CHAPTER XVIII (a).1
How, with God there is neither necessity nor
impossibility, and what is a coercive necessity, and what one that is not so.
Anselm. We have already said that it is improper to
affirm of God that he does anything, or that he cannot do it, of necessity. For
all necessity and impossibility is under his control. But his choice is subject
to no necessity nor impossibility. For nothing is necessary or impossible save
as He wishes it. Nay, the very choosing or refusing anything as a necessity or
an impossibility is contrary to truth. Since, then, he does what he chooses and
nothing else, as no necessity or impossibility exists before his choice or
refusal, so neither do they interfere with his acting or not acting, though it
be true that his choice and action are immutable. And as, when God does a
thing, since it has been done it cannot be undone, but must remain an actual
fact; still, we are not correct in saying that it is impossible for God to
prevent a past action
from being what it is. For there is no
necessity or impossibility in the case whatever but the simple will of God,
which chooses that truth should be eternally the same, for he himself is truth.
Also, if he has a fixed determination to do anything, though his design must be
destined to an accomplishment before it comes to pass, yet there is no coercion
as far as he is concerned, either to do it or not to do it, for his will is the
sole agent in the case. For when we say that God cannot do a thing, we do not
deny his power; on the contrary, we imply that he has invincible authority and
strength. For we mean simply this, that nothing can compel God to do the thing
which is said to be impossible for him. We often use an expression of this
kind, that a thing can be when the power is not in itself, but in something
else; and that it cannot be when the weakness does not pertain to the thing
itself, but to something else. Thus we say "Such a man can be bound,"
instead of saying, "Somebody can bind him," and, "He cannot be
bound," instead of, "Nobody can bind him." For to be able to be
overcome is not power but weakness, and not to be able to be overcome is not
weakness but power. Nor do we say that God does anything by necessity, because
there is any such thing pertaining to him, but because it exists in something
else, precisely as I said with regard to the affirmation that he cannot do
anything. For necessity is always either compulsion or restraint; and these two
kinds of necessity operate variously by turn, so that the same thing is both
necessary and impossible. For whatever is obliged to exist is also prevented
from non-existence; and that which is compelled not to exist is prevented from
existence. So that whatever exists from necessity cannot
avoid existence, and it is impossible for a thing to exist which is under a
necessity of nonexistence, and
vice versa. But when we say with regard
to God, that anything is necessary or not necessary, we do not mean that, as
far as he is concerned, there is any necessity either coercive or prohibitory,
but we mean that there is a necessity in everything else, restraining or
driving them in a particular way. Whereas we say the very opposite of God. For,
when we affirm that it is necessary for God to utter truth, and never to lie,
we only mean that such is his unwavering disposition to maintain the truth that
of necessity nothing can avail to make him deviate from the truth, or utter a
lie. When, then, we say that that man (who, by the union of persons, is also
God, the Son of God) could not avoid death, or the choice of death, after he
was born of the virgin, we do not imply that there was in him any weakness with
regard to preserving or choosing to preserve his life, but we refer to the
unchangeableness of his purpose, by which he freely became man for this design,
viz., that by persevering in his wish he should suffer death. And this desire
nothing could shake. For it would be rather weakness than power if he could
wish to lie, or deceive, or change his disposition, when before he had chosen
that it should remain unchanged. And, as I said before, when one has freely
determined to do some good action, and afterwards goes on to complete it,
though, if unwilling to pay his vow, he could be compelled to do so, yet we
must not say that he does it of necessity, but with the same freedom with which
he made the resolution. For we ought not to say that anything is done, or not
done, by necessity or weakness, when free choice is the only agent in the case.
And, if this
is so with regard to man, much less can we speak of
necessity or weakness in reference to God; for he does nothing except according
to his choice, and his will no force can drive or restrain. For this end was
accomplished by the united natures of Christ, viz., that the Divine nature
should perform that part of the work needful for man's restoration which the
human nature could not do; and that in the human should be manifested what was
inappropriate to the Divine. Finally, the virgin herself, who was made pure by
faith in him, so that he might be born of her, even she, I say, never believed
that he was to die, save of his own choice. For she knew the words of the
prophet, who said of him: "He was offered of his own will."
