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DETERMINISM AND PETITIONARY PRAYER IN JOHN AND THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS

An Ideological Reading of John and the *Rule of the Community (1QS)*

EMMANUEL O. TUKASI

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Emmanuel O. Tukasi
Temple College London
December, 2007

Abbreviations

AB	Anchor Bible
AJT	*Asia Journal of Theology*
BA	*The Biblical Archaeologist*
BI	Biblical Interpretation Series
Bib	*Biblica*
BibS	Biblical Series
BJRL	*Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*
BT	*The Bible Translator*
BVC	*Bible et vie chrétienne*
BZ	*Biblische Zeitschrift*
CH	*Church History*
CBQ	*Catholic Biblical Quarterly*
CJA	*Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity*
CurThM	*Currents in Theology and Mission*
DSD	*Dead Sea Discoveries*
EDNT	Balz, H. & G. Schneider, (eds), *Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament*. 3 vols; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1991.
EDR	Meagher, Paul K. *et al.*, (eds), *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion*. 3 vols; Washington, DC: Corpus Publications, 1979.
EDSS	Schiffman, L. H. & J. C. VanderKam, (eds), *Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls*. 2 vols; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
ETL	*Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*
ER	Eliade, Mircea, (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. 15 vols; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987.
EvQ	*Evangelical Quarterly*
EvT	*Evangelische Theologie*
ExpTim	*Expository Times*
HALOT	Koehler, Ludwig, and Walter Baumgartner. *The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament*. 3 vols; trans. M. E. J. Richardson. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 1996–9
HBTh	*Horizons in Biblical Theology*
Herm	Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review*
HSM	Harvard Semitic Monographs
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*

IBT	Interpreting Biblical Texts Series
ICC	International Critical Commentary
IEJ	*Israel Exploration Journal*
Int	*Interpretation*
ISBE	Bromiley, G., (ed.), *International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia*. 4 vols; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1979.
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JBLM	Journal of Biblical Literature Monograph series
JJML	*Journal of Jewish Music and Liturgy*
JJS	*Journal of Jewish Studies*
JQR	*Jewish Quarterly Review*
JSJSup	Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Period Supplements
JSNT	*Journal for the Study of the New Testament*
JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament, Supplement Series
JSOT	*Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*
JSOTSup	Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, Supplement Series
JSP	*Journal for the Study of Pseudepigrapha*
JSPSup	Journal for the Study of Pseudepigrapha Supplements
JTSA	*Journal of Theology for Southern Africa*
MTL	Marshalls Theological Library
NCB	New Century Bible
NICNT	The New International Commentary on the New Testament
NIDNTT	Brown, Colin, (ed.), *New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology*. 4 vols; Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1986.
NIDOTTE	Gemeren, Willem A. Van, (ed.), *New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis*. 4 vols; Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1996.
NovT	*Novum Testamentum*
NTL	New Testament Library
NTS	*New Testament Studies*
NTT	New Testament Theology Series
OBO	Orbis biblicus et orientalis
OTG	Old Testament Guide
OTL	Old Testament Library
PSBSup	*Princeton Seminary Bulletin Supplements*
PToday	*Philosophy Today*
RAC	*Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*
RB	*Revue biblique*
RevExp	*Review and Expositor*

RQ	*Review Quarterly*
RevQ	*Revue de Qumran*
RSRel	*Recherches de sciences religieuses*
SacP	Sacra Pagina
SANT	Studien zum Alten und Neuen Testament
SBL	*Society of Biblical Literature*
SBLD	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBLEJL	Society of Biblical Literature Early Judaism and Its Literature
Scr	*Scriptura*
SDSRL	Studies in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Related Literature
Sem	Semeia
SJT	*Scottish Journal of Theology*
SkrK	*Skrif en Kerk*
SNTSMS	Society of New Testament Studies Monograph Series
STDJ	*Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah*
StEv	*Studia Evangelica*
TB	*Tyndale Bulletin*
TDNT	Kittel, Gerhard and Gerhard Friedrich, (eds), *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. 10 vols; trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1964–5.
Th	*Theology*
ThEd	*Theological Educator: A Journal of Theology and Ministry*
TToday	*Theology Today*
VT	*Vetus Testamentum*
VTSup	Vetus Testamentum Supplements
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
ZAW	*Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*
ZNW	*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The interaction between human actions and determinism has been a subject of considerable attention in philosophical and theological discussion. Scholarly interest in the theological discussion of the subject is well summed up by E. Schuller as 'the classic dilemma of predestination versus human freedom'.[1] However, not much has been done to explore the relationship between determinism and petitionary prayer from a literary point of view. By this we mean that studies on how a given text articulates determinism on the one hand and human actions on the other have been uncommon especially in the biblical field. This is not surprising because biblical writers seem to have a subtle way of expressing the sovereignty of God and human actions in a non-absolute fashion. For them, the sovereignty of God is paramount, but it is upheld with a certain degree of flexibility which allows them to make sense of human actions within the context of that sovereignty.

However, in the literature of the Second Temple period, the flexible form of divine sovereignty that one encounters in the Old Testament books is less common; instead one finds the sovereignty of God being articulated in a rigid deterministic mode. All things happen in accordance with the divine foreordination, and there is little or nothing that human beings can do to alter those divine decrees. Creation follows its course in compliance with already established designs of God. On the other hand, there are indications of prayers of a petitionary kind in the same literature being addressed to that same God who determined the course of events from the beginning. The petitioner does not accept things as they are, hence he turns to prayer as a medium by which he articulates his rejection of the status quo.

If God's original designs cannot be altered, and petitionary prayers, on the other hand, are pleas to God to bring about changes in given conditions, for God to honour such prayers would imply the violation of his original designs which are known to be unalterable. The issue at stake is adequately expressed in these words of Schuller: 'The question is not just can an individual choose to act freely, but, more specifically, can or should an individual act to make

1. E. Schuller, 'Petitionary Prayer and the Religion of Qumran', in *Religion in the Dead Sea Scrolls*, (eds J. J. Collins and R. A. Kugler; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2000, pp. 29–45 (35)).

petition to God? What is the point of petitioning the God of knowledge who has determined all things from the beginning? What might be the proper object of petition?'[2] This is not at all a new theological enquiry because both Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin have pioneered the discussion in the field of systematic theology. However, the approach adopted in this present study differs in that it is not philosophical in its orientation. Instead, it examines the relationship between determinism and petitionary prayer at the *textual level*. In a text that articulates divine decrees over creation as permanent and irreversible, it is expected that one would hardly find traces of efforts initiated at changing the course of events. That is to say, when it is put in the form of a question, how does a text convey a notion of determinism on the one hand, and its concept of petitionary prayer on the other? Does the text offer an explanation for the interplay of determinism and petitionary prayer?

Because of the nature of our enquiry, two texts are in focus, the *Rule of the Community* (1QS) and the Fourth Gospel. Our goal in this study is twofold: to probe the nature of the determinism in the *Rule of the Community* and the Fourth Gospel, and to investigate the nature and place of petitionary prayer within the deterministic framework articulated in each text. Apart from the recognition of the similarities between John and 1QS by previous scholarship, these two texts are chosen for our study of determinism and prayer for three reasons. First, they are similar in terms of sharing a common Jewish background. Second, they are contemporary literature in that they both stem from the milieu of early Judaism, and thus reflect the dualistic pattern of their social context. Third, they both deal with the motifs of determinism and petition.

In an enquiry involving two texts, it is impossible to exclude totally a comparison of the two, but in this case, the comparison is secondary to the task of exploring the theological coherence of each of our texts. The comparison is warranted by our attempt to locate this study in the context of the scholarly discussion of the relationship between John and the Dead Sea Scrolls.

A. Literary Genre of John and the *Rule*

While the *Rule* and the Fourth Gospel are in several ways dissimilar with respect to their literary genre, content and purpose, to put it in the words of J. L. Price, 'there are features of both which invite comparison, and raise similar problems for their interpreters'.[3] Each of these documents projects a community which understood its existence in a mutually exclusive manner. In other words, they are literary collections with a highly charged sectarian terminology and ideology. This ideology includes a certain perception of how

2. Schuller, 'Prayer and Religion', p. 37.

3. James L. Price, 'Light from Qumran Upon Some Aspects of Johannine Theology', in *John and the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. J. H. Charlesworth; New York, NY: Crossroad, 1990, p. 12).

God works and how human beings are involved in divine activities. This does not in any way imply that the communities in which these texts evolved share nothing in common with others, rather it means that the texts exhibit certain features which are unparalleled in other literature.

In speaking of the genre of these texts, the Gospel of John can be categorized as narrative in the broad sense because it recounts the story of Jesus, but such is not the case with 1QS. In her study of the genre of the Fourth Gospel, Margaret Davies explores the genre of the Gospel against the background of the Scripture, Judaism (by which she means the Dead Sea Scrolls, the Rabbinic writings, and Hellenistic Judaism) and the non-Jewish Greek literature, and concludes that John, like the other three Gospels, 'is a theodicy, a vindication of divine providence in view of the existence of evil, but the theology is focused in the portrait of one man, Jesus, whose death, as well as his teachings and miracles, provides knowledge of God and of human destiny'.[4] Davies' position represents the broad outlook of the Fourth Gospel. In a similar fashion, Mark W. G. Stibbe, following the acknowledgement of his indebtedness to Robert Tannehill's ground-breaking article on Mark,[5] describes the Gospel as 'an understanding of Jesus artistically expressed in the language of story' by which he means that 'the fourth evangelist chooses a narrative genre which is particularly suited to his Christology'.[6]

The *Rule* is a more complex literature. It is made up of varieties of genre. Although we cannot classify it as apocalypse,[7] it is apocalyptic[8] in world-view, especially columns 3 and 4, because of its dualistic and deterministic

4. M. Davies, *Rhetoric and Reference in the Fourth Gospel* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992, pp. 89, 108).

5. R. C. Tannehill, 'The Gospel of Mark as a Narrative Christology', *Semeia* 16 (1979), pp. 57–97.

6. Mark W. G. Stibbe, *John as Storyteller: Narrative Criticism and the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 13).

7. Scholars have made distinctions between the terms 'apocalypse', 'apocalypticism' and 'apocalyptic'. 'Apocalypse' denotes a genre characterized by a formal report of a revelation mediated by a heavenly being. The primary modes of revelation include visions and other-worldly journeys, discourse and occasionally revelation via a heavenly book. The function of the mediating heavenly being is to interpret the vision or serve as guide on the other-worldly journey. On the other hand, the term 'apocalyptic' signifies a world-view, and since a world-view need not be tied to any one literary form, an apocalyptic world-view could find expression in other genres besides apocalypses. 'Apocalypticism' 'refers to the symbolic universe in which an apocalyptic movement codifies its identity and interpretation of reality'. For an adequate discussion of the three terminologies, see J. J. Collins, *Seers, Sybils and Sages in Hellenistic–Roman Judaism* (New York, NY: Brill, 1997, pp. 25–38); *idem*: *Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls* (London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 1–12); *idem*: *The Apocalyptic Imagination* (Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans; 2nd edn, pp. 1–42).

8. For the list of texts in the Dead Sea Scrolls identified as apocalyptic, see D. S. Russell, *The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic* (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1964, p. 39).

emphasis. It identifies the present age as the dominion of the angel of darkness who in turn poses threats to the sons of Light. However, this dominion is only for a while because God has set an appointed time in which he will judge deceit and all in its lot. Prayer is a genre found in 1QS. This is evident in column 2 where prayers for certain occasions are enumerated. Columns 5–9 are halachic in nature. They delineate the laws guiding the communal life of the Community. The text concludes with a long section (10–11) which is categorized as praise in 9.26c. This praise is much more hymnic in nature. This brief analysis of 1QS is intended to show how complicated it is to categorize 1QS as a whole. However when the text is read in the light of its opening column which states the purpose of the Community, it can be said that 1QS is a manifesto of a well-knitted group. The earlier part (1–4) states the doctrinal orientation of the sect, and the later part (5–11) deals with communal living. Thus 1QS can be described as a document which combines the theological indicative with the ethical imperative.

B. Usage of Terminologies

While the evidence of 4QS shows that the *Rule of the Community* is not a stable document,[9] for the purpose of this study, it is approached as a coherent literary document. Moreover, in light of the copies of the *Rule* from Caves iv (4Q255–4Q264) and v (5Q11), the following insightful observation of Charlesworth sums up our understanding of 1QS in this study: '1QS is no longer to be used as a synonym for the Rule of the Community; it is used here as the base text only because it is the most extensive witness to this important document.'[10] The term 'community' is used to denote the Community that is projected by the text. This implied sense is also intended whenever the term 'author' is employed. This usage is justified because the

9. For a brief review of scholarly hypothesis on the issue, see J. Murphy-O'Connor, 'La genèse litéraire de la Règle de la Communauté', *RB* 76 (1969), pp. 528–49; Markus Bockmuehl, 'Redaction and Ideology in the Rule of the Community (1QS/4QS)', *RevQ* 18 (1998), pp. 541–8. See also Robert A. J. Gagnon, 'How Did the Rule of the Community Obtain Its Final Shape? A Review of Scholarly Research', *JSP* 10 (1992), pp. 61–79; P. S. Alexander, 'The Redaction-History of Serek ha-Yahad: A Proposal', *RevQ* 17 (1996), pp. 437–53; a comprehensive study of the textual history is found in S. Metso, *The Textual Development of the Qumran Community Rule*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997); *idem*: 'In Search of the Sitz im Leben of the Community Rule', in *The Provo International Conference on the Dead Sea Scrolls: Technological Innovations, New Texts, and Reformulated Issues* (eds. D. W. Parry and E. Ulrich; STDJ, 30; Leiden: Brill, 1999, pp. 306–15); Charlotte Hempel, 'Interpretative Authority in the Community Rule Tradition', *DSD* 10 (2003), pp. 59–80.

10. J. Charlesworth, (ed.), *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek Texts with English Translations* (Rule of the Community and Related Documents; Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994, p. 4); see also Metso, *Textual Development*, p. 1.

text makes an explicit claim to be a manifesto of a community (1.1).[11] The terms 'sect' and 'sectarian' are used, except where otherwise stated, to convey 'an understanding of a *minority* group, which is in a *schismatic* relationship with a larger group'.[12]

Also, it is worth mentioning that the English quotations from the *Rule* are taken from Charlesworth's and García Martínez's translations[13] except where otherwise stated. There are occasions where long sections have been quoted for the sake of clarity on the context of the issues under discussion. In those instances, we consider it appropriate to present only the translations for the purpose of smooth reading. However, attempts are made throughout this study to engage the Hebrew edition in clarifying the issues at stake in each of these long quotations. Since there are no serious textual variants between 1QS and 4QS so as to warrant comparisons of passages discussed in this study, and the fact that such comparisons are immaterial to our objective, the reader is therefore referred to the textual notes in Qimron and Charlesworth's critical edition for the comparisons of paralleled passages.

This study is made up of seven chapters. The introductory chapter surveys scholarly contributions on the motifs of determinism and prayer. It also sets the background against which our study of determinism and prayer should be understood. In Chapter Two, our focus is on the types of determinism

11. While it is quite possible that an individual may have been responsible for the composition of the *Rule*, the text is certainly dotted with the tradition of its community. And should 1QS have been a production of an individual, whether or not the individual, to put it in the language of Judith Lieu, has adopted, modified or corrected the tradition of his community as well as making his own individual and creative contribution remains a matter of academic conjecture. See J. Lieu, *The Theology of Johannine Epistles* (NTT; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp.19–20).

12. Jutta M. Jokiranta, '"Sectarianism" of the Qumran "Sect": Sociological notes', *RevQ* 20 (2001), p. 224. Other publications on the use of the term 'sect' and 'sectarian' in the discussion of Second Temple Judaism include: Jack T. Sanders, *Schismatics, Sectarians, Dissidents, Deviants: The First Hundred Years of Jewish-Christian Relations* (London: SCM Press, 1993); Philip F. Esler, *The First Christians in their Social Worlds: Social Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation* (London: Routledge, 1994, especially pp. 70–91); John H. Elliot, 'The Jewish Messianic Movement: From Faction to Sect', in *Modelling Early Christianity: Social-Scientific Studies of the New Testament in Its Context* (ed. Philip F. Esler; London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 75–95); Albert I. Baumgarten, *The Flourishing of Jewish Sects in the Maccabean Era: An Interpretation*, (JSJSup, 55; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997); Ellen Juhl Christiansen, 'The Consciousness of Belonging to God's Covenant and What it Entails According to the Damascus Document and the Community Rule', in *Qumran between the Old and New Testaments* (eds. Frederick H. Cryer and L. Thompson; JSOTSup, 290; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998, pp. 69–97).

13. Charlesworth used the new transcription published by E. Qimron (1994) by the Princeton Dead Sea Scrolls Project (ed. J. H. Charlesworth), while García Martínez and Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar used their own transcription published in 1997.

found in the *Rule of the Community* (1QS). What is the determinism all about? Does it include the predestination of human beings as encountered in the *Thanksgiving Hymns* (1QH)? Chapter Three analyses the prayer texts in order to discover the theology that is encoded in them within the context of 1QS. What are the objects prayed for in the *Rule*? Do the prayers anticipate, either directly or indirectly, an alteration in the deterministic order articulated in 1QS? Chapter Four probes into the types of determinism articulated in the Fourth Gospel and the significance of the motif within the Johannine theological and sociological framework. The fifth chapter deals primarily with the prayer of John 17. Each petitionary element of the prayer is exegetically examined and interpreted within the literary world-view of the Gospel. Chapter Six is a comparison of John and the *Rule*. The comparison is set in the context of the ongoing debate on the relationship between John and the Dead Sea Scrolls, and the implication of this monograph on the discussion of the textual relation between John and the *Rule* is highlighted. The concluding chapter gives an overview of the arguments of each chapter, and also draws attention to areas of further research on both the 1QS and Johannine determinism.

C. Previous Scholarship

Scholars such as F. Delitzsch, Michael V. Fox, G. von Rad, J. L. Crenshaw and others[14] have seen some elements of determinism in the Old Testament Wisdom literature, especially the book of Ecclesiastes. Fox, for instance, in his 1989 publication interprets the catalogue of times in Ecclesiastes 3 as a divine determination: 'All events have a time when they will occur, and God determines when this is. Thus man cannot change the course of events, and his arduous efforts are not appropriately rewarded.'[15] Fox modified his position ten years later when he read the same passage 'as presuming a less rigid sort of determinism'.[16] Qoheleth, according to Fox, believes in divine control but this does not imply a strict fatalism. 'God does not predetermine

14. F. Delitzsch, *Commentary on the Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes* (repr., Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1982, pp. 254-50); M. V. Fox, *Qoheleth and His Contradictions* (JSOTSup, 71; Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989, pp. 191–2); G. von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel* (trans. James D. Martin; London: SCM Press, 1972, pp. 263–83); J. L. Crenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction* (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1981, p. 136); others include R. E. Murphy, *Ecclesiastes* (WBC, 23a; Dallas, TX: Word Books 1992, p. 33); J. Blekinsopp, 'Ecclesiastes 3:1-15: Another Interpretation', *JSOT* 66 (1995), pp. 55–64.

15. Fox, *Qoheleth and His Contradictions*, p. 191.

16. Fox, *A Time to Tear Down and A Time to Build Up: A Rereading of Ecclesiastes* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999, pp. 197–201).

exactly what will happen and when. He has the power to do so but does not always use it.'[17]

G. von Rad, as early as 1970, observed that the idea of Yahweh's sovereignty over history is presented in different ways in the Hebrew Bible. But the idea of the determination of times was not common in early biblical Israel.

> Whether we read through the Jehovistic patriarchal narratives or the Succession Narrative or the prophetic proclamation of events decreed by Yahweh, the idea of a plan of Yahweh's encompassing a fairly extensive period of time is frequently discernible, and yet, at the same time, it is always thought of as divine intervention which occurs according to the given case and which is completely incalculable.[18]

In an attempt to bridge the gap between the early Israelite conception of Yahweh's sovereignty over history and the rigid determination of history into a sequence of events which characterized Second Temple Judaism, von Rad turned to the Wisdom movement in Israel.

> That all that happens is predetermined, that God knows beforehand about all that is created, that he has determined days for all things, that he has chosen times, that he does not disturb them, that he does not anticipate them – could all this at least as far as the basic conviction is concerned, not also have been said by Sirach, indeed perhaps even by Joseph with his double seven years scheme? That the times are unalterably determined and that God's eye sees everything before it happens, we have already read, at all events, in Sirach (Sir. 23.20) and, similarly, in the book of Judith (Judith 9.5).[19]

These parallels between Wisdom and Apocalyptic led von Rad to conclude that the determination of times is pre-Apocalyptic.[20] S. J. De Vries in his essay on the conception of time in Wisdom and Apocalyptic observed that the apocalyptists' orderly arrangement of events shares the same ideological kinship with Wisdom. This is evident in the aim of Wisdom 'to manage reality by reducing its vast array of variegated phenomena to a complex set of rules. . . . Searching for analogies amid distinctions, it strives to put all things into their proper framework and relate each item of experience to all other phenomena.'[21]

17. Fox, *A Time to Tear Down and A Time to Build Up*, p. 197. A similar position was affirmed by J. Wilch in his *Time and Events* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969, pp. 126–7).

18. von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel*, p. 269.

19. von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel*, p. 277, see also pp. 278–80.

20. von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel*, p. 282.

21. S. J. De Vries, 'Time in Wisdom and Apocalyptic', in *Israelite Wisdom: Theological and Literary Essays in Honour of Samuel Terrien*, (ed. John. G. Gammie *et al.*; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978, pp. 263–76 [268]).

In a more recent monograph, Dominic Rudman explores determinism in Ecclesiastes.[22] He argues that Qoheleth was indeed a determinist. After giving attention to Qoheleth's usage of terms such as קרה 'to happen, befall', פגע 'meeting', עת 'time', משפט 'judgement', חלק 'portion', to reinforce his deterministic reading, Rudman contends that the references to 'the work which is done under the sun' (1.14; 8.9, 17) and 'the work of God' (8.17a) are two different phrases used by Qoheleth to express the same idea.[23] Perhaps

> the difference between the two concepts is simply one of emphasis: 'the work which is done under the sun' refers to human action and thought (cf. 4.1,3). The parallel phrase 'the work of God' refers to divine activity. Because Qoheleth is a determinist, human actions and thought is controlled by the deity, and any real distinction between human and divine actions therefore disappears.[24]

In other words, human action under the sun is not only dependent but also a subsequent outcome of the work of God. Having placed the book in a Hellenistic milieu, Rudman asserts that the form of determinism advanced by Qoheleth differs from that of his fellows (especially apocalyptists) in extending his deterministic world-view to human actions, and therefore does not entirely absolve the deity of blame. 'Although God is removed from the implication of direct responsibility for wickedness, he is still accused of giving the wicked freedom to commit evil.'[25] However, it is worth mentioning that there are scholars such as Whybray who hesitate to concur with a deterministic reading of Ecclesiastes.[26]

In the final analysis, there is no doubt that the book of Ecclesiastes underscores certain events such as 'birth' and 'death' as inevitable, but the scope of what is determined in the text remains to be debated. Moreover, determinism in the Wisdom tradition does not seem as rigid as that encountered in the Apocalyptic literature. Nevertheless it cannot be ignored that the deterministic conception of time in Wisdom literature could have influenced the rigid division of history into vast eras as apparent in the Apocalyptic literature. This does not mean that the authors of Wisdom writings are apocalyptists or proto-apocalyptists, instead it implies that the apocalyptists, as von Rad puts it, are wise men.[27]

22. Dominic Rudman, *Determinism in the Book of Ecclesiastes* (JSOTSup, 316; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001).

23. Rudman, *Determinism in Ecclesiastes*, pp. 33–69.

24. Rudman, *Determinism in Ecclesiastes*, p. 68.

25. Rudman, *Determinism in Ecclesiastes*, p. 172.

26. R. N. Whybray, *Ecclesiastes* (OTG; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989, p. 67). Instead of a deterministic reading, Whybray claims that the passage is explaining the appropriate times for human activities under the sun; Blekinsopp, 'Ecclesiastes 3:1-15: Another Interpretation', pp. 61–3.

27. von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel*, p. 277.

In his study of the Apocalyptic movement,[28] W. Schmithals highlighted the difference between Greek cosmological determinism[29] and the apocalyptist's conception of reality.[30] According to Schmithals, the Greek emphasis on the arrangement of the universe is replaced with a sense of the orderly arrangement of historical events in apocalyptic movement. Thus, the Greek notion of a determined cosmos provides the framework for the apocalyptist's understanding of history. In Schmithals' own words, 'the apocalyptist understands history *by analogy* with the Greek cosmos'.[31]

On the historical emphasis of the apocalyptic movement, Russell made a similar observation in his study of Jewish apocalyptic. From the viewpoint of Jewish apocalyptic, God systematically arranges history. Here are Russell's own words:

> those vast eras of time into which history was divided had been predetermined by the will of God and must follow the pattern which had already been set for them. Their number and their duration were both fixed beforehand. There was therefore an inevitability about history; through travail and persecution it would move unerringly to its predetermined goal – the defeat of evil and the establishment of God's kingdom in the time of the End. The past was fixed; the future was fixed also.[32]

Russell called attention to the books of *1 Enoch* 72–82, 83–90 and *Jubilees* 4.17, 19 in which this conception of history is prominent. While human beings cannot alter what had been predetermined, they can try 'to discover at what point they themselves stood in the scheme of history

28. J. J. Collins, in his investigation of the general matrix of apocalyptic, traces Jewish apocalyptic to the following influences: Babylonian, Persian and Hellenistic. In his opening remark on the Hellenistic milieu, Collins indicates that neither the Babylonian nor the Persian material can be thought of as an exclusive matrix for Jewish apocalypticism (p. 33). J. J. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination*, pp. 23–37. See also W. Schmithals, *The Apocalyptic Movement: Introduction and Interpretation* (trans. J. E. Steely; New York, NY: Abingdon Press, 1975, pp. 115–23).

29. The fact that not only the Jews of the Dispersion but also those in Palestine were surrounded by Hellenistic culture and civilization has been noted by previous scholarship. See Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination*, pp. 33–7; T. F. Glasson, *Greek Influence in Jewish Eschatology* (London: SPCK, 1961, pp. 1–7); Russell, *The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic*, pp. 18–20. However, in a more recent collection of essays edited by Collins and Sterling, the debate continues on how and to what degree the Jews were Hellenized and a part of the Hellenistic world – J. J. Collins and Gregory E. Sterling (eds), *Hellenism in the Land of Israel* (CJA 13; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001, p. 343).

30. Schmithals, *The Apocalyptic Movement*, pp. 31–3.

31. Schmithals, *The Apocalyptic Movement*, p. 19.

32. Russell, *The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic*, p. 230.

unfolded for them by divine revelation'.[33] Again the form of determinism articulated in Jewish apocalyptic is historical. Since there is a certain degree of scholarly unanimity in locating Jewish Apocalyptic and Wisdom literature within a Hellenistic milieu, it is not very unlikely that these writings have been coloured by Hellenistic influence. This is to say that while the Greek concept of the cosmos provides an analogy for the apocalyptic idea of history, it does not imply that 'the apocalyptic genre is derived from Hellenistic culture or that the Jewish apocalypses lack their own originality and integrity'.[34] Although the Hellenistic world provides some of the codes used in apocalypses, that the Jewish apocalypses rely on biblical tradition and that common Hellenistic motifs assume a distinctive outlook in a Jewish context remain paramount.

Among the first set of scholars to undertake the study of prayer in the Dead Sea Scrolls was Shemaryahu Talmon.[35] Following his observation that the prayers of the Scrolls were developed for, and recited on, certain occasions, Talmon argued that the Qumranites' renunciation of the Temple cult and the cessation of that cult resulted in the institution of fixed prayer among the Qumran sect. As a substitute for the sacrificial worship which characterized the Temple cult from which the sect had already distanced itself, the Qumranites adopted what they called the 'worship of the heart'. This is evident in the use of sacrificial language to denote prayer, e.g. 'an offering of the lips' (1QS 9.5). Thus praying among the sect was viewed as a replacement of the Temple sacrifice. This sociological factor of prayer is now widely recognized among many scholars of the Scrolls.[36]

In the 1980s and 1990s, the study of prayer in the Scrolls assumed a different outlook. This was due in part to the publication of more prayer texts from Qumran.[37] The publication made the extent, the variety of material and the prominence of liturgical works clearer. While the decision of earlier scholarship, that prayer was a substitute for sacrifice, was based on the few existing texts which were distinctively sectarian (especially the *Hodayot* and the concluding hymn of 1QS), the rush in publication of prayer texts during

33. Russell, *The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic*, p. 231.

34. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination*, p. 36.

35. See S. Talmon, 'The "Manual of Benedictions" of the Sect of the Judaean Desert', *RevQ* 2 (1960), pp. 475–500; *idem.*, 'The Emergence of Institutionalized Prayer in Israel in the Light of the Qumran Literature', *The World of Qumran from Within* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989, pp. 200–43) – this latter article was originally published in M. Delcor (ed.) *Qumrân. Sa Piété, sa théologie et son milieu* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1978).

36. This sociological factor was first echoed in J. Baumgarten, 'Sacrifice and Worship Among the Jewish Sectarians of the Dead Sea (Qumran) Scrolls', *HTR* 46 (1953), pp. 141–59.

37. The publication includes the complete version of the Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice, The Words of the Luminaries, Ritual Blessings (4Q512) and the Hymn against Demons (4Q510–11).

those years reveals that prayers for fixed occasions were not an exclusively sectarian practice. As a way of distinguishing sectarian practice from non-sectarian, several methodological studies emerged.[38] Some of these studies were devoted to:

> the recovery of authentic traditions shared by different Jewish groups during the Second Temple period. This is because the Scrolls – to the extent that they preserve imported, non Qumranic works amassed by the Qumran covenanters – provide direct evidence of Jewish religious practice, belief and literature outside the confines of that sectarian community.[39]

The more outstanding publication on prayer research of the period was that of B. Nitzan. It was originally published in Hebrew (1989) and later translated into English (1994).[40] Although Nitzan did not incorporate the provenance of the documents found at Qumran in her monograph, she did not hesitate to submit that the texts found in the Scrolls made use of contemporary traditional prayer, and by so doing, the texts at Qumran serve as witness to the existence of fixed prayer in Second Temple Judaism.[41] For Nitzan, the fixed prayer form of the Scrolls which is similar to rabbinical prayer reflects a point of transition from the spontaneous biblical prayer to standardized rabbinical prayer.

It was also in the 1990s that scholars began to show interest in tracing the literary history of uncontested sectarian writings such as the *Hodayot*, the *War Scroll*, and the *Rule of the Community* – all of which exhibit one form of prayer or the other. This resulted in a careful comparison of texts in order to discover the nature of the relationship of the texts to one another. Examples of such an approach include E. Schuller's work on the cave 4

38. Such studies include Esther G. Chazon, 'Is Devrei ha-Me'orot a Sectarian Prayer?', in *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Forty Years of Research* (eds D. Dimant and U. Rappaport; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992, pp. 3–17); C. A. Newsom, '"Sectually Explicit" Literature from Qumran', in *The Hebrew Bible and Its Modern Interpreters* (eds. W. H. Propp, B. Halpern and D. N. Freedman; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns 1990, pp. 167–87); D. Dimant, 'The Qumran Manuscripts: Contents and Significance', in *Time to Prepare the Way in the Wilderness* (eds D. Dimant and L. H. Schiffman; Leiden: Brill, 1995, pp. 23–58).

39. E. Chazon, 'Hymns and Prayers in the Dead Sea Scrolls', in *The Dead Sea Scrolls After Fifty Years: A Comprehensive Assessment* (eds P. W. Flint & J. C. VanderKam; vol. 1; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998, pp. 244–70 [249]).

40. B. Nitzan, *Qumran Prayer and Religious Poetry* (trans. J. Chipman; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).

41. Chazon has criticized Nitzan for her failure to pay closer attention to recent assessments of the non-Qumranic origin of certain texts. See Chazon, review of *Qumran Prayer and Religious Poetry*, by B. Nitzan, in *DSD* 2 (1995), pp. 361–5.

Hodayot manuscripts,[42] and S. Metso's work on the *Community Rule*.[43] As more attention is given to textual relationships, scholarly awareness of various prayers for the same occasion increases.

While Qumran prayer research has focused on the emergence of institutionalized prayer (S. Talmon), liturgical history (Chazon, Nitzan) and literary inter-relationship (Schuller and Metso), questions raised by these Scrolls cannot be confined to these areas. Reading through the text of the *Rule of the Community* has prompted us to ask different questions about the Qumran prayer texts. The questions are about the ideological strategy of the text. They focus on the inter-relation of ideologies which characterize the text of 1QS. To be precise, our present study sets out to analyse the theology encoded in the prayer of 1QS and how that theology fits into the deterministic framework articulated in the text.

At the end of the last millennium, Schuller published an essay in which she explores the theme of determinism and petitionary prayer in the Dead Sea Scrolls.[44] The article remains a pioneering work on the subject in the English-speaking world.[45] She begins the article with a brief background sketch about the prayer texts before embarking on her main concern. She sets out to answer the question which she states in this manner: 'What is the interplay between a strong deterministic theology such as is generally recognized in the Scrolls and specifically petitionary prayer?'[46] In dealing with the question, Schuller focuses more on those exclusively sectarian materials such as the *Rule of the Community*, the *Thanksgiving Hymns*, the *War Scroll* and others to highlight the determinism of the Scrolls and the petitionary prayer that characterize the religion at Qumran. After a careful presentation of deterministic and

42. Schuller's work reveals the existence of different versions of the *Hodayot*. Some of the collections had only 'Hymns of the Teacher' (4QH^c), others only 'Hymns of the Community' (4QH^a). There are also some which had both 1QH^a and 4QH^b. See E. Schuller, 'Prayer, Hymnic and Liturgical Texts from Qumran', in *The Community of the Renewed Covenant* (eds. E. Ulrich and J. VanderKam; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1993, pp. 153–71 [153–55, 166–9]); *idem*: 'The Cave Four Hodayot Manuscripts: A Preliminary Description', *JQR* 85 (1994), pp. 137–50.

43. Metso argued that the opening sections of the covenant renewal (1QS 1–2) and the two spirits (1QS 3–4) and also the hymn which concludes the *Rule* were not originally part of the *Rule*. The *Rule* as it now stands is a final production of several redactional stages. See Metso, *Textual Development*, pp. 143–9.

44. Schuller, 'Prayer and Religion', pp. 29–45.

45. Scholarly awareness of the theme of determinism and prayer in the Dead Sea Scrolls prior to Schuller's publication is echoed in a brief contribution by Israel Knohl in the appendix to his article in the *JBL*. The piece affirms that 'regular petitionary prayers do appear in some works found in Qumran, but these are evidently not explicitly sectarian works'. See I. Knohl, 'Between Voice and Silence: The Relationship Between Prayer and Temple Cult', *JBL* 115 (1996), pp. 29–30.

46. Schuller, 'Prayer and Religion', pp. 34–5.

petitionary materials, she asserts: 'Yet the total picture is more varied and complex, particularly now that we can take into account the full corpus of the Scrolls.'[47]

In the final analysis, Schuller concludes that the prayer texts used by the Essene community were mainly psalms and hymns of praise which 'confessed and acknowledged the sovereignty of God who has determined all things in his wisdom'.[48] And as regards petitionary prayer, she writes thus:

> Yet the community also continued to use some older, traditional compositions that had been fashioned by the pious in days past: the prayers for each day of the week and for festivals; confessions and lamentations; and the corpus of the much-beloved psalms of their ancestors, which included numerous lament psalms. In the praying of these texts, petition to God – with its implication that all is not absolutely fixed, that the human plea has a place in the divine economy and will be heard – became part of the religious experience of this praying community.[49]

While her usage of wide varieties of texts is strongly commended, it does not undermine the need to study each of the texts in its own right to discover the kind of determinism and prayer that is peculiar to it. Schuller rightly acknowledges the importance of her contribution when she concurs that 'the scenario that is reconstructed here can only be tentative and a starting point for further reflection'.[50] And for this reason, her work should be seen as a starting point on the subject that is yet to win the attention of the Dead Sea Scrolls' scholarship. Our present enquiry is therefore to be seen, in part, as a furtherance of this pioneering work of Schuller. However, it differs from Schuller's contribution in the sense that, instead of exploring a wide variety of texts from the Scrolls, it focuses on only one text, the *Rule of the Community*.

D. Determinism and Prayer Defined

1. Determinism in Biblical Tradition

Since there is a lack of scholarly consensus on the use of terms in debate, it is appropriate to clarify what we mean by determinism in this study. In biblical tradition, the existence of God is assumed, and that God is presented as the architect of the universe. He sets the course of the universe. There are scholars

47. Schuller, 'Prayer and Religion', p. 43.
48. Schuller, 'Prayer and Religion', p. 45.
49. Schuller, 'Prayer and Religion', p. 45.
50. Schuller, 'Prayer and Religion', p. 45.

such as E. H. Merrill[51] and D. A. Carson[52] who prefer the term 'predestination' to 'determinism', but for different reasons. Merrill draws a distinction between the terms 'determinism' and 'predestination' on the grounds that determinism refers to non-Jewish concepts such as pagan fatalism, which precludes human responsibilities.[53] On the other hand, Carson makes the distinction on the basis of the exclusion of God in determinism. '"Predestination" . . . refers to the fore-ordination of events by God', while 'determinism' supposes that 'all is in principle completely predictable according to the universal laws of nature, but which does not trace such fixedness to God'.[54]

In our study, the focus is on the principle of cause and effect which is common to both determinism and predestination. However, it should be noted that the notion of predestination in biblical tradition is sometimes used in a narrow sense of the election of certain people unto salvation and not necessarily the generality of divine providence. Dewey D. Wallace's remark on this point puts predestination in the right perspective: 'Sometimes predestination is considered as *a part* (italics mine) of divine providence, namely, that aspect of the divine determination of all things that refers to the supernatural end of souls, as opposed to the determination of persons with regard to all else or of the natural order.'[55] Nevertheless, we shall use the terms 'determinism' and 'predestination' interchangeably in the sense that they both affirm the dictates of God beforehand (cause), whether broadly or narrowly, which guide the course of events (effect).

The book of Genesis introduces God as the one responsible for the existence of the universe. He puts the universal order in place by giving form and shape to the world which he created.[56] The order is expressed, for example, in terms of the distinctions between light (day) and darkness (night), earth and sea (each with its inhabitants). God does not only arrange the universal order but

51. Eugene H. Merrill, *Qumran and Predestination: A Theological Study of the Thanksgiving Hymns* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975). In this study, Merrill employed the term 'predestination' to denote the providential arrangement of the universe and the human responsibility that characterizes the faith of Qumran. His attempt to distinguish the determinism of the Scrolls from Greek fatalism led him to stress the human responsibility which is implied in the ascetic lifestyle of the members of the community: 'Their life of strenuous piety and their oft-expressed fears concerning exclusion from the Community and/or falling from grace show that practically speaking they understood something quite different from Zoroastrian determinism when they wrote about predestination.' (p. 14)

52. D. A. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, (MTL; London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1981, pp. 2–3).

53. Merrill, *Qumran and Predestination*, p. 8.

54. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, p. 3.

55. Dewey D. Wallace, 'Free Will and Predestination', in *ER*, vol. 5, pp. 422–6 (422).

56. The shape of the world before the divine arrangement is described as 'formless' and 'void'.

also ascertains that the order carries out its task in accordance with the divine intention.

> Then God said, 'let there be lights in the expanse of the heavens to separate the day from the night, and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years; and let them be for lights in the expanse of the heavens to give light on the earth'; and it was so. And God made the two great lights, the greater light to govern the day, and the lesser light to govern the night; he made the stars also. And God placed them in the expanse of the heavens to give light on the earth, and to govern the day and night, and to separate the light from the darkness. (Gen. 1.15-18)

This is the universe in which humanity is given the mandate to 'rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky, and over every living thing that moves on the earth'. (Gen. 1.28) In spite of this dominion given to human beings, it is never within their reach to alter or amend the universal order that has been set up by God. Thus, human beings carry out their task as a ruler within the confinement of a divinely established universal arrangement which is irreversible. While they can determine the destiny of sea and land creatures, they can neither re-arrange for instance the sequence of day and night, nor alter the sun, moon and stars from fulfilling their functions.

A different form of determinism is echoed in the book of Deuteronomy, which forms the basis for the theological framework of the Deuteronomistic[57] narrative (Joshua–II Kings). While the determinism in Genesis may be categorized as 'cosmological', the determinism in Deuteronomy is soteriological because it is concerned with the bases upon which Israel remains alive or dead in the land of Canaan. The commandments in Deuteronomy 5 call on Israel to obey. The obedience is expressed in 5.1 in terms of 'learning' (למד), 'keeping' (שמר) and 'doing' (עשה). The object of study is described as 'statutes' and 'ordinances', and the contents are the Ten Commandments (5.7-21). These statutes constitute the essence of Life. 'You must therefore be careful to do as the LORD your God has commanded you; you shall not turn to the right or to the left. You must follow exactly the path that the LORD your God has commanded you, so that you may **live**, and that it may go well with you, and that you may **live** long in the land that you are to possess.' (5.32-33, cf. 4.1, 40).

57. The term 'Deuteronomic' refers to material found in the book of Deuteronomy (especially chs 5–28), and 'Deuteronomistic' refers to those writings and concepts which have been influenced by the Deuteronomic Torah. The main proponent of the Deuteronomistic hypothesis was Martin Noth. The theory sets out to show that the books of Deuteronomy–II Kings in their present form are the work of one author. This author is identified as the Deuteronomistic historian. See Martin Noth, *Deuteronomistic History* (JSOTSup, 15; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1981). For modifications and revisions of Noth's hypothesis, see Richard D. Nelson, *The Double Redaction of the Deuteronomistic History* (JSOTSup, 18; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1981); Mark A. O'Brien, *The Deuteronomistic History Hypothesis: A Reassessment* (OBO, 92; Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1989).

Appended to the statutes are blessings and curses (Deut. 27–28). The purpose of the blessings and the curses is to inspire obedience. According to Deuteronomy, obedience in practical terms means to 'not turn to the right or to the left' but to 'follow exactly the path that the LORD your God has commanded' (5.32, 33; cf. 17.19-20). In other words, the pathway to Life and blessings is a consistent walk in the divine statutes. This essential of Life and prosperity is irreversible from the Deuteronomist standpoint: 'I call heaven and earth to witness against you today that I have set before you life and death, blessings and curses. Choose life so that you and your descendants may live' (30.19). These are unalterable statutes which determine the destiny of Israel and its leaders in the books of Joshua–2 Kings.

Apart from the cosmological and soteriological determinism in Genesis and the Deuteronomistic tradition respectively, there is a nuance of ethical determinism in the story of Moses and Pharaoh in Exod. 7.2-3. By hardening Pharaoh's heart, God is depicted as pre-conditioning human decisions (in this case Pharaoh's thoughts). 'However, this idea seems more designed to provide an explanation for Pharaoh's continuing (and successful) resistance to the God of Israel in the narrative rather than genuinely to express a deterministic worldview.'[58] The idea of ethical determinism is echoed in Josephus:

> Now at this time there were three sects of the Jews, which held different opinions concerning human actions: the first was that of the Pharisees, the second the Sadducees, and the third the Essenes. Now the Pharisees say that some things, but not all, are the work of fate; whether some are going to happen or not depends upon ourselves. But the sect of the Essenes maintains that fate is ruler of all things and that nothing happens to people except it be according to its decree. (*Ant.* 13.171–2)

The extent to which the Pharisees and the Essenes upheld determinism may differ but there is unanimity on what is being determined and it is 'concerning human actions' – περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. This ethical determinism is uncommon in biblical tradition,[59] and even in Jewish apocalyptic literature, it is not obvious.[60] The nearest parallel is found in

58. Rudman, *Determinism in Ecclesiastes*, p. 161.

59. Rudman has argued that the determinism of the book of Ecclesiastes extends to human action. The problem with this view is that even those scholars who affirm a certain degree of determinism in Qoheleth are reluctant to stretch the determinism to human actions.

60. Although ethical determinism goes back to Greek antiquity, and is represented in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. While Socrates believed that human beings choose for themselves whatever in their view is best for them, Plato went further to hypothesize that those who know exactly what is morally good can hardly choose to do anything else. To act otherwise must surely be involuntary or due to ignorance of the good (see Plato, *Laches*, 196d1–199d; *Meno*, 77a–d). Thus for Plato, virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance. It

the Dead Sea Scrolls – 1QS 3 (this will be discussed in Chapter 2). It is not surprising that T. S. Beall, in his effort to validate Josephus' description of the Essenes, turns to the Scrolls for clues and by the same token equates the Qumranites with Josephus' Essenes.[61]

There are other indications in the Old Testament that God directs the course of events. However, such divine involvement should be conceived of in terms of guiding the course of historical events. The book of Jonah, for instance, speaks of God's intention to overthrow Nineveh: 'Yet forty days and Nineveh will be overthrown.' (Jonah 3.4) This idea of God making up his mind about a city is also evident in the case of Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis 18). In the cases of these three cities, God exercised his willingness to reverse his decrees, depending on the response of the inhabitants of Nineveh, and the possibility of finding a sufficient number of faithful in Sodom and Gomorrah. The Old Testament also recognizes the decree of God concerning individuals, such as Abram (Genesis 12), Hezekiah (Isaiah 38) and David (2 Samuel 7) etc. God predestined Abram to be father of a nation, and determined the permanence of the Davidic dynasty. However, in the case of Hezekiah, God reversed his earlier decree of death concerning King Hezekiah following the prayer of the king. While all these examples from the Bible suggest that God is capable of determining the course of historical events, they also reveal that historical determinism is not always absolute and rigid. 'In general, the Hebrew Bible may be said to be indeterministic in the sense that although God regularly intervenes in history, human beings remain in control of their own moral choices and, generally speaking, over their own actions.'[62] Although the Hebrew Bible displays some deterministic tendencies, most especially in the creation account, there is a lack of explicit rigid overtones similar to those which characterized the Hellenistic thought pattern.

