be won back to loyalty, replied—"Only by the complete Abolition of Slavery." It seem to us the most obvious truth, that whatever strengthens or fortifies Slavery in the Border States strengthens also Treason, and drives home the wedge intended to divide the Union. Had you from the first refused to recognize in those States, as here, any other than unconditional loyalty—that which stands for the Union, whatever may become of Slavery—those States would have been, and would be, far more helpful and less troublesome to the defenders of the Union than they have been, or now are.

IV. We think timid counsels in such a crisis calculated to prove perilous, and probably disastrous. It is the duty of a Government so wantonly, wickedly assailed by Rebellion as ours has been to oppose force to force in a defiant, dauntless spirit. It cannot afford to temporize with traitors nor with semi-traitors. It must not bribe them to behave themselves, nor make them fair promises in the hope of disarming their causeless hostility. Representing a brave and high-spirited

people, it can afford to forfeit anything else better than its own self-respect, or their admiring confidence. For our Government even to see, after war has been made on it, to dispel the affected apprehensions of armed traitors that their cherished privileges may be assailed by it, is to invite insult and encourage hopes of its own downfall. The rush to arms of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, is the true answer at once to the Rebel raids of John Morgan and the traitorous sophistries of Beriah Magoffin.

V. We complain that the Union cause has suffered, and is now suffering immensely, from mistaken deference to Rebel Slavery. Had you, Sir, in your Inaugural Address, unmistakably given notice that, in case the Rebellion already commenced were persisted in, and your efforts to preserve the Union and enforce the laws should be resisted by armed force, you would recognize no loyal person as rightfully held in Slavery by a traitor, we believe the Rebellion would therein have received a staggering if not fatal blow. At that moment, according to the returns of the most recent elections, the Unionists were a large majority of the voters of the Slave States. But they were composed in good part of the aged, the feeble, the wealthy, the timid—the young, the reckless, the aspiring, the adventurous, had already been largely lured by the gamblers and negro-traders, the politicians by trade and the conspirators by instinct, into the toils of Treason. Had you then proclaimed that Rebellion would strike the shackles from the slaves of every traitor, the wealthy and the cautious would have been supplied with a powerful inducement to remain loyal. As it was, every coward in the South soon became a traitor from fear; for Loyalty was perilous, while Treason seemed comparatively safe. Hence the boasted unanimity of the South—a unanimity based on Rebel terrorism and the fact that immunity and safety were found on that side, danger and probable death on ours. The Rebels from the first have been eager to confiscate, imprison, scourge and kill; we have fought wolves with the devices of sheep. The result is just what might have been expected. Tens of thousands are fighting in the Rebel ranks to-day whose original bias and natural leanings would have led them into ours.

VI. We complain that the Confiscation Act which you approved is habitually disregarded by your Generals, and that no word of rebuke for them from you has yet reached the public ear. Fremont's Proclamation and Hunter's Order favoring Emancipation were promptly annulled by you; while Halleck's No. 3, forbidding fugitives from Slavery to Rebels to come within his lines—an order as unmilitary as inhuman, and which received the hearty approbation of every traitor in America—with scores of like tendency, have never provoked even your remonstrance. We complain that the officers of your Armies have habitually repelled rather than invited the approach of slaves who would have gladly taken the risks of escaping from their Rebel masters to our camps, bringing intelligence often of inestimable value to the Union cause. We complain that those who have thus escaped to us, avowing a willingness to do for us whatever might be required, have been brutally and madly repulsed, and often surrendered to be scourged, maimed and tortured by the ruffian traitors, who pretend to own them. We complain that a large proportion of our regular Army Officers, with many of the Volunteers, evince far more solicitude to uphold Slavery than to put down the Rebellion. And finally, we complain that you, Mr. President, elected as a Republican, knowing well what an abomination Slavery is, and how emphatically it is the core and essence of this atrocious Rebellion, seem never to interfere with these atrocities, and never give a direction to your Military subordinates, which does not appear to have been conceived in the interest of Slavery rather than of Freedom.

VII. Let me call your attention to the recent tragedy in New-Orleans, whereof the facts are obtained entirely through Pro-Slavery channels. A considerable body of resolute, able-bodied men, held in Slavery by two Rebel sugar-planters in defiance of the Confiscation Act which you have approved, left plantations thirty miles distant and made their way to the great mart of the South-West, which they knew to be in the undisputed possession of the Union forces. They made their way safely and quietly through thirty miles of Rebel territory, expecting to find freedom under the protection of our flag. Whether they had or had not heard of the passage of the Confiscation Act, they reasoned logically that we could not kill them for deserting the service of their life-long oppressors, who had through treason become our implacable enemies. They came to us for liberty and protec-

tion, for which they were willing to render their best service: they met with hostility, captivity, and murder. The barking of the base curs of Slavery in this quarter deceives no one—not even themselves. They say, indeed, that the negroes had no right to appear in New-Orleans armed (with their inplements of daily labor in the cane-field); but no one doubts that they would gladly have laid these down if assured that they should be free. They were set upon and maimed, captured and killed, because they sought the benefit of that act of Congress which they may not specifically have heard of, but which was none the less the law of the land—which they had a clear right to the benefit of—which it was somebody's duty to publish far and wide, in order that so many as possible should be impelled to desist from serving Rebels and the Rebellion and come over to the side of the Union. They sought their liberty in strict accordance with the law of the land—they were butchered or reënslaved for so doing by the help of Union soldiers enlisted to fight against Slaveholding Treason. It was somebody's fault that they were so murdered—if others shall hereafter suffer in like manner, in default of explicit and public direction to your generals that they are to recognize and obey the Confiscation Act, the world will lay the blame on you. Whether you will choose to hear it through future History and at the bar of God, I will not judge. I can only hope.

VIII. On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined, intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that all attempts to put down the Rebellion and at the same time uphold its inciting cause are preposterous and futile—that the Rebellion, if crushed out tomorrow, would be renewed within a year if Slavery were left in full vigor—that Army officers who remain to this day devoted to Slavery can at best be but half-way loyal to the Union—and that every hour of deference to Slavery is an hour of added and deepened peril to the Union. I appeal to the testimony of your Embassadors in Europe. It is freely at your service, not at mine. Ask them to tell you candidly whether the seeming subserviency of your policy to the slaveholding, slavery-upholding interest, is not the perplexity, the despair of statesmen of all parties, and be admonished by the general answer!

IX. I close as I began with the statement that what an immense majority of the Loyal Millions of your countrymen require of you is a frank, declared, unqualified, ungrudging execution of the laws of the land, more especially of the Confiscation Act. That Act gives freedom to the slaves of Rebels coming within our lines, or whom those lines may at any time inclose—we ask you to render it due obedience by publicly requiring all your subordinates to recognize and obey it. The Rebels are everywhere using the late anti-negro riots in the North, as they have long used your officers' treatment of negroes in the South, to convince the slaves that they have nothing to hope from a Union success—that we mean in that case to sell them into a bitterer bondage to defray the cost of the war. Let them impress this as a truth on the great mass of their ignorant and credulous bondmen, and the Union will never be restored—never. We cannot conquer Ten Millions of People united in solid phalanx against us, powerfully aided by Northern sympathizers and European allies. We must have scouts, guides, spies, cooks, teamsters, diggers and choppers from the Blacks of the South, whether we allow them to fight for us or not, or we shall be baffled and repelled. As one of the millions who would gladly have avoided this struggle at any sacrifice but that of Principle and Honor, but who now feel that the triumph of the Union is indispensable not only to the existence of our country but to the well-being of mankind, I entreat you to render a hearty and unequivocal obedience to the law of the land.

Yours, . . . HORACE GREELEY.
New-York, August 19, 1862.

SOURCE: Greeley to Lincoln, August 19, 1862. Transcribed and annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Ill. Available at Library of Congress, *Mr. Lincoln's Virtual Library, Abraham Lincoln Papers*, Manuscript Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory Project, 2000–02), http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/alhome.html (June 13, 2005).

Executive Mansion,
Washington, August 22, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the New York Tribune. If there be in it any statements, or assumptions of fact, which I may

know to be erroneous, I do not now and here controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not now and here argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right.

As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt.

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.

I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free. Yours,

A. LINCOLN

SOURCE: Greeley to Lincoln, August 19, 1862. Transcribed and annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Ill. Available at Library of Congress, *Mr. Lincoln's Virtual Library, Abraham Lincoln Papers,* Manuscript Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory Project, 2000–02), http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/alhome.html (August 3, 2005).

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil War; Greeley, Horace; Lincoln, Abraham

1863 a

ENLISTMENT SPEECH TO AFRICAN AMERICANS

Jerry Sullivan spoke at a gathering of blacks in Nashville, Tennessee, on October 20, 1863, exhorting them to take up arms for the Union cause.

God is in this war. He will lead us on to victory. Folks talk about the fighting being nearly over, but I believe there is a heap yet to come. Let the colored men accept the offer of the President and Cabinet, take arms, join the army, and then we will whip the rebels, even if Longstreet and all the Streets of the South, concentrate at Chattanooga. (Laughter and applause.) Why, don't you remember how afraid they used to be that we would rise? And you know we would, too, if we could. (Cries of "that's so.") I ran away two years ago. . . . I got to Cincinnati, and from there I went straight to General Rosecrans' headquarters. And now I am going to be Corporal. (Shouts of laughter.)

Come, boys, let's get some guns from Uncle Sam, and go coon hunting; shooting those gray back coons [Confederates] that go poking about the country now a days. (Laughter.) Tomorrow morning, don't eat too much breakfast, but as soon as you get back from market, start the first thing for our camp. Don't ask your wife, for if she is a wife worth having she will call you a coward for asking her. (Applause, and waving of handkerchiefs by the ladies.) I've got a wife and she says to me, the other day, "Jerry, if you don't go to the war mighty soon, I'll go off and leave you, as some of the Northern gentlemen want me to go home to cook for them." (Laughter.) . . . The ladies are now busy making us a flag, and let us prove ourselves men worthy to bear it.

SOURCE: The Colored Citizen, November 7, 1863.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Civil War; Conscription and Volunteerism

1863 b

Frederick Douglass's Comments on the Recruitment of His Sons

Two of Frederick Douglass's sons were the first recruits from New York to join the 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer (Colored) Infantry. Douglass himself asked:

Shall colored men enlist notwithstanding this unjust and ungenerous barrier raised against them? We answer yes. Go into the army and go with a will and a determination to blot out this and all other mean discriminations against us. To say we won't be soldiers because we cannot be colonels is like saying we won't go into water till we have learned to swim. A half a loaf is better than no bread—and to go into the army is the speediest and best way to overcome the prejudice which has dictated unjust laws against us. To allow us in the army at all, is a great concession. Let us take this little the better to get more. By showing that we deserve the little is the best way to gain much. Once in the United States uniform and the colored man has a springing board under him by which he can jump to loftier heights.

SOURCE: Douglass's Monthly 5, March 1863, 802.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Civil War; Conscription and Volunteerism; 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry

1863 c

Letter of Lewis Douglass to Future Wife

The 54th Regiment of Massachusetts was nearly annihilated in a courageous but unsuccessful assault of the Confederacy's Fort Wagner at the mouth of Charleston, South Carolina, harbor. Shortly after the assault, Frederick Douglass's son Lewis, a sergeant in that regiment, described the fighting in a letter to his future wife:

My Dear Amelia: I have been in two fights, and am unhurt. I am about to go in another I believe to-night. Our men fought well on both occasions. The last was desperate we charged that terrible battery on Morris Island known as

Fort Wagoner [sic], and were repulsed with a loss of [many] killed and wounded. I escaped unhurt from amidst that perfect hail of shot and shell. It was terrible. I need not particularize the papers will give a better than I have time to give. My thoughts are with you often, you are as dear as ever, be good enough to remember it as I no doubt you will. As I said before we are on the eve of another fight and I am very busy and have just snatched a moment to write you. . . . Should I fall in the next fight killed or wounded I hope to fall with my face to the foe. . . .

This regiment has established its reputation as a fighting regiment not a man flinched, though it was a trying time. Men fell all around me. A shell would explode and clear a space of twenty feet, our men would close up again, but it was no use we had to retreat, which was a very hazardous undertaking. How I got out of that fight alive I cannot tell, but I am here. My Dear girl I hope again to see you. I must bid you farewell should I be killed. Remember if I die I die in a good cause. I wish we had a hundred thousand colored troops we would put an end to this war.

SOURCE: Lewis Douglass to Amelia Loguen, July 20, 1863, Woodson Collection, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Civil War; 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry

1863 d

Letter of Captain M. M. Miller to His Aunt

In early June, 1863, two regiments of recently raised Louisiana freedmen repelled a Confederate attack on Milliken's Bend, a Union outpost on the Mississippi River above Vicksburg, Mississippi. Soon after the battle, Capt. M. M. Miller of the 9th Regiment of Louisiana Volunteers of African descent wrote to his aunt in Illinois:

We were attacked here on June 7, about 3 o'clock in the morning, by a brigade of Texas troops about 2,500 in number. We had about 600 men to withstand them—500 of them negroes. . . . Our regiment had about 300 men in the fight. . . . We had about 50 men killed in the regiment and 80 wounded; so you can judge of what part of the fight my company sus-

tained. I never felt more grieved and sick at heart than when I saw how my brave soldiers had been slaughtered. . . . I never more wish to hear the expression, "the niggers won't fight." Come with me 100 yards from where I sit, and I can show you the wounds that cover the bodies of 16 as brave, loyal and patriotic soldiers as ever drew bead on a Rebel.

The enemy charged us so close that we fought with our bayonets, hand to hand. . . . It was a horrible fight, the worst I was ever engaged in—not even excepting Shiloh. The enemy cried "No quarter!" but some of them were very glad to take it when made prisoners. . . .

What few men I have left seem to think much of me because I stood up with them in the fight. I can say for them that I never saw a braver company of men in my life. Not one of them offered to leave his place until ordered to fall back; in fact very few ever did fall back. . . . So they fought and died defending the cause that we revere. They met death coolly, bravely—not rashly did they expose themselves, but all were steady and obedient to orders.

SOURCE: Letter printed in the Union, *July 14, 1863.*

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Civil War

1863 e

ACCOUNT OF COL. THOMAS J. MORGAN CONCERNING HIS AFRICAN AMERICAN BRIGADE

Colonel Morgan, commanding a brigade of four black regiments in the battle of Nashville, gave the following account of his original regiment from the time it was organized in November 1863 until the battle of Nashville:

November 1st, 1863, by order of Major Stearns, I went to Gallatin, Tennessee, to organize the 14th United States Colored Infantry. . . . There were at that time several hundred negro men in camp, in charge of, I think, a lieutenant. They were a motley crowd,—old, young, middle aged. Some wore the United States uniform, but most of them had on the clothes in which they had left the plantations, or had worn during periods of hard service as laborers in the army. . . .

As soon and as fast as practicable, I set about organizing the regiment. . . .

The complete organization of the regiment occupied about two months, being finished by Jan. 1st, 1864. The field, staff and company officers were all white men. All the non-commissioned officers,—Hospital Steward, Quartermaster, Sergeant, Sergeant-Major, Orderlies, Sergeants and Corporals were colored. They proved very efficient, and had the war continued two years longer, many of them would have been competent as commissioned officers. . . .

General George H. Thomas, though a Southerner, and a West Point graduate, was a singularly fair-minded, candid man. He asked me one day soon after my regiment was organized, if I thought my men would fight. I replied that they would. He said he thought "they might behind breastworks." I said they would fight in the open field. He thought not. "Give me a chance General," I replied, "and I will prove it.". . .

PULASKI, TENN.—September 27th, 1864, I reported to Major-General Rousseau, commanding a force of cavalry at Pulaski, Tenn. As we approached the town by rail from Nashville, we heard artillery, then musketry, and as we left the cars we saw the smoke of guns. [Confederate cavalry commander Nathan Bedford] Forest [sic], with a large body of cavalry, had been steadily driving Rousseau before him all day, and was destroying the railroad. Finding the General, I said: "I am ordered to report to you, sir." "What have you?" "Two regiments of colored troops." Rousseau was a Kentuckian, and had not much faith in negro soldiers. By his direction I threw out a strong line of skirmishers, and posted the regiments on a ridge, in good supporting distance. Rousseau's men retired behind my line, and Forest's men pressed forward until they met our fire, and recognizing the sound of the minie ball, stopped to reflect.

The massacre of colored troops at Fort Pillow was well known to us, and had been fully discussed by our men. It was rumored, and thoroughly credited by them, that General Forest had offered a thousand dollars for the head of any commander of a "nigger regiment." Here, then, was just such an opportunity as those spoiling for a

fight might desire. Negro troops stood face to face with Forest's veteran cavalry. The fire was growing hotter, and balls were uncomfortably thick. At length, the enemy in strong force, with banners flying, bore down toward us in full sight, apparently bent on mischief. Pointing to the advancing column, I said, as I passed along the line, "Boys, it looks very much like fight; keep cool, do your duty." They seemed full of glee, and replied with great enthusiasm: "Colonel, dey can't whip us, dey nebber get de ole 14th out of heah, nebber." "Nebber drives us away widout a mighty lot of dead men," &c., &c.

When Forest learned that Rousseau was re-enforced by infantry, he did not stop to ask the color of their skin, but after testing our line, and finding it unyielding, turned to the east, and struck over toward Murfreesboro. . . .

NASHVILLE, TENN.—November 29, 1864, in command of the 14th, 16th, and 44th Regiments U.S.C.I., I embarked on a railroad train at Chattanooga for Nashville. On December 1st, with the 16th and most of the 14th, I reached my destination, and was assigned to a place on the extreme left of General Thomas' army then concentrating for the defence of Nashville against Hood's threatened attack. . . .

Soon after taking our position in line at Nashville, we were closely besieged by Hood's army; and thus we lay facing each other for two weeks. . . .

. . . [T]he first day's fight . . . had been for us a severe but glorious day. Over three hundred of my command had fallen, but everywhere our army was successful. . . . General Steadman congratulated us, saying his only fear had been that we might fight too hard. We had done all he desired, and more. Colored soldiers had again fought side by side with white troops; they had mingled together in the charge; they had supported each other; they had assisted each other from the field when wounded, and they lay side by side in death. The survivors rejoiced together over a hard fought field, won by a common valor. . . .

When the 2nd Colored Brigade retired behind my lines to re-form, one of the regimental color-bearers stopped in the open space between the two armies, where, although exposed to a dangerous fire, he planted his flag firmly in the ground, and began deliberately and coolly to return the

enemy's fire, and, greatly to our amusement, kept up for some little time his independent warfare.

When the second and final assault was made, the right of my line took part. It was with breathless interest I watched that noble army climb the hill with a steady resolve which nothing but death itself could check. When at length the assaulting column sprang upon the earthworks, and the enemy seeing that further resistance was madness, gave way and began a precipitous retreat, our hearts swelled as only the hearts of soldiers can, and scarcely stopping to cheer or to await orders, we pushed forward and joined in the pursuit, until the darkness and the rain forced a halt. . . .

When General Thomas rode over the battle-field and saw the bodies of colored men side by side with the foremost, on the very works of the enemy, he turned to his staff, saying: "Gentlemen, the question is settled; negroes will fight."

SOURCE: Thomas J. Morgan, "Reminiscences of Service with Colored Troops in the Army of the Cumberland, 1863–65," in *Personal Narratives of Events in the War of the Rebellion* (Providence: Rhode Island Soldiers and Sailors Historical Society, 1885), 3rd series, no. 13, 11–48.

RELATED ENTRIES: *African Americans in the Military; Civil War*

1863 f

ACCOUNT OF BLACK PHYSICIAN ON ESCAPE FROM ANTI-DRAFT/ANTI-BLACK RIOTS

William P. Powell, a black physician, barely managed to save himself and his family from an antidraft/anti-black mob in New York City. He sent the following account to a newspaper:

On the afternoon of [July 13] my house . . . was invaded by a mob of half grown boys. . . . [They] were soon replaced by men and women. From 2 P.M. to 8 P.M. myself and family were prisoners in my own house to king mob, from which there was no way to escape but over the roofs of adjoining houses. About 4 P.M . . . the mob commenced throwing

stones at the lower windows, until they had succeeded in making an opening. I was determined not to leave until driven from the premises. My family including my invalid daughter . . . took refuge on the roof of the next house. I remained till the mob broke in, and then narrowly escaped the same way. . . . We remained on the roof for an hour; still I hoped that relief would come. The neighbors, anticipating the mob would fire my house, were removing their effects on the roof—all was excitement. But as the object of the mob was plunder, they were too busily engaged in carrying off all my effects to apply the torch. . . .

How to escape from the roof of a five story building, with four females—and one a cripple—besides eight men, without a ladder, or any assistance from outside, was beyond my not excited imagination. But the God that succored Hagar in her flight, came to my relief in the person of a little deformed, despised Israelite—who, Samaritan-like, took my poor helpless daughter under his protection in his house, where I presume she now is, until friends send her to me. He also supplied me with a long rope. I then took a survey of the premises, and fortunately found a way to escape, and though pitchy dark, I took soundings with the rope to see if it would touch the next roof, after which I took a clove-hitch around the clothes line which was fastened to the wall by pulleys, and which led from one roof to the other over a space of about one hundred feet. In this manner I managed to lower my family down on to the next roof, and from one roof to another, until I landed them in a neighbor's yard. We were secreted in our friend's cellar till 11 P.M., when we were taken in charge by the Police and locked up in the Station house for safety. In this dismal place we found upwards of seventy men, women and children—some with broken limbs—bruised and beaten from head to foot. . . .

All my personal property, to the amount of $3,000, has been destroyed and scattered to the four winds. . . . As a devoted loyal Unionist, I have done all I could to perpetuate and uphold the integrity of this free government. As an evidence of this devotedness, my oldest son is now serving my country as a surgeon in the U.S. army, and myself had just received a commission in the naval service. What more could I do? What further evidence was wanting to prove my

allegiance in the exigencies of our unfortunate country? I am now an old man, stripped of everything, . . . but I thank God that He has yet spared my life, which I am ready to yield in defence of my country.

SOURCE: Letter to the New Bedford *Standard,* reprinted in the *Pacific Appeal*, August 22, 1863.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Civil War; Conscription and Volunteerism; New York City Anti-Draft Riots; Race Riots

1863 g

LETTER FROM GRANT TO LINCOLN ON RECRUITMENT OF AFRICAN AMERICANS

Gen. Ulysses S. Grant penned the following letter to President Lincoln on August 23, 1863, about the enlistment of blacks to fight as Union soldiers.

I have given the subject of arming the negro my hearty support. This, with the emancipation of the negro, is the heavyest [sic] blow yet given the Confederacy. . . . By arming the negro we have added a powerful ally. They will make good soldiers and taking them from the enemy weakens him in the same proportion they strengthen us. I am therefore most decidedly in favor of pushing this policy to the enlistment of a force sufficient to hold all the South falling into our hands and to aid in capturing more.

SOURCE: Grant to Lincoln, August 23, 1863, A. Lincoln Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Civil War; Conscription and Volunteerism; Grant, Ulysses S.; Lincoln, Abraham

1863 h

EXCERPTS FROM GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 100

At the invitation of Gen. Henry Halleck, Francis Lieber, a German-born jurist and professor of law at Columbia University, prepared a general order on the laws of warfare

for all Union Army commanders in the field. Promulgated by the adjutant general's office in April 1863, it remained the code governing U.S. forces for the next 40 years and proved to be influential in the codes adopted at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. Here are its key provisions:

SECTION I

Martial Law—Military jurisdiction—Military necessity—Retaliation

Article 1.

A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence of the occupation, under the Martial Law of the invading or occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring Martial Law, or any public warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not. Martial Law is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest. The presence of a hostile army proclaims its Martial Law.

Art. 2.

Martial Law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by special proclamation, ordered by the commander in chief; or by special mention in the treaty of peace concluding the war, when the occupation of a place or territory continues beyond the conclusion of peace as one of the conditions of the same.

Art. 3.

Martial Law in a hostile country consists in the suspension, by the occupying military authority, of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory, and in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation.

The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of all civil and penal law shall continue either wholly or in part, as in times of peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military authority.

Art. 4.

Martial Law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war. Military oppression is not Martial Law: it is the abuse of the power which that law confers. As Martial Law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity—virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.

Art. 5.

Martial Law should be less stringent in places and countries fully occupied and fairly conquered. Much greater severity may be exercised in places or regions where actual hostilities exist, or are expected and must be prepared for. Its most complete sway is allowed—even in the commander's own country—when face to face with the enemy, because of the absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount duty to defend the country against invasion.

To save the country is paramount to all other considerations.

Art. 6.

All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual course in the enemy's places and territories under Martial Law, unless interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying military power; but all the functions of the hostile government—legislative executive, or administrative—whether of a general, provincial, or local character, cease under Martial Law, or continue only with the sanction, or, if deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or invader.

Art. 7.

Martial Law extends to property, and to persons, whether they are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government.

Art. 8.

Consuls, among American and European nations, are not diplomatic agents. Nevertheless, their offices and persons will be subjected to Martial Law in cases of urgent necessity only: their property and business are not exempted. Any delinquency they commit against the established military rule may be punished as in the case of any other inhabitant, and such punishment furnishes no reasonable ground for international complaint.

Art. 9.

The functions of Ambassadors, Ministers, or other diplomatic agents accredited by neutral powers to the hostile government, cease, so far as regards the displaced government; but the conquering or occupying power usually recognizes them as temporarily accredited to itself.

Art. 10.

Martial Law affects chiefly the police and collection of public revenue and taxes, whether imposed by the expelled government or by the invader, and refers mainly to the support and efficiency of the army, its safety, and the safety of its operations.

Art. 11.

The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad faith concerning engagements concluded with the enemy during the war, but also the breaking of stipulations solemnly contracted by the belligerents in time of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in force in case of war between the contracting powers.

It disclaims all extortions and other transactions for individual gain; all acts of private revenge, or connivance at such acts.

Offenses to the contrary shall be severely punished, and especially so if committed by officers.

Art. 12.

Whenever feasible, Martial Law is carried out in cases of individual offenders by Military Courts; but sentences of death shall be executed only with the approval of the chief executive, provided the urgency of the case does not require a speedier execution, and then only with the approval of the chief commander.

Art. 13.

Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which is conferred and defined by statute; second, that which is derived from the common law of war. Military offenses under the statute law must be tried in the manner therein directed; but military offenses which do not come within the statute must be tried and punished under the common law of war. The character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions depends upon the local laws of each particular country.

In the armies of the United States the first is exercised by courts-martial, while cases which do not come within the "Rules and Articles of War," or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on courts-martial, are tried by military commissions.

Art. 14.

Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.

Art. 15.

Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.

Art. 16.

Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.

Art. 17.

War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.

Art. 18.

When a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the surrender.

Art. 19.

Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity.

Documents

Art. 20.

Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or governments. It is a law and requisite of civilized existence that men live in political, continuous societies, forming organized units, called states or nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, suffer, advance and retrograde together, in peace and in war.

Art. 21.

The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships of the war.

Art. 22.

Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.

Art. 23.

Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war.

Art. 24.

The almost universal rule in remote times was, and continues to be with barbarous armies, that the private individual of the hostile country is destined to suffer every privation of liberty and protection, and every disruption of family ties. Protection was, and still is with uncivilized people, the exception.

Art. 25.

In modern regular wars of the Europeans, and their descendants in other portions of the globe, protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule; privation and disturbance of private relations are the exceptions.

Art. 26.

Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil officers of the hostile country to take the oath of temporary allegiance or an oath of fidelity to their own victorious government or rulers, and they may expel everyone who declines to do so. But whether they do so or not, the people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to them as long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril of their lives.

Art. 27.

The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civilized nations acknowledge retaliation as the sternest feature of war. A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage

Art. 28.

Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and moreover, cautiously and unavoidably; that is to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence, and the character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.

Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating rules of regular war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.

Art. 29.

Modern times are distinguished from earlier ages by the existence, at one and the same time, of many nations and great governments related to one another in close intercourse.

Peace is their normal condition; war is the exception. The ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace.

The more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.

Art. 30.

Ever since the formation and coexistence of modern nations, and ever since wars have become great national wars, war has come to be acknowledged not to be its own end, but the means to obtain great ends of state, or to consist in defense against wrong; and no conventional restriction of the modes adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted; but the law of war imposes many limitations and restrictions on principles of justice, faith, and honor.

SECTION II

Public and private property of the enemy—Protection of persons, and especially of women, of religion, the arts and

sciences—Punishment of crimes against the inhabitants of hostile countries.

Art. 31.

A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all public movable property until further direction by its government, and sequesters for its own benefit or of that of its government all the revenues of real property belonging to the hostile government or nation. The title to such real property remains in abeyance during military occupation, and until the conquest is made complete.

Art. 32.

A victorious army, by the martial power inherent in the same, may suspend, change, or abolish, as far as the martial power extends, the relations which arise from the services due, according to the existing laws of the invaded country, from one citizen, subject, or native of the same to another.

The commander of the army must leave it to the ultimate treaty of peace to settle the permanency of this change.

Art. 33.

It is no longer considered lawful—on the contrary, it is held to be a serious breach of the law of war—to force the subjects of the enemy into the service of the victorious government, except the latter should proclaim, after a fair and complete conquest of the hostile country or district, that it is resolved to keep the country, district, or place permanently as its own and make it a portion of its own country.

Art. 34.

As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to hospitals, or other establishments of an exclusively charitable character, to establishments of education, or foundations for the promotion of knowledge, whether public schools, universities, academies of learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific character such property is not to be considered public property in the sense of paragraph 31; but it may be taxed or used when the public service may require it.

Art. 35.

Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, as well as

hospitals, must be secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.

Art. 36.

If such works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments belonging to a hostile nation or government, can be removed without injury, the ruler of the conquering state or nation may order them to be seized and removed for the benefit of the said nation. The ultimate ownership is to be settled by the ensuing treaty of peace.

In no case shall they be sold or given away, if captured by the armies of the United States, nor shall they ever be privately appropriated, or wantonly destroyed or injured.

Art. 37.

The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality; strictly private property; the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women: and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished.

This rule does not interfere with the right of the victorious invader to tax the people or their property, to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, lands, boats or ships, and churches, for temporary and military uses

Art. 38.

Private property, unless forfeited by crimes or by offenses of the owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity, for the support or other benefit of the army or of the United States.

If the owner has not fled, the commanding officer will cause receipts to be given, which may serve the spoliated owner to obtain indemnity.

Art. 39.

The salaries of civil officers of the hostile government who remain in the invaded territory, and continue the work of their office, and can continue it according to the circumstances arising out of the war—such as judges, administrative or police officers, officers

of city or communal governments—are paid from the public revenue of the invaded territory, until the military government has reason wholly or partially to discontinue it. Salaries or incomes connected with purely honorary titles are always stopped.

Art. 40.

There exists no law or body of authoritative rules of action between hostile armies, except that branch of the law of nature and nations which is called the law and usages of war on land.

Art. 41.

All municipal law of the ground on which the armies stand, or of the countries to which they belong, is silent and of no effect between armies in the field.

Art. 42.

Slavery, complicating and confounding the ideas of property, (that is of a thing,) and of personality, (that is of humanity,) exists according to municipal or local law only. The law of nature and nations has never acknowledged it. The digest of the Roman law enacts the early dictum of the pagan jurist, that "so far as the law of nature is concerned, all men are equal." Fugitives escaping from a country in which they were slaves, villains, or serfs, into another country, have, for centuries past, been held free and acknowledged free by judicial decisions of European countries, even though the municipal law of the country in which the slave had taken refuge acknowledged slavery within its own dominions.

Art. 43.

Therefore, in a war between the United States and a belligerent which admits of slavery, if a person held in bondage by that belligerent be captured by or come as a fugitive under the protection of the military forces of the United States, such person is immediately entitled to the rights and privileges of a freeman To return such person into slavery would amount to enslaving a free person, and neither the United States nor any officer under their authority can enslave any human being. Moreover, a person so made free by the law of war is under the shield of the law of nations, and the former owner or State can have, by the law of postliminy, no belligerent lien or claim of service.

Art. 44.

All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.

A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence, and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.

Art. 45.

All captures and booty belong, according to the modern law of war, primarily to the government of the captor.

Prize money, whether on sea or land, can now only be claimed under local law.

Art. 46.

Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of their position or power in the hostile country for private gain, not even for commercial transactions otherwise legitimate. Offenses to the contrary committed by commissioned officers will be punished with cashiering or such other punishment as the nature of the offense may require; if by soldiers, they shall be punished according to the nature of the offense.

Art. 47.

Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer punishment shall be preferred. . . .

SECTION X

Insurrection—Civil War—Rebellion

Art. 149.

Insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their government, or a portion of it, or against one or more of its laws, or against an officer or officers of the government. It may be confined to mere armed resistance, or it may have greater ends in view.

Art. 150.

Civil war is war between two or more portions of a country or state, each contending for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to be the legitimate government. The term is also sometimes applied to war of rebellion, when the rebellious provinces or portions of the state are contiguous to those containing the seat of government.

Art. 151.

The term rebellion is applied to an insurrection of large extent, and is usually a war between the legitimate govern-

ment of a country and portions of provinces of the same who seek to throw off their allegiance to it and set up a government of their own.

Art. 152.

When humanity induces the adoption of the rules of regular war to ward rebels, whether the adoption is partial or entire, it does in no way whatever imply a partial or complete acknowledgement of their government, if they have set up one, or of them, as an independent and sovereign power. Neutrals have no right to make the adoption of the rules of war by the assailed government toward rebels the ground of their own acknowledgment of the revolted people as an independent power.

Art. 153.

Treating captured rebels as prisoners of war, exchanging them, concluding of cartels, capitulations, or other warlike agreements with them; addressing officers of a rebel army by the rank they may have in the same; accepting flags of truce; or, on the other hand, proclaiming Martial Law in their territory, or levying war-taxes or forced loans, or doing any other act sanctioned or demanded by the law and usages of public war between sovereign belligerents, neither proves nor establishes an acknowledgment of the rebellious people, or of the government which they may have erected, as a public or sovereign power. Nor does the adoption of the rules of war toward rebels imply an engagement with them extending beyond the limits of these rules. It is victory in the field that ends the strife and settles the future relations between the contending parties.

Art. 154.

Treating, in the field, the rebellious enemy according to the law and usages of war has never prevented the legitimate government from trying the leaders of the rebellion or chief rebels for high treason, and from treating them accordingly, unless they are included in a general amnesty.

Art. 155.

All enemies in regular war are divided into two general classes—that is to say, into combatants and noncombatants, or unarmed citizens of the hostile government.

The military commander of the legitimate government, in a war of rebellion, distinguishes between the loyal citizen in the revolted portion of the country and the disloyal citizen. The disloyal citizens may further be classified into those citizens known to sympathize with the rebellion without positively aiding it, and those who, without taking up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without being bodily forced thereto.

Art. 156.

Common justice and plain expediency require that the military commander protect the manifestly loyal citizens, in revolted territories, against the hardships of the war as much as the common misfortune of all war admits.

The commander will throw the burden of the war, as much as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens, of the revolted portion or province, subjecting them to a stricter police than the noncombatant enemies have to suffer in regular war; and if he deems it appropriate, or if his government demands of him that every citizen shall, by an oath of allegiance, or by some other manifest act, declare his fidelity to the legitimate government, he may expel, transfer, imprison, or fine the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to the government.

Whether it is expedient to do so, and whether reliance can be placed upon such oaths, the commander or his government have the right to decide.

Art. 157.

Armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States against the lawful movements of their troops is levying war against the United States, and is therefore treason.

SOURCE: The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, "Laws of War: General Orders No. 100," www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lieber.htm (June 7, 2005).

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil War; Geneva and Hague Conventions; Just War Theory; Philippine War; Prisoners of War; Spanish-American War

1863 i

LYRICS TO "JUST BEFORE THE BATTLE, MOTHER"

Many supporters of the Union cause in the North delighted in songs written by well-known composers, including Julia Ward Howe's "The Battle Hymn of the Republic" and George Root's "The Battle Cry of

*Freedom." Root followed up his first hit with this heart-
tugger about a young lad writing to his mother on the eve
of combat. Note how he folds the singing of his first song
into this one:*

Just before the battle, Mother,
I am thinking most of you,
While upon the field we're watching,
With the enemy in view,
Comrades brave are 'round me lying,
Filled with thoughts of home and God;
For well they know that on the morrow,
Some will sleep beneath the sod.

    Chorus:
    Farewell, Mother, you may never,
    Press me to your heart again,
    But, oh, you'll not forget me, Mother,
    If I'm number'd with the slain.

Oh, I long to see you, Mother,
And the loving ones at home,
But I'll never leave our banner,
Till in honour I can come.
Tell the traitors, all around you,
That their cruel words we know,
In ev'ry battle kill our soldiers,
By the help they give the foe.

Hark! I hear the bugles sounding,
'Tis the signal for the fight,
Now, may God protect us, Mother,
As he ever does the right.
Hear the "Battle Cry of Freedom,"
How it swells upon the air,
Oh, yes, we'll rally 'round the standard,
Or we'll perish nobly there.

*This appears to have been "a bit too much" for some of the
Union soldiers themselves, for they wrote parody verses of
"Just Before the Battle Mother." Here is an amalgam of the
verses, sung in South Dakota by the son of a Civil War
veteran to his grandson in the mid-20th century.*

Just before the battle, Mother,
I was drinking mountain dew,
When I saw the "Rebels" marching,
To the rear I quickly flew;
Where the stragglers were flying,
Thinking of their homes and wives;
'Twas not the "Rebs" we feared, dear Mother,
But our own dear precious lives.

    Chorus:
    Farewell, Mother, for you'll never
    See my name among the slain.
    For if I only can skedaddle,
    Dear Mother, I'll come home again.

I hear the bugle sounding, Mother,
My soul is eager for the fray.
I guess I'll hide behind some cover,
And then I shall be OK.
Discretion's the better part of valor,
At least I've often heard you say;
And he who loves his life, dear Mother,
Won't fight if he can run away.

Do not fear for me, dear Mother,
That death shall claim your only son;
For though I'm not a fighter, Mother,
Bet your sweet life I can run.

Just behind the battle, Mother,
Foemen charge the live-long day.
'Tis bad they didn't charge me, Mother,
For when I'm charged I never pay.

Just behind the battle, Mother,
That's the safest place to be.
War and all its horrors, Mother,
Never did appeal to me.

When the enemy approaches,
I turn about and fade away;
For I'd rather live a live bum, Mother,
Than a dead hero any day.

SOURCE: Doug Weberg, having heard this sung by his grandfrather, shared it with the editor.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil War; Music and War

1864 a

COMMENTS OF BLACK SAILOR GEORGE REED

George W. Reed, a black sailor serving on the U.S. gunboat Commodore Reed, Potomac flotilla, wrote this account of gunboat raids in northern Virginia:

Sir, having been engaged in the naval service nearly six years, I have never before witnessed what I now see on board this ship. Our crew are principally colored; and a braver set of men never trod the deck of an American ship. We have been on several expeditions recently. On the 15th of April our ship and other gunboats proceeded up the Rappahannock river for some distance, and finding no rebel batteries to oppose us, we concluded to land the men from the different boats, and make a raid. I was ordered by the Commodore to beat the call for all parties to go on shore. No sooner had I executed the order, than every man was at his post, our own color being the first to land. At first, there was a little prejudice against our colored men going on shore, but it soon died away. We succeeded in capturing 3 fine horses, 6 cows, 5 hogs, 6 sheep, 3 calves, an abundance of chickens, 600 pounds of pork, 300 bushels of corn, and succeeded in liberating from the horrible pit of bondage 10 men, 6 women, and 8 children. The principal part of the men have enlisted on this ship. The next day we started further up the river, when the gunboats in advance struck on a torpedo, but did no material damage. We landed our men again, and repulsed a band of rebels handsomely, and captured three prisoners. Going on a little further, we were surprised by 300 rebel cavalry, and repulsed, but retreated in good order, the gunboats covering our retreat. I regret to say we had the misfortune to lose Samuel Turner (colored) in our retreat. He was instantly killed, and his body remains in the rebel hands. He being the fifer, I miss him very much as a friend and companion, as he was beloved by all on board. We also had four slightly wounded.

SOURCE: Christian Recorder, May 21, 1864.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Civil War

1864 b

EXCERPT FROM SHERMAN'S MEMOIRS ON HIS MARCH FROM ATLANTA TO THE SEA

General Sherman wrote these words in his memoirs of his march from Atlanta to the sea:

The next day [November 17, 1864, one day out of Atlanta on his march to the sea] we passed through the handsome town of Covington, the soldiers closing up their ranks, the color-bearers unfurling their flags, and the bands striking up patriotic airs. The white people came out of their houses to behold the sight, spite of their deep hatred of the invaders, and the negroes were simply frantic with joy. Whenever they heard my name, they clustered about my house, shouted and prayed in their peculiar style, which had a natural eloquence that would have moved a stone. I have witnessed hundreds, if not thousands, of such scenes; and can now see a poor girl, in the very ecstasy of the Methodist "shout," hugging the banner of one of the regiments, and jumping up to the "feet of Jesus."

SOURCE: William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*, 2 vols. (New York: D. A. Appleton, 1886), 2: 180.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil War; Sherman, William Tecumseh

1864 c

EXCERPTS FROM THE WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.

Some veterans recall their time in the service as so much time lost. Those who experience the intensity of combat initially fix upon the horrors they have witnessed, but, as time passes, they tend to focus on the camaraderie associated with those moments of horror, and later remember their service as the most significant and moving periods of their lives. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., served in a Massachusetts regiment with the Army of the Potomac. He

was wounded at Ball's Bluff and left the war in 1864. The first passage is from his Civil War diary; the second is from a speech he delivered 30 years after the war.

DIARY ENTRY

1864, exact date unknown

. . . I WAS QUITE FAINT—and seeing poor Sergt Merchant lying near—shot through the head and covered with blood—and then the thinking begun—(Meanwhile hardly able to speak—at least, coherently)—Shot through the lungs? Lets see—and I spit—Yes—already the blood was in my mouth. At once my thoughts jumped to "Children of the New Forest." (by Marryatt) which I was fond of reading as a little boy, and in which the father of one of the heroines is shot through the lungs by a robber—I remembered he died with terrible haemorrhages & great agony—What should I do? Just then I remembered and felt in my waist coat pocket—Yes there it was—a little bottle of laudanum which I had brought along—But I won't take it yet; no, see a doctor first—It may not be as bad as it looks—At any rate wait till the pain begins—

When I had got to the bottom of the Bluff the ferry boat, (the scow,) had just started with a load—but there was a small boat there—Then, still in this half conscious state, I heard somebody groan—Then I thought "Now wouldn't Sir Philip Sydney have that other feller put into the boat first?" But the question, as the form in which it occurred shows, came from a mind still bent on a becoming and consistent carrying out of its ideals of conduct—not from the unhesitating instinct of a still predominant & heroic will—I am not sure whether I propounded the question but I let myself be put aboard.

. . . . I was taken into the large building which served as a general hospital; and I remember . . . Men lying round on the floor—the spectacle wasn't familiar then—a red blanket with an arm lying on it in a pool of blood—it seems as if instinct told me it was John Putnam's (the Capt. Comdg Co H)—and near the entrance a surgeon calmly grasping a man's finger and cutting it off—both standing—while the victim contemplated the operation with a very grievous mug . . . presently a Doctor of (Baxter's?) Fire Zouaves* coming in with much noise & bluster, and oh, troops were crossing to the Virginia side, and we were going to lick, and Heaven knows what not—I called him and gave him my address and told him (or meant & tried to) if I died to write home & tell 'em I'd done my duty—I was very anxious they should know that— . . .

Much more vivid is my memory of my thoughts and state of mind for though I may have been light-headed my reason was working—even if through a cloud. Of course when I thought I was dying the reflection that the majority vote of the civilized world declared that with my opinions I was en route for Hell came up with painful distinctness—Perhaps the first impulse was tremulous—but then I said—by Jove, I die like a soldier anyhow—I was shot in the breast doing my duty to the hub—afraid? No, I am proud—then I thought I couldn't be guilty of a deathbed recantation—father and I had talked of that and were agreed that it generally meant nothing but a cowardly giving way to fear—Besides, thought I, can I recant if I want to, has the approach of death changed my beliefs much? & to this I answered—No—Then came in my Philosophy—I am to take a leap in the dark—but now as ever I believe that whatever shall happen is best—for it is in accordance with a general law—and good & universal (or general law) are synonymous terms in the universe—(I can now add that our phrase good only means certain general truths seen through the heart & will instead of being merely contemplated intellectually—I doubt if the intellect accepts or recognizes that classification of good and bad). Would the complex forces which made a still more complex unit in Me resolve themselves back into simpler forms or would my angel be still winging his way onward when eternities had passed? I could not tell—But all was doubtless well—and so with a "God forgive me if I'm wrong" I slept—

*The 72nd Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, under Colonel DeWitt Clinton Baxter, was commonly known as Baxter's Fire Zouaves.

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THE SOLDIER'S FAITH

Memorial Day Speech, Harvard University, May 30, 1895

. . . Now, at least, and perhaps as long as man dwells upon the globe, his destiny is battle, and he has to take the chances of war. If it is our business to fight, the book for the army is a war-song, not a hospital-sketch. It is not well for soldiers to think much about wounds. Sooner or later we shall fall; but meantime it is for us to fix our eyes upon the point to be stormed, and to get there if we can.

Behind every scheme to make the world over, lies the question, What kind of world do you want? The ideals of the past for men have been drawn from war, as those for women have been drawn from motherhood. For all our prophecies, I doubt if we are ready to give up our inheritance. Who is there who would not like to be thought a gentleman? Yet what has that name been built on but the soldier's choice of honor rather than life? To be a soldier or descended from soldiers, in time of peace to be ready to give one's life rather than to suffer disgrace, that is what the world has meant; and if we try to claim it at less cost than a splendid carelessness for life, we are trying to steal the good will without the responsibilities of the place. We will not dispute about taste. The man of the future may want something different. But who of us could endure a world, although cut up into five-acre lots and having no man upon it who was not well fed and well housed, without the divine folly of honor, without the senseless passion for knowledge out-reaching the flaming bounds of the possible, without ideals the essence of which is that they can never be achieved? I do not know what is true. I do not know the meaning of the universe. But in the midst of doubt, in the collapse of creeds, there is one thing I do not doubt, that no man who lives in the same world with most of us can doubt, and that is that the faith is true and adorable which leads a soldier to throw away his life in obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan of campaign of which he has no notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use.

Most men who know battle know the cynic force with which the thoughts of common sense will assail them in times of stress; but they know that in their greatest moments faith has trampled those thoughts under foot. If you have been in line, suppose on Tremont Street Mall, ordered simply to wait and to do nothing, and have watched the enemy bring their guns to bear upon you down a gentle slope like that from Beacon Street, have seen the puff of the firing, have felt the burst of the spherical case-shot as it came toward you, have heard and seen the shrieking fragments go tearing through your company, and have known that the next or the next shot carries your fate; if you have advanced in line and have seen ahead of you the spot which you must pass where the rifle bullets are striking; if you have ridden by night at a walk toward the blue line of fire at the dead angle of Spottsylvania, where for twenty-four hours the soldiers were fighting on the two sides of an earthwork, and in the morning the dead and dying lay piled in a row six deep, and as you rode have heard the bullets splashing in the mud and earth about you; if you have been on the picketline at night in a black and unknown wood, have heard the spat of the bullets upon the trees, and as you moved have felt your foot slip upon a dead man's body; if you have had a blind fierce gallop against the enemy, with your blood up and a pace that left no time for fear—if, in short, as some, I hope many, who hear me, have known, you have known the vicissitudes of terror and of triumph in war, you know that there is such a thing as the faith I spoke of. You know your own weakness and are modest; but you know that man has in him that unspeakable somewhat which makes him capable of miracle, able to lift himself by the might of his own soul, unaided, able to face annihilation for a blind belief.

From the beginning, to us, children of the North, life has seemed a place hung about by dark mists, out of which come the pale shine of dragon's scales, and the cry of fighting men, and the sound of swords. Beowulf, Milton, Dürer, Rembrandt, Schopenhauer, Turner, Tennyson, from the first war-song of our race to the stall-fed poetry of modern English drawing-rooms, all have had same vision, and all have had a glimpse of a light to be followed. "The end of worldly life awaits us all. Let him who may, gain honor ere death. That is best for a warrior when he is dead." So spoke Beowulf a thousand years ago.

Not of the sunlight,
Not of the moonlight,
Not of the starlight!
O young Mariner,
Down to the haven
Call your companions,
Launch your vessel,
And crowd your canvas,
And, ere it vanishes
Over the margin,
After it, follow it,
Follow The Gleam.

So sang Tennyson in the voice of the dying Merlin.

When I went to war I thought that soldiers were old men. I remembered a picture of the revolutionary soldier which some of you may have seen, representing a white-haired man with his flint-lock slung across his back. I remembered one or two living examples of revolutionary soldiers whom I had met, and I took no account of the lapse of time. It was not until long after, in winter quarters, as I was listening to some of the sentimental songs in vogue, such as—

Farewell, Mother, you may never
See your darling boy again,

that it came over me that the army was made up of what I now should call very young men. I dare say that my illusion has been shared by some of those now present, as they have looked at us upon whose heads the white shadows have begun to fall. But the truth is that war is the business of youth and early middle age. You who called this assemblage together, not we, would be the soldiers of another war, if we should have one, and we speak to you as the dying Merlin did in the verse which I just quoted. Would that the blind man's pipe might be transfigured by Merlin's magic, to make you hear the bugles as once we heard them beneath the morning stars! For to you it is that now is sung the Song of the Sword:—

The War-Thing, the Comrade,
Father of honor
And giver of kingship,

The fame-smith, the song master.
. . . .
Priest (saith the Lord)
Of his marriage with victory.
. . . .
Clear singing, clean slicing;
Sweet spoken, soft finishing;
Making death beautiful,
Life but a coin
To be staked in the pastime
Whose playing is more
Than the transfer of being;
Arch-anarch, chief builder,
Prince and evangelist,
I am the Will of God:
I am the Sword.

War, when you are at it, is horrible and dull. It is only when time has passed that you see that its message was divine. I hope it may be long before we are called again to sit at that master's feet. But some teacher of the kind we all need. In this snug, over-safe corner of the world we need it, that we may realize that our comfortable routine is no eternal necessity of things, but merely a little space of calm in the midst of the tempestuous untamed streaming of the world, and in order that we may be ready for danger. We need it in this time of individualist negations, with its literature of French and American humor, revolting at discipline, loving fleshpots, and denying that anything is worthy of reverence,—in order that we may remember all that buffoons forget. We need it everywhere and at all times. For high and dangerous action teaches us to believe as right beyond dispute things for which our doubting minds are slow to find words of proof. Out of heroism grows faith in the worth of heroism. The proof comes later, and even may never come. Therefore I rejoice at every dangerous sport which I see pursued. The students at Heidelberg, with their sword-slashed faces, inspire me with sincere respect. I gaze with delight upon our polo players. If once in a while in our rough riding a neck is broken, I regard it, not as a waste, but as a price well paid for the breeding of a race fit for headship and command.

We do not save our traditions, in this country. The regiments whose battle-flags were not large enough to hold the names of the battles they had fought, vanished with the surrender of Lee, although their memories inherited would have made heroes for a century. It is the more necessary to learn the lesson afresh from perils newly sought, and perhaps it is not vain for us to tell the new generation what we learned in our day, and what we still believe. That the joy of life is living, is to put out all one's powers as far as they will go; that the measure of power is obstacles overcome; to ride boldly at what is in front of you, be it fence or enemy; to pray, not for comfort, but for combat; to keep the soldier's faith against the doubts of civil life, more besetting and harder to overcome than all the misgivings of the battle-field, and to remember that duty is not to be proved in the evil day, but then to be obeyed unquestioning; to love glory more than the temptations of wallowing ease, but to know that one's final judge and only rival is oneself—with all our failures in act and thought, these things we learned from noble enemies in Virginia or Georgia or on the Mississippi, thirty years ago; these we believe to be true.

> "Life is not lost," said she, "for which is bought
> Endlesse renown."

We learned also, and we still believe, that love of country is not yet an idle name. . . .

As for us, our days of combat are over. Our swords are rust. Our guns will thunder no more. The vultures that once wheeled over our heads are buried with their prey. Whatever of glory yet remains for us to win must be won in the council or the closet, never again in the field. I do not repine. We have shared the incommunicable experience of war; we have felt, we still feel, the passion of life to its top.

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RELATED ENTRIES: *Combat, Effects of; Memorial Day; Memory and War; Militarization and Militarism*

1865 a
NEW YORK TRIBUNE'S COMMENTS ON THE 54TH REGIMENT OF MASSACHUSETTS

The New York Tribune *summarized the importance of the performance of the 54th Regiment of Massachusetts at Fort Wagner in these words*

It is not too much to say that if this Massachusetts Fifty-fourth had faltered when its trial came, two hundred thousand colored troops for whom it was a pioneer would never have been put into the field, or would not have been put in for another year, which would have been equivalent to protracting the war into 1866. But it did not falter. It made Fort Wagner such a name to the colored race as Bunker Hill has been for ninety years to the white Yankees.

