

Plato's Theory of Knowledge The Theaetetus and The Sophist

PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS

PLATO'S Theory of Knowledge

The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato translated with a running commentary

By

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To J. VIVIAN WILSON

PREFACE

WHEN the Editor, some eleven years ago, invited me to contribute to this series, 10 dired a translation of the *Thexaedus* with a running commentary. I have since added the *Sophics*. Meanwhile the book has been announced under the title, *Plato's Thexaedus* with the book which may seem to promise more than 1 have performed. My object was to make accessible to students of philosophy who canot easily read the Greek text, two masterpieces of Plato's later period, concerned with questions that still hold a living interest. A study of existing translations and editions has encouraged also the hope that scholars already familiar with the dialogues may find a fresh interpretation not unwelcome. A commentary has been added because, in the more difficult places, a bare translation is almost certain, if understood at all, to be misunderstood.

This danger may be illustrated by a quotation from a living philosopher of the first rank :

' It was Plato in his later mood who put forward the suggestion " and I hold that the definition of being is simply power". This

suggestion is the charter of the doctrine of Immanent Law." Dr. Whitehead is quoting Jowett's translation. If the reader will refer to the passage (p. 334 below), he will see that the words are rendered: "I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but power." A mark for eal things may not be a 'definition of being '. This mark, moreover, is offered by the Elastic Stranger to the materialist as an improvement on his own mark of real things, tangibility. The materialist accepts it, 'having for the moment no better suggestion of his own to offer '. The Stranger adds that Theaetertus and he may perhaps change their minds on this matter later on. Plato has certainly not committed thimself here to a 'definition of being'. So much could be dis-

¹ A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (1933), p. 165. I am not suggesting that Dr Whitehead fundamentally misunderstands the master who has deeply influenced his own philosophy, but only pointing out how a profound thinker may be misled by a translation.

³ This rendering is itself doubtful, the construction of the words, as they stand in the MSS, being obscure and difficult.

PREFACE

covered from an accurate translation; but the word 'power' still needs to be explained. It has been rendered by 'potency', 'force', 'Moligichkei', 'puissance de relation 'Without some account of the history of the word dynamis in Plato's time and earlier, the student accustomed to the terms of modern philosophy may well carry away a false impression.

To meet difficulties such as this. I have interpolated, after each compact section of the text, a commentary which aims at discovering what Plato really means and how that part of the argument is related to the rest. There are objections to dissecting the living body of a Platonic dialogue. No other writer has approached Plato's skill in concealing a rigid and intricate structure of reasoning beneath the flowing lines of a conversation in which the suggestion of each thought as it arises seems to be followed to an unpremeditated conclusion. In these later dialogues, however, the bones show more clearly through the skin ; and it is likely that Plato would rather have us penetrate his meaning than stand back with folded hands to admire his art. An interpolated commentary. giving the reader the information he needs when and where he needs it, may be preferred to the usual plan of stowing away such information in an introduction at the beginning and notes at the end. It is not clear why we should be forced to read a book in three places at once. This book, at any rate, is designed to be read straight through.

The translation follows Burne's text, except where I have given reasons for departing from it or proposed corrections of passages that are probably or certainly corrupt. I have tried to follow Plato's own practice of keeping to the current language of educated conversation and refusing to allow any word to harden into a technical term. The commentary attempts only to interpret Plato from his own writings and those of his forerunners and contemporaries, and accordingly avoids, so far as possible, the misleading jargon of modern philosophy. Terms like 'subjectivism', 'relativism', 'sensationalism', even when defined, often mask ambiguities of thought that are lost sight of as this token currency passes from hand to hand.

At the risk of appearing arrogant or ill-informed, I have, for the most part, ignored interpretations which I cannot accept. Also I have not loaded the notes with acknowledgments of my debts to other scholars. Among works which have most helped me I would mention Campbell's editions; Apelt's translations (which contain full bibliographies); M. Dies' editions in the Collection des Universities de France; E. Stölzel, Die Behandlung des Erkonsinisfyrolems bei Pleton (Halle, 1905); J. Stenzel, Entsticklung

PREFACE

der platonischen Dialektik (Breslau, 1917); C. Ritter, Neue Uniersuchungen über Platon (München, 1910); V. Brochard, Études de philosophie ancienne (Paris, 1912); and the well-known writings of John Burnet and Professor A. E. Taylor.

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F. M. C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	P	AGE
	PREFACE	viı
	INTRODUCTION	I
MARGINAL PAGE	THE THEAETETUS	
142A-143C.	THE INTRODUCTORY DIALOGUE	15
	THE MAIN DIALOGUE	17
143D-151D.	Introductory Conversation	17
	I. The Clasm of Perception to be Knowledge	29
151D-E.	Theaetetus identifies knowledge with perception .	29
151E-152C	Dialectical combination of Theaetetus' position with Protagoras' doctrine	30
152C-153D	Dialectical combination with the Heracleitean doctrine of Flux	36
153D—154B.	Preliminary account of the nature of sense-objects and percipients	39
154B-155D.	Some puzzles concerning size and number .	41
155D-157C.	Theory of the nature of sense-perception .	45
157C-D.	Theaetetus accepts the theory of perception .	51
157E-160E.	The claim of perception, so defined, to be infallible	52
160E-161B	Interlude. Criticism begins	58
161 B -163A.	Some objections against Protagoras	60
163A-164B.	Objections to a simple identification of perceiving and knowing	62
164C-165E.	Socrates undertakes to defend Protagoras	65
165B168C.	The Defence of Protagoras	68
168C-169D.	Interlude	75
169D—171D.	Criticism of Protagoras' doctrine as extended to all judgments	76
171D-172B.	Restatement of the question : Wherein lies the superiority of the wise ? .	80
172B-177C.	Digression. The contrast of Philosophy and Rhetoric	81
1770–179C.	Refutation of the Defence of Protagoras	89

CONTENTS

MARGINAL PAGE	P	AGE
1790-1818.	The extreme Heracleitean position, contrasted with Parmenides' denial of all motion and change .	92
1830-184B.		95 101 102

11. The Clasm of True Judgment to be Knowledge . 109

187 4- C.	Theaetetus states the claim of true judgment .	109
187C-E.	How is false judgment possible ?	110
1875-188c.	False judgment as thinking that one thing (known or unknown) is another thing (known or unknown)	111
188с-189в	False judgment as thinking the thing that is not .	114
189B-190E	The apparent impossibility of false judgment as mistaking one thing for another	116
190 E -195B	One class of mistakes can be explained by taking into account memory The Wax Tablet	120
195 B-196C .	False judgment in general cannot, however, be defined as the misfitting of perception to thought	127
196D-199C	Memory compared to an Aviary, to provide for mis- taken judgments not involving perception	130
199C-200D.	Rejection of 'interchange of pieces of knowledge' as an account of false judgment .	136
200D-201C	Conclusion. Knowledge cannot be defined as true belief	140

III. The Claim of True Belief accompanied by an account or explanation to be Knowledge . 142

2010-202C.	Socrates states this theory as he has heard it .	142
2020-206C.	The theory criticised for making elements un- knowable	146
206C-E.	Three possible meanings of 'account': (1) Expres- sion of thought in speech (irrelevant)	154
206 E~2 08B.	(2) Enumeration of elementary parts This will not convert a true notion into knowledge	155
2088-210B.	(3) The statement of a distinguishing mark. This will not convert a true notion into knowledge.	158
210 B-D .	EPILOGUE. All these attempts to define knowledge have failed	163

CONTENTS

MARGINAL PAGE	THE SOPHIST	PAGE
216A-218D.	Introductory Conversation	165
218D-221C.	Illustrative Division defining the Angler	170
	The seven Divisions defining the Sophist	172
22IC-223B.	Division I. The Sophist as hunter	173
223C-224E.	Divisions II-IV. The Sophist as salesman .	174
224E-226A	Division V. Eristic	175
226A-231B.	Division VI. Cathartic method of Socrates .	177
-	The Methods of Collection and Division .	184
231B-235A.	Survey yielding the genus 'Image-making'.	187
235A-236C.	Division of Image-making into two species	195
236С-237В.	Statement of the problems of unreal appearances and of falsity in speech and thought	199
	I. The Worlds of Reality and Appearance .	202
237В-239С.	(a) The totally unreal	203
239С-242В	(b) Definition of endolon and the problem of false statement and behef	209
242B244B.	(c) The perfectly real. What does ' real ' mean ?	216
244B-245E	Criticism of Parmenides' One Real Being .	220
245E-246E.	The Battle of Gods and Giants. Idealists and Materialists	228
246E-248a.	A mark of the real is offered for the Materialists' acceptance	232
248A-249D.	The Idealists must concede that reality includes some changing things	239
249D-251A.	Transition. What does the Idealist mean by 'real'?.	248
	II. The Combination of Forms and the Problem of Negative Statements	252
251A-C.	Exclusion of the trivial question, how one individual thing can have many names	253
2510-252E.	Proof that some Forms will combine, others will not	255
252B-253C.	The texture of philosophic discourse	260
253C-254B.	Description of the science of Dialectic	262
	The structure of the world of Forms	268
2 54B- D.	Three of the most important Forms selected for purposes of illustration · Existence, Motion, Rest xiii	273

CONTENTS

MARGINAL PAGE	1	AGE
2 54D-2553.	Two further Forms, Sameness and Difference, dis- tinct from these three and all-pervading	279
2 55E-2 57A.	A review of true statements involving the five Forms shows that there are any number of true statements asserting that 'what is ' in a sense ' is not'	285
257B-258C.	There are also any number of true statements asserting that 'what is not' in a sense 'is '	289
258C-259D.	Conclusion: We have refuted Parmenides' dogma that ' what is ' cannot in any sense ' not-be ', and that ' what is not ' cannot in any sense ' be '.	294
	III. False Speaking and Thinking	298
259D-261C.	Introductory statement of the problem	298
261C-262E.	Every statement is a complex of heterogeneous elements (name and verb)	303
262E.	Every statement is about something and is either true or false	308
262E-263B.	The definition of true statement	309
263B-D.	The definition of false statement .	311
263D-264B.	Judgment being simply unspoken statement, false judgment and false 'appearing ' are possible .	318
2 64B- D	Transition, connecting these results with the inter- rupted Division of Image-making	320
264D-268D.		
	maker	323
	INDEX	333

INTRODUCTION

Struct the commentary aims at furnishing the reader with information as the need arises, it will be enough, by way of introduction, to indicate the place of the *Theastetus* and the *Sophisi* in the series of Plato's dialogues, and to define briefly the position from which the inquiry starts.

Our two dialogues belong to a group consisting of the Parmenides. the Theastetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman. As M. Dies has observed.1 Plato leaves no doubt that the dialogues are meant to be read in this order. The Parmenides describes a meeting imagined as taking place about 450 B.C. between Socrates, who would then be about twenty, and the Eleatic philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno. To suppose that anything remotely resembling the conversation in this dialogue could have occurred at that date would make nonsense of the whole history of philosophy in the fifth and fourth centuries ; and I believe, with M. Dies, that the meeting itself is a literary fiction, not a fact in the biography of Socrates. No ancient historian of philosophy mistook it for the record of an actual event, which, had it occurred, would have been a very important landmark. The Theasteins (183E, p. 101) alludes to this meeting, and it is once more recalled in the Sophist (217C. p. 166) in terms that can only refer to the Parmenides. The Theaetetus, again, ends with an appointment which is kept at the beginning of the Sophist : and the Sophist itself is openly referred to in the Statesman.

As for the order of composition, no one doubts that the Sophisi and the Statesman, which contain one continuous conversation, are later than the Theastetus. In the Theastetus many critics have noticed that the style changes towards the end in the direction of Plato's later manner. If that is so, stylometric results based on the dialogue as a whole will be misleading. The latter part of the Theastetus, as we have it, may have been finished years after the beginning, and the Parmenides may have been composed in the interval. On the other hand, we need not suppose any very long gap between the completion of the Theastetus and the composition of the Sophist and the Statesman.

¹ Parménude (1923), p. xu.

P.T.K.

It is now agreed that this group as a whole is earlier than the Timaeus, the Philebus, and the Laws, and later than the Meno. the Phaedo, and the Republic. The Republic is the centre of a group of less technical works, intended, not primarily for students of philosophy, but for the educated public, who would certainly not read the Parmenides and would find the Theaetetus and the Sobhist intolerably difficult. These more popular writings would serve the double purpose of attracting students to the Academy and of making known to the Greek world a doctrine which, in common with most scholars. I hold to be characteristically Platonic. Its two pillars are the immortality and divinity of the rational soul, and the real existence of the objects of its knowledge-a world of intelligible ' Forms' separate from the things our senses perceive.1 Neither doctrine clearly appears in any dialogue that can be dated, on grounds of style, as distinctly earlier than the Meno. Both are put forward in the Phaedo in a manner suggesting that Plato arrived at them simultaneously and thought of them as interdependent.

The Meno had already announced the theory of Anamnesis ; that knowledge is acquired, not through the senses or as information conveyed from one mind to another by teaching, but by recollection in this life of realities and truths seen and known by the soul before its incarnation. Socrates bases this doctrine on an account which he believes to be true.² learnt from men and women who are wise in religious matters and from inspired poets. The human soul is immortal (divine) and is purified through a round of incarnations, from which, when completely purified, it may finally escape. 'So the soul is immortal and has been many times reborn ; and since it has seen all things, both in this world and in the other, there is nothing it has not learnt. No wonder, then, that it can recover the memory of what it has formerly known concerning virtue or any other matter. All Nature is akin and the soul has learnt all things; so there is nothing to prevent one who has recollected-learnt, as we call it-one single thing from discovering all the rest for himself, if he is resolute and unwearving in the search ; for seeking or learning is nothing but recollection '.

¹ I agree with Mr J. D. Mabbott ('Aristotle and the χωρισμός of Plato', Classical Quarierly, xx (1926), 72) that the 'separate' existence of the Forma, strucked by Aristotle, is not to be explained away.

³ Meso Sia, Myree double, not poller, through the form which contains the true account may be mythical. So at Gorgus 232, he calls the myth of the judgment of the dead a Myree dubyer, through callicles may thunk it a poller. I take the Socrates of the Meso and the Phasedo as stating Plato's behefs, not those of the hattorn Socrates.

Socrates goes on to prove this doctrine by experiment. By questioning a slave who has never been taught geometry, he elicits from him, after several wrong attempts, the solution of a not very easy problem of construction. He claims that he has not ' taught ' the slave the true belief he now has, any more than the false beliefs he produced at first. At the outset the slave had not knowledge : but these beliefs were in him, including the true belief which he did not know. They have been 'stirred up in him as it were in a dream', and if he were questioned again and again in various ways, he would end by having knowledge in place of true beliefknowledge which he would have recovered out of his own soul This knowledge must have been acquired before birth. 'If, then, the truth of things is always in our soul, the soul must be immortal ; hence you may confidently set about seeking for and recovering the memory of what you do not know, that is to say, do not remember.' Socrates adds that, in some respects, he could not defend the whole account : but he is convinced of the practical conclusion, that we shall be the better for believing that we can discover truth we do not know. Owing to Plato's dramatic method. we cannot fix the extent of Socrates' reservation. It might mean that the historic Socrates did not hold this theory, or, more probably, that the details of reincarnation, purgatory, and so forth, as described by Pindar and others, are 'mythical': as such Plato always represents them elsewhere. But the reservation does not extend to the hypothetical conclusion which Socrates and Meno have both accepted : If the truth of things is always in the soul, then the soul is immortal.

Some modern critics, wishing perhaps to transform Plato's theory into something that we can accept, reduce the doctrine of Anamnesis to a form in which it ceases to have any connection with the pre-existence of the soul. But Plato unquestionably believed in immortaity; and in the Phaeedo, where Recollection is reafirmed, it is the one proof of pre-existence which is accepted as satisfactory by all parties to the conversation.

The doctrine of Recollection marks a complete break with current beliefs both about the nature of the soul and about the sources of knowledge. The soul was popularly regarded as a mere shadow or eidelow, an unsubstantial wraith, that might well be dissipated when detached from the body. And if common sense could be said to have any view of the common characters called Forms $(zb\eta)$ in the Socratic dialogues, it would be the empiricist view that they are present in sensible things, and that our knowledge of them is conveyed through the senses, perhaps by images, like the Atomist's *eidole*, thrown off by material bodies. Among the

philosophic theories which Socrates, in the Phaedo, savs he had found unsatisfying is the doctrine ' that it is the brain that gives us perceptions of hearing, sight, and smell, and out of these arise memory and belief, and from these again, when they have settled down into quiescence, comes knowledge '. Plato's break with all theories deriving knowledge by abstraction from sensible objects carried with it an equally firm repudiation of popular notions of the soul as either a firmsy double of the body or a resultant, supervening on the mixture of bodily elements. In other words, the 'separation' of the Platonic Forms from any dependence on material things went with the separation of the soul which knows them from any dependence on the physical organism. The Phaedo is designed to plead for both conclusions concurrently. It is not claimed that either doctrine is proved : but it is claimed that if the Forms exist and can be known, then the soul is immortal. Plato himself believed both : and his Socrates, unlike the Socrates of the earlier dialogues, now uses every resource of eloquence to convince his hearers of what he believes but does not know.

In his opening discourse it is assumed from the outset that the soul can exist without the body ; for ' to be dead ' is defined as meaning ' that the body has come to be separate by itself apart from (rook) the soul, and the soul separate by itself apart from the body'. 1 So much might be said of the wraith or shadow-soul of popular belief ; but the properties which Socrates goes on to ascribe to the separable soul are very different. The contrast is not between mind and matter, or even between soul and body as commonly understood. The psyche here is what was later called by Plato and Aristotle the Reason (rofc), or the spirit, in opposition to the flesh.* To the flesh belong the senses, and the bodily appetites and pleasures. The spirit's proper function is thought or reflection, which lays hold upon unseen reality and is best carried on when the spirit withdraws from the flesh to think by itself, untroubled by the senses. The pursuit of wisdom is a 'loosing and separation (romonomode) of the soul from the body '-a rehearsal of that separation called death (67D).

The effect of this introductory discourse is to establish in the reader's mind, before the argument begins, the idea of a complete detachment of the thinking self from the body and its senses and passions. This idea, though unfamiliar, would be easier for Plato's public to grasp than that detachment of Forms from sensible things

¹64C. In the Gorgias myth (524B), death is already described as the 'severance (3adkeous) of two things-body and soul-from one another'.

² Cf. F. M. Cornford, 'The Division of the Soul', Hibbert Journal (Jan. 1930), p. 206.

INTRODUCTION

which it is his other purpose to announce clearly for the first time. If the reader will forget all that he has learnt about the Forms from later writings and put himseli in the situation of Plato's readers who knew only the earlier dialogues, he will find that he is being led, step by step, to recognise the separate existence of the Forms.

The Forms are first mentioned as the objects of the son's reflection, when withdrawn from the senses. All that is pointed out here (65D) is that those entities which were the familiar topics of Socrates' conversation are perceived by thought, not by the senses. When Socrates and his friends considered, What is Justice', they were trying to define the Just 'by itsel' (abrd), and to discover 'what it is 'do for the 'being' (abrd), and to discover 'what it is 'do for the sense that Justice, not being a thing that can be seen or touched, will be known by pure thought when the soul is 'set free from eyes and ears and the body as a whole'.

There follows a long and elaborate defence of Anamnesis, addressed to the more difficult task of convincing the reader, on the one hand, that the soul has pre-existed, and on the other, that his own vague notions of how we first become acquainted with a thing like 'Justice itself' are radically wrong. We not only cannot perceive it : we cannot extract it from any sense-impressions. This might be argued more easily in the case of the moral Forms. which are obviously not sensible ; but Plato is no less concerned with the mathematical Forms. He undertakes to prove that we cannot derive our knowledge of Equality from the perception of equal things. The same two sticks sometimes appear equal to one person and unequal to another : but no one ever thinks that 'equals' are unequal or that Equality is Inequality. The sight of nearly equal things causes us to think of Equality, and we judge that they fall short of that ideal standard. It is argued that we must have obtained knowledge of true Equality before we began to use our senses, that is to say, before our birth ; and this carries with it the pre-existence of the soul. Whether the argument seems sound to the modern reader or not. Anamnesis is accepted by all parties and later reaffirmed (Q2A); nor is any doubt ever cast upon it in Plato's other works. The upshot is that the Forms have an existence separate from things as surely as the spirit has an existence separate from the body.

The next argument is to urge that the soul not only has preexisted, but is by nature indestructible. It is not composed or put together out of parts into which it might be dissolved. It is reasonable, we are told, to identify incomposite things with things

that never undergo any sort of change. Now the reader who has grasped the distinction between ideal Equality and the nearly equal things of sense, will agree that Forms must always be what they are and can suffer no kind of change. The many things that bear the same names as the Forms are perpetually changing in all respects ; and these are the things we see and touch, whereas the Forms are unseen. It is thus laid down that there are two orders of things: the unseen, exempt from all change, and the seen, which change perpetually. Finally it is argued as probable that the soul, which is unseen, most resembles the divine, immortal, intelligible, simple, and indissoluble ; while the body most resembles the human, mortal, unintelligible, complex, and dissoluble. The separation of the two worlds or orders of being is here very sharply marked. No relation between them is described : no transition from sense to thought is suggested. Even the fact that sensible experience may be the occasion of Recollection is lost sight of. Socrates recurs to the language of his opening discourse. When the soul uses any of the senses, it is dragged down into the world of change and becomes dizzy and confused. Only when thinking by itself can it escape into that other region of pure, eternal, and unchanging being,

⁴ Thus, by a series of steps, the reader acquanted with the earlier dialogues is led to see that the moral terms which Socrate was always discussing belong to a distinct order of realities, and that knowledge of them cannot be extracted from impressions of sense. Throughout, the separation of the Forms is intertwined with and illustrated by the separation of the divine spirit from all dependence on the mortal body. The conclusion is that the two doctrines stand or fall together.¹

The separate reality of the Forms created a problem which is courageously faced, though not solved, in the later group to which our dialogues belong. How are those separate Forms related to the things we touch and see in this world of becoming? The *Phaseo* inself (rooc-n) had indicated that to speak of a thing as 'partaking of 'a Form is to use a metaphor that leaves it obscure how an eternal and unchanging Form or its character can be 'present in' or 'shared by' transient individual things in time and space. In the *Parsensides* Socrates is represented as putting forward the theory of separate Forms to dispose of Zeno's paradoxical antinomies, and as confronted with this very difficulty of participation by Zeno's master, *Parmenides*. It is significant that the great founder of the Elas should attace the lade in the Softwice and that a Stranger from Elas should take the lead in the Softwice

1 Phasedo 76DE, 92D.

and the Statesman. Parmenides had been the first to raise the problem which the theory of Forms was intended to solve. This problem had two aspects. In Parmenides' poen it is presented chiefy as the problem that arises when a world of real being is distinguished from a world of 'seeming' or appearance, which is somehow false and unreal, or, as Parmenides humself declared, totally false and unreal. This aspect we shall encounter, as the problem of *eldola*, stated, but not solved, in the *Sophist*. Parmenides had also drawn the corresponding distinction between the senses, which profess to reveal appearances, and rational thought apprehending true reality. The *Thascatus* will formulate and examine the claim of the senses to yield knowledge. The discussion moves in the world of appearance and proves that, if we try to leave out of account the world of true being, we cannot extract knowledge from sensible experience.

The theory of Forms, as stated in the Phaedo, was meant to deal with both aspects of the problem bequeathed by Parmenides. The eternal and intelligible Forms were to provide rational thought with objects of knowledge. The transient existence or ' becoming' of sensible things in the world of appearance was to be grounded in the world of true being by some kind of participation; they were thus to be endowed with an ambiguous half-reality, not left, as in Parmenides' uncompromising system, totally unsupported. But our series of dialogues opens with a trenchant criticism of Plato's own theory as giving no intelligible account of the derivation of appearances from reality. The discussion starts from Zeno's counter-attack on the critics of Parmenides. Zeno had put forward a series of arguments, reducing (as he thought) to absurdity their defence of the common-sense belief in the existence of a plurality of real things. His first argument is quoted : ' If there are many things, then they must be both like and unlike.' From both horns of the dilemma Zeno deduced what he regarded as impossible consequences. Socrates replies that no impossibilities result, if you recognise 'a Form, Likeness, just by itself ', and another contrary Form, Unlikeness. That things which are simply 'alike' and nothing else should be ' unlike ' is no doubt impossible ; but there is no difficulty in supposing that individual concrete things should partake of both Forms at once and so come to be both like and unlike. One thing can have many names, partake of many Forms, some of which may be contrary to others. The difficulties disappear 'if you distinguish the Forms apart by themselves' and realise that individual things partake of them.

Parmenides' criticisms are directed against this 'separation' (reouguos) of the Forms, on which the Phaedo had laid so much stress,¹ and the consequent difficulty of conceiving clearly the 'participation' which is to bridge the gulf. Socrates is confronted with two questions, which he finds it difficult to answer.

The first is the extent of the world of Forms. Several classes of terms are mentioned, and Socrates is asked if he recognises separate Forms for each class. (1) First come the terms which had figured in Zeno's dilemmas : Likeness, Unlikeness : Unity, Plurality : Motion, Rest. etc.¹ To these are added (2) the moral Forms, ' Just, Beautiful, Good, etc.', About these two classes Socrates has no doubts. (3) The next class contains (a) Forms such as 'Man', 'separate from ourselves and all other men', and (b) Fire and Water. (These terms correspond to the products of divine workmanship described in the Sophist 266B (D. 326) ; 'ourselves and all other living creatures and the elements of natural things -fire, water, and their kindred'. Living organisms and the four elements of which all bodies are composed are the two classes of things in the physical world with the best claim to represent Forms -the models after which the divine creator of the Tumaeus works) Socrates says he has often felt some uncertainty about these. (Probably they were not contemplated in the early stages of the theory, which started with mathematical and moral Forms. But they are contemplated in the Timaeus.3) Last come (4) Hair. Clay. Dirt. and other undignified things. (Hair, an organic part of a living creature, was one of Anaxagoras' homeomerous substances ; and here it may stand for all organic compounds of the elementary bodies. 'Clay', as Socrates remarks at Theasteins 147C (D. 22). is 'earth mixed with moisture'. Clay and Dirt. as casual mixtures of the elements, have the least claim to Forms.) Socrates at first replies that he thinks there are no Forms for these undignified things : but he has been troubled with doubts ' whether it may not be the same with everything'. Then, fearing to fall into an abyss of absurdity, he has returned to the study of Forms of the first two classes. Parmenides remarks that when he is older he

Parmen 1200 (Socrates), the re baughter yould oth a self oth re 600, 1300 (Parmenules), which or others before a threat, yould be a reform a during one is a set of society yould for a soft of the set of the

municating its character (*ibia*, µop#f) to the individual thing. But how? • Motion and Rest are included at 1250 (d. *Pkasfau* sfrip) These terms (and the moral Forms) will receiper among the 'common terms' of *Thesistus* 1850 ff. (p 104), where 'unity and number in general', 'odd' and 'even', etc., are added. The mathematical Forms belong to this class.

⁸ Timasus 51C (on Forms of the elements) practically quotes Parm. 130D.

will be more philosophical and pay less regard to vulgar esteem. Here this question is dropped. No mention has been made of Forms for artificial objects or for sensible qualities like that and Cold, although 'Hot' and 'Cold ' had figured in the ideal theory of the *Phaedo*, and the *Ropublic* had appeared to recognise a divinely created Form of Bedstead.

What is the extent of the world of Forms ? Plato never answers this question.1 The difficulty arises from the double origin of the theory. As Aristotle tells us in his account of Platonism.² one root was the Socratic inquiry after the definition of 'universals' Socrates, who was not concerned with any system of Nature, confined himself to the attempt to define moral terms, such as 'Just'. Plato (who was concerned with ontology), accepting the Heracleitean Flux as applied to sensible things, saw that the subject of a Socratic definition could not be any sensible thing, since such things are in perpetual change and cannot be known ; so he said that it must be a separate entity, to which he gave the name ' Form ' and that the group of sensible things bearing the same name partake of that Form. The underlying assumption here is that every common name must have a fixed meaning, which we think of when we hear the name spoken : speaker and hearer thus have the same object before their minds. Only so can they understand one another and any discourse be possible. On this showing, however, all common names have the same right to have a Form for their meaning ; and so we arrive at the statement (Rep. 506A) ; 'we are accustomed to assume a single form (or character, alloc) for every set of things to which we apply the same name.' We can say : 'This is hot', 'This is dirty', 'This is human', 'This is just', and so on. If all such statements are on the same footing, we ought to recognise a common character or Form for every existing common name, and moreover for every entity that might be distinguished by a separate name. The world of Forms ought to be indefinitely more numerous than the vocabulary of any language.

But how does this theory look if we start from the other root of Platonism—the Pythagorean doctrine of Numbers as the real being of all things 7. According to Aristotle, Plato conceived the relation of things to Forms in the same way as the Pythagoreans conceived the relation of things to Numbers: when he said that things 'partake of' Forms he was only making a verbal change in their

Metaph. A, 6.

¹ If Episils VII, 342A ff. be accepted as genuine, Plato recognised, at the end of his life, Forms of mathematical objects, moral terms, every natural and artificial body, the four elements, every species of living creature, every moral quality, all actions and affections (s42D).

statement that things ' represent ' (or embody) Numbers. The Form now becomes something more than the meaning of a common name -an entity whose metaphysical status Socrates, probably, had never inquired into. Socrates had 'no system of Nature': but Plato endows the Forms with a 'separate' existence in an intelligible world of true being, where they replace the Pythagorean Numbers as the reality which appearances are somehow to represent. There is no trouble about the mathematical Forms, which are certainly distinct from visible and tangible bodies and constitute a realm of eternal truth. The moral Forms, again, may stand as ideals, never perfectly embodied in human action and character. Forms of both these classes can be maintained as eternal things which the soul can know (as the Phaedo asserts) without any recourse to the bodily senses. Further, when we come to physics, we can accommodate the fixed types of natural species and of the four elements. But what is to be said of the legion of other common names-nouns, adjectives, verbs-which also have fixed meanings ? ' Clay' is a common name : but can physics or metaphysics recognise an eternal exemplar of clay and of every distinguishable variety of clay ? And what of sensible qualities, like hot and cold ? Is Heat or Cold or Redness the sort of object that can be known. independently of all sense experience, by a disembodied soul ? Is Redness or Hotness an eternally real Form accounting for the ' becoming ' of red or hot things in the physical world ? Do bodies 'partake' of Redness when no one is seeing them, or of Hotness when no one feels their heat ? Such may have been the questions which embarrassed Plato with the uncertainty confessed by Socrates in the Parmenides. The most formidable consequence of recognising a Form for every common name would be that no limit could then be set to the world of Forms. The unlimited cannot be known. and if the Forms are unknowable, their raison d'être is gone. But Plato leaves this question without an answer.

Parmenides then turns to his second line of criticism : How are the separate Forms related to the things that 'partake of ' them ?

(1) If we press one natural meaning of 'partake' or 'share', are we to suppose that the Form as a whole is in each of the things, or that each thing contains a part of it? Either supposition is absurd. This dilemma can, indeed, be taken as merely an objection to certain misleading associations of the word 'partake'.' Many things can 'share' in one Form in the sense that they all have the same relation to it. But the question, what that relation can be, remains unanswered.

(2) The suggestion that the Form might be only a 'thought' in ¹ Cf. G. C. Field in Mind, XXXVi, pp. 87 fl. our minds is decisively rejected. The Form is not a mental existent ; it must be an object of thought, of which any number of minds may, or may not, think.

(3) Finally it is suggested that, while the Form has its separate reality, what is present here is not the Form, but a copy or image of it. One original can have many copies. The relation will then be 'likeness'. But this will lead to an infinite regress. If the original and the copy are alike, they have a common character, but then there will be just as much reason to posit another Form for original and copy to partake of as there was to posit the original Form for all the copies to partake of as there was to posit the original Form for all the copies to partake of as there was to posit be original. For more that the relation 'partaking' cannot be reduced to 'likeness', but we must look for some other account of it. The point might be argued thus : it may be true that the copy is, at least m some degree, like the original, but that cannot be all that is meant. Likeness subsists between any two copies, but we do not say that one copy 'partakes of ' another.

The upshot of all this criticism is that no intelligible account has yet been given of the relation between Forms and things; the metaphors will not bear serious scrutiny. Parmenides ends with a picture of the ideal world as withdrawn beyond the reach of human knowledge. A god might know the Forms, but can we know anything beyond the things in our world ? On the other hand, Parmendes himself acknowledges that the Forms are a necessity of thought; without them philosophic discourse, or indeed discourse of any kind, is impossible. This conclusion can only mean that the difficulties cannot be insuperable. Plat's intention may be to show that he is as aware as any of his critics that they exist, and to set his pupils to think about them.

There is one further problem, mooted by Scorates himself in the Parmenides, which is dealt with in the Sophist. This concerns the relations of Forms, not to things, but to one another. Scorates has just made his point that, if separate Forms are recognised, a concrete thing can very well paratek both of Likeness and of Unlikeness. 'But,' he then adds,' if you do separate the Forms apart by themselves—Likeness and Unlikeness, Plurality and Unity, Motion and Rest, and all such things—it would be extraordinarily interesting to me if anyone could then show that these Forms themselves can be combined and separated . . . if one could exhibit this same problem as everywhere involved in the Forms themselves,' as we have seen it to be in visible things.' This challenge is not taken up in the early part of the Parmenides. The terms 'combined' and 'separated' we shall find in the Sophist used for the relations reflected in affirmative and negative true statements about Forms. This problem is confined to the ideal world; it would remain if there were no sensible things at all. In such statements as 'Likeness exists', 'Likeness is different from Unlikeness', the meaning consists entirely of Forms; there is no reference to individual things, and the problem of participation does not arise. The question is: How can the unity of the Form, which had been so much emphasised, be reconciled with its 'blending' with other Forms ? A Form is 'one being'. Does it, Like Parmenide' One Being, exclude any sort of plurality, or is a Form both one and many ?

This question is bound up with the methods of Collection and Division, which will be illustrated in the Sobhist and there identified with the dialectical study of the Forms. The early part of the Parmenides points forward to the analysis of the blending of Forms in that context. Meanwhile, some of the arguments in the later part have a positive bearing on this question of their unity. Take the bare Eleatic dilemmas : Either a thing is or it is not ; Either a thing is one (and not many) or it is many (and not one) ; If the One is, the many are not ; if the many are, the One is not. Such reasoning must leave us either with a One Being, or Existent Unity. excluding all plurality (as in Parmenides' own system), or with a plurality having no sort of unity. Now, some of the arguments developed in the second part of the Parmenides show that on either hypothesis no knowledge or discourse is possible. A bare unity or a bare plurality cannot exist or be known or even spoken of. These results are deduced by reasoning at least as cogent as Zeno's ; and in the Sophist Parmenides' One Being will be criticised on similar lines. The arguments point to a positive conclusion : the unity of the ' beings ' recognised by Platonism-the whole realm of Forms as a 'one being' and each Form as a 'one being '-must be shown to be consistent with their being also complex and so a plurality. The study of Forms in the Sophist will clear up the perplexities and naradoxes based by the Eleatics and their successors on the too rigid Parmenidean conceptions of Unity and Being, Plurality and Notbeing.

But before passing to the world of Forms, where the true objects of knowledge are to be found, Plato fixes attention, in the *Theasteins*, on the world of transient becoming and ambiguous appearance, revealed by the senses. Writing for students acquanted with the great systems of the sixth and fifth centuries, he is now prepared to set his own doctrine beside the two opposed philosophies of Parmenides and Heracleitus, and to define what he will take, and what he will not take, from either. He will also meet the challenge

INTRODUCTION

of the first and greatest of the Sophists. Protagoras, in conscious opposition to Parmenides, had flatly denied that ' what seems to men '---what seems real to our senses and true to our judgment----is to be condemned as unreal or false because it disagrees with the properties ascribed by Eleatic reasoning to a One Being which we can never perceive. Man, declares Protagoras, is the measure of all things : what seems real and true to me is real and true to me : what seems so to you, is so to you. Your perceptions and judgments may not agree with mine ; but neither of us can have any ground for saving that the other is wrong. Such was the fundamental position of that Sophistry which Plato intends to analyse in the second of our two dialogues. The Sophist is the denizen of the world of appearances ; they are for him the sole reality. Plato himself cannot accept Parmenides' condemnation of appearances as totally unreal and of the senses as totally misleading. Accordingly, the Theaetetus examines afresh the claim of this lower world to yield knowledge-a claim that common sense would endorse and that Protagoras humself had pressed to the point of declaring that it yields the only knowledge we can ever have.

THEAETETUS

142A-143C. THE INTRODUCTORY DIALOGUE

THE main dialogue is prefaced by an introductory conversation between Euclides and Terpsion of Megara, friends of Scorates who were present at his death. Plato evidently wished to record his affection for Theatettos, a member of the Academy creditive with important discoveries in mathematics. Eucledes' account of how he came to write the main dialogue is obviously facitious. No such conversation could have taken place in Scorate's hletime.

The anonymous commentary on the Theastelus,1 believed to date from the first or second century of our era, records the existence of a second 'rather frigid' introductory dialogue of about the same number of lines, beginning, 'Boy, are you bringing the dialogue about Theaetetus ?' It has been argued that this lost introduction was probably written by Plato-for why should anyone forge such a document ?--- and that the obvious occasion for substituting the existing one would be the death of Theaetetus. The conclusion would then be that the main dialogue was at least partly written before that event. But it is not likely that the long and flattering description in the main dialogue of Theaetetus as a youth was written in his lifetime : and if it was not, the lost introduction may be assumed to have been merely a rejected draft which happened to be preserved. The whole dialogue-introduction and all -may, then, be dated after the fighting near Corinth in 360 B.C.² Theaetetus would then be a little under 50, if he was a lad of 15 or 16 in the year of Socrates' death, the imaginary date of the main dialogue.

EUCLEIDES. TERPSION

142. EUCLEIDES. Have you only just come to town, Terpsion ? TERFSION. No, some time ago. What is more. I was looking for you in the market-place and surprised that I could not find you.

EUCL. I was not in the city.

¹ Ed. Diels-Schubart, Berl Klassikertexte, 1905.

^a The case for this date is fully argued by Eva Sachs, De Theastein (Berlin, 1914), pp. 22 fl.

- 142. TERPS. Where were you, then? EUCL. On my way down to the harbour I met them carrying Theaetetus to Athens from the camp at Corinth. TERPS. Alive or dead?
 - B. EUCL. Only just alive. He is suffering from severe wounds, and still more from having caught the sickness that has broken out in the army.

TERPS. The dysentery ?

EUCL. Yes.

TERPS. How sad that such a man should be so near death | EUCL. An admirable man, Terpsion, and a brave one. Indeed, only just now I was hearing warm prase of his conduct in the battle.

TERPS. There is nothing strange in that; it would have been much more surprising if he had behaved otherwise. C. But why did he not stay here at Megara?

- b) Use why find he not sky here at megata? EUCL. He was eager to get home. I begged him to stay, but he would not listen to my advice. I went some way with him, and then, as I was coming back. I recalled what Socrates had said about him, and was filled with wonder at this signal instance of his prophetic insight. Socrates must have met him shortly before his own death, when Theatettus was little more than a boy. They had some talk together, and Socrates was delighted with the promuse he showed. When I visited Athens herepeated to me thur conversation,
- D. which was well worth the hearing; and he added that Theaetetus could not fail to become a remarkable man if he lived.

TERPS. And apparently he was right. But what was this conversation ? Could you repeat it ?

EUCL. Certainly not, just from memory. But I made 143. some notes at the time, as soon as I got home, and later on I wrote out what I could recall at my leisure. Then, every time I went to Athens, I questioned Socrates upon any point where my memory had failed and made corrections on my return. In this way I have pretty well the whole conversation written down.

TERES. True; I have heard you mention it before, and indeed I have always meant to ask you to show it to me; only I have let the matter slip till thus moment. Why should we not go through it now? In any case I am in need of a rest after my walk to town.

B. EUCL. For that matter, I should be glad of a rest myself; for I went as far as Erneon with Theaetetus. Let us go

INTRODUCTORY CONVERSATION

143B. indoors, and, while we are resting, my servant shall read to us.

TERPS. Very well.

Euc. This is the book, Terpsion. You see how I wrote the conversation—ont in narrative form, as I heard it from Socrates, but as a dialogue between hum and the other persons he told me had taken part. These were Theodorus the geometer and Theastetus. I wanted to avoid in the c. written account the tiresome effect of bits of narrative interrupting the dialogue, such as ' and I said' or ' and I remarked' wherever Socrates was speaking of himself, and 'he assented' or 'he did not agree ', where he reported the answer. So I left out everything of that sort, and wrote it as a direct conversation between the actual speakers.' TERMS. That was quite a good noton, Eucledes. Eucc.

THE MAIN DIALOGUE

The main dualogue is an imaginary conversation, supposed to have taken place shortly before the trial and death of Socrates, a date at which Theaetetus would be just old enough to take part. He is introduced to Socrates by Theodorus of Cyrene, a distinguished mathematician who has been lecturing on geometry at Athens,

143D-151D. Introductory Conversation

The opening section characterises the speakers and introduces the subject of discussion : the definition of knowledge. For the rest, it is concerned with method. Socrates, as m several earlier dialogues, dwells on the distinction (which must, it seems, have been difficult for the ordinary reader to grasp) between gyring a number of instances of knowledge and defining the meaning of the mane 'knowledge' which applies to them all. He ends by describing his own technique. Like the midwife who is past childbearing. Socrates function is not to produce his own ideas and impart them to others, but to deliver there minds of thoughts with which they are in labour, and then to test whether these thoughts are genuine children or mere phantoms.

P.T.K.

¹ Since the Parmensides is composed in the narrative form here rejected as tiresome and never again used by Plato, it may be inferred that this introductory dialogue was written after the Parmensides.

THEAETETUS

SOCRATES. THEODORUS. THEAETETUS

- 143D. SOCRATES. If I took more interest in the affairs of Cyrene, Theodorus, I should ask you for the news from those parts and whether any of the young men there are devoting themselves to geometry or to any other sort of liberal study. But really I care more for our young men here and I am anxious rather to know which of them are thought likely to distinguish themselves. That is what I am always on the look-out for myself, to the best of my powers, and I make inquines of anyone whose society I see the young men ready to seek. Now you attract a large following, as you
 - E. deserve for your skill in geometry, not to mention your other ments. So, if you have met with anyone worthy of mention, I should be glad to hear of it. Theororws. Yes, Socrates, I have met with a youth of this city who certainly deserves mention, and you will find it worth while to hear me describe him. If he were handsome, I should be afraid to use strong terms, lest I should be suspected of being in love with him. However, he is not handsome, but-forgive my saying so-he resembles you in being sub-nosed and having prominent eyes, though
- 144. these features are less marked in hum. So I can speak without fear. I assure you that, among all the young men I have met with-and I have had to do with a good many-I have never found such admurable gifts. The combination of a rare quickness of intelligence with exceptional gentiness and of an incomparably virile spint with both, is a thing that I should hardly have believed could exist, and I have never seen it before. In general, people who have such keen and ready wits and such good memories as he, are also quick-termered and nasionate: the vdart about
 - B. like ships without ballast, and their temperament is rather enthusiastic than strong; whereas the steadier sort are somewhat dull when they come to face study, and they forget everything. But his approach to learning and inquiry, with the perfect quietness of its smooth and sure progress, is like the noiseless flow of a stream of oul. It is wonderful how he achieves all this at his age. Sock. That is good news. Who is his father? THEOD. I have heard the name, but I do not remember it. However, there he is, the muldle one of those three
 - c. who are coming towards us. He and these friends of his have been rubbing themselves with oil in the portico outside,

INTRODUCTORY CONVERSATION

- 144C. and, now they have finished, they seem to be coming this way. See if you recognise him. Soca. Yes, I do ; his father was Euphronius of Sunium, just such another as his son is by your account. He was a man of good standing, and I believe he left a considerable fortune. But I don't know the law's name.
 - D. THEOD. His name is Theaetetus, Socrates; but I fancy the property has been squandered by trustees. None the less, laberality with his money is another of his admirable traits.

SOCR. You give him a noble character. Please ask him to come and sit down with us.

THEOD. I will. Theaetetus, come this way and sit by Socrates.

SOCR. Yes, do, Theaetetus, so that I may study the char-

g. acter of my own countenance; for Theodorus tells me it is like yours. Now, suppose we each had a lyre, and Theodorus said they were both tuned to the same pitch, should we take his word at once, or should we try to find out whether he was a musician?

THEAET. We should try to find that out.

SOCR. And behave him, if we discovered that he was musical, but not otherwise?

THEAET. True.

SOCR. And now, if this alleged likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we must ask whether it is a skilled draughtsman who informs us of it.

145. skulled draughtsman who informs us of it. THEAET. I agree. SOCK. Well, is Theodorus a painter? THEAET. Not so far as I know.

Socr. Nor an expert in geometry either ?

THEAET. Of course he is, Socrates, very much so.

SOCR. And also in astronomy and calculation and music and in all the liberal arts ?

THEAET. I am sure he is.

SOCR. Then, if, in the way of compliment or otherwise, he tells us of some physical hkeness between us, there is no special reason why we should attend to hum.

THEAET. Possibly not.

B. SOCK. But suppose he should praise the mind of either of us for its virtue and intellagence. Would there not be good reason why the one who heard the other praised should be eager to examine him, and he should be equally eager to show his quality? 145B. THEAET. Certainly, Socrates.

Soca. Now is the time, then, my dear Theaetetus, for you to show your qualities and for me to examine them. I can asure you that, often as Theodorus has spoken to me in praise of citizen or stranger, he has never praised anyone as he was praising you just now.

THEAET. That is good hearing, Socrates. But perhaps he c. was not speaking seriously.

Soca. No, that would not be like Theodorus. Do not try to shp out of your bargain on the pretext that he was not serious. We don't want hum to have to give evidence on oath. In any case no one is going to indict him for perjury; so do not be afraid to abide by your agreement.¹ THEART. Well, so it shall be, if you wish it.

SOCR. Tell me, then : you are learning some geometry from Theodorus ?

THEAET. Yes.

D. SOCR. And astronomy and harmonics and arithmetic ? THEAET. I certainly do my best to learn.

SOCR. So do I, from him and from anyone else who seems to understand these things. I do moderately well in general; but all the same I am puzzled about one small matter which you and our friends must help me to think out. Tell me: is it not true that learning about something means becoming wiser in that matter?

THEAET. Of course.

SOCR. And what makes people wise is wisdom, I suppose. THEAET. Yes.

 SOCR. And is that in any way different from knowledge ? THEAST. Is what different ?
 SOCR. Wisdom. Are not people wise in the things of which they have knowledge ?
 THEAST. Certainly.
 SOCR. Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing ?
 THEAST. Yes.

SOCR. Well, that is precisely what I am puzzled about: I cannot make out to my own satisfaction what knowledge is.

146. Can we answer that question? What do you all say? Which of us will speak first? Everyone who misses shall 'sit down and be donkey', as children say when

¹ I question Burnet's punctuation here. The last sentence seems to mean : 'Even if he were on oath, there is no one to mdict him for perjury, but you can keep your agreement without fear of getting him into trouble by not coming up to his estimate,'

INTRODUCTORY CONVERSATION

- r46. they are playing at ball; anyone who gets through without missing shall be king and have the right to make us answer any question he likes. Why are you all sleat? I hope, Theodorus, that my passion for argument is not making me ill-mannered, in my eagerness to start a conversation and set us all at ease with one another like friends?
 - B. THEOD. Not at all, Socrates; there is nothing ill-mannered in that. But please ask one of these young people to answer your questions; I am not at home in an abstract discussion of this sort, nor likely to become so at my age. But it is just the thing for them, and they have a far better prospect of improvement; youth, indeed, is capable of improving at anything. So do not let Theaetetus off; go on putting your questions to him.

Socz. You hear what Theodorus says, Theaetetus. I do c. not think you will want to disobey him; and it would be wrong for you not to do what an older and wiser man bids you. So tell me, in a generous spirit, what you thunk knowledge is.

THEAET. Well, Socrates, I cannot refuse, since you and Theodorus ask me. Anyhow, if I do make a mistake, you will set me right.

SOCR. By all means, if we can.

THEAET. Then I think the things one can learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the sciences you mentioned just now; and then there are the crafts of

- D. the cobbier and other workmen. Each and all of these are knowledge and nothing else Sock. You are generous indeed, my dear Theaetetus so open-handed that, when you are asked for one simple thing, you offer a whole variety. THEAET. What do you mean, Socrates ? SocR. There may be nothing in it, but I will explain what my notion is. When you speak of cobbling, you mean by that word precisely a knowledge of shoe-making ? THRAET. Precisely.
- E. SOCR. And when you speak of carpentry, you mean just a knowledge of how to make wooden furniture ? ITELET. Yes. SOCR. In both cases, then, you are defining what the craft is a knowledge of ? ITELET. Yes. SOCR. But the question you were asked, Theaetetus, was not, what are the objects of knowledge, nor yet how many

- 146E. sorts of knowledge there are. We did not want to count them, but to find out what the thing itself—knowledge—is. Is there nothing in that ? THEAET. No. you are quite right.
- 147. SOCR. Take another example. Suppose we were asked about some obvious common thing, for instance, what clay is; it would be absurd to answer · potters' clay, and ovenmakers' clay, and brick-makers' clay.

THEAET. No doubt.

Socr. To begin with, it is absurd to imagine that our answer conveys any meaning to the questioner, when we use the word 'clay', no matter whose clay we call it—the doll-

B. maker's or any other craftsman's. You do not suppose a man can understand the name of a thing, when he does not know what the thing is ?

THEAET. Certainly not.

SOCR. Then, if he has no idea of knowledge, 'knowledge about shoes' conveys nothing to him?

THEAET. No.

SOCR. 'Cobblery', in fact, or the name of any other art has no meaning for anyone who has no conception of knowledge. THEAET. That is so.

SOCR. Then, when we are asked what knowledge is, it is absurd to reply by giving the name of some art. The answer is 'knowledge of so-and-so'; but that was not what the moments much for

c. question called for.

THEAET. So it seems.

Socra. And besides, we are going an interminable way round, when our answer might be quite short and simple. In this question about clay, for instance, the simple and ordinary thing to say is that clay is earth mixed with moisture, never mind whose clay it may be.

THEAET. It appears easy now, Socrates, when you put it like that. The meaning of your question seems to be the same sort of thing as a point that came up when your namesake. Socrates here, and I ware talking not long ago.¹

SOCR. What was that, Theatetus ? THEAET. Theodorus here was proving to us something about square roots, namely, that the sides (or roots) of squares representing three square feet and five square feet

¹ The following passage is discussed and interpreted by Sir Thomas Heath, Greak Mathematics, 1, 155, and The Thorsen Books of Euclid's Elements, 11, 288 Theaetetus' friend, the young Socrates, takes his place as respondent in the Statesman.

INTRODUCTORY CONVERSATION

- 147D. are not commensurable in length with the line representing one foot; and he went on in this way, taking all the separate cases up to the root of seventeen square feet. There for some reason he stopped. The idea occurred to us, seeing that these square roots were evidently infinite in number, to try to arrive at a single collective term by which we
 - E. could designate all these roots. Sock. And did you find one? THEAET. I think so; but I should like your opinion. Sock. Go on. THEAET. We divided number in general into two classes. Any number which is the product of a number multiplied by itself we likened to the square figure, and we called such a number 'square' or 'equilateral'. Sock. Well done !
- THEAET. Any intermediate number, such as 3 or 5 or any 148. number that cannot be obtained by multiplying a number by itself, but has one factor ether greater or less than the other, so that the sides containing the corresponding figure are always unequal, we hakened to the oblong figure, and we called it an oblong number.

SOCR. Excellent; and what next?

THEAET. All the lines which form the four equal sides of the plane figure representing the equilateral number we defined as *length*, while those which form the sides of squares

- B. equal in area to the oblongs we called 'roos' (surds), is not being commensurable with the others in length, but only in the plane areas to which their squares are equal. And there is another distinction of the same sort in the case of solds. Sock. Nothing could be better, my young friends; I am sure there will be no prosecuting Theodorus for false witness. THEAET. But, Socrates, I cannot answer your queston about knowledge as we answered the question about knowledge as we answered the question about thing of that kind; so, on the contrary, it does appear that Theodorus for the runt.
- c. SOCR. Why, if he had praised your powers of running and declared that he had never met with a young man who was so good a runner, and then you had been beaten in a race by the greatest of runners at the height of his powers, do you think that his praise would have been any the less truthful?

THEAST. No, I don't.

SOCR. Well, as I said just now, do you fancy it is a small

THEAETETUS

143D--151D

- 148c. matter to discover the nature of knowledge? Is it not one of the hardest questions? THEAET. One of the very hardest, I should say. Socre. You may be reassured, then, about Theodorus'
 - account of you, and set your mind on finding a definition of knowledge, as of anything else, with all the zeal at your command.

THEAET. If it depends on my zeal, Socrates, the truth will come to light.

Soca. Forward, then, on the way you have just shown so well. Take as a model your answer about the roots: just as you found a single character to embrace all that multitude, so now try to find a single formula that applies to the many kinds of knowledge.

E. TERAET. But I assure you, Socrates, I have often set myself to study that problem, when I heard reports of the questions you ask. But I cannot persuade myself that I can give any satisfactory solution or that anyone has ever stated in my hearing the sort of answer you require. And yet I cannot get the question out of my mind. Socz. My dear Theaerteus, that is because your mind is

Sock. My dear Indetetus, that is because your mind is not empty or barren. You are suffering the pains of travail. THERET. I don't know about that, Socrates. I am only telling you how I feel.

149. SOCR. How absurd of you, never to have heard that I am the son of a midwife, a fine buxom woman called Phaenarete!

THEAET. I have heard that

SOCR. Have you also been told that I practise the same art?

THEAET. No, never.

Soca. It is true, though; only don't give away my secret. It is not known that I possess this skill, so the ignorant world describes me in other terms as an eccentric person who reduces people to hopeless perplexity. Have you been told that too?

B. THEAET. I have. SOCR. Shall I tell you the reason ? THEAET. Please do.

Soca. Consider, then, how it is with all midwives; that will help you to understand what I mean. I dare say you know that they never attend other women in childbirth so long as they themselves can conceive and bear children, but only when they are too old for that.

INTRODUCTORY CONVERSATION

- I49B. THEAET. Of course. Sock. They say that is because Artemis, the patroness of childbirth, is herself childless; and so, while she did not allow harren women to be midwives. because it is
 - c. beyond the power of human nature to achieve skill without any experience, she assigned the privilege to women who were past child-bearing, out of respect to their likeness to herself.

THEAET. That sounds likely.

SOCR. And it is more than likely, is it not, that no one can tell so well as a midwife whether women are pregnant or not?

THEAET. Assuredly.

Sock. Moreover, with the drugs and incantations they D. administer, midwives can either bring on the pains of travail or allay them at their will, make a difficult labour easy, and at an early stage cause a miscarriage if they so decide.

THEAET. True.

SOCR. Have you also observed that they are the cleverest match-makers, having an unerring skill in selecting a pair whose marriage will produce the best children ? THERET. I was not aware of that

Socz. Well, you may be sure they pride themselves on E. that more than on cutting the umblical cord. Consider the knowledge of the sort of plant or seed that should be sown in any given soil; does not that go together with skill in tending and harvesting the fruits of the earth ? They are not two different arts ?

THEAET. No, the same.

SOCR. And so with a woman; skill in the sowing is not to be separated from skill in the harvesting? THEAET. Probably not.

150. Socr. No; only, because there is that wrong and ignorant way of bringing together man and woman which they call pandering, midwives, out of self-respect, are shy even of matchmaking, for fear of falling under the accusation of pandering. Yet the genuine midwife is the only successful matchmaker.

THEAET. That is clear.

SOCR. All this, then, lies within the midwife's province; but her performance falls short of mine. It is not the way of women sometimes to bring forth real children, B. sometimes mere phantoms, such that it is hard to tell the 1508. one from the other. If it were so, the highest and noblest task of the midwife would be to discern the real from the unreal, would it not?

THEAET. I agree.

SOCR. My art of midwifery is in general like theirs; the only difference is that my patients are men, not women, and my concern is not with the body but with the soul that is in travail of birth. And the highest point of my

- c. art is the power to prove by every test whether the off-spring of a young man's thought is a false phantom or instinct with life and truth. I am so far like the midwife, that I cannot myself give birth to wisdom ; and the common reproach is true, that, though I question others, I can myself bring nothing to light because there is no wisdom in me. The reason is this: heaven constrains me to serve as a midwife, but has debarred me from group birth.
- D. So of myself I have no sort of wisdom, nor has any discovery ever been born to me as the child of my soul. Those who frequent my company at first appear, some of them, quite unintelligent; but, as we go further with our discussions, all who are favoured by heaven make progress at a rate that seems surprising to others as well as to themselves, although it is clear that they have never learnt anything from me; the many admirable truths they bring to birth have been discovered by themselves from within. But the delivery is heaven's work and mune.
- E. The proof of this is that many who have not been conscious of my assistance but have made light of me, thinking it was all their own doing, have left me sconer than they should, whether under others' influence or of their own motion, and theneoforward suffered miscarriage of their thoughts through falling into bad company, and they have lost the chidren of whom I had delivered them by bringing them up badly, caring more for false phantoms than for the true, and so at last their lack of understanding
- 151. has become apparent to themselves and to everyone elsc. Such a one was Aristides, son of Lysimachus, and there have been many more. When they come back and beg for a renewal of our intercourse with extravagant protestations, sometimes the divine warning that comes to me forbids it; with others it is permitted, and these begin again to make progress. In yet another way, those who seek my company have the same experience as a woman with child: they suffer the pains of labour and, by night

MIDWIFERY AND ANAMNESIS

- 151. and day, are full of distress far greater than a woman's;
 - B. and my art has power to bring on these pangs or to allay them. So it fares with these; but there are some, Theaetetus, whose minds, as I judge, have never concived at all. I see that they have no need of me and with all goodwill I seek a match for them. Without boasting unduly, I can guess pretty well whose society will profit them. I have arranged many of these matches with Prodicus, and with other men of inspired sagacity.

And now for the upshot of this long discourse of mine. I suspect that, as you yourself believe, your mind is in labour with some thought it has conceived. Accept, then, the

- c. ministration of a midwife's son who himself practises his mother's art, and do the best you can to answer the questions I ask. Perhaps when I examine your statements I may judge one or another of them to be an unreal phantom. If I them take the abortion from you and cast it away, do not be savage with me like a woman robbed of her first child. People have oftern felt like that towards me and been positively ready to bite me for taking away some foolish notion they have conceived. They do not see that I am doing them a kindness. They have not learnt
- D. that no duvinity is ever all-disposed towards man, nor is such action on my part due to unkindness; it is only that I am not permitted to acquiesce m falsehood and suppress the truth.

So, Theaetetus, start again and try to explain what knowledge is. Never say it is beyond your power; it will not be so, if heaven wills and you take courage.

Midnofery and Anamnessis.—It is significant that this introductory conversation runs closely parallel with the first part of an earlier dialogue, the Meno. When asked to define Virtue, Meno made the same mustake as Theaetetus, offering a list of virtues instead of a definition of the 'single form' common to them all. Scorates' illustration of a correct definition ('Figure 'means' the boundary of a solid') was drawn, as here, from mathematics. Meno's complaint that Scorates does nothing but reduce others to perplexity is here quoted by Scorates himself.¹ At this point there follows in the Thesateties the description of the art of midwifery, in the Meno the theory of Anamnesis—that all learning is the

¹ Μεπο 793, ήκουον... ότι σι οδόδυ άλλο ή αύτός τε άπορείε και τούς άλλους ποιείς άπορείο Τλεαδεί 1494, λόγουσι... ότι ... ότι στατάτατός (άπορείτατος conj Stalib είμι και ποιώ τούς πόγοδησιος άπορείο.

recovery of latent knowledge always possessed by the immortal soul.1 One of the few valuable remarks of the Anonymous Commentator is upon the equivalence of these two conceptions : 'Socrates calls himself a midwife because his method of teaching was of that kind . . . for he prepared his pupils themselves to make statements about the subject by unfolding their natural ideas and articulating them, in accordance with the doctrine that what is called learning is really recollection, and that every human soul has had a vision of reality, and needs, not to have knowledge put into it, but to recollect ' (on 140A). There is some evidence that the historic Socrates professed the art of a spiritual midwife * : but Anamnesis appears first in the middle group of dialogues and provides the link between two Platonic doctrines: the eternal nature of the human soul and the 'separate' existence of Forms, the proper objects of knowledge. The probable inference is that Anamnesis was a theory which squared the profession and practice of Socrates with Plato's discovery of the separately existing Forms and his conversion from Socratic agnosticism to a belief in immortality.

Now the Theastetus will later have much to say about memory. Why is there no mention of that peculiar impersonal memory of knowledge possessed before birth? There is no ground for supposing that Plato ever abandoned the theory of Anamnesis. It cannot be mentioned in the Theacters, because it presupposes that we know the answer to the question here to be raised afresh : What is the nature of knowledge and of its objects ? For the same reason all mention of the Forms is, so far as possible, excluded. The dialogue is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition. our awareness of the sense-world and judgments involving the perception of sensible objects. Common sense might maintain that. if this is not all the 'knowledge' we possess, whatever else can be called knowledge is somehow extracted from such experience. The purpose of the dialogue is to examine and reject this claim of the sense-world to furnish anything that Plato will call ' knowledge'. The Forms are excluded in order that we may see how we can get on without them ; and the negative conclusion of the whole discussion means that, as Plato had taught ever since the discovery of the Forms, without them there is no knowledge at all.

The Marks of Knowledge.—The Greek word for 'knowledge', like the English, can mean either the faculty of knowing or that which is known. The problem here is to define the faculty or function of knowing, though it cannot be defined without reference

¹ On Anomnesis, see Introd , p. 2 ¹ Aristophanes, Clouds 137.

to its objects. If we are to decide whether sensation or perception or belief is to be called knowledge or not, we must assume certain marks that any candidate for the title must possess. As Plato argues elsewhere 1 it is a question partly of the inherent qualities of our state of mind, partly of the nature of the objects, and from differences in the state of mind differences in the objects can be inferred. In Republic V this is applied to the contrast between Knowledge (vvaac) and Opimion ($\delta\delta\xi a$), in the wide sense which covers all acquaintance with sensible things and judgments about them. The states of mind differ in that knowledge is infallible. whereas opinion may be true or false. It is inferred that the objects of knowledge must be completely real and unchanging, while the objects of opinion are not wholly real and are mutable.

So here, these two marks of knowledge are assumed at the outset. Socrates will point out that Theaetetus' identification of perception with knowledge means that perception is infallible and has the real for its object (152C). Hence what the dialogue proves is that neither sense-perception nor judgment ($\delta\delta\epsilon a$) of the types considered possesses both these marks. We shall find that perception. although with due qualifications it may be called infallible, has not the real for its object.

The discussion falls into three main parts, in which the claims of (I) Perception, (II) True Opinion or Behef, (III) True Behef accompanied by an 'account' or explanation of some kind, are examined and rejected.

I. THE CLAIM OF PERCEPTION TO BE KNOWLEDGE

151D-B. Theaetetus identifies knowledge with perception

Plato naturally starts with the position of common sense, that knowledge comes to us from the external world through the senses. In his own view this is the lowest type of cognition ; he works upwards from beneath towards the world of intelligible objects, so as to see whether we can find knowledge at these lower levels without having to cross the boundary between the sensible and the intelligible.

- 15ID. THEAET. Well, Socrates, with such encouragement from a person like you, it would be a shame not to do one's best to say what one can. It seems to me that one who
 - E. knows something is perceiving the thing he knows, and, so far as I can see at present, knowledge is nothing but perception.

SOCR. Good ; that is the right spirit in which to express

IJIE. one's opinion. But now suppose we examine your offspring together, and see whether it is a mere wind-egg or has some life in it. Perception, you say, is knowledge? THEAFT. Ves.

The Massing of 'Perophics'.—In ordinary usage acutacsis, translated 'perception', has a wide range of meanups, including sensation, our awareness of outer objects or of facts,' feelings, emotions, etc. At 1568 the term is said to cover perceptions (sight, hearing, smell), sensations of heat and cold, pleasures and pains, and even emotions of desire and fear. All these are seated in the sentient part of the soul, inseparably associated with the body.' Theaetetus' words, 'one who knows something is perceiving the thing he knows', suggest that he is chefly thunking of perception of external objects, and the criticism which follows narrows down the word to that sense or at least treats senseperception of external objects as typical of all assistesis. The only case analyzed is vision.

151B-152C. Dialectical combination of Theastetus' position with Prolagoras' doctrine

Socrates at once starts upon the dialectical treatment of Theaetetus' suggestion. 'Dualectical' has some implications which may escape the modern reader. He will readily understand that dualectic means a co-operative inquiry carried on in conversation betive suggestion (*hybolessis*) put forward by one speaker is corrected and improved until the full meaning is clearly stated. The criticism that follows may end in complete rejection or lead on to another suggestion which (if the examination has been skilfully conducted) ought to approach nearer to the truth. In the present instance three successive suggestions will be made, and all will be rejected.

A less familiar feature of dialectic is the treatment of current

Antotice, Pointer 12765, 29: Babylon was so huge that when the city foll, it was three days before some of the mathtants locase assers of the event (advised). At do sawma, 4274, 19, Antotic remarks that thinking and the serves of intelligence are commonly regarded as 'a sort of perception', for in both the soul discerns and becomes acquainted with something that exists

TIMANUS 42A

Cí Theast 1878, where Socrates, after Theastetus' first definition of knowledge has been rejected, says: 'Biot out all we have been saying and see if you can get a clearer view from the position you have now reached. Tell us once more what knowledge is.' views, whether popular or philosophic. Aristotle regularly begins his treatises with a review of received opinions, proceeding on the avowed assumption that any belief accepted by common sense or put forward by wise men is likely to contain some measure of truth, however faultily expressed. It is the business of dialectic, by sympathetic comparison and criticism, to ehcit these contributions and to make the best that can be made of them. It is here that a modern reader is highly to be misled. He will expect a philosopher who criticises another philosopher to feel himself bound by the historical question, what that other philosopher actually meant. But neither Plato nor Aristotle us writing the history of philosophy; rather they are philosophusang and concerned only to obtain what light they can from any quarter. We can never assume as a matter of course, that the construction they put upon the doctranes of other philosophers is fauthful to histore fact.

Plato's procedure here is a classic example of dialectical method. The first object is to bring to light the full meaning of the bare statement that perception is knowledge. This is accomplished in the first section of the argument ending (160E) with the remark that Theaetetus' child has now been brought to birth. Socrates also says that, in the course of elucidation. Theaetetus' identification of perception with knowledge ' has turned out to coincide ' with the Heracleitean doctrine that all things are in motion and the Protagorean ductum that man is the measure of all things. What has really happened is that Plato has given an account of the nature of perception which involves elements taken from Protagoras and Heracleitus-elements that Plato humself accepts as true when they are guarded and limited with the necessary gualifications. Protagoras and Heracleitus, in fact, are handled as if they were parties to the discussion who could be laid under contribution.1 Having adopted these elements of truth. Plato will be free, in the subsequent criticism, to point out what he will not accept from Protagoras and the extreme Heracleiteans.

151E. Socze. The account you give of the nature of knowledge 152. is not, by any means, to be despised. It is the same that was given by Protagoras, though he stated it in a somewhat different way. He says, you will remember, that 'man is the measure of all things—alite of the being of things that are and of the not-being of things that are not'. No doubt you have read that.

¹ Compare Socrates' proposal to 'follow up' the meaning of Protagoras' saying (*iracolorifoquaev abrq* 1528) with Aristotle, Met 9854, 4: 'If we ware to follow out (*deploybedo*) Empedocles' yeaw and interpret it according to its meaning and not to its lasping expression, we should find . '

THEAET. Yes, often. 152.

SOCR. He puts it 1 in this sort of way, doesn't he ?---that any given thing 'is to me such as it appears to me and is to you such as it appears to you,' you and I being men. THEAST. Yes, that is how he puts it.

B. SOCR. Well, what a wise man says is not likely to be nonsense. So let us follow up his meaning. Sometimes, when the same wind is blowing, one of us feels chilly, the other does not : or one may feel slightly chilly, the other quite cold

THEAET. Certainly.

SOCR. Well, in that case are we to say that the wind in itself is cold or not cold ? Or shall we agree with Protagoras that it is cold to the one who feels chilly, and not to the other?

THEAET. That seems reasonable.

SOCR. And further that it so 'appears' to each of us ? THEAET. Yes.

SOCR. And 'appears' means that he 'perceives' it so ? * THEAET. True.

c. SOCR. 'Appearing'," then, is the same thing as 'perceiving', in the case of what is hot or anything of that kind. They are to each man such as he perceives them.

THRAFT. So it seems.

SOCR. Perception, then, is always of something that is, and, as being knowledge, it is infallible.

THEAET. That is clear.

The main point here is stated in Socrates' last speech. ' Perception is knowledge ' means that perception is an infallible apprehension of what is, or is real. These are the two marks of knowledge. which any candidate to the title must possess.

Theaetetus' statement, so interpreted, certainly does not exhaust the meaning of Protagoras' saying. Protagoras' word 'appears' was not confined to what appears real to me in sense-perception ; it included, as we shall see later, what appears true to me, what I

¹ Myra can mean ' say ' or ' mean ' Since Crat 386A repeats the formula in almost the same words, it may well be a quotation

^{*} Ast's conjecture 'alotarras' for alotareotas is confirmed by the Berlin papyrus (Diels, Vors. 4 ii, 228) Cf 164B, ro be ye 'our dod' 'our enformand' dame

apragia is simply the substantive corresponding to the verb daireofar, as at Sopk. 264A (p 319) We can substitute Theaetetus' word alobáverai for Protagoras' word paireras without change of meaning.

think or judge to be true.¹ On that point Plato will part company with Protagons; but here, as the qualification ' in the case of what is hot or anything of that kind ' indicates, we are taking only the relevant application of the doctrine to the immediate perception of sensible qualities.

So far as the infallibility of such perception is concerned, we shall see that Theaetetus, Protagoras, and Plato are in agreement. The second claum—that what appears to me in perception 'is', or exists, or is real—is at present ambuguous and obscure. Protagoras is represented as asserting that when the wnd appears cold to me, then it is cold to me, however it may appear and be to yow. Neither of us has any ground for saying that the other is wrong. Each is the sole measure or criterion or judge ¹ of the existence or reality for him of what he perceives. What remains obscure is the meaning of the addition 'to me' or 'for me'. It is probable that Protagoras actually meant something different from the construction put upon the phrase by Plato for his own purpose

Socrates, in his illustration from the wind, introduces a distinction between what may be called the sense-object and the physical object. There are two different sense-objects, the coolness that appears to me and the warmth that appears to you. There is one physical object, 'the same wind' that is blowing. How are the two sense-objects related to the single physical object ? Socrates asks whether the wind in itself is cold or not. Did Protagoras think that the cold and the warmth were qualities (or perhaps rather ' things ') both residing in a neutral or public physical object, the wind in itself? The answer suggested by Socrates as Protagorean is that the wind is cold to him who feels chilly, but not to the other. This is open to several interpretations. The ambiguity may be intentional. It would be entirely in accordance with dialectical procedure that Plato should ignore what Protagoras actually meant and adopt such a construction of his words as would contribute to his own analysis of sense-perception.* Two possible interpretations are as follows.

(1) The wind in itself is both warm and cold. 'Warm ' and ' Cold' are two properties which can co-exist in the same physical object. I perceive the one, you perceive the other. 'The wind is cold for me' means that the cold is the property that appears to me or

³ Diog L ix, 15: ' Protagoras held that the mind consists solely of the senses.' This is probably a false inference from our passage, to which Diogenee refers.

At 178B Plato uses the word spiripuor, and at 160C spirips

P.T.K.

D

affects me, though it is not the property that appears to or affects you. To say simply that 'the wind is cold' would naturally be taken to imply that it was not warm. But in fact it is both ; so we add 'to me', meaning that I am aware of that property, though you are aware of the other.

(2) The wind in itself is neither warm nor cold. It has neither of the properties we severally perceive and is not itself perceptible; it is something that exists outside us and orignates my feeling of cold and yours of warmth. Our sense-objects, the warm and the cold, do not exist independently in the public physical object, but only come into existence when the act of perceiving them takes place. 'The wind is cold to me' means that it is not cold in itself spart from me, but only gives me the feeling of cold. This cold which 'appears' to me exists for me as a private object of perception of which I alone can be aware. The fact that your private object is different does not justify you in discrediting my perception as false or denying that its object exist, or is real.¹

It is probable that Protagoras held the first and simpler of these two views 'a-that the wind is both warm and cold. The second view is an essential feature in the theory of perception presently to be advanced as a 'secret doctrine '-a phrase which implies that it was not to be found in Protagoras' book. The first view has not broken with the naive realism of common sense, which does not doubt that objects have the qualities we perceive. It agrees with the doctrine of Protagoras' contemporary Anaxagoras, who taught that opposite qualities (or things) such as 'the hot' and ' the cold' coexist insegnably in things outside us, and that perception is by contraries. 'What is just as warm or just as cold (as the sentient organ) neither warms nor cools on its approach, we do not become

¹ Professor Taylor (Plate, *its Mas and its Work*, 1936, p. 369 thinks that the verw Flate sarches to Professors 'dense that there is a convex real world which can be known by two percipients Resity itself is individual in the same that I huve an private world known only to mo, you m another private world known only to mo, you manother bot and only that it is disagreeably chilly, we both speak the truth, for each of as is speaking of a 'real' wind, but of a 'real' wind which belongs to that private world known is as infallable shorts how the private world known is as infallable about his own private world for that that each of us is a infallable about his own private world Protagoras . . . dense the reakity of the "common environment" prespored by " intra-subjective microure"."

This interpretation seems to me much too advanced for Protagoras' date, and it contradicts the language of our passage, for it asserts that there are two real winds, both private and totally unconnected, whereas Socrates says 'when the saws wrisk is blowing' and asks if 'ike wind in itself is cold or not.

* Cf. Brochard, Études de Philosophise (Paris, 1926), Protagoras et Démocrite.

aware of the sweet or the sour by means of those qualities themselves : rather we become aware of the cold by means of the hot. of the sweet by means of the sour, according to the deficiency (in us) of any given quality; for he says they are all present in us.'1 If Protagoras accounted for the same wind feeling cold to me and warm to you by the obvious explanation (suggested below at 158E ff.) that I am already hot, you are cold, the agreement with Anaxagoras is clear. Both, again, are at one with Heracleitus, on the point that opposites co-exist inseparably.1 In the main fifthcentury controversy, the Eastern or Ioman tradition maintained that the senses were to be trusted and that things were mixtures of the opposites apprehended by sense. The Western tradition included the Eleatics, who denied the evidence of the senses and the reality of the opposites. They influenced the Atomists, who said that the sensible opposites were ' conventional ' (subjective), not properties of the 'real' atoms. Protagoras' doctrine must have been a reply to the Eleatic denial of appearances. It is probable that he would maintain that 'hot' and 'cold' could co-exist in the same real thing without any contradiction. Finally, this view is supported by Sextus a: 'Protagoras says that matter contains the underlying grounds of all appearances, so that matter considered as independent can be all the things that appear to all. Men apprehend different things at different times according to variations in their conditions. One in a normal state apprehends those things in matter which can appear to a normal person ; a man in an abnormal state apprehends what can appear to the abnormal. The same applies to different times of life, to the states of sleeping or waking, and to every sort of condition. So man proves, according to him, to be the criterion of what exists . everything that appears to man also exists ; what appears to no man does not exist.' If Protagoras held this view his doctrine was not ' subjectivist ', and even the term ' relativism ' is dangerously misleading. For him both the sense-objects exist independently of any percipient. The hot and the cold, together with any other properties we can perceive in the wind, would constitute ' the wind in itself '. Since at this date such properties were regarded as ' things ', not as qualities needing some other ' thing ' to possess and support them, Protagoras would deny that the wind was anything more

¹ Theophrastus, de Sensu 28 (on Anaxagoras).

Sextus, Pyrvk. Hyp u, 63: Because honey seems bitter to some, sweet to others, Democritus said it is neither sweet nor sour, Heracleitus that it was both

^{*} Pyrrk Hyp. 1, 218. Sextus was no doubt influenced by the Theasterius, but appears to have had independent sources also.

than the sum of these properties, which alone appear to us. 'What appears to no man does not exist.'

The conclusion is that the second view, presently to be formulated —the wind in itself is neither warm nor cold till it meets with a percipient—is a construction put by Platch himself on Protagoras² ambiguous statement. By a legitimate extension of the historic doctrine, Plato adapts it to the theory he intends to attribute to the 'more refined' thinkers.

152C-153D. Dialectical combination with the Heracleitean doctrine of Flux

Plato next introduces another element required for his theory of sense-perception. It is drawn from Heracleitus: 'All things are in motion.' The suggestion that Protagoras taught this as a 'secret doctrine 'to his' pupils 'would deceive no one. Protagoras had no school ; anyone could attend his lectures and read his books. Plato is hinting that the doctrine of universal flux is really drawn from another quarter, and he goes on to attribute it to Homer and all philosophers except Parmenides. There is no more ground here for inferring that Protagoras was a Heracleitean than for inferring that Homer was one. Plato's intention is to accept from Heracleitus the doctrine that all sensible objects are perpetually changing—a fundamental principle of his own philosophy. But to Plato sensible objects are not 'all things'. He will later point out that the unrestricted assertion, 'All things are always changing ', makes knowledge impossible.

- 152C. SOCR. Can it be, then, that Protagoras was a very ingenious person who threw out this dark saying for the benefit of the common herd like ourselves, and reserved the truth as a secret doctrine to be revealed to his disciples ?¹
 - D. THEREFT. What do you mean by that, Socrates ? Sock. I will tell you; and indeed the doctrine is a remarkable one. It declares that nothing is one thing just by itself, nor can you rightly call it by some definite name, nor even say it is of any definite sort. On the contrary, if you call it 'large', it will be found to be also small; if 'heavy', to be also light; and so on all through, because nothing is one thing or some thing or of any definite sort. All the things we are pleased to say' are ', really are in process of becoming, as a result of movement and change and of blending one

¹ Truth was the trile of Protagoras' book which opened with the famous saying At r60a Socrates again suggests, monically, that this Truth may have been speaking in cryptic oracles.

1522. with another¹ We are wrong to speak of them as 'being', for none of them ever is; they are always becoming. In this matter let us take it that, with the exception of Parmenides, the whole series of philosophers agree—Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedcelss—and among the poets the greatest masters in both kinds, Epicharmus^a in comedy, Homer in tragedy. When Homer speaks of 'Oceanus, source of the gods, and mother Tethys',^a he means that all things are the offspring of a flowing stream of change. Don't you understand him_so?

THEAET. Certainly.

- 153. Soca. Who, then, could challenge so great an array, with Homer for its captain, and not make himself a laughing-stock ? TIFAST. That would be no light undertaking, Socrates. Soca. It would not, Theastetus. Their doctrine that 'being' (so-called) and 'becoming' are produced by motion, 'not-being' and penshing by rest, is well supported by such proofs as these ⁴: the hot or fire, which generates and controls all other things, is itself generated by movement and friction-both forms of change. These are ways of producing fire, aren't they?
 - B. THEAET. Yes.

SOCR. And further, all living things are born by the same processes ? ⁵

THEAET. Assuredly.

SOCR. Again, the healthy condition of the body is undermined by inactivity and indolence, and to a great extent preserved by exercise and motion, isn't it ? THRAFT. Ves.

SOCR. And so with the condition of the soul. The soul acquires knowledge and is kept going and improved by learning and practice, which are of the nature of movements. By

¹ The Ionuan doctrane that thungs are maximum of opposites, considered as things that can be blended in various proportions. This figures in Empedocles as the composition of complex substances by the juxtaposition of opposed elements. Hence Empedocles is included below, though he did not hold the Flux doctrane.

⁸ Epicharmus, frag. 2 (Duels), е́ интаλλауб де жа́жте е́нті жа́жта то́к хро́ног, ктл.

Quoted Crat. 402B, with Orphic verses and Hesiod.

⁴ The proofs may be borrowed from the later Heraclettean literature, and partly, perhaps, from medical writers under Heraclettean influence. Cf. [Hipportsel] & victor 1

* Was Plato's source acquainted with the primitive analogy, frequently noted by anthropologists, between the sexual act and the use of the fire-drill ? THEAETETUS

153B. inactivity, dullness, and neglect of exercise, it learns nothing C. and forgets what it has learnt.

c. and torgets what it has learn. Threat. True. Soca. So, of the two, motion is a good thing for both soul and body, and immobility is bad. THEAT. So it appears. Soca. Need I speak further of such things as stagnation in air or water, where stillness causes corruption and decay, when motion would keep things fresh; or, to complete the argument, press into its server that ' solder noe' in

D. Homer,¹ proving that he means by it nothing more nor less than the sun, and signifies that so long as the heavens and the sun continue to move round, all things in heaven and earth are kept gong; whereas if they were bound down and brought to a stand, all things would be destroyed and the world, as they say, turned upside down?

THEAET. I agree with your interpretation, Socrates.

In this Heracleitean doctrine two propositions may be distinguished.

($\tilde{\mathbf{x}}$) The first is essential to the Heracleitean harmony of opposites : No contrary can exist apart from its own contrary. This is the meaning here given to the statement that 'nothing is one thing just by itself'. You cannot give it the name of any contrary, such as 'large' or 'heavy', without also calling it 'small' or 'light'. Plato makes this 'blending of opposites' characteristic of the partroular things of sense. Thus at Reb. Argo ff. against the lover of appearances who believes only in the many beautiful things, not in Beauty itself, it is urged that there is no one beautiful thing share no better claum to be so called than to be called small or light. This inseparability of opposites was, as we saw, held also by Protagoras, if it is true that he regarded the wind in itself as both bot and cold. Here is the real point of contact between Protagoras, Heracleitus, and Plato.

(2) The second proposition is: All the things we speak of as having 'being ', never really 'are', but are always in process of becoming, as the result of motion. There is no obvious reason why Protagoras should hold this, any more than Anazagoras did.⁴ But

¹ Socrates, in the venn of sophistic interpretation of the poets, misuses the passage where Zeus challenges the gods to see if they can drag him down by a golden rope. If he chose to pull his hardest, he could drag them all up with earth and set as well *Ilsaf* vun, 18 fl.