2. What is Petitionary Prayer?

In the range of words used to denote the concept of prayer in the Old Testament, there are two which stand out most. They are עתר and פלל. The verb עתר means, 'to pray, to supplicate'. In its niphal form, it denotes 'to be supplicated, to be entreated'. It also occurs in the hiphil which is 'to make

follows therefore that 'since the human will is determined to incline toward the good, real, or apparent, all of man's voluntary actions are thus ethically determined'. On the other hand, Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1145b20–1146b30) rejected the Platonic theory of ethical determinism on the grounds that 'man's appetites or desires are often at war with reason in coveting something evil when it is known to be evil'. See J. T. Hickey, 'Determinism', in *EDR*, vol. 1, pp. 1039–40.

61. Todd S. Beall, *Josephus' Description of the Essenes Illustrated by the Dead Sea Scrolls* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 113–14).

62. Rudman, *Determinism in Ecclesiastes*, p. 171.

supplication'.[63] In all these occurrences in the Hebrew Bible, it is used with reference to God. In other words, the verb signifies entreaty and supplication directed to God. And even in the case of its niphal form, it is God who is granting the entreaty.[64]

The word פלל is the more popular prayer term. The verb carries a variety of meanings.[65] The aspect that is of relevance to our study is its hithpael form and the noun תפלה. While the origin of the hithpael form and the noun is contested, their meanings are clear in the contexts in which they occur. Their usage is confined to prayer.[66] The hithpael form means 'pray', 'intercede'. When the form is used to denote *intercession*, it is used with prepositions such as על or בעד (both can be read as 'for' or 'on behalf of'), e.g. Gen. 20.7; Num. 21.7; 1 Sam. 7.5; 2 Chron. 30.18. On the other hand, its usage for *petition* occurs with the prepositions לפני –'before', אל – 'unto, to' as in Dan. 9.4; 1 Sam. 1.26; 8.6; 2 Sam. 7.27; 1 Kgs 8.48. The noun form תפלה 'prayer' occurs over 70 times and it refers to 'both cultic and non cultic prayer, both sung and spoken prayer'.[67] The term is used to designate Psalms 17, 86, 90, 102 and 142. It is also used as the summary of the second division of the Psalter (Ps. 72.20).[68]

63. The qal and the hiphil forms of the verb appear more in the Pentateuch than any other section of the Old Testament (Gen. 25.21; Exod. 8.4, 5, 24, 25, 26; 9.28; 10.17, 18). All the niphal occurrences but two (Isa. 19.22; Gen. 25.21) are found in the historical books (2 Sam. 21.14; 24.25; 2 Chron. 33.13; 33.19).

64. The use of עתר is usually in the sense of petition. This is evident for instance in the story of Isaac and Rebekah in Genesis 25. Rebekah could not have children. The use of the word עקר meaning 'childless' to denote the state of Rebekah suggests that she was not alone in her condition. The adjective placed her in the same limelight with those women that the Bible noted as the bearers of the promised children. The women include Sarai (Gen. 11.30) and Rachael (Gen. 29.31). While Sarai and Rachael attempted to remove the shame of being known as עקרה by giving their husbands surrogates (Gen. 16.1-2; 30.3-4), Rebekah's situation was resolved by עתר, i.e. 'praying'. Her husband, Isaac, 'demonstrated that intercessory prayer rather than concubinage could effectively reverse his wife's biological situation'. See Victor P. Hamilton, 'עקר', in *NIDOTTE*, vol. 3, p. 510.

65. For a detailed list of meanings, see Ludwig Koehler and Walter Baumgartner, 'פלל', in *HALOT*, vol. 3. See also E. M. Schuller, 'The Use of Biblical Terms as Designations for Non-Biblical Hymnic and Prayer Compositions', in *Biblical Perspectives: Early Use and Interpretation of the Bible in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls* (eds Michael E. Stone and Esther G. Chazon; STDJ, 28; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998, pp. 207-22 [220–1]).

66. P. A. Verhoef, 'Prayer', in *NIDOTTE*, vol. 4, pp. 1060–6.

67. J. Herrmann, 'εὔχομαι, Prayer in the OT', in *TDNT*, vol. 2, pp. 785–800.

68. These occurrences in the Psalter led some scholars including Herrmann to concur that תפלה is often a parallel of שיר in the Psalter, see Herrmann, 'εὔχομαι, Prayer in the OT'. The word has assumed a technical term in the scholarship on the Psalter. For instance, Mowinckel and Gunkel considered the word as the technical term in Hebrew for the Psalm of Lamentation for an individual.

However, the conception of prayer in the Hebrew Bible is broader than the usage of עתר and פלל.[69] It includes: (1) petition, (2) adoration, (3) praise, (4) confession and (5) thanksgiving. Each prayer type falls under one of these two broader categories, namely, (a) an expression of homage to God and (b) an expression of a need. The only exception however is thanksgiving, in that it relates to both categories because, as W. L. Liefeld explains, it 'honours God (type one) by contemplating fulfilled needs (type two)'.[70] The aspect that is of special relevance here is what Liefeld classifies as expression of need – petition. Liefeld defines petition as 'the expression of dependence upon God for provision of needs'.[71]

C. Westermann adopts a similar definition but he goes further to show that two distinguishable elements are present in petition. The first is what he calls 'petition for something'.[72] This is generally conceived of as the listing of various requests. The second element present in petition is what Westermann classified as 'supplication'.[73] The object of supplication is determined by the situation of the one making supplication, and the situation is mostly that of lament.

While the supplicatory aspect may be the focus in the study of the Psalter, such singular emphasis does not necessarily diminish the use of the term to include asking something for oneself as well as others without the presence of lament. Any attempt to reduce the term only to supplication in the condition of lament as Westermann does in the case of the Psalter would not do justice to the other sections of the Hebrew Bible in which one encounters prayers of a petitionary kind.

Biblical petitions are made up of both brief appeals and complex elaborate expressions. The appeals are intimately bound up and correlated with the literary situation out of which they arose. F. Buck noted this circumstantial factor when he concluded that the prayer of primitive people arose from environmental needs that proved to be beyond human control. As a last resort,

69. For a concise list of other terms employed in the Hebrew Bible to denote the concept of prayer, see F. Buck, 'Prayer in the Old Testament', in *Word and Spirit*, (ed. J. Plevnik; Willowdale, ON: Regis College Press, 1975, pp. 61–110 [71–2]).

70. W. L. Liefeld, 'Prayer', in *ISBE*, vol. 3, pp. 931–9.

71. R. E. Clements embraced a similar definition. According to Clements, asking something from God for oneself forms the bedrock of petition. Lk. 11.9 offers a concise and precise insight on this definition, 'Ask . . . seek . . . and knock'. However petition, as Clements noted, can become 'self-centred and ultimately destructive in spiritual understanding' because a prayer repetition of 'give me . . . ; give me . . .' portrays a mind that is not adequately informed about the nature of God. See R. E. Clements, *The Prayers of the Bible* (London: SCM Press, 1986, pp. 10–11).

72. Claus Westermann, *Praise and Lament in the Psalms* (trans. Keith R. Crim and R. N. Soulen; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1981, p. 33).

73. Westermann, *Praise and Lament in the Psalms*, pp. 33–4.

human beings turned to higher and mightier beings by means of entreaty to influence those superhuman beings.[74]

Such circumstantial prayers are found in the patriarchal narratives. The prayer of Abraham in Genesis 18 is a typical example: Abraham's appeal to Yahweh (Gen. 18.22-33) was necessitated by the disclosure of God's impending judgement on Sodom and Gomorrah. The content of the appeal focused on Yahweh's averting the imminent danger. 'Will you indeed sweep away the righteous with the wicked? Suppose there are fifty righteous within the city; will you indeed sweep it away and not spare the place for the sake of the fifty righteous who are in it?' (Gen. 18.23-24) In an attempt to offer a functioning definition for her investigation of the scripturalization of prayer in Second Temple Judaism, Judith H. Newman eliminates this intercession of Abraham from her category of prayer by defining prayer as 'address to God that is initiated by humans; it is not conversational in nature; and it includes address to God in the second person, although it can include third person description of God.'[75] She rejects the definition proposed by scholars such as E. Chazon,[76] M. Greenberg,[77] and S. Balentine[78] as being too broad in certain ways and inadequate. Because of her overarching interest in the history of biblical interpretation within the confines of prayers, Newman's definition excludes human address to God in the form of conversation. She rejects Abraham's plea on behalf of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 18.23-32) as prayer because it is not only conversational in nature but also initiated by God and not Abraham.[79] Although Newman does not deny the fact that many blessings addressed to God in the second person constitute prayers,

74. F. Buck, 'Prayer in the Old Testament', p. 61. Buck also noted that prayer was a common phenomenon in antiquity. It was part of the official cult. Prayers were addressed to the gods. In Assyro-Babylonian prayer for instance, prayer was a collective exercise, although there were individual prayers. Among the known forms of prayer were 'praise' and 'lament'. The lamentations contained 'confession of sins, descriptions of the suppliant's misfortune, pleas for pardon, promises to adore the deity'. There are points of difference between the prayers of the Ancient Near East and the biblical prayers: while the prayers of the Ancient Near East were addressed to many gods, biblical prayers are 'addressed to Yahweh and to Him alone'.

75. Judith H. Newman, *Praying by the Book: The Scripturalization of Prayer in Second Temple Judaism*, (SBLEJL; Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 2001, pp. 6–7).

76. See Chazon, 'Prayers from Qumran and Their Historical Implications', *DSD* 1 (1994), pp. 265–84 (266) where she defines prayer as 'any form of human communication directed at God'.

77. Moshe Greenberg, *Biblical Prose Prayer* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983, p. 7) – prayer is defined as 'nonpsalmic speech to God – less often about God – expressing dependence, subjection, or obligation; it includes petition, confession, benediction and curse . . .'

78. Samuel E. Balentine, *Prayer in the Hebrew Bible: The Drama of Divine-Human Dialogue* (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1993, esp. p. 30).

79. Newman, *Praying by the Book*, p. 7.

she eliminates them from the focus of her study because of their form-critical structure. It is also by the same token that she excludes a third-person blessing such as the Aaronic benediction of Num. 6.24-26 and not necessarily because it is composed in the third person.[80]

It is apparent that Newman chooses to narrow her definition of prayer because of the focus of her enquiry. However such interest does not warrant a reduction of the prayer elements which dot the pages of the Hebrew Bible. For example, Newman asserts that Abraham's dialogue with God over the fate of the Sodomites does not qualify as prayer because God initiated the exchange of views and the bargaining is conversational. If that is the case, what then should we call the request of Abraham on behalf of the Sodomites other than 'petition', i.e. asking God to alter the course of events? Should the fact that the request occurs in the context of a dialogue override the element of 'asking' that characterizes the petitionary form of prayer? If it is the fact that God initiates the conversation that makes it less of a prayer, what about the cases of Hezekiah in Isaiah 38 (God through his prophets initiates the discussion regarding the death of Hezekiah, and it results in the plea of Hezekiah) and that of Moses in Num. 14.11-20 (especially Moses' plea for mercy and pardon in vv. 17-19 within the context of his conversation with God)? There can be no doubt that it is a complex task to arrive at a precise and closed definition of prayer; this is anticipated by the text of the Hebrew Bible in its use of various vocabularies and forms to denote the notion of prayer.

In the context of the Abrahamic covenant of Genesis 17, the fact of old age posed a threat to the promise of a child to Abraham through Sarah; the outburst of Abraham goes thus, 'Oh that Ishmael might live before thee!' (Gen.17.18) Another illustration is found in Genesis 24 on the occasion of finding a bride for Isaac: the servant who was assigned the task sought the directives of Yahweh in these words:

> O Lord, the God of my master Abraham, please grant me success today and show lovingkindness to my master Abraham. Behold, I am standing by the spring, and the daughters of the men of the city are coming out to draw water. Now may it be that the girl to whom I say, 'Please let down your jar so that I may drink,' and who answers 'Drink, and I will water your camels also'; – may she be the one whom thou hast appointed for thy servant Isaac. And by this I shall know that thou hast shown lovingkindness to my master. (Gen. 24.12-14)

All these prayers arose out of particular circumstances and they were shaped by those situations. Their importance was temporal in the sense that they ceased with the change in the circumstances that evoked them. The events rather than a set of beliefs determined their contents. They are less conscious of ideology because they are events-oriented. The fact that biblical prayers were situation-conditioned makes them unpredictable. In terms of locality where they were uttered, there was no restriction. The timing,

80. Newman, *Praying by the Book*, p. 7.

wording and venue were precisely determined by circumstances. B. Nitzan, after a brief survey of the variety of forms of prayer in the Bible, offers this concluding remark: 'that there are no fixed times for the recitation of prayers; that there are a small number of texts, with permanently set formulae, recited in a fixed manner upon certain cultic occasions, but these are by and large occasional'.[81]

Another common feature of these prayers in their narrative contexts is that each is rendered with anticipation of a change in the given situation. The petition of Abraham on behalf of Sodom and Gomorrah anticipated the aversion of the impending judgement. The prayer for Ishmael's survival was rendered in expectation that Ishmael would be granted to become the heir of God's covenant with Abraham. Praying for guidance in finding a wife for Isaac was intended to change him from being single to being married. Again, prayer in a narrative context, being a natural response of a human being in a given condition, constitutes an effort to alter the course of existence in which one finds oneself.

The prayers documented in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha do not display any striking deviation from those of the Hebrew Bible. They are prayers rendered in the situation of joy and travail of the individual and the community. While passages abound in the Intertestamental books on prayers, because of the length of this study, it is only appropriate to cite one or two passages: the book of Tobit offers some clues on the Apocryphal prayers which are found in narrative contexts.

The prayer of Tobit (Tob. 3.1-6) is an elaborate kind of prayer. It is made up of different parts: praise, petition and confession. The prayer is rendered in the condition of 'grief and anguish of heart' (3.1). The circumstances of Tobit were blindness and the challenge to his pious character by his wife. The prayer is similar to the post-exilic prayer of Ezra and Nehemiah in that it is a lengthy kind of individual prayer. It begins with an acknowledgement of the divine goodness (3.2). The invocation is followed by the petition, and the move is made possible by the use of the transitional phrase, 'And now' (3.3). The petition is for divine favour, aversion of punishment because of sin – including that of Tobit's ancestors. The prayer goes on to enumerate how God dealt with the people because of their sins (3.4-5). The petitioner (i.e. Tobit) prayed that his life should be cut off because the anguish he suffered has robbed him of the joy of being alive. Tobit was not alone in this prayer for sudden death. Sarah the daughter of Raguel also prayed for death so as to escape the reproach she suffered for not having a husband (3.7-15). God answered the prayer of Tobit and Sarah at the same time by restoring the sight of Tobit and by providing a husband as a remedy for the shame of Sarah. Other people who prayed include Tobias (see 8.4-8) and Raguel (8.15-17).

The prayers of the Intertestamental literature, like the biblical prayers, were rendered with the anticipation of a change of circumstances. In his commentary on the prayer of Tobit, C. A. Moore writes, 'In the Old Testament

81. Nitzan, *Qumran Prayer*, p. 39.

Apocrypha, the insertion of a prayer is a characteristic literary technique for signalling a dramatic change in action.'[82] Moore also noted this trait in the prayer of Judith (Judith 9) and the prayer in 1 Macc. 7.37-38. While this literary function of prayer as highlighted by Moore is accurate, it should also be emphasized that the notion that prayer precipitates change in real life is part of the ideological world-view of the Intertestamental period. In other words, the prayers of Tobit, Sarah and others do not only allow the writer to move from the account of one event to another but also serve as windows through which one gains insight into the world-view of the Intertestamental period. The prayers were the petitioners' own way of protesting against the conditions in which they found themselves. The only difference between Intertestamental prayers and the biblical prayers is the active role of an intermediary[83] and this is of no relevance to our enquiry.

It was the form and structure of the Psalms which served as a paradigm on which the prayers of the Intertestamental literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls were patterned. It is not surprising therefore that the interests of many scholars in the prayers of the Dead Sea Scrolls have focused mainly on their significance for the history and character of Jewish liturgical practices after the destruction of the second Temple.[84] This general trend in the prayer scholarship of the Dead Sea Scrolls is echoed in these words, 'Thus, this body of data is potentially available link between the mostly *ad hoc* prayers glimpsed in the Hebrew Bible and later synagogue liturgy.'[85] This present study is a detour from that popular trend. It sets out on a different adventure – the theology of prayer in the *Rule of the Community*.

There are three main elements in the prayers of the Hebrew Bible: (1) petitioner; (2) address; (3) addressee. The petitioner can be an individual or a group who expresses the outburst of his heart in a language of dependence upon a higher being. The expression may anticipate a change of circumstances or an acknowledgement of God's mighty acts which warrant praise. The petitioner can identify himself in the first person: 'Save me, O God by your name, and vindicate me by your power.' (Ps. 54.1) 'Deliver me from my enemies, O my God, set me securely on high away from those who rise up against me. Deliver

82. C. A. Moore, *Tobit* (AB; London: Doubleday, 1996, p.141).

83. The intermediary role of the angels with reference to prayer is not a prominent feature in the Old Testament as it is in the Intertestamental literature except in the latter writings when prophecy was on its way to apocalyptic (Ezekiel, Zechariah and Daniel).

84. Such works, to name just a few, include M. Weinfeld, 'Prayer and Liturgical Practice in the Qumran Sect', in *Forty Years of Research*, pp. 241–58; E. G. Chazon, 'On the Special Character of the Sabbath Prayer: New Data from Qumran', *JJML* 15 (1993), pp. 1–21; Chazon, 'Prayers from Qumran and Their Historical Implications', *DSD* 1 (1994), pp. 265–84; D. Flusser, 'Qumran and Jewish "Apotropaic" Prayers', *IEJ* 16 (1966), pp. 194–205.

85. Daniel K. Falk, 'Prayer in the Qumran Texts', in *The Cambridge History of Judaism*, (eds William Horbury, W. D. Davies and J. Sturdy; vol. 3; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 852–76 [852]).

me from those who do iniquity, and save me from men of bloodshed.' (Ps. 59.1-2) 'O God you have rejected us, you have broken us, you have been angry, O restore us.' (Ps. 60.1) In these cited prayers, the petitioner is signified by 'me' and 'us'. This is not the case however in the prayer of Solomon for understanding. Solomon as the petitioner identifies himself thus: 'So give your servant an understanding to judge your people to discern between good and evil.' (1 Kgs 3.9) Thus the petitioner can also identify himself in the third person, and in the case of Solomon as 'your servant'.

In a typical supplicatory prayer, the petitioner is the beneficiary of the things asked for. The Hebrew Bible contains also prayers whose beneficiary is not the petitioner but someone else. Such prayers include the priestly blessings in Num. 6.24-26. While the prayer is to be recited by Aaron and his sons, it is the Israelite community who is the beneficiary of the petition embedded in the blessing.

The second element in the prayer of the Hebrew Bible is the address. The address itself is crucial because it may hint at the circumstances surrounding the prayer. On some occasions, the address may give a clue as regards the nature of the relationship which exists between the petitioner and God (e.g. Psalm 80). Much more important is the language in which the address is composed and the nature of the concerns or crises for which the petitioner is seeking a resolution. The petition is addressed to God, who is identified in the second person singular. While the language seems to be imperative, it is actually that of entreaty. 'You have seen it O Lord, do not keep silent.' (Ps. 35.22) 'Let thy lovingkindness, O Lord, be upon us, according as we have hoped in you.' (Ps. 33.22) That the addressee is identified in the second person singular shows that prayer is a direct communication from a human being to God.

The third element, addressee, is evident in some non-psalmic prayers; the petition begins with a call to God in the vocative. Sometimes God is described in relation to certain key individuals in the history of Israel.[86] For instance, the petition of David in 1 Chron. 29.18-19 opens in this manner: 'O Lord, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel our fathers . . .'[87] (cf. Gen. 24.12;

86. The fact that God is identified with key individuals in Israel shows the consciousness of the petitioner in particularizing the One to whom he addresses his prayers. The 'God' is not a distant God but one who has dealt in one way or another with the ancestors of the petitioner. More so, by identifying God with a certain individual, the petitioner is 'placing God and himself in the flow of the generation'. See W. Brueggmann, *Genesis* (Int.; Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1982, p. 263).

87. This formula occurs within a larger context of 1 Chron. 29.10-19 which is generally regarded as the benediction that concludes the series of David's addresses. At the beginning of the benediction in 29.10 the formula 'O Lord, the God of our ancestor Israel' is used. This same formula is amplified in 29.18 to show that the 'ancestor' intended in 29.10 includes Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Furthermore, the formula in 29.18 introduces the petition with which David concludes his benediction. According to S. Japhet, the purpose of the introductory formula in v. 18 is to end the Davidic prayer in the same way as it begins in v. 10. See S. Japhet, *I & II Chronicles* (OTL; London: SCM Press, 1993, pp. 509, 511).

32.9-12; Exod. 32.13) There are instances where the petitioners begin their prayer by invoking the name of the Lord and then move to their petition: 'O Lord of hosts, if thou wilt indeed look on the affliction of thy maidservant, and remember me, and not forget thy maidservant, but wilt give to thy maidservant a son, then I will give him to the Lord all the days of his life, and no razor shall touch his head.'(1 Sam. 1.11; cf. Isa. 38.3; Num. 12.13)

There are also occasions in which the petitions are introduced by an account of the mighty acts of God in the past. The petition acknowledges the goodness of God as experienced by the petitioner himself or his ancestors. Such is the case of the prayers of David (2 Sam. 7.18-29) and Solomon (1 Kgs 3.6-9). The petitioner's awareness of the divine favour in the past forms the bedrock upon which his petition rests. The transition from acknowledgement to petition is made possible in this transitional expression, 'now therefore . . .' (2 Sam. 7.25) or 'and now . . .' (1 Kgs 3.7)

This account of the mighty acts of God characterizes the prayer of confession in the post-exilic literature. The book of Nehemiah (ch. 9) offers a structural insight on such prayer.[88] The confession begins with the people's acknowledgement of the divine lordship over the universe (9.5-6). It continues by mentioning specific events in the history of Israel such as the election of Abram (9.7-8), the Exodus (9.9-23), and the occupation of Canaan (9.24-31). The people recount the election motif in their confession so as to show their acceptance of the fact that God is faithful in his promises. They also acknowledge the favour of God in spite of the shortcomings of their ancestors by retelling side by side the arrogance and stubbornness of Israel (9.16-18, 26-29) and the wondrous deeds of God (9.9-15, 19-25, 30-31). The confession leads to this petition: 'Now therefore, our God, the great and mighty and terrible God, who keeps covenant and steadfast love, let not all the hardship seem little to thee that has come upon us, upon our kings, our princes, our priests, our prophets, our fathers, and all thy people, since the time of the kings of Assyria until this day.' (9.32) This is the only explicit request made in the whole prayer and the petition is introduced by ועתה.

Another example of this structure is Psalm 106. The Psalm tells Israel's history in the same order and from a similar theological perspective. Although the Psalmist begins his retelling with the Exodus, the same theme of confession which one encounters in Nehemiah 9 is also found in Psalm 106. It is not surprising therefore that Nehemiah 9 is often compared with Psalm 106 because they both 'use historical recollection as a vehicle for confession and

88. Scholars have drawn attention to the Deuteronomic colouring of this passage simply because of its reproduction of the cyclical pattern of rebellion, retribution, prayer for deliverance, and restoration. J. Blekinsopp for instance does not hesitate to speak of Neh. 9.26-31 in this manner: 'The source for this part of the prayer is the Deuteronomic historian's summary of the period of the Judges (Judg. 2.11-23), filled out with themes from prophetic preaching, especially Ezek. 20.' See J. Blekinsopp, *Ezra-Nehemiah* (OTL; London: SCM Press, 1988, p. 306). While the Deuteronomic influence remains strong on the passage, the emphasis of the passage is on the prayer of confession.

as a ground on which to base an appeal for mercy'.[89] Other later texts of similar style (i.e. of historical recital) include Bar. 1.15–3.8 and the Prayer of Manasseh 11. Again all these texts make the transition from confession with the use of 'and now' – ועתה.

It should be noted that not every prayer of confession has this element of embedded petition. Suffice it to say that it is a common feature in prayer of confession, especially in the post-exilic texts, to juxtapose the wondrous deeds of God with the sinful acts of human beings in order to show that the fault is not with God but human beings (see also Ezra 9.5-15). In this way, confession is an acknowledgement of one's inadequate condition in the context of divine righteousness. While confession may occur between a person and his neighbour, it is never a prayer until the confession is addressed to God. To put it differently, confession is a form of prayer because it is a human expression of one's inadequacies before God. Confession belongs in the category of petition because it is addressed to God in anticipation that forgiveness will be granted and thus precipitate a change in one's situation. This is to say that confession is an offering of the lips by a human being with the intention of appeasing God in order to secure forgiveness. I categorize confession, especially in light of the post-exilic writings, as petition because of its effect in changing the divine gesture towards the petitioner. This understanding of confession is important to this study because prayers of confession must be offered by anyone entering into the Qumran Community before the priests can offer their own blessing.

There is yet another form of petitionary prayer which is very pertinent to this study. It includes those petitions which are embedded in the blessings[90]and curses. The fact that these petitions now put on the language of blessing and

89. H. G. M. Williamson, *Ezra, Nehemiah* (WBC, 16; Waco, TX: Word Books, 1985, p. 307).

90. There is lack of scholarly unanimity on the etymology of the verb ברך. The most probable hypothesis among scholars is that the verb is a derivative of the noun form ברכה meaning 'gift', 'blessing'. If this is correct, the verbal form will then imply the granting of a gift. The verb and its cognates do not imply an abstract idea but substantial and material benefits. See B. A. Levine, *Numbers 1–12* (AB; London: Doubleday, 1993, p. 227). This is attested on the first occasion in which one encounters the concept of blessing in the Hebrew Bible – the creation account. The blessing is pronounced by God himself upon his creation. The blessing in the cases of sea creatures (Gen. 1.22) and human beings (Gen. 1.28) is concerned with multiplication. By virtue of divine blessing, according to G. von Rad, it becomes possible for these creatures to pass on the life they have received by means of their own procreation. Westermann expresses the same opinion when he speaks of blessing in the primaeval story as the power of fertility – 'God confers on the creature . . . the power to reproduce, multiply and fill the earth'. See G. von Rad, *Genesis* (London: SCM Press, 1972, p. 56); Westermann, *Genesis 1–11: A Commentary* (trans. John J. Scullion SJ; London: S.P.C.K., 1984, p. 140).

curses is clear evidence that they have taken on a standard liturgical structure for the purpose of communal worship.[91]

The priestly blessing in Num. 6.26 belongs to this category of blessings that express petition. 'The Lord bless you and keep you; the Lord make his face shine on you, and be gracious to you; the Lord lift up His countenance on you, and give you peace.' This blessing, like that of the patriarchal blessing of Gen. 27.27-29, is an invocation made by the petitioner asking God to do certain things for someone else. The recipient of the blessing is depicted in the language of the second person, while the God who is being summoned to act is in the third person. In biblical occurrences of blessing, the one invoking the blessing stands in the position of an intermediary between God who is being asked to grant the things asked for and the party on whom those things are bestowed. What is very significant about these blessings is that they shed light on one of the structures used by people to present their request before God.

Similarly, curses represent a form of prayer to God that he bring down certain misfortune upon the one being cursed. Among the people of the Ancient Near East in general, curses were attached to treaties between two parties.[92] Although ancient treaties were fundamentally elaborate promises, the function of the attached curses was to ensure that the promises would be kept by invoking the punishment of the gods on the defaulter.[93] The use of more than one term[94] to denote the idea of cursing in the Hebrew Bible is an indication that curse has 'a range of meaning from formal invocation of evil to violent denunciation or condemnation'.[95] The most common term for 'curse' is אָרַר.[96]

91. For a discussion of the psalms of blessing and cursing, see S. Mowinckel, *The Psalms in Israel's Worship* (trans. D. R. Ap-Thomas; vol. 2; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962, pp. 44–52).

92. See George E. Mendenhall, 'Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition', *BA* 17 (1954), pp. 50–76; Stanley Gevirtz, 'West-Semitic Curses and the Problem of the Origins of Hebrew Law', *VT* 11 (1961), pp. 137–58.

93. Delbert R. Hillers, *Treaty-Curses and the Old Testament Prophets* (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1964, p. 6).

94. H. C. Brichto, in his monograph on the subject of 'curse' in the Hebrew Bible, identified three principal terms, namely, אָלָה, אָרַר and קָלַל, to which he added others that figure less prominently, and they include קָבַב, זָעַם and חָרַם. The study was devoted to the investigation of all these terms 'with the specific objective of determining how they compare and differ in each case' and to arrive at a more precise meaning of each term. See H. C. Brichto, *The Problem of 'Curse' in the Hebrew Bible* (JBLM, XIII; Philadelphia, PA: Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, 1963); E. A. Speiser, 'An Angelic "Curse": Exodus 14:20', *JAOS* LXXX (1960), pp. 198–200.

95. Brichto, *The Problem of 'Curse'*, p. 2.

96. According to Brichto, the application of this term to earth or rain signifies a spell which bars fertility to men. On the other hand when it is applied to men (or animals), 'it bars them from the benefits of fertility or association with their fellow creatures'. See Brichto, *The Problem of 'Curse'*, pp. 114–15.

Nitzan has noted however that in biblical curses, the invocation of God's name is less common.[97]

The interweaving of blessings against curses occurs in the context of a covenant between God and his people for the observance of the Torah (Leviticus 26 and Deuteronomy 28). Again this practice of setting curses against blessings is attested in the covenant treaties and law codes of the people of the Ancient Near East.[98] It is used as 'a legal formula of covenantal obligation. Their function is to assure the fulfilment of the covenant or laws and to prevent their violation by serving as religious sanctions'.[99] From the biblical examples of Leviticus 26 and Deuteronomy 28, blessings against curses are addressed to those who enter into the covenant. These biblical examples serve as the backdrop against which we must understand the petitionary blessings and curses of the *Rule of the Community*.

E. Summary

In this chapter, the goal has been to show that prayer takes a prominent place in the ethos of the Jewish religion. It is the medium by which human beings communicate their joy and pains to God in the form of praise and petition. The Bible employs a variety of words to signify that communication. Moreover, the communication takes on certain patterns which were customarily recognized as prayer in the course of Jewish history. These customary patterns became a medium used by later generations to express their need of God in the different circumstances in which they found themselves. It is also worth noting that the narrative prayer of the Hebrew Bible is much more informed by circumstances than by ideology. And in the case of the prayer of petition, it is the particular situation which prompts the prayer that the petition seeks to confront by asking for divine intervention. In other words, petitionary prayer, both in the Hebrew Bible and Intertestamental writings, is rendered with anticipation of a change. The change expected in petitionary prayer can be that of cosmic events as in the case of Sodom and Gomorrah or in personal need as evident in Isaac's prayer for a child. It can also be change in the state of one's relationship with God as anticipated in the prayer of confession. Thus, it will be inadequate to separate the idea of change from the petitionary prayer in the biblical tradition.

On the other hand, determinism is about permanence and an unalterable view of the world. It sees the motion of events as irreversible. While it is

97. Nitzan, *Qumran Prayer*, p. 121.

98. F. C. Fensham, 'Maledictions and Benedictions in Ancient Near Eastern Vassal-Treaties and the Old Testament', *ZAW* 74 (1962), pp. 1–9. For a comparison between the treaty formulary in the Ancient Near East and the covenant formulary in the biblical tradition, see K. Baltzer, *The Covenant Formulary in Old Testament Jewish and Early Christian Writings* (trans. David E. Green; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971, pp. 9–38).

99. Nitzan, *Qumran Prayer*, p. 121.

evident from the Genesis account of creation that God creates the heavens and the earth, and determines the purpose of each of their components, the Old Testament also reveals that determinism is not always absolute and rigid. Thus one can explain the element of change that features prominently in the petitionary prayer of the Old Testament. However, Jewish writings from the period of the Second Temple, especially Apocalyptic, incorporate a certain sense of rigidness into their articulation of how God works, and thus present a world that is heading toward the end which God has pre-planned beforehand.

Chapter 2

DETERMINISM IN THE *RULE OF THE COMMUNITY* (1QS)

The theme of determinism, especially in the *Rule*[1], has not been given adequate attention in scholarly discussion of the Qumran literature. Although there is scholarly unanimity on the claim that the Qumran sect is a deterministic community, there have been few monographs and essays on the subject. Most references to determinism have been under the general discussion of the features of the Dead Sea Scrolls, especially the distinctive sectarian documents such as the *Rule* and the *Thanksgiving Hymns*. One major exception is a monograph by Merrill mentioned in Chapter One.[2]

Although Merrill's warning that we should not equate the Qumranian belief with that of pagan fatalism is quite understandable, it will be argued that the *Rule of the Community* subscribes to an immutable order of the universe. The fact that the universal order is set beforehand is indisputable. It is this prior arrangement to which everything conforms that we refer to as determinism. Although this form of determinism may appear strange to the ideological framework of the Hebrew Bible, a careful reading of the creation account of Genesis 1 indicates that the Qumranian view of a determined and unalterable universal order is not totally unprecedented in the Bible.[3]

While the concept of determinism is explicit in certain passages of the *Rule of the Community*, there are other passages in which the concept is only implied. Nevertheless it is appropriate to have a guiding framework by which we might identify the concept of determinism in 1QS.

A. Guidelines for Identifying Determinism in 1QS

The first guideline may be called 'linguistic attestation'. We can recognize determinism in a passage if the text employs certain terms. Although it is

1. For the 4QS parallels of the 1QS passages discussed in this chapter, see the textual notes in Charlesworth, critical edition.
2. Merrill, *Qumran and Predestination*.
3. See our earlier discussion in Chapter One (pp. 14–15).

inadequate to restrict the usage of words to one meaning, certain terms are peculiar to a particular ideology. And in the case of our subject, words such as 'beforehand, design or plan, establish, immutable' are vocabularies which are relevant. In the course of our study, attention will be drawn to this terminology of determinism.

Another cursor for recognizing determinism in 1QS can be cautiously called 'divine premeditation'. By this we mean an event which occurs or shall occur as a consequence of an earlier decision made by God. Where there is a lack of this earlier divine factor, there can be no determinism. This guideline sees a determined occurrence not in isolation but in relation to what precedes it (cause and effect). Thus an occurrence can be explained as inevitable on the grounds that it happens in compliance with the divine premeditation. In 1QS, determinism can be found in passages where the text speaks of or implies an occurrence as being a consequence of an earlier decision or previous act of God.

The theme of determinism can also be deduced from 1QS by applying the criterion of permanence. This criterion refers to those things which God has established at one point in time, and makes them remain the same for all generations. In other words, generations may change, but such divine ordinances do not alter and neither are they subject to alteration; and there is no amount of human effort that can alter the permanence of those ordinances. If we can find traces of such ordinances in our text, they will establish the presence of determinism in the *Rule*.

The guidelines mentioned above are not to be taken as the only ones. As a reader interacts with the text of 1QS itself, other insights may emerge. Suffice it to say that the framework proposed above is just a starting point in the road that few have travelled.

B. Literary Unity of 1QS 3–4

The larger unit of 1QS 3 and 4 raises the question of literary unity which takes us far beyond the limits of this enquiry and can be only briefly commented upon here. An example of the scholarly debate regarding the composite form of 1QS 3–4 is P. von der Osten-Sacken's reconstruction of the stages in the formation of 1QS dualism. He claimed that the section on the two spirits in the *Rule* is a production of three successive stages of growth and can be divided into the following: (a) 3.13–4.14; (b) 4.15-23a; (c) 4.23b-26. The earliest of these stages, 3.13–4.14, exhibits some traits which are peculiar to the dualism of the *War Scroll*.[4] In his 1987 article, Jean Duhaime argues for secondary additions to the section which Osten-Sacken classifies as the earliest stage of the development (i.e. 3.13–4.14). According to Duhaime, the secondary additions to the text of 1QS 3.13–4.14 include 3.13; 3.18b-25a.

4. P. von der Osten-Sacken, *Gott und Belial* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969, pp. 42–115).

Following his acknowledgement that other scholars such as J. Licht and J. Kamlah have previously noted certain additions with slight variations to column 3 of the *Rule*, he goes on to assert that the additions of 3.18b-25a took place in two stages. The first stage comprises 3.18b-23a and the other includes 3.13, 23b-25a.[5]

It is no longer possible to reconstruct with certainty what the text of 1QS 3 looked like at a certain stage. Osten-Sacken, for instance, sees 1QS 3.13–4.14 as a development of the eschatological dualism of the *War Scroll* (1QM 1 to be precise) and thus 1QS 3 is subsequent to 1QM 1. It is this same text (1QS 3) that Duhaime studied and concluded that those sections in 1QS 3, which exhibit features that are peculiar to the *War Scrolls*, are secondary additions, which implies that 1QS 3 in its original form antedates 1QM 1. Although the phenomenon one encounters in the text reveals that the text we now have is a production over a period of time, unity should be sought in theme(s) which reside(s) in the final form of the text.

C. Types of Determinism in 1QS

In approaching the theme of determinism in the *Rule of the Community*, the attention of the exegete is quickly drawn to the section on the two spirits (3.13–4.26) as a composite passage of much relevance. As a summary of the theme of the whole section, we shall analyse determinism in 3.15-17 before embarking on some specifics. Past scholarship has focused on this passage (3.13–4.26) more from the standpoint of dualism[6] than from that of determinism. However, earlier scholars overlooked the fact that there is hardly any dualistic construct that does not exhibit some deterministic elements in as much as dualism is generally viewed as the doctrine that the world is governed by two basic opposing and irreducible principles which explain all that exists.[7] The dualism in 1QS is anchored in the predetermined structure of creation.[8] The God of Knowledge sets up this structure of creation in antithetical pairs, and each pair runs its course in accordance

5. Jean Duhaime, 'Dualistic Reworking in the Scrolls From Qumran', *CBQ* 49 (1987), pp. 32–56 (41–3).

6. Such approaches include the following: Charlesworth, *John and the Dead Sea Scrolls*, pp. 76–89; Jörg Frey, 'Different Patterns of Dualistic Thought in the Qumran Library', in *Legal Texts and Legal Issues: Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies Cambridge 1995*, (eds M. Bernstein, F. García Martínez and J. Kampen; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997, pp. 275–335).

7. U. Bianchi, 'Religious Dualism', in *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Macropaedia, 26; London: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1997, pp. 555–60).

8. Frey does not hesitate to link the dualism in 1QS with the predestined order of creation in Sapiential tradition especially Sirach 33.10, 14, 16ff. See Frey, 'Different Patterns of Dualistic Thought in the Qumran Library', in *Legal Texts and Legal Issues*, pp. 297–8.

with its divinely assigned purpose. The polarity that exists between the pairs leads us to assume that there are certain fundamental properties which are pertinent to each pair, and that the properties of each of these pairs do not intermingle. For instance, the Angel of Darkness is fundamental to the domain of darkness, and the Angel of Light holds the domain of light and its property. The properties of each pair remain constant and unalterable. Thus the dualism in 1QS is as a result of the division of the order of creation into predetermined pairs by God.

There are also other scattered references in 1QS which reflect determinism. In order to avoid a fragmented structure because of these scattered references, we have categorized the passages including 3.15–4.26 under certain thematic sub-headings.

1. Cosmological Determinism (1QS 3.15–4.26)[9]

> From the God of Knowledge comes all that is occurring and shall occur. Before they came into being he established all their designs; and when they come into existence in their fixed times, in accordance with his glorious plan they perform their task. Nothing can be changed. In his hand (are) the judgements of all things; he being the one who sustains them in all their affairs. (3.15-17)

In dealing with the motif of creation expressed in these lines, one is confronted with the question of categorization. Armin Lange refers to this section of the *Rule* as an outline of 'a pre-existent order of the world'.[10] The phrase 'pre-existent order' suggests an order or planning beforehand. A. Dupont-Sommer categorizes the same section as 'God and creation', but goes on to describe the dynamics of creation expressed in the text as 'the order of the universe and its laws'.[11] This description of the text recognizes that creation goes through its motions in accordance with the foundational principles set by the 'God of Knowledge'. This order of the universe is not subject to change (3.16). Thus there is finality to creation and the course of existence. We adopt the term 'cosmological' for this type of determinism because it embraces the totality of creation.

Apart from the scholarly categorization of 1QS 3.15-23, the unit is dotted with deterministic phraseology including the following:

> ולפני היותם הכין כול מחשבתם 'Before they came into being he established all their designs' (3.15)

9. A substantial portion of this section (especially 1QS 3.15-26) is unparalleled in 4QS.

10. Armin Lange, 'Wisdom and Predestination in the Dead Sea Scrolls', *DSD* 2 (1995), pp. 340–54 (346). See also Lange, *Weisheit und Prädestination* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).

11. See footnote no. 3 in A. Dupont-Sommer, *The Essene Writings from Qumran* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961, p. 78).

במחשבת כבודו[12] ימלאו פעולתם 'In accordance with his glorious plan they perform their task' (3.16a)
ואין להשנות 'Nothing can be changed' (3.16b)

Another reason for categorizing 1QS 3.15-17 as deterministic lies in the fact that the order of creation is set or established by a force which is not part of the creation but independent or outside of it. The force is identified as the 'God of Knowledge'. Moreover, the order of creation is not left on its own but depends upon the sustenance of the One that established it. In other words, when the law of the universe is left on its own without the sustenance of its architect, it cannot but suffer breakdown and thus bring cosmic chaos.

It should be noted also that a careful reading of the 1QS passage shows that the determinism can be regarded as the pre-arrangement of historical events. This is supported by the use of the verb of 'becoming' – היה (3.15, 16). By making this affirmation, the text exhibits its indebtedness to apocalyptic emphasis on historical determinism. However, the smaller unit of 3.15-17 is best understood in the light of the cosmology of Genesis 1. The *Rule* recapitulates the creation account with its deterministic nuance in order to introduce its doctrine of the two spirits and their ways. The text attains that goal by setting out its view of the origin of 'all things' in 3.15-18.

a. The Creator of כול (3.15-18)

Regardless of the tense in which one may read כול הויה ונהייה (3.15),[13] that God is the origin of all creation remains uncontested. This concept of God

12. The syntax of line 16a is not as simple as it appears. Should במחשבת כבודו be read analeptically, i.e. in relation to the preceding clause, or proleptically, i.e with reference to the subsequent clause? All the popular translations in circulation such as Dupont-Sommer, Vermes, Knibb, Leaney and Charlesworth read the phrase proleptically. This reading makes ימלאו פעולתם, the activity of the order of creation, as the focus of what is in accordance with 'his glorious plan'. When במחשבת כבודו is read analeptically, it goes thus, 'And when they existed at their appointed times in accordance with his glorious plan . . .' This reading makes ובהיותם לתעודותם – the existence of the order of creation at their appointed times – as the issue that is already determined. Thus the timing of existence and not the activity of cosmic order is what is determined. Regardless of the reading one adopts, it does not eliminate the point of pre-ordination which is inherent in the word מחשבה. However, while previous scholarship has always taken the proleptic reference of the word in 1QS 3.16 for granted, this assumption may need to be revisited.

13. While commentators such as Dupont-Sommer, Leaney, Knibb and others read the phrase in the sense of 'everything there is and shall be' there are scholars like Wernberg-Møller who read it as 'everything which is happening (now) and happens (at any time)'. The debate focuses on the question of time aspect signified by נהייה. Knibb and others follow Milik in translating it as future tense, whereas Van der Ploeg maintained a past tense, i.e. 'everything that has occurred'. On the other hand, Wernberg-Møller followed Bardtke's rendering which avoids any specific time aspect being read into the text.

as the prime base from whom all things derive their existence is one of those traditions which the Qumranites took from the common Judaic heritage.[14] God is the designer of every cosmic occurrence. He predetermines all things before they actually take their course. In this way every event in history is a fulfilment of God's prior glorious design.

The cosmological passage (1QS 3.15-17) echoes the blessing of David in 1 Chron. 29. 10-13. Although the Qumranites broke away from the Jerusalem Temple, they did not disassociate themselves from Davidic tradition. In fact, the sect held David in high esteem and he was described as 'wise, knowledgeable, and perfect in all his paths before God and men'. (11Q5 27.2-3) David was regarded as the author of more than four thousand psalms. When 1QS 3.15-17 is placed alongside 1 Chron. 29.10-16, one cannot but notice certain features.

1 Chron. 29.10-12, 14, 16	1 QS 3.15-17
And David said, 'Blessed are you O Lord... Thine O Lord is the greatness and the power and the glory and the victory and the majesty, indeed everything that is in the heavens and the earth; you exalt yourself as head over **all**. Both riches and honour come from you, and you rule over **all** . . . For **all** things come from you and from your hand we have given you. . . . O Lord our God, **all** this abundance that we have provided to build you a house for your holy name is from your hand, and **all** is yours.'	From the God of Knowledge comes **all** that is occurring and shall occur. Before they came into being he establishes all their designs; and when they come into existence in their fixed times they carry through their task according to his glorious design. Nothing can be changed. In his hand (are) the judgements of **all** things; he being the one who sustains them in all their affairs.

The use of כול, 'everything' or 'all things', is common to both texts. While the Chronicler recounts certain things such as 'greatness, power, glory, victory, majesty, riches and honour' as coming from God, he employs כול to capture the totality of all things found in the domains of שמים and ארץ (29.11). And in terms of relation to the כול, Yahweh is not only the ראש, but also the מושל. The word ראש indicates sovereignty, and that sovereignty is expressed in these words 'and you rule over all' (29.12). It is not unlikely that the Qumranites have reworked this Davidic blessing with certain modifications of their own. For instance, instead of categorizing כול in terms of domains, it is used with time reference. It denotes the entire events, those that have

14. For different usage of the common heritage by Jewish groups, see Menahem Kister, 'A Common Heritage: Biblical Interpretation at Qumran and Its Implications', in *Biblical Perspectives*, eds Stone and Chazon; pp. 101–11.

occurred and those which are yet to occur. Every phenomenon in time and space does not come to exist on its own but owes its existence to God.