SOURCE: *New York Tribune,* Sept. 8, 1865.

RELATED ENTRIES: *African Americans in the Military; Civil War; 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry; Greeley, Horace*

1865 b
LYRICS TO "I'M A GOOD OLD REBEL"

By mid-1865 all Confederate forces had surrendered and a "reconstruction" of the rebellious southern states was about to begin. One reason that Congress's planned Reconstruction ultimately failed was the intransigence of the former rebels, captured well in this song, which was popular with most white Southerners for a century after the Civil War:

O, I'm a good old rebel,
    Now that's just what I am,
For this "Fair Land of Freedom,"
    I do not care a damn;
I'm glad I fit against it,

I only wish we'd won,
And I don't want no pardon,
    For anything I done.

I hates the Constitution,
    The great republic too;
I hates the Freedman's Buro,
    In uniform of blue;
I hates the nasty Eagle
    With all its brass and fuss,
The lyin', thieving Yankees,
    I hates 'em wuss and wuss.

I hates the Yankee nation,
    And everything they do,
I hates the Declaration
    Of Independence too;
I hates the glorious Union,
    'T is dripping with our blood;
I hates their striped banner,
    I fit it all I could.

Three hundred thousand Yankees
    Is stiff in Southern dust;
We got three hundred thousand,
    Before they conquered us.
They died of Southern fever,
    And Southern steel and shot,
I wish they was three million,
    Instead of what we got.

I followed old Mas' Robert,
    For four year near about,
Got wounded in three places,
    And starved at Point Lookout.
I cotched the roomatism,
    A-camping in the snow,
But I killed a chance o' Yankee
    I'd like to kill some mo'.

I can't take up my musket
    And fight 'em now no more,
But I ain't a-going to love 'em
    Now that is sartin sure;

And I don't want no pardon
    For what I was and am,
I won't be reconstructed,
    And I don't care a damn.

SOURCE: National Society of Colonial Dames of America, *American War Songs* (Philadelphia: privately printed, 1925), 134–35.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil War; Music and War

1866

JOHN FALLER, ANDERSONVILLE POW, ON HIS CAPTIVITY

John Faller, a Union Army captive at the notorious Confederate POW camp at Andersonville, Georgia, later recalled the long-term consequence of the inadequate rations provided to prisoners there:

We were all more or less afflicted with scurvy, and some of us were very bad. Our teeth became loose, and in many cases would drop out. Toby Morrison's legs began to swell and turn black. One day we dug a hole in the sand, and buried him up to his waist, and tramped the sand tight about him and left him in that position for hours. We were told by an old sailor that that would draw the scurvy out of him. I don't know whether it did him any good or not, but he was very lame when we left Andersonville to go to another prison. He lived through it all and thinks he is a pretty good man yet.

    Comrade Sites was afflicted with scurvy, and sinews of his limbs were drawn up so that he had to walk on his toes. He would put a little piece of wood under the ball of the foot and tie a string around it, which would relieve the pain to some extent. He, too, managed to get home alive.

    J. Humer was left at Andersonville when we left in the fall on account of not being able to walk. The only meat he got to eat after we left was the half of a rat and he says he enjoyed it very much. He, too, managed to get home alive in July 1865. Broken down in health, he has since died.

    Comrades McCleaf and Natcher were left back in Andersonville. McCleaf died shortly after. Natcher lived to

get home but died a few years after the war from the effects of the imprisonment.

Jack Rhoads managed to pull through, after living on low diet for so long. He now lives in the country; and enjoys a good square meal, and has no more use for cow feed and water as he called it.

Comrades Harris and Elliot, after starving and almost dying for many months, and partaking of the same hospitalities in the South as we all did, managed to reach home alive. If there is anything good to eat around, they prefer it to corn meal or [Captain] Otto [Wirz's] vegetable soup.

While at Florence, Cuddy, Landis, Adams, Hefflefinger, Schlusser and the Walker boys died, and later Hal Eby died on reaching our line. Holmes died at Annapolis before reaching his home. Harkness Meloy, McCune, Natcher, Ruby, Humer have died since the war. Of those surviving today are Comrades Burkholder, Constercamp, Elliott, Faller, Gould, Harris, Morrison, Otto, Rhoads, Sites, Stoey and Vantelburg.

SOURCE: M. Flower, ed., *Dear Folks at Home* (Carlisle, Penn.: Cumberland County Historical Society, 1963), 140–41. Courtesy of Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, Pennsylvani.

RELATED ENTRIES: Andersonville; Civil War; Medicine and War; Prisoners of War

1899 (to 1902)

Two Songs Popular among Naval Officers Dating from the Philippine War

The first of these songs, written by naval officers who served in the Philippine War, concerns a moment of "civil–military" tension in 1899 between the blustering and ineffective Gen. Elwell Otis, serving as U.S. governor-general of the Philippines, and Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, serving as military commander, who replaced Otis in 1900. The second is an ethnic jibe at Filipinos. The sentences following the songs were provided by the Navy compiler in 1955 and speak for themselves.

The Governor-General Or A Hobo

Oh, I've been having a helluva time, since I came to the
    Philippines;
I'd rather drive a bobtail mule, and live on pork and beans;
They call me Governor-General, I'm the hero of the day,
But I have troubles of my own and to myself I say—

    Chorus:
    Oh, am I the boss, or am I the tool?
    Am I the Governor-General or a hobo?
    For I'd like to know who's the boss of this show;
    Is it me or Emilio Aguinaldo?

The rebels up at old Tarlac, four men to every gun—
I think the trouble is at an end, they think it's just begun,
My men go out to have a fight, the rebels fade away;
I cable home the trouble's o'er, but to myself I say—

Now General MacArthur, I have no doubt, can run the
    whole concern,
All right, I'll pack my trunk and go, and he can take his turn;
But when the papers "cuss him out," and lay him on the
    shelf,
I only ask the privilege of saying to myself—

    Final Chorus:
    Oh, is Mac the boss, or is Mac the tool?
    Is Mac the Governor-General or a hobo?
    I'd like to know who'll be boss of this show—
    Will it be Mac or Emilio Aguinaldo?

This song was written on board the gunboat *Pampanga* during the winter of 1899. Aguinaldo was then the self-styled President of the Philippine Republic, and General Otis was Governor-General. The fact that an attempt was made to prevent the singing of the song only made it more popular. It was later introduced into Cornell University as a college song by one who had seen service in the Insurrection.

The Philippine Hombre

There was once a Filipino Hombre,
Who ate rice, pescado y legumbre,

His trousers were wide, and his shirt hung outside,
And this I say was costombre.

He lived in a palm-thatched bahai,
That served as home, stable and sty,
He slept on a mat with the dog and the cat,
And the pigs and the chickens close by.

His brother who was a cochero,
En Manila busco el dinero,
His prices were high when the cop wasn't nigh,
Which was hard on the poor pasajero.

His sister, a buen lavendera,
Smashed clothes in a fuerto manera,
On the rocks in the stream, where the carabaos dream,
Which gave them a perfume lijera.

His padre was buen Filipino,
Who never mixed tubig with vino,
Said, "No insurrecto, no got gun nor bolo,"
But used both to kill a vecino.

He once owned a bulic manoc,
A haughty and mean fighting cock,
Which lost him a name, and mil pesos tambien,
So he changed off to monte for luck.

His madre, she came from the Jolo,
She was half a Negrito and Moro,
All day in Manila, she tossed the tortilla,
And smoked a rotino cigarro.

Of ninos she had dos or tres,
Good types of the Tagolog race,
In dry or wet weather, in the altogether,
They'd romp, and they'd race, and they'd chase.

When his pueblo last gave a fiesta,
His familia tried to digest-a
Mule that had died with glanders inside,
And now su familia no esta.

This song is not only a wardroom favorite, but has found its way into practically every naval and military reservation in the United States and its dependencies, as well as into countless civilian homes which through friendship or blood relationship have ties with the Services. It was composed and first sung by the late Captain Lyman A. Cotten, U.S.N., about 1900, when Navy, Army and Marine Corps were busy "pacifying" the newly acquired Philippines.

SOURCE: Joseph W. Crosley and the United States Naval Institute, *The Book of Navy Songs.* (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Academy, 1955). Reprinted by permission of the Naval Institute Press.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil–Military Relations; Music and War; Philippine War

1900

BLACK SOLDIER'S LETTER TO A WISCONSIN EDITOR ON AMERICAN TREATMENT OF FILIPINOS

A black regular with the 24th or 25th infantry regiment poured out his anger at the racist views and conduct of his white counterparts during the Philippine War in this letter to his hometown paper in May 1900.

Editor, New York Age

I have mingled freely with the natives and have had talks with American colored men here in business and who have lived here for years, in order to learn of them the cause of their (Filipino) dissatisfaction and the reason for this insurrection, and I must confess they have a just grievance. All this never would have occurred if the army of occupation would have treated them as people. The Spaniards, even if their laws were hard, were polite and treated them with some consideration; but the Americans, as soon as they saw that the native troops were desirous of sharing in the glories as well as the hardships of the hard-won battles with the Americans, began to apply home treatment for colored peoples: cursed them as damn niggers, steal [from] and ravish them, rob them on the street of their small change, take from the fruit vendors whatever suited their fancy, and kick

the poor unfortunate if he complained, desecrate their church property, and after fighting began, looted everything in sight, burning, robbing the graves.

This may seem a little tall—but I have seen with my own eyes carcasses lying bare in the boiling sun, the results of raids on receptacles for the dead in search of diamonds. The [white] troops, thinking we would be proud to emulate their conduct, have made bold of telling their exploits to us. One fellow, member of the 13th Minnesota, told me how some fellows he knew had cut off a native woman's arm in order to get a fine inlaid bracelet. On upbraiding some fellows one morning, whom I met while out for a walk (I think they belong to a Nebraska or Minnesota regiment, and they were stationed on the Malabon road) for the conduct of the American troops toward the natives and especially as to raiding, etc., the reply was: "Do you think we could stay over here and fight these damn niggers without making it pay all it's worth? The government only pays us $13 per month: that's starvation wages. White men can't stand it." Meaning they could not live on such small pay. In saying this they never dreamed that Negro soldiers would never countenance such conduct. They talked with impunity of "niggers" to our soldiers, never once thinking that they were talking to home "niggers" and should they be brought to remember that at home this is the same vile epithet they hurl at us, they beg pardon and make some effeminate excuse about what the Filipino is called.

I want to say right here that if it were not for the sake of the 10,000,000 black people in the United States, God alone knows on which side of the subject I would be. And for the sake of the black men who carry arms and pioneer for them as their representatives, ask them not to forget the present administration at the next election. Party be damned! We don't want these islands, not in the way we are to get them, and for Heaven's sake, put the party [Democratic] in power that pledged itself against this highway robbery. Expansion is too clean a name for it.

[Unsigned]

SOURCE: Unsigned letter, *Wisconsin Weekly Advocate,* May 17, 1900.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Philippine War

1908 (to 1916)

LEONARD WOOD ON PREPAREDNESS AND CIVIL OBLIGATION OF THE ARMY

Gen. Leonard Wood, a veteran of the Indian wars in the West and the Spanish–American War in Cuba, later served as military governor of Cuba, commanding general in the Philippines, and Army chief of staff. In 1908 he offered his first call for universal military training. After the outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914, he became a Preparedness advocate as well.

Our past military policy, so far as it concerns the land forces, has been thoroughly unsound and in violation of basic military principles. We have succeeded not because of it, but in spite of it. It has been unnecessarily and brutally costly in human life and recklessly extravagant in the expenditure of treasure. It has tended greatly to prolong our wars and consequently has delayed national development.

Because we have succeeded in spite of an unsound system, those who do not look beneath the surface fail to recognize the numerous shortcomings of that system, or appreciate how dangerous is our further dependence upon it.

The time has come to put our house in order through the establishment of a sound and dependable system, and to make such wise and prudent preparation as will enable us to defend successfully our country and our rights.

No such system can be established which does not rest upon equality of service for all who are physically fit and of proper age. Manhood suffrage means manhood obligation for service in peace or war. This is the basic principle upon which truly representative government, or free democracy, rests and must rest if it is successfully to withstand the shock of modern war.

The acceptance of this fundamental principle will require to a certain extent the moral organization of the people, the building up of that sense of individual obligation for service to the nation which is the basis of true patriotism, the

teaching of our people to think in terms of the nation rather than in those of a locality or of personal interest.

This organization must also be accompanied by the organization, classification and training of our men and the detailed and careful organization of the material resources of the country with the view to making them promptly available in case of need and to remedying any defects.

In the organization of our land forces we must no longer place reliance upon plans based upon the development of volunteers or the use of the militia. The volunteer system is not dependable because of the uncertainty as to returns, and in any case because of the lack of time for training and organization.

Modern wars are often initiated without a formal declaration of war or by a declaration which is coincident with the first act of war.

Dependence upon militia under state control or partially under state control, spells certain disaster, not because of the quality of the men or officers, but because of the system under which they work.

We must also have a first-class navy, well balanced and thoroughly equipped with all necessary appliances afloat and ashore. It is the first line of defense.

We need a highly efficient regular army, adequate to the peace needs of the nation. By this is meant a regular force, fully equipped, thoroughly trained and properly organized, with adequate reserves of men and material, and a force sufficient to garrison our over-sea possessions, including the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands. These latter are the key to the Pacific and one of the main defenses of our Pacific coast and the Panama Canal, and whoever holds them dominates the trade routes of the greater portion of the Pacific and, to a large extent, that ocean. The army must be sufficient also to provide an adequate garrison for the Panama Canal, which is an implement of commerce and an instrument of war so valuable that we must not under any conditions allow it to lie outside our secure grasp.

The regular force must also be adequate to provide sufficient troops for our coast defenses and such garrisons as may be required in Porto Rico and Alaska. The regular force must also be sufficient to provide the necessary mobile force in the United States; by this is meant a force of cavalry, infantry, field artillery, engineers and auxiliary troops suffi-

cient to provide an expeditionary force such as we sent to Cuba in 1898, and at the same time to provide a force sufficient to meet possible conditions of internal disorder. It must also furnish training units for the National Guard, or whatever force the federal government may eventually establish in place of it, and provide sufficient officers for duty under the detail system in the various departments, instructors at the various colleges and schools where military instruction is or may be established, attachés abroad and officers on special missions.

The main reliance in a war with a first-class power will ultimately be the great force of citizen soldiers forming a purely federal force, thoroughly organized and equipped with reserves of men and material. This force must be trained under some system which will permit the instruction to be given in part during the school period or age, thereby greatly reducing the time required for the final intensive period of training, which should be under regular officers and in conjunction with regular troops. In brief, the system must be one which utilizes as far as possible the means and opportunities now available, and interferes as little as possible with the educational or industrial careers of those affected. A system moulded on the general lines of the Australian or Swiss will accomplish this. Some modifications will be required to meet our conditions.

Each year about one million men reach the military age of 18; of this number not more than fifty per cent are fit for military service, this being about the average in other countries. Far less than fifty per cent come up to the standards required for the regular army, but the minor defects rejecting them for the regular army would not reject them for general military service. Assuming that some system on the general lines of the Australian or Swiss must be eventually adopted in this country, it would seem that about 500,000 men would be available each year for military training. If the boys were prepared by the state authorities, through training in schools and colleges, and in state training areas—when the boys were not in school—to the extent that they are in Switzerland or Australia, it would be possible, when they come up for federal training, to finish their military training—so far as preparing them for the duties of enlisted men is concerned—within a period of approximately three

months. We should be able to limit the period of first line obligation to the period from eighteen to twenty-five, inclusive, or seven years, or we could make the period of obligatory service begin two years later and extend it to twenty-seven. This procedure would give in the first line approximately three and one-half millions of men at the age of best physical condition and of minimum dependent and business responsibility. From the men of certain years (classes) of this period, organizations of federal forces should be built up to the extent of at least twenty-five divisions. They would be organized and equipped exactly like the regular army and would be held ready for immediate service as our present militia would be were it under federal control.

Men of these organizations would not live in uniform but would go about their regular occupations as do the members of the militia to-day, but they would be equipped, organized and ready for immediate service. If emergency required it, additional organizations could be promptly raised from the men who were within the obligatory period.

There should be no pay in peace time except when the men were on duty and then it should be merely nominal. The duty should be recognized as a part of the man's citizenship obligation to the nation. The organizations to be made up of men within the period of obligatory service, could be filled either by the men who indicated their desire for such training or by drawing them by lot. This is a matter of detail. The regular army as organized would be made up as to-day; it would be a professional army. The men who came into it would be men who had received in youth this citizenship training. They would come into the regular army because they wanted to be professional soldiers. The regular army would be to a certain extent the training nucleus for the citizen soldier organizations and would be the force garrisoning our over-sea possessions. It would be much easier to maintain our regular army in a highly efficient condition, as general military training would have produced a respect for the uniform and an appreciation of the importance of a soldier's duty.

The reserve corps of officers would be composed of men who had had longer and more advanced training, and could be recruited and maintained as indicated below, through further training of men from the military schools and colleges and those from the officers' training corps units of the nonmilitary universities and colleges. There would also be those from the military training camps and other sources, such as men who have served in the army and have the proper qualifications. This would give a military establishment in which every man would be physically fit to play his part and would have finished his obligation in what was practically his early manhood, with little probability of being called upon again unless the demands of war were so great as to require more men than those of the total first line, eighteen to twenty-five years, inclusive. Then they would be called by years as the occasion required, and would be available for service up to their forty-fifth year. It would give us a condition of real national preparedness, a much higher type of citizenship, a lower criminal rate and an enormously improved economic efficiency. Pending the establishment of such a system, every effort should be made to transfer the state militia to federal control. By this is meant its complete removal from state control and its establishment as a purely federal force, having no more relation to the states than the regular army has at present. This force under federal control will make a very valuable nucleus for the building up of a federal force of civilian soldiers. Officers and men should be transferred with their present grades and ratings. . . .

. . . As has been recommended by the General Staff, there should be built up with the least possible delay a corps of at least 50,000 reserve officers, on lines and through means recommended by the General Staff, and by means of a further development of the United States Military Training Camps for college students and older men, which have been in operation for a number of years. These plans include the coordination of the instruction at the various military college and schools and the establishment of well-thought-out plans for the nonmilitary colleges at which it may be decided to establish officers' training corps units on lines now under consideration.

This number of officers, fifty thousand, may seem excessive to some, but when it is remembered that there were one hundred and twenty-seven thousand officers in the Northern army during the Civil War, and over sixty thousand in the Southern, fifty thousand will not appear to be excessive. Fifty thousand officers will be barely sufficient properly

to officer a million and a half citizen soldiers. We had in service, North and South, during the Civil War, over four million men, and at the end of the war we had approximately one and a quarter million under arms.

Under legislative provision enacted during the Civil War, commonly known as the Morrill Act, Congress established mechanical and agricultural colleges in each state, among other things prescribing military instruction and providing for this purpose officers of the regular army. There are nearly thirty thousand students at these institutions who receive during their course military instruction for periods of from one to two years. In some cases the instruction is excellent; in others it is very poor.

There are in addition a large number of military colleges and schools; at these there are some ten thousand students, so that there are approximately forty thousand young men receiving military instruction, nearly all of them under officers of the army. This means a graduating class of about eight thousand, of whom not more than forty-five hundred would be fit to undergo military training.

These men should be assembled in United States Military Training Camps for periods of five weeks each for two consecutive years, in order that they may receive that practical and thorough instruction which in the majority of instances is not possible during their college course. With these should be assembled the men who have taken the officers' training course at the various nonmilitary universities. This course, as outlined by the General Staff, will be thorough and conducted, so far as the purely military courses and duties are concerned, under the immediate control of officers of the army.

From all these sources we have practically an inexhaustible supply of material from which excellent reserve officers can be made. From the men assembled in camp each year, fifteen hundred should be selected and commissioned, subject only to physical examination, as they are all men of college type, for one year as second lieutenants in the line and in the various staff corps and departments of the regular army. They should receive the pay and allowance of second lieutenants, or such pay and allowance as may be deemed to be appropriate.

The men who receive this training would furnish very good material for reserve officers of the grade of captain and major, whereas as a rule the men who have not had this training would qualify only in the grade of lieutenant.

From this group of men could well be selected, subject to the prescribed mental and physical examination, the greater portion of the candidates from civil life for appointment in the army. We have the material and the machinery for turning out an excellent corps of reserve officers. All that is needed is to take hold of it and shape it.

The prompt building up of a reserve corps of officers is one of the most vitally important steps to be taken. It is absolutely essential. It takes much time and care to train officers. Not only should students of the various colleges, universities and schools where military training is given, be made use of to the fullest extent, but the military training camps which have been conducted so successfully during the past few years should be greatly extended and made a part of the general plan of providing officers for the officers' reserve corps. It will be necessary to place the instruction at these camps on a different basis and to combine certain theoretical work with the practical work of the camp. This is a matter of detail which can be readily arranged. The results attained at these camps fully justify their being given the most serious attention and being made a part of the general plan for the training of officers.

SOURCE: Leonard Wood, *Our Military History* (Chicago: Reilly & Britton, 1916), 193–213.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil–Military Relations; Preparedness Movement

1910

EXCERPTS FROM WILLIAM JAMES'S ESSAY, "THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR"

William James, a Harvard philosophy professor, offered this influential essay in 1910 at the behest of the American Association for International Reconciliation. James had absorbed considerable Social Darwinian views of humankind. Hence his view that "our ancestors have bred

pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us. . . . " A realist in that sense, James nonetheless believed that these warlike propensities, not as necessary as they once had been, could and should be redirected into more productive channels by drafting young men, not for military service, but for work within the nation for the common good. This "moral equivalent of war" in time inspired others to create the American Friends Service Committee, the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Peace Corps, VISTA, Habitat for Humanity, and Americorps.

We inherit the warlike type; and for most of the capacities of heroism that the human race is full of we have to thank this cruel history. Dead men tell no tales, and if there were any tribes of other type than this they have left no survivors. Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us. . . .

. . . Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human life with no use for hardihood would be contemptible. Without risks or prizes for the darer, history would be insipid indeed; and there is a type of military character which every one feels that the race should never cease to breed, for every one is sensitive to its superiority. . . .

. . . I do not believe that peace either ought to be or will be permanent on this globe, unless the states pacifically organized preserve some of the old elements of army-discipline. A permanently successful peace-economy cannot be a simple pleasure-economy. In the more or less socialistic future towards which mankind seems drifting we must still subject ourselves collectively to those severities which answer to our real position upon this only partly hospitable globe. We must make new energies and hardihoods continue the manliness to which the military mind so faithfully clings. Martial virtues must be the enduring cement; intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock upon which states are built—unless, indeed, we wish for dangerous reactions against commonwealths fit only for contempt, and liable to invite attack whenever a centre of crystallization for military-minded enterprise gets formed anywhere in their neighborhood. . . .

. . . If now—and this is my idea—there were, instead of military conscription a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against Nature, the injustice would tend to be evened out, and numerous other goods to the commonwealth would follow. The military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fibre of the people; no one would remain blind as the luxurious classes now are blind, to man's real relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life. To coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dish-washing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of skyscrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas. They would have paid their blood-tax, done their own part in the immemorial human warfare against nature, they would tread the earth more proudly, the women would value them more highly, they would be better fathers and teachers of the following generation. . . .

. . . I spoke of the "moral equivalent" of war. So far, war has been the only force that can discipline a whole community, and until an equivalent discipline is organized, I believe that war must have its way. But I have no serious doubt that the ordinary prides and shames of social man, once developed to a certain intensity, are capable of organizing such a moral equivalent as I have sketched, or some other just as effective for preserving manliness of type. It is but a question of time, of skillful propagandism, and of opinion-making men seizing historic opportunities.

The martial type of character can be bred without war. Strenuous honour and disinterestedness abound elsewhere. Priests and medical men are in a fashion educated to it, and we should all feel some degree of it imperative if we were conscious of our work as an obligatory service to the state.

SOURCE: William James, *The Moral Equivalent of War.* Leaflet no. 27. (New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1910).

1915 a

EXCERPTS FROM *THE POET IN THE DESERT* BY CHARLES ERSKINE SCOTT WOOD

Charles Erskine Scott Wood graduated from West Point in 1874. He participated in campaigns in the Northwest against the Nez Percé in 1877 and the Paiute in 1878. He earned a law degree in the 1880s and resigned from the military to practice law in Portland, Oregon. A successful attorney and poet, and a self-proclaimed "social anarchist," he associated with Mark Twain, Ansel Adams, Emma Goldman, Chief Joseph of the Nez Percé, Margaret Sanger, Robinson Jeffers, Clarence Darrow, John Steinbeck, and Childe Hassam. His first major poetry collection, The Poet in the Desert, *was a great success when it appeared in 1915. The first section of these excerpts, reflecting his service fighting "my brown brothers," is drawn from that edition; the second, an admonition to those facing death in the trenches, from his revised edition, published in 1918.*

XLIX

I HAVE lived with my brown brothers
Of the wilderness,
And found them a mystery.
The cunning of the swift-darting trout
A mystery, also;
The wisdom of voyaging birds;
The gophers' winter-sleep.
The knowledge of the bees;
All a mystery.
I have lain out with the brown men
And I know they are favored
As all are favored who submit
Willingly to the great Mother.
Nature whispered to them her secrets,
But passed me by.
My savage brothers instructed my civilization.
Tall, stately and full of wisdom
His face chiseled as Napoleon's,

Was Hin-mah-too-yah-laht-kt;
Thunder-rolling-in-the-mountains;
Joseph, Chief of the Nez-Perces;
Who in five battles from the Clearwater
To Bear Paw Mountain,
Made bloody protest against dishonorable Power.
Ah-laht-ma-kaht, his brother,
Who led the young men in battle
And gave his life for his brethren:
Tsootlem-mox-mox, Yellow Bull;
Cunning White Bird, a brown Odysseus,
And indomitable Too-hul-hul-soot,
High Priest, dignified; unafraid; inspired;
Standing half-naked in the Council Teepee,
Insisting in low musical gutturals,
With graceful gesture,
"The Earth is our Mother.
"From her we come;
"To her we return.
"She belongs to all.
"She has gathered into her bosom
"The bones of our ancestors.
"Their spirits will fight with us
"When we battle for our home
"Which is ours from the beginning.
"Who gave to the White Man
"Ownership of the Earth,
"Or what is his authority
"From the Great Spirit
"To tear babes from the nursing breast?
"It is contemptible to have too much where others want."
He too gave his life for his people.
And again at another time when the politicians
Once more betrayed the promise of the Republic
Squat, slit-eyed Smokhallah,
Shaman of the Wenatchies, and Chelans,
Half-draped in a red blanket,
Harangued his people to die
In brave fight on the bosom
Of the Mother who bore them.
But wily Sulk-tash-kosha, the Half Sun,
Chieftan, persuaded submission.

"The White Men are more abundant
"Than the grass in the Springtime.
"They are without end and beyond number.
"It is hopeless to fight them,
"Right is feeble against many soldiers."

Where are those many-colored cyclones
Of painted and feather-decked horses
With naked riders, wearing eagle-feathers,
And bonnets of cougar scalps;
Brandishing rifles, bows and lynx-skin quivers,
All gleaming through the yellow dust-cloud,
Galloping, circling, hallooing, whooping,
To the War Council? They are stilled forever.
The Christian Republic planted grass in their mouths.

<p style="text-align:center">L</p>

Just over there where yon purple peak,
Like a great amethyst, gems the brow of the Desert,
I sprawled flat in the bunch-grass, a target
For the just bullets of my brown brothers; betrayed
By politicians hugging to their bosoms votes, not Justice.
I was a soldier, and, at command,
Had gone out to kill and be killed.
This was not majestic.
The little grey gophers
Sat erect and laughed at me.
In that silent hour before the dawn,
When Nature drowses for a moment,
We swept like fire over the smoke-browned tee-pees;
Their conical tops peering above the willows.
We frightened the air with crackle of rifles,
Women's shrieks, children's screams,
Shrill yells of savages;
Curses of Christians.
The rifles chuckled continually.
A poor people who asked nothing but the old promises,
Butchered in the dark. . . .
Young men who are about to die,
Stay a moment and take my hand,
Who am also about to die.
You have been carefully winnowed and selected

For the banqueting of a Hooded Skeleton.
Tell me by whom selected?—and for what?
Not you alone die, but the children
Who through you should enter Life.
Fathers of these expectant generations,
Tell me, for what are you selected
And by whom?
Victims stretched upon hospital cots,
You who see not the faces bending above you,
Nor shall ever see the eyes of the beloved,
Nor the face of your child.
You between whom and the world
Doors have been shut,
Who never will hear the April bird-song,
Or squirrels throwing nuts into October leaves,
Or sudden crack of a dry branch
Startling the woody silences;
You who, crumpled and twisted,
Shall be frightful to children;
You who never again shall spurn
With light, keen feet the rugged mountain-top,
The level shore,
Tell me, for what?—For what?
Shall I applaud you?
Shall I applaud gladiators
Who stain the sands with each other's blood
In a game of the Masters?

Is not Death busy enough?
None escapes his shaft.
His muffled feet creep relentlessly to all.
Why should we heap him with an unripe load?
Take War by the throat, young soldier,
And wring from his blood-frothed lips
The answer,—why?—why should we die?
Why should we die and not those who have made War?
Young men,
And even more than young men,
Young women,
Guardians of the Future,
Is one man who toils for the Masters so much better
Or so much worse than another,

So much richer or poorer,
That he must kill his brother?
Is it just to inscrutable Nature
Who with mysterious care has brought you
Down the Path Infinite
That you should kill your brother or be killed by him?
Tell me distinctly for what is the sacrifice?
I demand that you refuse to be satisfied,
That you unravel the old shoutings,
That you peer to the very bottom.
Draw in your breath delightedly,
And confidently insist:
"My life is my Own.
"A gift from the Ages,
"And to me precious
"Beyond estimation.
"I will deny Presidents, Kings, Congresses.
"I will defy authority.
"I will question all things.
"I will obstinately be informed
"Whence comes the battle?
"Whose is the combat?
"Why should I be pushed forward?"
Alas, pitiful young men, you are without intelligence
And you die.

SOURCE: Charles Erskine Scott Wood, *The Poet in the Desert*, 2nd ed. (Portland, Oreg.: privately printed, 1918).

RELATED ENTRIES: *Indian Wars: Western Wars; Literature and War; Religion and War*

1915 b
Lyrics to "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier"

Calls for greater "preparedness" in 1915 and 1916 resonated with some Americans, but met opposition from others who didn't understand why the United States need concern itself with a war between kings, kaisers, tsars, and a Britain that had yet to grant "home rule" to Ireland. This song by Al Piantadosi and Alfred Bryan, recorded by Morton Harvey (and others), was a hit with such folk, who were not an inconsequential minority. After all, President Wilson's successful reelection campaign in 1916 included this tag: "He kept us out of [the] war!"

Ten million soldiers to the war have gone,
Who may never return again.
Ten million mothers' hearts must break,
For the ones who died in vain.
Head bowed down in sorrow in her lonely years,
I heard a mother murmur thro' her tears:

> Chorus:
> I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier,
> I brought him up to be my pride and joy,
> Who dares to put a musket on his shoulder,
> To shoot some other mother's darling boy?

Let nations arbitrate their future troubles,
It's time to lay the sword and gun away,
There'd be no war today,
If mothers all would say,
I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier.

What victory can cheer a mother's heart,
When she looks at her blighted home?
What victory can bring her back,
All she cared to call her own?
Let each mother answer in the year to be,
Remember that my boy belongs to me!

SOURCE: Al Piantadosi and Alfred Bryan, "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier." Morton Harvey., recording: Edison Collection, Library of Congress.

RELATED ENTRIES: *Antiwar Movements; Committee on Public Information; Music and War; Preparedness Movement; World War I*

1917 a

MOTHER'S POEM:
"I DIDN'T RAISE MY BOY" BY ABBIE FARWELL BROWN

Once Congress declared war in April 1917, the views expressed in the song "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier" (see document 1915 b above) were challenged. Here was a poetic response:

Not to be a soldier?

Did you then know what you, his mother, were raising him for?

How could you tell when and where he would be needed? When and where he would best pay a man's debt to his country?

Suppose the mother of George Washington had said, "I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier!"

Suppose the mother of General Grant, or the mother of Admiral Dewey had said it, or the mothers of thousands and thousands of brave fellows who fought for independence and liberty—where would our country be to-day?

If the mothers of heroes had clung and sniveled and been afraid for their boys, there wouldn't perhaps be any free America for the world to look to.

Mother, you are living and enjoying America now—you and the boy you "didn't raise to be a soldier."

Thanks to others, you and he are safe and sound—so far.

You may not be to-morrow, you and the other women, he and the other men who "weren't raised"—if Americans turn out to be Sons of Cowards, as the Germans believe.

You want your boy to live and enjoy life with you—to make you happy.

You don't want to risk your treasure. What mother ever wished it? It is indeed harder to risk one's beloved than one's self. But there are things still harder.

You don't want your lad to meet danger, like Washington and Grant and Sheridan, and the rest whom you taught him to admire.

You'd rather keep your boy where you believe him safe than have your country safe!

You'd rather have him to look at here, a slacker, than abroad earning glory as a patriot.

You'd rather have him grow old and decrepit and die in his bed than risk a hero's death, with many chances of coming back to you proudly honored.

You'd rather have him go by accident or illness, or worse.

There are risks at home, you know!

Are you afraid of them, too? How can you guard him?

Is it you who are keeping him back?

Shame on you, Mother! You are no true, proud mother.

It isn't only the men who have got to be brave these days. It's the women, too. We all have so much to risk when there's wicked war in the world.

Don't you know this is a war to destroy wicked war?

Don't you want your son to help make the world over?

This is a war to save our liberty, our manhood, our womanhood—the best life has to give.

Mother, what did you raise your boy for? Wasn't it to be a man and do a man's work?

Could he find a greater Cause than this to live or die for?

You should be proud if he can be a Soldier.

You must send him out with a smile.

Courage! You must help him to be brave.

We must help one another to be brave and unselfish.

For America!

SOURCE: Abbie Farwell Brown, "I Didn't Raise My Boy," in Albert Bushnell, ed., Handbook of the War for Readers, Speakers, and Teachers (New York: Hart & Arthur O. Lovejoy, 1918), 100-101.

RELATED ENTRIES: Antiwar Movements; Committee on Public Information; Preparedness Movement; World War I

1917 b

LYRICS TO "OVER THERE," OR "JOHNNIE GET YOUR GUN"

Popular Tin Pan Alley songwriter and performer George M. Cohan dashed off this lively tune shortly after war was declared. It was another response to the earlier Piantadosi–Bryan song (see documents 1915 b and 1917 a above).

Johnnie get your gun, get your gun, get your gun,

Take it on the run, on the run, on the run,

Hear them calling you and me,

Ev'ry son of liberty,

Hurry right away, no delay, go today

Make your daddy glad, to have had such a lad,

Tell your sweetheart not to pine,

To be proud her boy's in line.

> Chorus:
> Over There, over There
> Send the word, send the word over There
> That the Yanks are coming, the Yanks are coming
> The Drums rum-tuming everywhere.
> So prepare, say a pray'r
> Send the word, send the word to beware.
> We'll be over, we're coming over
> And we won't come back till it's over, over there.

Johnie get your gun, get your gun, get your gun,

Johnie show the Hun you're a son-of-a-gun.

Hoist the flag and let her fly,

Like true heroes do or die.

Pack your little kit, show the grit, do your bit,

Soldiers to the ranks from the towns aAnd the tanks,

Make your mother proud of you,

And to liberty be true.

SOURCE: Lyrics found at http://www.english.emory.edu/LostPoets/OverThere.html (August 10, 2005).

RELATED ENTRIES: Committee on Public Information; Music and War; World War I

1917 c

JOHN SIMPSON'S LETTER TO SENATOR

John Simpson, head of the Farmer's Union of Oklahoma, wrote to his senator on March 31, 1917, offering a farmer's opinion on proposals to draft men to fight in France.

My work puts me in touch with farmer audiences in country schoolhouses nearly every night. We always discuss the war question and universal military service. I know nine out of ten farmers are absolutely opposed to both. We farmers are unalterably opposed to war unless an enemy lands on our shores.

SOURCE: George Tindall, *The Emergence of the New South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 47.

RELATED ENTRIES: Antiwar Movements; Committee on Public Information; Conscription and Volunteerism; World War I

1917 d

"UNCLE SAM'S LITTLE WAR IN THE ARKANSAS OZARKS," A REPORT OF DRAFT RESISTANCE IN THE *LITERARY DIGEST*

Conscious that the British government had not been able to continue to raise sufficient numbers of men by relying on volunteers, the Wilson administration almost immediately secured from Congress the nation's first full-fledged conscription act. Most who were selected for service reported without incident and served honorably. But opposition to conscription was strong in rural America. Some 300,000 failed to respond to the call altogether, and over 100,000 of those who did report deserted within the first month and remained at large.[1] This account describes the response to conscription in rural northern Arkansas:

WHEN THE UNITED STATES entered the war with Germany, Cecil Cove did not. This little valley in the remote fastnesses of the North Arkansas Ozarks practically seceded from the Union for the duration of the war. The older men cooperated with the eligibles to resist the draft. They defied Uncle Sam, being well stocked with arms and prepared to hold out indefinitely in their hiding-places. When they finally gave up it was by no means an unconditional surrender, for the authorities accepted all the terms of the slacker gang, after a number of attempts to round them up had proved unsuccessful. A writer in the *Kansas City Star* attributes the incident to "a combination of plain ignorance, Jeff

Davis politics, *The Appeal to Reason*, and mountain religion." He adds that another fact may throw some light on the happenings in Cecil Cove, namely, that "it was a notorious hiding-place for men who were neither Federals nor Confederates in the Civil War," and who "found a refuge in the caves and fastnesses of the Cove exactly as did the slacker gang of 1917-1918."

Cecil Cove—some twelve miles long and eight miles wide—lies high up in Newton County, which has not been penetrated by the railroad. The people there form an isolated mountain community, suspicious yet hospitable, reticent, "trained and accustomed to arms," and also trained and accustomed, boys and girls, men and women alike, to using tobacco, as snuffers, smokers, and chewers. If we are to believe The *Star*, they are "unerring spitters," and "the youngest of the family is considered deserving of a reprimand if he can not hit the fireplace at ten paces."

When the news of the draft came the Cove prepared for war, but not with Germany. To quote the *Star:*

> The country roundabout was scoured for high-power rifles. Stocks of the Harrison and Jasper stores were pretty well depleted. Repeating rifles of 30-30 caliber and great range and precision began to reach the Cove from mail-order houses. Quantities of ammunition were bought—report has it that "Uncle Lige" Harp bought nearly $60 worth at one time in Harrison.

A number of young men were drafted, but refused to report for duty. The sheriff sent word he was coming after them, but seems to have thought better of it when he received the answer: "Come on, but look out for yourself!" Four United States marshals or deputies, several special investigators, and an army colonel all visited Newton County in turn, did some questioning and searching, and alike returned empty handed. We read in the *Star* that the people in the Cove were all related through intermarriage, and practically all of them were in sympathy with the slackers. They agreed to stick together, and it has been reported that some sort of covenant was signed. The Cove, we are told, "is a region of multifarious hiding places, studded with boulders and pocketed with caves; a searcher might pass within six feet of a dozen hidden men and see none of them." It is reached and penetrated only by steep mountain-trails, which are easily threaded by the "sure-footed mountain horses and mules and their equally sure-footed owners," but which are almost impassable to strangers. Moreover, continues the writer in the *Star:*

> So perfect were means of observation and communication a stranger could not enter the Cove at any point without that fact being known to all its inhabitants before the intruder had got along half a mile.

Nearly all the families in the Cove have telephones. It is a remarkable fact that these mountaineers will do without the meanest comforts of life, but they insist upon having telephones. This and the other varied methods of intercourse, peculiar to the mountains, gave the Cecil Cove slackers an almost unbeatable combination. They always knew where the searchers were and what they were doing, but the searchers never were able to find anything except a blind trail.

The telephone-lines might have been cut, but that would have served little purpose. News travels by strange and devious processes in the mountains. The smoke of a brush-fire high up on a peak may have little significance to the uninitiated, but it may mean considerable to an Ozark mountaineer. The weird, long-drawn-out Ozark yell, "Hia-a-ahoo-o-o" may sound the same always to a man from the city, but there are variations of it that contain hidden significances. And the mountaineer afoot travels with amazing speed, even along those broken trails. Bent forward, walking with a characteristic shuffle, he can scurry over boulder and fallen log like an Indian.

A deputy marshal "with a reputation as a killer" spent a month in Newton County, but made no arrests, telling some one that it would be "nothing short of suicide" for an officer to try to capture the slacker gang. The officer second in command at Camp Pike, Little Rock, took a hand in the affair and told the county officials that some of his men who were "sore at being unable to go across to France" would be very glad to "come up and clear out these slackers." But about this time the War Department offered something like amnesty to the Cove gang and apparently promised that a charge of desertion would not be pressed if the men were to

give themselves up. Word was passed around, whether or not from official sources, that the boys would be "gone only from sixty to ninety days, that they would all get a suit of clothes and a dollar a day." At the same time a new sheriff, Frank Carlton, came into office. He knew the neighborhood and its people. He got in touch with some of the leaders of the hiding men and finally had an interview with two of them. They agreed to give themselves up if certain concessions were made and finally told the sheriff to meet them alone and unarmed and thus accompany them to Little Rock. As we read:

> The next day the gang met the sheriff at the lonely spot agreed upon. They caught a mail-coach and rode to Harrison and then were taken to Camp Pike.
>
> The morning after their arrival Joel Arnold asked the sheriff:
>
> "Do they feed like this all the time?"
>
> The sheriff replied that they had received the ordinary soldier fare.
>
> "We've been a passel of fools," Arnold replied.

The slackers are still held in custody at Camp Pike, and, according to the writer in The Star, authorities there will make no statement as to the procedure contemplated in the case. In showing how such different influences as religion, socialism, and sheer ignorance operated, the writer lets certain of the Cove leaders speak for themselves. Uncle Lige Harp backed up the slackers strongly with all of his great influence in the community. "Uncle Lige" is now an old man, but in his younger days had the reputation of being a "bad man." He tells with glee of a man who once said he would "just as soon meet a grizzly bear on the trail as meet Lige Harp." In his heyday Uncle Lige "was accounted a dead shot—one who could put out a turkey's left eye at one hundred yards every shot." Here are Uncle Lige's views:

> "We-all don't take no truck with strangers and we didn't want our boys takin' no truck with furriners. We didn't have no right to send folks over to Europe to fight; 'tain't a free country when that's done. Wail till them Germans come over here and then fight 'em is what I said when I heard 'bout the war. If anybody was to try to invade this

country ever' man in these hills would git his rifle and pick 'em off."

> "Aunt Sary" Harp, between puffs at her clay pipe, nodded her approval of "Uncle Lige's" position.

France Sturdgil and Jim Blackwell say they are Socialists. They have read scattering copies of *The Appeal to Reason*. To be fair, it should be added that this Socialist paper, now *The New Appeal*, has taken an attitude in support of the Government's war-policy. Said Sturdgil:

> "It's war for the benefit of them silk-hatted fellers up in New York. We don't want our boys fightin' them rich fellers' battles and gittin' killed just to make a lot of money for a bunch of millionaires. Why, they own most of the country now."

To the writer of the *Star* article this sounds very much like the sort of argument which Jeff Davis used for many years in persuading the "hill billies" of Arkansas to elect him regularly to the United States Senate. George Slape, the Cove's religious leader, is "a prayin' man."

> "The good book says, 'Thou shalt not kill.' We didn't want our boys takin' nobody's life. It ain't right 'cause it's contrary to the Bible and the good Lord's teachin's," declared Slape.
>
> Asked to explain the difference between fighting Germans and preparing to resist the draft authorities, both likely to result in death, Slape said:
>
> "The boys wasn't goin' to kill nobody unless they had to. It's different killing a man who tries to make you do wrong and killin' somebody in war."

None of these leaders ever admitted they knew anything about where the boys were hiding. It was a common report that the slackers "lived at home except on those occasions when an officer was discovered to be prowling about." It is the Ozark way: "nobody ever has seen a hunted man, tho a rustling of the leaves, the crackling of a dead twig, might betray the fact that the fugitive was there only a moment before."

Cecil Cove had its loyal men. At least one young man defied home opinion and threats of violence by reporting for duty when he was drafted. He was sent to France and

became an excellent soldier. Loyal citizens living on the fringe of the Cove were shot at and threatened on a number of occasions, and several were ordered to keep away from the community. "Uncle Jimmy" Richardson, a Confederate veteran, loyal and fearless, was not afraid to go straight to some of the parents of the slackers and tell them what he thought of them.

"You're a gang of yellow bellies," he said. "If you've got any manhood in you, them boys will be made to go and serve their country."

"Uncle Jimmy" got his answer one day when he ventured a little way into the Cove. A shot rang out and a bullet whistled past his ear.

"The cowardly hounds wouldn't fight fair," he said. "In the old days of the Civil War them kind was swung up to the nearest tree. I'm past seventy-three now, but I'd have got down my rifle and gone in with anybody that would have went after them. I don't like to live near folks who ain't Americans."

"Uncle Jimmy" does not speak to the slacker folks in the Cove now. He says he never will again. If he did, he says he would feel ashamed of the more than a dozen wounds that he received in the Civil War.

Loyalists in the Cove were forced by fear into what amounted to a state of neutrality. "We couldn't risk having our homes burned down or our stock killed, let alone anything worse," said one of them, who added "I'm not afraid of any man face to face, but it is a different proposition when you're one against thirty-six, and them with all the advantage and willin' to go anything.". . .

Note 1. Sec. of War Newton Baker to Woodrow Wilson, May 13, 1920, Baker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

SOURCE: "Uncle Sam's Little War in the Arkansas Ozarks," *Literary Digest,* March 8, 1919, . 107 ff.

RELATED ENTRIES: Committee on Public Information; Conscription and Volunteerism; Draft Evasion and Resistance; World War I

1917 e

ALPHA IQ TESTS ADMINISTERED TO RECRUITS

During World War I, army psychologists administered intelligence tests that they claimed measured ability. From these tests, psychologists concluded that the average mental age of the American soldier was 13. This example from a test given to literate recruits reveals that many questions measured familiarity with American culture and level of schooling.

TEST 3

This is a test of common sense. Below are sixteen questions. Three answers are given to each question. You are to look at the answers carefully; then make a cross in the square before the best answer to each question, as in the sample:

Why do we use stoves? Because

☐ they look well

☒ they keep us warm

☐ they are black

Here the second answer is the best one and is marked with a cross. Begin with No. 1 and keep on until time is called.

1. Cats are useful animals, because
   ☐ they catch mice
   ☐ they are gentle
   ☐ they are afraid of dogs

2. Why are pencils more commonly carried than fountain pens? Because
   ☐ they are brightly colored
   ☐ they are cheaper
   ☐ they are not so heavy

3. Why is leather used for shoes? Because
   ☐ it is produced in all countries
   ☐ it wears well
   ☐ it is an animal product

4. Why judge a man by what he does rather than by what he says? Because
   ☐ what a man does shows what he really is
   ☐ it is wrong to tell a lie
   ☐ a deaf man cannot hear what is said

5. If you were asked what you thought of a person whom you didn't know, what should you say?
   - ☐ I will go and get acquainted
   - ☐ I think he is all right
   - ☐ I don't know him and can't say

6. Streets are sprinkled in summer
   - ☐ to make the air cooler
   - ☐ to keep automobiles from skidding
   - ☐ to keep down dust

7. Why is wheat better for food than corn? Because
   - ☐ it is more nutritious
   - ☐ it is more expensive
   - ☐ it can be ground finer

8. If a man made a million dollars, he ought to
   - ☐ pay off the national debt
   - ☐ contribute to various worthy charities
   - ☐ give it all to some poor man

9. Why do many persons prefer automobiles to street cars? Because
   - ☐ an auto is made of higher grade materials
   - ☐ an automobile is more convenient
   - ☐ street cars are not as safe

10. The feathers on a bird's wings help him to fly because they
    - ☐ make a wide, light surface
    - ☐ keep the air off his body
    - ☐ keep the wings from cooling off too fast

11. All traffic going one way keeps to the same side of the street because
    - ☐ most people are right handed
    - ☐ the traffic policeman insists on it
    - ☐ it avoids confusion and collisions

12. Why do inventors patent their inventions? Because
    - ☐ it gives them control of their inventions
    - ☐ it creates a greater demand
    - ☐ it is the custom to get patents

13. Freezing water bursts pipes because
    - ☐ cold makes the pipes weaker
    - ☐ water expands when it freezes
    - ☐ the ice stops the flow of water

14. Why are high mountains covered with snow? Because
    - ☐ they are near the clouds
    - ☐ the sun seldom shines on them
    - ☐ the air is cold there

15. If the earth were nearer the sun
    - ☐ the stars would disappear
    - ☐ our months would be longer
    - ☐ the earth would be warmer

16. Why is it colder nearer the poles than near the equator? Because
    - ☐ the poles are always farther from the sun
    - ☐ the sunshine falls obliquely at the poles
    - ☐ there is more ice at the poles

TEST 5

The words A EATS COW GRASS in that order are mixed up and don't make a sentence; but they would make a sentence if put in the right order: A COW EATS GRASS, and this statement is true.

Again, the words HORSES FEATHERS HAVE ALL would make a sentence if put in the order ALL HORSES HAVE FEATHERS, but this statement is false.

Below are twenty-four mixed-up sentences. Some of them are true and some are false. When I say "go," take these sentences one at a time. Think what you would say if the words were straightened out, but don't write them yourself. Then, if what it would say is true, draw a line under the word "true"; if what it would say is false, draw a line under the word "false." If you can not be sure, guess. The two samples are already marked as they should be. Begin with No. 1 and work right down the page until time is called.

SAMPLES:

a eats cow grass	<u>true</u>..false	
horses feathers have all	true..<u>false</u>	

1.	lions strong are	true..false 1
2.	houses people in live	true..false 2
3.	days there in are week eight a	true..false 3
4.	legs flies one have only	true..false 4
5.	months coldest are summer the	true..false 5
6.	gotten sea water sugar is from	true..false 6

7. honey bees flowers gather the from   true..false 7

8. and eat good gold silver to are   true..false 8

9. president Columbus first the was America of

          true..false 9

10. making is bread valuable wheat for   true..false 10

11. water and made are butter from cheese   true..false 11

12. sides every has four triangle   true..false 12

13. every times makes mistakes person at   true..false 13

14. many toes fingers as men as have   true..false 14

15. not eat gunpowder to good is   true..false 15

16. ninety canal ago built Panama years was the

          true..false 16

17. live dangerous is near a volcano to it   true..false 17

18. clothing worthless are for and wool cotton   true..false 18

19. as sheets are napkins used never   true..false 19

20. people trusted intemperate be always can   true..false 20

21. employ debaters irony never   true..false 21

22. certain some death of mean kinds sickness   true..false 22

23. envy bad malice traits are and   true..false 23

24. repeated call human for courtesies associations

          true..false 24

Test 8

Notice the sample sentence:

People hear with the   eyes <u>ears</u> nose mouth

The correct word is ears, because it makes the truest sentence.

In each of the sentences below you have four choices for the last word. Only one of them is correct. In each sentence draw a line under the one of these four words which makes the truest sentence. If you can not be sure, guess. The two samples are already marked as they should be.

SAMPLES:

People hear with the   eyes <u>ears</u> nose mouth

France is in <u>Europe</u> Asia Africa Australia

1. America was discovered by   Drake   Hudson
   Columbus   Cabot

2. Pinochle is played with   rackets cards pins dice

3. The most prominent industry of Detroit is
   automobiles   brewing   flour packing

4. The Wyandotte is a kind of   horse fowl cattle granite

5. The U.S. School for Army Officers is at   Annapolis
   West Point   New Haven   Ithaca

6. Food products are made by   Smith & Wesson
   Swift & Co.   W.L. Douglas   B.T. Babbitt

7. Bud Fisher is famous as an   actor   author
   baseball player   comic artist

8. The Guernsey is a kind of   horse goat sheep cow

9. Marguerite Clark is known as a   suffragist   singer
   movie actress   writer

10. "Hasn't scratched yet" is used in advertising a   duster
    flour brush cleanser

11. Salsify is a kind of   snake fish lizard vegetable

12. Coral is obtained from   mines elephants oysters
    reefs

13. Rosa Bonheur is famous as a   poet painter composer
    sculptor

14. The tuna is a kind of   fish bird reptile insect

15. Emeralds are usually red blue green yellow

16. Maize is a kind of corn hay oats rice

17. Nabisco is a   patent medicine disinfectant
    food product   tooth paste

18. Velvet Joe appears in advertisements of   tooth powder
    dry goods tobacco soap

19. Cypress is a kind of   machine food tree fabric

20. Bombay is a city in   China Egypt India Japan

21. The dictaphone is a kind of   typewriter   multigraph
    phonograph   adding machine

22. The pancreas is in the   abdomen head shoulder
    neck

23. Cheviot is the name of a   fabric drink dance food

24. Larceny is a term used in   medicine theology law
    pedagogy

25. The Battle of Gettysburg was fought in   1863   1813
    1778   1812

26. The bassoon is used in   music   stenography
    book-binding   lithography

27. Turpentine comes from   petroleum ore hides trees

28. The number of a Zulu's legs is two four six eight

29. The scimitar is a kind of   musket cannon pistol sword

30. The Knight engine is used in the   Packard Lozier
    Stearns   Pierce Arrow

31. The author of "The Raven" is   Stevenson   Kipling   Hawthorne   Poe

32. Spare is a term used in   bowling   football   tennis   hockey

33. A six-sided figure is called a   scholium   parallelogram   hexagon   trapezium

34. Isaac Pitman was most famous in   physics   shorthand   railroading   electricity

35. The ampere is used in measuring   wind power   electricity   water power   rainfall

36. The Overland car is made in   Buffalo   Detroit   Flint   Toledo

37. Mauve is the name of a   drink   color   fabric   food

38. The stanchion is used in   fishing   hunting   farming   motoring

39. Mica is a   vegetable   mineral   gas   liquid

40. Scrooge appears in   Vanity Fair   The Christmas Carol   Romola   Henry IV

SOURCE: *Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences,* vol. 15 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1921).