^{*} Sextus mdeed (Pyrrk Hyp 1, 217 = Vors 74A, 14) says Protagoras held that 'matter is in flux' (ray they fewerly ebus), and as it flows waste is

as applied to sensible things, Plato accepted the Heracleitean thesia'. The real being of intelligible objects is always the same, never admitting any kind of modification; but the many things perceived by sense never remain in the same condition in any respect.⁴ This principle Plato now builds muto his doctrine of sense-perception. The effect is to modify Protagoras' statement. 'I am the measure of what 4:; what appears to me is to me'. For this 's' we now substitute' becomes'. In the sphere of perception I am the measure of what becomes, but never is ; and the Protagorean claim (13cc) that 'perception is always of what is' gives place to the Platonic octrine : Perception is always of what s' gives place to the Platonic

153D-154B. Preliminary account of the nature of sense-objects and percipients

The next step is to give a precise meaning to the words ' for me' or 'to me' in the Protagorean formula, 'What appears to me is for me or lo me', and the Platom formula, 'What I perceive becomes for me or lo me'. The interpretation now to be given is: The quality I perceive (my sense-object) becomes or arises at the moment when at is perceived and only for a single perceipent; it has no enduring independent existence in the physical object at other times. Here again, if we are right, Platois goung Percend Protagoras.

- 153D. SOCR. Think of it, then, in this way. First, to take the case of the eyes, you must conceive that what you call white colour has no being as a distinct thing outside your eyes nor yet inside them, nor must you assign it any fixed place. Other-
 - E. wise, of course, it would have its being m an assigned place and abide there, instead of arising in a process of becoming. THEAET. Well, but how am I to think of it ? Sock. Let us follow out our recent statement and lay it down that there is no smalle thing that is m and by tsell.⁴

repared by additions and our sensitions are modified according to various times of lies and bodyly conditions. This may mean so more than the constant wates is our bodies repaired by nutrition (cf. Symp acro), an alternation of hunger and repleton which would modify the pleasures of easing. Sextuit source is unknown. He may have been maled by Socrate' dulactical inclusion of Protagoras among the addrements of the Finx doctime (1528)

¹ Ar, Met A 6,987g, 32: For having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Herachtean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flax and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years' (Ross trans)

Phasdo 78D

This rather bare and obscure statement here receives a new meaning. At 1320 b µb ebb and abb observe meant that no quality (contrary) exists subhout its contrary. This was compatible with the independent custence of qualities. Now apple abrit and abrit is o means (as sgain at abrit is o means in the state of the state of the state of the state of the state state.

THEAETETUS

- 153E. On that showing we shall see that black or white or any colour you choose is a thing that has arisen out of the meeting of our eyes with the appropriate motion. What we say 'is'
- this or that colour will be neither the eve which encounters 154. the motion nor the motion which is encountered, but something which has arisen between the two and is peculiar to each several percipient. Or would you be prepared to maintain that every colour appears to a dog or any other creature just such as it appears to you?

THEAET. Certainly not.

SOCR. Or to another man? Does anything you please appear to him such as it appears to you ? Are you quite sure of that ? Are you not much rather sure that it does not even appear the same to yourself, because you never remain in the same condition?

THEAET. I think that is much nearer the mark

This preliminary statement, explaining what is meant by ' becomes for me', will be expanded presently. So far, a number of points have been very briefly stated. On the side of the object, white colour has no permanent being anywhere ; it arises between the sense-organ and the physical object when they encounter. Also, it is peculiar to the individual percipient in two ways : my sense-object is private to me in that no one else can see just what I see, and peculiar in that no two people, looking at the same thing, will see precisely similar colours ; nor will even the same person at different moments, because the condition of his sense-organ will be always varving.

The above statements refer mainly to the object of perception. It remains to be added that the subject (which at this stage is identified with the sense-organ, not the mind) must equally have no fixed qualities. If it carried permanent qualities of its own, it could not adapt itself to each new object : those inherent qualities would obstruct the required modification of the organ,

154B. SOCR. So then, if the thing that we measure ourselves against or the thing we touch really were large or white or hot, it would never become different the moment it encountered a different person, supposing it to undergo no change in itself. And again, if the thing which measures itself against the object or touches it were any one of these things (large, white, etc.), then, when a different thing

156B. 8 and 157A. 8) that no thing just by itself (i e apart from a perceptent) has, existing in it, any single quality that we perceive. All such qualities arise between it and the percipient at the moment of perception.

PUZZLES OF SIZE AND NUMBER

154B. came into contact with it or were somehow modified, it, on its side, if it were not affected in itself, would not become different.

The expression 'measure ourselves against' looks at first sight like a reference to Protagoras' use of the word in 'Man is the measure of all things'. 'Measure' suggests a constant standard of reference: a measure which itself perpetually varied would be useless. But in the present case the subject is no more constant than the object, and the common implication of constancy must be ruled out. The sense-organ is undergoing perpetual modification no less than the external object, and its fluidity offers no obstruction to any fresh affection from without. It appears, however, in the next section that the literal measurement of a large thung against a small is intended.

154B-155D. Some puzzles concerning size and number

If Socrates now proceeded at once to the fuller statement of the theory of sense perception, there would be no difficulty. But here Plato interpolates some alleged puzzles about what we call 'relations' of size and number, whose relevance to their context is by no means obvious. Nor is it easy for us to understand why anyone should be perplexed by them.

- 154B. SOCR. (continues). For as things are,¹ we are too easily led into making statements which Protagoras and anyone who maintains the same position would call strange and absurd. THEAET. HOW so? What statements do you mean?
 - c. SOCR. Take a simple example, which will make my meaning quite clear. When you compare six dice with four, we say that the six are more than the four or half as many again; while if you compare them with twelve, the six are fewer-only half as many-and one cannot say anything else. Or do you think one can? IREART. Certainly not.

SOCR. Well then, suppose Protagoras or somebody else asks you: Can anything become larger or more otherwise than by being increased? What will you answer?

THEAET. I should answer No, if I were to speak my mind D. with reference to this last question; but having regard to your previous one, I might reply Yes, to guard against contradicting myself.

1 'As things are ' (rôv) apparently means 'on the current assumption, which has just been denied, that things have permanent qualities '.

154D. SOCR. An excellent answer ; really, you might be inspired. But apparently, if you say Yes, it will be like the situation in Europides : the tongue will be incontrovertible, but not the heart _____

THEAET. True.

SOCR. Now, if you and I were like those clever persons who have canvassed all the thoughts of the heart, we might

E. allow ourselves the luxury of trying one another's strength in a regular sophistical set-to, with a great clashing of arguments. But being only ordinary people, we shall prefer first to study the notions we have in our own minds and find out what they are and whether, when we compare them, they agree or are altogether mconsistent.

THEAET. I should certainly prefer that

SOCR So do I; and, that being so, suppose we look at the question again in a quiet and leisurely spirit, not with

155. any impatience but genuinely examining ourselves to see what we can make of these apparitons that present themselves to our minds. Looking at the first of them, I suppose we shall assert that nothing can become greater or less, either in size or in number, so long as it remains equal to itself. Is it not so?

THEAET. Yes.

Socr. And secondly, that a thing to which nothing is added and from which nothing is taken away is neither increased nor diminished, but always remains the same in amount.

THEAET. Undoubtedly.

- B. SOCR. And must we not say, thirdly, that a thing which was not at an earlier moment cannot be at a later moment without becoming and being in process of becoming? THEAET. It certainly seems so. SOCR. Now these three admissions, I fancy, fight among themselves in our minds when we make those statements about the dice; or when we say that I, being of the height you see, without gaining or losing in size, may within a year be taller (as I am now) than a youth like you, and c. later on be shorter. not because I have lost anwithing in the shorter. The shorter is the set of the shorter is the shorter is the shorter.
- c. later on be shorter, not because I have loss anything in bulk, but because you have grown. For apparently I am later what I was not before, and yet have not become so; for without the process of becoming shorter without losing some of my bulk. I could give you countless other examples, if we are to accept these. For I think you

PUZZLES OF SIZE AND NUMBER

- 155c. follow me, Theaetetus; I fancy, at any rate, such puzzles are not altogether strange to you. THEAET. No; indeed it is extraordinary how they set me wondering whatever they can mean. Sometimes I get quite dizzy with thinking of them.
 - cure only with minimage a infinite set of the set of the set of the set of your nature. This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosophin relationships in the set of set of a set of the set of set of set of set of the set of t

What is the point of these alleged puzzles ? Though Socrates continues: 'Do you begin to understand why these things are so, according to the doctrine we are attributing to Protagoras ?' nothing more is said about them in the following context, which analyses the process of sense-perception. Socrates leaves These texts —and us-to think out these puzzles for ourselves.

We have just been told that sensible qualties like ' white' and 'hot' have no independent and permanent existence either in objects outside us or in our sense-organs. They arise or 'become ' between object and organ when the two encounter one another. If either object or organ carried about with it permanent qualites, this becoming could not occur. And at 154B 'large 'was grouped with 'white' and 'hot', as if it were a quality on the same footing with them; just as earlier (152D) 'large ' and 'small', 'heavy and light', where taken as typical of all contraries.

The puzzle about the doce is thus: When we compare six dice with four, we say that the six are more. At another moment, when we compare them with twelve, we say they are lass. Yet the six dice have not increased or diminished in number. Common sense, we are told, holds that nothing can be at one moment what it was not at another, without becoming, that a thing cannot become greater or less so long as it remains the same in amount; and that it does remain the same in amount, so long as nothing is added or subtracted. How, then, can the dice, which have remained the same in amount, have become less?

It is clear that the difficulty here exists only for one who thinks of 'large' as a quality residing in the thing which is larger than something else, with 'small' as the answering quality residing in the smaller thing. If that is so, then, when the large thing is

¹ The Cratyius connects Ins with elper (4088), and elper (Adver) with dialectic (3980). So Ins (philosophy) is daughter of Thaumas (wonder). Since our passage is unitelligible without the Cratyius, the Theostetus must be the later of the two.

compared with something larger instead of something smaller, he will suppose that it has lost its quality 'large' and gained instead the quality 'small'. By suffering this internal change it will have 'become small'. He will then be puzzled when we point out that the thing has not altered in size.

Now when Plato wrote the Phaedo, he certainly regarded ' tallness' as an inherent property of the tall person. 'Phaedo is taller than Socrates' was analysed as implying (I) that there are two Forms. Tall and Short, of which Phaedo and Socrates severally partake : (2) that Phaedo contains an instance of Tallness (called ' the tallness in us '), and Socrates an instance of Shortness : (3) that neither the Forms. Tall and Short, nor their instances in us can change into their opposites ; and consequently (4) that, if Socrates should grow and become taller than Phaedo, the instance of shortness in Socrates must either 'perish' or 'withdraw' to give place to an instance of tallness. This analysis unquestionably means that the person who becomes taller or shorter than another suffers an internal change. The example chosen lends itself to this view because ' tallness ' was commonly ranked as a physical excellence. with beauty, health and strength, and as such it is mentioned earlier in the Phaedo.1 Plato himself shares the ordinary view and thinks of tallness as an internal property on the same footing as 'hot' or 'white', not as standing for a relation between the taller person and the shorter.

Now in our passage, though he repeats his example of Socrates, who is now taller than Theastetus, becoming shorter when Theastetus outgrows him, he remarks that Socrates will not have changed in size. And in the case of the duce it is equally obvious that the six dice do not become more or fewer in the sense of mcreasing or diminishing in number. Further, he hints that light on the puzzles here is to be drawn from the theory of sense-perception, which tells us that an object can 'become white 'for a percipient without undergoing any internal change of quality irrespective of a percipient. When we say it 'becomes white for me' we do not mean that it has lost some other colour and gained whiteness

¹ At Plasso 650, Tallness (μ/yeleg), Health, Strength, are instanced as Forms, together with Just, Basnithi, Good. That μ/yeles means 'tallness' (not 'absolute magnitude' or 'mathematical magnitude') is evident from Meero 720 Meero has and that excellence (μ/qerf) in a smn as one thing, in a woman another. Socrates asks whether this applies to physical excellences : are basiht, atliness (μ/yeleg), or strength different things in men and in women 'Tallness and beauty are coupled at 72a, as in Homer's phrase said re whether are not question of the absolute or mathematical magnitude of men and women. At Plasso 650 tallness appears without beauty beauty ends.

instead. In itself, apart from a percipient, it is neither white nor of any other colour. The change meant by 'becoming white' (for me) is not an internal exchange of qualities, but a change that occurs 'between' the object and the sense-organ. Neither of the two carries about with it a permanent property, independent of their meting.

The inference seems to be that Plato, since writing the Plato, has given up the view that any of these qualities—hot, white, large —is an instance of a Form residing in an undvidual thing and periabing or withdrawing out of it when the thing changes. We are now to think of the change as falling 'between' the thing and the perceptent, not inside the thing. The case of more or less in number or size may be introduced partly because it is easier to see in that case how a change can occur 'between' a thing and a percipient." The six chee well appear more to me when I compare them with four, less when I compare them with twelve, but they have not become more or fewer in thas renlaced some other colour.

It is not safe, however, to infer that Plato has 'abandoned Ideas (Forms) of relations', if that implies that he had drawn any clear distinction between relations and qualities. It is rather probable that he still sees no important distinction between 'large ' and ' hot ' or ' white'. And he nowhere explicitly states that he has abandoned Forms of both relative terms and sensible qualities.¹

155D-157C. Theory of the nature of Sense-perception

Socrates now expands the analysis of the process of sense-perception, which was briefly announced before the passage on size and number.

155D. Sock. (continues). Do you now begin to see the explanation of all this which follows from the theory we are attributing to Protagoras? Or is it not yet clear? TREAFT. I can't say it is yet. Sock. Then certars you will be crateful if I help you to

¹ Note that Plato's illustrations are perceptible things—dice, not abstract numbers He is not talking about mathematical 'relations' between the numbers 4, 6, 12.

⁴ The treatment by Flato and Aristotic of 'relative terms' will be further docused below, p 83 it is so out hing to any (with Flato) that 'larget' and 'more' are relative terms because what is larget or more is always larget fans something or more than something or 'ms complexion with its owneding' (wpfer n), and another to say (with Campbell) that 'use and number are wold) relative 'What is annuber, or any number (say), wholly relative to ?

- 155D. penetrate to the truth concealed in the thoughts of a man E. —or. I should say, of men—of such distinction.¹
 - E. Or, I should say, of mei—of such distinction. TREART. Of course I shall be very grateful. Socra. Then just take a look round and make sure that none of the uninitiate overhears us. I mean by the uninitiate the people who believe that nothing is real save what they can grasp with their hands and do not admit that actions or processes or anything invisible can count as real. THEART. They sound like a very hard and recollent sort
- 156. of people.³

Socia. It is true, they are remarkably crude. The others, into whose secrets I am going to imitiate you, are much more refined and subtle. Their first principle, on which all that we said just now depends, is that the universe really is motion and nothing else. And there are two kinds of motion. Of each kind there are any number of instances, but they differ in that the one kind has the power of acting, the other of being acted upon.⁹ From the intercourse and fraction of these with one another ares coffspring, endless in

- number, but in pars of twms. One of each pair is something perceved, the other a perception, whose birth always coincides with that of the thing perceived. Now, for the perceptions we have names like 'seeing', 'hearing', 'smelling', 'feeling cold', 'feiening tot', and again pleasures and pains and desires and fears, as they are called, and so on. There are any number that are nameless, though names have been found for a whole multitude. On the other side, the brood of things perceived always comes to burth at the same moment with one or another of these—with instances
- c. of seeing, colours of corresponding variety ; with instances of hearing, sounds in the same way ; and with all the other perceptions, the other things perceived that are aken to them. Now, what light does this story throw on what has gone before. Thesetetus ? Do you see ?

¹ Observe the hints that the coming theory is one that 'we are attributing ' to Protagoras, and not to him alone

* Like the physical bodies in whose reality they believe, with their essential property of hardness and resistance to touch.

•The two kinds of motion here meant are: (1) physical objects considered as agents with the power of acting upon or sifecting our meanes; (2) sensiorgans, as patients with the capacity of being affected in the way peculiar to sensation or perception Later (156c) both kinds are distinguished, as "dow motions (qualitative changed) occurring in the same place', from the rapid movements which pass between them—the offspring mentioned in the next sentences.

THEORY OF SENSE-PERCEPTION

- 156C. THEAST. Not very clearly. Socrates. SOCR. Well, consider whether we can round it off. The point is that all these things are as we were saving in motion : but there is a quickness or slowness in their motion. The slow sort has its motion without change of place and with respect to what comes within range of it, and that is
 - D. how it generates offspring : but the offspring generated are quicker, inasmuch as 1 they move from place to place and their motion consists in change of place. As soon, then, as an eve and something else whose structure is adjusted to the eve come within range and give birth to the whiteness together with its cognate perception-things that would never have come into existence if either of the two had approached anything else-then it is that, as the
 - E. vision from the eves and the whiteness from the thing that joins in giving birth to the colour pass in the space between. the eye becomes filled with vision and now sees, and becomes, not vision, but a seeing eye ; while the other parent of the colour is saturated with whiteness and becomes, on its side. not whiteness, but a white thing, be it stock or stone or whatever else may chance to be so coloured.

And so, too, we must think in the same way of the rest-'hard', 'hot' and all of them-that no one of them has any being just by itself (as indeed we said before), but that 157. it is in their intercourse with one another that all arise in all their variety as a result of their motion : since it is impossible to have any ' firm notion ' (as they say) of either what is active or what is passive in them. in any single case, as having any being." For there is no such thing as an agent until it meets with a patient, nor any patient until it meets with its agent.* Also what meets with something and behaves as agent, if it encounters something different at another time, shows itself as patient.4

The conclusion from all this is, as we said at the outset. that nothing 15 one thing just by itself, but is always in process of becoming for someone, and being is to be ruled

в.

¹ Taking ourse of (yerrougers) as referring forward and explained by the following clause with ydy. There should be a colon after *doriv* (so Dids). But perhaps this ofree 34 should be omitted, with Peipers

* The ambiguity of elval 75 is discussed below, p. 50 For rd motor . . . at av, cf. and topic attan. 1628. 8

* Strictly the present participles mean a thing which is acting, is being acted on It is not denied that there exists beforehand something with the power to act or be acted on

4 The eveball can be seen by another eve, the fiesh touched, etc.

1578. out altogether, though, needless to say, we have been betrayed by habit and inobservance into using the word more than once only just now. But that was wrong, these wise men tell us, and we must not admit the expressions 'something 'or 'somebody's 'or "inne' or 'this' or any other word that brings things to a standstill, but rather speak, in accordance with nature, of what is 'becoming', 'being produced', 'perishing', 'changing'. For anyone who talks so as to bring things to a standstill is easily refuted. So we must express ourselves in each individual case and in speaking of an assemblage of many—c. to which assemblage people give the name of 'man' or 's one' or dian Vision creature or kind."

Whose is this theory ? Modern critics usually say that Socrates attributes it to 'certain unnamed thinkers', and many have proceeded to identify these with the Cyrenaics. For this there is no warrant in the text. The theory is first introduced (152c) as a secret doctrine revealed by Protagoras to his disciples. Its fundamental thesis-the flux doctrine-is then ascribed to the whole series of philosophers, with the exception of Parmenides. and to Homer and Epicharmus. At 155D it is called ' the theory we are attributing to Protagoras ', and once more described as a secret 'concealed in the thoughts of a man-or rather men-of distinction '. Materialists, who identify the real with the tangible and do not reckon actions and processes as real at all, are excluded from the mystery, which reduces the tangible bodies they believe in precisely to actions and processes.* 'The others' are more refined, and now their secret doctrine is fully revealed. 'The others' means simply the distinguished men just mentioned, Protagoras humself and all the philosophers (except Parmenides, who denied the existence of motion) and poets who recognised the flux of all things-

¹ The text is doubtful: sol inserve (give re al effects hard to construe Does inserver (give mean 'an individual animal', effects a 'and o' of animal') What sort of 'assemblage's meant? Perhaps a physical object considered metely as an aggregate of what are commonly regarded as its sensible qualities. —all the qualities (which, hard, etc) we should name in describing a strong that we saw The whole theory is confined to the discussion of sensible qualities. Cf Burnet, G P J, 241.

⁹ We shall meet with the materialists again in the Sopkist (p. 231, 186/ra). Probably no particular school is directly aimed at though the Atomists who identified the real with (essentially tangible) body would come within the condemnation

Reading dilos & with Burnet at 156A, 2. But the reading does not affect my argument.

all who have been wise enough to acknowledge the reality of actions and processes. There are no 'unnamed thinkers' to be identified; nor is there any evidence that any Cyrenaics or other contemporaries existed who held the doctrine of sense-perception here set forth.

No one would take seriously the suggestion that this very advanced theory of the nature of perception and its objects was really taught in secret by any of the distinguished philosophers and poets. Socrates is, in fact, himself in the act of constructing it by a dialectical combination of elements borrowed, with important modifications and restrictions, from Protagoras and Heracleitus. Jackson 1 pointed out that the theory is not refuted in the secuel, but on the contrary taken as a true account of the matter, and that it is repeated elsewhere in Plato's writings. He inferred that it originated with Plato himself. There is a conclusive argument (not urged by Jackson) in favour of this inference. Plato intends to refute the claim of perception (in spite of its infallibility) to be knowledge on the ground that its objects have no real being, but are always becoming and changing and therefore cannot be known. For that purpose he is bound to give us what he believes to be a true account of the nature of those objects. It would be futile to prove that what some other individual or school, perhaps wrongly, supposed to be the nature of perception was inconsistent with its claim to yield knowledge. Accordingly he states his own doctrine and takes it as established for the purposes of the whole subsequent criticism of perception. To preserve the dramatic proprieties of dialogue, he uses the transparent device of making Socrates state it as a secret doctrine of a whole succession of wise men who notoriously had never taught anything of the kind.

Assured that the theory must be Plato's own, we may now look at it more closely. Contemporaries must have found it extremely darung. The physical objects which yield our sensations and perceptions are described as actually being 'slow motions'. No eprmanent quality resides in them. The only other thing we know about them is that they have the power (*divinue*) of acting upon our organs and (it may be added) upon one another. What we call a hot thing is a change that can make us 'feel hot' and can make another thing we call 'cold' hotter. This change, as opposed to locomotion, is a modification or qualitative change.⁸ On the other side, the subject of perception is here treated as if it were, not the

P.T.K.

E

¹ Journal of Philology xun, pp. 250 ff. Burnet (Greek Philosophy i, 242) agrees with the attribution to Plato

³ Thus us clear from 181D and Parm. 138B, where it is said that the two kinds of change are locomotion (φορf) and qualitative change (dλλoleosy) The conception of the δόναμας will be further discussed below, pp. 234 fi.

mind, but the sense-organ 1—the eye from which issues the stream of visual 'fire' or light (called 'vision', $\delta\mu\kappa$)—to encounter the rapid motion coming from the object. The eye which sees, or the flesh which feels, is itself a physical object which can be seen or touched, and therefore itself a qualitative change, a 'slow motion in the same place'. Thus, before the act of perception takes place, there are, on both sides, changes going on all the time in physical objects, unperceived and capable of giving rise to actual perceptions. But nothing that can properly be called an agent or patient exists until the two come within range of one another.

When they do come within range, the powers of acting and being acted upon come into play. Quick motions pass between organ and external object. A stream of visual light flows out from the eye to meet a stream of light whose structure corresponds in such a way that the two streams can interpenetrate one another and coalesce.⁴ The marriage of these two motions generates seeing and colour. Physically, the eye becomes filled with vision '--a mixture of visual fire and the fiery particles coming from the object. The external thing 'becomes white'; its surface is 'saturated with whiteness'. This last statement is more difficult; the object is described as affected by the act of sight and acquiring colour. The meaning may be that the 'fiame' or light belonging to the object cannot until this moment be called 'colour' or 'white'. At other times the object ought not to be spoken of as if it possessed in itself any quality with a fixed name.

When perception is not taking place, we are finally told, one cannot have any 'firm notion' of either agent or patient as 'having any being' or 'being any definite thing '(ebu(rt). The last words are ambiguous. 'Being any definite thing 'means having any definite quality, such as white. 'Having any being' means that there is strictly no such thing as an agent or patient as such : there is nothing that is acting or being acted upon, but only two things or changes with a capacity of acting and being acted upon. This capacity must imply that my pen and this paper have some difference of property when not perceived, which would explain why, when I do see them, the pen looks black, the paper white. Plato's point

¹ Later (184B) rt will be pointed out that there is a central mind which perceives rather *through* than *with* the several sense-organs, but this addition does not invalidate the present account of the commerce between organs and objects

⁴ The Timmene explains the process m terms of the theory which there assigns particles of regular form to each of the four elements. Colours are 'a fame streaming off any and every body, having its particles so adjusted (objuerspa) to those of the visual current as to excite sensation '(5/7) Cf. The collectors or dedecore or described at Fum, 45 ff. See p. 327.

is that these properties, whatever they are, are always changing, however slightly, and that they are not the qualities I perceive my sense-objects—and so should not be called ' black ' or ' white '.'

157C-D. Theaetetus accepts the theory of Perception

In a short interlude, Theaetetus accepts the theory, while Socrates disclaims the authorship.

- 157C. Socz. (continues). Does all this please you, Theatetus? Will you accept it as palatable to your taste? THEAET. Really, I am not sure, Socrates I cannot even make out about you, whether you are stating thus as something you believe on merely putting me to the test. Socz. You forget, my friend, that I know nothing of such matters and cannot claim to be producing any offspring of my own. I am only trying to deliver yours, and to that end uttering charms over you and tempting your appetite
 - D. with a variety of delicacies from the table of wisdom, until by my aid your own belief shall be brought to light. Once that is done, I shall see whether it proves to have some life in it or not. Meanwhile, have courage and patience, and answer my questions bravely in accordance with your convictions.

THEAET. Go on with your questioning.

SOCR. Once more, then, tell me whether you like this notion that nothing is, but is always becoming, good or beautiful or any of the other things we mentioned?

THEAET. Well, when I hear you explaining it as you have, it strikes me as extraordinarily reasonable, and to be accepted as you have stated it.

The theory so accepted stands henceforth as a satisfactory account of that perception which Theatertus has identified with knowledge. The word has now received a clearer meaning, more restricted than Theatertus, perhaps, at first intended. He apparently feels no qualm when Socrates slips in the words' good' and' beautiful', as if these qualities were on the same footing with 'hot' or 'white' or 'large', and since has identification of knowledge with perception implies that there is no knowledge other than perception, he would have no right to object.

¹ There is no question here of a 'solipsist epistemology ' or of a relativism asserting that, if every sentient creature were annihilated, nothing would exist

^{*} The allusion seems to be rather to the fastidious appetite of pregnant women than to drugs, which are not 'set before ' the patient to be ' tasted of '.

157E-160E. The claim of Perception, so defined, to be infallible

The next section completes the case on behalf of Theaetetus' identification of knowledge with perception. At the outset Protagoras' assertion that ' what appears to each man is to him ' was construed as meaning that what he perceives has being (at any rate ' for him') and that his perception is infallible. Plato's theory of perception has now denied that the object has ' being' apart from the percipient, and has interpreted ' is for him' as meaning 'becomes for him'. This interpretation, though it will finally prove fatal to the claim of perception to be knowledge of true reality, leaves untouched the claim to infallibility. Scorates, whose present business is to make the best of Theaetetus' hypothesis that perception is knowledge, now brings forward this latter claim and upholds it against the objections commonly based on so-called delusions of sense, the unreality of dream images, the vitiated sensations of the diseased on the hallucinations of insanity.

- 157E. SOCR. Then let us not leave it incomplete. There remains the question of dreams and disorders, especially madness and all the mistakes mandness is said to make in seeing or hearing or otherwise misperceiving. You know, of course, that in all these cases the theory we have just stated is supposed to be admittedly disproved, on the ground that in these
- 158. conditions we certainly have false perceptions, and that so far from its being true that what appears to any man also is, on the contrary none of these appearances is real. THEART. That is quite true, Socrates. Soca: What argument, then, is left for one who maintains that perception is knowledge, and that what appears to each man also 'is' for him to whom it appears? THEART. I hesitate to say that I have no reply. Socrates, because just now your rebuked me for saying that. Really,
 - B. I cannot undertake to deny that madmen and dreamers believe what is false, when madmen imagine they are gods or dreamers think they have wings and are flying in their sleep.

SOCR. Have you not taken note of another doubt that is raised in these cases, especially about sleeping and waking ?¹ THEAET. What is that ?

SOCR. The question I imagine you have often heard asked :

¹ The reply our theory will make to dispose of the objection does not begin till 158. Here Socrates makes a sort of preliminary answer: Who is to judge between the dreamer's conviction that his expensione is real and the waking man's, that it is unreal?

ALLEGED DELUSIONS OF SENSE

- 158B. what evidence could be appealed to, supposing we were asked at this very moment whether we are asleep or awake
 - c. —dreaming all that passes through our minds or talking to one another in the waking state. THRAFT. Indeed, Socrates, I do not see by what evidence it is to be proved; for the two conditions correspond in every circumstance like exact counterparts. The conversation we have just had might equally well be one that we merely think we are carrying on in our sleep; and when it comes to thinking un a dream that we are telling other dreams, the two states are extraordinarily alike. Sock. You see, then, that there is plenty of room for
 - D. doubt, when we even doubt whether we are askep or awake; and in fact, our time being equally divided between waking and sleeping, in each condition our mind stremuosily contends that the convictions of the moment are certainly true, so that for equal times we afirm the reality of the one world and of the other, and are just as confident of both. TREAET. Certainly.

SOCR. And the same holds true of disorders and madness, except that the times are not equal.

THEAET. That is so.

SOCR. Well, is the truth to be decided by length or shortness of time ?

E. THEAET. No, that would be absurd in many ways SOCR Have you any other certain test to show which of these beliefs is true? THEAET I don't think I have

The word assikes is here still used in a sense wide enough to molude awareness of inner senastions and feelings and of dramimages. All these are, in Protagoras' phrase, 'things that appear' to me. Since, as Socrates will point out, I cannot be aware and yet aware of nothing (troba), these objects must have some sort of existence; and there is no ground for saying that my direct awareness of them is 'false'.

It is true that Theatettus (1580), instead of keeping to Socrates' expressions 'perceptions,' what appears , speaks of the dreamer and the madmen as 'thinking ' $(\partial c_1^2 (z,v, \partial zove b (\partial u))$ or 'believing' ($(\partial c \partial d u)$) what is false. This is no doubt intentional. It stirs in the reader the suggestion that, although there may be no such thing as a false awareness of sensation, there is such a thing as false belief. But the vital distinction between direct awareness and behef is not yet drawn, and Theatettus, like most people, would

THEAETETUS

say indifferently of the dreamer that he 'has the sensation of flying', 'seems to himself to be flying', and 'imagines or believes he is flying'. When the distinction is drawn, the claim of direct awareness to be infallible is not shaken. No one can deny that the dreamer has just that experience which he does have.

After this glimpse of the distinction between sensation or perception and belfer of judgment, the argument returns to the case of 'perception' and is confined to that. Socrates now disposes of the popular notion that the healthy or the same man is the only measure of what is or appears—that wine really is in itself sweet because it seems sweet to the normal palate, sour opluty to the unhealthy. Since the sense-organ co-operates in producing the sensation, its condition at least partly determines the character of the sensation. The unhealthy main is not 'misperceiving' a fixed quality inherent in the external object, which the normal man perceives as it really is. The two percipient organs are different, and these differences will necessarily modify the joint product of the marriage of subject and object.

- r58E. Socz. Then let me tell you what sort of account would be given of these cases by those who lay it down that whatever at any time seems to anyone is true to him. I imagine they would ask this question: 'Tell us, Theaetetus; when one thing is entirely different from another, it cannot be in any respect capable of behaving² in the same way as that other, can it? We are not to understand that the thing we speak of is in some respects the same though different in others, but that it is entirely different.'
- 159. THEAET. If so, it can have nothing in common, either in its capabilities of behaviour or in any other respect, when it is altogether different.

Socs. Must we not admit, then, that such a thing is unlike the other?

THEAET. I agree.

SOCR. So if it happens that something comes to be like or unlike either itself or something else, we shall say that when it is made like it becomes the same, when unlike, different THERET. Necessarily.

SOCR. And we said earlier that there was no limit to the number of things that are active or of things that are acted upon by them.

THEAET. Yes.

¹ By Súreque the capacity of acting or being acted upon, mentioned at 156A, is specially meant, though the word has vaguer senses.

PERCEPTION IS INFAULTRUE

- SOCR. And further, that when one of these is married to a 159. succession of different partners, the offspring produced will be not the same but different.
 - B. THEAET. Certainly.

SOCR. Now let us take you or me or any other instance to which the principle applies-Socrates in health and Socrates ill: are we to call one of these line the other or unlike?

THEAST. You mean : Is the ill Socrates taken as a whole like Socrates in health taken as a whole?

SOCR. You understand me perfectly : that is just what I mean

THEAET. Then of course he is unlike.

SOCR. And consequently, inasmuch as he is unlike, a different thing?

THEAET. Necessarily.

c. SOCR. And you would say the same of Socrates asleep or in any other of the conditions we mentioned?

THEAET. Yes.

SOCR. Then any one of the objects whose nature it is to act upon something will, according as it finds Socrates well or ill, treat me as a different thing?

THEAET. Of course it will.

SOCR. And consequently the pair of us-I who am acted upon and the thing that acts on me-will have different offspring in the two cases ?

THEAET Naturally.

SOCR. Now when I am in health and drink wine, it seems pleasant to me and sweet.

THEAET. Yes.

SOCR. Because, in accordance with the account we accepted earlier, agent and patient give birth to sweetness and a

D. sensation, both movements that pass simultaneously. The sensation, on the patient's side, makes the tongue percipient, while, on the side of the wine, the sweetness, moving in the region of the wine.1 causes it both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

THEAET. Certainly that was what we agreed upon.

SOCR. But when it finds me in ill health, to begin with, the person it finds is not really the same : for the one it now meets with is unlike the other.

THEAET. Yes.

E. SOCR. And so this pair-Socrates in this condition and the

¹ repl abror depositon seems to mean, as it were, ' spreading itself over the wine ' as whiteness saturated the surface of the thing seen (156E).

1598. drinking of the wine—produce a different offspring : in the region of the tongue a sensation of sourness, and in the region of the wine a sourness that arises as a movement there. The wine becomes, not sourness, but sour ; while I become, not a sensation, but sentient. TERAET. Undonbrediv.

The assertion here that Socrates-ill is a totally different person from Socrates-well may seem fallacious. But the whole argument is confined within the limits of the earlier account of sense-perception. Socrates is for this purpose nothing more than a bundle of sense-organs. If these sense-organs are perpetually changing (as the theory maintains), then the whole of Socrates is different at any two moments. So at 166B Protagoras is made to say that we have no right to speak of a single person continuously existing, but only of an infinite number, if change of quality is always taking place. as it is on our Heracleitean premiss. Socrates is accordingly, justified in drawing the three conclusions that follow : (1) No percipient can have the same sensation or perception twice, since both subject (organ) and object will be different . (2) No two percipients can have precisely similar sensations or perceptions from the same object ; (3) Neither perciptent nor sense-object can exist independently of the other. These conclusions will yield the final result, that no one can challenge the truth of my perception on the grounds that he perceives an object different from mine, and that that object is a quality which resides in the thing independently of either percipient, so that one of us must be 'misperceiving' it.

- 159E. Socz. It follows, then, (1) that, on my side, I shall never become percipient in just this way of any other thing, for to a different object belongs a different perception, and in acting on its percipient it is acting on ¹ a person who is in a different condition and so a different person. Also (2) on its side,
- 160. the thing which acts on me can never meet with someone else and generate the same offspring and come to be of just this quality; for when it brings to birth another thing from another person, it will itself come to be of another quality.

I evoit 's acting on '(of rè roubé duin the next clause and 1500, 4), not 'makes him a different person, 'no the sensorgan as, on our Herachetas principle, perpetually changing. The agent table is different to, so the combustion of a different boyce and a different sensition. The expression reach reas for 'doing something to a person 'is a slight extension of the common usages, of work reas, oke old 'on gengla per works (Ar. Warks 507), rabra rebror derives (Ar. Warks 507), rabra re

THEAET. That is so. 160.

SOCR. Further, (3) I shall not come to have this sensation for muself 1 nor will the object come to be of such a quality for itself.

THEAST. NO.

SOCR. Rather, when I become percipient, I must become percipient of something for I cannot have a perception and have it of nothing : and equally the object, when it

B. becomes sweet or sour and so on must become so to someone : it cannot become sweet and yet sweet to nobody. THEAET. Ouite so.

SOCR. Nothing remains, then, I suppose, but that it and I should be or become-whichever expression we are to use-for each other : necessity binds together our existence. but binds neither of us to anything else, nor each of us to himself¹: so we can only be bound to one another. Accordingly, whether we speak of something 'being' or of its ' becoming ', we must speak of it as being or becoming for someone, or of something or towards something : but

c, we must not speak, or allow others to speak, of a thing as either being or becoming anything just in and by itself. That is the conclusion to which our argument points.

THEAET. Certainly, Socrates

SOCR. And so, since what acts upon me is for me and for no one else. I, and no one else, am actually perceiving it.

THEAET. Of course.

SOCR. Then my perception is true for me ; for its object at any moment is my reality,3 and I am, as Protagoras says, a judge of what is for me, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not.

THEAST. So it appears.

D. SOCR. If. then, I am infallible and make no mistake in my state of mind about what is or becomes, how can I

1 Without the co-operation of an object of which I am percipient, as the next speech explains roworros = ouror alabarouros (159E, 7-8)

² i.e. neither subject nor object can produce just that sensation and quality in conjunction with any other object or subject ; and neither of the two can produce offspring ' for itself ' without the other.

" rife dufic obolas = ray duol former, what is real for me Socrates is here stating the claim that perception is true as having the real (rd do) for its object, as well as its claim to infallibility, next mentioned. The weak point is that 'my reality' is in fact only 'what becomes for me', not genuinely real in Plato's sense. Note that in his next speech Socrates speaks of what 'is or becomes'.

160D. fail to have knowledge of the things of which I have perception ?

THEAET. You cannot possibly fail.

Soca. So you were perfectly right in saying that knowledge is nothing but perception; and it has turned out that these three doctrines coincide: the doctrine of Homer and Heracleitus and all their tribe that all things move like flowing streams; the doctrine of Protagoras, wisest of men, that Man is the measure of all things; and Theaetetus

E. conclusion that, on these grounds, it results that perception is knowledge.

Is it not so, Theaetetus? May we say that this is your newborn child which I have brought to birth? What do you say?

THEAST. I can only agree, Socrates.

Thus Socrates claims to have brought to light the full meaning of Theaetetus' identification of knowledge with perception The first step was to analyse the nature of perception. Plato was forced to give his own account of the process, based on the Heracleitean principle which he accepted so far as sensible things are concerned. He has also adopted Protagoras' doctrine as applied to my immediate awareness of sense-objects, including dream images and hallucinations. In this field I am the measure of what 'becomes for me' or 'appears to me', if wine tastes sour to me, no one can say I am mistaken because the wine really is sweet in itself. So perception has one of the two marks of knowledge, infallibility. And, if we can accept Protagoras' identification of what appears to me with what is, or is real, ignoring the addition ' for me' or ' to me' and the distinction between being and becoming, the case will be complete. Socrates has, at any rate, dealt fairly with Theaetetus in making the best case for his candidate that can be made.

160E-161B. Interlude. Criticism begins

A short interlude marks that the first stage of the dialectical process is now complete. Socrates has drawn out the full meaning of Theaeteru's suggested definition of knowledge. The second stage, criticism, is now to begin. What follows has sometimes been misunderstood through a failure to see what the scope of the criticism precisely is.

First, it is not directed against the theory of perception as a whole, or against those elements in the theory which Plato has adopted from Heracleitus and Protagoras. If the account of the nature of perception were now to be rejected, obviously we should

INTERLUDE

not know what we were denying when we finally deny that perception is knowledge. This fabric stands unshaken. The process of perception is such as it has been described. The question is whether, being such, it possesses all the marks of knowledge.

At the same time. Plato has to explain exactly how much he has taken from Heracleitus and Protagoras, and exactly where he refuses to follow them further. The Heracleitean dogma 'All things are in motion ' can be accepted if ' all things ' is restricted (as it is in the theory of perception) to sensible physical objects. But there are other things-intelligible objects-to which it does not apply ; and these are, for Plato, the true realities. If these were always changing, no true statement could ever be made and there could be no such thing as knowledge or discourse. Similarly, the Protagorean maxim, man the measure of all things, can be accepted if 'all things' is restricted (as our theory restricts it) to the immediate objects of our awareness in sensation or perception. in which no element of judgment is supposed to be involved. But Protagoras' phrase ' what appears to me ' was not so restricted : it included what appears true to me, what I judge or think or believe to be true. Plato will deny that whatever I judge to be true must be true, simply, or even true to me or for me. Hence, in the following argument, criticism is directed partly against the claim of perception, as Plato has defined it, to be knowledge: partly against those elements of Heracleitean and Protagorean doctrine which go beyond what Plato has accepted.

- 160E. Soce Here at last, then, after our somewhat paunful labour, is the child we have brought to birth, whatever sort of creature it may be. His birth should be followed by the ceremony of carrying him round the hearth 1; we must look at our offspring from every angle to make sure we
- r61. are not taken in by a lifeless phantom not worth the rearing. Or do you think an infant of yours must be reared in any case and not exposed ? Will you bear to see him put to the proof, and not be in a passion if your first-born should be taken away ?

THEOD. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates, he is thoroughly good-tempered. But do explain what is wrong with the conclusion.

SOCR. You have an absolute passion for discussion, Theodorus. I like the way you take me for a sort of bag

¹ The Amphidromia was held a few days after birth The infant received its name and was associated with the family cult by being carried round the central hearth.

THEAETETUS

- 161. full of arguments, and imagine I can easily pull out a proof
 - B. to show that our conclusion is wrong. You don't see what is happening: the arguments never come out of me, they always come from the person I am talking with. I am only at a slight advantage in having the skull to get some account of the matter from another's wisdom and entertain it with fair treatment. So now, I shall not give any explanation myself, but try to get it out of our frend. THEOD. That is better. Socrates: do as you say.

161B-163A. Some objections against Protagoras

Theodorus is here drawn into the discussion, to mark that the first objections will be made against his personal friend, Protagoras.

- IGIB. SOCR. Well then, Theodorus, shall I tell you a thing that surprises me in your friend Protagoras ?
 - c. THEOD. What is that ?
 - Soca. The opening words of his treatise. In general, I am delighted with his statement that what seems to anyone also is; but I am surprised that he did not begin his Truch with the words: The measure of all things is the pig, or the baboon, or some sentient creature still more uncouth. There would have been something magnificent in so disdainful an opening, telling us that all the time, while we were admiring him for a wisdom more than mortal,
 - D. he was in fact no waser than a tadpole, to say nothing of any other human being. What else can we say, Theodorus ? If what every man believes as a result of perception is indeed to be true for hum; if, just as no one is to be a better judge of what another experiences, so no one is better entitled to consider whether what another thunks is true or false, and (as we have said more than none) every man is to have his own beliefs for himself alone and they are all nght and true—then, my friend, where is the wisdom of
 - E. Protagoras, to justify his setting up to teach others and to be handsomely paid for it, and where is our comparative ignorance or the need for us to go and sit at his feet, when each of us is himself the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not suppose that Protagoras speaks in this way to flatter the ears of the public? I say nothing of my own case or of the ludicrous predicament to which my art of midwifery is brought, and, for that matter, this whole busness of philosophic conversation; for to set about overhauling and testing one another's notions and opinions when

OBJECTIONS AGAINST PROTAGORAS

162. those of each and every one are right, is a tedious and monstrous display of folly, if the Truth of Protagoras is really truthful and not amusing herself with oracles delivered from the unapproachable shrune of his book.

THEOD. Protagoras was my friend, Socrates, as you were saying, and I would rather he were not refuted by means of any admissions of mine. On the other hand, I cannot resist you against my convictions; so you had better go back to Theaetetus, whose answers have shown, in any case, how well he can follow your meaning.

B. Sock. If you went to a wrestling-school at Sparta, Theodorus, would you expect to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them making a poor show, and not strip so as to let them compare your own figure?

THEOD Why not, if they were lakely to listen to me and not insist, just as I believe I shall persuade you to let me look on now? The limbs are stiff at my age; and instead of dragging me into your exercises, you will try a fall with a more supple youth.

SOCR. Well, Theodorus, as the proverb says, 'what likes you mislikes not me.' So I will have recourse to the c, wisdom of Theaetetus.

Tell me, then, first, Theaetetus, about the point we have just made: are not yow surprised that you should turn out, all of a sudden, to be every bit as wise as any other man and even as any god? Or would you say that Protagoras' maxim about the measure does not apply to gods just as much as to men?

THEAET. Certainly I think it does; and, to answer your question, I am very much surprised. When we were dis-

D. cussing what they mean by saying that what seems to anyone really is to him who thinks it so,¹ that appeared to me quite satisfactory; but now, all in a moment, it has taken on a very different complexion.

Soca. That, my friend, is because you are young; so you lend a ready ear to clap-trap and it convinces you. Protagoras or his representative will have an answer to this. He will say: 'You good people sitting there, boys and old men together, this is all clap-trap. You drag in the gods, whose existence or non-existence I expressly refuse

E. to discuss in my speeches and writings, and you count

 $^{^3}$ The ambiguity of donetin, including ' what seems ' (rd donethy), which might mean only perception, and ' he who thinks ' or ' sudges ' (d donew), is here nearly illustrated

162E. upon appeals to the valger such as this : how strange that any human individual is to be no wiser than the lowest of the brutes I You go entirely by what looks probable, without a word of argument or proch. If a mathematician like Theodrus elected to argue from probability in geometry, he wouldn't be worth an acc. So you and Theodorus might consider whether you are going to allow questions of this 163. importance to be settled by plausible appeals to mere likelihood'.

THEAST. Well, you would not think that right, Socrates, any more than we should.

SOCR. It seems, then, we must attack the question in another way. That is what you and Theodorus think. THEAET. Certainly we must.

Socrates has brought against Protagoras two objections, which are not of equal cogency. (1) Why not 'Pig the measure of all things '? On the level of mere sensation, man has no privileged position. The pig, or the anthropomorphic god (if such a being exists), is just as much the measure of hos own sensations. Plato, who confined his acceptance of the maxim to that level, would admit this. But Protagoras went beyond sensation and perception to include under 'what seems to me' what I thunk or judge to be true. The serious objection is: (2) 'If what every man believes as the result of perception is to be true for him', how can any man be wiser than another ? Here Plato parts company with Protagoras. When we return to these objections, we shall deny that every man is the measure of the truth of his own judgments.

163A-164B. Objections to a simple identification of Perceiving and Knowing

Meanwhile, Protagoras having registered his protest against clap-trap, the question of judgment is dropped. Socrates turns to some preliminary criticisms of Theatetus' proposition: Perception is knowledge. These criticisms are made here because Protagoras will be able to answer them presently in his Defence. They take ' perception ', as we have now analysed it, in the strictest and narrowest sense, and point out that we shall find ourselves in curious difficulties if we assert that such perception is the only form of knowledge. The objections are later called captous or 'eristic', not because they are invalid, but because they take Theatetus' statement more literally than he intended. They serve a purpose by calling attention to various meanings of the

OBJECTIONS TO 'PERCEIVING IS KNOWING'

word 'know' (Enforcation). (1) I am said to 'know' Svriac 1 when I understand the meaning of written or spoken symbols. (2) I 'know' Socrates when I have become acquainted with a certain person by sense-perception and possess a record of this acquaintance in memory. In neither of these senses can 'I know' be simply equated with 'I am perceiving'. It is necessary and fair to make Theaetetus see what a simple identification of perceiving and 'knowing' commits him to.

163A. SOCR. Let us look at it in this way, then-this question whether knowledge and perception are, after all, the same thing or not. For that, you remember, was the point to which our whole discussion was directed, and it was for its sake that we stirred up all this swarm of queer doctrines. wasn't it?

THEAET. Quite true.

B. SOCR Well, are we going to agree that, whenever we perceive something by sight or hearing, we also at the same time know it ? Take the case of a foreign language we have not learnt. Are we to say that we do not hear the sounds that foreigners utter, or that we both hear and know what they are saying? Or again, when we don't know our letters, are we to maintain that we don't see them when we look at them, or that, since we see them, we do know them ?

THEAET. We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we do see or hear. The shape and colour of the letters we both see and know ; we hear and at the

c. same time know the rising and falling accents of the voice ; but we neither perceive by sight and hearing nor yet know what a schoolmaster or an interpreter could tell us about them

SOCR. Well done, Theaetetus. I had better not raise objections to that, for fear of checking your growth.² But look, here is another objection threatening. How are we going to parry it?

THEAST. What is that ?

D. SOCR. It is this. Suppose someone to ask : 'Is it possible

Συριστι ἐπίστασθαι (Xenophon), γράμματα ἐπίστασθαι.
 Socrates might object that to ' know ' a language does not mean hearing unintelligible sounds or seeing black marks on paper, but to know the meaning, which we do not see or hear But Plato does not want to embark on a discussion of what it is we know when we know the meaning of words. That would involve bringing in the Forms, which he is determined, so far as possible, to leave out of account So the point is not pressed.

r63D. for a man who has once come to know something and still preserves a memory of it, not to know just that thing that he remembers at the moment when he remembers it? ' Thus is, perhaps, rather a long-winded way of putting the question. I mean: Can a man who has become acquainted ¹ with something and remembers it, not know it? TERET. Of course not, Socrate; the supposition is monstrous. Socr. Perhaps I am talking nonsense, then. But consider: you call seeing ' perceiving ', and sight' perception', don't you?

THEAET. I do.

E. SOCR. Then, according to our earlier statement.² a man who sees something acquires from that moment knowledge of the thing he sees? THEAET. Yes SOCR. Again, you recognise such a thing as memory ? THEAET. Yes. SOCR. Memory of nothing, or of something ? THEAET. Of something, surely SOCR. Of what one has become acquainted with and perceived-that sort of things? THEAST. Of course. SOCR. So a man sometimes remembers what he has seen ? THEAST. He does. SOCR. Even when he shuts his eves ? Or does he forget when he shuts them ? THEAET. No. Socrates : that would be a monstrous thing to sav. SOCR. All the same, we shall have to say it, if we are to 164. save our former statement. Otherwise, it goes by the hoard THEAET. I certainly have a suspicion that you are right, but I don't quite see how. You must tell me. SOCR. In this way. One who sees, we say, acquires knowledge of what he sees, because it is agreed that sight or perception and knowledge are the same thing. THEAET. Certainly. SOCR. But suppose this man who sees and acquires knowledge of what he has seen, shuts his eyes : then he remembers the thing, but does not see it. Isn't that so ?

¹ μανθάναν here is wider than 'learn', and equivalent to the phrase ' come to know something ' (ἐπιστήμων γανέσθαι) above

³ The sumple identification of perceiving with knowing, recalled at 163A.

SOCRATES WILL DEFEND PROTAGORAS

- 164. THEAET. Yes.
 - B. SOCR. But 'does not see it' means 'does not know it', since 'sees' and 'knows' mean the same. THEAET. True. SOCR. Then the conclusion is that a man who has come to know a thing and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not see it; and we said that would be a monstrous conclusion THEAET. Quite true. SOCR. Apparently, then, if you say that knowledge and perception are the same thing, it leads to an impossibility. THEAET. So it seems. SOCR. Then we shall have to say they are different. THEAET. I suppose so.

In this argument memory first comes into sight. Remembering ' is a kind of knowing different from percerving as we have analysed it We seem to have immediate awareness of past objects not now given in the actual process of perception. If Theaetetus' definition of knowledge as perception is to be saved, 'perception' must be stretched to cover awareness of memory-objects Since there would be no objection to that, Socrates here breaks off what threatens to become a mere dispute about words. The conclusion stands, however, that 'I know' has other meanings than 'I am (now) percerving'. And the nature of memory will call for analysis later.

164C-165E. Socrates undertakes to defend Protagoras

In an interlude Socrates consents to state, on Protagoras' behalf, a reply to the criticism urged against Man the measure of all things. Incidentally, he adds another 'enstic' objection to Theaetetus' equation of perceiving with knowing.

154c. Socz. What, then, can knowledge be? Apparently we must begin all over agam. But wait a moment, Theaetetus, What are we dong? TREAET. Dong about what? Socz. It seems to me we are behaving towards our theory like an ill-bred gamecock who springs away from his adversary and starts crowing over him before he is beaten. TREAET. How so? Socz. It looks as if we were content to have reached an agreement resting on mere verbal consistency and to have got the better of the theory by the methods of a professional controversialist. We profess to be seeking wisdom, not 164D. competing for victory, but we are unconsciously behaving just like one of those redoubtable disputants.

THEAET. I still don't understand what you mean.

Soce. Well, I will try to make the point clear, so far as I can see it. We were asking whether one who had become acquainted with something and remembered it could fail to know it. Then we pointed out that a man who shuts hus eyes after seeing something, remembers but does not see; and so concluded that at the same moment he both remembers the thing and does not know it. That, we said, was impossible. And so no one was left to tell Protagoras' tale¹, or yours either, about knowledge and perception being the same thing.

E. THEART. So it appears. Soca. I fancy it would be very different if the author of the first story were still alve. He would have put up a good fight for his offspring. But he is dead, and here are we trampling on the orphan. Even its appointed guardians, like Theodorus here, will not come to the rescue. However, we will step into the breach ourselves and see that it has fair play.

THEOD. In point of fact, Socrates, it is rather Callias, son

165. of Hipponicus,⁴ who is Protagoras' trustee My own inclinations diverted me at rather an early age from abstract discussions to geometry. All the same, I shall be grateful for any succour you can give him.

Soca. Very good, Theodorus You shall see what my help will amount to. For one might commit oneself to even stranger conclusions, if one were as careless in the use of language as we commonly are in our assertions and denials. Am I to enlarge upon this to you or to Theastetus ?

THEOD. To the company in general, but let the younger man answer your questions. It will not be such a disgrace B. to him to be caught tripping.

Socs. Let me put, then, the most formidable poser of all, which I take to be this: Can the same person know something and also not know that which he knows? Inzoo. Well, Theastetus, what are we to answer? Inzakr: That it is impossible. I suppose.

SOCR. Not if you say that seeing is knowing. How are you going to deal with a question that leaves no loophole,

¹ A proverbial expression,

A wealthy amateur of sophistry, who had entertained Protagoras on his visit to Athens,

SOCRATES WILL DEFEND PROTAGORAS

- 165B. when you are trapped like a beast in a pit and an imperturbable gentleman puts his hand over one of your eyes and asks
 - c. if you can see his coat with the eye that is covered ? THEAET. I suppose I should say : No, not with that one,

but I can with the other.

SOCR. So you both see and do not see the same thing at the same time ?

THEAET. Yes, in a sort of way.

Soca. Never mind about the sort of way, he will reply ; that was not the question I set you, but whether, when you know a thung, you also do not know it. In thus instance you are obviously seeing something you don't see, and you have agreed that seemg is knowing and not seeing is not knowing. Now draw your conclusion. What is the consequence?

D. THEAET. Well, I conclude that the consequence contradicts my thesis.

Son. Yes, and you might have been reduced to the same conduito by a number of further questions: whether knowing can be keen or dum; whether you can know from close at hand what you cannot know from a distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity. A mercenary skrmisher in the war of words might lie in wait for you armed with a thousand such questions, once you have identified knowledge and perception. He would make his assaults upon hearing and smelling and suchlike senses and put you

E. to confusion, sustaining his attack until your admiration of his mestimable skill betrayed you into his toils, and thereupon, leading you captive and bound, he would hold you to ransom for such a sum as you and he might agree upon.¹

And now, perhaps, you may wonder what argument Protagoras will find to defend his position. Shall we try to put it into words? THERET. By all means.

The 'most formidable' objection here added is, like the earlier ones, valid against Thesetetus' position, since he has accepted the account of perception as the commerce between a sense-origen and an external object. If that is what perception is, then to identify it with knowledge does lead to these absurdities. The objections

¹ Protagoras, if a pupil objected to the fee he charged, made him swear in a tomple how much be thought what he had learnt was worth *Proiag.* 3285; Ar., E.N. 1164, 24.

THEAETETUS

do not touch Protagoras, who did not limit knowledge to perception. They are called captious because they only apply to Theatettus' statement when that is taken more literally than he meant, and do not apply to Protagoras, upon whom Socrates has seemed to father all thus complex of doctrines he has constructed by his dialectical oriwe which Theatettus meant to brang forward, and we do not want to quarrel about words. Further, they do not impair Flato's own doctrine of the nature of sems-perception, or shake the claim of perception, as so defined, to yield *infallible* awareness of a private i knowledge'. Accordingly, he admits frankly that the whole position has not been disposed of by means of a few essays in sophistical disputation.

165E-168c. The Defence of Protagoras

The Defence now put by Scorates into the mouth of Protagoras falls into three mann divisions. First comes a protest against the 'captious 'objections and a reply to them. The central and most important part attempts to meet the really damaging criticism of Protagoras humself . If every man is the measure of his own yielgments, how can Protagoras set up to be wiser than others ? Finally, in a peroration, the sophist is (romically) represented as exhorting the dialectician to argue seriously, not catching at words, but trying to understand what the opponent really means.

> Socr. No doubt, then, Protagoras will make all the points we have put forward in our attempt to defend him, and

r66. at the same turne will come to close quarters with the assulant, dismissing us with contempt.¹ 'Vour admirable Socrates', he will say, 'finds a little boy who is scared at being asked whether one and the same person an remember and at the same time not know one and the same thing. When the child is frightened mto saying No, because he cannot foresee the consequence, Socrates turns the conversation so as to make a figure of tun of my unfortunate self. You take things much too easily, Socrates. The truth of the matter is this: when you ask someone questions in order to canvass some opimon of mme and he is found tripping, then I am

¹ Protagoras will both (vq) arge, as we have done for hum, that we are tailing clap-trap (1620), that verbal disputation is futile (164) and we must use words more carefully (1654), and (cal) will come to graps (not with us, but) with the sophistic akirmisher and has armoury of ensitic cavits, despiaing us for our fooble surrender to such weapons

THE DEFENCE OF PROTAGORAS

- 166. refuted only if his answers are such as I should have given ;
 - b. if they are different, it is he who is refuted, not I. For instance, do you thusk you will find anyone to admit that one's present memory of a past impression is an impression of the same character as one had during the original experence, which is now over? It is nothing of the sort Or again, will anyone shank from admitting that it is possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing? Or, if he is frightened of saying that, will he ever allow that a person who is changed is the same as he was before the change occurred; or rather, that he is one person at all, and not several, indeed an infinite succession of persons,
 - C. provided change goes on happening—if we are really to be on the watch against one another's attempts to catch at words?

Protagonas here makes three replies: (1) The first is to the objection (1650): You admit I can remember and so 'know' an object I am not now seemg, but you say 'I do not see' = 'I do not know '; therefore I do not know what I remember, and we have the contradiction 'I know and do not know whe same thing Protagonas replies: The image before my memory is not the same thing as a present sense-impression or even like it. So it is not true that I know (remember) and do not know (see) the same thing All that the objection in fact established was that 'perception' must be stretched to include awarness of memory is not.

(2) 'No one will shrink from admitting that the same person can know and not know the same thing.' This replies to the 'most formdable' puzzle of the man with one eye open, one shut (1666). Theatetus did suggest the answer: If we identify perception with the physical commerce between organ and object, one of my eyes does know the object, the other does not. This reply was brushed aside ; and if we shrink from it, Protagoras says, another answer is ready.

(3) We have no right to speak of a person as *the same* at different moments. This reply is based on the theory of perception itself, which holds that the subject (organ) never remains the same for two moments together. Socrates humself has used this premiss for his conclusion at rook .: No one can have the same perception twice. We have, in fact, spoken all through as if the physical organ were the subject that perceives, and the person a mere bundle of senseorgans. Hence we could argue that Socrates-well was 'totally different', as a measure of the sweetness or sourness of wine, from Socrates-ill. If the subject, as well as the object, is perpetually changing, objections which turn upon the same person knowing and not knowing the same thing fall to the ground.

Thus the captious objections to Theaetetus' position are disposed of. We now turn to Protagoras' own doctrine and Socrates' criticisms of that (IGIC ff.).

166c Socz. (continues). 'No,' he will say: 'show a more generous spirit by attacking what I actually say, and prove, if you can, that we have not, each one of us, his peculiar perceptions, or that, granting them to be peculiar, it would not follow that what appears to each becomes—or is, if we may use the word' is '--for him alone to whom it appears With this talk of pies and baboons, you are behaving like a pig yourself,' and, what is more, you tempt your hearers b, to trrat um writings in the same way, which is not fair.

So much for the objection: 'Why not pig the measure of all things?' That really needs no answer. For the rest, Socrates will not attempt to disprove the propositions here asserted. that each man has his private sensations and perceptions, which are riallible. This was precisely the Protagorean element adopted by Plato humself. Protagoras is not responsible for Theaetetus' suggestion, interpreted as asserting that knowledge consists solely of such perceptions. On the other hand, the doctrme 'man the measure' was not confined to perception, but included judgment. To this extension it was objected' If each man is the measure of his own judgments or beliefs, how can one be waser than another ? Here we come to the core of the Defence, which attempts to explain how one man can be waser than another, although every man's judgments

166D. Sock. (cow/mex). 'For I do indeed assert that the truth is as I have written, each one of us is a measure of what us and of what is not, but there is all the difference in the world between one man and another just in the very fact that what is and appears to one is different from what is and appears to the other. And as for wisdom and the wise man, I am very far from saying they do not exist. By a wise man I mean precisely a man who can change any one of us, when what is bad appears and is to him, and make what is good appear and be to him. In this statement, again, don't set off in chase of words, but let me explain

¹ The pig, in Greek, is an emblem of stupidity (duckla). Lack. 169D: 'Would not any pig know. 'C.c. AC Post i, 5, 15: non sus docs Minervam This remark is less offensive than the English sounds

- 166z. still more clearly what I mean. Remember how it was put earlier in the conversation: to the sick man his food appears sour and is so; to the healthy man it is and appears the opposite. Now there is no call to represent either of the two as wiser—that cannot be—nor is the sick man to be
- 167. pronounced unwase because he thinks ¹ as he does, or the healthy man wase because he thinks differently. What is wanted is a change to the opposite condition, because the other state is better.

'And so too in education a change has to be effected from the worse conducton to the better; only, whereas the physician produces a change by means of drugs, the sophist does it by discourse It is not that a man makes someone who previously thought what is false think what is true (for it is not possible either to think the thing that is not or to think anything but what one experiences, and all

- a. experiences are true), rather, I should say, when someone by reason of a depraved condution of mind has thoughts of a like character, one makes him, by reason of a sound condition, think other and sound thoughts, which some people ignorality call true, whereas I should say that one set of thoughts is better than the other, but not in any way truer.¹ And as for the wise, my dear Socrates, so far from calling them frogs, I call them, when they have to do with the body, physicanas, and when they have to do with plants, husbandmen For I assert that husbandmen too, when plants are suckly and have depraved sensations, substitute
- c. for these sensations that are sound and healthy³; and moreover that wise and honest public speakers substitute in the community sound for unsound views of what is

¹ 'Thunks', 'judges' (hofségn), here replaces 'appears' (doiverfea) What is uncant as the judgment stating the fact of a sense-supresson - 'Thus food seems and is to me sour'. If Socrast' earlier expression, 'what every man belowes as the result of perception' (3 & 3 & advingering backgrouts) around to such judgments, they are not ignorant or foolish judgments, nor are they false

The text is doubtful The best sense is obtained by taking $rig(167_{A}, 7)$ as the subject of a single sentence from *i*-rel (A, 6) to older (B, 4). Read sompling and groups (Se styrig if any strain outried psordparate (with Delak Yors '11, 275) It is the sophist, not the growry if ign, that ' makes' the change to sound thoughts. The reading growry will then be explained as an attempt to provide the *i*-raiser following it with a subject, made by someone who did not see that rig (governing the earlier *fraingen*, A 7) is still the subject

⁹ Omitting τε κal ἀληθείς Diels' suggestion (Vors ⁴ 11, 225) ἀστε κal ἀληθείς gives a wrong sense, for the unhealthy sensations are also true The conjectures ἀληθείaς (Schleiermacher), ἔξας (Diès), πάθας (Richards) are not convincing.

- 167c. right. For I hold that whatever practices seem right and laudable to any particular State are so, for that State, so long as it holds by them. Only, when the practices are, in any particular case, unsound for them, the wise man substitutes others that are and appear sound. On the same principle the sophist, since he can in the same manner guide his pupils in the way they should go, is wise and worth a considerable fee to them when their education is com-
 - D. considerable net to them when ther enucation is completed. In this way it is true both that soome men are wiser than others and that no one thinks faisely; and you, whether you like it on not, must put up with being a measure, since by these considerations my doctrine is saved from shipwreck.¹

In this central section there is no reason to doubt that Socrates is doing what he professes to do-defending Protagoras' thesis as Protagoras, if he were alive, would humself have defended it." The form of the argument is necessarily adapted to the context : but the contents are, in all probability, Protagorean. Protagoras was the first to claim the title of ' Sophist ', with its suggestion of a superior wisdom.3 He must have reconciled this claim with his doctrine that all opinions are equally true, and can only have done so by arguing, as he does here, that some opinions are 'better', though not truer, than others, and that his own business, as an educator was to substitute better oninions for worse. The analogy of the husbandman substituting sound and healthy sensations in plants is an archaic touch,4 suggesting that Plato may be drawing on Protagoras' own writings. Protagoras' special profession was to educate men and make them good citizens, and he taught the art of Rhetoric, which was to enable the public speaker to offer good counsel to the assembly in an effective form He must have held the corresponding view, here stated, about the laws and customs of States, considered as the judgments or decisions (868a) of the community. Such laws and customs are 'right' for that community so long as it holds by them ; but a wise statesman can try to substitute others that are ' better ' or ' sounder '. We may conclude that Plato here is fairly reproducing the standpoint of the historic Protagoras.

¹ σώζεται ό λόγος seems to allude to μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, 164D. Cf. Rep 6218 μθθος ἐσώθη καὶ οἰκ ἀπώλετο.

⁶CI H Gomperr, Sophanth s Riscorth, p 261 ⁹ Protog 3179 ⁴ Pa-Arat, ds plantis 8154, 15, attributes to Anaxagoras and Empedocles the vuew that plants have seasation and pleasure and paun The analogy between physicas, husbandman, and educator recurs at Protog 334, and Symp. 187a, hot places where Plato is sumage ariser maternal. What, then, does the Defence actually maintain? The argument advances, by stages, from the position where Plato has already agreed with Protagoras to the position which he will challenge in the sequel.

(1) At the level of physical sensations or perceptions, it has been admitted (r50-f60) that a sick man's ahormal sensations are not less 'true 'than the healthy man's normal ones, and that they are partly determined by his own state of body. The physician, Protagoras argues, is called m to change that state, because it is generally agreed, by physicans and pattents alike, that the healthy sensations are 'better'. 'Better' presumably means 'more pleasant'; and each man is the sole judge of what he finds pleasant. The physician can be called 'wise' because he knows how to change the worse state to a better. The point that remains obscure is what sort of knowledge enables him to ob this.

(2) The position of the educator is said to be analogous to the physician's : it is his business to change our mental condition from unsound to sound, so that our judgments, beliefs, opinions, may be sounder, though not truer. The crucial statement is : 'It is not that a man makes someone who previously thought what is false think what is true ; for it is not possible either to think the thing that is not or to think anything beyond what one experiences, and all experiences are true.' The last words refer to Socrates' objection : ' If what every man believes as a result of perception is indeed to be true for him : if, just as no one is to be a better judge of what another experiences ($\pi d\theta_{0c}$), so no one is better entitled to consider whether what another thinks (dofay) is true or false'. where is the superior wisdom of Protagoras? Protagoras' reply. 'No one can think anything beyond what he experiences, and all experiences are true', refers primarily to judgments which are supposed merely to register the fact of a present sensation : I judge that this wine seems sour to me. No one can challenge the truth of such a judgment. But in the same breath Protagoras extends this claim to all judgments or beliefs in the general statement : 'It is impossible to think the thing that is not', i.e., to think what is false. The educator cannot, therefore, substitute truer behefs ; but only ' sounder ' ones. What ' sounder ' means is left obscure. It does not mean ' normal ', for that would set up the majority as a norm or measure for the minority. It can only mean more useful or expedient : a sound belief is one that will produce better effects in the future.1 'Better effects', again, must mean effects that will seem better to me when the sophist has trained me.

¹ Protagoras' position should not be confused with modern Pragmatism, which does not assert that all beliefs must be equally true

THEAETETUS

I shall then prefer my new beliefs to those which I now prefer. The same argument applies to the laws and customs of the State. 'Whatever practices seem right (*biscua*) and laudable (*wald*) to any particular State are so, for that State, so long as it holds by them'. Thus it is legally right and socially approved that Mohammedans should have several wives. Englishmen one only. But a statesman may try to substitute 'sounder' customs. This again can only mean 'more expedient': an Englishmen persuading Turks to adopt monogamy can only urge that the results will seem better to the converted Turk.

Such is Protagoras' position. The Defence now ends with a peroration, in which Protagoras lectures Socrates for frivolity and the points outstanding for serious criticism are recalled.

- 167D. SOCR. (continues). 'Now if you can dispute this doctrine in principle, do so by argument stating the case on the other side, or by asking questions, if you prefer that method, which has no terrors for a man of sense; on the contrary it ought to be specially agreeable to him. Only there is a not the specially agreeable to him. Only there is a sense of the sense.
 - E. this rule to be observed: do not conduct your questioning unfairly. It is very unreasonable that one who professes a concern for virtue should be constantly guilty of unfairness in argument. Unfairness here consists in not observing the distinction between a debate and a conversation. A debate need not be taken seriously and one may trip up an opponent to the best of one's power ; but a conversation should be taken in earnest; one should help out the other party and brank home to hum only those sins and fallacies
- r68. that are due to himself or to his earlier instructors. If you follow this rule, your assocates will lay the blanne for their confusions and perplexities on themselves and not on you; they will like you and court your society, and disgusted with themselves, will turn to philosophy, hoping to escape from their former selves and become different men. But if, like so many, you take the opposite course, you will reach the opposite result : instead of turning your com
 - panions to philosophy, you will make them hate the whole business when they get older. So, if you will take my advice, you will meet us in the candid spirit 1 spoke of, without hostihity or contentiousness, and honestly consider what we mean when we say that all things are in motion and that what seems also is, to any individual or community. The further question whether knowledge is, or is not, the same thing as perception, you will consider as a

INTERLUDE

168B. consequence of these principles, not (as you did just now)

c. basing your argument on the common use of words and phrases, which the vulgar twist into any sense they please and so perplex one another in all sorts of ways.'

So the Defence ends. The central part was confined to genuine Protagorean doctrme ; but here we are reminded that Socrates' dialectical construction has included also the Heracleitean flux and Theatetus' claim that perception is the same thing as knowledge. All three elements still await serious criticism, and they are dealt with separately in the sequel. (1) The Protagorean thesis—Every judgment true for hm who makes 1t—is refuted for the individual ($t6y_{D-T}\tau_{C}$) and for the State ($t7y_{C-T}7y_{S}$); next (2) the unrestricted doctrime—All things are in motion—is denounced as fatal to all discourse ($t7y_{C-T}3y_{S}$); and (3) the identification of perception with knowledge is finally rejected ($t8x_{B-T}6x_{S}$).

168c-16qD. Interlude

In an interlude Theodorus is again drawn into the discussion. This marks that the next section of the argument is directed against his friend Protagoras, who is not held responsible for the two other theses.

168c. SOCR. (continues). Such Theodorus is my contribution to the defence of your friend-the best I can make from my small means. Were he alive to speak for himself, it would be a much more impressive affair. THEOD. You are not serious. Socrates : your defence was most spirited. SOCR Thank you, my friend. And now, did you notice how Protagoras was reproaching us for taking a child to D. argue with and using the boy's timidity to get the better of his own position in what he called a mere play of wit. in contrast to the solemnity of his measure of all things, and how he exhorted us to be serious about his doctrine? THEOD. Of course I did. Socrates. SOCR. What then ? Do you think we should do as he says ? THEOD. Most certainly. SOCR. Well, the company, as you see, are all children, except yourself. If we are to treat his doctrine seriously. E. as he enjoins, you and I must question one another. So we shall at any rate escape the charge of making light of it by discussing it with boys.

THEOD. Why, surely Theaetetus can follow up such an

168E. investigation better than a great many men with long beards.

SOCR. But not better than you, Theodorus. So don't imagine that you have no duty to your departed friend, but can leave it to me to make the best defence for him. Please

169. come with us a little of the way at any rate—just until we know whether, in the matter of mathematical demonstrations, you cannot help being a measure, or everybody is just as competent as you in geometry and astronomy and all the other subjects you are supposed to excel in.

THEOD. It is no easy matter to escape questioning in your company, Socrates. I was deluded when I said you would leave me in peace and not force me into the ring like the Spartans: you seem to be as unrelenting as Skuron. The

B. Spartans tell you to go away if you will not wrestle, but Antaeus is more in your line : you will let no one who comes near you go until you have stripped him by force for a trial of strength.

SOCR. Your comparisons exactly fit what is wrong with me, Theodorus ; but my capacity for endurance is even greater. I have encountered many heroes in debate, and times without number a Heracles or a Theseus has broken my head ;

c. but I have so deep a passion for exercise of this sort that I stick to it all the same. So don't deny me the pleasure of a trial, for your own benefit as well as mine.

THEOD. I have no more to say; lead me where you will. You are like Fate: no one can elude the toils of argument you spin for him. But I shall not be able to oblige you beyond the point you have proposed

Socr. Enough, if you will go so far. And please be on the watch for fear we should be betrayed into arguing p. frivolously and be blamed for that again.

THEOD. I will try as well as I can.

169D-171D. Criticism of Protagoras' doctrine as extended to all judgments

Socrates now opens the attack on the genuinely Protagorean doctrine put forward m the central part of the Defence—the extension of the maxim, Man the measure, beyond the field of immediate perception (where we accepted it) to all judgments.

Our original objection (IGID) was: If all judgments are true to him who makes them, how can one man be wiser than another ? In the Defence Protagoras was represented as ' conceding that some are wiser than others, and this might seem to weaken his case.

CRITICISM OF PROTAGORAS

Socrates now observes that we ought to make sure of thus step by deducing it formally from what Protagoras certainly did say, namely, that 'what seems to each man is to him'. Presumably, Plato wishes to avoid the imputation of attributing to Protagoras a statement which did not appear just in that form nh is writings.

169D. SOCR. Let us begin, then, by coming to grips with the doctrine at the same point as before. Let us see whether or not our discontent was justified, when we criticised it as making every individual self-sufficient in wisdom. Protagoras then conceded that some people were superior in the matter of what is better or worse, and these, he said, were wise. Didn't he ? Theo. Yes.

SOCR. If he were here himself to make that admission,

E. instead of our conceding it for him in our defence, there would be no need to reopen the question and make sure of our ground; but, as things are, we might be said to have no authority to make the admission on his behalf. So it will be more satisfactory to come to a more complete and clear agreement on this particular point; for it makes a considerable difference, whether this is so or not. THEOD. That is true.

SOCR. Let us, then, as briefly as possible, obtain his agreement, not through any third person, but from his own statement.

170. own statement. THEOD. How?

SOCR. In this way. He says—doesn't he ?—that what seems true ¹ to anyone is true for him to whom it seems so ? THEOD. He does.

Socz. Well now, Protagoras, we are expressing what seems true to a main, or rather to all men, when we say that everyone without exception holds that in some respects he is waser than his neighbours and in others they are wiser than he. For instance, in moments of great danger and distress, whether m war or in sickness or at sea, men regard distress, whether m war or in sickness or at sea, men regard

B. look to him as a savour, when his only point of superiority is his knowledge. Indeed, the world is full of people looking for those who can instruct and govern men and animals and direct their doings, and on the other hand of people who thunk themselves quite competent to undertake the teaching

¹ rd doxofv here, as the context shows, mean ' what seems true ' Since Protagoras' maxim covered judgment, the interpretation is perfectly fair. 1708. and governing. In all these cases what can we say, if not that men do hold that wisdom and ignorance exist among them?

THEOD. We must say that.

Sock. And they hold that wisdom lies in thinking truly, and ignorance in false belief?

c. THEOD. Of course.

Soca. In that case, Protagoras, what are we to make of your doctrine? Are we to say that what men think is always true, or that it is sometimes true and sometimes false? From either supposition it results that their thoughts are not always true, but both true and false. For consider, Theodorus. Are you, or is any Protagorean, prepared to maintain that no one regards anyone else as ignorant or as making false judgments?

THEOD. That is incredible, Socrates.

D. SOCR. That, however, is the inevitable consequence of the doctrine which makes man the measure of all things. THEOD. How so?

Soca. When you have formed a judgment on some matter in your own mind and express an opmion about it to me, let us grant that, as Protagoras' theory says, it is true for you; but are we to understand that it is impossible for us, the rest of the company, to pronounce any judgment upon your judgment; or, if we can, that we always pronounce your opinion to be true? Do you not rather find thousands of opponents who set their opinion against yours on every occasion and hold that your judgment and belief are false?

- Z. THEOD. I should just think so, Socrates; thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says; and they give me all the trouble in the world. Socz. And what then ? Would you have us say that in such a case the opinion you hold is true for yourself and false for these tens of thousands? THEOD. The doctrine certainly seems to imply that. Socz. And what is the consequence for Protagoras himself ? Is it not this : supposing that not even he believed in man being the measure and the world in general did not believe it either—as in fact it doesn't—then this Truth which he . wrote would not be true for anyone? If, on the other hand,
- 171. wrote would not be true for anyone ? If, on the other hand, he did believe it, but the mass of mankind does not agree with him, then, you see, it is more false than true by just so much as the unbelievers outnumber the believers.

- 171. THEOD. That follows, if its truth or falsity varies with each individual opinion. SOCR. Yes, and besides that it involves a really exquisite conclusion.¹ Protagoras, for his part, admntting as he does that everybody's opinion is true, must acknowledge the truth of his opponents' belief about his own belief, where they think he is wrong. THEOD. Certainly.
 - B. SOCR. That is to say, he would acknowledge his own belief to be false, if he admits that the belief of those who think him wrong is true ?

THEOD. Necessarily.

Socs. But the others, on their side, do not admit to themselves that they are wrong.

THEOD. No.

SOCR. Whereas Protagoras, once more, according to what he has written, admits that this opinion of theirs is as true as any other.

THEOD. Evidently.

SOCR. On all hands, then, Protagoras included, his opinion will be disputed, or rather Protagoras will join in the general consent—when he admits to an opponent the truth

c. of his contrary opinion, from that moment Protagoras himself will be admitting that a dog or the man in the street is not a measure of anything whatever that he does not understand Isn't that so?

THEOD. Yes.

SOCR. Then, since it is disputed by everyone, the Truth of Protagoras is true to nobody—to himself no more than to anyone else.

THEOD. We are running my old friend too hard, Socrates. SOCR. But it is not clear that we are outrunning the truth, my friend. Of course it is likely that, as an older man, he

D. was where than we are ; and if at this moment he could pop has head up through the ground there as far as to the neck, very probably he would expose me thoroughly for talking such nonsense and you for agreeng to it, before he sank out of sight and took to his hels. However, we must do our best with such lights as we have and continue to say what we think.

¹ Sextus, Maik vu, 389, says that an argument of this form, known as 'turning the tables' (exproperf), was used against Protagoras by Democritus, as well as by Plato here.

THEAETETUS

Socrates' last words probably do not mean that Protagoras would, in Plato's opinion, have had any valid answer to make. The argument has fairly deduced, on Protagoras' own principles, the consequences of asserting that what every man thinks true is true for him. It does follow for Protagoras' opponents that his doctrue is not true, and, for Protagoras humself, that their belief in its failsity is true for them.

171D-172B. Restatement of the question : wherein lies the superiority of the wise?

This argument, however, is ad hominess. The real issue between Protagoras and Plato is too serious to be disposed of so lightly, and Socrates now gives the conversation a graver turn. He begins by restating the premiss on which all, including Protagoras, are agreed: that one man can be waser than another. Wherein can such superiority lie? Not in the field of immediate perception of sense-qualities: there (as Plato is careful to note once more) we have agreed with Protagoras that each man is the measure of what is, or rather 'becomes', for him. But the Defence steeff claimed a superiority in wisdom for the physican, the educator, and the statesman. All these undertake to change our condition and make 'better' things 'appear and be' to the individual or to the State. We have still to mquire what this profession implies.

- 171D. SOCR. (continues). Now, for instance, must we not say that everyone would agree at least to thus: that one man can be wiser or more ignorant than another ? THEOD. I certainly think so. SOCR. And further, shall we say that the doctrine would find its firmest footing in the position we traced out in a series of Decorpore. thet mort thinks much direct sources in the series of the serie
 - E. our defence of Protagoras: that most things—hot, dry, sweet, everything of that sort—are to each person as they appear to him? Whereas, if there is any case in which the theory would concede that one man is superior to another, it might consent to admit that, in the matter of good or bad health, not any woman or child—or annual, for that matter —knows what is wholesome for it and is capable of curing itself; but that here, if anywhere, one person is superior to another.

THEOD. I should certainly say so.

172. Socr. And again in social matters, the theory will say that, so far as good and had customs or nights and wrongs or matters of religion are concerned, whatever any State makes up its mind to enact as lawful for itself, really is

DIGRESSION . PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC

- lawful for it, and in this field no individual or State is wiser 172. than another. But where it is a question of laving down what is for its advantage or disadvantage, once more there. if anywhere, the theory will admit a difference between two advisers or between the decisions of two different States in respect of truth, and would hardly venture to assert that any enactment which a State supposes to be for its advantage will quite certainly be so.

The position taken up in the Defence is here restated fairly. The doctor has some wisdom or knowledge justifying his offer to change my condition to one in which things he calls ' better ' will appear and be to me. His case is parallel to that of the statesman. who uses his eloquence to recommend a change of custom or of law or a practical policy. If 'right' means simply what is enjoined by law and a 'good custom' one that is in fact socially approved, no State can claim to be wiser than another. But anyone who comes forward to recommend a change must claim that it will produce 'better' results, that is to say, results which will appear as more advantageous when the change has been effected. When we return to this point later, it will be argued that the doctor's or the statesman's present judgment about what will be more advantageous in the future conflicts, ex hypothesi, with the judgment of his unconverted hearers, and that both cannot be true. This argument, however, is not developed until after the ' digression ', which now follows.

172B-177C. Digression : the contrast of Philosophy and Rhetoric

The occasion of this digression has not been well understood. Socrates breaks off at this point to suggest that some who ' do not argue altogether as Protagoras does ' may not accept the analogy that has just been drawn between the doctor's concern with the bodily health of the individual and the statesman's concern with questions of right and wrong. They will deny that 'right' has any meaning at all other than what is publicly decreed at any time. This, as Socrates says, raises a larger issue than the argument we were just embarking upon with Protagoras.

