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NOMADS IN THE SEDENTARY WORLD

EDITED BY

Anatoly M. Khazanov
and
André Wink

CURZON

CONTENTS

PREFACE

The general subject of the relationship between pastoral nomads and the sedentary world has been addressed by numerous scholars in a variety of ways. Focusing on either the short, middle or long term, and emphasizing cultural, economic, socio-political as well as other aspects, the question has been asked what impact the sedentary world has made over the centuries on the development and functioning of nomadic societies. There is broad consensus that this side of the problem is already relatively well covered. On the other hand, the question about the impact of pastoral nomads on the sedentary world, and more particularly their role in it, while not failing to draw general attention, has at best generated very premature and incomplete conclusions which, if they were not outright ideological, were almost never substantiated by detailed studies and which still have to be fitted into a comparative framework. It is the latter question - or at least some aspects thereof - that this volume of essays seeks to address in the context of the history of Eurasia and Africa.

Seven of the papers presented here - by Anatoly Khazanov, Peter Golden, Nora Berend, Rueven Amitai, Thomas Allsen, E.I. Kychanov, and André Wink - are revised versions of contributions to a colloquium held at Leiden on 2-3 July 1998 under the auspices of the International Institute of Asian Studies at Leiden, and the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study at Wassenaar. Four other papers presented at the colloquium - by A.K. Narain, Nicola Di Cosmo, and Rudi Lindner - are not published in this volume, either to enhance the internal coherence of the volume or because they were withdrawn by their authors. The papers by Victor Azarya, Thomas Barfield, Daniel Bradburd, and Thomas Noonan were commissioned by the editors after the colloquium had been held. The editors acknowledge that due to constraints of time and money they have not been able to request contributions to the colloquium and the volume from a large number of outstanding scholars whose work is highly relevant to this subject and who they would very much have liked to include. Nevertheless they are most grateful for what could be achieved. They would like to express their gratitude, above all, to the staff of the International Institute of Asian Studies, particularly its Director, Wim Stokhof, for providing most of the financial support for this project; to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study and its Director, Henk Wesseling, for contributing additional funds to the colloquium; to all the participants at the colloquium for their comments and criticism; to the authors of the articles that were especially written for this volume; and to Dick van der Meij for his expert handling of the numerous editorial problems that this volume has posed.

The editors

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

THOMAS T. ALLSEN is Associate Professor of History, The College of New Jersey. His most recent book is *Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

REUVEN AMITAI is Associate Professor of History at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. His recent publications include *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhānid War, 1260-1281* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

VICTOR AZARYA is Rose Isaacs Professor of Sociology and a Fellow of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has published extensively on pastoral societies and on state-society relations in Africa. Among his most recent publications are *Pastoralists under Pressure? Fulbe Societies Confronting Change in West Africa* (co-editor, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999) and *Nomads and the State in Africa: The Political Roots of Marginality* (London: Ashgate, 1996).

THOMAS J. BARFIELD is Professor of Anthropology at Boston University. His books include *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.

NORA BEREND, formerly Research Fellow at St Catharine's College, Cambridge, is Lecturer in medieval history at Goldsmiths College, University of London. She is the author of Co-existence in a frontier society: Jews, Muslims and 'pagans' in medieval Hungary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

DANIEL BRADBURD is Professor of Anthropology at Clarkson University, Potsdam. His publications include *Sheep into Land* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

PETER B. GOLDEN is University Professor of History at Rutgers University, Newark. Among his recent publications is *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples: Ethnogenesis and State-formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992).

EUGUENY I. KYCHANOV is Director of the St. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He published extensively, in Russian, on the written sources, languages, and history and culture of the Tangut state of His-Hsia; the history of China during the Tang and the Yuan dynasties; the history of traditional Chinese law; and the history of Central Asia and Manchuria.

ANATOLY M. KHAZANOV, FBA, is Ernest Gellner Professor of Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His major publications on pastoral nomads include *The Social History of the Scythians* (Moscow, 1975, in Russian) and *Nomads and the Outside World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; second, revised edition Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994; third, revised edition Almaty, 1999, in Russian).

THOMAS S. NOONAN is Professor of History at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He is the author of numerous publications on early Russia, the Khazars, and the economic history of early medieval eastern Europe.

ANDRÉ WINK is Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of *Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, Volumes 1-2* (Oxford and New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).

CHAPTER 1

NOMADS IN THE HISTORY OF THE SEDENTARY WORLD

ANATOLY M. KHAZANOV

The problem of the interrelations of pastoral nomads, or extensive mobile pastoralists in general, with sedentary agricultural and urban societies has two sides. The first side, the impact of sedentary societies on nomads, has been studied in a more or less scholarly way. Research has been done not only on local or regional levels, but also in cross-cultural and diachronic perspectives. Remarkably, some differences notwithstanding, many scholars have come to similar conclusions. Nomadic societies, it appears, could never be characterized as autarkic and closed systems by any of their main parameters. Specialized mobile pastoralists were dependent on non-pastoralist, mainly sedentary societies because their economy was not entirely self-sufficient.[1] However, the more I study pastoral nomads the more I come to the conclusion that not only their economic and sociopolitical but also their ideological and cultural dependence on non-pastoralists was quite significant, because nomadic societies never were, nor could they be, closed systems by any of their major parameters. Therefore, just as the pastoral nomadic economy had to be supplemented with agriculture and crafts, so too did nomadic cultures need sedentary cultures as a source, a component, and a model for comparison, borrowing, imitation, or rejection. The sedentaries might be conceived by the nomads as the 'others,' but their cultural contribution to their nomadic counterparts should not be underestimated. Historical sources and numerous archaeological data demonstrate beyond doubt that a substantial part of their material culture (clothes, utensils, even arms, and, of course, luxury items) was procured by the nomads from the sedentaries. Even ideological opposition was never complete. Suffice it to observe that nomads did not create any world religion, but made significant contributions to the dissemination of religions around the world.[2]

The picture becomes much less clear and the difference of opinion much greater when one turns to the other side of the problem and asks the question: what impact have pastoral nomads had on the development of the sedentary world? The picture is far from clear even if we look only at cultural influences and borrowings. It can easily be established that in certain regions and in certain historical periods nomads contributed to the cultures of their sedentary

counterparts. The most obvious examples that come to mind are horseback riding and mounted warfare. The development of military arts and arms in Central Asia, Iran, and some other Middle Eastern countries, in late ancient and early medieval Europe, as well as in India, China and some other regions, was certainly influenced by their interrelations with different nomadic peoples, including direct military confrontation. Medieval European knights might be descendants, if not direct then collateral, of the ancient heavily armed cataphract cavalry that had originated in the Eurasian steppes.

Still, a certain caution is desirable even with regard to specific artefacts like the composite bow, armour, sabre, or stirrup. Not infrequently their invention is attributed to nomads, even when such claims lack definite proof. In several cases we can be sure, at the moment, of nothing more than that their origin was connected with cavalry. For example, the archaeological data indicate that, in the sixth century AD the Turks had invented a new type of saddle with iron stirrups that soon afterward spread across Eurasia. But the earliest iron stirrups, dating to the end of the third century AD or the beginning of the fourth century AD, were discovered not in the Altai Mountains but in the tombs of North Korea and adjacent regions of Manchuria. It now seems, therefore, that the Turkic nomads did not invent iron stirrups; they just borrowed them and contributed to their further development and dissemination.

It is not my intention to deny that nomads influenced the cultures of their sedentary counterparts. Nomadic arms, ornaments, and modes of fashion were often imitated in sedentary countries. Thus, in the seventh and eighth centuries Turkic decorated belts spread from Iraq to China. In the Tang period, Chinese dress styles were strongly influenced by those of the nomads. The Egyptian *mamluks*, while fighting the Mongols, wore Mongol accoutrements and let their hair flow loose in the Mongol style.[3] In Europe, the Russian, Hungarian and Polish aristocracies imitated the dress and hairstyle of the nomads. However, not infrequently the most brilliant and impressive inventions and displays of nomadic cultures were at least stimulated by their contacts with the sedentaries.

To provide some examples, I can refer to the famous but in many respects still enigmatic 'animal style,' the ornamental art with prevailing zoomorphic designs that in ancient times had been popular in Eurasia, from the territory of modern Hungary to China. The semantics of this style were apparently fairly complicated, being related to the nomads' aesthetic concepts, religious beliefs, and their system of values. In all, the animal style was a reflection of their worldview. However, this worldview had originally been expressed in the form of plastic arts under the influence of the art of sedentary countries and perhaps even with the help of their artisans. These artisans also played an active part in the further evolution of the animal style. They not only made

decorations ordered by their nomadic customers and in accordance with nomadic traditions and tastes; they even introduced new motifs, which were often promptly accepted by the nomads.[4]

Another example is the Turkic runic alphabet, quite remarkable because it was used for five or six centuries and was spread from Mongolia to Hungary. For a long time the origin of this alphabet remained a mystery. There was even an opinion that it had been invented by the Turks themselves. However, recent studies have shed light on the issue. The alphabet turned out to be the result of an adaptation of the Sogdian letters to Turkic phonetics that was most probably carried out by Sogdian scholars.[5] Still, the nomads played a very important role as middlemen in various kinds of cultural exchange between different sedentary societies. Their contribution to transcontinental circulation and transmission of cultural and technological artefacts and innovations, of ideas and concepts, and even of religions is very significant. In this respect, the multiethnic and multicultural empires created by the nomads had some positive effects.

In the ethno-linguistic history of the Old World the impact of pastoralists and pastoral nomads is hard to overestimate. I will not dwell on the spread of Indo-European languages because it is still unclear whether the first Indo-Europeans were pastoralists or incipient agriculturalists. However, the spread of Semitic languages, of the languages that belong to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European linguistic family, and of many Altaic languages, especially the Turkic ones, was certainly connected with the migrations, conquests and/or political dominance of the pastoralists and nomads.[6]

The enormous role played by the nomads in the political history of Eurasia, and even of Africa, also does not need any re-emphasis. The only comment that I would like to make in this respect is that many nomadic conquests were not a cause but rather a consequence of the weakness and disintegration of sedentary states. Such conquests often resulted in radical border changes, or even in the destruction of some states and empires and in the emergence of new ones. Changes like this, however, are most noticeable in the short- and middle-term historical range. Far from always did the conquests irreversibly alter the political configurations of entire historical regions. It is true that the Seljuq victory over Byzantium at Manzikert in 1071 eventually brought Anatolia into a quite different political constellation. But it is also true that when the dust of the Mongol conquest settled the main historical regions that had preceded it (China, India, Central Asia, Iran, Turkic Anatolia, and the Russian lands) resurfaced once again. However, the important question remains: to what extent did the nomadic conquests alter the overall order and basic socio-political structures of conquered sedentary countries and regions?

Nomadic conquests were accompanied by dynastic changes and by more or less serious changes in the ethnic and social composition of the newly

emerging conquest states, especially of their upper strata. But, more often than not even the turnover of ruling elites was not complete, and a certain institutional continuity can be traced in many cases. It was much easier for victorious nomads to replace 'people of the sword,' the military estate, than 'people of the pen,' the bureaucracy. A series of conquests destroyed the *dihqān*s, the traditional land-owning aristocracy in Iran and Central Asia that also had important military functions.[7] Their elimination was so complete that the very meaning of the word '*dihqān*' in Central Asia underwent a serious change. Instead of aristocracy it began to be applied to peasantry, and nowadays, with the repeasantization of former *kolkhoznik*s in such countries as Uzbekistan, the latter more and more often are again being called *dihqān*s. But neither the Seljuqs nor the Qarakhanids who struck the final blow to the *dihqān* aristocracy, or other conquerors for that matter, ever considered the encroachment upon the privileges of another group of Muslim society: the religious nobility, the *ulama* and the Sufi *shaykh*s.

Likewise, in China, the literati officials survived all nomadic conquests. The alien dynasties sooner or later discovered that the bureaucracy was indispensable and that to be able to rule the country they had to rely upon its assistance. The old and much-quoted aphorism of the ancient Chinese orator, Lu Tsia, taught to the Great Khan Ögödei by his Chinese counsellor, Yehlu Ch'uts'ai, was very indicative indeed: 'Although you inherited the Chinese Empire on horseback, you cannot rule it from that position.' Even the Mongols in China eventually had to revive the old Confucian examination system. It seems that with regard to political structures and institutions the change caused by nomadic conquests was often less drastic than it has sometimes been assumed. Such figures as Nizam al-Mulk, Rashid al-Din, Yehlu Ch'uts'ai, or Andalusian secretaries of the Almoravids, exemplify the limitations faced by the new rulers who had to adopt or adjust to the administrative models that had existed in conquered states.

The problem of innovations in the conquest states is as important as a certain continuation of political tradition and practice. One may ask whether victorious nomads introduced new institutions in conquered countries and what happened to these institutions in the long run. It is also important to inquire whether a fusion of nomadic institutions with the sedentary ones took place in such cases. Whatever one may think about the nomads, they had their own political culture. Their sedentary contemporaries might consider them barbarians, but they were rather sophisticated barbarians. To illustrate this I may refer to several concepts and institutions that for many centuries have been widespread in the Eurasian steppes. There was the notion of charisma and the divine mandate to rule bestowed upon a chosen clan.[8] There were specific models of rule (including dual kingship), imperial titles, and imperial symbolism.[9] There was the notion of collective or joint sovereignty, according

to which a state and its populace belong not to an individual ruler but to all members of a ruling clan or family as corporate property, and a corresponding appanage system. There were specific succession patterns based on different variations of the collateral or scaled rotating system and seniority within a ruling clan. With these we meet a patrimonial mode of governance which implied a redistribution of various kinds of wealth among vassals, followers, and even commoners. There were other political concepts and institutions. It seems that in their pure, pre-conquest forms these concepts did not much influence the political cultures of sedentary states. In conquest situations some of them, such as the supreme power legitimation or the notion of joint sovereignty, were simply imposed upon the conquered countries, but usually without long-lasting effect.

Perhaps an even more important question is: to what extent did nomadic conquests result in serious changes in land tenure patterns that broke with previous practices? It is well known that in many regions and in different historical periods the nomadic aristocracies, or the ruling elites of nomadic origin, eventually became landed elites in sedentary societies, like the Gurjaras in early medieval India. In Iran and Central Asia this happened many times; the last time in Central Asia after Shaybani Khan's invasion of Mā-warā' al-nahr. But society as a whole was far from always deeply affected by these developments. Thus, the poet Vasifi wrote that, during Shaybani Khan's conquest of Herat, one Uzbek amir thought that he and his fellow traveller were peasants and explained to them that they should not be scared, since nothing more than a change of landowners had taken place.

Attempts at introducing deeper changes in the structures of sedentary societies usually were not particularly successful, at any rate not in the long run. For example, the system of apportioned lands that was practised by the Mongols in China and Iran was disruptive of local patterns of landholding. Apparently it was abandoned after the end of Mongol rule.[10] On the other hand, there are many examples of nomadic conquerors that quite successfully adopted existing institutions when they considered them expedient. The first that comes to mind in this respect is the *iqtā'* - an assignment of land revenue paid in lieu of a salary for military service. The institution of *iqtā'* was practised on a large scale from the eleventh century, under the Seljuqs and Qarakhanids, but under different names it re-emerged time and again in different countries over a considerable length of time. Thus, the institution of *tankha,* a similar temporary and conditional assignment in return for services to the state, was widely practised in the Khanate of Bukhara even in the nineteenth century. In spite of all the disputes about the time of the appearance of *iqtā'*, and the lines of its evolution and local peculiarities, one point seems to be evident. As a way of rewarding military forces it had been adopted already by the Buyids and the Samanids. Therefore, the Seljuqs did not invent

the *iqtā'* system; but they certainly extended it, since, first, it corresponded to some nomadic traditions and practices (i.e. the appanage system and the redistribution of wealth among vassals and followers) and, second, it facilitated rule over a conquered sedentary population.

It seems that the change in the social and economic structures caused by nomadic conquests was often less drastic than it is sometimes assumed. A certain degree of continuity is quite evident in many cases. The direct and irreversible imposition of nomadic institutions, or even their effective fusion with those of sedentary societies, were the exception rather than the general rule. On the other hand, a certain mutual adjustment of these institutions and structures was quite a common phenomenon. In all, a permutation within the existing social order was a more frequent consequence of the nomadic conquests than its transformation.

The economic consequences of the relations between nomads and sedentaries are also ambiguous, especially if one attempts to discuss them in comparative terms. Many nomadic assaults and invasions of agricultural areas were devastating, although sometimes these devastations were exaggerated by contemporary sedentary historians and their modern followers. To take every line of the medieval chronicles at face value is as dangerous as reading them between the lines. Claims that the nomads were more cold-blooded and resorted to slaughter and butchery more often and more enthusiastically than sedentary conquerors are basically unsubstantiated. I wonder whether the Assyrians, or the Romans, or the Crusaders, were different in this respect from nomads. During the Thirty Years War in Europe the armies of all involved powers lived off the land just like the nomads during their military campaigns, and the population of Germany fell from 21 million to 13 million.[11] During the Northern War (1700-21) the Russian generals operating in the Baltics boasted to their tsar that in accordance with his orders they had killed everyone in the civilian population whom they could kill, and destroyed everything that they could destroy.

The thesis of the destructive consequences of all nomadic intrusions should be treated with greater caution, especially if one discusses economic processes of long duration. Too often the nomads are made scapegoats of economic decay. Thus, the desolation of certain areas in Central Asia, like Khwarazm, was explained by Soviet scholars as the result of the destruction of the irrigation networks by invading nomads. But, in fact, the salinization of the soil had played a more important role in this process than the nomads had. Contrary to a still widespread opinion, the Iraqi irrigation system had already been in decline since the tenth century, i.e. long before the Mongol invasion.[12] In North Africa, the destruction and ruin caused by the Hilalian invasion, which Ibn Khaldun called 'a plague of locusts,' apparently was exaggerated

not only by the Arab scholar but also by his followers amongst the French historians of the old school.[13]

With regard to trade, we often find that it was the sedentaries who benefited the most from their trade relations with the nomads, although this trade was less vital to them, since their economies were less specialized and more autarkic. Ibn Khaldun grasped the situation well when he stated: 'While (the Bedouin) need the cities for their necessities of life, the urban population needs (the Bedouin) for conveniences and luxuries.'[14] Available sources almost always show nomads as the side most in need of items of trade and sedentaries as the side benefiting the most from this trade. Trade with nomads could sometimes bring great profits, but, as seen from the sedentary world, it was often too unstable and sometimes even risky. Long-distance continental and transcontinental caravan trading was important as well. The role of nomads in this trade was extremely diverse, ranging from mediating trade to the transportation of goods, the sale or renting out of transport animals, the conducting or safeguarding of caravans, and so on. It was not a coincidence that all the great overland trade routes of antiquity and the Middle Ages were pioneered either by nomads or with their participation.

Pritsak's thesis that nomadic conquests were often initiated by merchants' guilds involved in international trade is unfounded and too extreme.[15] However, it is true that merchants from sedentary countries who were involved in international trade sometimes benefited from nomadic state building. In this respect, I agree with a much more balanced conclusion, which is drawn by Allsen: 'we normally think of nomadic states as stimulating long-distance exchange through the creation of a *pax* that provides security and transportation facilities; but in fact the process of state formation among the nomads in and of itself stimulates trade through an increased demand for precious metals, gems, and most particularly, fine cloths.'[16]

More generally, a certain caution is desirable with regard to long distance trade and its role in the world-historical process. After Wallerstein's study,[17] the idea of world economic systems became so fashionable that sometimes it has been extended *ad absurdum*. In my opinion, Wallerstein's hypothesis has some weak points even with regard to early modern Europe, but one should give him some credit. He never claimed that world economic systems could exist in pre-modern times. On the contrary, he stressed that their characteristic feature was increasing economic integration and systematic exchange of basic commodities and daily necessities. Therefore, there was not, nor could there be, any world-wide economy and global market before the advent of capitalism. In pre-capitalist times long-distance overland trade, in addition to slaves, was mainly confined to luxury commodities and prestige and exotic goods, in other words, to preciosities, and considering transportation and protection costs it could not be otherwise. It is true that luxuries and

necessities in pre-capitalist societies should not be considered as two opposing poles, since some luxuries acquired an important symbolic meaning.[18] Still, the difference is great. For these reasons and some others as well, I find it difficult to agree with the claim that, for example, the Mongols were central players in the expansion of the Chinese world-economy, integrating it with the world-economies of Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; or with another claim that the Mongols, like the Portuguese, the English, and the Dutch, created their empire with the political and strategic objectives of installing trading systems in the regions of their hegemony.[19] Thus, the impact of the nomads on the economic development of the world should not be overestimated.

However, the most difficult problems emerge when we turn to the historical trajectories of long duration. What impact did the nomads have on long-term historical processes in Europe, South Asia, East Asia, or the Middle East? There are many speculations here, but very few that have thus far been substantiated. The problems are not of a purely scholarly order. They have been debated for more than two hundred years, and almost always the debate has been ideologically loaded. As soon as intellectuals, first in Eastern and Central Europe and then in other parts of the world, discovered the backwardness of their countries in comparison with Western European ones, they strove for the least humiliating explanation, and started to look for a scapegoat. Nomads served this role well because they were the 'others,' the outsiders. Russian, Hungarian, Romanian, and other politically charged and patriotic historiographies presented their countries' retardation as the consequence of nomadic intrusions and conquests. Even some positive moments capable of healing wounded pride were discovered in these events. According to some, the countries of Eastern Europe were bulwarks against the barbarians and even the saviours of Christendom that sacrificed themselves to protect the West from the Mongols and the Turks (as well as from the Russians or even from the Slavs in general, who in the Romanian historiography were sometimes considered hardly much different from the Tatars).[20] In this way myths have been created and were propagandized not only by historians, but also by writers, poets, artists, and even by governments. These myths were and still are taught at schools; they have penetrated deeply into the public consciousness and demonstrate remarkable vitality. Following their medieval predecessors and some modern European scholars (though in the latter case often without due references), many Arab and other Middle Eastern scholars also tend to attribute the relative backwardness of their region to the calamity of the Mongol invasion.[21]

In order to demonstrate that the role of nomads in various national histories was, and still remains, a highly politicized issue, I will dwell a little on the ways the Mongol conquest was treated in the Imperial Russian and Soviet

historiographies and then on the ongoing debate in post-Soviet Russia. The first attempt at catching up with Europe undertaken by Peter the Great was only partly successful. Except in military matters, Russia remained a backward country. This humiliating backwardness required an explanation, which was discovered in the destructive Mongol invasion and the consequent period, which in the Russian historiography was labelled as 'the three hundred year Tatar yoke.' In fact the first traces of this concept appeared in the Russian literature not before the sixteenth, or even in the seventeenth century,[22] and only much later did it become fashionable to blame the Tatar yoke for all historical failures and shortcomings of Russian society and the Russian political system.

The negative consequences of the Mongol conquest and the consequent drain of economic resources connected with the tribute paid to the Golden Horde's rulers are evident. They were hardly balanced by the benefits of international commerce fostered by the Mongols. However, the alleged long-lasting, even permanent effects of the Tatar period of Russian history seem to be a myth, and as such it belongs more to the sphere of ideology than to that of history. So far no-one has really shown that the 'Tatar yoke' had been responsible for the fact that Russia 'missed' the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment, or, for that matter, for Russian despotism, or for the serfdom that was abolished only in 1861, or for the weakness of the burgher stratum in the medieval period and for the lack of a strong and numerous third estate in later times.

It is hard to deny that the Golden Horde had an impact on the emergence and further political development of the Moscow principality. The Moscow autocracy, as it emerged in the sixteenth century, may have borrowed some administrative methods and institutions from its former Mongol and Tatar overlords. The Moscow rulers even pretended to be the legitimate successors of the Golden Horde. However, the Tatar factor in the political unification of the Russian lands was hardly very significant, and it seems more plausible that autocracy evolved in Russia as the result of internal processes in which the legacy of Byzantium was at least as strong as the legacy of the Mongols. In all, I agree with Halperin that the assumption that only the Mongols and the Golden Horde are to be blamed for Russia's retardation is dubious.[23]

Curiously, there is a revisionist Russian school of thought on the Golden Horde and its role in Russian history that first emerged in some Russian émigré circles in the 1920's. The so-called 'Eurasianists' insisted on almost eternal enmity and antagonism between the continental Eurasian and the Western Atlantic civilizations. They were longing for the restoration of the Russian Empire in any garment possible. Thus, they argued that for ecological and cultural-historical reasons all peoples from the Hinggans to the Carpathians shared the same destiny and should have a common statehood. They

also claimed that autocratic rule in Russia (which, incidentally, they praised) was a Mongol contribution to Russian development.[24]

Since the 1970's these ideas, especially the thesis about the cultural and political symbiosis between Eastern Slavs and Turco-Mongol nomads were revived, though for the time being in a somewhat less extreme form, by epigones of the Eurasianists, the Soviet historian Lev Gumilev.[25] It is true that Gumilev was a maverick in Soviet academia, whose unprofessional treatment of many historical problems was matched only by his unbridled fantasy. However, nowadays Eurasianism (especially such of its characteristics as ill-hidden imperialism, illiberalism, and an anti-Western animus) has been reborn and became very popular among a segment of the Russian nationalists. More beguiling is that some ideas of the Eurasianists are now adopted by the Russian communists. Thus, their leader, Gennady Ziuganov, proclaims that Russia is the heir of Chinggis Khan's empire. This would be a new idea in post-Soviet Marxism, but whatever one calls contemporary Russian communists, one cannot call them Marxists. In post-communist Russia the Mongol period of Eurasian history is directly linked with a rabid nationalism and political polarization. Thus, the president of Tatarstan, Mintemir Shaimiev, claims that without the Golden Horde there would be no Great Russia, since, according to him, it was only due to the patronage of the Golden Horde's khans that the Moscow princes were capable of uniting the Russian princedoms. The poor Mongol communists had to follow their Soviet masters' suit and downgrade their national hero, Chinggis Khan. Those who deviated were punished. But as soon as communism collapsed in Mongolia, the central square in Ulan Bator, the Mongolian capital, was renamed Chinggis Khan Square.

Equally beguiling is the appropriation of Chinggis Khan in communist China. After China's break with the Soviet Union, Chinggis Khan began to be viewed more as a Chinese statesman than as a Mongol barbarian, and was praised for breaking forty different states out of their isolation and allowing them to become acquainted with a higher Chinese culture.[26] Another victory of nationalism over scholarship!

Leaving such rhetoric behind, I would like to return now to the general problem of the role that the nomads have played in the development of different historical and cultural regions. But before I discuss the role that the nomads played in the history of these regions, I should explain that my understanding of historical process is radically different from the Marxist and unilinear evolutionary ones, which are teleological in their essence. First, all major breakthroughs in human history, such as the Neolithic revolution and its consequences (which include the emergence of pastoral nomadism), the rise of statehood, or the industrial revolution, were the results of what seem to be unique combinations of many and various factors, some of which appear to

have been almost accidental. There was nothing 'automatic' in these breakthroughs. They occurred independently only a very limited number of times, or even once in a limited number of regions and then were spread to, or were imposed on, other regions. But they might well not have happened at all, or they might have happened at different times, in quite different forms, and in different regions. Actually, one can observe only a few, if any, laws and regularities in history, and they are mainly limited to a sequential order.[27] Second, in different regions the historical process took different patterns, forms, directions, tempos, and so on. As for similarities, these were connected at least as much with movements of ideas, cultural innovations, and populations, to which nomads contributed quite substantially, as with parallel internal developments.

Unfortunately, our understanding of the reasons for regional differences in historical development is at present very poor. I would not be surprised at all if we were never to comprehend them completely, and in some important respects will remain doomed to speculations and to subjective or intuitive interpretations. To claim that serious long-term regional differences were connected with many factors of geographic, ecological, economic, social, political, and many other orders, would be to claim a lot and at the same time to not claim anything definite at all. However, this is the state of the art at the moment, and the question of whether the nomadic factor was crucial, or at least played an important role, among those factors that defined specificities of regional development is open to debate just like many others.

Having said this, let me turn to individual regions, starting with Europe. The peculiarities of European historical development and especially the reasons for Western Europe's breakthrough to industrial civilization and liberal capitalism remain, or rather have become again, not only scholarly but also politically sensitive questions. They evoke strong emotions and are painful to those people who are preaching cultural and political relativism, sometimes in the disguise of culture-blind universalism. Still, one cannot and should not avoid this question. Some scholars consider the absence of internal nomads in Western Europe and the relatively insignificant occurrence of nomadic intrusions in the region since the high Middle Ages to be an important factor in its eventual transition to an industrial society.[28] I have already mentioned that this view is especially popular in the nationalist historiographies of East Central and East European countries, but it is also common in Marxist historiography. Thus, Perry Anderson claimed that the pressure of nomadic pastoralism was one of the most important factors among those which differentiated Eastern from Western Europe, and that the nomadic assaults on Eastern Europe retarded and thwarted its development.[29]

It is not my intention to dismiss these assertions altogether, but I think that the nomadic factor, whatever its alleged importance, should not be

exaggerated either. It may be doubted that the absence of nomadic invasions in and conquests of West European countries was as important in their transition to the industrial era as the Reformation and the Enlightenment, or the presence of a multipolar system of power beneficial for economic growth.[30] One may also wonder whether rational science became possible in the region only because after the tenth century the hoofs of the nomads' horses never stepped on West European soil. Many peculiarities of the historical process in Europe are evident already in its formative period, that is, much earlier than in early modern times. They certainly did not predetermine the outcome but they served as windows of opportunity for further development. Even so, the eventual realization of this opportunity seems almost a miracle.

If with regard to Western Europe scholars discuss the relatively insignificant impact of nomads on the development of the region, the situation becomes the opposite when we turn to some other parts of the world, like South Asia, and especially China and the Middle East. To say that the role of nomads there was greater would almost be tantamount to stating the obvious. It is more important to avoid simplification and simplifying models while discussing the obvious importance of nomads in these regions.

In the history of the Indian subcontinent the nomadic factor was less significant than in the history of China or the Middle East. The indigenous pastoralism in India became just an extension of the farming economy and of sedentary society, to such an extent that it even acquired some elements of the caste system. It is true that the collapse of the Harappan civilization is still sometimes attributed to the allegedly nomadic Indo-Aryans. However, this problem remains in the domain of speculation, and in any case the Indo-Aryans could not be pastoral nomads, since there was no such thing in the Bronze Age. The ancient nomadic migrations and conquests also did not dramatically change the social, political, and even long-lasting cultural characteristics of Indian civilization, especially if one considers that the Kushanas had ceased to be nomads long before they came to India.

The spread of Islam and the formation of Indo-Islamic society are considered the major cultural and political changes in medieval India. But it would be wrong to directly connect these changes with the nomads. A characteristic feature of medieval Indian development described by Wink[31] was the fusion of the settled society of the agricultural plains with the organizational mode of the frontier. The point is, however, that many, if not most of the Turks who were migrating to India had already been detribalized and even denomadicized; therefore they did not come there for ecological and environmental reasons. High demand for Turks in India was created not by nomadic expansion, but by an expansion of the sedentary Islamic society.

The Persianized Ghaznavids and some later dynasties, just like their *mamluk*-type elite troops, were of Turkic origin. However, they ceased to be

nomads, and their states were by no means nomadic. Despite the ethnic origin of their political and military elites, in medieval India they were much more Islamic than Turkic, and some institutions of Islamic Middle Eastern society, not nomadic ones, were transferred to the subcontinent through these states. Islam is a mighty social force, but I wonder if Islamic rule in India mainly affected the political sphere without changing such basic institutions of the Indian social order as the caste system. As for the Turks, not unlike the Bedouin during the early Arab conquests, they mainly served as 'fuel for Islam,' and Turkic slave soldiers had much less in common with nomadic pastoralist-warriors than it is sometimes assumed. In any case, indigenous nomadic institutions never took root in India in any conspicuous and long-lasting way.

The role of the nomadic factor was much greater in China than in India. From the beginning and for three thousand years, Chinese history was intimately linked with the history of the nomads of Inner and Central Asia. Exciting but inconclusive new archaeological materials and some historical sources hint that in the formative period of Chinese civilization the cultural and other influences of the nomads might have been even greater than after its crystallization.[32] However, external, and quite often internal nomads as well, remained an almost ever-present factor in Chinese history. Not infrequently they were deeply involved in the Chinese dynastic cycles. The destructive consequences of some nomadic intrusions into China are well known. In addition, the necessity of dealing with the nomadic threat often demanded from the Chinese state large military expenditures, or tribute, subsidies, and other payments to nomads, which resulted in taxation increases. This undermined the economic base of some dynasties, thus indirectly contributing to their decay and collapse. What remains less clear, however, is whether and to what extent this drain of resources has thwarted the country's long-term economic development. The great economic and technological achievements of medieval China seem to indicate that the negative consequences of her relations with the nomads should not be overestimated.

Likewise, the internal dynamics of the historical process in China was affected by the nomadic factor only to a limited extent. Hegel called China the land of the recurrent principle. One need not follow his dictum literally to concede that the Chinese development demonstrated a remarkable stability and continuity of basic ideological and socio-political structures and institutions. Even the victorious nomads never destroyed the Chinese state machinery and bureaucracy, nor did they introduce fundamental changes in the social order of the country. The best, or perhaps the worst, that they were capable of doing was to change the composition of the ruling class, turning it into something that was ethnically more heterogeneous. However, the emergence and persistence of such specific Chinese characteristics and

institutions as the imperial character of statehood, the Sino-centric worldview associated with it, the Confucianist ethos, the scholar gentry class, the examination system for civil service, and many others were responses to internal, not external conditions.

Even China's numerous failures to deal with the nomadic threat should be attributed to specifics of her socio-political system and political philosophy at least as much as to the strength of the nomads. As Waldron aptly remarked: 'Any reasonably well-educated official of late imperial China would have commanded at least as much information about Chinese relationships with the nomads as the most learned modern anthropologists, but would have organized and understood it in a different way.'[33] The Chinese governments, it seems, were never able to formulate, and even less to implement, a rational long-term frontier policy.[34]

The remarkable resilience of China's basic socio-political forms - in the pre-industrial era the source of her strength and her weakness simultaneously - was repeatedly demonstrated by the fact that when victorious nomads attempted to introduce their own alternative forms into the country, they inevitably failed sooner or later. Thus, the Mongols soon discovered that it was impossible to rule China by applying their own customary law and had to accommodate themselves to Chinese legal concepts and institutions.[35]

All foreign dynasties in China faced a similar problem. Insufficient Sinicization made them unacceptable to the Chinese subjects, while excessive Sinicization eroded their ethnic support base. In addition, Sinicization for the nomads implied sedentarization.[36] From time to time, in an attempt to solve this insolvable problem, various hybrid systems emerged in which the government relied on the Chinese bureaucracy but was backed by tribal armies, and assigned a higher status to their ethnic counterparts.

Some victors like the emperor T'o-pa Hong of the Northern Wei state created by the Tabgach (Hsien-pi) or the Jurchen,[37] openly pursued a policy of assimilation. Others, like Liao or Yüan, were more or less persistent in attempts at maintaining their separate ethnic and cultural identities and separate cultural institutions.[38] However, in the long run the result was the same. Those who were not defeated and expelled or who simply fled from China were eventually domesticated and assimilated. Sooner or later, purely Chinese ideological, political, and socio-economic institutions gained the upper hand over the double-rule systems.

Following Lattimore,[39] Barfield has suggested an interesting model of cycles of Chinese dynastic history.[40] He claims that all nomadic empires in the Mongolian steppes and unified Chinese dynasties rose and fell together. By contrast, Manchurian states could develop only in times of anarchy on the northern frontier when central authority both in China and on the steppe had collapsed. He also insists that all unified Chinese empires met their end as a

result of internal cataclysms. Likewise, the emergence of a unified China under native rule was a product of internal developments in which the steppe tribes played almost no part. In my opinion, this model has some weak sides along with strong ones, and, therefore, needs further elaboration. For example, I do not agree with Barfield that the Mongol conquest of China was an aberration of the steppe patterns and was almost accidental. It is also hard to agree with him that the nomads never played an important role in the collapse of unified Chinese Empires, although their impact was often indirect. To provide but one of several possible examples, I can refer to the Uighurs' assistance in the suppression of the An Lu-shan rebellion, which for a time saved the Tang, but certainly ruined the country and, thus, contributed to the eventual collapse of the dynasty.[41] But in the main I agree with Barfield. The historical process of long duration in China was much more connected with internal than with external factors.

Last but not least, we must look at the Islamic heartland, or the Middle East and Northern Africa. Here nomads and sedentaries were especially closely linked to each other both for ecological and historical reasons. This was the historical region where large-scale pastoral nomadism was capable of functioning not only outside, but also within its borders. In this respect it was different from India, China, and even from Eastern Europe. While in Eastern Europe there was a clear demarcation line between the steppe and other ecological zones, in the Middle East these lines were much more blurred. Moreover, in the medieval period, the number of internal nomads in the Middle East only increased. It is worth distinguishing between nomadic movements that took place inside the region and those that brought nomads there from the outside. The Bedouin might be disruptive, but with few and incomplete exceptions, like the short-lived Almoravid empire, they were never empire builders. In this respect, the Turks and Mongols were different.

A great deal of research has already been published on the role of nomads in the historical process in the Middle East, but the results are still inconclusive. I will confine myself to only a few questions and suggestions for the discussion. The two main scapegoats who are most frequently blamed for checking or setting back the Middle Eastern development are the nomads and the Europeans.[42] Often, the *mamluks* are also considered to be guilty of the same, while the nomads are implicated or guilty by association. There is an opinion that the '*mamluk* system was built up because every other political organization had been destroyed in the Near East by the Mongols.'[43]

Actually, there is another school of thought that considers the nomadic factor to have been of secondary importance and points out that some specific characteristics of Islam, or Muslim society, such as an alleged institutional power failure, were more responsible for stagnation or a blockage of the region. However, even more often the nomads and Islam are combined in

what amounts to 'blockage' explanations. Thus, in Hall's view, 'the merging of pastoralism with a closed scripturalist vision created a politically unstable yet culturally cohesive world unable to indigenously 'invent' capitalist economic development.'[44]

It is plausible that the Middle Eastern military organization, in so far as it was based on *mamluks* and/or tribesmen, contributed to a disjunction between state and society and, thus, had some detrimental effects. This had already been noticed by Ibn Khaldun, who thought that urban life and political responsibility were antithetical. He blamed the sedentary people for entrusting the defense of their property and their lives to corrupt governors and rulers and to the militias of tribal and/or nomadic origin, which had the task of guarding them. As Cook observed, 'it is remarkably hard to find in Islamic history instances of what might be called citizen armies locally recruited, by a state identified with the area in question, from a settled population that was not tribal.'[45]

Armies were ethnic or tribal and elites were ethnic and tribal too. But the pattern had been set not by the Turkic nomads, but by the Arabs themselves already in the ninth century.[46] Contrary to the still existing opinion,[47] the *mamluk* system in all its varieties is a phenomenon of Islamic, primarily Middle Eastern history, and of a sedentary society. It had never emerged in the steppes and deserts, and it could not emerge there because in its essence it was a negation of the very principle on which nomadic societies and their military organization were founded. The *mamluk* system was rooted in a specific kind of division of labour and in the professionalization of the military, while the strength of nomadic society consisted of the opposite. It is the undeveloped division of labor that made any pastoralist commoner a mounted warrior when necessary. Only this allowed the nomads, in spite of their relatively small number, to mobilize remarkably large armies. Most of the *mamluks* had been torn from their tribal context and were purchased and brought to Islamdom as young boys. Their military qualities were connected with a specific military training much more than with their ethnic and even occupational background. It is true that this training, as well as the *mamluks'* military equipment, sometimes reflected nomadic military traditions, but even this was far from always the case.[48]

And what about the tribesmen, who, to a large extent though not exclusively, consisted of nomads? Following Ibn Khaldun and Robert Montagne, Gellner suggested a model of the Middle Eastern historical process, very elegant in its simplicity, but, to my mind, too simple to be accepted completely. He claimed that 'in the main Islamic block between Central Asia and the Atlantic shores of Africa, one has the feeling that the same and limited pack of cards has been dealt. The lands vary, but the pack is the same.'[49] This led to a violent symbiosis of tribes and urban-based

governments. Gellner thought that because of the relative strength of pastoralism on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean the 'tribal solution' prevailed there, whereas the feudal alternative, which segregated rulers and warriors from the peasants, prevailed in the north.

Gellner believed that scripturalist Islam was more compatible with the modern rational spirit than any other faith. So, he was puzzled by the fact that this spirit had never revealed itself in the Middle East and that there was no Ibn Weber in the region who would write 'The Kharejite Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.' In principle it might be thought that this could be explained by the political instability of the region. While the Protestants in Northwestern Europe, in accordance with the predestinarian doctrine, contemplated whether they were the Elects of God or not, their Muslim counterparts in the Maghrib of Ibn Khaldun had more mundane concerns to worry about. They asked themselves another question, whether or not they would be robbed tomorrow morning. If instability was the cause, the nomads fitted well to the role of main villains.

But instability in the Middle East was relative. In some periods it was felt more acutely than in others. For centuries the Bedouin and other nomads were kept under quite efficient control by central governments; at any rate the latter were capable of checking their predatory inclinations in their own states. Suffice it to refer to the Ottoman Empire. Besides, nomadic invasions might be repetitive, but their consequences were not, and far from all these invasions were more destructive than the wars between sedentary states in the region.

It seems to me that the whole discussion on the role of nomads in the Middle East should take a different perspective. First, the problem of a 'blockage' is relevant only to those who think that the European pattern of development was natural for all other regions as well, and that the Middle East had been predestined to the industrial revolution - except that something went wrong. Hence, their attempts at establishing who should be blamed for the deviation from the alleged natural path. Second, it is the peculiarities of the sedentary Islamic society or societies one should inquire about in a search for an explanation of the importance of the nomadic factor in the region, not vice versa. If we stop using the 'European miracle' as a yardstick, assume that historical process was multiform, and pay more attention to the internal logic of developments, then we may possibly allocate the nomads a more modest role in the historical process of the medieval Middle East. At any rate this role may have to be evaluated differently. Perhaps in the world of Ibn Khaldun the nomads were indispensable and ever recurring and, thus, were conceived as the driving force of history, but after all, the Maghrib was only a small part of the Middle East, and even there this situation lasted for several centuries only.

These introductory remarks are very superficial and impressionistic. I had to intrude into fields that are certainly beyond my proper area of expertise and

to travel across the thresholds of time and space. Still, it seems to me that the general conclusion can be advanced that nowhere was the nomadic factor a single, or even the most important one among those many factors that defined historical developments of the long duration.

NOTES

1 Khazanov, 1984.
2 Khazanov, 1994.
3 Lewis, 1993, p. 198.
4 Khazanov, 1975, pp. 107ff.
5 Clauson, 1970, pp. 51ff.; Bazin, 1975, pp. 37-46.
6 Golden, 1992, pp. 15ff.
7 Barthold, 1963, pp. 369-71.
8 Rachewiltz, 1973; Golden, 1982.
9 Allsen, 1997.
10 See the contribution by T. Allsen to this volume.
11 Davies, 1996, p. 568.
12 Adams, 1965, pp. 71-89; Sourdel and Sourdel, 1968, pp. 272ff.
13 Fisher, 1977, pp. 244-5.
14 Ibn Khaldun, 1967, p. 122.
15 Pristak, 1979; 1980, pp. 14ff.
16 Allsen, 1997, p. 104.
17 Wallerstein, 1974.
18 Schneider, 1977, pp. 20ff.; cf. Allsen, 1997, p. 103.
19 Seaman, 1991, pp. 4, 7.
20 For the latter, see e.g. Pearson, 1988, pp. 163-4.
21 Lewis, 1993, pp. 189ff.
22 Halperin, 1982, p. 99; 1986, p. 17.
23 Halperin, 1987, p. 86; cf. Ostrowski, 1998, pp. 244ff. and passim.
24 For recent reprints of the most important publications of the Eurasianists see Isaev, 1992; Novikova and Sizemskaiia, 1995; Tolstoi, 1997.
25 Gumilev, 1970; cf. 1992.
26 Farquhar, 1968, p. 186.
27 Gellner, 1988, pp. 15ff.
28 For example, Strayer, 1970, p. 16; Crone, 1989, p. 150. Bartlett, 1993, however, does not mention the nomadic factor at all.
29 Anderson, 1974, pp. 218-28.
30 Hall, 1985, p. 139; Mann, 1988, pp. 10ff.
31 Wink, 1997, pp. 162ff.
32 For example, So and Bunker, 1995.
33 Waldron, 1992, p. 38.

34 See e.g. Fairbank, 1968; Rossabi, 1983; Jagchid and Symons, 1989.
35 Ch'en, 1979.
36 Cf. Barfield, 1991, p. 42.
37 Bol, 1987.
38 Endicott-West, 1991.
39 Lattimore, 1940.
40 Barfield, 1989, 1991.
41 Pulleyblank, 1955.
42 See e.g. Ashtor, 1976 among many others.
43 Garcin, 1988, p. 120.
44 Hall, 1985, p. 103; cf. also Gellner, 1981, p. 24.
45 Cook, 1988, p. 133.
46 Crone, 1980; Pipes, 1981.
47 Beckwith, 1984.
48 Amitai-Preiss, 1995, pp. 214ff.; Smith, 1997, pp. 255ff.
49 Gellner, 1981, p. 99.

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CHAPTER 2

NOMADS IN THE SEDENTARY WORLD: THE CASE OF PRE-ChINGGISID RUS' AND GEORGIA

PETER B. GOLDEN

In those states that bordered directly on the Eurasian steppe, it is often difficult to distinguish between the impact of nomads living within the boundaries of these states and those that were, technically speaking, outside of these, at best, only loosely defined borders.[1] Indeed, L.N. Gumilëv has argued, not without some justification, that the nomads of what we may call the Qipchaq[2] era (for Western Eurasia, approximately mid-eleventh to early thirteenth centuries), formed together with Rus' a single political subsystem of Eurasia.[3] Some nomadic groupings in Western Eurasia did, indeed, find themselves within the spheres of power of what we may call 'frontline' sedentary rulers.[4] Most of the nomadic populations of Western Eurasia (with the notable exception of the so-called *Chernii Klobutsi*), however, did not occupy physical space that was under the direct rule of their sedentary neighbours. Yet, they were a constant presence in these societies, interacting both positively and negatively with and within these states. The dynamics of Riurikid (the Rus' ruling clan) internal politics cannot be fully comprehended without reference to the steppe peoples who figured so intimately in their internecine struggles.

Of these close encounters with the sedentary world, only one steppe grouping survived: the Qipchaqs. They did so by integrating themselves still further into and often exploiting the fragmented political structure of Western Eurasia and the Balkans. Of the two sedentary states that are the focus of this paper, pre-Chinggisid Rus' and Georgia, the former was a 'frontline' state whose early history and development cannot be separated from the steppe and its nomadic population. The latter, although sheltered to some degree by its location, was nonetheless the frequent target of nomadic intrusions. Nomads from Western Eurasia, entering either through the Caucasian passes or via Iran, played a crucial role in the shaping of Georgian history as well. These states were not only in contact with nomadic polities. They were also drawn into some of the largest nomadic *states* of that era.

The Eastern Slavs who would come to comprise the bulk of the population of Kievan Rus', have been in contact with peoples of Altaic or more precisely Turkic linguistic affiliations since the late fourth century AD when elements of the European Huns crossed the Volga and broke up the Ostrogothic state. These same Huns in 395, perhaps invited in by disgruntled elements within the East Roman Empire, also streamed into Roman Asia Minor and thence came into contact with the Transcaucasian polities, including Georgia.[5] This was not the first, nor would it be the last such nomadic incursion. The Rus' primary chronicle, the *Tale of Bygone Years* (*Povest' vremjannyx let*), in its opening pages, traces a history of Altaic nomad-Slavic contact and interaction, often of a negative kind:

> When the Slav nation (*sloven'sku zhe iazyku*), as we have said, was living on the Danube, there came from Scythia, that is from the Kozars, those who are called Bolgars and they settled along the Danube and were oppressors of the Slavs (*naselntsi Slovenom bysha*). Then, the White Ugrians came and inherited the land of the Slavs for it was these Ugrians who began to be present during the time of the Emperor Heraclius while he was at war with the Persian Emperor, Khusraw. The Obri (Avars, PBG) were also present in those times, they were the ones who attacked the Emperor Heraclius and almost caught him. They waged successful war on the Slavs and tormented the Duleby who are Slavs, and raped their women ... After them came the Pechenegs, then the Black Ugrians passed by Kiev, later, during the time of Oleg.[6]

The Georgian chronicle attributed to Leonti Mroveli (eleventh century)[7] which begins in mythical times and concludes in the fourth century AD, anachronistically places the first attacks of the Khazars in the very opening pages of Georgian history, in his account of the origins of K'art'li.[8] The nomadic presence, thus, is noted at the dawn of Georgian statehood. Mroveli (or his source) places these 'fiery, heathen peoples (*nat'esavni, sastikni darmart'ni*), who are called the real Turks (*bunt'urk'ad*)[9] and Qipchaqs,' whom Alexander the Great initially found too powerful to dislodge, on the Mtkuari/Kura river.[10] There are similarly anachronistic references to Pecheneg (*Pachanikni*) invasions, brought in together with the 'Jiks' (i.e. Circassians) by the Osetin kings.[11] The Türks, Khazars, Seljuq-led Oghuz and Qipchaqs, however, were subsequently a real and sometimes disquieting presence in Medieval Georgia.

The impact of the nomads on issues as diverse as state-formation, political organization, religion, language and the culture of the Eastern Slavic peoples, in particular of the Russians and Ukrainians, has been much debated and engendered a substantial literature.[12] For the pre-Chinggisid period attention has, almost invariably, focused on the role of the Khazar Qaghanate and later nomadic polities in the fostering or destruction of the

economy of Kievan Rus'. For the Chinggisid and subsequent periods, the crucial question was the role of the nomads (i.e. Tatars), in addition to the universally acknowledged Byzantine influences, in shaping Russian political culture.[13] These issues were usually discussed in broad strokes with little attention paid to the actual mechanics of the relationship. Nineteenth-century historians tended to take a largely negative view of the nomads. Thus, the Russian Orientalist A.A. Kunik, on the eve of the beginning of Russia's conquest of Central Asia, considered them 'lower orders of humanity.'[14] S.M. Solov'ëv and V.O. Kliuchevskii, the doyens of Russian historical writing in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, viewed Russian history as a struggle of the Forest (i.e. the Slavs and ultimately Europe) against the Steppe (the nomads and ultimately Asia). Thus, Solov'ëv remarks that Rus', 'as a European borderland, like the Greek Pontic colonies of antiquity, had to stand perpetually on armed alert' against the 'barbarian hordes' of the steppe, concluding that 'it was not only that the steppe-dwellers, or Polovtsy, themselves attacked Rus', they cut her off from the Black Sea shores, hindered communications with Byzantium ... barbarian Asia sought to deprive Rus' of all routes, all outlets with which it communicated with educated Europe.'[15] Kliuchevskii, in discussing the deleterious effects of Cuman raids on Rus', writes that 'one should not forget for one minute that it (Rus', PBG) was founded on the border of the Christian cultural world, on the shore of Europe, beyond which stretched the shoreless sea of the steppes which served as the threshold of Asia. These steppes with their nomadic population were also an historical scourge for Ancient Rus ... Reading the chronicle of that time, we will find in it as many bright colours as one would want for the representation of the misfortunes that Rus' experienced from the Steppe.'[16] These are harsh words. Kliuchevskii, however, like a number of other Russian scholars, in his *Istoriia soslovii v Rossii* takes a more positive view of the Khazar Qaghanate, clearly differentiating it from the stateless nomads that followed them. He remarks that the 'Khazar yoke,' a disputed and emotionally charged label in any event, 'had a beneficial effect on the industrial (*promyshlennye*) successes of the Dnepr Slavs.' Having taken up 'peaceful pursuits,' the Khazars opened up to the Slavs access to the Pontic and Caspian markets.[17] A.E. Presniakov in his *Lektsii po russkoi istorii* (written in the early twentieth century but first published in 1938) viewed Kiev's constant struggle with the Steppe as producing great energy, dynamism and creating a powerful *druzhina* (military retinue). Ultimately, however, it exhausted Rus'.[18]

Myxajlo Hrushevs'kyi (1866-1934), the founder of modern Ukrainian historical studies, saw nomado-Slavic relations in similarly confrontational but at the same time ambivalent terms.[19] He too took a more positive view of

the Khazar Qaghanate, considering it a 'defensive shield (*zaborolo*) of Eastern Europe against the hordes of Asia.'[20] This benign view was also shared by M.K. Liubavskii who contended that Khazar domination of the Ponto-Caspian steppelands had a benevolent impact on the Slavs, protecting them from the 'nomadic hordes of the East' while maintaining 'peaceful, friendly relations' with them. It was under Khazar protection that the Slavs colonized Khazar-dominated lands, becoming, in the process, subjects of the Khazar Qaghans.[21] In brief, the Khazars provided protective cover allowing for Slavic colonization and commercial access to the powerful southern economies of the Mediterranean Basin. To this positive view held by some Russian and Ukrainian scholars today,[22] there are dissenting voices. Thus, P.P. Tolochko cautions that 'it is necessary to remember that the Rus' state developed and grew strong not under the patronage of Khazaria, but rather in a constant struggle with its expansion.'[23] In an earlier study, Tolochko, viewing the period extending from the Hunnic to the Mongol era as one of continual struggle against nomadic depredations, concluded that although the Turkic nomads did not constitute a threat to the existence of Old Rus', the deflection of resources to defence against their raids 'had a negative impact on the economic development of the border principalities.'[24]

Many Russian and Ukrainian historians of the nineteenth and twentieth century (e.g. N.I. Kostomarov, P.V. Golubovskii, N.Ja. Aristov, P.N. Miliukov, G.V. Plexanov and others,[25] and of the Soviet era B.D. Grekov, V.T. Pashuto, V.V. Kargalov)[26] concurred in this negative assessment. Although the Khazars were permitted some positive contributions by earlier scholars, B.A. Rybakov, one of the leading figures in Soviet Medieval Rus' studies wrote several severely negative articles on the role of the Khazars in Rus' history, considerably downplaying their importance. Indeed, the subject became almost taboo.[27] While the Khazars posed problems because of the Judaic religious orientation of the ruling groupings within the state, stateless nomads remained equally problematic. Only occasionally, less strident language was used, putting forth the notion that although Rus' was under 'continual attack,' which impeded natural growth, in the long run nomadic disruptions could not 'hold back much less halt the development of Rus'.'[28] The occasionally dissenting voice could be heard. Thus, M.N. Pokrovskii, a founder of Soviet Marxist scholarship, criticized the often-virulent tones of earlier discussions of the nomads and while not downplaying the destructive effects of nomadic raiding also saw areas of positive interaction.[29] The nomads could also serve, although not benignly, as necessary catalysts for political development. Thus, B.A. Rybakov asserts that the 'consolidation of the most important Slavic tribes was accelerated by an external danger - the appearance in the steppes of the Obry - the Avars

who crushed the Duleby'[30] which, he argues, led in turn to the formation of the Rus' state.

Some of the more recent studies of Rus' and the Steppe cast a more benevolent eye on even the more troublesome nomads and point to many areas of symbiosis. A.P. Novosel'tsev, agreeing with Hrushevs'kyi and Liubavskii that the Khazar presence allowed for Slavic expansion suggests that the Slavs of the seventh-eighth centuries were the 'natural allies of the Khazars.'[31] L.N. Gumilëv, as was noted above, was prepared to go a little further. From his perspective, the nomads of the Qipchaq Steppe, especially after Vladimir Monomax's victorious campaigns (early twelfth century), a 'conquest' (*zavoevanie*) but not a 'subjugation' (*pokorenie*), became as much a part of Rus' as the 'Polock or Novogorodian lands, without losing their autonomy.' Hence, it would be 'more correct to speak of a unitary Russo-Polovtsian system.' Thus, the Qipchaqs (Polovtsy), the *bête noire* of traditional Russian history, have been embraced and are now part of a common 'polycentric state' with the Rus'.[32] Rather, Gumilëv preferred to cast the Jews, Khazarian and others, as the villains of Rus' history.[33] Indeed, this anti-Khazar school of the Soviet era (associated with Rybakov and Gumilëv) reached such a fever pitch that, as V.Ja. Petrukhin has commented, Khazaria came to take on the 'features of an almost metaphysical kingdom of evil, the bearer of a yoke more fearsome than that of the Tatars.'[34]

A recent, post-Soviet study of Islam in the history of Russia by R.G. Landa, once again, underscores the importance of Khazaria in putting the Rus' of the eighth-ninth century in contact with the Arabian Caliphate, one of the great centres of world culture. From the Khazars, he points out, the Rus' gained important experience in administering a polyethnic and multiconfessional state. Landa also comments that the Rus' state had Turkic steppe allies who guarded its borders against nomadic incursions. Their significant numbers, he suggests, 'explain the abundance of Turkicisms in the Old Rus' language.' Many Rus', in his view, knew the Turkic tongues of these nomads, many of whom were ultimately assimilated into Rus' society.[35]

Outside of the region, scholarship, often less burdened by local ethnic and religious politics, has taken a more neutral view. Omeljan Pritsak, in a number of studies, has shown that pre-thirteenth century Rus''s nomadic neighbours were not interested in conquering the Slavs and had a positive impact on them culturally in many areas.[36] Thomas Noonan, taking on the long held notion that nomadic raiding was responsible for the economic decline of the Kievan Rus' state, has demonstrated that Rus' trade with the East did not decline during the Cuman era.[37] In a series of articles, Noonan pointed to the importance of the Khazar-Arab trade as the source of the

dirhams which began to penetrate the Eastern Slavic lands ca. 800 AD. It was this trade that attracted the Varangian Rus'[38] and ultimately led to the creation of the Rus' state. I have suggested that not only were the nomads of the pre-Chinggisid period in Western Eurasia not interested in conquering Rus' or other sedentary states, but it was they who were most negatively affected by the nomad-sedentary conflicts. The Khazar state was destroyed by the Rus', the Pechenegs and Western Oghuz driven off while the Qipchaqs survived only by successfully integrating themselves into the political state system of the region to which they contributed professional warriors.[39]

As for Georgia, from Scythian times onward, the nomads of the North Caucasian steppelands were a continuing presence (albeit usually external and removed). Without going into the political details of this interaction, which has not been fully studied, we may note that the Khazars and Qipchaqs, as in Rus', played important roles in the shaping of Georgian history.[40] Georgia was, moreover, considerably affected, as we shall see, by the movement of the Oghuz tribes, led by the Seljuqs, across Iran to Transcaucasia and Asia Minor.[41]

It is not my intention here to survey the whole of Eastern Slavic and Georgian interaction with the steppe world. Rather we shall focus on several important issues. Certainly, one of the most distinctive measurements of political, social, economic and cultural exchange between peoples is the borrowing of concepts and forms of political organization. One of the most interesting features of the governance of the Rus' state was the system of succession 'by scales' to the Grand Principate of Kiev. It has long been asserted that this system was taken from the Turkic world, or more specifically from the Khazars and that its origins lie in the Rus' Qaghanate, an institution also taken from the Khazar state.

THE KHAZAR ERA (ca. 650-965)
ORIGINS OF THE RUS' QAGHANATE AND THE QUESTION OF A RUS' DIARCHY

The origins and actual functioning of this system in Rus' remain problematic. As a consequence, we will have to examine the meagre evidence in some detail.[42] The *Annales Bertiniani*, s.a. 839, note that in May of that year, the Carolingian (Western) Emperor, Louis the Pious, received an embassy from the Byzantine Emperor Theophilos. Accompanying the embassy were 'some persons who called themselves, that is their people Rhos (*quosdam qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos uocari dicebant*), whom their king (*rex illorum*) called Chacanus' (or Chaganus), had dispatched to

Constantinople to establish bonds of friendship with the Byzantine state. Theophilos asked that Louis grant this hitherto unknown people safe passage through his lands as they returned to their own. The original itinerary to Constantinople is unrecorded, but Theophilos' request noted that they had travelled through the lands of 'fierce and savage' peoples and they were concerned that their return journey might prove even more perilous. The Franks, however, were not a little distressed to discover, upon closer examination, that these 'Rhos' were Swedes (*eos gentis esse Sveonum*).[43]

Somewhat later, however, in a letter to the Byzantine Emperor Basil I, dated to 871, Louis the German, clearly taking exception to what had apparently become Byzantine usage, declares that 'we have not found that the leader of the Avars, or Khazars (Gasanorum), or Northmen and (even) the prince of the Bulgars is called *Chaganum*, but (rather) king or lord of the Bulgars.'[44] Thus, although the Byzantines were calling the rulers of the Khazars, Northmen (most probably a reference to the Rus') and even Bulghar princes (the reference to the Avars is, at this point, historical) *Qaghan*s, such was not the practice in the West. The memory of the 839 embassy had clearly faded. Islamic sources of the tenth-twelfth centuries recorded a tradition going back to the ninth century (from al-Jarmī and al-Jayhānī), preserved in the Arabic-writing Ibn Rusta [ca. 903-13] and in the Persian works of the anonymous *Ḥudūd al-'Ālam* [982], Gardīzī [ca. 1050] and the anonymous *Mujmal al-Tavārīkh* [1126] which note that the Rūs have a king whom they call *khāqān rūs*, Pers. *khāqān-i rūs* or *rūs khāqān*.[45] Curiously, the other Muslim geographical sources make no mention of this institution - although a number of them are well-informed about the Rus'.

There is a later cluster of sources, coming directly from the Rus' themselves that mention the qaghanate. One grouping is associated with the reign of Iaroslav I Mudryi (the Wise) in Kiev (co-ruler with and rival of his brother, Mstislav, who was centred in Tmutorokan' and later Chernigov, 1019-36, sole ruler 1036-54). In his famous religio-ideological tract (composed ca. 1040-50), the *Slovo o Zakone i Blagodati*, Ilarion, the first native Rus' metropolitan of the Church (appointed by Iaroslav), refers (three times) to both *kagan nash Vladimir* ('our qaghan Vladimir') and to *kagan nash Georgii* ('Our qaghan Georgii,' a reference to Iaroslav).[46] A graffito from the Church of St. Sophia (built by Iaroslav to commemorate his victory over the Pechenegs) has the appeal *Spasi Gospodi kagana nashego* ('Oh Lord, save our Qaghan!'). As was noted by S.A. Vysockii, *kagan* was used in Old Rus' literature to refer to either Vladimir I (972-1015) or Iaroslav I. Since that part of St. Sophia in which the graffito is found was constructed after the death of Iaroslav I, it cannot refer to either of these two Rus' rulers. Vysockij deduces that it must refer to Iaroslav's son, Sviatoslav II (1073-6).[47] The latter briefly reigned in troubled times and was deeply interested in

ideologies that could promote internal harmony and strengthen royal authority. It was at his direction that the famous *Izborniks* (Miscellanies) of 1073 and 1076 were produced. These examples of wisdom literature, deriving from Bulgarian and Byzantine models, were reworked to suit local conditions.[48] We do not know who was the author of the graffito, but it may be presumed that this appeal to the qaghanal status of Sviatoslav II was another approach to shoring up the ruling prince.

There is also an obscure reference to the Rus' qaghans or qaghanal times in the *Slovo o polku Igoreve*, the dating and authenticity of which are in dispute.[49] The text has been read and interpreted differently. One may see in it, however, a reference to one or several *kagan*(s) of past eras.[50] The philological complexities notwithstanding, the Old Rus' material, taken together and coming from widely disparate sources, gives evidence of a consciousness of certain traditions.

A most perplexing aspect of the question of the Rus' Qaghanate is that of its origins and physical location. There has been no shortage of speculation here. Artamonov placed it in the Middle Dnepr and proposed that the Kievan princes in taking this title declared their independence from the Khazars.'[51] V.T. Pashuto states that 'when the Old Rus' state began to form, it began to free the Slavic lands that were drawn to it from the alien rule of the kaganate and subsequently subjected it too, having usurped (as the Muscovite tsars later did) the title of kagan.'[52] Novosel'tsev points out that the title must have been taken at a time when it still had real currency, i.e. before the Khazar qaghans were transformed into largely symbolic, ceremonial rulers, otherwise why would the Rus' have adopted it?[53] Petrukhin also takes it for granted that the Rus' chose Kiev as their capital as part of their claim to the 'Khazar legacy in Eastern Europe,' which included claims to the title of *qaghan* as well.[54] Most recently, P.P. Tolochko, otherwise generally critical of ascribing too many features of Old Rus' society and culture to the Khazars, takes it as axiomatic that the Rus' borrowed the institution of the Qaghanate from the Khazars and the diarchy as well.[55] Petrukhin posits the following connections. Oleg, in conquering Kiev, he suggests, became the 'heir' to the tribute that the local population had been paying to Khazaria. Sviatoslav I's conquest of the latter in 965 confirmed the claim to the qaghanal title. Thus, his son, Vladimir I,[56] and grandson, Iaroslav I, are associated with it. Sviatoslav Iaroslavich, as we have seen in the eleventh century graffito, was also accorded this dignity. His son, Oleg Sviatoslavich, the last associated with the title (noted in the Igor' Tale) is also associated with the territory of Chernigov, long an area of Khazaro-Rus' interaction as evidenced by archaeological finds which have been interpreted as reflecting Khazar themes in a Rus' setting. This same Oleg Sviatoslavich also ruled in Tmurtorokan' (the complex southern Rus'

principality of Khazar antecedents) whose authority extended to 'Zichia' (the Adyge lands) and 'all of Khazaria.'[57] The title, then, in this view, is a symbol of national liberation, confirmed by conquest.

It would be useful here to note some of the features of the Khazar state that are relevant to the points under discussion. The Khazar Qaghanate derived from and was a successor state of the First Türk Qaghanate (552-630/ in West 659), emerging as an independent state in the middle of the seventh century. After fighting the Arabs to a standstill in the North Caucasus (mid-eighth century), the Khazars became increasingly interested in selecting a state religion that would give them equal religious standing in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic world of the Eastern Mediterranean and Irano-Islamic Central Asia with which they had close (and not always untroubled) political and commercial relations.[58] In the course of the latter half of the 8th century, they converted to Judaism.[59] Some students of this complicated issue, however, would place the conversion to ca. 860.[60] The Jews of Khazaria, although not the dominant diaspora trading community there (they were outnumbered by the Muslims), came to play a role analogous to that of the Sogdians in the Türk and Uighur empires. We should note that any discussion of the impact of nomadic societies on sedentary states should also take into account the very important presence of foreign mercantile and other sedentary elements within nomadic society.[61]

As for the Rus' qaghanate, we know nothing concrete about its origins. Both Pritsak and the writer of these lines concluded that there must have been some marital connection between the Khazar qaghanal line and the Rus' rulers. Pritsak suggested that the founder of the line was a Khazar Qaghan who fled the Kabar (Qabar) revolt in the 830's and 'found refuge in the Rus' factory' (trading post) dominating the vital Volga-Donets route from the region near Iaroslavl''-Rostov.[62] I also argued for a blood tie because anything less, in steppe Eurasia (the most important audience for such imperial pretensions), would have been meaningless. The Türk qaghans, from whom the right to rule derived, as it later would from the *altan urugh* of the Chinggisids, were possessed of *qut* 'heavenly good fortune.' This was their divine mandate to rule. Anyone in the Türk politico-cultural orbit (and the Khazars were the last of the Türk qaghanal successor states, since the Uighurs, the heirs of the Türks by right of conquest in the East, had succumbed in 840 to the Qïrghïz) would have to be able to demonstrate a biological tie to the 'heavenly-ordained' Türk Qaghanal clan (whose name is given in the Chinese sources as *A-shih-na*). In contemporary Central Asia, the Qarluqs, one of the Türk-A-shih-na- derived tribal polities that would become the Qarakhanid state was, at this time, only cautiously laying claims to be the 'qaghan of qaghans.'[63] In addition, one should note that although Rus' was subsequently profoundly influenced by Byzantium

and Byzantine models of rulership, the imperial title, βασιλευς/ ц а р ь was not taken until *after* the fall of Constantinople and only *after* the ground had been prepared with the 'Moscow the Third Rome' theory.[64] Imperial titles and the qaghanal dignity was every bit as imperial and symbol-laden as the *augustus* of the Roman-Byzantine tradition - were not taken casually. In the Byzantine world-order, even blood ties were not enough to claim imperial rank. There could be only one Christian Emperor (although after Charlemagne occasional accommodations had to be made with Western upstarts).

As for the location of the Rus' Qaghanate, a variety of arguments have been put forward placing it in different parts of what became Rus'. Like Pritsak, I favour a more northerly location and have suggested that it was brought into being as part of a concerted Khazar movement to shore up defences in the North (Volga-Oka mesopotamia) in light of the movement of the Proto-Hungarian tribal confederation.[65] Another viewpoint, most recently articulated by M. Goldelman and following positions earlier enunciated by Moshin and Vernadsky, takes a more southerly perspective, situating the Rus' Qaghanate in the Azov-Tmutorokan' region, areas of direct contact with the steppe and Khazaria.[66] Vernadsky, moreover, attributed 'the idea of sovereign power of the prince' in Rus', at least in part, to Khazar influences and put forward the thesis that the 'Khazar title of the supreme ruler, *kagan*, was first assumed by the Russian ruler of Tmutorokan and later used by those Kievan and Chernigovian princes who controlled, or attempted to control, that city.'[67] In the absence of new data, this question remains open.

Related to the same question is the notice in Constantine Porphy-rogenitus De Administrando Imperio in which he mentions 'Outer Rosia' whence the Rus' ships (*monoksyla*) departed, in his day, for Constantinople. The starting point, according to his account, appears to be Novgorod (άπό τοῦ Νεμογαρδάς) Presumably, 'Outer Rosia' is in the North.[68] In such a schema, 'Inner Rosia,' which is nowhere mentioned, must be in the South, perhaps at Kiev. This 'inner' - 'outer' juxtaposition is reminiscent of the Turkic state structures with their 'inner' and 'outer' territories (*ich* and *tash(ra)*) and officers. Omeljan Pritsak has suggested that 'Inner Rosia' was the old patrimony of the Rus' where he located the original habitat of the Rus' qaghans (Great Rostov region, see above). 'Outer Rosia,' then, he identifies with the Dnepr trade route.[69] Such an 'inner' and 'outer' organiza-tion, however disputed the actual geographical identifications may be, might well bespeak important Turkic, most probably Khazar influences (although we have no direct evidence of such a structure in Khazaria), on the ordering of Rus' government. Caution should be exercised here too. As V. Ja. Petrukhin has noted 'Outer Rus' does not find any direct analogue in the

historical geography of Rus' itself.'[70] The evidence remains highly circumstantial.

As for the Rus' diarchy, Ibn Faḍlān, who encountered Rus' merchants during his sojourn in Volga Bulgaria, in 921-2, does not mention a Rus' Qaghan. The 'king of the Rūs,' whom he does describe (in all likelihood not on the basis of first-hand observation), is a sacral or semi-sacralized figure, surrounded by a 400-man comitatus and 40 maidens. He has a 'deputy' (*khalīfa*) who runs the actual affairs of state.[71] If all of this is not a traveller's tale, it does show a distinct resemblance to the Khazar dual kingship with its sacral elements.[72] The search for traces of this system in Rus' has thus far remained within the realm of erudite conjecture. Pritsak has identified the deputy of the Rūs Qaghan with the (Slavic) *voevoda* 'military commander,' citing the parallel of Igor' and Svenel'd (Sveinaldr).[73] He further suggests that Vladimir I divided his state, on the steppe model, into appanages and vassal provinces, the former consisting of the dynasty's territories in which a system of collateral succession, based on 'ascent by scales' (i.e. the *lestvichnaja sistema*) prevailed. In this system, Kiev, the home patrimony, was left, in accordance with the Turko-Mongolian system, to the younger son (the 'hearth-prince' *ot-tegin/otchigin*).[74] Goldelman, however, views the diarchy as coming to an end with the reign of Vladimir.[75] Indeed, one is hard put to find evidence for it beyond the era of Vladimir.

I am not convinced that a plausible argument can be made in favour of a diarchic system on the Turkic model being the motivating force of the duumvirate of Iaroslav and Mstislav (noted above), although there are many puzzling features of their relationship.[76] It is unclear who was actually senior. Moreover, after Mstislav's victory in 1024, he, apparently, elected not to have Kiev within his realm, setting Chernigov as his princely seat, while Iaroslav preferred or found it more prudent to remove himself to Novgorod. As Mstislav had 'eastern' support coming from the Khazars of Tmutorokan' and the Kasogi (Cherkes tribes) and Iaroslav had brought in Varangians, it may well be that, although they co-operated after this, both chose to be near their bases of military support.

DUAL KINGSHIP IN WESTERN EURASIA

There are complications with all of this. The dual system, as already noted, is well known in several variants in Eurasia. The Türks, however, whose empire was a dual qaghanate (the Great Qaghan in the East and the Yabghu or other Lesser/Junior Qaghan in the West) did not have a sacral ruler such as we find among the Khazars; although the *I-k'o-hans* (= *eb qaghan* 'house qaghans') noted by the Chinese sources, who remain at home and do

not rule, may point to something of that nature.[77] Within the separate halves of the empire, there were often cooperative relationships between siblings that also had the quality of a dual kingship (cf. Bilge Qaghan and his brother Kül Tegin).[78] The Balkan Bulghars appear to have had a dual kingship structure, with the *Qapqan/* kauxanov, holding the lower rank.[79] Within the Khazar orbit, we find it among the Magyars, among whom the Kende was the senior, apparently sacral, ruler while the Gyula ran the daily affairs of state. This set-up may be explained as stemming, in all likelihood, from Khazar sources, although the Proto-Hungarians were in contact with a variety of Turkic peoples, including the Sabirs, Türks and various Oghuric peoples.[80] A Khazar provenance for this institution is hardly surprising as the Proto-Hungarian tribal union, itself a melange of Finno-Ugric and Turkic groupings, had been formally allied with the Khazars. In the Magyar-led union we find a non-qaghanal dual kingship, completely in accordance with the Khazaro-Türk notion of things. The Magyar ruling houses did not have the requisite biological connections to assume the qaghanal dignity. Although there were marital ties with the Khazars, these were not with the holy, charismatic qaghanal house. Magyar kingship, however, was instituted by the Khazars, who invested Árpád in his office 'according to the Khazar custom.'[81] This, again, is to be expected.

Matters are complicated by the fact that we also find some evidence that may indicate the existence of a dual ruling structure among some Slavic groupings. Goldelman is prepared to ascribe all of this to Khazar influences across Eastern Europe.[82] It is doubtful that the range of Khazar power extended that far to the west. The Avars are a more likely source of influence, but we have no evidence for dual kingship among them. What do we really know? According to the Ibn Rusta-Gardīzī tradition among the Arab and Persian geographers, the 'Ṣaqāliba' had a 'great chief' who is called *swyt mlk* (=*swynt blk* = *Sventopolk?). He also had a deputy called *wbnj* (perhaps for *hwbnj* = *shupanch* (< zhupanec?). In Gardīzī the latter appears as *swyh*.[83] As for *Shwbanj = *zhupanec* (< *zhupan*), it is a title found in all the branches of Slavic, usually denoting a head or administrator of a district (*zhupa*). Its provenance is uncertain.[84] The only Svetopolk of note to whom this notice might refer was the ruler of 'Moravia' (ca. 869-93) whose state was destroyed by the Hungarians.[85] We cannot be detained by the complexities of Moravian history and the disputes surrounding its location.[86] Although recent scholarship has moved it further east and south, it still has not brought it to the region of 'Khrvāt' (Croatia) which our sources specifically note. Moreover, it is not clear if Croatia is Balkan Croatia or Western Slavic Croatia, (the latter located beyond the Carpathians in Southeastern Poland, the region around Krakow).[87] Finally, although one

is tempted to read the garbled Arabic-script forms as *Sventopolk, one cannot not do so with complete certainty.

The reading of the second form is similarly complicated. We do not know, in fact, whether we are dealing with names or titles. Do we have any other evidence for a dual kingship among the early Slavic polities? The reports of the Muslim geographers do not support such a conclusion.[88] Nor do our other sources.

Prokopios and the anonymous author of the *Strategikon of Maurice* present a picture of poly-centred rulership. Prokopios, in his remarks on the Sclaveni and Antae, says that they 'are not ruled by one man, but have lived, from of old, in a democracy.'[89] The *Stategikon* makes reference to their having many 'kings' who 'are not in agreement with one another.'[90] Constantine Porphyrogenitus, writing in the mid-tenth century with regard to the Balkan Slavs, but using Byzantine materials from earlier times (the era of the Slavic invasions and settlements in the Balkans) says: 'Princes, as they say, these nations had none, but only 'zupans' (zoupa/nouv), elders, as is the rule in the other Slavonic regions ...'[91]

This is such a widely observed institution in a variety of states, including neighbours who had an important influence on the Slavs (cf. the early Frankish state and the relationship of the Merovingians with the Carolingian *major domo* institution), that one is reluctant to ascribe automatically these particular features of governance to the Khazars or the steppe. Subsequently, it might be noted, some of the sixteenth-century Muscovite rulers, such as Vasilii III and his son Ivan IV would have co-rulers specifically chosen from available Chinggisids.[92] But, here we have a much more obvious and explicable attempt to associate the dynasty with the *altan urugh*.

I have not been able to uncover any traces of diarchic rule among the Slavs aside from the cluster of notices in the Islamic sources mentioned above. The closest one may come to this is the still unclear relationship between the tribal princes (*duces, principes*) and the zhupans (*optimates, primores*).[93] Indeed, one is hard put to trace such an institution in Rus' history. Other than Ibn Faḍlān's account, which may be nothing more than an amusing traveller's story (it is filled with salacious tales of Rus' sexual promiscuity, poor personal hygiene and heroic tippling) or perhaps a contamination of tales told about the sacral Khazar Qaghan (for whom we have no other, more chaste, confirmatory accounts), we have no data.

The only infrequent mention of the qaghanal title in later Rus' history must also be explained. Perhaps, it was too closely associated with a non-Christian past and the Churchmen who wrote the chronicles simply left it out.[94] That it was continued in the folk tradition is vouchsafed only by the graffito in St. Sophia and the reference in the *Slovo o polku Igoreve*. But, the

existence of a dual qaghanate on the Khazar model by the later tenth century cannot really be supported by the evidence now at our disposal.