RELATED ENTRIES: *Conscription and Volunteerism; World War I*

1917 f

BETA IQ TESTS ADMINISTERED TO RECRUITS

During World War I, many men who either did not speak English or were illiterate entered the military. To test their intelligence, Army psychologists developed special exams that still required the ability to write quickly and understand directions in English. Unsurprisingly, many men who took the Beta exam were classified as morons.

[These were the instructions given for the following Beta test for illiterate soldiers:]

TEST 6, pictorial completion.

"This is test 6 *here*. Look. A lot of pictures." After everyone has found the place, "Now watch." Examiner points to hand and says to demonstrator, "Fix it." Demonstrator does nothing, but looks puzzled. Examiner points to the picture of the hand, and then to the place where the finger is missing and says to demon-

strator, "Fix it; fix it." Demonstrator then draws in finger. Examiner says, "That's right." Examiner then points to fish and place for eye and says, "Fix it." After demonstrator has drawn missing eye, examiner points to each of the four remaining drawings and says, "Fix them all." Demonstrator works samples out slowly and with apparent effort. When the samples are finished examiner says, "All right. Go ahead. Hurry up!" During the course of this test the orderlies walk around the room and locate individuals who are doing nothing, point to their pages and say, "Fix it. Fix them," trying to set everyone working. At the end of 3 minutes examiner says, "Stop! But don't turn over the page."

SOURCE: *Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences,* vol. 15 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1921).

RELATED ENTRIES: *Conscription and Volunteerism; World War I*

1918 a

THE MAN'S POEM AND THE WOMAN'S RESPONSE

With conscription, opportunities arose for women to take work long denied them. Their fellow male workers were, generally speaking, uncomfortable with and opposed to the presence of women at "their" worksites. When an anonymous male machinist penned a sarcastic poem about female machinists employed during World War I, an anonymous female machinist responded with revealing zest.

THE MAN'S POEM
The Reason Why

The shop girls had a meeting
They came from far and near
Some came from Bryant's, J and L
And some from Fellows Gear.

But before inside the hall
They were allowed to look
They had to take their bloomers off,
And hang 'em on a hook.

Then into the hall they went at once,
With courage ever higher
But hardly were they seated
When someone shouted "Fire."

Then out they ran all in a bunch,
They had no time to look,
And each one grabbed a bloomer
At random from the hook.

They got their bloomers all mixed up,
And they were mighty sore,
To think they couldn't have the one
They had always had before.

And that's the reason that you see
As you go 'round the streets,
Each one will stop and take a look
At every girl she meets.

And hence the reason that the girls
Who are not so very stout,
Have had to take 'em in a bit,
And the fat ones, let 'em out.

THE WOMAN'S RESPONSE
She Hands Him a Lemon

My man, you're really out of date
And now before it is too late,
I'll try to set you right;
We never mixed our bloomers, clown,
They fit just like a Paris gown,
They're neither loose nor tight.
The simple, tender, clinging vine,
That once around the oak did twine,
Is something of the past;
We stand erect now by your side,
And surmount obstacles with pride,
We're equal, free, at last.

We're independent now you see,
Your bald head don't appeal to me,
I love my overalls;
And I would rather polish steel,
Than get you up a tasty meal,
Or go with you to balls.
Now, only premiums good and big,
Will tempt us maids to change our rig,
And put our aprons on;
And cook up all the dainty things,
That so delighted men and kings
In days now past and gone.

Now in your talk of shouting "fire,"
You really did arouse my ire,
I tell you, sir, with pride,
That you would be the one to run
While we would stay and see the fun,
And I lend a hand beside.
To sit by your machine and chew

And dream of lovely Irish stew,
Won't work today you'll find.
Now, we're the ones who set the pace,
You'll have to bustle in the race
Or you'll get left behind.

We're truly glad we got the chance
To work like men and wear men's pants,
And proved that we made good.
My suit a badge of honor is.
Now, will you kindly mind your "biz"
Just as you know you should.

SOURCE: Wayne Broehl Jr., *Precision Valley: The Machine Tool Companies of Springfield, Vermont* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 98–99.

RELATED ENTRIES: Committee on Public Information; Women in the Workforce: World War I and World War II; World War I

1918 b

VERSE OF THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 1918–1919

The American Expeditionary Force headquarters created a soldier's newspaper, The Stars and Stripes, which published a number of poems written by military personnel. These are some of the more revealing ones.

(UNTITLED)
I want to go home; I am tired of staying
    Where people don't savvy my tongue,
Where I cannot tell what the waiters are saying
    Nor know just how much I am stung.
I want to go back where I needn't climb stairways
    Or grope to my room in the gloom.
Or shiver in chambers like chill glacial airways,
    I gaze on the track to,
    I long to go back to,
That better and greater place, swift elevator place,
Hot radiator place—
        Home!

I want to go home; I am tired of getting
    This fancy but camouflaged food,
Pale substitute eats in a Frenchified setting—
    My tastes grow voracious and crude.
I'm dreaming of meals without food-card restrictions,
    With much more of bodyless foam,
Where sugar and pastry meet no interdictions,
    I dream of and yearn to,
    I pant to return to,
That thrilling-to-utter land, makes-my-heart-flutter land,
Milk-fat-and-butter land—
        Home!

                                    Anon.
                    The Stars and Stripes
                            (6 June 1919)

SONG OF ST. NAZAIRE
Hurry on, you doughboys, with your rifle and your pack;
Bring along your cooties with your junk upon your back;
We'll house you and delouse you and we'll douse you in a
    bath,
And when the boat is ready you can take the Western Path.

    For it's home, kid, home—when you slip away from
        here—
    No more slum or reveille, pounding in your ear;
    Back on clean, wide streets again—
    Back between the sheets again
    Where a guy can lay in bed and sleep for half a year.

Hurry on, you lousy buck, for your last advance;
You are on your final hike through the mud of France;
Somewhere in the Good Old Town, you can shift the load,
Where you'll never see again an M. P. down the road.

    For it's home, boy, home, with the old ship headed west;
    No more cooties wandering across your manly chest;
    No more M. P.'s grabbing you—
    No more majors crabbing you—
    Nothing for a guy to do except to eat and rest.

Documents

Move along, you Army, while the tides are on the swell.
Where a guy can get away and not the S. O. L.
Where the gold fish passes and the last corned willy's
    through.
And no top sergeant's waiting with another job to do.

    For it's home, kid, home—when the breakers rise and
        fall—
    Where the khaki's hanging from a nail against the wall—
    Clean again and cheerful there—
    Handing out an ear full there—
    Where you never have to jump at the bugle's call.

                         Lt. Grantland Rice
                       The Stars and Stripes
                         (2 May 1919)

THE WARD AT NIGHT
The rows of beds,
Each even spaced,
The blanket lying dark against the sheet,
The heavy breathing of the sick,
The fevered voices
Telling of the battle
At the front,
Of Home and Mother.

A quick, light step,
A white-capped figure
Silhouetted by the lantern's flame,
A needle, bearing sleep
And sweet forgetfulness.
A moan—
Then darkness, death.
God rest the valiant soul.

                            Anon.
                       The Stars and Stripes
                      (29 November 1918)

AS THINGS ARE
The old home State is drier now
Than forty-seven clucks
Of forty-seven desert hens
'A-chewin' peanut shucks.

There everybody's standin' sad
Beside the Fishhill store,
'A-sweatin' dust an' spittin' rust
Because there ain't no more.

The constable, they write, has went
A week without a pinch.
There ain't no jobs, so there's a gent
'At sure has got a cinch.

I ain't a-gonna beef a bit,
But still, it's kinda nice,
'A-knowin' where there's some to git
Without requestin' twice.

                            Anon.
                       The Stars and Stripes
                        (26 July 1918)

THE SHEPHERDS FEED THEMSELVES AND FEED NOT
MY FLOCK
We died in our millions to serve it; the cause that you told
    us was ours,
We stood waist-deep in the trenches, we battled with Hell
    and its powers;
And you? You have gathered your millions; you have lined
    your pockets with pelf,
You have talked of the rights of Nations, while you wor-
    shipped the rights of self;
Do you think we shall rise and smite you? Fear not. You
    shall garner your gain.
And we? Will you give us our freedom, just those who have
    not been slain?
Fooled tho we've been by your hierlings—you know that we
    fought for a lie—
We fathomed a truth you see not, but one you must learn
    when you die,
That silver and gold and raiment are things of but little
    worth,
For Love is the heir of the ages, and the meek shall inherit
    the earth.

                      Maj. Guy M. Kindersley
                         The Amaroc News
                       (7 September 1919)

DOCUMENTS

SOURCE: Alfred E. Cornebise, ed., *Doughboy Doggerel* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985).

RELATED ENTRIES: Literature and War; World War I

1918 c

SELECTED SONGS FROM THE COMPILATIONS OF JOHN JACOB NILES

Lt. John Jacob Niles, an Army aviator in France, was a musicologist and "song-catcher." He recorded songs as he heard them sung in bistros and trains, and was especially taken by those that black doughboys had created. These are some of the more illuminating examples of those he published in Songs My Mother Never Taught Me.

THE HEARSE SONG

Did you ever think as the hearse rolls by
That the next trip they take they'll be lay in you by
With your boots a swingin' from the back of a roan,
And the undertaker inscribing your stone.

'Cause when the old motor hearse goes rollin' by,
You don't know whether to laugh or cry.
For the grave diggers will get you too,
Then the hearse's next load will consist of you.

They'll take you over to Field thirteen,[1]
Where the sun is a shinin' and the grass is green,
And they'll throw in dirt and they'll throw in rocks,
'Cause they don't give a damn if they break your pine
    box.

TELL ME NOW

I don't know why I went to war,
    Tell me, oh, tell me now.
I don't know why I went to war,
Or what dese folks are fightin' for,
    Tell me, oh, tell me now.

I don't know what my brown's a doin',
    Tell me, oh, tell me now.
I don't know what my brown's a doin',

With all dose bucks around a wooin',
    Tell me, oh, tell me now.

I don't know why I totes dis gun,
    Tell me, oh, tell me now.
I don't know why I totes dis gun,
'Cause I ain't got nothin' 'gainst de Hun,
    Tell me, oh, tell me now.

Note 1: Field Thirteen was the Issoudun Graveyard. We had flying fields numbered up to 12, when some humorist hit onto the idea of numbering the graveyard 13.

SOURCE: John Jacob Niles, *Songs My Mother Never Taught Me* (New York: Gold Label Books, 1927).

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Music and War; Niles, John Jacob

1918 d

PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS

As the United States and its allies prepared for making the peace at the end of World War I, Pres. Woodrow Wilson put forth the following principles that he hoped would help to establish the new international world order. Known as the "Fourteen Points," it was a document that would help to define President Wilson's presidency and his postwar efforts at the peace conference in Paris, during which he tried to persuade his French and British allies to accept them. They did not, and neither did the Senate give its consent to the United States joining the newly-minted League of Nations.

(Delivered in Joint Session, January 8, 1918)
Gentlemen of the Congress:

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and

gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow nor or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme; and that programme, the only possible programme, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best

and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely

unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this programme does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this programme that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace- loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world,—the new world in which we now live,—instead of a place of mastery.

SOURCE: U.S. National Archives & Records Administration. "Transcript of Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points." http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=62&page=transcript (August 11, 2005).

RELATED ENTRIES: Wilson, Woodrow; World War I

1919 a

FLORENCE WOOLSTON REFLECTS ON THE EFFECT OF WORLD WAR I ON HER NEPHEW BILLY

Florence Woolston, writing in The New Republic shortly after the Armistice, described how her young nephew Billy, growing up in a suburb she called "one hundred per cent patriotic," reacted to World War I.

Billy, my nephew, is twelve years old. With the possible exception of the beef profiteers and a few superpatriots to whom life has been a prolonged Fourth of July oration, no one has got quite so much fun out of the war as Billy and his inseparable companions, Fritters, George and Bean-Pole Ross.

Clad in the khaki uniform of the Boy Scouts, with United War Campaign, Red Cross, War Saving, first, second, third and fourth Liberty Loan buttons, small American flags and service pins spread across their chests, they have lived the war from morning until night. I did not understand Billy's passionate allegiance to the Scout uniform until I discovered the great game of hailing automobiles bearing the sign, "Men in Uniform Welcome." Billy has never been willing to accompany his family on automobile rides but the pleasure of this boulevard game has been never ending.

They call the suburb in which Billy lives one hundred per cent patriotic. Everybody is in war work. Even the children under five years have an organization known as the Khaki Babes. These infants in uniform assemble, kindergarten fashion and solemnly snip for the Red Cross. Billy's crowd is indefatigable in its labors. With the other Scouts, the boys usher at meetings, assist in parades, deliver bundles and run errands. They are tireless collectors of nutshells, peach pits and tinsel paper. As Victory Boys they are pledged to earn five dollars for the United War Workers. Since most of them expect to do this shovelling snow they are praying for a severe winter.

One bit of voluntary war work was carried on through the periods of gasolineless Sundays when the four boys took positions on Commonwealth Avenue in such a way as to obstruct passing vehicles. If a car did not carry a doctor's or

military sign, they threw pebbles and yelled, "O you Slacker!" It was exciting work because guilty drivers put on full speed ahead and Billy admitted that he was almost run over, but he added that the cause was worth it.

In my school days history was a rather dull subject.

. . . It is not so with Billy. Modern history is unfolding to him as a great drama. Kings and tsars and presidents are live human beings. War has nothing to do with books. It is a perpetual moving picture with reels furnished twice a day by the newspapers. Wars were as unreal as pictorial combats with painted soldiers and stationary warships. Even the Civil War belonged to historical fiction. Once a year, on the 30th of May, a veteran in navy blue came to school and in a quavering voice told stories of his war days. Thrilling as they might have been, they always seemed to lack reality. . . .

. . . Billy and his chums . . . know what boundaries mean; they pour over war maps and glibly recite the positions of the Allied troops. Billy has a familiarity with principal cities, rivers and towns that never could have been learned in lesson form. The war has created a new cosmopolitanism. The children of Billy's generation will never have the provincial idea that Boston is the centre of the world. They will see the universe as a great circle, perhaps, but all the Allies will occupy the centre.

I must confess, however, that Billy, Fritters, George and Bean-Pole Ross have a rather vague idea of what the war is about, but then so do others with more years to their credit. I asked Billy what caused the war originally, and he replied in a rather large and lofty way, "You see, the French took Alsace and Lorraine away from the Germans a long time ago and Germany wanted it back. She thought it would be nice to get hold of Paris, too, and conquer the French people, then they would have to pay taxes and indemnities to support Germany. So they started to march to Paris and then all the other countries decided to stop them."

When I compare the anemic stereopticon travel talks of my school days with Billy's moving picture shows, I have the sense of a cheated childhood. We had nothing in our young lives like *Crashing Through to Berlin*, *The Hounds of Hunland*, *Wolves of Kultur* and *The Brass Bullet*. Billy's mental images have been built by such pictures as these with the additional and more educational films of the

Committee on Public Information and the Pathé weekly where actual battle scenes, aeroplane conflicts and real naval encounters are portrayed.

In the matter of books, too, Billy has had high revel. I sowed a few wild oats with Oliver Optic and Horatio Alger wherein poor lads were conducted from prairie huts to the Executive mansion. Of course we had Scott and Cooper to make medieval times or Indian days vivid. But think of reading *Over the Top* and going to shake hands with the author, a live, red-blooded officer in the army! Billy revels in *Private Peat*, *Hunting the Hun*, *Out of the Jaws of Hunland*, *From Base Ball to Boches*, and *With the Flying Corps*. I'm afraid he will never have a Walter Scott period and I am sure it will be years before contemplative literature can hold his attention.

Of course, the war has given us all an enlarged vocabulary. Billy calls his school "the trench"; he and Fritters go "over the top," "carry on," play in dug-outs, move in units, carry kits, eat mess and have elaborate systems of wig-wagging and passwords. When he is unsuccessful in a parental encounter, Billy throws up his hands and cries "I surrender!" Hun, Boche and Bolshevik are terms of terrible opprobrium. There was a bloody fist fight at recess recently, when Henry Earl was called "O you Kaiser!" The mere suggestion of a German name brings forth expressions of loud disgust and none of the boys would use a toy made in Germany.

At present it is in fashion to collect war posters. Billy has a remarkable collection of Food, Red Cross, Marine, War Savings, Navy and United War Work Campaign posters. He has trudged miles and spent much ingenuity in getting them. His room is papered with them and it is a matter of deep regret that the family is unwilling to have the entire house so placarded. A thriving business goes on in poster trading and a steady stream of small boys passes the house carrying large rolls of posters. From Billy's room, after a visitation, come delighted exclamations, "Gee! what a bute!" "Say, I'll give you a Join the Gas Hounds for a Beat Back the Huns." "Fritters has two Teufelhunden and he's going to swap it for a Clear the Way and a Tell That to the Marines."

Billy came to me with an ethical problem connected with his poster campaign. "I've got," he declared, "five Joan of Arcs, three Must Children Starves, five Blot it Outs, a

Britisher and a big Y. I can sell them and make lots of money. Would that be profiteering?" I thought it might be so considered by taxpayers. "Well," he demanded, "If I sell them and buy Thrift Stamps that would be profiteering to help the war, and that would be all right, wouldn't it?"

When a campaign is on, the boys find it hard to wait until the posters have done their work as propaganda. Sometimes a lucky boy gets a whole new set. Recently, there had been much buying and selling of addresses where posters may be obtained, five cents for a plain address, ten for a "guaranteed." I mailed a postal card for Billy addressed to the Secretary of the Navy which read, "Kindly send me a full set of your Marine and Navy posters. I will display them if you wish." Billy's collection numbers about two hundred but he knows boys who have a thousand posters. As evidence of his great delight in them, he made the following statement: "If the last comes to the last, and we couldn't get coal and we had to burn all the furniture, I'd give up one set of duplicates, but only if the last comes to the last."

Billy is a kind-hearted lad with humane instincts toward all creatures except flies. He feels, however, that the Kaiser can neither claim the protection of the S.P.C.A. nor demand the consideration usually afforded a human being. He loves to tell what he would do to the Kaiser. It is a matter of bitter disappointment that Mr. Hohenzollern is in Holland instead of in Billy's hands. At breakfast he issues bulletins of carnage. Some days he plans simple tortures like beheading, skinning, hanging, burning. At other times he concocts a more elaborate scheme such as splitting open the Kaiser's arms and putting salt on the wound, cutting his legs off at the knee and hanging his feet around his neck, or gouging out his eyes. A favorite idea is that of inoculating him with all the diseases of the world or to starve him for months and then eat a big Thanksgiving dinner in his presence.

Billy has had a full course in atrocities and is keen for reprisals. He longs to fly with an aviation unit, dropping bombs on Berlin, he aches to destroy a few cathedrals and palaces, burn all the German villages and poison the reservoirs. His description of what he would do to the Huns makes the Allied armistice sound like a presentation speech with a bunch of laurel.

There is a marked absence of patriotic sentiment with Billy and his chums. To them patriotism is action; they do not enjoy talking about it. When a Liberty Loan orator gushes about the starry banner, they roll their eyes expressively and murmur "Cut it out." Of course, some of this is the self-conscious stoicism of the small boy. But there is a matter of fact attitude toward suffering and pain which is new and due to familiarity with the idea. Boys discuss the kinds of wounds, operations and war accidents as a group of medical students might refer to a clinic.

Death seems to give them no sense of mystery and awe. "Gee! a thousand killed today," "That Ace has got his," "Say, John Bowers was gassed and he's gone now." They look over the casualty lists as grown-ups might read lists of guests at a reception. It may be because youth cannot understand the tragedy and heartache back of the golden stars on the service flags, but I think it goes deeper than that. These boys have a sense of courage and gallantry that makes the risking of life an everyday affair. Self-sacrifice is not a matter of poems and sermons and history, it is the daily news. Billy's attitude is that going to war is part of the game; when you're a little boy you have to go to school; when you're older, you draw your number and are called to camp—it's all in a day's work.

SOURCE: Florence Woolston, "Billy and the World War," *New Republic* (January 25, 1919): 369–71.

RELATED ENTRIES: Committee on Public Information; Militarization and Militarism; Rationing in Wartime; World War I

1919 b

DuBois Writes of Returning Soldiers

W. E. B. Dubois, one of the founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the editor of that organization's monthly newsletter The Crisis, *was a vigorous proponent of the Wilson administration's war aims in 1918; he believed that black service in the war might be the catalyst for change in the attitudes of whites. His editorial, "Close Ranks," in July*

1918 advised NAACP readers that 1918 was "the great Day of Decision," a year when his readers should "forget our special grievances and close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our own white fellow citizens" to defeat "the menace of German militarism" which represented "death to the aspirations of Negroes and all darker races for equality, freedom and democracy." He was not as sure in May 1919 after blacks, some of them returning black veterans, faced a new spate of brutal attacks in American streets.

The Crisis, May 1919

We are returning from the war! *The Crisis* and tens of thousands of black men were drafted into a great struggle. For bleeding France and what she means and has meant and will mean to us and humanity and against the threat of German race arrogance, we fought gladly and to the last drop of blood; for America and her highest ideals, we fought in far-off hope; for the dominant southern oligarchy entrenched in Washington, we fought in bitter resignation.

For the America that represents and gloats in lynching, disenfranchisement, caste, brutality and devilish insult—for this, in the hateful upturning and mixing of things, we were forced by vindictive fate to fight, also.

But today we return! We return from the slavery of the uniform which the world's madness demanded us to don to the freedom of civil garb. We stand again to look America squarely in the face and call a spade a spade. We sing: This country of ours, despite all its better souls have done and dreamed, is yet a shameful land.

It lynches.

It disfranchises its own citizens.

It encourages ignorance.

It organizes industry to cheat us. It cheats us out of our land; it cheats us out of our labor. It confiscates our savings. It reduces our wages. It raises our rent. It steals our profit. It taxes without representation. It keeps us consistently and universally poor, and then feeds us on charity and derides our poverty.

It insults us.

This is the country to which we Soldiers of Democracy return. This is the fatherland for which we fought! But is is our fatherland. It was right for us to fight. The faults of our country are our faults. Under similar circumstances, we would fight

again. But by the God of Heaven, we are cowards and jackasses if now that that war is over, we do not marshal every ounce of our brain and brawn to fight a sterner, longer, more unbending battle against the forces of hell in our own land.

We return.

We return from fighting.

We return fighting.

Make way for Democracy! We saved it in France, and by the Great Jehovah, we will save it in the United States of America, or know the reason why.

SOURCE: The Crisis 18, no. 1 (May 1919): 13–14.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Du Bois, W. E. B.; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces; World War I

1919 c
AFRICAN-AMERICAN REACTION TO D.C. RACE RIOTS

Whites viciously attacked blacks and the black community in Washington, D.C., in mid-July . Some 46 died and about 250 were wounded in these two riots. A black woman recalled her reaction to the way blacks, a number of them returned veterans, resisted the attacks:

The Washington riots gave me the thrill that comes once in a lifetime. I was alone when I read between the lines of the morning paper that at last our men had stood like men, struck back, were no longer dumb, driven cattle. When I could no longer read for my streaming tears, I stood up, alone in my room, held both hands high over my head and exclaimed, "Oh, I thank God, thank God!" When I remember anything after this, I was prone on my bed, beating the pillow with both fists, laughing and crying, whimpering like a whipped child, for sheer gladness and madness. The pent-up humiliation, grief and horror of a lifetime—half a century—was being stripped from me.

SOURCE: Francis Grimke, *The Race Problem* (Washington, D.C., 1919), 8, quoted in Arthur Barbeau and Florette Henri, *The Unknown Soldiers* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974), 182.

1919 d

FACTS AND QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE NREF

The American forces stationed in North Russia (the North Russia Expeditionary Force, or NREF) were severely demoralized in 1919. Stranded in the ice-locked area until spring, soldiers petitioned in February, protesting the American involvement in the Russian Revolution. This petition includes many of the reasons that caused President Wilson to withdraw the troops in June:

1. We officers enlisted and our men were drafted for the purpose of fighting Germany and her allies.

2. This force was sent to Russia to prevent Germany from establishing naval bases in the far North.

3. The American organisations have been split up and placed under British officers. England has undoubtedly many capable officers, but they are not in Russia. However we, ourselves, are woefully lacking in that respect. The manner in which this expedition has been mishandled is a disgrace to the civilized world.

4. Our original purpose having been accomplished we are now meddling with a Russian revolution and counter-revolution.

5. Is this consistent with the principles of American democracy?

6. The majority of the people here seem to prefer Bolshevism to British intervention. They mistrust the British. It is our opinion that British diplomats pulled the wool over the eyes of our representatives, to the end that we were sent with this expedition in an effort to take the curse off the British.

7. The few French here finally rebelled against British rule and have been given a French commander.

8. WHERE IS OUR MONROE DOCTRINE?
   If we stood by, while Mexico was torn by revolutions, the sanctity of our borders violated and Americans murdered, on what basis is our presence here justified? A British officer here, who is more human than most, quite aptly described this expedition as an effort to put on a show with two men and an orange.

9. We are fighting against enormous odds in men, artillery and material. Most of the men in the enemy forces have seen years of service. If they were not lacking in morale and discipline, we should have been wiped off the face of the earth ere this.

10. Due to a pending election in England, and the fear of antagonizing the labor parties, no reenforcements [sic] have been sent out. In fact before the election, certain British officials placed themselves on record as having no intentions [sic] of sending more troops to Russia.

11. We wonder what propaganda is at work in the States, which enables the War Department to keep troops here. It seems to us as though it is a question of potential dollars in Russia.

12. We, a porition [sic] of the civilian army of America, organized to fight Germany, wonder why we are called upon to spend American lives aiding and abetting a counter-revolution in Russia while the great majority of the people here sit idly by watching the show, not idly either, for the [sic] most of the natives here are Bolshevists in sympathy. We have no heart in the fight. We are fighting neither for Russia or for Russian wealth but for our lives. We have earnestly endeavored to find some justification for our being here, but have been unable to reconcile this expedition with American ideals and principles instilled within us.

13. We are removed 200 miles from our base, with an open country intervening, with no force except in a few villages to guard our lines and with the enemy within striking distance of the line. There is no military reason why we should be more than 20 miles from our base.

[Note from officer who confiscated the pamphlet:] The above was written by an American officer with the Dvina force and it is reported that it is widely circulated among the American troops at the front and the men consider that it fully covers their ideas regarding the reasons why American troops are kept here.

SOURCE: National Archives, Textual Records of the War Department General & Special Staffs, Record Group 165; Office of

the Director of Intelligence (G-2), 1906–49; Security Classified Correspondence and Reports, 1917–41 (Entry 65); file 24-327 (59).

RELATED ENTRIES: Antiwar Movements; Russia, Interventions in

1919 e

LYRICS TO "HOW 'YA GONNA KEEP 'EM DOWN ON THE FARM (AFTER THEY'VE SEEN PAREE?)"

Returning veterans, having experienced a good deal of the world beyond their home counties for the first time, moved out of those counties in numbers considerably greater than had been the case in the decades before the war. The phenomenon was addressed in this popular song of 1919:

Reuben, Reuben, I've been thinking,
Said his wifey dear;
Now that all is peaceful and calm,
The boys will soon be back on the farm;
Mister Reuben started winking,
And slowly rubbed his chin;
He pulled his chair up close to mother,
And he asked her with a grin:

> Chorus:
> How 'ya gonna keep 'em down on the farm,
> After they've seen Paree?
> How 'ya gonna keep 'em away from Broadway,
> Jazzin' aroun', and paintin' the town?
> How 'ya gonna keep 'em away from harm?
> That's a mystery.
> They'll never want to see a rake or plow,
> And who the deuce can parley vous a cow?
> How 'ya gonna keep 'em down on the farm,
> After they've seen Paree?

Reuben, Reuben, you're mistaken,
Said his wifey dear;
Once a farmer, always a jay,
And farmers always stick to the hay;
Mother Reuben, I'm not fakin',

Tho' you may think it strange;
But wine and women play the mischief,
With a boy who's loose with change.

SOURCE: Lyrics (Sam Lewis and Joe Young) and music (Walter Donaldson) found at http://www.musicanet.org/robokopp/usa/reubenre.htm (August 11, 2005).

RELATED ENTRIES: Music and War; World War I

1919 f

EXCERPTS FROM THE DIARY OF SGT. WILL JUDY

Will Judy, a young Chicago attorney, kept a rich diary of his thoughts, impressions and experiences from the day he entered the military until some time after he was discharged after war's end. These selections capture what evidence from other sources indicates: a general lack of understanding of or enthusiasm for America's war aims, the development of camaraderie among military personnel, and the veteran's problem of how to deal with media-fed conceptions of the war held by those at home:

3 May 1917:

I fell asleep with the dread gone that in my old age the children might point to me and laugh among themselves that in the great war I stayed at home.

15 November 1917:

Hart looked up from the morning paper and inquired whether Belgium was for the Allies or Germany. I chided him but back in my thots was the belief that the heart of our people is hardly in the war. Every one tells a different reason why we are at war. Could we have a secret ballot tomorrow of the entire population, I believe the vote would be greatly in the favor of peace. Likely this is true in all wars.

27 August 1918:

. . . [W]e are not shouting loudly about making the world safe for democracy.

In truth I have not heard more than a half dozen times during my year in the army a discussion among the men or even the officers, of the principles for which we fight. We read of them here, there and everywhere but the men of

their own accord and in an informal way seldom or never talk of them. . . .

Almost nine-tenths of the soldier's conversation concerns stories about women, the location of wine shops, the likelihood of being able to purchase cigarets, the next trip to the bath house, what the censor did to the last batch of letters, what is the popular song back in the United States, what's the idea of fighting for France when they charge us high prices, and above all other subjects—"when do we eat?"
18 January 1919:

We talk much of comradeship in the coming civilian life. Like mystics, we are conscious of an association that will bind us into a passionate group different and superior, as we think, to all others.

[back in garrison duty in the States:]

1 June 1919:

France has bred in us the habit of acting first and asking questions afterward. Here red tape, insolence and much ado about nothing are the order of the day. The camp officials have not learned as did we, on fields of war, where our mistakes wrought their cost first upon us, perhaps at price of our lives. They do not possess our qualities of swift action, daring effort and great labor.
3 June 1919:

Supervised the sorting and packing of the division's records for shipment to the Adjutant General of the Army at Washington for permanent file.

We hear much about ourselves as heroes. A thousand questions are asked of us and we know now the answers they wish us to make. We must say that the enemy were fiends, that they butchered prisoners, that they quaked in fear as we came upon them in their trenches, that they were not nearly as brave as ourselves, that Americans are the best and bravest fighters of all nations, and that it was only necessary to shout "We are Americans."

We are somewhat surprised but soon we learn that the populace insists upon dubbing us heroes; then we are swept into the pose against our will and wishes. We do not talk about the war unless the civilians ply us with questions and drive us into stories about our life on the battlefield. We have come back hating war, disgusted with the prattle

about ideals, disillusioned entirely about the struggles between nations. That is why we are quiet, why we talk little, and why our friends do not understand. But the populace refuses to be disillusioned; they force us to feed their own delusions.

Soon we will take on the pose of brave crusaders who swept the battlefields with a shout and a noble charge. The herd among our own number will be delighted with this unexpected glory and within a few years, a cult will be made of it. An ounce of bravery on the battlefield will become a ton of daring in story as related time and again in the years to come. We as soldiers shall find ourselves made the patriotic guardians of our country, a specially honored class, against our will.

The populace is not to be blamed. They never will get away from the effects of the propaganda in the press. To them every American soldier in France was a fighter, rifle and bayonet in hand, rushing mid shot and shell across No Man's Land, and plunging the knife into the cowering enemy. Indeed, they relate to us tales of our own bravery to our surprise; we subdue our astonishment and then obligingly add little touches of exaggeration to the already dropsied story.

Four-fifths of the American soldiers in France never went over the top and scarcely a tenth of us saw a German soldier, other than a captured one. . . .
19 June 1919:

. . . The twenty-two months in the army has taught many things to me. My experiences I would not trade for any ten years of my life. I have learned to like and to hate the army. At first I saluted grudgingly; then, as the spirit of the uniform won me, I took pride in saluting promptly and snappily. It caused me to be chivalrous in the presence of women and the aged; to conduct myself creditably to the flag; and to live up to the traditions of American honor.

I could not forget that I was a civilian first and a soldier second. Perhaps I can tell best my thot of war by saying that it is as a painted woman, more attractive at some distance. I hate war, I am a man of peace; I hope there will never be another war; but if my country fights again, right or wrong, I shall be among the first to have the tailor remodel the old uniform.

1929

LYRICS TO "MARINES' HYMN"

This version of the "Marines' Hymn" contains the official verses, recognized in 1929, except for one change in verse 4—from "On the land as on the sea" to "In the air, on land and sea"—made in 1942. The references in the first two verses relate to the Mexican War and the campaign against the Barbary Pirates in 1805.

From the Halls of Montezuma
To the Shores of Tripoli;
We fight our country's battles
In the air, on land and sea;
First to fight for right and freedom
And to keep our honor clean;
We are proud to claim the title
of United States Marine.

Our flag's unfurled to every breeze
From dawn to setting sun;
We have fought in ev'ry clime and place
Where we could take a gun;
In the snow of far-off Northern lands
And in sunny tropic scenes;
You will find us always on the job—
The United States Marines.

Here's health to you and to our Corps
Which we are proud to serve
In many a strife we've fought for life
And never lost our nerve;
If the Army and the Navy
Ever look on Heaven's scenes;
They will find the streets are guarded
By United States Marines.

1930

EXCERPT FROM *NINETEEN NINETEEN* BY JOHN DOS PASSOS

Many World War I veterans of combat had sufficient psychological trauma to leave them with many of the symptoms of what would in the 1970s be labeled "post-traumatic stress disorder." Others were politically affected by their experiences, embittered by the hypocrisy of their leaders, and stunned by the impersonality and pointlessness of the carnage. The more articulate of these, on both sides, expressed their thoughts on paper. John Dos Passos was one of the first of such American writers in print; his Three Soldiers appeared in 1921. His trilogy, U. S. A., broke new literary ground in 1930. This passage is from the first book of that trilogy, Nineteen Nineteen.

THE BODY OF AN AMERICAN

Whereasthe Congressoftheunitedstates byaconcurrent resolutionadoptedon the4thdayofmarch lastauthrizedthe Secretaryofwar to cause to be brought to thunitedstatesthe body of an Americanwhowasamemberoftheamericanexpeditionaryforcesineurope wholosthislifeduringtheworldwarandwhoseidentityhasnotbeenestablished for burial inthememorialamphitheatreofthenationalcemeteryatarlington virginia

In the tarpaper morgue at Chalons-sur-Marne in the reek of chloride of lime and the dead, they picked out the pine box that held all that was left of

enie menie minie moe plenty other pine boxes stacked up there containing what they'd scraped up of Richard Roe

and other person or persons unknown. Only one can go. How did they pick John Doe?

Make sure he aint a dinge, boys,
make sure he aint a guinea or a kike,

how can you tell a guy's a hundredpercent when all you've got's a gunnysack full of bones, bronze buttons stamped with the screaming eagle and a pair of roll puttees?

. . . and the gagging chloride and the puky dirt-stench of the yearold dead . . .

John Doe was born . . .

and raised in Brooklyn, in Memphis, near the lakefront in Cleveland, Ohio, in the stench of the stockyards in Chi, on Beacon Hill, in an old brick house in Alexandria Virginia, on Telegraph Hill, in a halftimbered Tudor cottage in Portland the city of roses,

in the Lying-In Hospital old Morgan endowed on Stuyvesant Square,

across the railroad tracks, out near the country club, in a shack cabin tenement apartmenthouse exclusive residential suburb; . . .

scion of one of the best families in the social register, won first prize in the baby parade at Coronado Beach, was marbles champion of the Little Rock grammarschools, crack basketballplayer at the Booneville High, quarterback at the State Reformatory, having saved the sheriff's kid from drowning in the Little Missouri River was invited to Washington to be photographed shaking hands with the President on the White House steps;— . . .

—busboy harveststiff hogcaller boyscout champeen cornshucker of Western Kansas bellhop at the United States Hotel in Saratoga Springs office boy callboy fruiter telephone lineman longshoreman lumberjack plumber's helper,

worked for an exterminating company in Union City, filled pipes in an opium joint in Trenton, New Jersey.

Y.M.C.A. secretary, express agent, truckdriver, fordmechanic, sold books in Denver Colorado: Madam would you be willing to help a young man work his way through college? . . .

Naked he went into the army;

they weighed you, measured you, looked for flat feet, squeezed your penis to see if you had clap, looked up your anus to see if you had piles, counted your teeth, made you cough, listened to your heart and lungs, made you read the letters on the card, charted your urine and your intelligence,

gave you a service record for a future (imperishable soul)

and an identification tag stamped with your serial number to hang around your neck, issued O D regulation equipment, a condiment can and a copy of the articles of war.

Atten'SHUN suck in your gut you c-----r wipe that smile off your face eyes right wattja tink dis is a choirch-social? For-war-D'ARCH.

John Doe

and Richard Roe and other person or persons unknown

drilled hiked, manual of arms, ate slum, learned to salute, to soldier, to loaf in the latrines, forbidden to smoke on deck, overseas guard duty, forty men and eight horses, shortarm inspection and the ping of shrapnel and the shrill bullets combing the air and the sorehead woodpeckers and the machineguns mud cooties gasmasks and the itch. . . .

Say buddy cant you tell me how I can get back to my outfit?

Cant help jumpin when them things go off, give me the trots them things do. I lost my identification tag swimmin in the Marne, roughhousin with a guy while we was waitin to be deloused, in bed with a girl named Jeanne (Love moving picture wet French postcard dream began with saltpeter in the coffee and ended at the propho station);—

Say soldier for chrissake cant you tell me how I can get back to my outfit?

John Doe
heart pumped blood:
alive thudding silence of blood in your ears . . .

The shell had his number on it.

The blood ran into the ground.

The service record dropped out of the filing cabinet when the quartermaster sergeant got blotto that time they had to pack up and leave the billets in a hurry.

The identification tag was in the bottom of the Marne.

The blood ran into the ground, the brains oozed out of the cracked skull and were licked up by the trenchrats, the belly swelled and raised a generation of bluebottle flies,

and the incorruptible skeleton,

and the scraps of dried viscera and skin bundled in khaki

they took to Chalons-sur-Marne

and laid it out neat in a pine coffin

and took it home to God's Country on a battleship

and buried it in a sarcophagus in the Memorial Amphitheatre in the Arlington National Cemetery

and draped the Old Glory over it

and the bugler played taps

and Mr. Harding prayed to God and the diplomats and the generals and the admirals and the brasshats and the politicians and the handsomely dressed ladies out of the society column of the Washington Post stood up solemn

and thought how beautiful sad Old Glory God's Country it was to have the bugler play taps and the three volleys made their ears ring.

Where his chest ought to have been they pinned

the Congressional Medal, the D.S.C., the Medaille Militaire, the Belgian Croix de Guerre, the Italian gold medal, the Vitutea Militara sent by Queen Marie of Rumania, the Czechoslovak war cross, the Virtuti Militari of the Poles, a wreath sent by Hamilton Fish, Jr., of New York, and a little wampum presented by a deputation of Arizona redskins in warpaint and feathers. All the Washingtonians brought flowers.

Woodrow Wilson brought a bouquet of poppies.

SOURCE: John Dos Passos, *U.S.A.: Nineteen Nineteen* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930).

RELATED ENTRIES: Antiwar Movements; Literature and War; Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; World War I

1932

"THE BONUSEERS BAN JIM CROW" BY ROY WILKINS

In 1924, approximately 25,000 impoverished veterans and their families converged on Washington, D.C., in the Bonus March. In this piece Roy Wilkins of the NAACP argued that the peaceful demonstration by black and white veterans revealed the possibility of immediately integrating the armed forces. Ultimately, the Army drove the bonus marchers out of the city and the military did not desegregate its ranks until 1948.

Floating clear on the slight breeze of a hot June night in Washington came a tinkling, mournful melody, a song known by now in every corner of the globe. Lilting piano notes carried the tune that set my foot patting, in spite of myself, on the trampled grass of the little hill. Then, as I was about to start humming the words, a voice took up the cadence and rode over the Anacostia Flats on the off-key notes—

Feelin' tomorrow,

Lak I feel today—

Feelin' tomorrow,

Lak I feel today—

I'll pack my trunk and make my get a-way

Never, I thought, was there a more perfect setting for W. C. Handy's famous St. Louis Blues. No soft lights and swaying bodies here; no moaning trombone or piercing trumpet; no fantastic stage setting; no white shirt fronts, impeccably tailored band master or waving baton. Instead, a black boy in a pair of ragged trousers and a torn, soiled shirt squatting on a box before a piano perched on a rude platform four or five feet off the ground. A single electric light bulb disclosed him in the surrounding gloom. Skillfully his fingers ran over the keys, bringing out all the Handy secrets of the song. Plaintively he sang the well-known words. A little of the entertainer was here, for there is a little of it hidden in most of us, but the plaintive note was largely the reflection of an actual condition, not the product of an entertainer.

On the ground about and below him were grouped white and colored men listening, smoking and quietly talking. From my elevation I could see camp fires flickering here

and there and hear the murmur of talk over the flats. Here was the main camp of the Bonus Army, the Bonus Expeditionary Force, as it chose to call itself, and here, in my musical introduction to it, was struck the note which marked the ill-starred gathering as a significant one for Negro Americans.

For in this army which had gathered literally to "Sing the Blues" with economic phrases, there was one absentee: James Crow. It is not strictly true, as I shall explain a little later, to say that Mr. Crow was not present at all; it is an absolute fact that he was Absent With Leave a great part of the time.

He was brought along and trotted out occasionally by some of the Southern delegations and, strange to say, by some of the colored groups themselves.

The men of the B.E.F. were come together on serious business; they had no time for North, East, South, West, black and white divisions. The main problem was not to prove and maintain the superiority of a group but to secure relief from the ills which beset them, black and white alike. In the season of despair it is foolhardy to expend energy in any direction except that likely to bring life and hope. At Washington, numbers and unity were the important factors, therefore recruits of any color were made welcome and Jim Crow got scant attention.

Here they were, then, the brown and black men who had fought (some with their tongues in their cheeks) to save the world for democracy. They were scattered about in various state delegations or grouped in their own cluster of rude shelters. A lonely brownskin in the delegation from the North Platte, Nebr.; one or two encamped with Seattle, Wash.; increasing numbers bivouacked with California and the northern states east of the Mississippi River; and, of course, the larger numbers with the states from below the Mason and Dixon line.

And at Anacostia, the main encampment, there was only one example of Jim Crow among the 10,000 men there and that, oddly enough, was started and maintained by colored bonuseers themselves, who hailed from New Orleans and other towns in Louisiana. They had erected a section of shacks for themselves and they insisted on their own mess kitchen.

A stroll down through the camp was an education in the simplified business of living, living not complicated by a maze of social philosophy and tabus. It is hard for one who has not actually seen the camp to imagine the crudity of the self-constructed accommodations in which these men lived for eight weeks.

Fairly regular company streets stretched across the flats, lined on both sides with shelters of every description. Here was a tent; here a piano box; there a radio packing case; there three doors arranged with the ground as the fourth side; here the smallest of "pup" tents; there a spacious canvas shelter housing eight or ten men; here some tin nailed to a few boards; there some tar paper.

Bedding and flooring consisted of straw, old bed ticks stuffed with straw, magazines and newspapers spread as evenly and as thickly as possible, discarded mattresses and cardboard.

At Anacostia some Negroes had their own shacks and some slept in with white boys. There was no residential segregation. A Negro "house" might be next door to a white "house" or across the street, and no one thought of passing an ordinance to "preserve property values." In the California contingent which arrived shortly before I left there were several Negroes and they shared with their white buddies the large tents which someone secured for them from a government warehouse. The Chicago group had several hundred Negroes in it and they worked, ate, slept and played with their white comrades. The Negroes shared tasks with the whites from kitchen work to camp M.P. duty.

In gadding about I came across white toes and black toes sticking out from tent flaps and boxes as their owners sought to sleep away the day. They were far from the spouters of Nordic nonsense, addressing themselves to the business of living together. They were in another world, although Jim Crow Washington, D.C. was only a stone's throw from their doors.

All about were signs containing homely philosophy and sarcasm on the treatment of veterans by the country, such as: "The Heroes of 1918 Are the Bums of 1932." I believe many of the white campers were bitter and sarcastic. They meant what they said on those signs. But disappointment and disillusionment is an old story to Negroes. They were philo-

sophic about this bonus business. They had wished for so many things to which they were justly entitled in this life and received so little that they could not get fighting mad over what was generally considered among them as the government's ingratitude. They had been told in 1917 that they were fighting for a better world, for true democracy; that a new deal would come for them; that jobs would come to them on merit, that lynching would be stopped; that they would have schools, homes, justice and the franchise. But these Negroes found out as long ago as 1919 that they had been fooled. Some of them could not even wear their uniforms back home. So, while the indifference of the government to the bonus agitation might be a bitter pill to the whites, it was nothing unusual to Negroes. They addressed themselves to humorous take-offs in signs, to cards and to music, the latter two shared by whites.

Thus it was I came across such signs on Negro shacks as "Douglas Hotel, Chicago"; "Euclid Avenue"; "South Parkway"; and "St. Antoine St." A card game had reunited four buddies from San Francisco, Detroit and Indianapolis and they were swapping stories to the swish of the cards.

Over in one corner a white vet was playing a ukulele and singing what could have been the theme song of the camp: "In a Shanty in Old Shanty Town." On a Sunday afternoon the camp piano was played alternately by a brown lad with a New York accent, and a red-necked white boy from Florida, while a few rods away Elder Micheaux's visiting choir was giving voice, in stop-time, to a hymn, "God's Tomorrow Will Be Brighter Than Today." Negroes and whites availed themselves of the free choice of patting their feet either outdoors to the piano or in the gospel tent to the choir.

Outside the main camp (there were four settlements) James Crow made brief and intermittent appearances, chiefly because the largest Southern delegations were not at Anacostia. But even in the Southern and border contingents there was no hard and fast color line. On Pennsylvania avenue, where the men had taken over a number of abandoned buildings in the process of being torn down, were camped the Carolina, Florida, Alabama and Texas delegations as well as a scattering from Virginia, Tennessee and West Virginia.

In a five story building a company of Negroes was assigned the fifth floor, but they all received treatment from the same medical center on the first floor. At first they all ate together, but there was so much confusion and so many men (not necessarily Negroes) were coming in on the tail end of the mess line, that a system whereby each floor took turns being first in the mess line was adopted. This was an equitable arrangement, but even here whites and Negroes lined up together and ate together; no absolute separation was possible, nor was it attempted.

In a mess kitchen which served only Southerners I saw Negroes and whites mixed together in line and grouped together eating. I was told there had been a few personal fights and a few hard words passed, but the attitude of the die-hard, strictly Jim Crow whites had not been adopted officially. Such Southern whites as I met showed the greatest courtesy and mingled freely with the Negroes.

Captain A. B. Simmons, colored, who headed his company, hails from Houston, Tex. He and his men were loud in their declarations of the fair treatment they had received on the march to Washington. They were served meals in Southern towns, by Southern white waitresses, in Main Street Southern restaurants along with their white companions. They rode freights and trucks and hiked together. Never a sign of Jim Crow through Northern Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, or Virginia. Captain Simmons attended the regular company commanders' councils and helped with the problems of administration. His fellow officers, all white Southerners, accorded him the same consideration given others of this rank.

His story was corroborated by others. A long, hard-boiled Negro from West Virginia who had just stepped out of the mess line behind a white man from Florida said: "Shucks, they ain't got time for that stuff here and those that has, we gets 'em told personally." And said a cook in the North Carolina mess kitchen (helping whites peel potatoes): "No, sir, things is different here than down home."

In general assemblies and in marches there were no special places "for Negroes." The black boys did not have to tag along at the end of the line of march; there was no "special" section reserved for them at assemblies. They were shot all through the B.E.F. In the rallies on the steps

of the nation's capitol they were in front, in the middle and in the rear.

One of the many significant aspects of the bonuseers' banishment of Jim Crow is the lie it gives to United States army officials who have been diligently spreading the doctrine that whites and blacks could not function together in the army; that they could not use the same mess tents, mingle in the same companies, council together on military problems. The B.E.F. proved that Negroes and whites can do all these things together, that even Negroes and white Southerners can do them together.

How can the army higher-ups explain that? Why can't the United States army with its equipment and its discipline enlist Negroes and whites together in all branches of the service? It can, but it will not. The army is concerned with refined democracy, with tabus, with the maintenance of poses. The B.E.F. is concerned with raw democracy and with reality. But hereafter the army will have to hide behind its self-erected tradition, for the B.E.F. has demonstrated, right under the august army nose, that the thing can be done.

And right there was the tragedy of it all. I stood again on the little rise above the Anacostia Flats and looked out over the camp on my last night in town. Men and women can live, eat, play and work together be they black or white, just as the B.E.F. demonstrated. Countless thousands of people know it, but they go on pretending, building their paper fences and their cardboard arguments. Back home in Waycross, Miami, Pulaski, Waxahachie, Pine Bluff, Cairo, Petersburg, Des Moines, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, Kansas City and St. Louis they go on pretending, glaring, jabbing, insulting, fighting. In St. Louis, where I first saw daylight, they separate them in everything except street cars.

A dump of a shanty town below the majestic Washington monument and the imperious national capitol. . . . Ragged torch bearers futilely striving to light the path for the blind overlords who will not see. . . . A blue camp, its cheerfulness undershot with tragedy. . . . A blue race problem, its surface gayety undershot with poignant sorrow. . . .

As I turned away, stumbling in the dark over a hose which brought water to the camp from a nearby fire hydrant,

a soft Negro voice and the tinkling piano notes came faintly to me.

> *I got the Saint Louis Blues*
> *Just as Blue as I can be. . .*

SOURCE: The Crisis, October 1932, 316–17, 332. The editors of the encyclopedia wish to thank the Crisis Publishing Co., Inc., the publisher of the magazine of the National Advancement of Colored People, for the use of this material first published in the October 1932 issue of *Crisis.*

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Bonus March; MacArthur, Douglas; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces; Veterans Administration; World War I

1933

Excerpts from *Company K* by William March

One of the more powerful and innovative novels about World War I was written by Sgt. William March, an Alabaman who served with the 5th Marines in France at Belleau Wood, Soissons, St Mihiel, and Blanc Mont. He was wounded and gassed, and received the Distinguished Service Medal and the Navy Cross. Company K consists of the personal statements of semi-fictional members of a company of marines not unlike his own comrades:

Private Richard Mundy

I decided to take my rifle apart and clean it thoroughly. I didn't want to think about those prisoners any more, but as I sat there with my squad in the shallow trench, with the rifle parts scattered about me, I couldn't help thinking about them. Corporal Foster was opening cans of monkey meat with a bayonet and Roger Inabinett divided the meat and the hardtack into eight equal parts.

Charlie Gordon got out his harmonica and began to play a lively tune, but Everett Qualls stopped him. Then Foster passed out the rations and each man took his share. At sight of the food, Bill Nugent took sick. He went to the edge of the trench and vomited. When he came back his face was white. Jimmy Wade had a canteen of cognac which he passed over to him and Bill took a big swig of it, but immedi-

ately he got up and vomited again. Then he lay stretched out and trembled.

"What's the matter with you, Bill?" asked Foster.

"Nothing," he said.

"They've pulled that trick on the French a thousand times, and got away with it, too!" said Foster. "These Germans are smart hombres. You got to watch them all the time."

Ahead of us, in the wheat field, the rays of the late sun lay flat on the trampled grain, but in the wood it was almost dark. Inabinett was playing with a cigarette lighter he had found in the wood. He kept snapping it with a clicking sound. "All it needs is a new flint," he said. "It'll be as good as new with another flint."

I put my rifle back together and rubbed the butt with oil. I kept seeing those prisoners falling and rising to their knees and falling again. I walked to the end of the trench and looked over the top. A long way ahead was the sound of rifle fire and to the west there was intermittent shelling, but here, in the wood, everything was calm and peaceful. "You wouldn't know we were in the war at all," I thought.