172B. SOCR. (continues). But, in that field I am speaking of-in right and wrong and matters of religion-people 1 are ready to affirm that none of these things is natural, with a reality of its own, but rather that the public decision becomes true

P.T.K.

¹ The subject of the plural *dolours* is not the same as the sungular subject (d hoyos) of the previous sentences, and accordingly not Protagoreans but (as Campbell says) ' certain persons who are presently defined '.

1728. at the moment when it is made and remains true so long as the decision stands; and those who do not argue altogether as Protagoras does carry on their philosophy on these lines.¹

But one theory after another is coming upon us, Theoc. dorus, and the last is more important than the one before.

Editors have not seen clearly that this sentence does not amplify the preceding one, but introduces a new position held, not by Protagoras, but by people who do not state their position altogether as Protagoras stated his. Their view is the 'more important' theory, involving larger issues than the restricted position we have just ascribed to Protagoras, the consideration of which is accordingly nostroned.

What is this larger theory ? Those who hold it are not ' incomplete Protagoreans', but go further than Protagoras himself. They deny the analogy between physical qualities (hot, dry, sweet, etc.) and moral qualities like 'just'. The hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, they will say, exist ' by nature '; and they would agree with Protagoras that the fact that one contrary appears to me, the other to you, is consistent with their having an objective being of their own. But 'just' and 'unjust', they say, have no status in Nature : they are mere creations of convention or of the public decision of the community. We have no evidence that Protagoras went so far as this.¹ It is the extreme position formulated in the Republic by Thrasymachus, who denies that ' right ' has any natural validity ; the word means nothing more than what the most powerful element in the State decrees for its own advantage (ro rov neutronos oungéoor). He would reject the distinction Socrates has just drawn between what is laid down as lawful and what is decided upon as advantageous (ouppeopra). When Socrates argued in the Republic (as he will later in the Theaetetus) that the strongest element in the State may be mistaken about its own advantage, Thrasymachus was not convinced. The atheists of Laws X (880 ff.) draw the same contrast between Nature and convention. Fire, Air, Water, and Earth exist by nature and

¹ Reading cal Seasy of by Myseon, "Ones is Myseon would mean 'all who do not argue', and we should then have to understand (with M Difs and others) all who do set go to far as Protagoras. But these people go further. It is not true that everyone who stops short of Protagoras' position holds the extreme revew here stated.

⁸ His speech in the *Protagoras* 320 ff. recognises innate moral instincts of allows and Merg, existing in all men before society is formed. Education in virtue is a development of these natural instincts by a socialising process, making men good citizens of their own States.

DIGRESSION : PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC

chance, without design; and by the interplay of their active powers—hot, cold, dry, moist, etc.—produce the whole physical cosmos. But art or design arises only later; it is mortal and of mortal origin. The whole of legislaton, custom, and rehgion is 'not by nature, but by art'. Conventions differ in different communities. 'What is nght (rà *béaux*) has no natural existence at all; but men are perpetually disputing about it and altering it, and whatever alteration they make at any time is at that time authonitative, owing its existence to design and the laws, not in any way to nature' (889c). This is precisely the position stated here, the extreme consequence of making man the measure of lithings, but a consequence never, so far as we know, drawn by Protagoras himself, who did not dream of subverting the basis of morality.

To Plato this thesis is the position of the arch-enemy the whole of the Republic is a reply to it Here, acknowledging that it cannot be attributed to Protagoras. Socrates drops for a time the criticism of Protagoras' own theory, and replies indurectly in the 'digression' that follows. A direct treatment would demand a repetition of the contents of the Republic and arguments supporting the Platonic thesis that the moral Forms. Justice and the rest, do 'exist by nature with a being of their own'. But the Forms are to be excluded, so far as possible, from this conversation. which discusses the claim of the world of appearances to yield knowledge without invoking the intelligible world. So Plato is content to indicate his answer by reviving the contrast drawn in the Gorgias and the Republic between the orator of the law court or the Assembly and the true statesman, the philosopher whose knowledge hes in that other realm of reality. The whole digression is studded with allusions to the Republic, and in the course of it the moral Forms are plainly, though unobtrusively, mentioned.

172C. THEOD. Well, Socrates, we have time at our disposal Socra. Evidently. And it strikes me now, as often before, how natural it is that men who have spent much time un philosophical studies¹ should look ridiculous when they appear as speakers in a court of law. THEOD. How do you mean? Socra. When you compare men who have knocked about from their youth up in law courts and such places with others bred in philosophical pursuits, the one set seem to be have been trained as slaves, the others as free men.

¹ Φιλοσοφία has often a wide meaning covering all liberal studies (as at 143D) or 'culture' (as in Isocrates).

172D. THEOD. In what way?

Soca. In the way you spoke of: the free man always has time at his disposal to converse in peace at has leasure. He will pass, as we are doing now, from one argument to another—we have just reached the third; like us, he will leave the old for a fresh one which takes his fancy more; and he does not care how long or short the discussion may be, if only it attains the truth. The corator is always talking

- E. against time, hurried on by the clock; there is no space to enlarge upon any subject he chooses, but the adversary stands over him ready to recite a schedule of the points to which he must confine himself. He is a slave disputing about a fellow-slave before a master sitting in judgment with some definite plea in his hand; and the issue is never indifferent, but his personal concerns are always at stake,
- 173. sometimes even his life. Hence he acquires a tense and batter shrewdness; he knows how to flatter his master and earn his good graces, but his mind is narrow and crooked. An apprentoceship in slavery has dwarfed and twisted his growth and robbed hum of his free spirit, driving him into devious ways, threatening him with fears and dangers which the tenderness of youth could not face with truth and honesty; so, turning from the first to lies and the requited of wrong
 - B. with wrong, warped and stunted, he passes from youth to manhood with no soundness in him and turns out, in the end, a man of formidable intellect—as he imagines.

So much for the orator, Theodorus. Shall I now describe the philosophic quire to which we belong, or would you rather leave that and go back to our discussion? We must not abuse that freedom we claimed of ranging from one subject to another.

TREON. No, Socrates; let us have your description first.
c. As you said quute rightly, we are not the servants of the argument, which must stand and wait for the moment when we choose to pursue this or that topic to a conclusion.
We are not in a court under the judge's eye, nor in the theatre with an audience to criticise our philosophic evolutions.

Socr. Then, if that is your wish, let us speak of the leaders in philosophy; for the weaker members may be neglected.

D. From their youth up they have never known the way to market-place or law court or council chamber or any other place of public assembly; they never hear a decree read out or look at the text of a law; to take any interest in

DIGRESSION : PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC

- 173D. the rivalries of political cliques, in meetings, dinners, and merrymakings with flut-girls, never occurs to them even in dreams. Whether any fellow-citizen is well or ill born or has inherited some defect from his ancestors on either side, the philosopher knows no more than how many pints of water there are in the sea. He is not even aware that
 - z. he knows nothing of all this; for if he holds aloof, it is not for reputation's sake, but because it is really only his body that sojourns in his city, while his thought, disdaming all such things as worthless, takes wings, as Pindar says, ' beyond the sky, beneath the earth', searching the heavens and measuring the plans, everywhere seeking the true

174. nature of everything as a whole, never sinking to what hes close at hand. THEOD. What do you mean, Socrates ? Socra The same thing as the story about the Thracian maidservant who exercised her wit at the expense of Thales, when he was looking up to study the stars and tumbled down a well. She socfied at him for being so eager to know what was happening in the sky that he could not see what lay at his feet. Anyone who gives his feet optimum who gives his feet optimum the size and any are what the net sumware what lay at his feet. Anyone who gives his feet optimum the size and the size and the size of the size and the size of the size o

what his next-door neighbour is doing, hardly knows, indeed, whether the creature is a man at all; he spends all his pams on the question, what man is, and what powers and properties distinguish such a nature from any other.¹ You see what I mean, Theodorus?

THEOD. Yes; and it is true.

SOCR. And so, my friend, as I said at first, on a public

- c. occasion or in private company, in a law court or anywhere else, when he is forced to talk about what lies at his feet or is before his eyes, the whole rabble will join the maidservants in laughing at him, as from inexperience he walks bindly and stumbles into every pitfall. His terrible clumsiness makes him seem so stupid. He cannot engage in an exchange of abuse, ⁴ for, never having made a study of anyone's peculiar weaknesses, he has no personal scandals to bring up; so in his helplessness he looks a fool. When
- D. people vaunt their own or other men's merits, his unaffected laughter makes him conspicuous and they think he is frivolous. When a despot or king is eulogised, he fancies

¹ A clear allusion to the theory of Forms. The real object of knowledge is the Form 'Man', not individual men.

^a A constant feature of forensuc speeches at Athens.

- 174D. he is hearing some keeper of swine or sheep or cows being congratulated on the quantity of milk he has squeezed out of his flock; only he reflects that the animal that princes tend and milk is more given than sheep or cows to nurse a sullen grievance, and that a herdsman of thus sort, penned up in his castle, is doomed by sheer press of
 - 2. work to be as rude and uncultivated as the shepherd in his mountain fold. He hears of the marvellous wealth of some landlord who owns ten thousand acres or more, but that seems a small matter to one accustomed to think of the earth as a whole. When they harp upon burb-some gentleman who can point to seven generations of wealthy ancestors—he thinks that such commendation must come from men of purblind vision, too uneducated to keep their
- 175. eyes fixed on the whole or to reflect that any man has had countless myrads of ancestors and among them any number of rich men and beggars, kings and slaves, Greeks and barbarians. To pride oneself on a catalogue of twentyfive progenitors going back to Heracles, son of Amphirtyon, strikes him as showing a strange pettiness of outlook. He laughs at a man who cannot rid his mind of foolish vanity
 - B. by reckoning that before Amphitryon there was a twentyfifth ancestor, and before hum a fifueth, whose fortunes were as luck would have it. But un all these matters the world has the laugh of the philosopher, partly because he seems arrogant, partly because of his helpless ignorance in matters of daily life.

THEOD. Yes, Socrates, that is exactly what happens.

SOCR. On the other hand, my friend, when the philosopher drags the other upwards to a height at which he may

- c. consent to drop the question 'What injustice have I done to you or you to me ?' and to think about justice and injustice in themselves, what each is, and how they differ from one another and from anything else¹; or to stop quoting poetry about the happiness of kings or of men with gold in store and think about the meaning of kingship and the whole question of human happiness and musery, what ther nature is, and how humanity can gain the one and escape the other—in all this field, when that small, shrewd,
- D. legal mind has to render an account, then the situation is reversed. Now it is he who is dizzy from hanging at such an unaccustomed height and looking down from mid-air.

 1 The moral Forms are here openly mentioned, and there are allusions to the allegory of the Cave in Rep. vi

DIGRESSION : PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC

- 175D. Lost and dismayed and stammering, he will be laughed at, not by maidservants or the uneducated—they will not see what is happening—but by everyone whose breeding has been the antithesis of a slave's.
 - Such are the two characters, Theodorus. The one is E. nursed in freedom and leisure, the philosopher, as you call him. He may be excused if he looks foolish or useless when faced with some menual task, if he cannot the up bedclothes into a neat bundle or flavour a dish with spices and a speech with flattery. The other is smart in the dispatch of all such services, but has not learnt to wear his look hke
- 176. a gentleman, or caught the accent of discourse that will rightly celebrate the true life of happiness for gods and men

THEOD. If you could convince everyone, Socrates, as you convince me, there would be more peace and fewer evils in the world.

Soca. Evils, Theodorus, can never be done away with, for the good must always have its contrary; nor have they any place in the divine world; but they must needs haunt thus region of our mortal nature. That is why we should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other; and

- B. that means becoming like the divine so far as we can, and that again is to become righteous with the help of wisdom. But it is no such easy matter to convince men that the reasons for avoiding wickedness and seeking after goodness are not those which the world gives. The right motive is not that one should seem innocent and good—that is no better, to my thinking, than an old wives' tale—but let us state the truth in this way. In the divine there is no
- c. shadow of unrighteousness, only the perfection of righteousness; and nothing is more like the drivine than any one of us who becomes as righteous as possible. It is here that a man shows his true spirit and power or lack of spirit and nothingness. For to know this is wisdom and excellence of the genuine sort; not to know it is to be manifestly blind and base. All other forms of seeming power and intelligence in the rulers of socrety are as mean and vulgar as the
- D. mechanic's skill in handicraft. If a man's words and deeds are unrighteous and profane, he had best not persuade himself that he is a great man because he sticks at nothing, glorying in his shame as such men do when they fancy that others say of them: They are no fools, no useless burdens to the earth, but men of the right sort to weather the storms

176D. of public life. Let the truth be told : they are what they fancy they are not, all the more for deceiving themselves : for they are ignorant of the very thing it most concerns them to know-the penalty of injustice. This is not, as they imagine, stripes and death, which do not always fall on the

E. wrong-doer, but a penalty that cannot be escaped. THEOD. What penalty is that ? SOCR. There are two patterns, my friend, in the unchangeable nature of things, one of divine happiness, the other of godless misery-a truth to which their folly makes them

utterly blind, unaware that in doing injustice they are grow-177. ing less like one of these patterns and more like the other. The penalty they pay is the life they lead, answering to the nattern they resemble. But if we tell them that, unless they rid themselves of their superior cunning, that other region which is free from all evil will not receive them after death, but here on earth they will dwell for all time in some form of life resembling their own and in the society of things as evil as themselves, all this will sound like foolishness to such strong and unscrupulous minds. THEOD So it will, Socrates.

- B. SOCR. I have good reason to know it, my friend. But there is one thing about them : when you get them alone and make them explain their objections to philosophy, then, if they are men enough to face a long examination without running away, it is odd how they end by finding their own arguments unsatisfying : somehow their flow of eloquence runs dry, and they become as speechless as an infant. All this, however, is a digression : we must stop now.
- c. and dam the flood of topics that threatens to break in and drown our original argument. With your leave, let us go back to where we were before. THEOD. For my part, I rather prefer listening to your digressions. Socrates : they are easier to follow at my time of life. However, let us go back, if you like,

The tone of this digression goes beyond the Gorgias and the Phaedo and is far removed from the humanity of Socrates, who certainly knew the way to the market-place, though he deliberately kept out of politics. There is a foretaste of Cynicism in the emphatic contempt of wealth and high birth. The main contrast is not between the life of contemplation and the active life, to which, in a reformed society, the philosopher king would acknowledge his duty to descend. Many saints, like Teresa, have led very active lives without abandoning the joys of contemplation. The life contrasted with the philosopher's is at first that of the rhetorician, and towards the end that of the man trained in rhetoric to be the ruler of society, the strong-minded man who will stick at nothing and thinks himself a 'realist' because he has no conception of the reality of ideals—a familiar figure in the post-war world of Plato's manhood, as in our own. It is an easy conjecture that some part of this tirade was inspired by Plato's experiences at the court of Syracuse.

The allusions to the allegory of the Cave, the passage about the true meaning of kingship, happiness, and justice, are intended to recall the whole argument of the *Republic*, with its doctrine of the divine, intelligible region of Forms, the true objects of knowledge. This is no mere digression; it indicates—what cannot be directly stated—the final cleavage between Platonism and the extreme consequences of the Protagorean thesis. The *Theatelsis* here opens a window upon the world of true being, but the vision must be closed. Our concern at present is only with the world of appearances and its claim to yield knowledge.

177C-179C. Refutation of the Defence of Protagoras

The argument is now resumed at the point where it was dropped (172A), when the genumely Protagorean position had been isolated from extraneous elements. That position is now stated again, to mark that we have been straying beyond it. Socrates proceeds to refute the defence he put forward earlier on Protagoras' behalf.

- 177C. SOCR. Very well. I think the point we had reached was this. We were saying that the believers in a perpetually changing reality and in the doctrine that what seems to an individual at any time also is for hum would, in most matters, strongly insist upon their principle, and not least in the case of what is right they would maintain that any D. enactments a State may decide on certainly are nght for that State so long as they remain in force: but when it is
 - that State so long as they remain in force; but when it comes to what is good, we said that the boldest would not go to the length of contending that whatever a State may believe and declare to be advantageous for itself is in fact advantageous for so long as it is declared to be so-unless he meant that the name 'advantageous ' would continue to be so applied; but that would be turning our subject mto a joke....

THEOD. Certainly.

- 177E. Sock. We will suppose, then, that be does not mean the name, but has in view the thing that bears it. TREON. We will.⁴ Sock. Whatever name the State may give it, advantage is surely the aim of its legislation, and all its laws, to the full extent of its belief and power, are laid down as being for its own best profit. Or has it any other object in view when it makes laws?
- 178. TEEOD. None. Soce. Then does it also hit the mark every time? Or does every State often miss its ann completely? TEEOD. I should say that mistakes are often made. Sock. We may have a still better chance of getting everyone to assent to that, if we start from a question covering the whole class of things which includes the advantageous. It is, I suggest, a thing that has to do with future time. When we legislate, we make our laws with the idea that they will be advantageous in time to come. We may call thus class 'what is going to be'.
 - B. THEOD. Certainly.

Soca. Here, then, is a question for Protagoras or anyone else who agrees with hum · According to you and your frends, Protogoras, man as the measure of all things—of white and heavy and light and everything of that sort. He possesses in humself the test of these things, and beheving them to be such as he experiences them, he believes what is true and real for him. Is that right? TREOD. Yes.

SOCR. Is it also true, Protagoras (we shall continue), that

c. he possesses within himself the test of what is going to be in the future, and that whatever a man believes will be, actually comes to pass for him who believes it? Take heat, for example. When some layman believes that he is going to catch a fever¹ and that this hotness is going to exist, and another, who is a physician, believes the contrary, are we to suppose that the future event will turn out in accordance with one of the two opinions, or in accordance with both opinions, so that to the physician the patient will not be hot or in a fever, while he will be both these things to himself?

¹ It is not a question of the State giving the name ' advantageous' to any class of actions it enjoins. Legislation must be understood to imply a judgment that the conduct prescribed will have good effects

² πυρετόν 18 Subject of λήφεσθαι, cf. Phasdr. 251A, Ϊδρως καλ θερμότης άηθής λαμβάνει.

PROTAGORAS' DEFENCE REFUTED

- 178C. THEOD. That would be absurd. SOCR. And on the question whether a wine is going to be
 - D. sweet or dry, I imagine the vine-grower's judgment is authoritative, not a flute-player's.

THEOD. Of course.

Soca. Or again, on the question whether a piece of music is going to be in tune or not, a gymnastic trainer would not have a better opinion than a musician as to what the trainer himself will later judge to be in good tune.

THEOD. By no means.

Socr. And when a feast is being prepared, the guest who is to be invited, supposing him not to be an expert in cookery, will have a less authoritative opinion than the confectuoner upon the pleasure that will result. We will not dispute yet

z. about what already is or has been pleasant to any individual; but about what will in the future seem and be to anyone, is every man the best judge for himself, or would you, Protagoras,—at least in the matter of the arguments that any one of us would find convincing for a court of law —have a better opimon beforehand than any untrained person?

THEOD. Certainly, Socrates, in that matter he did emphatically profess to be superior to everybody.

Socia, Bless your soul, I should think he did. No one 179. would have paid huge sums to talk with hum, if he had not convinced the people who came to him that no one whatever, not even a prophet, could judge better than he what was going to be and appear in the future.

THEOD. Quite true.

Soca. And legislation, too, and the question of advantageousness are matters concerned with the future; and everyone would agree that a State, when it makes its laws, must often fail to hit upon its own greatest advantage? THEOD. Assuredly.

SOCR. Then we may quite reasonably put it to your master B. that he must admit that one man is wiser than another and

8. that he must admit that one man is wiser than another and that the wiser man is the measure, whereas an ignorant person like myself is not in any way bound to be a measure, as our defence of Protagoras tried to make me, whether I liked it or not.

THEOD. I think that is the weakest point in the theory, Socrates, though it is also assailable in that it makes other people's opnions valid when, as it turns out, they hold Protagoras' assertions to be quite untrue.

THEAETETUS

179C. Soca. There are many other ways, Theodorus, of assailing such a position and proving that not every opinion of every person is true.

The Defence of Protagoras is thus refuted. The argument which 'turns the tables' is reaffirmed by Theodorus; and it has been shown that not all judgments can be true. When the patient and the doctor disagree about what the patient's experiences will be at some future time, they are disagreeing about the same fact, which is not at the moment part of the private experience of either, so that he might claim to be the only possible judge. They cannot both be right. No more can two politicians who dispute whether some law or decree will have good effects for the State. Protagoras' own profession as an educator of good critzens rested entirely on his claim to be a better judge than his pupils of what they would, when educated, find to be good for them.

179C-181B. The extreme Heracleitean position, contrasted with Parmenides' denial of all motion and change

Plato has now shown why he will not accept the Protagorean position as extended by its author to judgments which go beyond the individual's mmediate and private experience of his present sensations. But within this narrower field he has himself accepted the position, and built it into his own account of the nature of perception. We must now return to that account and consider the second element, drawn from the flux doctrine of Heracleitus. With what reservations and restrictions are we to adopt the principle that all things are perpetually in motion?

- 179C. SOCR. (continues). But with regard to what the individual experiences at the moment—the source of has sensations and the judgments in accordance with them—it is harder to assail the truth of these. Perhaps it is wrong to say 'harder'; maybe they are unassailable, and those who assert that they are transparently clear' and are instances of knowledge may be in the right, and Theaetetus was not beside the mark when he said that perception and knowledge.
 - D. ledge were the same thing.

We must, then, look more closely into the matter, as our defence of Protagoras enjoined, and study this moving

¹ C.F. Plandruz 350C, " through the *classes* of the senses, might, we apprehend beauty in the perfect *classes* of its radiance" (*bit sig beapverings clafforear* ord/*bit despirerar*). Flato will contend that perception of sensible qualities, though infailable in the sense above defined, does not reveal true reality and it therefrom the knowledge.

EXTREME HERACLEITEANISM

- r79D. reality, ringing its metal to hear if it sounds true or cracked. However that may be, there has been no inconsiderable battle over it and not a few combatants. THEOD. Anything but inconsiderable ; in Ionia, indeed, it is actually growing in violence. The followers of Heracletus lead the quire of this persuasion with the greatest vigour. Socr. All the more reason, my dear Theodorus, to look into it carefully and to follow their lead by tracing it to its
 - E. source.

TREOD. By all means. For there is no discussing these principles of Heracleitus—or, as you say, of Homer or still more ancient sages—with the Ephesans themselves, who profess to be familar with them; you might as well talk to a maniae. Faithful to their own treatises they are literally in perpetual motion; their capacity for staying still to attend to an argument or a question or for a quiet

- 180. interchange of question and answer amounts to less than nothing, or rather even a minus quantity is too strong an expression for the absence of the least moducum of repose in these gentry.¹ When you put a question, they pluck from their quiver little oracular aphorisms to left by at you; and if you try to obtam some account of their meaning, you will be instantly transfixed by another, barbed with some newly forged metaphor. You will never get anywhere with any of them, for that matter they cannot get anywhere with one another, but they take very good care to leave
 - 8. nothing settled either in discourse or in their own minds; I suppose they think that would be something stationary —a thing they will light against to the last and do their utmost to banish from the universe. Sock. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen these gentlemen in the fray and never met them in their peaceable moments; indeed they are no friends of yours. I dare say they keep

such matters to be explained at leisure to their pupils whom they want to make like themselves.

TERON. Pupils indeed! My good friend, there is no such c. thing as a master or pupil among them; they spring up like mushrooms. Each one gets his inspiration wherever he can, and not one of them thinks that another understands anything. So, as I was going to say, you can never bring them

¹ Taking $\tau \dot{\sigma}$ obly obly of not even nothing ' = a minus quantity) as the subject of $\dot{\sigma}_{rep}\beta d\lambda h_{r}$, is excessive (an exaggerated estimate) with respect to the absence of even a little quietness in them '. For $\pi \rho \delta_r$, cf. Soph. 258A, 5; Phase 75A, 9.

180c. to book, either with or without their consent. We must take over the question ourselves and try to solve it like a problem. Socc. That is a reasonable proposal. As to this problem.

then, have we not here a tradition from the ancients who

- n. hid their meaning from the common herd in poetical figures, that Ocean and Tethys, the source of all things, are flowing streams and nothing is at rest; and do not the moderns, in their superior wisdom, declare the same quite openly, in order that the very cobblers may hear and understand their wisdom and, abandoning their simple faith that some things stand still while others move, may reverence those who teach them that very thing is in motion ?
- But I had almost forgoiten, 'Theodorus, another school E. which teaches just the opposite, that reality ' is one, immovable: " Being" is the name of the All',' and much else that men like Melssus and Parmenides maintain in opposition to all those people, telling us that all things are a Unity which stays still within itself, having noroom to movein. How are we to deal with all these combatants' For, little by little, our

¹ Reading also (for also), idory ar rolfee, rof mori forgi visua. There is no reason to doubt that thus were stood in the text of Parmendes used by Plato and Simplicing, who twice quotes it, without reference to the Takasi way, at Pays 2, 13 and 14,2. 8 Both must have understood it as above translated. The sense is good and relevant I cannot behave that Plato concoted the verse form in the vol halves of fing 8, 38, sint is yet Moy information terms and and the sense is good and relevant I cannot behave that Plato concoted the verse form in the vol halves of fing 8, 38, sint is yet Moy information terms and the sense and have a quite different meaning may which belong to different terms and the sense and have a quite different meaning

I suggest, however, that Parmendes' text itself was corrupt roblew, is not used by the Pre-Scorates can the sense 'to be' I conjecture $re \, blan,$ and supply as the only possible subject of βDa logical Necessity (fabjega $of diego K shigs) C i Herat of Sci is re logical prices <math>\lambda_{breven}$ and with the subject of bba and $bbba \, Zyek \, \delta m_{Ba}$. The verse can then be placed after frag 19 at the end of the posen:

> ούτω τοι κατά δόξαν ξφυ τάδε και νον ξασι και μετέπειτ' άπό τούδε τελευτήσουσι τραφέστα' τούς δ' δικομ' άνθραποι κατέθεστ' έπίσημον έκάστοι, (τούτων ούδενή πίστις ξικ' μούπον γάρ 'Ανέγκη) οίου ακότητάν τε όθει τη παυτό διουί, είναι,

'Mon have given many names to changing things, but all these names are false, for Nocessity is willing that the All should only be called one and immovable' This makes a good ending. If we now suppose that the text used by Pitat and Simphicus had been corrupted and corrected into genory side drives | ofer, dedyner rolfen. of event fergi 'dea, we have the verse quoted, independently and correctly. by Pitat and Simphicus, as Parmender last word on the unity and changelessness of Being (see Classical Reverse, 1935, A New Fragment of Paramedice).

HERACLEITEANISM CRITICISED

- 180E. advance has brought us, without our knowing it, between the two lunes; and, unless we can somehow fend them off and
- 181. slip through, we shall suffer for it, as in that game they play in the wrestling schools, where the players are caught by both sides and dragged both ways at once across the line. The best plan, I think, will be to begin by taking a look at the party whom we first approached, the men of Flux ; and if there seems to be anything in what they say, we will help them to pull us over to their side and try to elude the others ; but if we find more truth in the partisans of the immovable whole, we will desert to them from these revolu-
 - B. tionaries who leave no landmark unremoved. If both sides turn out to be quite unreasonable, we shall merely look foolish if we suppose that nobodies like ourselves can make any contribution after rejecting such paragons of ancent wisdom. Do you think it worth while to go further in the teeth of such danger, Theodorus?

THEOD. Certainly, Socrates; I could not bear to stop before we have found out what each of the two parties means.

Theodorus' vigorous outburst perhaps expresses Plato's impatience with the later followers of Heracleitus, who appear to have copied with exaggeration their master's use of cryptic aphonsms and reiterated has doctrine of flux without contributing anything more than emphasis. The Heracleitean position that is to be examined is the extreme position, comparable to the equally extreme denial of all motion and change by Parmenides. Plato's own task was to discover what elements of truth each party was trying to express. Parmenides will be reserved for the 50phist. The Theastets, being concerned with the sensible world, deals with Heracleitus, whose doctrine has its application in that world.

181B-183C. Criticism of extreme Heracleiteanism

Socrates opens his criticism of Heracleitus by drawing the distinction between two kinds of change : local motion and change of quality. At *Parmenides* 1388 these were declared to be the only two species of change. The word for change of quality (*dllouöfoda*) occurs in Heracleitus hmself : 'God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger : he changes (*dllouöfral*) just as fire, when blended with spices, is named according to the savour of each '(36 Byw, 67 Dels). Whether the later Heracleiteans drew this distinction or not, they appear to have denied any kind of rest to fixety.

- 181B. SOCR. Well, if you feel so strongly about it, we must look into the matter. I think our study of change should begin
 - c. with the question: What after all do they mean when they say all things are in change? What I mean is this: Do they recognise one kind of change or two? I think there are two; but I must not be alone in my opinion; you must take your share in the risk, so that we may meet together whatever fate shall befall us. Tell me: do you call it change when something removes from place to place or revolves in the same place?

THEOD. Yes.

SOCR. Let that be one kind, then. Now suppose a thing p. stays in the same place but grows old or turns black instead

D. stays in the same place but grows old or turns black instead of white or hard instead of soft or alters in some other way, isn't it proper to call that a different kind of change ? THEOD. Yes, it must be.

Socs. So I should recognise these as two kinds of change —alteration and local movement.

THEOD. And you are right.

SOCR. Having made that distinction, then, let us now begin our talk with these people who say that everything is in change and ask them : Do you say everything is in

E. both sorts of change—both moving in place and altering —or that part changes in both ways, part in only one of the two ?

THEOD. I really cannot tell; but I think they would say 'in both ways'.

SOCR. Yes, my friend; otherwise they will find things at rest as well as things in change, and it will be no more correct to say that everything is changing than to say that everything is at rest.

THEOD. Quite true.

Socr. So, since they are to be in change and unchangingness 182. must be impossible anywhere, all things are always in every kind of change.

THEOD. That follows.

The theory of the nature of sense-perception, stated earlier, is now included in the position we are examining. Judgment, as distinct from sense-perception, has already been disposed of in the criticism of Protagoras. Being fallible, judgment (as Theasetetus will remark later, 38%) cannot be simply identified with knowledge. So the discussion has now been narrowed down to the question: Can senseperception, whose infallibility has been admitted, give us know-

HERACLEITEANISM CRITICISED

ledge? Plato stands by his analysis of sense-perception, which is now recalled. It is still attributed to those more refined thinkers who have been alleged to bold the doctrine of flux. That doctrine things?. Plato has now to point out that, if the objects of perception (to which it does, in his opinion, apply) are taken to be 'all things'. Plato can be no such thing as knowledge at all, since no statement we make about these perpetually changing things can possible, suce there will be no fixed and stable things for our words to refer to.

- 182A. Soca. Now consider this point in their theory. The account they gave of the geness of holtness or whiteness or whiteness or whiteness or whiteness or whatever it may be, we stated-didn't we ?--in this sort of way : that any one of these things is something that moves in place, simultaneously with a perception, between agent and pattent, and that the patient becomes perceptive, not a perception, while the agent comes to have a quality, rather than to be a quality. Perhaps this word 'quality' strikes you as queer and uncouth and you don't understand it as a general expression '; so let me give particular instances.
 - B. The agent does not become botness of whiteness, but hot or white, and so on with all the rest. No doubt you remember how we put this earlier : that nothing has any being as one thing just by itself, no more has the agent or patient, but, as a consequence of their intercourse with one another, in giving burth to the perceptions and the things perceived, the agents come to be of such and such a quality, and the patients come to be percipient.

THEOD. I remember, of course.

The reference is to the statement (r56s) that 'white', 'bot', 'hard', etc., have no being just by themselves, and that the agent (as such) and the patient (as such) do not exist until the external object and the sense-organ ome within range of one another and the 'quick movements' begin to pass between them. Such being the process of perception, Socrates now takes objects and perceptions separately, beginning with objects.

⁴ Thus is the first occurrence m Greek of the substantive readyrs, though the corresponding adjective weike, 'of what sort', or 'nature' or 'character', was in common use The word was cound as a general term for all characters like 'hotness', 'whiteness', 'heaviness', etc., the termination -rep corresponding to 'oness' in English

P.T.K.

r8zc. Socz. Very well, then, we will not inquire into other parts of their theory, whether they mean this or that, but keep to the point we have in view and ask them this : All things, by your account, are in a perpetual stream of change. Is that so ?

THEOD. Yes.

Socr. With both the kinds of change we distinguished both moving in place and altering ?

THEOD. Certainly, if they are to be completely in change. Soca. Well now, if they only moved in place without altering in quality, we should be able to say what qualities they have as they move in this stream, shouldn't we? THEOD. Yes.

D. Soca. Since, however, there is nothing constant here either —the flowing thing does not flow white but changes, so that the very whiteness stelf flows and shifts into another colour, in order that the thing may escape the charge of constancy in that respect—can we ever give it the name of any colour and be sure that we are naming it nghly?

THEOD. How can that be done, Socrates? Or how can anything else of the kind you mean be called by its right name, if, while we are speaking, it is all the time shipping away from us in this stream?

SOCR. And again, what are we to say of a perception of any sort; for instance, the perception of seeing or hearing?

E. Are we to say that it ever abides in its own nature as seeing or hearing?

THEOD. It certainly ought not, if all things are in change. SOCR. Then it has no right to be called seeing, any more than not-seeing, nor is any other perception entitled to be called perception rather than not-perception, if everything is changing in every kind of way.

THEOD. No, it hasn't.

SOCR. And moreover perception is knowledge, according to Theaetetus and me.

THEOD. Yes, you did say so.

SOCR. In that case, our answer to the question, what knowledge is, did not mean knowledge any more than notknowledge.

183. THEOD. So it appears.

The latter part of this argument, dealing with perception, seems at first sight less cogent than the part concerned with objects. It might be objected that, though the organ of sight and the perception (seeing) may be changing all the time, that does not mean that seeing cases to be seeing and might as well be called 'not-seeing '. Theastetus' identification of perception with knowledge meant that every individual act of perception is infallible awareness of something that exists. This is not disproved by pointing out that the perception and its object are always changing. But fit if yields knowledge at any moment, it does so at all moments. We are merely aware of slightly different objects in a slightly different way from moment to moment; but each new perception is as infallible as the last. The fact of change does not make perception case to be perception, or, fit iever is knowledge, cease to be knowledge.

The extreme Heracleitean, however, cannot make this reply. It would mean that my perception, though changing in content, remains the same in so far as it always has the character of being perception and knowledge. But the Heracleitean says that nothing ever remains the same. Plato's point is that, if 'all things' without exception are always changing, language can have no fixed meaning. In the statement 'Perception is knowledge' the meanings of the words must be constantly shifting. So the statement cannot remain true or the same statement.

The Heraclestean Cratvlus, who influenced Plato in his youth, did in fact reach this conclusion. Aristotle says that thinkers who identified the real with the sensible world concluded that ' to seek truth would be to chase a flying bird'. 'They saw that all this world of nature 15 in movement and that about that which changes no true statement can be made; at least, regarding that which everywhere in every respect is changing nothing could be truly affirmed. It was this belief that blossomed into the most extreme of the views above mentioned, that of the professed Heraclesteans, such as was held by Cratylus, who finally did not think it right to say anything but only moved his finger, and criticised Heracleitus for saying that it is impossible to step twice into the same river ; for he thought one could not do it even once.'1 The conclusion Plato means us to draw is this : unless we recognise some class of knowable entities exempt from the Heraclestean flux and so capable of standing as the fixed meanings of words, no definition of knowledge can be any more true than its contradictory. Plato is determined to make us feel the need of his Forms without mentioning them. Without the Forms, as his Parmenides said.³ there can be no discourse. The same conclusion had already been stated at the end of the Cratylus.

¹ Ar, Mstaph 1010a, 7, trans. Ross.

See Introd , p 11.

183A. Socz. That would be a pretty result of the improvement we made upon that first answer,¹ when we were so cager to prove it right by showing that everything is in change. Now it seems that what has in fact come to light is that, if all things are in change, any answer that can be given to any question is equally right: you may say it is so and it is not so-or 'becomes', if you prefer to avoid any term that would bring these people to a standstill. THEON. You are right.

B. there is no change in that either. Some new dialect will have to be instituted for the exponents of this theory, since, as it is, they have no phrases to fit their fundamental proposition—unless indeed it were ' not even no-how'.¹ That might be an expression indefinite enough to suit them. THEON. A most appropriate idiom.

SOCR. So, Theodorus, we are quit of your old friend, and not yet ready to concede to him that every man is the

c. measure of all things, if he is not a wise man. Also, we shall not admit that knowledge is perception, at least on the basis of the theory that all things are in change, unless Theaetetus has some objection.

THEOD. That is excellent, Socrates; for now these questions are disposed of, it was agreed that I should be quit of answering your questions, as soon as the discussion of Protagoras' theory should come to an end.

Two conclusions are here carefully stated. By the argument that the wise man is a better judge of what will be in the future we have disposed of Protagoras' doctrine as extended to judgenets; but in the restricted sphere of sense-perception our application of his principle still stands. Theatetus' proposition, that perception is knowledge, has been refuted 'on the basis of the theory that all things

¹ Viz that knowledge is the same as perception

⁹ The text is corrupt and of some (W) cannot be right, muce edge of the basicady been righted as not indefinite enough and from (B) is indefined. The form shall more negative expression is needed—in a solution with the competitive expression and the solution of the

INTERLUDE : PARMENIDES

are in change '—the extreme Heracleitean position—but only on that basis. The theory of the nature of perception is not abandoned; on the contrary it is used to disprove the claim of perception to be knowledge. It is true that the organs and objects of perception are always changing; and if this were (as Theaeteuts held) the only form of cognition, there would be no knowledge. Knowledge requires terms that will have a fixed meaning and truths that will remain true.

The upshot of this section is that Plato has disentangled the application of the flux doctrine to sensible things, which he accepts, from the unrestricted assertion, 'All things whatsoever are in change', which he rejects. The conclusion would be more obvious, if it were not his plan to exclude mention of the Forms—the things which are not in change and can be known.

183C-184B. Interlude. Socrates declines to criticise Parmenides

Socrates now declines to discuss the equally extreme Eleatic doctrine that all motion and change is an illusion. The criticism of Parmenides is reserved for the *Sophist*, where the world of unchanging reality will be allowed to come into view.

183C. THEART. No, Theodorus, you must not be released until D. you and Socrates, as you proposed just now, have discussed those others who assert that the whole of things is at rest THEOD. Would you teach your elders, Theatetus, to dishonour their agreements? No, for what remains you must prepare yourself to carry on the argument with Socrates. THEART. Yes, if he wishes; though I would much rather have been a listener while this subject is discussed.

> THEOD. To invite Socrates to an argument is like inviting cavalry to fight on level ground. You will have something to listen to, if you question him.

SOCR. Well, but, Theodorus, I think I shall not comply E. with Theaetetus' request.

THEOD. Not comply? What do you mean? Soca. A feeling of respect keeps me from treating in an unworthy spirit Melissus and the others who say the universe is one and at rest; but there is one being' whom I respect above all : Parmenides himself is in my eyes, as Homer says, a 'reverend and awful' figure. I met him wheen Iwas quite young and he quite ederly, and I thought there

 1 I suspect a sort of pun on δra δrra $\Pi _{appenb} \partial qr$ and the δr δr he believed m. (So Diès, p. 123)

- was a sort of depth in him that was altogether noble.1 I 184. am afraid we might not understand his words and still less follow the thought they express. Above all, the original purpose of our discussion-the nature of knowledgemight be thrust out of sight, if we attend to these importunate topics that keep breaking in upon us. In particular, this subject we are raising now is of vast extent. It cannot be fairly treated as a side issue : and an adequate handling would take so long that we should lose sight of our question about knowledge. Either course would be wrong. My business is rather to try, by means of my
 - B. midwife's art, to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

THEOD. Well do so if you think that best.

184B-186E. 'Perception is Knowledge' finally disproved

Plato has now eliminated those elements in Protagoras' doctrine and in Heracleiteanism which he will not accept. There remain those which he does accept and has included in his own theory of the nature of perception. He can now consider the claim of perception to be identical with knowledge. This claim, as advanced by Theaetetus, strictly implies not only that perception is knowledge, but that it is the whole of knowledge. The following refutation proves (I) that perception cannot be the whole of knowledge. for a great part of what is always called knowledge consists of truths involving terms which are not objects of perception ; and (2) that, even within its own sphere, the objects of perception have not that true reality which the objects of knowledge must possess. Hence, so far from being co-extensive with knowledge. perception is not knowledge at all.

(1) Perception is not the whole of knowledge.-The first argument does not depend on the details of Plato's theory of sense-perception. Such a theory, he would hold, can never be more than a probable account which might need amendment. But even if it be not accepted, he can still show that perception, in the strict sense which is taken to exclude judgment, cannot be the whole of knowledge.

184B. SOCR. Well then, Theaetetus, here is a point for you to consider. The answer you gave was that knowledge is perception, wasn't it ? THEAET. Yes.

¹ For this reference to the meeting described in the Parmensdes, see Introd., p. 1.

'PERCEPTION IS KNOWLEDGE' DISPROVED

1848. SOCE. Now suppose you were asked: 'When a man sees white or black things or hears high or low tones, what does he see or hear with?' I suppose you would say: 'With eyes and ears'. TWRAT. Yes I should.

C. SOCR. To use words and phrases in an easy-going way without scrutinising them too curiously is not, in general, a mark of ill-breeding; on the contrary there is something low-bred in being too precise. But sometimes there is no help for it, and this is a case in which I must take exception to the form of your answer. Consider: is it more correct to say that we see and hear with our eyes and ears or through them?

THEAET. I should say we always perceive through them, rather than with them

D. SOCR. Yes; it would surely be strange that there should be a number of senses ensconced inside us, like the warnors in the Trojan horse, and all these things should not converge and meet in some single nature—a mind, or whatever it is to be called—with which we perceive all the objects of perception *larongs* the senses as instruments. THEAET. Yes, I think that is a better description SOCE. My object in being so precise is to know whether

which we apprehend black or white through the eyes, and

E. objects of other kinds through the other senses. Can you, if the question is put to you, refer all such acts of apprehension to the body? Perhaps, however, it would be better you should speak for yourself in reply to questions, instead of my taking the words out of your mouth. Tell me: all these instruments through which you perceive what is warm or hard or light or sweet are parts of the body, aren't they >--not of anything else. TREAST. Of nothing else.

Socn. Now will you also agree that the objects you perrates and the second se

185. begin with, this thought which includes both at once-that they both exist? THEAET. I have.

SOCR. And, further, that each of the two is *different* from the other and the *same* as itself?

THEAST. Naturally.
 Sock. And again, that both together are two, and each of them is one ?
 THEAST. Yes.
 Sock. And also you can ask yourself whether they are waikie each other or aikie ?

Soce. Then through what organ do you think all this about them both? What is common to them both cannot be apprehended either through hearing or through sight. Besides, here is further evidence for my point. Suppose it were possible to inquire whether sound and colour were both bracksh or not, no doubt you could tell me what

C. faculty you would use—obviously not sight or hearing, but some other.

THEAET. Of course: the faculty that works through the tongue.

Soca. Very good. But now, through what organ does that faculty work, which tells you what is common not only to these objects but to all things-what you mean by the words 'exists' and 'does not exist' and the other terms applied to them in the questions I put a moment ago? What sort of organs can you mention, corresponding to all these terms, through which the perceiving part of us perceives each one of them ?

THEAET. You mean existence and non-existence, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also unity

D. and numbers in general as applied to them; and clearly your question covers 'even ' and ' odd ' and all that kind of notions. You are asking, through what part of the body our mind perceives these? Soce. You follow me most admirably. Theaetetus: that

is exactly my question.

THEAET. Really, Socrates, I could not say, except that I think there is no special organ at all for these things, as there is for the others. It is clear to me that the mind

E. in itself is its own instrument for contemplating the common terms that apply to everything.

Soca. In fact, Theaetetus, you are handsome, not ugly

'PERCEPTION IS KNOWLEDGE' DISPROVED

- 185E. as Theodorus said you were; for in a discussion handsome is that handsome does. And you have treated me more than handsomely in saving me the trouble of a very long argument, if it is clear to you that the mind contemplates some things through its own instrumentality, others through the bodily faculties. That was indeed what I thought myself; but I wanted you to agree.
- 186. THEAET. Well, it is clear to me.

In this argument, for the first time, we go behind the earlier account of sense-perception, which regarded the subject as no more than a bundle of distinct sense-organs, and sense-perception as a process occurring between organ and external object. That account stands; but it is now added that, behand the separate organs, there must be a mind, centrally receiving their several reports and capable of reflecting upon the data of sense and making judgments. In these judgments the thinking mind uses terms like 'exists', ' is the same as', ' is different from', which are not objects of perception reaching the mind through the channel of any special sense, but are 'common' to all the objects of sense. The mind gains its acquaintance with the meaning of such terms through its own instrumentality, not by the commerce between bodily organs and objects.

These terms are called 'common' (xouvá) in contrast with the 'private' (101a) or 'peculiar' objects of the several senses. 'Common' means no more than that. They are not to be confused with the 'common sensibles' which Aristotle regarded as the objects of a common sensorium seated in the heart, namely objects perceptible by more than one sense, such as motion, shape, number, size, time. Plato does not speak of a 'common sense' (nown) aloonauc), but on the contrary insists that his common terms are apprehended, not by any sense, but by thought. The judgments involving them are made by the mind, thinking by itself, without any special bodily organ. The terms are 'common', not in Aristotle's sense, but in the sense in which a name is common to any number of individual things. Thus 'exists' is 'applied in common to all things ' (xourdy ent man, 1850); it can occur in a statement about any subject you like. Existence, we are presently told (186A), 'attends on' or 'belongs to' all things. These common terms are, in fact, the meanings of common names -what Plato calls ' Forms ' or ' Ideas '. The instances given here correspond to the instances given by Socrates in the Parmenides (120D), where he says that Zeno's dilemmas could be escaped by separating apart by themselves Forms such as likeness and un-

likeness, plurality and unity, rest and motion and all such things '. The terms there mentioned happen to be those which occurred in Zeno's arguments against plurality and motion; Socrates adds later (r30s) the moral Forms ' beautiful good, and all such things ', just as he will presently add them here (i680.1¹ In the *Theadetus* Plato is determined to say as little as possible about the Forms, and he here avoids using the word', but that these 'common' terms simply are Forms should be obvious to anyone who has read the *Parmenides*. The avoidance of the word has musled many critics into asserting that the Forms are not mentioned in the *Floatedus*, and miscalling these common terms 'categories'.¹

Plato could not press the argument further in this direction without openly discussing the Forms as the true objects of knowledge. But the inference is clear: that percepts cannot be the only objects of knowledge, as the identification of knowledge with perception inplied. Any statement we can make about the objects of perception, and therefore any truth, must contain at least one of these common terms. Therefore all knowledge of truths, as distinct from immediate acquaintance with sense-data, involves acquaintance with Forms, which are not private objects of perception, not individual existents, not involved in the Heracleitean fux. The reader can now draw the first conclusion : Perception is not the whole of knowledge

The argument next proceeds to the second conclusion: (2) Perception, even within its own sphere, is not knowledge at all.

186A. Socz. Under which head, then, do you place existence ? For that is, above all, a thing that belongs to everything. THEART. I should put it among the things that the mind apprehends by itself. Socz. And also likeness and unlikeness and sameness and difference ? THEART. Yes. Socz. And how about 'honourable ' and ' dishonourable ' and ' good ' and ' bad '? THEART. Those again seem to me, above all, to be things

¹ See Introd., p. 8.

¹ The entirely gratuitous confusion, traceable to Protians, of Plato's common terms with Anstole's a stageories will be dealt with later (p 2, rep4), where some of the common terms come m same for discussion. The moderns add a further confusion with the quite different use of 'category' by Kant and others Campbell (p, hul), for instance, speaks of 'necessary forms of thought which are as inseparable from perception as from reasoning '. The common terms are not forms of thought, but objects of thought (weyrd), and they are separable from perception.

'PERCEPTION IS KNOWLEDGE' DISPROVED

- 186A. whose being is considered, one in comparison with another, by the mind, when it reflects within itself upon the past
 - B. and the present with an eye to the future.¹ Soca. Wait a moment. The hardness of something hard and the softness of something soft will be perceived by the mind through touch, will they not ? TERAET. Yes.

Soca. But their existence and the fact that they both exist, and their contrariety to one another and again the existence of this contrariety are things which the mind itself undertakes to judge for us, when it reflects upon them and compares one with another.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOCR. Is it not true, then, that whereas all the impressions which penetrate to the mind through the body are things

c. which men and animals alike are naturally constituted to perceive from the moment of birth, reflections about them with respect to their existence and usefulness only come, if they come at all, with difficulty through a long and troublesome process of education ?

THEAET. Assuredly.

SOCR. Is it possible, then, to reach truth when one cannot reach existence?

THEAET. It is impossible.

SOCR. But if a man cannot reach the truth of a thing, can he possibly know that thing?

D. THEAET. No, Socrates, how could he?

SOCR. If that is so, knowledge does not reside in the impressions, but in our reflection upon them. It is there, seemingly, and not in the impressions, that it is possible to grasp existence and truth.

THEAET. Evidently.

SOCR. Then are you going to give the same name to two things which differ so widely ?

THEAET. Surely that would not be right.

¹ These terms seems to be thinking of the recent argument against Protagoras, turning on the question of judgments board the comparative goodness of future effects, and what will seem honourable (laudable) or duhonourable customs to a State. Socrates stops han abort and apphes has statement to the contrasts of sense qualitars. Touch can show us that thus is hard, that soft.

186E. TREAST. Perceiving. What other name is there for it ? SOCR. Taking it all together, then, you call this perception ? TREAST. Necessarily. SOCR. A thing which, we agree, has no part in apprehending truth, since it has none in apprehending existence. TREAST. No, it has none. SOCR. Nor, consequently, in knowledge either. TREAST. No. SOCR. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge cannot possibly be the same thing. TREAST. Evidently not, Socrates. Indeed, it is now perfectly plain that knowledge is something different from perception.

Such is the final disproof of the claim of perception to be knowledge. Though admitted to be, in a sense, unfailable, perception has not the second mark of knowledge: it cannot apprehend existence (obta) and 'truth '($d\lambda/feta$): both are commonly used by Plato to mean that true reality which he ascribes to Forms and denies to sensible objects. If we keep to the sense suggested by the previous context, the statement should mean that the simplest judgment, such as 'Green exists here', is beyond the scope of perception noper, our immediate awareness of green. The faculty of perception has no cognizance of the meaning of the word 'exists'; and, since only judgments or statements can be true, all truths are beyond its scope.

To the Platonist, however, who is familiar with the associations of 'reality' and 'truth', the passage will mean more than this, The statement that reflections on the existence or usefulness of our sense-impressions come only, if at all, after a long and troublesome education seems at first sight to conflict with the argument for Recollection in the Phaedo, where it was asserted that from the time when we first begin to use our senses we make judgments involving Forms, which we must therefore have known before birth. All judgments involve the use of some common term : and Plato cannot mean to deny here that uneducated people make judgments. Plainly he means that they have not such knowledge of Forms as the dialectician gains by the long process of education described in Republic vii. And the Phaedo may only mean that, though children do make judgments such as 'This is like that' and mean something by them, they have only a dum and confused apprehension of Forms such as likeness. The advance to knowledge is a gradual recovery of clear vision, possible only by a training in dialectic.

II. THE CLAIM OF TRUE JUDGMENT

The conclusion suggested earlier was that perception cannot be the whole of knowledge because there are other objects-the common terms-which the mind must know if it is to reflect at all. If we now take account of the Platonic sense of ' reality and truth '. we can add a further inference. Even my direct perception of my own sense-object cannot be called ' knowledge ', because the object is not a thing which is unchangingly real, but only something that becomes and is always changing. Some might say that they are more certain of the sensations and perceptions they have at any moment than they are of anything else : and to deny the name of knowledge to such direct acquaintance is, in a sense, a matter of terminology. But to Plato knowledge, by definition, has the real for its object, and these objects have not true and permanent being. This point, however, cannot be elaborated without entering on an account of the intelligible world. Hence a certain ambiguity is allowed to remain about the meaning of ' reaching truth (reality) and existence'

II. THE CLAIM OF TRUE JUDGMENT TO BE KNOWLEDGE

1871-C. Theaetetus states the claim of True Judgment

In the foregoing argument against Protagoras the distinction between direct perception and judgment has gradually emerged. Theaetetus has been led to see that knowledge must be sought above the level of mere sensation or perception, somewhere in the field of that 'thinking' or 'judging' which has been described as an activity of the mind' by itself', exercised upon the reports of the senses and using the common terms. Judgments may be true or false. Theaetetus' next suggestion is that any judgment that is true is entitled to be called knowledge.

187A. Socra. But when we began our talk it was certainly not our object to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. Still, we have advanced so far as to see that we must not look for it in sense-perception at all, but in what goes on when the mind is occupied with things by itself, whatever name you give to that.

THEAET. Well, Socrates, the name for that, I imagine, is 'making judgments'.

Soca. You are right, my friend. Now begin all over B. again. Blot out all we have been saying, and see if you can get a clearer view from the position you have now reached. Tell us once more what knowledge is.

THEAET. I cannot say it is judgment as a whole, because

- 1878. there is false judgment; but perhaps true judgment is knowledge. You may take that as my answer. If, as we go further, it turns out to be less convincing than it seems now, I will try to find another. Sock. Good, Theaetetus; this promptness is much better than hanging back as you did at first. If we go on like
 - c. this, either we shall find what we are after, or we shall be less inclined to imagine we know something of which we know nothing whatever; and that surely is a reward not to be despised. And now, what is this you say: that there are two sorts of judgment, one true, the other false, and you define knowledge as judgment that is true? ITREAT: Vs: that is the view I have come to now.

The word $(\delta_0 \epsilon_0^2(x_P))$ above translated 'making judgments' has been loosely used earlier for thinking or reflection of any sort that goes on in the mund 'by itself'. Judgment $(\delta_0 \epsilon_0)$ will be more precisely defined presently (190A) as the decision terminating the mind's inward debate with itself. But the verb continues to be used as a synonym for thinking generally and even for 'thinking of 'some object. The translation will follow Flato in using whatever expression seems most natural in each context.

187C-E. How is false judgment possible ?

Instead of developing and criticising Theaetetus' new suggestion. Socrates here goes back to a point that arose in the Defence of Protagoras. Almost the whole of this section of the dialogue will be devoted to attempts to account for the possibility of false judgment. At 167n Protagoras sud that no one can judge falsely; 'for it is not possible either to think the thing that is not or to think anything but what one experiences, and all experiences are true'. So far, our only reply to this has been to argue ad hominem that if all judgments are true. Protagoras refutes himself, and that two contradictory judgments about a future fact which is not now part of 'what one experiences', cannot both be true. We have not shown that it is possible to 'think the thing that is not '; and if it is not possible, Protagoras could reply that then all judgments must be true and his position is unassailable by such arguments.

In the next dialogue, the Sophist whom we attempt to define will be found taking refuge in this position; and he is not finally dislodged from it till near the end, where the introduction of the theory of Forms at last provides a satisfactory definition of false statement and judgment. The *Thesatetics* is leaving the Forms out

HOW IS FALSE JUDGMENT POSSIBLE?

of account so far as possible, and the long analysis here given of the problem of false judgment cannot, accordingly, yield a complete solution. Its object is to explore the ground within the field of the present discussion and to see how far we can get towards an explanation of false judgment without invoking the Forms.

SOCR. Then, had we better go back to a point that came 187C. up about judgment?

THEAST. What point do you mean?

SOCR. A question that worries me now as often before. D. and has much perplexed me in my own mind and also in talking to others. I cannot explain the nature of this experience we have, or how it can arise in our minds. THEAET. What experience?

Socr. Making a false judgment. At this moment I am still in doubt and wondering whether to let that question alone or to follow it further, not as we did a while ago, but in a new way.

THEAST. Why not, Socrates, if it seems to be in the least necessary ? Only just now, when you and Theodorus were speaking of leisure, you said very rightly that there is no pressing hurry in a discussion of this sort.

E. SOCR. A good reminder ; for this may be the right moment to go back upon our track. It is better to carry through a small task well than make a bad job of a big one. THEAET. Certainly it is.

187E-188c. False Judgment as thinking that one thing (known or unknown) is another thing (known or unknown)

Socrates opens up this new problem with two arguments showing that false judgment cannot be explained if we limit the discussion to the terms in which it was commonly debated by contemporary Sophists. Plato, as often, begins with a simple and naïve view which ignores certain relevant factors, and gradually brings these factors in. The whole discussion, however, as we shall see, is limited by certain fundamental premisses, which are not Plato's own. He is criticising other people's attempts to account for the existence of false judgments, and the conclusion is negative ; they have failed to explain it, and must fail so long as those premisses are assumed.

(I) If we accept the dilemma that anything must be either known to us or (totally) unknown, it is hard, Socrates argues, to see how we can ever think that one thing (whether known to us or not) can be another thing (whether known to us or not), i.e. mistake one thing for another.

- 187E. Socz. How shall we set about it, then ? What is it that we do mean ? Do we assert that there is in every case a false judgment, and that one of us thinks what is false, another what is true, such being the nature of things ? TREAT. Certainly we do.
- r88. Soc. And, in each and all cases, it is possible for us either to know a thing or not to know it? I leave out of account for the moment becoming acquanted with things and forgetting, considered as falling between the two. Our argument is not concerned with them just now. TEREAT. Well then, Socrates, there is no third alternative

left in any case, besides knowing and not knowing.

SOCR. And it follows at once that when one is thinking he must be thinking either of something he knows or of something he does not know?

THEAET. Necessarily.

SOCR. And further, if you know a thing, you cannot also

B. not know it; and if you do not know it, you cannot also know it?

THEAET. Of course.1

Socr. Then is the man who thinks what is false supposing that things he knows are not those things but other things he knows, so that, while he knows both, he fails to recognise either $?^*$

THEAET. No, that is impossible, Socrates.

Soca. Well then, is he supposing that things he does not know are other things he does not know ? Is this possiblethat a man who knows neither Theatettus nor Socrates should take it into his head that Socrates is Theatettus or Theatettus Socrates ?

c. THEAET. No. How could he?

SOCR. But surely a man does not imagine that things he does know are things he does not know, or that things he does not know are things he knows?

THEAET No, that would be a miracle.

SOCR. What other way is there, then, of judging falsely? There is, presumably, no possibility of judging outside these alternatives, granted that everything is either known by us

¹ This apparently obvious admission is retracted later (191A). There is a sense in which you do not know (are not now conscious of) what you do know (have become acquainted with and possess stored somewhere in your memory).

³ dysocir means both 'fail to recognize ' and ' be ignorant of '. No English expression covers both meanings

'THINKING THAT ONE THING IS ANOTHER'

188c. or not known; and inside them there seems to be no room for a false judgment. THEAET. Quite true.

The limitations of this argument are obvious. As the illustration shows, 'to know ' is used in the sense in whuch I am said to know, not a truth, but a person or an object formerly seen and now remembered. We can divide all thangs into those we know in this sense and those we do not; and we can ignore any processes of becoming acquainted and forgetting. The argument is that I cannot think that a friend is a total stranger, or that one stranger is another stranger, or that one frnend is another finend. False judgments are never of that pattern. Three points are to be noted.

(z) The field is limited to judgments of the form asserting that one thing is (identical with) another—that Theatettus is Socrates. Very for values judgments consist in instakting one thing for another; but this limitation was characteristic of sophistic discussion of the question, partly because, as Apelt observes, the formula' one thing is another' (rd *Erecov Erecov elval*) was the Greek equivalent for our 'x is A', where x is subject, A predicate. This led to the confusion of commoner types of proposition with assertions of identity. It is not to be supposed, however, that Plato was guilty of this confusion.

(2) The discussion is psychological, rather than logical. It is argued that we never in fact think that Theatettus whom we know is Socrates whom we also know. It is true that when two known objects are clearly before the mind we do not judge that one is the other. Logicians, however, might maintain that there is a false 'proposition': 'Theatettus is identical with Socrates', which has a meaning, though I cannot believe it. With that we are not concerned, but only with judgments and statements that can be actually made and believed by some rational beng. Plato never discusses' propositions' that no one propounds.¹

(3) When we come to objects that are unknown (things I have never been acquanted with), it may be urged that I can identify one unknown object with another. I can judge (truly) or falsely) that Sir Philip Francis was the author of the Letters of Junius. Nearly all histonical knowledge is about things unknown to us in the present sense. But the argument assumes that, unless I' know ' an object, my mind must be a complete blank with respect to it, as it is with respect to a person I have never seen or heard of.

¹ Hence in translating Plato the unhappy word 'proposition' should be avoided where modern associations are likely to obtrude themselves. See below, p 265

P.T.K.

Plato was not blind to these considerations. The only conclusion, so far, is that so long as we confine the question to these very narrow limits, we cannot explain the occurrence of false judgment.

1880-189B. False Judgment as thinking the thing that is not

The second argument develops the current objection to the possibility of 'thinking the thing that is not'--a phrase which Protagoras used as equivalent to 'judging falsely' (167A).

- 188c. Socr. Perhaps, then, we had better approach what we are looking for by way of another alternative. Instead of
 - p. 'knowing or not knowing', let us take 'being or not being'.

THEAET. How do you mean?

SOCR. May it not simply be that one who thinks *what is not* about anything cannot but be thinking what is false, whatever his state of mind may be in other respects?

THEAET. There is some likelihood in that, Socrates.

SOCR. Then what shall we say, Theaetetus, if we are asked: 'But is what you describe possible for anyone? Can any man think what is not, either about something that is or absolutel?' I suppose we must answer to that: 'Yes,

E. when he believes something and what he believes is not true.' Or what are we to say?

THEAET. We must say that.

SOCR. Then is the same sort of thing possible in any other case ?

THEAET. What sort of thing?

Soca. That a man should see something, and yet what he sees should be nothing.

THEAET. No. How could that be?

SOCR. Yet surely if what he sees is something, it must be a thing that is. Or do you suppose that 'something'¹ can be reckoned among things that have no being at all? TREART. No, I don't.

SOCR. Then, if he sees something, he sees a thing that is. THEAET. Evidently.

189. SOCR. And if he hears a thing, he hears something and hears a thing that is. THEAET. Yes.

¹ The Greek ele $\gamma i \tau_{15}$, 'at least some one', is the contradictory of oddels, 'not even one', no one' $\delta \tau_{14}$ in means 'a (= one) thing '(sm Ding, sma, class), as the opposite of 'no-thing', and $\tau i \delta b$ here means 'what is one' (or ' a thing' in this sense), while $\tau_{15}i_{14}i_{15}d_{15}$ or means the opposite,' nothings'.

'THINKING THE THING THAT IS NOT'

т8о. SOCR. And if he touches a thing, he touches something, and if something, then a thing that is. THEAET. That also is true. SOCR. And if he thinks,1 he thinks something, doesn't he? THEAET. Necessarily. SOCR. And when he thinks something, he thinks a thing that is? THEAET. I agree. SOCR. So to think what is not is to think nothing. THEAET. Clearly. SOCR. But surely to think nothing is the same as not to think at all. THEAET. That seems plain. B. SOCR. If so, it is impossible to think what is not, either about anything that is, or absolutely. THEAET. Evidently. SOCR. Then thinking falsely must be something different from thinking what is not. THEAET. So it seems. SOCR. False judgment, then, is no more possible for us on these lines than on those we were following just now. THEAET. No. it certainly is not.

The problem developed in this argument is not a mere sophistic paradox, but a very real problem that is still being discussed. It will recur in the Sophist, where Plato, having brought the Forms upon the scene, will be able to offer a solution.* The statement of it is attributed to Protagoras elsewhere 3 : to think what is false is to think what is not : but that is to think nothing : and that, again, is not to think at all : therefore we can only think the thing that is, and all judgments must be true. Such was Protagoras' conclusion. Plato's is different, namely that, since there is such a thing as thinking falsely, it cannot be ' thinking what is not', if that means (as the argument implies) having nothing at all before the mind. But the real significance of ' thinking what is not ' cannot be followed up here. It would involve drawing the necessary distinctions between various meanings of the terms 'is' and 'is not', and a discussion of the whole question of reality and unreality. All this is reserved for the Sophist, where the inquiry will start again from the problem as stated here, and follow the only line that can lead to a satisfactory conclusion.

¹ Or ' makes a judgment '. 'Thinks something ', again, is not distinguished from ' thinks of something ' ¹ See pp 212 and 299 ff *Euthydemus* 286c and 2832. Since the limits of the Theasterns exclude a discussion of reality, the present argument has to be left where it is, and the transation to Socrates' next suggestion seems somewhat abrupt. We may, however, find a link, if we observe that the terms in which the debate had been carried on were too simple. Protagoras has been represented earlier (167A) as asserting that 'one cannot think anything but what one experiences, and all experiences are true'. He saw no important distinction between what appears read to me in direct perception and what appears fixed to me, what I believe or judge to be true 'Appears' covered both. So he assumed that belief was like direct acquaintance with a sense-object, and must be infallible in the same way. What I believe, what I have before my mind when I think, must be something; so there must be just that object or fact; and there are no false facts, any more than non-existent objects.

To escape this conclusion, further analysis is needed to bring out the distinction between direct acquantance with sense-objects (which Plato has admitted to be infallible) and the process of making a judgment, which is not so sumple and mmediate as seeing a colour. It will be indicated that judgments of the type so far considered—thinking that one thing is another thing—mwolve two terms, not to mention the connecting term 'is'. The act of making a judgment is not the same thing as perceiving this whole complex perceiving a fact as we perceive a colour—but mwolves an operation of the mind which puts the terms together in a certain way. There may be room for mistakes to occur in this process, the nature of which Socrates will attempt to bring out gradually and to illustrate by images.

189B-190E. The apparent impossibility of false judgment as mistaking one thing for another

Socrates now recurs to the conception of false judgment as mistaking one thing for another, or thunking that one thnng is another. We are to examine what thus can mean and in what circumstances it can occur. Our first conclusion (188c) that it was impossible resulted from the assumption that we must either 'know' a thing (be acquainted with it and have it clearly before our minds) or not know it (be totally unacquainted with it). This dlemma does not really exhaust the possibulities. By taking memory into account, we can find a sense in which an object can be both known and not know.

189B. SOCR. Well, does the thing we call false judgment arise in this way? THEAST, How?

MISTAKING ONE THING FOR ANOTHER

- 189B. SOCR. We do recognise the existence of false judgment as a sort of misjudgment,¹ that occurs when a person inter
 - c. changes in his mind two things, both of which are, and asserts that the one is the other. In this way he is always thinking of something which is, but of one thing in place of another, and since he misses the mark he may fairly be said to be iudding falsely.

THEAST. I believe you have got it quite right now. When a person thinks 'ugly 'in place of 'beautiful ' or 'beautiful ' in place of ' ugly ', he is really and truly thinking what is false.

Socr. I can see that you are no longer in awe of me, Theaetetus, but beginning to despise me.

THEAET. Why, precisely ?

Socr I believe you think I shall miss the opening you give me by speaking of 'truly thinking what is false', and not

D. ask you whether a thing can be slowly quick or heavily light or whether any contrary can desert its own nature and behave like its opposite However, I will justify your boldness by letting that pass So you like this notion that false judgment is mistaking. ITHLAT. I do.

Theaetetus' phrase 'thinking (or judging) "ugly " in place of "beautful "' is vague and ambiguous. We should expect it to mean : thinking that some object which is in fact beautiful is ugly, or (in the language of later logic) assigning a wrong predicate to a subject. But this is not the sense taken in the following context. A discussion of what we call 'predicates' would inevitably lead to the Forms. Possibly Theaetetus' remark is intended to remind us of their existence, but Socrates will not bring them in The field is still limited to judgments asserting that one (individual) thing is (identical with) another, as when I mistake Theaetetus for Socrates.³ We are to consider how and when such a mistake

189D. SOCR. According to you, then, it is possible for the mind to take one thing for another, and not for itself. THEAET. Yes, it is.

¹ Plato coms a word ἀλλοδοβία, 'misjudgment', analogous to ἀλλογνοείν, meaning to mistake one person for another.

⁸ Accordingly this hypothesis that false judgment is 'mistaking ' must not be confused with Plato's own analysis in the Sophist, which depends on the recognistion of Forms. See p 317.

- 180E. Socn. And when the mind does that, must it not be thinking either of both things or of one of the two ? THEAST. Certainly it must, either at the same time or one after the other Socr. Excellent. And do you accept my description of the process of thinking ? THEAET. How do you describe it? SOCR. As a discourse that the mind carries on with itself about any subject it is considering. You must take this explanation as coming from an ignoramus : but I have a notion that, when the mind is thinking, it is simply talking to itself, asking questions and answering them, and saving Yes or No. When it reaches a decision-which may come 100. slowly or in a sudden rush-when doubt is over and the two voices affirm the same thing, then we call that its ' judg
 - ment'. So I should describe thinking as discourse, and judgment as a statement pronounced, not aloud to someone else, but silently to oneself.¹

THEAET. I agree.

SOCR. It seems, then, that when a person thinks of one thing as another, he is affirming to himself that the one is the other.

B. THEAET. Of course.

The effect of this account of thinking and judgment is to equate the act of 'mistaking' one thing for another ('misjidgment', the suggested equivalent of false judgment) with making the silent statement ($kiyo_{C}$) that one thing is the other. So Theaetetus' phrase judging 'ugly' 'm place of 'beautifu' 'i' is reduced to making the statement that the beautiful (or what is beautiful) is ugly, or is the same thing as the ugly.⁴ We are still considering only judgments of this type, which assert that one thing is another thing. We are supposed to have both things clearly before our minds (memory not having yet come into the discussion). Socrates proceeds to point out that, within the limits of these assumptions, we never do judge that one thing is another.

190B. Socr. Now search your memory and see if you have ever said to yourself 'Certainly, what is beautiful is usly', or

¹ This account of the process of thinking and judgment is repeated in the Sophist (see p. 318).

⁶ Since the Forms are excluded from ducusson, this expression 'the beautiful' is left ambiguous. It can mean (1) anything that is beautiful (and recognised as such at the moment), or (2) Beauty stelf (the Form). The ambiguity does not matter, because we never judge either that what we now set to be beautiful as updy or that Beauty itself as Upinnes.

MISTAKING ONE THING FOR ANOTHER

- 1908. 'what is unjust is just'. To put it generally, consider if you have ever set about convincing yourself that any one thing is certainly another thing, or whether, on the contrary, you have never, even in a dream, gone so far as to say to yourself that odd numbers must be even, or anything of that sort. THEAST. That is true.
 - c. SOCR. Do you suppose anyone else, mad or sane, ever goes so far as to talk himself over, in his own mmd, into stating seriously that an ox must be a horse or that two must be one ? THEAET. Certainly not.

SOCR. So, if making a statement to oneself is the same as judging, then, so long as a man is making a statement or judgment about both things at once and his mind has hold of both, he cannot say or judge that one of them is the

D. other. You, in your turn, must not cavil at my language¹; I mean it in the sense that no one thinks: 'the ugly is beautiful 'or anything of that kind. THEAET I will not cavil, Socrates. I agree with you. Socra. So long, then, as a person is thunking of both, he cannot think of the one as the other. THEAET. So it appears. Socra. On the other hand, if he is thunking of one only and

Socr. On the other hand, if he is thinking of one only and not of the other at all,³ he will never think that the one is the other.

THEAET. True; for then he would have to have before his mind the thing he was not thinking of.

SOCR. It follows, then, that 'mistaking' is impossible, whether he thinks of both things or of one only. So E. there will be no sense in defining false judgment as 'mis-

¹Burnet's text. In Greek 'the one' and 'the other' happen to be carpressed by the same word, *repos.* Socrates means : 'You must not exual at my saying no one thinks one thing (rd 'frope) is another (*repos.*), on the vertal ground that *repos* is the same word at *repos*. I mean all the particular cases (such as 'the ngty is beantful') covered by this general formula 'The word let *not be plot*, *hereb*; *i* (*finge*), *repos*. The mean all the particular (B) may be a gloss on rgbe, inserted in the wrong place; or, if retained where they stand, they must mean. 'You must let this phrase pass as applied to the particular cases (covered by them), *for wrebally the word repos* (one) is the same state mord 'rapos (ode).' Cl Madrox, *Adv Crit*, 1(27), 377, Paipen, *Erhomstustatorus Plato's* 6, 4 Theo, is an sate part eacher' (at 180).' You must place is a sate part eacher' (at 180).' You must place is my capression as it passed your 'daylog' eacher' (at 180).''

¹ This sentence shows clearly that boffice (with accus) here, as in other places in the context, means 'densing of' a thing, not making a judgment about it; though boffers in the next line does mean meshes; dis judgment that the one is the other. This is a good example of Plato's deliberate refusal to use terms as fixed technicalities. 190E. judgment '. It does not appear that false judgment exists in us in this form any more than in those we dismissed earlier. THEAET. So it seems.

The upshot, so far, is that the notion of mistaking or interchanging one object for another will not explain how we can make a false judgment, so long as it is assumed that the objects must either be 'known' (clearly present to the mind) or else 'unknown' (completely absent from the mind).

190E-195B. One class of mistakes can be explained by taking into account memory. The Wax Tables

The notion of ' mistaking ', howver, need not be abandoned, if the assumption can be evaded ; and it can be evaded by introducing what has htherto been excluded—the contents of the memory. We shall find that there is one class of false judgments that can be described as ' mistaking '. These are judgments in whuch the two things wrongly identified are objects of different sorts—one a present object of perception, the other a memory-image. So the scope of the discussion is now enlarged to include memory.

190E. SOCR. And yet, Theaetetus, if we cannot show that false judgment does exist, we shall be driven into admitting all sorts of absurdities.

THEAET. For instance ?

SOCR. I will not mention them until I have tried to look at the question from every quarter. So long as we cannot see our way, I should feel some shame at our being forced

191. into such admissions. But if we find the way out, then, as soon as we are clear, it will be time to speak of others as caught in the ludrous position we shall have ourselves escaped; though, if we are completely baffled, then, I suppose, we must be humble and let the argument do with us what it will, like a sailor tramping over sea-sick passengers. So let me tell you where I still see an avenue open for us to follow.

THEAET. Do tell me

Socr. I shall say we were wrong to agree that a man cannot think that things he knows are things he does not know and B. so be deceived. In a way it is possible.

THEAST. Do you mean something that crossed my mind at the moment when we said that was impossible? It occurred to me that sometimes I, who am acquainted with Socrates, imagine that a stranger whom I see at a distance is 191B. the Socrates whom I know. In a case like that a mistake of the kind you describe does occur.

SOCR. And we were shy of saying that, because it would have made us out as both knowing and not knowing what we know?

THEAET. Exactly.

Socr. We must, in fact, put the case in a different way. Perhaps the barrier will yield somewhere, though it may

c. defy our efforts. Anyhow, we are in such straits that we must turn every argument over and put it to the test. Now, is there anything in this? Is it possible to become acquainted with something one did not know before? THTRAFT. Surely.

SOCR. And the process can be repeated with one thing after another?

THEAET. Of course.

SOCR. Imagine, then, for the sake of argument, that our minds contain a block of wax, which in this or that individual may be larger or smaller, and composed of wax that is com-

D. paratively pure or muddy, and harder in some, softer in others, and sometimes of just the right consistency. THEAET. Very well.

Soca Let us'call it the gift of the Muses' mother, Memory, and say that whenever we wish to remember something we see or hear or conceive in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions or ideas and imprint them on it as we might stamp the impression of a seal-ring. Whatever is so imprinted we remember and know so long as the image remains: whatever is rubbed out or has not succeeded in

E. leaving an impression we have forgotten and do not know. THEAET. So be it.

The word 'know' has now received a new meanug: I know a thing when I have had direct acquaintance with it and an image of it remains stored in my memory. This gives a fuller range of possibilities than we have so far had I may know Socrates in this sense and yet fail to recognise or identify him when I see hun; and I may mistake a stranger whom I see at a distance for the Socrates whom I know. This possibility of 'mistaking' was excluded in the earlier argument by the false assumption that I must either know Socrates, m the sense of clearly perceiving hum or having the thought of him clearly before my mind, or else my mind must be a complete blank concerning him.

It may be noted that ideas or notions (Erroual) are spoken of as

stamped on the memory, as well as perceptions. An idea is something we 'conceive in our own minds' (*abrol brodycauer*), but do not perceive. Its nature and origin are left obscure; but the mention of such objects prepares the way for our knowledge of numbers, which are not perceived but are treated as images stamped in the memory (r058).

IGME. Sock. Now take a man who knows things in this way, and is attending to something that he sees or hears. Is there not here a possibility of his making a false judgment? TREART. How? Sock. By thinking that things he knows are other things he knows, or sometimes things he does not know. We were wrong when we agreed earlier that this was impossible. TREART. What do you think about it now?

Socrates' next speech (1924, 1-6, 5) contains a list of all the cases in which it is impossible combinations of two objects which are (a) known (and now remembered) or (b) unknown (completely), (c) now perceived or (a) not now perceived. The conclusion is that there are only three combinations in which mistaking is possible. The reader would find the same difficulty as Theastetus in following the statement and may prefer a summary to a translation. It will be simplest to use 'an acquaintance' to mean a person (or thing) whom I know and of whom I have a memory mage now before my mind, and 'a stranger' to mean a person (or thing) with which I have never been accumated at all, a lodal straneer.

Mistake, then, is impossible in the following cases .

(1) If neither object is now perceived, I cannot mistake an acquaintance for another acquaintance, or confuse him with a stranger, or confuse two strangers. (These cases will be illustrated by examples at 193A-B.)

(2) If perception only is involved, I cannot confuse two things which I see, or an object seen with an object not seen, or two objects neither of which is seen.

(3) Where both knowledge and perception are involved, I cannot confuse two acquaintances both now seen and recognised ¹; or confuse an acquaintance now seen and recognised with an absent acquaintance or with a stranger who is present. And there can be no confusion of two total strangers, whether I now see one of them or not.

¹ To recognise is to fit the new perception to the right memory-image, left by a former perception of the same object.

MEMORY AS A WAX TABLET

Socrates now gives a summary statement of the three cases where mistake is possible, and these are illustrated in detail.

- 192C. 5. SOCR. (continues). There remain, then, the following cases in which, if anywhere, false judgment can occur, THEAST. What are they ? Perhaps they may help me to understand better. At present I cannot follow. SOCR. Take things you know : you can suppose them to be other things which you both know and perceive ; or to be things you do not know, but do perceive : or you can confuse
 - two things which you both know and perceive. D. THEAST. Now I am more in the dark than ever. SOCR. Let me start again, then, and put it in this way. I know Theodorus and have a memory in my mind of what he is like, and the same with Theaetetus. At certain moments I see or touch or hear or otherwise perceive them : at other times, though I have no perception of you and Theodorus. I nevertheless remember you both and have you before my mind. Isn't that so?
 - E. THEAET. Certainly.

SOCR. That, then, is the first point I want to make clearthat it is possible either to perceive or not to perceive something one is acquainted with.

THEAET. True.

SOCR. And it is also possible, when one is not acquainted with a thing, sometimes not to perceive it either, sometimes merely to perceive it and nothing more.

THEAET. That is possible too.

Socrates now takes, for illustration, three cases from his list, where mistake is impossible. They are cases in which no present perception is involved. (I) When nothing is before my mind except images of things I have formerly become acquainted with. I cannot judge that one of these remembered things is the other. (2) If I have an image of one only, I cannot judge that the thing is something I have never known. (3) Still less can I identify or confuse two things, neither of which I have ever known.

192E. SOCR. Then see if you can follow me better now. If 103. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither and has no sort of present perception of them, he can never think in his own mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Is that good sense? THEAET. Yes, that is true.

SOCR. Well, that was the first of the cases I mentioned.

- 193. THEART. Yes. SOCR. And the second was this: if I know one of you but not the other and perceive neither, once more I could never think that the one I know is the other whom I do not know. THEART. True.
 - B. Socz. And thirdly, if I neither know nor perceive either of you, I cannot think that one unknown person is another unknown person. And now take it as if I had gone over the whole list of cases again, m which I shall never judge falsely about you and Theodorus, whether I know both or neither or only one of you. And the same applies to perceiving, if you follow me.

THEAET. I follow now.

'The same applies to perceiving 'refers to the second class of cases, where perception only is involved. If there is nothing but two objects of perception, you cannot mistake the one for the other, whether you perceive both or neither or one only. There remains the third class of cases, where both previous acquaintance and present perception are concerned. Among these Socrates now illustrates the three cases in which mistake is possible.

- 193B. SOCR. It remains, then, that false judgment should occur in a case like thus: when I, who know you and Theodorus
 - c. and possess imprants of you both like 'seal-mpressions in the waxen block, see you both at a distance undistinctly and am in a hurry to assign the proper imprint of each to the proper visual perception, like fitting a foot into its own footmark to effect a recognition ', and then make the mustake of interchanging them, like a man who thrusts his fet into the wrong shoes, and apply the perception of each to the imprint of the other Or my mustake might be illustrated by the sort of thing that happens in a mirror

D. when the visual current transposes right to left.³ In that case mistaking or false judgment does result. THELAT: I think it does, Socrates. That is an admirable description of what happens to judgment. Sock. Then there is also the case where I knowledge I and the set of the set

¹ An allusion to the recognition of Orestee by his footmark tallying with his aister Electra's, Aeschylus, *Chosphore*, 205 ff

Plato explains reflection by supposing that a stream of light (the visual current) from the eye coalesces at the surface of the mirror with a stream of light (colour) from the object How the transposition occurs will be explained below, p. 327.

193D, have of that one to correspond with my perception. That is the expression I used before, which you did not understand

THEAST. No. I did not.

The first of these two cases might be called the mistake of double transposition. The second is really similar, but simpler, involving only a single transposition of the same type. Instead of two false judgments : 'Yonder man (Theodorus) is Theaetetus, and that other man (Theaetetus) is Theodorus', we now have only one. There is also the third case (192C) where I mistake a stranger whom I see for someone I remember. This is of the same pattern . I wrongly identify something now perceived (whether formerly known or not known, does not matter) with something I know. Socrates does not illustrate this, but now repeats his explanation of the two cases he has illustrated.

103D. SOCR Well, that is what I was saving ' if you know

E. one of two people and also perceive him and if you get the knowledge you have to correspond with the perception of him, you will never think he is another person whom you both know and perceive, if your knowledge of him likewise is got to correspond with the perception. That was so. wasn't it?

THEATT Yes.

SOCR. But there was left over the case I have been describing now, in which we say false judgment does occur, the possibility that you may know both and see or otherwise

perceive both, but not get the two imprints to correspond 104. each with its proper perception Like a bad archer, you may shoot to one side and miss the mark-which is indeed another phrase we use for error.

THEAET. With good reason.

