CHAPTER VI.
How no being, except the God-man, can make the atonement
by which man is saved.
Anselm. But this cannot be effected, except the price
paid to God for the sin of man be something greater than all the universe
besides God.
Boso. So it appears.
Anselm. Moreover, it is necessary that he who can
give
God anything of his own which is more valuable than all things in the
possession of God, must be greater than all else but God himself.
Boso. I cannot deny it.
Anselm. Therefore none but God can make this
satisfaction.
Boso. So it appears.
Anselm. But none but a man ought to do this, other
wise man does not make the satisfaction.
Boso. Nothing seems more just.
Anselm. If it be necessary, therefore, as it appears,
that the heavenly kingdom be made up of men, and this cannot be effected unless
the aforesaid satisfaction be made, which none but God can make and none but
man ought to make, it is necessary for the God-man to make it.
Boso. Now blessed be God! we have made a great
discovery with regard to our question. Go on, therefore, as you have begun. For
I hope that God will assist you.
Anselm. Now must we inquire how God can become man.
CHAPTER VII.
How necessary it is for the same being to be perfect God
and perfect man.
Anselm. The Divine and human natures cannot
alternate, so that the Divine should become human or the human Divine; nor can
they be so commingled as that a third should be produced from the two which is
neither wholly Divine nor wholly human. For, granting that it were possible for
either to be changed into the other, it would in that case be only God and not
man, or man only and not God. Or, if they were
so
commingled that a third nature sprung from the combination of the two (as from
two animals, a male and a female of different species, a third is produced,
which does not preserve entire the species of either parent, but has a mixed
nature derived from both), it would neither be God nor man. Therefore the God-man,
whom we require to be of a nature both human and Divine, cannot be produced by
a change from one into the other, nor by an imperfect commingling of both in a
third; since these things cannot be, or, if they could be, would avail nothing
to our purpose. Moreover, if these two complete natures are said to be joined
somehow, in such a way that one may be Divine while the other is human, and yet
that which is God not be the same with that which is man, it is impossible for
both to do the work necessary to be accomplished. For God will not do it,
because he has no debt to pay; and man will not do it, because he cannot.
Therefore, in order that the God-man may perform this, it is necessary that the
same being should perfect God and perfect man, in order to make this atonement.
For he cannot and ought not to do it, unless he be very God and very man.
Since, then, it is necessary that the God-man preserve the completeness of each
nature, it is no less necessary that these two natures be united entire in one
person, just as a body and a reasonable soul exist together in every human
being; for otherwise it is impossible that the same being should be very God
and very man.
Boso. All that you say is satisfactory to me.