Then I had an irresistible desire to go to the ravine and look at the prisoners again. I climbed out of the trench quickly, before anybody knew what I was going to do. . . .

The prisoners lay where we had left them, face upward mostly, twisted in grotesque knots like angleworms in a can, their pockets turned outward and rifled, their tunics unbuttoned and flung wide. I stood looking at them for a while, silent, feeling no emotion at all. Then the limb of a tree that grew at the edge of the ravine swayed forward and fell, and a wedge of late sunlight filtered through the trees and across the faces of the dead men. . . . Deep in the wood a bird uttered one frightened note and stopped suddenly, remembering. A peculiar feeling that I could not understand came over me. I fell to the ground and pressed my face into the fallen leaves. . . . "I'll never hurt anything again as long as I live," I said. . . . "Never again, as long as I live. . . . Never! . . . Never! . . . Never! . . ."

PRIVATE ROBERT NALLS

Following the fighting at St. Mihiel, we were billeted in Blenod-les-Toul with an old French couple. They had had an only son, a boy named René, who had been killed early in the war, and they were constantly finding points in common between us and him. I had brown eyes, and René's eyes had also been brown; René had had long, slender fingers, and Sam Quillin's fingers were also long and slender. They found resemblances to René in every one: Jerry Blandford because his teeth were even and white; Roger Jones for his thick, curling hair and Frank Halligan because of the trick he had of closing his eyes and throwing back his head when he laughed. Their lives centered around their dead son. They talked about him constantly; they thought of nothing else.

After his death, the French government had sent them a small copper plaque showing in bas-relief the heroic face of a woman surrounded by a wreath of laurel, and under the woman's face were the words, "Slain on the Field of Honor." It was not an unusual decoration. It was the sort of thing that a Government would send to the next of kin of all men killed in action, but the old couple attached great importance to it. In one corner of the room they had built a tiny shelf for the medal and its case, and underneath it the old woman had fixed up an altar with two candles that burned day and night. Often the old woman would sit for a long time silent before the altar, her hands twisted and old, resting her knees. Then she would go back and scrub her pans, or walk outside to the barn and look at her cow.

We remained in Blenod for five days, and then one night we got orders to move. The old couple had become very friendly with us by that time. They walked with us to the place of assembly, offering to carry our rifles or our packs. Then they stood in the muddy road, the September wind blowing against them strongly, crossing themselves and asking God to bring us all safely back.

A few weeks later, when we were miles away from Blenod, I saw the copper plaque again: It rolled out of Bernie Glass's kit bag while he was shaving one day. He picked it up quickly, but he knew that I had seen it.

"How could you do it, Bernie?" I asked; "how could you do a thing like that?"

"I don't know that it's any of your business," said Bernie, "but I thought it would make a good souvenir to take home."

I never returned to Blenod, and I never saw that old couple again, but somehow I wish they knew that I am ashamed of the whole human race.

PRIVATE ALBERT HAYES

In addition to the chocolate and cigarettes which were sold to us at three times their regular value, the canteen put in a line of sweaters and knitted socks. It was cold in the trenches and I wanted one of the sweaters to wear next to my skin to keep me warm at nights. I picked out a yellow one because it looked comfortable, and paid the canteen ten dollars for it. After I got back to my billet, and was examining it closely, I discovered there was a tiny pocket knitted in the bottom of the sweater and that a piece of paper had been tucked into it. Here's what I read:

"I am a poor old woman, seventy-two years old, who lives at the poor farm, but I want to do something for the soldier boys, like everybody else, so I made this sweater and I am turning it over to the Ladies Aid to be sent to some soldier who takes cold easy. Please excuse bad knitting and bad writing. If you get a cold on your chest take a dose of cooking soda and rub it with mutton suet and turpentine mixed and don't get your feet wet if you can help it. I used to be a great hand to knit but now I am almost blind. I hope a poor boy gets this sweater. It's not a very good one but I have put my love in every stitch and that's something that can't be bought or sold.

"Your obedient servant,
"(Mrs.) MARY L. SAMFORD.

"P.S. Don't forget to say your prayers at night and please write regularly to your dear mother."

PRIVATE ARTHUR CRENSHAW

When I came home the people in my town declared "Crenshaw Day." They decorated the stores and the streets with bunting and flags; there was a parade in the morning with speeches afterwards, and a barbecue at Oak Grove in the afternoon.

Ralph R. Hawley, President of the First National Bank and Trust Company, acted as toastmaster. He recited my war record and everybody cheered. Then he pointed to my twisted back and my scarred face and his voice broke with emotion. I sat there amused and uncomfortable. I wasn't fooled in the slightest. There is an expressive vulgar phrase which soldiers use on such occasions and I repeated it under my breath.

At last the ceremonies were over and Mayor Couzens, himself, drove me in his new automobile to my father's farm beyond the town. The place had gone to ruin in my absence. We Crenshaws are a shiftless lot, and the town knows it. The floors were filthy, and there was a pile of unwashed dishes in the sink, while my sister Maude sat on the step eating an apple, and gazing, half asleep, at a bank of clouds. I began to wonder what I could do for a living, now that heavy farm work was impossible for me any more. All that afternoon I thought and at last I hit on the idea of starting a chicken farm. I got pencil and paper and figured the thing out. I decided that I could start in a small way if I had five hundred dollars with which to buy the necessary stock and equipment.

That night as I lay awake and wondered how I could raise the money, I thought of Mr. Hawley's speech in which he had declared that the town owed me a debt of gratitude for the things I had done which it could never hope to repay. So the next morning I called on him at his bank and told him of my plans, and asked him to lend me the money. He was very courteous and pleasant about it; but if you think he lent me the five hundred dollars you are as big a fool as I was.

PRIVATE EVERETT QUALLS

One by one my cattle got sick and fell down, a bloody foam dripping from their jaws and nostrils. The veterinarians scratched their heads and said they had never seen anything like it. I knew what was the matter, but I didn't say anything, and at last my stock was all dead. I breathed with relief then. "I have paid for what I did," I thought; "now I can start all over." But about that time a blight came upon my corn, which was well up and beginning to tassel: the joints secreted a fluid which turned red over night. The green blades fell off and the stalks withered and bent to the ground. . . . "This, too!" I thought; "this, too, is required of me!"

My crops were ruined, my cattle dead. I talked it over with my young wife. She kissed me and begged me not to worry so. "We can live some way this winter," she said. "We'll start again in the Spring. Everything will be all right."

I wanted to tell her then, but I didn't dare do it. I couldn't tell her a thing of that sort. And so I went about hoping

that He had forgotten and that my punishment was lifted. Then my baby, who had been so strong and healthy, took sick. I saw him wasting away before my eyes, his legs and arms turning purple, his eyes glazed and dead with the fever, his breathing sharp and strained.

I had not prayed for a long time, but I prayed now. "Oh, God, don't do this," I pleaded. "It's not his fault; it's not the baby's fault. I, I alone am guilty. Punish me, if You will—but not this way! . . . Not this way, God! . . . Please! . . ." I could hear my baby's breath rattling in the next room; I could hear the hum of the doctor's voice, the clink of an instrument against glass and the worried words of my wife. Then the baby's breathing stopped altogether and there was my wife's intaken wail of despair.

I beat my breast and flung myself to the floor and that scene I had tried to crush from my mind came back again. I could hear Sergeant Pelton giving the signal to fire and I could see those prisoners falling and rising and falling again. Blood poured from their wounds and they twisted on the ground, as I was twisting now on the floor. . . . One of the prisoners had a brown beard and clear, sunburned skin. I recognized him to be a farmer, like myself, and as I stood above him, I imagined his life. He, too, had a wife that he loved who waited for him somewhere. He had a comfortable farm and on holidays, at home, he used to drink beer and dance. . . .

My wife was knocking on the door, but I would not let her in. Then I knew what I must do. I took my service revolver, climbed out of my window and ran to the grove of scrub oaks that divided my land. When I reached the grove, I put the barrel in my mouth and pulled the trigger twice. There came blinding pain and waves of light that washed outward, in a golden flood, and widened to infinity. . . . I lifted from the ground and lurched forward, feet first, borne on the golden light, rocking gently from side to side. Then wild buffaloes rushed past me on thundering hooves, and receded, and I toppled suddenly into blackness without dimension and without sound.

PRIVATE SYLVESTER KEITH
I came out sullen and resentful, determined that such a thing should never happen again. I felt that if people were made to understand the senseless horror of war, and could be shown the brutal and stupid facts, they would refuse to kill each other when a roomful of politicians decided for them that their honor had been violated. So I organized "The Society for the Prevention of War" and gathered around me fifty young and intelligent men, whose influence, I thought, would be important in the years to come. "People are not basically stupid or vicious," I thought, "they are only ignorant or ill informed. It's all a matter of enlightenment."

Every Thursday the group gathered at our meeting place. They asked innumerable questions concerning the proper way to hold a bayonet, and the best way to throw hand grenades. They were shocked at the idea of gas attacks on an extended front, and the brutality of liquid fire left them indignant and profane.

I was pleased with myself and proud of my pupils. I said: "I am planting in these fine young men such hatred of war that when the proper time comes they will stand up and tell the truth without fear or shame." But someone began organizing a company of National Guard in our town about that time and my disciples, anxious to protect their country from the horrors I had just described, deserted my society and joined in a body.

SOURCE: William March, *Company K.* (New York: Sagamore Press, 1957). Reprinted by permission of Harold Ober Associates Incorporated. Copyright 1933 by William March. Copyright renewed 1961 by The Merchants National Bank of Mobile and Patty C. Maxwell.

RELATED ENTRIES: Literature and War; World War I

1938

A MASSACHUSETTS VETERAN REFLECTS ON MEMORIAL DAY CEREMONIES

Many veterans feel called upon to honor those who did not return. A leader of the United Spanish[–American] War Veterans in Newburyport, Massachusetts, explained a Memorial Day ceremony in the late 1930s to those who had gathered to honor the memory and sacrifices of Newburyport men who had died in the service of their country.

The purpose of this ceremony is to honor those who preceded us to the land of the dead. This is the true patriotic day of the nation when the children of these men honor their fathers, the flag, and all for which the flag stands—bravery, glory, courage of people. It is fitting that the men who sleep beneath the flag of the Union should have graves decked with flowers in remembrance of this trying period of suffering and sorrow which molded this nation. This was in the cause of liberty and of God. It is only right that we quicken the memories of the dead. It is our purpose to preserve and protect Memorial Day. In times of peace it is the duty of us citizens to defend the flag and fulfill the patriotism of those who preceded us.

SOURCE: W. Lloyd Warner, *The Living and the Dead* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959), 261.

RELATED ENTRIES: Memorial Day; Memory and War

1940 (to 1943)

WAR ACTIVITY, NOVEMBER 1943, AND CIVILIAN POPULATION CHANGE, 1940 TO NOVEMBER 1, 1943

Low per capita` defense contracting correlated with population decline during World War II in the South, as this table indicates.

	War contracts, dollars per capita of civilian population, 1940	Civilian population change [%]
Virginia	821.08	+4.8
Tennessee	630.65	-3.3
Louisiana	613.88	-1.8
Alabama	537.88	-3.9
Georgia	474.60	-4.1
North Carolina	360.92	-6.1
Mississippi	279.18	-8.6
South Carolina	296.24	-5.4
Arkansas	215.73	-10.9

SOURCE: Rudolph Heberle, *The Impact of the War on Population Redistribution in the South* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1945), 21.

RELATED ENTRIES: Economy and War; World War II

1941

EXECUTIVE ORDER 8802: PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY

For at least a year before the beginning of U.S. involvement in World War II, the country engaged in rhetoric against our declared enemy—Nazi Germany—and its racist policies. At home, however, the social landscape was still rife with racial discrimination and segregation. Facing pressure by civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph to address this rift between rhetoric and reality, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941. The order set up the Fair Employment Practices Commission, which was authorized to investigate racial discrimination in companies under contract to supply war materials. Only partly effective in its implementation, the order nonetheless represents one step in the federal government's efforts to use war policy to change years of segregation by race.

Reaffirming Policy of Full Participation in the Defense Program by All Persons, Regardless of Race, Creed, Color, or National Origin, and Directing Certain Action in Furtherance of Said Policy
June 25, 1941

WHEREAS it is the policy of the United States to encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens of the United States, regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life within the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders; and

WHEREAS there is evidence that available and needed workers have been barred from employment in industries engaged in defense production solely because of considerations of race, creed, color, or national origin, to the detriment of workers' morale and of national unity:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, and as a prerequisite to the successful conduct of our national defense production effort, I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin, and I do hereby declare that it is the duty of employers and of labor organizations, in furtherance of said policy and of this order, to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin;

And it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. All departments and agencies of the Government of the United States concerned with vocational and training programs for defense production shall take special measures appropriate to assure that such programs are administered without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin;

2. All contracting agencies of the Government of the United States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin;

3. There is established in the Office of Production Management a Committee on Fair Employment Practice, which shall consist of a chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President. The Chairman and members of the Committee shall serve as such without compensation but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence and other expenses incidental to performance of their duties. The Committee shall receive and investigate complaints of discrimination in violation of the provisions of this order and shall take appropriate steps to redress grievances which it finds to be valid. The Committee shall also recommend to the several departments and agencies of the Government of the United States and to the President all measures which may be deemed by it necessary or proper to effectuate the provisions of this order.

Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
June 25, 1941

SOURCE: U.S. National Archives & Records Administration, "Executive Order 8802: Prohibition of Discrimination in the Defense Industry (1941)." http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=72&page=transcript (August 12, 2005).

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Executive Order 8802; Executive Order 9981; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces; Randolph, A. Philip; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano

1942 (to 1946) a

LETTERS FROM BLACK SOLDIERS IN WORLD WAR II

The military remained segregated throughout World War II, with the exception of a number of white companies— decimated during the battle of the Bulge—that received platoons comprised of black volunteers. African Americans serving in these years found many discriminatory measures offensive; some wrote to government officials or black newspapers complaining.

<div align="right">

3475th Q. M. Trk Co.
Fort Ord Calif.
November 10, 1942

</div>

Mr. William H. Hastie
[Deputy to Secretary of War Henry Stimson]

Dear Sir:

It has been several months since we have passed the necessary examination and approval of the Cadet Examining Board to qualify as an aviation Cadet.

During the Course of our examination we were stationed at Fort Sill, Okla, at which time several other soldiers took the examinations and have since then received their transfers to the Air Corp; but for some unknown reason we have not received ours.

Sir, we are college men and have had Senior R.O.T.C. training. We were also members of the Enlisted Reserve

Corp. Since completing our basic training in Field Artillery we have been transferred to Fort Ord California to do basic training in the Quartermaster Corp. It seems, sir, as if we are going from one basic training to another and getting no nearer to the Air Corp. We are writing you hoping you may be able to give us either and or information so as to hasten our transfer to the Air Corp. It seems with aviation playing the vital part it is we should have hardly any trouble getting in. Our papers are in Washington awaiting disposition, as is the case of all Negro applicants. We hope you can help us. We close now awaiting your answer.

Respectfully,
Pvt. Rufus R. Johnson 15317492
Pvt. Emory A. James 15317509
Pvt. Jack Housen 15317527

78 Aviation Sqdr. (Sy)
Randolph Field, Texas
October 28, 1942

The Pittsburgh Courier

Dear Sir:

We are members of the 78 Aviation Sqdr, and its seem like we are not being treated fair. Most of us got trades of our own to help win this war.

But instead we are servant and ditch diggers and we want better, if it ever been slavery it is now, please help us because we want better.

They got us here washing diches, working around the officers houses and waiting on them, instead of trying to win this war they got us in ditches.

Please report this to the N.A.A.C.P. and tell them to do something about this slavery place, where a colored soldier haven't got a chance.

Most of us are young and want to learn something, and we even got some that, want, action to help win this war.

And the sad part about it that most of us are volunteers, but they didn't give us what we ask for, they gave us a pick.

If you want your colored brothers to get somewhere please report this to the President.

Pvt Jus Hill   A Lone Soldier

Pvt. Laurence W. Harris
356 Av Sqdn S.P.A.A.T.
Lubbock, Texas
November 4, 1943

To: The Pittsburgh Courier

Dear Gentlemen:

I am writing to you in regards to my classification in the army. I have been in the army air corp for the past ten months. Gentlemen I do not feel, and in fact I know I am not doing the best I could to help win this war. I realize the army has a tough job trying to place each man where they think he is best fitted or will do the best of service for the armed forces.

In my civilian life I was a small tool maker. I worked for Silling and Spences Co in Hartford, Conn. Then I was doing much for the war effort, and was in hopes I could continue in the service. In the past ten months I feel as though I have been a complete failure to myself, and to the helping to win this war. Beside that my morale is very low because of the fact I have given the army ten months to reclassify me to something I could do much than what I am doing.

I was in hopes I could become an airplane mechanic, but the field doesn't seem to be open to negro soldiers.

I only hope and pray that I will hear from you soon as to what I could do, to get into some part of the service where I could use my trade.

Thanking you in advance.

Yours Very Truely,
Pvt. Laurence W. Harris

MEDICAL DETACHMENT, DIVISION ARTILLERY,
2nd CAVALRY DIVISION

Fort Clark, Texas
April 23, 1943

The Atlanta Daily World

Dear Editor:

I would like to know if your paper approves of a General calling his soldiers "Nigger" to their face? I think that we are in this war to fight for the rigts of all minority races, the

morale of this organization will be low if our soldiers are not addressed in the right manner.

Our colored chaplain was run off this post by the General Johnson solely because he protested to him against using the word "Nigger" when referring to colored troops. I feel that it is my right and privilege to protect against the un-Godly ways that the men of the 2nd Cavalry Division are treated by their white Texas officers.

I hope that you will see that the colored people of this nation know that these conditions exist.

Believe me that these are true statements.

A Negro Soldier

Sgt. Ben Kiser, Jr.
Ward 22 A.
Kennedy General Hospital
Memphis, (15), Tenn.
June 20, 1944

Mr. P.L. Prattis
Executive Editor
Pittsburgh Courier
Pittsburgh, 19, Penn.

Dear Sir:

This letter is being written with a purpose of extreme importance to the Negroes stationed here at this hospital. We hope and place confidence in your giving us the information deserved.

I have been stationed here for over two (2) months as a patient. I have not been overseas but there are plenty of Negro boys here who have. Most of these boys have companions who are white. They came back together. In the time that these boys have been here they have been together. They keep in the same wards, go to the same shows without any segregation. But when going to the mess halls for chow they are segregated. [A] few of the white boys sit at the tables allowed for colored. But the Sgt tells them to move because its not permitted in the mess halls. The white boys disapprove of this measure and ask why. The Sgt tells them its orders from the Lt. When we asked the Lt. he states that this is the South. We know this is the South but

also the Army. My belief is that it can be stopped with a slight push from you. We would like for you to give your opinion on the matter remembering an article published in the August edition of the Courier based on a War Dept. directive banning discrimination and segregation in army camps and hospitals. We would like to have a copy of that directive and also the numbers of it. We will appreciate all that you can do for us.

We will be awaiting your reply with great anticipation.

Sincerely yours,
Sgt Ben Kiser, Jr.
Ward 22 A.
Kennedy General Hosp.
Memphis (15) Tenn.

Napier Field, Dothan, Alabama
19 November 1944

The Pittsburgh Courier

Dear Editor:

I've just returned from the Post Theatre. Being rather disgusted over the way I was ordered out of the Post Theatre tonight; I thought I would just write this little article to show or rather let the people back home know just how we are doing down in Alabama. It is getting to the place that all colored soldiers just have to wait until there is plenty space for all whites before they can even get a seat.

I decided to take in a movie tonight. After reaching the theatre, I found that they had only five (5) seats reserved for colored, (five seats in a row), so the usher ask me to get out, so I had to get out and perhaps wait until tomorrow. Not that I mine waiting, but just the insult I got from the usher. "Get out, there isn't any seats for you colored boys." Can you picture a personnel of approximately two hundred and seventy (270) trying to see a picture at the theatre, when only twenty-five (25) can see a picture a night. Only twenty seats per night for the colored soldiers.

The Army often practice, "keep up your morale by attending movies," our morale would be very low if we had to see movies to keep it up in Napier Field.

This is something to laugh about. Two days ago a friend from Pittsburgh received a package from the Company he worked for before entering the army. It was a very nice package, he appreciated it to the highest. But one thing I notice on the outside of the package was; "To be mailed outside the limits of the continental United States." It was addressed to Napier Field, Dotham, Ala. We as colored soldiers at Napier Field readily agree with this company. When they mailed this package, they mailed it outside the limits of the continental United States.

Sgt. Jesse L. Wilkins

Pvt. John R. Wright
3252 nd. Q.M.
Ser. Co. A.P.O. 403 c/o P.M.
Munich Germany
November 16, 1946

The Pittsburgh Courier

Dear Mr. Editor:

I have just finished reading your paper, the July 7th edition and I enjoyed it very much as usual. I have eighty five points myself, and I had hoped to be home by now but, for some reason or the other, we are all still over here. My outfit has been here in Europe three years to the date yesterday. Most of these guys have 103 points. I have been over here 28 months, but here is one fellow that has 144 points and he has been over here three years. We all think that we have not been treated fair by this point system here. Isn't any kind of break for service troops. Most of us did not want to come in this army in the first place, and Mr. Eastland says we, the Negro soldier, has made America loose prestege in Europe, but it's just the other way around. There have been many times that Jim Crow and prejudice have made me very very shame to say that I was an American. And even here in Germany, the people are not as bad as we were told. The majority of the people here admire a colored man so it seems to me. I served in North Africa, Italy, France, and now Dutchland. I have worked very hard for our country. I can not understand why the people of America will let Bilbo's and others preach such hatred against the Negro citizens.

Yours Truly,
John R. Wright

SOURCE: Phillip McGuire, ed., *Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War II* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993).

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Port Chicago Mutiny; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces; World War II

1942 b

BLACK SERVICEMAN LESTER SIMONS'S ACCOUNT OF TRAINING EXPERIENCE

Sgt. Lester Simons had been raised in Ann Arbor, Michigan, had attended an integrated high school, and had participated in numerous integrated athletic events in the year prior to his induction. His unit was sent to Arkansas for training in 1942 and he later described the trouble his unit encountered there.

On maneuvers we were in a wooded area. We had rifles but no ammunition, not even bayonets. Our officers had their 45s, and that was all the protection we had in an area that was getting more hostile every minute. It was decided that we would move about twenty miles down the road. As we marched along counting cadence, to our new destination, a group of mounted farmers came out of nowhere, or so it seemed. Their spokesman told our lieutenant to "Get those god-damned niggers off of the white highway and march 'em in the ditch." The ditch he spoke of had several inches of water in it; water mocassins' playground. Our lieutenant objected and told them if they weren't careful the area would be placed under martial law (which should have been done in the beginning). The rednecks rode him down with their horses, then pistol-whipped him—one of their own color! The lieutenant was later given a medical discharge because of this beating; they damned near killed him.

SOURCE: Reprinted from Mary P. Motley, *The Invisible Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier in World War II* (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1987).

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Port Chicago Mutiny; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces; World War II

1942 c

MARINE'S LETTER TO FATHER CONCERNING HIS EXPERIENCE IN GUADALCANAL #1

Marine Lt. John Doyle speculated in a letter to his father, written on Guadalcanal in November 1942, on the effect of the combat experience on his personality and values.

What has it done to me? What does it mean to me?

I know that I have not become cruel or callous. I am sure that I am hardened. If a man cannot produce, I'll push him into the most degrading, menial task I can find. A man that shrinks from duty is worse than a man lost. He should be thrown out of the entire outfit. He's not fit to live with the men with whom he is not willing to die. Death is easy. It happens often.

The toughest part is going on, existing as an animal. Wet, cold and hungry many times, a man can look forward only to the next day when the sun, flies and mosquitoes descend to devour him.

Few men fear bullets. They are swift, silent and certain. Shelling and bombing are more often the cursed bugaboos.

SOURCE: Harry Maule, ed. *A Book of War Letters* (New York: Random House, 1943), 185.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; Marine Corps; World War II

1942 d

MARINE'S LETTER TO FATHER CONCERNING HIS EXPERIENCE IN GUADALCANAL #2

Pfc. John Conroy, a Guadalcanal veteran, wrote to his father from a hospital in late 1942:

I have been shell-shocked and bomb-shocked. My memory is very dim regarding my civilian days. . . . Of course I'm not insane. But I've been living the life of a savage and haven't quite got used to a world of laws and new responsibilities. So many of my platoon were wiped out, my old Parris Island buddies, that it's hard to sleep without seeing them die all over again. Our living conditions on Guadalcanal had been so bad—little food or hope—fighting and dying each day— four hours sleep out of 72—the medicos here optimistically say I'll pay for it the rest of my life. My bayonet and shrapnel cuts are all healed up, however. Most of us will be fairly well in six months, but none of us will be completely cured for years.

SOURCE: Excerpt from Dixon Wecter, *When Johnny Comes Marching Home,* pp. 545–46. Copyright © 1944 by Dixon Wecter. Copyright © renewed 1972 by Elizabeth Farrar Wecter Pike. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; Marine Corps; World War II

1942 e

MONICA ITOI SONE'S ACCOUNT OF HER TRANSFER TO A JAPANESE INTERNMENT CAMP

In April 1942, the Army on the West Coast was directed to relocate all Japanese Americans living in the four westernmost states to a number of internment camps in Rocky Mountain states. A young Nisei (born in the United States of Japanese immigrant parents) described her family's experience:

General DeWitt kept reminding us that E day, evacuation day, was drawing near. "E day will be announced in the very near future. If you have not wound up your affairs by now, it will soon be too late."

. . . On the twenty-first of April, a Tuesday, the general gave us the shattering news. "All the Seattle Japanese will be moved to Puyallup by May 1. Everyone must be registered Saturday and Sunday between 8 A.M. and 5 P.M."

Up to that moment, we had hoped against hope that something or someone would intervene for us. Now there was no time for moaning. A thousand and one details must be attended to in this one week of grace. Those seven days sputtered out like matches struck in the wind, as we rushed wildly about. Mother distributed sheets, pillowcases and blankets, which we stuffed into seabags. Into the two suitcases, we packed heavy winter overcoats, plenty of sweaters, woolen slacks and skirts, flannel pajamas and scarves. Personal toilet articles, one tin plate, tin cup and silverware completed our luggage. The one seabag and two suitcases apiece were going to be the backbone of our future home, and we planned it carefully.

Henry went to the Control Station to register the family. He came home with twenty tags, all numbered "10710," tags to be attached to each piece of baggage, and one to hang from our coat lapels. From then on, we were known as Family #10710.

[On the day set for relocation] we climbed into the truck. . . . As we coasted down Beacon Hill bridge for the last time, we fell silent, and stared out at the delicately flushed, morning sky of Puget Sound. We drove through bustling Chinatown, and in a few minutes arrived on the corner of Eighth and Lane. This are was ordinarily lonely and deserted but now it was gradually filling up with silent, labeled Japanese. . . .

Finally at ten o'clock, a vanguard of Greyhound busses purred in and parked themselves neatly along the curb. The crowd stirred and murmured. The bus doors opened and from each, a soldier with rifle in hand stepped out and stood stiffly at attention by the door. The murmuring died. It was the first time I had seen a rifle at such close range and I felt uncomfortable. . . .

Newspaper photographers with flash-bulb cameras pushed busily through the crowd. One of them rushed up to our bus, and asked a young couple and their little boy to step out and stand by the door for a shot. They were reluctant, but the photographers were persistent and at length they got out of the bus and posed, grinning widely to cover their embarrassment. We saw the picture in the newspaper shortly after and the caption underneath it read, "japs good-natured about evacuation."

Our bus quickly filled to capacity. . . . The door closed with a low hiss. We were now the Wartime Civil Control Administration's babies.

About noon we crept into a small town. . . . and we noticed at the left of us an entire block filled with neat rows of low shacks, resembling chicken houses. Someone commented on it with awe, "Just look at those chicken houses. They sure go in for poultry in a big way here." Slowly the bus made a left turn, drove through a wire-fenced gate, and to our dismay, we were inside the oversized chicken farm. . . .

The apartments resembled elongated, low stables about two blocks long. Our home was one room, about 18 by 20 feet, the size of a living room. There was one small window in the wall opposite the one door. It was bare except for a small, tinny wood-burning stove crouching in the center. The flooring consisted of two by fours laid directly on the earth, and dandelions were already pushing their way up through the cracks. . . .

I stared at our little window, unable to sleep. I was glad Mother had put up a makeshift curtain on the window for I noticed a powerful beam of light sweeping across it every few seconds. The lights came from high towers placed around the camp where guards with Tommy guns kept a twenty-four hour vigil. I remembered the wire fence encircling us, and a knot of anger tightened in my breast. What was I doing behind a fence like a criminal? If there were accusations to be made, why hadn't I been given a fair trial? Maybe I wasn't considered an American anymore. My citizenship wasn't real, after all. Then what was I? I was certainly not a citizen of Japan as my parents were. On second thought, even Father and Mother. . . . had little tie with their mother country. In their twenty-five years in America, they had worked and paid their taxes to their adopted government as any other citizen.

Of one thing I was sure. The wire fence was real. I no longer had the right to walk out of it. It was because I had Japanese ancestors. It was also because some people had little faith in the ideas and ideals of democracy.

SOURCE: Monica Itoi Sone, *Nisei Daughter* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979). Reprinted by permission of the author.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil–Military Relations; 442nd Regimental Combat Team of Nisei; Intelligence Gathering in War; Japanese Americans, Internment of; World War II

1942 (to 1945) f

INTERVIEWS WITH JAPANESE-AMERICANS REGARDING MISTREATMENT DURING WORLD WAR II

Two young Nisei interned in Manzanar angrily explained to government officials their refusal to attest to their loyalty to a country that had ignored their civil liberties in the passion of war:

FIRST NISEI

A. Here is the thing. I'm supposed to be a citizen of the United States. At the time of registration, I asked him how far my citizenship went. I don't know if there is such a thing as restricted citizenship in this country. I refused to answer because if there is such a thing as restricted citizenship, I have the right to refuse to answer. What security have we? If this can happen now, why can't the same thing happen in five years?

Q. What has happened is unfortunate. But other minorities have had to face discrimination too. In my part of the country the Germans are probably treated worse than Japanese.

A. It's all right to be of a minority as long as you're of the same race.

Q. I can't see that. If you're discriminated against because you belong to a minority group, it's as bad whatever race you belong to.

A. This is the reason you look at it differently; you are a white man. At the end of the war, animosities will be high. There will be high feelings against us. There will be a boycott of us if we start in business. At the end of the last war, the bad feeling didn't continue against the Germans. But you can't tell a German from an Englishman when he walks down the street. But when I go down the street they say, "There goes a Jap." Perhaps it will be 15 years before this feeling will die down. I disagree with you when you say that 100,000 Japanese can be assimilated now. I know the [government is] doing what [it] can. But the one hundred thirty

millions in this country are hostile. (After additional discussion of this same topic) Well, you'd better write me a ticket to Tule Lake. . . .

Q. Your record doesn't show any interest in Japan and you haven't said anything that would indicate that you want to go to Japan. Why is it then that you object so strongly to question 28 [Loyalty to the United States]?

A. I have not been given citizenship rights so I don't have to answer questions like that.

SECOND NISEI

Q. Don't you feel that whatever has happened you should express your loyalty to the only country in which you now hold citizenship?

A. At the time of the draft I was deferred because of my dependents. At that time I said I'd die for this country in the event of war. That's the way I felt. But since I lost my business when I was young and just starting up I've changed my mind. You Caucasian Americans should realize that I got a raw deal.

Q. But things like these happen in a time of war. Evacuation was a war measure, an emergency measure.

A. They shouldn't happen to citizens. What did a war with Japan have to do with evacuating me? You've got to realize that I am an American citizen just as much as you. Maybe my dad is not, because of Congress. He couldn't naturalize. But my associates in school and college were Caucasians. It's been a hard road to take.

A first-generation (Issei) man and a second-generation (Nisei) woman who was married to an Issei responded to questions put to them by government officials regarding their negative responses on the loyalty questionnaire:

THE MAN (via a Translator)

A. He didn't register because of the rumor that those who registered would be forced to leave [Tule Lake] and he had no place to go.

Q. Does he understand now that that isn't so?

A. I guess he does.

Q. He can't understand or speak English?

A. Very little.

Q. Does he plan to return to Japan after the war?

A. Yes.

Q. Does he feel more sympathy to Japan than to the United States?

A. His sympathy lies with Japan.

Q. Why?

A. He was a law abiding citizen, worked hard, respected law, and yet he was placed here. He can't stand it any longer.

THE WOMAN

Q. Are you disloyal?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. Well—no reason. If I say "loyal" will they take me or leave me here?

Q. We don't split families. If one member is on the segregation list the others in the family are given their choice of leaving or remaining. We don't want you to answer a certain way just because your husband does. This hearing is just to determine your loyalty.

A. Then it doesn't have anything to do with staying?

Q. No, you'll be given the choice of following your husband or not.

A. Then I'm loyal.

A young Nisei woman explained to U.S. officials in September 1945 the family pressures that had led her to renounce her citizenship during the war:

I am a Nisei girl, age 20, born and raised in Alameda, California, until the time of evacuation in Feb. 1942. My father passed away in May 1940. So there is my mother . . . 56 years old, and my brother [now] 18 years old. We were living a normal American life until we were uprooted from our beloved home. It was the home and security my father and mother worked so hard for when they came to America. This America was strange to them but they wanted to make their home here and raise us as good American citizens. Not knowing the language they had a hard time. . . . My mother was especially taken back by [evacuation] since my father passed away, so you can imagine her bitterness. Being pushed from one WRA camp to another (Pleasanton, Turlock Assembly Center, Gila Center and Tule Center) only hardened her bitterness and I myself got pretty dis-

gusted being shoved around but I reasoned that this would not happen under normal conditions. Life was not too hard up to Gila Center, but since segregation and coming here it has been a life of turmoil, anxiety and fear. My brother and I did not want to come here but we could not go against the wishes of our mother. She isn't young anymore so this life of moving about hasn't been easy for her so we obeyed her, thinking it was the only way to make up to all her unhappiness. We had life before us but mother's life is closer to end . . . so we couldn't hurt her with any more worries. Since coming here I found out it was wrong in coming here. There are too many pro-Japanese organizations with too much influence. Naturally mother in the state of mind she was in would be greatly taken in by them. She had the family name in one of the organizations but we (my brother and I) absolutely refused to acknowledge it so she reluctantly withdrew our name. . . . When the renunciation citizenship came mother again wanted us to renounce. My brother luckily was under age but I could not fight against her this time. One [thing] that put a scare into me was that families would be separated. To me, I just had to sign on that paper, so I piled lies upon lies at the renunciation hearing. All horrid and untruthful lies they were. I didn't mean anything I said at that time, but fear and anxiety was too strong. I have regretted that I took such a drastic step—in fact I knew I would regret it before I went into it but I was afraid if I was torn away from the family I would never see them again in this uncertain world. I should have had more confidence in America but being torn away from my home and all made things so uncertain. I would never have renounced if the Administration made it clear that there would be no family separation. But the Administration could not assure us that there would be no separation.

SOURCE: Richard Nishimoto, and Dorothy Swaine Thomas, *Japanese-American Evacuation and Resettlement: I: The Spoilage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946). Copyright © 1946 by The Regents of the University of California; reprinted by permission of the University of California Press.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil–Military Relations; 442nd Regimental Combat Team of Nisei; Intelligence Gathering in War; Japanese Americans, Internment of; World War II

1943

EXCERPT FROM BILL MAULDIN'S *UP FRONT*

The Army's system of replacing a unit's casualty losses with fresh troops during World War I and World War II amounted to sending both "green" privates, as well as seasoned veterans who had recovered from wounds, to replacement depots where they could expect to be "repple deppled" into the next unit in need of someone with their specific military knowledge and skills. But virtually all of those who had recovered from wounds wanted to return to their "buddies." Hence the expression: "AWOL-to-the-front." Cartoonist and commentator Bill Mauldin, who served in the war, explains:

When a soldier gets out of an army hospital he will most likely be thrown into a "repple depple." This institution, identified in army regulations as a replacement depot, is a sort of clearinghouse through which soldiers who have been separated from their outfits or soldiers newly arrived from the States have to pass for reassignment.

I went through a repple depple at Palermo, Sicily, and my experience seems to have been typical. This establishment was operated by a paratrooper lieutenant (I don't know why, either) who spent most of his time convincing us that paratrooping had a great postwar future. Several times I interrupted him to say that my outfit was only fifteen miles away and couldn't I get over to them. Each time he told me that a truck would come within a few hours and pick me up. I believed this until I discovered two other guys from my outfit who had been waiting for this same truck for three weeks.

I guess the repple depple people didn't trust us, because the place was surrounded by a very high wall and there were guards beyond that.

We waited until night fell, then we plotted our "break." We persuaded one inmate, whose outfit had already gone and who had given up hope of salvation, to distract the guard

while we went over the wall. As far as I know they still have my name and I'm still AWOL from a repple depple. I joined my outfit and caught the last boat to Salerno.

Later I learned that soldiers often languish in repple depples for months, only to be snapped up eventually by some outfit with which they are not familiar. A soldier's own outfit is the closest thing to home he has over here, and it is too bad when he has to change unnecessarily.

I heard of a soldier who spent his entire time overseas in repple depples, and went home on rotation without ever having been assigned. His home-town paper called him "a veteran of the Italian campaign."

*SOURCE: Bill Mauldin, *Up Front* (New York: Henry Holt, 1945).*

RELATED ENTRIES: Literature and War; Mauldin, Bill; Replacement Depots; World War II

1944 a

EXCERPT FROM ERNIE PYLE'S *BRAVE MEN*

Newsman Ernie Pyle and a GI friend watched troops passing by Italy in 1944 "after a siege in the front line." He reported his observations.

Their clothes were muddy, and they were heavily laden. They looked rough, and any parade-ground officer would have been shocked by their appearance. And yet I said, "I'll bet those troops haven't been in the line three days."

My friend thought a minute, looked more closely as they passed, and then said, "I'll bet they haven't been in the line at all. I'll bet they've just been up in reserve and weren't used, and now they're being pulled back for a while."

How can you tell things like that? Well, I based my deduction on the fact that their beards weren't very long and, although they were tired and dirty, they didn't look tired and dirty enough. My friend based his on that too, but more so on the look in their eyes. "They don't have that stare," he said.

A soldier who has been a long time in the line does have a "look" in his eyes that anyone who knows about it can discern. It's a look of dullness, eyes that look without seeing,

eyes that see without conveying any image to the mind. It's a look that is the display room for what lies behind it—exhaustion, lack of sleep, tension for too long, weariness that is too great, fear beyond fear, misery to the point of numbness, a look of surpassing indifference to anything anybody can do. It's a look I dread to see on men.

And yet to me it's one of the perpetual astonishments of a war life that human beings recover as quickly as they do. For example, a unit may be pretty well exhausted, but if they are lucky enough to be blessed with some sunshine and warmth they'll begin to be normal after two days out of the line. The human spirit is just like a cork.

SOURCE: Ernie Pyle, *Brave Men* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001).

RELATED ENTRIES: Censorship and the Military; Combat, Effects of; Frontline Reporting; Pyle, Ernie; World War II

1944 (to 1945) b

EXCERPTS FROM *PACIFIC WAR DIARY 1942–1945,* BY JAMES J. FAHEY

Seaman James Fahey's diary, the richest of its kind from the Pacific fleet during World War II, contains two revealing accounts. The first is of a kamikaze attack on November 27, 1944, and his shipmates' reactions to finding some of the remains of the kamikaze pilot; the second is of his experiences ashore in the Hiroshima area after the Japanese surrender.

Monday, November 27, 1944: . . . One suicide dive bomber was heading right for us while we were firing at other attacking planes and if the 40 mm. mount behind us on the port side did not blow the Jap wing off it would have killed all of us. When the wing was blown off it, the plane turned some and bounced off into the water and the bombs blew part of the plane onto our ship. Another suicide plane crashed into one of the 5 inch mounts, pushing the side of the mount in and injuring some of the men inside. A lot of 5 inch shells were damaged. It was a miracle they did not explode. If that happened the powder and shells would have blown up the ship. Our 40 mm. mount is not too far away. The men threw

the 5 inch shells over the side. They expected them to go off at any time. A Jap dive bomber crashed into one of the 40 mm. mounts but lucky for them it dropped its bombs on another ship before crashing. Parts of the plane flew everywhere when it crashed into the mount. Part of the motor hit Tomlinson, he had chunks of it all over him, his stomach, back, legs etc. The rest of the crew were wounded, most of them were sprayed with gasoline from the plane. Tomlinson was thrown a great distance and at first they thought he was knocked over the side. They finally found him in a corner in bad shape. One of the mt. Captains had the wires cut on his phones and kept talking into the phone, because he did not know they were cut by shrapnel until one of the fellows told him. The explosions were terrific as the suicide planes exploded in the water not too far away from our ship. The water was covered with black smoke that rose high into the air. The water looked like it was on fire. It would have been curtains for us if they had crashed into us.

Another suicide plane just overshot us. It grazed the 6 inch turret. It crashed into Leyte Gulf. There was a terrific explosion as the bombs exploded, about 20 ft. away. If we were going a little faster we would have been hit. The Jap planes that were not destroyed with our shells crashed into the water close by or hit our ships. It is a tough job to hold back this tidal wave of suicide planes. They come at you from all directions and also straight down at us at a very fast pace but some of the men have time for a few fast jokes, "This would be a great time to run out of ammunition." "This is mass suicide at its best." Another suicide plane came down at us in a very steep dive. It was a near miss, it just missed the 5 inch mount. The starboard side of the ship was showered with water and fragments. How long will our luck hold out? The Good Lord is really watching over us. This was very close to my 40 mm. mount and we were showered with debris. If the suicide plane exploded on the 5 inch mount, the ammunition would have gone up, after that anything could happen.

Planes were falling all around us, bombs were coming too close for comfort. The Jap planes were cutting up the water with machine gun fire. All the guns on the ships were blazing away, talk about action, never a dull moment. The fellows were passing ammunition like lightning as the guns

were turning in all directions spitting out hot steel. Parts of destroyed suicide planes were scattered all over the ship. During a little lull in the action the men would look around for Jap souvenirs and what souvenirs they were. I got part of the plane. The deck near my mount was covered with blood, guts, brains, tongues, scalps, hearts, arms etc. from the Jap pilots. One of the Marines cut the ring off the finger of one of the dead pilots. They had to put the hose on to wash the blood off the deck. The deck ran red with blood. The Japs were spattered all over the place. One of the fellows had a Jap scalp, it looked just like you skinned an animal. The hair was black, but very short, and the color of the skin was yellow, real Japanese. I do not think he was very old. I picked up a tin pie plate with a tongue on it. The pilots tooth mark was into it very deep. It was very big and long, it looked like part of his tonsils and throat were attached to it. It also looked like the tongue you buy in the meat store. This was the first time I ever saw a person's brains, what a mess. One of the men on our mount got a Jap rib and cleaned it up, he said his sister wants part of a Jap body. One fellow from Texas had a knee bone and he was going to preserve it in alcohol from the sick bay. The Jap bodies were blown into all sorts of pieces. I cannot think of everything that happened because too many things were happening at the same time.

These suicide or kamikaze pilots wanted to destroy us, our ships and themselves. This gives you an idea what kind of an enemy we are fighting. The air attacks in Europe are tame compared to what you run up against out here against the Japs. The Germans will come in so far, do their job and take off but not the Japs. I can see now how the Japs sank the two British battleships Prince of Wales and the Repulse at the beginning of the war at Singapore. You do not discourage the Japs, they never give up, you have to kill them. . . .

Monday, October 22, 1945: We covered another landing today. The convoy consisted of about 15 transports. The Army troops wore their heavy clothing. The Montpelier again served as flagship for the gunfire support unit. All guns were manned but nothing happened. These troops will take over the Matsuyama-Shikokku area of Japan. This will be the last landing for the U.S.S. Montpelier to cover.

I saw a monster of a Jap submarine. It was much longer than one of our destroyers. It must be the largest in the world. It had a catapult on the bow for launching planes. It also carried two planes.

During the rest of our two months stay in Japan, we visited many places and met many Japanese. The most famous place we visited was Hiroshima. We were one of the first to see the extensive damage caused by the atomic bomb. Hiroshima was the first city in history to be hit with an atomic bomb.

When we saw Hiroshima, a city of approximately half a million, it was deserted except for a few people walking through with white cloths over their nose and mouths. I will never forget what I saw there. You have to see it. I cannot explain it. A few frames of buildings were the only thing that was left standing. Everything was ground into dust. The city of Hiroshima was a city of large buildings. They were made of stone, cement and steel. I bought some pictures in the next town and could see how well constructed the buildings were. We passed a mother nursing her baby in the cellar of a destroyed house. She did not pay any attention to us as she sat there in the dust. Her whole family might have been wiped out and the both of them might die later from the effects of the bomb. We felt very sorry for them. The only thing they owned was the clothes on their backs, and that was not much. We saw a few stumps of trees that were barren. They were completely black from burning. The trolley cars were blown off the tracks. Only they did not look like trolley cars anymore. They were completely destroyed. I could just see pieces of them. The fire engines were still in the building. Everything was reduced to a lot of rubble, building and trucks. The enormous buildings with walls over a foot thick were all in small chunks. Even if you were in the basement of strongly built buildings of steel and cement, you would still suffer the effects of the bomb. No place was safe to hide. As far as the eye could see, there was nothing but destruction. The force from one of these bombs is fantastic. There is only one defense against the bomb, prevent it from falling.

When we left Hiroshima, we stopped at a town not too far away. I spent some time talking to a Jap who lived in the States for 32 years. He finally returned to Japan in 1940. He

said it was a warm, sunny day when the bomb was dropped, about 8 A.M. He was thrown to the ground but thought that it was an earthquake. Then a huge red flame rose high into the sky. He said that Hiroshima burnt for two days. Out of a population of half a million, two hundred thousand were killed and another two hundred thousand were injured. People were still dying. He treated many of the bomb victims. He said that there must have been poison in the bomb because it affected the victims' heads. It made them very sleepy and the next thing, they were dead. He was very angry and said the bomb never should have been dropped on Hiroshima because it did not help the war effort. He spoke very good English. While we were talking to him, some girls about 20 years old were cooking their meal over a little stove out on the sidewalk. It was a warm, sunny day but on the way back to our ship, the day became cool.

On our way back to the ship, we took a look at the damaged warships in the Kure Naval Base. It was quite a sight. Every Jap warship was severely damaged from the planes of Halsey's Third Fleet. They were hit with bombs and torpedoes. Every type of a warship was in the harbor. They even had a battleship with a flight deck on it. One of the Jap carriers we passed had some Jap sailors on it. They waved and we waved back. We also pulled alongside the Haruna. This is the ship Colin Kelley crashed into. He told his crew to bail out before he crippled the Jap battleship and lost his life for his country in the following action. The *Haruna* suffered extensive damage.

SOURCE: Excerpts from James J. Fahey, *Pacific War Diary: 1942–1945* (New York: Avon Books, 1963), 224–26, 379–80. Copyright © 1963, and renewed 1991 by James J. Fahey. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

RELATED ENTRIES: *Combat, Effects of; Hiroshima; Literature and War; Manhattan Project; World War II*

1944 (to 1950) c

BLACK SOLDIER'S ENCOUNTER WITH RACISM AND ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS

A black solider—identified here as J.G.S.—experienced racism while in the service during World War II. He developed psychoneurotic disorders, was hospitalized, and was eventually discharged. Army psychiatrists recorded his case history and noted his successful recovery upon his return to a less discriminatory and racist atmosphere.

J.G.S. was born and raised in a small Northeastern town. A member of one of the few Negro families in that area, he experienced little discrimination and was generally accepted as an equal by his schoolmates. He completed junior college at the age of twenty with a very good scholastic record and thereafter held jobs as a public stenographer and chief clerk with the draft board. Just before his twenty-second birthday, he enlisted in the Army. Until then he had had only very limited contact with the manifestations of prejudice against his race. He had deliberately sought out an environment in which he could expect to find people, both Negro and white, who would not feel that he should act differently just because he was a member of a minority group. In this way, he was able largely to avoid discrimination and developed cultural values much closer to those of the white middle class than to those of his fellow Negroes in the South.

In the Army, however, J.G.S. found himself treated differently from other soldiers because he was a Negro. He had no choice as to where or with whom he worked. He was constantly and directly exposed to a set of values which differed radically from his own and to the manifestation of these values in discrimination, segregation, and rigidly prescribed patterns of behavior. He received his basic training in the South; later he was sent to clerical school and then assigned as a clerk, specializing in courts-martial, to an anti-aircraft artillery group.

Intelligent and relatively well educated, he was promoted rapidly and became a technician fourth grade in less than a year. Nevertheless, he was in constant conflict with many of his officers, especially those from the South. He resented any system which assigned Negroes to segregated

units and on many occasions found himself in serious disagreement with his fellow Negro officers and enlisted men who accepted a second-class status. As a court stenographer he saw or heard about many instances of discrimination, which affected him in a very personal manner. Furthermore, as an educated Northern Negro he was considered by many of his white officers a troublemaker. Several times he was threatened with court-martial for treason. He was forbidden to give books to other soldiers and just before going overseas his commander denied him a pass to go to his home which was nearby; instead he received a two-hour lecture designed to make him give up his "liberal" values and accept his status as a Negro.

Early in his Army career the soldier began to develop psychiatric symptoms. During basic training he went on sick call several times with nausea, headaches, tenseness, and stuttering. While in clerical school he consulted a psychiatrist, but was not hospitalized. The symptoms continued after he joined the anti-aircraft group and became quite severe after his outfit left its former location in the Deep South and went overseas to North Africa. At times his stuttering was so incapacitating that he was unable to speak at all.

The morale of the outfit was poor primarily because of the discord between the white officers and Negro enlisted men. In May 1944, however, after about a year of overseas duty, the organization was disbanded because of reduced need for anti-aircraft protection, and J.G.S. was placed in charge of a quartermaster laundry receiving office. For two months until the replacement depot closed he supervised both white and Negro enlisted men. There was no difficulty and his headaches, nausea, and stuttering improved considerably. He was next sent to Italy and spent another two months working on courts-martial before being assigned to clerical duty with an Infantry division. Although he saw only intermittent combat, his symptoms now became quite severe. Again he was involved in a good deal of strife with white officers. Morale among the Negro troops was low and many resented being led by officers who seemed to hate them as much as the enemy. In addition there was frequent strife between Negro and white soldiers in rear areas. All this had a marked effect on J.G.S. and he spent almost a month at one time in the hospital because of his stuttering. Nevertheless, he was able to return to duty and served until returned to the States in the spring of 1945 after more than two years overseas.

Back in this country and on furlough, he became extremely disturbed over any evidence of discrimination, especially against Negro soldiers, who he felt deserved better. At that time he decided that he would never marry because he did not want a child of his exposed to the discrimination that he had experienced. On returning to camp he was hospitalized with a severe speech impediment and constant headaches. Several months later he was discharged.

Shortly after leaving service the veteran began receiving treatment for his speech disorder through the Veterans Administration while working as a government clerk in the Northeast. Free once again to avoid people who might be prejudiced against him because of his race, he gradually improved. By late 1947 when the treatment was terminated, he was making a good adjustment. He had married and had one child; he was happy in his home life. He had started taking courses with a view to obtaining a degree in business administration. By 1950 he was well on the way to accomplishing his educational objectives, although the necessity of holding a full-time job to support his family left him little time for studies.

SOURCE: From Eli Ginzberg, et al., eds., *The Ineffective Soldier, vol. 2, Breakdown and Recovery.* (New York: Columbia University Press), 105–08. Copyright © 1959 Columbia University Press. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

RELATED ARTICLES: *African Americans in the Military; Port Chicago Mutiny; World War II*

1945 a

BLACK SERVICEMAN'S ACCOUNT OF CONFRONTATION WITH BATTALION COMMANDER

Tech. Sgt. Willie Lawton recalled the means that some of his comrades used in 1945 to signal their extreme displeasure with their battalion commander.

We had an incident in the Philippines that just missed being a bloody war; the 93rd vs. the Dixie Division. This white outfit was there when we arrived. I do not remember the name of the place but it was in the vicinity of the Dole Pineapple Company. Our men had been overseas nineteen months without seeing any women to speak of so when the guys hit the Philippines they went hog wild. The Dixie Division couldn't stand the Filipino girls going for the Negro soldiers. After several days there were small battles. The ultimate finally arrived; the Dixie Division was lined upon one side of the road for about two miles or more and the 93rd was lined up opposite them. Both sides had fixed bayonets, their guns were on-load and unlock. It took the colonels of every battalion from both divisions to get their men and bring the situation under control. They were real busy riding or running up and down that road to keep down outright war.