SOCR. Also, when a perception is present which belongs to one of the imprints, but none which belongs to the other, and the mind fits to the present perception the imprint belonging to the absent one, in all such cases it is in error. To sum up : in the case of objects one does not

B. know and has never perceived, there is, it seems, no possibility of error or false judgment, if our present account is sound ; but it is precisely in the field of objects both known and perceived that judgment turns and twists about and proves false or true-true when it brings impressions straight to their proper imprints : false when it musdirects them crosswise to the wrong imprint.

- 194B. THEAET. Surely that is a satisfactory account, isn't it, Socrates?
 - C. SOCR. You will think still better of it when you hear the rest. To judge truly is a fine thing and there is something discreditable in error.

THEAET. Of course.

Soca. Well, they say the differences arise in this way. When a man has in his mind a good thick slab of wax, smooth and kneaded to the right consistency, and the impressions that come through the senses are stamped on these tables of the 'heart'-Homer's word hints at the

- D. mind's likeness to wax'--then the imprints are clear and deep enough to last a long time. Such people are quick to learn and also have good memories, and besides they do not interchange the imprints of their perceptions but think truly. These imprints being distinct and wellspaced are quickly assigned to their several stamps--the 'real things' as they are called--and stom hen are said to be clever. Do you agree ?
- E. Soca. When a person has what the poet's wisdom commends as a 'shagy heat', or when the block as muddy or made of impure wax, or over soft or hard, the people with soft wax are quick to learn, but forgetful, those with hard wax the reverse. Where it is shaggy or rough, a gritty kind of stuff containing a lot of earth or dirt, the impressions obtained are indistinct; so are they too when the stuff is hard, for they have no derth. Impressions in
- 195. soft wax also are indistinct, because they melt together and soon become blurred. And if, besides this, they overlap through being crowded together into some wretched little narrow mind, they are still more indistinct. All these types, then, are likely to judge falsely. When they see or hear or think of something, they cannot quickly assign things to their several imprints. Because they are so slow and sort things into the wrong places, they constantly see and hear and think amiss, and we say they are mustaken about things and sturid.

¹ The Homeric word for heart (edge) resembles engde (wax) Beare (GA. Theores of Elem. Cognition 5(7) immarks that, had Pisto cheen any physical organ to correspond to the wax as the sext of memory, it would probably have been the heart, the brain being the matriment of reason. There is no satisfactory evidence that the comparison of memory to a waite holde had ever been used before, except as a poet's metaphor (Aesch. P V. 815 *pulsous Borns genie*, Essa 372, etc.). 1958. THERET. Your descripton could not be better, Socrates. Socra. We are to conclude, then, that false judgments do exist in us? THERET. Most certainly. Socra. And true ones also, I suppose ? THERET. True ones also. Socra. At last, then, we believe we have reached a satisfactory agreement that both these kinds of judgments certainly exist ? THERET. Most emphatically.

It does not appear that Plato offers his waxen block as anything more than an illustration, a mechanical model which helps us to distinguish a memory-image from a fresh impression of sense, and to imagine the process of fitting the one to the other correctly or incorrectly. The conclusion, that true and fals judgments of this type do exist, rests simply on familiar experience. The illustration serves to bring out the point that error comes in, not in the act of direct perception, but in judgments we make about what we perceive. This is an advance on Protagoras, who drew no distinction between what 'appears' to me to be true (what I believe or think) and what 'appears' to me as real in perception. But his account of false judgment as ' thinking the thing that its not' and his denial that such a thing is possible have been shelved. This thesis is reserved for the Sophis.

195B-196C. False judgment in general cannot, however, be defined as the misfitting of perception to thought

The weak point, however, is thus. Only a small class of false judgments, even about things we now perceive, consist in identifying them with things we formerly perceived and now remember. This is the only type of judgment so far considered and described. It has been agreed, as a matter of common experience, that such judgments do exist. But there is an immense class of judgments, true and false, about things I do not now perceive and never have perceived. All historical judgments about events outside my own experience belong to this class. There are also, as Socrates now observes, true and false judgments about things that never can be perceived. Hence all that has been established is that false judgment does exist in a very small class of cases where we wrongly identify something we perceive. This is important, as contraducting Protagoras' doctrine that false judgment is impossible. But it has now to be pointed out that this 'mistaking' or wrong 'fitting together of thought and perception ' is not a definition of false judgment in general. It will not cover cases where no perception

is involved. We can make mistakes about numbers, which are not objects of perception but are said to be 'known' in the sense we have just given to that term, *i.e.* registered as imprints in the memory. We must accordingly retract the earlier statement that mistakes cannot occur between two objects both known but not perceived.

- 195B. SOCR. It really does seem to be true, Theaetetus, that a garrulous person is a strange and disagreeable creature.¹ THEAET. Why, what makes you say that?
 - c. Soca. Disgust at my own stupidity. I am indeed garrulous. what else can you call a man who goes on bandying arguments to and fro because he us such a dolt that he cannot make up his mund and is loath to surrender any one of them ?

TREAT. But why are you disgusted with yourself? Soca. I am not merely disgusted but anxious about the answer I shall make if someone asks: 'So, Socrates, you have made a discovery: that false judgment resides, not in our perceptions among themselves nor yet in our thoughts,

D. but in the fitting together of perception and thought?' I suppose I shall say, Yes, and plume myself on this brilliant discovery of ours.

THEAET. I don't see anything to be ashamed of in what you have just pointed out, Socrates.

Socs. 'On the other hand,' he will continue, 'you also say that we can never imagine that a man whom we merely think of and do not see is a horse which again we do not see or touch but merely think of without perceiving it in any way?' I suppose I shall say, Yes, to that. TREAR. And rightly.

E. SOCR. 'On that showing,' he will say, 'a man could never imagine that it, which he merely thinks of, is 12, which again he merely thinks of.' Come, you must find the answer now.

THEAET. Well, I shall answer that, if he saw or handled eleven things, he might suppose they were twelve; but he will never make that judgment about the II and the IZ he has in his thoughts.

Socr. Well now, does a man ever consider in his own 196. mind 5 and 7-I don't mean five men and seven men or anything of that sort, but just 5 and 7 themselves, which

¹ 'Garrulity' or 'babbling' was an abusive term applied to the conversations of Socrates and his associates. See below, p. 176, on Soph. 225D.

FALSE JUDGMENT WITHOUT PERCEPTION

- we describe as records in that waxen block of ours, among 106. which there can be no false judgment-does anyone ever take these into consideration and ask himself in his inward conversation how much they amount to ; and does one man believe and state that they make II, another that they make 12, or does everybody agree they make 12 ?
 - THEAET. Far from it; many people say II; and if larger R numbers are involved, the more room there is for mistakes : for you are speaking generally of any numbers. I suppose. Soca. Yes, that is right. Now consider what happens in this case. Is it not thinking that the 12 itself that is stamped on the waxen block is II ?

THEAET. It seems so.

SOCR. Then haven't we come round again to our first argument? For when this happens to someone, he is thinking that one thing he knows is another thing he knows : and that, we said, was impossible. That was the very ground on which we were led to make out that there could be no such thing as false judgment : it was in order c. to avoid the conclusion that the same man must at the

same time know and not know the same thing. THEAST. Oute true.

SOCR If so, we must account for false judgment in some other way than as the misfitting of thought to perception. If it were that, we should never make mistakes among our thoughts themselves. As the case stands now, either there is no such thing as false judgment, or it is possible not to know what one does know Which alternative do vou choose?

THEAET. I see no possible choice. Socrates.

The Platonist may here be surprised to find our knowledge of a number regarded as the record in the memory-tablet of an impression, as if we became acquainted with the number 12 in the same way as with a colour or a sound or a person. Has Plato abandoned his doctrine of Recollection, according to which our knowledge of Forms, including numbers and their relations, is always latent in the soul, not acquired through the senses during this life, but only revived on the occasion of sense-experience? There is no ground for such a conclusion. The whole dialogue examines the claim of the world of external sensible objects to be the sole source of knowledge. This claim is taken as implying that outside us there are physical objects which can vield us sensedata through the several organs, and inside us a tabula rasa on ĸ

P.T.K.

which impressions so received can be stamped and recorded. This mechanism is based on the empiricial assumption that all our knowledge must be derived somehow from the external objects of perception. On this assumption (which Plato himself does not accept) our idea of the number 12 must be supposed to be extracted from a series of sense-impressions and added to our memory records. As Campbell remarks, 'memory is made to do the work of abstraction'. This is all the apparatus that has so far come into view. It has sufficient to illustrate one class of mistakes—the wrong fittingtogether of old records and new impressions. But we have now seen that this formula will not cover the mustaking of one memory record for another, and so it will not do as a general account of false judgment. We cannot admit mistakes about numbers, unless we can find a sense in which we can not know something we do know. The empiricist's apparatus will have to be enlarged.

196D-199C. Memory compared to an aviary, to provide for mistaken judgments not involving perception

Objection might be taken to the statement ($2\phi\delta$) that, when we make the mustake, we 'thunk that the 12 on our wax-tablet is rr', or that 'one thing we know (r2) is another thung we know (r1)'. It is still presumed that a false judgment must consast in wrongly identifying one thing with another. Even if that were so, what we identify with r1 is, not r2, but' the sum of 5 and 7' —a number which at the moment we do not know (in a sense). We are wondering what number it is, and wrongly conclude that it is r1. The number r2, although we are familiar with it, is not present to our mind. We do not judge that r2 is r1.

This objection, it is true, does not invalidate the only conclusion stated : that the misfitting of thought and perception cannot be a definition of false judgment in general. But it serves to bring out the need for some enlargement of the empiricist apparatussome further distinction between the meanings of the word ' know'. The misleading statement that 'we judge the 12 in our waxen block to be II' is a consequence of the too narrow use of 'know' in terms of that image. To 'know' meant to have become acquainted with a thing and to ' remember ' it in the sense of having the memory of it now before the mind. If I remember both II and 12 in that way, to confuse them is as impossible as we said it was to confuse two absent friends when I now remember them both. Socrates, accordingly, goes on to distinguish yet another sense of 'know'. The image of an object may be registered in the memory without being present to our consciousness. It is possible not to know (have before our minds) what we do know

(possess somewhere registered in memory). A new simile, the aviary, is now substituted for the waxen block to provide for this latent knowledge. We shall no longer need to speak as if the number 12 were present to our minds and confused with 11.

IGD. SOCR. But the argument is not going to allow both alternatives. However, we must stick at nothing : suppose we try being quite shameless.

THEAET. In what way ?

Socr. By making up our minds to describe what knowing is like.

THEAET. How is that shameless?

SOCR. You seem to be unaware that our whole conversation from the outset has been an inquiry after the nature of knowledge on the supposition that we did not know what it was. THERET. No, I am quite aware of that.

Socr. Then, doesn't it strike you as shameless to explain what knowing is like, when we don't know what knowledge

E. is? The truth is, Theatetus, that for some time past there has been a vicous taint in our discussion Times out of number we have said: 'we know', 'we do not know', 'we have knowledge', 'we have no knowledge', as if we could understand each other while we still know nothing about knowledge. At this very moment, if you please, we have once more used the words 'know nothing' and 'understand', as if we had a right to use them while we are still destitute of knowledge.

THEAET. Well, but how are you going to carry on a discussion, Socrates, if you keep clear of those words?

197. SOCR. I cannot, being the man I am, though I might if I were an expert in debate. If such a person were here now, he would profess to keep clear of them and rebuke us severely for my use of language. As we are such bunglers, then, shall I be so bold as to describe what knowing is like ? I think it might help us.

THEAET. Do so, then, by all means. And if you cannot avoid those words, you shall not be blamed.

SocR. Well, you have heard what 'knowing' is commonly said to be?

THEAET. Possibly; but I don't remember at the moment. SOCR. They say it is 'having knowledge'.¹

¹ This is of course not a 'definition ' of knowing, but a verbal paraphrase, which occurs at Euklyd 2778. It may be due to Prodicus or some other writer on the correct use of language (see) despirate definitions). Producus is cited in the context at Euklyd. 2778.

197B. THEAET. True,

SOCR. Let us make a slight amendment and say : ' possessing knowledge '.

THEAET. What difference would you say that makes? SOCR. None, perhaps; but let me tell you my idea and you shall help me test it.

THEAET. I will if I can.

SOCR. 'Having' seems to me different from 'possessing'. If a man has bought a coat and owns it, but is not wearing it, we should say he possesses it without having it about him.¹

THEAET. True.

c. Soca. Now consider whether knowledge is a thing you can posses in that way without having it about you, like a man who has caught some wild birds—pigeons or what not—and keeps them in an aviary he has made for them at home. In a sense, of course, we might say he 'has' them all the time inasmuch as he possesses them, mightn't we?

THEAET. Yes.

Soca. But in another sense he 'has ' none of them, though he has got control of them, now that he has made them captive in an enclosure of his own; he can take and have hold of them whenever he likes by catching any bird he

D. chooses, and let them go again; and it is open to him to do that as often as he pleases.

THEAET. That is so.

Socr. Once more then, just as a while ago we imagined a sort of waxen block in our minds, so now let us suppose that every mind contains a knd of avary stocked with birds of every sort, some in flocks apart from the rest, some in small groups, and some solitary, flying in any direction among them all.²

E. THEAET. Be it so. What follows? SOCR. When we are babies we must suppose this receptacle empty, and take the birds to stand for pieces of knowledge. Whenever a person acquires any piece of

 ${}^1{}^{*}E_{X^{HP}}$ is commonly used of 'wearing 'a garment. It also means 'to have hold of '--the phrase used below for holding the bird that has been caught inside the avary.

⁶ Some classification of the objects of knowledge seems to be hinted at. Comparison with the Sophisi (2528 fl.) may suggest that the large and small groups of burds are generic and specific Forms, the solitary burds which fly among all the rest, Forms of universal application like Existence, Sameness, Difference. But nothing turns on such conjectures.

- 1975. knowledge and shuts it up ift his enclosure, we must say he has learnt or discovered the thing of which this is the knowledge, and that is what 'knowing' means. THEART. Be it so.
- 198. Soca. Now think of him hunting once more for any piece of knowledge that he wants, catching and holding it, and letting it go again. In what terms are we to describe that --the same that we used of the original process of acquisition, or different ones? An illustration may help you to see what I mean. There is a science you call 'arithmetic'. THERT. Yes.

SOCR. Conceive that, then, as a chase after pieces of knowledge about all the numbers, odd or even. THEAET. I will,

SOCR. That, I take it, is the science in virtue of which B. a man has in his control pieces of knowledge about numbers and can hand them over to someone else.

THEAET. Yes.

Socr. And when he hands them over, we call it 'teaching', and when the other takes them from him, that is 'learning', and when he has them in the sense of possessing them in that aviary of his, that is 'knowing'.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOCR. Now observe what follows. The finished arithmetician knows all numbers, doesn't he? There is no number the knowledge of which is not in his mind. THERET, Naturally.

C. SOCR. And such a person may sometimes count either the numbers themselves in his own head or some set of external things that have a number.

THEAET. Of course.

SOCR. And by counting we shall mean simply trying to find out what some particular number amounts to? THEAET. Yes.

Socr. It appears, then, that the man who, as we admitted, knows every number, is trying to find out what he knows as if he had no knowledge of it. No doubt you sometimes hear puzzles of that sort debated.

THEAET. Indeed I do.

D. Sock. Well, our illustration from hunting pigeons and getting possession of them will enable us to explain that the hunting occurs in two ways: first, before you possess your pigeon in order to have possession of it; secondly, after getting possession of it; in order to catch and hold

in your hand what you have already possessed for some 108D. time. In the same way, if you have long possessed pieces of knowledge about things you have learnt and know, it is still possible to get to know the same things again, by the process of recovering the knowledge of some particular thing and getting hold of it. It is knowledge you have possessed for some time, but you had not got it handy in your mind.

THEAET. True.

100.

F. SOCR. That then was the drift of my question what terms should be used to describe the arithmetician who sets about counting or the literate person who sets about reading : because it seemed as if, in such a case, the man was setting about learning again from himself what he already knew.

THEAET. That sounds odd. Socrates.

Socr. Well, but can we say he is going to read or count something he does not know when we have already granted

that he knows all the letters or all the numbers?

THEAET. No, that is absurd too.

SOCR. Shall we say, then, that we care nothing about words, if it amuses anyone to turn and twist the expressions 'knowing' and 'learning'? Having drawn a distinction between possessing knowledge and having it about one. we agree that it is impossible not to possess what one does possess, and so we avoid the result that a man should not know what he does know; but we say that it is possible for him to get hold of a false judgment about it. For

he may not have about him the knowledge of that thing. B. but a different piece of knowledge instead, if it so happens that, in hunting for some particular piece of knowledge. among those that are fluttering about, he misses it and catches hold of a different one. In that case, you see, he mistakes II for 12,1 because he has caught hold of the knowledge of II that is inside him, instead of his knowledge of 12, as he might catch a dove in place of a pigeon. THEART. That seems reasonable.

Socr. Whereas, when he catches the piece of knowledge he is trying to catch, he is not mistaken but thinks what

¹ Lsterally 'thinks II is I2'. This cannot now mean that he has both numbers before his mind and judges one of them to be the other. This was agreed to be impossible (1952) It means that he misiakes the number 11, which he lave hold of for the number 12 which he was really looking for. when he asked : What is the sum of 7 and 5 ?

199B. is true. In this way both true and false judgments can C. exist, and the obstacles that were troubling us are removed. You will agree to this, perhaps? Or will you not? THEAST. I will. Socz. Yes; for now we are nd of the contradiction about people not knowing what they do know. That no longer implies our not possessing what we do possess, whether we are mistaken about something or not.

The aviary has enlarged the machinery of the waxen block by providing for the process of hunting out latent pieces of knowledge and bringing them before the mind. So it has led to the suggestion that false indement occurs when we get hold of the wrong piece of knowledge and ' interchange ' it for the right one. An important difference between the two images is that the process of originally acquiring knowledge is differently conceived The waxen block was thought of as a receptacle for sense-impressions which left their imprint as memory-images. It seemed hard to imagine how one such imprint should ever be mistaken for another; and no provision was made for historical knowledge or any knowledge not immediately derived from the senses. The aviary, on the other hand, represents knowledge as acquired from a teacher who ' hands over ' pieces of information to the learner. Such information would not consist in a series of separate imprints, but rather of statements offered for our behef. It would cover historical and abstract knowledge, as well as our notions of such things as numbers.

Now, from the Meno onwards, Plato has repeatedly declared that what he calls 'knowledge' is not a thing that can be 'handed over ' by one person to another. The true objects of knowledge must be directly seen by the eye of the soul, the professors of education who claim to put into the mind knowledge that is not there are like one who should claim to put sight into blind eves.1 The sophists are condemned for offering to ' hand over ' ' excellence ' (areté) of various sorts to their hearers.* In Plato's view all mathematical knowledge and knowledge of the Forms cannot, in the ordinary sense, be 'taught'. It is always in the soul and needs to be 'recollected'. The intervention of a teacher is not necessary, though the process may be directed and assisted by conversation ('dialectic') with a wiser person who will act as midwife. The Platonist will see at once that what is here called a 'piece of knowledge' can be nothing more than a belief $(\delta \delta \xi a)$. conveyed from one mind to another. All this cannot be openly said here, because the Forms are excluded from the discussion,

¹ Rop. 518C. ¹ Mono 93B, Euthyd 273D, 287A.

which is confined to the empiricist claum that all knowledge comes from the external world of sense, either directly or by teaching as commonly conceived. But Plato is careful to note that we are still working on the empiricist assumption that the aviary is empty at birth—a *isbuli rass*—and gradually filled with contents derived from sensible experience and learning. The reader, guided by the long description of Socratic modwirdry, is left to nifer that these so-called 'pieces of knowledge' are not knowledge at all. It is perhaps with intention that Plato, while describus the recovery of latent 'knowledge', never uses his own word for recollection (*meanmensis*).

1990-200D. Rejection of 'interchange of pieces of knowledge' as an account of False Judgment

The aviary has enabled us to imagine how a man who has learnt that the sum of γ and 5 is r2, may sometimes ask humself what the sum of γ and js, and get hold of a wrong 'prece of knowledge', viz. the number 11, which he is also acquanted with. He mustakes this for the 'piece of knowledge' he wants, namely 12. This 'interchange' may seem to be an unobjectionable description of such a mistake. Socrates, however, at once rauses an objection, which turns upon the unexplained term 'piece of knowledge'.

199C. SOCR. (comtinues). But it strikes me that a still stranger consequence is coming in sight. THEAET. What is that? SOCR. That the interchange of pueces of knowledge should ever result in a judgment that is false. THEAET. How do you mean?

D. Sock. In the first place, that a man should have knowledge of something and at the same time fail to recognise ¹ that very thing, not for want of knowng it but by reason of his own knowledge; and next that he should judge that thing to be something else and vice versa—isn't that very unreasonable: that when a piece of knowledge presents itself, the mind should fail to recognise anything and know nothing? On this showng, the presence of ignorance might just as well make us know something, or the presence of blindness make us see—if knowledge can ever make us fail to know.

This objection is obscure, and the language ambiguous : dynoein can mean either ' to be ignorant of ' or ' to fail to recognise ' (the

¹ For dyverty, meaning ' fail to recognize ', cf. 188B.

'INTERCHANGE OF KNOWLEDGE' REJECTED

opposite of yman, 'to recognise'). The 'piece of knowledge that presents itself' must mean the number II, which I have laid hold of instead of the number 12 which I was looking for and have not found. In what sense does the interchange involve that I should 'fail to recognize (dynosize) that very thing, not for want of knowing it (dynamonium) but by reason of my own knowledge'? 'Fail to recognise that very thing' (the number II) can only mean that I fail to recognise the fact that it is not the number I want : hence Socrates says I judge it to be 12, i.e. mistake it for 12. But ' not for want of knowing it ' (dynamorin) means ' not for want of be ingacquainted with it '. The situation is analogous to what was described earlier : I see an acquaintance and, failing to recognise him, mistake him for another acquaintance. But there perception was involved, and the mistake was explained as the fitting-together of the fresh impression and the wrong memoryimage. Here no perception is involved. Socrates' point seems to be that the aviary contains nothing but ' pieces of knowledge'. I am acquainted with both the numbers, 11 and 12 One of them (II) is now before my mind. How can I mistake that number for the other which I am also acquainted with? If I have been taught and know the truth that 7 + 5 = 12, how can I substitute II for I2 and believe that I have got hold of the right number? There is no question here of seeing something dimly at a distance : only 'pieces of knowledge' are involved.

To this we might reply that an analogous explanation by the misfitting of two pieces of knowledge could be given, if the unexplained term 'piece of knowledge' were taken in a sufficiently wide sense. The expression covers objects (such as numbers) that I am acquainted with, as well as truths that I have been taught. All these are in my aviary. Does it also include a complex object such as 'the sum of 7 and 5'? This ought to be included: it consists of terms I am acquainted with and it is before my mind when I ask : what is the sum of 7 and 5? It is this object that I identify with II when I make my false judgment. If it is a ' piece of knowledge' and contained in the aviary, then the false judgment can be explained as the wrong putting-together of two pieces of knowledge, as in the waxen block false judgment was the putting-together of a fresh impression and the wrong memory imprint. The result will be a false judgment entirely composed of 'pieces of knowledge' (terms I am acquainted with). It thus seems that the aviary apparatus is, after all, as adequate to explain false judgment where no perception is involved as the waxen block was to explain false judgment involving perception.

It is hard to resist the impression that Plato has overlooked this

explanation, because he does not recognise 'the sum of 7 and 5' as a 'piece of knowledge', but persists in speaking as if we judged not that 'the sum of 7 and 5 is 11' but that '12 (the number we are seeking) is 11 (the number we lay hold of)'. If such objects as 'the sum of 7 and 5' are excluded, then the difficulty Socrates raises does exist: how can I mustake the 11 which I have before my mind for the 12 which I know but have not before my mind 7

Theaetetus, at any rate, does not put forward the explanation above offered. He takes up Socrates' word for 'ignorance' or 'failure to recognise' (dywuµoor/wy), and suggests that our minds may contain 'pieces of ignorance' as well as 'pieces of knowledge'.

199E. THEAST. Perhaps, Socrates, we were wrong in making the birds stand for pieces of knowledge only, and we ought to have imagined pieces of ignorance flying about with them in the mind. Then, in chasing them, our man would lay hold sometimes of a piece of knowledge, sometimes of a piece of ignorance; and the ignorance would make him judge falsely, the knowledge truly, about the same thing.

What is a 'piece of ignorance'? Evidently not an object I am unacquainted with, for then it would not be in the avary at all. It can only be a false belief which I have somehow formed or been taught, such as that $\gamma + 5 = 11$. There is no reason why false beliefs should not be in the aviary; in false to avariate contain only too many. In so far as they consist of terms I am acquainted with and are things that I have learnt ad possess stored in my memory, they satisfy the description of 'pieces of knowledge'. But they are not knowledge in the sense in which whathever is knowledge must be true. That they are simply false belefs is practically stated in Theaetetu's suggestion means that what I lay hold of is an odd false belief which bring up into consciousness.

An obvious answer to Theatettis' suggestion would be this: 'You explain my making a false judgment now as my getting hold of an old false belief which I have acquired and have in my memory; but that does not explain how I could acquire that false belief originally. You merely push back to an earlier stage the same problem: how could I ever judge that 7 + 5 = 11? Socrates, however, does not raise that objection. Taking Theatettus' suggestion that I call up and affirm an old false belief, he asks how it is that I fail to recognise it as false and mistake it for a true piece of knowledge.

199E. Socr. It is not easy to disapprove of anything you say, Theaetetus; but think again about your suggestion. Sup-

'INTERCHANGE OF KNOWLEDGE' REJECTED

- 199E. pose it is as you say; then the man who lays hold of the 200, piece of ignorance will judge falsely. Is that right?
- 200. piece of ignorance will judge falsely. Is that right ? THEAET. Yes.

SOCR. But of course he will not think he is judging falsely. THEAET. Of course not.

SOCR. No; he will think he is judging truly; and his attitude of mind will be the same as if he knew the thing he is mistaken about.

THEAET. Naturally.

SOCR. So he will imagine that, as a result of his chase, he has got hold of a piece of knowledge, not a piece of ignorance. THEAET. Clearly.

SOCR. Then we have gone a long way round only to find ourselves confronted once more with our original difficulty. Our destructive critic will laugh at us. 'You wonderful

- people,' he will say, ' are we to understand that a man knows both a piece of knowledge and a piece of ignorance, and then supposes that one of these things he knows is the other which he also knows? Or does he know neither, and then judge that one of these unknown thungs is the other ? Or does he know only one, and identify this known thing with the unknown one, or the unknown one with the known ? Or are you going to tell me that there are yet further pieces of knowledge about your pieces of knowledge and ignorance, and that their owner keeps these shut up in yet another of
- c. your ridiculous aviaries or waxen blocks, knowing them so long as he possesses them, although he may not have them at hand in his mind ? On that showing you will find yourselves perpetually driven round in a circle and never getting any further.' What are we to reply to that, Theastetus ? THEAET. Really, Socrates, I don't know what we are to say. Socn. Maybe, my young friend, we have deserved this rebuke, and the argument shows that we were wrong to
- D. leave knowledge on one side and look first for an explanation of false judgment. That cannot be understood until we have a satisfactory account of the nature of knowledge. THEAET. As things now stand, Socrates, one cannot avoid that conclusion.

The critic objects that it is as hard to explain how I can fail to recognise a false belief as false and mustake it for the true belief which I possess stored in my mind, as it is to explain how I can mistake an object before my mind for another object which is in my memory. As Socrates indicates, that leads on to the question : How can I know that I know? How can I recognise knowledge when I have it and be sure that it is knowledge? This is an opposen inconclusively discussed in the *Charmades* (156 ff.). Plato refuses to pursue it here, or to carry any further the attempt to account for failse belief.

What has emerged is that the term 'knowledge' is very ambiguous. Until we have discovered all its meanings, we cannot really explain false judgment. The discussion has been fruitful an bringing to light some of these meanings. But the scope of the dialogue excludes all that Plato calls knowledge in the full sense. He breaks off here because he cannot go further without invoking the true objects of knowledge. Flato's own analysis of false judgment will be given in the Sophist, when the Forms have been brought into view.

200D–201C. Conclusion : Knowledge cannot be defined as True Belsef

It has become clear that the so-called 'pieces of knowledge' which I have learn from a teacher and stored in my memory are nothing better than true beliefs. When I recall one to consciousness my attitude of mind towards it is, as Socrates says, indistinguishable from my attitude to a false belief. This consideration leads us to the next point: the final refutation of the claim of true belief to be knowledge. My confidence in a mere belief is not grounded in reason. The teaching which consists in 'handing over' beliefs, whether true or false, is no better than the rhetorical persuasion of a barrister. Knowledge is not so gained ; and when it is gained, it cannot be shaken by persuasion.

200D. SOCR. To start all over again, then. what is one to say that knowledge is ? For surely we are not going to give up yet. THEAET. Not unless you do so.

Socr. Then tell me: what definition can we give with the least risk of contradicting ourselves?

E. THEAET. The one we tried before, Socrates. I have nothing else to suggest. Socr. What was that?

THEAET. That true belief is knowledge. Surely there can at least be no mistake in believing what is true and the consequences are always satisfactory.¹

¹ It has been pointed out in the Memo (97A) that for practical purposes it is as useful to believe that a road leads to a certain place as to know that it does Cf also Rep 506C: belief without knowledge is at the best like a blind man who takes the right road

TRUE BELIEF IS NOT KNOWLEDGE

- 200E. SOCR. Try, and you will see, Theaetetus, as the man said when he was asked if the river was too deep to ford. So here, if we go forward on our search, we may stumble upon
- 201. something that will reveal the thing we are looking for. We shall make nothing out, if we stay where we are. THEAET. True; let us go forward and see. SOCR. Well, we need not go far to see this much: you will find a whole profession to prove that true belief is not knowledge. THEAET. How so? What profession?

SOCR. The profession of those paragons of intellect known as orators and lawyers. There you have men who use their skill to produce conviction, not by instruction, but by making people believe whatever they want them to believe. You

B. can hardly imagine teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the clock, to instruct their hearers thoroughly in the true facts of a case of robbery or other violence which those hearers had not witnessed.

THEAET No, I cannot imagine that; but they can convince them.

SOCR. And by convincing you mean making them believe something.

THEAET. Of course.

SOCR. And when a jury is rightly convinced of facts which can be known only by an eye-witness, then, judging by hear-

c. say and accepting a true belief, they are judging without knowledge, although, if they find the right verdict, their conviction is correct?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOCR. But if true behef and knowledge were the same thing, the best of jurymen could never have a correct belief without knowledge. It now appears that they must be different things.

This argument is repeated in a later dialogue, the *Timaeus* (51D), where the existence of the Forms is said to follow from the distinction between knowledge or rational understanding ($vo\bar{v}_1$) and true belief. Knowledge is produced by instruction, always accompanied by a true account of the grounds ($d\lambda v h c_1 \lambda c_2 v c_2$), unshakable by persuasion, and possessed by gods and only a few among men. True belief is produced by persuasion, not based on rational grounds ($d\lambda v v c_2$), and be changed by persuasion, and is possessed by all mankind.

In our passage Socrates has not spoken of the absence of rational

grounds, such as he has in mind in the Meno and the Timacus. In both those dialogues Plato is thinking of what he himself calls knowledge. In the Meno mathematical knowledge is in question. After his experiment with the slave, Socrates remarks that the slave has now a true belief about the solution ; but will not be knowledge until he has been taken repeatedly through all the steps of the proof. He will then see for himself, with unshakable conviction, that the conclusion must be true. His belief will now be assured by reflection on the grounds '($\lambda laph_{fc} \lambda oyus \mu \phi_{f}$). Such is the 'true account of the grounds '($\lambda laph_{fc} \lambda oyus \mu \phi_{f}$). Such is the 'true account of the grounds '($\lambda laph_{fc} \lambda oyus \mu \phi_{f}$) such the *Timmaeus* refers. But here the real objects of knowledge are not to be mentioned, and Socrates is only allowed this analogous contrast between the juryman's second-hand belief and the direct 'inowledge' of the ver-witness. who has seen the fact for humself.

III. THE CLAIM OF TRUE BELIEF ACCOMPANIED BY AN ACCOUNT OR EXPLANATION TO BE KNOWLEDGE

2010-2020. Socrates states this theory as he has heard it

Theaetetus' next suggestion is that the addition of some kind of 'account' or 'explanation' (logos) 'avall convert time belief into knowledge. Vanous possible senses of 'account' are distinguished and considered, and the suggestion is finally rejected. It will appear, however, that no one of these senses is the sense which 'account' bears in the *Meno* and the *Timmuss.* Why that sense is ignored will become clear as we proceed.

- 201C. THEAET. Yes, Socrates, I have heard someone make the distinction.² I had forgotten, but now it comes back to me.
 - D. He said that true behef with the addition of an account (logo) was knowledge, while behef without an account was outside its range. Where no account could be given of a thing, it was not 'knowable'—that was the word he used —where it could, it was knowable. Sock. A good suzgestion. But tell me how he distinguished

SOCR. A good suggestion. But tell me how he distinguished these knowable things from the unknowable. It may turn out that what you were told talkes with something I have heard said.

¹ English provides no angle equivalent for *lages*, a word which covers (1) statement, spech; (2) expression, defaultion, description, formula; (3) 'tale' or enumeration, (4) explanation, account, ground A translator is forced to use now one, now another of these expressions 1 in the text the word remains ambiguous until Socrates distinguishes some of its chief measurings

Between knowledge and true belief.

III. TRUE BELIEF WITH AN ACCOUNT

- 201D. THEAET. I am not sure if I can recall that; but I think I should recognise it if I heard it stated. SOCR. If you have had a dream, let me tell you mine in return. I seem to have heard some people say that what
 - E. might be called the first elements ¹ of which we and all other things consist are such that no account can be given of them. Each of them just by itself can only be named; we cannot attribute to it anything further or say that it exists or does
- 202. not exist, for we should at once be attaching to it existence or non-existence, whereas we ought to add nothing if we are to express just it alone. We ought not even to add 'just' or 'it' or 'each' or 'alone' or 'this'³, or any other of a host of such terms. These terms, running loose about the place, are attached to everything, and they are distinct from the things to which they are applied. If it were possible for an element to be expressed in any formula exclusively belonging to it, no other terms ought to enter into that expression, but in fact there is no formula in which any
 - B. element can be expressed. it can only be named, for a name is all there is that belongs to it. But when we come to things composed of these elements, then, just as these things are complex, so the names are combined to make a description (logos), a description being precisely a combination of names. Accordingly, elements are inexplicable and unknowable, but they can be perceived, while complexes (syllables) are knowable and explicable, and you can have a true notion of them. So when a man rets, hold of the true notion of
 - c. something without an account, his mind does think truly of it, but he does not know it; for if one cannot give and receive an account of a thing, one has no knowledge of that thing. But when he has also got hold of an account, all this becomes possible to hum and he is fully equipped with knowledge.

Does that version represent the dream as you heard it, or not?

THEAET. Perfectly.

The theory here put forward was certainly never held by Plato himself. On the other hand, it is obviously a philosophic theory,

¹ στοιχτέα meant letters of the alphabet, or the ' rudiments' of a subject Thus is said to be its first occurrence as applied to the elements of physical things Presently *anulafiai* (syllables) is used for the complex things composed of elements

² Buttmann's conjecture τδ 'τδ' for τοθτο (here and at 205C) may be supported by Sopk. 239A. See note there (p 207).

which would not occur to common sense. It must belong to some contemporary of Socrates or Plato, whom Plato does not choose to name.¹ Possiby, Socrates is represented as 'dreaming 'it because the theory was really advanced after this death. There seems to be no evidence sufficient to identify the author.¹

The theory may be considered under the three heads : (a) Things ; (b) Language ; (c) Cognition.

(a) Things.—The only things recognised are 'ourselves and everything else', i.e. concrete individual natural objects. These are composed of simple unanalysable elements. There is no question of unmaterial things, for the elements are said to be perceptible. This also shows that atoms are not intended. Since no examples are given, we cannot say whether 'elements' means simple prunary substances, such as gold, or simple qualities, like yellow, or even whether the author drew this distinction. He may have meant any simple constituent that we should name in enumerating all the parts we can perceave and distinguish in a complex thing.

(b) Linguage.—The element, being sample, has a name only. We can refer to or indicate it by this name. But it 'has no logs'. This appears to cover two meanings which we should distinguish. (c) We cannot make any statement about the element, such as that it exists. If we are to speak of it alone, we must not add, or ascribe, to it any second 'name' (word). The element is completely indicated by utterns the single word 'gold' or 'yellow'. We may not even say 'thus is yellow', since 'thus' and 'is' expresses something different from the simple name 'yellow', which already expresses all there is to be expressed and all that I perceive. Also, 'this' and 'is' do not belong exclusively to the element itself is unanalysable. The nature is simple and no 'account' consisting of several names (words) can be eiven of it.

The definition of *logos* as a 'combination of names (words)' will cover statements about a thing as well as the definition of a definable name. But probably the author was not thinking about defining names (which he would not rank among complex 'things ') but only about describing things. The simple name indicates the elementary

¹ Theaststus (at 201C) and Socrates (2023, rds elmosra) both speak of the author in the singular.

⁴ The case for Antsthemes was most fully stated by Gilleppe (Area, Gesch Paktor, xxv, 479 ff.; xxvu, 17 ff.). See also Ross, Mstaph. of Arustale 1, 346. A Lava (Rows Hust Pholes, 1930, pp 16 ff.), among others, has disputed this attribution. Prof G. C. Field has given a judicoos account of Antsthemes in Patto and His Contemporaries (1930), 150 ff. I can see little resemblance between the doctimes and the stomism attributed to Explantus, who is suggested by Burnets and Prof Taylor. part ; the full description or 'account' of a complex thing consists of as many names as there are elements. All statements about the thing he would regard as giving it names, each of which should belong to one of its parts. In the Sophssi (p. 333) we shall meet again with this view of what was later called 'predication'. The effect is that the distinction between the definition and other statements about the thing is not drawn; and this appears to be the case in our passage.

(c) Cognition.—The theory distinguishes between perception (αλοθησις), a true notion (άληθης δόξα), and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη).

Of the element we have only a simple direct perception, not 'knowledge'. Of the complex thing we have at first a true notion (alrong oofa) without a logos. Logos, as the later argument shows, means enumerating by name the simple components of the complex When I have done this, I have ' given an account ' of the complex thing and am now said to 'know' it. I have expressed what the thing is by giving a list of all its simple parts. But it is hard to be sure what is meant by the 'true dofa' which I have before I enumerate the parts Presumably it means a complex unanalysed presentation of the whole object In defence of the translation true notion ' it may be remarked that Plato uses the phrase ' get hold of the true doga of a thing without a logos'.1 'Notion' or ' impression' seems to be meant. It may be conjectured that such a notion would be expressed by a definable name, such as 'man', or (to use Socrates' later illustration, 207A) ' wagon'. Possibly $\delta\delta\xi a$ includes the judgment ' That is a man'. This judgment may be true (perhaps, must be true) ; but I shall not have knowledge till I have enumerated all the parts of the object, which is the same thing as defining the name.

The theory mentions only *inve* notions, not false ones. It is not unlikely that the author held that every notion is true. If the notion is composed of simple perceptions, each of which is an impression directly given by some simple property of the thing, and if there can be no error in the perceptions, there can be none in the complex notion. The theory may hold that there must be just that thing I perceive or have a notion of; otherwise I should be perceiving something else or nothing at all. It is quite possible that the author of the theory agreed (as Antisthenes did) with those who denied the possibility of false beliefs and statements.

¹ 2028. όταν άναν λόγου την άληθή δόξαν τινός τις λάβη We have already noted (p 119) Plato's use of δοζίζαν with an accusative for 'thinking of a thing '. Again δχων δόξαν περί σοῦ (203Α, 1) and σẻ δόξαζον (203Β, 2) are used interchangeably for 'having a notion of you '.

P.T.K.

2020-2060. The Theory criticised for making Elements unknowable

For the understanding of the following argument, it is essential to grasp that the theory is materialistic, in the sense that the only 'things' it recognises as the objects of any sort of cognition are concrete individual things, and the perceptible parts of which such things are aggregates.

Socrates first disposes of the theory on its own ground, where the statement that elements are unknowable proves fatal.

- 202C. SOCR. So this dream finds favour and you hold that a true notion with the addition of an account is knowledge? THEAET. Precisely.
 - D. Socz. Can it be, Thesetetus, that, all in a moment, we have found out to-day what so many wise men have grown old m seeking and have not found ? THEART. I, at any rate, am satisfied with our present statement, Socrates. Socz. Yes, the statement just in itself may well be satisfactory; for how can there ever be knowledge without an account and right behef?¹ But there is one point in the theory as stated that does not find favour with me. THEART. What is that? Socz. What might be considered its most ingenous
 - E. feature: it says that the elements are unknowable, but whatever us complex ('syllables') can be known. THEAET. Is not that nght? Sock. We must find out. We hold as a sort of hostage for the theory the illustration in terms of which it was stated. THEAET. Namely? Sock. Letters—the elements of writing—and syllables. That and nothing else was the prototype the author of this theory had in mind, don't you think? THEAET. Yes, it was.
- 203. Sock. Let us take up that illustration, then, and put it to the question, or rather put the question to ourselves : did we learn our letters on that principle or not ? a To begin with: is it true that an account can be given of syllables, but not of letters ? THEAFT. It may be so.

¹ This may mean that the formula 'true belief with an account' is a satisfactory description at least of some knowledge, provided that the right meaning be given to logos, not any of the meanings discussed in the following context.

Socrates goes back to this question at 206A.

SOCRATES' 'DREAM' REFUTED

- 203. SOCR. I agree, decidedly. Suppose you are asked about the first syllable of 'Socrates': 'Explain, Theaetetus; what is SO? ' How will you answer? THEAET. S and O. SOCR. And you have there an account of the syllable? THEAET. Yes.
 - B. SOCE. Go on, then; give me a similar account of S. THEART. But how can one state the elements of an element? The fact is, of course, Socrates, that S is one of the consonants, nothing but a nouse, like a hissing of the tongue; while B not only has no articulate sound but is not even a noise, and the same is true of most of the letters. So they may well be said to be unceylicable, when the clearest of them, the seven vowels themselves, have only a sound, and no sort of account can be given of them.¹ SOCK. So far, then, we have reached a right conclusion

about knowledge.

THEAET. Apparently.

The 'right conclusion' is that, if logos means an account or explanation consisting in the enumeration of the components of a complex thing, we must finally reach simple parts which cannot be so 'explained'. (So in mathematics the ultimate terms used in definitions must be indefinable.) But if such analysis is to yield knowledge, these ultimate components must be knowable. The weak point of the theory is that it says they are unknowable, and can only be perceived. So the process of acquiring knowledge will be a process of analysing a complex which is not yet known into components which cannot be known.

The argument exposing this weakness is in the form of a dilemma. A syllable (complex) must be either (r) the mere aggregate of the letters, or (2) a single entity which comes into being when the letters are combined and vanishes when they are separated. Socrates easily disposes of the first alternative.

203C. Socz. But now, have we been right in declaring that the letter cannot be known, though the syllable can? TREAST. That seems all right. Socz. Take the syllable then: do we mean by that both the two letters or (if there are more than two) all the letters?

¹ At Philobus 18_B we find the same classification : (1) rouses (φωνήσντα), (2) constonants (άφωνα, with out articulate sound), (3) muses (άφθογγα, which are not even noises).

- 203C. Or do we mean a single entity that comes into existence from the moment when they are put together ? THEAFT. I should say we mean all the letters. SOCE. Then take the case of the two letters S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. Anyone who knows that syllable knows both the letters, doesn't he?
 - D. THEAFT. Naturally. Soca. So he knows the S and the O. THEAFT. Yes. Soca. But has he, then, no knowledge of *ach* letter, so that he knows both without knowing either? THEAFT. That is a monstrous absurdity, Socrates. Soca. And yet, if it is necessary to know each of two things before one can know both, he simply must know the letters first, if he is ever to know the syllable ; and so our fine theory will vanish and leave us in the lurch.
 - E. THEAET. With a startling suddenness. SOCR. Yes, because we are not keeping a good watch upon it.

This argument is not verbal, but quite fair. If the syllable is exactly the same thing as its two letters, then to know the syllable is to know the letters It may be added that the theory distinguished knowledge from perception, and evidently regarded knowledge as superior. Since the syllable is nothing more than the aggregate of the two letters, of each of which I have a perception, 'the addition of the account' which was to yield knowledge can un fact only lead to two perceptions, side by side, of two unknowable objects.

(2) The second alternative—that the syllable is something other than the aggregate of the letters—requires some more subtle distinctions.

203E. Sock. (continues). Perhaps we ought to have assumed that the syllable was not the letters but a single entity that arises out of them with a unitary character of its own and different from the letters.

THEAET. By all means. Indeed, it may well be so rather than the other way.

SOCR. Let us consider that. We ought not to abandon an imposing theory in this poor-spirited manner. THEAET. Certamly not.

204. SOCR. Suppose, then, it is as we say now: the syllable arises as a single entity from any set of letters which can

SOCRATES' 'DREAM' REFUTED

204. be combined 1; and that holds of every complex, not only in the case of letters. THEAET. By all means. SOCK. In that case, it must have no parts. THEAET. Why ? SOCK. Because, if a thing has parts, the whole thing must be the same as all the parts.

The term 'whole' is here limited to mean a thing composed of parts into which it can be divided up, in such a way that the parts so arrived at account for the whole thing Thus the sum of money called a shilling can be divided into twelve pence which completely represent its value Nothing evaporates in the process of division. So the whole here is said to be exactly equivalent to ' all the parts '. Accordingly, if the syllable or complex is something over and above the letters, the letters will not be parts of that something (and it can have no other parts); so it will not be the ' whole '. From this statement we might pass straight to the conclusion (205c). Since a syllable is a unitary thing, having no parts into which it can be analysed, it is simple, inexplicable, and unknowable for the same reason as the letter. This is the conclusion which completes the dilemma. It is fatal to the theory, if we keep to the theory's own assumptions. But here Socrates turns aside to meet the objection that a whole consisting of parts may not be simply the 'sum' of those parts (ro nar) or ' all the parts ' (ra navra), but a single entity arising out of them and distinct from them. It is true that even a ugsaw puzzle, when completed, has a unity as forming a picture, which disappears when the parts are separated. But Socrates is ustified in arguing that that resulting entity is not properly described as ' the whole '. It is an additional element which supervenes on the putting together of the parts which make the whole. He urges that the whole cannot be distinguished from the 'sum'. which itself cannot be distinguished from 'all the parts'.

204A. Socr. (continues). Or do you say that a whole likewise ³ is a single entity that arcses out of the parts and is different from the aggregate of the parts ? THEAET. Yes, I do. Socr. Then do you regard the sum (r∂ nār) as the same thing as the whole, or are they different ?

" 'likewise ' (col), s.s as well as the syllable, of which this has been said.

¹ ситорногто́тин is not 'harmonicus' It means that only some letters will 'fit together' to form a syllable : one of them must always be a vowel (Soph. 253A) Other combinations of letters, s g two or three consonants without a vowel, are impossible

204B. THEAET. I am not at all clear : but you tell me to answer boldly, so I will take the risk of saving they are different. SOCR. Your boldness. Theaetetus, is right ; whether your answer is so we shall have to consider. THEAET. Yes. certainly. Socr. Well, then, the whole will be different from the sum. according to our present view. THEAET. Yes. SOCR. Well but now, is there any difference between the sum and all the things it includes ? For instance, when we say, 'one, two, three, four, five, six', or 'twice three' or c. 'three times two 'or 'four and two 'or 'three and two and one', are we in all these cases expressing the same thing or different things ? THEAET. The same. SOCR. Just six, and nothing else? THEATT Ves SOCR. In fact, in each form of expression we have expressed all the six 1 THEAST. Yes. SOCR. But when we express them all, is there no sum ² that we express? THEAET. There must be. Socr. And is that sum anything else than 'six'? THEAST. No. D. SOCR. Then, at any rate in the case of things that consist of a number, the words 'sum' and 'all the things' denote the same thing. THEAET. So it seems. SOCR. Let us put our argument, then, in this way. The number of (square feet in) an acre, and the acre are the same thing, aren't they ? THEAET. Yes. SOCR. And so too with the number of (feet in) a mile ? THEAET. Yes. SOCR. And again with the number of (soldiers in) an army and the army, and so on, in all cases. The total number is the same as the total thing in each case, THEAET. Yes. E. SOCR. But the number of (units in) any collection of things cannot be anything but parts of that collection ?

1 Reading márra rà & with BT

³ The word 'sum' (πŵ) here is necessary to the argument. The manuscripts have πάλω

SOCRATES' 'DREAM' REFUTED

204E, THEAET, No.

SOCR. Now, anything that has parts consists of parts. THEAET. Evidently.

SOCR. But all the parts, we have agreed, are the same as the sum, if the total number is to be the same as the total thing.

THEAET. Yes.

SOCR. The whole, then, does not consist of parts; for if it were all the parts it would be a sum.

THEAET. Apparently not.

SOCR. But can a part be a part of anything but its whole? THEAET. Yes; of the sum.

205. Socr. You make a gallant fight of it, Theaetetus. But does not 'the sum ' mean precisely something from which nothing is missing ?

THEAET. Necessarily.

Socn. And is not a whole exactly the same thing—that from which nothing whatever is missing? Whereas, when something is removed, the thing becomes neither a whole nor a sum : it changes at the same moment from being both to being neither.

THEAET. I think now that there is no difference between a sum and a whole.

Plato is not denving that there are wholes which contain an additional element that arises when the parts are put together and disappears when they are separated. He was aware of this,1 but his point is that such an additional element is not what we mean by 'the whole'. It may also be remarked that he is arguing within the limits of the theory he is criticising. That theory holds that the only things we can perceive or know or talk about are concrete individual things in nature, complex or simple, and that a complex thing is no more than an aggregate of simple things or elements, which can be enumerated in the only account we can give of it. When the enumeration is complete we know all that we can know about the thing. So the whole is nothing but the sum of its parts. A man is, for this theory, a trunk and a head and limbs. There is no substance or essence ' Man', over and above the separable 'material' parts, such as Plato and Aristotle would recognise and make the subject of a definition (logos) by genus and specific difference.

Having ruled out the suggestion that ' the whole ' can be a single entity distinct from all the parts, Socrates can now return to the

¹ Cf Aristotle's discussion, inspired by the Theasistus, at Melaph. 2, 17.

argument interrupted at 204A, namely the second alternative : that the syllable or complex is a unity over and above its letters or elements. He can now reaffirm the statement there made, that if the syllable is such a unity, it is not a whole and can have no parts.

205A. SOCR. Well, we were saying—were we not ?—that when a thing has parts, the whole or sum will be the same thing as all the parts ? THEAET. Certanly.

SOCR. To go back, then, to the point I was trying to make

B. just now; if the syllable is not the same thing as the letters, does it not follow that it cannot have the letters as parts of itself; otherwse, being the same thing as the letters, it would be netther more nor less knowable than they are? TREAET. Yes.

SOCR. And it was to avoid that consequence that we supposed the syllable to be different from the letters. THEAET. Yes.

Socr. Well, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you name any things, other than its letters, that are parts of a syllable?

THEAET. Certainly not, Socrates. If I admitted that it had any parts, it would surely be absurd to set aside the letters and look for parts of any other kind.

c. SocR. Then, on the present showing, a syllable will be a thing that is absolutely one and cannot be divided into parts of any sort?¹

THEAET. Apparently.

Sock. Do you remember then, my dear Theatetus, our accepting a short while ago a statement that we thought satisfactory: that no account could be given of the primary things of which other things are composed, because each of them, taken just by itself, was incomposite, and that it was not correct to attribute even 'existence' to it, or to call it 'this', on the ground that these words expressed different things that were extraneous to it; and this was the ground for making the primary thing inexpluable and unknowable?

THEAET. I remember.

D. SOCR. Then is not exactly this, and nothing else, the ground of its being simple in nature and indivisible into parts? I can see no other.

 1 warrings, put first for emphasis, should be construed with μla re idea dulptores.

SOCRATES' 'DREAM' REFUTED

205D. THEAET. Evidently there is no other.

Soca. Then has not the syllable now turned out to be a thing of the same sort, if it has no parts and is a unitary thing?

THEAET. Certainly.

Soca. To conclude, then : if, on the one hand, the syllable is the same thing as a number of letters and is a whole with the letters as its parts, then the letters must be neither more nor less knowable and explicable than syllables, since we made out that all the parts are the same thing as the whole.

E. THEAET. True.

SOCR. But if, on the other hand, the syllable is a unity without parts, syllable and letter likewise are equally incapable of explanation and unknowable. The same reason will make them so.

THEAET. I see no way out of that.

SOCR. If so, we must not accept this statement: that the syllable can be known and explained, the letter cannot. THEAET. No, not if we hold by our argument.

Putting aside the illustration from letters, it has now been established that knowledge cannot be gained, as the theory holds, by analysing a concrete thing, presented in a complex notion, into its sample parts, each presented in a simple perception which is not knowledge.

It is finally pointed out that the illustration itself tells against the theory. Our knowledge of letters must actually be clearer than our knowledge of syllables, whereas the theory evidently regards our perception of elements as inferior to the knowledge we are alleged to gain by giving an account of the complex.

- 206. Socz. And agam, would not your own experience in learning your letters rather incline you to accept the opposite view? THEART. What view do you mean? Socz. This: that all the time you were learning you were doing nothing else but trying to distinguish by sight or hearing each letter by itself, so as not to be confused by any arrangement of them in spoken or written words. THEART. That is quite true. Socz. And in the music school the height of accomplish-
 - B. ment lay precisely in being able to follow each several

206B. note and tell which string it belonged to; and notes, as everyone would agree, are the elements of music.¹ TIERET. Precisely. Sock. Then, if we are to argue from our own experience of elements and complexes to other cases, we shall conclude that elements and movelexes to other cases, we shall conclude that elements in general yield knowledge that is much clearer than knowledge of the complex and more effective for a complete grasp of anythmp we seek to know. If anyone tells us that the complex is by its nature knowable, while the element is unknowable, we shall suprose that.

whether he intends it or not, he is playing with us.

THEAET. Certainly.

206c-E. Three possible meanings of 'account'. (1) Expression of thought in speech (irrelevant)

The refutation of the theory ' dreamt ' by Socrates is now complete. It turns upon the allegation that the simple and unanalysable is unknowable. But Theaetetus' suggestion that knowledge is true judgment or belief combined with an account or explanation may have other meanings not involving this fatal flaw. Socrates accordingly turns to consider these possible meanings. The discussion still proceeds, however, on certain assumptions of the refuted theory, namely that the only things to be known are concrete individual things, and that knowledge accordingly must consist in giving some account of such things. This limitation is in accordance with the scope of the whole dialogue, which asks whether knowledge can be extracted from the world of concrete natural things, vielding perceptions and complex notions, without invoking other factors. The three meanings of logos now considered are determined by these assumptions, which exclude Plato's own view, that the objects of which knowledge must give an account are not concrete individuals but objects of thought, and that the simpler terms in which the account must be stated are not material parts but higher concepts.

206c. Soca. Indeed we might, I think, find other arguments to prove that point. But we must not allow them to distract our attention from the question before us, namely, what can really be meant by saying that an account added to true belief yields knowledge m its most perfect form.

¹ The appeal to music and (earlier) to numbers and measures leads no support to Campbell's suggestion that the theory is due to 'some Pythagorean ' (p. xxxix). These examples are brought forward, not by the author of the theory, but Socrates in refuting it.

(1) EXPRESSION OF THOUGHT IN SPEECH

- 206C. THEAET. Yes, we must see what that means. SOCR. Well then, what is this term 'account' intended to convey to us? I think it must mean one of three things. THEAET. What are they?
 - D. Soca. The first will be giving overt expression to one's thought by means of vocal sound with names and vertes, casting an image of one's notion on the stream that flows through the lips, like a reflection in a mirror or in water. Do you agree that expression of that sort is an 'account'?

THEAET. I do. We certainly call that expressing ourselves in speech ($\lambda \delta y e w$).

SOCR On the other hand, that is a thing that anyone can do more or less readily. If a man is not born deaf or dumb, he can signify what he thinks on any subject. So in this sense anyone whatever who has a correct

E. notion evidently will have it 'with an account', and there will be no place left anywhere for a correct notion apart from knowledge. THEAET. True.

Leges here does not mean a' verbal definition 'such as a dictionary gives, but simply 'statement', 'speech'—the utterance of the notion or judgment in our minds. This common meaning of the word is mentioned only for the sake of clearness. It is obviously not what Theaetetus intended.

206E-208B. (2) Enumeration of elementary parts. This will not convert a true notion into knowledge

The second meaning is the enumeration of elementary parts. This is now considered on its own ments, apart from the further feature which proved fatal to the earlier theory, namely, the doctrine that an element must be unknowable.

- 206E. SOCR. Then we must not be too ready to charge the author of the definition of knowledge now before us ¹ with talking nonsense. Perhaps that is not what he meant. He may have meant : being able to reply to the question,
- 207. what any given thing is, by enumerating its elements. THEAET. For example, Socrates ? Socra. For example, Hesiod says about a wagon, 'In a wagon are a hundred pieces of wood.' I could not name

¹ The author of the definition originally quoted by Theastetus (201D), who is now regarded as not responsible for the doctrine, in the theory 'dreamt' by Socrates, that elements are unknowable

- 207. them all; no more, I imagine, could you. If we were asked what a wagon is, we should be content if we could mention wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke. THEAET. Certainly. Socr. But I dare say he would think us just as ridiculous as if we replied to the question about your own name by
 - a. telling the syllables. We might think and express ourselves correctly, but we should be absurd if we fancied ourselves to be grammarans and able to give such an account of the name Theaetetus as a grammaran would offer. He would say it is impossible to give a scientific account of anything, short of adding to your true notion a complete catalogue of the elements, as, I think, was said earlier.

THEAET. Yes, it was.

SOCR. In the same way, he would say, we may have a correct notion of the wagon, but the man who can give a complete statement of its nature by going through those

c. hundred parts has thereby added an account to his correct notion and, in place of mere belief, has arrived at a technical knowledge of the wagon's nature, by going through all the elements in the whole.

THEAET. Don't you approve, Socrates ?

Sock. Tell me if you approve, my friend, and whether you accept the view that the complete enumeration of elements is an account of any given thing, whereas description in terms of syllables or of any larger unit still leaves it unaccounted for. Then we can look into the matter further.

b. accounted for. Inen we can look into the matter further. THEAET. Well, I do accept that. Socc. Do you think, then, that anyone has knowledge of whatever it may be, when he thinks that one and the same thing is a part sometimes of one thing, sometimes of a different thing; or again when he believes now one and now another thing to be part of one and the same thing ? THEAET. Certainly not.

SOCR. Have you forgotten, then, that when you first began learning to read and write, that was what you and your schoolfellows did?

THEAST. Do you mean, when we thought that now one E. letter and now another was part of the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable, sometimes into another ? SOCR. That is what I mean.

THEAET. Then I have certainly not forgotten; and I do

(2) ENUMERATION OF ELEMENTS

- 207E. not think that one has reached knowledge so long as one is in that condition. Socz. Well then, if at that stage you are writing 'Theaetetus' and you think you ought to write T and H and E and do so, and again when you are trying to write 'Theo-
- 208. dorus', you think you ought to write T and E and do so, can we say that you know the first syllable of your two names? THEAET. No; we have just agreed that one has not

knowledge so long as one is in that condition.

SOCR. And there is no reason why a person should not be in the same condition with respect to the second, third, and fourth syllables as well?

THEAET. None whatever.

SOCR. Can we, then, say that whenever in writing ' Theaetetus' he puts down all the letters in order, then he is in possession of the complete catalogue of elements together with correct behef?

THEAET. Obviously.

B. SOCR. Being still, as we agree, without knowledge, though his beliefs are correct?

THEAET. Yes.

SOCR. Although he possesses the 'account' in addition to right belief. For when he wrote he was in possession of the catalogue of the elements, which we agreed was the 'account'.

Тнелет. Тгие.

SOCR. So, my friend, there is such a thing as right belief together with an account, which is not yet entitled to be called knowledge.

THEAET. I am afraid so.

SOCR. Then, apparently, our idea that we had found the perfectly true definition of knowledge was no better than a golden dream.

Socrates has now disposed of the theory that the addition of a complete enumeration of elements to a correct, but previously unanalysed, notion of a complex thing will convert true beltef into knowledge. Even if we reject the doctrine that the element is unknowable, and suppose it to be at least as knowable as the complex, still the complete enumeration may fail to give us anything better than true beltef. The analysis, though it be carried as far as possible, will not yield knowledge of any different kind from the true notion we started with, or the correct beltes about

the parts of a wagon which stopped short at five parts instead of all the hundred. So the schoolboy may have a correct belief about every letter in the name' Theastetus' and write it correctly, without having that assured knowledge which would save him from writing it incorrectly on another occasion.

If we go behind the illustration and beyond the limits of the theory that is being criticised, we see further into Plato's mind. In the Meno the slave who is ignorant of geometry is led through a problem till he reaches the correct solution. But Scorates points out that he still has only true belief, not knowledge, because he does not understand the proof or see how the conclusion necessarily follows from the premisses. Even if he were taken back through the earlier propositions, axioms, and definitions to the primitive indefinables, he might still possess no more than an exhaustve catalogue of true beliefs leading to the solution. He will not know even this much of geometry until he has grasped the necessary connexion which will make all these beliefs abiding and unshakable. All this, however, lies outside the presuppositions of the theory under examination, which contemplates only the analysis of a concrete thing into elementary parts.

208B-210B. (3) The statement of a distinguishing mark. This will not convert a true notion into knowledge

Socrates now suggests a third possible meaning of *logos*—' being able to state some mark by which the thing in question differs from everything else'. Will this addition convert true belief into knowledge? *Logos* will now mean the 'account' of a thing given by a description which serves to distinguish the thing we wish to indicate from all other things.

2088. SOCR. (continues). Or shall we not condemn the theory C. yet? Perhaps the meaning to be given to 'account' is not this, but the remaining one of the three, one of which we said must be intended by anyone who defines knowledge as correct belief together with an account.

THEAST. A good 'reminder; there is still one meaning left. The first was what might be called the image of thought in spoken sound; and the one we have just discussed was going all through the elements to arrive at the whole. What is the third?

SOCR. The meaning most people would give : being able to name some mark by which the thing one is asked about differs from everything else.

THEAET. Could you give me an example of such an account of a thing?

- 208D. SOCE. Take the sun as an example. I dare say you will be satisfied with the account of it as the brightest of the heavenly bodies that go round the earth. THEAET. Certainly. SoCE. Let me explain the point of this example. It is to illustrate what we were just saying; that if you get hold of the difference distinguishing any given thing from all others, then, so some people say, you will have an 'account' of it; whereas, so long as you fix upon something common to other things, your account will embrace all the things that share it.
 - 2. THEAST. I understand. I agree that what you describe may fairly be called an 'account'. Socz. And if, besides a right notion about a thing, whatever it may be, you also grasp its difference from all other things, you will have arrived at knowledge of what, till then, you had only a notion of. THEAST. We do say that, certainly.

Soca. Really, Theaetctus, now I come to look at this statement at close quarters, it is lake a scene-painting : I cannot make it out at all, though, so long as I kept at a distance, there seemed to be some sense in it. THEAFT. What do you mean? Why so?

209. SOCR. I will explain, if I can. Suppose I have a correct notion about you; if I add to that the account of you, then, we are to understand, I know you. Otherwise I have only a notion.

THEAET. Yes.

SOCR. And 'account' means putting your differentness ¹ into words.

THEAET. Yes.

SOCR. So, at the time when I had only a notion, my mind did not grasp any of the points in which you differ from others?

THEAET. Apparently not.

SOCR. Then I must have had before my mind one of those common things which belong to another person as much as to you.

B. THEAET. That follows.

SOCR. But look here ! If that was so, how could I possibly

¹ Plato seems deluberately to avoid the term &sapood here and henceforward (though it occurred at ao8b), perhaps because of its technical use for the differentia of a species, which is irrelevant to this context dispository is a Platonic word which occurs again at Rep. 3672 209B. be having a notion of you rather than of anyone else ? Suppose I was thinking: Theatertus is one who is a man and has a nose and eyes and a mouth and so forth, enumerating every part of the body. Will thunking in that way result in my thinking of Theatertus rather than of Theodorus or, as they say, of the man in the street ? THEAT: How should it ?

Socr. Well, now suppose I think not merely of a man

c. with a nose and eyes, but of one with a snub nose and prominent eyes, once more shall I be having a notion of you any more than of myself or anyone else of that description ?

THEAET. No.

Soca. In fact, there will be no notion of Theaetetus in my mind, I suppose, mult the particular snubness has stamped and registered within me a record dustinct from all the other cases of snubness that I have seen; and so with every other part of you. Then, if I meet you tomorrow, that trait will revve my memory and give me a correct notion about you.

THEAET. Quite true.

D. SOCR. If that is so, the correct notion of anything must itself include the differentness of that thing.

THEAST. Evidently.

Soca. Then what meaning is left for getting hold of an 'account' in addition to the correct notion? If, on the one hand, it means adding the notion of how a thing differs from other things, such an injunction is simply absurd. THEART. How so?

SOCR. When we have a correct notion of the way in which certain things differ from other things, it tells us to add a correct notion of the way in which they differ from other

2. things. On this showing, the most vicious of cricles would be nothing to this injunction. It might better deserve to be called the sort of direction a blind man might give: to tell us to get hold of something we already have, in order to get to know something we are already thinking of, suggests a state of the most absolute darkness.

THEAET. Whereas, if ——? The supposition you made just now implied that you would state some alternative; what was it?¹

¹ Reading el δέ γε — τί τυνδή ώς έρῶν < ξτ.> ὑπέθου; The objection to reading (with Barnet and others) είπε δη τί νυνδή ώς έρῶν ἐπόθου is that Socrates' last question (το öν προσλαβέν . . είξι ; 209D, 4) did not suggest that he had

(3) A DISTINGUISHING MARK

- 209E. SOCR. If the direction to add an 'account' means that we are to get to *know* the differentness, as opposed to merely having a notion of it, this most admirable of all definitions of knowledge will be a pretty business, because
- 210. 'getting to know ' means acquiring knowledge, doesn't it ? THEAST. Yes. Socre So, apparently, to the question, What is knowledge ? our definition will reply: 'Correct belief together with knowledge of a differentness'; for, according to it, ' adding an account' will come to that. THEAST. So it seems. Socre. Yes; and when we are inquiring after the nature

Sock. Tes, and when we are inquiring after the nature of knowledge, nothing could be silier than to say that it is correct belief together with a *knowledge* of differentness or of anything whatever.

So, Theaetetus, neither perception, nor true belief, nor B. the addition of an 'account ' to true belief can be knowledge. THEAET. Apparently not

Some critics have imagined that the above argument is concerned with the definition of species by genus and specific diffeence, and even that Plato is here criticisum humseli. But it is clearly presumed throughout that the object to be defined and known is a concrete individual lining—' ourselves and other things ', Hesiod's wagon, a person (Theatetus), the sun. The 'differentness' is a perceptible individual peculiarity, such as 'this particular snubness which I have seen', distinguishing this individual person from other individuals, not a specific difference distinguishing a species from other species and common to all individuals of the species.

someting more to say What did suggest thus was the si $\mu h = \{aop, ..., tmplying that an alternative supportents (at 34) was to follow—the supportens stated in Socrates' next speech (at rd <math>\lambda dyser ... 2005, 6$) Badham saw thus and triet to restore the necessary sense to Thesettest' angury by resking if $\lambda dy = -\pi i \ n s k dy de fraper befflow ; 'Marreas II - what was it you suggested instances and the alternative ?' The sense substrat, if at could be got out of the strate state strate it... and the supportence would be required. The sense substrat, if at could be got out of year an explicit suggestion for a person, cannot mean to mply something not stated at all ; and the unperside would be required.$

The reading I propose (*Class. Rev.* xiv (1930), 114) means: 'Whereas if — what was it (the "whereas if ') that your supportion just now ("if on the one hand ") implied ($\dot{\omega}_{0}$) that you were going on to state ?' For eleve?' $\dot{\sigma}_{1}$, cf. Soph. 07. 748, $\dot{\sigma}_{1}$ et $\dot{\sigma}_{1}$, $\dot{\sigma}_{2}$ by $\dot{\sigma}_{1}$ for $\dot{\sigma}_{1}$, $\dot{\sigma}_{1}$

The rather obscure form of the question is (like the rest of these concluding pages) in the manner of the Sophist; : g 217A, r6 µ whora wi rö roky ri mepi airaw hamoophis dolodu haroichts ; 226C, rö rokw airaw mépi fouhndeis öphärau mepadshynara moodels raire aard máraw foor ;

P.T.K.

Socrates argues : Suppose I have a correct notion of Theaetetus. If um notion contains only trats he shares with all or some other men, then it is not a notion of him any more than of them. It must include his individual and peculiar characteristics. Thus my notion of his individual 'differentness' is already included in my notion of just that person, and I am acquainted with that differentness in just the same way as I am with his common characteristics. It is absurd to tell me to add at to my notion of the person, as a whole or to suppose that such an addition could convert a correct notion into some higher kand of cognition called 'howledge'.

The instance of the sun recalls Anstolie's argument that it is impossible to define an individual sensible substance.¹ A definition must consist of words whose established meanings can all apply to other actual or possible individuals. Even if you take an eternal substance which is in fact unique, such as the sun or moon, it is still impossible to define it. Some attributes of the sun (going round the earth, invisible at night) might be removed, and yet the sun would still be the sun Any description such as 'the brightset of the heavenly bodies' must consist of attributes that might belong to another subject. There can, at any time, be only one body which is 'the brightest', but if a brighter body should appear in the heavens, the description would transfer tiself to that.

"There is no question here of the definition of species, which are definable precisely because no two species are conceptually identical, as any number of individuals may be. The whole discussion is confined to the level of the theory 'dreamt 'by Socrates, which contemplates only our acquaintance with individual sensible things. The point is that we cannot get 'knowledge', supposed to be somehow superior to mere behefs or notions, by adding a logor in any of the senses considered. These senses appear to exhaust the possible ways in which an 'account' can be given of an individual thing. (1) We may name it (express our notion of it in speech); (a) we may enumerate the material parts of which it is composed; or (3) we may point it out by a description which will serve to distinguish the thing we indicate from other things. But none of these 'accounts' will yield any 'clearer' or more certain kind of cognition than we started with.

The Platonst will draw the necessary inference. True knowledge has for its object things of a different order—not sensible things, but intelligible Forms and truths about them. Such objects are necessarily unique; they do not become and perish or change

¹ Metaph z, 15 Aristotle took the example of the Sun from our passage and evidently understood Plato's meaning correctly.

EPILOGUE

in any respect. Hence we can know them and eternal truths about them. The *Theastetiss* leads to this old conclusion by demonstrating the failure of all attempts to extract knowledge from sensible objects.

210B-D. Epilogue. All these attempts to define knowledge have failed.

It only remains to point out that all these attempts have failed and no others are forthcoming.

- 210B SOCR. Are we in labour, then, with any further child, my firend, or have we brought to burth all we have to say about knowledge ? THEAET. Indeed we have, and for my part I have already, thanks to you, given utterance to more than I had in me. SocR. All of which our midwife's skill pronounces to be mere wind-eggs and not worth the rearing ? THEAET. Undoubtedly. SocR. Then supposing you should ever henceforth try to to some the source of th
 - c. conceive afresh, Theaeletus, if you succeed, your embryo thoughts will be the better as a consequence of to-day's scrutiny; and if you remain barren, you will be gentler and more agreeable to your companions, having the good sense not to fancy you know what you do not know For that, and no more, is all that my art can effect; nor have I any of that knowledge possessed by all the great and admirable men of our own day or of the past. But thus mudwife's art is a gift from haven; my mother had it for women,
 - D. and I for young men of a generous spirit and for all in whom beauty dwells.¹

Now I must go to the portico of the King Archon to meet the indictment which Meletus has drawn up against me. But to morrow morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.

¹ such as Theaetetus has, rather than bodily beauty. Cf. 1852.

THE SOPHIST

216A-218D. Introductory Conversation

THE introductory conversation announces the subject of the discussion begun in this dialogue and continued in the Statesman : How are the Sophist and the Statesman to be defined and distinguished (if they are to be distinguished) from the Philosopher ? A second nurpose is to describe the philosophic position of the Stranger from Elea, who here takes Socrates' place as leader of the conversation

THEODORUS. SOCRATES. A STRANGER FROM ELEA. THEAETETUS

THEODORUS. Here we are. Socrates, faithful to our appoint-216. ment of vesterday ; and, what is more, we have brought a guest with us. Our friend here is a native of Elea, he belongs to the school of Parmenides and Zeno, and is devoted to philosophy. SOCRATES. Perhaps, Theodorus, it is no ordinary guest

but some god that you have brought us unawares. Homer 1

B tells us that gods attend upon the goings of men of mercy and justice : and not least among them the God of Strangers comes to mark the orderly or lawless doings of mankind. Your companion may be one of those higher powers, who intends to observe and expose our weakness in philosophic discourse, like a very spirit of refutation.

THEOD. That is not our friend's way, Socrates, he is more reasonable than the devotees of verbal dispute. I should not call him a god by any means ; but there is some-

- thing divine about him : I would say that of any philosopher. c. SOCR. And rightly, my friend ; but one might almost say that the type you mention is hardly easier to discern than the god. Such men-the genuine, not the sham philosophers-as they go from city to city surveying from a height the life beneath them, appear, owing to the world's blindness, to wear all sorts of shapes. To some they seem of no account, to others above all worth ; now they wear the guise
- D. of statesmen, now of sophists ; and sometimes they may give the impression of simply being mad. But if our guest

1 Odyssey 1X, 270, and XVII, 483. 165

- 216D. will allow me, I should like to ask him what his countrymen
- 217. thought and how they used these names. THEOD. What names? SOCR. Sophist, Statesman, Philosopher. THEOD. What is your question exactly? What sort of difficulty about these names have you in mind? SOCR. This: dd they think of all these as a single type, or as two, or did they distinguish three types and attach one of the three corresponding names to each? THEOD. I imagine you are quite welcome to the information. Is not that so, sir?
 - B. STRANCER. Yes, Theodorus, perfectly welcome; and the answer is not difficult. They thought of them as three different types; but it is not so short and easy a task to define each one of them clearly. THEOD. As luck would have it, Socrates, you have hit upon a subject closely alled to one on which we were pressing him with questions before we came here. He tried to put us off with the same excuse he has just made to you, though he admits he has been thoroughly unstricted and has not
 - forgotten what he heard.
 - c. Soca. Do not deny us, then, the first favour we ask. Tell us this much 1 which do you commonly prefer—to discourse at length by yourself on any matter you wish to make clear, or to use the method of asking questions, as Parmendes himself did on one occasion in developing some magnificent arguments in my presence, when I was young and he quite an elderly man?¹
 - D. STR. When the other party to the conversation is tractable and gives no trouble, to address him is the easier course; otherwise, to speak by oneself.

Socr. Then you may choose any of the company you will; they will all follow you and respond amenably. But if you take my advice, you will choose one of the younger men— Theaetetus here or any other you may prefer.

STR. I feel some shyness, Socrates, at the notion that, at my first meeting with you and your friends, instead of exchanging our ideas in the give and take of ordinary

¹ It may be an acculant that μ¹..., τήν γε ερώτην χάρυ δεαρηθείς γέη₁ | τοσόσδε δ' ήμο όράζε scans as number verse ; but the last words do not perfectly if what follows (for the mformation whether the Stranger prefers geaking at length or saking questions is not perf of the favour saked, as reached suggraphic Plation may be adapting a quotation from Tranged Otherwase language and rhythm together seem slightly too trange for the occasion. For this reference to the Parwenside. see Introd., p. 1.

INTRODUCTORY CONVERSATION

- 2172. conversation, I should spin out a long discourse by myself or even address it to another, as if I were giving a display of eloquence.¹ For indeed the question you have just raised is not so easy a matter as one might suppose, on hearing it so simply put, but it calls for a very long discussion. On the other hand, to refuse you and your friends a request, especially one put to me in such terms as you have used, strikes me as a breach of civility in a guest.¹ That
- 218. Theatetus should be the other party to our conversation is a proposal which my earlier talk with him, as well as your recommendation, makes exceedingly welcome. THEATETUS. Then do as you say, sir; you will, as Socrates sad, be conterring a favour on us all. STR. On that point, Theatetus, no more need be said; the discussion from now onwards must, it seems, be carried on with you. But if the long task should after all weigh heavy on you, your frends here, not I, must bear the blane.
 - B. THEART. I do not feel at this moment as if I should sink under it; but should something of that sort happen, we will call in Socrates' namesake here, who is of my own age and shares my pursuits He is quite used to working out most questions with me.

STR. A good suggestion : that shall be for you to consider as our conversation goes forward. What now concerns us both is our joint inquiry. We had better, I think, begin by studying the Sophist and try to bring his nature to light

c. in a clear formula. At present, you see, all that you and I possess in common is the name. The thing to which each of us gives that name we may perhaps have privately before our minds¹. but it is always desirable to have reached an

¹ Three alternative procedures are suggested : (i) an unbroken monologue, such as the rhetorical Sophists preferred, (s) an exponition 'addressed to another', is cast in the form of questions, to which the respondent merely answers' yes 'or 'no 'as required (*Secoskel*), like the young Aristotle in the *Parmenistic*: (i) a genume conversation, to which the respondent makes a real contribution. The Stranger's preference for the third marks that he understands' dialecto' as 'Italo understood it.

Read dyposers, 'rude', for dypase, 'wild, savage, force', 'which is too strong a word At Anstolic FN 11286, 9,4999968 XG (Bype Burnet) at bit true reading: dypase rulg At 11289, 2, dyposes W (Bype Burnet) at bit for the MSS dypose JM FW. D. Ross has knolly supplied me with other matances of the confusion - Suddyd 2854, 2, dypaser/spar BT : dypaser/spar W. Phasfrus 2650, 6, dypacers, Et dypice (hyperker Gaam)

¹ Spyor, 'thing' = rphysic, as at 2218 and Theses 1778 (cf. Apolt) I think the meaning is: 'We may each have a private view of the same Ming which we both call by the same name, but we shall not be sure that we are 218c. agreement about the thing itself by means of explicit statements, rather than be content to use the same word without formulating what it means. It is not so easy to comprehend this group we intend to examine or to say what it means to be a sophist. However, when some great task is to be properly carried through, everyone has long since found it a good rule to take something comparability. However, when some great task is to be properly carried through, everyone has long since found it a good rule to take something comparability. However, when some can be a something the big thing itself. That is the course I recommend for us now. Theactetus. Judging the Sophast to be a very troublesome sort of creature to hunt down, let us first practise the method of tracking him o some easier quarry—unless you have some readier means to suggest? Threast, No. I have none.

This introduction serves both for the Sophist and for the Statesman, in which the same company continue the conversation, the young Socrates taking Theaetetus' place as respondent. It is still debated whether or not Plato contemplated a third dialogue, the Philosopher. Scholars have collected certain indications of such an intention.1 (I) At Soph. 253E, after the description of Dialectic. the Stranger says : 'In some such region as this we shall find the philosopher now and hereafter, if we look for him.' (2) That Plato did not think of this account of Dialectic as sufficiently describing the philosopher seems to be implied at the beginning of the Statesman (257A-C), where Theodorus speaks as if the Sophist had accomplished only one-third of the task and asks the Stranger whether he will now take the Statesman first or the Philosopher. (3) Later (258A). Socrates, discussing who shall act as respondent in the Statesman, remarks that Theaetetus has already served in the Theaetetus as Socrates' respondent and in the Sophist as the Stranger's. and suggests that the young Socrates should answer the Stranger in the Statesman (as he does), and ' myself on another occasion '. If this other occasion was to be the Philosopher, the four dialogues would be tied together in a symmetrical scheme :

	Theaetetus	Sophist	Statesman	Philosopher
Questioner :	Socrates	Stranger	Stranger	Socrates
Respondent :	Theactetus		Young Socr.	Young Socr.

meaning the same thing by that name until we have explicitly defined it,' not that we may each have a *different thing* before our minds. In any case *loyor* means the thing, not a ' notion ' of the thing, and *Myor* means a statement in words (a defining formula), not a ' conception '

1 See Dies, Parménide (Paris, 1923), p xv.

The alleged 'eclipse of Socrates ' by the Eleatic Stranger (of which critics have made too much) would then be only temporary ; he would reappear as leader in the *Philosophie*. It is hard to see why these expressions should be there at all, if the intention had never been in Plato's mind.

Why the Philosopher was never written, we can only conjecture. The Statesmost is concerned with the Philosopher in active life as the royal shepherd of mankind, the guardian who has come down from the vision of the Good to serve his follow-men in the Cave as lawgiver. We might expect the picture to be completed by an account of the registry to contemplation, his proper home, and of the nature of the registry the contemplates. Thus would be the place for that final account of the relation of reality to appearance which is called for in the Parametikes and again in the Sopker, but is not given in any of these dialogues. The Philosopher, if it could have been written, might have gathered up these loose ends in that doctrine which Plato adumbrated in the Lecture on the Good, but never published in writing. But, as we know from his Seventh Letter, Plato's final decision was that the ultimate truth could never be set down on paper, and ought not to be, even if it could.

In what appears on the surface to be a graceful exchange of compliments Plato has contrived to define precisely the philosophic standpoint of the Stranger from Elea. On hearing that he is ' of the school of Parmenides and Zeno '. Socrates at once fears he may be an exponent of that verbal disputation (' Eristic ') which disregards truth and aims solely at refuting an opponent. This type of Sophistry, analysed below (224E ff), was associated with the Megarian school, which, though founded by the Socratic Euclides took its main doctrine from the Eleatics. Zeno had supplied Eristic sophistry with one of its methods-the reductio ad absurdum, which refutes an opponent's thesis by asserting that it involves a dilemma. either horn of which leads to a contradiction. The description of the Stranger makes clear that he does not stand for this negative and destructive element in the Eleatic tradition. The reader is not to expect an exhibition of Zenonian dialectic, such as we had in the Parmenides. An open reference to the conversation in that dialogue emphasises the contrast between Eleatic methods of argument and the genuine dialectic of Socrates and Plato, already illustrated by the Theasteins.

