

PLATO'S Parmenides

Translated and with an
Introduction and Commentary by

SAMUEL SCOLNICOV

Plato's *Parmenides*

The Joan Palevsky  Imprint in Classical Literature

In honor of beloved Virgil—

"O degli altri poeti onore e lume . . ."

—Dante, *Inferno*

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ABBREVIATIONS

In this volume, fragments of the poem of Parmenides are cited as they appear in the edition of Diels and Kranz (1951), volume 1, number 28, section B. The other works cited in abbreviated form in the text and notes are listed immediately below.

DK Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* 6th ed., 3 vols. Berlin: Weidmann, 1951.

LSJ H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, eds., *A Greek-English Lexicon,* 9th ed., rev. H. S. Jones. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book has been a long time in the making. It resulted from a growing awareness, over almost twenty years, of the importance of the *Parmenides* for the understanding of Plato's mature metaphysics and of the gradual realization that nothing short of a line-by-line commentary could do justice to its intricacies and its far-reaching implications.

I have discussed the approaches and ideas developed in this book with many more people than I can hope to thank adequately. Some, however, deserve special mention. I am, first of all, indebted to my students and my colleagues over the years in seminars at the Universities of Jerusalem, Catania, Padua, Toronto, Irvine, and Paris-I for testing with me the interpretations advanced. To those from the Cambridge B-Club and Monique Dixsaut's seminar at Paris-XII, I am thankful for healthy skepticism. To Denis O'Brien and Rosamond Kent Sprague I am grateful for their encouragement and for having read one of the final versions of this book, questioning points I too readily took for granted.

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Many errors and oversights no doubt remain. For those, I must take full responsibility.

Paris, May 2002

J. A. Palmer's book, *Plato's Reception of Parmenides* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) came to my attention when this book was already in press, and so I have not been able to take full account of it, as it deserves. However, in the present book, I am less concerned than Palmer with Plato's reception of Parmenides. As will become clear, I acknowledge Plato's debt to Parmenides, as Palmer does, but I see Plato's main aim in the *Parmenides* as to clarify his own metaphysical standpoint in opposition to Parmenides and improve on him while, at the same time, stressing the absolute necessity of Parmenides' conception of being for any non-nominalistic metaphysics and epistemology.

Introduction

Toute interprétation du dialogue qui laissera séparées les deux parties de l'oeuvre ne pourrait nous satisfaire.

—WAHL (1951), 8

PLATO VERSUS PARMENIDES

Of all Plato's dialogues, the *Parmenides* is notoriously the most difficult to interpret. Scholars of all periods have violently disagreed about its very aims and subject matter. The interpretations have ranged from reading the dialogue as an introduction to the whole of Platonic—and more often Neoplatonic—metaphysics[1] to viewing it as a record of unsolved (and perhaps unsolvable) "honest perplexities,"[2] as protreptic "mental gymnastics,"[3] as a collection of sophistic tricks,[4] or even as an elaborate (though admittedly tedious) joke.[5]

Part I of the dialogue and especially the Third Man Argument have no doubt received more than their fair share of effort and ingenuity. During the last forty-odd years, the Third Man Argument has undergone detailed scrutiny by logicians, philosophers, classicists, and, in general, anyone who felt any connection with the subject, however distant. But while fine logical tools have been used to interpret the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* with important and interesting results, the *Parmenides* as a whole seems to have been,

1. For a summary of Neoplatonic interpretations, see Dodds (1928), Wundt (1935). The esotericist interpretation (e.g., Migliori [1990]), influenced by Krämer, can be seen as a variant of this trend. In the same vein, Séguy-Duclot (1998) interprets the dialogue as pointing beyond itself, to higher levels, up to a henological point of view above ontology.

2. Vlastos (1965b [1954]), 145.

3. Grote (1875), III, chap. 27; Peck (1953–54); cf. Kutschera (1995). See also Wilamowitz (1948), I 402; most recently Gill, "Introduction," in Gill and Ryan (1996). Klibansky (1943: 28 n. 1) attributes such a view already to Alcinous (Albinus), possibly on the strength of chaps. 5 and 6 of his *Didaskalikos*.

4. E.g., Owen (1986 [1970]).

5. Cf., e.g., Taylor (1934), 29.

until quite recently, rather neglected. Gilbert Ryle's renewed suggestion that Parts I and II of the dialogue are only loosely connected (and were probably composed at different times) is perhaps not always explicitly accepted, but until recently it has with few exceptions been as a rule tacitly assumed, especially in the English-language literature, at least for practical purposes.[6]

In this dialogue, Plato directly engages Parmenides, the most serious challenge to his own philosophy.[7] Plato's interest in Parmenides is not new. From the beginning, his forms were meant to meet the requirements of Parmenidean being.[8] Plato himself had reservations about Parmenides' method and doctrine, mainly in connection with his own doctrine of participation.[9] But never before had Plato confronted Parmenidean philosophy so directly and at such depth. From a Parmenidean point of view, there is no room for the most basic of Plato's ontological concepts: the concept of μέθεξις, 'participation'.[10] Unless a comprehensive alternative is offered to Parmenides' logic and ontology, participation will remain unintelligible, and the Platonic philosophical program will be nothing short of incoherent.

In the *Parmenides,* Plato reexamines his doctrine of forms and participation as developed in his central metaphysical dialogues, the *Phaedo,* the *Symposium,* and the *Republic,* and provides it with a rigorous logical foundation. Part I of the dialogue is an examination of the concept of μέθεξις *from an Eleatic point of view.* According to the Parmenidean view (or Plato's version of it), being does not admit of distinctions. Even if there could be two ontological domains, or two types of entities, a relation straddling them both, like μέθεξις, would still be impossible. In Part II, Plato distinguishes between two modes of being, provides an extensive analysis of each, dissolves the apo-

6. See Apelt (1919); Wundt (1935); Ryle (1965), 145; cf. also Thesleff (1982). But the tide may be turning: see, e.g., Miller (1986); Meinwald (1991); Gill, "Introduction," in Gill and Ryan (1996); Turnbull (1998). For summaries of previous interpretations, see Runciman (1965 [1959]), 167–76; Niewöhner (1971); Migliori (1990).

7. Calogero (1932) recognized the anti-Eleatic nature of the dialogue but read it as an ironical *reductio ad absurdum* of the "eleatismo megarico . . . di paternità zenoniana" in the manner of Gorgias's Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.

8. Parmenides' influence on Plato has been recognized since Antiquity: e.g., by Proclus in his commentary on the dialogue. See also Zeller (1876), 148 f. The question whether Parmenides held that τὸ ἐόν is one in the sense that there exists only one thing (Mourelatos [1970], 130 ff.; Curd [1991]) is irrelevant at this point. It is enough that Plato accepted that, at least for certain purposes, each of the forms must satisfy the restrictions that Parmenides imposed on his ἐόν.

9. Cf., e.g., *Phaedo* 100c4–6. See also below, pp. 12–16, on the Principle of Noncontradiction, and pp. 3–6, on method.

10. Throughout this volume, single quotation marks are used to indicate translations, glosses, concepts, hypotheses, and words as such. Double quotation marks are used for direct quotations and as so-called scare quotes; and language adopted from the translation, but not taken directly from it, is also shown within double quotation marks.

riae of Part I, and prepares the ground for the metaphysics of the *Sophist*. By his own admission, Plato may have murdered "our father Parmenides" only in the *Sophist,*[11] but the weapon of the crime was already cocked and pointed in the *Parmenides*. On this interpretation, the *Parmenides* does indeed occupy a central place in the development of Plato's late ontology, though not as a turning point.[12]

An examination of the overall strategy of the *Parmenides* shows that the two parts of the dialogue form a coherent and integrated whole, in which Part II lays the foundation for an alternative to Eleatic ontology and methodology, thus providing what Plato considers to be an adequate answer to the dilemma construed by Parmenides in Part I of the dialogue. It will turn out, however, that Plato thought that his conception of μέθεξις as being qualifiedly cannot totally supplant but can only complement the Parmenidean conception of being absolutely.[13]

Such an interpretation of the dialogue permits a unified and economical explication of its eight Arguments and the Appendix on participation in time, without being purely formal,[14] and without losing the wealth of possible metaphysical overtones.[15] The interpretation relies on an analysis of the antithetical structure of the dialogue. But this antithetical structure will not prevent ontological considerations about degrees of reality and modes of being from playing a central role in the argument. Much to the contrary, it is precisely the examination of this structure that leads to the detection of the contrast between, as well as the contiguity of, the two modes of being that Plato explores in this dialogue.

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD

Plato opposes Parmenides not only in regard to metaphysics, in a technical sense, but also, perhaps mainly, in regard to the method and aims of philo-

11. *Sophist* 241d2–7.

12. As claimed by de Vogel (1936); for a review, see Cherniss (1938).

13. I have proposed this view in Scolnicov (1984) and (1995).

14. As, e.g., Brumbaugh (1961). Note that in the present volume the term 'Argument' (capitalized) is used to designate each of the eight argumentative sections, and their subsections, in Part II of the dialogue (improperly called 'Hypotheses' since Antiquity). The term 'argument' (lowercase) refers to a complete train of reasoning, of any nature. Similarly, I use the term 'Hypothesis' (capitalized) to designate each of the two main propositions examined in Part II (each in its turn divided into four Arguments), in accordance with the method that Parmenides proposes at the end of Part I, viz. 'The one is' and 'The one is not'. The term 'hypothesis' (lowercase) refers to any proposition put forth for examination, as per Plato's method of hypothesis, explained in the next section.

15. E.g., as developed by Lynch (1959) and other interpreters of Neoplatonic inspiration, ancient and modern.

sophical argumentation. Such disagreement is not new with Plato, but only in this dialogue is it brought out in the open in all its depth and breadth.

Parmenides may be said to be the first Cartesian philosopher. He is the first to tackle the problem of method and to make truth dependent on it. He does so explicitly: witness his insistence on ὁδός, the 'way', and on the path that 'leads to truth'.[16] And he is Cartesian also in the method he favors: an absolutely certain, undeniable, primordial intuition is attained, and consequences are deduced from it. That fundamental rational intuition takes absolute priority over common perception, and truth is to be reconstructed from it according to strict rules of procedure. Even if Parmenides' method is not Descartes's in its details, still, like Descartes, the Eleatic philosopher reaches his conclusions starting from a premise considered as self-evident and as taking precedence over any other proposition one could entertain. The certainty of the conclusions is guaranteed by the certainty of this primary intuition (and also, of course, by the soundness of the procedure; but, as we shall see presently, the content of that intuition is intimately bound up with the method itself). No conclusion can be more certain than the premises from which it derives, and nothing is independently certain except the basic premise.

Parmenides' intuition is basically formal. As Kurt von Fritz has shown in his classic article, νόος is the faculty of seeing the truth behind appearances. With Parmenides, νόος becomes also intellectual intuition and the reasoning faculty.[17] This intuition, notwithstanding its far-reaching ontological implications, is primarily concerned with method, with the *way* to attain truth. Throughout his poem, Parmenides is enjoined to come to a κρίσις, to separate or to distinguish.[18] The first step on the way leading to the truth to be apprehended by νόος is a distinction. There are for νόος only two ways of inquiry: ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν [. . .], ἡ δ' ὡς οὔκ ἐστιν, 'the one, that (it) is [. . .]; the other, that (it) is not' (fr. 2.3, 5).[19] At this stage, there is no need to go into the vexed question of the meaning of ἔστιν in this fragment, as so many interpreters have done. Whatever else may be said about the first lines of the Way of Truth, at least one thing is immediately clear: what one part of the sentence affirms, the other denies. The primordial distinction is between *yes* and *no*. For the moment, one could take ἔστιν as a placeholder for some predicate—say, *A*. For νόος, then, there are two possibilities and

16. Ὁδός: frr. 1.2, 5, 27; 2.2; 6.3; 7.2, 3; 8.1, 18. Ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ: fr. 2.4.

17. Von Fritz (1974), building on Snell (1924). For a rather more nuanced picture, see now Lesher (1981).

18. Cf. fr. 7.5, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ; fr. 8.16, κέκριται δ' οὖν, etc.

19. It may not be totally superfluous to remark that the pronoun 'it' is not in the Greek and appears in the English translation for purely grammatical reasons; nothing should be made to hang on it.

two only: *A* or not-*A*. Whatever it is that is being considered must be either affirmed or else denied.

But Parmenides goes further: '(It) is', he says, 'and cannot not be [. . .]; and (it) is not, and must needs not be.' But although the disjunction of the categorical affirmation and the categorical negation, '(it) is' or '(it) is not', is exhaustive, this is not so for necessary affirmation and necessary negation. Not every affirmation and every negation are necessary. For Parmenides, however, the domain under consideration is solely the rational domain attainable by *νόος: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι*, 'for the same is for thinking and for being' (fr. 3).[20] And, in this domain, there is no room for contingency. As in deductive geometry (which was to develop in the wake of Parmenides himself),[21] all affirmations are necessary, and all negations likewise.[22]

Whatever is inconsistent with this primary intuition must be discarded as false. Hence the main procedure of Parmenides in his poem, namely the *reductio ad absurdum.* Parmenides' truth is what survives *ἔλεγχος*, 'refutation'.[23] This procedure is especially apparent, for example, in the proof of the impossibility of generation and destruction (fr. 8.5–21). In that same passage, another element of the Parmenidean method is clearly displayed. In order to prove the falsity of the premise under consideration, Parmenides sets up a dichotomy (expressly warranted by the exhaustiveness of the *κρίσις*; cf. fr. 8.15–16), and on this dichotomy he builds up a dilemma: if *h,* then either *p* or not-*p;* but *p* is impossible, and so is not-*p;* therefore, *h* must be false. If there is generation (or destruction), then it is either from (or to) what is or from (or to) what is not;[24] but generation (or destruction) can be neither from (or to) what is nor from (or to) what is not; therefore, there is no generation (or destruction). This procedure seems to have been particularly identified with the Eleatic school. Gorgias parodied it as such in his *On What Is Not; or, On Nature,* and Zeno, Parmenides' follower, developed it at great length in his book. (And Plato not unadvisedly elaborates on it at *Parmenides* 127e1–128a3, immediately at the beginning of the aporetic Part I of the dialogue.)

As early as the *Meno,* very early in the development of his mature metaphysics, Plato opposes to Parmenides' method his own method of hypothe-

20. On the grammar of this sentence, see Guthrie (1962–81), II 14.

21. Szábó (1969).

22. Cf. Scolnicov (1984), (1995).

23. Cf. Furley (1989). Lesher (1989) understands *ἔλεγχος* in this context as 'examination'.

24. Strictly, the second disjunct should be "or it is not from what is." The implicit passage from "not from what is" to "from what is not" is justified by the joint exhaustiveness and exclusiveness of "what is" and "what is not." But once the Parmenidean framework is abandoned, the passage is not unconditionally sound. See below, on 162e3 ff.

sis. Philosophy, he will explicitly claim later, is not deductive, or synthetic, and cannot rely on starting premises presumed self-evident.[25]

ELENCHUS

Socrates' dialectic in the earlier Platonic dialogues no doubt owes much to Eleatic method, especially as developed by Zeno. (Not only to it, of course; but this is what interests us in the present context.) It has strict rules, which have been the subject of much detailed and fruitful investigation.[26] Here, I shall only stress some points that will later prove relevant to our dialogue too, despite the lateness of its date.[27]

1. All premises are to be introduced or accepted by the interlocutor. The aim of the Socratic elenchus is to disabuse the interlocutor of his false opinions through testing and eventually refuting them. There would be no point in refuting a position that does not, in some way, have the interlocutor's agreement. This agreement can be, and very often is, implicit in, or merely required by, the logic of the general position of Socrates' partner, even despite his explicit denial.[28]
2. All moves in the argument must be sanctioned by the interlocutor. In the trivial case, he must answer to that effect at each and every step. In the less obvious case, Socrates takes the liberty of making a move to which the interlocutor *should* agree if he were consistently to hold to his position. Thus, for example, at *Meno* 96c Socrates thinks himself entitled to reject the view that virtue is knowledge, on the ground that it has no teachers, because it is Meno's conception that all knowledge is acquired by external teaching. Thus, too, in the *Protagoras,* Socrates allows himself the conversion of "the brave are confident" into "the confident are brave," because Protagoras cannot, on his own premises, and despite his protestations, provide a *differentia* for courage.[29]
3. As a consequence of the two previous points, Socrates must work within quite narrow limits. All conclusions are to be reached only on the assumption of the truth of the hypothesis under consideration. Until the hypothesis and its implications are examined as thoroughly as possible, no arguments are admitted that are incompatible with it. Plato makes this requirement explicit as the first step of his method of hypothesis in the

25. Cf. *Meno* 86e ff.; *Republic* VI 510d1, ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, '*as if* evident to all'; and pp. 9–12 below.

26. Cf., e.g. Robinson (1953), 7–32; Ryle (1966), 110 ff.; Vlastos (1983), 27–58, esp. 39; *et alii.*

27. On the date of the *Parmenides,* see Brisson (1994).

28. E.g., Polus at *Gorgias* 466e5.

29. *Protagoras* 350c ff.

Phaedo.[30] Once a proposition is held up for examination, all moves are conditional on the hypothetical truth of the position being examined and cannot be detached from it. Moreover, when a concept (say, courage or virtue) is being examined, it is to be taken, until the hypothesis is changed, in the sense explicitly or implicitly accepted by the interlocutor. When Socrates sometimes deviates from such a sense, it is because he maintains that what he says follows from or is implied by the words of his interlocutor.

4. Considerations external to the position examined are as a rule brought in only toward the end of the elenchus. These are opinions agreed to be held by the interlocutor (but not always unconditionally true) that contradict the conclusions reached so far in the examination and clarification of the initial premise. In this case, either the initial premise or the newly introduced accepted opinion has to be abandoned. Obviously, even if only because of Plato's literary forethought, it is the initial premise that is discarded.[31]
5. There is to the Socratic elenchus an important pragmatic and emotional component. Callicles, for example, is reduced to anger and to silence not because he dispassionately realizes that his opinions as stated in conversation with Socrates are contradictory, but because he is ashamed to face up to their logical consequences.[32] This element is lacking in the Eleatic elenchus,[33] and in our dialogue it is fittingly not prominent. Yet, as we shall see, pragmatic contradiction plays a small but crucial role in Plato's argumentation. (See on 142a6–8, below.) Young Aristoteles' characterization in Part II is minimal.[34] But the personal element cannot be completely neutralized: the shift in the conceptual framework is required only of him who is engaged in the dialectical exchange—unless, like Philebus or Aristotle's vegetable of *Metaphysics* Γ,[35] he is content to keep quiet. The *pragmatic* impossibility of the aporiae, 'perplexities', of Part I and of Argument I in Part II must be made as generally valid as possible without disregarding the personal involvement necessary in the dialectical situation.[36]

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30. *Phaedo* 100a, and p. 10, below.
31. Cf., e.g., *Meno* 95c ff.
32. *Gorgias* 494e.
33. Cf. Lesher (1989), Scolnicov (1996).
34. Throughout I shall use 'Aristoteles' to refer to Parmenides' respondent in the dialogue and 'Aristotle' as the name of the philosopher. Cf. below, pp. 45, 78.
35. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Γ 4.1006a15.
36. Miller (1986) has stressed the importance of the personal element but interpreted it differently.

The Socratic and the Zenonian dialectic are both destructive, in that both aim at exhibiting the falsity of the position held by the opponent. But there is between them an important difference, which will be at play in the *Parmenides*. Zeno's dialectic seeks to prove impossibility and to bring the opponent to abandon his position. Assuming that motion is possible, it must be either continuous or discrete; but it can be neither; therefore, it is impossible. If things are many, they can be neither finitely nor infinitely divisible; therefore, things are not many.[37] Socratic dialectic, over and above refutation, aims at setting up an aporia in order to shock the respondent into a shift in his conceptual framework—into, say, a totally new understanding of utility (as in the *Apology* or the *Gorgias*) or of knowledge (as in, e.g., the *Theaetetus*).[38] The prime example of such conversion is the shift undergone by Meno's slave boy: at first he can perceive numbers only as natural—there can be no number between two and three—but he eventually comes to the admission of irrational (or incommensurable) magnitudes, such as the ratio of the side of the square to its diagonal (*Meno* 82b ff.).

On the Eleatic interpretation of aporia, Parmenides' strategy in Part I should show that μέθεξις is impossible. But on a Socratic-Platonic interpretation, the aporia calls for a change of hypothesis and a complete shift in the understanding of the concept of being.

APORIA AND EUPORIA

Whether or not Socrates thought that elenchus could bring him to truth or only to a provisional assumption of consistency, Plato evidently held in the so-called middle dialogues that elenchus alone is not enough and that a firmer base has to be sought for knowledge. However, in the typical case (but not necessarily in all cases), Plato is not intent on deducing consequences from premises taken as evident and constructing from them a metaphysical system, in the classical manner of, say, Descartes or Spinoza, or, for that matter, Parmenides. In the typical case (e.g., *Phaedo* 99d ff.), Plato is primarily interested in untying aporiae. An aporia (literally, 'no passage') occurs when an objection is raised against an hypothesis under examination and seems effectively to block that hypothesis. The objections of Simmias and Cebes in the *Phaedo* are good examples of such moves (84b10–88b8; cf. 91c7–d9).

The dialectical procedure is, in its general outline, quite simple: the opponent has an opinion or an hypothesis, supposed to solve a given problem. The aim of the dialectical move is to block the way, to show why the opinion

37. Cf. frr. 28 B 1, 2 DK.
38. Cf. Mittlestrass (1988 [1982]), Scolnicov (1991).

or the hypothesis will not do. It is not a general proof of impossibility. It is simply a showing that, on *those* premises, the problem will not be solved. As we shall see, this is the procedure in Part I of the *Parmenides,* where the problem of the one and the many is shown not to be solved by the concept of participation under the interpretation assumed there. The aim of the argument that follows such objections in the postaporetic dialogues is to open a way, to secure euporia, 'free passage'. Plato is not seeking a constructive proof of the desired conclusion; it suffices for him that nothing prevents that conclusion from being true under certain agreed assumptions. This is the procedure also in the *Meno* (86e ff.), in the *Phaedo* (98b ff.), in the *Republic* after the aporia of Book I, in the *Philebus* (15a ff.), and elsewhere.[39]

Plato has two technical formulas (as usual with him, disguised as colloquial expressions) for marking aporia and euporia. Often, when an objection is threatened or announced, the question asking for its deployment is *τί κωλύει*; ('What prevents?'). The interlocutor assumes his position is sound, and he wants to know what prevents it from being an acceptable solution to the problem at hand.[40] Similarly, when euporia is deemed to have been attained, it is announced by the expression *οὐδὲν κωλύει* ('Nothing prevents')—that is, if the proposed solution is accepted, nothing prevents us from holding on to our position.[41]

Joseph Owens has shown Aristotle's euporetical approach and pointed to its terminological roots in Plato.[42] But Aristotle's debt to Plato seems much more than terminological: it has to do with what Plato, and Aristotle after him, considered an adequate solution to a philosophical problem, namely achieving euporia. Nevertheless, one can surely detect in Plato a trend toward systematization, which comes to full expression in the idea of philosophy as *σύνοψις* and in the conception of the *ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή*, the 'unhypothetical beginning', as the beginning of all hypotheses.

THE METHOD OF HYPOTHESIS

In the *Meno* (86e ff.) and the *Phaedo* (100a ff.), Plato introduced his new method of hypothesis. The method, as explained in these dialogues, is analogous to the geometrical method of analysis, and consists in supposing the truth of the desired conclusion and then looking for *the condition of its possibility.* The method does not *prove* the conclusion. It only shows *on what as-*

39. Cf. further Scolnicov (1975a), (1975b), (1992b).

40. See, e.g., *Charmides* 163a5, *Euthyphro* 9d7, *Phaedo* 77b6, *Theaetetus* 208a6.

41. See, e.g., *Charmides* 162b9, 163a6, 164a1; *Euthyphro* 9d8; *Gorgias* 526a2; *Theaetetus* 158c5, 199d6; *Sophist* 245a2, *οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει.* And cf. Aristotle, *Physics* VIII 4.255b12.

42. Owens (1963), 214, 215 n. 16. Allen (1983: vii) quotes Owens on aporia and euporia, but fails to take euporia seriously.

sumption or assumptions the conclusion is possible. It provides εὐπορία, 'free passage', by proposing an hypothesis that can withstand forseeable opposition.

The first step in testing the hypothesis is essentially the Socratic elenchus: what does not agree with the hypothesis is posited as not true; what does agree, as true. As in the Socratic elenchus, the basic relation is that of 'disagreement' (διαφωνεῖν): that is, of contradiction between the hypothesis and the proposition being considered. The relation of agreement is nothing more than the negation of disagreement: two propositions agree when 'there is no impediment' (οὐδὲν κωλύει) to affirming them both together.

Such a procedure can give us not the truth, but only the possibility of truth.[43] As Richard Robinson pointed out, the verb τίθημι, 'posit', is used by Plato in these contexts to designate the holding of some belief in a "provisional and tentative" manner.[44] Thus, what agrees with the hypothesis is "posited" provisionally as true; what does not, as false (*Phaedo* 100a).

The second step of the method of hypothesis has to do with the hypothesis itself. Here too, the method gives us a tool for disproving hypotheses. Hypotheses entailing consequences that contradict them, or each other, or other propositions 'worthy of acceptance' (*Phaedo* 92d7) have been discarded. Other hypotheses will stand not because they are true but because they have not been disproved. Lack of disproof, however, is clearly not sufficient. The transition from a given opinion to its supporting hypothesis is no more than the transition from one opinion to another. Yet Plato says explicitly that progress from opinion to knowledge is to be achieved 'in the same manner' (ὡσαύτως): by laying down yet another hypothesis (101d7). The somewhat surprising upshot of the second part of the method of hypothesis is that the logos given is itself an opinion, and is tested only for lack of disproof.

Nevertheless, the chain of hypotheses proceeds "upward." That is to say, the direction of the development of the chain of logoi is from the ontologically posterior to the ontologically prior. For Plato, dropping the claim to validity is tantamount to obliterating his basic distinctions, first drawn in the *Meno* and never since abandoned, between true and false opinion and between (true) opinion and knowledge. Without it, concepts like 'giving a logos' or 'higher hypothesis' are deflated of their meaning. But the claim to validity is met only at the *end* of the hypothetical chain: 'until you reach something sufficient' (*Phaedo* 101d8). In the *Phaedo,* this 'something sufficient' is only psychological and contextual, *ad hominem,* and its validity is merely subjective. But, as Socrates remarks at 107b5 on 'the first hypotheses', subjective validity is not sufficient as a foundation of knowledge: hence the demand

43. Cf. above, p. 8.
44. Robinson (1953), 94.

in the *Republic* for an unhypothetical principle. But we shall not follow this line here.[45]

Plato's method of hypothesis is more than an argumentative tool. Implied in it is a fundamental change in the conception of the task of philosophy and of what counts as a valid philosophical argument. Philosophy does not *prove* from first principles. Rather, it starts from convictions accepted beforehand (in particular the conviction that there is a real difference between truth and falsehood) and establishes the principles that support these convictions.

In proper philosophical argumentation, the 'principles' (*ἀρχαί*) come not in the beginning but in the end. Philosophy always starts *in medias res*. Via hypotheses, euporia leads to the *ἀρχαί*, and eventually to the *ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή*. Philosophical argumentation moves not, as with Parmenides, *from* the *ἀρχαί* but *to* the *ἀρχαί*.[46] This point is forcefully made in the Divided Line (*Republic* VI 510b4–9): philosophy is *not* mathematics, since it has its own distinctive nondeductive method.[47] Until the unhypothetical principle is attained, the progress from one step to the next runs counter to deduction, and the conclusions are more certain than the hypotheses devised to support them. The 'strength' of the hypothesis (cf. *Phaedo* 100e4, *ἐρρωμενέστατον*) is, in fact, judged by reference to its contribution to the solution of the problem at hand. Until the hypotheses are "removed" by being supported by still higher hypotheses, they draw all their justification from their claim to support the desired conclusion. This is why Plato considers himself entitled to draw his hypotheses from poets, myths, "dreams," unexplained intuitions, or whatever else comes to hand.

An important feature of the dialectical method is that no conclusion can be detached from its premises. Plato quite often stresses this dependence of the conclusions on their premises by repeating the protasis with the emphatic *εἴπερ* or *ἐπείπερ*, 'if indeed'. This is particularly noticeable in the *Parmenides*.[48]

It emerges from such considerations that one of the functions of the *ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή* is to guarantee that conclusions *can* be detached from their premises. Those propositions that were asserted only hypothetically on the way up, to the *ἀρχή*, can be asserted apodictically on the way down, from the *ἀρχή*. As we shall see in the analysis of the Arguments in the *Parmenides*, the 'one' in Argument VIII will fulfill a structurally similar role (although it should not, therefore, be simply equated with the *ἀρχή* of the *Republic*).

Plato gives the name *ὑπόθεσις* to only one of the premises that conjointly entail the conclusion, and sometimes even looks for only one of these

45. I have done this in Scolnicov (1975a).

46. Cf. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* I 3.1095c32.

47. Cf. also Plato's criticism of mathematics at *Republic* VII 533c3–5.

48. *Εἰπερ*: see, e.g., 138a8, d8; 146b2, c6; 152a3, 5; etc. *Ἐπείπερ*: see, e.g., 148d2, 149d4, 157b9, 159a8, 162b3, 163d8.

premises, presumably the one that in his eyes is the most important or the most controversial. Plato is not looking for the set of propositions whose conjunction is sufficient to entail the conclusion. He is interested in the *main* premise (called also *αἰτία*, the 'reason' or the 'cause'), which, in conjunction with the set of standing assumptions, entails the desired conclusion. The *ὑπόθεσις* is not a sufficient condition. While it is being examined, all other assumptions are kept undisputed. (So, e.g., in the *Meno.*) Sometimes, as in the *Meno,* Plato specifies these assumptions; sometimes he does not, as in the *Republic.*[49]

An examination of the textual evidence shows that the term *ὑπόθεσις* and its cognates are used by Plato indifferently of propositions or states of affairs (*Meno* 87a2, d2–3; *Republic* IV 437a6; perhaps also *Phaedo* 107b5), or of single terms or things (*Republic* VI 510c3–5; cf. *Theaetetus* 191c8–9), without paying attention to the distinction between formal and material uses (*Republic* VII 533c8).[50]

TWO PRINCIPLES OF NONCONTRADICTION

At *Republic* IV 436b8–c1, Plato formulates what is usually thought to be his version of the Principle of Noncontradiction:

> It is clear that the same thing will not consent [*οὐκ ἐθελήσει*] simultaneously to do or suffer opposites—at any rate not in the same respect and[51] in relation to the same thing.

Then, surprisingly, after defending his Principle with a couple of examples, Plato adds (437a4–9) that, in order not to be forced to deal with all possible objections, we shall go forth

> *hypothesizing* that this is the case and agreeing that, *should things ever seem to us otherwise,* all the consequences of this [assumption] will be untied.

But what could count as a counterexample to the Principle of Noncontradiction? Is not the Principle necessarily immune to counterexamples, since it is itself the criterion of counterexamples? Would not Aristotle call it 'the most certain of all principles'?[52] Plato, however, is not introducing his Principle of Noncontradiction as a general ontological or epistemological prin-

49. On *ὑπόθεσις* in Plato, see Scolnicov (1973); on the general significance of the method of analysis in Greek mathematics, see Hintikka and Remes (1974).

50. The nonpropositional use of *ὑπόθεσις* survives in Aristotle, especially in political, physical, or metaphysical, as distinct from logical, contexts. Cf. Bonitz (1955 [1870]), *s.v.*

51. *Καί* should be understood here as introducing an alternative expression. On the equivalence of *κατά* and *πρός* in such contexts, see below, commentary on 136a6, p. 77 n. 27.

52. *Metaphysics* Γ 3.1005b17.

ciple; he is putting it forward as an *hypothesis* from which conclusions are to be derived, for as long as the hypothesis stands. But how can the Principle of Noncontradiction be an hypothesis? How could things 'ever seem to us otherwise'?

A first step toward a better understanding of Plato's formulation is to note that he has *two* distinct Principles of Noncontradiction. One is that just quoted from *Republic* IV. The other Principle is implicit in remarks such as (*Phaedo* 74c1–3; cf. 103b4–5):

> What, then? Did the equals themselves ever appear to you unequal, or equality inequality?
>
> —Never ever, Socrates.

Two differences between these two Principles are immediately obvious: first, the *Phaedo*'s version mentions nothing like subject and predicate, no '*a* is not *b* and not-*b*'; second, there are no restrictions of time or respect in this version.[53] I shall call the *Phaedo*'s version the *absolute* Principle of Noncontradiction, and the *Republic*'s I shall call the *restricted,* or *weakened* Principle.

This absolute Principle is the historical Parmenides' Principle of Noncontradiction (fr. 7.1):[54]

> For this shall never be forced, that what are not should be.

The Parmenidean (absolute) Principle states simply that it is impossible for *A* to be not-*A,* with no allowance for restrictions of time, aspects, or relations.

The consequences of this Principle were drawn by Parmenides himself and developed at great length by Zeno.[55] Zeno showed again that sensible things do not conform to the Parmenidean, absolute Principle of Noncontradiction.[56] If the many are, they are like and unlike, finite and infinite, and so on, in forty different arguments. But pointing out to him that the many are differently predicated in different respects would be sheer *ig-*

53. It is easy to see that the first is a consequence of the second. Cf. below, on Theorem II.1, p. 97.

54. In a monograph by now almost forgotten, Svend Ranulf (1924) stressed the *Vieldeutigkeit,* or 'ambiguity', of concepts. I prefer to stress the restrictions to the Principle of Noncontradiction. This seems to me to square better with the actual texts of Parmenides and of Plato. The problem of contradiction in Plato has also been stressed by Hoffmann (1923).

55. Cf., e.g., 29 B 2 DK = Simplicius, *In Physica* 139.5; and *Parmenides* 127e. The interpretations of Zeno's paradoxes are controversial. Cf., e.g., H. D. P. Lee (1936), Salmon (1970), Fränkel (1975 [1942]), and Vlastos (1975 [1959]).

56. I shall be using the terms 'sensible things', 'sensibles', and the like, rather than 'particulars', in order to avoid the implicit contrast to 'universals'. By these terms I mean, like Waterlow (1982: 339 n. 1), objects of the senses, such as Socrates and this white color, as well as characteristics of individuals, like Socrates' wisdom, which although not properly apprehended by the senses can be said to be immediately given within an empirical context.

noratio elenchi: the whole point of the absolute Principle of Noncontradiction is that *A* cannot be not-*A*—*without any restrictions.* No restrictions to the Principle of Noncontradiction can be derived from reason alone, and thus, *sub specie rationis,* within the wholly necessary, rational domain,[57] any restrictions of time or aspects are totally unfounded.[58] Indeed, in the *Parmenides* (129a6 ff.) Socrates remarks not that Zeno's showing that sensible things do not conform to the Principle of Noncontradiction is wrong, but that it is trivial (since the problem was, at least hypothetically, dealt with already in the *Republic*).[59]

Plato is fully committed to the unrestricted (or absolute) Principle of Noncontradiction,[60] and he sees, with Parmenides and Zeno, that sensible things do not conform to it. But Plato does not dismiss the sensible world as a domain in which there is no truth and no reality. Forms do comply with the absolute Principle,[61] and they are, therefore, fully real. But if, in line with the method of hypothesis, we should want to ascribe some degree of reality to the sensible world, we must posit the possibility of restricting the Principle of Noncontradiction, so as to allow some reality to entities that do not conform to the absolute Principle.

A first list of aspects or respects according to which the Principle of Noncontradiction can be weakened or restricted is given, for example, at *Symposium* 211a1–5 and elsewhere. Sensible things are 'deficient' (ἐνδεέστερα), as the *Phaedo* (75b2) has it, because they do not conform to the absolute Principle of Noncontradiction as the criterion of reality. But they are not totally unreal, because they admit of contradictions only within certain bounds. The procedure is patently hypothetical. The (qualified, or restricted) reality of sensible things is accepted. The condition of this acceptance is that restrictions can be put on the Principle of Noncontradiction. The conclusion—that sensible things have some reality—has a higher degree of certainty (or, rather, of acceptability) than the hypothesis that supports it.

It should be noted that the restricted Principle was introduced in *Republic* IV (436b8–c1) expressly in order to allow a measure of unity and reality[62] to a nonideal entity—namely the soul, and more specifically, the soul incarnate,

57. Cf. above, p. 5.

58. I have followed some of the consequences of the absolute Principle of Noncontradiction in Scolnicov (1983).

59. A nice chronological conflation, or double focus, of the type Plato was not averse to: the dialogue reported in the *Parmenides* is supposed to have taken place *before* the *Phaedo* and the *Republic,* but it presupposes familiarity with their contents.

60. Note Simmias's emphatic response at *Phaedo* 74c3, quoted above, p. 13.

61. This position is only a first approximation, and will be modified in the *Parmenides;* cf. below, pp. 33–34, and Argument II. But see also Argument VIII.

62. To be one is to be something and to be real. Cf. below, p. 15.

subject to divisions and contradictions. This Principle is applicable to the soul insofar as it is linked to the sensible world. In the *Phaedo* (103a4 ff.), answering a possible query (the objector is, significantly enough, unnamed), Plato carefully distinguishes between the restricted Principle, which applies to sensible things (74b ff.: sensible things appear equal in one respect but not in another, etc.), and the absolute Principle, to which conforms what is in itself (103b4–5: 'the opposite itself would never become its own opposite').[63]

Plato's two Principles serve him thus to distinguish between two types of entities with different degrees of reality: those that (at least as a first approximation) conform to the unrestricted (absolute) Principle of Noncontradiction and are, therefore, fully real, and those that do not. Nevertheless, the latter still have some measure of reality, insofar as they are not absolutely self-contradictory: they can suffer contradictions, provided these are 'in different respects and not simultaneously'.[64]

The restricted Principle is considered by Plato an hypothesis because he presents it as the main necessary condition of the possibility of sensible things as imperfectly real. But, in itself, it is not necessary, as indeed it is not necessary that there should be sensible things.[65] Should we ever have reasons to abandon this version of the Principle, all that depends on it will have to be reconsidered. But note that the Parmenidean Principle is not similarly endangered; nor are the forms, insofar as they are real unities.[66]

As becomes clear from the analysis of the Principle of Noncontradiction, any consideration of what cannot be is inextricably linked with a consideration of what is. G. E. L. Owen called this, in the context of the *Sophist,* Plato's Parity Assumption: "The hope offered by the Eleatic Stranger [in *Sophist* 250e5–251a1] is that any light thrown on either being or not-being will equally illuminate the other."[67] As we just saw, this assumption is not new with the *Sophist.* In the *Parmenides,* it will be especially prominent.

The Principle of Noncontradiction is the criterion of what it is to be *one* thing, hence of what it is to be *something* and of what it is to *be.*[68] Thus, as in the *Parmenides,* the inquiry about the one and the many is *ipso facto* also an inquiry into being and not being. In Parmenides' hypothesis, 'one' is to be

63. On the supposed distinction between being *F* and having *F,* see below, p. 20.

64. Cf. also *Sophist* 249b8. Aristotle, by contrast, has no use for degrees of reality. Therefore, he has only one Principle of Noncontradiction (which he emphatically maintains is *not* an hypothesis). Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Γ 3.

65. Cf. *Phaedo* 100c4–5: '*if* anything else is beautiful besides the beautiful itself [. . .]'.

66. I beg to reserve judgment on the status of the forms in the *Parmenides* until it is considered below, pp. 18–22.

67. Owen (1970), 248.

68. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Γ 2.1003b22 ff.

understood as anything that can be taken as a unity, anything that can be identified as something (before we give it a name, or ascribe to it a description). In particular, the question is not so far prejudged of what can be taken as a unity: forms, sensible things, all the forms taken together, and so on.[69] This is precisely what the dialogue investigates. 'One' is to be taken as a most general term. In most contexts in this dialogue, it is perhaps best understood as a placeholder, as *x,* marking something analogous to the subject of a predication.[70]

Logic turns out not to be ontologically neutral. By Owen's Parity Assumption, the positive counterpart of the Parmenidean Principle of Noncontradiction is the Parmenidean interpretation of being: being admits of no aspects or restrictions. The counterpart of the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction is, as we shall see, participation. In the *Phaedo* and the *Republic,* Plato assumed that this distinction between the Parmenidean and the restricted Principle establishes the distinction between forms and sensible things, at least as a first approximation. Whether Plato recognized participation of forms in other forms (in such passages as *Phaedo* 102d ff., or *Republic* 476a) will, in this context, remain an open question, since it does not directly affect our present concerns. In any case, in the *Parmenides,* as we shall see, the distinction between forms and sensible things is drawn within participation itself. (Cf. below, Theorem II.10, Appendix.)

THE VERB 'TO BE'

Plato does not have a technical existential use of the verb 'be'. This was suggested already in 1952 by Étienne Gilson and has been increasingly accepted by scholars—among them Gregory Vlastos, John Malcolm, Michael Frede, G. E. L. Owen, and Mohan Matthen,[71] to cite only a few. Charles Kahn gave a good statement of the general position:[72]

> . . . if by a word for existence one means simply an expression which we would normally render into English by 'there is', then it is clear that the Greek verb *esti* often has this sense. But if we understand the phrase 'there is' as representing a univocal concept of existence for a subject of predication, as distinct from the content of the predication itself—as distinct from the 'essence' of the subject or the kind of thing it is (as we often do, for example, when we read the existential quantifier '(∃x)' as 'there is something of which the following is true')—if this generalized positing of a subject as 'real' is what we

69. Cf. McCabe (1996), 24.

70. But see below, p. 19, and on Theorem II.2.1, p. 99.

71. Vlastos (1965a), Malcolm (1967), Frede (1967), Owen (1970), Matthen (1983).

72. Kahn (1978), 33. Cf. also Calogero (1932), Mourelatos (1970), Nehamas (1979), Kahn (1981), Matthen (1983), Curd (1988).

mean by existence, then I would be inclined to deny that such a notion can be taken for granted as a basis for understanding the meaning of the Greek verb.

The interpretations of the *Parmenides* (and of Plato, in general) that rely primarily on an existential understanding of εἶναι run into unnecessary trouble. Thus, for example, F. M. Cornford and Reginald Allen (and many others) are ultimately reduced to seeing in the *Parmenides* nothing but an aporetic exercise, the point of which is difficult to grasp. Cornford's difficulties are made worse in his interpretation of Argument V. (See below, *ad locum.*) Plato himself (at 142e3 ff.) gives some of his reasons for not postulating a bare subject of predication.[73] True, the existential sense is never far away; but as will become clear from a detailed examination of the dialogue, it is never made to carry the burden of the argument.

For Plato—as generally for the Greek speaker of his time—it was possible to understand the verb 'to be' as incomplete, as 'to be (*F*)'. This is clear, for example, from *Republic* V 478e, where 'being' and 'not being' are exchanged in the continuation of the passage for definite attributes such as beautiful and ugly, just and unjust. Thus, in many contexts, '*x* is' has to be understood as '*x* is (*F*)'—that is, as signifying that *x* is of a certain character, specified by the context or not. In particular in the *Parmenides,* as we shall see, ἓν ἐστιν has to be understood, in the appropriate contexts, as 'the one is (*F*)'—that is, the one (or *x,* as we have just interpreted the term above) has any certain character whatsoever. And, accordingly, ἓν ὄν should be understood as 'the one that is (such-and-such)'. Οὐσία ('being'), then, will be the corresponding abstract noun, referring to any specified or unspecified characteristic being considered.

In this dialogue, the inquiry into ἕν is primarily an inquiry into what it is to be some one thing. In the same way, the inquiry into ἔστιν is primarily an inquiry into what it is to be *F* or to be *a certain F.*[74] Cornford was right in seeing in the *Parmenides* an examination of the concept 'one' and in stressing the play on the ambiguity of ἔστιν.[75] But in understanding ἔστιν existentially and obscuring the antithetical structure of the dialogue, he was bound to miss its main thrust.

73. See below, pp. 99–100.

74. Cf. Kahn (1978), 40: "What must reality be like if predications like '*X* is *Y*' are to be possible, and sometimes true? What will *X* be like? What will *Y* be like? And how can the two be related to one another?"

75. Cornford (1939), 109–15. Cf. McCabe (1996). As we shall see immediately below, there is no strict ambiguity of 'is'. For Plato, there are no two different senses of 'is'—one, say, for identity, and another for predication. Rather, the (putative) relation between the two terms of '*A* is *B*' is the same in both cases, except that in the one it is strict, or absolute, and in the other it is restricted, or qualified.

PARMENIDEAN BEING AND PLATONIC BEING

Parmenidean[76] being is the ontological correlate of the bare affirmation of a content. At the end of the road leading to truth—along which all predications are negated—what is is acknowledged not to be generated or destructed, not to move, to be unharmed and not imperfect.[77] *Ἔστι* is all that can be said, if that much. All the rest are nothing but names that mortals use, believing them to give us valid information about the world (fr. 8.38–39).[78] As the *Parmenides* will make clear, Parmenidean ascription of being is "transparent." As Plato shows in Argument I, nothing is added to the Parmenidean one when it is said to be. To say 'the one' and to say 'the one is' is to say the same thing.[79] The analysis of Argument I will show that it is not the existence of the one that is in question but its being of a certain character or of any character.

Parmenidean being should be distinguished from logical identity. Logical identity (of the Leibnizian type) is the relation that obtains between *a* and *b* when *a* and *b* are (1) indiscernible, or (2) their names are substitutable for each other *salva veritate,* or (3) both. In particular, Leibnizian identity bears no existential overtones. By contrast, Parmenidean being corresponds to the absolute affirmation of *a,* where nothing else can be said, for *a* exhausts all the universe of discourse. In fact, as in Argument I, even the affirmation of *a* as a definite entity is precluded by the Parmenidean concept of being. Such affirmation would presuppose the (possible) existence of a *b,* whose difference from *a* is being negated. But in the Parmenidean universe of being *and of true thinking* (cf. fr. 3) there is nothing else that can be considered alongside *a.* Existence is no doubt implied in the Parmenidean concept of being, but Parmenidean being is not identical with it.[80]

In the *Phaedo* and the *Republic,* Plato was concerned primarily with the problem of the relation between the one form and the many sensible things that bear its name. This is also how the question is presented in the aporetic Part I of the *Parmenides.* But Plato's Parmenides immediately points out, in expounding his method, that the real problem lies in the relation between

76. Unless otherwise stated or evident from the context, I shall be referring to Parmenides *as understood by Plato.* When necessary, I shall distinguish Plato's Parmenides from the historical Parmenides. In the analysis of the dialogue and in the commentary, the name without a qualifier will refer to the dramatic character.