The second point of similarity is with regard to the origin of כול. Both the Chronicler and the *Rule* prefix the word referring to the divinity with the preposition מן to denote the source of כול.[15] According to the Chronicler, the כול which David and his people have provided are not really theirs but God's. This is expressed as ומידך נתנו לך – 'and from your hand, we give to you' – in 1 Chron. 29.14b (cf. v. 16). The Hebrew expression suggests that there was never a time when what David and his people had acquired as their own ceased to belong to God. Thus the people are giving to God from the hand of God. Similarly, the *Rule* affirms that the כול is the direct creation of God. In making this claim, the Community does not only remain committed to the Scripture, but affirms its continuity with the common Judaic heritage. However, the Community has modified this common belief as it brings other insights to bear on its reinterpretation of the scriptural truth.

God does not only bring forth the כול, but also establishes its subsequent courses in advance. (3.15-16) While scholars such as J. T. Milik have taken the word מחשבתם in 3.15, which most commentators have translated as 'their designs' or 'their plans', to refer to the 'thoughts' of human beings, the context does not warrant this reading, because the word כול in the same line intends the totality of existence and not just humankind. Knibb recognizes this point when he comments that 'the author seems to have in mind not just the actions of human beings, but everything that happens'.[16] The goal of כול is set even before it comes to be, and its motion conforms to its pre-determined destiny. Thus the universe as it now exists could not have been other than what it is. This is a cosmological type of determinism. For the כול to exist in a manner other than God's glorious design would not only be irrational (i.e. lack of purpose), but also unsustainable. It is this sense of purpose and sustenance which warrants the claim of immutability in 3.16 – ואין להשנות.[17]

15. In 1 Chronicles 29, the second person masculine singular suffix is added to the preposition מיך to read ממך (from you), and the suffix refers back to the word אל in 29.13. In 1QS 3.15, the preposition is placed as a prefix to the word אל meaning 'from God'.

16. Michael Knibb, *The Qumran Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 97). P. Wernberg-Møller also highlighted the problem with J. T. Milik's reading of the word מחשבתם as referring to conscious beings (i.e. human beings) in the following words, 'the assumption of reference to the conscious beings only is not likely in view of the contexts in which *hwh* and *nhyh* are used in 1QS and CD; besides, the following *bhywtm* in 1.16 appears to correspond to *lpny hywtm* ("before they exist . . . and when they come into existence"), in which case it makes better sense to take *mhshbh* in the meaning "plan", "design"'. See P. Wernberg-Møller, *The Manual of Discipline*, (STDJ, 1; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957, p. 69).

17. It should be noted that previous scholarship has recognized that a similar idea of the universe and its laws as expressed in the *Rule* is also developed in Eccl. 16.24-28, *Enoch*, *Testament of Naphtali* and *Psalms of Solomon* (18.11-14). See Dupont-Sommer, *Essene Writings*, p. 78 note 3.

It is not unlikely that 1QS 3.15-17a is intended to serve as a summary to the theme which is being articulated in 3.13–4.26. This is because the author addresses the subject of determinism generally in 3.15-17a before embarking on some specifics from 3.17b onward. This summary also functions within the larger unit as an introduction to that section of the *Rule* which deals with the ideology of the Community. Instead of seeing different layers of tradition within the larger unit of 1QS 3.13–4.26,[18] we should think of different ways by which the text articulates one major ideology. And 3.15-17a, being an introductory summary, sets the framework within which the larger unit must be interpreted. Moreover, it is in this summary of 3.15-17 that the exclusive monotheistic context of 1QS determinism is forcefully articulated.[19]

While the *Rule of the Community* leaves no doubt on the origin of כול, the text does not assume the painstaking job of giving a detailed account of the order of creation. It is very selective in its exploration of the scope of the determinism that is operating in the universe. The text focuses only on human beings and the forces which have influences on their existence. It explains this cosmic order by adopting a dualistic construct. It is to this dualism that we now turn.

b. Determinism of the Two Spirits (1QS 3.18–4.26)

One of the ways by which 1QS articulates its idea of the determinism of the two spirits is in its affirmation that the spirits are necessary for the sake of human beings (3.18). The spirits are not on their own but exist for the purpose for which the God of Knowledge created them. They discharge their duties in accordance with the task assigned to them by God. They are the bearers of all the activities of human beings, for it is upon them that all the activities of humankind before their appointed time are founded – יסד – (3.25). Thus every human deed is a property either of the spirit of truth or of the spirit of deceit. Therefore, human activity is not actually theirs per se but is produced by the spirit which has the dominion over them. It is in this sense of ethical relevance that the dualism of the two spirits is articulated in 1QS.

***1. The Dualism of the Two Spirits*[20]**

There is a lack of scholarly consensus regarding the origin of the dualism in the *Rule*. Osten-Sacken sees the dualism in 1QS as a further development

18. Attention will be drawn to these different layers in the section on the two spirits.

19. Duhaime has also stressed a similar point in his comment on the context in which the ways of the two spirits should be understood: 'La section initiale situe le tout dans le contexte d'un determinisme assez net (iii 15b-18a), puis se concentre sur le sujet specifique du rôle des deux esprits dans la mission de l'humanité.' See Jean Duhaime, 'Les Voies Des Deux Esprits (1QS iv 2-14): Une Analyse Structurelle', *RevQ* 75 (2000), pp. 349–67 (351).

20. For a brief discussion of the term spirit – רוח in the Dead Sea Scrolls, see Maxwell J. Davidson, *Angels at Qumran: A Comparative Study of 1 Enoch 1–36, 72–108 and Sectarian Writings from Qumran* (JSPSup, 11; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992, pp. 153–6. It is noteworthy however that after Davidson's survey of the use of the term he asserts that

of the eschatological dualism of the *War Scroll*. On the other hand, Armin Lange writes of the 1QS dualism in this manner:

> The theology of the Teaching of the Two Spirits is a logical development of the dualism which characterizes the idea of the pre-existent order in 4Qsap A. Even the description of the eschaton as a purification from, and a destruction of, wickedness is aimed in the Teaching of the Two Spirits at a sapiential goal . . . Thus sapiential motifs and ideas are developed into a theology which can no longer be described as Wisdom any more and which is on its way to apocalypticsm.[21]

It is in the light of this sapiential background that Lange concludes that the teaching of the two spirits in 1QS is a production of 'the same circles in which 4QsapA and Myst. were composed'.[22] In his 1968 dissertation, J. E. Worrell explored the idea of Wisdom in the Dead Sea Scrolls,[23] and among the passages that he classified as Wisdom passages is 1QS 3.13–4.26. This is because of the frequency of Wisdom vocabulary, such as משכיל (wise, 3.13), דעת (knowledge, 3.15), and מחשבה (design or plan, 3.16), pertaining to the knowledge or insight of the sect.[24] In his concluding remarks, Worrell asserted that the appropriation of Wisdom concepts at Qumran is evidence that 'their categories for self understanding came through a "sapiential milieu"'.[25] A similar view of their origin is proposed by Otzen[26] and Gammie[27] who found the roots of the dualism of 1QS in the ethical dualism of biblical and post-biblical wisdom literature.[28]

'the term רוח is used quite widely for angelic beings in Qumran Literature' (pp. 155–6). See also E. Sekki, *The Meaning of Ruah at Qumran* (SBLD, 110; Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1989).

21. Lange, 'Wisdom and Predestination', p. 348.

22. Lange, 'Wisdom and Predestination', p. 348.

23. J. E. Worrell, 'Concepts of Wisdom in the Dead Sea Scrolls', (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1968) cited in W. Lowndes Lipscomb and J. A. Sanders, 'Wisdom at Qumran', in *Israelite Wisdom* (eds Gammie *et al.*, pp. 281–2).

24. Worrell, 'Wisdom in the Dead Sea Scrolls', pp. 237–9, cited in Lipscomb and Sanders, *Israelite Wisdom*, pp. 281–2.

25. Worrell, 'Wisdom in the Dead Sea Scrolls', p. 393, cited in Lipscomb and Sanders, *Israelite Wisdom*, p. 282.

26. B. Otzen, 'Old Testament Wisdom', *VTSup* 28 (1975), pp. 146–57.

27. J. G. Gammie, 'Spatial and Ethical Dualism in Jewish Wisdom and Apocalyptic Literature', *JBL* 93 (1974), pp. 356–85.

28. P. Winter for instance acknowledges the differences between Ben Sira and 1QS in their teachings on the two ways but concurs that there exists adequate similarity between the two texts to presume a connection between them – P. Winter, 'Ben Sira and the Teaching of the "Two Ways"', *VT* 5 (1955), pp. 315–18. Manfred R. Lehmann also highlighted the resemblances between Ben Sira and the Qumran literature, though he made no reference

While it is possible to explain the ethical aspect of the dualism against the backdrop of wisdom literature, many scholars are hesitant to explain the dualism exclusively in the light of sapiential tradition. For instance, Knibb suggests that:

> The Old Testament often speaks of God's Spirit which stirs men to action (cf. e.g. Judg. 14.6; 1 Sam. 10.10), but it also knows of spirits that are to some extent independent of him (cf. e.g. 2 Kgs 19.7; Num. 27.16); it can even speak of God sending an evil (1 Sam.16.14-16) or a lying (1 Kgs 22.21-2) spirit. The doctrine of the two spirits in the Rule may be seen as a development of these Old Testament ideas, a development perhaps influenced by the dualistic beliefs of Zoroastrianism, the religion of the ancient Iran.[29]

The doctrine of the two spirits is important to the conception of God as the Creator of all things. If the God of Knowledge is indeed responsible for the cosmos as it now exists, the age-old unsolved problem for all theism emerges. How does one account for the problem of evil in a universe where God is believed to reign supreme? Several books have been written on this subject and one needs not rehearse here an enquiry which has been given detailed consideration in previous scholarship. Suffice it to say that the Qumran Community offer their own insight in dealing with the problem.

The Qumranites read in the Prophet (Isa. 45.7 – MT) that God is the maker of light and darkness, peace (שלום) and calamity (רע). In the Isaiah scroll found in cave 1, the text has been modified. In place of the MT reading of שלום and רע, we find טוב (good) and רע in 1QIsa (see 1QIsa[a] XXXVIII and 1QIsa[b] IV). This changes the meaning of רע decisively. In the MT, the contrast of שלום with רע has a physical and social nuance, whereas the contrast of טוב with רע in 1QIsa makes רע mean moral and cosmic evil.[30] (The reason for this emendation in 1QIsa is best known to the author who is no longer available to defend the change.) However, it may be conjectured that 1QIsa was attempting to account for the evil in the universe as part of divine arrangement. For such a position not to be considered heretical, it must be scriptural, i.e., it must be found in either the Prophets or Moses. The author of 1QIsa finds the support by heightening the meaning of רע in the MT.

A similar case can be put forward for the author of 1QS. He is someone familiar with the Scriptures (1.3). In justifying his claim that God is the designer of all things, he needed a scriptural support that could allow him to include the evil in the world as part of the בול which originated from the God

to wisdom as part of what they share in common – see M. R. Lehmann, 'Ben Sira and the Qumran Literature', *RevQ* 3 (1961), pp. 103–16.

29. Knibb, *Qumran Community*, pp. 95–6.

30. A. R. C. Leaney, *The Rule of Qumran and Its Meaning* (NTL; London: SCM Press, 1966, p. 45).

of Knowledge. The story of Saul provided the scriptural reference. If God can bestow upon Saul his own Spirit and later an evil spirit (1 Sam. 16.14-16), it is not to be disputed therefore that good and evil are traceable to God. The question is how are these two opposing forces traceable to God? The author of 1QS adopts the medium of two spirits. God designed two spirits upon which he established those things which the author considered to be good and evil. It is in these spirits that God sets the dynamics of good and evil especially in relation to human beings.

It is appropriate here to recall the insight of H. W. Huppenbauer on the theme of dualism in the Dead Sea Scrolls. His threefold conclusion includes the following: first, the dualism of the Scrolls is not absolute but relative; second, it is ethical; third, its language is cosmically oriented.[31] In addition to Huppenbauer's threefold conclusion, Charlesworth insists that the dualism of the *Rule* is also psychological in the sense of a division within the individual as implied in the struggle between the spirits of truth and deceit in the human heart.[32] However, Maxwell Davidson warns against the error of reducing the dualism of the two spirits discourse to the later Rabbinic scheme of the good tendencies in humanity.[33]

The existence of these spirits is not eternal but temporal. U. Bianchi also acknowledges this sense of temporality when he posits that the dualism in the Qumran texts is a 'softened dualism' because God is presented as the ultimate ruler of the world.[34] The two spirits of the *Rule* have not existed co-eternally nor are they going to co-exist forever (4.18). They are not on their own for they owe their sustenance to the God who set them up as part of the cosmic order. 'These assertions . . . were necessary if the sect was to remain within the bounds of theism.'[35] The dualism of the two spirits is much more for the purpose of ethics as Huppenbauer rightly concluded. Embodied by the two spirits are two categories of deeds, vice and virtue. Moreover, that the activities of the two spirits are of utmost importance in the *Rule* is articulated in the way the text identifies them: רוחות האמת והעול – 'spirits of truth and

31. See H. W. Huppenbauer, *Der Mensch zwischen zwei Welten* (Zürich: Zwingli, 1959, pp.111–13). He summarizes his findings thus: (a) 'Der Dualismus dieser Texte ist kein absoluter. . . . Es ist das atliche Erbe, das hier immer nur einen *relativen* Dualismus aufkommen lässt.' (b) 'Das vorderste Anliegen dieses Denkens ist immer die *Ethik*.' (c) 'Die Sprache dieses Dualismus schliesslich ist weithin *kosmisch* orientiert.'

32. Charlesworth, 'A Critical Comparison of the Dualism in 1QS 3:13-4:26 and the "Dualism" Contained in the Gospel of John', in *John and the Dead Sea Scrolls*, pp. 101–2.

33. Davidson, *Angels at Qumran*, p. 161.

34. U. Bianchi, 'The Category of Dualism in the Historical Phenomenology of Religion', *Temenos* 16 (1980), p. 15, cited in J. Duhaime, 'Dualistic Reworking in the Scrolls from Qumran', p. 33.

35. P. S. Alexander, 'Demonology of the Dead Sea Scrolls', in *The Dead Sea Scrolls After Fifty Years: A Comprehensive Assessment* (eds Peter W. Flint and James C. VanderKam, vol. 2; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999, p. 343).

deceit' – (3.18-19). In other words, the spirits are identified by the deeds they embodied. It is also important to note the cosmic imagery associated with each of the spirits, which includes light and darkness (3.19, 25). These images (אור and חושך) are employed to denote the origins of the spirits of truth and deceit respectively (3.19). Thus the deeds embodied by the spirit of truth are properties belonging to the realm of light, while those by the spirit of deceit are traceable to the domain of darkness. These orderly arrangements are the works of the God of Knowledge from whom כול derived their existence. It is characteristic of these arrangements that they cannot be altered.

2. The Prince of Light

a. Its Identity

The spirit of truth assumes no personal name in 1QS, rather he is described in terms of his attributes. The references to רוח קודש, 'holy spirit' (3.7; 4.21; 8.16; 9.3), do not signify a proper name but the purity which characterizes the domain from which the spirit emanated. While a few scholars have drawn a distinction for instance between the Angel of Truth – מלאך אמת (3.24) – and the Prince of Light in the Dead Sea Scrolls for various reasons,[36] it is difficult to affirm such a distinction within the *Rule*. First, the two are mentioned in the dualistic section of the *Rule* as belonging in the same domain of light. Second, when they are mentioned it is in contrast to the spirit which emanated from the realm of darkness. Third, the function of the prince is the same as that of the angel. Moreover, the word שר which is rendered 'prince' in 3.20 can also mean 'a higher being, a guardian angel'.[37] Fourth, the appellation 'Prince of Light' stresses the domain of light itself, whereas the 'Angel of Truth' focuses on the truth which emanated from the abode of light (cf. 3.19-20). And finally, in the *Rule*, there is a preoccupation with only two spirits which are totally opposed to each other (3.18). It is each of these spirits which is described in more than one way. Thus in the following discussion, the Prince of Light and the Angel of Truth are used synonymously to refer to that spirit which emanated from the realm of light.[38]

36. See Helmer Ringgren, *The Faith of Qumran* (trans. E. T. Sanders; Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1963, pp. 82–4.

37. Koehler and Baumgartner, 'שר', in *HALOT*, vol. 3. The same word is used in Daniel 10 to refer to spiritual beings especially the angel Michael (10.13, 18-21). It is in light of the usage of the term in the book of Daniel that Davidson equates the Prince of Light in the *Rule* with an angel, and even goes further, on the basis of 1QM 17.6-8; 13.10, to agree with Y. Yadin by identifying the prince as the angel Michael in contrast to Uriel proposed by Wernberg-Møller – see Davidson, *Angels at Qumran*, pp. 147–9; Y. Yadin, *The Scroll of the War of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, 235–6); cf. Wernberg-Møller, *The Manual of Discipline*, p. 71 note 60.

38. Recent studies on the angelology of the Dead Sea Scrolls include: Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, 'Some Reflections on Angelomorphic Humanity Texts Among the Dead Sea Scrolls', *DSD* 7 (2000), pp. 292–312, which explores how the righteous are regarded as angelic especially Moses and the high priest; Hindy Najman, 'Angels at Sinai: Exegesis,

b. Its Tasks

The Prince of Light emerges as the one who has dominion over the children of righteousness. The word שר which is rendered as 'prince' (3.20) bears meanings ranging from royalty to military,[39] but it seems more appropriate in this context to understand the word in the sense of headship. This headship is modified by the word אור. Apart from the figurative nuance of the word (i.e. light), it is used in 3.19-20 in the sense of a domain or realm. Truth is said to be a generation from the abode of light. Thus the spirit upon which the existence of the children of righteousness is conditioned is the one in charge of the realm of light. The spirit is in charge in the sense of being entrusted with an official duty because the שר can also mean 'representative of the king'.[40]

The same word, ממשלה, 'dominion', which is used to represent human relationship to the world is used to express the relation of the Prince of Light with that category of human beings which is designated as בני צדק, 'children of righteousness'. The task of the spirit is restricted only to those under its domain. It is identified as co-helper with God in relation to the children of light. What constitutes the help from the Angel of Truth is most likely implied in the list of the 'ways' in the first part of column 4. One of the ways by which the text gently expresses this help is by its use of the hiphil form of אור in 4.2. While the word להאיר is read in various ways by different translators,[41] a literal rendering suggests that the Angel of Truth is the one who causes the 'light' or 'enlightenment' in the heart of human beings. It is also peculiar to the Angel to 'make straight' the path of true righteousness, and to quicken the heart of human beings to have reverent regard for the judgement of God (4.2). These activities and the rest listed in 4.3-5[42] are not optional to the spirit of truth but fundamental to its existence because the God of Knowledge designed those deeds to be the necessary properties of the spirit.

Since the Prince of Light is always mentioned in relation to the 'children of light' or 'children of righteousness', it is not an overstatement to affirm that the spirit is foundational to the course of existence of the 'children of light'. This is echoed throughout the text in more than one way. For instance, if the Community mentioned in 1.1 is the one referred to in 1.9 as the 'children of light' who are called out 'to perform truth and righteousness and justice upon the earth' (1.5-6a), it is inconceivable for the author of the *Rule* that the Community would meet these tasks without the intervention of the spirit specifically designed for those tasks. The author uses the same

Theology and Interpretive Authority', *DSD* 7 (2000), pp. 313–33, focuses on the role played by angels at Sinai during the revelation of the Torah, and the implication of that angelic mediation on the authority of the Torah.

39. Koehler and Baumgartner, 'שר', in *HALOT*.

40. Koehler and Baumgartner, 'שר', in *HALOT*.

41. While Dupont-Sommer, M. Knibb and F. Martinez rendered להאיר in 4.2 as 'to enlighten', Leaney adopts the reading 'to lighten'. Both Wernberg-Møller and Charlesworth translate the word as 'to illuminate'.

42. Cf. 4Q257, fg. 2, 1.1-3.

set of vocabularies – צדק, משפט and אמת – to express the purpose of the Community (1.5-6a) and the ways of the Prince of Light (4. 6a) in order to show the necessity of the spirit to the children of light.

Also in the dualistic section where the principles of the spirits of truth and deceit are spelt out, certain deeds are categorized under the spirit of truth, and most of those deeds are the same as those that are set before the Community in column 1. They constitute הטוב and הישר which is given to Moses according to 1.2-3. In other words, what God revealed to Moses as 'the good' and 'the right' is not different from the ways of the Prince of Light. And these ways are unalterable because the God of Knowledge established them. It seems that the permanence of the principles of the spirit of truth affords the author of the *Rule* an opportunity to articulate his conviction regarding the revelation God gave to Moses as unchanging. It is not surprising therefore that the author uses the same yardstick for both the Israel of old and the covenanters at Qumran. The revelation of what is good and right before God as given to Moses is nothing other than what has always been and shall continue to be the properties of the Angel of Truth.

3. The Angel of Darkness

a. Its Identity

This angel assumes more than one image in our text. It is associated with חושך by virtue of the realm in which it operates. It is identified as one of the two spirits designed for human beings (3.18). The angel is connected with deceit, העול.

In biblical tradition, the word מלאך is associated with God in almost all cases. The term denotes 'messenger' who is under the instruction of God, or acting in the place of God. In the *Rule*, the Angel of Darkness is not said to be acting on behalf of someone else, instead the angel is portrayed as an entity who has some 'spirits' under its domain (3.24). However, it is possible that the Community employs the term מלאך for each of the two spirits[43] in the sense that the spirits are messengers of God. This becomes plausible when the activities of the two spirits are seen as being assigned to them by the God of Knowledge. Thus when the spirits are thought of as divine agents, whose mission is to carry out the design of God, the term 'angel' becomes relevant. It seems appropriate therefore that since the *Rule* employs the language of 'messenger' to show that the two spirits designed for human beings carry out their activities in compliance with the divine instruction, the term 'Angel of Darkness' is a descriptive title for that spirit which is created to be in charge of the affairs of the domain of darkness.

Unlike the Prince of Light, the Angel of Darkness has other spirits in its lot. The text has little to offer about these spirits, and so there is not much one can say other than the fact that the spirits are responsible for the stumbling of the children of light (3.24). The relationship of these spirits to the Angel

43. See also 3.24 where the same word is used with reference to truth in order to denote the spirit of light.

of Darkness is not clear. Suffice it to say that they belong in the same realm of darkness as the Angel, and their activities are the same as that of the Angel also. Although 1QS restrains us from equating these spirits with demons, other literature from Qumran speaks of some spirits by name. In the *Hymns Against Demons* especially, some spirits are mentioned: 'And I the Sage declare the grandeur of his radiance in order to frighten and terrify all the spirits of the ravaging angels and the bastard spirits, demons, Liliths, owls and jackals . . .' (4Q510, fg, 1.4-5). If it can be granted that both 1QS and the *Hymns Against Demons* come from the same community, one can affirm with a certain degree of confidence that the spirits in the lot of the Angel of Darkness are possibly the bastard spirits and ravaging angels referred to in 4Q510.[44] However it should be noted that in spite of P. S. Alexander's attempt to offer a coherent view of the demonology of the Scrolls, the following remark of A. M. Reimer sums up the fact of the matter:

> And in this task of reconstructing demonologies, one must seek to hold a tension between an integrated and consistent reading of a text or body of texts and an awareness of the sociology of knowledge 'gaps' in any religious sect's worldview. This history of demonology has certainly shown that attempts by texts such as *1 Enoch* to rationalize entities that are by definition chaotic, irrational and typically open to all-out speculation are bound to fail. Scholarly attempts to reconstruct any sort of ancient demonology will always have to work in the midst of this chaos.[45]

Apart from the Angel of Darkness, another term mentioned in connection with the realm of darkness is Belial.[46] The word is used five times in the *Rule*.

44. In a recent article, Philip S. Alexander discussed the demonology of the Scrolls. He argued that the 'spirits of the bastards' are 'the Giants, the monstrous offspring of the illicit union of the angelic Watchers and human women as recounted in 1 Enoch'. He also noted the complexity of the term 'Liliths'. The word occurs once in Isa. 34.14 and it is widely attested in Ancient Near East magic to denote a demonic figure. The term was linked with לילה (i.e. night) from early-on Hebrew folk-etymology to designate night demons. However at a later time, Lilith was used to refer to an individual demon specializing in attacking pregnant women and newborn children. See Alexander, 'Demonology of the Dead Sea Scrolls', in *The Dead Sea Scrolls After Fifty Years*, eds Flint and Vanderkam; vol. 2, pp. 331–353 (337–41); '"Wrestling against Wickedness in High Places": Magic in the Worldview of the Qumran Community', in *The Scrolls and the Scriptures: Qumran Fifty Years After*, (eds S. E. Porter and C. A. Evans; JSPSup, 26; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997, pp. 318–37). For an appraisal and critique of Alexander's 'Demonology of the Dead Sea Scrolls', see Andy M. Reimer, 'Rescuing the Fallen Angels: The Case of the Disappearing Angels at Qumran', *DSD* 7 (2000), pp. 334–53.

45. Reimer, 'Rescuing the Fallen Angels', p. 353.

46. The word is not unique to the Scrolls. It is carried over from the biblical tradition (Deuteronomy, Judges, 1 Kings and 1 Chronicles). While its meaning remains a subject of debate, it is used in the deterministic passage of the *Rule* (1QS 3.13–4.26) as a name of the leader of the forces of darkness.

It is used thrice to mean the ruler of the age in which the Community lives (1.18, 24; 2.19), once as a lot in which human beings can belong (2.5) and lastly as an entity which can inhabit the heart of people (10.21). In all these occurrences, the term is used with a negative connotation. The era of Belial is characterized with terror, affliction, iniquities, transgressions and sins (1.17b-18a, 23-24a). These are the same expressions used to characterize the Angel of Darkness in 3.21-23. This characterization is the author's own way of projecting Belial as the same as the Angel of Darkness.[47]

b. Its Tasks

The aberration of the children of light is one of the major activities of the Angel of Darkness. The aberration is set out in practical terms, namely: sins, iniquities, guilt, afflictions and staggering (3.22-24). Why should the Angel of Darkness have such power over the children of light who are not under its domain? The fact of the matter is that the polarity between the two spirits is not absolute, especially with regard to their activities, although it is never mentioned in the text that the Prince of Light interferes with those outside his domain. The influence of the Angel of Darkness over those in the lot of light lies in the fact that the age in which children of light find themselves actually belongs to the Angel of Darkness. This is echoed on more than one occasion in the text (1.18, 23; 2.19). However, since the reign of Belial is for a particular period of time, so also is the duration of his influence over the children of light.

A further answer to such influence is found in 3.23 where the reason for the aberration is said to be in accordance with God's mysteries. The use of the words רזי אל with the phrase עד קצו 'until its end' is crucial. The word רז refers to 'divine unfathomable unalterable decision'[48] which remains hidden from human beings until such a time as it is revealed. It remains a mystery not because it is unknown but because it is not revealed. The length of these רזי אל is precisely qualified by 'until its end'. While the Community cannot comprehend the aberration they suffer from the Angel of Darkness, the end of the angel will bring to light that which has remained hidden until then. That the aberration is in accord with רזי אל is an indication that the suffering of בני אור from the Angel of Darkness is not outside of divine arrangement. What is mysterious about it has to do with human inability to account for the suffering within the framework of divine arrangement. However, at the appointed time of visitation, that which is unknown to the Community in the

47. Scholars who have equated the Angel of Darkness with Belial include Dupont-Sommer, *Essene Writings from Qumran*, p. 74; R. E. Brown, 'The Qumran Scrolls and the Johannine Gospel and Epistles', *CBQ* 17 (1955), pp. 403–19 (409). Recently, Davidson cautiously opined that Belial is a personal being identical with the Angel of Darkness mentioned in the two-spirit discourse. See Davidson, *Angels at Qumran*, pp. 163–4.

48. J. Licht, 'The Doctrine of the Thanksgiving Scroll I and II', *IEJ* 6 (1956), pp. 1–13, 89–101 (8).

era of Belial will be made obvious because the destruction of deceit and its associates will mean the emergence of truth eternally.

4. Human Beings and the Two Spirits

The position of human beings in the world of creatures is depicted in the language of kingship: 'He created human beings for the dominion of the world' – לממשלת תבל (1QS 3.17b-18a). This line recalls the purpose of human beings recounted in Gen. 1.26-28. The use of the word ממשלה in relation to human beings implies that certain authority is imputed into human existence. Just as kings exercise authority over their subjects, so also are human beings in relation to the world. While the text does not indicate who the subjects are, it could be assumed that the lesser creatures are intended to be their subjects as in Gen. 1.26. Moreover, since ממשלה can also refer to the actual territory of dominion (e.g., 1 Kgs 9.19),[49] for human beings, the world (תבל) is the territory of their domain.

In their rank as the governor of the תבל, their activities are conditioned by the presence of two spirits. These spirits do not come forth by themselves, their origin lies in the 'God of Knowledge'. It is implied in the phrase וישם לו – 'and he established for him' (3. 18) – that the existence of the two spirits is necessitated by the creation of man. The two spirits form the bases of all manner of human deeds. Just as human beings are created for the dominion of the world, so also are the two spirits created to determine the moral path of every human being and subsequently the final end of each person.

The verb הלך – 'to walk' is used in column 1 to signify the course of life which the Community is called to follow: 'to walk no longer with the stubbornness of a guilty heart . . . to walk perfectly before him (according to) all revealed (laws) at their appointed times' (1.6, 8). In columns 3–4, the author enumerates the ways – דרכות – in which man can walk as the ways in the domain of either light or darkness (3.20-21). Each domain is under the control of a spirit according to the divine order of the universe. While the text does not make the relationship between the human path and the ways of light and darkness obvious in column1, the connection becomes apparent by the end of column 4. The activities in each of these 'roads' are already fixed. Whichever path a person walks, it is the properties which are fundamental to that way that will become manifest in the person.

Another way by which the author links the goal of the Community with the dualism of the two spirits is in the paradigm of love and hate. The Community is called to love (לאהוב) everything which God has chosen (בחר), and to hate (לשנוא) everything which God has rejected (1.3, 4). It is the same words, אהב and שנא, which are employed to describe God's attitude towards the two spirits. According to 3.26, God loves one of the spirits eternally. Although the text is slightly corrupt at the end of column 3, the context supports the spirit of truth as the one loved eternally. This love is guaranteed in the expression that God takes pleasure in the deeds of the spirit forever (4.1). The other

49. Philip J. Nel, 'ממשלה', in *NIDOTTE*, vol. 2: pp. 1136–7.

spirit is the spirit of darkness, and everything under its domain is regarded as abomination (תעב) by God. The abhorrence is spelt out in the language of eternal hatred of everything pertaining to the spirit (4.1b). The dualistic section of the *Rule* (3.13–4.26) leaves no room for ambiguity in its description of what God loves and hates. It is the two spirits which are the recipients of the divine love and hatred. Thus for the sect to love what God loves and hate what he hates, the two spirits and their ways must be mastered. It is the impartation of that knowledge that is entrusted to the משכיל,[50] Master. 'It is for the Master to instruct and teach all of the children of light, concerning the nature of all the children of man with respect to all kinds of their spirits with their distinctions, for their works in their generation, and with respect to the visitation of their afflictions together with their times of peace.' (3.13-15a)

What God loves and hates are already established. They are founded upon the two spirits. This establishment by the God of Knowledge never changes. And since the activities of the two spirits are static and motionless, it is believed that through the משכיל, one can come to the knowledge of this divine arrangement.

While all people are created by the God of Knowledge, they do not all belong in the same category. Neither are they all regarded as the children of God. Human beings are categorized in various manners.

Category A	Category B
1. בני אור (1.9; 3.13, 24, 25) 'children of light'	1. בני חושך (1.10) 'children of darkness'
2. אנשי גורל אל (2.2) 'people of the lot of God'	2. אנשי גורל בליעל (2.4b-5a) 'people in the lot of Belial'

50. It should be noted that there is a lack of general consensus on the use of משכיל in the Scrolls. A large number of commentators read the word against the background of Dan. 11.33; 12.3 and Pseudepigrapha (especially *1 Enoch* 100.6; 104.12) and conclude that the term is probably used in a general sense to refer to an official in the Community who happened to be a leader of his congregation. Some scholars such as M. Knibb (pp. 66, 118) and Wernberg-Møller (pp. 66 note 39, 105 note 35, 107 note 42) are more inclined to identify the משכיל as the same person designated as המבקר (the Inspector) in 6.12 and הפקוד (the Overseer) in 6.14. However, the use of the term in 1QS 9.12, 21 has prompted some commentators to ask whether the משכיל is a unique historical figure or an official occupying a position only for a time and thereby making the position open to succession. The insight of Leaney may be helpful on this point. If the משכיל is also the same as הדורש איש (the interpreter) mentioned in 8.11b-12a, it means that the position is destined to be succeeded by others since the term הדורש איש refers to whomever is expounding the Torah at any particular time. It is also possible that the term refers to a select number of men who were able to train the rest. See Leaney, *Rule of Qumran*, pp. 229–31; Charlesworth, *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek*, p. 15 note 57.

3. בני צדק (3.20, 22) 'children of righteousness'	3. בני עול (3.21) 'children of deceit'
4. בני אמת (4.6) 'children of truth'	4. בני עול (3.21) 'children of deceit'

According to this table, when the words בני and אנשי are removed from each category, it becomes obvious that each of the two categories has certain fundamental properties. Category A is characterized by light, righteousness, truth and God, whereas darkness, deceit and Belial are unique to category B. Both no. 3 and 4 in category A and B are used with reference to the verb הלך – 'to walk' – (3.20, 21; 4.6, 12). The use of the verb in these contexts is significant because it implies that 'the walk' of each person determines his or her category. Thus to walk in truth, light and righteousness is to fall in the lot of God, and to walk in darkness and deceit is to belong under the dominion of Belial.

It should be mentioned also that all of these properties in categories A and B are linked with the two spirits, which are designed for human beings. The properties of light, truth and righteousness are connected to the Prince of Light, and those of darkness and deceit are tied to the Angel of Darkness. Every activity of humanity falls within these frameworks of the two spirits. Consequently, the way in which a person walks links him or her with either the Prince of Light or the Angel of Darkness. The *Rule* goes further however to show that the two spirits determine the nature[51] of all people until the time of their visitation.

How do the two spirits determine the character of every person? The *Rule* affirms that all human beings have a share in the two spirits (4.15-16). Individuals' participation in each of the spirits varies one from another. Although God established the two spirits in equal parts until the Endtime, their activities in human life are determined by one's share in each of the two spirits. 'According to a man's share in truth shall he be righteous and thus hate deceit, and according to his inheritance in the lot of deceit he shall be evil through it, and thus loathe truth.' (4.24-25a) It follows therefore that no human being can escape the activities of these spirits once he or she has participated in them. A person manifests the trait of truth or deceit not by choice but by the virtue of the spirit in which one participated. This character of truth or deceit is not fundamental to human beings but the two spirits. Thus the only reason why a person is truthful or deceitful according to the *Rule* is because of the person's participation in either the spirit of truth or the spirit of deceit. Consequently, the two spirits determine the character of human beings.

One of the ambiguities that the *Rule* does not resolve is how human beings acquire these spirits. According to 1QS 3.18, God is the one who designed

51. The word תולדות which is rendered as 'nature' in 3.13 and 4.15 is used to refer to 'an account of men's character'. Knibb, *Qumran Community*, p. 96.

these spirits for humankind. In what sense should one understand the phrase וישם לו in 3.18? Does it mean that when God creates human beings, he also brings forth two spirits out of which people choose their degree of participation? Or, on the contrary, does it imply that God brings forth the two spirits, and determines the level of participation of every person in each of the spirits? While there are no decisive answers to these questions, it is crucial to note that there are references in the 1QS which favour the fact that human beings themselves are responsible for their shares in each of the two spirits. This will become clear when we discuss non-determinism in the *Rule*. It is only adequate here to stress the fact that the characters of each of the two spirits are determined and they are not subject to alterations. And in whatever spirit one participates, the person will manifest the character trait of said spirit.

2. Eschatological Determinism

The End is set by God in his mysterious understanding and glorious wisdom (1QS 4.18). The time is referred to as the appointed time of visitation. Sometimes it is simply called the appointed time. It is that point in God's timetable when the era of Belial is terminated and the reign of truth is ushered into existence. At that time, God will destroy the spirit of deceit in such a way that it has no effect on the children of righteousness any longer. The judgement will result in the purification of the remnant (in this case the members of the Community) and all their deeds (4.20-23). The purification will be the culmination of the cleansing which the spirit of holiness wrought at the point when an individual enters into the Community (3.5-8). All the guilt which the children of light have incurred as a result of the aberrations of the Angel of Darkness shall be removed. The goal of this eschatological cleansing is 'so that upright ones may have insight into the knowledge of the Most High and the wisdom of the sons of heaven, and the perfect in the Way may receive understanding'. (4.22) This Endtime cannot be altered because it is rooted in the mysterious understanding and glorious wisdom of God. As it unfolds, it will bring forth the eternal destiny of all things.

That God determines the Endtime is a common ideology in Second Temple Judaism. The idea is found in several apocalyptic texts of the period. The Ethiopic book of Enoch, for instance, speaks of the destruction of injustice from the face of the earth in the vision of the Endtime (*1 Enoch* 10.1-7). Every iniquitous deed will cease, but righteousness and truth will appear forever (*1 Enoch* 10.16). The cessation of injustice will mean the cleansing of the earth from all forms of defilement, oppression, sin and iniquity. As a prelude to that Endtime, all of God's work will prosper and obey him; the work will never change but functions in the way in which God has ordered it (*1 Enoch* 5.2). In this manner, history takes its course in accordance with the pre-ordination of God. And so also shall the Endtime take its course in accordance with the divine decree.

3. Soteriological Determinism

Apart from the themes of cosmological and eschatological determinism of 3.15–4.26, 1QS affirms that 'the will of God' is determined and immutable. This divine will remains the same for all generations. While most people may not perceive what constitutes God's will, it is evident from passages such as 1.8-9; 5.8-9; 8.1-2 etc., and implied in the Community's devotion to the study of the Torah, that the unchanging will of God has been revealed and it is available to human beings to discover.

The term 'soteriological determinism' is employed to denote the idea of revelation in the *Rule*. This revelation consists of the command of God as spoken through Moses and the prophets. It is soteriological in the sense that the Community believed that by observing the commandments therein, the visitation of the Community will be 'healing and great peace in a long life, multiplication of progeny together with all everlasting blessings, endless joy in everlasting life, and a crown of glory together with resplendent attire in eternal light'. (4.6c-8) The revelation is determined because of its unchanging nature, i.e., what is good and acceptable before God in the time of Moses and the prophets remains the same for the Community and its generation. God's will is fixed and cannot be altered.

It is essential for an adequate understanding of the soteriological determinism of the *Rule* to highlight the functional role of the opening column. The column enumerates what constitutes the will of God and the goal which the Community is called to pursue. The Community believes this goal to be unalterable and non-negotiable. And in order to attain the goal, adequate knowledge of God's will is indispensable, i.e., the knowledge of God's will serves as the compass to the achievement of the purpose into which the Community has been called. It is in the opening column that the text explains the goal of the Community and the will of God, both of which do not change.

a. The Opening Column (1QS 1)

> To the [. . .] sym for his life [the book of the Rul]e of the Community. In order to seek God with [all the heart and soul] doing what is good and right before him, as he commanded through Moses and all his servants the prophets, and in order to love all that he has chosen and to hate all that he has rejected, keeping away from all evil and adhering to all good works, and in order to perform truth and righteousness and justice upon the earth; to walk no longer with the stubbornness of a guilty heart, and (no longer with) lustful eyes doing all evil; in order to receive all those who devote themselves to do the statutes of God into the covenant of mercy, to be joined to the council of God, to walk perfectly before him according to all the things revealed at their appointed times and in order to love all the children of light each according to his lot in the council of God, and to hate all the children of darkness each according to his guilt at the vengeance of God. (1QS 1.1-10)[52]

52. Lines 1-5 of this passage are paralleled in 4Q255, fg. 1. There is no striking variant to warrant a comparison of the two texts.

In this opening column, the phrase חוקי אל meaning 'the statutes of God' appears twice (1QS 1.7, 12) as does the expression כאשר צוה 'as he commanded' (1QS 1.3, 17). In the case of כאשר צוה, the contexts suggest that God is the subject, the one who commands. The phrase דברי אל – which is customarily rendered as 'the commands of God'(1QS 1.14) – is another expression that bears the same idea as חוקי אל. Although none of the expressions just mentioned attempt to enumerate what the contents of the 'statutes' or 'commands' are, they do imply that there are certain instructions which have come from God. These instructions are known to human beings only because God discloses them. While the opening column does not give the contents of Yahweh's commands, it is assumed that the members of the Community understood what those commands were. The presence of biblical scrolls among the Qumranites points to the fact that they were familiar with the writings associated with Moses and the prophetic figures. Moreover, in 1QS 5.8 for instance, it is required of a new convert into the Community to take a binding oath 'to return to the Torah of Moses' (לשוב אל תורת משה). It would have been inappropriate to bind oneself with that oath if the people had not recognized the Torah as divine instructions. Thus when the text speaks of the commandment through Moses and the prophets in 1.3, it expects the reader to assume that the Community knows precisely what is intended, and sees no need therefore to rehearse the content of the commandments. It should be noted also that the concern of the opening column is to focus not on the commands themselves but on the fact that they originate from God. This is echoed in the use of the phrase כול הנגלות – 'all the (things) revealed'[53] – in the context of 1.8-9.

What was good and right before Yahweh in the days of Moses and his generation remained the same for the Qumran Community. While the Qumran covenanters perceived the historical gap between themselves and Moses, they did not distinguish themselves from the audience upon whom the Mosaic and prophetic messages were binding. This attitude towards the Scriptures was not in any way special to the Qumranites, for 'the literature of the inter-testamental period shows faith and practice still firmly based on the Bible and a belief that the original revelation was directed not only to generations past but to them all'.[54] However, the Qumran covenanters attached themselves to Moses because of the firm conviction that what God commanded through Moses and the prophets was nothing other than הטוב והישר, 'what is good and right'. By linking itself to Moses and the prophets, the Community envisioned itself, as A. R. Leaney puts it, 'to be

53. The word כול implies that the totality of what God has revealed is intended. However scholars such as J. Charlesworth have narrowed the force of the כול to the totality of 'laws' by reading the phrase כול הנגלות as 'all revealed laws'. Although I am more inclined to 'all things revealed', should Charlesworth's reading be taken as the more appropriate, it will just bring into a sharper focus the claim that the Torah has its origin in God.

54. G. Vermes, *Post-Biblical Jewish Studies* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975, p. 38).

true Israel and organised itself to reflect what it believed to be the structure of Israel as God had intended her to be'.[55]

A further word of clarification on the Qumranian view of הטוב והישר is that 'the good' before God is already fixed. It is permanent in the revelation given to Moses and the prophets. This accounts for why the Community could not separate their understanding of הטוב והישר from the revelation given to Moses and the rest of the prophets. The good does not change, not because it is made known through Moses and others, but because it represents the will of God – רצון אל.[56] Hence the unchanging will of God now resides in the Scriptures. It is this immutable nature of 'what is good and right' before God which lends Moses and the prophets their enduring relevance in the faith of Qumran. That the good and the right constitute the will of God is indisputable. Much more important to our study is the fact that God himself has already determined what the 'good' and the 'right' are. Many generations may come and go, but the will of God remains the same.

b. Self-Contained Section (1QS 5–9)[57]

As we turn to the second major division of the *Rule* to explore the theme of revelation, the use of the word חוק deserves further attention. It is noted in the opening column that the word is used to denote 'what is good and right' and does not change. However, a careful reading of columns 5–9 shows that the word assumes a different nuance (see 5.20, 22; 9.12). It is used to signify the halachic rules for everyday life in the Community. In 9.12-14[58] for instance, the instructions guiding the leader of the Community are described as 'the statutes'. 'These are **the statutes**, by which the Master shall walk with

55. Leaney, *Rule of Qumran*, p. 74.

56. In his study of the word in the Scrolls, Norman Walker noted that 'The root meaning of RAṢON is two-sided, namely *will* and *pleasure*, whether of oneself or another. Doing one's own will and pleasure involves one's own desire, but doing the will and pleasure of another results in *acceptance, approval, delight* of another, and his returning favour and blessing.' See N. Walker, 'The Rendering of Rāṣôn', *JBL* 81 (1962), pp. 182–4.

57. It is worth mentioning that scholars have argued for compositional stages of 1QS partly on the basis that columns 5–9 consist of secondary additions. Sarianna Metso, for instance, argued that the insertion of Exod. 23.7 and Isa. 2.22 into 1QS 5.15b and 17a respectively, and also the use of Isa. 40.3 in 1QS 8.14 suggest that 1QS has gone through a redaction. The purpose of the insertions, according to Metso, 'was to provide scriptural legitimization for the regulations of the community, as well as to strengthen the community's self-understanding. . . . at the time that the proof texts were added, enthusiasm within the community had begin to show signs of waning and the need for separation was being questioned. Therefore, the strict rules had to be justified by allusions to the Scriptures.' See S. Metso, 'The Use of Old Testament Quotations in the Qumran Community Rule', in *Qumran between the Old and New Testaments*, eds Cryer and Thompson; pp. 217–31 (228).

58. 1QS 9.12-20 is paralleled in 4Q259, fg. 1, 3.6-19; 1QS 9.20-21 = 4Q259, fg. 2; 1QS 9.15–10.2 = 4Q258, fg. 3, 2.1-12. Again, there is nothing unique in these parallels to call for comparisons.

every living being, according to the norm of every time and the weight of every man. He shall do the will of God according to everything which has been revealed from time to time. He shall learn all the understanding which has been found according to the times and statute of the Endtime.' (9.12-14) The phrase refers to the instructions listed in 9.13-26. Are these instructions (cf. 6.8–7.25) also to be regarded as revealed and thereby the unchangeable will of God? Moreover, in the passage cited above (9.12-14), where the text speaks of 'the will of God according to everything which has been revealed from time to time' (cf. 8.15), what does the text mean by revelation from time to time? And if it is granted that 'what is good and right' is permanently fixed, what is the relevance of this 'now and then' revelation? Does it supplement, complement, or substitute the commands through Moses and the prophets? Although the answers to these questions may not be explicit in the text, it will be a hasty judgement to assume that the text does not propose answers.