The Stranger, then, is not, as Socrates feared, a 'very spirit of refutation', but a gemuine philosopher; and the philosopher is the 'divine' or inspired man who looks down from above on human life and is taken by the world for a madman. These traits recall the *Phasine* (24q) and the *Thesatetus* (773). All this means that

SOPHIST

the Stranger stands for the genuinely philosophic element in the Parmenidean tradition. He understands dialectic as the co-operative search for truth, and, once the conversation is started, his manner is distinguished by no individual trait from that of the Platonic Scorates. He is an abstract figure, a representative of Parmenides, because Parmenides had set the problem that is to be attacked : How can what appears, but is not real, exist at all ? Since he holds a theory of Forms which no one hesitates to ascribe to Plato himself, it seems as if Plato claumed to be the true her of Parmenides.¹

The purpose of the dialogue is to define 'the Sophist'. Here, at the threshold, we cross the boundary between the sensible world, to which the *Theastetus* was confined, and the world of Forms. We are to define by a formula (*logos*) an object of which both interlocutors have a notion before their minds. The object or 'thing' is no longer an individual concrete thms. The last conclusion of the *Theastetus* was that the addition of a *logos* of such a thing to a true notion of it could not yield knowledge. 'The Sophist' is not an individual, but a species; and the addition of a *logos* in new sense—a definition by genus and specific differences—can lead to knowledge of the nature of a species.

218D-221C. Illustrative Division, defining the Angler.


The Stranger now proceeds to illustrate by a trivial example the method to be used in defining the Sophist. The species is to be defined by systematically dividing the genus that is taken to include it. The method was new to Plato's public : but the modern reader, familiar with classifications all ultimately derived from the model here set up, might be wearied by a translation. I shall, therefore, give only a summary of the illustrative Division defining the Angler, and of the six following Divisions defining the Sophist under various aspects. Something must also be said about the method itself, which Plato evidentiv rearried as a very valuable entire of dialectic.

Although the classification of the Angler is the first long and formal Division in Plato, no preluminary account of the method is given and no rules are laid down. The only earlier description of the method (*Plasadius 2659*) tells us that a Division should be preceded by a Collection (*cownyoyrf*) or survey of the 'widely scattered' terms (species) which are to be brought under a single (genenc) Form. The object of such a review is to divune the geneir Form which is to stand at the head of the subsequent Division. As we shall see [p. 186], all hope of a correct definition depends on the right choice of the genus. Here, however, there is

¹ As Prof. Taylor remarks, Plato (1926), 375.

no systematic Collection. Plato prefers to introduce the method by giving an illustrative Division, reserving what needs to be said about rules of procedure to be added later, chiefly in the Statesman.

Angling being obvously a species of Huntung, it would be natural to begin with Hunting as the genus to be divided. But the Stranger starts farther back with the genus 'Art'. The earlier stages, before Hunting is reached, provide starting-points for the first five attempts to define the Sophst, as a spepars from the following table :




The classification of Arts is not meant to be systematic or complete: the 'Separatue' class (dwagrowd) is added later (236b), not mentioned here. The Acquisitive class includes 'learning and knowing' with money-making, contention, and hunting: all these are arts 'which produce nothing, but merely get hold of things that already exist and prevent others from getting hold of them' (247c). Nothing more will be heard of 'learning and knowing' 'lill the first Division of the Statesman (2562) which opens with 'knowledge', divided into 'theoretical' and 'practical' -a contrast relevant to the distinction between the Philosopher and the practical Statesman.

The method of Division may be used for two distinct objects: (1) the classification of all the species falling under a genus in a complete table, or (2) the definition of a single species only. Plato seems to contemplate sometimes one purpose, sometimes the other, though the rules to be observed will be somewhat different. A complete classification may exhibit more than two subordinate classes on the same level, and if these are to be subdivided, they must be described in positive terms. In biology, for instance, animals

SOPHIST

must not be classified as 'vertebrate' and 'invertebrate'. To lump together whole genera and families as 'invertebrate' tells us nothing of positive importance about their structure; and 'invertebrateness' is not a character that can be subdivided. But if our object is to define a single species of vertebrate animal, we can cut out all invertebrates at a blow and subdivide only the vertebrate. The illustrative division here is of this kind. It proceeds through two sets of stages. Angling is catching (e) a certain kind of prey (b) by a certain method. (e) The division of the prey:



would be absurd in a classification : there is no provision for birds which live and are caught in the air. Only the second set of stages --the division of methods (netting or striking: by a fish-spear or by hook and line) makes any pretence to a complete classification. Also the shift of principle from prey to method would vitate the scheme as a classification of hunting: land animals and birds may equally well be netted or struck. Considerations of this sort are pointed out in the Statesman. The upshot here is a definition of the species Angling in terms of the genus 'Art' and all the specific differences (as they were later called), formally enumerated at 2213.

The Seven Divisions defining the Sophist

The Stranger next (221C) sets out 'to discover the nature of the Sophist on the pattern of this illustration'. Sur Driviaons follow immediately and are summarised at 231C-E. The results are then criticised. The seventh and final Drivision is preceded by a discusson leading to the choice of a new genus, the image-making hranch of Productive (as distinct from Acquisitive) art. It is interrupted by the long discussions justifying the assumption that there can be such a thing as an unreal 'image' : the whole problem of appearance and flashity is involved. At the end of the dialogue (264B) this Drivision is continued and yields the final definition of the Sophist.

This procedure suggests the questions: Why are we given seven definitions? Is one of them meant to be right, the rest wrong? Who is the Sophist? What class, or classes, of persons are defined? Some have held that all the Divisions define one class of historical persons from different approaches, and even that all the definitions are 'adequate'. A fatal objection to this view is that there never existed any class of persons who could be characterised by the surth definition as well as by the first five and the seventh. The Cathartic art of the sixth Division was practised by Socrates alone. Its purpose is to purge the soul of the false conceit of wisdom. This flatly contradicts the final definition of the Sophist as the creator of a false appearance of wisdom; and the Stranger humself says that he is a fraid to call the practitioners of the Cathartic art Sophists: they only resemble the Sophist as the dog resembles the wolf (azta).

Plato was not primarily concerned to describe the character of any class of persons with historical accuracy. What interested him was the spirit of Sophistry, which might be incarnate in many persons or groups with a variety of superficial characteristics. The view I shall recommend is briefly this. Divisions I and II-IV characterise, superficially and with a considerable element of satire. the rhetorical sophists and lecturers on advanced subjects of the type represented in the fifth century by Protagoras, Gorgias, and Hippias. They are 'hired hunters of rich young men', or 'salesmen' of alleged wisdom and of the arts of succeeding in life. Division V starts from a different genus, the art of Contention, and defines the Eristic-the man who disputes for victory, not for truth. This class had its professional representatives in men like Euthydemus and his hrother : but Eristic was also a feature of the dialectic of the Eleatic school and of the Megarians. Division VI does not define any type of Sophist, but gives a serious and even eloquent analysis of the purifying elenchus as practised by Socrates himself. Division VII is the only one that goes to the heart of the matter and starts from the right genus. It defines, not any particular class of persons, but a whole tendency of thought. the essence of Sophistry. It is based on the metaphysical distinction of appearance from reality. Sophistry is the false counterfeit of philosophy and of statesmanship and has its being in the world of endola that is neither real nor totally unreal. The claim of that world to yield knowledge has been rejected in the Theaetetus, The Sophist will raise the question, what sort of existence it can have

221C-223B. Division I. The Sophist as Hunter.

Division I starts, with no explicit justification, from the Angler's genus, Hunting, and begins by distinguishing the Sophist's preythe tame animal, man. The significant part is the further sub-

division according to method. What follows is an analysis of that rhetorical Sophistry which had been attacked in the Goreias and the Phaedrus (T) Man-hunting may be violent (pracy, slave-hunting tyranny, and warfare in general) or persuasive (nullarouov usi) including forensic and political oratory and displays of rhetoric in private company. The Gorgias had defined Rhetoric as ' the producer of persuasion ', and the violent methods here contrasted with it recall Polus' idealisation of the tyrant and of the political orator. as men who can do what they like, and also Socrates' description of Callicles' ideal of unlimited egoism as the life of a robber and an outlaw. (2) The next division-public or private (low no surver) -separates the rhetorical displays of the Sophist to a private audience from the public oratory of the politician and the lawyer. (3) Then the taking of fees (unflaorment) is introduced. The Sophist demands a wage, in contrast with the false lover who, as described in the Phaedrus, offers bribes to his prev to induce him to yield. (4) Finally, the Sophist professes to seek the company of his victims ' for the sake of goodness ' as the exponent of a 'spurious education' (doctoraudeurunn). He is contrasted with the parasite, whose bait is pleasure. This echoes the elaborate parallel drawn in the Gorgas between the rhetorician and the parasite. The profession to teach 'virtue', or the successful conduct of public and private life, was characteristic of Protagoras. The genus chosen for this Division throws an initial emphasis on rhetoric, rather to the exclusion of sophists like Hippias, who mainly taught advanced subjects to youths who had left their elementary school. But this type finds a place in the next Divisions.

223C-224E. Divisions II-IV. The Sophist as Salesman

In Divisions II-IV, the taking of money, a minor feature in Division I, comes to the front in the genus, 'acquasiton by exchange ', the alternative to 'huntumg'. (1) The distinction of selling ($\dot{g}\gamma e_{0}\sigma \tau u \sigma \eta$) from giving presents characterises the Sophist as fundamentally a salesman. (2) The difference of methods-the manufacturer selling his own produce ($u \tau \sigma \tau \sigma \eta$), the local relail dealer ($u \sigma \tau \eta \sigma \eta$), the merchant who goes from city to aty ($\dot{g}\mu \tau \sigma \rho \omega \sigma \eta$)—though it leads to three definitions, is of less importance than the description of the wares. (3) The Sophist trades in commodities that are to nourish the avail ($v \sigma \tau \mu \sigma \sigma \sigma \eta$), not the body. He is grouped at first with the artist--the painter, the musican, the puppet-showman (who in the Laws, 658a, is classed with the dramanist and the recter). The Sophist's wares are knowledge ($u \sigma \theta \eta \mu \sigma \tau \sigma \sigma \lambda \omega \sigma \eta$), and in particular the knowledge of 'goodness' ($v \sigma \sigma \eta$). tion of the *Protagoras* (313), where Socrates warns the young Hippocrates against entrusting the care of his soul to 'a merchant or retail dealer in those commodities whereby the soul is nourished '.

These Divisions repeat many of the traits which occurred in Division I, only in a different order, throwing into relief the taking of money for teaching 'goodness', which in Division I holds a subordinate place. There is no objection to a teacher being paid for imparting a store of knowledge or information which can be transferred to another person. The other receives something he desires to possess and gets value for his money.1 Much of the Sophists' teaching was of this kind. What Socrates and Plato denounce is the taking of fees for teaching ' goodness'. Goodness. although according to Socrates it consists in a certain kind of 'knowledge', is not a thing that anyone can teach : not a stock of information that can be transferred * from one man to another. Moreover, the men who professed to sell 'goodness ' did not possess it themselves or even know what it was To offer for sale what you do not possess, and, if you did possess it, could not transfer. is fraudulent. The professor of 'goodness' demanding a fee excited in Plato the same sort of disgust as would be felt by a man who should summon a priest to give him spiritual consolation and then receive from the physician of souls a bill charging him five shillings for each visit.

Divisions I-IV may, then, be taken as analysing the practice of the great fifth-century Sophists, considered as rhetoricians and paid teachers of 'goodness'. The treatment is saturical and superficial; we have not yet found the essence of Sophistry.

224E-226A. Division V. Eristic

The next Drvision, defining Eristic, is, like its predecessors, ultimately derived from the Acquisitive (as opposed to the Productive) class of Art; but it follows a different branch. The fundamental character of this type is not 'hunting' or 'selling' but 'contention' (dyowrrowf). The taking of fees comes in only at the end, to mark off the Eristic who is a professional Sophist from others who are not.

First, fighting (uagna win) is distinguished from friendly competi-

¹ Gorgas, 520. It is no diagrace to the teacher of any ordinary art to stipulate for a fee. The transmost product so that the source of the bonest. But the sophist professes to make you virtuous; and the succeeds, he will have made you honest and there will be no need of a previous contract for payment.

Meno 93B, rapadorio nal rapalymrio alde rap alde Estityi 273D, 287A, derrip rapadoriou. Protaz 3132, Pencies could not rapaddore derrif to his sons. See above, p. 135. tion ; then fighting in the form of verbal disputation (dµµµβητητικα) from the violence of physical warfare. The disputation of forensic oratory, carried on in 'long speeches in public about rights and wrongs', is marked off from private disputation 'in the small change of question and arswer' (drardµµµ0).¹ Finally, there are the 'random and artless' disputes of ordinary life; but if disputation is conducted by rules of art we call it *Erissic*.

In the final summary of all the first six Divisions (23IE). this type will be simply called the Eristic; but here (225D) a further subdivision is added. The Eristic Sophist (like Euthydemus) is distinguished from other Eristics by taking fees and called a ' moneymaker' (vonuariarinoc). But there are other Eristics who 'waste their money' (χρηματοφθορικοί). Their sort of disputation ' which makes one neglect one's own affairs for the pleasure of spending time in that way, but is carried on in a style that gives no pleasure to the ordinary hearer, can only be called a sort of babbling' (adolegy univ). Who are these 'babblers'? I cannot agree with Campbell that Socrates is meant, though he did neglect his affairs and become poor in pursuit of his mission ; nor with Diès that the babbler is the true dialectician. This would make the true philosopher a species of Eristic, arguing for fame or victory. It is true that the term ' babbling ' was applied to philosophy by its enemies and in particular to Socratic conversation.3 Plato himself adopts it as a left-handed compliment, together with urrewookovoc, the term of reproach for Ionian science.3 This suggests that the babblers here, who do not take fees, must be some followers of Socrates who could also be described as Eristics. There can be little doubt that the Megarians are meant, as Susemihl suggested.4

¹ This contrast recalls *Rep* 4994: Many are scephcal about the value of the true philosopher, never having seen one or heard ' noble and free discourse ' suming only at truth. They have only listened to displays of enstic elevenness, whose sole object is reputation and strife, whether in lawsuits (forensic orstory) or in private company (ensite solbhitry)

* Eupolis 352 : Europirny, rdv wrazdr ddoldogyr Aristophanes, Clouds 1485.

Phasedo 70C, SOCTATCE: 'No one can say I döokeryö in discussing death at this moment ' Theses' 1958, Socrates calls himself drip döokorye Phasdrus 270A, All great arts require döokeryía and µerempoloria. Sistesman 270A, Rep. 488C.

¹ Dog L u, 105: Evaluates (of Megara) applied humself to the writings of Parmenides, and his followers were called Megaranas, then Ernstex, and later Dalectucanas, because they put their arguments in the form of question and answer. Thomo firms 350, D. L. n. 103: ¹ Care as of of these babbles (Addems) ... nor for Excludes the wrangler (Adderway), who inspired the Megaranas with a frenzy of controvery (Meyond) 'A counte fragment (D. I i, 107) calls the Megarana Eubnides # Jearned'; Dogenes says he spty up controvers with Antartotic, D. L. n. 30: Socrets' seeming Euclides

VI. CATHARTIC METHOD OF SOCRATES

They were also followers of the Eleatic School, and at *Phacetrus* 26tc disputation (*brridoyvof*) includes, together with political and forensic oratory, the dialectical arguments of Zeno¹, the Eleatic Palamedes —has art of 'making the same things appear to his hearers both like and unluke, one and many, at rest and moving'. The whole us condemned as an art of deception.

The mann contrast in Plato's mind is between Dialectic, the true art of philosophic conversation, and the technique of verbal dispute for victory which had been derived by the Meganans from the controversal methods of Zeno. This had enough resemblance to the Socratic *elenchus* for the two to be dehberately confused by Jsocrates, who, as the champion of Gorgas' tradition of rhetorical sophistry, persistently brackets the Socratics in general with the 'devotees of verbal disputation'.³ It may be for this reason that the Eristic strain in philosophical schools--the Elexic and the Megarian—stands here in close contrast with the Cathartic procedure of Socrates himself.

226A-231B. Division VI. Cathartic Method of Socrates

In the sixth Division satire is dropped. The tone is serious and sympathetic; towards the close it becomes eloquent. The type defined is 'the purifier of the soul from conceits that stand in the way of knowledge' (231E)—a description which (as Jackson and others have seen) applies to Socrates and to no one else.

This Drusion, unlike the others, is preceded by a Collection. From a survey of various domestic operations—filtering, sifting, winnowing, and the combing and dividing of the warp in weaving we collect the notion of an art of Separating (*Bazerteefi*). The effect is to dissociate this Drusion completely from the earlier ones, which were all derived from the art of Acquisition. The forms of Sophistry they defined were fundamentally arts of gain, acquiring influence over rich young men, or money by selling knowledge, or victory in argument instead of truth. All such

keenly interested in eristic arguments, said: "You will be able to get on with sophists, but not with men"; for he thought such har-splitting useless, as Flate aboves in the *Euchydense*'

¹ Yon Armum (*Flatos Jugendéslaloge* (1914), 193) thuist that not Zeno, but a contemporary Mégarana us here meant, but 1 agree with Taylor, *Plato* (1926), 317, and others A t Farm 1330 Farmenides humself describes the duplay of Eleathe dialectic that is to follow as 'what the world calls useless habbling'.

⁸ of mpk rds forder foroudencies — the phrase which Theodorus has said (2168) does not apply to the Eleate Stranger—is taken from Isocrates (sard ord, i, 2918); *Holms* 1 and 6 (after references to Antisthenes and Plato), *A mid* 258 (aimed at Plato).


P.T.K.

motives are ruled out by going back to a distinct branch of art, not recognised at all where Art was at first divided into Acquisitive and Productive. The Separative arts are not productive either. Ther function is negative.

The arts collected in this survey are introduced abruptly with no hint of their relevance. The normal Collection takes into consideration the term proposed for definition together with others which can plausably be thought to resemble it. The object is to discern some common property with a claim to be the most important or essential and so to stand as the genus to be divided. Here Sophistry is not included, and the reader is left entrely without a clue to the connection between Sophistry and these homely operations. There is no sort of promise that by dividing the generic notion of Separation we shall ever arrive at a definition of the Sophist. Nor can the reader guess that what we shall, in fact, define is not Sophistry but the Socratic *denchus*.

The art of Separating (doxogracef) is now divided. Things separated may be aluke; but we are concerned with punfication (wologuefc) which expels what is worse and retains what is better. One kind of purification is the physical cleansing of lifeless things and of the living body, 'including those internal separations and purgations effected by gymnastic and medicane'. The other kind is the punfication which 'removes evil from the soul' (depaiegore zowicz wyzrjc, 2270). (It should be noted that Purification is a negative notion—the nddance of evil.' Medicine and gymnastic case not regarded positively as creating health and strength, but classed with washing. They will presently be described more definitely under their negative aspect—medicane as the indiance of disease, gymnastic as the indiance of guliness. Similarly punfication of the soul is not the production of goodness but the 'removal of evil'.)¹

At the next step an analogy is drawn between two kinds of boduly, and two kinds of mental, purification:



¹ The passive substantive κdθapµa (offscouring, outcast) means the impurity removed, not the thing purified.

 Hence Apelt's assertion (note on 2268) that διακριτική is to be subordinated to ποιητική (πίχση) must be rejected.

VI. CATHARTIC METHOD OF SOCRATES

Disease is regarded, not in the usual way as lack of balance that needs to be redressed, but as faction, sedition, or civil warfare (orchouc) among things naturally 'akin'. This is for the sake of its counterpart, 'wickedness' (normola) in the soul, where there is 'mutual dissension everywhere—judgments at variance with desires, courage with pleasures, reflection with pains'. The description of wickedness recalls passages in the Republic where the conflict between the three parts of the soul 15 compared to political strife. Thus at 440B the 'spirited' part takes the side of reason against desire 'in the faction-fight of the soul'. This is Platonic, rather than Socratic. Vice is not here identified with ignorance (as by Socrates), but distinguished from it. The counterpart of medicine as the remedy for bodily disease is ' the justice that chastises '1 vice. Chastisement (xolagram) is introduced for the sake of its negative meaning. The Gorgias had used the same analogy between the doctor and the judge who chastises the wrongdoer to 'rid' him of his vice."

Gymnastic is the parallel remedy for physical ugliness, the deformity due to lack of proportion. This is, somewhat strangely, treated as analogous to a lack of proportion or co-ordination between impulses in the soul, causing them to miss their mark. Ignorance $(\lambda \gamma \rho \omega a)$ is the swerving aside of the soul's impulse towards truth, and (as Socrates had taught) is always 'involuntary '--against the true wish for the nght end. The remedy for ignorance in all its many forms is Instruction ($\lambda \phi d \sigma \rho \omega a c \rho m b$).

Instruction is next divided. Setting as the technical instruction (which is obviously positive), we take, as the other branch, moral education (moisein), concised negatively as the deliverance of the soul from that concert of wisdom which renders it unable to understand $(\partial_{\mu}\alpha\theta_{in})^{-1}$ (This education is directly contrary to the 'spurious education' offered by the Sophists in the earlier Divisions, which resulted precisely in producing the concert of wisdom). Next the method of rebuke and admonition practiced by parents

 1 é solvernezh ... & Ker (2394) as the manuscrupt reading. The optichet as unitended to distinguish justice as chasissement from the more common view of it as the vengeance of the community (In the next sentence σi yoùr sieks set wirk) is a solver the solution of the set of the s

* Gorg 478A, δικαιοσύνη τικί χρώμενοι κολάζουσαν οἱ όρθώς (1.8. ' in the true sense ') κολάζοντας

*/Aussia is not ignorance in the sense of a blank absence of knowledge, to be cured by imparting information. It is due to the positive presence of the fails behief that you already know or understand. It was Socratca' discovery that true moral education must begin with casting out popular balasts about right and wrong, derved from parents and baschers. is contrasted with the method of those who have ' convinced themselves upon reflection that all inability to understand is involuntary ' and that ' admonition yields little result for much pains '. ' They press a person with questions about some matter on which he fancies he has something valuable to say, when really he is talking nonsense. Then, when such persons begin to waver, they readily hold a muster of their opinions, collect them in argument and confront them with one another, and thereby show that they are in contradiction on the same subjects, at the same moment, from the same point of view. When the others see this, they are vexed with themselves, and become gentler towards others, so by this means they are delivered from their lofty and obstinate conceit of themselves-of all deliverances the most pleasant to witness and of the most lasting benefit to the patient. Their purifiers are of the same mind as those physicians who hold that the body can get no benefit from the food it takes until all inward obstructions are removed. These others have observed that the same is true of the soul, which will not profit by the instruction it receives until cross-examination has reduced the man to a modest frame of mind. and has cleared away the conceits that obstruct learning and so purged him and convinced him that he knows only what he does know and nothing more.' This examination (elenchus) is 'the highest and most sovran method of purification '.1' All this passage is in the tone and manner of the Republic. It describes the method of Socrates, who declares in the Abology that the life not subject to examination is not worth hving.

But are these purifiers of the soul 'Sophists'?

- 230E. STRANGER (continues). Well, what name shall we give to the practitioners of this art ? For my part I shrink from
- 231. calling them Sophists.

THEAET. Why so ?

STR. For fear of ascribing to them too high a function.³ THEAET. And yet your description has some resemblance to that type (the Sophist).

STR. So has the dog to the wolf—the fercest of animals to the tamest. But a cautious man should above all be on his guard against resemblances; they are a very slippery sort of thing. However, be it so (i.e. let then pass for Sophists; i for should they ever set up an adequate defence

¹ 2308-D. The language here closely resembles the description of the effect of Socrates' art on Theastetus, *Theast.* 2100 (p 163).

¹ As Jackson and others have seen, 'them 'can only mean the practitioners (not the sophists) This echoes Socrates' habit of disclaiming any title that implies the possession of wisdom, he is only a 'lover of wisdom, 'a philosopher.

VI. CATHARTIC METHOD OF SOCRATES

231B. of their confines, the boundary in dispute will be of no small importance.

THEAET. That is likely enough.

STR. Let us take it, then, that under the art of Separation there is a method of Purification ; that we have dustinguished that kind of purification which is concerned with the Soul, and under that, Instruction, and under that again, Education. Withm the art of education, the Examination which confutes the vain conceit of wisdom we will allow to pass, in the argument which has now come in by a side wind,¹ by no other name than the Sophistry that is of noble lnneage (*ij ydres yervaia cooperacify*).

It is hard to see why this analysis of Socrates' Cathartic method should stand here as the last of these preliminary attempts to define the Sophist. The whole argument has admittedly 'come in by a side wind'. From the outset the Division has no link or point of contact with first five or with the seventh , it starts from an entirely new genus—a point that may be emphasised by the final phrase, 'the Sophistry that is of noble Inneage' $(ydret)^3$. The fundamental am of the Cathartu method is the precise opposite of the production of the false concert of wisdom, characteristic of the Sophist in the earlier Divisions and in the seventh, which is taken as final.

Where the Stranger says he would shrink from calling the purifier of the soul a Sophist, Theaterties remarks that they have a certain resemblance. It is true that the negative *denchas* of Socrates, pressing the respondent with questions, reviveng his beliefs and confuting them by exposing their contradictions, did superficially resemble the controversy practised by Euthydemus, the Eleaties, and the Meganans 'in the purvate exchange of question and answer' (225B)—a style of 'habbling' which 'most hearers do not find agreeable to listen to ', whereas the Socratic deliverance of men 'from a lofty and stubborn conceit of themselves' was 'of all deliverances the most agreeable to listen to '. I Socrates persistently encouraged

¹ br of why hopy empositor. Insertiences as used at Theset 1900 of a difficulty that shows that in a freeh quarter where we were not looking The construction with $\lambda_2/\sigma_{\rm sho}$ is serievand. Perhaps we should read $\pi_{\rm spolymode}$, it is and series the value of waldom—a thing that has come by a side wind into our present argument—we will allow to pass, etc.

There is no trace in the text of the link with Eristic suggested by Campbell (Introd., p h): Controversy is, or should be, an art of separating the false from the true, of determining what propositions are not tenable '

² 225D, real of the deferrois madris the development of unof theory development (of Ernstic) in designed contrast with 230C, seculo development development of forms. Plato may (with some moderna) have understood development as a development

SOPHIST

the popular confusion of Socratic conversation with verbal dispute for victory. As Socrates remarked at the outset (2xf0n), the genuine philosopher sometimes seems to wear the guise of the Sophist. Here, moreover, Plato has been careful to analyse only the negative side of Socrates' practice—the side on which the resemblance lies.

But the resemblance, as the Stranger says, is as misleading as that of the dog to the wolf. In the *Republic* (3754 and E ff), the dog is the symbol of the Guardian of society. The watch-dog of generous breed is gentle to those whom he knows, and this friendliness to what is known is taken to be a genuinely 'philosophic' trait.¹ The wolf is the typical enemy of society. The sophist Thrasymachus breaks in upon the conversation with a wolf's ferocity.⁹ The tyrant is like the man who has tasted human fiesh and turned into a wolf.³ The sensual passion of the false lover in the *Phacetrus* is the passion of the wolf for the lamb; his kinship with the Sophist as a man-hunter was remarked in the first Division.⁴ The upshot is that the purifier of the soul is not a Sophist in the sense of this dialogue. The whole Division has no point of contact with any of the others.

Why then does it stand here? Perhaps it can be explained as a feature in the whole design of these dialogues, which remains obscure because never completed. Another element in the pattern is added in the Statesman where the 'art of Combining' (our our with) is contrasted with the 'art of Separating' (duampirum) The Statesman opens with a long Division defining the art of shepherding mankind. To illustrate its defects, an exemplary Division, to define weaving, reviews and classifies a number of household operations, including the use of comb and rod mentioned in the Collection of the Separative arts at Soph. 226B. Separation and Combination (from which Weaving is derived) are described as ' two great arts of universal application ' (282B). Just as in the Sophist Hunting, the genus of the Angler, turns out to be relevant to the first definition of the Sophist, so in the Statesman Weaving symbolises the art of the Statesman, whose function is to combine in harmony the various elements of society. It is perhaps to prepare the way for this conception of statesmanship that Plato in our passage regards

¹ In the Stranger's speech the phrases revelocita rip oularity and ouldrows suggest that the Guardian is in Plato's thoughts

^{*} Rep 336D, nal µos donô, el µì mpórepos émpány airóv i énciros éµé, dépavos du yeréobas.

^{*} Rep. 555D. Cf Glotz, Solidarité de la famille (1904), p 23. Phaedo 82A, the tyrant and the robber are reincarnated as wolves or birds of prey.

⁴ Phasdrus 241D, ώς λόκοι δρο' άγαπῶσ', ὡς παίδα φιλοθοιν ἐρασταί Šoph. 222D.

vice, not as ignorance, but as a political sedition in the soul, to be remedied by 'the justoe that chastens', the analogue of medical purgation of disease. So in the Statesman (308E) the Royal Art 'casts out by death or exile and chastens with the severest disfranchisement' those natures which cannot take a place in the pattern of the community.

The parallel elaborately drawn in the Statesman between the combining operations of weaving and statesmanship has its counterpart elsewhere 1 in an analogy between the separating operations of weaving and dialectic. The suggestion is being discussed, that there may be a 'right' way of naming things in words whose form will somehow express their natures. The name, like the weaver's rod (xeoxic), is a tool. The use of the rod is to separate (duaxoivery) the web or the warp. A name has two uses : to convey information and to distinguish (separate, duracivery) the natures of things. The rod is made by the carpenter under the directions of the weaver. who understands its use. So the skilled name-maker fashions names for the use of the dialectician (philosopher), who, it is implied, has the ability to distinguish those natures which are the meanings of names. It is no accident that the operations of weaving should thus be used in analogy with dialectic in the Cratylus and with statesmanship in the Statesman

Plato may have intended to derive the dialectical method of Division more openly than he has done from that branch of Separation which distinguishes things that are 'alike' (226D, in contrast with the branch separating the worse from the better, leading to Cathartic). Dialectic is ' to divide according to kinds ',ª not mistaking one Form for another, or ' to separate by kinds' (duaxolyciy ward vévoc, 253DE). It discovers differences separating things that are 'alike' in being of the same genus The task of philosophy is regarded in the Sophist as mainly analytical-the mapping out of the realm of Forms in all its articulations by Division. The practical task of the philosopher as statesman is synthetic. Possibly the Philosopher, had it been written, would have completed the account of philosophic method by recognising the synthetic or intuitive moment in dialectic, which the Sophist leaves in the background. If the Collection and Division of the Separative arts had some such intended relation to a larger design, its apparent irrelevance ceases to be a problem.

¹ Cratylus, 386E, ff

¹ rok and ying SampelorBas. At 226c the separative domestic operations were called Samperned, and at 227s the task of philosophic discourse was 'to duscern what is of the same kind and what is not' (rd oryyowks cal rd µù oryyowk).

The Methods of Collection and Division

But the purpose served by these six Divisions in the economy of the whole dialogue is still not perfectly clear. Some light may be gained by considering the nature of Plato's methods of Collecton and Division in contrast with the Socratic method sometimes called 'Induction' (*Edsegoel*).

Socrates had been the first to realise clearly that, both in common life and in science, men constantly use words without knowing the 'essence' of the thing named or being able to 'give an account' (Ajvor & Bowau) of it.¹ The Socratic and Platonic view is that, in such a case, we have the same object before our munds, but see it only indistinctly. We 'have only the name in common', until we express its meaning in an explicit formula. Such a name as 'justice' has one true meaning, more or less dunly present to our minds when we hear the name. If one of us can give the right account of it, the other will be able to see it too.

Plato's early dialogues illustrate Socrates' attempts to give an account of the meaning of terms, and, without any parade of technique, formulate a method that is regularly applied. In its full form the method has two stages. (z) The first is Cathartic. The questioner elicits from the respondent what he thinks he knows, often by deducing consequences conflicting with other optimons he holds. The result is the riddance of the false concet of knowledge. Conscious of ignorance and in perplexity (*dengela*), the respondent is now ready for the co-operative search * (2) This further inquiry normally proceeds by the same method: a series of suggestions criticised and amended by bringing in fresh considerations. The end should be the correct definition of the meaning or 'Form 'which has all along been coming more clearly into view

Contrast with this Socratic procedure the new method of Collection and Division. It is twofold. The preluminary Collection is to fix upon the genus to be divided. The Division is a downward process from that genus to the deflution of a species. This process has nothing in common with the deductive movement of the Socratic elements, which terminates in the rejection of a suggested definition.

¹ It is a curious fact that, not only in physical science, but even m mathematics, men have made great advances and discoveries without being able to define the most important concepts correctly, *s*, *s*, the concept of Number

A good illustration is the rejection of Mino's suggested definitions of Virtue, followed by his complexite radicos men to perplexity Mano had thought he knew what writes is; now he is paraled. Socrates replies that he does not know wither, but is willing to undertake the cooperative search (ext_prime). Meso Boa ff. The Thesistics, again, is Cathartic, rejecting all suggested definitions and ending m despite. In the Socratic procedure the clear vision of the Form and the true account of it are reached as the goal of series of upward leaps (to use Plato's metaphor). But in Collection and Division the goal is reached at the end of the downward process, when an indivisible species is defined in terms of genus and specific differences. In a word, the Socratic method approaches the Form to be defined from below, the new method descends to it from above.

The reason lies in the difference between the groups of objects with which the two methods are severally concerned The Socratic method contemplates a single Form (such as The Beautiful Itself) and the many individual things which partake of that Form. Only one Form is no view, and the definition is to be gauned by a survey of individual mistances. We seek to isolate and apprehend the common character (zbko) which, in ordinary language, would be said to be 'present' in all the instances, as white hair is white 'by the presence of whiteness'.¹ One expedient is to 'adduce' (*brdyopola*.) fresh instances that have been overlooked and, when produced, are seen not to be covered by the respondent's suggested account. If he has implated that it is always right to tell the truth, you may bring forward the he told to deceive an enemy in war or an insame friend. This is one sense of *Epsaget*.

Another use of the verb $kraj_{var}$, to 'lead 'on', also fits the Socratic procedure. Anstolute speaks of 'leading on from nutvidual instances to the universal, and from the familiar to the unknown ', and defines 'Inducton' ($kraj_{var}/\eta$) as 'the approach from particulars to the universal.' His illustration is an argument of obviously Socratic pattern.' If the skilled palot is most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer, then un general the skilled man is best at his particular task.' The process is confined to the Socratic group of objects; from observation of individual cases, an act of maight discerns the universal latent in them and disengages it in a generalisation

But, as the Parmenulas showed,³ Plato's attention is now transferred from the group of individuals with its common Form to the relations of Forms among themselves, and in particular to the relations between the Forms which occur in the definition of a specific Form. The earnest passage betraying any interest in this question is in the Meso (75.6 fl., where a definition of 'Figure')

1 Lysis 217D.

¹ Piato, Pol 298. A certain devoce for teaching children ther letters is the easest way to "lead item on to what they do not yet know" (ényeu abrob en ri a infra yoyoacadaen) Ar. Top. 1524, 4. ényora deb rin xal fecaror én ri afellou sul ris youques én ri dynaera, itid 1056, 13. ényenyh, 4 én ris xal fecaror én ri arablou felor.

* See Introd., p 11.

--'that which always accompanies colour'--is rejected as containing the unknown term 'colour'. Terms should be defined by other terms admitted to be already known. Socrates obtains Meno's admussion that he understands 'boundary' and 'sohd' before subsituting the correct definition of Figure as 'the boundary of a solid'. It is significant that the illustration should be taken from mathematics. Geometry may have supphed the first formal examples of definition by genus and specific difference, such as the division of triangle into equilateral, isosciets, and scalene. Here all the terms are Forms. The study of their mutual relations takes no account of individual instances, mdefinite in number and beneath the level of knowledge. Triangular objects in the world of sense, which partake more or less perfectly of the triangular character, drop out of sight. The question how an indefinite number of individual lings can partate of a single Form gives place to that other queston raised in the *Parmensides* : Can many Forms partake of a single Form ?

The new method of Collection and Division is thus wholly confined to the world of Forms; and Collection must not be confused with the Socratic muster of individual instances (knowned) Collection is a survey of specific Forms having some prima facie claim to be members of the same genus. As usual, Plato avoids a rigid terminology, and uses 'Form' (elloc, 186a), and 'kind' (véroc) indifferently for genus and species alike.1 His only distinctive word for species is ' part ' (uéooc, uóo100). The method of Division exhibits Forms arranged in systematic classification, spreading downwards from a single genus, through a definite number of specific differences, to the indivisible species at the bottom. Below that there is nothing but the indefinite number of individual things which may or may not partake of the indivisible specific Form. They are below the horizon of science : the method considers only the One which is divided and the definite Many which are its ' parts '.ª

The Division should be preceded by a Collection, to fix upon the genus we are to divide. This is done by 'taking a comprehensive view and gathering a number of widely scattered terms into a unity'.³ Here no methodical procedure is possible. The generic Form must be divined by an act of intuition, for which no rules can be given. The survey will include the Form we wish ultimately

¹ For instance, at Soph 227D, the Stranger says there are 'two forms (aDay) of evil m the soul', and at 2285 Theastetus remarks 'there are, as you said, two kunds (ydw)) of evil m the soul'

^{*} Cf Philebus 16B ff

Phandrus 265D.

to define, with others that may be 'widely scattered' and have httle superficial resemblance to it or to one another.

The need for a preliminary Collection is, as we have seen, ignored in all but one of the early Divisions of the Sophist, and where it does occur it is abnormal. What I would now suggest is that these first six Divisions actually, though not formally, serve the purpose of a Collection preliminary to the seventh. They bring before us the types to be surveyed before we can fix upon the really fundamental character of Sophistry. The name 'Sophist' had been loosely applied to various classes : the rhetoricians, like Protagoras and Gorgias: teachers of advanced subjects, like Hippias : professional disputants, like Euthydemus. All these had called themselves 'Sophists'. Isocrates and the public had also applied the name to Socrates himself and to his followers, including the Megarians, whose methods of argument did resemble the dialectic of Zeno and the eristic of Euthydemus. The early Divisions analyse and characterise each of these types and so provide a survey of the field within which we must discover the really fundamental trait, the generic Form that will finally yield the correct definition of the essence of Sophistry.

The Collection is disguised in the misleading form of a series of tentative Divisions. The definitions in which they terminate are not definitions of 'the Sophist', but analytical descriptions of easily recognisable classes to whom the name had been attached. By this device Plato avoids mentioning the names of individuals or of schools, and can amuse himself with sature. At the same time he can familiarise the reader with the method of Division before giving the final serious analysis of the essential Sophist. If these six earlier Divisions are in effect a Collection, that explains why no one of them is preceded by a Collection of the normal pattern. Plato may also mean to indicate that, when a difficult idea is to be defined, it may be well to begin by making a number of tentative Divisions, each starting from some salient character. and then compare the results. The same character may be found at different points in the various tables ; and reflection may discover which is the really fundamental trait that ought to stand as genus. This, at any rate, is the result now to be reached in the next section of the dialogue.

231B-235A. Survey yielding the genus 'Image-making'

The translation will now be resumed. The following section opens with a summary, mustering for review the six types that have been characterised. Further analysis then leads to the discovery of a new generic character, Image-making, which is taken as a starting-point for the final Division. At 235B the Division is begun, but is soon arrested by the problem : how can there be such a thing as an image or false appearance? So we reach the metaphysical kernel of the dialogue.

To the Stranger's suggestion that we may let the purification of the soul from the conceit of wisdom pass by the name of 'the Sophistry of noble lineage', Theaetetus replies :

23TB. THEAET. Let it pass by that name. But by this time c. the Sophist has appeared in so many guises that for my

c. the Sophist has appeared in so many guises that for my part I am puzzled to see what description one is to maintain as truly expressing his real nature STR. You may well be puzzled. But we may suppose that by now the Sophist too is very much puzzled to see how he is once more to slip through the meshes of our argument; for it is a true saying that you cannot easily evade all the wrestler's grips. So now is the moment of all others to set upon hum.

THEAET. Well and good.

STR. First, then, let us stand and take breath ; and while

D. we are resting let us reckon up between ourselves in how many gusses the Sophist has appeared First, I think, he was found as the hired hunter of rich young men. THEAET. Yes.

STR. And secondly as a sort of merchant of learning as nourishment for the soul

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Thirdly, he showed himself as a retail-dealer in the same wares, did he not?

THEAET. Yes; and fourthly as selling the products of his own manufacture.

STR. Your memory serves you well. His fifth appearance E. I will myself try to recall. He was an athlete in debate, appropriating that subdivision of contention which consists in the art of Eristic.

THEAET He was.

STR. His sixth appearance was open to doubt; however, we conceded his claim to be described as a purifier of the soul from concetts that block the way to understanding. THERET. Quite so.

The Sophist has 'appeared in many guises' 1-as many things, not a unity. As Theaetetus suggests, we have not yet defined

¹ The word 'appear' is repeated many times : διλ τό πολλά πεφάνθαι (231B); όποσα ήμῶν ὁ σοφίστης πέφανται; ἀπεφάνη (D); φαίνηται, φάντοσμα (232A) his real or essential nature. In reckoning precessly the number of these appearances, we are neffect collecting the 'many scattered terms' which must be 'comprehensively surveyed', if we are to drune the genus that will yield the true definition. The Stranger now remarks that we have not divined it yet. We have given the Sophist the names of many arts (hunter, salesman, Eristic, etc); but' Sophist the sames of a single art. There must be some fundamental feature common to all these many arts, and our next business to 'see ticlearly' (wartsein)—Plato's favourite world for that act of insight or intuition (wignes), which sees directly, without any process of discursive reasoning '

32. STR Now does it strike you that, when one who is known by the name of a single art appears to be master of many.¹ there is something wrong with thus appearance? If one has that impression of any art, plainly it is because one cannot see clearly that feature of it in which all these forms of skill converge, and so one calls their possessor by many names instead of one

THEAET. I dare say that is the gist of the situation

B. STR If so, we must not be so lazy as to let that happen to us in our inquiry. Let us begin by going back to one among the characteristics we attributed to the Sophist. There was one that struck me particularly as revealing his character. INTREFT. What was that?

STR. We said, I believe, that he was a controversialist. THEAET. Yes.

STR. And further that he figures as an instructor of others in controversy

THEAET. Certainly.

The term 'controversialst' (drvloyux/c) actually occurred in the analysis of Enstr.c (Drvsion V, 2259), and was there given the limited sphere of 'private debates about rights and wrongs in the small change of question and answer'. Such controversy differed from the public debates about rights and wrongs carned on by the forensic orator, only in the superficial circumstance that it was conducted in private conversation. The wider term 'disputation' (dupu0/grtyruco)) covered both. Reduced to rules of art, controversy

¹ In Rep Vu, scalopär is frequently used as a synonym of work in this sense of immediate intuitive vision of a prior truth or premiss to be used in the proof of a desired conclusion. See F M Cornford, Mathematics and Dialectic in Republic vi-vu, Mind XL, pp 37 ff. 173 ff.

³ Note the introduction at the outset of the phrase which will presently receive a deeper significance : ' one who appears as knowing many things '

included the verbal disputation of the Eristic Sophist and the Megarian, and the dialectic of Zeno. Of all the arts described it came nearest in externals to the genuine dialectic of Socratesa resemblance that caused the confusion of Socrates and his followers with the Eristics. But in fundamental motive controversy, which neglects truth to gain victory, is diametrically opposed to the philosophic art of conversation.1 Victory is gained by producing a belief in the audience that you are in the right as against your opponent. Hence the term ' controversy ' is used in the Phaedrus (26IC ff.) to embrace both Zenoman dialectic and the public forms of rhetoric (political and forensic), as a single art which makes things seem right at one time, wrong at another, according as the orator chooses. It is a practice of deception leading on those who do not know the true nature of things to false beliefs. It is the art of one ' who does not know the truth, but has gone hunting after opinions'. That passage enlarges the meaning of 'controversy' so as to include the rhetorical Sophists," the hunters of Division I, the 'producers of persuasion' (nutleronovuer)) and professors of spurious education in goodness, who were alternatively regarded as salesmen of the soul's nourishment in Divisions II-IV. Protagoras humself will presently be named. Because of this wider sense, 'controversy' is pitched upon as a character common to all the types described in the earlier Divisions (except the purifier of the soul) and as the 'most revealing' trait. Nothing that is said here has any relevance to Cathartic.

The next point is that the art of controversy in which the Sophist instructs others, covers the whole field of knowledge. It is a formal technique of debate (whether conversational or rhetorical), supposed to make men capable of disputing on any subject without really knowing anything about it.

- 232B. STR. Let us consider, then, in what field these people profess to turn out controversulats. Let us go to the root of the matter and set about it in this way. Tell me, does
 - c. their pupils' competence extend to divine things that are hidden from common eyes?³

¹ Cf. Rep. 455.: Many people nurvitingly fail into controversy (*dr-layerd*) and mustake Eratic dispute for philosophic conversation (*olevelu olv égléu dbk deukéredu*), because think about meanings and 'divide them by kinds', but are misied by words to go in chase of verbal contradictions, *labk. e dkultere spis* dki/dere spiseres

Forense Oratory was actually grouped with private Controversy under the wider term Disputation (disponential, 2258), a word used here (232D) as synonymous with 'Controversy '.

Divine things' may mean religion, but possibly the vague phrase is meant to cover the divine and invisible entries of Plato's system, the Forms, 232C. THEAET. So it is said of them, at any rate.

STR. And also to all that is visible in sky and earth and everything of that sort.

THEAET. Surely.

STR. And in private circles, whenever any general statement is made about becoming or reality, we are aware how cleverly they can controvert it and make others able to do the same.

THEAET. Certainly.

D. STR. And then again where laws are in question or any political matter, do they not promise to produce debaters ? THEAET. If they did not hold out that promise, hardly anyone would take part in their discussions.¹

STR. And about the crafts in general and each particular craft, the arguments to be used in controversy with any actual craftsman have been published broadcast for all who choose to learn.

THEAET. I take it you mean what Protagoras wrote on E. wrestling and the other arts.²

STR. Yes, and on many other things. In fact, the pretensions of this art of controversy amount, it seems, to a capacity for disputation on any subject whatsoever.

THEAET. It certainly seems that nothing worth speaking of is beyond its scope.³

STR. Do you, then, my young friend, really think that

which are meanings of words in common use, though their true nature is unknown to the many The Phildewis for a call the eternal Form of the circle 'the divine circle' as opposed to the 'human' The 'divine things' are contrasted in the next speech with the vanhe parts of the universe, and the terms 'reality' and 'becoming' just below suggest the intelligible and senable worlds So at sigs the region of true reality is called 'the divine' (rd \$wiso), on which the eye of the vulgar soul cannot fix its gaze

¹ Theastetus echoes Socrates' remark about Protagoras at *Theast.* 1782 (p 91).

^{*} Frotagoras published criticisms of special arts, probably in the two books of Convocrises (Arridopica, Diela, Vors^{*} 10, 33^(*)) or in the 'Abéña, which Bernays identified with the Convicorsister. It is attack on mathematics as mentioned by Arastotic (Mst. 997b, 33) Diela (abd) quotes Hippocrites e. recovés I (L. v. 140). 'Mhoever washes to ask and answer questions correctly and to dispute (dorudopou) about medicine, should bear in mind the following trutha, etc. This suggests Excite doebate about Medicines

*Pinto has not exaggerated the hatorical sophists' claim to wadom on all mbjects. Apelit cites a passage in the Dalaeses, an anonymous summary of argumenta, which some believe to have been based on the locture of some fifth-century sophist: 'I hold that it belongs to the same period and to the same art to be able to converse, to know the truth of things; to under SOPHIST

- 232E. possible ? You young people may perhaps see more clearly ; my eyes are too dim.
- 233. THEAET. Is what possible? What am I meant to see? I don't clearly understand what you are asking me.

STR. Whether it is possible for any human being to know everything.

THEAET. Mankind would indeed be happy, if it were so. STR. Then if a man who has no knowledge controverts one who does know, how can there be any sound sense in what he says ?

THEAST. There cannot be.

STR. Then what can be the secret of this magical power of Sophistry ?

THEAET. In what respect?

B. STR. I mean, how they can ever create a belief in the minds of young men that they are the wises of men on all subjects ? For clearly if they were not in the right in their controversies or did not appear to be so in the young men's eyes, and if that appearance did not enhance the belief that they are wise because they can dispute, then, to quote your own remark, it is hard to see why anyone should want to pay their fees and be taught this art of disputation.

THEAET. Hard indeed.

STR. But in actual fact there is a demand. THEAET Quite a brisk one.

c. STR No doubt because the Sophists are believed to possess a knowledge of their own in the subjects they dispute about.

THEAET. No doubt

STR. And, we say, there is no subject they do not dispute about.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. So they appear to their pupils to be wise on all subjects.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Although they are not really wise ; for that, we saw, is impossible.

THEAET. It must be impossible.

stand how to give a right verdict in court, to be able to speak in public; to understand the arts of discourse; and to give nathroctons on the nature of all things, how they are and how they came to be. He who knows the nature of all things must surely be able to unstruct hh at yt to act rightly in all matters. He who understands the arts of discourse will know how to speak rightly on any whylet?, and son (Disclasses 8, Disk), (we st. 1, 34, 4)

- 233C. STR. The upshot is, then, that the Sophist possesses a sort of reputed and apparent knowledge on all subjects, but not the reality.
 - D. THEAET. I quite agree, and perhaps this is the truest thing that has yet been said about them.

We are, in fact, at last approaching the essential feature of Sophistry. Controversy in the wide sense, a technique of debate applied to any subject, implies the false concert of wisdom in the Sophist himself and a false belief in that wisdom created in his pupils. This links with the 'spurious education' of Division I (*dogconaudevrori*, 223AB), producing that 'vain conceit of wisdom ' (*dogcongia*) which the true education of the Cathartic *elenchus* was designed to expel (323B).

The next speeches bring into view the genus. Productive Art, that will yield the final Division. The Sophist's power of producing an illusory belief in his own wisdom and a false appearance of unversal knowledge reveals him as a creator of appearances, an illusionist, one who produces an imitation of real things in play, comparable with the artist who can make images of all things in heaven and earth.

233D. STR. Let us, then, take an analogy that will throw more light on their position. THEAET. What is that? STR. It is this. Try to give me your closest attention in answering. THEAET. What is your question ? STR. Suppose a man professed to know, not how to speak or dispute about everything, but how to produce all things in actual fact by a single form of skill. E. THEAET. What do you mean by 'all things'? STR. My meaning is beyond your comprehension at the very outset. It seems you do not understand what is meant by 'all things'. THEAET. No. STR. Well, 'all things' is meant to include you and me and, besides ourselves, all other animals and plants. THEAET. How do you mean? STR. Suppose a man should undertake to produce you and me and all creatures. THEAET. What sort of production do you mean? You 234.

cannot mean some sort of farmer, for you spoke of him as producing animals as well.

STR. Yes, and besides that, sea and sky and earth and gods

SOPHIST

234. and everything else there is. What is more, after producing any one of them with a turn of the hand he sells them for quite a moderate sum. TREAST. You mean in some kind of play ? STR. Well, a man who says he knows everything and could

teach it to another for a small fee in a short time can hardly be taken in earnest.

THEAET. Assuredly not.

B. Srn. And of all forms of play, could you think of any more skilful and amusing than imitation ? Inraar. No. When you take that one form with all that it embraces, it covers a very large variety. Srn. Well, we know this about the man who professes to be able, by a single form of skill, to produce all things, that when he creates with his pencil representations bearing the same name as real things, he will be able to deceive the inmocent minds of children, if he shows them his drawings at a distance, into thinking that he is capable of creating, in full reality, anythine be chooses to make.

C, THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then must we not expect to find a corresponding form of skull in the region of discourse, making it possible to impose upon the young who are still far removed from the reality of things, by means of words that cheat the ear, exhibiting images of all things in a shadow-play of discourse, so as to make them believe that they are hearing the truth and that the speaker is in all matters the wises of men?

- D. TREAFT. There may well be such an art as you describe. STR. And is it not inevitable that, after a long enough time, as these young hearers advance in age and, coming into closer touch with realities, are forced by experence to apprehend things clearly as they are, most of them should abandon those former beliefs, so that what seemed important will now appear triffing and what seemed easy, difficult, and all the illusions created in discourse will be completely
- E. overturned by the realities which encounter them in the actual conduct of life ? INEAET. Yes, so far as I can judge at my age; but I suppose I am one of those who are still at a distance. STR. That is why all of us here must try, as we are in fact trying, to bring you as close as possible to the realities and spare you the experience.

But about the Sophist : tell me, is it now clear that he 235. is a sort of wizard, an imitator of real things—or are we still

TWO SPECIES OF IMAGE-MAKING

235. uncertain whether he may not possess genuine knowledge of all the things he seems capable of disputing about ? TREART. He cannot, sir. It is clear enough from what has been said that he is one of those whose province is play. STR. Then we may class him as a wizard and an unitator of some sort. TREART. Certainly.

The imagery of this passage is intended to recall the allegory of the Cave in the *Republic*. The young who are far removed from reality and can be deluded by the images (*sidola*) exhibited in the Sophist's discourse are like the prisoners bound in the darkness who watch on the wall of the Cave the shadows cast by firelight from images behind their backs. The mages are shown above a wall which screens the men carrying them as the puppet-showman is screened from his audence.¹ The allegory goes on to describe, in language recalling the cathartic ministry of Socrates, a luberator who turns the prisoners round and tries to convince them that the actual images they can now see are nearer to reality than the shadows they watched before. So in our passage the Stranger speaks of bringing Theaetetus and his young friends closer to the realities.

235A-236C. Division of Image-making into two species

We have now completed the analytical survey of the collection of types, rightly or wrongly called 'Sophists', provided by the six earlier Divisions. The train of thought has led us away from the Acquisitive class of Arts, the starting-point of all the first five Divisions, to the other class which was set aside at the very outset (219A), the Productive class. Acquisitiveness is not the fundamental trait in Sophistry. The Sophist is a creator, but a creator of illusions. We shall ultimately define his essence by dividing the Productive branch of Art in the complete table given at the end of the dialogue. Here, however, we start with the genus Imagemaking, which stands at a point some way down that table. The Sophist has just been grouped with the fine artist as a mere imitator of actual things, a maker of images or semblances. In the next section Image-making or Imitation is divided into two forms, before the Division is broken off in order to examine all the problems connected with appearance and falsity.

¹ Rep VII, 5148: ώστερ τοῦς θαυματοποιοῦς πρό τῶν ἀνθρώτων πρόκεται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὴρ ῶν τὰ θαύματα δαυσίως. The Sophist is called, 'a kind of θαυματοποιόζ: at Soph. 325 and 268D.

SOPHIST

- 235A. STR. Come then, it is now for us to see that we do not
 - B. again relax the pursuit of our quarry. We may say that we have him enveloped in such a ret as argument provides for hunting of this sort. He cannot shuffle out of this. TREART. Out of what? STR. Out of being somewhere within the class of illusionists.¹ TREART. So far I quite agree with you. STR. Agreed then that we should at once quarter the ground by dividing the art of Image-making, and if, as soon as we descend into that enclosure, we meet with the Sophist c at bay, we should arrest hum on the royal warrant of reason.
 - c. at bay, we should arrest hum on the royal warrant of reason, report the capture, and hand hum over to the sovereign.¹ But if he should find some lurkmg-place among the subdivisions of this art of timitaton, we must follow hard upon hum, constantly dividing the part that gives hum shelter, until he is caught. In any event there is no fear that he or any other kund shall ever boast of having eluded a process of investigation so minute and so comprehensive. TREAET, Good, that is the way to go to work.

STR. Following, then, the same method of division as

D. before, I seem once more to make out two forms of imitation; but as yet I do not feel able to discover in which of the two the type we are seeking is to be found.

THEAET. Make your division first, at any rate, and tell us what two forms you mean.

STR. One art that I see contained in it is the making of hkenesses (eikssiké). The perfect example of this consists in creating a copy that conforms to the proportions of the original in all three dimensions and giving moreover the

E. proper colour to every part. THEAET. Why, is not that what all imitators try to do?

¹ Sauserosoias means specially the puppet-showman, but it is used here to cover all species of 'imitators '-artists and poets as well as Sophists (cf. 224A). They are all 'creators of sodola'.

⁴ Applit illustrates the allisons to the Persan method (called 'draw-nettang', expressiof of several parts which population of a district by means of a line of soliters holding hands and marching across it. It is several times menotometry before Salamis, sent word to Athens that he had captured all the Everana by this method, under Draws' orders (the 'royal warrant') to transport all Revisorable and them at the Free. The method is an duminable information of the transmitter of the transmitter and the same to Free. The method is an duminable to Brand' orders are not all the transmitter of th

TWO SPECIES OF IMAGE-MAKING

- 235E. STR. Not those sculptors or painters whose works are of colossal size. If they were to reproduce the true proportions of a well-made figure,¹ as you know, the upper parts would
- 336. look too small, and the lower too large, because we see the one at a distance, the other close at hand. TREAST. That is true. STR. So artists, leaving the truth to take care of itself, do in fact put into the images they make, not the real proportions, but those that will appear beautiful. TREAST. Quite so. STR. The first kind of image, then, being like the original, may fairly be called a likeness (skow). TREAST. Yes. B. STR. And the corresponding subdivision of the art of
 - B. STR. And the corresponding subdivision of the art of imitation may be called by the name we used just now---Likeness-making

THEAET. It may.

STR. Now, what are we to call the kind which only appears to be a hikeness of a well-made figure because it is not seen from a satisfactory point of view, but to a spectator with eyes that could fully take in so large an object would not be even like the original it professes to resemble ? Since it seems to be a likeness, but is not really so, may we not call it a semblance (*bhawlassma*)?

THEAET. By all means.

STR. And this is a very extensive class, in painting and c. in imitation of all sorts.

THEAET. True.

STR. So the best name for the art which creates, not a likeness, but a semblance will be Semblance-making (*phantastike*). THEAET. Quite so.

STR These, then, are the two forms of image-making I meant-the making of likenesses and the making of semblances.

THEAET. Good.

At this point the Division is broken off. It is not at once clear why images should be divided here into 'likenesses' and 'semblances'.

¹ Well-made' (eaks), because what is in question is not improving the proportions of an il-made model to conform to canons of bearty, but alterning the proportions which are really beautiful is as to keep the appearance of bearty. Apple inschool shows in the Figurament macryphon on a wall at Genoanda, the letters in the top lines are cut larger than those in the lower, so that all may look the same case from blow.

The whole description of the Sophist as Imitator is meant to recall the attack on fine art as 'imitation' in Republic x; an attack based on metaphysical grounds which will reappear when our present Division is fully stated at the end of the dialogue. The object of that attack is to show that the representations of fine art. considered as imitations of actual things, are at two removes from true reality. The carpenter who makes an actual bed works with reference to a unique Form, a model not made by any carpenter. but fixed in the nature of things and made by God. This Form is real in the full sense : the carpenter's bed is ' something like this reality, but not perfectly real'; it belongs to the world of sensible things, which are only images of the real. The painter is farther still from reality. He copies, not the Form, but the craftsman's product, and that not as it is, but only as it appears from one point of view. He does not produce a second actual bed, a replica of the craftsman's work, but only 'an imitation of an appearance (bhantasma)', which may deceive a distant spectator. So a man might claim to ' make ' all things in heaven and earth by turning a mirror in his hands and catching their reflections-a marvellous virtuoso $(\theta a v u a \sigma \tau d c \sigma o \omega \sigma \tau \eta c)$! The painter's, or the poet's, work is only 'play'.

This part of the Republic has already been recalled by the description of the man who should profess to produce all things (233D ff.) : and it throws light on the present distinction between ' hkenesses ' and 'semblances', which is mentioned again in the full Division at 266D. Both here and in the Republic the whole of fine art, considered as ' imitative ', falls under the art of making 'semblances'. not 'hkenesses'. Plato does not mean that there is a good and honest kind of art which makes ' likenesses ' reproducing the actual proportions in all three dimensions and the natural colours of the original-a production of waxworks-and a dishonest kind, including the Parthenon sculptures, which distorts the true proportions. The term 'hkeness' is here used in a narrower sense than usual.1 It means a reproduction or replica, such as the making of a second actual bed, reproducing exactly the first bed made by the carpenter. If I make a plaster cast of a plaster cast, there is nothing to choose between the 'likeness' (copy) and the original. The two are exactly alike and either can be called the 'very image' of the other. In this case there is no element of deceit or illusion. This is the production of ' likenesses '. It lies outside the scope of fine art and

¹ Plato is never rigid in his use of terms. At Cratyliss 432B, 'likeness' (sikes) has its more usual sense of the painter's portrait, which is not a complete replica but is contrasted with a duplicate of the satter, such as a god might create, a second actual person

PROBLEMS OF EIDOLA AND FALSITY

of Sophistry. The Sophist creates 'images (*sidola*) in discourse ' (234c); but if there is such a thing in discourse as the productive of exact replicas, we are not concerned with it. All the 'images' we are going to consider fall under the inferior branch, the production of semblances, that are not complete reproductions of the original, but involve an element of deceit and illusion. This means that the class of 'images' (*sidola*) we are concerned with—semblances—imply two relations between image and original. The image is more or less *like* the original, though not wholly like it, not a reproducton. But it is also conceived as possessing in some sense a *lower grade of reality*, as illusory, phantom-like. We are to think of the work of 'semblance-makers' (artists and sophists) as analogous to shadow and reflections of natural objects, 'appearances' of thmgs that are themselves only images of the real world of Forms.

236C-237B. Statement of the problems of unreal appearances and of faisity in speech and thought

Here the Division is interrupted. The Sophist has been taxed with creating a false belief in his own wisdom by false statements. But, he will object, it is impossible to think or state 'the thing that is not'. The *Theastetus* failed to meet this objection with a satisfactory definition of false judgment. The present dialogue will supply one.

At the same time, many allusions to the *Republic* have recalled that the whole visible world is only an image of the real. The Demiurge himself is an image-maker. The long discusson which here intervenes before the division of Image-making can be resumed, is not confined to proving the possibility of false judgment and clearing up misconceptions as to the meaning of negative statements. It has a bearing on the metaphysical status of a world of appearances. Parmendes denied that there could be a world intermediate between the perfectly real and the totally non-existent. This problem of the *sidom* soon comes into view, alongside the problem of false judgment.

- 236c. STR. Yes; but even now I cannot see clearly how to settle the doubt I then expressed : under which of the two arts (likeness-making and semblance-making) we must place the
 - D. Sophist. It is really surprising how hard it is to get a clear view of the man. At this very moment he has, with admirable cleverness, taken refuge in a class ¹ which baffles investigation.

¹ Namely 'unreal appearance and falsity'.

SOPHIST

236D. THEAET. So it seems.

STR. You assent, but do you recognise the class I mean, or has the current of the argument carried you along to agree so readily from force of habit?

THEAET. How? What are you referring to?

- STR. The truth is, my friend, that we are faced with an R. extremely difficult question. This 'appearing' or 'seeming' without really 'being', and the saying of something which vet is not true-all these expressions have always been and still are deeply involved in perplexity. It is extremely hard, Theaetetus, to find correct terms in which one may say or think that falsehoods have a real existence, without being caught in a contradiction by the mere utterance of such words.1
- 237.

THEAET. Why?

STR The audacity of the statement lies in its implication that 'what is not' has being : for in no other way could a falsehood come to have being But, my young friend, when we were of your age the great Parmenides from beginning to end testified against this constantly telling us what he also savs in his poem :

' Never shall this be proved-that things that are not are : but do thou, in thy inquiry, hold back thy thought from this way.' *

B. So we have the great man's testimony, and the best way to obtain a confession of the truth may be to put the statement itself to a mild degree of torture 3 So. if it makes no difference to you, let us begin by studying it on its own merits

THEAET. I am at your disposal. As for the argument, you must consider the way that will best lead to a conclusion. and take me with you along it. STR. It shall be done.

¹ Falsehoods being ' things which are not ', as the Stranger next remarks, A common equivalent of ' speaking falsely ' is ' saying the thing that is not ', see Theast, 188D ff (p. 114). Campbell correctly interprets the construction. wood is placed where it stands for emphasis

* Parmentides, frag 7 I have discussed the nature of the ' ways of inquiry ' in Parmenules' Two Ways (Class Quarterly, XXVII (1933), p 97)

* The statement stelf (that falsehood, or what is not, really exists) is compared to a slave belonging to the other party in the suit, against whom Parmenides has borne witness. The immediate sequel submits this statement (not Parmenudes) to examination. Parmenudes' own statement will be put to the question later (rdr rol marpes Happenbou draykaior . . Basarl(er, 241D). It is thus agreed to take, if necessary, the 'way of inquiry ' forbidden by Parmenides, and to consider whether and m what sense 'that which is not'—the inneal or the not wholly real or the false—can have any sort of being or existence. The vague formula is wide enough to cover three problems, all of which had their origin in the challenge thrown down to common sense by Parmenides.

(1) ' This appearing or seeming without really being ' covers the metaphysical problem : If there is a world of real being (Parmenides' One Being or Plato's world of real Forms), how can there also be a world of Seeming, which is neither wholly real nor utterly nonexistent? Parmenides had said, there cannot be such a world of Seeming. A thing must either be or not be : if it is, then it is absolutely and completely : if it is not, then it is not absolutely and completely. In the first part of his poem he had deduced the nature of the One Reality and found that it excludes plurality. motion, change, and the qualities which our senses seem to reveal. Faithful to his logic, he had dismissed all these appearances of Nature as unreal and false, and left them unaccounted for. But Plato has argued 1 that between knowledge of the perfectly real and the blank absence of any consciousness of the totally unreal. we find in ourselves a faculty of Opinion or belief (doza, in the widest sense), which produces in us states of mind distinct from knowledge in the full sense and must therefore have a different set of objects. Of these objects he has said that ' they partake both of being and of not-being'. There are, for instance, the 'many beautiful things' which are unlike Beauty itself in that they come into existence and perish, undergo change, and can appear ugly no less than beautiful. In the magery of the Line and the Cave these objects were called 'likenesses' (shower) or 'images' (should) of the real Forms.

The first problem here suggested is: how can there be such things as these visible images of unseen realities? How can anything 'partake both of being and of not-being' or yield appearances without being real? The *Theastetus* has given some account of the physical process by which appearances are given to the senses. Our perceptions of them, as distinct from judgments we make about them, have been admitted to be infallible. But the extremal objects were declared to have no stable or real being, but only becoming. So there remains the present problem : what sort of existence, short of real being, can such objects have ?

(2) The second problem is the possibility of 'saying or thinking something which yet is not true'. This is the psychological aspect of the same question. Parmenides had said: 'It is the same thing that can be *thought* and that can be '. 'You cannot *know* what is not, nor utter it'. Thought must have an object, and that something must be real. This had given rise to the question we have already encountered in the *Theatetines* (1880 fl.): How is it possible to say or think what is *jailset*? If I think or speak, I must be thinking of something and meaning something. But what is this something, if what I say or think is false? There is no such thing as a false fact. How can I state something as a fact when there is no fact to state?

(3) Finally, there was the problem of negative judgments and statements (whether true or false). It was supposed that the words 'is not', occurring in a negative statement, must mean that the thing about which the statement was made did not exist. But if it does not exist, I am speaking of nothing: I the sounds I utter have no meaning. There is nothing for a negative statement to mean or refer to.

Some accounts of the Sophist represent the whole of what now follows as a solution of the last problem only.¹ But in fact it covers the whole range of questions just mentioned. They are not kept rigidly distinct; but the discussion falls into sections which, in their main bearings, are concerned with the three sets of problems:

I. 237B-251A. The Worlds of Reality and Appearance.

II. 251A-259D. Affirmative and Negative Statements. the various meanings of 'is' and 'is not', and the corresponding relations among the terms the statements refer to.

III. 259D-264B. False Speech and Judgment—the question directly involved in the analysis of Sophistry as the creation of false belief.

I. THE WORLDS OF REALITY AND APPEARANCE

The long section which begins at the point we have now reached and goes on to 251A, deals mainly with the metaphysical contrast of Reality and Appearance. It falls into three subdivisions corresponding to the three categories of Plato's analysis in *Republic* v:

¹ Burnet (Great PMi 1, 278): 'The modern reader would feel no difficulty if Plato had amounced a duscesson of the possibility of significant negative judgments, and that, as a matter of fact, is the subject of the dialogue 'But the reader would feel a difficulty. He would would why they had suid about reality. Why should not Plato say at mose that the words 'Is' and 's not' are ambiguous, and point out (as he does later) some of their different meaning? (a) The totally unreal (το μηδαμώς δr). This is dismissed from the discussion.

(b) The intermediate region of 'images' (widol), things which have some sort of existence but are not wholly real. The term widows is defined, and the problems of false judgment and false speech are stated. They cannot be further discussed without considering the meaning of 'real'.

(c) The perfectly real (τ∂ παντελῶς ὄ). A review is held of earlier and contemporary theories of the nature of the real, and a compromise is suggested between the extreme views of the materialist and the idealist.

This whole section is mainly tentative and inconclusive. It develops the difficulties connected with 'not-being 'in all its senses —the unreal, the negative, the false. At the end (2502) the Stranger says, 'Let us take it, then, that our difficulty is now completely stated. But since Being and Not-being are equally puzzling, there is henceforward some hope that any light, whether dum or bright, thrown upon the one will illuminate the other to an equal degree.' As we proceed, certain difficulties are settled and cleared out of the way; others are left either unsolved or to await their solution in later sections of the dialogue.

237B-239C. (a) The totally unreal

We start, then, with the notion of the totally unreal (rd $\mu p A p_{d} \mu \beta_{G}$ δp) or that which just simply is not '(rd $\mu \beta' \sigma \sigma d \sigma' a d \sigma'$). Sheer unreality had been the only alternative recognised by Parmendes to perfect reality : and he had declared that the totally unreal was not to be thought or even spoken of. The 'way 'that starts from it was 'utterly undiscernible' (frag. 4) and must be left on one side as 'unthuskible and unnameable' (frag. 8, 15). No being can ever be derived from the sheer non-existence of anything.

In the following section Plato is not criticising, but confirming, this doctrine. The Stranger will not break with Parmenides until sheer nonentity has been disposed of and he enters on the region of unreal appearances and false statement, where it will become necessary to maintain what Parmenides refused to admit—things that have some sort of existence without being wholly real.

237B. STR. (continues). Now tell me: we do not hesitate to utter the phrase 'that which has no sort of being '? ' THEAET. Surely not.

¹ τό μηδαμώς όν, the 'totally unreal' or 'absolute nonentity'. We can 'utter this phrase' (φθέγγκοθαι), but it will be shown to have no meaning.

- 237B. STR. Then setting aside disputation for its own sake ¹ and playing with words, suppose one of this company were
 - c. seriously required to concentrate his mind and 'tell us to what this name can be applied—' that which is not'. Of what thing or of what sort of thing should we expect him to use it himself, and what would he indicate by it to the inquire?

THEAET. That is a hard question. It is scarcely for a person like me to find an answer at all.

STR. Well, this much is clear at any rate: that the term 'what is not ' must not be applied to anything that exists. THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. And since it cannot be applied to what exists, neither can it properly be applied to 'something'. THEAET. How so ?

D. STR. Surely we can see that this expression ' something ' is always used of a thing that exists. We cannot use it just by itself in naked isolation from everything that exists, can we ?

THEAET. No.

STR. Is your assent due to the reflection that to speak of 'something' is to speak of 'some one thing'?³ THEAET. Yes.

STR. Because you will admit that 'something' stands for one thing, as 'some things' stands for two or more. THEAET. Certainly.

E. STR. So it seems to follow necessarily that to speak of what is not 'something' is to speak of no thing at all.

THEAET. Necessarily.

STR. Must we not even refuse to allow that in such a case a person is saying something, though he may be speaking of nothing? Must we not assert that he is not even saying anything when he sets about uttering the sounds ' a thing that is not '?

¹ The problems to be stated had figured in Eristic debate, but our purpose is to face the real difficulties sensously.

Compare the argument at Thesenser 1880 ff. (p 114) The accident that Englaha confines isome ower and in one we're persons, 'monshing', 'nothing' to thinge, makes transition awfward. Greek has (1) ng, 'some (maso comeons, next something) while (no peetry its contraductory ofne, 'not-some' (maso no-one, next nothing), and (2) obde,' not even one '(maso no-one, next no-thing) with its regular contraductory of y ng, 'at least owe one' (maso resource, next something), which a used here, and has to be rendered 'some one thing', in order to introduce the word' cose'.

(a) THE TOTALLY UNREAL

237E. THEAET. That would certainly bring the argument to the last pitch of perplexity.

It is hard to translate the above argument because the phrase Mever re is used in two ways, (1) to 'speak of something' that your words refer to ; and (2) ' to express a meaning ' or say something significant as opposed to 'saving nothing' or 'talking nonsense' (ovder lever). But the ambiguity does not vitiate the argument. We are here taking 'what is not' as equivalent to ' the totally unreal', ' absolute nonentity ' and to that only. The suggestion is that, when I utter the sounds ' what is not', those sounds are meaningless noises ; there is nothing whatever for them to refer to, and I have no meaning before my mind which I can hope to convey. How can I talk significantly or think of what has no sort of being at all? The inference will be that in the expression ' to say the thing that is not ' in the sense of ' to say what is false ' (but has some meaning), ' the thing that is not ' cannot be not absolute nonentity. We must find some other interpretation of the words. A false statement conveys meaning to another person and refers to something. How this can be, must be considered later : all that is established here is that any statement (true or false) which conveys meaning cannot refer to ' absolute nonentity '.

The Stranger's next argument is again based on Parmenides, who had said :

' Thou canst not know that which is not (for that is impossible), nor utter it.'

If (as Parmenides held and as we are here assuming) the words ' that which is not ' stand for the totally unreal or absolute nonentity, that cannot be the object of any kind of knowledge or consciousness; and you cannot even find any words to describe it correctly. The Stranger argues, in particular, that we cannot speak of the non-existent at all without using words that are either singular or plural. But how can the totally non-existent have any number —be either one or many ?

238. 'No time for boasting yet.' There is more to come, in fact the chief of all the difficulties and the first, for it goes to the very root of the matter. THEAST. How do you mean? Do not hesitate to state it. STR. When a thing exasts, I suppose something else that exists may be attributed to it. THEAST. Certamly. STR. But can we say it is possible for something that exists to be attributed to what has no exstence?

- 238. THEAST. How could it be? STR. Well, among things that exist we include number in general.
 - THEAET. Yes, number must exist, if anything does, B. STR. We must not, then, so much as attempt to attach either plurality or unity in number to the non-existent. THEAET. That would certainly seem to be wrong, according to our argument. STR. How then can anyone utter the words ' things which are not', or 'that which is not', or even conceive such things in his mind at all, apart from number ? THEAET. How do you mean ? STR. When we speak of 'things that are not'. are we c. not undertaking to attribute plurality to them ? THEAET. Yes. STR. And unity, when we speak of 'that which is not'? THEAET. Clearly. STR. And yet we admit that it is not justifiable or correct

to set about attaching something that exists to the nonexistent.

THEAET. Ouite true.

STR. You see the inference then : one cannot legitimately utter the words, or speak or think of that which just simply is not : it is unthinkable, not to be spoken of or uttered or expressed.1

THEAET. Ouite true.

D. STR. Perhaps then I was mistaken in saving just now that I was going to state the greatest difficulty it presents ; whereas there is a worse one still that we can formulate. THEAST. What is that ?

STR. I am surprised you do not see from the very phrases I have just used that the non-existent reduces even one who is refuting its claims 1 to such straits that, as soon as he sets about doing so, he is forced to contradict himself. THEAET. How? Explain more clearly.

STR. You must not look to me for illumination. I who E. laid it down that the non-existent could have neither unity

nor plurality, have not only just now but at this very

¹ όλογον, not ' irrational ', but ' incapable of being expressed in discourse ' (Adyos). There is no meaning conveyed (cf Parm 142A) dopyror means that there is nothing for the words to refer to. Plato is echoing Parmenides' warning against the 'Way of Not-Being ', ' to leave that way as unthinkable, unnameable; for it is no true way' (frag 8, 15).

^a Refuting any claim it might make to 'being' I cannot even deny its existence without contradicting myself by speaking of it at all.

(a) THE TOTALLY UNREAL

a38x. moment spoken of it as one thing: for I am saying 'the non-existent'. You see what I mean?
THEAST. Yes.
STR. And again a little while ago I was speaking of its being a thing not to be uttered or spoken of or expressed. Do you follow?
THEAST. Yes, of course.
STR. Well, then, in trying to apply that term 'being'
to it, was I not contradicting what I said before?¹
STR. And again a applying the term 'the', was I not

STR. And again in applying the term 'the', was I not addressing it as singular?¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And again in speaking of it as 'a thing not to be expressed or spoken of or uttered', I was using language as if referring to a single thing.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Whereas we are admitting that, if we are to speak strictly, we ought not to specify it as either one thing or many or even to call it 'it' at all ; for even that appellation means ascribing to it the character of singleness. TREART. Ounte so.

B. STR. In that case there is nothing to be said for me. I shall be found to have had the worst of it, now and all along, in my criticism of the non-existent. Accordingly, as I said, we must not look to anything I have to say for the correct way of describing the non-existent; we must turn to you for that. Come along now. TREAST. What do you mean?

STR. Come, you are young; show your spirit and make

 3 The reference is to 238a : nothing that has existence must be attributed to the non-existent 'Being' (rd elves) is something that exists, in the same sense that number exists.

¹ Read re¹ re¹ for reform. If refore is retained, the meaning can only be 'I not only used the verb' to be ', but I used it in the angular number (ferrow) in the phrase referred to (ferro é haséryer er), 350; 10). But if Plato meant thus, why did he not make it clear by writing for derb for each at 85 and ref ye ferro for ré ye ferse at 83? For refore Conjecture a' re³, 'in applying the word for inguilarly oit, was I not addressing it as angular ?'. By sump deau we have contradicted the words 'i gd for 'i dre' of the ref' is to quality discussible. Clear the set of reform the reformable clear to set of reform the reformable clear to set of the ref' is not all of addressing it as angular ?'. By sump deau we have contradicted the words 'gd for 'i dre' of all the ref' is or all to do for the ref' of the ref' is a set of the ref' of the ref' is a set of the ref' is a set

- 239B. the best effort you can. Try, without attributing being or unity or plurality to the non-existent, to find some form of words describing it correctly.
 - C. THEAET. I should need an extraordinary zeal for such an enterprise in face of what has happened to you.

This paragraph only reinforces the previous one by emphasising that the very words 'the non-existent' (absolute nonentity) cannot be uttered at all without self-contradiction. This point is not urged against Parmenides, and could not be urged without descending to captiousness. In all this section on 'the totally non-existent ' Plato is rather confirming Parmenides and accepting his warning : 'Hold back thy thought from this way of inquiry.' Plato does not afterwards go back upon the results here reached. The only later reference to this discussion of nonentity is at 258E after the other sense of ' that which is not ' (viz. ' that which is other than ') has been brought to light. The Stranger there says : 'So let no one say that it is the contrary of the existent (s.e. the simply non-existent) that we mean when we make bold to say that ' what 15 not ' exists. So far as any contrary of the existent is concerned, we have long ago said good-bye to the question whether there is such a thing or not, and whether any account can be given of it or none whatsoever.' Plato here, as in Republic v. accepts Parmenides' doctrine that the totally non-existent cannot be thought or spoken of.

This is all he has to say about a problem that has troubled modern logicians who have discussed the thesis that ' whatever is thought of must in some sense be '-Parmenides' thesis. Mr. Russell at one time, by distinguishing 'being' from 'existence', endowed non-existent things, like Chimaeras, with a sort of 'being', 'for if they were not entities we could make no propositions about them '. But this provision for non-existent entities seems now to be abandoned in favour of the view that there are descriptions. e.g. ' round square ', which describe nothing.1 So logic returns to the position of common sense, that there is nothing to prevent us from putting together verbal symbols such as 'round' and 'square' in phrases which refer to nothing whatever, because there is nothing for them to refer to. Plato's view seems to be that the phrase 'the totally non-existent ' is a description, or, as he would say, a 'name', that is a name of nothing at all. What corresponds to it psychologically is the blank absence of any kind of cognition (dywarda, Rep. v, 477A). He adds that the name does not even succeed in describing nothing correctly.

¹ See L S. Stebbing, Modern Introduction to Logic, chap ix, § 5. Happily we need not discuss other varieties of nonentity discovered by Meinong.

(b) EIDOLON DEFINED

The upshot is that we have no further use for 'nonentity' and can rule it out of the discussion. It cannot be invoked to account for the existence either of false statement and false belief or of a world of 'appearances' containing things not wholly real. So far as nonentity is concerned, Parmeidles is justified, except that strictly he had no more right than we have to make even negative statements about it or to utter the 'unutterable'.

2390-242B. (b) Definition of endolon and the problem of false statement and belief

Having said good-bye to 'nonentity', we now pass to the region intermediate between sheer non-existence and full reality—the world of eidola. Two sets of problems await us here. (1) How is it possible that anything should exast and yet not be wholly real? What sort of existence can belong to that world of 'appearances', demed by Parmenides, but recognised by Plato as the object of 'opinion', distinct from the object of knowledge? (2) How can false statement and false belief be explained ? If I say something that is significant (not a meaningless noise), my statement must refer to something. But what can it refer to, if it is false ' Having accused the Sophist of being a creator of eidola, of false statements and false beliefs, we must meet his objections that there can be no such thing as an eidolm, neither wholly real nor wholly unreal, and no such thing as a false statement or belief.

We have ghmpses of the sort of arguments used in Plato's time and earher. In a tract written probably about 400 B.C.¹ the author, presumably a Sophist, uses a Protagorean argument against those who attacked medicine as 'not a real art' (*one konca rfsrm*):

'It seems to me in general that there is no art that is not (real), for it is irrational to think that something which is, is not. For what 'being ' (*obola*) have things that are not, which one could look at and say of it that 'it is '? For if it is possible to see things that are not, as you can see things that are, I do not understand how one can regard them as not being, when you can see them with your eyes and think of them in your mid that they are. It is not so. Things that are, are always seen and known; 'thungs that are not, are not seen and known.'

The two problems are now raised successively. (1) The term edolow is defined as meaning a thing that is not wholly real but yet has some sort of existence. If there is such a thing as an eidolow, then something that has not 'being' in the full sense,

P.T.K.

¹ [Hippocr] sept rigrage, 2, cited by Apelit (trans, p 138) In his interesting edition (*Die Apologie der Heilaussi*, Laping, 1910) Th. Gomperz argues that the author may be Protagoras hinmself

must have some sort of being. (2) Thinking or stating what is false means asserting that what is not the fact is a fact, or that what is the fact is not a fact. We are asserting something ; our words have meaning. So 'what is not the fact ' must have some sort of being ; it is not sheer nonentity. The conclusion will be that we must escape from the Parmenidean dilemma : 'A thing must be either perfectly real or totally unreal ', and recognise a third intermediate region of things that are neither wholly real nor utterly non-existent. There must be some sense in which what is not (wholly real or true) has some sort of existence or meaning.

- 239C. STR. Well, if you agree, we will leave ourselves out of account : and until we meet with someone who can perform this feat, let us say that the Sophist with extreme cunning has found an impenetrable lurking-place.1 THEAET. It certainly seems so. STR. Accordingly, if we are going to say he possesses an art of creating ' semblances ', he will readily take advantage
 - D. of our handling our arguments in this way to grapple with us and turn them against ourselves. When we call him a maker of images, he will ask what on earth we mean in speaking of an 'image' at all. So we must consider, Theaetetus, how this truculent person's question is to be answered.