Therefore, since her faith was well founded, it must necessarily turn out as
she believed. And, if it perplexes you to have me say that it is necessary,
remember that the reality of the virgin's faith was not the cause of his dying
by his own free will; but, because this was destined to take place, therefore
her faith was real. If, then, it be said that it was necessary for him to die
of his single choice, because the antecedent faith and prophecy were true, this
is no more than saying that it must be because it was to be. But such a
necessity as this does not compel a thing to be, but only implies a necessity
of its existence. There is an antecedent necessity which is the cause of a
thing, and there is also a subsequent necessity arising from the thing itself.
Thus, when the heavens are said to revolve, it is an antecedent and efficient
necessity, for they must revolve. But when I say that you speak of necessity,
because you are speaking, this is nothing but a subsequent and inoperative necessity.
For I only mean that it is impossible
for you to speak
and not to speak at the same time, and not that some one compels you to speak.
For the force of its own nature makes the heaven revolve; but no necessity
obliges you to speak. But wherever there is an antecedent necessity, there is
also a subsequent one; but not vice versa. For we can say that the heaven
revolves of necessity, because it revolves; but it is not likewise true that,
because you speak, you do it of necessity. This subsequent necessity pertains
to everything, so that we say: Whatever has been, necessarily has been.
Whatever is, must be. Whatever is to be, of necessity will be. This is that
necessity which Aristotle treats of (
"de
propositionibus singularibus et futuris"),
and which seems to destroy any alternative and to ascribe a necessity to all
things. By this subsequent and imperative necessity, was it necessary (since
the belief and prophecy concerning Christ were true, that he would die of his own
free will), that it should be so. For this he became man; for this he did and
suffered all things undertaken by him; for this he chose as he did. For
therefore were they necessary, because they were to be, and they were to be
because they were, and they were because they were; and, if you wish to know
the real necessity of all things which he did and suffered, know that they were
of necessity, because he wished them to be. But no necessity preceded his will.
Wherefore if they were not save by his will, then, had he not willed they would
not have existed. So then, no one took his life from him, but he laid it down
of himself and took it again; for he had power to lay it down and to take it
again, as he himself said.
Boso. You have satisfied me that it cannot be proved
that he was subjected to death by any necessity
;
and I cannot regret my importunity in urging you to make this explanation.
Anselm. I think we have shown with sufficient
clearness how it was that God took a man without sin from a sinful substance;
but I would on no account deny that there is no other explanation than this
which we have given, for God can certainly do what human reason cannot grasp.
But since this appears adequate, and since in search of other arguments we
should involve ourselves in such questions as that of original sin, and how it
was transmitted by our first parents to all mankind, except this man of whom we
are speaking; and since, also, we should be drawn into various other questions,
each demanding its own separate consideration; let us be satisfied with this
account of the matter, and go on to complete our intended work.
Boso. As you choose; but with this condition that, by
the help of God, you will sometime give this other explanation, which you owe
me, as it were, but which now you avoid discussing.
Anselm. Inasmuch as I entertain this desire myself, I
will not refuse you; but because of the uncertainty of future events, I dare
not promise you, but commend it to the will of God. But say now, what remains
to be unravelled with regard to the question which you proposed in the first
place, and which involves many others with it?
Boso. The substance of the inquiry was this, why God
became man, for the purpose of saving men by his death, when he could have done
it in some other way. And you, by numerous and positive reasons, have shown
that the restoring of mankind ought not to take place, and could not, without
man paid the
debt which he owed God for his sin. And this debt was so
great that, while none but man must solve the debt, none but God was able to do
it; so that he who does it must be both God and man. And hence arises a
necessity that God should take man into unity with his own person; so that he
who in his own nature was bound to pay the debt, but could not, might be able
to do it in the person of God. In fine, you have shown that that man, who was
also God, must be formed from the virgin, and from the person of the Son of
God, and that he could be taken without sin, though from a sinful substance.
Moreover, you have clearly shown the life of this man to have been so excellent
and so glorious as to make ample satisfaction for the sins of the whole world,
and even infinitely more. It now, therefore, remains to be shown how that
payment is made to God for the sins of men.