The next morning the colonel of my battalion called a meeting of all of the officers and NCOs. He marched us to a field and instead of talking some kind of sense we were severely reprimanded, so we knew where we stood. The thing we kept thinking about was those Dixie boys wouldn't have been caught dead with the Filipino girls back home. Anyway, we were told that anyone would be busted in rank should he become involved with the girls of the country. Neither the officers nor the NCOs liked this directive, and instead of telling the enlisted what we were supposed to we told them exactly what had been said.

The colonel, being the colonel, was the only person who had a generator to furnish light in his tent at night. That night several men cut loose with their .30 caliber rifles on that light and the upper part of his tent. Man, he came crawling out of that tent screaming bloody murder. The whole thing was settled without another word; he had gotten the message and there was no problem about our mixing with the women who came into our area.

SOURCE: Reprinted from Mary P. Motley, *The Invisible Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier in World War II* (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1987). Copyright © 1975 by Mary P. Motley, ed., by permission of the Wayne State University Press. Excerpt is from p. 101.

RELATED ARTICLES: *African Americans in the Military; Port Chicago Mutiny; World War II*

1945 (to 1970) b
BLACK SOLDIERS' RECOLLECTIONS OF THEIR EXPERIENCES IN WORLD WAR II

Sgt. Floyd Jones, a black artilleryman in World War II and veteran of the bttle of the Bulge, recalled his decision to "set [my army experience] outside of the mainstream of my life."

From the very beginning, when I realized there was going to be a conflict in which I would participate, I determined I was not going to allow myself to be warped by war. Therefore the time I spent in service was something I set outside of the mainstream of my life. I did my time with but one thought; in spite of hell I was going to return just as I left physically and mentally. While I was in the army I was a soldier, not an interested spectator, asking no quarter and giving none. When I stepped out of my uniform for the last time I stripped off the last vestige of army life and took up my life, to a great extent, where I had dropped it. . . .

The time I spent in service was one of the greatest experiences I ever had. I saw much of the world I would most certainly would not have seen otherwise. I did not see the victims of the war that an infantryman, or a front line man, would encounter. I saw devastation but not the victims. I am sure this helped me remain an actor who would eventually remove his makeup and become himself once more.

Willie Lawton, a black veteran of World War II, had only unpleasant and bitter memories when interviewed in 1970:

I most certainly think the Negro GI of World War II did play a great part in the changed overt thinking and behavior of the white military because we'd take so much and that was all. But if I had it to do over again I would take off for Canada like many of the fellows have recently done. We were supposedly sent over there to do a job, fighting for our country, when it really added up to traveling half way around the world to endure the same insults from the same people. . . .

The war was a thing I wanted to forget. I've never put on my uniform since I took it off. I've never marched in any parade. I have never applied for my citation. It is something I'd rather forget because it was a bad dream, a real nightmare.

SOURCE: Reprinted from Mary P. Motley, *The Invisible Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier in World War II* (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1987). Copyright © 1975 by Mary P. Motley, ed., by permission of the Wayne State University Press. Excerpt is from pp. 103–04, 177–78.

RELATED ARTICLES: African Americans in the Military; Combat, Effects of; Port Chicago Mutiny; World War II

1945 c
SOLDIERS' POEMS ON THE HORRORS OF WAR

Two GIs in the Italian war zone wrote poems for The Stars and Stripes *that reveal the terror of those who experienced heavy combat:*

BATTLE

The blackness was in me,
Such fate and fury as I had never known:
Complete amnesia from love and spring,
And tenderness of home.
Surging through me, I could feel it rise
And lift me with it.
I was free, to lust for blood,
And I could use my hands
To tear and smash . . .
My eyes to sight for killing!
The noises, whistling, wooming
In the blackness
Became a part of me,
Spurred my passion, lashed me on,
Became fused with my mind's unwholesomeness:
I would caress, with savagery,
And put them all in hell forever.
I willed to butcher as they had butchered,
Destroy as they had destroyed.
I sobbed aloud as no man has ever cried:
Someone screamed, maybe me. I could smell

Powder, burnt flesh, maybe mine . . .
I think I died then.
I don't want to remember any more . . .
God knows—I wish I could forget.

—Sgt. S. Colker

HOME FROM WAR

Who can say at war's end
"We are lucky living men?"
After so much of us has died
How can we be satisfied
That we, the so-called living men,
Will find a way to live again?
For when a man has daily faced
The brute within him, low, debased,
Can he look forward to the light,
Wipe out the memories of the fight
Forget the strange erotic bliss
That comes with some cheap purchased kiss?
Ah, no! And it will be his fateful lot
To live on and find that he lives not
Though like the living we'll behave
We'll be the dead without a grave.

—Cpl. Anthony Carlin

SOURCE: Charles A. Hogan and John Welsh, comps., *Puptent Poets of the "Stars and Stripes, Mediterranean"* (Naples, Italy: Stars and Stripes, 1945), 18, 109.

RELATED ARTICLES: Combat, Effects of; Literature and War; World War II

1945 d
JOHN CIARDI'S "A BOX COMES HOME"

John Ciardi flew 16 missions as a gunner on an Army Air Force B-29 over Japan. He was then assigned to write letters of condolence to next of kin. After leaving the service, he wrote several successful volumes of poetry, some of which drew upon his wartime experience.

I remember the United States of America
As a flag-draped box with Arthur in it
And six marines to bear it on their shoulders.

I wonder how someone once came to remember
The Empire of the East and the Empire of the West.
As an urn maybe delivered by chariot.

You could bring Germany back on a shield once
And France in a plume. England, I suppose,
Kept coming back a long time as a letter.

Once I saw Arthur dressed as the United States
Of America. Now I see the United States
Of America as Arthur in a flag-sealed domino.

And I would pray more good of Arthur
Than I can wholly believe. I would pray
An agreement with the United States of America

To equal Arthur's living as it equals his dying
At the red-taped grave in Woodmere
By the rain and oakleaves on the domino.

SOURCE: Robert Hedin, ed., *Old Glory: American War Poems from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Persea Books, 2004), 223. Poem reprinted by permission from Ciardi Family Publishing Trust.

RELATED ENTRIES: American Veterans Committee; Literature and War, World War II

1945 e

Excerpt from Bill Mauldin's *Brass Ring*

Later in the war, after drawing several cartoons for The Stars and Stripes unflattering to officers, Bill Mauldin was ordered to report to Gen. George Patton for a "dressing down." Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, one of Mauldin's many appreciative readers, saw to it that this interview would not end badly for the young sergeant. In any event, this is how Mauldin reported the meeting. The passage begins with Mauldin's entertaining description of an encounter he had enroute with MPs and a provost marshal who wanted to know what a sergeant was doing, alone, in a jeep that he claimed (correctly) had been assigned to him.

"If you'll make a couple of calls we can get all this straightened out." I offered.

"No doubt. The question is, who do we call?"

"Well, you could try General Patton's headquarters—there's a Major Quirk there—or maybe you could try Captain Harry Butcher at SHAEF."

"Butcher?"

"He's General Eisenhower's aide."

"Now we got Eisenhower in the act, with a lousy captain for an aide. If you're going to try to bullshit your way out of this, you ought to at least study the tables of organization."

"Sir, he's a captain in the navy. That's the same as a colonel in the army."

"So Eisenhower, who runs the army in Europe, has a ship's captain for his aide. . . . Listen, I'll make a deal with you, you loony bastard. I'll call this Major Quirk. I don't guarantee I'll get him, mind you, but I'll speak to his office. You got this thing on your mind about calling somebody's office, maybe it'll relieve you or something. Actually, by rules we're supposed to check all stories later anyway for a report, but as a favor I'll do it right now. Meanwhile, we're going to keep that jeep. You won't need it any more."

"It's a deal, " I said. "If I don't have an appointment with Patton you keep the jeep."

"General Patton, sergeant!"

He made the call. He didn't get Quirk, but somebody in the office straightened him out. The provost was a sport. He even laughed a little.

"We'd better get this man on his way, corporal. We've made him late."

"Oh, that's all right," I said, airily, "the appointment was pretty well open, depending on when I got there."

Patton had taken over Luxembourg's royal palace. I was scrutinized and passed by a small task force of vitamin-packed MPs with mirror-toed shoes and simonized head-gear, then directed to Quirk's office in a downstairs wing of the magnificent building. The major turned out to be a nice man—so far I was having remarkably good luck with Patton's subordinates—and although he too inspected me carefully from head to toe, I could see that he was doing it for my own good. He led me through the story-book palace, full of huge, ornate, high-ceilinged rooms. Patton's office must have been

the throne room, the grandest of them all. It had great double doors. One was ajar; standing slightly behind the major as he discreetly rapped, I could see the general's desk at the far end of the room, across an acre of carpet.

There he sat, big as life even at that distance. His hair was silver, his face was pink, his collar and shoulders glittered with more stars than I could count, his fingers sparkled with rings, and an incredible mass of ribbons started around desktop level and spread upward in a flood over his chest to the very top of his shoulder, as if preparing to march down his back, too. His face was rugged, with an odd, strangely shapeless outline, his eyes were pale, almost colorless, with a choleric bulge. His small, compressed mouth was sharply downturned at the corners, with a lower lip which suggested a pouting child as much as a no-nonsense martinet. It was a welcome, rather human touch. Beside him, lying in a big chair, was Willie, the bull terrier. If ever dog was suited to master this one was. Willie had his beloved boss's expression and lacked only the ribbons and stars. I stood in that door staring into the four meanest eyes I'd ever seen.

"Come in, major," Patton said. Somehow, it broke the spell. There was that shrill voice again. Like the lower lip it brought him down to human proportions. We made the long trek across the room and came to a parade-ground halt before the desk, where I snapped out the kind of salute I used to make in high-school ROTC. Whatever of the parade-ground soldier was still left in me, Patton brought it out.

"Hello, sergeant." The general smiled—an impressive muscular feat, considering the distance the corners of his mouth had to travel—and came around the desk to offer his hand. I don't know who was more astonished, Willie or me. The dog, rising with his master, literally fell out of the chair. As we shook hands, I stole a glance at the general's famous gun belt. He was wearing only one of his pearl-handled six-shooters. Under-gunned, shaking hands, smiling—all were hopeful signs. Patton told me to sit. I appropriated Willie's chair. The dog not only looked shocked now but offended. To hell with Willie. Butcher had been right. This was going to be O.K.

"Well, sir, I'll be going," the major said.

"Going where?" Patton snapped. "Stick around. I want you to hear this."

The major hesitated for the barest instant, glanced at me—he was aware of the agreement for privacy—and took the adjacent chair. The old chill started back up my spine.

"Now then, sergeant, about those pictures you draw of those god-awful things you call soldiers. Where did you ever see soldiers like that? You know goddamn well you're not drawing an accurate representation of the American soldier. You make them look like goddamn bums. No respect for the army, their officers, or themselves. You know as well as I do that you can't have an army without respect for officers. What are you trying to do, incite a goddamn mutiny? You listen to me, sergeant, the Russians tried running an army without rank once. Shot all their leaders, all their brains, all their generals. The Bolsheviks made their officers dress like soldiers, eat with soldiers, no saluting, everybody calling everybody Comrade—and where did it get 'em? While they ran an army like that they couldn't fight their way out of a piss-soaked paper bag. Now they've learned their lesson. They put uniforms back on their officers. Some men are born to lead and don't need those little metal dinguses on their shoulders. Hell, I could command troops in a G-string. But in wartime you're bound to get some officers who don't know how to act without being dressed for it. The Russians learned you have to have rank and if some comrade looks cross-eyed at a superior today he gets his teeth kicked in. When somebody says 'frog' he jumps. And now he fights. How long do you think you'd last drawing those pictures in the Russian army?"

The question turned out to be rhetorical. I opened my mouth to say that I realized the necessity of discipline and had never thought officers should be called Comrade, chosen by popular elections among their troops, or deprived of the dinguses on their shoulders. But I quickly shut it again, and kept it shut for the next twenty minutes or so as the general reeled off examples of the necessity for rank through four thousand years of military history.

For a while it was fascinating. Patton was a real master of his subject. I have an affinity for enthusiasts, anyway, in any field of endeavor; as I sat there listening to the general talk war, I felt truly privileged, as if I were hearing Michelangelo on painting. I had been too long enchanted by the army myself—as a child listening to my father's stories,

as a high-school boy dreaming of West Point—to be anything but impressed by this magnificent old performer's monologue. Just as when I had first saluted him, I felt whatever martial spirit was left in me being lifted out and fanned into flame.

At one point, somewhere around the Hellenic wars, when once again the value of stern leadership was being extolled, I absently reached out to see if Willie's ear needed scratching. I was stopped by a dog owner's reflex which reminded me never to handle another man's pet uninvited. A glance at Willie confirmed this. Had I touched his ear it would have been with my left, or working hand, and I think he would have put me out of business, accomplishing in one snap what his master was trying to do the hard way.

When Patton had worked his way back through the Russian revolution to the present again, he got around to my cartoons.

"Sergeant," he said, "I don't know what you think you're trying to do, but the krauts ought to pin a medal on you for helping them mess up discipline for us. I'm going to show you what I consider some prime goddamn examples of what I mean by creating disrespect."

He opened a drawer and came up with a small batch of cutouts from Stars and Stripes. On top was a street scene I had drawn of a French town being liberated. A convoy of motorized infantry was being deluged by flowers, fruit, and wine, handed up from the street and dropped out of windows by hysterically happy citizens. Some of the soldiers were taking advantage of the general confusion and pelting the convoy commander, in an open command car in front, with riper samples of the fruit.

"My, sir," says a junior officer, "what an enthusiastic welcome."

The general held the next one up by the tips of his thumb and forefinger as if it were contaminated. It was a night scene of a war-battered opera house with a USO show advertised on the marquee: "GIRLS, GIRLS, GIRLS. Fresh from the States!" Queued up in the snow at the front door was a long line of weary-looking soldiers of various nationalities, mostly British and American, with their coat collars turned up against the raw weather and their sad faces filled

with anticipation of the charms within. It was one of my better drawings: loaded with poignancy, I thought. Queued up at the stage door were the officers, of course, all spruced up and waiting to take the girls out. Some even had bouquets.

"Now this," shrilled the general, "is the kind of goddamn . . . where are the words under this one? Somebody cut off the goddamn words!"

"Sir, there wasn't any caption under that one." Willie, the major, and I all jumped at the sound of my voice.

"No words!"

"No. sir. I didn't think it needed any."

"All right. You've got a bunch of messy goddamn soldiers in one line and a bunch of officers in another. What's it mean?"

He was going to let me speak again. It was really too much for Willie, who got up and stiffly walked to his master's side, ready for anything.

"Sir, it means the soldiers want to look at the girls and the officers want to take them out."

"Well, what the hell's wrong with that?"

"Nothing, sir," I weaseled. "I didn't imply anything was wrong. I just thought it was a humorous situation." No ordeal is worse than that of a cartoonist who has to explain his creation to a reader.

"You think the soldiers ought to get laid instead of the officers, don't you?" Patton growled.

In spite of himself he couldn't help grinning slightly at this; in spite of myself I couldn't help liking him a little for it.

"Sir, it has been my experience that when USO or Red Cross girls are to be had the officers usually get them."

"And what business is that of yours, sergeant?"

"None, sir. I just thought it was an amusing situation and I drew it as I saw it."

"It doesn't amuse me."

"To tell you the truth, sir, it doesn't seem very funny to me, either, any more," I said, honestly.

"Well, by God, now we're getting somewhere. Now, why did you draw this picture if it wasn't to create disrespect for the officers?"

He sat back in his chair, put his fingertips together in a listening attitude, and I got my chance at my only speech of the day.

"General," I said, "suppose a soldier's been overseas for a couple of years and in the line for a couple of months without a break, then he gets a few days in a rest area and goes to a USO show. He knows there's not much chance of getting next to one of the girls, but it would mean a lot to him if she'd circulate among the boys for a while after the show and at least give them the pleasure of talking to a girl from the States. Usually, there's not a chance. She arrives in a colonel's jeep two seconds before showtime and leaves in a gen . . . some other colonel's staff car before the curtain's down."

Patton's eyes glittered menacingly, but he did not interrupt.

"All right, sir, the soldier goes back to his foxhole," I said, "and he's thinking about it. He doesn't blame the girl—after all, he figures, she's a free agent, she did her bit by entertaining him, and it's her own business how she entertains herself. Nobody in her right mind would go out with soldiers when officers have better whiskey and facilities. The soldier knows all this. And he doesn't blame the officer for going after the girl, either. That's only human. . . ."

"Jesus Christ, major, does this make sense to you?" the general growled. "Well, I told Butcher I'd let this man speak his piece."

"I'm almost finished, sir. My point is, the soldier is back in his foxhole stewing about officers and thinking he's got the short end of the stick in everything, even women. Whether it makes sense or not, the fact is that he feels there's been an injustice, and if he stews long enough about this, or about any of the other hundreds of things soldiers stew about, he's not going to be thinking about his job. All right, sir, he picks up his paper and he reads a letter or sees a cartoon by some other soldier who feels the same way, and he says, 'Hell, somebody else said it for me,' and he goes back to his job."

"All I've got to say to you, sergeant," Patton said, "is that if this soldier you're talking about is stewing it's because he hasn't got enough to do. He wasn't put in that hole to stew, or to think, or to have somebody else do his thinking for him in a goddamn newspaper.

"I don't know where you got those stripes on your arm, but you'd put 'em to a lot better use getting out and teaching respect to soldiers instead of encouraging them to bitch and beef and gripe and run around with beards on their faces

and holes in their elbows. Now I've just got one last thing to say to you." He looked at his watch. Forty-five minutes had gone by. "You can't run an army like a mob."

"Sir," I protested, "I never thought you could."

"Think over what I've said. All right, sergeant, I guess we understand each other now."

"Yes, sir."

We did not shake goodbye. My parting salute was at least as good as the first one, but I don't think anyone noticed. The major and I started the long hike across the carpet and I heard Willie's chair creak as he climbed back on his perch.

Will Lang was waiting outside. As one of the instigators of the meeting he felt entitled to first crack at the story. I said Patton had received me courteously, had expressed his feelings about my work, and had given me the opportunity to say a few words myself. I didn't think I had convinced him of anything, and I didn't think he had changed my mind much, either.

Years later I read Butcher's account of reading Lang's Time story to Patton over the phone. When he quoted me as saying I hadn't changed Patton's mind, there was a chuckle. When he came to the part about the general not changing my mind, either, there was a high-pitched explosion and more talk about throwing me in jail if I ever showed up again in Third Army. Time didn't print the part about the general violating the agreement by keeping the major in the office during the interview. If I'd been quoted on that I'm convinced he'd have set Willie after me.

SOURCE: Bill Mauldin, *The Brass Ring* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971). Reprinted by permission of the Estate of Bill Mauldin and the Watkins/Loomis Agency.

RELATED ARTICLES: *Mauldin, Bill; Patton, George S.; World War II*

1945 f

EXCERPTS FROM *COMPANY COMMANDER* BY CHARLES B. MACDONALD

Charles MacDonald's Company Commander is one of the best autobiographical accounts by an American of combat in the European theater of operations. He led his advancing infantry company effectively for several months against German resistance, losing only a few of his men. His straightforward prose provides insights into two dilemmas that frontline officers like MacDonald sometimes confronted: subordinates who killed an enemy POW and superiors who proved to be disappointing.

It seemed that since we were now in a "quiet" position every officer in the division with the rank of major or above wanted to inspect the company area. They condemned the men for not having shaved or for wearing knit wool caps without their helmets, evidently an unpardonable misdemeanor, or for untidy areas around the dugouts. The officers did not inspect my 1st Platoon area, however, usually passing it over with the excuse that it was a bit far to walk, but we laughed inwardly, knowing that it was the threat of enemy shelling that kept most of them away.

I finally protested the inspections to Captain Anderson, and a captain from regiment was sent up a few days later with the primary mission of inspecting my 1st Platoon area. That was the virtual end of the inspections, however; either from my protest or the fact that all the inspection-minded "brass" had satisfied their egos with visits to "the front." We wondered how many Silver Stars and Distinguished Service Crosses came from the visits.

• • •

"Come out with your hands up or I'll shoot your nuts off, you Nazi sonofabitch!" a soldier yelled.

He fired a single shot into the underbrush.

The fir branches stirred. A dark figure emerged slowly from the brush, and I could see that it was a German soldier with his hands raised high above his head. He wore no cap or helmet, but a dirty, blood-stained bandage stretched across his forehead. Choosing each step carefully, he advanced across the firebreak.

"Do not shoot. Do not shoot."

Two of my men grabbed him roughly and searched him for weapons.

"I have no gun," the German said in carefully chosen English. "My comrades have left me when I am wounded."

"Bring him along," I said, designating two men to walk with him. "We'll send him back when we get where we're going.". . .

I turned my attention to the prisoner, directing the two men who were with him to take him to the A Company positions. I had lost contact with the rear CP group by radio and wanted them to contact Lieutenant Smith, who should be at the A Company positions now. The men were afraid they could not find the positions. Our circuitous route through the woods had confused them, but they said they would try.

"Would you be kind to give me cigarette?" the prisoner asked.

"Why you Nazi sonofabitch," one of the guards answered, kicking the prisoner in the rear, "of all the goddamned nerve. If it wasn't for you and all your ---------- kind, all of us could be smoking now."

The patrol from the 1st Platoon returned. . . .

The two men who had taken the prisoner to the rear returned. They had made a quick trip.

"Did you get him back OK?" I asked.

"Yessir," they answered and turned quickly toward their platoons.

"Wait a minute," I said. "Did you find A Company? What did Lieutenant Smith say?"

The men hesitated. One spoke out suddenly.

"To tell you the truth, Cap'n, we didn't get to A Company. The sonofabitch tried to make a run for it. Know what I mean?"

"Oh, I see," I said slowly, nodding my head. "I see."

• • •

The buildings along the street grew in height and density until we knew that at last we were in the outskirts of Leipzig. Civilians formed in thick bunches as if to watch a parade.

A voice beckoned me from an open window, and I recognized a soldier from battalion headquarters. The Colonel was inside and wanted to see me. I halted the column, and

the men sat down on the edges of the sidewalks, unperturbed by the unabashed stares of the curious civilians.

Inside the building the Colonel and the battalion staff were eating breakfast. The sight startled me at first and I said a bad word to myself. The pursuit of the war could not wait long enough for the rifle companies to eat, but there was time for battalion headquarters to breakfast in the luxury of a house that the sweat of the rifle companies had taken. I passed it off as another of the injustices to which we had become accustomed.

• • •

The battalion staff arrived on the hill, and Colonel Smith overrode my objections to firing the machine guns. I did not object because I saw the men from the patrol squad had reached the railroad tracks and four Germans jumped up from their foxholes and surrendered. I knew the town was ours. The other two squads from the 3d Platoon started down the hill, and the 1st Platoon followed.

The six machine guns chattered, their tracers spanning the town in a great fiery arc to burn themselves into the hill beyond. Lieutenant Reed called for artillery on the fleeing Germans.

An enemy machine gun opened up suddenly from the railroad tracks to the right front. The fire was high over our heads and did no damage, but the battalion staff cleared the hill as if by magic. The enemy gunner fired another burst, and I told our own machine gunners to cease firing, almost grateful to the enemy gunner who had fired and cleared the hill of the battalion staff.

• • •

We had already set up our defenses for the night in Altsattel and were delighted to find that the town still had electricity, when Colonel Smith arrived. I was dead tired from the fifteen-mile walk, and I felt that if he said to continue, I would surely fall to the ground exhausted.

He said we would continue to the next town of Prostiborg, however, and I cursed to myself, but there was nothing to do but forget our fatigue and move on.

I assembled the company at the eastern edge of town, and the machine gunners went into position in the last buildings, covering a wide expanse of valley which ended in a high tree-covered ridge which the highway crossed a mile and

one-half from Altsattel. According to my map, Prostiborg lay at the foot of the ridge on the other side, two miles from Altsattel.

I sent the 3d Platoon forward initially, deciding it would be foolish to expose the entire company in the open valley until we discovered if the ridge would be defended. The battalion staff arrived and watched with me from a small knoll at the edge of town.

"Have your men push right along, Mac," the Colonel said. "There's nothing out there." The phrase had become so familiar that it was maddening.

As if it had been waiting for the cue, a round of incoming artillery whistled overhead. It was so strange to hear a round of enemy artillery, that we were almost convinced that it was one of our own rounds, but a second round a few minutes later exploded a hundred yards from the knoll and removed any doubt. It was a German gun. The battalion staff cleared the knoll in one dash, and I was left to run the attack without interruption.

"I'll bet battalion thinks we're in cahoots with the Krauts," Lieutenant Reed said, and winked.

SOURCE: Excerpts from Charles B. MacDonald, *Company Commander* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1947), 82–83, 141–42, 264, 300–01, 303–04. Copyright © 1947 by Charles B. MacDonald. Copyright renewed © 1975 by Charles B. MacDonald. Reprinted by permission of Brandt and Hochman Literary Agents, Inc.

RELATED ARTICLES: Literature and War; World War II

1946 a

REMARKS OF NAVAJO VETERAN ON SERVING IN THE MILITARY

"John Nez," a Rimrock Reservation Navajo, could speak English and had been to school for 10 years before being drafted in 1941. When he returned after the war, he was unwilling to be a traditional "reservation Indian."

I was glad at first to get back and see the folks. Then I got too lonely. It was too lonesome. I didn't like the country too well. Not only around here, but the whole New Mexico. I didn't

like the people. Not only the Indians but also the Mexicans and the white people. It just seems that I didn't get along here. It was especially the Indians around here; too much government control, don't have as much freedom. I felt after being in the army and being told to do this and that, that when I got back I could make a living the way I wanted to instead of being told what to do. . . . When I was away from the reservation, I felt that I had more freedom and I can go anyplace where a white man goes like bars and places that are restricted to Indians on the reservation. I went around with white boys a lot of places where I can't do it here in New Mexico. . . . I wanted to put up some kind of business. I started thinking about it while I was in France in the hospital. Ever since they talk about getting GI loans, I thought anybody could get it. I didn't know it was so difficult. I was thinking about a small trading post. I was thinking about going to school and getting commercial training first. Eddie and I start going around asking people in government administration about it, but it didn't turn out right.

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[The former headman of his community talked to an anthropologist about "John's" behavior after returning from the service:]

I heard John say that he wants to be in big cities, be with white people all the time, and keep clean like he did in the army. But that's what he said when he first got back and still had some money. Now he's broke, and I haven't heard him say it any more. And he's still living out here with the rest of us. . . . I don't know how he was acting before he go to army, but people just been telling me he came back from army and he got a little bit smart among his people when he came home. He told his people that he been to army and he got wounded over there, and white doctors got him well. And he says he's brave, he says, nobody could kill him. That's why he's drinking all the time, he says, he wants to fight with his people. He says he knows how to fight and was trained for it. That's when he's drinking he says that. . . . He thought he had lots of money, and he could drink all he wanted. Then he got broke pretty soon and lose all that money. He thought he had plenty of money to do anything, and nobody would bother him.

• • •

["John" was asked to look at some "Veteran's Apperception Test" pictures of vague, shadowy forms and to construct a story to accompany them:]

#5. This veteran just got back from overseas. The other fellow is a white man. He is trying to get him behind a house because he is a bootlegger and he knows the GI has a lot of money and he is trying to sell him some liquor at a high price. But the soldier refused to listen to him. He's got a lot of experience. He was a corporal in the army and so he went home. He is a good soldier.

#2. This soldier has been away for quite a long time and he's finally got home. He came home to the reservation and found everything about the same as when he left. He stayed around home for a few months—then he re-enlists. He went back to Europe to Germany on occupation duties. [Why did he go back into the army?] For several reasons. Because he doesn't like to stay around home and it's too lonesome and he couldn't find a job that would suit him.

#1. This soldier came home a second time. First he came home and then he re-enlist again but this time he came home for good. He came home with sergeant stripes. A lot of people were waiting for him when he came home. This time he learned mechanics job. So he got himself a job downtown. [And then what happens?] And that's where he is.

#6. (Laughs) The two brothers from somewhere in the reservation came back from the armed service. They were both in the Marine Corps in the same division. They were fighting Japs in the South Pacific. They were doing special duties in the Signal Corps. They came home after the Jap defeat. They came home and found folks and everything were the same. And they don't know just what to do yet. But they don't want to stay around home [Why?] They got a hard time getting readjusted back to civilian life. They been away too long. [Tell me a little about why they have a hard time.] They just don't feel right around home, they feel that they should go outside the reservation where they can become free. . . .

SOURCE: Evon Z. Vogt, "Navajo Veterans," Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, vol. 41, no. 1, 1951: 53–54, 183–84. Reprinted courtesy of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University.

"John Nez" found it very difficult to live on the reservation after Army service. "Yazi Begay," who knew no English and had never been away from Rimrock before being drafted, found the post-service readjustment to reservation life easier, albeit he had changed some of his ways.

When I came back from the army, came back home, I don't like it here very well. It's kind of quiet. Where I been there's lots of noise, lots of noise, lots of things to see. Out here there's nothing to see, just woods. Nothing going on. Just sleep on the ground, not on a bed. Long ways to go to town too. I don't like to stay around here. I felt that way for about a month. Kind of lonesome to go back over to the camps. Also the whole Rimrock area here, it seems a whole lot changed around. But now I don't feel that way. Now I'm all right. . . .

Well, when I came back from the army, my home was the same as it was when I left. But when I came back I said, "I'm going to change it a little bit different." They were living the old way when I came home. It's a whole lot different now. I made a new house and some hogans. It's a whole lot better now. The time I left, they made a fire right on the ground inside the hogan. They had it that way when I came home too. But now I don't do that. I just get hold of a big cook stove. That's what I'm using now. When I came back I said to my wife and her folks, "How come you still living the old way? You should build a hogan the new way and make it nice inside." Now I make it a whole lot different; got a new stove and everything. The old way what people used to do, they didn't put any stove in hogan. The fire made it all black inside hogan. I want it like the white people's way. Keep the hogan nice and clean. That's the way I like it.

[The headman in "Yazi's" community talked about "Yazi" with an anthropologist, Evon Vogt:]

Yazi Begay was telling me about himself. When he first went to the army, he says he know just a few words of English and it was hard when he got into the army, especially when he don't understand English. After he got used to it and learned a few words of English it wasn't so hard. First he said he was with some Mexican who taught him some English words. He got along like that. And he seen lots of things that were hard for him to do. He stay down there

three years. He says he learned a lot of white people's things. Lots of different kinds of things. Machine guns, bombs, everything. He would rather be in that way he says. He wish he could understand English just as well as white people. He just wish that but he don't understand English. He says the white people are a long way ahead of us. Way ahead. We will never catch up. They are making a lot of things. Airplanes. Machine guns. And they sure know how to handle soldiers. He says he learned that when he was down there. He says he is glad that he seen all that, and he's glad he's been over the ocean. First when he start, he never did like it. But after all he liked it. He says he wish he knew more education like them other boys do. When he first came back, he says he had a little money ahead. He could have built up a little store or something else, so as to make a good living—if he only knew how to read, he says he could do that. But he can't do it now he says. He likes white ways just as much as he knows English. He would go on if he knew more English.

[The wife of the Rimrock trader talked about "Yazi" too:]

There has been more change in Yazi Begay than anybody else. He kept himself clean when he got back, and he knew a few words of English. He was a regular old Navaho when he left, but now he's not so bashful. He comes right up to the counter and tells me what he wants. When he first got back, he bought a toothbrush, toothpaste, towel, washrag, bar of soap, shaving cream—everything to keep himself clean.

SOURCE: Evon Z. Vogt, "Navajo Veterans," Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, vol. 41, no. 1, 1951: 158, 160–61. Reprinted courtesy of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University. Compare E. Vogt and J. Adair, "Navajo and Zuni Veterans," *American Anthropologist* (1949): 547 ff.

RELATED ENTRIES: GI Bills; Native Americans in the Military; World War II

1946 b

EXCERPTS FROM *HIROSHIMA*, BY JOHN HERSEY

John Hersey's straightforward report on his interviews with a number of survivors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was published in its entirety as a single issue of The New Yorker magazine on August 31, 1946. His frank style was compelling, as these passages indicate, and its impact on Americans and others throughout the world would be significant.

Dr. Fujii sat down cross-legged in his underwear on the spotless matting of the porch, put on his glasses, and started reading the Osaka Asahi. He liked to read the Osaka news because his wife was there. He saw the flash. To him—faced away from the center and looking at his paper—it seemed a brilliant yellow. Startled, he began to rise to his feet. In that moment (he was 1,550 yards from the center), the hospital leaned behind his rising and, with a terrible ripping noise, toppled into the river. The Doctor, still in the act of getting to his feet, was thrown forward and around and over; he was buffeted and gripped; he lost track of everything, because things were so speeded up; he felt the water.

Dr. Fujii hardly had time to think that he was dying before he realized that he was alive, squeezed tightly by two long timbers in a V across his chest, like a morsel suspended between two huge chopsticks—held upright.

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Everything fell, and Miss Sasaki lost consciousness. The ceiling dropped suddenly and the wooden floor above collapsed in splinters and the people up there came down and the roof above them gave way; but principally and first of all, the bookcases right behind her swooped forward and the contents threw her down, with her left leg horribly twisted and breaking underneath her. There, in the tin factory, in the first moment of the atomic age, a human being was crushed by books.

• • •

Outside the gate of the park, Father Kleinsorge found a faucet that still worked—part of the plumbing of a vanished house—and he filled his vessels and returned. When he had given the wounded the water, he made a second trip. This time the woman by the bridge was dead. On his way back with the water, he got lost on a detour around a fallen tree, and as he looked for his way through the woods, he heard a voice ask from the underbrush, "Have you anything to drink?" He saw a uniform. Thinking there was just one soldier, he approached with the water. When he had penetrated the bushes, he saw there were about twenty men, and they were all in exactly the same nightmarish state: their faces were wholly burned, their eyesockets were hollow, the fluid from their melted eyes had run down their cheeks. (They must have had their face upturned when the bomb went off; perhaps they were anti-aircraft personnel.) Their mouths were mere swollen, pus-covered wounds, which they could not bear to stretch enough to admit the spout of the teapot. So Father Kleinsorge got a large piece of grass and drew out the stem so as to make a straw, and gave them all water to drink that way.

• • •

Dr. Sasaki and his colleagues at the Red Cross Hospital watched the unprecedented disease unfold and at last evolved a theory about its nature. It had, they decided, three stages. The first stage had been all over before the doctors even knew they were dealing with a new sickness; it was the direct reaction to the bombardment of the body, at the moment when the bomb went off, by neutrons, beta particles, and gamma rays. The apparently uninjured people who had died so mysteriously in the first few hours or days had succumbed in this first stage. It killed ninety-five per cent of the people within a half mile of the center, and many thousands who were farther away. The doctors realized in retrospect that even though most of these dead had also suffered from burns and blast effects, they had absorbed enough radiation to kill them. The rays simply destroyed body cells—caused their nuclei to degenerate and broke their walls. Many people who did not die right away came down with nausea, headache, diarrhea, malaise, and fever, which lasted several days. Doctors could not be certain whether some of these symptoms were the result of radiation or nervous shock. The second stage set in ten or fifteen days after the bombing. Its first symptom was falling hair. Diarrhea and fever, which in some cases went as high as 106, came next. Twenty-five to thirty days after the explosion, blood disor-

ders appeared: gums bled, the white-blood-cell count dropped sharply, and petechiae appeared on the skin and mucous membranes. The drop in the number of white blood corpuscles reduced the patient's capacity to resist infection, so open wounds were usually slow in healing and many of the sick developed sore throats and mouths. The two key symptoms, on which the doctors came to base their prognosis, were fever and the lowered white-corpuscle count. If fever remained steady and high, the patient's chances for survival were poor. The white count almost always dropped below four thousand; a patient whose count fell below one thousand had little hope of living. Toward the end of the second stage, if the patient survived, anemia, or a drop in the red blood count, also set in. The third stage was the reaction that came when the body struggled to compensate for its ills—when, for instance, the white count not only returned to normal but increased to much higher than normal levels. In this stage, many patients died of complications, such as infections in the chest cavity.

SOURCE: From John Hersey, *Hiroshima.* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985). Copyright 1946, 1985, and 1974 by John Hersey. Used by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc.

RELATED ENTRIES: Literature and War; Hiroshima; Manhattan Project; World War II

1947

EXCERPTS FROM BILL MAULDIN'S *BACK HOME*

Bill Mauldin returned from the war a Pulitzer prize-winning cartoonist syndicated in more than 100 newspapers. After practicing his trade for some time stateside, he presented a number of his observations in Back Home, published in 1947. These passages by a staunch liberal and enthusiastic member of the American Veterans Committee reflect on the benefits of the GI Bill of Rights, the Baby Boom, the problems vets with families faced in finding housing, his own "survivor guilt," his rejection of racist, anti-Semitic, and ethnocentric views rampant in the service, his championing of Japanese Americans, and his

fear that Cold War America might pursue foreign and military policies that would support fascist dictatorships in the world and militarism at home.

The people who feared that the army had created a generation of bums were in for a surprise when it turned out that veteran-students were as a rule far above their classmates in applying themselves to their work and in scholastic achievement. Many people who teach in schools where numbers of veterans have enrolled feel that most of them were sobered and matured considerably by their wartime experiences and army service and thus have a far greater appreciation of the values of an education than their classmates who, for the most part, are still dependent upon their parents for support and spending money and haven't yet been faced with the hard facts of life. Also, a hell of a lot of the college vets were married, and marital responsibility can keep a young gent's nose to the grindstone like nothing else. Carl Rose did a New Yorker cartoon in this connection which is a real masterpiece. He filled a full page with a detailed drawing of a commencement exercise, with hundreds of young men in caps and gowns looking somewhat wryly at the distinguished old speaker on the platform, who says, as dozens of young wives sit on the side lines with babies swarming over them, ". . . . and as you leave these tranquil, ivied walls to face the stern realities of life. . . ."

Two great problems beset the veterans who went back to school: money, because the GI Bill of Rights provided them with a sum that fell pitifully short of the amount required for the barest necessities; and housing. While I didn't do many drawings about the schools themselves, I spattered a lot of ink around on the housing situation.

• • •

I had had more than a speaking acquaintance with the international fracas that had just ended, and couldn't subdue a sneaking feeling of wonderment and guilt that old man Mars, who had started me in the same boat with several million other guys, had kicked most of them in the teeth, but had in the end treated me so well. I have talked with several other gents who came out of the war in better shape than when they went in, and they have told me they share that feeling. None of us has been inclined to act like a slob about

it — weeping in his beer about the fortunes of war and his poor lost comrades and that sort of spectacular stuff — but we all had friends who were killed or crippled or had their lives, marriages, or careers wrecked in the past few years, and while we went ahead and enjoyed our good fortune, we did a little silent thinking to ourselves. It does throw a slight damper on your exuberance.

• • •

Somewhere in my early childhood and in the army I developed a rather suspicious and rebellious attitude toward stuffed shirts, and since it has been my experience that more stuffed shirts are to be found in the higher ranks of wealth and position than anywhere else, I find myself more often in sympathy with the people who oppose the "elite" than not.

• • •

I remember that one of the first shocks I got when I went to live in California after being discharged was the attitude among many residents toward the Japanese-Americans on the West Coast. I had grown up in New Mexico and Arizona, where I had heard some talk in my childhood about the "Japs" and the "Chinks" who "worked so cheaply and threatened the standard of living of the white men," but there hadn't been much of it, because in the places where I had lived Orientals were very scarce. The prejudices I had picked up early in life were confined to a vague feeling of aloofness toward people of Mexican extraction, who account for a good part of the population in that area, and a mild anti-Semitism, which came more from hearsay than anything else. So, because my childhood had been luckily devoid of extensive indoctrination in the glories of being a white Protestant, I came out of the army minus the few prejudices I had carried into it. During my service, I had seen some boorish Negroes, some unpleasant Jews, and some obnoxious Catholics, but I couldn't honestly say that there were any more bums in their ranks than among the "pure." The behavior of the soldiers I saw was good or bad in accordance with their upbringing and their character, rather than with their faith or ancestry.

It would be lovely if the statement, made by so many idealists, were true—that association with all races, creeds, and colors in the army cured everybody of his prejudices. Men from some areas had been taught almost from birth by family, friends, teachers, and even clergymen in some cases, to hate racial or religious groups other than their own. A few years in the army will not delouse a mind that has been that thoroughly poisoned. If a drunken Negro soldier made a spectacle of himself, he was typical of all Negroes; if a Jewish soldier was brave, he proved that Jews are troublesome; if he was timid, he proved the Jews are cowards; if he had money, he proved that Jews are selfish; if he was broke, he proved that Jews are worthless. To the minds of the indoctrinated, a bad non-Aryan was typical of his group, while a bad Aryan was nothing but a single renegade. Those of us whose indoctrination had been slight were lucky, because we were able to see all kinds of people under all kinds of conditions and were able to apply logic and come out with the conclusion that there are heels and heroes in every family.

But if my other prejudices had just sort of disappeared, I became positively lyrical about the Japanese-Americans. I saw a great deal of them in Italy where they had been formed into a battalion that fought with the 34th Division, and into two full regiments that sort of free-lanced around doing heavy fighting for everybody. Some of the boys in those outfits were from the West Coast, and some from Hawaii. A great deal has been written about their prowess, and I won't go into details, except to say that, to my knowledge and the knowledge of numerous others who had the opportunity of watching a lot of different outfits overseas, no combat unit in the army could exceed them in loyalty, hard work, courage, and sacrifice. Hardly a man of them hadn't been decorated at least twice, and their casualty rates were appalling. And if a skeptic wonders whether these aren't just "Japanese characteristics," he would do well to stifle the thought if he is around an infantry veteran who had experience with the Nisei unit.

• • •

If we must become strong in arms again, we should agitate against the professional militarists, the imperialists, the bigots, and the little Führers in our midst; it would be a terrible thing if the strength we built up fell into their hands. And we have even more reason to raise hell about our policy of buddying up with the world's worst characters – many of whom were recently our enemies – and lending support to oppressive regimes such as those in Greece and China. I

think our way of life can bear inspection if it needs the world's fascists for allies.

• • •

I don't trust the army, I don't like the army, and I even poke fun at its recruiting program. Perhaps, under all the pompous and high-sounding words I have mouthed about why we should have an army, I want it around so I can draw more pictures about it.

SOURCE: Bill Mauldin, *Back Home* (New York: William Morrow [William Sloane], 1947), 60–61, 129, 154, 162–65, 302–03, 309–10. © William Mauldin. Reprinted by permission from HarperCollins Publishers.

RELATED ENTRIES: American Veterans Committee; Baby Boom; 442nd Regimental Combat Team of Nisei; G.I. Bills; Japanese Americans, Internment of; World War II

1948 a

PSYCHIATRIC CASE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II TAILGUNNER

A psychiatrist wrote this case history of an AAF veteran whose neurosis appears to have stemmed, in large measure, from his religious sensitivity about his having killed many innocent people.

Born to a very religious Midwestern family, P.P.T. started attending church at an early age. As well as being the religious center of his community, the church was also a major factor in much of its social life. As he grew up, graduating from high school and taking his first job, he came to accept the religious precepts as basic to his way of life. He attended services twice a week and participated actively in church affairs. Religion was his guide as well as his solace. To flout its doctrines was to flout not only his God and his family, but the whole community of which he was a part. After leaving school P.P.T. worked for four years as a truck driver and construction laborer before entering the Army at age of twenty-two.

During the first nine months of his service career he was shifted rapidly from one air field to another—Florida, Utah, Colorado, Washington, Oregon, Nebraska. By the time this

training was completed he was qualified to work as a gunner on the large bombers and had attained the rank of sergeant. Although this was not the type of duty he would have chosen he accepted it. Next he was sent to England and joined a bomber squadron that had already amassed an impressive record in raids over France and Germany. His first mission was an easy one, but after that it was very difficult. The flak was almost always heavy and enemy fighters were everywhere. His pilot was killed on one raid, his bombardier on another. Once they just barely made it back to England after losing three engines and putting out a fire in the cockpit.

P.P.T. was frightened, but even more, he felt terribly guilty. Every time his plane went up its only purpose was to drop bombs on defenseless people. His job as a gunner was to kill enemy fliers and he did his job. But it seemed all wrong to him. This was contrary to his religion and everything that he had learned prior to entering the Army. He felt that he was guilty of participating in a never ending series of heinous crimes for which his family, his community, and his God must always condemn him. He became jittery, could not sleep, and vomited frequently. Yet he kept going and completed his twenty-five missions in a commendable manner. Seven months after leaving the United States he was on his way home again.

After a furlough, he returned to duty still completely obsessed with guilt. If anything, his state was worse than when he had been in combat. He didn't want to do anything, could not eat or sleep and had the sensation that ants were crawling all over his body. Hospitalized, he poured forth his preoccupations to the doctor: "There was the raid the day before Christmas. We had to go. I didn't want to kill those poor people. . . . I shot down a man, a German. I feel guilty about it. We shouldn't kill people. Here they hang people for that. . . . I guess that is what bothers me most. I killed somebody. . . . I think about that German I shot down. I know it was him or me, but I just can't forget that I saw him blow up. Up to then it was just an airplane. Then I realized that there was a man in the plane. . . . I keep trying to think that it is all behind me, but I can't. I just think about it and get upset. I can't read or go to classes without thinking about it. You have fighters coming at you in bed and you can't do anything about it. I keep dreaming about it. I just can't help it." The

doctor tried to convince him that he had only been doing his duty, but to no avail, and he was finally discharged virtually unimproved by his hospital stay.

Within two months of leaving the Army P.P.T. started work in a steel plant. At first he found it difficult to work; he was plagued with frequent thoughts and dreams of combat. He did not go to church or associate with his old friends. Gradually, however, he began to participate in community activities and finally started going to church again. By 1948, although still rather restless and suffering from insomnia, he had almost fitted himself back into his old pattern of life. He enjoyed his job, went hunting and fishing for recreation, and was thinking of getting married. He felt far less guilty than he had when he returned from Europe. Later he married and had two children. He feels very much a part of his community again and has, as he sees it, returned to a religious way of life.

SOURCE: From Eli Ginzberg, et al., eds., *Breakdown and Recovery, vol. 11 of The Ineffective Soldier* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 113–15. Copyright © 1959 Columbia University Press. Reprinted with permission from the publisher.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; World War II

1948 b

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9981: DESEGREGATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

On July 26, 1948, Pres. Harry Truman signed an order banning racial discrimination in the armed forces. He later explained that his intention was to end segregation in the armed forces as well. The Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity created by this order recommended such desegregation, which was quickly implemented by the Navy and Air Force. Truman's action thus became a watershed not only in military history, but in social history as well. Alongside a range of other social reforms taking effect in the middle of the century, Executive Order 9981 was instrumental in opening up opportunities to African Americans in the later decades of the 20th century.

Establishing the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity In the Armed Forces.

WHEREAS it is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve in our country's defense:

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the armed services, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.

2. There shall be created in the National Military Establishment an advisory committee to be known as the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, which shall be composed of seven members to be designated by the President.

3. The Committee is authorized on behalf of the President to examine into the rules, procedures and practices of the Armed Services in order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order. The Committee shall confer and advise the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and shall make such recommendations to the President and to said Secretaries as in the judgment of the Committee will effectuate the policy hereof.

4. All executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Committee in its work, and to furnish the Committee such information or the services of such persons as the Committee may require in the performance of its duties.

5. When requested by the Committee to do so, persons in the armed services or in any of the executive depart-

ments and agencies of the Federal Government shall testify before the Committee and shall make available for use of the Committee such documents and other information as the Committee may require.

6. The Committee shall continue to exist until such time as the President shall terminate its existence by Executive order.

Harry Truman

The White House

July 26, 1948

SOURCE: U.S. National Archives & Records Administration, "Executive Order 9981: Desegregation of the Armed Forces (1948)."

http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=84&page=transcript (August 14, 2005).

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Executive Order 8802; Executive Order 8802; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces; Truman, Harry S.

1949 (to 1950)

ATTITUDE OF VETERANS AND NONVETERAN FATHERS DURING WORLD WAR II TOWARD PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRST-BORN

Veterans surveyed by academics after the war complained of what they regarded as their wives' permissive rearing of their children, especially when the children had been too young to remember their fathers before the war. Fathers who had not served in the military and had not been separated from their families had few of these kinds of complaints.

Traits	War-separated	Non-separated
CRITICIZED		
Highly emotional	7	5
Unhappy	2	-
Stubborn	5	4
Disrespectful	3	-
Selfish	3	1
Demanding	3	-
Unresponsive	7	-
"Sissy"	9	5
Other	16	11
Total	62	29
APPROVED		
Intelligent	11	17
Verbal	4	5
Creative	1	3
Disciplined	3	5
"Good"	2	8
Self-reliant	2	5
Sense of humor	3	5
Friendly	3	10
Good natured	1	3
Interested	1	5
Other	3	8
Total	34	74

NOTE: Figures indicate numbers of responses, not percentages.

SOURCE: Lois Stolz and Herbert Stolz, *Father Relations of War-Born Children.* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1950), 31, 66.

RELATED ENTRIES: Baby Boom; Combat, Effects of; World War II

1950 a

WORLD WAR II VETERAN'S ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENCE IN SERVICE

A World War II veteran from the Midwest wondered whether his military service had helped him to see beyond his hometown:

The service made me see that this is rather a small-minded town. . . . Here they don't count on a person's ability. All they are interested in here is what's gone before—what the person, or people with him, have done in the past. I found this in the service, that it was the man's intelligence and ability which decided he would go ahead, and how far he would go. There's no prejudice because of your name—Romero or Smith or Brown. But here if you don't have a perfect back-

ground, it's no good. In the service a man gets ahead maybe by playing politics a bit. But there your past doesn't count a damn thing. It is your present that counts, and what you can do in the future. In this town I know I could do lots of jobs as well as perhaps half of the people here, but I wouldn't even have a chance, simply because of my [unpopular father].

I like to be left alone and do what I please, without someone forever forming a criticism of whatever I do. In a big city you get lost—or a fairly big city. But even if I hadn't been in service, I doubt if I'd ever have stayed in Midwest. I always realized that there were very few opportunities here for me. I've got a lot of ambition and so on, and even though I don't know whether my plans will come through or not, if they don't it will be simply because I'm not working. I'm not going to let this town of Midwest stop me from working them out.

SOURCE: Robert Havighurst, *The American Veteran Back Home* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1951), 119-20.

RELATED ENTRIES: Geneva and Hague Conventions; Korean War

1950 b

LYRICS TO THE R.O.T.C. SONG

Since 1916, one of the main sources of junior officers for each of the services has been the college-based Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). Until the last quarter of the 20th century, few officers who entered via ROTC made it to flag rank (general or admiral), and service academy graduates looked down upon their "Rotsie" compeers. Colin Powell, a ROTC graduate of the City University of New York, went on to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His success represents a growing trend away from those earlier prejudices, reflected in this song, sung to the tune "My Bonnie."

Some mothers have sons in the Army.
Some mothers have sons o'er the sea.
But take down your service flag, Mother;
Your son's in the R.O.T.C.

Chorus:
R.—O.
R.—O.
Your son's in the R.O.T.C., T.C.
R.—O.
R.—O.
Your son's in the R.O.T.C.

Some join for the love of the Service.
Some join for the love of the Sea.
But I know a guy who's a Rotsie:
He joined for a college degree.

Oh, we are the "Weekend Commandos":
The "Summertime Sailors" are we.
So take down your service flag, Mother;
Your son's in the R.O.T.C.

These Navy versions of "My Bonnie" have become quite popular in the Fleet since the Second World War. The first expresses the Marine Pilots' unhappiness at having to operate from escort carriers (CVE's) with their small flight decks, and their envy of the Navy pilots flying from the large carriers (CVA's). "The R.O.T.C. Song" has sprung up from the good-natured rivalry between the Naval Academy midshipmen and the members of the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps.

SOURCE: Joseph W. Crosley and the United States Naval Institute, *The Book of Navy Songs.* (Annapolis: United States Naval Academy, 1955).

RELATED ENTRIES: Music and War; ROTC Programs

1950 c

RANDOM HOUSE'S BENNETT CERF PRAISING MILITARY AFTER ATTENDING

By 1950 the services had become skilled at promoting their usefulness to the public-opinion shapers of the nation with such programs as the Joint Civilian Orientation Conference. Bennett Cerf attended one such "dog-and-pony-show" (as these came to be called by those who staged them) and reported his "ten days with the armed forces" in the

Saturday Review, shortly before the beginning of the Korean War.

It's become fashionable to remember just where you were or what you were doing when the news broke about Pearl Harbor. Should the invasion of South Korea prove an equally fateful moment in world history, I for one will have no trouble remembering where I heard about it. I was on the hangar deck of the *Midway*, the queen of the U.S. Navy's carriers, steaming to sea for a rendezvous with Task Force 23 and a brief but intensive series of naval operations in the 1950 manner. It was a stunning climax to a session of talks by top Government officials at the Pentagon Building, a display of new weapons and infantry tactics at Fort Benning, Georgia, and an inspiring show of the latest equipment and striking power of the Air Force at Eglin Base, Florida. The program was arranged for the Seventh Joint Orientation Conference, and that I was invited to be a member of it I consider one of the biggest honors and luckiest breaks of my career.