THEAET. Clearly we shall say we mean images in water or in mirrors, and again images made by the draughtsman or the sculptor, and any other things of that sort.

E. STR. It is plan. Theaetetus, that you have never seen a Sophist.

THEAET. Why?

STR. He will make as though his eyes were shut or he had no eves at all.

THEAET. How so ?

STR. When you offer him your answer in such terms, if you speak of something to be found in mirrors or in sculpture. he will laugh at your words, as implying that he can see.

He will profess to know nothing about mirrors or water 240. or even eyesight, and will confine his question to what can be gathered from discourse. THEAET. Namely ?

STR. The common character in all these things you men-

¹ It must be remembered that the various senses of ' that which is not ' are only gradually being disclosed. The Sophist does not lurk in the region of nonentity, above dealt with, but in the field of the not wholly real and the false which we are now entering.

tioned and thought fit to call by a single name when you 240. used the expression ' image ' as one term covering them all. State it. then, and hold your ground against the man without vielding an inch. THEAET. Well, sir, what could we say an image was, if not another thing of the same sort, copied from the real thing ? STR. 'Of the same sort'? Do you mean another real B. thing, or what does 'of the same sort ' signify ? THEAST. Certainly not real, but like it. STR. Meaning by 'real' a thing that really exists. THEAET. Yes. STR. And by 'not real' the opposite of real? THEATT OF COURSE. STR. Then by what is ' like ' you mean what has not real existence.1 if you are going to call it ' not real '. THEAET. But it has some sort of existence. STR. Only not real existence, according to you. THEAST. No : except that it is really a likeness. STR. So, not having real existence, it really is what we call a likeness ? *

¹ Reading one downs (oke) is with Burnet and others The only possible way (if it is possible) to retain one before is a to suppose (with Ritter, N Uniters 14) that the first one = some with Ayea, the whole sentence being a negative question But it is hard to believe that Plato would gratuitously make the sentence obscure in this way. Does (here and at 31) and Friedlander (Plat See '21) would understand one downs (one down other 4). This is impossible Greek and also the wrong sense An andoins in not the complete negation of downs do i, 'sen irrels non-dre'. This is impossible Greek and also the wrong sense An andoins in not the complete negation of downs do i, but is an do, only not downs dot may.

* Reading out or dog [out] former The subject 'it' is, as in the previous sentences, ro denses, is elkohor, the term we are defining The paredox les in saying that an elkohor, which is not read, readly is a likeness

Another possibility (which would cover all the previous statements) is to read : ole & do fas forwar, $\langle \phi = \phi \phi \rangle$ form forms, ϕ hopper cides in apposition to δ wave and explanming it : 'I1 (rd dawefs) without having real bareng, really as a thing with some sort of being-a likeness, as we call it ' Theatestus has just and that it welly is a likeness (dawe forwa) and that it as inset sort of some of the source). The result is a still more 'perplexing combination' of being and not-being Or, taking ϕ hopper defeat as tablectical daws as loosely used for elassive reliablement may a blackness, not being really a real thing, really as a thing having a serie of being ' The insection of $\langle \phi = w \phi \rangle$. Is downouth by the conclusion stated balow : these Sophist has forced us to admit that what is not has some sort of being (def

Cf. Timaeus 52C, the electro (contrasted with rd örror öv), is described as 'clinging to existence somehow or other, on pain of being nothing at all'.

240C. THEAST. Real and unreal do seem to be combined in that perplexing way, and very queer it is. STR. Queer indeed. You see that now again by dovetailing them together in this way our hydra-headed Sophist has forced us against our will to admit that 'what is not' has some sort of being. THEAST. Yes. I do.

This passage gives no more than a definition of the term 'image' (*icidolow*). It is something that has some sort of existence without being wholly real. This brings out the point made earlier, where the 'semblance' was distinguished from the exact 'likeness' or replica. The sort of 'image' we are concerned with is not only a likeness, but has a less degree of reahty, as the reflections and pictures instanced by Thesetetus are thought to be less real than the actual things they image. When we accuse the Sophust of 'practising the art of semblance-making' (*portractivi* 239c, 9), we accuse han of creating such unreal images which yet somehow exist. We have still to justify ourselves against his objection that unreal things cannot exist in any way.

The Stranger next points out that the same objection will be raised against the possibility of thinking or saying 'what is not', *i.e.* what is *false*. False beliefs (in his own wisdom) are the particular kind of 'images' or 'semblances' that we have accused the Sophist of creating.

- 240C. STR. And what now? How can we define his art without contradicting ourselves? THEAET. How do you mean? What sort of contradiction do you fear?
 - D. STR. When we say that he deceives with that semblance we spoke of and that his art is a practice of deception, shall we be saying that, as the effect of his art, our mind thinks what is false, or what shall we mean? ITERAET. Just that. What else could we mean? STR. And false thinking, again, will be thinking things contrary to the things that are ??

The context seems to imply that an image has to borrow such existence as it has from its medium. The mirror-image owes its existence to the mirror; so sensible things, as images of the eternal Forms, owe their existence to Space, the everlasting medium in which they appear.

¹⁴ The things that set ¹ The fact ¹ would be a more natural translation, but at this stage it seems bettier to keep the wagger expression ¹ Things that are not '(faishchoods) are things which are contrary to the facts and yet must have smooth of being for we have a tracky such that we cannot think sheer nonenity '(we'veries we' force, aySa, which Campbell here wrongly confuses with the plural sheeping works work which we are speaking)

(b) FALSEHOOD AS 'SAYING WHAT IS NOT'

- 240D. THEAET. Yes. STR. You mean, then, by false thinking. thinking things that are not? THEAET. Necessarily.
 - E. STR Does that mean thinking that things that are not, are not, or that things that are not in any way, in some way are ? THEAET. It must at least mean thinking that things that are not in are not, are in some way, if anyone is ever to be in error even to the smallest extent. STR. And also surely thinking that things which certainly are, are not in any way at all ? THEAET. Yes STR. That also is error ? THEAET. Yes, that also. STR. And a fabse startement.³ I suppose, is to be regarded
- 241. in the same light, as stating that things that are, are not, and that things that are not, are THEART. Yes. How else could it be false ? STR Hardly in any other way. But the Sophist will deny that. How could a sensible man agree, when the admissions we made earlier are set beside this one?⁴ We understand, Theaetetus, what he is referring to ? THEART. Of course we understand. He will say that we are contradicting what was said just now, when we have the
 - B. face to say that falsehoods exist in thoughts and in statements; for we are constantly being obliged to attribute

¹ Theaetetus does not repeat the Stranger's suggestion τὰ μηθαμῶς όντα, but correctly substitutes τὰ μή όντα, things which are not fact, but are not (as μηθαμώς might suggest) sheer nonentrizes.

* fairway, 'm any case '.' things which certainly have being ' (not warrolde, 'things which have the fullest sort of being or reality ') The whole means 'denying any existence to facts which certainly do exist'. Cf. 247A, warraw fead ru, is certainly a real thing'

* Statement ' is the best rendering for Myer, not ' proposition ', because of its modern uses. For Plato a 'statement' is simply the utterance in speech of a judgment made by the mind in its sulent dialogue with itself (263g, and Theset. 159g, zo6b, 208C)

⁴Omiting *different* . *disadyrs*, with Madvig, who pointed out that the words could only mant that our previous admissions were 'unittrable', etc. (*disers* 1, 35:) Against Deb's excision of rat raps reform *dyubyrghfra* as a gloss on *robusubyrghf*() (which he reads with rafers understood as subject) is that a reference to the untimableness, etc of absolute nonentity is not relevant Thesetetiar next spech ratics what the 'attrin admission' are; namely, that we must not 'attach what has being to what is not.' Nonentity has been ruled out of the discussion onco for all

24IB. what has being to what is not, after agreeing just now that this was altogether impossible.¹

Like the previous paragraph on the meaning of 'image', this passage only tells us what false thinking and false statement mean, namely attributing not-being to what is (the fact) or being to what is not (the fact). We have still to show that such things as images can exist and that false judgments can have anything to refer to. That is to say, we must explain how what is not wholly real and what is not true can have a sort of existence. Here is the point at which we must part company with Parmenides, who would allow no such thing; and the Stranger now asks leave to do so.

24IB. STR. Your recollection is correct. But you must now consider what we are to do about the Sophist; for if we pursue our search for him by ranking him under the art of the illusionists and creators of error, you see what an easy opening we offer to many perplexites and counter-attacks. THEAET. I do.

STR. They are almost without number and we have stated C. only a small fraction of them.

THEAET. If that is so, it looks as if it were impossible to catch the Sophist.

STR. What then? Are we to lose heart and give up now? THEAET. I don't think we ought to, if we have the least chance of being able to lay hands on him somehow.

STR. Then I may count on your indulgence, and, as you now say, you will be content if we can by some twist free ourselves, even to the least extent, from the grip of so powerful an argument?

THEAET. By all means.

D. STR. Then I have another still more pressing request. THEAET. What is that ? STR. That you will not think I am turning into a sort of

parricide.

THEAET. In what way?

STR. We shall find it necessary in self-defence to put to the question that pronouncement of father Parmenides, and establish by main force⁴ that what is not, in some respect has being, and conversely that what is, in a way is not.

¹ This is the 'earlier admission' referred to: 'Nothing that exists (such as 'Being') must be attributed to the non-existent' (2384), an admission already recalled at 238.

³ βιάζεσθαι may allude to Parmenides' own word δαμή (δαμάζω) in the lines quoted above.

(b) FALSEHOOD AS 'SAYING WHAT IS NOT'

24ID. THEAET. It is plain that the course of the argument requires us to maintain that at all costs. STR. Plain enough for the blind to see, as they say. Unless

STR. Plan enough for the blind to see, as they say. Unless E. these propositions are either refuted or accepted, anyone who talks of false statements or false judgment as being images or likenesses or copies or semblances, or of any of the arts concerned with such things, can hardly escape becoming a laughing-stock by being forced to contradict himself

THEAET. Quite true.

242. STR. That is why we must now dare to lay unfilial hands on that pronouncement, or else, if some scruple holds us back, drop the matter entirely. THEAET. As for that, we must let no scruple hinder us.

THEAET. As for that, we must let no scruple hinder us. STR. In that case, for the third time, I have a small favour to ask.

THEAET. You have only to mention it.

STR. I believe I confessed just now that on this point the task of refutation has always proved too much for my powers, and still does so

THEAET. You did say that.

STR. Well, that confession, I am afraid, may make you think me scatter-brained when at every turn I shift my posi-

2. tion to and fro. It is for your satisfaction that we shall attempt to refute the pronouncement, if we can refute it. TREAST. Then you may take it that I shall never think you are overstepping the limits by entering on your refutation and proof. So far as that goes, you may proceed with an easy mind.

This interlude closes the second of the three sections, concerned with (a) the totally non-existent, (b) images and false judgment, (c) the perfectly real. We have now raised the problems confronting anyone who would justify the existence of things not wholly real or not true. Theseletus has asked the Stringer to proceed with his refutation of Parmenides' prohibition, and with his 'proof'. We are thus led to expect a demonstration (1) that things that are not wholly real (*eidola*) can have some sort of existence, and (a) that it is possible to think and say what is false. In the sequel, this second point is established. But it cannot be said that the possibility of a world of *eidola*, imaging the real world of Forms, is ever demonstrated in this dialogue. That metaphysical problem remains in the background. Perhaps it was held in reserve for the *Philosophe*. 2A2B-2AAB. (c) The perfectly Real. What does 'real' mean?

We cannot proceed further to discuss how what is not wholly real can exist at all, without first considering what 'real' means,1 All philosophers, like common men, make a distinction between things they call 'real' and other things which are not fully 'real'. The next section opens by reviewing the philosophers of the archaic period before Socrates, and the things they had called real. They are divided into two groups : (1) the physical philosophers, who had recognised the existence of the natural world of material things and are here represented as having believed in more than one 'real thing', and (2) Parmenides, who stands alone in denving the phenomenal world and acknowledging only one Real Thing This classification is designed to isolate from all the rest Parmenides. who alone is criticised at length.

242B. STR. Come then, where is one to make a start on so hazardous a theme ? I think I see the path we must inevitably follow. THEAET. And that is ----?

STR. To take first things that are now supposed to be quite

c. clear and see whether we are not in some confusion about them and too easily reaching conclusions on the assumption that we understand them well enough.

THEAET. Tell me more plainly what you mean.

STR. It strikes me that Parmenides and everyone else who has set out to determine how many real things there are and what they are like, have discoursed to us in rather an off-hand fashion

THEAST. How so?

STR. They each and all seem to treat us as children to whom they are telling a story. According to one there are three real things, some of which now carry on a sort of

D. warfare with one another, and then make friends and set about marrying and begetting and bringing up their children. Another tells us that there are two-Moist and Dry, or Hot and Cold-whom he marries off, and makes them set up house together." In our part of the world the Eleatic set,

1 In the coming section no by will be translated by ' the real ' or ' reality '. This sense of the word has emerged from the contrast between the 'sort of existence ' belonging to an esdolow, and the real existence of the Series So

" Namely, the meaning of ' real ', a word we all use and imagine we understand.

^a Plato recognises in the pre-Socratic systems the presence of mythical images, especially the two most important : the sex-imagery of the cosmic

(c) THE PERFECTLY REAL

- 242D. who hark back to Xenophanes or even earlier, unfold their tale on the assumption that what we call 'all things' are only one thing. Later, certain Muses in Ionia and Sicily
 - E. perceived that safety lay rather in combining both accounts and saying that the real is both many and one and is held together by ennity and friendship. 'In parting saunder it is always being drawn together' say the stricter ' of these Muses. The milder 'relax the rule that this should always be so and tell us of alternate states, in which the universe
- 243. is now one and at peace through the power of Love, and now many and at war with itself owing to some sort of Strife.

In all this, whether any one of them has told the truth or not is a hard question, and it is in bad taste to find fault so grossly with men of long-established fame. But one observation may be made without offence.

THEAET. And that is-

STR. That they have shown too little consideration for ordinary people like ourselves in talking over our heads.

B. Each school pursues its own argument to the conclusion without caring whether we follow what they say or get left behind.

THEAET. How do you mean?

STR. When one or another of them in his discourse uses these expressions 'there really are 'or 'have come to be' or 'are coming to be 'many thungs' or 'one thing' or 'two', or again another speaks ³ of 'Hot being mixed with Cold', sasuming 'combinations' and 'separations', do you, Theaetetus, understand a single word they say? Speaking for myself, when I was younger I thought I understood quite learly when I was younger I thought in understood quite learly when Someone spoke of this thing that is now

Eros, and the warfare of opposed 'powers' (such as Hot and Cold). These images of Love and Strife can be traced all through the ancient science of nature, and survive even in Atomism as the Venus and Mars of Lucretus

¹ The structer Muses of Ionia represent the philosophy of Heracletus It was a man point of his doctrine that the Harmony of Opposites essentially involves a tension or strife that is never resolved. There is no peace without war.

^a The milder Muses of Stuly (Empedocles) recognised a Regn of Love (without Stinfe) and, at the opposite pole, a Regn of Stnife (without Love). Between these polar states, worlds come into being and pass away In one half of the cycle a world is formed by Love gaining upon Stnife, in the other, by Strife gaining upon Love.

³ Reading dNos etay (Rademacher, Diès) for dNoôl sy, which is pointless, whether it means ' elsewhere in his discourse ' or ' elsewhere in the universe '.

- 243B. puzzling us—' the unreal'. But now you see how completely perplexed we are about that.
 - c. THEAET. I do.

STR. Possibly, then, our minds are in the same state of confusion about reality. We profess to be quite at our ease about the real and to understand the word when it is spoken, though we may not understand the unreal, when perhaps we are equally in the dark about both.

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. And we may take it that the same is true of the other expressions I have just mentioned.

THEART. Certainly.

The early philosophers are here all introduced as asking and deciding 'how many' real things there are-one or several. Such a classification may strike us as superficial and as misrepresenting the facts. The Eleatics, for instance, are regarded as the only monists, whereas the Milesians, who said that all things were really water or air, are usually called monists. Aristotle, however, makes out that all who made the ' simple bodies ' into principles-whether one or two or three or all four-realiy regarded Hot and Cold (Fire and Earth) as the fundamental factors.1 In the argument which follows the philosophers are divided into pluralists ' with more than one real being ' and the monist, Parmenides, whom Plato wishes to single out for examination. Plato knew that the real contrast was not between many real beings and one, but between the physical philosophers, who derived a manifold world of Nature from one or more material principles, and Parmenides, whose One Being was not material and could not generate a natural world. Seen in this light, the two groups appear as the ancestors of the two parties in the Battle of Gods and Giants that is to followmaterialists and idealists.

The question now to be put to both groups is : What do you mean by 'real' or 'the real'? The physicists are taken first. They regard (say) two things. Hot and Cold, as somehow primary. From these are derived other things by processes they can only describe in mythical terms, such as 'marriage' and 'warfare'. Whatever this unintelligible account of becoming may mean, what is meant by calling the two principles 'real' in a sense that does not apply to the derived things ?

243C. STR. The general run of these expressions we will consider

1 De Gen et Corr. B3.

¹ Not material', in the sense that, though extended in space, it was not perceptible 'body'.

- 243D. later, if we so decide. We must begin now with the chief and most important of them all. THEAST. Which is that? Of course you mean we ought to begin by studying 'reality' and finding out what those who use the word think it stands for. STR. You have hit my meaning precisely, Theaetetus; I do mean that we must take this line. Imagine them here before us, and let us put this question: 'You who say that Hot and Cold or some such par really are all things.
 - E. what exactly does this expression convey that you apply to both when you say that they both are "real" or each of them is "real"? How are we to understand this "reality" you speak of? Are we to suppose it is a third thing alongade the other two and that the All is no longer, as you say, two things, but three? For surely you do not give the name "reality" to one of the two and then say that both alike are real, for then there will be only one thing, whichever of the two it may be, and not two.'

STR. 'Well then, do you intend to give the name "reality" to the pair of them?'

THEAET. Perhaps.

244. STR 'But that again', we shall object, 'will clearly be speaking of your two things as one.'

THEAET. You are quite right.

STR. "We are completely puzzled, then, and you must clear up the question for us, what you do intend to signify when you use the word "real". Obviously you must be quate familiar with what you mean, whereas we, who formerly imagined we knew, are now at a loss. First, then, enlighten us on just this point, so that we may not fancy we understand what you have to tell us, when in fact we

B. are as far as possible from understanding.' If we put our case in that way to these people and to any others who say that the All is more than one thung, will there be anything unwarrantable in our request ? THEAET. Not at all.

The question here put to the pre-Socratic physical philosophers is : What do you mean by the word 'real', when you assert that there are two *weal Sharg* (*Brra*), namely 'the Hot' and 'the Coid'? Plato's point is that 'real' has a meaning distinct from the meanings of 'hot' and 'coid'. 'Reality' is a third term, not to be identified with hotness or coldness or with the Hot or the Coid. It is, in Plato's view, a Form, of which both the Hot and the Cold partake and so have reality, but which is not identical with either of them or with both together. If the physicists do not admit that, they will be in a dilemma. (1) If they identify the meaning of 'real' with the meaning of (say') hot', then the Cold will not be real, for the Cold is not hot. (2) And if they identify it with the meaning of 'Aot-and-Cold', then 'the Auth-is hot-and-cold' will be the one real thing (composed of two parts), and there will not be two real things, as they said at first. 'Real', then, must have a meaning distinct from 'Hot' or 'Cold' or 'Hot-and-cold'. What is that meaning?

No answer is given by the physicists here. We might reply for them that by 'the real' they meant material substance—that underlying something which persists the same through all apparent change. They belong, in fact, to the materialist party in that Battle of Gods and Gants which is to be staged later. The Stranger will then put to the materialist a suggestion as to what 'real' means for him.

244B-245E. Criticism of Parmenides' One Real Being

The Stranger turns next to Parmenides, whom he intends to criticise in detail, because what is barring the path of discussion is Parmenides' rigid conception of the One Real Beng as alone having any sort of existence. The arguments are as brief and abstract as Parmenides' own. He had declared that the whole of reality is a One Being or Existent Unity, having only such attributes as can be rigidly deduced from the conceptions of Being and Unity. Each conception is taken with the utmost structness. 'Being 'implies complete reality; 'Unity' excludes any plurahity. There is nothing but this One Real Thing (br δp).

The Stranger's first argument is that, if there is only one real thing, it is inconsistent to give it are names, 'real' and 'one'. This seems at first sight superficial; but Plato is once more assuming his own doctrine that 'names', such as 'real' and 'one', have meanings, and those meanings are Forms of whuch the thing bearing the names partakes. If you give your one real thing the two names 'real' and 'one' (*i.e.* say of it that it is real and that it is one), then three terms are involved : the meanings of the two names, which are the Forms 'Reality 'and 'Unity', and the thing which bears those names and partakes of those Forms. In Plato's view, moreover, the two Forms Reality (Being) and Unity themselves have the highest degree of reality. Each of them is quite as much real and one as any one thung that partakes of

PARMENIDES' ONE BEING

them. Accordingly Parmenides' simplest and most fundamental proposition—that there is only one real thing—cannot be stated at all without recognising there real things. The true meaning of the argument is somewhat disguised by the Stranger's avoiding the mention of Forms and speaking only of 'names' and the thing (rapping) which is called by them.

2448. STR. Again, there are those who say that the All is one thing. Must we not do our best to find out what they mean by 'reality '. STR. Surely. STR. Let them answer this question, then: 'You say, we understand, that there is only one thing?' 'We do', they will reply, work they? TREART. Yes. STR 'And there is something to which you give the name real?' TREART. Yes.

C. STR 'Is it the same thing as that to which you give the name one? Are you applying two names to the same thing, or what do you mean?'

THEAET. What will their next answer be?

STR. Obviously, Theaetetus, it is not so very easy for one who has laud down their fundamental assertion to answer this question or any other.

THEAET. How so ?

STR. In the first place, it is surely absurd for him to admit the existence of *two* names, when he has laid down that there is no more than one thing.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And further, it is equally absurd to allow anyone to D. assert that a name can have any existence, when that would be inexplicable.

THEAET. How is it inexplicable ?

STR. If, on the one hand, he assumes that the name is different from the thing, he is surely speaking of two things.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Whereas, if he assumes that the name is the same as the thing, either he will have to say it is not the name of anything, or if he says it is the name of something, it will follow that the name is merely a name of a name and of nothing else whatsoever.

THEAET. That is so.

244D. STR. . . .¹

THEAET. Necessarily.

The question, what Parmenides meant by 'real', is here dropped, His one reality was, at any rate, not material substance underlying and persisting through change; and in the Battle of Gods and Giants he will appear on the side of the gods (the idealists). The argument seems verbal because Plato speaks of ' names', not of the Forms which in his view the names stand for, and it seems strange to us to speak of names as ' real things' (orra) alongside the thing which bears the names. What is meant is that Parmenides. like the physicists, has failed to distinguish between his One Real thing and the two Forms. Reality and Unity, of which it partakes, and to see that he cannot assert his One Real thing without also recognising the reality of those two Forms. In the First Hypothesis of the Parmenides (141E) it is shown that if you assume (as Parmenides did) a One which excludes any plurality, you cannot even assert that it exists (has being, is real) or apply any name to it.

The next criticism of Parmenides turns on his description of the One Real thing as 'the whole'. 'Whole' is the correlative of 'part'; nothing is a whole unless it has parts.¹ Parmenides had called his One Real thing 'the All' ($ro' \ arb)$ and declared it to be a finite sphere, with centre and circumference—language which implies, as the Stranger says, that it has distinguishable parts. The argument that follows is complex and extremely concise. The plan of it is given in the followng summary :

PREMISS: If the Real is a whole (one thing with many parts), then the Real is not identical with Unity Itself (which has no parts).

¹ The delemma stated in the Stranger's last two speeches is complete It has been shown that the very existence of a name is merghanchie, whether it be distinct from the thing or identical with it. This argument applies equally to the same 'real' and to the name 'one', and there is no need for any speecal application of it to the name 'one'. The speech here omitted as corrupt. It follows as if at might be intended to the mate 'the application of it to the name 'one'. The speech here omitted as corrupt. If is one D) be judye and application of it to the name 'one'. The speech here omitted as for might be intended to the mate 'the special application of it to the name 'one'. The speech state of the other other

1 Cf. Theast. 2044, fl. (p. 149).

PARMENIDES' ONE BEING

DILEMMA: Either (A) The Real is a whole of parts: Then the Real is not Unity Itself, and there will be a plurality (vir. the Real and Unity Itself).

- or (B) The Real is not a whole of parts: Then either (a) Wholeness exists; but then
 - The Real will not be a thing that is (over or Eoral to or);
 - (2) There will be plurality (viz. the Real and Wholeness Itself):
 - or (b) Wholeness does not exist, but then
 - The Real will not be a thing that is (airs for forma rd for):
 - (2) There will be plurahty; and also
 - (3) There will be no coming-intobeing of a thing that is;
 - (4) There will be no finite number (only indefinite plurality).

The Stranger begins by establishing a premise that is used in the subsequent dilermat. The premise is 'I the Real is a whole of parts, it has the property of unity (for it is one whole), but it cannot be identical with Unity Itself: for Unity Itself (arder of &b) is defined precisely as ' that which has no parts ', ' the indivisible '. Thus is the mathematical definition of Unity or the unit, as given by Aristole: ' Everywhere the cone is molvashle either in quantity or in kind. That which is indivisable in any dimension and is without position ; a point, if it is not divisible in any dimension and has position ', etc. (MA: roof 6, 23). It follows that if Parmenides' One real thing is a whole of parts, it is not identical with Unity Itself.

- 244D. STR. And what of 'the whole'? Will they say that this is other than their 'one real thing' or the same?
 - E. THEAET. Certainly that it is the same. In fact they do say so.
 - Srn. Then if it is a whole—as indeed Parmenides says 1: 'Every way like the mass of a well-counded sphere, evenly balanced from the midst in every direction; for there must not be something more nor something less here than there '—...

- 244E. if the real is like that, it has a middle and extremities, and consequently it must have parts, must it not ? THEAET. It must.
- 245. STR. Well, if a thing is divided into parts, there is nothing against its having the property of unity as applied to the aggregate of all the parts and being in that way one, as being a sum or whole. TREAST. Of course. STR. On the other hand, the thing which has these properties cannot be just Unity itself, can it ? TREAST. Why not ? STR. Surely Unity in the true sense and rightly defined must be altogether without parts.

THEAET. Yes, it must.

B. STR. Whereas a thing such as we described, consisting of several parts, will not answer to that definition. THEAET. I see.

The above argument probably implies a criticism of Parmenides, who had declared that the real was 'indivisable' (not $\delta augeories'$, frag. 8, 22). This meant primarily that the One Being was continuous, not an assemblage of discrete particles separated by empty space. But he also meant that it had absolute unity, such as excludes any kind of plurality. The Stranger may imply that, if Parmenides did identify his One being with absolute Unity, he was inconsistent in speaking of reality as a sphere with distinguishable parts.

The premiss just established is now used in the dilemma : either (A) the real has such unity as a whole or sum may have and is one whole; or (B) the real is not to be called a 'whole' at all. Either possibility leads to a contradiction of Eleatic doctrine.

245B. STR. Then, (A) is the Real one and a whole in the sense that it has the property of unity, or (B) are we to say that the Real is not a whole at all? THERET. That is a hard choice. STR. Quite true. For if (A) the real has the property of being in a sense one, it will evidently not be the same thing as Unity, and so all things will be more than one. THERET. Yes.

The other possibility (B) is that the real has not such unity as belongs to a whole—s not one whole. The consequences of this supposition are put in a subordinate dilemma. If the real is not one whole, then either (a) there is such a thing as 'Wholeness' (advo $\tau \delta \delta \delta \sigma$)—a real Form which exists, though 'the one real thing ' does not partake of it, or (b) there is no such thing as 'Wholeness' at all. The next three speeches of the Stranger deal with alternative (a).

245C. STR. And again (B) if the Real is not a whole by virtue of having this property of unity, while (a) at the same time Wholeness itself is real, it follows that the Real falls short of itself.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. So, on this line of argument too, the Real will be deprived of reality and will not be a thing that is. THEART. Yes.

STR. And further, once more all things will be more than one, since Reality on the one side and Wholeness on the other have now each a distinct nature.

THEAET. Yes.

The first of the two consequences here is that 'the Real will fall short of itself and will not be a thing that is'. This seems to mean that the Real, since it does not even partake of Wholeness, will ' fall short of itself ' in the sense that it does not include Wholeness, which nevertheless is real.¹ The words one for for are ambiguous. They may mean ' the Real will be a thing that is not', i.e. a thing of which the negative statement is true, that it ' is not ' the same as Wholeness. Or they can be rendered as above : ' the Real will not be a thing that 15 ' (for it is not the same as Wholeness, and Wholeness is a thing that is). Both renderings amount to the same thing. In favour of the second are the words ' so on this line of argument also ', which imply that this conclusion is parallel to the one reached above under alternative (A); 'the Real will evidently not be identical with Unity'. Here we conclude that the Real will not be identical with Wholeness (a thing that is).

The second consequence above is that the Real and Wholeness will be two real things; so 'all things will be more than one'.

There now remains alternative (b): that there is no such thing as Wholeness at all.

245C. STR. But if, (b) on the other hand, there is no such thing as Wholeness at all, not only are the same things true of the Real, but also that, besides not being a thing that really is, it could never even become such.²

¹ Parmenides had said : ' Nor may Being be imperfect , for it lacks nothing, and if it were imperfect it would lack everything ' (Frag. 8, 32)

² The word δν goes with πpds τῷ μή είναι as well as with μηθ' dryewlota more.

The statement that 'the same things will be true of the Real' on this supposition is at first sight obscure. For the consequences referred to, namely (t) that the Real will not be a thing that is, and (a) that all things will be a plurahty, followed from the supposition that there were two real things: the Real (which has not the unity belonging to a whole) and Wholeness. How can the same consequences follow from the present supposition that there is no such thing as Wholeness?

The answer is suggested by arguments in the Parmensdes, which Plato assumes to be familiar and does not care to repeat. The present supposition is : that (B) the Real has not the unity belonging to a whole, and (b) there is no such thing as Wholeness. It follows that the Real, having no unity or wholeness (for there is no such thing), must be a plurality without any unity This gives the second consequence 'all things will be more than one '-not two this time, but an unlimited plurality (arewa). The first consequence 'the Real will not be a thing that is (δv) ' is actually repeated here in the words ' besides not being a thing that is ' (nooc $\tau \bar{\omega} \mu \hat{\eta} \epsilon \bar{k} r a_1 \dots \bar{\delta} r$ This cannot now mean that the Real is not the same as Wholeness (a thing that is) ; for we are now supposing that Wholeness is not 'a thing that is'. But there is a sense in which the words (our on Erras ro on) will be true. The Real will not be a thing that is (ov in the singular), because the Real is now an indefinite plurality without any unity.

This explanaton may seem far-fetched, but Plato assumes that we have read and understood the *Parmendes*, where similar arguments are set out at length, and he leaves us to think out his meaning for ourselves.¹ He is more interested in stating two supplementary consequences of denying that the Real is a whole, and that there is any such thing as Wholeness. These are (i) that the Real, in that case, cannot even come into being, and (2) that it cannot have number. Theaetetus asks now for an explanation of the first, which has just been stated.

245D. THEAET. Why not?

STR. Whenever a thing comes into being, at that moment it has come to be as a whole ; accordingly, if you do not

¹ M Dobs (Actions de Platon, 10, 460) remarks that, if any positive conclusion can be drawn from the discussions of the existence or non-existence of the One in the Parmenides, it would be twofold: 'on ns peul ner absolument l'amité aux aboute à une plaraidé meconstante, pure possitée d'être, meconmissible é impendèle : on ne poir aire absolument la plaraidé sons être obligé de réplane, à l'amité qu'on pose auxes indussible et coltante, toute difermination, y compre celle de l'aristènce et celle même de l'amité.' 245D. reckon unity or wholeness ¹ among real things, you have no right to speak of either being ³ or coming-into-being as having any existence.

THEAET. That seems perfectly true.

STR. And further, what is not a whole cannot have any definite number either; for if a thing has a definite number, it must amount to that number, whatever it may be, as a whole.⁸

THEAET. Assuredly.

STR. And countless other difficulties, each involved in E. measureless perplexity, will arise, if you say that the real is either two things or only one. THEAST. That is plain enough from those we have had a

IRLAST. Inat is plain enough from those we have had a glimpse of now. One leads to another, and each carries us further into a wilderness of doubt about every theory as it is mentioned.

From the second alternative (that the real has not the unity belonging to a whole, and that there is no such thing as wholeness) the Stranger has drawn two supplementary conclusions; that without wholeness you cannot have (1) coming-into-being (genesis) or (2) definite number. These conclusions do not convict Parmenides of inconsistency, since he denied the possibility of coming-into-being and of plurality. They seem to be noted as the two most glaring deficiencies of his system. (1) His deduction of the nature of the One real being excluded from reality the whole world of becoming and change. In the next section Parmenides will be ranked with the Idealists because he recognised an unchanging reality. Here it is noted that he differs from the other idealists (the 'Friends of Forms') in not recognising also a world of becoming. (2) Without wholeness and that unity which belongs to a whole of parts and does not exclude plurality, there can be no definite number, no sum or total number, only indefinite nlurality. The other defect in Parmenides' conception of the One Being was that it was intended to exclude plurality. This again is a funda-

 1 rở
ảy $\tilde{\eta}$ rở ở
how, MSS 'Unity' here seems to mean that unity which is the property of a whole of parts, and to be used synonymously with 'wholeness' Cf 2459 4, ởr r cal ôles

*'Beng' ($\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial a}$) here must mean the custonce that results from a process of comma-into-beng ($\phi \phi \cos a$ ($\phi \phi \sin a$)). Complete littles Pare 1550, where the comma-into-beng of a whole of parts a described. The parts come into beng successively from beginning to end '; 'the unity or whole itself' ($\sigma \delta \log r \propto cal + \delta \lambda s a come into beng ' at the same moment as the end '$ $(<math>\delta \omega + \sigma \tau \partial m \tau \sigma$).

* Compare the identification of the Whole with the Sum, Theast 204A ff. (p 149).

mental point of difference from the Friends of Forms, who recognuse a world of reality which is one (a whole of parts) and embraces a definite plurality (mol/d) of real beings, the many Forms, whose structure the Daalectnican is to trace out in his divisions. Further, each of these Forms is a 'one beng', and yet, if it is definable, it must be complex, a whole of those parts which will appear in its definition. Whatever is real, accordingly, partakes both of Unity and of Plurality.

Plato may have chosen to mark these points of difference here because he did not want to stress differences among idealists where they are confronted with materialists in the next section.

245E-246E. The Battle of Gods and Giants : Idealists and Materialists

The Stranger now passes from his review of the archaic period to a picture of the battle that is always being waged by philosophers upon the fundamental issue between materialism and idealism.

245E. STR. So much, then, for those who give an exact account of what is real or unreal. We have not gone through them all, but let this suffice. Now we must turn to look at those who put the matter in a different way, so that, from a complete review of all, we may see that reality is just as hard to define as unreality.

THEAET. We had better go on, then, to their position.

Campbell remarks that ' those who give an exact account ' of the real obviously include all the pre-Socratic philosophers who have been mentioned, and that the phrase probably means ' those who have defined precisely the number and the kinds of being ' (4242). He adds that the meaning of ' those who put the matter st a different way ' is best inferred from the phrase with which it is contrasted : it means ' those who speak with less exactness'. There is no reason to reject this natural interpretation.¹ The Stranger's words do not imply that he is finally dismissing all the pre-Socratic philosophers at this point, and passing on to a different set of Schools. He

¹ Attempts to interpret the phrases otherwise have been made in the interests of some theory as to the identity of the 'Frends of Forma', who are among a' dbae, b/gorse. The word kacagdobyriefs in rare (Stephanus quotes only two other courtences), but transparent, kacagdobyriefs in a sepology for 'amng language so precisely 'I the second semes of Abyer, 'reckoumg', as contand in the superdisolverbar-'to give a minute reckoning '--t fits Campbell's interpretation exactly Of dbae Myeverg cannot mean 'the other and 'The rest in so semes of antagonusm in dbaes, and the parties to the Battle (who are both included in o dbaer Myever) are not ranged in opposition to all the pre-Socratica. means: So far we have considered the earlier philosophers as stating, with precision, exactly how many real things there are —one, or two, or three. We have not examined them all with the same thoroughness as Parmenides; but that will do. We will now bring mto our survey as well 'those who put the matter in a different way', and so see the difficulty of defining reality from a *complete srevies (&x nárrow)* of all philosophers, including these pre-Socratics and their successors, the contemporaries of Plato, and perhaps Plato humself.

The earlier division of the pre-Socratics into pluralists and the monist Parmenides suited Plato's purpose of isolating the advocate of a One real thing. Plato was specially concerned to show the defects of Parmenides' position from his own standpoint. He now wishes to survey the whole field of philosophy from a different angle and to group all the philosophers with reference to what he takes to be, at all times, the fundamental issue of the philosophic debate-materialism or idealism. The pre-Socratics had seen that issue as the question between one real thing or many, and argued on those lines with what may seem an archaic and pedantic precision. 'Those who put the matter differently ' have now formulated the issue in its genuine significance. They are carrying on the battle in these new terms, but behind these modern protagonists the pre-Socratics are still ranged in the rear. The conflict of materialism and idealism was not an entirely fresh issue that had arisen for the first time among the contemporaries of Plato. Ever since the sixth century the schools had been divided into two traditions ' on the one side the Ionian science of the Milesians and their successors, on the other the Italian tradition of the Pythagoreans and Parmenides. The Ionians, all through, had been seeking the real nature of things in some ultimate kind of matter or body, such as water or air or all the four elements. The Itahans had sought reality, not in tangible body, but in supersensible things. The Pythagoreans (who have not been mentioned) made numbers the real nature of things; and Parmenides' One Being was not tangible body but an object of thought, possessing none of the opposite qualities which our senses delusively profess to reveal. Accordingly, the Ionians had been essentially materialists, not merely pluralists, the Italians essentially idealists, not merely monists Plato's peculiar veneration for Parmenides shows that he regarded him as the precursor of his own philosophy.

At this point, then, the superficial way of contrasting the physicists with Parmendes according to the 'precise' number of real things they recognised, is merged in the really significant contrast between materialist and idealist. This is a battle of Gods and Giants which

is declared to be 'always' going on. On the side of the Gods are all who at any time believe that unseen things are the true realities ; on the side of the Giants all who at any time believe that the real is nothing but body which they can touch and handle. The two groups had been represented in earlier days by the Italians and the Ionians; but from now onwards no individual schools will be named. Here, as always, Plato is philosophism; no twriting the history of philosophy. When he criticises individual schools, it is only to determine what he can take from them and what he must reject. Both Gods and Giants are now to be asked what, from their points of view, they mean by 'real'.

246A. STR. What we shall see ¹ is something like a Battle of Gods and Giants going on between them over their quarrel about reality.

THEAET. How so ?

STR. One party is trying to drag everything down to earth out of heaven and the unseen, literally grasping rocks and trees in ther hands; for they lay hold upon every stock and stone and strenuously affirm that real existence belongs only to that which can be handled and offers resistance to the

B. touch. They define reality as the same thing as body, and as soon as one of the opposite party asserts that anything without a body is real, they are utterly contemptuous and will not listen to another word.

THEART. The people you describe are certainly a formudable crew. I have met quite a number of them before now. Srs. Yes, and accordingly their adversames are very wary in defending their position somewhere in the heights of the unseen, maintaining with all their force that true reality consists in certain mitelligible and bodiless Forms. In the clash of argument they shatter and pulverise those bodies

c. which ther opponents wield, and what those others allege to be true reality they call, not real being, but a sort of moving process of becoming. On this issue an interminable battle is always going on between the two camps. IRRAFT. True.

STR. Suppose, then, we challenge each party in turn to render an account of the reality they assert.

THEAET. How shall we do so?

STR. It will be easier to obtain from those who place reality in Forms, because they are more civilised; harder, from

 1 col $\mu\eta\nu$, as in tragedy, where a person on the stage calls attention to the entry of a fresh character.

- 246D. those whose violence would drag everything down to the level of body—perhaps, all but impossible. However, I think I see the right way to deal with them. THERET. What is that? STR. Best of all, if it were anyhow possible, would be to bring about a real change of heart 1; but if that is beyond our power, to imagine them reformed and assume them willing to moderate their present lawlessness in answering our questions. The better a man's character is, the more force there will be in any agreement you make with him. However, we are not concerned with them so much as with our search for the truth.
 - E. THEAET. You are quite right.

Who are the materialists ? There is no need to criticise all the many attempts to identify them with some particular school.* As we observed earlier, the question put to the Ionian physicists, ' What do you mean by real? ' was left unanswered. Now that they are merged in the new grouping of Gods and Giants, the beginnings of an answer come to light 'the real is tangible body, and nothing else.' This answer had, in fact, emerged in the Atomism of Leucappus and Democratus-the last word of Ionian science. In their system the real is nothing but the atoms, which are essentially bodily substance, impenetrable, offering invincible resistance to touch. This is the materialist's account of the nature of the real. It held the field later in Epicureanism, and right on into modern times as the physicist's answer. Plato never mentions Leucippus and Democritus by name or describes their doctrine in precise terms, but the inference that he had never heard of Atomism is entirely incredible. The Sophist was written some sixty years after the probable florwits of Leucippus (about 430) and Democritus (about 420), and Plato had been for perhaps twenty years head of the Academy, to which students (including Aristotle) had come from all quarters of Greece. There is nothing against including the

¹ To make them better men mactual fact ' Detter has a moral coloring Matenalum, as descrabed in Lews x, 88 of Leodu n Plation vow to athesm and 'lawiesness' The Gants are really making war on Heaven The parallel with Lews 605c. την bl Abfeav τής spicess (the decision between the more rightcours or the plasmatter life) errories repairesse real spiceeriors are right spices of why? if την της Bolrienes ; is closer than Campbell thinks, though the context is different

⁵ Antisthenes (Dummler, Natorp, Zeller, Maier, etc.), Antisthenes and the Atomists, merged in a general polemic on materialism (Campbell), the Atomists and Anstippus (Schleisermacher, etc.); the Atomists only (Gomperz), Meissus (Burnet)

Atomists in the materialist camp.¹ But Theaetetus' remark that he has met many of these materialists points rather to ' the crass unthinking corporealism of the average man '1-a type of materialist who must no doubt be included. On the other hand this battle of Gods and Giants is a philosophic battle, not a battle of one school of idealists against the unthinking average man. The Giants include all-philosophers or average men-who believe that tangible body is the sole reality. That is precisely how they are defined. and there is no need to look for one set of persons who held that belief, to the exclusion of others. In all cases like this, it is better to suppose that Plato is discussing exactly what he says he is discussing-the tendency of thought that he defines, not one or another set of individuals who, more or less, exhibited that tendency.

246E-248A. A mark of the real is offered for the materialists' acceptance

The Stranger now begins his argument with the materialists. They identify the real with visible and tangible body, but we do not yet know what they mean by calling this ' real'. The argument leads up to a definition-or rather a mark-of the 'real', offered for their acceptance. The Stranger opens by inducing the 'reformed ' or more reasonable materialist to admit that there are things, such as moral qualities, which are not visible or tangible bodies, and yet must exist, since we can be aware of their presence or absence in people's souls.

- 246E. STR. Well then, call upon these reformed characters to oblige you with an answer, and you shall act as their spokesman THEAET. I will. STR. Let them tell us, then, whether they admit that there is such a thing as a mortal living creature. THEAET. Of course they do. STR. And they will agree that it is a body animated by a soul? THEAST. Certainly. STR. Taking a soul to be something real?
- THEAST. Yes. 247.

¹ Burnet (Gk. Pksl 1, 279) objects that Democritus could not be meant because he 'asserted the reality of the void and could not be spoken of as making impact and contact the test of being '. But the Atomists expressly identified the Void with 'not-being ' or 'nothing ' and atoms with ' being '. You do not refuse to call a man a materialist because he recognises the existence of empty space, which he calls ' nothing '.

Taylor, Plato (1926), 384.

ARGUMENT WITH THE MATERIALISTS

- 247. STE. Again, they allow that one soul may be just, another unjust, or one wise, another foolish ? THEART. Naturally. STE. And that any soul comes to be just or the reverse by possessing justice or the reverse, which is present in it ? 1 THEART. Yes, they agree to that too. STR. But surely they will admit that whatever can come to be present in a thing or absent from it is certainly a real thing. THEART. Yes.
 - B. STR. Granted, then, that justice or wisdom or any other sort of goodness or badness is real, and moreover that a soul in which they come to exast is real, do they maintain that any one of these things is visible and tangible, or are they all invisible ?

THEAET. They can hardly say that any one of them is visible

STR. And do they really assert that something that is not visible has a body?

THEAET. That question they do not answer as a whole without a distinction. The soul itself, they think, does possess a sort of body³; but when it comes to wisdom or any of the other things you asked about, they have not the

c. face either to accept the inference that they have no place among real things or to persist in maintaining that they are all bodies.

STR. That shows, Theaetetus, that they are genuinely reformed characters. The Giants among them, of the true earth-born breed, would not stick at any point; they would hold out to the end, that whatever they cannot squeeze between their hands is just nothing at all.

THEAET I dare say that describes their state of mind. STR. Let us question them further, then ; for it is quite

¹ If this sentence (with the plural desyntant) is to be regularised, it is simplicit to read desuscoring < \$4 peorfsond; \$4 eta. Theseoide (guaranteed by regeriy/redef following) should not be changed as Campbell suggested. It is the ordinary non-technical word for the presence of a quality in a thing CI Lysis 2170; Haur, turning white with age, comes to be white 'by the presence of whiteness' in it, as contrasted with the superficial whiteness of a face paulot with white lead Grag 497. The good are good 'by the presence of goodness' in them Charm 1594.

The soul had been regarded both popularly and by philosophers before Plato as consusting of a subtle and invisible kind of matter. The Atomists continued to maintain that it was composed of atoms, ike everything else, only its atoms were round and so specially mobile

- 247C. enough for our purpose if they consent to admit that even
 - D. a small part of reality is bodiless. They must now tell us this: when they say that these bodiless things and the other things which have body are alike 'real', what common character that emerges as covering both sets of things have they in view? I it is possible they may be at a loss for an answer. If that is their state of mind, you must consider whether they would accept at our suggestion a description of the real and agree to it.

THEAET. What description? Perhaps we can tell, if you will state it.

STR. I suggest that anything has real being, that is so E. constituted as to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be affected, in however small a degree.

by the most insignificant agent, though it be only once. I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things, that they are nothing but power.¹

THEAST. Well, they accept that, having for the moment no better suggestion of their own to offer.

STR. That will do; for later on both they and we perhaps 248. may change our minds. For the present, then, let us take it that this agreement stands between us and the one party. THEAET. It does.

The meaning of 'power'. Before considering the general significance of this argument with the maternalist, something must be said about the previous history of the word translated 'power'. Dynamis' is the substantive answering to the common verb 'to be able' (dbradGa), and it covers the ability to be acted upon as well as the ability to act on something else, whereas most of the corresponding English words—power, force, potency, etc — suggest active, as opposed to passive, ability. Dynamis includes passive capacity, receptivity, susceptibility, as well.

The notion of body or matter as endowed with properties both active and passive, capacities of both causing and suffering modifications, is deeply rooted in primitive common sense. The warmth in my hand is capable of acting on a stone and making it warm; it is also capable of being acted on by ice and reduced to, or replaced

1 Themas rule four defines rel form of e form one form ruley before. The construction is difficult 1 think the sentence ought to mean that the mark of real things (not the real things themselves) is nothing but power. This sense could be obtained if we could translate. 'I am proposing a mark to distinguish real things-that there is nothing else but power (to serve as such a mark)' or 'that if (the mark) is nothing but power' But neither rendering seems defensible

by, coldness. The notion had acquired a technical significance in medicine, for obvious reasons. A doctor's business is to find substances that will modify our physical states, things that have healing powers or virtues. Regarding from this standpoint all substances that serve as food or drugs, he studies their properties to find those that will have the right action. He thinks of 'the salt', 'the bitter', 'the sweet', 'the astringent', etc., not simply as permanent states of a substance, but as 'powers' or 'virtues', and of the similar properties of the 'patient's' body (6 nágran) as capable of being modified by the action of a corrective drug or diet. Reviewing the use of the word dynamis in the medical writers. Dr Souilhe 1 points out that it tended more and more to take on a special meaning, best illustrated by the Hippocratic tract On Ancient Medicine. He concludes * that the term comprises two mutually complementary ideas. (1) Substances manifest themselves by their qualities. Things are made sensible by these properties, such as ' the cold '. ' the hot '. ' the bitter '. ' the salt ', which allow them to enter into relation with other bodies. These are so many durause, distinct entities which constitute, so to say, the 'exteriorisation' of the substance. But (2) these entities themselves can only be known in action : their action is their raison d'être : action characterises and individualises them. 'The cold' differs from 'the hot' or from ' the bitter ' or from ' the salt ' because it produces a certain determinate effect. It can be combined with the other qualities, but will never be confounded with them, because its action is not identical with theirs. This action of qualities, again, is their dynamis. The term designates at once their essence and their proper manner of manifesting themselves.

Later, Dr. Soulhé observes that in those Hippocratic treatises which show the influence of early cosmological ideas, the term dynamis stands for the characteristic property of bodhes, their exterior and sensible aspect, which makes it possible to determine and specify them. Thanks to the dynamis, the mysterious 'nature' (*physis*), the substantial 'form' (*sides*) or primordial element, makes itself known, and does so by its action. This explains why it was possible, especially at a later date, to pass from the known to the unknown, from the appearance to the reality, and how easy it was to identify the 'nature' (*dynsis*) with the *dynamis*.

¹ J Southé, Étude sur le terme Aúrapus dans les disalogues de Platon (Paris, 1919), p 55 ⁸ Op cut, p 36

¹⁴ För instance, Protag 3498: Are wakdom, temperance, couragé, justoe, piety, śrve names for one thung, or is there, underlying each of these names, a peculiar being (soled) or thing having its own proper dynamis (rødyna för alle and the solet and t

To state the nature of a thing is the same as to state its property, since the nature is made evident only by the property, the two are inseparable, and a genuine causal link unites them. Sometimes the two are almost synonymous; but usually a distinction is perceptible, which is illustrated by the following passage from Menon's latrica: 'Philistion holds that we are composed of four forms (black), that is to say, of four elements: fire, air, water, earth. Each of these has its dynamics: fire has the hot, air the cold, water the moist, earth the dry'. Dr. Souilb then shows how the Sophists adapted and transposed this terminology and finally facilitated the introduction of it into philosophy.

In Plato's earlier writings there is hardly any occasion for the term in its medical sense, though dynamis meaning the 'virtue' of a drug occurs in the *Charmides* (1508). But m the *Philobus* (29A), he says that the small portion contained in our bodies of each of the four elements is weak and impure, and 'the dynamis it possesses is not worthy of its nature (*physsis*)'. And again, the *dynamis* of 'the moist' is to replenish that which is diried up (312). The word naturally occurs most frequently in the physical and physiological discussions of the *Timaess*. It is there used of the active properties of the four elements (32c); the pungent properties of substances hike soda (66A); arrid and saline dynamesis, coupled with a variety of colours and bitternesses, characteristic of the blood in decomposing blood-vessels (52z); the congealing power of fibrine acting on the blood (85p).

The passive dynamis, the capacity for receiving 'affections' of which the nature or constitution is susceptible, is less often mentioned. But in the *Republic* (507c) the most precious work of the creator of the senses is said to be 'the power of seeing and being seen'. The power of seeing is the faculty of vision m the eye; the power of being seen belongs to colour residing in visible things. It is given to them by the sunlight (509a). Summing up the philosophic use of the word an Plato, Dr. Soulhé says' that the Platonic dynamis can be defined as the property or quality which reveals the nature of a thung. It may be manifested under one or other of two aspects: as an activity or principe of action.

are distinguished by 'convention' (seri $i_{0,000}$, $i_{0,000}$ the recognised unage of language) by four names, and equally by mature (seri $i_{0,000}$) their forms ($3M_{col}$) are distinct: philegm is not like ($i_{0,000}/m_{col}$) blood like ble, they differ no colour, and tatche qualities, warmsh, cold dryness, mosture Things so different in form and dynamic cannot be one thing, each has its own dynamics and native ($i_{0,0000}/m_{col}$) drived by drive in other Ji you give a man a drage which draws the philegm, be will yount philegm, if you give a mos that draws ble, be will wonth ble

1 Op cut, p 149.

of movement, or as a state or principle of passivity, of resistance. By either aspect, or sometimes by both, it unveils the inmost and hidden nature of things; still more, it distinguishes their essences. The *dynamis* makes it possible to give each thing a name conforming to its peculiar constitution, and places things in separate groups. In a word, it is at once a principle of knowledge and a principle of diversity.

There are two places in particular where 'the power of acting and being acted upon '-the phrase we have in the Sophist-occurs. In the first (Phaedrus, 270B ff.) the medical associations are recalled. The art of Rhetoric, instead of being concerned with pedantic questions of style, the divisions of a speech, and so forth, ought to study the soul, which oratory is to influence. Rhetoric should analyse the nature of the soul as medicine analyses the body, and administer arguments as the doctor administers drugs and diet with a knowledge of their proper effect. Hippocrates said that the nature of the body could not be known apart from the nature of the whole world. This is still more true of the soul; and if we would study the nature of anything whatever, we must first analyse the complex into its simple constituents, and then, when we have reached the simple, study ' what power it has by nature either to act upon something or to be affected in some way'. The implication seems to be that the simple and unanalysable nature can only be manifested and known by the effects it can produce and suffer.

The other passage is the analysis of sensation in the *Theatctus* (rg6s fi.). Here the sentent organ and the extremal object are regarded as slow processes of change, having the power respectively to be acted upon and to act. But where the actual process of sense-perception is described, it is treated as symmetrical : eye and object alke are both active and passave. The switt motion of the visual current comes from the eye to encounter a swift motion from the object; both are thus active. These motions coalesce and generate a pair of offspring: sensition and colour. The eye then 'becomes full of vision '--a seeing eye; the object is saturated with whiteness and becomes a white thung. This is the passive aspect for both : the organ has its 'affection', the object acquires its quality.

Finally, the conception of the active and passive dynamics may be illustrated from Aristotle.¹ Inquiring what qualities must be present in the simple bodies (earth, water, air, fire). Aristotle considers what are the fundamental qualities that must be common to all perceptible bodies. He decides on Hot and Cold, Dry and Moist, qualities of touch which are the essential mark of per-

ceptible bodies as such. These, like all perceptible qualities, are powers of acting and being acted upon '; they are the 'affective qualities 'of *Categoris* 8. Their power is shown in the action and reaction of all bodies, animate or not, when they come nut contact. In the special case of sensation, if one of the two bodies is animate, the physical change due to the action of the external object will be accompanied by an activity of the soul, sensation, the awareness of physical change.

These developments serve to connect the Stranger's suggestion to the materialists with the question put earlier to the archaic physicists: "When you say Hot and Cold, or some such pair, *really are* all things, what do you mean by calling both 'real'?" The Hot and the Cold are typical 'powers' in the early cosmologists,¹ the medical writers, and Arastolie. Now that these physicasts are merged in the materialist party, the suggestion supplies the answer that was not given earlier. The general mark of what they call 'real' is 'the power of acting and being acted upon'. The 'real things' they recognised are essentially dynames.

We can now consider the drift of the whole argument. The materialist's warrant for believing in the reality of tangible body is simply that it has the power of affecting his sense of touch. But this power of making a difference that he can be aware of is, we have argued, not confined to visible and tangible things. He can know that justice is present in or absent from a soul. So iustice has the same right to be called real. The reasonable materialist must then surrender tangibility as the mark of the real, and substitute ' the power of acting and being acted upon '. which belongs to 'the just' equally with 'the hot' or 'the cold'. He is thus ousted from his original position that only bodies are real and brought some of the way towards the full admission that not merely the justice residing in an individual soul, but Justice itself, is real-a unique object of thought that can be known without any use of the bodily senses. No attempt, however, is made to extract this further concession.

Is Plato himself committed to this 'mark' of reality-for it is offered only as a mark, not as a definition ?² Theaetetus accepts

1 Physics VII, 2, 244b, 10

* Parmensides (frag 9), for instance, uses dowduess for the contrary perceptible qualities ranged in pairs under the two main 'Forms', Light (Fire) and Darkness (Night)

^a The word Joes weed at 2475 and again at 2485, not Alyes I it is a mark, not a definition, of man that he is capable of laughter *boyr opliav* (*Gorg* 4709) is to draw a boundary-line marking off something from other things, hence *boys* comes to mean a 'definition ' *Moyes* is the definition giving the explicit statement of a complex content or meaning.

ARGUMENT WITH THE IDEALISTS

it provisionally, and the Stranger remarks that we may change our minds later. The general impression left is that Plato regarded the argument as one that a reasonable materialist would accept. He humself might hold that nothing is real that cannot be in some way known, and yet not hold that 'to be real' maens to possess whatever power of acting or being acted on is thereby implied. That he does not in fact regard this as the definition of 'real', is clear; for in a later section (2400 ff.) the question, What does realify (Being, Existence) mean 'is put by the Stranger to humself and Theaetettus as still unanswered.

248A-249D. The Idealists must concede that reality includes some changing things

The Stranger now turns to the idealists. Will the 'Friends of Forms' accept the 'power of acting and being acted upon' as the mark of the realities they believe in ?

248A STR. Let us turn, then, to the opposite party, the friends of Forms. Once more you shall act as their spokesman. THEAET. I will.

> STR. We understand that you make a distinction between 'Becoming ' and ' Real being ' and speak of them as separate. Is that so ?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And you say that we have intercourse with ¹ Becoming by means of the body through sense, whereas we have intercourse with Real being by means of the soul through reflection. And Real being, you say, is always in the same unchangung state, whereas Becoming is variable.

B. TERART. We do. STR Admirable. But now what are we to take you as meaning by this expression ' intercourse ' which you apply to both ? Don't you mean what we described a moment ago? THEART. What was that ? STR. The experiencing an effect or the production of one,

I converte ("are in touch with , Taylor) is chosen as a neutral word covering all forms of cognition, the usual words (abdra, synohese, is/eroseles, aledéwide, etc.) being too much specialised and associated either with knowledge to the exclusion of semainton and perception or words are some as to enter into relations with. It is used of social and business interiorine, semainton in the Takesides (see p. 47). Inserve the appendix of the probability term for cognition, and this use has no connection (secta as Campbell imaganes) with its use latter to describe the' combination of Forms (severe 4 else).

SOPHIST

248s. arising, as the result of some power, from things that encounter one another. Perhaps, Theatettus, you may not be able to catch their answer to this, but I, who am familiar with them, may be more successful. TIREAFT. What have the to say, then ?

c. STR. They do not agree to the proposition we put just now to the earth-born Giants about reality.

THEAET. You mean----?

STR. We proposed as a sufficient mark of real things the presence in a thing of the power of being acted upon or of actung in relation to however insignificant a thing.¹ **THERET.** Yes.

STR. Well, to that they reply that a power of acting and being acted upon belongs to Becoming, but neither of these powers is compatible with Real being.

THEAST. And there is something in that answer ?

STR. Something to which we must reply by a request for p more enlightenment. Do they acknowledge further that

the soul knows and Real being is known?

THEAET. Certainly they agree to that

STR Well, do you agree that knowing or being known is an action, or is it experiencing an effect, or both? Or is one of them experiencing an effect, the other an action? Or does neither of them come under either of these heads at all ?⁴

THEAET. Evidently neither, otherwise our friends would be contradicting what they said earlier.

STR. I see what you mean. They would have to say this :³
 E. If knowing is to be acting on something, it follows that what is known must be acted upon ⁴ by it , and so, on this

showing, Reality when it is being known by the act of knowledge must, in so far as it is known, be changed owing

¹ πρός τό σμικρότατον δρέν, Cl 247E, ύπό τοῦ φοιλοτάτου (παθεῦ) and Phaedrus 2700, την δύναμια αύτοῦ τίνα πρός τί πέφυκεν είς τό δρῶν έχον ή τίνα είς τό παθείν ύπό τοῦ.

* The Stranger puts all the possible ways of regarding knowing He does not suggest that it must be an action, not a being-acted-upon, but that it may be either, or both, or neither The Idealists m their next reply take up only one of these suggestions-that knowing is an action-and object to that

*25. mediation "velocity of (a Mysore 6). What follows us put into the mouths of the Idealist, who state there objection to regarding knowing as an action They ignore the possibility that knowing is an affection of the soil, acted upon by the object. M Disc prints "size syn, but translates r di or r d My "mais, cos, as mosse, is if anouerous" — a rendering which makes the Stringer force on the Idealists the alternative that knowing is an action

" Or ' affected '-a rendering that more clearly implies suffering some change.

ARGUMENT WITH THE IDEALISTS

- 248E. to being so acted upon ; and that, we say, cannot happen to the changeless. THEART. Exactly. STR. But tell me, in heaven's name ; are we really to be so easily convinced that change, life, soul, understanding have no place in that which is perfectly real-that it has neither life nor thought, but stands immutable in solemn 249. aloofness, devoid of intelligence? THEAET. That, sir, would be a strange doctrine to accept, STR. But can we say it has intelligence without having life ? THEAET. Surely not. STR. But if we say it contains both, can we deny that it has soul in which they reside? THEAST. How else could it possess them ? STR. But then, if it has intelligence, life, and soul, can we say that a living thing remains at rest in complete changelessness ? B. THEAET. All that seems to me unreasonable.
 - STR. In that case we must admit that what changes and change itself are real things. THEAET Certainly.

The Stranger now draws conclusions. (1) As just agreed, if Reahty consists solely of unchangeable things, intelligence will have no real existence anywhere. But (2) if Reality consists solely of things that are perpetually changing (as the Heracleiteans sud), there can be no intelligence or knowledge. (3) Therefore Reality or the sum of things ' must contain both changing and unchanging things.

2498. STR. From this, however, it follows, Theaetetus, first, that, if all things are unchangeable ¹ no intelligence can really exist anywhere in anything with regard to any object. THEAET. Quite so. STR. And, on the other hand, if we allow that all things are moving and changing, on that view equally we shall be excluding intelligence from the class of real things. THEAET. How so?

¹ despines re forces ~ (stormer >). Buildam Thus gives the conclusion required, and estraw is supported by stora in the next speech. Without storm, despine forces must be governed by pupped to make seenes, and the statement that 'nothing unchangeable has intelligence' is not a frash conclusion, having already been stated, nor sit the conclusion demanded by the following context The point is that, if the work of Reality excludes change, intelligence (which involves lide and therefore change) will have no real existence asymptise?

P.T.K.

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SOPHIST

- 240B. STR. Do you think that, without rest, there could ever c. be anything that abides constant in the same condition and in the same respects ? THEAST. Certainly not. STR. And without such objects can you make out that intelligence exists or could ever exist anywhere? THEAST. It would be quite impossible. STR. Well then, all the force of reasoning must be enlisted to oppose anyone who tries to maintain any assertion about anything at the same time that he suppresses knowledge or understanding or intelligence. THEAET Most certainly. STR. On these grounds, then, it seems that only one course is open to the philosopher who values knowledge and the rest above all else. He must refuse to accept p. from the champions either of the One or of the many
 - b) from the charge points that all Reality is chargedess; and he must turn a deaf ear to the other party who represent Reahty as everywhere changing. Like a child begging for 'both ',¹ he must declare that Reality or the sum of things is both at once—all that is unchangeable and all that is in change.

THEAST. Perfectly true.

In the concluding passage the idealists who believe in 'many Forms' are grouped with, but distinguished from, the Eleatos, the champions of the One Beng. What they have in common is their insistence upon the changelessness of the real: they both maintain that the whole of realty, 'the All', excludes all change and motion. It is put to them that this means excluding all life, soul, intelligence from the real—a position as fatal to the reality of knowledge as the opposite Heracleitean thesis (already dismissed in the *Theaetestis*, p. 98), that the whole of the real is in perpetual change.

Who are these Friends of Forms ? The plain fact is that every feature of their doctrine, which is described in some detail, can be illustrated from Plato's own earlier works, and that we know of no other school that held a theory of reality even resembling it.¹

• For the benefit of scholars (see Campbell's note) who have never asked a child, 'Which hand will you have?' I quote a letter from Mary Lamb (Aug 20, 1853) on a vasit to Cambridge: 'We were walling the whole time-out of one College mto another II you ask me which I hieb best, I must make the children's traditionary unoffending reply---Both'''

² As Ritter (Platon in, 132) remarks, no one could ever have doubted that the Friends of Forms include the Platonic Socrates of the Phaselo and Republic, The Gods, in this battle with the Giants, include all idealists, all behevers in unseen intelligible realities. Parmenides is expressly referred to, and the Pythagoreans (though not mentioned) belonged to that western tradition which had always stood in contrast with the materialistic science of Ionia. The battle is one that is always going on between the two camps, on a fundamental issue of philosonhy. It is ridiculous to conceive it as a guarrel between (sav) Antisthenes or Melassus on the one side and the Megarians or a misguided section of the Academy on the other, Plato knew well enough that his own theory of Forms was by far the most important product of the idealist tradition. He could not leave himself out of the picture The theory of Forms has already been submitted to the criticism of Parmenides. Why should it not be criticised here by one of Parmenides' disciples ? As we have remarked, it is Plato's purpose in this dialogue to set his own doctrine beside the Eleatic and to mark exactly the points in which he must differ from Parmenides. The gist of the Stranger's criticism is that the Friends of Forms have stated their view of reality in terms that are too Eleatic. They have taken changelessness as the mark of Real being, and relegated all change to the world of Becoming.

The theory of the Friends of Forms is the theory stated in the *Phaedo* and cruticused in the *Parmendes*. (1) They 'make a distinction between Becoming and Being and speak of them as separate'. Socrates had used the same words in the *Parmenides*. 'I for edistinguishes the Forms by themselves as separate', and Parmenides had repeated it: 'Have you yourself made this distinction you speak of—certain Forms and on the other hand the things that partake of them, each separate from the other '¹ The emphasis in both dialogues falls upon the separation (*goequide*) of the Ideal world from the many changing things of sense.

(2) The Friends of Forms speak of two contrasted kinds of cognition: intercourse with Becoming by means of the body through sense; and with Beng by means of the soul through reflection. This suggests a complete distinction between two fields of objects, the unseen and intelligible Forms and the visible objects of the bodyl senses. All this is in the *Phaesal* (7qA):

if the temporal sequence of the dalogues had been correctly determined earlier than it was Ritter himself identifies the Friends of Forms with members of the Academy who took the doctimes of personal immortability and of boddless Forms, as set forth in the *Pkesdo*, more seriously and literally than Plato himself intended

¹ Soph. 2488, γάνεταν, τήν δ' οδοίαν χωρίε που διελόμενοι λέγετε, Parme 129D, έδο της διαμοβται χωρίε αύτα έταθ' αύτα τα έδη 130B, αύτός σύ ούτω δηβησαι ώς λέγκες χωρίε μέν είδη αύτα άττα, χωρίε δέ τα τούτων αδ μετέχοντα, see Introd., D 7 there are two orders of things, the unseen and unchanging, and the viable that is always changing. We ourselves consist of soul and body. The soul as unseen is akin to the unseen objects; the body, as a vasible thing, to the visible. When the soul studies things 'through the senses', she is dragged down by the body and confused; when she is 'by hersel', reflecting on changeless objects without the senses, she has wisdom. So again in the *Republic* (5444) the lower kind of cognition is 'concerned with Becommg' (*resol viscour*), the higher know that 'Beine' (*resol viscour*), the higher know the distance of the sense sense of the sense sense of the sense sense of the sense sense of the sense sense of the sense sense sense of the sense sense sense sense sense of the sense se

(a) The Friends of Forms take unchangeableness as the mark of real Being, variability as the mark of Becoming. This had been asserted in the *Phaedo* with all possible emphases.¹ The Forms admit no sort of change, whereas the many sensible things never remain the same. In the *Phaedo* and *Republic* the deal world is constantly spoken of as excluding any change, and this was always treated as the necessary conduction for the existence of knowledge.

Now in the Parmenides the last criticism brought against the theory of Forms was that, if the Forms exist in a separate world ' by themselves', there is danger that they may be beyond the reach of the knowledge which exists in our souls here 'in our world ' (nap' nuiv). A god might possess perfect knowledge, but can our imperfect knowledge ever reach the Forms? Yet Parmenides admits that without the Forms there cannot be any discourse at all The Forms must exist and be knowable. The whole drift of the criticism is that the 'separation' of Forms from things in our world has been too sharply drawn and over-emphasised. The same impression is conveyed here by the Stranger The Friends of Forms are extremists who, like the Eleatics, want to make the whole of reality changeless. Although they speak of knowledge as an intercourse of the soul with reality by reflection, they will not admit that this is analogous to the intercourse with Becoming through the senses, for fear that some 'affection' of the real should be implied, inconsistent with its unchanging character. The Stranger demands from them, as earlier from the materialists, a concession. But what exactly is this concession ?

When the Stranger protests that intelligence, life, and therefore change must have a place in ' that which is perfectly real', he cannot mean that everything which is perfectly real must be alive

¹ Soph, 248a, rp Sraw solar & data serà radrà dontras Eque part, pirene 48 Udore Olive Plando, 750; Sarp da enti radrà na di advanta fuera most likoly to be incomposite, rà 14 Udore Aluer est aphérere enti radrà to be composite. Advà d edita never admits aux picanges : da darioù lescore d daro, monché o estrò est² det data, destrica sent radrà fue sua d diferere oddanji oddanis dùolacor oblique defuera.

What may easily mislead the reader is this: the Stranger's protest follows immediately upon the idealists' objection that, if knowing is an action, reality, in being known, must be acted upon and so changed It appears at first sight as if the Stranger himself must think that what is known is changed by being known. The conclusion, as we have seen, excludes the idea that the nature or content of a Form could possibly be altered by the act of knowledge. But it may be well to review here the whole argument with regard to knowledge.

In the first place, we may note that the idealists' conception of the intercourse between Becoming and the bodily senses exactly agrees with the analysis of sensation in the Theastetus-a further proof that that analysis is Plato's own. They have reduced the alleged hard and changeless ' being ' of physical bodies to ' a sort of moving process of becoming '." Our intercourse with this process is 'an affection or action arising, as the result of some power, from things that encounter one another ', viz, sense-organs and external objects. The conception of the active and passive dynamis is the same as that offered to the Giants, and the idealists accept it as belonging to Becoming. All this fits exactly the account given in the Theaetetus. The Stranger has, in fact, offered to the materialist Plato's own account of the nature of those perceptible bodies which the materialist regards as real, and of the intercourse we have with them in perception. So far as this sort of cognition is concerned, the reformed materialist who accepts the offer is at one with the Friends of Forms, who already hold that theory.

On the other hand, the materialist was induced to accept the dynamis theory, because we proved to him that his original identification of the real with the tangible was not wide enough to include

¹ Е g. Тітаны 28А, 52А, etc., Райсын 59А, с ² 246с, убысын феронбулу тыб. Cf Theast 156А ff (р. 46).

certain bodiless things, such as justice, whose reality has as good a warrant. But what will the Friends of Forms say to making the power of acting and being acted upon the mark of reality ? What they do say (248c) is that the dynamis theory applies to Becoming only, not to Being or Reality (obola). The point put to them by the Stranger may be stated thus: 'You conceive our intercourse with physical objects in this way. Must you not recognise an analogous intercourse between the soul which knows by reflection and the reality known ?' It is a fact that the same metaphor of sexual intercourse that runs through the analysis of sense-perception in the Theaetetus had been used by Plato for the intercourse of the highest part of the soul with truth or reality. Socrates in the Republic (400A) says that the true lover of knowledge strives towards reality and cannot rest among appearances. His passion (fooc) will not be blunted nor cease until he lays hold upon true being with the kindred part of his soul, whereby he approaches and is married (ninguisar sal myelc) with reality, begets (vermoac) intelligence and truth, and gains knowledge, true life and nourishment. So only will he cease from travail (do avoc). So again in the Symposium (212A) the ascent to the vision of the Beautiful ends in a marriage of the soul with truth and the begetting of true virtue. The question now put to the idealists may be interpreted as meaning : Is this marriage of the soul with reality mere metaphor ? Is not something analogous to the marriage of sense with its objects involved in the conception of knowledge ? How else can we overcome that sharp separation of the thinking soul in our world from the unchanging world of Forms, which Parmenides had pointed out as threatening Socrates' presentation of his theory of Forms?

The subsequent argument may be understood as showing that Plato, though he still held that the Forms must be changeless, has become aware that he ought not any longer to speak as if the Forms were the whole of reality. Life, soul, and untelligence do not exist only in our world of Becoming, they too must be real. The sort of change that they imply must have a real existence. Again, our own souls, if they are immortal and alk no the Forms, must be real, though they animate bodies in time and space. Life is not motion us space or the modification of physical qualities. It is spiritual movement. In the *Phasdrws* Plato has defined the soul as that which moves itself and is the source of all other motion; and he will repeat this in the *Laws*. Spiritual motions—thoughts, desires, feelings, etc.—are prior to all physical motions, and they reside in the soul of the universe and in our own souls. This is the motion which the idealists are required to admit into 'that's which is perfectly real'. Just as the reformed materialist was induced to surrender the mark of tangibility and enlarge his conception of the real to include some bodiless things, so the reformed idealist must surrender the mark of changelessness and allow that the real includes spiritual motion, as well as the unchanning Forms.

The question whether knowing and being known do not involve something analogous to the physical intercourse of perception seems to be left unanswered. The Stranger neither asserts this nor denies it. In this Battle of the Gods and Giants Plato stands between the two camps. Looking down upon the material world as conceived by the Atomists, he sees a disorderly chaos of atomic bodies each with its shape filled with that impenetrable solid stuff which the Atomist called 'being' or substance. In his own theory of matter as stated in the Timaeus he pulverises this alleged being and reduces it to a moving process, the restless change of qualitative 'powers'. Thus he describes the contents of space, 'the nurse of becoming ', before the creator imposes form and number in the distinct geometrical figures of the primary bodies.1 Looking in the other direction at the heaven of bodiless intelligible Forms which he had himself created, again he sees a pattern of Forms, each with its peculiar character, fixed in the immobility of Eleatic ' being '. But is this pattern, as his earlier language had constantly implied, the whole of the real ? In the Republic itself knowledge is compared to vision, and without light the eve has not ' the power of seeing ' nor its object ' the power of being seen '. The light comes from a source that is 'beyond being'. Perhaps what is here in his mind may be illustrated by Shelley's image of the dome of many-coloured glass that stains the white radiance of eternity. The Forms are like the pattern of colours on the dome, but reality

1 Timaeus 52D. Space contains the uopeal (characters or qualities, not ' shapes ') of the four elements, and is filled with their unbalanced ' powers ' (Surdues), before the creator disconnuction of the sal anduois I believe that a careful study of Plato's account of matter in the Timasus 47E ff leads to the conclusion that he does not reduce matter simply to space, figured by the geometrical shapes characteristic of the four primary bodies These shapes are not empty, but filled with ' motions ' or changes, which are durines (52E), having the power of acting on one another and on the organs of sentient creatures. Such in the hving world, is the irrational element which never exists without the other element of divine order, though it is mythically pictured as a pre-existing chaos (30A, 52D) The changes must be attributed to the irrational element in the world's soul ' before ' it is reduced to order by Reason They replace the alleged solid impenetrable and unchanging stuff of the Democritean atom, which involves the reduction of all change to locomotion of unchanging bodies and excludes all life from what is declared to be the sole reality (rd dv, for space, though it exists, is 'not-being') If this interpretation is correct, the agreement of the Timasus with the Theasistus and Sophist is complete.

SOPHIST

must include the radiance that shines through them. The word 'intercourse' suggests the type of relation that subsists in social fellowship—not action on a purely passive object, but action that meets with a response. There is an intelligence in the world, which answers to our intelligence, and of which, the *Philobs* declares, our intelligence is a part. How exactly that intelligence or life or soul is related to the Forms is a question that can only be answered in the figurative language of the *Timases*.

Here the review of all the philosophers' conceptions of the real comes to an end. We set out upon this survey in order to seek a justification for speaking of eidola-things that are not wholly real and yet have some sort of existence-and also of falsity in thought and speech. The reader might now expect that the discussion of reality as conceived by the materialist and the idealist should lead on to an explanation of eidola, how they are related to ' the perfectly real'. But this hope is disappointed. The next division of the dialogue has little or no bearing on that metaphysical problem. What Plato intended we can only guess ; but this looks like another loose thread, dropped here to be taken up in the projected Philosother. The reader must turn for further enlightenment to the Timaeus. The idealist who has learnt that reality is not only an unchanging pattern of Forms but contains also a divine intelligence with the living power of a moving cause, will there find the world of nature represented as fashioned by that power on the model of the Forms, and discover what elements of reality may belong to the moving images of time, in what sense they can partake of being and of not-being. But the discussion in the Sophist is diverted here to the other problem of falsity in thought and speech, which is to be solved at the close (259E ff.).

240D-25IA. Transition. What does the idealist mean by 'real'?

This diversion is effected in the next, transitional, section. Here the term 'Reality' or 'lengi' (rd ϕ) shifts its meaning. Like 'reality' or 'existence' in English, this term can mean either what it meant in the last section, 'that which is real', 'that which exists ' which real things or existents have. Using the same term without pointing out that its meaning shifts, the Stranger develops an argument which leads apparently to a contradiction of the results we have just reached, namely, that Reality must include all that is unchanging and all that is in change, 'both at once'. We shall now be led to the admission that' Reahty is not motion and rest both at once '; 'the real is by virtue of its own nature neither at rest or in motion'. The reader who, like Thesetetus, does not see that 'Reality' has ceased to mean ' the real' and now means ' realness ' will agree to the Stranger's concluding remark that Reality is as puzzling as unreality.

The Stranger points out that our conclusion, 'the real consists of all that is unchangeable and all that is in change ', is parallel to the early physicist's statement, 'the real consists of the Hot and the Cold'. Just as we put it to them that the term 'real' does not mean 'hot' or 'cold' or 'hot-and-cold', but has a distinct sense that should be defined, so now we put it to the Idealists that 'real' (realness) does not mean 'moving' or 'at rest' but is a third thing of which Motion and Rest themselves both partake. We have not yet got a definition of its meaning.

249D. STR. Well then, does it not look now as if we had fairly caught reality within the compass of our description? THEAET. Certainly it does. STR And yet 1--oh dear, Theaetetus, what if I say after all that I think it is just at this point that we shall come to see how baffing this question of reality is ? E. THEAET. How so? Why do you say that ?

THEALET. How so? Why do you say that? STR My good friend, don't you see that now we are wholly in the dark about it, though we fancy we are talking good sense?

THEAET. I certainly thought so, and I don't at all understand how we can be deceived about our condition.

STR. Then consider these last conclusions of ours more carefully, and whether, when we agree to them, we might not fairly be posed with the same question we put earlier to

250. not fairly be posed with the same question we put earlier to those who said that the sum of things 'really is ' Hot and Cold.

THEAET. You must remind me what that question was STR. By all means; and I will try to do it by questioning you in the same way as I questioned them, so that we may get a little further at the same time.

THEAET. Very good.

STR. Come along then. When you speak of Movement and Rest, these are things completely opposed to one another, aren't they ?

THEAET. Of course.

¹ The corrupt $\beta_0\beta_{11}$ μ^{0+} $\partial^{-}\phi_{0}$ has not been conventingly encoded Since ic can hardly be the exchanged region of the status of R^{0} of S^{0} of R^{0} of R^{0}

SOPHIST

- 250. STR. At the same time you say of both and of each severally, that they are real?
 - B. TERAST. I do. STR. And when you admit that they are real, do you mean that either or both are in movement? TBRAST. Certainly not. STR. Then, perhaps, by saying both are real you mean they are both at rest? TBRAST. No, how could I? STR. So, then, you conceive of reality (realness) as a third thing over and above these two; and when you speak of both as being real, you mean that you are taking both movement and rest together as embraced by reality? and fixing your attention on their common association with reality?
 - C. IMEART. It does seem as it we discerned rearry as a third thing, when we say that movement and rest are real. STR. So reality is not motion and rest 'both at once', but something distinct from them.

THEAET. Apparently.

STR. In virtue of its own nature, then, reality is neither at rest nor in movement.

THEAET. I suppose so.

The phrase 'both at once' (ourauporepor) is meant to recall our previous conclusion, ' Reality or the sum of things is both at once (ovvauporeog)-all that is unchangeable and all that is in change '. Now we say that reality is not motion and change both at once ; the real, in virtue of its own nature, is neither at rest nor in motion. This appears to Theaetetus to be a contradiction : but it is not so. The first conclusion meant that the Real, or the sum of things that are real, includes both things that are changeless and things that change. Our present conclusion means that Reality (realness) .- the Form with which the two other Forms. Motion and Rest, are associated or combined in the judgments ' Motion is real ', 'Rest is real '-does not include as part of its content or meaning either 'being in motion ' or ' being at rest ', but is a third distinct Form. Hence it is not true to say that the Real 'by virtue of its own nature '- the real, qua real-either is at rest or is in motion. If ' to be real ' implied either ' being at rest ' or ' being in motion '. evidently the real could not include both moving and unchanging things. This conclusion is in entire harmony with the earlier one.

The trained Academic reader, accustomed to think of Platonic Forms, would see that the meaning of 'Reality' has shifted from

¹ Taking περιοχομένην συλλαβών together (Campbell)

' the real' to 'realness'. But the next sentences describe the natural confusion of mind of the ordinary reader and of Theaetetus himself, who is not alive to the change of meaning.

2506. STR. If so, where is the mind to turn for help if one wants to reach any clear and certain conclusion about reahty? ThRAFT. Where indeed? STR. It seems hard to find help in any quarter. If a thing is is not in movement, how can it not be at rest? O rhow can what is not in any way at rest fail to be in movement, how can it not be at rest? ThRAFT. As impossible? ThRAFT. As impossible? ThRAFT. Then there is one thing that ought to be remembered at this point. TREAFT. And that is—? STR. That we were completely puzzled when we were asked to what the name 'unreal' should be applied. You remember? The state of the should be applied. You remember?

THEAET. Of course

E. STR. And now we are in no less perplexity about reality? THEAET. In even greater, I should say, sir, if that be possible

STR. Let us take it, then, that our difficulty is now completely stated. But since reality and unreality are equally puzzling, there is henceforward some hope that any light, whether dim or bright, thrown upon the one will illuminate

251. the other to an equal degree; and if, on the other hand, we cannot get sight of either, at any rate we will make the best we can of it under these conditions and force a passage through the argument with both elbows at once.¹ THEAT. Very good.