THE SYSTEM OF SUCCESSION BY 'SCALES'

We are much better informed about the workings of the Rus' system of princely succession, the so-called *lestvichnaia sistema* (<Old Slavic *lestvitsa* 'staircase, ladder,' Latin *scala*). This designated a 'scaled' system of succession according to which those eligible to ascend the Grand Princely throne did so according to an orderly system of hierarchical progression. Interestingly enough, it is widely believed that the key term for this system, *lestvitsa*, was first used in the 16th century in the Nikon Chronicle in reference to events s.a. 1196: 'But, as from (the times) of our forefathers, each one ascended, as by a staircase *lestvitseiu*), to the position of Grand Prince of Kiev.'[95]

Often termed the 'Rota System,' it is actually a system of 'collateral' succession, in which the position of supreme leadership 'passed across all eligible lineages in each generation and then passed to the next generation.' The system functioned, with varying degrees of success until the death of Iaropolk in 1139.[96]

This system of succession was practiced in the Türk Qaghanate and presumably spread from the Turkic peoples (in particular the Khazars?) to the Kievan state and thence to Muscovy.[97] Such a system allowed for a large grouping of kinsmen (the royal clan) to retain a direct interest in the state and the throne (which they might otherwise be tempted to dismember and carve out their own statelets). This usually proved to be a temporary solution (some three generations), however, for eventually, with an ever-growing number of claimants, distinctions were made between 'senior' and 'junior' groupings and the pool of eligible claimants was reduced. The offspring of those lines in which the father did not actually rule were eliminated from succession.[98] In Rus', these were the *izgoi*, princes who had 'outlived' (< *iliav, iz* 'from, out of' + *goit'* 'to live') their rights to succession.[99]

Did the Rus' adopt this system from the steppe? And if so, why? An obvious possible source would be the Khazaro-Rus' qaghans. Did the Khazars have such a system? Sources stemming directly from the Khazars (the Cambridge/ Schechter Letter), tell us that early in Khazar history there was no king in the land of Qazaria, but rather whoever would achieve victories in war would they appoint over themselves as chief officer of their army.' After their conversion to Judaism, the 'men of the land appointed over them one of the sages as judge. They call him in the language of (the) Qazars *kgn* (כגן) and have kept this name for the subsequent 'judges.'[100] This

is clearly an interesting and somewhat fanciful interpretation (for a foreign, Jewish audience) of the role of the Qaghan as fount of the *törm* (traditional Turkic law). We have no information on succession patterns. The Khazar ruler, Joseph (Qaghan or Beg?), the author of the reply to the Umayyad Jewish courtier Ḥasdai b. Shaprut, written in the mid-tenth century, describes a pattern of largely father-to-son succession, concluding: 'All of us are the king, the son of the king. No one else may sit on the throne of our forefathers, only the son sits on the throne of his father. Such is our custom and the custom of our ancestors.'[101]

Of the Muslim sources, al-Iṣṭakhrī reports that the 'qaghanate' (*khāqā-niyya*) is not permitted except among the people of a house of notables' (*ahl bait qawm ma'rūfīn*), elsewhere termed 'a clan of notables' (*qawm ma'rūfīn*) of whom only the Jews could hold the qaghanate.[102] The implication is that there was an element of selection involved, in keeping with theTurko-Mongolian pattern (cf. the later Mongol *qurilṭais*) of electing a ruler from the royal clan. Thus, the Khazars, with their Türk background, could have provided the source for this institution. In the Türk pattern of collateral succession, we find that the most common pattern (eight times) was that of elder to younger brothers. Uncle to nephew succesions are recorded three times and cousin to cousin only once. Direct father-to-son succession occurred three times. What is clear from this is that although there was a model, it was not always followed. The structure was flexible. Moreover, given the (occasionally deadly) competition within the ever-growing ruling clan, subordinate qaghanships were created to provide honorary status and lessen the intra-A-shih-na tensions.[103]

When the system is first employed in Rus', a key question, is not that clear. Traditionally, it is associated with Iaroslav I 'Mudryi' and termed the *riad Iaroslavl',* the 'Compact of Iaroslav,'[104] who, as we have seen, was also termed a *kagan* by contemporary Rus' sources. According to Kliuchevskii, before Iaroslav I it is difficult to perceive a system of succession. In fact, he writes, 'the holding of power by a single person (*edinovlastie*) before the mid-eleventh century was a political accident, not a political order.' Throne struggles within the ruling clan were the rule rather than the exception.[105] In this respect, the 'system,' *grosso modo*, resembles the steppe or Turkic notion of 'collective sovereignty' of the ruling clan over the state.[106] Kliuchevskii argues that the rota system according to seniority among the Riurikovichi of Rus' was put into place after Iaroslav's death. He viewed this system as unique to Rus', the product of a fusing of Varangian and Eastern Slavic notions of power. In particular, this constant movement without establishing a more permanent association with a region he attributed to the rootless, mercenary, Viking past of the dynasty.[107]

More recently, Janet Martin has concluded that the system evolved over time, beginning with 'shared generational authority' and intra-generational rotation of the princely seats. Iaroslav's measures laid the actual foundation for the 'rota system' which ' evolved in conjunction with the growth of the dynasty and the expansion of the state.'[108] In this, she is certainly correct. It is unclear, however, whether this was simply a response to the growing compexities of intra-Riurikovichi competition or a continuation of an ongoing political tradition. The system, which did not always work and constantly had to take into account other factors,[109] was certainly in tatters by the latter half of the twelfth century. It was completely undone by the Mongol conquest. The Danilovichi of Moscow, who were in no position to claim seniority, gained their claim to the Grand Principate by collaborating with the Chinggisids.[110]

Our question remains: was this system home grown? Are there other sources of origin outside of the steppe for such a pattern of succession? If it was, indeed, of steppe origin, from whom?

Among the Slavs there was considerable variety in patterns of inheritance. In the *zadruga* (extended family), all males received equal shares. If, however, the inheritance were to be held collectively, then one individual (usually the oldest son) could acquire senior status. But, on some occasions, we find the father's brother, rather than his sons, succeeding. Sometimes, the territory was divided among the sons. On the state level, these traditions of 'collective sovereignty' of the ruling clan, as elsewhere, generated intra-royal clan strife. The solutions were varied, depending on time, place and individuals. In Medieval Duklja (Montenegro), father to son succession competed with patterns of fraternal collateral succession.[111]

A.V. Nazarenko has placed the development of the Rus' system of rule and succession within the larger context of the evolution of the 'barbarian' kingdoms of early medieval Europe. Originating in a system of the collective sovereignty of the royal clan, a concept closely associated with the sacral power of the king in the Germanic polities (e.g. the Frankish kingdom, Denmark, Norway) and among the Slavs (e.g. the Czech state, Poland, Greater Moravia), a system of fraternal rule and succession (*corpus fratrum*) developed that gave each of the king's sons his own appanage, but which maintained the outward political and territorial integrity of the state. With the death of a brother, the appanage-statelet was inherited by his surviving brothers. Such a system, overtime, could become very complicated. As a consequence, an elaborate system of succession had to be worked out. In Rus', the *riad Iaroslavl'* was just such an arrangement, a compromise which sought to take into account the *corpus fratrum*. It is thus understood solely in terms of internal, structural developments. It is not borrowed.[112]

Another view suggests that by the eleventh century, among the Slavic states that had formed in the the ninth-tenth centuries and were now experiencing various degrees of political fragmentation, the notion was put forward that the state was the common patrimony of the whole of the ruling clan (often now quite extensive) and would be jointly ruled and protected by them. Nonetheless, there would have to be a 'senior' prince who held supreme power and 'junior' princes who obeyed him. The aristocracy often continued to demand that they have the right to place on the throne the representative of the ruling clan most favorable to them.[113] In keeping with a patrimonial view of the dynasty's rights to rule, the state was viewed as the property of the ruling clan/house and as a consequence each member of the dynasty expected to have his share. Succession to the throne usually went to the oldest son of the ruler, but not always. In Croatia, brothers or nephews could succeed. In Poland, the Piast dynasty had no fixed order of succession. The results were often bloody throne struggles.[114] The Czech ruler, Břetislav I (1034-55), Iaroslav I's contemporary, whose attempts to create a large Western Slavic Empire were broken by the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry III, sought in 1054 to settle the dynasty's internal throne struggles by decreeing that the 'oldest member of the reigning house' was to be the ruler and the younger princes were to 'receive lands in Moravia.' Clearly, a system not unlike the 'seniority' of the Rjurkovichi was in operation here. Later, Bolesław Kryzwousty, in 1138 established a similar principle of 'seniority' within the ruling and contentious Piast clan.[115] Whatever the perspective, then, there are good reasons to see sources for and parallels in the Slavic world and Old Slavic traditions for the Rus' system.

The post-Khazar Turkic nomadic contemporaries of Iaroslav I and his immediate successors, the Pechenegs, Western Oghuz/Torks and Qipchaqs constituted polities that were little more than advanced tribal confederacies. In the aftermath of the crushing defeat that Iaroslav administered to them in 1036, the Pechenegs (who were also under pressure from the Western Oghuz and Qipchaqs) were pushed off to the Danubian borderlands. Their remaining military strength was largely destroyed in 1092 by the Byzantines with Qipchaq assistance.[116]

The Western Oghuz (Torks) only briefly held sway in the Western Eurasian steppes before they too, in 1064, badly beaten by the Rus' and greatly weakened by epidemics, ceased to pose any threat to Rus'.[117] Their paramountcy in the Western Eurasian steppes extending from the Danubian borderlands to the Khwārazmian steppes was now taken over by the Qipchaqs (see below).[118] Fragments of the Pechenegs and Oghuz/Torks, as well as other, lesser nomadic groupings, left behind in the steppe or as refugee groupings from their Balkans disasters retrofluxed to the Pontic steppelands where in time they would enter Rus' service (see below).

The Rus' had very close interaction with the Pechenegs. Of their political organization, we know from Constantine Porphyrogenitus that in addition to what appears to be a bipartite, perhaps diarchic division, a system of collateral succession among cousins was, indeed, the norm among the eight tribes that made up the Pecheneg confederacy.[119] Artamonov was inclined to view the Pechenegs as the source for the Riurikid system of collateral succession, but offered no evidence to support this conclusion.[120]

Why would the Rus' 'borrow' this system from the Pechenegs? There was no imperial prestige attached to the latter. There was no pattern of marital alliances. There were trade relations between the two[121] and the Pecheneg language was known by some Rus'.[122] Nonetheless, there are no Pecheneg loanwords in the Rus' language. Their cultural and political impact appears to have been very slight at best. A case for significant Pecheneg influence has yet to be made.

With the Qipchaqs, however, we encounter a grouping with which the Rus' had long and intimate contact. They formally came into the purview of the Rus' annalists in 1054. Although usually depicted by the Rus' chroniclers in negative terms,[123] the pagan, barbarian *others*, the inhabitants of the 'wild steppe' (*dikoe pole*), the Qipchaqs never really constituted a mortal peril to the Rus' state. It was never their intention to conquer Rus'. Troubling and occasionally disruptive neighbours they, undoubtedly, were, especially for the Slavic border population. People and harvests were stolen[124] and on a very few occasions the trade routes suffered disruptions. But, even at the height of hostilities, commercial and other forms of peaceful interaction were taking place.[125]

The most difficult period was from ca. 1061-1125. During this time, the nomads were continually testing the borders and defenses of Rus' while the latter responded, on occasion, with powerful sweeps into the steppes, netting prisoners, cattle and booty. The Rus' never really faced the combined might of the Qipchaqs whose tribal confederation consisted of a number of loosely held unions, without a central leadership. When the Rus' were united, under Vladimir Monomax (d. 1125), they delivered a series of devastating blows against the nomads, driving off, in 1118, an important grouping of Qipchaqs into Georgia (see below). When the Rus' state itself began to divide into a series of Riurikid principalities, the nomads, rather than taking advantage of this political weakness, themselves became further broken into factions. Certain groups of Qipchaqs came to be associated with the princes of Kiev, while others (dubbed the 'Wild Cumans' by the Kiev-based chroniclers), were associated with the Ol'govichi, a rival Riurikid branch.[126] The Qipchaqs saved themselves from the fate of the Pechenegs and Western Oghuz by successfully integrating themselves into the complex, fractious, Riurikid state system.

Although it is possible to discern ruling clans and lines among the Qipchaqs (e.g. the Sharuqanids),[127] they, too, did not possess an overarching royal (qaghanal) authority. Muslim sources, however, do make reference to their 'amīrs' and 'kings'[128] while the Rus' sources, invariably, call their chiefs 'princes' (*knjazii* etc.),[129] the same titles accorded the Riurikids. Although we are largely ignorant of the internal workings of the Qipchaq system, it would not be unreasonable to assume that it followed the Turkic pattern of collateral succession. We may also discern elements of dual leadership in their subconfederations.[130] But, the Rus' system was already in place before the Qipchaqs became major players in the steppe borderlands of Rus' (ca. 1054-64). Thus, the Riurikovichi, who intermarried with the Qipchaqs,[131] may have found patterns of political succession that matched their own among their immediate steppe kinsmen and neighbours. But, they do not appear to have borrowed them from the Qipchaqs.

The Riurikid system of collateral succession clearly matches the Türk pattern, but it cannot be demonstrated conclusively that it was borrowed from either the Khazars (a prestigious source) or later Turkic nomadic peoples who were the neighbours of Rus'. Moreover, there are indications of systems not unlike that of the Rus' being practised elsewhere in the contemporary Slavic and Germano-Scandinavian world. Finally, it is difficult to imagine the Rus', already Christians (from the late tenth century) and anxious, as we see from the *Slovo o Zakone i Blagodati*, to establish their bona fides within the Orthodox Christian world (with its Roman-Byzantine traditions), adopting an institution so closely connected with the pagan steppe. Even the Hungarians, who were a steppe people, after their settlement in Pannonia (late ninth century) and subsequent Christianization in the early eleventh century, transformed the 'pagan' dual kingship into a Christian, monarchic system among the descendants of Árpád.

Finally, before leaving the subject of Khazar-Rus' ties, it should be noted that archaeological finds show that the burial ritual and grave inventory of the Rus' *druzhina*, the comitatus of the Riurikid princes, show both Scandinavian and 'eastern,' i.e. nomadic influences.[132] The Kievan prince Sviatoslav clearly modeled himself on the steppe warrior, a tradition preserved in the chronicles and in narrative (Leo the Deacon) and pictorial portrayals of him.[133] Individuals from Khazaria and other nomadic groupings entered the service of the Rus' ruler and were, over time, a very likely source of 'eastern' influences. Thus, the Rus' chronicles mention a Kievan military commander, Ivan Zaxar'ich Kozarin ('the Khazar'),[134] who, in 1106, drove off a Qipchaq attack on Zarech'sk. One should also note the 'Khazar Quarter' (*Kozare*) in Kiev undoubtedly inhabited by Khazars. As we know from the Islamic geographers, Rus' and Slavs were in Khazaria in sufficient numbers to merit a 'pagan' judge set aside to handle their legal matters (the Jewish, Muslim and Christian communities each had two judges).[135] Such interaction in the Khazar capital, of course, was another source of cultural exchange.

THE KHAZARS AND GEORGIA

The Khazar relationship with Georgia was less direct, but at times quite intimate. Transcaucasia became the scene of ongoing warfare between the Khazars and the Umayyad Caliphate, Georgia becoming the frequent recipient of devastating Khazar raids.[136] After Marwān's famous raid of 737 which culminated in the capture and forced, but short-lived, conversion of the Khazar qaghan to Islam, less bellicose relations were established between the Caliphate and Atil/Itil the Khazar capital on the lower Volga. There now developed a complicated triangular relationship between the three great regional empires: the Caliphate, Byzantium and Khazaria. The Khazars, given the geopolitics of the region and traditions inherited from their Türk past, tended to have an entente with Constantinople and served as guardians of the northern, steppe approaches to the Byzantine state. The Khazars and Byzantines often met directly in the Crimea where they shared an occasionally uneasy condominium and through proxies in Georgia.

The qaghans of Atil/Itil established marital ties or were sought out for that purpose by both Byzantium and the Western Georgian (Ap'xazet'i/Abkhazia and Egrisi) royal houses. Such attentions were not always welcomed by the Georgian princely houses. Thus, the beautiful Shushan, sister of the Georgian dynast Juansher I (786-post 807) of Kaxet'i[137] preferred to take poison rather than become the bride of the Qaghan. Juansher himself was obliged to spend seven years in Khazar captivity. This account, which has many legendary elements, cannot be more precisely dated. Other Georgian dynasts, however, took a more positive view of their powerful northern neighbour. Thus, we learn from the *Life of St. Abo*, that in 780, the K'art'lian prince Nerse, having just spent some three years in captivity in Baghdad, fled north to Khazaria in what proved to be a vain attempt to gain the backing of the Qaghan for further efforts to free his state from Arab overlordship. He returned to his domains through the Western Georgian lands where Leon II, the grandson of the Khazar Qaghan, was ruler. Sometime later, in 786, this Western Georgian polity, which had been under Byzantine overlordship, threw off Constantinople's suzerainty. Leon II who led this revolt was aided by his Khazar kinsmen.[138] This was not the first nor would it be the last intervention of a nomadic power in Transcaucasia that enabled a local state to achieve some measure of freedom.

Thus, Khazar involvement in Georgian affairs differed quite considerably from the situation with Rus'. Georgia suffered from a series of Khazar depredations up to the mid-eighth century. Thereafter, in keeping with older traditions of the Transcaucasian polities dating back to Sāsānid times, the threat of or actual assistance from the nomads could be used against their imperial neighbours. As we shall see this would prove to be a particularly important aspect of Georgian policy in the Qipchaq era. But the Khazar state left no lasting imprint on Georgian society. Khazar settlements, of which there were a few, were largely in Azarbayjan. The Khazar presence, undoubtedly, contributed to the formation of the Turkic peoples of the North Caucasus.[139] Primacy in the genesis of the Azeri Turkic population, however, must go to the Oghuz.

RUS' AND GEORGIA IN THE POST-KHAZAR ERA
RUS' AND THE CHERNII KLOBUTSI

It is interesting to note that the two nomadic groupings with which Rus' had the most intimate contact appear in the Rus' sources in names that are loan-translations of their original Turkic forms: Rus' *Polovtsi* (Russ. *Polovtsy*, Ukr. *Polovtsi*) < Slav. *polov* 'pale yellow' = *Quman* < Turk. *quba/quw* 'pale, pale yellow'[140] and *Chernii Klobutsi*, sing. *Chernyj Klobuk* < Slav. *chernyj* 'black' + *klobuk* 'tiara, headgear, hat,'[141] itself an old loanword from Turkic **qalbuq*, cf. Modern Turkic *qalpaq*.[142] The presence of these calques stands as eloquent testimony to the interaction of these peoples on Rus' territory. It may also be seen as a psychological 'domestication' of the nomads in the minds of the Rus'. By giving them 'non-foreign' names, they are brought into the world of familiar peoples and objects. These were, in effect, what the Rus' would call *svoi poganye* ('our own pagans').

The Chernii Klobutsi[143] (Modern Russ. *Chërnye Klobuki*, Ukrainian *Chorni Klobuky*) derived from an amalgam of Pecheneg, Tork/Oghuz, Berendei, Qay (Qayopa, rendered in Rus' in the Slavicized form *Kaepichi*) and other fragments of defeated nomads who took service with the princes of Kiev, functioning as their borderguard units. Attempts to connect them with the Qara Qalpaq (whose ethnonym has the same meaning) or with the Qara Börkli of the Qipchaq union (*börk* is another Turkic term for 'hat, headgear'), although often made, are incorrect. The term first appears s.a. 1146,[144] in the context of throne struggles between rival factions of the sons of Vladimir Monomax (1053-1125), with the older contest between this line of Riurikovichi and their arch rivals, the Ol'govichi looming in the background. As the latter were usually allied with the 'Wild Cumans' (Dikii Polovtsi), the Chernii Klobutsi, drawn from nomadic groupings that had

long standing enmities with the Qipchaqs, were, invariably, drawn to their opponents. It would appear that the Monomashich Iziaslav II (1146-54) first organized this otherwise fragmented group of nomads into a coherent fighting force.

A number of towns, named after the predominant ethnic component (e.g. Torchesk < Russ. *Tork*, i.e. Western Oghuz, cf. *Twrq*, as in the טורקיא of the Khazar Hebrew sources[145]) or from the names of their chiefs (e.g. Chiurnay < Chmrnay, Kul'diurev < Küldür), came into existence as part of this frontier guard system. They remained nomads or semi-nomads, but were fully integrated into the Rus' state or more specifically the Kievan principality. What is also important to note here is that they were organized as a military force and in a sense retribalized by the Kievan rulers. This would not be the first time that sedentary states consciously remade nomadic tribal groupings into units more amenable to their purposes.[146] Their name the 'Black Hats' reflected this. It was, as I have argued, a symbol of their subject status to the rulers of Kiev. This was not, initially, an ethnonym, but rather a social term.[147] The Chernii Klobutsi were, in a sense, the forerunners of the Cossacks of Ukraine and the Russian borderlands. Russian scholars, as early as Karamzin, have placed the origins of the Cossacks in the pre-Mongol period and attempted to directly link the Chernii Klobutsi with the Cossacks. Karamzin noted that Torks and Berendei were also called *Cherkasy* (lit. 'Circassians') in the Rus' sources, as were the Cossacks, and were directly associated with the Chernii Klobutsi (e.g. the Voskresenskaia letopis': *i vse Chërnye Klobuki, ezhe zovëtsia Cherkasy* 'and all the Chërnye Klobuki, who are called Cherkas'). Indeed, he derived the name 'Cossack' (Russ. *kazak*, Ukr. *kozak*) from *Kasog*, the Old Rus' term for Circassian.[148] This, of course, is incorrect as the Eastern Slavic *kazak*, *kozak* derive from Turk. *qazaq* in Middle Qipchaq 'free (man), unmarried' and then meaning 'freebooter' in the steppe.[149] Hrushevs'kyi, who examined these notices in some detail, concluded that the Ukrainian Cossacks were not lineal descendants of the Chernii Klobutsi.[150] The Cossack historian A.A. Gordeev dates the Cossacks back to settlements of 'Cherkes and Kasogians,' brought from Tmutorokan by Mstislav, Iaroslav's rival and co-ruler, who were then settled on the borders, joined with the Torks and Berendei, creating military settlements to defend the steppe approaches of the Kievan realm. These and similar groupings were called a variety of names, including Chërnye Klobuki. But, the name *kazak* did not become fixed with elements of them until after the Mongol conquest.[151] We need not discuss further the origins of the Cossacks, a complicated issue not easily resolved. Nor should we attempt to link directly the Cossacks with the Chernii Klobutsi. The latter may be viewed as an early solution of sedentary states to manage nomads

within their borders and use them to their advantage against the steppe nomads who harried or otherwise threatened their borders.

The Qipchaqs in Georgia

Prefaced by incursions into Transcaucasia in the mid-eleventh century, the Oghuz tribes, following the Seljuq victory over Byzantium at Manzikert in 1071, extended their sway insufficiency from T'bilisi to Barda'a in Azarbayjan. In Georgia 'there was not one among them. They traded with the towns, but they plundered our border of prisoners and a fullness of booty.'[152] In response to the 'Great Turkish Invasion' (*didi t'urk'oba*), the Georgian king, Davit' II (1089-1125), called *Aghmashenebeli* ('the rebuilder' or 'the restorer' as this sobriquet is often rendered), ca. 1118 brought in the Qipchaq tribal grouping led by Äträk, the son of Sharuqan, chieftain of one of the ruling houses of the 'Wild Cuman' confederation which had suffered a series of defeats at the hands of Vladimir Monomax. Rus' attacks, deep in the steppe, had dislodged some of the Qipchaq groupings and in 1116 had overrun 'Sharuqan,' the principal camp of the Sharuqanids.[153]

The groundwork for the overture to the Qipchaqs had been previously prepared by Davit' II's marriage to Äträk's daughter (in Georgia she was given the name Guranduxt, we do not know her original Qipchaq name) 'many years ago.'[154] Unfortunately, the Georgian accounts do not tell us of the timing and circumstances surrounding this significant matrimonial connection.[155] The Georgian monarchs already had a history of marriage alliances with the As (Georg. *Ovsi*), Davit's predecessors, Giorgi I (1014-27) and Bagrat III/IV (1027-72) having both taken brides from the As ruling house and the Georgian kings had brought in the 'northern' peoples to attack the Muslim rulers of Transcaucasia.[156] Thus, this was not an entirely new departure for Bagratid diplomacy. Having arranged a peace between the As and the Qipchaqs[157] and having secured safe passage for the Qipchaqs through the As lands, Davit' 'brought out a great multitude and his father-in-law and his wife's brothers...He settled the Qipchaqs in good places with their families from whom forty thousand select (warriors) were with him when he went to war. These he provided with horses and weapons.' In addition to this force, there were also 'slaves which he possessed, select men, trained in battle, some five thousand men, all of whom had become Christians ...' Here, we see that the Georgian Crown had imitated its Muslim neighbours and created a *ghulām* guard corps. It is unclear from the text whether this professional military slave army was also recruited from the Qipchaqs. In any event, 'many Qipchaqs themselves, were day by day

becoming Christians.'[158] It is estimated that a total of 200,000-225,000 Qipchaqs came to Georgia.[159] The massive influx and settlement of such a large grouping of 'friendly' nomads into Georgia (some regions of which had been depopulated by the Oghuz attacks), as one modern Georgian student of this period has written, cannot properly be compared 'with any other event.'[160]

The purpose of this massive infusion of manpower was not only defence but also to carry out the ambitious goals of the Georgian Crown, particularly those directed beyond the borders of Georgia. As Mariam Lort'k'ip'anidze, among others, has pointed out, Davit' II had ceased paying tribute to the Seljuq sultans in 1097 and by 1118 the Georgians had already scored significant successes against the Seljuqs and were driving them out of Georgian lands. Not all Georgian successes, Lort'k'ip'anidze and others argue, are to be attributed to the presence of these and other foreign troops in Bagratid service. Indeed, the core of the Georgian army, in addition to the 5000 man *mona-spa*, the king's personal guard, consisted of the now reorganized Georgian feudal army. Whether one accepts this view or not, there were, clearly, other factors at work as well. Davit' II, it would appear, hoped that the Qipchaq forces, loyal to him, would provide the necessary counterweight to his proud and haughty aristocracy that had become increasingly fearful of the centralizing tendencies of the monarchy. Thus, the summoning of the Qipchaqs should be viewed within the context of a larger program of reform being carried out within Georgian society aimed at not only strengthening the kingdom's military forces, but assuring the Crown's control over domestic institutions as well.[161] Over-reliance on the Qipchaqs, however, could also be dangerous. Given the notorious fickleness of the nomads in their loyalties, Davit' II's policy of sedentarization, Christianization (and ultimately Georgianization) was directed at establishing more lasting bonds.

The crowning event of Davit' II's reign was his victory over the Seljuq forces at Didgori in 1121 which had been preceded by a number of Georgian victories, in which the Qipchaqs played a not insignificant role.[162] In the following years, the Qipchaq forces in particular were put to use raiding the Shirvānshāh's realms which had been taken by the Seljuqs, from whom threatening missives were now sent to Davit.' The Seljuq sultan, according to Ibn al-Athīr, survived his initial encounter with the Georgians here in 517/1123-4 because 'a dispute and enmity occurred between the Georgians and Qipchaqs. They battled each other that night and departed as if they were defeated.'[163] On this disagreement, the Georgian sources are silent. The arrangement, apparently, was not untroubled. Thus, the Georgian chronicler subsequently notes in his summation of Davit' II's career: 'in how many ways did he detect the treason of his own Qipchaqs?'[164] Indeed, Georgia was

not entirely free of Qipchaq raids. This can be seen in the comment by the Georgian sources: 'who can count (the number) of prisoners which he (Davit' II, PBG) freed and brought back from the Qipchaqs at his own expense?'[165] Whether these raids were carried out by Davit' II's own Qipchaqs or other groupings is unclear.

The Seljuqs, nonetheless, were subsequently driven from the area and the Georgian army campaigned as far as Bāb al-Abwāb/Darband, attacking among others, the local Qipchaqs who along with Kurds and Leks were in the service of the master of 'Daruband.' The result of Davit' II's continuous campaigning was that the Seljuq Sultan Maḥmūd II (1118-31) now sought 'peace and love and that the Qipchaqs should not raid' (da edziebn mshwidobasa da siquarulsa da qivch'aqt'agan ara rbevasa).[166] The immediate fruit of the Battle of Didgori was the taking of T'bilisi, in 1122, which completed the unification of Georgia. The conquest of Ani, the former Armenian capital, followed in 1123 as Davit' II moved to make his kingdom the regional power.[167]

The numbers of Qipchaqs who actually remained and settled in Georgia is unclear. We know from the yawshan[168] tale, preserved in the Rus' chronicles, that after the death of Vladimir Monomax, Äträk's nemesis, and that of Davit' II, Sırchan, Äträk's brother who had remained 'on the Don,' sent an envoy (the bard Ör) to him asking him to return to 'your own land.' Ör's entreaties and songs were without effect until he produced some yawshan. With this, Äträk broke down and tearfully responded that 'it is better to lay down one's bones in one's own land than to be famous in a foreign (land).' Äträk, and presumably a goodly number of his followers, returned to the Cuman steppes. His son, Könchek, would become one of the most famous foes of the Kievan princes.[169] As for the Qipchaqs who remained, they appear to have been settled in the Georgian-Armenian Eastern Anatolian borderlands, the regions of Javakhet'i, Akhalts'ikhe (Ahıska), Ardahan, Kola (Göle) and Chorokhi river and adjoining Eastern Anatolia, in the Çıldır-Gölü region; the Qipchaqs of that region are believed to be their descendants.[170]

The Georgian sources are silent about the Qipchaqs until the reign of Giorgi III (1156-84). Caught up in the ongoing struggle for Ani, Giorgi, according to the Georgian chronicle, was able to summon assistance from the As, the Qipchaqs and vassal Shirvān.[171] In all likelihood, these were Qipchaqs brought in from the North Caucasian steppes. It is possible that they were from the tribal following of Äträk with whom, at the least, ties of kinship remained.

The Georgian Qipchaqs re-surfaced in 1177 in connection with the aristocratic revolt on behalf of Demna (Demetre), Giorgi's nephew, whose father Davit' III had briefly held the throne in 1155. Demna's cause may

have been little more than a pretext for the nobles, led by the Commander-In Chief (Amirspasalari) of the army, Ivane Orbeli, the viceroy of Ani and the head of the powerful and ambitious Orbeli clan, to weaken the crown. Giorgi was saved by the Qipchaq Qubasar and the latter was now elevated to the office of Amirspasalari, receiving many of Ivane Orbeli's very considerable land holdings as well. Giorgi, distrustful of the aristocracy, brought in Qipchaqs and men from the gentry and unranked classes to serve in his government. Of the Qipchaqs, in addition to Qubasar, we know of Qutlu Arslan who became Lord High Treasurer (Mechurchlet' ukhuts 'esi).[172] Georgia was not unique in this respect. Qipchaqs of ghulām origins were serving prominently in neighbouring states.[173]

Qubasar continued in the service of the Georgian Crown until the accession of T'amar (1184-1213, Giorgi's only child who, following the demise of Demna, had been designated co-ruler in 1178). Aged and infirm, the aristocratic opposition forced the Queen to retire him, along with other untitled servitors of Giorgi III.[174] One of the few to escape this fate was Qutlu Arslan who now appears as one of the leaders of a group of aristocratic conspirators who sought to limit the power of the Crown by the creation of a council or parliament that would have the power to 'administer the giving and taking of mercy and anger.' The council would 'make known to T'amar, our Sovereign and Queen, (what has been decided). Only then will what we have resolved be fully carried out ...' T'amar saw that this portended the end of (her) rule' and had Qutlu Arslan arrested.[175] Needless to say, the significance of this attempt at 'feudal constitutionalism' has engendered considerable discussion in Georgian historiography.[176] T'amar was compelled to make some concessions to the royal council (darbazi) which could serve as a check on the Crown's absolute authority. The role of Qutlu Arslan has also been hotly debated: was he 'progressive' or a 'feudal reactionary'? Did he get these ideas from Qipchaq forms of governance? Our sources are reticent on these questions. What is clear, however, is that Qubasar and Qutlu Arslan, one the faithful servitor, the other the scheming conspirator, were assimilated Qipchaqs, who were acting within a Georgian not a Qipchaq context.

T'amar's reign also provides us with an interesting insight into the role of the Qipchaqs in the diplomatic-alliance system of Western Eurasia at this time. Dynastic imperatives and the ethos of the times required that T'amar have a husband. The various factions of the aristocracy, hoping for a pliant tool, sought a suitable, but preferably weak, foreign 'prince' who would be beholden to whichever faction was his sponsor and could serve as a counterpoise to further royal centralization. Abulasan[177], 'an amir of K'art'li and Tp'ilisi,' one of the leading figures of the capital, a man to whom the Queen had already directed her favor, proposed the Rus' prince Iurii (born

late 1160's),[178] son of Andrei Bogoliubskii. The latter had been assassinated in 1175.[179] Iurii, whose paternal grandmother was the daughter of Ayapa (Rus' Аепа)[180], a prominent Qipchaq chieftain, had briefly served as 'governor' of Novgorod (1172-4, given his age he could hardly have functioned in the office), but had been driven from the city.[181] He had taken refuge with the Qipchaq chieftain Sevinch, the son of the famous Bonyaq, one of the leaders of the 'Wild Cuman' subconfederation.[182] According to the Georgian chronicler, Iurii, 'while small,was bereft of his father, persecuted by being banished, he fled from his uncle named Savalat' (= Vsevolod 'Bol'shoe Gnezdo). He lives now in the city of Sevinj, king of the Qipchaqs.' The prominent merchant, Zankan Zorababeli, was then dispatched, 'by relays of horses' to bring back the 'handsome knight.'[183] Iurii's seeking refuge or, given his youth, the actions of his supporters in placing him with his presumably Qipchaq relatives, is significant. Vernadsky claimed that there was also an As connection in that both Iurii and T'amar's mothers were As. But, the most recent study of Bogoliubskii's career concedes that 'the identity of his first wife is unknown.'[184] Perhaps more significant is the fact that T'bilisi merchants were familiar with the routes to the Qipchaq lands. Obviously, there were trading relations between the two and Zorababeli was able to complete his mission promptly and without incident.

'Giorgi Rusi' was brought to Georgia ca. 1185 and married to T'amar. This proved to be no idyllic union. Iurii, an able soldier, but a difficult person,[185] soon ran afoul of his bride and others. He was divorced and sent off to Byzantium (1187). Assisted by Georgian aristocrats anxious to limit T'amar's growing power, his periodic attempts to regain the throne failed and he went off to obscurity after 1191. His place was taken by the far more suitable Davit' Soslan, an As prince with Bagratid connections.[186] Qipchaq forces were among the Georgian troops, commanded by Soslan, that defeated Iurii.[187] It is in connection with his activist military policy that we learn of the movement of new groups of Qipchaqs (akhalni qivch'aqni 'New Qipchaqs') to Georgia. The circumstances are not clear. Sometime after the defeat of Giorgi Rusi and before the Battle of Shamk'ori (Shamxor, June, 1194 or 1195), the Georgian chronicle reports, in connection with an inter-Pahlavānid (Eldigüzid) power struggle in Azarbayjan, that the Georgians were gathering their forces for a campaign against Abu Bakr (1186-1211). Among the Georgian forces was 'the brother of Sevinj, king of the Qipchaqs, Savalat'i'[188] who 'was here in service. Having brought together great (numbers) of troops...' When T'amar and Soslan went forth from the city, they 'first were met by the As and the new Qipchaqs ...'[189] Presumably, these 'new Qipchaqs' were forces brought in from the steppe. The fact that Sevinch's brother was already in service with the Georgian Crown (and it

should be remembered that his line along with the Sharuqanids was one of the ruling clans of the 'Wild Cuman' subconfederation) makes it likely that these were Qipchaqs with whom there was some kind of ongoing relationship. In any event, Abu Bakr was defeated and T'amar's power grew thereafter. Georgia, with assistance from the Qipchaqs, by the time of T'amar's death had become the leading power in Transcaucasia, extending its authority to the North Caucasus, Armenia (much of which was under Georgian rule), the now client Shirvānshāh state and could even make its will felt in the Byzantino-Georgian state of Trebizond and in the Turkic beyliks of Eastern Anatolia.[190]

A new wave of Qipchaqs entered the region during the last years of the reign of T'amar's son and successor, Giorgi Lasha (1213-22), apparently in the aftermath of the Mongol attack on the Qipchaqs and As of the North Caucasian steppes (1220-1) but before the Battle of Kalka (1223). According to Kirakos Gandzakec'i and Sebastac'i, these refugee Qipchaqs, after Lasha rejected their offer of service, moved on to Ganja. The Georgians subsequently defeated these marauding bands and scattered them.[191] Qipchaqs were still in Georgian service when, in 1225, the Georgian army faced Jalāl al-Dīn, the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad's son who was fleeing the Mongol conquest of his land. Subsequently, the situation changed. Jalāl al-Dīn, with his Qipchaq ancestry and the large numbers of Qipchaqs in his army, was able to gain the support of the Qipchaqs of this region.[192]

Qipchaqs remained on both sides of the divide for we find them again in a coalition force, noted by Rashīd al-Dīn, consisting of Georgians, Armenians, Alans, the people of Sarīr, Lakz, Svans, Abxaz and Ch'ans (a K'art'velian people) and the Seljuq ruler of Rūm at Mindori in 625/1227-8 where Jalāl al-Dīn launched his attack on Georgia. Here again, Jalāl al-Dīn made an appeal to the 20,000 Qipchaqs that were in the coalition army, sending a certain Qoshqar to them with a loaf of bread and salt to remind them of their 'former obligations' to his house. The Qipchaqs withdrew, guaranteeing thereby the Khwārazmian's victory.[193]

The Qipchaqs, Rus' and Georgians were all brought into the Chinggisid realm with the Mongol conquests of the 1220's-40's.

CONCLUSION

The nomadic impact on Rus' and Georgia, at least as expressed in institutional and linguistic borrowings, appears to have been greatest and most enduring when the nomads were organized as an imperial state (Khazar or Chinggisid). Under these conditions, Rus' and Georgia were

either partly or completely subjects of these empires and obliged to maneuver within limits set down by their masters. Khazar rule over the Eastern Slavs was never complete. Some institutional borrowing, most notably the qaghanal dignity, is clearly attested. Beyond that, the record is much more problematic. The Chinggisid era had a far more profound impact. The Rus' called their Chinggisid overlord 'car,' an imperial title that was otherwise reserved for the Byzantine emperor. Pecheneg or Qipchaq leaders were, at best, recorded as 'princes,' the same term the Rus' chroniclers used for their own Riurikid rulers. Imperial structures, obviously, carried greater weight. Learning the imperial language or at least one of the linguae francae used at the imperial centre was important. Stateless nomadic polities (Pechenegs, Western Oghuz and Qipchaqs), with whom the Rus'/Eastern Slavs lived for some three hundred years in close symbiosis, had a much less enduring impact. Words were borrowed, but not nearly as many. Institutions, as far as can be discerned, were not. Presumably, had there been a great impact on material life (clothing, cuisine, household goods etc.), this would have been reflected in lexical borrowings. The assimilation of the stateless nomads in both Rus' and Georgia differed considerably from the pattern followed in the 'Abbāsid Caliphate. In the latter, the nomads were brought in as professional slave soldiers (later manumitted) and segregated residentially and sexually from the rest of society. They were housed in their own quarter of the capital and slave women were brought in as their wives.[194] The Rus' absorbed through intermarriage and Christianization some nomads, others were organized as borderguard forces (the Chernii Klobutsi), elements of which were, in all likelihood, assimilated as well. The Georgians made even greater efforts to Georgianize and Christianize the nomads who had taken service with the Crown. Among those that remained in Georgia, they appear to have been largely successful. No pockets of Qipchaq speakers remain in Georgia, although a few personal names can be found (cf. T'engiz < Turk. tengiz 'sea').[195] The Georgians have dealt with virtually every Turkic group that entered the North Caucasus region and Near East. They have also been in intimate contact with all the great empires that have held sway in the Eastern Mediterranean basin and Iran. Their profound impact on Transcaucasian society as a whole is easily measured in institutional and linguistic borrowings. The stateless nomads, at times, played crucial, indeed, vital roles, in Georgian political history, but institutionally and culturally had little impact,

NOTES

1 On nomadic-sedentary interaction, see the fundamental work of A.M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, trans. J. Crookenden (Cambridge, 1984, 2nd ed., Madison, Wisconsin, 1994). For the history of the Turkic nomads of Western Eurasia discussed in this essay, see P.B. Golden, 'Nomads and Their Sedentary Neighbours in Pre-Chinggisid Eurasia' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, VII (1987-1991), pp. 41-81 and his *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples* (Wiesbaden, 1992), esp. chaps. IV and VIII; G. Vernadsky, *Ancient Russia* (New Haven, 1943) and his *Kievan Russia* (New Haven, 1948), and M.I. Artamonov, *Istoriia Khazar* (Leningrad, 1962); A.N. Kurat, *IV-XVII Yüzyıllarda Karadeniz Kuzeyindeki Türk Kavimleri ve Devletleri* (Ankara, 1972); Ja. A. Fëdorov, G.S. Fëdorov, *Rannie Tiurki na Severnom Kavkaze* (Moskva. 1978); A.V. Gadlo, *Étnicheskaia Istoriia Severnogo Kavkaza IV-X vv.* (Leningrad. 1979) and his *Étnicheskaia Istoriia Severnogo Kavkaza X-XIIIvv.* (SPb., 1994); V. Spinei, *Ultimele Valuri Migratoare de la Nordul Marii Negre şi al Dunarii de Jos* (Iaşi, 1996).

2 For the sake of simplicity I am using the ethnonym *Qipchaq* to refer to the loose confederation of Turkic and Mongol tribes that was also termed Cuman (*Quman* = the Polovtsi of Rus') in the West and *Qangli* in the East.

3 L.N. Gumilëv, *Poiski vymyshlennogo carstva* (Moskva, 1970), pp. 311-12 and his 'Drevnjaja Rus' i kypchakskaia step' v 945-1225gg.,' *Problemy izuchenija i oxrany pamjatnikov kul'tury Kazaxstana* (Alma-Ata, 1978), pp. 38-71, reprinted in his *Ritmy Evrazii* (Moskva, 1993), pp. 518-7.

4 See the study of H. Göckenjan, *Hilfsvölker und Grenzwächter im mittelalterlichen Ungarn* (Wiesbaden, 1972).

5 See discussion in E.A. Thompson, *The Huns*, rev. ed. of his 1948 work, ed. by P. Heather (Oxford, 1996), pp. 30ff; O. Maenchen-Helfen, *The World of the Huns* (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 51ff; Gadlo, *Étnicheskaia Istoriia Severnogo Kavkaza IV-X vv.*, pp. 9ff.

6 *Polnoe sobranie russkikhx letopisei* (henceforth *PSRL*) (Moskva-St. Petersburg, 1841-1995), I, cc. 11-12.

7 The most recent study of the complexities of early Georgian history-writing is that of S.H. Rapp, Jr., *Imagining History at the Crossroads: Persia, Byzantium, and the Architects of the Written Georgian Past* (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1997, unpublished PhD dissertation), see pp. 59ff. for a discussion of Leonti Mroveli. See also

D. Rayfield, *The Literature of Georgia* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 38, 53-5 who terms it 'a work of secular, albeit fanciful historiography.'

8   *K'art'lis C'xovreba*, ed. S. Qaukhch'ishvili (T'bilisi, 1955, 1959, henceforth *K'C'*), I, pp. 11ff., see also the English translation of the Georgian text and of the Medieval Armenian translation of the *K'art'lis C'xovreba* in R.W. Thomson, *Rewriting Caucasian History. The Medieval Armenian Adaptation of the Georgian Chronicles* (Oxford, 1996, henceforth Thomson, *RCH*), pp. 13ff. All translations from the Georgian are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

9   Georg. *bun-i* 'real, genuine,' see I. Abuladze, *Dzveli K'art'uli enis lek'sikoni* (T'bilisi, 1973), p. 37, presumably < Pers. *būn* 'foundation, root, origin.'

10 *K'C'v.*, I, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, pp. 16, 18/Thomson, *RCH*, pp. 23, 25. My translation differs slightly from that of Thomson.

11 *K'C'*, I, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, p. 45, 18/Thomson, *RCH*, p. 54.

12 Cf. R.M. Mavrodina, *Kievskaia Rus' i kochevniki (Pechenegi, Torki, Polovtsy)* (Leningrad, 1983) and her 'Rus' i kochevniki' in V.V. Mavrodin et al. eds, *Sovetskaia istoriografiia Kievskoi Rusi* (Leningrad, 1973), pp. 210-21.

13 On this see the seminal essays of I. Ševchenko, 'A Neglected Byzantine Source of Muscovite Political Ideology' *Harvard Slavic Studies*, II (1954), pp. 141-79 and M. Cherniavsky, 'Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory,' *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 20 (October-December, 1959), pp. 459-76, both conveniently reprinted in M. Cherniavsky (ed.), *The Structure of Russian History. Interpretative Essays* (New York, 1970), pp. 65-107. For the Byzantine influences see the articles of I. Ševchenko collected in his *Byzantium and the Slavs* (Cambridge, Mass.-Napoli, 1991) spanning four decades of work on these themes and most recently his *Ukraine Between East and West* (Edmonton-Toronto, 1996). The most recent study on the Mongol impact is D. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols. Cross-cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589* (Cambridge, 1998) which deflates a number of the stereotypical claims of negative 'Tatar' influence.

14 A.A. Kunik, 'Istoricheskie materialy i razyskaniia, 2: O Torkskiikh Pechenegakh i Polovtsakh po mad'jarskim istochnikam,' *Uchënye Zapiski Imperatorskij Akademii Nauk po pervomu i tret'emu otdeleniiu*, 3 (1955), p. 714.

15 S.M. Solov'ëv, *Istoriia Rossii s drevnejshikh vremën* in his *Sochineniia* (Moskva, 1988-96), I/1-2, pp. 352, 357, 383, 647-8.

16 V.O. Kliuchevskii, *Kurs russkoi istorii* i his *Sochineniia* (Moskva, 1987-90), I, pp. 282ff. These attitudes were carried over into scholarship beyond the confines of Russia. Cf. N.V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York, 1963), pp. 42-3, who describes the Qipchaqs as 'a persistant threat to the security and even existence of Kievan Russia and a constant drain on its resources.'

17 See his *Sochineija*, VI, pp. 252-3.

18 A.E. Presniakov, *Kniazhoe pravo v Drevnej Rusi. Lektsii po russkoi istorii* (Moskva, 1993), pp. 376-8.

19 M.S. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* (L'viv, 1904-22, reprint Kyïv, 1992-6), I, 203ff.; II, pp. 505-6, 530, 533.

20 Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, I, p. 230.

21 M.K. Liubavskii, *Lektsii po drevnej russkoi istorii do konca XVI veka* (Moskva, 1918), pp. 43-5.

22 See V.Ja. Petrukhin, *Nachalo étnokul'turnoj istorii Rusi IX-XI vekov* (Moskva, 1995), p. 87; R.G. Skrynnikov, *Istoriia rossijskaia IX-XVII vv.* (Moskva, 1997), pp. 38-9.

23 P.P. Tolochko, *Kyïvs'ka Rus'* (Kyïv, 1996), p. 39.

24 P.P. Tolochko, *Drevniaia Rus'* (Kiev, 1987), p. 159.

25 See discussion in Mavrodina, *Kievskaia Rus'*, pp. 17-19, 21-3, 30-1, 34, 36, 38.

26 B.D. Grekov, *Kievskaia Rus'* in his *Izbrannye Sochineniia* (Moskva, 1959), II, pp. 373-5; V.T. Pashuto, 'Ob osobennosti struktury Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva' in A.P. Novosel'tsev, V.T. Pashuto et al. (eds), *Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie* (Moskva, 1965), p. 98; V.V. Kargalov, *Vneshnepoliticheskie faktory razvitija feodal'noi Rusi* (Moskva, 1967), p. 57.

27 Cf. his 'K voprosu o roli Khazarskogo kaganata v istorii Rusi' *Sovetskaia Arxeologija*, 18 (1953), pp. 128-50. A useful and thoughtful survey of Khazar studies as it pertains to Rus' in particular can be found in A.P. Novosel'tsev, *Khazarskoe gosudarstvo i ego rol' v istorii Vostochnoj Evropy i Kavkaza* (Moskva, 1990), pp. 45-66. Novosel'tsev noted (pp. 54-5) that Rybakov's distortions of Khazar-Rus' relations were not unconnected with the 'anti-cosmopolitan' campaigns in full swing in the Soviet Union at the time of its publication.

28 I.M. Shekera, *Kyïvs'ka Rus' XI st. u mizhnarodnyx vidnosynax* (Kyïv, 1967), pp. 99, 122.

29 M.N. Pokrovskii, *Russkaia Istoriia s drevnejshix vremën* (Moskva, 7th ed., 1924), I, pp. 94, 111-15 and his *Ocherki istorii russkoi kul'tury* (Petrograd, 1923), p. 46.

30 B.A. Rybakov, *Kievskaia Rus' i russkie knjazhestva XII-XIII vv.* (Moskva, 1982), p. 99.

31 Thus, Novosel'tsev, *Khazarskoe gosudarstvo*, pp. 185-5, 202 was inclined to view the 20,000 'Ṣaqāliba' families captured (probably in the Don region) and later settled in Transcaucasia by the Arab army of Marwān in his famous 737 campaign into Khazaria as allies and 'military settlers' in Khazar-ruled regions.

32 See Gumilёv, *Poiski*, pp. 311-2 and his *Drevnjaja Rus' i Velikaja step'* (Moskva, 1989), p. 327.

33 In his *Drevnjaja Rus' i Velikaja step'* a thinly veiled anti-semitism is a consistent theme in the chapters dealing with the Pre-Chinggisid era. This work (and some others) are also marred by theories of ethnicity that are more in keeping with the *Rassengeschichte* of Pre-World War II Central Europe than with modern scholarship.

34 See comments in Petrukhin, *Nachalo étnokul'turnoj istorii*, pp. 83-4 who is responding to the remarks of V. Kozhinov in his 'Tvorchestvo Ilariona i istoricheskaia real'nost' ego époxi' in *Voprosy Literatury*, No. 12 (1988), p. 140 '... the Khazar yoke was, without doubt, much more dangerous for Rus' than that of the Tatar-Mongols, in part because Rus' was only a developing nation (*narodnost'*), state structure (*gosudarstvennost'*) and culture.' The struggle, he argues, however, only served to strengthen Rus'. Kozhinov, p. 141, was following the thesis put forward by S.A. Pletnёva, *Kochevniki srednevekov'ja* (Moskva, 1982,' pp. 17.120, in which she claims that the Khazar problem remained a serious one for Rus' into the reign of Iaroslav I (undisputed ruler 1036-54), well after the Rus' destruction of the Khazar capital and core lands on the Lower Volga and Don region in 965. On the 'Khazar yoke polemic,' see below, n. 46.

35 R.G. Landa, *Islam v istorii Rossii* (Moskva, 1995), pp. 18-19, 32-3. On Turkisms (modest in number) in the language of Rus', see P.B. Golden, 'The Nomadic Linguistic Impact on Pre-Chinggisid Rus' and Georgia' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* [henceforth *AEMAe*] X (in press).

36 See his 'The Pechenegs, A Case of Social and Economic Transformation,' *AEMAe* I, (1975), pp. 211-35; 'The Polovtsians and Rus'' *AEMAe* II, (1982), pp. 321-80; *The Origin of Rus'* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981). A number of these theses, in particular those regarding the role of the Khazars in early Rus' history, have been sharply criticized by P. Tolochko, *Kyïvs'ka Rus'*, pp. 35-9.

37 T.S. Noonan, 'Russia's Eastern Trade, 1150-1350: The Archaeological Evidence,' *AEMAe* III (1983), pp. 201-64.

38 T.S. Noonan, 'Why Dirhams First Reached Russia: The Role of Arab-Khazar Relations in the Development of the Earliest Islamic Trade with Eastern Europe,' *AEMAe* IV (1984), pp. 151-282 and 'Khazaria as an Intermediary Between Islam and Eastern Europe in the Second Half of the Ninth Century: The Numismatic Perspective,' *AEMAe* V (1985), pp. 175-204; 'When Did Rūs/Rus' Merchants First Visit Khazaria and Baghdad?' *AEMAe* VII (1987-91), pp. 213-9.

39 P.B. Golden, 'Nomads and Their Sedentary Neighbours in Pre-Chinggisid Eurasia, *AEMAe* VII (1987-91), pp. 41-81; 'Aspects of the Nomadic Factor in the Economic Development of Kievan Rus' in I.S. Koropeckyj (ed.), *Ukrainian Economic History. Interpretive Essays* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 58-101; 'The Qipchaqs of Medieval Eurasia: An Example of Stateless Adaptation in the Steppes' in G. Seaman and D. Marks, *Rulers from the Steppe. State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 132-57.

40 A brief survey may be found in P.B. Golden, 'The Turkic Peoples and Caucasia.' in R. Suny (ed.), *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change* (Ann Arbor, 1984, rev. ed., Ann Arbor, 1996), pp. 45-67. On the Qipchaqs, see P.B. Golden, 'Cumanica I: The Qïpchaqs in Georgia,' *AEMAe* IV (1984), pp. 45-87 and M.F. Kırzıoğlu, *Yukarı-Kür ve Çoruk Boylarında Kıpçaklar* (Ankara, 1992). A useful outline of Georgian history for much of this period can be found in M.D. Lordkipanidze (Lort'k'ip'anidze), *Istoriia Gruzii XI-nachalo XIII veka* (T'bilisi, 1974).

41 On the Seljuqs in Georgia, see N. Shengelia, *Selch'ukebi da Sak'art'velo XI saukuneshi* (T'bilisi, 1968).

42 On this question see A.P. Novosel'tsev, 'K voprosu ob odnom iz drevnejshix titulov russkogo knjazja,' *Istoriia SSSR* 4 (1982), pp. 150-9 and P.B. Golden, 'The Question of the Rus' Qaghanate,' *AEMAe* II (1982), pp. 77-97.

43 *Annales de Saint-Bertin*, ed. F. Grat, J. Vielliard, S. Clémencet (Paris, 1964), p. 30. See also discussion in A.V. Riasanovsky, 'The Embassy of 838 Revisited: Some Comments in Connection with a 'Normanist' Source on Early Russian History,' *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas* 10 (1962), pp. 1-12.

44 'Chaganum vero non praelatum Avarum, non Gasanorum aut Nortmannorum nuncupari reperimus, neque principem Vulgarum, set regem vel dominum Vulgarum,' *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores* (Hannover, 1839) III, p. 523, cited in Kh. Lovmian'skii (H. Lowmiakhski], *Rus'i Normany* (a trans. of his *Zagadnienie roli Normanów w genezie pakhstw słowiakhskich*. Warszawa. 1957), trans.

M.E. Bychkova (Moskva, 1985), pp. 195-6n.4. See also P. Smirnov, *Volz'kyi shliax i starodavni rusy* (Kyïv, 1928), p. 135.

45 Ibn Rusta, *Kitāb al-A'lāq al-Nafīsa*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1892), p. 145; *Ḥudūd al-'Ālam*, trans. commentary V.F. Minorsky (London, 1937, 2nd rev. ed. 1970), p. 159; Gardīzī, *Tārīkh-i Gardīzī*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī (Tehran, 1363/1984), p. 591; *Mujmal al-Tavārīkh*, ed. M. Bahār (Tehran, 1939). On al-Jarmī and Jaihānī, see D.M. Dunlop, *The History of the Jewish Khazars* (Princeton, 1954), pp. 107-8 and I.Ju. Krachkovskii, *Arabskaia geograficheskaia literatura* in his *Izbrannye Sochineniia* (Leningrad, 1957), IV, pp. 219ff.

46 *Des Metropoliten Ilarion Lobrede auf Vladimir den Heiligen und Glaubensbekenntnis*, ed. L. Müller (Wiesbaden, 1962), pp. 37, 100, 103, 129, 143. The *Slovo* was a very sophisticated treastise operating on several levels and reflecting a growing sense of pride that the Rus' felt under Iaroslav as they were increasingly drawn into the mainstream of European politics. There is a longstanding debate among scholars regarding the audience(s) to which this tract was directed. Although making use of many traditional Byzantine formulae, it can be interpreted as juxtaposing the old and the new, Judaism (symbolized by the Khazar Qaghans) and Christianity (now represented by the Rus' ruler/ Qaghan). In addition to these themes it also pressed for the canonization of Vladimir I who had brought about the conversion of Rus' to Orthodox Christianity. M.N. Tikhomirov, *Russkaia kul'tura X-XVIII vekov* (Moskva, 1968), pp. 130-3, stressed the Khazar/Judaism vs. Rus'/ Christianity theme. This perspective has been further elabourated by Kozhinov in his 'Tvorchestvo Ilariona' in *Voprosy Literatury*, No. 12 (1988), pp. 130-50, noted above. This produced a lively response from M. Robinson and L. Sazonova, 'Mnimaia i real'naia istoricheskaia deistvitel'nost' épokhi 'Slova o zakone i blagodati' Ilariona' in the same issue of *VL*, pp. 151-75. The polemic was continued in *VL*, No. 9 (1989) with Kozhinov's 'Nesostoiatel'nye ssylki,' pp. 236-42 and the rejoinder by Sazonova and Robinson, 'Nesostoiatel'nye idei i metody,' pp. 242-52. The latter, basing themselves largely on the interpretations of Artamonov, *Istoriia Khazar* and S.A. Pletnëva's *Khazary* (2nd edition, Moskva, 1986), works that are fundamentally flawed in their treatment of the question of Judaism in Khazaria, as well as other issues, insist that Ilarion did not have an anti-Khazar political agenda in mind.

47 S.A. Vysockii, 'Drevnerusskie graffiti Sofii Kievskoi,' *Numizmatika i Épigrafika*, 3 (1962), pp. 157-8 and his *Drevnerusskie nadpisi Sofii Kievskoj XI-XIVvv.* (Kiev, 1966), pp. 49-52. M. Whittow, *The Making*

of Byzantium 600-1025 (Berkeley, 1996), pp. 250-2 suggests that the *chacanus* of the Rus' may actually have been their Khazar overlord. The post-965 references, then, may have been 'no more than ideological booty' from the conquest of Ītil.

48 See D. Chizhevskii, *History of Russian Literature* ('s-Gravenhage, 1962), pp. 25, 67-9 and I.U. Budovnits, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskaia mysl' Drevnej Rusi XI-XV vv.* (Moskva, 1960), pp. 109ff. The latter in the spirit of his own age and time argues that although based on Byzantine sources, the texts of the *Izborniks* were sufficiently reworked to be considered original works. The Greek sources for the *Izbornik* of 1076, however, published in the critical edition of the text by V.S. Golyshenko et al., *Izbornik 1076 goda* (Moskva, 1965) show how indebted the Kievan authors were to their Byzantine models.

49 See the discussions of B.A. Rybakov, *'Slovo o polku Igoreve' i ego sovremenniki* (Moskva, 1971) and his *Russkie letopistsy i avtor 'Slova o polku Igoreve'* (Moskva, 1972) and G.N. Moiseeva, *Spasoilaroslavskii xronograf i 'Slovo o polku Igoreve'* (Moskva, 1984).

50 See the editions of V.F. Rzhiga and S.I. Shambinago, *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (Moskva, 1959), p. 26, L.A. Dmitriev and D.S. Likhachëv, *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (Leningrad, 1967), p. 56 who note (p. 528) that there have been many 'corrections' suggested for this troublesome passage. A variety of translations can be found in the latter volume and in the edition edited by V.I Steleckii, *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (Moskva, 1981). These allow for a variety of interpretations some of which view Sviatoslav, Iaroslav and Oleg Sviatoslavich (a grandson of Iaroslav I) as *kagans*; others of which take a narrower reading (e.g. seeing it only a as reference to Oleg). The Oleg Sviatoslavich (d. 1113) in question was the Riurikid prince who was driven out of Tmutorokan' by his Riurikid opponents (and sent off to Byzantium) in 1079, but returned in 1083 and slaughtered the Khazars there (see *PSRL*, I, cc.204, 204). Kozhinov, 'Tvorchesto Ilariona,' *VL*, No. 12 (1988), p. 142 assumes Khazar control over this city, while Robinson and Sazonova,'Mnimaja i real'naja,' *VL*, No. 12 (1988), p. 167, in a fuller treatment, believe that the Tmutorokan' principality, a Rus' outpost in the Taman peninsula whose role and place in Rus' history is also the subject of much speculation with its polyglot population of Khazars, Alans,Kasogians (Cherkes) and others, was still under Rus' control at this time. See also A.V. Gadlo, 'K istorii Tmutorokanskogo knjazhestva vo vtoroj polovine XIv.' *Slaviano-russkie drevnosti*, I, *Istoriko-arkheologiches-koe izuchenie Drevnej Rusi* (Leningrad, 1988), pp. 204-10, who suggests that the qaghanal title was used only in its full sense after 965

when Sviatoslav mortally wounded the Khazar state and was borne only by the princes of Kiev, Vladimir and Iaroslav and some of the latter's sons. Oleg Sviatoslavich used it because of his direct blood ties to the Kievan princes and by virtue of his rule in Tmurtorokan.'

51 Artamonov, *Istoriia Khazar*, pp. 365-6. In his concluding remarks (p. 458), he states that the Kievan prince inherited this title from the Türks.

52 A.P. Novosel'tsev, V.T. Pashuto et al., *Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie* (Moskva, 1965), p. 82

53 Novosel'tsev, *Khazarskoe gosudarstvo*, p. 138. In his earlier article ('K voprosu' *Istoriia SSSR* 4 (1982), pp. 157, 159), he concluded that the Rus' ruler took this title to symbolize his claims to paramountcy over the other prince and rulers and as a sign of his independence from the Khazars. Later (early eleventh century), it would be used to demonstrate Rus' independence from Byzantium. Novosel'tsev also maintains that it was the equivalent of the Rus' title *velikij knjaz'* 'grand prince.' This, however, can hardly be correct as the qaghanal dignity everywhere in Eurasia signified an imperial status, something that even Ilarion did not directly claim.

54 Petrukhin, *Nachalo étnokul'turnoj istorii*, p. 141.

55 Tolochko, *Kyïvs'ka Rus'*, p. 39. D.A. Machinskii and A.D. Machinskaia, 'Severnaia Rus', Russkii Sever i Staraia Ladoga v VIII-XIvv.' in *Kul'tura Russkogo Severa* (Leningrad, 1988), p. 47, place it still further in the North, in the Ladoga region, an area of early Viking settlement. In their view, the Rus' leader took the title *qaghan* in imitation of the Khazar ruler.

56 According to the eleventh century life of Vladimir by Iakov Mnikh, Vladimir attacked the Khazars in 985, the same year in which he is reported by the *PVL* (*PSRL*, I, c. 84) to have raided, in alliance with the Torks (Western Oghuz), the Volga Bulghars. Artamonv, *Ist. Khazar*, p. 435, not unreasonably wants to connect this with the report in al-Muqaddasī, *Aḥsan al-Taqāsim fi Maʿrifat al-Aqālim*, ed. M.J. de Goeje, 2nd ed., Leiden, 1906, p. 361, who says that 'an army of the Rūm who are called Rūs, attacked them (Khazaria, PBG) and took possession of their country.' If al-Muqaddasī's report is not of the campaign of Sviatoslav two decades earlier, it would confirm Jakov Mnikh's account. The Khazar expedition, if true, would have further buttressed Vladimir's claim to the qaghanal title.

57 Petrukhin, *Nachalo étnokul'turnoj istorii*, pp. 193-4.

58 Iranian tradition accorded them imperial status. The Sāsānid court of Anosharvān, according to the *Fārsnāma*, had three golden thrones, the central one was occupied by the Shāhanshāh, the other two were reserved for the Khazar Qaghan and Emperor of China should they come to visit, see A. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhague, 1944), pp. 411-12.

59. On Khazar history, in addition to the works by Novosel'tsev, Artamonov, Pletnëva and Dunlop noted above, see P.B. Golden, *Khazar Studies* (Budapest, 1980); D. Ludwig, *Struktur und Gesellschaft des Chazaren-Reiches im Licht der schriftlichen Quellen* (Münster, 1982); N. Golb and O.Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century* (Ithaca, 1982).

60 C. Zukerman, 'On the Date of the Khazars' Conversion' *Revue des Études Byzantines*, 53 (1995), pp. 241-2, 246, 250-3, 269 argues for 861. Other viewpoints can be found in O. Pritsak, 'The Khazar Kingdom's Conversion to Judaism' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, II, (1978), pp. 261-81; P.B. Golden, 'Khazaria and Judaism' *AEMAe* III (1983), pp. 127-56.

61 It remains debatable whether one can contend, as Omeljan Pritsak does, that these mercantile communities were the principal organizing force behind the nomadic empires, *The Orgin of Rus'*, I, pp. 14-17.

62 Pritsak, *The Orgin of Rus'*, I, pp. 26-8, 182, 583 and Golb and Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents*, pp. 64-5.

63 al-Masūdī, *Murūj al-Dahab wa Maʿādin al-Jawhar*, ed. C. Pellat (Beirut, 1966), I, p. 155. On the complexities of Qarakhanid origins, see O. Pritsak, 'Von den Karluk zu den Karachaniden' *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 101 (1951), pp. 270-300; Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 196-201, 214-15; B.D. Kochnev, 'The Origins of the Karakhanids: A Reconsideration' *Der Islam* 73 (1996), pp. 352-7.

64 R.S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power, Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy* (Princeton, 1995), I, pp. 23-6. The first coronation of a tsar' was that of Ivan IV ('The Terrible') in 1547. On the interplay of Muscovite and Chinggisid Tatar politics that preceded this, see H. Inalcık, 'Power Relationships Between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as Reflected in Titulature' in Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay et al. (eds), *Passé Turco-Tatar Présent Soviètique. Études offertes à Alexandre Bennigsen* (Paris,, 1986), pp. 178-86; Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 164ff.

65 Golden, 'The Question of the Rus' Qaanate' *AEMAei*, II (1982), pp. 88-97.

66 M. Gol'del'man, 'O diarkhii v Drevnei Rusi (IX-X vv.)' *Jews and Slavs*, III, ΙΟΥΔΑΙΚΗ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ *In Honour of Professor Moshe Altbauer* (Jerusalem, 1955), p. 75.

67 G. Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia* (New Haven, 1948, reprinted 1959), p. 174.

68 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio*, ed. J. Moravcsik, trans. R.J.H. Jenkins, Dumbarton Oaks Texts, I, (Washington, DC, 1967), pp. 56-7. See also the various locations proferred in R.J.H. Jenkins (ed.), *De Administrando Imperio, II, Commentary* (London, 1962), pp. 25-6.

69 O. Pritsak, 'Where Was Constantine's Inner Rus'?' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, VII (1983), pp. 562-6.

70 Petrukhin, *Nachalo étnokul'turnoj istorii*, p. 69.

71 A.P. Kovalevskii (ed., trans.), *Kniga Axmeda ibn Fadlana o ego puteshestvii na Volgu v 921-922 gg.* (Khar'kov, 1956), p. 313; A.Z.V. Togan (ed. trans.), *Ibn Faḍlān's Reisebericht* in *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, XXIV/3 (1939), Arabic p. 43/trans. p. 253.

72 See P.B. Golden, 'Gosudarstvo i gosudarstvennost' u Khazar: vlast' Khazarskikh kaganov' in N.A. Ivanov (ed.), *Fenomen vostochnogo despotizma. Struktura upravlenija i vlasti* (Moskva, 1993), pp. 211-33. The origin of the Khazar dual kingship is itself not without problems. The institution of dual kingship is found in various forms among the Turks and other steppe peoples of Eurasia and beyond, see A. Alföldi, 'Türklerde çift krallık' *Ikinci Türk Tarih Kongresi - Istanbul 20-25 Eylül 1937* (Istanbul, 1943), pp. 507-519 and his *Die Struktur des vorestruskischen Römerstaates* (Heidelberg, 1974), chap. vi; K. Czeglédy, 'Das sakrale Königtum bei den Steppenvölkern' *Numen*, 13 (1966), pp. 20-5; M. Arslan, *Step Imparatorluklarında Sosyal ve Siyasi Yapı* (Istanbul, 1984), pp. 57-60; V.V. Trepavlov, *Gosudarstvennyi stroi Mongol'skoi imperii XIIIv* (Moskva, 1993), pp. 75-96). In Khazaria (and elsewhere), the dual kingship took on certain, specific characteristics associated with sacral kingship. Artamonov, *Istoriia Khazar*, pp. 275-81 put forward the theory that the sacralization of the Khazar Qaghan resulted from a bloody internal struggle associated with the Judaization of the ruling strata. A variant of this theme was also put forward by S.A. Pletnëva, *Khazary* (Moskva, 1986), pp. 60-8 and Novosel'tsev, *Khazarskoe gosudarstvo*, pp. 137-43. The latter suggested that the power of the Qaghan began to decline after the Arab victory over the Khazars in 737 which culminated in the forced and short-lived conversion of the Qaghan to Islam. After this, the power of the *shad/beg/yilig* grew. He eventually became the de facto ruler of the state, supplanting (by the early ninth century) the Qaghan (who was now relegated to a ceremonial position). The shad was associated with Judaism and induced the Qaghan to convert to this faith as well.

Novosel'tsev concludes that by the tenth century the Qaghan had lost all power and the Khazar state itself was undergoing decentralization. The evidence for this scenario is very tenuous at best, requiring a highly imaginative reading of the Khazar Hebrew sources. There is no question that the Islamic geographical and historical sources stemming from the ninth-tenth centuries depict the Khazar realm as governed by a dual kingship. Within this structure, the Qaghan was clearly a sacral figure. We do not know how old this system was among the Khazars, how it came to develop nor whether it was associated with the conversion to Judaism of the ruling clans (see discussion in Golden, 'Khazaria and Judaism' *AEMAe* III (1983), pp. 144ff.) The institutions of a sacral monarch and a war king are hardly unknown. J. Hocart in his *Kings and Councillors* (Cairo, 1936, reprint: Chicago, 1970), pp. 161-6, 176-9 stressed the idea that kingship involved two, contradictory functions: the king as priest-lawgiver-judge and the king as warrior. The former, as was the case with the Khazar Qaghan, was kept in a state of ritual purity. He was not to be involved in the shedding of blood nor could his own blood be shed. When deposed, he was strangled (in keeping with the Türk tradition which continued up to the early Ottoman era). There are many possible sources for this type of kingship in Khazaria. The Eurasian nomadic rulers, whose investiture involved shamanic rites (see M. Waida, 'Notes on Sacred Kinship in Central Asia,' *Numen*, XXIII/3 (1976), pp. 179-90), themselves were believed to possess shamanic powers. By way of comparison, it might be noted that the early Germanic tribes often separated kingship from military leadership. Kings were chosen from certain noble clans. War-leaders, on the other hand, rose up on a meritocratic basis, retaining their positions only as long as they were successful, see M. Todd, *The Early Germans* (Oxford, 1992), p. 33.

73 See most recently O. Pritsak, 'The System of Government under Volodimer the Great' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, XIX (1995), p. 573. Petrukhin, *Nachalo étnokul'turnoj istorii*, p. 130 remarks, however, that this 'distinctive dual rulership' (*svoeobraznoe dvoevlastie*) was typical of many medieval states, including Khazaria, but he does not directly link it with Khazar practices.

74 Pritsak, 'The System of Government' *HUS*, XIX (1995), pp. 580, 583-4. Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, pp. 75, 83 states that Vladimir I 'appears' to have 'intended to bequeath his realm to Boris, one of the youngest of his sons' and Iaroslav 'favored his fourth son Vsevolod over the others.' N. Kollmann, 'Collateral Succession in Kievan Rus',' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, XIV/3-4 (1990), pp. 378-9, is quite correct in finding this 'problematic.' It certainly does not constitute a hard and

fast practice in succession and may be explained by personal preferences etc. On appanages for members of the ruling clan, see A.M. Khazanov, *Social'naja Istoriia skifov* (Moskva, 1975), pp. 197-8 and below. This form of inheritance was also not unique to the steppe world. In Wales, the father's house and some of his land were given to the youngest son, presumably, as in the steppe, because his elder brothers had already established households of their own. See J. Morris, *The Age of Arthur. A History of the British Isles 350-650* (New York, 1972), p. 448.

75 Gol'del'man, 'O diarxii,' p. 82.

76 See discussion of the events in Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, pp. 76-7; J. Martin, *Medieval Russia 980-1584* (Cambrdige, 1995), pp. 25-6.

77 See the comments in the *T'ung-tien* in Liu Mau-tsai, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Türken (T'u-küe)* (Wiesbaden, 1958), II, pp. 498-9: 'There are also qaghans who are lower in rank than the Ye-hu (*yabghu*). There are also the great, non-reigning familes who remain at home and call each other I-k'o-han.'

78 W.E. Scharlipp, *Die frühen Türken in Zentral Asien* (Darmstadt, 1992), p. 66.

79 V. Beshevliev, *Die protobulgarische Periode der bulgarischen Geschichte* (Amsterdam, 1980), pp. 338-41.

80 Ibn Rusta, *Kitāb al-A'lāq al-Nafīsa*, ed. De Goeje, p. 142; Gardīzī, *Tārīkh-i Gardīzī*, ed. Ḥabībī, p. 586; Gy. Györffy, *István Király és m_ve* (Budapest, 1983), p. 56. On the Turkic connections of the Proto-Hungarians, see the classic work of Gy. Németh, *A honfoglaló magyarság kialakulása* (1930, 2nd ed., Budapest, 1991) and the recent study of A. Róna-Tas, *A honfoglaló magyar nép* (Budapest, 1996).

81 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *DAI*, ed. Moravcsik, trans. Jenkins, pp. 170-3 reports that the Magyar leader 'Levedias' was given 'a noble Khazar woman' by the Khazar Qaghan for marriage. No children, however, were produced from this union. Of the Magyar rulers, Constantine (pp. 178-9) mentions the gyula (γυλας) and the καρχας. The latter, according to Németh, *HMK*, pp. 247-8 corresponds to the *horka* noted in later Hungaro-Latin sources. See also L. Ligeti, *A magyar nyelv török kapcsolatai a honfoglalás elŒtt és az Árpádkorban* (Budapest, 1986), pp. 254, 485 who views *harka, harkány* (a place name) as a Khazar-Qabar title.

82 Gol'del'man, 'O diarxii,', pp. 72-3.

83 Cf. Ibn Rusta, *Kitāb al-A'lāq al-Nafīsa*, ed. De Goeje, p. 144; Gardīzī, *Tārīkh-i Gardīzī*, ed. Ḥabībī, p. 586. See also the comments of Gy.

Györffy, *István király* p *és m_ve*, pp. 34, 56; Ligeti, *A magyar nyelv*, pp. 253-3, 484; Németh, *HMK²* pp. 215-7.

84 See M. Fasmer (Vasmer), *Étimologicheskii slovar' russkogo jazyka*, trans. O.N. Trubachëv (2nd ed., Moskva, 1986, henceforth Vasmer, *EtSl.*) I, p. 66; Z. Gołąb, *The Origin of the Slavs. A Linguist's View* (Columbus, Ohio, 1991), p. 406. Cf. Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'*, I, p. 20, who derives it from: *fshu-pan* 'the shepherd of the (human) cattle' i.e. the 'comitatus.' Róna-Tas, *A honfoglaló magyar nép*, p. 101, maintains that it cannot be of Turkic origin.

85 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *DAI*, pp. 180-1 and the study by C.R. Bowlus, *Franks, Moravians and Magyars. The Struggle for the Middle Danube, 788-907* (Philadelphia, 1995), pp. 7ff.

86 Cf. I. Boba, *Moravia's History Reconsidered* (The Hague, 1971) who would place it south of the Danube in Pannonia and Serbia, with its urban centre at Sirmium; see also the useful overview of the question in Bowlus, *Franks, Moravians and Magyars*, pp. 5-18.

87 See Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *DAI*, pp. 138ff (chaps. 30-1) who gives a long account; F. Dvornik, *The Slavs Their Early History and Civilization* (Boston, 1956), pp. 27, 94 and his exhaustive commentary on the question of White Croatia in Jenkins (ed.), *Constantine Porphyrogenitus, DAI, II, Commentary*, esp. pp. 97-9.

88 See P.B. Golden, 'al-Ṣakāliba' *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, ed/ C.E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden, 1960-), VIII, fasc. 143-4, pp. 875-6.

89 Procopius, *De Bello Gothico*, VII, xiv, 22ff. (Loeb Library ed., trans. H.B. Dewing (New York, 1924), IV, pp. 268ff.

90 Mauricius, *Strategicon*, ed. Ruman. trans. H. Mihăescu (Bucureşti, 1970), p. 284 (Greek text).

91 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *DAI*, pp. 124-5.

92 See discussion in Landa, *Islam v istorii Rossii*, pp. 68-9.

93 See L. Leciejewicz, *Słowianie Zachodni* (Wrocław-Warszawa. 1985), p. 97.

94 A.A. Gorskii, 'Ob évoliucii titulatury verxovnogo pravitelia v Drevnei Rusi' in A.N. Sakharov et al. (eds), *Rimsko-konstantinopol'skoe nasledie na Rusi: Ideia vlasti i politiĕskaia praktika* (Moskva, 1995), pp. 97-102, hypothesizes that the qaghanal title was used by the princes of Kiev to underscore their paramountcy over the other, autonomous tribal princes. They were brought under control by the end of the reign of Vladimir I. Thereafter, a special title was not used as the senior prince was the Riurikiid who held Kiev. The title lingered as a 'relic' and finally disappeared.

95 *PSRL*, X, p. 26. See also N.Kollmann, 'Collateral Succession in Kievan Rus',' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, XIV/3-4 (1990), p. 376.