At Fort Benning, Georgia (the population of the post exceeds 30,000; the area comprises 282 square miles), the JOC had its first taste of life in the field, and the sounding of reveille at 5:45 A.M. provoked a stream of reminiscences about World War I which were, unfortunately, listened to by nobody. . . . A display of our remarkable new recoilless weapons (and other arms still considered secret) had the audience gasping. . . . The airborne troops begin their parachute training in a control tower exactly like the one that packed them in at the New York World's Fair and is now operating at Steeplechase Park. The stunt they perform just five weeks later give you goose pimples! . . .

I came home revitalized and simply busting to shout from the housetops this deep-felt conviction: when and if a war comes with Russia or anybody else this country is blessed with the basic equipment and leadership to knock hell out of them. We need more fighter planes and more carriers. We need more men in the armed forces. Our intelligence and propaganda departments need bolstering most of all. The money already allotted to defense has been, on the whole, wisely spent. In light of day-to-day news developments, increased appropriations are not only a wise invest-ment but an absolute "must." When your life is at stake, you don't haggle over the cost.

SOURCE: Saturday Review, July 22, 1950, 3 ff.

RELATED ENTRIES: Cold War; Frontline Reporting; Korean War

1950 d

EXCERPT FROM HARRY J. MAIHAFER'S *FROM THE HUDSON TO THE YALU: WEST POINT IN THE KOREAN WAR*

Lt. Harry Maihafer graduated from West Point in 1949. Within a year he was a platoon leader in the Korean War. His autobiographical account of that experience includes this insight into his humanity and professionalism.

A cave—there appeared to be one far to my front—a dark rectangle at the base of a steep slope. I pointed it out to the leader of the 75-mm recoilless rifle crew. The gun was brought into position, sighted carefully, and fired. There was an ear-splitting roar, the characteristic sheet of flame to the weapon's rear, and an instant later a puff of smoke in the distance, about fifty yards short of the cave. The crew resighted and fired again. This time the shell hit on the hillside, a few yards to the left of the cave's mouth. I called an adjustment, and a third round was fired. This one was almost exactly on target and hit only a few yards from the opening.

I looked through my binoculars and waited for the smoke to clear so as to make another adjustment. Suddenly I saw frenzied activity. People came running from the cave, waving their arms and holding up strips of white. Soon there seemed to be a crowd, a hundred or more, apparently all civilians. They moved slightly in our direction, then stopped. Three figures detached themselves from the group and kept coming.

The three were a long time getting to us, but eventually we saw they were older, white-bearded men carrying flags of truce—bamboo poles with white articles of clothing tied to the ends. They labored up our hill and told their story to an interpreter.

When the fighting had come this way, the people of their village had taken refuge in a large cave known to all

who lived in this area. Earlier in the day, enemy soldiers had come and tried to join them in the cave. But the people, especially the women, had shrieked that the Communist soldiers must go, that they would only bring trouble for all. Some of the villagers had wanted to come tell the Americans what was happening, but the Communists had threatened to kill them. Finally the soldiers had left, but only after cautioning them not to go to the Americans, who would be sure to kill any who came forth.

The leader had come to ask safe passage for his people. He and his two courageous companions were offering themselves as test cases—possible victims—in case the Communist warnings were true. I assured the leader they could pass through without harm, and the three patriarchs returned and led their people forward. Slowly the column, a ragged procession of old men, women, and children, wound its way up our mountain. I shuddered to think what would have happened had one of our shells actually entered the cave.

SOURCE: Harry J. Maihafer, *From the Hudson to the Yalu: West Point [Class of 1949] in the Korean War* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1993), 106. Reprinted by permission of the Texas A&M University Press.

RELATED ENTRIES: *Cold War; General Orders, No. 100; Geneva and Hague Conventions; Korean War*

1951

RECALL OF GEN. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

When the Korean War began, President Truman was empowered to appoint Gen. Douglas MacArthur to the position of commander of United Nations forces there. After MacArthur oversaw a successful end-around amphibious landing at Inchon, U.S.–UN troops routed the North Korean army and drove north towards the border with China. With increasing frequency, General MacArthur differed publicly with his commander in chief about questions of military strategy and policy. MacArthur wrote to the leadership of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of "unleashing Chang Kai-shek," the defeated Nationalist Chinese leader who had withdrawn with several hundred thousand of his troops to the island of Taiwan. After Chinese forces began flooding into North Korea (something MacArthur had assured the president would not occur), he wrote House Speaker Joe Martin, insisting that the war could only be won by going "all-out" and bombing Chinese bases and staging areas in Manchuria. The president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reluctant to risk widening the war, disagreed fundamentally on these issues, and Gen. Omar Bradley, Army chief of staff, told a congressional committee as much, and defended the president's decision to relieve MacArthur of command and replace him with Gen. Matthew Ridgway. Truman explained that decision to the nation, and the world:

I want to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East.

In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war.

I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now, many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action.

It is right for us to be in Korea. It was right last June. It is right today.

I want to remind you why this is true.

The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot—and will not—sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: When is the best time to meet the threat and how?

The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.

And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is for the peace-loving nations to act together. If they don't act together, they are likely to be picked off, one by one. . . .

This is the basic reason why we joined in creating the United Nations. And since the end of World War II we have been putting that lesson into practice—we have been working with other free nations to check the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union before they can result in a third world war.

That is what we did in Greece, when that nation was threatened by aggression of international communism.

The attack against Greece could have led to general war. But this country came to the aid of Greece. The United Nations supported Greek resistance. With our help, the determination and efforts of the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot.

Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade. That too could have led to war. But again it was settled because free men would not back down in an emergency. . . .

The question we have had to face is whether the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without general war. Our Government and other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there.

That is what we have been doing. It is a difficult and bitter task.

But so far it has been successful.

So far, we have prevented World War III.

So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding and bringing on a general war. And the ability of the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has been greatly improved.

We have taught the enemy a lesson. He has found out that aggression is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world who want to remain free have been given new courage and new hope. They know now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight.

Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indochina and other countries in that part of the world. It has already slowed down the timetable of conquest. . . .

We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war—not to start one. The best way to do this is to make plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack.

But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor? Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?

If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent.

If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world.

What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for military forces to be committed to a full-scale war with Red China?

The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow. . . .

If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is always open.

Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course.

I believe that we must try to limit war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important than any individual.

The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

The new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already demonstrated that he has the great qualities of military leadership needed for this task.

We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace.

Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors:

One: the fighting must stop.

Two: concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.

Three: there must be an end to the aggression.

A settlement founded upon these three elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces. This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea.

This is our military objective—to repel attack and to restore peace.

In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggres-

sion in Korea may be the turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving peace and security.

The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace.

The free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war.

That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming.

We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And so in doing we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

SOURCE: U.S. State Department Bulletin, 16 April 1951.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil–Military Relations; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; Truman, Harry S.

1953

CASE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II PSYCHIATRIC CASUALTY

Psychiatrists serving with the Army and Veterans Administration conducted these case histories of World War II psychiatric casualties. One case history described the experience of one veteran, including his condition a decade after combat stress had been experienced:

The youngest of five children, U.V. left his parents' Midwestern farm shortly after completing two years of high school and secured employment as a carpenter's helper in a nearby town. Married in 1937, he continued working at this trade until inducted late in 1942. Assigned to an anti-aircraft unit, he participated in the Normandy invasion and in the campaign across northern France. He was in good health and his character and efficiency ratings were "excellent."

After about two months of combat he was knocked unconscious by the blast of an aerial bomb. Because he complained of headaches, dizziness, and a "roaring in the ears," the aid station transferred him to the evacuation hospital where his condition was at first described as "mild." However, his headaches grew worse, and his dizziness was

accompanied by spells of nausea and vomiting. U.V. developed increasing nervous tension, had battle dreams, and jumped at any loud noise. Five months of hospitalization in England failed to reveal any organic basis for his persistent headaches but he showed no improvement. He was evacuated to the United States where his hospitalization continued for another seven months in general and convalescent hospitals. Finally, shortly before V-J Day, he was given a medical discharge with a diagnosis of psychoneurosis, acute, severe, anxiety state.

U.V. went back to the family farm and tried to return to the carpentry trade but could not make it. He could not tolerate the noises nor could he climb ladders. Unable to work, he puttered around the farm, and received as his only cash income the 70 percent disability compensation which the Veterans Administration had awarded him. Successive examinations failed to reveal any improvement in his emotional state. He started a liberal arts course at a junior college but soon dropped out. He was not considered suitable for training under Public Law 16 until he improved.

Over the next few years he worked occasionally at odd jobs but never for long. He had difficulties in securing jobs because he detailed his symptoms and his disabilities to any prospective employer. At times, he was able to work reasonably well but either he quit or his temporary work had ended. One employer reported (in 1950) that the veteran was "an excellent painter and carpenter but that he doesn't seem able to work. He frequently blew up on a job and went to pieces." His wife had left him and later divorced him.

He is still rated as 50 percent disabled by the Veterans Administration and the last information (1953) indicates that for the past several years he had been earning some money by working as a part-time contact man for the local post of a veterans' service organization. But his supervisor reports that he could never qualify for a service representative since he appears to be incapable of assuming responsibility. Even with close supervision he had not been doing very well since he made more promises to veterans seeking help than he could possibly fulfill. In communal activities, he would start out on a new project with great enthusiasm but soon tired and moved on to something else.

SOURCE: Eli Ginzberg et al., eds., *Breakdown and Recovery,* vol. 2, *The Ineffective Soldier* (New York: Columbia University Press,1959), 231-32. Copyright © 1959 Columbia University Press. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; World War II

1957 (to 1958)
EXCERPT FROM *BORN ON THE FOURTH OF JULY* BY RON KOVIC

The Cold War with the Soviet Union was a very real one to Americans like young Ron Kovic in the 1950s:

We joined the cub scouts and marched in parades on Memorial Day. We made contingency plans for the Cold War and built fallout shelters out of milk cartons. We wore spacesuits and space helmets. We made rocket ships out of cardboard boxes. And one Saturday afternoon in the basement Castiglia [a friend] and I went to Mars on the couch we had turned into a rocket ship. . . . And the whole block watched a thing called the space race begin. On a cold October night Dad and I watched the first satellite, called Sputnik, moving across the sky above our house like a tiny bright star. I still remember standing out there with Dad looking up in amazement at that thing moving in the sky above Massapequa. It was hard to believe that this thing, this Sputnik, was so high up and moving so fast around the world, again and again. Dad put his hand on my shoulder that night and without saying anything I quietly walked back inside and went to my room thinking that the Russians had beaten America into space and wondering why we couldn't even get a rocket off the pad. . . .

The Communists were all over the place back then. And if they weren't trying to beat us into outer space, Castiglia and I were certain they were infiltrating our schools, trying to take over our classes and control our minds. We were both certain that one of our teachers was a secret Communist agent and in our next secret club meeting we promised to report anything new he said during our next history class. We watched him very carefully that year.

RELATED ENTRIES: Born on the Fourth of July; Cold War; Film and War; Literature and War; Marine Corps; Vietnam War

1961

PRES. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER'S FAREWELL ADDRESS

Dwight Eisenhower served two terms as president of the United States. At the end of his second term, in early 1961, he gave his farewell address, which included a warning about what he called "the military–industrial complex." His experience as a student at the Army Industrial College, as a planner for the U.S. Army's mobilization prior to U.S. entry into World War II, as supreme Allied commander of European forces, and as president give his words the authority on the subject that they have enjoyed ever since.

Delivered on January 17, 1961

Good evening, my fellow Americans.

First, I should like to express my gratitude to the radio and television networks for the opportunity they have given me over the years to bring reports and messages to our nation. My special thanks go to them for the opportunity of addressing you this evening.

Three days from now, after a half century of service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the presidency is vested in my successor.

This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.

Like every other citizen, I wish the new president, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all. Our people expect their president and the Congress to find essential agreement on questions of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the nation.

My own relations with Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and finally to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years.

In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the nation well rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the nation should go forward. So my official relationship with Congress ends in a feeling on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.

We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

Throughout America's adventure in free government, such basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among peoples and among nations.

To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people.

Any failure traceable to arrogance or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us a grievous hurt, both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration.

To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex

struggle—with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in the newer elements of our defenses; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research—these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in light of a broader consideration; the need to maintain balance in and among national programs—balance between the private and the public economy, balance between the cost and hoped for advantages—balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between the actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their Government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well in the face of threat and stress.

But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. Of these, I mention two only.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a per-

manent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment.

We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central, it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity.

For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers. The prospect of domination of

the nation's scholars by federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we—you and I, and our government—must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without asking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war—as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years—I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight. Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been

made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

So—in this my last good night to you as your president—I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.

You and I—my fellow citizens—need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nations' great goals.

To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America's prayerful and continuing aspiration:

We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.

Now, on Friday noon, I am to become a private citizen. I am proud to do so. I look forward to it.

Thank you, and good night.

SOURCE: "Eisenhower's Farewell Address," TomPaine.com, http://www.tompaine.com/feature.cfm/ID/3749 (accessed May 27, 2005).

RELATED ENTRIES: Cold War; Economy and War; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Militarization and Militarism; Military-Industrial Complex

1964

VETERAN HAROLD BOND'S REFLECTIONS ON RETURNING TO MONTE CASSINO

Veterans may be slow initially in associating with veterans' organizations but, as time passes, the impact of military service stands out more clearly in their memories. Harold Bond, a veteran of World War II in Italy, took his family back to the scene in the early 1960s to share with them his reminiscences.

Monte Cassino has haunted my mind for the past twenty years. The last time I saw the abbey and the town was on a cold, wet afternoon in late February 1944, when I was being evacuated to an army field hospital. I had been an infantry soldier engaged in the bitter fighting on the German Gustav Line. This was the worst combat of the entire war for me, and during the long years of peace that followed, memories of it came back again. Scenes and incidents which I would have been happy to forget remained disconcertingly vivid. They were troublesome memories, and sometimes I brooded over them.

Like other ex-soldiers after the war, I was caught up in the business of starting a career in the workaday world and raising a family. There is little connection between a great battle and the ordinary rounds of life in peacetime, and as the war slipped further into the past I rarely heard mention of Monte Cassino and almost never had occasion to talk about it. Yet I found myself now and again reflecting on the terrible fighting. With experiences such as those I had had so deeply branded on my mind, I could not help wondering what they finally did mean to me and to the others with whom I had shared them. Had they consisted, after all, merely of senseless suffering without meaning, or was there a significance in them that I had been unable to discover?

SOURCE: Harold Bond, *Return to Cassino* (New York: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1964), 1.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; Memory and War; World War II

1965 a

SEYMOUR MELMAN ON AMERICA'S AGING METAL-WORKING MACHINERY

In 1965 Columbia University economist Seymour Melman carried President Eisenhower's warning (see document 1961 above) to the next level with a critique of the ways that massive military spending was sapping the nation's economic vitality. This brief passage from his book Our Depleted Society offers a taste of his analysis:

In 1963, the United States reached the position of operating the oldest stock of metal-working machinery of any industrial country in the world. . . .

Here is a portrait of antiquity in American production. The percentage of machines in use that was twenty years old or older in 1963:

	%
Machine Tools	20
Ships and Railroad Equipment	41
Construction, Mining, Materials Handling	25
Precision Instruments and Mechanisms	15
Electrical Equipment	16
Automobiles	23
Office Machines	14
Special Industry Machinery	28

Since 1925 the McGraw-Hill organization has been conducting national "inventories" of the machine tools and other equipment in American industry. The following data show the proportion of metal-cutting machines in American industry found to be ten years old or older at the indicated times:

1925……..44	1945……..38
1930……..52	1949……..43
1935……..67	1953……..55
1940……..72	1958……..60

1963……..64

The growing age of the machine tools in use in American factories means that 2.2 million basic manufacturing machines are not being replaced by newer equipment that could incorporate many technical improvements.

SOURCE: Seymour Melman, *Our Depleted Society* (New York: Rinehart & Winston: 1965), 50.

RELATED ENTRIES: Cold War; Economy and War; Military–Industrial Complex; Vietnam War

1965 b

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM'S CHANNELING MANPOWER MEMO

The Selective Service System, created in 1948 to provide military personnel that would be deployed on an as-needed basis, as well as a pool of semi-experienced reserves, was defended by President Truman when he proposed it as a measure that would "raise the physical standard of the nation's manpower, lower the illiteracy rate, develop citizenship responsibilities, and foster the moral and spiritual welfare of our young people." It also served to encourage those who preferred to acquire skills "vital to the national interest" to do so if they wished to be made exempt from military service. This memo was prepared by the director of the system's office in 1965 to provide information to new local Selective Service board members charged with determining who was to be considered exempt.

One of the major products of the Selective Service classification process is the channeling of manpower into many endeavors and occupations; activities that are in the national interest. This function is a counterpart and amplification of the System's responsibility to deliver manpower to the armed forces in such a manner as to reduce to a minimum any adverse effect upon the national health, safety, interest, and progress. By identifying and applying this process intelligently, the System is able not only to minimize any adverse effect, but to exert an effect beneficial to the national health, safety and interest.

The line dividing the primary function of armed forces manpower procurement from the process of channeling manpower into civilian support is often finely drawn. The process of channeling by not taking men from certain activities who are otherwise liable for service, or by giving deferments to qualified men in certain occupations, is actual procurement by inducement of manpower of civilian activities which are manifestly in the national interest.

While the best known purpose of Selective Service is to procure manpower for the armed forces, a variety of related processes takes place outside delivery of manpower to the active armed forces. Many of these may be put under the heading of "channeling manpower." Many young men would have not pursued a higher education if there had not been a program of student deferments. Many young scientists, engineers, tool and die makers, and other possessors of scarce skills would not remain in their jobs in the defense effort if it were not for a program of occupational deferment. Even though the salary of a teacher has historically been meager, many young men remain in that job seeking the reward of deferment. The process of channeling manpower by deferment is entitled to much credit for the large amount of graduate students in technical fields and for the fact that there is not a greater shortage of teachers, engineers, and other scientists working in activities which are essential to the national interest.

The opportunity to enhance the national well-being by inducing more registrants to participate in fields which relate directly to the national interest came about as a consequence, soon after the close of the Korean episode, of the knowledge within the System that there was enough registrant personnel to allow stringent deferment practices employed during war time to be relaxed or tightened as the situation might require. Circumstances had become favorable to induce registrants, by the attraction of deferment, to matriculate in schools and pursue subjects in which there was beginning to be a national shortage of personnel. These were particularly in the engineering, scientific, and teaching professions.

In the Selective Service System, the term "deferment" has been used millions of times to describe the method and means used to attract to the kind of service considered to be the most important, the individuals who were not compelled to do it. The club of induction has been used to drive out of areas considered to be less important to the areas of greater importance in which deferments were given, the individuals who did not or could not participate in activities which were considered essential to the Nation. The Selective Service

System anticipates evolution in this area. It is promoting the process by the granting of deferments in liberal numbers where the national need clearly would benefit.

Soon after Sputnik I was launched it became popular to reappraise critically our educational, scientific, and technological inventory. Many deplored our shortage of scientific and technical personnel, inadequacies of our schools, and shortage of teachers. Since any analysis having any connection with manpower and its relation to the Nation's survival vitally involves the Selective Service System, it is well to point out that for quite some time the System had been following a policy of deferring instructors who were engaged in the teaching of mathematics and physical and biological sciences. It is appropriate also to recall the System's previously invoked practice of deferring students to prepare themselves for work in some essential activity and the established program of deferring engineers, scientists, and other critically skilled persons who were working in essential fields.

The Congress, in enacting the Universal Military Training and Service legislation declared that adequate provisions for national security required maximum effort in the fields of scientific research and development, and the fullest possible utilization of the Nation's technological, scientific, and other critical manpower resources. To give effect to this philosophy, the classifying boards of the Selective Service System defer registrants determined by them to be necessary in the national health, safety, or interest. This is accomplished on the basis of evidence of record in each individual case. No group deferments are permitted. Deferments are granted, however, in a realistic atmosphere so that the fullest effect of channeling will be felt, rather than be terminated by military service at too early a time.

Registrants and their employers are encouraged and required to make available to the classifying authorities detailed evidence as to the occupations and activities in which registrants are engaged. It is not necessary for any registrant to specifically request deferment, but his selective service file must contain sufficient current evidence on which can be based a proper determination as to whether he should remain where he is or be made available for service. Since occupational deferments are granted for no more than a year at a time, a process of periodically receiving current information and repeated review assures that every deferred registrant continues to contribute to the overall national good. This reminds him of the basis of his deferment. The skills as well as the activities are periodically reevaluated. A critical skill that is not employed in an essential activity does not qualify for deferment.

It is in this atmosphere that the young man registers at age 18 and pressure begins to force his choice. He does not have the inhibitions that a philosophy of universal service in uniform would engender. The door is open for him as a student to qualify if capable in a skill needed by his nation. He has many choices and he is prodded to make a decision.

The psychological effect of this circumstantial climate depends upon the individual, his sense of good citizenship, his love of country and its way of life. He can obtain a sense of well being and satisfaction that he is doing as a civilian what will help his country most. This process encourages him to put forth his best effort and removes to some degree the stigma that has been attached to being out of uniform.

In the less patriotic and more selfish individual it engenders a sense of fear, uncertainty, and dissatisfaction which motivates him, nevertheless, in the same direction. He complains of the uncertainty which he must endure; he would like to be able to do as he pleases; he would appreciate a certain future with no prospect of military service or civilian contribution, but he complies with the needs of the national health, safety, or interest—or he is denied deferment.

Throughout his career as a student, the pressure—the threat of loss of deferment—continues. It continues with equal intensity after graduation. His local board requires periodic reports to find out what he is up to. He is impelled to pursue his skill rather than embark upon some less important enterprise and is encouraged to apply high skill in an essential activity in the national interest. The loss of deferred status is the consequence for the individual who has acquired the skill and either does not use it, or uses it in a nonessential activity.

The psychology of granting wide choice under pressure to take action is the American or indirect way of achieving what is done by direction in foreign countries where choice is not allowed. Here, choice is limited but not denied, and it is fundamental that an individual generally applies himself

better to something he has decided to do rather than something he has been told to do.

The effects of channeling are manifested among student physicians. They are deferred to complete their education through school and internship. This permits them to serve in the armed forces in their skills rather than as unskilled enlisted men.

The device of pressurized guidance, or channeling, is employed on Standby Reservists of which more than 2 1/2 million have been referred by all services for availability determinations. The appeal to the Reservist who knows he is subject to recall to active duty unless he is determined to be unavailable is virtually identical to that extended to other registrants.

The psychological impact of being rejected for service in uniform is severe. The earlier this occurs in a young man's life, the sooner the beneficial effects of pressured motivation by the Selective Service System are lost. He is labeled unwanted. His patriotism is not desired. Once the label of "rejectee" is upon him all efforts at guidance by persuasion are futile. If he attempts to enlist at 17 or 18 and is rejected, then he receives virtually none of the impulsion the System is capable of giving him. If he makes no effort to enlist and as a result is not rejected until delivered for examination by the Selective Service System at about age 23, he has felt some of the pressure but thereafter is a free agent.

This contributed to establishment of a new classification of I-Y (registrant qualified for military service only in time of war or national emergency). The classification reminds the registrant of his ultimate qualification to serve and preserves some of the benefit of what we call channeling. Without it or any other similar method of categorizing men in degrees of acceptability, men rejected for military service would be left with the understanding that they are unfit to defend their country, even in war time.

From the individual's viewpoint, he is standing in a room which has been made uncomfortably warm. Several doors are open, but they all lead to various forms of recognized, patriotic service to the Nation. Some accept the alternatives gladly—some with reluctance. The consequence is approximately the same.

The so-called Doctor Draft was set up during the Korean episode to insure sufficient physicians, dentists, and veterinarians in the armed forces as officers. The objective of that law was to exert sufficient pressure to furnish an incentive for application for commission. However, the indirect effect was to induce many physicians, dentists, and veterinarians to specialize in areas of medical personnel shortage and to seek outlets for their skills in areas of greatest demand and national need rather than of greatest financial return.

Selective Service processes do not compel people by edict as in foreign systems to enter pursuits having to do with essentiality and progress. They go because they know that by going they will be deferred.

Delivery of manpower for induction, the process of providing a few thousand men with transportation to a reception center, is not much of an administrative or financial challenge. It is in dealing with the other millions of registrants that the system is heavily occupied, developing more effective human beings in the national interest.

SOURCE: *The Selective Service: Its Concepts, History, and Operation* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office: September 1967).

RELATED ENTRIES: *All Volunteer Force; Cold War; Conscription and Volunteerism; Draft Evasion and Resistance;Selective Service System; Vietnam War*

1965 c

CASE REPORT ON PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS OF SUBMARINER'S WIFE

Men on Polaris submarines armed with nuclear missiles were deployed for as many as six months at a time each year. This caused a strain on some of their families, as this case report indicates:

Mrs. A., a 32-year-old mother of five, married for 15 years to a chief petty officer, had never previously had psychiatric difficulties. Two weeks before her husband was due home, she experienced a sudden onset of anxiety and was seen in the emergency room that same evening. The anxiety was

intense and accompanied by uncontrollable weeping and a persistent, diffuse headache. She felt all would be well if her husband would return "tomorrow." She denied any anger at his being away, but lamented the hardship to her and her family caused by the frequent patrols. On the visit to the psychiatrist the next day, she spoke with considerable anger about the previous years of hardship. "If only I could show him what he's done to us!"

SOURCE: Richard Isay, "The Submariners' Wives Syndrome," *Psychiatric Quarterly* 42 (1968): 648. With kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.

RELATED ENTRIES: Families, Military; Medicine and War; Vietnam War

1965 d

LETTER HOME FROM SERVICEMAN ON COMBAT EXPERIENCE

By the summer of 1965, thousands of Marines had been landed in the northernmost quadrant of South Vietnam, initially intended to protect the U. S. Air Force base at Da Nang. Soon they were inflicting and taking heavy casualties. A number wrote home of their experiences and feelings, as did Pfc. Richard Marks:

When we finally get out of this it will be quite awhile to readjust to normal life, of not jumping at each sound, and just living like an animal in general. Values even change—a human life becomes so unimportant, and the idea of killing a V.C. is just commonplace now—just like a job. In a way it all scares me more than being shot at.

I am a regular combat veteran now, and I have all the hair raising stories to go with it, and I am only 19 years old. I have just grown up too fast, I wonder when it is all going to catch up to me and kick me in the teeth, and it is bound to happen.

SOURCE: Gloria M. Kramer, ed., *The Letters of Richard Marks, Pfc., USMC* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967), 85.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; Vietnam War

1965 (to 1967) e

EXCERPTS FROM *A RUMOR OF WAR* BY PHILIP CAPUTO

Philip Caputo was a junior officer in "I" Corps of the U.S. Marines, serving in the northern quadrant of South Vietnam from 1965 to 1966. His memoir, A Rumor of War, was one of the more eye-opening and frank accounts of combat and its consequences of those written by Vietnam veterans.

For Americans who did not come of age in the early sixties, it may be hard to grasp what those years were like—the pride and overpowering self-assurance that prevailed. Most of the thirty-five hundred men in our brigade, born during or immediately after World War II, were shaped by that era, the age of Kennedy's Camelot. We went overseas full of illusions, for which the intoxicating atmosphere of those years was as much to blame as our youth.

War is always attractive to young men who know nothing about it, but we had also been seduced into uniform by Kennedy's challenge to "ask what you can do for your country" and by the missionary idealism he had awakened in us. America seemed omnipotent then: the country could still claim it had never lost a war, and we believed we were ordained to play cop to the Communists' robber and spread our own political faith around the world. Like the French soldiers of the late eighteenth century, we saw ourselves as the champions of "a cause that was destined to triumph." So, when we marched into the rice paddies on that damp March afternoon, we carried, along with our packs and rifles, the implicit convictions that the Viet Cong would be quickly beaten and that we were doing something altogether noble and good. We kept the packs and rifles; the convictions, we lost.

The discovery that the men we had scorned as peasant guerrillas were, in fact, a lethal, determined enemy and the casualty lists that lengthened each week with nothing to show for the blood being spilled broke our early confidence. By autumn, what had begun as an adventurous expedition had turned into an exhausting, indecisive war of attrition in which we fought for no cause other than our own survival. . . .

[In May, 1967], following a tour as the CO of an infantry training company in North Carolina, an honorable discharge

released me from the Marines and the chance of dying an early death in Asia. I felt as happy as a condemned man whose sentence has been commuted, but within a year I began growing nostalgic for the war.

Other veterans I knew confessed to the same emotion. In spite of everything, we felt a strange attachment to Vietnam and, even stranger, a longing to return. The war was still being fought, but this desire to go back did not spring from any patriotic ideas about duty, honor, and sacrifice, the myths with which old men send young men off to get killed or maimed. It arose, rather, from a recognition of how deeply we had been changed, how different we were from everyone who had not shared with us the miseries of the monsoon, the exhausting patrols, the fear of a combat assault on a hot landing zone. We had very little in common with them. Though we were civilians again, the civilian world seemed alien. We did not belong to it as much as we did to that other world, where we had fought and our friends had died.

I was involved in the antiwar movement at the time and struggled, unsuccessfully, to reconcile my opposition to the war with this nostalgia. Later, I realized a reconciliation was impossible; I would never be able to hate the war with anything like the undiluted passion of my friends in the movement. Because I had fought in it, it was not an abstract issue, but a deeply emotional experience, the most significant thing that had happened to me. It held my thoughts, senses, and feelings in an unbreakable embrace. I would hear in thunder the roar of artillery. I could not listen to rain without recalling those drenched nights on the line, nor walk through woods without instinctively searching for a trip wire or an ambush. I could protest as loudly as the most convinced activist, but I could not deny the grip the war had on me, nor the fact that it had been an experience as fascinating as it was repulsive, as exhilarating as it was sad, as tender as it was cruel.

This book is partly an attempt to capture something of its ambivalent realities. Anyone who fought in Vietnam, if he is honest about himself, will have to admit he enjoyed the compelling attractiveness of combat. It was a peculiar enjoyment because it was mixed with a commensurate pain. Under fire, a man's powers of life heightened in proportion

to the proximity of death, so that he felt an elation as extreme as his dread. His senses quickened, he attained an acuity of consciousness at once pleasurable and excruciating. It was something like the elevated state of awareness induced by drugs. And it could be just as addictive, for it made whatever else life offered in the way of delights or torments seem pedestrian.

I have also attempted to describe the intimacy of life in infantry battalions, where the communion between men is as profound as any between lovers. Actually, it is more so. It does not demand for its sustenance the reciprocity, the pledges of affection, the endless reassurances required by the love of men and women. It is, unlike marriage, a bond that cannot be broken by a word, by boredom or divorce, or by anything other than death. Sometimes even that is not strong enough. Two friends of mine died trying to save the corpses of their men from the battlefield. Such devotion, simple and selfless, the sentiment of belonging to each other, was the one decent thing we found in a conflict otherwise notable for its monstrosities. . . .

At times, the comradeship that was the war's only redeeming quality caused some of its worst crimes—acts of retribution for friends who had been killed. Some men could not withstand the stress of guerrilla-fighting: the hair-trigger alertness constantly demanded of them, the feeling that the enemy was everywhere, the inability to distinguish civilians from combatants created emotional pressures which built to such a point that a trivial provocation could make these men explode with the blind destructiveness of a mortar shell.

Others were made pitiless by an overpowering greed for survival. Self-preservation, that most basic and tyrannical of all instincts, can turn a man into a coward or, as was more often the case in Vietnam, into a creature who destroys without hesitation or remorse whatever poses even a potential threat to his life. A sergeant in my platoon, ordinarily a pleasant young man, told me once, "Lieutenant, I've got a wife and two kids at home and I'm going to see 'em again and don't care who I've got to kill or how many of 'em to do it."

General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition also had an important effect on our behavior. Our mission was not to

win terrain or seize positions, but simply to kill: to kill Communists and to kill as many of them as possible. Stack 'em like cordwood. Victory was a high body-count, defeat a low kill-ratio, war a matter of arithmetic. The pressure on unit commanders to produce enemy corpses was intense, and they in turn communicated it to their troops. This led to such practices as counting civilians as Viet Cong. "If it's dead and Vietnamese, it's VC," was a rule of thumb in the bush. It is not surprising, therefore, that some men acquired a contempt for human life and a predilection for taking it. . . .

I came home from the war with the curious feeling that I had grown older than my father, who was then fifty-one. It was as if a lifetime of experience had been compressed into a year and a half. A man saw the heights and depths of human behavior in Vietnam, all manner of violence and horrors so grotesque that they evoked more fascination than disgust. Once I had seen pigs eating napalm-charred corpses—a memorable sight, pigs eating roast people.

I was left with none of the optimism and ambition a young American is supposed to have, only a desire to catch up on sixteen months of missed sleep and an old man's conviction that the future would hold no further surprises, good or bad.

I *hoped* there would be no more surprises. I had survived enough ambushes and doubted my capacity to endure many more physical or emotional shocks. I had all the symptoms of *combat veteranitis*: an inability to concentrate, a child-like fear of darkness, a tendency to tire easily, chronic nightmares, an intolerance of loud noises—especially doors slamming and cars backfiring—and alternating moods of depression and rage that came over me for no apparent reason. Recovery has been less than total.

SOURCE: Philip Caputo, *A Rumor of War* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977), xii, xiv-xv, xvii-xviii, 4. Copyright © 1977 by Philip Caputo. Reprinted by permission of Henry Holt and Company, LLC.

RELATED ENTRIES: Antiwar Movements; Cold War; Combat, Effects of; Tiger Force Recon Scandal; My Lai Massacre; Marine Cops; Vietnam War

1966 a

LETTERS FROM VIETNAM GIS ON KILLING ENEMIES IN COMBAT

These three GIs wrote home of their thoughts upon knowing they had killed enemy personnel:

DEAR NANCEE,

I received your letter yesterday evening, and it was good to hear from you again. I am fine—just a little beat. I had guard duty last night, so I am tired. We had some visitors when I was on guard the other night. About 30 V.C. tried to get into our compound. You see, what we mainly guard are helicopters. Anyway, a few tried to blow up some copters. I saw them about 20 feet from where I was. I fired a few rounds in their direction, so I might have hit one. You see, the next morning they had an investigation of the area in which I saw the V.C., and they found traces of human blood.

When I was getting off the ship, I said a silent prayer for God not to make me try to kill anyone. Because He's the only one who has the right to take a life—after all, He put us here. He can take us when He wants.

But Nancee, it was either him or me.

Sincerely,
Eddie

HI GRAM,

It was good to hear from you. I was so glad to hear from home. It felt good. My arm was giving me a little trouble this week, but okay today. Tell everyone I said hi. My back is giving me some trouble. Say, do you know when I got shot I cried, and I grabbed my gun and rifle and said *dear God don't let me die*, then I started to yell and cry and stood up. I was shooting all over, then he shot back, and I saw where he was at. I killed him. When he fell from the tree, I ran to him. I was bleeding and I was shaking very bad. When I saw him, I don't know what came over me, but I emptied all I had in him, some 87 holes they found in him. After an hour or so, I was okay. It's no fun shooting a person, and now whenever I see a person who is a Vietnamese I think of that time out there, and I start shaking and I don't know if I should kill them or what. Say, how I wish I was home. It's no fun out

here. I feel lost and all alone out here so far from home. I am not doing too good. Please take care of yourself, okay? And please say a prayer for me that I get back okay. I tell you it's bad out here.

DEAR MARILYN AND LOWELL,

Hi! How is everything going for the two of you and the kids? Just fine, I hope. Everything is going pretty good for me here at the present time.

Since the last time I wrote, a few new things have been happening. Since the last time, I've turned from a nice quiet guy into a killer. That raid I told you about that they kept canceling came off on the thirtieth, but my platoon didn't go. The next one was on the fifth, and we weren't supposed to go, either. About ten o'clock that morning we got the word to get ready.

We went in by helicopter, and after reaching shore we set up outside a village. My lieutenant after a while asked for eight guys to go on a combat patrol with him, and I of course volunteered to go.

We were supposed to search an area that was cleared earlier, but they weren't sure if any Vietcong were left or not.

While we were walking along, a shot just missed the lieutenant, and everyone hit the deck. Just before it happened, I was looking up into the trees and saw the muzzle flash from the rifle. After we hit the deck, the lieutenant yelled and asked if anyone saw him. I was raising my rifle up towards the tree just then, and I said "yeah" as I pulled the trigger. I have an automatic rifle and fired about 14 or 15 rounds into the tree where I saw the flash, and the Vietcong came falling out.

I always wondered what it would feel like to kill someone, but after it happened I didn't feel any different. It didn't bother me a bit, and I sort of felt good about it. I didn't feel proud because I killed him, but proud that I didn't freeze up when the time came. I figured his next shot might have been at me and I beat him to it.

That was the only thing that happened around me, and the next morning everyone went back to the ships. We had a couple of guys killed and some wounded, but just how many I don't know.

Well, I guess that is about it for now, so I'll close for the time being. Take care of yourself for now and don't work too hard. I'll write again soon.

All my love,
Mike

SOURCE: Glenn Munson, ed., *Letters from Vietnam* (New York: Parallax, 1966), 53, 73, 123.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; Vietnam War

1966 b

LETTER FROM VIETNAM GI OBJECTING TO ANTIWAR PROTESTERS

This marine wrote home upset by the news of increasing protests against the war. He urged his family to "show your patriotism," and asked rhetorically: "After all, I am not fighting for nothing. Am I?!!"

Hi Mom, Dad, and all,

I just received your letter. The days are getting longer, so it seems. It won't be too long and I'll be back home again. I'm so anxious to get back home that it isn't even funny. I'm so happy that Dad ordered my car, and I can't wait to see it. Thank you, Dad, I'm so very proud of you and really, Dad, you're the greatest.

It's hard to sleep, eat, or even write any more. This place has definitely played hell with us. It's been a long hard road, Mom and Dad, and I think I've proved myself so far. I know you all have a great confidence in me, and I know I can do any job assigned to me. I've engaged with the Vietcong and Hard Core so many times, I lost track of them. I've got a right to boast a little cause I know I was right in hitting the licks, just like other good Marines have done and are doing and always will. We've put long hours of sweat and blood in this soil, and we will do our best to get these people freedom. Also protect America from Communism.

I only wish I could do something to encourage the boys that are burning their draft cards to stand up and take their responsibilities for their country, family, and friends. You can't defeat Communism by turning your backs or burning your draft cards. Anyone who does it is a disgrace and plain

yellow. They haven't got the guts to back up their fathers and forefathers before them. Their lives have gone to waste if the sons today are too afraid to face the facts.

There, I've said what has been on my mind! I hope this doesn't bore you but I just had to put it down on paper.

Mom, Dad, and kids, whenever the national anthem is being played, whether over TV, radio, or at a game, *please, please,* stand up. Show your patriotism. After all, I am not fighting for nothing.

Am I?!!

We've got to have a flag, also; do we have one?

Dad, try in every way, whether little or big, to push a little of the patriotism kick into Bob and Ron! Please! Also religion.

GO TO MASS. . .

Goodbye for now, and God bless you all.

I love you all.

Doug

SOURCE: Glenn Munson, ed., *Letters from Vietnam* (New York: Parallax, 1966), 106

RELATED ENTRIES: Antiwar Movements; Conscription and Volunteerism; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Families, Military; Vietnam War

1966 c

AIR FORCE OFFICER DALE NOYD'S LETTER OF RESIGNATION

Troubled by what he regarded as the immoral character of the war being waged by the United States in Vietnam, Capt. Dale Noyd, U.S. Air Force, a man with 11 years of experience, refused to train pilots for service there and tendered this letter of resignation, hoping to be released before the end of his term on moral grounds. He was sentenced to a year in prison by a general court-martial:

1. I, Dale Edwin Noyd, Captain, FR28084, under paragraph 16m, AFR 36-12, hereby voluntarily tender my resignation from all appointments in the USAF. . . .

2b. I am opposed to the war that this country is waging in Vietnam; and for the past year—since it has become increasingly clear that I will not be able to serve out my obligation and resign from the Air Force—I have considered various stratagems that would obviate my participation in, and contribution to, that war. Among other alternatives, I have considered grounding myself or seeking an assignment other than in Southeast Asia. But these choices were not an honest confrontation of the issues and they do not do justice to my beliefs. The hypocrisy of my silence and acquiescence must end—I feel strongly that it is time for me to demand more consistency between my convictions and my behavior. Several months ago I came to a decision that would reflect this consistency and sought counsel in what alternatives I might have. This letter is a result of that decision. . . .

2c. Increasingly I find myself in the position of being highly involved and caring about many moral, political, and social issues—of which the war in Vietnam is the most important—and yet I cannot protest and work to effect some change. Not only may my convictions remain unexpressed and the concomitant responsibilities unfulfilled, but I am possibly confronted with fighting in a war that I believe to be unjust, immoral, and which makes a mockery of both our constitution and the charter of the United Nations—and the human values which they represent. Apart from the moral and ethical issues, and speaking only from the point of view of the super-patriot, it is a stupid war and pernicious to the self-interest of the United States. I am somewhat reluctant to attempt an analysis of the role of this country in the affairs of Southeast Asia for two reasons: First, I have nothing to say that has not been eloquently stated by men such as Senators Fulbright and Morse, U Thant, Fall, Sheehan, Morgenthau, Goodwin, Scheer, Terrill, Raskin, Lacouture, and, of course, the spokesmen for most of the nations of the free world; and secondly, any brief statement almost of necessity will hazard the same defects that have been characteristic of our foreign policy and its public debate—simplistic and obfuscated by cliches and slogans. Nevertheless, because of the gravity of my circumstances and the unusual nature of my resignation, I shall state some of the observations and premises from which I have made my judgments. First of all, in a nation that pretends to an open and free society, hypocrisy and subterfuge have pervaded our conduct and policy in Southeast Asia at least since 1954. This is not only in relations with the

Documents

Vietnamese and in our pronouncements to the other nations of the world, but also with the American people. One need look no further than our public statements in order to detect this. I insist on knowing what my government is doing and it is clear that this right has been usurped. Although I am cognizant that an open society may have its disadvantages in an ideological war with a totalitarian system, I do not believe that the best defense of our freedoms is an emulation of that system. . . .

2g. It is an immoral war for several reasons. It is not only because our presence is unjustified and for what we are doing to the Vietnamese—as I have discussed above—but also because of our "sins" of omission. This country is capable of achieving for its people, and encouraging in other nations, enormous social advancement, but we are now throwing our riches—both of material and of purpose—into the utter waste of the maelstrom of increasing military involvement. If we as a nation really care about people, then we had best make concepts like freedom and equality real to all our citizens—and not just political sham—before we play policeman to the world. Our righteousness is often misplaced. Our behavior in Vietnam is immoral for another set of reasons which concern our conduct of that war. As many newsmen have witnessed, time and again we have bombed, shelled, or attacked a "VC village" or "VC structures" and when we later appraise the results, we label dead adult males as "VC" and add them to the tally—and fail to count the women and children. Our frequent indiscriminate destruction is killing the innocent as well as the "guilty." In addition, our left-handed morality in the treatment of prisoners is odious—we turn them over to the ARVN for possible torture or execution with the excuse that we are not in command but are only supporting the South Vietnam government. Again, this hypocrisy needs no explication. Also frighteningly new in American morality is the pragmatic justification that we must retaliate against the terrorist tactics of the VC. Perhaps most devastatingly immoral about the war in Vietnam are the risks we are assuming for the rest of the world. Each new step and escalation appears unplanned and is an attempt to rectify previous blunders by more military action. The consequences of our course appear too predictable, and although we as a people may elect "better dead than red," do

we have the right to make this choice for the rest of mankind?

2h. I am not a pacifist; I believe that there are times when it is right and necessary that a nation or community of nations employ force to deter or repel totalitarian aggression. My three-year assignment in an operational fighter squadron—with the attendant capacity for inflicting terrible killing and destruction—was based on the personal premise that I was serving a useful deterrent purpose and that I would never be used as an instrument of aggression. This, of course, raises the important and pervasive question for me: What is my duty when I am faced with a conflict between my conscience and the commands of my government? What is my responsibility when there is an irreparable division between my beliefs in the ideals of this nation and the conduct of my political and military leaders? The problem of ultimate loyalty is not one for which there is an easy solution. And, unfortunately, the issues are most often obscured by those who would undermine the very freedoms they are ostensibly defending—by invoking "loyalty" and "patriotism" to enforce conformity, silence dissent, and protect themselves from criticism. May a government or nation be in error? Who is to judge? As Thoreau asked, "Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience, to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterwards. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume, is to do at any time what I think right. . . . Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice." The individual must judge. We as a nation expect and demand this—we have prosecuted and condemned those who forfeited their personal sense of justice to an immoral authoritarian system. We have despised those who have pleaded that they were only doing their job. If we are to survive as individuals in this age of acquiescence, and as nations in this time of international anarchy, we must resist total enculturation so that we may stand aside to question and evaluate—not as an Air Force officer or as an American, but as a member of the human species. This resistance and autonomy is difficult to acquire and precari-

ous to maintain, which perhaps explains its rarity. Camus puts it succinctly: "We get into the habit of living before acquiring the habit of thinking." We must not confuse dissent with disloyalty and we must recognize that consensus is no substitute for conscience. As Senator Fulbright has stated, "Criticism is more than a right; it is an act of patriotism—a higher form of patriotism, I believe, than the familiar ritual of national adulation. All of us have the responsibility to act upon this higher patriotism which is to love our country less for what it is than for what we would like it to be." . . .

2j. I have attempted to sincerely state the values and beliefs that are both most meaningful in my life and relevant to my present dilemma. It would appear that I am no longer a loyal Air Force officer if this loyalty requires unquestioning obedience to the policies of this nation in Vietnam. I cannot honestly wear the uniform of this country and support unjust and puerile military involvement. Although it may be inconsistent, I have been able to justify (or rationalize) my position here at the Academy by my belief that my contribution in the classroom has had more effect in encouraging rationalism, a sense of humanism, and the development of social consciousness than it has had in the inculcation of militarism. My system of ethics is humanistic—simply a respect and love for man and confidence in his capability to improve his condition. This is my ultimate loyalty. And, as a man trying to be free, my first obligation is to my own integrity and conscience, and this is of course not mitigated by my government's permission or command to engage in immoral acts. I am many things before I am a citizen of this country or an Air Force officer; and included among these things is simply that I am a man with a set of human values which I will not abrogate. I must stand on what I am and what I believe. The war in Vietnam is unjust and immoral, and if ordered to do so, I shall refuse to fight in that war. I should prefer, and respectfully request, that this resignation be accepted.

SOURCE: Noyd v. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, et al., Records and briefs, U.S. District Court, Denver, Colorado, 1967.

RELATED ENTRIES: Antiwar Movements; Censorship and the Military; Hitchcock, Ethan Allen; Vietnam War

1966 (to 1971) d

EXCERPTS FROM *SOLDADOS: CHICANOS IN VIET NAM*

Chicano veterans of the Vietnam Ware spoke about their background and wartime experiences in Soldados: Chicanos in Viet Nam. Excerpts from four of these accounts are reprinted here.

Manuel "Peanuts" Marin
Seabees—Navy
Tour of Duty: August 1966 to April 1967

. . .. One of the reasons that went through my mind for joining the service was that I was once an illegal alien. I was brought over from Mexico at the age of one. Being a permanent resident, I felt that it was a good trade for being allowed to live here (U.S.) and go to school. By serving this country, I felt it was a way of paying off. It still goes, regardless of what has happened in between, whether I'd disagree with the politics of being in the service or not. I'm still sincere about this.

When I was about to finish boot camp, they told me that the school for which I had signed up, storekeeper school, was full. They told me there were a few other things I could do. I could go on sea duty and eventually I could apply for a school, or I could choose another school that was open. I wanted to go to storekeeper's school because my friend was going. I'm an impatient person. There was no way I was going on a ship. I hoped that eventually I was going to get into school. I wanted to get my training then. So I signed up for electricians' mate school. I didn't know the slightest thing about being an electrician.

I went to electrician school, and I couldn't handle it. I could do the manual part, but I couldn't handle the theory stuff. Some real nice people tried to help me pass the test, but I couldn't do it. . . . From there I was sent to Coronado, California, where they put me in the worst job possible, which was doing mess hall work. I was there for three months. It was hard work because we'd get up at four in the morning and work until seven or eight at night. After those three months, I was sent to a maintenance unit. That was a lot better because it was an eight to five job. That's when I got in the Seabees. Most of the sailors that were in maintenance were Seabees, and that's how I ended up in Vietnam.

Frank "Yogi" Delgado, Infantryman

25th Division—Army

Tour of Duty: August 1966 to February 1967

. . . The town closest to Fort Polk was Leesville. It was about the size of Corcoran. We used to call it Fleasville or Diseaseville. Louisiana is as bad as Alabama when it comes to segregation. We went to Leesville one time. It was me, a gabacho (*white man*) Jimmy Smith, and this mayate (*black man*) who went to this restaurant to eat. We were in our khaki uniforms, and we were waiting to be served. We waited for a while, and then we noticed other people were being served and waited on. Finally I asked this fat, redneck waitress, "Hey! When are you going to take my order?" She looked at us and said, "Hey! We don't serve niggers here." I have never been a person to go around fighting. I think I have only been in a couple of fights in my whole life. But I got mad in this situation and so did the gabacho. I felt that I had to do something. That's when the mayate said, "Naw, man, just look around you." We looked at the bar, and there were about ten rednecks looking at us—just staring at us. The best thing to do in that situation, which we did, was get up and leave. What are you going to do?

I'll never forget that incident. The war had been going on for two years already, and we were in our army uniforms trying to get a meal. And they pull that s--- on us?

All this time I still had the attitude, I'll take one day at a time. Somehow I knew I would make it. But I wasn't going to [sic] go ask for it. I wasn't going to join airborne. I wasn't going to volunteer for the infantry. I had a lot of camaradas (comrades) that did. That's fine, but that wasn't for me. I didn't volunteer for infantry, but that's what I got.

Larry Holguin, Infantryman

Third Marine Division

Tour of Duty: June 1968 to September 1969

At first you're scared, but after awhile the *susto* (fear) seems to go away. You will find that your fright will make you do things that you don't think you can do. Once you get past that, everything else just becomes a reflex. It's more of not thinking and just doing it. The longer you go into your tour, the sharper you get. . . .

I thought about my mom a lot—my parents, which helped me out a lot. I didn't want my mom to suffer as far as my not coming back. The way I thought about it was, if I was going to come back, I would come back whole. If I wasn't, I wouldn't come home. When I first went overseas, the only thing I wanted to do was make my mom and dad proud of me. But as things went along, it seemed to fade away. It didn't become as important. What became more important was being able to get home safely.

When you're over there (Vietnam), it's a high in itself. You figure that nobody can touch you and that nobody could even hurt you. It's just a phase of emotions that you go through, everybody goes through; and you can't change them because they're there. The only thing is to forget about them and hope the ideas don't ever come back because you're surprised at what a human body can do to another without even thinking about it. But only with the right reasons or the right surroundings can you do this. You just can't do it because you want to do it. You'd be a basket case. You'd be in trouble. Civilization and culture are made so you aren't supposed to go around blowing people up. It's like getting mad and wanting to kill the person right away. And that's what we did in Vietnam.

Freddie Delgado, Infantry

9th Mechanized Unit, 101st Airborne

Tour of Duty: April 1970 to March 1971

. . . They discharged me from Fort Lewis, Washington. They gave me my papers saying, "You, as of now, are a free man." We got there about midnight, and they paid us about three in the morning. When I left Fort Lewis, I had $600 in my pocket.

The first thing I experienced when I got back to the world was that people looked more healthy, more gordos (*fat*). They weren't as small. I said to myself, "Boy, are they feeding you people right over here."

There was an incident that happened at my sister's house. We were watching TV when I got up to change the station. At the same time a jet plane was flying over and made a sonic boom. It rattled the window and s---. I hit the ground automatically. When I got up, I felt embarrassed. My sister and my little brother didn't think it was funny. They

realized what was happening to me. After a little bit we started to laugh it off.

One time I was asleep and my dad was sleeping there in the same room when all of a sudden, I gave a big, old grunt. My father told me, "Estas aquí. Ya no estas allá" (*"you are here now, you are not there anymore"*). That happened the first night I was there. I woke up relieved. I got used to it fast. There was a time people were really talking about the Vietnam War, but I didn't talk about it. Even if I would have told them what happened, they wouldn't have believed me. So I decided not to say anything about it when people would ask me questions about Vietnam.

When I came home, I saw some guys with long hair. I was pissed off at them because they didn't go where I went. I guess most of the guys were caught in the middle of the war because we were drafted. After I was home for a few months, I let my hair grow long.

SOURCE: Reprinted with permission of copyright holder Charley Trujillo. From Charley Trujillo, *Soldados: Chicanos in Vietnam* (San Jose: Chusma House, 1990).

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; Conscription and Volunteerism; Latinos in the Military; Vietnam War

1967 (and 2003) a
POSTINGS TO TIGER FORCE WEBSITE IN RESPONSE TO *TOLEDO BLADE* REVELATIONS

In the spring and summer of 1967, a platoon belonging to "Tiger Force," the elite reconnaissance battalion of the 101st Airborne Division, murdered a number of unarmed Vietnamese in the Song Ve valley and the Chu Lai area of Quang Nam province. When The Toledo Blade broke the story of the botched Army investigation in a series of investigative reports in October 2003, several veterans of Tiger Force units in Vietnam, most of them incredulous, posted communications on that unit's website (http://www.tigerforcerecon.com). Here are two such posts:

HANK-

I would appreciate it if you would send this out to the Tigers for me.