A. Shemesh and C. Werman, in a joint article, draw attention to Deut. 29.28 (MT) as the basis for the Qumranic view of revelation: 'The secret things belong to the Lord our God, but the things revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may observe all the words of this law.' They argue that the terms נגלות – 'revealed things' – and נסתרות – 'secret things' – which are found in 1QS 5.10-13 and 8.11-16 are best understood in light of the Community's understanding of Deuteronomy. They sum up their understanding as follows:

> the Torah that God has commanded Israel contains both revealed and hidden commandments, of which the revealed commandments are those explicitly mentioned in Scripture, while the hidden ones are those divulged to the members of the sect alone and remain unknown to the rest of the people. Revelation of the hidden commandments ensues from fulfilment of the revealed ones; only he who meticulously observes the commandments of the revealed Torah merits the divine revelation of the hidden commandments.[59]

In seeing itself as the true Israel on whom the Torah was binding, the Community was not satisfied only with knowing the explicit instructions, but also the truth which may be concealed in those revealed commands. In order to extract the hidden truth from the revealed Torah, it was deemed fitting that among every ten men, there must be a man whose task is the study of the Torah: 'And where there are ten (members), there must not be lacking there a man who studies the Torah,[60] day and night continually, each man

59. A. Shemesh and C. Werman, 'Hidden Things and Their Revelation', *RevQ* 18 (1998), pp. 409–27 (410).

60. The phrase, איש דורש בתורה, in 1QS 6.6 is best understood in the sense of 'searching the Torah'. This is further reinforced by the use of the niphal form of the verb מצא – 'to find' – to denote the activity of הדורש in 8.11-12. The interpreter is the one who searches the Torah in order to uncover what is concealed. Thus the study of Scripture is not without a goal. My own inclinations as regards what the interpreter searches for in the Torah is this: the will of God – רצון אל.

relieving another' (1QS 6.6-7). In other words, what is regarded as revelation from time to time is the truth arrived at after a careful study of the Torah. It is quite possible that those truths discovered in the course of study inspired the introduction of certain instructions that were intended for the enforcement of the observance of Torah. It is those instructions which are regarded as חוק in 9.12. They are not new because they are derivatives of the explicit Torah.

That the revealed Torah generates the discovery of the concealed truth is also attested in the pledge of the initiates to adhere not only to the Torah, but also 'to everything which has been revealed from it to the Sons of Zadok, the priests who keep the covenant and seek his will, and according to the multitude of the men of their covenant who devote themselves together to his truth and to walk in his will'. (1QS 5.9-10) If the Sons of Zadok are the medium by which the hidden commandments are revealed, one could probably suggest that the man who studies the Torah on behalf of the ten is most likely a priest. However, such a reading will not do justice to the point that the studying of the Torah among ten members is on a rotational basis, as implied in the phrase 'each man relieving another'. And since there is no clue in the *Rule* to suggest that the ten members referred to in 1QS 6.6 were all priests, one cannot argue that the study of the Torah in the Community was unique to the priests. In other words, the study of the Torah was a piety for every member of the Community. It is in this sense that Wernberg-Møller's comment becomes relevant when he writes, 'the idea of a constant stream of revelations, gained by the study of the Torah, appears to be something fundamentally characteristic of the spiritual activity of the society'.[61] Again, the goal of studying the Torah is to discover 'what is good and right' before God. By making the study of the Torah a piety, the Community assumes that those things consisting of the will of God reside in the revealed commandments. That is to say that Moses and the prophets remain foundational in knowing the will of God.

Another way by which the text stresses the permanence of the revealed Torah is in its reference to the knowledge and ignorance of the hidden things. The distinction between the members of the Community and the outsiders is expressed in terms of the knowledge and ignorance of the 'hidden things' (הנסתרות). The problem is not with the ignorance of the explicit Torah, for the non-members were familiar with Moses and held him in high esteem, but that 'they have neither sought nor inquired after him through his statutes, in order to know the hidden things in which they erred'. (1QS 5.11) What is regarded as 'hidden things' in this passage are the truths which one discovers through a careful search of the revealed Torah. These hidden things are already encoded in the commands through Moses and the prophets. They are hidden not in the sense of being inaccessible but in that they are not so obvious to human perception, and thus they are not discovered casually. It was an attempt to discover these hidden things which heightened the exegetical exercise at Qumran. For the Community, exegesis – a study

61. Wernberg-Møller, *The Manual of Discipline*, p. 47.

conducted with the intent of knowing what the divine will is – constitutes the process of arriving at the hidden things. The hidden things are not invented but discovered. It is not surprising therefore that the text describes the purpose of exegetical piety in this manner (8.11-12): 'Everything which has been concealed from Israel and is found by somebody who studies – he shall not conceal it from these (i.e the council of the men of the community) out of fear of a backsliding spirit.' The goal of study is to find. The discovery is spoken of as revelation 'from time to time' (1QS 8.15; 9.13) in that 'the words of scripture are treated as mysteries that refer not to the time of their author but to the end time, which is now being fulfilled in the history of the community'.[62] Knowing the meaning of the biblical texts with particular reference to the covenant Community is conceived as revelation because such knowledge came as a result of enlightenment in two major aspects, namely, the observance of the Torah, and the study of the Scriptures.[63] The revealed interpretation is never a substitute for the commands through Moses, rather it is a new discovery guided and guarded by the study of the Torah and the prophets.

In 1QS 8.15, the word מדרש is used in the same context with נגלה. The preparation of the way mentioned in Isaiah is understood as the מדרש (study) of the Torah. And the מדרש must be in accordance with 'everything which has been revealed (נגלה) from time to time, and that which the prophets have revealed by his holy spirit'. (8.15b-16a) Study in the Qumran Community as evident in 1QS is more than a cognitive exercise. It is viewed as one of the ways by which human beings can seek God, לדרוש אל (1.1c-2a), i.e. it is an act of piety.[64] Thus the scrutiny yardstick of the Community must validate any insight gained from the study of the Scriptures. And that standard resides in the Teacher of Righteousness who is the official mediator of revelation for the Community.[65]

62. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination*, p. 121.

63. According to G. Nickelsburg, this revealed interpretation should be conceived of as a contrast to a lack of enlightenment with respect to the interpretation and observance of the Torah which characterizes those who are outside of the Qumran Community who 'have neither sought nor studied the decrees of the covenant in order to know the hidden things in which they stray'. See George W. E. Nickelsburg, 'Revelation', in *EDSS*, vol. 2; pp. 770–2.

64. Benedict T. Viviano has drawn attention to the fact that the idea of Torah study as one of the highest religious values goes back to the book of Deuteronomy, especially Deut. 6.4-9. Viviano quotes the insightful comment of Von Rad on this section of Deuteronomy in p. 112 of his monograph to show the importance attributed to the study of the Torah. 'For here the concern with Moses' words appears already almost an end in itself, as something which ought to claim the whole of a man's mental and spiritual powers and to occupy him completely.' See B. T. Viviano, *Study as Worship* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978, pp. 111–27).

65. According to Habakkuk Pesher, the Teacher is known as the one 'to whom God has disclosed all the mysteries of the words of his servants, the prophets'. (1QpHab. 7.4-5) Being the figure around whom the Community gathers, he is the bearer of those ideals for

The quest for the hidden meanings of Scripture among the Qumranites was inspired by their persuasion that beneath the explicit texts lie the concealed truths which are not obvious to the majority of human beings. These hidden truths are already fixed because they represent the will of God. Although time may change, the meanings remain the same. What it meant for Moses and his generation was what it meant to the Teacher of Righteousness and his generation. The hidden meanings are not invented because they are already determined. Instead they are discovered. To put it differently, the goal of the exegesis at Qumran was to unveil what is already in existence since Moses, but was and still is concealed from many people. It is this notion of concealed truth which enabled the members in the Community to discover themselves as the true fulfilment of Isa. 40.3 for instance, though a truth they themselves believed to be concealed still from many people in Israel. Consequently, while the Community may appear to be a new movement in Israel, its existence has been revealed long ago. By implication, it was a careful search for the hidden things in the explicit Torah that led the Community to the awareness that its existence has been determined, and therefore the emergence of the Community is the fulfilment of what must be. To put it differently, the members of the Community, 'while meditating on the words of the Old Testament prophets, sought to discover in them allusions to their own past, present and future. Convinced that they were living in the last days, they read the happenings of their times as the fulfilment of biblical predictions.'[66]

In his description of the members of the Community in relation to revelation, Leaney's assertion cannot be more accurate:

> They were equipped to receive the original revelation and to find in it new secrets which they could interpret, and this ability exactly fitted their organization as miniature Israel in which priests and Levites were prominent; side by side with this literary and scholarly ability there seems to have dwelt an imaginative capacity which enabled them to absorb new ideas within the stream of a well-respected tradition, and to claim new revelations without violence to the old.[67]

which the Community stands. Scholarly attempts to reconstruct the identity and the career of the Master have proved quite impossible. See for example, Frank M. Cross, *The Ancient Library of Qumran* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995, pp. 88–120). In more recent times however, Hempel has argued that the interpretative authority, according to the *Rule*, 'originated as a shared grassroots commodity that characterized the community from its earliest days in small groups. Over time the texts seem to testify to a restriction of access to the correct interpretation of the law by referring to individuals and groups with privileged access and special revelations.' See Hempel, 'Interpretative Authority in the Community Rule Tradition', especially her conclusion on p. 79.

66. Vermes, *The Dead Sea Scrolls in English*, p. 19.

67. Leaney, *Rule of Qumran*, p. 72.

From the perspective of the Qumran covenanters, the Torah and the prophets are Scriptures 'not because they have been formalized and fixed in stone (so to speak), but because in them it is thought that the divine will of God can be found'.[68] Again, the will of God is never invented for it is already fixed in the Torah and the prophets. It is discovered. There is no doubt that 1QS 1.3 could be taken as an indication of the high esteem in which both the Torah and the prophetic writings were held by the sect behind the Scroll.[69] The *Rule*, by drawing attention to Moses and the prophets as the medium of Yahweh's revelation, makes clear at the outset that those commands remain foundational in the life of the Qumran Community. They are foundational because they are irreversible. The will of God remains the same for all generations, and that divine will is encoded in the Torah and the prophets. It can only be decoded by observing the explicit Torah and searching the Torah for the hidden truths.

D. 1QS and Individual Responsibility

Our study of the concept of determinism in the *Rule* would be incomplete without calling attention to those passages which articulate human responsibility within the framework of determinism. References to this human responsibility are scattered within the first section (columns 1–4) but constitute a block of tradition in the second part of the *Rule* (columns 5–10). Drawing attention to this notion of human responsibility in this study is significant because it will sharpen our understanding of what is determined and irreversible according to our text. Moreover, it will help us in narrowing down whether the prayers of 1QS are concerned mainly with this area of human responsibility or not.

One of the ways by which the text articulates the idea of human responsibility is in its use of the language of change. This is crucial especially when one bears in mind the guideline of permanence used earlier on to identify determinism in the *Rule*. In the introductory column for example, the text employs words like לצעוד – 'to deviate' – (1.13), לסור – 'to turn aside' – (1.15), לשוב[70] – 'to turn back' (1.17). Each of these words denotes the concept of change, but they are all used with the negative particle לוא, and the particle renders their meaning to forbid change. The covenanters are prohibited from anything other than the purpose of the Community. They are not to depart (1.13) or turn aside (1.15) from God's statutes. Such turning

68. Timothy H. Lim, *Holy Scriptures in the Qumran Commentaries and Pauline Letters* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 179).

69. Wernberg-Møller, *The Manual of Discipline*, p. 45.

70. The verb שוב is used. The basic meaning, 'to (re)turn', implies physical motion or movement. In its theological function, it bears the two requisites of repentance: to turn from evil and to turn to good.

aside can be caused by terror, dread, affliction or agony which characterize the era of Belial (1.17-18). In other words, the steadfastness of every member in the path of truth is not determined beforehand, but a choice that lies with the individual as he encounters the terror and the afflictions of the age of Belial.

While the text portrays the Community as the predestined of God, it does not grant that a member's disregard for the Law of Moses is excusable on the grounds of predestination. The text makes it clear that continuation of membership in the Community is guaranteed on the condition that one's actions befit the purpose which identified the group as a predestined Community. If that were not the case, the text would not have made provision for expulsion from the Community (7.16-17, 23-24; 8.21-24). E. J. Christiansen expressed this idea of human responsibility when she noted that the Community's self-consciousness as a predestined community is built on 'the conviction that election means being obliged to live according to the law and being devoted to the study of Torah'.[71]

Other passages which contain the vocabulary of human responsibility include the following:

> And when someone enters the covenant to behave in compliance with all these decrees, . . . those who **freely volunteer**[72] in the Community to set up his covenant and to follow the decrees which he commanded to fulfil, and under the authority of the majority of Israel, those who **freely volunteer** to return within the Community to his covenant.' (5.20-22)

> And to any in Israel who **freely volunteers** to enrol in the council of the community, the Instructor who is at the head of the Many shall test him with regard to his insight and his deeds. If he suits the discipline he shall introduce him into the covenant so that he can revert to the truth and shun all sin, . . . (6.13-15)

> I shall not sustain angry resentment for someone who **converts** from transgression, but I shall have no mercy for all those who **deviate** from the path. (10.20-21)

The non-determinism of the text is also expressed in the closing remark on the doctrine of the two spirits. The activities of the spirits extend to the human psyche as they fight for dominion within human hearts. Human deeds are informed by the inward experiences of strife between the spirits of truth and deceit. 'Until now, the spirits of truth and of deceit struggle in the heart of man and they walk in wisdom or in folly. According to man's share

71. E. J. Christiansen, 'The Consciousness of Belonging to God's Covenant', p. 93.

72. The word that is rendered as 'freely volunteer' is נדב. That the word occurs in its *hithpael* (5.21, 22; 6.13) form is an indication that the text does not undermine human responsibility.

in truth, so he abhors injustice; and according to his share in the lot of deceit he acts irreverently in it and so abhors the truth.' (4.23-24)

This struggle is inconsistent with the notion that a person's lot is determined. If a person's lot in truth or deceit were already fixed and unalterable, the struggle between the two spirits would be irrelevant. The struggle is conceivable only if it is a fight for gaining the dominion of the object. The use of the word ריב (4.18, 23) for the struggle between the two spirits is significant. It is a legal term used in a lawsuit when one is giving evidence. The purpose of the whole exercise is to present one's case convincingly. In this instance, the goal of the contention between the spirits of truth and deceit is to influence the judgement of their object one way or the other, depending on which of the spirits succeeds in its rhetoric of persuasion. If this reasoning is tenable, then the dominion of the spirits of truth and deceit in the human heart is determined by the individual's own response to the struggle of these warring spirits. He is an individual who becomes righteous or abhors the truth through his yielding to the spirit of truth or deceit respectively. This is reinforced by the use of the *Hithpael* form of the verb הלך (3.20; cf. 1.8) which literally means 'they cause themselves to walk' in the ways of light (see also 3.18, 21). Thus, if the individual is the causative factor in the walk 'in the ways of light', it consequently means that each person's relation to light and darkness is determined by the individual's response to the struggle between the two spirits. The response is not pre-determined but left within the framework of human discretion.

Another way by which the text articulates human responsibility is in its emphasis on the standard of living within the Community. As a way of enforcing the standard, the text enumerates the punishment for every misdemeanour (see 6.24–7.25; 8.16–9.2). It should be noted however that the interest of the *Rule* is not in the misdemeanour and the punishment, but in preserving the Community as God intended it to be: 'to seek God with all the heart and soul doing what is good and right . . . to love all that he has chosen, and to hate all that he has rejected . . . to perform truth and righteousness and justice upon the earth.' (1.2-6) Nevertheless, the text makes expulsion from the Community the severest remedy for certain wrongdoings. For instance, 'The man who grumbles against the authority of the Community shall be banished and never come back.' (7.17, see also 8.21-23) Other punishments are in proportion to the misdemeanour. If the deeds of every member were conceived to be predetermined, the text would not have made the member responsible for any misdemeanour by assigning a befitting punishment. Furthermore, if the text had intended to propagate the idea that those in the lot of light and those in the lot of darkness were predetermined and unalterable, it would not have allowed for complete banishment from the covenant Community. Again, since our text projects a relatively closed community whose self-image is that of a remnant called not only to preserve the Torah but to embody it, continuation in the Community cannot entertain any form of compromise.

That the individual is held responsible for his deeds is also hinted at in the annual review of the members of the Community.[73] During the annual review, the individual's spirit and deeds are examined. 'And their spirit and deeds must be tested, year after year, in order to upgrade each one to the extent of his insight and the perfection of his way, or to demote him according to his perversion.' (5.24) Thus one's promotion or debasement in the Community is not viewed as predetermined, but as a consequence of one's deeds and insight in the way of truth. It is implied, therefore, that man can alter his position by his deeds and insight.

In light of the emphasis of the text on human responsibility, the following points should be underscored.

1. Continuation of membership in the Community is not automatic but conditional on one's steadfastness in the path of truth.

2. Ethics are held in high regard. The individual is inseparable from his deeds, and therefore every member is rewarded annually on the basis of his deeds and insight.

3. The individual's position either in the lot of light or in the lot of darkness is determined by his deeds.

It is appropriate to recall the point mentioned briefly in Chapter One regarding the determinism of Josephus. In *The Antiquities of the Jews*, Josephus claimed that the Essenes held a rigid deterministic opinion concerning human actions. Here are Josephus' own words again:

> Now at this time there were three sects of the Jews, which held different opinions concerning **human actions**: the first was that of the Pharisees, the second the Sadducees, and the third the Essenes. Now the Pharisees say that some things, but not all, are the work of fate; whether some are going to happen or not depend upon ourselves. But the sect of the Essenes maintains that fate is ruler of all things and that nothing happens to people except it be according to its decree. (*Ant.* 13.171-2)

That Josephus' emphasis is on human actions is implied in the description of the Pharisees when he noted the affirmation of the Pharisees that 'some things, but not all depend upon ourselves'. What could human beings be held responsible for if not those things that lie within their capacity (i.e., their deeds)? While the Pharisees, within the framework of their deterministic

73. A. Lange has suggested that the cryptical astrological text 4Q186 might have been used to examine the candidate for membership. See A. Lange, 'The Essene Position on Magic and Divination', in *Legal Texts and Legal Issues*, (eds Bernstein, García Martínez and Kampen; pp. 377–435.

world-view allow for human responsibility, the Essenes hold 'fate' accountable for all things including human actions. This ethical determinism of the Essenes as articulated in Josephus' passage is incompatible with the determinism of 1QS.

In 1QS, the ethical determinism focuses on the two spirits and their deeds. It is the deeds in the lot of each spirit that are permanently determined. On the contrary, in Josephus' Essenes, human actions are already fixed. It cannot be justified from 1QS that the God of Knowledge assigns certain deeds for certain people. According to the *Rule*, whatever action a person displays, it is not because such action has been ordained for that individual, but because of the spirit in which the person participates. Hence, those who are quick to equate Josephus' Essenes with the author or community behind 1QS on the ground of determinism must carefully qualify the kind of determinism intended. This is necessary because the Essenes, even in Josephus' *Antiquities*, were not the only group which held a deterministic view.[74] In fact, that the determinism of 1QS allows for human responsibility fits Josephus' description of the determinism of the Pharisees better than the Essenes. Although this is not a medium for such an enquiry, it is sufficient to say that the parallel between the Pharisees and the Qumranites is a subject worth exploring in a different study.

E. Summary

In view of the emphasis on human responsibility, what then is the determinism of the *Rule* all about? It can be said with a certain degree of confidence that it is not about the fact that certain human beings are predestined in the lot of light while others in the lot of darkness. Furthermore, it is not about the fact that certain deeds are already assigned to certain people and by so doing makes them not responsible for their actions. Rather the determinism is about the dynamics by which the universe runs its course. What is of particular interest to the *Rule* in the cosmic order is the two spirits and all the deeds established upon them. Every human being becomes either a child of light or a child of darkness not by any pre-arranged order, but by one's choice of actions.

In his section on predestination and freewill, E. P. Sanders cited 1QH 15.13-19; 1QM 13.9-11 and 1QS 3.13–4.1: 'We seem to have in these passages direct statements of double predestination: some to good, some to evil.'[75] On

74. Collins recently reminded us that apocalypticism, as a framework from which determinism flourished, constituted a distinctive world-view within Judaism during the last two centuries BCE. The precise extent of this world-view cannot be measured, but 'neither was it peculiar to a particular sect or the product of a single movement'. See Collins, *Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls*, pp. 7–8.

75. E. P. Sanders, *Judaism: Practice and Belief* 63BCE – 66CE (London, UK: SCM Press, 1992, p. 373).

the contrary, our reading shows that Sanders' perspective on 1QS 3.13–4.1 cannot be sustained. The predestination we encounter in the *Rule* concerns the two spirits and their ways, and not the allotment of people into good or evil.[76]

76. However Sanders' judgement on the point of the individual responsibility cannot be more true of 1QS: 'When considering community life, however, or outsiders, or those trying to enter the covenant, or backsliders within the sect, and in giving rules for dealing with these people, the authors naturally wrote as if all were at the disposal of individual. The same assumption will be found in all Jewish legal material, whether in the Scrolls or elsewhere, and in passages condemning those who are outside.' Sanders, *Judaism: Practice and Belief*, p. 374.

Chapter 3

PETITIONARY PRAYER IN THE *RULE OF THE COMMUNITY*

As we embark on the study of prayer in the *Rule*, it is important to stress from the outset that our interest is not in its significance for the history of Jewish liturgical practices. Previous scholarship[1] has explored that field and the result is well summed up by Esther Eshel: 'One of the most important contributions that the Qumran Scrolls have provided to our understanding of the development of Judaism is the light they shed on the concept of statutory prayers.'[2] Instead, the task before us is to analyse the prayer texts in order to discover the theology that is encoded in them within the context of 1QS. What are the objects prayed for in the *Rule*? Do the prayers anticipate either directly or indirectly an alteration in the deterministic order articulated in 1QS?

Although scholarly works on the liturgical texts from Qumran abound, there is hardly a monograph on the prayer of 1QS, and the contributions of the available commentaries on the prayer section of the *Rule* have been minimal. The orientation of existing works has been to take into account

1. See Weinfeld, 'Prayer and Liturgical Practice', pp. 241–58; E. G. Chazon, 'New Data from Qumran', *JJML* 15 (1993), pp. 1–21; Chazon, 'Prayers from Qumran', pp. 265–84 – Chazon is a notable scholar on prayers from Qumran who claims that even patently sectarian prayers are witnesses to non-sectarian liturgical customs because the sectarian prayers 'draw upon a common liturgical heritage and incorporate elements common to that heritage'. (See 'New Data from Qumran', 1993, p. 1) In her 1994 article, she argues that the Sabbath prayers (4QdibHam, 4Q503 and 4Q400) display features which are known patterns of the Sabbath prayers in contemporary prayers from the Second Temple period and in early Rabbinic liturgical sources; Flusser, 'Qumran and Jewish "Apotropaic" Prayers', pp. 194–205. Charlesworth, 'Jewish Prayers in the Time of Jesus', *PSBSup* (1993), pp. 35–56; Charlesworth acknowledged the importance of his contribution in this manner: 'our work should be seen as a prolegomenon to a full and detailed study of the text and context of each Jewish prayer.' See also E. Fleischer, 'On the Beginning of Obligatory Jewish Prayer', *Tarbiz* 59 (1990), pp. 397–441 [in Hebrew]; M. R. Lehman, 'A Reinterpretation of 4Qdibrê Hamme'oroth', *RQ* 5 (1964–66), pp. 106–10.

2. Esther Eshel, 'Prayer in Qumran and the Synagogue', in *Community Without Temple* (eds B. Ego, A. Lange and P. Pilhofer; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1999, pp. 323–34 [323]).

their significance for Jewish liturgical history. Where references are made to the prayer texts from 1QS, they are often cited independently of their 1QS context to illustrate a general point about the Qumranites.[3] The commentaries on the other hand are less helpful because they are much more concerned with cross-references and biblical precedents. Nevertheless, we have drawn on the insights of commentaries and monographs on liturgical texts in our study where such insights have proved valuable.

As a starting point, it is appropriate to recall some points from our discussion of prayer in Chapter One. These points are important because they provide the guidelines for isolating prayers in 1QS. They can be summed up in these ways: (i) prayer is an address directed to God by human beings; (ii) in biblical prayer, God is addressed in the second or third person singular; (iii) biblical petition is rendered in anticipation of a particular goal, and in most cases, the goal is a change in a given condition as especially evident in the petitionary prayer in narrative contexts; (iv) confession is regarded as petition in the sense that it anticipates the granting of forgiveness and thus alters the divine countenance towards the penitent; (v) petitionary prayer can also be in the form of blessings and curses. In light of all these features, a passage can be regarded as a prayer text should it exhibit some or all of these phenomena. Although the latter part of the *Rule* (columns 10–11) is generally considered as prayer, it is only the reference to petition in that long liturgical section which is relevant to our focus in this chapter. Apart from the entreaty of 11.16-17, the main section of the *Rule* which deals with petition is 1.24–2.18, and it can be outlined as follows: (i) confession – 1.24–2.1; (ii) petition in the form of blessings – 2.2-4; (iii) petition in the form of curses – 2.5-9, 11-18. Again our goal in this chapter is to explore the contents of these petitions within the deterministic world-view in order to discover whether or not the petitions can be accounted for within the structure of 1QS determinism.

A. Are There Sectarian Petitions?

In his study on prayer and liturgical practice in the Qumran sect, Weinfeld[4] acknowledged that discussion on the Qumran sect is usually centred on those aspects which are distinctive to the sect. In order to make up for what Weinfeld considered a neglected area in Qumran studies, he focused on certain prayers and religious customs which have their roots in wider Judaism. He noted that after the destruction of the Second Temple, there were certain 'norms concerning the way of life and the worship of God which were the common

3. What is implied by such an approach is the presumption that only one community or author is responsible for all the prayer texts of the Dead Sea Scrolls. The method adopted in our study however implies that the text of 1QS may not necessarily be a production of the same author as that of the *Hymns of Thanksgiving* (1QH) simply because they both form part of the Qumran Scrolls.

4. Weinfeld, 'Prayer and Liturgical Practice', pp. 241–58.

inheritance of the various streams of Judaism during this period'.[5] Such norms include the recurrence of certain themes and the recitation of certain formulae in the prayers for the Sabbath and Festivals. Weinfeld is right in noting that Qumran studies have focused heavily on distinctive features of the sect, however no such studies have dealt with petitionary prayers that are found in distinctive sectarian documents. It is part of the goal of this chapter to fill that gap.

It has been suggested on the basis of the deterministic world-view of the Qumran Community that there is no petitionary prayer which is distinctively sectarian in the Scrolls.[6] While it may be true that the prayers which are found in the distinctive sectarian documents such as 1QS and 1QH do not imply a sectarian origin, this is not sufficient grounds to dismiss the fact that the Community projected by the *Rule* renders petitionary prayers. The presence of these prayers of non-sectarian origin in the sectarian literature must have been for a particular purpose. In any case, it is not whether the prayers are sectarian or non-sectarian that is of relevance in the context of our study, but the point that prayers constitute a part of the whole document of 1QS and thus have a contribution of their own to the literary world-view of the *Rule*.

B. Types of Petitionary Prayers

1. Prayer of Confession (1.24–2.1)[7]

> Then the Levites shall enumerate the iniquities of the sons of Israel and all their guilty transgressions and their sins during the dominion of Belial. [And al]l those who cross over into the covenant shall confess after them by saying: 'We have perverted ourselves, we have rebel[led], we [have sin]ned, we have acted impiously, we [and] our [fath]ers before us, by our walking [. . .] True and righte[ous] is the [Go]d of [Israel and] his judgement against us and [our] fathers; but his loving mercy he has [bes]towed upon us from eternity to eternity.' (1.24–2.1)[8]

a. Its Context and Function

Before going into the details of the confession, its literary function in the general framework of 1QS deserves a brief comment. After setting out the goal of the Community, the text enumerates the sequence of events which accompany the entrance of a new convert into the Community. The first of

5. Weinfeld, 'Prayer and Liturgical Practice', p. 241.
6. See for instance the appendix to Knohl, 'Between Voice and Silence', pp. 29–30.
7. There is no parallel to this passage in 4QS.
8. The liturgical nature of the confession is apparent in the fact that it is formulated as a communal recitation, and phrased in the plural 'we'. The occasion for the prayer is described as ובעוברם ברית – 'when they cross into the covenant' (1.18, 20, 24). Thus there is fixation in terms of the occasion and the form of the confession. And the method of the confession is prescribed – it is to be led by the Levites and nobody else.

those events is the utterance of praise by the priests and the Levites with the 'amen' response of the newcomers. Thereafter, the author presents the confession as a necessary prayer that every new member must recite with the guidance of the Levites. The initiate is confronted with the need for confession as the Levites recount 'the iniquities of the sons of Israel and all their guilty transgressions and their sins during the dominion of Belial'. (1.22-24)

Scholars have taken this confession as part of the annual ceremony of the renewal of the covenant rather than a liturgy for the occasion of entering into the Community. This reading is based on the remark of 2.19 rather than on the introductory comments of 1.16-18:

> Thus they shall do year after year, all the days of the reign of Belial. (2.19)

> Thus all those who are entering shall cross over into the covenant before God by the Rule of the Community in order to act according to everything which he has commanded. . . . When they cross over into the covenant . . . (1.16-18)

In his study of confession in 1QS, H. Lichtenberger[9] calls attention to possible speakers of the confession and they include: (a) the entering novice, (b) only those already in the Community, (c) both the new initiates and the members of the Community. Wernberg-Møller, for instance, following the insight of Van der Ploeg, is of the view that the כזה – 'thus' of 2.19 should be taken retrospectively: 'the section starting with 1.19 is to be regarded as continuing the description of the renewal of the covenant . . . and not as describing a different ceremony . . .'[10] In other words, the confession is not just for those entering the Community but a liturgy in which the whole Community participated.

However, when the confession is read in light of 1.16-18, it emerges as a prayer designed more for those who are entering the Community afresh than for those who are already within the Community. This is justified by the fact that those already in the Community are presumed on the basis of the aim of the Community (1.1-11) to have disassociated themselves from the 'evil' mentioned in the confession. Lichtenberger is not far from the same position when he posits that the confession pertains to the newcomers, signifying a break from the old sinful existence, and forms the prerequisite for the Torah-true life in the Community.[11]

9. H. Lichtenberger, *Studien zum Menschenbild in Texten der Qumrangemeinde* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), pp. 94–6.

10. Wernberg-Møller, *The Manual of Discipline*, p. 55, cf. Knibb, *Qumran Community*, pp. 82–90. Wernberg-Møller goes further to place the ceremony on the Day of Atonement (p. 14).

11. 'Für die Neueintretenden steht das Sündenbekenntnis im Zusamenhang mit dem Bruch mit der alten sündigen Existenz schafft so die Voraussetzungen für den neuen toragemäßen Wandel in der Gemeinde.' See Lichtenberger, *Studien zum Menschenbild*, p. 96.

The purpose of recounting the sins of Israel at this point in the *Rule*, especially after the text has set out the goal of the Community (1.1-11), is probably to show the contrast between the Community and the outsiders. Anyone coming from Israel to become a member of the sect must renounce the iniquities and sins which are peculiar to the 'children of Israel' in order to be admitted into the new covenant. The prayer of confession therefore serves two purposes: (i) it forms a part of the large prayer unit (1.19–2.18) that allows the text to make a transition from the way people were admitted into the Community to the description of life within the Community; (ii) since it is not automatic to become a member, we can tentatively assert that the transition from being a part of 'Israel' into being a member of the Community is signified by the prayer of confession (this will be discussed shortly).

b. Its Theology within the *Rule*

The confession does not display any striking difference from the biblical and apocryphal confessions[12] except that the Levites play a special role in the recitation of the confession. It is the Levites who guide the converts through the confession.[13] This special role of the Levites does not render the confession less of the initiate's own confession. Rather it implies that the initiate's perception of his lot with the 'children of Israel' prior to his joining of the Community is defined and coloured by the Levites' characterization of the 'children of Israel' in terms of their 'iniquities', 'guilty transgression', and 'sins'. 'Through these words, those entering the covenant declared their identification with the words of the priests and the Levites, and their recognition of their own and their ancestors' responsibility for the sins of Israel in earlier generations and for their punishment.'[14] The focus on the sins of Israel is partly due to the point that it is Israel at large which is being viewed as the 'outsider' in the *Rule*. Those who constitute the members of the Community are recruited from Israel (6.13f.).

The similarity to the confessions of the Hebrew Bible is observable in two ways. Firstly, it is expressed in terms of human deeds, and secondly, just as the wickedness of man is juxtaposed with the goodness of God in biblical confession so also are the sins of the new covenanters counter-balanced with the mercy of

12. Past scholarship has noted the indebtedness of this confession to several Old Testament passages such as 1 Kgs 8.47, Psalm 106 and Neh. 9.5-37. The closest parallel, according to Knibb, is Nehemiah because they both share in common the Sitz im Leben of covenant ceremony. Knibb, *Qumran Community*, p. 85.

13. The sense in which the phrase מודים אחריהם – 'they shall confess after them' – should be understood is not that obvious. Does it mean that the new converts are to repeat after the Levites? Could the phrase imply that the converts are to make their confession after Levites have finished enumerating the sins of the children of Israel? While the answer is of little or no bearing on our goal, it is an issue worth asking for the sake of the liturgical significance of the confession.

14. Nitzan, *Qumran Prayer*, p. 132.

God in the *Rule*.[15] That the emphasis of the confession is on human deeds is attested in the use of the following words: עוון – 'to pervert', פשע – 'to rebel', חטא – 'to sin', רשע – 'to be wicked' (1.24c-25).[16] All these words describe the manner in which the people and their ancestors have walked.

The focus on human deeds in the 1QS confession is also due to the emphasis of the *Rule* on deeds in general. One of the ways by which the text explains the distinction between the Angel of Light and the Angel of Darkness is in terms of deeds established on the two spirits (3.25). In the process of admitting new members, the Overseer at the head of the Many is to examine the initiates with respect to their insight and deeds (6.14).

The characterization of human deeds as הלך, 'walk', in the prayer of confession (1.25) has a theological significance. Within the deterministic world-view of the *Rule*, there are two categories of ways in which human beings can choose to walk, namely, דרכי אור, 'ways of light', and דרכי חושך, 'ways of darkness', (3.20, 21), and they denote the domains of the Angel of Light and the Angel of Darkness respectively (see our earlier discussion in Chapter Two, pp. 41–9). The initiates until their entrance into the Community, by virtue of the path in which they walk as 'children of Israel', have subjected themselves to the dominion of the Angel of Darkness. The striking parallels between the deeds of the penitent and those deeds attributed to the Angel of Darkness cannot be undervalued. Just as the ways of the Angel are filled with עוון, פשע, חטא (3.22) and רשע (4.9), so also are the deeds of the penitent (1.24-25). Indeed, if it is the individual's level of participation in the lot of either truth or deceit that determines one's righteousness and wickedness (4.24), the penitent's deeds until now exhibit nothing other than the penitent's participation in the lot of the Angel of Darkness. In this way, the initiates by virtue of the nature of their walk belonged in the realm of the Angel of Darkness. This is the manner in which 1QS characterized those who are outside of its Community.

The equation of the confessed deeds with those of the Angel of Darkness is indispensable to the ideological strategy of 1QS because it allows the text to bring out the relevance of the confession within the world-view of 1QS. Prior to their entrance into the Community, the initiates were under the fury of God's vengeful wrath (4.12). It is this fact, that the initiates have been under the dominion of darkness that is acknowledged, and by the same token, renounced in the prayer of confession.

That the language of the confession is also paralleled in the description of the aim of the Community (1.1-11) is significant. In the list of the aim, each

15. This is one of the features which leads Lichtenberger to brand the confession as belonging to the Old Testament form of *Gerichtsdoxologien* because 'die Gerechterklärung Gottes dem Sündenbekenntnis gegenüber steht'. See Lichtenberger, *Studien zum Menschenbild*, p. 95.

16. For a discussion of the order of these verbs in the confession, see J. M. Baumgarten, 'Sacrifice and Worship among the Jewish Sectaries of the Dead Sea (Qumran) Scrolls', *HTR* 46 (1953), pp. 141–59, (158–9); Leaney, *Rule of Qumran*, pp. 128–9.

of these words, הלך, 'walk' and אשמה, 'guilt', occurs twice (see 1.6, 8, 10 cf. 1.23, 25). Especially in 1.6, the two words are used together to signify the way of life which must be abandoned by the members of the Community: 'to *walk* no longer with the stubbornness of a *guilty* heart'. What the members were to discontinue in their walk is characterized in the confession as the path in which the children of Israel and their ancestors have walked. By joining the Community, it is believed that the loving mercy,[17] רחמי חסדו, (2.1) of God is appropriated.

It is worth mentioning the manner in which the confession juxtaposes human deeds with the righteousness of God: 'we have perverted ourselves, we have rebel[led], we [have sin]ned, we have acted impiously, we [and] our [fath]ers before us, by our walking [. . .] truth and just [. . .] his judgement upon us and upon o[ur] fathers.' (1.24-26)[18] By placing the righteousness of God against the evil deeds of human beings, the text exonerates God of any blame for discharging judgement.[19] Thus the judgment is inevitable because

17. The word חסד appears around 250 times in the Hebrew Bible and its meaning and significance have been a matter of long debate. This is attested in the fact that none of the ancient versions uses the same word to represent it. In his *Das Wort Hesed* which was translated as *Hesed in the Bible*, Nelson Glueck argued that the word denotes a relationship between two parties. It can be a relationship between human beings, but when it refers to a relationship between human beings and God, it is within the context of covenant. This led Glueck to the assertion that the divine exercise of *hesed* is based on God's covenantal relationship with his people. See N. Glueck, *Hesed in the Hebrew Bible* (trans. A. Gottschalk; Cincinnati, OH: The Henrew Union College Press, 1967). K. D. Sakenfeld in her 1978 monograph concurred with Glueck's theory of covenant as the circumstances in which *hesed* operates, but she moved beyond Glueck's hypothesis by arguing that *hesed* is appropriate to the superior party in a relationship since the word involves 'deliverance or protection as a responsible keeping of faith with another with whom one is in a relationship' (p. 233). However, a human being is not fundamentally responsible for enforcing such action. See K. D. Sakenfeld, *The Meaning of hesed in the Hebrew Bible: A New Inquiry* (HSM, 17; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978). G. R. Clark recently stressed the bilateral commitment which is characteristic of *hesed* relationships: 'the relative status of the participants is never a feature of hesed act, which may be described as beneficent action performed, in the context of a deep and enduring commitment between two persons or parties, by one who is able to render assistance to the needy party who in the circumstances is unable to help him- or herself'. See G. R. Clark, *The Word hesed in the Hebrew Bible* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993, especially p. 267). These monographs have demonstrated that the word cannot be defined or clarified with precise accuracy because of the variety of its usage in the Bible. For the multiple use of the word see C. P. Whitley, 'The Semantic Range of *Hesed*', *Bib* 62 (1981), pp. 519–26.

18. The juxtaposition of these human deeds with the affirmation that God and his judgement is true and righteous, אמת וצדיק, is a common literary pattern of the confession in the post-exilic books (cf. Ezra, Nehemiah, Tobit).

19. K. Baltzer sees the phrase 'God is righteous' as the nucleus of the (entire) confession in that the statement 'recognizes that Yahweh has acted in accordance with the covenant and

of the manner in which the people and their fathers had walked. According to the world-view of 1QS, the objects of God's love and hatred are eternally established (3.25–4.1) and what he hates is what he punishes at the time of judgement (4.11-12). To be 'true and righteous' therefore means that the God of Israel acts in compliance with his eternal arrangement, and remains unchangeable in discharging judgement.

c. The Confession and the Spirit of Truth

In an attempt to put the focus on the permanence of the divine gesture towards the two spirits and all in their domains, the text asserts that the prayer of confession does not in itself bring a change in the divine gesture towards the penitent but the activity of the spirit of truth. The text works out the dynamic in the atoning work of the spirit. 'For it is by the spirit of the true counsel of God that the ways of man – all his iniquities – are atoned, so that he can behold the light of life. It is by the holy spirit of the community in his (God's) truth that he can be cleansed from all his iniquities.' (3.6b-8a cf. 4Q255, fg. 2.1-2) Why does the text stress this redemptive role of the spirit prior to its teaching on the two spirits? The fact that it is presented immediately after the prayer on the occasion of covenant renewal is probably to clarify any misconception that the prayer of confession is sufficient in itself to guarantee the atonement of the initiates' sins. Moreover, that the text places this redemptive work of the spirit in between the prayer and the doctrine of the two spirits has a twofold significance: first, the emphasis on the spirit as the medium by which sins[20] are atoned for is to remind the reader of the confession in 1.22–2.1; second, the emphasis anticipates the doctrine of the two spirits which later engaged the attention of the author. It is characteristic of these two spirits that, in order to carry out their deeds in a particular person, each of them must first secure dominion over that individual. This is the purpose of their struggle in the hearts of human beings. In the process of the struggle, it is the spirit to which people yield themselves that has dominion. This is to say that the dominion of either of the two spirits is determined by the reactions of human beings to the internal struggles.

is therefore justified as plaintiff against the other party, who has broken the covenant'. See Baltzer, *Covenant Formulary*, p. 50. Leaney, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the juxtaposition is intended to show the ingratitude of the children of Israel (p. 128). Leaney's assertion lacks adequate support in the confession texts of biblical tradition. In OT passages such as Nehemiah and Psalm 106, both of which influenced the confession of 1QS, the force of the juxtaposition is to show that the people were responsible for the default in the covenant while God remained faithful to it.

20. Martha Himmelfarb has recently argued that while 1QS certainly associates impurity and sin through its adaptation of P's terminology of impurity and purification to describe human imperfection and restoration, there is no indication that 1QS understood sins as defiling. See M. Himmelfarb, 'Impurity and Sin in 4QD, 1QS, and 4Q512', *DSD* 8 (2001), pp. 29–37.

In the case of the converts into the Qumran Community, the text takes the position that their dominion is in the hand of the spirit of truth. This is evident in the description of the spirit which atones for human iniquities as 'the spirit of the true counsel of God' (3.6), and 'the holy spirit of the community in his truth' (3.7). The terms 'counsel of God' and 'community in his truth' are never used for any other group of people in 1QS other than the covenanters who understand their association as that of 'the children of light'. The point is that the spirit which atones for the sins of people is the same as the spirit of truth that holds dominion over the children of light. This is the same spirit which is placed in sharp contrast to the spirit of deceit. Thus what actually atones for the iniquities of the new members of the Community is not the prayer of confession but the spirit of truth which is at work in the heart of the penitent.[21]

d. Summary

What then is the efficacy of the prayer of confession recited by the initiates? While the confession expresses the remorse of people for their evil ways, the text does not opine that the prayer is sufficient for winning the favourable gesture of God. The only medium by which one appropriates this divine countenance according to 1QS is by loving what God loves and hating what he hates, and these he (i.e. God) has already established upon the spirit of truth and the spirit of deceit respectively. For the confession of sins to accomplish its goal of changing the divine countenance towards the penitent, the efficacy of the confession is tied to the yielding of the individual to the spirit of truth upon which the favourable countenance of God is established forever.

The text does not state explicitly the spirit at work in the initiates at the time when the prayer of confession is being recited. However, in light of the overall thrust of the *Rule*, it is implied that the confession is rendered with the willingness to comply with the aim of the Community in 'keeping away from all evil and adhering to all good works' (1.4-5). The penitent's desire to embrace this sectarian way of life belongs in the category of deeds in the realm of the spirit of truth. It is the fact that the act of repentance on the part of the initiates falls in the domain of the spirit of truth which precipitates the favourable gesture of God towards the penitent.

2. Petitionary Blessings (2.2-4; 11.15-17)

As we explore the petitions embedded in the blessings and curses of the *Rule*,[22] it will be helpful to recall our discussion of the matter in Chapter One. We

21. Just as the entering of water (i.e. baptism, 1QS 5.13-14) does not purify people who have not repented, similarly, unless it is recited from a repentant heart, the prayer of confession has no significance of its own.

22. There are other instances in the Dead Sea Scrolls in which blessing is set against curse, though not in covenantal settings, but within the context of the struggle between

noted that the practice of counterposing blessings against curses in the Bible is a legal formula of covenantal obligation, and its purpose is to assure the fulfilment of the covenant. The same is also true of the petitionary blessings and curses of 1QS. The occasion of the blessings and the curses according to the text is 'the entrance into the covenant' (1.16, 20). While this may be in correlation with the practice in biblical Israel and the Ancient Near East, 'the adaptation of ceremonial customs and the use of texts and styles from the Bible for new purposes are among the most interesting phenomena in the literary creation of blessings and curses in Qumran'.[23] Unlike the Old Testament, blessings and curses in the *Rule* are not addressed to the same group of people. One group of blessings is invoked upon those who enter into the covenant and undertake to observe it, and against it there are two groups of curses: first on those who do not enter the covenant, and second on those who have entered the covenant, but intentionally violated their commitment. That the *Rule* makes a distinction between the recipients of the blessings and the curses is significant in that it allows the text to drive home its message of dualistic determinism. People are either blessed or cursed by virtue of the lot in which they belong. It is this deterministic element which prompts Nitzan to assert that 'even if the covenantal ceremony of reciting blessing against curse per se is learned from the Bible, in Qumran its aim was altered in accordance with the world-view of the sect, which in turn influenced the understanding of the covenant and its practice of using blessings and curses'.[24]

Following the prayer of confession are petitions in the form of blessing. Within the blessing, five major requests are noteworthy and their petitionary nature is obvious from the way they are framed in the text (1QS2.2-4)[25]:

יברככה בכול טוב – May he bless you with everything good
ישמורכה מכול רע – May he protect you against everything evil
יאר לבכה בשכל חיים – May he enlighten your heart with insight for living
יחונכה בדעת עולמים – May he favour you with eternal knowledge
ישא פני חסיו לכה לשלום עולמים – May he lift his kind countenance toward you for eternal peace

As we explore these requests, our interest is to discover whether or not the content of each petition is consistent with the deterministic framework of the

forces of light and darkness. In the *War Scroll* (1QM 13.2-6) for instance, there is a blessing and curse which is composed for the occasion of the eschatological war between the God of Israel and the lot of light, and Belial and the lot of darkness. See also 4Q510–11.