96 See Kollmann, 'Collateral Succession' *HUS*, XIV/3-4 (1990), pp. 379-83 and her *Kinship and Politics. The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345-1547* (Stanford, 1987), pp. 59ff. See also Martin, *Medieval Russia*, pp. 21, 27 ff., 375ff. for a recent discussion and summary of views on this system. M. Dimnik, 'The Testament of Iaroslav 'The Wise': A Re-examination' *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 29 (1987), pp. 369-86 concluded that the 'rotation system' was restricted to the 'genealogically most senior eligible members of three groups of Iaroslavichi.

97 For a discussion of the system in the Eurasian steppes, see L.N. Gumilëv, 'Udel'no-lestvichnaia sistema u tiurok v VI-VIII vekax,' *Sovetskaia Étnografija* (1959), No. 3, pp. 11-25 and T.J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier. Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 41-2 (Hsiung-nu), 134ff (Türks). The complexities of the Türk system are examined by M. Drompp, 'Supernumerary Sovereigns: Superfluity and Mutability in the Elite Power Structure of the Early Türks (Tu-jue),' in Seaman and Marks, *Rulers from the Steppe*, pp. 92-115 who underscores the flexibility of the system. Beyond the borders of Central or Inner Asia, we find traces of a system of fraternal succession in Shang China (eighteenthth-eleventh century BC), see T. Pokora, 'China' in H.J. Claessen, P. Skalník (eds), *The Early State* (The Hague-Paris-New York, 1978), p. 203. Among the Indo-Parthians, kingship occasionally passed from the king to his brother and then to the latter's son. R.N. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia* (Cleveland-New York, 1963), p. 173, viewed this as 'a feature of Central Asian steppe and nomadic society.' There are some notable exceptions to this system in Eurasia. The Scythians and early Hsiung-nu, as Khazanov (*Sotsial'naia ist. skifov,*, pp. 195-6) points out, do not appear to have followed this pattern.

98 J. Goody, *Succession to High Office* (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 35-7.

99 Vasmer, *EtSl.*, II, pp. 121-2.

100 Golb and Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents*, pp. 106-7, 110-13.

101 P.K. Kokovtsov, *Evreisko-Khazarskaia perepiska v X veke* (Leningrad, 1932), Heb. text, pp. 23-4/Russ. trans. pp. 80-1 (short redaction) and Heb. p. 31/Russ. trans., pp. 97-8 (long redaction).

102 Al-Iṣṭakhrī, *Kitāb Masālik al-Mamālik: Viae Regnorum*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (2nd ed., Brill, 1927), p. 224.

103 Drompp, 'Supernumerary Sovereigns,' pp. 95, 107. A good overview of the varieties of succession in the steppe may be found in J. Fletcher,

'The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives,' *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 46 (1986), esp. pp. 24-8 who notes that 'for the most part, succession to supratribal rule functioned as a choice, made by compromise, default, murder (usually fratricide), skirmish, or all-out tribal war, from among several candidates belonging to a generally acknowledged khanly lineage - a limitation to avoid what might otherwise become a debilitatingly open-ended struggle.'

104 A.E. Presniakov, *Kniazhoe pravo v Drevnej Rusi* (Petersburg, 1909), reprinted in his *Kniazhoe pravo v Drevnej Rusi, Lektsii po russkoi istorii. Kievskaia Rus'* (Moskva, 1994), pp. 35ff.; Gumilëv, *Drevniaia Rus' i velikaia step,*' p. 297.

105 Kliuchevskii, *Kurs*, I, p. 179.

106 Barfield, *Perilous Frontiers*, pp. 27-8, 138; H. İnalcık, 'Osmanlılarda Saltanat Veraseti Usûlü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telâkkisiyle Ilgisi' *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi dergisi*, XIV (1959), pp. 69-94; D. Streusand, *The Formation of the Mughal Empire* (Delhi, 1989), p. 30.

107 Kliuchevskii, *Kurs*, I, pp. 183-9.

108 Martin, *Medieval Russia*, pp. 22, 26-7, 29.

109 I.Ia. Froianov, *Kievskaia Rus'. Ocherki social'no-politicheski istorii* (Leningrad, 1980), p. 45.

110 Martin, *Medieval Russia*, pp. 378-9 and J. Fennell, *The Emergence of Moscow 1304-1359* (Berkeley, 1968).

111 J.V.A. Fine, Jr. *The Early Medieval Balkans* (Ann Arbor, 1983), p. 6. The *zadruga* has also been the subject of considerable discussion. Its antiquity, long accepted, as well as its uniqueness to Slavic society, have been called into question. Fine (pp. 7-8) suggests that this institution waxed and waned in accordance with conditions.

112 A.V. Nazarenko, 'Rodovoi siuzerenitet Riurikovichei nad Rus'iu' *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR. 1985* (Moskva, 1986), pp. 150-3. See also his 'Poriadok prestolonaslediia na Rusi XI-XII vv.' in Sakharov et al. (eds), *Rimsko-konstantinopol'skoe nasladie*, pp. 83-96.

113 Froianov, *Kievskaia Rus'.Ocherki social'no-politicheskij istorii*, pp. 32-33; Leciejewicz, *Słowianie Zachodni*, pp. 161-3; V.K. Volkov et al., *Ocherki istorii kul'tury slavjan* (Moskva, 1996), pp. 260-3, 268-70.

114 J.W. Sedlar, *East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, 1000-1500* (Seattle, 1994), p. 29-30.

115 F. Dvornik, *The Slavs. Their History and Civilization*, pp. 269-70; Presniakov, *Kniazhoe pravo*, p. 38; Leciejewicz, *Słowianie Zachodni*, pp. 232-3, 317.

116 See the classic study of V.G. Vasil'evskii, *Vizantiia i Pechenegi* in vol. I of his *Trudy* (St. Petersburg, 1908).

117 *PSRL*, I, c. 163, II, c. 152.

118 See Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 264-82.

119 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *DAI*, pp. 166-7. There is no evidence for a qaghanate among the Pechenegs. See discussion in Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 266-7. Only a very late source, a notice in the late thirteenth century Iberian Arab geographer, Ibn Sa'īd, preserved in Abu'-l-Fidā's *Taqwīm al-Buldān*, ed. M. Reinaud and M. de Slane (Paris, 1940), p. 205, a work of the early fourteenth century, makes reference to a Pecheneg 'khāqān.' O. Pritsak, 'The Pechenegs, A Case of Social and Economic Transformation' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, I, (1975), p. 221, accepts this as evidence for a Pecheneg dual kingdom with the qaghanal title being held by the ruler of the western branch of the confederation. The more contemporary sources (Rus', Byzantine and Islamic), however, all of whom had direct contact with them make no mention of such an office. The 'khāqān' of Ibn Sa'īd is a topos, by his day the standard term for a Turkic, nomadic ruler.

120 Artamonov, *Istoriia Khazar*, p. 458. See also his brief discussion of the system (pp. 350-1) where he notes (n.60) that the same system of succession existed in the Türk Qaghanate and Old Rus' state.

121 According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *DAI*, pp. 48-51, the Rus' bought horses, cattle and sheep from them, typical products of their nomadic economy which were, we are told, 'not found in Rus'.

122 *PSRL*, I, cc. 65-6.

123 Thus, in his prefatory remarks to the Rus' campaign of 1103 into the steppe, which ended with the death of a good number of Qipchaq chieftains, *PSRL*, I, c. 278, the Rus' chronicler puts in the mouth of Urusoba, who urged peace at a meeting of Qipchaq leaders before the battle, the words 'they will fight stoutly with us for we have done much evil to the Rus' land.'

124 *PSRL*, I, c. 277 which laments that the Qipchaqs kill peasants and drive their wives and children into captivity.

125 Cf. the events of 1185 in *PSRL*, II, c. 634-5.

126 P.B. Golden, 'The *Polovci Dikii* ' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* III-IV (1979-80), pp. 296-309.

127 See the pattern of succession suggested by Fëdorov, Fëdorov, *Rannie Tiurki*, pp. 236-9.

128 Cf. Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī/Dankoff, I, 279 noting Inal Öz, 'one of the kings of the Qifchāq.' Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-Tavārīkh*, ed.M. Rowshan and M. Mūsāvī, (Tehran, 1373/1994), I, p. 144 mentions the 'leader of the Qipchaqs in the time of Chinggiz Khan ... an *amīr* by the name of Könchek' who entered Chinggisid service. He and his son, Qumurbish Qonchi, belonged to the clan of the 'kings' (*shāhān*) of the Qipchaqs. He is most probably not to be identified with the Könchek

who figures quite prominently in the Rus' sources. The latter died sometime after 1202-3, when he was last noted as participating in the Cuman auxiliary forces of Riurik Rostislavich in his assault on Kiev (*PSRL*,I, cc. 418-19, X, pp. 34-5.) He is mentioned in this connection, however, only in the *Novgorodskaia pervaja letopis*,' ed. A.N. Nasonov (Moskva-Leningrad, 1950), p. 45. His son, known in the Rus' sources as Jurgi (George) Konchakovich was considered the 'greatest of all the Cumans' (*PSRL*, I, c. 504) i.e. had achieved some sort of paramountcy among the Western Qipchaqs, on the eve of the Mongol conquest.

129 Cf. *PSRL*, I, cc. 275, 279.

130 See discussions in O.Pritsak, 'The Non-'Wild' Polovtsians' in *To Honor Roman Jakobson*, vol. 2 (The Hague-Paris, 1967), p. 1615 and his 'The Polovtsians and Rus',' *AEMAe* II, (1982), pp. 375-6 and Golden, 'The *Polovtsi Dikii*, *HUS*, III-IV (1979-80), pp. 299-300, 305-7.

131 Pashuto, *Drevnerusskoe gosduarstvo*, pp. 108-10; N.A. Baskakov, 'Poloveckie otbleski v 'Slove o polku Igoreve'' *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher*, 48 (1976), pp. 17-18; A.N. Kononov, *Istoriia izuchenija Tiurkskikh iazykov v Rossii* (Leningrad, 1982), pp. 20-1 who suggests that these marriages were not only on the princely level but reached deeper into Rus' society.

132 Petrukhin, *Nachalo étnokul'turnoi istorii*, pp. 99-101, 105.

133 See I. Ševčenko, 'Sviatoslav in Byzantine and Slavic Miniatures' *Slavic Review*, 24/4 (1965), pp. 709-13, reprinted in his *Byzantium and the Slavs*, pp. 231-40.

134 *PSRL*, I, c. 281.

135 Al-Iṣṭakhrī, *Kitāb Masālik wa Mamālik*, ed. De Goeje, p. 221; al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-Ḍahab wa'l-Ma'ādin al-Jawhar*, ed. Ch. Pellat (Beirut, 1966), I, p. 213.

136 Dunlop, *History of the Jewish Khazars*, chap. III-IV remains the most thorough treatment. See also Gadlo, *Étnicheskaia istoriia Severnogo Kavkaza IV-X vv.*, pp. 156ff. and Novosel'tsev, *Khazarskoe gosudarstvo*, pp. 172ff.

137 Toumanoff, *Manuel de généalogie*, p. 565.

138 For the *Life of St. Abo*, see D.M. Lang (ed. trans.), *Lives and Legends of the Georgian Saints* (London, 1956, reprint: Crestwood, New York, 1976), pp. 115-19 and discussion in Dunlop, *History of the Jewish Khazars*, pp. 181-2. On the other events, see *K'C'*, ed.Qaukhch'ishvili, I, pp. 249-51, Thomson, *RCH*, pp. 255-8. See also I. Javakhishvili, *K'art'velis eris istoria* (T'bilisi, 1965-1966), II, pp. 82, 92-3; Z.V. Anchabadze, *Iz istorii srednevekovoi Abxazii* (Suxumi, 1959), pp. 101-

5; C. Toumanoff, *Studies in Christian Caucasian History* (Georgetown-Wetteren, Belgium, 1963), pp. 256, 401.

139 Fëdorov and Fëdorov, *Rannie Tiurki*, p. 178.

140 This is one of a number of explanations, see discussion in Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 270-2 and the literature cited there. For another view, see Pritsak, 'The Polovtsians and Rus'',' *AEMAe* II (1982), pp. 324-31.

141 O.N. Trubachëv, *Étimologicheskii slovar' slavianskikh iazykov*, 10 (Moskva, 1983), pp. 61-2; Vasmer *ÉtSl.*, II, p. 252 and Gołąb, *The Origins of the Slavs.*, pp. 402-3.

142 É. Sevortian et al., *Étimologicheskii slovar 'tiurkskikh iazykov* (Moskva, 1974-), vol. V (1997) dealing with q-k, p. 234. In discussing calqued ethnonyms, we might also note that the hypothesis that the Eastern Slavic tribal name *Tivertsi*, of whom the Rus' chronicle notes 'they are the translators' (*iazhe sut' tolkoviny*), may be derived from Old Turk. *tiver-* 'to twist, turn,' which may be an older form of *chevir-* 'to twist or turn,' later 'to translate.' See *PSRL*, I, c. 29; B. Strumiļnski, *Linguistic Interrelations in Early Rus'* (Rome-Edmonton-Toronto, 1996), p. 162. On the Turkic forms, see G. Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth Century Turkish* (henceforth *ED*, Oxford, 1972), p. 443.

143 For a more detailed discussion of many of the points noted here, see D.A. Rasovskii, 'O roli Chërnyx Klobukov v istorii Drevnej Rusi' *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, VI (1933), pp. 1-66 and his 'Rus', Chërnye Klobuki i Polovtsy v XIIv.' *Festschrift für Petur Nikov* (Sofia, 1940), pp. 369-78; S.A. Pletnëva, *Drevnosti Chërnyx Klobukov* in *Arxelogoija SSSR, svod arxeologicheskix istochnikov*, vyp. El-19 (Moskva, 1973), T. Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk,*Czorni K_obucy* (Warszawa, 1985) and P.B. Golden, 'The ¯Cernii Klobouci' in Á. Berta, B. Brendemoen, C. Schönig (eds), *Symbolae Turcologicae. Studies in Honour of Lars Johanson*, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, *Transactions*, vol. 6, (Uppsala, 1996), pp. 97-107.

144 *PSRL*, II, c.323.

145 See the Cambridge Document, Gold and Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents*, pp. 112-15, 127.

146 See R. Tapper, *Frontier Nomads of Iran. A Political and Social History of the Shahsevan* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 8.

147 Golden, 'The *Cernii Klobouci' Symbolae Turc*, pp. 104-7.

148 N.M. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo* (SPb., 1842-4, reprint Mokva, 1989), t.ii, c.vii, c. 90, t.v, c.iv, 230, and n. 218 (c. 90). The ethnonym appears to have entered Rus' via Alanic (Ossetic), cf. Osset. *Kaesaeg* 'Kabardinian' and is found in a variety of sources, Byzantine (Kasaxi/a), Muslim (Kashak, qāshāq, al-Kāsakiyya, al-Kasā'), Hebrew

(Kāsā), where they all designate the Adyge/Kabarda/Cherkes peoples. In Georg. k'ashag-i, it denotes 'a grown up youth destined for sale into slavery,' see N.G. Volkova, *Étnonimy i plemennye nazvaniia Severnogo Kavkaza* (Moskva, 1973), pp. 19-23; J. Marquart, *Osteuropäische und Ostasiatische Streifzüge* (Leipzig, 1903), pp. 2, 479; V.I. Abaev, *Istoriko-étimologicheskii slovar' osetinskogo jazyka* (Moskva-Leningrad, 1958), I, pp. 588-9; D.I. Chubinov, *K'art'ul-rusuli lek'sikoni* (2nd ed., T'bilisi, 1984), c.1330. The etymology of this ethnonym is obscure.

149 See M.Th. Houtsma, *Ein Türkisch-Arabisches Glossar* (Leiden, 1894), Arabic text, p. 25. Houtsma inaccurately renders the Arabic definition *al-mujarrad* as 'Landstreicher.' In the *Al-Tuḥfat al-Zakiyya fi'l-Lughat al-Turkiyya*, ed. B. Atalay (Istanbul, 1945), f. 24b [=24a], *qazaq bashlı* is translated as '*azab* 'celibate, single, unmarried; bachelor.' See also A. von Gabain, 'Kazıklık' in J. Eckmann et al. (eds), *Németh Armaghanı* (Ankara,, 1962), pp. 167-70.

150 Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia*, VII, pp. 68-78.

151 A.A Gordeev, *Istoriia Kazachestva*. ch. I, *Zolotaia Orda i zarozhdenie kazachestva* (Moskva, 1992), pp. 16-17.

152 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, I, p. 332, Thomson, *RCH*, p. 323. On the Seljuqs in Georgia, see Shengelia, *Selch'ukebi da Sak'art'velo XI saukuneshi*.

153 *PSRL*, I,cc. 277-9, 281-2, 289, II, cc. 250, 252-6, 258, 260, 264-8, 716. A detailed discussion of these events and their aftermath may be found in Golden, 'Cumanica I: The Qıpčaqs in Georgia' *AEMAe i*, IV (1984), pp. 45-7 and most recently in Kırzıoğlu, *Kıpçaklar*, pp. 105ff.

154 Kırzıoğlu, *Kıpçaklar*, pp. 107,110 suggests 1096 or 1098.

155 Kırzıoğlu, *Kıpçaklar*, pp. 106-16, noting the weakening of the Seljuq state after the death of Malikshāh (1092), the impact of the First Crusade and the revival of Byzantium under Aleksios Komnenos, believes that Davit' II began to plan this course of action after 1100. The death of Sultan Muḥammad Tapar in 1118 and the unequal throne struggle between his thirteen-year old son and successor Maḥmūd (1118-31) and his uncle, Sanjar, also made this a propitious moment. By 1119, Sanjar had firmly established his paramountcy in the Great Seljuq domain, but his powerbase was in the East. Sh.A. Mesxia, *Didgorskaia bitva* (T'bilisi, 1974), pp. 34, 49-52. has suggested that Davit' II, having originally feared the possibility of a Qipchaq attack and uncertain that the As would be able (or willing) to hold the mountains passes that would have blocked their raids into Georgia, decided on a marital tie as the best method to protect the northern approaches to his kingdom. Mesxia also suggests that Davit' II was

acting in concert with Vladimir Monomax, assuring him that this Georgian-Qipchaq alliance was not to be directed against Rus' and indeed was helping Rus' by removing from its borders a dangerous foe. For this, however, we do not have any evidence in ours sources.N.A. Murgulija (Murgulia), 'K voprosu pereselenija poloveckoj ordy v Gruziju' in A.D. Skaba et al. (eds), *Iz istorii ukrainsko-gruzinskikh sviazei* (Kiev, 1971), p. 48 views this matrimonial alliance as part of a long term strategy to draw on Qipchaq manpower.

156 See C. Toumanoff, *Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de la Caucasie Chrétienne (Arménie-Geéorgie-Albanie)* (Roma, 1976), p. 121; V. Minorsky, *Studies in Caucasian History* (London, 1953), pp. 74-5. In 454/1062, the As (al-Ālāniyya/Alans) were used with devastating effect against the Muslim ruler of Ārān (Azaybayjan), see Arabic text, p. 14/trans. p. 20

157 On the eve of the Mongol invasions, the As and Qipchaqs are depicted in the Muslim sources as being closely allied, see Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil fī'l-Ta'rīkh*, ed. C.J. Tornberg (Leiden, 1851-76, reprint Beirut, 1965-6 with different pagination), XII, pp. 385-6. Although this alliance was broken by the Mongols, those Cumans who fled to Hungary appear to have been accompanied or later joined by As groupings as well. On the As settlements in Hungary, see L. Szábó, *A Jász etnikai csoport* (Szolnok, 1979), pp. 26ff.

158 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, I, pp. 335-7, Thomson, *RCH*, pp. 326-9.

159 Javakhishvili, *K'art'veli eris istoria*, II, p. 215;Mesxia, *Didgorskaia bitva*, pp. 34-5; Murgulija, 'K voprosu pereselenija,'pp. 42, 44. Murgulia notes that Rus' tradition, reflected in the *byliny*, also ascribes to 'Atrak' a force of 40,000. The force that Kötän (Hung. Kötöny), the Cuman chieftain brought to Hungary in 1239 was also traditionally reckoned at 40,000, not including children and women, *see* Gy. Pauler, *A Magyar nemzet története az Árpádházi királyok alatt* (Budapest, 1899), II, p. 148; L. Rásonyi, *Hidak a Dunán* (Budapest, 1981), p. 121. Kırzıoalu, *Kıpçaklar*, p. 129, noting the 50,000 Qipchaq soldiers in Georgian service in 1123 estimates (6 persons per family) the total number of Qipchaqs in Georgia at that time as 300,000.

160 A. Abashmadze, *Narkvevebi Sak'art'velos politikur modzghvrebat'a istoriidan* (T'bilisi, 1967), p. 142.

161 On Georgian domestic politics, see Lordkipanidze, *Ist. Gruzii*, pp. 88-101; Javakhishvili, *K'art'veli eris istoria*, II, pp. 198-200, 214; K. Salia, *History of the Georgian Nation*, trans. K. Vivian (2nd ed., Paris, 1983), pp. 154ff.

162 On Didgori, see the study of Mesxia, *Didgorskaia bitva*; *K'C'*, I, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, I, pp. 339-42, Thomson, *RCH*, pp. 330-4. Bar

Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Gregory Abûl Faraj...Commonly Known as Bar Hebraeus*, trans. E.A.W. Budge (London, 1932), I, p. 250 places the event in the year 1433/1122 AD and briefly remarks that 'when the Turks went in the king of the Iberians shut the fortifications and destroyed many of them.'

163 Ibn al-Athīr, ed. Tornberg, X, p. 615.

164 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, I, p. 362, Thomson, *RCH*, p. 352.

165 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, I, p. 354, Thomson, *RCH*, p. 345.

166 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, I, pp. 343-6, Thomson, *RCH*, pp. 335-8.

167 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, I, pp. 344-5, Thomson, *RCH*, pp. 337. Ani would be lost and regained several times under his successors.

168 Clauson, *ED*, p. 872: *yapchan/yavchan/?yavshan* 'wormwood.'

169 *PSRL*, II, c. 716.

170 Kurat, *IV-XIII Yüzyıllarda Karadeniz Kuzeyindeki Türk Kavimleri ve Devletleri*, pp. 83-4; Kırzıo lu, *K ıpçaklar*, pp. 112, 122.

171 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, II, p. 4. His first wife was an As princess.

172 Stephannos Orbelian, *Histoire de la Siounie*, trans. M. Brosset (St. Petersburg, 1864), I, pp. 218-21; Javakhishvili, *K'art'veli eris istoria*, II, pp. 240-3, 246; Lordkipanidze, *Ist. Gruzii*, pp. 138-40. The unfortunate Demna, now blinded and castrated, failed to recover from his injuries.

173 E.g. the Atabeg Shams al-Dīn Eldigüz/El-Dengüz, ruler of much of Azarbayjan, reg. 1137-5 and founder of a dynasty there and the Sökmenid beylik in Axlāṭ in Eastern Anatolia, see Z.M. Buniiatov, *Gosudarstvo atabekov Azerbajdzhana (1136-1225 gody)* (Baku, 1978); O. Turan, *Doău Anadolu Türk Devletleri Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1973), p. 103

174 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, II, p. 30.

175 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, II, pp. 30-2.

176 See Javakhishvili, *K'art'veli eris istoria*, II, pp. 247ff; Lordkipanidze, *Ist. Gruzii*, pp. 143-6.

177 This is a Muslim name (Abu'l-Ḥasan) and he may have been one of the leading Muslim merchants in the city. S.T. Eremian (Yeremyan), 'Iurii Bogoliubskii v armianskikh i gruzinskikh istochnikakh' *Nauchnye Trudy Erevanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta*, 23 (1946), pp. 395, 399, however, identifies him with the Armenian noble, Amir K'urd Arcruni, as the post of *amira* of T'bilisi (who was also the deputy minister of finances) was in the hereditary possession of the Artsruni house. Muslim names were not unknown among the Christian elite.

178 Ju. A Limonov, *Letopisanie vladimirsko-suzda'skoi Rusi* (Leningrad, 1967), p. 75, suggests he may have been born in the early 1170's. Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, p. 359, places his birth ca. 1160.

179 On his turbulent career, see E.S. Hurwitz, *Prince Andrej Bogolubskii: The Man and the Myth* (Studia Historica et Philologica, XII, Setion Slavica 4, Firenze, 1980).

180 *PSRL*, I, cc. 282-3, II, c. 259.

181 Hurwitz, *Prince Andrej Bogoljubskii*, p. 18.

182 Golden, 'The *Polovci Dikii*' *HUS*, III-IV (1979-80), p. 300. The name (Bañaq/Mañaq/Böngäk, Rus', БОНЯКЬ, Byz. Μανιάκ), may be etymologized in several ways. L. Rásonyi, 'Kuman Özel Adları' *Türk Kültürü Araşstırmaları*, III-IV (1966-9), p. 95: *Böñek < Chagh. *bön*- Osm. *böna* 'alt werden, altersschwach werden' i.e. 'weak from old age' (?), with which there are problems. Osm. has *bön* (Old Osm. *böng*بونك) 'imbecile, simple, foolish' and *buna*- (Old Osm. *bunga*-) 'to enter upon dotage, to become imbecile,' *bunak* (*bungaq*) 'in second childhood, dotard' (see *Redhouse Yeni Türkçe-Ingilizce Sözlük* (3rd. ed., Istanbul, 1979), pp. 196, 200. Rásonyi discounted the Byzantine form found in Anna Comnena (Μανιάκ, see Gy. Moravcsik, *Byazantinoturcica* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1958), II, p. 181), but this clearly refers to the Cuman chieftain of the 1090's, i.e. the Bonjak of the Rus' sources. Given the well-known *b*- ~ *m*- alternation in Turkic and the Rus' *o* in the first syllable often for Turkic *a* in East Slavic (cf. *kogan* for *kagan*), the latter form, *Manyaq/Banyaq* may be correct. In this case, the, the name should be derived from Turk. *manyaq/mañaq/bañaq* (Clauson, *ED*, p. 350) 'dung.' These names are of the 'protective' or repellent-protective type.

183 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, II, pp. 36-7.

184 Hurwitz, *Prince Andrej Bogoljubskii*, pp. 12, 99n.37, the Tver' Chronicle (*PSRL*, XV, cc. 250-4) says she was Bulgarian.

185 Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, pp. 359-60, characterized him as an 'embittered young refugee' who 'later became a bold and unscrupulous adventurer.' Vernadsky implies that Iurii's upbringing among the Qipchaqs was the source of his personal problems. The Georgian sources, *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, II, pp. 40-1, however, portray him as a drunken homosexual.

186 See discussion in Lordkipanidze, *Ist. Gruzii*, pp. 147-52; Eremian, 'Iurii Bogoljubskii' *NTEGU*, 23 (1946), pp. 397, 403, 410, 413-14.

187 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, II, p. 53.

188 Perhaps a form confused with and contaminated by the Rus' Savalat'/Vsevolod noted above.

189 *K'C'*, ed. Qaukhch'ishvili, II, pp. 64-5. On events in Azarbayjan, see Buniiatov, *Gosudarstvo atabekov*, pp. 88ff.

190 Javakhishvili, *K'art'veli eris istoria*, II, pp. 273-88; Turan, *Do u Anadolu*, pp. 103-8; Kırzıo lu , *Kıpçaklar*, pp. 139-143.

191 Kirakos Gandzakec'i, *Istoriia Armenii*, trans. L.A. Khanlarian (Moskva, 1976), pp. 138-9; Sebastac'i's account is found in A.G. Galstian, *Armianskie istochniki o mongolakh* (Moskva, 1962), p. 23; see also Buniiatov, *Gosudarstvo atabekov*, pp. 114ff.

192 See account of Ibn Khaldūn, *Ta'rīkh al-'Alāma* (Beirut, 1983), IX, pp. 273 and 290, who tells of a certain Sabīr Jankish was sent to the Qipchaqs, apparently in the Darband region, to ask for their aid. Some 300 of them, led by their king Kürgen, 'crossed the sea' and joined Jalāl al-Dīn. A fuller account of this episode is given by al-Nasawī, *Sīrat al-Sulṭān Dzhalāl al-Dīn Mankburnī*, ed. trans. Z.M. Buniiatov, (Moskva, 1996), Arabic text, pp. 198-9/Russ. trans. p. 213, who gives the name of his emissary as Sirjankishi. The 'king' is noted as Kür/Gür xān, a title associated with the Qara Khitay. The form in Ibn Khaldūn may be read as Kürkän or Kür described as 'one of their kings.'

193 Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, ed. Rowshan, Mūsāwī, I, pp. 650-1, Eng. trans. J.A. Boyle, *The Successors of Genghis Khan* (New York, 1971), pp. 43-4.

194 Al-Yāqūbī, *Kitāb al-Buldān*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1892), pp. 258-9.

195 See A. Ghlonti, *K'art'veluri sakut'ari saxelobi. Ant'roponimt'a lek'sikoni* (T'bilisi, 1967), p. 84.

CHAPTER 3

THE KHAZAR QAGHANATE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EARLY RUS' STATE: THE *TRANSLATIO IMPERII* FROM ITIL TO KIEV

THOMAS S. NOONAN

For those reared on conventional medieval Russian or Rus' history, the above title probably sounds a little absurd. Everyone 'knows' that the Rus' state was shaped by foreign influences coming initially from Scandinavia via the Vikings and then from Byzantium via commerce and later the conversion to Orthodox Christianity. In the conventional histories, the Khazars are often ignored or, when mentioned, they are cast as nomadic competitors who blocked Rus' expansion to the south but were finally defeated and destroyed by Grand Prince Sviatoslav ca. 965. In short, the Khazars only played a nominal role, at best, in the development of the Kievan state. Stimulated by the editors' challenge to explore the role that nomads played in the socio-economic and political development of the sedentary world, this essay will address two key issues. First, the diversity of the Qaghanate's population and institutions will be examined so that we can better understand what kind of society existed in Khazaria and why certain of its practices might have been appealing to sedentary neighbouring peoples such as the Rus' who were in the process of creating their own state. Then, this essay will attempt to explore the important contribution of the Qaghanate to the political ideas and practices of the early Rus' state so that we can respond to the fundamental question raised by this volume.

THE DIVERSITY OF THE QAGHANATE'S POPULATION

To understand the impact of Khazaria on the early Rus' state, it is first necessary to consider the Khazar state and Khazar society as it existed in the ninth and first half of the tenth centuries. The population of the Khazar Qaghanate or Khazaria was very heterogeneous and we must take great care with the way such terms as Khazar and Khazaria are employed. There is a tendency to describe the inhabitants of the Qaghanate as Turks, nomads, Jews or some other word that is inevitably misleading and inaccurate. The Khazar Qaghanate in fact contained a number of very diverse peoples who spoke a

variety of languages, followed a variety of faiths, spent their lives engaged in a variety of survival strategies, and belonged to a variety of local communities. Any effort to understand the society of the Khazars and its impact on the Rus' must take this diversity into account. The Qaghanate did not possess the rather uncomplicated, homogeneous society that such terms as Turk, nomad or Jew suggest. It is thus necessary to go beyond traditional models and think in terms of a number of nomadic and semi-nomadic groups coexisting over the course of several centuries with a number of sedentary and semi-sedentary groups in a very heterogeneous, multi-ethnic state. Furthermore, peoples within the Qaghanate could pass from the sedentary world to the nomadic one and vice versa. Survival strategies and ways of life were not fixed and immutable.

In addition to the ethnic Khazars, the Khazar Qaghanate or Khazaria was inhabited by some twenty-five to twenty-eight distinct peoples.[1] The Khazars themselves formed the ruling elite of this multi-ethnic empire and were apparently divided into nine groups (clans/tribes?) or areas.[2] The land of the Pechenegs, a neighbouring tribe of Turkic nomads frequently at odds with the Khazars, consisted of eight provinces, each of which had its own name and own prince. Each province apparently belonged to a particular clan and each province was subdivided into five districts.[3] Consequently, it would be reasonable to assume that each of the nine Khazar provinces was the home of one Khazar clan or tribe, was subdivided into smaller districts, and was ruled by a prince who presumably had some relationship or connection with the *khagan*. These nine regions of ethnic Khazaria evidently reflect the parcelling out of the steppe lands among the nine clans of the Khazars with each receiving an area commensurate with its relative rank and status. Aside from the clan/tribal divisions among the Khazars, one source suggests that there may well have also been some racial or social distinction between the swarthy, black-haired Qara Khazars (Black Khazars) and the white Khazars who were reported to have been extremely handsome.[4] The ethnic Khazars were thus divided into nine groups or clans each of which had grazing rights over a particular area within the Khazar homeland and each of which was headed by its own governor. The complexion of the ethnic Khazars also varied from swarthy to white which points to their heterogeneity. The ethnic Khazars, like most peoples of nomadic origin, were not a uniform, homogeneous race.

At the top of the Khazar ruling elite were the *khagan/khāqān* and the *beg/īsha*. By the tenth century, the power of the *khagan* was largely ceremonial while the *beg* was responsible for the actual administration of the military and civilian affairs of the Qaghanate.[5] This so-called dual kingship was typical of many Turkic nomadic groups. The Khazar ruling elite had converted to Judaism sometime prior to ca. 870.[6] However, it appears that many Khazars had remained followers of Tengri.[7] In addition to the ethnic Khazar converts, a number of Jews from the Islamic world and Byzantium had migrated to

Khazaria following the conversion.[8] Consequently, even the Jewish Khazars constituted a diverse collection of elite Khazar Turks, Jews from Byzantium (especially those forced to flee due to the persecutions of the emperor Romanus Lecapenus)[9] and Jews coming from a number of Muslim lands. The Khazars of the Khazar Qaghanate therefore consisted of a combination of some ethnic Khazar Turks and various immigrants who followed Judaism along with other ethnic Khazar Turks who remained pagans. These Khazars were kept together by a form of dual kingship in which the figurehead ruler, the *khagan/khāqān*, provided legitimacy while the *beg/īsha* was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the empire.

The written sources tell us relatively little about the daily life of the ethnic Khazars or how they made their living. The Khazar ruling establishment apparently spent the winter in two large towns and in the spring went out into the steppes where it remained till the next winter.[10] Istakhrī provides more detailed information when he notes that residents of the Khazar capital of Ītil spend their summers working on the numerous farms that extend for up to twenty leagues from the capital. The crops raised on these fields as well as those along the river (probably the Volga) were transported both by cart and boat to Ītil.[11] This report is confirmed by King Joseph who stated: 'From the month of Nisan (around April) we go out from the city (Ītil), each man to his vineyard and to his field and to his tillage.'[12] Joseph also mentioned his fields and vineyards located on the island in which he rules, i.e., in the capital of Ītil.[13] At the same time, we hear of the many (4,000 or 40,000) vineyards south of the ancient Khazar capital of Samandar on the Caspian coast in what is now Daghestan as well as the numerous gardens in and around Samandar.[14] These reports are confirmed by Gardīzī who refers to the many tilled fields and orchards in the Khazar land.[15] These sources leave no doubt that many ethnic Khazars, and especially those residing in the main cities of Ītil and Samandar, had become sedentarized agriculturalists and viticulturalists. Having passed the winter in towns, they spent the entire growing season on their farms and vineyards which surrounded these towns. These Khazars were certainly not pastoral nomads.

The spread of agriculture among the Khazars was hardly unique. As we shall see, agriculture occupied an important role among both the Turkic Volga Bulghārs and the Turkic Burtās. Our sources also note that other Turkic nomads of the steppe and forest-steppe whose lands bordered on those of the ethnic Khazars combined nomadic pastoralism with sedentary life. Mas'ūdī, for instance, reported that the four Turkish tribes of the Banja, Bajghird, Bajnāk and Nūkurda who lived adjacent to the Khazars were 'both nomad and settled.'[16] The same source mentioned that sedentary Turkic tribes lived along the lower and middle Volga and that their settlements extended 'in an uninterrupted succession between the Khazar kingdom and the Burghar (= Volga Bulghārs).'[17] There is no doubt that farming assumed a major place in the society of most of the Turkic peoples in southeastern Europe during the Khazar era.

On the other hand, a number of ethnic Khazars had apparently remained pastoral nomads. There are reports of the many sheep in the Khazar country including the famous ones which were supposedly able to give birth twice a year.[18] We also hear of the grazing grounds in the Khazar mountains as well as the sheep exported from Khazaria.[19] Thus there can be no doubt that extensive pastoralism existed among the Khazars although the paucity of information in our sources suggests that it was far less significant than one might assume if the Khazars were primarily nomads.[20] When our sources describe truly nomadic Turkic pastoralists, they invariably emphasize the quantity of their sheep and horses.[21] Finally, some Khazars were apparently involved in apiculture.[22] In short, by the tenth century, the Khazars of the Qaghanate were a motley group of converts to Judaism as well as traditional pagans who were engaged in agriculture, viticulture, and pastoral nomadism.

The Khazar ruling elite dominated a heterogeneous conglomeration of peoples stretching from the borders of Khwārazm in the east to the lower Danube in the west and from the northern Caucasus in the south to the middle reaches of the Volga and Dnepr rivers in the north. The Qaghanate was not a peaceful confederation of diverse peoples inhabiting the steppe and forest zones of southeastern Europe. Rather, it was an empire composed largely of peoples and countries which had been conquered by the Khazars and were kept obedient by the threat of force. Furthermore, the Khazars had hostile neighbours on almost all of their frontiers. For the first century of its existence (ca. 650-ca. 750), the Khazars fought a hundred years' war with the Umayyad caliphate for control of the Caucasus. While this struggle ended with the partition of the Caucasus, it did not bring an end to Khazar involvement in both offensive or defensive wars. In the ninth and tenth centuries, the Khazars had conflicts with the Rus' to their north[23], the Pechenegs[24], Black Bulghārs[25] and Ghuzz[26] in the surrounding steppe, the Alans[27] and others[28] in the northern Caucasus, and the Byzantines in the Crimea and northeastern Caucasus[29], to name just a few hostile neighbours. At times, the Khazars found it necessary to deal with formidable coalitions of their enemies. In the 890s, for example, the Alans provided invaluable military assistance to the *khagan* when the Khazars were attacked by a dangerous alliance of Byzantines, Pechenegs, Kuban/Black Bulghārs, Torks, and Burtās.[30] In addition, the Khazars had to confront a series of revolts and potential revolts by subordinate peoples in the Qaghanate[31] as well as civil wars arising from amongst their own ranks.[32] The Khazars thus found it necessary to maintain a large military establishment in order to perpetuate their domination over many unwilling subjects.

The Khazar military establishment, as might be expected, was also multi-national. It was nominally headed by the *khagan* but the real commander-in-chief was apparently the *beg*.[33] Aside from the Khazar units per se, many of which may well have been furnished by other members of the Khazar elite,[34] the army consisted of two other types of units, mercenaries and conscripts from subordinate peoples. The mercenaries were primarily hired from amongst the Muslims of Khwārazm.[35] According to one report, these troops numbered some 7,000 well-armed cavalry as well as lancers ca. 943.[36] These Muslim mercenaries served the Qaghanate on condition that they would only fight infidels; when the *khagan* was at war with Muslims, they would remain aloof from the rest of the army and not fight. In addition, the Muslim mercenaries were allowed to practice their religion openly and have mosques.[37] The prohibition against the Muslim mercenaries fighting other Muslims intruded into other aspects of the Qaghanate's activities. Around 912, a Rūs force of some 500 ships was allowed to sail down the lower Volga into the Caspian on condition that they give the Khazar king half the booty they obtained from the Muslims living along the Caspian coasts. After devastating the Muslim communities in what is now Azarbayjan and starting their return home, the Rūs found that the *khagan*'s Muslim mercenaries as well as many other Muslims in the Qaghanate were enraged. Not only was the king forced to renege on his deal, but a Muslim force of about 15,000 slaughtered the Rūs who for some reason left their boats to fight on land. It is interesting to note that on this occasion some Christians living in the capital joined with their Muslim brethren to fight the pagan Rūs marauders.[38] This story vividly illustrates the limitations of a Muslim mercenary corps in a multi-ethnic empire, especially when the Jewish ruling elite conspired with pagans from the north to loot the Muslim population of a nearby region.

The conscripts came from such dependent peoples as the Burtās who dwelt directly to the north of the Khazars. The Burtās, as several sources note, were obedient to the Khazars and provided the *khagan* with ten thousand mounted troops.[39] It can be assumed that the more discontented peoples in the Qaghanate were not asked to furnish troops since these forces could not be trusted. The Bulghārs of the middle Volga, for example, strongly resented Khazar rule and had established ties with the caliph in Baghdad in an effort to obtain military assistance against their Khazar overlords.[40] Some non-Khazar peoples in or bordering on the Qaghanate were recruited to fight for the Khazars in particular campaigns. As noted above, the Alans provided invaluable military assistance to the *khagan* when the Khazars were attacked by a coalition of five neighbours in the 890s. Later, in the early tenth century, the Torks/Ghuzz were hired to aid the Khazars against a Byzantine-inspired Alan attack.[41] Finally, some of the pagan Rūs and Saqāliba, i.e., Vikings and Finns/East Slavs of central and northern Russia, who inhabited the capital also

served in the king's army.[42] Thus, Muslims were not the only mercenaries in the *khagan*'s military service. The Khazar army was a multi-national force composed of troops furnished by the Khazar elite, Muslim and pagan Eastern European mercenaries, units recruited from amongst the more loyal of the subject peoples, and forces hired from amongst neighbouring peoples in times of distress.

Thanks to Ibn Fadlān, we possess reasonably good knowledge of the relations between the Khazars and their subject peoples. First of all, the Bulghārs were required to pay the Khazars a tribute of one sable skin per household.[43] Then, to insure their loyalty, the Bulghār ruler had to turn over his son to be held as a hostage by the *khagan*. When the *khagan* learned that the Bulghār ruler also had a beautiful daughter, he demanded that she be sent to him. The Bulghār ruler refused, whereupon the Khazar king 'sent troops and seized her by force...'[44] This information is confirmed by an independent source. *The Russian Primary Chronicle* reported that the East Slavic Polianian, Severian, and Viatichian tribes of the middle Dnepr and upper Volga paid the Khazars a tribute of one squirrel skin per hearth.[45] The same source noted, about a generation later, that two East Slavic tribes, the Radimichians of the middle Dnepr and the Viatichians of the upper Volga, paid a tribute to the Khazars of one silver coin (*dirham*) per ploughshare.[46] This suggests that when silver coins were readily available the tribute could be paid in coin rather than fur. The subject peoples may also have been subject to other forms of taxation. Iṣtakhrī noted, for example, that the Khazar king received 'regular payments assessed on the people of the different places and districts, consisting of every description of food, drink, etc. ...'[47] We also learn that the Muslim population of the capital paid annual taxes to the Khazars based on its wealth.[48] In sum, the Khazar Qaghanate was composed of around twenty-five such subject peoples like the Bulghārs and East Slavic tribes who paid tribute and other taxes and who were forced to provide hostages to guarantee their good behavior.[49] The Qaghanate was thus a multi-ethnic empire held together by the superior military force of the Khazars. This superior military force enabled them to impose tribute upon their dependent peoples and this tribute, in turn, helped the Khazars to maintain their military supremacy by giving them the ability to recruit mercenaries.

The tribute paid by dependent peoples was only one of the two main sources of income possessed by the Khazar ruling elite. According to one informant, the treasury of the Khazar king depended on the 'customs-dues and tithes on merchandise ... from every land route and sea and river.'[50] Other sources mention the duties paid by merchants to the Khazar administration. Rūs' merchants, for instance, paid a tithe to the Khazar officials when they travelled through Khazaria to the south, presumably at the capital of Ītil.[51] The Khazar practice of collecting a tithe was also adopted by the Volga Bulghārs.

When ships arrived in the Bulghār land from Khazaria, the Bulghār ruler 'rides out, takes stock of what is on board and takes a tenth of the entire merchandise. When the Rūs or members of some other races come with slaves, the King has the right to choose for himself one out of every ten head.'[52] It is reasonable to conclude that the Khazar rulers, like those of the Bulghārs, collected a tenth of everything that was brought through their lands by merchants. The huge revenues generated by the tithes along with the enormous tribute from twenty-five or so different dependent peoples enabled the Khazars to hire the mercenaries needed to keep their subject peoples in line, defend themselves from attack, and provide safe markets where merchants from all over western Eurasia could safely exchange their goods.

The heterogeneity of the ethnic Khazars, such institutions as their army, and their empire was also reflected in the Khazar capital of Ītil. According to most of our sources, Ītil consisted of two parts. The *khagan* and Khazar ruling elite resided in the western half which was called Khazarān.[53] Here one found the *khagan*'s castle, a large brick building which stood out amongst the felt tents and small clay dwellings in this part of town.[54] It should be noted, parenthetically, that the presence of so many felt tents in the 'Khazar' section of the capital unquestionably reflects the nomadic traditions of the Khazar ruling elite. In fact, these tents might represent a symbol of nomadism for an elite that now resided in the capital for a good part of each year and then spent the rest of the year tending their fields outside the town. The eastern part, called Ītil, was inhabited by a motley population that included Muslims, Christians, and pagans. Among the latter were Rūs' and Saqāliba from central and northern Russia.[55] Most of the population in the eastern part of town were Muslims, the number supposedly amounting to more than 10,000.[56] The Muslim inhabitants were primarily the royal mercenaries although many Muslim merchants and artisans dwelt in Ītil. One report even states that numerous merchants and craftsmen settled in Khazaria due to the law and order prevailing there.[57] Since the eastern half was the commercial and merchant section, it apparently contained a number of warehouses where merchandise was kept.[58] Given the large Muslim population of Ītil, it is not surprising that a cathedral mosque with a minaret rising above the royal castle could be found there as well as other mosques which had schools where the Qur'ān was taught.[59] Another report notes that Muslims were to be found in both Khazarān and Ītil along with mosques, imams, muezzins and schools.[60] In fact, the number of Jews was smaller than the number of Muslims and Christians[61], which prompted one commentator to speculate that 'were the Muslims and Christians to enter into an agreement, the king would have no means (to oppose them).'[62]

Despite the large number of Muslims in Khazaria and their key role in the military and commerce, there were limits to Khazar toleration of them. Ibn

Fadlān mentioned the Friday mosque where the Muslims in Ītil worshiped and the destruction of its minaret by the *khagan* in 922/3 after he learned that a synagogue in Dar al-Babunj had been destroyed by Muslims. According to Ibn Fadlān, the *khagan* commented: 'Had I not feared that not a single synagogue would remain in the land of Islam, I would have destroyed the mosque.'[63] When Jews elsewhere were oppressed by Muslims, the Muslim population of Khazaria was made to pay. But these instances of intolerance and religious strife between Muslim and Jew seem to have been so rare in Khazaria that most Muslim sources make no mention of them. The Khazar capital of Ītil was thus a multi-ethnic and religiously diverse town which served both as the residence of the Khazar ruling elite and as the great emporium where merchants from all over western Eurasia could conduct their business in safety.

Given the heterogeneous population of the capital as well as the importance of commerce for Khazaria, a complex judicial system had to be created to handle the disputes that might arise amongst the many residents and visitors. The classic account of the Khazar legal system was given by Mas'ūdī who stated that there were 'seven judges, two of them for the Muslims, two for the Khazars giving judgment in accordance with the Torah, two for the Christians giving judgment in accordance with the Gospel, and one for the Saqāliba, the Rūs and other pagans giving judgment according to pagan (custom), i.e., according to the commands of Reason.'[64] It is not clear what happened if these seven judges could not agree. According to Mas'ūdī: 'when a case of major importance is brought up before them and they do not know how to settle it, they meet with the Muslim qādīs (judges) and submit their decision and follow the ruling of the sharī'at.'[65] However, another source indicates that the *khagan* was apparently consulted by these seven judges on the more significant legal cases.[66] To complicate matters even further, Ibn Fadlān indicates that a Muslim chosen from among the *khagan*'s servants presided over the Muslim side of the capital and acted as a judge for the Muslim merchants who came there on business.[67] Given the importance of the Muslim mercenaries and merchants, it is not inconceivable that they enjoyed some special legal privileges. At the same time, it also seems probable that the *beg* functioned as a kind of court of last appeal in contentious cases, especially those that might be politically sensitive. In any event, the Khazar legal system tried to accommodate the diverse population of the capital and provide everyone with a judge knowledgeable about their judicial system. A multi-confessional judiciary arose to accommodate the needs of a multi-confessional population.

The diversity that existed among the ethnic Khazars, their institutions, and their towns was also encountered among the subject peoples. The Turkic Burtās, for example, had no king or leaders. Instead, two men in each settlement had legal and administrative power.[68] The Burtās economy was quite diverse. They had tilled fields, a highly developed apiculture, and were

famous for their furs. At the same time, there were an abundance of camels, swine and oxen among them.[69] While the Burtās religion was like that of the Ghuzz (Tengri worship), their burial customs included both cremation and inhumation.[70] The Burtās thus possessed a highly decentralized political system quite different from that of their Khazar overlords, combined agriculture, pastoralism, apiculture, and foraging in their economy, and buried their dead in quite different ways.

The Volga Bulghārs also had a very diverse society. Thanks to Ibn Fadlān's visit to Volga Bulghāria in 922, we possess an invaluable primary source based upon considerable first-hand information. While a king (amīr) ran the country, his rule was contested. On one occasion, for instance, when the amīr summoned a group called the Suwāz to come with him, they refused and two factions arose among them. One group was headed by the amīr's son-in-law who proceeded to proclaim himself king. The second Bulghār faction was headed by a certain King Eskel who proclaimed allegiance to the amīr.[71] Another report states that the Bulghārs were divided into three groups: Bṛsūlā, Eskel, and Bolgār.[72] We also hear of a group of some five thousand Bulghārs belonging to the Baranjār family who had built a wooden mosque for themselves.[73] Thus, there were significant political differences amongst the Bulghārs. Aside from fending off internal enemies, the amīr was quite determined to put an end to Khazar domination and constantly complained to Ibn Fadlān that he needed the caliph's help to free himself from the Khazars 'who have enslaved me.'[74] In sum, the Bulghārs had a much greater degree of political organization than the Burtās although they were also divided into various factions. Given this relatively strong organization and the great revenues they collected from their subjects as well as foreign merchants, it is no wonder that the Bulghārs actively sought to end Khazar rule.

The economy of Volga Bulghāria was quite diverse and prosperous. Ibn Fadlān, for example, was so impressed that he told the amīr that 'Your kingdom is extensive, your wealth abundant and your tax revenues are many.'[75] While the amīr paid tribute to the khagan, he himself collected a sable skin from each household in his lands. The amīr also derived considerable income from the booty obtained in raids against other peoples as well as from a tithe on the merchandise brought by visiting merchants to the Bulghār markets.[76] While some nomadic traditions were maintained, (e.g., Ibn Fadlān noticed that everyone lived in tents[77]), agriculture was apparently extensive. We hear, for instance, that the Bulghārs had 'tilled, sown fields' and that they sow grains such as wheat, barley, leeks, lentils, pulse, and other things.[78] Another source noted that the Bulghārs ate much millet while wheat and barley were plentiful.[79] Barley and barley soup were so readily available that they constituted the mainstays in a slave's diet.[80] Fishing seems to have been widespread since the Bulghārs primarily used fish oil rather than olive oil or sesame oil for cooking.[81] Apiculture was also developed since much honey was collected from the wild beehives in the forests.[82] Honey was so abundant that when people married, they gave the amīr a portion of honey.[83] The Bulghārs also gathered something akin to maple syrup in their forests.[84] The Bulghārs also raised many horses.[85] Foreign trade was one of the mainstays of the Bulghār economy. Muslim merchants from Central Asia met in Bulghār with Rūs' merchants coming from the upper Volga. It was this commerce which produced the millions of Sāmānid dirhams found throughout European Russia and the Baltic lands.[86] In addition, there was considerable trade along the Volga between the Khazars and the Volga Bulghārs.[87] But, the Bulghārs, unlike the Khazars, did more than just collect a tithe from merchants passing through their lands. Bulghār merchants were active in the lands of the Turks to their south and east from whence they obtained sheep and in the lands of the Wīsū/Ves in northwestern Russia where they acquired sable and black fox furs.[88] Furs were so important in Bulghār trade that one source even claimed that their 'trade is entirely in sable (or marten), ermine, and squirrel.'[89] Agriculture and apiculture played major roles in the Bulghār economy while aspects of nomadism (horse breeding) continued. These activities combined with an extensive foreign trade made the Bulghār lands very rich.

Despite their active commerce and an extensive agriculture, certain nomadic traditions persisted among the Bulghārs. Istakhrī noted, for instance, that they lived in buildings of wood during the winter while they spent the summer in tents scattered around the country.[90] This pattern of alternating residences suggests that despite their large towns and extensive agriculture, the Bulghārs had not yet become complete sedentaries.

As is well known, the amīr and many, if not most, Bulghārs were Muslims.[91] Mosques, Muslim schools, muezzins and imams could all be found in Volga Bulghāria.[92] This conversion to Islam had begun prior to Ibn Fadlān's visit but was not complete at the time of the visit. The head of one faction, King Eskel, was subject to the amīr although he had not himself become a Muslim.[93] Like the Khazars, the Bulghārs were a people in transition from 'paganism' to a religion of the book and some kept the old beliefs despite the spread of Islam in official circles.

It is, of course, possible to examine other peoples in the Qaghanate, especially the many diverse inhabitants of the northern Caucasus. But, our brief review of the Bulghārs and the Burtās has been sufficient to demonstrate that the peoples of Khazaria were as heterogeneous as the ethnic Khazars. The Khazars were a diverse people whose ruling elite governed a multi-ethnic empire composed of around twenty five tribes or groups each of which was also quite diverse. What then did this highly heterogeneous steppe empire have to offer the sedentary Rus' of the forest steppe and forest zones?

THE *TRANSLATIO IMPERII* FROM ĪTIL TO KIEV

It is not clear when the Khazars first extended their domination over the middle Dnepr region where the town of Kiev later arose. If the *Russian Primary Chronicle* is to be believed, the Khazars ruled this area by the mid-ninth century at the latest.[94] Archaeological evidence indicates, however, that Turkic nomads, possibly connected with the Qaghanate, were active in this area already in the late seventh and eighth centuries.[95] It is also not clear how long Khazar rule of the middle Dnepr lasted. The *Russian Primary Chronicle* implies that the Khazars lost control over this area by the 880s.[96] But, there are good reasons to believe that Khazar domination may have lasted until the first quarter of the tenth century or even into the 930s.[97] Khazar occupation of Kiev left behind various traces. The *Russian Primary Chronicle*, for instance, mentions, under the year 945, a Khazar quarter in Kiev.[98] The so-called 'Kievan Letter,' found in the Cairo Geniza, was a letter of recommendation written ca. 930 by representatives of the Jewish community in Kiev on behalf of a certain Mar Jacob, a member of the community who had suffered great financial reverses and was now being sent abroad to try to raise the money he needed for his debts.[99] For our purposes it is most significant that among the names of the Jewish signatories were 'six Khazarian Turkic personal names.' Golb concludes from this fact that these Kievan Jews were originally of Khazar stock; upon conversion to Judaism, their old tribal names remained in use for some time.[100] In short, the extension of Khazar control into the middle Dnepr led to the settlement of various Khazars in the small town of Kiev where they constituted the local ruling elite and functioned as governors, lesser officials,[101] and soldiers as well as merchants. In short, there was a well established Khazar community running Kiev for most of the period between ca. 850 and ca. 930.

Recent scholarship suggests that the Rus' first settled in Kiev in significant numbers starting around 880.[102] Very soon they began to transform the future capital from several small, distinct villages into a larger town of stature. By the early tenth century, they made Kiev and the middle Dnepr part of the Islamic trade for the very first time and almost simultaneously developed an active commerce with Constantinople.[103] During the course of the tenth century, Kiev emerged as the center of a major state as its Rus' rulers overthrew Khazar domination and established themselves as independent 'princes,' expanded their tributary domain in the upper Dnepr, northwestern Russia, and along the upper Volga by subjecting a variety of East Slavic, Finnic and Baltic tribes to their control, and eliminated competing Rus' princes in other towns. However, aside from Rus' domination, there was nothing that united the heterogeneous peoples of the nascent Kievan state. They spoke different languages, practiced a variety of faiths, had diverse survival strategies, and had never been incorporated into the same polity before. Then, in the 970s, a vicious

internecine war over succession led Vladimir, the winner in this struggle, to realize that he and his successors faced two major challenges. First, they had to establish a legitimacy for their rule that went beyond conquest and military superiority. They had to convince the diverse peoples of their state that the Rus' princes of Kiev had a divine right to rule over them. Second, they had to create some higher loyalty that went beyond that of clan and tribe. This new supra-tribal identity would supersede the traditional allegiances that had divided these peoples for so long. In short, Vladimir had to foster the development of a Rus' people ruled by Kievan princes who were sanctified by some higher power.

The two tasks facing Vladimir were formidable. The various peoples of his Rus' state had never been incorporated into a single kingdom much less any large multi-ethnic state. In fact, each of these peoples was also divided into a series of often antagonistic tribes which spent much time fighting each other. Vladimir looked to conversion to provide the new cohesiveness and identity that the embryonic Rus' state so desperately needed as well as elevating the status of the Kievan princes and giving them a new legitimacy as God's chosen rulers over the Rus.' After rejecting paganism, Judaism, Islam, and Catholicism, he and his ruling elite chose Orthodoxy. Byzantine Christianity was to provide the cement to unite his disparate peoples and to legitimize his position as Grand Prince by casting him as God's viceroy here on earth. Vladimir's strategy worked. Orthodoxy became the glue that kept the Rus' together when their princes could not and it gave them an identity that distinguished them from their pagan, Catholic, and Muslim neighbours.

How does the Khazar legacy fit into the history of the early Rus' state? Around 1051, Grand Prince Iaroslav appointed the first native Rus' metropolitan of Kiev, a monk named Ilarion. While much controversy surrounds this unprecedented appointment, that is not what concerns us here. A few years before his appointment, Ilarion delivered his famous *Sermon on Law and Grace*.[104] In the *Sermon*, Ilarion hails Vladimir as the new Constantine who brought the true faith to Kiev and the Rus' just as Constantine made Christianity the religion of the Roman Empire. These sentiments are, of course, what one would expect from a Rus' monk writing about a prince who initiated the conversion of the Rus.' What is startling, however, are Ilarion's references to Vladimir as 'our *khagan*' and 'the great *khagan* of our land.'[105] Furthermore, Ilarion refers to his own patron, Grand Prince Iaroslav, the son of Vladimir and his 'divinely' chosen heir, as 'our devout *khagan*.'[106] How can the new Constantine also be the great *khagan* of the Rus' lands? Why does a Rus' metropolitan refer to both grand princes by the title of the Khazar ruler?

In his efforts to create a viable Rus' state, Vladimir had accepted Orthodoxy along with the legitimacy that came from being God's chosen ruler here on earth. But, Constantinople was faraway from the Rus' lands and its

ideology and beliefs were little known among the East Slavic, Baltic, and Finnic peoples of European Russia. The early Kievan Christian princes thus had to buttress their claims to be the rightful rulers of all the Rus' by appealing to an older tradition that was well known to the heterogeneous peoples of the emergent Rus' state. This was the idea of the Rus' prince as the *khagan*, the legitimate successor and heir of the Khazar *khagan*. This notion originated as early as the first half of the ninth century. In 839 a Byzantine embassy arrived at the court of the western Emperor in Ingelheim. In a letter which accompanied the embassy, the Byzantine emperor explained that along with his own envoys the embassy included some men called Rhos who had appeared in Constantinople claiming they had been sent there by their ruler who was known as Chacanus (*rex illorum Chacanus vocabulo*). The Byzantine emperor then requested that the western Emperor help these men return home since the route by which they had come to Constantinople was blocked by ferocious barbarians.[107] There is great controversy about the identity of this *khagan* and his relationship to the Rus.' Some believe that the Chacanus mentioned in the letter was the Khazar *khagan* who had sent Rūs/Rus' in his service to Constantinople. This approach might also suggest that Rūs/Rus' peoples were subjects of the Khazar *khagan*.[108] Others argue that there was a Rūs/Rus' *khagan* independent of Khazaria who had sent the envoys to Constantinople. The main dispute amongst these scholars is the location and origins of this supposed Rūs Qaghanate.[109] These interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Peter Golden, for example, has suggested that the title of *khagan* might well have been awarded to the ruler of the Rūs by the Khazar *khagan* as part of a Rūs/Rus'-Khazar alliance against the Magyars.[110] Alternatively, Pritsak has argued that the Khazar *khagan*, defeated in the Kabar revolt, fled to a Rūs/Rus' base on the upper Volga and thus transferred his charisma and title to them.[111] In any event, by the 830s, the Rus' were very familiar with the title of *khagan* either through their service to/subjugation by the Khazar *khagan* or as a title appropriated by one of the Rus' rulers who was independent of the Khazars. This development is not surprising since the Rus' had been visiting Khazaria on a regular basis since the late eighth/early ninth century.[112]

The existence of a Rus' *khagan* during the period after 839 is attested by several sources. An 871 letter from the western emperor to the Byzantine emperor refers to the rulers of the Avars, Khazars, Danubian Bulghārs and Nortmanni as *khagan*s. The Rus' are quite clearly meant by the term Nortmanni.[113] Both Ibn Rusta and Gardīzī note that the Rūs ruler is called the *khāqān/khagan* of the Rūs[114] while the *Hudūd al-'Ālam* states that the Rūs king is known as the Rūs khāqān.[115] The title of Rūs *khagan* was thus alive and well in the first half of the tenth century. As the Rus' princes in Kiev emancipated themselves from Khazar control and subjected the other Rus' princes to their

domination, they became heirs to the title of Rūs *khagan*. Their ancestors may have been Rūs *khagan*s before they moved their operations to Kiev ca. 880, they may have acquired the title by defeating the Rus' group that originally possessed it, or they simply may have claimed it when they replaced the Khazars as masters of the middle Dnepr. In any event, the Rus' princes of Kiev laid claim to the appellation of *khagan* that had existed among the Rus' since the first half of the ninth century.

The title of *khagan* was quite familiar to most of the diverse peoples in the new Kievan state. Those inhabiting the middle Dnepr and upper Oka had been under Khazar domination for some time while many of the others had been in contact with the Khazars if only directly for well over a century. Many of the people of the Rus' state were thus very accustomed to Khazar institutions and practices. The Rus' of Kiev knew from first-hand experience the implications of the title *khagan*. A true *khagan* was descended from the house of Ashina and possessed the mandate of heaven as the locus of all political and legal authority.[116] The Khazars like the Mongol khans had an imperial ideology, a pretention to be the legitimate rulers over other peoples. According to the *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, the Khazar *khagan* 'is one of the descendants of Ansā,' i.e., the charismatic Ashina clan whose members ruled the Türk Qaghanate in Mongolia during the sixth and seventh centuries.[117] Members of the charismatic Ashina clan had a 'heaven-mandated' right to rule over large nomadic tribal groupings.[118] These claims to descent from the Ashina clan, whether true of fictitious, served to raise the Khazar ruling elite above both nomads and sedentaries who lacked any imperial pedigree or claim to legitimacy. The Khazar claim to royal status via the Ashina clan exerted a very powerful influence upon the sedentary inhabitants of European Russia. Prior to the emergence of Khazaria, these peoples had never lived in a state like the late Roman empire where both secular and religious rulers advanced claims to universal sovereignty. Consequently, the Khazar claims to the mandate of heaven had a great impact upon these peoples. It was no accident that in the early tenth century the rulers of some of the Rūs claimed to be the Rūs *khagan*.

The Khazars thus claimed legitimacy as *khagan*s because of their descent from the charismatic ruling clan, and the Rus' grand princes of Kiev, in their turn, aspired to be recognized as successors of the Khazar *khagan*s. These pretensions were expressed, albeit indirectly, in the chronicle tale of the Khazars demanding tribute from the Polianian tribe of the Kiev region. The Polianians agreed and paid a tribute of one sword per hearth. This type of tribute created consternation among some members of the Khazar ruling elite who said to the *khagan* that one day 'these men shall impose tribute upon us and upon other lands.' To which the chronicler added: 'all this has come to pass, for they spoke thus not of their own will, but by God's commandment.'[119]

In other words, the Rus' princes of Kiev had conquered the Khazar *khagans* and had inherited their title with all its significance.[120]

But, why would the Rus' princes of Kiev lay claim to the title of *khagan*, a title held by a nomadic, Turkic, and Jewish ruler of a steppe empire so seemingly different from a sedentary, Rus,' and Christian ruler of the forest-steppe and forest? The Rus' of Kiev were aware that Khazar pretensions to universal rule were something to be reckoned with. The Khazar ruling elite led by the *khagan* provided the political unity and military muscle that transformed Khazaria into a multi-national empire. The Khazars who migrated into the north Caspian-Azov steppe and began the creation of an empire based in that region were a relatively homogeneous society of fairly typical pastoral nomads. Yet, even at this stage in their development, they successfully pursued a hundred-years' war to keep the Arabs/Islam south of the Caucasus mountains. There was no force north of the Caucasus except the Khazars that could have halted the Arab advance into this region. If it had not been for the Khazars, much of southeastern Europe would have been conquered by the Umayyads and 'Abbāsids and subsequently incorporated into the Islam world.[121] The Rus' of Kiev undoubtedly knew this history and understood how the mandate of heaven had helped the Khazars keep the Arabs out of southern Russia and Ukraine.

Having repulsed Arab expansion north of the Caucasus, during the ninth and first half of the tenth centuries the Khazars transformed Khazaria into a great but diverse empire. The Khazars at this time were quite mixed themselves. They consisted of nomads, semi-nomads, semi-sedentaries, and sedentaries who practiced a number of faiths and governed a motley empire of some twenty-five different peoples through administrative, military, and legal institutions that reflected the complex, multi-ethnic character of the Qaghanate. This transformation of an ambitious nomadic group into rulers of an empire that brought unity to southeastern Europe was a major accomplishment that often does not receive sufficient recognition. As Peter Golden has noted, the Khazar Qaghanate 'possessed all the attributes of an advanced, complex society or archaic empire. It had an ordered and regular government with an appropriate imperial ideology, a system of tax-collection, the means to achieve external goals and internal security and a more or less fixed territory.'[122] Many of the nomads who have inhabited the north Pontic steppes remained divided into a number of hostile tribes preoccupied with internecine warfare. The Pechenegs and Polovtsy are good examples of those 'stateless' nomads whose political structure never advanced beyond the tribal level. At most, such nomads produced ephemeral, personal states of the type associated with Attila. The Rus' princes of Kiev were well aware of the Khazars' great achievement and sought to replicate it. They desired to create a comparable empire led by a Rus' *khagan* whose capital was in Kiev.

As part of its transformation, Khazaria became a major center for international trade. The new capital at Ītil became the hub for much of the commerce in western Eurasia. In particular, it was the indispensable intermediary in the great trade between the Near East and European Russia/the Baltic. The Pax Khuzarica, the Khazar imposed peace in the southeastern European steppes, made it possible for merchants from all over western Eurasia to travel through Khuzaria safely and to conduct their business in Ītil without obstacles. And if difficulties did arise, there were judges of all faiths to help decide any disputes. Among other things, this great Islamic trade with northern Europe facilitated the rise of the Rūs/Rus' and Volga Bulghār states. The emerging Rus' state had also become the center for extensive commerce with the Islamic world, Byzantium, and the Baltic. And, just as the Khazar capital dominated the trade along the Volga with the Islamic world, so Kiev dominated the commerce with Byzantium via the Dnepr. Kiev's rulers no doubt sought to emulate the *khagan*s whose realm had prospered due to the revenues derived from trade and tribute.

Khazar domination and the resulting Pax Khazarica fostered the emergence of a diversified economy throughout the Qaghanate in which pastoralism, agriculture, apiculture, viticulture, foraging, and craft production could all flourish.[123] Such a highly diversified economy had only existed earlier under the Scythians and later under the Golden Horde. Extensive agriculture and a developed craft production were only possible when a well organized 'nomadic' state provided the necessary peace and security. They could not flourish when the steppe was dominated by 'stateless' nomads. Similarly, the Rus' princes of Kiev no doubt believed that the diversified economy of the Rus' lands could not flourish if they were ruled by some 'stateless' tribes of the forest whose horizons did not go beyond immediate, parochial concerns.

The Grand Princes of Kiev thus ruled over a heterogeneous empire of diverse peoples (East Slavs, Finns, Balts, Scandinavians, etc) each of which was divided into tribes and clans. Among these disparate peoples were nomads, semi-nomads, different types of agriculturalists, artisans, and foragers. The inhabitants of the Rus' state were also divided religiously into Norse, Slavic, Finnic, and Baltic pagans, Orthodox and Latin Christians, Muslims, and Jews. As in the Qaghanate, international trade was well developed and would provide great revenues if peace and stability could be established. Khazaria was not only familiar to the Rus' of Kiev, it was quite similar in many fundamental ways and the many successes of the Qaghanate seemed to give credence to the implications of a divine mandate surrounding the title of *khagan*.

Metropolitan Ilarion's references to Grand Princes Vladimir and Iaroslav as *khagan*s were not the idiosyncratic ramblings of some eccentric monk who lived in isolation from the political currents of his day. In the north gallery of the cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev was found a graffito which asked God 'to

save our *khagan*.' Since the graffito was found on a fresco of St. Nicholas and the Christian name of Grand Prince Sviatoslav II (1073-6) was Nicholas, the graffito is considered to have been a reference to an unsuccessful operation undergone by Sviatoslav not long before his death.[124] In other words, it was not uncommon for members of the ruling circle, both lay and clerical, to refer to the eleventh-century princes of Kiev as *khagan*s. Nor did this practice necessarily end in the eleventh century. The highly controversial *Igor Tale*, whose date and authorship are the subject of much dispute, also refers to the *khagan*s Sviatoslav, Iaroslav and Oleg.[125] Whether this tale was composed in the late twelfth century or was a forgery of the late eighteenth century is still unresolved while there is some debate about which princes are meant. Perhaps the most likely candidates are Sviatoslav II of Kiev (d. 1076) and his sons Iaroslav (d. 1129) and Oleg (d. 1115). If these are the princes memorialized in the *Igor Tale*, then there are only two possible conclusions. Either court troubadours of the late twelfth century preserved the old tradition of calling the eleventh-century Kievan princes as *khagan* or the composer of spurious Kievan court lyrics in the late eighteenth century thought it added an element of verisimilitude to refer to these princes as *khagan*. In either case, there was a tradition which endured until the late twelfth (or late eighteenth) century that the Grand princes of Kiev and their offspring were *khagan*s.

Having borrowed the title of *khagan* from the Khazars to help legitimize their rule over the motley population of their emerging state, it is natural to ask whether the Rus' of Kiev adopted other Khazar practices and institutions. Omeljan Pritsak, for example, has argued that the Khazar system of dual government by the *khagan* and *beg* was inherited by the Rus' rulers of Kiev. He cites Ibn Fadlān's report that the King of the Rūs 'has a viceregent who manages his armies, fights his enemies and represent him among his subjects.' Ibn Fadlān then goes on to indicate that the Khazar *beg*, not the *khagan*, 'leads the (Khazar) armed forces and manages them, conducts the affairs of the kingdom and assumes the burdens thereof, appears before the people and raids (external enemies).'[126] Since Ibn Fadlān did not visit either the Rūs or Khazar courts himself and all his information came from those he met in Volga Bulgharia, we must treat his information with due caution. Nevertheless, the parallel between the government of the Rūs/Rus' and that of the Khazars is remarkable. The Khazar division of administration between a ceremonial head of state and an active manager of daily affairs appears to have been adopted by some Rus' although it is very doubtful that the King of the Rūs mentioned by Ibn Fadlān resided in Kiev. Pritsak, however, does connect this system of dual administration with the Rus' of Kiev. He considers Prince Igor' of Kiev a *khagan* and argues that Igor's military commander or voevoda Sveneld was, in fact, a kind of Rus' *beg*. In sum, he refers to a *khagan*-voevoda system amongst the Rus' of Kiev and sees this as evidence of 'the influence of the

Khazar system of government on the Rus' state.'[127] In addition, Pritsak claims that the earliest system of succession to the Kievan throne followed the Altaic (Turko-Mongolian) practice of 'home-hearth' wherein 'the youngest sons received the father's role and key possessions.'[128] This practice presumably was introduced into Kievan Rus' via the Qaghanate. In short, Pritsak argues that two key institutions of the Kievan political system had Khazar roots.

Ibn Fadlān provides fairly convincing evidence that some Rūs/Rus' had borrowed the Khazar practice of a *khagan* and *beg*. However, the Rūs *khagan* mentioned by our sources appears to have had his seat somewhere in northern Russia rather than in Kiev. Furthermore, the Rus' who established themselves in Kiev starting in the late ninth century were only one group of Rus' out of the many which were active in European Russia during the ninth and tenth centuries. Even the *Russian Primary Chronicle*, the great propaganda work designed to legitimize the Riurikid dynasty of Kiev as the sole Rus' rulers, notes the existence of various non-Kievan Rus' princes.[129] While there is no direct evidence that the Riurikids of Kiev were influenced by the Khazar practice of having both a *khagan* and *beg*, there can be little doubt that they were familiar with this institution. The testimony of Ibn Fadlān makes it quite clear that some of the Rus' centered in northern Russian who dealt with the Volga Bulghārs had even adopted this dual kingship. But, although the Riurikids of Kiev were very familiar with the Khazar practice of *khagan* and *beg*, they did not necessarily adopt it. Such Riurikid princes as Igor,' Ol'ga, Sviatoslav, and Vladimir are very far removed from the ceremonial *khagan*s described by the Islamic sources. All four, for example, led military campaigns themselves and all four took an active role in governing the Kievan state. They did, however, undertake these activities in conjunction with their retinue. However, there is no reason to see the leaders of the princely retinue such as Sveneld as *beg*s who were entrusted with the actual administration of the government. Therefore, while the Khazar dual kingship was known to the Rus' of northern Russia and to the Riurikids of Kiev, it did not take root amongst the Rus' of Kiev. There is even less reason to credit a Khazar influence upon the system of succession that arose in Kiev. As Kollmann pointed out, starting with the death of Vladimir, no younger son of a Kievan Grand prince ever successfully defended his alleged claim to the grand-princely throne.[130] In a very recent study of the Kievan system of succession, Peter Golden concluded that the Kievan system of ascent by scales 'was one approach. widely found in Eurasia. In Rus,' taking into account the Riurikid's close ties with the steppe, it may have had Turkic steppe antecedents. But, it may just as easily be explained as one means of dealing with the question (of succession), analogies for which may be found in societies well-removed from the steppe.'[131] In short, Khazar political institutions may have served as a model for those which developed in Kiev but there is no conclusive proof for such borrowing.

Khazar borrowings may also have been present in such other Rus' practices as the system of tribute collection,[132] the use of troops collected from amongst the tributary peoples,[133] the hiring of mercenaries from neighbouring lands,[134] and the taking of hostages.[135] Nevertheless, it is difficult if not impossible to prove such influences. The Rus' of Kiev could draw on a host of practices starting with those brought from Scandinavia and the Baltic to European Russia where they interacted with the customs of the native Finnic, Baltic, East Slavic, and Turkic peoples. Given such a rich and diverse combination of potential sources, it is probably unproductive to attempt to determine if any one custom in particular came from a particular source such as the Qaghanate. The institutions of the Kievan Rus' were unquestionably syncretic in their origin. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Rus' of Kiev must have taken more from Khazaria than the title of its ruler.

Conclusion

Following his conversion to Orthodoxy, Vladimir found that he still needed to strengthen his position as the legitimate ruler of a heterogeneous state. Orthodoxy provided the basis for a new Rus' identity that superseded old tribal affiliations. However, being the representative of the God-given *basileus* in distant Constantinople was not sufficient to guarantee the political legitimacy of Vladimir and his immediate successors in the Rus' lands. Consequently, they also styled themselves as *khagan*s, the rightful successors of the Khazar rulers. As the new *khagan*s resident in Kiev, they inherited the mandate of heaven to rule over peoples. The Khazar legacy was later ignored or passed over in silence by the Christian monks who composed most of the Rus' sources. After all, how could the descendants of the new Constantine also be the rightful heirs of the Ashina clan and the Khazar *khagan*s. But, in the eleventh century, the charisma of the *khagan* was still very important. In short, the Khazar *khagan* was very familiar to many of the peoples in the Rus' state, Khazaria was sufficiently similar to the Rus' lands that the borrowing had relevance, and the title reinforced the legitimacy of the Rus' Grand Princes. When worthwhile, sedentary rulers had no hesitation in assuming the political ideology of their nomadic neighbours.

Notes

1 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 156-7, states that thee Khazar king had twenty-five wives each of whom was the daughter of a neighbouring ruler and had been taken either voluntarily or by compulsion. The Jewish traveler Eldad ha-Dani indicated that the Khazars took tribute from 25 or 28 kingdoms while the *Reply of King Joseph* suggests 28 tributary nations (see Dunlop, 1954, pp. 140-2).

2 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1949, Ch. 10, pp. 62-5, mentions the nine regions of Khazaria that border upon Alania while the *Reply of King Joseph* (Dunlop, 1954, pp. 140-2, 146) indicates that there were nine tributary nations along the Volga. Dunlop quite reasonably suggests that these nine nations formed the home province of the Khazars.

3 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1949, Ch. 37, pp.166-71; Marvazī, 1942, p. 29, reports that the Turkic Ghuzz were composed of twelve tribes.

4 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 96.

5 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 153-5; Gardīzī, 1982, pp. 153-4), where it is indicated that the *beg* collects his own taxes and decides on how to spend them; Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, 97; Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 148; Ibn Rusta quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 104.

6 See Zuckerman, 1995, pp. 237-70, for a recent study of this continuing controversy over when and how the conversion took place.

7 Ibn Rusta (quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 104) and Gardīzī (1982, p. 153) say that besides the Khazar ruling elite who were Jews, the other Khazars follow a religion like that of the Oghuz Turks. Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 54-5, states that the religion of the Oghuz/Ghuzz was 'Bir tengri,' 'God the One.' Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 146, states: 'The Jews are: the king, his *entourage* and the Khazars of his tribe.'

8 Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 146.

9 Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 146.

10 Gardīzī, 1982, p. 153; Ibn Rusta quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 105; and, Marvazī, 1942, p. 33.

11 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 93.

12 *The Reply of King Joseph* quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 149; Golden, 1980, p. 104.

13 Cited in Golden, 1980, p. 105, n. 326.

14 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 95.

15 Gardīzī, 1982, p. 155.

16 Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 212.