I have been thinking about the recent story about the killing of unarmed civilians in Vietnam by members of the Tiger Force, and the one thing I keep coming back to is the fact that Vietnam was a very long time ago, and there is nothing we can do about what happened in the past.

What we can do however, is set aside our individual differences, and offer understanding and support for the Tigers who are still fighting the Vietnam War today.

I have been in touch with Rion Causey, and have read the transcript of the interview with Doug Teeters.

They (and I am sure there are more), are still suffering emotionally over what took place back then, and now the important thing is that we, as Tigers both past and present, pull together and try to help them out.

The cold reality of life is that this thing will blow over soon, and eventually be forgotten by the vast majority of people in this country, except for the people involved, and those who care about them. Let's stick together and take care of our own.

As Always,

Lance ("DOC MAT") Matsumonji

SUBJECT: Ok, wrapping our arms around this problem

We have a forum here and I am believing it is a forum of some pretty good Vietnam veterans, men who didn't dodge the draft, men who put their lives on the line for their country, men who became soldiers. These have also been men that were faced with moral quandries that presented themselves by being put in situations where decisions of life or death, and large consequence was confronted and certainly these decisions added to our difficulty with the war. I don't care if someone was in supply or on the front lines at this stage of the game. If you went to Vietnam you were a cut above those that didn't. If you were an American soldier you had to endure the news of fellow soldiers being killed and wounded, but you also had to deal with the news of a faction of the citizens in the United States that appeared to vilify you and what you stood for and in the end, many of us found a troubling conflict about how we were going to process that.

This story won't kill us. In the end it will make us stronger as a group, in the end it will probably be good for us. I suggest everyone read as much of these links as they can stomach and talk about them.

If you look at the numbers, the number of people in this investigation at the outside, as stated, it appears to be about 18 men. The Song Ve incidents were from around May of 1967 to August 1967. Of those 18 the crimes ranged from the killing of "innocent" civilians, to the mutilating of dead bodies and on to less severe "crimes". Further of those 18 the one person that I personally found the most culpable seemed to die suffering from his own guilt and that would be Sam Ybarra, but several others who were objects of the investigation died while serving in Vietnam.

Out of the total number of men that passed through the Tiger Force Rosters over the years this represents a small percentage. As a few of you have heard, I like to draw some parallels to Columbine High School on this. Remember, many of us were just beyond High School so to place weaponry and responsibility on our heads of the magnitude we were confronting certainly became a difficult proving and testing ground. There were a lot of men that did just fine, certainly the vast majority. In the army we got used to the screw ups making our lives difficult, causing us to lose our weekend passes and those people who screwed up, lost it, tipped over, they were in the fray. Men are not perfect, we leave that distinction to God. We don't want to taint the memories of those who have lost their lives in service to their country but at the same time we don't want to ignore the accusations and attempt to hide from or cover up what may serve future soldiers and may need to be brought out.

The exploration of the Toledo Blade's activities has led me to some very interesting information and due to my knowledge and involvement in the Tiger Force there is an honest fascination and appreciation of much of the stories brought to light. Are the stories true? I can only answer for my small part of the equation. Some of what they attributed to me was accurate, but some was not. For example they said I saw P.O.W.'s being murdered. I didn't, to my present day knowledge. Further they indicated I lied to the investigator. I attempted to be honest with the investigators but we all wondered about the usefulness of the investigation in view of what the Tiger Force and it's members had already been through. In the end the investigator told me that this investigation was consuming his life and asked me to answer a few questions by saying "I don't remember". It was Oak Creek Colorado, we were standing outside an old hotel and it was near freezing at night. I told him, fine, if it would make his life easier, ask the questions, and I answered, "I don't remember." This was after I had spent several days and lost a job over this investigation.

I told Joe Mahr, of the Toledo Blade to think about it. A stint in Vietnam was more difficult than any prison sentence. It's pretty obvious that if all these soldiers had spent their years in Vietnam in prison instead we'd have over 58,000 additional people working on behalf of the United States today, educated and paying taxes. Our greatest societal punishment, the death penalty, didn't look a whole lot different than what actually happened to many of the men who were objects of this investigation. Thousands of planes fly the skies, it is only the one that crashes that makes the news and it is a good question of what could be served by this investigation. Well, I'm older now and perhaps some good could be served. Not by punishing the men further, and over the years they have demonstrated they aren't a threat to society post war, by their lives, so it was a special situation. Something should be done. Perhaps something has been done.

These stories were based upon a four and a half year investigation by the Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Department (CID). The Toledo Blade reporters were able to procure a copy of this from a person who worked in the hierarchy of the National Archives of Records who felt the story had been under reported. This person has since passed away as well. Harold Fischer, a Tiger Force medic and person that I have attempted to remain connected to, and I Dan Clint, sought to procure a copy of this report and we succeeded in getting copies. Fischer and I were not objects of the investigation, were listed as witnesses. We had the trauma of seeing these things, of reading these reports several months earlier and we kept it largely to ourselves. I didn't know how to broach the subject with the others that I had acquaintance with via this web site. Fischer kept saying, "I had no idea". Neither did I. Our initial sense of the investigation was that it centered primarily around the

activities of Sam Ybarra. Sam seemed to lose it even more severely, morally, when his best friend and fellow "homey" "Boots" Green was killed. His stated hatred of the Vietnamese translated into his policy of shoot first and ask questions later and I for one was distressed that these were not always "clean" enemy confrontations.

For Fischer and I, we seemed to hold to higher moral ground, but even that higher moral ground was shaky and difficult in view of the circumstances. The two young boys working at a table in the jungles manufacturing Chi-Comm grenades. They were maybe 12 and 14 and they grabbed grenades and were dumping them on us. For them, was it playing at war? Did they know better? One of them was shot and killed and the other took off running. That was the day that Fague was shot in the arm in pursuit of the fleeing lad. Were they simply civilians doing honest work? Could we have laid our rifles down and persuaded them to stop lobbing grenades at us. You'd better laugh here. But it was interesting, Sergeant Haugh was in front of me and I could tell he didn't want to shoot them. He was looking for a way out. In a way, most of us were looking for a way out, an honorable way out. Not a draft dodging cowardice way out. Like rats in a cage, we weren't looking for food we were just wanting out.

The story countering this article needs to be told and I am confident it will be. But there is something here for us now. We can understand how these students, say, these children of Columbine High School, the young kids starting their lives, how they were going about their lives, working hard, getting good grades, thinking about their futures when two of the boys in their midst went on a killing rampage. Suddenly everything changed for these students. When someone asks them, "Where are you going to High School?" The pride of their efforts and their accomplishments suddenly becomes secondary to the larger national attention of the two schmucks that put the name "Columbine High" into an unpleasant national spotlight. Two out of how many really great kids? Well, there are parallels, but there are also certainly differences. We are older, we are men, we are paratroopers, we have demonstrated our courage under fire and in the end we will know how to understand the tragedy of these kids and how they are victims of the actions of a small minority and that will make us more compassionate and

understanding and temper us a little more. In the end it will make us better friends.

As for our unit now in Iraq, these stories making the national media, the training these new soldiers are receiving as a result of our experiences in Vietnam, the difficult moral decisions of war are being addressed differently and better resultant from our having faced them. I believe the improvements are built upon the backs of us as men who waded through the streams of these complex jungles and carried our friends and our country with us.

With all of that said, Reporters are the pits eh.
Dan Clint

SOURCE: Two letters to the webmaster of the TigerForceRecon.com website, late 2003. Reprinted with permission from www.tigerforcerecon.com.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; My Lai Massacre; Vietnam War

1967 (to 1969) b
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF WAR IN VIETNAM

By 1967, the efforts of the United States to destroy the "cover" used by the enemy in South Vietnam heated up; the spraying of jungles, forests, and rice paddies (aiming at defoliation and crop destruction) with such plant killers as Agent Orange, rose dramatically, as this table indicates:

DEFOLIATION AND CROP DESTRUCTION COVERAGE, 1962-70 (ACRES)

	Defoliation	Crop Destruction	Total
1962	4,940	741	5,681
1963	24,700	247	24,947
1964	83,486	10,374	93,860
1965	155,610	65,949	221,559
1966	741,247	103,987	845,144
1967	1,486,446	221,312	1,706,758
1968	1,267,110	63,726	1,330,836
1969	1,198,444	64,961	1,263,405
1970	220,324	32,604	252,928
Total	**4,747,587**	**481,897**	**5,229,484**

1968 a

ACCOUNTS OF SERVICEMEN'S COMBAT-RELATED PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS

A psychiatrist described a typical case—from around 1968—of "pseudocombat fatigue syndrome:"

This 22-year old LCPL USMC with 2 years of active duty and 4 months of service in Viet Nam was hospitalized aboard *Repose* after he "froze" while under enemy fire. At the time of admission he was grossly anxious, tremulous, and agitated. His speech was in explosive bursts, interrupted by periods of preoccupied silence; he reported only vague memory for his combat experiences of recent weeks and the incident which had precipitated his evacuation from the field. He was immediately treated with chlorpromazine in a dosage similar to that of Case I, and 24 hours later his symptoms had remarkably improved. He was calm and communicative, and history could be obtained. This indicated longstanding problems with emotional and impulse control which had caused difficulties in social, family, and school relationships. He enlisted in the Marine Corps after impulsively quitting high school; and his 2 years of service had been marked by frequent emotional upheavals, marginal performance of duty, and a total of nine disciplinary actions for a variety of minor offenses. His initial 2 months of Viet Nam duty had been comparatively peaceful. As his unit made more contacts with the enemy over the next 2 months, however, he grew increasingly apprehensive, and this became more severe after he received a minor shrapnel wound. On the night prior to hospitalization, he was involved in a brief but intense fire fight, and he "froze" in a state of tremulous dissociation. He was sedated, maintained in the field overnight, and then evacuated to the hospital ship in the morning. There his treatment program was very similar to that of Case I, utilizing both chemotherapy and group and individual psychotherapy;

he showed early good results with almost complete initial disappearance of anxiety symptoms. It was noted that some tremulousness and apprehension recurred, however, whenever new casualties arrived aboard or when combat ashore was visible or audible from the ship. He then demonstrated acute exacerbation of symptoms when confronted with the prospect of possible return to duty, and he was finally evacuated out of the combat zone with the diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality after 10 days of hospitalization.

Another Vietnam-era Army psychiatrist described the background of a psychiatric case from the combat zone:

Henry was a 21-year-old enlisted man who had been in Viet Nam for some 7 months prior to his referral. He was a member of an airborne unit that had been engaged in fairly heavy combat since its arrival. Four weeks prior to his referral, the company had been surrounded while on a search and destroy operation. A saturation bombing of the area was requested. After the bombing, the enemy withdrew and the company returned to base camp. The cost, however, had been heavy. A number of Henry's close buddies had been killed or wounded. Henry did not remember talking very much about the buddies upon his return to base camp. He was all caught up with the realization that he had emerged unscathed. Besides, he was to leave on R & R the following week. The unit did not engage in combat during that week. Henry had a good deal of time to contemplate what he would be doing when he got to Thailand. His description of R & R was of a complete surrender to pleasure. There were girls and "booze." The days and nights were quiet. He had no thought of killing or being killed. However, R & R lasted only 5 days. As the time came to return to Viet Nam, he noticed that his heart was beating more rapidly, that he was sick to his stomach, and that he was restless and "all tied up in knots." Upon return, he heard that the unit had a new CO who was

reputed to be a "bastard" and a "glory-hound, John Wayne type." The actual return to the unit was a lonely affair. There had been another mission in his absence. Casualties had again been high. Of the squad to which he was assigned, he was now the only "old timer." "I felt like a stranger in my own home, and that home didn't look so good either." He began to get suspicious of the new men. He thought that they were talking about him and planning to steal the things that he had brought back from Thailand. The next evening, Henry picked up an M-16. He pointed it at one of the new men, accused the man of wanting to laugh at him, and threatened to shoot. A number of men jumped on him. He was subdued and evacuated shortly thereafter.

SOURCE: Gary Tischler, "Combat Zone Patterns," in Peter Bourne, ed., *The Psychology and Physiology of Stress* (New York: Academic Press, 1969), 37-38.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; Vietnam War; Psychiatric Disorders, Combat-Related; Psychiatry, Military

1968 b

DEFENSE AND NASA SPENDING IN VARIOUS STATES

The impact of spending by the "military–industrial complex" during the Vietnam War, as at other times during the four decades of Cold War, varied considerably across the United States, as this table indicates. For the states listed below, defense and NASA spending in 1968 is measured in terms of the percentage of the state's total work force.

State	Percent
Alaska	31.6
Hawaii	18.8
District of Columbia	15.6
Virginia	14.1
Maryland	9.9
Utah	9.9
Georgia	9.7
Colorado	9.6
California	9.3
Connecticut	9.2
Arizona	9.0
South Carolina	8.8
Texas	8.4
New Mexico	8.3
Oklahoma	8.1
Washington	8.1
New Hampshire	7.8
Mississippi	7.3

Note: Figures are as of June 30, 1968.

SOURCE: "Economies in Arms Mean Leaner Times for Many Workers," *U.S. News & World Report* (1970), reproduced in Seymour Melman, ed., *The War Economy of the United States* (New York, 1971), 231.

RELATED ENTRIES: Economy and War; Military–Industrial Complex; Vietnam War

1969

SURVEY OF VETERANS' OPINIONS ON EFFECTS OF SERVICE

Gallup pollsters asked thousands of Army veterans of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam three questions about the possible benefits they felt they had acquired as a result of their military service. Despite the popular view during the Vietnam War (and among many to this day) that Vietnam veterans were transformed by the war in ways terribly different from their predecessors, only a few differences between their experiences and those of their fellow veterans can be detected in the responses to these questions:

TABLE 1: BENEFITS OF MILITARY SERVICE

"Here is a List of Benefits Veterans Sometimes Say They Have Gained from Military Service. Please Read Through the List and Pick as Many or as Few Statements That Describe the Benefits You Feel You Gain from Your Military Service."

	Army Veterans			Vietnam Veterans in College
Total	**WWII**	**Korea**	**Vietnam**	**College**
INTANGIBLE REWARDS				
Satisfaction of Serving my country				
79%	82%	78%	64%	62%
Chance to travel and see the world				
72	71	76	68	67
Sense of accomplishment				
41	40	43	39	49
CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT				
Developed sense of responsibility				
63	61	66	62	57
Discipline				
62	63	67	46	47
Self-confidence				
56	56	59	53	56
SOCIAL BENEFITS				
Helped me to get along better with people				
61	61	62	61	53
Personal lifetime friendships				
42	40	41	50	45
Helped me socially				
23	22	25	24	15
CIVILIAN CAREER BENEFITS				
GI benefits for education				
48	41	57	63	92
Became a more effective supervisor				
31	30	32	35	41
Helped me to get a job in civilian life				
18	18	17	16	12

("None" and "no opinion" responses omitted)

TABLE 2: EFFECT ON A MAN'S CHARACTER

"In General, Do You Think Service in the Armed Forces Has a Good or Bad Effect on a Man's Character?"

	Army Veterans			Vietnam Veterans in College
Total	**WWII**	**Korea**	**Vietnam**	**College**
Good				
79%	80%	80%	72%	65%
Bad				
4	4	2	13	10
Other answers				
14	13	16	11	20
No opinion				
3	3	2	4	5

"Why Do You Say That?"*

	Army Veterans			Vietnam Veterans in College
Total	**WWII**	**Korea**	**Vietnam**	**College**
Percent who say army service has a good effect on a man's character				
79%	80%	80%	72%	65%
Maturity				
27%	24%	33%	31%	31%
Discipline				
22	26	19	10	9
Responsibility/ independence				
20	19	21	20	15
Learns how to get along with people				
18	19	16	12	12
Learns and acquires general experience				
7	6	6	10	13
Acquires training, special schooling, and education				
4	5	3	1	0
Improves personal well-being, habits				
4	5	2	4	2

(Top mentions)

*Open, free-response question.

SOURCE: Opinion Research Corp., *The Image of the Army* (Princeton, N.J.: Opinion Research Corp., 1969), 73, 77.

RELATED ENTRIES: American Legion; AMVETS; Korean War; Veterans of Foreign Wars; Vietnam Veterans against the War; Vietnam Veterans of America; Vietnam War; World War II

1970 a

OPEN LETTER OF CHICANA GI WIDOW

A Chicana widow of a GI who died in Vietnam sent an open "letter to Chicano G.I.s," printed in Right on Post, a underground GI newspaper, in August 1970:

It is my intention in writing this letter that I will place some very important questions in your minds. It is also my most sincere hope that I may save your women, and your mothers the heartache and sorrow I have experienced.

It has been almost three years since my husband was killed in Viet Nam, leaving me without a man and my daughter without a father.

Recalling the memory of my husband, I've asked myself many times why he died in a war I knew nothing about. And the truth that I found was not easy to accept. Because I then realized my husband died for nothing. Not only did he die for nothing, but he fought and killed in the name of a government that has shamed and discriminated against our race for over two hundred years. This same government that robbed our land and kept us as slaves to work his fields. The same government that won't allow our children to speak our language in his racist schools. The same government that denied us our rights as human beings.

Every day our chicano brothers are being sent to Viet Nam and every day they're coming home in boxes. Our fight is not in Viet Nam fighting people who are fighting for their land and freedom. Our fight is here in this country; for *our land and our freedom.*

The rich white pig has used us as his slaves enough, I say. Ya Basta to the white pig politician and Ya Basta to the white pig businessman. Ya Basta! I want freedom and justice for myself and my people.

Chicana Sister

SOURCE: Larry Waterhouse and Mariann G. Wizard, *Turning the Guns Around* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 99. Reprinted with permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, Conn. Compare L. Nielson, "Impact of Permanent Father Loss on . . . Male War Orphans" (Ph.D. diss., University of Utah, 1971).

RELATED ENTRIES: Families, Military; Latinos in the Military; Vietnam War

1970 b

WIDOW OF AIR FORCE PILOT'S ACCOUNT OF HER EXPERIENCE AND ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR

The wife of a young officer killed in Vietnam spoke in 1970 of her loss and of the war:

The war came home to me on the 4th of March when I learned that my husband had been killed. I am not bitter about this war. I'm extremely shocked and grieved over his death. He was a professional officer and it seemed inevitable that he would go to war. I am the daughter of a career officer and I've grown up really all over the world. I've always had in the back of my mind that I would want to marry a military man, and while we were stationed in Germany I met my husband. On the morning of Tuesday, March the 4th, my Principal came to my classroom and asked me to go into the office with him. [She was a primary school teacher.] I did, and there were two officers who had been sent to notify me that my husband was missing in Vietnam. Of course, I had many telephone calls to make, to his parents and to the rest of our families, and I stayed at school to make those. I couldn't go home then, and shortly after that a friend came and she took me home. I spent the rest of the day at home sitting and waiting for more news, and also for the first telegram that had been promised to confirm this notification of missing. Since his death I've been surrounded by family and friends and I've also returned to my teaching job where I've been since last September.

Many people do consider this war to be an immoral war, to be unjust. I feel the United States entered this war under an agreement and we must continue there as long as we can

fulfill our duty to that country, even though it does mean tremendous suffering for families and a tremendous economic strain on the country. We can't lose the ship halfway at sea. That he did not die in vain—I would never believe that nor would any one who knew him or anybody as dedicated to the military as he was. I've lived with it for two and a half years with my husband, at times I've thought maybe I should be a man so that I could also serve my country. I'm an American first and foremost even though I've lived in different countries and enjoyed different countries thoroughly. They've afforded me different experiences, but the United States is my fatherland, and I respect and admire it's Government and it's military force. My husband's death was not a useless death. It was untimely.

SOURCE: Robert Jones (producer), *The War Comes Home* (New Films Co., 1972). The editors are grateful for the permission to print these remarks.

RELATED ENTRIES: Families, Military; Vietnam War

1970 c

Excerpts from "Pentagon Papers" Supreme Court Briefs

In 1970 analyst Daniel Ellsberg leaked a rather pessimistic internal Pentagon evaluation of the Vietnam War to the New York Times. The Nixon administration secured a temporary restraining order on the publication of these documents from the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, and the case, involving questions of prior restraint of the press, and national security, was heard on appeal by the Supreme Court; the Court quashed the restraint, and the Times published the "Pentagon Papers."

Excerpt from the Brief Submitted by the United States

ARGUMENT

I. The First Amendment Does Not Bar a Court From Enjoining the Publication by A Newspaper of Articles that Pose A Grave and Immediate Danger to the Security of the United States

A. The First Amendment does not provide an absolute bar to any prior restraint upon the publication by the newspaper of particular material.

1. The issue before the Court, although of great importance, is narrow. There is no question here of any blanket attempt by the government to enjoin the publication of a newspaper, or any attempt to impose a generalized prohibition upon the publication of broad categories of material. The only issue is whether, in a suit by the United States, the Frist Amendment bars a court from prohibiting a newspaper from publishing material whose disclosure would pose a "grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States."

In the *Times* case, the Court of Appeals fro the Second Court affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injuction, except with respect to a limited group of documents. . . . As to those documents, the court continued the preliminary injunction, but remanded the case for the district court to determine, in further *in camera* proceedings, whether any of those specified items met the standard of "grave and immediate danger" to the national security. The government has not sought review of the portion of the judgement of the court of appeals that otherwise affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction.

In the *Post* case, the government similarly had not challenged the court of appeals' affirmance of the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, except insofar as that court declined to impose the same condition as the Second Circuit had imposed on the *Times* case. In other words, the government is urging only that the *Post* should be prohibited from publishing those materials within the categories specified by the court of appeals in the *Times* case that pose a "grave and immediate danger" to national security.

The answer to narrow this question does not depend upon the fact that all of the material whose publication the government is seeking to prevent is classified either "top secret" or "secret", that all of the it was obtained illegally from the government and that both the Times and the Post hold such material without any authorization from the government. For whatever the classification this material has, and however the newspaper may have come into possession

of it, we submit tht the First Amendment does not preclude an injunction preventing the newspaper from publishing it.

The standard adopted by the Second Circuit is that of "grave and immediate" dander to national security. Since the effect of particular action upon diplomatic relations may be extremely severe in the long run even though its immediate impact is not clear or great, we believe that, insofar as this standard involves the conduct of foreign affairs, the word "immediate" should be construed to mean "irreparable." Indeed, in the delicate area of foreign relations frequently it is impossible to show that something would pose an "immediate" danger to national security, even though the long-run effect upon such security would be grave and irreparable.

SOURCE: Brief for the United States, *New York Times Company v. United States of America*, the U.S. Supreme Court Reports, October Term, 1970, no. 1873. Found on National Security Archives Website, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB48/usbrief.pdf (accessed 7/13/2005).

EXCERPT FROM THE BRIEF SUBMITTED BY THE *NEW YORK TIMES*

CONCLUSION

This country's experience with censorship of political speech is happily almost non-existent. Through wars and other turbulence, we have avoided it. Given the choice of risks, we have chosen to risk freedom, as the First Amendment enjoins us to do.

We have not opted for some naïve insistence that all our processes of government take place in the open, or that those charged with heavy responsibilities, executive, legislative or judicial, be denied privacy in their decisional processes. But we have preserved the values of decisional privacy without resorting to censorship. We have met the needs for privacy by safeguarding it at the source, as in the Government's internal procedures for maintaining informational security. In some limited measure, we have used the deterrent force of the criminal sanction to safeguard privacy and security. But we have not censored.

As our affidavits show, press and government have a curious, interlocking, both cooperative and adversary relationship. This has been the case more or less in this country since the extension of manhood suffrage, and the rise of an idependent, rather than party-connected, or faction-connected press. It is not a tidy relationship. It is unruly, or to the extent that it operates under rules, these are unwritten and even tacit ones. Unquestionably, every so often it malfunctions from the point of view of one or the other partner to it. The greater power within it lies with the Government. The press wields the countervailing power conferred upon it by the First Amendment. If there is something near a balance, it is an uneasy one. Any redressing of it at the expense of the press, as this case demonstrates, can come only at the cost of incursions into the First Amendment.

In effect, in this case the Court is asked, without benefit of statute, to redress the balance, to readjust the uneasy arrangement which has, after all, served us well. That which the Government seeks in this case is outside the framework of both law and history.

Except as it inferentially affirms the judgment of the District Court, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed, and the case remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.

SOURCE: Brief for the Petitioner, *New York Times* Company, *New York Times Company v. United States of America*, the U.S. Supreme Court Reports, October Term, 1970, no. 1873. Found on National Security Archives Website, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB48/nytbrief.pdf (accessed 7/13/2005).

RELATED ENTRIES: Cold War; Media and War; Pentagon Papers; Vietnam War

1971 a
LETTERS TO EDITORS OF *SGT FURY AND HIS HOWLING COMMANDOS*

Enthusiastic fans of the Marvel comic book series "Sergeant Fury and His Howling Commandos" wrote the series editor

in 1970 and early 1971. The first letter is from a Specialist/5 in Vietnam.

DEAR EDITOR:

I have been a regular reader of Marvel mags for many years. They have provided me with pleasure throughout my college years and afterwards. It has never occurred to me that one day I might be writing to you. However, something has come to my attention of late and I feel that I must write to you collectively.

At the present time I am serving with the "Free World Forces" in Viet Nam. As an American citizen I too feel like "Nick Fury," ". . . Fact is, the American fightin' man has always been there when the call came. . . . I ain't sayin' whether we're right or wrong." I am here doing my duty. I may be opposed but I am doing my job the best way I can.

Now I'm gonna cut all this formal jazz n get to the point, And the point is . . . I've got, as we say here in the Nam, a case. Here's why.

I used to be out in the field. Not as a grunt or a Howling Commando type, but out there close to it doing the job my government trained me to do. Out there you have a lot of time to think. You pick up on things, real easy. Things you never thought about back in the world. Out there I used to pick up your mags at the PX, read em' and think about them. You guys have been saying stuff for a long time. Good things that tell it like it is. Believe me, your audience digs it. I do 'n became a legit KOF [Keeper of the Flame] turning my buddies on to you.

When your Aug. SGT. FURY came out I flipped. I bought all I could without cornering the market. I started leaving them places and passing them on to people. I left them in places where people who normally wouldn't read them would be exposed to it. Any place where guys just pick up something to read while waiting for something to happen. The ish [issue] became a real topic of rap sessions. People who never before were aware sort of got turned on to new ideas. It became sort of a collectors' item in a very short time. A lot of us were waiting for the next ish to arrive. Here's where my "case" comes in.

IT NEVER CAME.

So I figured someone screwed up . . . it is the army and it does happen. There was nothing to do but wait. Oct ish

time came and still no Marvels. I got transfered to another unit cause my old unit was going home. Low and behold I was assigned to Saigon to work. Now Saigon is the New York City, Allice's Resturant, and big PX of Viet Nam. You can get it no matter what you want. N' you know what? There ain't a Marvel Mag in a PX in Nam.

Seems like you guys have stepped on some toes and hit some nerves and the "big wigs" have had you censored. How does that grab you?

It is not because there is not a market. The "other" mags are coming in and being bought. The only difference is the absence of the Marvel line.

Now I don't expect you guys to believe what follows. I have a hard time believing it myself. A couple of weeks ago I had this dream. I didn't really dig it, but you guys should know about it. It wasn't a good trip, but here goes.

I was out in the field humping an M-16 and sweatin like a polar bear in Miami. We came upon this old fort a relic of the French. It was rubble, like somebody had really done a job on the place. You could tell that whoever was hole' up in there had gotten blown away . . . but good. Being hot we dropped our gear an took ten. I went out back to check the place out and found this old fatigue shirt. I was gonna send it to you but it was so old it has fallen apart, so's I'm sending you the name tape which is all that's left . . . "Cpt. AMERIKA."

Like I said, it was a dream and a bad one. I din't like it and I hope it "never happens", God, I really do.

But, right now, I got a real bad case.

". . . you know if you gotta fight, you do . . . but it'd sure be great if we all wised up and decided to chuck all the fighting."

Sgt. Nick Fury, August, 1970.
    RFO, TTV, KOF (in exile) Sp/5 Keith A. Mishne
    275-40-5723, Co. A 519 Sp. Bn. APO S.F. 96307

[From the Editors:] Amen to that, Brother Keith—and we hope you're out of exile soon. That name tape you found sort of worried us, until we realized that it had to be a plant. Guess the Cong don't know how to spell "America."

But, seriously, we've got a stack of letters from Nam complaining that our books disappeared. We don't know what's happened yet, but we've got a guy checking it out with the distributor, and when we know something, we'll pass it on to you guys soonest.

DEAR STAN, GARY, AND JOHN:

How about having Sgt. Nick Fury, Sgt. Bob Jenkins [leader of the "Missouri Marauders"], and Captain Savage on a mission together?

Also, I would like to see the return of all the Marauders and to see the Howlers fighting the Japanese again.

Tray Turner, 2400 S. Frazier St.
Phila, Pa 19143

[From the Editors:] Well, Tray, we're putting it to our assemblage of battle mag buffs. What d'ya say, ya goldbricks?!

DEAR STAN, GARY, AND JOHN:

After reading an old ish last Thursday, I came to the conclusion that you guys deserve the three-star medal for your fine portrayal of our military forces. Too often our country's young criticize and deride the Armed Forces of the United States. Our boys in khaki are fighting for democracy and protecting freedom and liberty.

Your portrait of our unsung heroes is a credit to the future's hopes for our land. I thank you personally and for the men with whom I'll be serving in the ensuing months. Peace

Usher Dangerfield, 704 Roderick Mayfair House
Raploch, SCOTLAND

[From the Editors:] We're proud to receive your thanks, Usher. Even though we're not about to say that America's armed forces are always perfect, it's safe to say that we at Marvel can certainly appreciate the heroic part our men played in World War II.

SOURCE: Stan Lee and Al Kurzrok, *SGT Fury and His Howling Commandos,* Mag. Management Co., I, no. 88, June 1971.

RELATED ENTRIES: Captain Marvel Comic Books; Cold War; Literature and War; Militarization and Militarism; Vietnam War; World War II

1971 b
INTERVIEW WITH U.S. ARMY COL. DAVID H. HACKWORTH

Col. David Hackworth may have been the most decorated man in the history of the U.S. Army. He and Marine Corps general Victor Krulak were among the most perceptive military critics of the ways the Vietnam War was being waged. Aware that his next assignment would have virtually assured him of future promotion to flag rank, Hackworth boldly chose to grant a public interview on ABC's "Issues and Answers," aired nationwide on Sunday, June 27, 1971, laying out the errors being committed and explaining why he was resigning from the Army.

Interview with U.S. Army Col. David H. Hackworth
SUNDAY, 27 JUNE 1971
GUEST: Colonel David H. Hackworth, U.S. Army
INTERVIEWED BY: Howard Tuckner, ABC News Saigon Correspondent

MR. TUCKNER: You have served in Korea, you have served in Vietnam for a long time, you have served back at the Pentagon. How do you rate the training of U.S. Army troops who came to Vietnam?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: I think in the main the training for Vietnam from the standpoint of the individual soldier, the young officer, and even the battalion, brigade, and division staff officers and senior commanders has been totally inadequate.

I think that our training was geared to the individual replacement system of World War II. The curriculum was wrong, the quality of the instructors and the leaders was—in my judgment we didn't have the type people that should have been there. The commanders there should have been—the battalion commanders should have commanded battalions in Vietnam. The company commanders should have commanded companies, here, and leaders should have

been the finest leaders our country could have mustered to provide the young soldiers with the type training, the realistic training that they needed to confront a guerrilla enemy in Vietnam.

And I'd like to just make the point that when my well-trained, STRAC, one of the finest units in the U.S. Army arrived in Vietnam in June and July of 1965, the mistakes they made were criminal. The number of dead that they have killed among themselves, men that were shot by their comrades, artillery that had fallen on them. Great mistakes were made because of improper training, being not prepared for the war, even though we had from 1953 to 1965 to prepare for the war.

MR. TUCKNER: In your view did poor training lead to higher casualties in Vietnam?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: I am convinced of it. I think that our casualties were at least thirty percent higher because of—or even higher than that, but I'd say, just safely, thirty percent higher because of troops that were not properly trained.

I participated in a study group in the Pentagon in '67 and early '68 which considered U.S. casualties caused by friendly fires and the group was composed of highly experienced personnel that had served in Vietnam and it was our conclusion that fifteen to twenty percent of the casualties caused in Vietnam were the result of friendly fire—one man shooting another man; artillery, friendly artillery firing on a friendly element; friendly helicopters firing on a friendly unit; tac air striking a friendly unit; and I could count you, in my own case, countless personal examples. For example, during the battle of Dak To, June the seventeenth, a rocket ship came into my A Company's position by mistake and released its rockets right on top of the company killing the executive officer and wounding twenty-nine other troopers.

I can recall in September of 1965 as my battalion was deployed, artillery was fired in the wrong place killing seven men in one of my platoons.

MR. TUCKNER: Can it be said that the generals in the U.S. Army, many of them, did not really adjust to the tactics of this war?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: I think the average general that came to Vietnam did not have a good concept, good appreciation of the nature of guerrilla warfare. In most cases because of their lack of even reading in depth about guerrilla warfare, they were not prepared for the war and they had to fall back on Korea and World War II and they used the thought process and the techniques that worked successfully there, moving in large formations, making battalion and brigade airmobile assaults on a small LZ and having everything very tidy, artillery in position and fighting much as we did on the plains of Europe.

I don't feel that too many division commanders, or even separate brigade commanders, really understood the name of the game.

MR. TUCKNER: Did this mean more U.S. casualties, this misunderstanding of the name of the game, as you put it?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: Absolutely. Absolutely. I think probably one of the most classic examples is Hamburger Hill. Here was a hill that had to be taken. Hundreds and hundreds of casualties occurred taking this hill. They had the hill for a few days, the Americans did, and pulled off. So what was the point of taking the hill? Why not stand back if the enemy is on it and bomb, but why use infantry to take the hill?

MR. TUCKNER: Did the upper echelon of the Army really ever become changed on this war? Did they learn from their mistakes?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: I don't think so. I don't think that the top level ever developed a realistic strategic plan nor did they ever have tactics to support that strategic plan.

MR. TUCKNER: Why?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: I think that the top managers of the Army—and there is a big difference between a leader, a combat leader and a manager, the top managers were so involved in systems analysis, in the normal bureaucracy of it all that they were fighting from day to day just to move the paper that crossed their desk and they couldn't see the forest for the trees.

In February when we went into Laos, we went into Laos conventionally. The idea was to block the enemy's supply routes. So we dropped in there. We paid a horrible—the Vietnamese paid a horrible price. Tremendous mistakes

were made. Again, conventional thinking. Conventional thinking put us in that operation rather than having a light, mobile guerrilla force, but a guerrilla force that belonged to the Government of Vietnam, or the American Army operating in there like guerrillas. It takes a thief to catch a thief. What we need is a thief. We don't need a conventionally trained FBI agent dashing through the woods with a large force behind him.

We need small people, well trained, highly motivated, and this is what we have not had, because what we have now among the Army is a bunch of shallow dilettantes who run from pillar to post trying to punch their card, serving minimum time at company level because the exposure—you are very close to the heat of the furnace there, meaning you can get in trouble easily.

MR. TUCKNER: Have you found that many other U.S. Army officers who have been here in Vietnam feel the way you do?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: Most of my young friends—that would be captains, majors and lieutenant colonels—who have a considerable amount of experience in Vietnam, feel as I do. A number of very highly qualified full colonels whom I know feel as I do, and I suppose there are a few generals who feel as I do, but in the main this group unfortunately—I suppose it is because of the nature of the beast—is not highly vocal regarding their views because if one would become highly vocal you might become a Billy Mitchell. It might be the end of your career.

MR. TUCKNER: Hasn't this silence meant that some who have died in this war might have been saved?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: That is right, and that is why perhaps we who have not been vocal should be charged for just criminal neglect, because it is our obligation, it is our responsibility, not only to train our soldiers well, to lead our soldiers well, but to make sure that there are no mistakes made, that they are protected as well as possible from mistakes and error and once you make mistakes they must be surfaced, critiqued, identified, and remedial action taken.

MR. TUCKNER: Colonel, I understand that because of the fact that you are considered one of the best infantry officers in the Army you have been asked a number of times to

go to the War College, which is preparation for becoming general one day.

COLONEL HACKWORTH: Yes, I have been asked to go to War College for three years straight, and my reason for refusing is that I just simply felt that we were on the battlefield, we were engaged in a critical battle, and I didn't need to go to school at the time to learn anything. I was learning it on the battlefield and I was transferring the skills that I had to my men and probably saving lives.

I can recall in November of 1969 a major general here in Vietnam told me that, when I asked him, should I extend again, he said, "Hack, get out. The war for the U.S. Army is over with in Vietnam."

He said, "You've got all the right tickets and all the right credentials. Go on to War College now and prepare yourself for bigger things."

MR. TUCKNER: Colonel, we have heard a lot about body count in this war. What about it?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: Well, it has been used as a rule of measurement of success. The body count has cost us a lot. It has cost us unnecessary casualties because always in the chain of command one commander is pressuring the other commander for what is the success, what is the body count and it ends up you are calling the platoon leader, "How many have you killed?"

The platoon leader is in a firefight and he hasn't a clue of how many he has killed, but he may have to stop the fight. He may have to expose a few soldiers to go out and count the bodies during the fight. He may lose the momentum of the attack to stay on the enemy and pursue him while he is counting bodies. He may have to squat on the enemy and count the bodies.

It has also really weakened the moral fiber of the officer corps because it has taught them to lie; it has taught them to exaggerate because, again, it is a form of success. It is "How many touchdowns do you have? What is the final score of the game?" And the body count has been greatly exaggerated as a result of this and I would say it has been exaggerated to the tune of twenty to twenty-five percent.

MR. TUCKNER: Do you know of any example specifically where you were involved in trying to substantiate body count that you didn't think was accurate?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: Yes. I could give several good examples. One which comes to mind is a battle which was fought with a great number of friendly maneuver elements, found—reputedly found—an enemy force; we encircled the enemy force. All night long artillery, rockets, fighter bombers were placed on the enemy for us, and came the dawn when we swept the enemy positions there was a total of enemy dead on the battlefield of not more than twenty.

When I crossed over to the other side of the canal that we were fighting on to talk to the commander of the other battalion which was the other half of the encirclement force, the brigade commander came in and started talking about such a brilliant victory we had and that we killed something like two hundred seventy-five or two hundred eighty enemy dead, and this was a classic battle. It illustrated the techniques of mobile warfare, how we could drop on an enemy force, find them, fix them, surround them, and then destroy them, and I pointed out to the brigade commander, the acting brigade commander, I should say, that there wasn't that many dead on the battlefield. We had only killed, I would say, no more than twelve or fifteen and the colonel on the other side had told me he had six or seven, so there couldn't have been twenty or twenty-two or so and I was told there were two hundred eighty killed.*

This is what had been reported to Division. I said, "Well, it is not right. We only had—This battalion is reported to have a strength of three hundred and if we killed two hundred eighty that would leave less than twenty able-bodied men, able to remove the bodies from the battlefield," which is a normal VC technique, which was his excuse for why the bodies weren't on the battlefield.

He said, "Well, that night the survivors carried them off."

I said, "Look, we had the enemy completed surrounded; there was no corridor in which he could escape. If there were a small path that he could have gained escape through our lines that would have meant that every survivor would have had to carry seven or eight bodies plus all their individual weapons." I think there were five total individual weapons found on the battlefield, and this complete battle was a total lie in my judgment.

I was called in by the commander at the time to endorse his after-action report, this report which had all of these bodies in it, and great other irregularities and falsehood, I think designed to make this individual look like Rommel or look like some great tactician and very, very effective combat leader. And I refused to do it. And he and I had somewhat of a major confrontation.

Also during this time I was asked to sign a statement, a narrative statement to support an award for the Distinguished Service Cross for this individual who didn't even get out of his helicopter during the "battle," and I refused to do that.

It was insinuated if I would sign one or two of these documents that I would be—my unit would be considered, possibly, for a unit citation as a result of this action, which I, of course, refused to go along with.

MR. TUCKNER: Did you sign it?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: Absolutely not.

MR. TUCKNER: When leading U.S. government officials, people like former Secretary of Defense McNamara, come to Vietnam for a visit, do they get the clear, straight picture?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: I think what we do for a presentation for a senior official such as Mr. McNamara is put on a razzle-dazzle briefing, complete with charts and extremely well rehearsed briefing officers, and we try to put our best foot forward to try to look as good as possible. Perhaps a scenario would go kind of like this:

After the briefing Mr. McNamara turned to General Wheeler, who was with him, or to General Westmoreland, who I would think accompanied him, and said, "What do you think about that?" And General Wheeler said, "Great battle! We are knockin' 'em dead." And General Westmoreland would have said, "We really got 'em that time! This is a typical action in Vietnam of your U.S. modern Army in action! We have really nailed them and that is the way we are nailing them and that is why we are winning this war. Just give us a few more troops, a few more resources, and we will have 'em on the run. There's light at the end of the tunnel."

He didn't say the VC was holding the candle but he said the end is in sight.

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So as a consequence, Mr. McNamara, believing this, perhaps—because it looked real enough to believe—went back and he is sitting—again part of the scenario with the President, and Mr. Johnson says, "How's it going in Vietnam?" And McNamara says, "We are winning."

MR. TUCKNER: Colonel, in 1968 you were so highly thought of that you were selected from a group of a few officers to contribute to a report to General Westmoreland. What did you say in that report?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: Well, my comments were very exciting insofar as the Army staff was concerned. I felt they were truthful and I said that in my judgment at the time this paper was written in 1968, the U.S. Army had badly botched the war in Vietnam and I had considered from a tactical standpoint we had lost the war.

And now my experience three years later only confirms those comments to General Westmoreland.

MR. TUCKNER: What's happened since then? Has there been any change? Have your comments helped anything?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: No, I don't think so. I said that I felt there have been no viable reforms. I felt that the corruption that exists in Vietnam, the graft, the failure to produce continues to exist. I felt that the military had not established any strategic goals, nor had there been any tactical concept developed to support the strategic goals which were not developed and announced.

I felt that we sent an Army to Vietnam that was not prepared to fight the war. We sent an Army that was top-heavy in administrators and logisticians and bloody thin on fighters, not trained for the war. I felt that we didn't understand the nature of the war in the military. I felt that just everything we had done in Vietnam had been done wrong.

MR. TUCKNER: Do you think it is possible, Colonel, that past United States Presidents who have been involved during the Vietnam War, the present Administration, do you think it is possible they may feel they are getting the straight truth, but that it might not be?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: Well, my thing is infantry, which I am very familiar with, and I don't know what happens at the higher echelons. I know the nature of the beast in the military is to sanitize a report to look good. I have seen what has happened at brigade level where the whole situation has been distorted.

I think it is highly probable that all of these beautiful briefings and excellent reports were so production-line Hollywoodized that by the time they got to the President and they got to the people who were making decisions, they didn't have the real facts; they didn't understand what was happening.

MR. TUCKNER: Colonel, what do you think of the Vietnamization program? Is it viable now?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: Well, my view of Vietnamization is, it is a nice word. I think that it has been glamorized; I think that it has been Madison Avenued; I think that it is perhaps a PR's dream. It is a public-relations gimmick.

I have been with the Vietnamese a long time and I have seen great improvements, significant improvement, but I haven't seen the improvements that I read about in many papers, and different magazines, and I hear leading statesmen of our nation say. I don't think the Vietnamese are that good. I don't think the whole Vietnamization thing is real.

MR. TUCKNER: If the enemy chose to react and if American troops were not here, what do you think would happen to the Vietnamese Army?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: I think if the enemy had the capability of launching a concerted attack I would think we would find ourselves in a situation as we were in in '63, '64, and early '65, really, because of the American involvement here, was to save the shattered Vietnamese Army. We were losing on the average of, as I recall, almost a battalion of Vietnamese a week in '65 and I think we would find the same situation developing. If the North Vietnamese, who I feel have the capability—they certainly proved they were pretty dangerous and tough up in Laos—and we find that we recently made a foray into Cambodia, and the enemy is much harder in Cambodia. Last April the targets we were striking along my zone in Cambodia were like taking candy from a baby. Now you go to Cambodia and you find the enemy with his stuff together. He is tough; he is moving back into the areas we used to raid with ease. I think we are going to find it more and more difficult of making these raids into Cambodia.

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MR. TUCKNER: Do you think that the programs that the U.S. military and perhaps the U.S. mission had here did not fit the situation for Vietnamization?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: Exactly. We gave them a sheet of music designed by the military and that is what they had to dance by, and the whole organization of the Vietnamese Army in my judgment has been wrong; it has not been tailored or designed to fight the guerrilla in this type of warfare and we have given them a lot of sophisticated equipment, helicopters, sensor devices, radars, complicated vehicles, other complicated equipment that the Vietnamese are just incapable of using, incapable of maintaining, so we have given them now all kinds of sophisticated junk and asked them to use this. Vietnamization now will suddenly win the war because the Vietnamese have helicopters. We will suddenly win the war because the Vietnamese have the M-16 rifle, but it takes a lot more than a piece of equipment or a complicated piece of equipment such as radar and sensors and so on for them to win the war.

Instead of saying, "What you need is well-trained soldiers, what you need is highly motivated soldiers, what you need is soldiers who are similar to the Viet Cong soldiers who are fighting for an ideal, who are fighting for something—similar to Christianity; who are fighting for a cause, a crusade, not fighting to get a Honda or get a new watch or get a portable radio or to have a nice house, but fighting for a cause, and this is what has not been inculcated in the whole army of Vietnam.

MR. TUCKNER: Colonel, do you feel it is possible you have become too emotionally involved in Vietnam?

COLONEL HACKWORTH: I have become emotionally involved in Vietnam. One couldn't have spent the number of years I have spent in Vietnam without becoming emotionally involved. One couldn't see the number of young studs die or be terribly wounded without becoming emotionally involved.

I just have seen the American nation spend so much of its wonderful, great young men in this country. I have seen our national wealth being drained away. I see the nation being split apart and almost being split asunder because of this war, and I am wondering to what end it is all going to lead to.

*Clearly, during the interview my chronology as pertaining to the subject of body count at the Battle of My Phouc Tay (Thanh Phu) was confused. Though the count was inflated by almost one-third by acting Brigade CO Hunt the morning after the battle, the figure of (approximately) 280 did not come to my attention until six weeks later, when Hunt showed me the draft copy of his "History of the Battle of Thanh Phu" and attempted to get my endorsement of it. Similarly, no prolonged discussion about the battle took place between Hunt and myself until that time.

SOURCE: Colonel David H. Hackworth, interview by Howard Tuckner, ABC News *Issues and Answers*, ABC, 27 June 1971.

RELATED ENTRIES: Censorship and the Military; Hitchcock, Ethan Allen; Media and War; Vietnam War

1971 c

DRUG USE IN THE ARMY

Drug use by Army personnel in Vietnam exceeded that of those stationed elsewhere in the world in 1971, but not, for the most part, by drastically different amounts, as this table indicates:

PERCENTAGE OF U.S. ARMY USING DRUGS IN THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS (1971) BY PLACE OF SERVICE

		TYPE OF DRUG			
Service Location	Marijuana (%)	Other Psychedelic Drugs (%)	Stimulants (%)	Depressants (%)	Narcotic Drugs (%)
Continental U.S.	41.3	28.4	28.9	21.5	20.1
Europe	40.2	33.0	23.0	14.0	13.1
Viet Nam	50.9	30.8	31.9	25.1	28.5
Other S.E. Asia	42.0	23.2	24.7	18.1	17.6
Total Army	42.7	29.4	28.0	20.4	20.1

SOURCE: U.S. Senate, *Drug Abuse in the Military: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Drug Abuse in the Military of the Committee on Armed Services,* 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1972, 127, cited in Savage and Gabriel, "Cohesion and Disintegration

in the American Army: An Alternative Perspective," *Armed Forces and Society* 2 (1975): 351.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; Medicine and War; Psychiatry, Military; Vietnam War

1971 d

DID VIETNAM TURN GIS INTO ADDICTS?

Even given the tendency of soldiers in Vietnam to use drugs slightly more frequently than soldiers elsewhere (see document 1971c above), their use did not result long-term addictions. When those returning from tours of duty in Vietnam were surveyed at a later date, it appears that only those who had used heroin, one of the most addictive drugs, were likely to have continued to use it:

INCIDENCE AND FREQUENCY OF DRUG USE AMONG VIETNAM ENLISTED RETURNEES, OAKLAND OVERSEAS PROCESSING CENTER—1—13 MARCH 1971 (1,010 VIETNAM ENLISTED SEPARATEES—E-1—6, AGE 26 OR BELOW)

	Before Vietnam	During Vietnam	Current (last 30 days)
Marihuana: total users	45.80% (461)	58.50% (592)	37.10% (374)
Amphetamines: total users	14.00% (141)	16.40% (165)	5.76% (58)
Barbiturates: total users	11.32% (114)	15.46% (156)	7.04% (71)
Acid (LSD, peyote, and the like): total users	12.67% (127)	9.54% (96)	4.16% (42)
Heroin or morphine: total users	6.17% (62)	22.68% (228)	16.15% (163)
Opium: total users	7.75% (78)	19.59% (196)	9.14% (92)

SOURCE: K.E. Nelson and J. Panzarella, "Prevalence of Drug Use, Enlisted Vietnam Returnees Processing for ETS Separation, Oakland Overseas Processing Center," unpublished ms., 1971, cited in John Helmer, *Bringing the War Home* (New York: Free Press, 1974), 78.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; Medicine and War; Psychiatry, Military; Vietnam War

1972

REMARKS OF BLACK VETERAN ON HIS RETURN TO PENNSYLVANIA

A black Vietnam veteran from Pennsylvania talked about his moment of horror:

Ya know, some of the fellows in Vietnam, they become hardened; ah, they develop a crustation or something that affords them the benefit of not having their conscience bother them. Now these guys might go out to the field. They might kill women, children.

Ya know, I cannot do this. I tried to develop this shield of force or whatever it was, and I really tried hard. I talked to guys who had; guys who could laugh at this, to try and formulate some way ya know, to help myself, so I could live, and on several occasions when I said I killed or was responsible for the death of my fellow man.

But, um, there's one time that really stands out in my mind, that I feel contributed greatly to my having to spend six months in a psychiatric ward. I was out on patrol and came to a village and the Cong had been there and they had killed about everyone. The ones that they hadn't killed were dying and there was one child there, and they hadn't harmed her; she was a very small child. And one of the officers said that she could inform the Cong, and that we were waiting for them we knew they'd be back because they'd left supplies here.

And he wanted this child killed, and as I looked at him I could see that this really meant something to him (to have her killed); and it was going to help him believe in what he was doing.

I could see that in his face. It was like it was unspoken. And I didn't want to help him. I didn't mind helping my fellow man, but I didn't want to help him with that. But what can you do when someone puts a gun to your head (or in your hand).

So, I killed the child. . . . and a couple of weeks later, as a result of this, my head blew up. I lapsed into a psychosis or

something like this. When I was in the psychiatric ward I once saw my chart and it had "schitzophrenic reations."

I really felt as though when I was in the ward that I was an invalid. Ah, I had no physical handicap whatsoever, but some vital, ah, ah, basic, ah, central or part of my mind was affected to the extent that I really couldn't manage.

I finally left that talk about killing that person, that girl, I don't really have that much trouble providing I stay away from mirrors. But if I go out every face is a mirror, ya know what I mean?

I don't know what I see but I'll just say this, that it immediately transports me back to Vietnam. And I relive what happened over there.

I wanted to burn Pittsburgh and possibly Philly. But it's not that I'm adverse to war, it's just that I had changed so much and Pittsburgh hadn't.

SOURCE: Robert Jones (producer), The War Comes Home (New Film Co., 1972). The editors are grateful for the permission to print these remarks.

RELATED ENTRIES: African Americans in the Military; Combat, Effects of; Racial Integration of the Armed Forces; Vietnam War

1973

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

An attempt by Congress to assert a more powerful role in war-making decisions, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 was enacted during a time when a public—wary from increased intelligence surveillance during the Cold War and the news of break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate Hotel—pressured elected officials to institute measures to address the possible misuse of governmental power. The resolution required presidents to inform Congress within 48 hours if U.S. military personnel were deployed in combat overseas and to withdraw them within 60 days unless sanctioned by Congress.

Public Law 93-148
93rd Congress, H. J. Res. 542
November 7, 1973

Joint Resolution

Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".

PURPOSE AND POLICY

SEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicate by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

CONSULTATION

SEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed

Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

REPORTING

SEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced--

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the president shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth--

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad

(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

SEC. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL

SEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section

shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference.

Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION

SEC. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred--

(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or

(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.

(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.

(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of member of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.

(d) Nothing in this joint resolution--

(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provision of existing treaties; or (2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

SEPARABILITY CLAUSE

SEC. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.