77. Reading *οὐδ' ἀτέλεστον* at fr. 8.4.

78. Reading *ὄνομα ἔσται.* Cf. Mourelatos (1970), 180–85.

79. Note that, for Parmenides, there can be no difference between a term and a proposition, or between an object and a state of affairs. This distinction will not be explicitly made until Plato's *Sophist* 259e.

80. Cf. Matthen (1983). See also Mourelatos (1970); Schofield, in Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983); and Curd (1991).

any 'one' and any 'many'. In order to solve the problem of the relation of forms to sensible things, Plato has first to overcome two Parmenidean tenets that prevent any talk of participation or the like. He has to show how a rational plurality is possible and how true internal relations are possible between members of such a plurality. Only after euporia has been secured in these most general terms can Plato go into the details of his doctrine of forms, and of participation of forms in forms, and of sensible things in forms.

At this point, a word of warning is in order. Strictly speaking, Platonic participation is not to be understood in terms of (Aristotelean) predication (although sometimes I shall be using the word 'predication' for the sake of convenience). The relation is not the one that obtains between universals and particulars. Moreover, the relation between forms and sensible things will turn out to be a further specification of the relation between forms. 'Predication' is something of a misnomer. *Μέθεξις*, 'participation', is not *ἓν ἐπὶ* (or *κατὰ*) *πολλῶν*, 'one over many'. (Cf. below, on 131b6.) The relation between sensible things and forms is not (1) subsumption, in the sense that yellow things "fall under" the general concept of yellow. Nor is it (2) predication, in the sense that 'yellow' is 'said of' (*λέγεται*: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Δ 7) or 'belongs to' (*ὑπάρχει*) yellow things. Nor is it (3) instantiation, in the sense that any given pair is an example of 'the pair'; if 'the circle itself', or, say, 'what it is to be a circle',[81] does not have a circular shape, then the sensible circle cannot be an instantiation of it. (See below, p. 21, on self-predication.) Finally, it is not even (4) imperfect instantiation: a sensible pair is a pair, neither more nor less than two items. Sensible things are what they are *in a different mode of being*. They do not instantiate the form, in the same sense that a picture does not instantiate its original. It *represents* it in another medium. As becomes clear from the *Timaeus,* there is ultimately no individual subject of predication, but all forms are ultimately predicated of 'place' (*χώρα*).

In the *Parmenides,* Plato is not distinguishing between two distinct senses of 'is'. He is distinguishing between two modes of being. If all we had were an ambiguity between two distinct senses of 'is', then the aporia of the master and the slave (133d7 ff.) would stand. We would have two types of entities or realities, being$_1$ and being$_2$, and any relation between them, on the assumptions of that argument, would still be impossible.

The difference between modes of being and types of entities is crucial for understanding the *Parmenides*. Distinctions between types of entities are classifications, such as those in animate and inanimate, fire and night (as

81. Cf. Nehamas (1979), 93. Nehamas's formulation is not quite adequate, but it will do for our immediate purpose. '*F* is *F*' is tautologically evident, and it is accepted as such by Socrates' interlocutors; '*F* is what it is to be *F*' is not. For a critique of Nehamas's interpretation, see Malcolm (1991).

in Parmenides, fr. 8.56–59), universals and particulars. Types are, in Parmenidean terminology, 'separate' or 'apart' from each other (*χωρὶς ἀλλήλων*, fr. 8.56): if something is of one type, it is not of another. By contrast, something could be, in itself, blobs of paint on a piece of cloth or wood, but in relation to Simmias, it could be a portrait of him. Being a portrait is a relational (*πρός τι*) characterization; every portrait or image is a portrait or image *of* someone. To be an image of something is to be in a parasitical way, or mode. Note that what is parasitical is not necessarily its *existence,* but its being an image. Any of the presumed statues of Socrates exists in its own right as a piece of marble; what is dependent on Socrates is its being *his* (presumed or intended) representation: it is *meant* to represent *him,* well or badly.

Furthermore, modes of being should not be confused with degrees of reality. A ghost has presumably a lesser degree of reality than a man: it cannot be touched; it disappears at the crow of the cock; and so forth. It lacks certain of the characteristics that we assume to establish reality. If the ghost is also that of Hamlet's father, then its mode of being, so Plato would say, is such as to be dependent on Hamlet's father. In a sense, it *is* Hamlet's father, albeit only derivatively. If all ghosts must be of someone or other, not only are they less real but also their mode of being is derivative. But this is not always the case. Any personage of fiction is supposed to be less real than its author, but it is not dependent on him in the same way that an image is dependent on its original.

Plato interprets having *F* (or being *f,* or being *an F*) as a lower degree of being *F.* 'To be *F*' is systematically ambiguous between 'to be *F*' (in the full sense) and 'to be *f*'—that is, 'to be *F* derivatively or eponymously'. In the *Phaedo* (102 ff.), Plato analyzed predication as being in a qualified way. He separated the subject from its attributes and distinguished between those statements "that ascribe a character to a subject and those that identify the designate of linguistic subject and predicate,"[82] and he maintained that having *F* is no different from being *F,* except for the accompanying qualifications or restrictions. The large itself *is* large, but in a way different from how Simmias is large. Largeness in Simmias, however, is the same as largeness itself; but in Simmias it appears as corporeal, temporal, relative, whereas largeness itself is none of these. The difference between largeness in nature (or largeness itself) and largeness 'in us' (*ἐν ἡμῖν*: cf., e.g., *Phaedo* 103b5) is not in the presumed different *senses* of 'large' but in the different *ways,* or *modes,* in which forms and sensibles are large—much the same as, say, Simmias and the number 10,000 are large in different ways. And since Simmias is large only in a certain way and not in some other, his largeness is deficient, has a

82. Stough (1976), 24. See also Nehamas (1979).

lesser degree of reality than largeness itself, which is not restricted or qualified in any way.

But degrees of reality do not necessarily entail self-predication.[83] That the beautiful itself is beautiful is self-evident. Here, the grammatical predicate *identifies* the grammatical subject. That Alcibiades is beautiful needs to be explained by the presence of the beautiful in Alcibiades. There is no need, however, for 'immanent characters'.[84] Alcibiades is beautiful, and the beautiful itself is beautiful; but the two cases are not the same: Alcibiades *has* beauty, or rather beauty *is* in Alcibiades, but neither is true of beauty itself. Hence, beauty can be said (somewhat inappropriately) to be predicated of Alcibiades, but not of the beautiful itself.[85]

A third Parmenidean claim that Plato has to counter in order to clear the way for his doctrine of participation is that, for Parmenides, there is only one mode of being, namely being *καθ' αὑτό*, 'in itself' (or more exactly, 'in relation to itself'). The historical Parmenides himself had laid great stress on this (fr. 8.29). Even when he was ready to envisage a (deceitful) plurality of entities, in the Way of Seeming, he emphatically specified that they are each *καθ' αὑτό* (fr. 8.58).

In the *Phaedo,* Plato distinguished between 'two types of entities' (79a6, *δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων*): intelligible and immutable as against sensible and changeable. For this he could claim some Parmenidean authority. But he went further and postulated also two modes of being. Sensible things are what they are because they participate in or imitate other entities, which are what they are in themselves. The beautiful itself is beautiful in and by itself; other beautiful things are beautiful because they stand in a certain relation to the beautiful itself, and only in certain respects but not in others (*Phaedo* 100b5–101b8). Sensible things can be only *πρός τι*, 'in relation to something', never *καθ' αὑτά*, 'in themselves'. Being *πρός τι*, they are dependent, and this is why they are deficient: they can be differently predicated only *πρός*, or *κατά*, different aspects, and they are never capable of being what they are in their own right.

This is spelled out in the formulation of the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction. Entities that conform to the restricted Principle are what they are only in relation to this or that. The sensible beautiful thing is beautiful only in relation to this or that observer, or in relation to this or that aspect, and so on. Thus, Plato's two Principles of Noncontradiction implicitly define two modes of being: the absolute Principle defines what it is to be in itself (this had already been done by the historical Parmenides, as we saw

83. As Penner (1987: 142) maintains.
84. As Stough (1976: 23) has shown.
85. See further p. 60, below.

above), and the restricted Principle defines what it is to be πρός τι, 'in relation to something', or πρὸς ἄλλα, 'in relation to other things'.[86]

Philolaus had already contrasted entities that are ποθ' αὑτά and those that are πρὸς ἄλλο.[87] It seems, however, that he did not provide a justification for this distinction, nor either an analysis of what it is to be πρὸς ἄλλο (or, in Plato's terminology, of what the hypotheses are of such a distinction). This is what Part II of the *Parmenides* sets out to do. Plato had already picked up the distinction earlier—for example, in the *Charmides* (168b ff.), in the *Republic* (438a), and elsewhere. There it was used, probably following Philolaus, of different *types of entities.* In the *Parmenides* and in the dialogues that follow it, the distinction between καθ' αὑτό and πρὸς ἄλλο comes to be used to differentiate between *modes of being.* (Cf. *Sophist* 255c13, *Philebus* 51c.)

THE DIALOGUE

The *Parmenides* divides neatly and notoriously into a short proem and two unequal parts. (On the proem, see below, *ad locum.*) That Part I of the main dialogue is aporetic, there is no doubt. The overall plan of the dialogue is much the same as that of the *Meno* and the *Republic:* a relatively short aporetic first part, the bulk of the dialogue dealing with overcoming the initial aporia. (One could perhaps take this scheme further and imagine the *Theaetetus* as the aporetic introduction to the projected trilogy *Sophist-Statesman-Philosopher.*[88])

Part I

The aporia in Part I of the *Parmenides* is set up in true Eleatic fashion. The problem is the relation of the one to the many, and it is this problem—or a variety of it—that the doctrine of forms was meant to solve. The relation of the one to the many is expressed as a rule by ἔστι, 'is', be it the relation of Socrates to his many predicates or that of the large itself to the many large things. Parmenides confronts Socrates with an Eleatic dilemma aimed at blocking the doctrine of forms as a solution to the problem at hand: either

86. Cf. Curd (1988), 309: "So we have two sorts of 'is' here: the strong 'is' that marks the real, essential being of Forms, and the weak 'is' that marks the derivative being of particulars." Meinwald (1991) identifies in the *Parmenides* what she takes to be "two kinds of predication," thus interpreting the distinction in too Aristotelean a fashion.

87. Fr. 44 B 11 DK. Ποτί (Doric for πρός) is a variant of κατά. On Philolaus, cf. Huffman (1993).

88. Diès (1923: xii) sees the *Parmenides* as the first dialogue of a tetralogy, followed by *Theaetetus, Sophist,* and *Statesman.* Cf. also Migliori (1990), 54. The chronological relation between the *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides* is uncertain.

we accept a single-world, homogeneous ontology, in which forms and sensible things are said to be of the same ontological type (i.e., have the same ontological characteristics), or else we accept a split-world, heterogeneous ontology, in which forms and sensible things belong to different ontological types and, accordingly, have different ontological characteristics (e.g., single location vs. multiple location, materiality vs. immateriality, or whatever—the exact characteristics turn out to be irrelevant to the present discussion).

This is a clean dichotomy: either the first or the second. If the first, then either forms are ontologically similar to sensible things, or else sensible things are like forms. If forms are like sensible things, then sensible things participate either in the whole of the form or else in only a part of it. But they could not participate in the whole, for the form, being homogeneous with sensible things, cannot be in many places at once. Socrates' suggestion that the form is like the day, which can be in many places at once without ceasing to be one and the same, is rightly ignored by Parmenides, since it is not consistent with the current implicit hypothesis, from which Parmenides is arguing in this section, that forms and sensible things are of the same ontological type. But, on this assumption, neither can sensible things participate in a part of the form. The large sensible thing cannot participate only in a part of the large itself, for that part, being sensible-like, would be smaller than the whole. Self-predication—the assumption that forms are *F in the same way* that sensibles are *F*—arises as a consequence of the assimilation of forms to sensible things.

Along a parallel line, still assuming a single-world ontology, either the form is epistemically posterior to sensible things—that is, our awareness of the form arises from our consideration of sensible things—or else it is prior to them. If the first, seeing that we are committed to self-predication as our current ontological presupposition, then the Third Man Argument: large sensible things are large by another large, different from them; but this new large, on the assumption of an homogeneous ontology, must be large by virtue of yet another large, different from it; and so on. Socrates again retorts out of order: the forms are nonmaterial thoughts in the soul. Parmenides, rightly again, will have none of it: either thoughts are of an independent reality (and then we are back to the previous difficulties), or else, if thoughts are themselves independently real, the best we can do, on our current assumption, is to assimilate sensible things to the form, instead of going the other way round as we have been doing up to this point. If the second—if forms are prior to sensible things, being paradigms in nature—then we must interpret the relation between paradigm and copy as symmetrical in the relevant respect, in order to remain within our assumed single-world, homogeneous ontology.

If we take the second horn of the main dilemma, then we commit ourselves to the total heterogeneity of sensible things and forms, entailing an unbridgeable gap between ourselves and the forms, or, for that matter, between



Fig. 1. The structure of the arguments in Part I of Plato's *Parmenides*.

any sensible thing and the form. These are the arguments about the master and the slave, about the gods not knowing about us, the knowledge of the forms being unattainable by us, and the like. In a totally heterogeneous ontology, there can be no middle ground. Relations are possible only between entities of the same type (or else the terms of the relation would have something in common and would not be totally heterogeneous in regard to each other).

The aporia is complete: such a relation between the one and the many as Socrates needs for his doctrine of forms is impossible whether forms are homogeneous with sensible things or they are heterogeneous with them.

The structure of the arguments in Part I is shown in Figure 1. The method of this aporetic part of the dialogue is thoroughly Parmenidean. A strict dilemma is set up, and Socrates is impaled on its horns: either there is only one type of entity (collapsing forms onto sensible things or the converse), or, if there are two types, they must be completely apart. In either case, participation is impossible; forms are no solution to the problem of the one and the many. The method corresponds to an ontology that is likewise Parmenidean. There are no two modes of being: whatever is can only be *καθ' αὑτό*, 'in itself', whether there is only one type of entity or there are more than one.

But if participation is impossible and no relation can be established between the one and the many, philosophy is impossible too. However, we *are* engaged in philosophy in the very act of proving its impossibility: in order to carry out the foregoing inquiry, we have been predicating forms of forms and ascribing well-defined characteristics to sensible things—all of which presumes some possibility of relating the one and the many. The problem is pragmatic, not purely logical. Therefore, the solution will be reached not by proof but by the method Plato has already used in similar circumstances, and in which he saw *the* method of philosophy. One must assume, then—contrary to Parmenides' strictures—that an entity (form or sensible thing) can be also 'somehow' (*που*) 'in relation to another' (*πρὸς ἄλλο*). Only thus can Helen be beautiful without being the beautiful, and only thus can the form be both 'in itself' and 'in us'.

Part II

In Part II, Parmenides will first, in Argument I, set out strictly the presuppositions and characteristics of a Parmenidean ontology. This Argument will lead again to an impasse. (Cf. 142a6–8.) But this time the assumptions leading to it will have been laid bare. The Argument can be seen as an examination and a critique of the hypothesis on which Part I is based. Taking its start from the pragmatic aporia at the end of Argument I, Parmenides will propose, in Argument II, an alternative hypothesis, whose only defense is its ability to provide euporia for the possibility of philosophy.

Part II turns on the partial ambiguity of the verb 'to be' in the different

Arguments, designating at one time Parmenidean being (i.e., the absolute positing of the content of the hypothesis) and at another time participation (i.e., being 'somehow', as restricted in accordance with the weakened Principle of Noncontradiction). In the course of the Arguments, Plato distinguishes and clarifies these two modes of being. Arguments I, IV, VI, and VIII give us a clarification of Parmenidean being, and Arguments II, III, V, and VII give us an explication of the Platonic concept of participation, as being qualifiedly: that is, only in some respects but not in others.

As in all dialectical and hypothetical arguments, the conclusions are always dependent on the premises and cannot be detached from them. The whole argument and every step in it must be interpreted strictly within the limits established by the hypothesis in force at each stage.[89] Moreover, the aim of the argument is either to reduce to impossibility the propositions under consideration (Arguments I, etc.) or else to establish euporia, the *possibility* of the conclusions (Arguments II, etc.): hence Plato's use of the subjunctive and the optative throughout these latter Arguments (with some stylistic variations). In any case, as a detailed examination will show, the relevant Arguments establish not the conclusions but only their possibility,[90] according to the different respects in which they may be true.

Following Parmenides' recommendations on method at 135c8–136e4, Part II lays down two main Hypotheses: 'The one is' and 'The one is not'. Consequences are then drawn for the hypothesized entity ('the one') and for its 'opposite'—'the many', or 'the not-one' (later equated with 'the others'). But each Hypothesis is taken twice for each series of consequences: once drawing the consequences for the one (or the many) 'in (relation to) itself' (or 'in themselves')—that is, as if no relations of any kind are possible—and once as if it (or they) can 'somehow' be 'in relation to something else'. This gives us, in all, eight Arguments.

The general question is that of the relation of the one and the many: How is it possible that anything may participate in other things without ceasing to be the one thing it is? This is prior to, and more general than, the question of the relation of sensible things and forms. In fact, the *logical*[91] problem is that of the relation to its complement (if there be such) of anything that can be said to be one. The problem of the participation of the many in the one arises also for forms, as Parmenides intimated at 135d8–e4. The possibility

89. This was clearly seen by Pico della Mirandola (1492, *cap.* II): "Quibus etiam testimoniis si non credimus, ipsum percurramus dialogum, videbimusque nusquam aliquid affirmari, sed ubique solum quaeri: hoc si sit, quid consequetur, quid item, si non sit." Cf. Klibansky (1943), 320–21.

90. Not their intelligibility, as Turnbull (1998: 48) would have it. I can find in the text no basis for such an interpretation.

91. In Plato's not purely formal understanding of logical relations.

of participation of forms in each other will be shown to be a condition of the possibility of the participation of sensible things in forms. This will not be *derived,* and no mechanism will be given for it. Only euporia against the impediments raised by Eleatic logic will have been secured. This euporia, however, is almost a by-product of a much more pervasive inquiry, encompassing the whole of the logical web of relations between the one and the many, which will provide the understructure for the metaphysics of the *Sophist.*

Note that throughout Part II of the *Parmenides,* no mention is made of sensible things or of forms. This is not because Plato became disenchanted with forms following Parmenides' attack in Part I. Rather, Parmenides now raises the inquiry to a higher stage of generality (a 'higher hypothesis', in the terminology of *Phaedo* 101d5 and *Republic* VI 511a6). On this level, forms and sensible things are alike considered 'ones'.

Some considerations, such as those of the "Parmenidean" Arguments (I, IV, VI, VIII), apply only to entities that are capable of being καθ' αὑτά—that is, forms. Other considerations apply to both forms and sensible things alike,[92] except that forms can *also* be πρὸς ἄλλα, 'in relation to others', whereas sensible things can be *only* such (Arguments II, III, V, VII). Some few apply only to entities that can be in relation to time—that is, only to sensible things (Theorem II.10, Appendix, on physical changes). Figure 2 diagrams the Arguments in Part II of the *Parmenides.*

Each Argument follows a more or less rigid pattern: first, there is a definition of 'one' for that Argument (abbreviated "df."). This is, at the same time, a clarification of the meaning of 'is'. Then comes what may be called the Basic Theorem (1), which establishes the relation, if any, between the whole and its parts. In fact, this amounts to an explication of the definition: if 'is' is interpreted as referring to Parmenidean, absolute being, then no aspects or parts are possible, and the one cannot be a whole. 'Is' is then completely "transparent," and there can be no distinction whatsoever between 'one' and 'is': asserting that the one is is tantamount to asserting the one. If, on the other hand, 'is' is interpreted as referring to something distinguishable from 'one', then a distinction can be made within the one that is. In this case, the one that is is a whole comprising parts or aspects, and it can be predicated according to these aspects. Then come the various Theorems (2–10) exploring these various aspects, with the occasional addition of lemmas, corollaries, and notes. Each Argument normally winds up with a conclusion on being as attribution and its corollary on knowledge, opinion, or the like. The conclusion is in fact a summary of the whole Argument, bringing together under 'being' all the attributes that have been examined in it. The pattern is varied according to the requirements of each Argument.

92. Or, rather, to sensible things *through* their participation in the forms.



Fig. 2. The structure of the Arguments in Part II of Plato's *Parmenides*.

It is easy to see that the order and content of the Theorems are devised primarily for Argument II. Indeed, the distinction between whole and parts, or aspects, makes sense only in that Argument and in those that correspond to it, since all consequences in Argument I and its derivates are negative.

After Arguments I and II, the series of Theorems and the Theorems themselves are often abbreviated. The Theorems do not necessarily appear always in the order shown below. This is the order of Argument II, for which, in fact, the Theorems were designed. Other Arguments may have different requirements for the order of the Theorems. The full sequence of the Theorems is shown in Table 1. That list of categories[93] can be shown to be under Parmenidean influence, perhaps actually drawn from Parmenides' poem. A quick survey of Plato's list of categories and of Parmenides' poem yields the parallels shown in Table 2.

The categories are partially dependent on each other, the earlier being necessary conditions of the later, as shown in Figure 3.

A brief summary of the Arguments one by one may be helpful here. A detailed analysis of each appears in the commentary.

Characteristically, Plato superimposes onto a dichotomic structure also a linear progression from Argument to Argument. He proceeded similarly, for example, in the simile of the Divided Line in the *Republic*. As we saw above, he did this also in Part I of our dialogue, and as will be apparent from the analysis, he does it again in Part II. Later Arguments are often dependent, in different ways, on previous ones, and earlier conclusions must be reread in the light of later analyses.

Hypothesis: The One Is

Argument I

Argument I, as we already saw, is a systematic analysis of Parmenidean being. Its hypothesis is the absolute Principle of Noncontradiction: to be one is not to be many, with no restrictions allowed. It is impossible, for whatever is, that it should be in one way but not in another. The unity of the subject is absolute. No aspects can be distinguished in it, for this would mean that the one is such-and-such in relation to one aspect but not in relation to another.

93. For a somewhat different list of Platonic categories, cf. Rist (1962: 8), drawing on a suggestion of Alcinous (Albinus: 6.10) that in the *Parmenides* Plato introduced (Aristotle's) ten categories. This is obviously false so far as Aristotle's categories are concerned, but the *Parmenides* does present a list of categories, plausibly even of ten categories, as we just saw, and Alcinous may have had some tradition in mind, overzealously interpreting it so as to harmonize Plato and Aristotle. Cf. also Natorp (1903), 237.

TABLE 1 The sequence of the Theorems and their categories in Part II of Plato's *Parmenides*

Theorem	Category
df.	Definition[a]
1	Part(s)/whole
1.1	Part(s)
1.2	Whole
2	Limit
2.1	Unlimited
2.2	Limited
2.corollary	Number
3	Extremities/middle
3.corollary	Shape (round/straight)
4	Inclusion
4.1	In itself (or: in themselves, and so on)
4.2	In another (or: in others, and so on)
5	Contact
5.1	With itself
5.2	With another
5.corollary	Place
6	Motion/rest
6.1	Motion
6.1.1	Alteration
6.1.2	Locomotion
6.1.2.1	Revolution
6.1.2.2	Translation
6.2	Rest
7	Sameness/difference
7.1	Same
7.1.1	As itself
7.1.2	As another
7.2	Different
7.2.1	From itself
7.2.2	From another
8	Likeness/unlikeness
8.1	Like
8.1.1	Itself
8.1.2	Another

Theorem	Category
8.2	Unlike
8.2.1	Itself
8.2.2	Another
9	Equality/inequality
9.1	Equal
9.1.1	To itself
9.1.2	To another
9.2	Unequal (larger/smaller)
9.2.1	To itself
9.2.2	To another
9.corollary	Equality of number
10	Being and coming to be younger-older/same age
10.1	Being
10.1.1	Younger-older
10.1.1.1	Than itself
10.1.1.2	Than another
10.1.2	Same age
10.1.2.1	As itself
10.1.2.2	As another
10.2	Coming to be
10.2.1	(As above . . .)
(etc.)	(. . .)
Conclusion[a]	Being
Corollary[a]	Relations, knowledge, opinion, perception, name, account, and so forth

NOTE: Any Theorem in the sequence shown may at any level include one or more subsections not listed in this table—definition, excursus, lemma, or conclusion—or a note (or multiple notes) to any of these. Furthermore, the Appendix to Theorem 10 in Argument II is itself divided into three main subsections, and it has its own conclusion and a note.

It is important to keep in mind that the sequence of Theorems listed in this table will not necessarily appear either in full or in exact numerical order in all Arguments.

[a] Although the definitions, conclusions, and corollaries to Arguments I–VIII may not be Theorems strictly speaking, they are no less important. In particular, each Argument includes its own distinct definition of 'one', which incidentally serves to clarify the distinct sense in which 'is' must be taken.



Fig. 3. The categories of being and their relations in Part II of Plato's *Parmenides*. Parenthetical numerals indicate Theorem numbers.

TABLE 2 Parallel categories in the Theorems in Part II of Plato's *Parmenides* and in the poem of Parmenides, fragment 28 B 8 DK

Theorem in Plato's *Parmenides*	Category	28 B 8 DK, lines
1	Part(s)/whole	4, 22, 38
2	Limit	42
3	Extremities/middle	43
4	Inclusion	29
5	Contact	6, 25
6	Motion/rest	26, 38; cf. 41
7–9	Sameness (etc.)	57
10	Being in time	5, 12–14, 20–21
II.10, Appendix	Generation/destruction	3, 40
II.10, Appendix, 1	Separation/combination	22
II.10, Appendix, 2	Assimilation/dissimilation	41
II.10, Appendix, 3	Growing/diminishing	6

Hence, no attribution whatsoever is possible. In general, the one cannot be said even to be *something*, as this would imply an *οὐσία*, a characterization, which in turn would imply distinction and plurality. The one cannot stand in any relation to anything, since it is considered only *καθ' αὑτό*, 'in relation to itself'. Since knowledge is a relation of some sort, the one cannot be the object of knowledge (or indeed of any sort of cognition).

But, as in Part I, of which this Argument may be considered a reformulation, we have been making the one an object of inquiry and, at least, of opinion: we have been implying some sort of epistemic relation between us and it. We thus end in a pragmatic aporia. Therefore, we must change our hypothesis so as to allow for a different conclusion, more in line with what we have been doing.

Argument II

Argument II gives us, then, an alternative interpretation of the Hypothesis: 'The one is' is now taken to mean that the one has some (unspecified) character, distinguishable from it. In other words, it is in some respect (according to the character being ascribed; the Theorems will examine those respects one by one), but its being such-and-such does not exhaust all of it. To be something (e.g., one) does not contradict being also something different, provided these two characteristics are not ascribed to the subject in the same respect. This is a direct application of the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction. In particular, being one does not exclude being many (in some respects). In general, the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction, as a cri-

terion of unity and being, opens up the possibility of something's being *one* and nevertheless oppositely predicated, κατὰ different aspects. Argument II assumes the possibility of predication and establishes its conditions, chief among which is the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction.

This Argument takes the one that is as a ὅλον, a complex. The Basic Theorem lays bare the essential ambiguity of such a one: it is *both* a whole *and* parts (these constituting, in themselves, different respects, implicitly assumed by the Basic Theorem). This ambiguity or duplicity comes to a head in Plato's holistic approach in this and related Arguments: the one that is is prior to its parts. This is meticulously spelled out in the derivation of number. Number is especially important for Plato in this context. It emerges as the prototype of a structured plurality, such as the form must be. Once the possibility of structured, holistic pluralities is secured, the formal framework can be developed that will make possible diairesis: forms are shown to be complexes, not simple units. Diairesis will also necessitate a double focus, which will be further considered in later Arguments: forms must be considered *both* in themselves *and* in relation to one another.

On the current hypothesis, then, the one that is, or the one as a whole, *can* have all possible predicates—in different respects, as whole and parts or in relation to different parts (or aspects) of the whole. The Argument is hypothetical throughout, and its hypothetical character is carefully marked by the modalities of the verbs. We must also interpret the necessity voiced by young Aristoteles as *conditional* necessity, as referring not to the necessity of the conclusions in themselves but to the necessity that they follow from their premises. In most cases, Plato qualifies the conclusions as ascribing this or that character to the one only 'somehow' (που, πῃ, πως), or else he specifies the different respects in which the subject is this or is that.[94] Sometimes, for stylistic reasons, Plato varies the mood of the verb and uses the indicative. But this can easily be shown not to have any deeper significance. Aristotle was later to recognize that, when he wrote: 'And of that which is already at rest and of that which can be at rest, we say that it rests.'[95]

An important characteristic of the complex one, considered in this Argument, is the possibility that it be in time. 'Being in time' (or rather, tensed being) allows changeable entities. Plato's interest here is in sensible things not as sensible but as changeable. In the context of relational entities, this is the most relevant difference between them and forms. Their being apprehended by the senses is to be accounted for in the *Timaeus* but is of no consequence in our context. Forms, as he saw them in this Argument, can

94. Cf. *Sophist* 259c7 ff.

95. *Metaphysics* Δ 7.1017a35. In this Argument, Theorem II.6, about motion and rest, is precisely where Plato uses the indicative; cf. p. 112, below. Was Aristotle quoting it?

(and must) also be *πρὸς ἄλλα*, 'in relation to others'. But they cannot be different at different times, and this is what marks them off from their everyday homonyms. The specific participation of changeable things in forms turns out to be merely a special case of being *κατά τι*, 'in respect of (or according to) something', namely *κατὰ χρόνον*, 'in respect of (or according to) time'. For this to be possible, there must be a possibility that being be tensed. This is not to say, though, that *everything* that is one is tensed; only that there *can* be entities that are 'somehow' one, and their being also many is manifested 'according to time'. And if being can be tensed, there can be physical processes—that is, nature is possible. The Appendix to Theorem II.10 examines those physical processes.

The one that is can be a member of relations: it can both be known and be the object of opinion (under different descriptions), and so forth. The difference between objects of knowledge and objects of opinion is not considered in the *Parmenides*. Structurally, there is no difference between them. Thus, there *can* be opinion also of forms.[96] The structure of *μέθεξις*, 'participation', is the same for sensible things and for forms. Both problems are solved in one stroke. *Μίμησις*, 'imitation', the specific relation between sensible things and forms, implies a different medium, which is not relevant here.[97]

Plato is showing here that the world of forms and the physical world have the same structure. But Plato does not actually construct the physical world.[98] Rather, he only secures euporia: he shows that there is a way of escaping Parmenides' strictures, and that it is not impossible for a physical thing to have reality (however restricted this reality may be) and exhibit a restricted—but well-delimited—lack of contradiction. But he does not derive the material world as such from its metaphysical structure. (Note, for example, that he never says that those entities under consideration are sensible, material, or the like; only that they are changeable.) Argument II and its continuation, Argument III, show the *possibility* of the forms as a system of interconnections, and thereby also the possibility of the sensible world, as against the Parmenidean interpretation of being.[99]

Argument III

In order for relation, knowledge, and the like to be possible, there must be a plurality (cf. 155e1–2 and above), and the many—considered under the

96. Cf. *Republic* VII 533c1, on *διάνοια* as 'dreaming about being'.

97. Cf. Fujisawa (1974), 49: "[I]t might be the case that Plato had come to think that, though the 'participation' idioms could be used to describe the relation of Forms to one another, they were, in contrast with 'paradeigma' idioms, no longer suitable to describe the relation of particulars to Forms."

98. *Contra* Cornford (1939), 146.

99. In order to cancel the Third Man regress—if it is a regress—it is not enough that copies be shown to be contingent, as Waterlow (1982) maintains, i.e., a different type of entity. They

restricted Principle of Noncontradiction—must have the same properties as the one of Argument II (the one that is one of many). This is what Argument III shows. Argument III is, then, the natural consequence of Argument II.

The many can be taken collectively or severally—which is parallel to taking the one as a whole or as part or parts. This allows any sort of relation between the one and the many. In other words, the one can be predicated of the many in any way, and anything (even forms!) can be one as well as many. There is a symmetry between the one and the many: in order for there to be knowledge, and so forth, the one has to be many, and the many have to be one—'somehow': that is, always supposing that the Principle of Noncontradiction can be restricted in specifiable ways.

Argument IV

Argument IV takes one and many as a strict dichotomy: to be many is not to be one in any way, according to the absolute Principle of Noncontradiction. But if the many are such, they cannot even be many. This is a criticism of Parmenides' Way of Seeming and of his complete separation of his two forms from the true one and from each other. In order for there to be many, there must be some relation between the one and the many—that is, a plurality of entities that are only καθ' αὑτά, 'in themselves', is impossible. The assumption of a plurality of entities requires the possibility that those entities be (also) πρὸς ἄλληλα, 'in relation to each other'. Argument IV, then, shows that if there is a plurality of entities, they cannot be units of the type analyzed in Argument I.

Hypothesis: The One Is Not

The next four Arguments deal with the Hypothesis 'The one is not'. Its existential interpretation comes up against grave difficulties. Cornford, for example, has to suppose that Argument V draws conclusions from an entity that has no existence. It is difficult to see what sense this could have had for Plato.[100]

But there is no reason to assume from the start that εἶναι must be existential. It is better understood as predicative and incomplete, making much better sense throughout: 'The one is not (*F*)'. In effect, it is much easier to grasp that the one that is not (*F*) is knowable and has many other characters—say, *G, H* (etc.)—than that this should be true of a *nonexistent* one. Unless we are willing to import bodily into the text the whole medieval apparatus of existence and subsistence, unrealized essences, and the like, a nonexistent

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are already such at *Phaedo* 100c. It is further necessary to show that two modes of being are required and that the forms are such as to be capable of being reflected in another medium, viz. (in the *Timaeus*) in place.

100. *Contra* Cornford (1935), Casertano [1996], and others.

one that has many characters remains unintelligible. On the other hand, a one that is not (*F*) but, nevertheless, has many other characters (including *being:* i.e., being *G* or *H,* as distinct from being *F*)—such a one makes perfectly good Platonic sense.

Argument V

Argument V starts from the assumption of the possibility of knowing, and speaking of, what is not. This will make room for the possibility of an "other." The one that is not, in some way *is.* Once we have the possibility of *x* being *F,* we must have also the possibility of *x not* being *F.* For we do speak about what is not, and we assume we speak truly of it.

The Argument establishes the equivalence of 'not being *F*' and 'being not-*F*'. Especially important is the move at 161e3 (and ff.), which demonstrates the equivalence of not-being and otherness. This is necessary for interpreting '*x* is not *F*' as '*x* is *G, H* (etc.)', or 'not-*F*'. This difficult passage turns out to be crucial for the parallel move at *Sophist* 256d11–e4.

Participation is shown to be always *partial*—according to relevant aspects only. Participation is thus possible only on the assumption of the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction. Once this is accepted, the aporiae of total participation are effectively dissolved. So, if participation as being restrictedly is to be possible, there must be also a possibility of restrictedly not being. Participation requires, therefore, the interpretation of not-being as otherness.

Argument VI

But the results of Argument V do not mean that Parmenides was totally wrong. If the one is not, in an absolute sense, nothing can be said of it: it has no character, and it is in no way whatsoever. Parmenides *was* right in maintaining that what is not cannot be spoken of, and so on—according to *his* Principle of Noncontradiction. However, we have already recognized the (hypothetical) necessity of a different Principle.

Argument VII

Our Hypothesis is that the one is not. But even if we negate the one, as we did in Argument I, we do not necessarily negate the other. Once negation has been established as otherness (or: not being *F* as equivalent to being not-*F*) in Argument V, the others can be, and can be considered, in relation to each other.

Restricted nonbeing is equivalent to otherness: the one is not in one respect (say, *F*), but it is in another (say, *G*). This is not a total negation of the one, because we are assuming that units *can* be established, albeit only in relation to each other, in an arbitrary way. The notion of otherness implies that there are units that can be taken to be different from one another, and insofar as they can be so taken; but we do not have to take such units absolutely.

In metaphysical terms, this means that a world constructed on the principle of difference, rather than on the supposition of real units, *is* possible, at least *prima facie*. This would be a purely structuralist world, in which to be is to be different from something else. What we have, then, is a pure system of relations. Nothing *is* in itself; it is only in relation to something else. To be is to be a member in a relation. There are units, but they are arbitrary and, in themselves, indeterminate. Nothing *is* something in an unrestricted manner. Such a possibility is explored in the *Theaetetus* (153e4 ff.), where the hypothesis is considered of 'not positing a one that is in itself'.

Since units are arbitrary, anything can be made to appear to be of any character. Argument VII provides the logical background for the definition of the sophist in *Sophist* 236 (and ff.). By negating real units, the sophist can make anything appear anything, by shifting points of view without ever being committed to any of them. It sketches a world of pure perspectives, in which there is no advantage to any point of view over any other.

Although this Argument fits the Platonic view of the phenomenal world, as has been recognized since ancient times, it does not necessarily refer to phenomena alone. The Argument can very well describe also a nominalistic conceptual field, in which distinctions are arbitrary, without any ontological basis, being, as it is; whereas the one is not. If we are willing to forgo truth and satisfy ourselves with the appearance of truth, such a world seems possible—at a price Plato was not prepared to pay.

Argument VIII

But if the one absolutely is not, if nothing can be said to be in itself one definite thing, then the many are impossible. Even the structuralist world of Argument VII must presuppose that something can be said (even illusorily) to be this or that in itself. Otherwise, it would be impossible that these supposed others be many, or indeed others.

Totally denying the one—or totally denying that something can be truly said to be this or that in itself—destroys all possibility of discourse, or even of anything's being this or that. Anaxagoras was wrong, then, in saying that 'all things were together' (59 B 1 DK), denying (as Plato understood him) any real units of being. In order to say 'all things', Anaxagoras needs a concept of a 'this' and of a 'that', just as all perspectivists, from Protagoras to Nietzsche and Derrida, presuppose—so Plato seems to be arguing—a real unit of meaning in order to be able to establish their discourse. Structuralism is not enough. Grammar is impossible without semantics. There must be, at least, the concept of a 'one' (i.e., of a determinate object, which is in itself what it is, and to which the many can be related). But if there is nothing determinate in itself, to which the others can be related, they cannot be individuated, and they cannot be denumerably many. Thus, they cannot be objects of any type of cognition or discernment, not even (false) opinion,

since they cannot be distinguished from one another. For Plato, the absolute one is a precondition of the possibility of anything's being a 'this' or a 'that'. No true difference can ultimately be established without the presupposition of absolute unity and absolute being.

On the other hand, there can be cognition only of articulated entities, and articulated (or complex) entities presuppose the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction. If cognition (and articulated entities) is (are) to be possible, we must assume *both* absolute, Parmenidean being *and* being πρός τι, 'in relation to something'. In other words, both Principles are necessary. Here lies the anti-Aristotelean thrust in this dialogue. The restricted Principle is not sufficient on its own. Since the restrictions it allows cannot be defended rationally (and Aristotle acknowledged that much in making his Principle open-ended),[101] it cannot be a sufficient criterion of unity and being, and it must be backed by the absolute, Parmenidean Principle. And if so, forms are necessary and the unhypothetical principle cannot be dispensed with, even if the entity to which it corresponds cannot be the object of discursive knowledge.

The assumption of only one mode of being—being in itself—led to the aporia of Part I, even if we were prepared to accept entities of different types. Being in relation to something else must be assumed, irrespective of whether or not the entities in question have the same degree of reality. On the other hand, if there is only being in relation to something else, but not in itself, no knowledge is possible, and truth becomes an empty word. The postulation of forms as units of reality and knowledge requires that they be both in themselves and in relation to something other. That the Arguments are all hypothetical does not mean that we have to choose between them. It means only that their hypotheses are the conditions of the possibility (or the impossibility) of their consequences. Plato has argued that, in order to overcome the aporia of participation and retain the possibility of knowledge, we have to take both interpretations of the hypotheses together. Being must be καθ' αὑτό, 'in itself', as well as πρός τι, 'in relation to something'. But since there cannot be only being πρός τι, only what can be καθ' αὑτό is fully real, and what can only be πρός τι is dependent or derivative.

A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION

This translation differs from existing English translations in stressing some important philological and interpretive points:

1. The translation tries to render as accurately as possible the remote conditional optative used by Plato throughout Part II of the dialogue, with few stylistic variations.

101. Cf. *Metaphysics* Γ 3.1005b21–22.

2. It emphasizes the strong conditional particles (such as *εἴπερ, ἐπείπερ, ἐπειδήπερ*) and the frequent repetition of the protases, thus stressing the hypothetical character of the series of arguments in Part II of the dialogue.
3. *Ἧι . . . ᾗι . . .* and *ὅτι . . . ὅτι . . .* are translated 'insofar as . . .' and 'inasmuch as . . .', in order to bring out the qualifications that Plato's metaphysics introduces into Eleatic being.
4. *Ἀνάγκη* is translated throughout 'it is necessary that', attributing the necessity to the derivation of the conclusion from the premises rather than to the property being deduced.
5. Common, and even colloquial, expressions are pressed by Plato into technical use, and the translation tries to safeguard their technical aspect. Thus, *που* in most of its occurrences is taken in a technical sense, to mean 'somehow', and indicating that the characteristic in question is to be attributed to the subject under certain restrictions; *οὐδὲν κωλύει* is a common form of assent, but Plato turns it into a key expression of the elenchus, and it is translated 'nothing prevents'; *ἄλλο τι (ἢ)* is a common interrogative expression, but Plato stresses its literal meaning, 'nothing else than', when defining the one strictly as 'not many' and vice versa.
6. Aristoteles' answers are translated as closely as possible, in order to mark, as in the Greek, the rhythm of each argument.

The cumulative result, I hope, is a translation in which the arguments are much more hypothetical and more subtly qualified than what can be understood from the previous translations. I have tried, so far as possible, to keep to a minimum the inevitable sacrifice of the careful blend of accuracy and conversational tone characteristic of Plato's dialogues in general and of this dialogue in particular. But this is not intended primarily as a literary translation; rather, it is meant to aid the reader in negotiating the subtleties and intricacies of the Platonic text.

I follow Cornford in not forcing the reader "to read a book in three places at once."[102] The commentary and the notes are interspersed with the translation. This arguably makes for easier reading. Some, however, may complain that such a layout intensifies the already inevitable superimposition of the interpretation onto the text. On the other hand, this objection may be compensated by the extra burden this format puts on the commentator, who will find it more difficult to dodge recalcitrant passages. In any case, the translation should stand, so far as possible, on its own.

Unless noted otherwise, Burnet's Oxford Classical Text edition is assumed for the *Parmenides* as for the other Platonic dialogues, except those in Burnet's volume I, for which I have followed the new edition of Duke *et al.* (1995).

102. Cornford (1935), viii.

Parmenides

Proem

Cephalus recounts the dialogue

THE FRAME STORY

126a1–127a7 After arriving in Athens from our home town, Clazomenae, we happened to meet Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace; and Adeimantus, taking my hand, said:

—Greetings, Cephalus, and if you wish anything here in which we can help, say so.

—Well then, said I, this is just what I have come for, to ask you for something.

—Tell us your wish, said he.

b And I said: —Your half-brother on your mother's side—What is his name? I don't remember. He was a child, I believe, when I came here before from Clazomenae; and by now that was a long time ago. His father's name, I think, was Pyrilampes.

—Indeed.

—And his own?

—Antiphon. But why do you ask?

c —These men here, said I, are my fellow citizens, very much philosophically minded [*μάλα φιλόσοφοι*], and they have heard that this Antiphon frequently used to meet a certain Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno's, and that he so often heard the conversation Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides once had that he can tell it from memory.

—That is true, he said.

—Well, said I, this is what we wish to hear.

—This is not difficult, said he. For when he was a lad he took good care to learn it by heart, although now he takes after his grandfather and namesake, and spends most of his time dealing with horses. But if you so wish, let us go and see him; he has just gone home from here, and his home is nearby, in Melite.

127 Having said this, we walked there and found Antiphon at

> home, giving instructions to a smith about making a bit or something of the sort. After he sent the man away and the brothers told him what we had come for, he recognized me from my previous visit and welcomed me; and at first when we asked him to repeat the conversation he was reluctant—for he said it was hard work—but later he told us the whole story.

The pedigree of the story is very carefully established. Cephalus tells us what Antiphon told him that Pythodorus reported of the conversation between Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates. The other dialogue in which we have such an elaborate framework is the *Symposium,* and there Plato seems to be very serious about Diotima's speech, even though the speech must be fictitious. The case could be the same here: Socrates' conversation with Parmenides is wholly fictitious, and so is Parmenides' dialectical exercise with young Aristoteles, but the Chinese-box arrangement of the proem focuses our attention on the contents, as opposed to the fictitiousness of the meeting itself.

Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato's half-brothers, and 'very much philosophically minded', who followed the argument of the *Republic,* are not the type of men to swallow a garbled story. By them, we are directed to the metaphysical scene of the *Republic.* Antiphon has a good memory (127a4). Cephalus[1] hardly remembers Antiphon. His memory is not as good as Antiphon's, but this only sets off the latter's very good memory. True, Antiphon now spends most of his time with horses. But he *does* know the whole story by heart. That he is no longer interested in philosophy could make his report less susceptible to his own subsequent elaborations and more likely to be unbiased. In any case, it would be perverse to maintain that the whole thing is to be understood as misreported.[2] What would then be the point of going to such lengths in order to establish *their* good memories and the pedigree of the story? Establishing the supposed good memory of the tellers of the story does not necessarily imply historical accuracy. On the contrary, the story could never have happened. (Cf. below, n. 3.) That the "report" can be taken as accurate is only a way of signaling us that the content is to be trusted.

1. Cephalus of Clazomenae is not to be confused with Cephalus of Syracuse, in whose house the *Republic* is supposed to have taken place. Cf. Brisson (1994), 12. But having a homonym of the host of the *Republic* tell the story could be significant. That Clazomenae was the home town of Anaxagoras has been taken to point to the latter and connect his saying 'In the beginning all things were together' (59 B 1 DK) to Argument II in this dialogue. The possible significance of this detail was pointed out already by Proclus, *ad loc.,* who interprets it in his characteristic symbolic manner. Cf. Allen (1983), 63; and, for a different interpretation, Miller (1986), 25. See also below, on 142e3–143a3.