17 Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 148.

18 Muqaddasī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 224; al-Bakri quoted in Zakhoder, 1962, p. 139.

19 *Hudūd al-'Ālam,* 1970, pp. 160-1.
20 Zakhoder, 1962, p. 139, observed: 'But, it would be a mistake to think that cattle raising (i.e., pastoralism) occupied a significant place in the description of Khazar life by our sources. The oriental sources concentrate in a more detailed way on agriculture.'
21 Noonan, 1995-7, p. 256.
22 Gardīzī, 1982, p. 155.
23 *The Russian Primary Chronicle,* 1953, pp. 58, 61, 84.
24 Ibn Rusta (quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 105) and Gardīzī (1982, p. 154) report that the Khazars war with the Pechenegs each year. Also see Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1949, Ch. 37-38, pp. 166-75.
25 See Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1949, Ch. 12, pp. 64-5.
26 See Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1949, Ch. 10, pp. 62-5; Gardīzī, 1982, p. 154; Mas'ūdī, 1958, pp. 150-3.
27 See Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1949, Ch. 10-11, pp. 62-5.
28 The *Hudūd al-'Ālam* (1970, p. 155) states that the king of the Sarīr, whose kingdom adjoined that of the Alans, raided the Khazars successfully.
29 See Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1949, Ch. 11, pp. 64-5.
30 'The Schechter Text/Cambridge Document,' tr. and comm. in Golb and Pritsak, 1982, , pp. 113-16, 132-4.
31 The 'Abbāsid embassy to the Bulghārs in which Ibn Fadlān participated was sent in response to the Bulghār request for military aid against the Khazars (Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 25-6, 90).
32 The best known of these civil wars was that of the Kabars who revolted, were defeated, and then fled to the Magyars with whom they then joined. See Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 1949, Ch. 39, pp. 174-5.
33 Ibn Fadlān (1979, pp. 153-5) indicates that the *beg* 'leads the armed forces and manages them ...' However Gardīzī (1982, p. 154) reports that the King/khagan goes to war with ten thousand warriors, a statement more or less repeated by Marvazī (1942, p. 33). The latter reports may reflect an earlier practice that had been abandoned as the khagan became a more ceremonial figure.
34 This seems a reasonable interpretation of Gardīzī's statement (1982, p. 154) that part of the Khazar army comes from the clients and retainers of wealthy men.
35 Gardīzī (1982, p. 154) notes that part of the Khazar troops are salaried. Mas'ūdī (1958, pp. 146-7) states that the Muslims who form the royal guard in Khazaria 'are immigrants from the environs of Khwārazm' and that they 'are the mainstay of this king in his wars.'
36 Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 147. According to Istakhrī (quoted in Dunlop, 1954, pp. 92-3), the royal army consisted of 12,000 men. If these figures are

reasonably accurate, then the troops raised from amongst the Khazars themselves numbered around 5,000.
17 Mas'ūdī, 1958, 147.
18 Mas'ūdī, 1958, 150-3.
19 Gardīzī, 1982, pp. 154-5; Marvazī, 1942, p. 33.
40 According to Ibn Fadlān (1979, pp. 125-6) the Bulghār ruler requested the aid of the caliph to build a fortress due to his fear of the Khazar King.
41 'The Schechter Text/Cambridge Document,,' tr. and comm. in Golb and Pritsak, 1982, pp. 115-16, 136-7. The military importance of the Alans in these events no doubt arose from the fact that the Alan king could raise an army of some 30,000 cavalry. See Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 157.
42 Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 147.
43 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 125.
44 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 125-6.
45 *The Russian Primary Chronicle,* p. 59.
46 *The Russian Primary Chronicle,* pp. 61, 84.
47 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 93.
48 Gardīzī, 1982, pp. 153-4.
49 Ibn Fadlān, (1979, pp. 125-6) notes that the Khazar khagan had twenty-five wives each of whom was the daughter of a neighbouring king who either came voluntarily or was taken by force.
50 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 93.
51 According to Ibn Khurdādhbih (Pritsak (1970, p. 257), Rūs merchants passing through Khazaria on their way to Baghdad paid a tithe to Khazar officials. We can assume that all the other merchants who did business in Khazaria also paid a tenth to the Qaghanate's officials.
52 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 125.
53 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, pp. 91-2, 163.
54 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, pp. 91-2, who also states that the khagan was the only one permitted to build with brick.
55 Mas'ūdī, 1958, pp. 146. Mas'ūdī (1958, p. 146) also says that the capital consisted of three parts. In addition to the two parts on each side of the river he notes an island in the middle of the river where the *khagan's* castle stands. Ibn Fadlān (1979, pp. 158-9) indicates the *khagan* and *beg* resided in a great city along both banks of the Volga river. The Muslims lived on one side while the Khazar ruling establishment resided on the other.
56 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 92.
57 Mas'ūdī, 1958, pp. 147-8.
58 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 93
59 Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 147-8.
60 Gardīzī, 1982, pp. 153-4.

61 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 92.
62 Mas'ūdī, 1958, pp. 147-8.
63 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 159-60. The location of Dar al-Babunj is not certain (see p. 159, fn. 559).
64 Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 147. Also see Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 93. Istakhrī seemingly contradicts himself when he states (p. 92) that 'the predominating manners are those of the heathen ... Their legal decisions are peculiar, being according to old usages contrary to the religion of the Muslims, Jews, and Christians.'
65 Mas'ūdī, 1958, p. 147.
66 *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, 1970, pp. 161-2.
67 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 158-9.
68 Gardīzī, 1982, p. 155. An alternative report (*Hudūd al-'Ālam*, 1970, pp. 162-3) states that the Burtās had two kings who kept apart from each other. Marvazī, (1942, p. 33) supports Gardīzī by stating that the Burtās had no overall chieftain but an elder in each settlement settled their disputes.
69 Gardīzī, 1982, p. 156. The same source (p. 156) mentions that the territory going from the Burtās land to that of the Khazars was cultivated prairie with springs, trees, and rivers. Also see Marvazī, 1942, p. 34.
70 Gardīzī, 1982, p. 156; Marvazī, 1942, p. 33.
71 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 117-18. Elsewhere (pp. 125-6), Ibn Fadlān refers to the King of the Eskel who was subject to the amīr.
72 Gardīzī, 1982, p. 157. The *Hudūd al-'Ālam* (1970, p. 162) also notes the existence of three hordes among the Bulghārs and states that these hordes are at war with each other but unite if an external enemy attacks.
73 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 111.
74 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 90, 125-6.
75 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 126.
76 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 104, 125. Gardīzī (1982, p. 158) mentions the frequent Bulghār raids in the Burtās land as well as the tithe collected by the Bulghār *amīr* from merchant ships visiting his land.
77 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 106.
78 Gardīzī, 1982, p. 158.
79 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 103.
80 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 105.
81 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 104-5, who also complains that 'everything reeks of fish oil' among the Bulghārs.
82 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 110.
83 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 104.
84 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 103.
85 Gardīzī, 1982, p. 158.

86 These dirham imports are discussed in Noonan, 1992, pp. 237-60 and idem, 1994, pp. 215-36. Gardīzī (1982, p. 159) explained that the dirhams found in the Bulghār land came from the lands of Islam and that the Rūs and Saqālaba would only sell their goods for such coins. He also mentioned (p. 149) the caravans that constantly go between Khwārazm and the Bulghār land.
87 Gardīzī, 1982, pp. 157-8.
88 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, p. 110.
89 Gardīzī, 1982, pp. 157-8.
90 Istakhrī quoted in Dunlop, 1954, p. 98. The *Hudūd al-'Ālam* (p. 162) also mentions the tents and felt-tents of the Bulghārs.
91 Gardīzī (1982, pp. 149-50) claims that the *amīr* accepted Islam after 922. However, the *amīr* and many Bulghārs were already Muslims at the time of Ibn Fadlān's visit in 922.
92 Gardīzī, 1982 p. 158. Istakhrī (quoted in Dunlop, 1954, pp. 98-9) notes the cathedral mosque in Bulghār as well as that in Suwār.
93 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 119-20.
94 *Russian Primary Chronicle*, 58.
95 Pletneva, 1967, pp. 101-2; Ambroz, 1982, pp. 204-22.
96 *Russian Primary Chronicle*, 61.
97 Golb and Pritsak, 1982, pp. 59, 70.
98 *Russian Primary Chronicle*, 77.
99 Golb and Pritsak, 1982, pp. 5-32, 71.
100 Golb and Pritsak, 1982, pp. 26-7.
101 Golb and Pritsak, 1982, pp. 58-9, argue persuasively that one site mentioned in the *Russian Primary Chronicle* was, in fact, the official residence of Khazar customs officers in Kiev.
102 Callmer, 1987, pp. 323-53; Mezentsev, 1986, pp. 48-70.
103 *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, pp. 64-69; Noonan, 1987, pp. 393-6.
104 Ilarion, 1991, pp. 3-29.
105 Ilarion, 1991, pp. 3, 17, 18.
106 Ilarion, 1991, p. 26.
107 *The Annals of St.-Bertin*, 1991, p. 44; Vasiliev, 1946, pp. 6-13; Franklin and Shepard, 1996.
108 Vasiliev, 1946, pp. 9-10. As noted earlier (fn. 42), Islamic sources confirm that Rūs served in the khagan's army.
109 Vasiliev, 1946, p. 9; Franklin and Shepard, 1996, pp. 39-42.
110 Golden, 1982a, pp. 96-7.
111 Pritsak, 1981, p. 28.
112 Noonan, 1987-91, pp. 213-9.
113 Golden, 1982a, p. 82, n. 17.
114 Gardīzī, 1982, p. 167.

115 *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, p. 159.
116 Golden, 1982a, pp. 84-6; Golden, 1982b, p. 56.
117 *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, pp. 161-2. Also see Golden, 1990, p. 263, and Sinor, 1990, p. 295.
118 Golden, 1990a, p. 349.
119 *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, p. 58.
120 *The Russian Primary Chronicle* (p. 84) states very clearly that Grand Prince Sviatoslav of Kiev defeated the khagan and his armies in 965.
121 The Arab-Khazar wars are discussed in Noonan, 1984, pp. 151-282.
122 Golden, 1991, p. 75.
123 There is a detailed discussion of the diversified Khazar economy in Noonan, 1995-7.
124 Vysotskii, 1966, pp. 49-52.
125 *Igor Tale*, 1960, p. 71.
126 Ibn Fadlān, 1979, pp. 152-4.
127 Pritsak, 1995, pp. 573-4.
128 Pritsak, 1995, pp. 584-5. The quote comes from Kollmann, 1990, p. 378
129 The *Russian Primary Chronicle*, 1953, pp. 64, 73.
130 Kollmann, 1990, p. 379.
131 Golden, 1999, 25.
132 The *Russian Primary Chronicle*, 1953, pp. 58-61, 84.
133 The *Russian Primary Chronicle*, 1953, pp. 60-1, 64, 72, 91, 122.
134 The *Russian Primary Chronicle*, 1953, pp. 72, 91, 93, 124, 130-2, 134.
135 The *Russian Primary Chronicle*, 1953, p. 72.

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CHAPTER 4

CUNAN INTERGRATION IN HUNGARY

NORA BEREND

The medieval kingdom of Hungary, at the meeting-point between Christian sedentary and Turkic steppe civilizations, was open to raids and settlement by a variety of groups from the Eurasian steppe. In the mid-thirteenth century, Cumans from various clans under the leadership of a chieftain, fleeing from the Mongol advance on the steppe, asked for and received admittance into the kingdom, and gradually integrated into local society. This article investigates Cuman integration as a historical process, the impact of the sedentary society on the immigrant nomads and the impact of the nomads on the sedentary society.

The case of the Cuman immigration does not resemble the previous large-scale migrations from the steppe into the Carpathian basin, such as the conquest by the Avars in the late sixth century or by the Hungarian tribal alliance in the late ninth century. These earlier migrations were intertwined with the nomad conquests of sedentary societies, and were followed by a period of acculturation and sedentarization of the nomad conquerors. In spite of such cultural change, the conquerors retained their position as the elite of the areas conquered.[i] The Cuman entry, however, meant the immigration of a small fragment of a nomad tribal alliance into a numerically superior sedentary society. It was not a conquest, an entrance by force, but one based on negotiation and invitation by the ruler of the sedentary society. In contrast to the Avar or Magyar conquerors, these immigrants did not subjugate the society that received them; they were in a dependent position.

Cuman entry to some extent resembled immigration into medieval Hungary of other Turkic groups from the steppe, the Oghuz and Pecheneg, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.[ii] These Turkic nomads also entered as small groups detached from the majority of their tribal alliance, often with the aim of escaping subjugation by a more powerful nomad confederation. Once in the kingdom, they depended on the local ruler, and finally assimilated into local society. Yet, in spite of similarities between the integration of the Oghuz and Pecheneg on the one hand, and of the Cumans on the other, there was a major difference. The Oghuz and Pecheneg entered

in several small groups at different times, and lacked an overarching organization. They were often settled as border-guards. The Cumans entered in one, better organized group. They also played a more important role within the kingdom. As a consequence of their (at least initially) stronger cohesion and especially of their potential as a possible support for royal power, enmity towards them as well as their revolts and resistance were more formidable than as regards the Oghuz and Pecheneg. The Cuman case is also much better documented than that of the earlier Turkic immigrants, because literacy was more developed by the thirteenth century. Thus the case of Cuman integration into medieval Hungary represents one type of nomad - sedentary interaction: the entry and eventual assimilation of a small group of subject (not conqueror) nomads into a sedentary society.[3] The closest parallel is that of Cuman integration into Georgia.[4]

The background to this immigration was geographical, socio-political, and religious. Geographical conditions on the Hungarian plains (Alföld) in the medieval period resembled those on the steppe, which may have facilitated the absorption of successive waves of nomads.[5] A parkland with areas of loess, sand, and alluvial land, the Alföld was suitable for cultivation and animal grazing. Nevertheless, access to this region was through the Carpathian mountains, via certain mountain passes, instead of the free, continuous range of the Eurasian steppe. Once the kingdom of Hungary developed, rulers sought to secure the borders and block passage across the Carpathians. The system of medieval borders did not prevent attacks, only hindered them and allowed warning messages to reach the king so he could lead a counterattack.[6] A large-scale invasion, like that of the Mongols in 1241-2, could overcome these obstacles. But smaller raiding parties, even though they could penetrate the borders, had no capacity to conquer, as was the case with many eleventh – thirteenth century raids and even a late-thirteenth century Mongol attack. The Cuman clans fleeing from the advancing Mongols had to seek permission for entry from King Béla IV; their arrival was very different from early medieval conquests.

Earlier connections to the sedentary Christian world probably facilitated this choice on the part of the Cumans. Missions to convert the Cumans directed from the kingdom of Hungary, and with the support of Prince Béla (King Béla IV) in the 1220s and 1230s, as well as political and marriage alliances with Rus' princes, paved the way for the Cuman decision to immigrate into a Christian kingdom.[7] At the start of the Mongol invasion in 1241, which followed close upon Cuman entry into Hungary, the local population accused the recent immigrants of complicity with the invaders, and killed the Cuman chieftain and his family as Mongol spies. The Cumans left the kingdom. King Béla of Hungary soon recalled them (by 1246), and

thus their second and final entry was by royal initiative. Subsequently, even though the kings of Hungary benefited from their presence, the Cumans were by and large dependent on the ruler and the Christian establishment for their continued existence in the kingdom.

The Cumans constituted a small minority, perhaps up to seven-eight per cent of the population. Most calculations of the size of the Cuman population in thirteenth-century Hungary were based on the single figure that appears in a medieval source. The canon Roger, who was present in Hungary at the time, stated that the Cumans who entered the kingdom 'preter ipsorum familias circa quadraginta milia dicebantur.'[8] Because of the multiple meanings of the Latin word familia, debates centered on whether 40,000 should be understood as not including family members (women and children), or servants. The figure itself was accepted, that is, the question was whether 40,000 individuals or families moved into Hungary.[9] Medieval chroniclers, however, are notorious for the imprecision of their figures. A. Pálóczi Horváth discarded this number and estimated the size of the Cuman population from the extent of their lands within the kingdom.[10] On the basis of charters mentioning Cuman settlements, he calculated the territory inhabited by the Cumans at the beginning of the fourteenth century to have been 8,500 per square kilometre. Drawing on analogies, Pálóczi assumed a population density of six to seven people per square kilometre. In this way he arrived at a total Cuman population of 50-60,000 for the early fourteenth century. Estimating a thirty per cent population loss as a result of late thirteenth-century Cuman revolts and emigration, he advanced the figure of 70-80,000 as the number of Cumans who originally moved into Hungary. Although Pálóczi's method is more plausible than the simple acceptance of Roger's figure, even this calculation rests on too many unsubstantiated and indeed unprovable suppositions (such as the thirty per cent population loss and the six to seven people per square kilometre population density), to provide an accurate estimate; it is no more than an educated guess.[11]

The two major aspects of the subsequent nomad - sedentary interaction are the impact of the sedentary society on the Cumans, and the impact of the Cumans on sedentary society. I shall focus on the early period of the encounter, in order to highlight Cuman roles and impact, as well as the dynamics that determined the outcome of the interaction. I shall indicate longer-term trends briefly.[12] The main direction of influences was from the sedentary society towards the Cumans. This is not surprising, given that the Cumans constituted a dependent minority within society. To what extent minorities can and wish to safeguard their independence, separate customs and lifestyle depends both on the incentives offered and/or force used by the

majority, and on the resilience of the traditions and social structures of the minority community. In this case, there was both a strong incentive for the Cuman elite to integrate, and a strong pressure for the entire community to do so. At the same time, Cuman social structure was disintegrating, and there were no links to outside forces or communities to counteract this development. An analysis of the interaction between Christian authorities and the Cumans, and of Cuman roles in society, illustrates the adaptations as well as the tensions as nomads entered the sedentary world.

The admittance of the Cumans was based on the understanding that they would be useful for the king, and that they would integrate into local society. These premises of the sedentary Christian world influenced to a large extent Cuman roles in the kingdom; they also generated tensions and conflict. Contemporary Christians conceived of non-Christian integration in terms of conversion. Thus the Cuman law of 1279 set out to change a number of characteristics associated with the Cumans, 'in order to enlarge the tents of the faith of the Lord,' by baptism and the correction of the behaviour of those already baptized but erring in their conduct.[13] The demands addressed both strictly religious issues and broader aspects of the Cuman lifestyle. In the first category is the stipulation that Cumans be baptized, that they obey the Church, and give up pagan practices. In the second category is the issue of permanent settlement, and refraining from killing and looting within the kingdom. All of these stipulations are explicitly described as conforming to 'Christian' ways. To give up tents and settle in houses is to live 'Christiano more.' It is emphasized that the Cumans are not to kill Christians. From a modern perspective, integration meant religious change, change in lifestyle (including sedentarization) and cultural change.

Religious change initially seemed to proceed rapidly. The first, and from the medieval Christian perspective, key element of Cuman integration, baptism, met with no opposition at the start. When the Cumans first moved into Hungary, their leaders were baptized, King Béla IV himself serving as the godfather of the Cuman chieftain Köten.[14] Upon the second entry, baptism and dynastic marriage were linked, with Prince István's marriage to Elizabeth, daughter of a Cuman chieftain. She and her family were baptized prior to the marriage. Baptism was of great symbolic importance, and in the case of the Cumans initially thought to be the turning point in religious adherence. That is, in the initial period the act of baptism and the process of conversion were not differentiated. There was a recurring medieval notion concerning the ease with which 'pagans' would convert. It was often thought that they were not hampered by erroneous religious belief, unlike Jews, Muslims or Eastern Christians. Thus once the true faith was shown to

them, they would follow it whole-heartedly.[15] Missionary enthusiasm was seemingly supported by the quick acceptance of baptism by the Cuman elite. Dominicans continued to engage in missionary activity among the Cumans in Hungary, seeing it as the direct continuation of their work in Cumania. The Dominican account of 1259 described the work of Christianization as still not complete but proceeding successfully at the time of the writing, estimating the number of those already converted as several thousand.[16] King Béla IV, who in 1254 reported daily successes to the pope in the conversion of the Cumans, announced in 1261 the completion of the process, claiming that all the Cumans were converted.[17]

This easy acceptance of baptism had two main reasons. First, the syncretist culture of nomad steppe peoples facilitated the ready incorporation of new religious elements. The Cumans had already encountered and were influenced by a variety of religions on the steppe.[18] Second, the political advantages conversion offered to the elite were attractive. On the highest level, it meant immediate integration into the royal dynasty; Elizabeth the Cuman and various members of her family received all the benefits of the marriage alliance. She was given lands, and she had a court and prerogatives appropriate for the queen of Hungary, while her son László IV eventually became king of Hungary, and her relatives received donations. Other Cuman notables also received lands and royal favors. Due to the late thirteenth-century fragmentation of power and growing anarchy, neither Elizabeth nor her relatives could retain effective power for long, although she kept her title of queen, and later 'queen mother' until her son's death. The converted Cuman elite rose to the highest positions in the kingdom. In short, nomads could rapidly take on very important roles, even of leadership, in a sedentary society, but it was through the adoption of the norms imposed by that society. Conversion generally meant access to more power for the elites of 'pagan' societies during the Middle Ages.[19]

In the case of some individuals, baptism may have been accompanied by personal conversion and devotion. But for the majority of Cumans, the distance between baptism and 'conversion' proved to be much larger than was initially supposed by Christians. Missionary enthusiasm gave place to a view that baptism was not sufficient and that 'pagans' were deceitful in their conversion. In 1264 King Béla turned to the pope for help against the Cumans, whom he represented as a danger to Christianity only three years after the 'success' of conversion.[20] Béla's sudden change of opinion was a result of civil war, when the Cumans sided with his son István.[21] Following Béla's initiative, Pope Urban IV urged the archbishops of Esztergom and Kalocsa to ensure the baptism of all the Cumans, compel those baptized to lead a Christian life and expel those who refused to convert.[22] The Cumans

were accused of only pretending to convert. The charge that baptism did not bring about a true respect for Christianity was leveled against them: allegedly the Cumans ridiculed the consecrated host and priests, made stables out of churches and continued raping Christian women and killing Christians. The pope ordered the archbishops to organize, if necessary, a crusade against recalcitrant Cumans. What was perceived as purposeful deception, the acceptance of baptism without inner conversion, led to the conviction that true conversion should be imposed by force if necessary. Since the Cumans formed a minority within Hungary, such measures could be put into effect.

The change from almost boundless optimism about the quick success of Christianization to its opposite, a view that even those who had undergone baptism only pretended to convert, highlights more than the political opportunism of King Béla. It also reflects the fundamental differences between Christian and Cuman perceptions of Christianization. Initially, the fact of baptism was taken by king, missionaries, and other ecclesiastics alike as the indication of the completion of Cuman conversion. Therefore, the continued 'un-Christian' behaviour of the converted Cumans seemed to signal an insincerity of conversion. The Cumans, however, just as other steppe people, easily integrated new beliefs but did not abandon the old ones. This was demonstrated at the wedding of István and Elizabeth. The Christian marriage ceremony was accompanied by another ritual. Ten Cuman lords swore over a dog 'cut into two by a sword, as is their custom, that they would hold the land of the Hungarians, as men faithful to the king, against the Tartars and barbarous nations.'[23] From the Cuman point of view, baptism did not exclude a continued reliance on the traditional belief system. Once Christian attention was directed to this 'treacherous' behaviour, the emphasis shifted to enforcing conversion and conformity to Christian norms, relying on a long-time complement to missionary persuasion, the force of arms.

By 1279, when the papal legate Philip imposed the Cuman law on the king, there was no question about even a temporary choice between conversion and Cuman religious practices. The text stipulated that each and every Cuman be baptized, cease to observe all pagan customs and rituals (the 'worship of idols' and 'pagan rites'), and adopt the Christian way of life.[24] In order to ensure that they complied, the legate was regularly to appoint and send suitable investigators, and both royal and ecclesiastical punishment was to follow non-compliance with the regulations. The king was to keep Cumans as hostages to ensure cooperation, and promised to wage war against the Cumans in case they refused to obey. The 'Cuman law' aimed at the conversion of all the Cumans and the enforcement of their

Christianization. Although King László IV was not eager to implement these demands, when the Cumans rebelled, the king defeated them in battle.

The year 1279 was not the end of traditional Cuman beliefs and practices, as archaeological finds show. The solitary graves of chieftains, heads of clans and other high-ranking individuals provide the most information. Mass cemeteries contain much fewer objects; but their advantage is that they were used for centuries, some starting from the thirteenth century.[25] The Cumans practiced traditional burials, corresponding to those in the steppe regions, into the fourteenth century. Eleven solitary graves (seven of men, four of women) have been excavated to date, yielding over 300 objects.[26] These members of the Cuman elite were buried alone or in family groups, far away from cemeteries and settlements. The graves were oriented toward the east, and contained remains of horses, harnesses, and other objects. About forty percent of the finds is of an Eastern steppe origin, about twenty-four percent Byzantine and about sixteen percent Hungarian or Western European, indicating the still important hold of steppe traditions as well as the significance of previous Byzantine relations.[27] Burial mounds have not been found; it is an open question whether this lack was due to soil conditions (sand) that facilitated erosion, or to the Cumans' effort to make their traditional burials less conspicuous under Christian pressure.[28] It has been argued that wooden statues similar to the *kamennye baby* of the steppe existed but have since disintegrated.[29] The continuity of traditional beliefs is manifest in many burial practices, such as placing food, arms, jewelry, knives, and clothes in the grave.[30] Entire horses were interred in only three of the solitary graves in Hungary; no graves included parts of horses, but most contained harnesses or other horse accoutrements.[31] This may have been due to a scarcity of horses, or to tribal custom (even on the steppe, differences existed between the burial practices of various Cuman tribes); or it may be a sign of the slow phasing out of the custom.

There is evidence for the survival of some 'pagan' practices in graves of commoners, in Christian cemeteries for an already converted population, throughout the fourteenth century. Once the head of the deceased rested on a dog; in some graves there were signs of a fire.[32] Objects also continued to be placed in the graves. These included amulets (crystals, horse teeth, and animal bones);[33] eggs (an ancient symbol of fecundity) in graves of women;[34] mirrors;[35] a sharp (in general, iron) knife, perhaps to ward off the evil eye.[36] Jewels and remains of food placed in the grave were also common.[37] Thus the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century strata of Cuman mass cemeteries show a mixture of traditional and Christian customs. Cuman conversion came to completion during the fourteenth – fifteenth

centuries. In the early fourteenth century Pope John XXII admonished the prelates not to collect tithes too soon from recent converts, so as not to frighten them and others away from the new faith.[38] Until the fifteenth century popes kept insisting that all the Cumans be converted.[39] The last elements of 'pagan' traditions disappeared from graves by the sixteenth century.[40] All Cuman settlements had a church by the fifteenth (or exceptionally the sixteenth) century.[41]

The analysis of the stock of names also shows the progress of Christianization.[42] The names of Cumans in Hungary were initially representative of Turkic anthroponyms in general: totemistic names, names indicative of parental desire, protection or a wish for the child's life, and names due to chance happenings, such as the first word the parents uttered or the first object the mother saw after giving birth.[43] Their replacement by Christian ones happened gradually. The turning-point was the period between roughly 1330 and 1360, when Cumans whose father still bore a traditional name appear in large numbers with Christian names. Christian names outnumber traditional Turkic ones by the last third of the fourteenth century in the stock of names, although the latter still existed in the sixteenth century.[44]

While Cuman conversion became a cause of conflict and coercion, the Cuman role in society more generally was also contested. One of the justifications for admitting the Cumans into Hungary was that they would help protect the country, especially against the Mongols.[45] Drawing on nomad military power by a sedentary society in this way was a common pattern of nomad-sedentary interaction. In various societies the Cumans performed military service in a number of capacities: for example, as Mamluk slave-soldiers in Egypt, as allied troops of Byzantium against other nomads, as mercenaries in Rus' domestic wars, and as immigrants in royal service, as was the case in Hungary.[46] Cumans constituted light cavalry units in the royal army, fighting with bows and arrows according to the nomad mode of warfare.[47] Their armament was specially adapted to this type of warfare. For example a Cuman grave in Hungary yielded four different sorts of arrowheads, suited for killing horses, and piercing leather or metal armor.[48] Instead of the defense of the kingdom, from the time of their re-entry the Cumans were employed in wars waged against Hungary's neighbours.[49] They were still employed in foreign wars during the reign of Louis the Great in the fourteenth century, but Cuman light cavalry disappeared by the fifteenth century.[50]

Kings also sought to turn the Cumans into the military basis for royal power within the kingdom at the time of growing noble strife and anarchy. Cumans played a similar role in Khwarazm, Rus' and Georgia.[51] They participated in internal wars between King Béla and his son István. Both tried to keep or sought to win Cuman backing, giving land-grants and presents to their supporters.[52] King László IV (1272-90) attempted to rely on Cuman military power even more. László himself was half-Cuman, and, more importantly, the political anarchy was reaching its zenith. László succeeded to the throne as a minor, with his Cuman mother Queen Erzsébet (Elizabeth) exercizing royal power, in a period when nobles began to carve out territorial power for themselves. Cumans constituted the elite military bodyguard of the king, called *neugerii* in Latin documents, perhaps modelled on the Mongol nökür.[53] The king spent much time in the company of the Cumans, adopted their attire and hairstyle, and was excommunicated and accused of becoming 'pagan.'[54] Ultimately Cuman discontent brought about László's end; he was assassinated by the Cumans.

Cumans had an important short-term impact on the image that was formed of the kingdom of Hungary by its neighbours and the rest of the Christian world. Clerics from neighbouring countries which experienced military confrontations with Hungary complained about the violence of the Cumans who were part of the royal army. They explained this violent behaviour by the 'paganism' of the perpetrators, and used it as leverage for papal backing.[55] Chronicles from neighbouring countries even suggested the Cuman presence influenced the Hungarians themselves to become 'pagans,' a useful argument against a political enemy. For example, an anonymous author, probably a monk in Styria, described an attack 'by Cuman unbelievers and semi-Christian Hungarians.'[56] An Austrian annalist said that the papal legate Philip went to Hungary not just to convert the Cumans but to 'recall the Christian Hungarians, who had nearly forgotten the Christian life, ... to the catholic faith.' He added that the Hungarians did not wish to obey.[57] The identification of Hungarians and barbarians was revived; the earlier equation of Hungarians and Huns now enlarged. Thus Ottokar of Steier, a contemporary of László IV who treated Hungarian affairs at length in his *Reimchronik*, wrote that Hungarian nobles arriving at the wedding of prince Béla of Hungary (son of Béla IV) to a niece of Ottokar II of Bohemia used pearls and precious stones to adorn their beards and wore braids, 'like Mongols.'[58] During the latter part of the reign of László IV, the king's political adversaries in Hungary, including the archbishop of Esztergom, convinced the papacy of impending disaster. King László IV was admonished to give up Cuman attire and hairstyle.[59] He was suspected of apostasy and of endangering the entire realm, which would be detached from Christendom.[60]

Cuman roles were especially important in the half-century after their immigration. Eventually, sedentary and Christian influences changed every

aspect of Cuman life in the kingdom. Apart from conversion, Cuman integration meant a change from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle, permanent settlement, and assimilation in dress, customs, language, and culture. Nomadism had to be discontinued for lack of sufficient territory and the limited possibility of raiding. There was also Christian pressure on the Cumans to settle. Cuman nomadism was not dwelt on at length by Christian authors; one reported that they roamed around the kingdom with their cattle, not respecting the peasants' planted fields, and thereby arousing the hostility of the population.[61] After their second entry, the Cumans mostly inhabited areas on the Alföld (plains) in the central part of the kingdom; parts of this territory are to this day known as 'Greater' and 'Lesser Cumania,' although their size changed between the mid-thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. Archaeological excavations showed that territory that any one group (*aul*), consisting of several extended families, had at their disposal was about forty to fifty square kilometres. Nomadism was unsustainable here, although limited movement was possible.[62] To give up full-scale nomadism cannot necessarily be equated with settling in permanent villages. The presence of villages ruined during the Mongol invasion partly determined the settlement-patterns of the Cumans, who established winter camps, or even permanent settlements there. Some groups settled permanently by the end of the sixteenth to early seventeenth century, others only later.[63] Some Cuman cemeteries had a thirteenth to early fourteenth century layer, thus attesting to a certain stability of the Cuman population.[64] Toponyms also provide guidance; the names of Cuman settlements were sometimes compounds of a personal name and the word 'dwelling' (*descensus*). When the personal names used were traditional Turkic ones, they suggest that the settlements were named before the stock of names changed - in the thirteenth or early fourteenth centuries.[65] By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Cumans were living in villages whose structures resembled those of Hungarian villages with the exception of the presence of a *yurt* near the house.[66]

Those Cumans who received lands from the king conformed in the practices of landownership to local custom; already in the thirteenth century some Cumans possessed estates.[67] During the thirteenth century, the Cuman extended family often retained communal ownership.[68] Cumans bought and sold land.[69] Land was inherited by all the sons, and when a Cuman died without heirs his land escheated to the king, according to the custom of the kingdom.[70] Cumans exchanged deserted land for land inhabited by peasants, established border-markers on their estates, and maintained a water-mill.[71] During the 13th and fifteenth centuries landed estates developed under the power of Cuman lords, while other Cumans became members of the peasantry.[72]

Cumans could also be a disruptive presence. They occupied land by force, looting and burning; they devastated villages, especially when they participated in Hungarian civil wars in the 1260s and during the reign of László IV (1272-90). For example, a bishop was robbed and captured, while his men were killed; a village was destroyed when Cumans (led by a Christian) attacked, taking the property of the inhabitants, ruining the church and killing three of the *ispán's* men (the *ispán* was a local royal official); thirty-seven men died during the defense of a church against the Cumans.[73] Many thirteenth-century sources emphasized that the Cumans did not fit in, that they were enemies and posed a danger to the local population. Violence by Cumans was always ascribed to their treacherous, 'pagan' nature by Christians. Nonetheless, we should not conclude that the violent behaviour of the Cumans necessarily set them apart from society. In one instance cited above, Cumans were led by a Christian lord. Moreover, there is a multitude of charters talking about similar attacks by Christians against Christians.

Costume also reflected the process of integration. In their armament and attire the Cumans combined their own traditions and certain new elements in thirteenth to early fourteenth-century Hungary. Warriors had chain-mail and dome-shaped helmets, a bow and arrows, a sword, sometimes a mace (which appeared in Hungary with the Cumans in the thirteenth century).[74] Their bow and quiver was represented in the same way on the *kamennye baby* and on the Hungarian murals of the fourteenth century.[75] Their armament was typical of the steppe, with additions resulting from encounters with the sedentary world. These included the adoption of chain-mail, Hungarian swords and studded belts of a Western European type.[76]

Grave-finds and pictorial representations show that Cumans continued to wear traditional trousers and a caftan, with long boots, and retained the habit of hanging a knife, bow, and other objects from their belt.[77] Cuman women continued to wear torques and the characteristic horn-shaped Cuman female headdress of the steppe.[78] Other jewelry used by Cuman women was partly similar to apparel worn by Hungarian women at the time, such as rings, buttons, and hairpins, and partly identifiable with those widespread in the Balkans, for example, a type of earrings. The Cumans brought these latter with them from their previous homeland. Thus initially Cuman costume in Hungary shows a continuity of essential characteristics as compared to the *kamennye baby* of the steppe, but different from that of the local population of the kingdom.[79] Adaptations to local styles first affected two areas: elements especially associated with prestige, and armor. Belts adorned with studding and an elaborate clasp found in Cuman graves in Hungary started to replace the simple belts of the Russian steppe, and the use of jewellery

and ornaments corresponding to local styles gradually increased.[80] The Cumans also adopted chain-mail that protected them better than the traditional leather armor.[81] And Cumans began to adopt the straight stirrup, suitable for hard-soled shoes as opposed to the traditional soft boots, and (in the fourteenth century) spurs.[82]

Cumans also conformed to a nomad hairstyle, common on the steppe.[83] Men had no beards, wore a narrow moustache and braided their hair into one or three tresses that fell onto their backs. The top of the head was shaved. This was in contrast to then current hairstyles in the kingdom.[84] The Cumans resisted demands to relinquish their hairstyle and costume more than baptism. A papal letter referred to permission for Cumans to retain their traditional hairstyles.[85] As in every culture, throughout the Middle Ages both clothing and hair had special significance in distinguishing personal status in the social hierarchy by making it immediately visible.[86] Tolerated as a temporary measure to facilitate conversion, Cuman attire also became a symbol, often with negative connotations.

Within Hungary, Cumans or figures in Cuman-style costume appear in images of late thirteenth and fourteenth-century mural paintings and illuminated manuscripts (*Illuminated Chronicle*, *Angevin Legendary*).[87] This type of attire designated several different groups: Cumans, other Turkic nomads including the Mongols, the Hungarians prior to their conversion. The representations were sometimes charged with a negative, sometimes with an ambivalent meaning. Cuman attire could be a visual statement about the negative characteristics of the people represented. Thus to indicate that King László IV was a bad king, he was depicted in Cuman attire.[88] The Cuman as enemy, sometimes even as a demonized enemy also appears in churches, on mural paintings. These present an episode from the legend of King St László I (1077-95), his fight with a Cuman warrior to save a young woman who was abducted in a Cuman raid. In some paintings, fire or an evil spirit escapes from the mouth of the Cuman, who otherwise retains the physical traits (characteristic hairstyle, moustache, etc.) of Cumans.[89] On these frescoes King László I is portrayed wearing Western hairstyle and a beard, in sharp contrast to his Cuman opponent's moustache and braids.[90] The same type of attire also played a part in the visual aspect of the creation of the myth of Hun - Hungarian identity. The *Illuminated Chronicle* represented the Huns and the Hungarians prior to their Christianization in the same costume; and attributed a positive value to this attire by including courtiers dressed according to the Cuman style in the first image - the king and his court.[91]

Another important aspect of integration pertains to the changing structure of Cuman society. On the steppe, the Cumans were organized into clans and tribes, led by khans.[92] Upon their arrival in Hungary Cuman tribal organization had been disturbed by population losses and the flight from the Mongols; fragments of tribes from several clans entered the kingdom.[93] Clan organization already coexisted with social differentiation between the elite, called nobles in the Latin sources, and commoners, called peasants or 'poor.'[94] Already at the time of their arrival in Hungary, the poor members of Cuman clans were willing to serve Hungarian lords.[95] In the fourteenth century, clans - at least theoretically organized along the lines of blood-relationship - evolved into a hierarchy based on the ownership of land. Clan structure gave place to a new hierarchy of lords and peasants.[96] According to Gy. Györffy clan leaders (captains) became land-owning lords, their families a hereditary nobility, while free clan members turned into serfs, working on the land of the captains. The level of development was not uniform; by the late fourteenth century some of the Cumans became royal serfs, others populated the lands of clan-captains, and some became serfs on the lands of other nobles.[97] In the fifteenth century the territorial organization of *székek* (*sedes*) developed. Whereas the heads of clans who became captains (*szálláskapitányok*) in the fourteenth century owed their position to the ownership of landed estates, the captains of the *sedes* (*székkapitányok*) were officials.[98] By the late fifteenth century social integration was accomplished.[99]

Integration and assimilation did not happen smoothly. Changed circumstances and pressure for social and religious adaptation in the thirteenth century led to Cuman dissatisfaction and revolt. Yet, in the end, the Cumans progressively adopted the Christian religion, naming patterns, local social and settlement structures, attire, customs. They lost their own language and spoke Hungarian.[100] By the modern period, the Cumans were indistinguishable from Hungarians, except for their privileged legal status. Cuman legal status changed between the time of their entry and the later Middle Ages. The Cumans had personal ties to the ruling dynasty until the death of László IV in 1290. They were also legally directly under royal power; the Cuman law of 1279 designated the Cumans as an 'universitas,' a legally defined group, whose two representatives negotiated with the king. From the late thirteenth century the palatine, the highest lay official in the kingdom, became the 'judge of the Cumans' and retained this position into the modern period. The legal status of the Cumans changed in the fifteenth century, when the territory they inhabited in Hungary was divided into *sedes*, each under a captain. Legal privileges were then attached to the territory; every inhabitant, regardless of descent, shared in them. This territory was identified as the 'As-Cuman' (*jászkun*) district and those living there came to see themselves as a separate ethnic group within the country.

(This included not only the Cumans, but also the As, who appear in Hungarian sources from the fourteenth century; they may have settled in the kingdom as part of the Cuman tribal association, or separately in the late thirteenth to early-fourteenth century). The possession of their own legal status gave the Cumans a means of integration into the kingdom, yet, at the same time, through the corporate and then later territorial privileges this legal status entailed, a way to foster a separate identity. Although population movements, both into and away from the areas settled by the Cumans, and the Ottoman conquest, led to a complete mixture of inhabitants in 'Greater and Lesser Cumania,' an As-Cuman consciousness and identity were invented during the eighteenth-century struggle for rights to a territory and a legal status.

Cuman influence in Hungary had some long-lasting effects as well. Daily coexistence resulted in the adoption of some loan words in Hungarian. These loan-words attest Cuman influence especially in the domains of horse-breeding, hunting, eating and fighting; their number is about twenty.[101] The impact was strongest in the areas of Cuman settlement, in the regional dialect, but even there the number of such words is small.[102] The name of a breed of dog (komondor) used by shepherds was also introduced by the Cumans.[103] Certain other regional characteristics were also attributed to Cuman influence by the local population or modern ethnography.[104] The most popular type of hat in the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries in the Alföld (Hungarian plains) was called 'Cuman hat.' A village pattern in the same area (houses built without any order in groups, with meandering paths between them) was associated with the Cumans. Extensive animal husbandry on the Hungarian plains and the life-style of the shepherds who lived away from the villages with their animals has also been understood as a Cuman way of life. That is, because Greater and Lesser Cumania constitute part of the Hungarian plains, many of the modern practices and customs on the plains have been associated with the Cumans. They are, however, early modern in origin, and do not represent a continuity of medieval Cuman tradition.

In the integration of the Cumans, both the dynamics of nomad - sedentary and of Christian - 'pagan' interaction were at play. To contemporary Christians, the entire process of integration was one of 'Christianization.' In this, the case of the Cumans resembles that of other medieval encounters of Christians with non-Christian minorities. Processes of integration involved many aspects of life, from religious change to the adoption of the local language. In this incorporation of a small nomad minority into a sedentary majority the first to disappear was nomadism itself. It was neither tolerated by the sedentary society, nor made possible by the local circumstances. Stable settlement, acculturation, and assimilation followed more slowly; nonetheless, these were the final results of Cuman integration. The short-term impact of the nomads was important. It lay, first, in their military role, the part they were given in attempts to build a strong royal power. Their symbolic role both as representing the enemy and in constructions of identity outside and within the kingdom was equally significant. As an effective power-base for kings, they were not reliable. Their military role decreased, and then disappeared. Their long-term impact was negligible; they assimilated into sedentary society.

NOTES

1 Bowlus, 1995; Kristó, 1995 (analyses the road from nomad to sedentary state in the case of the Hungarians); Pohl, 1988.

2 Györffy, 1990a; Göckenjan, 1972, chapter 7; Pálóczi Horváth, 1989b; Rásonyi, 1981. For the steppe background: Golden, 1992.

3 Khazanov, 1983, pp. 212-21.

4 Golden, 1984, and the article in this volume.

5 'Alföld,' in Kristó (ed.) 1994 with further bibliography; information on geographical features by counties: Györffy, 1963-.

6 Göckenjan, 1972, pp. 5-22; 'gyepü,' in Kristó (ed.), 1994, with further bibliography.

7 Cuman alliance with Rus': Golden, 1987-91, p. 72. Missions from Hungary: Makkai, 1936; Richard, 1977, pp. 21-6.

8 Szentpétery (ed.), 1937-8, 2, p. 554.

9 See for example Gyárfás, 1992, 2, p. 261 (the book includes a series of documents); Pauler, 1985, 2, p. 148; Székely (ed.), 1984, 1, pt. 2, p. 1386; Györffy, 1942, p. 28; Györffy, 1963, p. 56; Szücs, 1993, p. 18. The same number (40,000) was used to describe the size of the Cuman population entering Georgia: see Golden, 1984, p. 62.

10 Pálóczi Horváth, 1989b, pp. 52-3.

11 The population of Hungary itself cannot be calculated with precision. The Cumans constituted 8 per cent of the post-Mongol invasion population if the latter was 1 million. (Kovacsics (ed.), 1995; Fügedi, 1992).

12 For a fuller account see my book on non-Christian populations in Hungary (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). Pálóczi Horváth, 1994b, is a brief account with a focus on archeological finds, and now

somewhat outdated (especially its thesis of continued nomadism for over 100 years).

13 'cupientes ... tentoria fidei dominice ampliare' ASV AA Arm I-XVIII-595; Theiner 1859 (printed editions of documents from the Vatican Archives concerning Hungary), p. 339.

14 Szentpétery (ed.), 1937-8, 2, pp. 559, 567.

15 See for example Richard, 1977, p. 119; Ricoldo of Montecroce, 1967, pp. 162-3; Ryan, 1997. It was not the only opinion concerning the conversion of pagans.

16 'Commentariolum de provinciae Hungariae originibus' 1913, pp. 145-6.

17 Theiner, 1859, p. 233; Fejér, 1829-44, 4, pt. 3, pp. 30-3 respectively.

18 Golden, 1998 (I thank P. Golden for kindly sending me the manuscript of his article); Roux, 1984.

19 Fletcher, 1997.

20 Béla's letter is known from the papal response: ASV Reg. Vat. 29 f. 337v; Theiner, 1859, pp. 269-70; Guiraud, 1892-1906, no. 2769.

21 ASV Reg. Vat. 29 f. 100r; Theiner, 1859, pp. 265-6; Guiraud, 1892-1906, no. 1243.

22 Cf. note 19.

23 'In his *autem nuptiis(1) X(2) Comanorum convenerunt iurantes super canem gladio bipartitum(3) iuxta eorum consuetudinem, quod terram Hungarorum(4) tamquam regis fideles contra Thartharos et(5) barbaras nationes obtinebunt.*' Marczali, 1878, p. 376. The following are variations in Istványi's edition, 1938, p. 271: (1) *nuptys*, (2) principes *add.* (3) *bipertitum*, (4) *Hungarum*, (5) *et om..* On these oaths and the role of dogs in Cuman religion: Golden, 1997.

24 '*ydolorum cultura*' and '*paganorum ritus.*' ASV AA Arm I-XVIII-595; Theiner, 1859, p. 340. These reflect Christian views of 'paganism' even if they may be based on Cuman practices, such as ancestor-worship.

25 Selmeczi, 1992f.

26 Pálóczi Horváth, 1994a, pp. 104-37. Some other graves may belong to this category but cannot be securely identified as Cuman.

27 Pálóczi Horváth, 1994a, pp. 139-75. The total does not add up to 100 per cent because some of the objects could not be identified or categorized.

28 Pálóczi Horváth, 1989b, p. 90; idem, 1994a, p. 140.

29 Fodor, 1987.

30 Horváth, 1987, p. 67; Pálóczi Horváth, 1989a; idem, 1994a, pp. 105-23.

31 Pálóczi Horváth, 1994a, p. 140.

32 Selmeczi, 1992b, p. 39; Pálóczi Horváth, 1976, p. 293. Lighting a fire in the grave was a purificatory practice to chase away the evil spirits before the deceased was placed in the grave: Selmeczi, 1992b, p. 43.

33 Pálóczi Horváth, 1989a, p. 124; Selmeczi, 1992a, p. 16; Hatházi, 1991, p. 661; Pálóczi Horváth, 1989b, p. 93.

34 Móra, 1906, pp. 21-4 (fourteenth- century graves).

35 Pálóczi Horváth, 1973, p. 206.

36 Selmeczi, 1992b, p. 42. Hatházi, 1991, p. 660.

37 Hatházi, 1991, p. 659; Selmeczi 1992b, p. 39.

38 Theiner, 1859, pp. 519-20 (1328).

39 Gyárfás, 1992, 2, pp. 35, 164-6, and 3, pp. 531-4.

40 Selmeczi, 1992b, pp. 31-45; idem, 1992f; Méri, 1954, p. 142.

41 Selmeczi, 1992a, pp. 12, 19.

42 Benkö, 1949; for a general model of names and conversion: Bulliet, 1979.

43 Rásonyi, 1967; idem, 1966-9; idem, 1958.

44 Pálóczi Horváth, 1975, p. 331.

45 Szentpétery (ed.), 1937-8, 2, p. 559; ASV AA Arm. I-XVIII-605; Theiner, 1859, pp. 230-2.

46 Golden, 1987-91, pp. 68, 72-4; Sinor (ed.), 1990, pp. 282-3; Ayalon, 1977; idem, 1979.

47 Borosy, 1984; idem, 1962, pp. 137-55.

48 Pálóczi Horváth, 1969, pp. 118-20.

49 Györffy, 1990b, p. 278 has calculated that between 1246 and 1278 the Cumans participated in ten wars against Austria, Moravia, Carinthia and Styria.

50 Borosy, 1962, pp. 153-5. Taxation increasingly replaced military service in the early fifteenth century: Gyárfás 1992, 3, p. 226.

51 Akhinazov, 1991; Golden, 1984; Franklin and Shepard, 1996, especially pp. 260, 262, 267, 272.

52 Fejér, 1829-44, 4, pt. 3, pp. 70, 160, 407, and 5, pt. 2, p. 95; Knauz, 1874-82, 1, pp. 476, 560-1; ASV Reg. Vat. 32, f. 83r; Theiner, 1859, pp. 284-5.

53 Németh, 1953a; idem, 1953b.

54 Szabó, 1886.

55 For example, Bruno, bishop of Olomouc wrote that the Cumans of Hungary represented a danger to Christendom (1272): ASV AA Arm. I-XVIII-3104-5; Theiner, 1859, pp. 307-8.

56 'ab incredulis Comanis et a semichristianis Hungaris' Pez (ed.), 1721-1745(1), p. 849, excerpt reprinted in Gombos, 1937-8, 1, p. 276.

57 '...*Philippus...Ungariam venit; Ungaros christianos, qui christianam vitam fere obliti fuerant, et Comanos ad fidem catholicam studuit revocare.*' Pertz (ed.), 1851, p. 711.

58 Ottokar of Horneck, 1890-93, lines 7980-8010. Tr. and analysis: Vnzkelety, 1993.

59 '*dimisso paganorum abusu, resumeres christianorum habitum, tam in vestibus quam capillis.*' ASV Reg. Vat. 39 f. 219r, Theiner, 1859, p. 342.

60 ASV Reg. Vat. 45 f. 172r; Theiner, 1859, p. 369.

61 Szentpétery (ed.), 1937-8, 2, p. 554.

62 Hatházi, 1996, p. 57.

63 Hatházi 1991; idem, 1996, pp. 56-7; Pálóczi Horváth, 1975; idem, 1973; Selmeczi, 1992d; idem, 1992e; idem, 1976; Méri, 1954, p. 139.

64 Selmeczi, 1992b, pp. 24, 32; Hatházi 1991, p. 656.

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69 See for example Gyárfás, 1992, 2, pp. 418, 447, 456; Wenzel (ed.), 1860-74, 12, p. 313.

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75 László, 1940; Kristó, 1986, pp. 216-79; Köhalmi, 1972, pp. 194-200; Pálóczi Horváth, 1994a, pp. 81-2.

76 Selmeczi, 1992, p. 8; Pálóczi Horváth, 1994a, pp. 160-9.

77 Pálóczi Horváth, 1994a, pp. 105-23, 177-186; idem, 1989b, pp. 75-83; idem, 1980; idem, 1982.

78 Pálóczi Horváth, 1994a, pp. 145-6.

79 Lovag, 1974, pp. 397-8.

80 Éri 1956; Pálóczi Horváth, 1972, pp. 189-90, 196; idem, 1994a, pp. 161-167; Fazekas (ed.), 1985, pp. 11-13 on ornaments in the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries.

81 Pálóczi Horváth, 1969, pp. 116-17. Chain-mail was used already on the steppe by the military elite.

82 Fazekas (ed.), 1985, p. 11; Fodor, 1976.

83 Johannes de Plano Carpini, 1929, 1, pp. 32-3; Willelmus de Rubruc, 1929 1, p. 182. Cf. Pelliot, 1973, p. 17.

84 Lovag, 1974, p. 383.

85 ASV Reg. Vat. 39 f. 219r; Theiner, 1859, p. 342.

86 Barthes, 1957; Simmel, 1904; Cahiers du Léopard d'Or, 1989.

87 Geréb (ed.), 1964; Levárdy, (ed.) 1973. László, 1993 includes color reproductions of these mural paintings.

88 Berend, 1997, p. 172.

89 László, 1993, pp. 98, 112, 136, 150.

90 László, 1993, pp. 97-8, 112.

91 Marosi, 1991; idem, 1995, chapter 1.

92 Golden, pp. 305-9; idem, 1987-91, pp. 61-8.

93 Described as '*generaciones,*' '*generacionum gradus*' belonging to '*linea*' in the 1279 Cuman law: ASV AA Arm I-XVIII-595; Theiner, 1859, p. 340.

94 '*Nobiles*': Szentpétery (ed.), 1937-1938, 2: pp. 554, 557. 'Principales': ASV AA ARM I-XVIII-595; Theiner, 1859, p. 340. Szentpétery (ed.), 1937-8, 2, p. 554 ('*rustici*'); p. 557 ('*pauperes*').

95 Szentpétery (ed.), 1937-8, 2, p. 557.

96 Kring, 1932, pp. 53-5; Györffy, 1990b.

97 Györffy, 1990b, pp. 294-9.

98 Rásonyi, 1981, p. 128.

99 Gyárfás, 1992, volume 3 on fourteenth-fifteenth century Cuman life in Hungary.

100 Rásonyi, 1981, pp. 128-9; Mándoky Kongur, 1976, pp. 143-4.

101 Ligeti, 1986, pp. 244-50: *Tözeg* (horse-manure), *kantár* (bridle), *árkány* (a type of horse accoutrement), *balta* (ax), *buzogány* (war-club), *bicsak* and *bicska* (pocket-knife), *csákány* (as armament; hatchet); other words include names of animals and plants; pp. 287, 305-16, analysis of impact of Cuman on Hungarian: pp. 538-44.

102 Mándoky Kongur, 1971; idem, 1993.

103 Benkö (ed.), 1967-76, 2, p. 540.

104 Györffy and Viski, n. d., 1, pp. 132, 385-98, and 2, pp. 179-80.

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CHAPTER 5

THE INFLUENCE OF
PASTORAL NOMAD POPULATIONS
ON THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY OF
POST-SAFAVID IRAN

DANIEL BRADBURD

Recall what a state is: a distinct organization that controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within a well-defined territory, and in some respects exercises priority over all other organizations operating within the same territory. (A national state, then, extends the territory in question to multiple contiguous regions, and maintains a relatively centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structure of its own.) Armed men form states by accumulating and concentrating their means of coercion within a given territory, by creating an organization that is at least partially distinct from those that govern production and reproduction in the territory, by seizing, co-opting or liquidating other concentrations of coercion within the territory, by defining boundaries and exercising jurisdiction within those boundaries. They create national states by extending the same processes to new adjacent territories ...[1]

In this paper I will explore the political and economic impact of nomadic and pastoral peoples on the larger Iranian society, focusing primarily on the post-Safavid period. Overall, I shall make three points. First, that discussions of nomads or tribe and state in Iran tend to overstate the importance of pastoralists for the Iranian polity, particularly with regards to their role in challenging the state. Second, that discussions of Iranian political economy tend to underplay the degree to which the processes of state formation in Iran parallel those in Europe and elsewhere. Third, that from later Safavid times through the early twentieth century, goods produced by pastoral nomads feature prominently in Iran's economy and trade.

With regard to the impact of pastoral nomads on the Iranian state, I shall provide a rather broad outline of its history and then turn to a largely theoretical and comparative argument. The argument aims to demonstrate that while the Iranian state was indeed weak during this period, and while 'tribe-state' relations were indeed fraught, the presumption that this was a result of the significant pastoral-nomadic presence in Iran, or indeed of

tribe-state relations, arises largely from a failure to adequately consider the nature of states and the process of national state formation. In making this argument, I shall rely heavily on the work of Charles Tilly examining the formation of European nation states and Margaret Levi's examination of the constraints on rulers and revenue collection. Regarding the economic role of pastoral nomads, I shall show that the very patchy available data suggests that pastoral nomads produced important goods for both domestic consumption and for trade, with the role in trade increasing dramatically from the mid-nineteenth century on.

PASTORAL NOMADS IN IRAN

From the perspective of many historians of the Islamic world, the Turkish and Turko-Mongol invasions of Iran appear to have had an almost exclusively negative impact. For instance, Lapidus, writing of the collapse of the Seljuqs in his synoptic account of Middle Eastern history, suggests that 'the result [of Seljuq inability to consolidate power] was renewed nomadic *invasions* ... Iran ... experienced an almost *complete breakdown of state authority*, unremitting nomadic invasions and *unprecedented destruction*.'[2] Lapidus goes on to note that, 'The Mongol invasion ... dealt a devastating blow to Iranian-Muslim civilization.'[3] Continuing this theme he argues that 'the first impact of the Mongols on Iran was *disastrous*, and amounted to *a holocaust*' in which 'whole regions were depopulated' such that 'a period of urban autonomy and cultural vitality was ... brought to an end.'[4]

According to Lapidus the period of devastation was followed by a significant rebirth of high culture, first under the Ilkhanids and then under Timur and his successors. However, he also points to profound changes in Iranian society. Of these the two most significant for our purposes were: 1) the introduction of large numbers of pastoral nomads so that 'substantial territories were turned from agriculture into pasturage' leading to 'the division of Iran into two economic and cultural worlds - one the world of the sedentary village; the other, the world of the pastoral camp';[5] and, 2) a transformation of the nature of the state. I will examine below the economic implications of the presence of a substantial pastoral population in Iran. First, it will be worthwhile to examine claims about the nature of the political transformation arising from the Turko-Mongol invasion and consider some of these claims in a broader, comparative context.

In essence, the argument summarized in Lapidus (representing a widely shared view) is that 'all post-Saljuq Iranian states ... acquired a dual heritage of an Iranian monarchical tradition and of Turkish ... polities.'[6] In particular,

from the Safavids until the Pahlavis, the Iranian state is seen as encompassing both a centralizing political structure centered about the Shah and his court, and an array of tribal polities that are only loosely incorporated into the larger state. Iranian state politics then comes to be seen as a constant struggle between the center and the tribal periphery whose leaders, are, in their turn, seen as having conflicting loyalties to their 'tribal' followers and kinsmen on the one hand and to the Shah and his court, on the other.[7] The end result is seen to be a decentralized, generally weak state, characterized by endemic conflict between 'tribe' and 'state.' This condition is seen as becoming more or less institutionalized with the rise of the great qizilbash groups associated with the Safavid drive to power and is presumed to continue, in one way or another, to shape Iranian politics until the destruction of tribal power in the mid-twentieth century.[8]

There are several assumptions contained in the argument outlined above. The first is that we should unambiguously see the qizilbash polities as 'tribes' or tribal entities; the second is that the political systems of the entities which came to prominence in Iran after the decline of the qizilbash, e.g. groups such as the Bakhtiari, the Qashqa'i, and to a lesser extent the Khamseh, were 'tribal' as well and that they were structurally isomorphic with the qizilbash.[9] Finally, there is the presumption that the weakness of the Iranian state, or its lack of centralization, which is implicitly conceived of as a problem of tribe and state, is in some way linked to the presence of a large nomadic and pastoral population.

There are, however, significant problems with these assumptions. First, there is the vexed issue of what an Iranian tribe was. The term is itself complex and frequently used in an imprecise if not a misleading way. For example, because they present similar difficulties for state administrators, pastoralism, nomadism, and tribal organization are often conflated.[10] As Tapper puts it, 'nomads, by virtue of their shifting residence, and tribespeople, by virtue of their personal allegiances to each other or to chiefs, have always posed problems of control to officials of sedentary states who have thus tended to classify them together ...'[11] Questions have also been raised about the meaning of 'tribe.' In both anthropological and local usage the term tribe and its nominal local equivalents (*il, tiafeh*, etc.) is very imprecise, standing for units that range in size from fewer than a hundred families to populations of over half a million people. These groups range in political structure from acephalous overlapping kin networks (as, e.g. the Komachi and other tribes in Kirman)[12] to hierarchical organizations whose leaders had their own praetorian guards comprised of 'well armed irregular cavalry, drawn from their extensive entourage of kinsmen and personal followers as well as from the families of subordinate chiefs' who 'did not actively participate in the pastoral or agricultural economy.' Leaders of

larger 'tribes' collected taxes, often had a minimally developed bureaucracy of scribes, etc., owned vast agricultural estates, were involved in trade, and received subsidies from the Iranian government.[13]

Turning back to the structure of the Qizilbash 'tribal groups,' it seems likely that they 'had an open membership' and were 'complex and heterogeneous collections of people of varied origins' including 'fragments of other tribes' and 'non-tribal settled peasants.' Common descent was rarely the basis for group identity. In general, '*Chiefs had no links of kinship or common descent with most of their follower.*'[14] Like the Safavid shahs, chiefs of tribes, and on a smaller scale chiefs of clans and other tribal subdivisions ... had similar [to the qorchi cavalry] retinues ... of tribesmen with no other loyalties, who performed military, administrative, household, and other services.'[15] These qizilbash groups and the 'confederations' of nineteenth and twentieth century Iran seem structurally equivalent.[16]

Moreover, comparison of the features enumerated above with accounts of seventeenth century France - which is rarely considered 'tribal' - and highland Scotland - which often is - show the parallels between Iran's 'tribes' and local polities in Europe. Tilly, for example, writes that, 'As seen from the top down, seventeenth century France was a complex of patron-client chains. Every petty lord had his *gens*, the retainers, and dependents who owed their livelihood to his 'good will,' to his 'protection' against their 'enemies' (to use three of the time's key words). Some of the *gens* were always armed men who could swagger in public on the lord's behalf, avenge the injuries he received, and protect him from his own enemies. The country's great magnates played the game on a larger scale. They maintained huge clienteles, including their own private armies ... Great Catholic lords ... tried repeatedly to strengthen their holds on different pieces of the kingdom.'[17] In the case of the Scots, Cregeen writes, 'Until land came to be commercialized in the Highlands, its function was purely to support the chief, his clan, and dependants. A chief reckoned his wealth not in sheep, cattle, or acres, but in the size of his following. His following was made up of his clan and 'dependers.' The inner core of the clan consisted of the chief's immediate kinsmen, the gentry of the clan or daoine uaisle ... [who were] the chieftains of the clan, responsible for organizing the clan as a fighting force. They were essentially a military caste, for whom prowess and courage were the ultimate values, and war and cattle raids a way of life ... The work of their farms was performed by servants and sub-tenants ...'[18] Cregeen goes on to note that, 'A clan ... was never simply a group of kinsmen dwelling together and tracing descent from a common ancestor ... The chief of a clan might include among his followers the representatives of ancient local families too weak to stand alone in the ruthless conditions of the sixteenth century. The struggles of the great clans induced the weak to seek protection from the

strong and give 'bonds of manrent,' promising to follow and obey the chief and to bring presents at stated times in return for the chief's favour and protection. Fugitives and broken clans, and their descendants, went to swell a chief's following ...'[19]

As I have argued elsewhere,[20] in areas other than the Middle East, groups with the characteristics of Iran's large 'tribes' have been immediately recognized as complex chiefdoms and, more likely, have been considered small states. It says much about the anthropology and history of Iran that traditionally the state-like character of these groups has been denied, indeed obscured, by calling them 'confederations' rather than by a term which more clearly denotes their political structure.[21]

Nonetheless, the central point is that, in Iran (but the same almost certainly holds elsewhere), the so-called conflict of 'tribe' and state was, with regard to larger 'tribal' polities, really a conflict between states, or between larger and smaller state-like structures.

But what of the larger 'state-like structures' themselves? What of the states? What were they like? Let us return for a moment to Lapidus' notion that 'all post-Saljuq Iranian states ... acquired a dual heritage of an Iranian monarchical tradition and of Turkish ... polities.'[22] In practice, this meant that the state comprised a centralized bureaucratic structure, including, under the Safavids, non-tribal slave military forces who owed direct allegiance to the shah; this, in turn, entailed creating a (theoretically) reliable source of revenues from which to arm and maintain the new military force. In practice, at least some of this revenue came from declaring territories to be 'crown lands' whose revenues belonged to the shah.[23] Other lands, under the guise of *iqṭā'* or *tuyul* grants, remained in the hands of local leaders, who used some of that income to support their own levies of troops. Over time, much of that land became de facto, if not de jure, private property, weakening the state and strengthening the power of local leaders.

Tapper calls these polities 'tribal states' among which, he argues, one can discern those in which 'one tribal (descent based) elite or dynasty rules a conquered territory and its heterogeneous population,' and, alternatively, the model of the Safavids themselves, in which 'a non-tribal dynasty is brought to power by, and continues to depend on, tribal support.'[24] In both cases, Tapper suggests that 'the state resembles an empire in conceding a certain recognition to semiautonomous tribal groups.'[25]

In sum, it seems that the 'tribal' states and the 'confederations' - which I have argued were, in effect, states - were polities that shared numerous structural features and differed most prominently in terms of scale. The most important instances of conflict between 'tribe and state,' i.e. those that entailed the conflict between 'confederations' and the state or the leaders of 'confederations' and the agents of the state, are thus more profitably considered conflicts between states, or between state-like and state structures. At a structural level the conflict that one finds in Iran generally described as conflict between 'tribe' and 'state' is therefore quite similar to the conflicts that occurred world-wide in the process of national state formation: it is conflict between state-like entities marked by attempts at centralization, and, where that was successful, the consolidation of a single national state, which controlled the entire territory within its borders (see below). If this is so, then the question may legitimately be raised, whether there is any special impact on the nature of the Iranian state or on Iranian society due to the fact that the conflicting state structures had pastoral-nomadic or tribal components. That is, were the structures of the Safavid, Zand, or Qajar states significantly determined by the inclusion of 'tribal' elements in the first case, or as a result of the dynasties' 'tribal' origins in the two latter cases? While it is far beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed, comparative analysis of the processes of state building that occurred in Iran, a brief examination of the nature of the Qajar state and its relations with the 'tribal' polities will, I hope, make it clear why I think the answer is, negative.[26]

THE QAJAR STATE

Accounts of the nineteenth century Iranian state show that it was a decentralised, tributary[27] state suffering from the pressure of integration into the world market. As Ervand Abrahamian has noted,

> The Qajars ... were despots without the instruments of despotism; Shadows of God on Earth whose writ did not extend far beyond the capital; Kings of Kings who trembled before unarmed demonstrators; and absolutists ruling with the kind permission of the provincial magnates, the religious dignitaries, and the local officials.[28]

In practice, this meant that through the nineteenth century, as the Qajar state needed ever more income to modernize, it weakened itself through the systematic sale of offices - with local governorships sold annually to the highest bidder - the reinforcement of landlord power, and an increase in the tax burden borne by the peasantry.[29] The increase in landlord power occurred as tuyuls, grants of territory to provide income for office-holders, became hereditary private property whose revenues now flowed only to the landowner.[30] This 'conferred a not inconsiderable benefit upon the holder.' Among other things, the revenue - as we saw above - enabled the landowner

to keep a body of armed retainers. As a result, 'the government often had to defer to the larger landowner in the areas in which he held land.'[31]

Note in this account an ironical outcome: the decentralized Qajar state needed revenues, among other things to pay for the modernization of state institutions; however, to gain revenue, the state decentralized itself even more through the farming out of its offices. In so doing it lost both revenue and the potential to fix its sources of revenue. The only possible solution to its new shortfall was, of course, to farm taxes again, and then again. Hence, the oppression of the peasants and the ultimate fall of revenue through erosion of the agricultural base.

But, if the state was so weak, how was it that local magnates were made to pay at all? The answer is largely through indirect means. For example, the Qajars often used parties in local or internal rivalries to collect taxes from their opponents.[32] By promising them rewards, which might well be the rights to the revenues of the region in question, the Qajars were able to use some local leaders to reduce the powers or fortunes of others. Qajar control had the following character: the Qajars could not regularly collect the revenue they wished from local leaders and were generally short of revenue, but they rarely failed to depose leaders who they deemed a real threat to their rule.[33] Thus, even the most powerful local leader would think carefully about remitting no revenue to the state. As the Qajars collected taxes by setting powerful local leaders against each other, magnates struggled for land and peasants as a means of generating revenue to buy tax farms and political power to protect their ability to act on those rights or prevent others from doing the same to them (see above).[34] For the politically powerful, life in late Qajar Iran was a constant struggle for wealth and power, a 'competition between classes of non-producers for power at the top' that typifies tributary states.[35]

TRIBE AND STATE?

I argued above that the larger 'tribal' polities within Iran generally had the structure of states, and that much conflict of 'tribe and state' was, structurally, conflict between contending state-like entities. We have also seen that the character of the Qajar state was such that it was desperate for resources, was decentralized, and that it was ruled by exploiting struggle among its elite. How does the history of Qajar Iran compare with the history of modern national state formation in Europe?

In broad outline, the European process of national state formation has been characterized as follows. In the late feudal period, European states were weak. Like the Iranian Qajars, Europe's rulers 'lacked direct access to

surpluses generated through agrarian production,' and, in general, could tax feudal suzerains 'only with their consent, and for purposes subject to their will.'[36] However, while Qajar Iran saw a growth in landlord power, in Europe, where 'before the seventeenth century, every large European state ruled its subjects through powerful intermediaries who enjoyed significant autonomy,' power shifted such that 'rulers bypassed, suppressed, or co-opted old intermediaries and reached directly into communities and households to seize the wherewithal of war.[37]

In short, European states centralized while the Qajar state did not. Even so, in the process of state formation, the give and take between local magnates and the center remains a constant refrain. Although the struggle had different outcomes in Europe and Iran - strong centralized states in the former, a weak decentralized state in the latter - the contenders and sources of contention were similar in both.[38] The reason for this will become more apparent if we move away from the specific cases and move toward a more general discussion of the nature of the state, exploring the goals of rulers in nation building.

In a work titled, *Of Rule and Revenue*, in which she analyzes the relations between ruler and ruled in 'tributary' states, Margaret Levi argues that, 'Rulers maximize revenue to the state, but ... subject to constraints of their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis agents and constituents, their transaction costs, and their discount rates.'[39]

In this view, state building is always a contest between interests. The question is why some centralizing powers succeed and why others fail, and for us, particularly, the question is whether the presence of nomads and pastoralists can explain the failure of state centralization in Iran. In that regard, I wish to draw particular attention to Levi's suggestion that

> Rulers possess political resources to the extent that they can inhibit the desertion of constituents to competitors or rival states and to the extent that they can block opposition and promote support, that is, ensure that collective action is in their interests. People will vote with their feet if they feel they can flee at low cost. It is a truism that dissatisfaction often causes fight or flight. Thus, the more rulers can raise the costs of exit while preventing antagonistic mobilization, the more they increase the prospects ... for compliance with their policies.[40]

If Levi is correct that 'people will vote with their feet if they can flee at low cost,' then the significance of a large nomadic pastoral population becomes apparent. Pastoralists' mobility coupled with their ability to exploit marginal and hostile environments makes them more difficult to control than many (though not all) sedentary populations. From the perspective of a mobile,

nomadic pastoral community, flight has a far 'lower cost' than it has for sedentary peoples who must, in flight, abandon significant investments in houses, improved agricultural land, or irrigation works.[41] In Levi's terms, because nomadism and pastoralism reduce the cost of flight, Iran's rulers, quite likely, found it more costly (though by no means impossible)[42] to ensure compliance with their policies. Since Qajar rulers had difficulty with all local leaders who possessed significant resources, one cannot argue that the existence of pastoral nomads weakened the Qajar state. Rather it seems that a weak state - indeed a state that was never strong - lacked the resources to raise the costs of exit which pastoralism made low. As a result, pastoral polities were only imperfectly integrated into the Qajar state.

In one sense then, because it made it more costly to fully integrate all its peoples into a system in which flight or exit was too costly an option to contemplate, a large pastoral and nomadic population made it more difficult for the Qajar state to centralize. Since flight and exit were relatively cheap options for nomads and pastoralists, the state bore the cost. This is, however, far different from the claim that the existence of a pastoral or nomadic population, or even a large pastoral nomad population precluded the creation of a strong central state. Rather, one can argue that other factors, including large size, difficulty of transport, barriers to communication, and external pressures made it difficult for the Qajars to build a strong state, and in the face of weakness, the costs of fully integrating pastoral nomads could not be met. A weak state may promote the persistence of organized pastoral communities more than the existence of the latter weakens the state.

'Tribalism' also emerges in an interesting light when looked at through the lens of a centralizing state. One of the key characteristics of the notion of tribe - one which does not hold particularly well for Iran - is the presumption that it is a community of kin. In theory, kinship may provide the group cohesiveness necessary to gain political power (a view perhaps most famously expressed by Ibn Khaldun), but groups organized along kinship lines are seen as being highly resistant to the process of state centralization, leading to both divided loyalties and foci of resistance.[43] While Levi does not directly address the issue of 'tribe,' she works over the same ground within the notion of community, arguing that 'shared common beliefs and norms, direct and multifaceted relationships, and reciprocity - can lead to conditional cooperation.'[44] Levi continues by noting that:

> Political entrepreneurs, be they rulers or rivals, can promote political mobilization by constructing community where it does not already exist and by bringing new incentives and disincentives to bear where it does.[45]

That is, rulers build community feeling to help promote unified political action.

Once built, communities based on kin are often seen as a hindrance to state centralization. Tilly, for example, argues:

> If lineages controlling land, labor, and loyalty had sprawled across the European map, it would have been harder to break up the population into discrete territories, co-opt powerful members of local elites without extending privileges to their clienteles, or reinforcing lineages as such ...[46]

In the Iranian context, pondering the implications of Levi's and Tilly's arguments raises important questions. As we noted earlier, Qizilbash 'tribes' had an open membership; they were not based on common descent but were 'complex and heterogeneous collections of people of varied origins'[47]. Tapper suggests that this complexity was most manifest at the level of larger political units and that there were more fundamental communities, such as camp groups and larger resource holding units, numbering roughly a hundred and a thousand families respectively which showed greater genealogical coherence and concomitant group identity.[48] Interestingly, Tapper does not claim that these groups were units of common kin, and while some may have been, I have demonstrated for the Komachi and their neighbors in Kirman, that even units as small as a hundred families or less are often complex and heterogeneous collections of individuals from different origins.[49] I have also argued that a careful reading of Barth's work shows the same to be true for similar sized units of Basseri society, and is quite likely so for other Iranian 'tribal' peoples.[50] Indeed, I would argue that many 'tribes' and virtually all larger 'tribal polities' in Iran were constructed from heterogeneous elements as local political leaders attempted to build followings which would enable them to more effectively resist encroachments by the state and by rivals (who were often in the service of the state).

Far from relying on kin (who were often the deadliest rivals), leaders - like the Safavid Shahs - built personal followings of dependents who were, in theory, loyal to them alone. Seen in this light, the heterogeneous 'tribal' confederations that characterized Iran's Safavid and post-Safavid history appear less as kinship based communities whose 'tribal' organization and primordial loyalties made them formidable obstacles to centralization, than as constructed communities built by local leaders in response to pressures (however feeble) from a centralizing state or its local agents, including other comparable structures. Kinship, or claims of common kinship may have been a means of building community, but it is a mistake to assume that Iranian tribes were communities of kin, or that 'tribalism' - Tilly's lineages controlling land and loyalty - prevented the integration of the Iranian state. Rather, it seems more economical to assume that, as elsewhere in the world,

local interests resisted consolidation and that in Iran they used the idiom of kinship and of 'tribe' as a means of generating and consolidating local opposition. 'Tribes' did not cause the resistance to centralization; they were the local idiom of resistance.[51]

The existence of 'tribes' did not cause the Iranian state's weakness, but it did provide a frame for organizing opposition to the state. As was the case with pastoralism and nomadism, the existence of tribes and of tribal ideology made resistance less costly. It took a new kind of state, with new sources of revenues, and new abilities to project force to create an Iranian national state.[52] As many students of pastoral nomadism and tribalism have shown, local leaders and their followers paid the price.

PASTORAL NOMADS AND THE IRANIAN ECONOMY

Some years ago, Charles Issawi noted that 'it is extremely difficult to give even a rough picture of Persian agriculture in the nineteenth century.'[53] It is more difficult to provide that picture for Iran's nineteenth-century nomadic and pastoralist populations, and even more difficult to provide even a sketch for earlier centuries. There are a number of reasons for this. First, as Issawi indicates, the Iranian government 'kept practically no statistics.'[54] Second, even where there are some statistics, as in foreign trade, one often cannot determine whether goods such as wool, leather, skins, carpets were produced by pastoral nomads or whether they were produced by settled agriculturalists, who also produced both foodstuffs such as clarified butter, meat, and milk, and such raw materials such as goat hair, wool, skins and hides.[55] Thus, in the material that follows I will provide less an overview of the pastoral nomadic or tribal contribution to Iran's traditional economy, than a series of fragmentary images, suggesting the kind and the importance of the contribution pastoral nomads are likely to have made. I will proceed in rough chronological order, beginning with accounts from late Safavid Iran, then moving through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

By way of background, there are several points which should be kept in mind. Through the early twentieth century, pastoral nomads represented a significant portion of Iran's population. At the end of the nineteenth century, they comprised about twenty-five percent of the total population - that is, about two and a half million souls - a figure that far exceeded Iran's urban population at that time. One estimate for the beginning of the nineteenth century - and all early figures are estimates - suggested that pastoral nomads comprised fifty percent of Iran's population.[56] In either case, one would expect the contribution of pastoral nomads to Iran's economy to have been substantial, even if it were not entirely visible. This is all the more likely to be true when one considers

that less than fifteen percent of Iran's land is arable for settled agriculture,[57] while large portions of that land are available as seasonal pasture, some of it enormously productive. At the same time, it is important to note that the major inputs of pastoral nomads to the Iranian economy reported in the ethnographic record, namely carpets and wool for carpets, became salient only in the later years of the nineteenth century, when carpets became Iran's most important exports.