23. Nitzan, *Qumran Prayer*, p. 124.

24. Nitzan, *Qumran Prayer*, p. 128.

25. This 1QS passage is generally considered an expanded version of the Aaronic blessing of Num. 6.24-26. It is unparalleled in 4QS. In later writings, the language of the 1QS blessing is reflected in the fourth *berakah* of the prayer of *Eighteen Benedictions* (Mishnah, *Ber.* 4.3; 5.2; *Ta'an.* 2.2).

1QS Community. In other words, do any of the petitions anticipate a change or alteration in the things which are determined beforehand?

a. Protection against Evil

Protection against evil is a characteristic feature in the prayer of the Second Temple period.[26] In the opening column (1.4), רע is mentioned as the main phenomenon from which the Community must keep away. It is associated with 'stubbornness of a guilty heart', 'lustful eyes' (1.6), rebellion, sin, perversion and wickedness (1.24-26). As already noted in Chapter Two, all these deeds are described as belonging in the domain of the Angel of Darkness (4.9-26). This is to say that the term 'evil' signifies the entire activities of the Angel and everything found in its abode. The term is used in 1QS to embrace all that is in contrast to what is acceptable and approved by God. רע is that which God loathes eternally (4.1). Hence it is the object of punishment at the time of the divine visitation.

This petition for protection from evil is probably the most essential of all the petitions in this blessing on the occasion of entrance into the Community. It is needed because of the Community's self-consciousness of its purpose of existence, and the factors which can hinder that goal. Walking perfectly before God forms the bedrock of the Community. The sect recognizes also the threats posed by Belial. This is echoed in the warning that forbade the new members from being led astray by the 'fear', 'grief', or 'agony' which characterize the age of Belial's dominion (1.17-18). Thus the possibility that a member of the sect could be led astray called for a defensive measure that keeps the members protected from Belial's threats. This petition is recited against possible interference from the Angel of Darkness (i.e. Belial).[27]

We noted earlier in Chapter Two (p. 42) that the only assistance available to the Community in overcoming the threats of the Angel of Darkness is 'the

26. See 11Q5 19.15-16 cf. Mt. 6.13. However, the commonality does not imply that its usage and function was monolithic. In 1QS for instance, the prayer has been given a nuance of exclusiveness as the term 'evil' refers to all that is outside of the 1QS Community and belongs in the domain of the Angel of Darkness.

27. In another text of the Scrolls, *Hymns Against Demons*, singing the praise of God is employed for the purpose of frightening the spirits of Belial: 'And I, the Sage, declare the grandeur of his radiance in order to frighten and terr[ify] all the spirits of the ravaging angels and the bastard spirits, demons, Liliths, owls and [jackals . . .] and those who strike unexpectedly to lead astray the spirit of knowledge, to make their heart forlorn . . . and in the era of the rule of wickedness and in the period of humiliation of the sons of light, in the guilty periods of those defiled by sins not for an everlasting destruction but rather for the era of the humiliation of sin [. . .] Rejoice, righteous ones, in the God of wonders. My psalms are for the upright. *Blank.* May all those of perfect path praise him. *Blank.*' (4Q510, fg. 1.4-9). By praising God, it is believed that the singing itself is capable of driving the forces of darkness away. The praise terrifies Belial and his demons as it reminds the demons of the majesty of God. This could possibly be a factor behind the production of the large collection of hymns associated with the Community (the *Hodayot*).

God of Israel and the angel of his truth.' One way by which the help is solicited is expressed in this petition for protection against evil. It is a plea which aims to prevent the interference of the common enemy of the Community. Since its existence is in the era of Belial, the Community knows that it cannot stop the enemy from inflicting evil; instead, the people turn to the Creator of all things for protection. In this way, the prayer is not only a plea to abstain from the deeds that are alien to the purpose of the Community but also a defence against the interference of the Angel of Darkness who causes the aberration of the members of the Community. It is in this same sense that Alexander's remark on the Qumran defence against demons becomes relevant: 'The Dead Sea sect saw itself as engaged here and now in a desperate struggle against Belial and his minions. Its defences were essentially spiritual, consisted of prayers and incantations, the recitation of which created a spiritual cordon round the Community.'[28]

This petition does not in any way undermine the deterministic world-view of the Community. In fact, the prayer recognizes that good and evil as embodied by the Prince of Light and the Angel of Darkness respectively cannot be altered. However, it also recognizes that God the creator of all things is the one who sustains the parallel distinction that separates the good from the evil. It is this recognition of the divine sustenance that prompts the apotropaic petition for those in the lot of good. The goal of the prayer is to establish the cosmic arrangement by the God of Knowledge. It is a plea by those who see themselves in the lot of good to remain that which they have been predestined to become. Thus the petition is not recited in expectation of a particular change but in anticipation that God would continue to sustain the cosmic order as it relates to those in the lot of the good.

For a community that sees its existence solely in terms of 'doing good' and 'walking perfectly' before God, a prayer of protection from evil serves as a preventive measure against degeneration into the opposite of what the Community is meant to be. In other words, the prayer is consistent with the determinism in 1QS in the following ways: First, it is in harmony with the determined purpose of the Community as stated in column 1. Second, it is to ban the interference of one lot into another, and by so doing reassert the parallel distinction of the lot of good and evil. Third, the petition is permissible by 1QS determinism because of the era in which the Community (projected by the text) found itself.

b. Enlightenment with Insight for Living

The function of this prayer in the framework of 1QS correlates with the emphasis of the text on studying the Torah and the prophets. The finality of the Law and the prophets and the exegetical activities of the Community have been noted in Chapter Two. As the members of the Community arrive at new truth in their search of the Scriptures, the discovery is always subject

28. Alexander, 'Demonology', in *Dead Sea Scrolls After Fifty Years*, eds Flint and Vanderkam; vol. 2; p. 344.

to the approval of the Maskil whose insight provides the yardstick for correct interpretation of the Scriptures. This is to say that not all interpretations are acceptable. Moreover, the fact that the goal of exegesis is to discover the hidden things, לדעת הנסתרות (5.11), in order to embrace or walk in them requires a sense of discernment of what is acceptable and what is not. It is against this background that the petition for enlightenment should be understood.

יאר לבכה בשכל חיים – 'May he enlighten your heart with insight for living.' Almost all the words of this petition for enlightenment, יאר לבכה בשכל חיים, are paralleled in the deterministic passages of the *Rule*. The verb האיר – 'to enlighten' – is a derivation of the noun אור – 'light' – which itself constitutes a deterministic symbol of 1QS. The heart – לב – is the location of the struggle between the spirit of truth and the spirit of deceit over the domination of human beings. The word שכל meaning 'insight' is a cognate of משכיל.[29] In 1QS 5.21, 23, 24 שכל is used in connection with מעשה meaning 'work' or 'deed' as the yardstick of promotion. Each member's שכל must be taken into account whenever the spirit of the members is being examined for promotion, and each member's registration in the סרך must correlate with the individual's שכל in the Torah. While מעשה refers to the 'doing' of Torah (i.e. praxis), it is most probable that שכל denotes the 'understanding' which determines and guides the 'doing' of the Scripture. This reading is reinforced by the fact that the purpose of שכל requested in the petition is for 'living'. In other words, the שכל is imparted into the members for practical purposes.[30]

The only occurrence of the verb יאר other than in this blessing (2.3) is in the context of the description of the activities of the spirit of truth (4.2): להאיר בלבב איש, 'to illuminate the heart of man'. The function of the verb in 1QS is to depict the removal of darkness (i.e. ignorance) in the abode of human decision, לב, and this task is assigned to the spirit of truth. Again, this spirit, as noted in Chapter Two, is foundational to the existence of the children of light. Thus when the priests invoke this petition on the members of the Community, they are not asking God to do anything contrary to his established order, rather the petition asks God to accomplish that which is already inevitable in the deterministic world-view of the Community, making the members of the Community the beneficiaries of the enlightening activity of the spirit of truth.

29. Although there is no unanimity on the translation of this term, it should be excusable for the sake of the point we are making here to read the term as 'the insightful one'.

30. While Wernberg-Møller has read the word חיים – 'living' as denoting 'eternal life' in the same sense as that of the Pseudepigrapha and the New Testament (see Wernberg-Møller, *Manual of Discipline*, p. 52 note 10), I do not find such a reading convincing because the overall framework of 1QS tends to suggest that the word denotes 'life' in the sense of living in the Community. To live in the Community requires שכל especially since promotion or demotion of the members is based partly on their שכל.

c. Favour with Eternal Knowledge

The word דעת – 'knowledge' – and its cognates are used in the deterministic section of the *Rule* in relation to God (3.15; 4.22), spirit (4.4), and mysteries (4.6). But it will be helpful first to comment on two crucial terms which are closely associated with the concept of דעת in this deterministic section. They include להבין – 'to instruct' – and ללמד – 'to teach' – both of which are used to describe the function of the Maskil in 3.13. The content of the instruction is 'the nature of all the sons of man, with respect to all the kinds of their spirits with their distinctions for their works in their generations, and with respect for their visitation of their afflictions together with their times of peace'. (3.14-15)

We need not rehearse the content here except to note, as a way of reminder, that the content of the Maskil's instruction is spelt out in 3.15–4.26. The focus of the instruction is anthropological in the sense that it focuses on foundational truth concerning the existence of human beings. The pupils of the Maskil are the children of light, and the goal of the instruction is to expose the children of light to the dynamics of human existence within the framework of creation in order that they might know their lot in the divine cosmological arrangement. The function of the Maskil as expressed in the words להבין and ללמד is to impart into the children of light the knowledge of the natures of all human beings, their relation to the two spirits, the dualism of human deeds and the final destiny of the spirits and the people in their lots. In other words, the Maskil is the medium by which the members acquire the knowledge of the mysteries of creation.

In 1QS, the term דעת itself bears various meanings. It is used in the context of didactic impartation of righteous precepts, thus denoting the intellectual or mental perception of the Torah (3.1). It can also signify knowing by experience and sensory perception. One other crucial usage is the revelatory medium (8.9; 9.17). However, in passages such as 1.11, 12; 3.2, it seems that knowledge in all its modes (i.e. intellectual, sensory, experiential and revelatory) is intended.

While the prayer text does not specify a particular medium of knowledge, it is conceivable that the favour anticipated is the endowment with the perception of the dynamics by which the God of Knowledge sets creation in motion, especially human beings and the two spirits upon which all human deeds are established. When we read the petition for eternal knowledge in the light of the didactic function of the Maskil enumerated earlier on, the Maskil emerges as an agent by whom the favour is bestowed upon members of the Qumran Community. The modifying word עולמים 'eternal' is to be read in the sense of permanence, i.e. the unchanging nature of the divine ordinance which the members in the Community are being taught. The content of this petition therefore is the perception of the foundational truth about God and his creation, namely, the nature of human beings, the two spirits and their deeds, the bearing of the two spirits on human beings and the final destiny of the two spirits and the people in their lots. The petition for knowledge is crucial because whatever knowledge the members of the Community acquire,

they regard it as 'part of the divine revelation given through Moses and the Scriptures'.[31]

There is nothing in this prayer that undermines the determinism articulated in the *Rule*. It never anticipates an alteration in the arrangement of the divine ordinances but a discovery of them. The petition acknowledges the revelatory role of the Maskil within the deterministic world-view of the *Rule*, and asks for nothing other than that which the Maskil has been assigned to do within the Qumran Community.

d. 'Everything Good' and Countenance for Peace

In the petition for כול טוב – 'everything good', the term טוב is best understood in the total framework of the *Rule*. As already observed in our discussion of determinism in 1QS in the last chapter, what is 'good' or 'right' is permanent in that it remains the same at all times. It is explained in terms of the revelation of God through Moses and the prophets. The function of טוב in 1QS lies in its representation of the totality of 'the will of God' both revealed and concealed. This indeed is the purpose for which the Community exists (1.1-2). As the priests invoke the blessing of 'everything good', they are asking that the initiates be granted nothing contrary to the predetermined purpose of the Community they are joining. In other words the petition for 'good' is a plea that the new initiates might be endowed in accordance with the purpose of the Community.

The last petition in the blessing is concerned with the lifting up of God's countenance – ישא פני. This expression in the context of 1QS, as in biblical tradition, connotes divine expression. In this petition, the kind of expression is signified by the word חסד. In 2.9, another kind of divine expression is signified by the word אף, 'anger', which implied the judgement of God. In the determinism of 1QS, it is the spirit of truth (and all that belongs in its domain) that attracts the divine favourable countenance. It is this spirit and its principles that God loves eternally (4.1). The destiny of those under its dominion is described as 'healing and great peace in a long life' (4.6-7). This is to say that the divine gesture that precipitates peace is already established upon the spirit of truth. By belonging in its lot, one finds oneself inseparable from the divine חסד and שלום which are fundamental to the domain of the spirit. Thus as we read this petition in light of the predetermined gesture of God towards the spirit of truth, it is invoked on the initiates in anticipation of the final destiny of the Community. Again the petition does not alter the determinism of the text. Instead it affirms the determinism by reassuring the members of the inevitability of that which is the determined end of the Community.

31. Leaney, *Rule of Qumran*, p. 63.

3. Imprecatory Petitions in the *Rule of the Community* (2.5-18)[32]

> Then the Levites shall curse all the men of Belial's lot; they shall respond and say: 'Cursed be you in all your guilty (and) wicked works. May God give you up (to) terror through all the avengers. May he visit upon you destruction through all those who take revenge. Cursed be you without compassion in accordance with the darkness of your works. Damned be you in everlasting murky fire. May God not be compassionate unto you when you cry out. May he not forgive (you) by covering over your iniquity. May he lift up his angry countenance to wreak his vengeance upon you. May there be no peace for you according to all who hold fast to the fathers.' And all those who cross over into the covenant shall say after those who bless and those who curse: 'Amen, amen.' And the priest and the Levites shall continue and say: 'Because of the idols of his heart which he worships cursed be he who enters into this covenant and puts the stumbling-block of his iniquity before him so that he backslides, (stumbling) over it. And when he hears the words of this covenant, he blessed himself erroneously, saying: "Peace be with me, for I walk in the stubbornness of my heart." May his spirit be destroyed, (suffering) thirst along with saturation, without forgiveness. May God's wrath and his angry judgements flare up against him for everlasting destruction, and may all the curses of this covenant stick to him. May God set him apart for evil that he may be cut off from all the Sons of Light because of his backsliding from God through his idols and the stumbling-block of his iniquity. May he put his lot among those who are cursed forever.' And all those who enter the covenant shall respond and say after them: 'Amen, amen.'

As already noted, the curses are twofold: the first group is directed against those who are not members of the Community, while the second aims at the apostates from the Community. Its similarity to the Deuteronomic curses is quite minimal. In both texts, the Levites invoke the curses (1QS 2.4 cf. Deut. 27.14) and the people respond with 'Amen'[33] (1QS 2.10, 18 cf. Deut. 27.26). However, the resemblance is not sufficient 'to permit a claim that the author of the ceremony was depending primarily on Deuteronomy'.

32. Cf. 4Q256, fgs. 3 and 4. There is a hint in the curses which suggests at least two layers of tradition. The reference in 2.11 to the pronouncement of a curse by both the priests and Levites is in sharp contrast to the distinctive role assigned to them in 2.1 – the priest is responsible for pronouncing blessing, and 2.4 – the Levites pronounce the curses. Our own conjecture is that it is most likely that the blessing of 2.2-4 and the curses of 2.5-10 originally existed together as one unit for the occasion of entrance into the Community, and that at a later stage, the curses of 2.11-17 were introduced for the sake of those who have become full members in order to prevent apostasy from the Community. At the time of the composition of 1QS, the author conflated the two units probably because of their similar purpose, which is to stress the danger of being in the lot of Belial. However, the author has not smoothed the conflation by his assignment of the same liturgical role to both the priests and Levites.

33. The difference in the response however lies in the fact that there is a single 'Amen' in Deut. 27.26, while that of 1QS is a double 'Amen'.

From the viewpoint point of Werline,[34] there are several features of the curses which are more in line with the scenes of the condemned in *1 Enoch* and *Jubilees* than Deuteronomy. They include[35]: (1) the turning over of the wicked to 'terror by the hand of all those who carry out acts of vengeance' and 'destruction by the hand of all those who accomplish retribution' (1QS 2.5-7) are references to the angels of torture which are paralleled in the 'Book of the Watchers' and the 'Parables of Enoch' (*1 Enoch* 12–16; 62–63); (2) the curses of 1QS anticipate that the wicked will 'cry out' (i.e. pray) to God for mercy at the time of judgement (1QS 2.8), and this conception is prefigured in the judgement scenes from *1 Enoch* and *Jubilees*; (3) the description of the fate of the wicked is reminiscent of the commissions to imprison Asael and Shemihazah and his companies in *1 Enoch* 10.

In spite of the parallels between the curses of 1QS and *1 Enoch* and *Jubilees* as Werline observed, it would be overreaching to conclude that *1 Enoch* and *Jubilees* generate or shape the curses in the *Rule of the Community*. Instead the author of the *Rule*, who happens to be well versed in biblical tradition, composed his prayer by taking into account the richness and vitality of blessings and curses in the context of the sacred covenant ceremony and expressed it in contemporary language and ideological patterns. It is the Deuteronomic framework of the covenant ceremony which correlates more to the purpose of the 1QS community[36] than the judgement scenery of *Enoch* and *Jubilees* as articulated by Werline. Although the language of the curses may be unparalleled in Deuteronomy, the function of the curses is similar to that of Deuteronomy – to prohibit and discourage any act of default from the covenant on the part of the members of the Community.

The first set of curses is directed at those in Belial's lot (2.5-10), while the other aims at the hypocrites within the lot of God (i.e. the covenant Community).[37] They are cursed primarily because of their deeds which belong in the realm of darkness. In 2.5, 7, ארור occurs with particular reference to בכול מעשי רשע 'in all deeds of wickedness' (2.5) and מעשיכה בחושך 'according to the darkness of your works' (2.7). The hypocrites in the Community are identified as such because of their deeds which the text

34. Rodney A. Werline, 'The Curses of the Covenant Renewal Ceremony in 1QS 1:16–2:19', in *For A Later Generation: The Transformation of Tradition in Israel, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity* (eds R. A. Argall, B. A. Bow, and R. A. Werline; Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000, pp. 280–8).

35. Werline, 'Curses of the Covenant Renewal Ceremony', especially pp. 285–7.

36. This suggestion has recently been taken up and developed by Stephen D. Fraade, see 'Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Miqsat Ma'ase ha-Torah (4QMMT): The Case of the Blessings and Curses', *DSD* 10 (2003), pp. 150–61.

37. That one can enter into the Community physically and still remain an outsider because of the idols in one's heart indicates that those who belong in the lot of God are based not on physical membership of the Community but on a disposition in the heart to adhere to the revealed truth.

describes as עוון – 'iniquity' – (2.12) and their perversion of the purpose of blessing (2.13). In Chapter Two, we noted that it is the deeds or actions established upon the two spirits which are permanently fixed, and that those in Belial's lot become so not as a result of any act of predestination but by virtue of their deeds. The occurrence of the curses in correlation with the deeds in the realm of darkness is intended to show that it is human deeds which determine those who are cursed. Furthermore, according to the structure of the determinism in 1QS, every deed is assigned a given end via the domain of the spirit in which it belongs. The determined end for those who embrace the deeds in the domain of Belial is described in this manner:

> many afflictions by the angels of punishment, eternal perdition by the fury of God's vengeful wrath, everlasting terror and endless shame, together with disgrace of annihilation in the fire of the dark region. And all their times for their generations (will be expended) in dreadful suffering and bitter misery in dark abysses until they are destroyed. (There will be) no remnant nor rescue for them. (4.12-14)

This end is inevitable because the divine hatred for the lot of Belial is eternal (4.1). It is when we grasp this logic in the determinism of the *Rule* that the curses can be rightly appreciated.

The petitions in the curses can be summarized as follows: terror through all the avengers, destruction through those who take revenge, denial of divine compassion and forgiveness,[38] angry countenance of God, lack of peace, and divine abandonment to evil (2.5-17). When these contents are read in light of the determined end of the lot of Belial, it becomes apparent that in the Levites' pronouncement of curses upon the people, the Community has evoked what is by nature the eschatological destiny of the lot of Belial to bear on the present existence of those outside and the pretenders within the Community. Since a curse is a 'ban', its function on the occasion of entering the Community is to confront the converts with the 'ban' that hangs over those outside the Community in case the initiates consider dishonouring their oath of allegiance to the commands of Moses. By the same token, those already in the Community are reminded of the danger surrounding the violation of the covenant through the imprecatory pronouncement directed at the pretenders within the Community.

38. Werline has drawn attention to the fact that 'confession' is implied in the denial of forgiveness in 2.8: 'while the curses do not explicitly state that the wicked confess their sins, the Levites' pronouncement that God will not "pardon" them by "atoning" seems to imply a confession'. See Werline, 'Curses of the Covenant Renewal Ceremony', p. 286.

C. Summary

In this chapter, our primary concern has been to discover whether or not the contents of the petitionary prayers in the *Rule* are consistent with the determinism articulated in the text. Our study has revealed that there is nothing in the petitions which cannot be explained in the framework of determinism. Although the language of the 1QS confession correlates with that of the deterministic section, it is insufficient to conclude on the basis of the correlation that the confession is unique to the Qumran sect. The fact that the confessions found in the late Old Testament books such as Nehemiah (9.33) and Daniel (9.5), and some literature of the Second Temple period, e.g. *Jubilees* (1.22), employ similar vocabulary is an indication that there is nothing sectarian about the confession of 1QS despite its coherence with the language of the sect's deterministic world-view. It is safer however to say that the sect inherited from the common Judaic heritage a pattern of confession which was adequate and relevant to its deterministic ideology.

The relevance of the prayer of confession in the context of the determinism and aim of the Qumran Community is that it serves as a medium by which a person acknowledges and renounces as evil the ways in which he walked before enlisting in the Community. The confession is not only consistent with, but also necessitated by the purpose for which the Community exists. It is also a verbalized symbolic representation of how a person moves from the dominion of the Angel of Darkness into the lot of the Prince of Light, from being an object of divine hatred into being a lover of what God loves. This is to say that the confessions 'symbolize the repentance by those entering into the covenant for their past sins, which according to the belief of the sect were performed as the result of being misled by Belial as well as the preparation for the renewal of the covenant with the God of Israel'.[39] The content of the confession makes no attempt to alter the structure of the cosmological determinism articulated in the *Rule of the Community*. Rather than God changing his decrees, it is the human being, who by his confession expresses remorse for being under the dominion of darkness, and by his yielding to the spirit of truth relocates himself within the framework of those things that God loves eternally. The divine countenance is permanently fixed on the deeds of the spirits of truth and deceit, and there is nothing a person can do to alter it, not even by his prayer of confession.

In the blessings and curses of 1QS, the text reasserts its ideological distinction of the determinism into the lots of the spirit of truth and the spirit of darkness. The priests' and the Levites' blessing and cursing respectively ensures that 'the wicked are assigned to their lot (2.17) and the righteous within the community are placed in theirs (2.23), in a way that reflects the divinely ordained dualism between the sons of light and the sons of darkness in their respective lots'.[40] The petitions embedded in the blessings and the

39. Nitzan, *Qumran Prayer*, p. 132.

40. Fletcher-Louis, 'Reflections on Angelomorphic Humanity Texts', p. 309.

curses anticipate the granting of what are naturally the inevitable outcomes of those who walk in each of the lots. They are inevitable outcomes not because they have been requested in prayer but because they form part of the arrangement of the God of Knowledge. The petitions 'reflect the good reward or evil bad retribution decreed by God for the two opposing lots in accordance with their deeds, which are similarly determined (1QS 1v 2-14)'.[41]

It is essential to stress the fact that the focus of the petitionary elements is not so much on God who answers, but on those who render the prayer. The petitions re-articulate the ideology of 1QS about God and how he works in the world in a prayer form, and by the same token allow those who render the prayer to embrace the ideology as their own. The function of the prayer is didactic on two levels: firstly, to the people outside who are willing to join the Community, it is a rejection of an understanding of God which is contrary to the one articulated in the Community; secondly, to those within the Community, by participating in the liturgy, they verbalize their acceptance of the convictions encoded in a given petition with their 'amen' response.

41. Nitzan, *Qumran Prayer*, p. 127.

Chapter 4

DETERMINISM IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

In studying the Gospel of John, we must ask first and foremost whether or not John exhibits any tendency of determinism. And if there is, how crucial is it in the theology of the Gospel? What is the nature of the determinism? Is it cosmological in the sense of articulating certain laws as to how the universe operates, or salvific in that it articulates an unalterable design of God for humanity's attainment of salvation? What purpose does the determinism serve both in the narrative and in the implied social contexts of the Fourth Gospel? Are there passages in John which lean towards non-determinism, and, if there are, are these passages reconcilable with Johannine determinism or not? Finding answers to these questions is not easy; nevertheless our attempt to search for answers has determined the structure of this chapter.

A. Is there Determinism in John?

Although commentators use the phrase 'God determines' or similar expressions[1] in explaining certain passages in the Gospel, they rarely discuss the theme systematically, unlike other topics. This is already evident in the works of influential scholars such as Bultmann, Käsemann, Barrett, Brown and others. Subsequent scholars feel the pressure of not only responding to, but also refining and modifying, the contributions of those earlier works. And in the process of doing so, the discussion of the theology of John until recently has been focused mainly on Christology, ecclesiology, eschatology and sacramentalism. With the emergence of literary approaches to the study of John, the question of theology is formulated differently. Alan Culpepper expresses it thus:

> One who is interested in understanding the theology of this Gospel must, therefore, confront the issue of method: How can we extract a system of thought from a narrative? Where do we find its theology? Rather than coming to the Gospel and

1. See for example R. Schnackenburg, *The Gospel According to John* (trans. K. Smyth; vol. 1; London: Burns & Oates, 1968, p. 330); Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, p. 190.

> finding a set of theological propositions, we participate in a revelatory process as we read it. Our interpretation of theology of the Gospel then arises from our effort to make sense of what we have experienced while reading it. Theology is our effort to bring sense and order to the affirmations and responses to which the Gospel leads us.[2]

Indeed the Fourth Gospel affirms traditional theological formulations, but being a narrative, it also 'leads the reader to consider new and distinctively Johannine insights'.[3] This is to say that its theology does not have to be restricted to traditional theological formulations because the Gospel encodes theological varieties. Our quest for determinism in the Fourth Gospel is a result of reading and re-reading the Gospel in order to draw attention to what in our judgement has not been given adequate treatment in Johannine studies.

D. A. Carson[4] explored the tension between divine sovereignty and human responsibility as delineated in Christian forms of monotheism. His enquiry covers a wide range of literature including the Old Testament, Intertestamental Jewish literature, and the Gospel of John. As a starting point for his discussion of divine sovereignty in John, Carson drew attention to certain passages such as 3.27; 5.14; 9.1-3; 11.4, 49-52; 19.10-11 as specific examples of God's control over human beings and events. Carson went further, to see the sovereignty of God displayed in Johannine fulfilment motifs,[5] eschatology,[6] and Christology.[7] In his section on the soteriology of

2. R. Allan Culpepper, *The Gospel and Letters of John*, (IBT; Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1998, p. 88).

3. Culpepper, *Gospel and Letters*, p. 88.

4. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*.

5. From the perspective of the Fourth Gospel, the Old Testament is given a Christocentric significance: 'Not only did Moses and the prophets write about Jesus (1.45; 5.46f), but Abraham saw his day (8.56) and Isaiah his glory (12.38).' These fulfilment motifs, writes Carson, 'are established by way of predominantly pesher exegesis which presupposes new revelation enabling the identification of Jesus with the roles alluded to from Old Testament pages'. See Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, p. 133.

6. In simple apocalyptic, according to John, the age to come is established and controlled by God. There would be no question of the human will co-operating with God's will at that point. However in Johannine eschatology, just as it is in New Testament eschatology in general, the age to come has already arrived in a preliminary manner. The delay of certain eschatological features into the future allows the opportunity for human beings to respond to God. See Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, p. 145.

7. Based on the assumption that Jesus is both God and man, Carson sees the sovereignty-responsibility tension coming into sharpest focus in Jesus himself. His conclusion is that in his divinity, Jesus stands with God and expounds divine transcendence to human beings, and in his humanity, he stands with human beings and demonstrates in his own life

John, he highlighted those passages which speak of human responsibility (3.16-21, 36; 4.39, 41f.; 6.66, 69; 8.34, 40-44; 10.37f.; 11.40; 13.18; 20.8, 28f.) before engaging the texts which articulate election (6.37-40ff., 70-71; 10; 15.16; 17.1ff.) and related concepts. Carson summed up his conclusion in these words:

> John does not use man's responsibility to formulate a doctrine of freewill . . .; neither does he deduce from God's sovereignty that men are robots. . . . On the other hand, election serves to deflate personal claims, ensures that the saving mission cannot fail (e.g. 6:37-40), and guarantees the security of genuine believers without permitting spiritual lethargy. . . . The sovereignty-responsibility tension in John serves to magnify man's sins and God's grace.[8]

Some of the passages (especially chs. 6, 10, 17) from which Carson deduced his sovereignty motif have deterministic nuances. This is because those passages display one or more of the following features: permanence, divine premeditation, and deterministic language. One of the outstanding contributions of Carson's monograph in relation to Johannine studies is its emphasis on the fact that divine sovereignty and human responsibility in the Fourth Gospel are tied to Christology and soteriology. An example is John's emphasis, on the one hand, upon the Father's election of certain people from 'the world' to become the sheep of Christ for a salvific purpose. On the other hand, human beings are held responsible for their responses to no one else but Christ. This implies that whatever way one reads those passages upon which Carson established his sovereignty motif, the christological and soteriological elements highlighted by Carson cannot be ignored.

In our study of determinism in John, we shall apply the guidelines of language, divine premeditation, and permanence (see our earlier discussion in Chapter Two). Language pays attention to those passages which have words or phrases with deterministic references. In the Gospel, the most striking of such expressions is the impersonal δεῖ, meaning 'it is necessary'. Others include δίδωμι, especially in the context of John 6, ἐκλέγομαι, 'to select', and πληρόω, 'to fulfil'. There is no need to catalogue the occurrences of these terms here, but their functions will be apparent in the course of our investigation. The criterion of 'divine premeditation' identifies a passage as containing determinism if it articulates an occurrence as a consequence of an earlier design or plan of the Father.[9] The guideline of permanence isolates passages that speak of ordinances which are not subject to change or any form of alteration.

the proper relationship between human beings and God. See Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, p. 160.

8. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, pp. 197–8.

9. For a contemporary debate on the use of the term 'Father' as a metaphor for God in the Fourth Gospel, see Adele Reinhartz, (ed.) *God the Father in the Gospel of John* (Semeia, 85; Atlanta, GA: SBL, 1999).

Reading the Gospel from this perspective brings certain passages to the forefront of our discussion of determinism. The most prominent of such passages is ch. 6. Other references are spread throughout the book and will be recalled in the course of our study. Unlike our study of 1QS, finding categories for determinism in John is not that simple. This is due in part to the monofocal nature of Johannine determinism in that the determinism revolves around the central character of the book, i.e. Jesus.[10] For instance, there are certain characters (the disciples, and those who believe) in the story that are spoken of as being given by the Father, and by the same token, are identified as belonging to Christ. In other words, the action of the Father in the election of some is played out in the positive response of those characters to no one else but Christ. Another example of the christological focus of John's determinism is found in the report of the death and resurrection of Jesus and of Lazarus.[11] In spite of the commonality of death and resurrection to them both, it is only that of Jesus which John describes as 'necessary', and as the fulfilment of Scripture and prophecy (3.14; 11.49-52; 12.27; 18.11; 19.28, 36-37; 20.9).

Thus Johannine determinism can be broadly described as christological, although it is expressed in more than one way. The fact that the Johannine christological focus is oriented towards soteriology, as R. Schnackenburg correctly noted, is also true of Johannine determinism because 'everything that the Johannine Jesus says and does, all that he reveals and all that he accomplishes as "signs", takes place in view of man's attaining salvation, in view of his gaining divine life'.[12] To put it differently, 'Christology and soteriology cannot be separated in the Fourth Gospel. The life and death of Jesus – who he was and what he did – are held together by John, and understood as one.'[13] It is the variety of ways by which John articulates his christological interest that helps us in classifying the passages on Johannine determinism. Our goal in this chapter therefore is to explore the diverse forms in which the Fourth Gospel expands its christological determinism.

10. Scholars have long recognized the centrality of Christology in the theology of John. M. J. J. Menken speaks of Christology as 'the heart of the fourth evangelist's message', although his brief survey of scholarly monographs on the Christology of the Fourth Gospel between 1985 and 1990 shows that the exact content of Christology is a matter of substantial disagreement in Johannine scholarship. See Maarten J. J. Menken, 'The Christology of the Fourth Gospel: A Survey of Recent Research', in *From Jesus to John: Essays on Jesus and New Testament Christology in Honour of Marinus de Jonge* (ed. Martinus C. de Boer; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993, pp. 292–320).

11. The text allows us to speak of the raising of Lazarus as resurrection since it is in his case that the reader first learns of what resurrection is, and then in the case of Jesus.

12. Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 1; p. 155.

13. Stephen S. Smalley, *John: Evangelist and Interpreter* (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1978, p. 220).

B. Types of Determinism

1. Soteriological Determinism (6.37-66)

By soteriological determinism we mean the will of God to dictate in advance the response of human beings to Jesus and his message. This is also sometimes referred to as predestination or election. As already noted in Chapter One (see pp. 13–14), predestination is the same as determinism but it is narrow in scope since it is used for the predetermination of human beings by God unto salvation and not for the broader pre-arranged order of the universe. Scholars have long recognized the dualism which characterizes the Fourth Gospel. The dualism is expressed for instance in the polarity of those who believe and those who do not believe (3.36). What is of interest to our enquiry is the Johannine portrait of those who believe as the 'given ones' by the Father. According to John it is those who believe who have eternal life. They are the sheep that hear the voice of the shepherd (10.27), they are said to belong not to the world and for that reason they are hated by the world (15.18-21). In spite of the accolade that goes with believing, it would not have been possible for anyone to believe apart from the giving of the Father. What exactly does this 'given' mean and what is its function in the Gospel?

a. 'The Given Ones' by the Father

The verb δίδωμι occurs frequently in John (3.16, 27, 35; 4.7; 5.36; 6.37, 39 etc.) and its meaning is best determined by each context. However, we will limit ourselves here to those contexts in which the word bears on the theme of soteriological determinism. John 6 presents Jesus as the bread of life.[14] The chapter begins with the feeding of the multitude and leads to the people's awareness of Jesus as the prophet who was to come into the world (6.14). In order to prevent the people from making him king, he escapes to the mountain (6.15). This is followed by another miracle story of Jesus walking on the water (6.16-21). The narrative goes further to report the search for Jesus by ὁ ὄχλος 'the multitude' (6.22-24). However, instead of Jesus answering their question of when he got to the other side, he accused them of misunderstanding his σημεῖα, 'signs' (6.26). John makes the ignorance of the multitude apparent in the following questions by the multitude: (1) 'What must we do to do the works of God?' (2) 'What sign are you going to perform for us to see?' If the multitude who have witnessed at least the feeding miracle cannot believe in him as the bread of life, what then do they need still in order to believe? It is in this context that the verb δίδωμι is used in the sense of predestination.

14. In his reading of John, Peder Borgen draws attention to some of the puzzling problems raised by ch. 6 which include: the 'collective designations of people'; the meaning of the term 'sign' in vv. 2 and 14, and in v. 26 and v. 30; the long-debated question of relating the eucharistic formulations in vv. 51-58 to the preceding section of Jesus' discourse – see P. Borgen, 'John 6: Tradition, Interpretation and Composition', in de Boer, *From Jesus to John*, pp. 268–91.

> Whatever the Father gives me will come to me and anyone who comes to me I will never drive out, because I have come down from heaven not to do my will but the will of the one who sent me. And this is the will of the one who sent me: that I do not lose out of what he has given me but that I should raise it up in the last day. For this is the will of my Father, that everyone who looks at the Son and believes in him may have eternal life, and I will raise him in the last day. (6.37-40)

Commentators have long recognized the use of the neuter singulars, πᾶν ὃ and αὐτὸ, in vv. 37, 39 instead of the expected masculine plural. Attempts to make sense of the construction have generated two prominent hypotheses. The first, championed by H. Odeberg, explained the neuter singular as due to the evangelist's thinking in Aramaic. According to Odeberg, the construction πᾶν ὃ is understood by a writer thinking in Aramaic to be an adequate rendering of *kol d*^{e} which does not distinguish gender or number. However, Odeberg warned that the neuter singular should not be treated as 'a mistranslation in the sense of a translation footed on a misunderstanding of the original, but instead as a more or less unsuccessful attempt at rendering into Greek the Aramaic sense of "the totality of"'.[15] The second explains the neuter as a collective emphasis by John. This reading is adopted by many scholars including C. K. Barrett, R. E. Brown and L. Morris.[16] In the words of Barrett, the effect of the neuter is 'to emphasize strongly the collective aspect of the Father's gift of believers'. F. J. Moloney has recently suggested that the neuter πᾶν could indicate 'all creation' in which human beings form a part.[17] However, in light of John's use of the neuter singular in a number of cases (see 17.2, 24) for the sum of believers,[18] Moloney's suggestion does not fit the present context. In 6.37 πᾶν ὃ clearly refers to human beings as is made plain by the following statement καὶ τὸν ἐρχόμενον πρὸς ἐμὲ οὐ μη ἐκβάλω ἔξω. Moreover, the reference to the gift of eternal life, and resurrection in the last day (vv. 39-40), which is meant exclusively for believers in the Johannine thought pattern, makes it doubtful that the totality of creation is intended by πᾶν ὃ in the context of 6.37-40. Πᾶν ὃ is a collective reference to all those who believe. The neuter has the

15. H. Odeberg, *The Fourth Gospel Interpreted in Its Relation to Contemporaneous Religious Currents in Palestine and the Hellenistic-Oriental World* (Uppsala: Almigvist and Wiksell, 1929, p. 262 note 1).

16. C. K. Barrett, *The Gospel According to John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text* (London: S. P. C. K., 1965, p. 243); R. E. Brown, *The Gospel According to John* (AB, vol. 29; Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1966, p. 270); L. Morris, *The Gospel According to John* (NICNT; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1995, p. 325).

17. F. J. Moloney, *The Gospel of John* (SacP; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1998, p. 216). He appears to decide against this but also tries to keep it open.

18. J. H. Bernard in his monumental commentary noted that the collective use of the neuter singular is not unknown in classical Greek. See J. H. Bernard, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John* (ICC, vol. 1; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1953, p. 198).

same nuance in 17.2, and as Barrett rightly noted, the neuter singular signifies the unity of the disciples in the strongest possible way.[19] This motif of unity is given an adequate attention in the farewell prayer in John 17.

What is the relevance of John 6.37-40 in the midst of the discourse on the bread of life?[20] It is best understood when it is read in light of the misunderstanding of the purpose of Jesus' signs which is echoed at different stages of the bread of life discourse (vv. 26, 28, 30, 41, 42, 52). The passage accounts for the multitude's lack of appropriate response to the σημεῖα. In his opening remark on 6.37, Schnackenburg expresses the issue adequately when he writes: 'Unbelief requires an explanation. It is a problem which continually preoccupies the Evangelist, and he has two answers to it, depending on the situation.'[21] They lack the right response not because the signs were insufficient but because the response is in accordance with God's previous gift of some to the Son. The fact that the issue of 'the given ones' occurs in the context of disbelief in the face of overwhelming evidence for positive response is an indication that faith is a matter of divine initiative. This is put in more blatant language in the statement: οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρός με ἐὰν μὴ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με ἑλκύσῃ αὐτόν, 'No one is able to come to me except the Father who sent me has drawn him.' (6.44 cf. 6.65) The same Father who has given to the Son is also the one who has drawn those who respond to Jesus.

There are seventeen occurrences of the verb δίδωμι in chapter 17 alone, the Father is the subject of the verb on thirteen occasions. And in four instances the Father gives human beings to the Son (17.2, 6, 9, 24). The 'giving' is in the sense of 'assigning' or 'selecting' those people for the Son. This is echoed in 17.6 where those who are 'given' to the Son are said to be out of the world – ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου.[22] It is in this sense that Carson speaks of the 'given ones' in

19. Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 419; see also Brown, *John XIII-XXI*, p. 741. Leon Morris reads the neuter differently as he suggests that the use of πᾶν 'puts the emphasis on the quality as God-given, rather than on the persons as such'. See Morris, *Gospel According to John*, p. 636.

20. Scholars have drawn attention to the fact that 6.36-40 has no close association with the theme of the bread of life and thus may have a history of its own. R. Bultmann placed the passage after vv. 41-46; see R. Bultmann, *The Gospel of John: A Commentary* (trans. G. R. Beasley-Murray; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971, p. 163). Brown however has underplayed the sequence on the ground that 'if 35 was once followed immediately by 41-43, then the coming down from heaven could have echoed 33'. Brown, *John I-XII*, p. 276.

21. Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 2; p. 46.

22. The term κόσμος has various nuances in John. In the context of 17.6 however, it denotes the inhabitants of the world, i.e. people. This reading of the word is also attested in 3.16; 12.19; 16.8, 20 and so on. While the ἐκ of the ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου can imply 'origin' or 'belonging', it undoubtedly connotes a sense of 'separation' on this occasion. For a brief discussion of the term κόσμος in John, see Morris, *Gospel According to John*, pp. 111–13; N. H. Cassem, 'Grammatical and contextual inventory of the use of kosmos in the Johannine corpus with some implications for a Johannine cosmic theology', *NTS* 19

terms of 'God's election'. Moreover, he speaks of the election as 'preceding' the action of those who believe: 'the giving by the Father of certain men to the Son *precedes* their reception of eternal life, and governs the purpose of the Son's mission'.[23] Barrett also reads the 'given' in the sense of 'predestination', and stresses the nuance of precedence: 'The small group of disciples, *previously* (italics mine) selected by and known to God, stands over against the world.'[24] Schnackenburg adopts a similar position: 'The Father is the first to act. He "gives" Jesus the people who are to belong to him.'[25]

By contrast, Charlesworth argues that the coming to Jesus is not subsequent to but simultaneous with the giving of the Father. In his comment on 1.12, 13 Charlesworth denies any chronological division between being a 'child of God' and 'believing': 'There is no predestination here, for one is a "child of God" the moment he believes; he does not believe because he has been foreordained a "child of God".[26] Furthermore, he argues that ὁ πιστεύων (3.16; 12.36) and ὁ μὴ πιστεύων (3.18) categorize themselves by their response to Jesus. 'In the Fourth Gospel, therefore, we find the idea that all men are in darkness and the suggestion that men are divided into different categories according to their response to Jesus.'[27] How then does Charlesworth account for John 6.37-40, 44? In the case of 6.37, he comments:

> 'All that the Father gives to me shall come to me'. One wonders to whom the *pan* 'all', refers? If it refers only to those who are given to Jesus then there is an element of determinism, since the 'giving' precedes the 'coming'. But it is necessary to observe what the verse does not say: it does not say some are not given to Jesus. Hence, there are not two predetermined categories of men. There is no chronological precedence affirmed here but rather a theological precedence, i.e. God is prior to man; it is not that man's election is prior to his act of faith.[28]

Stanley B. Marrow also adopts a non-predestinarian reading of 6.37. His argument is based on human freewill. He contends that 6.37 does not say that God arbitrarily chooses to save whom he wills, for common sense 'ought to tell us that a God who "so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life" (3.16) is not, and can never be, that capricious'.[29] God created human beings and made

(1972–73), pp. 81–91; and in relation to dualism, see John Ashton, *Understanding the Fourth Gospel* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 206–8).

23. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, p. 187.
24. Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 419.
25. Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 2; p. 46.
26. Charlesworth, 'Critical Comparison', p. 94.
27. Charlesworth, 'Critical Comparison', p. 92.
28. Charlesworth, 'Critical Comparison', p. 95.
29. Stanley B. Marrow, *The Gospel of John: A Reading* (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1995, p. 89).

them genuinely free, able to accept or reject him as God. And in the context of the Johannine Gospel,

> we have to keep in mind those who accept the revelation of the Son can only do so freely, of their own free will. . . . In this sense, when Jesus says, 'All that the Father gives me will come to me' (6.37), he is simply acknowledging a fact, not providing a reason for those who do come to the Father either to boast or to feel superior toward those who ostensibly choose not to 'come to him.'[30]

In other words, the purpose of 6.37 and possibly related passages is inserted in order to produce humility in those who believe.

The first response to the non-predestinarian reading is that those commentators who adopt such a reading do not do so on the basis of the text; instead, they read the text in light of two opposing theological traditions, namely Calvinism and Arminianism.[31] There are at least two occasions in the Gospel (3.27 and 19.11) which suggest that the reading of δίδωμι is in the sense of 'chronological precedence', and to read it otherwise would undermine the sovereignty of the Father in Johannine theology.

Charlesworth came close to the recognition of the deterministic nuance of 6.37 when he conceded that if the 'all' refers only to 'those who are given to Jesus then there is an element of determinism since the "giving" precedes the "coming"'. Perhaps he deliberately abandoned this line of thought by concentrating on what the text does not say rather than what it does say. While the text does not speak of those who are not given to the Son, as Charlesworth rightly noted, the fact that John identifies the 'given ones' as those who come to Jesus is sufficient enough to suggest that the opposite is implied. Although the Fourth Gospel may not employ the language of 'not given' for any of Jesus' audience, the rejection displayed by a certain audience such as ὁ ὄχλος in 12.34-41, and οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι[32] in chs. 8; 9.18-23; 10.22-27 excludes such people from the category of the 'given ones'.