SOURCE: Almanac of Policy Issues, http://www.policyalmanac.org/world/archive/war_powers_resolution.shtml (July 22, 2005).

RELATED ENTRIES: Cold War; War Powers Resolution; Vietnam War

1975

Lt. Keffer's Reflections on Attending a Reunion of Buchenwald Survivors

Fredric Keffer, a World War II veteran of the 6th Armored Division, made a different kind of trip with his son Tom to the 30th reunion of the survivors of Buchenwald; he had been a part of the first Allied unit to reach the camp. Keffer described the reunion for his "Super-Sixer" comrades, and commented on the meaning to him of what had transpired a generation before:

On April 11, 1945, HERBERT GOTTSCHALK and I crossed through a hole in a twelve-foot-high double barbed wire enclosure and were suddenly swarmed upon and cheered and tossed up and down and madly jostled, embraced, and crushed by the 21,000 political prisoners of Buchenwald Concentration Camp. We had arrived in an M-8 scout car, just four of us, HARRY WARD and JAMES HOYT (radio operator and driver, both of whom remained with the scout car) and HERB and myself, on a side trip several kilometers away from the main body of Combat Team 9. We had come—the first American soldiers—minutes after the brutal SS guards had fled. We had come, in fact, because many of the guards had been picked up by our main body,

and we wanted to find out just what it was they were fleeing. And those wonderful prisoners, those emaciated and battered skeletons of men, had somehow summoned-up a last bit of adrenalin for joyous welcome. There was little else left in them, and it didn't seem likely that any could survive another year, even in a hospital.

Yet here we were, HERB and I, over thirty years later, on September 20, 1975, being honored by nearly a hundred healthy and hearty Belgian survivors of Buchenwald, members of an organization very much like our Association, called the Amicale de Buchenwald. And we were assured that they were in close touch with many survivors from France, Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia, indeed from all over Europe—even from West and East Germany; and in fact we met one German anti-Nazi who had spent ten years, from 1935 to 1945, in various Nazi prisons. It was the first time we had seen Buchenwalders since 1945, and we were amazed and delighted by their tenacity of body and exuberence of spirit. Our Belgian hosts, together with their wives and a few fellow prisoners from outside Belgium, were assembled in the sumptuous new Congress Palace in Liège. Any Super-Sixer who had seen the crumbling town of Liège in 1945 would hardly have been prepared for the bustling, sky-scrapered, traffic-choked, steel-mill-smoked, river-polluted metropolis of 1975, complete with Holiday Inn right next door to the Congress Palace. I had trouble adjusting to the reality of today, just as my son TOM, who came with me, had trouble adjusting to a past which had produced concentration camps.

TOM and I began our journey into present and past with a drive around Bastogne, through northern Luxembourg, and across the Our River into Germany. We had to look hard to see any evidence of those awful days of 1944-45 in the cold snow. We were able, with real effort, to find one miserable little pile of rocks that looked like it might once have been part of the massive Sigfried Line. Here and there in Luxembourg one finds a German tank, an 88, or an American tank, but only because some local group has carefully maintained these relics like stuffed animals in a museum. And in Clervaux there even is a museum, yes Sir, a genuine museum, where you pay admission to look at such

rare old specimens as GI helmets and OD shirts, and carbines and M1 rifles, and K rations (and even German counterparts) which were carefully collected from all that good old American (and German) litter that was left on Luxembourg battlefields. We stared in disbelief. Somehow none of this seemed to be real anymore. . . .

On Sunday noon there was a formal meeting, with speeches. [Maurice] Bolle chaired. A fiery speech with pounding on the rostrum was presented by a Frenchman who was introduced as head of the International Congress of ex-Concentration Camp Prisoners. A non-fiery, 40-minute speech in soporific French was given by the president of the Belgian group. Bolle read a "wish I could be with you" telegram from a comrade in Moscow, in French, but broken with several "STOP"s in English. I was moved to give a short speech, in English of course, to thank them all on behalf of my fellow soldiers and to say that the liberation of Buchenwald and indeed of the European continent was what World War II was all about. I didn't say so, but if I had ever had any doubts that our participation in that war was right and just, those doubts had been completely dispelled on greeting and being greeted by these wonderful men of Buchenwald. . . .

There was one little session in Liège that I have saved mention until last. Bolle brought a small group together, gave each American a handsome pewter plate memento, and then read a speech (in English, followed by translation into German by BONNIE ELDER). This Speech which expressed his worries about the future, was directed to us Americans and most specifically to TOM and to his generation. How easy it is, he said, to forget the terrors of fascism, and how hard it is to prevent fascism from arising. The principal reason he spends his time and energy keeping the Amicale de Buchenwald functioning is to educate the public and make people aware of the brutalities that might come again. He cannot rest, even at age 85. How can he get more publicity, he kept asking.

The question has no simple answer. I had already given a portion of my own answer by inviting TOM to accompany me to Liège. Another portion of my answer has been to write this account. I hope that many Super-Sixers will pass this on to their sons and daughters. Memories of evil get erased, for

life must go on, and new generations cannot be locked into the past. But they would do well to remember the past.

SOURCE: Fredric Keffer, *The Super-Sixer* [6th Armored Newsletter] 26 (January 1976): 3-6.

RELATED ENTRIES: Combat, Effects of; Memory and War; World War II

1976 a

EXCERPTS FROM BOOK TWO (INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS) OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT

During the Cold War the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and military intelligence bureaus gathered information about American citizens, manipulated the media, and plotted secret wars and assassinations overseas. One FBI operation, COINTELPRO, engaged in counter-intelligence measures against radical political groups and civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King for some seven years (1965–1971) until its existence and conduct came to public attention. It was thereupon formally disbanded. For two decades there existed few constraints on how the information was obtained or what was done with it. With the disclosure of the break-in to the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate hotel in Washington in 1972, and the overthrow of Pres. Salvatore Allende in Chile in 1973, Congress began to act. In 1974 Congress gave teeth to the 1966 Freedom of Information Act by requiring prompt responses to requests for information held by government agencies and placing the burden of proof upon the agency for any "secret" classification of such documents. In 1975 the Rockefeller Commission reported its findings on CIA activities within the United States, and in April 1976 the public was presented with this revealing Senate report on "Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities," commonly referred to as the "Church Committee Report," after the committee's chair, Senator Frank Church (D, Idaho).

UNITED STATES SENATE
APRIL 26 (legislative day, April 14), 1976

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The resolution creating this Committee placed greatest emphasis on whether intelligence activities threaten the "rights of American citizens."

The critical question before the Committee was to determine how the fundamental liberties of the people can be maintained in the course of the Government's effort to protect their security. The delicate balance between these basic goals of our system of government is often difficult to strike, but it can, and must, be achieved. We reject the view that the traditional American principles of justice and fair play have no place in our struggle against the enemies of freedom. Moreover, our investigation has established that the targets of intelligence activity have ranged far beyond persons who could properly be characterized as enemies of freedom and have extended to a wide array of citizens engaging in lawful activity.

Americans have rightfully been concerned since before World War II about the dangers of hostile foreign agents likely to commit acts of espionage. Similarly, the violent acts of political terrorists can seriously endanger the rights of Americans. Carefully focused intelligence investigations can help prevent such acts. But too often intelligence has lost this focus and domestic intelligence activities have invaded individual privacy and violated the rights of lawful assembly and political expression. Unless new and tighter controls are established by legislation, domestic intelligence activities threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally alter its nature.

We have examined three types of "intelligence" activities affecting the rights of American citizens. The first is intelligence collection—such as infiltrating groups with informants, wiretapping, or opening letters. The second is dissemination of material which has been collected. The third is covert action designed to disrupt and discredit the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social order. These three types of "intelligence" activity are closely related in the practical world. Information which is disseminated by the intelligence community or used in dis-

ruptive programs has usually been obtained through surveillance. Nevertheless, a division between collection, dissemination and covert action is analytically useful both in understanding why excesses have occurred in the past and in devising remedies to prevent those excesses from recurring.

A. Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens' Rights

A tension between order and liberty is inevitable in any society. A Government must protect its citizens from those bent on engaging in violence and criminal behavior, or in espionage and other hostile foreign intelligence activity. Many of the intelligence programs reviewed in this report were established for those purposes. Intelligence work has, at times, successfully prevented dangerous and abhorrent acts, such as bombings and foreign spying, and aided in the prosecution of those responsible for such acts.

But, intelligence activity in the past decades has, all too often, exceeded the restraints on the exercise of governmental power which are imposed by our country's Constitution, laws, and traditions. . . .

Our investigation has confirmed that warning. We have seen segments of our Government, in their attitudes and action, adopt tactics unworthy of a democracy, and occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of totalitarian regimes. We have seen a consistent pattern in which programs initiated with limited goals, such as preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign spies, were expanded to what witnesses characterized as "vacuum cleaners", sweeping in information about lawful activities of American citizens. . . .

C. Summary of the Main Problems

. . . . Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government agencies and too much information has been collected. The Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power. The Government, operating primarily through secret informants, but also using other intrusive techniques such as wiretaps, microphone "bugs", surreptitious mail opening, and break-ins, has swept in vast amounts of information about the personal lives, views, and associations of American citizens. Investigations of groups deemed potentially dangerous—and even of groups suspected of associating with potentially dangerous organizations—have continued for decades, despite the fact that those groups did not engage in unlawful activity. Groups and individuals have been harassed and disrupted because of their political views and their lifestyles. Investigations have been based upon vague standards whose breadth made excessive collection inevitable. Unsavory and vicious tactics have been employed—including anonymous attempts to break up marriages, disrupt meetings, ostracize persons from their professions, and provoke target groups into rivalries that might result in deaths. Intelligence agencies have served the political and personal objectives of Presidents and other high officials. While the agencies often committed excesses in response to pressure from high officials in the Executive branch and Congress, they also occasionally initiated improper activities and then concealed them from officials whom they had a duty to inform.

Governmental officials—including those whose principal duty is to enforce the law—have violated or ignored the law over long periods of time and have advocated and defended their right to break the law.

The Constitutional system of checks and balances has not adequately controlled intelligence activities. Until recently the Executive branch has neither delineated the scope of permissible activities nor established procedures for supervising intelligence agencies. Congress has failed to exercise sufficient oversight, seldom questioning the use to which its appropriations were being put. Most domestic intelligence issues have not reached the courts, and in those cases when they have reached the courts, the judiciary has been reluctant to grapple with them.

Each of these points is briefly illustrated below, and covered in substantially greater detail in the following sections of the report.

1. The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelligence Activity

United States intelligence agencies have investigated a vast number of American citizens and domestic organizations. FBI headquarters alone has developed over 500,000

domestic intelligence files, and these have been augmented by additional files at FBI Field Offices. The FBI opened 65,000 of these domestic intelligence files in 1972 alone. In fact, substantially more individuals and groups are subject to intelligence scrutiny than the number of files would appear to indicate, since typically, each domestic intelligence file contains information on more than one individual or group, and this information is readily retrievable through the FBI General Name Index.

The number of Americans and domestic groups caught in the domestic intelligence net is further illustrated by the following statistics:

—Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photographed in the United States by the CIA between 1953-1973, producing a CIA computerized index of nearly one and one-half million names.

—At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photographed by the FBI between 1940-1966 in eight U.S. cities.

—Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer system and separate files were created on approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups during the course of CIA's Operation CHAOS (1967-1973).

—Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through the United States were obtained by the National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret arrangement with three United States telegraph companies.

—An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United States Army intelligence files created between the mid 1960's and 1971.

—Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and groups were created by the Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and tax investigations were started on the basis of political rather than tax criteria.

—At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on an FBI list of persons to be rounded up in the event of a "national emergency".

2. Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long

Intelligence agencies have collected vast amounts of information about the intimate details of citizens' lives and about their participation in legal and peaceful political activ-

ities. The targets of intelligence activity have included political adherents of the right and the left, ranging from activitist to casual supporters. Investigations have been directed against proponents of racial causes and women's rights, outspoken apostles of nonviolence and racial harmony; establishment politicians; religious groups; and advocates of new life styles. . . .

3. Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means

(a) Covert Action.—Apart from uncovering excesses in the collection of intelligence, our investigation has disclosed covert actions directed against Americans, and the use of illegal and improper surveillance techniques to gather information. For example:

(i) The FBI's COINTELPRO—counterintelligence program—was designed to "disrupt" groups and "neutralize" individuals deemed to be threats to domestic security. The FBI resorted to counterintelligence tactics in part because its chief officials believed that the existing law could not control the activities of certain dissident groups, and that court decisions had tied the hands of the intelligence community. Whatever opinion one holds about the policies of the targeted groups, many of the tactics employed by the FBI were indisputably degrading to a free society. COINTELPRO tactics included:

—Anonymously attacking the political beliefs of targets in order to induce their employers to fire them;

—Anonymously mailing letters to the spouses of intelligence targets for the purpose of destroying their marriages;

—Obtaining from IRS the tax returns of a target and then attempting to provoke an IRS investigation for the express purpose of deterring a protest leader from attending the Democratic National Convention;

—Falsely and anonymously labeling as Government informants members of groups known to be violent, thereby exposing the falsely labelled member to expulsion or physical attack;

—Pursuant to instructions to use "misinformation" to disrupt demonstrations, employing such means as broadcasting fake orders on the same citizens band radio frequency used by demonstration marshalls to attempt to control demonstrations, and duplicating and falsely filling

out forms soliciting housing for persons coming to a demonstration, thereby causing "long and useless journeys to locate these addresses";

—Sending an anonymous letter to the leader of a Chicago street gang (described as "violence-prone") stating that the Black Panthers were supposed to have "a hit out for you". The letter was suggested because it "may intensify . . . animosity" and cause the street gang leader to "take retaliatory action".

(ii) From "late 1963" until his death in 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr., was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to "neutralize" him as an effective civil rights leader. In the words of the man in charge of the FBI's "war" against Dr. King, "No holds were barred." . . .

The FBI mailed Dr. King a tape recording made from microphones hidden in his hotel rooms which one agent testified was an attempt to destroy Dr. King's marriage. The tape recording was accompanied by a note which Dr. King and his advisors interpreted as threatening to release the tape recording unless Dr. King committed suicide. . . .

(b) Illegal or Improper Means.—The surveillance which we investigated was not only vastly excessive in breadth and a basis for degrading counterintelligence actions, but was also often conducted by illegal or improper means. For example:

(1) For approximately 20 years the CIA carried out a program of indiscriminately opening citizens' first class mail. The Bureau also had a mail opening program, but cancelled it in 1966. The Bureau continued, however, to receive the illegal fruits of CIA's program. In 1970, the heads of both agencies signed a document for President Nixon, which correctly stated that mail opening was illegal, falsely stated that it had been discontinued, and proposed that the illegal opening of mail should be resumed because it would provide useful results. The President approved the program, but withdrew his approval five days later. The illegal opening continued nonetheless. Throughout this period CIA officials knew that mail opening was illegal, but expressed concern about the "flap potential" of exposure, not about the illegality of their activity. . . .

4. Ignoring the Law

Officials of the intelligence agencies occasionally recognized that certain activities were illegal, but expressed concern only for "flap potential." Even more disturbing was the frequent testimony that the law, and the Constitution were simply ignored. . . .The man who for ten years headed FBI's Intelligence Division testifed that:

. . . "never once did I hear anybody, including myself, raise the question: 'Is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral.' We never gave any thought to this line of reasoning, because we were just naturally pragmatic." . . .

5. Deficiencies in Accountability and Control

The overwhelming number of excesses continuing over a prolonged period of time were due in large measure to the fact that the system of checks and balances—created in our Constitution to limit abuse of Governmental power—was seldom applied to the intelligence community. Guidance and regulation from outside the intelligence agencies— where it has been imposed at all—has been vague. Presidents and other senior Executive officials, particularly the Attorneys General, have virtually abdicated their Constitutional responsibility to oversee and set standards for intelligence activity. Senior government officials generally gave the agencies broad, general mandates or pressed for immediate results on pressing problems. In neither case did they provide guidance to prevent excesses and their broad mandates and pressures themselves often resulted in excessive or improper intelligence activity. . . .

6. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity

Many of the illegal or improper disruptive efforts directed against American citizens and domestic organizations succeeded in injuring their targets. Although it is sometimes difficult to prove that a target's misfortunes were caused by a counter-intelligence program directed against him, the possibility that an arm of the United States Government intended to cause the harm and might have been responsible is itself abhorrant. . . .

7. Cost and Value

Domestic intelligence is expensive. We have already indicated the cost of illegal and improper intelligence activities in terms of the harm to victims, the injury to constitutional values, and the damage to the democratic process itself. The cost in dollars is also significant. For example, the FBI has budgeted for fiscal year 1976 over $7 million for its domestic security informant program, more than twice the amount it spends on informants against organized crime. The aggregate budget for FBI domestic security intelligence and foreign counterintelligence is at least $80 million. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Bureau was joined by the CIA, the military, and NSA in collecting information about the anti-war movement and black activists, the cost was substantially greater.

Apart from the excesses described above, the usefulness of many domestic intelligence activities in serving the legitimate goal of protecting society has been questionable. Properly directed intelligence investigations concentrating upon hostile foreign agents and violent terrorists can produce valuable results. The Committee has examined cases where the FBI uncovered "illegal" agents of a foreign power engaged in clandestine intelligence activities in violation of federal law. Information leading to the prevention of serious violence has been acquired by the FBI through its informant penetration of terrorist groups and through the inclusion in Bureau files of the names of persons actively involved with such groups. Nevertheless, the most sweeping domestic intelligence surveillance programs have produced surprisingly few useful returns in view of their extent. For example:

—Between 1960 and 1974, the FBI conducted over 500,000 separate investigations of persons and groups under the "subversive" category, predicated on the possibility that they might be likely to overthrow the government of the United States. Yet not a single individual or group has been prosecuted since 1957 under the laws which prohibit planning or advocating action to overthrow the government and which are the main alleged statutory basis for such FBI investigations.

—A recent study by the General Accounting Office has estimated that of some 17,528 FBI domestic intelligence investigations of individuals in 1974, only 1.3 percent resulted in prosecution and conviction, and in only "about 2 percent" of the cases was advance knowledge of any activity—legal or illegal—obtained.

[Conclusion]

In considering its recommendations, the Committee undertook an evaluation of the FBI's claims that domestic intelligence was necessary to combat terrorism, civil disorders, "subversion," and hostile foreign intelligence activity. The Committee reviewed voluminous materials bearing on this issue and questioned Bureau officials, local police officials, and present and former federal executive officials.

We have found that we are in fundamental agreement with the wisdom of Attorney General Stone's initial warning that intelligence agencies must not be "concerned with political or other opinions of individuals" and must be limited to investigating essentially only "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States." The Committee's record demonstrates that domestic intelligence which departs from this standard raises grave risks of undermining the democratic process and harming the interests of individual citizens. This danger weighs heavily against the speculative or negligible benefits of the ill-defined and overbroad investigations authorized in the past. Thus, the basic purpose of the recommendations contained in Part IV of this report is to limit the FBI to investigating conduct rather than ideas or associations.

The excesses of the past do not, however, justify depriving the United States of a clearly defined and effectively controlled domestic intelligence capability. The intelligence services of this nation's international adversaries continue to attempt to conduct clandestine espionage operations within the United States. Our recommendations provide for intelligence investigations of hostile foreign intelligence activity.

Moreover, terrorists have engaged in serious acts of violence which have brought death and injury to Americans and threaten further such acts. These acts, not the politics or beliefs of those who would commit them, are the proper focus for investigations to anticipate terrorist violence. Accordingly, the Committee would permit properly controlled intelligence investigations in those narrow circumstances.

Concentration on imminent violence can avoid the wasteful dispersion of resources which has characterized the sweeping (and fruitless) domestic intelligence investigations of the past. But the most important reason for the fundamental change in the domestic intelligence operations which our Recommendations propose is the need to protect the constitutional Rights of Americans.

In light of the record of abuse revealed by our inquiry, the Committee is not satisfied with the position that mere exposure of what has occurred in the past will prevent its recurrence. Clear legal standards and effective oversight and controls are necessary to ensure that domestic intelligence activity does not itself undermine the democratic system it is intended to protect.

SOURCE: U.S. Senate. *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book Two: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans,* http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book2/contents.htm.

RELATED ENTRIES: *American Civil Liberties Union; Cold War; Intelligence Gathering in Warfare; War on Terrorism*

1976 b

REMARKS OF DESERTER ON EVE OF HIS SURRENDER TO AUTHORITIES

Austin Hodge, a Marine Corps deserter and war resister, addressed a group gathered in a church in 1976 on the eve of his surrendering himself to authorities after living "underground" for seven years:

"I have given up my home, my family, my wife and son, moved from city to city, taken countless menial jobs because in my heart I could not support a war so incredibly hideous that it was far beyond my capacity as a human being to conceive. [I am turning myself in because I want to confront the military with my moral opposition to the war and to actively join in the struggle for amnesty for my fellow exiles.]

You live from minute to minute. You can't be honest with friends. You can't stay in one place. You can't have a job

for more than three months. . . . My father [a retired Navy Chief Petty Officer] has been my greatest supporter all along."

SOURCE: *Unitarian Universalist World 7 (March 15, 1976): 1.*

RELATED TOPICS: *All Volunteer Force; American Civil Liberties Union; Antiwar Movements; Conscientious Objection; Conscription and Volunteerism; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Pacifism; Vietnam War*

1977

REMARKS OF MOTHER ON THE DEATH OF HER SON AND THE PARDON OF DRAFT RESISTERS

Alberta Mierun's son may or may not have volunteered. In any event, he was killed in Vietnam and she expressed her anger in a letter to the editor of her city's evening paper shortly after President Carter announced his pardon of Vietnam-era draft resisters:

So President Carter is giving pardons. Maybe he will give my son a pardon.

In case he doesn't know where he is, I will give him his address:

Sgt. James Roberts, Calvary Cemetery.

If this cannot be done, then why should the evaders get pardons and come home as if they were heroes?

It's boys like my son who are the heroes, but it's the evaders who are getting the glory for not going into a war that was not declared war. Big deal!

They were nothing but cowards.

Alberta Mierun
Clinton

SOURCE: *The Pittsburgh Press,* January 29, 1977.

RELATED ENTRIES: *All Volunteer Force; Antiwar Movements; Conscription and Volunteerism; Draft Evasion and Resistance; Families, Military; Vietnam War*

1988

EDITORIAL ON LOSS OF MILITARY SERVICE AS A RITE OF PASSAGE BY GERALD A. PATTERSON

Veteran Gerald Patterson, father of two teenage boys and associate editor of The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, offered his thoughts on the pluses and minuses of "the draft" some fifteen years after the institution of the all volunteer force. He argued that, while the draft may have provided vital GI Bill benefits, and the discipline to get "some kids . . . on track" that President Harry Truman had promised in 1948, a voluntary military was preferable, in that "individuality and sensitivity stood a somewhat better chance of survival under a [college] logic professor than a drill sergeant."

MISSING THE MILITARY RITE OF PASSAGE

As someone who matured during that three-decade stretch of our history when going into "the service" was a rite of passage, I often reflect on my two sons being able to grow up without having to undergo that experience . . . and wonder how much better (or worse) off they are for having missed it.

I don't have in mind missing a war, for probably 90 percent of the 14,900,987 persons drafted into the armed forces during that period from 1940 to 1973 (with but a single, 15-month pause in the late '40s) were never exposed to hostile fire.

What I am thinking of is the exposure to the ordinary discipline and restrictions of military life at that key stage of their development. Having been exposed to three years, 11 months and 10 days of it, I have to confess that I felt a lot better seeing my guys going off to college dorms than to boot camps (in no small part because I perceived that individuality and sensitivity stood a somewhat better chance of survival under a logic professor than a drill sergeant).

But I say that not without a degree of ambivalence, an awareness that they would, indeed, be missing some worthwhile lessons. My quarrel with the military was always that it took so long to teach what it had to convey about growing up—and that you couldn't drop out if you felt satiated.

After all, I say to myself, these kids will now never know the euphoric barracks atmosphere on a once-a-month payday as a bunch of young fellows with weekend passes pre-pare to descend on a town (an excitement that always seemed somewhat keener to me than arrival of spring break at college). Or the awesome relief of having your discharge papers handed to you under honorable conditions after an interminable wait and being, at last, free to go.

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Perhaps it is the absurdities of service life that remain most vivid in our memories. The sight of a hundred young men in fatigues "policing the area," stooping down to pick up cigarette butts among blades of grass and then, when those had all disappeared, spent matches, looking not unlike a flock of pigeons bobbing about Market Square. Being ordered to undergo sun-lamp treatments because our work at Strategic Air Command headquarters in England kept us underground all day and when we got out of our mountain hideaway there were rarely any rays to be absorbed.

I keep returning to the time element because that was my strongest emotion during that period, the feeling that I was marking so much time. So coiled had I become that weeks after it was over, I was enrolled in journalism school, a soon-to-be 23-year-old freshman among teen-agers. Though I had been a staff sergeant for two years, I worked full-time at night at the New York Herald Tribune as a "copy boy," so anxious was I to catch up.

But—in addition to the rich experiences of spending a summer at Barksdale Air Force Base in Shreveport, La., when the weather was so drainingly hot that life was reduced to a strange study in slow motion, after having just completed a numbing winter at Sampson Air Force Base at Geneva, N.Y., and having felt, day after day, the howling arctic wind coming off frozen Lake Seneca—what somehow made "the service" worthwhile for so many of us were the financial benefits accrued.

How many would ever have been able to go to college or get that no-down-payment first home at 5 percent interest were it not for the GI Bill? It seemed then, as it does now, more than fair payment for those who hadn't been shot up or forced to see the actual face of war.

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It's been 15 years now since the last man was drafted and though there are some 27.5 million veterans in the country (the vast majority former enlistees), the sight of a

man in military uniform, once so commonplace, is becoming less and less familiar, one almost restricted to airports and bus terminals.

Those in the armed services are there in a more purely voluntary way now. For so many of us who enlisted in other times, there wasn't really that much of a choice. The atmosphere, the peer pressure were such that one was swept up and almost carried down to the recruiting station. Few wanted to be left behind, excluded from this challenging, manly experience and the chance to get away from home, away from that familiar street corner or ice-cream parlor booth. Never mind that the terms of enlistment were for four years; when you are 18 or 19 there is time to squander.

Today those pressures—and the allure of a soldier's uniform—are much diminished and enlisting (economic need aside) appears to be more of a personal decision than a mass movement. Fortunately, the military lifestyle still attracts enough young people to make conscription unnecessary.

Though the remunerations are better than ever, it seems to me that, as long as there is a military, there will only be a certain small percentage of young men and women truly suited for the life. To the vast majority, alas, there will always be basic flaws. It will, of necessity, always be a job one cannot quit and one that demands that you either show up for work in the morning or go on sick call and demonstrate your inability to function. For sure, some kids need those restrictions to get themselves on track, but still it's a reassuring thing to see that at least now it's a path they themselves choose.

SOURCE: Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 3 March 1988, C, 11. Copyright, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 2005, all rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

RELATED ENTRIES: All Volunteer Force; Cold War; Conscription and Volunteerism; Selective Service System

2000

"Principles of Ethical Conduct . . . The Ultimate Bait and Switch" by Peter L. Duffy

Peter L. Duffy was a senior engineering manager (GS-15) at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island, when, sometime in the early 1990s, he read Pres. George H. W. Bush's Executive Order 12731, "Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employees." In time this and the misconduct of three of his superiors inspired him to accept the order's invitation to "blow the whistle." Soon he found his career destroyed. He wrote this account of his experience while serving a two-year research fellowship with MIT's Security Studies Program.

On October 17, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed Executive Order 12731, entitled "Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employees." This order specifically requires all federal civil servants to "respect and adhere to the fundamental principles of ethical service" to include that "Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities." A little over ten years later his son, President George W. Bush, made a point to make his first presidential memorandum to the heads of all executive departments and agencies be on the subject of "Standards of Official Conduct." In that memorandum, President Bush asked his heads to ensure "that all personnel within your departments and agencies are familiar with, and faithfully observe, applicable ethics laws and regulations, including the following general principles from the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch." One of the fourteen principles of this executive order requires every federal employee to stand up and be a whistleblower if the situation ever presents itself. What this order does not tell you is that this is the ultimate federal "bait and switch" trick.

On 18 August 2000, I took the bait by submitting a complaint to the Navy alleging executive misconduct by the top three members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) at my command. This was not an anonymous hotline call. It was in writing, sent certified mail with my "John Hancock" at the bottom of the page. It also included evidence to back up my

allegations. I was a GS-15 senior engineering manager and the actions I took in reporting this misconduct were by the book. It was an internal Navy matter and I went to the "appropriate authorities," the Naval Inspector General (IG). The allegations were made in confidence because I believe in the presumption of innocence. When the head of the Inspector General's Office for Special Inquiries told me it would be difficult for them to conduct this investigation and maintain my confidentiality I immediately waived my right to it. I did what was right and what was expected of me and assumed without question that I would be treated fairly by the Navy. This was the first of a series of bad assumptions on my part.

Over the next year and a half the Naval IG conducted an investigation and wrote its report. In the end, two of the three senior executives retired the day before they were due to be removed from federal service[1] because "the facts of this case suggest a premeditated, conspiratorial effort to defraud the Government."[2] The third executive retired after invoking his "Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination" and declined to answer any more of the IG investigator's questions.[3] The scheme in question allowed these executives to bank their vacation time, which would then lead to a huge financial windfall, at taxpayer's expense, when they retired. Banking their vacation time however didn't stop them from still taking their vacations. These executives annually took many weeks off, claiming it was for religious observation. The estimated retirement payout to these three executives was $694,210.[4] Much of this leave was taken away from them upon their removal, saving the U.S. taxpayer hundreds of thousands of dollars.[5][6] Subsequent investigations, because the misconduct was more widespread than I even realized, resulted in at least four more members of the SES being suspended without pay.[7] This was an unprecedented number of disciplinary actions against members of the federal government's elite SES Corps.

The switch took place the moment I submitted my complaint to the Naval IG, although I certainly didn't realize it at the time. That was the moment when I went from dutiful civil servant to institutional threat. This is because when you blow the whistle on serious executive wrongdoing you immediately create a situation where you are perceived as being potentially harmful to the very institution you set out to protect. In this case the harm comes in two forms.

First, it caused embarrassment to the Navy leadership, the very leaders who were at the helm when all this took place on their watch. The misconduct in question had gone on for more than seven years and took place right under the noses of the admirals and captains who were supposedly in command of these activities. Additionally, independent Navy audit teams with the charge to expose waste, fraud and abuse conducted regular command evaluations. Their efforts to uncover this wrongdoing were about as effective as the independent accounting audits at Enron and WorldCom. Our command received nothing but outstanding reviews.[8] By blowing the whistle, I not only uncovered the executive misconduct but also glaringly exposed the ineptitude of those in charge and the failure of the protective systems that were supposedly in place.

A second form of institutional harm is the potential liability of the agency if the whistleblower faces retaliation. This liability derives from the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), which purports to protect those civil servants who have the courage, or one could legitimately argue stupidity, to stand up and expose corruption. What most civil servants may not realize is that the WPA only covers very specific personnel actions taken against them. This law does not protect federal employees against some of the subtle, but no less effective, punitive tactics that retaliators employ to punish them for disclosing their wrongdoing.

As a consequence of this, once I filed my complaint and provided my evidence and testimony, the Navy lost no time in abandoning me—even though it was abundantly clear that I was vulnerable and working in a hostile environment. My whistleblower status was actually exposed by a senior Navy admiral when he betrayed to the most senior of the accused executives that I was the complainant.[9][10] Once the IG interviews started it didn't take long for word to spread throughout the activity that hunting season was open and I had antlers. Inappropriate, subtle offers of awards and time off that were made behind closed doors quickly turned into not so subtle threats behind closed doors. To escape this situation I used personal vacation "leave" time. Then, while on leave and within 48 hours of the IG investigators interview-

ing the subject executives, my vacation time was backed out and I was unknowingly placed on a "Leave Without Pay" status. A coworker who became aware of what was being done to me was immediately directed not to contact me or accept any calls from me.[11] Six weeks after realizing my pay had been stopped I had to return to the same hostile environment in order to restore my family's income. Additionally, as part of my return and as further punishment for my actions, I was forced to move out of my GS-15 office and into a GS-12 cubical. My performance evaluation, for the year in question, went from the highest to the lowest with no explanation. A tire on my brand new vehicle was slashed in the parking lot. These were all classic whistleblower reprisal tactics that were meant to threaten, embarrass and humiliate. Each and every one of these incidents was reported to naval authorities at the time they occurred. Each and every one was ignored and the reprisals kept coming. The switch was real. I had been disowned and in the process the Navy leadership involved abandoned the institutional values they swore to uphold: Honor, Courage, Commitment.

Now, let's juxtapose the treatment I incurred with that of some of the players involved. The activity commander, who authorized the stoppage of my pay was transferred to a prestigious job in Washington, DC and given a meritorious medal prior to his departure. The executive director, one of the SES members forced out of the federal government, got to return three months later as an announced guest of honor at the same commander's change of command ceremony. The two most senior executives that were fired now work for a local defense contractor and at least one is regularly seen around the campus he once led.[12] Three of the four senior executives, who were suspended without pay, were authorized by the Navy to work for private contractors during their suspensions.[13] Two of them went to work for local defense contractors supporting the very activity from which they had been suspended.[14] The person who advised the senior Navy officials to authorize these executives to circumvent their pay suspensions just so happens to be responsible for the ethics program at our activity.[15] Finally, several of the subordinates to the removed executives, who participated in the corrupt scheme and who helped to facilitate its execution have now been placed in some of the most senior management positions at this command.

Numerous times throughout this difficult ordeal I reached out to various Navy leaders, both military and civilian. All, with the exception of one, ignored my plight and subordinated the principle of doing the right thing to the Darwinian principle of doing what is necessary to protect their own careers. Only one, a member of the SES and one of the few not involved in the exposed scheme, came to my aid as best he could and provided me with a safe harbor at a time when I was in dire need. In the end the corrupt scheme was exposed, the senior executives were punished and preventative corrective actions were taken. I survived a battering that no employee should be expected to endure. With my career in ruins and after being subjected to seven consecutive "120 day details" into meaningless positions I agreed to move on to a two-year Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) assignment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Never once, during this three-year ordeal, has any Navy official ever approached me to acknowledge, never mind recognize, the sacrifice I made by practicing the kind of ethical behavior the government disingenuously promotes.

In the final analysis, the Government needs to decide if they are truly going to get serious about ethics. Our federal commitment to ethics should not merely focus on whether accepting a cup of coffee from a contractor, pulling up CNN on your government computer or being sure to disclose to your supervisor that you own stock in IBM is the ethical thing to do. Our federal commitment to ethics should center on individuals evaluating right and wrong and choosing to do right. Lawmakers can't legislate it. Presidents can't order it. The development of this ability requires open, honest discussion at all organizational levels, about important issues that confront us in the workplace. It must be done in an environment where those that are critical should not fear being beaten for having the courage to question it. In the end we must trust that the consensus of many consciences, developed in an environment of openness, will yield sound ethical courses of action. In the meantime, until that day comes, someone needs to put a warning label on Executive Order 12731, "Following this order may be hazardous to your career and your health."

NOTES

1 Merit Systems Protection Board, Agency's Prehearing Submission, Docket Numbers BN-0752-02-0153-I-1 and BN-0752-02-0162-I-1, 7 Nov 02, Page 6

2 Naval Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Senior Official Case 20000836, 12 Feb 02, Page 5

3 Naval Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Senior Official Case 20000836, 12 Feb 02, Page 21

4 Naval Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Senior Official Case 20000836, 12 Feb 02, Page 4

5 U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board Appeal, 1 Jul 02, Page 2, Block 12

6 U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board Appeal, 12 Jul 02, Page 2, Block 12

7 Personal discussion with Executive Director NUWC Div. Newport, 3 Dec 02

8 Personal email, 19 June 00, Subj: NAVSEA IG Command Performance Inspection

9 Naval Inspector General Transcript 14 Aug 01, Pgs 4–7

10 Naval Inspector General Transcript 30 Aug 01

11 Personal discussion with former NUWCDIVNPT, Code 40 Administrator, 26 Jun 01

12 http://www.rite-solutions.com

13 Personal discussion with Executive Director NUWC Div Newport, 3 Dec 02

14 Personal discussion with Executive Director NUWC Div Newport, 3 Dec 02

15 Personal discussion with Executive Director NUWC Div Newport, 3 Dec 02

SOURCE: Peter L. Duffy, "Principles of Ethical Conduct . . . The Ultimate Bait and Switch," MIT Security Studies Program, *Breakthroughs* [of MIT Security Studies Program] 13, no. 1 (Spring, 2004): 8–12.

RELATED ENTRIES: Civil–Military Relations; Cold War; Hitchcock, Ethan Allen; Military–Industrial Complex

2001
"THE HARVEST MATRIX 2001"

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, produced an upsurge of patriotic sentiment, horror, and rage within the United States, and a groundswell of sympathy and solidarity for America from abroad. It also inspired poets to react with lines like these by Margaret Shaughnessy of Pittsburgh:

It's October, one month later,
and the bittersweet ripens on vines
hanging from maples along Pennsylvania's farm roads.
The corn maze has led us here;
it's impossible to see above the stalks.
A month later and still the acrid, burning-flesh smell
seeps into our souls,
and fires blaze randomly.

Over and over I watch the plane slide into the side of the
World Trade Center.
I could watch it a million more times
to make it real, to make it hurt.
Like the Pawnbroker slamming his splayed hand on the
spike,
I need to feel it through me.
We have been perhaps immune, too safe,
at birth inoculated against pain, against terror,
our American right.

The nuclear mushroom we so worried about in the fifties
became steel and concrete
chasing thousands down New York City streets.
How soon did they realize that steel at boiling temperatures
would melt the building into our pores,
seer our reinforced steel hearts?
Melville's Rachel weeps, searching for her lost children,
yet days later all we heard was the chirping of firemen's
alarms
buried deep in our historical dust.

Now, surreal moon men monitor our anthraxed lives.
Bible sales are up and NASDAQ is down.
Unmanned drones fly low over Afghanistan

to find Osama and burka'd women
held hostage by someone else's faith.
Poppies blooming for al-Qaida
are exchanged for our beliefs,
down payments for a honeyed jihad.
Puts on the stock market make millions for
a war against the evil West.

October in Afghanistan is grape and melon harvest.
An overlay of sadness results from
the cruel fruit of our capitalist seeds.
Freedom is
jumping from our own high buildings,
threatened by, fearful of
weapon-grade pain.

SOURCE: Transcript from "The Poetry of War: NPR Reviews Poems Inspired by Past Conflicts," *All Things Considered,* January 24, 2005. Printed with permission of the author.

RELATED ENTRIES: Literature and War; War on Terrorism

2004 a

Yale Law School Faculty Suit against Department of Defense Regarding On-campus Recruitment

In 2004, most of the faculty of Yale University's Law School joined in a suit against the Department of Defense. Their concern related to on-campus recruitment. The commentary of the lead plaintiff in the suit and a professor who did not join the others in the suit follow.

Why we are suing
ROBERT A. BURT, Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law

As a service to our students, Yale Law School administers an employment program that provides computerized scheduling of job interviews with, and information about, prospective employers. Since 1978, the Law School has required all employers participating in our program to pledge that they exclude no one from employment on grounds of race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation. We adopted this nondis-

crimination requirement as part of our general educational mission to ensure that all of our students are treated with equal respect in any school-sponsored activity, inside or outside the classroom. In our employment program specifically, the faculty concluded that none of our students should be subjected to the indignity of encountering a discriminatory job listing ("No _____s need apply").

The United States military cannot sign our nondiscrimination pledge because it withholds employment based on sexual orientation. We have not barred the military from access to our students on this ground. For the military and other employers unwilling to sign our nondiscrimination pledge, we make available contact information for all of our students and, at the invitation of any individual student or student organization, we permit use of Law School meeting rooms. We understand that some of our students are interested in employers who do not qualify for participation in the interview program we administer. We respect the right of these students to reach their own moral judgments about prospective employers. But in our own program, we are not willing to practice, or actively to assist in the implementation of, invidious discrimination.

In May 2002, the Department of Defense announced that unless the Law School exempted the military from our nondiscrimination pledge, the entire university would lose almost all federal funds—more than $300 million, most of which goes to the School of Medicine, primarily for cancer research. (None of these funds go to the Law School.) In response to this demand, the Law School faculty voted to exempt the military temporarily, in order to protect the university against loss of federal funds while various means were pursued to vindicate our nondiscrimination policy. After this temporary exemption had lasted for three semesters, it became apparent that none of the approaches by university officials to the DOD offered any clear prospect that we would be able to reinstate our nondiscrimination policy. Accordingly, in October 2003, 44 members of the Law School faculty—two-thirds of the voting members—filed suit in Federal District Court for Connecticut seeking a declaration that the DOD had no constitutional or statutory authority for its threatened action. (The DOD invoked the Solomon Amendment, a law that authorizes the federal gov-

ernment to cut off federal funds if a university prevents military recruiting on campus. Our suit charges both that the DOD has misinterpreted the Solomon Amendment and that the amendment as interpreted by the DOD would itself violate the Constitution.) A few weeks later, a separate lawsuit was filed by two Law School student organizations seeking the same result.

We have gone to court to carry out our obligations as teachers and as members of the university faculty. As teachers, we have a duty to our students to protect them against unjust discrimination. The military exclusion of gays and lesbians based on their sexual orientation has no rational relationship to their capacity to perform military service. The Supreme Court recently concluded that state criminal sodomy laws are unconstitutional because they "demean the lives of homosexual persons." The military exclusion has the same wrongful implication.

As faculty members, we also have a duty to defend the autonomy of the university in carrying out its educational mission. The Supreme Court recently ruled that universities are constitutionally entitled to deference in making "educational judgments [about matters] essential to [their] educational mission." Such deference must apply not only to university decisions favoring diversity through affirmative-action admissions policies, as the Court specifically held; universities must also be free to ensure that the diverse characteristics of their students—not only race but other defining attributes such as sexual orientation—are fully respected and protected in the academic environment.

Moreover, the threat to university autonomy in our case has implications beyond our educational goal of protecting our gay and lesbian students. If the DOD action is upheld, virtually no issue of educational policy would be exempt from the government's dictate. Government control over universities' federal funding could potentially become government control over universities' admissions, courses of study, or faculty hiring.

Since World War II, American universities have become increasingly dependent on federal government funding to maintain research activities, especially in the sciences. The government does have a legitimate interest in assuring that funds given to universities for, say, cancer research are not spent for some other, unrelated purposes. But in our case the government is trying to use its cancer research funding as a lever to control the Law School faculty's decisions about matters with no conceivable relevance to the government's funding program.

We cannot properly serve as teachers and scholars if the federal government is able to exploit the financial dependence of universities in order to override educational judgments on any matter of its choosing. We cannot properly educate our students if we are forced to engage in activities that demean the equal dignity of some of our students. We look to the courts for protection against these wrongful exercises of government power.

WHY YALE SHOULD OPEN ITS INTERVIEW PROGRAM TO THE MILITARY

PETER H. SCHUCK, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law

There is much to applaud in the legal challenge brought by my Yale Law School colleagues. "Don't ask, don't tell" is not a principled policy of tolerance or equality. Instead, it is a political compromise between the earlier flat ban on gays in the military and the full acceptance of them that equality demands. It places both gay and straight soldiers in a painfully ambiguous situation, encourages dissimulation and exploitation (if not outright blackmail) of gays, and reinforces existing stigmas. In practice, the policy has caused the cruel outing and arbitrary discharge of many gay soldiers who boast proud records of devoted military service. DOD's refusal to clarify its own policies and interpretations under the Solomon Amendment has, moreover, created needless uncertainty, contention, and, now, litigation. At the same time, its opaque regulatory process, which seems to permit the government to cut off funds without affording Yale administrative review, raises serious questions of due process. For all these reasons, a legal test of DOD's policy is both overdue and welcome—although, like the federal court that recently ruled preliminarily against the law schools in a similar suit, I do not see how this law violates the First Amendment rights of Yale faculty and students.

Let us assume that my litigating colleagues turn out to be right on the law—either that our interviewing rules as

applied to the military do not violate the Solomon Amendment or that this law violates the Constitution. This ruling would still leave us with a very important question of pedagogical policy: should Yale have adopted this policy toward military recruiters in the first place?

I have my doubts. Let me be clear about my own normative position: I oppose "don't ask, don't tell." I favor equal treatment for gays. I support the assertion of academic autonomy in the face of political pressures. My colleagues are right to defend these positions. But Yale should be dedicated to another norm as well. As a matter of principle, Yale should treat our students as mature individuals who are sufficiently well educated to be able to assess the evidence and make their own choices among potential employers without needing to be "protected" by us.

Why should Yale screen employers' practices and norms for some of the most thoughtful, critical, and well-informed young adults in the world? Can't students make up their own minds about whether they want to work for organizations whose views on sexual orientation may differ from those of their teachers? What vision of intellectuality, character, and maturity does Yale convey when it relieves students of their duty as autonomous adults and citizens to make their own moral choices? Given Yale's vaunted quest for diversity, is it not inconsistent, perhaps even intolerant, for Yale to place even small obstacles in the path of its students' exposure to a worldview—opposition to gays in the military—that was resoundingly endorsed by a democratic (and Democratic) Congress, affirmed by administrations of diverse ideological stripes, upheld by the courts, and preached by some of the great religions to which many of the students subscribe? How much liberality and subtlety of mind do Yale faculty exhibit when their interviewing rules treat all versions of that worldview as a single species of invidious homophobia to be categorically condemned and marginalized—regardless of whether it proceeds from the kind of blind hatred that murdered Matthew Shepard or from ethical traditions or prudential concerns shared by many thoughtful, morally scrupulous people?

In truth, Yale's interviewing policy is not meant to be evenhanded. Rather, it is designed to allow Yale faculty to make a political and moral statement about employers whose practices offend us. Consider an analogy. Suppose the Acme Corporation made it a bit more difficult for black applicants, but not for others, to arrange job interviews—say, by making blacks call an additional number or travel farther. Acme could not legitimately defend this practice on the ground that it did not discriminate against black applicants but instead merely denied them the benefit of the faster-track option available to other students. This analogy, I think, indicts Yale's interviewing policy a fortiori. Here, after all, Yale is disadvantaging an employment practice that unlike race discrimination is perfectly legal, a practice that reflects a hard-won political and moral consensus (although one that I do not share).

Yale's policy should be truly evenhanded. It should allow its placement resources to be used on an entirely equal basis by all employers whose policies with regard to sexual orientation are legal in the jurisdictions where their lawyers work, so long as they affirmatively disclose those policies to students and certify their legality. The real issue is not what Yale thinks about the military's refusal to hire gays—the school has already made that crystal clear—but how our students view it. Yale's moral and pedagogical duty to our students is to cultivate their capacity for independent thinking, explain the faculty's view (if, as here, it has one) on "don't ask, don't tell"—and then get out of the way. The students' duty is to listen carefully—and then make up their own minds, without their professors' thumbs on the scales.

SOURCE: Reprinted from "The Law Professors vs. the Military." *Yale Alumni Magazine* January/February 2004, www.yalealumnimagazine.com.

RELATED ENTRIES: All Volunteer Force; American Civil Liberties Union; Conscription and Volunteerism; Iraq War; Militarization and Militarism; War on Terrorism

2004 b

STATEMENT BY CHRISTIAN LEADERS CONDEMNING A "THEOLOGY OF WAR"

Shortly before election day, on October 24, 2004, evangelist Jerry Falwell told a CNN audience that he hoped President

Bush would "blow [all the terrorists] away in the name of the Lord." These remarks prompted some 200 Christian theologians to take exception to Farewell's views by issuing this statement, which was published in a paid advertisement in USA Today.

In their statement "Confessing Christ in a World of Violence," more than 200 theologians and ethicists—many from leading evangelical institutions—wrote:

"A 'theology of war,' emanating from the highest circles of American government, is seeping into our churches as well. . . . The roles of God, church, and nation are confused by talk of an American 'mission' and 'divine appointment' to 'rid the world of evil.'"

They continued: "In this time of crisis, we need a new confession of Christ."

- Jesus Christ knows no national boundaries.
- Christ commits Christians to a strong presumption against war. Christians have a responsibility to count the cost, speak out for the victims, and explore every alternative before a nation goes to war.
- Christ commands us to see not only the splinter in our adversary's eye, but also the beam in our own.
- Christ shows us that love of enemy is the heart of the gospel.
- Christ teaches us that humility is the virtue befitting forgiven sinners.
- We reject the false teaching that a war on terrorism takes precedence over ethical and legal norms.
- We reject the false teaching that America is a "Christian nation," representing only virtue, while its adversaries are nothing but vicious.
- We reject the false teaching that any human being can be defined as outside the law's protection, and the demonization of perceived enemies, which only paves the way to abuse.
- We reject the false teaching that those who are not for the United States politically are against it or that those who fundamentally question American policies must be with the "evil-doers."

Peacemaking is central to our vocation in a troubled world. We urge Christians and others to remember Jesus' teachings in making their decisions as citizens.

SOURCE: Sojourners Website, http://www.sojo.net/action/alerts/confessing_christ.pdf.

RELATED ENTRIES: Iraq War; Just War Theory; Religion and War; War on Terrorism

2004 c

INTERVIEW WITH YALE GRADUATE TYSON BELANGER WHO SERVED IN THE IRAQ WAR

The "Where-They-Are-Now" reporter for the Yale Alumni Magazine interviewed First Lieutenant Tyson Belanger, USMC, a veteran of the assault on Baghdad in 2003.

TYSON BELANGER '98

A first lieutenant in the Marine Corps infantry based at Camp Pendleton, California, Belanger led a platoon of marines in amphibious assault vehicles to Baghdad in the Iraq War. He expects to be redeployed to Iraq soon.

Y: Why did you decide to go into the Marine Corps?

B: I wanted to get beyond the books in my international relations studies and see international relations firsthand.

Y: The perception is that it's very unusual for an Ivy League graduate to go into the military.

B: I think that's a terrible misconception, dating from just the last 20 years. If you go to Woolsey Hall, you'll see the veterans on the wall. There's a very strong tradition at Yale of military service. I think it's only a recent phenomenon that students from Yale don't tend to be engaged in and involved in international security.

Y: And why do you think that is?

B: I think people are very interested in service, they just don't necessarily feel that service in the military is the way for them to serve. I think, however, that that's a mistake, because I think that we could use the talents and perspectives of Yale graduates in the military. And I want to make it very clear that I was far from the only Yalie who fought in the Iraq War.

Y: What was it like to be part of the war?

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B: It's a bit of an understatement to say that it was memorable. Something that I was most surprised by and most impressed by was how much the Iraqi people welcomed us. We would drive down the streets and there would be thousands of them lining the streets, cheering for us.

Several of my marines mentioned—and it felt like it was true—that we were rock stars at least for that short time. And for me, that was the only explanation for how few casualties we had in the war.

Y: How did you feel after you came home?

B: I felt very good about what we did. I genuinely felt that we were liberating the people of Iraq, giving them an opportunity to live in a way that they haven't had experience with in their past, and that this was something that they wanted—the opportunity to govern themselves. I think now that the military solution has been provided, what remains is the political solution.

Y: What do you do when you are not at war? For fun?

B: Watch videos? Not much. September 11 meant a lot to me, and it's created a sense of urgency in everything I do. I've cut down to the bone a lot of what I do and I focus on my friends, my family, and my marines.

Y: Where were you on September 11?

B: I was at the infantry officers' course at the time. We cancelled our classes, we went on high alert, and we were ready to defend the FBI academy and the marine base at Quantico. There was myself on the line, with the chance that if I didn't learn something, somebody could die. With the question of life or death, there's a clarity about what's important.

Y: There does not seem to be that clarity in the country as a whole. How do you feel about the mixed reactions to the Iraq action here at home?

B: I respect it, because I know that in their hearts they do support my marines as individuals, and they recognize that they have families. And it is healthy, as a democracy, to debate, discuss, and consider the direction of the country.

Y: Any regrets?

B: I regret putting my friends and family through the experience. My poor parents were watching the television, two televisions, as often as they could during the war. It makes them upset that I keep volunteering, but they understand, they recognize that I'm following my path in doing what I'm doing.

Y: It's definitely hard to hear every day on the news that American soldiers have been killed.

B: It's easy to count American casualties. It's much more difficult to quantify the intangible benefits to the Iraqis and to feel the value of what we're doing. But the people who go, in particular me and my marines, recognize that it's a sacrifice worth making. I'm excited about the possibility of going back to Iraq. I'm studying Arabic in preparation.

SOURCE: Reprinted from "Where they are now: Tyson Belanger '98," *Yale Alumni Magazine* January/February 2004, www.yalealumnimagazine.com.

RELATED ENTRIES: All Volunteer Force; Conscription and Volunteerism; Iraq War; Marine Corps; War on Terrorism

General Bibliography

This bibliography aims to offer researchers a substantive guide to literature on the subject of American military experience and its relationship to society. The resources are categorized by subject areas and reflect the analytical approach taken in this encyclopedia. Consequently they tie into the reader's guide found at the beginning of the set. Also, some resources may be found in more than one category.

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