Pre-Safavid accounts of pastoral nomads' economic contributions are rare. For example, Barthold's *An Historical Geography of Iran*, which reviews early Arab accounts of Iran, makes no direct mention of pastoral nomad contributions, though he does mention the tenth-century manufacture of Kirman shawls - which were woven from cashmere wool, often produced by pastoralists - and the fourteenth-century manufacture of carpets, presumably integrating sheep's wool.[58]

By contrast, early European accounts of Iran's trade, which date from late Safavid times, do remark on the significance of pastoral products. John Fryer's late seventeenth century list of goods which had value for the British East India Company, prominently included 'Carmania wool' (that is, cashmere, from goats), sheep's wool, which was kneaded into 'Felts, for seamless Coats for the ordinary sort of People, for their common wearing' and sheep skins, which 'with the Wool on, are both and Ornament and a Safeguard against the roughest Weather,' and 'Lamb - skins with their crisped wool are ... not disdained to be worn by the chiefest Gentry; of whose leather they make good merchandise, it being esteemed better than the Turkish, their Tanners being expert at dressing, not only these and Kid, but other hides of larger size, which therefore are bought up with Greediness by all Foreigners for their real excellency.' Finally, Fryer noted that 'Goats and Camels ... bequeath their hair to their Weavers, of which they make water'd Camlets.'[59] Tavernier, Fryer's contemporary, who was in Isfahan in 1647, noted that he was 'shew'd ... a sample of it [cashmere],' and 'Informed ... that the greatest part of the Wool came from the Province of Kerman, which is in the ancient Carmania, and that the best wool is to be met with in the mountains ...' Tavernier continued, noting that, 'you must take notice that they never dye this wool, it being naturally of a clear brown or a dark ash colour, and that there is very little of it white, which is much dearer than the others, as well for that it is scarce, as because the Mufti's and Moullah's and other persons belonging to the law , never wear any Girdles or Vails ... but white.'[60]

Fryer's work thus tells us that in the late seventeenth century, wool felts were an integral part of the common Persian's wardrobe, while Tavernier's tells us that cashmere was being consumed by the elites. Since felts of the kind Fryer describes remained common in rural areas of Iran during the 1970s, and

since, at the very least, they had to be replaced once a year, we may presume that domestic demand for felts, and wool for them was very high. Based on Fryer's testimony, one would also expect considerable demand for sheep skins. The luxury items he and Tavernier mention, while quite likely drawn from pastoralists as well as settled peoples (see below), probably supplied a smaller - if perhaps more lucrative - market. It thus seems indisputable, that whatever their later place in export trade, pastoral products played a central role in the internal Iranian economy as early as the 1670s.

By the 1780s, with one hundred years experience behind them, British East India Company agents' list of what they considered Iran's main potential exports is largely urban, comprising 'silks, brocades, carpets, manufactures of steel, sword blades, spear heads, gun barrels, glass, rose water, attar of roses, cotton cloths, some shawls, sheep skins dressed in a most superior manner, raw silks, some indigo and tobacco, rhubarb, irak, drugs of different sorts, dried fruits, cotton, mines of iron and copper, wool of the Kerman sheep, in small quantities, wine, marble and some trifling articles.'[61] Only the shawls, sheep and skins have a likely pastoral origin.

However, in 1801, Sir John Malcolm, also of the British East India Company, gave the following views of both Persia's internal commerce and external trade:

> The manufactures of Persia ... are silks of various kinds, coarse cotton cloths, plain and coloured carpets, Nummuds (a thick felt used for sitting and sleeping upon), cotton cloths, Kirmaun shawls, gold cloths, etc., swords and other military weapons, saddles and horse furniture, leather, glassware, sheep and lambskins, iron work, gold and silver...and enamelled work.[62]

Malcolm's list, like Fryer's and Tavernier's, points to a number of goods which are often pastoral in origin.

Focusing more on domestic consumption than trade, we find James Morier, in 1815, in one of the earliest accounts of Persian pastoralists' economic condition noting that:

> Sahranishins (pastoralists) wealth consists primarily in cattle which yields them considerable revenue ... They breed horses for sale, and their sheep yield milk, which is made into roghan (liquid butter) and sold throughout the country.[63]

Elsewhere in his Journal, Morier recorded information showing that pastoralists in regions of Fars Province now passed through by the Basseri and Qashqa'i supplied the local market (and one must suppose urban market of Shiraz) with pastoral produce. These included the dairy products noted above and meat.

> The Iliots of Fars are numerous but not rich. Some of the tribes breed good horses, but their riches consist mainly of sheep, goats, cows, asses, and camels... Their revenues consist in the sales of milk, mast, doug, &c. which their flocks afford them, as well as in the sale of the cattle themselves, which consist entirely in that of lamb and mutton, the flesh of oxen being despised as coarse and only fitted to the vulgar, unbelieving stomachs of Jews.[64]

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Morier's account is his comment on the consumption patterns of settled Persian society. If, as he suggests the only real meat for most Persians was lamb and mutton, then we may infer that those who raised sheep and goats indeed played a vital role in the subsistence of Persia as a whole.[65]

Other accounts for the mid-to-late nineteenth century also speak of the pastoralists' role in supplying Iran's urban centers with meat and other goods. Layard, writes that 'The Bakhtiyari during summer supply the Isfahan market with mutton, and with sour milk, curds, or mast and butter...'[66] In 1882, W. Baring reported that the Bakhtiyari 'yearly sell large numbers of sheep, either driving them themselves to Chahar Mahal and Isfahan or selling them to dealers... Clarified butter and skins are also exported...' Baring also noted that 'Bakhtiari [sic] women employ a good deal of their time in the manufacture of carpets. These are, however, coarse, the colours glaring, and the patterns untastefully arranged. They are sold by weight ...'[67]

At almost the same time, another report on the Bakhtiyari claims that while 'The chief wealth of the tribe consists in sheep and goats, cows, donkeys, and mules' the Bakhtiyari produced other goods as well; specifically the report noted that 'where woods abound ... charcoal is burnt for export' and 'the sweetmeat gez, gum mastic, cherry sticks, gall nuts, tobacco, clarified butter and skins are also articles of export.'[68]

There are several points which are worth noting here. First, in these late nineteenth century reports, the Bakhtiyari are trading a range of goods. While it is clear that meat and wool predominate, items like carpets, charcoal, cherry sticks, gums, and galls also are mentioned. Ends are being met through both the sale of primary products, and through sale of a range of handicrafts and collected wild products, which were accessible to pastoralists as they traveled far from settled areas. In this regard, the economy of pastoral nomads appears very like that of European peasants caught in the transition to capitalism, who attempted to remain economically viable through self-exploitation and the diversification of production. Second, while the scattered nature of the data

make it hard to trace continuities in trade or production, there are conjunctions which are highly suggestive. For example, we have seen above that Fryer's mid-seventeenth-century account specifically mentions 'Lamb-skins with their crisped wool' as an item of trade. Two hundred years later Abbott in a list of goods produced in Fars writes that, 'Lambskins. About 400,000 are now said to be obtained for Caps and Pelisses.'[69] And, toward the end of the nineteenth century there are additional accounts of lambskins being exported.[70] Similarly, one finds suggestions of continuity in the production and sale of felts, first reported by Fryer and reported again by Malcolm (see above). In the mid-nineteenth century Layard noted that 'Carpets, Namads, Horse Trappings of a very fine quality are made by the women [of the Faili] and fetch a considerable price in Persian markets,' and Abbott noted trade in wool and other goods among pastoralists in northwestern Iran.[71]

In the nineteenth century pastoral nomads, thus, played a role in three areas of Iran's economy: they produced raw materials and/or finished goods for export or for domestic trade; they produced foodstuffs, particularly meat and dairy products, for the domestic economy; and they provided animals for transportation, which were vital in a large country lacking both navigable rivers and - well into the twentieth century - railroads, let alone motorable roads.[72] The data I have presented above, sketchy as they are, suggest that pastoralists were providing similar goods and services to the domestic market from at least late Safavid times. It thus seems quite likely that though they may have been difficult to tax and resistant to political control, pastoral nomads supplied important commodities to and thus played a significant part in Iran's sedentary economy. This should not be at all surprising. Virtually every modern ethnographic account of Iran's pastoral nomads has stressed the degree to which they are linked in trade with the settled world, and one would expect that in a vast land with large areas inhospitable to traditional systems of agriculture but welcoming to pastoralists, some system of symbiosis would arise.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding paper, I take issue with the argument that the weakness of the Iranian state from the late Safavids through the early twentieth century, and the concomitant failure of dynasties such as the Qajars to effectively modernize or centralize, is associated with the presence in Iran of a large nomadic pastoral population which entered Iran during the Mongol invasions and was, to some degree, integrated into the political structure during the Safavid period. While neither denying the weakness of the Iranian state, nor the presence of large pastoral nomadic and tribal populations, nor the role of 'tribal' leaders as significant political players on the regional and national scene, I have attempted

to argue that it was not the presence of pastoral nomads, nor the fact that tribal leaders led powerful followings, that made the state weak. It was the state's weakness which permitted these populations and their leaders to be politically significant. More specifically, I have argued that a careful examination of the political structure of Iran's larger tribal polities, those commonly glossed as 'confederations,' shows that they were state-like structures. What is commonly construed as a conflict between 'tribe and state' was, therefore, a conflict between a weak state attempting - albeit feebly - centralization and other states (and particularly their leaders) which resisted those attempts. I have further argued that an examination of Europe during the same historic period shows similar kinds of processes and conflicts, strongly suggesting that they are intrinsic to the process of state building.

I have also attempted to show that the fragmentary evidence which is available points to a long established role for pastoral nomads in both Iran's domestic consumption and in commodities produced for export trade. This should not be surprising. First, they constituted a substantial share of Iran's population; second, the modern ethnographic record is consistent in reporting continual exchange between Iran's pastoral nomads and its settled peoples; and third, if our preceding arguments about the political structure of Iran's pastoral nomad communities is accurate, and they were state-like, one would expect the leaders of those communities to have had an active interest in facilitating exchange among the populations over whom they held sway.[73] Pastoral nomads were thus not merely a political and economic burden on settled Iran.

I will close by noting that while European history provides examples of stronger states, and earlier, and perhaps more complete, national state-building than occurred in Iran, one can also find examples of unsuccessful centralization or state-building. In particular, the last two decades provide clear evidence that even in the absence of nomadic, pastoral, or tribal populations - centralizing agents in states can and do fail to successfully create a unified national state, and that previously centralized structures can come apart. Successful state building is not inevitable and weak states may fail to build centers powerful enough to reduce alternative centers or overcome centrifugal forces. Earlier works on 'tribe and state' in Iran were written when the trajectory of state formation appeared far more unidirectional, and instances of unsuccessful, or incomplete, centralization seemed, perhaps the anomaly. Given that, Iran's failure to effectively centralize - from the Safavids through the Qajars - seemed to require a special explanation, and the presence of large pastoral nomadic and 'tribal' populations in Iran appeared to provide one. Looked at from the perspective of the end of this century, Iran's lack of centralization seems less anomalous, there seems less need for special explanation, and, as I hope I have shown, Iran's 'tribes' seem less a necessary cause than a reflection of the state's weakness.

NOTES

1 C. Tilly, 1990, p. 131.
2 I. Lapidus, 1988, p. 146, emphasis added.
3 I. Lapidus, 1988, p. 276.
4 I. Lapidus, 1988, p. 278.
5 I. Lapidus, 1988, p. 282.
6 I. Lapidus, 1988, p. 283.
7 See M. Szuppe, 1996, for a detailed discussion of these relations.
8 See, e.g., I. Lapidus, 1988, p. 571 and A.K.S. Lambton, 1964, p. 6.
9 See, e.g., Barth, 1960, 1961; L. Beck, 1983, 1986, 1990; D. Brooks, 1983; G. Garthwaite, 1983a, 1983b; and also J.P. Digard, R. Loeffler, 1976, 1978; R. Tapper, 1983a, 1983b, 1990, 1997.
10 See, e.g., R. Tapper, 1983, 1990.
11 R. Tapper, 1990, p. 54, and see also 1997, p. 8.
12 See D. Bradburd, 1990 for a discussion of the twentieth century. See K. Abbott, 1850, and Government of Great Britain, 1923 for earlier periods.
13 R. Tapper, 1997, p. 12. As I will argue in more detail below, at a formal level, there are great similarities between these structures and those of, for example, state building Europe.
14 R. Tapper, 1997, pp. 44-7, emphasis added, and see below. Again, the parallels with Europe are striking.
15 R. Tapper, 1997, p. 47, emphasis added, and see below.
16 R. Tapper, 1997, pp. 45, 47.
17 C. Tilly, 1981, p. 117.
18 D. Cregeen, 1968, p. 161.
19 D. Cregeen, 1968, p. 164.
20 D. Bradburd, 1987, 1992.
21 The notion of confederation has generally involved a shift of focus from the hierarchical structure to the absence of a single ramifying genealogy which encompasses all members and a series of related characteristics, including the diverse origins of the tribe's membership, the fluidity of that membership (as individuals and groups move in and out), and a notion of group membership arising from declared political attachment to and recognition of the leader (or through attachment as a member of a group or the subordinate of a leader who, in turn, has accepted subordination to the higher leader). In short, the state-like structure is denied while the complexities of membership are stressed.
22 I. Lapidus, 1988, p. 283.
23 I. Lapidus, 1988, pp. 289-90.
24 R. Tapper, 1990, p. 69.
25 R. Tapper, 1990, p. 69.

26 The history of the Tudors in England, rough contemporaries of the Safavids, would show far more similarities than one might expect, and that it is not at all clear that one can lay the differences on the presence of nomadic/pastoral/tribal populations in Iran and their absence in England. The following brief passage in which Charles Tilly sets out the broad parameters of Tudor state-building could with very minor changes describe the relationship between the Safavids and the qizilbash tribes or, as we shall see, the Qajars with the great confederations of the nineteenth century. 'Tudor demilitarization of the great lords entailed four complementary campaigns: eliminating their great personal bands of armed retainers, razing their fortresses, taming their habitual resort to violence for the settlement of disputes, and discouraging the cooperation of their dependents and tenants.' C. Tilly. 1985, p. 174.
27 E. Wolf, 1982, p. 80. G.N. Curzon, 1892 , p. 391; J. Fraser, 1825 in Lambton, 1953 , p. 135; Katouzian, 1981, p. 43; N. Keddie, 1972; A.K.S. Lambton, 1953; Government of Great Britain 1859.
28 E. Abrahamian, 1974, p. 13.
29 N. Keddie, 1972, p. 366-7. Margaret Levi's discussion of the ruler's decision making may put in context the rapaciousness with which the Qajars have generally been credited. She suggests that 'Rulers with very few pressures are unlikely to undertake costly bargaining measurement, and monitoring, and they are unlikely to extract beyond the point at which taxpayers will resist through either decreased production or actual rebellion. Rulers under greater pressure may be compelled to' (Levi, 1988, p. 33). The Qajars were under great pressure, and whether compelled to or not, they certainly pushed local populations to the point of resistance.
30 A.K.S. Lambton, 1953, p. 140.
31 A.K.S. Lambton, 1953, p. 140. In this regard, the Qajars appear similar in both condition and actions to the feudal rulers described by Levi who 'confronted by subjects with comparable political and economic resources ... are likely to make concessions in the form of tax exemptions and services in exchange for loyalty to the regime.' (Levi, 1988, p. 14; see Wolf, 1982 for a discussion of feudalism as a tributary state system).
32 E. Abrahamian, 1974, p. 31.
33 See, for example, Garthwaite's discussion of the depositions of Mohammed Taqi Khan and Hossein Quli Khan of the Bakhtiyari (Garthwaite, 1983).
34 Again, the comparison with Europe is instructive. There, as Tilly notes, 'How did state makers succeed? By dividing their opposition, by using force, by routinizing the collection of revenues, by multiplying the specialists devoted to the extraction of those revenues, and by expanding the number of people and groups who had a financial interest in the state's

survival' (Tilly, 1981). That is, by starting at the same point but investing in the state apparatus such that it grew disproportionately powerful compared to, and differentiated from, the local elites.

35 E. Wolf, 1981, p. 81.
36 H. Gintis and S. Bowles , 1984, p. 33.
37 C. Tilly, 1990, p. 104.
38 C. Tilly, 1984, p. 42.
39 M. Levi, 1988, p. 10.
40 M. Levi, 1988, pp. 19-20.
41 W. Irons has made much of this point in several key essays (1974; 1979).
42 For example, Layard's account of how Mu'tamid al-Daulah ultimately destroyed the power of the Bakhtiyari leader Mohammed Taqi·Khan shows both how pastoralism and nomadism might reduce the costs of flight, and, at the same time, how the Qajars were able to use a combination of means, including tribal rivalries, to gain the upper hand.
43 M. Szuppe, 1996; C. Tilly 1975.
44 M. Levi, 1988, pp. 20-1.
45 M. Levi,1988, p. 21.
46 C. Tilly, 1975, p. 29.
47 R. Tapper, 1997, p. 44.
48 R. Tapper, 1997, p. 16.
49 D. Bradburd, 1990.
50 D. Bradburd, 1992.
51 The example of Iran suggests that Tilly is, quite likely, wrong in asserting that lineages make it harder for states to control local populations. Rather, claims of kinship seem more a mode of resisting state centralization than a cause of it.
52 As Tilly has summarized it, 'Building a differentiated, autonomous, centralized organization with effective control of territories entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semi-autonomous authorities...' (C. Tilly, 1975, p. 71). In Iran, many of those 'authorities' were nomadic, pastoral, or tribal communities.
53 C. Issawi, 1971, p. 206.
54 C. Issawi, 1971, p. 206.
55 G. Gilbar, 1979, p. 188.
56 Malcolm, 1800, from Issawi, 1971, pp. 262ff
57 H. Bowen-Jones, 1968, p. 566.
58 W. Barthold, 1984, pp. 139-40.
59 J. Fryer, 1915 [vol. 3], p. 8.
60 J.B. Tavernier: Six Voyages Through Turkey into Persia, London 1678-84, p. 40. Quoted in Fryer, 1909, vol.1, p. 219.
61 C. Issawi, 1971, p. 88.

62 Malcolm, 1800, from Issawi, 1971, pp. 262ff.
6↑ J. Morier, Quoted from Gazetteer of Persia, Part Three, 1885, p. 272.
64 J. Morier, 1811, vol. 2, p. 17.
65 This view is supported by other accounts. For example, in the mid nineteenth century, A.H. Layard also commented that he never 'saw' the flesh of cows and bullocks 'during my presence in this part of Persia.' A.H. Layard, n.d., p. 207b.
66 A.H. Layard, 18xx, p. 207b.
67 W. Baring, 1882, p. 5.
68 M. Bell, 1885, p. 98.
69 Abbott, p. 114
70 Government of Great Britain, 1895, p. 11.
71 A.H. Layard, n.d., p. 206b.
72 G. Gilbar, 1978.
73 See D. Bradburd 1997 for a discussion of the role of 'tribal' leaders in trade and D. Bradburd 1996 for a discussion of the balance of trade between the settled and nomadic worlds in Iran.

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CHAPTER 6

TURKO-MONGOLIAN NOMADS AND THE *IQṬĀ'* SYSTEM IN THE ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST (CA. 1000-1400 AD)*

REUVEN AMITAI

Someone looking at the history of the late medieval Islamic world, particularly its eastern half, might ask why the experience of the eleventh century was so different from that of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. In particular: why did the Seljuqs cause so much less destruction than their Mongol 'cousins'? Why did two groups of nomadic, Inner Asian origin act so differently upon entering the lands of Islam?

In its broad lines the standard answer is convincing enough, and I will not attempt to challenge it: the Seljuqs and their Türkmen followers, nomadizing on the fringes of the Islamic world for some decades, entered Iran as Muslims. The Seljuqs and their entourage accommodated themselves quickly to the political norms prevalent in the eastern Islamic world, and saw themselves as responsible not only for their nomadic followers but also for the population as a whole. Moreover the Türkmen appear to have been relatively few in number, evidently some several tens of thousand families. This can be contrasted to the Mongols who first came into Iran as invaders and not as migrants; when - in the 1250s - the Mongols entered into the Islamic world they arrived in much larger numbers, perhaps more than a hundred thousand families. More important, however, is that Chinggis Khan and his followers had had little contact with Islam and its culture (although individual Muslims may have been known) before the invasion. The world of eastern Islam was a foreign one, and the Mongols certainly did not stand in awe of it. To this may be added the circumstances in which the war with the Khwārazm-shāh began, the desire to revenge the death of the merchants from Mongol territory, and perhaps the intent to establish a *cordon sanitaire* along this front. Mongol imperial ideology probably also played a role in the destructiveness of the Mongols in their various campaigns into the Islamic world.[1]

With little knowledge of, and no commitment to Islam and the Muslim way of life, it is not surprising that in the newly conquered areas the Mongols erected an administrative system different from that of their Seljuq

predecessors. The latter were quick to see themselves as Muslim rulers, embracing the trappings of Muslim state-craft, including titles, forms of legitimization, bureaucratic usages, and the establishment of a regular army based on mamluks (slave soldiers).[2] The Mongols, in contrast, did not adopt these institutions in a wholesale manner, although components of Middle Eastern origin were integrated in their rather eclectic administrative system, where elements of Uighur, Khitan, Chinese, and Mongolian provenance each played their part.[3]

To some degree, in the 1290s this situation began to change with the conversion of the Ilkhans, as the Mongol ruler in Iran came to be called, along with the Mongols as a whole in that country. The Ilkhans began to express their right to rule in Islamic terms, although traditional Mongols forms continued to exist concurrently, albeit in an attenuated form.[4] In fact, Mongol and Muslim components were to co-exist - at times uneasily - in the realm of administration for a long time, as they would in other aspects of public and private life, not least in the sphere of religion and law.[5] These changes have usually been associated with the well known reforms of Ghazan (1295-1304), the Ilkhan whose name is justifiably connected with the conversion to Islam of the Mongols in Iran. Scholars have debated the results of these reforms and their long-term implications, but the consensus is that they enjoyed some success, at least in stabilizing the economy of the Ilkhanid State, and this appears to have continued into the reigns of his successors. If these reforms were motivated to some degree by a renewed interest in Islamic administrative institutions, and if they were at least partially executed, then one can thus discern a certain convergence of the Mongol state in Iran to the model erected by the Seljuqs and their senior bureaucrats. One of these institutions frequently mentioned in this context is the *iqṭā'* (plural *iqṭā'āt*), the revenue generating allotment of land for army officers, which was re-introduced under Ghazan shortly before his death in 703/1304. On the whole modern scholars accept that at this time some type of change in land administration was promulgated, leading to a certain drawing together in this field of Mongol and Muslim traditions. There is, however, some disagreement what exactly the term *iqṭā'* meant and how far it was implemented, even in Ghazan's own reign.[6]

It appears to me, however, that even the portrayal of the limited nature of the reimplementation of the *iqṭā'* under Ghazan and the later Ilkhans has gone too far. I will suggest that whatever the intent of Ghazan in this matter, perhaps prodded on by his *wazīr* Rashīd al-Dīn, the promulgation of the neo-*iqṭā'* system - as it might conveniently be called - remained all but a dead letter. If this is true, then one instance of the supposed drawing together of Muslim and Mongol administration practices is effectively

eliminated, giving us a clearer perception of the continued resilience of Mongol tradition even after the conversion to Islam.

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The *iqṭāʿ* system had its origins in the political, administrative and economic confusion which affected the center of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate from the middle of the ninth century AD.[7] The difficulty in procuring cash to pay the army prompted the government to seek an alternative method to keep the senior officers and their military following satisfied. From this evolved the *iqṭāʿ*, the assignment to an officer of the right to collect revenue, i.e. taxes, at source. This was in lieu of the money being collected by the agents of the central administration and then distributed to the army via a bureaucratic apparatus. From the government's viewpoint, the advantage of the new system was that the onus of collection was placed on the officers. Some revenues, in theory, were even to reach the state treasury: the officer was to collect the *kharāj*, or agricultural tax, from which he was to pass on the tithe (*ʿushr*), a smaller amount, to the treasury. The grantee (*muqṭaʿ*) was given neither administrative rights nor title over the land in question, but only the right to collect taxes. The allotment was also not to be passed on by inheritance. Thus the lands remained in principle the property of the state and all that had been done was to simplify the collection and distribution of the moneys involved. This type of *iqṭāʿ* was referred to by the jurists as *iqṭāʿ tamlīk* (*ʿiqṭāʿ* of possession'), evidently since the *ʿushr* paid by the *muqṭaʿ* made this resemble privately held *ʿushr* paying land (*milk*).

In reality, however, things turned out differently. The right of the state to receive its share, the *ʿushr*, was increasingly ignored. More importantly, the fact that the *muqṭaʿ* lacked both administrative control and the right to pass on the *iqṭāʿ* to his heirs was not conducive to the strengthening of his interest in its long-term vitality. It became an increasing prevalent phenomenon that the *muqṭaʿ* attempted to extract as much revenue as possible from his *iqṭāʿ*, and having done so - perhaps for a period of several years - move on to another, 'untapped' *iqṭāʿ*. This inevitably harmed the agricultural areas in the Caliphate's central provinces, and contributed to depopulation and declining agricultural productivity, and in the long run to falling tax receipts. Over time, then, the *iqṭāʿ* system of the ninth and tenth centuries contributed in a significant way to the political and military crises it had been created to alleviate.[8]

In spite of the problems inherent in the *iqṭāʿ* system, successive dynasties adopted it as a major, if not the primary way to pay their armies. It

was evidently considered the most efficient method of financing expensive military formations, primarily - but not only - those of a mamluk nature. An important phase in the development of this institution took place under the Būyids, who gained control over Iraq[9] and western Iran in the mid-tenth century, keeping the ʿAbbāsids on as puppet rulers. The fiction of the payment of the *ʿushr* to the state was finally eliminated and hence there arose the *iqṭāʿ istighlāl* (*ʿiqṭāʿ* of usufruct'): the *muqṭaʿ* was no longer under any obligation to pay the *ʿushr* to the treasury. The use of the of *iqṭāʿ* spread under their rule, and the stage was thus set for the adoption by the Seljuqs of this system to finance their army in the second half of the eleventh century.[10]

The acceptance by the Seljuqs of an already established administrative mechanism should be seen in the wider context of the development of the Seljuq state as it expanded westward in the mid-eleventh century. Certainly urged on by key bureaucrats such as al-Kundurī and Niẓām al-Mulk, the Seljuq elite made a quick transition from being Central Asian tribal chiefs to being rulers of an enormous Muslim state whose inhabitants were overwhelmingly sedentary. In the process, they appear to have alienated the great mass of Türkmen tribesmen on whom their power was originally based. Many, if not most, of the Türkmen, perhaps with the encouragement of the rulers, began to move to the Azarbayjan and other border areas to put some distance between themselves and the central authorities. The attraction of the latter region included not only extensive grasslands and a congenial climate (at least for someone inured to that of the Eurasian Steppe), but also the proximity of the Byzantine frontier, which offered plenty of opportunity for raiding, now under the guise of *jihād*.[11] Of course, the Türkmen were not too far away from the Seljuq court in western Iran, and if necessary could be called up for campaigning. Still, their relative distance from the centers of power necessitated the creation of a new fighting force. The Seljuqs saw fit to adopt the type of army already established for over 200 years in the central and eastern Islamic lands, one composed of mamluks, mainly of Turkish origin.[12]

Mamluk armies, however, were expensive: not only did the young mamluks have to be bought and imported from far away, they also had to undergo several years of training and education before they were deemed ready to be enrolled in fighting units.[13] The costs of establishing and maintaining a mamluk army had to be borne in some way, and the *iqṭāʿ* system was called upon to play this role, under the supervision of the Persian bureaucrats. Because of their great expense, mamluk armies tended to be relatively small, and the estimates given by modern scholars of the standing mamluk army of the Seljuq sultans at their height was 10,000-

15,000.[14] It is worth mentioning, however, that at the crucial battle of Manzikert/Malazgird in 1071, only 4000 Turkish mamluks are mentioned by one Arabic source as being with Sultan Alp Arslān,[15] an indication that the actual mamluk force may have been smaller.

On the Seljuq *iqṭā'*, Claude Cahen has written: '... the Saldjūks made a wider use of the *ikṭā'* in their empire than had been made previously, and probably introduced it in provinces (particularly eastern Iran) were it had scarcely ever been used: but it remained in conception a continuation of that of the Būyids - an equivalent of pay granted for a short time...'[16] This being said, under the Seljuqs, and particularly when the power of their state began to decline, there arose the so-called 'administrative' *iqṭā'*,[17] whose holder received together with the right to collect taxes in a certain area, the authority to govern there. With the weakening of Seljuq authority, some of these 'administrative' *iqṭā'* even took on a hereditary nature, and in one Seljuq successor state, that of the Zengids of Mosul and Aleppo, this right of inheritance was even institutionalized.[18] But this development, by which the Muslim *iqṭā'*s took on a certain resemblance to the western European fief, was a dead end: the Ayyūbids and Mamluks, successors of the Zengids in Syria and Egypt, reverted to the system of non-hereditary *iqṭā'*, and the Mamluks completely removed any connection between the *muqṭa'* and the local governor.[19]

Pursuing the *iqṭā'*, even briefly, through the Seljuq empire and its successor states serves two purposes: first, it demonstrates how an elite of nomadic origin, taking upon itself a mode of government found in the Muslim world, can contribute to the development and spread of one or more well-established institutions, in this case, the method of payment of standing armies. Secondly, it can be seen that potential problems of the *iqṭā'* system could be kept in check by strong central government. Paradoxically, the regime which could probably best dispense with the *iqṭā'* as an administrative device, was the one best equipped to regulate it and prevent the grantees from abusing it.[20]

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There is no convincing evidence that the Mongols upon entering the Islamic world, either under Chinggis Khan in ca. 1220 or under his grandson Hülegü and his immediate successors more than 30 years later, used the *iqṭā'* as described above to finance their troops.[21] I.P. Petrushevsky, however, has written: 'Under the first six Īlkhāns also *iqṭā'* land was granted to the military, but not to all soldiers, the grants being mainly to the higher ranks.'[22] The basis for this statement is uncertain. The only reference he gives is to Juwaynī's *Ta'rīkh-i jahān-gushā*,[23] and an examination of this source shows that the word *iqṭā'āt* used there refers only to land allocated by *enemies* of the Mongols.

The term *iqṭā'* does turn up on occasion for this period, but it is applied only to land grants of some type to soldiers from pre-Mongol regimes who continued to serve the Mongols, as in the case of Khwārazmian troops, which actually were subordinate to the khans of the Golden Horde.[24] In Syria in 1260, during the brief Mongol occupation of the country, an *iqṭā'* which could support 100 horsemen was granted by Hülegü to the Ayyūbid prince al-Ashraf Mūsā, prince of Ḥimṣ, who submitted to the Mongols.[25] According to Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1233), writing in Mosul, Chinggis Khan was said to have offered the defenders of Merv *iqṭā'āt*, but this was only a ruse to get them to leave the city.[26] It is clear that this has nothing to do with an incipient form of land administration in the newly conquered territories, but was only a deceptive offer - or the rumor of one which reached Ibn al-Athīr - to Muslim troops accustomed to such payment. Similarly, Tegüder Aḥmad Ilkhan (1282-4) is said to have been accused by his nephew Arghun, soon to replace him, of having planned to grant *iqṭā'āt* to the descendants of the Kurds (perhaps referring to the Ayyūbids) and to give them the lands of the Mongols.[27] This story is very possibly apocryphal, and again refers to some type of grant of land, referred to here by a well-established expression, to an already existing Muslim political-military elite. Naṭanzī, the early fifteenth-century Persian chronicler, reports that Abagha Ilkhan (1265-82) granted a large area as a *soyurghal*, a Mongol term used from the mid-fourteenth century and understood in the sense of administrative *iqṭā'* (more about this below), to the local ruler of Luristan.[28] From the context it appears that some type of administrative *iqṭā'* is the intent of the author. Since this is the only use of *soyurghal* for such an early date it is quite likely that Naṭanzī's use of it was anachronistic. In any case, we may note that it was granted to a non-Mongol ruler.

There is one example, however, where *iqṭā'* may perhaps be connected with the Mongols themselves at a relatively early date: following Waṣṣāf, it seems that some Mongol commanders may have expropriated for themselves *inter alia* tracts of lands, which are referred to as *iqṭā'*. Thus it is reported in an order issued around 692/1293 prohibiting them to do so.[29] Whether such so-called *iqṭā'āt* resembled the traditional allocation to collect granted by a ruler, as described above, is doubtful. This expropriation of land, condemned by the central authorities seem to have been tagged *iqṭā'* only since it was a convenient term for tracts of land known by the bureaucrats who wrote up the order.

The above review of the appearance of the term *iqṭāʿ* in the history of the early Ilkhanate (up to Ghazan's reforms) leads to the conclusion that the *iqṭāʿ* institution as it was understood in the pre-Mongol Islamic east had basically ceased to exist, except in the residual Muslim states, now reduced to vassaldom to the Ilkhans. Why did the Ilkhans not adopt this particular institution which had a history of some 400 years behind it, and which virtually every regime in the Islamic world from Egypt to the east utilized in some form or another? A first answer, as suggested above, was that there was no *a priori* reason why the Mongols, non-Muslims as they were, should have adopted a given institution common to the Islamic world. Related to this is their steadfastness in maintaining an army based on tribesmen, unlike the Seljuqs. Thus they had no need or desire to introduce a mamluk army, which would have necessitated heavy expenditures. A tribal army was, from the point of view of the state, a self-paying venture, although it was helpful if it was supported by booty and occasional gifts and payments. Since revenues from agricultural taxes were, in theory, not needed for the military, they could be brought straight to the treasury for the use of the court. It comes as no surprise, then, that the term *iqṭāʿ* virtually disappears from the sources, since the intstitution was now superfluous.

What seems to have been allocated by the Ilkhans to the Mongols (and perhaps Turks), be they commanders or regular tribesmen, were pasture lands. These were referred to as *ʿulūfa* by the mid-fourteenth century Mamluk official and encyclopedist Ibn Faḍlallah al-ʿUmarī (d. 1349), who describes such areas as having been given to Jochid contingents in the early Ilkhanid army in the area of Azarbayjan.[30] The granting of pasture land also seems to have been the case when Hülegü granted the area of Jazīrat Ibn ʿUmar (northern Iraq of today) to one of his wives after he conquered it.[31] In Persian sources, these grazing grounds are referred to by the Arabic-Persian hybrid *ʿalafkhwār* or the Mongol-Turkish *yurt*. Lambton provides several examples of the use of these terms before Ghazan's reforms.[32] Mention should also be made of land grants made by the Great Khans to themselves and other members of the royal family in Iran in the period before the arrival of Hülegü, which are described by Allsen in his contribution to the present volume. The exact extent of these holdings and how long they endured into the Ilkhanid period is unclear, but there are indications that some were still extant up to Ghazan's reign.

This was the situation into which Ghazan re-introduced the *iqṭāʿ*, shortly - as it becomes clear in retrospect - before the end of his life. Following Rashīd al-Dīn, it appears that many of the Mongol tribesmen had been having difficulty maintaining themselves only from pastoral nomadism. Up to then, the Mongol tribesmen had not received any salary, and had even been expected to pay taxes to the treasury;[33] a similar statement is given by Juwaynī in his history.[34] But this was no longer a tenable arrangement, especially since booty from conquest and raiding had apparently been drying up for some time, notwithstanding the success of the Mongol campaign into Syria in 1299-1300.[35] Rashīd al-Dīn goes as far as to suggest that part of the problem was the growing sedentarization, or a desire for it, among the Mongols. He writes:

> At this time, most of the soldiers had the desire for estates (*amlāk*) and [the practice of ?] agriculture. Upon acquiring *iqṭāʿ* land (*milkī iqṭāʿī*), they will have reached [their] goal.[36]

Ghazan's solution to these problems was to reintroduce the *iqṭāʿ* system, albeit in a slightly altered form. An interim, and not successful, solution had been to grant the troops drafts, or rights for payment (*bārāt* in the singular), of grain.[37] Rashīd al-Dīn himself cites *in extenso* the text of Ghazan's order (*yarlīgh*); it is a reasonable assumption that Rashīd al-Dīn, then one of the two *wazīrs* of the state, also had a hand in the formulation of the *yarlīgh*. Its gist is as follows: The Mongol troops were to receive *iqṭāʿ* from either crown or state lands (*īnjū wa dālāy*), and taxes which had previously been paid to the treasury were now to go straight to the troops. So far there is a similarity to the Seljuq *iqṭāʿ*. But the land was to be distributed among the regiments of 1000 horsemen (*hazāra*), and then broken up among the units of 100, 10, and individual soldiers. This represents a departure from the Seljuq model (as well as its successor states), where the *iqṭāʿ* remained in the hands of the officer, who saw to the needs of his troops. Another difference was that the individual allotments were to be passed on by inheritance, or at least to family members. The land itself was to be worked by peasants and slaves, and not by the Mongols. The system was to be supervised by officials (sing. *bitikchī*).[38] As Lambton and Morgan have noted, another divergence from the Seljuq model was that whereas in the Seljuq version, the local landlord and notables intervened between the military man and the peasant, according to Ghazan's system the common Mongol soldier was directly above the peasant, and apparently the landlord had been all but eliminated in the collection of taxes.[39]

There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of this document. Whether this decree had much of an effect is a different matter. Lambton has already noted that on account of the late date of the promulgation of this edict, shortly before Ghazan's death, 'it is questionable how far it was implemented in the form set out in the *yarligh*.'[40] In the following, I will examine whether it was executed at all.

First, it may be noted that the term *iqṭā'* does not appear in the narrative portion of the section in Rashīd al-Dīn's history devoted to Ghazan himself, which, given the late date of the *yarlīgh*, should not come as a surprise. Rashīd al-Dīn's history of Ghazan's brother and successor Öljeitü (1304-16) has not come down to us, so that it cannot be ascertained if it appeared there. We do have, however, the history of Öljeitü's reign by Qāshānī,[41] but the term *iqṭā'* does not crop up there. Another contemporary, Waṣṣāf, 'seldom refers to *iqṭā'*s under the Īl-Khāns though he has a great deal of information on tax-farming in Fārs. It is difficult not to conclude from this that *iqṭā'* s were rare or almost nonexistent in Fārs.'[42] Waṣṣāf does mention an *iqṭā'* being granted to 'sulṭān,' the son of the renegade bedouin leader of north Syria, Muhannā b. 'Īsā (of the Āl Faḍl tribe), who fled to Iraq around 712/1312-3. Öljeitü granted 'Sulṭān' many presents, including an *iqṭā'* in the province which included Ḥilla, Kūfa and Shafāta.[43] A contemporary Syrian source, Abū 'l-Fidā', gives a slightly different rendition of this story: the father Muhannā b. 'Īsā had received Ḥilla as an *iqṭā'*, while maintaining his *iqṭā'* from the Mamluk sultan at Salamiyya in Syria. To demonstrate his 'loyalty' to Öljeitü, Muhannā sent his son Sulaymān (evidently corrupted by Waṣṣāf to 'sulṭān') to the Ilkhan's court. Abū 'l-Fidā' concludes with a critical comment about Muhannā's double loyalty.[44] Whatever the details, it is clear that this is nothing more than a throwback to the earlier model of allocating *iqṭā'*s to local Muslim rulers and has nothing to do with Ghazan's edict. The fact that this occurs in Iraq, 'home' of the *iqṭā'*, should be noted.

A more serious contender for an example of the realization of Ghazan's edict may perhaps be in a story mentioned in a Mamluk source. Also in 712/1312-3, a group of important Mamluk officers, led by Qarā Sunqur, fled the wrath of the sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwun, for the Ilkhanate. They were well received by Öljeitü, who gave them *iqṭā'*s: Qarā Sunqur himself received Marāgha and his associate Āqqūsh al-Afram got Hamādhān.[45] Assuming that we can fully accept the veracity of this report - as far as I know it is found only in a fifteenth century Mamluk source - this can be understood as nothing more than the Ilkhan's way to compensate important Mamluk deserters. At most, we have something which resembles the administrative *iqṭā'*, i.e., a governorship combined with the enjoyment of revenues from that area. Again, no mention is made of Mongols, officers or otherwise, receiving *iqṭā'*s.

An earlier example of such an *iqṭā'* might be found s.a. 698/1299 in the description of the events following the earlier defection of a group of Mamluk amirs from Syria to the Ilkhanate. Ghazan offered to grant their leader, Qipchaq, Hamadhān as an *iqṭā'* (*wa-aqṭa'a li-qibjaq hamadhān*).

Qipchaq, however, refused the offer, saying that he preferred to remain in Ghazan's presence.[46] Here too, it seems that a traditional type of *iqṭā'* was not intended, since it is clear that Qipchaq was expected to reside there. This appears to be something resembling an administrative *iqṭā'*; in other words Qipchaq was appointed as governor of Hamadhān and the surrounding country. In any event, since Qipchaq declined the offer, nothing was to come of this would-be precedent.

It is with these accounts in mind that another report of Qarā Sunqur's arrival in the Ilkhanate can be examined. Ibn al-Dawādārī (fl. 1330s), who goes to lengths to besmirch this amir and to exaggerate his influence with the Ilkhan, tells that Qarā Sunqur was granted almost unlimited power to enact reforms within the Ilkhanate, which supposedly was in a terrible state. Among his many 'reforms' intended to revitalize the army was the introduction of *iqṭā'āt*.[47] I have little doubt that this particular action, like the many others mentioned by the author, is a product of his imagination (or that of his source, the anonymous *al-nāqil*, 'the transmitter'). Ibn al-Dawādārī is attempting to demonize Qarā Sunqur by exaggerating his power among the Mongols, and thus to justify the attempts of the Mamluk sultan to assassinate him.[48] What is important here is that this particular claim would only impress a Mamluk audience if they believed that the Mongols did *not* have any type of *iqṭā'* system. Indirectly, then, we learn that the Mamluks, who were generally well informed about events at the Mongol court,[49] knew little or nothing of the existence of *iqṭā'*s among the Mongols, presumably since they did not exist, or were very limited in scope.

That the Mamluks and the historians who wrote in their kingdom did not know of the existence of an *iqṭā'* system in the Ilkhanate, is seen in the following passage from the biographical dictionary of Khalīl b. Aybeg al-Ṣafadī (d. 1363). In his entry on Ghazan, al-Ṣafadī writes:

> [Ghazan] devoted his attention to putting in order the armies. He defended the borders, guarded the kingdom, and attacked the enemy in every direction. He issued orders and commands (*al-yarāligh wa'l-a ḥkām*) to rebuild the land, to desist from bloodshed, and to augment the [number of] people of each profession, so that they would become many and the land would be populated ...[50]

As far as I know this is the only passage in a Mamluk source which mentions the reforms of Ghazan. It is significant that no reference is made to the introduction of *iqṭā'āt*.

Of course, only so much can be made of negative evidence, but this conclusion is strengthened by the information provided in the portion devoted to the Mongols in the encyclopedia by Ibn Faḍlallāh al-'Umarī, al-

Ṣafadī's friend and colleague. In his detailed description of the financial system of the Ilkhanid state, al-'Umarī reports information which was conveyed to him by Niẓām al-Dīn Abū 'l-Faḍā'il Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥakīm al-Ṭayyārī, a high official in the service of the Mongols who fled to the Mamluk Sultanate in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ilkhanate.[51] No mention whatsoever is made of iqṭā's by al-'Umarī, except for the above cited passage referring to the grants given to Khwārazmian troops.

Al-'Umarī does, however, mention other types of grants called idrārāt, ma'īshāt, marsūmāt and in'āmāt.[52] Lambton translates the first two terms as 'allowances' and 'pensions,' and the last as 'gifts.' The idrārāt may be 'money grants' or villages, but if it was the latter it was a form of private landed property (milk).[53] Elsewhere, Lambton writes that ma'īshāt was the name usually given to 'grants on the revenue for a specific sum.'[54] The meaning of the term marsūmāt is not clear. Lech does not translate it, and for that matter leaves his reader to his or her own devices with the terms idrārāt and ma'īshāt.[55] Lambton lumps marsāmāt together with the idrārāt and ma'īshāt, calling them all 'a variety of land grants and money grants.'[56] Leiser renders marsūmāt as 'pensions,'[57] which is about as precise as we can probably get. It appears that the exact meanings of these terms are elusive, as are the distinctions between them.[58] Some of these 'grants' may be connected to land, but these gifts were of private property. They were not connected to the iqṭā' envisioned by Ghazan, not the least since the marsūmāt go back to Hülegü.[59] There is certainly no justification for Togan rendering these expressions as iqṭā's, let alone as soyurghals (on that see below), and even timars and zeamats.[60]

Al-'Umarī, then, has passed on credible if not completely clear information on gifts, allowances and grants of private lands. His source was a refugee bureaucrat from the recently defunct Ilkhanate, who was in a position to know about these things. No mention is made of anything resembling an iqṭā' system. Might we ask whether one was in place?

We are, however, denied a simple or unequivocal answer. Another Ilkhanid official, Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī, writing in the 1330s, perhaps soon after the collapse of the Ilkhanate in 1335, mentions in his geographical work Nuzhat al-qulūb the term iqṭā' four times: Pīshkīn in Azerbaijan, Shīrwān and Gushtāfī along the Caspian Sea, and Khurasan.[61] These were, of course, areas of major concentrations of Turko-Mongolian tribesmen, although not the only ones. What is to be made of this evidence, in what is generally taken to be a reliable source?[62] I can suggest three explanations for this information, which appears out of the blue after some thirty years of silence regarding the iqṭā': a) That the author mentions this information en passant may indicate a deeply rooted and common

institution which gave no cause for comment by the author. b) Iqṭā' as used by Mustawfī meant something different than was usually understood in the medieval Islamic world and even circa 1300 by Ghazan and his entourage. An example of the 'misappropriation' of this term is given above (p. 11). c) This information reflects the arrangements ordered by Ghazan in the aftermath of his above described yarlīgh, but not necessarily carried out. It may be mentioned that geographical works in the medieval Islamic world are often more prescriptive than descriptive. Given the total lack of record of the expression iqṭā' in the three decades or so before its appearance in this source, the last suggestion seems the most likely. With regard to the first possible explanation, an additional problem can be noted: Why is there mention of specifically Pīshkīn and nowhere else in Azarbayjan, the center of Mongol Iran where much of the Mongol army and elite were found? Other provinces with known Mongol garrisons, such as the Jazīra and Rūm, are also missing.

It is in this light that we should examine another piece of evidence from the post-Ilkhanid area. This is from the chancery manual of Muḥammad ibn Hindūshāh Nakhjawānī, Dastūr al-kātib,[63] who writes that the commanders of tümens (10,000), 1000s and 100s held iqṭā's in the provinces.[64] Rather than see this as further proof of the implementation of Ghazan's order on iqṭā', it makes more sense to see the passage as an idealized vision of a Persian bureaucrat. This information does not even have the advantage of providing the names of the four locations as given by Mustawfī to strengthen his claim. It is possible that the ultimate inspiration of this passage is the yarligh found in Rashīd al-Dīn along with the information that preceded it, which was discussed above. A hint to this effect is the subsequent sentence given by Nakhjawānī: the army commanders were concerned inter alia with cultivation (or prosperity) and agriculture (ba-'imārat wa zirā'at mashghūl mī-shūwand). This is reminiscent of Rashīd al-Dīn's statement - cited above - that the Mongols had a 'desire for property and [practising] agriculture.'[65]

Whether the Mongols really had begun to settle and to be engaged in agriculture is another matter. A detailed exposition of this subject is beyond the confines of this article, but it can be mentioned that Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī provides a different view:

Every tribe has land to reside in and the descendant inherits it from the forefathers since Hülegü conquered this country. Their abodes (manāziluhum) are in it. They have in it crops for their substance, but they do not live by tilling and sowing.

To al-'Umarī's mind, based on information brought from knowledgeable informants from Ilkhanid territory more than a generation after Rashīd al-Dīn, the Mongols continued to maintain their nomadic lifestyle. The practice of agriculture by the Mongols, or their desire to engage in it, is not as simple a matter as some Persian writers might have us believe.

There exists, however, another term, which might be connected with Ghazan's *iqṭā'*. This is the *soyurghal* (literally in Mongolian a 'grant' or 'favour'), that according to Petrushevshky was 'a military fief [*sic*, R.A.] which appeared under the Jalayirids, was hereditary, and had fiscal and administrative immunity.'[66] The evidence for the use of *soyurghal* in this sense during the immediate post-Ilkhanid, however, is fairly sparce, to put it mildly.[67] It appears several times in the published portion of Nakhjawānī's work, but in the more general sense of 'favour.'[68] In the post-Ghazan Ilkhanate it does not surface, and thus it is clearly a development unrelated to Ghazan's promulgation of the *iqṭā'*. If *soyurghal* does appear in descriptions of the Ilkhanid period, it is only in later sources, and thus most probably is being used in an anachronistic sense. One example is that given by Naṭanzī, cited above. A second one is provided by al-Ahrī (ca. 1360) in his *Ta'rīkh-i Shaykh Uways*, which is mainly a history of the Jalayirid dynasty. In his descriptions of the Ilkhan Arghun (1284-91), he writes: 'In the year 685/1286-7, Pūlād Chinksān and Ūrduqiyā brought a *soyurghal* from the Qān [=Qubilai Qa'an], concerning [the appontiment to] the kingship of Arghun Khan.'[69] But, as the translator J.B. van Loon notes, in this particular case, *soyurghal* could best be understood as a synonym for the term *yarligh*, 'royal order.' Whether we accept this or rather understand *soyurghal* in a more general sense of 'favour,' it is clear that no type of land holding is intended here.

Later in the fourteenth century and afterwards, the term *soyurghal* does appear more frequently in a sense which Lambton understands to resemble the administrative *iqṭā'* of Seljuq days.[70] The *soyurghal*, then, is not relevant to the *iqṭā'* described in Ghazan's *yarligh*, either in function or provenance.

I have found only one explicit mention of an *iqṭā'* in the Ilkhanate during the post-Ghazan era which is actually connected with a Mongol personage. The Syrian historian Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373) describes s.a. 715/1315-6 how Chūpān, the most senior officer in the Ilkhanate,[71] received the town of Malaṭya in southeastern Anatolia as an *iqṭā'*. 'The Mongol king had given it to him totally' (*aṭlaqahā la-hu malik al-tatar*). The source adds that Chūpān appointed there a 'Kurdish man' as his representative or governor.[72] Al-Maqrīzī makes a distinction between a Kurd named Manduh, active in anti-Mamluk counter espionage and a personage named Mīzāmīr who was Chūpān's governor there.[73] Whatever the exact identity of his

representative, it is clear the great Mongol officer had the right to administer the area, including surely the collection of taxes. Could this be a lone piece of evidence pointing to some type of implementation of Ghazan's neo-*iqṭā'* system? Probably not, although the possibility cannot be eliminated. The use of the expression *aṭlaqa*, which I have translated 'to give something totally' hints that this is some type of grant of private property to this important officer, similar to the types referred to by al-'Umarī which were cited above.

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The fact that *iqṭā'* is rarely mentioned during the time of Ghazan, the later Ilkhans and their direct successors, is not something that can be ignored. One can contrast it to the recurrent appearance of *iqṭā'* in the sources for the history of the Mamluk Sultanate, which show a keen interest in which Mamluk amir had replaced another (through death, retirement, or - more often than not - arrest) and received his land grant.[74] Al-'Umarī's taciturnity with regard to *iqṭā'* among the Ilkhans contrasts sharply with the detailed discussion of the principles of this institution among the Mamluks.[75]

The highly attenuated form (at best) of the *iqṭā'* among the Mongols in Iran in the post-Ghazan period has implications for the study of the Ilkhanid government's attitude to land use, tax policy and perhaps the settled population as a whole. These are, however, subjects which must be left to further research. In the context of the present volume, I will briefly comment on the implications of this conclusion for understanding the long-term impact of sedentary Islamic culture on nomadic conquerors. The case of the *iqṭā'* is one case of several, which shows that the Mongols were hesitant to adapt themselves to the culture of their subjects, even after several generations in Iran and the surrounding countries. Whatever Ghazan's intentions, it appears that they were fulfilled at best to a very limited degree. This reluctance to adopt the *iqṭā'* institution, even in a modified form, is indicative of the aversion or diffidence of the Mongol ruling class towards many of the political norms of the eastern Islamic world. The process of adopting the political norms of their adopted country was long in coming and far from being complete when Mongol rule collapsed in 1335. The Mongols, or at least their elite, showed a great deal of resilience in protecting their traditional culture, much more than their Seljuq predecessors, and perhaps more than has generally been understood by modern scholars.

NOTES

1 D. Morgan, *Medieval Persia, 1040, 1797* (London, 1988), chapters 3 and 6; J. Fletcher, 'The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives,' *HJAS*, 46 (1986), pp. 19-32, 39-43. For the numbers of the Mongols, see T.T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1987), 2, pp. 203-7; J.M. Smith, Jr., 'Mongol Manpower and Persian Population,' *JESHO*, 18 (1975), pp. 270-99, especially pp. 274-8.

2 Besides Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, ch. 3, see A.K.S. Lambton, 'Aspects of Saljūq-Ghuzz Settlement in Persia,' in D.S. Richards, *Islamic Civilisation 950-1150* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 105-126.

3 D. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 84-111; P.D. Buell, 'Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara,' *JAH*, 13 (1979), pp. 121-51.

4 See T.T. Allsen, 'Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran,' in G. Seaman and D. Marks (eds), *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 223-41.

5 On this, see R. Amitai-Preiss, 'Ghazan, Islam and Mongol Tradition: A View from the Mamluk Sultanate,' *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 59 (1996), pp. 1-10.

6 Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, pp. 75-6; A.K.S. Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia* (New York, 1988), pp. 115-29; C. Cahen, 'Ik tā',' *EI²*, 3, p. 1089; I.P. Petrushevsky, 'The Socio-economic Condition of Iran under the Īl-khāns,' in *Cambridge History of Iran*, 5 (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 518-21; B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, 4th ed. (Leiden, 1985), pp. 273-8.

7 In this general discussion and examination of the Seljuq period, I am following the pioneering work of A.K.S. Lambton and the late Claude Cahen. See: A.K.S. Lambton, 'Reflections on the *Iqtā*', in G. Makdisi (ed.), *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A.R. Gibb* (Leiden, 1965), pp. 358-76; idem, 'Eqtā, *EIr*, 8, p. 520-3; C. Cahen, 'L'évolution de l'iqā' du IXᵉ au XIIIᵉ siècle: contribution à une histoire comparée des sociétés médiévales,' *Annales: Écomomies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 8 (1953), pp. 25-52; idem, 'Iktā',' *EI²*, 3, p. 1088-91. See now also Sato Tsugitaka, *State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam: Sutlans, Muqta's and Fallahun* (Leiden, 1997), especially chapters 1 and 2.

8 For a summary of this development, see H. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century* (London, 1986), pp. 158-99.

9 Iraq here means the province of al-'Irāq, today the southern part of the modern state of Iraq between the Euphrates and Tigres rivers.

10 Cahen, 'Iktā',' *EI²*, 3, p. 1088; see also C.E. Bosworth, 'Military Organization under the Buyids,' *Oriens*, 18-19 (1967), pp. 159-66.

11 C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, tr. J. Jones-Williams (London, 1968), pp. 19-72.

12 D. Ayalon, 'The Mamlāks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads,' *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 3rd ser., 6/3 (1996), pp. 305-33.

13 D. Ayalon, 'Preliminary Remarks on the Mamlūk Institution in Islam,' in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (London, 1975), pp. 56-8; ibid., 'Aspects of the Mamlūk Phenomenon: The Importance of the Mamlūk Institution,' *Der Islam*, 53/2 (1976), pp. 206-9.

14 Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, pp. 7-8; Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, p. 29.

15 Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, ed. A. Sevim (Ankara, 1968), pp. 147-8; cited in Ayalon, 'The Mamlūk s of the Seljuks,' p. 324.

16 Cahen, 'Iktā',' *EI²*, 3, p. 1088.

17 This is a modern term. Cahen, 'Évolution de l'iqtā', p. 247, refers to it as *iqtā'-wilāya*, and discusses the antecedents of the 'administrative' *iqtā'* in the pre-Seljuq period

18 Lambton, 'Reflections,' pp. 369-73; Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, p. 38.

19 See R.S. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260* (Albany, 1977), pp. 371-5; H. Rabie, *The Financial System of Egypt, A.H. 564-741/1169-1341* (London, 1972), pp. 26-72; Sato, *State and Rural Society*, ch. 3.

20 Cahen, 'Iktā',' *EI²*, 3, p. 1090, understates the problem in the Mamluk state when he writes: 'With the exception, perhaps, of a certain relaxation of control at the end of the régime, the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk i kṭā' is characterized by the maintenance of close administrative and financial control over the *mukṭa'*...' This statement gives little idea of the vast abuses of the *iqtā'* from the second half of the fourteenth century onward; see the comments of R.S. Humphreys scattered in *Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry*, 2nd ed. (London, 1991).

21 This is briefly demonstrated in Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, p. 115; idem, 'Eqtā', 8, p. 526.

22 Petrushevsky, 'The Socio-economic Condition of Iran,' p. 518.

23 Ed. M.M. Qazwānī (Leiden and London, 1912-37), 1:23; translation in J.A. Boyle, *The History of the World-Conqueror* (Manchester, 1958), 1:32.

24 Ibn Falallah al-ʿUmarī, *Das Mongolische Weltreich: al-ʿUmarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-abṣār fī 'l-mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. and tr. K. Lech (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 83 of Arabic text. Lambton, 'Eqṭāʿ,' 8:526, gives some additional examples of its use as a land grant among non-Mongols in 'outlying areas' or even in a more general sense as a grant of revenue.

25 Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mir'at al-zamān fī ta'rīkh al-a'yān* (Hyderabad, 1954-61), 1, pp. 362-3, 2, pp. 34-5. For similar offer given to another Ayyūbid prince around this time, see R. Amitai-Preiss, 'Hülegü and the Ayyūbid Lord of Transjordan (More on the Mongol Governor of al-Karak),' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 9 (1995-7), p. 14.

26 Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-ta'rīkh* (Beirut, 1385-6/1965-6), 12, p. 392; cited in Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, vol. 27, ed. S. 'Āshūr (Cairo, 1405/1985), p. 326.

27 Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa'l-mulūk*, vol. 8, ed. C. Zurayk and N. Izzedin (Beirut, 1939), pp. 3-4; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmiʿ al-ghurar*, vol. 8, ed. U. Haarmann (Wiesbaden, 1971), p. 264. Both sources cite al-Jazarī (d. 1338) as their ultimate source.

28 Naṭanzī, *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i mu'īnī*, ed. J. Aubin (Teheran, 1957), p. 45; cited in Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, p. 117.

29 Waṣṣāf (ʿAbd Allāh b. Faḍl Allāh), *Ta'rīkh-i waṣṣāf (=Tajziyat al-amṣār wa-tazjiyat al-aṣ'ār)* (rpt., Teheran, 1338 S./1959-60 of ed. Bombay, 1269 H./1852-3), pp. 269-70; cited by Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, p. 117.

30 'Umarī, ed. Lech, 78 of Arabic text.

31 Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:248. This wife was the mother of Möngke Temür, the brother of Abagha Ilkhan.

32 Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, pp. 115-7.

33 Rashīd al-Dīn, *Geschichte Gāzān-Hān's aus dem Ta'rīh-i-Mubārak-i-Gāzānī*, ed. and tr. K. Jahn (London, 1940), pp. 300-2; translation in A.P. Martinez, 'The Third Portion of the History of Ğāzān Xān in Rašīdu 'd-Dīn's Ta'rīx-e Mobābak-e Ğāzānī,' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 6 (1986 [1988]), pp. 84-91; summarized in D.O. Morgan, 'The Mongol Armies in Persia,' *Der Islam*, 56 (1979), pp. 92-3.

34 Juwaynī, ed. Qazwānī, 1:22 (=tr. Boyle, 1:30), who is summarized by 'Umarī, ed. Lech, pp. 10-11. This report is contradicted, however, by other information given by 'Umarī, ed. Lech, pp. 94-5. A discussion of the last mentioned evidence must be relegated elsewhere.

35 See the comments in Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, pp. 122-4; Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, pp. 75-6.

36 Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p. 302.

37 Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, pp. 300-1; see also Morgan, 'Mongol Armies,' pp. 92-3.

38 Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, pp. 303-9; tr. Martinez, pp. 91-108; Morgan, 'Mongol Armies,' pp. 92-5; Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, pp. 125-8.

39 A.K.S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (London, 1953), p. 90; cited in Morgan, 'Mongol Armies,' p. 94.

40 Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, p. 129.

41 Qāshānī [=Kāshānī], *Ta'rīkh-i ūljāytū*, ed. M. Hambly (Teheran, 1969).

42 Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, p. 129.

43 Waṣṣāf, 553; cited in Lambton, *Change and Continuity*, p. 117.

44 Abū 'l-Fidā', *al-Mukhtaṣar fī ta'rīkh al-bashar* (Istanbul, 1286/1869-70), 4:73; translated in P.M. Holt, *The Memoirs of a Syrian Prince* (Wiesbaden, 1983), p. 63. For the Āl Fal tribe and its relations with the Mamluk Sultanate, see R. Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Īlkhānid War 1260-1281* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 64-9; M.A. Hiyari, 'The Origins and Development of the Amīrate of the Arabs during the Seventh/Thirteenth and Eighth/Fourteenth Centuries,' *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 38 (1975), pp. 509-24; A.S. Tritton, 'Tribes of Syria in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,' *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 12 (1948), pp. 567-73.

45 Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M.M. Ziyāda and S.'A-F. 'Āshūr (Cairo, 1934-73), 1:115.

46 Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmiʿ al-ghurar*, vol. 8, ed. U. Haarmann (Cairo, 1971), p. 375; the anonymous chronicle edited in K.V. Zettersteen, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlūkensultane* (Leiden, 1919), pp. 49-50. It appears that these two works have a common source, probably al-Jazarī's *Ḥawādith al-zamān*.

47 Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmiʿ al-ghurar*, vol. 9, ed. H.R. Roemer (Cairo, 1960), p. 234.

48 I discuss this matter at length in a paper currently under preparation: 'The Qara Sunqur Affair.' D.P. Little, *An Introduction to Mamlūk Historiography* (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 112-36, takes a much more charitable view to Ibn al-Dawādārī's evidence.

49 See R. Amitai, 'Mamlūk Espionage among Mongols and Franks,' *Asian and African Studies*, 22 (1988), pp. 173-82.

50 Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī bi'l-wafayāt*, MS. Topkapi (Istanbul), Ahmet III, 2920/25, fol. 62a. This passage is discussed in some detail in R. Amitai-Preiss, 'New Material from the Mamluk Sources for the Biography of Rashid al-Din,' in J. Raby and T. Fitzherbert (eds), *The Court of the Il-khans*, in *Oxford Studies in Islamic Art*, vol. 12 (1996), p. 26.

51 Lech, in his edition of 'Umarī, p. 36 (of introduction).

52 'Umarī, ed. Lech, p. 95 (of Arabic).

53 Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, p. 148.

54 Ibid., p. 146.

55 'Umarī, ed. Lech, p. 155 (of translation).

56 Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, p. 148.

57 G. Leiser, 'Economic Conditions in Anatolia in the Mongol Period by Ahmet Zeki Valid Togan,' in *Annales Islamiologiques*, 25 (1990), p. 237.

58 I found the discussion in Petrushevsky, 'Socio-economic Condition,' p. 520, unilluminating.

59 'Umarī, ed. Lech, p. 101, and see pp. 93-4.

60 Leiser, 'Economic Conditions,' p. 237, points out the anachronistic use of these terms which derive from the Ottoman Empire.

61 G. Le Strange (ed. and tr.), *The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat-al-Qulūb composed by Ḥamd-allāh Mustawfī of Qazwīn in 740 (1340)* (Leiden and London, 1915-19), 1, pp. 83, 92, 93, 147; cited by Morgan, 'Mongol Armies,' p. 92; Petrushevsky, 'The Socio-economic Condition of Iran,' pp. 518-9.

62 Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, p. 166.

63 On this work and its author, see Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, pp. 371-2.

64 Muḥammad ibn Hindūshāh Nakhjawānī, *Dastār al-kātib fī ta'yīn al-marātib* (Moscow, 1964-71), I/2, p. 187.

65 See also *ibid.*, I/1, p. 306 and I/2, p. 200, for other mentions of *iqṭā'āt*. These, however, are also general descriptions, and like the first instance seem to be of an idealized nature.

66 Petrushevsky, 'The Socio-economic Condition,' p. 520.

67 I.P. Petrushevsky, 'K istorii instututu soyurgāla,' *Sovestskoe Vosto-kovendenie*, 6 (1949), pp. 227-9 (I am grateful to my colleague Ms. Michal Biran for providing me with a translation of the relevant sections of this article).

68 Nakhjawānī, *Dastūr al-kātib*, 1/1, pp. 166, 268; 1/2: 251, 253, 490; see also G. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente in Neupersischen* (Wiesbaden, 1963-75), 1, pp. 351-3.

69 J.B van Loon, *Ta'rīkh-i Shaikh Uwais (History of Shaikh Uwais), An Important Source for the History of Ādharbaijān in the Fourteenth Century* ('s-Gravenhage, 1954), p. 139 (Persian text) = 41 (translation). The translation given here is a modified version of that provided by van Loon.

70 Lambton, 'Eqṭā',' 8:527; see also Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 275 and n. 18.

71 On him, see C. Melville, 'Wolf or Shepherd? Amir Chupan's Attitude to Government,' J. Raby and T. Fitzherbert (ed.), *The Court of the Il-khans 1290-1340 (=Oxford Studies in Islamic Art*, vol. XII) (Oxford, 1996), pp. 79-93.

72 Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa'l-nihāya fī'l-ta'rīkh* (rpt., Beirut, 1977). 14:73.

73 Maqrīzī, 2:143. For a further discussion of the events at Malaya and the subsequent Mamluk raid there, see C. Melville, '"Sometimes by the Sword, Sometimes by the Dagger': The Role of the Isma'ilis in Mamlūk-Mongols in the 8th/14th Century,' in F. Daftary (ed.), *Mediaeval Isma'ili History and Thought* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 251-2.

74 For some examples in the early 1310s, a parallel period, see R. Amitai, 'The Remaking of the Military Elite of Mamlūk Egypt by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn,' *Studia Islamica*, 72 (1990), pp. 145-63.

75 Ibn al-Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amsār: l'Égypte, la Syrie, la Ḥigāz et le Yéman*, A.F. Sayyid (ed.) (Cairo, 1985), pp. 47-9.

CHAPTER 7

SHARING OUT THE EMPIRE:
APPORTIONED LANDS UNDER THE MONGOLS

THOMAS T. ALLSEN

The underlying structure and long-term political dynamics of the Mongolian Empire were shaped by a series of major territorial dispensations of its early rulers. So, too, was the fate of the empire's numerous sedentary subjects; their political status and economic well-being often turned on the character and conditions of these allotments to the senior Chinggisid lines. The place to begin this exploration is with Chinggis Khan's original dispensation of territories among his sons and immediate kin.

This consequential event, crucial to understanding the subsequent evolution of the Mongolian polity is not extensively reported in the sources. The earliest and most complete account is provided by Juvaynī, the well-informed Persian historian who wrote in the 1260s. Because of its extreme importance, this passage is quoted at length:

> And when in the age of the dominium of Chinggis Khan, the area of the kingdom became vast, he assigned every one their own place of abode called a *yurt*. To Ötegin [Ūtakīn], who was his brother, and some other of his grandchildren he designated [territory] in the region of China [Khitāi]. To his eldest son Jochi [Tūshī] he gave [the territory] from the regions of Qayālīq and Khwārazm to the far reaches of Saqsīn and Bulghār [on the Volga] and from those parts to whatever places the hooves of the Tatar horses had reached. To Chaghadai [he gave the territory extending] from the country of the Uighur to Samarqand and Bukhara and his place of residence was Quyās in the vicinity of Almālīq. The royal residence of the heir apparent, Ögödei, during his father's reign was his *yurt* in the region of the Emil and Qobaq [rivers in Jungharia]. When he sat upon the royal throne, he transferred [his royal residence] to the [Mongols'] original homeland which is between China and the country of the Uighur, and gave that [other] place of residence to his own son Güyüg. ... [The territory of] Tolui [Chinggis Khan's fourth son] likewise was contiguous with and adjacent to his [Ögödei's], and indeed this place [of Tolui's] is in the middle of their kingdom just like the center of a circle.[1]

While somewhat short on specifics, Juvaynī's account gives us an accurate depiction of the division of the territorial spoils made, apparently, in the last years of Chinggis Khan's lifetime. The Jochids in fact received and subsequently occupied what is now the Kazakh steppe, southern Siberia, the lower Volga, the Qipchaq steppe, North Caucasia, and the Rus principalities. Chaghadai, his second son, obtained West Turkestan; Ögödei, his third son and political heir, had his personal territory in Jungharia and later moved to Central Mongolia, the site of the imperial capital, Qara Qorum; and, finally, Tolui, the youngest, received eastern Mongolia, the *Urheimat* of the Mongolian tribes. China, it is critical to recognize, was given out piecemeal as shares to kinsmen. It was a kind of joint property in which all Chinggisids came to have an interest, a share. And later, when Mongolian rule extended into Iran and an administrative apparatus was fashioned there, it, too, was shared out among the imperial princes. Consequently, as Paul Buell pointed out some time ago, this territory was governed by a 'joint satellite administration,' a branch of the imperial chancellery in Mongolia. The staff of such branch chancelleries was composed of joint appointees of the qaghan and the imperial princes.[2] Thus, the administrative personnel, at least in theory, represented the interests of all the Chinggisid lines, with the qaghan enjoying the status of the first among equals. This meant, it must be stressed, that there was no direct princely control over China and Iran, as there was in Central Asia and the western steppe. This arrangement, as it evolved under Chinggis (r. 1206-27), Ögödei (r. 1229-41), and Güyüg (r. 1246-8), was never, so far as I am aware, challenged in principle by any of the Chinggisid lines.

The sources of princely tension that in time divided the empire did not, therefore, arise from the territorial dispensation of Chinggis Khan. That is, there was no confrontation over 'borders,' rather the conflict was over access to and control of apportioned lands. Naturally, the qaghan and the officials of the central chancellery tried to limit the authority and access to resources of the princely shareholders. This competition was particularly acute in Khurāsān, which was so distant from Qara Qorum. There is little doubt that Batu, the son of Jochi, tried to use his apportioned lands as a base from which to assert his control over, or at least extend his influence in, Iran and Transcaucasia.

To eliminate such possibilities, Möngke (r. 1251-9), soon after he came to the throne, made a new dispensation, one that forever changed the political alignment among the princely lines. At about the same time that he granted new shares to family and officials in China and Iran, he asserted and established direct Toluid princely control over both countries. In the words of Rashīd al-Dīn, the new emperor

put one of his brothers, Qubilai Qaghan, in charge of the countries of Khitāi (North China), Machīn (South China), Qarā-jāng (Yunnan), Tangut, Tibet, Jurche, Solanga (North Korea), Kūlī (Kao-li, or Korea), and that part of Hindustan which is contiguous to Khitāi and Machīn, and to Hülegü he assigned the countries of the West, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Rum, and Armenia, so that each of them, with the armies they would have, would be his right and left wings.[3]

More simply, the *Yuan shih* states that in 1251 Möngke 'ordered his younger brother Qubilai (Hu-pi-lai) to take charge of the population of the Chinese territory (held by) the Mongols' and a year later he ordered his other brother 'Hülegü (sü-lieh) to subdue the states of the Western Region and of the sultan (*su-tan*).'[4]

This assertion of immediate control over the richest and most populous parts of the empire made the Toluids the most powerful of the princely lines, not only in name but in fact. The result, of course, was new tension and new enmity. The Ögödeids already viewed Möngke as a usurper and now the Jochids, his erstwhile allies, saw him as an unwanted and unexpected meddler in what had long been considered their special preserve; it was no doubt particularly frustrating that the new qaghan with one hand affirmed and extended their apportioned lands in West Asia and with the other introduced measures that had the effect of restricting their rights and undermining their influence in the region.

The growing hostility can be seen in the confrontation over access to the Jochids' apportioned lands in Khurāsān. Some time in the late 1250s two nephews of Batu, Balaghai and Tutar, made repeated demands on Herat for supplies and monies. The local ruler, Shams al-Dīn Kart, rebuffed them and this decision, after a long period of bickering, was sustained by Hülegü.[5]

Even more consequential and long lasting was the rivalry over Transcaucasia. From the time of their establishment in the Lower Volga, the Jochids had been extending their influence in Georgia. No doubt as a counterbalance to the qaghan's officials in Iran, the Georgian monarchy seems to have welcomed these attentions. Queen Rusudan (r. 1223-45), for instance, dispatched Georgian nobles to serve at Batu's court.[6] This special relationship was even recognized by Möngke. After consolidating his hold on the throne, the qaghan in 1252 rewarded his princely supporters in a new dispensation. According to the *Yuan shih* account, Möngke

Allotted (*fen-ch'ien*) each prince of the blood (*chu-wang*) his own place: Qadan (Ho-tan) with the territory (*ti*) of Besh Baliq (Pieh-shih Pa-li); Melik (Mieh-li) with (territory) on the Irtysh (Yeh-erh-te-shih) River;

Qaidu (Hai-tu) with Qayaliq (Hai-ya-li); Berke (Pieh-erh-ko) with the territory of Georgia (Ch'u-erh-chihṣ> Persian Gurj); Totoq (T'o-t'o) with the territory of Emil (Yeh-mi-li); and Mönggetü (Meng-ko-tu) and Ögödei's empress, Chi'li-chi-hu-t'ien-ni, with (territory) to the west of that inhabited by Köden (K'uo-tuan). Further, (the emperor) allotted (*fen-tz'u*) Ögödei's wives, concubines and family property to the imperial princes (*ch'in-wang*).[7]

Juvaynī, a contemporary, also reports on this same dispensation. He states, in conformity with the *Yuan shih* account, the division of Ögödei's camps (*urdū-hā*) and women (*khavātīn*) among the princes, but most revealingly, while he mentions Qadaghan (i.e., Qadan), Melik, and Batu's brother Berke by name, he suppresses all reference to the territories allotted them, since, obviously, the rights of Berke in Georgia was a politically sensitive issue for his patrons, the Hülegüids.[8]

During Möngke's reign the contest for influence in Georgia was limited to a series of political and bureaucratic struggles over census taking, taxation, etc., struggles which Hülegü, with the qaghan's backing, always won. However, once Berke (r. 1257-66) became Khan of the Golden Horde and Möngke passed from the scene, open warfare broke out in the Caucasus. In 1262 Berke launched a major assault which devastated northern Azarbayjan and in the next year Hülegü countered with a campaign that reached the Terek in southern Daghestan.[9] In consequence of this contention the Toluids now lost their last firm ally among the Chinggisids: henceforth they would be faced with three rival lines who not only contested their legitimacy but who joined forces to secure their destruction.

Möngke's new dispensation of apportioned lands and his imposition of Toluid princely control over China and Iran laid, therefore, the geographical foundations for the subsequent emergence of the Il-khan state and the Yuan dynasty, and, at the same time, intensified preexisting princely rivalries that resulted in a Chinggisid civil war that lasted intermittently into the early fourteenth century. In this internecine struggle, the Mongolian courts in China and Iran, by virtue of their very origins became fast allies against the remaining princely lines, who saw them as usurpers, usurpers of the imperial throne and subsequently usurpers of territories, China and Iran, that were supposed to be held and managed by the Chinggisid family collectively.

Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Yuan and Il-khan courts became so interdependent, militarily and ideologically. Throughout the thirteenth century the Il-khans' legitimacy was derivative in character, their right to rule dependent on a formal grant of authority from the qaghan in the east. This is understandable because Hülegü, the founder of the state, received his territory and administrative authority in a secondary

dispensation from Möngke and not, as the Il-khans were painfully aware, in consequence of the primary dispensation of Chinggis Khan.

The apportioned lands assigned individual Chinggisids have often been discussed but usually on a regional basis and no one, to the best of my knowledge, has ever investigated the matter on the imperial scale. Such a task will involve, first off, tracing the various dispensations both chronologically and geographically; only when these temporal and spatial relationships are established does the extent, nature, and purpose of apportioned lands become evident.

The generic term in Mongolian for such 'shares' was *qubi*, but there developed over time a complex, and at times confusing, Chinese and Mongolian vocabulary related to territories and the peoples granted to notables. Among the more common were *t'ou-hsia*, 'appanage,' *ai-ma* (Mongolian *ayimagh*), 'tribe,' and most important for our purposes, *fen-ti*, 'apportioned territory.'[10] On a large scale at least, *fen-ti* were first bestowed under Ögödei (r. 1229-41). The decision to do so generated much controversy and political debate and was vigorously resisted by the Mongols' most influential Chinese advisers, notably Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai.[11] Nonetheless, the plan to share out large areas of North China (Chung Yuan) was implemented, with modifications, in 1236. The consequence was that a sizable part of the population was 'apportioned'[12] among the imperial family. In this dispensation Ögödei generously assigned senior Chinggisid princes entire prefectures: for instance, Orda and Batu, the eldest sons of Jochi, received P'ing-yang; Chaghadai the prefecture of T'ai-yuan, and Ötegin, Chinggis Khan's youngest brother, I-tu. It was, however, stipulated by the emperor, on the insistence of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, that while each recipient might place his own agent (*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* > Mongolian *darughachi*) in his apportioned land, court-appointed officials would collect the taxes and then turn the proceeds over to the grantee or his agent.[13] The tax imposed on this category of the populace was called *aqa-tamur in Mongolian and *wu-hu-ssu*, literally, 'five households silk' in Chinese. Such households, accordingly termed *wu-hu-ssu-hu*, 'five households silk households,' paid their tax in silk floss at an annual rate of one *chin* (5966.82 grams) to the central government and six *liang*, four *ch'ien* (238.72 grams) to the grantee. The central government therefore received 2.5 times as much as the holder of the apportioned land.[14]

Because of the tradition of bureaucratic record keeping that underlies Chinese historiography, the data on apportioned lands in China are rather full and have often been discussed in the scholarly literature. It is far less appreciated, however, that the Mongolian leadership also apportioned agricultural lands in Iran in a similar fashion. These data are quite scattered and less explicit but the evidence as a whole points to the unmistakable conclusion that there were allotted territories in the Hülegüid realm set aside for princes and officials, many of whom were non-residents.