30. Marrow, *Gospel of John*, p. 89.

31. Although there are commentators such as Moloney and Thomas L. Brodie whose readings of John 6 are somewhat ambiguous as to their positions in relation to our study of determinism. See Moloney, *Gospel of John*, pp. 213–20; Thomas L. Brodie, *The Gospel According to John: A Literary and Theological Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 253–5).

32. There is lack of consensus on the identity of those whom the term οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι refers to in the Fourth Gospel. Barrett for instance read it as 'the title regularly given by John to Judaism and its official leaders who stand against Jesus'. See Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 143. A similar position is taken by U. C. von Wahlde, 'The Johannine Jews', *NTS* 28 (1982), pp. 33–60. As an alternative reading, M. Lowe expounds that the term should be translated as 'Judeans' – Malcolm Lowe, 'Who Were the IOYΔAIOI?' *NTS* 18 (1976), pp. 101–30. In his assessment of the term, Ashton rejects the 'authorities theory' on the ground that John chooses the term 'the Jews' instead of ἄρχοντες 'rulers' or ἀρχιερεῖς

If those who are regarded as the 'given ones' are those who display a positive response to Jesus, it is logically acceptable to place those who reject Jesus in the opposite category to the given ones. However, since the Gospel does not speak of those who reject Jesus in terms of 'not given', it is safer to say that the motif of soteriological determinism in John is monofocal because it is interested primarily in those who respond in faith to Jesus. Although John attributes the lack of faith in some of the audience to the necessity and fulfilment of the Scriptures (12.37-40), it is his overwhelming concern that such an audience do not believe because they are not Jesus' sheep.

Our second response, especially to Marrow's free-will argument, is that the argument is philosophical rather than textual. When the text is allowed to speak for itself, the context of 6.37 shows that the purpose of the verse is to account for the response of Jesus' audience to his message. Those who respond to Jesus positively can only do so as a result of the Father giving them first to the Son. While the moral issue raised by Marrow may be implied in predestination as a philosophical concept, the primary concern of John is to explain the misunderstanding of the crowd toward the signs. However, a more adequate way of speaking of predestination in John is found in the cautious comment of Lindars on 6.37: 'It is natural that here, as also in 17:2, we should from these words **conclude** that some are predestined by God to salvation, and others not; but it should be observed that only the positive side is mentioned. We should, then, be on our guard against reading a rigid doctrine of predestination into the verse.'[33]

'chief priests' even though the words are familiar to him – see Ashton, *Understanding*, p. 132. In place of either the Authorities theory or the Judean hypothesis, Ashton proposes that οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι should be read with a particular historical reference in the social context of the Fourth Gospel. He suggests that the term is used to represent 'the powerful party that took advantage of the disarray following the fall of Jerusalem in AD 70 and gradually assumed authority over the Jewish people. This party, not to be identified absolutely with the Pharisees, laid the foundations of what we know as Judaism' (p. 152). Whether Ashton's solution can win the approval of the majority of Johannine scholars or not is yet to be seen. Recently, D. Moody Smith adopts the 'Ashtonian' reading of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι in his own study – see D. M. Smith, *The Theology of the Gospel of John*, (NTT; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 171). In his 1998 commentary, Moloney explores the theme of οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι from the viewpoints of its narrative function and his conclusion represents adequately 'the Jews' one encounters in the text: 'the expression "the Jews" in the Gospel indicates those people who have taken up a theological and christological position that rejects Jesus and the claims made for him by his followers. Thus they also reject his followers. The expression "the Jews" does not represent a race. Indeed, the expression could be applied to anyone of any age and any nation who has decided once and for all, that Jesus of Nazareth is not the Messiah, but a sinner whose origins are unknown (9:24-29).' See Moloney, *Gospel of John*, p. 11.

33. Barnabas Lindars, *The Gospel of John* (NCB; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1972, pp. 260–1).

b. Misunderstanding and Disbelief as Theological Issues in John

In John 12.37-43 the issue of disbelief is raised again in connection with the σημεῖα which Jesus had performed. As already indicated in 6.26-36, the signs are insignificant on their own, they are to lead to an understanding and acceptance of who Jesus is. Unlike the synoptic Gospels where the theme of misunderstanding is commonly associated with the disciples, in John it is virtually everyone including Nicodemus, the Samaritan woman, the disciples, the 'crowd' and 'the Jews' who do not understand. The closest οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι ever come to gaining understanding is when they asked Jesus to disclose to them plainly if he is ὁ Χριστός (10.24). Since they cannot believe Jesus' own words, he therefore presents his τὰ ἔργα to them as a proof. What he does, including the signs, is meant as evidence about him (10.25 cf. 5.36). In other words, the signs are meant to be a didactic springboard from which one can make the appropriate verdict concerning Jesus. In spite of the compelling evidence, the people cannot grasp the implication of Jesus' works.

There have been several attempts to explain the function of misunderstanding in John.[34] The point to be noted however is that, as Luise Schottroff rightly indicated, 'misunderstanding is for John not only a literary device but a component of his theological perception'.[35] The misunderstandings of the signs from a Johannine theological position are to show that: 'No quantity of evidence suffices to produce faith in the one who does not *already* belong to Christ's sheep (10:26), belong to God (8:47), belong to the truth (18:37).'[36] Thus the way we read the responses of Jesus to a misunderstanding, or

34. Such attempts include David W. Wead, *The Literary Devices in John's Gospel* (Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt Kommissionsverlag, 1970, pp. 69–70); M. de Jonge, 'Nicodemus and Jesus: Some Observations on Misunderstanding and Understanding in the Fourth Gospel', *BJRL* 53 (1971), pp. 337–59; Carson, 'Understanding Misunderstanding in the Fourth Gospel', *TB* 33 (1982), pp. 59–91; Culpepper, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design* (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1983, pp. 152–65); Paul D. Duke, *Irony in the Fourth Gospel* (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1985, pp. 55–7, 145–7).

35. Luise Schottroff, 'Johannes 4:5-15 und die Konsequenzen des johanneischen Dualismus', *ZNW* 60 (1969), pp. 199–214 (207). The work of Mark Stibbe is commendable on John's use of literary styles to achieve a theological goal when he insists that Johannine literary strategies are used for christological persuasion. In making the point of the literary unity of the Fourth Gospel, Stibbe highlights certain Johannine strategies (pp. 17–22) such as the use of double entendres, symbolism, narrative progression, irony and dualism, etc. and his conclusion cannot be more adequate: 'If John uses double entendre, dualism, irony or symbolism, it is again to direct the reader to a significance about Jesus of Nazareth that he wants the enlightened reader to perceive. Quite clearly, the author is writing narrative Christology, and it is his Christology which unites the concepts, images and episodes of the gospel into a coherent whole. John may contain moments where the narrative appears flawed, but the overall picture is one of a gospel which has been artistically conceived so that its readers might have a true faith in Jesus of Nazareth.' See Stibbe, *John as Storyteller*, p. 22.

36. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, p. 190.

an explanatory comment of the evangelist is crucial because in it lies the theological position of the evangelist.[37] In his comment on the confusion of 'the Jews' in 10.24-39, Barnabas Lindars hints at the agenda of the evangelist in this way:

> At this point John has two things which he needs to do. He must make it clear that Jesus knows that the Jews *cannot* believe, in view of the preceding discussion on spiritual blindness, so that there is really no point in answering their question. But he must also give the answer in spite of this, for the benefit of the reader and for the sake of giving the grounds for the final rejection. . . . So the unbelief of the Jews, which is a refusal to hear and to obey (cf. 9:27) can be expressed extremely simply by saying 'you do not belong to my sheep'.[38]

The Johannine emphasis on the lack of faith of certain characters is strategic for his theological orientation. It is to show that those who believe do not do so on their own accord but in subsequence to the giving of some by the Father to the Son. For John, unbelief is a symptom of exclusion of an audience by the Father from 'the given ones'.

This unbelieving response of certain audiences, especially the unbelief of 'the Jews', is attributed to the fulfilment of Scripture. In her 1988 article, Judith Lieu explored the motif of blindness in the Johannine tradition, giving particular attention to Jn 12.40. She noted that John, in common with other New Testament books, found Isaiah 6.9-10 a useful proof-text to explain unbelief.[39] Lieu called attention to the Johannine introduction of the verb πωρόω 'to harden'[40] into the quotation from Isaiah 6.10[41] to stress the

37. Culpepper, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 164.

38. Lindars, *The Gospel of John*, p. 368.

39. J. M. Lieu, 'Blindness in the Johannine Tradition', *NTS* 34 (1988), pp. 83–95 (84–6). Other New Testament passages with similar usage include Mk 4.11-12; Mt. 13.13-15 and Acts 28.25-28. See also Edwin D. Freed, *Old Testament Quotations in the Gospel of John* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965, pp. 82–8).

40. Lieu suggested a Hellenistic Jewish rather than a biblical background for the use of πωρόω in John. She was led to this conclusion by parallels from Hellenistic literature such as Philo, and the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*. Other usages of the verb in a manner similar to John are found in Mk 6.52; 8.17; Rom. 11.7 and 2 Cor. 3.14. Lieu, 'Blindness in the Johannine Tradition', pp. 86–9.

41. In relating the use of the Isaian passage to the social context of the Fourth Gospel, although Lieu did not rule out the possibility that the experience of exclusion from the synagogue led to the agonizing over the unbelief of the Jews and to the development of the imagery of blindness based on Isa. 6.9-10 to interpret that unbelief, rather she leaned toward the position that the Johannine community's self-consciousness as reflected in the binary opposition of blindness/sight left no room for them in the synagogue and contributed to their exclusion. In other words, the importance of the reference to the Isaian passage in John may

permanence of those who are blinded and cannot believe. According to Lieu, 'it was not the experience of becoming "excluded from the Synagogue" which prompted the development of the theology of "being blinded"', instead it was 'a theological understanding of unbelief as blindness, with a degree of tension as to the question of ultimate responsibility'.[42] However, Lieu's understanding of the quotation from Isaiah in Jn 12.40 as the 'ultimate responsibility' for unbelief cannot be more adequate.[43] This is expressed more explicitly in these words of Moloney, 'the divine necessity of the unbelief of "the Jews" is stated in a way that is without parallel in the rest of the NT. In order to fulfil the Scriptures it was impossible for them to believe . . . The Johannine use of this Isaian passage insists that God was responsible for their blindness and their hardness of heart, lest they should turn to Jesus for healing (v. 40).'[44]

The significant point about the disbelief in the face of overwhelming evidence for believing, in our assessment, is to show that the responses of the characters to Jesus in John are predetermined by not just the fulfilment of the Scripture but also an outworking of the prior election of the Father in the giving of some to the Son. It is the giving by the Father which allows Jesus to speak of those who believe as his own sheep.

> But you do not believe because you are not among my sheep. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them and they follow me. And I give them eternal life and they will never perish, and no one is able to snatch them out of my hand. My Father who gave them to me is greater than all, and no one is able to snatch them out of the Father's hand. I and the Father are one. (Jn 10.26-30)

The 'given ones' belong to Jesus simply because they belong to the Father. It is in that sense that the reference to the oneness of Jesus and his Father (10.30) becomes meaningful in the context of Jn 10.26-30.[45]

be not polemical but for identity-construction of the Johannine community in relation to the 'other', i.e., unbelieving Jews.

42. Lieu, 'Blindness in the Johannine Tradition', p. 90.

43. In speaking of the Johannine use of Isaiah as a proof-text for unbelief, Martin C. Albl's caution should not be ignored: 'John's tendency towards a dualistic or deterministic outlook (however one may define these terms) is reflected in the commitment that the people could not believe . . . because he (i.e. God) had blinded them (John 12.39-40a). To what extent these theological ideas were already present in the tradition taken over by John, and how much they are due to his creative adaptation, is difficult to assess.' See M. C. Albl, *'And Scripture Cannot be Broken': The Form and Function of the Early Christian Testimonia Collections* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999, p. 246).

44. Moloney, *Gospel of John*, p. 364.

45. For a similar reading of the oneness of the Father and Son in Jn 10.30, see Ernst Haenchen, *John*, (trans. and ed. R. W. Funk; Herm, vol. 2; Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984, p. 50).

c. Theological Function of Soteriological Determinism

The function of soteriological determinism in John is to show that the response of faith by the narrative audience of the Gospel is the outworking of the prior design of the Father. Thus when Carson sees divine sovereignty in these passages instead of determinism, the sovereignty embraces God's absolute prerogative in dictating beforehand the course of a given action. In certain occasions where the word δίδωμι is used to designate those who believe (i.e. as 'the given ones'), it allows the evangelist to trace the Johannine believers back to God the Father. Those who believe do not do so on their own accord but because they are beneficiaries of the Father's prior assignment of some people to the Son. The author of the Fourth Gospel found in the giving of some by the Father, not just an excuse for the disbelief of the Jews, but also evidence that the disciples are the fulfilment of the will (θέλημα) of the Father in the Son. In John, the content of the θέλημα[46] of the Father is salvific. It is the working out of eternal life for those the Father gives to the Son (6.38-40). This will of God is embodied and revealed in Christ, and it is unchangeable and permanent. 'It is most comprehensively understood in John as God's redemptive mission.'[47] Thus to do the θέλημα of the Father is to believe in the Son (7.17). Unlike the *Rule of the Community* (1QS) where the will of God רצון אל resides in the Torah and is appropriated by the doing of the Torah (see our discussion in Chapter Two), according to John, it is exclusively christological and is appropriated by believing in the one that the Father has sent (this contrast is further discussed in Chapter Six)).

Furthermore, by presenting the Johannine Christians as the inevitable consequence of the prior action of the Father, the evangelist intensifies the claim that Jesus and all that belong to him are inseparable from God. The believers can only come to Jesus by virtue of being made so first in the will of the Father. This is more apparent especially in light of Jesus' own claim that his will is to do the will of the Father who sent him (6.38-39). The only reason Jesus can accept and keep those who come to him without losing any of them is because their action can be accounted for within the framework of the will of the Father.

The Fourth Gospel, by presenting those who believe as 'the given by God', assures the Johannine believers that the hatred they suffer at the hands of ὁ κόσμος (15.18), the banishment from the synagogue – ἀποσυνάγωγος[48]

46. In the New Testament, God's will is expressed in the singular because the concept of the divine will is shaped 'not by individual legal directions but by the conviction that θέλημα of God is a powerful unity'. See Gottlob Schrenk, 'θέλημα' in *TDNT* vol. 3; pp. 44–62.

47. Clinton D. Morrison, 'Mission and Ethic: An Interpretation of John 17', *Int* (1965), pp. 259–73 (266).

48. The word is peculiar to John. There is a wide scholarly consensus that the reference to excommunication in John is a kind of anachronistic reference to the social context of the Gospel. The Gospel 'looks back on Jesus from the perspectives of a time after the split between Jews and Christianity had become irreversible'. See Culpepper, *Gospel and Letters*, p. 45.

(9.22; 12.42; 16.2) – are nothing but the inevitable outcome of their being predestined by the Father. The evangelist found in this concept of the giving by the Father a metaphor for helping those who believe to understand their origin in God so as to enable them to persevere in the tribulations they may suffer (16.33). This reading of understanding one's suffering in terms of one's identity is a Johannine thought pattern. It is evident in John's portrait of the suffering of Jesus, although this will be explored next; suffice it to say that it is Jesus' constant awareness of the design of the Father for him which enables him to face the crucifixion courageously (8.28; 12.27, 34; 18.11).

2. Missiological Determinism

One of the prominent motifs of the Fourth Gospel is the appearance of Jesus (in the cosmos) as the sole agent of God the Father. This is expressed, for instance, in the participle form of the verb πέμπω with the definite article to designate the Father who sent Jesus (5.23, 30; 13.20; 14.24). It is the Father who initiates the coming of Jesus and also the mission he is to accomplish in the cosmos. On several occasions, Jesus speaks of his activities in relation to the Father. He equates his will to the will of the Father and even the words, τὰ ῥήματα, spoken by Jesus are said to belong to the Father (14.10). Jesus as the Sent One is incapable of doing anything of himself independent of the Father who sent him (5.19). And in all that he does, it is the will of the Father that is paramount (5.30). Thus there is hardly anything about him which is not traceable to God the Father. If the presence of the Son and his activities in the cosmos are pre-conditioned by the Father, to what degree are the activities of Jesus not determined by the causative factor, namely, the will of the Father? The Johannine answer is clear and precise: there is no aspect of the Son which does not reflect the will of the Father. For 'no one has ever seen God, the begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father has made him known'. (1.18) To see the Son is the same as seeing the Father not in the sense of corporeality but in terms of the disclosure of the Father's will in τὰ ῥήματα and τὰ ἔργα (14.8ff.). It is against this background of the Son being a perfect embodiment of the Father's will that the determinism of Jesus' mission is best understood.

a. The Necessity of the Mission

In speaking of the mission of the Son, John uses the language of necessity, the impersonal verb δεῖ. In its Hellenistic context, it reflects 'the sense of a determining constraint, no matter whether it was exerted by magic or laws, by men or by gods'.[49] The word is also used to express 'the idea of the compulsion of duty, or of a necessity'.[50] But through its introduction into the LXX, the verb was 'transformed by the underlying OT idea of the necessity of the divine

49. R. Morgenthaler, 'Necessity, Must, Obligation', in *NIDNTT*, vol. 2, pp. 662–4.

50. Basil G. Mandilaras, *The Verb in the Greek non-Literary Papyri* (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sciences, 1973, p. 327).

will'.[51] There is no doubt that the use of δεῖ in the NT is informed by the LXX usage.

In John the verb occurs ten times[52] and it is mostly used with reference to Jesus. While the usage in John cannot be said to bear a deterministic nuance always,[53] its use with regards to the mission of the Son cannot be read otherwise. It is employed in articulating the necessity of the lifting up of the Son (3.14; 12.34). In John, the δεῖ of Jesus being lifted up is a matter not of political but of salvific necessity. Bultmann makes the point cogently, the δεῖ indicates that 'the saving-event is governed by a divinely ordained necessity'.[54]

The purpose of the lifting up is identified as ἵνα πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον (3.15 cf. 12.32). By using the passive form of the verb ὑψόω[55] to anticipate the crucifixion (3.15; 12.32, 34), John shifts the focus of the action from the subject or agent of the verb to the action itself and its victim in order to stress the inevitability of the crucifixion. According to Morris, 'the death Jesus died was not simply the result of the raging of wicked men, but was the divine plan for men's salvation. This is not a side issue. It is the very heart of the story'.[56] Although 'the Jews' are implied as the subject of ὑψόω in 8.28 (cf. 8.22), even there John stresses the significance of the lifting up in relation not to 'the Jews' who perform the action, but to Jesus who suffers it: 'When you lift up the son of man, then you will know that I am, and that I do nothing of myself, but I speak just as the Father instructed me.' In other words, the necessity of the crucifixion in the Fourth Gospel is about one person only, Jesus.

The divine necessity of the mission is solemnly echoed in the conversation that takes place behind closed doors between Jesus and Pilate during the judicial proceedings. Pilate cannot find any evidence upon which to render a guilty verdict. But he can only acquit Jesus on the basis of Jesus' own response to the charges against him. Pilate said to Jesus: 'Do you refuse to

51. E. Tiedtke and H.-G. Link, 'δεῖ', in *NIDNTT*, vol. 2, pp. 664–6.

52. 3.7, 14, 30; 4.4, 20, 24; 9.4; 10.16; 12.34; 20.9.

53. In fact scholars such as Popkes go as far as to claim that all its occurrences have a deterministic nuance when he asserts that 'sentences with δεῖ have fundamentally an absolute, unquestioned, and often anonymous and deterministic character'. See W. Popkes, 'δεῖ', in *EDNT*, vol. 1; pp. 279–80.

54. Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, p. 152 note 3.

55. This verb assumes a significant theological reference in John. Many commentators have taken the word as a Johannine equivalent of the passion predictions found in the synoptics (Mk 8.31; 9.31; 10.33-34). Thus the verb signifies the suffering and the glorification of the Son. According to Brown the use of the verb in John is to denote one continuous action of ascent which encompasses three dimensions: the lifting up on the cross, the raising up from death, and the lifting up to heaven. Brown, *John I-XII*, pp. 145–6.

56. Morris, *The Cross in the New Testament* (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1976, p. 155).

talk to me? Do you not know that I have authority to release you and to crucify you?' (19.10) Jesus' response to Pilate is crucial because it lays bare Jesus' own understanding of the principle at work in his trial: 'You would have had no authority against me, not even one, except it were given to you from above.' (19.11) This is to say that 'the power and the authorization by virtue of which Jesus is now given into Pilate's hand does not proceed from the official position he enjoyed – or in so far as it actually does so, it has a deeper reason. . . . the fact that Jesus has been given into his hands has been determined by God. Pilate is the instrument through which the decree of God is put into effect.'[57] Ashton also grasps the deterministic tendency that shapes the Johannine report of the encounter between Jesus and Pilate: 'Confronted by Pilate it is he who is the real judge; such power as Pilate has comes to him from on high, and in acceding to the demand that Jesus be crucified he is unconsciously complying with a divine decree, following the directions and speaking the words assigned to him in the text.'[58]

b. 'The Hour' of the Mission

Another way in which John speaks of crucifixion as the inevitable destiny of Jesus lies in his use of the term ἡ ὥρα.[59] Apart from the use of the word to signify the intimation of future events (4.21, 23; 5.25, 28; 16.2, 25) and something that is just at hand (4.23; 5.25; 16.32), its use for the particular moment of Jesus' suffering is of relevance to our study. From the first occurrence of the word in 2.4, John signals a crucial moment that his audience must watch out for in the story of Jesus. On two occasions, 'the hour' is referred to in connection with the arrest of Jesus (7.30; 8.20). It is linked with the departure of Jesus from this world (13.1). Other passages which associate painful experience with 'the hour' include Jesus' illustration of the pain of child-bearing (16.21), and the brief petition of Jesus in 12.27.

The hour is first linked with the experience of death in 12.23, although it is wrapped up in parable. And the consensus of commentators identifies the grain which dies and bears fruit as Christ (12.24).[60] The force of 'the hour' in the context lies in the fact that 'it underscores the necessity and life-giving significance of Jesus' death'.[61] The emotion and the petition that Jesus expressed later in 12.27 are due to the hour arriving at last. Since the arrival of the hour is linked with the arrival in Jerusalem for Passover, it is logical

57. Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, p. 622.

58. Ashton, *Understanding*, pp. 489–90.

59. For a brief study on the concept of ὥρα in John, see Brown, *John I-XII*, pp. 517–8; Schnackenburg, *John*, vol. 1; pp. 328–31; for a more detailed study, see Ignace de la Potterie, *The Hour of Jesus: The Passion and Resurrection of Jesus according to John* (Text and Spirit; Slough: St. Paul Publications, 1989).

60. See for examples, Brown, *John I-XII*, pp. 471–3; Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 352; Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, p. 424.

61. Culpepper, *Gospel and Letters*, p. 194.

therefore to see the hour in light of the arrest and trial, and the death on the cross that Jesus suffered in Jerusalem. That Jesus is capable of averting his death is apparent in John (12.27-29; 18.4-11), but for him to do so would be a violation of the will of the Father. Instead of escaping the trial and crucifixion at the expense of the will of the Father, Jesus accepts the suffering as inevitable (18.11): 'Jesus therefore said to Peter, "Put your sword into its place. Will I not drink the cup which the Father gave to me?"'[62]

The fact that ἡ ὥρα is also the glorifying moment of both the Father and the Son is mentioned in 12.23, 27ff.; 13.31-32; 17.1.[63] So Bultmann speaks of the hour as paradox that is plainly brought home: 'the hour of the δοξασθῆναι is at the same time the hour of passion'.[64] If indeed the hour is filled with arrest, trial and death on the cross, where does the glory lie in Christ's troubled emotion and humiliation? In his comment on 12.23-26, Bultmann asserts that Jesus' glory is 'an event of salvation history: to his δόξα belongs the gathering of his community. To this extent v. 24 can be understood as an indirect answer to the request of the Ἕλληνες: through his passion Jesus will become accessible for them as exalted Lord.'[65] Indeed the context of 12.23-26 is concerned with the life-giving consequence of Jesus' death, and there is no doubt that this is the ultimate mission of the Son. However, Bultmann's interpretation did not do justice to John's understanding of 'glory' as 'praise' or 'approval' that one receives from another, especially the Father (see 5.41, 44; 7.18 etc.).

For John, glory resides in doing the will of someone else. The glory of the Son lies in his fulfilment of the Father's purpose in sending him into the world. It is the will of the Father which is being worked out in the arrest, trial and crucifixion. This is well summed up by John in these words of Jesus: 'Now my soul is troubled, and what shall I say? Father, deliver me from this hour; but it is for this reason that I came into this hour.' (12.27) Again as Lindars rightly noted, 'the irony is that Jesus cannot be saved from suffering, for it is the appointed means of achieving salvation'.[66] Glory is tied to ἡ ὥρα because in the hour lies the climactic fulfilment of all that the Father predestined for the Son he sends as τὸ Φῶς εἰς τὸν κόσμον. In John, true glory resides not in the

62. The reference to τὸ ποτήριον – the cup – is essential for John's understanding of the Father's will for the Son. In the context of the passion narrative, it symbolizes the imminent death of the Son. By receiving the cup presented to him by the soldiers, Jesus accepts willingly the design of the Father for him in totality, and thus can say τετέλεσται (19.28).

63. For a discussion of glory in John, see G. B. Caird, 'The Glory of God in the Fourth Gospel: an Exercise in Biblical Semantics', *NTS* 15 (1968–9), pp. 265–77; Smalley, *John: Evangelist and Interpreter*, 220–3.

64. Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, p. 424.

65. Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, p. 424. A similar reading is echoed in Brown, *John I-XII*, pp. 469–70.

66. Lindars, *The Gospel of John*, p. 428.

winning of human praise, but in doing the will of the Father (12.43 cf. 5.41, 44; 7.18; 8.49, 50, 54). With the declaration of Jesus in 19.30 – 'it is finished' – John affirms that the Son has accomplished all that constitutes the Father's will for him. It is in the Son's absolute conformity to the will of the Father that he is approved, and thus glorified.

This element of glorification has been a subject of considerable attention in Johannine scholarship. It constitutes the hallmark of Käsemann's understanding of Johannine Christology as 'naive docetism'.[67] If the goal of John is to articulate the glory of Jesus, what is the relevance of the passion tradition with its shock and horror in a Gospel with so much interest in Jesus' glory? According to Käsemann, the Gospel resolves the tension by imprinting 'the features of the victory of Christ upon the passion story'.[68] In spite of Ashton's rejection of Käsemann's claim that the passion story is 'a mere postscript', he sees the evangelist's imprint in certain allusions in the passion narrative which echo the book of signs. Instances of such allusions according to Ashton include:

1. Jesus' acceptance of the cup given to him by the Father (18.11) as a recall of Jesus' refusal to plead for an escape from the hour (12.27);

2. the evangelist's explanatory comment in 18.32 that 'this was to fulfil the word which Jesus had spoken to show by what death he was to die' as an analeptic reference to the lifting up (crucifixion) of Jesus in 12.32 and 33.

These connections are sufficient to show that the passion narrative has been skilfully integrated with the book of signs by the same writer who is preoccupied with one concern – Jesus' glory. This style of the evangelist 'is a strong indication of his desire to show that the manner of Jesus' death was divinely determined, fulfilling as it did not just the scripture . . . but also Jesus' own word'.[69]

As we sum up what constitutes 'glory' in John, the monograph by Patrick C. Counet is quite helpful. He draws attention to three features about the Johannine Jesus: first, Jesus acts on the basis of an initiative which is outside of his person, i.e. his actions are informed by the initiative of the Father. Jesus himself emphasizes quite often that he has not come of his own accord, but

67. By this he meant that the incarnation for John is really epiphany, for 'he who has become flesh does not cease to exist as a heavenly being'. This is Käsemann's response to Bultmann who affirmed that the incarnation is about Jesus becoming 'a man and nothing else'. See E. Käsemann, *New Testament Questions of Today* (London: SCM, 1969, pp. 152–67).

68. Käsemann, *The Testament of Jesus According to John 17* (trans. G. Krodel; Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1968, p. 7).

69. Ashton, *Understanding*, p. 488.

that he is being sent to do the work of the one who sent him; second, his words are not his but those of the Father (7.16; 8.26, 28;12.49; 14.10, 24); third, his centre of consciousness lies outside of him and this is evident in statements such as 'I am not seeking honour for myself' (8.50 cf. 7.18), 'The Father is in me and I am in the Father' (10.38).[70] The significance of these characteristics for Counet lies in the fact that 'the loss of one's identity, the search for the glory of another and speaking words which are not one's own form the outlines of the postmodern implicit value which the implied author holds up for us'.[71] While Counet's interest is in the 'postmodern implicit value' of John, it is his recognition of the initiative outside of Jesus' own ego that is relevant to our study. Thus, glory does not reside in egocentric actions but in adequate response to the initiative of the 'other', and the other in the case of Jesus is the Father. It is the fact that Jesus fulfilled the design of the Father for him in its entirety which warranted Jesus' final utterance – 'It is finished.' All the moments he was agonizing on the cross until he finally gave up his spirit form the decisive hour of glory because there and then, it was the will of the 'other' (i.e. the Father) that was being realized.

c. Scriptural Necessity of the Passion

In our discussion of the scriptural necessity of the mission, it is appropriate first to comment on the theological relevance of the OT to the NT writers, especially John. It is indisputable that the OT provides the basis for the theological interpretation of the Christ event.[72] At the centre of the consciousness of the NT writers is the permanence of the written word.[73] This is evident in their use of the perfect passive γεγραμμένον ἐστίν 'it is written'. This expression occurs not less than five times in John (2.17; 10.34; 12.15, 16; 15.25). As a way of stressing the permanence further, John refers to the OT in a manner that is tantamount to quoting God himself (Jn 7.38; cf. Isa. 44.3; 55.1; 58.11; Jn 7.42 cf. Mic. 5.2). Thus for John the OT stands on the same level of authority as God himself – they both have an authority which is unquestionable. However, our concern here is to trace the Johannine use of Scripture as a deterministic factor for certain occurrences in the story of Jesus. The fulfilment motif allows John to speak of Scripture as a necessitating factor in the story of Jesus. This is evident from the use of the relative clause ἵνα and διὰ τοῦτο in relation to γραφή or its synonyms such as Torah, prophet, or the name of a biblical author (Jn. 12.38, 39; 13.18; 19.24, 28, 36).

70. Patrick C. Counet, *John, A Postmodern Gospel: Introduction to Deconstructive Exegesis Applied to the Fourth Gospel*, (BI; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000, pp. 189–90).

71. Counet, *John, A Postmodern Gospel*, p. 190.

72. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, 'The Use of Explicit Old Testament Quotations in Qumran Literature and in the New Testament', *NTS* 7 (1960–61), pp. 297–333; B. Lindars, 'The Place of the Old Testament in the Formation of New Testament Theology', *NTS* 23 (1976–77), pp. 59–66; see also Peder Borgen, response to 'The Place of the Old Testament in the Formation of New Testament Theology' by B. Lindars, *NTS* 23 (1976–77), pp. 67–75.

73. R. Mayer, 'Scripture, Writing' , in *NIDNTT*, vol. 3; pp. 482–90.

It is not easy to distinguish the function of ἵνα as purpose or result. Even with a careful study of its contextual usage in the New Testament, its significance is not always too strict.[74] It is used in the sense of both consecutive[75] and final significance. However, its most common occurrence is in purpose or final clauses[76] and it appears regularly with the subjunctive mood. In John, the use of the ἵνα clause with reference to Scripture is consistently to express purpose. In his observation on the use of the word in the context of John 12.38-39, for instance, Brown asserts that the use of ἵνα has a telic force by which he means that the Scripture necessitates the unbelief of Jesus' audience: 'the basic thought is not that the unbelief resulted in the fulfilment of the prophecy, but that the prophecy brought about the unbelief. In this mentality where the OT prophecies had to be fulfilled, *hina* has telic force.'[77] In other words, the purpose of the Scripture is to generate unbelief.

As we return to our discussion of the mission of the Son, it is important to stress that the necessity of the crucifixion of the Son is not only expressed by the impersonal δεῖ and ὥστε but also described as a scriptural necessity.[78]

74. E. Stauffer, 'ἵνα', in *TDNT*, vol. 3; pp. 323–33. See also H. E. Dana and J. R. Mantey, *A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1955, pp. 248–9, 282–4); C. F. D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, reprint ed., 1984, pp. 138–9, cf. pp. 142–6); P. Lampe, 'ἵνα', in *EDNT*, vol. 2; pp. 188–90.

75. Although the common method of expressing result is by the use of ὥστε followed by the infinitive – Dana and Mantey, *A Manual Grammar*, pp. 285–6; Moule, *Idiom Book*, p. 141.

76. Moule suggested a reason for this could be the unwillingness in the Semitic mind to draw a sharp dividing-line between purpose and consequence. 'It may be for this reason (or at least, Semitic influence may be a contributory cause) that the ἵνα with Subj. sometimes occurs in contexts which seem to impose a *consecutive*, instead of *final*, sense upon it; and conversely, that ὥστε with Infin. seems sometimes to approximate to a *final* meaning.' See Moule, *Idiom Book*, p. 142.

77. Brown, *John I-XII*, p. 483. Barrett adopts a similar reading but in a more forceful way by affirming that the use of ἵνα in this passage 'signifies predestination (to condemnation) of the most absolute kind. . . . The non-purposive use of ἵνα is attested elsewhere in John (e.g. 1.27; 17.3) but that it is impossible here is shown by v. 39. . . . It can hardly be questioned that John meant that the hardening of Israel was intended by God.' Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 359. See also Moloney, *Gospel of John*, p. 364.

78. There have been numerous publications which deal with the use of Scripture in the Fourth Gospel. Because of the scope of this study, the reader is hereby referred to some of those works: Freed, *Old Testament Quotations in the Gospel of John*; D. J. Moo, *The Old Testament in the Gospel Passion Narratives* (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1983, especially pp. 224–32, 252–7); Carson, 'John and the Johannine Epistles', in *It is Written: Scripture Citing Scripture* (ed. D. A. Carson and H. G. M. Williamson; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 245–64); Martin Hengel, 'The Old Testament in the Fourth Gospel', *HBTh* 12 (1990), pp. 19–41.

In John 19, Scripture is referred to no less than three times to explain the activities at the cross (19.24, 28, 36). On every occasion, it is in connection with a ἵνα clause. Thus from the Johannine standpoint, the passion of the Son was not by coincidence but a matter of scriptural necessity. Initially, John sets up the betrayal which eventually leads to the arrest and trial as the fulfilment of Scripture: 'But that the Scripture might be fulfilled, "the one who eats with me raised his heel against me"'. (13.18) This scriptural reference is strategically placed here in the narrative because it alerts the reader to the fact that the subsequent events are to be viewed not in relation to Judas Iscariot but in connection with Jesus who suffers the consequences of Judas' betrayal. In the Fourth Gospel, the betrayal by Judas has no scriptural reference of its own[79] apart from the victim of the betrayal, because it is Jesus, the central character of the Gospel, who is under the surveillance of Scripture. Jesus' triumphant entry (12.12-15), the response of people to him (12.37-41), his betrayal (13.18), and his resurrection (20.9) are explained in light of Scripture.

This preoccupation with the fulfilment of Scripture, according to Bultmann, is 'the sign that what is here taking place is being achieved in accordance with the divine plan'.[80] Thus the soldiers' throwing of dice for instance, as Lindars put it, is 'their own contribution to the plan of God'. And even much more appropriate to our study is the utterance τετέλεσται – 'it is finished' – by Jesus. The force of the utterance lies in John's report that Jesus knew that all things were now completed. It is on the basis of that knowledge that Jesus expresses his thirst and his last word in John (19.28, 30). The word τετέλεσται (19.28, 30) does not mean the end of Scripture, rather it denotes the accomplishment of 'what is appointed in Scripture for Jesus as the agent of God's will'.[81] In the Gospel, the climactic point of God's mission for the Son is that moment when Jesus died and gave up his spirit.[82]

79. Stibbe expresses this point cogently by speaking of characters in John as 'foils' which means that characters such as Judas, Pilate and others 'speak and behave in such a way that our understanding of who Jesus really is is enhanced. Characters are therefore not generally introduced and developed for their own sakes as they are in the modern novel.' See Stibbe, *John as Storyteller*, p. 25.

80. Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, p. 674.

81. Lindars, *The Gospel of John*, p. 58. It should be added that the force of the utterance is to evoke not just death's physical depletion, the physical emptiness and thirst, but also all of death's bitterness and finality. This is coherent with Johannine emphasis on Jesus as the giver of life.

82. Marrow has read this giving up of the spirit (19.30) as a form of Johannine Pentecost. According to Marrow, 19.30 is a reminder that 'the crucifixion of Jesus is not only his own glorification but also a Pentecost as well, the giving of his spirit to the world'. See Marrow, *Gospel of John*, p. 348. Culpepper also highlights the same point when he notes that the giving up of Jesus' spirit in 19.30 resonates with the narrator's comment in Jn 7.39 that the spirit had not yet been given since Jesus had not yet been glorified. The emphasis on the Paraclete in the farewell discourse has already prepared the reader 'to understand that at

d. Johannine Relevance

What then is the function of the deterministic overtone of the mission of the Son? By presenting the trial and the crucifixion as the necessary moment, John locates the passion within the framework of the Father's will in sending the Son. John intensifies this claim by giving a twofold meaning to the metaphor of ἡ ὥρα, i.e. suffering and glory. This allows John to affirm through the main character of his story, Jesus, that true glory does not reside in winning the praise or approval of people but in doing the will of the Father, even if it means suffering in the form of rejection. This indeed is an irony first to those audiences within the narrative who do not believe because of the fear of 'the Jews', and then to those who are contemplating giving up their faith because of the danger of expulsion from the synagogue. It is not surprising, therefore, that John summarizes the goal of his Gospel in terms of generating and inspiring faith: 'But these things have been written so that you might believe that Jesus is the Christ, Son of God, in order that while believing, you may have life in his name.' (20.31)

The deterministic nuance of the mission of the Son features in the Fourth Gospel also as a polemic metaphor of Johannine Christianity. By tracing the crucifixion to the centre of the Father's will, John re-orientates his audience from Jesus the man of good deeds who is the victim of human hostility to Jesus the bearer of the Father's will in suffering. In other words, the hostility he suffers is in accordance with the mission that the Father assigned to the Son. In the encounter with Pilate, John solemnly exonerates Jesus of any wrongdoing which could have amounted to his being guilty as charged: 'I cannot find any reason to condemn him.' (18.38; 19.4 cf. 19.12) Again, Jesus as the hero of the Johannine Christianity experiences all that beset him, not because of his ego, but because of a necessity which lies outside of him, the will of the Father.

3. Providential Determinism (3.27)

The Johannine comparison of the ministries of John the Baptist and Jesus echoes a form of determinism which may be identified as providential determinism. By this we mean the divine provision assigned to an individual in terms of quantity and quality. It should be stressed outright that John does not express this form of determinism in every character but only in the two mentioned.[83] Since this kind of determinism is not a recurrent motif in John, our treatment of it will be brief.

the death of Jesus the Spirit will come to guide the community of disciples after Jesus' death'. Culpepper, *Gospel and Letters*, p. 236.

83. Although it is worth mentioning that there are commentators who think that this affirmation in 3.27 is general. Moloney for example states that the verse is 'a statement about the source of ultimate truth for anyone . . . and does not apply, as some would maintain . . ., only to the Baptist'. Moloney, *Gospel of John*, p. 109.

In the witness of John the Baptist, nothing belongs to a person except what is granted from heaven (3.27). That the passage echoes the Baptist's own acceptance of his limitation in comparison with Jesus is acknowledged by commentators.[84] What is significant to our study is that the Fourth Gospel explains the limitation in deterministic terms.

Scholars continue to debate what precisely is being given from heaven: does it mean human 'capacity to receive' as Lindars asserted,[85] or 'authority' as Schnackenburg[86] argued? That the verb δίδωμι assumed a predestined nuance in John is evident from our discussion of soteriological determinism, although this is not so in every occurrence. The context of 3.27 seems to indicate that humanity is intended as what is being given from heaven. In 3.26, the disciples of John the Baptist told their leader that πάντες, 'all', are going to Jesus for baptism. The word πάντες does not imply 'all things' but 'all men'. The only way that John can make sense of such a movement of people to Jesus is in the paradigm of the 'given ones'. This is articulated in the Baptist's affirmation that: 'A man is not able to receive anything except it is given to him from heaven.'

While the phrase οὐδε ἓν (3.27), which literally means 'not even one thing', tends to shift the focus from people to things, the literal meaning will not suffice in this context because the interpretation of the phrase οὐδε ἓν cannot ignore the force of the πάντες in v. 26. Here is another occasion where John employs neuter when the masculine form is expected. However, on this occasion, the neuter is used to represent the totality of the divine supply to the individual, of which the movement of πάντες – 'all men' – to Jesus forms a part. In other words, it is John's attempt to show that the movement of people to Jesus is not accidental but 'the giving' from heaven which warrants the claim that an individual's lot is proportionate to the degree of provision granted by God. If the immediate context of 3.27 is not to be ignored, taking δεδομένον as a reference to 'capacity to receive' or 'power' will undermine its narrative function in this instance. It is a reference to the 'given ones' which is echoed in the πάντες in v. 26.

Reading the verse (3.27) in view of the contrasting ministries of Jesus and John, its function is to show that Jesus' overshadowing of John the Baptist is due to the will of God and nothing else.[87] This is summed up in the affirmation of the Baptist in 3.30: 'It is necessary (δεῖ) for him to increase and for me to decrease.' It is God, the one who gives from heaven, that makes the increase of Jesus and the decrease of the Baptist a necessity. Thus, the force of the

84. Brown opines that 3.27 can mean one of two possibilities: (1) if only a few come to John the Baptist, it is because that is all that God has assigned to him; (2) if many come to Jesus, it is because God has ordained it thus – Brown, *John I-XII*, p. 155. Carson sees the verse as embracing not just one of Brown's possible readings but both – Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, p. 125.

85. Lindars, *The Gospel of John*, pp. 166–7.

86. Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 1; p. 415.

87. Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 185.

δεδομένον in the context of 3.27 is to show that whatever John the Baptist or Jesus does is determined by God in whom lies all the initiative.[88] Carson grasps this point when he posits that the word δεδομένον is used to explain the Baptist's own peculiar position, 'giving ultimate significance to the movement of people from himself to Jesus. . . . The Baptist responds thoughtfully and humbly to the circumstances he cannot (and would not) change.'[89]

C. Apostasy and Johannine Determinism

The metaphor of the vine and the branches in John 15, at first glance, tends to cast a doubt on the Johannine emphasis on the eternal keeping of the 'given ones'. This is due to the recurring motif of 'exclusion' in vv. 1-7. The exclusion is expressed in the use of words such as αἴρω – 'to remove' – in v. 2, and βάλλω – 'to throw away' – in v. 6. The identity of the disciples as branches of Jesus the true vine is linked with their ongoing abiding in the Son. Thus a branch can be 'cut off' and 'thrown away' if it ceases to abide and bear fruit. How is this possible in light of John's emphasis on the predestination of the given ones?

The inclusion of this metaphor is another occasion of a skilful storyteller. In presenting Jesus as the vine, and the disciples as branches, John intends to show that the well-being of both the vine and its branches stems from the activity of the vinedresser. In other words, tending the vine and its branches is the action of the Father. 'As throughout the Fourth Gospel, it is the Father who is ultimately responsible for all Jesus does and makes known.'[90] In John, the only one among the given ones who 'falls out' is Judas. Earlier in 6.66 John remarks that some disciples discontinue their walk with Jesus (Ἐκ τούτου πολλοὶ ἐκ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω καὶ οὐκέτι μετ' αὐτοῦ περιεπάτουν). However, the withdrawal of such 'disciples' is explained as a result of their not being granted to Jesus by the Father (6.65). In order not to confuse Judas with such 'disciples', John notes that Judas is one of the chosen Twelve (6.70), but for what purpose? The fact that these 'disciples' stop following Jesus is a rhetoric intended to show that true discipleship in John is only possible through the prior giving of some people by the Father.

It is not surprising that John locates the setting of the discourse of the vine and the branches at the table where Judas left the rest of the disciples to align himself with the opponents of Jesus (13.21-30). The significance of the metaphor is not to suggest that apostasy is a possibility for any of the 'given ones', but to account for the 'falling out' of Judas who was once a branch of the true vine. Even in the context of the metaphor, John boldly asserts that

88. Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 185.

89. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, pp. 126–7.

90. Moloney, *Glory Not Dishonor: Reading John 13–21* (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1998, p. 59).

none of the other disciples can 'fall out' because they are already clean: ἤδη ὑμεῖς καθαροί ἐστε διὰ τὸν λόγον ὃν λελάληκα ὑμῖν (15.3). Judas as a branch of the true vine does not fall out arbitrarily, it is as a result of the necessity that the Scripture places upon the Son. It is in the process of the vinedresser tending the vine and its branches that the 'cutting off' of a particular branch becomes inevitable.

There have been several attempts to make sense of the character of Judas in the Passion story.[91] What are we to deduce from the portrait of Judas Iscariot in light of the determinism of the Fourth Gospel? John affirms the election of Judas in the same manner as the rest of the disciples. Among the selected (ἐκλέγομαι[92]) Twelve mentioned in 6.70-71, one is said to be 'a devil'. The editorial note of v. 71 identifies the 'devil' as Judas Iscariot.