¹ & advisofies with an accusative can mean (1) to fend off : Thue 18 &, of hips, roke ofromes baddeborn Thesati 150; excises a given's badyoingle' (1) box shall we find off this argument?¹), (2) to force one's way through : & advisofies we's follow. Xean (1) the word has either of these senses here and signable is dative it is hard to see how we can use reality and unreality as instruments when we cannot' see 'them Against the interpretation 'force a passage for the argument between both at once' (Agaéo gen governed by 8Å in & advisofie, Campbell, Dieb) is the word Age. Otherwise (1) the construction could be paralleled) the metaphon of a sing between two invasible rocks is appropriate Davison for the second statistic of the construction could be paralleled) the metaphon of a sing between two invasible rocks is appropriate Davison, 1831-56, is fuelpe, 28Cc), abriets sindrawe powinie indebi, robundeta grabit, digar set Altico, at of Hom Agdefords if daylordgene' Stephantare Otso Sophust 256a, ab 7 Home (1) Suprises if daylordgene's get, and instances of the unmiar oursaeous of worke's and of m The Stranger's words, 'let us take it that our difficulty is now completely stated ', indicate that all that has gone before is a statement of problems, with some hints towards their solution. Faithful to Socrates' method, Plato has reduced the reader to a state of perplexity that will make him eager for such explanations as are now to come. At the same time, under the mask of an apparent contradiction, he has changed the subject from a metaphysical consideration of the nature of the real to a different field, which we should call Logic. Our attention is now fixed on the three Forms, Reality (or Existence ¹), Motion, Rest. We are to take these Forms in isolaton from any existing things that may partake of them and indeed from everything else, and consider in what ways they ' combine' with one another or refuse to combine.

II. THE COMBINATION OF FORMS AND THE PROBLEM OF NEGATIVE STATEMENTS

The purpose of the coming section (\$21A-250p) is to clear up confusions about negative statements containing the words 'is not' —negative, not false statements. In particular there was the fallacy that every negative statement denses the existence of somethmg. It was necessary to show that such a statement as 'Motion is not Rest' does not deny the existence of either Rest or Motion, but only means that Motion is not the same as Rest, or Motion is o*ther than*. Rest: Everything in the world that is other than Rest can be negatively described as 'that which is not Rest', but none the less it exists and may be just as real as Rest. So we succeed in finding a sense in which ' that which is not (so and so)' exists, or has being. The conclusion will be the disproof (promised at 2410) of Parmenides' two complementary dogmas: ' That which is cannot in any sense bo'.

This result is not all that is conveyed in the long discussion of the combination of Forms. In the middle of it comes a description of Dialectic, the task of the philosopher, who is to trace out the pattern of the world of Forms by his methods of Collection and Drison. The whole section is concerned solely with that world and the relations that subsit between the Forms themselves, and are reflected in true statements that we can make about them. The Stranger is, in fact, fulfilling the wish expressed by Socrates in the Parmewides, when he said it would interest him if anyone could show that the problem of one thing having many names and

¹ The shift will be marked in the translation by the use of 'existence' instead of 'reality' for ode/a, rd &. 'Exists' is a more natural word for that meaning of 'is' which we are going to distinguish from others

participating in many Forms, which his theory was to solve, has its counterpart within the world of Forms itself.¹

25IA-C. Exclusion of the trivial question, how one individual thing can have many names

The opening paragraph makes it clear that we shall be concerned only with the relations of Forms to one another, not with the old question of the participation of an individual concrete thing in many Forms. Once more that question is impatiently dismissed as not meritung further discussion²

The transition here necessarily seems a little abrupt, because the shift to a fresh set of problems has been diagnised by the apparent contradiction which has reduced Theaetetus to perplexity. The link of thought is: Being and Not-being have proved to be equally puzzling Let us now conside statements (*diyoqi*) in which the words is ' and ' is not ' occur, and see if we can discover how Motion and Rest can both *be*, and yet Being itself can *work-be* inher moving or at rest. So we pass to statements in which we ' give names to things'.

251A STR Let us explain, then, how it is that we call the same thing—whatever is in question at the moment—by several names.

THEAET. For instance? Give me an example.

STR. Well, when we speak of a man we give him many additional names: we attribute to him colours and shapes and sizes and defects and good qualities; and in all these and countless other statements we say he is not merely

B. a 'man' but also 'good ' and any number of other things. And so with everything else : we take any given thing as one and yet speak of it as many and by many names. THERAET True.

STR And thereby, I fancy, we have provided a magnificent entertainment for the young and for some of their elders who have taken to learning late in life. Anyone can take a hand in the game and at once object that many things cannot be one, nor one thing many; indeed, they delight in forbidding us to speak of a man as 'good'; we must

c. only speak of a good as good, and of the man as man. I imagine, Theaetetus, you often meet with these enthusiasts, sometimes elderly men who, being poorly endowed with intellegence, gape with wonder at these discoveries and fance.

¹ See Introd., p II.

³ It was dismissed at *Parm.* 129A ff. as solved by the earlier statement of the Theory of Forms, and will be described as 'childish' at *Philobus* 14D.

251C. they have lighted here on the very treasure of complete wisdom.¹

THEAET. I have indeed.

It is widely agreed among scholars who allow Plato to take notice of his contemporaries that the phrase 'old men who have taken to learning late m life' is pointed at Antsthenes. We know so little of Antisthenes that the reference cannot be taken as certain. The words would fit Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus, who do put forward the view here mentioned.¹ On the other hand, it was suggested by Schleiermacher that Antisthenes was attacked under the name of these Eristics. He had been a pupil of the rhetorician Gorgias, and had opened a school after Scorates' death, at which date he can hardly have been under fifty. He may have developed an interest in what we call locical questions late n hife.

The theory here dismissed as trivial objects to calling one thing by many names, because one thing cannot be many nor many one. We must not say 'this main is good' but only that 'a good is good', 'a man is man '—one name for one thing This is not a 'denial of predication ', but rather a theory of predication (if we are to use that term), and one which is not allogether contemptible.

The theory has been brought into relation with the doctrine 'dreamt' by Socrates at *Theadebus* 2012 (D. 143), but it may be independent. It can be stated as follows. A good white man is a complex thing, with three parts, each of which has its own proper name. 'Good' is the name of this goodness which exists here, 'man 'is the name of this man, and so on. I may call the complex thing a 'good white man ', or I may call each elementary constituent by its own name : but I ought not to say 'this man is good' : the name good belongs, not to him, but to his goodness. Antisthenes, we are told by Arstotle.'' showed his simplicity by his contention that nothing should be spoken of except by its proper verbal expression (logos), one expression for one thung'. If logos here includes not only many-worded formulas, such as 'good white man ', but also single names, Antisthenes' doctrine may be the same as the theory in the Sophiest.

Plato would reply that a common name is not samply the name of this mdividual thing and others like it, but has a universal meaning, which is a unique Form. 'This man is good 'means that this thing partakes of the Form, Good. There is nothing against one thing partaking of any number of Forms. It is mere pedantry to object

¹ Cf Philebus, 15E, ήσθείς ως τινα σοφίας εύρηκώς θησαυρόν

[·] Euthyd. 272B, yéporre örre fofáother raires ris ochlas

³ Mstaph. 1024b, 32.

SOME FORMS COMBINE, OTHERS DO NOT

that 'good' is strictly the name only of the goodness present in this man. Why should we not use the compendious form of words 'This man is good' or 'partales of goodness'? This answer has been sufficiently indicated in the *Parmenides*. What here concerns us is not statements about individual things (such as the theory contemplates) but the problems presented by statements about Forms. How and to what extent can Forms partake of one another ?

251C-252E. Proof that some Forms will combine, others will not

The Stranger's next words indicate that this question is addressed not only to elderly pedants but to all philosophers.

251C. STR. Well then, we want our argument to be addressed to all alike who have ever had anything to say about existence; so let us take it that the questions we shall put now are intended not only for these people but for all those others whom we have been conversing with earlier.

THEAST. And what are the questions ?

STR. Are we not to attach Existence to Motion and Rest, nor anything else to anything else, but rather to treat them no ur discourse as incapable of any blending or participation in one another? Or are we to lump them all together as capable of association with one another? Or shall we say that this is true of some and not of others? Which of

E. these possibilities shall we say they prefer, Theaetetus? TREAET. I am not prepared to answer that on their behalf. STR. Then why not answer the questions one at a time and see what are the consequences in each case? TREAET. Very good.

The word translated 'combine' (xonvoria) happens to be the same that was used in the metaphysical section for our 'intercourse' with the objects of perception or of thought; but the two meanings are entirely distinct. The word itself means no more than 'to have relatons with 'something, and the relations now to be described between Forms are not psychological. A Form is not imagened as perceiving or thinking of another Form when it 'combines' with it. The relation is expressed by other metaphors used synonymously. In a positive statement we are said to 'connect' (regord/srrue) the two Forms. The Forms themselves are said to 'mix' or 'blend' (*oupuelymotha*) or to be incapable of blending (*duewra*); to 'fit together' (*owngavere* 2538); to 'accept' or 'receive' one another (*divgeda*); to 'partake' of one acother *queralapdibers*

or *µereyew*). The contrary of this combination is sometimes called 'division', 'disjunction' (dvalosauc) or 'separation' (diamplireoflat).1 Plato, here as elsewhere, wisely refuses to allow any one metaphor to harden into a technical term. Nearly all language is metaphorical, and every metaphor has misleading associations. By varying the word, Plato helps the reader to free his conception of the relation intended from such associations and to escape the illusion that philosophical language can be really precise and unambiguous. The following definitions, however, may be useful. Two Forms are said to 'combine' when they stand (eternally) in such a relation that their names can occur in a true affirmative statement of a certain type. For example, ' Motion exists' means that the Form Motion blends with the Form Existence. A true negative statement such as 'Motion does not rest ' reflects the fact that the two Forms, Motion and Rest, are (eternally) incompatible-refuse to blend. There are also true negative statements of the type ' Motion is not Existence ' or ' Motion is not Rest ' which express the fact that the Forms in question are different, though they may not be incompatible (for Motion is compatible with Existence). These definitions are in terms of statements that we can make about Forms ; hence the proviso that the statements must be true. We can, indeed, connect two names in a false statement, e.g. 'Motion is Rest'; but the Forms referred to do not combine. The combinations and disjunctions exist eternally among the Forms themselves. They are reflected only in true statements.

The relation between Forms that combune is also called ' participation '; but it must not be assumed that this relation is the same that subsits between an individual thing (e.g. a man) and the Form (Man) that he ' partakes of '. Flato nowhere implies that the Form Motion partakes of the Form Existence, or the Form Man partakes of the Form Animal, in the same way as this man partakes of the Form Man. He uses the same word with his usual dusregard for precise terminology, and he nowhere gives any explicit account of either relation. It seems obvious, however, that he cannot have regarded the two relations as the same. The word *sourcere*, as well as $\mu erdyzer$, is used of individuals which 'share in ' a common Form ', but he would not describe a man as ' blended with' the Form Man. Further, 'participation' as between Forms is a symmetrical relation. At 2550, p Existents (δrca) are divided into two Forms or Kinks (rd wod' evia and $rayed_{dl}$) and the Existence

¹ Parm. 1293, onyespánnova sal διακρίσκαθαι Anstotle, π. έρμ ι, uses σύσθεας ('putting together') for the combination of two terms in an affirmative proposition, and διαίρεσε for the disjoining of the two in a negative proposition

SOME FORMS COMBINE, OTHERS DO NOT

is described as 'partaking of' both these subordinate Forms. So the generic Form partakes of (blends with) the specific Form no less than the specific partakes of the generic. This consideration also shows that the relation is not that of subject to predicate; for that is not symmetrical. The Aristotelian terms 'subject', predicate' and 'copula' should not be used at all to describe what is in Plato's much. This will become clearer as we proceed.

That the terms whose combination or non-combination is discussed here are Forms is clearly stated by the Stranger where he refers to the results obtained: 'Since we have agreed that kinds ' (yém) are related in the same way (as letters or muscal sounds) as regards blending' (ag33). It is true that from the combination or non-combination of Forms among themselves, consequences follow with regard to the truth and failsty of statements about individual things. For instance, if the Form Motion did not partiake of Existence, then no statement implying that a moving thing or a particular motion exists would be true. Some such consequences are referred to, but we are actually discussing Forms, not individual things.

The three possible alternatives with regard to the extent of combination among Forms are now considered in turn. The first is that no form combines with any other, which means that no affirmative statement about a Form is true. This alternative is analogous to Antisthenes' view that a thing must not be called by any name but its own. Apply that to Forms, and the result is that a Form can only be named; nothing can be said about it,

25IE. STR. And first, if you like, let us suppose them to say that nothing has any capacity for combination with anything else for any purpose. Then Movement and Rest will have no part in Existence.

252. THEAET. No.

STR. Well then, will either of them exist, if it has no association with Existence?

THEAET. No, it will not exist.

STR. That admission seems to make short work of all theories, it upsets at one blow those who have a universe in motion, and those who make it a motionless unity, and all who say their realities exist in Forms that are always the same in all respects "; for they all attribute existence

¹ Here, as elsewhere, the term 'kind' (genos) is used indifferently as a synonym of Form (stdos).

² The three classes mentioned above (2498) at the end of the argument with the idealists The earlier philosophers are recalled in the next speech.

P.T.K.

- 252. to things, some saying they really are in movement, some that they really are at rest. THEAET. Quite so.
 - B. STR. And further, those who make all things come together at one time and separate at another, whether they bring imnumerable things into a unity and out of a unity? or divide things into and combine them out of a limited set of elements; no matter whether they suppose this to happen in alternation or to be going on all the time—however it may be, all thus would be meaningless if there is no blending at all.⁸ ITRLAFT. True.

STR. Moreover, the greatest absurdity of all results from pursuing the theory of those very people who will not allow one thing to share in the quality of another and so be called by its name.

C. THEAET. How so ?

STR. Why, in referring to anything they cannot help using the words' being' and 'agart' and 'from the others' and 'by itself' and any number more. They cannot refrain from these expressions or from connecting them in their statements, and so need not wait for others to refute them; the foe is in their own household, as the saying goes, and, lake that queer fellow Eurycles, they carry about with them wherever they go a voice in their own bellies to contradict them.

D. THEAET. True; your comparison is very much to the purpose.

According to the theory of Socrates' dream' in the *Theadebus* (2017, p. 143), each simple element can only be named; you cannot add that it is 'or call it 'that' or 'each', etc. These terms are 'running round' and being attached to everything; whereas the element can only be called by its proper name. Here the Stranger remarks that the (perhaps kindred) theory of the elderly pedants, which as applied to Forms would mean that every Form is by itself apart from all the rest and refuses to combine, cannot be stated without self-contradicton.

¹ Cf Ar., Met. 984a, 10, ovykpurduena nal diakpurduena els év re nal éf évés (of Empedocles' four elements).

^{*} No blending ' means no blending of Forms If no Form partakes of any other, the statements that ' Motion exists' and ' Rest exists' are either false or meaningless. If that is so, it follows that physical things cannot partake of Motion or of Rest, and this is fatal to all cosmologues.

¹ A ventriloquist, mentioned by Aristophanes.

Ritter ¹ understands Plato to assert here that there is no thinking except in the form of a judgment connecting a subject and a predicate, and no sort of actuality or determination, to be grasped by thought, except in relation to other determinations. This, he says, implies that no word by itself has any meaning, but only when combined with other words in a judgment. Accordingly, 'Being' has no meaning save in a judgment, either as subject or as predicate, or as determination of subject or preducate, each of which always presupposes the other. Burnet ² echoes this: 'The solution is briefly that is and is wol have no meaning except in judgments or preducations (λdyo_i).' Being, Rest, and Motion . . . have no meaning

I cannot see that Plato says, or implies, anything of the sort. The point is difficult to argue, because 'meaning' is an extremely ambiguous word.ª But Plato's view of a 'meaning 'is simple. The name 'circle' which I now utter means the Form 'Circle', an eternal and unchanging object of thought, which we can know and (if it be complex) define. The name is an articulate sound conventionally attached to this Form. Hence, if two people speak the same language, when one utters the sound ' circle ', the other will have the same meaning more or less clearly before his mind and understand the sound. Plato nowhere suggests that the name ' circle ' has no meaning by itself and only acquires a meaning when. and for so long as, someone thinks of the Form and utters its name together with other names in a statement. All that he asserts here is that, unless some Forms at least have to one another the relation he calls ' combming ' or ' blending ', no affirmative statement about any Form can be true. Hence you cannot even say that 'every Form stands apart by itself', for all these words have meanings. and unless those meanings are combined in a fact corresponding to the statement, the statement must be either false or meaningless.

The misunderstanding may be due to the false notion that Plato here means by 'Being' the copula, which is supposed to connect subject and predicate and to have no meaning except in a judgment. But Plato does not speak of subjects or predicates or of the copula. 'Being 'in this context clearly means the Form, Existence. And even if 'Being' meant the copula, it is hard to see why' Rest ' and 'Motion' and all other words should be declared to have no meaning save in a judgment. The whole notion seems to be entirely unfounded.

The Stranger next quickly dismisses the second alternative.

¹ Neus Untersuchen (1910), p. 55; Platon, vol. 11, p. 189.

- Gh. Phul. I, 282 ff
- * See Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning

252D. STR. Well, suppose we allow that all are capable of combining with one another. THEAST. Even I can dispose of that suggestion. STR How? THEART. Because then Movement itself would come to a complete standstill, and again Rest itself would be in movement, if each were to supervene upon the other. STR. And that is to the last degree impossible-that Movement should come to be at rest and Rest be in motion ? THEAET. Surely. STR. Then only the third choice is left. THEAST. Yes. R. STR. And observe that one of these alternatives must be true: either all will blend, or none, or some will and some will not. THEAET. Certainly. STR. And two of the three have been found impossible. THEAET. Yes. STR. Whoever, then, wishes to give a right answer will assert the remaining one. THEAET. Oute so.

252E-253C. The texture of philosophic discourse

Some Forms will blend, some not. This means that some affirmative, and some negative, statements (of the types under consideration) about Forms are true. These true statements will make up the texture of philosophic discourse—that 'dialectical' argument which is entirely about Forms ¹ The Stranger next compares thus texture of discourse with the texture of sounds in speech and music. In both these cases we find elements that will combine and others that will not.

252E. STR. Then since some will blend, some not, they might be

253. said to be in the same case with the letters of the alphabet. Some of these cannot be conjoured, others will fit together. THEAET. Of course.

STR. And the vowels are specially good at combinationa sort of bond pervading them all, so that without a vowel the others cannot be fitted together.

THEAST. That is so.

STR. And does everyone * know which can combine with which, or does one need an art to do it rightly?

¹ Rep. vi, 5118. The phrase 'texture of discourse' is based on Plato's later remark that 'all discourse depends on the weaving together (ouperAcce) of Forms' (p 300).

In Burnet's text (1899) was is misprinted for was.

TEXTURE OF PHILOSOPHIC DISCOURSE

- 253. THEAET. It needs art. STR. And that art is----? THEAET. Grammar.
 - B. STR. Again, is it not the same with sounds of high or low pitch? To possess the art of recognising the sounds that can or can not be blended is to be a musican; if one doesn't understand that, one is unmusical.

THEAET. True.

STR. And we shall find differences of the same sort between competence and incompetence in any other art.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Well, now that we have agreed that the Kinds ¹ stand towards one another in the same way as regards blendung, is not some science needed as a guide on the voyage of discourse, if one is to succeed in pointing out which Kinds are

c. consonant, and which are incompatible with one another; also, whether there are certain Kinds that pervade them all and connect them so that they can blend, and again, where there are divisions (separations), whether there are certain others that traverse wholes and are responsible for the division ?

THEAET. Surely some science is needed-perhaps the most important of all.

The interpretation of the Stranger's last speech is vital, if we would understand the description of the science of Dialectic or Philosophy which is to follow. The Stranger is speaking of the whole texture of philosophical discourse, the actual process of conversation aming at the discovery of truth. The metaphor of the voyage of discourse ('travelling through arguments') recalls the terms used in the Reybuike' of Dialectic, which is concerned solely with Forms. Here the object is 'to point out which Forms are consonant with which, and which are incompatible '. The whole texture of philosophic discourse will consist of affirmative and negative statements about Forms, which should correctly represent their eternal combination or disjunction in the nature of things.

Specially important is the analogy drawn in the last clauses between the vowels which 'pervade' (dut advrow xeydopuer) the whole texture of speech and certain Forms which pervade (dut advrow) the texture of discourse and enable Forms to blend. These

^{1 &#}x27; Kinds ' (yers), synonymous with ' Forms ' (ello), here as elsewhere

Soph 2538, 84 raw köyaw nopedeclas Rep. 5108, duxh ... oth er dpytw nopeogebry dil estension, 5118, the metaphot of climbing, seufderes, lån, escafalog; 5178, the dwa duffarw: 5330, f dealerned, utbodos udon radry nopedera, 5340, cimiler vi dryg dearopedyna, etc.

pervasive Forms are obviously the meanings of certain words used in affirmative statements. They are, in fact, the meanings of the word 'is', which we shall distinguish presently.

There are also certain Forms which 'traverse wholes and are responsible for the division of them '(backgeorg). These disjoining Forms are the meanings of the words 'is not' in true negative statements. They correspond to the 'divisions of wholes'. The phrase 'traversing wholes' (bd' dlaw) must be distinguished from the phrase 'raversing wholes' (bd' dlaw) must be distinguished from the phrase 'raversing wholes' is determined by the description of the vowels as 'running through all' the letters (bd advrow region ever 253A). The disjunctive Forms that appear in 'divisions' for which they are responsible are as did to 'traverse wholes'. 'Wholes' means Forms considered as complexes divisible into parts (or species). The disjunctive Forms correspond to lines of division either passing between such complexes and separating them or passing brough them and separating their parts. These expressions will recur in the coming account of dialectal method.

253C-254B. Description of the science of Dialectic

Finally, it has been agreed that, to guide the course of philosophic conversation as here described, a science is needed—a technique and the body of knowledge attained by it. This science is now identified as the philosopher's science of correctly dividing the structure of reality according to those Forms or Kinds which are the meanings referred to in philosophic discourse. This knowledge will guide the progress of actual discourse as the musician's knowledge of harmony guides him in the composition and discourse of actual music.

- 253C. STR. And what name shall we give to thus science? Or —good gracious, Theatettus, have we stumbled unawares upon the free man's knowledge¹ and, in seeking for the Sophist, chanced to find the Philosopher first? THEAET. How do you mean?
 - D. STR. Drviding according to Kinds, not taking the same Form for a different one or a different one for the same-is not that the business of the science of Dialectic? THEAET. Yes. STR. And the man who can do that discerns clearly one Form everywhere extended throughout many, where each

one lies apart, and many Forms, different from one another, ¹ Cf. the comparison of the philosopher to the free man, *Theast* 172D ff. (p. 83).

THE SCIENCE OF DIALECTIC

253D. embraced from without by one Form : and again one Form connected in a unity through many wholes, and many Forms, entirely marked off apart. That means knowing how to

E. distinguish,1 Kind by Kind, in what ways the several Kinds can or can not combine. THEAST. Most certainly.

STR. And the only person, I imagine, to whom you would allow this mastery of Dialectic is the pure and rightful lover of wisdom

THEART. To whom else could it be allowed ?

STR. It is, then, in some such region as this that we shall find the Philosopher now or later, if we should look for him.

He too may be difficult to see clearly ; but the difficulty in 254. his case is not the same as in the Sonhist's.

THEAET. What is the difference?

STR. The Sophist takes refuge in the darkness of Not-being. where he is at home and has the knack of feeling his way : and it is the darkness of the place that makes him so hard to perceive.

THEAET. That may well be.

STR. Whereas the Philosopher, whose thoughts constantly dwell upon the nature of reality, is difficult to see because his region is so bright ; for the eve of the vulgar soul cannot B. endure to keep its gaze fixed on the divine.

THEAET. That may well be no less true. STR. Then we will look more closely at the Philosopher presently. if we are still in the mind to do so ; meanwhile clearly we must not loosen our grip on the Sophist until we have studied him thoroughly. THEAST. I entirely agree.

The imagery of the Cave in the Republic is here once more recalled -the dark region of the world of Seeming inside the Cave, and the sunlit region of Reality outside. There seems to be a promise, not fulfilled in the Sopkist or the Statesman, that we shall return to seek the philosopher in his proper home, the world of Forms, with which this account of Dialectic is entirely concerned.

The general sense of that account is clear. The expert in Dialectic will guide and control the course of philosophic discussion by his knowledge of how to ' divide by Kinds ', not confusing one Form with another. He will discern clearly the hierarchy of Forms which

¹ Asarphenes, an echo of the genus discontant, including all the arts described as baueruca , from which we derived earlier the definition of the cathartic sienchus of Socrates (226c).

constitutes reality and make out its articulate structure, with which the texture of philosophic discourse muct correspond, if it is to express truth. The method is that method of Collection and Davision which was amounced in the *Phacebrus* and has been illustrated in the *Soybust*. Finally, to discourt this structure clearly is the same thing as 'to know how to distinguish in what ways the several Kinds can or can not comhune'. In other words, the science will yield the knowledge needed to guide us to true afirmative and negative statements about Forms, of which the whole texture of philosophic discourse should consist.

Before we attempt to interpret in detail the speeches describing Dialectic, it is necessary to clear away certain misconceptions and, above all, to grasp, if we can, how Plato concerved this science and its objects. The whole subsequent discussion of the 'combination ' or 'blending' of Forms is usually called 'logical', and with some justification; but it is very important to make out in what sense Plato can be said to have a Logic, and how his Logic differs from the traditional Logic we have derived from Anstotle.

First, Dialectic is not what is now known as 'Formal Logic'. The identification is suggested by Professor Taylor,1 who remarks on our passage : 'Logic is here, for the first time in literature, contemplated as an autonomous science with the task of ascertaining the supreme principles of affirmative and negative propositions (the combinations and "separations").' If 'autonomous' means that Dialectic is a Formal Logic, concerned with propositions and independent of Ontology (the science concerned with the structure of reality), this statement seems to me misleading. Formal Logic may be described as the study of (I) propositional forms-not actual significant statements, but the patterns or types under which statements can be classified ; (2) the constituents of these propositional forms (subjects, predicates, relations between terms, etc.); and (3) formal relations of inference between propositional forms. The beginning of Formal Logic is marked precisely by the introduction of symbols. These were, so far as we know, first used by Aristotle. in such formulas as this

> If A belongs to all B and B belongs to all C then A belongs to all C.

The symbols A, B, C are algebraic signs for which you can substitute any one of a whole class of appropriate terms, as any actual numbers can be substituted for the x, y, z of an equation. The introduction of symbols means that attention is now fixed on the form of state-

> ¹ Plate (1926), p. 387. 264

ments apart from their content. 'A belongs to B' is not a statement, nor is it either true or false. The blanks must be filled by significant words, to yield a true or false statement. Plato does not use symbols or construct propositional forms. The factors he recognises are these : (1) The immutable structure of Forms or Kinds, eternally combined or disjoined in the system of truth or reality : these are the meanings, to which common names are conventionally attached. (2) Our thoughts (duároua) about these objects, our acquaintance with them, reasonings (loviguée) about them, judgments (ddfau) in which such reasonings terminate : all these are mental existents. (3) Statements (2000). the vocal expression of thoughts and judgments, consisting of spoken names and verbs. The meanings of common names and verbs are the Forms. Statements are not propositional forms but actual significant statements, existing only while we utter them. The science of Dialectic does not study formal symbolic patterns to which our statements conform, nor yet these statements themselves. Nor does it study our thoughts or ways of reasoning, apart from the objects we think about. It is not 'Logic', if Logic means the science either of logos or of logismoi. What it does study is the structure of the real world of Forms. Its technique of Collection and Division operates on that structure. It is a method for which some rules are laid down , but these are rules of correct procedure in making Divisions; they are not laws of inference or laws of thought. There is no place in this scheme either for ' propositions' that no one propounds or for the propositional forms of Formal Logic, as distinct from actual significant statements. All the statements analysed in the sequel are actual significant statements about certain 'Kinds'. They are either true or false, and statements such as 'Motion is Rest' are rejected by simple inspection, not as formally incorrect, but as obviously untrue. All through. Plato is speaking of the real nature of the Kinds mentioned and their actual relations in the structure of reality, not about symbolic patterns under which statements can be classified. There is nothing to show that he had ever conceived of such a science as Formal Logic.

It might be objected that Plato believed in eternal truths, for instance the truths of mathematics. Is not 'The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles 'a 'propositon ', which, being eternally true, must be independent of my thought of it and of my written or spoken statement? Plausible as this seems, we must, I think, answer No. If I make the above statement, it must, being true, reflect in some way the fact it refers to. But I may be misled if I start from the verbal statement, and syme its grammatical structure into elements related in certain ways, and then assume that the structure of the fact corresponds, point by point, with the grammatical structure I have analysed. If I finally call the fact so constructed a 'proposition'. I shall be tacitly implying that the structure of the fact answers to the structure of the verbal statement. Suppose, for example, I analyse 'Man is rational' into a subject 'Man', a predicate 'rational', and a link 'is' coupling the two-the 'copula'. I seem then to have two elements of different kinds (for I shall say that ' subjects ' have certain peculiarities which predicates ' have not) and a link tying them together. But it does not follow that the fact my statement reflects consists of two disparate elements and a link between them. That is not how Plato describes the facts he is here concerned with. He says, the Form Man and the Form Rational are combined or blended in reality. When two things-say, two colours-are blended, there is no link coupling them together : nor is there any suggestion that the two elements are of different sorts, one a 'subject', the other a 'predicate'. There is nothing but the mixture. The so-called 'copula' vanishes. It is a trick of grammatical structure, essentially the link between grammatical 'subject' and 'predicate'. As Plato has nothing to say here of 'subjects' and 'predicates', he never mentions the ' copula'. It is, in fact, often dispensed with in Greek. 'O average loyunos is a complete statement without an erri. This may be the reason why Aristotle says much less about the 'copula' than English writers, who cannot sav 'Man rational' for 'Man is rational'.

This may not be the end of the matter ; the word 'is 'has several meanings, which we shall presently distinguish. But Plato's language seems to show that he did not imagine eternal truths as existing in the shape of 'propositions' with a structure answering to the shape of statements. He conceived them as 'mixtures' in which Forms are blended ; and the word *logot* is reserved for spoken statements. Hence the term 'proposition' had better be avoided altogether ; and we must realise that Dialectic is not Formal Logic, but the study of the structure of reality—in fact Ontology, for the Forms are the realities (*lorag Grav*). In Plato's view the study of patterns of the statements we make would belong to Grammar or to Rhetoric. There is no autonomous science of Logic, distinct on the one hand from Grammar and Rhetoric and on the other from Ontology.

Let us now consider the first part of the sentence describing Dialectic: 1

¹ The interpretation here offered owes something to Stenzel, Studies s. Estur. d. plat. Deal. 62 ff., and to M. Diès' introduction to the dialogue.

THE SCIENCE OF DIALECTIC

'The man who can do that (divide according to Kinds, without confusing one Form with another) discerns clearly one Form verywhere extended throughout many, where each one lies apart, and many Forms, different from one another, embraced from without by one Form.'

The structure of Forms is conceived as a hierarchy of genera and species, amenable to the methods of Collection and Division. This first half of the sentence refers specially to the preliminary process of Collection, described in the Phaedrus as ' taking a synoptic survey of widely scattered Forms (species) and bringing them into a single (generic) Form '.1 So here there are at first a definite number of Forms 2 (nolld), 'each one lying apart'. These are the scattered species to be collected, including the specific Form (or Forms) that we wish ultimately to define. The dialectician surveys the collection and 'clearly discerns' by intuition the common (generic) character 'extended throughout' them all. So he divines the generic Form that he will take for division. This generic Form he now sees as a unity which is complex. 'embracing' a number of different Forms, which will figure in the subsequent Division as specific differences or as specific Forms characterised by their differences

The second half of the sentence is less easy to interpret :

'and again one Form connected in a unity through many wholes, and many Forms entirely marked off apart'.

As the first half described the results of Collection, this second half appears to describe the results of the subsequent Division. The many Forms, which after Collection were seen to be embraced by a single generic Form, are now seen 'entirely marked of apart'. Division has brought to light all the differences that distinguish them. The indivisible species in which Division terminates are 'entrely separated' in the sense that they are mutually exclusive and incompatible : Man cannot blend with Ox as both blend with Annmal or as Man blends with Biped, OX with Quadruped. With these many Forms is contrasted the 'one Form connected in a unity through many wholes' ($\delta t \delta tor mobils'm$). The term 'wholes' is applied to the many (specific) Forms because, now that they have been completely defined, they are seen as completes: each is a whole whose parts are enumerated in the defining formula, such as 'Man is the rational biped Animal'. Finally, through all

¹ Phasdrus 265D, els plas re idéas ouroparra éven ra mollaxí decorappéra.

^{*} Not 'individuals', as Campbell imagines. The whole procedure deals with Forms only

these subordinate wholes—Man, Ox, Horse, etc.—the single generic Form Anımal is, as it were, dispersed. It blends with each specific Form, and yet in virtue of its own nature it is 'connected in a unity' traversing them all.

The Structure of the World of Forms

The extreme compression and consequent obscunty of this account of the field of Dualectic may be explaund if we suppose that Plato, as the Stranger's subsequent speeches suggest, intended to analyse the relations of Forms in more detail in the *Philosopher*. Where it stands in the *Sophisi*, the account us almost a digression, and Plato may have wished to restrict it to the smallest possible space. It will, however, be convenient to attempt here a picture of the structure of Forms, based on such indications as he gives. This question has a bearing on the problem left over from the *Parmenids*: How and in what sense is a Form bot one and many?

Here it must once more be stated that no satisfactory account of the relations of Platonic Forms can be given in terms of Aristotelian logic. We have seen that Plato was not concerned with propositional forms ; his Dialectic studies realities, and his conception of these realities was radically different from Aristotle's. When Aristotle comes to consider the constituents of propositions-subjects and predicates-metaphysical assumptions are involved. There are things-substances-whose nature is such that their names can only stand as subjects ; other things-attributes-whose names can stand as predicates. The most real things in the world are concrete individual substances, having a core of essential being together with that material substrate which prevents them from being anything but subject, and a fringe of inherent and dependent attributes. Specific and generic concepts are not primary substances with an independent existence, not full-blooded realities. but abstractions. As a consequence, the higher we ascend in the hierarchy of genera and species, the further we are from full reality. The higher the term, the poorer in content and the more abstract it becomes. Every proposition, we are told, has a subject and a predicate. The subject proper is the real, independently existing, substance. Predicates are all the things asserted to 'belong to' a substance, including its species and genus, its qualities, quantity, etc. Finally, these predicates are classed in categories-a set of pigeon-holes to one of which (and only one) any given predicate can be assigned.

Now, all this cannot be foisted upon Plato. His ontology, as Aristotle was not slow to point out, was fundamentally different. The individual members of a class of things existing in time and space are not ' real ' things (brow bra). They become and perish and change : they are indefinite in number and unknowable. They cannot enter into truths that can be known : they are not the subjects of the universal truths of science. The goal of Dialectic is not to establish propositions ascribing a predicate to all the individuals in a class. The objective is the definition of an indivisible species-a Form-by genus and specific differences. What we define is not ' all men ' but the unique Form ' Man'. A definition is not a subject-predicate proposition. The many-worded formula 'three-sided plane figure ' is the explicit statement of the complex contents of the Form ' Triangle'. The two expressions are equivalent ; neither is a ' predicate ' of the other. The Platonic statement 'Man (the Form) is Animal (partakes of, blends with the Form Animal) ' is not the same as the statements, ' All men are animals ' or 'Animal (the predicate) belongs to all men (as subjects)'. The Platonic science has nothing to say about 'all men' or 'some men ' or ' this man '. The only terms it contemplates are Forms.

The question how Plato conceived the relations of Forms to one another presents a peculiar difficulty. His metaphysics are far removed from the unconscious ontology of common sense, embedded in the structure of the Greek language, which fits the Arstotelian view. Yet Piato insusts on using ordnary language, and we are reduced to inferring his conception partly from what we know of his metaphysics, parity from the metaphors he employs.

At the head of a Table of Division stands a generic Form, say 'Animal'. We divide that Form, down through the subordmate differences to the indivisible species, Man, Ox, Lion, etc. Below that are only the indefinite number of individual men, oxen, lions, of which we take no account. Now, when we divide 'Animal', what are we dividing ? Not the class of all individual animals, but a single complex Form or nature, of which the subordinate Forms are called 'parts' ($\mu \phi_{00n}, \mu \phi_{00}\eta$). The generic Form is said to 'embrace' them, as a whole embraces its parts, and also to 'pervade' them as a single character 'extended throughout them all'. It is this whole that we divide, as the *Phasirus* says, 'according to its natural articulations' ($a \phi_{00} \phi_{1}, a \phi_{000} \phi_{100}, a \phi_{000} \phi_{100})$

That being so, Plato cannot hold that the higher we ascend in the hierarchy of genus and species, the poorer the terms become in content.¹ Were that true, the highest of all would be the poorest. The upward movement of thought would lead to the most shadowy of abstractions, not (as we learnt in the *Scipublic*) to the fullest and richest of realities, the source of all other reality and truth. One of the important Kinds presently to be mentioned is Being (Exist-

¹ On this point, see Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt, 115 ff.

SOPHIST

ence, Reality). Suppose that Form to stand at the head of the whole hierarchy. If it were the barest of all abstractions, nothing could be got out of it by an attempt to divide it into parts. It would have no parts, but be as simple and indivisible as the One Being of Parmenides. In Plato's view the highest Form, whether it be called 'Being' or 'the One' or 'the God', must be not the porrest, but the richest, a universe of real being, a whole containing all that is real in a single order, a One Being hat is also many. Such a Form is as far as possible from resembling an Anstotelian category; for the categories are precisely the barest of abstractions, at the furthest remove from substantial reality.

Now consider the lowest Forms in the herarchy, the informacy species. Each of these is called indivisible (forguor sideo) because the process of Division can be carried no further. Below the informa species such as 'Man' (here is nothing but the individual men which partake directly of that Form and of which we take no account. But the species is not simple and unanalysable; if it were, it could not be defined, and the object of the whole procedure is to define it in terms of the generic Form and all the differences that occur nn its ancestry. The nanes Annual, Bjeed, Rational, are the names of parts or constituents of the complex specific Form, form and the specific are complex. The generic Form contains all the species and its nature parvades them all. The lowest species contains the nature of the genus and all the relevant differences.

Here a diagram may help us. In the traditional Logic of modern times, circles are used to symbolise genus and species as classes. The large circle is a pen in which all animals are herded; the smaller



pens contain all lions, all men, etc. These are sets of individuals identical with 'some animals'. But Plato is not concerned with individuals.¹ A different diagram is needed to symbolise the

¹ Proclas in Parm. i, p. 42 (Cousin), interpreting Sopk. 253D, correctly observes, moreover, that the genus (*ida* ide add ex)*idar rerequéry*) is not an aggregate (*dépousue*) of the species, but present in each of the species, being prior to them, and partaken of by each of them.

relations of Forms. We may obtain it, if we keep faithfully to Plato's metaphor of ' blending '.

Take a circle to represent the generic Form 'Animal', and suppose its area to be coloured blue. The blueness stands for the character or nature 'Animality'. Now divide the carcle into two semicricles, and let one be coloured red, symbolising the nature of the difference 'Biped' (the other will stand for 'Many-footed'). The



two colours will now be blended in the semicarde. Next add the further difference 'Rational', a thurd colour blending with the other two. The blend of these three colours will stand for the complex content of the specific Form 'Man ', if we assume that to be definable as 'rational buped animal'.

If we now imagine boundary lunes and colours representing all the other differences to have been filled m, the total result will be a picture of the complex generic Form, Animal. The circumference of the circle will symbolise that the genus is 'a single Form vades' all parts of the area. The species are 'many Forms, different from one another and embraced from without by a single Form '. They are complex and definable 'wholes'. The generic Form that is divided is not the abstraction, animality, if the differences are not parts of the meaning of animality; if 'biped' were part of the meaning of 'animality', all animals would be hiped. What is divided is the total complex Form, Animal, pictured by the complete pattern of colours.

This representation is supported by the description of the Form, Animal, in the *Timaeus* (30A). God created the visible universe as a living creature, with body, soul, and intelligence. After what pattern? Not after the pattern of any 'part' ($r\bar{c}m$ be $\mu depow$ eBe, i.e. species of animal); for then it would be imperfect; but after the pattern of 'that of which all living creatures other than itself, severally and in their kinds, are parts ($\mu depa()$; for that emphases and contains within itself all the intelligible animals

SOPHIST

(specific Forms of species of annual), as this (visible) cosmos contants ourselves and all other visible creatures that satist (classes of individual animals)¹. Again at 392 the Creator, designing to fashion all living creatures within the cosmos after the pattern of his model, y jurposed that this world also should receive such and so many Forms as intelligence discerns contained in the Living Creature that truly is (*Boodog Liber of & Born (Coor*)¹.

Only by picturing the complex Form, Animal, in this way can we satisfy the conditions: (1) that the generic Form must be a whole of which the specific Forms are parts; (2) that the highest Form in a Table of Division must be the richest, not the poorest, in content; (3) that every specific Form must be hkewise a whole of parts, complex and definable.

Let us now take the completed diagram, with all its blended colours, to represent the Real, the complete pattern of Forms which the dualectician has to divide, and can divide because it is complex. This what was called 'the perfectly real' (rd *averzéde*, δv) or 'the All' (rd δv re soul rd $s \delta v$) in the argument with the Friends of Forms, in so far as the Real consists of a pattern of unchanging Forms. This complex of Forms was what the Friends of Forms originally recognised—a unity that was also a many, as contrasted with the Parmenidean Unity, which excluded plurality. We agreed that this changeless pattern must be recognised as a necessity of thought and discourse. We added, it is true, that it is not the whole of reality; the real must include such change as is involved in hife and intelligence. But we are not now concerned with that addition, but only with the unchanging pattern of Forms, as the object of knowledge.

As soon, however, as we had reached the conclusion that the Real must contain 'all that is unchanging and all that is in change'. we argued that the Real cannot be the same thing as realness. If we take any two Forms, Motion and Rest, realness is a ' third thing ' that must belong to and 'embrace' both, just as we put it to the physicists that realness cannot be the same thing as ' Hot ' or ' Cold', or as 'the-Hot-and-the-Cold', which in their view constituted the Real. It is this realness (Existence) that will presently be described as one of the most important Kinds. It is a single Form or character extended everywhere throughout the many diverse Forms that blend with it. In the diagram it will appear as the single colour diffused over the whole area, before the other colours are added. It is simply the meaning of the word ' Existence ', when we say that Motion or any other Form 'has existence', 'exists'. The other Forms, such as Motion and Rest, are parts of the Real ; they are not parts of realness. If 'realness' has any definition, neither

THREE MOST IMPORTANT KINDS

Motion nor Rest nor any other subordinate Form can appear in its definition, any more than 'biped' can appear in the definition of 'animality'.

254B-D. Three of the most important Forms, selected for purposes of illustration · Existence, Motion, Rest

The Stranger now returns from his digression on Dialectic to the next stage of his argument. The purpose of the coming section, on the blending of Forms, is to bring to light those meanings of 'as' and 'as not' which are relevant to the proof that 'what is not' (in certain senses) may nevertheless exist. The discussion is simplified by taking three Forms—Existence, Motion, Rest—in solation from all others, and considering what true statements, affirmative or negative, can be made about them, and what these statements mean.

- 254B. STR. Now that we are agreed, then, that some of the Kinds will combine with one another and some will not, and that some combine to a small extent, others with a large number, while some pervade all and there is nothing against their
 - c. being combined with everything, let us next follow up the argument in this way. We will not take all the Forms for fear of getting confused in such a multitude, but choose out some of those that are recognised as most (or very) important, and consider first their several natures and then how they stand in respect of being capable of combination with one another. In this way, though we may not be able to conceive Being and Not-being with perfect clearness, we may at least give as satisfactory an account of them as we can under the conditions of our present inquiry) and see
 - D. if there is any opening allowing us to assert that what is not, *really* is what is not, and to escape unscathed. ITREAET. Yes, we had better do that. STR. Now, among the Kinds, those we were just now discussing—Existence itself and Rest and Motion—are very important.²

^a Possibly a hint that in what follows we shall not draw all the distinctions that a complete account would require, or at least not emphasise those which do not directly bear on the conclusion desired.

⁴ Thus sentence is usually matranalacid, physrs being rendered as if it were righors and taken as subject (1) Appli. 'Do michigizen datusgibergif, die wir vorker durckgragen, maren doch das Sesende solbt, zones Shiltstend und Benegung.' (ymbis is, of course, not the antecedent of 4: the relative would be do) (2) Campbell. 'I be most important head are sknose which we kave jusi been considering.' (3) Dieb. 'Or ise phus grandes des genes soni exus pressionent gue noss versons de passer en reveue : l'êbre lu-même, is revos oi te.

P.T.K.

SOPHIST

2540. THEART. Quite so. STR. And observe, we say that two of the three will not blend with one another.¹ THEART. Certainly. STR. Whereas Existence can be blended with both; for surely they both exist. THEART. Of course. STR. So they make three in all.

It has become the established practice to call these very important Kinds, together with Sameness and Difference, the Platonic ' Categories'. The use of this term is based partly on the mistranslation above noted, which makes Existence, Motion and Rest 'the most important Kinds', partly on a passage in the Enneads where Plotinus, after demolishing the Aristotelian categories, deduces these five Kinds as ' the Kinds or principles of Being ' (yern or doyal rou ovroc). Plotinus was probably thinking not only of our passage but of the appearance of Being, Sameness, and Difference in the highly figurative description of the composition of the world-soul in the Timaeus." That passage, however, which says nothing about Motion and Rest, lends no support to a list of five Kinds or principles : and the argument here in the Sophist gives no ground whatever for imagining that these five Kinds hold the place afterwards occupied by Aristotle's categories, or for calling them ' categories ' at all. There may be some sense of that vague and ambiguous word as used by modern philosophers, that might be considered appropriate. But we are concerned with the use of it in the fourth century

mouvement,' The point is important because all these renderings mean that Existence, Motion, and Rest are the most important kinds. Plato does not assert this. The previous speech said that we would select ' some of those that are recognised as most (or very) important'. The present speech tells us which these 'some ' are, but they are only some of the most important, not the most important. The subject is & wood diffuer : persona is predicate, standing first for emphasis and because it provides the link with the former speech. We might translate : " Now this description ' most important ' (or 'very important ') among the Kinds does apply to those we have been dis-cussing, namely Existence. Rest. Motion '' Accordingly, we take those as the 'some' we said we would take But there are others of the highest importance, as the earlier speech implied. Sameness and Difference, presently added, are equally important, and actually 'wider ' than Motion and Rest, being 'all-pervading ' like Existence. These speeches leave open the possibuilty that there may be any number of other provers yern, which we do not require to mention for our purpose. The consequences of mistranslation will be noted presently.

¹ That Motion will not blend with Rest was remarked at 252D. The point of these sentences is that Existence, Motion, Rest, are three distinct Forms, no one of them identical with any other.

⁸ 35▲, 37▲.

B.C., and to introduce it into Plato in any other sense than Aristotle's is to court confusion.

Plato never uses the word 'category'. There is no evidence that *κατηγορία* ever meant anything but 'accusation' until Anstotle gave it a technical use in Logic. The verb *κατηγορείν* was used in ordinary speech to mean 'to declare', 'to assert'. Aristotle, needing a special word for what is asserted about a subject, adopted *κατηγόρημα* for 'predicate', and *κατηγορία* for 'predicate' or 'predication'. 'Category' finally was used as a short expression for the 'modes' or 'fashions of predication '(*orfjunta* τῆς *κατηγορία*) aritved at by taking a subject—say 'Socrates' — and tabulating all the kinds of assertion you can make about it. 'Socrates is a man, an animal': these predicates are essential and belong to the category of Substance. 'Socrates is white': this is Quality.' Socrates is five feet tall: this is Quantity. 'Socrates gives a list of the such modes of predication ; elsewhere it is doubtful whether a smaller number may not suffice.

Further, these predicates appear to be entities of different knds and related to the subject m different ways. Hence the categories also provide a classification of all the things there are according to their mode of existence. They are then ultimate and irreducible classes, reached by pushing the question 'What is this?' to the furthest point. 'What is Scorates? A man. What is a man ? An animal. What is Animal? A Substance.' Here we reach an ultimate class of entity. 'What is this?' Red. What is red? A colour. What is colour? A Quality.' Once more we have reached an ultimate class; and so with the rest.

No one of these classes can be reduced or subordinated to any other. They are the summa genera of things, to one, and only one, of which any thing that exists can be assigned. If we now think of genera as classes, a summum genus is one of the widest classes, with the greatest extension. It is easy to see why Plato's phrase upywror yéroc, which could be (wrongly) translated 'very wide' or 'widest genus', should be confused with Aristotle's categories.

The confusion is entirely unwarranted. No one of Plato's five Kunds (Forms, not classes) is, in Aristotle's opinion, a category. Take 'Being ' or 'Existence'. In several places Aristotle says that Being (Existence) and Unity are not categories, precisely because they can be predicated of everything; they do not fall into any one of his ten pigeon-holes. The same is true of Sameness and Difference. As Plato goes on to remark, you can say of any thing that it is the same as itself, and different from everything else

For that very reason Aristoile denues that they are categories. That Motion and Rest should be categories could never occur to Aristoile's mind; 1 or do modern critics explain how Motion and Rest can be summa genera either of entities or of predicates. The upshot is that Plato never uses the word, and Aristoile, who does use it, considers it inapplicable to any of the five Kinds.

The confusion that results from introducing the word may be illustrated from Campbell's Introduction to the Sophist. On one page (xvii) he says: ' These predicates of sameness and difference are found to be no less universally applicable than the form of Being. Thus Being, Sameness, or Difference, to use Aristotelian language. are universal predicaments or categories. Everything, of which we can speak, exists, is the same in one relation, different in others, and is either at rest or in motion or both in different ways.' Campbell's reason for calling the Kinds ' categories ' is precisely the reason why Aristotle refuses them that name. On the next page the reader is startled by the statement : 'But the categories of Plato are not connected with the theory of Predication, towards which. as appears even from Sook, 261C. Plato had made but little progress. Even those of the Sophist are rather ontological than logical, and are more nearly analogous to the ' four causes' of the Metaphysics : denoting, to use a convenient distinction of Plotinus, rather the elements than the kinds of Being '. To this it may be replied that Aristotle's categories are connected with the theory of Predication : that he never calls his four causes categories : that categories are kinds, not elements, of Being. In fact, the Aristotelian use of ' category ' is totally misleading and irrelevant : and the word had no other technical use in the fourth century.

Such are the confusions that result from interpreting Plato in terms of Aristotelian Logic. Plothuus and modern critics have been misled by the phrase 'very important (or very wide) Kinds'. The word 'genus' later came to be used in opposition to eidos, 'species'. But Plato in the Parsmeides and throughout the Sofhste uses 'Kind' (yénog) and 'Form' (rélog) indifferently.¹ Both mean, not 'genus' or 'species' or 'class', but 'Form' or 'Nature' (génog and léfe are used synonymously). No one of the Kinds is thought of as a class, either of entities or of predicates. The epithet *uphyroror* may mean no more than 'very important'.³ But the

¹ In the passage before us the Stranger says, 'let us choose some of the most important Forms (e2e)', and then 'among the Kunds (yeredro) those we have been discussing are very important '

^{*} The highest Kinds', 'the most important Kinds' (Campbell), 'die wichigzien (Apelt); 'les plus grandes' (Dies) 'Highest 'should be avoided as suggesting summan genus.

SO-CALLED 'CATEGORIES'

meaning ' wide ' may be included in the same sense that is applicable to the generic or specific Forms (not classes) pictured as areas in our diagram. In making his tables of Division earlier, Plato has spoken of dividing a complex generic Form into parts that are usyura.1 This probably means 'wide' as well as 'important'. for in a table of Division the differences should be taken in an order of descending wideness : the field of the generic Form is narrowed at each step. Existence. Sameness. Difference are 'very wide' in that they pervade and blend with every other Form and with one another. But Plato does not say that these very wide or very important Forms are the widest in the sense that there are no others of equal extent. Unity has just as good a claim as Being ; for it is true of everything that it is one. The Parmenides shows clearly enough that Plato was aware of this, and Plotinus is hard put to it to explain why Unity is not included.3 Further, Motion and Rest are not so wide as the others ; being contraries, they divide the field of existents between them, and exclude one another. This in itself is enough to show that 'the widest Forms' would be a mistranslation.

The really serious consequence of the confusion with categories is that some modern critics, misled by Plotinus, read a metaphysical significance into the passage that follows, and in particular suppose that Motion and Rest are here treated with reference to the part they play in the economy of the universe." There is, however, no suggestion in the text that any one of these five Kinds is to be deduced or evolved out of any other. They are simply posited from the outset as some (but not all) of the very important Forms. The whole purpose of what follows is to elucidate the nature of Existence, Sameness, Difference (not of Motion and Rest). The analysis of these three will yield all the senses of the words 'is' and 'is not' that we are seeking. For this purpose Plato requires two other terms which are contraries having the relation of Incompatibility (dustante mode dilinia, 254D) as well as that of Difference. He chooses Motion and Rest because (as the Stranger says) we have been discussing them, and for no ulterior reason. They come from the list of contrary terms that had figured in Zeno's dilemmas, mentioned at Parms. 1200 : 'Likeness and Unlikeness,

¹ 2298, ' Is there only one kind (yéres) of Instruction, or several, and two of them µeyforw? ' Dividing Ignorance 'through the middle' (eard µform), we find one Form (efflor) that is µfye and counterbalances all the rest. At 2208 Fishing is divided kard µfyera µfor

^{*} Enn. VII, 11, 9.

³ A theory of this kind, due to Professor Joachim, is summarised by Mr. Mure (Arisiolie, 1932, pp 55 ff.).

A and Not-A, standing for any pair of contraries. If the reader will substitute these symbols for Rest and Motion in the following argument, he will find that its meaning and conclusions are in no way affected by the change. What is discussed is solely the nature and meanings of Existence. Sameness, and Difference. The nature of Motion (as such) and Rest (as such) is not in question at all.¹ The only fact about them that is relevant is that they are contrary and uncommatible.

A diagram representing the three chosen Forms in isolation from all others will suffice to symbolise all the relations that will be distinguished in the coming analysis. The line dividing Motion from



Rest stands for their incompatibility. Three different colours symbolise the different natures of the three Forms. Motion and Rest blend with Existence, but not with one another.

Before we go on to the introduction of the two other all-pervading Forms considered—Sameness and Difference—we may take note of the statements already made about Existence, Motion, and Rest :

Motion (or Rest) blends with Existence (and with other Forms, including Sameness and Difference).

Motion does not blend with Rest.

These are statements of Compatibility and Incompatibility. Plato does not emphasise negative statements of this type, denying that one Form blends or combines with or partakes of another. As already remarked, the relation intended is not the meaning of the 'copula', Inking subject to predicate in traditional Logic; for we can equally say 'Existence blends with Motion'. Hence, though the word 'partaking' is used, the relation is not the same as that which connects an individual man to his specific Form,

¹ Again, *Phasdrus* 261D refers to the Eleatic Palamedes' (Zeno's) proofs that things are 'like and unlike, one and many, at rest and moving '. Cf. Introd., pp. 7, 8.

* Save in so far as certain consequences about (e.g.) actual motion would follow if 'Motion exists' were not true.

SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE

Man, in 'Socrates is human'. All statements assigning 'names' to individual things have been ruled out at the beginning of this whole discussion (251A, p. 253). The 'oopula' has no place anywhere in Plato's scheme of the relations of Forms. The above two statements are taken as equivalent to

Motion (or Rest) exists.

Motion does not rest.

'To exist' and 'to rest' are verbs, and verbs are later defined as names for 'actions', though, as we aball see, this definition is not to be taken as strucily adequate.¹ Actions, the meanings of verbs, are treated as Forms. Plato does not go unto the question whether such Forms differ in any important way from Forms which are the meanings of nouns or adjectives. These types of statement, expressing Compatibility or Incompatibility, are not further analysed in the sequel. One particular set of statements of such a type will specially concern us, namely :

Motion (or any other Form) exists.

Every such statement, whatever Form may stand as subject, is true. If we substitute :

Motion is an existent

Motion is not a thing at rest,

the word 'is' will mean 'is the same as '-the other sense of 'is', presently to be considered.

254D-255E. Two further Forms, Sameness and Difference, distinct from these three and all-pervading

The Stranger next introduces two fresh Forms, Sameness and Difference, and shows in detail that neither of these can be identified with any of the three, Existence, Moton, Rest. We shall thus have five distinct irreducible Forms in all, whose combinations we can study.

254D. STR. And each one of them (Existence, Motion, Rest) is different from the other two,² and the same as itself.

E. THEAET. That is so.

STR. But what do we mean by these words we have just used—'same' and 'different'? Are they a pair of Kinds distinct from those three, though always necessarily blending with them, so that we must consider the Forms as five in all, not three? Or, when we say 'same' or 'different',

255. are we unconsciously using a name that belongs to one or another of those three Kinds?

¹ See p. 308.

¹ This statement at once notes that Difference is distinct from Incompatibility; for Motion and Rest are not incompatible with Existence.

THEAET. Possibly. 255. STR. Well. Motion and Rest at any rate cannot be (identical with) Difference or Sameness. THEAET. Why not? STR. Neither Motion nor Rest can be (identical with) anything that we say of both of them in common. THEAST. Why? STR. Because Motion would then be at rest, and Rest in motion : for whichever of the two (Motion or Rest) becomes applicable to both (by being identified with either Sameness or Difference, which are applicable to both) will force the other (Rest or Motion) to change to the contrary of its B. own nature, as thus coming to partake of its contrary. THEAET. Ouite so. STR. But both do partake of Sameness and Difference. THEAET. Yes. STR. Then we must not say that Sameness or Difference is (identical with) Motion, nor vet with Rest.¹ THEAST. NO. STR. Are we, however, to think of Existence and Sameness as a single thing? THEAST. Perhaps. STR. But if 'Existence ' and ' Sameness ' have no difference in meaning, once more, when we say that Motion and Rest c. both 'exist', we shall thereby be speaking of them as being ' the same '. THEAET. But that is impossible. STR. Then Sameness and Existence cannot be one thing. THRAFT. Hardly. ¹ This argument is highly compressed and somewhat obscure even with the additions I have interpolated in the translation We want to prove that neither the word ' Motion ' (or ' being in motion ') nor the word ' Rest ' (or 'being at rest') can mean the same thing as either the word 'Sameness' (or 'being the same ') or the word 'Different' (or 'being different'). The proof is: (1) We know that

Motion	blends	with	Sameness
Rest			Sameness
Motion			Difference
Rest		.,	Difference.

(a) We now may Anything that can be asserted of (biends with) both Motion and Rest-mail Samenass and Difference do blend with both-cannot be identical with either. (a) For suppose (for example) that Motion is identical with Sameness Then 'Motion' can be subtuitted for 'Sameness 'I approximate 'Sources' Rest blends with Motion'. But that is false. Therefore Motion is not identical with Sameness. The same proof holds of all the other identifications of Motion with Difference, Rest with Samenes' Mannesses 'I be approximate the same proof holds of all the other identifications of Motion with Difference, Rest with Samenes'

SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE

255C. STR. We may, then, set down Sameness as a fourth Form, additional to our three. THEART. Certainly.

The nature of Sameness is somewhat neglected in the sequel though Campbell's remark that ' the distinction between Being and Sameness is hardly maintained in what follows ' is not justified. The distinction is clear, but not dwelt upon, because our main concern is with Difference. we are trying to clear up confusions about the meanings of ' is not ' rather than the meanings of ' is '. Every Form, we have seen, is ' the same as itself ' (254D). That is, every Form is what it is, has a nature which is peculiar to it and constant, so that it is ' always the same ' (del woowrwe eyel), or keeps its identity. This identity appears in the diagram as the peculiar colour standing for the nature or essence $(ob\sigma la)$ of the Form. This essence is, of course, distinct from its existence. Sameness itself is considered as a single Form of which all these samenesses are instances, as Colour might be called the one Form of which all the diverse colours in our diagram are instances. Thus Sameness is all-pervading, like Existence, and is distinct from Existence. We have thus two meanings of '1s'; 'exists' and 'is the same as '.

255C. STR. And are we to call Difference a fifth? Or must we think of Difference and Existence as two names for a single Kmd?

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. But I suppose you admit that, among things that exist, some are always spoken of as being what they are ¹ just in themselves, others as being what they are with reference to other things.

THEAET. Of course.

D. STR. And what is different is always so called with reference to another thung, isn't it? TREART. That is so. STR. It would not be so, if Existence and Difference were not very different things. If Difference partook of boomtimes be. characters¹ as Existence does, there would sometimes be.

¹ The addition of the words 'being what they are ' is justified by the statement below (n₇) that what is different is maked it is (robb' deep derie) with reference to another thing Cf also Parm 133C, doen row Reduction calor at easy, for instance, early Removed arise Robins early derived in the series of series.

I c rd saf aird and rd rder dblo Note that Existence, which includes both these Forms, is said to partake of both This is one of the places which show that 'partaking' is symmetrical in the case of Forms 255D. within the class of different things, something that was different not with reference to another thing. But in fact we undoubtedly find that whatever is different, as a necessary consequence, is what it is with reference to another. THEAST. It is as you say.

STR. Then we must call the nature of Difference a fifth E. among the Forms we are singling out.

2. almong the Funds we are sampling out. THEART. Yes. STR. And moreover we shall say that this nature pervades all the Forms; for each one is different from the rest, not by virtue of its own nature, but because it partakes of the character of Difference. THEART. Omite so.

In Anstotic relative terms figure as one of the categories, because he supposed that every proposition has a subject and a predicate, and relative terms must consequently be a special class of predicates. Plato before him had observed that some 'names' (as he would say) had the poculiarity that a thing only has such a name' towards' or 'in comparison with' or 'with reference to 'something else ($agd_c \, d\lambda \lambda o$. Thus at $Re_c \, 438$, Plato speaks of 'things which are such as to be greater Akas something'. 'The greater ' is such as to be greater Akas something'.

¹ Mr. Murn, Arstofe, p. 57, writes : 'Though be does identify otherness with not-being, be then unbounces a dariatorie between safet embeddent dependent (relative, adjectival) being, and identifies otherness with dependent being—a proceeding dibloss enough in itself, and one which increases a contain confinsion present throughout the discussion between being in the sense of the abstract, minimal, characterisation of all that is, and being in the sense of the abstract, minimal, characterisation of all that is, and being in the sense of Reality as a complete whole 'Again at p. 180, 'Plato's durinction of self-abstract from dependent being a processing '. He is not spessing of self-abstract and dependent or adjectival being. Both in Plato and in Aristotle v² spés runnas 'stalstee', a contrident with attempts to find in this part of the Sopker an evolution of self-abstract by Plotins.' This mouth and the self weather of the sopker of the self weather the self weather the self weather that attempts to find in this part of the Sopker an evolution of self-abstract and by Plotins.'

'less', 'heavier' and 'lighter' (comparatives), 'doubles' and 'halves', hot things as compared with (mp6c) cold things. So to knowledge is knowledge is comething it thist is thirst is thirst for something.' These names which things have 'towards' or 'with reference to 'somethine else were called 'relative' (rd mode rd.)

Chapter 7 of the Categories follows Plato closely : "All those (things ? predicates ?) are said to be ' with reference to something ' (node rs), which are what they are of (or ' than ', etc.-any genitive) other things or are in any other way (s.g., the dative case) ' towards something'." Examples are: 'The greater is what it is (greater) than another thing (erecord)'. 'A habit is a habit of something. knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something.' 'A mountain is high in comparison with (mode) something.' 'What is similar is similar to something else (dative).' All relatives have correlatives (drrugroeporra) : a slave is said to be the slave of a master, the master to be master of a slave, 'Correlatives,' we are told, ' are thought to come into existence simultaneously': the existence of a master implies the existence of a slave ; but this is not true of all : the objects of knowledge or of perception (the knowable, perceptible) can and do exist before the knowledge or perception of them exists ; whereas knowledge and perception cannot exist without their objects. Specially illuminating is the discussion whether any substances are relative. Primary substances and their species are not. 'Wood' is relative only in so far as it is someone's property, not qua wood. But are 'head' and 'hand ' relative or not ? A head or hand must be the head or hand of somebody The writer is inclined to think that 'head' and ' hand ' are not relative, because, although we know that a head must be somebody's head, we can know the essential nature of 'head' without knowing whose head it is. But, he adds, it is hard to say that no substance is relative without an exhaustive examination. which he does not attempt.

It would not occur to a modern writer on Logic to wonder whether 'head' or 'hand' must be a relative term because such a thing must belong to somebody. Obviously, the author of the Categories did not conceive of relations as subsisting between 4 and b in aRb. He thinks of 'relative things' or 'relative names'; some are substantives, some adjectives, all are predicates. Perception and its object are correlative things; yet you can destroy perception without destroying its correlative. Perception and knowledge are not conceived as relations subsisting between 4 and wowledge are

 $^1\pi\omega\mu aros$. It so happens that 'of', 'for', and 'than ' are all expressed in Greek by the genitive case

object, and necessarily disappearing with the suppression of either. The examples given are nouns and adjectives, not verbs, which fail. Space and Time relations again belong to other categories. 'In the Lyceum 'is a predicate in the category of Place', 'yesterday', a predicate in the category of Time. Prepositions, not being' predicates', have no place in any category, and it does not occur to the writer that a preposition in itself means a relation.¹ 'Relations', in fact, are not recognised as a class of enthy distinct from predicates. The author considers only nouns and adjectives signifying properties with the poculiarity that a subject has these properties with reference to something else'. A man has the property 'fatherhood' towards his son. It was reserved for still living logicians to discover that a proposition hise' Scorates is shorter than Phaedo' has two subjects with a relation between them, and no predicate all.

That Plato conceived relative terms in the same way is clear from the *Pkaedo*, where he speaks of a man partaking of tallness simmas. These characters (*Mean*) results, *Socrates has in him* a tallness towards (as compared with, *ngoc*) a shortness that is in Simmas. These characters (*Mean*) results its in Simmas itself), of which we might call them instances. These individual properties cannot change into their contraries (any more than the Forms can do so). If Simmias grows to be taller than Socrates, the tallness in Socrates either 'pershes' or 'gives way to the approach 'of its contrary. Thus the *Phaedo* clearly treated relations as properties, and whatever inferences may be based on the passage about size and number in the *Theasetsis* (p. 45), he has not abandoned Forms of relative terms.

This reduction of relations to 'relative things' or 'names' explains the passage before us. 'Different is a relative name which things have towards other things. Difference is not a relation subsisting between the two things. Two different Forms are said to 'partake of the character of Difference' (*wertgeven'*, *Vi*, *bbcg*, *vi*', *bbcg*, *vi*',

¹ The word 'preposition' is introduced into some translations of the Categories, but it is not in the text

'sameness'; it always is what it is. But just because this nature is peculiar and unique, every Form has its 'difference' distinguishing it from any other. Its name blends with Difference in the negative statement that it is not any other.

The class of relative things is introduced in connection with Difference, not with Sameness; but Plato seems to regard Sameness as a relative thing. Thus he says, Motion is the same as itself 'because of its participation in Sameness towards itself' (but γp $\mu \theta e \xi w rodroof <math>\pi a \phi \xi$ fourty, 256B). It is equally true of Sameness that it pervades all the Forms.

255E-257A. A review of true statements involving the five Forms shows that there are any number of true statements asserting that 'what 1s' in a sense 'is not'

It is now established that all the five Forms are distinct. No one can be reduced to, or identified with, any other (nor, we may add, evolved or deduced from any other). The Stranger now proceeds to formulate statements in which the names of these Forms appear. The statements are taken as obviously true. The purpose is to see in what ways one of these Forms (Motion is taken as the example) blends with others in true afiinative statements or is disjoned from them in true negative statements. The statements are grouped in pairs, afiirmative and negative, such as

> {Motion is not (Rest) Motion is (i.e. exists). {Motion is the same (as itself) Motion is not the Same (Sameness).

Such statements had been represented as contradictory by Enstus, imitatung Zeno's disproof of the existence of a Many by dilemmas leading to such alleged contradictions. That Plato had these dilemmas in mind is clear from his reference to them below (2590). Here he is content to show that all these statements are true and consistent, when the ambiguities of is' and 'is not' are recognised.

255E. STR. Now, then, taking our five Kinds one by one, let us make some statements about them. TREART. What statements? STR. First about Motion : let us say that Motion is altogether different from Rest. Or is that not so ? TREART. It is so. STR. So Motion is not Rest. TREART. Not in any sense.¹

¹ Possibly ' *allogsiker* different ' and ' not is any sense ' mean that Motion and Rest are not only different but also incompatible

 STR. But Motion is (exists), by virtue of partaking of Existence.

THEAST. Yes.

STR. And once more Motion is different from the Same (Sameness).¹

THEAET. No doubt.

STR. So Motion is not the Same (Sameness).

THEART. No.

STR. But on the other hand, Motion, we said, is the same as itself, because everything partakes of the Same (Sameness).³

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Motion, then, is both the same and not the Same : we must admit that without boggling at it. For when we say it is 'the same' and 'not the Same' we are not using

b. the expression in the same sense : we call it 'the same' on account of its participation in the Same with reference to itself; but we call it 'not the Same' because of its combination with Difference, a combination that separates it off from the Same (Sameness) and makes it not the Same but different, so that we have the right to say this time that it is 'not the Same'.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. So too, supposing Motion itself did in any way participate m Rest, there would be nothing outrageous in speaking of it as stationary. <But it does not in fact participate in Rest at all.

THEAET. No, it does not.

STR. Whereas it does participate both in Sameness and in Difference, so that it is correct to speak of it as both the same and not the Same.>

THEAET. Perfectly correct, provided that we are to agree that some of the Kinds will blend with one another, some will not.

C. STR. Well, that is a conclusion we proved at an earlier stage, when we showed that such was indeed their nature. THEAET. Of course.³

¹ In Greek the appearance of contradiction is increased by rairdy meaning both 'Sameness' and 'the same'.

*I understand the argument here as follows We have just said that Motion is the same and not the same (as partaking of Difference) This sounds like a contradiction : how can what is the same partake of DifferHOW 'WHAT IS' CAN 'NOT-BE'

256c. STR. To go back to our statements, then: is Motion different from Different (Difference), just as it was other than the Same (Sameness) and other than Rest ? THEAET. Necessarily. STR. Motion, then, in a sense is not Different, and also is different, in accordance with the argument we stated just now. THEAET. True.

We have now collected the following pairs of statements, which an Eristic would regard as contradictory but which are in fact all true and consistent:

> {Motion is not (Rest) Motion is (i.e. exists). {Motion is not the Same (Sameness) Motion is the same (as itself). {Motion is not Different (Difference). Motion is different (from Difference).

The same procedure is now used to refute the fundamental Eleatic doctrine that there is no sense in which that-which-is (ro δr) can not-be. There is a sense in which the Real (everything that is real, including Realness or Existence itself) 'is not'. Anything real is the subject of unnumerable true statements, asserting that it is not

ence ? Same' and 'Different' sound as if they were contrartee and so incompathle, hie Moton and Rest, which are contrartees and mompathle But suppose Moton and Rest were merely different, not incompathle; then Moton could partials of Rest and be called estatonary. That is unpossible because Moton and Rest are in fact incompathle. But the sameness which Moton has towards itself and the difference thas towards other things are not incompathle. So there is no contradiction m saying Moton is the same and not the same (CI Brochard, *Ender*, 143)

If thus as the meaning, the text is incloredly elliptical and obscure. Hendorf supported a lacuna which he filled this : 256, 7, geospression. $\langle \phi \phi \phi \rangle$ of $\mu \sigma columbra lacuna which he filled this : 256, 7, geospression. <math>\langle \phi \phi \phi \rangle$ of $\mu \sigma columbra lacuna which he filled this : 256, 7, geospression. <math>\langle \phi \phi \phi \rangle$ defined that the state of $\mu \sigma columbra does of the state of the state of the state of the state$ state of the statedefinition of the state of the state of the state of the state of the stateof the state of the stateof the state of the state

Other critics suppose that Plato is suggesting that there is, after all, a sense in which Motion does partake of Rest, e_d the uniform motion of a sphere in the same place (Disk), or because Motion partakes of stability in that it can be measured and described Ritter, N. Use (5). But I agree with Brochard that the reference to earlier statements asserting that Motion and Rest are uncompatible excludes such unterpretations

(is different from) anything else that is real. We take first Motion as an instance of a real thing, and point out that

Motion is a thing that is not (Existence) Motion is a thing that is (i.e. exists).

256. STE. What, then, of the next point? A rew we to say that Motion is different from three of the four, but not from the D. fourth, when we have agreed that there were five Kinds in the field we set before us for examination ? TREART. How can we ? We cannot allow that their number is less than it was shown to be. STR. So we may fearlessly contend that Motion is different from Existence. TREART. Without the smallest fear. STR. In fact, it is clear that Motion really is a thing that is not (Existence) and a thing that is, since it partakes of Existence. TREART. Perfectly clear.

This conclusion is now generalised: it applies to all the Forms. Of any Form it can be said that it is a thing that is not (any other Form) and also a thing that is (*i.e.* exist). Finally, it is pointed out that this is as true of Existence itself as of any other Form.

- 256D. STR. It must, then, be possible for 'that which is not' (i.e. is different from Existence) to be (to exist), not only in the case of Motion but of all the other Kinds. For in
 - E. the case of them all the nature of Difference makes each one of them different from Exstence and so makes it a thing that 'is not'; and hence we shall be right to speak of them all on the same principle as things that in this sense 'are not', and again, because they partice of Existence, to say that they 'are' (exist) and call them things that have being (existence).

THEAET. No doubt.

STR. So, in the case of every one of the Forms there is much that it is and an indefinite number of things that it is not.¹

THEAET. So it appears.

 STR. And, moreover, Existence itself must be called different from the rest. THEAET. Necessarily.

¹ This means that many affirmative statements are true of any Form, and also any number of negative statements, expressing its difference from other Forms. This conclusion is next applied to Existence itself.

HOW 'WHAT IS NOT' CAN 'BE'

257. STR. We find, then, that Existence likewise 'is not' in as many respects as there are other things: for, not being those others, while it so its single self, it so not all that indefinite number of other things.

THEAET. That is so.

Srs. Then we must not boggle even at that conclusion, granted that Kinds are of a nature to admit combination with one another. If anyone denies that, he must win over our earlier arguments to his side before he tries to win over their consequences.

THEAET. That is a fair demand.

In this passage $\tau \partial \delta_P$ primarily means the single Form, Existence itself, one of the five Forms we selected. We have seen that

(Existence is (exists 1).

Existence is not (any other Form).

But the conclusion applies equally to what Parmendes meant by robolow bound to be a start of the sensitive forms which make up realityit is true of anything that is real, that it exists and is not anythingelse, and of the Real as a whole that it is not any one of its parts. Infact, <math>robolow bound to bound the start is not any one of its parts. Infact, <math>robolow bound to be start in the other start is not show both the start is over two conclusions, which areboth true. The second is

(Any existent is (exists)

Any existent is not (any other existent).

We have thus established the first point against Parmenides' dogma that there is no way in which ' that which is ' can ' not-be'. We have shown that an unlimited number of negative statements are true of any existent or of Existence itself.

257B-258C. There are also any number of true statements asserting that 'what is not' in a sense 'is'

The next section refutes Parmenides' complementary dogma: 'There is no sense in which that "which-is-not can be.' This section is concerned with 'that which is not' $(rd) \mu \beta \phi$) in the sense explained, namely 'the different ', *i.s.* any existent defined as different from some other existent ; for example, 'the not-tal', 'the notbeautiful'. It is first pointed out that 'that which is not' in this sense is distinct from 'Non-existence' and from 'the non-existent', both of which are covered by the phrase 'the contrary of what exists (or of Existence)', roberrier to force.

¹ Or perhaps '1s the same as itself '--has a being or identity of its own P.T.K. 289 U 257B. STR. Now let us mark this.

THEAET. Yes?

STR. When we speak of ' that which is not ', it seems that we do not mean something contrary to what exists but only something that is different.

THEAET. How ?

STR. In the same way that when, for example, we speak of something as 'not tall', we may just as well mean by that phrase 'what is equal' as 'what is short', mayn't we ?¹ THERET. Certainly.

STR. So, when it is asserted that a negative signifies a contrary, we shall not agree, but admit no more than this :

c. that the prefix 'not' indicates something different from the words that follow—or rather from the things designated by the words pronounced after the negative. THRAFT. EXactly.

'The different' is 'the not so-and-so'. Remembering that the discussion is confined to the world of Forms and their relations, we can now see that the whole field of reality, divided up into all the subordinate Forms, can be regarded as covered by Forms, every one of which can be negatively described as 'that which is not so-and-so'. So 'the nature of the Different' is distributed over the whole field, just as much as the nature of Existence. 'The not-beautiful' is the collective name for all the Forms there are, other than the single Form, 'Beautiful'. 'The not-beautiful' is a special name for this 'part' of the Different, just as the various species ('parts') of knowledge have special names.

257C. STR. And here, if you agree, is a point for us to consider. THEAET. Namely ?

STR. The nature of the Different (Difference)^a appears to be parcelled out, in the same way as knowledge.

THEAET. How so ?

STR. Knowledge also is surely one, but each part of it that commands a certain field is marked off and given a special

D. name proper to itself. Hence language recognises many arts and forms of knowledge.^{*}

¹ 'Short' is the contrary of 'tall', but 'equal' is not, so the equal is different from the tall, not contrary Similarly 'the not-beautiful' is not necessarily 'the ugly'

* The ambiguity of fáreper in all this section--' the different ' (that which is different) and ' Difference itself '--will be discussed below

³ Knowledge and its species are a mere illustration There is no suggestion that the species of knowledge correspond to 'parts of the Different' Every Form is a part of the Different, but there is not a species of knowledge for every Form.

HOW 'WHAT IS NOT' CAN 'BE'

257D. THEAST. Certainly.

STR. And the same thing is true of the parts of the single nature of the Different.

THEAET. Perhaps; but shall we explain how?

STR. There exists a part of the Different that is set in contrast to the Beautiful ?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Are we to say it is nameless, or has it a special name? THEART. It has. Whenever we use the expression 'not Beautiful', the thing we mean is precisely that which is different from the nature of the Beautiful.

STR. Then tell me this.

E. THEAET. What?

STR. May we not say that the existence of the not-Beautiful is constituted by its being marked off from a single definite Kind ¹ among existing things and again set in contrast with something that exist?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. So it appears that the not-Beautiful is an instance of something that exists being set in contrast to something that exists.

THEAST. Perfectly.

STR. What then? On this showing has the not-Beautiful any less claim than the Beautiful to be a thing that exists? THEAET. None whatever.

 STR. And so the not-Tall must be said to exist just as much as the Tall itself.

THEAET Just as much.

STR. And we must also put the not-Just¹ on the same footing as the Just with respect to the fact that the one exists no less than the other.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And we shall say the same of all the rest, since we have seen that the nature of the Different is to be ranked among things that exist, and, none it exists, its parts also must be considered as existing just as much as anything else.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. So, it seems, when a part of the nature of the Different

¹ runds érds yérous, ous the Beautiful ; not ' any single kind ', or ' some kind ' (érés yé runds yérous).

[&]quot;The 'not-Just' is not 'the unjust', but any Form that is different from 'the Just' For spor, cf Theses 180a, spor rd und queed betwa. Note that the moral Forms (Beautiful, Just) once more appear alongside the rest.

- and a part of the nature of the Existent (Existence)¹ are
 set in contrast to one another, the contrast is, if it be per
 - missible to say so, as much a reality as Existence itself; it does not mean what is contrary to 'existent', but only what is different from that Existent. THRAFT. That name are we to give it, then ? THRAFT. Obviously this is just that 'what-is-not' which we were seeking for the sake of the Sophist. STR. Has it then, as you say, an existence inferior to none of the rest in reality? May we now be lod lot say that 'that which is not' unquestionably is a thing that has a nature of . it so wor-just as the Tall was tall and the Beautiful was
 - C. its own—just as the Tall was tall and the Beautiful was beautiful, so too with the not-Tall and the not-Beautiful and in that sense 'that which is not 'also, on the same principle, both was and is what-is-not, a single Form to be reckned among the many realities ? Or have we any further doubts with regard to it, Theaetetus ? TREAET. None at all.

The Stranger has now completed his promised refutation of 'Father Parmenucks' pronouncement' by showing 'that in a certain respect what is not, exists, and again what exists, in a sense is not '(241D).

Translation of the foregoing argument into another language reveals that the terms $r\delta \, \delta r$, $ravir\delta r$, $\delta dragow$ are used ambguously. $T\delta \, \delta m$ means sometimes 'Existence riself', sometimes 'the exisent' or 'that which is so-and-so', $ravir\delta r$ sometimes 'that which is the same', $\delta dragow$ sometimes 'that which is the same', $\delta dragow$ sometimes 'that at which is different'. But it is clear that Plato was not blind to these ambiguities. He has indicated the two senses of $r\delta \, \delta r$ quite clearly in the passage at 240p ff. where the Stranger passed from the discussion of the Real (that which is real) as containing both things that move and things that are at rest to

¹ Understanding if mostor rife Bartpoor defocuses al (mostor) rife ros forros (defocuses) deriverses. A part of the nature of the Existent', s o 'that which is so-and-so 's g. Beautiful).

* Require the manuscript reading, without meeting $\langle \phi | \mu / \phi \rangle \ge \operatorname{and} \langle \phi | \phi - \phi \rangle$ $\operatorname{add} \langle \phi | \phi \rangle$ and $\langle \phi | \phi \rangle$ $\operatorname{add} \langle \phi | \phi \rangle$ and $\langle \phi | \phi \rangle$ are being a strange of the second strained strained of the second strained Realness or Existence as a Form of which everything that is real partakes. Further, no writer who was unaware of the ambiguities could have constructed an argument which is perfectly lucid when the various meanings are kept distinct.

What is really puzzling to us is the description of 'the not-Tall', 'the not-Beautiful', etc., as 'parts of the nature of the Different (or Difference)'. At the outset where the five selected Forms are proved to be distinct, $\theta drsgoor$ clearly means the single Form. Difference. At 255 nt is called 'the nature of Difference' ($\theta d oragoor$ $<math>\varphi d o x_{0}$), and this is said to 'pervade' all the Forms, each of which 'partakes of its character'. But what is meant by calling 'the not-Beautiful', etc., 'parts of this single nature' (2570)?