Such assignments of land are first noted in the reign of Ögödei. Speaking of members of the Onggirad tribe in Iran, Rashīd al-Dīn relates that 'Amir Tusū (Tesü) had originally come from the Qā'ān (Ögödei) as a companion (*nökör*) of Arghun Aqa in order to manage a district (*vilāyat*) which belongs to the person of the Qā'ān.'[15] Jūzjānī, writing of the life and times of Batu (d. 1256), Khan of the Golden Horde, says that 'from each district that had come under the control of the Mongols in Iran, he (Batu) had an assigned share (*naṣīb*), and his agents (*qumāshtagān*) were installed in those portions allotted to him. ...'[16] Finally, Juvaynī, like Jūzjānī a contemporary to the events he describes, clearly alludes to a later dispensation of apportioned lands in Iran:

> And since at this time (1257) the census (*shumār*) of the districts had been completed, the Emperor of the World (Möngke Qaghan) apportioned (*takhsīs jarmūd*) the districts among all his kinsmen and brothers and this shall be mentioned in its proper place.[17]

Most unfortunately, Juvaynī never returns to this subject but the Chinese sources fully corroborate his testimony. According to an entry in the *Yuan shih* dating to the winter of 1256-7, Möngke 'apportioned (*fen-tz'u*) the subject Muslim (Hui-hui) population of the Amu Darya (A-mu River) among the imperial princes and high officials.'[18] That northern Iran is meant here is verified by an earlier passage in the same source which has Möngke assigning Arghun Aqa (A-erh-hun) to the A-mu River, an assignment, we know from Persian sources, that sent him to Tūs in Khurāsān.[19] Piecing the data together, it is evident that apportioned lands were established in Iran and China at approximately the same time: in both places the practice was first systematized under Ögödei and then further expanded under Möngke. In the latter instance the timing (1257) and the terminology (*takhsīs jarmūd*, *fen-tz'u*) are exactly the same. Moreover, in Iran as in China, the grantee's own agents, variously called *nökör*, *darughachi*, or *qumāshtagān*, played a prominent role in the administration of these 'shares' called *fen-ti*, *qubi*, or *naṣīb*. Lastly, the territories in Iran, like those in China, were assigned to many shareholders, resident and non-resident.

While certainly the principal source, China and Iran were not the only providers of shares. Data on such allotments in the Golden Horde and Chaghadai Khanate exist, but they are fragmentary and sometimes only recognizable in a comparative perspective. For example, the unauthorized transfer of certain districts in Turkestan that provoked, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, a dispute between Chaghadai and Ögödei may well have been a

struggle over control of apportioned lands.[20] More certainly, we know from a local history of Herat that Ögödei once gave Qutlugh Ishi, a widow of Chinggis Khan, 'five flourishing villages in Turkestan' in return for some skilled Herati weavers in her possession.[21] Qubilai, too, had 'shares' in the Chaghadai lands. In the reign of Alghu (1260-5) Qubilai sent an envoy to Bukhara to conduct a new census. According to Vassāf, 16,000 of the inhabitants belonged to various non-resident Chinggisid lines: the Jochids had a claim on 5,000, the estate of Sorqaqtani Beki, the wife of Tolui, had 3,000, and 8,000 belonged to Qubilai himself.[22] The qaghan's agent in this case was almost certainly a Mongolian officer named Onggiradai (Weng-chi-la-tai), who, the Chinese sources say, was dispatched to Central Asia (Hsi-yü) around 1264 'to register population and local products,' and that he did so successfully, much to the qaghan's pleasure.[23] Finally, the Yuan shih also reports that in September of 1308 an official 'came from Samarqand (Hsieh-mi-ssu-kan = Semizkent) and other cities and presented to the throne the blue census registers prepared at the time of Tai-tsu (Chinggis Khan).' Several weeks later, the same source records that an emissary was sent to Samarqand, Talas (T'a-la-ssu), T'a-shih-hsuan, and 'other cities' to regularize the collection of incomes owed the Yuan emperor.[24] Clearly, the Toluids had claims on apportioned lands throughout West Turkestan.

As for shares in the Jochid realm, there is unambiguous evidence that one of their most prized territories, Khwārazm, was extensively apportioned. In 1221, the Secret History relates, Jochi, Chaghadai, and Ögödei subjugated Urganj (Mongolian Örünggechi) and divided the city's peoples (irgen) among themselves. This soon became a point of controversy because the acquisitive sons did not provide a share (qubi) for their father, who was much incensed by the slight.[25] Equally informative is Natanzī's statement that Chinggis Khan 'gave to Chaghadai Kat and Khivah in Khwārazm, which is the territory (mamlakat) of Jochi.' He then adds that 'from that date until the appearance of the fortune of Sultān Ghāzī (Tamerlane), the proceeds (mal) of those two districts have been received without diminution.'[26] The Toluids, as well, had their possessions in the Golden Horde. Rubruck reports that Möngke had a town or fort in the Alan lands of North Caucasia.[27] It is not clear if the system of shares was applied in the Rus principalities, but it is relevant to note that soon after the conquest the Tatars 'forcibly summoned' the Rus princes and peoples and informed them that they now lived in 'the land of the qaghan and Batu (zemli kanovi i Batyeve).'[28] In my opinion, these principalities, like other parts of the Golden Horde, and all other parts of the empire - China, Iran, Turkestan, and Transcaucasia - were also shared out among the Chinggisid lines.

How long such shares remained in the hands of the grantees is, of course, an important issue. If one takes Natanzī's testimony about Khwārazm at face

value, it appears that the system of apportioned lands, once established in the early days of the empire, continued to function and pay dividends until the final collapse of Mongolian rule. This particular case cannot be verified but we can trace in some detail the later history of such shares in other parts of the empire, most particularly in Yuan China.

Fortunately, both the size and longevity of the Jochid bestowals are registered in the Yuan shih. In 1236 Ögödei apportioned (pen-po) Batu and Orda, 41,302 households in P'ing-yang, Shansi province. Two years later an additional 10,000 households were granted in Chin-ting and Chin-chou in Chihli province. Finally, Qubilai in 1281 allotted a further 60,000 families in Yung-chou in Hunan province for a grand total of 111,302 households.[29]

Incomes from these shares were not, it appears, regularly collected in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Consequently, Özbeg (Yüeh-tsi-pieh), the ruler of the Golden Horde (r. 1313-41), sent an envoy east in 1336 to inquire after his apportioned lands (fen-ti) and annual grants. The Chinese records indicate that together P'ing-yang, Chin-chou, and Yung-chou annually produced 2,400 ingots (ting) of chung-tung paper money (ch'ao). This sum, we are told, was annually paid out to the Jochids starting in 1339.[30] Presumably, such payments then continued until chaos engulfed the Yuan regime in the 1360s.

We are even more fully informed on Hülegü's apportioned lands and other economic assets in China. The Yuan shih records that in 1257 Möngke, as part of a much larger dispensation, fixed Hülegü's (Hsü-lieh) annual grant at 100 ingots of silver and 300 rolls of cloth. At the same time the emperor 'apportioned' 25,056 households in Chang-te in Honan as five households silk households. By 1319, the text continues, there were only 2,929 households producing 2,201 chin of silk.[31] The sharp reduction in the number of households is not explained in this passage but it is almost certainly connected with the Yuan court's efforts to assert control over the apportioned lands. This task was placed in the hands of Temüder, the powerful Minister of the Right, and by 1319 he had succeeded in reducing the overall number of silk households by 75 percent, thereby increasing central government revenues at the expense of imperial princes and meritorious officials.[32]

As regards the administration of Chang-te, we know that Hülegü exercised his right to place an agent in this territory. Some time toward the end of his reign the Il-khan appointed a Chinese scholar, Kao Ming, to be the 'general administrator of Chang-te.' The selection process, involving as it did protracted negotiations, occasioned three separate missions from Iran to China before the nominee accepted.[33]

There is information, too, on another of Hülegü's officials in China. This was a certain Po-te-na, a native of Balkh (Pan-le-ho) in Afghanistan whose

entire family submitted to the Mongols in 1220. According to his biography in the *Yuan shih*, Po-te-na later served Hülegü (Hsü-lieh) and was 'given (the post of) assistant revenue officer for the people of Ho-tung; in consequence (of this assignment) he lived in Ho-chung and I-shih counties (*hsien*) and later moved to Chiai-chou.'[34] Since all the locales mentioned here are in Shansi province, Po-te-na was clearly not associated with the administration of Chang-te in Honan. It is possible, therefore, that he was managing or monitoring other, unspecified, lands Hülegü shared in the neighboring province of Shansi.

More certainly, Hülegü also had rights to households in China assigned to him by his grandfather. This is detailed in a long and sometimes opaque passage which I quote at length:

Originally Chinggis Khan transferred more than 7,000 families of hunters and falconers from various circuits and placed them under the authority of Imperial Prince Hülegü [Hsü-lieh]. In 1261 arrangements were instituted [to administer them]. In 1275 the Imperial Prince Abaqa [A-pa-ha] sent an envoy with a memorial [requesting] they be returned to the court's [authority]. They were attached to the Ministry of War. [For purposes] of control they were basically subordinated to the General Administration of Hunters, Falconers and Various Classes of Artisans in Ta-tu [Peking] and Other Circuits. [The officers of which] held the rank of 3a and they managed the affairs relating to Imperial Prince Ghazan [Ha-tsan]. In 1304 [new] arrangements were instituted and officials for all princes were selected for employment. In 1311 all [these] offices were suppressed. Because Imperial Prince Kharbandah [Ha-erh-pan-ta, i.e., Öljeitü [r. 1304-16]] guarded a far distant corner and further [because] there were no officials attached [to this office], the existing arrangement was not wasteful.[35]

While the early sections of this text are clear enough, the events of 1311 and after call for clarification. As I understand the latter passage, the 'new arrangements' of 1304 were abolished in 1311 and administrative responsibility for these households devolved upon the General Administration of Hunters, Falconers, etc., that is, matters reverted back to the arrangement of 1275. This interpretation is borne out by another passage in the *Yuan shih* that speaks directly to the administrative status of those 'subordinate to Imperial Prince Abū Saʿīd (P'u Sai-yin),' Öljeitü's successor, which states that 'control (over these households) was basically turned over to the *Darughachi* of the General Administration of Falconers, and Various Classes of Artisans in Ta-tu and Other Circuits.' By Abū

Saʿīd's time, our source adds, the number of households had dwindled from 7,000 to 780.[36]

To round out the picture of the Hülegüid's holdings in the east, there is some interesting data on his properties in Tibet. During Möngke's reign, territories in Tibet were apportioned to all the emperor's brothers. The core of Hülegü's share was the Yar-lung valley in southern Tibet. As was the case of other apportioned lands, Hülegü had a resident commissioner attached to his properties in the Himalayas. These officials looked after the Il khan's holding here until about 1300, by which time their rights and interests had lapsed, perhaps due to difficulties of access and communication.[37]

While the Hülegüids' assets in East Asia declined over time, they remained substantial until the fourteenth century and were well worth collecting. In fact, Ghazan mounted a major embassy to do just that in 1297. The embassy, headed by a Muslim merchant and a Mongolian official, spent some four years in China, and returned to Iran with presents for the Il-khan including 'some valuable silk stuffs which had fallen to Hülegü's share but which had remained in China since the days of Möngke Qaghan.' No amount is indicated but a special junk was designated to carry these textiles and the Yuan ambassador to Iran.[38]

There are indications as well that non-resident princes found it worthwhile to collect incomes from their apportioned lands in the Hülegüid domains. In 1265, for example, Masʿūd Beg, a long-time civil official in the Chaghadai Khanate, arrived in Iran as an envoy of Baraq (r. 1266-71) and his Ögödeid ally, Qaidu, and 'asked to go over the accounts of their hereditary assignments (*injū-hā*).'[39] And at roughly the same time, so too, did the representatives of Qubilai. Around 1265, Rashīd al-Dīn relates, the Grand Khan sent two envoys, Sartaq and ʿAbd al-Rahmān, to Hülegü to inquire after Bayan, a Mongolian officer temporarily assigned to Iran. Shortly thereafter Sartaq and Bayan returned to China but ʿAbd al-Rahmān 'remained here (in Iran) for the purpose of clearing accounts (*afragh-i muhāsābat*).'[40] There is no indication of what accounts were gone over but it is easy to believe that the object of the inquiry was the proceeds of Qubilai's apportioned lands in the Hülegüid realm. In any case, it is certain that the Yuan emperor had possessions in Iran down to Ghazan's time. These consisted in part of domesticated animals tended, not well it turns out, by *qānchī*, that is to say, by 'the qaghan's men.'[41]

The total number of sedentary people affected by the apportionment of shares is not precisely known but data from China at least reveal the order of magnitude. Census results from the mid-1230s indicate that about 1,830,000 households were registered in the north, that is, in the former territory of the Chin dynasty recently conquered by the Mongols.[42] From other data in the

Chinese sources we know that between 1236 and 1258 over 900,000 households, or half the registered population, were shared out by Ögödei and Möngke, of which 133,688, or 15 percent, were bestowed on just three non-resident princely lines, those of Jochi, Chaghadai, and Hülegü.[43] Although we have no equivalent figures for Iran, there is little doubt that there, too, a very sizable portion of the local agricultural population was apportioned in this same fashion.

The frequency and scale of this system of apportioned lands have generated much discussion on the Mongolian influence on patterns of land tenure in the sedentary sector of the empire. For some, these divisions constitute a form of feudalism. This is particularly true of Marxist historians, who have written extensively on categories of 'feudal' lands in medieval China and Iran, and who directly connect many types with nomadic conquest and institutions.[44] Others, to the contrary, have associated the Mongols with the spread of 'Oriental despotism,' in which the state, in the person of the sovereign, becomes the supreme landowner and notions of private property are thereby weakly developed or non-existent.[45] Indeed, it is somewhat surprising how often discussions of the history of land tenure systems in the agricultural zones of Eurasia invoke the steppe dwellers, the nomads, as an important catalyst of change. To cite well known examples, the emergence of European feudalism, with its specific forms of landholding, has been explained in one instance by the insecurity produced by Magyar (and Viking) raids and in another by new modes of combat made possible by the diffusion of the stirrup through Inner Asia.[46] And in Asia, the nomads have been viewed as direct agents of change whose incursions and conquests encouraged the growth of feudalism in India and helped to ensure the prevalence of command-type economies in the Middle East.[47] Even the more recent and generalized discussions of these matters, which contrast systems of landholding linked to coercive rent-taking with those that encourage tax-raising, recognize the importance of conquest, including nomadic conquest, in determining which 'mode,' the 'tributary' or the 'feudal,' came to predominate.[48]

In the Mongolian case we have unusually full information on the circumstances of conquest and expansion that allow a productive exploration of this issue. Here I have no intention of resolving these long-debated matters, which turn on definitions of terms such as feudalism that are ofttimes elastic or vague; rather, I have the more limited goal of explaining the origin and purpose of the apportioned lands in the Chinggisid imperium. Naturally, I hope that this will contribute to the larger question of the linkage between conquest and changes in land tenure patterns in the history of the Old World.

In my view, the system of shares so widely expanded in the early empire, was a direct outgrowth of well-established nomadic social practice; foreign models and foreign stimuli were of secondary importance. More specifically, nomadic political culture, tied to patrimonial notions of society and government, required leaders to redistribute part of their wealth and possessions among their family, retainers and followers. Juvaynī, for one, recognized that this practice was central to Mongolian imperial politics:

> Although outwardly [he says] authority and empire are vested in one person, he who is adorned with the rank of khan [khāniyyat], yet in truth all the sons, grandsons, and uncles have a share of the wealth and property. The proof thereof [he continues] is that the Emperor of the World, Möngke Qaghan, at the second quriltai [i.e., in 1251], ordered the entire empire apportioned, and that to all his kin - sons and daughters, brothers and sisters - he gave a share [bakhsh].[49]

Such redistribution could be accomplished in various ways: the organization of large-scale feasts and drinking parties, or through the bestowal of clothing. Speaking of the truly vast amounts of jewels, money, and garments distributed at Güyüg's enthronement, Juvaynī says 'the first to receive their shares (nasīb)' were the Chinggisids, and then adds that in the end all officers of the realm, civilian and military, elevated and lowly, received as well their rightful 'share (nasīb).'[50] This account is fully confirmed in substance and detail by Carpini, an eyewitness to the enthronement, who says he saw five hundred carts 'all filled with gold and silver and silken garments and these things were shared out among the emperor and the chiefs.' 'Each chief,' he continues, 'divided his share among his men, but according to his own good pleasure.'[51] The chase, as well, offered an opportunity to display royal munificence and generosity. In describing the massive and carefully organized hunts of Ögödei's time, Rashīd al-Dīn relates that at the end of the day 'the commissaries (büke'üls) distributed with justice the accumulated game among all the various princes, commanders and troops so that no one went without a share (nasīb).'[52]

Booty of all kinds, including cattle and humans, was similarly apportioned. According to the Secret History, Chinggis Khan regularly shared out defeated peoples and prisoners of war among his family and chief officers. In narrating these divisions, the Mongolian text consistently uses the noun qubi and verbs such as qubiyaju. Indeed, such divisions were so central to their political culture that in the Secret History the foundation of the Mongols' administrative apparatus is directly linked to the need to keep full records of this continuous sharing out of subject peoples in a 'blue register (kökö debter).'[53] But it was not only people who were apportioned.

So, too, were pasture lands. Traveling through Mongolia in 1237, the Sung ambassador Hsü T'ing reports that 'from the Tatar ruler to the so-called empresses, princes, and princesses, and on down to the imperial relatives, each had their delimited (*chiang-chiai*) territory (*ti*).'[54] And, not surprisingly, once Mongolian rule was established over sedentary societies this practice was extended as well to agricultural land, much of which was now allotted to imperial princes and some to meritorious officials.

This system of shares was of course inaugurated by Chinggis Khan, who parceled out the steppe and some contiguous agricultural land to his four sons by his senior wife, but set aside North China and Khurāsān as a preserve whose land and populace were shared out piecemeal to the entire Chinggisid family and their favored retainers. The bestowal of such shares was then greatly expanded and regularized under Ögödei and Möngke, and to judge from the Chinese data, this in its initial stages involved a good portion, perhaps half, of the population.

The question of why non-resident princes were so prominent in this dispensation focuses attention on another factor influencing the emergence of the institution of shares - the size of the empire. One of the most arresting features of the Mongolian imperium is its immense scale; it falls somewhere between the 13.1 million square miles of the British Empire and the 8.6 million square miles of the Soviet Empire. One recent estimate put the Mongols' territory at 9.3 million square miles.[55] Given the distances involved, and the territorial arrangements arising from the initial dispensation to the four sons, the shares may have been intended as glue to keep the ever-expanding empire together. Certainly Natanzī, writing in the Temürid era, thought this was the case:

> When in former times (he says), Chinggis Khan divided (the empire) among his four sons, he assigned each son several possessions (*milk*) in the territory (*mamlakat*) of the others so that in this way envoys would continuously pass to-and-fro between them.[56]

Of course, these measures did not, as intended, prevent divisions among the Chinggisids, in some degree because under Möngke the Toluids seized direct princely control over the two major preserves of shared interests, North China and Khurāsān, thus short-circuiting the system. Nonetheless, the system of shares survived the fracture of the empire in modified form, probably because it had the imprimatur of the founding father, Chinggis Khan. Moreover, even when the princely lines became involved in an intermittent civil war after 1259, the shares could serve as a useful diplomatic tool in the ever-shifting alliances among the Chinggisids. For example, it is very likely that the Yuan court made the large addition

(60,000 households) to the Jochid holdings in China in 1281 as a means of inducing them to reconsider their alliance with the lines of Ögödei and Chughadai, who at that time were bent on deposing Qubilai and to this end were assailing Yuan forces in Mongolia and Uighuristan.

In summation, several conclusions are warranted. To my mind, the system of shares so lavishly bestowed on non-resident princes was an institution created at the imperial center, an institution designed to encourage unity among widely dispersed princely lines. It was not, in other words, an institution created by local accumulation or usurpation of political-economic power, a process most commonly associated with feudalism. Further, it seems evident that apportioned lands in the Mongolian Empire, however characterized, disrupted existing patterns of landholding and social-political dependency in the sedentary world and did so on a grand scale. The lives and livelihood of hundreds of thousands of agricultural households were transformed by a practice that was nomadic in origin and continental in application.

Whether this disruption was transitory or long-term is, naturally, much harder to measure; in fact, any discussion of this issue at present can only take the form of questions without ready answers. We can begin with the most specific. Did claims of non-residents on their shares in the territory of other princely lines erode over time, as was the case with Hülegü's holdings in China, and did such shares then fall under the complete control of the local Mongolian court, in this instance the Yuan? In a similar vein, were the Jochids' apportioned lands in Iran seized outright by the Il-khans? Such shares, it seems likely, would have been converted into crown land (*inju*) which the sovereign could then recycle as he wished. From Amitai's article in this volume (pp. 142-66) it does not appear that it was recycled in the form of *iqtā'* to retainers and military commanders. Perhaps some was granted as pious endowments (*waqf*) which Ghazan, following his conversion, bestowed on a large scale.[57] And what happened to the Jochids' extensive shares in China once the Yuan collapsed? Did they revert by default to the agriculturalists on the scene or did they become state land under the Ming? Some land inherited from the Yuan was certainly converted into military colonies (*t'un-t'ien*), an institution widespread in this period.[58] It is also possible that some was granted to impoverished peasants or to imperial princes who were repeatedly invested (*feng*) with titles and estates under Ming T'ai-tsu.[59]

Of a more general nature, there is the intriguing question of long-distance transfers of agricultural populations around the empire. We know from Juvaynī's testimony that following the conquest of Khwārazm many of the survivors were transported to the east, where, he says, 'there are now numerous localities in those parts cultivated and well-peopled by its

inhabitants.'[60] And in the opposite direction, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, 'Chinese [Khitāyān] from the region of North China (Khitāi)' were first brought to Marv and later on part of the community was settled in Khūi and Tabrīz in Azarbayjan.[61] It is quite possible that such forced resettlement were connected with the system of shares. The Chinese may well have come from Hūlegū's properties in Chang-te and the Khwārazmians from Ögödei's holdings in Urganj.

Finally, and most problematically, did the Mongols' system of apportioned lands influence or encourage their successors' fiscal practices toward reliance on private rent-taking or public tax-raising? The outcome, conditioned by specific historical and environmental circumstance, no doubt varied from region to region. In some cases apportioned lands, recaptured by the government, might well have favored centralizing tendencies, while in others the shares of non-resident Chinggisids might have been reassigned to local officials, thus fostering decentralization. The essential point, of course, is that the legacy of the system of shares was not that it established a new model for the sedentary world but that its disruption of earlier patterns of landholding provided the Mongols' successor states with options, a measure of flexibility in fashioning the relations of the land.

Clearly, these issues, however complex, deserve further investigation and such efforts, hopefully, will be carried out on a cooperative, comparative, and continental basis. Like so many other aspects of Mongolian political culture, the institution of shares had a pronounced international flavor and deserves an imperial perspective.

NOTES

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2 Paul Buell, 'Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara,' Journal of Asian History 13 (1979), p. 147. For further comment, see Thomas T. Allsen, Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia and the Islamic Lands, 1251-1259 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 100-13.

3 Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmi' al-tavārīkh, 2 vols., ed. by B. Karīmī (Tehran: Eqbal, 1959), vol. II, p. 685.

4 Yuan shih, (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1978), ch. 3, pp. 44 and 46.

5 Sayf ibn Muhammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Havarī, Tarīkh nāmah-i Harāt, ed. by Muhammad Zubayr al-Siddīqī (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1944), pp. 228-33; and Peter Jackson, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire,' Central Asiatic Journal 22 (1978), pp. 222-3.

6 S.S. Kakabadze, trans., Gruzinskie dokumenty IX-XV vv (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), p. 71.

7 Yuan shih, ch. 3, p. 45.

8 Juvaynī, ed. by Qazvīnī, vol. III, pp. 69-70, and Juvaynī, trans. by Boyle, vol. II, pp. 594-5.

9 Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. by Karīmī, vol. II, pp. 732-3; and Kirakos Gandzaketsi, Istoriia Armenii, trans. by L. A. Khanlarian (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), p. 237.

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11 See Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, 'Yen Shih (1182-1240),' Papers on Far Eastern History 33 (1986), pp. 121-2.

12 The Chinese term is fen-tz'u, literally 'divide and bestow.'

13 Yuan shih, ch. 2, p. 35 and ch. 95, p. 2413; and Su T'ien-chüeh, Yuan wen-lei (Taipei: Shih-chiai shu-chü ying-hsing, 1967), ch. 40, pp. 23a-b.

14 Yuan shih, ch. 93, pp. 2361-2. For a complete translation, see Herbert F. Schurmann, The Economic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 94. On the Mongolian term, see David M. Farquhar, The Government of China under Mongolian Rule: A Reference Guide (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990), pp. 338 and 363, note 244.

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21 Sayf, *Tarīkh nāmah-i Harāt*, p. 107.

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29 *Yuan shih*, ch. 95, pp. 2413-14.

30 *Yuan shih*, ch. 107, p. 2906.

31 *Yuan shih*, ch. 96, pp. 2417-18.

32 See Elizabeth Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 97ff.

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34 *Yuan shih*, ch. 137, p. 3309.

35 *Yuan shih*, ch. 85, pp. 2141-2; and Paul Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo* (Paris: Librairie Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959), vol. I, pp. 5 and 120.

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55 See Rein Taagepera, 'Size and Duration of Empires,' *Social Science Research* 7 (1979), p. 126.

56 Naṭanzī, *Muntakhab*, p. 427.

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CHAPTER 8

NOMADS IN THE TANGUT STATE OF HSI-HSIA (982-1227 AD)

E.I. KYCHANOV

The Tang-hsiang, ancestors of the Tanguts who founded the state of Hsi-Hsia, lived in the northwestern areas of what is today the Chinese province of Szechwan. In the seventh century, the Tang-hsiang became subjects of the Chinese Tang Empire, partly of their own volition and partly under pressure from the advancing Tibetans. They relocated northward to the territory of the Chinese province of Kansu, to the southern regions of Ordos, where the winding Huang ho River wends it way. In the mid-seventh century, thanks to Tibetan advances into the Tang Empire, they moved farther north and occupied territory that approximately corresponds to what is today the Ninghsia Hui autonomous region of the PRC. The latter's capital, the city of Inchuan, was formerly the capital of the state of Hsi-Hsia. In 880-4, T'o-pa Ssu-Kung, the ruler of the Tang-hsiang, was rewarded by the Tang court for his aid in quelling the Huang Ch'ao uprising with the post of governor-general of Ting-nan, areas in central and southern Ordos, and the title of Hsi-p'ing Wang - the Prince who Pacified the West. The Tang-hsiang gradually settled the entire territory of today's Ninghsia-Hui autonomous region as well as the western regions of today's Shensi province and the eastern regions of the Kansu province. The Tang-hsiang gradually formed a majority in this region of varied ethnic composition consisting of Chinese, Tibetans, Hsien-pei T'u-yü-hun, and Tang-hsiang. When China disintegrated in the tenth century, the rulers of the Tang-hsiang became independent. When a new dynasty, the Sung, began to reunite China in 960, the Tang-hsiang did not submit and, by the end of the tenth century, had practically created their own state - the Great Hsia. The latter included all of the western and central parts of today's Kansu province, today's Ninghsia Hui autonomous region and areas of Northern Ordos that are currently part of the autonomous region of Inner Mongolia.

Their state was multinational, with a population that included Tanguts, Chinese, Tibetans, Uighurs, and others. Power belonged to the Tangut Ngvemi dynasty, whose ancestors can be traced in Chinese sources back to the fourth century AD. The Tangut language is part of the Tibetan-Burman

family of languages. In 1036, the Tanguts created and began using their own writing system. In 1908, the noted traveler P.K. Kozlov discovered an entire library of Tangut texts in Edzina, a former provincial city of the Great Hsia (its Mongol name was Khara-Khoto). At present, the Tangut written language has received substantial study; the present article is based on Tangut sources.

Since ancient times, the Tanguts bred livestock and farmed. In their original homeland, their livestock breeding was primarily of the pasturing variety. Tangut legends and sayings confirm that livestock breeding was one of their main forms of agricultural activity. One of the ancestors of the ruling dynasty spent his entire life pasturing livestock beneath the hot sun.

They fixed the livestock enclosure, a wolf cannot get in,
They dug a well in the thicket, the livestock will not suffer from thirst.

If the courageous and wise do not sit [there], the meeting will not be successful,
If there is no bull with high horns in the herd, the herd is empty.

If you cannot ride the rounds on a horse, it is no good for riding.
If the livestock are beyond count, the owner deals only with livestock.

If you know the sayings poorly, you will not be able to have a conversation,
If you have few horses and yaks, you will not eat your fill.

There are no better close ones than [one's] father and mother,
There is no meat tastier than the meat on the bones.

He who has livestock is not rich,
He who has a [good] mind is rich.

And so on.[1]

In 'The Sea of Knowledge Established by the Saints' (1182), a work of an encyclopaedic nature, we read the following in the section on land: it is convenient to pasture yaks and sheep in the mountains, domestic animals in the hills, and especially white sheep, who 'readily eat nourishing grasses and ... become very fat. For several years they provide young, milk, and cheese.' 'Domestic animals in deserts fatten themselves on nourishing grasses ... Among other breeds of livestock, it is convenient to pasture in deserts camels, who eat nourishing grasses.' 'There are many domestic animals in

the steppes. Among the herds of domestic livestock in the steppes, horses are pastured freely. Horses are paired, foals are raised in the steppe.' 'River valleys and swampy lowlands are good for raising cows.'[2]

In the poem 'Month after Month', we learn that sheep lamb in the first month according to the lunar calendar. The summer sun is compared in the poem to a 'bull, a spirit, a giver of milk'. In another place, the sun is described: it is as 'beautiful as sheep's wool'. In the fifth month, 'they taught the milking of cows'; in the sixth, 'livestock are pastured on green pastures'; in the sixth and seventh months domestic livestock 'grow fat' and 'foals for the well-born people of the state' appear in satisfactory numbers.[3]

Cattle-breeding agriculture predominated in the Ch'o-lo mountain-mass (Jarung) on the border with Tibet, where yaks were pastured, the mountains of Yin-shan and Pilanshan on the northern borders of Hsi-Hsia, to the north of the modern city of Wu-wei (Liang-chou), Kansu province. Horses and sheep were bred there, and herds of mares intended especially for the production of koumiss were pastured there. The Jurchen, contemporaries of the Tanguts, considered that 'the best horses in the world' were raised on the Liang-chou pastures. Yaks were bred in the mountain pastures of the main mountain-mass on the territory of Hsia - the Ho-lan shan Mountains.

Nomadic livestock-breeding was conducted in the steppe, semi-desert, and desert regions of the country, primarily Alashan, the central and northern parts of Ordos, the western regions of the country which border the Gobi desert to the south, and the so-called 'shifting sands' (Liu-sha) in the Sha-chou Tun-huang region. Ethnically, the nomads were, in part, Tanguts, Uighurs, Tibetans, and a small number of Khitans, who migrated to the territory of Hsi-Hsia after 1125, seeking refuge from the Jurchen. It is possible that a small group of Tatars also lived there; the emperor Hsia Yüan-hao referred to a request in which the Tatars supposedly asked him to assume the title of emperor (1038). It is also possible that there was a very small number of Kereits and other refugees from events in Mongolia in the twelfth century. We know that the uncle of the Kereyid To'oril, Gur-khan, sought refuge on the territory of Si-Hsia; the Kereyid To'oril himself and his son, Senggüm, later fled to Hsi-Hsia to escape persecution. Chinggis Khan was dissatisfied with the Tanguts because they received these refugees (Shilgok-san-xonu, for example). Among the nomads may have been groups of Hsien-pei T'u-yü-hun, who came to the region together with the Tanguts after the Tibetans sacked their state in 663.

The Tangut state had a mixed economy based on both agriculture and livestock-breeding. As we noted above, the state was multinational, in our understanding of the term. Unlike Jurchen and, later, Mongolian laws (under the Yuan Dynasty), Tangut laws did not provide special rights for the dominant Tangut nationality. Tangut ancestry was required for seniority

only when the situation demanded a determination of seniority among two or three officials (military commanders) of equal rank.

In the tenth century, livestock breeding was still the basic form of economic activity among the Tanguts. Chinese officials reported to the court: 'The Tanguts live in the sands, pasture livestock, and do not have a permanent place of residence.'[4] Yuan-hao, who had decided to challenge openly the Sung court and assume the title of emperor, in his youth juxtaposed the Tanguts and Chinese, declaring several times with pride that 'to wear pelts and wool and to pasture livestock - that certainly fits the character of the Tanguts!'[5] At the turn of the tenth century, horses made up the bulk of Tangut exports. The Tanguts frequently paid in horses for the Buddhist texts they received from Sung China and from the Khitans of Liao.

Thus, the Tanguts bred horses, camels, cows, yaks, sheep, goats, donkeys, and mules. As concerns the camels, we know that the Mongols brought back from their first campaigns against Hsi-Hsia 'camels ... as booty'. B.Ia. Vladimirtsov surmised that camels 'appeared in large numbers [in Mongolia] after Chinggis Khan's campaigns against the Tanguts'.[6]

Throughout the 250-year history of the Tangut state, livestock breeding remained its most important branch of activity, although it gradually gave way to agriculture, especially after the renewal and construction of powerful irrigation systems on the Huang ho and other rivers. Even today, livestock breeding remains a notable source of income in the Ninghsia Hui autonomous region, the Kansu province and western Shensi. One notes this even in the greater consumption of meat in the diets of those who live there in comparison with, for example, residents of Peking.

Thus, the Tanguts, mainly livestock-breeders in the past, created in the tenth century a multinational state in which the only group that did not breed livestock was the Chinese. One notes that they adopted Confucianism as the ideology of the state; Buddhism as the main religion; and that they brought about the gradual Sinification of the ruling dynasty. In what fashion was the nomadic population incorporated into the administrative system, economy, military organization, and culture of this state?

A nomad who owned his own livestock and conducted his own affairs, like a peasant farmer, was considered a 'proprietor'. This was a social unit recognized by law, a person who was head of a household, capable of paying taxes and fulfilling other obligations, primarily military and labour-related. If a person did not possess his own livestock, he was not a 'proprietor', but a shepherd who worked either for a 'proprietor' or for the treasury (the state). On all its territory, the state exercised sovereignty, influencing in one way or another the right to own land (pasture). The state recognized both private and state lands, as well as lands that 'were neither state nor private'.

In regions of nomadic livestock breeding, there were pastures that belonged to 'proprietors', separate state pastures on which livestock belonging to the ruler (the state) were pastured, and, it is possible, lands (pastures) which belonged to no one. The law demanded that in areas of intensive nomadic livestock breeding, state and private pastures be demarcated. State pastures were registered and assigned to those officials who managed such pastures and the livestock that were pastured there. 'State lands must be registered with an indication of the names of those who supervise them or who are the holders of the land. When lists of livestock are drawn up every year, they should provide at the end an inventory of the lands (pastures).'[7] Other, non-state pastures were private and could, correspondingly, belong to a 'proprietor', usually the head of a nomadic collective.

On both state and private pastures, shepherds were obligated to repair wells and maintain them in good condition. In case of drought, the state permitted 'proprietors' to pasture livestock on state pastures and to live on those pastures for one year. If nomads who had moved to state pastures had the opportunity during the year to migrate elsewhere but failed to do so, their head was subject to criminal persecution. If he held a civil or military rank, he was fined one horse; if he held no rank, he received thirteen blows with a stick. Cattle were pastured on the ruler's lands by both unfree shepherds - for example, people condemned to labour - as well as by nomads under labour obligation or hired, that is, people with their own livestock. The latter condition was important, for state livestock were distributed among them on the basis of their personal holdings; that is, the state distributed its livestock to them in accordance with their ability to compensate the treasury, should harm come to the ruler's livestock on their account.

The pastures that were considered private property were, in all likelihood, not private property as we understand the concept. These were territories set aside for nomads, territories that were either by tradition or as the result of a division or migration recognized by the state as allotted to a certain 'proprietor', a certain nomadic collective and its head. The 'new laws', introduced in 1215, decreed that 'on all borders, nomadic livestock-breeders who are subjects of the Tangut state must be monitored by sentries and military commanders to ensure that they remain on the territories to which they have been assigned. If they stray beyond their borders, or, in migrating, move beyond the jurisdiction of the sentries, then the owners of the herds ... receive three years of hard labour.'[8]

Pastures that had been abandoned for various reasons in regions difficult to access or not permanently settled, were neither state nor private.

Cattle fell into one of two property categories: state (the ruler's) and private. The laws mention shepherds who 'pasture the ruler's and private

livestock'. The sign of ownership was a brand that was placed either on the ear (as with large livestock) or on the cheek (as with sheep and goats).

The law provided for four types of animals: 1. Camels; 2. Horses; 3 Cows and bulls; 4. Sheep and goats.

Yaks bred in mountain regions formed a category apart. On the basis of the codex, one can establish the ratio of value between the 'four types of livestock': camels and horses were seen as basically of equal value. One camel or horse was equal in worth to five cows or bulls and twenty goats or sheep.

A nomadic livestock-breeder could make a profitable living that allowed him to weather minor misfortunes with animals if he had fifteen to twenty head of livestock (camels, horses, cows, and bulls) and seventy sheep and goats. A nomad with this particular quantity of livestock could receive state livestock to pasture, as he was considered capable of compensating for potential losses.[9] Upon appearing for military service, he who had five cows and fifty sheep would come with a horse; he who that had ten cows and a hundred sheep would appear with a horse and armour either only for himself or only for the horse. He who had twenty cows and two hundred sheep would appear for service with a horse and armour for both warrior and horse.

Both state and private livestock were inventoried. Private livestock was inventoried for the purpose of collecting taxes in wool and dairy products, which were primarily understood as butter and cheese. We lack information on the quantity of 'dairy products' collected from a cow. Collections for other livestock were as follows: from a she-camel, 1.2 kg; from a female sheep or goat, 112 g; from old camels and camel young, 75 g. Collections of shearing were: from sheep and goats, 260 g (spring shearing), and 150 g (autumn shearing); from a yak, 375 g (spring shearing), from a yak yearling, 300 g, from a yak-calf, 185 g. The labour obligations of nomadic livestock-breeders included the pasturing of state livestock, supplying shafts for arrows, bound branches, and so on.

After collecting taxes, the treasury bought up surpluses of wool and 'dairy products' from livestock breeders 'for money at actual prices in the area', as the law stated.[10]

Norms were established for maintaining the increase of state herds. These norms were unquestionably indicators of the average maintenance of increase for private livestock as well: Yaks - five young from 10 female yaks; Camels - 30 young from 100 she-camels; Horses - 50 foals from 100 mares; Cows - 60 calves from 100 cows; Sheep and goats - 60 lambs from 100 sheep or goats.

In state employ, the shepherd had the right to a part of the increase as a reward for his labour.

Penalties for losses of state livestock were harsh. The shepherd or pasture manager who lost and failed to provide compensation for perished livestock was subject to capital punishment for twenty-five horses or camels, thirty-five cows, fifty sheep or goats or more. Punishments existed for the substitution of livestock as well. If good livestock belonging to the ruler were replaced with gaunt or sickly livestock from a private holding, the guilty parties were punished as if for theft and fined a sum equal to the difference in market price between the animals.

State pastures were worked by shepherds fulfilling their labour obligations, those personally owned by the state, 'the ruler's shepherds', those sentenced to forced labour, and hired workers. Every herd or household unit was managed by junior and senior pasture managers.

Nomads were included in the state's basic system of organization, which was based on a decimal system. Ten families of nomads had their own manager, termed a *chia-hsiao* (possibly a Tangut word in Chinese form, with Tangut word order: *chia*, 'family', *hsiao*, 'small'; a small family.) Five *chia-hsiao* (fifty families) had as their supervisor a senior centurion, 100 families were supervised by a 'nomadic encampment elder'. Such elders were advanced from among people 'capable of managing matters'. 200-250 families had a higher-ranked elder or senior of the encampment. This system continued along the lines of the basic administrative units of the Tangut state: the *gvon* (Chinese 'yuan'; 'household'). The *gvon* was the basic military unit. The *gvon* was managed by an official known as a 'director'. People who lived and worked in a given gvon were bound to that *gvon*. For ordinary people, livestock-breeders or farmers, leaving a *gvon* on their own was punishable by death by suffocation. If a livestock-breeder migrated separately, without a *gvon*, and was robbed as a result of his defenselessness, even in the event that he was able to recover his livestock, it was confiscated as a fine for leaving the *gvon*. In Mongol terminology, as interpreted by B.Ia. Vladimirtsov, the offender had migrated as an 'ail', and not as a '*kuren*'. A *gvon* of nomadic livestock-breeders of 500 families in Hsi-Hsia can be compared to the thousands of Chinggis Khan. In addition to an economic-administrative unit, the *gvon* was an 'army *gvon*', obligated in the event of a mobilization to supply a certain number of warriors - with a horse, with a horse and armour for the horse, with a horse and armour for the warrior and the horse.

Economically, in terms of tax collection, the nomadic population of the land was subordinate to the livestock-breeding administration (one of the central administrative organs) or the ministry of horse breeding, which controlled state stud farms. The livestock-breeding administration passed on to the finance and tax administration revenue collected from private nomadic livestock-breeders. The registration of livestock both in state herds

and among private nomadic livestock-breeders was controlled by a special administration of audits and monitoring.

Administratively, the basic mass of the nomadic population was under the jurisdiction of the northern or western courts (or commissariats). Military commissars (*ching-lüeh shih*) were representatives of central authority in the provinces for the maintenance of stricter control over subjects in distant, inaccessible regions and border regions. The staff of the military commissariat (*ching-lüeh*) consisted of 50 clerks. A commissar was in charge of both civil and military affairs in the region and had the right to issue judgements.

The life of the nomadic population was also linked to border sentry duty. Although the borders of the state were clearly demarcated and well guarded in the eleventh through the thirteenth centuries, there were still sections of the border described by a source as 'lacking strict demarcation'. The border was guarded by far-range and close-range sentries. There was a section of the border where guarded sections overlapped, but there were also sections where between sentries interceded 'territories visited neither by long-range nor short-range sentries.' Those who lived close to the border were frequently sent to fulfill their labour obligations on sentry duty; thus, some of the sentries were local nomads. Sentries were directed by so-called 'border emissaries', who could also be appointed from among the 'directors' of the local nomadic population.

In addition to providing information on incursions by foes or bandits, a direct obligation of the sentries was to supervise nomadic livestock-breeders in a given area. In case of enemy attacks or the appearance of a band of thieves, the sentries were charged with informing the nomads of the danger so that 'our livestock and people be collected and not fall into the enemy's hands'. Local superiors and sentries, as was noted above, also had to make sure that nomads did not migrate in small groups, exposing themselves to thievery or abduction. 'If a proprietor of our [Tangut state] did not migrate together with a gvon and, migrating alone, encountered foreign bandits, suffered at their hands, lost his livestock and people to them, but later regained them, then the owner of the livestock must surrender the regained livestock as a fine for failing to join earlier with the supervisor of the encampment. The proprietor himself is not subject to punishment, however. For failing to retain him in the gvon, the border official, emissary and supervisor of the encampment are subject to 13 blows if there was no bribe; if a bribe was paid, they receive six months of forced labour. Sentries who overlook an enemy or allow a theft are sentenced in accordance with the law.'[11]

Nomads were not supposed to approach the border at all, let alone cross it, or 'to establish themselves beyond the bounds of the territory allotted to

them'.[12] If nomads, 'having crossed the borders of the territory allotted to them, go far and fall into the enemy's hands', their supervisors and elders were subject to criminal prosecution. The law stated that 'on certain sections of the border with other states where there is no strict demarcation and where [the sides] counted on peaceful relations established with Tibetans, Uighurs, Tatars and Jurchen, our long-range and short-range sentries ... should send back, detain, and not allow border crossings when migrating families approach the border from either side in search of water and grass for their livestock.'[13]

On the other hand, the Tangut authorities welcomed those who voluntarily became subjects of Hsia after having gone abroad. For living on the territory of Hsi-Hsia for six years, such individuals were rewarded with reduced penalties for crimes that were not anti-state.

Certain nomads, for example, Uighurs on the western borders of Hsi-Hsia and Hsi-chou, who had crossed over to migrate on the territory of Hsi-Hsia, were not considered 'subjects in full'. Evidently, they remained subjects of the Turfan Khanate. In the article on punishments for crimes committed by members of a different tribe - non-subjects of Hsi-Hsia - the law stated: 'If such [offenders] turn out to be Uighurs who have crossed our western border, although they are considered subordinate to us, it is known that they are both subjects and unruly, then [the crimes committed by such Uighurs] must be reported in a timely fashion to higher authority and action must be taken in accordance with received instructions.'[14] Thus, the nomadic population near the border included groups of nomads who did not consider themselves true subjects of Hsi-Hsia. Indirect information indicates that foreigners who arrived in Hsia were obligated to swear an oath of fealty to the Tangut state. The law forbade the use of foreigners, even good warriors, as guards in the inner chambers of the Tangut state: 'People from among the Tibetans and Uighurs who have submitted to us ... are not to be used for guarding the inner chambers of the palace or that place where the ruler resides.'[15] The law forbade the sale of rice, flour, grain, and groats to foreign nomads in Mongolia and, as the source states, peoples 'of the northern border' and Uighurs. Supervisors of encampments were charged with ensuring this. Punishments for the violation of this ban were quite harsh - three years of forced labour.[16] It was forbidden to sell crockery and all implements to Tatars: 'People sent and directed directly to the Tatars and to other foreigners are forbidden to manufacture for them crockery and implements. If this law is violated, the craftsman receives three years of forced labour.'[17] Aside form the treasury, it was entirely forbidden to sell horses and livestock, grain, arms, people, and coin abroad.[18] Thus, nomads were limited to selling the products of their labour abroad. The law stated: 'It is forbidden by Imperial [decree] to sell other states horses, armour for

warriors and for horses, cows, camels.' The sale abroad of felt, grain, mule■ donkeys, bull hides, cows, camels, and horses, was punished as theft. On■ can evaluate these bans in two ways - as a ban on violating the s■a■■ monopoly on foreign trade and as an unwillingness to support forei■■ nomads, to refuse them help in perfecting crafts, to equip them wi■■ agricultural products.

We must note that we do not, unfortunately, possess any information ■■ internal trade between the nomadic and settled populations of the Tang■■ state. We know only that there were markets at which trade was control■■■ by the state, there were market prices in various areas (as one mig■■ naturally expect), and that nomads brought animal products to market ■■■ settled folk brought agricultural products. Trade was conducted for mon■■ Hsia circulated its own coin, examples of which have survived to th■ present.

Nomads were obligated to catch and return fugitives within a ten-mon■■ period. Supervisors of the encampments were personally responsible f■■ this. The reward for catching a fugitive could be as high as one hundr■■ bundles of coins, that is, 100,000 coins, which was a considerable sum. H■ who compelled a fugitive to work for him, apart from criminal punishme■■, returned to the treasury the value of the work the fugitive had done for him. In the mid-twelfth century, the value of a day's work for an adult male in the Tangut state was equal to the use of a camel or horse for a day and wa■ valued at seventy coins. A day's work from a woman was evaluated at fifty coins, equal to the use of a bull or donkey for a day. Fugitives, includin■ nomads who had gone abroad, who returned, even if they returned via a different section of the border, were necessarily brought back to their place of origin: the *gvon* to which they had been bound before flight. If the reason for flight was excessive requisitions or debt, the authorities were obligated to investigate, and a part of the debt could be paid by the treasury.

Nomads, like the citizens of any state, were obligated to pay a 'tax in blood', that is, to serve in the army of the Tangut state, forming a battle-ready cavalry. Among the innovations of the Hsia army connected with the nomadic population, we note the light camel artillery - compact stone-throwers affixed to the backs of camels on a rotating base, which made possible bombardment in all directions. Already at the end of the tenth century, Chinese authors noted that 'like a tornado, the Tanguts moved this way and that; they were all warriors and easily changed position'.[19] The nomads were 'daring and courageous'. They moved about freely from place to place, and if they were defeated, they melted away into the sands and remained beyond the reach of the Imperial [Chinese] troops.'[20]

At the beginning of the eleventh century, many large nomadic groups had their own military formations. But as it grew stronger, the Tangut state

■■a■ed a regular army on the basis of military service and placed limitations ■■ ■uch formations. The army consisted of warriors and military service ■■■■onnel responsible for supply and military engineering support. The ■■■duction of iron and iron implements, including arms, was highly ■■veloped in Hsia. Especially famed were swords (sabers) from Hsi-Hsia. A ■■■nese author wrote that 'Khitan saddles, swords of the Hsi-Hsia state, and ■■■■kery from Koryö [Korea] were the best on earth'.[21]

The strike force of the army was the cavalry, and special detachments ■■lled 'iron hawks'. Tangut law required, in the event of a commander's ■■a■h, the execution of those in his immediate surrounding for allowing his ■■a■h; the families of those executed were confiscated and turned into state ■■aves. Service in the army was obligatory; it was proclaimed that 'people ■■e the basis of the state and inseparable from service in the army'.[22] Every ■■a■thy man from the age of fifteen to seventy was considered liable for ■■ll-up in Hsia. fifteen-year-olds underwent a special medical examination ■■d were placed on a special military register. This applied to nomads as ■■ell, at least to those who were within reach of the authorities. Lists of those ■■able for call-up were drawn up annually; lists from distant border regions where nomads lived were demanded by the first day of the sixth month. After this, lists were checked over a period of two months. Premeditated ■■ilure to include a man fit for service was punishable by death.

In *gvon*s of livestock-breeders subordinate to the administration of ■■vestock-breeding, exemptions from the list of men liable for call-up for ■■a■ons of age, illness, et cetera were approved by officials of the livestock-breeding administration. They would draw up lists of those freed from military service and forward them to the administration of the imperial ■uard. In actual fact, far fewer than all eligible men were drafted into the regular army. Men liable for call-up were brought together in pairs - one ■erson, especially if he was a volunteer, served and the second remained in the reserves. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, in accordance with the 'New Laws', rich livestock-breeders could send a 'poor, but healthy and ■trong' person to serve in their place.[23]

The material wealth of a recruit's family and his social position determined what he was obligated to bring with him to military service. We ■poke earlier of the ratio between the amount of livestock in a nomad family ■nd the appearance for service with or without a horse, with or without ■rmour. A family incapable of giving a warrior armour or a horse was in any case obligated to present to the regular army a son with at least a set of felt ■rmour. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, when family incomes began to be calculated in money, a recruit from a family with an income of 300-500 packets of coin had to appear for service either with a horse or a

camel; income of greater than 500 packets of coin entailed two camels or two horses.[24]

If they appeared for service without a horse, nomadic livestock-breeders received a horse from the treasury. Each recruit received a bow, sixty arrows, a lance, a sword, and a battle cudgel. In peacetime, military supplies and arms were stored in a warehouse supervised by the commander: 'In peacetime, livestock-breeders ... do not use this. When the army sets off on a campaign and the commanders issue [weapons and armour], the commanders of subdivisions must inventory and check [them].'[25] Nomads received twice as many arrows as farmers (sixty, rather than thirty). One should interpret this as direct recognition of the greater military skills of nomadic livestock-breeders compared to settled farmers.

The army was required to 'brand a horse healthy from the hooves to the teeth. It is forbidden to brand a fat or overly thin horse, or one with an uneven back or one which does not have all its teeth or one which is too old.'[26] He who received a war-horse was obligated to feed it, to care for it, and to not allow it to grow gaunt or fat (the law stipulated that the layer of fat must be within 2.1-3 cm). A war-horse could not be used for ordinary riding or even for hunting. It was forbidden to slaughter the horse for meat or to substitute one's own or another's horse for it. Only if 'the ruler's horse has grown old or is sick and one cannot ride on it or put armour on it and the army is setting off on a campaign and there is no time to replace it [from the treasury]', was it possible to 'bring one's own, healthy and strong [horse] ... in place of the unfit horse.'[27]

Deserters were executed. Commanders were executed if their soldiers fled the field of battle.

The Tanguts created a battle-ready army, an important part of which was made up of soldiers and commanders from the nomad population. We recall Asha-gambu from the 'Secret History' of the Mongols, who announced to the Mongol ambassadors that he was ready to fight with the Mongols, that he had for this purpose 'both latticed *yurts* and pack camels'.[28] To him belongs one of the refusals of the Tanguts to follow Chinggis Khan in a campaign against the Khwārazmshah in 1217: 'If you have no strength, there is no reason to be a khan!'[29] the Tangut army resisted the Mongols for quite a time, enduring campaigns against Hsia in 1205, 1207-8, 1209-10, 1215, 1217, and 1226-7. Only in 1227 was the Tangut state destroyed by Chinggis Khan.

It is more difficult to say something about cultural ties between the nomadic population of Hsia and the Tangut state. It is likely that the nomad elite, the rulers of the encampments, was literate and knew Tangut writing in order to conduct official business and carry out their duties as judges. Non-Tanguts - Tibetans and Uighurs - possibly knew the writing systems of their own peoples. Beyond a doubt, a significant part of the nomadic population professed Buddhism; among the nomads lived clerics who disseminated sacred texts in Tangut and Tibetan, and possibly in Uighur. In the mid-eleventh century, Uighur monks were the first to help the Tanguts to translate the Buddhist canon into Tangut. We know that especially in the mid-twelfth century, the authorities published sutras in xylograph editions in enormous quantities that ran into the tens of thousands of copies. These texts were often distributed to the people for free. Temples were constructed in fortresses in provincial and regional centers. The dead city of Khara-Khoto, rather unimportant in the administrative structure of the Tangut state, was typical in this regard.

Tangut legislative texts have preserved several details relating to the conduct of livestock breeding.

Transport animals, primarily camels, received special attention from the state. The ruler's caravans were comprised largely of male camels; if she-camels were used for this purpose, then no tax was collected on them in wool and increase. These caravans fell under the jurisdiction of the administration of livestock breeding. Senior supervisors were appointed to operations involving pack camels and a driver was assigned to each camel for the duration of the work. The driver and his supervisor were responsible for the camel: 'should it happen that an animal's eyes, back or nose are harmed', then the guilty party was punished with blows from a stick. If a camel died as a result of illness, its hide and meat had to be presented to an official; only after this could the animal be written off. If the hide and meat were not presented, the guilty parties paid the treasury compensation for the camel and were subject to criminal prosecution.

If livestock became ill, a veterinarian or shaman was summoned. Veterinarians were narrowly specialized - for camels, horses, cows, et cetera. If an animal died despite the treatment, the veterinarian or shaman received no remuneration for his efforts.

The meat of dead animals was used for food. It could be sold at markets. We even know the prices: a horse carcass, depending on the age of the horse, fetched 500-1,000 coins; a camel, bull or cow fetched 500 coins; a young camel, foal, an adult sheep or goat - 100 coins. It is interesting to note that horseflesh was considered first-class meat.

Epidemics were a special case. During mass livestock plagues, shepherds were under strict orders to make the meat unusable in order to prevent its consumption and to preserve the hide and ears until the arrival of the authorities and doctors. The latter were charged with establishing the cause of the epidemic by inspecting wells, grass in pastures, afflicted animals, which were still alive in the region and in nearby areas. The hides and ears of the dead animals were studied. The brands were cut from the ear and the

ears were burned, The hides were not destroyed, however, as they could be used for household needs.

Naturally, the consumption of meat of dead animals at times when there were no epidemics, including the meat of animals that did not die from injuries, as well as the use of hides of dead animals at all times - both during epidemics and when there were no epidemics - could not help but aid the dissemination of epidemics and illnesses among the human population.

Livestock were sacrificed to the Heavens. Sacrifices were presented both by the state and by individual families (clans). The largest sacrifice was on the third day of the fourth month, approximately May, at the height of spring. Colts and bulls were usually sacrificed, wine and tea were drunk, and the entire affair entailed prayers for deliverance from misfortune and the provision of strength. Livestock were also sacrificed at burials, in memory of the departed. We note here that in time the state came to demand that the animal to be sacrificed not be slaughtered at burials, but be set free. Whether this was connected with a desire to maintain the number of livestock or with Buddhist beliefs is difficult to say. The law states that only those who were discovered slaughtering livestock during funerals rather than releasing them received the same punishment as for the illegal slaughter of livestock.

The state forbade the slaughter for meat of draught and milk livestock (cows, female yaks). The law stated: 'If someone slaughters for meat the cows, camel, or horse that belong to him, then he receives for a single animal, be it young or adult, four years of forced labour; for two, five years; for three or more, six years.'[30] In the case of slaughtering state livestock for meat, the punishment rose to 10 years of forced labour. Punishments also existed for the slaughter of donkeys and mules for meat, but the maximum for the slaughter of three or more animals was limited to a year of forced labour.

Those who knew that an animal was illegally slaughtered or stolen, yet ate the meat, were also punished. If a found animal, 'lost in a desert area', was slaughtered for meat, a punishment was also decreed. The ban on slaughtering transport animals and cows was confirmed at the beginning of the thirteenth century in the 'New Laws': 'In the state, it is forbidden for officials and the people to slaughter for meat cows, camels, horses, mules, and donkeys.'[31]

If someone killed a transport or milk animal in an act of vengeance, he paid its value and was punished more severely than if he had slaughtered it for meat. The carcass of the killed animal was given to the guilty party. If an animal that belonged to another person was maimed, it was given to the person who maimed it, but for the full price of a healthy animal. 'If a wounded animal was of good breed and it was possible to treat it and if the owner was unwilling to give it up, such an animal was evaluated twice -

once to establish its worth before it was maimed and once to establish its worth after it was maimed. From its worth before the maiming should be deducted its current worth; the animal itself should remain with the owner.'[32] 'If a person slaughters, shoots, or destroys a sheep, goat, dog ... he is subject to punishment. A person with rank pays five packets of coin, a simple person pays ten packets. The worth of the dead sheep, goat, or dog is to be paid to the owner and the body of the animal given to the person who paid its value.'[33] If another's animal was accidentally destroyed - by a stray arrow or a fallen load in similar circumstances - the body was divided evenly between the owner and the person who had killed it, and the person who destroyed it paid half of its value. The negligent infliction of harm to another's livestock was punished by fines and blows with a stick.

Livestock owners were punished for damage caused to crops by their animals. We know from Chinese history that nomadic neighbours often caused intentional damage to the spring crops of their settled neighbours; they did the same in autumn, destroying ripe crops. Tangut laws decreed that the owner of livestock could receive up to a year of forced labour even for insignificant damage to crops. Intentional damage received the same punishment as theft and entailed payment for the worth of the damaged crops and losses incurred as a result of damage caused by the livestock. Unintentional damage entailed remuneration for the worth of damaged crops and a beating for the shepherds. These laws were enforced in border zones where nomadic and settled populations lived.

Rabid animals were subject to rapid destruction. Animals that were aggressive by nature were supposed to wear warning signs. 'If an animal bites, tramples, or butts a person and the person dies, the owner is punished with six months of forced labour ... The animal is to be given to the family of the dead person.' If one animal killed another, no compensation was demanded from the owner.

Anyone who found another's livestock was required to report such a discovery to the authorities within a month. Within three months, the brand had to be established, the found animal(s) described, and a description posted at the nearest markets. If the owner was found, the livestock was returned to him. If no owner was found within a certain, unclear period of time, then the livestock was transferred to the treasury and went to the nearest livestock-breeding institution.[34]

Those who caught another's animals and used them for riding or moving loads were subject to criminal punishment.

The nomadic population of the Tangut state belonged to the southern area of the vast nomadic world of Central Asia. During the existence of the Tangut state of Hsi-Hsia, the Khitan state of Liao and the Jurchen state of Chin, the territory of today's Mongolia was witness to the far-reaching

displacement of the Turkic-speaking population by Mongolian speakers. This process was, in its basic outlines, completed in 1206 by the great *kuriltai* and the selection of Temüjin as the all-Mongol khan and the second bestowal of the title of Chinggis Khan (khan of khans, the first among the khans). The nomads of Hsi-Hsia were cut off from these events by a state border, dependably guarded in many places, if not entirely closed. Moves from Mongolia (the Kereyids, for example) were possible, as were moves from Mongolia. The Uighurs also moved back and forth from the Turfan Khanate.

The nomads were incorporated into the Tangut state. The system of provinces and districts was not, for the most part, used in their administration. They were subject to special organs - the military commissariats, which were part of the northern and western courts. The southern and eastern courts principally monitored the settled population. Nomadic units were headed by the rulers of encampments, who, in all likelihood, were frequently tribal elders. Nomads were allotted places within which they could migrate. Counterpoising nomadic pastures and state pastures, one can, at a certain stretch, view the former as private property in a state which had two basic forms of property - the ruler's (state) and private. Nomads paid taxes in wool and livestock products and served in the army. A certain segment of the nomad population was distributed among *gvon*s - administrative-economic and military-accounting formations. It was forbidden to abandon one's *gvon* under penalty of death. The state kept accounts on people and livestock in encampments. Camels and horses were considered to be of special value. The state controlled their usage and established rules and laws for that use. The nomad elite was, without a doubt, literate in Tangut and held rank in state and military service. The children of such individuals were able to study in the capital's schools and could inherit their father's service. The basic part of the nomadic population, alongside their beliefs in Heaven and spirits, was familiar with Buddhism, which flourished in Hsi-Hsia, although it would be incorrect to term Hsi-Hsia a theocratic state. The Tangut state was East Asian (but not Central Asian, that is, nomadic) and took shape on a Chinese basis and maintained Confucianism as its ideology. Lacking industrial production and suffering from the impossibility of expanding arable land even with well-established irrigation systems or turning natural pastures into agricultural land, two forms of economic activity formed a natural balance in the state. Judging by extant

sources, the economy of Hsi-Hsia was, as a result of this, self-sufficient, possessing a necessary amount of agricultural products, livestock breeding, and producing enough camels and horses for military and transportation needs. A certain amount of livestock was sold to China. Until the 1220's, the

state's need for tea and silk (fabrics) was met to a certain extent by the payments that China dispatched to Hsi-Hsia in recognition of the latter's seniority in foreign affairs. Once the Chin state appeared in northern China and Hsi-Hsia no longer bordered on south Sung, these payments ceased and the need for Chinese products was maintained by trade that was, as concerns large amounts, a monopoly of the treasury. Markets also existed near the border where regular trade was practiced in quantities not significant on a state level. Transit trade from the Uighur khanates and, most likely, northeastern Tibet passed through Hsi-Hsia to China. Trade relations linked the Tangut state with the western Chinese province of Sichuan.

The sources used in this study are documents of a legal nature - the code of 1149-69 and additions to it dating to the thirteenth century. They do not allow us to recreate in full the life of nomads in the Tangut state. We still do not know the most important information - the actual extent of economic interaction between the settled and nomadic population in the state. It must have been diverse - of the four basic ethnic groups in Hsia, only the Chinese were non-nomadic. The Tanguts, the predominant ethnicity and ruling dynasty, the Tibetans and the Uighurs lived both as settled residents and as nomads. Ethnic differences between the nomadic and settled populations should not have played a significant role.

If one is to believe the Chinese sources, by our accounts, Hsia could field an army of 500,000. The population of Hsi-Hsia could have been about four or five million. It is possible that nomads comprised around a quarter of that population - around one million.

After the ruin of Hsi-Hsia in 1227 and the destruction of a large part of its population, many of the survivors, according to Rashid al-Din, were converted to Islam at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The encampments of Ordos passed to the Torgouts, who guarded Ikh-edzhen-khoro, where Chinggis Khan died. In time, the encampments in Alashan also became Mongol and Oirat. The remaining portion of the Uighur population, the so-called Yellow Uighurs, to this day live along the Edzin-Gol River. A section of the nomadic population became part of the 'New Tanguts' - the nomadic population of northeast Tibet, more accurately, those regions adjoining the Tibetan plateau. These Tanguts, who should be distinguished from the Tanguts of Hsia, have been described well by numerous travelers to that area.

NOTES

1 'Vnov' sobrannye dragotsennye parnye izrecheniia. Faksimile ksilografa, perevod s tangutskogo, vstupitel'naia statiiai kommentarii E.I. Kychaanova - Pamiatniki pis'mennosti Vostoka' (The Newly-Assembled Precious Dual Maxims, Facsimile of the Xilograph, translation from Hsi-Hsia (Tangut), preface, and commentary by E.I. Kychanov, *The Monuments of the Literature of the Orient*) XL, 1974, pp. 97, 99, 102, 103.

2 'More znachenii, ustanovlennykh sviatymi. Faksimile ksilografa, izdanie teksta, predislovie, perevod s tangutskogo, kommentarii i primechaniia E. I. Kychanova - Pamiatniki kul'turi Vostoka' (The Sea of Meanings Established by the Saints. Publishing of text, preface, translation from Tangut, commentary and supplements by E.I. Kychanov, *The Monuments of the Culture of the Orient*) IV, 1997, pp. 111-13.

3 Ibid, pp. 23-7.

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CHAPTER 9

INDIA AND THE TURKO-MONGOL FRONTIER

ANDRÉ WINK

India evokes the picture of a land of peasant villages. Most of its historians have emphasized the sedentary characteristics of Indian civilization and, encouraged by a bias in the source material, gave little attention to the role of pastoral nomads. The study of pastoral nomads in the Indian subcontinent is, therefore, still in its infancy. This article can do little more than point at a few basic conclusions that historical research on pastoral nomads has thus far produced.[1] It consists of two parts. The first deals with the indigenous nomads of the Indian subcontinent. The second with the impact of the Turko-Mongol nomads which, over the centuries, entered it from the outside.

I

Within India itself, as elsewhere, we find a variety of forms of migration as well as transhumance which have to be distinguished from real nomadism. To a very considerable extent, even the sedentary world was a world on the move. There was the seasonal migration of agricultural labourers, military personnel, army suppliers and camp followers, and the more incidental but recurrent migration brought about by war, drought, overtaxation or famine; or of that undertaken by artisans in search of work, peasants in search of new land, traders, and the like. The latter, together with the shifting population of nomads, pastoralists, caravaneers, slash-and-burn cultivators, hunters-and-gatherers, as well as wandering scholars and ascetics, still constituted perhaps as much as half of the total population of India in early modern times.[2] But mostly these population groups were not nomadic. And, similarly, transhumance is a form of pastoralism whereby a specialized part of the population moves with flocks between lowlands and summer pastures in the mountains or, inversely, moves down from the mountains to a coastal strip during winter and spring or, in a more mixed form, dwells somewhere halfway between winter and summer pastures. Essentially, transhumance is combined with crop cultivation and some form of permanent settlement. In India it was, and still is, widespread in many areas. A rather extreme example is that of the Kohistanis of the Swat area in the western extensions of the Himalayas, where they move up and down between

altitudes of 2,000 and 14,000 feet. Kohistani families typically possess houses in four or five different settlements, and nearly the whole population is concentrated at any one particular time of the year on the altitude level that is appropriate to the season. They combine the cultivation of grain on terraced fields - which are mostly irrigated and plowed with bullocks - with the breeding of oxen, buffalo, sheep, goats, and donkeys. In an extreme form, they represent a type of vertical transhumance which has for centuries been characteristic of the pastoralists of the Himalayas and the hilly flanks of the Deccan plateau - many of whom combine the herding of sheep and goats with the breeding of various kinds of cattle. Some, like the Tibetan-speaking Bhotias of Himachal Pradesh, do not engage in crop cultivation, but rely on a combination of sheep/goat and yak pastoralism and trans-Himalayan trade with Tibet and the lower Indian foothills.[3] The Bhotias are exceptional in that they do not cultivate, but they too have fixed sets of dwellings, one at each terminus of their migration. On the Deccan, for the Dhangars of the villages around Kolhapur transhumance begins at the start of the monsoon; their herds of sheep are driven away on roads to the east and northeast, into the drier parts of Maharashtra, away from the moisture of the monsoon, which is harmful to the animals' hoofs and wool.[4]

By contrast, real nomadism involves the entire community and typically is a form of long-distance movement of people, animals, and dwellings. This is characteristic of all nomadism, even though we can distinguish different types according to the patterns of movement or modes of livelihood that are favoured. Nomads can move cyclically or periodically, and they can be either hunters-and-gatherers, pastoral nomads, trader-and-service nomads, or a combination of these. Unfortunately, we know little about historic groups of nomadic hunters-and-gatherers in India, except that they usually consisted of small, isolated bands that moved through a delimited territory where they were thoroughly familiar with animals and plants but often avoided contact with sedentary people. Pastoral nomads, dependent as they were on domesticated livestock, moved around in search of pasturage for their animals, but they could secondarily be hunters-and-gatherers, practice some agriculture, or trade with sedentary people or with other nomads. If they cultivated crops between seasonal moves in search of pasture, we would perhaps do best to refer to them as semi-nomads. Generally, we know enough about such groups to be able to make the point that in India these and almost all other nomadic groups were closely or fairly closely associated with sedentary societies in one way or another, and that, in other words, they represented a kind of 'enclosed nomadism.' As we will see, pastoral nomadism was one of many forms of mobility which was common in the sedentary world of India, but, at least in historical times, it never constituted an autonomous economic system and it involved distances which, while much longer than those involved in trans-

humance, were relatively short in comparison with nomads in some parts of the arid zone outside South Asia, particularly in Central Asia and the Middle East.

Perhaps the longest distances were covered not by pastoral nomads at all, but by the trader-and-service nomads, caravaneers, and such nomads as were represented by the Romany-speaking Gypsies. The latter had travelled as far as England by about the beginning of the sixteenth century! Examples of still active Gypsy-like service nomads are the Nandiwalla of Maharashtra, the Gadulia Lohar of Rajasthan, and the Lambadi of northern and central India.[5] Many of these were once pastoralists and caravaneers, maintaining herds of bullocks (castrated bulls, oxen), but now work as labourers in mining, construction, and on farms, while continuing to wander in often circular patterns. Literary evidence from as early as the fourteenth century refers to such people as *kārwānīyān*, nomad 'caravaneers' who dealt in grain and supplied moving armies. They were similar to the people that became known as *Banjāras*, nomadic bands of graindealers with bullock trains that made their appearance in the late twelfth century, when they became important in military campaigning, and later dominated overland long-distance conveyance everywhere in the subcontinent. These nomads possessed vast herds of bullocks and covered thousands of miles, while they were themselves involved in stockbreeding.

Pastoral nomadism, as much as the existence of mixed pastoral-agricultural economies, is in evidence in India from very early times. The society that is depicted in the Rig-Veda was largely pastoral, and the Mahabharata depicts many pastoral elements as well. To what extent we can speak of true nomads here is not clear. Ancient Tamil literature definitely points at pastoral nomads, and hunters-and-gatherers, in mountains, forests, wasteland and seashore regions, while ancient memorial stones in many parts of the subcontinent are evidence of pastoral-nomadic cattle-raiding on a wide scale.

It is the Arab geographers and Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who provide us with some of the earliest and most detailed descriptions of pastoral-nomadic populations in the arid and semi-arid wastes of the northwestern parts of the Indian subcontinent during the medieval period.[6] Here such populations were probably most common. And there can be no doubt that the pastoral-nomadic economies of Sind were the closest approximation the medieval Indian subcontinent had to offer - in terms of autonomy, range, and specialization on stockbreeding - to the strictly nomadic economies of the arid zone beyond. But even these pastoral nomads, it appears from the descriptions we have, had a range which was relatively limited.

In the seventh century, when the Arabs first conquered the area, the mountainous borderlands between Makran and Kirman were inhabited by the marauding nomad tribes of the Baluchis and the Qufs ('mountain-dwellers'), both of which claimed descent from the Arabs of the Hijaz. Of these two tribal

formations, the Qufs never made it into the Indian parts of Makran and continued their predatory activity, though on a much reduced scale, in the Great Desert or Dasht-i-Lut up to the eleventh century - after which we no longer hear of them. The Baluchis did not yet inhabit the region that is now Baluchistan but they probably migrated from northern or northwestern Iran at some time prior to the tenth century, when they are first mentioned in Kirman. Then, under pressure from the Buyids, the Ghaznavids and especially the Seljuqs, they seem to have moved further eastwards, into Baluchistan, where they superimposed themselves upon the Dravidian Brahuis and drove out others. Such Baluchis possessed dromedaries and maintained an often predatory lifestyle but went mostly on foot. Afterwards, they mostly moved between the plains in the wet winter season and the mountains in the dry season.

Slightly further east, in large parts of Sind it has always been impossible to draw an absolute dividing line between pastoralism (nomadic or otherwise) and sedentary agriculture, with many of the inhabitants having generally been engaged in both on a limited scale, or alternating between the two activities according to weather conditions. This was especially the case in a place like Makran, but it was also true in the northwestern hills, and in the sub-montane region of the trans-Indus plains and parts of the Salt Range. Wherever the productivity of sedentary agriculture was constrained by scanty and highly unreliable rainfall, settlement in Sind remained instable and population density remained extremely low. And in such areas the economy was dependent on animal breeding to a corresponding degree. The breeding and grazing of sheep and goats or cattle are still the regular occupations in the lower country of the south, while the breeding of dromedaries is a dominant activity in the regions immediately to the east of the Kirthar range.

Hiuen Tsang gave the following account of a numerous pastoral-nomadic population in seventh-century *Sin-tū* (Sind): 'By the side of the river..[of Sind], along the flat marshy lowlands for some thousand *li*, there are several hundreds of thousands [a very great many] families ..[which] give themselves exclusively to tending cattle and from this derive their livelihood. They have no masters, and whether men or women, have neither rich nor poor.'[7] While they were left unnamed by the Chinese pilgrim, these same people of lower Sind were called '*Jats*' or '*Jats of the wastes*' by the Arab geographers. The Jats, as 'dromedary men,' were one of the chief pastoral-nomadic divisions at that time, with numerous subdivisions, and with more of them moving in from Makran between the seventh and eleventh centuries under pressure of the Baluchis. Numbers of other Jats had been migrating from Sind to Iraq, Mesopotamia and Syria even before the Arabs started to deport them. Jat nomadic pastoralists and swamp-dwellers had been settled with water buffaloes by the Sasanid emperors in the area of the Persian Gulf, where they became associated with the *Sayābija*, a group which possibly originated in the marshes of eastern Sumatra. In the early eighth century, the Arab governor of Iraq settled even larger numbers of Jats and Sayābija in the marshes of southern Iraq, where they were induced to take up agriculture (particularly rice). They (and their kinsmen who preceded them) seem to have merged with the 'Marsh Arabs' that have been described by W. Thesiger shortly before the marshes were drained.

There were other large groups of pastoral nomads in lower Sind and between Multan and Mansura in the same centuries which have been described as people 'who resemble the Jats,' and who owned and bred goats and camels, and went under various names while being compared by the geographers with the Bedouin and Berbers. Subgroups of these were also swamp-dwellers.[8] Others, like the Mids (or Mayds) were amphibious, pursuing a second career as seafaring pirates as far as Cutch and Makran, and even up to the mouth of the Tigris and the southern part of the Red Sea and the coasts of Sri Lanka.[9] While many of them appear to have occupied strategic positions in the armies of the pre-Islamic kings of Sind, under the Arab regime of the eighth to tenth centuries the Jats and other pastoral-nomadic groups of Sind were progressively marginalized. The Arabs made sustained efforts to domesticate and sedentarize the various mobile, pastoral-nomadic and often predatory groups of the wastes of Sind.[10] In the case of the Jats, these efforts resulted in a gradual shift away from the pastoral nomadism of lower Sind to a more sedentary, agricultural existence in areas further to the north, in and beyond Multan and in the Panjab. In these latter areas the Jats began to turn up as peasants by the eleventh century. The transformation of a largely pastoral people into sedentary peasants, which was concomitant with an enormous expansion of the Jat population, was boosted in the eleventh to sixteenth centuries. By the end of that period the Jats had become mainly a peasant caste of the Panjab, with the Jats of lower Sind constituting a relatively insignificant residue of the pastoral-nomadic population that they once were. In the Panjab, those Jats that did not sedentarize by assimilating with the already settled peoples of the riverine areas continued to live in the thinly populated *barr* country between the five rivers, in a symbiotic but frequently conflictuous relationship with the sedentary people of the areas of intensive cultivation. Here a type of transhumance came into existence, based primarily on the herding of goats and dromedaries, whereby the pastoralists only moved between the river areas and the *barr*, never leaving the Panjab plains and covering but a small distance, of at most sixty to ninety miles.

Another important nomadic people associated with India's northwestern frontier were the Afghans.[11] The cradle of the Afghans was the Zhob district, embracing the Sulayman mountains, on a high road from India to the west which was of considerable mercantile importance. With the advent of the Muslims, the Afghans expanded further to the border of the Indus valley and the Khyber Hills, and then much beyond this area, becoming ethnically more

and more mongrelized and assuming an important role in the Muslim conquest of India. In their homeland, in the Sulayman mountains, the equilibrium between the nomadic or semi-nomadic Afghan warrior tribes was often upset, as was the case elsewhere in the northwestern frontier areas of the Indian subcontinent. On the plateau east of Quetta demographic pressure among the Baluchis had to seek an outlet in the pastures of their northern Afghan ('Pathan') neighbours.[12] Other Afghan pastoral nomads, known as *powindas*, were involved for many centuries in the caravan trade between India and Iran and Central Asia. They could assume this role because the caravan routes coincided with the routes of their pastoral migrations.[13] This type of Afghan nomads rented out dromedaries, drove flocks, guarded caravans, and engaged in trade themselves, particularly in the trade in horses - a crucial commodity on the Indian markets.[14]

It was only in the mountainous areas in Afghanistan and on the northwest frontier that pastoral nomads successfully opposed the expanding sedentary states of the plains. In the long run, neither the nomads of the Sindian wastes nor the nomads of the plains to the east of the Indus river, nor the nomads of the Himalayan foothills, could withstand the encroachment of the sedentary world. Particularly in the Himalayas, nomadic penetration quickly reached its limits.[15] When some of the most western mountain valleys, like Swat, were occupied by nomadic Afghans this did not lead to major changes in the use of the land. Swat was an old agricultural region (Hiuen Tsang's *Udyana*, 'the garden') which was occupied by Afghan tribes in the sixteenth century. But the latter stayed at the bottom of the valley, leaving the alpine valleys to the Kohistanis and Gujars, while the agricultural land continued to be exploited by a previously settled peasant population whose religion was superseded by Islam but whose agricultural traditions were perpetuated without modification. Nomadic occupation here meant merely a repartition of the proceeds of the soil in periodic redistributions among the occupying clans.