The word διάβολος means 'slanderer' or 'accuser'. It is used in the New Testament, in its substantive form, to refer to σατανᾶς the prince of darkness.[93] This is the sense in which John uses the term in 8.44; 13.2 (cf. 13.27). However John's identification of Judas as διάβολος does not imply that he is the σατανᾶς par excellence, but a medium of satanic activity. Judas is designated as 'devil' because he betrays Jesus (6.71 cf. 13.2). The betrayal unfolds in the sense of someone who was once within the sheepfold but later changed sides to ally with the outsider in attacking the sheepfold.[94] For John, the use of the term διάβολος for Judas is not in the evil which is generally associated with it, but in the position Judas assumes when he takes a stand outside of the sheepfold alongside those officials who arrest his master.[95]

91. Such works include K. T. Hughes, 'Framing Judas', *Semeia* 54 (1991), pp. 223–38; H. Maccoby, *Judas Iscariot and the Myth of Jewish Evil* (Oxford: Maxwell-MacMillan, 1992); R. J. S. Manning, 'Kierkegaard and Post-Modernity: Judas as Kierkegaard's Only Disciple', *PToday* 37 (1993), pp. 133–52; Friedrich Ohly, *The Damned and the Elect: Guilt in Western Culture* (trans. Linda Archibald; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 1–102, 143–9); W. Klassen, *Judas: Betrayer or Friend of Jesus?* (London: SCM Press, 1996); James Veitch, 'The Making of a Myth: The Case of Judas Iscariot and the Rise of Anti-Semitism', *AJT* 10, 2 (1996), pp. 363–76; Anthony Cane, 'Judas Iscariot, Bishop Roderick Wright and the Testing of Eucharistic Boundaries', *Th* 101 (1998), pp. 119–24; Kenneth C. Hein, 'Judas Iscariot: Key to the Last-Supper Narratives?' *NTS* 17 (1971), pp. 227–32; Joseph Klausner, *Jesus of Nazareth: His Life, Times, and Teaching* (trans. Herbert Danby; New York, NY: Macmillan, 1925, pp. 324–9).

92. The occurrence of this verb in John is always in the aorist and it means Jesus' action of selecting the Twelve from other disciples – J. H. Charlesworth, *The Beloved Disciple* (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1995, p. 123).

93. Carson, *The Gospel of John* (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1991, p. 304).

94. Cf. R. A. Piper's reading of Judas in terms of 'the crossing of a boundary', see Ronald A. Piper, 'Satan, Demons and the Absence of Exorcisms in the Fourth Gospel', in *Christology, Controversy and Community: New Testament Essays in Honour of David R. Catchpole*, (eds D. G. Horrell and C. M. Tuckett; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000, pp. 253–78 [278]).

95. Klassen, *Judas: Betrayer or Friend*, p. 142.

Judas' identification with those who have been antagonists of Jesus hitherto in the Gospel reflects Judas' participation in the 'devil' which is said to be the father of those who are antagonists of Jesus in 8.44. It is the dynamics by which Judas becomes 'devil' that is enumerated in 13.2, 26-30 where Satan is said to enter into Judas.[96]

The portrait of the devil or Satan in the Johannine deterministic scheme makes him an agent of the Father. John locates the activity of ὁ Σατανᾶς in 'the hour' of the Son (13.1). His invasion of Judas' heart to betray Jesus is linked with the arrival of the 'hour' (13.2, 27). The earlier reference to Judas as a devil in 6.70 is a prolepsis of the devil acting out its role in the appointed hour of the Son. It is the Father's appointed hour for the Son which warrants the devil's involvement. Thus the devil does not just arbitrarily become involved in Jesus' story, for John, he is an agent whose activity is inevitable not just at any moment, but in the appointed hour in Jesus' story.

While the reference to the devil in the context of John 8 seems to suggest that the devil has equal fatherhood with God, it is not in the sense of absolute dualism. In 8.44, the devil is identified as the father of the 'Jews'. However, a careful reading of the text shows that the fatherhood of the devil is in contrast to that of Abraham. John does not contest the fatherhood of Abraham as the Jews claimed (8.33, 37), instead he rejects the claim that these Jews are children of Abraham, because they are not doing Abraham's deeds. Their attempt to kill Jesus, and their rejection of the truth from God are not Abrahamic (8.37, 40), but are of the devil because the devil is a murderer and a liar (8.44). In this manner, the fatherhood of the devil is temporal, not absolute. In John there is only one Father, the one who sent the Son. People become his children because they believe in the Son whom he has sent.

The giving of the morsel to Judas precipitates the sequence of events that culminates in the crucifixion. It is somewhat strange that John describes the event that actually triggers the expected 'hour' of Jesus as due to satanic interference upon Judas (13.27). However, that Jesus' gift of the morsel invokes Satan in the heart of Judas suggests: (i) that although Judas' action is imputed to Satan, it is actually Jesus who determines the timing of the Passion,[97] not Judas or Satan; (ii) that Satan is not co-equal with Jesus but subject to Jesus.

Why does Jesus include 'a devil' in his choice of disciples? Many scholars have had difficulty with the fact that Jesus chose Judas.[98] Indeed, for Jesus to choose Judas deliberately presents a fundamental problem which can be

96. This is an 'invasionist view' of evil. See Piper, 'Satan, Demons and Absence of Exorcisms', p. 267.

97. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, p. 131.

98. Friedrich Schleiermacher, for instance, found it impossible, mainly because of Judas 'to think that Jesus deliberately chose his apostles'. Instead he affirmed that Jesus did not choose Judas but Judas out of his own initiative entered the circle of the Twelve. See F. Schleiermacher, *The Life of Jesus* (trans. S. Maclean Gilmour; Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1975, pp. 346, 413–14).

summed up thus: 'either Jesus was ignorant of what resided in the mind and heart of Judas or Jesus himself involved Judas in his deliberate destruction'.[99] The inclusion of διάβολος is an indication that election in John is not always for salvation but for some other purpose.[100] And in the case of Judas, it is for the purpose of scriptural necessity upon Jesus. This is evident in the fact that the possession of Judas by Satan is prefaced by emphasis on the fulfilment of Scripture in the life of Jesus (13.26-27 cf. v. 18). It is only on this basis that John makes sense of Judas' plot against Jesus in the events leading to the passion.

Why then does John speak of Judas as κλέπτης 'a thief' (12.6)? The first reference to κλέπτης is John 10 where it occurs three times. Its meaning in that context is ambiguous because of the complex history of interpretations that the parable has generated.[101] Despite the ambiguity, one point that stands out is the nuance of illegitimacy. Entering the sheepfold by means other than the gate is an act of stealing (10.1). Apart from Jesus, the gateway to the sheepfold, all other gates offer access to destruction (10.8, 10). In the case of the reference to Judas as κλέπτης, when the reference is taken at surface level, it is in an economic sense rather than the means of access. However, further reflection on the role of the character of Judas in John opens up a reading of Judas as a 'thief' at another level; as the one who, through his liaison with the Jewish authority, offers the means of access into the sheepfold, Judas can be seen as someone who stands as an alternative 'gate' for the outsiders. But his kind of access precipitates the scattering of the fold (16.32). According to the parable of John 10, Judas is, by virtue of his role in leading the authorities to the sheepfold, a thief whose activity has destroyed the unity of the fold and resulted in the death of the true shepherd.[102]

However, while the immediate narrative context of the reference to Judas as a thief (12.1-8) has an economic nuance, John's description of Judas as a thief economically (12.4-6) does not adequately account for Judas' action in the Johannine passion narrative. By identifying Judas as a thief, John holds Judas responsible for his action; but in the process of doing so, John unconsciously undermines his own emphasis on the outworking of Scripture through the action of Judas. Still, in spite of Judas' greedy tendencies, it is the

99. Klassen, *Judas: Betrayer or Friend*, p. 35.

100. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility*, p. 191.

101. See J. Beutler and R. T. Fortna, (eds) *The Shepherd Discourse of John 10 and Its Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

102. A similar reading is briefly hinted at by Stibbe. In his diagrammatical use of Greimas' structural approach to illuminate the relationship between the Shepherd discourse (10.1-21) and the arrest scene (18.1-11), Stibbe intimates that Judas' role in the arrest scene echoes that of the κλέπτης in the Shepherd discourse. Thus just as the κλέπτης is linked with the illegitimate entrance εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν τῶν προβάτων, so also does Judas emerge as an illegitimate gateway to Jesus' fold in the arrest drama. See Stibbe, *John as Storyteller*, p. 103.

primary concern of the passion narrative to show that Jesus is betrayed not because of Judas' love of money[103] but because Scripture must be fulfilled. Gärtner reached a similar conclusion: 'It seems to me that it is this motif of "scriptural fulfilment" which dominates the New Testament understanding of Judas and not the motif of greed.'[104]

There is a further crucial reference to Judas which has a direct bearing on the determinism of John. In the farewell discourse (17.12), it is reported that none among 'the given ones' by the Father is lost except the son of perdition – ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας.[105] The word ἀπωλείας occurs only here in John, and it is used in connection with its verbal form ἀπόλλυμι to denote 'loss' in the sense of exclusion from those that belong to the Son.[106] That the son of perdition is a reference to Judas is a widely held consensus,[107] and it is indeed implied in the same verse (17.12) that Judas is included in the number of 'the given ones'. Does the case of Judas signify that the determinism of 'the given ones' is not permanent? Or does it mean that Jesus is incapable of all that the Father has given him, as J. A. T. Robinson suggested?[108] How does John explain the dismissal of Judas from the list of the chosen ones by the Father?

In an attempt to exonerate Jesus of any blame of incapability to keep the 'given ones' of the Father, some commentators adopt the view that the predestination of the given ones is not permanent because, as F. F. Bruce puts it, 'even among those so given apostasy is a solemn possibility'.[109] This is a way of locating the factor for the dismissal of Judas from among the given ones within Judas himself and not independent of him. One must ask

103. This line of interpretation has a long history which goes back to the Patristic literature. For example, Origen explained the betrayal by Judas as a consequence of his love for money and lack of faith. See S. Laeuchli, 'Origen's Interpretation of Judas Iscariot', *CH* 22 (1953), pp. 253–68 (254, 257).

104. Bertil Gärtner, *Iscariot* (BibS; Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1971, p.15).

105. A similar expression is found in 2 Thess. 2.3, it is used as a reference to the eschatological 'man of sin' who must be revealed before the end.

106. It should be noted also that the noun ἀπώλεια is generally used in the New Testament for the final loss of a man, see Bernard, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 2; p. 571; Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 424.

107. Exception to this agreement is expressed in Moloney, *Gospel of John*, pp. 467–8, 470. He identified the ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας as Satan. The problem with this position is that Satan is never described as one of the 'given ones'. In John, Satan is consistently portrayed in the role of an antagonist.

108. See J. A. T. Robinson, *The Roots of a Radical* (London: SCM Press, 1980, pp. 139–43), who attributed the loss of Judas (as a son of perdition) to Jesus' own failure to make Judas clean or alter his course by the gesture of love.

109. F. F. Bruce, *The Gospel and Epistles of John: Introduction, Exposition and Notes* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, rep. 2001, p. 332); cf. Carson, *The Gospel of John*, pp. 563–4.

however whether or not such a position is sustainable in the face of the strong Johannine emphasis on predestination. How does this notion of possible apostasy of the given ones coalesce with John's remarks in 6.39; 10.29-30 where the eternal security of the given ones is assured? In fact, for John the ἀπώλεια of Judas is not due to Judas' own making but warranted by the necessity of Scripture, ἵνα ἡ γραφὴ πληρωθῇ (17.12). Morris' insight on the son of perdition is quite helpful in the context of our study: 'And if attention be drawn to Judas, then it must be said that the Father's will was done both in the eleven and in the one, for Scripture was fulfilled. The reference to the fulfilling of Scripture brings out the divine purpose.'[110] Judas fell out of the 'given ones' because of the necessity of the fulfilment of Scripture, not in Judas but in the mission of the Son.

D. Summary

It has been the purpose of this chapter to engage the Fourth Gospel from the standpoint of determinism. Our reading has demonstrated that the motif is significant in the overall structure of the narrative. It is articulated explicitly in some passages by the use of specific deterministic terms, and solemnly in other passages by way of implication. The nature of the determinism in John is soteriological, missiological and providential.

One of the main emphases of the Johannine determinism is that the response of people (i.e. narrative characters) to Jesus is conditioned not only by the determination of the Father in the giving of certain people to the Son, but also by the determination of Scripture. Although the term 'whosoever' in John seems to make people's response to Jesus a matter of human volition, the fact of the matter is that the actions of those who respond positively within John's narrative are attributed to the previous act of the Father. On the other hand, the inadequate response of certain characters is said to be the outworking of Scripture. In other words, while unbelief can be explained in light of Scripture, it is the necessity of the previous action of the Father in the giving of some people to the Son that determines human positive response to Jesus. These 'given ones' cannot respond otherwise.

Johannine determinism is also articulated in the mission of the Son. It is expressed in more than one way. First, the use of deterministic terminology (the impersonal δεῖ) to stress the need of the mission is apparent in chs 1–13. Second, there are references to fixation of a particular moment (the hour) for the glorification of the Son. The hour and the event which make it a glorifying moment are set beforehand and cannot be altered. Third, scriptural predictions make the mission of the Son inevitable. This is evident from the allusions to the Old Testament, especially in the passion story, as the framework for understanding Jesus and his activity.

110. Morris, *Gospel According to John*, p. 645; Haenchen, *John*, vol. 2; p. 154.

Other forms of determinism found in John include providential determinism. It should be said, however, that this form of determinism is not forcefully articulated, but affirmed by way of implication. It is deduced from an occurrence associated with a particular character (i.e. John the Baptist) in a given situation. It lacks a broad-based textual support and therefore its relevance in the context of our enquiry is minimal. However, our concern to make the theme of determinism apparent in John requires that we highlight all the types of determinism that are conveyed in the narrative.

In spite of John's emphasis on the determinism of the 'given ones', the portrait of Judas Iscariot raises concerns as to whether or not the determinism is absolute and rigid. Although John attempts to explain the falling out of Judas on the ground of scriptural necessity, the picture that the reader is left with tends to suggest that the predestination of the given ones, as depicted in the character of Judas, is not absolute and permanent. Alternatively however, it is possible to conclude that his inclusion as a 'devil' among the given ones is deliberate for the purpose of precipitating the necessity which Scripture places upon the Son and his mission.

Finally, the function of Johannine determinism cannot be overemphasized. The significance has been noted in various sections of this chapter. It is adequate only to sum up that it is in the motif that the origin of Johannine believers is traced back to God. In the face of harsh opposition to the Johannine claim of Jesus as the Messiah, the motif of determinism helps the reader of the Gospel of John to make sense of the opposition within the divine framework.

Chapter 5

PETITIONARY PRAYER IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

In studying the petitionary prayer of the Fourth Gospel, our primary textual source is John 17.[1] It is the only block of prayer text in the Gospel.[2] Other relevant Johannine passages which will be discussed as a prelude to our discussion of the petitions in John 17 include John 11.41-42 and 12.27. The theological significance of this farewell prayer of chapter 17 is widely recognized among scholars. In the present form of the Gospel, as E. Malatesta rightly put it, 'ch. 17 dramatically recapitulates in the form of a prayer . . . the theology elaborated throughout the gospel'.[3] In a similar tone, Barrett

1. The compositional difficulties of the farewell discourse of which John 17 is a part have been a subject of considerable scholarly debate. The most obvious literary problem is the command in 14.31, Εγείρεσθε, ἄγωμεν ἐντεῦθεν. Does the verse mark the end of the preceding block of speech material of 13.31–14.31? The problem is even amplified by the fact that the verse (14.31) can be smoothly followed by John 18.1. Between the two, 14.31 and 18.1, lies a large block of material including the prayer under investigation. This intervening speech (chs 15–17) is noted with problems of its own especially chapters 15 and 16: difficulties in matters of content and theological positions. In terms of content, there are repetitions of materials from the first speech (i.e. 13.31–14.41), and such repetitions include the forthcoming departure (13.36-38 cf. 16.4-6), and the Paraclete (14.26 cf. 15.15-17; 16.4-11). Theologically, there are disparities with regard to the figure and role of the Paraclete, and the teaching concerning the Parousia. In an attempt to resolve the problems, scholars have adopted several approaches consisting of historicizing, transpositional, redactional and symbolic readings of the text. For a review of this debate and proposed resolutions, see F. F. Segovia, *The Farewell of the Word: The Johannine Call to Abide* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1991, pp. 24–47); L. Scott Kellum, *Farewell Discourse: The Literary Integrity of John 13.31-16.33* (JSNTSup, 256; London: T. & T. Clark, 2004).

2. Although Robert J. Karris recently argued that the prologue of John (1.1-18) is a prayer more than anything else. This he contends on the ground that the prologue is a prayer in the form of a hymn, psalm, song or confessional statement. See Robert J. Karris, *Prayer and the New Testament: Jesus and His Communities at Worship* (New York, NY: Crossroad, 2000, pp. 83–90). While there can be little doubt about the hymnic nature of the prologue, as it is generally accepted in exegesis, the fact that there is no single line of petition in the entire prologue undermines its relevance to our present study.

3. Edward Malatesta, 'The Literary Structure of John 17', *Bib* 52 (1971), pp. 190–214 (190).

describes it as 'a summary of Johannine theology relative to the work of Christ'.[4] Long before Barrett and Malatesta, B. Westcott wrote of John 17 as being 'at once a prayer, and a profession, and a revelation'.[5] Thus the contribution of the prayer to the overall structure of Johannine theology cannot be overstated. Apart from its function in the context of the farewell discourse,[6] scholars have written extensively on the sociological context that generated the prayer,[7] but it is of no relevance to engage in such discussion in the context of our investigation. Our aim here is to explore the contents of the petitionary prayers in the Fourth Gospel. What are the focuses of the petitions? What are the results anticipated by the prayers? Do the petitions seek to alter or change the structure of the determinism articulated in John as discussed in the last chapter? The purpose of this chapter is to discover whether or not the petitions are consistent with the Johannine deterministic perspective.

A. Johannine Approaches toward Petition

Apart from John 17, the common form of prayer that is associated with the Johannine Jesus is represented in the word εὐχαριστῶ. The word occurs thrice in John (6.11, 23; 11.42):

> ἔλαβεν οὖν τοὺς ἄρτους ὁ Ἰησους καὶ **εὐχαριστήσας** διέδωκεν τοῖς ἀνακειμένοις ὁμοίως καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀψαρίων ὅσον ἤθελον. (6.11)

4. Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 417, cf. Marie-Eloise Rosenblatt's submission that 'this final prayer marks the ending of Jesus' life and work, and becomes, in the form of prayer, the evangelist's way of expressing the meaning of that life and work'. See Rosenblatt, 'The Voice of the One Who Prays in John 17', in *Scripture and Prayer: A Celebration for Caroll Stuhlmueller* (eds C. Osiek and D. Senior; Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1988, pp. 131–44 (136)).

5. B. Westcott, *The Gospel According to St. John: The Greek Text with Introduction and Notes* (vol. 2; London: Murray, 1908, p. 239).

6. The inclusion of a prayer is not uncommon in descriptions of farewell discourses in the OT and Jewish literature, e.g. Deuteronomy 33; 4 *Ezra* 8.19b-36; 2 *Bar.* 48. For a brief study of Jewish background to the literary genre of the prayer, see Brown, *John XIII–XXI*, pp. 597–601; cf. C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953, pp. 420–3) in which Dodd compared the Johannine farewell discourse with the dialogue in the Hermetic tractates (vol. 29, lviii–lix), a study which led him to believe that the readers of John would have understood the farewell discourse (including the prayer) against a Hellenistic background. For a recent survey of scholarship on farewell-type scenes especially in relation to the Fourth Gospel, see Segovia, *Farewell of the Word*, pp. 2–20.

7. See for instance, John Painter, 'The Farewell Discourse and the History of Johannine Christianity (Jn 13–17)', *NTS* 27 (1981), pp. 525–43.

ἄλλα ἦλθεν πλοιάρια ἐκ Τιβεριάδος ἐγγυς τοῦ τόπου ὅπου ἔφαγον τὸν ἄρτον **εὐχαριστήσαντος** τοῦ κυρίου. (6.23)

ἦραν οὖν τὸν λίθον. ὁ δὲ Ἰησους ἦρεν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἄνω καὶ εἶπεν, Πάτερ, **εὐχαριστῶ** σοι ὅτι ἤκουσάς μου. ἐγὼ δὲ ἤδειν ὅτι πάντοτέ μου ἀκούεις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ὄχλον τὸν περιεστῶτα εἶπον, ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ὅτι σύ με ἀπέστειλας. καὶ ταῦτα εἰπὼν φωνῇ μεγάλῃ ἐκραυγασεν, **Λάζαρε, δεῦρο ἔξω**. (11.41-43)

Unlike the episode of Lazarus in John 11, there is no indication of the content of the thanksgiving in the two occurrences in John 6 and thus their relevance is minimal to our enquiry. On the other hand, the thanksgiving at Lazarus' tomb is specific in content: it acknowledges Jesus' dependence upon the Father for granting whatever he asks. The thanksgiving echoes the granting of Jesus' petition not just in the past (ἤκουσάς) but also in the present and future (πάντοτέ μου ἀκούεις). However on this occasion, there is no recall of any petition by Jesus that is granted by the Father. This absence of petition therefore minimizes the relevance of John 11.41-42 to our discussion of petition in John.

Another occasion of prayer outside of the farewell discourse is John 12.27-28. This is the only passage in the book of signs that portrays Jesus as a character who performs petitionary prayer. Like the narrative of the Hebrew Bible, the petition is inspired by the imminent painful circumstances awaiting Jesus.

Νῦν ἡ ψυχή μου τετάρακται, καὶ τί εἴπω; Πάτερ, σῶσόν με ἐκ τῆς ὥρας ταύτης; ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἦλθον εἰς τὴν ὥραν ταύτην. πάτερ, δόξασόν σου τὸ ὄνομα. ἦλθεν οὖν φωνὴ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ἐδόξασα καὶ πάλιν δοξάσω.

However, the petition is immediately dismissed because it is irreconcilable with the determined mission of the Son. In light of this, coupled with the fact that the Johannine prayer so far has been exclusively thanksgiving (6.11, 23, more especially 11.41-42), it is appropriate therefore to ask whether the Johannine Jesus can actually make petitionary prayer or not? While this passage (12.27-28) dismisses the aptness of Jesus' petition, it does not completely deny that Jesus offers petitionary prayer. Rather it is a Johannine clue that Jesus' petition must be consistent with the determined purpose of the Father. This is well articulated in v. 28 where the tension in the initial petition in v. 27 is resolved in the glorification of the Father, the glorification that is a prolepsis of the farewell petition of John 17.

It is worthwhile to ask why John 17 is formulated as a prayer rather than a dialogue between Jesus and the disciples as in the rest of the farewell discourse. Furthermore, why is the prayer not dialogical between the Father and the Son as in the prayer in 12.27-28? In responding to these questions, it is essential to draw attention to the use of prayer in the Johannine story of Jesus. In the episode at Lazarus' tomb, John resorts to prayer in order to show the unique relationship between Jesus and the Father (11.42), a

relationship that is expressed in terms of the Father as the sender and Jesus as the messenger. In other words, in the prayer, it is the priority of the Father and the dependence of Jesus that is asserted. A similar motif is also present in the petition for escape in 12.27-28. It is the Father (the sender) whose name must be glorified in the hour from which Jesus (the messenger) is asking for a rescue. Thus, prayer for John, either thanksgiving or petition, is employed as a medium for explicating the unity between the Father and the Son, a unity in which the priority of the Father and the dependence of the Son are both affirmed.

The fact that the prayer in John 17 is placed in the context, and more especially at the end, of the farewell discourse is crucial. If we regard Jesus' imminent death as a 'return from a mission' as Ashton suggests,[8] this prayer in John 17 represents Jesus' own report of his earthly mission to the Father who sent him. This reading is based on two factors: first, Jesus locates the timing of the prayer at his final moment, ἐλήλυθεν ἡ ὥρα (17.1); second, Jesus emphasizes repeatedly the accomplishment of the task assigned to him by the Father (see 17.4, 6-13). Like the thanksgiving at the tomb of Lazarus and the petition for escape from the hour, the prayer in John 17 depicts Jesus as a messenger sent by the Father, who on the completion of his assigned mission gives the report of that mission to the Father who sent him. In light of these, the opening petition is an entreaty of a divine messenger who asks for divine approval in the accomplishment of his given mission. Again, it is the Johannine understanding of the unique relationship between Jesus and the Father that prompts John to locate the prayer at the end of the farewell discourse.

B. Discipleship and Prayer

Although there is no doubt that John 17.1-26 recalls certain themes which are found in John 13.31–16.33[9] the prayer is prefixed by Jesus' teaching of the disciples on the subject of prayer. This teaching is different from that of

8. Ashton, *Understanding*, pp. 448–52.

9. Recent scholarship which has highlighted these recurring themes includes Stibbe, *John Readings: A New Biblical Commentary* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993, pp. 175–6); Moloney, *Glory not Dishonour*, p. 126); Andreas Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart des Erhöhten: Eine exegetische Studie zu den johanneischen Abschiedsreden (Joh 13,31–16,33) unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihres Relecture-Charakters* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), especially chapters four and five; Christian Dietzfelbinger, *Der Abschied des Kommenden: Eine Auslegung der johanneischen Abschiedsreden* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1997, pp. 357–8); J. L.Boyle, 'The Last Discourse (Jn 13,31 – 16,33) and Prayer (Jn 17): Some Observations on Their Unity and Development', *Bib* 56 (1975), pp. 210–22.

the synoptics in the sense that John does not enumerate the contents of the prayer.[10]

Earlier in chapter 14, the disciples are assured of the answer to 'whatever', ὅ τι ἄν, they ask for, provided the asking is in the name of Jesus (14.13). However, John immediately asserts that the goal of the praying process is not the answer to the petition but the glory of the Father – ἵνα δοξασθῇ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ. Again, this notion of asking 'whatever' is repeated in 15.7, 16 (cf. 16.23, 24) and the granting of the petition is linked with the δόξα of the Father. Thus in the assurance of Jesus to grant the petition of the disciples, it is the glory of the Father which is paramount. This motif of the glory of the Father forms the content of the opening petition of the farewell prayer: 'glorify your Son, in order that the Son may glorify you'. (17.1). While the expression 'whatever' excludes nothing, it is equally valid to assert that what is implied or intended by the 'whatever' in these prayer texts is qualified within the framework of the Father's glory. This is not at all surprising, especially in light of John's presentation of Jesus as the embodiment of the will of the Father. The Son does not seek his own glory, not even in his answer to the petition of his disciples, but the glory of his Father.

However while these passages (14.13, 15.7, 16; 16.23, 24) encourage the disciples to make petition, such prayer is not expected of them until after Jesus has departed from the world. At first impression, 16.24 appears to be an exception. It reads, ἕως ἄρτι οὐκ ᾐτήσατε οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου.

10. Scholars have occasionally called attention to similarities between the prayer in John 17 and the Lord's Prayer of the synoptic Gospels (see Brown, *John XIII–XXI*, p. 747; Dodd, *Historical Tradition in the Fourth Gospel* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963, pp. 333–4]; Graham Smith, 'The Matthean "Additions" to the Lord's Prayer', *ExpTim* 82 [1970], pp. 54–5; W. O. Walker, Jr., 'The Lord's Prayer in Matthew and John', *NTS* 28 [1982], pp. 237–56). While there are striking resemblances of language, the similarities in themes of the two prayers are not as simple as W. O. Walker for instance argues. One example is his equation of the kingdom motif in the Lord's Prayer of Matthew with John's theme of eternal life. There is no doubt that the kingdom and eternal life are related, but from the way the themes are presented in their respective context, they differ in terms of their contents. In Matthew, the kingdom is spatial and futuristic, whereas in John, it is present and existential. It should be said also that the liturgical characteristics of the Lord's Prayer are altogether lacking in the prayer of John 17. Thus the resemblances between these two prayers do not warrant either of the following conclusions: first, that there is a literary dependence between John and the synoptic Gospels; second, that the prayer of John 17 is the Johannine version of the Lord's Prayer of the synoptic Gospels. It is overreaching to assert, as Walker does, that 'the actual language of the High Priestly Prayer can best be understood as a re-working and expansion of the basic themes of the Lord's Prayer in terms of the specifically Johannine theology or, in short, that the High Priestly Prayer represents a type of "midrash" on the Matthean version of the Lord's Prayer'. (See Walker, Jr., 'The Lord's Prayer', p. 238.) John does not have to re-work certain themes of the Lord's Prayer because there is no aspect of the farewell prayer which is not derivative from Johannine themes. Instead of speaking of 're-working', 'similarities' between the two should be sufficient.

Αἰτεῖτε καὶ λήμψεσθε, ἵνα ἡ χαρὰ ὑμῶν ᾖ πεπληρωμένη. As obvious as the nuance of immediacy may appear in this verse, the repeated reference to ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ – 'on that day' – (vv. 23, 26) in the broader context of the verse suggests that the petition by the disciples is expected in the future. The only character whose prayer is found in John is Jesus.

Does it mean that the Johannine believers are *not* a praying community? The Fourth Gospel allows us, on the basis of its repeated emphasis (14.13-14; 15.7, 16; 16.23, 24) on the asking, to infer that the Johannine community is a praying community. While John stresses that the asking must be in the name of the Son and thus make Jesus the 'broker'[11] between the believers and the Father, there is no textual evidence regarding the nature and the content of their asking. In other words, although Johannine Christians are encouraged to make petitions, unlike the Lord's Prayer of the synoptics, the contents and nature of their petitions remain a matter of scholarly conjecture. It is not surprising that Jesus is the only one who prays in John because the Johannine story is about Jesus (21.25) and no one else.

C. Themes of Johannine Petitions

There is a lack of scholarly unanimity on the structural division of the farewell prayer.[12] For instance, Malatesta, because of his interest in the literary structure of the prayer, finds five distinctive parts.[13] Boyle, whose division is representative of many commentators, focuses on the thematic structure and finds three major parts (apart from the introduction of vv. 1-3 and the conclusion of vv. 24-26) which comprises the following: (i) Jesus' recall of his own work, vv. 4-8; (ii) prayer for the disciples, vv. 9-19; (iii) prayer for future believers, vv. 20-23.[14] Brown adopted a threefold division,

11. R. A. Piper, 'Glory, Honor and Patronages in the Fourth Gospel: Understanding the Doxa Given to the Disciples in John 17', in *Social Science Models for Interpreting the Bible: Essays by the Context Group in Honor of Bruce J. Malina* (ed. J. Pilch; BI, 53; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001, pp. 281–309 [297]).

12. For a concise survey of the diverse structural analyses that have been proposed by scholars, see Jürgen Becker, 'Aufbau, Schichtung und theologiegeschichtliche Stellung des Gebetes in Johannes 17', *ZNW* 60 (1969), pp. 56–83 (57–60).

13. The parts include: (i) Jesus' prayer for his glorification and description of eternal life, vv. 1-5; (ii) the beginning of eternal life in the disciples, vv. 6-8; (iii) prayer for the disciples, vv. 9-19; (iv) prayer for future believers, vv. 20-24; (v) conclusion, vv. 25-26. See Malatesta, 'The Literary Structure of John 17', pp. 195–210.

14. J. L. Boyle, 'The Last Discourse (Jn 13,31 – 16,33) and Prayer (Jn 17)', p. 219; cf. Schnackenburg, who based his own division on the linguistic structural analysis of the chapter, see R. Schnackenburg, 'Strukturanalyse von Joh 17', *BZ* 17 (1973), pp. 67–78, pp. 196–202 (70–2). It should be noted that while commentators are united in speaking of the introduction and the conclusion to the prayer, they differ in terms of which verses form those parts. Malatesta identifies 17.1abc as the introduction and vv. 25-26 as the conclusion,

but noted that vv. 6-8 (in which the disciples are mentioned) have been the bone of contention between fourfold and threefold divisions.[15] Do these verses (6-8) exist as a separate unit as C. H. Dodd maintained,[16] or should they be joined to either vv. 1-5 as Boyle has done, or 9-18?[17] Since there is a lack of any petitionary element in vv. 6-8, it is of less significance to engage in the debate here; suffice it to say that the unit is taken in this study as an introduction to the intercessory petition for the disciples and their converts. In other words, verses 6-8 should be read in conjunction with verses 9ff. For the purpose of our interest in the theological themes of the prayer, the following structural analysis proposed by D. F. Tolmie[18] is hereby modified and adopted in this study:

A. Jesus' petition for his own glorification (vv. 1-5)
B. Prayer for the disciples (vv. 6-24)
   i. Jesus' task completed (vv. 6-8)
   ii. Identification of the persons for whom Jesus is praying (vv. 9-11a)
   iii. Petition for the preservation of the disciples (vv. 11b-16)
   iv. Petition for the sanctification of the disciples (vv. 17-19)
   v. Petition for unity (vv. 20-21)
   vi. Petition for glorification (vv. 22-24)
C. Conclusion (vv. 25-26)

While commentators often refer to the prayer in John 17 as 'High-Priestly prayer'[19] or 'prayer of consecration',[20] Barrett finds both of these categorizations inadequate on the basis that none of it has done justice to

whereas from Boyle's thematic perspective, the introduction is made up of vv. 1-3 and the conclusion is vv. 24-26.

15. Brown, *John XIII–XXI*, pp. 749–50.

16. Dodd, *Interpretation*, p. 417.

17. M.-J. Lagrange, *Évangile selon Saint Jean* (Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 2nd ed., 1925, p. 436).

18. D. F. Tolmie, *Jesus' Farewell to the Disciples: John 13:1 – 17:26 in Narratological Perspective* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995, pp. 31–2).

19. This categorization is evident in the titles of the following articles on John 17: S. C. Agourides, 'The "High-Priestly Prayer" of Jesus', *StEv* 4 (1968), pp. 137–143, (137); Johan Ferreira, 'The so-called "high priestly prayer" of John 17 and ecclesiology: the concerns of an early Christian community', in *Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church* (eds P. Allen, R. Canning, and L. Cross; Queensland, Australia: Australian Catholic University, 1998, pp. 15–37).

20. See F. F. Bruce, *The Gospel and Epistles of John*, p. 328. He called it 'prayer of consecration' because it is in the prayer that Jesus consecrates himself for the sacrifice in which he is simultaneously both the priest and the victim. Also, it is a prayer that consecrates the disciples and the subsequent generations of believers.

the full range of materials contained in John 17.[21] In this study, we have adopted Bultmann's designation of 'farewell prayer'[22] (Abschiedsgebet) for the simple reason that the narrative context of the prayer is the farewell discourse.[23]

1. Glorification (17.1-5, 22-24; 12.27-28)

In contrast to the view of the majority of commentators who see Jn 17.1-5 as a prayer of Jesus for himself, Agourides has insisted that the Twelve are the only object of the entire farewell prayer. He called attention to the following phrases in 17.1-5 as references to the disciples: πᾶν ὃ (17.2), αὐτοῖς (17.2), and γινώσκωσιν (17.3). In the section of the prayer where future believers are mentioned (17.20-21), Agourides argued that such reference to future disciples is in relation to the Twelve. 'If this argument is accepted, then the so called High Priestly Prayer will not have three subjects (viz. first, a prayer of Jesus for Himself; secondly, a prayer for His disciples: and thirdly, a prayer for the Church), but one main subject, the petition to the Father for the "twelve".'[24] This position of Agourides does not do justice to John 17, especially vv. 1-5. The references to the disciples which Agourides capitalized upon are secondary because they are mentioned in John's attempt to clarify the glorification which forms the content of Jesus' petition, and this glorification in vv. 1-5 is not about the disciples but Jesus himself.

The opening remark that Jesus looks up to heaven καὶ ἐπάρας τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν[25] (17.1) before making his petition recalls the scene at the raising up of Lazarus in 11.41-42. This gesture of looking up is used in John to convey the union between Jesus and the Father to those who are immediately present in order to inspire faith.[26] In the episode of Lazarus, the audience is identified as the 'crowd' (11.42), and in the context of John 17, it is the 'disciples' (16.29).

That the opening petition recalls the theme of glory is not surprising: Πάτερ, ἐλήλυθεν ἡ ὥρα. δόξασόν σου τὸν υἱόν, ἵνα ὁ υἱὸς δοξάσῃ σέ (17.1). In the previous chapter, we noted that the 'hour' is associated with the suffering and the death of the Son. It is also in the ὥρα that glory resides. However the δόξα

21. Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 417.

22. Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, pp. 486–8.

23. This designation is further supported by the contribution of those scholars who interpreted the prayer mainly in the context of the 'Abschiedsreden' of 13.31–16.33. See for instance Dettwiler, *Die Gegenwart des Erhöhten.*

24. Agourides, '"High-Priestly Prayer"', p. 141.

25. The use of οὐρανός here (cf. 1.51; 12.28), as Schnackenburg rightly puts it, represents 'the transcendent space of God, to which Jesus belongs and with which he is closely connected'. See Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 3; p. 170.

26. Agourides, '"High-Priestly Prayer"', p. 137.

lies not in the winning of human praise, but in doing the will of the Father (12.43 cf. 5.41, 44; 7.18; 8.49, 50, 54). From John's theological perspective, the Son can only be glorified by his unreserved conformity to the will of his Father. When the hour finally arrives for the mission of the Son to be culminated, the petition for glorification of the Son is a Johannine equivalent of 'may the will of the Father be *done* in the Son'.[27] This is hinted at earlier in John 12.27 when the Son's distaste for the ὥρα evoked the petition for an escape: Πάτερ, σῶσόν με ἐκ τῆς ὥρας ταύτης. However, such a petition is immediately dismissed since it is in disagreement with the goal of the ὥρα. The hour with all it entails is made for the Son, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἦλθον εἰς τὴν ὥραν ταύτην.

The inevitability of the hour changes the content of the petition from that of escape to the glorification of the Father: πάτερ, δόξασόν σου τὸ ὄνομα (12.28). By reversing the focus of the petition, John presents the Son as someone who willingly accepts the impending passion. Brown expresses the point cogently when he describes the glorification of the Father's name as 'really a plea that God's plan be carried out'.[28] The immediate response by a voice from heaven (12.28) confirming that the petition for glory is already granted is a Johannine way of echoing the inevitability of the hour from which Jesus seeks an escape.

The second part of this response from heaven, καὶ πάλιν δοξάσω, has been a matter of debate among commentators. There are those who see it as a reference to the imminent experience of the cross.[29] Some commentators such as Thüsing take the aorist clause ἐδόξασα (in the first part of the response) on the one hand as a reference to Jesus' life and the hour of his cross, and the future tense on the other hand as an indication of the glory of the exalted Christ.[30] Other interpreters extend the future tense δοξάσω to the future preaching of the gospel, and 'every fresh triumph of Christian Spirit'.[31] However, in our estimation, the reference to the future glorification at this point in John's story is a prolepsis of the ultimate divine approval that is awaiting the Son in his suffering of the cross. Thus the hour of the Son's agony is the moment that the Father is glorified because it is the design of

27. Bernard, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 2, p. 437; see also C. Morrison who describes the entire farewell prayer as the total dedication of the Son to the will of the Father, Morrison, 'Mission and Ethic', p. 260.

28. Brown, *John I-XII*, p. 475; see also Bernard, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 2, p. 437.

29. See Lindars, *The Gospel of John*, p. 432; Dodd, *Interpretation*, pp. 372–9; Josef Blank, *Krisis: Untersuchungen zur johanneischen Christologie und Eschatologie* (Freiburg: Lambertus Verlag, 1964, pp. 276–80).

30. See Wilhelm Thüsing, *Die Erhöhung und Verherrlichung Jesu im Johannesevangelium* (Münster: Aschendorff, 3rd ed., 1979, pp. 193–8).

31. See Godfrey C. Nicholson, *Death as Departure: The Johannine Descent-Ascent Schema* (SBLD, 63; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983, pp. 129–30); Bernard, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 2, p. 440.

the Father which is being accomplished in the suffering that characterizes the predetermined ὥρα. When Jesus recounts the same petition for glory in 17.1, it is the completion of the mission assigned to him by the Father that is intended. The Father is glorified in return as a result of the Son's conformity to the purpose of the Father.

Instead of taking the glorification of the Son as 'his leaving the earth and returning to the heavenly mode of existence' as Bultmann and others claimed,[32] it should be said that the Johannine language of departure does not necessarily imply 'goodbye' but also 'completion' or 'fulfilment' because the word ὑπάγειν for John denotes not just 'death as departure' but also, as Ashton rightly perceives, 'return from a mission'.[33] The introductory unit (17.1-5) of this farewell prayer reinforces the fact that the glory is accomplished in Jesus' conformity to the will of the Father. It is reiterated in v. 4 that the Son, while on earth, glorified the Father. The manner in which he did that is expressed in the participle τελειώσας 'having fulfilled, completed'. What did the Son fulfil? It is stated as the task (τὸ ἔργον) which the Father assigned (δέδωκάς) for him to perform (ἵνα ποιήσω). Again the use of ἵνα here is purpose, and it is the Son's compliance with his missiological purpose which gives a precise meaning to the participle τελειώσας. Lindars hinted at the completion of the mission of the Son in the petition for glorification in this manner: 'The glorification of Jesus is at once the completion of his mission and the vindication of his obedience even to death. Jesus can make this demand because it accords with the Father's will (12.28). . . . For the Father's glory is revealed in the same act.'[34] Once we grasp the presence of the Son on earth in terms of a divine emissary who is to fulfil a predetermined task, it should be expected that at the completion of the task, the Son deserves the approval of the Father who sends him. The Johannine way of speaking of such approval is δόξα (see 5.30, 41-44).

If the glorification signifies the fulfilment of the divine purpose, what then is the purpose being accomplished in the context of John 17? The completed task is identified as the giving of ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή to those the Father has given to the Son, πᾶν ὃ δέδωκας αὐτῷ (17.2-3).[35] This giving of eternal life is

32. Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, p. 491. Although Bultmann saw more than one meaning in δόξα, for him it also means the 'divine power in action', and 'honour'. See also Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 3, p. 168; Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 421.

33. Ashton, *Understanding*, pp. 448–52.

34. Lindars, *Gospel of John*, p. 518; see also Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 354.

35. Here again, the scope of the mission of the Son is specifically restricted to the 'given ones' (see our discussion in Chapter Four, for the use of the neuter singular ὃ δέ δωκας αὐτῷ as used in πᾶν ὃ δίδωσιν). Although John does not hesitate to declare that the Son has ἐξουσίαν πάσης σαρκός (17.2), the glory of the Son however resides not in the possession of authority over all, but in the exercise of such authority to accomplish his predetermined mission of giving eternal life, not to all as echoed by Moloney, but only to those the Father gave him. See Moloney, *Gospel of John*, pp. 463–4.

explained further in vv. 6-8 as revealing the Father in terms of sharing with the disciples the words from the Father.

Earlier in 6.39-40, the giving of eternal life is identified as the will of God. This eternal life is also described as 'seeing' (θεωρῶν) and 'believing in' (πιστεύων εἰς) the Son. Similarly, in the petition for glorification, ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή is identified as 'knowing' τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν θεὸν καὶ ὃν ἀπέστειλας Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν (17.3).[36] This is an instance of a profound skill of a literary genius. In the prologue, John claims that θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο (1.18). Later in 14.8-12, John re-emphasizes the centrality of the Son to the knowing of the Father in Philip's quest to see the Father. It is here that John makes it apparent that 'knowing' and 'seeing' the Son is the same as 'seeing' the Father (14.9), which is the same as gaining eternal life. By identifying ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή in 17.3 with 'knowing' both God and Jesus Christ, and reasserting in 17.6-8 that the Son has revealed the Father to the disciples, John does not only recapitulate the claim that the Father and the Son are inseparable, but also gives a christological nuance to his interpretation of the will of the Father. Jesus does not only fulfil the will of the Father in his missiological purpose, he also embodies the will of the Father for his disciples. It is in this sense that the following insight of Haenchen becomes paramount: 'God is glorified when Jesus, whom John depicts as the absolutely obedient embodiment of the divine will, gives himself up entirely to the passion: the divine will triumphs in that hour when God, entering fully into the passion, exhibits his love definitively for his own.'[37]

In contrast to our claim that the glorification of the Son lies in his fulfilment of the Father's will, reading the glorification as Jesus' return to his pre-existent status has been dominant in commentaries especially in light of passages such as 17.5, 24.[38] Although there are hints throughout the Gospel

36. This verse (17.3) is widely regarded as an editorial gloss for a variety of reasons: the occurrence of the definite article with the adjective αἰώνιος in speaking of eternal life, a phenomenon that is only found here in the entire Gospel; the phrase 'the only true God' as a late confession of faith and cultic formula (cf. 1 Tim. 1.17; 6.15-16; Rev. 6.10); the ambiguity of the name 'Jesus Christ' on Jesus' lips in the context of this prayer. On the basis of the close parallel between Jn 17.3 and 1 Jn 5.20 in which the latter describes Jesus as ὁ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος, Schnackenburg opines that the parallel could be a signal that the same circle was responsible for both the Gospel and the epistle. See Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, p. 172.