2. Cf. Gill, "Introduction," in Gill and Ryan (1996), 4.

THE PROBLEM: THE MANY CANNOT BE

127a7–e5 So, Antiphon said that Pythodorus told him that Zeno and Parmenides once came for the Great Panathenaea. And Parmenides was already a rather elderly man, his hair quite gray, but of a distinguished appearance, aged about sixty-five; Zeno was then nearing forty, tall and attractive, and it was said that he had been Parmenides' darling. He said that they were staying at Pythodorus's, outside the walls, in Ceramicus. Socrates came there, and a few others with him, eager to hear Zeno's book—for it had then been brought here by them for the first time—and Socrates was then quite young. So Zeno himself read it to them, and Parmenides happened to be outside. And when the reading of the arguments was almost over, Pythodorus said, he himself came in, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles who became one of the Thirty, and so they still heard a little of the book; he himself, however, had heard it from Zeno before.

After having heard it, Socrates urged him to read the first hypothesis of the first argument again, and after it was read, he said:

—How do you mean this, Zeno? If the things that are [τὰ ὄντα] are many, they must therefore be both like and unlike; but this is impossible, for neither can the unlike be like, nor the like unlike? Don't you say so?

—I do, said Zeno.

127c2, 'a few others'] The reason for accepting the emendation of Cornford, after Taylor, <οὐ> πολλούς, is not 129d1, 'although we are seven' (the reference is not to the number of people present in the room; see below, *ad loc.*), but rather 136d6–8; 'If we were more people, it would not be right to ask him; for it would not be fit for him to speak of such things in front of a crowd.'

127c6, 'Parmenides happened to be outside'] The master does not necessarily approve of the disciple's defense of him. Cf. below, on 128a6, b5; 136a.

127d2, 'Aristoteles'] Not the philosopher of Stageira; cf. Brisson (1994), 12–15. See Thesleff (1982: 58), not convincingly, for the opposite view, and bibliography there. Aristoteles could possibly have been the 'Athenian statesman' in Diogenes Laertius V 1.35; but of course Diogenes' source could ultimately go back to Plato himself.

Antiphon is telling the story some fifty years after the event. Cephalus is telling it at some unspecified time, but there is no reason to believe it to be much later. The dramatic date of Socrates' supposed conversation with Parmenides, when Socrates was 'quite young' (127c5), is of course *earlier* than that of the *Republic*. In fact, what we have in the present conversation is an argument that is to *support* or *clarify* what has been said in the *Republic* (and in the middle dialogues in general) and might thus be thought to be metaphysically prior.[3]

3. Mansfeld (1986: 43–44) has remarked on the impossibility of the chronological "pseudo-precision" of the proem of the *Parmenides:* Zeno's floruit is placed by Apollodorus in

Zeno's hypothesis is εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα, 'if the things that are are many' (127e1), or, as in Zeno's own fragment 3, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, 'if the many are'.[4] In the latter formulation, there are, of course, existential overtones ('if there is a plurality'), but, as we shall see, it is not the existential meaning that carries the burden of the argument. It is not necessary to assume that Zeno is arguing against the numerical plurality of what exists. He could as well be arguing against predicational plurality—that is, against the assumption that a single thing has more than one characteristic.[5]

At the conclusion of the dialogue, things (in general; not only sensible things) will supposedly have been shown to have contradictory predicates.

127e6–128b6 —And thus, if it is impossible both that things unlike be like and that things like be unlike, it is also impossible that they be many? For if they were many, they would be affected by impossibles. Is not this what your arguments aim at, nothing else than [οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἤ] to maintain, despite all that is said, that the many are not? And don't you take each of these arguments as proof of this very thing, so that you consider however many arguments you have
128 written as so many proofs adduced to the effect that the many are not? So do you say, or do I not follow you correctly?

—No, said Zeno, you have grasped well the aim of the book as a whole.

—I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno here wants to enjoy a relationship with you not only in love but also in his book. For in a certain way he wrote the same as you did, but with some change, trying to deceive us into thinking that he is saying some-
b thing different. For in your poem you say that all is one, and you adduce nice and proper proofs of it. And he, in turn, says that the many are not [οὐ πολλὰ . . . εἶναι], and he too adduces very many great proofs. So, the one says it is one; the other, that it is not many; and thus each speaks so as to seem not to have said the same thing while saying almost the same; and so, to the rest of us, it appears that what you both have said is well above us.

Olympiad 79 (464–461 B.C.); cf. Diogenes Laertius IX 29 = 29 A 1 DK. Plato has him come to Athens when he was 'nearing forty', during the Great Panathenaea: i.e., in 462/1 B.C. But at that time Socrates was eight years old. "The readers of the *Parm.* are not even expected to believe the encounter could really have occurred outside a dialogue dramatizing a conflict of ideas" (Mansfeld 1986: 44). Migliori (1990: 107–8, 112 n. 27) also notes the impossible chronology, on different grounds. But he sees in it a sign on Plato's part that the text is not self-contained and points to the "unwritten doctrines." I hope that my interpretation will show that the esotericist assumption is unnecessary.

4. There seems to be no appreciable difference between the two formulations. Cf., e.g., Matthen (1983).

5. Cf. Curd (1991).

Zeno was rightly considered the father of dialectic. From one hypothesis, he draws contradictory ("opposite") consequences, so that the hypothesis has to be abandoned. From this method, Socrates developed his own elenctic method, which Plato took over as the first part of his method of hypothesis. (Cf. the Introduction, above, p. 6.)

Socrates accuses Zeno of trying to deceive people into thinking he is saying something different from what Parmenides said (128a6–8). Plato, in Part II of this dialogue, will do the converse: when stating pairs of hypotheses with the same formulation (Arguments I and II, III and IV, V and VI, VII and VIII), he will be saying different things but pretending they are the same.

Parmenides claims in the dialogue that ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν (128a8–9), 'the all is one',[6] or, in the standardized formulation of Part II of the dialogue, that 'the one is' (128d1, ἕν ἐστι).[7] As with Zeno's proposition, the two Parmenidean formulations are interchangeable: everything there is is one; there is (only) a unity. But Socrates is implying that Zeno's position is not necessarily a simple negative formulation of Parmenides'. (Cf. 128a6, τρόπον τινά, 'in a certain way'; b5, σχεδόν, 'almost'; and below on 136a.) The exact force of Zeno's arguments will be shown to depend on the interpretation of the Principle of Noncontradiction: things *could* be like and unlike, and so on, if a restricted version of the Principle should be accepted, as in Argument II. And indeed, sensible things, which are the object of Zeno's arguments, as Socrates remarks below (129a6 ff.), do not comply with the unrestricted Principle of Noncontradiction.

128b7–e4 —Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But you have not fully grasped the
c truth about my book. Although, like the Spartan hounds, you are good at picking up the scent of what is said and tracking it, nevertheless you have missed, first, that the book is not at all so proud, as you say you understood what I wrote, of deceiving people, as if this were a great deed. You point out something merely incidental; but in truth, this is a sort of defense of Parmenides' argument
d [λόγῳ] against those who try to make fun of it, saying that if the one is, it follows that this proposition [λόγῳ] is affected by many ridiculous consequences and by its own opposites. This book opposes, then, those who uphold the many, and pays them in their own coin with some to spare, aiming at showing that their own hypothesis—namely if the many are—would be affected by consequences even more ridiculous than those following from the hy-

6. This formulation does not occur in our fragments of the historical Parmenides. On the possibility that the historical Parmenides may not have maintained numerical monism, see Mourelatos (1979), Curd (1988).

7. One of the tasks of this dialogue is to explicate this latter formulation and establish to what extent it is or is not equivalent to the former.

pothesis that the one is, if one should set them out in sufficient detail. It was in such a contentious spirit that I wrote it, when young, and someone copied it in secret, so that I could not even consider
e whether it should be brought out into the light or not. This is where you went wrong, Socrates, in thinking that it was written not out of the contentiousness of a youngster, but out of the love of honor of an older man—although, as I said, you did not represent it badly.

128d1, *εἰ ἕν ἐστιν*] Parmenides' hypothesis as reinterpreted by Plato. Cf. above, on a8–b1. The clarification of the meaning of 'is' is one of the objects of this dialogue. Arguments I–IV will show that, if the one is, either it will not even *be,* or it will be affected by contradictory predicates (cf. 160b2–4); Arguments V–VIII will show, on the other hand, that the opposite hypothesis is no better (cf. 166c2–5). However, the dialogue will have shown how the solution of the problem depends on a distinction between two modes of being.

THE THESIS: FORMS PARTICIPATE IN EACH OTHER, AND SENSIBLE THINGS PARTICIPATE IN FORMS

128e5–129a6 —I concede the point, said Socrates, and I believe it is as you
129 say. But tell me this: Don't you think there is some form in itself [*αὐτο καθ' αὑτό*] of likeness and, again, something else, opposed to it, that which is unlike [*ὅ ἐστι ἀνόμοιος*], and that in these two, I and you, and all that we call 'many' come to take part? And those coming to take part in likeness become like both by it and to the extent that [*κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον*] they would come to take part in it, and those coming to take part in unlikeness become unlike, and those coming to take part in both become both?

129a1, *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*] The intensive *αὐτό* reinforces the reflexive *αὑτό*, hence 'in itself', in contrast with *πρός τι*. For a nontechnical use of the expression, see, e.g., Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.5.4. Cf. Bailly (1950), *s.vv. αὐτός*, pp. 317–18; *ἑαυτοῦ*, p. 563. *Κατά* in this context as elsewhere is 'in relation to', 'in respect of', and cannot possibly mean 'in virtue of' (*contra* Gill and Ryan [1996]). Plato expresses the causative by the dative (as, e.g., in this dialogue at 139c6) or by *διά* (as at *Meno* 72c8).

129a2, 'in which two' (*τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν*)] Literally, 'in these, which are two'. The point is that they are separate (distinct) from each other.

129a5, 'to the extent that'] As we shall see in Argument II and in Argument V, participation requires a distinction in the participated-in (and correspondingly in the participant) between those aspects that are relevant to participation and those that are not. Socrates is suggesting here not *degrees* of participation but only that participation in *F* is not full identity with *F.* In the aporetic Part I of dialogue, Parmenides will resist such a distinction, because it immediately introduces plurality into the one. (On Parmenides' alternative strategy at 132d5 ff., see *ad loc.*; cf. also on 131b6–c11.)

129a6 ff.] This passage is a short restatement of the doctrine of forms as developed in the *Phaedo,* with all its terminology: *εἶδος* (cf. *Phaedo* 102b1), *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό* (cf. 78d3), *ὄντοιν* (cf. 71a13), *αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια* (cf. 74c1, *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα*), *μεταλαμβάνειν* or *μετέχειν* (cf. 100c5; cf. also Prior [1985], 152). And cf. also *Phaedo* 78d6–7, 80b1 ff., 104b6–7, and the whole of *Parmenides* 129e4–130a2 (below), with *Phaedo* 103a–c.

This is Socrates' thesis (to which Zeno never agrees): there are 'forms in themselves' (*αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*), and each of them is one; and the many 'come to take part' (*μεταλαμβάνει*) in them. Zeno does not answer. As a good Eleatic, he will not distinguish between *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*, 'forms in themselves', and the participants, and will not allow forms (or anything else) to be *both* in themselves *and* in a relation (of participation) with sensibles. Parmenides will pick it up from here (cf. 130a3–b6) and sharpen the point.

Socrates introduces the technical term (*αὐτό*) *καθ' αὑτό*, 'in itself', without explanation, but it should have been familiar to Zeno. (Cf. Parmenides, fr. 8.58.) Here, Socrates puts forward the assumption that to be 'in itself' (*καθ' αὑτό*) is not to be 'something else' (*ἄλλο τι*), namely its opposite (129a1 ff.). This is indeed the Eleatic position as presented by Plato in Argument I, 137c4–5: *ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἕν*; 'Would not the one be something other than the many?' In the sequel, *αὐτό καθ αὑτό* will be opposed to *πρὸς ἄλλο*, 'in relation to another'.

129a6–b6 And even if all things come to take part in both, although these are opposites, and are themselves like and unlike themselves by
b participating in both, what is the wonder? If someone showed [*ἀπέφαίνεν*] that the likes themselves become unlike, or the unlike like, this I should think was a marvel [*τέρας*]. But if he shows that those things that participate in both these appear to be affected by both—this seems nothing strange, not to me, Zeno; nor, for that matter, if someone shows that everything is one by participating in the one and those same things are many again by participating in plurality.

129a8–b2, *ὅμοια . . . ἀνόμοια*] The plural is irrelevant; cf. *Phaedo* 74c1, *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα*.
129b2, *τέρας*] Cf. *Phaedo* 101b1. There Socrates was referring to someone's becoming larger by the addition of something small (e.g., becoming larger by a head). That problem had been solved in the *Phaedo* itself, in the immediately following passage: one becomes larger not by virtue of a head but by virtue (or on account) of largeness. Now the marvel would be not how sensibles can be contrarily characterized, but that the forms themselves could be so characterized.

Some (unspecified) weakened version of the Principle of Noncontradiction is accepted for individual things. Socrates opposes to Eleatic, homogeneous, ontology his own ontology, in which there are two types of entities, or, in the formulation of *Phaedo* 79a6, *δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων*, 'two types of what is': sensible things, in relation to which participation in opposites is trivial; and those things that are *αυτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, 'in themselves', and cannot accept their contraries.[8] (Cf. *Phaedo* 103b.) This distinction will be questioned by Parmenides immediately below, at 130b. Socrates takes the participation of sensible things

8. On the equivalence of having *F* and (qualifiedly) being *F*, see above, p. 20.

in forms to be unproblematic and only the participation of forms among themselves to present a problem. Parmenides will presently show the problems inherent in the participation of sensible things in forms and will later show how the two problems are in fact the same.

129b6–130a2 But if someone will prove [ἀποδείξει] that that which is one is itself many, and again that the many are indeed one, at this I shall then wonder. And likewise for all other things: if he should try to show that the kinds and forms themselves are affected by these opposite affections in themselves, this would be worth wondering at. But what is the wonder if someone will prove that I, who am one, am also many, saying, whenever he may want to prove that I am many, that my right side and my left side are different, and that my front and my back are different, and likewise my top and my bottom—for I think I do participate in plurality—and whenever he may want to show that I am one, he will say that although we are seven I am one man since I participate also in the one; and so he shows both cases to be true? Thus, if one should try to show that such things are many and also the same one—stones and sticks and suchlike—we shall say that he is proving that something was many and one, not that the one is many nor that the many is one, nor that he is saying anything wonderful, but only what we should all agree about. But if, in those things of which I was talking just now, one would in the first place distinguish the forms [εἴδη] apart [χωρίς] in themselves—such as likeness and unlikeness, and plurality and the one, and rest and movement, and all suchlike—and then show that these are capable of being mixed with and separated from one another, then (said he) I, for one, would admire him wonderfully, Zeno. I think you have dealt with these things altogether courageously; but my admiration would be much greater, as I say, namely if someone should be able to demonstrate [ἐπιδεῖξαι] that this very same difficulty is in every way [παντοδαπῶς] involved in the forms themselves—just as you two displayed it in visible things, so also in the things that are grasped by thought.

129d1, 'although we are seven'] The point is not that there are seven people in the room. There would be no reason to stress this, especially as we are given only five names (Zeno, Parmenides, Socrates, Aristoteles, and Pythodorus). Rather, the point is that Socrates participates *both* in plurality ("we" are seven: right, left, front, back, top, bottom, and Socrates "himself") *and* in unity (for he is *one* man). Cf. *Sophist* 251a7.

Showing that sensible things can be one and many is presented by Socrates as a trivial matter. (The continuation of the dialogue will show that it is far from trivial.) Socrates presupposes the Platonic distinction between sensible things and forms, and remarks that the real wonder would be to show that the *forms* are each one and multiple. Zeno could prove that the (sensible) many are both like and unlike because he disregarded the different respects

in which they can be said to be (and are) so. That the Principle of Noncontradiction must be restricted for sensible things Socrates takes for granted, assuming the discussion of the Principle in *Republic* IV;[9] that it must be restricted for forms too is what Parmenides is going to show in Argument II.

True, it is Socrates who introduces the *Parmenidean* term χωρίς, 'apart'. (Cf. on the following section.) But he wants to have it both ways. Parmenides will gladly accept the χωρίς concept and will presently elaborate on it, but in true Eleatic fashion, he will not allow Socrates to have it both ways.

At *Phaedo* 74a11–12, the equal itself is said to be 'something different besides' sensible equals (παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι), and the difference between forms and sensible things is explicitly or implicitly presupposed. But they are never said anywhere in Plato to be *apart,* except in this passage (by Socrates) and in the following (by Parmenides). In fact, never is the term χωρίς used by Plato of the forms outside the *Parmenides.*

In the *Theaetetus* (155d), written about the same time as the *Parmenides,* Plato makes Philosophy the daughter of Wonder (Θαύμας). In our short passage, he uses related words *six* times in quick succession (129b1; c1, c3, c4; d5; e3; and cf. also below, 135a6, b1) in connection with the possibility of ascribing opposite attributes to the same thing. Attributing opposites to the same sensible thing is nothing wonderful; the wonder from which philosophy—in our case, more specifically, dialectic—springs up is the possibility of attributing opposites to those things that can be grasped only by thought: the forms. If this can be shown to be possible, the possibility of dialectic as the science of the combination of forms will have been established. (Cf. also below, 134e7; 135a6, b1; 142a1–8.)

The classical theory of forms in the so-called middle dialogues stressed the difference between sensible things and forms, and the fact that forms are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, 'in themselves'. Now Plato takes up a point that seems not to have been sufficiently developed (though not completely dismissed) in those dialogues, namely that forms nevertheless *do* combine with each other. Some mention of this had already been made in the *Phaedo* (102d ff.), where certain forms are said to imply certain others, and possibly in the *Republic* (476a), where forms are said to appear multiple because of their κοινωνία ἀλλήλων, 'communion with each other'. In the *Phaedrus* (265e ff.), the combination of forms is explicitly mentioned. But nowhere had Plato considered *how* this is possible.

Here, (at 129d6 ff.), the main ὑπόθεσις of the theory of forms is spelled out: forms must both be in themselves *and* combine with each other. It is a precondition of μέθεξις, 'participation', and later (in the *Sophist*) of the συμπλοκή, 'weaving,' of forms that what is one—and the form *is* one—should

9. Cf. the Introduction, above, pp. 12–16.

be affected by opposites (129b6–c1; cf. e2–3, *συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι*, 'to be mixed and separated', and 131b3). But this is precisely what an Eleatic will not accept: that the one can be many. Just above (at 129c4 ff.), Plato almost gives the game away: a thing can be both one and many *in different respects*. Socrates, *as* one of a group, is one; but *as* having spatial parts, he is many. (For the purposes of this argument, spatial parts will do; the notion of a nonspatial part will be developed in Argument II.)

This is what will be shown in Part II: the one *both* is in itself *and* combines with and separates from other ones. We must hold both concepts of the one (in this case, the form): it must be both *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό* and *πρὸς ἄλλα*. (Cf. 129d7–e2, *πρῶτον μὲν . . .*, 'first . . .', with Argument I; and *εἶτα . . .*, 'and then . . .', with Argument II. Cf. also *Philebus* 15b.)[10] But to this Parmenides cannot agree.

10. See also Scolnicov (1975b), Curd (1988).

Part I

Aporia

130a3–b3 While Socrates was saying that, Pythodorus told us he himself was thinking at each point that Parmenides and Zeno would grow vexed, but they paid great attention to Socrates and glancing frequently at each other smiled as in admiration of him. Now, when he finished, Parmenides intervened:

—Socrates, said he, how worthy of admiration is your urge
b toward arguments. But tell me: Have you yourself thus distinguished, as you say, on the one hand some forms [εἴδη] themselves apart [χωρίς], and on the other hand apart the things that participate in them?

Parmenides reformulates Socrates' position, stressing the separation of sensible things and forms.

Χωρίς (130b2, b3, b4), 'apart', is used by the historical Parmenides when first introducing (illusory) plurality. (Cf. fr. 8.56.) True, it is Socrates who brings up the term in this discussion, at 129d7—but as *one* aspect or mode of the forms' being. Socrates says he 'would admire him wonderfully' who would show forms *both* to be apart *and* to mix with each other. (Cf. 129d7–e2; for wonder as a mainspring of philosophy, cf. above, p. 51. But this is precisely what Parmenides opposes: he will allow forms and sensible things *either* to combine (and then they must be entities of the same type) *or* to be apart (and, thus, entities of two different types), but not both. For dichotomy as standard Eleatic procedure, see the Introduction, above, p. 4.

130b3–e4 And do you think that likeness itself is something apart from the likeness that we have, and the one as well as the many, and all the things you just heard from Zeno?

—I do, said Socrates.

—And such things, said Parmenides, as some form in itself of just and of beautiful and of good and, again, of all suchlike?

—Yes, he said.

c —What, then? A form of man apart from us and from all that are like us, some form itself of man or of fire or also of water?

—I have often been perplexed, he said, about these, Parmenides, whether one must speak about them as we did about those, or otherwise.

—And about these too, Socrates, which would also seem ridiculous, such as hair and mud and dirt or any other most base and lowly thing: are you perplexed whether one must say that of each

d of these too there is a form apart, which is again other than the things we handle, or not?

—In no way, said Socrates. Rather, those things we see such as they are; to think of a form of those would be exceedingly strange. And yet, sometimes I am worried whether it should not be the same case with all things; but then, whenever I get to this point, I pull back in fear that once I fall into such a pit of nonsense I am lost; and I then go back there, to those things that we were just saying have forms, and I spend my time dealing with them.

—For you are still young, Socrates, said Parmenides, and phi-

e losophy has not yet taken hold of you as I believe it will, someday, when you will despise none of these things; but meanwhile you are still mindful of people's opinions, because of your age.

130d1, 'the'] Reading <τῶν> with Heindorf, Diès, and Cornford.

A preliminary problem: What kinds of separate forms are there? What real unities are there, which do not appear as such in our world but are necessary for sensible things to be what they are? Parmenides suggests four kinds of forms:

1, 2. Mathematical and axiological concepts, such as likeness, or just, beautiful, and good. These first two kinds have not been problematic for Plato since the *Meno* and the *Phaedo*. There is a simple reason for accepting them: they never appear unadulterated, and of them it might understandably (although metaphorically) be said that sensible things "want to be" like them (*Phaedo* 74d9–10) but "fall short of them" (e1; cf. d6, e3–4). The unity of the just or the equal is not apparent in sensible things, and thus warrants the postulation of a just itself or an equal itself, which are those desired unities.

3. On the other hand, natural things, like man, are rather well-defined unities as they are. (Water and fire also, each taken as a whole, are well-defined, natural unities.)[1] Although sensible, they are what they are,

1. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z 16.1028b9 ff.

and a form of man or fire adds nothing to man or fire as they appear empirically. Empirical man does not "want to be some other thing" (*Phaedo* 74d9–10): he already is what he is, and his unity seems trivially assured.

4. Hair, mud, and dirt (a) have no intrinsic value and (b) are not natural unities. Here a separate form not only would add nothing but would be arbitrary. Hair is a *part* of an animal—parts cannot have forms, for these would not be real unities.[2] Mud is earth mixed with water, in any proportion—and arbitrary mixtures are not real unities.

Parmenides corrects Socrates' approach, at 130e1: the problem is not primarily axiological, and it does not even, at this point, have to do with the specific features of the Platonic doctrine of forms. What we have in hand is the *general* logico-ontological problem of the one and many. The axiological aspects of the doctrine, and even the more specifically ontological question of what unities are *real* unities, can be approached only after the primary question is settled: How can *any* unity be also many, and what is the relation between that unity and its correlative many? This relation was declared impossible by Parmenidean logic and ontology, and until this aporia is overcome, all attempts to solve the specific problems above are premature.

THE DILEMMA

Main Dilemma

HORN I. SINGLE-WORLD ONTOLOGY

Let us then examine the problem of participation as the problem of the unity of the form. Can the form be one and in itself *and* fulfill its ontological and epistemological function? At this point, we have at our disposal only one well-articulated logic and ontology: the one that Parmenides developed in his poem. His is a single-world, homogeneous ontology. There are no two modes of being; as he could have put it, holding his ground against Aristotle: *τὸ ὂν λέγεται μοναχῶς*, 'being is said univocally'.[3] Even allowing, for the moment, a plurality of entities, these must all be of the same ontological type. A split-world ontology, in which there are two *types of entities* (but not two *modes of being*),[4] will be examined later, and it too will be found impossible.

2. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z 16.1028b6.

3. Cf. *Metaphysics* Z 16.1028a1.

4. On the distinction between types of entities and modes of being, see the Introduction, above, pp. 19–21.

First secondary dilemma

HORN I.1. TOTAL PARTICIPATION: FORMS ASSIMILATED TO SENSIBLE THINGS

130e4–131b2 But now tell me this: Do you think, as you say, that there are *I.1*
some forms from which these other things that come to take part
131 in [*μεταλαμβάνοντα*] them take their names—as, for example,
things that take part in likeness become like, and in largeness large,
and in beauty and justice beautiful and just?

—Indeed, said Socrates.

—Now, each thing that comes to take part comes to take part either in the whole form or in part? Or could there be another way of coming to take part, apart from these?

—How could there be? said he.

—Does it seem to you, then, that the form, being one, is as a whole in each of the many, or what?

b —What prevents it [*τί γὰρ κωλύει*], Parmenides? asked Socrates.

—For despite being one and the same it will be a whole simultaneously in things that are many and apart, and thus would be apart from itself.

130e6, *μεταλαμβάνοντα*, 'come to take part in'] *Μεταλαμβάνει* is the Platonic equivalent of 'becomes', just as *μετέχει*, 'takes part in', or 'participates in', is his equivalent of the predicative 'is'. Of course, on Socrates' thesis (cf. 128e5 ff.; above, p. 48), only sensibles can 'come to take part in' something, viz. in the forms, which are different from them. But Parmenides will interpret this relation as obtaining between sensibles and forms considered as analogous to sensibles.

131a10, *τί* [. . .] *κωλύει*] This is a technical term in the dialectical procedure and in the hypothetical method: so long as 'nothing prevents' (*οὐδὲν κωλύει*) an hypothesis from being true, it 'stands' (*μένει*). An aporia is reached when something 'prevents' the proposed hypothesis from being true. The hypothetical procedure aims at reestablishing the desired conclusion by proposing a viable hypothesis, one that 'nothing prevents' from being true. Cf. the Introduction, above, p. 9.

Parmenides starts from an Eleatic dichotomy: the sensible thing partakes *either* of the whole *or* of the parts severally (131a4). Socrates accepts Parmenides' premise (a6).

Let us suppose at first that the many sensible things participate in the form as a whole. But they could not partake of the whole, for the whole would then be in many things at once. And this, on the current hypothesis, is impossible (131a8–b2). The form cannot be participated in as a whole without being apart from itself. Here Parmenides interprets *μέρος*, 'part', as strictly material. This is not simply a caricature of the doctrine of forms. So long as the possibility of a split-world ontology is not being considered, Parmenides argues from his own point of view: from a single-world, homogeneous ontology, in which all entities are of the same type. Here, *εἴδη* are as-

similated to sensible things. Of course, one could have a single-world, homogeneous, *nonmaterial* ontology, in which sensible things are assimilated to immaterial εἴδη. This possibility is taken care of in 132b3–c11.

COUNTERHYPOTHESIS I.1.1. TOTAL PARTICIPATION: FORMS NOT MATERIAL: THE DAY (*OUT OF ORDER*)

131b3–6 —It would not, said he, if only [γε], as the day, despite being one and the same, is in many places [πολλαχοῦ] at once, and is none the more apart from itself—if each form too should thus be simultaneously one and the same in all things. *I.1.1*

131b3, 'the day'] Not the light of the day, as the word ἡμέρα can also mean. What Socrates needs here is precisely a nonmaterial entity that can be simultaneously 'in many places at once and none the more apart from itself'. *Contra* Brisson (1994: 37 n. 74): "Suivant toute vraisemblance, il s'agit de la lumière du jour, qui, pour les anciens Grecs en général et pour Platon en particulier, était une réalité matérielle, cf. le *Timée* (45c–46a)." Cf. also Guthrie (1962–81), V 41 n. 1.

131b4, πολλαχοῦ] See on the following passage.

Socrates demurs, adducing a nonmaterial example. Parmenides ignores it, rightly, as out of order: under the current hypothesis of a single-world ontology, one cannot distinguish between entities of different types—in this case, entities that can be simultaneously in many places and entities that cannot. With some modifications, this is the position that Plato will defend in Part II of the dialogue, showing under what assumptions it is possible: μέθεξις, 'participation', understood as ἓν διὰ πολλῶν, 'one through many', is possible only if the form can be *simultaneously* one *and* many. (Cf. also 129b6, above.) From one point of view, the form is itself and nothing else; it is καθ' αὑτό, 'in itself', and μονοειδής, 'unique'. (Cf., e.g., *Symposium* 211b1.) But from another point of view, it is this and that, and it is participated in here and there. And this is exactly what Parmenides will not allow.

OBJECTION I.1.2. TOTAL PARTICIPATION: THE SAIL

131b7–c11 —How sweetly, Socrates, he said, you make one and the same thing be simultaneously in many places, as if you were to cover many men with a sail and say that it is one over many as a whole. Or don't you think you are saying something like that? *I.1.2*

c —Perhaps, he said.

—Now, then, would the sail as a whole be over each man, or would a different part of it be over each one?

—A part.

—So, said he, the forms themselves are divisible, Socrates, and the things that participate in them would participate in their parts; and no longer would the whole be in each, but only a part of each form.

> —So it appears, at least.
>
> —Now, then, Socrates, said he, will you want to assert that the one form is actually divisible for us and will still be one?
>
> —In no way, said he.

Parmenides is right, from his point of view, in interpreting *πολλαχοῦ* as strictly spatial. If the current hypothesis is that of an homogeneous ontology, in which forms are assimilated to sensible things, then forms can be *πολλαχοῦ* (131b4, above) only if they are 'in many places'. Socrates does not quite agree with Parmenides' interpretation of what he has just said (cf. c1, *Ἴσως*, 'Perhaps'): there is an important difference between the day and the sail—namely that the sail is of the same ontological type as the men covered by it, whereas the day is not of the same type as the places it is "in."

The phrase 'one over many' (*ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς* or *κατὰ πολλῶν*) is used only by Socrates' opponents, to describe the supposed relation between the form and the sensibles. Plato consistently describes his own view of the relation between forms and sensible things by *διά* or by the causal dative. For example, compare Socrates' demand at *Meno* 72c7–8 for *ἕν γέ τι εἶδος . . . δι' ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί* ('one certain form . . . *by which* they are virtues') with Meno's answer at 73d1, *εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων* ('if you are searching for one thing *over* all'); note also *Euthyphro* 6d1, *ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν* ('*by which* all the pious things are pious'). In the *Parmenides* too, *ἐπί* is reserved for such mistaken apprehension. (Cf. 132a11, c3, c7, below.) See also on 132a7, below.

In our dialogue, the Platonic position was stated by Socrates at 129a3–5: *καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι ταύτῃ τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ*, 'And those coming to take part in likeness become like both *by it* and *in the measure that* they would come to take part in it'. That position had been implicit to some extent in the theory of forms as Plato's alternative to Parmenidean logic and ontology. But he had not explained or analyzed it. Therefore Parmenides will have nothing of it, and thus far, from his point of view, rightly so. He sticks to the current hypothesis and to the interpretation of *μέθεξις* as a relation similar to that between sensible things. He will not allow that anything can be one and many, not even in different respects—for example, in this case, considering the many collectively or severally—since, on his view, there can be no respects at all. It is *either* one *or* many, and in either case participation is impossible.

This, then, is the conclusion of the first horn of the dilemma (131c5–6): if the form is participated in as a whole, it must be divisible, and therefore it cannot be one.

Argument II will show how the one can both have parts and be one. Before solving the problem of the participation of sensible things in forms, the

problem has to be solved of how the forms can be each in itself one but nevertheless divisible. There is a *general* problem of the one and the many, however the one is interpreted. The problems of forms and sensible things and of the communion of forms among themselves are special cases of the problem of the one and the many.

HORN I.2. PARTIAL PARTICIPATION: SELF-PREDICATION AS CONSEQUENCE OF HOMOGENEITY

131c12–e3 —For look here, he said: If you divide largeness itself, and each *I.2*
d of the many large things is to be large by virtue of a part of largeness, which is smaller than largeness itself, will this not appear senseless?

—Indeed, said he.

—What, then? Will each thing that took some small part of the equal be equal to something by having that which is less than the equal itself?

—This is impossible.

—And one of us will have a part of the small, which itself the small will be larger than, inasmuch as [ἅτε] it is a part of itself; and in this way, then, the small itself will be larger, and whatever the portion taken away be added to will be smaller, not greater, than
e before.

—This, at any rate, could not happen, said he.

131d8, 'inasmuch as it is a part of itself'] The language here stresses the impossible reflexivity of self-predication: the small itself must be larger than its parts, which are supposed to be—they too—small in the same way. This move foreshadows the Third Man Argument, to follow.

The second horn of the dilemma: if, then, sensible things do not participate in the whole of the form, let us examine the possibility of partial participation. Now, 'partial participation' could mean participation in some aspects of the form but not in others.[5] This is briefly considered—and dismissed—below (132d5 ff.). Indeed, under the hypothesis in force, there can be no "aspects," and in particular there is no way in which something can participate in something else according to one aspect but not according to another. Partial participation must be understood, then, as participation in a physical part, as in the case of the sail, immediately above.

Let us then suppose that the form is divisible in this sense. The parts will then be *different* from the whole. (In this case, a part of the large will be small.)

5. As, e.g., in Malcolm's (1991: 172) interpretation that, say, "the Form of Man is made of Rationality and Animality," and if Socrates participated in "less than" both these aspects, he would become not a man but either pure reason or a brute.

If being is univocal and the *F* is nothing but *F,* then the parts (or aspects) of *F* can be only non-*F.* Therefore, *ex hypothesi,* there is no way in which they can be *partially* different from *F*—say, *f*—without being in fact non-*F.* On the hypothesis of ontological homogeneity, parts can be only of the same ontological type as the whole—in our case, physical. Nor can there be different "modes," "aspects," or "categories" of being. Thus, being *F* must be the same as having *F,* and vice versa.

Worse, yet: an homogeneous ontology of the type assumed not only leads to self-predication but may even lead, at least in some cases, to *opposite* self-predication:[6] on the assumption of assimilation of forms to sensible things, "partially" is to be interpreted physically (since, *ex hypothesi,* entities are of one type only, namely physical, and there are no other "aspects" to be invoked). Thus, if sensible things participate in (say) the small only partially, the part of the small in which each sensible thing participates, being a (physical) part, will be smaller than the whole small itself. But then the small itself will be larger than the part. And if something comes to take part in the small, that thing will have something *added* to it (namely that part of the small in which it comes to take part); but this addition is supposed to make that thing *smaller*—which, on the current assumption, is absurd.

It was Parmenides who introduced self-predication, and Socrates is bound to accept it on the terms of the hypothesis being examined. Self-predication is a property not of Platonic forms, but of forms as understood within the Parmenidean framework of an homogeneous ontology. It depends on the assumption that εἶναι is univocal—that *F* is *F* in the same way that *x* is *F* (or has *F*-ness)—and on the assimilation of forms to sensible things. (See further on 141e10.) It is true that Plato himself contributed to the imputation of self-predication to his forms by such formulations as 'How could anything else possibly be pious, if piety itself, at least, will not be pious?' (*Protagoras* 330d8–e1) or 'if anything else is beautiful except [πλὴν] the beautiful itself' (*Phaedo* 100c4). This is not a denial that there is anything beautiful except the beautiful itself, but rather an assertion that whereas the beauty of the beautiful itself is above suspicion, the beauty of everything else is only hypothetical or conditional. 'Is' is used here ambiguously, but this ambiguity is systematic and has to do with different *modes* of being, not with different *types* of entities.[7] The investigation into the modes of being and their implications is one of the tasks of Part II of the

6. By 'self-predication' I mean only this: that a form *is,* in a strong sense, the character that it *has.* Cf. above, p. 20; and, on self-predication and self-participation, e.g., Malcolm (1991); Brisson (1994), 295–306.

7. Robin (1963 [1908]: 65, 109) noted that ambiguity already long ago. This is not "Pauline predication," as Peterson (1973) and Vlastos (1973b [1972]) would have it. For a penetrating critique of self-predication and Pauline predication, cf. Hägler (1983), 18 ff.

Parmenides. The main point had already been stated without argument in that same passage of the *Phaedo:* the form is beautiful by itself; the many beautiful things are beautiful because of their participation in the form. But the *Phaedo* did not offer any support for the claim that 'is' is ambiguous in this way.

131e3–7 —In what manner, then, Socrates, he said, will the others come to take part in your forms, being able to come to take part neither in respect of [κατά] the parts nor in respect of the wholes?

—No, by Zeus, said he; I do not think it easy to determine such a question in any way.

Impaled on the horns of the dilemma: participation is impossible either way.

Second secondary dilemma

HORN I(*BIS*).1: TOTAL PARTICIPATION

OBJECTION I(*BIS*).1.1. FORMS (EPISTEMICALLY) POSTERIOR TO PARTICIPANTS: THE THIRD MAN ARGUMENT: HOMOGENEOUS ONTOLOGY

131e8–132b2 —And what now? What do you think of this? *I*(bis).*1.1*

—Of what?

132 —I presume you believe that in each case there is one form because of [ἐκ] something like this: whenever you think several things to be large, perhaps you think, looking at them all, that there is some idea, one and the same; hence you suppose that the large is one.

—You speak the truth, he said.

—And what about the large itself and the other large things? Whenever you look at them, with your soul, in the same way, will there not appear again one large thing [ἕν τι αὖ μέγα], by which [ᾧ] all these appear large?

—So it seems.

—So, another form of largeness will turn up besides the largeness itself that has come to be and the things that participate in it;

b and over all these again another, by which [ᾧ] all these will be large; and thus you will no longer have one of each form, but an indefinite plurality.

132a2–3, *μία τις . . . ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι*] Literally, 'some one idea is the same [in all those cases]'.

132a7, *ᾧ*] The dative is instrumental, not causative. On the current assumption, that forms are posterior to sensible things, the form is that *by means* of which the large things are *perceived* as large, not that which *causes* them to be large. The transition to the suggestion that forms are thoughts in the soul is smooth. But even if the form is supposed to be causative (as suggested at b1), and the many large things are large *because*

of the form, still the form could not be causative only in a certain aspect of it. According to the current hypothesis, it has to be what it causes, no more and no less. (Cf. Teloh's [1981: 43] Causal Principle: "The beautiful is beautiful and so it can make that to which it is present beautiful." This is, however, *Parmenides*' interpretation of the forms, under the current hypothesis of an homogeneous ontology, implying as it does self-predication.) Cf. above, on 131b9, and below, on 132c12–d4.

Now Parmenides suggests to Socrates a reason for supposing, nevertheless, that the form is one: that is, for supposing that apart from the many large things there is also a large itself, which is one, in contradistinction from the sensible things, which are many. Starting from the many large things and surveying them all together, a seemingly unitary form, the large itself, arises in order to account for the common largeness of all. But, on the Parmenidean assumption of an homogeneous ontology, which we are now examining, the large itself cannot be large in a way different from how the many large things are large. Hence, it too must be large 'by virtue of' another large.[8] (Cf. ᾧ, 132a7, b1.) But then we will have an indefinite plurality of forms and not one only, as required by Socrates.

Here, the problem is not that an infinite regress is generated (although this too may be the case), but, as Parmenides makes quite clear (at 132b2), that the form, which has to be one in order to fulfill its function according to Socrates (a1–3), turns out to be an indefinite plurality (b2, ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος). According to this argument, what makes large things capable of being identically predicated is the *one* large thing common to all. Now, if it turns out that we need a similar requirement for *that* large thing, then nothing can be large, for there would be no justification for the common predication. Thus, if the form is one (under the current hypothesis), it must be not just divisible, but indefinitely many. But it cannot be both one and many: it must be either absolutely one or absolutely many.[9]

Parmenides starts at the wrong end: he suggests that the form appears *in the wake of* the many large things, consistent with his ἓν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ('one over many') approach. The crucial step is at 132a6, when Parmenides surveys the large things *and* the form of largeness *in the same way* (a6, ὡσαύτως) as he surveyed the large things alone. That is, he assimilates largeness itself to what participates in it; in his homogeneous ontology, he is bound to do so. The converse assimilation, of participating things to forms, will be considered immediately below.

8. Vlastos's Nonidentity Assumption. Cf. Vlastos (1973a [1969]).

9. Cf. Sellars (1959 [1955]); Gerson (1981), 21; C. Strang (1970 [1963]). Cf. also Malcolm (1991), 47–53 (although I do not agree with him on the forms' being universals, for reasons given above). Summaries of interpretations of the Third Man Argument and relevant bibliographies are to be found in Mignucci (1990); and Dorter (1994), 32 n. 18, 48.

COUNTERHYPOTHESIS I(*BIS*).1.2. FORMS (EPISTEMICALLY) POSTERIOR TO PARTICIPANTS: NOT MATERIAL: THOUGHTS: HETEROGENEOUS ONTOLOGY (*OUT OF ORDER*)

132b3–6 —But, Parmenides, said Socrates, perhaps it may be that each of the forms is a thought of these things [τούτων], and it would not be proper for it to come to be anywhere else but in souls. For thus each would be one indeed and would no longer be affected by what we were just referring to. *I(bis).1.2*

132b4, τούτων, 'of these things'] I.e., of the many large things. Cf. below, 132b7 ff.

Socrates tries again to press the claim that the forms are of a different ontological type—say, "thoughts in souls." This would make each of them *one* and not subject to self-predication. But this necessitates the assumption that *F* is *F* in a different way from that in which the sensible *f* is *F*. But this assumption is out of order, as in this horn of the dilemma we are examining a single-world, homogeneous ontology, and in this there is no room for two different ontological types. In his rebuttal, which follows immediately, Parmenides refuses to consider this possibility, steadfastly interpreting 'being' as univocal.

REBUTTAL: THINGS THAT PARTICIPATE IN FORMS MUST BE THOUGHTS, THEY TOO

132b7–c11 —What, then? said he. Each of the thoughts is one, but is a thought of nothing?

—But that is impossible, he replied.

—Rather, of something?

—Yes.

c —Of something that is? or that is not?

—Of something that is.

—Is it not of some one thing, which that thought takes as set over all of them [ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν], as one single idea?

—Yes.

—Further, will not this thing that is thought of as one be a form, ever being the same over all?

—It seems necessary, again.

—And what, then? said Parmenides. Is it not necessary, from the way you say the other things participate in the forms, that it seems to you that either each is made of thoughts and everything thinks, or, although thoughts, they are without thought?

—This, said he, makes no sense either.

132c3, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν] Cf. above, on 131b9.

Thought, if it is true thought, must be the thought of *something*. (Cf. Parmenides, fr. 3.) It must have a content, and that content must *ex hypothesi* be (a) real (132c1, c2, ὄντος) and (b) one (c3, ἑνός τινος). But if the participants participate in it, they too must be νοήματα: for, if being is univocal, as assumed in this horn of the dilemma, then they must be *F* in exactly the same way that the νόημα is *F*. There is no "partial" participation. The form cannot be participated in only "in part," according to some but not all of its characteristics.[10] This would require a distinction, within the form, of properties that are participated in from those that are not. And such a distinction we do not have. Thus:

either (1) the others are 'made of thoughts'; as there can be no difference, in Parmenidean terms, between the act of thought and its content[11] (for then we should have two types of entities), the others will have to be "acts of thought"; *or* (2) they will be 'without thought'; but then what is it that makes them νοήματα? For νοήματα they must be, according to the ontology under consideration, if they participate in thoughts.

HORN 1(*BIS*).2. PARTIAL PARTICIPATION: FORMS PRIOR TO PARTICIPANTS (CAUSATIVE): PARADIGMS

132c12–d4 d — But, Parmenides, to me, at least, the matter appears to be very much like this: these forms stand fixed like models [παραδείγματα] in nature, and the others resemble [ἐοικέναι] them and are their likenesses [ὁμοιώματα]; and this participation in the forms turns out to be for the others nothing else than [οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ] being images [εἰκασθῆναι] of them. — *I*(bis).2

The suggestion that forms are paradigms picks up ᾧ (132b1) as causative (cf. above, on 132a7) and does away with the ἓν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν assumption. The form does not *arise* from sensible things (as in the Third Man Argument); it is now expressly conceived as *prior* to sensible things.

The key concept is εἰκασθῆναι, 'to be an image'. Participation is defined as being an image of the form. (Note 132d4, οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ as the technical term for a definition.) The relation, first loosely described as resemblance and likeness, is then defined more precisely as being an image: that is, as nonsymmetrical.

Moreover, being a paradigm implies a causal relation, which is not necessarily relevant in the case of νοήματα. But, again, such a relation implies a distinction between two ways of being *F:* the paradigm is *F* 'paradigmatically',

10. At least in this respect, Keyt (1971) assumes that the demiurge's (unfulfilled) intentions in the *Timaeus* are Parmenidean.

11. At least one possible reading of Parmenides' fr. 3 gives such a sense. But Plato's argument here does not depend on this interpretation of Parmenides' words.

and therefore needs no standard of *F*-ness; the others are *F* only derivatively. A copy of Myron's *Discobolus,* accurate as it may (or may not) be, is deficient *because* it is a copy: its deficiency is ontological. This implies, again, that the original *is* in a different sense from that in which the copy is said to be.

REBUTTAL: ASSIMILATION OF PARADIGM TO COPY

132d5–133a7 —Now, said he, if anything resembles the form, can that form be not like its image, to the extent that it is its likeness [*ἀφωμοιωθη*]? Or is there any device, so that the like be not like its like?

—There is none.

—And is it not strictly necessary that what is like its like partic-

e ipates in the same one thing?

—It is necessary.

—And that by participating in which the likes are like: Will not that be the form itself?

—By all means.

—So, nothing can be like the form, nor the form like anything else; otherwise, beside the form another form will always turn up,

133 and, if this be like anything, yet another, and a new form will never cease coming to be, if the form should come to be like the thing that is participating in it.

—What you say is absolutely true.

—And so, not by likeness do the others come to take part in the forms; we must rather look for something else by which they come to take part in them.

—So it seems.

132e1: [*εἴδους*] Burnet, Diès *εἴδους*, MSS.