It was essentially similar in Kashmir. Here we find the highest meadows (at 9,000-12,000 feet) occupied by the Bakerwal, nomadic goat pastoralists which winter in the steppes of the Siwalik and the Panjab; the level below them is occupied by the Gujars, cattle nomads which are also wintering in the plains of the Panjab. Together they represent a type of residual nomadism, brought about by pressure from the sedentary lowlands. It was never the reverse, i.e. nomadism never threatened Himalayan rural life.

In other parts of the Indian subcontinent, south of the Himalayas and to the east and southeast of Sind and the Thar Desert, we again encounter, as a general rule, a situation in which pastoral nomads have been pushed into meadows above the valleys and beyond the well-cultivated river basins. In these marginal habitats they ended up in roles subservient to the sedentary community which would entrust them with flocks during the summers in order to get them to

higher altitudes or semi-arid pasture zones. Here too the domain of pastoral nomadism shrunk dramatically over the centuries, while sedentary agriculture expanded.

Historically we can follow this process in broad outline. The Ramayana already celebrates the expansion of sedentary agriculture as the triumph of civilization over the *mlecchas* or 'barbarians,' and the later Vamcavali literature presents us with battles against the tribal forces of disorder - of which pastoralism was one. From the Gupta period on, about the middle of the first millennium AD, the territorial control of agrarian states began to solidify, and the reduction of pastoral nomadism from then on proceeded without much interruption in core areas of the subcontinent.[16] By the end of the first millennium sedentary states were in the ascendant everywhere, while pastoral nomadism and tribal life in general had already been pushed decisively to the margins. The sedentary domain then, over the subsequent centuries, moved further from wetter into drier regions, and from the lowlands into the hills, with the result that by the nineteenth century pastoral and tribal people had become restricted to uncultivable dry zones and mountain forests, swamps, and the like. By that time pastoralists were still vitally important as an adjunct to the agricultural economy but they had become entirely subordinate to sedentary people, if not as pastoralists then as labourers and in a variety of other ways.

As many have observed, in earlier times the pastoral-nomadic societies of India were the womb from which some of its most illustrious ruling elites sprang.[17] Defending and rescuing cattle could lead to the formation of a successful political dynasty. Militarily, the pastoral nomads could at times enjoy major advantages due to their better access to horses and relatively high mobility, as well as other advantages such as an undeveloped division of labour which allowed many, if not all, men to join the armies. Hence nomadic conquests did result within regions of the subcontinent. Ancient Tamil society was probably conquered by pastoral nomads from the peninsular steppe in the fourth century AD. Pastoral-nomadic populations of the Panjab, Gandhara and parts of Central Asia are known to have served as a military manpower reservoir for the kings of the 'heavenly valley' of Kashmir. The latter asserted their power in extensive parts of northern India in the eighth century AD and without the nomadic element they would have been dependent on a pedestrian population without any riding animals.[18] Tibetan nomads appear to have played an important military role in eastern India under the Pala dynasty in the ninth century.[19] And, to take another example, the royal clan of the Pratihāras, which ruled all of northern India in the eighth to tenth centuries, can be shown to have been a subdivision of the originally pastoral-nomadic Gurjaras of the semi-arid zone of Rajasthan.[20] Under the umbrella of the 'Gurjara-Pratihāras' there was a host of emerging ruling clans with pastoral-nomadic origins (as names like 'Guhilots,' referring to the Guhila forest of Gujarat, indicate) which are

generally regarded as the antecedents of India's medieval military elite of Rajputs. In the Deccan and the Peninsula we still find people from the semi-arid backwoods with pastoral-nomadic components that emphasized horse-breeding and asserted power under such important dynasties as the Yadavas, Hoysalas and Kakatiyas in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and similar elements went into the making of the empire of Vijayanagara in the fourteenth century.[21] Such conquest movements invariably led to the sedentarization of the pastoral nomads who initiated them.

In recent centuries, pastoralism continues to be found in India in a variety of economic and geographical contexts, and pastoral variability remained high, still including nomadism of some types as well.[22] Leaving aside the dromedary herding nomads which are restricted to the dry margins of the Thar desert, almost all pastoral activity however has become subsidiary to agriculture. It may still be the primary activity of a group or a secondary one. Certain groups can perhaps be best defined as 'agro-pastoralists.' Most closely associated with sedentary agriculture continued to be the radial pattern of animal husbandry which is characterized by a diurnal movement of animals and people who leave villages in the morning and come back in the evening. The circular pattern of pastoral nomadism, characterized by seasonal movements, is much more rare - to be found only on the dry margins of India's western deserts, in the dense forests of the Deccan, and in certain areas of the Himalayas where agriculture is not well-established and extensive grazing is possible. But there too, the cyclic movements of Indian pastoral nomads normally brought them into contact with sedentary farming communities, with whom they maintained all types of exchanges. The nomads, in any case, stayed within close range of the sedentary economy. Indian pastoralists were mostly involved in a kind of herdsman husbandry.[23] Arid and humid areas which served as summer and winter pasturages were within relatively short distance to each other, hence the corresponding grazing movements were shorter than was common in the Middle East and Central Asia. Most herds in India consisted of cattle, sheep and goats, moving vertically up and down hills or back and forth between river beds. Horse breeding was even more restricted, even though there were some good breeding grounds. Many Gavlis or Gollas in the Deccan have become shepherds since the expansion of agriculture and the reduction of pasture lands have made it impossible for big cattle-breeders to continue to support themselves independently of agriculture.[24] Similarly, the pastoral Dhangars represent merely a valuable supplement to agriculture.[25] Thus, if the pastoral economy became largely an appendage of the sedentary agricultural one, the social organization of pastoralists and pastoral nomads, in the course of time, shed all specific tribal particularities and even adopted elements of the caste system.

It is important, however, to keep in mind that the Indian subcontinent never became entirely settled and that sedentary agriculture could not expand beyond a delimited ecological habitat. Historically, South Asia has always remained a region of transition between the arid zone of Afro-Eurasia where pastoral nomadism predominated, of deserts and steppes, and the humid tropics of monsoon Asia where intensive agriculture predominated.[26] The arid zone which embraces North and East Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, has very important arid and semi-arid extensions reaching from western and north-western India to the Deccan plateau, and all the way into the deep south of the Indian peninsula, and even beyond into northern Sri Lanka. This extended arid or semi-arid zone in South Asia receives relatively low annual rainfall (below forty inches per year) and has always been more suited to pastoralism than sedentary agriculture. The extensions of the arid zone in India provided special possibilities for stockbreeding, in particular of camels, dromedaries, and goats, bullocks, and some horses, while they also stimulated north-south mobility. In the more humid areas, stockbreeding was restricted to pigs, buffaloes, ducks, chickens, and geese.[27] In spite of the advance of agriculture, the ecological constraints of the subcontinent determined that India always retained a mixed economy. But, over the long term, this became more and more an economy in which pastoralism was closely associated with sedentary agriculture.

II

When we now turn to the second of our problems, the impact of Turko-Mongol nomads on the sedentary societies of India, we may take as our starting point the conclusion that the subcontinent was ecologically unable to sustain an autonomous or quasi-autonomous pastoral-nomadic economy and was at best capable of accommodating the restricted forms of 'enclosed nomadism' of which we have given some examples in the preceding section. In effect, nomadic peoples or peoples with a recent nomadic background which entered the subcontinent from the arid zone of Central Asia and the Middle East always had to make very considerable adaptations to the new environment in which they found themselves. In almost all cases we find that they had to leave their nomadic pastoralism behind. Nonetheless, as this section intends to show, the impact of the nomads which migrated into India throughout many centuries, has been quite important in several respects. Even though they left their nomadism behind, the Turko-Mongol groups that made it into India did bring about a revolution in warfare and military technique that allowed them to impose new patterns of political mobilization and resource allocation. Instead of nomadization, what we observe here is perhaps best described as a successful 'fusion' of nomadic frontier elements and sedentary society.

Turks and Mongols were, of course, not the first nomads to enter the subcontinent. Leaving aside the Aryan-speaking pastoralists of the second millennium BC (whose status is controversial), the first recorded nomadic movements southwards across the Hindu-Kush were those of the Shākas, and, in close succession, the Kushānas; these were followed by the Hephthalites or 'White Huns,' and by a variety of Turkish groups from about the tenth century AD, then by Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

The history of nomadic penetration into India begins with the Shākas in the centuries BC, but the extent to which any of these early groups were really nomads when they arrived in India should not be exaggerated.[28] Shākas is the Sanskrit ethnonym for the Central-Asian people who were called Sakas in Iran. In the latter area, it has been proposed, their name may have been derived from the Iranian sakā, 'to go, flow, run,' hence saka, 'running, swift, vagrant, nomadic.'[29] The 'Shāka' hordes of nomadic horse-archers had been moving from the Central-Asian steppe to the west at an early stage, but neither India nor Iran nor China had been much affected by their movements before the third century BC. The Shāka invaders of India, however, do not appear to have come directly from Central Asia to India but, after a long interval, from Iran and areas on the Iranian periphery. The earliest reference to the Shākas in India is found in a text called the Mahābhāshya, of about 150 BC, where the commentator Patañjali mentions them as 'pure Sudras' who need not be excluded from the dish.'[30] The fact that they are accorded a low-caste Sudra or 'peasant' status seems to indicate that by that time they had settled in India, albeit possibly in the periphery of the cultivated area. Most likely, as horse-keepers, they had drifted to the surrounding semi-arid zones less fit for cultivation.

Further clues to their identity can be found in Buddhist literature and the Indian epics, which also show an early awareness of the people of the area beyond the northern and northwestern frontier which they call Shākadvīpa, 'the Shāka realm.' The way these texts use the term 'Shākas' indicates that it is futile to try and sift out the basic ethnic units here. If the Indians referred to the people of Central Asia as 'Shākas' it is sometimes because this was the oldest name which was applied to them. They are often mixed up in these sources with the Iranians ('Pahlavas') and the Greeks ('Yavanas'). Here again it becomes evident that the Shākas were no longer stateless nomads without prior exposure to sedentary civilization when they moved on to India via the Bolan Pass, into the lower Indus valley, western India, Kathiawar, and Ujjayni, and as far as Mathura. They had, in fact, been instrumental in the creation of the Parthian dynasty in Iran in 247 BC, and they had undergone a powerful Parthian influence, adopting an eastern Iranian dialect along the way. It may have been a Parthian invasion, led by Mithradates I (173-38 BC), that brought the earliest Shākas across the Kabul valley, into the Panjab. Large numbers of

them had been settled by other Iranian kings in Sistan, again prior to their arrival in India.

It is very striking that, once in India, the Shākas gradually became almost imperceptible and then seem to disappear after the fourth century AD, while becoming a virtually indistinguishable element within Indian society, and leaving but traces of their nomadic background. 'Shāka' costumes, and the pointed cap or helmet, are found in the Ajanta frescoes, and many such elements survived among the peoples of western India. The royal fillet and the cylindrical crown which may have been the prototype of the later Indian kirītamukuta, and other pieces of jewelry (such as the torque-shaped necklace which is still found today among tribes in Rajasthan) are of Central-Asian nomadic origin.[31] Above all, the Shākas played the role of cultural middlemen, passing on Iranian and Roman-Hellenistic elements to the Indian subcontinent, and acting as promoters of particular aspects of Indian culture which suited them. Some of the Shākas may well have merged with clans that were later able to constitute themselves as Rajputs. But this should not induce us to postulate a Central-Asian origin for India's medieval Hindu rulers. All the less so since Indian sources are completely silent about such a connection.

The Indian sources do mention, together with the Shākas and Pahlavas (Iranians), the Kushānas, as another formerly nomadic group which, in the first century AD, set up an empire that crossed the mountainous divide between Central Asia and India (extending from the Ganges to the Oxus and as far as Kashmir), and which lasted for about five generations. In the later Sanskrit literature, the Kushānas are often referred to as 'Turushkas' or 'Turks.' Kalhana in the Rājataranginī, for instance, tells us that some of the Kushāna kings (amongst which Kanishka) had a 'Turushka' origin.[32] Nowadays, no historian considers them to be Turko-Mongoloid or 'Hunnic,' although there is no doubt about their Central-Asian origin. By the time the Kushanas established their empire, they too had long ceased to be barbarian nomads. They appear to have first settled in areas where Buddhism was the prevalent religion, in the old cities of the Shākas. Kushāna administrative models were often derived from the Iranian Achaemenids and their successors. And in general they became strong promoters of Buddhism, while creating conditions favourable to long-distance trade.

Similarly, the Hephthalites were an offshoot of the later Kushanas and they were allied to the Huns who conquered most of Kashgaria, Transoxania and Bactria in the fourth century AD, but they were not Huns themselves. In Sanskrit they are referred to as Shveta Hunas, that is 'White Huns.' It was only the Hephthalites, not the Huns, who broke into northern India in the later fifth century. Although in the areas across the Hindu Kush they continued to rule as viceroys of the Huns, the latter never came down to India themselves. The Chinese carefully distinguished the Huns and Turks (Tu-kueh) from the

Hephthalites, but not so the Arabs, who misleadingly denoted the Hephthalites (Ar. Hayātila) as 'Turks.' They were definitely not Turks, and they were hardly barbarian nomads, for by the time they came to India they too had been subjected to powerful religious stimuli from Iran. In India, the Hephthalites subjected the Panjab, together with areas of Rajasthan and Kashmir. Here they caused considerable destruction. But, as far as can be made out, this did not have a great and lasting impact on the sedentary peasant population of these areas. The suggestion which is often found in textbooks of Indian history, that these 'Hunnic' invaders are somehow at the beginning of a medieval 'dark age' must be dismissed. On one level, this claim is based on an assumed parallel with the Huns in Rome. On another, it is perhaps best regarded as a dubious residue of the racial theory which proposed that waves of barbarian invaders from the Turko-Mongol frontier compromised the Aryan purity of an ancient civilization. Instead, what happened is that the Hephthalite involvement in northern and northwestern India boosted the political rise of indigenous pastoral-nomadic groups such as the Gurjaras and the latter's transformation into landed ruling elites in many of the northern parts of the Indian subcontinent.

What is in any case evident is that India since the centuries BC has been characteristically open to the nomadic world of Central Asia but that in ancient times the impact of the latter on the sedentary life in most of the subcontinent was on the whole limited in scope and often tempered. The nomadic people which were called 'Turks' did not introduce themselves until after this early period had come to a close, and hence were relative newcomers on the scene. The origins of the Turks, as of all nomad peoples, are obscure. The very word 'Turks' appears as the name of a Central-Asian nomad people only from the sixth century AD onwards. We know that the Turks, in a variety of ways, made their appearance in Iran and Transoxania prior to the rise of the great Turkish Muslim dynasties of the Seljuqs and Ghaznavids, although the extent of Turkish infiltration into the Muslim world in the first three centuries is disputed. There is some evidence of the presence of Turks in India as early as the eighth century, largely from Kashmir and adjacent areas. But this presence does not amount to very much. Al-Biruni, in his *Kitāb al-Hind*, dates the beginning of 'the days of the Turks' (`ayyām al-turk) from 'the time when they seized power in Ghazna ...,' in other words from the beginnings of Ghaznavid rule in the late tenth century onwards.[33]

It was at this time that a series of nomadic conquests and migrations was touched off which began with the Turks in the late tenth century, climaxed with the 'Mongol storm' in the thirteenth century, and ended with Timur's raids and the sacking of Delhi in the late fourteenth century. Perhaps we are justified in regarding this as an illustration of what an eminent military historian, John Keegan, has observed on a more general level, that 'the tide of war tends to flow one way - from poor lands to rich, and very rarely in the opposite direction.'[34] But why should it be so? In this particular case, at least part of the reason may lie in the ecological contrast between sedentary India and the Turko-Mongol frontier world. Paradoxically, demographic pressure was most intense in the nomadic societies of the arid zone. This is a basic geopolitical fact which plays a role in nomadic-sedentary contact generally.[35] Hence, the penetration of sedentary society by nomads is determined, among other factors, by the recurrent demographic surplus production of the latter. In the deserts and steppes the nomads enjoyed a relatively salubrious environment and climate; constantly on the move, the food they ate and the air they breathed was healthier, and what is very important is that due to their dispersal the nomads enjoyed a relative immunity from the many epidemics which so often adversely affected the densely packed sedentary world. In the fourteenth century, Ibn Khaldun pointed out that, due to these factors, the desert environment was a source of both moral and physical superiority of nomads over sedentaries. Medicine, according to Ibn Khaldun, while a necessity for sedentary people, was useless for nomads.

Wherever they occurred, nomadic societies grew faster than peasant societies, and if we can conclude that the nomads at regular intervals experienced serious demographic pressure this would help to explain their 'irresistible penchant for the raid' - as an earlier and naive psychology of the nomads had it. In addition, we have to consider that the relations between nomads and sedentaries take different forms according to the level of social, political and military organization of the time.[36] Up to the first millennium BC the nomads which lived on the margins of the Fertile Crescent were mere shepherds and, without horses or dromedaries, lived in a state of dependence vis-à-vis the sedentary society which they could slowly infiltrate but not conquer. Due to demographic excess, the push of the nomads towards the sedentary regions of the Fertile Crescent occurred long before the rise of Islam. But after the nomads began to mount horses and dromedaries, their dynamism was enhanced in such a way that invasion and conquest of the sedentary world became possible. The displacememt of the Bedouin tribes could now easily reach twenty-five miles per day, even if their herds included beasts of burden, and many more if they just consisted of warrior troops without such beasts. Considering the relationship between India and the Turko-Mongol nomads in the tenth to fourteenth centuries, we probably have to take account not only of demographic surpluses produced on the steppes but also of military advantages on the part of the nomads which derive from the possession of superior horses and the development of mounted archery.

By contrast, the alluvial river plains of India had a virtually unlimited absorptive potential. By the late tenth century the great crescent from the Indus to the Ganges delta had already become one of the world's richest agricultural

regions and was the demographic heartland of India.[37] India's population, however, appears to have expanded at a considerably lower rate than that of the arid zone of Iran and Central Asia.[38] India's population growth rate was also much lower than that of the rest of the world on average. The reasons for this are to be found in the peculiar disease situation which arose in the ever more populous agglomerations in the river plains. The warm and humid climate of India allowed the survival of infectious microparasites much better than colder or drier climates. Infections established among cattle and other animal herds could more easily transfer to human hosts. Smallpox has been present in India for at least 2,000 years, in particular in the densely settled rural areas of the Ganges plain, and it has always been one of the leading causes of death, an endemic disease with dry season maxima, punctuated by outbreaks of epidemic intensity every five to seven years. Bubonic plague and cholera perhaps also began their careers as human diseases in the Ganges plain. In summary, it seems likely that the main reason for India's low demographic growth rate before modern times lies in the endemic and sometimes epidemic presence of diseases like smallpox and numerous other unspecified tropical 'fevers.' The effects of this situation made themselves felt over many centuries.

If we can estimate the population of the entire Indian subcontinent to have been around 100 million in the year 1270 AD (taking into account the low growth rate and working our way back from the relatively plentiful statistics of early modern times), this would mean that in the thirteenth century India had at least twenty times as large a population as either Iran or Central Asia, areas which had no more than five million people each and probably less. Relatively sparsely populated, and with an overall unfavourable ecology and dry climate, Iran was much more deeply affected than India by the repeated invasions of Turkish and Mongol tribes and armies from the eleventh century onwards. After massacring and dispersing some two million, largely sedentary, people, the Mongols sponsored a great nomadic migration into the Middle East.[39] About 170,000 men, accompanied by 680,000 women and children and perhaps 17 million sheep in accompanying camps and herds, were involved in the conquest and occupation of Iran and adjacent areas. One-fifth to one-fourth of these were stationed in Anatolia, and the rest in Iran (with some of these wintering in the lowlands of Iraq). The two processes combined profoundly altered the ethnic composition of Iran, with the proportion of Turkish and Mongol nomads in the population as a whole increasing dramatically, leading to pervasive conflict.

In Central Asia, the population, while thinly spread, grew at a much faster rate than in India, perhaps at about twenty per cent per century, due to a more favourable disease situation and a more secure diet. It was a region of continual competition between sedentary agriculturists and pastoral nomads. But within *Mā warā' al-nahr* or Transoxania, irrigated and settled agriculture occupied probably less than ten per cent of the total land area. By the tenth century (when the population could well have doubled since the time of Hiuen Tsang's visit) competition for grazing lands appears to have been intense in many parts. Conflict and emigration may have become inevitable by that time, providing the drive behind the Ghaznavid and Ghurid invasions of India. Migration from the Turko-Mongol frontier of Iran and Turan to India reached a peak in the thirteenth century, after which it persisted at a lower level down to the eighteenth century. Like war, the tide of migration tended to flow from poor lands to rich ones. The flow of people from the Turko-Mongol frontier, constantly nourished by surpluses among the nomadic and semi-nomadic populations, became a decisive factor in medieval Indian history. And it was a factor which was to a significant degree determined by the ecological and environmental context in which nomads confronted sedentary society.

The ecological unsuitability of India for extensive pastoral nomadism also explains why the subcontinent never really suffered a nomadic conquest in the strict sense of the word. In the first centuries of Islam, the battles of the Arabs - from Andalus to Sind - were mostly fought by infantry, supported by archers, and it was not made up of nomads but of the sedentary population of the towns and oases.[40] Whatever nomadic element there was in the Arab armies, it was largely put to tactical use as light cavalry, particularly in raiding expeditions. On the other hand, superior mobility was decisive in the campaigns in the desert, and it was essential that the Arabs could concentrate their forces and cover great distances rapidly by making use of the dromedary. The essential role played by the dromedary probably explains why the Arabs never went much beyond Sind and the arid regions of the Thar Desert. But the Arabs did not introduce mounted archery to India, nor did they bring along nomadic pastoralists in any significant numbers for relocation in Sind.

The Indian subcontinent, while it did contain its own patchy pastoral economy of sheep, goats and cattle in close association with sedentary life, was mostly unsuitable for Bedouin-style nomadism in a pure form. It could also not accommodate great numbers of Turkish or Mongol nomads on account of the lack of sufficient good pasture land, particularly for horses. The Seljuq Turks barely touched the outer periphery of India in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Mongols failed to establish a permanent nomadic presence beyond the western borderlands of Sind and some parts of the Panjab. In this respect the situation in India was unlike that on the Iranian plateau. In the latter area, Seljuq and, more especially, Mongol conquest was followed by extensive nomadization and, simultaneously with it, the destruction of agriculture on a substantial scale.[41] It was also unlike in Iraq, where the Bedouin made destructive inroads into the breaches which were left open by the Mongols. Most of India was not exposed to the kind of large-scale Mongol attacks that occurred in the Middle East, Central Asia,

China, and Russia in the thirteenth century. Chinggis Khan first appeared on the Indus river in 1221, but did not move beyond it. From that date on until 1398, when Timur sacked and destroyed Delhi, there were numerous incursions in the northwest-frontier regions, the Panjab, as well as in Kashmir. Indo-Persian chronicles describe the 'infidels of Chīn' as a sometimes quite formidable threat. But the truth is that Mongol incursions into India were on the whole small and ill-coordinated. In the Panjab, some cities were devastated, and in some localities agricultural land was turned into pasture, and sometimes agriculture did not revive here until the fifteenth century and after. Few areas, nevertheless, even on the northwest frontier and in the Panjab, came under Mongol occupation for a considerable length of time.

Mongol troopers are mentioned regularly as auxiliaries in the armies of the Delhi Sultanate. These appear to have brought their wives and children with them, and all their belongings. There are, moreover, references to thousands of 'women horse-riders' (khātūn-i-chābūk suwār) among the Mongol armies in India.[42] In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, fairly large numbers of Mongol immigrants in India are recorded to have served as 'new Muslims' or 'new Amirs' in the Islamic polities. They remained thoroughly suspect allies at all times, and attempts were made to suppress or exterminate them on several occasions. In one instance, which occurred at the end of the thirteenth century, a large number of Mongols was brought into Delhi by the Muslim authorities to be settled there with their families, and provisions were made for their support and houses were given to them in specially designated suburbs. But we learn from the historian Barani that 'the climate of Hindustan and their city homes did not please them, and the majority of them with their wives and children departed to their own country.'[43] The fear of India's hot and humid climate and unhealthy conditions pervades Turko-Mongol writing. Timur's advisers still held out the warning: 'Although we may subdue Hind, yet if we tarry in that land, our posterity will be lost; and our children, and our grandchildren, will degenerate from the vigour of their forefathers, and become speakers of the languages of Hind.'[44]

Instead of being overrun by the Mongols during one or several major invasions, the agricultural plains of northern India were brought under Islam by Turkish conquerors in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. The rest of the subcontinent, with few areas excepted, followed suit in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. The Turkish conquest of India occurred in a slow, incremental way and it was effected by regular professional armies, built around a core of slave soldiers, which were relatively small in size and which at times were accompanied by irregular ghazis recruited from the nomadic world but not by any large-scale population movements of nomadic elements arriving with flocks and herds. Like the Mongols, many of these Turkish military men, regulars and irregulars alike, had originally been nomads in Central Asia but

unlike the former they had already converted to Islam before they came to India. They created a mamluk state which in some respects resembled that of contemporary Egypt. In the thirteenth-century Delhi Sultanate the number of identifiable Turkish slaves was much smaller than that in Egypt. Another major difference was that in India they were spearheading the first Islamic expansion in densely populated 'infidel' territory, an area of wide expanse, while Egypt could be controlled from a single centre and had been ruled by Muslim dynasties for centuries. In India, also, the number of Muslim fugitives from Mongol-occupied territory and other assorted immigrants from among the Turks, Khalajis, Iranians, Afghans, Africans, Arabs, and even Mongols, was proportionately very large. The Turkish slave elite had to share power with all of these. Most importantly, it did not arrive in India as nomadic conquerors. It merely had a nomadic background in Central Asia. Its numerous Turkish horseriding followers are pointed out in our sources as having come from Mā warā' al-nahr, 'from beyond the river,' the ancient Transoxania, but they came as warriors who were giving up their pastoral-nomadic life.

This new Turkish political elite also had to share power with the leaders of the large Hindu population of the sedentary realm which it had conquered. In effect, the population of India was so vast that it dwarfed the numbers of immigrants of all sorts that, individually or in groups, drifted in from the Turko-Mongol frontier. Recalling the particular disease conditions and health hazards to which this migrant, 'post-nomadic' population was exposed, we may speculate that more of the newcomers died of disease than on the battlefield. Following upon three decades of Ghaznavid raids, a major plague broke out in 1033 AD, which, as Ferishta reports, 'swept many thousands from the face of the earth.'[45] This epidemic is recorded to have raged 'from Isfahan to Hindustan,' and we are told that here 'whole regions were entirely depopulated.' It was perhaps no coincidence that the first important Arabic work to be translated at Delhi was Al-Biruni's book on the Greek system of medicine, the Kitāb as-Saydana fī-l-tibb.

The foregoing analysis also yields the overall conclusion that the Turkish conquest of India did not noticeably modify the equilibrium between nomads and sedentaries. With the conquest completed, the expansion and contraction of agriculture came to depend on the measures with which the successive rulers bore down on peasant society, not on the breaking waves of pastoral nomads. Islamic culture and religion, as sponsored by the Turks and their auxiliaries, was confined to urban enclaves inhabited by immigrant Muslims or their descendants - at least until native conversion began on a large scale in some of the peripheral parts of the Indo-Islamic state in the early modern period. Islam in India thus became dependent on the implantation of urban colonies, not 'Bedouinization.' Muslim social life was profoundly shaped by the physiognomy of cities, which were most commonly the political capitals of

Muslim-dominated states. Typically the new capitals of the first half of the second millennium - Delhi, Devagiri, Warangal, Dvarasamudram, and then Bijapur, Golkonda, and Vijayanagara - functioned as major centres for the recruitment of man- and animal-power and, hence, were to be found on the fringes of the arid or semi-arid zone.[46] Situated on the interface of the sedentary world and the world of the marches, these eccentric new capitals could mediate between sedentary investment and the mobilization of the resources of military entrepreneurs, merchants and pastoralists. Indian states that took up the fight against the Turkish invaders also could not do without a solid sedentary base and show the same type of duality. This was the case with the Rajputs on the frontier of the Thar desert; with the Yadavas in Maharashtra, the Kakatiyas in Andhra Pradesh, and the Hoysalas in Mysore; and still with the Marathas who rose out of the Timurid empire in the semi-arid zone of the western Deccan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The rise of these fringe polities was always related to the more effective use of the warhorse.

Since the Turkish conquerors inserted themselves in the interstices of sedentary society, they at the same time boosted activity of all kinds along India's inner frontier of arid and semi-arid habitats, enhancing the mobility of these areas and linking them more closely to the Turko-Mongol frontier. As a result, in this period the economic role of horses, dromedaries and oxen increased considerably, enlarging India's potential for warfare, transportation and cultivation.[47] The globalization of the economy, together with the great increase of the offensive capabilities of warfare in these centuries followed the vagaries of the arid zone. Clearly, the mobilization of the resources of the sedentary world had become more effective.

The successful fusion of nomadic frontier and settled society also led to the sedentarization of nomadic warfare - as it did in the case of the Ottoman conquerors of Anatolia.[48] Since the early Turkish invaders had been relatively small in numbers, and prone to be decimated by disease, what mattered all the more was the military differential between them and the Indian armies which opposed them. This military differential was both technical and social in its origin, and it revolved around the coordinated deployment of mounted archers. Nomadic warfare worked well on the steppe, and depended on speed, mobility, surprise, and on the use of mounted archery to avoid pitched battles.[49] In India, of course, the horse and horsemanship had a long history.[50] But it seems that archery was largely left to infantry and a relatively small number of elephant-riders. Like in the case of the Byzantines, it was the failure of the Indians to develop mounted archery that was exposed by the Turks from the steppes of Central Asia.

In India the domestic production of horses was limited to a few areas that were an extension of the arid zone, particularly in the northwest, but with some in the Deccan as well. In most of the subcontinent horses did not do well and a

regular supply of good warhorses could only be guaranteed by the nomadic inhabitants of the Eurasian steppes, and parts of Iran and Arabia. According to Marco Polo, 'in India the climate is so hot that horses cannot be bred and are not born, or, if they are, they are monstrosities, blemished and misshapen in their limbs and quite worthless.'[51] There was a scarcity of grazing grounds and appropriate fodder grasses, hence a competitive relationship of pastoral nomadism with sedentary agriculture.

By contrast, on the Eurasian steppes the conditions for horsebreeding were optimal. The nomadic inhabitants of these temperate regions were able to develop mounted archery (even before the invention of the stirrup) and for centuries were able to maintain a qualified military superiority over their sedentary neighbours - in India as much as in Byzantium, Iran, or China - which made the steppe nomads one of the most significant and dreaded forces in military history.[52] It was the experience of flock management, as much as slaughter and butchery, that shaped the cold-blooded attitude of pastoral nomads in their military confrontations with sedentary agriculturists. The nomads would engage in hand-to-hand combat only when the battle was clearly going in their favour, and then used sharp-edged weapons which often decapitated or dismembered.[53] To turn the battle in their favour, they harried the enemy with volleys of arrows, shot at longe range with the composite bow, itself an instrument that was perfectly suited to be used from horseback (because it was short) and which had originated in the borderlands where the nomadic touched the sedentary world.

All war requires movement, but for sedentary peoples even short-range movement imposed difficulties. In contrast to the rulers of sedentary states who were generally bogged down by peasant infantry in their armies, the Turks relied heavily on mounted archers of nomadic extraction, especially in their early operations in India. But the environment imposed limits on the depth of penetration that nomads could effect in settled lands.[54] If elsewhere the nomads reconverted irrigated lands into pasture it sometimes returned to a state in which it would support neither animals nor men. Nomadic expansion could normally be consolidated only in the borderlands between steppe and agriculture, in the interstices of the sedentary world. For this same reason, the Turks could consolidate a horse-warrior revolution in India but not a pastoral-nomadic one. In order to be able to stay in the subcontinent, they had to leave their nomadic past behind and rely on the importation of horses. Had they not done so, Turko-Mongol rulers would have been unable to acquire a permanent footing in places throughout India. But these same rulers remained wedded to the culture of the camp, the horse and the bow, and like the Ottoman Turks and the various Mamluk leaders in Egypt and elsewhere, in many ways remained nomad chiefs who had struck it rich.

It is somewhat of a paradox, then, that it was this military differential (derived from horsemanship, and deploying skills that are not easily taught) that made possible the successful fusion of nomadic frontier and settled society. In the context of a gradual shift to a war-horse economy and of agricultural expansion as the result of the enhanced effectiveness of resource mobilization, in India the domesticated elephant was driven from its pre-eminent military position. Throughout Indian history, elephants had been maintained in reservations outside the cultivated realm. There they needed a transhumance circuit in a forested area which included both elevated and lowland, even swamplike, terrain. With the agricultural realm expanding over time, it appears that the ecological situation of elephants in many parts of India had come to resemble that of horses, since forests, like grazing lands, stood in a competitive relationship with sedentary agriculture. The advantage of horse-grazing was that this could be done in areas which were not contiguous or excluded from any other use. Moreover, while elephants were kept in a half-tamed or in a wild state in reservations and had a reduced mobility due to the fodder problem, horses were always tame, could be more easily controlled, relocated, concentrated, and deployed over longer distances. From the beginnings of Turko-Mongol penetration the disadvantages of the keeping and use of horses relative to elephants were gradually reduced to a point where it became feasible to concentrate more on horses and exclude the extensive use of elephants. Meanwhile, horses had proven to be tactically more useful in mobile warfare, while elephants could best be deployed statically, in set battles. Significantly enough, in areas beyond the Indian subcontinent, such as Sri Lanka and the mainland of Southeast Asia, where the ecological situation precluded the permanent penetration of Turko-Mongol cavalries, war-elephants retained their central role down to early modern times. It is no doubt for the same reasons that the Mongol incursions in some of these areas were, within the broader context of events, mere incidents and that there could be no question here of a fusion of nomadic frontier and settled society of the type that the subcontinent produced.

NOTES

1 In pulling these conclusions together I have benefited from numerous discussions with Jan Heesterman, Anatoly Khazanov and Jos Gommans.
2 Cf. Ludden, 1994.
3 Cf. Palmieri, 1982, pp. 332-3.
4 Sontheimer, 1989, p. 113.
5 Palmieri, 1982, pp. 331-2.

6 Cf. Wink, 1990, p. 141 ff.
7 Beal, 1906, II, p. 273; Waters, 1904-5, II, p. 252.
8 Cf. Maqbul Ahmad, 1960, p. 52; Wink, 1990, p. 160.
9 De Goeje, 1873, p. 231.
10 Wink, 1990, pp. 155-6, 162-3, 169, 279, 281.
11 Wink, 1990, pp. 168-9; 1997, pp. 115-19.
12 See also De Planhol, 1968, pp. 335-41.
13 Cf. Khazanov, 1984, pp. 210-11.
14 For the horse trade see especially Gommans, 1995.
15 Cf. De Planhol, 1968, ibid.
16 Cf. Ludden, 1994, pp. 15-16; Wink, 1990, passim.
17 See e.g. Sontheimer, 1989, p. 101.
18 Wink, 1990, p. 235 ff.
19 Ibid., pp. 265-6.
20 Ibid., pp. 279-94.
21 Sontheimer, 1989, p. 101 says that there are traditions that Devagiri, near Aurangabad, was founded by a king of the pastoral Gavli (Dhangar).
22 Cf. Palmieri, 1982, pp. 325-36.
23 Cf. also Khazanov, 1984, p. 68.
24 Sontheimer, 1989, p. 102.
25 Ibid., p. 105.
26 Cf. Gommans, 1998, pp. 4-10.
27 Ibid., p. 10 ff.
28 Cf. Wink, 1997, pp. 52-6, of which the following five paragraphs are an abbreviated version.
29 Cf. Golden, 1992, pp. 46-9.
30 Patañjali, 1892, II, 4.10.
31 Van Lohuizen-De Leeuw, 1975, pp. 16-29.
32 Stein, 1960, VIII, 3612.
33 Al-Bīrūnī, 1958, p. 16.
34 Keegan, 1994, p. 75.
35 Cf. De Planhol, 1968, pp. 14-21.
36 Ibid.
37 Cf. Wink, 1997, p. 162 ff.
38 I am indebted here to unpublished computations by James Hoover, Department of History, UW-Madison.
39 Cf. Masson Smith, 1975, esp. pp. 282-8; 1978, esp. pp. 67-8. In a recent article, Smith has argued that in the Middle East 'the Mongols' interest in acquiring land was stimulated by the need for fodder, not by any desire for settled life. The new stables and fodder-farms were to supplement, not supplant, nomadism; at most, the war-horses were sedentarized. The

continuing reliance on nomadism can also be seen in the persistence of the Mongol rulers, along with their guard force, in following a migratory life, setting the example and style for the rest of the army' (Masson Smith, 1997, esp. pp. 262-3). The key issue here, according to Smith, was the Mongol need for larger horses, but larger horses had to be fed, not simply grazed, and fodder could only be procured from the sedentary agricultural sector.

40 Cf. Wink, 1997, pp. 87-8.
41 Cf. Wink, 1997, passim. For a good account of some of the controversial issues relating to the Mongols in the Middle East, see Lewis, 1973.
42 See e.g. Ahmad Khan, 1862, p. 219; Husain, 1938, pp. 246 (vs4765), 281 (vs5406 ff).
43 '..eshān-rā hawāy hindūstān-o-sukūnat-i-hawālī' shahr mawāfiq nayaf-tād wa beshtarī az eshān bā zan-o-bacha bāz dar wilāyat-i-khūd raftand' (Ahmad Khan, 1862, p. 219).
44 Davy, 1972, p. 48.
45 Wink, 1997, p. 126.
46 Cf. Gommans, 1998, p. 15.
47 Ibid., pp. 9-17.
48 Cf. Lindner, 1983, pp. 30-1.
49 Ibid., p. 30.
50 For the following, cf. Wink, 1997, pp. 79-110.
51 Latham, 1987, p. 61.
52 Cf. also Keegan, 1994, p. 161.
53 Ibid., pp. 161-5.
54 Ibid., pp. 183, 388.

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CHAPTER 10

STEPPE EMPIRES, CHINA, AND THE SILK ROUTE: NOMADS AS A FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND POLITICS

THOMAS BARFIELD

Nomads had the greatest historical impact on sedentary peoples when they used their political and military power to dominate them. Ironically the most effective way to do this was to abandon the nomadic life for a sedentary one as a ruling elite. Indeed most of what could be considered 'nomad influence' on sedentary societies historically involved the imposition of a certain number of the nomadic elite's values, tastes, and styles of political organization on sedentary populations that then permeated the larger society.

This was particularly evident in North Africa, the Near East and Central Asia, where the list of the regions' important dynasties often seems to be a roll call of nomadic tribes turned imperial conquerors. The medieval Arab historian Ibn Khaldun even proposed a general model of dynastic replacement for Islamic North Africa in which weak dynasties in sedentary states were replaced by desert nomads who possessed superior military ability and 'group feeling,' a process that he argued took place every three or four generations. While this process was nowhere near as regular in Eurasia, many of the dynasties that ruled the Iranian Plateau in ancient and medieval times, and Anatolia in the Islamic period, were nomadic in origin. Similarly China's dynastic history had many periods of foreign rule by people of steppe nomadic origin, particularly immediately after the end of the Later Han dynasty from the third to the sixth centuries, in the tenth-eleventh centuries following the destruction of the Tang dynasty, and most famously after the Mongol conquest under the successors of Chinggis Khan in the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries.

By contrast nomads who stayed nomads generally had far less influence. They had small populations when compared to those in urbanized agricultural societies, and as nomads they were more mobile and more widely dispersed. Nomadic pastoral economies were undiversified and often surprisingly dependent on economic ties to urban areas that provided items like metal, cloth, and foodstuffs, as well as a market to sell their animals.[1] Ibn Khaldun[2] went so far as to argue that in spite of their highly vaunted

political independence from sedentary states, nomads such as the Bedouin were vulnerable to exploitation because:

> While (the Bedouins) need the cities for their necessities of life, the urban population needs (the Bedouins) for conveniences and luxuries ... (Bedouins) must be active on the behalf of their interests and obey them whenever (the cities) ask and demand obedience from them.[3]

This was true even when sedentary areas were ruled by dynasties of nomadic origin. While one might assume that nomads would benefit more from a situation in which it was their people who held the reigns of power, such was not the case. Conquest dynasties always attempted to use their newly acquired power to crush the autonomy of their more nomadic cousins by refusing to share revenue or political power.

There is a notable exception to this general rule. The nomads of the Mongolian plateau managed to found a number of long lasting powerful empires that stayed on the steppe and confronted China without attempting to conquer any Chinese territory. The most notable of these steppe empires included the Hsiung-nu Empire in the Han dynasty and the Turk and Uighur Empires in the Tang dynasty, and the various Mongol polities during the Ming dynasty.[4] They had a major impact on the organization of Chinese foreign policy and international trade that deeply affected the way China dealt with the outside world.

NOMADIC EMPIRES

Nomadic empires in Mongolia arose as secondary phenomena, responses to imperial expansion by the Chinese. Individual tribes could not hope to effectively confront a unified China to gain access to trade and aid, or to defend themselves against Chinese aggression. Under the steppewide leadership, however, they could organize both an effective defense against the Chinese and, more importantly, create a 'shadow empire' that stood as China's equal on the battlefield or in diplomatic negotiations.[5] Such steppe empires were not autocratic and centralized, but rather imperial confederacies that employed principles of tribal organization and indigenous tribal leaders to rule at the local level while maintaining an imperial state structure with an exclusive monopoly of the control of foreign and military affairs.[6] Their stability depended on extorting vast amounts of wealth from China through pillage, tribute payments, border trade and international re-export of luxury goods, not by taxing subsistence oriented steppe nomads. When China was centralized and powerful under native Chinese dynasties,

so too were nomadic empires; when China collapsed into political anarchy and economic depression, so did the unified steppe polities that had prospered by its extortion.

The number of nomads confronting China was always small, perhaps about a million people overall, and they were trying to extortion Chinese dynasties that in Han times (202 BC-220 AD) ruled over fifty million people, and 100 million in the Tang dynasty (618-907). However, as masters of mobile cavalry warfare with an unlimited supply of horses, the steppe nomads could field armies that used these small numbers to great effect. They could concentrate all their strength against a single point, employed a form of mounted archery that was effective at a distance or in retreat, and could mobilize a much higher percentage of their population for warfare than their sedentary neighbors. They could not, in general, breach well defended city walls or lay long sieges.

The nomads of Mongolia had to influence decision making at the very highest levels of Chinese government because foreign policy was made at court and not by frontier governors or border officials. To this end the nomads first implemented a terrorist strategy of aggressive raiding to magnify their power. Taking full advantage of their ability to suddenly strike deep into China and then retreat before the Chinese had time to retaliate, they could threaten the frontier at any time. Such violence and the disruption it caused encouraged the Chinese to negotiate agreements favorable to the nomads. Military action against the nomads proved generally ineffective because they could always retreat and their land could not be permanently occupied by the Chinese, as it was unsuitable for agriculture.

A striking element of the nomad strategy was the deliberate refusal to occupy Chinese land that they would then have to defend. They knew that they could never hope to defeat China's vast armies if they had to hold a fixed point. They also lacked the administrative skills to govern sedentary conquests effectively. The nomad strategy was one of extortion that let the Chinese administer, tax and defend their own territory, territory which could then be put at risk by nomad attacks. In return for not bothering China the nomads expected to be paid handsomely. The alternatives to paying off the nomads were few. Military campaigns against the nomads could be temporarily effective but generally cost vastly more than peace treaties and disrupted China's economy. Indeed, no native Chinese dynasty (i.e. the Han, Tang, Sung, and Ming) ever maintained an offensive war policy against the nomads for longer than the reign of a single emperor.[7] But ignoring the nomads was not an option either, as this would provoke raids all along the frontier in which the nomads seized loot directly and did great damage to frontier areas.

The pattern of relations between the nomads and native dynasties of China followed a regular course. At first new nomad empires would engage in violent raiding to terrify the Chinese court. They would then seek treaties that guaranteed peace along the frontier in exchange for direct subsidies and trade privileges. Threats of war, or war itself, would be used periodically to increase the size of these grants and improve the terms of trade in border markets. Although the treaties created long periods of peace, the threat of violence always lurked beneath the surface. Zhonghang Yue, a Chinese defector working for the Hsiung-nu nomads in the first century BC, once warned some Han envoys of the danger they faced in very simple terms.

> Just make sure that the silks and grain stuffs you bring the Hsiung-nu are the right measure and quality, that's all. What's the need for talking? If the goods you deliver are up to measure and good quality, all right. But if there is any deficiency or the quality is no good, then when the autumn harvest comes we will take our horses and trample all over your crops![8]

China first disguised the true nature of its appeasement policy by devising an elaborate 'tributary system' in which large payments to the nomads were described as gifts given to loyal subordinates who were in theory coming to pay homage to the emperor. The cost of this system was very high. For example, between 50-100 AD when the system was first regularized during the Later Han dynasty, records show that the estimated annual cost of direct subsidies to China's frontier peoples amounted to one-third of the Han government payroll or 7 percent of all the empire's revenue, goods that would have the value of around $130 million dollars in modern terms.[9] The Tang dynasty made similarly large payments to the steppe nomads during the mid-ninth century when the Uighurs collected 500,000 rolls of silk a year in subsidies of China disguised as payment for tributary horses.[10] The Ming dynasty had a similar arrangement with the Mongol tribes in the sixteenth century that included a system of extensive subsidy payments and lucrative trade deals on horses and tea.[11]

As interactions became more frequent and profitable the nomads found that they no longer needed to threaten China and the politics of naked extortion developed into a more symbiotic relationship. Over time they saw that it was in their own best interest to preserve the dynasties that paid them so handsomely, so the nomad empires began to provide weak Chinese dynasties with critical military aid in periods of decline. This aid included auxiliary troops to guard the frontier against other non-Chinese enemies or troops from the steppe that helped put down rebellions in China itself. In the later Han dynasty (25-220) nomad troops became essential to maintaining

frontier security [12]and the Uighurs saved the Tang dynasty from extinction by putting down the An Lushan Rebellion in the mid eighth century.[13]

The impact of nomadic steppe empires on China had worldwide implications as well because it was the catalyst for long distance foreign trade. Payments from China that funded nomadic states with luxury goods attracted international merchants from the west who often used the nomads' political influence to establish their own profitable relations with China. Attempts to undercut steppe nomadic power by denying them access to the resources of the oases of eastern Turkestan also drew China into the so-called 'Western Regions,' which served as the main east-west overland transit route for Central Eurasia. Indeed one may say that without nomad pressure there would never have been a 'silk route,' given the traditional negative Confucian attitudes about foreign trade.

LONG DISTANCE TRADE

The famous 'Silk Route' that linked China to the West consisted of two major routes that split north and south around the Tarim Basin upon leaving China in Gansu, reconnecting in the west at Kashghar. The routes connected a string of desert oases that have often been portrayed as royal roads of commerce that China needed to conquer in order to control and protect the flow of trade there. However, officials in China during the Han dynasty were in fact ambivalent about the value of commercial trade with foreigners, particularly in private hands, because it was beyond their ability to control and was thought to benefit the individual at the expense of the state. As Ying-shih Yü has noted:

> Within the domain of non-agricultural economic activities, the under-lying principle of the policy, especially in the reign of Emperor Wu [140-87], was that the government should control all the important productions and put commerce under regulation.[14]

To this end the government in the Han dynasty created monopolies in liquor, salt and iron in order to divert the profits from these industries to itself, policies that served as models for later Chinese dynasties such as the Tang. It also put restrictions on exports, particularly iron, which it feared could be used to make weapons and maintained a close watch on border crossings to prevent smuggling.

Long distance trade was deemed particularly problematic when it was generated by tributary gifts because the Han court lost revenue in these transactions. Even private trade with distant foreign nations, it was argued,

only served to drain China's real wealth for the acquisition of expensive luxury items whose only value was their rarity. This bias against international trade was closely tied to a Confucian ideology that condemned merchants as a class for being leeches on the hard work of peasants and artisans. Why, they argued, should a merchant deserve any more than the cost of transport for moving goods from one place to another? That they could make phenomenal profits by moving merchandise from areas of surplus to areas of shortage was not seen as an entrepreneurial virtue but rather a defect in the government administration that had allowed such shortages to arise. The government should buy up basic goods when they were in surplus and sell them when they were in short supply to maintain a constant price and create a 'Balanced Standard.' However such an ideal was thwarted when, as Sima Qian argued, trade and money entered the picture:

> The purpose of currency is to provide a medium of exchange between farmers and merchants, but in extreme cases it is subject to all kinds of clever manipulations. As a result ... men compete for the opportunity to turn a neat profit, abandoning the pursuit of agriculture, which is basic, to follow secondary occupations of commerce.[15]

This is not to say that trade was ever unimportant in China. Indeed it would not have been subject to so much criticism had not so many powerful individuals, including government officials, profited so greatly from trade. Throughout the Han period, particularly in the Later Han, there were many wealthy merchant families who controlled large enterprises that generated great wealth. However, at the elite level such enterprises were deemed illegitimate, or at least suspect, and merchants were therefore forbidden to compete in the imperial examinations that led to high government offices and their wealth was subject to arbitrary confiscation. (A modern analogy that captures the flavor of this official distaste might be fabulously wealthy drug smugglers whose businesses and morals are condemned even as their money is welcomed.) Ideally China should be autarkic: self sufficient and self contained. The existence of a merchant class was evidence that it had failed to reach this ideal.

Such attitudes stood in sharp contrast to those of the nomad elites in Mongolia. They actively encouraged trade and attempted to attract merchants into their territories because the pastoral economy was not self sufficient except in terms of sheep or horses. While animal husbandry produced regular surpluses of live animals, skins, milk products, wool, and hair, only by exchanging them with sedentary areas could the nomads acquire the commodities they did not produce themselves. This often required the overland movement of goods across long distances since most

steppe tribes specialized in the same type of animal production. The most important products they sought were grain, metals (iron, copper, bronze in raw or finished form) and hemp or cotton cloth. Sedentary areas were also the source of coveted luxury items such as silk, satin, wine, precious metals, bronze mirrors and even musical instruments. Far from viewing export trade as a drain on national wealth, nomads saw it as a source of prosperity and stability because it diversified the economy and provided access to both necessities and luxuries the steppe itself could not provide.

The demand for trade and the extortion of luxury items increased exponentially with the unification of the steppe. The imperial nomad leader, such as the Hsiung-nu *Shanyu* or Turkish *khaghan*, was a large-scale redistributive chieftain whose power was secured in large part by his ability to generate revenue from China and secure trading privileges there. But the nomads' increasing demands for such luxury goods, particularly silk, was not simply for their own use. Once they had acquired a surplus of these valuable commodities the nomads in Mongolia became the center of an international re-export trade which attracted traders, especially from the oases of central Asia, who became wealthy middlemen linking the economies of China and the West.[16] The wealth of items found in Hsiung-nu nomadic tombs in Mongolia and their wide source of manufacture provide evidence of this flow in the Han dynasty.[17]

Even more striking was the emergence of trading cities in Mongolia in the Tang dynasty such as the Uighur capital Karabalghasun that was established soon after the empire was founded in the eighth century. Although rulers of a nomadic people, the Uighur elite also acted as middlemen in the lucrative re-export of silk that they extracted from China. To handle the volume, which at its height reached a half million bolts a year, they needed an urban center on the steppe as a place to store and protect the silk, and to receive traders who flocked to Mongolia to buy it. An Arab traveler, Tamim ibn Bahr, who saw Karabalghasun in the 830s described it as a large town surrounded by intensive cultivation with twelve iron gates enclosing a castle that was 'populous and thickly crowded with markets and various trades.'[18]

Thus, although Mongolia was never a center of production, as a center of extraction the nomad empires acted as a trade pump, drawing surplus goods from China and redirecting them into international markets. While it has often been noted that the political unity of the steppe facilitated long distance overland trade by securing the routes for peaceful passage, it may be equally true that the nomads themselves (and not the Chinese) were the source of much of what was traded along the silk route. This is particularly true if, in addition to the goods the nomads themselves resold, we take into account the number of foreign merchants who were incorporated into official tributary visits to China or who traveled under the protection of nomadic states in order to participate in border markets. The latter may have been particularly important since rich foreign merchants were less vulnerable to exploitation by Chinese officials when under the diplomatic protection of a powerful nomad empire.

Perhaps the best example of this is the relation between the merchant Sogdians from western Turkestan and the Turks and Uighurs in the Tang dynasty. Sogdian merchants had been known in China since the end of the Han dynasty, but beginning in the sixth century they allied themselves with a series of Turkish empires that ruled over Mongolia until 840. Much to the annoyance of the Chinese, the nomads often let Sogdians merchants travel under their diplomatic protection to trade during tributary visits. They also received protection in the Chinese capital where they had extra-territorial status and became the most prosperous group of foreign moneylenders in China. Sogdian success was due in small part to their close alliance with the Turks and Uighurs who Tang Chinese officials feared offending.[19]

EXPANSION TO THE WEST

Many scholars have assumed that China's expansion to the desert regions of the west, today's Xinjiang, was a natural consequence of unification in China because these regions fell under Chinese control during the Han, Tang, and Qing dynasties. A closer look at these expansions shows that in all three cases, the move west was the product of a deliberate strategic decision to weaken the steppe nomads of Mongolia that occurred long after China itself had been unified. Once in these regions, which were ethnically non-Chinese, the Chinese government played a large role in promoting economic growth and development, pouring in resources to buttress its presence there and becoming embroiled in the trade politics of Central Asia.

The oases that ran along the northern silk routes bordered the Mongolian plateau and often fell under the control of nomadic empires there. In the early part of the Han dynasty they were under Hsiung-nu domination:

> The states of the Western Regions for the most part [have inhabitants] who are settled on the soil, with walled cities, cultivated fields, and domesticated animals. Their customs differ from those of the Hsiung-nu and the Wusun. Formerly they were all subject to the Hsiung-nu; at the western edge of the Hsiung-nu, the Riju king established the post of Commandant of Tungbu (Slaves) with orders to direct the Western Regions. He ... acquired wealth and resources by levying taxes on the various states.[20]

The control of this region provided the nomads with important economic resources and trade opportunities. It also served the interest of many oasis-based merchants who could then take advantage of their subordination to the nomads to gain safe passage for their caravans through nomad territory. This was particularly useful because nomadic empires often controlled the vast stretches of steppe land that linked eastern and western Turkestan, and even in areas beyond their direct control fear of their power kept small states from interfering with international commerce under their protection.

From China's perspective eastern Turkestan had little intrinsic value; rather it was control of the area by nomadic empires that created a strategic problem because it provided the nomads with important resources. This became clear in policy debates about what to do about the Hsiung-nu in the Han dynasty when Emperor Wudi determined that if he could wrest the area away from the nomads' control, he could 'cut off the right arm of the Hsiung-nu' by stopping the revenue the Hsiung-nu derived from the city-states of the region.[21] To this end he dispatched an envoy, Zhang Qian, in 139 BC to find their old enemy, the Yuezhi, nomads who the Hsiung-nu had driven from eastern Turkestan a generation earlier. He was authorized to make an alliance that would open up a second front against the Hsiung-nu and to return to China with detailed information about the almost mythic 'Western Region.'

Zhang Qian's expedition to find the Yuezhi constitutes one of the classic adventure stories of the age, for the Yuezhi resided in distant Bactria (northern Afghanistan), a region known to China only through hearsay. Zhang Qian got off to an unpromising start when he was captured by the Hsiung-nu and held prisoner for ten years (rather loosely because they gave him a wife) before he found the opportunity to escape and reach western Central Asia to continue his mission. There he discovered that the Yuezhi had no interest in renewing their war with the Hsiung-nu, and so he returned to China (after again being held prisoner by the Hsiung-nu) in 126 BC, having failed in his primary mission. However, he brought with him another even more valuable prize: detailed information about the city states and kingdoms that extended from China's frontier to the borders of Persia, including even vague information about the Roman Empire.[22] Wudi decided to use this information to bring Eastern Turkestan into China's orbit because since 133 BC China and the Hsiung-nu had been continually at war with one another.[23]

The Chinese first attempted to wean eastern Turkestan from the Hsiung-nu by means of bribery rather than coercion. Zhang Qian was the first to volunteer to return to the west, but this time he was accompanied by 300 men and a caravan carrying 'gold and silk goods worth 100,000,000 cash' to pay for expenses and buy influence.[24] Since the value of 10,000 cash was equivalent to 244 grams of real gold, this amounted to goods and other valuables worth approximately $25 million. Many other missions were also dispatched over the next fifty years at the rate of around six to ten a year. Although roundtrip missions to the most distant places might take as long as eight or nine years, word of their potential profitability attracted many eager adventurers. Too many of them, according to dour court officials, lacked the virtue expected of true envoys and did not always put China's interest first.

> The envoys were all sons of poor families who handled the government gifts that were entrusted to them as though they were private property, and looked for opportunities to buy goods at a cheap price and to make a profit on their return to China. The men of the foreign lands soon became disgusted when they found that each of the Han envoys told some different story, and considering that the Han armies were too far away to worry about, refused to supply the envoys with food and provisions, making things very difficult for them.[25]

Indeed envoys soon became so common that many foreign states along the silk route 'had become surfeited with Han goods and no longer regarded them with any esteem.'[26] The Hsiung-nu also periodically raided Chinese envoy missions and captured their treasures en route because they rarely consisted of more than a few hundred ill-armed men. For these reasons, in areas close to the Hsiung-nu, Chinese envoys began to receive less and less respect. Over time Han missions became so devalued that they became little more than pigeons to be plucked:

> In the case of Han envoys, however, if they did not hand out silk or other goods they were given no food, and unless they purchased animals in the markets they could get no mounts for their riders ... They [the Central Asians] also believed that the Han had plenty of goods and money and it was therefore proper to make the envoys pay for whatever they wanted.[27]

By contrast, the Hsiung-nu envoys passing through the region were still treated with awe because,

> it was well known that the Hsiung-nu had earlier caused the Yuezhi people great suffering. Therefore whenever a Hsiung-nu envoy appeared in the region carrying the credentials of the Shanyu, he was escorted from state to state and provided with food and no one dared to detain him or cause him any difficulty.[28]

Chinese envoys were also sometimes insulted, robbed, and, on a few occasions, even murdered by rulers of local oases. Complaints about their ill treatment, and the insolence of the Central Asians, caused Wudi to abandon his hope of buying the oasis peoples ways away from the Hsiung-nu.

As a consequence, the Chinese found that they had to send large expeditionary forces to restore Chinese prestige in the area by attacking some of the most recalcitrant Central Asian states, beginning in 101 BC with Daiyuan (Ferghana), which was the source of the so called 'blood sweating horses' that had captured Wudi's imagination. The Han Chinese then established military garrisons and appointed a governor-general to oversee the region. But this more direct domination of the region by China did not reduce the revenue stream into Turkestan. Throughout the period of Han domination it remained a drain of China's finances even after they established peace with the Hsiung-nu around 50 BC. Chinese garrisons and officials had to be supported by state funds and, as part of the tributary system, the Central Asians annually received 74,800,000 cash (or approximately $20 million) between 50-100 AD under the later Han dynasty. Far from being a lucrative resource that China needed to defend at all costs, the western regions were a monetary liability that could only be justified as a strategic necessity to keep the region's resources out of the Hsiung-nu's hands. The richness of the region so acclaimed by students of international trade was to a large extent the product of the goods that China brought to it. Therefore China's expansion to the west was a byproduct of its nomad defense strategies, not an outgrowth of trade. Only on two other occasions (leaving aside the Mongol Empire) did China again occupy the territory: in the Tang dynasty from the seventh to the ninth centuries when they had close relations with the Turks and Uighurs, and again after 1737 when the Manchu Qing dynasty occupied eastern Turkestan after destroying the Zunghar nomads who had ruled it from their base in the Altai.[29]

CONCLUSIONS

We have argued that the political organization of nomadic empires was not the product of internal development, rather it was a consequence of its external relations. The rise and fall of the empire was therefore intimately associated to its relationship with China and other neighboring sedentary areas. Dependent on outside revenue for its existence, nomadic empires in Mongolia developed a military power that was well beyond anything needed to deal with other steppe tribes and used it to extort revenue from China, directly by raiding, or indirectly through subsidies and trade. The emergence of the Hsiung-nu empire simultaneously with the unification of China was

the steppe tribes' response to both the danger and opportunity such a rich and powerful state represented. It marked a profound political break with the past, just as the Qin and Han administrations in China marked a profound break with the history of Warring States kingdoms. This dynamic relationship was also reflected in the changing patterns of production and distribution of goods along the Sino-Mongolian frontier, a flow of commodities that was intimately connected with the newly increased power of the nomads in Mongolia. With the ability to extract revenue from China and facilitate frontier trade, the Hsiung-nu Empire became an economic center in its own right. Chinese production, both in tributary gifts and ordinary trade, became more geared to meeting Hsiung-nu demands and caravan routes now had a reason to come into Mongolia instead of bypassing it. What had been a backwater became an important node in a Eurasian system of overland trade in which the nomads acted as key facilitators. The collapse of the Han state and the Chinese economy at the end of the second century undermined the foundation of this relationship and Mongolia reverted to a decentralized tribal political organization. The subsequent reunification of China under native Chinese control during the Tang and Ming dynasties presented structurally equivalent opportunities to the nomads of those times, and we see a similar pattern of frontier relations emerging during those periods.

While the overland silk trade, and trade in other luxury goods for that matter, began well before the rise of powerful steppe nomadic tribes in Mongolia, it is clear that the centralization of power there acted as a stimulus to its expansion. The nomads themselves were not the great long distance traders, but they acted as patrons for sedentary Central Asians who were. It was during these periods of nomad political power in the Han and Tang periods that the Silk Route took on its greatest importance. Perhaps most important, the large-scale extraction of silk from China in tributary payments generated more than just wealth; it created a form of international currency measured in bolts of silk that had unquestioned value everywhere but was easier to transport than metal coins or bullion. This meant that it could be used to buy anything the nomads wanted and attracted merchants trading imported goods into Mongolia and Central Asia. The profits available to these merchants were immense, not only because silk in the west was worth its weight in gold, but because to the nomads it was essentially a free good. They did not have to bear the cost of producing the silk itself or having it dyed and woven. Their only cost was transport and storage.

The workings of this network can be seen most clearly in the Mongol Empire when both China and the steppe fell under a dynasty of steppe nomadic origin beginning in 1234. Unlike native Chinese dynasties that

attempted to restrict and control foreign trade, the Mongols actually created quasi-governmental trading corporations (*ortaq*) with partnerships with international merchants who had access to government finance. Initially they had special access to the Mongol horse relay system and were treated as a privileged class that was exempt from most state obligations. While they lost many of these privileges during the reign of the Grand Khan Möngke, international trade remained a priority throughout the dynasty and included such innovations as paper money.[30] They also gave high priority to securing the safety of overland trade routes. But while this direct control of China by steppe nomads was a rarity, the steppe nomad interest in trade was not. Although it may have been the movement of Chinese products that gave the silk route its importance, it was the nomads that kept the goods moving at a rate that China, if it had had a choice, would have never permitted on its own. The nomads were, if you will, the godfathers of international overland trade in Eurasia, making peoples all along the route offers they could not refuse.

NOTES

1 Khazanov, 1985.
2 1968:122
3 Ibn Khaldun, 1967, p. 122.
4 In his classic universal history, *Shi qi*, Sima Qian was the first Chinese historian to write in detail about the 'nomad problem' during the reign of Han Wudi (r. 140-87 BC) when it was of the most contentious issues facing China. His descriptive model was continued by Ban Gu, author of the *Han shu*, which completed the history of the Former Han dynasty. This rich material has been the source for a number of important studies on Han frontier relations (Lattimore, 1940; Yü, 1967; Hulsewé, 1979; Loewe, 1967). Later dynastic histories are also rich in details on China's relationship with Mongolia, particularly for the Tang (Mackerras, 1972, Shafer, 1963) and Ming dynasties (Serruys, 1959, 1967, Waldron, 1990).
5 Barfield, in press.
6 Barfield, 1981.
7 Foreign dynasties that conquered north China such as the Toba Wei, Khitan Liao, Jurchen Jin, Mongol Yuan, and the Manchu Qing (all of tribal origin themselves) followed a different policy that attempted to interfere with the internal politics of the steppe tribes. By using divide and rule strategies that included co-opting nearby frontier tribes, maintaining open trade policies, and by mounting frequent steppe

campaigns against rising tribes that appeared on the verge of uniting Mongolia, they were generally successful in inhibiting or disrupting empire building by the steppe nomad tribes. Their success at implementing this policy over long periods of time was due in part to their systems of political organization which left military and frontier affairs in the hands of men skilled at tribal politics with few of the ideological inhibitions of Confucian bureaucrats that hamstrung frontier policies in native Chinese dynasties (cf. Barfield, 1989).

8 Watson, 1993, II, pp. 144-5.
9 Yü, 1967, pp. 61-4.
10 Mackerras, 1972, 1978.
11 Rossabi, 1970; Serruys, 1967, pp. 64-93.
12 Yü 1967, pp. 65-8.
13 Pulleyblank, 1955.
14 Yü, 1967, p. 17.
15 Watson, 1993, II, p. 61.
16 Lattimore, 1940, p. 493.
17 Rudenko, 1969.
18 Minorski, 1948, p. 283.
19 Mackerras, 1969.
20 Hulsewé, 1979, p. 73.
21 Hulsewé, 1979, p. 217.
22 Watson, 1993, p. 230-41.
23 Loewe, 1974.
24 Watson, 1993, II, p. 238.
25 Watson, 1993, II, p. 242.
26 Watson, 1993, II, p. 241.
27 Watson, 1993, II, p. 244.
28 Watson, 1993, II, p. 244.
29 Barfield, 1989.
30 Allsen, 1987, p. 160.

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CHAPTER 11

THE NOMADIC FACTOR IN AFRICA: DOMINANCE OR MARGINALITY*

VICTOR AZARYA

Pastoralist nomads in Africa,[1] like their counterparts in other continents, have been known for their particular military skills. Their mobility, their constant need to protect their livestock and the relative ease with which they convert saddled animals into 'combat vehicles' have given them military advantage over sedentary people. Sometimes, they used these skills simply to raid, terrorize and tax other people (both sedentary and fellow nomad), but they did not establish a permanent rule over them. In other cases, they used that advantage to build or conquer states, and in so doing, reshaped political structures and boundaries, modified economic arrangements, juggled status groups and recreated collective identities. Their impact, over time, was quite different.

It may be useful, therefore, to start our discussion of the nomadic impact on sedentary societies in Africa with an analytical distinction of the two situations. In one, the pastoralist nomads in question were state builders or state conquerors and established, or were incorporated in, centralized institutionalized political systems. In the other, the pastoralist nomads kept their distance from states and were organized in much smaller and more segmented political structures. The Fulbe in West Africa and the Tutsi and Hima in East Africa belong to the first category of 'state-builders' whereas the Maasai, the Turkana, the Pokot in East Africa, the Herero in Southern Africa, etc. exemplify the second category of 'stateless societies.' The Tuareg in West Africa are an intermediate type, though closer, in my view, to the 'stateless' category.[2]

Related, but not identical, to the question of state formation or not is the issue of whether the impact of nomads on settled groups is exerted from a position of dominance or is manifested while the nomadic group in question maintains a peripheral position *vis-à-vis* the sedentary group. The analysis of the Tuareg case will show us that dominance may be maintained also without state formation and it would be interesting to see if dominance can be maintained even from a position of marginality (a contradiction in terms?). A further question of utmost importance is whether the nomadic pastoralists who form, or conquer, states and/or come to ruling positions

over settled populations remain nomadic themselves, or settle more permanently while still keeping certain nomadic-pastoralist traditions and identity, thus creating a new 'post-nomadism' in culture and institutions. Such questions will be examined in this paper with respect to the Fulbe, the Tuareg and the Maasai and will illustrate, I hope, the complexity and diversity of the nomadic impact on sedentary societies in Africa.

THE MAASAI

The Maasai are among the best known 'stateless' pastoralist groups of East Africa. They number around 250,000 people and live on both sides of today's Kenya-Tanzania border.[3] It is generally assumed that their ancestors moved south from today's Ethiopia-Kenya border area along the Rift Valley and gradually spread to the surrounding plains in today's central and southern Kenya and northern and central Tanzania. As they expanded, they pushed away mostly Kalenjin speaking groups who stood on their way, some of them pastoralists, others hunters-gatherers or cultivators. They raided the livestock of other groups, took over their pastures, forced them out of the grasslands to the fringes of forests and to the higher slopes of mountains.[4]

By the early nineteenth century, the Maasai had become the dominant group of the Rift Valley, the Serengeti plains and the surrounding grasslands. However, they did not establish states. The Maasai carefully nurtured a warrior culture among their youth, were renown for their combat skills and were feared very much by their neighbours but they did not create centralized political structures nor did they establish permanent rule over other groups. They preferred to raid them rather than rule them. At the height of their power they also waged wars among themselves and raided each other's livestock.[5] At the time of the colonial penetration, by the turn of the century, they seemed to have passed their peak and were much weakened by internecine strife coupled first with rinderpest epidemics that decimated their cattle and then an outbreak of smallpox that caused them heavy fatalities. Despite their fierce reputation, they were subdued rather easily by the colonial powers, British in Kenya and German in Tanganyika. In the beginning of British colonial rule in Kenya, those living in the northern and central parts of the Rift Valley (north and west of Nairobi) were relocated in more southerly portions of the country. Thus were shaped the current areas of Maasai inhabitation.[6]

The Maasai did not recognize any ascribed or hereditary chiefs. Authority rested with age-set leaders and with elders who had power over lower age-grades. Settlement of disputes and the enforcement of customary

law were the responsibility of each locality's council of elders.[7] Members of the warrior age group lived in separate quarters, ever ready for combat and cattle raids. Maasai legends attributed to themselves the rightful ownership of all cattle in the world and thus sanctioned raids on the herds of others. Cattle raids were also the principal means by which members of the warrior group tried to prove their worth and accomplishments in society. The Maasai lived in settlements from which they moved several times a year as they accompanied livestock between dry and wet season pastures. The same settlement was used for a number of years after which it was usually abandoned and a new settlement was built nearby or on a new grazing route.[8]

The Maasai are considered to have been among East Africa's most exclusively pastoralist and nomadic groups, compared to others, such as the Dinka, the Nandi, the Pokot, the Karamojong, etc. who, though they disliked agriculture, gave it a more important role in their economic activities and were relatively less mobile. It seems that the gradual expansion of the Maasai which climaxed in the early nineteenth century was accompanied by increasing pastoralist specialization.[9] The Maasai regarded pastoralism as crucial to their identity. Hence those who relinquished pastoralism due to loss of cattle could lose their Maasai identity if they did not revert to it in a generation or so.[10] The Maasai stressed their distinction especially *vis-à-vis* people whom they called Dorobo (which meant cattleless and hence poor) and with whom they maintained a symbiotic but unequal relationship. The Dorobo were of separate ethnic and linguistic origin (many were Kalenjin speaking Okieks) but also spoke the Maa language spoken by the Maasai and were generally subservient to them. They engaged in hunting and honey collection that they supplemented with some agriculture and hence earned the contempt of the Maasai. They represented, for the Maasai, the anti-Maasai model in occupation and behaviour. Towards the end of the nineteenth century their rank swelled with the addition of former Maasai who, due to defeat, epidemics and cattle loss, had to drop out of pastoral nomadic life.[11]

It should be noted, though, that there were also other non-pastoral Maa-speaking groups, such as the Arusha who engaged in agriculture at the foothills of Mount Meru and who claimed ethnic affinity with the Maasai. The Maasai despised the Arusha's agricultural occupations but recognized their common origins with them (unlike the Dorobo). The number of Arusha rose, too, with the addition of Maasai refugees from the wars of the nineteenth century.[12] Another Maa-speaking group, the Samburu, live to the north of the Maasai. They are nomadic pastoralists like the Maasai and, as such, are considered to be the closest kin of the Maasai.[13]

The relationship of the Maasai with neighbouring fellow pastoralists was one of almost constant conflict, as they vied for the same resources: livestock, pastures and water. The Nandi, for example, fought long battles against the Maasai[14] and the resistance that they mounted to the Maasai occupies a central part in their collective memory. Similar enmity between pastoralist groups could be found between the Pokot and Karamojong, the Turkana and Karamojong, the Pokot and Samburu, etc.

The relationship of the Maasai with non-pastoral groups was much more complex. They felt cultural superiority and contempt towards those groups but also maintained economic ties. With the groups that they dominated, such as the Dorobo, the relationship was based on inequality and external signs of subservience by the latter but also mutual dependence. The Maasai dominated also the Arusha (later challenged by the Arusha in the colonial and post-colonial periods) but their feelings of contempt towards them were not mitigated by their acknowledgement of ethnic affinity that they did not feel towards the Dorobo.[15] With agricultural groups whom the Maasai threatened but did not dominate, such as the Kikuyu or the Chagga, they competed for land and were on hostile terms but also engaged in commercial exchange. Thus, whereas the relationship between the Maasai and other pastoralist groups was purely competitive and antagonistic despite similar social organization and lifestyle, the relationship with non-pastoralists, whether hunters or sedentary agriculturists, manifested greater mutual dependence precisely because of different occupations and lifestyle.[16] It is also important to add that all those relations were maintained in an environment where no states were formed by either the pastoralists or the agriculturist counterparts.

The Maasai impact on their neighbours extended beyond military attack and commercial exchange. For other pastoralists, though the Maasai were dangerous enemies who threatened their cattle and livelihood, they were also role models to be emulated in order to resist them better. The Nandi, for example, showed great similarity to the Maasai in their age-group based organization, in the position of their religious experts, in their rite de passage ceremonies, etc., probably as a result of some Maasai influence.[17] The Maasai cultural influence was felt also among the Dorobo. Not only did they speak the Maa language but they also adopted the physical appearance, dress and ornamentation of the Maasai[18] though the Maasai would be quick to point out that subtle differences still existed and that the copy was far from perfect. The Arusha, likewise, were very similar to the Maasai in physical appearance and age groups. However, in this case, since the two groups had a common origin, one should not necessarily assume a 'Maasai influence.' The Arusha may have had those features from the beginning, as part of their cultural background rather than having 'adopted' them from the Maasai.

It should be noted, in any case, that the bulk of the sedentary populations living near the Maasai were neither dominated by them as were the Dorobo nor were attributed ethnic affinity with them as were the Arusha. They simply existed in the vicinity of the Maasai and often fought them. For these groups, such as the Kikuyu and the Chagga, the Maasai impact was an impact coming from the periphery. The Maasai were indeed 'significant others,' but their importance was reflected in their being different from the sedentary world of those groups. The Maasai represented the 'dangerous outside' from which these groups had to protect themselves even if, as part of their interaction, they also adopted some elements of the other group's culture. The Kikuyu, for example, feared the Maasai military skills and sought ways to counteract their threat. They tried to maintain economic ties with them without falling prey to their aggression. They also may have adopted some elements of their age group system.[19] However, by and large, the Kikuyu, or the Chagga, were not ready to let the Maasai exert a broader influence on their society. They did not consider the Maasai to be role models for them. On the contrary, the Maasai epitomized for them the 'other,' the 'bush,' the margins of society, whereas for the Dorobo they represented the dominant centre. It should also be added that whatever impact the Maasai had on their sedentary neighbours was exerted from a position of continued nomadism. This formed the cornerstone of their lifestyle and their difference from the Kikuyu, the Chagga and other such sedentary agriculturists. The importance of this last point will become apparent when we discuss the other examples of pastoral nomadic impact on sedentary populations.

The apprehension felt toward the Maasai was shared by Arab traders coming from the East African coast. The Maasai presence has been mentioned as one of the reasons why the northern trade routes between the coast and the interior developed less than the southern routes crossing today's central Tanzania. The Europeans fully adhered to this view. The 'noble savage' image of the Maasai was greatly strengthened in the colonial period and contributed to a further marginalization of the Maasai. They took little part in colonial innovations and were considered by the colonial authorities to be among the native populations most impervious to change, those who had to be contained rather than be relied upon in the new order. Their way of life was seen as economically wasteful. At the same time, they aroused intense curiosity for being different, but that, in effect, froze them in marginal positions in colonial eyes.