37. Haenchen, *John*, vol. 2; p. 97.

38. It should be acknowledged that John does not impose a unilateral meaning on his use of the noun δόξα and its verbal form. In John 17 alone, Counet observes at least three occasions of contradictions which include 17.1 cf. 17.4; 17.22 cf. 17.24; 17.5 cf. 17.10, 22. However, the contradictions observed by Counet are not about the content of δόξα, but the timing (i.e. the question of when) and the possessor (i.e. who is being glorified) of glory. See Counet, *John, A Postmodern Gospel*, p. 275. Commentators such as W. Walker Jr. have been lured into reading this petition for glorification as a Johannine equivalent of

about the existence of the Father and the Son before the world (1.1-18; 8.56-58; 10.30) the prologue represents the strongest Johannine affirmation of this theological perspective. The reference to the pre-existent δόξα in the sense of Jesus' status as the only-begotten Son of the Father (1.14) is not very helpful since there is a lack of clarity regarding the interpretation of the word μονογενής. One thing that is uncontested however is the unity that characterizes the existence of both the Father and the Son in John. This unity is central in John's theological understanding of the Son to the extent that he makes Jesus the physical presence of the Father. To see the Son is to see the Father (14.9). When John further describes the glory anticipated in the farewell petition as that which the Father and the Son had before the world, what does he mean? Since the Father, on the one hand, is glorified in the Son's fulfilment of his purpose, and the Son, on the other hand, is glorified in the approval that comes from the Father (5.41-44), it is our contention that the force of 17.5 (καὶ νῦν δόξασόν με σύ, πάτερ, παρὰ σεαυτῷ τῇ δόξῃ ᾗ εἶχον πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι παρὰ σοί) lies in clarifying the glory of the Son in terms of the eternal and mutual approval which the Father and the Son share in common. When this is read alongside the claim of Jesus in 17.4 that he has glorified the Father on earth, it becomes apparent that the glory anticipated in this petition is the Father's approval in return, an approval that is won only on the basis of the Son's fulfilment of the will of the Father. However, that the glory is described as πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι in sharp contrast to ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς highlights the transcendent and eternal nature of the approval.[39]

In studying the theme of glorification in the Johannine petition, there is no doubt that John remains consistent in the manner in which he sets out the concept of glory within his framework of determinism. In the petition for glorification, John has one thing in mind, the predetermined hour when the Son's ultimate conformity to the will of the Father is realized.[40] This is to say that the petition for glorification of both the Father and the Son is a plea for the fulfilment of that which is inevitable. The petition is Jesus' own acceptance of the design of the Father who sent him.

the petition for the 'sanctification' of the divine name in the Lord's Prayer of the synoptics. While Walker acknowledges that δοξάζειν and ἁγιάζειν are not identical in meaning, he does not hesitate to say that 'in this context of prayer, the difference is not great'. In the Lord's Prayer, the ἁγιάζειν is in reference to the divine name (a synonym for God himself), whereas in John the δοξάζειν is in reference to the Father and the Son, and somewhat extends to the disciples (17.1, 4, 5, 10, 22, 24). This difference according to Walker is due to Johannine Christology and 'the Fourth Gospel's somewhat "mystical" view of the relationship between the Father, the Son, and the disciples'. (See Walker Jr., 'The Lord's Prayer', p. 240) In light of our reading of the theme of glorification in John, we find Walker's equation of the ἁγιάζειν in the Lord's Prayer with δοξάζειν in John to be too imposing because John's notion of glorification is highly influenced by his theological reflection on the passion, a perspective which is altogether lacking in the Lord's Prayer.

39. Bernard, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 2; p. 563.

40. Morrison, 'Mission and Ethic', p. 266.

2. Protection (17.11-16)

In shifting the focus of the petition from Jesus to others, John makes it clear that Jesus' intercession is exclusively for the 'given ones' (17.9). In the last chapter, we argued that the given ones are those who respond positively to Jesus' message not by their own initiative, but because of God's prior election. Do the petitions for these given ones correlate with, or violate, or undermine the concept of Johannine soteriological determinism? It is the answer to this question which is paramount as we now explore the petitions for the disciples.

As an introduction to this petition, Jesus stresses the fact that his intercession is exclusively for the disciples (17.9-12). He also echoes his own immediate departure from the world as the basis for interceding. It has been part of his task in the world to protect (ἐτήρουν and ἐφύλαξα) the given ones, and this he has done with the exception of Judas alone (17.12). However, since Jesus is no longer in the world, he cannot continue to fulfil the task of keeping them. It is this role which is being committed to the Father in the petition for protection: Πάτερ ἅγιε, τήρησον αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί σου ᾧ δέδωκάς μοι, ἵνα ὦσιν ἓν καθὼς ἡμεῖς (17.11).

The meaning of this petition is better informed by the Shepherd discourse in 10.11-16. John describes the good shepherd as the one who lays down his life for the sake of his sheep, not out of compulsion but sheer willingness. The reason for taking such a maximum risk for the well-being of the sheep lies in the fact that the shepherd owns them (10.12-13). In the arrest scene (18.3-11), Jesus as the good shepherd demonstrates his care for his disciples. While John 18 does not disclose the reason for the involvement of a band of soldiers and police in the arrest of Jesus at an odd hour, the fact that they came with weapons suggests that they were prepared to arrest him at all costs. In what could have become a violent encounter between the emissaries of the chief priests and Jesus' fold, Jesus steps forward (ἐξῆλθεν 18.4) to identify himself so as not to endanger the disciples, and thus spares the two sides the use of weapons.[41] This self-disclosure to the soldiers is significant because it reflects the Johannine understanding of Jesus as the gateway to the sheepfold and also the shepherd who voluntarily lays down his life for his sheep. Although Lindars was right in his caution that 'it is too much to say . . . that Jesus pays for the safety of the disciples with his life' since he is going to his death in

41. The only use of weaponry in the encounter came from a member of Jesus' fold (i. e. Simon Peter), an action which Jesus himself refutes in order not to aggravate an already tense situation. Unlike the synoptics (Lk. 22.50), John leaves no hint on what was done to the damaged ear. It is probable that John is unaware of the healing (Lindars, p. 542), but from the narrative standpoint the action of Peter is more relevant to John because the damaged ear caused by Peter's action becomes a testimony against Peter in his denial of Jesus. It is precisely by the action that the identity of Peter as a disciple lingers in the recollection of Malchus' relatives (18.10 cf. 18.26).

any case,[42] it is also characteristic of the Johannine Jesus to ensure that the disciples remain unharmed, for it is on this basis that he submits himself to the arrest in the garden.

This theme of protection is also brought into a sharper focus in v. 12 where the verb τήρεω is repeated as the antithesis of ἀπόλλυμι. The latter is used to describe the condition of Judas in relation to the rest of the disciples. As already noted in the last chapter, Judas is the only disciple who changes position and identifies himself with the 'other side' and as such decamps from the sheepfold. In light of this, the meaning of ἀπόλλυμι in contrast to τήρεω can simply be stated as 'falling out of the sheepfold'.[43] In the Johannine thought pattern, such a falling-out amounts to nothing other than the fulfilment of scriptural necessity. The petition for τήρεω – 'keeping' – is an entreaty to prevent the disciples from ἀπολοῦμαι – 'falling out of the sheepfold'. This is not different from what Jesus echoes in 10.28[44] where he guarantees the eternal 'keeping' of his τὰ πρόβατα. In essence, the petition for protection is in conformity with Johannine soteriological determinism as explicated in the depiction of the 'given ones'.

In 17.15, the petition for protection is amplified: οὐκ ἐρωτῶ ἵνα ἄρῃς αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου, ἀλλ' ἵνα τηρήσῃς αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ. The latter part – τηρήσῃς αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ – echoes a line of the Lord's Prayer (cf. Mt. 6.13). The protection asked for is qualified as keeping them ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ as the disciples remain in the world. To whom does 'the evil one'[45] refer in John? The word πονηρός and its cognates occur thrice in John (3.19; 7.7; 17.15). In 3.19 it is the works of men that are described as πονηρά because men love darkness more than light. A similar notion is found in 7.7 where the works of ὁ κόσμος are also said to be evil. In essence, evil is associated with οἱ ἄνθρωποι and ὁ κόσμος, and it is also a characteristic of darkness. In John, ὁ κόσμος in its negative connotation is depicted not only as the domain of darkness (3.19; 8.12; 9.5; 12.46), but also as being ruled by the devil (12.31; 14.30; 16.11). Thus by way of implication, ὁ πονηρός is the prince of this world whose works are reflected in the deeds of his subjects,

42. Lindars, *Gospel of John*, p. 542.

43. There are ten occurrences of ἀπόλλυμι in John, it is used five times as an antithesis of possessing life (3.16; 6.27; 10.10, 28; 11.50), four as an antithesis of 'keeping' (6.12, 39; 17.12; 18.9), and only once as a paradox of 'keeping', i.e. losing one's life as a synonym of keeping it for eternal life (12.25). In the use of the term as an antonym for life, it denotes the opposite of what constitutes the will of the Father (i.e. life) for the given ones. The same is also true of its usage in relation to 'keeping', for it is the Father's will to keep his sheep from destruction. Thus, in most occurrences of ἀπόλλυμι in John, it is in sharp contrast to the will of the Father for the sheep.

44. Again the word ἀπόλλυμι is used here with double negation – οὐ μὴ – meaning 'never'.

45. Commentators have long recognized the ambiguity in the reading of τοῦ πονηροῦ simply because the genitive case can denote either the masculine or the neuter gender. However the masculine reading is preferable in the context of our study.

ὁ κόσμος. The petition for the safety of the disciples is a recognition of the danger that the devil and his agents pose in the world. The stance of the disciples in relation to ὁ κόσμος 'is rooted in the relation between Jesus and the world in their mutual confrontation'.[46] Since the reaction of the world to the mission of the disciples is not going to be different from the reaction of the world to Jesus (17.14, 18), the asking of the Father to keep the disciples is an appeal to allow them to fulfil the will of the Father just as Jesus did in the face of worldly hostility. Moreover the repeated emphasis on the distinction between the disciples and the world (see 17.9, 14, 15, 16) is an indication that the 'keeping' can also mean 'preserve them as what they are, a group of men separated from the world as God's own possession'.[47]

The fact that the protection is achievable in the Father's name – ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί σου – is also noteworthy. Does it imply security in the profession of faith in the revelation which the disciples have received as Lindars has suggested?[48] In 17.6 the name of the Father is said to be the revelation to the disciples. The 'name' is the representation of the totality of all that the Son received from the Father to be disclosed to the disciples. Thus the petition for protection may be another way of asking the Father to keep the disciples in accordance with his will which the Son has revealed to them. It is with that same name that the Son has protected the disciples until this moment of his departure (17.12).

The goal of this particular petition is expressed as ἵνα ὦσιν ἓν καθὼς ἡμεῖς (v. 11). A similar expression is also found in v. 22. The frequent occurrence of the ἵνα clause in the petitionary context of the farewell prayer is significant because it explains the reason for reciting the petition. For instance, this petition for protection in the name of the Father (v.11) is for the purpose of unity among the disciples. If the result expected in the petition for protection is the unity of believers, a unity which is similar to that of the Father and the Son, in what way does that unity fit into the Johannine determinism? Although this will be addressed later under our discussion of the petition for unity, our tentative submission here is that the unity is achieved by conformity to τὸ θέλημα of the Father.[49] The relationship between Jesus the good shepherd and his sheep is paralleled to the intimate relationship which exists between Jesus and the Father. Thus the common bond between the Shepherd and the sheep on the one hand, and between Jesus and the Father on the other forms the bedrock of the petition for safety in the Johannine narrative.

46. Boyle, 'Last Discourse and Prayer', p. 214.
47. Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, p. 423.
48. Lindars, *Gospel of John*, p. 542.
49. Bernard, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 2, p. 569.

3. Sanctification (17.17-19)

The verb ἁγιάζειν is not a frequent term in John. Apart from the context of this farewell prayer (17.17, 19), the only occurrence of the verb is in 10.36. In the context of 10.36, it is used in the sense of setting a person apart for a particular divine purpose. In John's use of the verb in relation to Jesus, it is the Father who ἁγιάζει Jesus for his mission to the world. However, the use of the verb in 17.19 makes Jesus the one who sanctifies himself. This usage of the verb with the reflexive pronoun ἐμαυτόν

> is unique in the gospel of John and very rare elsewhere. This, together with the word ὑπὲρ, leaves us in no doubt that Jesus' self-offering in death is meant here. In John, Jesus' free disposal of himself to death – in obedience – is stressed again and again (10:17f; see also 13:27b; 14:4; 18:11; 19:11, 17, 30) and the formulae with ὑπὲρ express this giving of his life done for the benefit of others (6:51; 10:11, 15; 15:13) and in their place (see 11:50-52; 18:14).[50]

Although nothing in the word ἁγιάζειν itself calls for a sacrificial reading[51] apart from the prepositional factor (ὑπὲρ), the fact that John uses the verb with its traditional connotation of setting apart for a divinely appointed task coheres with Jesus' anticipation of the ὥρα, the moment of ultimate conformity to the will of the Father in suffering and in death. In other words, Jesus' use of the verb in relation to himself in 17.19 recapitulates the motif of the divine emissary in 10.36; by sanctifying himself, Jesus reaffirms in a similar language his own conformity to the mission which the Father has appointed for him.

When it comes to the reading of ἁγιάζειν in the petition for the disciples in 17.17, almost all commentators agree on the point that the traditional meaning of setting apart is in focus but not in the same sense in which Jesus is consecrated to death as the usage in v. 19 suggests. The thematic development of the prayer puts the meaning of ἁγιάζειν in this petition in a better perspective. In vv. 6-8, 14, the disciples are depicted as keeping the word, which in essence constitutes the revelation from the Father. On their acceptance of the word, ὁ κόσμος ἐμίσησεν αὐτούς (v. 14). While the aorist tense – ἐμίσησεν – tends to make the hatred as an experience of the past, John uses the aorist as if it were a perfect.[52] This is supported by the fact that the reason for the hatred is expressed in the present tense, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου καθὼς ἐγὼ οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου. The hatred suffered by the disciples began in the past and extends to the present as the disciples are

50. Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 3; p. 187.

51. Haenchen puts the same point differently in these words: '"To sanctify" (ἁγιάζειν) is used as a technical term of sacrificial discourse, although the author is not thinking of Jesus' death as a sacrifice or a surrogate. Yet the Evangelist has to use such expressions in order to make it clear, at some risk, that the meaning intended is veiled.' See Haenchen, *John*, vol. 2; p. 155.

52. Bernard, *Gospel According to John*, vol. 2; p. 572.

disassociated with the world. The hatred is generated because the word is not of the world but of the Father. Those who belong to the world reject not only the word but also those who receive the word. Thus the revelation (i.e. the word) that Jesus embodies forms the bedrock of the separation between the world and the disciples.[53] Since the notion of ἁγιάζειν is to set apart for God, one of the ways by which the disciples are sanctified in Johannine theology is by accepting the revelation that Jesus discloses, and this is exactly what the disciples have done (17.6, 14). In contrast to Jesus, the petition does not ask for the sanctification of the disciples by themselves, but by the Father. It seems that in the Johannine thought pattern, sanctification is an act of the Father rather than human activity. Just as Jesus is sanctified first by the Father (10.36) before sanctifying himself for the imminent passion (17.19), so also do the disciples need to be sanctified first by the Father before they can sanctify themselves for their mission in the world.

The fact that the sanctification requested for the disciples is ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ is crucial because there is only one medium of truth in John – the Son whom the Father sent – and the truth is encoded in the words which the Son received from the Father – ὁ λόγος ὁ σὸς ἀλήθειά ἐστιν. Brown puts it thus:

> We must remember that in Johannine theology Jesus is both the Word and the truth (xiv 6), so that consecration in truth that is the word of God is simply an aspect of belonging to Jesus (and, of course, belonging to Jesus is belonging to God [xvii 10] who is holy). The disciples have accepted and kept the word that Jesus brought them from God (xvii 6, 14); this word has cleansed them (xv 3); now it sets them aside for a mission of conveying it to others (xvii 20).[54]

If it is granted that the phrase ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ is a parallel of ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι in vv. 11, 12 as commentators such as Bultmann, Schnackenburg and others affirm, it follows therefore that whatever kind of dative one is, so also is the other. This is to say that if the reading of ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι is a locative rather than an instrumental dative, so also is ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.[55] This local

53. Bultmann made a similar observation although from a different perspective when he noted that 'the fact that the world's hatred is due to the community's becoming (through the word) the eschatological dimension in which the world is annulled, means that this very hatred is the criterion for the community as to whether it does in fact no longer belong to the world, as Jesus does not belong to it'. Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, p. 507.

54. Brown, *John XIII-XXI*, p. 765.

55. While it is possible to read the preposition ἐν instrumentally, the emphasis of the mid-section of the farewell discourse on 'abiding' – μένειν – makes us incline to its function as locative. Bultmann, in his comment on the phrase ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι in vv. 11, 12, played down any difference between the instrumental and locative reading: 'It is easiest to take ἐν instrumentally; but it could also be understood as an ἐν of place, because it is in fact the same, whether the protection takes place through the power or in the sphere of the ὄνομα; in the latter case as well. The name would be understood as the protecting power.' See Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, p. 503 note 2.

interpretation implies that the sanctification of the disciples anticipated in this petition is realized in their continuation within the scope of the revelation they have been given by the Son. Bultmann summed up this point when he affirmed that holiness (i.e. Bultmann's term for sanctification) 'is therefore nothing permanent, like an inherited possession: holiness is only possible for the community by the continual realisation of its world-annulling way of life, i.e. by continual reference to the word that calls it out of the world, and to the truth that sets it free from the world'.[56] This reading correlates with the Johannine call to abide as echoed in chapter 15.

Since it is characteristic of Johannine commissioning to include sanctification,[57] it is beyond doubt that the goal of the sanctification petitioned for the disciples is to set them on course for their mission in the world. This is apparent in v. 18: καθὼς ἐμὲ ἀπέστειλας εἰς τὸν κόσμον, κἀγὼ ἀπέστειλα αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν κόσμον. Just as the Son is the Father's medium of revelation to the world, similarly the disciples become the medium by which that revelation is transmitted in (and to) the world from which the Son will soon depart. It is as a prelude to the disciples' fulfilment of their assigned mission εἰς τὸν κόσμον that the petition for sanctification finds its relevance in the Fourth Gospel. The petition does not anticipate a particular change but reaffirms that which the disciples have already done, accepting and keeping the word from the Father. The disciples have been able to accept and keep the word, not by their own initiative but because of their predestination by the Father. It is evident from this petition that the Father does not give certain people (i.e. the disciples) to Jesus arbitrarily but for a purpose: to become the embodiment of divine revelation just as Jesus does in the world.

4. Unity (17.20-23)

In the petition for unity, some scholars have interpreted the unity as a reference to eucharistic union. Walker for instance in his exposition on unity in John 17 writes,

> Clearly the language here is eucharistic language, the idea being that it is in the Eucharist that the oneness of the disciple with the Son and thus, by implication, with other disciples is realized and, along with this oneness, eternal life. It is these themes of eucharistic oneness and eternal life that are then picked up and developed in the High Priestly Prayer, when Jesus prays to the Father 'that they all may be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us' (verse 21; cf. verses 11, 22-23, and 26) and speaks of giving eternal life to all those whom the Father has given him (verses 2 and 3).[58]

56. Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, p. 509.

57. This is supported by the use of ἁγιάζειν in relation to the sending of the Son – ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον – in 10.36, and in the context of the anticipation of the ὥρα in 17.19.

58. Walker Jr., 'The Lord's Prayer', pp. 244–5.

While this reading may not be strange to the Johannine world-view, it is highly doubtful that the union intended in John 17 is eucharistic unity. Walker's attempt to harmonize John's farewell prayer with the Lord's Prayer of the synoptic Gospels has led him to develop a highly mystical concept of unity. Although scholars have drawn attention to the parallels between John 17 and the eucharistic prayer of the *Didache* (chs 9, 10),[59] the fact of the matter is that, as Agourides rightly observed, the similarities are remote.[60] The best we can make of the parallels is well summed up by Brown:

> The theme of unity in John xvii is a theme often associated with the Eucharist, but one must admit that such a reference to the Eucharist is far less obvious than what we found in John vi 51-58. And so we would qualify that eucharistic interpretation of the prayer in xvii as no more than possible. The thesis of the liturgical usage of xvii as a hymn is also possible, but this thesis can play no great part in our interpretation of the thought of the chapter.[61]

On the other hand, a careful reading of John offers a non-mystical reading of unity that is consistent with the Johannine world-view. According to John, the ideal model of unity is the kind of oneness which exists between the Father and the Son,[62] and the unity is expressed in terms of common will, θέλημα. While there is a distinction between the Father and the Son, there is no difference in the will of the two.[63] However, it is τὸ θέλημα of the Father which determines the actions of the Son and not vice versa. Thus the unity of the disciples lies in the fact that their activities in the world are not only guided by but also in conformity with τὸ θέλημα of the Father whom the Son has revealed. In light of John's emphasis on the theme of unity as embodied by the Father and the Son, the sense of unity anticipated in this petition, as Clinton D. Morrison puts it, 'is no pantheistic or mystical homogenization;

59. The following parallels are often cited by scholars: the theme of glory (Jn 17.1, 5, 22 cf. *Didache* 9.2, 3, 4; 10.2, 4, 5); addressing the Father as Πάτερ ἅγιε (Jn 17.11 cf. *Didache* 10.2); the petition for deliverance from evil (Jn 17.15 cf. *Didache* 10.5). However, despite these parallels, '*Didache* ix-x mentions the eucharistic bread and wine, while John xvii does not'. See Brown, *John XIII-XXI*, p. 747.

60. Agourides, '"High-Priestly Prayer"', p. 142.

61. Brown, *John XII-XXI*, p. 747.

62. Boyle captures this point quite well when he notes that in the first half of the farewell discourse of 13.31–15.10, there is a development of 'the theme of the nature of the unique covenant union between Jesus and his disciples, a union grounded in the union between Jesus and the Father'. See Boyle, 'Last Discourse and Prayer', p. 211.

63. T. E. Pollard, in his argument against the existence of one church in the sense of one all-inclusive organization, pointed out that the idea of unity in John is best informed by the reference between the Father and the Son especially in 10.30 – a unity which recognizes the distinction between the two but oneness in terms of purpose and mission. T. E. Pollard, '"That They All May be One" (John xvii 21) and the Unity of the Church', *ExpTim* 70 (1958–59), pp. 149–50.

it is a unity of mission'.[64] For it is in the mission of the immediate disciples and the continuation of subsequent generations of Johannine believers in that same mission that unity resides. Again the mission is revealing to the world the will of the Father as embodied by the Son (17.21, 23). This τὸ θέλημα does not change, and it is the Johannine distinctive mark of unity among the disciples both present and future.

D. Function of Johannine Farewell Petitions

Previous scholarship[65] on the motif of farewell types in biblical, extra-biblical and Graeco-Roman literature has identified certain functions, some of which are relevant to the farewell prayer of John 17. In his review of such scholarly works, Segovia identified at least five functions: didactic, consolatory, exhortative, admonitory and polemical.[66] Whilst all these five functions may fit well in the broader context of the Johannine farewell discourse (chs 13–17), only two are noteworthy in the prayer section of the farewell.

First, the function of the prayer within the broader context of John's narrative is didactic. It is a summary of some of the themes articulated throughout the Gospel but more especially the themes of the farewell discourse. Such themes include glorification, predestination and unity. As an introduction to his prayer for the disciples, Jesus summarizes his mission in the world as making the Father's name known τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (17.6). But the 'people' intended are further defined as οὓς ἔδωκάς μοι ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου and by so doing John recalls the motif of predestination which has been articulated in a variety of ways in the Gospel.

Second, the prayer is polemical. This polemic function is present as the disciples are sharply differentiated from the world at large. While they are in the world, ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, they are not of the world, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου. By drawing a distinction between the disciples and the world, the prayer assures the disciples of their continued association with the Son and the Father rather than the world which is linked with Satan, the prince of the world.

Thus within the framework of John, the farewell prayer recapitulates the mission of the Son on earth and its implications for the disciples in their relationship with the Father on the one hand, and the world on the other.

64. Morrison, 'Mission and Ethic', p. 264.

65. Such works include W. S. Kurz, 'Luke 22:14-38 and Greco-Roman and Biblical Farewell Addresses', *JBL* 104 (1985), pp. 251–68; H.-J. Michel, *Die Abschiedsrede des Paulus an die Kirche Apg 20:17-38: Motivgeschichte und theologische Bedeutung* (SANT, 35; Munich: Kösel, 1973); E. Stauffer, 'Abschiedsreden', *RAC* 1 (1950), pp. 29–35; J. Munck, 'Discours d'adieu dans le Nouveau Testament et dans la littérature biblique', in *Aux sources de la tradition chrétienne: Mélanges offerts à M. Maurice Goguel, Bibliothèque théologique* (Neuchâtel and Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1950, pp. 155–70).

66. Segovia, *Farewell of the Word*, p. 19.

The prayer recognizes the predestinarian perspective adopted in the narrative and formulates its petition in accordance with this theological framework. Apart from Jesus' prayer for himself, the farewell petition is exclusively for the 'given ones' and it takes into account the condition of these given ones in the world. The petition is a plea for the continuation of what Jesus has done until now (17.12).

E. Summary

Are the petitions in the Fourth Gospel consistent with its perspective on determinism? The answer is an emphatic yes. In the first place, the petition is exclusively on behalf of the 'given ones' of the Johannine story. Second, it does not ask the Father to grant anything, either for Jesus himself or his disciples, other than that which is the will of the Father as embodied by the Son. Thus the petitions are in harmony with the purpose of the Father for both Jesus and the disciples. This purpose of the Father forms the hallmark of Johannine determinism in that the will of the Father cannot be altered, not even by the petitions of his chosen ones, rather his 'given ones' must make their petitions in conformity with his τὸ θέλημα.

Chapter 6

THE *RULE* AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The relationship between the Fourth Gospel and the Dead Sea Scrolls has been a matter of scholarly interest since the discoveries of the Scrolls in the latter half of the last century. As early as 1950, K. G. Kuhn was convinced that there was a relationship between the two. For Kuhn, the far-reaching dualism in the Fourth Gospel shares the same basic structure with that of the Dead Sea Scrolls. This chapter compares the *Rule* and John on the theme of determinism and petition, and highlights the implication of this monograph on the relationship between John and the Scrolls.

A. What is the Relationship?

In his monumental commentary on the Fourth Gospel, Brown drew attention to certain striking features that the Gospel has in common with the Scrolls. They include the following: (i) the dualistic mode of thought and language; (ii) the ideal of love of one's brother within the community. While these parallels exist in John and Qumran, as Brown asserts, they are not sufficiently close 'to suggest a direct literary dependence of John upon the Qumran literature, but they do suggest Johannine familiarity with the type of thought exhibited in the scrolls'.[1] Thus, for certain features of John's thought and vocabulary, the Dead Sea Scrolls are indispensable because the Qumran texts offer 'a closer parallel than any other contemporary or earlier non-Christian literature either in Judaism or in the Hellenistic world'.[2] From Brown's perspective, one can study John and the Scrolls together for the sake of the thought patterns and vocabularies which one encounters on the pages of the two documents.

A similar point of view was put forward by Charlesworth in his essay comparing the dualism of John and 1QS. Charlesworth rejects any attempt to trace John's dualism to rabbinical thought because 'the rabbinical literature was not compiled until after the Gospel'.[3] He also shies away from the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs* as the background to the Johannine dualism because

1. Brown, *John I-XII*, p. lxiii.
2. Brown, *John I-XII*, pp. lxiii–lxiv.
3. Charlesworth, 'Critical Comparison', pp. 76–106 (96).

'we must first allow for the possible redaction of post-Johannine Christians'.[4] He plays down the Ethiopic book of *Enoch* as inadequate for understanding John because chs 37–71 of the book of *Enoch* could have come from a Jewish Christian author of the second century AD. Charlesworth agrees with those scholars who concluded that 'both John and Qumran were influenced . . . by the dualism in earlier Jewish writings'.[5] However, after a careful analysis of the dualism in 1QS and John, Charlesworth posits that the dualistic opposition between light and darkness for instance 'is not something each developed independently but rather something that betokens John's dependence on the Rule'.[6] It is in light of this dependence that Charlesworth concludes that 'John probably borrowed some of his dualistic terminology and mythology from 1QS 3.13–4.26.'[7] While the similarities of terminology and ideology are not close enough or numerous enough to prove that John directly copied from 1QS, the closeness is sufficient to conclude that the two documents evolved out of the same milieu. Charlesworth reasserts his position in these words: 'John may not have copied from 1QS but he was strongly influenced by the expressions and terminology of 1QS.'[8] Again from Charlesworth's point of view, the best way to understand the dualism of John is to study it in light of the Qumranian dualism.

John Ashton accused Charlesworth and Brown of 'settling somewhat timidly' in their answers to the question of relationship between John and the Scrolls. In response to Charlesworth's proposal for instance, Ashton poses some crucial questions: 'For what kind of borrowing is he thinking of? Does he picture John visiting the Qumran Library, as Brown calls it, and taking the *Community Rule* out of the repository, scrolling through it, taking notes perhaps, and then making use of its ideas when he came to compose his own work?'[9] From Ashton's standpoint, the theories of literary indebtedness of Charlesworth and that of Brown's indirect influence cannot account for the striking similarities between John and Qumran.

As an alternative proposal, Ashton insists that 'The pervasive and deep-lying dualistic structures so finely perceived by Kuhn are scarcely to be accounted for by the suggestion that the evangelist was a disciple of John the Baptist, unless the latter was himself so deeply soaked in Qumranian ideas as to be virtually indistinguishable from one of the Community's own teachers.'[10] The evangelist's receptivity to the Qumranian ideas can only be accounted for in this way: 'Just as Paul's underlying convictions concerning the provident dispensations of a beneficent deity remained unaltered when he

4. Charlesworth, 'Critical Comparison', p. 96.

5. These scholars include F. Nötscher, J. van der Ploeg, H. J. Schonfield and O. Böcher. See Charlesworth, 'Critical Comparison', p. 97.

6. Charlesworth, 'Critical Comparison', p. 101.

7. Charlesworth, 'Critical Comparison', p. 104.

8. Charlesworth, 'Critical Comparison', p. 103.

9. Ashton, *Understanding*, pp. 236–7.

10. Ashton, *Understanding*, p. 235.

became a Christian, so, I believe, the author of the Fourth Gospel retained the pattern of thinking with which he was probably familiar from an early age, maybe from childhood.'[11] What is implied in this assertion is the fact that the author of the Fourth Gospel was a Christian convert from Qumranian faith. Hence the Gospel of John is a product of an author who used to be a member of the Qumran Community. However, just as his Qumranian belief has been given a christological significance, so also is his Christian ideology coloured by the Qumranian dualistic pattern. By Ashton's theory of direct influence, John and the Scrolls can be studied together because of their direct relationship, a relationship mediated by the author of the Fourth Gospel.

All the scholars reviewed thus far have recognized some points of relationship between John and the *Rule of the Community*. However, the disunity among them revolves around what to make of the relationship. Do the similarities imply indirect influence as articulated by Brown or direct influence as represented in Ashton, or even the literary indebtedness theory of Charlesworth? In contrast to the position of these scholars, Richard Bauckham recently argued that the similarities between John and Qumran, especially the dualistic pattern of light and darkness, do not amount to a case for any influence or for any particular historical connection between John and Qumran.[12] According to Bauckham, the contrast of light and darkness stands as 'the most obvious of dualisms observable in the natural world, and has therefore acquired the metaphorical meanings of knowledge and ignorance, truth and error, good and evil, life and death, in most (perhaps all) cultural traditions'.[13] To put it differently, there is nothing unique in the Johannine and Qumranian use of the dualism of light and darkness because it is a widely known metaphorical symbolism in every culture. Bauckham further asserts that the dualism of light and darkness occurs 'relatively often in the Hebrew Bible and in Second Temple Jewish literature, and so were readily available in the Jewish tradition to the authors of both the Qumran texts and Johannine literature'.[14] Consequently, it should not be surprising to find two authors[15]

11. Ashton, *Understanding*, p. 236.

12. Richard Bauckham, 'Qumran and the Fourth Gospel: Is There a Connection?', in *The Scrolls and the Scriptures: Qumran Fifty Years After* (eds Stanley E. Porter and Craig E. Evans; JSPSup, 26, Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997, pp. 267–79).

13. Bauckham, 'Qumran and the Fourth Gospel', p. 269.

14. Bauckham, 'Qumran and the Fourth Gospel', p. 269.

15. However Bauckham spells out some noteworthy differences in the use of light and darkness imagery between the Fourth Gospel and Qumran texts (see pp. 272–5). The different usage of the dualism in the two texts only reinforces Bauckham's assertion that it does not amount to influence: 'The particular development of this symbolism in each case diverges widely. Characteristic terminology, dominant imagery and theological significance all differ to such an extent as to make the influence of Qumran on the Fourth Gospel unlikely.' (p. 275)

from the same cultural milieu independently developing imagery from their Jewish heritage more extensively than most other Jewish texts do.[16]

While Bauckham disagrees with Brown, Charlesworth and Ashton on their focus on the influence of Qumran on the Fourth Gospel, he does not dismiss the claim that there are similarities. However, he insists that the commonality of the dualism of light and darkness in John and Qumran goes back to common Jewish tradition and therefore does not constitute sufficient grounds upon which one can establish the dependence of John on Qumran.

B. Comparison of John and the *Rule*

One of the implications of this monograph is its contribution in the context of John and the Dead Sea Scrolls debate. In order to gain a better understanding of this study in the context of the debate, a comparison of 1QS and John in their articulations of determinism and petition will be helpful.

They both perceive that the will of God is permanently fixed and unalterable. In our discussion of soteriological determinism in the *Rule*, we noted that the will of God resides in the revelation given to Moses and the prophets. This revelation gains its enduring credence not because it came through Moses and the prophets, but because it contains that which is eternally 'good' and 'right' before God. The task of each generation is not to 'invent' the will of God but to 'discover' it, and this, according to our study, explains to some extent the understanding of 'study as worship' in the communal life of the Community.

Speaking of the will of God in John, it is described as eternal life (Jn 6.39-40; 17.2-3). Eternal life is fixed exclusively and permanently in the Son. It is comprehensively understood as God's redemptive mission. There is a salvific nuance to this will of God both in 1QS and in John. Salvation is guaranteed only in the will of God. According to the *Rule*, the observance of God's will means that the visitation of the Community members will be 'healing and great peace in a long life, multiplication of progeny together with all everlasting blessings, endless joy in everlasting life, and a crown of glory together with resplendent attire in eternal light' (4.6c-8). John expresses the same in different words: 'And this is the will of him who sent me, that I should lose nothing of all that he has given me, but raise it up on the last day. This is indeed the will of my Father, that all who see the Son and believe in him may have eternal life; and I will raise them up on the last day.' (6.39-40)

While the two texts agree on the permanence of the will of God, they differ on their perception of where that divine will resides. In 1QS, the will of God, רצון אל, is found in the Torah and the prophets. There is no truth about God which is not encoded in Scripture. In contrast, from the Johannine perspective the will of the Father is exclusively christological. John does not reject Scripture, rather he sees the Son as the new Moses in whom the will of

16. Bauckham's emphasis on Johannine indebtedness to the Hebrew Bible in the use of light/darkness and parallels in Second Temple Jewish literature are outlined in pp. 275–9.

God dwells (Jn 3.14; 5.45-47; 6.32; 7.19-23). Instead of searching Scripture to discover the will of God as the Qumranites did, John stresses the point that one needs to believe the words of the Son who himself is the embodiment of τὸ θέλημα of the Father. Unlike 1QS where the will of God is appropriated by the doing of the Torah, according to John, it is appropriated by believing in the Son that the Father has sent. The fact that 1QS emphasizes human action is consistent with its focus on the permanence of the two spirits and the deeds allotted to each of them. It is the spirits and the deeds in their domain which are determined. Human beings belong in the domain of either light or darkness by their choice of actions, and not by prior allotment of people into the domain of truth and deceit. On the other hand, in John, the human act of believing is a predetermined decision of the Father in the prior election of the given ones. In other words, it is the relation of human beings to the Son that is predetermined and re-enacted in the disciples' response of believing.

The determinism in the *Rule* and John is theocentric in that God is the one who sets the course of a given event. In 1QS, it is the 'God of Knowledge' who arranges the order of the world, and sets its course in motion. He does not only set the order in motion, he guides its course to conform to his design. The same God establishes vice and virtue upon the spirits of deceit and truth respectively and also sustains the eternal distinction between the two spirits. Similarly in John it is the Father who determines those who believe by his prior election of the 'given ones'. He guides the given ones to the Son by drawing them (6.44). The Father is also responsible for defining the mission of the Son in the world. While the terminology is not exactly alike, there is no difference in the function of the 'God of Knowledge' and the 'Father' in the Scrolls and John respectively. Both terminologies refer to God who is called 'Yahweh' in biblical tradition. It should be noted however that this theocentric perspective in both 1QS and John could be accounted for on the basis of the influence of a common heritage, the creation narrative of the biblical tradition.

In spite of the commonality of theocentric focus, there is dissimilarity between John and 1QS on what God has determined. In the *Rule*, it is the cosmic order that God predetermined, whereas in John, it is the human being that God predestined. The *Rule* focuses on the dynamics at work in creation. It identifies God as the source of every occurrence, and the one who sustains the orderly arrangement of the world. While the *Rule* sees determinism at work in everything, כול, it gives detailed attention only to that aspect of creation (i.e. the two spirits and the deeds in their domains) which has a direct bearing on the actions of human beings. John, on the other hand, gives attention to people. Its determinism is focused on the election of certain people for the Son. Even when it speaks of the determinism of certain occurrences, it is in relation to the mission of the Son. Thus we can speak of Johannine determinism in this manner: human beings are predestined and the mission of the Son is predetermined. However, in speaking of human predestination in John, we must bear in mind that the predestination is not dualistic because it is focused exclusively on the given ones.

The perspectives of 1QS and John on petitionary prayers in the context of determinism are similar. They both explore petitionary prayer not as a means of rejecting the status quo of a deterministic framework, but as a medium of precipitating its fulfilment. Petitions are composed in compliance with the orderly arrangement set forth by God. Unlike the narrative prayers of the Bible which are informed by circumstances, the petitions of 1QS and John are much more informed by ideology. In 1QS for instance, the recitation of confession (which is altogether lacking in John) as a prerequisite for entering into the Community is warranted by the perspective of the text in regarding membership in the Community as belonging in the domain of the spirit of truth. Those who were once outside and wishing to enter must renounce their previous 'walk' which amounts to being in the domain of the spirit of deceit so as to gain admission into the covenant Community. In other words, the confession stands as the gateway between those within and outside of the Community. This is an ideological issue and not a circumstantial one.

In 1QS, the petitions are recited by all with the leading of the Levites and the priests, the only exception is the blessings and imprecatory petitions which are invoked upon people by only the priests and Levites. On the contrary, in John, the petition is recited by Jesus who is the main character of John, and no one else. While the disciples are encouraged to pray, there is no nuance of immediacy in their call to make petition. Moreover, in addressing their petition to the Father, it must be in the name of the Son. Thus for John, there is a christological nuance to the disciples' petition. However, in both John and 1QS the petitions are composed in such a manner that they do no violence to their respective deterministic construct.

The function of the determinism in both 1QS and John is polemical. In the *Rule*, the determinism of the two spirits serves as a medium by which the members in the Community emerge as objects of the eternal love of God. This is worked out in the categorization of their deeds into the domain of the spirit of truth. It is this spirit and its ethical properties that the Lord loves forever, and thus makes the covenanters who embrace its deeds the recipients of that eternal love. In relation to those who are outside, only the members in the Community are true Israelites, the beloved of God. In a similar manner, it is in the motif of determinism that John draws the line between the world and the disciples. John traces the origin of the Johannine believers back to God by stressing that the Father himself gives them to Jesus. The hostility which confronts the disciples in the form of hatred by the world and banishment from the synagogue is inescapable because of their link with the ἄνω, 'above'. The reluctance of 'the Jews' to accept the revelation of the Johannine Jesus amounts to nothing other than the fact that they are of the κάτω, 'below'.

C. New Perspective

In the context of the John and 1QS debate, our study has shown that the similarity can be explained not just in terms of direct or indirect influence

or literary indebtedness, not even simply in terms of a common Jewish heritage. The similarity, as evident in our study of determinism and prayer, is warranted by a similar social concern which each text attempts to address. Both John and the *Rule* employ especially the theme of determinism to make an exclusive claim of divine origin for their respective community. Although scholars such as Brown, Ashton and Charlesworth are commendable for their insights to the debate, the comparison of John and the *Rule* needs to go beyond surface similarity to a deeper conceptual framework of the two texts. To make a claim of similarity on the basis of common terminology, symbolism and dualism is not enough, the claim must take into account how each text employs the terminology, symbolism and dualism in its conceptual framework. Holding a deterministic world-view in the Second Temple period was not peculiar to one particular group, because the concept was already present in the biblical tradition. Each group developed its own theology as it interacted with the biblical tradition to find legitimacy for its own distinctive identity in relation to others.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

It has been the primary goal of this study to explore the theme of determinism as articulated in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Fourth Gospel, and to discover the place of petitionary prayer within the framework of the determinism of each book. Our approach has been predominantly from a literary standpoint, by which we mean how a given text explores the theme of determinism and petitionary prayer within the scope of its literary framework as a unified whole. In the light of our investigation, we can state without hesitation that petitionary prayers within the framework of the determinism in our studied texts do not anticipate a change but ask for the fulfilment of that which is already predetermined. To put it differently, the petitions do not violate the determinism but reaffirm it.

In Chapter One, we set out the background against which the themes of determinism and petition in 1QS and John should be understood. It was noted that determinism assumes an unalterable view of events. Although the creation account of Genesis depicts God as creator and the one who sets the course of cosmic order, the biblical notion of determinism is not as rigid as that encountered in the apocalyptic writings of Second Temple Judaism. On the other hand, petition plays a crucial role in biblical tradition. It is rendered in expectation of a change in the particular circumstances that prompt the petition. In making petition, various terms are employed, and this kind of human communication with God takes on specific patterns (such as praise, confession, blessing etc.) that formed the media used by later generations to express their need of God in different circumstances. The change expected in petition ranges from cosmic events as in the case of Sodom and Gomorrah to an individual's need, as in Isaac's prayer for a child. Petition can also anticipate change in the state of one's relationship with God as in the prayer form of confession. Thus in biblical tradition, petitionary prayer is concerned with change.

In our discussion of determinism in the *Rule*, we discovered that the determinism is cosmological, soteriological and eschatological. The cosmological determinism is about the orderly arrangement of the world by God. He does not only create everything, כול, but sets and sustains its course to its expected goal, and this arrangement is unalterable. However, it is the determinism of the two spirits and their relationship to human beings

that is given prominent attention. In 1QS, the determinism is not about human beings but the two spirits that embody the actions which human beings perform. Soteriological determinism emphasizes the permanence of the divine will – רצון אל – as revealed in the Scriptures. In spite of changing generations, God's will for all remains constant, and the task for each successive generation is to discover (not invent) הטוב –'what is good' – and הישר – 'what is right' – from Moses and the prophets. In this unchanging will of God lies the way of salvation for the members of the Qumran Community. Eschatological determinism is concerned with the appointed time set by God when the era of Belial is terminated and the reign of truth is established.

Chapter Three explored the petitionary prayers of the *Rule*; the petitions take the form of confession, blessings and curses. The chapter demonstrated that the contents of the petitions are in harmony with the theme of determinism articulated in 1QS. This is evident for instance in the fact that the language of the prayer of confession correlates with the language of determinism adopted in the text. The confession is also relevant in the context of 1QS determinism because it shows that, rather than God changing his decrees, it is human beings who need to change their 'walk' by their confession in order to relocate themselves within the framework of the will of God. Moreover, there is nothing anticipated in the petitionary blessings and curses which is not a natural consequence of belonging in the domain of either the spirit of truth or the spirit of deceit. In other words, the petitions are human pleas to the God of Knowledge, asking him to act in accordance with his unchanging purpose and design in the world. Thus the result anticipated in each petition is granted accordingly only by aligning oneself into the appropriate domain within the framework of 1QS determinism.

In our study of the Fourth Gospel, Chapter Four demonstrated that the determinism in John is concerned with the predestination of certain people who are designated as 'the given ones' of the Father. The responses of believing and disbelieving by Johannine narrative characters are explained as due to the outworking of the Father's prior election on the one hand, and the outworking of the necessity of Scripture on the other. In spite of this explanation, the predestination in John is mono-focus in that it is exclusively concerned with the 'given ones'. It is these given ones whose eternal safety is guaranteed by the Son. Although the character of Judas casts doubt on the permanence of the predestination of the given ones, his case is unique in that his falling out of the sheepfold is also due to the outworking of the necessity of Scripture. Another aspect of the determinism of the Fourth Gospel is with regard to the mission of the Son. He came into the world to fulfil the specific task assigned to him by the Father. His 'hour' was set by the Father, and whatever he did was determined by the unchanging will of the Father, and the necessity of Scripture.

The petitions in the Fourth Gospel are shaped by the determinism articulated in the text. The petitions are meant exclusively for the given ones. And the contents of the petitions seek to preserve the structure of the determinism. By

asking for the protection of the given ones and their oneness in the world, the anticipation is that they should remain who they are: maintaining their distinctiveness as the elect of the Father and not falling out of the sheepfold like Judas did. Again it is characteristic of Johannine predestination that none among the given ones will perish, not because they are being prayed for but because the Father has determined it so. Thus the petition for protection is a plea to God to fulfil that which he has decreed. The same point is also true of the petition for glorification. In making the glorification of the Son a petitionary issue, John turns that which is a predetermined task of the Son into an object of expectation, and by so doing demonstrates that the relevance of petition in the framework of determinism is not to anticipate a change but to ask for the fulfilment of that which is already predetermined. This is made explicit in the petition in Jn 12.27. The petition for sanctification confirms the divine purpose for the disciples, and sets them on course to fulfil the task for which they are given to the Son: to become the embodiment of divine revelation just as Jesus does in the world.

In a study of this nature, a comparison of the two texts under investigation is inevitable. Although the primary goal of this study is not a comparison of John and the *Rule*, Chapter Six sums up the similarities and the differences between John and the *Rule* in their expression of determinism and petitions. The significance of the comparison in the context of the ongoing debate on the relationship between John and the Scrolls is also highlighted.

It needs to be said, however, that this study does not presume the absence of tensions in the concept of determinism articulated in each of our studied texts. As we have noted in the appropriate sections of our enquiry, there are passages in the texts which are not easily harmonized with the concept of determinism. In the *Rule*, the tension is evident in the ambiguity of the text as to how human beings participate in the two spirits. Does God determine the level of an individual's participation in the two spirits? Or is the level of an individual's participation in each of the spirits left to the discretion of the individual? While the latter position is adopted in our study, further investigation along these lines is still required for a more precise understanding of the relationship of the two spirits with human beings.

Another ambiguity which our study has highlighted is the character of Judas. The character is not easily harmonized with the determinism in John. If the disciples are the 'given ones', none of whom is destined to perish according to John, why is Judas (who is described as a 'devil' and 'the son of perdition') included in that category of people? While we have attempted to make sense of the election of Judas as a disciple within the Johannine determinism, there can be no doubt that further exegesis with a different ideological interest in John may offer more insights on his inclusion in the 'given ones'.

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