The paradigm argument is an improvement on the *νοήματα* suggestion, because it implies that there are relevant as well as irrelevant aspects of the form *qua* participated-in. Note especially 132d6, *καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη*, '*to the extent that* it is its likeness'. Likeness will be analyzed at 139e8 as 'being somehow [i.e., in some respect] affected by the same'. It is therefore essential to likeness that some aspects of the things considered are relevant to it and some are not.[12] But even if we relax the strictures of the current hypothesis and make room for the distinction between relevant and irrelevant aspects, we still have to assume, on the hypothesis in force, that any relation of this sort must be symmetrical (else we would have two modes of being: being as an original, in itself, and being as a copy, in relation to the original).

12. Cf. Waterlow (1982), 345: "Obviously [the sensibles] are not supposed to resemble [the forms] in those respects that indicate their Form-dependence." But Socrates is "in a poor position for driving that point home"—not because he has put himself in it, as Waterlow supposes, but because the symmetry is required by the hypothesis in force at this stage of the argument.

Parmenides, though, refuses to entertain any sort of ambiguity of εἶναι. This leads to the assimilation of paradigm and copy. Thus the *F* itself too is *F* only because of the similarity to something else that is *F*, and so on.[13] Parmenides assumes the symmetry of the aspects in respect of which similarity should be considered. (Cf. 132d9–e1, 'in the same one thing', namely in the relevant aspect.)

But in the relation of being an image, the image is *constituted* by the relation—that is, the relation is *prior* to one of the relata. A copy of Polycleitus's *Doryphorus* is a copy by virtue of being copied from it, and the degree of resemblance to the original is relevant only to the copy's being a bad or a good copy, not to its being a copy (insofar as it *is* a copy). By contrast, likeness is a symmetrical relation *posterior* to the relata. Two twin brothers may or may not be like one another in different degrees and in different respects not given beforehand. But a copy, in those respects in which it is a copy, stands to the original in an antisymmetrical relation. Both in the relation of likeness and in the relation of being an image, there are relevant as well as irrelevant aspects. But in likeness *any* aspect could be relevant, and which ones are or are not can be ascertained only *ex post facto;* in an image, the relevant aspects are determined *beforehand* as being those aspects according to which the image was made.[14]

This presupposes two different modes of being: being in itself, and being derivatively or in relation to something else (as, e.g., being an image of it). If we do not accept that distinction (as Parmenides is not willing to), then we have no choice but to interpret "being an image" as "being like." The two relata *are* then in the same way: both are in themselves, and the relation between them must be *posterior* to them, external and symmetrical.

But if so, there are no privileged aspects according to which the image is an image. And if so, there must be a criterion of likeness, whereby the relevant aspects are established. Moreover, this criterion of likeness, by our current hypothesis of an homogeneous ontology, cannot be of a type different from that of the entities whose likeness it serves to establish. Hence, it is it-

13. Waterlow (1982: 345) sees the problem with the paradigmatism of forms, proposed here, in that "[n]o thinkable Form can fulfill this role [of original], since there is none so immaculate that it does not harbour contraries." It is true that the fact that forms are not totally unified may cause difficulties for their degree of reality. (Cf. ibid. 344.) This is considered by Plato in the continuation of the dialogue, and especially at the very end of Argument VIII, but it is not the consideration operative in this passage.

14. Cf. Prior (1985), 72–73: "The argument understands 'paradigm' as 'exemplar'; but Plato in the middle dialogues uses it to mean 'pattern'. A pattern of a house is not a house." True enough. But one must add to the difference in type also the difference in *mode* of being. The plan of a house, according to which the house is built, is not only different from the house but also *prior* to the house, and the house is *dependent* on it. Cf. also E. N. Lee (1966).

self in need of a criterion of the likeness of itself and the entities supposed to be like it. (Cf. 133a1.)

Schofield (1996: esp. 62 ff.) takes 'the form itself' at 133e4 to refer to the form of likeness, retaining εἴδους at e1. But if so, one should expect at e4 something like 'its form'—that is, the form of likeness. 'Participating' (μετέχοντα) at e3 is a technical term (although not yet sufficiently clear—in fact, still under discussion and clarification). Εἴδους at e1 would indeed be redundant. Parmenides proceeds here by small steps: there must be something in common between things that are like each other, and this is the form itself—that is, the very form that we started with (or rather, another form with the same name). The force of 'itself' at e4 is 'that very form of which we are talking'. 'The form' at e4 must be the same as 'the form' at e6. So, if nothing can be (say) beautiful unless it is so by being like the form of beauty (e4), then 'the form itself' by which the likes (say, the beautiful things) should be like their like (say, the form of beauty) will be the form (of beauty) itself, reduplicated *ad infinitum* at 132e7–133a2. For 'likeness' is precisely this: 'being somehow affected by the same' (139e8). Likeness is thus effectively dissolved into 'participating in the same'.

Furthermore, it is surely not the case that "things are like in virtue of being modelled on an original, likeness" (Schofield 1996: 66). Rather, although things are like by participating in likeness (however this is to be unpacked), they are surely not *modeled* on likeness as their *original*. The copies a_1 and a_2 are like each other in virtue of being modeled, if at all, on a common original *A*. But here Parmenides is assimilating this case to the case in which *a* is like its model *A* by virtue of their both being modeled on *A′*, which is only numerically different from *A*. Parmenides blocked the distinction between the two cases by his assumption of symmetry, necessitated by his single-level ontology. In the relation of original and copy, there is no need of a separate standard. The original *is* the standard in the relevant aspects. "Relevant" because, of course, a portrait is like its original only in those aspects in which it is *meant* to be like it (say, in general visual features, complexion, expression, etc.) but not in size or in being made of flesh and blood. And although these aspects may vary from case to case, we do not *discover* them by comparing copy to original; they are implied beforehand in the fact that the copy is going to be this particular type of copy (say, an oil portrait and not a bronze sculpture).[15] The case is even clearer if, instead of a portrait, we have a *re-*

15. *Contra* Schofield (1996), 74. The original, unlike the copy, does not need an explanation of why it is as it is. It just *is* what it is. One can ask what makes this portrait a portrait of Simmias, and the answer will be given in terms of certain features of Simmias reproduced or represented in the portrait. But it makes no sense to ask what makes Simmias Simmias. He just *is* Simmias.

flection of Simmias. Then the similarity is generated by the very fact of its being a reflection, and to the extent that, and in those respects in which, it is a reflection, both qualifications deriving *a priori* from the nature of the reflecting medium.

An analogous reasoning shows that the form is not a standard or paradigm, if by that we mean an embodiment or exemplification of a more fundamental universal.[16] Whereas the standard yard bar not only is one yard long but also has other irrelevant properties that make it this individual bar (e.g., being of such-and-such a material), the form has no irrelevant properties that make it *this* individual form. Its *F*-ness cannot be conceptually distinguished from its being (the) *F.* Of course, it has other properties irrelevant to its being *F* (such as being one, nontemporal, etc.),[17] but these are properties belonging to it as being *a* form, not as being *this* form. Any yard bar, even the standard yard bar, will be made of some material or other: this particular bar is made of (say) platinum; another could be made of gold. This could not happen to a form. What makes it *this* form is just this: its being *F,* and nothing else.

Main Dilemma Revisited

HORN II. SPLIT-WORLD ONTOLOGY

Having disposed of the possibility of μέθεξις on the assumption of a single-world ontology, Parmenides is now ready to tackle the other horn of the main dilemma. Let us suppose that forms and sensible things are of two different ontological types: say, immaterial intelligible forms and material sensible things. (Exactly what the difference is between the two types of entities under consideration is not relevant to the argument. It is enough that they *are* different.) As Parmenides will show presently, this hypothesis is no better than the former. If forms and sensible things are of two different ontological types, each must be αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, 'in itself', or they will not be separate. For this is what is meant, in Parmenidean terms, by being different: being (completely) separate. As we saw above, Parmenides will not allow *partial* difference: this would require not only that sensible things have aspects, but also that forms do too, and this would immediately make each form multiple. Accordingly, even if we posit unitary forms αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, we cannot admit any other mode

16. For, as C. Strang (1970 [1963]) observes, a paradigm implies a universal that is being (paradigmatically) exemplified: "It seems clear that without a *logos* specifying unit length no object can have unit length and *a fortiori* no object can be a standard of unit length, i.e. a paradigm." *Contra* Spellman (1983). Nor does the form resemble a law or a formula, as Teloh (1981: 135) has it, insofar as the form is not a universal.

17. Cf. Keyt (1971).

of being, such as being *πρός τι*.[18] In this horn of the dilemma, Parmenides is prepared to admit two *types* of entities (but not two *modes* of being).

OBJECTION II.1. SEPARATE FORMS ARE UNKNOWABLE

The problem is first of all epistemological: forms *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά* are supposed to provide a firm anchor for knowledge. But they are not fit for this role, precisely because they are ontologically distinct from sensibles.

133a8–c1 —Do you see now, Socrates, said he, how great the perplexity is if one marks off forms as being in themselves? *II.1*

—I certainly do.

—Well then, said he, I tell you that you have not yet grasped, so
b to say, how great the perplexity is if you posit on every occasion each form as something one, distinguishing it from the things that are.

—How so? he said.

—There are many other perplexities, said he, but this is the greatest. If someone should say that the forms, such as we say they must be, are not even fit to be known, one would be unable to show him that he is mistaken, unless the challenger should happen to be widely experienced and well endowed, and be willing to busy himself with following quite a long and remote demon-
c stration, else he who holds that they are unknowable would remain unconvinced.

The argument proceeds in four steps: (1) forms and sensible things are absolutely apart from each other; (2) whatever knowledge we have cannot be knowledge of the forms; (3) the forms are not fit to be known by us; (4) nor can the gods have knowledge of us.

OBJECTION II.1.1. FORMS ARE ABSOLUTELY SEPARATE FROM SENSIBLE THINGS

133c2–d5 —How so, Parmenides? said Socrates. *II.1.1*

—Because, Socrates, I believe that you, or anyone else who posits that each one's being [*οὐσίαν*] is something in itself, would agree, first, that none of these is in us.

—For how could it still be in itself? said Socrates.

—Well said, he replied. Now, also those ideas that are what they are in relation to one another have their being in relation to them-
d selves but not in relation to what is with us—whether as likenesses or indeed however one posits them—by participating in which we are called by each name; and these things here that take the names of those are again in relation to themselves but not to the forms,

18. The historical Parmenides had, in fact, considered such a possibility of two forms *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ* in his Way of Seeming (fr. 8.53 ff.).

and whatever names they are thus called by are their own and not of those.

133c4, *οὐσίαν*] The first appearance of the term in this dialogue. As we shall see later, *οὐσία* is the technical term for 'being' (as a noun), i.e., for whatever anything is. For the sake of the present argument, a multiplicity of forms is required, distinguishable from each other, so that we can have relations between them. Each of them will be a definite *οὐσία*, i.e., will be something else: say, *F, G,* etc.

If the form is *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*, 'in (relation to) itself,' then—on Parmenides' strict dichotomic view (accepted by the young Socrates against his best interests)—it is not 'in us'. The separation can be nothing less than total: the form is *either* in itself *or* in us; and if it is in us, it must be in us in the same way that it is in itself. And being in itself is precisely this: not being in (or in any relation to) something else. On the terms of the present hypothesis, then, there can be no relation between two ontological types.

At this point, Parmenides is prepared, for the sake of this argument, to admit *εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλας* (133c8), 'being in relation to one another', between entities *of the same ontological type,* because the matter under discussion is the relation between forms and sensible things, not the relation of forms among themselves. But, strictly, as Part II of the dialogue will show, for Parmenides, *εἶναι καθ' αὑτό* must exclude all *εἶναι πρός τι*. Here, in this passage, the question is: How can *f* be *πρὸς F*—for example, be called after *F,* or participate in *F*? For the time being, the question how *F* can be *πρὸς G* is not raised. But of course it will *have* to be raised: How can anything be *πρὸς* anything else without ceasing to be *καθ' αὑτό*? The problem of the participation of sensibles in forms will be shown to be an appendix of the more general problem of the participation of forms in forms.

133d6–134a2 —How do you mean? said Socrates.

—For example, said Parmenides, if one of us is master or slave
e of someone, no doubt he is not the slave of the master itself, that which is master [*ὃ ἔστι δεσπότης*], nor is the master master of the slave itself, that which is slave, but, being a man, he will be master or slave of a man; mastership itself is what it is of slavery itself, and likewise slavery itself is slavery of mastership itself; but these among us have no capability [*δύναμιν*] in relation to those, nor do those in relation to us. Rather, as I say, those are of themselves and in re-
134 lation to themselves, and these with us are likewise in relation to themselves. Or don't you understand what I am saying?

—I understand indeed.

If there could be two ontological types, they would have to be completely apart from each other. (Or else, being each in itself, they would not be *two*.) There could be no relation between them. This is the Parmenidean *κρίσις*,

'distinction' (cf. frr. 6.7, 7.5), now misapplied to the world of seeming. Parmenides, in the Way of Seeming in his poem, considered a world in which there are two types of entities. But these—night and fire—are *apart* (8.56, *χωρίς*) and each in itself (8.58, *καθ' αὑτό*).

Even if we allow relational beings, these will be of the same ontological type, like master and slave: the sensible slave will be dependent not on the master itself, nor on what it is to be master, but on the sensible master; and the same goes for the slave itself, with the appropriate modifications. Even if relational entities could be related to other relational entities, this would be true only of entities *of the same type*. On Parmenidean premises, total separation between the types is inevitable in any case. By contrast, the doctrine of forms and participation requires an unparalleled—and, on the face of it, impossible—relation across ontological types.

OBJECTION II.1.2. WE CANNOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE FORMS

134a3–b2 —Now, knowledge too, said he: Would not that which is knowledge itself be knowledge of that which is truth itself? *II.1.2*
—Indeed.
—Again, each of the several cases of that which is knowledge would be knowledge of that which each thing is? Or not?
—Yes.
—And the knowledge with us: Would it not be of the truth with us? And again, each of the several cases of knowledge with us:
b Would it not follow that it is knowledge of each of the several things with us?
—It is necessary.

Since there can be no relation straddling two ontological domains (as established immediately above), there can be no relation of knowledge between ourselves as sensible beings and the forms. Whatever knowledge we have can be only of sensible things like ourselves.

OBJECTION II.1.3. FORMS ARE NOT FIT TO BE KNOWN

134b3–c3 —Furthermore, as you agree, we do not possess the forms themselves, nor are they capable of being with us. *II.1.3*
—Indeed not.
—And each of the kinds [*γένη*] themselves that are is presumably [*που*] known by the form itself of knowledge?
—Yes.
—Which we do not possess?
—We do not.
—So, none of the forms is known by us, since we do not participate in knowledge itself.

—It seems not.

c —And so, the beautiful itself that is, and the good, and in fact all that we suppose to be the ideas [ἰδέας] themselves are unknowable to us.

—Very likely.

On the current assumption, knowledge *stricto sensu,* knowledge of the forms, is impossible. If there can be no relation between two different ontological domains, there can be no knowledge across them. In particular, there can be no passage from our knowledge to knowledge in the strict sense, from δόξα to ἐπιστήμη. The passage from δόξα (as cognition of sensible things) to ἐπιστήμη (as cognition of forms) was described at *Phaedo* 72 as ἀνάμνησις, 'recollection', and forms were introduced in the immediate sequel in order to support ἀνάμνησις. But this is precisely what, according to the present argument, they cannot do.

OBJECTION II.1.4. THE SITUATION IS SYMMETRICAL: THE GODS CANNOT KNOW US

134c4–e8 —Look now at something even more formidable than this. *II.1.4*

—Like what?

—You would say, presumably [που], that if indeed the kind itself of knowledge is something, it is much stricter than the knowledge with us, and so too with beauty and all the rest.

—Yes.

—Now, if indeed something else participates in knowledge itself, would you not say that God more than anyone else has the strictest knowledge?

—It is necessary.

d —Next, again, will God, having knowledge itself, be able to know the things with us?

—Why not?

—Because, answered Parmenides, it has been agreed with us, Socrates, that neither do those forms have in relation to the things with us the capability that they have, nor do the things with us in relation to those, but each in relation to itself.

—It has been agreed.

—Now, if this strictest mastership and this strictest knowledge is with the god, neither would their mastership ever govern us, nor would their knowledge know us nor anything else of the things with

e us, but, just as we do not rule them with the rule that is with us, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, so, again, by the same reasoning, neither are they our masters, nor do they, being gods, know things human.

—But surely, he said, this must be a wonderful argument, if someone will deny the god knowledge.

134e7, 'a wonderful argument'] Cf. above, on 129b6 ff.; Parmenides will show this below, 142a1–6.

One might think that the problem is in some shortcoming of ours, that we, for some reason, are incapable of attaining knowledge. The argument about the gods stresses that this is not the case and that the situation is perfectly symmetrical. Knowledge in the strictest sense,[19] *ἐπιστήμη* as cognition of the form, in the Platonic technical sense of the word, would, by its very nature, be unattainable by us. And on the other hand, those capable of *ἐπιστήμη* in the strict sense are incapable of *δόξα* as cognition of the sensible world. The problem is not only epistemological (although this is *our* way of approaching it) but ontological too: there can be no relation straddling the two ontological domains. The gods cannot be our masters. Or so it has been agreed (134d8, *Ὡμολόγηται γάρ*): it follows from the premises. But is it true?

THE NECESSITY OF POSITING FORMS

134e9–135c7 —Nevertheless, Socrates, said Parmenides, it is necessary that
135 the forms have these features, and still a good many others besides these, if there are these ideas [*ἰδέαι*] of things, and if one will mark off each form [*εἶδος*] as something itself—to the point that the hearer will become perplexed and will dispute whether these are not or, if they should indeed be, it is most necessary that they be unknowable to human nature; and, in saying that, he will seem to be saying something, and as we were just saying, he will be wonderfully difficult to persuade out of his position. And it will take a
b man thoroughly well endowed who will be able to understand how there is a kind of each thing and a being in itself, and someone even more wonderful who will discover and be able to teach another, how to discriminate all these sufficiently.

—I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; for you speak quite in line with what I think.

—And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if anyone, on the other
c hand, considering all that we have said just now and the like, will not allow that there are forms of things and will not mark off a form for each one thing, he will not even have whither to turn his thought, not allowing an idea to be ever the same for each of the things that are, and will thus completely destroy all possibility of dialogue. But you seem to me to have perceived something of the sort only too well.

19. Cf. 134c7, *ἀκριβέστερον*, 'more strictly'; c11, *τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην*, 'knowledge in the strictest sense of the word'; cf. also LSJ *s.v. ἀκριβής*, II.2.

—You speak the truth, he said.

—What will you do, then, about philosophy? Where will you turn to, so long as these issues are unknown?

—I do not think I can see at all, at least not at present.

135a6, *θαυμαστῶς*; b1, *θαυμαστοτέρου*] Cf. above, on 129b6 ff. And cf. *Sophist* 259d9 ff.: The attempt at complete separation of everything from everything is not logically wrong; it is *improper* (*οὐκ ἐμμελές*) and, moreover, 'the deed of one who is altogether lacking the Muse and unphilosophical' (*παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου*).

We have reached an aporia. The doctrine of separate forms was meant to give the epistemological and ontological basis for philosophy. But now it seems that philosophy is impossible on any interpretation of this separation. On the Eleatic dichotomy, there can be no partial separation; hence either participation completely assimilates forms to sensible things (or sensible things to forms), or else there is no relation whatsoever between them. And the same problem will occur among the forms themselves regarded as distinct unities: How can each of them *be* and, nevertheless, be *F, G,* and so on?[20]

The problem, then, is how to discriminate between forms. How can *εἴδη* (as opposed to sensible things) be distinct from each other? (Cf. *Philebus* 15.) The problem is pragmatic, not logical. If *εἴδη* cannot be "marked off" from each other, there can be no dialectic (135b7–c2). Without one and the same form for each (type of) thing, dialogue itself is impossible. The move is analogous to, for example, that in *Republic* II (esp. 358b–d): Glaucon's social-contract theory is wrong by his own admission. Hence we must look for an alternative hypothesis. Our starting point, as usual in Plato's hypothetical procedure, is our desired conclusion: philosophy is possible, since we are doing it just now. The task is to find the hypothesis or hypotheses under which it is possible.

THE METHOD

135c8–136e4 d

—For you are trying to mark off something beautiful, said he, and just, and good, and every single one of the forms, Socrates, too early, before you are trained. I noticed that earlier too, as I was listening to you talking here to our friend Aristoteles. Believe me, your urge toward arguments is indeed noble and divine; but while you are still young you should exercise and train yourself better in what the many call idle talk and think useless, else the truth will escape you.

20. Cf. Rist (1962), 4: "Parmenides is asking the believer in Forms not simply to waste his time classifying particulars, but to realize that each *Form* is a member of a *γένος* as well as being an *οὐσία αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν*." See also Rist (1970), 227 n. 2.

—Well, Parmenides, said he, what is the manner of training?

—Precisely that which you heard from Zeno, he said. Except
e this: I admired what you said to him, that you would not allow the inquiry to wander among visible things nor to be about these, but about those things that one would especially apprehend by argument and would think of as being forms.

—For it seems to me, he said, that in this way, at any rate, there is no difficulty in showing that things are affected by both likes and unlikes and any other affection whatsoever.

—And right you are, he said. But, in addition to that, you must
136 still do this: not only investigate the consequences of the hypothesis in hypothesizing if each thing is, but also hypothesize if that same thing is not, if you wish to be thoroughly trained.

—How do you mean? said he.

—For example, he said, if you wish, in connection with this hypothesis that Zeno hypothesized, if the many are, what must follow both for the many in relation to themselves and in relation to the one, and for the one both in relation to itself and in relation to the many; and, again, if the many are not, once more investigate what will follow for the one as well as the many, in relation to themselves as well as in relation to one another; and again, in each case in turn, whenever you hypothesize if likeness is or if it is not, what will follow from each of the two hypotheses for these things
b themselves that were hypothesized as well as for the others, in relation to themselves as well as in relation to each other. And the same argument about the unlike, and about movement and about rest, and about coming to be and passing away, and about being [εἶναι] itself and not being. And, in one word, about whatever you may on any occasion hypothesize as being and as not being, and
c as being affected by any other affection whatsoever, you must investigate the consequences in relation to itself and in relation to each and every one of the others, whatever you choose, both severally and collectively alike; and again the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to the other that you choose at each time, whether you hypothesize what is hypothesized as being or as not being, if you intend to train thoroughly and to discern the truth properly.

—You are speaking of a huge undertaking, Parmenides, he said, and I do not quite understand it. But why don't you go through it for me, yourself hypothesizing something, so that I comprehend better?

d —It is a great labor, Socrates, said he, that you are laying on me at this age.

—But you, Zeno, said Socrates—Why don't you go through it for us?

And he said that Zeno replied, laughing: —Let us ask Parmenides himself, Socrates; for what he means may be no light mat-

ter. Or don't you see what a labor you are trying to impose? If we were more people, it would not be right to ask him; for it would
e not be fit for him to speak of such things in front of a crowd, especially at his age; for the many do not know that without thus setting out all things and inquiring into them it is impossible to hit upon the truth and grasp it. And I too, Parmenides, join Socrates in asking you, so that I myself may listen to you after such a long time.

136d4, 'he'] Pythodorus.

Socrates may be basically right, says Parmenides, in requiring that forms be distinct from each other and from their respective sensibles; without such forms, all thought would be impossible (135c). But he is going too fast. Before "marking off" such individual, separate forms, he should consider what the consequences are of postulating them. So far, this is familiar stuff from the *Phaedo* 100a.[21] But this is not enough. Whatever the consequences of our hypothesis, we should also examine the consequences of its negation. That one hypothesis gets us into difficulties does not always or necessarily mean that it must be unconditionally abandoned in favor of its contradictory. Moreover, since we are dealing with forms supposed to be many and different from each other, but each of them one and the same as itself, we must also consider what the consequences of our hypothesis and its negation are, not only for each one form but also for the other forms. Before asserting that each form is one and different (or separate) from the other forms—each of them too supposed to be one—Socrates has to clarify to himself what is implied in being 'one'.[22]

Thus, the method requires the exhaustive examination of all the possible consequences from the affirmation and from the negation of an hypothesis. An hypothesis is anything (say, *F*)[23] that is supposed to be (in an as yet unspecified sense of 'be'). So far, no distinction can be made between things ('*F*') and states of affairs ('*F* is'). Such a distinction depends on the establishment of the possibility of attribution (i.e., of the communion of εἴδη, or of participation), which is barred in Parmenidean ontology. Parmenides chooses the formulation '*F* is', so as to leave the way open for this distinction.

21. See above, p. 10.

22. Cf. McCabe (1996), 19: "The argument that follows [in Part II of the *Parmenides*] is an abstract thought-experiment, free of ontological commitment." True, Part II of our dialogue is announced here as a formal exercise. But, as the analysis of Part II will show, these presumed formal considerations will carry heavy ontological consequences. Here as elsewhere. Plato disallows a hard-and-fast distinction between form and content.

23. On 'hypothesis' referring indifferently to things denoted by terms or to states of affairs denoted by sentences, see the Introduction, above, p. 12.

One should, then, consider not only the affirmative hypothesis, '*F* is', but also the negative, '*F* is not'. In each case, the consequences are to be drawn both for *F* itself and for its opposite, not-*F*. What precisely the relation is between *F* and its negation (e.g., contrariety, complementarity, contradiction) is again left unspecified at this stage. This too will depend on the interpretation given to '*F* is'. Likewise, it is not immediately to be assumed that the negation of *F* is equivalent to the affirmation of not-*F*, that '*F* is not' is equivalent to 'not-*F* is'. We shall see in the continuation of the dialogue that this is not always the case.[24] Plato thought it necessary to establish the equivalence in Argument V.

The important question is about forms (135e1–7). The question of the participation of sensible things in forms is to be solved almost as a "side benefit" of the solution of the general problem of the possible relations between any 'one' and the respective 'many'.

Parmenides himself, in his poem, 'went both ways':[25] he assumed, in the Way of Truth, that the one is, and then, in the Way of Seeming, that plurality is (which is equivalent, on his interpretation of being, to the assumption that the one is not; cf. below, 137b4). Parmenides derived the consequences of the being of the one for itself and of the (illusory) being of the many for themselves. These two series of conclusions are echoed and developed by Plato, in this dialogue, in Arguments I and IV, respectively. But Parmenides had not entertained the possibility of two different modes of being, or two interpretations of '*F* is', and therefore did not need explicitly to consider the negations of his two hypotheses, since these are, on his interpretation, mutually contradictory.

On the assumption of a not-*F* alongside *F* (which cannot be summarily dismissed without argument), one should consider the consequences of '*F* is' and '*F* is not' (whatever 'is not' means) for *F* and for not-*F*. This should give us *four* series of arguments. But here comes an unexpected addition:[26] the consequences are to be drawn for *F* (and likewise for not-*F*) *in relation to itself and in relation to not-F*. (Cf. 136a6, *πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἕν*.) Here Parmenides introduces a non-Eleatic twist: the consequences are to be investigated both *πρὸς* the hypothesized entity and *πρὸς* its opposite.[27] This

24. Aristotle, for one, thought the two expressions not trivially identical. Cf. *De Interpretatione* 10.

25. Theophrastus, *In Physicam,* quoted by Alexander, *In Metaphysicam* 31.7 (= fr. 28 A 7 DK). Of course, later interpretations of Parmenides, like that of Theophrastus, would arguably be influenced by Plato's understanding of him. But in the context of Plato's view of Parmenidean difficulties, this is hardly a fault.

26. Cornford (1939: 107) thought it "an important discrepancy."

27. *Πρὸς αὑτά* (136a6) seems to be a stylistic variant of *καθ' αὑτά*. Cf., e.g., in this dialogue, 133c9 and d3 with 133a9, c4, and c6; and above, on *Republic* IV 436b8–c1, Introduction, p. 12.

leaves open the un-Parmenidean possibility of a *πρὸς ἄλλο* alongside a *καθ' αὑτό* mode of being. This possibility will be explored in Arguments II, III, V, and VII, to follow, and will eventually lead to the dissolution of the initial aporia.

Zeno's formulation (*εἰ πολλά ἐστι*) rather than Parmenides' (*εἰ ἕν ἐστιν*) makes it easier to assume tacitly that there is a one as well as a many. Moreover, the eight series of arguments here delineated by Parmenides do not close the door to the possibility that the one *may* relate to the many.

136e5–137c3 So Antiphon told us that Pythodorus said that after Zeno spoke thus, he himself asked Parmenides, and so did Aristoteles and the others, to demonstrate what he meant and not to refuse. And Parmenides said: —One must obey. Yet it seems to me that there is
137 happening to me what happened to the horse of Ibycus, that old champion, before the chariot race, trembling out of experience at what was to come. Comparing himself to it, the poet said that he too, at that old age, was being compelled against his will to enter the lists of love; I too seem to me very much to fear, because of my memories, how I must at this age swim through such a wide sea of arguments of this sort. However, one must be agreeable, since, as Zeno says, we are amongst ourselves.

b Where, then, shall we start, and what first shall we hypothesize? Or, if you wish—since indeed it seems that we are to play this laborious game—shall I start from myself and my own hypothesis, hypothesizing about the one itself, if the one is and if it is not, what must follow?

—By all means, said Zeno.

—Who, then, he said, will answer me? Perhaps the youngest? For he would least cause trouble, and would most answer as he thinks; and meanwhile his answer would give me some rest.

c —I am ready for that, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for you mean me when you speak of the youngest. Ask, then, and I shall answer.

137b4, 'if the one . . . is not'] Reading *εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ* [*ἕν*], as Wundt proposed. For a defense of Wundt's emendation, see Cornford (1939), 108; and now Meinwald (1991), 39–45.

Young Aristoteles is chosen as Parmenides' interlocutor because he is least likely to deviate from the matter at hand, to answer only to please Parmenides instead of answering 'as he thinks'. Parmenides wants an unspoiled mind. In the early dialogues, young respondents are, as a rule, more trustworthy than adults with set opinions. Plato gives Aristoteles (not unlike Meno's slave boy) practically no individual characterization, so as to make the conclusions as generally valid as possible. (Cf. the Introduction, above, p. 7.)

Part II

Euporia

Parmenides' method is now applied to his own hypothesis: the one, or (as Plato rephrases it) 'if (the) one is'.[1] So far, there is no difference between hypothesizing the one and hypothesizing that the one is. We do not yet have the distinction between an object (or the corresponding term) and a state of affairs (or the corresponding proposition). Or, to put this differently: there is as yet no definite interpretation of 'is'.

This is what the exercise will clarify, namely the partial ambiguity of 'is'. As it has already transpired from the description of the method, two modes of being will be postulated: being *καθ' αὑτό*, 'in itself', and being *πρὸς ἄλλο*, 'in relation to another'. The clarification of each of these will be developed in the Arguments, and thus will the relation between the two emerge from their clarification.

There are, then, two Hypotheses: 'The one is' and 'The one is not'. For each Hypothesis, four Arguments (I–IV and V–VIII) are developed,[2] according to Parmenides' method just described. (For the structure of the Arguments, see the Introduction, pp. 25–29, above.)

1. *Εἰ ἕν ἐστιν* or *ἓν εἰ ἔστιν*. The presence or absence of the article has no significance; cf. above, 137b3. On the word order, cf. below, on 159b5.

2. In Scolnicov (1984) I misguidedly called these Arguments 'Hypotheses', 'in deference to tradition'. But in this use, the term is inexact and misleading.

HYPOTHESIS: THE ONE IS

ARGUMENT I. IF THE ONE IS: CONSEQUENCES FOR ITSELF: IN RELATION TO ITSELF

ARGUMENT I, DEFINITION. THE ONE IS NOT MANY: ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLE OF NONCONTRADICTION

137c4–5 —Very well, then, said he. If the one is, would not the one be something other than [ἄλλο τι] the many? —How so? *I.df.*

137c4, εἰ ἕν ἐστιν] Brisson (1994) takes ἕν as predicate: "Supposons qu'il soit un." *Contra,* see now Séguy-Duclot (1998), 32 ff.

137c4, ἄλλο τι (ἤ)] For this expression introducing definitions, cf., e.g, 151e7; 163c2, d2. This use of the expression was prepared above, at 129a1, 130d1. Plato adopted, as he often does, a usual idiom to serve his terminological needs. For the equivalence of ἄλλο τι and ἄλλο τι ἤ, cf., e.g., *Meno* 82c8 with d1.

Argument I opens, then, with a definition of what it is to be one (and, implicitly, with a parallel assumption about what it is to be). The Parmenidean concept of being is assumed: either it is, or it is not; nothing can be itself and something else, and no restrictions to the Principle of Noncontradiction are admitted. The dichotomy is complete. To be one is to be 'something other' (ἄλλο τι) than many.

The force of this definition is that, in this Parmenidean Argument, as in those related to it (viz. IV, VI, and VIII), being is univocal. There can be no distinction between different modes of being, or being 'somehow' (που), or 'in some way but not in another'.

THEOREM I.1. THE ONE HAS NO PARTS AND IS NOT A WHOLE

This Basic Theorem is set out in the full canonical form established by Parmenides (fr. 8.5–21): first the enunciation (later to be called πρότασις by Hellenistic mathematicians), followed by Aristoteles' request for a demonstration (ἀπόδειξις), which is then developed, and finally the conclusion (συμπέρασμα), confirmed by Aristoteles' response.

137c5–d3 —So, there must not be a part of it, nor must it be itself a whole. —Why? —The part is somehow [που] part of a whole. —Yes. —And what about the whole? Would not a whole be that of which no part is lacking? —Indeed. —So, in both ways the one would be madeof parts, both in being a whole and in having parts. —It is necessary. *I.1*

d —So, in both ways the one would thus be many and not one. —True. —And yet it must not be many but one. —It must. —And so, it will neither be a whole nor have parts, if the one is to be one. —Indeed not.

137c9, *Ἀνάγκη*, 'It is necessary.'] Here, as elsewhere throughout the dialogue, the necessity is conditional, not absolute; the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. This does not imply that the conclusion is necessary *per se*.

The argument proceeds *per impossibile*. Suppose that *somehow* (*που*, 137c6) there could be parts of a whole. This would contradict our current Hypothesis, since it would make the one both one and many.

But surreptitiously, Parmenides has already introduced the alternative: there could *somehow* be parts and wholes. Here Plato uses *που* as a technical term indicating the restrictions to Parmenidean being corresponding to his non-Parmenidean alternative conception of being. A survey of the term *που* in this dialogue shows its terminological value. It means, in this context, not 'I think' or the like, but 'somehow', 'in a certain respect', qualifying 'is'. (Cf., e.g., 147e6–148a3, below.) Aristotle is very clear about the meaning of the term in *Topics* II 11.115b13, where it is contrasted with *ἁπλῶς*. At 163c6–7 in our dialogue, *ἁπλῶς*, 'simply', 'unrestrictedly', is contrasted with *πῇ* (a variant of *που*).

Note that the formulation of the conclusion stresses in its final clause (*εἰ ἓν ἔσται τὸ ἕν*, 137d3) the conditional character of the demonstration: '*if* the one is to be one', as assumed, then it is not a whole and has no parts. This conditionality is maintained throughout, with a few occasional exceptions: the whole exercise is conducted mostly in the subjunctive or in the optative and occasionally, for stylistic reasons, in the future indicative (as here) or in the present indicative (where it can be easily shown to be a variation on a preceding or a following subjunctive or optative; cf., e.g., 139b4–5, below).

THEOREM I.3. THE ONE HAS NEITHER EXTREMITIES NOR MIDDLE

On the order of the Theorems, see the Introduction, above, p. 29.

137d4–6 —Now, if it has no parts, it would have no beginning, nor an end, nor a middle; for such things would at once be parts of it. —Right. *I.3*

THEOREM I.2. THE ONE HAS NO LIMITS

137d6–8 —Moreover, the end and the beginning of each thing are its limit. —How else? —So, the one is unlimited, if it has neither beginning nor end. —It is unlimited. *I.2*

Turnbull (1998: 51) notes that this is "the sole affirmation" made of the Parmenidean one. But a comparison with the parallel Theorems II.2.1 and II.2.2 shows that there is here no affirmation: all that is said here is that the one

is undelimited (ἄπειρον, 137d7); that is, it is not a quantity of any sort, and it is not susceptible to definition. The denial of any quantitative aspect makes irrelevant Turnbull's comparison to Aristotelean prime matter or the receptacle in the *Timaeus*.

THEOREM I.3, COROLLARY. THE ONE HAS NO SHAPE

137d8–138a1 e —And thus also without shape, for it participates neither in the round nor in the straight. —How so? —The round is somehow that whose extremities are everywhere equidistant from the middle. —Yes. —Further, the straight will be that whose middle is facing both extremities. —So it is. —Therefore the one would have parts and would be many, if it were to participate in either straight or circular shape. —Absolutely. —And so, it is neither straight nor circular, if indeed it has no parts at all. —Right. *I.3. corol.*

137e1, στρογγύλον, 'round'] Circle or sphere. As in Euclidean geometry, all shapes are derivable from the circle and the straight line, as required by the classical "compass and straight-edge" restriction.

137d8–e1, οὔτε . . . μετέχει, 'for it participates . . . straight'] Cf. 141e9.

On the relation between shape and extremities, see below, on Theorem II.3.

THEOREMS I.4 AND I.5. THE ONE IS NOT IN ITSELF AND NOT IN ANOTHER; AND IT IS NOT IN CONTACT WITH ANYTHING

138a2–b6 —Moreover, being such, at any rate, it would be nowhere; for it would be neither in another nor in itself. —How so? —By being in another, it would somehow be encompassed round by that in which it would be, and it would touch it in many places [πολλοῖς]; but it is impossible that, being one and partless and not participating in the circle, it should touch the circle in many places. —It is impossible. —However, by being in itself, it would also encompass no other but itself, if indeed it were in itself; for it is impossible for anything to be in something without being encompassed by it. —Yes, it is impossible. —But, then, that which encompasses would itself be one thing, and that which is encompassed, another; for the same thing will not as a whole do and suffer both simultaneously; and thus the one would not be one any longer, but two. —It would not. —And so, the one is not anywhere [που], being neither in itself nor in another. —It is not. *I.4* *I.5*

138a8, εἴπερ καὶ] Cf. Denniston (1966), 305: καί "logically refers to the apodosis."

138b3–4] Cf. *Republic* IV 436b8–c1, where the Principle of Noncontradiction is weakened in order to account for the fact that the soul is affected contrarily in different parts of it. But here, with no restrictions allowed to the Principle of Noncontradiction, the like is impossible.

138b5, *που*] It is not 'anywhere', which is a particular case of not being 'somehow'.
138b6, *μήτε ἐν αὑτῷ*, 'neither in itself'] Correcting Parmenides, fr. 8.29.

To be somewhere is to be *in* something, to be in a place (not "in space"); compare Aristotle, *Physics* IV 4.212a2. Hence, place and contact are *not* two different categories. To be in a place is to be in contact with the *περιέχον* (138a8, b1, b3; cf. a4), with what encompasses. 'Being in another' or 'being in itself' is a presupposition of (sensible) place but is not identical with it. See further on Theorem II.4, below.

It is impossible that the same thing should do or undergo opposites (*ἐναντία*); if it does, (1) it must be two different things, unless (2) the Principle of Noncontradiction can be restricted, and what is done or undergone is done or undergone at different times or in different respects. (Cf. *Republic* IV 436b8–c1.) But, under the current hypothesis, the one must be taken 'as a whole' (138b3): that is, it has no parts or aspects, and, accordingly, in this case the Principle of Noncontradiction cannot be restricted. Therefore, keeping the time index constant (b4, *ἅμα*, 'simultaneously'), for the sake of the argument, if the one encompasses and is encompassed 'as a whole', it must be more than one—which contradicts the hypothesis.

THEOREM I.6. THE ONE IS NEITHER IN MOTION NOR AT REST

138b7–8 —See, now, if, being such, it can rest or move. —And why not? *I.6*

138b7–8, *κινεῖσθαι*, 'move'] The voice is middle-passive. So too *φέρεσθαι*, 'be carried', and *ἀλλοιοῦσθαι*, 'be altered'. Plato may be here intentionally ambiguous between the middle and the passive. See below on 156c1, p. 137.

On motion as change of any sort, see below, pp. 111–12.

THEOREM I.6.1. THE ONE IS NOT IN MOTION

138b8–c1 —Because, at any rate, by moving, it would either be carried or be altered; for these are the only motions. —Yes. *I.6.1*

THEOREM I.6.1.1. THE ONE IS NOT ALTERED

138c1–4 —But it is impossible that the one, being altered from itself, should somehow still be one. —It is impossible. —So, it does not move in respect of [*κατὰ*] alteration, at least. —It appears not. *I.6.1.1*

THEOREM I.6.1.2. THE ONE IS NOT CARRIED

138c4–6 —By being carried, then? —Perhaps. —But if the one were to be carried, either it would be carried round in a circle in the same place [*ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*] or else it would change place from one to another. —It is necessary. *I.6.1.2*

138c6, *Ἀνάγκη*] See above, on 137c9, p. 80.

THEOREM I.6.1.2.1. THE ONE DOES NOT REVOLVE

138c6–d2 —Yet, being carried round in a circle, it is necessary that it should stand at the middle and have what is carried around the d middle as other parts of itself. But that to which neither middle nor parts are proper, how on earth can it ever be carried in a circle round a middle? —In no way. *I.6.1.2.1*

THEOREM I.6.1.2.2. THE ONE DOES NOT UNDERGO TRANSLATION

138d2–5 —But is it, then, by shifting places that it comes to be in different places at different times, and thus it moves? —If indeed it does. —Yet, did it not appear impossible that it should somehow [*που*] be in anything? —Yes. *I.6.1.2.2*

138d5–e7 —Is it, therefore, even more impossible that it should come to be in anything? —I don't see how. —If anything comes to be in something, is it not necessary that it should not yet be in that thing so long as it is coming to be in it and not yet completely outside e it, if indeed it is already coming to be in it? —It is necessary. —So, if anything else will be thus affected, only that would be affected of which there should be parts; for some of it would already be in that thing, and some of it, simultaneously, outside it; but that which does not have parts can in no way be somehow [*που*] as a whole simultaneously both inside something and outside it. —True. —And as to that which neither has parts nor happens to be a whole, is it not even much more impossible that it should come to be somewhere [*που*], coming to be in it neither in parts [*κατὰ μέρη*] nor as a whole [*κατὰ ὅλον*]? —So it appears.

138e6, *που*] In this context, *που* seems to mean 'somewhere' (i.e., 'somehow in a place', where 'somehow' means, as usual, 'against Parmenidean standards'). The negation of the possibility of aspects is given by (e3) *τρόπῳ οὐδενί*, 'in no way'. If the one cannot somehow be inside something or outside it, it is 'even much more impossible' that it should come to be somewhere.

If it cannot *be* in anything (Theorem I.4), *a fortiori* it cannot *come to be* in anything: that is, it cannot move from being in one place to being in another. A process of translation (coming to be in a place) requires that the one have parts that will sequentially (or continuously) enter that place. But since the one, under the current hypothesis, has no parts, it cannot undergo a process of coming to be in something.

On place as a presupposition of locomotion, see below, on Theorem II.5.

THEOREM I.6.1, CONCLUSION. THE ONE IS NOT IN MOTION

138e7–139a3 —So, it does not change places either by going anywhere and 139 coming to be in anything, or by being carried round in the same *I.6.1.concl.*

place, or by being altered. —It seems not. —The one, then, is immobile in respect of every motion? —It is immobile.

THEOREM I.6.2. THE ONE IS NOT AT REST

It cannot rest either, since for it to rest would be to stay in the same place. But it cannot be in a place at all (Theorem I.4).

139a3–b2 —We say, however, that it is impossible that it should be in something. —So we say. —Therefore, it is also never in the same [ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ]. —How so? —Because it would at once be in the very same it is. —Absolutely. —But it was incapable of being either in itself or in another. —It was indeed. —So, the one is never in the same. *I.6.2*

b —It seems not. —But, further, what is never in the same does not stay still, nor does it rest. —No, it could not.

THEOREM I.6, CONCLUSION. THE ONE IS NEITHER IN MOTION NOR AT REST

139b2–3 —And so, as it seems, the one neither rests nor moves. —It certainly appears it does not. *I.6. concl.*

THEOREM I.7. THE ONE IS NEITHER THE SAME AS NOR DIFFERENT FROM EITHER ITSELF OR ANOTHER

The basic category here is sameness. Likeness (Theorem I.8) is a specification of it, as sameness in some respect, and equality (I.9) is a further specification, as sameness in respect of measure. Younger-older/of the same age (I.10) is difference/sameness in respect of precedence (possibly, but not necessarily, temporal; see below) as prior and posterior. Theorems 7–10 form a separate series, directly dependent on Theorem 1.

139b4–5 —Moreover, it will be the same neither as something different nor as itself, and again it would not be different from itself or from something different. *I.7*

139b4–5, ἔσται . . . ἂν εἴη, 'will be . . . would . . . be'] Note the shift from the (future) indicative to the (potential) optative in the same sentence. This clearly shows that the use of the indicative is purely a stylistic variation. The hypothetical character of the derivation is not compromised by its use.

THEOREMS I.7.2.1 AND I.7.1.2. THE ONE IS NOT THE SAME AS A DIFFERENT; NOR IS IT DIFFERENT FROM ITSELF

139b5–c3 —How so? —Being somehow different from itself, it would be different from the one and would not be one. —True. —And, further, being the same as something different, it would be that thing *I.7.2.1* *I.7.1.2*

c and would not be itself; so that in this way it would not be even what it is, namely one, but different from one. —It would not.

—So, it will not be the same as something different or different from itself. —Indeed not.

This seems to be pretty straightforward and not really worth arguing for: the one is neither different from itself nor the same as something different from it. These statements, however, are needed for the sake of completeness and to close off all possibility of attribution to the one in any of the categories. Further, they set up the contrast with the one of Argument II. But, as it turns out immediately below, these self-evident affirmations do not imply, as one could expect, that the one is the same as itself or different from something different from it.

