Just as this Nature exists through itself, and other beings through it, so it derives existence from itself, and other beings from it.
SEEING, then, that the truth already discovered has been satisfactorily demonstrated, it is profitable to examine whether this Nature, and all things that have any existence, derive existence from no other source than it, just as they do not exist except through it.
But it is clear that one may say, that what derives existence from something exists through the same thing; and what exists through something also derives existence from it. For instance, what derives existence from matter, and exists through the artificer, may also be said to exist through matter, and to derive existence from the artificer, since it exists through both, and derives existence from both. That is, it is endowed with existence by both, although it exists through matter and from the artificer in another sense than that in which it exists through, and from, the artificer.
It follows, then, that just as all existing beings are what
they are, through the supreme Nature, and as that Nature exists through itself,
but other beings through another than themselves, so all existing beings
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This Nature was not brought into existence with the help of any external cause, yet it does not exist through nothing, or derive existence from nothing. --How existence through self, and derived from self, is conceivable.
SINCE the same meaning is not always attached to the phrase, "existence through" something, or, to the phrase, "existence derived from" something, very diligent inquiry must be made, in what way all existing beings exist through the supreme Nature, or derive existence from it. For, what exists through itself, and what exists through another, do not admit the same ground of existence. Let us first consider, separately, this supreme Nature, which exists through self; then these beings which exist through another.
Since it is evident, then, that this Nature is whatever it is, through itself, and all other beings are what they are, through it, how does it exist through itself? For, what is said to exist through anything apparently exists through an efficient agent, or through matter, or through some other external aid, as through some instrument. But, whatever exists in any of these three ways exists through another than itself, and is of later existence, and, in some sort, less than that through which it obtains existence.
But, in no wise does the supreme Nature exist through another, nor is it
later or less than itself or anything else. Therefore, the supreme Nature could
be created neither by itself, nor by another; nor could
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What is to be inferred? For that which cannot have come into existence by any creative agent, or from any matter, or with any external aids, seems either to be nothing, or, if it has any existence, to exist through nothing, and derive existence from nothing. And although, in accordance with the observations I have already made, in the light of reason, regarding the supreme Substance, I should think such propositions could in no wise be true in the case of supreme Substance; yet, I would not neglect to give a connected demonstration of this matter.
For, seeing that this my meditation has suddenly brought me to an important and interesting point, I am unwilling to pass over carelessly even any simple or almost foolish objection that occurs to me, in my argument; in order that by leaving no ambiguity in my discussion up to this point, I may have the better assured strength to advance toward what follows; and in order that if, perchance, I shall wish to convince any one of the truth of my speculations, even one of the slower minds, through the removal of every obstacle, however slight, may acquiesce in what it finds here.
That this Nature, then, without which no nature exists, is
nothing, is as false as it would be absurd to say that whatever is is nothing.
And, moreover, it does not exist through nothing, because it is utterly
inconceivable that what is something should exist through nothing. But, if in
any way it derives existence from nothing, it does so through itself, or
through another, or through nothing. But it is evident that
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But nothing can, through itself, derive existence from nothing, because if anything derives existence from nothing, through something, then that through which it exists must exist before it. Seeing that this Being, then, does not exist before itself, by no means does it derive existence from itself.
But if it is supposed to have derived existence from some other nature, then it is not the supreme Nature, but some inferior one, nor is it what it is through itself, but through another.
Again: if this Nature derives existence from nothing, through something, that through which it exists was a great good, since it was the cause of good. But no good can be understood as existing before that good, without which nothing is good; and it is sufficiently clear that this good, without which there is no good, is the supreme Nature which is under discussion. Therefore, it is not even conceivable that this Nature was preceded by any being, through which it derived existence from nothing.
Hence, if it has any existence through nothing, or derives
existence from nothing, there is no doubt that either, whatever it is, it does
not exist through itself, or derive existence from itself, or else it is itself
nothing. It is unnecessary to show that both these suppositions are false. The
supreme Substance, then, does not exist through any efficient agent, and does
not derive existence from any matter, and was not aided in being brought into
existence by any external causes. Nevertheless, it by no means exists through
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Finally, as to how it should be understood to exist through
itself, and to derive existence from itself: it did not create itself, nor did
it spring up as its own matter, nor did it in any way assist itself to become
what it was not before, unless, haply, it seems best to conceive of this subject
in the way in which one says that the light lights or is lucent,
through and from itself. For, as are the mutual relations of the light
and to light and lucent (