In Kenya, the Maasai were concentrated in two 'native reserves' in Kajiado and Narok. Their movement was severely restricted and they were, in effect, cut-off from their cattle's dry season grazing areas, leading to overgrazing within the reserves. Land taken from them was used for European settlement, for African agricultural colonization and later also for the establishment of wildlife parks.[20] Their livestock was put on quarantine and its sale and movement outside the reserves was prohibited, thus eliminating any prospects of Maasai commercial pastoralism.[21] In Tanganyika, too, large tracts of land were taken away from them for agriculture and wildlife conservation.[22] With the declaration of the Serengeti and Ngorongoro areas as wildlife conservation zones, the movement of domestic animals in them was subject to severe restrictions. The establishment of the Serengeti National Park forced the Maasai to leave that area altogether.[23]

The same tendencies were manifested also in the post-colonial period It is interesting to see how little difference independence made in the central government's attitude toward nomadic pastoralism. Nomads continued to be seen as impediments to development and as people who are particularly hard to control. Post-colonial governments' policies ranged from benign neglect, in which governments limited their action among nomads to taxation and maintaining order within restricted movement, to more active intervention, in which they tried to mold them into some centrally determined national vision of development, with the ensuing frustration when the nomads did not co-operate and tried to evade the central projects and policies.[24] Like their colonial predecessors, post-colonial governments encouraged the permanent settlement of pastoralists and pushed for greater commercialization of livestock. However, when settlement did not include sufficient wet and dry season grazing areas, it became ecologically destructive and could not sustain large herds in the long run.[25] Among settled Maasai, the gap between rich and poor households grew and the number of very poor households increased considerably.[26] Nomads clinging to their way of life saw their freedom of movement and their access to pastures steadily diminished.[27] Encroachment by agriculturists into pastoral land continued unabated, in the case of the Maasai mostly on the part of Kikuyu in Kenya and of Chagga and Arusha in Tanzania.[28] In Kenya, the freehold land tenure system established towards independence posed a special threat to pastoralist interests, as large-scale land registration and purchase spread to pastoralist areas and accelerated agricultural colonization in those areas. 'Group Ranch' schemes, devised to maintain collective Maasai control over their land, offered some protection but could not completely stop that trend.[29]

The Maasai continued to lose land also to wildlife reserves, as the Safari-related tourism industry developed and became one of the major sources of income for Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya, the Maasai lost 3,248 square kilometers to the Amboseli National Park and 1,671 square kilometres to Maasai-Mara.[30] In Tanzania, after having been evicted of the Serengeti

National Park when it was established in 1959, the Maasai faced a similar threat in Ngorongoro in the 1980s. Their cattle's grazing area steadily shrank and they were subject to numerous rules and restrictions as the conservationist attitude stiffened.[31] The numbers of the wild animals grew and their interests took precedence over that of the pastoralists. Herdsmen were forbidden to hunt wildlife and were left with little protection against animals that attacked their cattle, spread them diseases and competed with them for pastures.[32]

The development of modern tourism has also offered new economic opportunities to pastoralist peoples. Being located in a major tourism zone, the Maasai figure prominently in this development and have become, themselves, exhibits in the tourism industry. Some have learned to turn this into profit, being photographed for a fee, opening their camps to visits by tourists, performing folk dances or shows of blood-drawing from cattle, etc. Others have found employment as hotel and campsite workers, park attendants, night watchmen, scouts in nature treks, souvenir peddlers, etc. Local councils near the game reserves and national parks receive some of the income obtained from visitors.[33] Even though these activities earn only a small share of the revenues generated by tourism, they, nonetheless, are sufficient to draw the Maasai (and other groups in a similar situation) into the new economy. However, posing as exotic specimens of remote and vanishing cultures also means that, in a cultural sense, the marginality of the Maasai is further emphasized and certainly publicized. It illustrates the 'strange,' the 'different' in their culture. Thus, the tourism industry appears to have had a paradoxical impact on the Maasai. For most of them it is an important means of economic incorporation and transformation. However, this depends on the fact that at least some of them would be frozen in cultural marginality, be exhibited in 'suspended animation' and as such attract the curiosity and attention without which none of the economic benefits would be forthcoming.

The post-colonial developments examined so far have played a major role in creating the predominant contemporary image of nomads occupying the margins of society. They are portrayed as recipients of central directives enacted upon them, trying to evade them if they can, or adjusting to them partially while attempting to salvage as much as they can of their traditional lifestyle. If that is so, where is the impact *of* nomads *on* sedentary people? Whereas, prior to colonialism, the Maasai did exert influence on neighbouring people and, in some cases, even dominated them, we have to conclude that in contemporary times the direction of the impact has been predominantly *from* the sedentary groups *to* them. However, our analysis of the place Maasai occupy in modern tourism may also hint at an impact coming in the opposite direction. The Maasai play an important role in the

contemporary tourism industry. They are central actors in modern-day tourism and related activities such as nature photography, travel magazines and TV shows, etc. As such, they exert a subtle but growing influence on a rapidly expanding global activity strongly supported by powerful international economic organizations as well as by national governments. However, they achieve that impact from a position of marginality and apparent weakness; indeed, their marginality is a *sine qua non* for that impact. We have seen that they exerted influence from the periphery in the pre-colonial period too but in that case peripherality was coupled with power and not weakness. In the past, even when they did not dominate other groups, they had to be taken into account as a serious threat to others. In the present, they arouse attention in a more 'domesticated' form, framed to respond to the rising consumer demand coming from the modern Western world which is curious about, but not threatened by, their difference. In the other examples examined in this chapter we shall see how marginality versus dominance plays out with regard to other African pastoral nomads' impact on sedentary societies.

THE TUAREG

The Tuareg inhabit the Sahara desert and the West African Sahel region to the south. They are found mainly in today's Niger, northern Mali and southern Algeria and are estimated to form a total population of about 850,000 people.[34] They are Muslims and speak the Tamachek language related to Berber. Over the centuries they moved south in recurrent waves, perhaps under the pressure of other Berber groups.[35] Their southward movement continues in the present as well. Their livestock consists mainly of camels and goats (more suited to their environment than cattle); they also ride camels, rather than horses, and use them as principle means of transport.

In the pre-colonial period, the Tuareg controlled the trade routes that crossed the Sahara between North Africa and the Sahel region of West Africa. They often raided the caravans, or offered them protection in return for taxes, and occasionally engaged in commercial activities themselves. They were known to maintain a commercial presence in the towns of the Sahel which were the distribution points for the trans-Saharan trade.[36] The Tuareg also subjugated sedentary agriculturist black populations of the Sahel, such as Hausa or Songhay, levied regular taxes from them, and took slaves who were established in separate villages to cultivate crops for their masters.[37]

The Tuareg were a constant threat to the states of the Sahel. However, they did not form states of their own. They lived under the authority of warrior chiefs and were organized in loose tribal confederations which often waged wars against each other as much as against other groups.[38] In the nineteenth century, an attempt to establish a more centralized political structure in Kel Gress (in today's Niger) failed dismally and provoked a serious political crisis.[39] The Tuareg were also allied with those who opposed the Fulbe state formation efforts in the nineteenth century as they rightly perceived that the Fulbe-ruled states would endanger their freedom of action in the Sahel and would create a serious new competition for their dry season pastures in the south.[40]

The Tuareg, like the Maasai, stressed very much their military skills and nurtured an image of fierce raiders. The importance attributed to military functions was apparent in the fact that the warrior class occupied the highest status in a very rigid stratification system. Unlike the revolving age-group system of the Maasai in which status positions were generally not inherited and every male had, in principle, the opportunity to reach the position of senior elder as part of his lifecycle, the Tuareg society was based on a rigid hierarchy, irrespective of age. At the top of the hierarchy stood the families belonging to the warrior class. They held a monopoly over the political and military command positions. Below them stood the class of religious specialists. The third stratum was that of dependent vassal freemen who paid tribute to the warrior and religious classes. Below the three strata of freemen were several levels of 'servile' groups, mostly originating from the 'black' populations of the Sahel. Some of them were uprooted from their society and became domestic servants in Tuareg households and camps. Others were brought north to desert oases and relocated in separate slave villages. Greater numbers were left in the Sahel (since cultivable land was more limited in the north), but lived in Tuareg-controlled agricultural estates and had to supply their nomadic patrons annual tributes in grain as well as food, lodging and labour whenever requested. Craftsmen and freed slaves formed separate classes, above the actual captives but below the three strata of Tuareg freemen.[41]

The Tuareg stratification also indicates a major difference from the Maasai in their relationship with the neighbouring sedentary people. Both groups refrained from establishing states; both preferred to raid their neighbours rather than rule them and both were regarded by their sedentary neighbours as a threat coming from outside. However, the Tuareg established a much more permanent and institutionalized dominance over the sedentary people whom they encountered. Many of the latter were actually enslaved and were incorporated into Tuareg society at the lowest strata (the Maasai, by contrast, had no use for slaves in their society). Those who were not removed from their society were kept in a system of subjection whereby they had to put their labour, crops and livestock at the disposal of the Tuareg whenever the latter arrived at those regions, whether as part of their seasonal migrations, or when some special necessity arose due to drought or political uncertainty in the north. The Tuareg came to regard those regions of the Sahel as 'resource reservoirs' that they regularly visited to replenish their dwindling resources.[42] In times of drought, the Tuareg spent longer periods in the south and their extraction of resources from the local population rose accordingly. The proportion of dependent agriculturists in Tuareg society was highest among the southernmost Tuareg groups. In Kel Gress, for example, the bulk of the population was composed of servile dependent agriculturists.[43]

The Tuareg economy was thus much more diversified than that of the Maasai and than that found in most other 'stateless' pastoralist groups. The exploitation of subjected agricultural labour indicated tendencies of economic change usually found among pastoralists engaged in state formation (see below). The Tuareg achieved those changes without establishing states and without having to modify their nomadic lifestyle and social organization. In terms of their impact on sedentary populations, we witness a combination of marginality and dominance. As far as the sedentary world was concerned, the Tuareg continued to epitomize the margins of society, the periphery of human existence. They lived under very harsh climatic conditions, far from population centres, in areas to which very few other groups dared to move. They were widely feared by other groups; their influence was considered, by and large, destructive. However, in large tracts of the Sahel and in the desert oases, they also established a regular dominance on local populations. They deeply affected economic production and distribution in those regions. They were a constant factor in the lives of the inhabitants; they established over them a new social order that they closely controlled. Some of the sedentary people were also culturally incorporated in Tuareg society. They adopted the Tuareg language, internalized Tuareg cultural values and norms while remaining devoid of any power, completely dependent on higher strata and occupying the most despised positions within Tuareg society.

With the establishment of colonial rule, the Tuareg underwent a rapid marginalization and their dominance over the sedentary population started to decline, though it did not disappear completely. As could have been expected, the Tuareg warriors strongly resisted the colonial incursion into the different regions in which they lived. In 1901-2 and again in 1916-17 they rose against the French who had to conduct extensive campaigns against them. The eventual defeat of the Tuareg was accompanied by severe repression on the part of the French and led to the decimation of the warrior

class. The religious class tried to take advantage of the situation and positioned itself as chiefs and intermediaries of the colonial administration.[44]

Under colonial rule the movement of the Tuareg was restricted; they were confined to specific areas in order to exert closer control over them and, allegedly, to protect other populations from their depredations. As they were no longer allowed to attack other groups, the military class could not display its mark of distinction.[45] With the decline of the trans-Saharan trade, they had fewer opportunities of engaging in commercial activities or of offering protection to caravans. The agricultural south gradually slipped away from Tuareg control as the French provided better protection to the local population against Tuareg raids and transferred tax collection authority from the nomads to the sedentary chiefs. By the 1920s the Tuareg had lost control over much of the Sahel areas which had served as their 'resource reservoir' prior to the colonial period.[46]

Despite these important losses, however, the Tuareg still benefited from the fact that a system of economic exploitation of lower class labour had been established in their society before the Europeans arrived. They still controlled the labour of substantial numbers of cultivators, especially of those who lived in Tuareg camps or in the separate slave villages controlled by the Tuareg in the desert oases and regarded themselves as part of Tuareg society. The formal abolition of slavery was not accompanied by a significant change in land tenure or in personal relations. While some former slaves migrated to towns where they joined the lowest strata of urban dwellers,[47] most remained as dependent labourers of their former masters and continued to supply them crops and services. Thus, the system established before the colonial period continued to be the basis of the Tuareg economy under colonial rule as well and slave-labour remained an essential part of Tuareg society as late as the 1960s when post-colonial independence was achieved in Niger, Mali and Algeria.[48]

The Tuareg thus did suffer marginalization under colonial rule but they could also use some elements of their pre-colonial economy and stratification to mitigate the effects of such marginalization. With passage to independence, however, such mitigating circumstances started to disappear and gave way to a much fuller marginalization and an almost complete elimination of the old dominance. In Mali and Niger the Tuareg viewed the passage to independence as a loss of their autonomy maintained under French rule and as an act of betrayal on the part of the French for putting them under the rule of despised 'black' people.[49] In the 1960s, in Niger, the Tuareg still resisted sending their children to school and had very few Western-educated people. They were very poorly represented in the state structure.[50] Sedentarization was accelerated. Most Tuareg were still nomads, but the cycle of their movements shortened and involved only part of the

family members. They also continued to lose control over their agriculturist dependents who were supported by the central government.[51] In the 1980s, as tension flared up between Libya and Niger and Libyan intervention was feared throughout Africa, the Tuareg were brandished as 'Libyan agents' and were subject to repression on the part of the Niger military forces.[52] In Mali, the Tuareg were in open rebellion against the government for most of the post-colonial years and their regions were closed off for security reasons. An agreement granting them some autonomy was reached with the government in recent years, but I do not know how well it is implemented. It seems that most Tuareg rebels laid down their arms and local elections were held in Tuareg inhabited areas.[53] Their regions were also opened to some outside visitors, though security remained precarious as some Tuareg units refused to disband and occasionally attacked travellers. As recently as in January 1999, some participants in the Paris-Dakar motor rally were robbed in one of the legs of the race in Mauritania, allegedly by Tuareg rebels from Mali roaming the border area between the two countries. The clashes between the Tuaregs and the governments of Mali and Niger led to some exodus of Tuaregs northward towards Algeria and Libya,[54] reversing the more general southerly direction that has characterized Tuareg movement throughout history. However, the situation of the Tuareg was not much better in Algeria, as we shall see below, and the bulk of the movement, even in current times, has remained southward.

In Algeria, the Tuareg had to contend with an especially interventionist government policy which was bent on destroying the traditional economy and stratification which did not square with revolutionary socialist ideology. The Algerian State stressed sedentarization and agriculture, restricted the caravan movements from which the Tuareg profited and, most importantly, forced the removal of former captives from their former masters' control. In some cases, the implementation of such forced separation meant, for the 'liberated' people, unemployment and migration to urban shantytowns. In other cases, the former slaves could keep the agricultural land that was taken away from their former masters.[55]

While the post-colonial Algerian government was bent on destroying the traditional Tuareg society, it was also interested in keeping remnants of Tuareg culture as exhibits for tourists. In the 1970s, before the outbreak of Islamic fundamentalist violence in the country, Algeria had high hopes for the development of tourism. The town Tamanrasset, in the heart of the Ahaggar region, was a major target for such attraction to the exotic, with planeloads of Europeans arriving to meet the 'genuine' Tuaregs. For some Tuaregs, this, indeed, provided an economic opportunity. They were photographed for fees and were put on shows for the Europeans. They sold them their blue robes, organized camel races, or else were employed in the

construction of hotels or served as guides in desert tours, etc. However, just as we have seen in the case of the Maasai, incorporation in the tourism industry also meant an emphasis on cultural marginality.[56] The Tuareg were represented as different, as strange and peripheral, as the last specimens of a vanishing world. Dominance was gone and to the extent that they still had some impact on the sedentary world, this was an impact coming from weakness and marginality.

Outside the tourism tract, which has dried up in recent years, the Tuareg tried to evade as much as possible the interventionist tendencies of the Algerian government. Sedentarization did spread, continuing trends started in the colonial period, but many households tenaciously kept to their nomadic way of life, even if their movement became more restricted. While they lost the crops provided by their former dependent cultivators, few engaged in agriculture themselves. They much preferred other kinds of work, even if menial. Also, while they did lose control over their agricultural labourers, they still kept, within their families, the domestic servants of slave origin who were closely integrated in the family and had no other place to go. When the camels died due to drought and deteriorating grazing conditions, the Tuareg owners travelled south to buy new ones, just as they used to go south to replenish their resources in the past. However, now they had to buy rather than simply seize those resources. Many Tuareg also opted to move south more permanently and migrated, mostly to Niger.[57]

In neither Niger nor Mali was tourism much developed, hence it did not become an important factor there as it became, for a while, in Algeria. I was told, however, that when some nature preservation project was initiated in Niger it met with Tuareg resistance. The Tuareg of Aïr opposed a World Wildlife Fund project that would have created a large nature park to protect antelopes in the region and in the adjacent Tenere desert. They attacked Westerners working in the project, confiscated their vehicles and equipment and forced them to leave the area.[58]

Finally, the Tuareg of Niger and Mali, as well as those of Algeria suffered very much from the prolonged drought and consequent famine that hit their area in recent decades. One clear result of the drought was a heavy southward push of the Tuareg which, in turn, put pressure on more southern nomadic groups such as the Fulbe who also moved further south into less arid areas. The majority of the Tuareg already lived in the southern edges of the desert rather than in the desert itself[59] and the recent southward drift intensified that concentration. The massive southerly movement obviously disrupted the population balance of the region and created great tensions with the local sedentary populations.

Drought and the consequent loss of livestock also forced many Tuareg to abandon their pastoralist occupation altogether. While some became even

more mobile as a consequence, in desperate search for work and a meagre income, or joining rebel bands,[60] others were immobilized as they concentrated around emergency relief centres. They became idle welfare recipients and lost their livelihood and self-respect.[61] For the latter groups the result was even greater marginalization. They found themselves not only at the outskirts of society, but in a situation in which even their bare subsistence depended on other groups' willingness to offer them help, or even tolerate their presence. From dominating others, or at least being a military threat to them, they turned into becoming a welfare burden. All vestiges of dominance were lost and were replaced by extreme marginality.

THE FULBE

With the Fulbe we move to the 'state-forming' pole of the African pastoralist nomads and the nomadic influence on the sedentary world receives a new significance. The Fulbe are the major 'subsaharan' pastoralist people of West Africa. Estimates of their total population range from nine to ten million to seventeen million people.[62] They are scattered throughout West and Central Africa, with greatest concentrations found in northern and eastern Senegal, the Futa Jallon heights of Guinea, the inner delta of the Niger in Mali, northern Nigeria and southern Niger and the Adamawa plateau in Cameroon. It is generally assumed that sometime in their history, probably around the tenth century, most of them were concentrated in the more western parts of their present habitat and that they undertook a mostly eastward migration, in search for water and pastures or in response to adverse political conditions. Their migrations have continued up to the present. Some Fulbe groups can be found as far east as Sudan and Ethiopia. They have also moved south into more humid areas in northern and central Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria and Cameroon as modern veterinary care offers their cattle greater protection from tropical diseases. The current southern push of the Fulbe is also a result of the intensifying drought that has hit the more northern regions and whose effect on the Tuareg was mentioned above.

Parallel to their easterly migration, the Fulbe also gradually adopted Islam. A small section of them, called the Torobbe, forsook their pastoral life, settled in towns, mixed with other Muslims and, together with Arab and Moor clerics, formed the most learned and respected layer of Muslim religious leaders in West Africa. Others who continued their nomadic pastoralism adopted Islam later and more superficially. In the course of their migratory drift, the Fulbe were organized in loose groups led by pastoral leaders called *arbe*. They were usually subjected to the authority of local

non-Fulbe rulers or chiefs to whom they had to pay grazing dues or other taxes. In areas of large Fulbe concentrations, the *arbe* held greater autonomy but generally acknowledged the overall suzerainty of a larger state, such as the Bambara or Hausa kingdoms. The Fulbe clerics generally settled in the political centres and tried to influence local rulers into greater acceptance of Islam.

The relations between the Fulbe and the other populations were often tense. The Fulbe resented being subjected to the authority of agricultural populations whose lifestyle they despised. With their adoption of Islam, tension grew even further as it strengthened their feeling of superiority toward pagan or superficially Islamized groups and their frustration at being subjected to them. It is not surprising, therefore, that Fulbe clerics, many (but not all) of Torobbe origin, were at the forefront of the Islamic ferment that rocked West Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. When the local rulers were Fulbe, the struggle pitted Fulbe groups against each other, a more orthodox Muslim group, led by clerics, rising against a less Islamic group. When the rulers were not Fulbe, an ethnic element of Fulbe against non-Fulbe was added to the struggle. The clerics, in any case, were the catalysts of the discontent. They gave it religious justification and were in contact with both centres of Islam and the nomadic populations, thus being optimally situated to mobilize the latter under a religious Islamic banner.[63]

The Fulbe thus played a major role in the series of Islamic military uprisings, or jihads (holy wars), that erupted throughout West Africa in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Where they succeeded, they led to the formation of new states or to the conquest and restructuring of existing states. The Fulbe became a new ruling group in West Africa and completely altered the region's political map, with far-reaching economic and religious consequences, as we shall see below.

The first successful Fulbe jihad and subsequent state-formation occurred in Futa Jallon in the early eighteenth century. A confederation of Muslim Fulbe families, led by the cleric Karamoko Alfa, rose against Jallonke chiefs and established a state ruled by the Alfaya and Soriya families.[64] In Futa Toro (in today's Senegal) the jihad was instigated by the Torobbe, led by Suleyman Bal who, in 1776, rose against the Denyanke dynasty, descendants of a pagan Fulbe state established in the sixteenth century. As the jihad was directed against a non-Muslim Fulbe class, it was more of an internal struggle between Muslim and non-Muslim elements.[65] In the inner delta of the Niger, too, the jihad erupted as an internal feud between Muslim and non-Muslim Fulbe. The area was ruled, long before the jihad, by Fulbe chiefs (*arbe*) who paid tribute first to the Songhay and later to the Bambara. In 1805, a Muslim cleric named Shehu Ahmadu led the uprising against those chiefs and created the strongly theocratic state of Maasina which freed the area from Bambara tutelage and came to dominate the important urban commercial centers of Jenne and Timbuktu.[66] In today's Northern Nigeria, in 1804, the Torodo cleric Othman dan Fodio rose against the superficially Islamized Hausa state of Gobir. Between 1804 and 1810, his supporters overran most of Hausaland, including the states of Katsina, Kano and Zaria, and formed the empire of Sokoto, by far the largest and most populous Fulbe-ruled state.[67] Sokoto's rule extended also beyond the Hausa-inhabited areas. One of Othman dan Fodio's flag-bearers, Modibo Adama, spread the jihad to a vast area in the southeast which came to be named, after him, Adamawa, most of which is now located in North Cameroon. He established a vassal state of Sokoto and ruled over a multitude of mostly pagan sedentary populations.[68]

Finally, in the mid-nineteenth century, another Torodo, Umar Tal, left Futa Toro on pilgrimage to Mecca. On his way back, he stopped for prolonged periods in Sokoto, Maasina and Futa Jallon. Back in Futa Toro, El Hajj Umar evoked the example of Suleyman Bal and called for a new jihad. However, realizing the futility of direct confrontation with the French who were penetrating into the area, he turned his attention to the east and, preaching war against the infidel Bambara, he led a great exodus of disciples (*taalibe*) from Futa Toro. He engaged in a great conquest spree and established a vast state which, on its way, also conquered the Fulbe state of Maasina. El Hajj Umar lost his life in the ensuing battles. His state was taken over by his son Ahmadu who waged a long resistance to advancing French colonial forces, but was eventually defeated and fled to the east, beyond the reach of the French.[69]

Prior to the jihads, the typical Fulbe pastoral migration units were quite small and kept their autonomy within societies to which they were loosely related. Their decentralized structure was similar to that of many other pastoralist nomads who did not take part in state-formation efforts. This decentralized structure continued to prevail among Fulbe groups, some of whom called Mbororo, who took little part in the state-formation efforts of their kinsmen and continued their migration at the margin of the states. By contrast, those Fulbe who were actively involved in the jihad movements were incorporated in much larger governmental organizations and often held high-ranking positions in them. They were transformed into a ruling group dominating a large population, most of whom were non-Fulbe sedentary agriculturists. State formation meant the establishment of stronger and more centralized political structures than what the Fulbe were accustomed to in their own society and from the ones they encountered in the neighboring groups.[70] Even in the Hausa inhabited areas, where the Fulbe inherited relatively well-developed state structures, they further strengthened,

institutionalized and centralized those structures.[71] Only in Futa Toro did the 1776 jihad fail to form a stronger state than the one that already existed under the Denyanke dynasty. This perhaps explains the rapid decline of that jihad and may have created the conditions that paved the way for the subsequent movement of El Hajj Umar.[72]

The Fulbe state-formation also had deep economic and cultural consequences in the societies affected. It created a completely new basis of social stratification and moral order. It established the inherent supremacy of the Fulbe over non-Fulbe and of Muslims over non-Muslims. It also created a new hierarchical differentiation among the Fulbe themselves according to their differential participation in the jihad. The families who led the war became the ruling aristocracy. A much more stratified structure was created than what the Fulbe were hitherto accustomed to as pastoralists.[73] The economic impact was truly revolutionary, as the ruling Fulbe acquired control over large tracts of land and a huge pool of manpower in the form of slaves or subjected tribute-paying populations tied to the land.

The acquisition of slaves was a major tangible reward for the Fulbe who took part in the jihad. Slaves were taken from captured enemy forces as part of the war booty. They were also sent as tribute to political superiors and were sold in markets. The more prominent one's role in the jihad, and the higher one's position in the political hierarchy, the more slaves one accumulated. Slaves could be used as domestic servants or could be established in special villages to cultivate the land for their owners.[74] They quickly became the most important source and measure of wealth. Consequently, the exploitation of slave labour in agriculture grew rapidly and became the basis of the new economy under Fulbe rule.

The full economic value of slaves and other subjected labour could be realized in conjunction with increased control over land. Islamic law (of the Maliki School recognized in West and North Africa) enabled the conquerors to take possession of the land they conquered. Some of the lands allocated to the victors were non-inheritable title land linked to certain political offices. Others were inheritable possessions. Those who controlled the land received crops and labour, as taxes, from the subjected people living on that land and they could establish their own slaves on it. Owners of slaves could also use their manpower to clear the bush and claim control over the new land that was prepared for cultivation. Manpower and land were thus complementary resources, each one appreciating the value of the other. Joint possession of the two became the cornerstone of the new economy in the Fulbe-ruled states and, for the ruling class, it replaced livestock as the most valuable economic resource. However, the continued high symbolic value of cattle was attested by the fact that wealthy Fulbe invested a large portion of their new income in buying even more cattle. Their enlarged herds were put under the charge of hired herdsmen, most probably poorer Fulbe, who also took them on seasonal movements to richer pastures.

The new economic opportunities that were opened to the Fulbe as a result of state-formation and restratification also led to greater permanent settlement. It should be noted that some sedentarization of Fulbe, especially in Futa Toro and in Hausa inhabited areas, had occurred prior to the jihads, and it involved particularly those most closely attracted to Islamic learning. Indeed, some of the leaders of the jihads did come from that already settled group. Nonetheless, the bulk of the Fulbe were still pastoralist nomads at the time of the jihads and their nomadic mobility helped spread the conquest to far reaching regions. Following state formation, sedentarization accelerated very much among the Fulbe. With agricultural products supplied by captive labor, livestock tended by hired hands, the remaining specialized goods and services supplied by non-Fulbe craftsmen and traders, the Fulbe of higher ranking could establish themselves in permanent settlements. They could dedicate themselves there to a life of leisure and to learning, religion, political and military activities, as well as maintaining a keen interest in cattle, as owners but not as herders. They lived what could be termed the life of 'gentlemen' that reinforced their superiority over other populations.[75]

By contrast, those Fulbe who did not take an active part in state-formation and did not obtain a share of its spoils were less tempted to forsake their nomadic life. Some of them were employed as herdsmen by the settled Fulbe and were thus integrated in the new economic system. Others kept their distance and continued their traditional pastoral practices at the margins of the state.[76] Thus developed an increasingly sharper distinction between the settled Fulbe, more devout Muslims and well integrated in the new political and economic systems, and the less Muslim nomadic pastoralists organized in looser segmentary units and more tangentially related to the new economy. Moreover, as sedentarization continued at an accelerated pace among the Fulbe, the nomadic pastoralist group became an increasingly small minority compared to their settled kinsmen.[77]

The economic transformations and sedentarization that followed Fulbe state-formation were accompanied by significant changes in culture and ethnic identity. First of all Islam changed its face. The court Islam which had little impact on the population at large was replaced by a revolutionary Islam bent on reaching the grassroots and imposing its values on the entire population. Islamic law became compulsory for all; the society was remodelled, and the population mobilized, according to a new moral order that pervaded all aspects of life. The Fulbe attributed to themselves the role of carriers of orthodox Islam, hence a cultural model to be adopted. Certain aspects of the Fulbe way of life were integrated with Islam and presented as true Islamic behaviour. Interestingly, this occurred just as the Fulbe

themselves underwent a deep transformation in their economy and settlement patterns. Nevertheless, their way of life, demeanour, poise, high value attributed to cattle were regarded as symbols of nobility, hence to be adopted by others as part of upward social mobility. In most areas under Fulbe rule, this also meant that the Fulbe language was adopted by subjected populations and became the *lingua franca* of the region. Furthermore, many non-Fulbe groups, including the slaves, gradually attributed to themselves the Fulbe identity as part of Islamization.[78] In the Hausa-inhabited areas of the Sokoto empire, by contrast, the settled Fulbe themselves adopted the Hausa language and Islamization led to Hausa'ization rather than to Fulbe'ization. At the same time, Hausa traditions were influenced by Fulbe cultural elements, such as stoic reserve and self-control, which were re-identified as Muslim elements. A cultural symbiosis thus emerged around an inclusive Hausa language and identity attracting all those who aspired to upward mobility associated with Islam.[79] Among the Muslims, Fulbe identity became a special mark of upper class or of nomadic pastoralism and the Fulbe-Hausa distinction became principally a class distinction.[80]

Our brief survey of Fulbe state building has illustrated the great impact that a nomadic pastoralist people exerted on sedentary societies in eighteenth and nineteenth century West Africa. The impact of the Fulbe-led jihads and the consequent state-formation, or conquest, could clearly be called revolutionary. They introduced a new militant Islam that penetrated the grassroots and remodelled societies according to its values and precepts. They redistributed economic resources, according to new principles, intensified the use of land and manpower and created a new social stratification. They institutionalized larger and stronger political structures and based them on a new legitimacy. They reshuffled ethno-cultural identities. Those who led the jihads formed a ruling nobility that controlled land and labour. Positions held in the state bureaucracy entitled the holders to differential rewards and greater bureaucratization meant greater hierarchical differentiation between office holders. While some entitlements were specifically tied to given offices, others were granted more generally to the person involved and could be inherited by descendants, thus creating differential privileges acquired at birth. Hence, new class differences were generated and, with time, became entrenched. As slavery expanded, important differences emerged between household slaves, public slaves, second-generation slaves, former slaves, etc. Various sectors of free people were also ranked on the basis of occupation, ethnicity, lineage and religion. Ethnic and religious identities were used as general markers of status in society and their boundaries changed as various groups scrambled to be included in higher categories in their attempt at upward social mobility. Other groups, by contrast, tried to maintain subtle differences as signs of

distinction. A more complex social stratification thus emerged in which various identity profiles carried with them differential wealth, power and prestige. These changes also led to the rapid sedentarization of a hitherto nomadic pastoralist people. While cultural attachment to cattle and to the pastoralist occupation was maintained and large herds continued to be owned as economic capital and status symbol, the actual herding and movement were left to hired workers of lower rank. Those who continued their nomadic lifestyle became a rapidly declining and marginalized minority.

The Fulbe impact was exerted from a position of dominance and centrality. It was very different from the kind of influence coming from the periphery that the Maasai exerted on their neighbours (except the Dorobo). The Maasai threatened and attacked their neighbours but did not re-model their society. The Fulbe ruled their sedentary agriculturist neighbours, they did not simply raid them, and they deeply changed the latter's economy and their religious and political order. The Tuareg case combined elements of both and represented dominance as well as peripherality. It included the economic exploitation of sedentary agricultural manpower from a position of superior power, in ways similar to those carried out by the Fulbe but without state formation. Some sedentary agriculturists were uprooted from their societies and reintegrated in the lowest strata of Tuareg society. They adopted the Tuareg language and culture, including the norms that relegated them to the lowest positions in society. For them, Tuareg impact indeed derived from the latter's dominance at the centre. However, for other sedentary groups who were not removed from their society and remained tribute paying dependents, the Tuareg also manifested elements of peripherality, periodically descending upon them from the desert to raid them or to collect tribute and then vanishing again into the desert until their next appearance. The Fulbe, by contrast, established themselves in the midst of sedentary societies, built a permanent government over them, imposed a new economy and spread the religious justification for the new order.

In the course of the revolutionary impact that the Fulbe exerted on the sedentary populations of their respective regions, they also underwent a revolutionary change themselves. Those most influential in bringing changes to the sedentary world stopped being nomads and joined that sedentary world at highest positions. Can we talk of a 'nomadic impact' on the sedentary world, when those most instrumental in bringing about that impact become sedentary themselves, as a result of the very same transformations they imposed on the people of their region? In response, it should be noted that the sedentary Fulbe did not relinquish the cultural roots that tied them to nomadic pastoralism. They still valued their pastoralist identity and kept large herds of cattle tended by hired poorer kinsmen. They

also maintained a vivid collective memory that stressed their common origin and history. In most cases, though not in all, they kept the same language and even spread it to other people. They recognized a common feature of 'Fulbe'ness,' called *pulaaku*, often presented as a distinct code of behaviour.[81] They emphasized their ties with other Fulbe, from whom they were separated by great distance for many generations. The emphasis on ties with people who lived so far away implied recognition of nomadic mobility as an essential part of their culture, an aspect that both explained and bridged such distances. The nomadic past was not forgotten or denied even though it was vanishing rapidly just as the Fulbe impact on sedentary societies was at its highest.

What happened to the Fulbe in the colonial and post-colonial periods? Here, again, interesting comparisons can be drawn with the Maasai and the Tuareg. In contrast with the marginalization of the Maasai and the Tuareg under colonial rule, the Fulbe ruling class was incorporated in the colonial system as indispensable mediators between the European administration and the local populations. Far from being relocated in closed 'reserves' as were the Maasai, or being militarily decimated, as were the Tuareg warriors, the Fulbe ruling class maintained its position under colonial rule and even reinforced its influence on neighbouring groups. The colonial governments which needed local agents who would maintain effective law and order and collect taxes were quite willing to rely on those groups who appeared to command the greatest authority in the region. Therefore, by and large, the old ruler-subject relationship was not altered significantly even though the pre-colonial states lost their sovereignty and had some of their heads of states replaced (usually by someone from the same ruling family) and their provinces fragmented or cut off by new colonial boundaries.

Collaboration with the colonial government also enabled the Fulbe to maintain their economic privileges that had already led many of them to become sedentary. Even though slavery was abolished, land tenure was not changed. Hence the liberated slaves and their descendants continued to depend economically on their former masters. They continued to cultivate their former masters' land and provided the landowners part of the crops and other services.[82] The Fulbe traditional elite were also able to convert their traditional resources into new uses and became the primary beneficiaries of the colonial innovations introduced into their regions. As they continued to control land and manpower, they also earned the greatest share of the revenue generated by the development of cash crops. They also took part in the growing commercialization of livestock, due to the increasing demand for meat and dairy products, and reaped from it the greatest profit.[83]

As for the cultural bases of the traditional order, they were disturbed even less by the colonial presence. The colonial administration had no

interest in challenging the position of Islam in which it saw an instrument of order. It discouraged Christian missionary activities in Muslim areas. Islamic law was maintained as 'customary law' and the Fulbe continued to dominate the traditional judiciary system. With colonial peace and new economic opportunities, pagan populations who had hitherto retrenched to hilltops, swamps or other relatively inaccessible places started opening up to the outside world. There they encountered a strongly implanted Islam, represented by the Fulbe, which also seemed to enjoy the support of the colonial power. With few missionary activities to promote it, Christianity was too distant and unfamiliar to mount a real challenge to Islam. Hence, for pagans, opening up to the outside world generally meant joining Islam. In many cases this also meant adopting a Fulbe appearance, speaking the Fulbe language, sending their children to Fulbe schools where most teachers and pupils were Fulbe. In a generation or two, it was most likely that these new Muslims would start calling themselves Fulbe, thus continuing the expansion of the Fulbe identity which had started prior to the colonial period. Only in those regions, such as Hausaland, where the Fulbe themselves had already adopted the Hausa language and culture did Islamization lead to an expansion of Hausa rather than Fulbe identity.[84]

The incorporation and accommodation that the Fulbe displayed under colonial rule were, no doubt, related to their having been 'state builders' in the pre-colonial period. The only Fulbe who did undergo marginalization in the colonial period were those who, like the Mbororo, had continued their existence at the margins of the Fulbe states. Their marginalization continued a trend that had already started prior to colonialism. Furthermore, as permanent settlement continued to spread among the Fulbe with the open encouragement of the colonial government, the nomadic segment of the Fulbe continued to decline in size relative to their sedentary kinsmen, thus emphasizing even more their marginal status in society. The impact of the Fulbe on sedentary societies thus continued in the colonial era and it was exerted from a position of continued dominance, but so did the permanent settlement of that hitherto nomadic group and its greatest impact was felt at its post-nomadic stage.

The position of the Fulbe after the achievement of independence was more variable and depended on the extent to which they were allied with the groups who gained ruling positions in the new post-colonial states. It is important to note, however, that the Fulbe were more active participants in the struggles to gain control over the political positions vacated by the colonial power than were the Tuareg and the Maasai in their respective territories. When the Fulbe were strongly represented in the post-colonial governments, as in Nigeria or in Cameroon in the early years of independence, they continued to enjoy their privileges in their own region as

well. When they were part of the defeated camp, as in Guinea and Mali, they obviously lost much power and some privileges. However, even under these circumstances, they were not totally marginalized. They had to be taken into account as opponents, and as such continued to occupy centre stage. Unlike the Tuareg rebels whose activities were geared toward cutting their ties to Mali and Niger, the Fulbe struggled to have greater influence at the political centres of those countries

In Cameroon during the Ahidjo regime and in Nigeria under the first post-colonial civilian government, the Fulbe were politically the strongest group in the country and their influence extended far beyond their region. Within their own region, they continued to occupy top status positions, exerted patronage on other groups, controlled large tracts of land whose value rose with increasing cash-crop development, invested in large herds of cattle and were the primary beneficiaries of Northern and Islamic solidarity. The expansion of Fulbe identity to other groups continued in North Cameroon and so did the expansion of Hausa identity in most of Northern Nigeria while Fulbe identity was maintained as a class distinction.[85]

In Mali and Guinea, by contrast, the Fulbe were identified with the opposition to the first independent governments and were not strongly represented in the subsequent governments that were all dominated by Mande-speaking groups. In Guinea, under Sékou Touré, the Fulbe were even a special target for repression and faced important changes that eliminated past privileges. The Sékou Touré government abolished the traditional chiefdoms and the Islamic courts. It caused the destruction of pastoralism by forcing a large quota of livestock sale through state channels at unprofitable prices, thus leaving the livestock owners the choice of either selling their herds at a loss or smuggle them out of the country. It also decreed that land belonged only to those who actually cultivated it, thus inflicting a severe blow to the economic system from which the Fulbe had benefited since the jihads.[86] Many Fulbe opted to migrate to neighbouring countries from which some of them returned after the change of regime. However, even when their economic and political fortunes were at their lowest ebb, the Fulbe of Guinea still enjoyed high ethno-cultural prestige due to Islam and to the memory of their past glory.[87] They continued to be cultural models for others and Fulbe identity continued to include former non-Fulbe of servile origin.

Evidence from Mali indicates another important feature of Fulbe adjustment to post-colonial changes that has occurred in some other countries as well: an increasing gap between the descendants of the traditional elite and the more commoner elements, some of them still nomads. Even though the Fulbe were not strongly represented at the national level and lost power to other groups, descendants of the traditional

leadership incurred minimal loss as they still were necessary intermediaries between the government and the local populations and had influence on the distribution of local resources.[88] The commoners who did not have similar political ties and had less diversified economic resources were more vulnerable to economic blows. The elite also had a comparative advantage in religious ties. Most of the teachers, advisors, arbitrators came from their group. They continued to be cultural models under difficult economic conditions and, in fact, their status rose as people tried to find, in religion, solace from current difficulties. Meanwhile, the number of nomads continued to decline throughout Fulbe-inhabited countries as more nomads joined their settled kinsmen, being attracted by contemporary amenities and other advantages of sedentary life.[89] Post-colonial governments continued their colonial predecessors' policy of encouraging, and at times pressuring, nomads to settle permanently. Those who clung to their traditional lifestyle found their pastures further limited, their transhumance routes closed off or pushed away to more distant areas.[90]

The recurrent droughts that hit the Western African Sahel hurt the nomadic Fulbe disproportionately because cattle, on which they depended more exclusively, were the first to perish. Many nomads lost their herds and had to abandon pastoralism. They became destitute migrant workers, desperately seeking any kind of work that would sustain their family, or welfare recipients congregating around centres of food distribution. They did experience utter marginality, similar to that of the Tuareg discussed above. Others, still keeping their herds, moved south into more humid areas. However, in the new areas, the nomadic Fulbe had to contend with the growing hostility of local agriculturists.[91] They also had to face such hostility from a position of relative disadvantage since they were the strangers, the migrant intruders, non-citizens (when their movement crossed post-colonial state boundaries). They could rely less on the protection of local authorities. They were, clearly, the weaker, more marginal elements under the new circumstances.

Marginality, so prominent among the Maasai and the Tuareg, could thus be found among the Fulbe too, but it was found mainly among its nomadic minority. The settled Fulbe, even when they were not dominant in the new political centres, were nonetheless active participants in the efforts to influence those centres or continued to mediate between the centre and the local populations. As such, they were not fully marginalized even when they experienced a significant loss of power.

Even with regard to the tourism industry, the comparison between the Fulbe on the one hand, and the Maasai and the Tuareg on the other, is illuminating. In Fulbe-inhabited areas, the objects of tourist attraction are not so much the settled Fulbe themselves but rather their nomadic Mbororo

kinsmen, or the pagan groups who inhabited hilltop villages to protect themselves against Fulbe attacks in the pre-colonial period. They, and not the Fulbe former 'state-builders' arouse the greatest curiosity as the specimens of the exotic, of the different, in the contemporary world.

I have attempted, in the preceding pages, to present a brief comparison of three nomadic or post-nomadic societies in Africa and have focused on the kinds of relations they maintained with sedentary societies in their region. I stressed the themes of dominance and marginality in the discussion in order to characterize the different types of impact that the nomads had on sedentary populations and the various roles that they played with respect to them. In some cases the nomads occupied positions of political, economic and/or cultural supremacy over sedentary agriculturists. In other cases they appeared at the margin of or beyond the sedentary societies but, nevertheless, exerted influence and pressure over them and had to be considered by them as 'significant others.' Whereas influence from a position of dominance was, perhaps, obvious, it was important to stress that influence could be exerted also from a position of marginality. It was also important to show that dominance and marginality were not always contradictory. As the example of the Tuareg showed, they could be found together, in the same case, in interesting configurations.

The comparison of the Maasai, the Tuareg and the Fulbe also highlighted the crucial importance of pre-colonial state formation in the kind of impact that these groups had on the respective sedentary societies with which they interacted. State-formation, or the lack thereof, affected to a large extent the particular configuration of dominance versus marginality in the relations between nomads and sedentary peoples. The impact of the 'stateless' Maasai came mainly from the margin. For most of their neighbours (with some notable exceptions such as the Dorobo), the Maasai were considered mainly as a danger lurking at the horizon, against which one had to protect oneself. The marginality of the Maasai was further accelerated by colonial and post-colonial developments, and in the present they display an interesting paradox of economic incorporation and cultural marginality derived from the modern tourism industry. Their main current role, and impact, vis-à-vis the modern sedentary world is the curiosity they arouse for being different.

In the case of the 'state-forming' Fulbe, centrality and dominance clearly replaced marginality and the overall impact on sedentary societies was even stronger, forcing a revolutionary change in those societies in the economic, political and cultural spheres. However, in that process, the nomads themselves were transformed. Most of them stopped being nomads while the few who did retain their nomadic life were pushed to the margins of society. The impact, therefore, was that of a post-nomadic group. It is true that the group still maintained many elements of its preceding nomadic culture, such

as a strong attachment to cattle, strong awareness of its mobile past and close ties with alleged kinsmen who lived far away. Nonetheless, the greatest impact on the sedentary world was achieved when the group in question was already at its post-nomadic stage.

With the Tuareg we faced a third case, which broke the dichotomy between stateless and state-forming pastoralists. While remaining basically stateless and nomadic, the Tuareg did establish a permanent dominance over sedentary societies and installed a type of economic exploitation that the Fulbe achieved only with state-formation and sedentarization. We also faced an impact deriving from a mixture of dominance and marginality. The Tuareg did impose a new socio-economic order on the sedentary populations, but at the same time remained far from population centres, in areas of harsh climatic and topographic conditions to which few other groups would venture to enter. On some of the subjected sedentary populations they exerted their influence from some distance, visiting them only periodically and keeping them as a resource reservoir, to be taxed or raided as needs arose. Other sedentary groups, uprooted from their region of origin, were controlled more closely. They also adopted the Tuareg language and culture and were incorporated in the Tuareg society at the lowest strata. With regard to the latter, Tuareg dominance was more prominent than marginality. Regarding the former, marginality was equally manifest in combination with a more tangential dominance.

In the colonial and especially post-colonial periods, however, this combination of dominance and marginality was gradually broken and gave way to undisputedly greater marginality. The Tuareg example became gradually more similar to that of the Maasai. The Fulbe were increasingly more differentiated from both the Maasai and the Tuareg, thus illustrating further the important role of pre-colonial state formation. Rather than being marginalized, the Fulbe were regarded as essential mediators between the colonial authorities and the local population and in the post-colonial period they were regarded as major contestants for the central political positions vacated by the colonial power. Marginalization was manifested mainly among those Fulbe who insisted on maintaining a nomadic life and whose numbers shrank rapidly as increasing numbers joined their kinsmen in permanent settlement.

The different patterns manifested in the Maasai, Tuareg and Fulbe cases can also be found in other nomadic pastoralist groups in Africa. The Turkana, the Samburu, the Karamojong and many others show great similarity to the Maasai in their decentralized segmentary social structures, their form of interaction with sedentary societies and the marginalization experienced under colonial and post-colonial rule. The Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi show, by contrast, similarity to the Fulbe in state formation,

dominance over agricultural societies and subsequent large-scale sedentarization. The analytical similarities between the Tutsi and the Fulbe are striking also because the two groups inhabit very different regions of Africa and are not known to have had any kind of ties with each other. The Tutsi were not affected by Islam, which was strongly integrated into Fulbe society and identity. The Tuareg example is paralleled by other desert groups such as the Tubu who inhabit the Sahara desert east of the Tuareg, maintained decentralized political structures and nomadism but also established a very hierarchical society and a similar system of dominance over 'captive' sedentary agriculturists. Currently, the Tubu appear to be in control of the post-colonial state of Chad, which they captured at the outcome of a civil war.[92] This is quite different from the position of the Tuareg *vis-à-vis* their respective post-colonial states and it should sensitize us to the differences that could also be found among groups who show overall similarity. It would be interesting to see if, and how, continued control over the Chad government (if it persists) would affect Tubu society and its relations with its neighbours.

Space limitations do not permit me to go into any more details on these examples, and still others, which show interesting similarities as well as differences from the three cases examined in this chapter. I do hope, however, that the spark of such comparative study has been ignited and that the richness of the African material would continue to attract scholarly attention to the role of nomads in that continent's sedentary world.

NOTES

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1 It is important to emphasize the pastoralist occupation of the nomads discussed here in order to distinguish them from other nomads such as hunters or gatherers who remain beyond the scope of this study.
2 It is obviously not easy to clearly differentiate between 'state' and 'non-state.' The concept of state assumes, in my view, centralization of political authority and bureaucratic institutionalization, i.e. recognition of a specifically political hierarchy, a differentiated group of 'office holders.' By means of such apparatus, a certain territorial domain and population is claimed to be controlled, including a recognized right to levy taxes and manage the natural resources in that domain and to apply coercion in order to enforce centrally made decisions. Whatever the precise definition of 'state,' I assume that most people would not find it too difficult to distinguish between polar types of 'state' and 'non-state.' Most would agree, for example, that in nineteenth century Africa, the Tutsi and Hutu of Rwanda and the Fulbe and Hausa of Sokoto lived in states whereas the Maasai and the Turkana lived in stateless societies. They may, however, find it harder to classify intermediate cases such as various factions of Moors, Tuaregs or Somalis. I would simply suggest to place each case along a continuum of political centralization and institutionalization and acknowledge that 'stateness' may indeed be conceived as a variable rather than as a fixed category.

3 Olson, 1996, p. 374.
4 Galaty, 1993a, pp. 66-77; Sindiga, 1984, p. 26.
5 Talbot, 1972, pp. 700-01; Hedlund, 1979, p. 24; Galaty, 1993a, pp. 70-5.
6 Jacobs, 1975, pp. 412-13; Talbot, 1972, p. 701; Arhem, 1985a, pp. 8, 33.
7 Jacobs, 1975, pp. 414-16; Arhem, 1985a, p. 12.
8 Talbot, 1972, p. 702.
9 Galaty, 1993a, pp. 61-9.
10 Galaty, 1993b, pp. 175-7.
11 Bernsten, 1976, pp. 3-5; Blackburn, 1982, pp. 282-95; Galaty, 1982, pp. 4-8.
12 Spear, 1993, pp. 122-4; Gulliver, 1963, pp. 10-13; Jacobs, 1975, p. 407.
13 Spencer, 1965, p. xvii.
14 Huntingford, 1953, pp. 76-7.
15 Spear, 1993, pp. 122-3.
16 Bernsten, 1976, p. 6; Blackburn, 1982, p. 295; Sindiga, 1984, pp. 26-7.
17 Huntingford, 1953, p. 49; Langley, 1979, p. 7.
18 Blackburn, 1982, p. 294.
19 Bernsten, 1976, pp. 1, 7-8.
20 Campbell, 1993, pp. 260-2; Hedlund, 1979, p. 28; Sindiga, 1984, p. 271.
21 Jacobs, 1975, pp. 412-13.
22 Arhem, 1985a, pp. 34-5.
23 Arhem, 1985b, pp. 19-23.
24 Galaty, 1980, p. 185; Arhem, 1985a, pp. 30-1.
25 Fumagalli, 1978, pp. 56-8.
26 Arhem, 1985b, p. 68; Hedlund, 1978, p. 35.
27 Arhem, 1985a, pp. 55-61.
28 Galaty, 1980, p. 160; Gulliver, 1963, p. 9; Sindiga, 1984, p. 33.
29 Galaty, 1980, 160-3.
30 Sindiga, 1984, p. 32.
31 Arhem, 1985b, pp. 28-37.
32 Ibid., pp. 95-7; Sindiga, 1984, pp. 32-3; *Time*, 23.9.96, p. 50.
33 Talbot, 1972, p. 707; *Time*, 23.9.96, p. 51.

34 Olson, 1996, p. 568.
35 Keenan, 1972, p. 348; Bernus, 1966, pp. 10-11.
36 Baier, 1976, p. 3.
37 Bernus, 1966, pp. 11-12.
38 Ibid., pp. 12-13; Bernus, 1993, pp. 87-90.
39 Bonte, 1979, p. 185.
40 Baier, 1976, p. 3.
41 Ibid., pp. 4-5; Bernus, 1966, pp. 12-14; Bonte, 1975, pp. 51-9; Baier and Lovejoy, 1977, pp. 399-402.
42 Baier, 1976, pp. 3-5; Swift, 1977, pp. 462-3.
43 Bonte, 1975, p. 51.
44 Bernus, 1966, pp. 12-13; Bourgeot, 1978, p. 166.
45 Bernus, 1993, pp. 105, 113.
46 Baier, 1976, p. 7; Fuglestad, 1973, p. 82.
47 Bernus, 1993, pp. 404-8.
48 Bonte, 1975, pp. 71-3; Keenan, 1972, pp. 350-5.
49 Bourgeot, 1990, p. 139.
50 Bernus, 1966, pp. 31-4.
51 Ibid., p. 17; Bernus, 1990, pp. 165-6.
52 Bourgeot, 1990, pp. 142-3.
53 Klute, 1997.
54 Bourgeot, 1990, p. 139.
55 Keenan, 1972, pp. 345, 356-9.
56 Bourgeot, 1972, p. 89.
57 Keenan, 1972, p. 359.
58 Personal communication by Georg Klute in 1995.
59 Baier and Lovejoy, 1977, p. 395.
60 Bourgeot, 1990, pp. 147-58.
61 Swift, 1977, p. 475; Cissé, 1989, p. 32.
62 Riesman, 1984, p. 173; Olson. 1996, p. 181.
63 H.F.C. Smith, 1961, pp. 171-3.
64 Azarya, 1978, p. 19; Baldé, 1975, pp. 186-9.
65 Robinson, 1975, pp. 10-15; H. F. C. Smith, 1961, pp. 173-4.
66 Johnson, 1976, pp. 482-3.
67 Azarya, 1978, pp. 20-3.
68 Ibid., pp. 19-20; Lacroix, 1952, pp. 21-31; Kirk-Greene, 1958, pp. 126-35.
69 Robinson, 1985, pp. 3-4, 320-9; H.F.C. Smith, 1961, pp. 180-3.
70 Rodney, 1968, p. 270; Johnson, 1976, pp. 481-95; Lacroix, 1952, pp. 29-30.
71 M.G. Smith, 1960, pp. 299-305.
72 Robinson, 1975, pp. 165-6; Robinson, 1985, pp. 65-72.

73 Azarya, 1996, p. 13; Dupire, 1970, pp. 428-38.
74 Lovejoy, 1978, pp. 343-53; Baldé, 1975, pp. 188-9; VerEecke, 1994, pp. 31-2.
75 Demougeot, 1944, p. 14; Richard-Molard, 1956, p. 121; Boutrais, 1994, p. 177; Bassett, 1994, p. 166.
76 Boutrais, 1994, p. 178.
77 Gallais, 1967, pp. 127-8; Riesman, 1984, pp. 176-7.
78 Azarya, 1978, pp. 97-8; Baldus,1977, pp. 447-8; Dupire, 1994, pp. 270-5.
79 Salamone, 1975, pp. 412-23; Kirk-Greene, 1986, pp. 49-51; Dupire, 1994, pp. 275-8.
80 M.G. Smith, 1955, p. 3.
81 Azarya et al., 1993, pp. 3-4; Kirk-Greene, 1986, pp. 42-3.
82 Azarya, 1978, pp. 75-8; De Bruijn & Van Dijk, 1993, p. 134.
83 Azarya, 1978, pp. 86-8.
84 Ibid., pp. 96-100.
85 Schultz, 1984, pp. 46-57; VerEecke, 1994, pp. 46-8; Salamone, 1975, pp. 419-21; Kirk-Greene, 1986, p. 49.
86 Azarya, 1978, pp. 167-90.
87 Botte, 1994, pp. 118-24.
88 De Bruijn & Van Dijk, 1992, pp. 49-57.
89 Frantz, 1981, pp. 108-10.
90 Awogbade, 1981, p. 329.
91 Ibid., pp. 329-31; Bassett, 1994, pp. 149-53; Blench, 1994, pp. 208-9.
92 Buijtenhuis, n.d., pp. 1-17.

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CONCLUSION

ANDRÉ WINK

The idea for this volume emerged from the observation that the impact of sedentary societies on nomads has been extensively studied but that the reverse, the impact of nomads on the sedentary world, has to a large extent been the subject of speculation. The intention of this collective effort therefore has been to study this issue in a systematic and comparative framework and to raise questions on a general level.

In his keynote paper, Anatoly Khazanov made the point that although in some periods the nomads played a very important role in political, ethno-linguistic and, to a lesser extent, in socio-economic and cultural developments in many parts of the sedentary world, nowhere or almost nowhere was the nomadic factor on its own the determining one among many factors that defined regional historical developments of long duration. This means that the impact of nomads cannot be isolated from the general internal dynamics of sedentary societies. Correspondingly, we see that even the short- and middle-term effects of nomadic involvement vary a great deal in different parts of the world. In the contributions to this volume the importance of this general principle of nomadic-sedentary interaction is demonstrated everywhere.

1. THE MILITARY ROLE OF NOMADS IN THE SEDENTARY WORLD

The crucial question has often been asked: to what extent does the sedentary world generate political-military opportunities which are pursued by the nomads? It will be clear from the case studies presented here that there is no simple answer to this question. In the sedentary world the superior military qualities of nomad peoples have often been recognized and numerous studies exist which point at the advantages that the nomads enjoyed throughout history in mounted archery and the use of animals, particularly horses, in warfare generally, or in the facility with which they could mobilize, due to a relatively undeveloped division of labour, a much higher percentage of their population for warfare than sedentary people. But the actual forms that the military presence of nomads in the sedentary world took varied a great deal and depended as much on factors at work in the sedentary world as on the nomads' military strengths and mobility. In North Africa, the peculiar juxtaposition of cities, agricultural oases, and desert

habitats generated a pattern of nomadic circulation of elites - every three generations or so - which has become something of a general paradigm for the interpretation of nomadic-sedentary interaction due to the famous work which Ibn Khaldun devoted to it in the fourteenth century. But it is easy to see that this paradigm does not work in many other parts of the world.

Elsewhere in the sedentary Islamic world the military presence of nomads often took the form of mamluk or 'slave' armies. Such armies however were an institution which developed in the sedentary world, and the people who filled their ranks were, properly speaking, not nomads but people of nomadic origin only. The slave soldiers were military elites that were purchased by powerful Islamic states and maintained in urban garrisons; unlike Ibn Khaldun's nomadic Bedouin they did not conquer cities on their own, and they were a specific kind of mercenaries that could co-exist with any type of non-servile elite, or with armies recruited from sedentary areas. While such 'post-nomadic' servile armies could be deployed in all manner of military endeavours within the Islamic world, they are not often seen outside of Islam. Peter Golden, however, describes in his contribution to this volume how the Georgian kings imitated their Muslim neighbours and created a slave guard corps of about 5,000 men recruited from among the nomads; and how these were used for military purposes beyond the Georgian borders, and as a centralizing force against the Georgian feudal army. Thus, whether it occurs within Islam or outside of it, and whether it is in imitation of the Islamic institution or not, we can identify slave or mercenary troops recruited from among nomads as one more type of military force that flourished in some parts of the sedentary world and which has to be distinguished from the nomadic circulation of elites that Ibn Khaldun identified for North Africa.

Another example of nomadic military forces serving in a sedentary state, also provided by Golden, were the Chernii Klobutsi, fragmented groups of defeated nomads who are found in the medieval state of Kiev. The Chernii Klobutsi - often seen as the forerunners of the Cossacks of the Ukraine and other Russian borderlands were used as borderguards, and they represented an early attempt of a sedentary state to divert nomadic military power inside its boundaries against other nomads outside of them. A similar case is described by Eugeniy Kychanov in the Tangut state of Hsi Hsia, in the southern area of the nomadic world of Inner Asia, in the late-tenth to thirteenth centuries. Here too, we find a clear recognition of the greater military skills of nomads as compared with sedentary peasants (evident in the fact that nomads received twice as many arrows as did peasants serving in the army). Among these nomads not all eligible men were drafted into the regular army, but those who were in general served as a battle-ready cavalry doing border sentry duty. Another case again was that of the Cumans, as described by Nora Berend. The groups of nomadic Cumans that entered Hungary in the mid-thirteenth century came at the invitation of the ruler of a numerically far superior sedentary society, and they remained in a subordinate position, constituting units of light mounted archers in the royal army. Cumans were employed in foreign wars, as a force for royal centralization against noble power, and as the king's elite guard of neugerii. The Cuman military's impact on Hungary in the short term was particularly in evidence in their attempt to help build a strong monarchy. But in the long term their impact was negligible, as by the fifteenth century they had sedentarized and were integrated in the sedentary society, to which they bequeathed some loanwords related to horse-breeding, fighting, hunting, and so forth, as well as elements of a nomadic dress code (which had appealed particularly to some of the Hungarian kings) but no permanent military formations.

Three papers in this volume describe the impact of nomadic military conquests respectively in India, China and Africa, and here again quite considerable differences in outcome are brought to light which are associated with conditions within the sedentary lands conquered as well as with the specific nature of the nomadic conquests. In India, as analysed in André Wink's paper, in ancient and medieval times pastoral nomads of the semi-arid zones of the subcontinent often produced military elites which, through conquest of sedentary lands, established states which could persist for centuries. But in all such cases the pastoral-nomadic elites eventually sedentarized after the conquest. For a long time, people of nomadic origin entering India from outside generally underwent the same fate and had little lasting effect on Indian society. This situation however changed drastically with the arrival of the Turks in the tenth-eleventh centuries. The Turks who conquered India had a Central-Asian nomadic origin and brought about a horse-warrior revolution in the subcontinent that changed forever the terms of warfare and led to a far more effective mobilization of sedentary resources. But the Turks, and other groups which followed in their wake, had to leave their nomadism behind since the new environment in which they found themselves was unsuited to it. Instead the Indian subcontinent continued to rely on the importation of horses.

The case of China, analysed by Barfield, both resembles and differs from this. In Chinese history there are many periods of foreign rule imposed through conquest by people of steppe nomadic origin. Like in India the military advantages of mobile cavalry were important, as was the unlimited supply of horses, but in the case of China the relationships with nomad empires outside China were much closer and continued to be of more importance. Especially when the Chinese dynasties were weak, the steppe nomads served as potent backstops across the sedentary-nomadic divide.

From the Hsiung-nu in the Han dynasty to the Turk and Uighur empires in the Tang dynasty and up to the Mongols during the Ming, nomads of the Mongolian plateau founded empires that militarily confronted China without attempting to conquer Chinese territory. Like in India, the number of nomads confronting China was always small, a fraction only of the sedentary populations. The essential difference between China and India lay not only in the unity of the Chinese imperial state but also in the proximity to China of the Mongolian plateau with its nomadism.

Within Africa, Victor Azarya analyses three major nomadic populations who at different times and in different parts of the continent raided or conquered their sedentary neighbours: the Maasai of East Africa, the Tuareg of the Sahara and the Sahel of West Africa, and the Fulbe of West and Central Africa. All three groups were renowned for their warlike orientation and for their outspoken contempt for sedentaries. They all enjoyed military advantages over their sedentary opponents on account of their mobility and particular military skills. But in each case the expansion of their power took a different form. The Maasai gradually expanded up to the early nineteenth century, when their power reached a peak, and they became increasingly specialized in pastoralism. They did not, however, establish states among or permanent rule over other groups. Their relationships to other nomadic groups were purely antagonistic. With the sedentaries in their neighbourhood they established ties of mutual dependence, while also threatening them and fighting them. Most of the sedentary populations living near the Maasai were however not dominated by them. And for these sedentaries the Maasai impact was therefore an impact from the periphery. The Tuareg, in the pre-colonial period, controlled the trans-Saharan trade routes between North Africa and the Sahel region of West Africa, raiding caravans or providing protection in return for tribute, and they also did not form states of their own. Instead they remained organized as tribal confederations which fought each other as well as other groups. The Tuareg, developing a rigid stratification system with the warriors at the top, subjugated sedentary agriculturists of the Sahel, levied taxes from them, and employed them as agricultural slave labourers. Only the Fulbe, at the forefront of the Islamic military uprisings that shook West Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, created new states or conquered and restructured existing states. The Fulbe, with strengthened feelings of superiority over superficially Islamized agricultural populations and other 'pagan' groups, became a new ruling elite in West Africa and had a far-reaching political, economic and religious impact on the societies affected. The essential point here is that the Fulbe, at the time of the conquests, were still mostly pastoral nomads, and that their nomadic mobility facilitated their conquests of even distant

regions. Families who led the wars became a ruling aristocracy, the basis for a new system of social stratification and a new moral order.

2. NOMADS AND THE TRADE OF THE SEDENTARY WORLD

When we look at the role of nomads in the trade of the sedentary world we have to distinguish between nomads as producers of trade goods which were in demand among the sedentaries from nomads who themselves engaged in trade of either nomadic or sedentary products, and these again from nomads who merely facilitated trade with or within the sedentary world or between different parts of the sedentary world.

Among the papers collected here, Daniel Bradburd's paper on Iran gives the most emphasis on the importance of pastoral products in the trade of a sedentary economy, in this case that of post-Safavid Iran. According to Bradburd, at the end of the nineteenth century, less than 15 per cent of Iran's land was arable for settled agriculture, while pastoral nomads constituted about 25 per cent of Iran's population, i.e. about 2.5 million people. In this context pastoral products such as meat and wool, as also carpets, charcoal, cherry sticks, gums, and galls, played a central role in the internal Iranian economy. This implies that nomads should not be seen, at least in Iran, as a mere burden on the agricultural economy, or as mere extortioners of agricultural products, or as parasites on the settled economy.

Kychanov, in his turn, demonstrates that horses made up the bulk of Tangut exports. The Tanguts often paid with horses for the Buddhist texts which they received from Sung China and from the Kidans of Lyao. The export of horses from nomadic areas to sedentary societies is well-documented for many parts of Arabia, Iran, and the Eurasian steppes throughout the centuries, and hardly requires further comment here. It should be obvious that there was a considerable mutual dependence between the sedentary and nomadic worlds on the products that each of these produced.

A question that is less easily answered relates to the extent to which nomads were themselves actively engaged in actual trading operations. There have been various types of nomads who specialized on trade or transportation, or who geared their animal-raising activity towards transportation and trade, and there are examples of nomads who conducted trade alongside their pastoral activity. The nomad caravaneers described briefly by Wink for India, dealing in grain to supply moving armies and later dominating overland trade in the subcontinent, are an example of these. The Afghan Powindas were nomads who were important in the transportation of goods between India and Central Asia, but were also pastoralists. This

volume, in various places, however, supports the general conclusion for which considerable evidence has already accumulated in other publications: that nomads themselves were not often great long-distance traders. Much more commonly they were facilitators of long-distance trade. It is not that this was necessarily the case; as Azarya recalls, the Maasai presence has often been seen as one of the reasons why the northern trade routes between the Swahili coast and the interior of Africa were less developed than the southern routes. The Maasai nomads may, in effect, have deterred Arab traders and Europeans alike. In general however evidence has been accumulating of nomads as facilitators of trade, and this volume provides further examples of such a role, from India and the Turko-Mongol world, as also from Africa. The question is most systematically addressed in Barfield's paper. Barfield pronounces the nomads 'the godfathers of international overland trade in Eurasia'. According to him, the impact of nomadic steppe empires was especially significant in China, given the bias of Confucian ideology against trade and the prevalent official Chinese ideals of autarky. It was the nomads that drew China into expansion into the 'Western Regions' and the overland silk route. The nomad elites of Mongolia encouraged trade and attempted to attract merchants to offset the limitations of the pastoral economy, seeking grain, metals, hemp, and cotton cloth, as well as silk, satin, wine, precious metals, and other items from the sedentary world. With the unification of the steppe the demand for trade increased, and beyond this the nomads of Mongolia became the centre of an international re-export trade which attracted ever more traders. Nomad empires thus acted as a 'trade pump', drawing surplus goods from China into international markets. But here too the nomads themselves were not commonly long-distance traders themselves.

3. THE NOMADIC IMPACT ON THE SEDENTARY STATE

The view has often been expressed that the nomadic impact on sedentary agriculture and on peasant society in general was more or less destructive. In the papers assembled here no attempt is made to deny that this could be the case. But questions of agrarian and demographic history in relation to nomadic movements have not been systematically addressed in this volume, especially not in a long-term perspective. The editors hope, however, that it will raise some questions about the received wisdom. Studies such as undertaken here in mainly the institutional realm may suggest tentatively how complex patterns of interaction within the sedentary world itself shape the outcome of all kinds of nomadic penetration in various regions of the old world.

Several papers do address the question of the nomadic impact on the formation and development of sedentary states, which is closely related to questions of agricultural history. Thus Bradburd discusses the impact of Turkish and Turko-Mongol invasions in Iran and the problem of nomadic or 'tribal' polities within the Iranian State of later times. Both have been interpreted in almost exclusively negative terms, for turning substantial territories from agriculture into pasturage and ultimately weakening the Iranian State. Iranian politics came to be seen as a constant struggle between centre and tribal-nomadic periphery, until the destruction of tribal power in the mid-twentieth century. Questioning the notion of nomadic 'tribes' in Iran, Bradburd proposes that this struggle is really one between larger and smaller state-like structures, comparable in many ways to the struggle accompanying the formation of national states in Europe. However, the essential difference is that nomads or pastoralists can flee at low cost and that rulers could not force them into compliance. The mobility of pastoral nomads, together with their ability to exploit marginal and hostile environments, makes them more difficult to control than most sedentary populations. Even in post-Safavid Iran, for example under the Qajars, Iran had a weak state. Due to its large size, and to transport and communication difficulties, and due to external pressures, it could not meet the costs of fully integrating pastoral nomads. But this does not mean that the presence of a large pastoral-nomadic population in Iran by itself precluded the creation of a strong state.

Amitai asks the question why in the Islamic Middle East the Seljuqs in the eleventh century were so much less destructive than the Mongols in the thirteenth century. Both were of nomadic, Inner-Asian origin, but the Seljuqs came in smaller numbers and were already committed to Islam. In addition, Amitai suggests important differences in the way that the Seljuqs adopted the trappings of Muslim statecraft, including the iqtā' system of revenue assignment. The Mongols, by contrast, did not adopt these institutions, with far-reaching implications for the Mongol-Ilkhanid government's attitude to land-use, taxation, and the fate of the sedentary population in general.

Wink notes that in India there was not really a nomadic conquest at all, at least not in medieval and early modern times, except in some parts of the northwest frontier areas which were exposed to Mongol nomadism and were either devastated or turned into pasture. The Turkish Muslims who conquered India from the eleventh century onwards did not arrive as nomads. They did not sponsor a great nomadic migration into northern India, as the Mongols had done in Iran. India was ecologically unsuited to large-scale nomadism and it would have been unable to accommodate large numbers of migrating nomads on account of the absence of good pasture

lands, especially for horses. The Turks who entered India as a conquering and future ruling group, by contrast, were already converted to Islam and adopted Islamic institutions of revenue administration. These Turkish conquests did not really modify the equilibrium between nomads and sedentaries. The Islam that they brought to the subcontinent was associated with urban enclaves, not nomadization. Establishing themselves at the interface between the sedentary realm and the arid- or semi-arid marches of India, these conquerors did, however, enlarge India's capacity for warfare, transportation and cultivation, as also for trade.

An entirely different situation is found among nomadic pastoralists in Africa. Here Azarya describes how nomadic raiders and conquerors could subjugate sedentary agriculturists without giving up their nomadism and without actually establishing territorial states. Thus, both the Maasai and the Tuareg would customarily raid their sedentary neighbours. The Tuareg established more permanent forms of dominance over the black sedentary people of the Sahel, such as the Hausa or Songhay, enslaving many of them, taxing them, and incorporating them at the lowest levels of Tuareg society as cultivators of crops for the Tuareg masters. Even though such exploitation of subjected agricultural labour usually indicates types of economic change associated with pastoralists who are engaged in state formation, the Tuareg achieved the same result as stateless nomadic pastoralists living under very harsh climatic conditions in the most marginal circumstances, far from population centres. From a position of marginality they deeply affected the economy and social order of sedentary people, sometimes, but far from always, in a destructive way. The Tuareg case can again be contrasted with that of the Fulbe, pastoral nomads who did create states by establishing themselves as a conquering ruling group in a sedentary society, with deep economic, social and cultural consequences. The Fulbe acquired a huge pool of manpower in the form of slaves. The exploitation of slave labour in agriculture became the basis of a new Fulbe economy, together with the increased control over land. Here the result was also greater permanent settlement, with the pastoral-nomadic element among the Fulbe becoming increasingly marginal and declining as a minority within a sedentarizing group.

4. THE NOMADIC INSTITUTIONAL LEGACY
IN THE SEDENTARY WORLD

The articles collected here deal with a great variety and number of regions, ranging from Hungary to Russia, to West Asia and Africa, Iran, India, Central Asia, and China, and with periods which range from the first

millennium BC to the modern, and even contemporary period. Except the contributions of Wink and Bradburd, all address issues relating to the short-term and middle-term impact of nomads. The volume as a whole deals more with institutional history than with agrarian or economic history. If one general conclusion emerges from these studies it should perhaps be this one: that the impact of nomads on the sedentary world has varied a great deal according to circumstances at work among the nomads themselves and according to those at work in the sedentary world, and that this impact again varied over the short, middle and long term. But closely related to this conclusion is another one: that nomads may have energized or destroyed sedentary people, but that they left no enduring institutional legacy among them. This is irrespective of the fact that the nomads not uncommonly were great disseminators of the institutions of the sedentary world (such as, for example, the iqṭā' system of revenue assignments). While showing the different ways in which the nomadic impact varied in different parts of the sedentary world, the conclusions of all authors were remarkably congruent in this regard. They show that those nomadic practices that were at odds with sedentary ones and were simply imposed by nomads on sedentary societies did not last long. To the contrary, even victorious nomads had for the most part to adjust to or adopt the socio-political institutions of the conquered, sedentary populations.

Thus Golden and Noonan examine the often-made assertion that the system of succession 'by scales' to the Grand Principate of Kiev was taken from the nomadic Turkic world, more specifically from the Khazars. This was actually a system of collateral succession, allowing for a large group of kinsmen (the royal clan) to retain a kind of collective sovereignty over the state in order to avert fragmentation. This same system, which allowed constant movement without establishing more permanent ties with a region, has also been traced back to an alleged Viking past of the Rus' dynasty. The two papers show that, while there were some nomadic influences in Kiev, most notably in burial ritual, and also in the adoption of the qaghanal dignity itself (with the associated notion of a divine mandate to rule), and while it is true that the system of collateral succession is in evidence here, it cannot be proven that the latter was borrowed from the Khazars, or, for that matter, from later Turkic nomadic peoples who were neighbours of the Rus'. Moreover, the other influences, associated with the qaghanal title and divine mandate to rule, did not become a part of a permanent nomadic legacy in the eastern Slavic world.

Allsen analyses the fate of the Chinggisid 'sharing system', a territorial dispensation which was a direct outgrowth of well-established nomadic practice. It was a part of nomadic political culture that leaders redistributed part of their newly acquired wealth among their family and retainers. People

were 'shared out' or apportioned in this way, as were booty, cattle, pasture lands, and, in the end, agricultural land as well. This system of apportioning shares may have affected over 900,000 households between 1236 and 1258 in China alone, and in Iran a very large portion of the agricultural population was shared out in a similar way. The idea was that all Chinggisids would retain a kind of joint property right in these shared territories. The shares served as a diplomatic tool in the shifting alliances among the Chinggisids, and it had in fact been intended as a tool to keep the expanding empire together. While it is difficult or impossible to establish what exactly were the effects of this system on the sedentary population (there may have been forced re-settlements connected with the system), Allsen's main point is that the legacy of the system was not that it created a new model for the sedentary world. To the contrary, it merely allowed the Mongols' successors a measure of flexibility in refashioning new relations to the degree that older patterns had been disrupted by the imposition of this system.

Concerning the legacy of the nomadic Cumans in Hungary, Berend observes that on the short term they reinforced a 'pagan' image of Hungary among its neighbours, but that eventually they assimilated in dress, customs, language, and culture. The main direction of influences was from the sedentary society towards the Cumans. Pressure was put on the nomads to 'conform to Christian ways' and to settle down permanently - which is what had happened by the fifteenth century.

Other groups of nomads in Central Asia, India, and Africa, described in this volume by Kychanov, Wink, and Azarya, represent situations in which the sedentary institutions and culture gradually transform the nomadic ones. Kychanov's nomadic Tanguts adopted Confucianism as the ideology of their state, Buddhism as their main religion, and as a ruling elite underwent a gradual Sinification. In India the domain of pastoral nomadism shrank drastically over the centuries, and the nomads which were indigenous to the subcontinent, if they did not sedentarize, often adopted the institutions of the agrarian societies in which they were assigned to the margins. Of nomadic institutions that were imposed by invading nomads there is no permanent record, although some traces of foreign nomadic cultures continue to be in evidence in India today. In Africa, with British assistance in the colonial period, agriculturists forever continued to encroach upon Maasai pastoral lands, which were further reduced by the expansion of wildlife reserves and the upsurge of Safari-related tourism. In post-colonial times the impact has been predominantly from the sedentary groups on the nomads. For the Tuareg the onset of colonial rule and the decline of trans-Saharan trade brought a similar scenario of demilitarization, rapid marginalization, and sedentarization. Even the Fulbe, whose impact on sedentary societies was revolutionary in political, economic and cultural terms, cannot be said to

have transmitted any specifically nomadic institutions to the people they subjugated in what was essentially a series of Islamic 'holy wars' or jihāds. In the colonial and post-colonial periods the nomadic element, among the Fulbe too, continued to decline.

What this seems to suggest, then, is that the institutional framework of sedentary life, wherever it is found, is not merely more persistent than that of nomadism, but that it could even be argued that the nomadic world generated almost no institutions that could be maintained in the sedentary world. Perpetual movement is the essence of nomadism. Nomads can enhance the mobility of people and trade goods, and they can galvanize other elements of sedentary society. They can also support it militarily. But they cannot give it anything that resembles a self-sustaining political-institutional infrastructure. And it is for this reason that the sedentary world in the long term always won out over the nomads.

5. THE CONDITION OF 'POST-NOMADISM'

The editors of this volume recognize that all of the above phenomena deserve to be investigated further. One main concern in the future should probably be to arrive at a better understanding of what we may call 'post-nomadism': all those cultural practices and traditions that are found among pastoral nomads who became part of the sedentary world and that are rightly or wrongly attributed to a nomadic past. Post-nomadism itself can only be understood as a corollary of transition, and therefore it may be hard to grasp. It reflects the condition of a whole range of societies over many centuries which were without fixed parameters and boundaries, and which had changing identities. Post-nomadism is mainly a cultural and not, as this volume demonstrates, a political phenomenon. If the research papers presented here should encourage the exploration of this condition, the editors will feel their efforts have been amply rewarded.

Nomads in the Sedentary World

Edited by Anatoly M. Khazanov and André Wink

The impact of the sedentary world on nomads has been well-covered by previous scholarship. However, the issue of the impact of pastoral nomads on the sedentary world, and their role in it, has generated premature and incomplete conclusions which, if not outright ideological, were almost never substantiated by detailed studies, and which still need to be fitted into a comparative framework. This book addresses these various shortcomings in the context of the history of Eurasia and Africa by studying the important role nomads have played in the political, ethno-linguistic, socio-economic, and cultural developments in many parts of the sedentary world.

This collection addresses issues relating to the impact of nomads on regions from Hungary to West Africa, North Africa, Iran, India, and China during periods ranging from the first millennium BC to the early modern period. The conclusions show the different ways in which the nomadic impact varied according to factors at work in the sedentary societies. Those nomadic institutions that were at odds with sedentary ones, and were simply imposed on sedentary societies, did not last long. On the contrary, even victorious nomads had to adjust to or adopt the socio-political institutions of conquered, sedentary populations - which raises the issue of drawing a distinction between genuinely nomadic and 'post-nomadic' institutions and traditions.

Anatoly M. Khazanov, FBA, is Ernest Gellner Professor of Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. **André Wink** is Professor of History at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

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Cover photograph: An early Medieval Turkic burial monument in Mongolia.
Photograph A. M. Khazanov

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