THEOREM I.7.2.2. THE ONE IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM ANYTHING

139c3–d1 —And, in any case, it will not be different from something different, so long as it should be one: for it is not proper [*οὐ . . . προσήκει*] to the one to be different from something; but only to the different, and to nothing else, is it proper to be different from
d a different. —Right. —So, it will not be different by being one. Or do you think it will? —Certainly not. —But, further, if not by that, then not by itself, and if not by itself, not itself; and not being itself in any way different, it will not be different from anything. —Right. *I.7.2.2*

The one, considered in itself, is not different from anything. As one *simpliciter,* 'it is not proper' for it to be different from anything: to be different from something is not part of what it is to be one. 'So long as' (or 'inasmuch as', *καθ' ὅσον*, as Plato also says) it is one, it cannot be different; 'by itself', it can be only what it is. Only the different is by itself different from something. It will not do to counter that 'different' is an external relation, which anyway is not implied in being one. 'By itself', or 'in itself', the one cannot be in any relation to anything, and hence it cannot be different from anything, for this would require that it be *πρὸς ἄλλο*, 'in relation to another', in addition to being 'itself'. And this is denied in the current hypothesis.[3]

THEOREM I.7.1.1. THE ONE IS NEITHER DIFFERENT FROM A DIFFERENT NOR THE SAME AS ITSELF

139d1–e4 —Moreover, neither will it be the same as itself. —How not? — The nature of the one is surely not the same as that of the same. *I.7.1.1*

3. Plato is not asserting unconditionally that "a subject cannot possess any attribute not entailed by its defining characteristic" (Schofield [1977], 149). This is true only on the Parmenidean interpretation.

—Why? —Because when something comes to be the same as something, it does not come to be one. —But why? —It is necessary that what comes to be the same as the many should come to be many, not one. —True. —But if the one and the same are not distinct [διαφέρει] in anything, whenever something came to be the same, it would always come to be one, and whenever it came to be one,
e it would come to be the same. —Indeed. —So, if the one were the same as itself, it would not be one with itself; and, thus, by being one, it will not be one. This, however, is impossible; so, it is impossible also for the one to be different from a different or the same as itself. —It is impossible.

A comparison $a = b$ implies the possibility of a distinction, subsequently negated, between a and b. Even a reflexive relation, of the type $a = a$, would imply the distinction between the terms of the relation, in order later to identify the two terms previously separated. But any distinction of the sort (or of any sort) is precluded by the hypothesis. If the one were the same as itself, it would not be one with itself, since it would be at once both terms of the relation.

Further, being the same is different from being one. Therefore, the one cannot be the same as anything (not even the same as itself), for this would necessitate a further attribution, namely 'being the same as'. And this is denied by the hypothesis, according to which the one is nothing else than not many.

THEOREM I.7, CONCLUSION. THE ONE IS NEITHER DIFFERENT FROM NOR THE SAME AS ITSELF OR THE DIFFERENT

139e4–6 —And so, the one would be neither different from nor the same as itself or the different. —Certainly not. *I.7. concl.*

THEOREM I.8. THE ONE IS NEITHER LIKE NOR UNLIKE ANYTHING

139e7–8 —Further, it will not be like or unlike anything, neither itself nor a different. *I.8*

THEOREM I.8.1. THE ONE IS NOT LIKE ANYTHING

139e8–140a6 —Why? —For 'like' is being somehow affected by the same [ταὐτόν που πεπονθός]. —Yes. —And the same appeared to be in its na- *I.8.1*
140 ture apart from the one. —So it appeared. —But if the one were affected by anything apart from being one, it would be affected as being more than one, and this is impossible. —Yes. —So, in no manner is the one affected as being the same either as another or as itself. —It appears not. —And so, it is not possible for it to be like either another or itself. —It seems not. *I.8.1.concl.*

Likeness is sameness in some respect, to be affected 'somehow' (*που*)—that is, not 'simply', *ἁπλῶς*—by sameness. But on our hypothesis, there are no respects in which a thing can be. Likeness refers to 'affects', *παθη*, not to the thing as a whole. For the one 'to be affected' [*πεπονθέναι*] is for it to have an attribute without ceasing to be itself. Under our current assumption, this is of course impossible.[4]

THEOREM I.8.2. THE ONE IS NOT UNLIKE ANYTHING

140a6–b5 —Moreover, the one is not affected as being different; for else it would be affected as being more than one. —More, indeed. —And what is affected in a different way either than itself or than b another would be unlike either itself or another, if indeed the like is what is affected in the same way. —Right. —And yet, the one, as it seems, being in no manner affected in a different way, is in no manner unlike either itself or a different. —Indeed not. —So, the one would not be like or unlike either a different or itself. —It appears not. *I.8.2* *I.8.concl.*

140b1, *τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς*, 'what is affected in the same way'] *Που*, 'somehow', is not used here, but it can be easily supplied from 139e8, *τὸ ταὐτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον*, and understood from *οὐδαμῶς*, 'in no manner', at 140b2 (twice: *οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιόν ἐστιν*).

THEOREM I.9. THE ONE IS NEITHER EQUAL NOR UNEQUAL TO ANYTHING

140b6–7 —Moreover, being such, it will not be equal or unequal either to itself or to another. *I.9*

140b7–c4 —In what way? —Being equal, it will be of the same measures as that to which it is equal. —Yes. —And being somehow larger or c smaller than those with which it would be commensurable, it will have more measures than those of them that are smaller, and fewer than those that are greater. —Yes. —And of those with which it would not be commensurable, it will be of smaller measures than some, and of greater than others. —How else? *I.9.lemma*

Equality is a particular case of likeness: that is, of sameness in some respect—in this case, in respect of measure.

There can be two cases of inequality: inequality of commensurable and of incommensurable magnitudes. With commensurable magnitudes the measures will be the same, but there will be more or fewer measures. With incommensurable magnitudes, the measures themselves will be either greater or smaller. (Cf. Euclid, *Elements* V 8.)

4. The argument is valid (*contra* Gill, in Gill and Ryan [1996]) not unconditionally, but only on the assumption that the one has no aspects according to which it can be like; so, likeness collapses into sameness.

140c4–8 —Therefore, is it not impossible that what does not participate in the same should be of the same measures or the same anything else whatever? —It is impossible. —So, it would not be equal either to itself or to another, not being of the same measures. —It certainly appears so. *I.9.1*

140c8–d4 —However, being of more or of fewer measures, it would also
d be of as many parts as measures; and thus it would be one no more, but as many as its measures. —Right. —And if it were of one measure, it would become equal to its measure; and that appeared impossible, that it should be equal to anything. —So it appeared. *I.9.2*

It cannot have measure or measures, since these would be aspects of it. Hence, it cannot be unequal to anything, either commensurably or incommensurably. And it is not equal to anything, not even to itself, because so long as it is considered simply in itself, it cannot be the same as anything in any respect. And see further on 139d1–e4, above.

THEOREM I.9, CONCLUSION. THE ONE IS NOT EQUAL OR UNEQUAL TO ANYTHING

140d4–8 —So, participating neither in one measure nor in many nor in few, and not participating at all in the same, it will never be equal to itself, as it seems, or to another; and, again, it will not be greater or smaller than either itself or something different. —It is so, by all means. *I.9. concl.*

THEOREM I.10. THE ONE DOES NOT COME TO BE, NOR IS IT OLDER OR YOUNGER THAN OR OF THE SAME AGE AS ANYTHING

140e1–141a4 —What, then? Does it seem possible that the one should be older or younger than or of the same age as anything? —And why not? —For, being somehow of the same age as itself or as another, it will participate in equality and likeness of time, which we said not to be present in the one, namely neither likeness nor equality. —So we said. —And we said, further, that it participates nei- *I.10*
141 ther in unlikeness nor in inequality. —So we did. —How, then, being such, will it be able to be [οἷόν τε ἔσται] older or younger than anything, or of the same age as anything? —In no way. —So, the one would not be younger or older than or of the same age as itself or as another. —It appears not.

Equality of age is considered here as a special case of equality, as equality in respect of time. Again, it seems obvious that the one of Argument I cannot be measured in respect of time. But Theorem I.10 is needed here in order to set off the contrast with Argument II and to exclude, in the present

Argument, all the possible cases. Being younger-older/of the same age is so far primarily considered as a relation. 'Being in time' (i.e., occupying a certain temporal position in relation to other things also in time) is introduced in what follows immediately.

THEOREM I.10.1, LEMMA. OLDER AND YOUNGER ARE CORRELATES

141a5–b3 Next, could [δύναιτο] the one be in time at all, if it were of this sort? Or is it not necessary that, if ever anything should be in time, it would ever be coming to be older than itself? —It is necessary. —And is not the older ever older than a younger? —Of course. — So, that which is coming to be older than itself is simultaneously coming to be younger than itself, if indeed it is to have something than which it is coming to be older. *I.10.1.lemma*

Whatever is 'in time' changes in respect of its temporal parts. Being in time implies, but it is not identical with, coming to be in time, as will be shown in Argument II.

141b3–c4 —What do you mean? —This: there is no need for what is different from a different [ἕτερον ἑτέρου] to come to be distinct [διάφορον] from what is already distinct [διαφόρου], but it already is distinct from what already is distinct, and what has come to be is distinct from what has come to be, and what is going to be from what is going to be; but what is coming to be has not come to be, and is not going to be, and is not, distinct from something, but is coming to be, and is in no other way. —It is indeed necessary. — 'Older', however, is a distinction [διαφορότης] from 'younger' and from nothing else. —So it is. —So, it is necessary that what is coming to be older than itself is also, simultaneously, coming to be younger than itself. —It seems so.

Older and younger are strict correlatives and, as such, perfectly symmetrical. If (*per impossibile*) the one had temporal parts, then its parts would relate to each other as younger and older. Seen as a whole, the one is (in some of its temporal parts) older or younger than itself (in some other of its temporal parts). But the distinction between being in some way (or in some part) but not in another is not admissible by our hypothesis. Therefore, as the next section spells out, the one cannot be younger or older than or the same age as anything, not even as itself.

141c4–d6 —But, further, it comes to be in neither more nor less time than itself, but it comes to be and is and has come to be and is going to be in an equal time to itself. —This too is indeed necessary. —So, it is necessary, as it seems, that all those that are in time and participate in the like of it, each of them should have the same age

and come to be simultaneously both older and younger than itself. —Very likely. —In the one, however, none of such affections is present. —They are not present. —And so, they are not present in it in time, nor is it in any time. —Indeed not, at least as this reasoning proves it. *I.10.concl.*

141d4, *παθημάτων*] Cf. 139e8 ff., *πέπονθε*, etc.
141d6, *ὥς γε ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ*] Cf., e.g., *Hippias Minor* 376c1.

THEOREM I.10, COROLLARY. SINCE THE ONE HAS NO COMING TO BE, IT IS NOT TENSED

141d6–e7 —What now? Are not 'was' and 'has come to be' and 'was coming to be' taken to signify participation in time that has once come *I.10.corol.*
e to be? —Most certainly. —What, then? 'Will be' and 'will come to be' and 'will have come to be': In time that is going to be afterwards? —Yes. —And, finally, 'is' and 'comes to be' —in time that is now present? —Absolutely. —So, if the one does not participate in any way in any time, it has never come to be nor was it ever coming to be nor was it once, nor has it come to be now nor is it coming to be nor is it, nor will it be coming to be nor will it have come to be nor will it be afterwards. —Most true.

141e2, 'that is going to be'] Retaining *τοῦ μέλλοντος* of the MSS, with Moreschini.

ARGUMENT I, CONCLUSION. THE ONE IS NOT ANYTHING

Theorems I.2–I.10 have explored the ways in which the one could (or, rather, could not) *be* anything, the ways in which it could be *πρὸς* (or *κατὰ*) something else. Since, by our hypothesis, all these are excluded, we must conclude that the one in no way participates in being (i.e., in something else).[5]

141e7–10 —Now, is there a way [*ὅπως*] in which anything could participate in being [*οὐσία*], other than according to one of these [*κατὰ τούτων τι*]? —There is not. —So, in no way does the one participate in being. —It seems not. —And so, the one in no way is. —It appears not. *I.concl.*

141e9, *τούτων*, 'these'] The demonstrative must refer to all that has preceded in Argument I. It cannot refer only to tensed being, immediately above. If it did, it would have to mean that the only way of participating in being is participating 'according to time'. But this cannot be true; we have seen, even in this Argument, nontemporal ways of participation—although only hypothetically, for the one of this Argument cannot be in any of these respects. Note also Aristoteles' answer at 141e7, *Ἀληθέστατα*, 'Most true', marking a very strong caesura, so as to round up the whole Argument.

5. The meaning of *οὐσία* will become clear in the beginning of Argument II.

In the course of Argument I, we have gone through the ways according to which anything can participate in *οὐσία*—that is, in which they can be something or other by participating in the appropriate entities. Plato now claims that his list of categories is exhaustive.

Οὐσία, 'being', the abstract noun of *εἶναι* ('be'), is shorthand for whatever the one can be in this sense, whatever it can participate in. *Οὐσία* is, then, the summary of all the preceding categories, not a category in itself.[6] It functions, in fact, as a placeholder, *F*. It should be noted that, if predication were possible (as it will be in Argument II), the one would not *be* itself *F* (in a strong sense) but would only *participate* in *F* (i.e., it would be *F* only qualifiedly). So, the one of Argument I would only *participate* in being (*οὐσία*), if it were possible for it to *be* anything at all. To say that Helen is beautiful is to say no more than that she participates in the beautiful, or in beauty (which is an *οὐσία*). This point will be developed at great length in Argument V (162a ff., pp. 153–54, below).

Plato's exact phrasing is important. *Ὅπως*, 'How?', is the question to which *οὐδαμῶς*, 'in no way', is the answer. *Οὐδαμῶς* is the negation of *που*, 'somehow', Plato's technical term for marking the weakening of the relation between two terms, such as in a predication. (Cf. above, p. 81.) *Μετέχει*, 'participates', is, of course, Plato's technical term for being *πρὸς ἄλλο*, 'in relation to another', or *κατά τι*, 'according to something' (or 'in respect of something').

The one *οὐδαμῶς . . . οὐσίας μετέχει* (141e9)—it 'in no way does . . . participate in being (something)', but there is no hint that it is *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*, '*beyond* being' (*Republic* V 509b9). Proclus interpreted this passage as maintaining that the absolute one is *beyond* all predication.[7] True as this may be, this is not what is stated here. So far, it is only claimed that nothing can be predicated of it. But no precedence is established as yet between the one of Argument I and the one of Argument II. (But cf. also Argument VIII.)

The one in no way is. Here 'is' is not exactly equivalent to the 'is' of the Hypothesis. There (at 137c4), as became clear in the course of Argument I, it is the simplest affirmation. Here it signifies 'is (something)', 'is in a qualified manner', 'is in some way but not in another'. But, of course, if the one is not anything, it cannot be said to *be* in this sense. The conclusion does not, then, strictly contradict the hypothesis. Rather, it calls for a careful distinction between two modes of being: being as implying the total exclusion of not-being (137c), and being as participation (141e). This is the first step to-

6. Existence is, of course, implied. But this is not the main force of *οὐσία*. (See above, p. 17.) Note, for example, that Plato does not find it necessary to argue separately for participation in *οὐσία* in Argument II, as he should if he were using a concept of existence distinct from being this or that.

7. Proclus, *In Parmenidem* VII 1060, 1240 Cousin; Morrow and Dillon (1987), 578–79.

ward the dissolution of the Third Man aporia, further to be developed in Argument II.

What we have had, then, is a list of ways in which anything can *be,* the sorts of predicates anything could take, if only it could be 'somehow'. But being 'somehow', or 'in some way but not in another', is precisely what is denied of the one in this Argument. On Argument I, then, nothing can be attributed to the one. That the one does not participate in being is the negation of Argument II, to follow. (Cf. below, 142b5.)

But could Plato not have saved himself the trouble and concluded immediately from the Basic Theorem (I.1) that no attribution whatsoever is possible, hence no participation in *οὐσία*? Of course, the conclusion would follow. But, as we have seen above (p. 32), the categories look back to, and could actually have been derived from, the historical Parmenides' poem. Argument I corrects Parmenides at several points—where he claims, for example, that his *ἐόν* is limited and round, is at rest, and so forth. These and other categories will be shown to be applicable by way of affirmation and by way of negation, and not all trivially, to the one in Argument II and its derivates.

ARGUMENT I, CONCLUSION, NOTE. THE ONE IS NOT ONE

141e10–142a1 —So, it is not even such as to be one; for otherwise it would at once *be* [*ὂν*] and participate in being [*οὐσία*]; but the one, as it
142 seems, is not one and is not, if one must trust such an argument.
—Very likely. *I.concl.*

141e12–142a1, *εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν*] The Greek does not mean 'if one *can* trust such an argument', but rather 'if one *must* trust' it. The argument is presented not as faulty, but as dependent on the hypothesis. Note that Aristoteles' responses, starting at 141e8 and down to 142a6, are all hypothetical. Plato is not presenting the argument as fallacious; rather, he is intimating that an alternative interpretation is possible to the Hypothesis 'The one is'. Moreover, an alternative interpretation is necessary, because the Parmenidean notion of being, if taken exclusively, is self-defeating (though not strictly contradictory); see further below, 142a6–8.

Now Plato considers the special case of *ἕν* itself as an *οὐσία*: that is, as an attribute. Can the one be said to be one? (On the difference between *ἕν* as a subject and *ἕν* as attribute, see below, on Argument II, 142b5–c7, pp. 95–96.) It is immediately apparent that this too is excluded here, together with every *οὐσία*: our one is not a 'one that is' this or that, such as the one of Argument II. Hence, the absolute one is not even one: it cannot *have* what it *is;* it cannot be predicated of itself. Self-predicaton is a Parmenidean blunder: it is based on a confusion between the strong 'is' of *καθ' αὑτό*, Parmenidean being in itself, and the qualified 'is' of participation. *F* is *F* but, not being a 'one that is' (as in Argument II), it does not participate in *F.* (Cf. 128d2, 131c12 ff., and pp. 60–61, above.)

ARGUMENT I, COROLLARY. THE ONE HAS NO RELATION AND NO NAME, AND THERE IS ABOUT IT NO DISCOURSE, KNOWLEDGE, PERCEPTION, OR OPINION

142a1–6 —And that which is not: Would anything be of or to what is not? —How would it? —So, there is of it neither name nor account [λόγος], nor any knowledge or perception or opinion. —It appears not. —And so, it is not named or spoken of [λέγεται], nor is it an object of opinion, nor is it known, nor does any of the things that are [τι τῶν ὄντων] perceive it. —It seems not. *I.corol.*

142a6, τι τῶν ὄντων] Cf. 166a6.

Therefore, it has no name, nor can any account be given of it, nor is it the object of knowledge or perception or opinion, for any of these would presuppose it as a possible member in a relation. Compare above at 134: if the forms are καθ' αὑτά, 'in themselves', we have no knowledge of them. But neither have the gods, as we learn here—to the contrary of what was supposed there. Now we have shown the full significance of being καθ' αὑτό (or πρὸς αὑτό) and have explicated the meaning of 'being' underlying the Parmenidean conception. If being πρός τι, 'in relation to something', or που, 'somehow', 'in certain respects but not in others', is not allowed, then indeed no knowledge or cognition of any kind is possible. A one that has no aspects (or parts) cannot be κατά τι or πρός τι, 'in relation to something'. A form, if it is one and in itself, cannot be an object of any sort of cognition.

APORIA. CAN THE ONE BE LIKE THIS?

142a6–8 —Now, is it possible that these things should be true of the one? —I, for one, do not think so.

But 'these things' (142a7, ταῦτα, referring to a1–6, not to the whole of Argument I) cannot be true of the one, for we have been discussing it and giving it a name, and making it at least an object of opinion, if not of knowledge. This will be the point of departure for the alternative Arguments. The aporia is not logical but pragmatic. Note 142a7, ἔμοιγε, 'I, for one': Aristoteles sees the problem because *he* has been talking about the one. The problem arises only for someone who is already engaged in dialectical argumentation. (Cf. above, 134e9 ff., and below, 155d7.)

ARGUMENT II. IF THE ONE IS: CONSEQUENCES FOR ITSELF: IN RELATION TO THE OTHERS

The Parmenidean hypothesis brought us to an aporia. If the one *is* in an absolute sense, with no distinctions whatsoever within it, then nothing is true of it, and it cannot be a member in any relation without ceasing to be what it is. Knowledge of such a one is impossible.

This consequence is unacceptable. The reason is not logical but pragmatic: the very fact that dialogue about the one is being conducted shows us that the one can be the object of opinion, perhaps also of knowledge. There is a logos of it, and it can be spoken about; and sensible experience shows us that there is perception of sensible objects, each of which is, at least in a weak sense, one.

Because the consequences are unacceptable and we start from the fact of knowledge (or, at least, of opinion), the hypothesis has to be changed. We need an alternative concept of what it is to be one, or an interpretation of being that will support the consequences we desire. This is the main thrust of the hypothetical method: we are convinced of the conclusion, and we seek to establish the premises that support it.

142b1–5 —Do you wish, then, that we go over our hypothesis again from the beginning, to see whether, in so doing, something of another sort should appear to us? —I certainly wish to. —Now, if the one is, we say, the consequences that follow for it are to be agreed upon, be they of whatever sort they happen to be: not so? —Yes.

142b5, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, 'if the one is'] The word order does not seem to make any appreciable difference as to the force of 'one' or of 'is'. In fact, Plato switches quite casually between (b3, 5) ἓν εἰ ἔστιν and (c3) εἰ ἕν ἔστιν; *contra* Séguy-Duclot (1998: 37), following Diès (1923), *ad locum*. Cf. Argument I, 137c4, εἰ ἕν ἐστιν; but Argument IV, 159b3, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, both referring to the "absolute" one; and Argument III, 157b6, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, referring to the "complex" one. *Contra,* e.g., Migliori (1990: 225 n. 6), to the effect that the formulation in Argument II puts in relevance the one as subject and avoids equivocations. I cannot follow his explanation of Plato's reversion to the original formulation at 160b7, c11, that "la formula che serviva a mettere in risalto che l'Uno era solo Uno, va bene per indicare che l'Uno qui non è Uno, ma non per questo va confuso con il Non Uno."

ARGUMENT II, DEFINITION. THE ONE THAT IS PARTICIPATES IN BEING: RESTRICTED PRINCIPLE OF NONCONTRADICTION

142b5–c7 —Then look into them from the beginning. If the one is, could it be but not participate in being [οὐσίας]? —It could not. —Now, the one's being [οὐσία] would be too, not being the same as the
c one; else that being would not be its being, nor would it, the one, participate in that being, but saying that the one is would be like saying that the one is one. However, the hypothesis now is not this, what must follow if the one is one, but if the one is: not so? —Absolutely. —Again, so that 'is' signifies something other than 'one'? —It is necessary. —Therefore, would anything be said other than *II.df.* [ἄλλο ἤ] that the one participates in being, whenever one says in short that the one is? —Not at all.

Let us suppose, then, that the one is (something). If so, we have already distinguished between the one itself and whatever it happens to be. In making

this distinction, we deny that the one, in being something in the required sense, is identical with what it is. (The point is sharper in Greek, where the copula is not required.) Plato calls such a relation between the one and whatever it is, without being identical with it, 'participation' (*μέθεξις*), and that which the one is he calls its 'being' (*οὐσία*). To say that the one is, under this hypothesis, is not to say anything other than that the one participates in being. (Cf. 142c5–7, and contrast 137c4–5.)

'Is' is now interpreted as an incomplete predicate: 'to be', on our new hypothesis, is 'to be (something)'. To say that the one is, thus, is to say that the one is something, that it participates in being (*οὐσία*): that is, it participates in something or other,[1] without being identical with it. *Οὐσία* as something definite is always marked off from something else. (Cf. 129e, 130b, 135a, 147e, etc.) To have an *οὐσία* is to be a certain determinate thing, to the exclusion of some other.

Argument II is, together with the related Arguments III, V, and VII, an explication of *μέθεξις*, as opposed to Parmenidean being. 'Participation' is 'being in some respect (but not in another)', as will become clear presently.[2]

THEOREM II.1. THE ONE THAT IS IS A WHOLE AND HAS PARTS

142c7–d9 —Then let us say again, if the one is, what will follow. Consider, now, whether it is not necessary that this hypothesis signifies that *II.1*

d the one is such as to have parts. —How? —In this way: if 'is' is said of the one that is, and 'one' of the being [*ὄντος*] that is one, and being and one are not the same but are said of that same thing that we hypothesized, namely the one that is, is it not necessary, therefore, that the one that is should itself be the whole, and that both the one and being should come to be parts of it? —It is necessary. —Now, shall we refer to each of these parts as merely a part, or is each of them to be referred to as a part of the whole? —Of the whole. —So, the one that is to be, both is a whole and has parts [*μόρια*]. —Indeed.

142d9, *μόρια*, 'parts'] Heindorf's emendation for the singular *μόριον* of the manuscripts.

We start, then, from a one that is (something). Note the holistic approach, which will be prominent in this Argument: we do not start from the one

1. For *οὐσία* as a placeholder, see above, p. 92. The current assumption is that the one is *F*, *G*, etc., not that it is 'being', as Migliori (1990: 229 n. 19) has it.

2. Curd (1988: 312) is right in contraposing the Parmenidean one of Argument I, which can be said to be only in a strong sense, to the one of Argument II, which can participate in being. But there is no need to see here a contradiction due to the *Parmenides*' being a "transitional" dialogue. This is precisely the duality that Plato is arguing for in this dialogue.

and that which the one is. Rather, we start from an intuition opposed to the Parmenidean. Parmenides attains the intuition of an utterly simple object. Plato, on the contrary, begins from a (preanalytical) intuition of an object (no mention is made at this stage whether ideal or sensible) that is complex, and he proceeds to analyze it.[3] We start from the as yet unanalyzed fact that the unities we deal with are complex. Such a one, which is something (in a sense, other than itself), *can* be analyzed. It is not simple, but neither is it "put together" of parts; it is *analyzable* into parts. The important difference is that it is not the case that there are predefined, atomistic parts or aspects that make up the one; rather, the one is taken holistically as a complex, and parts are discerned in it. This is essential for the next step.[4]

Ὅλον/μέρη, 'whole'/'parts', is the basic distinction. The one *both* is a whole *and* has parts. This is what Parmenides would not have accepted in the aporetical Part I of the dialogue. Note 131a4, *ἤτοι ὅλου . . . ἢ μέρους*, 'either in the whole . . . or in part'—a very strong disjunction. Whole and parts were considered there as mutually exclusive. The historical Parmenides himself may have thought of his being as partless; consider fragment 8.4, *οὐλομελές*, 'whole-limbed'.[5] If the one can be considered as being a whole—and thus as having parts or aspects (i.e., if the weakened Principle of Noncontradiction can be applied to it)—then it can receive opposite attributes and still be 'the same'. The attributes will then refer to the one as a whole or to different parts (aspects) of it. That *εἶναι*, 'be', is to be interpreted as *οὐσίας μετέχειν*, 'participate in being', is the *ὑπόθεσις* (142c9) that makes this possible.

Here *μέρη*, or *μόρια*, are clearly aspects, not merely parts. (Parts may be thought to be "spatial aspects"; see below.) The one must have parts or aspects, without ceasing to be a whole, in order to make way for predication or attribution (participation, communion).

The hypothetical character of the series of arguments now to come is clear. (Note the optatives throughout Argument II: e.g., 143a2, *Οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ ἓν ὂν εἴη*; 'Thus would the one that is be unlimited in plurality?'; 144a7–9, *Οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόριον ἕκασ-*

3. Cf. Liebrucks (1949), 195: "Das relazionelle Gefüge wird einen Augenblick auf seine Teile hin betrachtet, ohne daß deshalb diese Teile aus den Relazionalität zu einem Für-sich-sein gelöst würden."

4. This is a theorem to be proved, not the hypothesis, as Allen (1983: *ad loc.*) seems to think. So much is clear from the structure of the Arguments themselves. See further Brumbaugh (1961), *ad locum.*

5. The reading is contested. Some interpreters now prefer *μουνογενές*, 'unique'. Cf., e.g., Mourelatos (1970); Schofield, in Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983); *contra,* Kranz, in Diels and Kranz (1951). But the reading does not affect Parmenides' "predicational monism" at least; cf. Curd (1991).

τον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἂν αὐτῆς; 'Therefore, if every number participates in being, would not also each part of number participate in it?') The conclusions are not offered categorically, but only their *possibility* is established: if the one is interpreted in this way, *nothing prevents* it from being this or that; it is necessary that it *could* be so or so, not that it *is* so and so. At several points throughout this Argument, Plato stresses that opposing characters can be attributed to the one *in different respects*. Once the possibility of respects, or aspects, has been accepted (and this is now our current hypothesis), the one *can* have opposite attributes—according to the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction.

THEOREM II.2. THE ONE THAT IS IS A PLURALITY

142d9–e3 —What now? Each of these parts of the one that is, the 'one' and 'being': Would ever either the 'one' be lacking the 'being' part, or 'being' the 'one' part? —It would not. *II.2*

e

Having distinguished two parts (aspects) in the complex one, let us now look into each of them. Since we can tell the one apart from its οὐσία, the one must have some character by which it is distinct from its οὐσία, whatever this is. Hence, the one too has an οὐσία of its own, which marks it off from everything else. Conversely, its οὐσία also cannot be simple; if it were, it would not be (rationally) distinguishable from other οὐσίαι (which would then be, by this hypothesis, simple too).

Simple entities can stand in external relations to each other. A point *A* can be to the left or to the right of another point, *B*. External relations, however, are not, as such, implied by the nature of the relata and are thus purely accidental. (Contrast, e.g., the relation between parent and child: being a parent implies that there is a child whose parent the parent is, and vice versa.) But Plato is looking for the conditions of internal relations—that is, relations that are not purely accidental—as a condition of diairesis and of μέθεξις. Such internal relations require that the relata be entities with inner differentiation and articulation.

The Parmenidean view, presented in the aporetic Part I of the dialogue and in Argument I, is that relations are impossible, since all being is καθ' αὑτό, and 'in itself' no entity relates to any other entity. Thus, if one wants to have the possibility of *A* being *B* without *A* and *B* being identified with each other, one must differentiate in *A* an aspect according to which *A* is *B,* as opposed to that aspect according to which *A* is itself (and also opposed to other aspects, according to which *A* is *C, D,* etc.).

The interpretation of the second half of this passage, 'or "being" the "one" part' (142e2), is more difficult. Brumbaugh rightly shows that the first part ('Would ever [. . .] the "one" be lacking the "being" part') fol-

lows from substitution in the definition of 'one' for Argument II (II.df.) and in Theorem II.1. But he and Cornford (1939) are not very helpful with the second half. Neither is Allen (1983); nor, for that matter, are other modern interpreters. *Ἕν* is expressly supposed to be *ὄν*, but nowhere is it said or implied that the proposition *ἓν ὄν* (or '*x* is *F*') is convertible. In fact, if 'is' is taken to signify participation, then the relation is not symmetrical, and the conversion is not unconditional.

The justification of Plato's move here stems from the way in which he interprets what it is for *ἕν* (*x*) and *ὄν* (*F*) to stand in a relation to each other. As he showed in Argument I, simples without aspects cannot stand in relation to anything. All relations considered by Plato in the context of participation are internal. If to be a member of an internal relation implies a distinction in aspects, then *both* members of the relation have to be complexes. But then the interpretation of being as participation (142c5–7) requires that not only the participating as such be necessarily complex, but also the participated-in. Hence, in the one that is (something), it must be possible to identify, within the one itself, that aspect of the one according to which it participates in whatever it participates in (say, Socrates is white in respect of his color only), and, likewise, within its being, that aspect in which being is participated in (say, the white itself is participated in as being white, not as being unique or atemporal).

THEOREM II.2.1. THE ONE
THAT IS IS AN UNLIMITED PLURALITY

142e3–143a3 —Then, again, each of the parts will have both 'the one' and 'being', and the smallest of the parts will again come to be of two parts, and thus, always by the same reasoning, whatever part should come into being will ever have these two parts; for 'the one' will ever have 'being', and 'being' 'the one'; so that it is necessary
143 that it should always come to be two and never be one. —By all means. —Thus, would the one that is be unlimited in plurality? — It seems so. *II.2.1*

The same is true, of course, of each of the parts, which have now been found to be, they too, complex. This means, among other things, that there is never a bare (i.e., irrational)[6] subject or a bare attribute, for each of these parts is, in principle, divisible again. Thus, on the current hypothesis, there is no subject of predication *x* that is not also a determinate *F*. Implied here is the rejection of a concept of existence separate from essence: a bare subject of predication can never be attained by the diaretical procedure. Every further

6. "Irrational" because a bare entity, an entity with no attributes whatsoever (e.g., Locke's *je ne sais quoi*), could not have any account given of it. Cf. *Theaetetus* 201d.

distinction will always give us another one that is (something), a subject characterized by a predicate, the Platonic equivalent of the Aristotelean τόδε τι. Such a one that is will be later described as a συμπλοκή, a 'weaving'.[7]

So far, the one is 'unlimited in plurality' (ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθος, 143a2), and there is in it, as yet, no articulation. (Cf. Theorem II.2.2, Lemma).

Thus, Argument II develops the concept of a complex unity as an entity that, impossible as it may be in Parmenidean terms, alone could stand in relations that are not purely external. Moreover, this complex must be such that its parts too are complex unities. An immediate consequence of this postulate is that there can be no intrinsically necessary end to the division of parts or aspects into further parts or aspects. All true complex is a complex of complexes (144a5–e7).[8] This is the ὑπόθεσις of the possibility of diairesis. Diairesis presupposes the possibility of making distinctions within the form—*any* form—and requires, in principle, that division can go on indefinitely. In each particular case, though, it will come to an end at a certain point, thus exhibiting the determinate character of each form under consideration. But only with a particular example and for particular purposes can we actually reach a "sufficient" division.[9]

The whole is thus prior to its parts. Its parts are parts because of their relations to the whole. It is their relation to the whole that constitutes them as parts. In this sense, the relation itself is prior to the relata. Only such internal relations can be rationally explained, shown to be necessary: under the current hypothesis, the relata are not primarily in themselves but are *constituted* by the relations of part to whole and of part to part. To be a whole and to be a part is *ipso facto* to be in a relational way.

Plato has now at hand all he needs in order to dismember the Third Man. The form is one insofar as it is considered as a Parmenidean ἕν, an absolute one. However, as ἓν ὄν, as a one that is, that participates in this or that, it is (in principle) ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθος, 'indefinite in respect of quantity'. And this is the case not only for the participant (be it another form or a sensible thing) but also for the participated-in. Now, according to the Third Man Argument, if the form is one and participated in, it must also be indefinitely many. Here Plato shows that this is indeed the case, but that absolute unity and indefinite complexity follow from different ways of understanding the Hypothesis 'The one is'. The one (in this case, the form) is one in a strong, Parmenidean sense; however, the one is this or that (if it is so) only in a weak sense, as participating in something else. (Cf. on 141e10, p. 93, above.)

7. Cf., e.g., *Sophist* 262b.

8. Cf. the Living Being comprising many living beings in *Timaeus* 30c–31b, and Scolnicov (1992a).

9. Cf. *Philebus* 15, and Scolnicov (1975b). I would now see diairesis, with Trevaskis (1967), as heuristic, not definitory.

F is *F*, but in a manner unlike that in which anything else (form or sensible) is *F*. To be itself is not the same as to be (qualifiedly) something else. Nothing can be itself qualifiedly (as a proper part or aspect of itself), just as nothing can be something else unqualifiedly. The self-predication of forms is unmasked for what it is: a conflation of two modes of being. And this is what Parmenides refused to accept in the aporetic Part I of the dialogue: that there *can* be two modes of being.

Plato's Parmenides does here precisely what Socrates thought an admirable wonder at 129a–b: he shows that forms too, and not only sensible things, can be oppositely predicated, if only we are prepared to allow that forms too are subject to some version of the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction.

This antiatomistic line is pursued in the *Theaetetus* (202a ff.): a logos cannot be based on a *σύνθεσις*, an aggregate, since no *σύνθεσις* can, as such, be the proper object of rational thought. A *σύνθεσις* is ultimately composed (literally, 'put together') of irrational elements, which can be named but not explained. The relation between such elements must likewise be irrational, since one can do no more than enumerate them and state the fact of their conjunction (like the *στοιχεῖα* of Socrates' dream, *Theaetetus* 201d8–202c6).

Here, Plato is opposing to the atomism of the *Theaetetus* a holistic approach, which has sometimes been called "Anaxagorean."[10] His point is the refutation of the fundamental premise of all atomism, logical, epistemological, and physical: that wholes are composed of simple parts as a matter of necessity. Of course, this still *may* be the case, on factual grounds, and indeed Plato does offer his own version of physical atomism in the *Timaeus* (if the label 'atomism' is still appropriate to what he does there, 53b–61c).

THEOREM II.2.2. THE ONE THAT IS IS A DEFINITE PLURALITY: IT IS A NUMBER

THEOREM II.2.2, LEMMA. DIFFERENCE AS A CONDITION OF PLURALITY AND OF DIAIRESIS

Indefinite plurality is prior to definite plurality. Indefinite plurality does not require difference, for in it there is no need to distinguish between the terms, to identify each term as distinct from the others. Only now does Plato proceed to definite plurality (number).

143a4–b8 —Let us proceed also in the following way. —Which? —Do we say that the one participates in being, since it is? —Yes. —And it was because of this that the one that is appeared many? —So it was. *II.2.2.lemma*

10. See above, on 126a1, p. 44n.1. If Plato had Anaxagoras in mind, it surely was because of the latter's intuition that the proper beginning of an explanation is with the concept of a whole that already includes, implicit in itself, all further specifications.

—What, then? The one itself, that which we say participates in being: If we grasp it in our mind alone by itself, without that in which we say it participates, will it then appear one only, or will this same
b thing also appear many? —One, or so I think. —Let us see, then. It is necessary that its being should be one thing and itself should be another, different thing, if indeed the one is not to be being [*οὐσία*] but, rather, as one, it is to participate in being. —It is necessary. —Therefore, if being is one thing and the one is another, it is neither by being one that the one is different from being, nor is it by being being that being is other than the one, but they are different from each other by the different and other. —Absolutely. —So that the different is not the same as either the one or being. —Of course.

143a6, *αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν*, 'the one itself'] I.e., the one considered without its participation in being. This is indeed 'the one itself' in its technical sense—i.e., the Platonic form. But it is not simply 'the one' of Argument I, for it does participate in being, although, for the moment, it is considered in itself. The Platonic form, then, which is capable of communion with other forms and which can be participated in, is not identical with the Parmenidean one. But, considered in itself, the one that is is one only. Cf. 143a8–9, *ἓν μόνον . . . ἢ καὶ πολλά*, 'one only, or . . . also . . . many', referring back to Argument I, Definition; and see further Argument VIII.

Grasping the one *in itself* is a necessary condition of making the required distinction between the two aspects of the one that is. Moreover, the one itself is a condition of the one that is. Otherwise, we should be in the Anaxagorean position—'everything was together' (fr. 59 B 1 DK—without the possibility of making *any* distinctions. (Cf. Arguments III and VIII, below.)

About that one itself, then, it can be said only that it is *different* from being. Such a differentiation is possible precisely because this one itself is not identical with the one of Argument I: that one itself, as we saw above (Theorem I.7), cannot be different in virtue of itself. The different, then, arises from making a distinction in the whole, as a condition of it. We start by having not two distinct entities that enter into a relation, but one single entity within which we make a distinction. Such a distinction requires, apart from the aspects distinguished between, also the (implicit) concept of difference. This concept is now spelled out.[11] But *τὸ ἕτερον* is not yet a *third,* for we do not have number as yet. (Cf. the next passage.)

Both interpretations of the one are necessary: the one itself and the one that is. This is to say that the form must be considered *both* in itself *and* in

11. Speiser (1937: 29) rightly sees (143b1 ff.) *τὸ ἕτερον* as a condition of *διάνοια*. But it is not quite the case that "[d]er diskursive Verstand bringt die Verschiedenheit in die Welt." On the contrary: *τὸ ἕτερον* makes discursive thinking possible. Not only must we be able to express that *a* is different from *b,* but it must in fact be the case that it is possible that *a* be different from *b.*

communion with other forms. Already at this stage, it is becoming apparent what will be explicit in Argument VIII, namely that we must have a double focus: we must be able to grasp the one *in itself* and the one as participant (and ditto for being). If we were not able to grasp the one in itself, without its being, one and being would be the same, and we would be back to the Eleatic collapse of all attributions onto one another and of subject and attribute likewise. One must *mark off* or *distinguish* the εἴδη from one another and yet concede the possibility of participation. (Cf. Socrates' demand at 129d6–e4.)

143c1–144a5 —What now? If we should choose from them, whichever you wish, either being and the different, or being and the one, or the one and the different, would we not in each of the choices have chosen a pair [τινε], which should rightly be called 'both of them' [ἀμφοτέρω]? —How? —Like this: Can one mention being? —One can. —And, again, mention one? —This too. —Next, have we not mentioned each of them both [ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν]? —Yes. —What, then? Whenever I mention being and one, do I not mention both of them? —Indeed. —Now, whenever I mention being and different or different and one, and so in every case, do I not in each *II.2.2*

d case refer to both [ἄμφω]? —Yes. —And those that should be rightly called 'both': Could they be 'both' but not 'two' [δύο]? —They could not. —And those that are two: Is there any way that each of them would not be one? —There is no way. —So, if indeed, in each case, they happen to be two together [σύνδυο], each of them would be one. —It appears so. —And if each of them is one, whenever any one is added to any couple [συζυγίᾳ], will they all not become three? —Yes. —Are not three odd, and two even? —How else?

e —What, then? If there are two, is it not necessary that there should also be twice, and if there are three, thrice, if indeed two is twice one and three is thrice one? —It is necessary. —And if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice two? And if three and thrice, is it not necessary that there should also be thrice three? —How else? —What, then? If there are three and there is twice, and there are two and there is thrice, is it not necessary that there should be twice three and thrice two? —Quite

144 necessary. —So, there would be even times even and odd times odd, and odd times even and even times odd. —So it is. —Therefore, if this is so, do you think any number is left that must not necessarily be? —Not at all. —And so, if the one is, it is necessary that number also should be. —It is necessary.

143c6–7, ἑκάτερον . . . ἀμφοτέρω, 'each of them both . . . both of them'] The language here presupposes 143b5, τῷ ἑτέρῳ, 'by the different'.

143d6, συζυγίᾳ, a 'couple' (two put together), not 'both' (before separation)] *Now* we can have addition, which follows immediately (143d6): 'whenever any one is added [συντεθέντος] to any couple'. The possibility of addition is a necessary condition of number in the "counting sense"; see below.

Numbers are not primarily *συνθέσεις μονάδων*, 'aggregates of units', or *πλήθη μονάδων*, 'pluralities of units', as Pythagoreans would have it.[12] A putting together of units would never make *one* number. Numbers are only secondarily *σύμβλητοι*, 'additive'; they do not arise as cardinals, or "counters," which grow by addition of unit to unit.[13] Numbers as unified pluralities that can stand in mutual relations can come about only as a result of a distinction (i.e., a *διαίρεσις*) in a *ἕν* within which all possible distinctions are already implicit.[14] *Πλῆθος*, 'multitude', is always given already within the *ἕν*. Number requires an indefinite progression, but any given number (as opposed to *πλῆθος*, a sheer multitude) is always definite: any actual diairesis (of numbers or of forms) always stops at a certain point. Number is a *πλῆθος πεπερασμένον* a 'limited plurality'.[15]

We start from a complex unity, or a *ὅλον*, a 'whole'. It is of the nature of such unity that we can distinguish in it aspects, taken as inherently related to each other. But the very possibility of a distinction between its aspects (namely between that of being one thing and that of being something) immediately requires the difference[16] between them as distinct from either. Thus, the complexity of the one gives us first the triad as a configuration, or structure. From the triad, the pair is derived. The pair cannot precede the triad, for, as we shall see presently, the triad cannot be derived from it. Moreover, since the one that is, although it has aspects, still has to have these aspects differentiated from each other, difference is required before the pair can arise. It is not enough that we have *a* and *b;* we must also have difference, so as to make possible diff(*a,b*), '*a* is different from *b*'.

From the pair (*τινε*, 143c3; *αὐτοῖν*, c6, d3) as 'both' (*ἀμφοτέρω*, c4, 7; *ἄμφω*, c9, d1), the number 'two' (*δύο*, d2)[17] is derived. In a pair taken as such (hence the dual) we cannot speak of 'each' (*ἑκάτερον*, c6, d3) before we can distinguish between the members of the pair: for example, by *naming* each of them

12. Cf. Raven (1948), 72; Burkert (1972), 286; Knorr (1975), 43; Scolnicov (1992c); Pritchard (1995), 25–26.

13. Cf. *Phaedo* 96e–97a, 100d. And cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* M 6.1080b11, on the distinction, in Aristotelean terms, between *μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί*, 'mathematical numbers', and number having *τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον*, 'prior and posterior', i.e., the forms.

14. Cf. the Pythagorean monad, which 'breathes in' (*ἀναπνέοντι*) the unlimited void and splits into two (Aristotle, *Physics* IV 6.213b22–27). Only, in the Platonic conception, there is no need—and no possibility—of introducing the unlimited from outside: the element of distinction must already be presupposed in the primordial unit. Cf. 143a4–b8, above.

15. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Δ 13.1020a13. Eudoxus's definition of number as *πλῆθος ὡρισμένον*, 'definite plurality', is given by Iamblichus, *In Nicomachi Arithmenticam Introductio* 10.18. Cf. also *Philebus* 16c5–17a5.

16. Not only the *concept* of difference, but difference itself. The argument is ontological no less than epistemological.

17. 'Number' (*ἀριθμός*), that is, in the ordinary Greek sense of the word, as 'denumerable quantity'. The concept is formally introduced only at 144a2.

(cf. 143c4–6), thus considering each as a different member of the pair (c6, ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν). Only now (d3–5) is the number 'one'[18]—not the one that is, which is not a number or a quantity[19]—derived from the couple (συζυγίᾳ, d6) as 'two together' (σύνδυο, d4).

'Three' (as a number, not the triad as a structure) is derived from the pair in order to establish it as odd—the odd being that which differs from the even by one. And, indeed, from 'two' and 'three' Plato proceeds immediately to establish the odd and the even. But note that 'three' could not have been so derived if it were not already given in the triad: it is only the *number* that can be thus produced, not the structure itself. The structure, as we saw, is prior to its number and has to be established independently of it.

At 143d1 Plato makes the transition from structure to ἀριθμός properly speaking, from 'couple' to 'two', and from 'two' to 'one' (d3, ἕν) as number. The ἕν of the hypothesis is not a number. 'One' as a number has to be derived from 'two', which is the first ἀριθμός. A unique object is not *one* in this sense. But each of 'both' is. Similarly, 'two' has to be derived from 'both'. Number as structure is prior to number as quantity.