Clearly ' the not-Beautiful ', etc., are not parts of the single Form. Difference itself, the meaning of the word 'different'. A Form can have parts in two senses. (1) If it is complex, the simpler Forms by which it is defined can be called parts, in that their names stand for parts of the meaning of its name. 'Figure' is part of the meaning of 'Triangle'. This sense does not apply. 'Not-Beautiful 'is not a part of the meaning of 'Difference '. (2) ' Parts ' may also mean 'species '-a meaning actually suggested by the analogy with knowledge and its species at 257C. But, once more, ' the not-Beautiful ' is not a species of Difference, as numerical and conceptual difference might be said to be. 'The not-Beautiful' evidently means ' that which is different from the Beautiful '-a collective name for all the Forms there are, other than the Beautiful itself. These other Forms, whether singly or as a group, are not species of a generic Form 'Difference'. What is 'the not-Beautiful' a 'part' of?

It is a part of the whole field of Forms which make up the Real. It is, in fact, the whole group of Forms that is separated off from and contrasted with the single Form, the Beautiful itself. In the Statesman (debog). The Stranger there objects to the division of animals into men and beasts, *i.e.* human and not-human. Negative terms like 'Barbarian' (non-Greek), though they have a name, have no Form that could be subdivided. 'Not every part is a Form, though every Form is a part.' So 'the not-Beautiful' is not a Form, but a group of Forms, negatively described, which is a part of the Real.¹

When it is said to be 'a part of the Different' or 'of the nature of the Different', the Different must mean 'that which is different'. Since every part of the field of Forms is different from every other

¹ Such a group of Forms is a whole (δlor) or complex of diverse parts, in the sense in which 'whole ' is used in the description of Dialectic at 253D.

part, the whole field can be called 'the Different': it will bear the collective name ' that which is not', just as well as the name ' that which is': and any Form or group of Forms can be called both existent and 'a part of the Different'. In a Table of Division of genus into species, every positive determination we reach as we descend is called a 'difference'. This technical term may be derived from Plato's analysis here. It signifies that each positive element of content we discover in dividing the generic Form is a ' difference ', marked off by a line of division from something else. Positively, it is an element in the identity (sameness) of the species we shall define by it ; negatively, it differentiates that species from others. Thus 'the not-Beautiful' is 'a part of the Different'. though not of Difference itself : and the nature of Difference can be described as diffused over the whole field of Forms, no less than is Existence. The thought is clear ; but the language is certainly confusing, partly thanks to Plate's way of thinking of Difference. not as a relation between things, but as a property of which things that are different ' partake'.

258C-259D. Conclusion : We have refuted Parmenides' dogma that 'what is ' cannot in any sense not-be, and that 'what is not ' cannot in any sense be

The Stranger now formulates the conclusions. Parmenides forbade us to assert 'that things that are not, are'. That is to say, he recognised only one sense of 'is not', namely 'is totally nonexistent'. We have ruled out that sense long ago; and now we have brought to light another sense, which allows us to assert that things which are not (are different from other things) nevertheless are (exist).

258C. STR. You see, then, that in our disobedience to Parmenides we have trespassed far beyond the limits of his prohibition. TREAST. In what way? STR. In pushing forward on our quest, we have shown him results in a field which he forbade us even to explore. TREAST. How?

D. STR. He says, you remember,

'Never shall this be proved, that things that are not, are; but keep back thy thought from this way of inquiry'. THEAET. Yes, he does say that.

STR. Whereas we have not merely shown that things that are not, are, but we have brought to light the real character of 'not-being'. We have shown that the nature of the

E. Different has existence and is parcelled out over the whole field of existent things with reference to one another; and 258z. of every part of it that is set in contrast to ' that which is ' we have dared to say that precisely that is really ' that which is not'. THEAST. Yes, sir, and I think what we have said is perfectly true.

For the purposes of the formal conclusion now to be stated—that things that are not (are different) exist—the relevant senses of is' and 'is not ' are Existence and Difference. The third all-pervading Form, Sameness (' is the same as '), is left in the background without explicit mention. The next speech (1) rules out non-existence (the only sense of ' not-being ' that Parmendes would recognise) as a sense of ' is not' that has no application to Forms, and (2) describes how Existence and Difference are two Forms, both extending over the whole field of reality and everywhere blending.

- 258z. STR. Then let no one say that it is the contrary of the existent that we mean by ' what is not ', when we make bold to say that ' what is not ' exists. So far as any contrary of the existent is concerned, we have long ago' said good-bye 250, to the question whether there is such a thing or not and
- 259. to the question whether there is such a thing or not and whether any account can be given of it or none whatsoever. But with respect to the 'what-is-not' that we have now asserted to exist, an opponent must either convince us that our account is wrong by refuting it, or, so long as he proves unable to do that, he must accept our statements:

that the Kinds blend with one another .

that Existence and Difference pervade them all, and pervade one another,

that Difference (or the Different), by partaking of Existence, is by virtue of that participation, but on the other hand is not that Existence of which it partakes, but is different; and since it is different from Existence (or an existent), quite clearly it must be possible that it should be a thing that is not i;

¹ At 238c, where το μηθαμώς δ_τ, 'the samply non-existent', was dismissed as not to be spoken or thought of There are no true statements saying that any Form does not exist But it is true of every Form other than Existence itself that it is not (identical with) Existence.

⁴ As before, \$\$\phi_sequence\$ is verbally ambiguous and the formula covers the two statements (1) that the Form Difference is no! (the same as) Existence, but is (exists), (2) that the different (that which is not so-and-so) is no! (the same as) a thing that is (ur a certain existent, the so-and-so it differs from), but is a thing that is (as curstent)

³ forus if dráyκης elsas, 'It is possible, necessarily, for it to be '. Cf. 256D, forus if dráyκης . . . elsas in the same sense.

• Is (1) Difference is not Existence; and (2) the different is not some other definite existent with which it contrasted.

2598. and again, Existence, having a part in Difference, will be different from all the rest of the Kinds; and, because it is different from them all, it is not any one of them nor yet all the others put together, but is only itself¹; with the consequence, again mdisputable, that Existence is not myriads upon myriads of things, and that all the other Kinds in the same way, whether taken severally or all together, in many respects are not.

THEAET. True.

We may here collect the meanings of 'is ' and ' is not ' that have been brought to light.

(1) 'Is 'means' exists'. Every Form exists; consequently 'the non-existent' has no place in the scheme, and we have ruled out that sense of 'is not'.

(2) 'Is' means 'is the same as'. Every Form is (the same as) itself. The contradictory 'is not' means 'is different from'.

It will be noticed that neither of these two senses of 'is' has anything to do with 'the copula', the supposed link between subject and predicate in Anstotelan logic. The statement that Plato' has discovered the ambiguity of the copula' is far removed from the facts.

There remain statements expressing the relation of two Forms that are neither wholly different nor wholly the same, but related as generic to specific Form or as specific to generic Form. The diagram given earlier shows the specific and generic Forms overlapping and 'blending'; but they do not coincide. A definition is a statement of complete identity : ' Man is (the same as) rational biped Animal'. But genus and species are related as whole to part. At Parm. 146B it is said that ' everything stands to everything in this way : either it is the same or different, or, if it is neither the same nor different, then one thing is a part, the other a whole '. Hence ' part ' is the regular Platonic term for ' species '. Plato has not occasion to analyse statements of the type : ' Man is Animal'. Perhaps he regarded them as statements of partial identity : 'the Form Man is (the same as) a part of the Form Animal'. The appropriate word would be ' partake of ' (uerersuy). indicating that genus and species are blended, but do not coincide. But he does not use ' partake of ' with any precision or distinguish

¹ Here the distinction between the Form Existence as discussed in all this section and the Existent (the Real, the whole world of real Forms) is clearly recognized. The corresponding statements are: (1) Existence is nof (the same as any other Form), but is (the same as) itself. (2) the Existent (any Form or group of Forma) is not (the same as any other existent, but is (cleasing as any other existent, but is (cleasing as any other existent).

'partaking' from the mutual relation called 'blending' or 'combining' ($\sigma f \mu \mu v t c_{\pi}$, worow/a). The reason for supposing that this use of 'is 'would fall under 'is the same as 'is that the whole discussion recognues only three all-pervading Forms-Existence, Sameness, Difference-which are already accounted for.

It may be added that this whole account of the blending or mutual participation of Forms cannot be directly applied to the old problem, raised in the Parmenides, of the participation of individual things in Forms. M. Brochard 1 writes : 'The relations of things to Forms are no doubt the same as the relations of Forms among themselves.' But this is not so. In the Parmenides and again at Soph. 251A and in the Philebus, the old question how one thing can have many names is distinguished from the problem of the interrelations of Forms and dismissed as already solved by the theory of Forms, though the precise nature of this participation may remain obscure. Also, as we have seen, in speaking of Forms 'participation' is synonymous with 'blending' or 'combination' and is a symmetrical relation, whereas the participation of things in Forms traverses the boundary between things and Forms and is not a symmetrical relation · Forms do not partake of things. This problem, therefore, remains where it was

Next follows a short interlude, pointing out the bearing of the conclusions just reached upon eristic controversy of the type started by Zeno.

- 259B. STR. And if anyone mistrusts these apparent contradictions, he should study the question and produce some better
 - c. explanation than we have now given , whereasi if he imagines he has discovered an embarrassing puzzle and takes delight in reducing argument to a tug of war, he is wasting his pains on a triviality, as our present argument declares. There is nothing clever in such a discovery, nor is it hard to make; what is hard and at the same time worth the pains is something different.

THEAET. And that is----?

STR. What I said before : leaving such quibbling alone as leading nowhere,⁴ to be able to follow our statements step by step and, in criticising the assertion that a different thing

D. is the same or the same thing is different in a certain sense, to take account of the precise sense and the precise respect in which they are said to be one or the other. Merely to

¹ Études, 148.

² drywra (Badham) seems to be the most probable correction of *buvard* yet proposed.

259D. show that in some unspecified way the same is different or the different is the same, the tall short, the like unlike, and to take pleasure in perpetually parading such contraditions in argument—that is not genuine criticism, but may be recognised as the callow offspring of a too recent contact with reality.¹

THEAET. I quite agree.

III. FALSE SPEAKING AND THINKING

The last main division of the argument opens here (2500) and continues to 264, where the final definition of the Sophist us resumed and completed. It explains how there can be Falsty in speech and thought. In the *Thesetesss* all attempts to explain this failed because the discussion was deliberately confined to an apparatus which excluded the Forms. These have now been brought into account, and we shall find that, when Forms are recognised as the meanings of common names and therefore as entering into the meaning of all statements, it will be possible to give false statements a meaning without invoking non-existent things or facts for them to refer to.

259D-261C. Introductory statement of the problem

The introductory section states the problem in terms which are, at first sight, puzzlng in that they seem to ignore the distinctions that have just been drawn. Some entus here accuse Plato of gross confusion and fallacy.¹ Such accusations are groundless. The subsequent analysis of falsity is as lucid as the previous account of the blending of Forms. Such obscurity as there is occurs only in this introductory passage, which is 'dalectical' and dramatic. The purpose is to make the reader feel that there is a difficulty to be cleared up, and to represent the perplexity of the respondent, who does not yet see just what the difficulty is, still less how to solve to i. In such passages Plato does not use terms with precision or observe all the distinctions of which a very clear-headed reader would be conscious.

The difficulty which every reader is meant to feel lies in seeing how the preceding demonstration that 'is not' has two senses

¹ The phrase recalls 3343 where young men were said to be imposed on by the Sophst's wisardry until they were undecouved by 'contact with reality' (deferredu are deform). The Stranger here inducates that the dilemmas of Zeno and his later imitators turned on ambiguities of the kind he has just cleared up.

^a Appli (note on 260c) declares that there is no possible transition from the $\mu \partial_{\bar{\mu}} \delta_{\bar{\nu}}$ which has been shown to exist to $\nu \partial_{\bar{\mu}} \partial_{\bar{\nu}}$ in the sense of ' the false', and that the confusion of these two is rampant throughout the rest of the dialogue

-- 'does not exis' ' and ' is different from '-bears on the question whether false statements can have any meaning. The connection is as follows. It was common ground that ' to say what is false' is, in some sense, ' to say things that are not ' (ro' or *laf*) *brac lafyes'*, such set Stranger will observe presently. The question is, what sense can 'things that are not ' bear in this phrase'? The Sophist's argument was ' To say the thing that is not ' can only mean ' to say nothing' or ' to speak of nothing' (*addre Jayes*), that is, to ' talk nonsense'.' You cannot speak of what does not exist ; there are no non-existing things or facts to speak of. Therefore all false speech must be meaningless. This is a quite serious difficulty, not easily disposed of. What are we talking about when we make a false statement ?

Plato has now shown that 'the thing that is not ' does not (as the Sophist assumed) always mean 'the non-existent'; it can also mean something which is different from something else. Both these 'somethings' are something ($\delta \phi$), not nothing. He intends to interpret the phrase 'to say, or speak of, that which is not ' by means of this second sense, as equivalent to 'to say, or speak of, something different from the actual facts, but not simply non-existent '. The question is, what sort of existence that 'something different' can have. If we can discover that, we can assert that a false statement has meaning.

But this explanation is still to come. At present all we know is that 'that which is not' is ambiguous. The Stranger is thinking of the sense he will use in his explanation; it the Sophist, who is represented as defending his position, still feels that 'saying what is not ' involves somewhere an element of unreality or non-existence, which he will challenge as illegitimate. Thesetetus, like the ordinary reader, may well be excused for not having taken m the full sense of the foregoing analysas. Once we realise the dialectical character of the passage, we shall see that Plato himself is not guilty of confusion.

The phrase just used by the Stranger, 'the offspring of a too recent contact with reality', recalled the earlier reference to young men deluded by the Sophist's wizardries. It also recalls the 'old men who have taken to learning late in life' (251B), who were coupled with the young as delighting in the sophism: One thing cannot have many names. The position of these men who would 'separate everything from everything the 'is now mentoned again. Their difficulties arose from not recognising the existence of Forms as the meanings of common names, or seeing that one thing can

¹ Cf. 240D (p. 212) and the full statement of this argument at *Theasterns* 188D ff (p. 114).

partake of many Forms. The Stranger begins by pointing out that 'all discourse depends on the weaving together of Forms'.

259D. STR. Yes, my friend, and the attempt to separate every-E. thing from every other thing not only strikes a discordant note but amounts to a crude defiance of the philosophic Muse.¹

THEAET. Why?

STR. This isolation of everything from everything else means a complete abolition of all discourse; for any discourse we can have owes its existence to the weaving together of Forms.

THEAET. True.

260. STR. Observe, then, how opportune was our struggle with those separatists, when we forced them to allow one Form to blend with another.

THEAET. In what respect?

STR. In respect of securing the position of discourse as one of the kinds of things that exist. To rob us of discourse would be to rob us of philosophy. That would be the most serious consequence, but, besides that, we need at the present moment to come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if its very existence had been taken from us,

B. we should naturally not be able to discourse any further. And that would have happened, if we had yielded the point that there is no blending of any one Form with another.

All discourse depends on the 'weaving together (σ_{VRZAOM}) of Forms'. 'Weaving together 'is not a synonym of 'combining' or 'blending'; it includes all statements, adiimmatre or negative.³ It is not meant that Forms are the only elements in the meaning of all discourse. We can also make statements about individual things. But it is true that every such statement must contain at least one Form—one of those 'common terms' (*Tkasat*, *HS*) which least one Form—one of those 'common terms' (*Tkasat*, *HS*) which are necessary to all thought or judgment about the objects of direct perception. So (at 25aC) it was objected against the separalists that they could not express their theory at all without' connecting in their statements' (*covárresv & rois lávjouc*) terms like 'is', 'apart from', 'the rest', etc., which are common terms. The

¹ ducourse is almost a synonym of debideroofer. Crat 406A derives Moleon and µowner/ from µoorden = {/rprof: rt sal \$\u00e9charrow backs of 51A quotes the Pythagenean asymg that Fhilesophy is the highest form of 'Music'

In Aristotle, de interpr init συμπλοκή is used for the contextus verborum in a sentence, as distinct from isolated words So below at 262c, ή πρώτη συμπλοκή, and 262p, πλέγμα.

FALSE SPEAKING AND THINKING

point here made, that every statement or judgment involves the use of at least one Form, is important because the recognition of Forms as entering into the meaning of all statements will solve the problem of false speech and thinking.

- 260B. THERET. That is certainly true. But I do not understand why we need an agreement about discourse at the present moment. STR. I may be able to suggest a line of thought that will help you to understand. THERET. What is that? STR. We saw that 'not being ' is a single kind among the rest, dispersed over the whole field of realities. THERET. Yes. STR. We have next to consider whether it blends with thunking and discourse. THERET. Why that?
 - c. STR. If it does not blend with them, everything must be true; but if it does, we shall have false thinking and discourse; for thinking or saying 'what is not ' comes, I suppose, to the same thing as falsity in thought and speech. THRAET. Yes. STR. And if falsity exists, deception is possible. THRAET. Yes. STR. And once deception exists, images and likenesses and appearance will be everywhere rampant THRAET. Of course. STR. And the Sophist, we said, had taken refuge somebut that the staty is and the bab denied the very exist-ence of falsity: in one could etther think or say 'what is say.
 - ence of faisty: no one could either think or say 'what is not', because what is not never has any sort of being THEAET. So he said. STR. But now that 'what is not' has been found to have its share in existence, perhaps he will not fight with us

further on that point.

The 'not-being' which we found to be a single Form distributed over the whole field of reality was 'Difference'. When the Stranger asks whether 'not-being' blends with speaking and thinking, the real question is whether there is any sense of 'what is not' that will justify our combining that phrase with speaking and thinking in the expression 'to speak of, or think, what is not'. The Sophist originally maintained that there can be no justification, because 'what is not' always means 'the non-existent'. We have ousted

him from that position by showing that it sometimes has another meaning, 'the different', which is compatible with existence.

But a second line of defence remains, as the Stranger goes on to suggest. The Sophist may accept the ambiguity of 'what is not', and still deny our right to assert the possibility of saying and thinking what is not. The meaning of 'what is not' here has still to be defined and justified. 'What is not' may not always mean 'the non-existent '; but in this particular phrase it suggests some element of uremailty (which, as we have argued, is not the same thing as 'difference'). So the Sophist is represented as raising a further objection.

- 260D. STR. (continues). On the other hand, he may perhaps say that some things partake of not-being, some do not, and that speech and thunking are among those that do not; and so once more he might contend that the art of creating
 - E. images and semblances, where we say he is to be found, has no existence at all, since thought and speech have no share in not-being, and without that combination there is no such thing as falsity.

That is why we must begin by investigating the nature of discourse and thinking and appearance, in order that we

261. may then make out their combination with not-being and so prove that falsity exists, and by that proof pin down the Sophist there, if he is amenable to capture, or else let hum go and pursue our search in some other Kind.

The Sophist's second line of defence is here stated as the Sophist himself would state it, not as it would be put by auyone who was confining himself to the precise use of the terms defined in the last section. 'Some things', he suggests, 'partake of not-being, some do not'. If 'things' (abdow) meant Platonic Forms, we have just shown that no Forms partake of 'not-being 'n the sense of nonexistence, and that all Forms partake of in the sense of Difference. But eides is a vague word, sometimes meaning no more than 'entity', 'thing '; and by 'not-being' the Sophist clearly means falsity. We have still to discover how 'the false ' (a term strictly applicable only to thought and speech) is related to 'the non-existent' and 'the different'. The last section dealt solely with the world of Forms where non-existence and falsity have no place. The thought and speech which can partake of falsity are not Flatonic Forms, but the thoughts which exist in our minds and the speeches we utter.' No result reached so far has shown how they can very be false.

¹ At 263D the thinking, judgment, and 'appearing ', which 'occur in our minds' are called yorq ('things' or 'kinds of thing'), if we read vd yorq with B (yorq T : ye Stobaras).

EVERY STATEMENT IS COMPLEX

Theatettus' next speech expresses the perplexity to which he and the reader are reduced by the ambiguities of 'not-being'. That Plato himself was misled by them is entirely incredible; for as soon as the argument begins again the thought once more runs perfectly clear.

- 261A. THEART. Certainly, sir, what we said at the outset about the Sophist seems true: that he is a hard sort of beast to hunt down. Evidently he possesses a whole armoury of problems, and every time that he puts one forward to shield him, we have to fight our way through it before we can get at him. So now, hardly have we got the better of his defence that 'what is not' cannot exist, when another
 - B. obstacle is raised in our path: we must, it seems, prove that falsity exists both in speech and thought, and after that pertaps something else, and so on. It looks as if the end would never be in sight. STR. A man should be of good courage, Theaetetus, if he can make only a little headway at each step. If he loses heart then, what will he do in another case where he cannot
 - advance at all or even perhaps loses ground ? No city, as C. they say, will surrender to so fant a summons. And now that we have surmounted the barrier you speak of, we may have already taken the highest wall and the rest may be easier to capture.

THEAET. That is encouraging.

261C-262E. Every statement is a complex of heterogeneous elements (name and verb)

The Stranger opens the discussion by pointing out that every statement is complex. The simplest statement must contain at least one 'name' and one verb. The terms 'name' and 'verb' are defined.

261C. STR. Then, as I said, let us take first statement¹ and judgment, so as to establish clearly whether not-being has any point of contact with them, or both are altogether true and there is never falsity in either. THEAT. Very god.

¹ 'Statement' So far X_j has been transletd 'ducourse', but the following analysis as concerned with what Antotic calls the selevature k_j a statement which can and must be either true or false, as distinct from questions, nyres, etc. A' judgment '(as septianed later) is here equivalent to an unspoken statement made by the mind in its internal dialogue with itself. 261D. STR. Now, remembering what we said about Forms and letters.1 let us consider words in the same way. The solution of our present problem promises to lie in that quarter. THEAET. What are you going to ask me about words ? STR. Whether they all fit together, or none of them, or some will and some will not. THEAET. That is plain enough ; some will, some will not. STR. You mean perhaps something like this : words which. E. when spoken in succession, signify something, do fit together. while those which mean nothing when they are strung together, do not. THEAET. What do you mean ? STR. What I supposed you had in your mind when you gave your assent.¹ The signs we use in speech to signify being are surely of two kinds. THEAST. HOW ? STR. One kind called ' names ', the other ' verbs ', 262 THEAST. Give me a description of each. STR. By 'verb' we mean an expression which is applied to

actions. THEAET. Yes.

STR. And by a 'name' the spoken sign applied to what performs these actions.

THEAET. Quite so.

STR. Now a statement never consists solely of names spoken in succession, nor yet of verbs apart from names.

THEAET. I don't follow that.

B. STR. Evidently you had something else in mind when you agreed with me just now; because what I meant was just this: that these words spoken in a string in this way do not make a statement.

THEAET. In what way?

STR. For example, 'walks runs sleeps '," and so on with all the other verbs signifying actions—you may utter them all one after another, but that does not make a statement.

1 At 253A (p. 260)

Probably what Theasteries had in mind was the combination of Forms in affirmative statements and the incompatibility of Forms expressed by negative statements, which was illustrated by the fitting-together (overspiorwo) or nof fitting of vowels and consonants at 233. But the Stranger is referring only to the illustration and is thinking of the fact that a statement cannot consist of a combination of two nouns only or of two verbs only, any more than a word can consist of two consonants without a vowel

² The inverted commas in Burnet's text between βαδίζει and καθεύδει (and below, between λίαν and ίσποι) should be omitted.

262B. THEAET. Naturally.

STR. And again, if you say ' lion stag horse ' and any other names given to things that perform actions, such a string

c. never makes up a statement. Neither in this example nor in the other do the sounds uttered signify any action performed or not performed or nature of anything that exists or does not exist, until you combine verbs with names. The moment you do that, they fit together and the simplest combination becomes a statement of what might be called the simplest and briefset kind.

THEAET. Then how do you make a statement of that kind ?

STR. When one says 'A man understands', do you agree that this is a statement of the simplest and shortest possible kind ?

D. THEAET. Yes.

STR. Because now it gives information about facts or events in the present or past or future : it does not merely name something but gets you somewhere " by weaving together verbs with names. Hence we say it 'states' something, not merely' mame' something, and in fact it is this complex that we mean by the word 'statement'. THEART. THE.

STR. And so, just as some things fit together, some do not,

E. so with the signs of speech. some do not fit, but those that do fit make a statement. THEAET. Quite so.

The definition of 'word'. Aristotle defines spoken words as tokens $(\sigma f \mu \partial \partial a)$ or signs $(\sigma \eta \mu e ia)$ of mental affections; and the written word as a token of the spoken word. He remarks that, although languages have different spoken and written signs, the mental affections are the same in all men and so are the things (rade/yaara) of which the mental affections are likenesses (*De* interpr. 1).

I splice obl' depeier refers to the former example (*lexive*) of the string of verbs, which does not state that any action is actually performed, on not performed, or not not setually performed, or not performed, or not any share a state of the string of the string of annes, which does not state that there actually example (*device*) of the string of annes, which does not state that there actually example (*device*) or does not exast, anything with the nature (*devic*) expressed by any of the names. This does not mean that the words themselves have no meaning, and are senseless noises ; but that such concatenations are not statements of fact, do not refer (or profess to refer to any actual fact or overs).

* repairer rs, the opposite of odder repairer, 'to get nowhere' Cf. Theast 180A.

P.T.K.

Plato defines a word, not as the token of a mental affection, but as a vocal sign (*cynucion vifc*, *qourif*, *zical*, used to signify *being* (*regl vity obvica of biogua*). This at none implies that every word stands for something or means something; it is not a meaningless noise. It follows that no element in a false statement can be simply meaningless. But ' being' is an ambiguous expression.

(I) 'Being' may mean the nature of a thing. At Laws 805D. Plato says that in the case of everything there are always three factors : the 'being' or nature (odola), the definition or account (Lóyoc) of the nature, and the name (oroug). The nature is a counterpart of the definition. So at Phaedrus 245E the 'essential being or definition of soul ' (worns obolas sal hoyor) is ' that which moves itself'. At Cratylus 303D, where significant or descriptive proper names are in question, it is said that Astvanax (Lord of the city) and Hector (Warden) have the same ' force ' (dovauc) ; one meaning can be expressed in different syllables or letters, so long as the being of the thing (obside row πράγματος) as expressed in the name ($\delta\eta$ loo $\mu\delta r\eta$ δr to $\delta r\delta\mu a t$) prevails. Cratylus 383E: Things ($\pi\rho d\gamma\mu a \tau a$) have a constant being ($\beta\delta \delta a \log \sigma \delta \sigma d a$) of their own, which we cannot alter ; so have actions ($\pi \rho d \xi \epsilon \mu$). The example at Laws 805D is the name 'even' as applied to numbers. This has the definition ' divisible into two equal parts ', and the corresponding being (odola) is this property of numbers. Every such nature is, in Platonic terms, a Form (eidos)-the meaning of a common name. which, if complex, is definable,

(2) In the case of Forms the nature and the thing are one and the same. So at Protagoras 340B it is asked whether the five names of the cardinal virtues all apply to one thing (Enl Erl moayuars), or is each name applied severally to ' a peculiar nature or thing ' (1000; odola xal noãyµa) having a property of its own. But there are also proper names attached by convention to individual things. In the statement we shall presently take as typical, 'Theaetetus sits', 'Theaetetus' stands for an individual thing, and (as the Cratylus showed) does not necessarily express its nature. The name may have no 'meaning' in itself ; it merely stands for the thing we choose to attach that sound to. The definition of 'word 'must cover such names as these ; 'sign signifying being ' includes this second sense : ' standing for something that exists '. At Cratylus 388c a name is said to have two functions : it is a tool (1) to convey information (didaonalistor) and (2) to distinguish things (τα πράγματα διακρίνειν, διακριτικόν της οθσίας). 'Thing' or ' being ' here has the wider sense, covering any object distinguished

¹ δήλωμα, cf Laws 792A: Crying is to infants a means of signifying their desires (δήλωμα ών έρξ)—not a happy kind of sign (σημείων)!

by a name, whether that object be a Form (the nature which is the *meaning expressed* by common name) or an individual thing which may be indicated conventionally by a proper name *standing* for it.

Plato's definition of 'word' thus covers two senses. (1) A common name signifies or 'means' a' nature 'which is a Form, as well as 'slanding for' or indicating existing things. (2) A proper name slands for or indicate an existing thing only. With his usual disregard for precision, Plato uses all the common words for 'signify', 'mean ,' indicate', indiscriminately. But in order to understand the analysis of the statement, 'Theaetertus sits', we shall find it necessary to distinguish between a proper name like 'Theaetetus' and a 'common term' like 'sits'.

Names and Verbs .- At Cratvlus 425A the notion that speech or statement (lovoc) consists of names and verbs is taken as familiar. without explanation. It was probably due to grammarians, for the previous context refers to their classification of letters into vowels, sonants, and mutes. A statement is 'a combination of names and verbs' (431B). Aristotle repeats this.1 Other parts of speech are ignored. Aristotle is understood as meaning that a noun and a verb are, as Plato here remarks, necessary and sufficient for the minumum statement that can be true or false. Later grammarians seem to have taken the same view. Ammonius observes that other parts of speech (conjunctions, prepositions, articles, etc.) cannot, when put together, make up a statement (lovoc) : they are accordingly ' parts of speech ' (lefic), not ' parts of statement' (lovoc). Plutarch (Plat. Ou. x) says that Plato speaks only of names and verbs because a statement really does consist of these parts. A name ('Socrates') or a verb ('is beaten') calls up the idea of a person or a thing ; but words like us, yap, nepl, do not. Apart from the mention of a person or thing they are empty noises, not significant either (as names and verbs are) by themselves, nor yet when strung together. He compares them to salt in a dish of meat or the water in a cake, which is not properly ' part' of the cake, but serves to hold it together. Only names and verbs are ' parts of statement' (Myoc). This neglect of the minor parts of speech led to serious consequences in Logic. It facilitated the theory that every proposition has a subject (noun) and a predicate (normally adjective or verb); and the nature of relations was obscured by the

¹ De Interpr. 1 Cf. Rhst. 1404,b. 26, forum 8d droydraw ral faydraw if av d Adyos owdorness – Stanzel (Studen z. Enterchiwage d piet Disiskith, 88) thinks that figue includes any predicate (Aussage), o g molds in d wais radds (cf art. Logik m P.W. Encyci. Halbband XXV, 1011).

failure to recognise the claim of prepositions to have meanings of their own.

It will be noticed that Plato takes as the typical minimum statement the combination of a name (noun) and a verb expressing an action, not such a sentence as 'Socrates is wiss'. But he is not writing a treatise on logic. If he were, his definition of 'verb' as 'an expression applied to actoos' would be obviously defective, as ignoring verbs expressing states; and to define 'name', as he does, in terms of the verb-'the spoken sign applied to what performs these actions '---would be odd. The definitions are not meant to be precise.

The 'mpabot of this section is that every statement is complex, consisting of heterogeneous elements (name and verb) which severally have meanings and, when put together, form a whole having significance as a whole. The fact or event which the statement corresponds to and professes to represent as a whole, is also complex, consisting of heterogeneous elements (agent and action), which fit together in a coherent structure.

2622. Every statement is about something and is either true or false Two more points are now added. (1) One element in the complex statement is the name of the agent, about which the statement is made. (2) Every statement as a whole is either true or false.

262E. Str. Now another small point. THEAST. Yes? STR. Whenever there is a statement, it must be about something ¹; it cannot be about nothing. THEAST. That is so. STR. And must it not have a certain character?² THEAST. Of course.

The assertion that 'every statement is about something ' indicates that one element in the complex statement is the name of the agent or (to use the later term) subject, and the agent itself is one element in the existing fact. In the examples we shall take, Theaeterths himself is the subject both in the true statement ' Theaetetus sits' and in the false ' Theaetertus files'. Probably the Stranger means here to emphasise that the subject of both state-

¹ The sample genitive τρότ ' of something ' is used , and at 263A Theactetus speaks of the statement about him as 'mnie' (μότ), as if this genitive ware possessive But in the same breath he speaks of it as ' about me ' (weşl έμοθ); and that is evidently while both expressions mean.

² That ' character' or ' quality ' means truth or falsity, here as at *Philobus* 37B, is obvious from what follows (263A, B).

TRUE STATEMENT DEFINED

ments is the actually existing Theaetetus. Whatever element of unreality we may look to find in the false statement, at any rate the subject is not unreal or non-existent. A false statement is not a statement about a non-existent subject, nor does it deny the existence of its subject. To 'speak of or say what is us not 'does not mean' to make a statement about nothing'.

The importance of this point may explain why Plato selects as examples true and false statements about an individual thing. Theaetetus, not about a Form, such as we had in the previous section. That Theaetetus exists here and now is common ground with his opponents; but they would have denued the existence of Forms like Moton and Rest, and Plato does not want to lay himself open to that objection here. Granted that Forms do exist, the objection is invalid, and the analysis now offered of the meaning of true and false statements would apply also to statements about Forms.

262E-263B The definition of true statement

The Stranger next takes two statements about the same subject, one obviously true, the other inconsistent with it and obviously false. He then proceeds to give, with surprising brevity, his definitions of true and false statement.

262E. STR Now let us fix our attention on ourselves. THEAET. We will. STR. I will make a statement to you, then, putting together a thing with an action by means of a name and a verb. You are to tell me what the statement is about. THEAET. I will do my best. 263. STR. 'Theaetetus sits'-not a lengthy statement, is it ? THEAET. No. of very modest length. STR. Now it is for you to say what it is about-to whom it belongs. THEAET. Clearly about me : it belongs to me. STR. Now take another. THEAET. Namely-----? STR. 'Theaetetus (whom I am talking to at this moment) 1 flies ' THEAET. That too can only be described as belonging to me and about me. STR. And moreover we agree that any statement must have a certain character.

B. THEAET. Yes.

¹ Not an imaginary Theactetus or Theactetus at some other moment, but the real Theactetus here and now 2638. STR. Then what sort of character can we assign to each of these? THERET. One is false, the other true. STR. And the true one states about you the things that are (or the facts) as they are. THERET. Certainly.

This brief definition of true statement occurs in earlier dialogues. (I) At Euthydomus 283E, Euthydemus maintains that it is impossible to speak falsely. For if you speak of the thing that the statement is about, that thing must be one among the things that are (row orraw). So you are speaking of the thing that is (rd or). But to speak of the thing that is or the facts (rd on leven wal rd (mra), is to speak the truth. Ctesippus objects that one who speaks falsely ' does in a way speak of things that are, but not as they are ' (τά όντα μέν τρόπον τινά λέγει, ού μέντοι ώς γε έχει, 2840). Ctesippus is evidently quoting a popular definition : 'The true statement speaks of things that are, or states facts, as they are', (2) Again at Cratvlus 385B Socrates remarks to Hermogenes that the true statement ' speaks of the things that are, as they are ' or ' states that the things that are, are ' (oc dr rà orra levn ac Erry). Here the phrase is ambiguous in form, but the difference is rather grammatical than substantial. The definition is given as current and accepted without discussion. Both here and in the Euthydemus (where we kyss must mean 'as they are') the notion is that truth consists in the correspondence of the statement with the 'things that are' or 'the facts'. How they correspond is not explained

But for our present purpose of discovering what a *false* statement can mean or correspond whih, it is important to be clear about the meaning of 'things that are ' or 'facts'. We have seen that all facts represented by statements are complex. In the case of the true statement 'Thesetetus sits', there are (1) the thing about which the statement is made—an existing thing, Thesetetus; (a) the 'action' referred to by the verb' sits'—another existing thing; and (3) the whole complex existing fact—Thesetetus=sitting—composed of those two elements. Let us take this complex existing fact and suppose that it is, or contains, all the 'things that are ', which the statement is to correspond with.

This existing fact—Theatetus-sitting—is a complex object of perception; and, if we may assume that my judgment 'Theatetus sits' simply represents what I actually see with no element of inference, my statement will be true. We shall then get the following scheme :

FALSE STATEMENT DEFINED TRUE STATEMENT: "Theastelus sits" stands for corresponds to stands for EXISTING FACT. Theastelus sitting.

Here each of the two words *stands for* one element in the complex fact. The statement as a whole is complex and its structure corresponds to the structure of the fact. Truth means this correspondence.

Common sense might accept this account of true statement : and this, no doubt, was the popular meaning of 'speaking of things that are', or 'stating facts, as they are'. If all statements were true and were of the type here exemplified, the account might be taken as complete. But here the difficulty begins. How are we to define false statement on these lines? If we define true statement by the correspondence of its structure with the structure of an existing fact which it refers to, the Sophist will object that a false statement cannot be defined as corresponding with anything, because there are no non-existent facts for it to correspond with or mean or refer to. A false statement, therefore, means nothing, This involves a problem which modern logicians are still discussing. 'Charles I died on the scaffold ' corresponds to a fact : 'Charles I died in bed ' and ' Charles I did not die on the scaffold ' do not. If I judge or believe either of these statements, how can there be an 'objective falsehood ' or ' negative fact ' to provide an object for my belief ? 1

263B-D. The definition of false statement

The language in which Plato now states his solution is extremely simple, and consequently vague and ambiguous. The meaning of the literal translation here given will be discussed later.⁹

¹ See, for instance, Russell, *Philosophical Essays* (1910), On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood

* The text is as follows :

BE. 'O be by peubly erepa two botwor (SC heres mepl 000)

OB. Nal.

BE. Tà ut orra doa as orra dere.

ΘΕ. Σχιδόν.

BE. "Οττοιν (Cornarius : δντως BT) δέ γε δντα έτερα περί σοθ. πολλά μέν γαρ έφαμαν δντα περί έχαστον είναι που, πολλά δέ οδκ όντα.

I cannot follow M. Debs' explanation Arnes la proposition est fausse quand elle affirme d'un sugei ce qui n'est ponsi de lui C'est ben toujours de l'être qu'elle exprime Elle asprime ce qui est, mais autrement qu'il n'est pour le sujet donné : elle dit être, de lus, ce qui n'est pas, et, me pas être, ce qui est (Sophiste, P. 283).

- 263B. STR. Whereas the false statement states about you things different from the things that are. THRAFT. Yes. STR. And accordingly states things that are-not as being. THRAFT. No doubt. STR. Yes, but things that exist, different from things that exist in your case. For we said that in the case of everything there are many things that are and also many that are not. THEAET. Ouite so. c. STR. So the second statement I made about you, in the first place, according to our definition of the nature of a statement. must itself necessarily be one of the shortest possible. THEAET. So we agreed just now. STR. And secondly it must be about something. THEAET. Yes. STR. And if it is not about you, it is not about anything else. THEAET. Certainly. STR. And if it were about nothing, it would not be a statement at all; for we pointed out that there could not be a statement that was a statement about nothing. THEAET. Quite true.
 - D. STR. So what is stated about you, but so that what is different is stated as the same or what is not as what is a combination of verbs and names answering to that description finally seems to be really and truly a false statement. INREAR. Perfectly true.

In his later speeches here the Stranger emphasises the points (1) that this false statement has a subject, (2) that this subject is Theaetetus, not anyone else, and (3) that the subject cannot be nothing at all.

(a) "Thesetetus, not anyone else'. This refers to the wrong view that a false statement, if it means anything, must be a true statement about something disc. This is asserted by Euthydemus ' in defence of the thesis : ' It is impossible to contradict'. The argument is : Every thing or fact (\$\delta, zdops, zdops,

1 Enthydemus 285D.

FALSE STATEMENT DEFINED

(3) 'The subject cannot be nothing at all'. This dismisses the alternative wrong view that the false statement can have no meaning because it is about nothing that exists. (It may be added that the Theory of Forms provides a meaning even for false statements which seem to have no existing subject, such as 'The present King of France favours Free Trade'. The description has a meaning, though it stands for no existing person. But Plato does not consider such statements.)

To return now to the first three speeches. I have tried to give a literal translation; but what does it mean? The ordinary reader ingith naturally suppose that the thing described as 'different from the things that are in your case' or 'different from the facts about you 'must be a non-existent fact, other than the existing fact. And he might take the third speech as meaning that this non-existent fact is a fact, though other than the existing fact ¹. He would then conclude that Plato intended to define false statement by correspondence with a non-existent fact on the same lines as the diagram of true statement above:

But that is precisely the explanation we must exclude. The Sophist will rightly repeat has objection: "There is no such thang as the non-existent fact, Theatettus flying. Your statement is not false, but meanungless--not a statement at all, for there is nothing for it to mean or refer to. A false statement is not a true statement about a 'different fact', which is not a fact at all, because it does not exist."

We must not, then, attribute this explanation to Plato. His purpose is to meet this very objection, and he has deliberately chosen a statement which is not only fails now but could not be true at any time, since Theaetetus can never fly. Let us restore the existing fact and set the failse statement beside it. All we now have is:

¹ Cf. H. Jackson on The Sophest (Journ Philol. 210, 223): 'which does may be defined as Moyos frair form Myous up the scale at up form stra. provided that by rd form are meant the facts which the proposition, thought or spoken, purports to represent, and by up form facts other than these '(my stalics). The name *Theasteins*, as before, stands for the thing. Theastertus: as the Stranger has emphasised, the fails statement is about an existing subject. '*Flass*' does not stand for the other element in the fact, 'stiting'. The Sophist will now say. '*flas*' has no meaning; there exists nothing for it to refer to. Therefore the statement as a whole has no meaning. It is not a statement at all.

We can get no further, so long as we confine ourselves to what we have called the existing fact, such as common sense recognises and such as seemed sufficient to provide a satisfactory account of true statement. We must fill out Plato's scheme with elements he has furnished elsewhere and here takes for granted. There are other ' things that are ' to be brought in, namely the Forms, which we have so far ignored. Plato evidently means the Forms to come in. The whole section on combination of Forms was avowedly to furnish the key to false statement. He has said that ' all discourse depends on the weaving together of Forms' (259E), i.e. at least one Form enters into the meaning of any statement.1 In the passage before us he refers to statements made earlier about Forms : 'in the case of everything there are many things that are, and also many that are not '. This was said of Forms in a context where individual things were not in question at all. Finally, we have seen that the failure of the Theastetus to explain false statement was due to the deliberate exclusion of Forms.

All this shows that our diagram of the true statement and its meaning is not yet complete. There is another 'thing that is' to be added, namely a Form. In the true statement one term is a proper name "Theaetetus", standing for the existing subject. There is no Form. Theaetetus. But the other term 'sits' is a common term ; and in the theory of Forms common terms have meaning in two ways. (I) Like the proper name, they stand for or indicate particular existents : 'sits' stands for 'sitting', the second component of the existing fact. (2) They also have meanings of their own. as significant articulate sounds. The word ' sitting ', spoken by itself, conveys a meaning to the hearer's mind ; it is not a senseless noise. If I say, 'Sitting is always more comfortable than standing', he understands what I am talking about. This meaning is not the particular attitude of a particular person here and now. but is what Plato calls a Form, which is a real thing, whether Theaetetus is actually sitting or not, and whether or not anyone says he is sitting. This Form, Sitting, is part of the meaning of the true statement, and must be added to the scheme :

¹ Compare also the passage on ' common ' terms in the *Theastelius*, 185 ff (p. 104).



The word 'siks' has now a double significance: it stands for a part of the existing fact, and it means the Form. To put it differently, the phrase 'thing that is in your case' (dv repl ord) has two senses: (1) an existing element in the fact in which you are the other element, (a) the Form of which this existing element 'partakes'. This Form is an object of knowledge, not of perception, and is permanently real, independently of any existing facts; whereas the particular' sitting 'which is part of the existing fact, occurs at some time and place and ceases to be. Complicated as the dagram now is, the brefest true statement involves, on Plato's punciples, all these 'things' that are' and their relations.

Now the introduction of Forms provides a meaning for the false statement, "*Theatetus filse*", without our having to invoke a non-existent fact or objective falsehood. The diagram for the false statement will be:



Each element in the statement has now a meaning; and so the statement as a whole has meaning. What is missing in the case of the false statement is: (1) the relation 'partaking' between the actual' sitting 'and the *different* Form Flying; (2) '*files*'' does not stand for this' sitting 'though it has a meaning of its own, which the word calls up to the hearer's mind; (2) the statement as a whole does not correspond with the fact as a whole or with any fact. Only by thus using the theory of Forms can Plato meet the Sophist's objection that false statement cannot exist because there is nothing for it to mean. SOPHIST

We can now interpret the literal translation above given of the Stranger's first three speeches :

O δε δη ψευδής έτερα των όντων (λέγει περί σού).

'Whereas the false statement states about you things different from the things that are '.

In the illustration the 'different thing 'is the meaning of the word 'fies', viz. the Form, Flying, which is different from the Form String. Stitung is a 'thing that is' and can be truly stated about Theaeterus, because the existing fact contains an element which 'partakes' of it—what we might call an 'instance' of Stitung.

(2) Τὰ μη ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὅντα λέγει.

'And accordingly states things that are not as being.'

Here a result established in the section on the combination of Forms is invoked: It was shown that every Form¹ is not 'm the sense that it is not (as different from) any other Form.¹ So we can substitute 'things that are not' (rd µn) δraa) for the phrase in the previous speech 'things different from) by the phrase in the previous speech 'things different from) Sitting, but is none the less real. Thus we have found a satisfactory meaning for 'that which is not 'in the expression' speaking that which is not ', used as the equivalent of 'asymg what is false'. And we have found this meaning by invoking the Forms and using the results of the section on combination.

(3) "Οντων δέ γε όντα έτερα περί σοῦ. πολλὰ μèν γὰρ έφαμεν όντα περί έκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ öντα.

Yes, but things that exist, different from things that exist in your case. For we said that in the case of everything there are many things that are, and also many that are not.

The first sentence points out that the phrase just used, 'things that are not', does not mean 'things that do not exist ' (but only 'different things'). Flying is a thing that readly si, and is different from another thing that *really* is, viz. Sitting.¹ Both Forms are real. That Plato is thinking of Forms here is evident from the second sentence. This refers to two earlier statements about Forms: (1)

¹ This particular result was expressly recalled by the Stranger at the beginning of the present discussion. 'We saw that "not-being " (i.s. Difference) is a single Form among the rest, dispersed over the whole field of realities ' (things that are', *Sre*), 2008

^{*} In this sentence both from and form are emphatic

256E, ' In the case of every Form there is much that it is, and an indefinite number of things that it is not '; (2) 259B, 'Exstence is not myriads upon myriads of things, and all the other Kinds in the same way, whether taken severally or all together, in many respects are and in many respects are not.' So when we speak now of Flying as that which is not Sitting (or any other Form), we can use this negative description without implying non-existence.

In his concluding speeches the Stranger emphasizes once more that the false statement, Theaetetus fises, is a statement, not ' about nothing ' but about the Theaetetus who exists here and now, and who is equally the subject of the true statement. Theaetetus sits. The name Theaetetus stands for a 'thing that is' in the sense of an element of existing fact, no less than fies means a ' thing that is ' in the other sense-a Form. Finally, the false statement is defined as a combination of verbs and names stating about its subject ' what is different as the same or what is not as what is '. This rather obscure expression seems meant to recall the conception of false judgment in the Theaetetus as some kind of ' misjudgment '-mistaking one thing for another. In the attempt to imagine how this could happen, the empiricist apparatus was enlarged until we reached the notion of 'interchanging pieces of knowledge'. 1 But this theory broke down, because, on the empiricist assumptions we were then working with, a ' piece of knowledge ' could be nothing but an old record stored in the memory." Now that the Sophist has brought the Forms into the account, a 'piece of knowledge' can mean a Form which we know. Hence the notion of 'thinking that one thing is another ' or ' mistaking one thing for another ' can be revived with a new meaning. The ' things ' we interchange are not old memory images, but eternally real objects of thought. So at 253D it belongs to dialectic ' not to take the same Form for another or another for the same '. With this correction, the description of the hunt for birds in the aviary is, perhaps, meant to be accepted as a rough mechanical image of what happens in our minds when we mistake objects of knowledge.

It is certainly surprising that Plato should be content with a statement of his solution so brief and ambiguous. Presumably the fact that Forms are involved and the relevance of all the earlier discussion of their combination was so clear to his mind that he took the reader's understanding of these points for granted.

¹ Theast 199C (p 136)

^a It will be remembered that our knowledge of numbers was so described at *Theast* 196A (p. 128).

263D-264B. Judgment being simply unspoken statement, false judgment and false ' appearing ' are possible

The final step in the argument is now taken by identifying judgment ($\delta \delta \delta c$) with unspoken statement. From this if follows that false indgement must be just as possible as false statement. The meaning of $\delta \delta c$, 'judgment', as here defined must not be confused with Plato's use of the word elsewhere for 'Opinion' considered as having a different class of objects ($\delta c \delta c a r d$) from those of knowledge ($\gamma word \delta$). Judgment differs from knowledge in that it can be true or false, but its objects may be entirely Forms and their relations, which the $R c \mu \omega b c$ as objects of knowledge, not of opinion. The final definition of false statements above given covers false statements about Forms.

263D. STR. And next, what of thinking and judgment and appearing ? Is it not now clear that all these things occur in our minds both as false and as true? THEAST. How so ? STR. You will see more easily if you begin by letting me give you an account of their nature and how each differs E. from the others. THEAET. Let me have it. STR. Well, thinking and discourse 1 are the same thing, except that what we call thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind with itself without spoken sound. THEAST. Certainly. STR. Whereas the stream which flows from the mind through the lips with sound is called discourse. THEAST. True. STR. And further there is a thing * which we know occurs in discourse. THEAET. Namely ? STR. Assertion and denial.3 THEAET. Yes.

¹Thmixing (&desue) and discourse (Adyse) are both used in the wide sense which includes, not only yudgment (Adyse) and statement (Adyse) which must be true or false, but all forms of thmiking and speech, questions, commands, etc. The account of thmiking as napoken discourse at Thesei 189x (p 118) and 2005 (p: 153), is have buredy repeated.

* estré, BT should be retained : 'a thing (presently to be mentioned) '. Cf. adrà at Theses. 207D (Campbell).

* done and exceptions cover (1) affirmation and negation, which appear in the affirmative or negative form of the spoken statement, and (2) the mental

FALSE JUDGMENT AND 'APPEARING'

264. STR. Then when this occurs in the mind in the course of silent thinking, can you call it anything but judgment ? THEAET. No.

STR. And suppose judgment occurs, not independently, but by means of perception, the only right name for such a state of mind is 'appearing'.¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well then, since we have seen that there is true and false statement, and of these mental processes we have found thinking to be a dualogue of the mind with itself, and judg-

B. ment to be the conclusion of thinking, and what we mean by 'it appears' a blend of perception and judgment, it follows that these also, being of the same nature as statement, must be, some of them and on some occasions, false. THREAT. Of course.

STR. You see, then, that we have discovered the nature of false judgment and false statement sconer than we expected just now when we feared there would be no end to the task we were setting ourselves in the search for them. TREART. I do.

^A Appearing '(georgravia) is briefly described because the process meant by the term here has been discussed at length in the *Thesstess.* It is not 'imagination', the faculty which pictures an absent or imaginary object not perceived at the moment. It is that combination of perception and judgment which, as the *Thesetess* described, occurs when I see an indistinct figure and, rightly or wrongly, judge it to be someone I know.¹ It appears to me 'to

acts of assent and dissent—saying 'yes ' and ' no '—to questions which the mind puts to itself, as described at *Theast* 190A, *foreover* and *eb foreover* (p. 118) Judgment was there defined as the mind's final decision when all doubt and debate is over

¹ Ourracia here, as at These: 152C (p 32), is simply the substantive equivalent to the verb \$\u00e9cabel{eq:substantive} (\u00e9daffecture) and \$\u00e9daffecture) and \$\u00e9daffect

*seisrem: \$ λόγομο, *what we mean by "it appears ". * Theat, 1998 ff. [D tai) and 1990, orients elifeysus syste Advenue [D 128]. Thus description is repeated in the Phildewig Sf. Then in a later passage (396 ff.) imgunation is separatively described as the work of a sort of painter in the mind who makes pictures ([ayyopfigures) or likensess (slower) of things. These are called 'pictured semilances' ((aryopfigures) or likensess (slower) of things. These are called 'pictured semilances' (aryopfigures). The mane deviated as a start of painter in the minging facility which he calls deviated. "Where Aristotic describes the manging facility which he calls deviated." Where Aristotic describes the manging facility which he calls deviated. "Non' by means of perception" (d' adofference. Plato's pirzes here), hor a 'combination of judgment and perception." (nyurkeet) defig: as al adofeser = Plato's ofquarfie adofference add defig hared), de sames 428a, 32. Anstotic means that he as giving deviated a new sense, which is not to be confined with Plato's use of the word here.

SOPHIST

be so-and-so. This judgment rightly or wrongly interpreting a present perception is all that 'appearing' means here. It is the one kind of judgment that may be false which the psychological apparatus of the *Theastetus* was adequate to describe. The Stranger here notes that we are now fully justified in asserting that such false judgments (like others) have a meaning and can exist.

264B-D. Transition, connecting these results with the interrupted Division of Image-making

Far back (at 236) the art of Image-making, which we had divined to contain the essential characteristic of the Sophist, was divided into the making of hikenesses (*eixarrom*) and the making of semblances (or appearances, *opararram*). We were then arrested by the problems of unreal appearance and false statement : how can such things have any sort of existence ? We have since explained how false statement, at any rate, can exist, and the Stranger now points out that we are justified in resuming the interrupted Division.

264B. STR. Then let us not lose courage for what remains to be c. done. Now that these matters are cleared up, let us recall our earlier divisions by forms THEAET. Which do you mean ? STR. We distinguished two forms of Image-making, the making of likenesses and the making of semblances. THEAST. Yes. STR. And we said we were puzzled to tell under which of these two we should place the Sophist. THEAET. We did. STR. And to increase our perplexity we were plunged in a whirl of confusion by the apparition of an argument that called in question all these terms and disputed the very existence of any copy or image or semblance, on the ground p. that falsity never has any sort of existence anywhere. THEAET. True. STR. But now that we have brought to light the existence of false statement and of false judgment, it is possible that there should be imitations of real things and that this condition of mind (false judgment) should account for the existence of an art of deception. THEAST. Yes, it is. STR. And we agreed earlier that the Sophist does come under one or other of the two kinds mentioned. THEAST. Yes.

The connection between 'appearing' (quarvaola), just now described as the blend of perception and judgment, and the art of creating semblances or appearances (quarvaored) under which we shall place the Sophist, is to be found in the earlier description of this art.¹ The sculptor who deliberately distorts the actual proportions of his original in order to make his statue 'appear 'correct, produces semblances (quarda quaro) such as are rife in painting and fine art generally. He imposes on us false judgments by means of our senses (quartaolo.). Similarly the Sophist creates in us false beliefs in his wisdom on all subjects.

This, however, is the only sort of 'appearing' explained in this dialogue. It is not what we mean by 'appearance ' when we speak of a world of appearance, as opposed to reality. 'Appearance' there suggests some sort of unreality in the object : whereas when 'it appears to me' that a distant figure is a friend, that judgment may be true, and, if it is false, there is nothing wrong with the object : the falsity lies wholly in my judgment. Hence, all that has been said about 'appearing' throws no light on what may be called the problem of the eidolos, which the Stranger seemed to raise where the Division was interrupted. He spoke of two problems ; (1) ' this appearing or seeming without really being ' a and (2) 'saying something which yet is not true'. We have solved the second, but what has become of the first ? The words naturally mean : How can there be something which seems real without being real? This is the problem of appearances, as opposed to reality. Later, moreover, an eidolon was defined as something that is not wholly real (orray or) but yet has some sort of existence (or max). Then followed the long discussion of theories of the ' perfectly real'. after which we expected some account of how a world of imperfectly real things-the objects of sense-could exist. But this hope was disappointed. The whole subsequent discussion of the combination of Forms was confined to the world of perfect reality, and has told us nothing about the status of imperfectiv real things. That problem remains where it was.

Burnet," indeed, takes Plato as meaning that the explanation of 'not-being' as 'difference' has solved the *sidolow* problem. 'In the course of the foregoing discussion' [2583], he writes, 'the remark was thrown out that we have found the Not-being which was necessary to justify our account of the Sophist. This is not explained further, but the point is quite simple. We called him an

¹ At 235E ff. (p 197).

^{* 236}E, rd salwesta robro sal rd souris, elsa se µ4. Here it is the object that appears but is not real.

Gh. Phil, p 286.

image-maker, and he replied that there was no such thing as an image, since an image is really not real. We now see that there is nothing in this objection; for the art of image-making, like all other arts, includes a part of Being and a part of Not-being.⁴ The image is not the reality, indeed, and the reality is not the image, but that involves no difficulty. We are dealing with a particular art, that of Image-making, and in it "not real" has a perfectly definite and positive signification. The "not real" is not the unreal, but just the image, which is quite as much as that of which it is the image.

It is hard to be satisfied with this, as a solution of the *sidolon* problem. It amounts to saving : 'When I sav an image is not perfectly real, and yet has a sort of existence, all I mean is that an image is not the same thing as its original, but is just as real.' Burnet appears to think that this is the solution, for he says later (p. 340): ' Plato laid the ghost of the two-world theory which had haunted Greek philosophy since the time of Parmenides, and that is what he meant by saying that the sensible world was " the image of the intelligible". He had shown already in the Sophist that to be an image 1s not to be nothing. An appearance is an appearance, and is only unreal if we take it for what it is not.' Burnet seems to mean that Plato, in his maturity, no longer held that the sensible world is nartly unreal (as he had said in the Republic) or any less real than the intelligible world. The unreality or falsity of ' appearance ' lies wholly in our thoughts about the world, not in the objects themselves. They are only unreal if we take them for what they are not.

But if Plato came to hold that objects of perception are merely different from intelligible objects, but just as real, what ground remains for denying that sense-perception is knowledge in the full sense? The *Licasteiss* admitted that perception was infallible; it is soljects are not real. If we now say that the objects are just as real as Forms, perception has every claim to be knowledge. This cannot be reconciled with the *Timesess*. Also, it would be strange if a conclusion amounting to a revolution in Platonism should not even be stated explicitly, but left to be inferred from the same as its original, but none the less exists. The whole question is, what sort of existence the image has, for it has been defined as ' not really real'. A


¹ Thus obscure statement seems to be based on the use of knowledge and its species as an illustration at 237c (p. 390). But this was a mere illustration, and Plato does not say that any art ' includes a part of Being and a part of Not-being '.

ghost is a ghost, and is not the same thing as the tangible body it resembles: anyone will admit that; but it does not settle the question what kind or degree of reality a ghost has.

Our conclusion must be that the *eidolog* problem is not yet solved . nor shall we find a solution later in this dialogue. The reason may be that Plato could not solve it or that the problem was reserved for another occasion (perhaps, for the Philosopher). In the Sophist he is justified in shelving it because the only eidola we are now concerned with are those which the Sophist is accused of creating. The Sophist does not create the world of sensible objects ; these are the work of that divine image-making which will presently be distinguished from the human image-making of fine art and sophistry. The eidola created by the Sophist are false beliefs in our minds. Hence it was said at 260c, and is repeated here, that the existence of images and semblances depends on the existence of deception, and deception depends on the existence of false belief. We were only bound to prove that false belief could exist, and that has been done. The metaphysical status of 'appearances' in any other sense lies beyond our scope. The explanation, if it is to be found anywhere. must be sought in the Timaeus. I suspect that, when Plato had finished the Statesman, he found himself unable to carry out his intention of continuing the present conversation in the Philosopher and there gathering up the loose threads. So he abandoned his scheme and started another trilogy-Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates -in which all that he had to say about the sidolow problem could be cast into the form of a myth.

264D-268D. Division VII. The Sophist as a species of Imagemaker

That Plato was consciously shelving the eidoka problem appears in the coming section. If the had thought it was already solved, he would have taken up the Division of Image-making at the point where it was dropped and proceeded to subdivide semblance-making (gourscored). But we find the Stranger now going back, behind the art of Image-making, to the most general conception, Art, precisely in order that the divine creation of image—the world of appearance—may be set aside as not relevant to the definition of Sophistry. In fact, the shelving of the unsolved problem is openly effected here, in terms evidently meant to recall the contrast of reality and appearance as set forth in the *Repwike*. These terms would be extremely misleading, if Plato had really abandoned his old doctrine of the partial unreality of sense objects. SOPHIST



- 264D. STR. Now, then, let us set to work again and, as we divide E. the Kind proposed in two, keep to the nght-hand section at each stage. Holding fast to the characters of which the Sophist partakes until we have strapped off all that he has in common with others and left only the nature that is peculiar to him, let us so make that nature plan, in the
- 265. first place to ourselves, and secondly to others whose temperament finds a procedure of this sort congenial. THEAST. Very good. STR. Well, we began by dividing Art into Productive and Acquisitive. THEAST. Yes. STR. And under the head of the Acquisitive we had glimpses of the Sophist in the arts of hunting, contention, trafficking, and other kinds of that ext i

¹ Thm reference to the five tentative Divisions of the Acquantive branch is signaficant. They only provided 'glumpses' or mdustanct vanous of various types called copulars, and the essential feature With spendicer compare servel/geneous used of the figure industructly seen at a dustance, Phildens 36c. The third main branch of Art, the Separative (Suegersch), from which was derived the Catharton method of Socrates in Division VI, is here ignored. It gaves an so glumps of the Sophist

PRODUCTION, DIVINE AND HUMAN

- 265. THEAET. Certainly. STR. But now that he has been included under an art of Imitation, clearly we must start by dividing into two the
 - Productive branch of Art. For Imitation is surely a kmd of production, though it be only a production of images, as we say, not of originals of every sort. Is that not so? THEART. Assuredly. STR. Let us begin, then, by recognising two kinds of

STR. Let us begin, then, by recognising two kinds of Production.

THEAET. What are they ?

STR. The one Divine, the other Human.

THEAET. I don't understand vet.

STR. Production—to recall what we said at the outset—we defined as any power that can bring into existence what did not exist before.¹

THEAET. I remember.

c. Srz. Now take all mortal animals and also all things that grow t-plants that grow above the earth from seeds and roots, and lifeless bodies compacted beneath the earth, whether fusible or not fusible. Must we not attribute the commg into being of these things out of not-being to divuse craftsmanship and nothing else? Or are we to fall in with the belief that is commonly expressed ?

THEAST. What belief do you mean ?

STR. That Nature gives birth to them as a result of some spontaneous cause that generates without intelligence. Or shall we say that they come from a cause which, working with reason and art, is divine and proceeds from divinity?

¹ Production, so defined at 2198, included agriculture, manufacture, and fine art The definition is not intended to suggest creation out of notiones, with no pre-existing maternal

• \$evid (cf. 333; "you and me and all other creatures', \$evid) covers all things that come to be by a natural process, including metals (funkle) and minerals, the regular nameable compounds of elements . The elements (& \$evid rd wefwire, 3669) are also products of divines workmanable (as in the Timasse), but it is not implied that the elements are created as "which. The only question here is whether the compound 'creatures' grow out of the elements spontaneously or by a process directed by divine craftamaship

¹ The construction of field is ambiguous. (1) If it is taken with *berefips*, *rip dow yook* remains as the main verb; bot the contrast is between Nature which *generates* and the drume Artist who maker. And why should 'involvidge' be suid to 'come from divinity' (*ide beep yrpostreps*)? (2) Byt taking *bdas* with *drd adrias* understood, we get a cause or causation which might be suid to 'come from divinity' and is contrasted with acasahar of spontaneous origin (*drivagirs*, *ci Arr*, *Phys.* 1966, 24), a gerd *driver* and *berefi*.

- 2650. THEAET. Perhaps because I am young. I often shift from one belief to the other ; but at this moment, looking at your face and believing you to hold that these things have a divine origin, I too am convinced. STR. Well said. Theaetetus. If I thought you were the sort of person that might believe otherwise in the future. I should now try by force of persuasion to make you accept that account. But I can see clearly that, without any
 - R. arguments of mine, your nature will come of itself to the conclusion which you tell me attracts you at this moment. So I will let that pass : I should be wasting time. I will only lay it down that the products of Nature, as they are called, are works of divine art, as things made out of them by man are works of human art. Accordingly there will be two kinds of Production, one human, the other divine. THEAET. Good.

STR. Once more, then, divide each of these two into two parts. Theast. How?

266. STR. As you have just divided the whole extent of Production horizontally, now divide it vertically.

THEAET. Be it so.

STR. The result is four parts in all : two on our side, human ; two on the side of the gods, divine.

THEAST. Yes.

STR. And taking the divisions made in the first way (horizontally : divine and human), one section of each part will be the production of originals, and the remaining two sections will be best described as production of images. So we have a second division of Production on that principle (originals and images).

B. THEAET. Explain once more how each of the two parts (divine and human) is divided. STR. Ourselves, I take it, and all other living creatures and the elements of natural things-fire, water, and their kindred-are all originals, the offspring, as we are well assured, of divine workmanship.1 Is it not so ? THEAET. Yes.


supplied from the previous speech, as by Campbell, whose punctuation may be preferred to Burnet's

¹ In this phrase the metaphors of generation (veryingra) and of the craftsman's workmanship (drespynophys) are combined, as at Timasus 28C, 'the maker and father of this universe', and Symp. 209A, poets (' makers') and creative artists are begetters of spiritual children.

- 266B. STR. And every one of these products is attended by images which are not the actual thing, and which also owe ther existence to divine contrivance. TREAET. You mean—? STR. Dream images, and in daylight all those naturally produced semblances which we call ' 'shadow' when dark
 - patches interrupt the light, or a 'reflection' when the light belonging to the eye meets and coalesces with light belonging to something else on a bright and smooth surface and produces a form yielding a perception that is the reverse of the ordinary direct vare.⁴

¹ Taking Myeres with end µbr... & whole bi. The Lexica do not seem to recognue 'reflection' as a sense of & whole, but it can hardly agree with \$dee, leaving the reflection nameless. Are we to understand & whole \$dornaya, 'a duplicate image'?

¹In the 'ordinary direct view '(<u>keysoder</u> = in front, opposite) the two lights or 'iners' which coalesce are the vasal ray or stream of far from the eye and the fire outside, *s* = either sanight reflected from the body looked at or, when the body us self-immoust, its own hight In reflecton from a mirror, the ray of light from my eye (<u>levies</u> <u>fixe</u> = *i* + *irrs* <u>time</u> <u>sin</u>) and the light belonging to the object ((*liftyraps* <u>fixe</u>), *s* <u>c</u> <u>if</u>), *s* <u>time</u> <u>sin</u>) and the light belonging to the object ((*liftyraps* <u>fixe</u>, *s* <u>c</u>), to coalesce on the surface of the surface of the mirror, and the untert ary is then thrown back from it to my eye. So the reflection seen is explained in the same way as duret visuo, except that in reflection divescence occurs at the mirror's surface, not at the surface of the reflection dy a discussed to the rage of the reflection dy a discussed to the reflection dy a discussed to the surface of the reflection dy a discussed to the r



In (A) Direct Vision the high from the right side of the person's face is supposed to reach the key find of any sys. In (B) Reflection the light from the key and of the person's face is supposed to reach the key find of any sys. (There is no again that Flatch through of all the rays from the object as entering the sys at the centre of the lens and preading out again on the refins, or knew arythm of lines and remain

- 266C. THEAST. There are, indeed, these two products of divine workmanship: the original and the image that in every case accompanies it.³ STR. And what of our human art ? Must we not say that in building it produces an actual house, and in painting a house of a different sort, as it were a man-made dream for waking eyes ? D. THEAST. Certainly.
 - STR. And so in all cases, we find once more twin products of our own productive activity in pairs—one an actual thing, the other an image.

THEAET. I understand better now, and I recognise two forms of production, each of them twofold: divine and human according to one division, and according to the other a production of actual things and of some sort of likenesses.

At this point we have got back to the human art of Image-making, now clearly distinguished from divine production of natural objects and from the useful crafts, like building. Image-making includes all the fine arts, with political rhetoric and sophistry. The chief object of the further subdivision is to place the demagonge and the Sophist in the lowest class. First the subdivision already made (chearaver) and georacrore() is declared to be now justified.

2650. STR. Let us remind ourselves, then, that of this production of images there were to be two kinds, one producing like. E. nesses, the other semblances, provided that falsity should be shown to be a thing that really is false and of such a nature as to have a place among existing things. TREART. Yes, it was to be so. STR. And that has now been shown ; so on that ground shall we now reckon the distinction of these two forms as beyond dispute ? TREART. Yes. 27. STR. Once more, then, let us divide in two the kind that

produces semblances. THEAET. How ?

¹ These originals and images make up the contents of the visible world (gever or before of ReP vi, where they are described in similar terms, 510A). They are the work of the divane craftman of the Tensera, who fashnoss the visible world shere the pattern of the Forms. The Pores themselves, which are not created, are, of course, not mentoned here. But the Pistonst will result that the scalat things here called originals are these where only copies or images of the Forms. They are those sidele whose ambiguous existence still remains a problem.

MIMICRY

267. STR. There is the semblance produced by means of tools, and another sort where the producer of the semblance takes his own person as an instrument.

THEAST. How do you mean ?

STR. When someone uses his own person or voice to counterfeit your traits or speech, the proper name for creating such a semblance is, I take it, Mimicry.¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Let us reserve that section, then, under the name of mimicry, and indulge ourselves so far as to leave all the

B. rest for someone else to collect into a unity and give it an appropriate name.

THEAET. So be it.

STR. But there is still ground for thinking that mimicry is of two sorts. Let me put it before you. THEAET. Do.

STR. Some mimics know the thing they are impersonating, others do not; and could we find a more important distinction than that of knowing from not knowing? THERET. No.

STR. And the mimicry we have just mentioned goes with knowledge; for to impersonate you, one must be acquainted with you and your traits.

c. THEAET. Of course.

STR. And what of the traits of Justice and of virtue generally? Are there not many who, having no knowledge of virtue but only some sort of opinion about it, zealously set about making it appear that they embody virtue as they conceive it, mimicking it as effectively as they can in their words and actions?

THEAET. Only too many.

STR. And are they always unsuccessful in appearing to be virtuous when they are not really virtuous at all? Do they not rather succeed perfectly?

THEAET. They do.

D. STR. We must, then, distinguish the ignorant mimic from the other, who has knowledge.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Where, then, must we look for a suitable name for each? No doubt it is hard to find one, because the ancients,

¹ Ci. Crst. 4238 Should we read from rô obr oxfusi reş rô éarrol (sc oxfusr) yeóguros, < cóque > cóque resconsador ñ éarro éarô, éaleocha roig, 'when a man produces a semblance of your traits by using his own, making his body or his voice like youn ??

- 267.D. it would seem, suffered from a certain laziness and lack of discrimination with regard to the division of Kinds by forms, and not one of them even tried to make such divisions, with the result that there is a serious shortage of names. However, though the expression may seem daring, for purposes of distinction let us call minicry guided by opinion 'con-
 - E. ceit-mimicry ',¹ and the sort that is guided by knowledge 'mimicry by acquaintance'.

THEAET. So be it.

STR. It is the former, then, that concerns us; for the Sophist was not among those who have knowledge, but he has a place among mimics.

THEAST. Certainly.

STR. Then let us take this concet-mimic and see if his metal rings sound or there is still a crack in it somewhere. THEAET. Let us do so.

STR. Well, there is a gaping crack. There is the simple-

a68. minded type who imagines that what he believes is knowledge, and an opposite type who is versed in discussion, so that his attitude betrays no little migriving and suspicion that the knowledge he has the air of possessing in the eyes of the world is really upnorance.

THEAET. Certainly both the types you describe exist.

STR. We may, then, set down one of these mimics as sincere, the other as insincere.

THEAET. So it appears.

STR. And the insincere—is he of two kinds or only one? THEAET. That is for you to consider.

B. STR. I will; and I can clearly make out a pair of them. I see one who can keep up his dissimulation publicly in long speeches to a large assembly. The other uses short arguments in private and forces others to contradict themselves in conversation.³

THEAET. Very true.

STR. And with whom shall we identify the more longwinded type—with the Statesman or with the demagogue? THEAET. The demagogue.

STR. And what shall we call the other-wise man or Sophist?

THEAET. We cannot surely call him wise, because we set c, him down as ignorant ; but as a mimic of the wise man he

¹ Sofoundruch, cf. 223B, Soforenserver, education in the conceit of virtue, Philebus 49D, Soforenka, Soforenfia, the conceit of beauty and windom.

* Cf. the subdivision of Disputation at 2258 (p. 176).

- 268c. will clearly assume a title derived from his, and I now see that here at last is the man who must be truly described as the real and genuine Sophist. STR. Shall we, then, as before collect all the elements of his description, from the end to the beginning.² and draw our threads together in a knot? TREART. By all means. STR. The art of contradiction-making, descended from an insuncere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image-making, distinguished as a por-
 - D. tion, not divine but human, of production, that presents a shadow-play of words—such is the blood and lineage which can, with perfect truth, be assigned to the authentic Sophist. THEREF. I entrely agree.

¹ The construction of the final definition is obscured by the effort to frame it so as to mention all the specific differences in order 'from the end to the beginning' (productive art) At zröa there is another summary in this reverse order (r) agguarance by des, jaconetic is drayer, sig 'endopsity, rej' 'upicapproved, r) where the gentives are used as in a genealogy: 'A the son of B, the son of C, 'etc.

ADDENDUM

SOFH. 263C. δν δστερον δή λόγον εξρηκα περί σοῦ, πρῶτον μέν, έξ ῶν ὡρισάμεθα τί ποτ' ἔστι λόγος, ἀναγκαιότατον αὐτόν ἕνα τῶν βραχυτάτων είναι.

The upperlative draysaufrarow throws a quite unnecessary emphasis on the obvious fact that 'Theaetertus files' is a statement of the shortest possible type. advár, moreover, seems superfluous; most translators ignore it. I suspect that Plato wrote *Ldycg draysaufarcac*, 'according to our definition of the minimum statement' (cf. Rep. 3600. A draysaurdin móluc). It was, in fact, *tön Jdyaw 5 apöröc; ex aud apuspórarco* that was defined above (a52c), rather than statement in general. advár must then conceal the main werb, perhaps gardor, as at 2638. 2.

Account (Logos) : of grounds of knowledge, 141 added to true belief, 142 meanings of, 142 combination of names, 144 expression in speech, 154 enumeration of elements, 155 statement of distinguishing mark. 158 definition by genus and difference. 161. 170 Anamnesis : In Mano. 2 and Midwifery, 27 f in Phasdo, 5, 108 not abandoned, 120 Animal, Form of, 271 Antisthenes : alleged author of Socrates' 'dream ', 144 on predication, 254, 257 held 'every statement is true ', 312 Appearing ' (darragia) . Protagoras' use of, 32, 116 problem of appearances, 200 ff as blend of perception and judgment. 310 Aristotle . account of Platonism, o logic, contrasted with Plato's, 268 on relative terms, 282 definition of 'word ', 305 Atomism, 231, 247

Battle of Gods and Giants, 228 ff. Behef, see Judgment

'Categories'. falsely so called, 106, 274 ff. Aristotle's, 275 Cathartic Method, 177 ff. Change, two kinds of, 95 Charmides, on recognition of knowledge, 140 Classification, by Division, 171 Collection . preceding Division, 170 Divisions of Sophist as substitute for, 187 Collection and Division . Division illustrated, 170 ff Seven Divisions of Sophist, 172 ff. methods of, 184 ff as Dialectic, 262 ff Combination . of Forms, 252 ff meaning of, 255 of letters compared to Forms, 260 of words in statement, 304 Common terms in Theastetus, 105 in every statement, 300 Compatibility, statements of, 278 Cratylus, doctrine of, oo Cyrenaucs, 48

Definition (Logos) of individual thing, impossible, 162 as object of Collection and Divi-S100. 184 Socratic, 185 Democritus, 231 Dialectic procedure, 30 analogy with weaving, 183 science of, described, 262 ff. not Formal Logic, 264 Dialexeis, 191 Difference . distinct from Incompatibility, 279 as all-pervading Form, 279 ff. distributed over all reality, 290 verbal ambiguity of Barepor, 292 Division, see Collection and Division Dynamis, see Power

Eudolon : endols of Cave, 195, 201 definition of, 209 ff problem of. 7, 100 ff. postponed, 248 not solved. 321 consciously shelved in Sophist, 323 Element (grouvelow), applied to physucal elements, 143 Epistie VII, on Forms, 9 Eristic, defined, 175 Existence (see Reality), as very amportant Form, 273 ff. Falsity, see Judgment, False, Statement. False Borms . separate existence of. 2 ff . 105 known by Recollection, 5 theory criticised in Parmenides, 6 ff extent of, 8 as meanings of common names, 9, 250 relations of, to one another, 11 mentioned in Theastatus, 83, 85, 86. 106 in Tumaeus, 141 as hierarchy of genus and species, 186, 269 in Phasedo and Republic, 243 f Combination of, 252 ff all-pervading, 261 disjunctive, 262 structure of world of, 268 highest, the most complex, 260 Form of Animal, 271 three very important, 273 ff. as ' parts of the Different ', 290 ff. Friends of Forms, 230 ff. Heracleiteaniam : Flux doctrine, 36 Extreme, refuted, og ff. Hippocrates : ment regress, 200 On Ancient Medicine, 235 de natura hominis, 235 Idealists : in Battle of Gods and Giants, 228 ff. as Friends of Forms, 239 Image-making, 187 ff. species of, 195 ff.

divine and human, 326

Imagination, described in Philebus, Immortality, in Meno and Phasedo, 2 ff Incompatibility, statements of, 256, 278 Indivisible Species as objective in Division, 185, 267 ff as complex whole, 270 Induction, Socratic method of, 184 Isocrates, 177, 181 Judgment (&(Fa) : about future facts, 81, 00 ff is complex. 116 as unspoken statement, 118, 318 Judgment, False (see Statement, False) denied by Protagoras, 71, 73, 115 possibility discussed. 110 ff. as thinking one thing is another, ... as thinking what is not, 114 as mistaking, 116 ff as misfitting of perception to image, 120 ff not involving perception. 127 ff as interchange of pieces of knowledge, 135 Judgment, True, see Statement, True claim to be knowledge, 100 is not knowledge, 140 ff. Leucippus, 231 Likeness (electro), defined, 196, 198 Logic . of Aristotle, contrasted with Plato's. 268 Formal, not = Dialectic, 264 Logos, see Account, Definition, Statement Materialists : in Theastetus, 46, 48 in Battle of Gods and Giants, 228 ff. Meaning . as Form in Plato, 259 of common or proper names, 307, 314 Megarians : affiliation to Eleatics, 169 as Eristics, 176

Memory : introduced, 64 as Wax Tablet, 120 ff as Aviary, 130, 317 Meno : doctrine of Anamassis, 2 parallel with Theastetus, 27 account of grounds of true belief. 142, 158 definition of Figure, 185 Midwafery of Socrates, 24 ff Motion as very important Form, 273 ff. Name, as constituent of statement. 304 ff Negative, signifying 'the different', 200 Negative statement . problem of, 202, 252 ff. about Forms, 285 ff Nonentities, 208 Number puzzles about, 41 mistakes about, 128 ff. memory imprints of. 122, 129 **Opinion**, see Judgment Parmenides. meeting with Socrates, 1, 101, 166 criticises theory of Forms, 6 ff fragment restored, or discussion of, postponed, 101 Ways of Inquiry, 200 denies world of appearance, 201 on the totally unreal, 203 ff One Being criticised, 220 ff. denial of plurality and becoming. 227 as Idealist, 220 Parmensdes : position in series of Dialogues, I theory of Forms criticised in, 6 ff separate Forms in, 105, 243 on relation of Forms to one another. 185. 252 Participation . problem of, 6 ff , 10 ff of individual in Forms, 253, 256, \$78, 297 of Forms in one another, 256

Perception : meaning of, 30 by contraries. 34 Plato's theory of, 39 ff . 237 infallible, 52 ff alleged delusions of, 52 not the whole of knowledge, 102 not knowledge at all, 106 Phaedo doctrines of separate Forms and immortality in. 2. 4 ff relative terms in. 44, 284 theory of Forms in. 243 Phasdrus, on Collection and Division. 170. 186. 267 Philistion, 236 Philosopher, projected dialogue, 168, 183, 215, 248, 323 Plotinus on alleged Platonic 'categories ', 274 Power (Dynamis) : of acting or being acted on, 46, 49 as mark of reality, 234 ff Pre-Socratics criticised and ff. in Battle of Gods and Giants, 220 Production, divine and human, 325 Proposition not recognised by Plato as distinct from 'statement'. 113, 265 Protagoras . Man the measure, 13, 31 ff objections against, 60 ff. defence of, 65 ff denies possibility of false judgment. 71, 73 profession as Sophist, 72 doctrine of judgments criticised, 76 ff defence of, refuted, 80 ff. Contropersies, 191 Pythagoreans : doctrine of Numbers, 9 as Idealists, 220 Quality, term introduced, 97 Reality (Existence) . and Appearance, 202 ff the totally unreal, 203 ff , 295 the perfectly real, 216 ff.

power ' as mark of, 232 ff.

Reality (Existence). meaning of ' real 'to Parmenides, 220 to Pre-Socratics, 218, 238 to Friends of Forms, 230 ff. to materialists, 232 ff. to Idealists, 248 must include change, 241 as conceived by Friends of Forms, 272 verbal ambiguity of rd &r. 280, 202 Recollection, see Anamnesis Relative terms : in Phasdo. AA in Plato and Aristotle, 282 ff. Rest as very important Form, 272 ff. as all-pervading Form, 279 ff. verbal ambiguity of raindy, 292 Semblance (#deraopa) defined, 197 Semblance-making, 197 and darragia, 321 Sensation, see Perception Size, puzzles about, 41 Socrates : Cathartic method, 177 ff , 184 'induction', 184 Sophist, position in series of Dialogues, r Soul, as separable spirit in Phasedo, 4 Speech, parts of, 307 Square Roots, theory of, 22 ff. Statement (logos) : meaning of, 265 always complex, 303 as combination of name and verb, 307 Statement, False problem of, 199, 209 as ' saying what is not ', 212 solution of problem of, 298 ff not 'about nothing ', 309, 313 definition of, 311 ff not true statement about something else, 312

Statement, True, defined, 309 Statesman, position in series of Theaetetus, death of, 15 Theastetus : nosition in series of Dislogues, I scope of, 7, 12, 28 date, 15 Thinking as internal dialogue, 118, 318 Thrasymachus, view of right, 82 Tumasus : Forms in. 8. 141 doctrine of matter, 247 on Form of Animal, 271 problem of sudola in, 323 on mirror images, 327 Truth, see Judgment, True; Statement, True Unity, defined, 223 Verb · Forms expressed by, 279 as constituent of statement, 304 ff. process of, 47, 50 of mirror-images, 124, 327 Weaving symbol of statesman's art, 182 of Forms, 300 Whole . equivalent to 'Sum 'and 'all the parts ', 149 as applied to Parmenides' Being, 222 complex Form as, 262, 267 Word, definition of, 305 ff. Zeno: meeting with Socrates, 1

paradoxes, 6 ff.

dilemmas, 177, 285, 297