Once we have 'two' and 'three', we can derive numbers according to a proportional procedure: twice three, thrice two, and so forth. Here, multiplication is conceived of not as iterated addition (which would presuppose an impossible σύνθεσις), but "geometrically," as a structure.[20] The product $m \times n$ can be represented as the pattern

$$\begin{matrix} & m & \\ & \cdots & \\ n & & \\ & \cdots & \end{matrix}$$

Of course, the abstract structure itself does not imply the spatial configuration.

The operation $m \times n$ gives us the structure before it gives us its quantity. It can be performed without asking *How many?* Hence, τρία δίς, 'thrice two', and δύο τρίς, 'twice three', and in general ἄρτια περιττάκις, 'even times odd', and περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις, 'odd times even', are established independently of each other (143e7–144a2), since they are different structures, although their number is the same. We do not yet have commutativity ($m \times n = n \times m$).

Primes greater than three cannot be derived by the *addition* of a unit to a previously derived collection, for this would make them συνθέσεις μοναδῶν,

18. 'One' was not normally considered a number in Greek. But here it obviously denotes a definite quantity; hence it is treated as if it were a number. But note that it is *not* the first number. It is *derived* from the first number, 'two'.

19. But which now can be said to *have* number or quantity, i.e., to be *one*.

20. For the Pythagorean "theory of figured numbers," see Knorr (1975), chap. 5, §4. I fail to understand what Turnbull (1998: 84) means by "circular and even spherical numbers."

'aggregates of units', and qualitatively different from the other numbers.[21] But they could be obtained by *subtraction*. Subtraction is, in this context, essentially different from addition, because it is performed within an already established structure, whose members have already been differentiated. The pentad, for example, could be derived from the hexad in the same way that the couple is derived from the triad: by *leaving out* any single member among the members of the hexad, already distinct from one another (say, by name—as done, for example, when aspects of the one that is were distinguished as 'one' and 'being', or the members of the triad as 'one', 'being', and 'difference', but not yet numbered). This procedure would require not *counting* (i.e., putting units together, thus regarding them as *σύμβλητοι*), but only a change of structure or configuration—say, from [*aa ab ac ba bb bc*] to [*ab ac ba bb bc*]: that is, from the hexad as twice three to the pentad as a hexad minus any one of its members, identified by its name (in this case *aa*).

Numbers are thus considered primarily as proportions and as *structures,* and only secondarily as (denumerable) collections. It is in this way that Plato reinterprets the Pythagorean dictum that things (or forms) are numbers: numbers are the prototypes of structured pluralities.[22]

THEOREM II.2.2, NOTE 1.
BEING IS UNLIMITED IN PLURALITY

144a5–c2 —However, if number is, the many should be, and an unlimited plurality of beings [*τῶν ὄντων*] too; or is not number unlimited in plurality, and does it not come to be by participating in being [*οὐσίας*]? —Indeed so. —Therefore, if every number participates in being, would not also each part of number participate in it? —Yes. *II.2.2.n1*

b —Will being, then, be distributed over all the many beings [*ὄντα*] and be not lacking from any of them, neither from the smallest nor from the largest? Or is it nonsense even to ask this? For how, indeed, could being [*οὐσία*] be lacking from any of the things that are [*τῶν ὄντων του*]? —In no way. —So, it is chopped up as small as possible, and as large, in every way, and of all things it is the most

c divided, and the parts of being are endless. —So it is. —And so, its parts are of the greatest plurality. —Of the greatest plurality indeed.

144c1, 'endless', *ἀπέραντα*] Cf. *Statesman, χρόνος ἀπέραντος*, 'endless times'; *Theaetetus* 147c, *ὁδὸς ἀπέραντος*, 'endless way': not 'indefinite' (*ἄπειρος*). In contrast to Theorem II.1, here it is the *parts* that are of the greatest plurality. There, the one was

21. Thus, five cannot be derived from a "two-machine" and a "three-machine," as Turnbull (1998: 79) proposed.

22. Cf. Scolnicov (1971). The distinction is between (ideal) numbers as structures and numbers as collections. There is no need to introduce 'intermediates' or 'mathematical entities', as Aristotle (cf., e.g., *Metaphysics* A 6.987b15, Z 2.1028b20) and many modern interpreters have it.

shown to be indefinitely undifferentiated; here, its parts are shown to be endless in number, being distinct from one another. They can be a denumerable endless group.

Every number participates in being (*οὐσία*: i.e., a determinate being, something or other), because number is a *certain* number, apart from being *one* number (i.e., a unified plurality). Each number is distinct from all other numbers. We can now speak of a plurality of (different) beings (*ὄντα*) Each number has a different *οὐσία*: that is, it is a *different* number. But then, by Theorem II.2.1, each part of any number will also be different from any other part: that is, it will have an *οὐσία* of its own.

Οὐσία will, then, be distributed over all the *ὄντα*, because each of the beings (*ὄντα*), as a unity, participates in being (*οὐσία*), which is just another way of saying that it is *something.*"*Οντα* are things that are. They *are* because they have an *οὐσία*, because they are so-and-so. (And, of course, they exist by being so-and-so and not otherwise.) *Οὐσία* is thus divided up into as many parts as we care to divide up number into. Therefore, units can be as small as we care to take them and also as large, and they will still be something. Anything, small as it may be, is *something.*

Compare *Republic* VII 525d5–526a5, where the mathematicians will not allow the one to be 'chopped up' (*ἐὰν σὺ κερματίζῃς αὐτό*, 525e2).[23] Here Plato corrects them. But, as will emerge from Argument VIII, he does not totally do away with a real, absolute unit.

THEOREM II.2.2, NOTE 2.
THE ONE IS AN UNLIMITED PLURALITY

The converse: anything that is something must be *one* thing. There are many things, then, that can be one.

144c2–d4 —What now? Is there any of them that is a part of being and yet no part? —How could this ever [*καὶ*] come to be? —But, I think, if indeed it is, it is necessary that, so long as it is, it should ever be some *one* thing, and it is impossible that it should be nothing. —It is necessary. —So, the one is present to every part of being, lacking from neither the smallest nor the largest part, nor from any d other. —So it is. —Therefore, being one, is it simultaneously in many places as a whole? Look into it. —I am looking into it, and I see that it is impossible. —If indeed not whole, then divided; for, unless divided, in no way will it somehow be present simultaneously to all the parts of being. —Yes. *II.2.2.n2*

A part of something is also *one* part. This establishes *ἕν* as *anything* taken as *one* thing, regardless of whether it is a part of another *one* or has parts itself.

23. Cf. Schofield (1972).

Thus, it *must* be possible for the one to be in many places simultaneously. This answers the aporiae of 131, above.

144d4–e7 —Moreover, it is most necessary that what is divisible should be as many as its parts. —It is necessary. —So, we did not speak truly just now, when we said that being would have been distributed in parts of the greatest plurality. For it is distributed not more than
e the one, but, as it seems, equally with the one; for being is not lacking from the one nor the one from being, but the two are ever equally distributed throughout. —It appears so, by all means.

—So, the one has been itself cut up by being and is many and unlimited in plurality. —It appears so. —And so, not only the one that is is many, but it is also most necessary that the one itself should be distributed by being. —By all means.

Any one thing must be *one* thing.[24] And it must be possible to distinguish between the thing's being one and its being what it is. This will later allow it to be *one* thing participating in many *οὐσίαι*.

Cornford says of this passage that it is "[a] brilliant refutation of the Eleatic thesis."[25] But it is based on a *petitio principii,* albeit a legitimate one in Plato's eyes. The refutation is achieved by refusing to play the Eleatic game.

THEOREM II.2.2, CONCLUSION. THE ONE THAT IS IS, AS A WHOLE, LIMITED (I.E., IT IS A NUMBER)

144e8–145a4 —Moreover, inasmuch as [*ὅτι*] the parts are parts of a whole, *II.2.2.concl.*
the one would be limited in respect of the whole; or are not the
145 parts encompassed by the whole? —It is necessary. —The encompassing, however, would be a limit. —How not? —So, the one that is is somehow both one and many, and whole and parts, and limited and unlimited in plurality. —It appears so.

Insofar as it is a whole, it is limited. But insofar as the division is, in principle, endless, it is unlimited.[26] *In abstracto, τὸ ἕν* is indefinitely many. But any given thing (sensible or ideal), being a *ὅλον*, a 'whole', is definite. Diairesis requires the possibility of infinite extension, but any particular diairetical picture is finite. The one is limited and unlimited, but in two different respects: it is *in principle* indefinite, but, in any given case, it is definite.

24. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Γ 3.1006a21, b10.

25. Cornford (1939), 143.

26. I see no need to invoke here, or elsewhere, the esotericist assumption according to which "[s]i richiamano esplicitamente due processi e, quindi, due Principi: uno unificante che conduce all'Uno, al tutto, al limite, e uno di divisione che conduce alla Molteplicità, alle parti, all' infinito" (Migliori [1990], 241).

THEOREM II.3. THE ONE THAT IS HAS, AS A WHOLE, EXTREMITIES AND MIDDLE

145a4–b1 —Next, does it not, if indeed it is limited, also have extremities? —It is necessary. —What, then? If it is a whole, would it not have also a beginning and a middle and an end? Or could anything be a whole without those three? And if ever any one of them be lacking, will it still consent to be a whole? —It will not consent. *II.3*

b —So, the one, as it seems, would have a beginning and an end and a middle. —It would have.

The argument is conducted throughout (here as elsewhere) in hypotheticals and in the optative mood (e.g., 145a5, *οὐ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι* [. . .]; 'would it not also have a beginning [. . .]?'), with occasional stylistic variations. The whole argument is hypothetical and refers to the *possibility* of the one's being such-and-such, not to its *actually* being such-and-such.

Thus far, the one is not necessarily considered as spatial. It is enough that it have an "inside" and an "outside," so as to allow (e.g.) logical inclusion. (Cf. *Phaedrus* 264c.) For 145a7, *ἐθελήσει*, 'will consent', used to refer to nonsensible entities, see (e.g.) 146d6, 149a2, below; *Phaedo* 61c8; *Republic* IV 436b9.

THEOREM II.3, COROLLARY. THE ONE THAT IS HAS (CAN HAVE) SHAPE

145b1–5 —But, moreover, the middle is equally distanced from the extremes; else it would not be a middle. —Indeed not. —So, the one that is such would participate, as it seems, also in some shape, either straight or round or some mixture of both. —Yes, it would participate. *II.3.corol.*

As a corollary of the preceding, the one is said to be able to have sensible shape (145b3, *σχήματος*). The one *can* have a sensible shape, as a corollary of having beginning, middle, and end. This is only a note *en passant,* and is not strictly relevant here.

THEOREM II.4. THE ONE THAT IS IS IN ITSELF AND IN ANOTHER

145b6–7 —Next, this being the case, will it not, therefore, be both in itself and in another? *II.4*

This being the case (i.e., if the one is limited), it is possible for it to stand in relations of inclusion. Again, this inclusion is not necessarily spatial (but it can *also* be spatial, of course); see below, p. 111. This will be important, for example, for the discussion of *difference* at 146c4–d1.

THEOREM II.4.1. THE ONE THAT IS IS IN ITSELF

The whole is coextensive with all its parts. The one *qua* all its parts (collectively) is in itself *qua* whole.

145b7–c7 —How? —Each of the parts is somehow in the whole and none is outside the whole. —So it is. —And are all the parts encompassed *II.4.1*
c by the whole? —Yes. —Moreover, is the one all its own parts, and nothing more nor less than all? —Of course. —Now, is not the one also the whole? —How else? —So, if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all and the whole itself, and all is encompassed by the whole, the one would be encompassed by the one and thus the one would at once be in itself. —It appears so.

Note that the argument depends on limit, not on shape. This confirms that shape (at 145b1–5, above) is a corollary, not part of the main argument.[27]

Note again the optative mood in the conclusion of the argument. The conclusion depends on the premises that have been established: *if* the one as a whole is all its parts, and *if* all are encompassed by the whole (by Theorem II.2.2), then the one *would* (or *could*) be in itself.

THEOREM II.4.2. THE ONE THAT IS IS IN ANOTHER

THEOREM II.4.2.1. THE ONE
THAT IS IS NOT IN ALL ITS PARTS

The one *qua* whole is not in all its parts (severally). For if it is not in each or any part, then it could not be in all (severally).

145c7–d4 —However, the whole is, again, not in the parts, neither in all *II.4.2*
d nor in any of them. For if in all, necessarily also in one; for if it *II.4.2.1*
were not in any one it could no longer be somehow in all; and if that one part is one among all, but the whole is not in it, how could the one still be in all? —In no way.

THEOREM II.4.2.2. THE ONE
THAT IS IS NOT IN SOME OF ITS PARTS

145d5–7 —Nor is it in some of the parts: for if the whole were in some *II.4.2.2*
of them, the more would be in the less, which is impossible. —It is impossible.

145d7–e3 —But, being not in several of the parts nor in one of them nor *II.4.2.concl.*
in all, is it not necessary that the whole should be in something
e different or no longer be anywhere [μηδαμοῦ ἔτι]? —It is necessary. —Now, not being anywhere, it would be nothing; whereas being a whole, since it is not in itself, is it not necessary that it be in another? —Indeed.

27. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Δ 26.

145d8, e1, *μηδαμοῦ*, 'no[t] . . . anywhere'] Also 'no[t] in any way'. Cf. above, 138a2.

To be *in* is to be encompassed *by*. Insofar as the whole is limited, it must be limited (encompassed) by something. If it is not encompassed by anything, it is nothing. But, again, the passage does not have to be understood exclusively in spatial terms. (Cf. below.)

145e3–6 —Insofar [*Hi*], then, as the one is a whole, it is in another; but insofar [*ēi*] as it is all its parts, it is in itself. And so, it is necessary that the one be both in itself and in a different. —It is necessary.

Note 145e3, 4, 'insofar', stressing different aspects. For the use of *ēi* to distinguish between aspects, compare, for example, *Meno* 72b7. The logical justification for this is given here, on the basis of the weakened Principle of Noncontradiction of *Republic* IV 436b8–c1. (See above, pp. 13–14.)

'In another' (*ἐν ἄλλῳ*, 145e2) need not necessarily imply spatial inclusion. Position (*ἕδρα*) and place (*χώρα*), which do imply space, will not be introduced until later (148e6, e9; p. 119, below). The phrase, here, could as well refer to any kind of inclusion—such as, say, species within genus[28]—or rather any form to its superordinated form: in this sense, acquisitive art is "in" art and animal is "in" living being. This interpretation and the spatial interpretation are two special cases of the more general structure developed by Plato. (See also on 145b6–7, above.)

Space is introduced probably only below (at 148e6 ff.; but see *shape*, 145b1–5). The opposition 'in itself'/'in another' is a necessary condition of spatiality, but is not spatiality itself. The operative spatial concept is *contact*. (Cf. on 138a2–b6, above.)

THEOREM II.6. THE ONE THAT IS IS IN MOTION AND AT REST

145e7–8 —Thus, is it not necessary that the one, being of such a nature, should move as well as rest? *II.6*

'Motion' (*κίνησις*), as usual, is the general term for change, as specified in what follows.

145e8–146a3 —How? —It will somehow be at rest, if indeed it is in itself; for being in one situation [*ἐν ἑνὶ*] and not changing out of it, it would be in the same situation, in itself. —So it is. —But what is ever in the same: doubtless it is necessary that it should be ever at rest. —Indeed. *II.6.2*

146a3–6 —What, then? What is ever in a different: Is it not necessary, on the contrary, that it should never be in the same, and, never *II.6.1*

28. Cf. Stenzel (1940 [1917]), 135; Wilpert (1949), 48; cf. also Wyller (1960), 122.

being in the same, it should never rest, and not resting it should move? —It is so.

146a6–8 —So, it is necessary that the one, being ever both in itself and in a different, should ever move and rest. —It appears so. *II.6.concl.*

146a3, ἀεὶ, 'ever'] Not 'always', but 'at any given time'.

What follows from the hypothesis is the *possibility* of motion, not the necessity of actual motion. It *can* move.[29] If the one is considered in a certain respect—that is, as being in another (or in others)—it can be looked at, *even at the same time,* as if it moved and were at rest. It moves 'and' rests (τε καὶ, 146a7), in different respects (as in Theorem II.3), by the same argument by which it is 'in itself and in a different' (ἐν ἑαυτῷ [. . .] καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, 145e5, 146a6–7). This is important not only for physical motion and change, but also for the discussion of γιγνώσκεσθαι, 'being known' (134b6, b11; and cf. 142a4 with 155e6, 160c7): in one respect the form is καθ' αὑτό, 'in itself', and as such it is at rest; in another, it is ἐν ψυχαῖς, 'in souls' (132b5), and as such it moves.[30] This answers the aporia at 134a3–c3.

THEOREM II.7. THE ONE THAT IS IS THE SAME AND IS DIFFERENT

146a9–b2 —Moreover, it must be the same as itself and different from itself, and, similarly, both the same as and different from the others, if indeed it is affected by the foregoing. *II.7*

The concepts of identity and difference have been used (and difference explicitly introduced) from 142c5 on as a (necessary) part of the characterization of the one that is.

THEOREM II.7.1.1. THE ONE THAT IS IS THE SAME AS ITSELF

146b2–5 —How? —Everything is somehow related to everything, as follows: either it is the same or it is different; or, if it should be neither the same nor different, it would be a part of that to which it is thus related, or it would be as whole to part. —It appears so. *II.7.1.1.lemma*

146b2, 'somehow', που] For it depends, of course, on the very possibility of being related.

Plato starts by establishing the general scheme for things that are or are not the same as, or different from, each other. He is considering here only total

29. The shifts in the moods of the verbs are to be explained as stylistic variations. Cf. the Introduction, pp. 26, 34, above.

30. For γιγνώσκεσθαι, 'being known', as κινεῖσθαι, 'being moved', cf. *Sophist* 248e.

sameness and total difference. Partial difference (i.e., unlikeness) and partial sameness (i.e., likeness) are considered in Theorem II.8, below. But apart from the two "pure" cases, our hypothesis allows also for two things to be different and yet to be in some sort of relation (as opposed to Parmenides' interpretation of χωρίς, 'apart', at 133d6 and in Argument I). One could be a 'part' (μέρος)—an aspect or a predicate[31]—of the other. A man and a hand are two different things, yet the hand is part of the man; likewise, Socrates is different from wisdom, yet wisdom is a 'part', an attribute, of Socrates.[32]

146b5–c4 —Next, is the one a part of itself? —In no way. —So, it would also not be related to itself as whole to part, thus being a part in relation to itself. —It could not be. —But is the one different from the one? —Certainly not. —So, it would not be different from itself. —Indeed not. —So, if it is not related to itself either as different or as whole or as part, is it not at once necessary that it should be the same as itself? —It is necessary. *II.7.1.1*

The one is taken univocally. Note especially 146c1: the one is not different from itself. If the relations are considered as excluding each other (*either* the same *or* different, *or* part to whole, *or* whole to part), the one is the same as itself. For a different way of considering the one, see the next section.

THEOREM II.7.2.1. THE ONE
THAT IS IS DIFFERENT FROM ITSELF

146c4–d1 —What, then? That which is in something different from itself while being in the same as itself: Is it not necessary that it should be different from itself, if indeed it should be also in something different? —So it seems to me. —And such appears to be the case with the one, being both in the same and simultaneously also in another. —So it appeared. —Therefore, as it seems, the one would be, in this way, different from itself. —So it seems. *II.7.2.1*

The one is considered as being in a different (situation) in one respect while being in the same (situation) in another respect. The relations are now taken as not exclusive of each other.

The whole passage is explicitly dependent on Theorem II.4. (Cf. esp. II.4.2.2, 145d5.) The hypothetical character of the argument is well stressed. Note the optative (146d1, εἴη . . . ἄν, 'would be'); 146c6, εἴπερ, 'if indeed'; and d1, ταύτῃ, 'in this way'. (Cf. πῃ, 'in some way', 147a4.)

31. For 'part' as 'predicate' or 'attribute', see 142c7–d9, pp. 96–97, above.

32. Owen (1986 [1970]: 93) has noted that "here identity seems to be distinguished from predication." But, in complaining that "the confusion is reimported" at 147a and again at 148e–149a, he misses the shift in moods, or in respects, that is the constitutive feature of Argument II.

THEOREM II.7.2.2. THE ONE
THAT IS IS DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHERS

146d1–5 —What now? If anything is different from anything, will it not be different from something that is different? —It is necessary. —Therefore, will not as many things as are not one be all different from the one, and the one from those that are not-one? —How else? —The one would, then, be different from the others. —It would be different. *II.7.2.2*

146d4, 'those that are not-one', *τῶν μὴ ἓν*] On the distinction between 'not one' and 'not-one', see below, Argument V, 161e3–162a4, pp. 152–53.

THEOREM II.7.1.2. THE ONE
THAT IS IS THE SAME AS THE OTHERS

146d5–147a3 —Now look at this: Are not the same itself and the different opposites to one another? —How else? —Now, then, will the same ever consent to be in the different, or the different in the same? —They will not consent. —So, if the different will never be in the same, there is none of the things that are [*τῶν ὄντων*] in which the
e different is for any time; for if it were in anything for whatever time, the different, at any rate, would be in the same for that time. Is it not so? —It is so. —And since the different is never in the same, it would never be in any of the things that are. —True. —So, the different would be neither in the not-ones nor in the one. —Indeed, it would not. —And so, not by the different would the one be different from the not-ones or the not-ones from the one. —Indeed not. —Moreover, not participating in the different, neither
147 would they be different from each other by themselves. —How would they? —But if they are not different by themselves or by the different, would not at once their being different from each other completely evade us? —It would evade us. *II.7.1.2*

Insofar as anything is what it is (i.e., insofar as it is one of the things that are), the different would not be in it (i.e., it would not, in itself, be different). So, insofar as the not-ones are what they are, they do not participate in the different. And, of course, they do not differ by virtue of being what they are. If each thing is considered solely as being what it is, things are incommensurable: they are not different insofar as they are not comparable. In this respect, we cannot see them as different from each other. Their being different 'would evade us'.

This passage is again dependent on Theorem II.4.

147a3–6 —However, neither do the not-ones participate in the one; for then they would not be not-one, but would, in some way, be one. —True. —So, neither would the not-ones be numbered [*ἀριθμός*];

for if they had number, at any rate [γε], they would not be entirely not-one. —Indeed not.

Being numbered is to be a unified plurality. But the others are here considered as 'entirely not one'. And insofar as the not-ones do not participate in the one, they cannot be such as to be an ἀριθμός, a 'thing numbered'—that is, they cannot be a denumerable plurality. (Cf. 147a6, ἀριθμόν γε ἔχοντα; and cf. further Argument IV.)

147a6–b3 —What, then? Are the not-ones parts of the one? Or would thus the not-ones participate in the one? —They would participate.
b —So, if in every way [πάντῃ] the one is and the not-ones are, neither would the one be part of the not-ones nor would it be a whole as if of parts; and, again, neither would the not-ones be parts of the one, nor would they be wholes with the one as their part. —Indeed not.

If the one and the not-ones are considered only as they are, they cannot be related as parts and wholes. The not-ones cannot be part of the one. If they were, they would participate in it. Nor can they be wholes in relation to the one as part, by a parallel reasoning. But we are now considering the one and the not-ones, each in itself, or in themselves, as they are, not as participating in something else.

147b3–6 —But we have said, further, that what are neither parts nor wholes nor different from each other will be the same as each other. —We have said so. —Are we to say, then, that the one too should stand in such a relation to the not-ones, namely being the same as they? —Let us say so. *II.7.2.2.concl.*

Considered only as being what they are—that is, without further specification—the one and the others are homogeneous with each other, and, to that extent, they are the same: insofar as they are homogeneous, there is no difference between them that could be expressed. We are disregarding any specific character they might have, and considering them only as having *some* (unspecified) character. Thus considered, the not-ones could also be ones, and the one not-ones. (Cf. above, on 142d9 ff.)

147b6–8 —So, the one, as it seems, is both different from the others and from itself and the same both as they and as itself. —At any rate, so it appears from this reasoning. *II.7.concl.*

147b6, b8, 'as it seems', 'so it appears'] Not implying that the reasoning is false or fallacious, but that there could be (and in fact there is) another argument that will yield different results (but will be based on different considerations).

THEOREM II.8. THE ONE THAT IS IS LIKE AND UNLIKE

147c1–2 —Next, will it be both like and unlike itself and the others? — Perhaps. *II.8*

THEOREM II.8.1. THE ONE THAT IS IS LIKE AND UNLIKE THE OTHERS

147c2–8 —In any case, since it appeared different from the others, the others too would somehow be different from it. —Why? —Would it not be as different from the others as the others are from it, neither more nor less? —Of course. —If neither more nor less, then likewise? —Yes. —So, insofar as it would be affected [*πεπονθεν*] by the different from the others and the others, similarly, by the different from it, so far would the one be affected by the same as the others, and the others by the same as the one. *II.8.1.2*

To be like is to be the same in a certain respect, to be affected by the same *πάθος*. (Cf. Theorem I.8, 139e8; and below, 148a3.)

The one is a different thing from its opposite, and so are the others from theirs. In this respect they are like each other. The others are *somehow* (i.e., in a certain respect) different from the one, but not absolutely different from it. If they were absolutely different from it, they could not be compared to it in any respect (as stated in Argument I). Accordingly, the one is different from the others in that same respect, neither more nor less.

The attribution of difference brings about a homogenization of the relata, insofar (and only insofar) as they are different from each other and in that respect according to which they *are* different from each other. In that much they are like each other. If they were absolutely different—'something other' (*ἄλλο τι*), in Plato's technical terminology—they could not even be comparable so as to be different.

147d1–6 —What do you mean? —This: Do you not refer each word to something [*ἐπί τινι*]? —I do. —What now? Can you say the same word [*ὄνομα*] many times or once? —I can. —And is it the case that if you say it once you refer to that of which it is a name [*ὄνομα*], and if many times not to it? Or is it rather the case that whether you should utter the same name once or many times, it is most necessary that you say always the same thing? —Of course. *II.8.1.2.lemma*

147d7–148a6 e —Now, is not also the word 'different' about [*ἐπι*] something? —Indeed. —So, whenever you utter it, whether once or many times, you are not uttering anything else or naming anything other than that of which it is a name. —It is necessary. —Thus, when we say that the others are a different thing [*ἕτερον*] from the one and the one is a different thing from the others, we are using the word 'different' [*ἕτερον*] twice, although, for all that, not referring to *II.8.1.2 (cont.)*

another nature, but rather always to that nature whose name it is. —Absolutely. —So, insofar as [ἦ ἄρα] the one is a different thing
148 from the others, and the others from the one, in the very respect of being affected by the different [κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι], the one would not be affected otherwise than by the same as the others; and what is somehow [που] affected by the same is like: Is this not so? —Yes. —Insofar, then [ἦ δὴ], as the one is affected by *II.8.1.2.concl.* the different from the others, in that very respect it would be entirely like them all; for it is entirely different from them all. —It seems so.

When we say that the others are a different thing from the one and that the one is a different thing from the others, we are referring not to the one's being such-and-such and the others' being otherwise, but only to the fact that they are different from each other, whatever their own characteristics may be. So, the one and the others are like each other in the very respect of being different (from something). That 'different' is a dyadic relation does not affect the argument: *a* and *b* (in this case, 'the one' and 'the others') are alike in being members in the difference relation, and only insofar as they are such.

Note the equivalence of ἦ (147c6, 148a4), κατά (148a1), and που (148a3), 'insofar', 'in respect of', 'somehow' (= 'in some respect').

148a6–c1 —However, the like is opposite to the unlike. —Yes. —So also *II.8.2.2* the different to the same? —This too. —But, further, this too appeared, that the one is the same as the others. —So it appeared.
b —And being the same as the others is the opposite affection to being different from the others. —Certainly. —Yet, insofar as it is different, it appeared like. —Yes. —So, insofar as it is the same, it will be unlike in respect of the affection opposite to that which made it like. But the different made it somehow like? —Yes. —And so, the same will make it unlike, or it will not be opposite to the different. —It seems so.
c

We have just seen that the one is like the others insofar as both are *different* from something. (The one is *different* from the others; the others are *different* from the one.) But at Theorem II.7.2.2 we saw that the one is the same as the others (i.e., *not different* from them). Hence, if it is like the others insofar as it too is *different* (from something), then insofar as it is *not different* (while the others are, for the moment, still supposed to be different), the one is *unlike* them (i.e., it is different from them in a certain respect; in other respects, of course, it would not be such).

148c1–3 —So, the one will be like and unlike the others; insofar as it is *II.8.1–* different it will be like, but insofar as it is the same it will be unlike. —Some such reasoning certainly seems to hold good too. *8.2.2. concl.*

THEOREMS II.8.1–8.2.2 (*BIS*). THE ONE
THAT IS IS LIKE AND UNLIKE: ANOTHER ARGUMENT

Direct deduction of like and unlike as sameness and difference in a given respect ('insofar').

148c3–7 —And also the following. —What? —Insofar as [᾽Hι μὲν] it is affected by the same, it will not be affected by another sort [ἀλλοῖον]; not being affected by another sort, it will not be unlike; and not being unlike, it will be like. But insofar as [ᾗ δὲ] it is affected by another sort, it will be of another sort, and in being of another sort it will be unlike. —You speak the truth. *II.8.1–8.2.2(bis)*

Note the careful distinctions between the respects in which ('Insofar as. . . . But insofar as . . . ') it would be like or unlike, as may be the case.

148c7–d1 —And so, the one, on both grounds together and on either singly, on the one hand being the same as the others and on the
d other hand since it is different from them, would be like and unlike the others. —Indeed. *II.8.1–8.2.2. concl.*

148c7–8, 'on the one hand . . . on the other', τε . . . καὶ] Cf. LSJ *s.v.* τε, A II: "sts. the elements joined by τε . . . καὶ . . . are joined in order to be compared as contrasted rather than simply joined . . . ; sts. . . . even used of alternatives."

'On both grounds together and on either singly' (literally: 'according to [κατὰ] both and according to each') because, like the others, it is *both* the same *and* different, and, like the others, it is the same *and* it is different, but in carefully specified respects.

THEOREMS II.8.1–8.2.1. THE ONE
THAT IS IS LIKE AND UNLIKE ITSELF

148d1–4 —Therefore, will it not likewise appear, on both grounds together and on either singly, both like and unlike itself, if indeed it appeared both different from itself and the same as itself? —It is necessary. *II.8.1–8.2.1*

148d1, 'on both grounds . . . '] See on Theorem II.8.1–8.2.2.concl., immediately above.

THEOREM II.5. THE ONE THAT IS IS IN CONTACT

148d5–7 —And what now? Consider what is the case concerning the one touching and not touching itself and the others. —I am considering. *II.5*

THEOREM II.5.1. THE ONE THAT IS IS IN CONTACT
WITH ITSELF AND WITH OTHERS: INCLUSION

148d7–e4 —The one appeared to be somehow in itself as a whole. —Right. —Now, is not the one also in the others? —Yes. —So, insofar as it *II.5.1*

e is in the others, it would touch the others; but insofar as it is in itself, it would be prevented from touching the others but, being in itself, it would touch itself. —It appears so. —And thus the one would touch both itself and the others. —It would.

The one (as all its parts) touches itself (as a whole); that is, it is contained or encompassed by itself. As a whole, 'it would touch the others' as one among the others: a direct derivation, by substitution, from Theorem II.3.

THEOREM II.5.2. THE ONE THAT IS IS NOT IN CONTACT

THEOREM II.5.2.1. THE ONE THAT IS IS NOT IN CONTACT WITH ITSELF

Contact is here conceived of as immediate succession in place. The restitution of the nonmetaphorical sense of *χωρίς* makes it possible that two things that are apart may, nevertheless, be in relation to each other: in this sense, the exclusion is not total and unrestricted, but in respect of place only.

The short argument on motion (Theorem II.6, 145e7–146a8) referred to all motions, not only spatial. Therefore, it did not require the concept of place.

148e4–149a3 —And what about the following? Must not everything that is to touch something lie next to what it is to touch, occupying that position [*ἕδραν*] which would be after the position in which lies that which it is to touch? —It is necessary. —So, the one too, if it is to touch itself, must lie immediately next after itself, occupying a place [*χώραν*] after that in which it is. —It must indeed. —But then the 149 one would do it by being two, and would come to be in two places at once; and so long as it is one, it will not consent to this? —It will not. —So, it is equally necessary for the one not to be two and for it not to touch itself. —It is equally necessary. *II.5.1*

148e6, *ἕδραν*, and e9, *χώραν*] Place is here first introduced in this Argument. (Cf. also Argument I, 138c–139a.) It was delayed up to this point presumably because from here onward the argument concerns the possibility of a material world, including place, extension, and time. Shape, at 145b1–5, was an aside.

148e6–7, 'which would be . . . in'] Reading *ἢ* . . . *ἕδρα <ἐν>*, after Moreschini.

But the argument works also *without* place, and does not necessarily refer to the sensible world. 'Contact' ('touch') is understood as 'be next to', as (e.g.) the natural numbers 1 and 2 are immediately "next to" each other.

THEOREM II.5.2.2. THE ONE THAT IS IS NOT IN CONTACT WITH THE OTHERS

149a3–c3 —But, further, neither does it touch the others. —Why? —Because, we say, that which is to touch must be next to and apart *II.5.2.2. lemma*

from that which it is to touch, and there must be no third between them. —True. —So, two must be the minimum, if there is to be contact. —It must. —And whenever to the two terms [*τοῖν δυοῖν*
b *ὅροιν*] a third is added next to them, they will themselves be three but the contacts will be two. —Yes. —And thus, by adding one term, always one more contact will be added, and it follows that the contacts will always be fewer by one than the amount of things numbered. For by as much as the first two exceed the contacts, the things numbered being more than the contacts, by that much
c will all subsequent terms numbered exceed the contacts; for as soon as the remaining one is added to the things numbered, at once also one contact is added to the contacts. —Right. —So, as many as are the things numbered [*τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμόν*], the contacts will always be fewer than they by one. —True.

149a5, *χωρὶς . . . ἐφεξῆς*, 'next to and apart from'] Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* V 3.

149c4–d5 —But if there is one term only, and there is no pair [*δυάς*], there *II.5.2.2*
would be no contact. —How else? —Now, we say, the others than the one neither are one, nor do they participate in it, if indeed they are other. —No, indeed. —So, there is in the others no number, as there is in them no one. —How else? —So, the others are
d not one or two, nor do they bear the name of any other number. —No. —So, the one is one only, and it would not be a pair [*δυάς*]. —It appears not. —So, there is no contact, as there is no pair [*δυοῖν*]. —There is not. —And so, neither does the one touch the others, nor do the others the one, if indeed there is no contact. —Indeed not.

149c5, 'we say'] Cf. 147a3–6.

There is contact only between denumerable things. Insofar as the others are not denumerable, they cannot be terms in contact. At 148d8, above, the one was in the others as *one* term among other denumerable terms. Here, it is one only.

149d5–7 —Thus, in all these respects, the one both touches and does *II.5.concl.*
not touch the others and itself. —It seems so.

149d5, *κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα*, 'in all these respects'] When taken together. But when taken singly, the case is different for each aspect.

149d6, 'both touches and does not touch'] Cf. the note on 148c7–8, above.

The one, considered as a whole (Theorem II.5.1), touches itself and the others; but considered as one only (and not as whole and parts), it would not touch itself (II.5.2.1), since it is not part of the others and would not be counted among them.

THEOREM II.9. THE ONE THAT IS IS EQUAL AND (LARGER AND SMALLER, I.E.) UNEQUAL

Equality is likeness in respect of quantity. (Cf. above, Theorem I.9.) On equality of number see below (151b7 ff.).

149d8–9 —Next, is it equal and unequal both to itself and to the others? *II.9*

THEOREM II.9, LEMMA. LARGENESS AND SMALLNESS ARE CORRELATES

149d9–e8 —How? —If the one were larger or smaller than the others, or, *II.9.lemma*
e again, the others larger or smaller than the one, surely the one would not, by being one, nor would the others, by being other than the one, be any larger or any smaller than each other, at least not by their own being? But, if, in addition to being such, each would possess equality, they would be equal to each other; and if they should possess largeness and it smallness, or the one largeness and the others smallness, whichever form [τῷ εἴδει] largeness would be added to would be larger, and that to which smallness, smaller. —It is necessary.

149d9, μεῖζον . . . ἢ ἔλαττον, 'larger or smaller'] The phrase can also mean 'more or less'.

Continued from Theorem II.9, above: In order for the one to be larger or smaller than the others (and conversely for the others), it must 'possess' largeness or smallness. By being strictly what it is, the one could not be smaller or larger than anything, and similarly with the others. (Cf. above, 139d1–e4.)

149e8–150a5 —Now, are these, largeness and smallness, two forms? For, at any rate, if somehow they were not, they would not be opposites
150 to each other, nor would they come to be in things. —How would they? —So, if smallness came to be in the one, it would be either in the whole or in part of it. —It is necessary. —What if it came to be in the whole? Would it not be extended through the whole of the one equally with it or else encompass it? —Clearly.

149e9, εἴδη, 'forms'] Almost technical usage, in the Parmenidean sense: each is what it is and 'apart' from the other. Cf. Parmenides, fr. 8.56 ff.

Being 'two opposites' (ἐναντίω, 149e10) and 'com[ing] to be in' things are characteristic of opposites in themselves. (Cf. *Phaedo* 102e, 104b.)

150a5–b2 —Next, being equally with the one, would not smallness be equal to it? Or encompassing it, larger? —How else? —Is it possible, then, for smallness to be equal to something or greater than something, and discharge the function of largeness and equality

b but not its own? —It is impossible. —So, smallness would not be in the one as a whole, but, if at all, in a part. —Yes.

Either the one as a whole would be small, or part of it would. If the whole, then the whole of it is small. But compared to itself, the whole is equal to itself; hence, from this point of view, smallness cannot be present in it.

150b2–7 —But, again, not in all that part, else it will act in the same way as in relation to the whole: it will be equal to or greater than the part in which it is in each case. —It is necessary. —So, smallness will never be in any of the things, not coming to be in either a part or the whole; nor will anything be small except smallness itself. —It seems not.

150b5, *σμικρότης*, 'smallness'] The term appears to be a Platonic coinage *ad hoc,* to drive home the anti-Parmenidean point.

Only smallness itself can be *small.* Strictly speaking, other things can be *smaller;* they cannot be *small,* at least not in the same sense in which smallness is small: an unrepentant reaffirmation of *Phaedo* 100c4–5, in the face of Parmenides' accusations of self-predication at 131e and 133c, above.

In one sense, nothing is small or large but smallness itself or largeness itself (150b1–d4). But in another sense, the one can be large and small (or, rather, larger and smaller) and equal. (Cf. 150e5 ff.) Smallness is small in a different sense from that in which the one is small. This is not self-predication. Plato makes it quite clear that smallness does not 'possess' itself and does not 'come to be' in itself; it does not *participate* in itself.

150b7–c4 —So, neither would largeness be in it; for something else would
c be larger besides largeness itself, namely that in which largeness is—and that without the small being with it, which is necessary for it to exceed, if indeed it is to be large; but this is impossible, since smallness is in nothing whatever. —True.

'Larger' is relational: 'larger (than)'. Only the large itself (or largeness) is large in a nonrelational way. Other things are not large; they can only be larger than other things. (I.e., they can be large only in a qualified way.) Thus, whatever participates in largeness cannot be large in the same way that largeness, or the large itself, is large. And, conversely, largeness does not participate in (nor is it predicated of) itself; it simply *is* itself.

It follows that largeness is not extended. To be extended is to be in spatial relations with other things, which is not the case with largeness itself: largeness itself, precisely by being itself (or 'in itself', *καθ' αὑτό*), is not considered in any relation (spatial or otherwise) to anything else; thus it is not larger or smaller than anything else.[33]

150c4–d4 —But, further, largeness itself is not larger than anything other than smallness itself, nor is smallness smaller than anything other than largeness itself. —Indeed not. —So, the others are neither larger nor smaller than the one, having neither largeness nor small-
d ness; nor have these two the power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to each other; nor, again, would the one be larger or smaller than either these two or the others, having neither largeness nor smallness. —It certainly does not appear so.

As at 133d7, things in themselves are relative, if at all, only to their correlates. But considered *πρός τι*, things can be relative to (*πρός*) things other than their correlates. Mastership itself is of slavery itself. But (Aristophanes') Dionysus is not, in himself, the correlate of Xanthias, and yet he can be his master.

THEOREM II.9.1. THE ONE THAT IS IS EQUAL

THEOREM II.9.1.2. THE ONE THAT IS IS EQUAL TO THE OTHERS

150d4–8 —Next, if the one is neither larger nor smaller than the others, is it necessary that it neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them? —It is necessary. —Now, what neither exceeds nor is exceeded, it is most necessary that it should be of equal extent [*ἐξ ἴσου*], and, being of equal extent, that it should be equal. —How else?

150d5, *μήτε μεῖζον μήτε ἔλαττον*, 'neither larger nor smaller'] Cf. 149d9 ff.
150d8, *ἐξ ἴσου*] Also: 'of equal standing', 'equally'. 'Extent' is not in the Greek.

THEOREM II.9.1.1. THE ONE THAT IS IS EQUAL TO ITSELF

150e1–5 —Furthermore, this would be true also of the one in relation to itself: having in itself neither largeness nor smallness, it would neither exceed itself nor be exceeded by itself; but being of equal extent [*ἐξ ἴσου*], it would be equal to itself. —Certainly. —And so, *II.9.1.concl.* the one would be equal to itself and to the others. —It appears so.

Considered in relation to the others, the one would (or could) be equal to them; in relation to itself, it would be equal to itself only.

33. Indeed, "an explicit and flamboyant reference to the 'self-predication' assumption," as Owen (1986 [1970]: 94) remarks. Not, however, "to produce still more outrageous consequences," but to elaborate on the difference between the two modes of being and dispel the confusion between them, using for this purpose the same example exploited in the aporetic Part I of the dialogue.

THEOREM II.9.2.1. THE ONE THAT IS
IS LARGER AND SMALLER THAN ITSELF

150e5–151a2 —Moreover, being in itself, it would also be around [περὶ] itself from without and, encompassing itself, it would be larger than itself, but being encompassed, it would be smaller; and thus the one would be larger and smaller than itself. —It would. *II.9.2.1*

By Theorem II.4. In a general, nonspatial sense, this is a necessary condition of the argument on time, where the one will be shown to be older and younger than itself.

THEOREM II.9.2.2. THE ONE THAT IS
IS LARGER AND SMALLER THAN THE OTHERS

Smallness, greatness, and equality are here relations between things. Note that there is no talk of smallness in itself or the like.

151a2–b5 —Now, is not this too necessary, that nothing should be beside the one and the others? —How else? —However, whatever is in each case must be somewhere [που]. —Yes. —Now, will not that which is in something be in it as a smaller in a larger? For else it could not be in it as a different in a different. —Indeed not. —And since nothing else [ἕτερον] is, apart from the others and the one, and these must be in something, is it not at once necessary that they should be in each other—namely the others in the one
b and the one in the others—or not be anywhere? —It appears so. —So, inasmuch as [ὅτι μὲν] the one is in the others, the others would be larger than the one, encompassing it, and the one, being encompassed, would be smaller than the others; but inasmuch as [ὅτι δὲ] the others are in the one, the one would be larger than the others, by the same reasoning, and the others smaller than the one. —It seems so. *II.9.2.2*

151a4–5, τό γε ὂν ἀεί] Allen's translation, 'what always is' (1983, *ad loc.*), is incorrect (the Greek would be τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν) and does not make sense. What always is is not 'in some way', and much less is it 'somewhere'. What is needed is the very opposite: 'whatever is in each case' has to be 'somehow' different in each case.

151a4, που] Also 'somehow', i.e., in a certain way, πρὸς ἄλλα, 'in relation to others'. Here presumably 'somewhere', but not necessarily in a spatial interpretation. What is needed at this stage is (logical) inclusion, of which spatial inclusion may be seen as a subordinated case. So, 151a8–b1 is not to be read necessarily in a spatial sense; it could also refer, e.g., to the diairetical scheme. The discussion is conducted in terms of 'exceeding' or 'encompassing' (= 'including'). Only from 151b7 ff. will it concern *numerical* equality/inequality (and extension).

151b1, ὅτι μὲν . . . ὅτι δὲ . . . , 'inasmuch as . . . but inasmuch as . . .] Cf. LSJ *s.v.* ὅτι, IV: "with regard to the fact that," *Cratylus* 384c3; cf. *Protagoras* 330e, etc.

151b5–7 —So, the one is equal to, and larger and smaller than, both itself and the others. —It appears so. *II.9.concl.*

The different respects in which the one has opposite attributes have just been specified above.

THEOREM II.9, COROLLARIES. EQUALITY OF NUMBER

151b7–c7 c —Further, if indeed it is larger and smaller and equal, it would be of equal and more and fewer measures than itself and the others; and since of measures, also of parts. —How else? —So, being of equal and more and fewer measures, it would also be less and more in number than itself and the others and, by the same reasons, also equal to itself and to the others. —How? —Those than which it is larger would somehow be also of more measures than it, and also of as many parts as measures; and similarly those than which it is smaller; and, by the same reasons, those to which it is equal. —So it is. *II.9.corol.*

Number is here considered as any *measurable* quantity. This corollary is to be completed by following the explicit argument of Theorem II.9. As in the case of contact, Plato deals first with the opposition encompassing/encompassed (or: in another/in itself) and later with the case of discrete and (spatially) separate magnitudes.

THEOREM II.9, COROLLARY 1. THE ONE THAT IS IS NUMERICALLY EQUAL AND UNEQUAL TO ITSELF

151c8–d4 d —Now, being larger and smaller than itself and equal to itself, would it not be of equal measures as and of more and fewer measures than itself, and since of measures, also of parts? —How else? —So, being of equal parts as itself, it will be equal in plurality to itself, and being of more parts more in number than itself and of fewer less? —It appears so. *II.9.corol.1*

THEOREM II.9, COROLLARY 2. THE ONE THAT IS IS NUMERICALLY EQUAL AND UNEQUAL TO THE OTHERS

151d4–e2 —Now, will the one be similarly related to the others? Inasmuch as it appears larger than they, it is necessary that it should also be more in number than they; but inasmuch as it appears smaller, less; and inasmuch as it appears equal in magnitude, it should also be equal in plurality to the others. —It is necessary. —And thus, again, e as it seems, the one will be equal in number to and more and less than itself and the others. —It will be. *II.9.corol.2* *II.9.corol. concl.*

THEOREM II.10. THE ONE THAT IS IS AND COMES TO BE (I.E., CAN BE AND CAN COME TO BE) IN TIME

This is a further specification of the opposition equality/inequality in respect of measure: in particular, of measure of time.

151e3–6 —Next, does the one participate in time too? And is it and does it come to be younger and older than itself and the others, and *II.10*

neither younger nor older than either itself or the others, participating in time?

151e6, *χρόνου μετέχον*, 'participating in time'] Or: 'if it participates in time'.

If the one has parts and can be greater and smaller, and can be measured, and so forth, then it can participate in time—that is, it can be younger and older, and so on, than itself or the others. These are necessary conditions (i.e., the *ὑποθέσεις*) of participation in time.

THEOREM II.10, DEFINITION.
BEING AS BEING IN TIME

151e6–152a3 —How? —Being belongs [*εἶναι ὑπάρχει*] to it somehow [*που*], if indeed the one is. —Yes. —And is 'being' [*εἶναι*] anything else than [*ἄλλο τι ἢ*] participation in being [*οὐσία*], together with [*μετὰ*] time *II.10.df.*
152 present, just as 'was' is communion with being together with time past, and, again, 'will be' together with time future? —So it is. —And so, it participates in time, if indeed it participates also in being [*εἶναι*]. —Indeed.

At 151e7–152a2 a new definition of *εἶναι* is given, for the purposes of this passage. Here *εἶναι* is again a restricted sort of participation in *οὐσία*, as defined immediately above: being such-and-such (i.e., participating in an *οὐσία*; cf. 142b5–c7) together with time present, past, or future. This is a restriction on *μετέχει οὐσίας*, 'participate in being', of 142b6. Note the terminological use of *που*, 'somehow', at 151e6, and of *ἄλλο τι . . . ἢ*, at 151e7–8, introducing a definition. (Cf. 137c4.)

Argument II has dealt so far with one type of restriction to the Principle of Noncontradiction, that subsumed under *κατά* (or *πρός*: for the equivalence, see above, p. 77n.27). Now Plato deals with the temporal restriction to the Principle, denoted by *ἅμα*, 'simultaneously'.

THEOREM II.10, DEFINITION: EXCURSUS.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN BEING (STATE)
AND COMING TO BE (PROCESS)

In Argument I, being and coming to be younger or older were treated purely as correlatives. In what follows, the distinction between being and coming to be is established in substantive terms as state and process. This distinction can be made only after being is interpreted as being in time, as immediately above.

152a3–b2 —Now, in time as it passes? —Yes. —So, it comes to be ever older *II.10.df.exc.* than itself, if indeed it advances in respect of [*κατὰ*] time. —It is necessary. —And do we remember that the older comes to be older

152a6, 'do we remember . . .?'] Cf. 141b1.

than what comes to be younger? —We do. —Now, since the one comes to be older than itself, would it not come to be older by coming to be younger than itself? —It is necessary. —And thus it comes to be both younger and older than itself. —Yes.

'Older' and 'younger' are correlates (like 'larger' and 'smaller'). The one, in respect of some of its (temporal) parts, comes to be both younger and older than itself in respect of some of its other parts.

152b2–d4 —But is it not older when, in coming to be, it would be in respect of time now, which is between the 'was' and the 'will be'? For, at any rate, in passing somehow from the 'before' to the 'after' it will not overstep the 'now'. —It will not. —Next, will it not thus stop then coming to be older, once it reaches the 'now', and then it does not come to be but is already older? For, if it were advancing, it would never be caught by the 'now'; for what is advancing is such that it touches both, the 'now' and the 'after', the 'now' in leaving it and the 'after' in reaching for it, and it comes to be between these two, the 'after' and the 'now'. —True. —And if, at any rate, it is necessary that all that is coming to be should not sidestep the 'now', since it should be in respect of [κατά] it, it will ever cease to be coming into being and will then *be* whatever it happens to be coming to be. —It appears so. —And so, the one too, whenever in coming to be older it coincides with the 'now', ceases to come to be and *is* then older. —Absolutely.

A process is not a succession of states: that is, it is not a sum of states (as in Zeno's "arrow" paradox). Rather a state is the limit of a process. (Or the present ['now'] is the limit of the past and the future.) See further Theorem II.10, Appendix, 156c1–e7, on the instant. Nevertheless, whatever is in process passes through a succession of states: at any stage of the process it can be said to be in a certain state. Analogously, a line is not a succession of points; but anything in movement along a line passes through (all) the points of the line.

THEOREMS II.10.1.1.1–10.2.1.1. THE ONE THAT IS IS AND COMES TO BE OLDER AND YOUNGER THAN ITSELF

152d4–e3 —Now, that than which it was coming to be older: Is it also older than that, and was it coming to be older than itself? —Yes. —And is the older older than a younger? —It is. —So, the one is also younger than itself whenever in coming to be older it coincides with the 'now'. —It is necessary. —But the 'now' is ever present to the one throughout all its being [εἶναι]; for, whenever it should be, it will ever be now. —How else? —So, the one ever is, and is coming to be, older and younger than itself. —It seems so. *II.10.1.1.1–10.2.1.1*

The one, in respect of any one of its temporal parts, ever is, and is coming to be, older and younger than itself in respect of some of its other temporal parts. At any given time, the (temporal) one is both in a state of being older and younger than (other temporal parts of) itself, and in the process of coming to be older and younger than itself.

THEOREMS II.10.1.2.1–10.2.2.1. THE ONE THAT IS COMES TO BE AND IS THE SAME AGE AS (NEITHER OLDER NOR YOUNGER THAN) ITSELF

152e3–10 —And is it or does it come to be for more time than itself, or for an equal time? —For an equal time. —But, further, what either comes to be or is for the same time has the same age. —How else? —And what has the same age is neither older nor younger. —Indeed not. —So, the one, coming to be and being for an equal time as itself, is not, and does not come to be, either younger or older than itself. —I don't think it does. *II.10.1–10.2.2.1*

On the other hand, considered as the whole, the (temporal) one is of the same age as itself throughout any given temporal span.

THEOREM II.10.1.1.2. THE ONE THAT IS IS OLDER THAN THE OTHERS

152e10–153a5 —What, then? Younger or older than the others? —I cannot *II.10.1.1.2. lemma*
153 say. —But, surely, you can say this: that the others than the one, if indeed they are different things and not *a* different thing, are more than one; for if they were a different thing, they would be one, but being different things they are more than one and would have plurality. —They would. —And being a plurality they would participate in a number greater than one. —How else?

153a5–b7 —What now? Shall we say that the greater part of number comes *II.10.1.1.2*
b to be and has come to be earlier, or the lesser? —The lesser. —So, the least is first, and this is the one: not so? —Yes. —So, of all things having number, the one came to be first; and all the others too have number, if indeed they are others and not another. —So they have. —And having come to be first, I think, it came to be earlier, and the others later; and those that came to be later are younger than that which came to be earlier; and thus the others would be younger than the one, and the one older than the others. —They would.

Temporal order is a succession, not of states (cf. above, 152b2–d4), but of temporal spans. The first temporal span, taken as a unit of measurement, comes before the others, and thus it is older than the others.

The one is considered as one among many. The parts of the one are also ones. (Cf. 142e3–143a3.)

THEOREM II.10.1.1.2. (CONT.). THE ONE THAT IS IS YOUNGER THAN THE OTHERS

153b8–d5 *II.10.1.1.2*

c —What about this: Would the one come to be contrary to its own nature, or is this impossible? —It is impossible. —But, further, the one appeared to have parts, and if parts, then also a beginning and an end and a middle. —Yes. —Now, does not the beginning come to be first of all, also before the one itself and before each of the others? And after the beginning, all the others up to the end? —Of course. —And shall we say, further, that all these others are parts of the whole and of the one, and this itself comes to be one and whole together with the end? —We shall indeed. —And the

d end, I think, comes to be last, and the one by its nature comes to be together with it; so that, if indeed it is necessary that the one should not come to be contrary to its nature, in coming to be last of all the others it would by its nature come to be together with the end. —It appears so. —So, the one is younger than the others, and the others are older than the one. —Again, so it appears to me.

Considered as a whole, the one is younger than any of the others, considered as its parts.

THEOREMS II.10.1.2.2–10.2.2.2. THE ONE THAT IS IS AND COMES TO BE THE SAME AGE AS THE OTHERS

153d5–e7 *II.10.1.2.2–10.2.2.2*

—And what, then? The beginning, or any other part of the one or of anything else: If indeed it should be a part and not parts, is it not necessary for it to be one, being a part? —It is necessary. —Now, the one would come to be together [ἅμα] with what comes

e to be first and together with the second, and is not lacking from any of the others that come to be, whichever is added to them, until, going through to the end, a whole one has come to be, lacking in its coming to be neither the middle nor the first nor the last nor anything else. —True. —So, the one has the same age as all the others; so that, unless the one itself were by nature contrary to its nature, it would have come to be neither earlier nor later than the others, but together with them.

Considered as all its parts severally, the one would come to be cotemporally with any one of its parts.

154a1–5 *II.10.1.2.2–10.2.2.2 concl.*

And, by this reasoning, the one would be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others than the one; whereas, by the previous reasoning, it will be both older and younger, and, similarly, the others will be older and younger than it. —Certainly. —And so, this is how it is and has come to be.

Note the careful distinction at 154a1–3 between the different points of view: 'by this reasoning [κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον] . . . whereas, by the previous [κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν]'.

THEOREM II.10.2. THE ONE THAT IS COMES TO BE OLDER AND YOUNGER THAN AND THE SAME AGE AS THE OTHERS

154a5–7 But, again, what about its coming to be older and younger than the others, and the others' than the one, and their coming to be neither younger nor older? *II.10.2*

At 154a7 one would expect Aristoteles' reply, to mark the passage from the enunciation to the demonstration. But there is no need to suppose a missed line here. It could just as well be a stylistic variation.

THEOREM II.10.2.2.2. THE ONE THAT IS DOES NOT COME TO BE OLDER OR YOUNGER THAN THE OTHERS

'Older' and 'younger' are now considered as *difference* in age.

154a7–c5 As with being, so is it also with coming to be, or differently?
b —I cannot say. —But I can say at least this much: if one thing is, in fact, older than another, at any rate it could not come to be still older by more than the difference there was in age when it just first came to be, nor could the younger come to be still younger; for equals, being added to unequals, be it to time or to anything else, will always make them distinct by an amount equal to whatever it was by which they were first distinct. —How else?
c —So, what is would never be coming to be older or younger than what is, if indeed it is always distinct from it in age by an equal amount; but it is and has come to be older, and the other younger, but it is not coming to be so. —True. —So, also the one that is is not coming to be either older or younger than the others that are. —It is not.

The difference in age does not change throughout the process. Hence, at any stage of the process, the one is in the same state. 'It is and has come to be' since the state is the end of the process. But the temporal process does not change the difference in age. Thus, the same (relative) state is kept throughout the entire process.

THEOREM II.10.2.1.2. THE ONE THAT IS COMES TO BE OLDER AND YOUNGER THAN THE OTHERS

'Older' and 'younger' are considered as *proportion* of ages.

154c5–155a2 —See, then, whether they come to be older and younger in this way. —In what way? —Insofar as both the one appeared older than the others, and the others than the one. —How so? —Whenever *II.10.2.1.2*

the one should be older than the others, it has somehow come to
d be for a greater time than the others. —Yes. —Again, consider: If we add the same time to a greater or a lesser time, will the greater time be distinct from the lesser by an equal part, or by a smaller? —By a smaller. —So, it will not be the case that, whatever was at first the distinction in age of the one toward the others, that distinction will also be in the 'after', but, in receiving an equal time with the others, it will ever exceed them in age by a lesser time than earlier: not so? —Yes. —Now, that which is differing [*διαφέρον*] in
e age in relation to something less than before: Would it not be coming to be younger than it was before, relatively to those in relation to which it was previously older? —It would. —And if that is coming to be younger, will those others, in their turn, be coming to be older in relation to the one, or younger? —Older, indeed. —What has come to be younger is coming to be older in relation to what both has earlier come to be and is older; however, it never *is* older but is ever *coming to be* older than the other; for the other is ad-
155 vancing toward the younger, and this toward the older. And, likewise, the older is, in its turn, coming to be younger than the younger.

If, on the other hand, we consider the process as a *proportional* incrementation, we find that the difference is never stable but ever increasing or decreasing. Thus, during any given span of time, the one, under such considerations, is never in a state but always in a process.

Note the stress on different aspects, expressed by the repeated use of 'in this way' (*τῇδε*, 154c5), 'insofar' (*ᾗ*, c6), 'somehow' (*που*, c8).

THEOREM II.10.2.1.2A. THE ONE THAT IS COMES TO BE YOUNGER THAN THE OTHERS

155a2–b2 For, as the two are going in opposite directions, they are coming to be each other's opposite, the younger coming to be older than the older and the older coming to be younger than the younger; but they could never have come to be so. For, if they had come to be, they would no longer be coming to be, but would be. But, as it is, they are coming to be both older and younger than *II.10.2.1.2a*
each other: the one is coming to be younger than the others, inas-
b much as [*ὅτι*] it appeared to be older and to have come to be earlier; and the others, older than the one, inasmuch as [*ὅτι*] they came to be later.

In the course of the process of coming to be older and younger, the proportional age changes so that the younger becomes proportionally less young than the older, and the older less old than the younger. But there is no state *as part of the process* in which the younger *is* older than the older. States are not constitutive parts of processes. (Cf. 152b2–d4, above.)

Note 155b1, b2, ὅτι, 'inasmuch as', again stressing different aspects.

THEOREM II.10.2.1.2B. THE OTHERS
COME TO BE OLDER THAN THE ONE THAT IS

155b2–4 And, by the same reasoning, also the others will be thus related to the one, precisely since they appeared to be older than it and to have come to be earlier. —It certainly appears so. *II.10.2.1.2b*

THEOREM II.10, CONCLUSION.
THE ONE THAT IS IS AND COMES TO BE IN TIME

155b4–c8 —Now, insofar as [ᾗ μὲν] nothing is coming to be older or younger than another, ever differing [διαφέρειν] from each other by the same number, would not the one come to be neither older nor younger than the others, nor either the others than the one?
c And insofar as [ᾗ δὲ] it is necessary that what has come to be earlier should be distinct from what has come to be later, and the later from the earlier, by an ever differing part, in the same way is it not necessary both that the others should come to be both older and younger than the one, and that the one than the others? —Absolutely. —Thus, according to all this, the one both is and is coming to be older and younger than itself and the others, and neither is nor is coming to be either older or younger than itself or the others. —Entirely so. *II.10.concl.*

Note again the careful distinction of respects.

THEOREM II.10, COROLLARY.
THE ONE THAT IS HAS TENSED BEING

155c8–d4
d —And since the one participates in time and in coming to be older and younger, is it not necessary that it should participate also in the 'before' and the 'after' and the 'now', if indeed it participates in time? —It is necessary. —And so, the one was and is and will be, and has come to be and is coming to be and will come to be. —Of course. *II.10.corol.*

This corollary of Theorem II.10 establishes a link to the following two important corollaries of Argument II entire. The possibility of relations in time is a necessary presupposition of knowledge and opinion (ours, not the gods'; cf. 134a3–c12). And *that* there is knowledge has been accepted as the motivation for this alternative interpretation of the Hypothesis. (Cf. above, p. 94.)

Moreover, and more generally, tensed being is a necessary condition of processes of change, without which the sensible world would be impossible. Such processes are analyzed in the Appendix to Theorem II.10 (below, 155e3–157b5, pp. 134–36.)

ARGUMENT II, COROLLARIES 1 AND 2.
THE ONE THAT IS IS A MEMBER OF RELATIONS;
THERE IS OF IT KNOWLEDGE, OPINION,
AND PERCEPTION, AND IT CAN BE NAMED

155d4–e3 —And there would be something to it and of it, and was and is and will be. —Indeed. —And there would be of it knowledge and opinion and perception, if indeed we are even now exercising [πράττομεν] all these concerning [περὶ] it. —You are right. —And e it has name and account [λόγος], and it is named and spoken of [λέγεται]; and as many of this sort as happen to be true of the many are true also of the one. —This is absolutely true. *II.corol.1* *II.corol.2*

Corollary 1 summarizes the answer to the aporia of the master and the slave (above, 133d6 ff.). On the current understanding of the Hypothesis, the separation between two distinct entities is not total, not even if they are of two different types: it is enough that each of them can be said to be one. Being one does not exclude being a member of a relation.

Corollary 2 responds to the argument about unknowability (134a3 ff.). Being one does not prevent being an object of knowledge, of opinion, and of perception. This does not mean that everything that is one is necessarily an object of all these. (This hypothesis, we should keep in mind, establishes only *possibility*, not fact or necessity.) Forms, although each of them is one, can be known, not only by the gods but also by us; and sensible things are objects of perception without ceasing to be, each of them, one.

Note 155d7, 'if indeed *we* are even now exercising all these', stressing the pragmatic motivation of Argument II.

A plurality of ones is a necessary condition of cognition in all its forms ('knowledge and opinion and perception', ἐπιστήμη . . . καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, 155d6). This is the assumption on which the whole of Argument II depends. Moreover, these ones have to be complex ones, as postulated in this Argument. The one of Argument II was found to be not completely apart from the many; in fact, it is one of them.[34] This is the final collapse of the χωρισμός, the 'separation', of forms and sensibles in this Argument.

Argument II has shown that, in order to make possible participation, and consequently also cognition and perception, one has to presuppose a conception of being (and, accordingly, also a concept of one) different from the Parmenidean. The assumption has to be made that there is a possibility of being not

34. Cf. 155e1, ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα: "Das Eine nimmt keine Sonderstellung ein. Es ist 'eines des Anderen' geworden,—wobei dieses 'Andere' jetzt, d.h. in der 4. Hyp., sich selbständig thematisieren lässt" (Wyller [1960], 147).

absolutely, that restricted contradictions are acceptable. Thus, the one can have opposite (and even contradictory) attributes, in carefully delimited ways.

This amounts to accepting a restricted, or weakened, Principle of Noncontradiction and the corresponding concept 'being in some way [*που*] but not in another'. Such a conception of being implies that the one that is the subject of Argument II is a 'one that is' (*ἓν ὄν*): that is, a whole or a complex (*ὅλον*). The Argument gave us an analysis of such a one and established the *ὑπόθεσις* under which it is possible.

Argument II opened the way to a much more flexible use of *ἕν*. It also leads to the nominalism of Argument VII and beyond it to the postulate of Argument VIII, that the Parmenidean one is necessary precisely in order to escape that nominalism.

THEOREM II.10, APPENDIX. ON COMING TO BE AND PASSING AWAY: PHYSICAL PROCESSES

That coming to be in time is possible has been established in Theorem II.10. It now remains to explain how this can occur by means of physical processes. Coming to be in time is the presupposition of all physical processes.

155e3–156a1 —Let us say, again, for the third time: If the one is such as we have described it, is it not necessary that, being both one and many and neither one nor many and participating in time, inasmuch as [*ὅτι μὲν*] the one is, it should at some time participate in being [*οὐσίας*], but inasmuch as [*ὅτι δὲ*] it is not, it should, again, at some time not participate in being? —It is necessary. —Now, will it be able not to participate when it participates or to participate when it does not participate? —It will not. —So, at one time it participates, and at another it does not participate; for only thus could
156 it both participate and not participate in the same thing. —Right. *II.10.app.*

'For the third time'—in *this* Argument. The first time was the definition of the one that is, in the beginning of Argument II, at 142c7: 'Then let us say again, if the one is, what will follow'. The second was at 151e7–152a2: 'Is being anything else than participation in being, together with time present, . . . past, . . . future?' Now, for the third time, the one is supposed *sometimes* to participate and *sometimes* not to participate in being *F*. Change, as a physical process, presupposes temporal participation in being, which in turn presupposes a one that is.

This is not a separate Argument, as the Neoplatonic interpretations would have it.[35] The qualification at 155e4–5, *οἷον διεληλύθαμεν*, 'such as we have described it', refers back to 151e7–155d6 only. If the one is as Argument II postulates it, and it can, consequently, participate in time (155e6;

35. See esp. Plotinus V 1 [10], 8.1–27; Proclus, *In Parmenidem* 1039–40, 1054, 1063 Cousin; see also Dodds (1928).

cf. 152a2–3, 'it participates in time'), then it is necessary (155e5, ἀνάγκη) that it 'at some time' (e7, ποτέ) participates in being (i.e., it is *F*) and sometimes does not (it is not *F*). This is what it means to be one and many and not-one and not-many *and* to participate in time: time is the measure of motion; to participate in time is to move or change "in" time (or "with" time).

A comparison of this passage with the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction of *Republic* IV 436b8–c1 shows an important difference: here, the main distinction between sensible things and forms is that sensible things do, and forms do not, participate in time. Argument II showed that forms can—in fact, *must*—have aspects and be contrarily ("oppositely") predicated in different respects, and further that they do participate in each other. Forms, however, do not receive different predicates at different times, as do sensible (or rather, changeable) things.

Hence the further restriction of the Principle of Noncontradiction at 155e10–11: 'at one time it participates, and at another it does not participate; for only thus could it both participate and not participate in the same thing. —Right.' But note that the restriction now applies to 'participate', not to 'is', and it refers to time only, not to the other possible aspects. For the possibility of being *F* and not-*F* in different respects marks the difference between Parmenidean being and being πρός τι, 'relational' being in general. A special case of participation is participation in time, which is the specific mode of participation of sensible things.[36] And, of course, if forms participate in each other according to different aspects, so do the respective sensible things participate "indirectly" in the relevant forms.

The Neoplatonic view recently revived by Allen (1983) and, in a different variation, by Gill (in Gill and Ryan [1996]), that this passage is the result of a union of Arguments I and II, corresponds to nothing in the text. Moreover, the one that is the subject of this Appendix is in time; but only sensible things can be in time. Hence, this Appendix cannot refer to the one simply as a form. Rather, it refers to a one that can *become* this and that at different times. It is not the *form* that changes in time, but some one (sensible, or temporal) thing that can participate now in this form, now in that.

Once we have the concept of a process ('coming to be'), we go back to the relevant sections of Argument II, in order to examine the attributes of the one and define the physical processes involved in coming to be (and ceasing to be) *F*. But there is no question of coming into existence, except insofar as indirectly implied by the processes described immediately below. All physical processes are processes by which the one comes to be *F* and ceases to be *G*.

Theorem II.10 has established that the one, under a certain interpretation, comes to be and passes away. But it did not specify the processes by which

36. One can detect in this Appendix the root of Aristotle's characterization of the substance as what can receive contrary predicates at different times. Cf. *Categories* 4a10–21.

this can occur. These processes must be *physical* processes, because only physical things can come to be and pass away. From this Appendix to Theorem II.10, it is clear, by the way, that time, not place or space, is for Plato the index of the physical world.[37]

There are three physical processes by which any (sensible) thing can come to be something else, three processes by which something that is *F* comes to be *G*. Coming to be and passing away are explicated, in general, as coming to participate in an *οὐσία* (say, *F*) or ceasing to participate in it. According to what *οὐσία* is the case (or what values *F* takes), Plato distinguishes three processes, corresponding to the three relevant categories dealt with in Theorems II.1 (one and many), II.8 (like and unlike), and II.9 (larger and smaller, and equal), as follows.

THEOREM II.10, APPENDIX, 1. SEPARATION AND COMBINATION

The first case is that in which *οὐσία* refers to the dichotomy one/many. Something that is one comes to be many, or vice versa. This is the closest we can come to (absolute) generation and destruction. The gaining or loosing of existence as such is not considered.

156a1–b5 —Now, is there not also a certain time when it comes to take part in being [*τοῦ εἶναι*] and when it lets go [*ἀπαλλάττεται*] of it? Or how would it be able now to have and then not to have the same thing, if it should not at some time take it and let go of it? —In no way. —Coming to take part in being [*οὐσίας*]: Don't you call it 'coming to be'? —I do. —And letting go of being [*οὐσίας*]: Don't you call it 'passing away'? —Quite so. —Thus, the one, as it seems, in b coming to take being and in leaving it, both comes to be and passes away. —It is necessary. —And, being one and many and coming to be and passing away, is it not the case that whenever it comes to be one its being many passes away, and whenever it comes to be many its being one passes away? —Indeed. —And in coming to be one and many, is it not necessary that it should separate and combine? —Most necessary. *II.10.app.1* *II.10.app.df*

THEOREM II.10, APPENDIX, 2. ASSIMILATION AND DISSIMILATION: *οὐσία* AS LIKE/UNLIKE

THEOREM II.10, APPENDIX, 3. GROWING, DIMINISHING, AND STAYING THE SAME: *οὐσία* AS LARGER/SMALLER/EQUAL

156b6–8 —Moreover, whenever it should come to be unlike and like, does it undergo assimilation and dissimilation [*ὁμοιοῦσθαί τε καὶ* *II.10.app.2*

37. For time as a specific characteristic of the sensible world, cf. *Timaeus* 38b ff.

ἀνομοιοῦσθαι]? —Yes. —And whenever larger and smaller and equal, *II.10.app.3*
does it grow and shrink, and is it made equal? —So it is.

THEOREM II.10, APPENDIX, NOTE. THE INSTANT OF CHANGE

Every process occurs between two states. The state is the limit of a process (cf. above, 152b2–d4) without being part of it. At Theorem II.6 the one was shown to be in motion and at rest, albeit in different respects. There, the different respects were 'in itself' as opposed to 'in another'. Here, the distinction between state ('being') and process ('coming to be') is drawn in terms of time: to come to be is to change in time ('to move'); to be in a state is not to change in time ('to rest'). The question now arises of *when* the passage from state to process or from process to state occurs. The passage itself could not occur at any one point in time, for at that point the subject of change would have to be simultaneously in motion and at rest.

156c1–e7 —But when, moving, it should come to rest, or when, resting, *II.10.app.n*
it should change into moving, surely it must not be in one time.
—How so? —Being first at rest and later moving, or first moving
and later resting, it will not be able to be thus affected without
changing. —Of course. —But there is no time in which something
could simultaneously neither move nor rest. —Indeed not.

—It does not change, however, without changing. —It is not
likely. —When does it change, then? It changes neither when it
d rests nor when it moves, being in time. —Indeed not. —Now, is it
this strange thing in which it should be when it changes? —What
sort of thing is this? [*Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;*] —The instant. For 'instant' seems
to signify something such that from it a thing changes into one or
other of these two states. For, surely, it does not change from rest
so long as it rests, nor does it change from movement so long as it
moves; but the instant is that certain strange nature inserted in be-
e tween movement and rest, being in no time, and it is into it and
from it that what moves changes into resting, and what rests into
moving. —Very likely. —Also the one, therefore, if indeed it both
rests and moves, would change into the one or the other—only
thus would it do both—and in changing it changes instanta-
neously, and when it changed it would be in no time, and would
then neither move nor rest. —Indeed not.

156c1, *κινούμενον*, 'moving'] Plato is probably ambiguous between the middle and the passive voice. Nothing moves of itself, except soul. (Cf. *Phaedrus* 245c5–9.) Everything else is moved by soul (including the world itself; cf. the world-soul of *Timaeus* 34b).

At any moment of time a thing is either in motion or at rest. The actual change from motion to rest or from rest to motion must therefore take place 'between' (*μεταξύ*, 156d7) two moments of time. But that change cannot

take place at any moment between two given moments. Thus, the 'instant' (ἐξαίφνης, 156d3) is not a moment in time. It cannot be arrived at by subdividing the time continuum: whatever two moments of time are chosen, close to each other as they may be, the instant of change will always be 'between' them without forming part of the time continuum itself, since at any point in the time continuum the thing must be either in motion or at rest. In this sense, then, the instant is in no time.

156e7–157b3 —Next, is it not the same also in relation to the other changes? 157 Whenever it should change from being into passing away or from not being into coming to be, does it then come to be between certain movements and rests, and is it neither being nor not, and is it neither coming to be nor passing away? —It certainly seems so. —So, by the same reasoning, also in passing from one to many and from many to one it is neither one nor many, and is neither combining nor separating. And in passing from like to unlike and from unlike to like it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it undergoing as- b similation or dissimilation; and in passing from small to large and to equal and into their opposites it is not small or large or equal, nor would it be growing or shrinking or becoming equal. —It seems not.

Change from motion to rest and from rest to motion occurs 'in no time' (ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ, 156e6; cf. e1). Thus, in the instant of change the thing cannot be said to be either in motion or at rest, for these occur *in* time. The thing can then be said neither to be in a state nor not to be in it, neither to be undergoing a process nor not to be undergoing it. Specifically, it neither is nor is not combining or separating, nor either is it undergoing either assimilation or dissimilation, or growing or shrinking or becoming equal.[38]

THEOREM II.10, APPENDIX, CONCLUSION.

157b3–5 —The one would thus be affected by all these affections, if it is. —How else? *II.10.app. concl.*

Insofar as it is in time, the one both moves and rests (albeit at *different* times), and insofar as the change from motion to rest takes place in *no* time (i.e., in the instant), the one neither moves nor rests. Here too we arrive at the possibility of all the contraries being predicated of the one, according to the weakened Principle of Noncontradiction.

I take the last exchange to be the conclusion of the Appendix only, and not of Argument II entire. The caesura marked by Aristoteles' response at 155e2, above, was a very strong one, whereas here it is pointedly mild (cf. the endings of all the other Arguments), indicating that, from the point of

38. See also the discussion between C. Strang (1970 [1963]) and Mills (1974).

view of method, this was a rather secondary argument, and that the main argument ended there, not here.

ARGUMENT III. IF THE ONE IS: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE OTHERS: IN RELATION TO THE OTHERS

ARGUMENT III, DEFINITION. THE OTHERS PARTICIPATE IN THE ONE THAT IS: RESTRICTED PRINCIPLE OF NONCONTRADICTION

157b6–c2 —Should we not consider next what would be fitting for the others to be affected by, if the one is? —We should. —Are we to say, then, what the others than the one must be affected by, if the one is? —Let us say. —Now, if indeed they are other than the one, c the others are not the one; for else they would not be other than the one. —Right. —The others, however, are not completely deprived of the one, but participate in it in some way. *III.df*

157b6, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, 'if the one is'] Cf. on 142b3.

157b8, τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς, 'the others than the one'] Thus, for we cannot yet speak of a 'many'. The identity of 'the others' and 'the many' will be established below (157c2 ff.). This is not trivial. At Theorem IV.1 (159d3), for example, the others are said *not* to be many.

Argument III is the counterpart of Argument II. The others are variously affected (157b6, *πάσχειν*, and b8, *πεπονθέναι*, picking up b4, immediately above, *τὰ παθήματα . . . ἂν πάσχοι*). They are such as not to be Parmenidean unities. We *assume,* then, that the others are such. Under this hypothesis, to be other than the one is not to be its total opposite, but only to be not-one in some qualified sense to be explained immediately below. (The negation at 157b9 is introduced by *οὔτε*, looking forward to *οὐδέ* at c1.). This is in conformity with the weakened Principle of Noncontradiction: the others may be both many and one, provided the respects in which they are many or one are specified or tacitly understood.

THEOREM III.1. THE OTHERS ARE A WHOLE AND HAVE PARTS

THEOREM III.1.1. THE OTHERS ARE (COLLECTIVELY) A WHOLE

Being collectively a whole, the others are a one with parts. Hence, they are collectively one, although severally they are many.

157c2–d7 —In what way? —Inasmuch as [*ὅτι*], somehow [*που*], the others than the one are other in having parts; for should they have no parts, they would have been absolutely one. —Right. *III.1.1*

—But parts, we say, are of that which would be a whole. —So

we say. —However, it is necessary that the whole should be a one composed out of [ἐκ] many, of which whole the parts will be parts; for each of the parts must be a part not of the many but of the whole. —How is that? —If something were a part of the many, in
d which it were itself, it would surely be a part of itself, which is impossible, and also of each one of the others, if indeed it is a part of them all. For, not being part of one, it will be a part of the others except this one, and so it will not be a part of each one; and not being a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many. But not being anything of any one of them all, of none of which it is anything, it is impossible that it should be a part, or anything else, of them. —So it appears, indeed.

157c6, ἐκ πολλῶν, 'out of many'] 'Composed' is not in the Greek. The relation between the whole and its parts is left vague and unspecified. It will be clarified in what follows.

The others are other than the one 'in having parts' (μόρια ἔχοντα, 157c3). If the many are to be possible, they must not be identical to the one. Moreover, if they are such as to be affected in some way, they must have parts or aspects: that is, they must participate in the one of Argument II (i.e., in a one that can have parts). The one and the many are thus not completely apart.[1]

The concept of a part presupposes a plurality that is unified in some way, a plurality that is a structured whole. But not only the single form is structured. If the single form is such, the whole system of forms must likewise be structured, since the structure of the form is just its relation to other forms. This is especially clear, for example, from the diairetical scheme in the *Sophist,* and from the concept of the Living Being itself at *Timaeus* 30c–d. Similarly, the fact that each sensible thing is structured, as a reflection of the forms, entails that the sensible world as a whole must be structured too, at least insofar as this is compatible with its materiality.[2] Argument III is thus directly derived from Argument II. So far, the Neoplatonists were right in stressing the continuity of these two Arguments.

Each of the parts must be a part not of the many severally, but of the whole (which is the many) collectively. Suppose a part is part of all the parts taken severally (i.e., of 'the many'). Since that part is not a part of itself, it must be a part of all the others (i.e., of all the many except itself). But it cannot be a part of any one of them, hence neither of all of them, severally. Thus, the parts are parts of the whole (i.e., of the one of Argument II), which is different from all the parts taken severally (i.e., from 'the many').

The parts are contrasted with the Parmenidean one of Argument I. The

1. Cf. Speiser (1937), 49.
2. Cf. *Timaeus* 30a: the sensible world is a copy of the Living Being itself.

one of Argument I was, by definition, devoid of parts (cf. 137c5 ff.) The others, then, considered collectively as the opposite of that one, are that which does have parts. But that which has parts is somehow a whole. ('Somehow', since being a whole with parts violates the Parmenidean, absolute Principle of Noncontradiction.) From the definition of the other than the one as that which (collectively) has parts, it follows that the parts must be parts of a whole. The many are seen as a whole, and hence as somehow unified, as being one in a certain respect: that is, collectively.

157d7–e5 —So, the part is part not of the many nor of all, but of a certain character [*μιᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας*] and a certain one, which we call
e 'whole', a complete one that has come to be out of all, of which whole the parts would be parts. —By all means. —So, if the others have parts, they would also participate in the whole and the one. —Indeed. —And so, it is necessary that the others than the one *III.1.1.concl.* should be a complete whole one having parts. —It is necessary.

THEOREM III.1.2.
THE OTHERS ARE EACH OF THEM ONE

Now the others are looked at severally.

157e5–158b4 —Further, the same reasoning holds of each part too: for it is *III.1.2*
158 necessary that it too should participate in the one. For if each of them is a part, 'being each' surely signifies being one, marked off from the others and being in itself, if indeed it will be 'each'. —Right. —But it would participate in the one clearly as being other than the one; else, it would not participate but would be the one itself. But, as it is, it is presumably [*που*] impossible for a one to *be*, except the one itself. —It is impossible. —But it is necessary for both the whole and the part that they should participate in the one. For the one will be a whole, of which the parts are parts; and each part that should be a part of the whole will, in its turn, be *one*
b part of the whole. —So it is. —Now, will not those that participate in the one participate in it as being different from it? —How else? —And the different from the one would be somehow many; for if the others than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing. —Nothing indeed.

The one of Argument II is now also one of many. And, conversely, only by being complex can the many be intelligible. If the many were simple, the difference between them would be irrational. (Cf. Parmenides, fr. 8.56–59; and *Theaetetus* 201d10 ff.)

If there are many distinct parts, each part is what it is by being marked off from the others. None of the parts, however, can be the one itself, else it would be indistinguishable from any other part, since each of these too would, as it were, be the one itself, without any additional characteristic to mark it off

from the others. Thus, if we are to distinguish in each part between its being what it is and its being one, we must, strictly speaking, say that it *participates* in the one, and not that it *is* one. The same holds of the whole. Hence, both the whole and the parts, according to the current hypothesis, must participate in the one without being the one itself. The absolute necessity of the one itself, stressed in Argument VIII, is already foreshadowed here.

Argument III formally establishes the possibility of a plurality of ones. Up to here the many were the opposite of the one. Now the many are *composed* of ones. The others are one, or rather have unity, or participate in the one, both severally and collectively. 'The all' is one (as Parmenides maintained at 128a8–b1), but each of the components of the whole one is also one in that restricted sense.[3]

Theorem III.1 has two important implications, which Plato exploits in the *Timaeus* and in the *Sophist:* first, the sensible world can be said to be one notwithstanding the plurality it contains, and so can every component of it (but see Argument VII); and second, the total object of intelligibility is not the one itself, as Parmenides thought,[4] but it *has* unity, and each form is one but, again, only in that it participates in the one without being the one itself.

The passage from 'the others' to 'many' (τἆλλα = πολλά) is effected at 158b2. Argument III establishes the condition of the possibility of the many alongside the one. In fact, it shows that Argument II's one that is cannot be unique: it necessarily implies a plurality of ones having the same characteristics as the one that is.

THEOREM III.2. THE OTHERS ARE UNLIMITED AND LIMITED

THEOREM III.2.1. THE OTHERS ARE UNLIMITED

158b5–c7 —But, since those that participate in the one part and in the one whole are more than one, is it not at once necessary that those that come to take part in the one should be unlimited in plurality? —How? —Let us see it thus: When they come to take part in the one, do they come to take part in it otherwise than not being c one and not participating in it? —Clearly not. —Therefore, as being pluralities, in which the one is not? —Pluralities, indeed. —What now? If we wished to grasp in our thought the least of those such as we were capable of grasping, is it not necessary that that which would be grasped, if indeed it should not participate in the one, should be a plurality and not one? —It is necessary. —Thus, whenever we should consider, in itself, that nature, different from *III.2.1*

3. This is the formal structure of the one cosmos at *Timaeus* 31a.
4. Or, at least, so Plato interprets him.

the form, as little of [ὅσον] it as we should ever see will be unlimited as to plurality. —By all means.

The many, considered in themselves (i.e., simply as many), are unlimited in plurality. In themselves, they are not unified in any way. (Cf. Argument VII.) If we 'consider, in itself, that nature' under a very definite restriction—that is, if we consider the many strictly as such, disregarding the form (158c6, τοῦ εἴδους) that unifies them in some way—they are an unlimited plurality.

THEOREM III.2.2. THE OTHERS ARE LIMITED

158c7–d3 d —Moreover, since each one part would come to be a part, they at once have a limit toward [πρὸς] each other and toward the whole; and the whole, toward the parts. —Precisely so. *III.2.2*

But if each part is considered as *one* part (158d1), it is distinct from the other parts (it has 'a limit toward' them); hence it is limited.

158d3–8 —Thus, it follows for the others than the one that, from the communion of the one and of themselves, something different comes to be in them, as it seems, that which gives them a limit toward each other; whereas their own nature gives them, in themselves, unlimitedness. —It appears so. —And thus the others than the one, as wholes and part by part, both are unlimited and participate in limit. —Indeed. *III.2.concl.*

The others are unlimited and limited in different respects. In themselves, according to their own nature, they are unlimited; but in relation to each other they are limited. Note the distinction between what each of the many is in itself and what comes to be in them ensuing the communion of the one and of themselves. (Cf. *Republic* V 476a5–8, on ideas appearing many because of κοινωνία ἀλλήλων, 'communion with each other'.)

THEOREM III.8. THE OTHERS ARE LIKE AND UNLIKE

158e1–159a6 —Would they not be, then, like and unlike each other and themselves? —In what way? —Insofar as [Ἧι μὲν] they are all somehow unlimited in respect of their own nature, they would be all affected by the same in the same way. —Indeed. —Moreover, insofar as they all participate in limit, they would also be all affected by the same in the same way. —How else? —However, insofar as [Ἧι δέ γε] they should be both limited and affected by the unlimited, they
159 would have these affections, which are opposite to each other. —Yes. —But opposites are as unlike as possible. —Of course. —So, in respect of [κατὰ μὲν] each affection, they would be like themselves and each other; but in respect of [κατὰ δὲ] both, they are most opposed to both and most unlike. —Very likely. —And thus the others would be like and unlike themselves and each other. —So it is. *III.8* *III.8.1* *III.8.2* *III.8.concl.*

Note the explicit qualifications (*Ἡι μὲν. . . . Ἡι δε . . .*; *κατὰ μὲν . . . κατὰ δὲ . . .*) throughout the argument and the dropping of the qualifications in the conclusion. Here it is very clear how such qualifications are to be supplied throughout the Arguments.

ARGUMENT III, CONCLUSION

159a6–b1 —And, if indeed it appeared to be affected by these, we shall have no further difficulty in finding that the others than the one are also the same as and different from each other, and are moved and rest, *III.concl.*
b and are affected by all the opposite affections. —You are right.

The opposition like/unlike is taken as a paradigm that may be followed for all the other affections.

ARGUMENT IV. IF THE ONE IS: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE OTHERS: IN RELATION TO THEMSELVES

ARGUMENT IV, DEFINITION. THE OTHERS ARE APART FROM THE ONE: ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLE OF NONCONTRADICTION

159b2–c4 —Now, if we should at once leave these as obvious [*φανερά*], are we to investigate again, if the one is, whether it is not thus also with the others than the one or thus only? —By all means. —Let us say, then, from the beginning, if the one is, what must affect the others than the one. —Let us say. —Now, must not the one be apart [*χωρὶς*] from the others, and the others apart from the one? — Why? —Because there is not, somehow, anything different beside these that is both other than the one and other than the others; *IV.df.*
c for everything has been mentioned whenever one has mentioned the one and the others. —Everything indeed. —There is nothing more, then, different from these, in which same thing both the one and the others would be. —There is not. —The one and the others are, then, never in the same. —It seems not. —Are they apart, then? —Yes.

159b2, *φανερά*, 'obvious'] Also 'apparent'. Cf. *Republic* VI 510d1, where the assumptions of the mathematicians are said to be taken *ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν*, 'as if apparent [or: 'obvious'] to all'—needing, however, to receive their foundation from dialectic.

159b3–4, *οὐχ οὕτως . . . ἢ οὕτω μόνον*, 'not thus . . . or thus only'] The interpretation of the Hypothesis 'The one is' that was developed in Argument III is not the only one possible. There could be an alternative interpretation of the same formulation, which will now be developed.

159b5, *ἓν εἰ ἔστιν*, 'if the one is'] Cf. on 142b3.

Argument IV is the correlate of Argument I, applied to the many. The one and the many are 'apart' (159b6, *χωρίς*, repeated at c4; cf. 130b2–4) from

each other and have nothing in common. There is no concept that includes them both: 159c3–4, 'The one and the others are . . . never in the same.' Moreover, according to the Parmenidean Principle of Noncontradiction (which, in this absolute version, implies also the Principle of the Excluded Middle), the dichotomy one/many is not only exclusive but also exhaustive: 159c1, 'everything has been mentioned whenever one has mentioned the one and the others.'

This Argument fits equally well the separation of the form from sensible things and Parmenides' conception of *his* forms in the Way of Seeming as *incommunicantia.* (Cf. Parmenides, frr. 8.53–61, 9.) Argument IV will show not only that a world of appearances is impossible without forms, but also that even the historical Parmenides' *incommunicantia* are impossible on his own assumptions. If a plurality of entities is admitted, they cannot be each 'in itself', *καθ'αὑτό*, as Parmenides would have them in his Way of Seeming (fr. 8.50 ff.). His predicational monism implies numerical monism.[1]

THEOREM IV.1. THE OTHERS ARE NOT MANY: NEITHER ARE THEY A WHOLE, NOR ARE THEY PARTS OF A WHOLE

159c5–e1 —Moreover, we say that what is truly one has no parts. —Of course. —So, neither would the one be in the others as a whole, nor would parts of it, if it both is apart from the others and has no parts. —Of course. —So, in no manner would the others participate in the one, not participating in it either in respect of a certain part of it or in respect of the whole. —It seems not. —So, in no way are the others one, nor do they have in themselves any one. —Indeed not. —Nor are the others many; for each of them would be one part of the whole if they were many; but, as it is, the others than the one are not one nor many nor whole nor parts, since they do not participate in it in any way. —Right. —And so, the others themselves are not two or three, nor are these in them, if indeed they are in every way deprived of the one. —So it is. *IV.1*

The one here considered is 'what is truly one' (159c5), the Parmenidean one of Argument I: 'what is truly one has no parts.' By this hypothesis, there can be no participation. Whatever was true of the one and the many in Arguments II and III is now negated. So, the others are not (denumerably) many (159d4–5).

But if the others corresponding to the Parmenidean one are not denumerably many, then Parmenides was wrong in his Way of Seeming. In his poem, Parmenides rejected any possibility of a relation between the one of

1. Predicational monism asserts that each thing has only one predicate; numerical monism asserts that there is only one thing. Cf. Curd (1991).

knowledge and the many of seeming.[2] If there is no such relation, the many cannot be denumerable; hence they cannot be two (as in Parmenides' Way of Seeming) or any other number. The historical Parmenides would not consider any but a strong, absolute Principle of Noncontradiction. This should have led him to reject anything like Arguments II and III. But if the many do not participate in the one, they cannot even be *incommunicantia,* since this would require that each of the many be *one,* distinct from each of the others.

THEOREM IV.8. THE OTHERS ARE NEITHER LIKE NOR UNLIKE

159e2–160a3 —And so, the others are not like or unlike the one, nor is there in them likeness and unlikeness; for if they were like and unlike or had in them likeness and unlikeness, the others than the one would somehow have in themselves two forms opposite to each other. —It appears so. —But it would be impossible for what would not participate even in the one that it should participate in any two. —It would be impossible. —So, the others are not like and
160 not unlike, nor are they both. For if they were like or unlike the one, they would participate in the one or the other of these forms; and if they were both, in both of the opposites; and this appeared impossible. —True. *IV.8*

If they cannot participate in *one* οὐσία (i.e., if they cannot *be* one; cf. Argument I, 141e10), of course they cannot participate in more than one. In order to have any character, they would have to be *one* definite thing as opposed to any other. And this is what is negated in Argument IV. They cannot be something (severally).

As in Argument III, the opposition likeness/unlikeness is taken as the paradigm of all affections.

THEOREMS IV.7, 6, 10, 9, . . . AND ARGUMENT IV, CONCLUSION. THE OTHERS ARE NOT THE SAME OR DIFFERENT; THEY ARE NEITHER IN MOTION NOR AT REST; THEY DO NOT COME TO BE, NOR DO THEY PASS AWAY; THEY ARE NOT GREATER OR SMALLER OR EQUAL; (ETC.)

160a4–b2 —And so, they are not the same or different, nor are they moved or at rest, nor do they come to be or pass away, nor are they larger or smaller or equal. Nor are they affected by any such; for if the others admit of being affected by any such, they will also participate in the one and in the two and in the three and in the even and in *IV.7, 6, 10, 9, . . . ; IV.concl.*

2. Cf., e.g., the abrupt passage in the words of the goddess at fr. 8.50.

b the odd, in which it appeared impossible that they should participate, being totally deprived of the one in every way. —Most true.

Argument IV has thus established that if the others (i.e., the many) are completely apart from the one, no character whatsoever can be ascribed to them, not even their being many.

HYPOTHESIS: THE ONE IS: CONCLUSION

160b2–4 —And thus, if the one is, the one is on the one hand everything, and on the other hand, it is nothing, in relation to itself as well as in relation to the others. —Absolutely. *I–IV.concl.*

160b2, τε . . . καὶ, 'on the one hand . . . on the other hand'] Cf. on 148c6–7, above.
160b3, 'it is nothing'] Reading οὐδέν ἐστι with manuscript B and Wyller.

In concluding the examination of the affirmative Hypothesis, 'The one is', Plato drops the qualifications he has carefully been using and disguises the fact that different conclusions were reached for different understandings of the Hypothesis and, in Arguments II and III, for the different respects according to which the one was said to be this or that. Disguising the solution to an aporia is common Platonic practice (cf., e.g., *Protagoras, Meno, Theaetetus,* etc.), and Plato will do it again at the very end of this dialogue.

HYPOTHESIS: THE ONE IS NOT

ARGUMENT V. IF THE ONE IS NOT: CONSEQUENCES FOR ITSELF: IN RELATION TO THE OTHERS

Having examined the Hypothesis 'The one is', we pass now to the examination of the opposite Hypothesis, 'The one is not'. As in the first half of the exercise, here too 'being' is taken in two senses, and the consequences of the negation of each of the senses are considered for the one itself (which is not, in a sense to be specified in each Argument) and for the many.

In Argument V, 'being' is taken in a non-Parmenidean, incomplete sense. To say that the one is not, in this case, is to take it as something definite, distinct from something else (as, say, largeness is distinct from smallness), and as something whose being is negated. But, obviously, being is not negated of it absolutely, since it is supposed to be such as to be distinct from its opposite. Thus, the being that is negated of the one, in this case, is only qualified being, some οὐσία that is *not* attributed to the one. Non-Parmenidean negation is here established as *difference,* paving the way for the *Sophist.*

That the one that is not is definite is clear from 160b6–c7, and especially from the substitution examples in 160c2–4, 'if largeness is not' and 'smallness is not'. In such cases it will be clear, so the text goes on, that what is in-

tended is that 'that which is not is something different from the others', and we know what it is that is being spoken about.

Only a definite one can be distinct from a not-one. We have, therefore, the counterpart of Argument II, built on the restricted interpretation of being. Indeed, the one that is not (this or that) nevertheless participates in many characters (160e4; cf. especially 160e7–161a5).

The possibility of qualified negation cannot be directly proved. Measured by Parmenidean standards, any qualification to the Principle of Noncontradiction is arbitrary and irrational, and therefore unacceptable. Plato's justification for a qualified (restricted) Principle of Noncontradiction is not apodictic but transcendental, in an almost Kantian sense. A weakened Principle of Noncontradiction is the condition of the possibility of dialectic. Hence the peculiar structure of Argument V: non-Parmenidean negation has to be approached indirectly, working from the conclusions to the premises that would support it.

160b5–c7 —Very well. But should we not consider, after that, what follows if the one is not? —We should consider. —What, then, would be this hypothesis: if the one is not? Is this hypothesis distinct [διαφέρει] in anything from that, if the not-one is not? —It certainly is. —Is
c it distinct only, or is saying "if the not-one is not" even totally opposite to saying "if the one is not"? —Totally opposite. —And what if one should say "if largeness is not" or "smallness is not" or anything else like that: Would it not be clear that he would be ascribing not-being [μὴ ὄν], in each case, to something different? —Indeed. —Would it not be clear, then, now too, that whenever one says "if the one is not," one is saying that that which is not [τὸ μὴ ὄν] is something different from the others, and we know [ἴσμεν] what he is speaking of? —We know it.

ARGUMENT V, COROLLARY 2. THERE IS KNOWLEDGE OF THE ONE THAT IS NOT

160c7–d2 —First, then, whenever one speaks of the one, he is speaking of something knowable [γνωστόν], and, second, of something dif-
d ferent from the others, whether being or not-being is added to it; for what is said not to be is nonetheless known, and also that it is distinct from the others. Or is it not so? —It is necessary.

160d3–6 —So, we should say from the beginning what must be if the one *V.corol.2*
is not, in this way. First, then, this must belong to it, as it seems: that there should be knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] of it, else it would not even be known what was being spoken about whenever one said "if the one is not." —True.

'First, then', we start from the consequence we desire to establish: there is knowledge of the one. Now we inquire about the condition of such knowl-

edge. The movement of the argument is patently analytical. (Cf. esp. 160e2 ff., below.)

THEOREM V.7.2.2. THE ONE THAT IS NOT IS DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHERS

160d6–e2 —Now, must not the others be different from it, else it would not be said to be different from the others? —Indeed. —So, it has also difference, besides there being knowledge of it. For, when e one says that the one is different from the others, he is not speaking of the difference of the others but of *its* difference. —It appears so. *V.7.2.2*

Since we started from the assumption that the one that is not (this or that) is *distinct* from anything else, it is only natural that the first predicate that can be ascribed to it is difference.[1] But it is not immediately clear that the one that *is not* can have difference predicated of it. At 160c6, Plato was careful to ascribe difference not to the one directly but to 'that which is not', relying with no argument, as a provisional measure, on the specific example of largeness and smallness. That the others, however, are different from the one is less problematic, since we are not now negating them or anything of them. Next, gaining assent to the symmetrical nature of difference, Plato moves from diff(*a,b*) to diff(*b,a*)—that is, from the others being different (from the one) to the one also being different (from the others).

Moreover, not only do we know *from what* the one is different, but we know that *it* is different. It is not an indeterminate character that is different from *G, H, J, . . .* Rather, it is a *determinate* (but unspecified) character *A* that is different from *G, H, J, . . .* See further below (161a2 ff.): what is being hypothesized is *that* one, and not something else.

ARGUMENT V, COROLLARY 1. THE ONE THAT IS NOT CAN STAND IN RELATIONS

160e2–7 —Moreover, the one that is not participates in the 'that' and in the 'something' and in the 'of this' and the 'to this' and the 'of these' and all of this sort; for the one would not be spoken of, nor those different from the one, nor would anything be said to be 'to it' or 'of it', nor would it said to be anything, if it participated neither in the 'something' nor in these other things. —Right. *V.corol.1*

It is a necessary condition of the one's being spoken of that it can be a member in relations.

1. It is thus not the case, *contra* Curd (1988: 318), that difference and not-being are playing here the same role. Only after the exact force of the negation of being is established can difference be ascribed to it. This was not necessary at 143b1–7, for there no negation was involved. There is no question of existence in those passages.

(ARGUMENT V, DEFINITION.) THE ONE THAT IS NOT PARTICIPATES IN THE OTHERS: RESTRICTED PRINCIPLE OF NONCONTRADICTION

160e7–161a5 —And although the one cannot have being [εἶναι], if indeed it
161 is not, nothing prevents it [οὐδὲν κωλύει] from participating in *(V.df.)*
many things; rather, this is necessary, if indeed it is *that* one that is not and not another. If, by contrast, it was neither the one nor *that* which were not to be, but the discourse [λόγος] were about something else, nothing should even be uttered; but if it was *that one* and not something else that was hypothesized not to be, it is necessary that it participate in the 'that' and in many other things. —Indeed.

Although by this hypothesis the one is not (*F*), nothing prevents it from being *G, H, J,* . . . In fact, it *must* be *G,* or *H,* or *J,* . . .; if it were not something or other, it could not be an object of discourse (as shown in Argument I). Since we have posited a one *distinct* from other possible objects of discourse, it is necessary that this one have *some* character ('that it participate in the "that"', etc.).

In Argument V the definition of not being is only implicit. This is the closest we come in this Argument to a (formal) definition of not being as not participating. Note 160e8–9, οὐδὲν κωλύει, 'nothing prevents', as a technical term: on the absolute Principle of Noncontradiction, the one is prevented from being this or that; on the current, weakened Principle, 'nothing prevents' the one from 'participating in many things' (e8, μετέχειν . . . πολλῶν). On this interpretation, the statement '*x* is not *F*' is equivalent to '*x* is *G,* or *H,* or *J,* . . .' Negation is interpreted as otherness: that is, as nonparticipation in what is negated, or rather as participation in something different from that which is negated. (Cf. below.)

THEOREM V.8. THE ONE THAT IS NOT IS (CAN BE) UNLIKE

161a6–b4 —So, it has also unlikeness in relation to the others; for the oth- *V.8.2.2*
ers than the one, being different, would also be of a different sort [ἑτεροῖα]. —Yes. —And are not those of a different sort of another sort [ἀλλοῖα]? —How else? —Now, are not those of another sort
b unlike? —Unlike, indeed. —Therefore, if indeed they are unlike the one, clearly things unlike would be unlike an unlike. —Clearly. —Thus, also the one would have unlikeness, in relation to which the others are unlike it. —So it seems.

161a8, ἀλλοῖα] Cf. 148c3.

Unlikeness is difference in a certain respect. Once it has been established that the one that is not has nevertheless other specifiable characters *G, H,*

J, . . ., Plato can make the passage from being different to being qualifiedly different (being 'of a different sort') and to being unlike.

F is defined as that which not-*F* is not. This is the historical Parmenides' interpretation of being in the Way of Seeming. (Cf. Parmenides, fr. 8.58.) Similarly, in the Platonic diairesis, the opposed sides define each other.

161b4–c2 —But, if it has unlikeness to the others, is it not necessary that it have likeness to itself? —How? —If the one had unlikeness to the one, the discourse would not have been somehow about something of the sort of [τοῦ τοιούτου . . . οἵου] the one, and the hypothesis would not have been about the one, but about something c other than the one. —Indeed. —And this, in any case, must not be. —Certainly not. —And so, the one must have likeness to itself. —It must. *V.8.1.1*

In that very respect in which the one is unlike the others (say, in being *G* while the others are *H, J,* etc.), the one is like itself. When we say that the others are unlike the one in that it has, say, the character *G,* while they have the characters *H, J* (etc.), we are referring to that very character (*G*) in respect of which the others are unlike the one. Thus, we imply that the one is like itself in having that character. Considered as being *G*—although it is not (*F*)—the one is like itself.

Note the careful distinction of aspects: the one is both unlike (the others) and like (itself).

THEOREM V.9. THE ONE THAT IS NOT IS (CAN BE) EQUAL AND UNEQUAL

161c3–d1 —Moreover, it is, again, not equal to the others; for if it were equal, it at once would both be, and be like them in respect of equality. And both of these are impossible, if indeed the one is not. —They are impossible. —And since it is not equal to the others, is it not therefore necessary that also the others be not equal to it? —It is necessary. —But are not the not-equal unequal? —Yes. —And are not the unequal unequal to what is unequal? —How d else? —And thus, the one participates in inequality, in relation to which the others are unequal to it? —It participates. *V.9.2.2*

Note 161c4–5, κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα, 'in respect of equality', and d1, πρὸς ἥν, 'in relation to which'. Plato is very clear about the weakening of the Principle of Noncontradiction.

The one is not equal to the others. For if it were, it would be (the others). That is, the others are what the one is not (say, *G, H,* etc.). If the one were equal to the others, it would (numerically or specifically; it does not matter) be what they are; and being what they are, it would be what it is not. Therefore, the one that is not cannot be equal to the others.

This proof is complementary to the preceding (161a6 ff.), to the effect that the one has unlikeness toward the others and likeness to itself. Cornford remarks that Plato is silent about the one's being like the others or unlike itself, in order to escape "sophisms or antinomies."[2] But surely the one that is not (*F*) can still be like the others in some respect (even, e.g., in their not being *F*) and also unlike itself (for, say, as *G*, it would not be like itself as *H*). This is obviously possible if the one has several aspects that can be separately considered (i.e., on the present interpretation of being), and there is no need to elaborate on that possibility at this stage.

THEOREM V.9.1. THE ONE
THAT IS NOT IS (CAN BE) EQUAL

161d1–e2 —On the other hand, largeness and smallness belong to inequality. —So it is. —Such a one, then, has largeness and smallness? —Very likely. —But [μὴν] largeness and smallness are always farthest apart from each other. —Indeed. —So, there is always something between the two. —There is. —Now, can you mention anything else between the two except equality? —No, only that. —So, whatever has largeness and smallness has also equality, which
e is between these two. —So it appears. —Thus, in the one that is not, as it seems, there would be present equality and largeness and smallness. —So it seems. *V.9.1*

161d4, μὴν] "Marking the transition from major to minor premise": Denniston (1966), 337.

Whatever is susceptible of being smaller and larger must also be susceptible of being equal.

ARGUMENT V, CONCLUSION. THE ONE
THAT IS NOT PARTICIPATES IN BEING

161e3–162a4 —Moreover, it must, in any case, participate in some manner also in being [οὐσίας]. —How, then? —It must be of such manner as we describe it; for if it were not so, we would not have spoken the truth about it when we said that the one is not; and if we speak the truth, it is clear that we say the very things that are [ὄντα αὐτά]. Is it not so? —It is so, indeed. —And since we claim to speak
162 the truth, it is necessary for us to claim also that we say things that are. —It is necessary. —So, the one that is not [τὸ ἓν μὴ ὄν], so it seems, is; for if it should not be what is not [μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν], but should in some manner slip from being into not being, the one would straightaway be what is [εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν]. —Absolutely. *V.concl.*

2. Cornford (1939), 223.

To speak the truth is to say what is the case, to say of a definite state of affairs that it is as it is.[3] A necessary condition for a statement to be true is that it refer to a definite state of affairs, which is such-and-such and not otherwise. Therefore, in order that we may speak truly of the one that is not, it is necessary that the one be definite. For if it were not, any statement would be true of it, and we could no more say of the one that it is not than that it is.[4]

If we can speak truly about the one that is not, there must be something we say about it that is true. 'We say the things that are' (162a1); therefore, it is the case that the one *is,* that it participates in some *οὐσία*. The one that is not-*F* nevertheless *is* something, namely not-*F*. 'Not-*F*' can be truly predicated of the one, and to that extent it is not just an empty form of words. If being were denied of the one in every respect, it would have to be denied also in respect of not-*F*. But denying this is against the current hypothesis.

Being not-*F* too is *being*. (*Ὄν*, 'what is', is attributed to whatever has an *οὐσία*, and stands for any attribute *F, G, H,* etc.) Suppose, if possible, that being not-*F* were not-being (162a2–3, it 'should . . . slip from being into not being'). Then, in saying that the one that is not is not, we would be denying of it what we supposed—that is, not being (*F*)—for, by double negation, the one would straightaway be what is (i.e., it would be *F*).

The hypothesis that the one is not, interpreted according to the restricted Principle of Noncontradiction, thus requires the equivalence of 'not being *F*' and 'being not-*F*'. This equivalence is not unconditional.[5] (Cf. above, Introduction, p. 5nn.24, 37.)

ARGUMENT V, CONCLUSION, NOTE.
PARTICIPATION IN BEING AND NOT-BEING

162a4–b3 —So, it must have the very bond of not being being what is not [τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν], if it should not be, just as what is [τὸ ὂν] must have that of not being what is not [τὸ μὴ ὂν . . . μὴ εἶναι], so that, again, it would thoroughly be [ἵνα τελέως αὖ [εἶναι] ᾖ]. For thus certainly [οὕτως . . . μάλιστα] both what is would be and what is not would not be: what is, on the one hand [τὸ μὲν ὄν], participating in the being of being what is [οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν], but not in the being of not being what is not [μὴ οὐσίας . . . τοῦ <μὴ> εἶναι b μὴ ὄν], if it should thoroughly be; and what is not, on the other hand [τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν], participating not in the being of not being what is [μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι [μὴ] ὄν], but in the being of being what is not [οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν], if what is not too will thoroughly not be. —Most true. *V.concl.n*

3. Cf. *Republic* V 477b10 ff.
4. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Γ 4.1007b33.
5. As, e.g., Turnbull (1998: 44, 125) takes it to be.

162a6, *εἶναι*] Shorey conjectured that the infinitive is to be corrected, either by bracketing as spurious or by replacement with the participle *ὄν*.

162a8, *τοῦ <μὴ> εἶναι μὴ ὄν*] Adding *μὴ*, as Shorey proposed.

162b2, *τοῦ εἶναι [μὴ] ὄν*] Bracketing the negative as a scribal error, as Shorey suggested.

162b1–3, 'if it should thoroughly be . . . will thoroughly not be'] *F* is, insofar as it is *F*, and is not, insofar as it is not not-*F*; not-*F* is not, insofar as it is not *F*, and is, insofar as it is not-*F*. Only thus, if *F* as well as not-*F* have both being and not-being, can *F* be and not-*F* not be. (Cf. *Sophist* 250e5 ff., and above, p. 153.)

What is (the one that is) participates in the *οὐσία* of being *F*: strictly speaking, it participates only in a certain aspect of *F*, namely in what it is to be *F*. There are other aspects of *F*, in which what is does not participate (such as, say, atemporality or being in itself). Participation is necessarily partial. Thus, what is, or the one that is, participates only in what it is to be (i.e., the *οὐσία* of being) *F*, but not in what it is not to be (i.e., in the *οὐσία* of not being) not-*F*. What is not (i.e., the one that is not *F*) does not participate in what it is to be *F* (*οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν*), but does participate in what it is to be not-*F*. So, both the one that is and the one that is not participate in *οὐσία*, although each in a different *οὐσία*.

What is, on the one hand, participates not in the *οὐσία* of *F* but in the *οὐσία* of being *F*: that is, strictly only in that aspect of *F* by which it is *F*. On the other hand, it participates in the *οὐσία* of being *F* but not in the *οὐσία* of not being not-*F*. It is insofar as it is what it is (namely *F*), but not insofar as it is not what it is not (namely not-*F*). Only *οὐσία* can be the object of *μέθεξις*, 'participation'. (That is, all participation is participation in *οὐσία*.) This explains such circumlocutions as *οὐσία τοῦ εἶναι*.[6]

At 162a6, perhaps Shorey's alternative reading, *ἵνα τελέως ὂν ᾖ*, 'so that it would thoroughly be what is', is right. But on an understanding of *εἶναι* as incomplete (i.e., as 'to be *F*'), the complement would be supplied as a matter of course.

162b3–8 —Now, if indeed both the being of not-being is present in what is and the being of being in what is not, it is necessary that also in the one, since it is not, be present the being of being, in order for it not to be [*εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι*]. —It is necessary —Thus, it appears that the one will have being too, if it is not. —So it appears. —And so, also not-being, if indeed it is not. —How else? *summary*

162b4, 'the being of' (twice)] Supplying *οὐσία* from 162b2, in order to have a subject for *μέτεστι*; note *τοῦ (μὴ) εἶναι*, 'of (not-)being', in the genitive.

6. There is thus no need to suppose that we have here a "Bradley-type regress" (i.e., that every relation needs another relation to relate it to its relata as surmised by Gill, in Gill and Ryan [1996], 98).

The one that is not-*F* must be (*G, H, J,* . . .) in order for it to *be* (not-*F*). It must *be* a determinate entity according to Argument V. It must also participate in not being (*F*), if it is not. In other words, the one that *is not F* must also *be* not-*F*. (Cf. *Sophist* 256e, and 259b5, *πολλαχῇ μὲν ἔστι, πολλαχῇ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν*, 'in many ways it is, and in many ways it is not'.)

THEOREM V.6.1. THE ONE THAT IS NOT IS (CAN BE) IN MOTION

162b9–c6 —Now, could what is in a certain state [*τὸ ἔχον πως*] not be thus [*μὴ ἔχειν οὕτως*] without changing out of that condition? —It could *V.6*
c not. —So, anything of this sort—namely that it should be thus and also not thus—means change. —How else? —And change is motion; or what shall we say? —It is motion. —Now, the one appeared as both being and not being? —Yes. —It appears, then, thus and not thus? —So it seems. —So, the one that is not has appeared also *V.6.1*
to move, if indeed it should change from being to not-being. —Very likely.

The one that is not (*F*) can have an attribute—say, *a* (i.e., 'be in a certain state')—as well as not have it ('not be thus'), without ceasing to be not-*F*. Therefore, it must be possible for it to change from one state into another. The category of motion, or change, must be applicable to it: it must be able to move. *Κίνησις*, 'motion' (162c2), as usual, is the most general term for any type of change.

THEOREM V.6.2. THE ONE THAT IS NOT IS (CAN BE) AT REST

162c6–d5 —However, if in no way is it one of the things that are, as it is *V.6.1.2*
not if indeed it is not, it would also not shift from here to there.
d —How would it? —So, at any rate, it would not move by passing from place to place [*τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν*]. —It would not. —Nor indeed would it revolve in the same place; for nowhere does it touch the same. For the same is something that is; but it is impossible that what is not be in any of the things that are. —It is impossible. —So, the one that is not would not be capable of revolving in that in which it should not be. —Indeed not.

However, considered merely as not being (cf. 162c7, *εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων*, 'if in no way is it one of the things that are'), and not as being something else, the one that is not is not capable of motion. *As* not being it cannot move from place to place. Similarly, it cannot revolve in the same place: it is in a place only as being something or other, not as being completely indeterminate—that is, as *not* being this or that.

162d5–8 —But neither will the one, whether that which is or that which is not, be somehow altered from itself; for then the discourse would no longer be about the one, if indeed it were altered from itself, but about something else. —Right. *V.6.1.1*

Likewise, considered as not-*F,* the one could be altered only by becoming *F;* considered as *G, H,* . . . , the one would be altered by becoming not-*G,* not-*H,* . . . In either case, we would no longer be speaking about the same one.

162d8–e3 —And if it is not altered nor does it revolve in the same place *V.6.2*
e nor does it pass from place to place, would it still be moved in any way? —How could it? —But it is necessary that what is motionless be stationary, and what is stationary must be at rest. —It is necessary. —So, the one that is not, as it seems, both is at rest and is moved. —So it seems.

THEOREM V.6.1.1. THE ONE THAT IS NOT BOTH IS AND IS NOT ALTERED

But we have seen above (162b9–c6) that the one that is not moves, insofar as it is considered as capable of being (not-*F*) and not being (*F*). Thus, in one respect, the one is capable of being altered; in another, it is not.

162e4–163a7 —Moreover, if indeed it is moved, it is most necessary that it *V.6.1.1*
163 be altered; for in whatever manner a thing is moved, to that extent it is no longer in the same situation as it was, but in a different one. —So it is. —And, in being moved, the one is also altered. —Yes. —Moreover, not being moved in any manner, it would not be altered in any manner. —Indeed not. —So, insofar as the one that is not is moved, it is altered; but insofar as it is not moved, it is not altered. —Indeed not.—And so, the one that is not both [τε καὶ] *V.6.concl.* is and is not altered. —So it appears.

Plato is very careful to specify the different respects in which the one respectively is and is not altered, and then he camouflages the distinction in the final conclusion. Note 163a4–5, Ἧι μὲν . . . ᾗ δὲ . . ., 'insofar as . . . insofar as . . .', and a6, . . . τε καὶ . . ., 'both . . . and . . .' (but possibly also 'on the one hand . . . on the other hand . . .'; cf. above, on 148c6–7, p. 118).

THEOREM V.10, APPENDIX. THE ONE THAT IS NOT BOTH DOES AND DOES NOT COME TO BE AND PASS AWAY

163a7–b6 —But what is altered: Is it not necessary that it come to be dif- *V.10.app.*
ferent from what it was earlier, and that it pass away from its pre-
b vious condition? And that what is not altered does not come to be and does not pass away? —It is necessary. —So the one that is not,

> also, in being altered both [τε καὶ] comes to be and passes away, but in not being altered neither comes to be nor (οὔτε . . . οὔτε) passes away; and in this manner the one that is not both [τε καὶ] comes to be and passes away, and does not come to be and (οὔτε . . . οὔτε) does not pass away. —Indeed not.

Again, the conclusion is carefully qualified. The one that is not can come to be and pass away (if it fulfills the additional requirements of being a sensible thing: e.g., it is in time). The fact that it is not in some respect (e.g., it is not *F*, or is not *F* itself) does not prevent it, nevertheless, from coming to be and passing away.

ARGUMENT VI. IF THE ONE IS NOT: CONSEQUENCES FOR ITSELF: IN RELATION TO ITSELF

ARGUMENT VI, DEFINITION. THE ONE DOES NOT PARTICIPATE IN BEING: ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLE OF NONCONTRADICTION

163b7–c7 —Once more, then, let us go back to the beginning, to see whether it will appear to us the same as just now or differently.

c —So we must. —Now, do we say, if the one is not, what must follow for it? —Yes. —And whenever we say 'is not', does it mean anything else than [τι ἄλλο . . . ἤ] the absence of being [οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν] from that which we say not to be? —Nothing else. —So, whenever we say of anything that it is not, do we say that it is not in one way [πως] but is in another? Or does this 'is not', when said, signify simply [ἁπλῶς] that what is not is in no way or manner, nor does it in any way [πῃ] participate in being? —Most simply indeed. *VI.df.*

163c6, ἁπλῶς] Cf. on 137c5–d3, above, p. 81.

By 'is not' we mean now the absence of any οὐσία, the total impossibility of predication. (Cf. the meaning of οὐσία, as established at 142b5 ff; see also 141e7–10.) The distinction between the two senses of μὴ εἶναι, 'not being', is clearly drawn at 163c4–7, according to the two versions of the Principle of Noncontradiction. By the strong (absolute) Principle, negation is the absolute negation of any predicate whatsoever. This is contrasted with the weak (restricted) Principle, by which negation is qualified negation: to say of something that it is not is to say that it is not in one way (πῃ) but is in another. In Argument VI the strong sense is meant: what is not does not in any way participate in being and has no affections, and nothing can be predicated of it. (Cf. *Sophist* 238–39, 257b ff.)

ARGUMENT VI, CONCLUSION. THE ONE THAT IS NOT ABSOLUTELY DOES NOT PARTICIPATE IN BEING

THEOREM VI.10, APPENDIX. THE ONE THAT IS NOT DOES NOT COME TO BE, NOR DOES IT PASS AWAY

163c8–d9 —So, what is not could not be, nor could it otherwise partici- *VI.concl.*
d pate in being [οὐσίας] in any way [οὐδαμῶς]. —It could not. —But *VI.10.app.*
are coming to be and passing away anything else than, respectively, coming to take part in being and losing it? —Nothing else. —But that to which none of this is present would neither take it up nor lose it. —How could it? —So, the one, since it is in no way, would not be able to have being, or lose it, or come to take part in it in any way. —It is likely. —And so, the one that is not does not pass away, nor does it come to be, if indeed in no way does it participate in being. —It appears not.

The one that is not in an absolute sense does not participate in being and has no *οὐσία*. Nothing can be attributed to it. Note the stress, throughout Argument VI, on the absoluteness of negation ('in no way', 'not in any way').

To negate that the one is, in a strong, Parmenidean sense, is not to relegate it to the world of becoming, as one might think. (See below, on 164a7–b4.) If we do not introduce the possibility of a partial negation (cf. above, 163c7, *πῃ*, 'in some way'), according to aspects, the world of becoming too is impossible. All the rest follows immediately.

THEOREM VI.6. THE ONE THAT IS NOT ABSOLUTELY DOES NOT CHANGE: IT IS NEITHER IN MOTION NOR AT REST

163d9–e6 —So, neither is it altered in any way; for in undergoing this, it *VI.6*
e would at once come to be and pass away. —True. —And if it is not altered, is it not necessary that it does not move either? —It is necessary. —But neither shall we say that what is not in any way is at rest; for what is at rest must be always in the same situation [ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινι]. —The same, of course. —And thus, again, we should not say that what is not either is at some time at rest or moves. —We should not.

163e5, *ποτέ*, 'at some time'] Note the stress on time as the index of things that come to be.

THEOREMS VI.9, 8, AND 7. LARGENESS/SMALLNESS/EQUALITY, LIKENESS/UNLIKENESS, SAMENESS/DIFFERENCE

The one that is not in an absolute sense cannot be said to have any character whatsoever. It cannot be related to the others in any way.

163e6–164a2 —It has, however, none of the things that are; for, in partici-
164 pating in that which is, it would at once participate in being. —Clearly. —So, it has neither largeness nor smallness nor equal- *VI.9*
ity. —It has not.

163e6–164a1, *τούτου ὄντος*, 'that which is'] Accepting the reading of Diès.

164a2–7 —Nor would it have likeness or difference in sort, in relation *VI.8*
either to itself or to the others. —It appears not. —What, then? Is there any way in which it would have the others, if it must have nothing? —There is not. —So, the others are not like or unlike or *VI.7*
equal, nor the same or different from it. —They are not.

164a7–b4 —What, then? Will there be about what is not 'of that' or 'to *VI.corol.*
that', or 'something' or 'this', or 'of this', or 'of another' or 'to another', or 'once' or 'afterwards' or 'now', or knowledge or opinion
b or perception or discourse or name, or whatever else of the things that are? —There will not be. —And thus, the one that is not is in *VI.concl.*
no way whatsoever. —It surely seems to be in no way.

ARGUMENT VII. IF THE ONE IS NOT: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE OTHERS: IN RELATION TO THE OTHERS

ARGUMENT VII, DEFINITION. THE OTHERS THAN THE ONE THAT IS NOT ARE OTHER THAN EACH OTHER: RESTRICTED PRINCIPLE OF NONCONTRADICTION

164b5–c4 —Let us say, further, if the one is not, what must affect the others. —Let us say. —They must somehow be other; for if they were not even other, we would not be speaking about "the others." —So it is. —But if the discourse is about the others, the others at any rate are different. Or do you not refer by 'other' [*ἄλλο*] and
c 'different' [*ἕτερον*] to the same thing? —I do. —But, surely, we say that the different is somehow different from the different, and the other is other than the other? —Yes. —So, also the others, if *VII.df.*
they are to be other, have something than which they are other. —It is necessary.

In this hypothesis, the one is not negated absolutely, in a Parmenidean way, but is 'somehow' (*που*, 164b6) considered only as not being (say, *F*), as (so far) indeterminate. Argument VII examines the conditions of the possibility of speaking about the others, if the one is not, in a restricted sense. Here, again, the negation is taken as partial or qualified negation. Thus, we *can* speak about the others.

Argument VII will establish the possibility of sophistics as based on an il-

lusory μέθεξις: how a world is (illusorily) possible without real units (i.e., without anything being really so-and-so), but only as *not being* so-and-so. To say that the one is not-*F* is not to negate the others. But this one, by merely not being *F*, is indeterminate, and cannot serve as a point of reference for the others. (Cf. *Theaetetus* 153e4–5, Ἑπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἓν ὂν τιθέντες, 'Let us follow the present argument, not positing a one that is in itself'.)

THEOREM VII.2. THE OTHERS THAN THE ONE THAT IS NOT APPEAR TO BE A PLURALITY AND A NUMBER

164c4–6 —Yet, what would it be? For they will not be different from the one, which is not. —They would not. —From each other, then. For only this is still left to them, unless they are other than nothing. —Right. *VII.2.1*

The others cannot be 'different from the one, which is not'. There is no need to understand 'the one, which is not' as the one that does not exist, at least not primarily. Insofar as something is not determinate, it cannot be an object of comparisons, relations, and so on. The others cannot be other than a mere not-*F*.

Yet, the others must be, somehow, other than something. Otherwise, we could not be speaking about them as "others." We must presuppose, then, an arbitrary point of reference, so as to provide something than which they could be other. This point of reference can be taken only from the others themselves, in the absence of a one that is something in itself. Hence, in structuralist fashion, whatever each of the others is said to be, it is said to be only in distinction from another, which, in turn, is what it is again only in distinction from an other than itself. Meaning is difference, or, in true Derridean spirit, *différance*.

164c7–d6 —So, they must be other than each other in respect of plurality; they could not be so in respect of the one, as the one is not. But
d each of them, as it seems: its bulk [ὄγκος] is indefinite in plurality, and whenever one should take what is thought [δοκοῦν] to be the smallest, suddenly, as in a dream, instead of what seemed to be one, many will appear; and instead of the smallest, something enormous in comparison with what has been chopped out of it. —Quite right. —Thus, the others, as such bulks, would be other than each other, if the others are, whereas the one is not. —Quite so.

The one being indeterminate, there can be no criterion of individuation for the others. Hence, unities are arbitrary and merely relative to each other.

164d6–e3 —Now, will there be many bulks, each of them appearing one, but not being so, if indeed the one will not be? —So it will be. *VII.2*

e —And it will seem that they have number too, if indeed each is also one while being many. —Indeed. —And, in fact, some among them will appear, not truly, to be even, some odd, if indeed the one will not be. —Indeed not.

Number is a plurality taken as a whole (164e1, 'one while being many'). The many have number, but their number is arbitrary: the collections in which the many may appear as members have no real unity. To form such collections there is no need of a true principle of unification. But such collections remain defective, insofar as they have no inherent necessity and they can be formed in any arbitrary way.

THEOREM VII.9. THE OTHERS THAN THE ONE THAT IS NOT APPEAR TO BE LARGE AND SMALL AND EQUAL

164e3–165a5 —And we say, moreover, that it will appear that there is in them a smallest too; but this appears many and large in comparison with *VII.9*
165 each of the many, insofar as [*ὡς*] they are small. —How else? —Further, each bulk will be deemed to be equal to the many smalls; for it could not appear to change from larger to smaller before it seemed to go to an intermediate, and this would be the semblance [*φάντασμα*] of equality. —It is likely.

Since units are arbitrary, anything can be made to appear of any number, extension, or size.

THEOREM VII.3. THE OTHERS THAN THE ONE THAT IS NOT APPEAR TO HAVE EXTREMITIES AND MIDDLE

165a5–b4 —Now, having a limit [*πέρας*] in relation to another bulk, but in relation to itself having neither beginning nor end [*πέρας*] nor middle? —How so? —Since whenever one should take up in thought *VII.3*
b one of them as being one of these, before the beginning there will always appear another beginning, and after the end, a different end will be always left over, and in the middle others even more in the middle, but smaller, in virtue of the impossibility of taking any of them as one, inasmuch as [*ἅτε*] the one is not. —Most true.

This is also true of the distinctions (spatial or otherwise) among the others: in the absence of anything that can be truly said to be so-and-so, the distinctions among the others can be drawn nominalistically in any fashion we please and at any point.

THEOREM VII.2. THE OTHERS THAN THE ONE THAT IS NOT APPEAR TO BE UNLIMITED AND LIMITED

165b4–c6 —Thus, it is necessary that any being that one takes up in thought shall crumble away, chopped up in pieces; for one would

always somehow be taking up a bulk without a one. —Absolutely.
c —Now, it is necessary that something much like this should appear one to him who views it dimly from afar, but to him who sees [*νοοῦντι*] it closer and keenly each one of them would appear indefinite in plurality, if indeed they lack the one that is not. —It is certainly most necessary. —And in this manner, each of the others must appear *VII.2.concl.* as both unlimited and having limit, and one and many, if the one is not but the others than the one are. —So they must.

Depending on one's point of view, each of the many will seem unlimited and limited, and one and many.

THEOREM VII.8. THE OTHERS THAN THE ONE THAT IS NOT APPEAR TO BE LIKE AND UNLIKE

165c6–d4 —Now, will they thus seem to be both like and unlike? —How *VII.8* so? —Like a painting to him who stands at a distance, all that appears will happen [*πεπονθέναι*] to appear one and the same and
d alike. —Indeed. —But to him who comes nearer they will appear many and different, and by virtue of this semblance of the different, they will appear of a different sort than, and unlike, themselves. —So it is. —And thus it is necessary that those bulks should appear both like and unlike both themselves and each other. —Absolutely.

165c7, 'Like a painting'] Cf. *Theaetetus* 208e7–10.

ARGUMENT VII, CONCLUSION. THE OTHERS THAN THE ONE THAT IS NOT APPEAR AND DO NOT APPEAR TO BE ANYTHING

165d4–e1 —Therefore, they should appear both the same as and different from each other, both touching and apart from themselves, both being moved in every motion and standing in every respect, both coming to be and passing away and neither coming to be nor
e passing away, and somehow all things of that sort, which we could easily go through at once, if the many are while the one is not. —Most true indeed. *VII.7,5,6, 10, . . .*

Argument VII established the conditions of discourse about a world in which no mention is made of anything that can be truly said to be this or that but can be said only to be *not* this or that. Such a structuralist or perspectivist world is not impossible. But its deficiencies are also pointed out: in such a world there could be no true predication.

Argument VII also criticizes Parmenides' Way of Seeming. Parmenides' nominalistic world, presented in the goddess's 'deceiving words' (fr. 8.52), is based on the complete mutual exclusion of the two basic forms: the one is what the other is not. (Cf. above, 164c4.) In Argument VII, Plato argues

that even such an illusory world does not totally violate the Principle of Noncontradiction, but presupposes a restricted Principle, according to which things could be predicated differently from different points of view and still be objects of intelligible—even if unfounded—discourse. Parmenides' Way of Seeming is thus not the Parmenidean negation of being but the weaker, restricted negation of being, expressed by the Platonic Principle of Noncontradiction. But this is not enough, as will become clear in Argument VIII.

Argument VII is to be contrasted with Argument III, according to which the others *can* be referred to a one that is truly predicated as such-and-such. There, the many were said to be able to take different predicates in different respects—which were, however, justified by reference to the one that was considered (truly) to be in some respect or respects but not in others. Here, the different points of view are purely immanent in the others.

It would seem, then, that such a world, in which there can be no knowledge in the strict sense but there can be opinion, is perfectly acceptable. This is what Argument VIII denies.

ARGUMENT VIII. IF THE ONE IS NOT: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE OTHERS: IN RELATION TO ITSELF

ARGUMENT VIII, DEFINITION. THE OTHERS ARE NOT ONE: ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLE OF NONCONTRADICTION

Argument VIII closes the series by considering the many, on the hypothesis that the one is not in an absolute sense. The others are defined, now according to the strong (absolute) Principle of Noncontradiction, as not being one.

165e2–7 —Once more, then, let us go back to the beginning and say what must be if the one is not but the others than the one are. —Do let us say. —Well, the others will not be one. —Of course. —Nor indeed will they be many; for, then, the one also would be in the many that are. For, if none of them is one, all are nothing, so that they would not even be many. —True. *VIII.df.*

165e5, 'for, then, the one also would be in the many that are'] Cf. above, Argument VI, 159d3–4.

Argument VIII does not posit an indeterminate one, as did Argument VII; it totally negates the one. But if the one is completely negated, the others cannot be many, not even in a qualified sense as in Argument VII. There is no room here even for a relativistic concept of a unity that can be said to be something in a sense although it can be said not to be that same thing in another sense, real or illusory. Thus, under the current hypothesis, the others can be neither one nor many, in any sense.

ARGUMENT VIII, DEFINITION, NOTE 1.
THE OTHERS ARE NEITHER MANY NOR ONE

165e7–8 —And, there not being in the others a one, the others are neither many nor one. —They are not. *VIII.df.n1*

ARGUMENT VIII, DEFINITION, NOTE 2.
THE OTHERS APPEAR NEITHER MANY NOR ONE

165e8–166a4 —Nor do they appear one or many. —Why? —Because the others in no way and in no manner have any communion with any of the things that are not, nor is any of the things that are not present in any of the others; for nothing is a part of the things that are not. —True. *VIII.df.n2*

Compare *Sophist* 251e7–9.

ARGUMENT VIII, COROLLARY.
THERE IS NO OPINION ABOUT THE OTHERS

166a4–b3 —So, not even opinion is there of what is not beside [παρὰ] the others, nor is there some semblance, nor will what is not be in any way or manner object of opinion by the others. —Indeed not. —So, if the one is not, none of the others is deemed [δοξάζεται] to be either one or many; for it is impossible to deem the many without a one. —It is impossible. —And so, if the one is not, the others neither are nor are deemed to be either one or many. —It seems not. *VIII.corol.*

166a4, παρὰ, 'beside'] Not πρός, 'in relation to', because the one is considered as being καθ' αὑτό, 'in itself'.

166a6, 'by the others'] Reading ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων with Brisson, following manuscripts B and T. Cf. Brisson (1994), 282 n. 507: "On notera . . . que parmi les autres choses, il y a des choses qui sont des intellects, ou qui possèdent l'intellect."

The consequences in Argument VIII are drawn for the others that cannot be related to the one that is not. The others are, thus, 'beside' the one, they too being καθ' αὑτά, 'in themselves', for they cannot be related to what cannot be, for its part, related to them. And if no relation is possible between the one and the others, there can be no sort of cognition of the one by the others. But if the one is not, the others cannot be (denumerably) many. And if they are not (denumerably) many, then there can be no one of the many that could be sufficiently individualized so as to be the object of even the feeblest type of cognition.

If the one is totally negated, if there is nothing that is in itself one, then the many cannot even be the object of illusory or counterfeit cognition. Even such a sophistic type of cognition would presuppose, as shown in Argument VII, the possibility of distinguishing, if only for the moment, between aspects according to which the subject of predication is or is not what it is said to be or not to be.

THEOREMS VIII.8, 7, 5, . . . THE OTHERS ARE NEITHER LIKE NOR UNLIKE, NEITHER THE SAME NOR DIFFERENT; THEY ARE NOT IN CONTACT, . . .

166b3–7 —And so, also not like or unlike. —Indeed not. —Nor, again, the same or different, nor touching or apart, nor all that we have previously described as appearing: the others are or seem none of these, if the one is not. —True. *VIII.8,7, 5, . . .*

ARGUMENT VIII, CONCLUSION. THE OTHERS ARE NOT IN ANY WAY

166b7–c2 —Thus, if we should say in short that, if the one is not, nothing is, would we be speaking rightly? —By all means. *VIII.concl.*

166c1, *οὐδέν ἐστιν*, 'nothing is'] *Οὐδέν* must be the subject. Argument VIII draws conclusions for the many: 'nothing is' (not 'it [*sc.* the one] is nothing'). And such is indeed its summary. If we negate the one *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*, 'in itself', we cannot have discourse, etc.

The absolute one is a precondition of all *οὐσία*, as Proclus rightly pointed out in this context. But this is not to say, of course, that we must accept his general claim that in the *Parmenides* we are given Plato's systematic theology. In fact, we have here not even a systematic metaphysics, but only the logical skeleton of a possible metaphysics, a "logische Aufbau der Welt," to be developed in the *Sophist*.

For Plato, as for Derrida, difference is the condition of discourse. But Derrida maintains that, since difference excludes the possibility of an absolute one, there is no difference between grammar and ontology.[1] Plato, on the contrary, maintains that not even grammar (discourse) can exist without an absolute one. Arguments VII and VIII show that any grammar based only on the weakened Principle of Noncontradiction, and in which the one is not, will not hold. Argument VIII amounts to saying that no difference can ultimately be established without absolute being.

The absolute one cannot be directly apprehended (cf. *Phaedo* 99e5, 'escaping to the *λόγοι*, and Argument I, 142a1–6), but it must be assumed as a condition for an *ἀληθὴς λόγος*. (Cf. *Republic* VI 511b6–7, VII 533d1 ff.) In order to escape the conclusion that no cognition or meaningful discourse is possible, one *must* assume the form as an absolute one.[2]

We must, then, consider the one in *both* respects: *πρὸς αὑτό* (or *καθ' αὑτό*), 'in relation to itself', and *πρὸς τἆλλα*, 'in relation to the others'. Against Aristotle's insistence to the contrary,[3] Plato maintains that both Principles of Non-

1. Or between semiology and semantics. Cf. Derrida (1989 [1968]), 382; Benveniste (1966).
2. Cf. Scolnicov (1994).
3. *Metaphysics* Γ 3.1005b9, 11 *(bis)*, 14, 16, 17, 21.

contradiction are necessary, the restricted Principle being dependent on the absolute Principle. The fact that forms can be known and participated in must be taken together with their transcendence. Parmenides' ontological dichotomies must be negated, if dialectic (and metaphysics) are to be possible.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

166c2–5 —Well, then, let this be said, and also that, as it seems, if the one is and if it is not, both it and the others, in relation to themselves as well as in relation to each other, both are and are not, and appear and do not appear everything in every way. —Most true. *I–VIII.concl.*

166c3, εἴτ'. . . εἴτε . . .] Not 'whether . . . or . . .' but perhaps something more like 'if . . . (then . . .) and if . . . (then . . .)'.

Young Aristoteles is not baffled by the conclusion and gives it his fullest assent. The ostensive conclusion again camouflages the real moral of the long argument. Parmenides himself draws our attention to the purely formal character of his last statement (166c3, ὡς ἔοικεν, 'as it seems'). For him who has followed the argument closely, the lesson should be clear.

Parmenides has done what Socrates had deemed wonderful at 129b6–130a2: he has shown 'that that which is one is itself many, and again that the many are indeed one', and how the form itself can—nay, *must*—be affected by opposites, if philosophy is to be saved and the possibility of dialogue will not be destroyed. (Cf. 135c1–5.)

But he has also done more than that. Arguments I–VIII distinguished not only between two *types of entities* but also, more important, between two *modes of being*. The being of the many is dependent on the being of the one. The situation is asymmetrical. If there are no many, the one can still be καθ' αὑτό (so in Argument I, in spite of all its inherent problems—mainly epistemological). But if there is no one καθ' αὑτό, there can be no real many (Argument VIII).

Plato's hypothetical procedure has led us from the conviction that knowledge in the strict sense and opinion are possible, to the conditions of that possibility: unities can be said to be both in themselves and in relation to others, and, moreover, the possibility of such unities to be in relation to each other presupposes that they be also in themselves. The fact of cognition requires a non-Parmenidean logic, such as was developed in the course of Arguments I–VIII. Such logic provides us with the infrastructure of an ontology of mutual participation of forms in each other and unidirectional participation of sensible things in forms, which has been outlined since the *Phaedo* and will be elaborated more carefully as from the *Sophist*. But the Parmenidean one, although not an object of (discursive) cognition, cannot be done away with.

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